Can States Resist Migration Blackmail While Protecting Migrants?

Abstract

Migration blackmail occurs when one state threatens to engineer a “migration crisis” on the borders of a target state by creating or permitting an irregular migration flow unless political or economic concessions are made by the target state. States may have legitimate interests in resisting migration blackmail. However, migrants have strong interests in accessing international protection and avoiding harm. These goals may seem to stand in tension and generate a dilemma: it may seem that there is no way for target states to effectively resist and deter blackmail while adequately respecting migrants’ interests. This paper explores what is problematic about migration blackmail and how states may permissibly respond to it. I argue that target states are not permitted to close their borders in response to migration blackmail but instead must respect the right to seek asylum. I offer four complementary arguments for this conclusion: (1) not all cases of migration blackmail are dilemmatic; (2) target states have often contributed to the circumstances that give rise to migration blackmail and so may bear some responsibility for the situation; (3) the interests of migrants in accessing protection and avoiding harm outweigh states’ interests in resisting blackmail; and (4) states have options available to resist migration blackmail without contravening the right to asylum.