[These notes were prepared by H. S. Harris and used as the basis of his oral lectures to his students. He had no intention of writing a book about Hegel’s logical works. However he did have his daughter prepare a word document from his handwritten manuscript in two notebooks. He was anxious to provide them to anyone who may be interested. Somehow he misplaced the notes he prepared for his first lecture that provided a background and overview; they were not included in the file sent to his daughter. He did permit J. Devin to copy these notes that have been inserted where appropriate. The Course description read: “Detailed study of the final version of the Encyclopedia Logic (1831), the background in German Idealism will be sketched. It will be one main object of the inquiry to reach some tentative conclusions about the purpose and function of Hegel’s Logic.” These notes were written for the study of G.W.F. Hegel: The Encyclopedia Logic, translated by T. F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting and H.S. Harris; Indianapolis, Hackett, 1991. Each paragraph of the notes like the Hegel text itself is numbered. Many paragraphs have Remarks [R] and others have both Remarks and Additions [A]. There are no notes for 26 to 78 of the Preliminary Conception as Professor Harris was required to be selective both to complete the analysis of the Hegel text and to allow time for student seminar presentations and discussion. These sections are Hegel’s reworking of what he had done in the Phenomenology of Spirit that was the subject of a multi-year course that Harris had given previously. He did encourage his students to read these sections and referred them to other commentaries such as An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel by Errol E. Harris, University Press of America, Lanham MD, 1983, pp.47 - 82, Hegel’s Logic. An Essay in Interpretation by J. G. Hibben, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1902, reprinted Garland, 1983. The reader may also find help in Hegel: Phenomenology and System by H.S. Harris, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1995. It is important that the user of these lecture notes have the Encyclopedia Logic at hand for reference. There are also a few references to other commentators such as Mure and the reference for this can be found in the Hackett translation. The Glossary in the Hackett will also be helpful for the German.]

[BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW]
[What follows are notes prepared by Harris that provided an outline for his first oral lecture on September 13, 1993 with additional elaboration of themes to be discussed.]
Background for Hegel’s Encyclopedia Logic [opening lecture notes.]

1. - What is “Speculative Philosophy”?
   a) dogmatic speculation
   b) the empiricist-critical reaction

2. - What is “Philosophical Logic”?
   a) the logic of “experience” (Phenomenology)
      (i) the sensible world
      (ii) perceptual consciousness
      (iii) the understanding
      (iv) the observation of “life”
   b) the logic of pure thinking
      Two poles:
      (i) the finite self
      (ii) “God” or “the Absolute Being”

   Both to be kept in mind at all times.

3¹ - Stages of Method
   (i) fixity of understanding
   (ii) Dialectical motion (contradiction)
   (iii) speculative reconciliation

3¹ - Stages of result:
   (i) Being
   (ii) Essence
   (iii) Concept

   There is a parallel between method and result that shows up in the character of the progressive motion:

   (a) In “Being” the understanding is forced to roll over from one unitary category to the next.

   (b) In “Essence” two explicitly complimentary opposites produce a dialectical motion to a new conceptual pair. Every category has two sides.

   (c) In the “Concept” every category is a circular process in which the two sides are united by a middle. This mediation or reconciling process is what Hegel calls “Syllogism”.
4. The Absolute Idea is the syllogism of “pure thought thinking itself as method” – this is what “Pure Being” develops into.

LOGIC is the self-development of pure thinking – thinking in concepts that are beyond sense experience – to overcome the standpoint of consciousness – to absolute knowing – for pure thinking.

There are 3 versions of Hegel’s Encyclopedia

First - 1817 - very short and compact and presupposes the Phenomenology of Spirit.

Second - 1827 - lengthy introduction about 3 attitudes of thought toward objectivity that is a history of philosophy from Descartes and Wolff to Hegel’s own time.

Third - 1830 - the final edition that is a somewhat revised and augmented version of the second edition.

The old metaphysics before Kant includes the dogmatic metaphysics of Leibniz and Wolff. Spinoza - systemizing Descartes. Leibniz - correcting errors of Spinoza.

The empirical thinking of the English is a critical reaction to rationalism and scholasticism.

The critical philosophy is that of Kant.

Then there is the immediate knowing of God (Jacobi).

Descartes proceeds from the self to God and then the world.

Spinoza proceeds from the world to the self and then to God.

For Hegel his Logic replaces the old philosophical theology.

His Philosophy of Nature replaces natural philosophy/cosmology.

His Philosophy of Spirit replaces psychology.

English Thought

Berkeley - the order of nature is God speaking to us. Nature is God’s language.

Hume - Do we know anything about how our experiences are caused? But - there is a propensity to make deductions/connections that is conditioned (custom). We do not understand it at all. We learn by experience.
Kant

How can we do this learning if there is not [unless there is] a rational mind with the ability to organize by concepts – the capacity to organize sense experience into one world through the 12 categories. The categories are a priori – the predispositions to interpret the world - to make one world.

Kant recognized that the organization of experience is rational, i.e., that there are certain common structures for there to be one common world and for one to be able to talk about it at all. This is Kant’s reorganization of Berkeley – a world in which matter is a fundamental component. Kant also takes over Hume’s commonsensical view – the instinctive beliefs from which we cannot escape.

Jacobi

He replaces rational critical and post-critical thought with Hume’s “belief” – the ordinary world of finite experience is actually based on a kind of faith that we find we have to have = God. We know God is there and is the foundation of our shared life – the doctrine of faith ... cultured bound ... Whose faith? – the interpretation of one’s religious experience becomes everyone’s immediate experience.

In the Encyclopedia Logic of 1817 Hegel is arguing with Jacobi who died in 1816. In the Encyclopedia Logic of 1827 Hegel is arguing with Schleiermacher who viewed the experience of dependency to get to the point of immediacy ... the immediate being ... God. But the concept of God has been painfully constructed over centuries. For Schleiermacher the absolute is somehow available to us as the immediate awareness of experience.

What is Speculative Philosophy?

In general it is the post-Kantian replacement of the old dogmatic metaphysics. Logic replaces the old metaphysics. Hegel does accept/agree that philosophy is about experience – only about experience.

Kant limited knowledge in order to make room for faith. Faith is a mode of experience that cannot become knowledge – it has God as its object and material. What are we to say about this?

Hegel tried to write first a logic of experience including religious experience to the time of Protestant Christian theology in the Phenomenology of Spirit. He refuses to admit that things that are believed cannot be known. He is a Pythagorean in that what we think through the concept of experience we make everything part of this continuum. God is the limit concept for the continuum.
[The concept of God? What does it mean? Cf. Phenomenology of Spirit, Miller par.60. What does the believer mean or refer to in believing in God?] At the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit God is the rational totality of human experience. At the beginning we do not know what subjectivity is but at the end we know that it is the subjectivity of the human community living or dead - it is the human community that transcends time both past and future. [Humanity - human being with its proper world/environment. Hegel’s concept of experience is man in time - man in the world.]

Hegel’s set of categories is not Kant’s twelve categories that just replace the table of judgments. Hegel’s forms of experience embrace/start from sense-certainty and comprehend the whole of human history: the selfhood of Descartes - the comprehension of death - finite and mortal selves that do not last - these are not real metaphysical substances known to God --- the nearest substance is the communities we build.

The logic of pure thinking that knows the community of the living and the dead - pure thought - for it to be comprehensible we have to think purely - to bring the finite spirit/the single intellect/the philosopher - to bring into identity with God as the object of pure thinking. [Finite self - embodied, mortal being, being ale it must die. The Hegelian self - I am alive therefore I am not VS. Descartes - I think therefore I am.]

In the Phenomenology of Spirit through a history of human experience Hegel sets aside the name of God that becomes the intellectual community - now we must do it rationally/intellectually.

1. name of God – being – infinite self
2. finite self – nothing – the unhappy consciousness – the being that counts, suffers, and feels.
3. the name of God again.

But nothing is also a name of God – the nirvana experience – the finite is the positive – then negative theology – the infinite is known as an engulfing negative.

In the progression of the categories – (its role in the progress to replace Kant) there are 3 stages as far as the method is concerned:


The attempt of the understanding to fix the categories fails. Cf. Hegel’s The Encyclopedia Logic, Hackett, pp. 125-134 entitled “More Precise Conception and Division of the Logic”.

↓

The dialectical motion

↓

Speculative reconciliation

The method comprehends itself. The Logic reaches its climax when pure thinking comprehends these three stages.

First stage – the logic of being - its motion changes to nothing.
Second stage – **essence** - dialectically positive & negative. You cannot have the concept of positive without the negative concept. You cannot have the concept of appearance or reality without the concept of what is not reality.

**Third stage** – of the **result** – the logic of the concept that is itself the motion – from one side to the other with no paradox.

The three stages of method are connected to the three stages of the result. Opposites give place to another pair of opposites – but a richer pair – **two sides** of a concept rolling over into a category with **two sides**.

Every category is a circular process - **the mediating/reconciling process is a syllogism**.

*The Absolute Idea* is pure thought thinking itself as method [for Aristotle God is thought thinking itself].
Reconciling all the concepts we need for experience – the **Logic** is God thinking himself.

*The Encyclopedia* as a whole may have a comforting effect on the pious but the **logic** is disturbing as a method of thinking. Is God just the human mind as in Feuerbach or is God a cunning and useful projection of the governing class as for Marx?

The absolute process is the same as the process of the finite mind. *The Phenomenology* gives the right idea - the idea of God originates as the human community attempts to make sense of itself in the whole – God becoming identical to the human community of rational knowers.

None of us could be the rational beings we are without a set of fixed concepts -
Rational being [rational being] is a moral goal - a hard path – Fichte.

Today there is a global market and supernatual powers – global corporations – multi-national corporations – and there are national governments and international organizations. Today there are no self-sufficient states and cultures are getting together or mixed up in one another.

We are becoming aware of what we cannot do? Are we social rebels like the left Hegelians?

Selfhood (Fichte) is not a fact but an achievement and we are always uncertain that it will hold – like Bradley it is very fragile and not substantial.

We could not be selves at all without the structures of the human community (communities).

*The theological side of the Logic* : the absolute has transformed itself into the ideal human community – **our now** – philosophically comprehended or philosophy comprehends itself.
We would have no hope of being selves without the community. [Thrasymachus – getting ahead of everybody else.]

*The Logic is the structure of the rational self in the rational community.*

We produce together and share together -- to understand the foundations of the human personality.

God = universal love & universal forgiveness. We can sense/ or realize the support that comes from or which we all need – forgiveness.
Table of Contents for the Encyclopedia Logic and these Lecture Notes

I. Introduction [1 - 18]
II. Preliminary Conception [19 - 83] No Notes for 26 - 78
III. The Doctrine of Being [84 - 111]
IV. The Doctrine of Essence [112 - 159]
V. The Doctrine of the Concept [160 - 244]

Introduction

§1 Like religion, Philosophy deals with truth simply: i.e. first with God. Cannot presuppose Gegenstände (of consciousness) as religion does, or the method of cognition (which is not that of simple consciousness à la Jacobi). Must construct its Gegenstand according to its own method. Like religion it goes from God to the finite, to nature and human life. This implies that Logic is theory of God. But that means that "God" is finally the method of philosophical thinking.

This presuppositionless science is allowed to (must) "presuppose" everything non-logical -- e.g. all of our acquaintance (Bekanntschaft) with the religious tradition. In constructing logical science we have all our experience available in the form of Vorstellungen. But (as logical) our construction must be logically necessary; and how can
the **beginning** be necessary? This is logically impossible. (The beginning must be chosen with an eye on our Vorstellung of God as the **end**. It **becomes** logical when beginning and end are joined. Hence the Aristotle quote at end of the *Encyclopaedia*.)

§2 For the science of experience philosophy is marked out from other studies as the science of pure thinking. **Pure** thinking is different from empirical cognition or practical thought, because what is known is known **universally**. For anything **within** the science of consciousness the experience is necessary. For logic the argument constitutes the experience. Logic is not Nachdenken. We are not going to prove that God is. We are going to discover what He is by constructive thinking. (Proof impossible, God self-evident.)

§3 Three levels of conscious thinking -- see note 3, p. 310. Notice that we do begin from Jacobi's "God" as immediately known. But we don't have to **call** him that. Pure thinking is difficult because unfamiliar. We must **practise** it (955). Can we think what we mean by "The leaf is green"?
§4 For ordinary finite consciousness the question is "Do we need pure thinking?" For "infinite" consciousness the question is "Can we achieve pure thinking?" (Infinite = Religious.)

§5 In moving from ordinary consciousness we have to begin with Nachdenken. But this sets up an absolute prejudice against the pure thinking that goes beyond it.

§6 What we are thinking about is the process of feeling and reflection by which we have formed our concept of the actual world. We must think about experience as a movement in which the actual appears. The actuality that produces experience is exactly what we mean by Reason. It deserves that name because it is what becomes known to itself in our pure (universal) thought. Of course, we have to know whether what we are conscious of is a serious (universally significant) actuality or not; and we only find that out by observing and putting things together over time. (Thus the Hegelian doctrine of actuality leads us to Peirce's conceptual pragmatism.)

§7 Nachdenken contains the principle of pure thinking in so far as it is practically religious (aiming to bring us to
union with God. (Hence reference to Luther.) Natural Science is "philosophy" because it is part of this way to "God" -- as self-comprehension, not as the increase of uncomprehended power. (Notice how unLutheran this twist is.) Social theory (Grotius) is next higher stage.

§8 But beyond these spheres of finite experience, we find the experiences of freedom, Spirit, God. We must reverse the definition of experience "Nothing in intellect that was not in sense" and say "Nothing in sense that was not in intellect." In other words we must recognize our own interpretive activity as primary in experience.

§9 Speculative thinking begins as the reflective comprehension of this necessary inversion. "Necessity" in experience arises from the fact that logical interpretation is primitive. We can only have experience by conceiving it. But our concept is free; we can change it, it develops.

§10 The pure thinking (consciousness in speculation) which provides our frame of interpretation evolves logically. This becomes evident when we concentrate attention on the infinite objects: freedom (our own speculative thought),
Spirit (the path or process of development) and "God" (the concept-experience of Absolute Spirit at which we arrive).

We should not be put off by critical fears that we cannot do speculative thinking. We must learn by doing, just as one learns to swim. (Whether the critique of Kant himself is justified is not important. It is obvious enough that the Critical Philosophy was used this way by religious intuitionists and sceptics.) Dewey's pragmatism and all modern historical relativism -- e.g. Rorty -- is return to Reinhold. But the conceptual pragmatism of Peirce is not -- because of its foundation in Platonic realism; my Hegel reading adds the "true infinite" dimension to his "pragmatic maxim."

§11 Once we start thinking, the experience itself won't let us stop till we reach this good infinite self-comprehension of what we are doing. The dialectic happens, and the contradictions leave us dissatisfied till we get there.

§12 This felt need generates philosophy. We begin from our experience, by negating its finite aspect. What is the "essence" that appears in all this? This is a question at a different level from the empirical quest for patterns of finite phenomena. When we find an answer we do not mind about all the detailed patterns. But soon critics begin asking us to move back and show how the details fit in. "It
is" or "Everything flows" is not enough (note the reference of Pure Being -- Parmenides; and Becoming -- Heracleitus). Thus it is experience that generates development.

§13 So the history of philosophy exhibits the logic of philosophy (but Hegel gets the history wrong by following logic. Parmenides wrote his poem after the Heracleitean teaching was known).

§14 In the systematic philosophy of self-conscious speculative thinking the historical process is presented, set free from its empirical bodily envelope. (Here we can see clearly that what we are reading is the Introduction to the Encyclopaedia as a whole. But §135 shows that we can choose a less than perfectly self-conscious system, as long as it is a system that relates "God" and "human thinking." What will be interesting to consider is how non-systematic philosophizing appears when we see it in the context of the self-conscious system that identifies itself with its historical genesis.) Can it be scientific? Certainly it need not be subjectively personal (as Hegel assumes).
§15 Each proper part of the system is a self-closed circle. (Is there an implication for non-systematic inquiries here? I think so.) The system is a circle of circles.

§16 In the Encyclopaedia everything is reduced to the minimum necessary. It can be expanded as far as we can make the discussion of each part conceptually circular.

We cannot systematize everything. Application to particular cases e.g. -- or decisions in practical sciences such as jurisprudence. Nature is impotent, History is free.

Sciences are also positive because content to stay in finite sphere, and avoid dialectical transitions to another level. There is a commonsensical philosophy that does this. But sometimes speculative insight (and dialectic) can be discovered in what takes itself to be the philosophy of Understanding.

§17 Here Hegel shows how the presupposition of the beginning is overcome. We should note that with respect to the empirical presupposing of thinking as the topic (Gegenstand). He does not begin explicitly with thinking (or the "I think"), but with the most universal thought (is/is not).

§18 No commentary needed.
**Preliminary Conception**

§19  Since a philosophical science is a circle (because its logic must be circular in order to make itself presuppositionless), Hegel can only give us a Preliminary Conclusion of Logic by anticipating the end of the development (which has returned to the beginning).

Logic is the science of the pure Ideal. Real Philosophy is the science of the completely actualized Idea. Hence quote from Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* [Book Lambda] XII 7 1072b 18-30 at end of *Philosophy of Spirit*. Pure Idea is the Concept (of thinking) thinking itself: Real Idea is World knowing itself (cf. Thomist interpretation of Metaphysics [Book Lambda] Xii 5 -- see notes on §20 first paragraph.

Philosophical thinking is difficult because we are not used to it. Easy because both elementary and necessary. Difficulty is overcome by practice; and we are forming (structuring) our own minds by this practice. Equipping ourselves to interpret the world -- or (if it is actual experience that does that) we are making ourselves consciously aware of what we do in the interpreting of our world. It is not useful in the ordinary instrumental sense; but as the self-comprehension of our rational activity it is what is most useful to us. [See 20A at end.]

§19A  Topic (Gegenstand) is truth. God is "the truth" (cf. A² below). Unhappy Consciousness. is gone, and presumption
of the Beautiful Soul is come. (For historical background, Fries etc., see note 1, p. 312). The young will only make a new world if they take on the task of recollecting the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. We must not be cynically sceptical; and we must not be timid or lazy (1820?).

§19A2 Thinking is either **subjective** (as in stream of consciousness thought) or **objective** (when we are focusing our minds on "what is"). Kierkegaard calls that "subjectivity" too -- but he is simply using "subjective" two ways. Hegel agrees with that use too (the Absolute is **Subject**). But he wants to rule out the subjectivity of **feeling** and immediately intuitive knowing. Cognitive feeling has a **content**; that content must be **discursively developed**. Even formal logic teaches us to recognize something higher. [See 20A.]

§19A3 All the **spiritual** interests of life drive us to philosophical logic. But thinking overthrows assumptions (Sophists, Socrates, Aristophanes' *Clouds*). Unhappy Consciousness followed; Jacobi etc. are return of Unhappy Consciousness. (See note 4, p. 312.)

§19 cont. **Thinking** (begins with more commentary on 19)

The **Idea** (as pure) is the Concept that has completed its motion, and has come to rest in self-comprehension. It comes to Hegel from **Kant**, as the concept that cannot be instantiated, and sets up dialectic when we think about it;
and to Kant from Plato. Hegel restores the Platonic sense (in his own interpretation of it) and accepts the dialectic in Kant's sense. But the **dialectic** belongs to the Concept. Plato taught that everything participates in the Ideas, so far as it has being (and ultimately in the Idea of the Good so far as it is rational). When the Hegelian Idea **realizes** itself it is the **comprehending** of everything within the Idea of the Good.

§20  **Thinking**, as subjective, is the making of a concept or a logical chain of concepts. It produces a world of universals, and it is the active universals.

Consciousness relates to its world in lots of other ways (sensation, intuition, imagination etc.). The concrete universal that **actuates itself** in thinking is what we call "consciousness," "the mind" etc. It is what contains and comprehends our "universe." The Ich.

§20R  The sensible object is **singular**. Only the sign-token is a proper singular in the operation of thought. Representative thinking uses these tokens to refer to sensible contents; but these contents are **types** (not singulars) in **my memory**; and representation can deal with what never was properly singular -- e.g. custom, law, God, freedom, thinking. The represented type has a pure thought as its content. The typing **isolates** it; so that can be **defined** (or characterized) by the addition of other isolated
types. "God" is the "Creator" etc. This stringing together of types is Understanding.

But "singularity" and "externality" are again universal thoughts (concepts not properly isolatable things. Thought overgrasps things.) Everything that is in our experience exists in the context of our thoughtful interpretation. All is within the Ich. But the Ich is not personal to me, for it comprehends you, and you comprehend me in it, just as much as I do you. It is mine personally (or yours), because I can think for myself (or you for yourselves).

§20A Begins with repetition. Discussion of formal logic belongs rather to §19A² or to further comment on §19R.

§21 Thinking-over, reflective thinking develops the experience of some Gegenstand of consciousness. By reflection (including observation) we discover the essence of the Sache.

§21A Example: This rose is ---? (red) to a child.

Example 2: What do I want? How do I achieve it?

Example 3: What ought I to do here? What is the rule, requirement, etc.

Example 4: Scientific hypothesis: Why is lightning followed by thunder? Individuals die, but kind abides; stars have courses. That there is order is faith of spirit, instinctive object of thoughtful quest. But these unities
exist only in the intellect. "God" is the objective sum of them.

§22 Thinking-over changes what is there for consciousness. It grows.

§22A Practical example: Athens is on the brink of civil war. Solon thinks up a solution. See §21A² but Solon is not solving his own personal problem: "What do we want?" he says. Even to know this he must put his own head to work. The thing itself is the result of his interpretation and remedy-solution being accepted by the rest of the "We." Kant and his critical followers say we cannot know the thing in itself. But common sense knows better, because in the realm of spiritual activity we make the "thing itself." The spirit leads us into all truth. (We have to ask the Critics: "What do you mean by 'knowing the thing in itself'? What does God supposedly know that you don't?")

§23 Thinking-over is my personal private activity. I produce the truth by my own free activity.

§23R I cannot think for someone else. My language is only sound-tokens (or mark-tokens) of thought for her (and hers for me). Interpretation of the tokens (and of the sense-certain world in which they occur) is a free activity. The "making-mine" of the world is the activity of thinking as the concrete universal. But logical interpretation is the free striving away from what is subjective (Pirandello,
Henry IV) towards what is objective (universally valid for I as We). I can use my freedom to be free from my particular self. (Being like God -- Aristotle.)

§24 Thoughts that are universally shared as necessary acts of interpretation in structuring the world are objective. These are the content of ontology (theory of being) which is the original topic of metaphysics. So philosophical logic is the true metaphysics.

§24R Saying that the old metaphysics is now recognized to be logic means that ontological interpretation should be structured in the language of logic: Concept, Judgement, Syllogism. This is what we mean (or ought to mean) when we call Hegel's philosophy idealism. But this should be seen not as invalidating the more traditional type of ontological (metaphysical) inquiry -- e.g. Quine -- but as revalidating it, by providing the proper post-Kantian logical frame for it. Thus Quine is not "wrong." What he says is not "false." But he has his questions in the wrong order. When we get them back into the right order, then we see his work as a contribution to the labour of spirit's self-comprehension of its world. That is what Hegel means by insisting that all true philosophy is idealism. Objective idealism is the interpretive discovery of the understandable structure of the world, the Reason in it, that makes sense of it. (About the "final solution" for example, we must say first that it exemplifies Reason as the negative freedom
that goes to the death; and that like the Terror it can only realize itself as the contradiction of itself as the Good. Then we inquire how and why it happened -- just as Hegel did for the Terror.)

§24A¹ That there is Reason in things, does not mean that things think, but that the interpretation of them must minimally be the recognition of a petrified rationality in them (e.g. the Great Year). For the free movement of life (in evolution, say) we need the concept of Nous that we find in Anaxagoras. Our intellectual activity in making scientific sense of the world is (and should self-consciously be) the proper consciousness of this life that we are participant in.

In his Aristotelian frame of an unchanging nature, Hegel wants to emphasize the reality of the universal animal life in all animals. (I have simply generalized this further for evolutionary theory. Cf. *Phenomenology* [Miller translation, par. 285]: life indifferent to its mills.)

Rational thought becomes the substantial basis of all spiritual life. The Ich is pure negation (a void like "life" on the side of nature -- these are "pure Being"/Nature and "Nothing"/Self.

(58) Note that in representation there is always "pure" form and "sensible" content whether we think of "rose" or "God." (Not so with "Life" and "Logos.")
§24A² Contrast between "pure" thought and Vorstellung. Vorstellung supposes always "standpoint of consciousness." Thinking has only conceptual content (empirically: words refer to other words). Difficulty: must we not come round to sensible cashability somewhere? Answer: Yes (I think). But the sensible cash is recognized as only a moment in the circular reference of the concepts. (My paradigm is the concept of Force and Utterance in Phänomenologie des Geistes. But the Idea returns to embrace experience -- but think of two shapes of friendship: a happy marriage and "49 Charing Cross Road." Then add modern atomic theory of chemical bond. The logical community in all this is not "sensible" -- though even in the last case cloud-chambers and electron microscopes are involved.)

Hegel on ordinary language. It is not what is sensibly embodied that is concrete, but the logical relations that are true in the Platonic sense of being "according to concept."

§24A³ More about "truth." This time from the side of experience. Now "truth" is seen as relative to depth of insight and comprehension. (But here we come up against the Protagorean paradox. "Truth is subjectivity." We may recognize that Goethe has "great experiences" but that is only because what he says about them makes our experience deeper and clearer. We can only experience depth in ourselves. So from Kierkegaard's own point of view Hegel
was right to be always critical of edification (LSS p. 69 n, Pref. Intro gives Journals and Papers -- HV & EH Hong, 1970, 2, 2(4).)

The Fall: relation of cognition to spiritual life.

Spirit must split from nature in order to return and comprehend it freely. Innocence is not to endure, but to be returned to. Become as little children.

The Serpent is not an external agent, but the assertive singularity of selfhood (the I against the We).

The need to clothe the natural self is the breach with nature (cf. Freud -- natural sexual energy redirected to free activity. In Hegel it is the influence of Plato's theory of Desire -- see Symposium). Labour is both the result of the breach and its overcoming. We do not find what we need, but we create our spiritual world in producing it. And the expulsion involves God's recognition that Man is his equal. (The Serpent's promise was true.)

Adam's original sin expresses the fact that nature has to be known as evil, and sublated. It is not what we must be true to. We must be true to the Beautiful, the Good, and the True -- and ultimately the True is the absolute comprehension of the process of communication through which I become voluntarily identical with We. The Beautiful Soul in its lonely communion with God is evil. As Royce said, "We are saved by the community" (but not by the finite community of the living who are bound to be unjust, and may be perpetrating the "final solution").
§25 The **objective thoughts** of Logic (as this structure) ought to be the **Gegenstand** of our consciousness, not just the **Ziel** of the love of wisdom. The love of wisdom must become the **science** of wisdom. But we must not take the Kantian view of this logic -- that it just deals with the **forms** through which the **finite** contents of rational life are interpreted. That is the position of Understanding which is to be sublated (in Dialectic and Speculation).

§25R Comparison with **Phänomenologie des Geistes** -- treated as still valid science, but no longer as the necessary "first part." Too complicated to be good introduction. But **better** than the approach here (because logical). This present approach is only **historical** and **räsonnierend**.
Conception and Division

§79  The logical has three sides (moments of every concept):

a) Understanding

b) Dialectic

c) Speculative Comprehension

§80  Understanding fixes and keeps separate.

Long lecture comment by Hegel. Mostly not very useful; but the identification of Understanding as "goodness of God" is instructive. God lets everything be by setting its limits (which we discover and define). Living things refer to the whole, because they need the proper environment, nourishment, etc; and it is the goodness of God that makes Prussia better than Russia (apparently).

Even Absolute Spirit needs the Understanding. Drama needs definite characters; Greek mythology is better than Nordic; and philosophy needs precise concepts to start from.

§81  Dialectic is the motion of definite concepts into their opposites.

Because this transition is contradiction, dialectic produces Scepticism. Often it is regarded as mere sophistry; or as the sign that we cannot get clear (have not got clear) about something. But logical dialectic reveals the actual nature of all definite (finite) concepts; it produces true coherence and necessity. (Thus death is a necessary moment of life. The model of logical dialectic is Plato's Parmenides. All natural change is dialectic;
Dialectic is God's power just as Understanding is his goodness.

§82 In the speculative moment thought moves on to a higher concept within which the opposites are seen as being both necessary moments -- and hence as reconciled. The dialectical negation becomes determinate. (The speculative is the rational on the side of thought. Thus the will of God is the rational as actual. The speculative reconciliation maintains both sides at full value. The Absolute is not just the unity of subjective and objective, but equally their distinction.
First Subdivision of Logic

The Doctrine of Being

§84 Being is the Concept in itself. It moves by rolling over from one thought-determination into another. Being is thinking, and its rolling motion is the self-determination of thinking. (Phänomenologie des Geistes demonstrates the claim that "pure being" is the being of thinking but only so can it be pure; and only so can we be doing logic).

Pure being is not yet "the totality." But it is a name of God, or of the Absolute.

Thus I can say "anything is" (and specifically "I am"). But properly I must think "It is" -- some quite indefinite absolute being within which I am.

§85 First and third moments refer like this to God. Second moment refers rather to the finite. This seems not to apply to first triad -- where Hegel takes Nothing as name of God anyway. But it is true if we follow Parmenides with Gorgias and take the primitive referent to be our own finite (but absolutely negative) thinking.

It is important not to use the form of definition, and say "God is," because the subject name is empty. We have to concentrate attention on the predicate "is."

§85A How "Being" is logically structured: Triad of Quality, Quantity, Measure. Notice that Hegel gives ordinary (finite) examples. Pure Being and Nothing are not
"Qualities." Quality comes to be as Becoming and is definite as Thereness. (The sense-world is mainly comprehended as Quality and Quantity. When it is measured we are at the verge of Essence -- because the measures that abide are ratios -- which do not themselves directly appear.)

A: Quality

§86 (A) Being

Pure Being is pure thought, because only thinking can purify it. Since God is Being we could begin with the Absolute Identity. But we ought not to begin with a thought that is already mediated (as Jacobi's supposed immediate knowledge of God is, and Schelling's Indifference admits to being).

Parmenides found the right way to immediate simplicity. He said IS. But notice that Hegel takes this positively as the Inbegriff of all realities; it is not just the empty category -- as it readily appears in the Science of Logic. God can hardly be conceptualized as meaning emptiness. The emptiness is what we grasp or comprehend. For myself I take Pure Being to be Plato's Form of the Good (cf. §235) or as the Platonic-Parmenidean One that passes over into the many singulares comprehending their unity (§243): "the principle
of being in all that is there -- and what is there properly is conscious thinking beings.

§86A1 Thinking has only its purely indeterminate self to begin with. We must not reflectively wipe out all differences in empirical being. They are wiped out, have been wiped out (in Phänomenologie des Geistes).

§86A2 The movement of the logical Idea (= Concept of the Idea, §236) can be observed as Gegenstand in history of philosophy. It begins in Parmenides (and continues with Becoming in Heracleitus, §88A). Hegel ignores Gorgias who turns the Parmenidean Being into Nothing (preferring Buddhism, §87R, as definition of Absolute here). Heracleitus is actually before Parmenides with "first concrete thought," §88A. This is perhaps an argument for my own approach which insists that the circle of Concept and Experience is what is prior. I do not like the production of Becoming as "pure Concept" from the coincidence of Being and Nothing. It is not more intuitive than the logical analysis of Becoming into Being/Nonbeing (I think). But I don't see how anything can be demonstrated here. It is a fact that Heracleitus came first.

§87 Pure Being is "the pure abstraction." When we say "IS" we have said nothing about "What is." ("Existence is not a predicate" follows -- but that is at the level of essence, where Pure Being -- to which Anselm's argument refers -- is
distinguished from actual Being -- to which Gaunilo refers it.)

Being in its purity is therefore **Nothing** for thinking. Not because it is "not something" but because it *drowns* all qualitative somethings. Thus it *is* "what cannot be said," though it is also "what *is*" absolutely. Both ways it is empty of thinkable content. But this coincidence is one in which the difference in direction -- the opposite pointing of the arrow -- is preserved.

§87A We turn God as absolute fullness of Being into God as absolute power. These are opposite sides of his being. He is **bottomless** (*bodenlos*). The Buddhists are right that we *become* God by absolute self-annihilation, self-forgetfulness (not in any **specific** topic of knowledge, but in "pure thinking" -- cf. §88R²).

§88 The Unity of the two **directions** is Becoming. One arrow points towards **Coming to be**, the other towards **passing away**.

§88R¹ Perhaps the best way of seeing the identity (and the fact that no beginning can be really immediate) is to begin from this **end** of the circle -- i.e. with the concept of **Beginning**. What **begins** must **end** (e.g. lightning flash). This way all the witty comments about City, Sun, God are obviated. (Hegel thinks all are **perpetual**. But as we see it, City and Sun are certainly not, and it seems clear that we ought not to confuse the eternity of God (as Truth) with
any "perpetuity." Analytically the two are both the same and absolutely diverse.

\[ \text{diverse (----->) diverse} \]
\[ \text{same} \]

§88R² (No need to comment on Hegel's R about how to achieve "pure abstraction."

§88R³ Comprehending this unity is precisely achieving the abstraction. We have plenty of paradigms. Hegel himself instances the concepts of coming to be and beginning.

§88R⁴ When we speak of the sameness of Being and Nothing we must never forget their diversity. That memory is how we pass from Becoming to Being there. Lightning flash is a quality that is not, just as soon as it is. But it is there just as much as the blue sky which stably fills all of our visual field if we lie on our backs on a cloudless day -- and it reveals the inwardness of that placid appearance.

§88R⁵ "From Nothing, Nothing comes" is the obvious truth of Understanding which experience contradicts. Lightning comes "from nothing" and the blue sky passes into darkness. We look for a ground of these changes. But the ultimate ground is the spontaneity of interpretive thinking. Lightning "comes from" a supersensible force.

§88A Hegel seems deliberately to confuse Heracleitus with Leucippus -- see note 12, pp. 325-6. It is as if he knew that there was a Heracleitus before Parmenides and another
after him. (There is a big temporal gap between the philosophy of Becoming and that of Being-There.)

B: Being-There (Dasein)

§89 Becoming is the ceaseless motion of Being into Nothing and Nothing back into Being. This is the motion of ending and beginning (see §88R³). The two sides of the motion collapse together into the subsisting unity that sublates them: something that is and is not all at once is "a flash of lightning"; and the universal flux of Heracleitus is "a river" (even if we cannot step in it twice!). This is a necessity of thought -- to think the coming to be and passing away as one concrete event. The concept of Dasein is the Aufhebung of the is/is not identity which grasps it again as "what is."

§89R We can see here that any finite thing is a "contradiction" because it begins and ends. So its being is the motion from one opposite to the other, the motion of a contradiction. When we say of something in the world that it is so we are blandly and obstinately ignoring the fact that it is destined absolutely not to be so in due course. Of course, we admit this if asked, but we insist that it is not relevant now, at this moment. What we forget is that this moment is itself unchangeingly permanent, and as such it is our window on the eternity of logical cognition. The logical contradictoriness of temporal appearance from the
Hegel: Encyclopaedia Logic

point of view of logical eternity is just what Zeno grasped and expressed; and he got right to the heart of the matter by attacking the concept of motion. The Atomists moved from Becoming to Dasein with "Out of Nothing nothing comes" and "Being is no more than Not-Being." But Zeno overthrows even the idea of moving atoms with his "fourth" paradox of the moving rows in the Stadium (Aristotle, Physics 239 b 33 DK 29 A 28).

And behold our atoms are energetic systems and our "space-time" is some sort of continuum. This is where Hegel's reading of the Eleatics is validated. We must not say (as the Eleatics and McTaggart did) "Time is unreal." This is only "the negative side of the result." Properly the result is a determinate negation. The permanence of temporal motion establishes finite being as finite.

§89A The fact is that Becoming has a result. If we think of it (as Heracleitus did) as a "burning up," the fact is (eternally) afterwards that "it was." (New sun every day is allegorical for human life probably; but the record abides, just as the book of Heracleitus did in the temple of Artemis. It has come to be.)

§90 Dasein is Quality. A flash of lightning (say) is (at the right distance) a sheet of white light. This being-there has to be reflectively remembered. That is what "reflected into itself" means. It is not reflected into the otherness of my private consciousness (like Hamlet's
father's ghost in the Queen's bedchamber). It is a public fact reflected into thought as such -- that is itself. If Hamlet realized that his experience was hallucinatory he would talk of it differently. (That is just the point about full-fledged hallucination -- you don't realize that it is not "there" for the public.)

§90A Quality is essentially outward and sensible -- hence finite and natural rather than spiritual. If we take this in the strongest way we have to say that Dasein is precisely what God (as infinite and as Spirit) does not have. But that is obviously not meant. Only just as the view that we are our "character" or "disposition" cannot be maintained unless we identify it with the stable pattern of our actions, so the Dasein of God is simply not interesting unless we can say what the pattern of his action is. His simple Being is tantamount to his Not-Being. Our spirit is identical with its Dasein only when it determines our actions neurotically.

§91 What stably is (in a qualitative sense) is real. Thus, we can all agree with Epictetus that "Now is the evening." But the evening is not "real." It is rather "the evening and the morning that were the first day" (and every other day). The cycle is "real." This is the identity of something and other; and it necessarily exists not immediately (for now is evening) but for us. Yet it is for us only because we can recognize that it is what is in
itself. Now is evening (for us). But what is is "evening and morning." It was before we arrived, and it will be after we are gone.

§91A Hegel loves to quote Spinoza's omnis determinatio etc. But he has created this quote. As far as our texts go (or his), Spinoza never uttered the omnis. Of course, it is logically implicit anyway. [Cf. Note 15, page 326.]

At the spiritual level Hegel is interested in Reality as our conceptual control of time. A "plan" is essentially "not real yet." But if someone wants to understand what we are doing it is precisely our plan that is the reality that has to be comprehended. We utter (or express) our "souls" through the control of our bodies; and this or that "right" (thing to do) is the reality of our freedom -- it may be ours, or another's, or the posited law that is valid for us all -- but we ought to translate it at the simplest level. Or (absolutely) the world is the reality of the Concept. (Thus the Dasein of God is Spinoza's Deus Sive Natura.)

The most interesting use of real is the one that turns it into a synonym of Hegel's true: "a real Mensch," etc.

§92 Being-qua-Being is a pure abstraction. Being-in-itself is what is: the evening and the morning. But it is what is by containing limitation. Day is not night; and it is when we come around to evening again that we say "Now the day is over."
§92A  A reality can be defined because it involves limit. The day alters into another one, because it is finite. But equally it alters within itself. It is born out of the night, with which it began. (If T.F. Geraets's note 28 to Glossary is right, then "restriction" is implicitly more spiritually. But we should remember that the Presocratics thought of the year -- not the day admittedly -- as a process of cosmic justice -- and Heracleitus said "The Sun will not overstep his measures.")

The containing of day and night in "day proper" is the simplest model of qualitative limit. When we say "Tomorrow is another day" we may be thinking only quantitatively. But we generally mean "Tomorrow will be different, another chance, a new beginning." That is qualitative.

I use temporal examples because time is motion. But Hegel rightly sees that space illustrates the dialectic of reality of negation more clearly. A field is a field because it has a fence (or a hedge) round it, or a wood next to it, etc.; and the limit is reciprocal. It matters not which is "something" and which is "other."

Also, more logically, the Moon would not quite be the Moon without the Sun. It is "the Moon" properly because of its place in the Solar System; its relation to the Sun is part of the interpretation of "Moon."

Plato was turning his logic into a picture -- illustrating Being -- in the Timaeus. He was producing an intelligible theory of motion (after Zeno's dialectic). But
the paradigm of the identity of reality and limit is our own living towards death.

§93 The process of alteration (of othering) is a bad infinite progress or regress. Here time is the ideal paradigm, but Hegel was content (apparently) to leave the step without commentary.

§94 The simplest model of the "bad (or negative) infinite" is time. (I think myself that there is nothing "spurious" about it. That is Eleatic thinking.) The bad infinite is emphatically real. (Thinking about our own birth or death reinforces this intuition.) It is the perpetual repetition of the contradiction involved in finite being.

§94A We see why Hegel uses spatial examples. In space the moments of 'something' and 'other' do not "fall asunder." We can see them with their boundary. But the day/night cycle is the simplest paradigm of the True Infinite (especially since both together are called "a Day"). At the other extreme the true Infinite is "eternally gone from itself." It is the non-finite, the self-negating of the finite, the return to itself out of our "one-day" "one-place" consciousness. The concept of an ought that is never reached is the full expansion of the bad infinite; and "immortality" (meaning "non-deadness") is not a postulate.

§95 Now we have the True Infinite stated in the text as a Concept. The identity of 'something' and 'other' -- their
reciprocity -- means that each is "at home with itself" in the other -- as Night is part of Day, and Day is elsewhere Night. What is for-itself is the whole cycle.

