Chapter 17

Antiphon

1. His career

Antiphon the Sophist is an interesting and important social philosopher. But is he identical with the orator Antiphon of Rhamnos, who was one of the Four Hundred in the abortive political revolution at Athens in 411 BCE? And is he also identical with the Antiphon who was a diviner and interpreter of dreams? These questions cannot be conclusively settled (partly because even the ancient reporters who supply the evidence may themselves have been misled). However, there is no contemporary witness who distinguishes two Antiphons; and one would think that both the political orator and the Sophist were important enough to deserve that, if they were indeed different men. So I shall assume that they were the same man. In part I make this assumption because the philosophy and the rhetoric seem to me to be coherent (although, as we shall see, active political partisanship poses a problem for the interpretation of the thought).\(^i\)

Antiphon (of Rhamnos in Attica) was born in about 480 BCE; and he was put to death in 411 BCE. (If the author of Truth was really a different person, he may have been born a bit later, and died later also.) The Rhamnusian studied rhetoric from his early years (with his father); and he wrote speeches for others to use in the courts. He was quite concerned to be paid for what he did. According to Xenophon he had more than one dispute with Sokrates, and one of the most important topics upon which they disagreed was the need to be paid for helping people with psychological
problems (87 A 1, A 5, A 3). (Not surprisingly, Antiphon also believed in enjoying the good things of life, and not living ascetically, as Sokrates did.)

In Xenophon’s account Antiphon also takes Sokrates to task for not going into politics himself, since he professed to prepare others for public life. This is slightly surprising, because Antiphon himself taught political rhetoric, while avoiding politics. The explanation is probably that his conversations with Sokrates occurred late in his life, after he had changed his mind (or at least his life-policy) and become involved in political life (as he certainly did — A 3).

Antiphon was perhaps the first professional teacher of rhetoric at Athens (though the Sicilian school was older, and Gorgias himself was not the first professional teacher in the West). Antiphon set up his school while he was still fairly young. It is likely that he also did what we would call psychiatric counselling. Like Sokrates, he became a favorite butt of the comic poets, and they credited him with a “pain-and-grief clinic” (A 6). He is supposed to have promised the cure or consolation of troubles through verbal medicine; and he certainly wrote a manual on “Avoidance of Grief.” Whereas the Sokratic “Think-tank” was located in Athens by Aristophanes, Antiphon’s clinic was supposed to be at Corinth, because that was the proverbial home of the profit-motive. But Antiphon actually made all the profits that he could in Athens. Verbal consolation was only a sideline for him, as compared with the writing of speeches for the courts. But it was in this connection, no doubt, that he wrote and published his manual on the Interpretation of Dreams. The slight remains of this indicate that it was a fairly rational production. Antiphon taught people to laugh at the fear of dreams; and he said that divination was “a wise man’s guess” (A 9, A 8, B 78-81a).

Several reports say that he was the first to write speeches for the courts. He was a pioneer in this field at Athens. Thucydides says that “if anyone was involved in a legal or political contest, his single assistance was of more value than anything, if anyone asked his advice” (VIII, 68). We have a collection of model speeches (both prosecution and defence) for homicide cases. This would have been part of a textbook. We have also three actual speeches for murder cases; some fragments of his defence at the treason-trial in which he was condemned; and fragments (mostly just odd words
and phrases) from seventeen other speeches. None of the speeches are significant for us, except for Antiphon’s defence in the aftermath of the abortive revolution.

At some point in his busy (and lucrative) life as an orator, Antiphon wrote an essay (in two “books”) on Truth (which surely made him no money at all!). In it he shows himself to be a student of the Eleatics, as well as of Protagoras (Gorgias he would have studied for professional reasons, but I see no sign of philosophical influence). There is an argument in the first book, which accords well with the avoidance of pain and grief, but less well with the revolutionary politics of Antiphon’s last years. One would guess that Truth was written before the War.

Antiphon also wrote an essay On Concord, and another called Statesman. We have about thirty fragments definitely or tentatively ascribed to On Concord (many being just odd words — B 45-71). There are only half a dozen words and phrases from the Statesman (B 72-7).

