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Open Access
Stocking Up on Wealth . . . Concentration
(2024) Fix, Blair
It turns out that like the rest of us, billionaires experience wealth inequality. (Individuals who top the Forbes billionaire list are far richer than those at the bottom of the list.) Interestingly, this billionaire wealth concentration fluctuates over time … in tight correlation with the movement of the stock market. Why? A plausible reason — explored here – is that stock indexes like the S&P 500 are unwitting indicators of corporate concentration. And corporate concentration, in turn, seems to drive the concentration of individual wealth.
Open Access
Is Bitcoin More Energy Intensive Than Mainstream Finance?
(2024) Fix, Blair
When it comes to Bitcoin, there’s one thing that almost everyone agrees on: the network sucks up a tremendous amount of energy. But from there, disagreement is the rule. For critics, Bitcoin’s thirst for energy is self-evidently bad — the equivalent of pouring gasoline in a hole and setting it on fire. But for Bitcoin advocates, the network’s energy gluttony is the necessary price of having a secure digital currency. When judging Bitcoin’s energy demands, the advocates continue, keep in mind that mainstream finance is itself no model of efficiency. Here, I think the advocates have a point. If you want to argue that Bitcoin is an energy hog, you’ve got to do more than just point at its energy budget and say ‘bad’. You’ve got to show that this budget is worse than mainstream finance. On this comparison front, there seems to be a vacuum of good information. For their part, crypto promoters are happy to show that Bitcoin uses less energy than the global banking system. But this result is as unsurprising as it is meaningless. Compared to Bitcoin, global finance operates on a vastly larger scale. So of course it uses more energy. To be meaningful, any comparison between Bitcoin and mainstream finance must account for the different scales of the two systems. So instead of looking at energy alone, we need to look at energy intensity — the energy per unit of circulating currency. That’s what I’ll do here. In this post, I compare the energy intensity of Bitcoin to the energy intensity of mainstream US finance. Which system comes out on top? The results may surprise you.
Open Access
Follow the Money: The Political Economy of Petrodollar Accumulation and Recycling
(2023) Noble, Leonie
This thesis makes two unique contributions to the International Political Economy literature. It presents the first comprehensive, empirical investigation of petrodollar accumulation and recycling spanning the period 1980-2021. It also corrects the misconception that petrodollar recycling in the 1970s and 1980s involved the extension of loans to developing countries using fractional reserve banking and argues that these loans were the extension of created credit. Petrodollars garnered significant academic attention in the 1970s and 1980s when increased oil prices led to large influxes of petrodollars to oil-exporting states and widespread deficits and stagflation in oil-importing states. The recycling of these petrodollars led to increased militarisation in oil-exporting states, as well as increased national debts in oil-importing states which precipitated the developing world’s debt crisis. Between 1999 and 2021, oil prices have hit peaks higher than those reached in the 1970s and this has resulted in a similar transfer of petrodollars. This thesis uses a quantitative and qualitative methodology to explore the key role of petrodollars in the current global political economy, and to illustrate the impact they are likely to have in the future as resources deplete. Over the period 2004-2021, petrodollar accumulation averaged $1.27 trillion annually, with approximately 54.6 percent of this accumulated by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries. These petrodollars predominantly flow back into the global economy through one of two channels: economic, through increased imports and domestic expenditure; or financial, through foreign investments and the purchase of foreign exchange reserves. These recycling methods will have lasting implications as they impact on which oil-importers’ deficits are financed and which are not, and which businesses/industries are funded and which are not. The significance of petrodollar accumulation and recycling is likely to further increase in the future. While advances are being made in alternative energy, oil’s unique characteristics and its embeddedness in the petrochemical, agriculture, and transportation sectors make it invaluable in a petro-market civilisation which is dependent upon transnational supply chains and large-scale agriculture. This makes it likely that high oil-consumption rates will continue, as will petrodollar accumulation, until we reach depletion. *** Posted with the author's permission ***