"For itself," für sich, means "on its own account." We should not think that it means "the Self that is its own project" (as in Sartre). My being for myself is the spiritual example of being-for-self. But this is not separate from my being-for-you others. My being on my own account is a requirement of recognition. You must acknowledge that I am here.

§95R The True infinite has no "other." It cannot go out of itself into otherness, or be faced by the finite as other, because then it would itself be finitized, having the external finite as its limit. We here "in this world" do not exist separately from God. But that does not mean that we are simply one with God (or the Absolute). Our finitude is sublated. Our reality is idealized. Being-for-self is being-recognized in the community of selves. As finite being-there, this thing (or self) is real; as truly infinite being-for-self (returned into self) even the thing is ideal -- i.e. it is an element in an "infinite" whole that is cyclic.

Every genuine philosophy is Idealism because it grasps Being-for-self as true Infinity (cf. §24R notes). It places everything in the ideal whole in which it can exist "for itself," or in which it makes sense "on its own account."
C: Being-for-Itself

§96 The Something that is indifferently Other is "for-itself" as the One. In its immediacy this excludes otherness from itself. The Other is only another One (and so we shall pass to Quantity).

§96A Being-for-itself has Being and Dasein as its ideal moments. It is simple self-relation (the true Infinite at home with itself) yet determined.

Familiar example: the Ich. I am here (in my chair); you are each there (distributively, in your chairs). I do not know what you are thinking (for your attention may be wandering). But we are thinking together; and so regaining the indefiniteness of being at the ideal higher level of freedom. We are really separate and ideally together. Similarly, we can think of the chairs as having their ideally determined function which we fulfil by sitting in them. But if we think of each of them as one because of that we shall have to count them (and pass on to Quantity).

It is here, in giving his account of reality and ideality, that Hegel chooses to remark on the word aufheben. Reality is aufgehoben, cancelled, but well taken care of, in ideality. Spirit exists on the natural foundation; but it takes nature up into itself and gives it a vastly enriched meaning. We sit comfortably in our chairs, oblivious to all that went into their making, and even into our learning to
sit in them (for time was when the chair had to be made into a little prison).

§97 There really are many chairs in the room (and many selves). We simply are immediately many, so each self needs her own chair and two can't sit comfortably in the same one (thought that too was part of the learning process). Logically the One excludes everything else. But as the identity of "something" and "other" what it excludes can only be itself as many others. In the counting (of the chairs, e.g.) we see how each "one" repels itself.

§97A "it lies in the thought of the One to posit itself as what is many."

Dasein is already relation; the One is explicitly relation to itself as other, i.e. to another one (not as "wood" or "pond" to "field"). Because it must have itself as its other, the One is "strictly incompatible with itself." It repels itself in order to have an "other," and so to be "for itself" as one. This is a figurative expression.

But the many ones are all equally just One. So the repulsion that makes them many, turns round into the "attraction" of their identity. They are all the same one. We count (primitively) on our fingers. But Plato was already puzzling about the fact that our fingers are all different (one of the counting members is so different as to have a different name: the thumb). How can we do it, he
asked -- the "repulsion" works but not the "attraction" here (I think). We can't say: "they are all the same."

§98 This section explains **attraction** (as I have already done). Each of the many is the one and one of the many. All are the same one. The negative Verhalten is their **connection** (Beziehung). The repulsion is a relation to self (and hence "attraction"). These words are used logically (or as defined) only. The identity of the return to self from multiplication is **quantity**. Determinacy (as difference) is sublated. "a being that is **indifferent** with regard to determinacy" (98A²).

§98R Atomism is the philosophy of logical repulsion (or simple multiplication). The attraction-return is not fully realized. Attraction (coincidence) is only realized by chance. So the Atomist "God" is Chance. The Void is the **nothing that is** (not: nothingness). (Thus Hegel does know who said "Being is no more than not-being" in spite of 88A.) Empty space is that **determinate** nothing out of which indeed "nothing comes."

Interestingly, Hegel thinks modern corpuscularian theory is a logically weakened form of atomic theory; and clearly he thinks that attraction and repulsion should not be dissociated into separate forces.

The social contract theory of politics is a mistake. Selves are not **atome**; and their attraction is not by the **Partikularität** of needs (the gravity of **particles**?).
Atomism is a necessary stage in concept-evolution. Its principle is "Being for Self as Many" (hence contract theory). It is a metaphysical view (not simple factual observation as Newton thought). Newton (like us) was a born metaphysician.

Kant got conceptual unity of repulsion/attraction right. But he posited the opposites without deducing them (what does that mean I wonder?).

Particle (Dingenschen) theory soon took over in German physics. But it is decadent.

Our passage from Quality to Quantity is not a conscious experience -- just an also-relation. But it is logically necessary. Hegel sums it up.

B: Quantity

B(A) Pure Quantity

Quantity is Pure Being in which determinacy is posited as sublated -- i.e. as variable. All finite modes of Dasein can be quantified.

(1) Magnitude is a good name for a quantum (over many ranges).

(2) Increase/Decrease determines a bad infinite of pure Quantity (but Hegel thinks it is circular definition).
(3) To conceive the Absolute as Quantity is Materialism. (But it can be a subordinate aspect of theism -- e.g. in Newton's theory of Space as the divine sensorium.

§99A Explanation of $R^2$. (I would say that "Magnitude" is closer to implying the possibility of "measure" but perhaps both Quantity and Magnitude only imply comparability: "A is more (less) X than B.")

Philosophy does not have to be concerned with correct definitions (but philosophers may perhaps read dictionaries for other reasons?) until the definition is validated as part of a dialectical logic (system of free thinking). How do we know when that is? (Peirce).

If we don't think out the concept rightly we shall be tempted to use it beyond its limits. Then we shall recognize as exact (i.e. logical) only relations of quantity; our biology -- and still more our social science and theology -- will suffer. What results is the boo-hoorah theory of ethics and the democracy of subjective opinion.

Mathematics is important, especially in natural sciences of inorganic phenomena; but from mechanics upwards its importance decreases (wrong about the evolution of chemistry. Hegel failed to anticipate the advent of statistical calculation). But the idea that only what is quantifiable is logical is "one of the most obstructive prejudices that stand in the way of any exact and thorough cognition."
§100  The immediate form of Quantity (posited by the self-equivalence of "Attraction") is continuous; but when we arrive at the One it becomes discrete. (There appears to be no order of logical succession here. Each determination contains the other implicitly. But it is continuity that gives rise to paradoxes. Hegel's continuity of the many hides a multitude of them. (A post Cantor and Peirce mathematician would certainly rewrite this section rather differently. In Hegel's formulation we can see the primacy of the common-sense needs of life.)

§100R(1) Continuous/discrete are not species of Quantity but different ways of viewing the whole.

(2) The antinomies of Quantity (space, time, matter -- Zeno generally) arise from this.

§100A  The antinomies originate in the opposite movements of Repulsion/Attraction. (Is Hegel speaking of his actual audience when he uses the example of 100 in the room? Looks like it. But the important point is that just as the room is made up of discretes, so the audience is continuous. But spiritual continuity is different from material continuity.)

(B)B Quantum

§101  When the Quantity is posited as essential we have Quantum.
§101A Quantum is the Dasein of Quantity. Degree will be its Being-for-Self. In this Dasein discreteness is applied to continuity. A Quantum is a number (of units which form a continuum).

§102 Quantum is perfectly determinate in Number. (But the possibility of fractions indicates the internal continuity of the unit.) The simple contrast of Anzahl and Einheit is Greek not modern. Every number is a unity; and if greater than one, it is a number of units.

§102R The logic of counting, adding, multiplication, and powers. (Notice that subtraction is left out. So is Division -- simple inversions of adding, multiplying). No doubt the theory could be laid out in different order: and the raising of a number to its own power has turned out to be significant in Cantor's mathematics of the infinite.)

The calculus is ignored here, but not in the WL; and the lecture addition is of no philosophic interest. Again we recognize the primacy of the pedagogic concern with ordinary life.

(B)C Degree

§103 From the positive aspect of Dasein we turn now to the negative: limit (Grenze). The Quantum as One made of many units, is its own limit. But if it can be divided it is extensive; if it can only be varied (increased/decreased) it
is intensive. (We note how Hegel needs the concept of Magnitude.)

§103R Whatever has one type of magnitude has both. (Paradigm: temperature.)

§103A Extensive magnitude is Quantum -- logically more primitive. It is a conceptual mistake to think that intensive magnitude can be reduced to extensive. (If so, Pythagoras began it!) Certainly there were mistaken hypotheses about it. But is it mistaken in principle? (Pythagoras' case illustrates the error of simplistic models: length of pipe = tension of string. Measurement of intension typically depends on finding extensive expression -- e.g. mercury thermometer. But this does not show that degrees of intension must essentially be extensions? Consider light wavelengths however!)

For spiritual purposes we must maintain the distinction. (Pain as felt is quite different from pain as measured. But does it even make sense to measure the intensity of pleasure?) As for character, we might measure the range of actual influence -- but think of Dorothea.

Hegel reveals a thoroughly reactionary attitude towards scientific hypothesis. He is a fairly radical phenomenalist in the interest of the primacy of sense-experience. But surely his logic asks for an operationalist development of theory?
He is carried away by the immediate need to defend Absolute Idealism against a simple-minded empirical materialism. It is right to object to atoms, but wrong to object to dynamic (or energetic) theories of matter.

§104 In Degree (Grad) the Concept of Quantum is posited (explicitly established). The Remark shows that this is the concept of an infinite series open at either end. And the A1 shows that Hegel thinks we have now shown why the infinite progress (or regress) is necessarily implicit in the concept of number.

Degree is an intensive magnitude that can be correlated with an extensive (hence measurable) magnitude. But what about locutions such as "redder than --," "brighter than --" which can be perceived but not (or not yet) measured? Hegel says "it has the determinacy in virtue of which it is quantum, strictly outside of it." What does this mean? Even a comparative expression of "degree" involves reference to the outside standard (the other case taken as norm). A degree is essentially part of a quantitative progress. (Of course, the progress is not empirically a bad infinite: "larger and smaller than" looks like one (conceptually) but seems not to be in fact. "Hotter/colder than" certainly has absolute limits in fact. These discoverable limits take us to Measure.

§104A1 See above.
§104A² The reflective Understanding relies on the Bad Infinite Progress to express the Absolute as Sublime. But properly it ought to be bent back to the self as von Haller recognizes (cf. Pascal "par l’espace etc.").

§104A³ Pythagoras: "Things are Numbers" was "the first step towards metaphysics" (unjust to Anaximander's Boundless, but Hegel accepts Aristotle's view that the Ionians were just materialists). Pythagoras is the medium between that and Eleatic thought. Pythagoras did not go too far in the "idealistic" direction (i.e. towards dogmatic rationalism) but rather not far enough. Eleatics went further [but left us a longer journey back?]. The trouble is that numbers are external. This is the basis of occultism -- this invades Hegel studies too -- e.g. Francis Sedlák. Hegel fell victim to it in Dissertation. Recognizing the mistake is recognizing that real "thinking itself" is the interpretation of our shared life (or of "experience").

§105 This determinacy that is for itself, being outside self, is the Quality of Quantum. In other words, Quantum as simple number (external to what is numbered) becomes identical with the Quality of what is quantitatively determined when it expresses a ratio of Qualities (32° F is the freezing point and 212° is the boiling point of water. These degrees are identical with certain qualities.)
§105A This last comment is anticipatory. Hegel is thinking more of the Pythagorean musical scale (and of ratio simply).

§106 The ratio is not simply a relation of numbers but a measure of things.

§106A Here quantity returns to Quality (cf. §105). Magnitude is what is alterable (variable) in Dasein; but only in a continuous way. It is alterable in sameness -- more or less of a homogeneous abstraction (a contradiction). The contradiction is resolved in Measure. We already call the determination of Quantity measuring. (Examples -- musical scale, H₂O, statistics). Quality becomes determinately quantified, or fixed as a measured quantity.

C. Measure

§107 A measure is a qualitative amount -- an amount that is logically linked with a certain quality (e.g. water at 32°F becomes ice).

§107A Hegel calls this vollendete Sein. It is only now that Being is determinate; Dasein embraces what is instantaneous (lightning) and what is audibly/visibly changing (sunset, jet engine sound).

God is the "measure" of all things. This is in Plato, and in O.T. (see nn 35, 36, pp. 327-8).
At the spiritual level, the most important measure is death -- hence Hegel's insistence on Nemesis as Measure. Human life has its appropriate measure. Protagoras would be right if we could take the measure of ourselves properly.

In the order of Nature it is the measures of the Solar System that provide the ground or foundation for our self-measuring. Geology and plant life fall largely below this level of determinacy (Hegel thinks -- but this is largely because he does not have the evolutionary perspective. For us the measure, even of what appears to lack it, emerges in statistics.)

§108 The simplest measures determine ranges of variation. Melting points and boiling points (for example) are rules telling us what to expect at certain points in continuous processes of heat-variation.

§108A In these simple cases the identity of quality and quantity is not yet gesetzt. It manifests itself suddenly.

In questions of free decision, the Sorites paradox arises here. How much hair can a bald man have? How big must a territory be, to be a viable State? (a vital question for us now).

§109 Quantity is essentially a bad infinite. So Measure necessarily passes into the Measureless. For instance the weather (which has certain measures called "the seasons") is always different; and it goes on changing endlessly. (We
know that eventually it will not sustain our kind of life, but for Hegel there was simply a "measureless" here.)

§109 (and A) Quantity (of experience) is essentially a continuous increase. The measureless is itself a "measure"; but only as the intuitive recognition of the infinite progress. There are "knotted lines" -- quantitative continuities with qualitative changes at the "knots" -- in many ranges of our sense experience. But there is no bending back of the line into a new concept. The "true infinite" of Measure is of quite a different kind. We have to go inwards to find it. This is exactly where Kant's critical doctrine comes in. We do not comprehend the world of Being as a whole. It is simply the Measureless.

Thus there is for us an absolute minimum of temperature (Kelvin zero) but no maximum; and (more tentatively) an absolute beginning (the Big Bang) but no determinable end that is a new beginning.

§110 The supposed "True Infinite" of Measure is the logical fact that measure is only a "relational identity" of Quantity and Quality. Measure goes together with itself in the Measureless. What does this mean except that there can only be measures in a subsisting "measureless" substrate?

There is no explanatory Zusatz here, but we can usefully add one of our own. The way that the Measureless is sublated in a true Infinite, shows up in the way that God appears as the Measureless in the tradition. This is God as
the sublime. The Measureless is not a finite moment (like
the dialectical moment generally). Hegel's lecture comment
on quantitative infinity -- §104A2, pp. 165-6 -- applies
here (cf. von Haller's reference to "times" and "worlds").
We have to renounce this standpoint, in order to progress.
(The Science of Logic is right: the Measureless is logically
a third moment after the "nodal line.") But renunciation
has to be logically motivated. Thus in the Encyclopaedia
the third moment of Measure is properly the logical transition
to Essence.

Hegel has abbreviated so that each named moment is
quite properly a name of God: Measure is the first moment of
its triad; and Measureless the third moment of its triad
(Real Measure). The transition ought to provide a name of
God too -- and it does.

§111 The Infinite (as Measureless) has quality and quantity
as its sides. Quality passed over into Quantity at the transition (§98).
Quantity passed back into Quality at the transition into Measure (§105).
Each negates itself, so Measure is (progressively) the negation of the negation. At
first the two sides mediate one another. But when this immediacy sublates itself, the unity is gesetzt, set up for itself as what it is in itself -- simple self-relation that
"contains being in general and its forms is sublated." This is Essence.
What on earth does this mean? When the qualitative world was conceived as atoms, it became quantitative -- and we were already faced with the essence/appearance distinction, one might say. But we did not have to deal with it yet.

In §105 we recognized that quantity was necessarily self-external; and that this is its quality. Measure teaches us how this "quality" correlates with ordinary qualities. So we can have quantitative determinations for changes of quality (melting point, boiling point). But this is only possible on the supposition of a material substrate which is the abiding continuum within (or upon) which the measured changes occur. When measure is said to be only "going together with itself in the Measureless" this abiding substrate is explicitly posited. God as the "measure of all things" who is "measureless" is the totality of being, the conceptual totality of all the measurable changes that can occur in Being. (He is also "Matter," the divine ground of "things" posited by the Materialists -- but they are avoiding the recognition that the transition to Essence/Appearance that is involved is a movement of thought.)

§111A The "True Infinite" of Measure is the Concept of Essence. In the WL Hegel calls it "Absolute Indifference" -- This is Pure Being as explicitly full, or as containing all qualities, quantities and measures indifferently. In
the WL the dialectic follows the plus/minus concept of Schelling's Absolute Indifference theory. So it was good to leave that out. But the indifferent substrate of all sensible change ought not to be left out. This is the universal Being that necessarily appears (the Concept of Essence).

Water seems indifferent to heat. But certain quantities of heat change its quality; and we can measure these. When we want to comprehend the identity of ice, water, and steam we must move to the concept of an essence that appears in these three ways (in accordance with the general condition of the essential environment). We begin now to need different categories -- continua with opposite poles.
Second Subdivision of Logic

The Doctrine of Essence

§112 The Concept is now posited as Concept. While we are doing the Logic of Being, we can think of Being itself as what is real, and of our own thinking as merely external reflection. Even with Pure Being/Nothing/Becoming we can take it that we are thinking reflectively about God -- and Measure brings us to "God of Nature," the Supreme Being or Matter. But now it is a thought-process that is self-consciously moving; and we are thinking about something that is beyond or behind "what is for us."

We can still think reflectively about what is in and for itself (the essence) and what appears (for us). But the relational contrast of Essence and Appearance is always present (or for-self and for-us). Being is still with us. But now it is the essential, as opposed to the apparent; the immediate being of Qualities, Quantities and Measures is a Schein of true Being. Real Being is that which shines within itself -- i.e. it is the whole concept of Being that is by appearing. It is not just essential being. Schein is what is not truly real; but at the same time it is the essential activity (the self-expression) of what is real.

§112R "Essence" is often used for the abstract thought of what is. But it must be taken as the activity in which what essentially is, expresses itself. (See end of 112A.)
§112A The standpoint of Essence is that of reflection -- the physical model is a metaphor for Nachdenken. Essence is "what has been there" all the time (for instance, the spinning of the Earth to explain Night and Day). It reveals itself only a bit at a time, but it is what has been completely already.

Wesen also means an instituted system: the postal service is the Postwesen etc. We also speak of "finite" essences. But this time (for once) it is German that is out of line with logic. We humans are "finite beings" not "finite essences" (as German says). God is properly the supreme Essence (rather than Being). But as such he is not "given," because he is not a finite object of consciousness. As conscious essences we are properly infinite because we are in him. Anything, taken apart from the supreme essence, is a mere Schein (a finite phenomenon that perishes and is not any longer).

"Highest essence" is a misnomer anyway. God is the essence of all essences -- the absolute activity that expresses itself in everything -- the "Lord." This concept is "the truth," but it is only the beginning of wisdom. It does not give the finite its proper due; or in the case of Enlightened Deism it gives the finite too much credit. Moses and Islam make too little of the finite world; Voltaire and Kojève too much.
§113  Instead of *immediacy*, Being is now relation-to-self. *Identity* is reflection into (or within) self. Like Being-for-self this is easiest to understand at the spiritual level. My *identity* is what I can hide (if I wish); and what I cannot expose *completely*, because I remain free always to express myself differently. But we must not think only of that model. The "identity of night and day" (or of "this moon") is essential to our control of time; the identity of Morning Star with Evening Star is crucial to our grasp of the Solar System.

§113R  How are these "reflected into (or within) self"? The answer springs at us from the Remark. We *understand* the identity of the different appearances of *one thing*. Thus that one thing (rotating Earth, phasing Moon, planet Venus) becomes a *supersensible* unity under the appearances that are preserved in our memories. "Identity" is the work of Understanding operating according to the "law of identity." ("Everything is what it is, and not another thing."")

§114  To illustrate the next step we should focus on the Moon. The Moon goes through "phases" (including the phase of complete invisibility). These phases, remembered, are its "being" proper. But now they are only its *appearances* (or disappearances). *Essentially* it is the one body moving stably in its elliptical orbit round the Earth, sometimes in the sunlight, sometimes shaded (and hence invisible). All of its appearances are "external" to it, and quite
inessential. On a cloudy night we may not be able to see it, but that makes no difference to its essential reality. Reflecting the sunlight, and hence being visible, however, is essential to it. It must appear. Reflection is what makes it "the Moon."

The Moon is a physical paradigm of Essence. It is a "contradiction" because it both needs and does not need its appearance, its reflection into another (our consciousness). Another shines in it (Sun); and it shines in another (the sunlight). Essence is this reciprocal relationship of the phenomenal being within which it is perceived -- the simply visible Moon shows us its permanent self in the sunlight -- and the essential being within which all of the phenomenal appearances are comprehended and interpreted.

§114R The whole movement of Essence repeats that of Being; but it is reflected (i.e. doubled). Being and Nothing appear as Positive/Negative. The Positive (Being) is Identity: the Negative develops Nothing (by shining into itself) as Distinction. Becoming is the Ground of Dasein. This is the hardest part of Logic -- containing the categories of general Metaphysics and (natural?) Science (cf. E.E. Harris, 153). The standpoint of Understanding still prevails. The distinctions are recognized to be related but are still regarded as independent nevertheless.

This is helpful as an interpretive aid. But the understanding of it will come by reference back, watching
for the parallel. We should note especially that Being interprets the world of Sense-Certainty and Perception, Essence that of Understanding. It is Essence therefore that is most at risk with reference to Mure's "eternal finality of the categories" problem (vii-viii); and it is their spiritual use that must stabilize them as purely logical (if anything can). (See Mure VI 1.4 for the reason for hope at the basic level.) We have here, also, a reason for preferring the condensed dialectic of the *Encyclopaedia Logic*.

*(Essence A): Essence as Ground of Existence*

**A: The Pure Determinations of Reflection**

The pattern of the WL is different. Here we can see that Hegel's logic is not an iron-clad sequence -- quite apart from the fact that (as we saw in Measure) abbreviation of the course is possible. We begin here at the same point; and first there is a concertina-type abbreviation. Then the order of concepts is changed: Matter and Form, and Content and Form are now taken after Existence instead of before it (as in WL). Hegel has changed his mind (surely because, as Mure thinks, the new order is an improvement for intelligibility). But we cannot say he has corrected a logical mistake, without casting doubt on the whole enterprise. Logic must be laid out discursively as a chain-sequence. But we can go by different routes -- the simplest case
being to go opposite ways round a circular pattern. Could we begin differently (as §88R3 suggests)?

(•) **Identity**

§115 We begin Essence at the subjective extreme (of Thinking). Even in Being we were studying the Being of pure Thinking. But when we turned back from the bad Infinite of Measurelessness towards the Unity at its source, we were consciously turning towards the supersensible; and our access to that is where it is generated: in the thinking activity. We have arrived at the Identity of the bad Infinite of sensible experiences -- the Identity of the pure thinking that manifests itself in the self-interpretation of the understandable order as a system of measures.

Essence (as the pure thinking of the supersensible) first shows into itself (J and S). It sees itself reflected in what has been called Being up to now. It is the thinking identity of it all.

Hegel cuts his treatment of this self-showing to a minimum in the *Encyclopaedia Logic*. But theologically this reflection-upon-self as identical is the "thinking of God before the Creation." Implicit here is the reason why God has to be a Trinity. The concreteness of self-identity will drive us to this -- and drive us out of Essence as a result. But we should follow Hegel's example and cut the cackle. For that purpose it will be best to use our own self-showing as the paradigm.
"I am I" quite independently of the world. Hume couldn't find that nice "impression" of a finite being, because there is not one. Wittgenstein has it right in the *Tractatus*. "I" am the boundary of my "world." As reflective, I am not in it.

§115R How then is this identity to be taken? The Understanding takes everything to be formally identical with itself, and hence independently thinkable. But can that assumption about impressions be made to work for the thought of the pure thinking that is not an impression? Hegel wants us to realize at once that real self-identity cannot be so. He begins with the Absolute and tells us that its concrete identity (which after all is just what we arrived at in our conceptual unification of the Measureless is the Ground [of all Show] -- which we can see already, because that is how we got to it in the first place -- and then "in higher truth" the Concept.

But so far -- because there is no experience of the Absolute as a Being -- this "Ground of Being" is a postulate only. The Absolute is just the absolute abstraction of the essence that grounds all being. We must develop what this means by thinking it out as a pure thought.

Abstraction discovers essences either by focusing on one given element (the taste of salt) of by disregarding the diversity that is unified and concentrating on the unity of the whole as One. (This second procedure is mandatory here
-- it seems! -- but think of the Light-Essence. Yahweh or Allah is mandatory for us because we have the science of experience all behind us: and we are moving from that abstraction towards the Nous of Anaxagoras.

For the moment we must begin with Identity as a logical predicate of everything. (We can see why the decision to collapse Thing into the climax of the first movement was reached. Concrete thinghood is the basis of our identity.)

An identity proposition taken formally is one that promises to tell us something and tells us nothing. We don't say "The table is the table." We do say "I'm me" (ungrammatical but revealing). Saying "the table is the table" contradicts the aim of speech (notice this intelligible but far from formal use of "contradiction").

The negative law of identity is the one that Hegel means when he says it is sublated by "the so-called laws of thought that follow it." These "so-called laws" are Contradiction and Excluded Middle. I don't see how these laws make "A is both A and not-A" into laws. (Each of them must do it independently.) But I do see how experience does it. Nothing in the world or in thinking stays still at its simple identity or its T value. A becomes not-A because it is (essentially) not-A (Law of Contradiction) and "Everything is either A or not A" because it is (essentially) both A and not-A. This seems to be what Hegel is claiming -- and where it shows up as true is in the identity-relation of self and world.
§115A  Being is Reality; the Identity of Being (in the
difference of all of its determinate Measures) is Ideality.
Understanding Identity properly is what distinguishes bad
philosophy from real (true) philosophy (polemical talk, to
be distrusted unless we take it as an injunction to
interpret what we read as well as possible, and to leave
alone what we cannot interpret so).

Identity is first of all the beginning of theology.  Not "God is One" but "God is the true Identity of all
Being."

Our own self-identity is what sunders us from Nature
(the Bad Infinite of Measures) and especially from other
living things.  We are purely (i.e. rationally) self-
identical.  This concept will develop, but will always
remain our self-identity.  We shall discover why the
identity is pure as we discover that we must be "members one
of another" in order to be ourselves.  This is how we are
different from animals and things.  Our self-identity is not
a pure thought in the abstract sense of purity either.  It
is a participation in the world as a community at every
level of consciousness at which participation is possible.
The abstractly pure thought is that of the world of being as
showing forth God's "power and glory."
(•) **Distinction**

§116 The definition of Essence as "pure Identity and inward show" fits very well as a description of the conscious self. Essence is this doubled mode of Being because it is "self to self relating negativity" and hence "repulsion of self from itself." So it essentially involves the determination of distinction.

If we think how we got to it (as what is not any of the bad infinity of measures, but their measureless substrate, we can see why this is so. But now we are applying that structure actively, by looking in the other direction. The absolute Identity necessarily expresses itself in many distinct identities (which are different from the knots of Measure because they maintain themselves, they are not just produced by external changes.

§116R Otherness is now distinctness of being (separateness) not just qualitative difference. (I don't know how to gloss "being posited" or "being mediated" -- we must see if the Zusatz helps. But "I am I" by not-being anything in my world.)

§116A Identity already contains distinction. That is why the question "How does it come to distinction" (asked of the Absolute -- say of the One of Plotinus, or of "God before Creation") is stupid. Identity is not separate from Distinction (as the Understanding posits it). Identity is the identity of the distinct (see how Understanding uses
it); and distinction is the distinctness of the identical.
(We can see now how "negation" is "being mediated." It is "being posited" because what is distinct is what is distinguished -- and posited as distinct.)

§117 Unterschied is first immediate (factual) distinction, diversity (Verschiedenheit). A good model is three snooker balls, two reds and the black, say. They are diverse simply by space-occupation. But the player -- the third who makes the comparison -- will say that two are "the same" (equal) and one is "not the same" (unequal) since the black is worth seven points to the red's one, and is the last left on the table, etc.

§117R We can all see that in this example identity and distinction are quite separate. But it is distinct things that are "equal" and identical things that are unequal; and equality is "identity" while inequality is "distinction."

Leibniz laid down "the identity of indiscernibles" as a metaphysical principle: No two things differ only in number (see further §117A). Here is how the later "so-called laws of thought" contradict each other. Everything is identical with itself and different from everything else (cf. Butler) "No contradiction seemingly. But if the diversity does not just arise from external comparison then being what it is (self-identity) is what makes something diverse from all else. Identity is determinate distinction."
§117A The Identity of Understanding already involves Diversity (immediate Distinction -- i.e. it is Determinate Distinction).

The rest is self-explanatory.

§118 Equality is an identity of diverse terms; and inequality is the relation of terms that are diverse. The meanings are mutually implicative and interdependent. Application of the category determines the distinction.

§118A Comparison necessarily involves simple diversity plus some kind of equality (or identity). Otherwise there will be a "category mistake." To recognize the basis of an interesting comparison is an imaginative gift; and to recognize diversities in what is spontaneously taken as "equal" is another gift. Theory is built through the re-identification of what has been distinguished. (This is one of Hegel's most insightful comments on the "philosophy of scientific method.")

§119 Determinate distinction is what is essential: positive and negative. The two concepts are mutually exclusive and implicative. This logical interdependence is what Hegel calls "shining within the other." The opposites pick one another out, so that it is logically determined that precisely P is opposite of N (and vice versa).

We should notice the logical advance here. Two comparable things (having some ground of identity) are
diverse; and as such they are equal or unequal. If we ask about "unequals" what the diversity is," the equality which they do not have becomes the mid-point or zero on a positive/negative scale. One is larger, one smaller, etc. (depending on what absent identity we are interested in). (A simple distinction (relation) mediates itself into a determinate one.)

§119R The logical principle of excluded middle arises precisely where the middle (of identity, equality) has been deliberately excluded. Equality itself is now one of the terms of this exclusion system, for we can say "Everything is either 'equal' or 'unequal'"; and if we take that paradigm it becomes very clear that the use of the "logical principle" is subject to the specification of the ground of comparison. (Category mistakes must be avoided.)

Hegel's point about quantitative differences is that we can identify either of the opposites as the zero point itself. Then the positive/negative distinction "sublates itself." From one place we go six miles east, from the other six miles west; but it is the same road (and the same journey unless there are other differences such as up/down).

Nothing is both a square and a circle; but a circle can be treated as the limit case of a polygon, while in polarity, the positive/negative opposition becomes internal. It is sublated only at the focal point of indifference.
(This is the concept that has to be thought in order to comprehend determinate distinction as identity.)

§119A¹ The positive is "identity"; the negative is "distinction." We can see this when we apply positive/negative to equal/unequal (as we did in comment on §119R). Now identity has determined itself -- and so has distinction. The way that they implicate one another has become explicit.

P/N look as if they are absolutely distinct. But Polarity shows us they are interchangeable (as does double-entry book-keeping).

The example of human organism and environment shows us why Hegel thinks that the development of this dialectic is important. Human life is an identical whole of self-opposition; and subhuman nature must be conceived in the same way (even if the early constructions of it were overly hasty and simplistic).

§119A² In place of the simple law of excluded middle we must substitute the principle of opposition (according to which identity contains distinction and vice versa). We "think contradiction" by comprehending the organic interdependence of opposites.

§120 The positive (as self-identical) is what differentiates itself from its opposite, as independent -- e.g. as organism
from environment. But also it depends on its opposite (and is not indifferent to it.

The negative has to be equally independent as the negative; but at the same time it is dependent for its very independence upon the positive as its own other. In this logical identity of structure the two opposites are sublated. They perish or "go to the ground." Thus we are able to make the transition to the common ground of their opposition.

There is no lecture commentary for this piece of logical manoeuvring; but that is because it has already been illustrated (§119R 6 miles E or W, §119A¹ poles of magnet, debits/credits, organism/environment; 119A² acid/base). The best examples of how the logical negative (blue/not-blue, §119R) is positive within itself is the discussion of "inorganic nature" (§119A¹).

(*) Ground

§121 Ground is the more comprehensive concept within which identity and distinction make sense. Thus it is their unity. It becomes explicit when we reach polarity because the opposites necessarily have a focal point of origin. But it was already present when we recognized that the six miles between A and B was indifferently six miles west (from A) or east (from B).

The unity of identity and distinction is the totality of essence. We can begin now to contrast essence with its
appearance etc. *Being* went over into *Essence* (as the focal point of all "measures"). Now *Essence* begins to unfold again into the *opposition* of *Essence/Existence*. (Cf. the end of §121R: *Ground implies what is grounded*.)

§121R The Principle of *Ground* is the Leibnizian P of Sufficient Reason. Everything is grounded not in itself but in the Other which is its complete essence. Thus everything natural has its ground somewhere in the Order of Nature (completely supersensible); and everything spiritual has its ground in "God" -- and if we are as severely tautological about "God" as we habitually are about the Order of Nature we shall be able to show that the criticisms of Hegel as a "totalizing philosophy" are mistaken.

§121A The *unity* of identity and distinction is a comprehensive one in which the distinction of identity and distinction is preserved. That is evident from the fact that *Ground* implies the distinct term (or universe) of what is grounded. This is the developed standpoint of *reflection* (comparison).

The principles of identity and distinction need to be reflected upon (and seem to mediate each other, and so themselves) as we have reflected upon them. Similarly the simple logical relation of "ground and consequence" must be reflectively comprehended. (There are "vicious" circles as well as enlightening ones in logic.)
Sometimes the tautological explanation is adequate to an immediate need. To tell someone that "electricity" is the ground of a static shock is to widen her conceptual horizon by introducing the concept of a force. But it is only useful because other phenomena can now be fitted in.

At the spiritual level "ground" divides into "grounds for and against." The teleological dimension reveals itself -- the ground is ultimately the final cause. We have to have teleological grounds for preferring the criminal justice view of theft to that of the thief. It is at that level that real conflict arises -- e.g. Proudhon's "Property is theft." All grounds are sufficient (if they are taken as grounds); and none is absolutely sufficient. There is no "unhypothetical beginning" for dialectic -- such as Plato postulated. The Hegelian Idea claims to be this, so far as it turns out to be possible. But the way in which it turns out to be possible leaves room here for a bad infinite of disagreements about grounds.

Concepts are final causes that are self-efficient. It is the concept of the plant that makes it grow, flower, and seed.

The dialectic of "grounds" is the sphere of practical sophistry. Notice that Hegel appreciates the broadening of consciousness that the Sophists produced -- just as he wants us to see how much sophistry there is in our ordinary rationalization of our prejudices. (There is some of that in the Philosophy of Right.)
Socrates tried to sublate the scepticism of the Sophists into the valid concept of the Good. (The category of Ground is the level of practical scepticism and relativism.)

§122 The self-unity of Essence is now posited (as its existence). We return to immediate being speculatively comprehended. That which has a ground is grasped in (or with) its ground. Having gone to the ground, we turn around at once and say "the ground is the ground of something determinate, something that immediately is, the observable phenomenon."

§122R We have not reached purpose. We do not conceive of the ground as productive (as when a sculptor carves a statue as the external realization of a purpose). The ground logically refers to (and involves) some existence; but because grounds can be given for anything possible, the existence implied is only a possible one. So this is the category of the would-be. For something that already exists, $G^1$ would be a good reason to let it be; and $G^2$ would be a good reason to change it; $G^3$ would be a reason to change it thus; and $G^4$ ... to change it in this other way.

(No lecture comment because dealt with under §121A.)
(A: Essence as Ground of Existence) B. Existence

§123 In spite of the new heading we have not yet reached any concrete existence. We are still studying Essence as Ground; but we are now looking at how Ground means "ground of." (We shall begin from the side of Existence when we reach B: Appearance -- p. 199.)

Existence is the system of perception. Everything is in itself (inward reflection) the totality of its possible relations with everything else (reflection into another) -- and especially with the perceiving mind. Existence embraces all that would be in every conceivable circumstance (or under every condition). Existence is the world of the changeable. It changes according to the grounds that are actually effective; it can be changed according to those that we make effective. The grounds themselves exist; so existing things in general are grounded (necessarily, but in many ways) and are (or can be) grounds (possibly, and in more than one way).

§123A What exists is what stands out (or emerges) from the ground (of what is possible). It does not show its ground any more. It simply is there; and it may be taken for a mere being (without a ground). But if we try to remove or change it we find that it has a real ground after all -- and we must bring other grounds against it, and make them effective. Hegel sums up the logical progress that differentiates existence from thereness.
But Hegel begins with natural examples. I do not like the first one. We ask "What caused the fire?" and answer "lightning." Why then is lightning a "ground" (and not already in the more determinate category of cause)? Is it because lightning can strike without setting the house on fire? I suppose this is the reason. If so then (in natural philosophy) cause does mean sufficient reason (or condition) -- and the expression "sufficient reason" is only pleonastic at this present level, not in the end. (Is it only that lightning is not the only cause of fire?)

The spiritual example is clearer. The constitution is grounded in customs and "life-relations." But the grounding is a result of free decision and interpretation (the constitutions of Greek cities were all different, but customs were much the same, and the "life-relations" were often contingently different (as far as we can see). Grounding is a less determinate comprehension of things than causation. (We can see here why the "covering law" conception of historical explanation is slightly absurd.)

§124 The Ding is the stable unity of reflection into self (immediate essence) and reflection into another (relation). It is its own ground -- a unified collection of "powers" (as Locke would say). The world of existence is a world of existing things. That whole world reflected into itself on the same model gives us the "thing in itself." Things seem to be just what they are "in themselves," because their
relations (reflective into other) are stabilized up to a point. We can move them about freely. (But acid?)

§124A The commentary is naturally devoted to that ideal limit -- the thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself is beyond cognition first, because it is an abstraction. All concrete things are in relation. They are known as stable in an environment.

Any category can be considered in itself. But it is not only whim (as Hegel says) that has picked on "thing." There has to be a reason ("ground") for this; and surely the reason is practical. We strive to know the world as "things" because "things" are what we can manipulate in order to make changes.

We also apply "in-itself" to concrete things and to natural and spiritual "contents." When we do this we mean to designate the ideal aim (or "perfection") of that thing or content. "Humanity" or "the State" in itself then means "the way it ought to be."

Finally, there is the Hegelian meaning of in-itself. Here it means the potential or the possible thing. "The child is father to the (wo)man" because it contains the potential of what the grown-up will be (and obviously the rest of the world is involved in how it turns out); and the State-in-itself is the "patriarchal" social order of the tribe. (Hegel clearly thinks that order is what must "return to itself" in the actual State. But Plato was wiser
than Aristotle here. We have a vivid example of how the indeterminacy of grounds can mislead the logician.)

All of these examples show that "what-is-in-itself" need not be regarded as "unknowable"; in particular, the thing-in-itself is what reveals itself in its properties (what it is for other things, and for the mind).

(A: Essence as Ground of Existence) C. Thing

§125 The whole organization of the 1812-16 Science of Logic is reorganized around Thing as the completion of Essence as Ground of Existence. Existence itself is the first moment of Appearance in the SL (see McTaggart 150-1 for a neat table). Thing now leads to Matter and Form; and Form and Content come under Appearance. Both are moments of Ground in the SL (and Thing is not). The thesis of this course is that Hegel is seeking the clearest and simplest way of presenting the theory of selfhood now. But the freedom of the choice of grounds is illustrated. The concept of Ground itself has many aspects from which it can be picked up and developed. (On the evolution of the categories of Essence see W. Jaeschke in Editor's Introduction to Wissenschaft der logic : Lehre vom Wesen (1813) ed. H.G. Gawoll, Meiner, 1992.)

This section repeats §124 but now we are looking ahead. The thing is concrete and determinate. That is to say the existence reflected into itself (as thing-in-itself)
consists of properties that it has (and that we are or can be aware of.

§125R Essence having existence as properties takes the place of the simple being (of qualities). Qualities simply cease to be (and something becomes something else). But generally we can't even talk about this without using thing-language. Thus leaves do simply die when they lose their green colour. But the tree does not. Sprouting leaves in spring is one of its properties. The stark tree has that property as its past. To have a past is the essence of being. (Much of the discussion of "beings" is logically illegitimate because it is about "things.")

§125A All of the moments of reflection recur as existent now. (Thus whatever abbreviations happen, the priority of Existence to Thing must be preserved.) The thing as self-identical is thing-in-itself. But that is only known by its self-differentiation in relation with others. We do not put things together out of qualities. We recognize that the qualities are together because they are properties of the thing. Rock is hard, grass is soft, stark tree will be green (was green) etc.