Antiphon’s political career is hard to put together. He was a naval commander at some stage, and he was elected “general.” Pseudo-Plutarch claims that he was “victorious in many engagements.” But most of what we hear seems to come from his last speech in his own defence, and to refer to the year of the Four Hundred (412/11 BCE). He served on embassies, obtained allies for Athens, helped to arm the lowest class of citizens (who could not supply their own armor). But already when Aristophanes produced the Wasps (422 BCE) Antiphon was notorious as an opponent of the War; and his (brief?) political career ended in personal disaster. Thucydides, who is generally reported to have been his pupil, tells the sad story of his prominence in the attempt of Theramenes, Peisander and Phrynichos to reform the Athenian democracy (turning it, as the democrats later thought, into an oligarchy). Thucydides says that Antiphon did not speak or appear in the Assembly, because of popular distrust of him as too clever. In the opinion of Thucydides himself, Antiphon was “one of the ablest Athenians of his time, achieving preeminence in intellectual power and in the expression of his thoughts.” In the short period while Athens was governed by the Four Hundred (412/11 BCE) he played an active and important part. When the Four Hundred broke up, and the Assembly was restored to power, he was prosecuted for treason. Both Thucydides and the tragic
poet Agathon (expert judges of rhetoric) thought that his speech in his own defence was an outstanding effort. But his oratory availed him nothing. He was condemned to death as a traitor (for his part in the peace-embassy to Sparta); and his body was denied burial in Athenian territory. viii

2. **Human Truth and Justice**

The first book of *Truth* was concerned largely with problems of the kind that we call “theory of knowledge.” But it dealt also with “natural justice.” It was really about the mortal human situation; and in view of the general psychological emphasis we can best classify it as “philosophy of mind.” Intellectual judgment (*gnōme*) rules the body; but it must depend on the senses for all of its data. What we see with our eyes is what we primarily believe in (B 2, B 14). ix Speech itself has no evidential value. We believe first what we perceive sensibly; and in the second place what carries conviction to our understanding (B 1).

Already we can recognize Antiphon’s concern with the imaginary. What we imagine must have its origin in sense experience, not in words alone. But the memory of sense experience fades. What speech refers to does not abide (B 1). xi The passing away of sensation is in *time*; and time is an abstract intellectual category, a “measure” not a sensible reality (B 9). xii Nevertheless time is the most important of all human “realities” because we are *mortal* (our time is limited). So the art of words must invert the normal course of nature in human experience (B 77, B 53a, B 50). xiii The art of words must use names (and coin new ones) in such a way as to make the invisible truths of the intelligence vivid. xiv

Antiphon was certainly interested in mathematical intuition; and it seems clear that this was because it brings pure intellect to the level of sensation. He studied the problem of squaring the circle, by turning it progressively into a polygon with an infinite number of sides (First you inscribe a square; then you construct an octagon, and so on — B 13). xv
In general, the scraps that remain from the first book of *Truth* only show that Antiphon was deeply concerned with the contrast between visible (sensible) reality, and the invisible (intellectual) realm. The intellectual realm contains both a truth that ought to be trusted absolutely, and a free imaginative activity that we instinctively (and rightly) distrust (B 3-8). We must use sensation to rescue ourselves from imaginative fantasies; but that is only the first step in preparing our minds for the divine truth.

That our world, and our life, is only a kind of dream, as compared with the real life of Nature, is shown by what would happen if we buried a wooden bed that we have made. It might simply rot, and return to the Earth; but if there was still some natural life in it, so that it grew, we should be faced not by a bed, but by the live shoot of a tree once more. Our life, and our social order, with knowledge and the sciences, are not part of any divine plan. God is quite self-sufficient; he does not need us, or our religious service of him (B 15, B 12, B 10).

Our life, therefore, and our social justice, is founded upon convention. We have a long fragment (B 44 Fragment A) which draws out the consequences. “Justice consists in not transgressing the customs (nomima) of the city of which one is a member.” But we are part of the great order of nature; and when we are certain that no one can witness and testify against us we shall be wise to do what relieves the stresses of natural need or impulse. “The demands of the laws are imposed, those of nature are necessary.” Whatever we do that is contrary to the demands of nature, we must unfailingly pay the penalty for it; while if we break the social convention, we shall pay only if we are caught. We are socially commanded to see, hear, and say things, to do things, and to desire things; but we are bound to perceive and feel what nature obliges us to perceive and feel. Society controls us through the death-penalty, because death is a natural evil that we wish to avoid; but a happy life is one that is in accordance with nature as far as possible. Pain and grief are evils to be avoided quite generally. Aggression may be a less painful policy than peaceful non-aggression and self-defence. Being good to parents who have mistreated one is often “contrary to nature.” Antiphon does not say that aggression is always good, or that being kind to those who hurt you is always bad. You should follow the policy that brings least stress upon you. The conventional law
can change the balance of stress. But it does not do so reliably. In the circumstances of our life, we must calculate what is to our natural advantage, as well as we can. The law is evenhandedly concerned both with the agent and the sufferer. But it ought to be more concerned with the diminution and relief of suffering.