Open Access
Degrowth and Capitalist Power: A Step Towards a Theory of Change
(2024) Vastenaekels, Julien
This article explores the relationship between degrowth and the theory of Capital as Power (CasP), aiming to understand how socio-ecological transformations can unfold against capitalist power dynamics. While degrowth scholars have largely overlooked this perspective on capital, CasP argues that capitalism is primarily a mode of power, with capitalisation quantifying power – the confidence in in – the ability to shape society against opposition. Key CasP concepts are brought into dialogue with degrowth research to identify potential implications and offer a step towards a theory of change for degrowth. The article first outlines the CasP perspective, including its notion of power, the process of capitalisation and the conflictual nature of capital accumulation, and highlights links with degrowth research. It then looks at the elements underlying the valuation of capital as power and how they provide entry points for degrowth transformations. The role of dominant capital groups and the concept of “sabotage” in exercising power over society are then addressed. As such, degrowth transformations must challenge the confidence of dominant capital groups in their ability to rule, as these groups inhibit possibilities for socio-ecological change. This dynamic, summarised in a conceptual diagram, provides a first step towards a theory of change for degrowth in the face of capital accumulation. Finally, the conclusion offers potential directions for further research.
Open Access
Правда об инфляции (The Truth About Inflation)
(2024) Fix, Blair
От редакции: среди всего набора макроэкономических тем, текущие показатели инфляции — одна из самых популярных и часто обсуждаемых. Аргументы сторонников режима жёсткого инфляционного таргетирования хорошо известны, равно как и возражения противников подобного подхода. Не касаясь их содержания, этой статьёй мы хотим привлечь внимание российской аудитории к самому подходу измерения инфляции. Как следует из представленного текста, определение уровня инфляции на практике сталкивается с теми же проблемами, что несут и прочие “средние”, “общие”, “агрегированные” показатели. Это делает актуальным вопрос о внедрении секторального, адресного подхода в управлении ценовой динамикой — что касается как фискальных мер, так и ДКП. *** Милтона Фридмана нет в живых уже более десяти лет, но его призрак всё ещё преследует нас. В 1960-х годах Фридман заявил, что инфляция "всегда и везде является денежным явлением" — проблемой печатания слишком большого количества денег. С тех пор всякий раз, когда инфляция дает о себе знать, вы можете рассчитывать на то, что кто-нибудь оживит призрак Фридмана и обвинит правительство в том, что оно слишком много тратит. Если бы только инфляция была такой простой. Как и многое в экономической теории, мысли Фридмана на первый взгляд кажутся правдоподобными. Инфляция — это общий рост цен. А поскольку цены — это ничто иное, как результат обмена (благ) на деньги, то больше денег в обращении означает, что цены должны расти. Следовательно, инфляция "всегда и везде является денежным явлением". К сожалению, при дальнейшем рассмотрении эта мысль рассыпается. Проблема в том, что она рассматривает инфляцию как равномерный рост цен. Теоретически это удобно, но эмпирически неверно. В реальном мире темпы инфляции сильно разнятся. В то время, когда цена на яблоки повышается на 5%, цены на автомобили могут вырасти на 50%, а цены на одежду — упасть на 20%. Чтобы понять реально существующую инфляцию, нужно обратиться не к учебникам по экономике, а к реальным данным. Именно этим занимался политэкономист Джонатан Ницан во время своего докторского исследования в начале 1990-х годов. Его работа вылилась в диссертацию под названием "Инфляция как реструктуризация". В реальном мире, заметил Ницан, изменение цен всегда "дифференцированно", что означает наличие победителей и проигравших. Как следствие, инфляция не является чисто "денежным явлением", вопреки заявлениям Фридмана. Инфляция перестраивает социальный порядок. Именно эта особенность инфляции в реальном мире является наиболее важной, поскольку она означает, что инфляция сигнализирует об изменении структуры власти в обществе. Предсказуемо, что именно эту особенность реального мира игнорируют мейнстримные экономисты — в основном потому, что она противоречит их стройной теории инфляции как "денежного явления". К счастью, доказательства очевидны. Инфляция является (и всегда была) в подавляющем большинстве случаев дифференциальной. Инфляция — это перестройка [экономики]. Сегодня, когда инфляционные страхи возвращаются и призрак Фридмана воскресает, стоит напомнить себе о реальных фактах.
