Goldilocks and the Three Negations: An Appeal to a Minimal Ethics for the Phil-Anthropocene

Abstract

I pursue a focused reading of Joanna Zylinska’s Minimal Ethics for the Anthropocene, structured around following theoretical motif: mapping the pattern in Zylinska’s notion of opposition or difference, marked by the logical negation. To account for this, Zylinska makes use of Karen Barad’s notion of an intra-action, a device for eliminating reference to binary polarity in identifying objects. The resultant picture—let’s call the negation procedure Goldilocks—is one where negation is “just right”: weak enough not to necessitate binary polarity between any two things but strong enough to “carve up” the world in myriad creative, intuitive, or useful ways. If negation is stronger than Goldilocks, we carve too much and erase the aboriginal embeddedness of things; and if it is weaker, then we miss important differences. I critique Goldilocks by claiming that: one, if there are three degrees of inferential strength to negations, then Goldilocks negations exhibit only the weakest of the inferential powers; and two, that there is a priori reason to think that denying this enriched view of negation rests on a foundational equivocation. The upshot therefore ought to be global for Zylinska’s notion of ethics: we cannot begin to think through ethics without first properly thinking through negation.