It is clear, I think, that Antiphon is not a radical partisan of “Nature” (like Kallikles), but a conservative social reformer. He thinks that aggression ought to be punished, and that non-aggression should be supported and rewarded. The world will be a better place if we love and support our aged parents. But we can’t be expected to do it, if they are allowed to mistreat us as children. Social policy should be less concerned with retribution — though the fear of that is certainly necessary — and more concerned with the righting of wrongs, and the relief of suffering. Also the equal opportunities offered by the law, often operate to the advantage of the unscrupulous. (At the level of policy, what can be done about this is not obvious; but an honest man will be prudent about offers made to an opponent he believes to be dishonest.)

It is a fact — even if it is the result of social convention — that we respect the aristocracy of blood and tradition, and we do not respect the lower orders. But the truth is that all such feelings — including the Greek contempt for barbarians — are merely conventional. We must distinguish the feelings that we need not have, and can change, from the natural needs and feelings that we cannot change. We simply have to breathe, eat, drink and sleep; but the social feelings that are “appropriate” are a matter of policy and choice (B 44 Fragment B).

This provides us with an appropriate context for the third and last papyrus fragment of Book I. In all conventional views it is right to bear true witness against one’s neighbor, if (s)he has done wrong. But this is not “just” if the true standard of justice is not to wrong someone who has not wronged you. To get someone else into trouble is to start a natural chain of “vengeance.” If you testify against someone, you make an enemy; and (s)he will feel that you deserve to suffer as much as you have made her suffer (or more). The ideal of natural concord is to avoid causing trouble for
anyone. This is the only way to be just (according to the ideal standard). Once the chain of vengeance starts, both sides are necessarily unjust (B 44 Fragment C).

It is important that this is a dialectical argument. Antiphon does not say categorically that it is absolutely just to do harm to no one (even a wrong-doer). It is clear that this would be the ideal of a happy life; but it is equally clear that Antiphon sees that the ideal cannot be achieved. If you can bear witness to some wrongdoing, and you do not do so (out of the desire for a quiet life, or for friendship’s sake, or for whatever reason) then you do wrong to (and make an enemy of) whoever would be benefited by your true testimony. Sometimes — where the person wronged is dead and friendless — silence may be the path of prudent expediency. But it is not “just.” Perfect justice is actually impossible. “Helping one group harms another.” We should not pretend to ourselves that conventional justice is perfectly just. But that is not because there is such a thing as perfect (or “natural”) justice. Once harmony has been violated, it cannot be justly restored.

The conclusion that seems to me to be most consistent with Antiphon’s general position is that we ought not to be as concerned about abstract justice as we are. “Justice” is always the interest of some party or other (as Thrasymachos was already preaching — if we can believe Plato). The general human good is concord and harmony (the reduction of stress). Settlements that are to be stably satisfactory and acceptable must appear to be “just.” But justice is entirely a matter of appearance; the appearance can be produced by appropriate rhetoric; and no appearance will ever be final (or absolutely real).

3. Divine Truth and Nature

The second Book of Truth is unique among the productions of the Sophists. It seems to have contained an Eleatic theory of Nature and of eternal Being. In other words, Antiphon was not only a Sophist, but a natural philosopher. It is also true that he was not a very distinguished inquirer into
the order of the kosmos, or of the natural life. So we need not bewail the fact that this part of his thought is almost completely lost to us.

God, or the absolute order of Nature, is perfectly stable and self-sufficient; he (or better ‘it’, since there is no designing providence) is in need of nothing; God is an eternal “standstill” outside of time and change (B 10, B 12, B 22).

