Derandomization of Persuasion Mechanisms

dc.contributor.authorZeng, Yishu
dc.date.accessioned2025-09-29T19:23:40Z
dc.date.available2025-09-29T19:23:40Z
dc.date.issued2023-07-04
dc.description.abstractWe consider a setting where one sender can communicate with several privately informed receivers through a persuasion mechanism before the receivers play a game. We show that for any potentially randomized persuasion mechanism, under certain conditions, there is an effectively equivalent deterministic persuasion mechanism, and these two mechanisms have the same set of equilibria. We exhibit the usefulness of our result in an information disclosure application, where our technique helps to derive the optimal persuasion mechanism. Overall, this paper provides a rationale for the fact that persuasion mechanisms are often deterministic in practice.
dc.identifier.citationZeng, Y. (2023). Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms. Journal of Economic Theory, 212, Article 105690. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105690
dc.identifier.issn1095-7235
dc.identifier.issn0022-0531
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105690
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10315/43155
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectDerandomization
dc.subjectPersuasion mechanism
dc.subjectBayesian persuasion
dc.subjectInformation design
dc.titleDerandomization of Persuasion Mechanisms
dc.typeArticle

Files

Original bundle

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
AAM.10.1016.j.jet.2023.105690.pdf
Size:
843.84 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format

License bundle

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
license.txt
Size:
1.83 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description: