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dc.contributor.advisorJackman, Henry
dc.creatorCumby, Jill Nicole
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation provides a better understanding of the method of cases, a method widely used in philosophical theorizing. Using this method involves relying on one’s intuitive judgments about cases to guide theorizing. Recently, such judgments have been experimentally examined, and it has been argued that the results of these studies encourage skepticism about the trustworthiness of this method. Responding to this skepticism involves developing a better understanding of the method of cases and the reliance on intuitive judgments in theory construction. I contribute to this project by arguing for a constraint on the kinds of hypothetical cases that can function as compelling counterexamples in conceptual analysis.
dc.rightsAuthor owns copyright, except where explicitly noted. Please contact the author directly with licensing requests.
dc.titleConcepts, Cases, and Compellingness: Exploring the Role of Intuitive Analysis in Philosophical Inquiry
dc.typeElectronic Thesis or Dissertation - Doctor of Philosophy
dc.subject.keywordsMethod of Cases
dc.subject.keywordsConceptual Analysis
dc.subject.keywordsIntuitive Judgements
dc.subject.keywordsTwo-Dimensional Semantics

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