The professionalization of financial planning in Australia: an institutional logics perspective

Purpose – This paper researches the professionalization of financial planning in Australia. We investigate how the institutional logic of major institutions inhibits this occupation from moving toward a professional status.

Design/methodology/approach – The study uses documentary analysis of government inquiries into Australian financial services from 1997 to 2017 to ascertain the various institutional logics relating to the professionalization of financial planning. The method involves generating ideas from the data and applying an institutional logic framework to make sense of impediments to the professionalization of financial planning in Australia.

Findings – The regulator adopted a self-regulation logic that empowered financial institutions to govern financial advice. These financial institutions have a logic of profit maximization that creates conflicts of interest in financial planning. The financial planning professional bodies adopted a logic of attracting and retaining members due to a competitive professional environment. Thus, financial planners have not been defined as fiduciaries, professional standards have not increased, and an ineffective disciplinary resolution system exists.

Research limitations/implications – This research illustrates the various institutional logics that need to be addressed to professionalize financial planning in Australia. However, the data used is limited to that drawn from the parliamentary inquiries.

Originality/value – Prior research on the emergence of professions such as accounting has shown that financial institutions are sites of professionalization. Our research shows that financial institutions impede professionalization in financial planning. Also, where the state granted legitimacy to other professions, our research indicates the state regulator’s logic of self-regulation has not legitimized financial planning.