§126 The properties are themselves universal essences. Many things are white -- whiteness is an essence unto itself, a species of colour; and the ground of any perception is a material substrate of some kind in the thing. (Colour is
not perhaps the clearest example because of the general involvement of light; but the salt taste of salt is a good one.) "Matters" are the identical ground of qualities. O, (§126R) H, N, CO₂ are "matters" as conceived in Hegel's chemistry; and so are the modes of "force" -- e.g. electricity and magnetism as here.

§126A Hegel is anxious to insist that only inorganic things are made up of "matters" -- and that is a good thing because this is an example of a dispensable category in his logic. What things consist of is other things until we get to the atomic level. O, H, N, CO₂ are in fact different things simply. Hegel only needs "matters" because he accepts "Matter" as an Aristotelian substrate. We should notice that although he gives electricity and magnetism in §126R he dismisses them as fictions in §126A. He clearly understands that all of this physical theory is hypothesis, and is subject to change. (But only what is not subject to change can properly belong to Logic rather than to Real Philosophy. Otherwise Hegel becomes a historicist of consciousness -- like Kuhn or Rorty.) (For once Hegel was wiser in speech than in writing. But students going on to Real Philosophy had to understand the logical place of "matters." This is a dialectical problem about "logic" -- mediating concepts for our actual interpretation of the world are functionally necessary but not purely logical.)
§127  The "matter" is the as yet undetermined power of the thing to express itself in relation to another -- the real capacity of salt to be perceived as salt. This is essentially (in-itself or in abstraction) quite determinate -- hence the name salt. The "matters" together are the subsistence (not "substance" -- typo) of the thing -- the thing as a set of "permanent possibilities of sensation" to revise J.S. Mill appropriately. This is the inversion of what was said in §125. There the thing is taken to be the ground of the qualities that it has as its properties. Now the properties (as material grounds of sensational qualities) are seen as what the thing is made up out of.

§128  The (●) here marks our arrival at the second inversion. (α) is in §125; and in that first position the relations to another (i.e. to consciousness) which make it this kind of thing (e.g. salt) are said to have their essence ("reflection into self") in the thing as their unitary ground. They are properties of the thing that has them. The first (or simple) inversion (β) begins directly in §126. Here the proportion are recognized to have their own essences as independent "matters." They must be so viewed, because all of them belong to other kinds of thing, and not just to this kind. Only the salt taste belongs uniquely to salt. These properties are immediate beings ("qualities"). But we have to suppose that they have each their own ground (kind by kind: i.e. What is perceived as white is a
different "matter" from what is perceived as sweet, but not from what is perceived as brown, for the sweet refined white sugar was once brown). Thus although the actual properties are immediate qualities, their material grounds are proper "essences."

Now in (γ) both positions are inverted together into a concept of higher generality. Thing and Properties gives place to Matter and Form. We have to make this transition, because on the one hand the thing is the common ground of its properties, the singular or unitary explanation of all of them; and on the other hand, the properties must each have their own grounds; and these separate grounds brought together as constituents make up the thing.

This paradox of one common ground and many particular grounds is resolved when we consider that all of the grounds are material. Thus the thing is the common matter that is specified in particular ways (for the different senses of the perceiver); and since this resolution applies to each and every thing, the whole world of particular things melts away into the world view of Materialism. The universal ground of all the properties of a thing is its material substrate; and the ground of all things equally is Matter in general. The abiding identity of all "existence" is the material substrate that is neither created nor destroyed; and all the differences in this universal substrate -- the differences which we identify as different things -- are differences in the form of the one identical substrate.
Each thing is properly a totality of Matter and Form. Aristotle called these totalities substances, but that was a mistake because the identities of distinct things are all finite -- the matter of each is eventually transformed.

§128R Materialism finds a perfect foundation concept in the Ding an sich. The universal substrate has to be conceived as self-transforming. Thus it is not unknowable; for it is precisely what makes itself known to the perceptual and understanding consciousness that is its universal "form." (This is how we must take Hegel's last clause from the point of view of materialism; but from the simply descriptive standpoint of Aristotle, the matter submits to the activity of some form; and when we are thinking of completely indeterminate prime matter, the form (of everything above the elements) is a complex hierarchy of formal levels.)

§128A Hegel presents his own doctrine in its Aristotelian shape (as we might expect). All of the "matters" are one and the same (easy to see if we think of visible, tangible, audible, tasteable "matters" since all refer to the same spatial focus); and in a relative sense "Matter" is indifferent to its form. This is only relatively true because every material thing must have some form which is its fixed "nature." A piece of marble can be statue or pillar; water takes automatically the shape of its impervious container; but marble can't become water or vice versa; and we cannot perceive "prime matter" as an
existence, because no matter is unformed. (Note that this does not convert. There are non-material forms -- our pure thinking being one.)

Applying this to his essentially Aristotelian view of primitive Greek thought, Hegel concludes that Hesiod's "Chaos" was a Vorstellung of prime matter. This is a mistake (historically) but it does no harm. It simply helps us to see that the independence of Matter makes a dualism of mind and matter necessary. Theologically: God is 'architect' working with given stuff. Because we agree that this is a theological error we are led to reconceptualize the matter-form relation with form as what is primitive and fundamental. Form is the totality; and so we must begin from the Concept, because that is the final shape of the free form. "Matter" is itself a pure Concept -- not a perceptibly existent thing; and of course Hegel knew that proper materialists regard it as a Concept (i.e., as self-forming). But we don't talk about that way of formulating logic, because it is not orthodox.

§129 So everything is matter in general; and everything is some particular form; and the material thing (as what exists) is the totality of the form informing its own essential matter. As existent matter it must be reflected into the otherness (of particular form), but especially -- as a pure concept -- into the Understanding mind itself). Thus as an existing unity of Matter and form, the material
thing is already the totality of the form. And when we look at it as a totality of form, it is an ideal which refers essentially to its proper matter; a form which determines what the matter is meant to become, or what it ought to be. (In this aspect we can see how form is a more comprehensive concept than matter, because each of us aims to be more than (s)he actually now is, and we come up against material limitations which we regard as accidental misfortunes relative to our humanity as such. But even at the level of physical thinghood, we can identify deficiencies or deformities readily enough -- and that is what we ought to think of primarily here -- poor vision, deafness, etc.). In virtue of the is/ought distinction, the Form-Matter unity which is "in-itself" an identity ("Both are in-themselves the same") becomes a relation in which they are always distinct -- since nothing (important) is ever quite all that it ought to be.

§130  Thus the thing is the "contradiction" of being one exclusive thing according to its form -- while at the same time consisting of specified matters. The contradiction emerges clearly in the conception of the matters, because they are both independent (whiteness is the same in salt and sugar so it does not belong exclusively to either) and negated (in the second inversion in which all the particular matters are seen as forms of the universal substrate). The contradiction is resolved by recognizing that the thing is
not an independent existence but a self-sublating shining forth [Erscheinung] or appearance of the one universal supersensible ground. The thing appears to be a self-grounded unity which has "properties." But that conception of it is inadequate. The matters of which it is made up have to be recognized as sensible forms of a purely conceptual "prime" matter.

§130R Hegel's students will have to learn a physical theory in which Prime Matter is conceived as porosity. This comes from John Dalton's chemistry. The "matters" are united together in the general matter of the physical thing, because they are somehow porous to one another. They flow through one another. Obviously smell was an important paradigm here, because odours permeate the air; but colour, sound, heat, electricity, magnetism were all conceived as stuffs that interpenetrated in a similar way. Our own atomic and molecular theory has replaced this view. But it has the same logical place and function, except that the contrast between scientific essence and perceptual appearance has become more absolute. Eddington cannot make a bridge between his "two tables" by using a sensory analogy like the smell in the air, or the colour that we find running all through a stone if we break it. That two "matters" should be in the same place is contradictory. But the theory of "pores" covers that up. When we think properly, we realize that the "matters" are both independent
and negated. Eddington has the merit of recognizing the contradiction in his metaphysics. "Faculty" psychology (like Dalton) is less wide-awake.

(Essence) B: Appearance

(Introductory)

§131 Essence must appear. We have seen how by its reflection into itself it clarifies itself into the concept of the substrate -- the universal matter that consists of many matters -- and the form which determines its own proper matter, and so reveals itself to be the true totality of matter and form. What exists, therefore, is the shining forth, the Erscheinung (or appearance) of essential being. The essence is what exists -- not its hidden "ground." In more familiar terms, Eddington's scientifically conceived table is the actual table of perception at which he sits to write his book. Essence and the proper totality of appearance are the same reality seen from the intellectual and the sensible sides. The developed shining into itself of essence as intellectual is identical with the shining forth of essence as perceptual appearance.

§191A We must distinguish between Erscheinung and Schein. Schein is just what immediate Being turned out to be. At the end of the motion of Being we had to go inwards, because
we discovered that what truly is a unity behind the immediate play of sense-qualities. But this inner reality has now emerged, come forth, appeared as the total world of things.

The absolute expression of Appearance is God's revelation of himself in Nature. (Notice the carefully vague way that Hegel puts this. He must avoid saying clearly that God and Nature are identical under this category-name, because he is already in trouble over his pantheism. But by identifying Appearance as the category of all properly naturalistic pantheism, we can see how Hegel's spiritual pantheism goes beyond Spinoza (to name the heretical shadow plainly). The necessary identity of Essence and Appearance holds good from here onwards; but the Essence that appears is far from completely developed in the Concept of the universe of material things.

Of course, God is not identical with the world of what is, just as it is (reality), but with the world as a universe of ideal forms striving to actualize themselves; and because God is the ideal totality of Spirit not the real totality of matter, Hegel can speak of him as the Creator of the world in which his goodness appears. But in the end we shall discover that it is just the methodical movement of pure thinking that creates our world. So God dissolves into the moving totality of spiritual experience (and pantheism seems a more honest word than panentheism which suggests theos as a real substrate (like matter in the material
theory). But it will be best then to avoid theological words altogether.

The world of ordinary common sense experience is the world of Appearance; the world of philosophical speculation fills in its essential side. The things that we speak of as independent beings are only appearances. But the universe of Appearance is not "only appearance." It is the appearing of what is -- and nothing can truly be that does not appear. When we reach Actuality we shall have the concept in which the identity of the two sides -- Essence and Appearance -- becomes conscious and explicit. Then we can say truly that the World of Appearance is "only Appearance" (One-sided).

Kant is the philosopher who understood that our common-sense world is a universe of "appearances." But then the logic of "appearance and reality" led him to suppose that there must logically be a "thing-in-itself" beyond or behind the world of Appearance. This shows that we need the higher concept of Actuality. Appearance (as a world or system) is not subjective (in the way in which dreams are). What is, is precisely the appearing of the world to itself (as Understanding and Speculative Thinking). Thus when we arrive at Speculative Thinking we recognize that in knowing Appearance (as a totality or "world") we know its essence. Appearance is the content of our knowing; Essence is its form.

Hegel thinks that the reaction of despair in Fichte's Vocation of Man is justified. But, of course, an equally
natural reaction is to laugh at the idealist interpretation and to affirm straightforward materialism. The Critique simply makes us aware that absolute Matter is the unknowable "thing in itself." Then Hegel's speculative doctrine turns into a simple-minded progressive historicism. (We come to know the supposed "unknowable" bit by bit as it reveals its properties and powers under investigation -- but the scientific revolutions of paradigms remain a mystery -- and as we catch on to the dialectically logical movement of our own Understanding we may finally become speculative idealists after all.

The eating example is very revealing of why all sensibly formed things are only appearances for Hegel. Apples (to take the first eating we know about) are not independent things, because we can make them part of our bodies. Hence Hegel says (in Phänomenologie des Geistes) that the animals are wiser than the philosophers of Perception.

B(A) Quantum

§132 What appears exists in such a way that its Bestehen (its make-up) is only one moment of the form itself. The other moment is its Ground. Every appearance changes in accordance with its inner essence; and eventually it completes its share of the infinite mediation (sequence of changes) by disappearing. Between first appearance and
final disappearance (in the ideal sequence that ought to occur according to the form) the whole form is fully revealed in appearance. Thus "the ground of what appears" particularly now (or under these specified conditions, or at this point in the sequence) is itself "something that appears" (over the whole natural lifespan of the thing).

Since Matter is neither created nor destroyed (according to our concept of it) the "infinite mediation" continues beyond the disappearance of the particular thing. But this does not make it a bad infinite because the transformation of Matter is cyclic. The "infinite mediation" is a unity, a balance of action and reaction. The material world is a totality, a balanced order of finite things -- things that have their finite essences (which are reflected into self and into other things so as to maintain the balance).

B(B) Content and Form

§133 The balance of the world of Appearance (and the complete appearance of all grounding form) means that change is only relative (or apparent). What is disappearing at one point is appearing at another. Every moment of Appearance is external to the rest; but they are all present. Otherwise we could not grasp them as Erscheinung (a totality of Appearance) but only as Schein. ("Present" here means "comprehended by Understanding." Thus the Great Year or the
Eternal Return is a **totality** of Appearance -- and indeed the best paradigm for it.

Since the **world** of appearance remains the same (as a totality) even while its parts are changing, its **difference** is the difference of its **form** from its **content**; and its sameness is the identity of its form with its **content**. The self-differentiating identity of form and content is what we grasp as the **law** of appearance -- the necessary relation between the one progressively self-revealing Essence as the Ground, and its sequential appearances as its moments.

When we grasp the **law** of something's Appearance, we have to distinguish between what is essential to its life-sequence and what is only external and accidental. There are aspects of the apparent form that are **dependent** on outside circumstances (or environmental conditions) and which are **alterable** (they are altered in the appearance of other cases). Hegel calls this external form "the negative of Appearance" because it disguises or conceals the **totality** that is essential to it.

§133R The Remark simply distinguishes the internal form which is essential to Appearance as a totality of content, from the external form which is not essential. The content evolves in accordance with the law that is its inward form. Living things are fairly good models here -- since Hegel accepts Aristotle's view that "Nature does nothing in vain" -- yet chance and accident play a certain part in how life
actually goes on. Certainly Aristotle's theory of the soul as the self-realizing form of the living body provides the inspiration for Hegel's concept of the "form" that is identical with the "content." What is implicit ("present in-itself") in the form/content relation is Actuality. Actuality is the proper Umschlagen (overturning) of the two terms into one another. But at that stage the difference of the two sides is no longer visible (cf. §142, p. 213). It is "Inner and Outer" (§§138-41) which is the "absolute Relationship" in which the cyclic overturning is set up explicitly.

§133A If we consider the prominence of the law "the Outer is the expression of the Inner" in the discussion of the Organism in the Phenomenology we can see that organic life is the proper basic level for the form/content category. But in his own lectures Hegel takes the easy way by concentrating on the spiritual level. If we think of the form and content of a book, the difference between the external form and the one that is internal to the content is easy to see. But now what is important is the relativity of the distinction. The physical character of the book really is "external" to its content (printing, binding, etc.). But the relative formlessness of the verbal content is more instructive. We understand the overturning relation of form and content by comparing a book that has the right form for its content with one that is wrongly formed (or badly
formed). Something is a work of art when its form and content display the "overturning" kind of identity. (But notice that in this paradigm of the relationship it is the form that can be external. In the Aristotelian biological model it is the form that expresses itself in the content (and any failure is to be blamed on the content). This is the higher perspective on the form/content relation which we shall arrive at in the sphere of the Concept. For the present (in Essence) we are looking at things from the standpoint in which content determines and demands the right form. But the concept of form as what can and should be right is one in which the ideal dictates and determines its own reality. Something becomes a work of art because the author intuitively sets up this dictatorship of the form. Then the good critics coming afterwards show that "the content demands the form "the artist has given it." This is the overturning in action. (Example -- Iliad. Problem: What has the Catalogue of the Ships to do with the Wrath?)

The distinction between philosophy and the empirical sciences depends on the difference between the combining of form and content as external -- the imposition of form upon content that is given already -- and the circular "overturning" relationship of form and content as internal to one another. Philosophy is "infinite cognition" because of its circular relation to ordinary cognition. Philosophy as logic is activity of the form which generates its own
content (perfect Aristotelian model). Thus when it goes round in a circle its "infinity" is perfect.

But we ought not to stop at the simple contrast of empirical science and philosophy that Hegel sets up. His last paragraph (on how a book full of words can have no content) invites us to go on to consider how the overturning works in successful empirical science. A book full of "facts" may have no scientific content, because no attempt has been made to discover what form there is in the facts that will make them into a "totality of appearance." If that form is discovered in the facts, then that is precisely the scientific content of the book.

Going on from this we can ask (on the other side) what form does the content of human experience demand? This is the problem of the Phenomenology; and it is only because it has been answered that we have discovered the self-determining "pure form" of Reason itself (as Logic). Philosophy too must go round the circle of the overturning. The logician must go on to discover the form that is given in the content of experience as organized by the empirical sciences. When we look at the whole circle of philosophy itself as it overcomes the opposition that Hegel sets up here, we realize that the self-determining form of pure logic logically has to be the form of cognitively self-conscious human life striving to express itself as a free but coherent unity in the world. No matter how much the sceptical intelligence may emphasize the bad infinity of
human conscious experience (e.g. the many possible interpretations of the *Iliad* as expression of a chaotic world against my hypothetical quest for the *unity* of the Wrath theme) it remains true that we all *do and must* want to "make sense" of our lives, and to be unified and self-determining selves in a world which we know how to face. That this is *possible* no philosophy can guarantee; what systematic idealism asserts is not that it is possible, but that it is *necessary*. The most absolute *reality* in the world is not the reality of something that immediately *is*, but the reality of an *ideal*, an ought-to-be; and the reconciliation of *logic* with "real philosophy" is the discovery of where and how that ideal can be *actual* -- i.e. where and how it can be experienced as self-realizing and self-satisfying. (The *bad infinity* of interpretation will turn out to be a condition for the experience of satisfaction. There is no need to become excited about its *absoluteness*. It is an absolute *reality* in the same way that the *good infinity* is an absolute *ideal*. Their equal absoluteness is the *philosophical* expression (the conceptually ultimate expression) of the *contradiction* of life).

§134 The fact that *form* is necessarily both external and internal to content sets up the necessity of *relationship* in a category which ought (obviously) to be -- according to its *name* -- self-identical. What *exists* does so immediately.
It is there outwardly. The content and the form exist as an immediate unity. It uses the word Bestehen (make-up) to designate the content in its immediate thereness (referring us back to the "matters" which make up the physical thing). But existence is (by definition) the external side, the outward appearance. This externality to the real content (which is what becomes identical with the form in their rolling turnover) is also an essential moment of the content itself. Hence what we have seen so far as two meanings of form, is now viewed (in virtue of the turnover) as two aspects of the reality of the content. The book has to have some binding, typeface, so many pages etc; and what is on one page is external to what is on the next -- even though they may be two sides of one leaf, etc. If we wickedly tear a page out (to use for quotation in an essay) the book has lots one of its parts. Thus the transition here is through pushing the externality of form to the limit (see §133A) and showing how the rollover works. The completely external form is a necessary moment of the content (as matter).

The relation of the external aspect (say of the book) to its inner content -- all of the conceptual meaning expressed on its pages -- sets up (and illustrates) the explicit relationship that develops Existence into Appearance. The book is a set of external signs on separate surfaces. But the signs have meanings; and what makes the book identically this book, is its physically external body
(with all of its markings) on the one hand; and the meaning of its marks on the other.

This is an essentially spiritual example. But it can be illustrated all the way down through the sphere of natural phenomena. Every existent phenomenon is the outward appearance of some essence which is its meaning for us.

(Essence: B: Appearance) C: Relationship

§135 (•) Immediate Relationship (Whole and Parts)

Relationship, as it immediately exists for direct observation, is perfectly exemplified in our book-paradigm -- but also in any inorganic thing. The living organism exemplifies it in the dialectical shape that will drive our thought forwards.

The book is, physically, an inorganic thing; and as such it is a whole which can be divided into external parts. These are its content in the material sense of its make-up. The parts are recognizable as parts, in the sense that we can tell (at least) what sort of whole they belong to. A loose page tells us to look for a book (even if we can't tell what book).

The organism transcends this category because it is not made up of externally independent parts. It can lose some parts and survive as a (defective) whole; but the parts that it loses, lose their own independent identity (as parts) very rapidly. G.E. Moore said "this is a hand"; but
Aristotle already saw that the name applies quite differently when the hand is cut off. The ensemble (Zusammen) of the organic body is "the opposite and negation of the part." But we need to find an intermediate paradigm in the inorganic world in order to make the transition to Force and Utterance properly. The right model is the magnet. No matter how many parts we chop it into, each one remains a whole magnet; and we can make any magnet into part of a greater Zusammen.

§135A Existence as the expression of an essence is more adequately described as Appearance (which refers us logically to the essential being that appears). But Existence is a world of Appearance. Everything exists in the context of its proper environment. As an existing thing, we can move it about, and change its relationship with other things in its environment. But there are limits to this independence (or indifference). If we drop our book into the bath it will soon be ruined as a book. The right environment is essential to every existing thing (as a unity of content and form, external and internal). The identical relationship of the sides of form and content, implies a world of stable relationships.

It is this that Hegel's lecture comment concentrates on. He is already thinking of the transition to Force and Utterance -- so the first paragraph of his comment does not connect directly with §135 because the next paragraph
embarks on the critical **overthrow** of Whole and Parts. If a **whole** is a proper **unity** then it ceases to be a whole when divided. The organism has "parts" only as long as they are held **together** in the whole. There are wholes whose parts can exist as **fragments** (book pages, or the "fragments" of Heracleitus); and there are wholes which exist imperfectly developed (bad State) or defective through disease (sick body).

Only the **dead** organism on the dissecting table has **parts** in the ordinary sense. Medical students in the lab can discuss which "part" each will take to study this morning. But this organic view of whole and parts already takes us to the level of "Inner" (living function) and Outer (dead body). It hardly connects with §135; and it does not explain the transition to §136. (We must wonder whether von Henning made the best choice from the student notebooks he had, since it seems likely that Hegel himself actually made this comment a bit further on).

What Hegel says about observational psychology shows the **recognized** inadequacy of the Part/Whole category. Even the observing psychologist knows that the Hobbesian image of the mind as a machine with "parts" is not to be taken literally. But to "understand" it we must view it like that (and in the models of **artificial intelligence** we still do). This last paragraph shows how Whole and Parts is the **Understanding** phase of "(C) Relationship."
§136 (⋆) **Force and Utterance** shows us the **dialectic** of Relationship. In order to **understand** the transition we only have to find the clear instance in which it **appears** in the "world of Appearance." The magnet shows us the Whole that can only be divided into Parts that are identical with it as a Whole; and any magnet can become Part of the Zusamment of a larger Whole. When we ask why this is so, the answer comes back that the **essence** of the magnet is "magnetism"; and magnetism is a "Force" which manifests (or "utters") itself as an essential unity of polarized **opposites**. So no matter how far we **divide** the whole, we **cannot** divide the N from the S Pole. The "one and the same" of the magnet -- its identity -- is a self-opposition, a **negative** relation to self. The "One and the same" is indifferent to the distinction (of parts). But it is this indifference properly (i.e. with respect to its own undivided identity as well). The (empirically) undivided magnet is in principle, divided already. It is a part as much as it is a whole. We can **put it into** a larger whole magnet. The only absolute whole is Universal Magnetism. All of the finite magnets could be combined in one great one, which (when rightly oriented) would make a circle of force with the Earth itself (as the environment of all magnets). And we don't need to do this literally. We **know** that this is how (and what) Magnetism is -- a circle of "reflection into self" and "reflection into other" that turns upon the "indifference point." This circle is Force and Utterance. (The **Utterance**
shows up outwardly as all the disturbances of things that
the presence of a magnet occasions.)

§136R Hegel now gives us in his text a proper commentary on
§135. In the mechanical sphere where the category of Whole
and Parts is adequate we can go back and forth between the
"sides" taking "things" to pieces and putting them together
quite "thoughtlessly" (i.e. our thought is all instrumental
-- we already know the relevant whole and its parts). For
the parts of the whole, it is the whole that is essential.
But each of the parts is a thing on its own account. We can
use it by itself, or as part of something different. Thus
there are mechanical toy-construction sets (Meccano, Lego,
etc.) whose essence is the fact that either Whole or Part
can be taken as essential (and the other term as unessential).

Infinite divisibility is important in such contexts as
the representation of value for example. A piece of metal
can make one coin, or two (or be part of a larger coin, or
of a "gold reserve" etc.). This "bad infinity" in principle
is "the negative relation of the relationship to itself." I
have illustrated that in the case of the magnet (see
explanation of §136). But Hegel claims that in the infinite
divisibility of some simple matter (say gold) we have the
logical transition to Force. This is validated by our own
energetic concept of matter (since it is not infinitely
divisible and we come to energetic units (molecules etc.) at
the limit. Hegel's own concept of matter was dynamic. But it is not clear how this empirical transition is *logically necessary* -- except where we encounter things like the magnet.

Even in the case of the magnet -- which I think we ought to simply accept as the intended paradigm -- the Whole (the indivisible unity of N and S) is finite. The *force* (which is the unity) only *appears* (utters itself) when there is something else that is *disturbed* by it. That *other* (iron filings in the school lab) is a *complement* of the magnetic force which *solicits* it.

Taken *universally*, the Force concept is the general relation of mind and world *understood* as a circle of perceptual experience and supersensible theory. But the *mechanical* concept of Force is not *adequate* for Perception and Understanding -- our thoughts don't line up like iron filings. We shall have to advance to the Concept (and particularly to the Concept of Purpose, before the mind-world relation can be grasped adequately. So Herder's Concept of God as Force is inadequate -- he would need the world as soliciting matter for his expression in any case. The doctrine that he *creates* the world in which his *utterance* becomes known to us is the way in which this inadequacy becomes explicit.

Newton is the great voice of those who say that the (inner) nature of Force is *unknown*. It is *gravity* that is (for Hegel) the *limit* where divisible matter turns into
energy. Herder's God contains the correction of Newton's mistake. The "nature" of Force is precisely what is fully revealed in its Utterance. Hence explanation of perceptual phenomena in terms of forces is tautologous. Gravity is what it visibly does. But when we use Herder to correct Newton (and so give the true infinite or circular concept of Force that God requires) the concept of God as self-creating Utterance of Force reveals its inadequacy even more clearly. God as Force is indistinguishable from Matter as Force. Herder's God is indistinguishable from Spinoza's. Both of them contradict themselves because our knowledge of God makes a difference to what is. Herder's God is explicitly free (unlike Spinoza's) and we are his free creatures. This freedom is what is not conceptualized in Newtonian Force.

Newton's claim that the nature of force is unknown is also valid methodologically. The nature of Force (particularly and universally) is what has to be learned by empirical inquiry. It is all perceptible (in principle). But it must be perceived; and what is perceived must be organized into the unity of Appearance in order to be conceptualized properly; and the necessity of the Concept will further inform us even about what cannot be perceived in practice (for instance the inside of the Sun). (Hegel's philosophy of scientific method is primitive and undeveloped. He understands Newton's achievement in bringing Moon and falling apple into one internally coherent theory of "necessity." But he is quite naive about "the
necessity of the content insofar as it is restricted on its own account" (i.e. about the design and interpretation of experiments).

§136A1 Force is the infinite shape of Whole and Parts, because it is necessarily doubled. There must be a complementary "force" in order for the first force to utter itself. If we break a magnet, the new poles at the point of breakage will attract each other. So we can turn one of the pieces round and make a circle of force in which the two pieces cling to each other in a new orientation; and the iron filings become little magnets as they line up in the schoolroom experiment.

Just as Herder's God, conceived simply as Force, needs the world (as other than his force) in order to express himself, so Magnetism needs the iron to carry it. Forces (even Gravity) need material substrates. The iron filings become magnetized; but Newton's apple is already a small gravitational quantum -- though it will not last long if it rots on the ground or is peeled and put in a pie dish.

There is a closed circle of simply identical opposites (or mechanical complements) here. Herder's God is an inadequate concept because he cannot have purposes. He simply is his total utterance.

§136A2 The cognition of the utterance is the cognition of the force because the utterance simply is the appearance of the force. This doctrine works well with magnetism because it has only iron as its substrate. But if we apply it to heat,
for example, then the utterance becomes very various, depending on what is heated, and how much. Heat as a force is the whole array of effects that it can produce in the world. But if we are ready to call God a Force, and the world his Utterance, that will not give us intellectual cramps. When Herder does this, his God becomes Spinoza's -- and not distinguishable from D'Holbach's Matter. But we should notice that this is the controlling Concept of Hegel's own Philosophy of Nature. Nature is the Utterance of the Concept (the Logos as Word). But, of course, words (Concepts) are not simply forces.

Hegel refers here to the empirical reason why Newton was right to say that the nature of force is unknown. It is the nature of the force that has to be found out. All of the shapes of its utterance have to be found out, and organized into a coherent unity of Appearance. But also the Appearances of the many different forces have to be organized into one unified theory.

We can see at once how inadequate the concept of the mind as a unity of many forces is bound to be; and this leads on to a deeper reason why Newton was right to insist that "the nature of Force is unknowable." God cannot be properly comprehended as Force. His nature is something beyond the physics (or mechanics) lab. The Church was right to condemn the programme of the Scientific Revolution as impious; for the concept of the divine as Force is Materialism. Magnetism expresses itself in iron. So it was
natural for Gassendi to revive the atomism of Lucretius. Newton's Pantocrator was Clockmaker and regulator; and the God of his personal faith was much more than that -- a Being whose purposes were unknown (except as revealed but still hidden in the riddles of Revelation. But in the modern Enlightenment Newtonianism is the faith of Deists and Materialists alike -- and it is not clear what difference the Duty makes (except through the whim of the enlightened Deist).

So the Church was right, says Hegel. But that is only a one-sided rhetorical concession. He certainly thought Voltaire (and others) were right in attacking persecution; and he does not think the Church is right in condemning his philosophy. His justification of the Enlightenment (as the secularization of faith) is just as important as the justification of Faith's claim that there is a world beyond. (The real world of Spirit is here, just where the Enlightenment wants it to be.) Both sides are wrong; and the rightness of the Church depends on its acceptance of the command to know God "in spirit and in truth." We cannot do that with just the concept of Force.

§137 We are now about to make the transition to Inner and Outer. Here Force and Utterance must return with Whole and Parts -- both being comprehensively negated (or inverted) in a more universal concept. We can see how Whole and Parts is negated in Force/Utterance, because we cannot separate Whole
from Parts, although we can still divide. It is division that is transcended by Inner/Outer. That is the category of the Organic proper.

Force and Utterance are logically identical. But the Utterance is a Whole that is divisible into Parts. As soon as we think of the universal force of Gravity we can see that this is so, because gravitational masses are just what can be broken up into parts. Newton's apple could have been cut up for a pie; Eve's apple was consumed bite by bite.

But at the same time the identity of Force and Utterance is the identity of Inner/Outer. What can be divided is the material substrate through which Force utters itself. We have been breaking magnets into smaller parts and putting them together into larger wholes all along -- what we could not break was the force of Magnetism. The breakable magnet which remains itself as the identical utterance of Magnetism mediates the utterance of the force; and we can see it as soon as we bring in the iron filings on their non-magnetic sheet. Magnetism is the "inner" which becomes visible in the outward pattern of the filings -- and we need the sheet to separate the inner force of the magnet from the outward behaviour of the filings. (I hope Hegel's language -- self-repulsion, reflection into another, reflection into self -- does not need repetition of the old glosses.)

§138 Inner and Outer
The speculative moment involves a return to the Concept of Ground. But now the Ground is determinate. The "Sufficient Reason" for the thing is tautologous with the Appearance of the thing itself. In Force and Utterance we have a duplication in which the identity is one of perfect likeness (or equality). The force must be solicited by another force in order to utter itself. The magnet needs the iron filings in order to show what it is -- to show the force that is in it (but not in another iron bar that looks just like it). But when we reach Inner/Outer, the thing has become self-expressive. The magnetism is in the iron bar; but not in the way in which life is in the seed which (when planted) germinates and grows, expressing the "nature" that is in it -- and not just uttering what it is inwardly as a "reflection into otherness." Now the identity of force and utterance is fulfilled; they are two sides of the same content. Between the seed and the plant there is only a difference of form.

§139 Inner/Outer is the identity which we first saw in Form and Content. In our thoughtful uses of it, it applies to everything within the range of Essence. Essence and Existence are the Inner and Outer sides of the same Concept. But in thought, the identity is not fulfilled. Hence it is possible to be a nominalist, and insist that all "essences" are really only names for complexes of names. We don't know any real essences, so we say; and this is true in the twin
senses that we can always be mistaken, and that there is always more to find out about a real essence. But if we are not mistaken in naming a seed, and in thinking it is actually viable, then we do know a real essence, since we know what will happen when the seed germinates and grows. The same content that is in our mind is what is expressed in the world. (This is even more obviously true about Gravity and Magnetism. But a less developed Concept, with separable "parts," will cover them.) Inner/Outer remains implicit, and is not completely utilized -- except when we try to conceive God as Force. Then we cheat. We have to identify God and Nature (i.e. use Inner/Outer); and at the same time insist that God is beyond Nature -- employing the separability of Force and Utterance to express the truth (but God is more than Force).

§140 The dialectic of Inner/Outer is visible enough in the identity of seed and plant. What is inner is what is all in the seed, and what is not (cannot be) all expressed in any one moment of its growth. The seed is the identity, and the plant is a temporally extended manifold of states. As "determinations of the form" the life-principle (soul) is quite distinct (opposed to) the body (which can lose some parts for example). But essentially they are identical (indivisible).

The fact that what is only inner is equally only outer is a very important point for the further development of the
Logic (and for its real-philosophical applications. The illustration of this that is immediately at hand in our plant-paradigm is the separable existence of the seed on the mature plant at harvest time. The acorn is external to the oak (which can only produce it when mature). It contains the whole life cycle of another oak, but only inwardly; and it has become an outward thing entirely external to the living tree that produced it.

§140R Usually (because of the abstraction of all thinking from life) we identify essence with "the inner." This makes it strictly external (to real life). Hence the possibility of reducing all essences to names; and hence, too, God becomes the unknowable Thing-in-itself -- the absolute inner who is absolutely outside of experience. But here it is the inner life of Nature that becomes the Ding-an-sich. (This confirms our contention that the Inner/Outer identity is the living organism.) This pure inner is exactly the sort of thing that we have in our merely external knowledge. The Concept purpose and law of Nature conceived as inner are conceived as known to God in the same external way that the outer mechanism of nature is known to us. The true inwardness of Nature is what is expressed in its visible life just as the true moral character of a human being is what is revealed in her actual life.

[Memo: Read bit of text; and add ref. note to ODY (Ch. V A)]
§140A This time the editor has clearly chosen an appropriate piece from the lecture notes. We begin with a comment on the logical movement. Inner/Outer sublates both "mere relationality" (Force and Utterance) and "appearance" (Whole and Parts) together. Things as they appear can be divided - - until we come to the magnet where each part is still the identical whole -- and no thing is the actual whole until we reach the whole world of magnetic relations sustained by the Earth. Here we have reached the identity of Inner and Outer. But the Earth is much more (inwardly and outwardly) than a magnetic system.

Hegel labours the point that we must not assume that the "inner" is what matters (p. 210 note c). This is exactly what we have been assuming since we entered the Sphere of Essence. We have arrived at Inner/Outer explicitly now because we are finally in a position to recognize the identity of the two sides. The truly disastrous shape of this error is the identification of Spirit as inner and Nature as outer. Nature is indeed what is external; essentially it is what is external to itself, what is spatio-temporal, sense-perceptible. But if we oppose this externality to inwardness abstractly (i.e. as distinct or separate spheres) then both sides become "merely internal" -- i.e. mere thoughts which have no reality at all. Reality is life, the identity of inner and outer, of Spirit and Nature.
Hegel speaks of "the Idea" and of "our religion." But since we have no common religion, and quite generally no religion at all, we must leave that aside. It is only a historical illustration and pointer to his meaning. We should only note that he wants to insist that Nature is one side of God's self-revelation. He wants his orthodox hearers to share the romantic religious consciousness of nature, and recognize that God is here in Nature -- not "beyond" in Heaven. Nature does not know itself as God; but that is just what we have to do. The inward secret of Newton, von Haller and Kant is the false image of a jealous God.

Hegel matches my example of seed and plant with the corresponding spiritual one of human child and adult. The infant has to learn to speak and to reason. (S)he does this in the spiritual soil of the community, just as the plant grows in the soil of the Earth (which Hegel was not wrong in conceiving as "alive" (organic). But the eventual inwardizing of "ethics, religion and science" is the spiritual dimension (the reality of "Heaven") which goes beyond the sphere of living Nature (for which our Inner/Outer concept is adequate).

The spiritual identity of Inner/Outer never becomes perfect. The necessity for criminal justice shows this. The perfect Inner/Outer identity of the natural organism has to be breached and negated in human education. This is only sublation; the identity should be recreated at the higher
level. But this level is one of conscious freedom, not of spontaneous instinct. So there is necessarily lots of room for things to go wrong. But the punishment of crime shows us how things ought to come out (not as a rational ideal but as actual practice). The criminal who escapes punishment shows that the "inner" can be separated from the "outer." But punishment itself shows what we ought to think of those who plume themselves on their "inner" potential. We know them by their fruits, just as we do the criminals.

On the other side, if someone achieves great things, it should not matter to the historian that (s)he was ambitious, selfish, etc. Many problems arise here. Hegel agrees that Jean Valjean was not a criminal; and Parnell, brought down by adultery, is a clear case of great plans frustrated by circumstances. But Goethe's recipe "Love" is the right one for the rational historian. (How it applies to Hitler is not clear. But that is because he infected the objective structures of society with his own diseased consciousness. It is certainly true that the pragmatic history which looked for moral lessons, "good kings" and "bad kings," was missing the real point of historical inquiry.)

§141 Inner/Outer are truly identical. When this is clearly recognized they sublate themselves; and we find ourselves faced with the Concept of Actuality. The dialectic of Inner/Outer (§140) consists in the fact that when we try to conceive of them in their opposition they both collapse into
the abstract inwardness of reflective thinking (which is the same as the absolute externality of what cannot be known). We can observe this dialectic in the observational theory of the organism. But it is only the theory (that we are discovering the inner nature, by observing the outward behaviour, dissecting the corpse, etc.) that collapses. Hegel's own philosophy of nature uses the concepts of Kantian observers; but (like modern observers) he knows that he is putting together the theory of the actual organism. He is not inferring an inner nature from external observations.

*The tautology of Force and Utterance (the fact that they must be identical) reveals the essential identity of Inner/Outer. The distinction between inner Essence and outer Existence is shown up to be a mere semblance (Schein) -- *a distinction of thought, without a difference in reality. Actuality is the essence recognized as that which actualizes itself. Inner/Outer was the category that we needed in order to conceptualize the living organism. Free Self-Actualization is what we need for the comprehension of ourselves as Spirit. Thus what it will turn into is the Concept simply. For what is actual is what is conscious of its own self-actualizing activity. It knows that it is responsible for what actually exists; and because it is the identity in and for themselves of inner and outer, its knowledge and responsibility can be brought to the level of philosophical comprehension. This is a matter of education;
and resistance is to be expected, because alienation is experienced. But with logical clarification, recognition becomes possible; and self-recognition is what is logically necessary.

(Properly speaking the speculative moment of Inner/Outer -- as totality of Relation -- is **Actuality**.)

**(Essence:) C: Actuality**

§142 This section has a quite lengthy introduction before we get to the unfolding of its moments. This is partly because "actuality" (and cognates) has so many uses in ordinary language below the level of the conscious identity of essence and existence. The German *wirklich* is a synonym for "real" (just as "actual" is in English); but we met "reality" far back in the primitive stages of the logic of immediate Being. It is helpful to remember the connection with *wirken* and *Wirkung* (and with the English verb "work"). Actuality is what works, what is caused, and what produces its effect; and in the full implementation of the category (at the spiritual level) it refers to what does all of these things knowingly. For it is only in consciousness that the unity of essence and existence becomes "immediate." For the rebellious child, its being compelled to behave in a certain way may be just the result of an existing force; for the conscientiously rebellious adult, the law (s)he rejects is
an existence that has become opposed to its proper essence (which is justice). The child has to be brought to see two opposed existences (its own will and that of "authority") as an existence and an essence that should properly be identical; and for the adult, law and justice must be reunited (either subjectively as in the child's case, or objectively through the reform of the law). It is law and justice united that are actual. (Notice that Hegel uses the language of Force and Utterance -- that is where Actuality first emerges.)

§142R Hegel gives us a short survey of the development of the Concept. At the level of Being, essence and existence are not yet distinguished. This distinction is made when the whole sphere of Being becomes Existence -- for now Essence is reflectively recognized as the inner truth. When we take seriously the fact that Essence must appear, we recognize that existence itself is Appearance. Appearance is all phenomenal; but it is recognized to be the appearing of the supersensible (intelligible) "Ground." Actuality is the explicit (conscious) identity of Appearance with its ground. In other words, Actuality is self-grounded; the side that appears externally is the direct product of its own self-realizing energy (Aristotle's word for actuality). There is a perfect (and conscious) circle of inner and outer. The naughty child is told (s)he will get nothing but trouble until (s)he meets the standards of behaviour we all accept;
and the one who thinks deceit and pretence (the separation of the inner) is funny is told (s)he is excluding herself (externalizing herself) -- as in the fable of "the boy who cried Wolf."

