The Visual Politics of Taiwanese Nationalism: Contested National Identities in the Imagery of the Sunflower Movement

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Abstract

This dissertation explores how national identity is constructed and contested in visual media by analyzing the use of national symbols in the visual materials produced by the 2014 Sunflower Movement in Taiwan. Through comparison with imagery published by the government’s Mainland Affairs Council, I examine different conceptions of national identity circulating in contemporary Taiwanese society. I also consider how visual materials contribute to the construction and reproduction of national identities.

My analysis of the imagery produced by the Sunflower Movement indicates a reformulation of Taiwanese national identity. While these images frame Taiwan primarily in opposition to a Chinese identity promoted by the ruling Nationalist Party (KMT), they also selectively appropriate symbols typically associated with Chinese identity. This re-signification indicates the need for fine-grained, contextual analyses of the construction and contestation of conventionally ‘national’ symbols. I develop a method of visual analysis based on social semiotics, demonstrating its usefulness in analyzing the visual reproduction of implicit attitudes and beliefs, including national identity. I apply this method to a range of visual materials produced by participants in the Sunflower Movement – photographs, drawings, paintings, and posters – and compare these with government imagery.

Chapter 2 presents the rationale for a visual analysis of national identity. I then review the dominant conceptions of Chinese and Taiwanese identity over the past 150 years, highlighting how the Sunflower Movement imagery both adopts and adapts existing conceptions of national identity. The subsequent chapters analyse three themes in the Sunflower Movement’s imagery. First, I examine how these images appropriate the Republic of China flag, resignifying it from a symbol synonymous with KMT’s Chinese nationalism to one associated with a local Taiwanese identity. Next, I consider how symbols conventionally associated with ‘Chinese’ history are variously evoked to critique or legitimate different conceptions of the nation in Taiwan. Finally, I explore how maps and map-like logos combine spatial and affective imagery to frame Taiwan as political territory distinct from ‘China’. My conclusion considers opportunities and limitations of using visual analysis to study national identity, and situates the project in the literatures on Taiwanese identity and on national identity more broadly.
For my Grandad, Peter Verrall, whose stories about China planted the seed for this dissertation decades ago.

And for his great-granddaughter, Nadia Jane Rose-Verrall, who held off being born just long enough for her father to finish writing it.
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Although it has evolved over time, this dissertation has remained true to the themes and questions raised by colleagues during my time in Taiwan in 2017. I am especially indebted to Dr. Hsaiu A-chin, Dr. Ho Ming-sho, and Dr. Chang Mau-kuei for their insights and suggestions on my provisional findings.

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Table of Contents

Abstract ......................................................................................................................................................... ii
Dedication ....................................................................................................................................................... iii
Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................................ iv
Table of Contents .......................................................................................................................................... v
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................................ vii
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................................ viii
Note on Copyright of Figures ..................................................................................................................... xiii
Note on Romanization and Use of Chinese Characters ............................................................................... xiv
List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................................................... xv

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1
The 2014 Sunflower Movement .................................................................................................................... 1
Social, political, and economic context of the SM ....................................................................................... 5
Impacts of the SM ....................................................................................................................................... 8
National Identity in Taiwan .......................................................................................................................... 11
National identity in the SM ......................................................................................................................... 13
Approaches to studying national identity in Taiwan .................................................................................. 14
Limitations of current approaches ............................................................................................................ 15
Project Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 17
Research questions .................................................................................................................................... 17
Methodology: visual analysis .................................................................................................................... 19
Research design and data collection ......................................................................................................... 22
Contributions ........................................................................................................................................... 23

Chapter Overview ....................................................................................................................................... 24

CHAPTER 2 – NATIONALISM THEORY AND VISUAL ANALYSIS .......................................................... 27
Critical Theories of Nationalism ................................................................................................................ 28
Contemporary Approaches to National Identity in Taiwan ....................................................................... 31
Visual Analysis ......................................................................................................................................... 41
Data Sources and Selection ....................................................................................................................... 52
SM data sources ....................................................................................................................................... 52
MAC image sources ................................................................................................................................. 53
Coding and content analysis ..................................................................................................................... 55
Limitations .................................................................................................................................................. 62
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 66

CHAPTER 3 – HISTORICAL CONTEXT .................................................................................................... 68
Taiwan During the Qing Imperial Rule (1684-1895) .................................................................................. 69
Japanese Colonial Rule in Taiwan (1895-1945) ....................................................................................... 71
KMT Rule and Martial Law (1945-1987) ................................................................................................. 74
Democratic Era ......................................................................................................................................... 82

CHAPTER 4 - FLAGS .................................................................................................................................. 90
Flags and National Identity ......................................................................................................................... 92
Origins of the ROC Flag .......................................................................................................................... 96
Legal context of the ROC flag .................................................................................................................. 101
ROC flag and other political parties ....................................................................................................... 103
Alternatives to the Shining-sun flag ....................................................................................................... 106
The ROC Flag in MAC Imagery ............................................................................................................. 108
Banal flagging ......................................................................................................................................... 110
Evocative photographs .......................................................................................................................... 111
SM Resignification of the Flag ................................................................................................................. 116
Removing the KMT from the ROC ........................................................................................................ 118
Flag inversions ....................................................................................................................................... 130
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................... 134
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 5 – Alternate Histories</th>
<th>136</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAC Images: Evoking Chinese History</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC evocation of traditional Chinese culture</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun Yat-sen</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunflower Movement Histories</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM appropriation of Sun Yat-sen</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of civil protest</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making Ma Chinese</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 6 – Space and Territories</th>
<th>177</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAC Imagery: Taiwan in a Borderless World</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition and global integration</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colour in MAC imagery</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunflower Movement: Taiwan as Political Territory</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan and personification</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compositions of isolation</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visualizing the 'China Factor'</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 7 – Conclusion</th>
<th>222</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directions for Future Research</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concluding Thoughts</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Tables

Table 2.1: 20 most common symbols appearing in SM and MAC images............................................. 57
List of Figures

Figure 1.1: View from the roof of the Legislative Yuan, including an inverted ROC flag and a large cardboard sunflower above a crowd of protesters (Photograph) ....................... 1

Figure 1.2: Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese (1992-2019) ..................... 11

Figure 2.1: Visual Elements in MAC Annual Reports, 2008-14 ..................................................... 55

Figure 2.2: Comparison of SM and MAC images containing symbols with national significance 59

Figure 3.1: “The 1992 Consensus: The key to cross-strait peace and prosperity” pamphlet showing doves and the ROC flag flying against a blue sky. ........................................ 87

Figure 4.1: A ROC flag replacing the French Tricolour in Eugène Delacroix’s La Liberté guidant le peuple, with the slogan ‘Protect democracy, reject black-box [politics]’. .................... 90

Figure 4.2: Five-bar Republican flag .............................................................................................. 96

Figure 4.3: Shining-sun Nationalist flag ........................................................................................ 96

Figure 4.4: ROC flag - Shining-sun canton against a red field.................................................... 96

Figure 4.5: Republic of Taiwan Provisional Government Flag (1955-65). ................................. 106

Figure 4.6: ‘Hearts in Harmony’ flag proposed by Reverend Liu Ruiyi (1994). ......................... 106

Figure 4.7: 908 Taiwan Republic Campaign flag (2005-) ......................................................... 106

Figure 4.8: World Taiwan Congress flag (2007-) ....................................................................... 106

Figure 4.9: MAC minister Lai Xingyuan speaking at a press conference with ROC flag in the background. ............................................................................................................ 110

Figure 4.10: MAC photograph of young women wearing ROC flag-themed shirts .................. 111

Figure 4.11: MAC chapter title showing a young boy floating in a field of ROC flags, with the words ‘守護’ (shouhu) and ‘Protection’ (in English). ......................................................... 113

Figure 4.12: Two-page spread including an evocative photograph of ROC flags sewn together and held aloft at a parade ................................................................. 114

Figure 4.13: Chinese Taipei Olympic Flag .................................................................................... 116

Figure 4.14: Hand peeling the KMT logo off the ROC flag to reveal the PRC flag underneath ... 118
Figure 4.15: ROC flag with a half-hidden sun and white text reading: “Sunset or sunrise” (日落 or 日出). .......................................................... 119

Figure 4.16: ROC flag missing the white sun emblem, with grey text reading ”Tomorrow’s sun can’t be seen” (看不到明天的太陽). .......................................................... 119

Figure 4.17: PRC as a devil shaking hands with the KMT (left), and the KMT opening the door to a house with the ROC flag as a roof while a confused figure looks on (right)........ 122

Figure 4.18: ROC flag with sunflower emblem composed of orange island shapes. ............... 123

Figure 4.19: Formosan-bear and panda characters arguing about the secretive contents of the CSSTA (in English). .......................................................... 124

Figure 4.20: Muscular Formosan bear wearing ROC flag clothing and shouting in Taiwanese slang. .......................................................................................... 125

Figure 4.21: ROC flag with sunflower photograph, eclipsed sun, and Sun Yat-sen quote: 革命尚未成功 同志仍需努力 (革命尚未成功 同志仍需努力 “The Revolution is not yet finished. My comrades must carry on”). ............... 126

Figure 4.22: Announcement of a ‘grave cleaning’ ceremony for democracy (民主已死 馬上掃墓) consisting of barbed-wire and wreath in the shape of the ROC flag. ............ 128

Figure 4.23: A figure draped in a ROC flag and holding sunflowers................................. 130

Figure 4.24: Seated protesters holding an inverted ROC flag, facing a line of riot police. (Black and white photograph). ................................................................. 132

Figure 4.25: Protesters on the second floor of the Legislative Yuan. An inverted ROC flag is visible near the centre of the frame. (Black and white photograph). .............. 132

Figure 4.26: Watercolour painting combining various iconic scenes from the occupation...... 133

Figure 5.1: Lee Yi Hsien (2014) Photograph of the occupied Legislative Yuan plenary chamber. ................................................................................................. 136

Figure 5.2: Details of Figure 5.1, showing portraits of Cheng “Nylon” Nan-jung (1947-1989), two images of Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), and a set of three portraits including Jiang Yushui (1891-1931), Loa Ho (1894-1943), and Li Zhenyan (1915-2001). ............... 137

Figure 5.3: 17th century map of Taiwan framed by a red gate bearing menshen (door gods)... 141

Figure 5.4: Green floral design pamphlet on the 4th Jiang-Chen Summit in December, 2009... 144
Figure 5.5: Orange floral design pamphlet on the 5th Jiang-Chen Summit in June, 2010. 144

Figure 5.6: Sun Yat-sen portrait and ROC flags in the background of an official reception with President Ma Ying-jeou. 147

Figure 5.7: MAC Chairperson Lai Shin-yuan seated under a portrait of Sun Yat-sen at a meeting with local authorities. 147

Figure 5.8: Weeping Sun Yat-sen smeared with red ink. 149

Figure 5.9: Funeral tablet to democracy in front of Sun Yat-sen’s portrait, along with offerings of tea, energy drinks, and a sunflower. 149

Figure 5.10: Interior scene of the occupied Legislative Yuan. Oil on Canvas. 152

Figure 5.11: Watercolour painting of various scenes from the SM incorporating sunflowers, ROC flags, police, and barbed wire. 153

Figure 5.12: “Illuminated Darkness,” Legislative Yuan chambers filled with sunflowers in front of the Sun Yat-sen portrait and inverted ROC flag (oil on canvas). 154

Figure 5.13: A muscular and shirtless Sun Yat-sen holding Ma Ying-jeou’s severed head. 155

Figure 5.14: Photograph of Jian Yushi. 156

Figure 5.15: Photograph of Loa Ho. 156

Figure 5.16: Photograph of Li Zhenyuan. 156

Figure 5.17: Protestor with a bloody face following conflict with police on March 23 (black and white photograph). 158

Figure 5.18: Fu Sinian sticker including the quotation: I have a request: When you disperse the students tonight, there can be no blood. If any student bleeds, I will resist”. 159

Figure 5.19: Fu Sinian banner outside the Legislative Yuan on March 30, 2014. 160

Figure 5.20: Sticker of Nylon Cheng with a raised fist shouting "I declare..." (wo zhuzhang). 162

Figure 5.21: T-shirt bearing a Nylon Cheng logo, with "We are all free" (women dou shi ziyoude) handwritten underneath. 162

Figure 5.22: Stylized black and white copy of an iconic photograph of Nylon Cheng. 164

Figure 5.23: Nylon Cheng image printed on cardboard (detail of Figure 5.1). 164

Figure 5.24: Nylon Cheng mask. 164
Figure 5.25: SM supporters wearing Nylon Cheng masks. ......................................................... 164
Figure 5.26: Parody banner of Ma leading the KMT leadership as a Maoist icon.................... 168
Figure 5.27: “Unite to win still greater victories” Cultural Revolution poster of Mao Zedong.. 168
Figure 5.28: Caricature of Ma Ying-jeou as emperor seated on a red throne......................... 170
Figure 5.29: Map of China filled by an ROC flag and Ma wearing an imperial headdress. ...... 171
Figure 5.30: Fake newspaper showing Ma as the Empress Dowager and KMT officials as ladies of the court.................................................................................................................... 173
Figure 6.1: Personified Taiwan in a white dress being introduced to a PRC character by a deer-headed Ma......................................................................................................................... 177
Figure 6.2: Golden island of Taiwan against a blue world logo-map from a pamphlet promoting the 3rd Jiang-Chen summit (cover and detail of interior header). ......................... 187
Figure 6.3: ECFA pamphlet showing a blue map of Taiwan with domestic jurisdictions........ 188
Figure 6.4: Taiwan superimposed on a chessboard, in front of a blue dot-matrix world map. 190
Figure 6.5: Taiwan sitting on an outstretched hand below doves flying in a blue sky, in front of a grey map of Eurasia. ................................................................................................... 191
Figure 6.6: Globe showing South East Asia on the left, and Ma Ying-jeou in front of a dot-matrix world map on the right. ............................................................................................ 193
Figure 6.7: Borderless map of South East Asia with national flags. ........................................... 195
Figure 6.8: Sketch of a rat and horse carving up Taiwan. The text reads “Shameful table manners!” chixiang nankan 吃相難看)............................................................................................ 200
Figure 6.9: Zombie devouring Taiwan alongside the character fan 反 (resist, reject).............. 200
Figure 6.10: Suited island with a spike through its forehead. .................................................... 203
Figure 6.11: Island of Taiwan behind bars, weeping, above the slogan “Send back the CSSTA” (tuihui fumao 退回服貿). ................................................................................................... 203
Figure 6.12: Solid black poster with a small white Taiwan on the far right and an English pro-democracy slogan. .................................................................................................................. 206
Figure 6.13: Black poster of a weeping eye over the phrase “Democratic Crisis” with Taiwan used as the letter ‘i’. ........................................................................................................ 207
Figure 6.14: “Democracy at 4AM” full-page advertisement run in the New York Times, March 29, 2014. ................................................................. 210

Figure 6.15: Trojan horse unloading stick-person army against Taiwan................................. 211

Figure 6.16: Fist marked with PRC logo squeezing Taiwan into a coffee cup. ....................... 213

Figure 6.17: Panda holding Taiwan in its jaws against a red background. .............................. 215

Figure 6.18: Panda emerging from the mainland to attack Taiwan, deflected by a Formosan bear projecting a yellow heart. ................................................................. 216
Note on Copyright of Figures

The majority of the images in this dissertation were downloaded between September and November, 2017 from the public.318.io digital archive of Sunflower Movement materials at http://public.318.io. These items are referenced by their five-digit archival code. Unless otherwise specified, the images from this archive are ‘orphan works’ of unknown authorship, permitted to be reproduced for reasonable academic purposes. For more information on copyright status of these images, see http://public.318.io/about-rightgranted.

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Note on Romanization and Use of Chinese Characters

I use the Pinyin system romanization for translations as well as for the names of individuals from the People’s Republic of China, as *Pinyin* is the transliteration style most commonly used internationally. Names of Taiwanese individual are transliterated using the Wade-Giles romanization system. Additional transliterations are also included for the names of individuals who use other pronunciations, such as the Taiwanese-Minnan dialect or Aboriginal languages. For historical figures I have opted to use the most widely recognizable conventional spellings (e.g., Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek), as well as for place names ("Taipei" rather than "Taibei").

For Chinese characters, I use simplified characters for the names of people and organizations affiliated with the PRC. Otherwise traditional characters are used in most other cases. When there is a question as to the most appropriate character set to use, both are included in the text.
List of Abbreviations

CPP  Chinese Communist Party (Zhongguo gongchang dang  中國共產黨, simplified Chinese: 中國共产党)

CSSTA  Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (Haixi laing’an fuwu maoyi xieyi 海峽兩岸服務貿易協議)

DPP  Democratic Progressive Party (Minzhu jinbu dang 民主進步黨)

ECFA  Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (Liang’an jingji hezuo jiaogou xieyi 兩岸經濟合作架構協議)

KMT  Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang 國民黨)

LY  Legislative Yuan (Lifa yuan 立法院)

MAC  Mainland Affairs Council (Dalu weiyuanhui 大陸委員會)

NPP  New Power Party (Shidai liliang 時代力量)

PRC  People’s Republic of China (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 中華人民共和國, simplified Chinese: 中华人民共和国)

ROC  Republic of China (Zhonghua minguo 中華民國)

SM  Sunflower Movement (Taiyanghua xueyun 太陽花學運)

TIM  Taiwan Independence Movement (Taiwan duli yundong 臺灣獨立運動)
Chapter 1 - Introduction

The 2014 Sunflower Movement

On the evening of March 18, 2014, a coalition of civil society and student groups organized a rally outside of Taiwan’s legislature building. They were protesting in response to a controversial move the previous day by lawmaker Chang Ching-chung 張慶忠, a legislator from the ruling Guomindang (KMT) party. Chang had concluded committee review of a contentious trade agreement between the Republic of China (ROC) and People’s Republic of China (PRC) after only 30 seconds of debate, sending it back to the KMT-dominated legislature where it was certain to pass final reading. At around 9 PM a group of about 50 protesters forced their way into the plenary chamber of the Legislative Yuan (LY) building, barricaded themselves inside, and put a call out via social media for public support. By midnight around 200 people had joined

Figure 1.1: View from the roof of the Legislative Yuan, including an inverted ROC flag and a large cardboard sunflower above a crowd of protesters (Photograph).
Source: Mandy Cheng/AFP
the occupation, while thousands of supporters filled the surrounding streets (M. Ho, 2018, p. 194). The occupation quickly became known as the Sunflower Movement (SM) after a florist donated dozens of sunflowers as a symbol of the transparency which the protestors were demanding from the government (Rowen, 2015, p. 9). The ensuing occupation of the LY lasted 24 days, with affiliated marches, concerts, and public lectures in the surrounding streets. The protest peaked with an estimated 500,000-person rally on March 30, making it the largest political protest in Taiwan’s history (M. Ho, 2015, p. 69). It was also an incredibly effective protest in terms of achieving its political objectives, resulting in the indefinite postponement of the contentious Cross-strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA), and contributing to the landslide defeat of the KMT in both the 2014 midterm (Hsieh, 2015) and 2016 legislative and presidential elections (van der Horst, 2016).

As is often the case in Taiwan’s politics, the national identity issue – whether Taiwan is ‘Chinese’ or ‘Taiwanese’, and what that identity means for cross-strait policy – loomed large in the background of this dramatic, month-long standoff. Photographs and video feeds of the occupied LY chamber are filled with flags, portraits of ‘national heroes’ from the past, and images of the ubiquitous seed-shaped island of Taiwan. The prevalence of these national symbols indicates that while the SM was most immediately a response to a specific investment and trade policy proposal (the CSSTA), it also engaged in the construction, reproduction, and contestation of national identity. Despite this, there has been surprisingly little scholarly attention given to the role of national identity in the SM. The handful of exceptions acknowledge that national identity informed participation in or support for the SM (e.g., Au, 2017; F.-Y. Chen & Yen, 2017; Kwan, 2016; Pan, 2015), but these studies do not seek to unpack how such identities are constructed, reproduced, or contested. The current project addresses this oversight by approaching national identity as an ongoing and iterative process, not a pre-existing identity which can be claimed (or denied), but one which is defined and redefined through acts of claiming (and denying) symbolic markers of national identity. Specifically, I analyse images produced by the SM, in order to unpack the often implicit and unreflexive
assumptions about what constitutes ‘the nation’. My analysis of the visual materials created by participants during the SM – posters, pamphlets, banners, photographs, paintings and sketches – reveals a sustained but easily overlooked engagement with questions of Taiwan’s national identity. I show how SM images do not merely re-present Taiwan as a distinct national community, but that they do so in ways which shift the conceptual margins of the categories ‘Taiwanese’ and ‘Chinese’. National identity in these images is not simply claimed or asserted, but also re-imagined and reproduced in ways which are subtly but significantly different from conventional ways that the nation has been imagined in Taiwan. Unlike previous generations of resistance against the KMT government, many of the SM images appropriate and resignify well-worn national symbols as symbols of resistance against the very party that created and claimed them for nearly a century. In order to highlight some of these differences, I contrast the SM imagery with government images relevant to the controversial cross-strait agreements, which rely on and reproduce well-worn symbolic conventions to frame Taiwan as part of a larger Chinese nation. I argue that, by contrast, a novel conception of national identity informs the SM imagery, one which draws upon elements from conventional understandings of both Taiwanese and Chinese identity. On one hand, this novel identity is framed in opposition to the version of Chinese identity promoted by the ruling Nationalist Party (KMT). However, it also differs from previous conceptions of Taiwanese identity through its selective appropriation of symbols and motifs typically associated with Chinese identity.

On a theoretical level this project shows how national identity is an ongoing process of identification. By approaching identity as continually reproduced or performed through acts of representation (Butler, 1990, p. 185), I avoid essentializing notions of nation and of national identity (Hearn & Antonsich, 2018). My point is precisely that there is no true Taiwanese identity or nation ‘out there’ to be discovered and analysed. I do not set out looking for a singular Taiwanese identity at the core of the SM, nor to determine if the SM portrayed ‘accurate’ representations of ‘authentic’ Taiwanese identity. Instead, I show that these processes of identification ‘from below’ are not monologs. Rather, the construction and
reproduction of identity takes place in conversation with top-down nation-building policies and related government imagery, as well as with other ways of conceptualizing the nation which are circulating in society. Thus, national identity in the SM was also a process of contestation through visual representations.

This project focuses on visual materials, developing a novel approach for studying national identity. As I explain in Chapter 2, visual materials are an underutilized source for studying implicit attitudes and beliefs (Duncum, 2004, p. 257; Weber, 2008, p. 138). In order to unpack the complex ways in which national identity is reproduced and contested in images, I adapt a method of visual social semiotic analysis developed by Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen (2006). This approach devotes considerable attention to how the ‘preferred reading’ (Hall, 1980, pp. 123–124) of an image is shaped by its composition (the arrangement and relationships between component elements) and context (its place in broader physical, social, and intertextual milieux). I show how the context and composition of the images created by the SM re-signify easily recognized ‘national’ symbols, imparting them with unconventional connotations and, by extension, complicating associated conceptions of ‘the nation’.

The primary source of SM images for this project is the 318 archives (public.318.io), a collection of over 7000 artifacts gathered from the LY on the final morning of the occupation by researchers from Academia Sinica. To the best of my knowledge, the present analysis is the first scholarly engagement with the archives. I compare its images with those appearing in publications by the government’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) promoting the ECFA (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement) and the CSSTA, in order to highlight the contested nature of national identity. Each analysis chapter (Chapters 4-6) explores one of the three most common motifs found in images from the public.318.io archives, comparing how the conception of national identity evident in the SM imagery differs from that of the MAC. In Chapter 4 I show how the SM images appropriate the ROC flag and dissociate it from its deeply sedimented connections to the KMT and Chinese national identity. Chapter 5 looks at how SM images appeal to ‘history’ in ways which shift the conceptual boundaries of Chinese and
Taiwanese identities by incorporating historical figures, such as Sun Yat-sen. The result is a visual narrative which implicitly justifies the SM while situating the KMT in a pointedly ‘foreign’ national history. Chapter 6 considers representations of national space in the form of maps and map-like logos. I argue that the MAC imagery frames Taiwan as a deterritorialized and apolitical space, while the SM images use a range of visual techniques which reinforce the idea that the island of Taiwan is coterminous with a distinct political community.

*Social, political, and economic context of the SM*

The SM emerged in a broader context of social, political, and economic conditions, all of which had contributed to an increasing mobilization of civil society in Taiwan. Although grassroots social movements had been on the decline since 2000, a dramatic resurgence of political activism began around 2008 (Cole, 2017; M. Ho, 2014). It is generally agreed that this new wave of social activism started with the 2008 Wild Strawberries Movement (*ye caomei yundong* 野草莓運動) in response to a visit by the PRC official Chen Yunlin 陈云林 to Taiwan.¹ For the most part the protests and movements which emerged subsequently did not engage with divisive questions of national identity or Taiwanese independence. Although a few groups formed to protest Chinese consolidation of ownership over Taiwanese mass media, most focused on local issues including environmental protection, land rights, urban renewal, and abuses of military trainees (M. Ho, 2015, p. 78).² The SM itself emerged out of this broader trend towards grassroots political activism. The organizing body of the March 18 protest which set off the SM, the Democratic Front Against Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement (*fanheixiang fuwu minzhu zhenxian* 反黑箱服務民主陣線),³ was a coalition of labour, gender,

¹ Chen led the PRC delegation which negotiated ECFA and the CSSTA during the ‘Jiang-Chen Talks’ between 2008 and 2012 (see discussion in Chapters 5 and 6).
² For discussion of the protest movements preceding the SM, see Cole (2015) and Fell (2017b).
³ Note that the common English name of this coalition (also commonly called simply ‘the Democratic Front’ in English scholarship) omits reference in the Chinese name to ‘black box’ (*heixiang*) political decision making. Representing the issues as a straightforward opposition between ‘democracy’ and the CSSTA – and bypassing more complicated questions around official decision making processes – is common in English language media produced by the SM. See the discussion of Figures 6.12-6.14.

A number of scholars have argued that this rise in political activism is at least partly the result of a generational shift in Taiwanese society. Most of the activists involved in these new movements were born after 1981, colloquially referred to as qinianjisheng 七年級生 or ‘seventh graders’ in reference to their education cohort (M. Ho, 2019a, pp. 74–75). This generation grew up under very different political conditions than the one before it: “[u]nlike their parents and elders, their socialization framework was not a dictatorship based on the myth of ‘retaking the mainland’ and on integral Chinese nationalism. Young Taiwanese were socialized in a rapidly democratizing and relatively prosperous society” (Le Pesant, 2018, p. 68). On one hand, for those coming of age at the close of the 20th century the institutionalized discrimination between ‘mainlanders’ and ‘Taiwanese’ under Martial Law (1949-1987) was more a matter of history than lived experience (discussed in Chapter 3; see also Corcuff, 2002b). On the other hand, both of the major political parties were widely perceived as unresponsive to the concerns of the younger generation, leading them to turn to other channels of political engagement (Brading, 2017; Liao, Liu, & Chen, 2018, p. 23).

Economic concerns were also an increasingly prominent issue under Ma Ying-jeou, especially for younger people in Taiwan. Although GDP increased during Ma’s first term (2008-2012) as the global economy recovered from the 2008 economic crisis, income inequality also continued to rise (Batto, 2014, p. 20; Fuller, 2014, p. 89). Increasing investment from the mainland contributed to a growing real-estate bubble, pushing prices out of the reach of many Taiwanese, while outsourced manufacturing suppressed wages (Sullivan & Smyth, 2018, p. 22). These forces hit younger Taiwanese especially hard, and by 2014 unemployment for those under 25 had risen to 11% and median income was declining (M. Ho, 2019a, p. 76). Ma promised that ECFA would rejuvenate the Taiwanese economy by making exports to the PRC more competitive, increasing domestic and foreign direct investment, and facilitating Taiwan’s integration into the East Asian market. However, there was little or no measurable
improvement in any of those areas between 2008 and 2015 (Tung, 2018, pp. 164–175). All of
this led to a growing concern that the ‘seventh grader’ generation would have a worse quality
of life than their parents (Le Pesant, 2018, p. 69).

These larger social, political, and economic contexts leading up to the SM are reflected in
the main issues articulated by the protestors, which can be grouped into three broad
categories: exacerbated economic inequality, increased PRC influence in Taiwanese affairs, and
a perceived lack of democratic oversight. Building on the questionable benefits of ECFA, many
groups participating in the SM were skeptical of the economic impacts of the CSSTA. They
argued that it would mainly benefit wealthy investors while exposing Taiwan’s struggling
service sector to greater competition with large state-backed Chinese enterprises and the
mainland’s much larger and less expensive workforce, which would force down already
stagnant wages in Taiwan (C.-M. Wang, 2017). This made economic disparities a significant
concern for many SM participants (Hsu, 2017; Tseng, 2014). Accordingly, slogans emphasizing
economic issues were prominent features of the SM textual discourse, such as the phrase
“22k”, referring to the expected monthly salary for a university graduate of NT$ 22,000
(approximately US$ 750) (C.-M. Wang, 2017). Thus, it is especially notable, as I note below, that
economic themes are largely absent from the SM’s visual materials. My analysis of the
construction of meaning in visual symbols suggests that this could be because other ways of
framing opposition to the CSSTA, such as on national identity grounds, are more effective in a
visual modality. At the same time, the other two concerns evident in SM protester textual
discourses, PRC influence and KMT erosion of democratic process, were evident in SM visual
imagery, intertwined with symbolic representations of national identity. Protestors feared that
greater access to Taiwan’s service sector would give the PRC unprecedented economic leverage
over Taiwanese policy makers, while also allowing mass media to consolidate in the hands of
pro-PRC moguls. In terms of democratic process, the closed-door negotiations of the terms of
the CSSTA (Dai & Wu, 2014), combined with Chang Ching-chung’s abrupt conclusion of the
review process without substantive debate, sparked fears that the government was acting in a
secretive and authoritarian manner to bypass democratic oversight of cross-strait relations and forward the KMT’s pro-China policies. These two issues – PRC influence and democratic principles – are discussed in detail in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, where I show how SM imagery frames them as national identity issues.

