Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Normative Properties
| dc.contributor.advisor | Myers, Robert | |
| dc.creator | Rocheleau-Houle, David | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2019-03-05T14:41:00Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2019-03-05T14:41:00Z | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2018-08-31 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2019-03-05 | |
| dc.date.updated | 2019-03-05T14:40:59Z | |
| dc.degree.discipline | Philosophy | |
| dc.degree.level | Doctoral | |
| dc.degree.name | PhD - Doctor of Philosophy | |
| dc.description.abstract | Normative non-naturalists seem to be committed to a supervenience relation about the normative. This means that the normative necessarily varies with the non-normative, such that the normative features of a person or a thing cannot change if the non-normative features of that person or that thing do not change either. Furthermore, according to normative non-naturalists, normative properties are metaphysically discontinuous with non-normative properties, as the former are irreducible to the latter and cannot be exhaustively understood in terms of the latter. However, it is not clear that normative non-naturalists can explain the necessary connection between the normative and the non-normative they themselves seem to maintain; this is the core of the problem of supervenience. In order to respond to the problem of supervenience, non-naturalists could either try to explain the necessary connection between the normative and the non-normative, or deny that this necessary connection between the normative and the non-normative holds. I first define normative non-naturalists theoretical commitments and give a few reasons to take this view seriously (Chapter 1), and then I explain how the problem of supervenience against non-naturalism should be understood (Chapter 2). Then, I argue that there are issues with the most convincing attempts to explain the necessary connection between the normative and the non-normative (Chapter 3) and with the most convincing attempts to deny this necessary connection (Chapter 4). My conclusion is then that non-naturalists do not have a convincing response to the problem of supervenience. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10315/35791 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.rights | Author owns copyright, except where explicitly noted. Please contact the author directly with licensing requests. | |
| dc.subject | Metaphysics | |
| dc.subject.keywords | Moral Realism | |
| dc.subject.keywords | Normative Realism | |
| dc.subject.keywords | Non-naturalism | |
| dc.subject.keywords | Supervenience | |
| dc.subject.keywords | Metaphysical Explanation | |
| dc.subject.keywords | Normative Contingency | |
| dc.title | Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Normative Properties | |
| dc.type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
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