All Items
Permanent URI for this collection
Browse
Recent Submissions
Item Open Access Partisan Politics and the Road to Plutocracy(2025) Fix, BlairAs billionaires dance in the halls of the second Trump administration, it’s haunting how well Plutarch’s two-thousand-year-old words describe the state of American politics. It’s a barren landscape of plutocratic insatiability. How did it get this way? One way to tell the story is to look at the battle between the ruling class and everyone else — a battle which elites are obviously winning. But another way to understand the struggle is to look at the war between factions of the ruling class — a battle that plays out largely within partisan politics. On this partisan front, the historical backdrop is that for forty years, Republicans have been playing a political shell game. As Jay Michaelson puts it, Republicans “appear populist … but act plutocrat”. What’s disorienting is that this shell game has worked. Although Republicans have historically governed for the benefit of the rich, they have recently rebranded themselves (successfully, it seems) as the party of the working class. Is this new Republican messaging sincere? Or is it gaslighting? Well, Trump’s billionaire-stacked administration is quickly answering the question for us. However, this essay is not primarily about Trump, nor is it focused on the future. Instead, it’s a journey into how the partisan politics of the past have shaped the American plutocracy of today. The essay consists of a deep dive into the realm of US state politics. The story will be simple and repetitive. Across states, I will measure the degree to which Republicans control each state’s legislature. Then I will observe, in a statistical sense, the policies and social outcomes that follow. That’s it. Of course, I’ll add commentary along the way. But the goal is to let the evidence speak for itself. And what leaps from the data is this: Republican control of state legislatures is systematically associated with the rich being (and becoming) richer. In short, American plutocracy seems to be a quintessentially Republican affair. And that’s not all. As we journey into the depths of US state politics, the plot will thicken. We’ll find striking partisan differences in the language used in state bills. We’ll see the many ways that Republicans help the rich and hurt workers. We’ll see the impact partisan politics have on the population as they work longer hours with less security. We’ll see the toll that Republican control takes on human welfare. And we’ll study the ways that Republicans gain power, despite enacting policies that are self-evidently bad for the majority. And we’ll reflect on the reasons that plutocracy can become self-reinforcing. Think of the evidence that follows as a case study in how the machinery of democracy can be used to benefit the few and harm the many. It’s a warning from the past about tactics that will no doubt be intensified by Trump and his posse of plutocrats.Item Open Access The American Housing Crisis: A Theft, Not a Shortage(2024) Fix, BlairIf mainstream economics teaches us one lesson, it’s that when something becomes unaffordable, it’s because of a shortage. And that brings me to the US housing crisis. In America, housing is getting less affordable. So there must be a short supply, right? Not necessarily. You see, shortage is not the only route to unaffordability. There’s also … theft. Here’s how it works.Item Open Access From Commodity to Asset: The Truth Behind Rising House Prices(2024) Fix, BlairWhen it comes to rising house prices, nearly everyone has a theory about the cause. There’s ‘too much foreign money’. There are ‘too many immigrants’. There’s ‘too little construction’. And so on. What unites these explanations is that they appeal, in some way, to the idea that rising prices are caused by a mismatch between supply and demand. And surely that’s true, right? Yes, it is true … in the same way that death is caused by dying. But of course, that’s circular logic. And so it goes with ‘supply and demand’. Since prices are always caused by the interplay between what we want and what we can get, evoking ‘supply and demand’ leads us pretty much nowhere. Worse, it often puts the focus on short-term patterns, when the real scientific payoff lies in studying price trends over the long term. Speaking of the long term, many people assume that rising house prices are a recent problem. But in the United States, the pattern