Open Access
Degrowth and Capital: Assembling a Power-Centred Theory of Change
(2023) Vastenaekels, Julien
In the context of contemporary socio-environmental shifts, the concept of “degrowth” advocates for transforming societies to ensure environmental justice and a well-being for all within planetary boundaries. This PhD thesis, positioned within degrowth studies, provides a processual, holistic and interdisciplinary exploration of the dynamics between degrowth transformations and capital accumulation, understood as an all-encompassing power process. I start by critically exploring the role of capital accumulation in the unfolding of degrowth transformations, highlighting some shortcomings of conventional views that predominantly see capital accumulation as a primarily production-oriented process. While, historically, the degrowth project has opposed economism, these perspectives tend to overlook the deep intertwinement between economics and politics in the intersection between degrowth transformations and capital accumulation. This thesis then considers the theory of “Capital as Power” (CasP), which dissolves the boundaries between economics and politics in the study of capital. Key implications of CasP for the unfolding of degrowth transformations are highlighted. Through this lens, I identify four distinct elements of dynamics, each represented as a causal loop diagram (CLD), capturing the complex relationship between degrowth transformations and the power processes of capital accumulation. Using insights from Social Practice Theory (SPT), I further investigate how degrowth-aligned practices, reforms, and ruptures may be inhibited by “strategic sabotage” processes that bolster capital accumulation, conceptualising four modes of sabotage, set into motion through two additional elements of dynamics. These six elements of dynamics are then assembled into a single CLD, which is used to explore four scenarios for the unfolding or marginalisation of degrowth transformations against the process of capital accumulation. In short, as the journey progresses, this thesis assembles a power-centred theory of change for degrowth against the process of capital accumulation. It emphasises the importance of understanding and navigating these power dynamics for those willing to move towards a degrowth society.
Open Access
The Mismatch Thesis. Fiction and Reality in the Accumulation of Capital
(2023) Bichler, Shimshon; Nitzan, Jonathan
Political economists, both mainstream and Marxist, find it difficult to reconcile the «real» and «financial» appearances of capital. The conventional view is that «real» capital is an objective productive entity; that «finance» merely reflects this reality; and that, unfortunately, the reflection is often inaccurate, causing the two to «mismatch». This convention, we argue, is baseless if not fraudulent. First, although economists know full well that «real» capital, comprising different capital goods, cannot have a unique objective quantity – they measure this pseudo quantity anyway, arbitrarily. Second, when they realize that their arbitrary measure of «real» capital differs greatly from the corresponding magnitude of finance, they blame the deviation on invisible fluctuations in intangible capital, investor irrationality and market imperfections. And third, they insist that «real» accumulation drives «financial» accumulation, even though their own measures show that the two processes move in opposite directions!
Open Access
Unhealthy Profits
(2023) Mouré, Christopher; Gorsky, Shai
FROM THE ARTICLE: At the end of November 2023, the New York Times published an editorial: Why Are Nonprofit Hospitals Focused More on Dollars Than Patients? It is certainly a valid question. Most people might assume that not-for-profit (NFP) organisations focus on providing a public benefit rather than profit. At most, common wisdom suggests that any income derived from providing a service should be reinvested into expanding or improving the service. There is no obvious reason why a NFP should accumulate large profits over years. Yet in the NFP world of large US hospitals, profit, rather than public purpose, seems to have become the guiding light.
