These three are grouped together here as representatives of what we may call the “general cultural” wing of the Sophistic movement. Prodikos belongs with the professional rhetoricians as a professed expert on the “correctness of names”; and Kritias, on the other side, is not a professional Sophist at all, but an Athenian gentleman, and political leader who was much interested in (and influenced by) the movement. But they share an interest in the enormous range and variety of human culture and the possible topics of human learning. They follow the lead that Protagoras gave in suggesting that education is the distinguishing mark of civilized human culture, and that the educated person ought to study how human culture itself develops.

1. Life and Work of Prodikos

Prodikos was born in Iulis on the small island of Ceos, near Athens (84 A 1, A 2, A 4, A 7). He was probably not older than Sokrates; and he may have been a few years younger. He was an accomplished orator, and he served sometimes as the official emissary of his city to Athens (A 3). In Athens he built up quite a following for his lectures and courses of instruction. He had a deep voice; and he was something of a hypochondriac, or at least he was careful of his health. Plato gives us a memorable portrait of him, discoursing to his disciples at the house of Kallias, while still in bed (A 2 — Protagoras 315cd). He was especially interested in precise distinctions in verbal usage; and
Plato makes fun of this (A 13-15). But Plato’s Sokrates, with his own interest in definitions, admits that he has attended one of the display lectures that Prodikos gave (A 11); and he says that he has sometimes sent students to Prodikos, whom he could not himself help (A 3a — *Theaetetus* 151b). This is largely ironic; but there is probably a kernel of factual truth in it.

Prodikos himself made something of a joke about the contrast between his serious instruction and his popular displays, for Aristotle tells us that he used to speak of “slipping in a bit of the fifty-drachma when the audience begins to nod” (A 12 — *Rhetoric* 1415 b 12). Plato lets Sokrates play with this joke; but the historical Sokrates — who had not discovered the “theory of Forms” — was probably more seriously interested in (and impressed by) Prodikos’ work on the precise meaning and use of words, than the Platonic “Sokrates” appears to be. They shared a common interest in ethics, and in the choice of the good life; and Aristophanes jokingly accused Prodikos of “corrupting the young” (A 5).

Sokrates’ friend Damon was a “follower” of Prodikos (A 17); and Damon was the “teacher” of Perikles. Even if Sokrates was not one of the paying pupils, Prodikos had some notable patrons who could well afford to pay. In Plato’s picture, we see him at the house of the rich Kallias (A 2); Theramenes, one of the principal leaders in the abortive revolution of the Four Hundred (412/11 BCE) is mentioned as a “pupil” (A 4b, A 6). Xenophon may have studied with him (A 1a). Euripides went to his lectures (A 8); and so did Isocrates (A 7). Thucydides also was interested in his studies of language (A 9). Prodikos was still alive at the time of Sokrates’ Defence in 399 BCE (A 4). We do not know how long after that he died.

Plato lays all the emphasis upon Prodikos’ work regarding the “correctness of names.” But I have put him here with the general theorists of culture, because I believe that the evolution of human culture was the real heart of his concern, and that it provided the conceptual context for his rhetorical and linguistic teachings. The hypothesis that best explains the confused tradition which makes Prodikos a theologian, a natural philosopher, and a writer on human nature is that his major work on *The Seasons* (B 1) drew a parallel between the Spring, Summer-Autumn, and Winter of the human
individual, and the corresponding stages of human culture. It was Hesiod who first made a social-cultural interpretation of the Seasons. He called them *Eunomia* (Good Custom), *Dike* (Right Judgment) and *Eirene* (Peace), and made them children of Themis (*Theogony* 901-2). Prodikos followed the model set by Protagoras in expounding the poetic authority that was familiar to everyone.

Thus the famous “choice of Herakles” comes at the end of “Spring” for the human (male) individual; and the invention of the Gods belongs to the social springtime of human culture. These two pieces from the establishment of *Eunomia* in “Spring” are almost all that we have of the *Seasons*. The “Choice of Herakles” attracted a lot of attention in the ancient world. To us — to me, at least — it is a not very exciting piece of moral rhetoric; a little more interesting, perhaps, than Fordyce’s Sermons, which Mr. Collins was willing to read to the Bennet family in *Pride and Prejudice*. Xenophon — who would approve of Mr. Collins — reports the “Choice” at some length. The young Herakles, arriving at manhood, is presented with a choice of lives by two divinely tall ladies, Virtue and Vice. Vice hurries to get in first. She offers Herakles “every pleasure” and no troubles. He will not have to fight or to work. Her name, she says, is really Happiness, but her enemies call her Vice. Then Virtue (who knows how Herakles has been brought up so far) tells him that no real goods are achieved without struggle and doing good to others. The life of vicious pleasure is “to eat before hunger and drink before thirst.” Vice is immortal, but she is “denied the company of the Gods.” She is never praised (to be praised is the greatest pleasure of all) and never has the satisfaction of looking on her own completed work — unlike Virtue, who is the “companion of the Gods” (B 2).