dates to the early 1970s. For almost a century before that, US house prices had been dropping against income. And so Americans treated their house like a ‘commodity’ — a thing they bought to live in. But from 1972 onward, house prices began to slowly appreciate against income. And so Americans started to treat their house like an ‘asset’. It’s this transformation — from commodity-like depreciation to asset-like appreciation — that is the real story of house prices. And the truth is that this story can’t be understood using popular scapegoats. To see why US house prices headed south and then north, we need to forget about supply and demand and instead, peer into the belly of industrialism. We need to ground house prices in the use of energy. Now, if going from prices to energy sounds like a non sequitur, I’ll show you why it makes sense. And I’ll show you how, when we bring debt into the energy fold, we can explain almost all of the historical variation in US house prices. The lesson here is simple yet disturbing. When it comes to rising house prices, the trend has less to do with a ‘supply crisis’, and more to do with basic physical limits to industrial supply chains.Item Open Access A Tour of the Jevons Paradox: How Energy Efficiency Backfires(2024) Fix, BlairAccording to mainstream thinking, efficiency is a potent tool for conservation — a way to live better while using fewer resources. Unfortunately, this simple narrative is contradicted by overwhelming evidence. Instead of spurring conservation, efficiency seems to stimulate the consumption of more resources. This paper surveys the evidence for efficiency backfire and concludes that efficiency is a general tool for catalyzing technological sprawl.Item Open Access Re-Considering the Origins of the Climate Emergency: War, Finance, and the State(2023) Di Muzio, Tim; Dow, MatthewOne of the most important and recurring debates in the field of International Political Economy and international affairs are the links between capitalism, fossil fuel energy and climate change. In these debates, the origins of our current climate emergency are rooted in how Britain became the first country to become reliant on mass production and consumption coal (fossil fuels) for economic growth, industrialization, as well as social reproduction. Britain becoming a coal-fire capitalist-imperial global empire deeply influenced and structured the current world order and global political economy which is still locked-into a vicious cycle of path dependency whereby balance of power, production and social reproduction is dependent on energy, predominately fossil fuels.Item Open Access Measuring Hierarchy(2024) Carbonell-Nicolau, OriolThis paper presents a novel axiomatic approach to measuring and comparing hierarchical structures. Hierarchies are fundamental across a range of disciplines – from ecology to organizational science – yet existing measures of hierarchical degree often lack systematic criteria for comparison. We introduce a mathematically rigorous framework based on a simple partial pre-order over hierarchies, denoted as ≽H, and demonstrate its equivalence to intuitively appealing axioms for hierarchy comparisons. Our analysis yields three key results. First, we establish that for fixed-size hierarchies, one hierarchy is strictly more hierarchical than another according to ≽H if the latter can be derived from the former through a series of subordination removals. Second, we fully characterize the hierarchical pre-orders that align with ≽H using two fundamental axioms: Anonymity and Subordination Removal. Finally, we extend our framework to varying-size hierarchies through the introduction of a Replication Principle, which enables consistent comparisons across different scales.Item Open Access נסיכי הנפט מול קואליציית ההיי-טק (The Oil Princes versus the High-Tech Coalition)(2024)ספרם של שמשון ביכלר ויונתן ניצן "הדרך לעזה" נראה כמקרה בוחן פרטי וכהרחבה של טענתם הכללית בדבר מהות ההון "כמוסד השליטה במשטר הקפיטליסטי", מעבר לכאן ועכשיו. ניתן לומר שהשאלה הנידונה היא כיצד הגענו מהקהילה הקמאית השוויונית דרך "משטרי כוח" בהשראתו של אל עליון כל-יכול, עד שלטון ההון במשטר הקפיטליסטי של ימינו. הטענה (הפסימית) היא, שמבחינתם של "אנשי התחתית", אין חדש תחת השמש ושלטון ההון הקפיטליסטי כישות זרה וכל-יכולה, איננו אלא המשך שלטון האוליגרכיות של העת העתיקה. אף על פי כן, למרות הטקסט הביקורתי, קשה שלא לראות את הסב-טקסט הניאו-מרקסיסטי של הספר. כלומר, כדיאלוג ביקורתי עם המרקסיזם. [. . .] קשה לקבל את הטענה "הגלובלית" כהסבר לכאן ועכשיו. אך "הדרך לעזה" הוא ללא ספק ספר מאתגר ומעורר מחשבה הראוי לקריאהItem Open Access Rentiership and Intellectual Monopoly in Contemporary Capitalism: Conceptual Challenges and Empirical Possibilities(2024) Baines, Joseph; Hager, Sandy BrianThe concepts of rentiership and intellectual monopoly have gained increased prominence in discussions about the transformation of global capitalism in recent years. However, there have been few if any attempts to construct measures for rentiership and intellectual monopoly using firm-level financial data. The absence of such work, we argue, is symptomatic of conceptual challenges in delineating what precisely qualifies as rent, intellectual or otherwise. In place of static conceptions of rent and intellectual monopoly, we develop a dynamic framework for analyzing the processes of rentierization and intellectual monopolization and apply this framework to the analysis of the transformation of non-financial firms in the United States since the 1950s. We find that the timing and intensity of rentierization and intellectual monopolization differs significantly across sector and firm size and is heavily mediated by the uneven ramifications of government policy across companies and industries. Overall, our framework illuminates the variegated landscape of corporate power in the US, and offers a useful guide for critically interrogating rentierization and intellectual monopolization in other contexts.Item Open Access The Road to Gaza, Part II: The Capitalization of Everything(2024) Bichler, Shimshon; Nitzan, JonathanOur recent article on ‘The Road to Gaza’ examined the history of the three supreme-God churches and the growing role of their militias in armed conflicts and wars around the world. The present paper situates these militia wars in the broader vista of the capitalist mode of power. Focusing specifically on the Middle East, we show the impact these militia wars have on relative oil prices and differential oil profits and explain how the wars themselves, those who stir them and the subjects that fight them all get discounted into capitalized power.Item Open Access Ontology of Finance Redux(2017) Breitling, Dustin“Ontology of Finance Redux” is an abridged version of Suhail Malik’s long essay “The Ontology of Finance: Price, Power, and the Arkhéderivative” published in Collapse Volume VIII Edited by Robin Mackay. Interweaving the works of Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, Elena Esposito and Elie Ayache, Malik provides a tour de force critique of the critique of political economy to demand an engagement with the byzantine operation of finance. The essay is an examination of the array of derivative tools and their constitutive role in hedging and speculating futures. It explains how the organizing element of ‘Capitalization’ via price renders all conceptions of temporality as a revisable, adaptable, and ultimately contingent operation. Malik’s philosophical assertion is that the traditional notions of social order and norms have always been subject to perpetual restructuring. ‘Risk-Order’as the primary ingredient of ‘capital-power’ poses a tremendous challenge not only for Marxist and neoclassic political economy but also for Left-Accelerationaism and its underlying neorational philosophies.Item Open Access Making America Great Again, 2024(2024) Bichler, Shimshon; Nitzan, JonathanIn 2019, we published a RWER paper assessing Trump’s promise to ‘Make America Great Again’. Here are updates of two key charts from this paper.Item Open Access הדרך לעזה: על משטרי הכוח וכנסיות האל העליון היחיד (The Road to Gaza: On Modes of Power and Supreme-God Churches)(2024) Nitzan, Jonathan; Bichler, Shimshonמלחמת הקודש המתנהלת בין המיליציות הרבניות לבין המיליציות האיסלמיות הינה מסוג חדש. אבל הדרך למלחמה בעזה נסללה עוד לפני כששת אלפים שנה, בעת שקמו לראשונה משטרי המלוכה-כהונה במסופוטמיה. אוליגרכיות אלה היו הראשונות שיצקו תשלובת חזקה של מלך עריץ בארמון וכוהני אל-עליון במקדש. ילידי המזרח התיכון היו הראשונים בהיסטוריה האנושית שזכו בכבוד להתקיים כנתינים כנועים במשטרי המלוכה-כהונה. אין פלא אפוא שמוצאן של שלוש כנסיות האל העליון היחיד – הכנסייה הרבנית, הנוצרית והאיסלמית – היה באזור זה. ככל שאופי-הכוח המדיני התמסד בקיסרויות המאוחרות יותר, באלף הראשון להולדת האל ישו – בביזנץ, באירופה ובמזרח התיכון – כך עלה והתמסד פולחן האל הריכוזי היחיד ונציגו המלך הארצי שכונה בשמות שונים (מלך, קיסר, צאר, ח'ליף, סולטן ועוד). המשטר הקפיטליסטי במאה ה-21 הוא בינתיים האחרון במשטרי הכוח