A Defense for Scientific Realism: Skepticisms, Unobservables & Interference to the Best Explanation
MetadataShow full item record
The epistemological status of scientific knowledge claims has been undermined by skepticism, in particular by universal skepticism. This thesis asserts that Bas C. van Fraassens empirical stance is akin to universal skepticism. This work also maintains that van Fraassens empirical stance does not lead to the conclusion that scientific knowledge claims are empirically adequateespecially those claims that resulted from the scientific method of inference to the best explanation (IBE). To illustrate why van Fraassens stance does not devalue scientific knowledge claims will be suggested via Peter Liptons understanding of IBE combined with Ernan McMullins epistemic values. By bridging McMullins values with Liptons version of IBE, we get a more robust version of IBE; as a result, scientific claims may display a cluster of epistemic virtues and values. Where scientific knowledge claims display a cluster of epistemic virtues and values, they are simply beyond being empirically adequate.