Shared Ledgers, Fragmented Institutions: The Feasibility of Blockchain for Canadian Defence Supply Chains

Abstract

This paper examines the extent to which blockchain technology is feasible as a means of improving the security, transparency, and efficiency of defence supply chains in the Canadian context. It begins from the documented failures of Canada’s defence procurement and supply chain system, including fragmented accountability, poor organizational data sharing, persistent delivery delays, and growing concerns about supply chain integrity and cybersecurity. Drawing on peer-reviewed scholarship, public audit findings, parliamentary committee evidence, and government policy documents, the paper develops a four-part analytical framework to assess feasibility across technical, economic, institutional, and legal/security dimensions. Ultimately, it finds that blockchain adoption is conditionally feasible rather than ready for broad deployment. The technical foundations are sufficiently mature, and the Canadian context presents several independently verified pain points to which blockchain’s core functions are directly relevant. However, the strongest constraints are institutional, particularly the absence of a governance architecture capable of coordinating a multi-party ledger across Canada’s fragmented procurement environment. Economic feasibility is strongest in bounded, high-value workflows but remains uncertain at system-wide scale, especially where smaller supplier participation is required. The paper concludes that blockchain is most viable as targeted, controlled-access infrastructure for specific defence supply chain functions and not a comprehensive procurement solution.