This unchanging system of law displays itself to us in time as a cyclic balance of forces. There is a certain right “disposition” or “arrangement” (diathesis) of mind which mirrors the “arrangement” of Nature; and that is what we ought to strive for (B 24a) — in the observational or theoretic sense of “arranging our ideas” just as we do for the making of a speech.

Nature should be conceived (like the development of consciousness) as the gradual separation of what is originally undistinguished (B 23-4). The means of separation is a great “whirl” (B 25). The sun rises and sets like a living organism. It seeks damp air to feed upon (B 26); and when it reaches the water it burns out or is quenched. But the water replenishes it and allows it to be reborn. When it returns, it drowns the weaker (but independent) light of the Moon (B 27).

In saying that the Sun is quenched and reborn, I have gone beyond our direct evidence. I have done so because Antiphon shows himself to be indebted to Herakleitos in his views about eclipses. He accepted the theory that eclipses are caused by the turning of the “bowl” in which the Sun-fire or Moon-fire is contained. I am assuming therefore that he also accepted the Herakleitean view of how the fire in the Sun-bowl burns out and comes to life again. This agrees with his view of human life (as a microcosm); and he may well have been attracted to Herakleitos for that reason.

He was also indebted in an important way to Anaximenes. He believes that natural change and difference arises by condensation and rarefaction (B 29). This probably harmonizes in his mind with the Eleatic monism that he finds intellectually attractive. What we regard as “inorganic,” he thinks of as homogeneously alive. Fire is the element that produces organic development and
change; but also, of course, it produces aging and death. The Earth’s deserts arise from scorching; and earthquakes are analogous with “wrinkling” (B 30-1). The sea is salty because it is the Earth’s “sweat” (B 32). xxvii

Antiphon also dealt with the life of the finite organism — and especially with that of the human organism. But here we have only single words in the lexicographers, from which no doctrines (or even influences) can be safely inferred. He was interested in headaches (because they interfere with thought?); and in embryology (because of the analogy with the great kosmos?). Human life is notable for its capacity for active self-help; and at a higher level, there are those who are at leisure because they can pay for others to help out all their natural needs (B 33-43). xxviii

4. Human Concord

Antiphon’s essay on Homonoia (literally “being of the same mind,” unanimity) contained his ethical philosophy and theory of human culture. He anticipated Plato’s view that the “concord” of the individual human soul is the true foundation of all real social harmony; and he was not alone in this. He was also echoed (probably quite consciously) by Demokritos. xxix A similar ideal can be found in the Anonymous Writer cited by Iamblichos. (I shall add a few notes about him at appropriate points as we proceed.) xxx

The general tendency of Antiphon’s theory of Concord is aristocratic (or “oligarchic”). The majority is to be persuaded to accept the wisdom of ancestral traditions, and the authority of the wisest and best among them. But Antiphon himself does not believe that wisdom and nobility are inherited. He would not have agreed with Lycothron (a pupil of Gorgias) who said that nobility of birth was a verbally generated illusion; but he agreed with Sokrates that one must not be taken in by appearances. xxxi
The fundamental institution of human society is the educational system. Natural needs are compulsive, but there is quite a lot of human behavior (and of human desire) that is malleable. The conventional forming of it must begin early, because the desirable social behavior pattern has to be planted early, so that it matures at the level of feeling, like a kind of second nature (B 60). Good behavior must feel natural. Our natural impulses should be disciplined from the beginning into obedience to convention (B 61). Being imitative creatures, children model themselves spontaneously and willingly upon the grown-ups they live with (B 62). Discipline should not be punitive; a good character is not founded upon fear. But shame is a necessary human emotion; one must experience it, and learn to avoid what causes it. The temptation to do wrong and to enjoy what is evil, is the portal of human orderliness and of self-control (B 59).

One may think that it is good to be aggressive and to attack one’s enemies. It is natural to be angry, and to wish to hurt. But this is an impulse that can be controlled; and it is more prudent to control it. Wilful harm starts a chain-reaction. If you do harm, you must expect to suffer the same (and once you have done it, it is too late to change your mind). It is better always to aim at self-control than at immediate gratification (B 58). (But we may add here that it is not wise to push repression and self-denial too far. We must be as “light on the rein” — B 70 — as we can manage.)