**Impacts of the SM**

The significance of national identity imagery of the SM extends beyond the 24 days of the occupation of the LY. This is because the movement itself has had an enduring impact on society and politics in Taiwan. These effects can be broadly grouped into impacts on cross-strait policy, changes in the electoral landscape, and lasting influences on civil society. In terms of substantive policy impacts, the SM achieved its major aims. Most immediately, the CSSTA was shelved indefinitely. Additionally, the government agreed to amend the law governing cross-strait relations, making the process for negotiating political agreements with the PRC more transparent and democratically accountable.\(^4\) Public support for Ma’s cross-strait economic policy shifted drastically: while it was generally supportive of the ECFA in 2010, following the SM it was extremely critical of the CSSTA (Fell, 2017a, pp. 10–11; see also Y. Wu & Hsieh, 2014, p. 27). This shift in public opinion was a major factor in turning political elites against the CSSTA, including factions within the KMT, effectively curtailing further cross-strait rapprochement (C. K. S. Wu, 2019, p. 290). The rising unpopularity of their approach to cross-strait relations along with internal factionalism cost the KMT at the polls. The party suffered major losses in the 2014 local elections and the 2016 legislative and presidential elections; the latter marked the worst electoral defeat in the KMT’s history. Observers have argued that this rout was in no small part due to young voters inspired by the success of movements like the SM in campaigning and voting against the KMT (Fell, 2017a, p. 14; M. Ho, 2019a, p. 198). These elections also marked a  

\(^4\) It took until 2019 for such legislation to finally be passed into law. SM alumni who ran for office or continued to organize public pressure were instrumental in keeping this issue on the agenda in the intervening years. Cross-strait agreements now require the approval of 75% of the LY and passage in a public referendum before coming into effect (C. Chen & Ko, 2019).
sea change in party reputation, the public perceiving the KMT as the party more likely to disrupt the cross-strait status-quo, with the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, *minzhu jinbu dang* 民主進步黨) becoming the party associated with stability (Clark & Tan, 2016, p. 339). It appears unlikely that the KMT will be able to shake its image as a pro-China party and reverse the alienation of young voters in the near future (Clark, Tan, & Ho, 2019, p. 24).

The SM has also changed Taiwan’s political landscape by mobilizing and politicizing supporters. The short term appeal of the movement was most evident in the weeks of solidarity marches, teach-ins, and performances in the streets surrounding the LY and especially the March 30th rally - the largest in Taiwan’s history (M. Ho, 2015, p. 69). That momentum has been channeled into long-term political movements. Pan-green parties (the DPP and the pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union, led by former president Lee Teng-hui) created programs to support young independent candidates in local elections in 2014, including assistance with funding, producing campaign materials, and canvassing (A. H.-E. Wang, 2020, p. 319). 2016 saw a boom in new political parties with connections to the SM, which were dubbed the ‘third force’ (*disan shili* 第三勢力), including the New Power Party (*NPP shidai liliang* 時代力量). The DPP agreed not to nominate their own candidates against independents or the NPP (A. H.-E. Wang, 2020, p. 319), and as a result NPP became the third largest party in Taiwan’s legislature with 5 seats (Kwan, 2016, p. 961; Subba, 2016, p. 214). This has led to a broadening of the pan-green platform. The NPP has been active in putting LGBTQ and indigenous issues on the legislative agenda, while the DPP renewed its lapsed ties with civil society, including adding more activists from a broader range of social movements to its lists for proportional representation seats (M. Ho, 2019a, p. 199). Other prominent figures from the SM, such as Lin Fei-fan 林飛帆 and Lai Pin-yu 賴品妤, have subsequently joined the DPP. Taken all together, echoes of the SM will continue to influence electoral politics in the ROC for years to come. This makes the conceptions of national identity which emerged during the SM a topic of enduring interest.

The SM has also been widely credited with reinvigorating Taiwanese civil society long after the occupation of the LY concluded. Its success at achieving substantive concessions from the
government has “reanimated civic activism and empowered youth in a way that makes it impossible for political institutions to ignore them” (Cole, 2017, p. 28). Subsequent social movements, many led by former SM participants, sought to reshape political institutions directly, advocating for constitutional reform, recall of elected officials, new referendum laws, and a lower voting age (M. Ho, 2019a, p. 191). It also offered a model of successful collaboration by a wide assortment of organizations, resulting in stronger networks and a greater sense of solidarity in Taiwan’s civil society. Most notably in terms of national identity, ‘China’ became a focal point for resistance that united the diverse coalition of civil society organizations which participated in the SM. Before the occupation many of these groups had considered the PRC as largely irrelevant or tangential to their primary concerns, particularly those focused on more local issues, such as youth rights, indigenous land rights, or opposition to nuclear power (Hsu, 2017, pp. 137–146). Over the course of the occupation, many of these groups came to share a sense that ‘the China Factor’ was a significant concern, even while they maintained different understandings of ‘China’ and how that impacted their respective concerns (Hsu, 2017, p. 149). So, although the SM was not a Taiwanese independence movement per se, it was instrumental in framing opposition to ‘China’ as the common cause shared by a distinctly Taiwanese civil society. The present study considers how these different ideas of ‘China’ are constructed in SM images, as well as how they contrast with ideas of ‘Taiwan’, in order to better understand the dynamic nature of national identity in contemporary Taiwan.
National Identity in Taiwan

Identity is a key political issue in Taiwan, and one which is hotly debated. The proportion of the population that exclusively identifies as Taiwanese has been rising steadily since the mid-1990s, overtaking the hyphenated ‘both Chinese and Taiwanese’ category as the predominant identity by 2008 (Figure 1.2). This begs the question: is self-identifying as Taiwanese (or Chinese) an expression of national identity, or an ethnocultural one? As I discuss more extensively in Chapter 2, I consider a national identity one which entails a claim to political autonomy or sovereignty. An ethnocultural identity, on the other hand, does not necessarily imply such a claim, although it may be put forward as the basis for claims to special (e.g., cultural) rights within a national community. So whether Taiwanese society is (or sees itself) as
Chinese or Taiwanese is a question of national identity to the extent that those categories intersect with claims to political autonomy or sovereignty (Brubaker, Feischmidt, Fox, & Grancea, 2006, p. 14). Whether someone in Taiwan understands the Taiwanese community as part of a larger Chinese nation or as a distinct nation unto itself has profound impacts on their views on both local and cross-strait political questions (Hsieh, 2005). The PRC’s behaviour regarding Taiwan, ranging from demanding Taiwan’s exclusion from international organizations to thinly veiled threats of military action, is rooted in claims that Taiwan should be part of a united Chinese state because Taiwan is part of the Chinese nation (see, e.g., C. Hughes, 1997). The majority of people in Taiwan seem to disagree. Nonetheless, the PRC government treats assertions of Taiwanese identity as a separatist threat to national integrity, resulting in cross-strait tensions that threaten regional stability. When Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九 was elected president of the ROC in 2008, one of his stated goals was to reduce tensions with the PRC. In addition to opening up trade and travel across the Taiwan strait, part of this rapprochement strategy involved re-emphasizing shared Chinese identity in his speeches and in his administration’s cultural and education policies (Amae & Damm, 2011; B. Chang, 2004; Kaeding, 2009). And yet, as Figure 1.2 indicates, it is precisely around 2008 that more people started identifying as Taiwanese, placing the government narrative at odds with the apparent trends in society. It is not surprising, then, that national identity has remained an ongoing source of political tension. However, as I explain below, a problem emerges from the tendency to treat ‘Taiwanese’ and ‘Chinese’ as self-evident and uncontested categories. In other words, in scholarship, media, and everyday conversation, we too often take for granted that we know what people mean when they assert a Taiwanese (or Chinese) identity. By providing a more nuanced and dynamic analysis of how national identity is represented and articulated during the SM period, the present study not only informs our understanding of contentious cross-strait relations, but offers insight into the tensions between state and popular ideas of national identity which came to bear during the SM.
National identity in the SM

Given the importance of the national identity question in Taiwan, it is surprising that this issue has been relatively neglected in studies of the SM. Within this literature, Ho Ming-sho, one of the foremost experts on contemporary social movements in Taiwan, focuses on a political opportunity model. From his perspective, the SM was able to prevent the passage of the CSSTA due in large part to conflicts within the ruling KMT. In brief, this argument suggests that the SM was able to succeed because of an ongoing feud between Speaker of the LY, Wang Jin-pyng 王金平, and President Ma Ying-jeou. Wang refused to eject the protestors by force and ultimately negotiated the agreement that ended the occupation in an effort to undermine Ma (M. Ho, 2015, 2019a; see also Kaeding, 2015, p. 211).5 This prevented the government from presenting a unified front, giving the protestors room to maneuver at key moments during the occupation. Other scholars focus on the organization of the movement and tensions within it (B. Chen et al., 2014; Cole, 2015, p. 7; Hsu, 2017), or on the social issues and political objectives motivating participants (B. Chen et al., 2014; C.-M. Wang, 2017). A number of prominent figures in Taiwan studies briefly note that national identity played an important role in the success of the SM (e.g., Kaeding, 2015; Le Pesant, 2018). However, only a handful of studies have explored this issue in a sustained fashion. When this latter research addresses national identity, it typically only uses self-identification surveys as background context, noting that more people than ever before identify as Taiwanese rather than as Chinese (e.g., Clark & Tan, 2016; M. Ho, 2019a, p. 61; Kwan, 2016). While valuable, this work does not unpack how Taiwanese identity was represented and used by participants in the SM, what claims were attached to such representations, nor how the SM was involved in re-producing particular understandings of ‘Taiwaneseness’ while challenging others. The present study addresses this

5 Charles Wu (2019) critiques this analysis, arguing that public support for the SM was more influential than factional infighting in pushing KMT leaders (including Wang) to meet the protestors’ key demands. See also Ho Ming-sho’s (2019b) response in the same issue.
gap by looking at how ideas of Chinese and Taiwanese identity were constructed, reproduced, and in many cases, contested through SM imagery.

Approaches to studying national identity in Taiwan

Studies about national identity in Taiwan (outside of the SM) typically have taken one of two approaches since the early 2000s. One strand is top down, in that it focuses on state-led nation building. These studies explore how the state constructs national identity through official discourses and policies, with particular attention to presidential speeches (H.-C. Chang & Holt, 2009b; Sullivan & Lowe, 2010; Sullivan & Sapir, 2012, 2013), education curricula (Stolojan, 2017; Fu-chang Wang, 2005), and cultural policy (B. Chang, 2018; W.-C. Ho, 2007; Rudolph, 2004). The central issue in this literature is how different administrations define Taiwan’s national identity and attempt to instill that identity in the populace. The overall argument this literature lays out is that the government under President Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008) pursued a program of ‘Taiwanization’ which emphasizes Taiwanese identity as the basis for political autonomy. On the other hand, under President Ma Ying-jeou (2008-2016) the government downplayed symbols and discussions of Taiwan’s distinctiveness and instead stressed shared Chinese history and culture.

The second approach in the literature is more bottom up. Rather than focusing on how the state conceptualizes national identity, this literature quantitatively examines how average citizens see Taiwanese national identity, through self-identification surveys. By far the most common source cited on this topic is the quarterly survey administered by the Election Study Centre at National Chengchi University in Taipei. This survey asks respondents if they consider themselves Taiwanese, Chinese, or both (Figure 1.2). Surveys like this show that a growing majority of people identify as Taiwanese, leveling off at about 58% after peaking at 60% during the SM. However, as many scholars note, both ‘Chinese’ and ‘Taiwanese’ could describe either

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6 Even Dawley (2009) marks the year 2000 as a turning point in Taiwanese studies, a delayed response to the end of Martial Law which allowed greater intellectual freedom and access to previously restricted documents.
a cultural or political community (or both). Thus it is unclear whether or not this trend should be taken as an indicator of a shift in national identity (e.g., Cabestan, 2017; M. Chang, 2000; Chen, 2012; Jiang, 2017; Yu, 2016). Although the exact terminology varies, these quantitative studies generally conclude that national identity in Taiwan has become ‘civic’ – based on shared political values, rather than ethnicity (R. Chen, 2014; Kwan, 2016; I.-C. Lee & Pratto, 2011; Rigger, 2002; Zhong, 2016)7 (see Chapter 2 for a more extensive discussion of these two analytical approaches). While both of these approaches offer important insights into national identity in Taiwan, neither engages with questions of how such identities are constructed, reproduced, and sometimes contested by those outside the government – Taiwan’s civil society.

Limitations of current approaches

The top-down approach treats national identity as an ongoing state-led construction or process, while the survey approach focuses attention on actors outside of state institutions, namely the people who constitute ‘the nation’. The insights offered by these two approaches provide the groundwork for my study. The literature on state-led nation building sheds light on how official discourses and policies construct national identity. However, it has little to say about how citizens take up, resist, or adapt those official identity narratives. By contrast, my research focuses on the processes through which ordinary citizens construct national identity in an overtly political context. As Eric Hobsbawm notes, in order to understand national identities we must also pay attention to “the view from below”: the nation as understood by those who are the object of state policies and propaganda (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 11; see also Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008; Goode & Stroup, 2015). I extend questions of how the nation is constructed in contemporary Taiwan to include a ‘view from below’ by looking at how national symbols are incorporated into the imagery of a social movement such as the SM, which enjoyed significant

7 The terminology results in even more confusion, as some authors use ‘nationalism’ to refer exclusively to politicized ethnic identities, while others include ‘civic’ or ‘constitutional’ political identities as a form of nationalism.
public support (M. Ho, 2015, p. 71). Additionally, by comparing this with MAC images, I empirically demonstrate that the government and the activists framed their stances on cross straits rapprochement by drawing on profoundly different conceptions of ‘the nation’. The extensive resignification of (conventionally) ‘national’ symbols in the SM imagery stands in sharp contrast with the MAC’s often banal reiteration of sedimented associations between the KMT, ROC, and Chinese nation frequently through the same ‘national’ symbols. My analysis thus shows that not only is the ‘view from below’ sometimes different from the official conception of national identity, but also how social actors outside of formal political institutions engage with, appropriate, and reconfigure ideas of ‘the nation’.

On the other hand, given that the survey approach considers national identity as an aggregate of popular attitudes extrapolated from statistical sampling, it tells us very little about how contextual factors influence identity, nor about the processes through which identities are reproduced. Quantitative studies such as surveys are useful for identifying long-term social trends, but they are also limited. In order to identify social trends, they must assume that the constructs they purport to measure (i.e., ‘Chinese’ and ‘Taiwanese’) are relatively unambiguous and consistent over time. As Rogers Brubaker (1994, p. 5) has astutely pointed out, treating categories of social practise as categories for analysis runs the risk of reifying and essentializing those categories as stable, natural, and uncontested group identities. In other words, we should not assume that people are signifying the same concept of national identity just because they tend to use the same signifier (verbal or visual) in many different contexts. This begs the more critical question of what identities are being constructed and reproduced by such symbolic acts.

In contrast, I approach Taiwanese (and Chinese) identity, like all social categories, as contingent and relational (Corcuff, 2018, p. 113; Le Pesant, 2018). Put simply, what a person means when they state “I am X” means very different things depending on the context of that assertion. For example, ‘Chinese’ may refer equally to a racial, linguistic, cultural, or political

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8 For an especially thorough examination of the contingent nature of conceptions of ‘the Chinese nation’, see Callahan (2004).
(i.e., citizenship) category, and individuals may identify with one or more of those categories but not others depending on the situation (M. Chang, 2000; Liao et al., 2018, p. 66). Moreover, the contingency of these identities means that they necessarily change over time (Kaeding, 2009). When the pro-democracy advocate Cheng Nan-jung declared “I am Taiwanese” in 1987 to protest decades of martial law, the phrase had different cultural and political connotations than when SM participants repeated the phrase in 2014 to protest the CSSTA. (This is discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 5, where I argue that implying that both assertions refer to the same identity is itself a political act which legitimizes the SM by framing it as part of the same historical narrative as Cheng Nan-jung.) Consequently, whether or not someone considers Chinese identity as opposed to or compatible with a Taiwanese identity is not easily measured by categorical check-boxes in a survey. Identity and nation in Taiwan are, in a word, complicated (Cabestan, 2017; R. Chen, 2012; Jiang, 2017, p. 23). In order to address this complexity, researchers need to explore the processes through which national identity is constructed, reproduced, and contested.

**Project Overview**

**Research questions**

This project develops a nuanced and context-sensitive analysis by looking at one, often overlooked process by which national identity in Taiwan is reproduced: visual representation. This leads me to three overlapping research questions. First, how are ideas of the nation constructed and reproduced in images? Rather than asking what an individual artist intended their image to convey (a question better answered through interviews), I identify and analyse the implicit connotations that make national symbols intelligible and yet also open to contestation. Taking national identity as a form of political habitus, that is, a set of largely

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9 I use the term ‘imagery’ to refer to a complete set of images – all the SM images examined or all the MAC images – as a whole. In general, it is used synonymously with ‘images’, although the latter may also refer to only a few specific images.
unconscious perceptive schemes (Bourdieu, 1984; De Cillia, Reisigl, & Wodak, 1999), I use visual images as a way into the implicit, sometimes contradictory understandings of ‘the nation’.

My second research question focuses specifically on the contestation of national identity. How do representations of national identity differ between SM imagery and government imagery on the same issue? The SM did not occur in a vacuum, but in the context of Ma Ying-jeou’s broader assertion of Taiwan’s ‘Chineseness’. Comparing the SM imagery with the imagery used in government publications on the same topic (i.e., cross-strait relations) sheds light on the competing conceptions of national identity shaping contemporary politics in Taiwan. This is not simply a question of representing Taiwan as either Chinese or Taiwanese. Rather, I look at how these images construct different ideas of ‘Taiwanese’ and ‘Chinese’ to legitimate particular political actors and actions.

At the intersection of these two questions emerges a third. Visual symbols of the nation depend on an implicit conception of what ‘the nation’ is, in order to be understood as symbols of the nation. How then, can an image use national symbols to contest the conception of the nation associated with these very symbols? In other words, how can a person use a symbol to problematize the very thing it symbolizes? What conditions allow such symbols to be resignified, or reiterated in ways that enable them to take on alternative, possibly counter-hegemonic meanings (Lloyd, 2007; see also Butler, 1997)? As I discuss more below and in Chapter 2, to address this question I draw on a social semiotic framework for analysing visual materials (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006). This approach posits that the meaning of a given image is determined not only by its content (the symbols which appear in it), but also by its context (where the image is located in physical and social space), and composition (the arrangement of formal elements such as colour, line, texture, and space in the image). Symbols are neither completely open to interpretation nor rigidly fixed in a single meaning. Rather, the context and

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10 Note that ‘composition’ here does not refer only to the formal arrangement of elements (i.e., where things are on a page or screen), but also to how that arrangement indicates relationships between the various elements (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 176).
composition steer the viewer toward a range of plausible interpretations or “preferred readings” (Hall, 1980, pp. 123–124). As my analysis shows, the context and composition of both the government and SM imagery direct the preferred reading of conventionally ‘national’ symbolic content, reproducing national identities which legitimate their respective interests and actions.

**Methodology: visual analysis**

In order to develop a more complete picture of competing conceptions of national identity circulating during the SM, I focus on visual materials such as posters, photographs, banners, and drawings. We live in a world that increasingly relies on visual modes of communication (Emmison & Smith, 2000, p. x; Weber, 2008, p. 138). Despite this, with the exception of those with formal training in visual art or design, people are not taught how to ‘read’ images critically as they are with texts (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p. 18). Moreover, as I discuss in greater detail in Chapter 2, visual communication is distinct from spoken or written discourse, with its own conventions for representing connections between the contents of an image, between it and other images, and between the image and the viewer (Duncum, 2004, p. 257). This means that we cannot simply read an image the way we read a piece of text. The preferred reading of an image is communicated through a ‘visual grammar’ which functions in ways that are analogous to, but distinct from that of spoken or written language (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 18). As with such linguistic grammar, meaning is conveyed not only by the individual contents (words), but through the arrangement of these contents relative to each other. Consider for example the old journalism adage that “‘dog bites man’ is nothing, but ‘man bites dog’ is news.” The same three words in a slightly different arrangement changes not only what the sentence means (the action described), but also the perceived social importance of the information. Meaning in images is similarly subject to formal¹¹ conventions which suggest how the viewer

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¹¹ I use the terms ‘form’ and ‘formal’ to refer to the basic elements which make up an image: line, colour, shape, tone (or value), texture, as well as their arrangement on the page. This is in contrast to the content of the image: the
should interpret the contents (Weber, 2008, p. 138; see also Berger, 1972). As a result, visual analysis is useful for revealing implicit attitudes and assumptions, especially those that reproduce lines of social difference (Bleiker, 2019, p. 119; Campbell, 2007).

As a methodology, visual analysis has much to offer the study of national identity in particular. When people are directly questioned about the nation (in surveys or interviews, for example), their answers tell us little about their unselfconscious beliefs about the nation, or ‘national habitus’ (Fox, 2017, p. 42; L. Li, 2015, pp. 315–317). Researchers have used discourse analysis (De Cillia et al., 1999; Moreno-Almendral, 2018) or ethnographic approaches (Brubaker et al., 2006; Hearn, 2007) to get at underlying preconceptions about national identity. However, visual analysis remains underutilized. This is surprising given that seminal nationalism literature often points to visual artifacts as examples of how national identity is constructed and reproduced. The empirical foundation of Michael Billing’s influential work on banal nationalism is almost entirely the written or spoken word (speeches and newspapers), but the metaphor at the heart of his argument, that of the ‘unwaved flag’ hanging unobtrusively outside a public building, describes a completely non-verbal signification of the nation (1995, pp. 6, 39–43).12 Other studies have looked at how national identity is constructed and reproduced through national colours and portraits in public spaces (Brubaker et al., 2006), the design of national currency (Gilbert, 1998; Helleiner, 1998; Lauer, 2008; Mwangi, 2002; Unwin & Hewitt, 2001), and the aesthetics of patriotic films (Edensor, 2002). By and large, however, nationalism scholars treat visual symbols as illustrations, rather than objects of study in their own right.

This excessive reliance on text-based methodologies is even more pronounced in the study of Taiwanese identity. The surveys discussed above all use verbal or textual methods to people, places, objects represented. This is not to suggest that form and content can be neatly isolated from one another: quite the contrary, much of my argument shows how form informs content. However, the distinction is analytically useful when emphasizing how an image is put together, rather than what is represented in it.

12 Billig later argues that these visual reminders of the nation must be reinforced by “routine habits in language” (1995, p. 93). I agree that language interacts with visual symbols, often anchoring otherwise ambiguous meanings (see Chapter 2). Nonetheless, the visual aspects of this dynamic have received far less attention than discourse.
measure identity (i.e., phone and printed surveys). Accounts of the discursive construction of identity focus on literature (Hsiau, 2000; Tzeng, 2009; see also Dawley, 2009), speeches (Lams & Liao, 2011; Sullivan & Sapir, 2012, 2013), or newspapers (H.-C. Chang & Holt, 2009b). Even studies on nationalizing the physical landscape typically focus on the discursive practices of place naming (Kaeding, 2009, p. 7), largely overlooking the visual aspects such as architecture, spatial arrangement, design and decoration. Dafydd Fell (2011, 2012) and Stephan Corcuff (2011) offer some strong insights into the visual aspects of Taiwanese political advertisements, but these analyses are brief and supplementary to their main arguments. Similarly, while articles on the SM often include photographs of the occupation site or the numerous protest posters and banners they produced, the authors use these images only to illustrate rhetorical or discursive themes (e.g., B. Chen et al., 2014; Rowen, 2015; Wright, 2014). As such, my research not only contributes to the growing literature on visual materials in nationalism studies more generally, but to my knowledge it is also the first sustained visual analysis of Taiwanese national identity specifically.

My analytical framework draws primarily on social semiotics, initially proposed by Hodge & Kress (1988) and developed into a framework specifically for analyzing visual materials by Kress & van Leeuwen (2002, 2006) and Painter, Martin, & Unsworth (2013). I discuss this approach in detail in Chapter 2. In brief, semiotics devotes careful attention to the production of meaning – or the relationship between signifier (e.g., a written word or pictured object) and signified (an associated concept or idea). Semiotics thus offers a technical framework for analysing how the composition of an image – “the way in which the... elements are made to relate to each other, the way they are integrated into a meaningful whole” (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 176) –

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13 By way of comparison, looking at Hong Kong identity Eric Ma and Anthony Fung (2007) conducted surveys measuring respondents’ attitudes towards images of visual symbols such as flags and landmarks. I am not aware of any similar studies in a Taiwanese context.

14 For example, numerous authors discuss the conflicts over President Chen Shui-bian changing the name of ‘Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Square’ Zhongzheng jinian guangchang 中正紀念廣場 to ‘Liberty Square’ ziyou guagnchang 自由廣場. The extensive influence of traditional Chinese aesthetic in the design and organization of the space is left as an architectural footnote, at best.
directs how a viewer is likely to interpret that image (Rose, 2001, p. 69). As an extension of
semiotic theory, social semiotics seeks to situate these meaning-making processes in their
social context, arguing that the conventional associations between signifier and signified are
shaped by prevailing social and political forces (Hodge & Kress, 1988; see also Bal & Bryson,
1991; Berger, 1972). This framework is attuned to the subtle ways that meaning is a product
not only of the content of an image, but also of its composition, and the cultural, political, and
ideological context in which it was produced and circulated. Such an approach is thus well
suited to unpacking how ‘national’ symbols not only legitimate certain actors, actions, or
priorities while marginalizing others, but also how they reproduce particular conceptions of the
nation itself.

Research design and data collection

My primary source material for SM images is the archive of material collected from the LY
by researchers and volunteers on the final day of the occupation. From this collection of over
7,000 artefacts (images, notes, video files, and physical objects), I have identified all objects
containing original visual content.15 In order to better examine the contested or competing
conceptions of national identity, I also collected an 157 documents published by the MAC
during the Ma Ying-jeou administration (2008-2016), identifying the images they contain. The
MAC is the government organization responsible for relations with the PRC and was the main
body in charge of promoting cross-strait rapprochement including the ECFA and the CSSTA. This
makes MAC imagery the most comparable with the SM in terms of subject matter. I then
manually coded the resulting sets of 1037 SM images and 466 MAC images in order to identify
the visual content conventionally associated with symbols of national identity. This included

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15 This excluded purely text-based letters or notes, and images which were self-evidently created outside of the SM
(e.g., unaltered notebook covers or postcards). In order to keep the data to a manageable scope, I also excluded
images containing only a sunflower, as well as video files (see the discussion of data sources and selection in
Chapter 2).
flags, maps, national animals, historical figures, political party logos, and stereotypically ‘ethnic’
clothing or objects. I then selected the most common motifs for closer social semiotic analysis.

**Contributions**

By analyzing how the SM and the government used symbols commonly associated with ‘the
nation’ in their visual materials, I aim to better understand how national identity is constructed
and contested in contemporary Taiwan. A close, interpretive analysis contributes a more fine-
grained picture of some of the understandings of nation that underlie the rising popularity of
Taiwanese identity observed in numerous surveys. Moreover, by looking at national identities
in the context of a specific political conflict, this study is able to consider how different actors
use those identities as a cognitive schema or ‘frame’ which defines problems, suggests the
causes of those problems, and legitimizes actions to remedy them (Entman, 1993; Snow &
Benford, 2000b).

Comparing SM and government imagery highlights the conflicting conceptions of ‘the
nation’ circulating in Taiwan. The extensive use of national symbols by both sides of the conflict
over the CSSTA indicates that it was not simply a policy disagreement, but a conflict rooted in
profoundly different conceptions of Taiwan as a political community. As I show in my analysis,
these different conceptions were more complex than a simple binary opposition of “Chinese vs.
Taiwanese.” Rather, national flags, national histories, and national territory were all used to
reiterate particular conceptions of Chinese and Taiwanese identities.

My analysis also seeks to move beyond the binary “civic vs. ethnic” framework which
informs much of the existing literature on identity in Taiwan. I am less interested in categorizing
contemporary Taiwanese identity as either civic or ethnic (or in fact, in trying to unearth any
essential quality of a supposedly singular Taiwanese identity), than I am in looking at how
different conceptions of national identity frame certain actors, policies, or values as legitimate
or authentic, while framing others as non-national or ‘foreign’. I make no overarching claims or
efforts to pin down a ‘true’ Taiwanese identity, even within the narrow context of the SM.
Instead, I trace the contours of the different, sometimes contradictory conceptions of ‘China’ and ‘Taiwan’ which are invoked in images in ways that justify certain political positions and actions, including civil disobedience. Additionally, this project sits at the intersection of the two approaches to national identity in Taiwan discussed earlier. Studies on state-led nation building address how ideas of the nation are constructed and reproduced by government leaders and policy, while survey-based studies look at national identity in the general population but have little to say about the processes of reproduction and contestation of that identity. Comparing government and SM imagery makes it possible to consider the representational processes through which national identity is contested. Creating and circulating images which suggest interpretations of national symbols that contradict the official narrative is one way that alternative conceptions of national identity can be articulated ‘from below’. Finally, the project’s contribution also lies in its extensive analysis of SM visual artifacts not previously examined in the scholarly literature. To my knowledge this is the first scholarly analysis of materials from the public.318.io archive, which represents a significant resource for the study of social movements in contemporary Taiwan.