Open Access
Capital as Death Denial
(2023) Hager, Sandy Brian
Terror Management Theory (TMT) argues that subconscious fears about death shape our behaviour in often disturbing and destructive ways. Building on the work of Ernest Becker, the core theoretical claim of TMT is that human activity, including all forms of culture, is ‘…designed largely to avoid the fatality of death, to overcome it by denying in some way that it is the final destiny of man.’ Capitalism is unlike anything that preceded it, and this novelty stems from a specific behaviour amongst capitalists that leads to sustained growth: the routine reinvestment of profits in the anticipation of future profitability. What might this novel feature of capitalism have to do with death denial? What kind of phenomenological specificity is bound up with this historical specificity? My aim in this chapter is to tackle these questions, primarily through a comparison between the role of death in capitalism and the archaic gift economy. My argument can be summarised as follows. First, I place the archaic gift economy, organised around the redistribution and destruction of surplus, on the low end of the death denial continuum. Archaic economic activity is collective and sacred, actively involving the dead and death in order to make payable the existential debts that haunt us from the moment of biological birth. Cyclical time and periodic redemptive ritual are purposefully designed to prevent accumulation of anything, whether it be wealth, power, time, anxiety, or guilt. Second, I place the capitalist economy, organised around the routine reinvestment of surplus for profit, on the high end of the death denial continuum. With capitalism, economic activity is individualised and de-sacralised and the dead and death are banished, resulting in unpayable debts. Capital accumulation is the primary psychological defence mechanism, a power intended to stave off mortal dread. But because accumulation rests on linear time and is shorn of redemptive and sacrificial ritual, guilt and anxiety also start to accumulate. The system is driven by an endless and increasing neurotic charge. Third, I claim that since the 1970s, capitalist death denial has intensified. Structural transformations in the so-called ‘advanced’ economies over the past few decades have dissolved the remaining vestiges of collectivism in economic life and shattered any shared vision of social progress. The result is a disintegration of the remaining collective outlets needed to share, expiate, and to some extent relieve, the cumulative guilt and anxiety of capitalist life. Intensified death denial in the contemporary era finds its most spectacular manifestation in Silicon Valley’s quest for literal immortality. This privatised immortality project is a morbid escapism intended to hive the ruling class off from the irredeemable masses.
Open Access
Massaging the Message: How Oilpatch Newspapers Censor the News
(2023) Fix, Blair
FROM THE ARTICLE: In their book Manufacturing Consent, Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky argue that the mainstream media functions largely as a propaganda arm for the state. When the war drum beats, the corporate media tows the government’s line, censoring facts that don’t fit the official narrative. Outside of war, media bias is typically less overt. But to the careful observer, it can still be discerned. In this case, our careful observer is Canadian oil critic Regan Boychuk. Boychuk lives in Calgary — a prairie city that is famous for two things. Calgary hosts the world’s largest rodeo. And it is the corporate heart of the Canadian oil business. Calgary … home to cowboys and crude-oil CEOs. As you might guess, our story of media censorship is not about cowboys. Calgary’s main newspaper, the Herald, is staunchly pro-oil. And that means its editorial pages are filled with oilpatch jingoism. However, the rest of the paper is an archetype of neutral reporting. Just kidding. Unsurprisingly, the Herald’s pro-oil stance shapes the content that appears in the paper. This post takes a quantitative look at the editorial ‘curation’. Most of the heavy lifting has been done by Boychuk, who had the brilliant idea to track the reporting of environmental journalist Mike De Souza. Between November 2010 and July 2013, De Souza wrote a series of articles documenting scandals related to the Canadian oilpatch, and its staunch defender, the Harper government. At the time, De Souza was working for Postmedia, a news conglomerate that operated a wire service for its many subsidiaries. So when De Souza’s pieces were published, they were delivered to local papers like the Ottawa Citizen, the Edmonton Journal, and the Calgary Herald. Here’s the catch. Although owned by the same conglomerate, these local papers had leeway to edit (or shelve) their wire-service articles. The result, Boychuk realized, was a controlled setting to analyze media censorship. Earlier this year, Boychuk published his findings in a piece called ‘Proximity to Power: The oilpatch & Alberta’s major dailies’. My contribution here is mostly visual. I’ve taken Boychuk’s investigation and translated it into charts. The results largely speak for themselves. As De Souza’s articles approached the center of Canadian oil-and-gas power in Calgary, they were increasingly gutted, and their message changed. It’s a fascinating case study of how business interests shape the news.