We know what choice Herakles made, for he became the greatest benefactor of humankind; and when Prodikos turned to the heroic Heraklean springtime of human culture, he produced the theory that “the Gods” were originally just the greatest gifts of Nature itself, discovered by human ingenuity. Demeter was the grain, and Dionysos was the vine. Sometimes, as in the case of Herakles himself, it was the heroic discoverer who was deified; sometimes, again, as in the cases of
Sun, Moon, rivers and springs, no particular human ingenuity was involved; but anything recognized as an important benefit to human life became a god (84 B 5).

To some of Prodikos’ readers, both among the pious and among the sceptics, this “naturalism” appeared to be “atheism.” It must be conceded that he was a rationalist about religion; but he was not deliberately undermining it. He was only trying to understand it, and to see why it was socially necessary. He was operating in the tradition established by Protagoras (in his Myth). But Prodikos was not as sceptical as Protagoras. When he said that “Fire is the best spice” (as I am sure he did, although Diels classified the fragment as “false”) he was pointing to the significance of cooking as an advance in human culture. He probably said that “milk is best if one sucks it directly from the teat” also; and that is philosophically significant because it indicates that in his eyes, not every cultural development is an advance. “Sucking from the teat” (like the baby at the breast) would have been the way of primitive culture (B 10, B 11).iv

Prodikos apparently called the merely rhetorical Sophists (of the school of Gorgias, and perhaps of Thrasymachos) “frontiersmen between philosophy and politics” (B 6). He wanted to be regarded as a philosopher himself; so it is a mistake to think of him simply as a rhetorical expert on semantics. Even in his semantic studies he shows his interest in psychology and ethics. For instance, he declared that “desire doubled is love, and love doubled is madness,” which is a psychological thesis, and not a clarification of correct usage; and his attempt to distinguish types of enjoyment — which Aristotle thought was quite fallacious — should be viewed in the same context (B 7; A 19).

If we look at his semantic studies in this light we can see that Alexander of Aphrodisias was on the right track about the distinction between kinds of enjoyment. Prodikos thought that the vocabulary of psychological and ethical words could be made to provide a map of human nature. This may have been absurdly optimistic, but it was not trivially stupid (as Alexander thought). Prodikos’ program was an anticipation of Plato’s theory of Forms. What it lacks still — as far as we can see — is a method of clarifying concepts so as to discover their ontological base. But the “ideal history of culture” was an important first step in that direction.
The Reign of the Whirlwind

From the one case discussed by Galen, we can confirm that Prodikos was interested in human affairs generally, and not just in our psychological vocabulary. He wanted to reform the medical use of the word *phlegm*, in terms of its macrocosmic origin (84 B 4 — *phlegma* is “flame”). This illustrates the connection between Prodikos’ “natural philosophy” and his semantic theory, and shows how etymology guided his doctrine of the “correctness of names.” The rest of our evidence has been funnelled through the ethical interests of “Sokrates.” But we can see why the ethical context, though not comprehensive, was at least central for Prodikos. So the measure of distortion is not great.

In the *Meno*, Sokrates identifies the “end” (or finish) with the “limit” and the “last”; and in doing so, he remarks that Prodikos might disagree. This probably shows Plato’s consciousness that the cultural-historical approach of Prodikos will produce different results from his own. In the *Euthydemos*, on the other hand, there is a recognized community between them (when faced by the Eristics) in distinguishing the use of “to learn” meaning “to understand,” from “to learn” meaning “to gain information” (84 A 15, 16).