Some work of Antiphon’s — it may have been Freedom from Pain rather than On Concord — probably contained an ideal model of human life from the cradle to the grave. This claim is supported by the excerpt that we have about marriage which begins: “Well then, let his life progress further [after youth and schooling obviously] and let him desire marriage and a wife.” This desire is the beginning of a new life, and a “great gamble.” Divorce is difficult (and makes enemies for one in the family of the wife). But home-life is full of stress (psychiatrists, we may reflect, typically see the worst side of marriages). On the other hand, a happy marriage is a great source of pleasure. The pleasures of life, however, all bring their pains after them; or like victories in the Olympic games they cost a great deal of suffering to gain. Human happiness already involves “health of body, earning a living, honor and a good name and reputation.” Why make oneself responsible for the
health of two bodies (with the living, the self-control and the good name)? If children come, they bring further worries. Youth is over and the fun is all gone out of life (B 49). xxxiv

This could all be a rhetorical preparation for a defence of marriage as necessary to the happy life. Sexual desire is certainly one of the necessities of the natural order. For Antiphon called it by the name of its Goddess (Aphrodite) in the first book of Truth (B 17). xxxv But it does look as if he took the same view as Demokritos: one who is philosophically wise will avoid marriage, and satisfy his sexual needs — and even the need for an heir — in some other way. Did Antiphon have a wife and children to bury him outside of Athenian territory when the time of disaster came? (He did not expect the disaster; and once it had come, he would have said, perhaps, that not to be buried is not a natural evil; but there are anxieties that a wife and family do relieve. A response in favor of marriage is not at all impossible. But the likelihood that Demokritos followed the lead of Antiphon tells against it.)

With aggressive impulses, Antiphon recommends delay. It is best to let anger cool before we decide what to do about its cause. But Antiphon is no friend of procrastination and inaction generally (B 55). One must not delay where there is no need for it; and one must not be bold in words, but a coward when it comes to action (B 56). “Illness is a holiday for cowards,” he said (B 57) — another observation that probably came from his psychological counselling experience. It is easy to find fault with life; for the most part it is full of petty matters, and there are some great sorrows in it (B 51). But we must overcome this pessimistic attitude of complaint. It is useless to regret what is past, for we cannot take back the acts and choices that we make, as we can take back a mistaken move in a game of draughts (B 52). xxxvi

One must live in the present; and whatever capacities or material means one has, one must put them to use. Antiphon, who was often accused of mercenary motives, has no patience either with peasant thrift, or with the hoarding instinct of the miser. If one works and saves, one has only pain in one’s life, and the material possessions become like flesh and blood (B 53). Our sources have preserved a little parable in which a philosopher (of Antiphon’s own persuasion) tells a miser
whose hoard has been stolen to put a stone in its place and think of it as his treasure, because it will be just as useful to him (B 54).

To live in the future, or to procrastinate, is to waste the most precious of all human commodities: our time (B 77). We have only one life, and we should not live as if we were preparing for another (B 53a). “Being alive is like a day-long watch, and the length of a life is a single day, in which when we have looked up to the light, we hand over to the others who come after” (B 50). We may claim to be “the most divine-looking of creatures” (B 48); but we should use our reason (which is what is “divine-like”) to recognize our mortality, and live in accordance with it.

Human beings are not self-sufficient (as God is). We need to make friends. The friendships of the young are intense; but the long-matured and well-tried friendships of older folk are steadier and stronger (B 64). Of course, we must know who our friends are (B 65). The test of time, and of help in need, sorts out those who are flatterers, seeking their own advantage.

There was a passage in On Concord in which the customs of strange tribes were discussed: the “Long-Heads,” the “Shady-Feet,” the “Troglodytes.” But we cannot now discover how they were relevant to the topic (B 45-7). We should remember this, because there is no sign in what remains to us of the impossibly self-sufficient “man of adamant” — the hypothesis that is so indignantly dismissed by the Anonymous Writer. (We cannot regard this gap in our records as conclusive, because we know that there was more in the essay than we can now interpret.)