Open Access
Does the US Tax Code Encourage Market Concentration? An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of the Corporate Tax Structure on Profit Shares and Shareholder Payouts
(2023) Hager, Sandy Brian; Baines, Joseph
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Concerns about the market power of large corporations are growing. There are good reasons why monopoly now features so prominently on the political and economic agenda. Mounting evidence shows that corporate concentration stifles innovation and investment, resulting in lower-quality goods and services and less economic dynamism. Concentration is also a catalyst for rising wealth and income inequality, as monopolistic firms are able to suppress workers’ wages and charge consumers higher prices. Most of the public policy debate has been focused on the role of antitrust law in combating the monopolistic practices of large corporations. But recently, the focus has shifted somewhat, as more and more people come to recognize the role of federal and state-level taxation in understanding corporate concentration in the US. Yet, there are still many questions about the effect of taxation on market structure: Is there a tax advantage associated with bigness, as measured by revenues? If so, is this advantage confined to a few “bad apples” or is it widespread among large corporations? What role do the domestic and foreign tax systems play in encouraging monopoly power? What does an analysis of the relationship between tax and monopoly tell us about wider macroeconomic shifts in the US economy over the past few decades? The purpose of this brief is to address these questions by analyzing and comparing the overall effects of the US tax code on the profit share of large and smaller corporations. Our analysis reveals a striking tax advantage for big business in the US. Specifically, we find that the total post-tax profit share of the top 10 percent of listed corporations since the mid-1980s is consistently and significantly higher than their total pre-tax profit share, indicating that the overall tax structure (domestic and foreign) fuels profit concentration at the top of the corporate hierarchy. For example, in the most recent period covered in our analysis, 2019–2022, the overall tax structure has boosted the post-tax profit share of large corporations by 2.32 percentage points relative to their pre-tax share. We then assess the contribution of different tax jurisdictions to concentration by estimating the pre-tax and post-tax profit shares of large corporations, domestically and internationally. Here, our analysis reveals that the domestic tax structure is especially influential in driving concentration. Over the past four decades, the domestic post-tax profits of large corporations have been much larger than their pre-tax share, with the domestic tax structure augmenting the profit share of large corporations by 3.79 percentage points in 2019–2022. The effect of the foreign tax structure on profit concentration is more ambiguous. In most periods it is either slightly positive or slightly negative. For 2019–2022, the foreign post-tax profit share of large corporations was 0.87 percentage points higher than their pre-tax share. Based on these findings, we argue that the tax structure, especially the domestic tax structure, plays a crucial but still underappreciated role in exacerbating the monopoly problem. We go on to consider the wider consequences for the US economy of big business’s tax advantage. The political justification for corporate tax cuts—including those that were part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017—is that they would free up money for companies to invest in productive capacity, in turn generating higher employment and wages. But as our analysis shows, the capital expenditures of large corporations tend to decrease, not increase, when their tax advantage grows. Instead of fueling productive investment, the tax savings of large corporations are principally used to pay out dividends and buy back their own stock. This means that large corporations are less disposed to investments that may indirectly benefit ordinary workers and more disposed to shareholder value enhancement that directly benefits the asset-rich. Overall, we find that the tax system contributes in crucial ways to rising corporate concentration and to widening inequality among households. With the objective of leveling the playing field, our findings offer powerful justification for the restoration of graduated statutory corporate income tax rates in the US alongside a global minimum effective tax rate of 25 percent and a graduated excise tax on share buybacks. The monopoly problem has become endemic to US capitalism, and corporate tax reform on its own will not solve it. Yet one clear advantage of taxation is that it has a direct, and therefore much more easily discernible, effect on distributive outcomes compared to other policy measures. A more holistic approach, combining corporate tax reform with more robust antitrust regulation, the strengthening of workers’ rights, and increased public ownership in key sectors, is needed to build an economy based on equity, fairness, and prosperity for all.
