YorkSpace has migrated to a new version of its software. Access our Help Resources to learn how to use the refreshed site. Contact diginit@yorku.ca if you have any questions about the migration.
 

Concepts, Cases, and Compellingness: Exploring the Role of Intuitive Analysis in Philosophical Inquiry

Loading...
Thumbnail Image

Date

2015-12-16

Authors

Cumby, Jill Nicole

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

Abstract

This dissertation provides a better understanding of the method of cases, a method widely used in philosophical theorizing. Using this method involves relying on one’s intuitive judgments about cases to guide theorizing. Recently, such judgments have been experimentally examined, and it has been argued that the results of these studies encourage skepticism about the trustworthiness of this method. Responding to this skepticism involves developing a better understanding of the method of cases and the reliance on intuitive judgments in theory construction. I contribute to this project by arguing for a constraint on the kinds of hypothetical cases that can function as compelling counterexamples in conceptual analysis.

Description

Keywords

Philosophy

Citation

Collections