It is important that Actuality is a social realm. What is subjective and private is left behind -- as in Hegel's reflections on proper history (§140A). Actuality in the natural sphere is what is objective in the ordinary sense. It makes us recognize it. In the spiritual sphere it is objective in the Kantian sense. It is what we recognize as valid, what we maintain as the standard of rationality (or "truth").

§142A Because Actuality involves consciousness, Hegel has to begin from the ordinary opposition between what is actual, and what can be imagined. Actuality is properly the identity of what is with what is thought. But, of course, we are quite free to think what is not. Only the thought of what is not cannot be a Concept. Actuality contains the ought to be which can and does enforce itself. But the ought which cannot do that is no more real than my fantasy of being a prince. The Inner/Outer opposition is at its most powerful and its most attractive in moral theory. But it is only a dialectical illusion. What we (as a community) really think ought to be, is just what we make to be (from teaching children not to pretend when seriousness is called for, onwards).
Hegel himself considers *utopian* thinking generally here; and we may note that a plan ceases to be utopian when we persuade everyone to agree, and to support it. It may turn out to be *disastrously* impractical. But it is then an actuality of some sort until we abandon it.

Hegel wants to insist that both Plato and Aristotle are philosophers of Actuality. Plato is not a Utopian idealist and Aristotle is not a simple empiricist. Plato we must leave aside here. But it is important to recognize that Hegelian Actuality rests on Aristotle's concept of the "Form" of a living thing as an activity of self-actualization. My paradigm of the plant (for the identity of Inner/Outer) was chosen with this in mind.

§143 Repeats much of §141. Actuality contains *all* of the determinations run through in §142R; but especially it contains Inner/Outer as a *semblance* (distinction of thought which has no reality). The inner side is what we do not see until we trespass against it. What we see is just *existence*. But what is actual is an essence that enforces its own reality as needed. Actuality has a logical genesis that has several stages -- and the first takes us right back to the beginning. For it is the pure Being of what is merely *possible* and the actuality of the Nothing that is *freedom* (cf. §87R).
(1) Possibility

Only what is self-identical (non-contradictory) is possible. The round square is not within the realm of possibility. That the Moon is made of green cheese can actually be imagined (for a fantasy to amuse a child) but not thought (first because we cannot see how the cheese could be there, but in strict logic because if it were there it would long ago have ceased to be "green" (i.e. unripe). The first stage of Actuality proper is "real possibility"; and that is the range of the things that are not, but are objects of hope or fear. Possibility is an essential conditional actuality, because only what is really possible can be actualized. But it is unessential because it is not yet real, it has no real essence except the freedom of thought. It is unessential in contrast to what is actual. Possibility is a function of Actuality, rather than vice versa. The freedom of thought is determined by the actual situation it is in.

§143R Possibility seems like the most comprehensive category because it is limited only by the law of non-contradiction. It embraces the whole range of abstract thought. Hence Kant took it for the basic modality of Being -- Actuality and Necessity being narrower ranges within it. Hegel identifies it as the abstraction of "the inner." But this abstract inwardness of thought now knows itself to be the abstract externality of what is not real. It is external to the world of reality (merely subjective).
Actuality and Necessity, on the other hand, are not "modalities" but concrete realities. Everything that is consistent (abstractly self-identical) is possible; but everything abstractly possible is concretely impossible too, in the sense that everything actual must perish. This is a sophism because it puts the proposition "Canada is a democracy" on the same level as "the Moon is made of green cheese" (which is abstractly but not really possible). Hegel is right to disallow the category of what is abstractly thinkable (imaginable) in logic and metaphysics; but he does not need this kind of misuse of logic to justify his rejection logically. It won't work anyway. Those who want to argue about "brains in vats" will go on doing so; and they will laugh at him, not at themselves.

§143A In common-sense consciousness Possibility seems to be a richer category than Actuality. But when we try to comprehend what is really possible, we find that real possibility is just an aspect of Actuality, and that the understanding of what is actual is the comprehension of what is possible.

Abstract possibility (thinkability, i.e. imaginability) should be avoided. Thus it is not possible for the Moon to fall (like Newton's apple) because of the very same law in both cases; and it is not possible for the Sultan of Turkey to become Pope (because of what it really means to be Sultan). The study of what is really possible is perhaps
the most important aspect of actuality. For we do not, in fact, believe that "yogic flying" will be the salvation of our political society.

We need not pause over the demonstration of the primacy of Actuality by appeal to proverbs. But the illustration of the proposition that "everything is impossible" deserves some notice. The argument that "Matter is impossible because it is the unity of attraction and repulsion" suggests that Hegel might have done better to attack thinkability as a valid category by appeal to Zeno's arguments against motion. There is something radically wrong, we might say, with a canon of the possible that makes motion incomprehensible.

On the other hand, his first example, "It is impossible that I should exist," has a serious positive significance, because it draws attention to the actual difficulty of existing as an integrated self. We do exist (very largely) as a response to the expectation of others; and if we rebel against this Hegelian spiritual definition by turning back to our natural selves for our identity-foundation we do not find that we are logically better off. It is the comprehension of Actuality that offers our best hope. (Of course, to be an integrated self is not the same as to be "happy." Perhaps in our actual world we ought to be unhappy.)

The appeal to Trinitarian Christianity is again useless to us. But we should notice that implicitly it suggests
that the community of the Spirit is the ultimate conceptual context of our actual existence. For us, however, it will be the logical exposition of the human community that must salvage whatever is "absolute" in the Trinitarian faith. We don't start out with a common faith -- and for all who come from a non-Christian background (or have consciously rejected that background) the Trinitarian talk is a ground of suspicion that something other than logic is being smuggled in.

§144 (Real) Possibility is the "inner" of Actuality. But in its (outer) distinction from mere possibility, the actual is what is externally real (concrete). Hegel says that it is "the unessential immediate." He can hardly mean literally that it does not have an essence. So "unessential" is meant to mark its immediacy, its distinctness from the whole range of possibilities (which is the range of essence). Thus calling it "unessential" is tantamount to saying that it exists but its existence is contingent -- one of the other real possibilities could equally well exist in its place. Regarded as a contingent fact it is only a possible existence just as they are. As being only an external fact, it is only internal just as they are.

This is the standpoint of practical freedom. The contingent fact is what I can change if I want to -- or at least what can be changed, if I can get others to agree to help me change it. But that if reveals the real problem.
Whether something is contingent (once we get beyond the simple case of picking up a book in the native tongue and sitting down to read it, and then deciding after a few minutes "not to waste time on inessentials") is a matter of effort and of faith. We can spend our whole lives struggling to change something that ought to be "contingent" (we hold); and it may prove to be an inescapable necessity (as far as we are concerned). But in a longer (wider) perspective we may still turn out to be right. Then we get to be the heroic pioneers in that sphere. Hegel never tires of attacking Fichte's concept of the Ought; but someone can move from being a Fichtean to being a Hegelian, without changing their actual plan and policy of life in the slightest. They simply say "this thing can be done, and I want to do it because it is the best thing that I see to do" instead of "this is what ought to be done" (but they say that too, in the continuing effort to bring others to desire it with them). There is a shift of logical priorities. Being actually-possible is admitted to be a prerequisite of being morally-necessary. You do not say "Ought implies Can." That is a dialectical illusion produced by your own subjective (essentially selfish) desire.

We should see this transition in terms of what truly is (at the level of practical everyday common sense) an immediately free choice. The very fact that we are here in this class [or: reading this book] means that for us more things are actually-contingent, and we have a better chance
(i.e. range of real possibility) in the world than most of our living human fellows. Others may have a better range of material possibilities than we (more money, better social connections etc.). But if they do not know what their "chances" are, they are actually less fortunate. (This ceases to be true as our actual range of choices is diminished.)

§145 Hegel now takes advantage of the identity of the merely inner and the merely outer. In the actually-contingent we can see that real possibility and actual existence are its sides. The book is there to be read, and I am presently at leisure. Shall I read it or not? The externality of the moments for my thoughtful consideration is what constitutes (sets up) my freedom. What is the content of my free afternoon to be? My decision will make the actual "determinate in sich." Possibility will be realized as a contingent actuality (and afterwards it will be a necessary element in my recollection). At the moment there is no necessity. I have a finite choice. The form-determination (my leisure) and the content (what I do) are distinct. What I want to do (as I contemplate my options) is the actual content upon which contingent actuality and mere possibility depend.

§145A Real possibility comprehends the actual, so far as the actual is changeable (contingent). A situation is changeable insofar as it has the ground of its being
elsewhere. Thus I cannot change the fact that it is raining. But I know that the weather changes, and I tap my barometer to find out if it will change (on the hypothesis that atmospheric pressure is its ground). We look for reliable grounds of change (means of prediction and retrodiction) -- because we want to "overcome" (überwinden) the contingent, and to reach what is necessary.

Even in the practical sphere, this is true. If the book in my example is by P.G. Wodehouse (say), then (as a general rule) if I am making a decision to read it, I am deciding whether I need a rest from whatever pursuits of a more serious kind constitute the main fabric of my leisure time. (This will be true even if my main avocation is the reading of science fiction.)

Simple contingency (and the abstract freedom to choose) is not something to be wondered at (or treasured). Chance has an important place in Hegel's philosophy of Nature (just as it does in our biology -- and more recently in our physics). Since he is an Aristotelian about the natural order, he sees it as the weakness ("impotence") of Nature -- the way it falls short. We see it as the openness of nature, the logical ground of all freedom and creative possibility; and Hegel sees it that way too. Nature has to be "impotent" -- unable to achieve the perfect order it aims at -- because it is only the stage for spiritual self-realization. We know that, because we are here; and because we have changed our view of nature, seeing it now as an
evolutionary continuum, we should be able to appreciate the imaginative achievement of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel together in recognizing the concept of (Aristotelian-Newtonian) nature as posited by the freedom of human reason. We see Nature now as potent -- the impotence is now on the side of Spirit, since we are menaced by self-destruction. But to see the logical significance of natural contingency in the Newtonian world-picture was an astounding feat of speculative insight. (Notice that cloud-formations as well as animals and plants get into Hegel's picture -- freedom begins already with what he calls "chemism.")

On the practical (spiritual) side, we must not get things upside down, and take "free-will" for the highest truth of our freedom. It is only "possibility" (the "distinctness of the form-determination" in our relation with Nature). Real freedom is the content (what we see as worth doing provided that it actually can be done). The "content as something steadfast" is what Hegel -- following Plato -- will eventually identify as "the Good" (and I have shown already how that is not a separate Utopian ideal, like the Fichtean Ought -- or what we might call the "idea" in "vulgar Platonism").

Ordinary partisan politics (where both sides accept the structure within which they compete) is founded on "conceit." This is vividly illustrated for us by the contrast between election rhetoric and what the elected government actually does. The actual situation does not
change, so what the government does (whether changed or not) is never what it promised. What we are immediately free to do (our options) is a function of the external circumstances of our situation; and what we actually choose to do is subject to explanation (grounding) in terms of that situation. Real freedom, the freedom of real active achievement, is going to depend upon identifying ourselves with something that is not just a contingent feature of the situation. (If the serious alternative to P.G. Wodehouse is reading science fiction, then our free choice will never become very significant -- we shall be defined by our "work" and shall belong to the "artisans and farmers" of the world -- which is no sad fate, unless we are conceited enough to view it sadly.)

The example of someone whose only problem about leisure is how to enjoy it, illustrates the one-sidedness of contingency. Leisure activities will never be the actuality of such a one -- and an "estate" which only has this problem has ceased to be actual in the Hegelian sense. The ancien régime in France was only "rotten existence." It could be swept away by those who were serious about their actual lives (bourgeoisie and peasants) because it was only the side of external contingency -- no longer a truly actual world of existence.

The reality of a natural language is the best illustration of the relation of change and contingency to the necessities of nature and logic that Hegel can produce.
He would certainly smile at Austin's dream of a "science" of ordinary language. But why shouldn't there be one? (Look at what has happened to weather-forecasting -- even though actual cloud-shapes remain unpredictable.) Certainly he shares the linguistic-behaviourist conviction that "language is the [living] body of thinking" [see also note 25].

§146 The externality of contingent actuality involves (logically contains, enthält) its positedness. It is what either natural processes or human action has "set up." It is what is given (and we accept it as given, or in the human case we may study it with the idea of changing it). But insofar as we accept it as the given starting point, we presuppose it. We study it as the condition of all presently real possibilities. Sometimes we are surprised to find that what we accept as truly actual can be sublated. Even the sacred person of the Monarch -- the Ego that was the State itself -- went to the guillotine in 1793.

§146A Contingent actuality is what can be changed. But what it actually is determines how it can be changed, what it can be changed for. It is the condition of all that is really possible. When the King was guillotined, the Nation still had to have a government (and other monarchies were hostile to that actual government in a way that pushed it into an extreme form of monarchy itself). Things keep moving, because everything actual is both an immediate existence, and a "destiny," a living process that is going towards some
changed state. (When we reach what is necessary, the movement will be towards the change called "self-understanding.")

The contingent has this destiny of being changed because it is finite. It has an inner side that must appear in order for its essence to be complete. Hegel calls the inner unrevealed side its "essentiality." But the whole essence is not what emerges in the change; it is rather the total cycle of changes -- the alternation of inner and outer. Thus the mature oak-tree is not the real end of the process. The real end is the stable maintenance of the process -- the perpetuation of oak-trees; and Plato's idea (or Aristotle's) that there is an ideal socio-political condition that could be stably perpetuated is a mistake. The history of how some condition has come to be gives it a bias; it is already going in some direction. No condition of things is without bias -- but it looks to me as if this is only logically necessary because whatever happens we can find a reason for it in the "condition" from which it emerged; and since we can then find many different grounds for its emergence the certain presence of bias must depend on our being able to show that some rational advance has occurred. I find it hard to see how the triumph of Nazism in Germany, for instance, was "the positing of [some prior] actuality in accordance with its essence." I still want to say with Croce that "History is the story of liberty." But it is only a new (and terrible) aspect of freedom as
contingency that is revealed -- or perhaps (as with the Terror of 1793) the necessity for a new beginning. This, after all, was what the Nazis themselves proclaimed in 1933, but it only became evident for us, when they perished in 1945.

§147 (3) Necessity

The circle of possibility and contingent actuality makes us aware of actuality proper as real possibility. Real possibility is the content, the Sache selbst. Content of what? Does the Sache have a name? "Freedom of choice" will not do -- for that is only the "form." It is empty (like the Terror, or the blank slate that came into existence as the "Iron Curtain" in 1945). But this points to the name of the Sache. The content of the Thing Itself is human life, and the name of the Thing is "Reason" (or "rational freedom" if we want to keep the "identity of form and content" before our minds).

Rational freedom is "the totality of the form for itself," the self-realizing process (Betätigung) of the Thing Itself. The Sache is self-grounding, and as such it is the real ground -- the Reason that can find so many grounds for anything that is, or anything that it wants. In order to be rational, freedom (the formal freedom of free choice) must become fully conscious both of its options, and of its goal. This is the necessity that operates when all conditions are present. The Sache itself is one of the
conditions for its own realization. It is a condition as "the inner," i.e. as the thought of what is still unrealized, but must exist. Thus, for the universal triumph of the Enlightenment, it was necessary that someone (like Kant) must write a manifesto (like "What is Enlightenment").

Developed actuality is Necessity (the necessity that freedom should become rationality, and that Reason itself should be free). Thus the theory of Gravity is a proper paradigm of "Necessity" only if we see that the "infinite" motion of the Moon (brought together with the finite fall of the apple, as necessary in accord with the same law) is an image (Vorstellung) of spiritual freedom.

§147R  Necessity is correctly defined as the unity of Possibility and Actuality. It is the possibility that cannot be separated from its actuality. But this is superficial, and it causes misunderstanding. In that sense it is "not understandable" (unverstandlich). We think it is very easily understood, and we go quite wrong about it. Actually it is very difficult because Necessity is the Concept itself (Reason); and human Reason is human Freedom. We have to put that qualifier "human" in, because the moments of Necessity (Condition, Sache and Activity) must lose their contingency and come together as the identity of possibility and actuality, "in passage" (or in their passing over from one to the other). They are actualities, that must be grasped at the same time only as forms, because they
are states of the knowing self. Only in this way can Necessity be the *Sache selbst*, the self-knowing Concept. When we try to conceive the identity of Necessity and Freedom as the one unique Actuality we have Spinoza; and when we try to conceive an order of actualities that is non-transient, we have Leibniz. Neither can produce a convincing account of Freedom. (This historical application shows us the criterion for understanding Hegel. If our interpretation leads to a form of determinism that is unacceptable to ordinary reason, we have simply misunderstood.)

§147A The claim of actual necessity can always be challenged. This is not the case with formal (logical or mathematical) necessity. We do not (normally) ask why 2 and 2 are 4. But what is seen to be actually necessary is so because it is posited (i.e. mediated or grounded). Also it is not simply mediated or grounded through something else, so that we can break the link and change it (or anyway it will change itself, like the weather). The necessary is what contains its own ground, so that to understand it is to know why it can't be changed. (We know, by experience, that we can't change the tides or the weather; the theory of gravity gives us a reason why in the case of the tides -- and it even explains some stable facts about the weather.)

Ordinarily, necessity is blind -- i.e. it has no purpose. But this is not the developed concept. Natural
necessity is the simple emergence of a new situation from a set of conditions that come together and collapse into it. The emergent change is spoken of by Hegel as an "inversion into the negative" of the still dispersed conditions (before they come together). Notice that causation is not yet invoked. For that we have to have grasped the unity of the "necessary conditions." What happens -- the emergence of the Sache -- shows us this unity; but it is "blind" because we could not see it beforehand. Insofar as we can give a purposive explanation, it is because we can read off this unity as an "inner," a thought that existed beforehand, even if we are only observers who discover it afterwards.

"Blind" and "sighted" necessity -- as exclusive alternatives -- set up the "design" hypothesis for whatever is "infinite" in our experience. When we discover the cyclic order of the Heavens, and notice that living organisms preserve themselves, and reproduce their kind before they die, we think that, because the "essence" has appeared to us completely, there must be some higher mind whose purpose is the "sight" of this order. But we can't say why this Providence wants (or needs) that "sight." We should attend rather to the fact that "sighted" (or purposive) necessity is what belongs to us as rational beings. For us to exist, we have to be able to interpret the world as a purposive order, and it has to be interpretable in the purposive way. Does the fact that it has to be interpretable in that way mean that there must be
a divine Providence? Rather, the recognition of this necessity removes the necessity to posit such a mind (as separate from the order in which we are the self-positing of rational necessity). It shows that the evidential value of the order is nil. Of course, the formal freedom of Reason remains. We can posit the Divine Mind if we want to. But the necessity to do so has shown itself to be a dialectical illusion.

"What underlies the divine Providence ... is the Concept." The world -- our human world -- is necessarily a self-interpreting process. We need not trouble about the accusation of blind fatalism levelled against the Philosophy of History, because we know that we have one kind of "sight" when we look forward, as we struggle to make actual the possibilities that we take to be real, and which we do actually desire; and another kind of "sight" when we look back and seek to comprehend what we have actually made real. The two sights don't coincide. Is there an all-seeing mind that has the second kind of sight of the "essence" before it is actualized? The hypothesis contradicts our own experience of rational freedom. We need it, because we need the consciousness of Nemesis, the Destiny that brings an opposite reaction for every action that disturbs the balance of Nature (or of Spirit). It is precisely the element of Necessity ("God's eternal and immutable decrees") that is valid in the Vorstellung of Providence. Fate is exactly what we must always regard with reverence.
Compared with the ancient Nemesis, the Will of God as a means of "consolation" is decadent. This makes God responsible for everything (the fall of the sparrow). Fate as Nemesis allows for our freedom in the first place. Antigone does not separate ought from is. She pleads for what she thinks ought to happen, and then hangs herself when it does not. One ought not to want consoling for the way things are. Hegel offers here a trenchant condemnation of the consolatory belief in Heaven as "pie in the sky."

The "truth" of Christianity is that "God wills that all men should be saved," because every individual consciousness has an infinite value. He himself became a "person," he died and rose again, because that is the full meaning of our life. Zeus and Apollo are not persons who know themselves. In that guise they are only human fictions. If someone says "That's all the Resurrection story is, too," (s)he has missed the point. The Trinity (and Incarnation) tell us how the "pure actuality" of "what is" can be understood as personality. When we learn to see that in the Gospel story we see that we can stop worrying about how much of the story is historical.

As Heracleitus said, "Character is daimon for man." A good character is eudaimonia, happiness. But character is not given -- it is made; and when it has been made, through our collaboration with our ethical world, then we know that we are now "the smith of our own fortune (Glück, happiness). We can only enjoy our own lives. We decide what makes life
meaningful, enjoyable. Complaining about "bad luck" (Unglück) is a waste of time. Hegel is not saying or implying that there is no such thing as bad luck. That is the contingent aspect of things which has to be there by natural necessity. The attitude of acceptance and reverence towards it is the foundation of that peace of mind that makes contentment possible (and discontent rewarding).

§148 Now we reach the two sections in which the moments of Necessity are detailed properly. Condition and Sache we could already recognize; and Activity (Tätigkeit) was the mediating moment that arrived in §147.

a) The condition is the presupposed situation. We should notice that our concept of mediated Necessity is one that involves free activity. Properly it is spiritual necessity. Each moment has two sides. Externally it is an existent fact. In this perspective, the necessary connection is a contingency. The conditions are passive. They form the material content of the Sache which achieves itself by uniting them.

b) The Sache is a thought-project. It exists as such, but in order to be realized, it must find the conditions present as its raw material. But in unifying them it produces itself as a novel situation.

c) Hegel is kind enough to give us an example of the activity: a human agent imposing her project on some situation; or a human character expressing itself in an active response to
some practical problem. Otherwise we would only have Divine Providence creating a new situation for us out of the raw material of our interactions; and in its application to Nature this concept would give us the Platonic Demiurge imposing his order on matter to produce the immortal Living Thing; or Newton's Divine Clockmaker.

These are the great paradigms of this category at the infinite level. This concept of external Necessity is identical with the concept of external Teleology. Two things seem to me to be important about it. First Necessity is conceived as external so that it can be freely imposed. Secondly, being restricted freedom it is implicitly finite. It says right on its face that it is an inadequate Concept of the Absolute. It will not do as a name of God. God cannot be conceived as an external agent, who operates within the limits imposed by material conditions. Thus this concept forces us on towards its own inversion (or self-internalization) into the concept of Substance.

There is nothing strange about this Concept except its name. It emerges logically from the dialectic of Possibility and Contingent Actuality. But in ordinary parlance we would say that it is "freedom" not "necessity" that unifies Possibility and Contingency, and keeps them spinning round in the circle of their dialectic. But precisely because it is restricted by the Chance that provides the "initial conditions" of its activity, this "freedom" can be thought of either as Necessity or as
Freedom. Thus the Ancient atomists taught both that the motion of the atoms was strictly random (or "by chance") and that the generation of the world was necessary (once the right set of accidents began to happen); and it appeared to Laplace, once he had shown that the Newtonian Clock did not need regulating, that he could drop the Clockmaker too. What he overlooked was himself. Where did the free intelligence that could make this decision come from? That was what Voltaire's retort pointed to.

Hegel's Concept puts this finite free intelligence in the place of Chance, in order to make the Category of Necessity a going concern. The human agent is restricted freedom (and her character is the completion of a set of contingently actual conditions in which her action is what social custom dictates as necessary). The juxtaposition of "character" with "man" is what directs our attention to the fact that the whole cycle is properly necessary rather than free. The condition is given by the contingent facts of life; the project is dictated by custom. The activity is the conditioned response produced by education (or "virtue"). If we look at the Sache in this light it is necessary (not yet free). (And for Laplace's naturalism, chance fills the place of the activity.)

We should note how Hegel's summing up of Necessity as a unity answers both to Laplace's scientific vision, and to our world of common sense. "Necessity" is the God visible in the "ineluctable decrees" of Providence. The Sache
selbst is the One essence of a unified world constituted by independent actualities (either us humans or Laplace's heavenly bodies and chemical elements). As the absolute form this unity is the total process which appears (perceptually) as a succession of states. Everything that immediately is, sublates itself into some new state, and then returns to its first state. The identity of the whole is posited. We do not rationally intuit it (whatever that would be). We know how our projects work; and we suppose that there is an Author of Nature who is related to the whole order of things (including ourselves) in that way. Thus Hegel agrees completely with Hume: "the necessary is not in and for itself, but is merely supposed."

The overcoming of this intellectual construction is through the identification of the posited other with the world in which its activity is expressed. The world-order is conceived as its own system of Necessity. The separate "ground" and "condition" become together the immediate
identity of Deus sive Natura. The supposed external Author is now "sublated into actuality." He is the world-soul, and he is identical with his body. The Sache as project has "gone together with itself" as result (or as activity). Now we have a properly self-identical Necessity. The necessary is "necessary as mediated by the circle of circumstances" but equally it is "necessary without mediation." It is simply the way things are. "God" and "the World" are identical; and what I do is mediated by the whole story of how I have come to have my character; but equally it is the immediate expression of my character -- it is "who I am."

§149 Laplace was already conceiving his world of Necessity as a Substance. It is clear that the three moments of Necessity regarded as one indissoluble circle are Spinoza's concept of God as Substance. But in Spinoza's concept the free intelligence of Laplace himself is not forgotten. The Absolute is a perfect and equal identity of Thought (the inner) and Extension (the outer). But now we have the explicit antinomy of Freedom and Necessity. God is both completely free and completely necessary in every moment. But the moments make the contradiction explicit, because they are externally free from the whole and from one another. They are independent.

[Memo: Should the "distinctions" at beginning be interpreted as God and World? But then how is Necessity the One
**Essence?** Better to read the *other* as *Providence and Us* as I have done.]

**[ Essence: C. Actuality]**

**A: Relationship of Substantiality**

(Intro) We should notice that Reciprocity -- which is explicitly a two-place Relationship -- is not called one. While Causality (which is a relation, though it can be reflexive -- God is *causa sui* and so are we) *is* called a Relationship. So is Substantiality (which is not necessarily so conceived at all). All three categories are taken over (like Possibility, Actuality and Necessity) from Kant's Table; and in Kant they form the triad of Relationship. Thus Substance is logically bound up with Accident here. Reciprocity, on the other hand, is not called a Relationship because it is the logical fulfilment of Substance -- nothing is left outside it as accidental.

§150 The first section simply completes the transition from Necessity -- and makes clear why Substance must be conceived in a relational context. The necessary is *absolute relationship* (hence Hegel's own discussion of "Providence" -- in which all of our finite activities and contingent relations exhibit their *absolute* result). But in the developed process of the three moments (condition, Sache, and activity) this absolute relationship (between God and
our world) has sublated itself into absolute identity. The necessity of Divine Providence simply is the way in which our world as a whole makes sense. Contingency survives as the aspect of actuality that is a merely external cloak. There are a lot of chance phenomena that are merely accidental to the substance that we rationally grasp.

§150R Substance and Accident is the immediate shape of this concept of the Whole as its own necessity. Substance is the relationship of the world with itself -- i.e. it is Spinozist, or Substance is the world as knowing itself. As necessity Substance is the negation of this thinking into extension (which is actuality as natural physical necessity). But equally it is the negation of this externality which reduces it to accidental status.

Thus we have passed over from the side of necessity to that of freedom. This Remark is a prospective survey of the whole logical development of the section. Spinoza insisted that his God, being self-determined and not compelled or impelled from outside, was free. Hegel's use of the Substance/Accident relation to express Inner/Outer makes that freedom a reality. The finite is free, because it begins as accidental. (In Spinoza there is no room for accident except as an illusion in the sphere of imaginatio.)

§151 Substance is the totality of the accidents. That is to say it is the intelligible unity within which they take on a rational sense or meaning. This does not affect their being
contingent (i.e. free). Contingency (freedom) is a necessary condition of there being *accidentes*; and to be recognized as "only an accident" is the minimal way of "making sense" -- i.e. of being comprehended in the totality. Something that is so recognized in its singular aspect may make positively rational sense when seen statistically (or in its particular aspect). Then we start asking for causes. Why does that happen? Why do "people" do that? etc. (*Cause* is the particular moment of Substance.)

Substance is the might (of fate) that brings *accidents* as such to death and nothingness. It makes them evidently trivial (or without significance). But it does that to some of them, because it takes over others and gives them a significance they were (subjectively) quite unconscious of possessing; or (objectively) which they could not have by themselves. (In *history*, this is the might of *Providence*.) As significance-creator Substance is *richness of all content*, and the accidents are totalized into its manifestations. *Manifestation* (German word) is the higher -- spiritual, implicitly *Conceptual* -- level of Utterance (*Äusserung*) as Substance is of Force. The Content as *mere content* (or as accidental) passes over into the *might* of Substance (i.e. it perishes). Napoleon thinks *rightly* that he is a "man of Destiny." But he dies as an *explicit irrelevance*. His "destiny" belongs strictly to Substance (as positive *richness*). Substance is the *activity* of the
Form (which is the total movement of Substance and Accidents) -- and in that aspect it is freedom. But equally it is the Mephistophelean might that says No to everything Finite: "Your time is up." So it is the Activity that overturns the Form/Content category into its dynamic identity. Napoleon is the perfect paradigm. He is/isn't a Man of Destiny.

§151A Spinoza is the philosopher of Substance. The accusations are: (1) Atheism and (2) Pantheism because his God is only Substance. To be only Substance is to be the simple negation of Thought into Extension (in §150R); and not yet the double negation (or Activity-of-Form). So Spinoza's God is Necessity (Sache) but not yet freedom (Person). This is the Oriental intuition of God -- the one which belongs to the Empires in which there was no personal freedom. Hegel assimilates the Old Testament to this "intuition." But that is bad philosophical history because (accepting his view of Zarathustra without a historical critique) we must say that Abraham was essentially different. He was non-conformist (and the Jews have been persecuted for nonconformity ever since). Hegel is radically unjust to Judaism -- and perhaps to Spinoza also. He is plainly guilty here of accommodating to the orthodox alliance of throne and altar in Prussia; and we can plainly see that the fault is not in his Logic but in his supposedly philosophical interpretation of history.
Whether he is unjust to Spinoza is less clear. It is true that the Hegelian concept of Substance is fully explicit in the good German Protestant Leibniz. But Leibniz only gives us a consistent development of the "divine freedom" of Spinoza. There is no dialectical revolution of Necessity into real freedom here. Nothing is really (rationally) accidental in either of them. Actually I think Spinoza's Ethics has inspired more personally creative freedom than Leibniz. But that is philosophically irrelevant because both have had good and bad applications (supposing that my Hegelian "Good" is the right one).

Pantheism is certainly a just interpretation of Spinoza. Hegel wants to get him out of it, because the Identity Philosophy is certainly a higher development of Spinozism in this respect. One might say that Hegel is claiming that Spinoza is a panentheist (just as his theological followers do about him). But he does so in the clear consciousness that no person of developed intelligence is or can be a "pantheist" simply. So the contrast crops out and the change of terminology changes nothing real.

Actually Hegel says Spinoza is a pantheist because he is forced into acosmism. He cannot account for the world-order. The finite world -- with human freedom and Reason as its engine -- does not form a stably permanent whole in Spinoza. Whether this is a just interpretation the Spinoza experts must decide. (I suspect it of being marred by accommodation myself. But Hegel definitely has a logical
bias against it because of its mathematical method. He seems to hold that this entails that the identity of form and content can only be "the dark night in which all the cows are black." But that is not the experience of those who take Spinoza's Ethics as a guide of life.)

§152 As an immediate category Substance is rational necessity. But as rational necessity in the process of self-actualization Substance is the Macht that requires accidents as the material upon which to work. Thus Substance as the activity of form is the authentic category of Relationship: Cause and Effect. Within the totality of Substance every accident is (or contributes to) the causing of others; and it is the effect of another (or others). (We should notice that Substance can have only a communal application. It is a totality -- a Unity of Many.) With Causality we arrive at a Category that applies to particular collections, and to singulars. But it does not apply to God properly. If we say (with Spinoza) that God is causa sui we do not (must not) mean that He is properly independent of the world. He causes "Himself" by causing the world -- that cosmos which Spinoza (supposedly) cannot explain. He is manifest as Himself in the world [Spinoza got that right]; and he is only manifest to Himself because he is so manifest as Himself to us [Spinoza did not get that explicitly right; and Leibniz got it explicitly wrong].
Essence (C). Actuality

B. Relationship of Causality

§153 Essence is cause because it is inwardly reflected -- i.e. because it is the essence of the World of Appearance. Its passing-over into the total community of Accidents is only one side of it. It is not just the Unity of Many, it is One; and as such it is the originating Thing. (Ur-Sache = ursprüngliche Sache). But as Cause it refers us necessarily back to itself as the Unity of Many. God is Cause because He is the cause of the world. He is necessarily Cause, because it is only in the world that He knows Himself. Only by being cause of the World is He causa sui. (The section does not make this absolute application explicit. Hegel simply gives an analytic account of what the category involves in all of its applications. But Substance is explicitly God; so the transition must implicitly involve Him.)

§153R Here the application to God is patent. Only the Cause of the Whole has "absolute independence and a subsistence that preserves itself." In finite use "causes" are (mostly anyway) already "effects." Only at the spiritual level (as the causes of our own actions) do we deserve this description. So this is the sense that is to be given to the analysis of Cause in the section itself. Hegel says nothing there about the Cause being already an effect. The Cause is the Ur-Sache, the original Thing; and it is only
the free agent that is an original Thing in ordinary finite experience.

Of course, we ourselves as causes are members of the rational community. Others influence our decisions about what impulses to actualize, what motives to make effective; and the reality of our freedom is in what we do. As the "identity of necessity" the Cause passes over into the effect directly. There is nothing in the effect that is not in the cause (as the traditional metaphysics taught). If what we do is not what we would like to do then the effect is inhibited precisely because the cause is inhibited by the operation of some motive (which may elsewhere or at another time not operate). Our freedom makes itself into this finite situation which we set up (posit); but our freedom is still really effective in that situation. The situation we posit is us. So as Cause we are causa sui (and so is God as Providence or as the setter-up of the world). Jacobi could see that God must not be taken as Ground. He has to be conceived as a Cause, which like our subjective freedom is free from its effect. The freedom of Spinoza's God he condemned as a formalism (and so it is if God's thought, and His love of Himself, is actually separate from ours -- but a separate God is just what Jacobi was determined to have). But in retreating to Cause (instead of going forward to Reciprocity, in which Ground returns with its bad Infinity overcome) Jacobi was simply refusing to think out what Cause means. Hegel loves to use a finite model, "Rain is the
cause of wetness," in which the identity of cause and effect is patent. The Humean model is rather "Fire is the cause of smoke"; and when we think of the range of actually possible causes of fire, we must begin to wonder what it can mean to say "nothing in the effect that is not in the cause." What it means in the case of arson is clear however: the arsonist is responsible if the whole town burns and many die. (Only the "Author of Nature" can be blamed for a similar conflagration caused by lightning or some other form of spontaneous combustion; but I shall leave the theologians to wrestle with that, and simply say that the absurdity of the metaphysical concept of causation is revealed by it. My Hegel comprehends Hume as the sublation of Descartes, Aquinas etc.; and this comprehension involves recognition of human scientific cognition as the only "Author of Nature.")

In the ordinary finite use of cause in the construction of our scientific view of the world, every cause is already the effect of some prior cause. Here the form-determinations are present in their distinction, whereas when we speak of the causa sui (God or the free self) we have the identity of Cause and Effect in mind (God/World, Self/Active Record). But even about the free self's acts, we can ask "What caused that?" and expect to find an answer. It I ask "Why did I do that?" I am admitting that the causation of my behaviour transcends my conscious knowledge, and looking for an unconscious inner cause, or an external social pattern etc. In this way a bad infinite chain of
causes will be set up, in both directions (past and future). My actions have effects that transcend my motives and reasons altogether; and, of course, there is the same infinity (both ways) in natural causation.

§153A The Understanding is more comfortable with Cause/Effect than it is with Substance/Accident. This is our familiar model of necessary connection. But it is a one-sided model. The side of freedom (caused spontaneity) is lacking. We do not see that causal chains form closed circles (of "simple self-relation" -- Beziehung auf sich). Causality "in its truth" is self-causation. Ordinary causality is causation-by-something-else; but ordinary consciousness recognizes that Cause and Effect cannot be severed; and this implicitly leads us back to Self-causing and Self-effecting. But what remains familiar as the paradigm is the infinite chain.

§154 The effect is diverse (Verschieden) from the cause. Think of fire and smoke, not of rain and wetness. The smoke is positedness; but more people are killed by it than by the flames, so it is certainly a cause in its turn. The smoke has its own essence. It is a condition of the air, not of the burning matter. But smoke presupposes fire. If we see it, we give the alarm and start looking for the fire. The fire itself is a burning process in some material. Causation is a motion in some substrate situation. But this substrate moves too. The lightning (say) starts a fire, because the wood reacts to being struck by it. Fire is a
reaction; and, of course, all of our free actions are reactions to situations (including the expectations and arguments of our fellows). Causality completes itself as the circle of *reciprocity*, the circle of action and reaction.

§154R This remark identifies the middle moment of this concept for us clearly. We have only two sections. §153 gives us the Understandable Concept; and §154 passes to the Speculative Sublation of it. But the Dialectic in between is the bad infinity of the endless chains of finite causes/effects. We pass from the metaphysical concept of the *causa sui* to the ordinary concept of finite cause and effect. Here the bad infinite is generated; and the bad infinite is overcome when we recognize that "for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction." (Or at the spiritual level that every initiative stimulates a balancing response, so that the stable result is never simply what the agents intended -- this is the Hegelian "Providence.")

In the Newtonian law the bad infinite chain is bent back on itself; and we can see that this must happen to the workings of "Providence" in the end. Will the "end" be the "abyss" of Substance in which all finite free action perishes? We do not know, but we can see that it could. Thus it is the Newtonian law that is comprehensive. If spiritual freedom is to maintain itself it must do so by conscious respect for this law (as the absolute *Macht* of
Fate). Reciprocity is the distinction not of cause and
effect but of one effect that is a cause from another effect
that is a cause. Will there continue to be a difference in
this distinction (a difference made by freedom)? We do not
know. But the full application of the Logic of the Concept
(and indeed the utility of Logic generally) depends upon it.

[Essence (C): Actuality]

C. Reciprocal Action

§155 Reciprocity is the adequate concept of Nature. We
reached the simple concept of Nature as a totality in the
Category of Measure (at the climax of the Logic of Being).
What Hegel himself called the "true Infinity" of Measure
(§111A) is a true Infinite only on its logical side (a
perfect circle of Quantity and Quality). On its real side
it is a leap in the dark. It is the postulate of an
absolute Essence that is supposedly revealed everywhere in
the "bad Infinite" of Measure. That Essence has now ceased
to be a postulate (at least if we agree that God's thinking
is simply our scientific thinking and that "the Author of
Nature" is human, scientific cognition. Nature is now
revealed to us as the perfect total balance of action and
reaction; and the action-programme of the empirical sciences
is to discover by inquiry what the history and evolution of
that balance is in detail.
Reciprocity is the restored identity of opposite sides. The paradigm is the identity of the world-order with the scientific cognition in which it is expounded. Spinoza's God has gone apart into Extension and Thinking; and the sides have come back together in our speculative concept of human science. The sides (Force and Law, Being and Thought, etc.) are an sich the same. And this is true in the sphere of our actions too. Our given nature is what is expressed in our active lives. But the unity of the sides is in Hegel's God, the One Cause present in the World Order and in the free community that knows Him in it. Spinoza's Divine Substance is released into the freedom of human reciprocity.

§156 • The Dialectic of this perfect balance is in the tragicomic shape of human life and history. It is in our consciousness that reciprocity is for-itself; and in its separate existence as for-itself it is destined to reduce itself to nullity. One can regard this also as an exposition of Leibniz. God's positing of himself as the system of the Monads is entirely pointless, because there is no freedom in it. But the ordinary finite view of Newton's law is all we need. If every action provokes and is completed by its equal reaction, then the end-result (the totality) is a zero. Nothing makes any difference. This was exactly what Nietzsche wanted to use the Myth of the Eternal Return for. Can you face the ultimate pointlessness of the whole flurry of existence? he asked. This is not
just a scientific theory. It is the way things are: an endless (and quite pointless) repetition.

§156A Hegel's lecture-comment is given at this stage, because it reveals the empty pointlessness of historical explanation, when it is founded on the category of Reciprocity. We start out by trying to decide whether the character and customs are what "causes" the constitution and laws or vice versa. Then we recognize that this is a chicken-and-egg problem, and we begin expounding the life of the people as a closed cycle of Reciprocity -- just as we do with the Inner and Outer of the living organism.