Open Access
הקפיטליזציה של סרטי הקולנוע (The Capitalization of Movies)
(2023) Nitzan, Jonathan; Bichler, Shimshon
תוך פחות מארבעים שנה הצליחו בעלי הסרטים לא רק להכפיל את הריכוזיות לנקודה שבה כ-90% מהכנסות הסרטים מתקבלות מ-10% בלבד מכלל הסרטים, אלא גם לצמצם פי ארבעה את הסיכון הדיפרנציאלי של רווחיהם • מתוך ספרם של יהונתן ניצן ושמשון ביכלר, ההון ושברו.
Open Access
The Billionaire Boom: Capital as Power and the Distribution of Wealth
(2022) Popcevski, Natasha
FROM THE CHAPTER: During the pandemic, the world’s billionaires increased their net worth to unprecedented historical heights. This was an impressive feat for the world’s richest, who took to celebrations by launching themselves into outer space, hosted factory mega-raves, and perhaps more prudently sailed away from the virus on their mega-yachts during the mass suffering caused by the global health crisis. Whether billionaires have profited during the pandemic, or whether billionaires have profited from the pandemic may be difficult to detect with any certainty. However, we know that the accumulation of billionaire wealth has transcended previous orders of magnitude set before the crisis. In this chapter, I use the capital as power framework to argue that ownership and exclusion (institutional power) rather than individual productivity or the exploitation of workers can help us account for the rise of the billionaire class and its increase in wealth throughout the pandemic. However, although ownership and exclusion are key factors in the rapid accumulation of wealth, so too have the unprecedented fiscal stimulus and loose monetary policy of governments and central banks during the pandemic. At least in the United States, there is some survey evidence to suggest that a considerable amount of stimulus checks given by the Biden administration ended up in financial markets, boosting share prices, and thus the wealth of billionaire shareholders like Elon Musk of Tesla. This chapter considers two additional main factors: The turn to neoliberalism and rapid technological change. To demonstrate my argument, I have divided this chapter in the following manner. First, I consider the rise of the billionaire class before and during the pandemic. Second, I consider the neoclassical and Marxist understandings of the distribution of wealth and contrast this with the capital as a power perspective before discussing some of the reasons for the rise in billionaire wealth. In the third section, I briefly consider whether billionaires should exist and canvass some recent proposals to address the divide between billionaires and the vast majority of citizens. The chapter then ends with a short conclusion.
Open Access
Teknojätit ja pääoman vallankäyttö (Techno giants and the use of power by capital)
(2023) Mouré, Christopher
Pääoma valtana -viitekehys, jonka on kehittänyt Jonathan Nitzan ja Shimshon Bichler, esittää että liiketoiminnan tavoite ei ole ‘liikevoiton maksimointi’ vaan differentiaalinen yhteiskunnallisen vallan akkumulointi. Tätä viitekehystä teoreettisena lähtökohtana käyttäen analysoin Googlen ja Microsoftin vallan akkumulointistrategioita. Esitän kvalitatiivista ja kvantitatiivista näyttöä, josta käy ilmi, että huolimatta siitä että Google ja Microsoft tällä hetkellä saavat suurimman osan liikevoitostaan erillisestä liiketoiminnasta (ja näin perinteisen logiikan mukaan ne eivät ole toistensa suoranaisia kilpailijoita), nämä kaksi yritystä ovat kuitenkin kilpasilla keskenään tietojenkäsittelyteollisuuden kontrollista.
