The Moral Agency of Animals: Responsible in Practice

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dc.contributor.advisorAndrews, Kristin A.
dc.creatorRing, Rebecca Lynn
dc.date.accessioned2015-08-28T15:10:18Z
dc.date.available2015-08-28T15:10:18Z
dc.date.copyright2014-12-10
dc.date.issued2015-08-28
dc.date.updated2015-08-28T15:10:18Z
dc.degree.disciplinePhilosophy
dc.degree.levelMaster's
dc.degree.nameMA - Master of Arts
dc.description.abstractMark Rowlands argues some non-human animals can be moral subjects that can act for moral reasons, but cannot be moral agents because they lack sufficient understanding for responsibility. I argue Rowlands’ mere moral subjects are responding to, not acting for, moral reasons. Action for moral reasons is necessarily normative and the actor must be able to track the moral reason. I argue Rowlands’ conflation of moral agency and moral autonomy results in falsely denying responsibility to animals. Moral autonomy is an ideal to which some humans can aim. Responsibility is not contingent on this ability, but on the cognitive and volitional capacities of the individual and her normative social practices. Some animals can be moral agents in virtue of their normative social practices that involve harm to others and sharing resources. Moral agency and responsibility can be ascribed to some animals in terms of their intentional agency within such practices.
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10315/29967
dc.language.isoen
dc.rightsAuthor owns copyright, except where explicitly noted. Please contact the author directly with licensing requests.
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.subjectCognitive psychology
dc.subject.keywordsAnimals
dc.subject.keywordsAnimal mind
dc.subject.keywordsNon-human animals
dc.subject.keywordsMoral agency
dc.subject.keywordsMoral autonomy
dc.subject.keywordsIntentional agency
dc.subject.keywordsPropositional attitudes
dc.subject.keywordsAgency
dc.subject.keywordsReasons
dc.subject.keywordsMoral philosophy
dc.subject.keywordsPhilosophy of mind
dc.subject.keywordsAnimal cognition
dc.subject.keywordsMetacognition
dc.subject.keywordsFolk psychology
dc.subject.keywordsKristin Andrews
dc.subject.keywordsPeter Carruthers
dc.subject.keywordsMark Rowlands
dc.subject.keywordsRobert Myers
dc.subject.keywordsSarah Buss
dc.subject.keywordsChristine Korsgaard
dc.subject.keywordsAnimal morality
dc.subject.keywordsFrans de Waal
dc.subject.keywordsNormativity
dc.subject.keywordsNormative force
dc.subject.keywordsMoral responsibility
dc.subject.keywordsMoral practice
dc.subject.keywordsMoral reasons
dc.subject.keywordsExternal reasons
dc.subject.keywordsNormative grip
dc.subject.keywordsAction
dc.subject.keywordsReasons for action
dc.subject.keywordsEthics
dc.subject.keywordsMeta-ethics
dc.subject.keywordsMoral agency of animals
dc.subject.keywordsResponsibility
dc.titleThe Moral Agency of Animals: Responsible in Practice
dc.typeElectronic Thesis or Dissertationen_US

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