It is a pity that we do not have any summary of the Statesman; so we do not know what Antiphon’s published views were about the constitution of the polis. Pleading in his own defence, he argued that he was not an enemy of the democracy, because he had had a successful political career in it, and a lucrative career in the courts which he would not have had in an oligarchy. The democratic constitution was in his interest, and surely he could appreciate his own advantage? He appealed, in other words, to his well-established reputation for avarice. But in fact he definitely
did not act in his own “interest.” He knew, like Sokrates, that he ought not to become involved in partisan politics. Athens had gone, in his lifetime, from a prosperous City-State to a tyrannical imperial power. Probably he had felt for many years that the democracy needed some checks and balances. The War was a total violation of his ideal of the perfect concord of humanity (which would make us as much like God as we ever can be). Antiphon was never popular with the democratic majority, so, when he did become a partisan, he had to stay in the background somewhat. There is a bitter irony involved in his dying as a traitor, physically cast out by his own community. But he does illustrate his own insight, that no matter what one does (or refrains from doing) one cannot help taking sides.
Notes

i. I shall use the complete collection of the remains, edited and translated by J.S. Morrison (1972). But I have supplied references to Diels-Kranz as far as possible. Unlike Guthrie, I think that the political speeches and career are philosophically significant (contrast 1969, III, 286). The best recent survey of the identity problem is that of J.S. Morrison (1961, 1972) — with whom I agree. I assume also that both Sophist and statesman are identical with the dream-interpreter. But it will not matter much if that part of my hypothesis is set aside. For the ancient evidence see 87 A 1 to A 7, and Thucydides, VIII, 65. (The Sophist was also identified sometimes with Antiphon the tragic poet, but that is simply a mistake.)

ii. Morrison, A 1, A 3, A 5, A 8, A 9, A 11.

iii. Morrison, A 3, A 5.

iv. More fully in Morrison, A 3, A 4, A 5, A 12; and B 152-156. Antiphon “advertised ‘Painless lessons’ claiming that no one could tell him a sorrow so terrible that he could not remove it from the teller’s mind.” (Only D.-K. B 81a = M 156 seems at all superstitious.)

v. There are three “tetralogies” (two speeches on each side). The second concerns the throwing of a javelin which kills the young man charged with fetching back the javelins thrown in training (who runs into the way at the wrong moment). Who is to be blamed? The victim’s father charges the thrower with manslaughter. The thrower’s father says the victim (or his director) is to blame. (Protagoras and Perikles canvassed the question of whether the javelin
itself was the only blameworthy agent. No one suggests that in Antiphon’s imaginary court. But Antiphon himself may have thought it was the most sensible view.)

vi. See Morrison, A 11 and I-XXV, 129-212. (He lists the editions of the Greek texts, at p. 129.)


viii. Morrison, A 11, A 3, A 4, A 5. (None of this is in D.-K. 87.)

ix. Morrison, B 70, B 82, and B 68 (the last is not in D.-K. 87).

x. Morrison, B 67.

xi. Morrison, B 67, B 162 (B 162 is not in D.-K. 87).

xii. Morrison, B 77.

xiii. Morrison, B 151, B 133, B 129. (The passages come from *On Concord* and the *Statesman.*)

xiv. Morrison, B 69. (If the coining of names occurred in *Truth*, this is how it would fit in, but Galen may have been citing “The Art of Speaking.”)
Morrison, B 81 (Aristotle, *Physics*, 185a 14). Aristotle says he was not “proceeding from the principles of geometry.” But we can see from the commentaries of Simplicios and Themistios that it was Aristotle who was a bad geometer. From Themistios it appears that Antiphon used the same procedure starting also from an equilateral triangle.

Morrison, B 72, B 73, B 74, B 75, B 76; B 71.

Morrison, B 83, B 80, B 78.

Morrison, B 90.

Antiphon was not “conventional” about this. One of the *cases* that has survived gives us the speeches that he wrote for a son who prosecuted his stepmother on the charge of poisoning his father (her husband). Her own children naturally were on the side of the defence. The prosecutor seems to recognize his Orestes-role. This puts Antiphon in the role of Apollo. Much conservative opinion seems to have sided with the Furies, and regarded Antiphon as outrageously arrogant (see Morrison, B 1, pp. 129-36). The *shocking* character of the case was no doubt one factor in the survival of the record.

Morrison, B 91.

Morrison, B 92.