But we ought not to stop here. We must not be satisfied with this closure. There is no true mediation here. This is not the properly syllogistic process of the Concept. We have to grasp the unity of the whole. The self-moving Form here is the Concept. In order to write Spartan history we must have a concept of Spartan life. Shifting back and forth between customs and constitution explains nothing really. (But we must ask whether the Hegelian concept of Sparta is not likely to be a set of blinkers. An "intuition" that remains tentative, self-critical, continually self-revising seems a more accurate characterization of the best historical practice. But it is best not to be a dogmatic Marxist, for example.)

§157 (γ) Now we move on to the speculative moment. Scientific reciprocity is the unveiled category of necessity,
explicitly set up. Anyone must be dissatisfied with the claim that the Spartans had to have the constitution that they did have. But the subjugation of the Messenians certainly forced them into a corner. They could not be politically free in the way that other Greeks were. At the level of the Substance-Accident relation, the bond of necessity is inner and hidden. Here Necessity is the identity (the Substantiality) of the sort of <beings> that count as actual. For them it is their independence that ought to be what is necessary. On the side of natural reality these members are necessarily one substance, because they must hang together or perish. But this is hidden from them, because the ideal aim that is essential to them is to be free. The ideal of independent freedom is what drives the dialectic of Substance. A community of independent beings (who are not just "accidents") is in an "infinite negative connection to self." A negative connection in which the distinguishing and mediating become the spontaneous freedom of actual agents who are independent of one another. (Hegel thinks of family heads with property, but there is nothing logically necessary about that. Intelligent single individuals, educated to understand their substantial community, seem to be the logically necessary minimum.) An infinite self-connection because the independence of the terms is just the rational identity to which they must consciously return. Thus the contradiction between the hidden and the conscious necessity is resolved
by the motion from a political community like Sparta to a modern political State (in which there are no longer any serfs at all, and in which even the womenfolk are liberated from the substantial life of the family).

§158 Because of the necessary identity of the real (but hidden) natural (or substantial) necessity with the ideal (and conscious) spiritual necessity (of independence of thought) the truth of necessity is freedom (and the truth of Substance is the self-positing Concept). We must go from Spinoza, not to Herder, but to Fichte. But we must remember to take the whole world of Nature (comprehended as the totality of Reciprocity) with us. We do not go to a noumenal realm in which Nature becomes merely a repertory of instruments. Notice that "the Concept" is identified as "the independence ... [of] distinct independent [members]."

An individual thinker (like Descartes) cannot satisfy the Concept. Nor can Descartes' God. The Concept is necessarily a community of rational intelligences -- rational because it remains bei sich ("at home") in its self-repulsion into free independence of thought. We do not fear one another (as in Hobbes). We love one another, because we realize that rational freedom is one and indivisible. If we are to speak theologically we must say that the Concept is God at home in his community -- or the Incarnation of God in every member. Hegel will confirm this
in his lecture comment by his reference to Spinoza's intellectual love.

§158A The immediate concept of Necessity is hard, ineluctable Fate. The free and individual breaks herself on it. (Cf. Faust and Gretchen as Pleasure and Necessity in the Phänomenologie des Geistes. Necessity there is the social custom and law. What is bound together is love and marriage, or Faust and Gretchen by the pregnancy.) Necessity must be recognized; and freedom must incorporate willing sacrifice to it, because simple free choice is simply the following of natural impulse.

Necessity begins as external compulsion, but as we comprehend it we internalize it by grasping its rationality. Thus love and marriage go together because of the child: the inner comes out literally in this model. Necessity becomes the freedom of voluntary identification. Necessity and freedom are not mutually exclusive, because real freedom presupposes some necessity. Real freedom is ethical identification; hence the punishment of crime is not alien violence restricting freedom but the demonstration to the criminal of why real freedom is ethical. It shows the rational meaning of the crime by turning it into a true infinite of reciprocity. The extreme of independence is to grasp the whole and love it (Spinoza).

§159 As the freedom that contains Necessity sublated, the Concept is the truth of Being and Essence. It is in our
membership in the rational community that we can see the identity of reflection within self and independent spontaneity, and of being a separate self with having an essence that is universal (or common). But in the external reflection of the scientific observer we can see this identity for Being and Essence generally.

§159R On the one hand, both Being and Essence have returned into the Concept (Freedom sublating Necessity in living consciousness) as their ground (their reason or explanation). On the other hand, the Concept has developed out of them (i.e. the Concept of free rationality has evolved out of the Concept of Nature as Necessity). On the first side, the concept of Being has deepened itself. What is immediate for cognition has revealed its inward structure. On the second side, what was only a seed has become a full-grown plant. The first side ties down the seeming arbitrariness of philosophical thought which is the mature result of the second. True freedom is the truth of the actual being of Nature. It is not simple Being, or the order of Nature, that immediately is; it is actually our Concept of Being and Nature that immediately is for us. (Of course, to say this is -- in another way -- to say that nothing is immediate, because the Concept moves ineluctably every time we try to fix it.) But in its "immediate" aspect the Concept is the presupposing of Being (and of the natural order) in accordance with itself -- so that the return into
itself is identical with the presupposing. The "return" is the development of the concept of Freedom as sublating that of Necessity. Every stage of the development is presupposed and incorporated in the next. But it is sublated, i.e. negated or inverted, even as it is preserved and carried forward.

Thus the Concept is Essence that has returned to Being as simple immediacy. It is the world of the free rational selves as known to them in its immediacy. Not "things" (or the world) but the knowledge of things (or the world cognized) is what is immediately there. The shining of Essence has its actual being in the world; and its free shining within itself is its being in the mind of the free rational community. The being of the Concept within itself is the world as known within philosophic Science.

The passage from Necessity to Freedom is hard because it involves this shift in the interpretation of immediate being. Independent actuality has its substantiality in its passage to identity with the Concept of it. This works both ways. The independent world must pass over to the logical concept of it; and my concept of myself must pass over to the actual world. Otherwise there is no real freedom.

In the last stages of Essence === Substance, the causa sui has to pass over to a cosmos of finite states that can be known. This is the hardest transition. The return from here to Necessity is the dissolution of this difficulty, because the thinking of Necessity already involves Freedom.
The Necessity that free thought faces is its own logical necessity. The necessity of the world-system in thought is the necessity of freedom for the thinking self. (We saw already in the logic of Necessity as a concept that the sphere of Contingency is necessary to Necessity as its logical complement; and we should not be surprised at this final result because logical thinking is an effort or project freely undertaken. The Concept simply existing for itself (like Essence as Schein) is the Ego; in its developed totality it will be free spirit (the rational self in its community of pure thought). As the identity of immediate feeling, it is love; as actual self-enjoyment it is blessedness. (Heaven is an aspect of this life in the world.) Hegel acknowledges that the inspiration for this whole concept of spiritual freedom is from Spinoza; and Spinoza brings out the fact that true freedom of thought is founded upon the conscious recognition of Necessity.

§159A After this long and informative Remark the lecture comment is brief. It deals with the problem raised by the discovery that the Concept (the free and thoughtful awareness of Being and Essence) is what is really immediate. If that is so, why didn't we begin with it (as Fichte does, for example)? The simple answer is: because Truth must be our result. If we begin with it, then we have the problem that truth appears as just another opinion (cf. Phänomenologie des Geistes, Preface). Truth is that which
can demonstrate itself logically in the pure freedom of thinking. If we begin with the Concept as a definition, we should still have to go back to our actual beginning right away. The difference would be that (like Fichte) we would have to take up the categories of Being and Essence from the imaginative-experiential realm of representative thought. In our approach we have followed the logical development of the categories from the simplest up to the point where we have reached the Self-Concept that truly is.
Third Subdivision of Logic

The Doctrine of the Concept

§160  With proper observation of our cumulative progress the Concept of Rational freedom must be defined as the substantial might of what is for itself. The Concept for itself simply, is the thinking Ego (§159R). But this definition means that the rational Ego is only truly free when (s)he thinks, speaks, and acts for the whole rational community (the substantial might which her thinking makes to be for itself). Critics sometimes say that this means we have no real freedom in the ordinary sense. But that is a mistake. My freedom in the ordinary sense remains exactly what a reasonable person reliably takes it to be. I can do (with the full support of the substantial might) whatever we all recognize to be legitimate. "Thinking, speaking, and acting for the community" sounds Kantian. But it does not mean that I am only free when I am doing my duty. What the "substantial might" wills is freedom for itself through the independent rational self-expression of its members. So I can do whatever everyone rationally sees that a free member must be permitted to do. I cannot do what Faust did in killing Gretchen's brother, and abandoning her orphaned and pregnant. But I can do what others may want to describe as selfish, or morally biased ("unjust" or "unfair") but not illegal. There may be many opinions about Rushdie's Satanic Verses; but we all agree that he should be allowed to
publish his book without molestation. It may be blasphemy; but the vengeance belongs to God alone. Let Providence look to it; that is what rational freedom means.

On any grammatically intelligible reading of the text Hegel clearly asserts that each member of the free community of Reason is the whole that the Concept itself is. We understand what the community is and what it aims at; and in exercising our freedom we achieve its purpose by making it be for itself as well as in itself. We understand what the necessary limits of our freedom are (the "negativity of the totality" in the text of 1827); and if we do not spontaneously respect those limits, we understand why we are punished -- the punishment should be so designed as to make us understand precisely this.

The Concept is what is in and for itself determinate, because as free Macht, it can only be for itself by determining itself. Logically it is "determinate" -- i.e. definable -- as the process of self-determination. That is what the totality, and every member in it, equally and identically is.

§160A Compared with my exposition of the four lines, Hegel's commentary -- though longer -- is less helpful. He is obsessed about the fact that when we recognize that it is our Concept (the communal world-interpretation) that immediately is, we are making the move to his Absolute idealism. All of what we normally take as immediately real
(Being) or true (Essence) is actually an ideal (i.e. thoughtfully mediated or interpreted) moment in the Concept. The Understanding takes Concepts to be forms of thinking (as opposed to extension) which represent the reality that is external to them. But the real world is the humanly interpreted world; and interpretation (the actual Concept) is the principle of all life. It is the interpreted world that is "utterly (schlechthin) concrete."

To confirm for ourselves where we have got to we must go back to Form and Content (on which the ordinary understanding of "concepts" is founded). The actual Concept embodies the whole development from that point. It is a "form" in the Aristotelian sense of a living power that realizes itself in the world. It is "abstract" because it is a "form" that is free of matter (in Aristotle's sense). In other words it is a thoughtful interpretation of the world which realizes itself for us, the logical interpreters of experience.

The stations (categorical triads) of the Logic are definitions of what absolutely (i.e. non-relatively, self-sufficiently, independently) is. We now have "The Absolute is the Concept." Obviously this entails the use of "Concept" to mean "process of self-conception." God is here taken to be the self-comprehension of the "substantial might" in its own thought. But why use "concept" in this strange way, when it is bound to lead to misunderstanding? The answer is that there is a continuum of uses here. In
order to be I must comprehend my thinking being; so we must build the bridge from the more familiar usage to this. Hegel instances the Kantian (and post-Kantian) employment of the legal usage of deduction meaning the "leading back" of concrete cases to their conceptual "ground." The Concept is the rational ground of the whole world of communicable experience.

§161 At this stage of Logic we shall have not a rolling-over, and no longer a reflection back and forth, but a conscious development. It is always the community of rational members that is there before us. But its interpretation of itself grows and gets richer. Like its real members, its logical stages are always explicitly free states of being (i.e. thinking) of the whole Concept.

§161A In the logic of Being we had a rolling-over advance; in Essence an advance by the logical reflection of complementary opposites. Now we have development, the emergence explicitly of what is implicit. In Nature the paradigm of this is the growth and maturing of the organism (e.g. plant). The emergence is not a becoming visible of what is preformed, but a pattern of change that is natural -- not programmed but proceeding by the free recognition of what is the necessary next step. There can be mistakes and false steps, but we recognize the right step when we make it. This recognition-experience is the truth in Plato's
doctrine of Reminiscence. In Christian doctrine the Trinity expresses the movement of the Concept.

§162 The Division of the Conceptual Motion

The fact that Hegel gives a triadic division for the Concept indicates the syllogistic character of the motion at this level. We have first the doctrine of the subjective Concept, which contains the formal doctrine of the speculative Concept, Judgment and Syllogism. Then the doctrine of Objectivity (or of the same universal process in re, rather than in the intellect; and finally the doctrine of the Idea, which is the completed mediation of intellect and world, the theory of the Concept as that which realizes itself and knows itself as the Truth.

§162R The formal (or Subjective) Concept comprehends all of the topics of ordinary formal logic (in its traditional shape; but some well-grounded student who understands Hegel's logic ought to study the impact and significance of the modern "logic of relatives" -- Peirce's triadic theory of signs and sign-categories strongly indicates that Hegel's basic syllogistic structure will not suffer as a result.)

What is important for us to remember is that the Concept is substantial even in this formal phase. It is the speculative structure of a scientific community. We must expect to find applications at the level of Chapter V of the Phenomenology (Subjective Reason). Also, it is a "name of God"; and on that side we ought to be able to recognize the
theology of the Trinity in its subjective abstraction -- i.e. as pure thought.

The laws of thought (in Essence) have now become the actual process of thinking. (We should notice that Hegel is firmly opposed to the psychological treatment of logic and its laws.)

Everything we have dealt with so far has been a sequence of concepts. But they are concepts-in-themselves, which means the same as concepts-for-us (as pure thinkers). We have now reached the Concept that determines itself as singular -- i.e. it determines itself as a conscious thinking activity. We, the pure thinkers, are consciously identical with it (not reflecting upon it).

The logic of the Concept is the motion of actual truth (not of formal validity). Form and Content are not to be regarded as external (or as accidentally related). The forms of the Concept are "the living Spirit of what is actual." (When we meet with a typical logic-book example we shall have to study how to treat it concretely in the required sense.)

A: The Subjective Concept

A: The Concept as Such

§163 The formal Concept has three moments. Singularity is the concrete self-realizing unity of universality and
particularity. (The perfect paradigm is the thinking self which is a self-determining activity that opposes itself to the world, but is identical with itself as universal Reason. The Cartesian Ego? The Kantian "I think"? Both and neither. The substantiality of the first belongs to this self as self-identical in God; and because it has that substantiality it is more than the Kantian "form."

But also anything that we can think about as substantial exemplifies the Concept. (The rose-bush in bloom.)

§163R The singular is the same as the actual, but now it has "come forth from the Concept." It is posited as universal (i.e. as negative identity with self). The singular has the substantial community as its sustaining context. We can see that only the active self fulfils the subjective Concept properly. The actual can have effects (it does when we violate it). But the singular concept does (must) have effects. It acts; and it acts not in order to change the world, but in order to realize itself.

As a moment of the immediate Concept, singularity is not yet itself immediate. It determines itself as immediately singular in Judgment: ("this rose is red"). In the Concept as such, every moment is the whole, and the singular moment is the totality of the three moments -- the subject itself.
§163A1 The philosophical Concept is not the ordinary concept that we employ in ordinary speech. That is an abstract Vorstellung. "Colour," "plant," "animal" are abstract concepts from which particularity has supposedly been omitted. We have a bare universal, understood as distinct from the particular (never mind singularity). It is a schema, a form which needs to be filled out with content by perpetual experience (or imagination). The actual Concept is what specifies itself (i.e. it is an Aristotelian living form).

True universality must be distinguished from "what is common." We have always understood that all humans have a "common nature." But the true universality of the human community has taken millennia to emerge as actually effective. We can see here that "the Concept as such" is properly "humanity"; but "the Universal" generally is a self-realizing form (as in Plato, and more determinately in Aristotle) which particularizes and finally individuates itself. Thus what we begin with here is the rational thinking of the Phänomenologie des Geistes (Chapter 5) which goes through individuation in Chapter 6. Now it moves back to full self-consciousness of its substantial subjectivity. This is the parallel movement of Chapter 6 and 7. Hegel reminds us of it here. The Greeks knew humanity only as a particular community (as opposed to barbarians) of particular member (the men and the women). In the rational community of enlightened Europe, slavery has vanished; but
the particularity of sexual destiny survives. (Hegel accepts it from Nature -- as indeed we rationally must, but we clearly ought to do so in a Platonic spirit, not in the Aristotelian way that he does.)

True universality involves particularization ("all members have not the same office"). Thus the Revolutionaries confused the volonté générale with the volonté de tous -- and Rousseau's doctrine of a "social contract" encouraged this error. Hegel's own acceptance of natural particularity in politics, teaches us that Rousseau was not so radically mistaken as Hegel thinks. In order for there to be a volonté générale there must be a sense of universal participation. Democratic election secures that. But the moment of particularity must equally be institutionalized as partial agencies with distinct authority; and the substantial-subjectivity of the community must enable us to realize ourselves as unique persons. The Enlightened rationalism of 1789 refuted itself in 1793. But that only meant that the ideals of 1789 must be organically articulated in a substantial community. Rousseau's General Will is the true Concept of rational willing. (What Thrasy-machus claimed is a necessary truth also -- but it is the aspect of politics that must be forgiven. What can make forgiveness just is taking turns in ruling and being ruled -- as Aristotle said).
§163A2 This presumably comes from another course of lectures (later one?). We do not "form" Concepts. The logical Concept does not come to be at all. (The consciousness of it has come to be in history -- see §163A1 -- but properly it is what is first. The Phenomenology could not be written until it was comprehended as what is first.)

The Concept cannot simply be -- it must know itself. It is not enough to say simply that it must be known. Socrates knew it (and so did Antigone and Creon). But in the religion of the universal community it knows itself. In religious consciousness, things are the right way round. Ordinary finite utilitarian consciousness has everything backwards. (It would be utopian perhaps to say that Hegel ought to have known what Plato knew; but he certainly could have seen the actuality of what Mary Wollstonecraft knew -- she asked only for equal education.)

Otherwise this comment repeats the first one (common sense has the speculative truth backwards). But now the Concept is treated as a name of God itself. Thus the two comments together illustrate Hegel's doctrine of the Incarnation.

§164 The Concept as such -- being the true Universal -- is the concrete relation of my singular self to my universal self. Only a singular self can say "I." But we can all do it; and we can do it only because we are "We." What "I" know is ours, and what "we" know is rightfully mine. Our
identity is mine (speaking universally); and I could not be "me" without this universal identity. (I may, of course, be negative or exclusive of some particular We -- the paradigm is Jesus and his "generation of vipers.")

In the concrete universality of rational consciousness the moments (U, P, S) are always united no matter how immediately we grasp them. The separateness of the terms in Understanding is merely a supposing (a Sollen).

§164 In this abstract separation the moments U, P, S correspond to Identity, Distinction and Ground. My human identity is the universal identity of the human community; I am particularly distinct (naturally) as male, (spiritually) as English-speaker and in thousands of other ways. My singular historical existence is the ground of this coincidence of U and P sides. But concretely it is the Universal identity that consciously contains the P and S moments. In the natural or empirical perspective the Universal identity is the goal of my educational formation. But when I am educated the perspective shifts (e.g. Bertrand Russell).

If we look at the whole from the P standpoint, I am naturally a male human. But even this natural determination is one side of the natural genus (or kind); and the kind can only be actual through the reuniting of the singularized particulars.
The Singular moment is the negative unity of the thinking Subject. But when the Subject is fully formed by its education (which takes it through its systematic "phenomenology") the thinking subject knows that its foundation is really the substantial community of Reason; and its specificity has multiplied consciously in many directions (e.g. it is a professor of philosophy). The unseparated unity of the three aspects is the (Cartesian) clarity of the Concept. This will develop its own distinctness in what follows. But at present we can see the distinct moments within the clarity of the Concept as Such.

Even the speculative Concept is abstract (not fully concrete) because it is a motion of pure thinking in abstraction from the determinate life of the subject; and it is abstractly logical. In the philosophy of Nature and Spirit, the Concept becomes the Idea which comprehends the life of the subject as a whole (in her own time).

But this is quite different from the commonsensical abstraction of a category of Understanding which must return to experience in order to have a content. The beginning Concept of Pure Being logically contains (implicitly) the whole conceptual content of the Logic which unfolds from it. Every step is a determination of Being as it is in its truth (and its "truth" is its motion towards its reality in the process of our interpretation of the real world). Thus the Concept is what is absolutely concrete, because here in the Logic is where we are absolutely in the Absolute. We are
the absolute Subject. I say "We" because what is absolutely concrete is "the Spirit"; and "I" am the Spirit (or better, I am in the Spirit) only when I successfully communicate my reading of the Logic to you, only when we share our experience of reading and interpreting the logic of the concrete Concept.

This experience is one of distinguishing ourselves as Concept from the whole world of natural and social reality (while recognizing that it is our own objectivity, and a necessary moment of our substance. This is the most concrete of all experiences, and the foundation of all other concreteness. Compared with it, ordinary concrete things are only abstractions (just like their representative concepts "in our minds." For this experience is what makes the world concretely ours; this unity of U, P, and S is our human existence.

§165 Logical Singularity is the "negative inward reflection" of the Concept. We become "pure thinking" by separating ourselves from the whole world of real being. Our thinking is real; but it is the reality of pure negation, the Pure Being that is Nothing. This is the absolute (universal) Identity that distinguishes itself, and so posits itself as a determinate thinker. I am the logician because I am the particular thinker who distinguishes myself as universal thinking. Thus, as the pure thinker, I must be able to say what I think. As the Concept that has this circular U-P-S
structure I am necessarily the maker of judgments. I am the identity of identity (U) and distinction (P); and I must express myself so. This is Judgment.

§165R Descartes' distinction of concepts into clear and distinct was developed by Leibniz, who added the category adequate (for what was perfectly clear and distinct). In this form the classification passed into the school logic-books (see text pp. 331-2, note 7). It does not properly apply to the speculative Concept -- though I have applied it appropriately to the identity of the moments in §164R where Hegel himself speaks of clarity. Hegel needs to distinguish this usage (which refers to a moving self-distinction within the always clear whole) from the ordinary usage of the logic books. This ordinary usage is psychological. It designates states of the objective content of conscious reflection. The clear concept is an abstraction through which what it represents can be identified; it is distinct when its logical differentia is clearly identified; and it is adequate when its logical elements are all clearly identified. This comes closest to the "clarity" of the Concept itself as spoken of in §164R.

Hegel has a cheerful contempt for most of the distinctions made in the logic of representation. He is not interested in the Leibnizian project of a calculus (which being mathematically inspired is at the formal extreme of alienation from speculative philosophy). His own project is
closer to the project of a universal characteristic -- i.e.
a logically perfect language which has all of the structural
elements that are needed for an adequate description of the
world. But we should notice what he says about
"characteristic." he recognized what Peirce struggled
twenty years to avoid admitting: that only the triadic
structure of the logical Concept is logically absolute.
(Thus the clear Concept is the only adequate one. Judgment
is essentially free -- or in other words it runs away into
the bad infinite of experience as an endless continuum in
temporal consciousness.)

[A: The Subjective Concept]

(A) B: The Judgment

§166 Some of the logical distinctions that Hegel condemns as
trivially enumerated in ordinary logic books are vitally
important to his speculative logic. There is a certain
series of relations between the subject and its world, which
can be illustrated in very ordinary judgments, and which
will be paralleled in the evolution of the syllogism. Each
sequence is a logical image of the total movement of Hegel's
Logic as a whole. Thus the whole treatment of Judgment and
Syllogism follows the pattern of development (as
categorized in §161). The origin of the development is
the distinction of U, P, and S as moments within the
transparently clear identity of the Concept itself. But now
(in Judgment) two of the three moments are always distinguished.

§166R In §166 Hegel says that the moments are "for themselves" and are "identical with themselves, not with each other." This is the position from which the Remark starts. But the copula is unites the two independent identities. Hegel's paradigm is clearly that of perceptual judgment. There is the thing in the world, and a property which I assign to it in my mind. The assignment is logically a claim that the property inheres in the thing itself. Judgment is urteil, the original division (between world and intellect) of what is first an identical conceptual unity.

The abstract judgment is: "the singular is the universal." Cf. the slave in Terence: "I am a man." This becomes concrete when he adds: "I count nothing human alien." (The other combinations of the two moments come later in the logical development.) This (S is U) is the absolutely abstract one because it subsumes all judgments. It is the general relation of world and intellect. It is equivalent to "the subject is the predicate" (and the absolute truth -- "God is absolute Spirit" falls into that pattern -- though a lot of development is necessary before we understand that properly.

The copula is preserves the identity of the Concept in the sphere of distinction (Judgment); and what in the sphere
of Essence was the necessary having of a relation is now the identical being of one.

§166A The ordinary understanding of Judgment is formally correct. Judgments presuppose Concepts; and they bring together two distinct Concepts. But this diversity of Concepts is speculatively misleading. The concrete Concept is essentially one (my thinking act) and its moments are not really diverse Concepts but moments of the same one (difference of ratio and imaginatio in Spinoza).

Thus it is a mistake to speak of a combination of Concepts; and even more of a mistake to say that judgment is the "ascription" of a predicate to a subject. Philosophical judgment (and syllogism) is the development of the one original universal Concept. We do not usually say "this rose is red" when it is in bloom (unless we are teaching a child the color-words). But we might say it to a visitor in the winter. That illuminates the objective truth of judgment; but ordinary judgments cannot exhibit their developmental relation to the One Concept as a rule -- my Terence example is exceptional.

The Concept is properly the growing point from which all logical development emerges. Judgment is the first stage of its necessary growth. It particularizes itself by dividing into its original parts (urteilen); just as the seed particularizes itself into the parts of the plant, and the stages of its growth. (Thus "judgment" becomes a
"syllogism" when the new seed is produced.) The Concept is the living form of the thing itself, which reveals what it conceptually is in the process of its development.)

§167 Judgment proper, however, is not what plants do, but what thinking minds do. It is a conscious operation (and in logic it is self-conscious). But at this stage (before it develops) we must take it universally -- as a name of God, and as a characteristic structure or motion of everything concrete. Everything that has an essence can be expressed as a true judgment; it is an identity of universal and singular.

§167R Hegel repeated some of this Remark in his lectures (and we must query whether the editor (L. von Henning) was right to include some of §166A since he knew that §167R was just over the page). But there is an important new point here about the distinction of judgments from propositions. After the revolutionary development of the "logic of relations" it is natural for us to think of logic as made up of propositions. But Hegel uses proposition for statements about historical singulars (e.g. Julius Caesar) or about events etc. in the present ("a carriage is passing")). It is interesting that he leaves ordinary imperatives ("Present arms") and questions ("Is it really a carriage?") in the non-speculative category. But what would he say about the Relativity theory which leaves the decision about motion and rest to us? That has a speculative side to it.
§168  The standpoint of judgment is finite. "God is Spirit" is a true judgment; but "God is (the) Judgment" is not. In Hegel's theology "God cannot judge, He can only have mercy." The fact that everything finite is a judgment follows immediately from its being finite. It contains its own limit, it perishes. Its soul separates from it, and its essence is seen to involve being diverse (distinct) from its concept as a singular being (Dasein).

§169  In the abstract judgment, Singular is Universal, the subject is concrete but the predicate is abstract (undetermined). But the identity of the copula (is) carries concrete determinacy over to the abstract universal term. The Universal is always a particular characterization of the Singular. Our Terentian slave is a man (not a brute beast, or for that matter a living tool like the domesticated ox, as Aristotle claimed). Thus in the identity of the judgment, the predicate contains the determinate content.

§169R  It follows from this that the name "God" (as the designation of the Absolute Subject) is empty and uninformative. Hegel agrees with J.L. Austin (almost!) that what God said to Moses told him nothing. But if there really was a concrete speaker, then the meaning of "I am" carried the logical requirement of further specification. All specificity of Being was here implicit. This is how Hegel regards Pure Being in the Logic. Thus his concept is
Platonic-comprehensive (rather than abstract-Aristotelian).
(Cf. §31 under "Metaphysics.")

§169A According to the abstract thought of it, the Subject is directly the S and the predicate is U. Logical development changes both sides. The subject becomes S, P and U; and the predicate becomes U, P and S (as well as keeping their original logical designations). Thus the ordinary distinction of what is spoken about and what is asserted about it is quite unhelpful. (This is a useful programmatic statement to guide our understanding of what follows).

§170 The subject is what is fixed as the foundation in which the predicate subsists and inheres (what does "is ideal in it" mean?). The predicate is only one among many determinate predicates of the subject. (As negative relation to itself the subject excludes everything other; so it must be a contrast in many ways, and hence be concretely positive in many ways?)

Conversely the predicate as universal must go beyond this subject. The subject is a member of the class defined by the predicate. Only the motion of the copula in determining the predicate as the content of this subject (§169) constitutes their actual identity.

[171 Read as you go]

§171 In judgment the Subject, Predicate and the 'is' of identity are posited separately. The actor who played "Mr.
Spock" is a man; but the character is not. Yet there was also an "identity" between them. (I think this case separates the terms successfully.) The necessary singularity of what appears on our screens arises from the identity involved in the Concept of the original "Star Trek" series (and ultimated in the Concept of the human communication and self-realization process). This S is the subject; and in its identity with the predicate, it is P and U. Since Mr. Spock is only an imaginary individual, the is of identity is certainly an abstract one. The figure on the screen is "Mr. Spock." But the man in front of the camera has quite a different life of his own; and the ordinary nominalist logic will concede this distinction quite generally as holding between thought and thing. It is what the very possibility of symbolic logic is founded upon. p, q, r, Fx, etc. have no concrete identities at all. Their function (relative to concrete reality) is entirely representative.

The destiny of the abstract identity is to become concrete; and in this process of concretion, the transformation first referred to in §169A takes place. The subject has to be posited as the predicate so that the identity of the copula is "fulfilled." "Socrates is a man" becomes "Socrates is concretely human," "Human existence is fulfilled in Socrates." What this means has been expressed for us by the Terentian slave (who is imaginary like Mr.
Spock, but the hypothesis about Mr. Spock is that he is "alien".

The completion of this concretion of identity in the judgment will lead us to the Syllogism. When we reach "Subject is (necessarily) Predicate" a mediated process of development must begin. Before we get to that, however, we must determine the "sensible universality" of the predicate to Allness, Genus and Species (three levels of narrowing, the last two being logically connected. "Allness" is still "abstract" -- i.e. it can be handled "externally" (or nominally). (? hypothesis is to be tested).

[Read the paragraph sentence by sentence with comments]

§171R We have to understand this motion of development in order to organize the "table of Judgments" coherently and intelligently. (Not do our table of categories from a quite "incoherent" "table of Judgments" as Kant did.) [Read sentence 1] Very little is said about the distinctions "positive," "categorical" and "assertoric" -- and that little is quite haphazard. Actually there is a logical sequence in which types of judgment follow from one another as specifications of the Concept -- Judgment being the self-determination of the Concept. The movement of this developmental sequence reproduces the logical progression of Being and Essence.

§171A Usually Hegel is much less polite to Kant than he is here. He speaks now as if Kant organized the Table of
Judgments according to his Table of Categories. Kant himself implies that we can see how to organize the Categories by looking at the Table of Judgments already there in the Logic book. But it is true (at least) that he saw how the Judgment-table in his book made sense and became coherent, for someone who had Aristotle's Categories and wanted to produce something more logical. Hegel is more just to Kant here, in admitting something circular in his relating of the two tables (not a mechanical relation in which the second is simply derived from the first).

But he maintains his usual view -- that Kant's Table of Categories is inadequate in any case. He has followed what he now presents as Kant's example (i.e. a procedure that was certainly suggested by his own interpretation of how Kant went to work) but he uses his own "table of Categories" to set in order the table of Judgments. We have three main types of Judgment (corresponding to Being, Essence, Concept); and the second divides into two (like Urteil itself. Really Judgment organizes Being and Essence as Concepts for the development of the Syllogism. The simple "Judgment of the Concept" only reformulates the "resting Concept" as we already know it.

In the logical evolution of Judgment what matters is the Predicate. Going back to the end of §171 itself we can recognize that Hegel's examples: "this wall is green," "oven is hot" illustrate "sensible universality." "This picture is beautiful," "action is good" are (when truly said) "the
developed universality of the Concept." As such they are "Judgments of the Concept" -- with reflective contingency and necessity sublated back into quality.

§172 (• The Qualitative Judgment

First comes the elementary judgment of simple Dasein. We identify the wall as "green," the rose as "red" or "not red." We say "the stove is hot" to a child to keep her from touching it. We have not touched it ourselves. We say "the rose is not red" in winter time, because we say it bloom last summer. Thus simple positive judgment has important functions in actual life. When the rose is in bloom, we tell a child it is red to teach her the color-words; and we say "not-red" if (s)he gets it wrong. Negative judgment is logically dependent on positive judgment. But that is only because the positive judgment is already specific. It is $P$ (not $U$). We are identifying the colour of the rose. "Red" is "not-white," "not-yellow," etc. The negative is implicit in the positive.

§172R Judgments of Perception (the sensibly-universal) do not properly contain (or express) "truth." They are "correct" (and if someone cannot identify the rose as red, we try to "correct" her vision, or classify her as "color-blind"). But proper "truth" must derive from the Concept (as the canon of the "reality"). Thus "This rose is beautiful," "more beautiful than that one," "perfect" is "true" if it is right. But deciding whether it is right (or "correct")
involves using the Concept of "rose" as a standard (not some existing situation as in the case of the color-blind person).

§172A What is factually "correct" is often said to be what is "true" (the qualification "factually" indicates the standard appealed to). But philosophical (or logical) truth is the agreement of the Gegenstand of experience (sensible or intellectual) with its concept (i.e. with its intellectual self, which is also "the truth of it"). As long as we regard truth as a "correspondence" relation, and look for a standard of comparison, we have to say of every finite thing that it is not really "true." But we can set ourselves to discover the "truth" of what something "really is." Then its finitude is simply the level of factual correctness, and what we are concerned with is its eternal logical structure -- in other words, the "Concept" with which it is actually identical.

Medicine has to work with this "identity" as its standard. The question is "what is the ideal balance of health for this patient?" This use of the Concept (which has to apply to justice and punishment [spiritual] just as much as it does to health [natural]) makes it easy to appreciate the logical inadequacy of "the rose is red." It is like the doctor focusing on one symptom that has to change or vanish. When the gardeners paint the white roses red (in Alice in Wonderland) they don't cease to be white
roses (as a door would). But that is because roses are so much more than "white" or "red." (So is the door, but its Concept has a different structure.)

On the other side, doors are red, as well as roses. Subject and Predicate just touch one another at a single point in the simple judgment of Dasein (or a single point of separation is defined in the negative judgment). At the climax of the evolution (in the "Judgment of the Concept") the identity is not complete, but it is necessary: "the body is healthy," "the action is good." The predicate is now the living soul of the subject. (What about the negative judgment at this level? If we say that Guido Franceschini, in Browning's The Ring and the Book is "wicked" or "evil" -- "not good" will not do -- we are correctly describing the soul that has exposed itself in 2400 lines; and we could say the same about Hitler after reading Mein Kampf. Similarly Browning's Pope Innocent is "good.")

§173 The positive and negative judgments of Dasein are already the beginning of the dialectic of Qualitative Judgment. The first or simple negation must now give place to the "negation of the negation." We must move on to a comprehensive negation of both alternatives. "The rose is not red" is logically incomplete: "not red but white" (as in Alice). If we transcend both positive and negative logically, then we arrive at two alternative logical forms: the tautology in which nothing concrete is asserted; and the
concept mistake in which the whole range of particular options is *inappropriate* (rather than false). Subject and Predicate have fallen apart.

§173R "The Spirit is Spirit," "the Spirit is not an elephant." Either of these might be uttered for *emphasis* -- or to direct attention in the right direction. But they are not properly judgments at all. They mark the *limit* of sensible experience, and the passing over to the sphere of pure thought. For it is only in the sphere of pure thought that they can occur. Objectively considered, they show how sensible beings fall apart into an *empty* (formal) self-identity on one side (Butler's "Everything is what it is") and a contradiction on the other ("This sensible thing is this intellectual concept").

§173 The negatively infinite judgment ("Spirit is not an elephant") is not just a logical curiosity. The tautology is *neither* positive *nor* negative (for "A round square is a round square" is as good a tautology as any); and the negatively infinite judgment is *both* positive and negative; in other words it is a contradiction. The truth of "Spirit is not an elephant" implies (*falsely*) that there is some *universal* under which both are comprehended -- and that there is some alternative to "elephant" in that category which Spirit truly is. So the proposition is both *true and false* (when we take it to have a point which is "true").
If we look at it this way we can see the analogy with crime. I steal your purse. This logically denies the whole concept of property. But I want to use the money in the purse as mine (and I know that it is not mine). This is quite different from a civil suit in which both parties are willing to do what is right, but the court has to decide what the right is.

Similarly illness is nature's negative judgment against my doing some things I can and do do when I am well. But death is the true infinite judgment which affirms that "this sensible thing is not this intellectual concept."

§174 (β) The Judgment of Reflection

The truth at one and the same time of a tautology: "Socrates is Socrates" and of a negatively infinite judgment: "Socrates is mortal" (in the Phaedo he and his friends know that this is his last day, he is not really this embodied human, but "the best man we have ever known") leads us on to the recapitulation of the logic of Essence. All of the judgments of Dasein are judgments of simple fact. But the judgments of Reflection deal with dispositional properties of things and people. We have moved from Dasein to Existenzt; and the predicate has become an inward essence that emerges in relational contexts: the thing or person is useful or dangerous; the thing is heavy or an acid; the person (or institution) has a drive.
§ 174A Where we speak of dispositional predicates, Hegel speaks of relational ones. "The rose is red" expresses a disposition of the winter-bush. But "the rose-hip makes a very pleasant infusion to drink in winter" is a permanent truth like "rubber is elastic" or "Plato is very wise" (we had better not use "Socrates" in this example, though it is clear that "Socrates was wise").

Notice that Hegel does not specify any of his subject-terms. He says "this plant," "this body, ... instrument ... punishment," leaving the P moment out. One can specify -- as I have done with "rose-hips" -- but Hegel wants to keep the subject indefinite, because this mode of judgment can never define it quite determinately. The Gegenstand of reflection has always some further aspects that could be specified. [In my opinion the reading derselben should be kept at note 13: "i.e. the concept of that nature" -- distinguishing and identifying the real and the ideal universal.]

§ 175 The subject as a singular "this" is designated by a universal (rather than a particular or specific) term; and the dialectic of this stage comes (not from simple negation but) from vaqueness. Not all members of the universal subject class, but only some of them, have the predicate. The subject class is a particular subgroup; so the particular judgment is positive and negative at the same moment. If I say "some stoves are hot," I am saying that
"some are not"; and if I say "some stones are not heavy" I am saying that some stones are heavy. This is a concreteness requirement. If we deny it (on formal logical grounds) then the affirmation (or the denial, whichever is explicit) loses its point. Normally in real communication the contrastive implication is there. If we don't intend it we must neutralize it. "Some swans are white anyway," says a cautious child (and her elders tell her -- wrongly -- that they all are).

In this example -- or with "crows are black," which has not been falsified and won't be now -- we see how the particular judgment becomes the reflectively universal judgment of "allness."

§175A In his lectures Hegel carried the concreteness imperative further than it can safely go -- or at least he expressed it very crudely. Saying "this plant is curative" does not imply that "some or many plants are" -- but only that if this plant is good for this condition, then it is at least worth looking for curative plants (both for this and other unhealthy states). Hegel's "implication" involves the presupposition that "this plant is curative" comes from a herbal (or herbalist). If we take it in the context of an existing "science" then it does lead us logically from the singular judgment to the particular judgment. "Some plants are curative" (and that does "imply" that some are not). Indeed, it is virtually certain that by the time we can say
"this plant is curative" we know that "some plants are harmful" ("poisonous"). If we consider the order of discovery we can see why Hegel's concreteness imperative is logically sound. (Notice that Hegel switches from "this plant" to "this man" in order to progress towards the community of "all men.")

The judgment "all men are mortal" is the first paradigm for allness. If we start from this kind of U we get problems about swans and crows. But if we start from "Socrates" as "this man" then we grasp concretely why "the U is the ground and soil, root and substance, of the S." ["Caius, Titus, Semp" are Latin for Tom, Dick and Harry.] Humanity is the concrete universal, the real Concept that makes us all able to communicate, and to do logic.

In contrast, descriptive universality is superficial. Mr. Spock's ears are pointed; but that is not what makes him an "alien." Mr. Spock is "brave and learned." If we found a real person like him, (s)he wouldn't be human; but surely part of the community of Spirit?

§176 The dialectic of §175 is a matter of continuity (one-some-all) rather than of opposition (or contradiction). This is a return of the rolling-over continuity of the logic of Being. Development is a harmonious kind of progress. Everything is coherent with what went before.

Subject and predicate are equally U now. So the judgment is set up as an indifference of terms. What is
meant by this "indifference" is not convertibility. "All men are mortal" does not imply "All mortals are human." But the connection is now necessary. All of humanity is necessarily mortal. Humanity involves mortality; and we may perhaps add that "whatever knows it is mortal is human"?

