Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisorKecskes, Ambrus
dc.contributor.authorTut, Daniel
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation examines how information asymmetry and bankruptcy costs magnify the conflict between creditors and borrowers. And the conflict between creditors and managers.The central idea of this dissertation is that in order for credit to be extended there has to be some effective mechanisms in place. These mechanisms would ensure that creditors can recoup their claims even in the case of bankruptcy. Examples of such mechanisms would be legal reforms, such reforms would facilitate enforceability of contracts and minimize conflict amongst contractual parties. In order to understand how these conflicts arise and to quantify their welfare implications, this dissertation exploits changes in institutional settings, laws, Anti-Recharacterization laws, legal reforms and differential in corporate governance structure.
dc.rightsAuthor owns copyright, except where explicitly noted. Please contact the author directly with licensing requests.
dc.titleEssays on Creditor Rights Protection, Corporate Debt and Corporate Liability
dc.typeElectronic Thesis or Dissertation - Doctor of Philosophy
dc.subject.keywordsCreditor Rights
dc.subject.keywordsDebt Financing
dc.subject.keywordsDebt Structure
dc.subject.keywordsAnti-Recharacterization Laws
dc.subject.keywordsCorporate Governance
dc.subject.keywordsProperty Rights
dc.subject.keywordsPledgeable Assets
dc.subject.keywordsCreditor-Borrower Conflict

Files in this item


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

All items in the YorkSpace institutional repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved except where explicitly noted.