It may have been Antiphon who was actually preaching the gospel of “political interest.”
(But he was not teaching the doctrine of self-interest that Plato ascribes to Thrasymachos.)

xxiii. There are several passages in the speeches that are relevant to Antiphon’s critical attitude towards retributive justice. Thus, for instance, the position of the prosecution in the second Tetralogy is that the javelin-thrower must be exiled to avoid general pollution (and that “responsibility” for what is admitted to be an accident must be equally shared, on this account — see Morrison B 111(2) and C 7-8, 10-11). The defence never responds to the threat of divine retribution at all.

xxiv. Morrison, B 78, B 80 and B 93. B 10 and B 12 are from Book I. Only B 22 is from Book II. It must be admitted that my hypothesis about this Eleatic basis is tentative; the evidence is very scanty.

xxv. Morrison, B 95. Compare 87 B 63 (Morrison, B 136 and B 33).


xxvii. Morrison, B 101-104. (D.-K. 87 B 32 — M 104 — may well be a debt to Empedokles.)


xxix. Antiphon is certainly not very up to date in his reading of natural philosophy; and he is the older man, so I assume that any influence passes from him to Demokritos, rather than the other way. In particular, the Demokritean concept of the human good, “Well-standing”
(Euesto), may be modelled on the “Ever-standing” (Aieiesta) of Antiphon’s “God or Nature.” (Compare D.-K. 87 B 22 — Morrison, B 93 — with 68 A 164 and B 4.)

xxx. Blass, who discovered the Anonymus in 1899, thought that he was indeed Antiphon. After the papyrus fragments of Truth were discovered, that opinion fell out of favor. Opinion now generally supports the view that the Anonymus is post-Platonic, but perhaps a disciple of Demokritos. In that event he does not properly belong in this book, since our terminus is Plato. But it is worth our while to consider the evidence in support of Blass’ view.

xxxi. 87 B 44 (Morrison, B 90-2); 83 A 4 (Aristotle, Fragment 91 — Lycophron); Theaetetos 174e-175b (Sokrates).

xxxii. Morrison, B 117-119, B 125. J. de Romilly calls Antiphon “the most moralistic of the Sophists” (1993, 184). But B 59 shows that he is a very enlightened moralist. There is a general harmony between his view and the conservative conventionalism of the Anonymus — who emphasizes the desire for a good reputation as the goal to be set before a child. Good reputation, however, is hard to obtain because our neighbors are so envious. This is a problem that Antiphon must have considered, because he certainly felt himself to be the victim of envy. The Anonymus says that “complete virtue” must be desired for its own sake; and this is achieved by being helpful to others. Antiphon’s career exhibits this motive very clearly. The Anonymus further says that the good man should not be subject to bribery (a temptation that Antiphon must have felt); and that most men are unduly anxious, and fear the perils of life — some of which, like old age, are inevitable — because they lack self-discipline. All of this — even the rejection of cupidity, of which Antiphon was certainly accused — could have come from (or been inspired by) On Concord, the Statesman or Freedom from Pain — see D.K. 89, 1-4. (And all that is needed in order to reconcile the
conventionalism of the Anonymus with the doctrine of “Nature” in Truth is the recognition that educational discipline should not be punitive.

xxxiii. Morrison, B 124 and B 144).

xxxiv. Morrison, B 123. Compare what the Anonymus says about “reputation” — summarized in note 32. (Most of what is not specifically assigned to On Concord seems more likely to come from Freedom from Pain. So I think D.-K.’s B 50 — Morrison, B 129 — should also be assigned to that.)

xxxv. Morrison, B 85.

xxxvi. Morrison B 126-128, B 130, B 131. (B 52 [131] is further evidence of the influence of Herakleitos.)

xxxvii. Morrison, B 132, B 134. (Compare Demokritos 68 B 227.)

xxxviii. Morrison, B 151, B 133, B 129, B 135.


xl. Morrison, B 120-122.
The “man of adamant” would have fitted in, because it is clear that Antiphon argued that we cannot be self-sufficient “like God.” But if the “man of adamant” was in the essay, I would have expected him to get into someone’s report. I think that he was actually invented by critics who were responding to “Kallikles” — or to the gospel of “strength” preached by “Thrasymachos” in Plato’s Republic. So I fear that the Anonymus is not in fact Antiphon. But the hypothesis of Blass ought not to be hastily dismissed. Antiphon agrees with the Anonymus perfectly. (Of course, if Kallikles really said, both to Sokrates and to Antiphon, the sort of things that Plato puts in his mouth, the case for Antiphon’s being the Anonymus would be quite strong.)

Morrison, B 19 (not in D.-K. 87).