§176A There has been a transition here. The judgment of Allness is outwardly a judgment of empirical observation. But thought it may be a fact that "all men have earlobes" it is not necessarily like "all men are subject to praise and blame," "virtuous or vicious," etc. (and some deserve praise for the virtues of courage, learning, etc.). When we move to conceptual formulation -- from "all plants" to "the plant as such" we are marking the transition to necessity.

§177 (γ) The Judgment of Necessity

The judgment now becomes definition. "Humanity is mortal" is the fundamental step which defines us as emergent from living nature. It is a categorical judgment. Positively we must say "Humanity is rational." But necessity is only fully explicit where the positive and negative (exclusive) sides are united by the identification of genus and species: "Man is the rational animal" (where the genus "animal" as part of Nature, brings mortality back to mind as its negative side).

The dialectic of necessity comes to light in the hypothetical reformation of the categorical form: "If there is a human then there is a rational animal." Starting from
actuality, formulated categorically, we can begin to deal with the realm of possibility as a function of it. When we see how Hegel speaks of this form as an inner identity of two actualities we must think of problems like abortion. Obviously there is the human potential before there is the rational animal; and to drown her baby as Gretchen did is homicide. But when is there a human being before that? We are in the realm of hypothesis, and it is we who must decide what hypothesis to accept.

In this externalizing (Entäusserung) of the Concept the inner identity is consciously set up. We can now see the whole structure of the universal. If we formulate the hypothesis as "If rational is then animal is" we can reach a fully necessary categorical judgment. "Animals are rational and non-rational." "This animal is rational or non-rational." Now we have returned to a Judgment in which all three terms (S, P, U) are brought into a necessary relation. The universal is on both sides (collectively and distributively); and the totality of the genus (animal) is clearly set up for consciousness.

§177A In his lectures Hegel gives his own examples: "Gold is a metal," "the rose is a plant." "This gold piece" and "this rose" are no longer present. He points out that categorical necessity is substantial. As Mure points out, he is working with the Aristotelian categorical logic. Since "everything is a categorical judgment" the universal
"Color" is a logical substance because "Red is a color." "Gold is expensive," on the other hand, is not a categorical judgment. It is an accidental truth of human relations, not a scientific truth about gold at all. Similarly, "Dick is a man" is of substantial import, but "Dick is black" is not. What about "Jane is a woman"? In the context of the natural genus (the human animal) this is her "substantial particularity." But it does not appear to have any substantial implications at the spiritual level. We can see "Dick and Jane are rational animals" and "Humanity is Dick or Jane or ..." (the totality would be hard to state distributively -- indeed it is impossible since it includes the distant descendants of Jane and Dick).

Hegel also insists that the advance to hypothesis moves us to the sphere of Causality. In an "If ... then ..." statement, the protasis is to be seen as the "cause" of the apodosis. That is why I have taken abortion as my example here. The child is the rational human only in posse (an sich). So "if a human is (an sich) then a rational animal is" (but not yet an actually rational being). No one (on either side) is going to quarrel with the "necessity" of this. But the problem of how the protasis is to be interpreted is clearly posed. It is not a simple case of "If this is gold then it is metal" (which is not interesting, since even if it is not gold, it is almost certainly metal -- the problem is precisely what metal or metals).
When we make the trivial case of "If gold, then metal" interesting we can see how the disjunctive judgment must logically emerge as the totality. This problematic piece is metallic. But metals are: gold, silver, and so on down to lead. So is it "gold or silver or (very probably) some combination of gold and x or y in the list"? We shall need the whole list if we are to be sure of finding out the answer.

Hegel himself reverts to color as his final natural case. Here the painters have discovered that there is a triad from which all colors can be derived. But we could retort on him that there are other short lists from which the whole wheel can be generated. It is not clear that he thinks "red, yellow, and blue" is a canon of natural law. But it is probable -- and he might insist that alternatives are artificial constructs. But there seems no logical way of showing this. In the end the clinching argument-stopper is "Why does it matter?"

"Poems are either epic, lyric, or dramatic" seems to be positively dangerous. There appears to be no reason for a canonical triad here. The very distinction between poetry and prose is only an empirical convenience. Shelley's *Defence of Poetry* is a marvellous statement from Hegel's own generation of the reasons why we must refuse to go with any claim of logical necessity here until we are told (or shown) what the necessity is for. What is the final cause of this logical perspective on poetry? What do we learn about human
experience that we should not see without it? (Don't say "No, it is just an excess of romantic rationalism"; look and see how it orients life.)

§178 (§) The Judgment of the Concept

The organization of Judgment into four triads enables Hegel to have a table of twelve forms of Judgment (just like Kant). And the Judgment of Necessity reflects the triad Substance, Cause, and Reciprocity. Conceptual Judgment reflects Kant's triad of Modality likewise, but with a difference. We have to take the categories in the order: Actuality, Possibility, Necessity. For we have (a) Assertoric Judgment, (b) Problematic Judgment, (c) Apodeictic (i.e. demonstratively necessary) Judgment.

This fourth triad is the speculative moment of Judgment. The Judgments of Reflection and Necessity together were the dialectic of Judgment. We moved on from Reflection to Necessity in a continuous progress; but we must now see them reflectively as opposites. They are united (and comprehensively inverted together) in Conceptual Judgment.

The inversion can be seen in the very fact that we make the transition here from "finite" to "infinite" Judgment. We came up against the Infinite at the level of simple Judgment (Dasein). But we could not deal with it there. It drove us into Reflection; and all six forms (or categories) of Reflection provide the logical structure of the finite
world of experience. Now we have the True Infinite -- the Concept itself -- as the explicit content of Judgment. (This is logical because disjunctive Judgment finally allows us to formulate the finite world as a totality. The Concept is the actual life of that totality.

Assertorid Judgment -- our first form -- unites the simple judgment with the reflective judgment as simply as possible. But now we are going to make judgments of philosophic truth -- i.e. judgments of value. (Notice that Hegel includes correctness as a value; and remember that richtig has a practical dimension. It refers to what is ethically or morally right.)

§178R We make judgments of perceptual fact ("this rose is red" etc.) without being habitually conscious that they are judgments at all. So this returned simplicity of judgment is the first form that is ordinarily called "judgment" at all. (Judgments of reflection are "observations" -- "some plants are toxic" etc.; and when necessity emerges, they become "definitions" ("gold is a metal").

But any simple judgment of absolute value is a mere assertion. It can be uttered with absolute assurance. But assurance is not truth. (Think of Luther at the Diet of Worms.) If someone says "This is very good pie" we accept her assurance; given that the pie is not harmful to health, "truth for her" (or for the consumer generally) is the only truth that matters here. But when (s)he says "That's a good
painting" we can only regard it as an invitation to discussion, if we take it seriously at all. If the discussion becomes a heated repetition of the judgment we break it off. Nothing is established; and the same is true of claims about God. (But there is another way forward there. For it is not what is said, but what is done -- how life is lived -- that is the substance of the "discussion." Hegel does not allow the disciples of Jacobi this here. But he ought to; and his critique of Jacobi's novels shows that he can do it.)

§179 A simple assertoric judgment does not contain any reason or ground. It is not obvious how "the relation of P and U" is expressed in the predicate (say "true" or "good" or "beautiful"). But perhaps Aristotle's critique of Plato's Good gives us the clue. If we say "Socrates is good" we mean "good as a rational animal." He is in accord with his Concept. Now what is needed is a properly philosophical history of Socrates in order to justify this judgment. We have to show how rationality (P) and animality (U) are united in him as a singular subject. The Athenian jury held the opposite opinion with equal right (or lack of it). And, as soon as our judgment is contradicted we have a problem: Is Socrates a good man, or is he not? Problematically: "Socrates may or may not be good." This is the problem of everyone as a potential human -- cf. the famous resolution of the young Victoria.
But if the judgment contains the particularity of the Subject, it becomes apodeictic: Socrates, being the one who lived the examined life, is Good. Hitler, having lived the fantasy of Mein Kampf, is evil. It appears to me that only about the historically complete life can an apodeictic judgment be given. Of course, many are problematic even then. But Hegel's own house example remains blessedly vague. The "truth" is not quite a matter of personal satisfaction (like the goodness of the pie). But dispute about the goodness of a house seems to be in principle endless, as soon as we have to deal with more than one inhabitant of same.

It is a fact, however, that everything is subject to conceptual judgment because it is a genus in a singular actuality with a particular constitution. Clearly Hegel does have the return to the subjectivity of the simple assertoric judgment in mind. It is to be accepted as logically inevitable. What is essential is that any judgment must be backed up by a particular specification which makes it apodeictic for the speaker. (We cannot prove to the Athenians that they were wrong about Socrates -- but history proves to Creon that Antigone was right. Hegel, himself, seems more interested in the actual conflict of "apodeictic" certainties, since he tries to show us why both the Athenians and Creon were "justified."
§180 In the apodeictic judgment both subject and predicate are identically the whole judgment. This is because the "constitution" of the (S) subject is specified (P) as the mediating ground of the predicate (U). (The structure of the demonstrative syllogism is just under the skin.) The division of the Concept has overcome itself, and revealed Judgment to us as the developed form, the explicitness of the Concept itself. This is what "being" (Pure Being, the empty is of the copula) is. The concept has emerged again as the necessary middle term. Thus the Syllogism has evolved.

[III. Doctrine of Concept; A: The Subjective Concept]

(A) C: The Syllogism

§181 Syllogism is unity of Concept (M) and Judgment (Su and Pr). The Concept is now (properly) the identity of the whole pattern. Moreover, it is clear from the evolution of Judgment to apodeictic certainty that the Syllogism is the structure of what actually is. We can be certain that there are apodeictically true judgments about Socrates because he is; and this means that his being has the structure of a syllogism. The syllogism is the structure of everything that is rational (in its rational aspect).

§181R In Hegel's time (and for a few years longer) the syllogism was the paradigm of formal rationality. Boole and
De Morgan will be publishing in twenty years; but they do not matter to us, just as the formal logic books of Hegel's time do not either. Hegel is interested in concretely rational contents (principles, actions, "Ideas" -- i.e. theories). His doctrine of apodeictic judgment has shown why the structure of "reason" itself is syllogistic; and the revolution that has made formal logic into a general study of "relations" has not affected this -- as can be seen in the triadic theory of signs developed by C.S. Peirce (together with his thesis that "Man is a sign").

Hegel can see clearly that formal reasoning is concerned with validity not with truth. The forms develop the truth when they have a real Gehalt ("basic import") that is rational. The syllogistic structure is the posited-real Concept. Initially it is real in a formal sense [formell-reale]. (What this means we shall have to discover as we go. But it is different from the abstract formal correctness of Lewis Carroll's Sorites examples. The content has to be "real," i.e. factually "correct" at least.

"The Absolute is a syllogism" is true from here onwards; and that translates as "All is a syllogism." The proposition is true both of the "All together" (the Infinite) and of the "all distributively" (everything finite but real). We shall see that implicitly this truth both ways is the truth of the Incarnation. God is incarnate in everything finite, in so far as it is rational (and
especially in every one of us -- our own experience will be the proper test case of what it actually means).

Everything knowably real is a real Concept; and that means that it has a syllogistic structure. (We have to put in the qualification knowably, because one quite ordinary use of "real" is to designate what is objectively present, but as yet unknown; and philosophically it can be used to designate the supposedly unknowable (as for instance in Herbert Spencer). That "everything is a Concept" is the principle of Hegel's Idealism. Idealism is the comprehension of reality as a self-comprehending process; and "all true philosophy is idealism" because it is a "comprehensive" view of "reality." Even Spencer's theory is idealism, but we can see that it is not very good, by comparing Kant's -- where the status of the "Unknowable" is recognized to be necessarily problematic.

The remark ends by stating the syllogistic structure of the apodeictic judgment as a process of self-transformation -- i.e. as a syllogism -- both ways: starting first from the U side (the predicate), and then from the S side (the subject). In the process of his Bildung, Reason particularizes itself in the Athenian citizen, Socrates, who asserts himself negatively as the critical examiner of Athens. Or conversely, the little son of Sophroniscus raises himself, through his education as an Athenian citizen, into the mission of "caring for the soul" or "pursuing death." He identifies with Universal Reason and
preaches the gospel of the "examined life" to all who have ears to hear.

§181A In his own lecture comment Hegel simply underlines the fact that the structure of an apodeictic judgment is necessarily syllogistic; and the result that Judgment thus returns to the unity of the Concept. I have already said enough about this.

§182 The immediate shape of the syllogism, as it emerges from the apodeictic judgment, is a structural explication of "what is there" (and of its quality). The terms which determine the Concept are simply factual; and it is a contingent truth that they are factually related. The career of Socrates, son of Sophroniscus, is a historical contingency. For instance, he fought bravely at the battle of Delium; he might have been killed then, and we would never have heard of him. That he lived the examined life and is therefore good, is his fortune. He was the "smith" of it; but the metal came from the Fates. That the stuff of life itself is the gift of Lachesis, makes it an "abstract" connection (P) between S and U. We have to start by observing what actually happened, as a mass of contingency. We do not know that the son of Sophroniscus is a heroic paradigm of the spiritual life (nor does he). It is all there in the abstract propositions in the books. We put the story together, and what a task it is to make the miscellany of the record into an apodeictic judgment that is really
concrete. In the syllogism of understanding Socrates, we argue back and forth, about his relation to the natural philosophers (Anaximenes and Anaxagoras in Aristophanes and Plato); to the Sophists (Protagoras in Aristophanes and Plato); to Alcibiades and Critias; to Plato, Xenophon, and half a dozen others; and finally to his own daimonion. But two scholars who agree (pretty well) about all the external facts can write widely different books, because then it is the concrete problem of a living man and a real life. In the end, the serious reader, who reads both books, must conclude (zusammenschliessen) herself with Socrates, this brother in humanity.

§182R The syllogism of Understanding embraces the whole range of reasoning that we do in pursuit of truth as correctness. We make the syllogistic (or generally relational) connections; others criticize both our assumed premisses and our inferences. The whole procedure is "subjective" -- at least until it becomes experimental (or consciously "abductive," to use Peirce's word -- I don't think serious abduction is "subjective" in Hegel's sense -- but what goes on in Plato's dialogues largely is, because we are to be satisfied with the agreement of those participating in the conversation ("the determinate mode that the form has achieved at this point").

Notice that Hegel uses "subjectivity" to refer to the subject of the judgment; so my "S" is identical with "Su" at
this stage. "This thing, in virtue of its taste is salt" (and certainly it is finite, because the bit I tasted has vanished -- I separated "thing" (S) from "properties" (P) by tasting; both disappeared, leaving me with knowledge of the U (salt). I already knew that it was a white thing, like my sugar.)

§182A It is Kant who has defined Understanding as the faculty of forming concepts; so Hegel must distinguish his own use. But he also wants to insist on the circularity of Understanding and Reason. In so far as the qualitative syllogism is the work of Understanding and the explicated shape of the Concept, Hegel's usage agrees formally with Kant's. But when we admit this, we are saying that we have not reached the level of Reason properly at all. There are not two kinds of concepts, but only two attitudes towards concepts, two kinds of use for concept language (as in my example of arguing and reading about Socrates). Hegel himself gives the examples of "freedom" and "God" (the finite and the infinite comprehensively) Kant's concept of freedom is the antithesis of necessity (see the Third Antinomy); in our concept freedom contains (involves) necessity as a moment within it. Similarly Voltaire's God is an abstraction of the Understanding (a bad smell blown off by the Absolute Freedom of the Terror); whereas the Christian Trinitarian God comprehends all of our lives in the full concreteness.
§183 (α) The Qualitative Syllogism

The immediate syllogism is that of what is there, the singular being known through its particular quality as a determination of some universal category. (Hegel will give us an elementary example.)

§183R Simply warns us that both the subject (minor term) and the predicate (major term) has other determinations (qualities) besides those that are identified in the immediate syllogism. (Obvious enough for the minor term (rose) because so many syllogisms about it are possible. But what else is "colour," besides being a universal? The answer is to be found, I suppose, by considering all the truths about which the battle between Newton and Goethe raged.)

§183A This syllogism is the rational shape of empirical observation -- the last extreme in the self-externalization of the Concept. The connection of S, P, U is simple fact -- the terms can be abstractly separated; and their togetherness is a contingency of experience. (As Hume would say: no existence can be demonstrated. We have here the reason why one can say "But that isn't God" when we reach Hegel's Idea. The Idea is what can be demonstrated.) Example: "Red is a color" (Major: M is P): "This Rose is
red" (Minor: S is M). Therefore "This Rose is colored" (S is P).

As late as Wolff's time this was the required form of scientific demonstration. But in Hegel's time, even the many disciples inspired still by Wolff have abandoned it. Yet syllogistic reasoning goes on under cover of the most familiar kinds of experiential inference. You wake up to hear a cart creaking, and the sound tells you what the weather is like (a nice "abduction," but what would the formal syllogism look like?). Hegel agrees with Peirce that it is as interesting and important to know about this, as to know how the body works (or the order of nature). But we can do it "instinctively," just as we can digest our food. Aristotle worked out everything important formally; but he did not use the forms in his actual philosophizing.

§184 This section and the next give us the dialectic of the qualitative syllogism. First it is contingent in content. The Su has many qualities; and any one can be the M of a syllogism (which brings S under a different U each time). Even one M can be logically divided so as to lead us to different Us. (I am not sure that one can do this with "red," because different shades will only lead to color as U. But probably I am not thinking pragmatically enough. Hegel probably has in mind something like the experimental divisions that Plato offers us in the Sophist.)
§184R This contingency of the qualitative syllogism makes it philosophically "incorrect" (in the sense that one thinks one is establishing something important when one is not). We have to find our way to the right division -- the one that is philosophically correct -- just as Plato does in the *Sophist*; and no syllogism of quality will certify this correctness for us.

What is interesting is that Hegel claims that by choosing the M appropriately one can prove "opposite" conclusions. His lecture commentary provides us with the concrete example of the opposite cases made by advocates in court on the basis of agreed facts. (One backs up the crucial conclusion, with other syllogisms claiming to prove that this one is the right one -- the one that ought to be accepted as valid and decisive.)

§184A The place where we can see this contingency of the qualitative syllogism revealed is in civil lawsuits (and, of course, in many ordinary "disagreements" about situations or courses of action). The advocates have to convince the judge that something on their side is the decisive M. (Diplomatic negotiations are not really parallel, because there a decision need not be reached; and one must often -- perhaps generally -- doubt whether any line of reasoning is what is decisive; whereas a judge will usually say whose argument (s)he accepts -- though that is often not the whole
story either. We should notice that we are back in the sphere of "grounds" and the ground is sandy in the extreme.

§185 On the other side, the qualitative syllogism is contingent, because the relation of S to M and M to P is immediate. S and P are supposed to be unified in M; but is either of them truly M?

§185R This question is already implicit in Hegel's example of the contending advocates. The dialectical character of the contingency shows up as the *endlessness* of the process of justifying the premises of one's initial syllogism. The connections of one's justifying syllogism remain immediate. So every syllogism needs two more *ad infinitum*. (One can see here why Logic itself must form a *circle* of self-justification -- and why the circle itself can always be expanded.)

§186 In order for this dialectic of bad infinity to be transformed into a continuum of development Hegel must show that the qualitative syllogism forms its own logical circle. The "defect" of its philosophical "incorrectness" must sublate itself in the development. The "opposition" of mediation and immediacy must be not just implicitly present (leading to the demand for more syllogisms of justification) but explicitly posited in the developing motion of the Concept itself. In the *immediate* syllogism of quality S becomes identified with U through P. But S and M, M and P,
remain immediately connected. Thus S as the mediated connection must now become the M of a second figure of syllogism -- and U must take its place in the Su position. This means that P will actually be the last moment to be mediated. This is logically necessary because we have to start with S; and it is S from which the contingency springs.

§187 The U "steps across" from the preceding conclusion. Thus we are meant to see the development as a linear motion: S - P - U "stepping across" U - S - P. The U is now posited as a species (a particular division of itself) through its instantiation in some S. Hegel goes straight on with the running sequence: U - S - P stepping across P - U - S. Being posited as a species, the U becomes properly -- i.e., internally, mediated; and so it can take its place as M (note that P - U - S completes the circle -- the next "step" is S - P - U again).

§187R Hegel is so preoccupied about the necessary exclusion of the "fourth figure" from the speculative theory of the syllogism that he does not give us any examples of the second and third figures. (Actually his second figure is Aristotle's third, and conversely.) Even in his lectures (as we shall see) he concerns himself only with the three syllogisms of the Absolute Spirit. He could do syllogisms (including the fourth figure, no doubt) when he was twelve; and so could most of his audience -- or even Lewis Carroll's
little female friends). We need to be reminded what the "figures" are; and to be sure that we can construct philosophically "correct" cases.

Mure simply transforms the example given in accordance with the stepping-over continuity: "This rose is coloured; this rose is (specifically) red therefore Colour is (specifically) red." But no one ever reasons like this. We say rather "Red is a color." (Abstractly we know that already -- it was our major premiss earlier -- and any transformation from the first to the second figure goes round in a circle. Concretely, what we discover by this circular "inference" is that the specific color of this rose is part of the continuum called "red" -- a fact that may be of absorbing concern to an artist trying to paint the rose; and that is highlighted by the conclusion "Color is precisely this red.")

Finally in the third figure (Aristotle's second) we have: "This rose is colored (S-U): Red is a color: therefore this rose is red. This is formally a bad inference -- and if we put in "green is a color" for the minor premiss it will certainly be false. It is not true that "this rose is colored" involves "A rose can be any color" as a presupposition. So perhaps we ought not to do what Mure does. But no formal syllogism can be constructed in Aristotle's second figure (Hegel's third) without a negative premiss (and a negative conclusion). So we are forced to reflect that the syllogism is valid in Hegel's
speculative use because both the S and P terms have already been mediated into identity. Thus the form P - U - S is already the concrete realization of the abstract mathematical syllogism U - U - U. (Hegel makes this explicit in the Science of Logic. And in this Remark he tells us explicitly that the circle produced by reordering Aristotle's second third figure is more important than discovering whether premisses must be Universal or negative in the formal syllogism. In that object, reasoning in the mode of Understanding is mechanical -- and machines can now do it far better than we can. Aristotle himself was far too wise to confuse that sort of mechanical exercise (which he applied in many areas) with speculative thinking.

§187A What matters about the circle of mediation constructed in §187 is that everything rational is thus shown to be a threefold syllogism. The third figure explicitly presupposes the first two; and with the closure of the circle we can see that they each presuppose the others. The supreme paradigm of the circle is given by the three encyclopedic sciences. Logic (the Universal Truth) knows itself as singular Spirit, through particularity of Nature (S - P - U). Then, secondly Spirit (S) knows the Logical Idea (U) in Nature (P) (U - S - P). Finally Nature (P) is known as the substance of the rational community (S) through Logic (U) (P U - S). There are several long articles (or books) about what this circle means.
§188  We have already seen that Hegel's third figure is only formally valid when it is understood as a statement of concrete identity. When we abstract from this concreteness we can recognize the quantitative (or mathematical) syllogism as the abstract form of the three figures together. Each moment has passed through all three positions. Thus they have become identical in everything except outward appearance. They are all equally concrete universals. This equality can now be seen by the Understanding as a simple quantitative identity. They are equivalent. (We must not forget that our progress is cumulative. The U's in U - U - U stand for what happens to S - P - U, U - S - P, P - U - S when they close their circle.) [Memo: to spell out how P, U and S should be interpreted as middle -- note that U is the last middle.]

§188A  Mure takes a very negative view of the quantitative syllogism. He refers to the passage in the *Science of Logic* where Hegel says that "this [quantitative] syllogizing is in no way a conceptual process" (Miller, p. 680) and he asks "why ... Hegel allows it to appear in the dialectical movement" (p. 216, XIII, 3.4). The answer is fairly simple. Hegel gives no examples of qualitative syllogism in his second and third figures because he cannot give valid ones. The simple syllogism of Dasein (S - P - U) requires the other two figures for its logical justification. But it is only the circle that is valid; and the validity of the
Qualitative circle is what is formally expressed in the quantitative syllogism.

Furthermore, as Hegel's lecture-comment makes clear, this is the point where mathematical reasoning is justified in the logical evolution of the Concept. Hegel holds that the axiom of equality is what mathematics is founded on. The kind of equality that holds in "$3 + 9 = 7 + 5$" or between the area of a square and that of a triangle is like that between the three terms $S, P, U$ each regarded concretely as a circle of three syllogisms.

Finally, it is crucially important that this equality of the three circular processes of mediation is the disappearance of conceptual form altogether. The conceptless emptiness of the pure intellect in which mathematics operates freely with postulates set up arbitrarily, is the field of free positing generally. In qualitative syllogism we must posit what "is there" (not whatever we like). But we cannot justify what we do posit logically; and now we see the ultimate reason why. We have discovered the absolute (logical) freedom of reflection. The quantitative syllogism is the transition to reflective syllogism which maintains the unbroken continuum (or coherence) in the development of the Concept.

§189 This section makes the transition. From the qualitative and the quantitative syllogism we have a double result. In the circle of the three figures each of the
three terms S, P, U has lost its immediacy, its on-sidedness as a mere fact of observation. But this circle results in an immediate identity of the terms; and the circle must not be broken, because each of the syllogisms requires the others for its logical validity. The mediated status of the terms is established only implicitly. We can go forward into the mathematical world (where there are no S's and P's but only explicit U's) but nowhere else. In mathematics everything is equally a quantity and nothing else. From here onwards we must deal with premises that are explicitly quantified.

§189R The new beginning (which I have expressed mathematically as the necessity of quantification) requires in the language of the Concept that the M term should be posited explicitly as a unity of S and U. Again it will be the first figure (S - P - U) that we begin with, so it is P in which the unity (or identity) must be made explicit first. But again there is a circle of the figures. The transformation will happen to P, S, and U in turn (as they move to the M position). Thanks to the circularity of the qualitative syllogism, and to the universality of mathematics, we are now thinking reflectively about essences, not about finite beings that "are there" for perception.

§190 (β) The Syllogism of Reflection
Again we have a triad of syllogisms; and they become formally weaker as we move round the circle. There is an explicit critique of experimental reasoning at this stage. We must treat the section and the Remark together, because the Remark provides the examples.

1. **Allness**: First we have \( S \rightarrow P \rightarrow U \). "Socrates is a man," we say; and "All men are mortal, so Socrates is mortal." "Socrates" is a human name applied to a human being. But it wouldn't matter if "Socrates" were a dog in this case. The syllogism is valid for all living things; and that is precisely its weakness. The major premiss really presupposes the conclusion that is supposed to be derived from it. It is because we know that Socrates (like his father, Sophroniscus, etc.) is mortal, that we say "All men are mortal."

2. **Induction**: Conductors are gold, silver, copper, etc. Gold, silver, copper etc. are metals. Therefore All conductors are metals.

What is wrong here is that we do not know when we have the full list of \( S \) terms that constitute the middle term. We are always looking for more; and we must use analogy as our guide.

3. **Analogy**: We can never complete the task of observing all instances, so all of our reflective syllogisms are subject to extension by analogy; and the analogy may not be reliable. We are driven to fasten upon \( M \)'s that are valid only as working hypotheses. We require (as Hegel says) a
"universality that is inwardly determinate"; in other words we have to be able to identify the singular case as the universal genus. This is very important for Hegel's Philosophy of Nature. It has to be a conceptual structure of inferences that are conceptually valid; i.e. it has to be a coherent system of real definitions. We shall see in his lecture commentary that he regards most philosophies of nature as based on analogies that are quite unsound. But he gives no example of analogy in his text. (It is easy to give bad ones; but the best are only "safe up to now."

§190A The Remark has given good examples of the Syllogism of Allness. But Hegel takes one of them ("Copper is a metal, all metals conduct, therefore Copper conducts") and turns it into a syllogism of induction -- thus illustrating the vicious circularity of the Allness form. The major premiss "All metals conduct" is empirically established by testing them one by one. The form of the resulting syllogism is P - S - U (not U - S - P as I set it up in accordance with the original circle of the figure). First we assemble all the metals (P as a class); then we test them all one by one (S distributively); then we affirm the result (U comprehends class P). This comprehends experimental science within Hegel's logic -- which is not concerned with that (except for the analogies that it suggests). But before we move on to that we should notice that once we move to reflection the "figures" are liberated. All that matters is which
conceptual determination is M. P - S - U is the Hegelian second figure, just as much as U - S - P (which would cover the inquiry as to whether only metals are conductors). My procedure is logically correct however. Hegel's example only brings out the defect of the Allness syllogism (that the major premiss presupposes the conclusion). It is the U - S - P paradigm that drives us on to analogy. We can never be sure that we have tested everything that might be a conductor.

No empirical induction is demonstrably exhaustive. When we say "All mammals bear live young" we have not discovered the platypus yet. We expect to find more mammals, but we don't expect to find an egg-layer among them. Hegel's example is an analogy of this same powerful type. In his Dissertation on the Orbits he believed that he had discovered one element in their "law of motion." But even while he was writing, the Sicilian Piazzi was announcing the discovery of the first asteroid (Ceres) which violated Hegel's formula.

Tom, being a human, is a scholar; therefore Dick will be a scholar too. We know how bad that is, because Dick's scholarship is easy to test. When we are dealing with moons and planets it is the scientifically organized empirical knowledge we have, that we use to decide whether an analogy is probably good or not. It is "the instinct of Reason" that what we have discovered is grounded in the Genus (U). Hegel has very little in the way of a philosophy of
"scientific method," but the "syllogism of reflection" points towards one. But what he is concerned about is the Philosophy of Nature; and he ought to explain how the philosopher of Nature can escape from the logically inevitable extension of induction into analogy. One can criticize bad analogies. But can one escape them altogether (as he seems to imply)?

§191 (γ) The Syllogism of Necessity

Hegel is not interested either in defending or in attacking finite syllogistic reasoning. In §190R he agrees with all of the critics who have said that syllogisms are useless; but in §190A he points to the syllogistic character of empirical scientific inquiry as "the instinct of Reason." But essentially he means to let finite reasoning go its way (in spite of circular emptiness on one side, and the bad infinity of finite experience on the other). It is logical that the Syllogism of Reflection (being the finite moment) should have these unsatisfactory aspects. What Hegel is seeking, is the philosophical (or "necessary") form of Syllogism. We need a syllogism that has the circular completeness of the three figures of Quality, but is self-contained.

We should note first, that the Syllogism of Necessity is the one that has U as its middle. It is essentially the third figure. Similarly Reflection was essentially the second figure. The mode of Reflection is essentially
inductive. By implication, Qualitative Syllogism is essentially the first figure -- so it is no wonder that the only plausible example was "This rose is red; Red is a color; so this rose is colored."

In syllogistic Necessity, the triadic sequence of M's continues. But we begin with $P$ as the determinate $U$ in the $S - P - U$ figure. This is the Categorical Syllogism. Then we have $S$ as the immediate being of $U$ (so that it is "both mediating and mediated"). This gives us the Hypothetical Syllogism. And finally we have $U$ as the totality of $S$ and $P$'s. This will give us the Disjunctive Syllogism. We shall find out what all of this means by watching the M's in the examples as we go. For these examples, however, we are dependent upon ourselves. The syllogisms are normal and regular, so Hegel does not bother to give them here. He is interested from now on in the transition to Objectivity.

Categorical: We may as well take the most obvious categorical case (Stace): "Socrates is human; humanity is rational; therefore Socrates is rational." We can make it safer by taking Mure's natural example: "Gold is a metal, metals are elements, therefore Gold is an element." But the spiritual instance is more instructive. Socrates may be insane, or he may be in a coma. But because humanity is his proper genus ($U$), he has to be treated as a (potentially) rational animal. The formal validity has power practical consequences even when it is not correct (at the level of Dasein).
**Hypothetical:** Both Mure and Stace realize that something more than direct transformation into hypothetical form is necessary in order to get S into the middle of the Hypothetical Syllogism. Hegel gives a *Dasein*-translation of *modus ponens* in the *Science of Logic*: "If A is, then B is; but A is, therefore B is." This has the effect of tying Categorical Syllogism to Substance; and Hypothesis to Cause. The S term reveals its U aspect; and at the same time it shows up the inadequacy of the categorical form. Socrates is human; but he is one man, not humanity. What seems clear is that we have not U - S - P but P - S - U. Thus:

1. If humanity is, then rationality is. \( P \Rightarrow U \)
2. Socrates is human. \( S \) is \( P \)
3. Therefore Rationality is. \( \therefore U \) is

(We cannot formulate this the other way round, without begging the question whether there are rational beings other than humans. I am loath to think that Hegel did that.)

The fact is that we have three terms, and the *singular* is the middle one (which disappears in the conclusion, where we could read *human rationality* if we liked); but it is difficult to find a *syllogistic figure* other than the first (S - P - U). Only my formulation puts S firmly in the middle; and that seems to be the whole point of Hegel's switch to the *modus ponens* form.

**Disjunctive:** In Disjunctive Syllogism, the U is explicitly the middle term; and since P passed from M to Su position in the transition to hypothesis, we should expect S to pass to Su
now. Hegel gives only symbolic formulas in the *Science of Logic*; and for the first time he uses negation. We have reached logical necessity now so we have:

Syllogisms are either immediate, reflective, or necessary.

This one is neither immediate nor reflective.

So it is necessary.

Or we can switch the minor with the conclusion. Mure says we cannot label the terms S, P, U at all -- and hence that we have sublated syllogism. But that is surely wrong because there is a "This x is A" premise with a securely S term. S is firmly in the Su position; and U is the middle which disappears as it should. Thus we can argue:

"Animals are either rational or brute.

Socrates is not a brute Therefore Socrates is rational.

or Socrates is rational Therefore Socrates is not a brute."

(The important thing to remember here is that "rational animal" is the genus; it is animality fully realized. The brutes are animality in the otherness of the particular species. The rational animal sums up all that they are [contains it sublated] just as Sophia sums up and contains all lower forms of ethical and intellectual virtue in Aristotle. For this reason Stace's example [p. 261] "Rational beings are either men or angels" is an absurd mistake.)
§192  This section sums up the cumulative results of our progress. (That is why it is important to have a "Socrates" example at the climax.) Each of the moments S, P, U has shown itself to be identical with the others; and this identity is the identity of the philosopher herself as "pure thinking." Each moment is this totality of the thinking that unfolds as logic; the negation of the distinction between them is the philosophical consciousness (or the "being for itself of the Concept" -- note that Hegel says simply "the being-for-itself"). Negation is the last determination that the Hegelian syllogism explicitly acquires. Because of his doctrine that the genus is the perfect species, the species as negative of genus (because it is one species among others) can only enter when the perfect identity of genus, species and instance has been shown. The circle of identity made by S (or by U, or by P) is a mediation by the sublation of mediation. We end with "Socrates" who simply and immediately is, as thinker (S), human (P), and rational (U). Notice that because of the circular identity of P, the natural "particularity" of Socrates (as male) is of no logical significance. He is Socrates, son of Sophroniscus; but I could equally well have spoken of Arete, daughter of Aristippus.

§192A  In his lecture explanation Hegel wants to insist that the traditional division between "the elements" and "the doctrine of method" is not valid for his logic, because the
"elements" cannot be abstracted from their use. Hegel's "forms of syllogism" are the forms of an actual content -- the thinking mind. With the identity of the syllogism (S, P, U) we have reached the objective existence of that mind itself. McTaggart's whole interpretation of Hegel's logic -- as a set of concepts to be applied to our experience -- is invalidated by the revelation here that we are now making the transition from subjectivity to objectivity. Philosophical logic is not methodically applied to "objects" given from elsewhere. It must show how objects are constituted; and the first such object is the thinking subject itself. The thinking subject must now open up syllogistically into its world -- so far as that world has a logically necessary structure implicit in the rational subjectivity of a mortally finite thinker.

§193 The section itself is a categorical assertion of our result. The Concept is a totality in which U, P, S are identical. the Universal is this One (Socrates or Arete). (On the infinite side the perfected Concept is the God who must exist because his very Concept makes existence necessary. That will be the topic of the Remark.)

§193R The logical "object" is not some contingent fact that "is the case." It is "the World" or "everything that is the case." But even that appears to be contingent. It arouses the pseudo-problem "Why is there something rather than nothing?" There must be something (to wit, the thinker) in
order for there to be that "question." But the question points to the need for the "object" of logic to exist necessarily, not just contingently and for the moment.

Thus the objectivity that we have reached is not "objective" as opposed to subjective. That antithesis must develop later. Moving from the subjective Concept to the Object we are at the point of indifference between them. As necessary the world is identical with God; and he is the absolute object who is a subject. But as an objective world it breaks up necessarily into a great collection of contingent objects (including other finite subjects). All of the categories of Being and Essence can be seen as the Object. This is a "form that is diverse from determinacy as it belongs to the Concept and appears in it." How can Concept and Object, being essentially diverse, be "in themselves the same"? Each statement is "correct"; and for that reason both are "incorrect." That is to say, both are misleading. The Concept has two sides; and we have just moved from one side to the other; but this is only the setting up of a dialectical contradiction. We shall have to advance to the negation of the negation." The "sameness in themselves" has to come to be "for itself." "The speculative identity is not the trivial one." Socrates as subject is identical with himself as object. But we have to see how that "object" is the identity of self and world.

This explains why the Ontological Argument is not convincing in the "infinite" case of God. Hegel thinks
Anselm's argument is valid, because what is "perfect" is in no way dependent. God's Dasein is contained in the concept of his absolute independence. There is an intuitive conviction of God's thereness that it articulates. But as an argument it fails to convince because the absolute unity (of perfect being or perfect knowing) is a presupposition. The diversity of perfect Being and perfect knowing can be urged against their identity because they do go apart in finite experience. Thus we have Gaunilo arguing that a "perfect island" need not exist (quite right!). The identity can only be shown in the infinite case; and it must be a result. If presupposed the "proof" will be invalid. (This is a criticism of Hölderlin's poetic intuition and of Schelling's Absolute -- also of all Heideggerian readings of Hegel's own Phenomenology.)

[III: The Doctrine of the Concept]

B: The Object

§194 We have arrived at an object that immediately is -- a Dasein -- but which is the inward totality of all that has logically evolved. In other words, we have arrived at the Subjective Concept as something that is there. But as an immediate identity of the three logical moments it is radically self-contradictory. Is it the SPU identity, the
USP identity, or the PUS identity? Each of the moments is completely independent and completely dependent.

§194R The Monad of Leibniz is a purely logical object; and it exhibits this contradictoriness. In this historical case we can see exactly why the contradictoriness of the subject as object will set thought in motion towards a living absolute community. Every finite monad is contradictory because it represents the world to itself in its own way. It refers to the world (as absolute object); and it strives to be the true knowing of the object, but it is not. On the other side, God (as the absolute object) knows the truth (of himself) perfectly. But why does his perfection have to comprehend all of the finite imperfect knowings? Is he, or isn't he, the truth independently? Hegel doesn't ask this question. He is content with the problem that each monad is perfect in itself, but God sets up their harmony. So are they free and independent, or determined and dependent? The advantage of this presentation is that it exhibits the contradiction of determinism as such -- whether Rationalist metaphysics or the materialist determinism of D'Holbach (or even of Hume).

§194A In his lectures Hegel does not refer to the possibility of a materialist interpretation of the Object. He speaks rather of the degeneration of religious authority into "superstition and fear." We should think not just of fundamentalist liberalism in seminaries and sermons, but of
the doctrine that God established the social order (divine right of kings, etc.). The true divine object is the one who wills universal salvation. Having used the mention of Fichte to point to the French Revolution (and what it meant) Hegel retreats to the safe topic of the preaching of the Gospel to the oppressed millions in the Roman Empire. Our concern (Sache) is to make a reality of our redemption in this world by becoming members of the divine community of love and forgiveness (that characterization of it takes us beyond the socio-political level which will be our more immediate logical problem. But Hegel is looking that far ahead here.)

Turning from life (Being) to thought, Hegel says that science (and specifically philosophy) overcomes the Gegensatz of the subjective and the objective Concept. This gives philosophy the task of reconciling us with our world, making ourselves at home in it, so that it is perceived as ours, not as alien. How can we hope to do this, when all sub-philosophical science seems to have been used to create an "objective order" that is as alien to us as the legions were to the citizens of the Empire (and in the case of the poor, as alien as the whole civic and military system was to the slave population?). (This is not a problem that logic can answer. But it explains why we need to look far ahead to the sphere of spiritual freedom.)
§194A² The second lecture excerpt looks ahead to the immediate future of our developing process (whereas the first addition looked to the Idea and came backwards towards where we are). The thinking Subject-Object will comprehend the world, as its objective content, under three great universal categories: mechanism, chemism and teleology. In spite of Hegel's denial of the elements/method sequence in logic, we should take note that these are the defining characteristics of three methods of inquiry and understanding. Each will be shown to have universal application (and statistical observation has greatly increased the range of mechanical interpretation in the social sphere). Mechanism is a universal concept (natural paradigm: gravity and machines). Chemism is a particularized universal (paradigm: polarized forces). Teleology is a relationship that unites universal continuity and differentiation in a universal that is fully singularized through particular differentiation.