Chapter Overview

Chapter 2 sets out the theoretical and conceptual framework of the project, reviewing the literature on nationalism and national identity. The chapter also elaborates the rationale for a visual methodology in the study of national identity. Finally, it presents the methods of data collection, selection, and analysis used in this project. Chapter 3 provides a broader historical context of national identity in Taiwan from the late 19th century up to the Ma Ying-jeou administration which was in office when the SM took place. This chapter serves as a critical literature review, as well as providing context for the analysis of visual motifs in the following three chapters. Chapter 4 examines how the SM images appropriate the ROC flag as a specifically Taiwanese symbol, and contrasts this with how the flag was used in government publications to blur distinctions between the KMT Party, the ROC state, and a Chinese national
identity. Chapter 5 compares the use and reproduction of ‘national history’ in images produced by the KMT government and the SM to frame cross-strait relations. In brief, I show that the KMT uses cultural imagery to emphasize a common Chinese history as the basis for cross-strait rapprochement. In contrast, the SM imagery makes extensive use of visual references to the past which frame the SM as part of a history specific to Taiwan while framing the KMT as stuck in an anachronistic Chinese history. Notably, however, I show how the SM images accomplish this by synthesizing conventionally ‘Chinese’ and ‘Taiwanese’ historical narratives in novel and sometimes surprising ways. Finally, Chapter 6 examines the use of representations of geographic space – maps and map-like logos – to frame the nation. I show how KMT images emphasize Taiwan’s global connectivity, representing Taiwan as part of a borderless world free of geopolitical tensions. On the other hand, the SM imagery emphasizes the territoriality of Taiwan, stressing a conceptual equivalence of bounded physical space with the exclusive jurisdiction of state sovereignty (Agnew, 1994). The KMT images represent the economic and political fields as wholly detached from each other, locating Taiwan firmly in the former. In contrast, the island of Taiwan in the SM images is saturated with political significance, framing it pointedly as national territory defined in opposition to the PRC. This is achieved through the repeated juxtaposition of the island of Taiwan with PRC symbols, as well as through representations of Taiwan which reinforce the sense of Taiwan as a distinct community whose boundaries are inscribed by vulnerability and injury. The analysis in this chapter shows how context and composition elicit different affective responses, resulting in an emotionally charged tone or ambience (Painter et al., 2012, pp. 34–44) which inscribes a distinction between a

16 Throughout my analysis I use the term ‘geopolitical’ in a colloquial sense to refer narrowly to the competition between states over territory and resources. This is meant as an analytical shorthand for the competition between the PRC and ROC (largely underwritten by the USA) over the control of Taiwan using ‘hard power’ – the threat of military force, economic rewards or punishments, or coercive diplomacy (Keohane & Nye, 2012, p. 216). However, by no means should this be taken as a commitment to a political realist or realpolitik approach which would see these as the main (or only) factors driving cross-strait relations. A distinction also needs to be made here between this colloquial use of ‘geopolitics’ and geopolitics as an analytical approach, which looks at the interaction between geographic space and political power (Agnew, 2003, p. 1; Cohen, 2009, p. 16; Flint, 2006, pp. 13, 16). The latter includes consideration of how the representation of geography constitutes or reproduces power relations (Agnew, 1994; Ó Tuathail, 1996), such as in the analysis presented in Chapter 6.
collective inside and outside (Ahmed, 2004, pp. 62–64). This frames Taiwan not only as a physical island but also as a political community whose boundaries are as much affective as spatial. The concluding chapter places the analysis back into conversation with the broader literature on national identity. I consider the role of national identity in the SM, arguing that it was not simply a background contributing factor. The conception of national identity which emerges from the SM images directly contests the Chinese identity evident in the MAC imagery (as carefully ambiguous as the latter may be). However, the SM images also break with the conventional symbolic representation of Taiwanese identity, offering instead a novel reformulation of the two, Taiwanese and Chinese. I conclude with a brief discussion of the limitations of the research project and avenues for further research using visual methodology in the study of nationalism and political identity.
Chapter 2 – Nationalism Theory and Visual Analysis

This chapter presents the analytical framework which informs the rest of the dissertation. This framework brings together three bodies of literature: critical nationalism theory, studies in Taiwanese national identity, and visual analysis. Theoretically, my work is informed by critical nationalism scholarship such as Michael Billig (1995), Craig Calhoun (1997) and Rogers Brubaker (1994; 2006), who consider national identity as an ongoing set of practices and discourses which reproduce particular ideas of the nation, or as a kind of political habitus (Bourdieu, 1984). Although there is an extensive body of literature on national identity in Taiwan, this nation-as-process or as habitus perspective is largely absent. This project also contributes to the empirical work on Taiwanese national identity. This field has focused on two broad objects of research: official policy and discourse on one hand, and self-identification surveys on the other. The former is attentive to the processes through which national identity is constructed and changes over time, while the latter directs attention to how national identity is understood by the general population. However, as I explain below, there is surprisingly little empirical work on how national identities circulate and are reproduced or contested by political actors outside of the government. Analyzing the use of ‘national’ symbolism during the SM speaks to this neglected area of research. Finally, I have adopted a visual analysis for this project. This not only means using images as the primary object of analysis, but also treating visual materials as a distinct mode of communication, with its own structures, conventions, and processes of producing meaning. This means that we cannot simply approach images as we would text or spoken language (Duncum, 2004, p. 257). Moreover, visual analysis offers a unique window into national identity as habitus in particular because, simply put, in our everyday lives imagery is less subject to sustained critical reflection than discourse (Weber, 2008). We are taught

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17 Images do contribute to the structuring of knowledge in ways that reproduce social power, and so in that sense are a part of Discourse in the Foucauldian sense. However, in order to differentiate analytically between visual and linguistic modes of communication, I use the term ‘discourse’ in the narrow sense to refer only to spoken and written language.
critical reading skills, but few of us learn critical viewing in any sustained fashion. This makes images a useful but underutilized avenue for understanding the implicit assumptions which constitute national identity. Each of these bodies of literature are explained in turn below.

**Critical Theories of Nationalism**¹⁸

‘Nationalism’ and ‘the nation’ are notoriously slippery concepts. In talking about national identity, I mean whatever social category people posit as the basis for political autonomy. Put more simply, if someone makes the assertion “we should belong to the same sovereign country because we are both members of X group,” then I consider X as a form of national identity. This echoes Ernst Gellner’s elegant definition that ‘nationalism’ is simply the principle that the political unit and the nation should be congruent (Gellner, 1983, pp. 1, 55). As Gellner notes, this begs the question of what ‘the nation’ is. ‘X’ may be an ethnic group or a group defined by certain political principles, racial or regional, a purportedly ancient community or a thoroughly modern one. Perhaps the most used (and useful) definition is Benedict Anderson’s, who describes a nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson, 2016, pp. 6–7).¹⁹ Anderson’s definition is often cited to highlight how most communities are not based on direct interaction, but on the supposition that we share some distinguishing qualities or experiences with a large number of people who we will never meet. This is true of many collective identities in the modern world. What is distinctive about national identity, however, is that the nation is imagined as sovereign: “The specificity of nationalism (and of 'nation' as a form of imagined community) is that, unlike many

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¹⁸ Umut Özkirimli (2010 ch. 6) identifies the approaches discussed here as “New theories of nationalism” because they largely move away from the classic debate over whether ‘nations’ are primordial or thoroughly modern social groups. While authors identified with new theories all address different aspects of nationalism and national identity, they are all influenced by the ‘cultural turn’ in social science. As such, they devote their attention to the construction, reproduction, and change of identities over time.

¹⁹ Applying theories of Western thinkers to other contexts is not without its problems. Chang Maukuei (2004) has noted the problems of using Anderson and Gellner in particular to Taiwan’s case. While recognizing these concerns, I draw on these authors’ conceptual frameworks and not necessarily their view of the historical development of nationalism.
forms of politicized ethnicity, it involves claims of some sort to autonomy or independence" (Brubaker et al., 2006, pp. 6–7). Nations differ from other kinds of imagined communities in that members of that community imagine it as the ultimate source of political authority, and thus as having the right to self-governance.

This is complicated by the fact that nations are neither as homogeneous nor as unique as they present themselves (Özkirimli, 2005, p. 2). In everyday discourse we often talk about nations as social categories with self-evident and stable boundaries. This reifies the nation as an objectively measurable group distinct from the political claims made in its name. In contrast to the propensity to reify nations and national identity, following critical nationalism scholars such as Craig Calhoun (1997) and Rogers Brubaker (1994; 2006), I approach the nation as a process: a nation is not itself a group, but rather a way of imagining (and thereby constituting) a group. Nations do not make claims, but rather “nations are constituted largely by the claims themselves, by the way of talking and thinking and acting that relies on these sorts of claims to produce collective identity” (Calhoun, 1997, p. 5). Nationalism is better understood as a discursive scheme for understanding the world, or as Brubaker puts it, "Nationhood... is not an ethnocultural fact; it is a frame of vision, a cultural idiom, and a political claim" (Brubaker et al., 2006, p. 358). In other words, using the language (or symbols) of national identity is not simply asserting membership in a given political community, but part of an iterative process of constructing and re-producing that community: its boundaries, norms, and hierarchies. Thinking about nations as a process rather than as a thing allows us to consider what political work these ideas of the nation do, how they function to bound, discipline, evaluate and mobilize people. In this view, a Taiwanese nation is not a pre-existing group of people which social scientists can define, describe, and measure. Rather, it is an assertion of a worldview in which certain political authorities or actions are more legitimate than others (Thompson, 2001, p. 19). As such, in talking about ‘the Taiwanese nation’ I am not referring to a single entity, but to how ideas of ‘Taiwan’ are invoked to frame some actors, actions, or subjectivities as legitimate expressions of ‘the nation’, while others are framed as foreign or non-national.
Similarly, ‘national identity’ refers to the qualities or values - often implicit - underlying particular claims to represent the nation. In this sense, national identity is primarily an elaboration of one particular way of imagining a nation, while nationalism is the underpinning principle that this ‘nation’ has the ultimate claim to political autonomy. Treating national identity as a contingent process of ongoing identity formation exposes the historical nature of such identities. This de-reifies ‘the nation’ (both as a general concept and particular claims of nationhood) and highlights “the institutional and discursive mechanisms through which nationalisms are maintained and, just as importantly, resisted or challenged” (Özkirimli, 2005, p. 8).

A third insight from nationalism theory which informs this project is that much of the construction and maintenance of national identity occurs under the surface, outside of conscious reflection. The key contribution of Michael Billig’s seminal Banal Nationalism (1995) is to draw attention to the habitual ‘flagging’ or marking of national identity in ways that escape notice, but are essential to reproducing the idea that nations are natural and self-evident forms of social organization. From this perspective, national identity is akin to what Bourdieu calls habitus: a set of internalized or unselfconscious perceptive schemes and emotional attitudes, as well as related behavioural dispositions (habits, practices, and competencies) adopted within a particular social field (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 170). The term ‘national habitus’ thus describes the common-sense ways of thinking and talking about the nation to frame experience and organize our response to the world (De Cillia et al., 1999, p. 153; Edensor, 2002, pp. 88–98). This implicit or unreflective aspect of national identity makes it difficult to examine, especially in contexts that are not overtly nationalistic. Jon Fox suggests that we can look for evidence of how nationalism is (or is not) taken up by people (rather than just assuming that it is) by looking at what he terms ‘breaches’ – times where the ‘received natural order’ of the nation-state seems to be violated and demands repair or reassertion: “This might include explicit references to ‘the

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20 For a discussion on ‘nationalism’ versus ‘national identity’ as an analytical framework, see Carlson (2009) and Costa (2014).
nation’, but it could also include invocations of other mutated and improvised forms of ‘the nation’” (Fox, 2017, p. 32). Breaches are most evident at the physical, temporal, or political edges of the nation: times, places, and situations where contradictory conceptions of who or what ‘the nation’ is cannot be ignored (Fox, 2017, p. 37). I argue that the SM is a political breach of this kind: although it was not an explicit debate over national identity, the underlying conflicts over President Ma’s sinicizing policies and the perceived threat of PRC influence made questions of national identity profoundly relevant in choosing which side to support. This makes the SM an excellent case study for looking at the conceptions of national identity which are often unstated.

Contemporary Approaches to National Identity in Taiwan

Scholarship on national identity in contemporary Taiwan largely falls into one of two types: state-led nation building and popular opinion surveys. Each of these approaches sheds light on the different conceptions of national identity circulating in Taiwanese society, each in their own way highlighting how Taiwanese identity is the product of historical, social and political forces rather than the politicization of some primordial or essential group identity.21 However, as I will discuss below, both of these approaches are limited by how they theorize national identity, leaving hidden the processes through which national identity is constructed and reproduced (Conversi, 1995). In brief, studies that focus on state-led or ‘top-down’ approaches to nation building draw attention to the processes through which national identity is constructed through official discourses, policies, and institutions. However, by focusing exclusively on the state, it overlooks how people respond to official narratives of the nation, either by reproducing, adapting, or contesting them. The gap is especially evident in political breaches like the SM, where state and popular conceptions of the nation come into conflict. On the other hand, the

21 In a 2009 review article of Taiwanese identity studies, Evan Dawley observes that contributions to this subfield are “so concerned with explaining the origins of the Taiwanese independence movement that they miss the significance of contemporary identity formation” (Dawley, 2009, p. 451). With a few notable exceptions, this oversight has largely continued in the decade since.
survey approach is a ‘bottom-up’ approach in that it considers the views of the wider population, but does so by reifying national identity as an objectively measurable dependent variable. Approaching identity this way overlooks the processes by which identity is constructed and reproduced, at best. At worst, reifying national identity gives it the appearance of a homogeneous category, rather than as a dynamic and highly contingent process. My aim is to develop a more robust understanding of the processes through which ordinary (if politically engaged) citizens construct national identity by considering how various visual symbols of ‘the nation’ were deployed in the context of the debate over ECFA and the CSSTA.

State-led nation building has been the primary focus of research on nationalism since political reform starting in the mid and late 1980s made it easier for scholars in Taiwan to engage with sensitive questions of national identity. State-led nation building refers to official policies and discourses which work to instill a particular national identity in the governed population. Initially this research focused on the KMT’s political dominance and heavy-handed nation-building policies during the Martial Law period (1949-1988). It understood Taiwanese nationalism primarily as a form of resistance to the KMT’s official Chinese nationalism (Dawley, 2009, p. 443). Since the ROC’s democratization in the 1990s, scholarly attention has gradually turned towards state-led nation building under successive elected administrations.

National identity has become an especially relevant topic since Chen Shui-bian embarked on an explicit program to foster Taiwanese national consciousness (Dittmer, 2004, p. 475; Lynch, 2004, p. 514). Extensive attention has been paid to changes in the ‘national’ history and geography curricula (B. Chang, 2004; Fu-chang Wang, 2005); in public museums (Vickers, 2010); in the naming of public spaces after significant national figures or events (Edmondson, 2002; Simon, 2003); and in cultural policy (B. Chang, 2004). An especially popular avenue of research has been to look at the discursive representation of Taiwan/ROC by presidents Lee Teng-hui 李登輝 (Corcuff, 2002c; Jacobs & Liu, 2007), Chen Shui-bian (H.-C. Chang & Holt, 2007; Sullivan & Lowe, 2010) and Ma Ying-jeou (Kaeding, 2009; Lams & Liao, 2011; Muyard, 2010; Sullivan & Sapir, 2012), or across all three administrations (Sullivan & Sapir, 2013). The overall consensus
is that Chen pursued a de-sinicizing program, minimizing or effacing symbolic connections to Chinese history and culture, while Ma’s KMT administration’s sinicizing efforts sought to re-emphasize those connections. Chapter 3 discusses each of these different conceptions of national identity in more detail. On a theoretical level, however, what is common to all of these studies is that they approach the nation as a product of official discourse and policy.

Top-down theories of national identity neglect the ways in which non-elite groups in society produce, reproduce, and adapt nationalist narratives (Edensor, 2002; Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008; Goode & Stroup, 2015). State-led nation building undoubtedly has a significant influence on which national identities are more pervasive, but focusing exclusively on these top-down processes ignores the equally important question of how nationalism is understood “by the ordinary persons who are the objects of [state] action and propaganda” (E. J. Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 11). Although people often rely on concepts of ‘the nation’ to give order to events and make sense of actions (Thompson, 2001, pp. 28–29), these concepts are not simply passive reproductions of elite discourse (Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008, p. 539). Considering how national identity is seen ‘from below’ is particularly important when looking at individuals and groups who are actively contesting the current official narrative. A theory of nationalism should also consider how national identities are reproduced, appropriated, and contested by actors other than those who wield state power. Top-down theories of national identity tell us little about how actors outside of the government, such as the SM, understand national identity or reproduce it, especially when it is in tension with the state’s vision of national identity.

The second common scholarly approach to Taiwanese nationalism has been to investigate public attitudes through surveys of ethnic self-identification and political preferences. Unlike studies of nation building, the self-identification survey approach considers how nationalism is seen ‘from below’. At the same time, most of this work attempts to disentangle ‘ethnic’ from ‘political’ identities. This is accomplished most often by empirically demonstrating that people who identify as ethnically Chinese do not necessarily believe that they should live in a unified Chinese state encompassing both Taiwan and mainland China. However, these studies rarely
proceed to investigate how national identity is conceptualized, if it is not along the conventionally assumed lines of ethnic difference. In other words, while the analysis of survey data consistently shows that the majority of people in Taiwan do not imagine their ethnic communities to be synonymous with their political community (nation), it has much less to say about how those people (or particular groups of people) do imagine their nation.22

Numerous analyses of self-identification surveys entail contrasting ethnic identity with some easily quantifiable political preference assumed to indicate national identity or nationalist orientations. For example, nationalism has been operationalized as a preference for allocating public resources to programs and policies that foster relations with the PRC versus those that promote Taiwan’s autonomy on the international stage (Huang, Liu, & Chang, 2004, p. 165) or as stronger positive affect towards members of the same political unit compared to towards members of the same ethnic community (F.-Y. Chen & Yen, 2017; I.-C. Lee & Pratto, 2011, p. 17). The assumption here is that attitudes and preferences expressed in hypothetical situations are consistent with actual political behaviour. Although there is a range of approaches to classifying ethnic groups in these studies,23 they all stress that ethnic identity is not statistically consistent with purported ‘nationalist’ attitudes. Such conclusions lead to the widespread assertion that Taiwanese nationalism has become ‘civic’ rather than ‘ethnic’ in nature (Lams & Liao, 2011, p. 70; Rigger, 2002; Schubert, 2004, p. 537; Tierney, 2011; Wong, 2001).24

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22 Scholars have studied how Taiwanese identity is represented and produced in literature (e.g., Hsiau, 2000; Tzeng, 2009). However, this work deals exclusively with the development of ‘Taiwanese consciousness’ before 1990 (see also Dawley’s (2009) critique of the over-reliance on literary sources in Taiwanese identity studies).

23 The studies categorize ‘ethnic groups’ in Taiwan in three main ways: membership in one of the four official ethnic groups (Hoklo, Hakka, Aboriginal, or mainland Chinese); as waishengren or benshengren (respectively, mainland Chinese who came to Taiwan after 1945 and their descendants versus those with ancestors living on Taiwan before 1945); or based on self-identification as Chinese or Taiwanese, based on National Chengchi University Election Study Centre (ESC) National Identity surveys. Comparison across studies becomes difficult because these categories can overlap, and may not be defined in the same way between studies. For example, some use benshengren to refer to any group living in Taiwan before 1945, some only apply the term to the Hoklo and Hakka (as Han Chinese ‘sub-ethnicities’), and yet others treat benshengren as synonymous with Hoklo only.

24 For a more extensive critique of the limitations of the various identity surveys common in Taiwan, see Jiang (2017) and Cabestan (2017).
What this body of research demonstrates is that established ethnic identities tell us little about national identity. This opens up conceptual space to think differently about how national identity in contemporary Taiwan is conceptualized. However, popular attitude studies typically stop short of interrogating what people implicitly assume is the basis or unifying feature of their national identity, if not ethnicity. There are two likely reasons for this. First, in order to produce easily quantifiable results many surveys reduce national identity to a conscious preference on a single issue (most often this issue is reunification with the mainland). Second, these studies typically theorize national identity as a simple binary between ethnic and civic forms: once it has been shown that nationalist sentiments transcend established ethnic categories, it is assumed that the common denominator is an abstract ‘civic’ identity which does not need to be unpacked further. As I explain below, each of these issues limits the usefulness of popular attitude studies for understanding the complex processes shaping national identity.

By far the most common statistic used as an indicator of Taiwanese or Chinese nationalism (i.e., specifically understood as national identities) are attitudes towards reunification (yitong—統) or independence (duli 獨立), commonly abbreviated as tongdu preference (see e.g., R. Chen, 2014, p. 530; Hsieh, 2005, p. 15; Jiang, 2017; T. Y. Wang & Liu, 2004, pp. 573–574; Yu, 2016, p. 81; Zhong, 2016). However, this is problematic because it reduces national identity to a simple policy preference on the tongdu issue: a checkbox on a survey in favour of declaring formal independence is considered a sign of Taiwanese nationalism, while a check in favour of reunification with the mainland is a sign of Chinese nationalism. On the surface these seem like reasonable assumptions: if nationalism is a belief that “the political and the national unit should be congruent” (Gellner, 1983, p. 1), then asking which political unit people wish to belong to should presumably reflect which nation they consider themselves part of. In the case of Taiwan, however, independence is too complex a topic to be a clear indicator of respondents’ national identity. This is because many surveys of tongdu preference do not consider either the island’s ambiguous political status; nor do they account for the practical constraints on formal independence. The salience of these mediating concerns is evident in the fact that the majority
of respondents in tongdu surveys do not actually express a strong preference for either yitong (reunification) or duli (independence), but prefer the status quo (e.g., Election Study Centre - National Chengchi University, n.d.). Fixating on de jure independence, particularly in terms of formal recognition at the international level, does not allow for the possibility that Taiwanese nationalist aspirations may be perfectly satisfied with the current de facto independence (Rigger, 1999b, p. 539). This data also tells us little or nothing about what people understand is the ‘status quo’ in regards to the nation – that the Taiwanese nation is effectively independent already, or that uniting a divided Chinese nation is impractical for the time being (Yu, 2016, p. 83). As such, it is not at all clear which national identity, if any, is at the root of how most people think about the independence issue. Categorically equating tongdu preference with identity also ignores the pragmatic factors which may have more immediate influence on policy preferences than national identity – most notably the threat of a PRC invasion if Taiwan were to declare formal independence (T. Y. Wang & Liu, 2004, pp. 573–574; see also Jiang, 2017, p. 25). The majority preference for the status-quo cannot distinguish between respondents who prefer that Taiwan should be independent if the threat of PRC invasion was removed, and those who prefer that Taiwan should ultimately reunite with the mainland if the current PRC government was replaced or became less authoritarian. As such, tongdu preference alone is a poor indication of which ‘nation’ people identify with.

The second limitation to self-identification survey analyses is the tendency to adopt an overly narrow definition of ethnic identity. This framework in turn leads to two related oversights. First, most studies of popular political attitudes (including those that conduct original surveys rather than relying on the widely cited Election Study Centre (ESC) data) take a

[25] Although the ESC surveys include a range of options including “status quo, moving towards independence” and “status quo moving towards reunification,” consistently over the past decade the ambivalent “status quo indefinitely” and “decide later” together have made up more than 50% of responses.

[26] Examining representations of ‘the nation’ in speeches by Chen Shui-bian, Sullivan & Lowe (2010, p. 620) argue that at minimum we need to distinguish between the language of independence, national identity, and democracy if we wish to develop a coherent picture of Taiwanese identity discourse.
set of predetermined ethnic categories and treat them as social fact. In studies where ethnicity is
the primary focus, the tendency is to use the four official ethnic groups recognized by the
government, while studies that stress nationalism tend to use the *waishengren/benshengren*
distinction (which was the primary line of ethnic difference shaping political life before
democratization). In purely pragmatic terms, categorical distinctions between these groups in
any objective sense is impossible, as the lines between them are constantly blurred by
intermarriage and strategic changes in identity over time or in different contexts (Wachman,
1994, pp. 15–18; see also e.g., M. J. Brown, 2004; Harrell, 1990). Similarly, as scholars such as
Chang Maukuei (2000, p. 52) have pointed out, when a person in Taiwan asserts that “I am
Taiwanese” (or Chinese), they may have in mind their current citizenship, the birthplace of their
ancestors, the language they speak, the cultural practises they follow, or the place they live.
Which of these identities is most salient can vary greatly depending on the context and this can
have dramatically different political implications. This variability is lost in surveys and
questionnaires which approach Taiwanese identity as an abstract category. At the same time,
relying exclusively on official ethnic categories makes it impossible to consider ethnic identities
not recognized by the government (Dawley, 2009, p. 451), such as the *Pingpu* or ‘plains
aborigines’ (I. Pan, 2000). Brubaker cautions against just such a conflation of categories of
practise with categories of analysis, because it risks naturalizing and essentializing the former
(Brubaker, 1999, pp. 5, 7; Brubaker et al., 2006, p. 9). Groups, he points out, are the things we
want to explain, not what we want to explain things with (Brubaker, 2004, p. 9). These studies
may tell us that *particular* ethnic categories are not useful predictors of political attitudes, but
this tells us nothing about the political relevance of ethnicity more generally. All too often this
oversight results in the conclusion that Taiwanese national identity is *devoid of* or *opposed to*
ethnocultural identity entirely.

A further consequence of an overly rigid conception of ethnicity is that it leads the majority
of researchers to adopt a theoretical framework that divides national identities into ‘civic’ and
‘ethnic’ types (e.g., Rigger, 2002; Zhong, 2016). This framing leads many scholars to equate
Taiwanese national identity with the absence of ethnocultural content – or at least none of any political significance (e.g., Chu, 2016; Kwan, 2016; Wong, 2001). The implication is that if Taiwanese national identity (often reduced to tongdu preference) cannot be correlated with membership in one of the predetermined ethnic groups, then by process of elimination it must be a civic nationalism. As a result, designating Taiwanese identity as a civic nationalism becomes the end goal of the study, foreclosing deeper questions into what is being asserted by particular representations or claims to Taiwanese identity. Although it remains the most common paradigm in Taiwanese studies dealing with national identity, the civic-ethnic framework has been thoroughly critiqued in the field of nationalism studies. The civic-ethnic dichotomy reduces complex social phenomena to a simplistic binary, and depends on a number of questionable normative and theoretical assumptions. Empirically distinguishing between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ nationalism in practise is problematic, if not impossible, as every national identity entails a mixture of cultural, historical, and sociopolitical elements (Brubaker et al., 2006, p. 137; Jayet, 2012, p. 72). As Taro Kuzio argues, “all civic states have ethno-cultural cores” (2001, p. 136, original emphasis), because national identity always depends on some reference to shared culture and values. In his influential work on nationalism in the United States, Michael Billig argues that obscuring the ethnic associations underlying so-called ‘civic’ nationalism by re-branding it as ‘patriotism’ serves to legitimize ‘our’ nation as a rational association based on enlightened principles (Billig, 1995, p. 49; see also Brubaker, 1999, p. 57). In the process it denigrates other nations as less civilized, representing them as acting out of excess passion and attachment to blood ties (see e.g., Ignatieff, 1993, p. 6). Other critical nationalism scholars have argued that the civic-ethnic distinction obscures racial and ethnic hierarchies that persist within ‘civic’ nations (Goode & Stroup, 2015; Hutchinson, 2004; Spencer, 2014). As such, an analytical framework that is built around a civic-ethnic dichotomy is analytically vague and may obscure more than it reveals. For example, my analysis in Chapter 5 shows how SM images engages in a complex appropriation of selective figures from Chinese history while deploying others to undermine their opponents in the Ma administration. This
suggests that framing certain symbols or narratives as civic and other as ethnic is itself an important part of the symbolic contest for legitimacy.

Indeed, a number of articles argue the SM is evidence that contemporary Taiwanese nationalism should be categorized as civic, because participants identified themselves more in terms of political values than by reference to official ethnic categories – Chinese, Hoklo, 27 Hakka, or Aboriginal (Au, 2017; Kwan, 2016; Yeh, 2015). By making categorization as either ‘ethnic’ or ‘civic’ the end-goal of analysis, such approaches stop short of considering processes of inclusion and exclusion (Every & Augoustinos, 2008), how boundaries are produced, maintained, and crossed (Barth, 1969), or the dynamics of group-making (Brubaker, 2004, p. 13). In concrete terms, this means that by looking so intently for an objective measure of whether a singular Taiwanese national identity is ‘ethnic’ or ‘civic’, we overlook what political work representations of ‘the Taiwanese nation’ do in society. It also reduces national identity to a single, homogenous identity which has some essential nature that can be empirically determined. Instead, we need to pay more attention to how national identities are constructed by different actors, which symbols, tropes and themes they use to frame some actions and objectives as synonymous with those of ‘the nation’, and how these reproduce certain conceptions of ‘the nation’ while contesting or disavowing others.

In light of this, a small but growing number of studies approach national identity in Taiwan as a complex and contingent phenomenon. Most often this is done by correlating identity with other, explicitly political attitudes. Wang and Liu (2004) unpack what people are referring to when they refer to a Taiwanese nation, which they divide into three patterns: territorial/political (what is my country), ‘peoplehood’ (who are my countrymen), and cultural (is Taiwanese culture part of Chinese culture or different). 28 Liao, Liu & Chen (2018) identify

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27 Hoklo is also sometimes referred to as Minnan, or Hokkien, terms which refer specifically to the dialect spoken in southern Fujian province and Taiwan.

