Now showing items 1-10 of 12
From Plato to Socrates: Wittgenstein's Journey on Collingwood's Map
How can I learn and help others to learn to mean more precisely by saying, doing and making things? By attending to how Ludwig Wittgenstein and Robin Collingwood answered that question during the first half of the twentieth ...
Filmmaking, Logic and the Historical Reconstruction of the World
An assessment in historical context of how and what filmmakers, logicians and philosophers could have learned from one another about the rudiments of their crafts.
Santayana's Missing Pages: Learning by Recollecting How We Use Photographs
Sometime between 1900 and 1907 George Santayana addressed the Harvard Camera Club on 'Photography and the Mental Image', noting that his remarks seemed to him 'of some importance'. They were indeed, for his talk marked the ...
Nelson Goodman's 'Theory of Symbols': an Exposition and Critique
Notes in outline form for a presentation on 13 February 1985 to the 'Media, Mind and Society' seminar of David R. Olson, Co-Director of the McLuhan Program in Culture and Technology of the University of Toronto, on the ...
Pudovkin, Kant and the Principle of Perceptual Coherence
In 1926 Vsevolod Pudovkin, while making his first feature film, articulated a precept crucial to understanding how powerful movies are made. He did so by assimilating unwittingly the core of Kant's principle of experiential ...
Randomness and Mr. Goodman's Paradox
Viable inductions can only be drawn from unbiased samples. A predicate like Nelson Goodman's 'Grue', therefore, cannot be used within inductions, for the temporal nature of its definition ensures that any sampling of objects ...
KING KONG, Carroll and Currie: Misconstruing Monstrously How We See Things by Means of Movies
Two confusions have vitiated recent philosophical discussions about filmmaking: the presumption of Nöel Carroll that discrimination entails essentialism and the presumption of both Carroll and Gregory Currie that we cannot ...
McLuhan's Method: the Mad Hatter at Tea with Austin and Wittgenstein
What was McLuhan doing? How was he doing it? Was it important? Within this essay I try to answer those questions by linking what he said and did, and how he did it, with the ways and means of the seemingly dissimilar ...
'In My Mind's Ear': Misconstruing Sounds as Sights – a Philosophical and Cinematical Caution
The notion of 'imaging' music ought to perplex us philosophically, for 'to imagine' is a verb of visualisation. Hearing musical events may cause us to imagine things, and seeing things may cause us to think of hearing ...
How Do You Solve a Problem Like Induction? Flip a Coin, Twice if Needed
A simple solution to Hume's problem of induction, pragmatically construed.