[III: The Concept: B: The Object]

A: Mechanism

§195 The world as a mechanism (and as a great collection of mechanisms) is the immediate Object: the object as it exists externally for the real thinking subject that must interpret it. This external totality comprehends living things, and human society; human psychology and social relations are
mechanical in many ways. Simple externality gives rise to simple (or formal) mechanism.

§195R There is mental as well as physical mechanism. We learn to count mechanically, and to transform formulas as well as to recite prayers, creeds, etc. (But we are not being mechanical, when we are thinking what we are doing, reflecting on the meaning of the words, etc. The unlettered use of Latin in Church was a paradigm case for Hegel. But he admitted that "devotion" was spiritual.)

§195A Of course, the mechanical interpretation is generally inadequate -- outside the science of mechanics. Only matter as simple mass is mechanical (as soon as we let it "open up" it becomes chemistic). Light, heat, magnetism, electricity are chemistic -- so chemism extends far beyond "chemistry" even in nature.

Living organisms are not mechanical -- still less free rational organisms. Looking for the contact point of soul and body was a mechanical folly. But we must accept gratefully any insight we can get by applying it everywhere; and we must accept the way sick people describe their symptoms (though Hegel seems willing to take them a bit too literally).

In the spiritual realm what has become automatic and unconscious is "mechanical." But we must distinguish between common-sense usage and scientific theorizing. (For the latter it is statistical observation that has become
important. What we are to say about the continuum of ordinary usage is not clear, but certainly we cannot take it to have any logical validity.)

§196  The dialectic of mechanism shows itself in the differentiated operation of gravity in producing finite motion and rest. The meteor falls to rest on earth (if not chemistically burned up by friction). The moth is attracted to the lamp (where chemism takes over). This differentiation is a relation of dependence/independence. (The sex-relation is not mechanical but chemistic, so the interpretation of it as "lordship/bondage" is logically degenerate.) Dependence is the simple negation of independence -- which is reestablished when all finite motion comes to rest. But the perfect paradigm case of differentiated mechanism is a balanced (centralized) system of "free motions" (the ecological balance, a healthy economy, the feudal society, etc.).

§197  The dialectic leads now (because we have syllogism as our achieved paradigm of logical development) to a speculative syllogism exemplified in the Solar System. The abstractly universal center (the Sun) relates itself to the simple satellites (S) through the planets (P) which are "relative" centers -- being both independent (vis à vis moons) and dependent (vis à vis the Sun). This is absolute mechanism.
§198 This "syllogism" (S, P, U) is a triad (as we should expect). But it is not clear to me how the transformation can be applied to the "absolute mechanism" of the Solar System. The transformation to USP is invalid (just as it is with the Aristotelian formal syllogism). But when U is clearly identified as "gravity" the PUS transformation works. We have to take this discovery back to USP. Then we see that the claim is that the singular bodies (planets and moons) make possible the expression of the Sun's universal force of gravity as this particular Solar System.

§198R Whether or not it is right to regard the State as a system of mechanical systems, Hegel offers us this example here; and the fact that it is mechanical indicates that it formulates a liberal-contractarian perspective on his theory. When we think of society as made up of independent singular real thinking then it mirrors the Solar System thus:

(1) SPU: The independent singular agent (Hegel thinks of family-fathers, but we need not, though we must leave "dependents" out) is syllogistically bound up with customary society (U) through the needs of the natural organism (P). This syllogism comes into play before there is a developed political system. It operates in the tribal world of Oedipus and Theseus; when it becomes fully "free" (or "civil") the P moment is fully developed as "Civil Society."
(2) USP: The singular wills of these free agents actualize the traditional custom into the particular shape of the City's Constitution. The S's who have been drawn into society (U) by their natural needs (P) become the conscious makers of a legally assertive particular community. They give up family feuds etc. and recognize an authority which they create themselves. (The paradigm of S here is Theseus who gets the Attic tribes to unite into the particular community of Athens.)

(3) PUS: The needs of life having thus brought effective self-conscious rational freedom to birth can now become the basis of the good life (the life that has U in the middle). Through its universal aspect -- as a free cultural community of Greeks -- the particular community of Athens creates the opportunity for poetic existence (the spontaneous formation of free selves) and finally for the "examined life." The U is universal humanity knowing itself in Socrates as the "child" of the laws of Athens. This finally is a syllogism that can be formulated in all three ways because all three terms are identical. We have successfully moved from the rational self to the rational community. But the mechanical standpoint (which was adequate for (1) SPU became inadequate for USP and is only applicable in the most externally formal way to PUS. Socrates can indeed be put to death. But that implies the "identity" of the Terror.
The social system in being can be seen as an example of Absolute Mechanism (just like the Solar System). But this depends on the fact that only the System [?] is "self-conscious." So when we view society mechanically it becomes a cold and indifferent universal context (like space) in which "bodies" move. We don't understand what makes them move at all. If we want to understand why Socrates stays to be executed, or even why his fellow-citizens vote to condemn him, we must abandon the standpoint of mechanism altogether. Even in order to comprehend the unity of the Solar System (instead of analysing it into a result of two opposite moving forces) we must move on to a higher standpoint. In fact, the Newtonian analysis itself already implies the opposition of forces that Hegel calls Chemism.

[III: The Concept: B: The Object]

B: Chemism

Greek society was implicitly chemistic because it was founded on slavery. The "dependent" consciousness (of women and children) can be comprehended as part of the developed operation of Mechanism. But Hellenic "freedom" involved the polar opposite of slavery necessarily. The Greeks were (for themselves) a species of humanity. They were perfect humanity -- the species that is identical with the genus. The rest of humanity were the "other" species -- the "barbarians" (or in the developed logical theory of
barbarism, two other species: the "natural slaves" to the East, and the "wild men" to the North, who could not even be civilized into rational servitude). This example illustrates the logical conflict between the Concept as totality and the differentiated Object as a polarization of opposite determinations. The simple natural case of the magnet shows how inner tension (or opposition) can be unified as a perfect balance which is "the equality of the Concept." The magnet is not simply (or mechanically) located where it is. It is a "field of force"; and the Solar System shows us that even "simple bodies" are actually centers of self-opposed force. They attract one another from afar, only to repel one another when they come together.

§200A We ought to distinguish Chemism from Mechanism. They are not usually distinguished as logically significant because they are both opposed to Teleology. They characterize the inorganic world, whereas Teleology is an organic phenomenon. In the organism, the Concept exists for itself (life strives to maintain itself) not just in itself. But a chemistic system is a system of opposition in which the poles have fixed opposite logical characters (whereas all gravity is essentially homogeneous). A chemistic system cannot be broken into single bits. If you break the magnet you have two magnets; break the battery and you have nothing
electrical at all (whereas all matter continues to be gravitational mass).

§201  This section seeks to show the syllogistic triad in chemism. But this is difficult, and the results are implausible (at the inorganic level anyway). [Memo: this is a problem to be studied in the SL; and if the social example can be worked out, the "logic" of the inorganic process can probably be exhibited (see also Burbidge's paper). For the moment this should be left.]

§202  We can see from §201 that Force is what is syllogistically manifested as Chemism. The Universal Force reaches a balance of immediate being (the neutrality of salt -- S) through its particularizing into the opposites, acid and base (P). The SPU pattern is reversed (UPS). The great spiritual example of this is the understanding of perception. Understanding (U) grasps the singular product of Perception (S) through the mediation of the conceptual hypothesis that there are two complementary forces (Mind and Matter -- P) that produce it. These two opposite forces (which the very concept of Force itself requires as its elementary terms) are immediately independent. (The perceived world does not need me; and I can have another world of Perception just by turning round. Also I can sit in a chair with eyes closed and think (about Perception for example). But since I am the Concept for itself, I cannot actually break out of the total unity of Force -- as the
world could if we all died. The Concept would then exist only in itself -- or as Mechanism and Chemism.

Acid and base are the fully developed model of chemism at the natural level. When brought together, they form a salt. We know this, but the circularity of the process exists only in the external reflection of the scientific observer. (We should note that the magnet is a paradigm of the concept of Force, not of the syllogistic process of chemism; and the making (or recharging) of a battery is the operation of external teleology (which we have not reached yet).

§202A Hegel underlines the fact that this is a finite moment. We cannot conceive of God as a chemical process. (The Manichees did that, but they contradicted themselves by postulating the logical triumph of Good.) We can conceive of "God" as Mechanism (Materialism does that), with Chemism as its finite aspect. But when Chemism takes over, the divine aspect (even of Matter) disappears. All motion is seen as headed toward rest. There is a final state of neutrality in which all process is extinguished. Death triumphs (and the Third Law of Thermodynamics).

§203 The externality of the two processes (from opposition to neutrality or from neutrality to opposition) shows that they are finite. The pendulum swings forever. Or if it doesn't, that is because Death (complete neutrality, the Third Law) will triumph, and neutrality will be final.
(Hegel does not anticipate this, but his Logic allows it). Certainly Chemism as a process has death as its most striking logical paradigm. The immediacy of the objects (whether acid, base or salt) is null and void. Heracleitus is the philosopher of Chemism; and Hegel sees the "meteorological process" as one in which the supposed "elements" are continually transmuted. This is the setting free of the Concept from objectivity. And when we think of Perception as a "chemical" process that leads to the "neutral state" of Understanding we realize that what our own quantum theory will say about the transformation of physical reality if it ever reaches the stable neutrality of an unshakeable consensus, does not matter. The chemical opposition of conceptual forces in the world of Understanding logically implies the overarching teleological unity of scientific Understanding itself. the world in which Understanding (and Logic) exists for itself, is a world of purposive self-understanding.

[III: The Concept: B: The Object]

C: Teleology

§204 Purpose is the Concept that has entered free existence (not the thereness that is limited and causally bound). Here the Concept is for itself (meaning primitively just "on its own account"). This is the living organism that looks out for itself, by responding actively to its own needs, and
to the challenges of its environment. From the point of view of teleology we can finally set up the contrast of subject and object within the range of the objective world. When the organism sets itself against its environment it negates the objective world. But this simple (apparently chemistic) opposition is abstract (or 'subjective' in the sense that it is only privately valid) because it fails to recognize the dependence of the organism on the environment. The organism has the purpose of maintaining itself as well (and as long) as it can come what may ("all determinacy is posited as sublated" -- the relation is quite different from chemism). The environment is necessary of course -- food comes from it and a home, and it satisfies the truly chemistic urge for a mate. But its reality is ideal. It exists not "in itself" but as a repertory of references to the organism: my territory, my prey, my enemy etc. The world is to become my home, where I am safe and can do as I like. There I can raise my young, and the life of the Concept can go on without me. It is the species that preserves itself by coming together with itself as a syllogism.

§204R Materialists think the concept of purpose is redundant. But rationalists insist that it is (the) Vernunft begriff (and even critical philosophers will agree that it is a "concept of Reason." Unlike the "concepts of Understanding" the form is identical with its own content. The purpose of
life (which is empty in the brute animals) is to be rational; and it is the purpose of an animal species. It contains its own particular; and hence it is a real singular (say Socrates).

Efficient causes operate in the mechanical and chemical worlds. But purpose requires its own higher world of final causes. Mechanical causation sets up a visible balance; and chemical causation can eventuate in brute fact (fire passes away into smoke). The process is blind; only we external observers can see how the reciprocal balance of energy is maintained. But with a purpose that we have, we are aware of its identity at every stage. At the end what was inner has become outer; we can say "there it is, just as I meant it to be." The original Concept has first divided itself into destruction and construction, change and preservation; and through the combination of new construction with preservation it becomes real. (In the middle phase of Judgment the Concept is opposed to what is real, so that what is to be changed or destroyed can be identified.

But we should think first of the internal purposiveness of the organism (not of this conscious realization of finite purposes). The organism changes itself (and consumes its environment). But its purpose is just to preserve itself (and to produce its own replacement (since preservation is a losing battle). Kant's concept of the organism as a Naturzweck is the proper concept of the final cause for
logical development. But it was Aristotle who defined it first (in the *De Anima*).

Natural need (*Bedürfnis*) and assertive impulse (*Trieb*) (Plato's desire and *thumos*) are the readiest examples of this immediate shape of purpose. The contradiction is felt in the organism, and the world must provide something that will remove or resolve it. The negation of satisfied self-awareness must be replaced by a second negation that returns the organism to satisfaction. At this level the second negation is a chemistic reversal of the first. Consumption (feeding, drinking) is just the conversion of chemism into a proper circle. But the animals have the drive to assert themselves in this restoration of the balance. They have life's certainty that what it requires belongs to it. Their feeling of need is just one side of the satisfaction that belongs to life properly. The Gegensatz, and the finitude that comes with it, must be sublated.

In the syllogism of purpose (*Zweck*) the negation of the terms essentially occurs (these "terms" are apparently the finite needy subject (S), and the object it needs, which is the means (P) to its satisfaction (U). Devotion, or the religious desire for God, has the same structure (but here the "means" is the negation of the entire world of finite objects -- and as Aristotle already realized we can't keep that up for long). That is why the "proofs" that move to the Dasein of God by way of the world of finite things (as positive) fail to convince us.
Now we begin to open out this **inward** immediacy of purpose into its **external** (understandable) form. These two moments are really identical (logically). We can recognize this in two ways. First, in the fact that we must use the language of external teleology to describe the organism as it maintains itself -- although the organism does not have self-conscious "intentions"; and secondly, because it is internal teleology that the speculative double inversion of external teleology will lead us back to -- but this time in the self-conscious shape of our own life-making.

**External** teleology is very familiar and straightforward. We can use Aristotle's favorite example. The sculptor has a lump of stone and his tools in his studio. He also has all the years of his apprenticeship. (This difference from us is also a **presupposition**.) He is going to make a statue -- say Apollo, since we are with Aristotle in the Academy. This is formally "self-determined." But the stone, in all of its physical determinacy, is a given condition of all that is possible for him. He has the P in his mind, but the S is out there in the world. He is going to create the Concept (the U) in the stone. But it will be the "totality" of his rational subjectivity only "in itself" or "for us." And once the statue is made, he will be just one of **us**, looking at it. It won't **be** his concrete subjectivity at all (though precisely by **not being** what he wanted, it may bring his ideal project back to mind). But the selfhood to be
expressed is now beyond it; and this is clearly a "bad infinite." In the mode of external teleology, the sculptor must die (or lose the strength to continue) while still dissatisfied.

§205A External teleology is what we usually mean in our discourse about "purposes." This category defines the **Utilitarian** standpoint in which everything counts as a means. This is a superficial standpoint (as Socrates already argued against Thrasymachus). Even the shepherd must think of his flock as purposes-in-themselves, and do what is **good for them**. We must not think of Nature as **created for us** (as in Wolff's example of the marvellous convenience of cork-trees). Here, as so often, the threshold of truth is absurdity (Absolute Teleology is the Concept as Idea).

§206 Here the general syllogistic form of Teleology is given in the first figure. The Means (as Middle) is the P through which the subjective project (S) becomes a public, universally observable, fact (U).

§206A The P in this figure is the identity of the sculptor's skilful activity with his tools and the stone. It is the actual identity of what Aristotle calls the material cause with the efficient cause. The formal cause is on the S side, and the final cause is U. This is the pattern of "subjective purpose" as defined in §207. This syllogism is
run through its circle in the three stages by which the purpose of Understanding becomes Idea. These stages, therefore, are the dialectic of Purpose. In the second stage, it is Purpose in Action; and finally it is Purpose Accomplished. We have already seen how Purpose Accomplished is dialectical because it returns the sculptor to the status of us, the observing audience, and leaves him with a bad infinite task of self-expression. But in the development it will change its aspect, and become the realization of a speculative (or "good infinite") whole.

Hegel expresses the subjective concept as the first figure in reverse order. I have myself adopted our observational standpoint as definitive -- with the realized public object as U. But the reversal is typical for action -- i.e. for the subject as real in the sphere of objectivity. For the agent, it is the formal cause that is U; for her it is already final. The project is what is to be, by means of her activity and the objective material in the world (P); and when it is it will be a new S, a singular fact. Hegel identifies the U project as "beschliessen"; and the P as "entschlossen." A decision is the result of our Aristotelian "deliberation"; and when we set to work to put it into effect we are "resolved." (What this is worth as ordinary language analysis, I shall leave experts to decide.)
§207 (1) **Subjective Purpose**: The syllogism is first figure reversed, U - P - S. But we can see why this is identical with S - P - U, because it is the singular agent who deliberately particularizes the formally vague Universal (say "Apollo" for the statue) and posits the antithesis of subjectivity and objectivity (the sculptor is one with his chisel, but the stone is "other"). The Apollo becomes clear in his mind as he works the stone. He finds out what the stone can be (what it has in it). But his ideal aim remains always a goal, a vision in his mind. He (as S) is "returned into himself." No one else will ever see that, or know exactly why he is dissatisfied with the statue when it exists to be seen. But this first moment of formulating the ideal has action as its object. Aristotelian "deliberation" is going on all the time that the statue is being carved. But that only shows us graphically why the **subjective purpose** is an **immediate** turning outwards towards action. If it is **serious** deliberation it is inseparable from **execution**.

[Memo: I say "he" and "his" because the example is Aristotle's; but probably I ought to modernize it directly as it is introduced.]

§208 (2) **Action**: This is the transformation to the second figure: U - S - P. But again it is in reverse. S in the middle is the agent; and (s)he must be concerned first with the means (P). The project, formulated in deliberation as the subjective project, is the "immediate Macht" of the
Concept in action (her S action). The subjective syllogism has produced this identity of S and U. The formal cause is (as I said) already final for the agent. S is therefore negative of the objectivity of the existing objects that are its means. That objective state is now an ideal term -- it is the potential of the new state. The whole middle term is the Macht of the Concept: the activity of the sculptor working on the stone to transform it from its first state to its final state.

§208R In finite purpose-realization, the middle is broken. The sculptor stops for lunch (or a rest). We don't always see the mallet and chisel moving, and the stone chips flying. There is the stone here, and the agent somewhere else (acting still, perhaps, but subjectively, or in thought). But we have to understand that the stone is not now the object (as it was for the men who quarried it). The major premiss of the Action-syllogism is the subjection of that given object (the stone) to the Macht of the Concept (in the sculptor's activity). But by this means the new object (the finished stone-statue) emerges; and so the final figure of the syllogism: P - U - S arrives. Both of the terms, P and S have now been identified with the Universal. But in the example they fall apart. The sculptor is the universal; that is evident when (s)he goes to work on the stone. The statue is the universal -- for the stone is now what the sculptor had in mind. But the sculptor is not the
§208A In his lectures Hegel pointed out that external teleology is the mediated shape of what happens immediately in the growth and formation of the organism. In biological growth, the inner expresses itself immediately -- without the visible intervening process of mallet and chisel and stone chips. But in the formation of the human individual this mediating process is present. The sculptor was an apprentice for years. (S)he learned by doing; and at first her bodily movements were more wrong (perhaps) than right. In the difference between spontaneous growth and apprenticeship we can see why the logical move to external teleology and the return to self-making as "Idea" has to be made.

§209 (3) Accomplished purpose: We are still doing the dialectic of purpose; and we shall be doing it until we reach the "cunning of Reason." Hegel will make us linger with the broken character of the formal and final cause, for some time. The sculptor makes the formal cause of the statue into a final cause. (S)he carves the statue. The activity of carving is "for the sake of" the statue. But her "final" cause (as sculptor) is "to carve." So it would be truer from her point of view to say "the statue is for the sake of the carving." This is the contradiction of her finitude. The "cunning of Reason" is what turns the sculptor's finite
view round. The way it seems when the stone is there, and the statue is a mental vision, is the way that it really is. The sculptor must turn her back on it when it is done because she is a sculptor. Reason has cunningly made her one -- leading her on from seeing the master's work, and thinking "how wonderful to be a master," to the discovery that even when everyone says she is a master, she is not happy. To Reason that does not matter. The mastery that Reason needs is the active subjective consciousness that "Mastery is not yet." For that is the drive that subjects the whole sphere of mechanism and chemism into the service of its purpose. (Someone like Leonardo who is deeply concerned with chemism can drive us to distraction by producing works that are not stable, which we can neither perfectly preserve nor successfully restore -- sometimes Reason is a bit too cunning.)

As far as I can see, Hegel talks of "first" and "second" premise, because by restoring the major and minor premisses to their Aristotelian order he can preserve the S - P - U, U - S - P, P - U - S circle in the sphere of the Object. Probably this indicates that "the Object" is the primary sphere too -- in Aristotelian ontological terms. Anyway, the "second premise" relates the means (as objective) immediately with the presupposed objectivity of the material. The fact that the subjective purpose is able to remain free, and is not caught up in the process of
realization (so that it is able to pass on to a new project afterwards) is the "Cunning of Reason."

In other words, the Cunning of Reason is, first of all, something that we exercise. I have spoken of the dissatisfaction of the sculptor as the tool (or "means") of the Providential (or infinite) Cunning of Reason. But the finite cunning of Reason, consists in the sculptor's being able to use objective nature against itself in order to change it. Adam's spade, or the sculptor's mallet and chisel, are already the cunning of Reason. The object is "used up through mutual friction." The stone turns into the statue through the activity of the tools. The mind stays outside of the whole process and preserves itself. The fact that the teleology is "external" is our cunning; the fact that no external achievement can content us is the cunning of Providence.

§209A The Macht of Reason is identical with its List. Hegel simply points out that our (Baconian) Macht is just knowing how to make objective nature work on itself to produce what we want; and God lets our purposes work on one another to produce what he wants. But what is that? When we can recognize it we know what the "infinity" of Reason is.

§210 Everything we have done so far is dialectic (in spite of the number 3). But now we are about to make the transition to Absolute Teleology: the Idea. We have seen how the unity of subject and object, posited in deliberate
purposive action, leaves the subjective Concept and the Object neutral. They are sublated in their one-sidedness. But they remain independent. The statue is still a lump of stone. With the best of luck it goes from the temple to the museum. This is how the purpose preserves itself freely against the objective (as well as within it). It is not only the one-sided subjective (a particular project accomplished) but the concrete universal (which reveals new sides in the hands of "Providence"). This is the P - U - S syllogism, the one that can be seen to be U - U - U. I have picked up Aristotle's example of the statue, partly because a work of art has the absolute dimension self-consciously. Michelangelo would have to realize that those who go to the Accademia to see his David have a different view of the chosen hero of Providence than his audience did. But he would understand why it has been moved indoors, and a copy set up in the Loggia dei Lanzi; and if we grant that his "faith" was always doubtful, whereas his "humanism" is indubitable, then the transition to U - U - U becomes patent. From the first he set himself consciously to produce what we now see: the ideal of young male beauty and natural vigor. He was no "tool" of Providence. (Can the future of artistic experience affect this judgment? I have to say "perhaps"; but I confess that I don't see how -- except by degeneration.)
§211  The accomplished purpose of external teleology is still broken inwardly. The purpose was mine while I worked on it. But it was never the purpose of my humanity. Except in the case of a successful work of art, what I accomplish jut passes into the common stock of materials for the self-expressive activity of others. The bad infinite of action and production is the dialectic of "absolute teleology." The discontent of the creative artist is part of the "cunning of Providence." But so is the satisfied contentment of us lesser mortals. We go to be happy when some project has been successfully completed. But tomorrow (or the day after) some critic will start deconstructing it. That's how life is: finite.

§212  The necessity and justice of this operation of fate can be comprehended. This takes us to the Idea -- the purpose of the whole finite struggle, which seems to be just a rat race. Young and old, we can all troop into the Accademia to contemplate David. Chemism turns the seeming stability of the mechanical masses into a flux of becoming; even that marble image will crumble eventually. But for the moment we have a complete triumph of the Concept, and a perfect identity of content and form. No one is like David (or like any Eve you choose) for very long; most of us never. But the image points us towards the project of the philosophical comprehension of life -- which all can achieve. (Some achieve philosophical peace of mind religiously -- without
thinking it out. The paradigm is Dame Julian of Norwich: All shall be well.)

§212A Finitude arises from the fact that although the identity of form and content can be perfect, the identity of form and matter cannot. Others can give a new form to what is necessarily a material achievement. But if we return now to the natural identity of the organism as its own purpose, we have a form and matter that cannot be sundered. Here we can see that the object is an sich the Concept. In finite life we can only have a bad infinite struggle. But the philosophical comprehension of history (for example) can make us see that freedom has been accomplished. When Hegel says that "the good ... fulfils itself eternally in the world" he sounds like Dame Julian (but more irrational than she, because in his view this is not a mystery for the hereafter, but something we can perceive here and now. We need the "illusion" that the good is not yet realized in order to keep us at work realizing it. When we grasp what the "illusion" language properly implies: that "the absolute good" is just the existence of a world in which finite goods have to be realized (and evils overcome) we shall (arguably) want to give up the "illusion" language. It is not an illusion that there is evil in the world, and that good must be done; and it is not a fact that the good "fulfils itself eternally." The Idea is a logical frame within which the struggle out of evil towards good takes place.
§213 The definition of the Absolute as the Idea is easily stated. But if we are to avoid the Left Hegelian (and Marxist) misinterpretation of it we must remember the content that it contains in sublated form. Hegel helps his critics by declaring that this is the absolute definition of the Absolute. He does not mention God. But up to this point he has offered the Concepts as names of God. the long alliance of Christianity with "two-world Platonism" makes it easy to think that the Idea is just the absolute knowledge that the traditional God has of himself. This is not the orthodox tradition, because the world is "the Concept in the form of external thereness." But it is the tradition of Galileo's "book of Nature." But logically it is not and cannot be Hegel's doctrine at all. What we have reached logically is the teleological interpretation of the world by the philosopher. This is the Idea.

It is "the unity of the Concept and objectivity" because the philosopher knows herself as a real individual in the order of Nature. Science is the absolute project, the infinite purpose. The Gestalt of Nature is embraced within the Macht of the Concept; and that Concept is our philosophical Science.

§213R The Idea is the Truth into which all earlier definitions return. It is the correspondence of Objectivity
with its Concept. My ideas are "correct" when they correspond with the finite objects in the world of my projects. Everything that is actually effective is at least a moment of the truth. We have to take account of it. But it is one of many moments. The right interpretation of it depends on getting it into the proper relation with all of the other moments. To have the Concept of Nature (for starters) we must get the moments properly ordered. By themselves they will only lead us to the contradiction that is their logical "fall."

But the Idea is not the Idea "of something" (even something as general as "Nature"). §213 said that the "ideal content is nothing but the Concept in its determinations." These are Logic, Nature and Spirit. All of these are universal concepts that embrace everything -- world and self alike. "The Idea" is their circular (or syllogistic) relation. That is the best way to take the One Idea (Logic) and its judgment (Nature and Spirit). Absolute Spirit (where we philosophers logically are) is the "returning into the One Idea."

The Idea is not founded on the Cartesian ego. It is founded on "pure thinking." The road to that (for a Cartesian ego that wants to turn its certainty into "truth") is written down in one book; and the unfolding of "pure thinking" is written down in another book. To read the books you must exist; but your passing away will not matter to the Idea. What will matter is whether you have left an
effectively written record of any improvements to either of the logic books. For what these books contain is not a formal logical construction out of representations or logical symbols. They show how the free Concept "determines itself and in so doing determines itself to reality." If no community reads them intelligently then they become abstractions. (It is horrifying to reflect how much abstract discourse they have occasioned -- including some in this discussion. But that can be determined only because there is a community trying to make sense of them. This is the subjectivity of the Concept for which it exists; and the totality of the circle from abstract being in itself to being in and for itself is the Idea.

§213A The Idea is the Truth. So Hegel has to expound his conception of Truth here. Ordinary "correspondence" is "correctness." Philosophical truth is an evaluative term. A "true" State is one that is rationally developed to maturity; and a "true" work of art is one that is beautiful. But apart from the subjectivity of beauty-judgments, the second example suggests that "true" States might be as various as "true" paintings. Just how different can two "true" States be? We can agree with Tolstoy that unhappy families are all different (so are "bad" humans). But is it true that "all happy families are the same"? Hegel's own doctrine that the bad can only subsist because there is some good in it points to the variety of the Good. It is best to
admit that the question is open, and Reason (or rational freedom) is only a regulative ideal.

The doctrine that what subsists has some truth, follows from the general Hegelian position that the Idea is perfectly present. This is identical with the circle of the actual and the rational. We do not need to wait for Paradise to understand the mystery of Hell (as Dame Julian presumably thought); but we shan't maintain the bad infinite concept of it. We can see that only the absoluteness of free self-determination can reconcile the "perfect presence" of the Idea with the evident facts of "confusion and impairment." The Idea is a logical structure of thinking consciousness.

The progressive argument of the Logic is the best proof that can be given that "The Idea is the Truth." Philosophy has always been concerned with the Idea -- i.e. with the identity of thinking and being as "actuality." (This is a fairly strong version of "all true philosophy is idealism": philosophy always seeks to go beyond "Understanding" -- so "common-sense philosophy" is almost ruled out.)

§214 The Idea can be comprehended as the proper philosophical interpretation of Reason. But also it is what Schelling has called "Subject-Object" or "unity of ideal and real." It is the unity of the finite and infinite (Schelling's words perhaps but more distinctively Hegelian in interpretation). Finally coming close to a concrete
interpretation, it is unity of soul and body (Aristotelian soul: self-actualizing potentiality); and theologically it is the being that necessarily exists. All of these are formulas for the speculative self-transcendence of the Understanding in its different relationships. (There does not seem to be a descending order here; there may be a circular one. But it is a mistake to look for more than the two perspectives: infinite/finite. Soul/body identity as the proper meaning of "Reason" is the most illuminating connection to make.)

§214R Because all of these "identities" are "speculative" it is easy to show that they are contradictory. But our argument so far has been the resolution of these contradictions. They are the fault of the Understanding itself and must be laid to its charge. Think first of soul-body. The sides ought not to be dissociated. Hegel takes first subjective/objective (where the mistake of separation is almost as obvious); and then the Kantian critique of the Ontological Argument (where the "mistake" can only be demonstrated after we have reconstructed the whole relation of subject/object, being and concept, (Kant is not more mistaken than Anselm or Descartes.) The crucial opposition is between finite and infinite (where the latter concept has to be reconceived. Of all of Hegel's denials, the claim that "the finite supposed to be merely finite has no truth" is the most interesting. "Truth" here seems to be
synonymous with meaning rather than value. The paradigm case is "The Spirit is a bone" (in Phrenology). His other oppositions have all come up in the course of the Logic and need no special discussion.

The basic error of Understanding is the isolation of moments that only make sense in their logical relationship as if they were really independent. (There is no harm in studying them as abstractions.) Notice what Hegel says here about the identity posited by the copula. In Judgment he gives the formula: "The singular is the universal." But now he says "The S is not just S but U as well." This puts the problem helpfully; and it indicates that the dialectic is not meant to take us out of this world of singulars, and into a noumenal realm.

The second error both follows from and underlines the first. When its concepts become dialectical, the Understanding defends both the world and its own basic view of thought, by assuming that the contradictions arise only from its external reflection. The actual origin of it is the self-reflective, self-conscious character of reality (or of what is) as knowledge of "Science." "What is" is dialectical in its essence, because it is identical with what can be known; and because knowing is a practical relation. Consciousness is Spirit, which is a freely self-creative, perpetually novel process of self-interpretation. "What is" is a circle that goes from sense-awareness (of becoming that factualizes itself) to Understanding, and from
there round to the Reason that knows itself to be the soul/body identity. We must insist that the circle is one of "this world's knowing itself" precisely in order to avoid any illogical reference to another world of pure intellect. Experience is what there is for us; and we can make coherent sense of all the "sciences" to which it leads (modes of universally valid knowledge) when we take them to be "the world's knowledge of itself." We must speak of "the world's knowledge" in order to get our practical science right. We must avoid Bacon's error. "Science" is not our knowledge as a finite human community. It is not an instrument of power. We cannot use it as an instrument; when we suppose that we are doing that, it simply ceases to be science, and we ourselves become "tools of Providence," subject to the "cunning of Reason." When we are actually rational, we are the world's self-knowledge. (Since all actual knowing is finite, and all action has its hidden "cunning" aspect, there is a logical temptation to say that "the world's self-knowledge" belongs only to "God." But that is a logical mistake. Not only do we have no logical or experiential ground for supposing that there is a knowing more "complete" than our own; we are logically incapable of saying how there could be such a knowledge, or what it would be like. The supposition violates our concept and experience of what knowledge is. The best way of understanding why "the determinacy of the Idea is at the same time only itself" is to reflect on how there could not be a "divine knowledge"
that was more adequately "the world's knowledge of itself" than ours (once we stop regarding our science as "power"). The Idea is the "infinite judgment" that "the same can be thought and can be." The fact that "infinite judgments" are always (formally speaking) "category mistakes" warns us to put "the Idea" on a different logical level than ordinary empirical knowing.

§215 The Idea is a process that must not be sundered from the result. In experience we can only grasp it properly as process. It has to be grasped as the unity or identity of the dialectical process that carries thought from the Understanding to the speculative standpoint. (This anticipates the climax of Logic as philosophical method.) The Idea is the double inversion of the Concept (which moves from subjective Reason, to Objectivity as its first inversion, and so to absolute Reason (as the universe of philosophical discourse within which the identity of Subject and Object in their opposition is comprehended. I have spoken of philosophy as "the world's self-knowledge" in order to convey this sublation of the subject/object antithesis. Hegel is more interested in emphasizing the return of subjectivity at the higher comprehensive level. This has its dangers, because the all-comprehensive Subject is evidently "God." So we may think that we are being logically driven into theism. But "God" has been made over in the process. "The Object" is properly "man in Nature"
(meaning the real community of human life); and "the Idea" is Philosophy as the self-knowing activity of that community in its "true Infinity." This community can be identified in the Christian tradition as "the body of Christ," or as the universal "Incarnation of the Logos." But since we have arrived at it by logic, we know that membership in it does not involve any kind of "Christian" faith -- and a fortiori it does not involve any other form of religious faith. Moreover it does not involve the rational postulation of any divine knowledge more perfect than ours (for it shows that a postulate of that sort is irrational and conceptually meaningless). So Hegel's "theism" is only a logical license to use religious language to express the "infinity," the "beyondness" of the philosophical level of thought. Since it is perfectly possible (and equally legitimate) to avoid using religious language here, rational "atheists" ought not to mind. The important thing is to be able to say what needs saying, and to make the distinctions that need making.

§215R "Static" -- or seemingly static -- and "unitary" expressions for the Absolute are "false" (i.e. one-sided or dangerously misleading). The Idea is not a "unity," or a "substance." But it is "subjectivity" because it is the subjective side of each antithesis that can "overgrasp" or comprehend the objective one. Subjectivity is infinity overgrasping the finite, because it is freedom, a thinking that does not just contemplate its being, but continually
makes itself afresh. The citation of Aristotle at the end of the *Encyclopedia* is condemned by implication here because it strongly suggests that the Idea is "unchanging." The truth is Heracleitean: "Changing, it rests." Aristotle's God is a substance. The Idea is not.

§215A In his lectures Hegel gave a programmatic division of what is to come. The Idea has three stages of development. First there is Life, which is the Idea in Nature, or the consciousness of the world as immediate feeling. Then, in antithesis to Life, as the negation of its confidence that "the world is mind" there is Cognition. This moves from the establishment of Understanding (of the world-order as other) into the practical creation of the order of Reason. This brings us back to the sense of living identity (where we are right now); and so we arrive at the Absolute Idea. This last stage (of real development, as also of logical cognition) is what is first in the order of being -- the implicit frame of all rational life and thought.

[III: The Concept: C: The Idea]

**A: Life**

§216 Immediately, the Idea is Life, the Aristotelian soul, the self-actualizing form of a living body. The Idea is our living body -- not the finite organism of any one of us, but the living body in which the human community --
philosophical and sub-philosophical -- maintains itself. But thought begins in the singular mortal living organism. So that is where the life-story of the Idea must start.

Hence the living organism must be interpreted as a "concrete universal" -- a cyclic identity of U, P, and S, or a Hegelian triad of syllogisms. The organic body is already a little image, a microcosm, of the rational community. Its members are both means and ends for one another; and the totality is an assertive self-maintaining unity that negates the independence of the world generally. We can say that "soul and body are separable" because when it dies the "same" body is there -- and we can dissect it to discover the "outer" side of "Life." But it is not really the "same," and its difference illustrates the error of the Understanding in taking its concepts to be "the same" in abstraction as they are in their life. Their life is as members in the life of the "separate soul." But we shall soon see (if we have not seen already) that that "life of the Spirit" is just the life of the universal body which the singular organism recognizes even in its activity of negative exclusion.

§216A The editors have given us here a short passage in which Hegel discusses the unity of the organism, and the inadequacy of the Concept of Life that will lead us on to Cognition. His main object is to bring out the fact that "Reason" is the comprehension, the intelligent
interpretation, of Life. The Understanding life soon declares that "life is incomprehensible," because what it can deal with is the hand cut off -- which is not really a hand any more.

The inadequacy of "Life" is that its self-knowledge is only sentience. We have to move on to the Self-Concept as the Judgment of Theory and Practice in order to comprehend the unity of Life conceptually in our return. But we must never lose sight of the fact that the return is to Life. Our cognition will not be "sentient" any more; but it will be the "absolute Idea" that Reason (as soul) has of its universal body. It will involve "resurrection" -- Hegel for instance is a very important member of our philosophical community -- but a "resurrection in the body" (less misleading than "of").

§217 Sure enough, "what is alive" is a triad of syllogisms. Hegel sends us first to the triad of Mechanism (of which the political community is the appropriate paradigm -- §198 and 198R). Then to the triad of Chemism (§201) [which we have not yet tried to expound]; and finally to the syllogism of subjective purpose (§207). All of these are to be found within it. It is odd that he does not refer to §204R (where Aristotle's definition of life is cited as a paradigm of internal purposiveness). He is going to work out all three syllogisms for us [which will help us with Chemism]. The whole theory should be seen as a development of §204R.
§218 (1)  **The Mechanical Syllogism:** Digestion

As with the State, the first syllogism of the organism is "mechanical" only in an extremely metaphorical sense. The body grows -- it gains mass -- because it divides itself into an organic and an "inorganic" side internally. Food and drink are assimilated into an indifferent (unorganized, unspecialized) fluid that can be specialized to support and increase whatever system needs it. Life is to be comprehended as a self-reproducing universal (homogeneous) process that specializes itself.

§218A  In his lectures Hegel explained the system of specialization as another triad. Sensibility is the universal presence of the soul in the body which makes the whole into a self-defending unity. Irritability is a kind of "judgment" -- the muscular system moves the non-muscular part of the organism. "Reproduction" (i.e. growth) is what is described in the section.

§219 (2)  **The Chemistic Syllogism:** Sense and Motion.

The **logical** judgment of Life is the sensory relation of the organism to the world outside it. Sensation obliges us first to recognize the **externality** of the world. The impulse to move brings this to light. But the "release of the objective" is already the release of Nature to which we shall come back in §244. But here it is made not "logically" but as an experience of sense. The Concept divides here into its subjective and objective shapes; but
the next "experience" is precisely that my body needs something which only the "outside" world can supply. I lack something, I am in want (Mangel). If I can find it, I take it and absorb it confidently.

§219A Hegel underlines the confidence of sense-consciousness in his lectures. Life grabs whatever it needs for self-maintenance; and the life process transforms what it assimilates to itself. This is not a "chemical" process. It falls into the category of teleology. Death is the final triumph of mechanism and chemism in the ceaseless struggle between the organism and its inorganic environment.

§220 (3) The Syllogism of Subjective Purpose

The chemistic syllogism is what keeps the first syllogism (of self-maintenance) going. There is a circle here. The organism can "feed on itself" only for a limited time. It must use its senses, and let the world that they reveal go, precisely in order to possess itself and absorb what it needs in the world. When it reaches maturity in the resulting process of growth, a new kind of need and drive declares itself. The organism "posits itself" as a determinate shape of life, or as needing a mate in order to fulfil its spontaneous purpose. It is only half of what it "truly" is, and it must find the other half. The "Judgment" of Life as Universal is that the S organism is only P -- only one of the two different sexes that Life requires for the self-reproduction that effectively overcomes mortality.
§221  Logically, Life as Genus -- human life being the perfect species that is identical with the genus -- needs this sexual division and reproduction because death is a necessary moment of finite existence. The organism exists immediately as a living thing. But this immediate (sensory) Idea of the World is not really immediate. When death threatens it becomes aware of itself. It exists for itself as finite. It was generated, and it will pass away. If we think about "the Genus" this is where community enters. The sensibly self-aware organism knows that it was "born and raised" and that it must bear and raise children. In its negative struggle with the environment, the U side wins.

§221A  Death resolves the contradiction of the unmediated identity of U and S. The Genus (U) is the Macht. So for the animals (which are only P, not U, because they are not specifically identical with life as such) the Genus-process is their highest moment. To leave successors is their absolute purpose. This is just a bad infinite series of generations. But the Concept that spontaneously exists like this aims at self-cognition.