28 Eric Ma and Anthony Fung (2007) develop a similar framework of national identity in Hong Kong in the decade after the 1997 handover, identifying three dimensions of ‘Chinese/Hongkong’ identities (political, military, and historical-cultural).
three fields where encounters between ROC and PRC citizens often cause tensions, crystallizing into different conception of conflicting national identities. They suggest that uneven benefits from cross-strait economic exchanges, different political systems (particularly with respect to civil and political liberties), and negative perceptions of mainland Chinese cultural habits (largely from encounters with tourists) each reinforce distinct ideas of the differences between Taiwanese and mainland Chinese, which result in three distinct ‘Taiwanese’ national identities (economic, political, and cultural, respectively) (pp. 59-60). For their part, Chen & Yen (2017) approach nationalism as an abstract orientation towards outsiders and argue that there is a measurable distinction between nationalism as attachment to country (pro-Taiwan), a relation to another (anti-China), and generalized chauvinism (p. 1194). These studies conceptualize national identity in very different ways: respondents are either identifying with different groups, identifying within different circumstances, or identifying with different emotional responses. In all three cases, though, the goal is to demonstrate that there are multiple meanings behind the claim to be Taiwanese, even when it is explicitly framed as question of national identity (see also Storm, 2018, p. 9). As with the public attitude research discussed earlier, all of these studies stress that ‘national identity’ (however conceptualized) no longer coincides with dominant ethnic categories, but they do so without invoking a generic and singular civic identity. Nonetheless, although these studies acknowledge the contingency or variability of national identities, the processes of constructing and reproducing those identities remain largely unexamined. As I discuss above, national identity is better understood as a cognitive or discursive schema, a way of framing certain values, actors, and behaviours as ‘national’, and hence more legitimate than others. In order to better understand the processes through which national identities are constructed and reproduced, we need to include more research methods that look at the ways that people actually use representations of national identity when making political claims. I suggest that a visual analysis of specific movements, such as the SM, is one such method, and one that has been underutilized.
Visual Analysis

Rather than a traditional text-based approach, my analysis centers on how national identities are constructed, reproduced, and contested specifically through visual modes of representation. A number of factors have informed this choice of methodology. Although there are numerous interviews with and essays by participants in the SM, most often the question of national identity is addressed only briefly and tangentially, if at all (see e.g., He, 2014; Yan, Luo, Liang, & Jiang, 2015). Even if this were not the case, however, on a theoretical level, my approach to national identity as a kind of political habitus means that I am less interested in direct statements about national identity than in the indirect ways that concepts of ‘the nation’ are used to frame experiences and order the social world (De Cillia et al., 1999, p. 153). Even when people are directly questioned about the nation (in surveys or interviews, for example), their answers are not necessarily indicative of their unselfconscious beliefs about the nation (Fox, 2017, p. 42; L. Li, 2015, pp. 315–317). Spoken and (especially) written language is typically more subject to conscious reflection, as I discuss further below, making it more open to self-censorship or expectation biases. Moreover, while a robust discourse analysis could uncover unstated (but implicit) attitudes and beliefs about national identity, my current fluency in Mandarin and the Hokkien dialect common in Taiwan is not sufficient to do justice to such an analysis (the limitations of this study are discussed in greater detail below). Finally, the visual approach outlined below synthesizes an assortment of interdisciplinary theories and methods, and as such will be unfamiliar to many readers. Rather than diluting the argument by attempting to incorporate discourse analysis, my aim is to present a thorough, focused, and well-supported case study which demonstrates the usefulness of this kind of visual analysis in the social sciences.

An increasingly robust range of methods for analyzing visual materials have been developed in the social sciences over the past 20 years, which some have termed the ‘pictorial turn’ (Mitchell, 1994) or ‘visual turn’ (Callahan, 2015). The visual turn marks a shift towards giving serious scholarly attention to visual materials as valid objects of study. Rather than simply using
images to illustrate an argument, this research grapples with the ways in which visual images function as a mode of communication distinct from language. Some nationalism scholars have looked at the visual construction and reproduction of national identity through the design of national currency (Gilbert, 1998; Helleiner, 1998; Lauer, 2008; Mwangi, 2002; Unwin & Hewitt, 2001), the aesthetics of patriotic films (Edensor, 2002; Weber, 2002), and the saturation of public spaces with nationalist associations through everyday practices (Brubaker et al., 2006) and visual spectacle (Kal, 2011). Although a handful of scholars do incorporate visual examples into arguments about Taiwanese identity (e.g., B. Chen, Liao, Wu, & Hwang, 2014; Corcuff, 2011; Fell, 2012), there is as yet little or no sustained attention to the visual in the analysis of Taiwanese identity. An original contribution of the present project is to bring the insights offered by a visual analysis into conversation with both of the study of nationalism and the study of national identity in Taiwan. Additionally, there is a practical benefit to applying a visual analysis in the case of the SM. The primary source of data for this project, the public.318.io digital archive, consists predominantly of visual images gathered from the occupied LY. This presents a unique opportunity to perform a rigorous and extensive empirical analysis of a corpus of thousands of artifacts.

Until relatively recently, visual materials have been overlooked in most of the social sciences and humanities, which have traditionally focused on spoken and written language and left the visual to specialized fields such as art history and film studies (Mirzeoff, 1999, pp. 12–15). Informed by Enlightenment views which categorically separate the intellect from the body, in positivist social science “images are often considered to be subordinate to written text, logical argument, and truthful exposition” (Emmison & Smith, 2000, p. 12; Hill & Helmers, 2004, p. 3). Cynthia Weber argues that the field of international relations in particular has overlooked the visual because it is associated with popular culture, while ‘real’ politics is seen as taking place in linguistic modes: treaties, speeches, reports, negotiations and so on (2008, p. 138; see

29 318 is a reference to the first day of the SM’s occupation of the LY, on March 18, 2014.
also Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 17). Starting in the 1990s, however, the emergence of the field of cultural studies and interpretive approaches more generally resulted in greater interdisciplinary interest in how images communicate and represent the social world. This visual turn was the result of independent debates in critical linguistics, poststructural sociology and anthropology, and also between art history and the emerging field of cultural studies. While a range of different methods of analysis have emerged, what these disparate developments share is a commitment to approaching visual materials as important objects of study in their own right, based on the belief that “visual images exist as a relatively autonomous mode... [and communicate] factors that language is patently ill equipped to handle” (Duncum, 2004, p. 257). Others argue that whatever the perceptual particularities of visual representation may be, the visual warrants serious study because visual images have replaced text as the dominant cultural mode of communication in postmodern societies (Lash, 1988; Mirzeoff, 1999, p. 3). Visual communication is “the language that amateurs and experts increasingly rely upon in order to claim contemporary literacy” (Weber, 2008, p. 138), and this tendency has only increased with the spread of the internet (Emmison & Smith, 2000, p. x).

Unsurprisingly perhaps, it is difficult to put into words just what factors distinguish visual images from language. Visual scholars have suggested that visual images are perceptually distinct because they are more affective or more sensually immediate than language (Mirzeoff, 1999, p. 15; Arnheim, 1969, pp. 18–22; see also Gursin, 2010, Chapter 3), or because they are experienced holistically rather than linearly like text (Whitely, 1999, p. 119). Recognizing that the visual is a distinct mode of communication is not to say that it operates completely independently of other modes of communication. Written text is both visual and linguistic, for example, a point which is especially evident in an ideographic language such as written Chinese. Text, images, and sound are interpermeable and can inform, complement, or contradict each other (Bal, 2003, p. 9). Roland Barthes argues that labels, captions, price tags, and surrounding text ‘anchor’ the interpretation of images, narrowing down possible connotations (Barthes, 1977, pp. 38–41). More recently, visual theories have come to consider the relationship
between image, text, and spoken language as more interactive than Barthes does, with each
mode informing the other but each capable of conveying meaning independently: “the visual
component of a text is an independently organized and structured message, connected with
the verbal text, but in no way dependent on it – and similarly the other way around” (Kress &

Regardless of the specific nature of the relationship between text and images, however, we
need recognise that visual communication operates differently than written or spoken
language, and thus requires different analytical tools. Barthes argues that images, particularly
photographs, are mimetic or “analogical reproductions of reality” (1977, p. 17): unlike words on
a page, they look like the objects they depict. This mimetic relationship with the material world
lends images some degree of resilience of interpretation. In other words, the materiality of
objects limits the possible meanings that can be derived from a given image (Bal, 2003). This is
not to say that images are more truthful or neutral representations of the ‘real world’. In fact,
the pretence of objectivity is part of what makes images especially political. The more realistic
an image looks, the more likely we are to ‘see’ it as an objective depiction rather than as a
partial or subjective position, seemingly naturalizing certain social orders (Bal, 2003, p. 15). As
John Berger argues in his influential BBC series and book (1972), images work not only in what
they show, but in how they induce particular ‘ways of seeing’ which situate the viewer in a
particular social position (see also Rose, 2001, p. 12). Images reproduce lines of difference,
because “images determine both who is visible and what remains out of view, [so] they allow
only limited and specific kinds of seeing” (Shim, 2014, p. 3). However, despite the increasing
role of visual media in modern societies, people are not taught from a young age to critically
view images the way they are taught to critically read text. As a result, “institutional education,
under the pressure of often reactionary political demands, produces [visual] illiterates” (Kress &
van Leeuwen, 2002, p. 17; see also Machin & Mayr, 2012, p. 18). Analytical tools geared
specifically towards visual materials (such as the social semiotic approach adopted in this study)
are essential if we wish to develop a better understanding of this underexamined mode of communication within the social sciences.

There has been a growing interest in visual materials in political science and the field of international relations, particularly from postpositivist scholars. These studies move beyond simply citing images as illustrations or evidence of their argument, and instead approach the visual as a mode of communication with its own distinct “syntax and grammar” (Weber, 2008, p. 138). Within international relations, critical security studies in particular makes extensive use of visual analysis to explain how images (re)produce lines of difference and shape perceptions of violence (e.g., Campbell, 2007; Friis, 2015; Opondo & Shapiro, 2012; Shapiro, 2007; Shim, 2014). Other issues where images have been central to scholarly analysis include the study of visual rhetoric in political campaigns (Strachan & Kendall, 2004), the impact of photography on foreign policy (Perlmutter, 2005), and the visual production of racialized colonial subjects and spaces (Nederveen Pieterse, 1992). Although not explicitly working with a nationalism framework, Cynthia Weber interrogates how the cinematography of popular films such as United 93 (2008) and Pearl Harbour (2002) reinforces dominant conceptions of American masculinity, exceptionalism, and moral authority.

Nationalism scholars have also incorporated visual materials into their analysis. For example, Benedict Anderson wrote not only of the importance of a shared experience of reading the same news, but also about how the visual layout of that news on the front page produced a novel sense of time which enabled the emergence of a national imaginary (Anderson, 2016, p. 33). Michael Billig’s influential study of banal nationalism (1995) begins with a discussion of the entirely visual marking of public spaces with national flags, as noted earlier. Rogers Brubaker similarly discusses the use of flag colours and heroic portraits to imbue spaces and objects with national significance, and includes an inset folio of colour photographs to illustrate the point (Brubaker et al., 2006). These studies are enlightening in how they bring in visual elements to show that national identity is not simply produced through rhetoric, but also through other symbolic systems which reproduce and reinforce the nation as an
omnipresent frame of reference. In most of the nationalism literature, however, the visual elements are supplemental or illustrative, rather than the central focus of the analysis. The handful of nationalism studies which have adopted some form of analysis specifically focused on visual materials only count instances of national symbols (i.e., flags) without attempting to contextualize them further (Dumitrica, 2019; Pottie-Sherman & Wilkes, 2016; Skey, 2017). This kind of content analysis can draw attention to the profusion of national symbols, but has little to say about their interpretation. Thus, when nationalism scholars do incorporate visual materials into their analysis, they tend to do so without theorizing the visual or visuality – the way in which what is seen and how it is seen is socially constructed (Rose, 2001, p. 6). Because these scholars do not theorize how meaning is constructed or conveyed in images, they are restricted to attributing only the most obvious and overt connotations to a narrow range of official symbols, such as flags and national colours. There is a tendency to attribute a single meaning to a given symbol, namely that national symbols affirm the supremacy and ubiquity of the state (Hearn & Antonsich, 2018, p. 600). This leaves little conceptual space to consider how both the context and composition of images (or elements within them) may elicit different, even contradictory interpretations of the content. A burning flag is counted the same as one flying over a courthouse.

Exceptions to this relatively superficial treatment of visual nationalism are works focusing on how the images used on paper currency reinforce a symbolic association between popular national myths, histories, and values (Helleiner, 1998; Lauer, 2008; Mwangi, 2002). These studies argue that the visual design of currency – and to a lesser extent, stamps (Brunn, 2001) – legitimates the state and its preferred conceptions of national identity. Others have argued that the design and iconography of paper currency needs to adhere to documentary conventions associated with the political-legal authority of the state in order to be widely recognized as legitimate currency (Gilbert, 1998; Hymans, 2004). 30 Other scholars, particularly in the field of

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30 Anyone who has heard the colourful bills of Canadian or Australian currency dismissed as ‘play money’ already has a good sense of some of these documentary conventions.
cultural geography, have considered how both textual and visual representations of landscape contribute to the production of a sense of national place and, by extension, national identity (Daniels, 1993; Daniels & Cosgrove, 1993; Jaworski & Thurlow, 2010; Rycroft & Cosgrove, 1995). However, few of the insights of these works have been applied beyond the very specific contexts – the production and circulation of paper bills or landscape painting and photography, respectively.

The interpretation of visual materials in many studies on nationalism is primarily deductive, in the sense that the meaning of symbols is assumed based on the theoretical framework underpinning the initial research question. This is because the studies described above are interested in how one particular (dominant) identity is reproduced across a broad range of social contexts. For example, Billig’s banal nationalism thesis assumes the American flag consistently represents one particular conception of American national identity, suggesting that national identity is a top-down phenomenon. Likewise, Cynthia Weber examines the conceptions of ‘America’ which perpetuate dominant representations of militarism and hypermasculinity. These analyses provide important insights into how dominant ideologies and identities are reproduced visually. However, much less attention has been given to how those ideologies or identities may be adapted and contested by different social actors, or what we might call ‘visual counter-narratives’. This requires a more inductive approach, because we cannot assume a priori which visual counter-narratives might emerge in any given situation. I suggest that visual social semiotics, discussed below, provide a useful framework for just such an inductive, contextualized, and fine-grained interpretative analysis.

As the range of approaches discussed above indicates, ‘visual analysis’ covers many different methods, each with their own strengths and limitations.\textsuperscript{31} I use two complementary methods in this project: content analysis and visual social semiotic analysis. As I explain in greater detail below, in essence content analysis counts how often objects appear in a set of

\textsuperscript{31} For a comprehensive survey of methods of visual analysis in social science research, see Rose (2001).
images with minimal interpretation, while a semiotic analysis considers in minute detail how meaning is produced. I use content analysis to identify commonly occurring motifs in the full sets of SM and MAC images, in order to ensure that the samples selected for closer interpretive analysis are representative of larger trends in the SM and MAC imagery (Krippendorf, 1980; Lutz & Collins, 1993). The sample data sets have then been analysed using visual social semiotic analysis, which devotes close attention to how composition and context affect the interpretation of visual content (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Rose, 2001, Chapter 4). Each of these methods is detailed below,

While content analysis can be an important step toward drawing generalizable conclusions about representation, “alone [it] is seldom able to support statements about the significance, effect or interpreted meaning of a domain of representation” (Bell, 2001, p. 13). In other words, because content analysis entails abstracting data in order to generalize, it has little to offer in terms of contextual or interpretive analyses. Content analysis is therefore limited in its ability to attend to an image’s connotative meanings, given that connotative meaning largely depends on the overall composition of the image which is not captured in broad frequencies and correlations. Similarly, content analysis is also not attuned to wider social and political contexts (Rose, 2001, p. 67). On the other hand, semiotics is the study of how symbols (text, images, sounds, gestures) convey meaning. Semiotic approaches provide the analytical tools and vocabulary for extremely close readings of individual images, though this attention to detail comes at the expense of breadth and generalizability. As such, semiotic and content analyses complement each other well, with each method of analysis addressing the limitations of the other (see Rose, 2001, p. 73).

To inform my analysis, I have drawn on a number of key concepts in semiotics which help explain how signs and symbols ‘work’. The first is the distinction between denotation and
connotation. The denotated content of the message is the literal or most obvious referent of the sign (person, thing, activity), while connotations are associated or implied objects, concepts, values, or qualities (Hall, 1980, p. 122). Numerous writers have argued that social and political ideologies (or Discourse in the Foucauldian sense) are communicated primarily through the connotative level of symbolic systems. These approaches are broadly referred to as social semiotics, because they place greater emphasis on how signs simultaneously reflect and reproduce social relations. Methods that have been developed based on this social semiotic perspective include critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1992; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 258; van Dijk, 1993, p. 249), multimodal discourse analysis (Bell, 2001; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Painter et al., 2012), and visual social semiotics (Hodge & Kress, 1988; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006).

Following Ferdinand de Saussure, the second important distinction in semiotics that informs this project is the separation of symbols or signs into signifier, the sound or mark on a page, and referent or signified, the concept associated with that sign (Rose, 2001, pp. 74–75). Saussure argued that there is no essential connection between signifier and signified. Because there is no one meaning intrinsic to a sign or symbol, they are polysemic: they have multiple possible meanings. In order to interpret what any given sign means, we need to consider the context in which it is situated. This context includes the social and physical location of the image, its

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32 In this regard, connotation and denotation cannot be rigidly separated, but inform each other. For example, my initial coding had not distinguished between plum and cherry blossoms. A number of Taiwanese colleagues pointed out that the plum blossom is the ROC’s national flower and has strong associations with the KMT, while cherry blossoms are associated with Japanese culture. The coding scheme thus had to be revised to include a number of significant distinctions such as this.

33 A number of scholars note that even denotative meaning is informed by cultural conventions. See e.g., Bal & Bryson (1991, p. 189) and De Lauretis (1984, p. 167).

34 For images, the relationship between signifier and signified is somewhat muddier because images bear some perceptual similarity to material objects (see discussion above). Charles Sanders Pierce argues that visual symbols operate on three levels. At an iconic level, a sign denotes an object through visual resemblance. Indexical meaning depends on existential or causal connotations. The classic example is an image of a bullet hole, which only indicates a gun and a bullet through causal inference. Barthes describes this relationship as a sign which “points, but does not tell” (quoted in Hill & Helmers, 2004, p. 16). Symbolic signification depends entirely on conventional associations rather than on any visual or logical resemblance between the sign and the referent. These include abstract ideas, values, and intertextual allusions.
creators, and its audience (Rose, 2001). Notably, it also includes how one sign is situated with respect to other signs, for example other words in a sentence. Thus, Halliday argues that meaning is communicated both by content – individual words – and also by the structure of the communicative act – its syntax or grammar (Halliday, 1978; Jamani, 2011, pp. 198–199).

Social semiotic approaches argue that the range of possible readings of an image is narrowed by its composition – how the elements of the image work together to produce meaning (van Leeuwen, 2001, p. 116). This is because images, like sentences, are communicative acts which function at an interpersonal level as well as an ideational one (Halliday, 1978). That is, communicative acts are about something, but they also convey information about how the recipient should respond to that content: agree or disagree, respond or ignore, feel a certain way, and so on. Put simply, there are multiple ways to put a message together, all of which are meaningful but each of which predisposes the audience towards particular interpretations, or preferred readings. By visually emphasizing specific symbols or relations (between symbols, or between the viewer and the image), some interpretations are encouraged, and others downplayed or erased altogether. John Berger calls these channelled interpretations ‘ways of seeing’ (Berger, 1972), which reproduce social difference and hierarchy by positioning the viewer in a particular relationship with the image and its contents (Nederveen Pieterse, 1992, p. 10; van Leeuwen, 2001, p. 102). Images can communicate ideological positions through their composition: “Visual structures do not simply reproduce the structures of ‘reality’. On the contrary, they produce images of reality which are bound up with the interests of the social institutions within which the images are produced, circulated and read. They are ideological” (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 48). Because these compositional choices reproduce certain social orders and privilege particular social positions (and challenge or obscure others), they are an important but often overlooked site of political communication.

In this regard, visual social semiotics is a useful tool for analysing what social movement theories refer to as ‘collective action frames’ or ‘framing processes.’ Other social movement
theories, such as political opportunity and resource mobilization approaches, focus on the structural or institutional factors that shape the emergence, development, and success or failure of social movements. In contrast, framing theories look at the ways in which actors – governments, protesters, the media – represent their understanding of the causes, solutions, and moral evaluations of an issue in order to mobilize support and gain public attention (Entman, 1993, pp. 51–59; Snow & Benford, 1988). The way an actor or group frames a contentious issue “provides coherence to an array of symbols, images, and arguments, linking them through an underlying organizing idea that suggests what is essential – what consequences and values are at stake” (C. Ryan & Gamson, 2006, p. 14). As I show throughout this study, both the SM and MAC images draw extensively on national symbols and themes which frame their respective positions as the more legitimate expression of national interest.

Framing processes take place within the constraints of ideological systems (including nationalism) in that they draw upon widely held beliefs about how the world operates to make sense of specific issues, policies, or incidents. Frames are thus limited by the symbolic systems which render them intelligible (Steinberg 1998, p. 846; Sandberg 2006, p. 212). This is not to suggest that actors are only able to select from a set menu of ideologically determined frames: they can also use framing processes to bring into question some of the assumptions about the broader ideological system within which they act. By problematizing common-sense conceptions of a social issues, “collective action frames can function to amplify and extend existing ideologies or provide innovative antidotes to them” (Snow & Bedford 2000, p. 58). Moreover, actors (e.g., from the government or from the movement) do not simply put forward their preferred frame for understanding an issue and its potential solutions, but rather they engage in a contentious dialogue with other opposing groups. In this context, these actors often use framing “to appropriate, reconfigure, and delegitimize the meanings” (Steinberg, 1998, p. 857) deployed by other actors. Thus the idea of framing is useful in that it emphasizes how meaning production is an ongoing, dynamic, and contested process (Snow & Benford, 2000a, p. 59). As I show in subsequent chapters, SM images often both reproduce a national frame of
reference, but also contest or adapt many of the conventional conceptions of national identity circulating in Taiwan. At the same time, this framing is constrained by the broader ideology of nationalism, in which political community is understood almost exclusively as a bounded, sovereign nation (Anderson, 2016, p. 7; Gellner, 1983, p. 1).

Data Sources and Selection

SM data sources

The primary source for visual materials from the SM is the public.318.io archive, an online database of materials collected from the LY and immediate surroundings at the conclusion of the SM. On the final morning of the occupation, a multidisciplinary group of scholars from universities around Taipei and organized by Academia Sinica’s Hwang Ming-chorng, arranged with protesters and police to collect as many materials related to the SM as possible in order to preserve them for public record and future scholarly study (Tang & Chung, 2015). Volunteers were in the process of gathering objects and loading them into trucks as the protesters were leaving the building on April 10th (Hsiau A-chin, personal communication). Over 7000 items were collected, including photographs, drawings, sculptures, t-shirts and hats, stickers, handmade stamps, water bottles, and air-conditioning ducts. These items were subsequently digitally recorded and catalogued, before ultimately being transferred to the National Taiwan History Museum in Tainan city. The digital archive also includes approximately 800 hours of audiovisual recordings taken inside the chamber and the road surrounding the LY where assemblies and support rallies took place (Jinan Road, Qingdao E. Road, Zhongshan S. Road, and Zhenjiang Street). Organizers and volunteers gathered these audiovisual recordings from social media or from individuals who had been at the site (http://public.318.io/about). The resulting archive consists of 11,029 image and video files which are cataloged by file type, original medium, and physical dimensions, as well as brief description of the contents and transcription of visible text, all of which are searchable in Chinese and English on the website. The majority of
the artifacts are either unclaimed, public domain, or available under Creative Common license, which permits the images to be used for academic purposes (see Note on Copyright).

In order to build my dataset of SM images, I downloaded from the archive all files marked as ‘graphic’ (平面, 7216 results) and ‘dimensional’ (立體, 125 results), as these are the broadest top-level categories which include static images.\(^\text{35}\) I then cross-referenced this dataset with database searches for specific media (drawings 繪畫, photographs 照片, apparel 服飾, printing 印刷, banner 布條), and any items missing from the top-level search were added to the dataset. Finally, I manually excluded from my dataset any images which fit any of the following four criteria:

1. Items which consisted only of plain text (printed or handwritten). Text which is highly stylized (e.g., graffiti and calligraphy) was included.
2. Images clearly not produced or altered by participants in the SM. This primarily consists of the covers of notebooks, as well as approximately 700 illustrated postcards from supporters in Japan.
3. Images consisting only of a Sunflower with no other visual content. This excluded a large number of marginal doodles and sketches.
4. Duplicate items, for example, multiple copies of the same pamphlet or posters.

This resulted in a final dataset of 1037 separate SM images for coding and content analysis.

**MAC image sources**

In order to better highlight contested or competing conceptions of national identity, I also collected an extensive assortment of materials published by the MAC during the Ma Ying-jeou administration (2008-2016). As the name suggests, this is the government body responsible for cross-strait relations with the PRC, and which published most of the related public relations material related to ECFA and the CSSTA. The MAC is an official arm of the executive branch headed by a cabinet minister appointed by the president (Lai Shin-yuan 賴幸媛 2008-2012 and

\(^{35}\) The other top-level category, ‘digital media’ 數位媒體, covers video and audio recordings.
Consequently, my research treats MAC publications from this period as broadly representative of the Ma Ying-jeou administration’s understanding and use of national identity specifically in the context of cross-strait relations. MAC annual reports and public relations materials are often very visual, incorporating numerous photographs and illustrative graphics. These two factors make MAC publications a useful foil for how national identity is invoked in SM imagery. In order to build a sample data set of MAC images to compare with the SM images, I collected documents published by the MAC between January 2008 (when Ma Ying-jeou was inaugurated as President) and March 2014 (when the SM began). These included the MAC’s annual reports – 100-page glossy booklets and DVDs for wider distribution – as well as pamphlets and shorter booklets of public relations materials promoting the government’s cross-strait policies. These documents were downloaded from the MAC website while I was conducting fieldwork in the fall of 2017, with supplemental materials gathered and scanned over the same time.

Of the 178 documents collected, I analysed only publications which include a substantive amount of visual content (i.e., more than a single logo or decorative border). I then identified individual images within each publication, resulting in a dataset of 466 discrete images from 33 separate documents. These include reports and pamphlets on the ‘Jiang-Chen talks’, a series of eight summits between Jiang Pin-kung (on behalf of the ROC) and Chen Yunlin (for the PRC) between June 2008 and August 2012 to negotiate increased cooperation on a

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36 An examination of the changes in MAC publications from the DPP administrations before and after those of Ma Ying-jeou (2000-2008 and 2016-present, respectively) is beyond the scope of the present study. A provisional look at these materials, however, suggests that there would be ample material for a future study on how both visual content and overall design style reflected the DPP’s more Taiwan-centric national identity.

37 My unit of analysis is the individual image; however, this is an imperfect measure. Collages, multiple copies of the same image, or designs which span multiple pages or front and back covers all raise the question of what should be counted as a single image. The quantitative measures presented in this study are useful indications of general trends, but are not intended as claims of statistical certainty. As a general rule, a visual composition was treated as a single image if it was distinctly separated by text, page margins, or blank space with no visual indications of connection to other visual elements (e.g., lines, or characters pointing or reacting). Repeated images such as an icon in the page header or margins were counted as a single image.
broad range of issues, including trade and transportation. The MAC also published materials promoting the 2010 ECFA, a major agreement facilitating trade and financial investment between the PRC and ROC. ECFA was a cornerstone in Ma Ying-jeou’s efforts toward cross-strait rapprochement. (The CSSTA was a follow-up agreement negotiated with the framework set out in ECFA. As such, MAC materials most often address the CSSTA in publications promoting the benefits of ECFA more generally.) These two topics, the Jiang-Chen talks and ECFA, dominate the MAC’s public relations between 2008 and 2014.

![Figure 2.1: Visual Elements in MAC Annual Reports, 2008-14](chart)

**Coding and content analysis**

The final dataset of relevant images consists of 1037 separate SM images and 466 MAC images. These images were then imported into nVivo for coding and analysis. Content analysis entails systematic coding of the denotative contents of each image in the dataset with minimal

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38 Three further talks were held between June 2013 and August 2015, the first of which resulted in the CSSTA that sparked the SM. As the Heads of both delegations changed between the eighth and ninth meetings, the talks were renamed the ‘Cross-strait High-Level Talks.’
interpretation. The aim is to produce a quantitative description of the entire dataset which can be empirically verified and replicated (Rose, 2001, p. 55; see also Bell, 2001, p. 15). Content analysis is well suited to dealing with large volumes of data in a systematic way in order to identify general trends and patterns which may be easily missed when examining a large number of images (Rose, 2001, p. 55). Similarly, because content analysis focuses on the denotative level, it can also serve as a check on researcher bias, whereby a researcher may select only images that confirm his or her initial assumptions (Lutz & Collins, 1993, p. 89). Given that the current study uses a dataset of over 1500 images, content analysis is a useful starting point for ascertaining which motifs are most widely represented in the materials (see Table 2.1).

In order to identify common motifs I developed a provisional coding scheme for denotative contents. Images were sampled at random and the contents coded as extensively as possible. Codes were created for objects (flags, flowers, animals, public figures) as well as the dominant colour, medium (photographs, drawings, printed graphics), and language (when text was part of the image). I stopped initial sampling when I reached what I considered to be saturation – when five images in a row could be coded without requiring any new codes (see Charmaz, 2006). The resulting coding scheme was refined in consultation with colleagues at Academia Sinica, with particular attention to identifying distinctions with cultural significance that I initially overlooked.\(^{39}\) Both the SM and MAC dataset were then re-coded according to the revised scheme. This level of coding provided the quantitative data for content analysis of the dataset, showing the frequency of specific symbols (summarized in Table 2.1).

\(^{39}\) For example, the code for flowers (other than sunflowers) was revised to distinguish between generic flowers and plum blossoms, which are the official state flower of the ROC and thereby often associated with the KMT.
The most common content in the SM imagery are sunflowers (appearing in 23% of images), the island of Taiwan (14.6%), president Ma Ying-jeou (12.5%),\(^{40}\) the ROC flag (5.9%), black boxes (4.4%) and the Formosan black bear (3.8%). For the MAC imagery, the most common contents

\(^{40}\) Note that the SM also used many symbolic allusions to Ma Ying-jeou, particularly of a satiric nature, which are not reflected in these denotative frequencies. The most common of these are horses (a play on Ma’s family name), deer, and antlers (referencing a comment Ma made about horns growing from a deer’s ears). If we count these as visual representations of Ma, the total frequency jumps up to 27% of all SM images, making it the second most common symbol.

Table 2.1: The 20 most common symbols appearing in SM and MAC images

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>SM</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>MAC</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunflower</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>Lai Shin-yuan 賴幸媛(^2)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Island of Taiwan*</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>ROC flag*</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma Ying-jeou*</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>Island of Taiwan*</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROC flag*</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>Ma Ying-jeou*</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black box</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>Menshen 門神</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antlers</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>Ship</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formosan bear</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>Flowers*</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fists*</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>Sun Yat-sen**</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiang Yi-huah 江宜樺(^1)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>Airplane</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT Shining-sun logo</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>Globe</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-star PRC logo</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>Chen Yunlin 陈云林(^3)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banana</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>Conical straw hat</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>Fists*</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blood</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>Wu Den-Yih 吳敦義(^4)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eyes</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>Gears*</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese mainland*</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>Rice paddies</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heart</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>Bridge*</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC flag*</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>Taipei 101 building</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>Chiang Pin-kung 江丙坤(^5)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other flags*</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>Lantern</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: % indicates percentage of total number of images in the respective dataset: SM n=1037 MAC n=466

* Symbols which also appear in the opposing imagery
** Sun Yat-sen appears in 6 (0.6%) of the SM imagery. See Chapter 5.
\(^1\) Premier of the ROC, 2013-2014 (KMT)
\(^2\) Minister of the MAC, 2008-2012 (KMT)
\(^3\) Chair of the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), PRC organization dealing with cross-strait relations, 2008-2013
\(^4\) Vice President of the ROC, 2012-2016 (KMT)
\(^5\) Chair of the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), ROC organization dealing with cross-strait relations, 2008-2012
are Lai Shin-yuan (Chair of the MAC from 2008-2012), the ROC flag (10.1%), the island of Taiwan (5.8%), Ma Ying-jeou (5.8%), and menshen (traditional Chinese door gods, 3.6%). In other words, four of the five most common items represented in SM images and three out of the top five objects in MAC images have strong national connotations. This suggests that national identity is a significant theme in both imagery data sets.

One point to note here is the dearth of economic symbolism in the SM imagery. After all, the CSSTA was a trade agreement, and part of Ma Ying-jeou’s broader program of economic cooperation under ECFA. Ma argued that ECFA would rejuvenate the Taiwanese economy by making exports to the PRC more competitive, increasing domestic and foreign direct investment, and facilitating Taiwan’s integration into the East Asian market. However, there is little indication that ECFA contributed to improvement in any of these areas (Tung, 2018, pp. 167–174). As discussed earlier, the net benefits of economic growth during Ma’s first term were highly uneven (M. Ho, 2019a, p. 76; Sullivan & Smyth, 2018, pp. 22–23) and economic disparities were a significant concern for many SM participants (Hsu, 2017; Tseng, 2014). Despite this, representations or allusions to the economy are noticeably lacking in SM images. Only eight images (0.77%) include visible money or currency symbols (bills, coins, dollar signs, ‘RMB’, etc.), and only one image incorporates the ‘22k’ slogan (a reference to the low average starting salary for college graduates, commonly used in SM discourse to indicate anxiety over their poor economic prospects; C.-M. Wang, 2017). Other objects which connote economic exchange or trade appear throughout the MAC imagery – shipping containers and ports, for example, or the 2011 Annual Report cover which shows nothing but the title and a cash register receipt (although rarely in conjunction with conventional national symbols). However, no similar items appear in the SM imagery. Ideas of the nation – specifically the nation as people – far outweigh appeals to economic gain or distributional justice, at least in the visual realm.
While content analysis highlights which symbols are used and how often across the data set, semiotic interpretation looks more closely at how those symbols were used, and consequently which conceptions of the nation were reproduced by individual images. With this in mind, after identifying the most frequent symbols, I used a social semiotic approach to analyse each image containing those symbols, with a special focus on the composition of the entire image. For example, each image that contained the ROC flag was interpreted independently to see how the overall composition of the image informs the interpretation of the flag, before comparing the entire subset of ‘flag images’ to identify thematic patterns. The specific framework for this visual social semiotic analysis is the ‘visual grammar’ developed by Kress and van Leeuwen (2002; 2006) and elaborated by Painter, Martin, & Unsworth (2012). This approach entails analyzing the formal elements (line, shape, colour, value, space, and texture), as well as how those elements are related to each other in the image to form a meaningful whole (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 176; see also J. Harris, 2001, p. 90 ff).

Composition, a concept I deploy throughout my analysis, refers to this interaction of formal elements, their arrangement within the image, and the relationships between them. The
meaning of individual symbols within an image can be drastically altered by composition, including other subjects or actors in the image, the processes relating them, and their relative salience (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 59). Actions or dynamics in the image can be conveyed by gestures, lines (especially diagonals), or directional signs (such as arrows) which suggest the flow of activity between participants. The arrangement of spaces and lines also directs the eye around the image in a certain order, which can suggest a narrative, logical, or causal sequence (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 74). Participants and actors can be emphasized or made more salient by their size, placement in the frame relative to other objects, contrast of light and dark, highly saturated or distinctive colour, or sharpness of focus (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 63). For instance, in Chapter 4, I consider how the colour, contrast, and size of ROC flags make them especially salient in many images, intensifying their role as markers of national identity.

In addition to relationships between the contents of an image, composition can also convey interpersonal relationships between the contents and the viewer, directing the viewer towards particular ‘ways of seeing’ (Berger, 1972). Synthesizing film, art, and design theory, Kress and van Leeuwen define a number of visual techniques which affect how viewers are likely to position themselves with respect to the contents of the image. At the risk of oversimplifying an extremely detailed analytical framework, some examples of the formal aspects of an image which can influence its interpersonal meaning include: size of frame, horizontal and vertical perspective, gaze or eye contact, ambiance (color and light), and ‘stylistic modality’ (how realistic an image looks). Size of frame refers to how ‘close’ the pictured object or person appears to be. A close-up image showing a person’s head and shoulders (or an object as if it were within arm’s reach) conveys the impression of closer proximity than a long-shot of the entire body. Whether this proximity is interpreted as intimate or threatening depends on other factors (narrative context, colour and lighting, facial expressions, etc.). Nonetheless, the size of frame influences how immediate the figures or objects in the image appear, which in turn influences what sort of viewer responses feel appropriate (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006, pp. 124–29). The horizontal viewing angle can involve a viewer in the action (face on view) or
detach them from it as an observer (oblique or side-on perspective) (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006, pp. 133–40), while higher or lower viewing angles position the viewer in analogous social or power relations respective to the actors (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006, pp. 140–43). Similarly, apparent eye contact with human, animal or anthropomorphized objects demands contact or engagement from the viewer, while the absence of such an interpolating gaze makes an image less socially demanding and more observational (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006, pp. 116–125; Painter et al., 2012, p. 19). Colour, in addition to culturally and contextually specific ideational associations (e.g., yellow has traditional associations with Chinese emperors and with prosperity, while white carries connotations of purity but also of death due to its use in funeral clothing), plays an interpersonal role in setting the mood or ambiance of an image. Highly saturated colours are more active than muted or faded ones, while a preponderance of warm tones (yellow, red, orange) appear more energetic than cool ones (blue, green, purple) (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2002; Painter et al., 2012, pp. 40–41). Value (light and dark) and contrast can produce similar effects, especially in black and white images (Painter et al., 2012, p. 36). Chapter 6 devotes particular attention to how colour, value, and saturation in images of the island of Taiwan position the viewer in positions that evoke sympathy, pity, and, ultimately, responsibility. Chapter 6 further elaborates the ways in which images can use this interpersonal level of communication to invoke different conceptions of the nation. Each of these aspects of an image represent a continuum rather than absolute categories, and each interacts with the others (and with the contents of the image) to convey meaning. Moreover, interpretation is not an objective process that can be reduced to one ‘correct’ reading. However, this visual semiotic framework offers a useful analytical vocabulary for describing how different aspects of an image influence the range of possible interpretations.

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41 For a discussion of how the top-down or “gods-eye” perspectives of satellite imagery takes this association between perspective and power to the extreme, see Shim (2014).
Limitations

I have endeavored to refine my interpretation through discussions with Taiwanese colleagues, but ultimately, I come to this research as a cultural outsider. As such, I have no doubt missed some cultural nuances and connotations which may be obvious to the creators or target audience of many of these images. And there will be places that I have ascribed connotations that are intuitive from a White, Anglophone Canadian cultural perspective, but have little resonance in the original context. This is true of any interpretive analysis, but the same things that make visual analysis so promising – the greater reliance on implicit connotations – also make it potentially more prone to a false sense of universalism on the part of the researcher.

A similar caveat needs to be made regarding the social semiotic approach to visual analysis. Indeed, one of the strengths of social semiotics over other more structuralist semiotic theories is that it explicitly calls for attention to cultural contexts (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 4). The theoretical tools and analytical framework used in this study have been developed in a Euro-American context, and can only be applied judiciously and with careful reflection. A straightforward example is the influence of conventional orientations of printing. Kress and Van Leeuwen suggest that orientation of Western languages from left to right also influences how native speakers (or readers) interpret images: objects on the left side of an image are conventionally understood as chronologically or logically preceding those on the right (2006, pp. 179–185). We should not assume the same implicit sequencing in images from a Taiwanese context, since Chinese is traditionally read from right to left (as well as vertically) but is also commonly printed in the ‘Western’ orientation as well. Similarly, psychological research suggests that native readers of ideographic writing systems cognitively process written characters as images before they process them phonetically (H.-C. Chen, Yamauchi, Tamaoka, & Vaid, 2007; K. M. Lee, 2004). This suggests that the distinction between text and image is less clear cut in ideographic languages such as Chinese, because there is already a direct association between the visual mark and the connotated concept (i.e., meaning does not require an
intermediary step, visual mark – sound – concept, that it does in a phonetic alphabet). Such
issues do not mean that cross-cultural analysis is impossible, but that it should include an
awareness of these limitations.

The limitations of the source materials should also be taken into consideration. My goal has
been to temper the interpretive dimension of my analysis with quantitative content analysis to
support the generalizability of my findings. However, the balance of my work is on the
interpretive side, and so it should also be noted that there are limits to what can be concluded
from the materials examined here. Although the public.318.io archive is a remarkable collection
of objects, images, and digital media, it is not an exhaustive collection of the entire visual
material output of the SM. Items destroyed, disposed of, or taken from the premises during or
at the conclusion of the occupation, for example, are not represented. I have attempted to
supplement my dataset with additional images that appear in other sources if those objects
were clearly present in the protest site during the occupation (e.g., as was evident in news
photographs or video footage of the LY). A total of four such images have been included in the
semiotic analysis, as noted in the figure captions. Additionally, the public.318.io archive focuses
almost exclusively on the material objects produced by the movement. As such, it does not
include digital images which only circulated online, such as memes, GIFs, or online posters. A
great deal of attention has been paid to the role of social media in the SM (Hsiao & Yang, 2018;
Tsatsou, 2018; Tsatsou & Zhao, 2016; Y. Wu & Hsieh, 2014). A promising line of further study
would be an analysis of visuality in the digital culture of such movements.

Moreover, since the artifacts were gathered during a single morning, as the occupiers were
in the process of leaving the LY, there is no record of what artifact was made when. As a result,
it is impossible to trace changes in imagery over time.42 Similarly, although the archive website
invites individuals to identify themselves as the creator of a piece of work, only a handful have
done so. This makes it difficult to attribute different symbols, motifs, or styles to particular

42 By contrast, using date-stamped social media posts, Jeffery Martin (2015) is able to identify five distinct ways that
supporters of the SM represented police and to connect each to a particular phase of the movement.
individuals or groups. My analysis is thus limited to identifying and analysing general patterns within the archived materials of the SM examined collectively. Approaching the SM as a unified actor raises its own problems. Participants in the occupation came from 23 different civil society groups, with priorities ranging from resisting PRC influence in mass media to land rights, environmentalism, and labour, gender, and social welfare concerns (B. Chen et al., 2014, pp. 19–20). Participation was motivated by three related but distinct issues tied to the CSSTA: anti-China concerns, distributive justice or anti-neoliberal globalisation concerns, and democratic process concerns (C.-M. Wang, 2017, p. 179). Scholars, including some who were themselves participants, differ in whether they see the main unifying factor as resisting PRC influence (Hsu, 2017) or opposition to Ma Ying-jeou (B. Chen et al., 2014). The anonymous nature of the public.318.io archive makes it impossible to compare the contributions and perspectives of these different groups within the SM though the images it contains.

Similarly, although the MAC imagery is useful because the MAC is the official department most directly involved in cross-strait relations, it is only one part of the government’s communication apparatus. Whereas the SM is limited in scope, spatially, temporally, and in its objectives, the MAC images address a broader range of issues. The role of national identity in such imagery is more ambiguous. The SM imagery is firmly situated in the specific context of anti-CSSTA protests, which suggests particular connotations for symbols associated with ‘China’ or ‘Taiwan’. The MAC documents considered here cover a six-year period, and address a broader spectrum of cross-strait issues than just the CSSTA. I have aimed to select MAC images most directly addressing a similar set of issues as the SM by only including documents which deal directly with cross-strait trade agreements (excluding MAC handbooks on cross-strait marriages and immigration, for example). Nonetheless, the different scopes and timescales of the MAC and SM imagery do mean that the contrasts identified throughout this project speak to general trends, not definitive statements on ‘the’ national identity articulated by each group. (In fact, any suggestion that there is a singular national identity narrative in either the SM or
MAC imagery would contradict my larger argument that national identity is always a contingent and ongoing process).

Additionally, while there is an obvious shift in visual style and content when Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008 and appointed a new MAC minister, official publications are guided by the government’s public relations strategy and subject to institutional vetting. This is quite a different ecosystem than the more spontaneous and self-directed art produced by participants in the SM. These different conditions in the production of the images cannot be taken as an indication of how coherent or cohesive a concept of national identity is in either body of images (see Rose, 2001, pp. 29–33). Further, the impact of institutional organization on constructing more (or less) unified conceptions of national identity through images is a different line of inquiry than the one I develop here. My attention is directed toward the techniques of signification, and the processes through which conceptions of national identity which seem cohesive or unified are contested, problematized, or appropriated. Factors influencing the adopting of a new design aesthetic, such as the MAC’s internal bureaucratic decision-making process and interdepartmental coordination across the administration’s entire ‘branding’ efforts, are beyond the scope of this study.

A second limitation is inherent in the visual analysis approach used in this project. While some issues lend themselves more easily to visual representation due to the overabundance of highly charged symbols (e.g., flags representing nation), other issues are less amenable to powerful visual representation. So while anxieties over neoliberal globalization were widely evident in the SM discourse (C.-M. Wang, 2017) and were among the stated reasons for public support for the SM (F.-Y. Chen & Yen, 2017, p. 1195), this issue is far less evident in the SM imagery. As such, I do not presume to offer a definitive analysis of the issues and interests driving the SM. My intention, rather, is to trace how one important issue (national identity) is articulated in an overlooked communicative medium (visual materials).

A third point to note is that examining these images through an online archive presents them in a significantly different context than they were originally created and displayed. It is
necessary to acknowledge that our experience of visual material changes when viewing a painting or sculpture on a computer screen as opposed to in person and in the context they were produced and meant to be displayed. As mentioned above, context affects the meaning of an image. For example, hanging two paintings of historical figures opposite one another may create a juxtaposition that elaborates their respective connotations. Likewise, dozens of black-and-white photographs of police violence hung together may magnifying their emotional impact through sheer repetition. In an archival setting, however, the original physical arrangement of visual materials vis-à-vis one another is often unknown. Similarly, the layers of emotional and social significance that stem from being in a particular space (such as an occupied legislative chamber), at a particular time, and experienced with other people also remain hidden. This project does not claim to replace an analysis based on experiencing the material objects in their original context, such as could be accomplished with an ethnographic or participatory action approach. This is not to say that archival research is entirely disconnected from its subject matter, but simply an acknowledgement of the limitations particular to this approach.

Conclusion

The current literature shows that national identity remains a pressing issue in Taiwanese political life, and that we need to move beyond established ethnic categories to understand what ‘Taiwanese identity’ means to people today. The existing studies on nation building demonstrate how official and elite discourses shape national identity (Brass, 1991), and how successive governments have pursed competing nation-building projects. The question of popular uptake or resistance to those top-down projects is a topic ripe for further research (Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008). The popular opinion approach engages this question of nationalism as seen from below. However, it is most often hindered by theoretical frameworks which oversimplify popular national identity into a single binary variable: either independence/reunification, or ethnic/civic. National identity is not a single phenomenon that
can be described and measured categorically. It is not, in other words, the collective identity of
group that exists outside of or prior to claims of nationhood. Rather, it is a performative
process, an iterative act of asserting the political primacy of one way of imagining a community
over others: a vision of who belongs, under what conditions, and with what rights and
obligations. Approaching national identity as a process, an ongoing construction and
contestation of the meaning of ‘Taiwanese identity’, invites a more nuanced a dynamic
understanding of the forces shaping political tensions on the island. Visual analyses such as the
social semiotic analysis outlined above offer a novel way into these complex questions of
identity construction in the context of the study of Taiwan and of nationalism. Chapters 4, 5
and 6 apply this visual approach to three of the most common nationalist symbolic motifs that
appear in the SM imagery: national flags, representations of history, and representations of
territory. In order to place this analysis in historical context, Chapter 3 first provides an
overview of the different ways in which national identity has been understood in Taiwan over
the last century.
Chapter 3 – Historical Context

In order to appreciate how national identity is reformulated and reiterated in the images discussed in the following chapters, this chapter presents an overview of the ways in which Taiwanese identity has been conceptualized from the late 19th century to 2014 and the historical conditions which contributed to these different conceptions. Four regimes have governed modern Taiwan, during the Qing Dynasty (1684-1895), Japanese imperial rule (1895-1945), KMT Martial Law (1945-1990), and the democratic period (1990-present). Each of these periods entailed its own complex social and political conditions which shaped what it meant to assert Chinese and/or Taiwanese identity, as well as the relationship between the two. Contemporary contestation over national identity in Taiwan, such as in the SM, both draws upon and differs from these historical conceptions. The overview developed below provides the historical context for understanding why national identity remains a major issue in Taiwan’s politics as well as the complicated and mutually constitutive relationship between conceptions of Chinese and Taiwanese identities. Most importantly, it lays out the historical and institutional sedimentation of particular ways of conceptualizing Taiwanese and Chinese identity. On one hand, the significance of emphasizing a shared Chinese heritage (as I will show the MAC imagery does extensively) can only be appreciated in light of the complicated relationships between inhabitants of the island and different conceptions of what constitutes Chinese identity. On the other hand, the historical sources of various ideas of what constitutes Taiwanese identity continue to inform contemporary assertions of national identity in Taiwan.

43 To reiterate the distinction made in Chapter 2, I consider any collective identity that serves as the primary basis for claims to sovereignty as a national identity. A movement, policy, or ideology is nationalist if it seeks to make (or keep) the national community coextensive with the political one (i.e., the state).

44 Strictly speaking martial law was declared on May 20, 1949 and ended July 14, 1987, bracketed by two transition periods. During the first of these (1945-1947), Taiwan was under authoritarian KMT rule, while during the second (1987-1990) competitive democratic institutions were gradually expanded. For the sake of simplicity, I treat each transition as part of the subsequent period (Martial Law and Democratization, respectively). The particularities of these transitions, and the evolving conceptions of national identity evident during each, are discussed more thoroughly in the relevant sections below.
at all levels. The conceptions of Taiwanese identity which emerge in the SM imagery stand out in comparison to previous claims for local autonomy which, historically, were predominantly directed against Japanese or KMT authorities.

In this chapter, I present the larger backdrop from which the SM and MAC imagery draw their symbolic material, while also highlighting how these reiterations introduce variations of those sedimented identities. This is not an attempt to determine the ‘true’ history of Taiwanese identity. Quite the opposite, my aim is to highlight how Taiwanese identity has been conceived in many different, sometimes contradictory ways. What interests me more than the apparent truth or falsity of a given narrative is which themes are picked up and repurposed by political actors, and which are selectively left out. Seeking a historical basis for a given contemporary conception of identity is itself a political act, one which attempts to legitimize that identity by giving it the appearance of being connected to the past (Duara, 1996). In later chapters I explore in depth how these varied histories are appropriated in images in the context of the CSSTA. Chapter 5 focuses on direct appeals to history by the SM and MAC images, to frame ECFA and the CSSTA in terms of national identity. Meanwhile, Chapters 4 and 6 consider how the historical use of common symbols representing ‘the nation’ – the flag and territory – have left them sedimented with specific nationalist connotations, and how SM imagery contests these connotations while also being constrained by them.

Taiwan During the Qing Imperial Rule (1684-1895)

Both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and KMT claim Taiwan as part of a single Chinese nation on the basis of its marginal inclusion in the Qing empire, even though the Qing did not integrate Taiwan into the empire until quite late in the 19th century (Fiskejo, 1999; Shepherd, 1993, p. 107). Primarily in response to French and Japanese forays onto the island in late 19th century, the Qing instituted a number of integration policies, or neidihua (内地化 lit. ‘making in-land’), to shore up their claims to the strategically located island. These policies included modernizing infrastructure, centralizing authority and building the new capital city of Taipei,
extending the Qing educational system across the island, and ultimately raising Taiwan to provincial status in 1886 (Morris, 2002, pp. 6–7). Qing authorities made a distinction between so-called ‘raw barbarians’ (shengfan 生番) and ‘cooked barbarians’ (shoufan 熟番), indicating the degree to which a community had adopted Han cultural practices. However, these categories were primarily administrative ones used by Qing officials to determine taxes and access to communal hunting lands, rather than collective social or political identities (Tavares, 2005, see esp. p. 366, note 5). To the contrary, communal violence in the 19th century most often occurred between sinicized (i.e., ‘cooked’) communities, rather than between the cooked and raw barbarians (Harrell, 1990; Hsiau, 2000). 45 Similarly, uprisings against the Qing were as likely to be by Han settlers as by ‘uncooked’ (i.e., un-sinicized) groups (Shepherd, 1993, pp. 309, 357). There is little evidence to suggest that inhabitants of the island thought of themselves as a part of either a Chinese or Taiwanese community. Similarly, imperial discourse framed Taiwan primarily as a source of natural resources rather than a part of Qing civilization (M. Harrison, 2006, p. 7; see also Katz, 2005, p. 390). 46 So although the Qing Empire is used as the basis for claims of a long-established Chinese national identity, such claims are better understood as latter-day attempts to legitimate contemporary policy choices (such as the CSSTA) by framing Taiwan and the mainland as part of the same political community at some point in history (see Chapter 5). 47

45 Stevan Harrell emphatically rejects any attempt to label various groups of settlers from the mainland (e.g., Anxi, Tongan, and Sanyi) as ‘sub-ethnic’ divisions of Han ethnicity, pointedly calling it “silly and in the end probably unconsciously politically motivated” (1990, p. 109, note 16).

46 The Manchurian rulers of the Qing dynasty did not initially share the language, religion, or social customs of the majority of their Han Chinese subjects. As a result, in order to legitimize their rule the Qing court actively propagated Confucian cultural and political values as the basis of Han identity, rather than ancestry (Hughes, 1997, p. 4). ‘Race’, understood as patrilineal ancestry, had become central to Han identity during the Song dynasty (960–1279 C.E.), in contrast to the culturalist view that Chinese language and culture defined Chinese identity which had been widely accepted previously (Ebrey 1996, p. 23). For a detailed examination of the changing identity narratives of the Qing aristocracy, see Crossley (1999).

47 For a thorough discussion of Qing administration of Taiwan, see Shepherd (1993), Chapter 7.
Japanese Colonial Rule in Taiwan (1895-1945)

The Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895) saw Taiwan transferred from Qing to Japanese control. The conditions for the development of some form of collective Taiwanese identity only emerged under Japanese colonial rule. A distinct social category of ‘Taiwanese’ emerged out of the contradictions between assimilatory cultural and education policies on one hand and inflexible legal, political, and economic distinctions between the Japanese administrators and the heterogeneous residents of Taiwan on the other. However, the relationship between the categories of Taiwanese and Chinese was hotly debated and contested during this period, producing multiple, sometimes contradictory notions of which national identity included the people of Taiwan.\(^48\)

Such contradictions where themselves the consequences of two different approaches to governing the inhabitants of Taiwan. On one hand, influential liberal voices in the Japanese government advocated rapidly assimilating the people of Taiwan into Japanese society using widespread public education centred on Japanese language, culture, and loyalty to the Emperor (M. Chang, 2000, p. 55; Tai, 1999, p. 504; Komagome & Mangan, 1997, p. 316 and passim).\(^49\) This suggested that national identity rested largely on cultural practices which could be learned. On the other hand, residents of Taiwan were relegated to a second-class status in the legal and political systems put in place by Japanese colonial administrators. Legal standing was primarily

\(^{48}\) It also led to the first attempt to establish a Taiwanese state. Abandoned by the Qing court, members of the local gentry proclaimed an independent Republic of Taiwan, touted as “Asia’s first Republic” (Morris, 2002, p. 14). This event is notable in that it marks the first concerted articulation of a distinct Taiwanese people with a common political identity (Dawley, 2009, p. 448; R.-R. Wu, 2003, p. 160). This claim included the creation of a national flag (see Lennard, Pollak, Lin, & Chen, 2013) and the coining of the terms ‘Tairen’ 台人 and ‘Taimin’ 台民 – both roughly translated as ‘Taiwanese people’ (Corcuff, 2002a, p. xiii). Ren 人 is a relatively neutral term for ‘person’. Min 民 carries connotations of collective peoplehood.

\(^{49}\) The lines of colonial difference (Chatterjee, 1993) were never as sharply defined as in the European empires which relied on orientalism and racial logics to produce rigid social categories. “Japan’s oriental colonialism…. [w]as rather a rule of ambiguity aiming to exploit and incorporate the colonies” (Wu, 2003, p. 31, original emphasis; see also Barlow, 1997, p. 13). As a result, life in colonized Taiwan was much closer to that of its imperial metropole than was the case for most European colonies (Tzeng, 2009, p. xvii). These contradictory colonial policies were a reflection and articulation of similar debates over Japanese national identity itself, which was only beginning to emerge as an important claim during this time (Tai, 1999, pp. 531–532).
determined by the *koseki*, or household registration system. The Meiji constitution explicitly excluded Taiwanese households from Japanese civil law.\(^{50}\) As there was no mechanism for legally relocating one’s household to Japan, the *koseki* system made it impossible for people from Taiwan to obtain the rights of full imperial subjects (T. Wang, 2000, pp. 140–141). This produced two distinct classes of subjects in Taiwan: Japanese and Taiwanese. Taiwanese subjects were subject to harsh criminal penalties. There was a mandatory death sentence for ‘banditry’, broadly interpreted as any resistance against Japanese officials by two or more people. Crimes committed by an individual could result in collective punishment for their entire community (Heé, 2014, p. 633), and Japanese police had the authority to summarily execute Taiwanese civilians under their jurisdiction (Barclay, 2005, p. 350). This two-tiered system also extended to economic opportunities. Day wages were determined by official racial categories, with Japanese earning more than non-Japanese (M. J. Brown, 2004, p. 55; Davidson, 1903, p. 600). Japanese firms did not hire non-Japanese employees until late in the colonial period (Brown, 2004, p. 56), while Taiwanese entrepreneurs were not permitted to establish corporations of their own until 1923 (T. Wang, 2000, p. 51). Even then the government maintained a strict monopoly over many of the most profitable industries such as sugar and camphor plantations and refining. Extremely stringent Japanese language requirements limited access to higher education by non-native speakers, further restricting economic opportunities for most of the island’s residents (Komagome & Mangan, 1997, p. 318; Tai, 1999, p. 516; see also Tsurumi, 1977). These unequal conditions resulted in a proliferation of Taiwanese political associations in the 1920s and 1930s pushing for more equal treatment, including the Taiwan Cultural Association (*Taiwan wenhua xiehui* 台灣文化協會; see Chapter 5), the Taiwan People’s Party (*Taiwan Minzhongdang* 臺灣民眾黨), and the Taiwanese Communist Party (*Taiwan

\(^{50}\) The main piece of colonial legislation was the *Law Relating to Laws and Ordinances to Be Enforced in Taiwan under Title 63*, passed by the Japanese government in 1896. This granted the Governor-General of Taiwan expansive legislative, military, and judicial authority, with minimal accountability to the Japanese diet in Tokyo, and even less to the people of Taiwan. Consequently, Law 63 was the primary target for political anger and mobilization in Japanese Taiwan. For a fuller discussion of Law 63 and successive colonial laws, see T. Wang (2000, pp. 38–44).
These associations have subsequently been used as symbols both of an emerging *Taiwanese* identity (Ching, 2001, p. 56) as well as patriotic *Chinese* resistance against Japanese imperialism (C. R. Hughes, 2014, p. 123; see also Chapter 5, esp. Figure 5.14).