שנכפו על החברה האנושית. בראשית דרכו, המיר הקפיטליזם את המשטר הישן של מלוכה-כהונה בדגם חדש של מדינה לאומית ("של כל אזרחיה"). הנתינים הכנועים זקפו עתה גבם והפכו לאזרחים חופשיים. הם החליפו את שכירי החרב המלוכנים כחיילים בחינם במטחנות הבשר של צבאות העם ולחמו במלחמות העולם של האימפריות החדשות. ההון הפך לאל הגדול במקומם של יהוה-ישו-אללה, אשר לא התאימו עוד ליחסי השליטה החדשים. את מקומם של כוהני הכנסייה הישנים ירשו כוהני האקדמיה וכנסיות הרציונליות בשירות שליטי ההון, ופולחן הקפיטליזציה הפך לאבן הכעבה של המאמינים החדשים. אלא שמאז שנות השמונים של המאה ה-20, הלך וגדל הקיטוב בין קבוצות ההון הדומיננטי לבין אנשי התחתית המתרבים ושכבות הביניים המצטמקות. המדינה הלאומית נמצאת מאז בתהליך פירוק ובמקומה צומחת מדינת ההון האוליגרכית. יחסי השליטה החדשים מבוססים על פולחני הניאו-ליברליזם והפוסטיזם, ומנגד על כנסיות אל עליון יחיד הישנות המעוצבות בלבוש חדש. מכאן מתחילות "מלחמות הדת" החדשות המנוהלות ברחבי העולם על ידי מיליציות בחסות ובמימון שליטי ההון הדומיננטי. בספרים קודמים עסקנו בתהליך המרכזי של הקפיטליזם העולמי, שהוא גם המנוע העיקרי המפעיל את המלחמות המחזוריות במזרח התיכון: רווחי קבוצות ההון הדומיננטיות. בעבר התמקדנו ברווחים הדיפרנציאליים של קואליציית הנפט-נשק ובעיקר בירידות המחזוריות ברווחים אלה המעוררות את המלחמות. ספר זה מדגיש את הצלע השלישית במשולש התאגידי-מדיני החבויה בתוככי אופי הכוח הקפיטליסטי ומלחמותיו: כנסיות האל העליון היחיד. כותבי הספר, יהונתן ניצן ושמשון ביכלר, הם מרצים לכלכלה-פוליטית באוניברסיטאות ובמכללות בקנדה ובישראל. *** The book is available for purchase on Amazon and in independent Israeli bookstores.Item Open Access 30 Years to the AIC. A Speech at Beit Sahur(2013) Bichler, ShimshonThe following is the text of a presentation delivered by Dr. Shimshon Bichler at the 30-year celebration of the Alternative Information Center (AIC), on October 5, 2013. Dr. Bichler is a political economist and veteran member of the AIC Board of Directors.Item Open Access The Road to Gaza, Part II: The Capitalization of Everything(2024) Bichler, Shimshon; Nitzan, JonathanOur recent article on ‘The Road to Gaza’ examined the history of the three supreme-God churches and the growing role of their militias in armed conflicts and wars around the world. The present paper situates these militia wars in the broader vista of the capitalist mode of power. Focusing specifically on the Middle East, we show the impact these militia wars have on relative oil prices and differential oil profits and explain how the wars themselves, those who stir them and the subjects that fight them all get discounted into capitalized power.Item Open Access The Road to Gaza(2024) Bichler, Shimshon; Nitzan, JonathanThe war that started in 2023 between Hamas and Israel is driven by various long-lasting processes, but it also brings to the fore a new cause that hitherto seemed marginal: the armed militias of the Rabbinate and Islamic churches. The Rabbinate militias, embodied in Jewish settler organizations, have taken over not only Palestinian lands, but, gradually, also Israeli society. The Islamic militias, represented by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, rose to prominence after the traditional resistance groups of the Palestinians – primarily the PLO and the PFLP and, by extension, also the Palestinian Authority – weakened and proved unable to reverse, let alone stop, the Israeli occupation. The rise of these militias, though, is hardly unique to Israel/Palestine, or even the Middle East. It is part of a broader, global process, in which ‘private’ military organizations, financed by states, church-related NGOs and/or organized crime, fight for and against states as well as each other. The ascent of such groups is closely related to the decline of the nation-state and its popular armies, a model that developed in the wake of the French Revolution but no longer resonates with the increasingly globalized nature of capital accumulation. Our previous studies of Middle East wars emphasized the ‘state of capital’ – our notion that the capitalist mode of power fuses state and capital into a single logic in which dominant capital groups are driven by the power quest for differential accumulation. We showed that, in the Middle East, this logic was imposed by a Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition of large oil and armament corporations, OPEC, financial institutions and construction firms, whose differential incomes and profits were tightly correlated with – and helped predict – the cyclical eruption of ‘energy conflicts’. But this mode of power