In the *Laches* “Sokrates” directly takes over from Prodikos the distinction between being (emotionally) “fearless” or “bold” and being (intelligently) “brave.” In some of his other references to Prodikos’ doctrine, he is neutral (or “impartial” as distinct from “equal or undecided,” to quote one of the distinctions employed in the *Protagoras*). But generally “Sokrates” is in agreement. The distinction between “to debate” and “to dispute” is a crucially important criticism of the Protagorean conception of intellectual life as linguistic wrestling (the object of “debate” being not to win, but to discover the truth by collaboration). Similarly, Plato clearly thinks that the distinction between “esteem” (an inner attitude) and “praise” (an outer expression that may be faked) is valuable; so is that between (mental) satisfaction and (physical) pleasure. The Platonic importance of the distinctions between “to will” and “to wish” or “to become” and “to be” — which come up later — needs no underlining. But Prodikos did not anticipate what Plato would do with “being and becoming” (84 A 13-14, A 17).
The distinction between “doing” and “making” was already fairly clear in ordinary Greek. But Prodikos wanted to reform and improve ordinary usage. He wanted to reserve the name “works” (erga) for things that were well done. The words poiein and poiema (our “poem”) should be used without this evaluative implication. Here Plato was probably more neutral — though the distinction fits in with his own view of ordinary poetry and poets! (A 18).

In dealing with this theory we are forced to recognize that every natural language is different, and hence that perfect “correctness of names” is impossible in translation. The readiness of Prodikos to make his human map in Greek, reflects his conviction that his Ionic Greek was the most perfectly developed (and civilized) language in the world. (We shall see quite a different attitude in the work of Kritias.)

2. Life and Work of Hippias

Hippias came from Elis — the mainland city that hosted the Olympic Games. The Protagoras clearly implies that he was young enough to be Protagoras’ son; and the Apology mentions him as still living and active in 399 BCE (80 A 5; 86 A 4). We can take it that he was certainly not older than Sokrates (and probably a little younger). Like Prodikos, he was, first of all, an important figure at home in his native city. He served as ambassador for Elis (A 2, 5; A 6); but he also used the Olympic Games as a means for becoming universally known in the Greek world. He was a polymath, with a truly remarkable memory (A 2, A 5a, A 12); he was also clever with his hands; and he put on a display at Olympia, exhibiting his many talents and his range of works (A 12). All of the Sophists were great self-advertisers; but if we can believe Plato, Hippias was probably the biggest boaster of them all. He boasted about the amounts of money that he made (A 7; A 2, 5-6); and, like Gorgias, he offered to answer any question (A 8). But unlike Gorgias, he thought that there were right answers, and that he knew them.
He developed his memory by training and technique; and he taught the technique — whatever it was — to others (A 5a, A 12); he was learned in many areas, and he did some valuable research. Thus, he compiled the first list of Olympic victors (B 3); and he was by way of being the first historian of philosophy (and the source of our most reliable information about Thales — B 7, B 12).

He learned a mass of detailed information, about Greek myths, Greek tribes, and family-genealogies (A 11, B 2, B 6, B 8, B 14-15). This made him very welcome at Sparta — and he was the only Sophist who was welcomed there (A 6, A 11; cf. B 11). He also became an expert scholar of Homer — though not a rhapsode (A 10, B 9, B 18). And finally, he did some quite distinguished work in mathematics — being credited with the discovery of the quadratrix, a construction that can be employed for the trisection of an angle; and he studied astronomy (B 21).

None of this qualifies Hippias for inclusion in a history of philosophy (though Plato would count his mathematical work as a qualification). Plato makes Protagoras offer him as a rival model of the professional Sophist — and Protagoras specifically mentions arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music. Hippias is answering questions about astronomy when we first observe him (Protagoras 315bc, 318de). Plato’s marked interest in him would be something of a puzzle, were it not for his concern with mathematics and astronomy. But Demokritos (who was himself a polymath) may have been thinking of Hippias when he criticizes polymathy (68 B 65); and Plato confirms his verdict (as far as Hippias is concerned).

It is clear that Hippias taught both “political wisdom” and political-legal rhetoric (A 14). But there is not a lot of evidence about the content of his teaching. He wrote a Trojan Dialogue that was clearly intended to outdo Prodikos’ Choice of Herakles. The wise old Greek Nestor describes for the young Neoptolemos the pursuits by which a young man can gain a good reputation. Hippias gave this “display” at Olympia, at Sparta, and again at Athens. But Xenophon clearly admired the Choice of Herakles more; and he was probably right (A 2, A 9, A 10).
Apart from this lost “display” we have a couple of remarks preserved by Plutarch from a speech by Hippias on “Slander.” This began with the claim “Slander is a terrible thing, because there is no legal redress, as there is against thieves; yet slanderers steal one’s most valuable possession, namely friendship. So violence is not so unjust as slander, because it is not concealed” (B 17). According to Hippias there were two kinds of envy. It was only just to begrudge honor given to bad men; but unjust to begrudge it to the good. “The envious have double distress. They are vexed by their own ills, as others are; but also by the goods of others” (B 16).