§222  When I see my parents and elders die, and I know that I must die myself, Spirit is born. That "mother" is now a dead body, is sensory knowledge. But the knowledge of what is gone is not sensory; nor is the knowledge that I too must die in my time. I am aware of what Life is (as a Concept). This is the logical beginning of Cognition. With this
knowledge I am more than a natural species. The Idea of Life exists in me as a free Genus. We should pay careful attention to the fact that this "birth of Spirit" (or of the universal Concept of Reason) is in my recognition of myself as a member of the community of thinking consciousness. The human being is Antigone, conscious of debt and duty to her family, and wishing to found her own family in which the family-memory will be carried on.

[III: The Concept: C: The Idea]

B: Cognition

§223 The Idea exists freely for itself as philosophical knowledge. This is not (for example) Kierkegaard's subjectivity -- though it contains that sublated; and the kind of "returned" subjectivity that it is will allow for the cultivation and deepening of that authentic inwardness in all non-polemical ways. But in philosophical cognition it is objectivity that must be emphasized. It is what I can reliably communicate that is "objective" in this world of thought where "universality" is the element of existence. We should remember that we are beyond "death" now. If we are still alive and thinking, it is in the realm where Plato, Spinoza and Hegel are alive and thinking likewise. That world is still a way of conceiving this one. But its "body" is the universal order of Nature (including Life as its fullest manifestation). I have spoken of Science as
"the World's self-knowledge." Hegel speaks of the Concept "having itself as its Gegenstand." This is how we have to speak if we are to express the absolute subjectivity of "pure thinking." (I don't like the reference to "intuiting" myself, because logical thinking confirms itself in successful communication. But of course the "success" is itself "intuited.")

Again, we have a reference to the "releasing" of Nature. In order to be its own Gegenstand, the Idea must "repel" itself. It must presuppose itself -- even though it actually finds itself in the experience of sense-consciousness. This finding is a long dialectical process of construction (and reconstruction) in which the presupposition is always maintained, but in which it is the Concept that interprets the world rather than vice versa. Or, to be more accurate, there is a circle of Reciprocity.

§224 We have two judgments:

1. the Idea exists as self-knowing and
2. the World exists as not yet known.

Finite life, as cognition, is the relating of these two. (We have seen how free knowing begins as the standpoint that accepts finite mortality. The presupposition of the world is an experience; I know it was here, and that I have been taught to interpret it; and that it will continue to be when I am no longer one of its interpreters. But my relation to it is the reflective one of interpreting it. Interpreting
it is a continual process of learning and revising. The presupposing is not yet a positing because I can only set up an interpretation that I have already reached. I find the world to be already there, and myself to be one thing in it. But this distinction between myself and the world is one that I make within the sensory consciousness of the world that is "mine." I distinguish the world from my consciousness of it. But I do so within my consciousness -- which now begins to extend into thinking. As I construct the world in thought (being taught most of the basic construction) my Idea of the world is the identity of the presupposed reality of my sensory experience with my scientific theory. This is the fundamental certainty of Understanding. Reason operates as Understanding (and grows out of it logically) because the certainty that the world makes rational sense is identical with the certainty that cognitive consciousness is itself rational. The world can be interpreted rationally. That is the "positing of the antithesis" (between the two judgments above) as null (nichtig) and void.

§225 So far we have spoken of Cognition generally. But before we can proceed we need to distinguish the two ways of harmonizing the two judgments in their antithesis. The sublation of the antithesis between subjectivity and objectivity happens first implicitly. Instead of the simple Concept of Life we have two opposed perspectives which arise
from the recognized finitude of the knowing organism. On the one side, there is the acceptance of the presupposition of sensible reality as an absolute horizon. Moving in this direction we establish the world-view of Understanding as we find it in the *Phenomenology*; and we come back to the essential freedom of Life by being driven to a great inversion at the climax. On the other side, there is the acceptance of Reason as *legislative*. In this perspective of practical Reason, all the knowledge gained in the theoretical construction is just instrumental, just raw material for the creation of the world that ought to be -- the world of Reason. These opposite movements must be articulated as continuous.

(a) Cognition

§226 We start here in the position of naive perceptual realism. The objective world (including the perceiver's body) is taken to be separate ("diverse") from the subjective consciousness that represents it. The mind reflects on the world as what exists independently. Actually we are constructing our scientific interpretation of experience all the time; and this interpretive activity is a "built in contradiction" of the assumption upon which the interpretation is based. "Reason acts as Understanding" in this intellectual construction of the world as a theoretical projection; and what is understood is always
some finite, definite, situation. Comprehension of the world as a whole ("the Concept") appears to be beyond the horizon of experience. If we imagine it from within this perspective, then we form the concept of God's knowledge (as the free creator of this whole finite world). But the infinite context of our finite interpretations is actually the "built in contradiction" constituted by the free activity that is progressively putting the interpretation together. The experience is "all ours"; and the "Concept of the Whole" is our own Concept in its actual exercise. The "higher standpoint" of God as an outside intellect is superfluous.

§226A All that the editors have given us from Hegel's own explanatory discourse is his insistence that Aristotle was not a naive perceptual realist. The world does not come to a passive mind already interpreted. That is how it seems; and our "presupposition" establishes that view. But we are simply the unconscious Concept. We know that we must learn to interpret the world. But we do not personally create the interpretation. So we assume that it was always already there. Actually it was not, and it is not. We are intellectually active all the time without realizing it.

§227 We are, of course, aware that we think -- and that our thinking interprets the world. But this appears to us as a game that we play with abstract concepts. All of our thoughts are abstract universals. We classify the world in
our minds -- many "kinds of rock," "kinds of plant," "kinds of animal" etc. But when we discover laws about their relations and behavior we are making the concrete universal (the actual living form in the real world) stand out as an abstraction. This is the aim and object of the analytical method (which is one side of the cognitive process as a whole).

§227A "Analysis" and "synthesis" are not alternatives about which we have a free choice. We must analyse with our eyes on some synthetic goal; and we must synthesize what has been properly analysed. Proper analysis identifies "forces and laws" (as the section said). It does not do what Descartes' analytical geometry does. The object appears to it as an isolated "phenomenon"; and the analytic understanding "traces it back to a universal." To take the Cartesian view that analysis into abstract elements is the end of the matter is to get everything upside down. To go from an organic substance like meat to its inorganic chemical components is not progress, because we cannot get back from them to meat. Yet this is what "analytical psychology" does; and when we treat the mind like an onion, we find ourselves in the end with nothing. The living activity escapes us (just as the life was already gone from the dead meat).

We must note here that Hegel (like the "nature-philosophers" generally) has a strong critical position, but
no positive methodology at all. He knows (as they all did) that there is a mistake involved in the reduction of the organic to the inorganic. But (as yet anyway) he has no cognitive method for "life" as such. (There is plenty left for philosophers to work out when he has finished doing logic.)

§228 The proper result of analysis is a determinate universal. Locke (or Descartes) presents us with the productive results of simple (naive, unconscious, automatic) Understanding. But "Reason operating as Understanding" knows what sort of elements it is looking for. It already has the process of synthesis in mind. The synthetic method takes the results (or products) of analysis "through the moments of the Concept." What these are we shall see in the following sections. But it is fair to say at once that we can only deal here with the logical structure of science as it is expounded and communicated. Hegel's logic of science, like Aristotle's, is logica docens. Logic in use, the logica utens of actual inquiry, is not dealt with at all. Indeed, it is not clear that there is anything systematic that deserves the name "logic of inquiry." But there is such a thing as disciplined analysis of the logical forms and processes that occur in the process of inquiry; and the Hegelian concentration on system leaves that out.

§228A Synthesis reverses the process of analysis. Analysis goes from S to U. Synthesis goes from U (which it
formulates as a definition back to S (formulated as theorem) by way of P (logical division). The inspiration of this pattern is clearly Platonic (compare the method of "Collection and Division" in the Sophist and the Statesman). The reversal of analysis in synthesis recalls what Aristotle says about Plato's habitual distinction between "the way to first principles" and "the way from first principles."

§229 Definition provides the determinate Concept of the object perceived by consciousness. The Concept is the genus; and by the identification of its difference it is determined as a species. All of the elements, and the justifying argument, are provided by the analysis; and the determinacy is produced by external reflection. It can be challenged as subjective.

This final admission is quite remarkable. In the Phenomenology (and here again) Hegel defends the system of mammal classification by tooth and claw by arguing that that is how the animals differentiate themselves. But the decision as to what is a "mammal" is not simple of "objective." Still our evolutionary biology (being genetically based) is not reflective or subjective -- so Hegel's impulse about "division" was methodically well founded.

§229A Hegel's own commentary shows how he has taken over the traditional logical doctrine. He is apparently not concerned with the necessary (or philosophical) definition
of the human rational genus (which is identical with its own perfect species). All finite definition -- since it is analytic, and the analysis is always subject to challenge -- is logically unsatisfactory. Only Geometry can operate in logical security because it is so absurd.

In general, Hegel's concept of the particular sciences is Platonic. Every science assumes its objects (as a basic hypothesis). (But we can see from his critique of Physiognomy and Phrenology, that Hegel's view of this "hypothetical" procedure is proto-pragmatic. A true science is one that works.)

Philosophy must somehow make a logical circle of the two procedures as one method. Spinoza and Schelling have tried to use the synthetic method alone. They begin with definitions that are supposed to be intuitively valid (like geometry). But the open possibility of challenge undermines them logically. Why should we grant what they accept as axiomatic? (One can see here why Hegel's "Science of Experience" is necessary to his System; and why systematically established self-knowledge -- the perfect Genus-Species -- Individual identity -- is the only necessary starting point.)

§230 The Concept as U is specified (into P) by division. Empirically the ground of division is some external aspect. Again the influence of Plato is evident. But the problem of empirical application is made explicit. There can be many
bases for division (cf. Plato's definition of "Sophist"); and it is hard to be sure that the "collection" is complete and the "division" exhaustive.

§230A Hegel's commentary is Platonic. The division must be logically natural; as Plato said, we must divide "at the joints." Here, Hegel offers us the paradigm of the mammals dividing themselves by "tooth and claw." The danger of trusting an "intuition" of this sort is evident; and this Addition shows Hegel's logical method at its weakest. He tells us dogmatically that division must be triadic -- and that in the sphere of Nature, the division of the moment of antithesis produces fourfold divisions. But he does not tell us what the other three kinds of mammal are (homo sapiens being the climactic fourth, where species and genus coincide). That is probably lucky for him -- though "the impotence of Nature" would probably allow him to dismiss whatever new discoveries failed to fit.

The example of the division of poetry into "epic, lyric, drama" shows us the folly of this a priori theory of classification. We may be disposed to grant that the motion from first position into "otherness" and so to "return" is philosophically enlightening. But part of its value is that it is free. We can apply it as we see fit (or rather, as we find it illuminates what we are interested in). Nothing is gained by ossifying it into a supra-historical framework of "absolute divisions." When we let Nature go, we must let
Nature be; and we must let the spirit of interpretation have its absolute freedom likewise. (Also "life" must have its indefinite multiplicity of purpose.)

§231 The concrete singularity (S) of cognition is in the theorem. The theorem treats the determinacy (the P moment in definition) as a relationship. We can see that Hegel has mathematical cognition as the paradigm of perfect logical cognition. This is confirmed by the discussion in the Science of Logic where Euclid's First Book (and its climax in Pythagoras' theorem) provides the theme. This may seem surprising in view of Hegel's general rejection of mathematical method for philosophy. But actually it is quite logical; for as that discussion shows concrete geometry forms the transition to Philosophy of Nature. The axioms of Euclid (and his hypotheses in general) must be "deduced" from the Concept. The Concept here is the Concept of Nature as the world of our perceptual experience; and although we have found it useful in our physics to adopt a "pure logical" (non-Euclidean, free postulational) view of Geometry, no one will deny that the perceptual world of our life-experience is Euclidean. What has happened to Geometry (and to mathematical logic generally) appears to me to confirm the Hegelian view that it should not be accepted as "pure cognition" at the level of immediate intuition. It is an instrument (both of concrete life and of Science). What is to be said about Hegel's proposed "deduction" of it, I
shall leave more competent experts to decide. (As far as I can see the value of Hegel's Logic is independent of any decision about that.)

It is very hard to decide formally what the difference is between a definition and a theorem. This is because both of them are already mediated. In formal symbolic logic it is perfectly possible (and legitimate) to choose different axiom-sets (and to investigate whether some members of a given set are dispensable etc.). So Hegel was right to say (in SL) that no absolute principle of distinction can be given. If we turn to the finite cognition that does not pretend to mathematical certainty, we can see that empirically "principles" are agreed upon; and "conclusions" are argued for. This is the "mediation." Some sort of "proof" must be offered; and because it is frequently not decisive, the argument is "inconclusive." What Hegel calls "relationship" here is indefinitely various -- so the reflective subjectivity of the definition and division stages produces the world of "agreement to disagree" with which we are all familiar.

§231R In this Remark, several topics already brought up in the Lecture comments are dealt with expressly in the text. If the editors have presented their lecture texts accurately, then Hegel thought it advisable to anticipate what was coming. But he begins now by using his mathematical knowledge to show us that we cannot
successfully separate analysis from synthesis, or definitions from theorems. Because of the external reflective point of view everything can be set up and presented in both ways.

Therefore neither method can be used alone for philosophy; and the standpoint of external reflection must be avoided. Spinoza did speculative philosophy by the synthetic (geometric) method. But it soon degenerated into the dogmatic metaphysics of Wolff (see §§26-36).

Schelling (and his imitators) developed a new version of mathematical method inspired by Kant's theory of geometry. But Hegel is just as hard on that. It could only produce bad philosophy of Nature, because (like Geometry) it is rooted in sense-experience. Mathematical schemas (and abstract ideas) were substituted for proper Concepts -- and the best that can be said for it is that there is an obscure Vorstellung of the Idea in it. (How far Hegel's Philosophy of Nature offers anything better is a topic for separate investigation. But clearly analogies from sense-experience should be avoided in our interpretation of it. So far, it is "modern."

Geometry is the perfect paradigm of synthetic method. (Hegel accepts Kant's view that it is "synthetic"; and that seems to be a viable view with respect to the space of ordinary perceptual experience). But the discovery of "irrational ratios" drives us on from the simple view that space is a passively inert receptacle. What is called the
"irrational" is actually the birth of Reason. We discover already in mathematics that the standpoint of Understanding is inadequate and must invert itself; and "common sense" cannot help mathematics (as it does the empirical sciences).

§232 The logical breakdown of geometry can be regarded as producing necessary inversion of the Understanding. The necessity of demonstration must be seen now as resulting not from an external matter of reflective awareness, but as the result of our decision. Thus we have to recognize our interpretation as voluntary; and so we make the transition to rational free will. What we seemed to find, and so took to be given, is implicitly our own free Concept -- i.e. our free activity of interpretation. We are not conscious of this (it is true only an sich). But we logically have to admit it.

§232A In his lectures Hegel gave a slightly different account of §232 than the one that I have read into it. Experience begins as simple factual necessity. The object is simply there (contingently). But when we "understand" it, it is necessary in a different way because it has become "the reasoned fact." This makes the transition from the end of §231 (rather than from §231R). The activity of interpreting and understanding is a voluntary one. The "recognition" of necessity is an act of wilful assent. When we have an explanatory interpretation of the fact that satisfies us we adopt it freely as necessary. We need the interpretation
(in many cases) for our exercise of active freedom -- but Hegel does not actually say that.

(* Willing

§233 We must remember that Hegel is offering us a Platonic theory of Truth as a value term. This (together with the SL) justifies my reading of the transition from the discovery of "irrational numbers" to the freedom of the will; and Hegel confirms it here by moving directly from the Concept of the free will to Plato's Idea of the Good. Perhaps I ought not to say "Plato's" since Hegel's concept is the human Good -- as the object of rational action -- so that it avoids at least some of Aristotle's strictures. But it is also -- as the Absolute Idea -- finally the object of contemplation, as well. In common-sense parlance it is "the meaning of Life." (Logically, this translation is confirmed by the "return of Life to itself" in the Absolute Idea.)

In its first appearance it is the subjective Idea -- or in other words, it is the practical object of all our striving. We conceive of the True as the standard that abides quite unaffected by our efforts to recognize it. But the Hegelian Truth is a Platonic standard that lies beyond the factual world (the world of existence) just as it is. We have to discover what is actual, what is working itself out beneath the veil of contingency; and this effort is inseparable from our own practical response. When we
recognize "necessity" our response can vary -- for the "necessity" of Cognition takes different shapes. The "laws of Nature" are simply the boundaries of what it makes sense to try to do. When we recognize one we abandon projects which we see to be in conflict with it; but also we use our knowledge to define the "good" that can be achieved. The Hegelian "Truth" is logically bound to transform itself into "the Good." Thus -- to take our example from one of Hegel's most noteworthy failures of insight -- Mary Wollstonecraft had the Enlightenment vision of the Kingdom of Heaven transplanted to Earth as a world of perfect partnership between the human sexes. She did not envisage (like Plato) that "marrying and giving in marriage" would become rationally irrelevant. She did not think that women should be allowed to do everything that men do (or if she dreamed of that Platonic ideal, she was prudent and sensible enough not to propose it in her publications). But she argued the cause of female education. Every human, she said, must have the best education possible for their social self-realization. This was the "Good" as it could conceivably be actual in her time. She was "the time at its best," whereas Hegel fell far short here -- though not as far as Schopenhauer, who printed as philosophical truth the sort of empirical observations that Hegel made in the lecture room. As empirical observations, Hegel's remarks were "correct" -- as George Eliot showed in *Middlemarch*. But *Middlemarch* also showed how radically "untrue" they were by the standard of
Hegelian "Truth" -- and how right Mary Wollstonecraft's argument was. ("Correct" and "right" overlap in meaning, but the connection of "correct" with "true," is different from that of "right" with "good.")

Mary Wollstonecraft knew that (after the "Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen") the subjection of women was "null and void." But she had to recognize (or "presuppose") the "independence of the object." She could only "determine the world ... already there" according to her purpose" in a written prospectus of the moral ideal. But lo and behold, when that prospectus began to be actually effective, it became increasingly apparent that the original Platonic ideal is fully realizable after all; and that ideal (which was certainly in Mary Wollstonecraft's mind, whatever she may have thought about its actual realizability) is the Hegelian "Good." (Hegel's Logic shows us that Plato, not Aristotle, is "the master of them that know." That is fairly evident from Pure Being onwards; but the doctrine of "Willing" is where it can be said to be finally "proved.")

§234 Mary Wollstonecraft's situation (her desire for a world which she "knew" to be beyond actual achievement) illustrates the contradiction involved in all finite willing. She had to accept a world in which full active equality could not even expect to be taken seriously as a project. But even when the "self-contradicting determinations of the objective world" turned themselves
round so that the Platonic ideal could be seriously proposed, the situation did not change in principle. George Eliot -- whose every written word had an "educational" purpose, and who produced in Middlemarch a supremely vivid illumination of Mary Wollstonecraft's Vindication of the Rights of Women -- was surprisingly lukewarm about the projected establishment of Girton College for Women at Cambridge. We may infer that she felt that the "enlightened" ideals of the founders were too abstract, and that (as such) they represented a threat to the ethical ideal of the Family. It is natural to suppose that she regarded motherhood (from which she was morally debarred in its natural fulfilment, by her irregular "marriage in the sight of God") as the highest vocation (or alternatively as the fundamental ground) of rational female existence. Many (beginning with Plato himself) would disagree with her about that. But even if we hold to the ideal of a "free self-definition" that rests logically on a "breach with Nature," we must recognize that George Eliot's situation as the effective stepmother of a family that was "broken" long before she arrived to put it back together, put her in a good position to perceive the new stress of "contradicting determinations" set up by the acceptance of voluntary divorce as the appropriate means for the achievement of a world of free self-definition. Since the tensions (and costs) of the stresses are bound to be different in every concrete "singular" situation, we are bound to go on
disagreeing about what "the Good" is even in theory -- quite apart from the logically necessary gap between the world of "existence" and the "actuality" that we rationally (and that means "morally") recognize as working itself out in our present world.

For the moral mind, which rationally defines its projects within the bounds of actuality -- i.e. the Mary Wollstonecraft of my image, rather than the "Utopian" William Godwin whom she married -- the realization of the Good must present itself as a project for infinite progress. Hegel does not refer to the fact that it is also a necessary and endless conflict of ideal programs (though George Eliot's attitude to Girton College shows why that is so). For the rationally moral subject it is axiomatic that all conflicts can be rationally mediated and reconciled. In Hegel's own Real Philosophy the Good is seen to be actually realized in "the State" -- which provides in its Constitution, the universally recognized and accepted means for the composition and reconciliation of conflicts. So it is only "progress" that is a "bad infinite." Hegel can afford to dismiss all cosmopolitan practical projects as Utopian. That assumption was challenged by the "Communist Manifesto"; and in spite of the failure of that cosmopolitan project in practice (overthrown already by "patriotism" in 1914, and shamefully degraded into the most transparent hypocrisy by the history of "international Socialism" after 1917) the self-destruction (and even more shameful self-
degradation) of nationalism since 1914 has shown that the cosmopolitanism of Marx and Engels was conceptually sound for the post-Hegelian world. (Our task now is to create the objective institutions that can effectively mediate and reconcile the ethical conflicts between cultures.)

It is the system of objective institutions which makes rational interaction possible that we must fix our eyes upon in order to recognize that the "infinite progress" does not turn "the Good" into a Utopian ideal ("a mere ought"). When someone successfully does something "good" subjectivity is sublated; and when the achievement is recognized as part of the permanent fabric of our lives, then the whole antithesis of the subjective and the objective is sublated as such. The achievement sublates "subjectivity in general." The achievement is "objective" for all of us (like Mary Wollstonecraft's Vindication). But it is "objective" in a new way, since it is also universally subjective. That is to say it is absolute. Logical consciousness goes up to a new level in this new universal subjectivity. But, of course, universal subjectivity has been the standpoint of logical thinking all along. So now, in this final comprehensive grasp of the concept of Cognition, logical thinking has itself as its own object. There is no distinction between the two "subjectivities." Pure thinking can now "return into itself." It can recollect everything that has taken place (or that it has done) since the beginning. But what is most important here is the
recollection of the whole world of action; the thinker recognizes her own thought as the vivifying power -- the life -- of the whole institutional structure that is the reality of the Good. This is the important practical sense of the "recollection of the presupposition of the theoretical attitude." But, of course, the general meaning of that general recollection is the recognition that our world is a result of our communal interpretive activity.

§234A Hegel's lecture commentary is for the most part easy to follow; it requires little further explanation. Kant internalizes the "contradicting determinations of the objective world" -- and the results can be seen in the cycle of the "Moral World View" [Phenomenology §§ 599-615]. The self-contradiction involved in an achieved Kingdom of Ends should teach us that the world in which rational moral consciousness exists already is "the way it ought to be" (philosophically, or at the level of absolute knowing). Once we have set up the second formula of the Categorical Imperative as our moral ideal, there is no way in which the world can in principle become "better." We can -- indeed we must -- work for the elimination (or amelioration) of this or that evil. But our own efforts will both generate, and bring to light, other evils; and we are obligated to respect the very freedom that produces the terrible evils of our natural evolution in ever new and more terrible forms. Our vocation is not to be happy, but to know. Hegel's
philosophy shows us the situation that we are (and absolutely have to be) in as free self-knowledge.

Not having "Flanders fields," or Dresden, Auschwitz and Nagasaki to contemplate, Hegel is more comfortably complacent about the human situation than we can afford to be. When one can believe simply in the "infinite progress" it is easy enough to agree with Lessing's choice. But when the massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day has made its permanent presence evident on the world-cultural level, it is hardly prudent to agree that only the surface of the world vanishes in our advance to the Absolute Idea. "Religious consciousness" nowadays can scarcely agree that "God's in his Heaven" (as it ought to). But it will quite properly deny that the world is "governed by Divine Providence." But no one can logically reject what Hegel says about "the agreement between is and ought" -- only the progression is an advance in human self-understanding, not in "happiness."

§235 The Absolute Idea is "the truth of the Good" -- or the unified comprehension of the theoretical and the practical Idea. Whatever new depths of inhumanity the conflict of cultures may generate in our world, Hegel's recognition that the theoretical Idea is necessarily practical, and that the seeming logical independence of is and ought is an illusion is a permanent logical achievement -- and one that will actually assert itself against all attempts to reestablish the Humean division, and to reduce theoretical truth to a
tool for the free disposition of utilitarian Reason. Life both is, and is not, free to go any and every way that it chooses in its self-realization. Spontaneously (or "naturally") it is free -- and in that perspective Hume's view that one can never derive "ought" from "is" is correct. But we can now see that if we do not behave morally (as a universe of ethical cultures regulated by the ideal of "respect for humanity") we shall certainly destroy ourselves in the end -- and that is a truth from which Hume would agree that an ought follows -- we ought to avoid that conclusion of our human affairs.

[III: The Concept: C: The Idea]

C: The Absolute Idea

§236 What we have reached is the logical Concept of the Absolute Idea. Action makes the subjective idea objective. Finite action has to presuppose the world from which it starts, but comprehension of the self-actualizing process of the Good (i.e. the rational, or "moral," object of action) leads us to the recognition that the whole process of world-interpretation is the activity of free Reason. This is the Concept of the Absolute Idea. We are now doing our duty as philosophers by reflecting on our own thinking activity in the formulation of this Concept. Hegel describes our recollective activity in terms that recall Aristotle's definition of the life of God (cf. the Addition following).
He will quote Aristotle's Greek at the end of the *Encyclopedia*. There "the absolute truth" seems logically to comprehend all material truth; so only a transcendent knower could have that self-knowledge -- and Hegel appears to agree with Aquinas that "in knowing Himself God knows everything else." But here he seems closer to my reading of Aristotle.

As the fulfilled concept of "pure thinking" what "God" thinks (and we think with him) is what it means for the subject to be a rational self, and for the object to be truly human "knowledge." Any and all truth only is "absolute truth" upon the condition that it is thought within this conceptual frame of "absolute pure thinking."

In order to know (in this sense) that this Concept is "the absolute truth and all truth" I do not have to know anything particular (just as Aristotle's God does not have to know our world of change). Indeed, as a careful student of the Logic, I now know how and why it is logically impossible for me to "know everything." That Vorstellung violates the circular identity of theory and practice, the identity indifference of "is" and "ought." So the Thomist-Aristotelian interpretation of the quotation at the end of the *Encyclopedia* refutes itself automatically, as a philosophical (conceptually vicious) contradiction; and the one offered here remains as the only one possible. Speculative logic -- speculative philosophy generally -- is the human Incarnation of God; and God has no knowledge except his incarnate knowledge.
§236A  The Absolute Idea is the unity of the Idea of Life with the fully completed Idea of Cognition. The antithesis of theoretical and practical cognition (or of Life and intellectual awareness generally) is the Gestalt of "Difference" in the Idea. But the full self-conscious comprehension of what Cognition is produces (first) the circular concept of Cognition, and secondly the recognized identity of knowing and being (i.e. living). Philosophical comprehension of our life is the "being in and for itself" of the Idea. The Idea is now "in and for itself" without being "above and beyond" the thinking mind -- as it is in all ordinary religious consciousness. It is quite clear here that what Aristotle calls God's thinking, is (for Hegel) just our own -- fully self-conscious or "speculative" -- philosophical thinking.

§237  This section is a summing up; and I can find nothing new to say about there being "no presupposing" in the Idea; or about there being no "passing over" (because theory and practice, philosophy and life, have become circular). The "fluid transparency" of all determinacy cannot be commented on, because this is precisely the intuitive character of logic itself. We see through the case (or the formula) to the universal necessity it exhibits. Our Logic is now complete. We know what the fulfilled Truth of Pure Being is; so everything ought to have become transparent. It is perhaps worth pointing out that "the distinguishing of
itself from itself" implies the positing of a community of thinkers who know that they both are and are not distinct, because they are universally human. The Identity of the Absolute Idea is their identity as well as the identity of the Logic as a "totality." Their identity belongs -- at least on its contingently actual side -- to Real Philosophy not Logic. But since logic itself is not really intuitive, and the Idea is never perfectly transparent, this distinction is somewhat artificial. It is the process of communication about philosophical logic that is truly "absolute"; and that is because it is actual (i.e., real).

The only remaining content for the Absolute Idea (apart from its fulfilled Being as the recollected totality of the Logic as a system) is the method of thinking that unifies the system itself into a "totality." This then is what the Absolute Idea is (as a logically distinct moment); and we can see -- "transparently" I hope -- that the "process of philosophical communication" of which I have spoken is properly just its real side.

§237A As a formal "result" separate from the process that has produced it, the Idea is quite unsatisfactory and empty. Discourse about it soon becomes merely edifying (especially "theological" discourse about it). The whole system of speculative philosophy -- as an interpretation of human life universally -- is its proper content; and beyond that, there is our actual day-to-day and hour-to-hour, lives of thought
and action for which it provides the categorial structure (unconscious or conscious -- and conscious in many different modes). The Hegelian Idea expresses the philosophical meaning of the Christian Creed; it explains what "God created the world out of nothing" and "God became Man" mean (i.e., all that they can comprehensively mean). And like the Creed (learned as a child by rote) it should reach out and inform every aspect of our lives. For the serious-minded child this happens gradually; but philosophy is not for children. When we study Hegel's philosophy we ought to know what we are doing; yet (to me at least) it is quite striking how little charity there often is in what "Hegelians" say and write about non-Hegelian philosophers. (But, of course, there are but few confidently logical Hegelians left now; and as soon as the confidence of Reason is lost, "philosophy" of a Hegelian stripe turns into a rhetorical maelstrom of power-hungry ideologies -- whereas the very first lesson a "true" Hegelian must learn is that philosophy is not about power.

The philosophical perspective is that "Truth is the whole"; and we must remember that this truth is not a "whole" of empirical knowledge, but a value-concept of the Platonic type. We are not required to "know everything," but to see our lives and our world comprehensively as a whole in the light of our philosophical understanding of what it means to be concretely rational -- i.e., to be fully human -- or, as Locke would have written it, "humane."
§238  Hence there is no harm in our leaving the account of philosophical method as bare and stark as Hegel has made it here. We can learn a bit more about it from the Science of Logic. But we shall be well advised to treat it as a review of the system we have gone through, and to look only for what justifications Hegel can now offer for what he has done. We must begin (naturally) with the beginning. Pure Being is first because it is what "immediately is." More empirically the immediate is Dasein; but that is antithetically objective (the world) and subjective (the mind). We went all the way through the Phenomenology to purify Dasein into the "pure being" of actual philosophical thinking. We can see now that it is the "self-determining of thought" which makes it identical with Nothing; and that identity (in absolute difference) is what drives the dialectic movement of the Logic onwards. The Concept divides into the Subject that judges and the Object that is judged (the antithesis of Cognition and Will is ultimately involved here, although there is "judgment" in both ranges, with subject and object in opposite roles). What happens to Being in this logical Judgment is its evolution into the self-conscious Concept. But it was already the Concept that divided in Judgment; and now that we have reached its fulfilled self-awareness, we shall see the existence of Consciousness -- the fact that there is a natural world for interpretation -- interpreted logically as the resolve of the Idea to "let itself go" into free and independent
otherness as Nature. This is the conscious decision to make the "presupposition" and to seek to establish theoretical science. The Concept that is its own negation, because it is "not yet posited as Concept," is "objectivity generally." It is the topic not only of the Logic of Being (though that is what Hegel explicitly refers to) but of the Logic of Essence. Hegel confines us to the logic of Being here, because this section is about the "beginning." Essence belongs to the "progression" in the next section. The subject (as Being-for-itself) will actually be involved there.

§238R As I said already, the "beginning" is empirically Dasein. The beginning of all logical effort comes with the beginning of all our experience in the Sense-Certainty of the Phenomenology. To arrive at "Pure Being" requires an effort of thought (and one that took time, as the history of the Presocratics shows). As far as I can understand this Remark, that effort was the beginning of "synthesis." It is the identification of Lockean "simple ideas" that is the beginning of analysis (which operates in finite cognition). But speculative philosophy begins in a way that is both analytic and synthetic at once. (Hegel will explain this in his lecture comment. But the uniting of analysis and synthesis never becomes very clear.)

§238A Philosophical method, being circular, is both analytic and synthetic together; but not alternately as if they were
halves of its circle. It is analytic in that it observes the Concept as an object; and synthetic insofar as it is the Concept, or insofar as it is objectively subjective. This is the sense in which it "sublates subjectivity in general" (§234). As Hegel says this involves "holding off our own bright ideas from itself." (He did not succeed in doing this with respect to female education, and my appeal to Mary Wollstonecraft shows that I am not just indulging my own "particular opinions" about that.)

§239 Since "the beginning ... is taken from intuition and perception" it comprehends the Phenomenology. It reaches its perfected shape in the "Pure Being" with which we began here. The "progression" is every step of the dialectical movement from there onwards. But the complete "positing of the Idea" as a judgment is in Teleology where Being and Essence change places in the circle of the "infinite" purpose of human rational freedom. Hegel's description of this "progress" applies to the operation of the dialectic in the Phenomenology too, however. As the implicit Concept "the immediate Universal [which appears first as Sense-Certainty] is the Dialectic of downgrading upon its self its immediacy and universality to a moment." This happens between Being and Essence in the Logic; but it happens more rapidly and often in the movement of "Consciousness." It seems to be the genesis of rational Self-Consciousness that Hegel is describing here: "the negative of the beginning"
(i.e. of the sense-world as a whole) is posited in its determinacy "for one." This is the beginning of Essence (since it is the "moment of reflection"). But it is also the "determinate negation" of the Unhappy Consciousness in Reason. Reason knows itself to be "the one" for whom the freedom of self-consciousness has been "reflected" into "the Unchangeable" (and "the Unchangeable" is the "Infinite" of Understanding which through that reflection became a self).

Both in the **Phenomenology** and in the **Logic** the progression is "analytic" because it is logically necessary; and "synthetic" because we learn something new. (The best illustration in "experience" is the movement from "Perception" to "Understanding." But later movements illustrate clearly how the logical necessity is different from empirical necessity -- if the reader can be brought to see the necessity at all.

§239A Hegel seems to have attended to the "science of experience" in his lectures too. For the Addition contrasts the movement of immediate consciousness (which begins from the sensible awareness of nature and moves away towards pure Logic) with the movement of Logic (which moves from the pure concept of "Being" back to the positing of Nature).

§240 This speaks explicitly of the progression in the **Logic**; and it only repeats what we had to be told in a preparatory way at the beginning of Being, Essence and Concept. In Being there is a rolling over to a new concept; in Essence
there is the becoming explicit of an implicit opposition; and in Concept there is the continuous development of the distinct singular into its identity with the Universal, and then the movement back to distinction.

§241 The movement of Essence has to be looked at in more detail because the Idea can be seen to be implicit in it. "Shining" is Hegel's metaphor for the explicit implication of opposition. "Passing over" (or my "rolling-over") is a metaphor for the emergence of logical distinction. The development of Essence makes a circle back to Being. This circle is necessary because they are distinct (Essence is the sphere of Thought -- but both spheres are logically generated by Pure Thinking, so the identity is logically implicit.) Essence must move back, because when Being consummates itself as the world of Measures it passes over finally into Essence. But it is a distinct realm; and essence must shine back into it in order that its distinctness (and that of Essence) may be fully validated. This is what it does in the Concept of Actuality; and the famous "rationality of the actual" is the implicit presence of the Idea. (We must somehow be able to discover the Idea in the world of actuality, if it is not to be a Utopian dream. Hegel shifted his ground in controversy about whether Plato discovered it validly or not.)

§242 The Idea exists as a Judgment when we are faced with the reality of experience as the contradiction of Infinite
Teleology. Our world is one of bad infinite progress because we must go round the circle of the True and the Good for ever; and we don't necessarily make any "progress" except in knowledge. (We shall keep on doing that as long as we can go on recollecting the past according to the regulative ideal of objective recognition in charity. That is why 1984 was so powerfully alarming.) This brings us to the third moment of absolute method: the End.

We actually recognize the Idea in actuality in three ways: Art, Religion, and Philosophy. But in the Logic, where conceptual knowledge is our concern, and the scientific positing of Nature as a cognitive project is our next logical step, we can only consider Philosophy. But we should keep the "Science of Experience" in our mind in order to interpret what Hegel says. In the End "what differentiates itself [ist differente] is posited as what it is in the concept." "What differentiates itself" is rational consciousness, the negative of sense-consciousness, which is "what is first." But rational consciousness is identical with sense-consciousness -- sense-consciousness is its being. So it is "the negativity of its own self"; and as speculative or philosophical awareness it is "the unity within which both these first are as ideal." Both of them are empirically "first." They are there separately (Being and Thought, or Essence) and we distinguish them. But we have now understood their identity; we know that what is logically "first" is the activity of rational
interpretation. Our world as produced by this logical activity is the "realized Concept"; and the "realized Concept," as what is logically first, is the Idea. Comprehending the Idea is turning everything round so that the interpretive activity of Reason is recognized as the comprehensive circle of the whole process. Thus the semblance of an immediate beginning (with sense-consciousness) vanishes. "The Idea" is the total process.

§243 The method, being the circle of the three moments (beginning, progression, and final self-comprehension) is the "soul" (the Aristotelian self-realizing form) and the Concept (the interpreting activity) of the content (the world that is understood). It is distinct from the Concept, only as long as the Concept is not comprehended as Idea -- i.e., as long as it does not fully comprehend itself. For the realm of Being is the whole Concept as a content distinct from the method; and so is the realm of Essence (Thought). The realm of the Concept is distinct from them both -- being the realm of thinking as active interpreting -- until it reaches its climax in the Idea, where the recognition of it as the logical life and moving force of the whole overturns the presupposition that Being is first. The motion of Logic itself constitutes the philosophical thinker as "the simple being-for-itself of the Idea." The philosophical interpreter, the logical interpreter of life as a scientific whole, is the "concept of the Idea." Now
(s)he must show us how to interpret the world from this absolute (philosophically comprehensive) standpoint. The world of experience is the real actuality (or content) of the Idea.

§244 Obviously the logical interpreting of the world must begin where consciousness itself begins -- but conceptually. Sense-consciousness begins with the experience of being engulfed as a finite moment in the infinity of the world-process. But it logically constructs that "infinity" as the Infinite of Understanding -- or the order of Nature. This is the Concept of Reality that the free subjective Concept of the Idea-for-itself necessarily has. (We couldn't have started upon the Logic of Being, without it -- it is the an sich from which everything evolves analytically.) But now we are ready to unfold it in its logical order. This scientific interpreting is not the self-intuiting of a logical necessity -- as it was for us when we began the logic of Being). We have now comprehensively understood our freedom as interpreters. Thus we are under no logical obligation to pass over to Nature as the world of Being; and our life-world does not "shine back" to us as the object upon which we must finitely reflect. Our proper standpoint is that we freely desire to know. So we must make the presupposition freely that our sense-experience is experience of an objective order. As sensing organisms, Nature comprehends us; but as free intelligences we resolve
to let Nature go. We freely recognize its independence in order to comprehend it scientifically.

We should be in no position to do this if we did not have the "Science of experience" behind us. The Stoics tried to do it without that necessary experience. They were the first to recognize the radical freedom of thought. They knew that they need not "pass over" to Nature. But the Sceptics showed them that once they had "let Nature go" they were caught in "finite reflexion." Life "shines back" to everyone differently. So there is no way of establishing where to start.

Hegel's philosophy escapes from the sceptical bind because it does not need an empirical foundation. It is based on the circularity of the conceptual process of interpretation. With the "Science of experience" to set us free from the sceptical problem, we can start with the concept of "Nature." But that means that we have to reconstruct our "real philosophy" continually, because the reconstruction happens in the movement of scientific inquiry itself. As philosophers we must build the conceptual bridge between our life as the circle of the True and the Good and the Concept which scientific Understanding constructs from the finite experience of scientific inquiry. Thus (to go no further than the beginning) our philosophical theory of space and time will be different from Hegel's.
§244A  The editors found nothing to help with the transition in their texts. Hegel chose simply to look back, and to insist that we have made a circle from "pure Being" to the "Idea as Being." In his (§19) "Preliminary Conception" Hegel told us that Logic is the "Science of the pure Idea." But nowhere in his Introduction did we get any inkling -- except for theological ones -- of what the "Idea" is. So that formal circle is not very important to us now. The circle from abstract being to the "Idea as being" is more important, because it is "methodic philosophical thinking" that is "the Concept of the Idea." And that Concept which is real "for itself" as the philosopher is thus the first being of the Idea. When we "let Nature go" it is our own being that we are knowingly and resolutely releasing. Real Philosophy will thus be our taking back to ourselves in thought of the knowledge that properly belongs to us. The self-knowing of the Idea -- for which Aristotle's words are used at the climax -- is our self-comprehension of what our life is all about.