comprises not two elements, but three. In addition to state and capital, it also includes the supreme-God churches, and in this paper we outline the role of these churches and their militias in capitalism generally and in Middle East wars specifically.Item Open Access Rethinking the Political Economy of Environmental Conflict: Lessons from the UK Fracking Controversy(2023) Marshall, Adam P.As governments and corporations have intensified their efforts to locate, extract, and capitalise oil, gas, and various other biophysical materials, the world has simultaneously witnessed a proliferation of social resistance to these efforts. While taking many forms, such resistance, and concomitant ecological distribution conflicts (EDCs), are invariably motivated by a diverse range of objections regarding the unequal distributions of power, harms, and benefits associated with these extractive endeavours. This thesis primarily addresses the EDC literature, an environmental justice activist orientated literature at the intersection of ecological economics and political ecology. Despite offering numerous insights regarding the socio-metabolic drivers of EDCs, this literature often tends towards problematic explanations regarding the role of capitalist power. Thus, while these explanations foreground questions of capitalist power, their core assumptions - especially the analytical distinction between ‘the political’ and ‘the economic’- serve to elide key aspects of capitalist power within this context. Moreover, they also tend to obscure an important counterpart to capitalist power of special relevance to the activists who mobilise for environmental justice within EDCs; namely, capitalist vulnerability. Consequently, this thesis enfolds existing EDC insights within a broader theoretical framework underpinned by the Capital as Power (CasP) approach to political economy. CasP’s overarching contribution is to enable researchers to map how intra-capitalist conflicts unfold through the reorganisation of social ecological relations. Mobilising this framework, and a unique combination of qualitative and quantitative methods in the context of the UK fracking conflict (2010-2020), this thesis aims to explore, understand, and explain capitalist power and vulnerability in fracking conflicts (specifically) and EDCs (generally). Alongside other key findings, the inherent uncertainty surrounding future earnings and the divergent interests of competing capitalist coalitions are identified as key sources of capitalist vulnerability that environmental justice activists can exploit within EDCs. These findings highlight the analytical benefits of a CasP-driven theoretical framework for elucidating capitalist power and vulnerability in fracking conflicts and EDCs, not only for activists and academics, but also for policy makers, businesses, and other advocates for just transformations towards sustainability.Item Open Access A Tour of the Jevons Paradox: How Energy Efficiency Backfires(2024) Fix, BlairWhen it comes to our sustainability problems, striving for greater resource efficiency seems like an obvious solution. For example, if you buy a new car that’s twice as efficient as your old one, it should cut your gasoline use in half. And if your new computer is four times more efficient than your last one, it should cut your computer’s electric bill fourfold. In short, boosting efficiency seems like a straightforward way to reduce your use of natural resources. And for you personally, efficiency gains may do exactly that. But collectively, efficiency seems to have the opposite effect As technology gets more efficient, we tend to consume more resources. This backfire effect is known as the ‘Jevons paradox’, and it occurs for a simple reason. At a social level, efficiency is not a tool for conservation; it’s a catalyst for technological sprawl.1 Here’s how it works. As technology gets more efficient, it cheapens the service that it provides. And when services get cheaper, we tend to use more of them. Hence, efficiency ends up catalyzing greater consumption. Take the evolution of computers as an example. The first computers were room-sized machines that gulped power while doing snail-paced calculations. In contrast, modern computers deliver about a trillion times more computation for the same energy input. Now, in principle, we could have taken this trillion-fold efficiency improvement and reduced our computational energy budget by the same amount. But