Open Access
"על חמישים שנות בדידות: ספרו של אודי אדיב "המהפכה שלא הייתה (Fifty Years of Solitude: Udi Adiv's Book "The Revolution that Never Was")
(2023) Bichler, Shimshon; Nitzan, Jonathan
בליל חורף קר של שנת 1972 פרצו כעשרים אנשי שב"כ ומשטרה לדירה בהדר הכרמל בחיפה ועצרו את אודי אדיב וחברתו, לאה לשם. כך נפתח ספר הזיכרונות של אודי אדיב, המהפכה שלא הייתה. זאת הייתה תחילתה של פרשה מתוקשרת אשר הגיעה לשיאה במשפטים שנערכו לחברי "הרשת היהודית-ערבית", שבסופם אודי אדיב נמצא אשם בין השאר בבגידה ובריגול ונשלח למאסר ממושך של 17 שנה (שהוקלו מאוחר יותר ל-12 שנים). שרשרת המעצרים ומשפטי הראווה של אודי וחבריו זכו לסיקור יומיומי מנופח מצד כלל אגפי התקשורת הישראלית של אותה תקופה. יש לזכור כי נפלאות התבונה האינטרנטית טרם התגלו, ורשתות המחשבה הלא מגויסת עדיין לא הומצאו. עיקרי התקשורת היו אז עיתונות כתובה, מפלגתית ו"לא מפלגתית", שלוש תחנות רדיו בבעלות ממשלתית ישירה וערוץ טלוויזיה ממלכתי אחד פטריוטי גאה, שנאשם תדיר על ידי מפלגות הליכוד, המתנחלים והחרדים ב"שמאלנות". אבל במקרה זה נוצר לראשונה בישראל קונצנזוס חמים מימין וממה שכינו אז שמאל: אדיב וחבריו הינם סמל ומשל לאויבי העם, אוהבי ערבים, קומוניסטים שונאי ישראל. הם תוצאת החינוך המתקדם כביכול של הקיבוצים השמאלנים. הם "תלושים מערכי היהדות" וסובלים מ"שנאה עצמית". התברר גם שמקור הרעה הוא תנועת "מצפן" הבוגדנית. ממנה צמחו העשבים השוטים. עד מהרה הפך המשפט למסע הסתה נגד כל דעה המעזה לבקר את עצם מדיניות החוץ והביטחון הישראלית, התוהה אחר מדיניות הכיבוש וההתנחלויות שניהלה אז ממשלת מפלגת העבודה, המטילה ספק בהיסטוריה הציונית הרשמית, או המזכירה חלילה את קיומה של האומה הפלסטינית, שלא לדבר על רמז לניסיון הידברות מדינית עם נציגי התנועות הפוליטיות הפלסטיניות….
Open Access
Stocking Up on Wealth … Concentration
(2023) Fix, Blair
There’s an old joke that economics is too important to be left to economists. In the same vein, I think rich people are too important to be left to the self-help industry. Yes, the popular appeal of you-can-get-rich-too books is obvious. But what’s not obvious is why so few social scientists study wealth.1 Clearly, the public thirsts for serious inquiries about the rich. (Thomas Piketty’s opus on inequality was a bestseller.) But for the most part, social scientists are content to focus on ‘poverty’ and let the self-help gurus wax about ‘wealth’. The irony, in my view, is that poverty and wealth are two sides of the same coin. Concentrated wealth begets concentrated poverty. Still, there is an asymmetry between the two extremes. As a rule, poor people have little power, which means they cannot be blamed for their own poverty. But almost by definition, the rich wield power to their own benefit, which means they create the conditions of their own opulence … and everyone else’s misery. Given their power over society, I find myself on a research kick studying rich people. This post concludes the binge with a look at what drives wealth concentration among the richest Americans. I find that there’s a straight line between wealth concentration, corporate consolidation, and the strategy of ‘buying, not building’. In short, Peter Thiel is correct when he says that ‘competition is for losers’.