Hippias was almost certainly a PanHellenist, and probably a “democratic contract” theorist in political theory. The one place in our records where he says something philosophically adventurous is in the speech that Plato gives him in the Protagoras. Here he claims that the whole assembled company (being from several cities, but all Greeks) are “kinsmen, relatives and fellow-citizens by nature, not by convention.” “Convention,” he says, “is a tyrant over men, and constrains them against nature in many ways.” The rest of the speech is flattering to the host Kallias, and to Protagoras and Sokrates (to persuade them to compromise about their discussion-procedure). But this view of nature and convention coheres with what Hippias says to Sokrates elsewhere about how he could educate the Spartans, only their customs will not allow it (A 11); and the language of blood relationship connects with his interest in Greek tribes and traditions.

About the “tyranny” of convention, as in his interest in mathematics, astronomy and music, Hippias anticipates one of Plato’s fundamental positions. But he seems not to have been very seriously committed about it. For in Xenophon (A 14) we find him agreeing that justice is identical with obedience to law (i.e. convention). Plato himself seems to want to show that Hippias is involved in a dialectical contradiction (without being concerned to resolve it). Xenophon has probably just borrowed the side that he agrees with from Plato’s Hippias Major.

The claim of Hippias about the community of human nature, had (already?) been made by Antiphon (and by Demokritos). None of them drew the radical conclusion stated later by a follower of Gorgias (Alkidamas): “God has set all men free; and nature has made no man a slave.” This was
in a speech supposedly addressed to the Spartans, with reference to the liberation of long-enslaved Messene. The Spartans would have driven Hippias out (or worse) if he had said anything like that — though the Messenians were his blood-relations too, and they had once been free Greek citizens. But the truth seems to be that Hippias did not have the urge to be a systematic thinker; he was only a highly intelligent eclectic. In words of his own (quoted by Clement of Alexandria) “Some of these things may have been said by Orpheus, some by Musaeos briefly in various places, some by Hesiod and Homer, some by other poets, others in prose works of Greek and non-Greek writers; but by putting together the most significant and kindred material from all these sources, I shall make this piece both new and varied” (B 6).

3. Life and Work of Kritias

In his Lives of the Sophists Philostratos speaks of Kritias as a Sophist (88 A 1). But this is inaccurate to the point of insult, because Kritias never taught anyone anything, still less took money for it. He was an Athenian of noble birth, and a political leader of considerable importance. He was the cousin of Plato’s mother, and her brother Charmides (Plato’s uncle) was his ward (A 2-3). He was some years younger than Sokrates (though we don’t know by how much); and he associated with him. In Athenian politics he certainly began as a would-be reformer of the democracy (A 10) — like Theramenes and Antiphon in the abortive revolution of the Four Hundred (412/11). He regarded the War with Sparta as a disastrous error, and would have liked to bring about a peace settlement. In the crisis at the end of the War, he became one of the leaders of a radically tyrannical government called “the Thirty.” His old friend Theramenes, among others, was executed for resistance to the Thirty; and Sokrates himself might have met with the same fate, for non-collaboration, if the government had not been overthrown quite rapidly. Kritias died fighting against the forces of the insurgent democrats in 403. He was then (probably) in his fifties (A 1, A 3, A 6-7, A 9, A 11-13).
After his death Kritias became the best-hated man (next to Alcibiades perhaps) in the Athenian political tradition. Philostratos’ account is full of the sort of things that were said. He is surely right, that Kritias was not taken seriously as a philosopher after his death because of his record in the last year of his life. The most generous verdict was that he was “a layman among philosophers, a philosopher among laymen” (A 1). But Plato presents him always in a friendly light; and Aristotle names Charicles as the real leader of the Thirty. Aristotle remarks in the Rhetoric that if you want to praise Kritias, you must recount his good deeds, because they are forgotten (A 14). Both Plato and Aristotle take the view that a good man made a disastrous mistake. Xenophon (who must have known Kritias) adopts the conventional view that you know men by their fruits (A 4). But Aristotle was right: Kritias was a better man — and a better thinker — than the conventional verdict allows.