we didn’t. Instead, we took these efficiency gains and invested them in technological sprawl. We took more efficient computer chips and put them in everything — phones, TVs, cars, fridges, light bulbs, toasters … not to mention data centers. So rather than spur conservation, more efficient computers catalyzed the consumption of more energy. In this regard, computers are not alone. As you’ll see, efficiency backfire seems to be the rule rather than the exception. Far from delivering a cure for our sustainability woes, efficiency gains appear to be a root driver of the over-consumption disease.Item Open Access Key points on Bichler/Nitzan’s text “Capital as Power”(2024) Szepanski, AchimFROM THE ARTICLE: At first glance, it would appear that Deleuze’s concept of structure involves a complex form of so-called creorder, a term that appears at the forefront of the methodological findings of the economists Bichler/Nitzan. If the structure is actualized in each of its moments in processes, then Bichler/Nitzan describe this process with the term “creorder”. They consider this to be a highly artificial term, which is intended to indicate that a structure/order must constantly construct and reconstruct itself in (historical) time, just as a form must constantly transform itself. According to Bichler/Nitzan, in the context of creorder, the meaning of the relationship between Heraclitean becoming and Parmenidean being lies precisely in the fact that the fusion of verb and noun results in the term “creorder”: “To have a history is to create order – a verb and a noun whose fusion yields the verb-noun creorder.” On the one hand, the so-called creorder may be completely vertically or hierarchically ordered, as is the case in ultra-bureaucratic systems, for example; on the other hand, it may also be horizontal, as could be the case in radical democracies, or it may be in between order and disorder.Item Open Access ההון ושברו (Capital and its Crisis)(2022) Nitzan, Jonathan; Bichler, Shimshonהקפיטליזם שולט בעולם. דיונים סוערים מתנהלים בין המלומדים הממסדיים לבין "הביקורתיים" על טיבו של הקפיטליזם הגלובלי. הבעיה היא שטיבו של המוסד המרכזי בקפיטליזם -- ההון -- אינו ידוע. לאחר יותר ממאתיים שנה של התפתחות קפיטליסטית נמרצת לא קיימת תיאוריית הון הגיונית אמפירית -- לא במדע הכלכלה, לא בכלכלה הפוליטית המרקסיסטית ולא במדעי החברה בכלל, בין אם הם פוזיטיביסטיים או ביקורתיים, בין אם הם מודרניים או פוסטיסטיים הדבר בולט בעת משברי הון. אז נחשפת אוזלת ידם של המומחים והמנהלים האמונים על רזי ההון, ולעתים, ברגעי חרדה, הם אף מתוודים כי אין הם מבינים לא את טיבו של ההון ולא את משבריו. וכאשר מונפים דגלי המחאה והמפגינים יוצאים בזעם אל הרחובות, מתברר שאין להם תוכנית אלטרנטיבית. אין הם מבינים את מהותו של ההון ואת תוצאותיו הספר מציג דרך חדשה להבנת ההון ומשבריו המחזוריים. ההון אינו עצם מטריאלי ואף לא תהליך ייצור כלכלי. הוא אינו הצבר של אמצעי ייצור או מלאי של ציוד וטכנולוגיה, אלא מוסד מרכזי של יחסי שליטה, המאפשר בין השאר לשלוט בקווי הייצור, במלאי הסחורות ובעבודה השכירה. ההון הוא סימבול פיננסי של יחסי כוח מאורגנים הפרושים ברשת היררכית, ובמרכזם ניצבות קבוצות ההון הדומיננטי ,אותן תשלובות תאגידיות-מדיניות. אלה כפויות לחלק-מחדש את יחסי הכוח לטובתן מול ההתנגדות ההולכת וגוברת, ובצירוף היחסים נוצר משבר ההון. משטר ההון (הקפיטליזם) הוא אופי-כוח מסוג חדש יחסית בהיסטוריה של המין האנושי -- משטר שהתמסד במאות האחרונות והלך והתגבש מחדש לאורך שבעת משברי ההון שהתחוללו מאז תחילת המאה התשע–עשרה הספר כתוב בשפה תמציתית פשוטה, ללא ערפל אקדמי, ואינו דורש מן הקוראים ידע מוקדם, "כלכלי", מתמטי, או אקדמי. הוא אינו מסתפק בסיסמאות ובהכרזות. הוא מציג לא רק היסטוריה ביקורתית, אם לא קטלנית, של תיאוריות ההון המרכזיות המקובלות, האקדמיות והרדיקליות, אלא גם תיאוריות ומודלים כמותיים אלטרנטיביים של ההון ומשברי ההון אשר יוכלו לשמש את הרוצים בדרך רדיקלית חדשה להריסת משטר ההון ולהחלפתו במשטר אנושי כותבי הספר, יהונתן ניצן ושמשון ביכלר, הם מרצים בכלכלה פוליטית באוניברסיטאות ובמכללות בקנדה ובישראלItem Open Access Stocking Up on Wealth . . . Concentration(2024) Fix, BlairIt turns out that like the rest of us, billionaires experience wealth inequality. (Individuals who top the Forbes billionaire list are far richer than those at the bottom of the list.) Interestingly, this billionaire wealth concentration fluctuates over time … in tight correlation with the movement of the stock market. Why? A plausible reason — explored here – is that stock indexes like the S&P 500 are unwitting indicators of corporate concentration. And corporate concentration, in turn, seems to drive the concentration of individual wealth.