Open Access
When Stocks Go Up Who Benefits?
(2023) Fix, Blair
Cui bono? For whose benefit? Think of this question as a sword — a sharp piece of steel that cuts through bullshit. In this post, we’ll use it to slice through business-press bullshit about the stock market. You know the stuff — the ubiquitous puff pieces that gush about rising stock prices, as though they benefit everyone. When we ask cui bono, we carve through this BS. We discover that for most people, rising stocks are a tool not for gain, but for administering pain. Looking at the United States, I find that when stocks go up, the vast majority of people see their share of income (and wealth) decline. So here’s the truth about the stock market: it’s a socially sanctioned way to take from the poor and give to the rich.
Open Access
The Great Gatsby Curve Among America’s Über Rich
(2023) Fix, Blair
Economists are not known for their literary imaginations. Flip through any economics textbook and you’ll find a barrage of terms like the ‘Philips curve’ and the ‘Fisher effect’. The jargon is simple enough — empirical relations are usually named after the person who discovered them. But this convention is neither descriptive nor fun. The exception to this vanilla naming practice is a pattern called the ‘Great Gatsby curve’.1 It’s named after F. Scott Fitzgerald’s famous book The Great Gatsby, which explores the roiling inequality and tumultuous class dynamics of the 1920s. The Great Gatsby curve is an empirical relation between social inequality and social mobility. As inequality rises, social mobility tends to decline. In this post, we’ll look at the The Great Gatsby curve among America’s über rich. As it turns out, these folks are not immune from inequality. Nor are they immune from an ossifying social ladder. In other words, among America’s richest people, the Great Gatsby curve is alive and well.
Open Access
How the Rich Get Richer
(2023) Fix, Blair
The rich get richer. It’s a phrase that packs a lot of punch. It’s potent rhetoric, yet surprisingly accurate at describing how rising inequality plays out. Of course, there’s nothing inevitable about the rich getting richer. We just happen to live in an age of growing corporate despotism. And our friends at Forbes have been there to document the disease. Forbes. Forbes who loves the free market. Forbes who loves obscene wealth. Forbes … the unwitting social scientist? When Malcolm Forbes started publishing his rich list — the Forbes 400 — back in 1982, he surely wasn’t intending to do social science. By all accounts, Forbes simply loved opulence, and wanted to celebrate those who had the most of it. It was part of a 1980s trend that fetishized obscene fortunes. For the middle class, there was the saccharine show ‘Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous’, which exalted the excesses of elite living. But for the upper class there was something less crass — a list that ignored the material trappings of wealth. It was called the Forbes 400, and it did nothing but report the raw numbers of capitalism — the capitalized wealth of the richest Americans. In hindsight, Malcolm Forbes’ obsession with wealth seems ominous — kind of like the Sackler’s claim that OxyContin wasn’t addictive. But while Malcolm Forbes certainly cheerled the excesses of modern capitalism, he (and his magazine successors) also left an exquisite record of how US elites enriched themselves. Sure, the enrichment left a big mess. But for the moment, let’s forget about cleaning it up and instead, investigate how it happened. Come, let’s look at how the American rich got richer.
Open Access
Billionaires are so Predictable
(2023) Fix, Blair
Have you ever wondered what it takes to become a billionaire? Do you need rare genius? Exceptional acumen? Miraculous foresight? An uncompromising work ethic? On all four counts, the answer is no. It turns out that to become a billionaire, what you really need is the right social setting. You need to live in a society that is suitably rich and appropriately unequal. Without those things, your chances of wearing the billionaire badge are low. In this post, I’ll do the math. Using data from Forbes, I’ll show you how the billionaire headcount varies across countries. Then I’ll show you how to predict this variation. Forget about character traits and personal histories. We don’t need them. To predict how many billionaires a country has, we can get surprisingly far just by knowing the distribution of income.