As a known enemy of the democracy and the War, he was exiled between the two revolutions; and he went to Thessaly, where he probably associated with Gorgias (A 1, A 4). He returned home only after the War ended with the defeat of Athens. He belongs to the Protagorean wing of the Sophistic movement (rather than to the pure rhetoricians); but we can perhaps see the influence of Gorgias’ doctrine of the primacy of language, in his view that the Gods were originally invented by cunning political leaders, as a method of maintaining the obedience of the ordinary uneducated masses.

This hypothesis was put forward in a satyr play (the Sisyphos). The whole quartet (three tragedies and the satyr-play) are ascribed sometimes to Euripides, and sometimes to Kritias. Kritias did write quite a lot of poetry; and some kind of collaboration with Euripides is quite possible in this instance. There is no reason to doubt that the ideas in the Sisyphos speech (at least) came from Kritias (B 25).

The argument of this speech reads like a brutally frank version of Protagoras’ myth. In the state of nature, before civilization dawned, there was only the “law of the stronger.” Then communities established the life-and-death authority of conventional justice. But crimes continued
under cover. So some wise and clever man invented the fear of the Gods. Actually only one God is described — and he sounds very much like the God of Xenophanes (but no doubt it is Anaxagoras who is the actual target): “a deity flourishing with indestructible life. Through mind it hears, sees, is very thoughtful. . . . It will hear all that is said among mortals, and will be able to see all that is done.” This God is both the traditional lord of the lightning, and the supposed divine life of Nature. But in both shapes he is a myth. There is indeed a “self-begotten great whirl” of natural phenomena, and perhaps a “great Year” cycle of time. But the hypothesis of a divine mind behind it is a human invention — an example of how the understanding makes use of chance (B 25, B 19, B 21).\textsuperscript{xv}

In spite of his own extremely aristocratic birth, Kritias was no believer in nature as a source of virtue. He was a true disciple of Protagoras, believing in education, and above all in the internalization of virtue by habituation and practice. Plato ascribes the definition of justice in the Republic (“minding one’s own business and not meddling”) to Kritias as the right definition of temperance (B 41a). Obviously Kritias held that the uneducated should follow the discipline of their daily work, and leave government to the educated (B 9). (But he also took note of how well educated leaders managed to enrich themselves when in power — B 45.)\textsuperscript{xvi}

Kritias thought that the work of the Sophists was valuable for the educated (who ought to govern). We can see in what remains of his poetry and prose, that he regarded it as important to know as much as possible about how other communities lived and what their customs were. Like Prodikos he was interested in the progressive advance of civilization, through technical discoveries — and he recognized pastimes (such as the game of kottabos) as significant cultural advances (B 2, B 36).\textsuperscript{xvii}

He wrote about the Constitutions of the Greek cities, both in prose and in verse — and he meant the way of life (B 32, B 38), as much as the political system. Thus, he commented on the extravagance of Thessalians (B 31, B 33), and the cups and dress of the Spartans (B 6, B 33-4), as well as their policies towards the enslaved Helot population (B 37). He greatly admired the Spartan cult of temperance (moderation), and he was much interested in drinking-habits. He was probably as cynical as Thrasy-machos about “justice”; but not as cynical as Kallikles about “temperance.”
We have also quotations from two books of *Aphorisms* (B 39) and two books of *Homilies* (B 40). From the very scrappy remains we can see that Kritias was interested in the relation of the mind and the body (or the intellect and the senses). But we do not know what he thought — except that he identified the general capacity of sensation with the blood (B 23). This Empedoklean doctrine came to him, no doubt, through Gorgias.

