Parental justice: A Rawlsian proposal

Abstract

Discussions of parental justice typically start from the thought that when people become parents through voluntary choices, they are presumptively responsible for the costs of raising their children. This responsibility-based argument is often presented as innocuous. I argue that it actually denotes a highly contentious view of how voluntary choices relate to the demands of justice, and that this view is particularly problematic regarding the kind of choices at stake in parental justice. In light of these concerns, I contend that the literature on parental justice would benefit from a Rawlsian turn. To negotiate this turn, we must acknowledge that the significance of the choice to have children depends on the justice of the institutional background against which it is made—not the other way around. The first question of parental justice is therefore not what responsibility parents should bear for their choices, but rather how a just institutional order would define the rights, duties, and responsibilities associated with the social position parent . I outline how a Rawlsian theory of parental justice might tackle this question.