The colonial institutions put in place by the Japanese were instrumental in the development of national identities on Taiwan in two complementary ways. First, they created a class of people whose legal and political lives were circumscribed *first and foremost* by their relationship to the island of Taiwan thorough a combination of residence and ancestry. The people living on Taiwan were separated politically from China, but simultaneously separated legally from Japan, creating an interstitial social space. Second, modernization under Japanese rule created conditions conducive to an island-wide imagined community which overrode local identities. By centralizing administration, education, and communications, and extending these state institutions into the mountainous inland areas, the colonial government blurred community boundaries and stimulated ‘administrative pilgrimages’ (Anderson, 2016, pp. 53–65), which gave students, tax collectors, bureaucrats, and merchants travelling across different parts of the island a sense of common experience. Moreover, although moveable type printing existed in the Qing dynasty, it had never been brought to the island, and magazines and newspapers were not published in Taiwan before the Japanese period (Shozo, 2012, pp. 67–68). Japanese public education and the introduction of print capitalism made Japanese a common language across the island (Ching, 2001, pp. 67–69), which ironically enabled heterogenous inhabitants of Taiwan to communicate their experiences and organize against discriminatory Japanese policies, particularly among the social elite most engaged in political activities (M. Chang, 2000, p. 58). So although ideas of a distinctively Taiwanese national identity did not emerge under Japanese rule, it did produce a political and legal category of ‘Taiwanese’ which could serve as a basis for the later construction of such identities.
KMT Rule and Martial Law (1945-1987)

After Japanese colonial rule ended many of these same discriminatory institutions were adopted by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) when it took control of the island following the Second World War. These were further entrenched after the imposition of Martial Law in 1949, following the KMT’s retreat from the mainland. The apparent opposition between Chinese and Taiwanese identities which dominates contemporary political debates is primarily a result of KMT policies between 1949 and 1987. However, while these policies produced a distinct social and political category based largely on ancestral ties to Taiwan, ideas of a Taiwanese identity connected to that category have continued to evolve and be contested. This is because concepts of Taiwanese identity have largely developed in response to the KMT’s conceptualization of Chinese identity (and the articulation of that identity in government policy). The KMT itself had to continually adapt its version of Chinese national identity in response to the PRC, which presented its own alternative vision of the legitimate Chinese nation (see e.g., Unger, 1996). The internal and external political forces shaping official Chinese identity in Taiwan are thus essential for understanding the opposing concepts of Taiwanese identity, and ultimately for understanding how the SM imagery indicates a significant break with these earlier ways of imagining Taiwan as a national community.

With Japan’s defeat at the end of the Second World War, Taiwan became part of a larger Chinese state for the first time in fifty years. Ironically, 1945 became a definitive date for institutionalizing a categorical distinction between Chinese and Taiwanese. Although residents of Taiwan were equal citizens of the ROC in principle, in practice legal status was determined by household registration (jiguan 籍貫). Over time jiguan became increasingly anachronistic, as it was based not on birthplace or current residence, but on patrilineal place of origin as of 1945 (Allio, 2000, p. 46). The KMT’s policies for governing Taiwan produced an impermeable social distinction between those with pre-1945 ancestral roots on the island (benshengren 本省人).
and those who traced their ancestry back to the mainland (waishengren 外省人). This distinction was exacerbated by the influx between 1945 and 1949 of between one and two million Mainland Chinese (equal to roughly a third of the island’s total population at the end of World War Two), about half of them KMT soldiers (Corcuff, 2002b, p. 134). This designation subsumed other collective identities (such as Hoklo, Hakka, and Aboriginal among the benshengren, or provincial origins among the waishengren); in a similar fashion, it cut vertically across class divisions between the KMT leadership and the troops and refugees who fled across the Taiwan straits in 1949 (Wachman, 1994, pp. 60–62), becoming the most salient social distinction in Taiwan for the next fifty years (Corcuff, 2000).

The dominant conception of contemporary Taiwanese identity developed primarily as a counter to KMT narratives of Chinese national identity which underwrote their policies privileging (as well as constituting) waishengren as a social category. The waishengren/benshengren distinction undermined any burgeoning sense of shared Chinese national identity. The first KMT governor (from 1945-7), General Chen Yi 陳儀, saw the residents of Taiwan as Japanese collaborators rather than as liberated compatriots and treated them with suspicion (Hughes, 1997, p. 25; Rubinstein, 1999). At the same time, the KMT seized Japanese assets and took over Japanese monopolies, effectively locking out local entrepreneurs (Phillips, 2003). Tensions over the unequal treatment of benshengren came to a head on February 28, 1947, when agents for the Tobacco Monopoly Bureau beat a Taiwanese cigarette seller in Taipei. Riots followed, and protestors demanded not only justice for the immediate incident, but also remedies for more widespread government corruption and abuses (M. Chang, 2000, p. 62). In the ensuing government crackdown, KMT troops killed around 10,000 and wounded 30,000 more (Phillips, 2003). This incident, known as the 2/28 incident (er’erba shijian 二二八事件), became a powerful symbol of a deep division between the KMT authorities and

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51 Most work in English on this period of Taiwanese history use the terms ‘Taiwanese’ and ‘Mainlander’ respectively. To avoid confusion with the numerous other ways of conceptualizing ‘Taiwanese’, I use the Chinese terms when discussing the waishengren/benshengren opposition in particular.
Taiwanese which “helped to crystallise the meaning of what it is to be ‘authentically’ Taiwanese as opposed to nationalist Chinese” (M. Chang, 2000, p. 69, emphasis added; see also Wong, 2001, p. 185). On March 9, General Chen declared martial law, which remained in effect (with brief suspension in 1949) until 1987 (Edmondson, 2002, p. 28). The ensuing forty-year suppression of political dissidents became known as the White Terror, which remains a powerful symbol for most political opponents of the KMT. This makes it particularly notable that neither the 2/28 incident nor the White Terror feature in SM images critiquing the KMT (see Chapter 5).

Although officially all citizens of the ROC had equal status, in practice political power remained firmly in the hands of waishengren. Officially, Taiwan’s provincial legislature remained in place. However, its authority was superseded by the Legislative Yuan (lifa yuan 立法院) and National Assembly (guomin dahui 國民大會), both of which constitutionally represented all of the ROC’s claimed territory and population (including all of mainland China). Members elected to the National Assembly 1947 were frozen in their positions until new elections could take place (namely once the mainland had been retaken), earning the moniker “The 10,000 year parliament” (wannian guohui 萬年國會). In the meantime, the KMT filled vacancies by appointment, relying on the principle of ‘legitimate succession’ (fa tong 法通). In order to maintain ‘balanced’ representation for all of the (nominal) provinces of the ROC, waishengren were significantly overrepresented in the national assembly and the bureaucracy (Rigger, 2002, p. 358). Moreover, well into the 1970s Chiang Kai-shek 將介石 appointed to high political positions those who had earned his personal trust, meaning mostly

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53 Under the 1947 ROC constitution the legislative branch of government was divided between the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly (Guomin dahui 國民大會). The latter was primarily responsible for selecting the president and vice president as well as constitutional amendments. The KMT’s retreat to Taiwan in 1949 made it impossible to hold elections on the mainland, leading the Judicial Yuan to suspend elections for representatives from non-ROC controlled areas. Democratization in the early 1990s included the gradual transition to local (i.e., Taiwan) elections for all seats in the LY. The National Assembly was phased out over the same time, with a shift to direct presidential elections (1996) and the transfer of its other responsibilities to the LY.
those hailing from his original base of support in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, and Shanghai (Wong, 2001, p. 203, note 31). Because of their disproportionate representation in the government, large state-owned enterprises (power, petroleum, banking, public transport, wine and tobacco) were typically run by waishengren, while small- and medium-sized enterprises were owned and operated by benshengren (M. J. Brown, 2004, p. 61). Export-oriented industrialization strategies from the 1950s to 1970s exacerbated this bifurcation of the economy because it made large-scale capital investment available primarily to state enterprises and firms linked to the KMT. Benshengren were more reliant on informal capital markets based on traditional social networks (familial, village, clan) and individual deals with overseas investors (Rigger, 2002, pp. 370–371). These economic and political exclusions entrenched the benshengren/waishengren distinction as the primary way of conceptualizing Taiwanese identity through the latter half of the twentieth century (Solinger, 2008, p. 101). As I explore in following chapters, the SM imagery reconceptualizes Taiwanese identity in a way that moves away from the well-worn waishengren/benshengren opposition.

In terms of cultural identity, the KMT depended on an increasingly narrow and dogmatic conception of Chinese national identity to justify both its ongoing (and ever more unrealistic) claims against the CCP to be the legitimate government of mainland China and the continued imposition of martial law in Taiwan. Those who questioned KMT management of the economy (especially the nationalization of lucrative industries) were branded as ‘poisoned by the Japanese mindset’ (M. Chang, 2000, p. 64; see also Hsiau, 2000, p. 53), and the government cited this Japanese-instilled mindset as a major cause for the 2/28 incident (Fu-chang Wang, 2005, p. 59). Chinese nationalism was not only a corrective to Japanese influence, but also central to KMT ideology. The KMT’s founder and intellectual leader, Sun Yat-sen, founded the party in 1912, and Chiang Kai-shek saw himself as the successor to Sun’s nationalist vision (see Chapter 4). The Cultural Revolution in the PRC further exacerbated Chiang’s appeals to a

54 In the month following the 2/28 incident, protest banners, slogans, and radio broadcasts were largely made in Japanese (and some radio in the Hoklo dialect), which only reaffirmed KMT fears (Hsiau, 2000, p. 58).
narrow vision of ‘traditional’ Chinese culture as the basis for national identity and legitimacy. The KMT’s response was to launch The Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement (zhonghua wenhua fuxing yundong 中華文化復興運動, or CCRM), which had three aims: to show the world that Chinese culture was well preserved in Taiwan, to give the people a sense of pride in their (Chinese) cultural inheritance, and to position the KMT as the legitimate defenders of this Chinese cultural legacy (Fu-chang Wang, 2005, p. 61). Chiang Kai-shek relied heavily on this image to shore up support against the communist mainland among both Western powers and the Chinese diaspora. The ‘Chineseness’ of Taiwan became essential not only in justifying the KMT’s rule, but in ensuring the regime’s survival during the Cold War (see K.-H. Chen, 2010, Chapter 3).

The KMT pursued a rigorous policy of instilling ‘correct’ Chinese culture in the inhabitants of Taiwan; a process of sinicization. In the first standardized textbooks in the ROC, issued in 1968, geography and history curricula focused almost exclusively on the mainland and explicitly stated their aim to inspire Chinese national consciousness in their introductions (Wong, 2001, p. 194; F. Wang, 2005, p. 62). Outside of the education system, the CCRM “set standards for rites and music, social etiquette and correct dress so as to improve the Chinese image” (Tozer, 1970, p. 85). The official National Language Movement (Guoyu yundong 國語運動) started in 1946, included as a stated goal the promotion of Taiyu 台語, the local variation of the Hokkien dialect widely spoken in Taiwan. However, in practice it implemented a rigid Mandarin Chinese monolingualism in education, magazines and newspapers, which was even more rigidly enforced after 2/28 (Hsiau, 1997, pp. 305–306). Fines and public shaming for students speaking the local dialects of Hoklo or Hakka became official policy in 1970, and in 1976 new laws severely restricted the amount of airtime which could be used for TV and radio broadcasting in local dialects (Fu-chang Wang, 2005, pp. 61–62).

Opposition to the KMT regime and its legitimating conception of Chinese national identity developed two distinct versions. Through the 1950s and 1960s, concepts of a Taiwanese national identity developed mainly outside of Taiwan as a result of KMT efforts to suppress
opposition. Exiles fleeing the White Terror established the Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM), which some see as the first true articulation of a Taiwanese *national* identity (e.g., M. Chang, 2000, p. 62; Hughes, 1997, p. 33). These expatriate voices tended to focus on differentiating Taiwanese culture and history from that of China, framing democracy mainly as a means of taking back political control from the KMT and its discriminatory polices favouring the minority *waishengren*. A number of changes starting in the 1970s made democracy an increasingly important value in itself, rather than simply an instrumental means to assert Taiwanese autonomy. The loss of the ROC seat in the United Nations in 1971 was a major blow to the KMT’s claims as the legitimate government of a single Chinese nation (Wong, 2001, p. 189). This was further compounded in 1978 when the USA announced that it would recognize the PRC government in Beijing as the official seat of the Chinese government. With Chinese national unity an increasingly unrealistic goal, the KMT leadership faced a choice, “[e]ither it could continue to impose the ROC fantasy by force, or it could undertake reforms aimed at building a new foundation under the ROC regime – a foundation of democratic participation” (Rigger, 2002, p. 359). The nominal democracy of the ROC helped the KMT maintain a degree of international acceptance and US support (Wong, 2001, p. 192), but the contradiction between this democratic rhetoric and the reality of martial law gave ample fuel to opponents of the KMT both domestically and abroad.

Chiang Kai-shek’s death in 1972 presented new opportunities to push for democratic reforms. Without his obsessive personal and ideological fixation on reclaiming the mainland guiding KMT policy, reform-oriented factions in the government were gradually able to exert more influence. Chiang’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo 蔣經國, gradually took on more authority before finally assuming the presidency in 1978, and became increasingly sympathetic to the push for more democratic governance, leading to his unexpected lifting of Martial Law in 1987. The lifting of the blanket ban on travel to the mainland in 1987 lead to increased contact between citizens of the ROC and PRC. An idealized homeland of KMT nationalist propaganda was gradually replaced by personal experiences. Over time, this shifted the frame of reference
for Chinese identity from *waishengren* to the current inhabitants of the mainland. Meanwhile, residents of Taiwan also confronted the impact of more than 40 years of living under a drastically different political system than PRC had citizens (R. Chen, 2014, p. 525). The 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and ensuing massacre became a vivid example of these differences, pushing democratization into the centre stage of the identity debate in Taiwan. The ROC’s image as ‘Free China’ was becoming increasingly untenable, both internationally and domestically, with the ‘temporary’ suspension of China-wide elections under the ROC stretching into the fortieth year. The KMT’s condemnation of the crackdown on pro-democracy protests in Beijing rang hollow. This gave pro-democratization activists more leverage, and the Tiananmen Square events were instrumental in sparking the pivotal White Lily protests in Taipei the following year (H.-H. Chen, 2005). Chiang Ching-kuo’s vice president (1984-1988) and successor as president (1988-2000), Lee Teng-hui 李登輝, himself a *benshengren*, accelerated the pace of reform dramatically. Lee ultimately instituted direct elections for all levels of government, ushering in the current democratic period of the ROC (see below). Democracy thus became increasingly important in differentiating Taiwanese society from that of the mainland.

It was in this rapidly changing context that an opposition movement developed in Taiwan itself. Consisting of a broad spectrum of politicians both inside and outside of the KMT, public intellectuals, and writers, the opposition movement was more concerned with reforming and democratizing the government than with Taiwanese independence *per se*, or related questions of national identity. Although political parties other than the KMT remained illegal, in the early 1970s independent candidates began winning elections for local governments and the handful of contested seats in the LY as an informal coalition referred to collectively as the *dangwai* (黨).

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55 The National Assembly nominally included representatives of every Chinese province claimed by the ROC, including all of the mainland provinces. As PRC control made it impossible to hold elections in these areas, new members had not been elected to the National Assembly since 1947. As the National Assembly held the authority to elect the president and to make constitutional amendments, reforming or abolishing the institution became a key objective of democratization movements. A new National Assembly was elected in 1991, and its powers gradually transferred to the LY before being fully abolished in 2006.
In 1986, elements of both of the TIM and the dangwai groups formed the core of the DPP, which continues to be the major opposition party to the KMT. As a result, the contemporary DPP still includes a significant moderate wing more focused on democratic rights than on questions of Taiwanese identity as well as vocal pro-independence wing. The internal debates between these wings of have contributed to a vacillating party position on independence (Fell, 2006, p. 90; Hsiau, 2000, p. 89; see also the discussion of 'Nylon' Cheng Nan-jung in Chapter 5). The SM in turn was careful to distance itself from the DPP establishment’s sometimes-ambivalent position on Taiwanese identity (Brading, 2017, p. 157), including through the choice of visual symbols used in SM images (see Chapter 4).

The KMT’s hardline efforts to instill Chinese nationalist sentiments in the population of Taiwan were ironically a major factor in producing a specifically anti-Chinese conception of Taiwanese identity. As such, since 1949 the idea of Taiwanese identity has been first and foremost an ongoing process of opposing official narratives of Chinese identity. Notably, however, the Chinese identity being rejected has typically been the version propounded by the KMT. The tensions which shaped conceptions of Taiwanese identity over the next 50 years were only indirectly related to the PRC’s evolving ideas of Chinese nationalism (see Callahan, 2010; Hughes, 1997). As I show in later chapters, a major theme in the SM imagery is a shift toward a strictly PRC-centric conception of Chinese nationalism, which allows SM imagery to appropriate and resignify ROC symbols. In other words, rather than simply opposing ‘Chinese identity’, the SM images shift conceptual boundaries so that legitimating narratives and symbols are re-framed as Taiwanese, including many that have been conventionally seen as signifiers of Chinese identity. This selective resignification is profoundly different from the blanket opposition (or negation) which was characteristic of Taiwanese nationalist movements for the preceding six decades.

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56 Starting in 1969 a small number of seats in the LY were filled through elections. While the number of such seats increased gradually over the years, they remained a minority of the total LY seats until the democratic reforms in the 1990s.
Democratic Era

With the end of Martial Law and the shift to open legislative and presidential elections by 1996, national identity became an even more complex issue. In March of 1990, protestors dissatisfied with the slow pace of democratic reforms led to a six-day sit-in in Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Square demanding direct election of the president and the dissolution of the National Assembly. Known as the White Lily Movement (yebaihe xueyun 野百合學運) after they adopted the indigenous Formosan Lily as their symbol, the protests have become a model of civil society in Taiwan which has been emulated in later student movements, including the SM (He, 2014). President Lee quickly reached an agreement with the protestors to introduce direct elections for all levels of government over the next six years, ushering in Taiwan’s democratic era.

The democratic period has been characterized by both of the major political parties struggling to balance ideological commitments with electoral and geopolitical pressures. The DPP struggled to navigate the tension between its two founding principles: distinguishing Taiwan from China while also remaining competitive in the democratic elections they had fought to institute, as much of the electorate still expressed some degree of Chinese identity. For its part, the KMT had to reconcile its long legacy of Chinese nationalism with the fact that for the past four decades the ROC had only exercised effective sovereignty over Taiwan. Democratization forced leaders (and candidates for leadership) to engage the contradiction between imagined boundaries of the nation and the effective boundaries of the state. These tensions played out in the shifting nation-building policies of subsequent presidents.

Lee Teng-hui vigorously advocated a ‘New Taiwanese consciousness’ based on ethnic harmony and a shared future, rather than ancestral origins (B. Chang, 2004, par. 9; T. Y. Wang & Liu, 2004, p. 572). Lee used a combination of ambiguity and framing which presented a national identity which was distinctly Taiwanese, but not mutually exclusive with Chinese identity. In this

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57 Botanical motifs have also been consciously adopted by later student protesters, including by the 2008 Wild Strawberries protesters and, of course, the SM.
regard, there are some clear parallels with the SM in terms of the strategic resignification of ‘national’ symbols. Although symbols like the ROC flag continued to be prominent in Lee’s administration, for example in campaign ads for his 1996 election campaign, he shied away from overt or melodramatic nationalist appeals. This niche was filled by the New Party (新黨, which had splintered off from the KMT largely in response to Lee’s leadership). The New Party’s 1996 campaign, for example, featured reverent depictions of Sun Yat-sen and military veterans bleeding for the ROC flag (Fell, 2006, p. 114; see also Chapter 4). This worked to KMT’s benefit, allowing Lee to reposition his party as the moderate option between the DPP and New Party. Lee also tried to distance the KMT from symbols of its nationalist roots. During his time in office, references to Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen in official ceremonies and presidential speeches became noticeably less frequent, while many of their statues disappeared from public spaces (Corcuff, 2002c, pp. 79–83). Similarly, a proposal was put forward in 1992 to remove Sun and Chiang from banknotes. However, this was met with strong opposition, and they remained on the most commonly used denominations along with botanical motifs strongly associated with traditional Chinese painting, such as plum blossoms, bamboo, and chrysanthemums (Corcuff, 2002c, p. 92). At the same time, however, new banknote designs were added which included symbols unique to the island, such as local fauna, mountains, and the Taitung Red Leaf baseball team, a little-league team which became emblematic of a ‘Taiwanese spirit’ when they defeated a Japanese all-star team in 1968 (Corcuff, 2002c, p. 93). The emphasis on a localized (Taiwanese) identity was most clearly articulated in the new “Renshi Taiwan” (‘Knowing Taiwan’) education curriculum developed between 1995 and 1997, which presented history and geography from a Taiwan-centred perspective (Lynch, 2004, p. 515).

These attempts to reframe Taiwanese identity paid off at the polls. As the number of seats open to competitive elections increased after the end of Martial Law, politicians faced electoral pressure to frame Taiwanese national identity in terms of political and civic values. Candidates who followed Lee’s lead in campaigning under the inclusive ‘New Taiwanese’ identity fared
better than those who appealed to a narrow conception of Taiwanese as an ethno-racial category contrasted with Chinese identity (R. Chen, 2014, p. 541; T. Y. Wang & Liu, 2004, p. 572). Lee’s New Taiwanese rhetoric focusing on a ‘community of fate’ resonated with the electorate, and he handily won the first presidential election in 1996. His DPP opponent, Peng Ming-min, had been an influential figure in the TIM in the 1970s and 1980s. Peng’s defeat led the DPP to shift focus away from independence and take a much more ambiguous stance on Taiwan’s national identity. This new strategic ambiguity was more successful than hardline Taiwanese nationalism had been, and in 2000 the DPP’s presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian 陳水扁 was elected as president of the ROC.

Initially Chen took a conciliatory tone on cross-strait relations, appealing to moderate voters by proposing a ‘new middle road’ approach (Schubert & Braig, 2011, p. 73). During his campaign he asserted that Taiwan already exercised de facto sovereignty under the ROC name, implying that a formal declaration of independence would be redundant. However, despite this moderate approach toward independence, Chen was far from ambiguous in asserting a Taiwanese national identity. Chen promoted a Taiwan-centric conception of the nation, framing Taiwan as the point of reference for cultural, historical, economic, and of course political communities with minimal reference to China. On the symbolic front, many of these moves targeted the KMT’s narrative of Chinese identity specifically. Chiang Kai-shek’s name and statues were removed from public buildings, the most prominent example being the 2007 re-naming of ‘Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall’ as ‘National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall’ (Lams & Liao, 2011, p. 77). These moves became even more frequent during Chen’s second term (Amae & Damm, 2011, p. 7).

Such gestures continued to antagonize the PRC, and the KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou made cross-strait stability a central plank in his successful 2008 campaign. During his campaign Ma adopted the multicultural discourse of ‘New Taiwanese’ of Lee and Chen while also offering a more stable relationship with the PRC based on a common Chinese identity (Sullivan & Sapir, 2012, 2013). In many respects, this ambivalence appears to have been a
strategic choice. Born in Hong Kong to parents from the mainland, Ma had to counter both his own and the KMT’s image of only representing *waishengren* and not being sufficiently Taiwanese. To do this, his campaign appealed to an expansive conception of Taiwanese identity which moved beyond the ethnic tensions of the past. However, Ma’s version of a ‘local’ Taiwanese identity was clearly different than that of his predecessors, Lee and Chen: “First of all, it raise[d] Chinese culture to a superior position in Taiwan once again; second, its appeal depend[ed] on portraying the DPP as advocating not real nativization, but a chauvinistic and divisive de-sinicization” (Hughes, 2014, p. 123). For Ma, Chinese identity appeared to be more of an umbrella concept which incorporates local variants like Taiwanese.

The groundwork for this renewed emphasis on Chinese national identity began as early as 2005, when KMT Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) coordinated a ‘United Front’ strategy between the KMT and Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For its part, by stonewalling the DPP administration the CPP made it abundantly clear that it would only negotiate with the KMT. At the same time, they hosted visits by high-level KMT party officials, including a high-profile meeting between Lien and PRC president Hu Jintao in April 2005. The CPP also passed the Anti-Secession Law shortly after Chen’s re-election, which formally declared the PRC’s willingness to use military force to supress any gestures toward independence (Suisheng Zhao, 2008, p. 200). Building on the CCP’s intransigence, Ma Ying-jeou’s 2008 presidential campaign relied heavily on this narrative that the DPP’s promotion of Taiwanese identity was synonymous with a reckless pursuit of *de jure* Taiwanese independence. By contrast, the KMT presented itself as the only party in Taiwan capable of working peacefully with the CCP (Hughes 2014, p. 122). Ma asserted that people on both sides of the Taiwan straits were part of a common culturally Chinese people (*zhonghua minzu* 中華民族) and that this should be the basis for cross-strait cooperation.

After taking office in 2008 it quickly became clear that for Ma the foundations of the political community, the nation, were firmly rooted in a Chinese identity. He reverted to the official name of the postal service to ‘China Post’ and restored Chang Kai-shek’s name to the
memorial hall (Hughes 2014, p. 123-4). The name ‘Taiwan’ was removed from all Ministry of Foreign Affairs webpages. The ministry was also ordered to use the term “Coming to China” rather than “Coming to Taiwan” in all its tourism materials, although this latter move was abandoned after public outcry (Corcuff 2011, p 118-9). The Ministry of Education made the study of the Classical Chinese language and Confucian classics required subjects, as they had been before Lee’s education reforms, and doubled the teaching time dedicated to Chinese history (Corcuff 2011, p. 118). Similarly, Ma’s official discourse heavily emphasized the Chinese culture, history, and “homeland” (Lams & Liao, 2011, p. 93; see also Sullivan & Sapir, 2012). This has led numerous commentators to describe Ma’s approach to national identity as a re-sinicizing of Taiwanese society (B. Chang, 2018; Sullivan & Sapir, 2012). Although the 2014 SM was a response to Ma’s trade policy, this re-sinicization was an important aspect of the administration’s framework justifying ECFA and the CSSTA (see Chapter 5), and a major theme in the SM’s criticism of both the CSSTA and Ma personally (Chapter 6).

The Ma administration justified its conception of Taiwan as part of a Chinese nation by reference to the ‘1992 Consensus’ (jü er gōngshí 九二共識), an informal understanding supposedly reached between the two parties in a summit in Singapore in 1992 that there existed “one China with different interpretations” (yì zhōng gè biao 一中各表). Whereas both Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian had dismissed the 1992 consensus, Ma’s administration presented it as the cornerstone of cross-strait rapprochement. (See e.g., Figure 3.1, showing the cover of a MAC pamphlet presenting the 1992 Consensus as “the key to cross-strait peace and prosperity.” The ROC flag is foregrounded against a bright blue background: these common

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58 The large plaza surrounding the Hall retained the new name, Liberty Square (zìyóu gōngchǎng 自由廣場), in recognition of the White Lily Movement which took place there.

59 The actual provenance of the concept of a 1992 Consensus is hotly debated. Critics suggest it was coined in 2000 by MAC Minister Su Chi 蘇起, who later served as Ma Ying-jeou’s National Security Council Chief (Muyard, 2010, p. 7).
MAC motifs are discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 6). To this end, Ma sought to downplay distinctions between Taiwan and mainland China. He abandoned all campaigns to (re)enter the United Nations, which had been important symbolic campaigns for the DPP and a constant point of contention with the PRC (Corcuff 2011, p. 99). In 2011 the president issued an order to all government agencies to call the far side of the Taiwan straits the “Mainland”, “Mainland China,” or “Mainland areas”, rather than “China” (Corcuff 2011, p. 118). These political and symbolic moves framed rapprochement with the PRC as more than simply a smart strategic move: it was also presented as the logical consequence of a common Chinese identity.

It was in this larger context of re-siniciation that Ma Ying-jeou’s policy of pursuing greater economic integration with the PRC took place. A key plank in Ma’s 2008 electoral platform was opening trade, tourism and investment with the mainland in order to both reinvigorate

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60 Notably this pamphlet was published in both Chinese and English. This suggests that the argument about the significance of the 1992 Consensus was aimed at both domestic and (English speaking) international audiences. I discuss the role of foreign languages in framing visual content in Chapter 6.
Taiwan’s economy and stabilize cross-strait relations through greater interdependence (Sullivan & Smyth, 2018, p. 17). Although Chen Shui-bian had taken a conciliatory tone towards the PRC during his first term (Chao, 2003, p. 126 ff), including opening limited shipping routes and reducing barriers to cross-strait investment (Schubert & Braig, 2011, p. 74), the United Front strategy between the CCP and KMT enabled Ma Ying-jeou to take cross-strait rapprochement much further. The new administration quickly moved forward opening trade with the PRC, signing eighteen agreements during Ma’s first 25 months in office (Corcuff, 2011), ranging from accords permitting charter flights to the mainland to ones opening trade in agricultural and fishing products. The crowning achievement in Ma’s first term was the signing of the ECFA in 2010. ECFA is a preferential trade agreement reducing tariffs in specific industries, primarily agricultural and manufactured goods, and easing restrictions on investment in a limited number of transportation, communication, and financial services. As the name suggests, it also established a framework for further trade liberalization. The CSSTA was one such follow-up agreement, expanding the range of service industries open to cross-strait investment and competition.