Kritias was not a great philosopher. We can generally see where his inspiration came from (most notably from Protagoras). But he was an outstandingly gifted follower. He was not as systematically original as Prodikos, perhaps. But he was both more profound, and more systematic than Hippias; and he was more of a philosophical all-rounder than the professional Sophists. He first appears on our scene when he was caught up in the great scandal of the “mutilation of the Hermae” (415 BCE). That highlights his contempt for the popular religion. In the chequered history of philosophy at Athens, he became, at last, the moment of the intellect’s revenge. But either he was sadly mistaken or he was not himself really wise when he said that “fortune fights on the side of those with good understanding” (B 21). Perhaps he would have agreed that he did not have political prudence, after all. Antiphon had already gone to his death for meddling with politics against his own better judgment. Kritias was ruthless enough, when the pressure of circumstances came upon him; and he died bravely in battle. But he cannot have enjoyed sending Theramenes to his death; and it was largely because of him (and his friend and ally Alcibiades), that Sokrates — the philosopher who was prudent enough to avoid political involvement as far as he possibly could — became the final victim of the tragic curse that began with the banishment of Anaxagoras.
Notes

i. 84 A 5. The association between “Sokrates” and Prodikos here, caused the compiler of the Suda to confuse them later, and report that Prodikos was put to death for “corrupting the young.” (For the active association of Sokrates and Prodikos see all of the passages collected from Plato’s Dialogues — especially A 3, A 3a, A 11, A 13-18).

ii. In early Greek usage, there were just three “Seasons”; it is a weakness of my interpretation that we have no evidence about the cultural “Winter.” The Suda (84 A 1) calls Prodikos a “natural philosopher and Sophist”; and Galen (24 A 2; cf. Cicero, 84 B 3) mentions him as one who wrote “on Nature.” The Suda is probably following some source that derived from Aristophanes; but Galen had a list of works before him (including Gorgias’ “On Being, or Nature”). The basis that Aristophanes had for linking Prodikos with Sokrates as a “Sky expert” as well as a Sophist, was almost certainly a work on mythical origins (à la Hesiod) — see A 5 and A 10. But Galen’s other reference to Prodikos shows that he knew of a work on human nature (B 4). Cicero (B 3) follows the same source as the Suda. (But perhaps he has the source of 24 A 2 to confuse him further.)

iii. Plato, Symposium, 177 B is cited in B 1. Compare also Protagoras, 340 D which points to the Hesiodic inspiration of the piece.

iv. B 10 is ascribed elsewhere to Evenos of Paros. But I think that Evenos was only borrowing from Prodikos without acknowledgement. Diels thinks that Galen wrote Herodikos, not Prodikos for B 11. But if there is a mistake there, it is more likely that “Herodotos” is wrong.
v. See also *Hippias Mi.*, 366c-368a. The Spartans apparently did not pay him. If this is true (*Hippias Ma.*, 283bc, 284c) then he did all of his Spartan work to ingratiate himself on embassies.

vi. We should note that — in spite of Hippias’ mathematical interests — Plato’s *Hippias Minor* is about the expert’s necessary mastery of fact and fiction; and the *Hippias Major* is about “beauty.”

vii. See also *Hippias Ma.*, 283c-3, 295e-296a, 304ab, *Phaedrus*, 267bc (= 80 A 26).

viii. Compare Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, IV, 4, 13. M. Untersteiner (1954, 284), among others, thinks that Hippias is the Anonymous Writer. This is possible, but we do not have enough reliable evidence about his political theory to say more than that (cf. De Romilly, 1992, 181-182).

ix. C 1 is *Protagoras*, 337c-338b; compare also *Hippias Ma.*, 284d-285b.

x. One should read on from A 14 in the *Memorabilia* (and compare Plato).

xi. Quoted by the Scholiast on Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1373b — see Guthrie, III, 159. The speech may have been a textbook model.

xiii. Compare also *Meno* 70ab. (One would like to know what the relations of Kritias with Antiphon were like.)

xiv. The *Sisyphos* was ascribed to Kritias by Sextus; cf. B 10, B 17 for the tragic trilogy. (See K. Freeman, 1946, 411, for a positive argument; and Guthrie, III, 303 n2 for a summary of scholarly opinion.)

xv. Here I have woven some of the fragments of the *Peirithous* together with the *Sisyphos* speech. I am inclined to believe that Euripides was the actual author of (at least most of) the tragic trilogy. But Kritias certainly agreed with the ideas expressed in the fragments.

xvi. But compare B 44, for the importance of the *mystique* of nobility. This ties up with the ideological theory of religion.

xvii. Compare also B 34-5. There is no sign in our remains, of an appreciative interest in the cultural development of *religion*. Kritias, who was involved in the “mutilation of the Hermae,” was a convinced atheist.

xviii. Actually he said “the soul is blood” (*Aristotle, On the Soul*, 405b 3). A commentator on Aristotle ascribes the actual words of Empedokles (regarding the “blood around the heart”) to Kritias.