Defending the Coherence and Practicability of Autonomy through a Multi-level Analytical Approach

The objective of this dissertation is to develop a coherent account of autonomy that builds on a general understanding of autonomy as the capacity by which people decide or discover for themselves what is valuable and live accordingly. I will advance a multi-level, multi-factor theory of autonomy while responding to potential criticisms relating to autonomys coherence as a concept and practicability as a capacity.

In my first chapter, I refute allegations that taking practical considerations into account in developing a theory of autonomy constitutes a wrongful inclusion of normative considerations into what should be a purely conceptual analysis. I also respond to situationist arguments against the possibility of autonomy. In so doing, I will articulate the common-sense psychological standard I will use to judge theoretical adequacy throughout the remainder of the dissertation.

In the second chapter, I track how common-sense concerns about the practicability of autonomy have been used to bring contemporary conceptions of autonomy more in line with human experience and limitations. I argue that while considerable nuance has been added to the otherwise proceduralist picture of autonomy, this increased complexity exacerbates concerns about the (lack of) conceptual coherence of autonomy and raises concerns that the exercise of autonomy is overly demanding.

In the third chapter I respond to Nomy Arpalys claim that the concept of autonomy is incoherent. I do so by advancing a three-level approach to analyzing autonomy in which important elements of Arpalys discussion of moral responsibility feature at different levels of analysis. While my model helps join different aspects of autonomy together into a coherent picture, it simultaneously reveals the extent to which the exercise of autonomy requires an extensive range of abilities and is highly complex.

Defending autonomy against these renewed concerns about practicability will be the objective of the final chapters of the dissertation. This defense will rely on three additional features of my theory of autonomy: degree, automaticity, and reinforcement/substitution. In both chapters four and five, I will endeavour to convince the reader that these proposed features are plausible on a common-sense understanding of human psychology.