Although the proposed policy which sparked the SM, the CSSTA, had only been inked a year before the occupation of the LY, the analysis in the present chapter shows that underlying questions about Taiwan’s national identity go back more than a century. The construction of national identity in the SM and MAC imagery discussed in the following chapters takes place within this historical context of contentious and fluid conceptions of Chinese and Taiwanese identities. An understanding of this context is useful in three ways. First, it highlights how national identity has been contested in Taiwan. Second, understanding how national identity has been contested historically makes it possible to see where the SM imagery borrows from previous generations, but also where it differs. For example, as the analysis will show, the SM images’ use of ROC symbols, historically associated with Chinese identity, to construct a local

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61 For a detailed discussion of the contents of ECFA, see Hong (2011).
Taiwanese identity was a novel appropriation of these powerful symbols. Finally, the present chapter has outlined the deep historical ties between the KMT and Chinese national identity. These linkages are important for appreciating why the Ma Ying-jeou administration was so committed to sinicizing policies and cross-strait rapprochement. Ma Ying-jeou (2008-2016) reframed Taiwan as a local version of an underlying Chinese national community. This commitment to a common Chinese identity was at the core of Ma’s cross-strait rapprochement policy, including offering this identity as a justification for preferential trade agreements such as ECFA and the CSSTA which sparked the SM. It also helps explain why many symbols have much more partisan connotations than may first appear from an outside perspective. It explains the degree to which connotative associations between symbols of the KMT, ROC, and Chinese national identity are deeply sedimented in the broader cultural milieu within which the SM occurred. The following chapters looks at how the MAC predominantly uses images which reproduce such associations. This is contrasted with the SM imagery, which uses context and composition that contest those connotations while remaining constrained by the larger ideology of the nation as the legitimate basis for political autonomy. The chapters that follow focus on these competing SM and MAC visual framings of such symbols as the ROC flag (Chapter 4), allusions to Chinese and Taiwanese history (Chapter 5), and territorial representations of the island of Taiwan (Chapter 6).
Eugène Delacroix’s painting of Liberty leading the people during the French Revolution may seem like an incongruous place to begin an analysis of a Taiwanese protest movement. The painting is steeped in iconography particular to the French context – from the allegorical figure of Marianne to her phrygian cap, not to mention the tricolour flag in her hand. Despite this cultural specificity, the painting has become emblematic not only of the French nation, but of modern democracy and the assertion of popular sovereignty against oppressive authority in

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62 On the historical context of the production of painting itself, see Spector (1996); on its use of gender in the production of French national identity, see Hobsbawm (1978); on the appropriation of the image in advertising and caricature, see Kidd (2005).
general. It is not surprising then to find La Liberté among the postmodern bricolage of revolutionary symbols that made up the iconography of the SM (Figure 4.1), which drew on figures from Mahatma Gandhi to Guy Fawkes. Much could be said about the localization of globalized iconography, or the vast overrepresentation of Euro-American history in that ‘global’ stock. What first intrigued me about this image, however, is the deceptively simple substitution of the French Tricolour with the flag of the ROC, and what this suggests about contemporary national identity in Taiwan. In Taiwan the official flag of the ROC – a red field with a white star on a blue square in the top right corner – has conventionally been associated with the KMT as well as with Chinese national identity. As Chapter 3 explains, this is the result of decades of concentrated efforts to blur distinctions between the KMT party, the ROC state, and the Chinese nation. While democratization has loosened this party-state-nation conflation institutionally, KMT imagery has continued to draw upon the symbolic elision to reinforce its legitimacy and represent itself as the ‘natural’ ruling party. As a result, proponents of Taiwanese autonomy have typically turned to alternative symbols as an indication of a distinctive national identity unique to the island, rallying under their own alternative flags and empathically rejecting the ROC flag as a symbol of foreign rule.

Notably, the SM broke this trend by making extensive use of the ROC flag, both displaying it proudly around the occupied LY and incorporating it into the images produced by the movement. It is the fourth most common element in SM images. More importantly, it is almost always framed as an object of affection and identification. A handful of scholars have looked at competition over ROC symbols by Chinese nationalist parties (Corcuff, 2011; Fell, 2006, p. 114, 2011), and at President Chen Shui-bian’s ambivalent, often begrudging treatment of the flag at official events (H.-C. Chang & Holt, 2009b). However, the present study is the first empirical examination of the appropriation of that flag by an emphatically pro-Taiwanese movement.

63 These include parties that support eventual reunification with the mainland, commonly referred to as the ‘pan-blue camp’, consisting of the KMT and its splinter parties, the New Party (Shin dang 新黨) and People First Party (Qinmin dang 親民黨).
After discussing the ways in which the MAC imagery draws on (and thus reinforces) the conventional association between the national flag and the KMT party, the chapter will turn to the ways in which this association is problematized in SM images. I argue that the pervasive use of the ROC flag in SM imagery is a prime example of the resignification of national symbols, associating the ROC with Taiwanese (rather than Chinese) identity. Visually resignifying the flag entails using context and composition to de-emphasize or problematize dominant connotations while also emphasizing alternative, preferred connotations. This not only shows that flags are polysemous – they can ‘mean’ different, even contradictory things – but that this ambiguity itself can be a site for political contestation. The SM should be understood not only as a rejection of one specific policy, the CSSTA, but also as articulating a profoundly different understanding of the national identity at the core of political legitimacy.

Flags and National Identity

There is a growing body of literature on how everyday objects, places, and practises come to signify (and reproduce) ideas of the nation (e.g., Caldwell, 2002; Fox, 2006; Gimeno-Martínez, 2016). In both academic writing and everyday conversation, flags in particular are treated as synonymous with national identity. And yet we rarely question the extent to which different members of a society agree on what that the national identity signified entails. When nationalism scholars theorize this most common symbol of a nation, they typically only do so in brief and tangential ways. This is surprising given that flags are so inextricably intertwined with national identity. This is an especially pertinent issue in the Taiwanese context where national identity remains a pressing concern at the core of many political questions.

What is so special about flags in particular, compared to other national symbols? The intense public debate and even moral panic that accompanies someone refusing to stand to attention when a piece of cloth is raised, or the hanging of a flag the wrong way up, demonstrates a symbolic power invested in flags that is matched only by sacred religious symbols. A nation’s flag is the epitome of national symbolism, at once the most recognizable
and most abstract way of representing a nation. In fact, this abstraction may help explain why flags are such effective symbols of the nation: they can mean many things to many people, representing diverse experiences in a single, seemingly homogenous sign. Eric Hobsbawm suggests that objects are best suited to become national symbols when they are “no longer fettered by practical use” (1983, p. 4). Much as Levi-Strauss (1962) claimed about the kinds of plants or animals which are typically chosen as totems – sacred symbols of collective identity in pre-modern societies – flags are ‘good to think with’ (bons à penser) precisely because they have little other practical use. As such, the symbolic function of flags rarely comes into conflict with other, profane functions, like paying for commodities. In fact, many existing laws against flag desecration were originally aimed at preventing its commodification (Welch & Bryan, 1996). This also means that there is less of a need for the state to rigidly control production of flags the way it does with currency, where counterfeiting undermines the state’s monopoly; printing more flags does not dilute the value of existing ones. Flags can mark a person, place, or object as belonging to a nation because, by and large, flags serve no other purpose except signifying the nation.

A second, related suggestion is that flags can evoke such emotional responses because they signify other people, albeit the abstract and unmet people who make up the imagined community of the nation. Drawing on Durkheim, Welch & Bryan (1996, p. 87) argue that flags fill the role of sacred religious symbols in modern, secular societies. Such symbols stand in as a metaphorical representation of an idealized community. The nation has become the modern equivalent of the ‘chosen people’, and flags serve as a symbolic link between the individual and this collective identity. The idea that a nation’s flag is most commonly read as signifying the ‘the people’ is supported by a neuroscience study which suggests that flags produce an emotional response similar to images of co-nationals (i.e., other people). Notably, the researchers found that this response is significantly stronger than that elicited by images of the nation’s material

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64 This sacralization of flags echoes Ernest Renan’s depiction of modern nationalism as “the cult of the flag” (1882, p. 17).
culture such as iconic historical buildings, traditional food, or consumer brands (X. Ma et al., 2014).65

There is also a temporal dimension to the social relationship inscribed in a nation’s flag. Anthony Smith argues that the relative fixity or stability of particular flags over time contributes to “a sense of continuity with past generations of the community” (2009, p. 25) which is fundamental to national identity. Again, this contrasts with other common symbols such as currency, which are periodically updated and redesigned to reflect (or reproduce) contemporary values or identities (Hymans, 2004, p. 7). Flags can symbolize the mythological timelessness and unity of the nation because they appear to be uncomplicated and persistent; the relative visual simplicity and stability of the signifier glosses over the complex and contentious identities it signifies.

State-centric connotations of national flags are so heavily sedimented that most people treat flags as fixed signifiers, as does most of the scholarly literature on national identity. Studies that attempt to quantify contested national identities by measuring people’s preference for or identification with a particular flag are often based on a priori assumptions about which political unit the flag is ‘encoded’ as signifying (e.g., E. K. W. Ma & Fung, 2007; X. Ma et al., 2014). As a consequence, although much attention has been given to the presence and prevalence of national flags, most often they are treated as self-evidently representing state authority and institutions (e.g., Billig, 1995; Skey, 2017). In many cases this is a reasonable assumption, because contesting political symbols is not an equal opportunity endeavour. Established states have clear advantages when promoting and reproducing a specific interpretation of national symbols such as the flag. Symbols such as flags, banknotes, and stamps, which have been explicitly designed with the aim of signifying the nation (usually by the state as part of nation-building projects), are more resilient to re-signification than “accidental” symbols that come to signify the nation through successive, largely unintentional

65 On the transformation of consumer brands into national symbols, see Gimeno-Martínez (2016).
associations with a particular country (Gimeno-Martínez, 2016, pp. 101–102).\footnote{Common examples of “accidental symbols” include buildings (the Eiffel Tower signifying France), food (sushi and Japan), or commercial products (Volkswagen or BMW with Germany). The rise of national branding has blurred the distinction between intentional and accidental national symbols somewhat, however (Aronczyk, 2013).} Public schools, museums, and public relations departments provide the state with the institutional and material capacity to articulate their preferred interpretation (Anderson, 2016 ch. 10; Billig, 1995), which is ultimately underwritten by the legal authority to judge and punish alternate significations as ‘desecration’. These advantages are coupled with widespread social deference to state actors as legitimate authorities in determining and standardizing the meaning of national symbols, which Bourdieu terms symbolic capital (1989, p. 21). The combination of symbolic capital and material resources give state actors a powerful advantage in promulgating their preferred reading of official symbols.

However, these advantages should not be mistaken for a state monopoly over the interpretation of national symbols. Symbolic acts can ‘misfire’ or fail to reproduce the collective identity that they purport to symbolize (Austin, 1962, p. 16; Butler, 2010, p. 152). The possibility of re-signifying national symbols exists because state actors are also subject to such misfires (Lloyd, 2007, p. 132). Flags may evoke such intense responses because they signify an ambiguous and idealized imagined community, but that ambiguity also leaves the connoted ‘nation’ open to contestation: “the ephemeral symbolism of an object like a national flag must constantly undergo a process of discursive and real struggle between different actors who seek to fix the exemplification of the flag in their own interests” (L. J. Harris, 2008, p. 82). In terms of visual semiotics, there are two broad techniques of resignification: changing the context and changing the composition. Embedding a flag in unconventional contexts can significantly alter how it is understood because, “The flag, as a metaphor, is malleable, and it is possible to use the symbol joined with other iconic images to present competing metaphors” (VanderLippe & Batur, 2013, p. 221). On the other hand, altering the visual composition of the flag itself can make a powerful visual statement about perceived gaps between the ideals attributed to the
nation and the current state of affairs, for example by replacing the stars on the American flag with corporate logos. Sonia Katyal refers to this process as ‘semiotic disobedience’ (2012, p. 57). SM imagery, which challenged the legitimacy of the KMT’s leadership and cross-strait policy (including the CSSTA), made extensive use of both of these approaches to resignification.

Origins of the ROC Flag

Prior to the SM, political opposition to the KMT in Taiwan typically rejected the symbols of the ROC outright, rather than attempting to appropriate them. The largest obstacle to resignifying the ROC flag is the flag itself. The current flag has been intertwined with KMT nation building since its creation over a century ago, leaving deeply sedimented associations between the flag, the Party, and Chinese nationalist ideology. This sedimentation is no accident, but the result of efforts by Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek to establish a one-party state. As a result, the ROC flag has been a partisan symbol throughout most of its history. The significance of the SM’s embracing the ROC flag is most apparent when contrasted with the depth of the flag’s associations with the KMT over the past hundred years.

The original “Shining-sun” banner showing a white sun on a solid blue field (Figure 4.3) was designed by Lu Haodong 陸皓東, a revolutionary and compatriot of Sun Yat-sen’s who was executed while organizing an uprising against the Qing dynasty in 1895. Sun adopted this as

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67 Coincidentally, this is the same year that the Qing emperor ceded Taiwan to Japanese control, leading to the short-lived Republic of Taiwan (see Morris, 2002).
his party flag to honour Lu as one of the first martyrs of the revolution (Fitzgerald, 1998, p. 181). The 1911 Xinghai Revolution that overthrew the Qing dynasty was brought about by an uneasy coalition of revolutionary organizations, each of which acted as a quasi-state authority within their own regional strongholds. Institutionalizing state symbols, including flags, was an important component of the struggle between these rival quasi-states in their attempt to exert control over the new Republic of China (L. J. Harris, 2008, p. 83). As part of this symbolic contest, Sun proposed his own version of a national flag which incorporated the Shining-sun canton against a red field (the current ROC flag, Figure 4.4). However, this move was rejected by parliament because they felt this flag was too closely associated with Sun and his party (H. Harrison, 2000, p. 174). Instead, the provisional government designated party emblems as official insignia for different branches of the new armed forces, in recognition of the numerous organizations that had contributed to the revolution, and the Shining-sun was assigned to the Republican Navy (Fitzgerald, 1998, p. 181). The Shining-sun thus remained a primarily partisan flag of the KMT for the first decade of the Republic.

For the flag of the new ROC, the provisional government adopted a design of five coloured bars representing five major ethnic groups: Han (red), Manchu (yellow), Mongol (blue), Tibetan (white) and Hui (black) (Figure 4.2). This was the same flag that students like Mao Zedong marched under during the anti-imperialist and anti-traditionalist May 4th movement in 1919. Throughout the turbulent early years of the Republic and the warlord period (1916-1928) many competing groups claimed the five-bar Republican flag as their own: Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 and his opponents both used it to frame themselves as the legitimate national government (Fitzgerald, 1998, p. 182). The association of the Shining-sun flag with the ROC only came about later as a result of intensive KMT propaganda aimed at making the Party synonymous with the state.

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68 Lu was a member of Sun’s ‘Revive China Society’ (Xingzhonghui 興中會). This organization merged with a number of other revolutionary groups in 1905 to form the Chinese United League (Zhongguo Tongmenghui 中國同盟會), which played a central role in overthrowing the Qing emperor in 1911. In August 1912, the Tongmenghui formed the core of a new political party, the KMT. Through each of these transitions the Shining-sun remained the official flag and emblem of the organization.
Although Sun Yat-sen also fought under the five-bar flag for the next 12 years, he had originally opposed its adoption in 1912 (H. Harrison, 2000, p. 173). Over time Sun became increasingly vocal in his disapproval of its multi-ethnic symbolism (Fitzgerald, 1998, p. 183).69 Ultimately, in 1924 Sun ordered the Republican flag removed from military and government offices under his control, and in 1925 police in Guangzhou started issuing fines to private citizens displaying it (Fitzgerald, 1998, p. 180). This coincides with a shift in Sun’s support from liberal politics to an explicit commitment to a Leninist party-state:

In raising the flag and anthem of the partisan Nationalist movement to the status of national symbols, he [Sun Yat-sen] declared his allegiance first to himself and second to a new kind of revolutionary politics. The distinctive flag of Nationalist China announced the arrival of a single-party state. (Fitzgerald, 1998, p. 185; see also H. Harrison, 2000, p. 201).

After Sun’s death in 1925, his successor Chiang Kai-shek continued the systematic replacement of Republican symbols with KMT ones to cement the equation of the party and the state (Harrison 2000, p. 183). This strategy was especially evident during the Northern Expedition (1926-8), where Chiang led KMT armies against the ineffective Beiyang government in Beijing as well as the warlords who exerted effective control over most of China.70 The KMT’s National Republican Army carried thousands of the Nationalist’s Shining-sun flags and leaflets to distribute along their route north, and each division was accompanied by special propaganda corps dedicated to fostering among the people they encountered both a sense of national identity as well as an association between the KMT and the nation (H. Harrison, 2000, p. 179).

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69 Whether Sun’s dislike of the republican flag is indicative of his egalitarianism or Han chauvinism is open to debate. While the popular narrative is that Sun felt the stacked horizontal bars implied an ethnic hierarchy reminiscent of the Qing social order, Fitzgerald (1998) argues that Sun’s personal correspondence indicate his growing insistence that only a unified Han nation could resist Western imperial power.

70 After Yuan Shikai’s failed attempt to establish himself as emperor in 1915 and his death the following year, the government of the Republic lost effective control over most of the country to warlords in control of local military factions.
The Northern Expedition was a turning point in both the military and symbolic efforts to unite a nation under the KMT banner:

The identification of the symbols of the party with the symbols of the nation was central to the success of the party’s Northern Expedition, which can be seen in part as a victory of the new symbols and their meanings. The earlier symbols – the [republican] flag, the anthem and the calendar of national holidays – had identified citizens while being seen as separate from, and above, politics. The new symbols of the Nationalist government were infused with a clearly defined party ideology. The expedition aimed to transform the common people into citizens and citizens into party members. (H. Harrison, 2000, p. 173)

The Northern Expedition concluded on December 29, 1928, when Zhang Zuolin 張作霖, leader of the last holdouts of the Beiyang government in Manchuria, announced that all Republican banners be replaced by the KMT’s preferred flag, the Shining-sun against a red field, transferring formal control to the KMT government. The common name for this incident, known as the dongbei yizhi 東北易幟 (literally: Northeast changing banners), underscores the symbolic significance of the flag in recognizing legitimacy. This gesture was the culmination of 16 years of political and military conflict aimed at making the KMT and its symbols synonymous with the ROC, and the Chinese nation more broadly. It is this sedimented conflation of party-state-nation that has led Taiwanese opponents of the KMT to reject the ROC flag as irredeemably ‘foreign’. This makes the SM’s eventual appropriation of that same flag all the more surprising.

The KMT cemented this elision of party, state, and nation by promoting a symbolic orthodoxy. The iconography of the flag itself had remained largely unspecified until 1927, but this changed with the onset of the Chinese Civil War between the KMT and Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It was during this period that the KMT set out an official interpretation of the ROC flag.

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71 Although it had existed as a distinct party since 1921, the CCP made up a significant portion of the KMT’s left wing, and the two only became completely separate in 1927 with the onset of the Chinese Civil War.
flag’s symbolism. Chiang Kai-shek had drawn on Lenin’s theories of anti-imperialism as the ideological justification for the Northern Expedition, as well as the basis for cooperation with communist revolutionary forces and the Soviet Union. However, after violently purging the CCP and their affiliated militias in April 1927, Chiang distanced the KMT from Communist influences. In place of Leninism, he began emphasizing Sun’s Three Principles of the People as the foundation of party ideology (see also Chapter 5). This move to establish an ideological orthodoxy extended to the party’s symbols. Government publications began promulgating the official interpretation that the ROC flag represented the Three Principles: the sun shining representing equality as it shines equally on independent nations (minzhu 民主), the blue sky representing freedom under democracy (minquan 民權), and the red representing the blood of those who sacrificed themselves for the welfare of the people (minsheng 民生) (Harrison 2000, p. 189-90). The last point in particular undermined suggestions that the red field signaled solidarity with the Communists or the Soviet Union.

Ironically, Chiang’s implementation of a one-party-state based on Leninist principles greatly facilitated the dissemination of this official interpretation. Party and state organization overlapped to such a degree that it became analytically difficult to distinguish the two. The party was the only coordinating body between various branches of government (Mattlin, 2011, p. 239). KMT membership was required for individuals to advance in military, education or public sector careers, and occupational groups were rewarded with significantly better social welfare provisions (Fell, 2006, p. 10). The functional overlap between party and state institutions reinforced the effective equivalence of KMT and ROC. This conflation of party and state only accelerated after the KMT was forced to retreat to Taiwan from the mainland in 1949. During the Martial Law period (1949-1987) party and state institutions were nominally separate, but deeply intertwined in practice (see Chapter 3). This message was further propagated through the mass media, which was under strict party control either directly through the political appointment of party members to senior positions (Mattlin, 2011, p. 40) or by extensive censorship by party officials (Rigger, 1999a, pp. 73–74).
Legal context of the ROC flag

The national flag has been intertwined with the KMT national imaginary in the legal system of the ROC as well. There are three major legal documents which codify the ROC flag. The *National Emblem and National Flag Law* (Zhonghua minguo guohui guoqi fa 中華民國國徽國旗法), promulgated in 1928 following the Northern Expedition, formally established the ‘Shining-sun canton against a red field’ design as the national flag of the ROC, officially replacing the five-bar Republican flag. Between 1928 and 1954 the KMT passed numerous supplementary ‘regulations on the use and manufacture of party and National flags’ (*Dangqi guoqi zhi zhizao ji shiyong banfa 黨旗國旗之製造及使用辦法*). Article 14 of these regulations aimed to standardize national symbols, but also to limit their crass commercialization through being printed on ‘unsolemn products’ (*buzhanguan zhi yongpin 不莊嚴之用品*). These regulations applied to both the national and KMT party flags, reinforcing a conceptual equivalency of the two. Also, Article 160 of the ROC Criminal Code, first introduced in 1934, makes it an offence to ‘damage, remove, or dishonour’ the national flag, emblem, or the image of Sun Yat-sen. Since the end of Martial Law, judicial decisions on the scope of Article 160 have eased. For example, in 2017 two men were convicted of burning the ROC flag, but were acquitted after the

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72 A similar shift in the understanding of ‘desecration’ took place in the United States. Early anti-flag desecration movements and laws in post-Civil War America were mostly concerned with restricting the use of the national flag on commercial goods. The use of such laws as a mode of political control (i.e., to prosecute ‘leftist’ organizations such as trade unions, peace activists, and socialists) only became common around the First World War (Welch & Bryan 1995, p. 78-9).

73 See specifically *Dangqi guoqi zhizao shiyong tiaoli* (黨旗國旗製造使用條例 [Regulations on the construction and use of the party and national flags], 1934). For a detailed description of revisions to the National Flag Laws and regulations, see: https://www.globalflag.idv.tw/wg/gqfggy.htm (Accessed Nov. 8, 2019).

74 For an overview of the 1934 revisions to the ROC Criminal Code, see van der Valk (1936).

75 “A person who with purpose to insult the Republic of China openly damages, removes, or dishonors the emblem of the Republic of China or the flag of the Republic of China shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year, short-term imprisonment, or a fine of not more than three hundred yuan. A person who with purpose to insult the founder the Republic of China, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, openly damages, removes, or dishonors his portrait shall be subject to the same punishment.”

court made a distinction between insulting (wuru 侮辱) the ROC and rejecting the ROC as a legitimate state. The court deemed the former a crime under Article 160, while regarding the latter an expression of political dissent which should be given the fullest possible protection (Department of Culture and Law, 2017). So, although desecrating the ROC flag remains a crime, the bar for enforcing this law has been raised quite high since the end of Martial Law.

Finally, the current flag design was included in the ROC constitution adopted on December 25, 1946. It states that “The national flag of the Republic of China shall be of red ground with a blue sky and a white sun in the upper left corner” (ROC Constitution, Article 6). Incorporating a flag into the constitution does more than simply codify its appearance. It formally enshrines it as a foundational element of the political community. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s the KMT was able to fend off numerous legislative attempts to create a new constitution for Taiwan. As a result, the 1946 Constitution, including its flag provisions, remains the law of the land. This makes contesting the official flag a matter of constitutional reform. Despite Chen Shui-bian’s efforts to disentangle state symbols and institutions from those of the KMT, the KMT used its legislative majority to secure the symbolic status quo even further. In 2003 the KMT-controlled legislature passed a Referendum Act (gongmin toupiaofa 公民投票法), but pointedly excluded DPP proposals calling for referendums on the national flag and the official name of the state (Kan, 2007 p. 76 n. 185). At the same time, it raised the bar for ratifying constitutional amendments inordinately high. This made any future efforts to change the national flag via constitutional reform even more difficult. As a result, although numerous alternative flags which make a clear distinction between symbols of the nation and the KMT

76 Under this act, amendments to the Constitution or changes to territorial claims required a 3/4 majority vote in the legislature before being sent to a public referendum, which then required both a majority vote and a minimum 50% voter turnout to pass. None of the six referendum questions put to the public between 2003 and 2008 reached the electoral turnout threshold. In response to public pressure (much of it organized by former SM participants), the DPP government revised the Referendum Act in 2017, making it easier for the public to propose and approve referendum proposals. Consequently, seven of the ten referendum questions posed in 2018 passed (Central Election Commission, 2019).
have been proposed (see below), these legal hurdles make it profoundly difficult to replace the Shining-sun against a red field as the official national flag.

**ROC flag and other political parties**

The shift to competitive, multi-party elections for the legislature (1992) and presidency (1996) made it possible for other political parties to contest the KMT’s monopoly on national symbols. In practice, however, the ROC flag remained strongly connected with nationalist dreams of a unified China for the next two decades. New parties that emerged to challenge the KMT have doubled down on this *Chinese* nationalist interpretation of ROC symbols. For instance, in 1993 conservative members of the KMT critical of Lee Teng-hui’s promotion of Taiwanese identity split off to form the New Party (*shindang* 新黨). Its nationalist commitment to eventual unification with mainland China was reflected in the dramatic appropriation of symbols such as the flag and Sun Yat-sen. The New Party also ran television ads demanding that patriots “Wear the national flag as a cloak, save the national Father” and showing party leaders and supporters shedding blood on a white ROC flag to dye it red (Fell, 2011, p. 102). In other words, when political parties other than the KMT use the ROC flag in their visual communication, it is to show that they are even *more* *Chinese* than the KMT.

On the other hand, political parties and social movements advocating Taiwanese national identity have turned to alternative symbols rather than trying to claim the ROC symbols as their own. This has been most evident in the ambivalent, sometimes contradictory relationship between the DPP and the ROC flag. The DPP, Taiwan’s second major political party, has been closely connected to the TIM since its formation in 1986. And yet the DPP has struggled to distance itself from the Chinese nationalist associations of the flag while simultaneously seeking the institutional and legal legitimacy it signifies. Despite the common tendency to describe it as the ‘pro-independence’ party, since its formation the DPP has contended with internal divisions between factions prioritizing democratic reform and those more focused on formal independence (see Chapter 3). An example of the latter is the New Tide faction (*xin chaoliu xi* 新潮流).
新潮流系), made up largely of supporters of the TIM who had returned from political exile abroad (H. Chen, 2015; A. H.-E. Wang, 2017). Under New Tide pressure the DPP introduced a Taiwan independence clause to its charter in 1991 (Fell, 2006, p. 90). However, in the wake of their disappointing performance in the 1996 presidential elections the DPP moderated its stance on independence. This pragmatic shift included a new conception of Taiwanese identity as inclusive and multi-ethnic. This more inclusive national identity would include Chinese identity (and voters who identified as Chinese) as part of a multicultural Taiwanese nation, rather than interpreting them as its opposite. The DPP sidestepped the hot-button issue of replacing supposedly ‘Chinese’ national symbols by asserting that “Taiwan’s independence is a matter of spirit, not symbolism; thus, changing the flag or the name of the state is not important” (Rigger, 2006, p. 47).

This shift toward strategic ambiguity on the national identity question continued at the 1999 party convention, where the delegates passed the ‘Resolution on Taiwan’s Future’ (Taiwan qiantu jueyiwen 台灣前途決議文). This resolution asserts that Taiwan is already an independent state and that further moves to declare independence are not strictly necessary (including symbolic ones such as changing the national flag or name). In effect the resolution moved national identity issues out of the DPP’s electoral platform and left them to the public to decide though a referendum (Bedford & Hwang, 2006, p. 16). This allowed the party to strategically adopt ROC symbols when they were necessary to present a more moderate or reconciliatory public position (Bedford & Hwang, 2006, p. 189; H.-C. Chang & Holt, 2007 p. 147 n. 80). In practice, however, the DPP government has found ways to downplay or challenge the ROC flag without pursuing a politically costly constitutional amendment to replace it. For instance, the ROC flag was used sparingly in the DPP’s 2004 election campaign materials, where the green DPP flag was more often used (Bedford & Hwang, 2006, p. 189). Chen Shui-bian, the first President from the DPP, not only avoided referring to ‘the ROC’ in speeches, but also resisted raising the ROC flag at the Office of the President during National Day celebrations (H.-C. Chang & Holt, 2009b, p. 318). In 2006 Chen threatened to change the National Emblem Law if
the KMT did not voluntarily change its party emblem. He insisted that “[o]nly by doing so can we clearly distinguish between the two emblems, and the KMT won’t say things like ‘the nation is stolen’ just because it lost the election” (quoted in Bedford & Hwang 2006, p. 197). The KMT, which held a majority in the LY, called Chen’s bluff, and no changes were made to either the emblems or the law. Thus, the KMT’s opponents have typically shied away from ROC symbols such as the flag, rather than attempting to adopt them for their own symbolic purposes. As I discuss below, the approach in the SM imagery is quite different, using visual cues to dissociate ROC symbols from the KMT in a way that opens a conceptual space to resignify the ROC flag with novel, anti-KMT meanings.

