A Survey of Game Theory Models on Peace and War
This paper will present a survey of game theoretical applications to peace and war relevant to the continuing debate on the theory's place. (Some contributions are by Deutsch, 1954, 1968; Waltz, 1959; Quandt, 1961; Snyder, 1961; Shubik, 1968; Robinson, 1970; Rosenau, 1971; Junne, 1972; George and Smoke, 1974; Plon, 1976; Martin, 1978; Wagner, 1983; Maoz, 1985; Snidal, 1985a; Hardin, 1986; Larson, 1987; Jervis, 1988a; O'Neill, 1989b; and Rapoport, 1989.) The review will be non evaluative, and will focus on the areas chosen for applications rather than developments in the mathematics. It will be fairly comprehensive in the international relations (IR) section, and include the main subjects in the military operations part. In regard to IR, I examine the mutual influences of the mathematics and the conventional theory or policy questions. The military section notes the interaction of game applications with new military strategy and technology. A companion paper (O'Neill, 1990b) surveys introductory writings for each game theory subfield that might be relevant to IR.