Now showing items 1-10 of 10
McLuhan's Method: the Mad Hatter at Tea with Austin and Wittgenstein
What was McLuhan doing? How was he doing it? Was it important? Within this essay I try to answer those questions by linking what he said and did, and how he did it, with the ways and means of the seemingly dissimilar ...
How Do You Solve a Problem Like Induction? Flip a Coin, Twice if Needed
A simple solution to Hume's problem of induction, pragmatically construed.
KING KONG, Carroll and Currie: Misconstruing Monstrously How We See Things by Means of Movies
Two confusions have vitiated recent philosophical discussions about filmmaking: the presumption of Nöel Carroll that discrimination entails essentialism and the presumption of both Carroll and Gregory Currie that we cannot ...
On Mathematics, Music and Film
An early attempt by the author to comprehend the nature, scope and limits of the constraints on the possibilities of 'colour music'. (Thesis submitted in the Spring of 1968 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for ...
Santayana's Missing Pages: Learning by Recollecting How We Use Photographs
Sometime between 1900 and 1907 George Santayana addressed the Harvard Camera Club on 'Photography and the Mental Image', noting that his remarks seemed to him 'of some importance'. They were indeed, for his talk marked the ...
Nelson Goodman's 'Theory of Symbols': an Exposition and Critique
Notes in outline form for a presentation on 13 February 1985 to the 'Media, Mind and Society' seminar of David R. Olson, Co-Director of the McLuhan Program in Culture and Technology of the University of Toronto, on the ...
From Plato to Socrates: Wittgenstein's Journey on Collingwood's Map
How can I learn and help others to learn to mean more precisely by saying, doing and making things? By attending to how Ludwig Wittgenstein and Robin Collingwood answered that question during the first half of the twentieth ...
Kant at the La Ciotat Station: the Arrival of the Lumière's Train
In 1787 Immanuel Kant published a second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason. Within a new preface he reaffirmed an identity that his critics had failed to comprehend: we and God encounter things differently rather than ...
Randomness and Mr. Goodman's Paradox
Viable inductions can only be drawn from unbiased samples. A predicate like Nelson Goodman's 'Grue', therefore, cannot be used within inductions, for the temporal nature of its definition ensures that any sampling of objects ...
Filmmaking, Logic and the Historical Reconstruction of the World
An assessment in historical context of how and what filmmakers, logicians and philosophers could have learned from one another about the rudiments of their crafts.