Social Norms in Transition: Identity, Ethics, and Social Change

Abstract

This dissertation offers clarity on how social norm change occurs and provides ethical guidance on how change should occur. I offer an analysis of the following philosophical quandary: how can we effectively and ethically change social norms? A central claim of my dissertation is that people follow norms to belong to social groups. I contrast this view with current views and show how my view offers a more psychologically robust theory for grounding social norm change. The contributions of my dissertation to ethical discourse are as follows. I argue against the contemporary view that we should persuade people on logical, moral grounds to not consume meat. One reason is such persuasion is likely to cause backlash. The other is that moral judgements about what is acceptable to consume are systematically non-rational. If we want to persuade people to not consume meat, then we ought to pursue non-rational means such as undoing or supporting propaganda. Finally, I argue that in some cases shaming is ethically permissible. Martha Nussbaum argues that shame is impermissible as a means of changing others’ behaviour or views. Shame can fail to respect others’ worth and bypass their rationality and agency. I show that there is an important exception to this: if the aim of shame is to include someone in rational persuasion, then shaming becomes a duty, as it acts as an invitation to feel guilt, and offers respect for that person and attempts to include them into the precious and valuable social practice of moral discourse.