For its part, the KMT has continued to frame the party and the ROC flag as synonymous throughout the democratic period. This is especially evident in its attacks on the DPP, which appeal to the flag in efforts to frame the opposition party as unpatriotic. For example, KMT campaign ads during the 2001 legislative election showed the flag being smeared with green paint, the DPP’s colour (Fell, 2011, p. 99). The 2004 KMT campaign materials urged voters to “rescue Taiwan” and “not allow this flag to disappear from the earth” (Jacobs, 2012, p. 197). ROC flags became even more prominent in KMT advertising under Ma Ying-jeou (Fell, 2012, p. 48). One particularly melodramatic example is a two-minute video from Ma’s 2012 re-election campaign which follows the slapstick adventures of a young man rescuing a fluttering ROC flag from a snarling dog set loose by two laughing men in green vests (Zhongguo guomindang KMT, 2012). Despite the gradual disentangling of the KMT from the institutions of the ROC state over the past two decades, symbolically the two have remained closely interconnected. Unlike previous political or social movements opposed to the KMT, however, the SM imagery challenges this elision head on by reframing the ROC flag as a marker of a distinctly Taiwanese nation.
Alternatives to the Shining-sun flag

In many ways the most striking aspect of the SM’s use of the ROC flag is that it used it at all. The ROC flag is strongly associated with the KMT and its particular understanding of Chinese national identity due to its origins and the long history of single-party rule. Consequently, for previous generations of advocates of a distinct Taiwanese identity and political autonomy, the ROC flag has been a symbol of everything they opposed, leading them to propose alternatives.

The Republic of Taiwan Provisional Government (Taiwan gongheguo linshi zhengfu 台灣共和國臨時政府) established in Japan by Thomas Liao Wenyi 廖文毅 operated under its own flag between 1955 and 1965 (Figure 4.5), consisting of a white circle and crescent moon on a navy background (S. Li, 1988). A number of other alternative flags have been proposed since democratization in the 1990s made it legally possible to change the national flag via a constitutional amendment. In 1994 Reverend Liu Ruiyi 刘瑞义 proposed a design of green bars flanking a stylized red chrysanthemum pattern made up of four overlapping heart shapes (representing Taiwan’s four official ethnic groups) against a white background (Figure 4.6). This flag was popular for a time among advocates, both in Taiwan and abroad, of a new Taiwanese constitution. It even appeared in an episode of the American political drama The West Wing.

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77 Liao was originally supportive of the KMT and a minor government official in Taipei, but turned against the regime after his brother was arrested and beaten in the crackdown following the 2/28 incident. Although initially the focal point for Taiwanese expatriates escaping the White Terror, Liao’s government-in-exile gradually lost support and eventually collapsed under a combination of internal factionalism and coercion by the Chiang Kai-shek government (Kerr 1965, p. 462-70; “The Month in Free China,” 1965).
However, it was never formally adopted by the DPP and has subsequently become less common.

Another alternative flag that appears in many Taiwanese independence circles is that of the 908 Taiwan Republic Campaign. The latter is an umbrella organization which has held annual flag-raising ceremonies every September 8 since 2005 outside of the Presidential Office, demanding a new Taiwanese constitution. The organization’s flag consists of a blue-white-green horizontal gradient. There is a large red circle in the centre with 台灣國 (taiwan-guo, lit: ‘Country of Taiwan’) written inside (Figure 4.7). Although this flag is still a common sight at pro-independence events, as an alternative national flag it has been largely superseded by that of the official World Taiwan Congress (WTC). Similar to the design of the Canadian flag, the WTC version has two vertical green bars against a white background and a green island of Taiwan in the centre. The flag was designed by the prominent DPP politician Yao Chia-wen 姚嘉文 in the early 2000s and formally adopted by the WTC in 2007 (Figure 4.8). It has since become the most common alternative to the ROC flag in contemporary independence circles and has been the flag used at the 908 Campaign flag-raising ceremonies since 2007. All three of these contemporary flags make extensive use of green and white, which are the colours of the DPP; the WTC flag in particular bears more than a passing resemblance to the DPP emblem of a green island against a white cross. As such, much like the KMT cultivated a conceptual equivalence between the party and (Chinese) national symbols, symbols of Taiwanese national identity have tended to elide into DPP symbolism.

The SM imagery adopts a completely different strategy of symbolic contestation from previous social movements and parties opposed to the KMT. This trend began even before the occupation of the LY, as there was a notable absence of the white-and-green WTC flags associated with the DPP and independence movements more generally (Figure 4.8) at rallies and protests against the CSSTA leading up to March 18 (Cole, 2015, p. 144). Conventional
independence flags only appear in four of the 1037 SM images I examined (0.04%), \(^7\) while the
ROC flag features in 61 (5.9%). Moreover, the composition of an overwhelming majority of the
SM images frame the ROC flag as an object of pride and affection. Notably, then, SM imagery
appropriates and resignifies ROC symbols instead of drawing on alternative symbols associated
with Taiwanese nationalism.

The ROC Flag in MAC Imagery

In order to highlight the significance of the SM imagery’s appropriation of the ROC flag, it is
helpful to first look at how the flag was used in official imagery on the same issue. As the
previous discussion shows, there is a long history of associating symbols of the ROC with the
KMT. While democratization has disentangled the KMT from the formal institutions of the
state, the Ma Ying-jeou administration continued to use imagery that relies on and reproduces
a symbolic elision of the two as complementary articulations of a Chinese nation. This is
especially evident in the imagery published by the MAC, including annual reports, pamphlets,
and handbooks on cross-strait issues. These annual reports and public relations are extremely
visual, incorporating numerous photographs and illustrative graphics. Moreover, because the
MAC was the primary official organization responsible for promoting ECFA and the CSSTA, this
extensive imagery addresses the same cross-strait issues as the SM. As such, MAC materials
published between 2008 and 2014 offer a foil to the SM images. Comparing the two sets of
imagery reveals how the same signifier – in this case the ROC flag – can signify drastically
different national identities.

There are two distinct kinds of MAC photographs that include flags, which I refer to as
documentary and evocative photographs. The context and composition of documentary images
reinforces the impression that they are objective records of official visits, summits, speeches, or
other specific events (e.g., Figure 4.9. See also Figures 5.6 and 5.7). Such images include

\(^7\) Two of these are WTC flags, the other two a white-green-black striped flag not associated with a specific
organization or movement. Four other flags associated with indigenous rights movements are also visible in
pamphlets collected form the SM and included in the 318 archive.
captions which identify the name and titles of the people shown and date and location of the event, as well as a clear connection to the topic of nearby text. In terms of visual composition they are mostly static, highly posed, face-on shots with little creative framing or lighting. By contrast, evocative photographs, as the name suggests, are designed to evoke emotional responses rather than to impart or reassert information. These images are uncaptioned, and most often the content bears no immediate connection to the contents of the page or chapter in which they appear. The people in these images are generic (though often attractive and youthful), unnamed, sometimes with their faces obscured or turned away: they appear as models for how the viewer should feel, rather than as individuals we should recognize. Dramatic lighting, unusual camera angles, oversaturated colours and repeated patterns all intensify the emotional and aesthetic impact of evocative images.

National symbols, especially flags, play a completely different semiotic role in documentary images than they do in evocative images. And yet both serve to reinforce the association between KMT and the ROC in their own way. When national symbols such as the flag appear in documentary images, it is most often in the background, escaping casual notice, but reproducing ideas of the nation all the same. This is a purely visual example of what Michael Billig calls the ‘banal flagging’ of national identity (1995, pp. 38, 41; see also Dumitrica, 2019; Skey, 2017). Banal flagging reinforces the perceived legitimacy not only of individual officials, but of the state itself as the institutional manifestation of the nation. The repeated marking of people, places, and events with national symbols differs from the overt, ritualistic invocation of the nation in parades or pledges of allegiance: “the routine business of flagging... is not a conscious activity; it differs from the collective rememberings of a commemoration. The remembering is mindless, occurring as other activities are being consciously engaged in” (Billig, 1995, p. 41). In comparison, in evocative images flags play a starring role as the object of mass affection and adulation.
The most common place for the ROC flag to appear in MAC publications is also the least eye-catching: in the background of numerous photographs of government officials meeting foreign dignitaries, delivering speeches, and posing in commemorative group photos. The ROC flag appears in 14% of all imagery used in the MAC’s annual reports between 2008 and 2014. In most (80%) of those images, the ROC flag hangs in the background, unobtrusive but easily identifiable (e.g., Figure 4.9). Michael Billig (1995) argues that this ‘banal nationalism’ – the continual, unobtrusive, and hardly noticeable repetition of national symbols including anthems, coins, and especially flags – is essential to the maintenance of national identity. Decorating official spaces with the national flag is so commonplace as to be virtually a cliché, but this ubiquity obscures the fact that it is often precisely the decorating of a space with the flag that visually marks it as ‘official’. These flags subtly reiterate an understanding of the social world divided into national units, including the idea that these categories are natural or inevitable. Considered through the lens of banal nationalism, the flags hanging in the background of numerous MAC photos repeatedly framing the officials shaking hands or delivering speeches as speaking and acting ‘for the nation’ (Billig, 1995, pp. 106–109). In the case of Taiwan, where national identity is a point of profound contention, the banal display of the ROC flag also
reinforces ideas about which nation is being represented by these state officials and institutions. This is not to suggest that the flag intrinsically signifies Chinese identity, but that by virtue of their banality these images reiterate the conventional connotations of the KMT as having a Chinese national identity. In order to problematize this official identity narrative, opposition movements first need to draw attention to the symbols. This can be accomplished either by mobilizing alternatives or, as in the case of the SM, using composition and context to foreground the flag in ways that question those conventional connotations, as later analysis will show.

*Evocative photographs*

![Evocative photographs](image)

Figure 4.10: MAC photograph of young women wearing ROC flag-themed shirts

While the vast majority of flags in MAC imagery are banal background cues, when the flag is meant to be noticed it is impossible to miss. In contrast to the banal flagging that occurs in the many documentary photographs of official events such as speeches, meetings, and press
conferences, there are also numerous dynamic photographs of masses of ROC flags being waved or worn by exuberant crowds. These evocative photographs use composition to elicit an air of energy, youth, and awe, while eschewing details (visual or in captions) about event, location, or participants. They evoke a general mood or feeling, rather than communicating specific information. For example, the 2010 MAC Annual Report includes a half-page photograph of a crowd of young women wearing ROC flag t-shirts and waving ROC flags under a shower of tinsel (Figure 4.10), while the first chapter of the 2012 Annual Report begins with a photo of a sea of small ROC flags held aloft by large crowd (Figure 4.11). The dynamic poses, motion-blurred flags, and rapturous facial expressions in both images evoke the energy of a festival, but one unrelentingly marked as a celebration of the ROC.

ROC flags are also heavily identified with youth in the MAC publication images. When older people appear in evocative MAC photography, they are engaged in ‘traditional’ practises such as agriculture or arts and crafts. In contrast, Figure 4.10 shows only young women, who are not only waving flags but wearing them like team jerseys. Figure 4.11 draws similar associations through focus and framing. The image includes a crowd of people, but the only face fully visible and in focus is that of a young boy on the right, framed by his yellow jacket lapels. On the left of the photograph the white calligraphic script characters 守護 (shouhu) are beside the English translation, “Protection.” The balancing of the two, child and text, evokes what is to be protected, while the entire relationship is saturated in and mediated through the sea of flags.

Although evocative images are less plentiful than the banal ones in MAC publications, they are much more prominent. Documentary photographs such as Figure 4.9 are typically smaller and aligned with the body text, so that the viewer ‘reads’ the image as a subordinate illustration of the textual information. Evocative images are most often used on chapter title pages and occupy significantly more space. For example, the image in Figure 4.12 takes up the

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79 The subtitle, “Arranging for an even better tomorrow” (zhī wéi bōhuá gèng měihào de míntiān 只為擘畫更美好的明天), alludes to the shared future of the nation, reinforced by the yellow of the text mirroring the young boy’s collar.
first two pages of the first chapter in the 2011 MAC report. The left-hand page is dominated by a large photograph of young men in a parade carrying numerous ROC flags sewn together into one huge banner, the low camera angle framing the flags against a blue sky. In contrast to the large expanse of solid, bright colour, the two smaller documentary photos fall in to a supplementary, illustrative role. Similarly, Figures 4.10 and 4.11 each fill half a page in the MAC’s glossy annual reports, and are unbounded along at least one of the page margins as the image continues or ‘bleeds’ up to the physical edge of the page (or across it, in the case of a two-page spread). The prominent position and size of these images allows them to frame the information in the chapter that ensues (see Painter, Martin, & Unsworth, 2013, pp. 104–105).
Evocative images were both much less common and less prominent in reports published under the previous DPP administration. The MAC annual reports became noticeably more visual in 2008, with images increasing in number and size, as well as making use of more dynamic and creative page layouts than those published under Chen Shui-bian’s administration.80 When these reports include evocative photographs they consist exclusively of landscape and nature photographs rather than the heavily politicized images shown here. While landscape photography can its own way be political in its reproduction of national territory and identity

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80 The current (2016-) DPP government has continued to use more visually elaborate designs, although with a noticeably more subdued use of ROC symbols. For example, a provisional scan of the 2016 and 2017 annual reports show only two instances of the ROC flag – all of them banal – compared to an average of five ROC flags in each report under Ma Ying-jeou. The evocative photographs under President Tsai Ying-wen have been predominantly nature themed, including mountains, local birds, rice paddies, and one photograph of a train each year, with no flag related examples published as of the 2019 report.
(Daniels & Cosgrove, 1993, p. 59; Jaworski & Thurlow, 2010, p. 7), the Ma administration’s new emphasis on expressly political symbols like the flag indicates a clear shift to an overtly nationalist design aesthetic.

Moreover, given the history of eliding the party-state-nation discussed earlier, in the Taiwanese context it is often difficult to distinguish between patriotism and partisanship. Although other pan-blue parties will also use the ROC flag at events and in advertising, it remains most pervasively used by the KMT and is emblematic of it (Fell, 2012, p. 48). This, combined with the festive subject matter of the evocative images, make MAC reports appear more like KMT campaign materials than government reports. The flag-laden images evoke the mass political rallies known as zaoshi wanhui 造勢晚會 that are an essential feature of contemporary election campaigns in Taiwan. Ironically, zaoshi wanhui have their origins in the dangwai movement and early DPP when they were a populist tactic to counter the KMT’s abundant resources and entrenched clientelist relationships. This strategy was so successful that in the 1990s the KMT began following suit (Mattlin, 2011, p. 216; Schafferer, 2006, p. 50). These rallies are often festive, carnival-like events including dancing, music, and performances (W.-C. Ho, 2007, p. 471; Kaeding, 2009, p. 12). In contrast to public rallies in most other democratic states, zaoshi wanhui are larger and directly organized by major political parties; they serve as a show of force to mobilize supporters and sway uncommitted voters (Mattlin, 2011, pp. 219–220). The prominent use in the MAC publications of photographs that evoke zaoshi wanhui reinforces the partisan connotations of the ROC flag as effectively synonymous with the KMT. Thus, both documentary and evocative imagery used in these publications incorporate the ROC flag in ways that reproduce well-worn associations between the ROC state, the KMT party, and a Chinese national identity.
For their part, the SM images situate the flag firmly in an international context, where the rising influence of the PRC has contributed to a resignification of the ROC flag. This resignification has reached a point where the same flag that has strong pro-China associations at a domestic level can also be a powerful pro-Taiwan symbol in an international venue. PRC efforts to erase the ROC flag from the international stage have only served to dissociate that flag from Chinese nationalism. Ironically, as the PRC has gained the power to enforce its interpretation of the One China approach (namely that there is only one China and that is the PRC), it undermined the ambiguity which made the idea of One China tenable in Taiwan.

This use in international contexts of the ROC flag as a symbol of localized patriotism is most visible at sporting events like the Olympics. Ever since it applied to rejoin the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1975 the PRC has insisted that Taiwan not be allowed to participate in the Olympics under the ROC flag or name. Consequently the IOC executive committee recommended a variation of the Olympic flag (Figure 4.13) and the name ‘Chinese Taipei’ as alternatives (Bairner & Hwang, 2010, p. 238).\footnote{The PRC had been a member until 1958, when it withdrew in protest over the IOC’s refusal to expel the ROC.} Notably, this flag incorporated the KMT shining-sun emblem, not the official ROC emblem (which has a larger blue margin). Olympic athletes from Taiwan have not participated under the ROC flag since 1979, which has led to a number of incidents. In 1996 police in Atlanta forcibly removed two spectators for...
waving ROC flags at the gold medal table tennis match between the PRC and ‘Chinese Taipei’ (“Taiwanese Spectators Arrested,” 1996). During the 2012 London Olympics the ROC flag was removed from a Regent Street display at the request of the PRC embassy (Moore-Bridger, Watling, & Prynn, 2012). The Chinese Olympic Committee organizing the 2008 Beijing Olympics attempted to negotiate a leg of the torch relay to include Taiwan, but the DPP government ultimately abandoned the negotiations when Beijing “demanded that no national flag, national emblem, or national anthem representing Taiwan should feature on the Torch Relay route” (Bairner & Hwang, 2010, p. 241; see also Ryan, 2009). While such conflicts at Olympic venues tend to gain the most media attention, the ROC flag is an important symbolic target in the PRC’s broader campaign to deny Taiwan recognition as a sovereign state. The PRC emphatically resists any display of the ROC flag in international fora, even those where Taiwanese participation is allowed as ‘observer’ (World Health Assembly), ‘member economy’ (APEC), or ‘separate customs territory’ (WTO). So while on the domestic stage the ROC flag is most commonly associated with Chinese national identity (institutionalized in the KMT), on the international level it has increasingly become a symbol of resisting Chinese nationalism associated with the PRC. The vast majority of SM imagery adopts this anti-Chinese (meaning specifically anti-PRC) connotation of the ROC flag which is already taking place in many international contexts. However, because most of these images are aimed primarily at a domestic audience82 – one where the flag is saturated with KMT associations – they must first dissociate the flag from the party before resignifying it as a more Taiwan-centric symbol.

82 Some images were clearly meant to include a more international audience, such as those which were primarily circulated online or in foreign newspapers (see Chapter 6). As many of the images discussed here include text written in traditional Chinese characters or rely heavily on local cultural referents, however, it is reasonable to assume that the intended audience was mainly residents of Taiwan.
As discussed earlier, historically opponents of the KMT have struggled to visually articulate a distinction between the state and the party because of the inclusion of the KMT Shining-sun emblem in the ROC flag. One of the most surprising symbolic moves made in the SM images is the widespread effort to produce a visual and conceptual separation between the two, rather than promote an alternative national flag. It is common to see the KMT’s white sunburst emblem used as an object of critique or ridicule in SM images. However, such images also often visually dissociate the party emblem from the ROC flag. Conceptually, this detaches the flag from the Chinese nationalist imaginary of the KMT. In many cases this disassociation is

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83 Strictly speaking, the KMT emblem is slightly different from the Shining-sun on the official ROC emblem and on the flag, in that the sun is larger so that the triangular rays extend to the edge of the blue margin of the party emblem. This distinction is largely only observed in official publications, while in most other contexts a white-sun-on-blue by itself is treated as symbolizing the KMT regardless of the exact dimensions.
accomplished by visually manipulating the Shining-sun canton in the flag itself. For example, Figure 4.14 shows two stylized hands peeling the KMT’s blue Shining-sun canton away from the red field of the flag, revealing a PRC flag underneath. The angle and size of the hands appear as if they belong to the person viewing the image. This “mediated focalization” positions the viewer as an actor in the pictured scene, casting them as the one dis-covering the flag, rather than as a detached observer (Painter et al., 2012, p. 21). By literally pulling the flag apart, the image pushes the viewer to consider individual symbolic elements rather than the whole. On its own, Figure 4.14 is ambivalent: it is not clear whether it is portraying the KMT or the entire idea of the ROC as a mask for PRC interests. However, simply by drawing attention to this ambiguity it questions the sedimented associations of the KMT and ROC. Numerous other images such as those discussed below go a step further and strongly imply a conflict between KMT and ROC, framing the latter as instead synonymous with the Taiwanese nation.

Numerous SM images play on connotations of the sun as a metaphor for the future of the nation by manipulating the flag’s iconography. By problematizing the KMT’s Shining-sun emblem within the flag, these altered flags also problematize the elision between KMT and ROC symbols more generally. Figure 4.15 shows the Shining-sun partially hidden behind the horizon. The blocky white text reads “Sunset or sunrise” (riluo or richu 日落 or 日出). Both the visual
elements and the text are ambiguous, leaving the viewer with a question as to whether the
current state of affairs should be understood as ‘a new beginning’ or ‘the beginning of the end’
for the ROC. Figure 4.16 is much more direct in comparison: the white sun emblem is entirely
absent, and the silvery-grey text elaborates by stating “Tomorrow’s sun can’t be seen”
(kanbudao mingtian de taiyang 看不到明天的太陽). In both cases the images disrupt the
conventional symbolism of the flag to encourage reflection on the situation. There are no
internal references to the CSSTA, so the viewer can only interpret the source of threat to the
nation’s future by considering the context in which these images were produced and circulated.
However, manipulating the composition of the flag also encourages the viewer to engage with
the unconventional iconography, rendering it anything but banal. Images such as these
problematize the party-state equation by taking the KMT’s white-sun emblem out of the ROC
flag. However, the suggestion of a threat to the future of the nation presupposes a positive
identification with the ROC flag as a symbol of the nation. In other words, symbolically
dissociating the KMT from the ROC also implicitly (re)associates the ROC flag with the legitimate
political community, something that would have been unimaginable for previous generations of
anti-KMT movements in Taiwan.

Other images juxtapose the KMT emblem with the ROC flag by representing them as
separate objects to emphasize the distinction. This is especially common in political cartoons,
which rely heavily on personification to represent national identities. Figure 4.17, for example,
shows two frames from an illustrated guide to the CSSTA which aimed to present the SM’s
concerns using accessible language and humorous imagery. The series features a devilish
‘China’ – identified by the PRC emblem – making secretive deals with ‘the government’ – a blue
color character marked with the Shining-sun. The text makes no reference to political parties or
states by name: the terms ‘PRC’, ‘ROC,’ or ‘KMT’ do not appear and ‘China’ is only referred to
by the relatively generic zhongguo 中國. Zhongguo includes the character for ‘country’, making

84 I use the passive voice here in my English translation to capture the ambiguity of an unstated grammatical subject
the Chinese.
it more indicative of a political unit than other terms commonly translated as ‘China’ such as zhonghua 中華 (which carries more cultural connotations). However, it does not specify which political unit, the PRC or ROC, is being referred to. It is only through the associated imagery that it becomes clear that the cartoon equates ‘China’ with ‘PRC’, and by extension frames the ROC as a political entity wholly distinct from ‘China’. Moreover, the nation (referred to in the text simply as “our homeland” women de jiayuan 我們的家園) is portrayed as a house with a ROC flag as the roof. The image underscores a sharp distinction between the KMT/government from the ROC/homeland by juxtaposing the (personified) Shining-sun logo with the flag, even though the logo is part of the flag’s design. Representing the KMT figure shaking hands with the PRC and causing alarm by inviting smaller red PRC figures into the home conveys a clear indication of the KMT’s supposed allegiances. This not only frames the PRC/‘China’ as a malicious, but also underscores a conceptual distinction between the KMT and ROC through both the composition and the narrative of the image. This seemingly simple political cartoon incorporates a complex resignification, conveying in two frames the message that “this is ‘our’ national flag, which is not the KMT’s Chinese nation, neither of which are ‘China’”. As in Figure 4.14, visually problematizing the sedimented associations between the KMT and the ROC often entails literally and conceptually detaching the Shining-sun from the ROC flag. Other SM images, such as those discussed below, go a step further by literally and conceptually replacing the KMT in symbols of the ROC, making it possible to resignify them as Taiwanese symbols.
Dissociating the ROC flag from its well-worn KMT associations is only one step in the larger process of resignification evident in the SM imagery. The second step is to suggest alternative connotations, ones which more firmly frame the SM as articulating a more genuine defence of the national interest. One especially common way of creating such a positive association between the SM and the ROC is to replace the Shining-sun canton with a similarly placed sunflower on a black field. The symbolism of covering the KMT’s logo with sunflowers is obvious, literally replacing the party. Other images use only small alterations, such as changing the colours from white and blue to yellow and black, and curving the triangular sun rays to appear more like petals while retaining the overall abstract, geometric style of the original flag. However, most SM images of the flag consist of more overt, eye-catching modifications which also introduce additional layers of signification. For example, Figure 4.18 uses a ring of orange ‘petals’ shaped like the island of Taiwan to form a sunflower-like pinwheel. Unsurprisingly, other proponents of Taiwanese national identity have incorporated the island into their flags to clearly assert a specific geographic scope of ‘national territory’, such as in the WTC flag (Figure 4.8). The use of representations of national territory is discussed in Chapter 6.
What is distinctive about the SM imagery is that rather than rejecting ROC symbols in favour of Taiwan centric ones, images like Figure 4.18 localize the ROC. In other words, it re-frames the ROC itself as the institutionalized articulation of Taiwanese culture, values, and collective experiences.\(^{85}\) Localizing the flag by associating it with conventionally Taiwan-specific symbols frames the ROC as a specifically Taiwanese polity, in contrast to the KMT’s commitment to the pointedly ambiguous 1992 Consensus. The symbols most used to localize are the island itself, as in Figure 4.18 (discussed more extensively in Chapter 6) and the Formosan black bear. Formosan bears, identifiable by a distinctive white V shape at the neck, are indigenous to Taiwan, but also offer a convenient contrast to China’s iconic panda. Numerous political

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\(^{85}\) On similar processes of the ‘localization’ or ‘Taiwanization’, see the discussion in Chapter 3, as well as Makeham & Hsiau (2005).
cartoons show black bears and pandas arguing or physically fighting each other as a metaphor for the relationship between the two nations (Figure 4.19. See also Figure 6.18).86

Often this localizing imagery associates Formosan bears with the ROC flag, transferring distinctly Taiwanese connotations to the flag. For example, Figure 4.20 consists of an extremely muscular bear wearing a blue-sky-white-sun tank-top and red shorts mimicking the ROC flag. The bear is lifting a huge trash bag over its head and exclaiming "I reject the trade agreement!" (拎北反服貿啦!! Linbei fan fumao la!!).87 The bear and “Taiwan” printed along the waistband

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86 Especially popular images that circulated around the LY during the SM suggested Ma Ying-jeou’s loyalties were to a Chinese nation by showing him dressed in a panda costume, or by depicting a panda having sex with a horse (the latter a homophone for Ma’s family name). See also Figure 6.15.

87 The character 拎 is commonly pronounced ‘ling’ in Taiwan (rather than ‘lin’ in standard Mandarin), and by itself means ‘carry’ or ‘grasp’, adding a pun to the visual content of the image.
localize the character. Similarly, localization is achieved through the use of Taiwanese slang, as “lin bei” is a gruff, colloquial way of saying “I” in the Hokkien dialect strongly associated with Taiwanese identity. The combination of the bear and dialect ground the ROC flag as signifying a Taiwanese nation, and one which is quite emphatically opposed to the CSSTA. Numerous other SM images show Formosan bear characters wearing the ROC flag as a cape or curled up underneath it like a blanket. In each of these cases, the bear grounds the flag as a specifically Taiwanese symbol, distancing it from connotations of the KMT and the party’s official Chinese national identity.

Figure 4.20: Muscular Formosan bear wearing ROC flag clothing and shouting in Taiwanese slang.
Source: http://public.318.io/13068
Figure 4.21 uses a collage of elements to weave an even more elaborate web of reconfigured or reinterpreted national (ROC) associations around the SM. The Shining-sun of the official flag has been replaced with a yellow-on-black sunflower motif. A photograph of a sunflower has been pasted on top of this, the abrupt transition between the stylized background and a naturalistic photograph self-consciously underscoring the manipulation of the image. In the bottom half of the flag is a large white circle enclosing a smaller black one, suggesting an eclipse, but also resembling a stylized eye (both motifs were common in SM artwork, respectively as symbols of ‘hidden’ political decision-making and of public oversight). The Chinese text in the black circle reads “oppose black box” (fan heixiang 反黑箱), reinforcing either or both interpretations of the circles as a critique of the process the KMT used to pass the CSSTA. What is notable in this case is the integration of these critiques into the national flag, which frames transparency and democratic oversight as national values. Put another way, Figure 4.21 bridges two issue frames: the CSSTA as a breach of political process and as an
affront to national character. The flag is further decorated with a well-known quote from Sun Yat-sen’s will: “The Revolution is not yet finished. My comrades must carry on” (*genming shangwei chenggong, tongzhi reng xu nuli* 革命尚未成功 同志仍需努力). 88 Evoking the legacy of Sun Yat-sen in this way implicitly frames the SM, and not the KMT, as the spiritual successors to his revolutionary ideals. The SM appropriation of Sun Yat-sen is discussed more extensively in Chapter 5. In the context of Figure 4.21 specifically, however, the inclusion of the Sun quote situates the flag in ROC history, an effect visually reinforced by the choice of narrow, blocky *songti* typeface reminiscent of early Republican propaganda posters. The three main elements - sunflower, eclipse, and quote – present a visual synopsis of the dominant narrative of the SM, gesturing toward its protagonists, central issue, and ethical justification, all framed against the literal backdrop of the national flag.

While national colours are often the predominant way of referencing a nation’s flag (see e.g., Brubaker et al., 2006, Chapter 4), compositions that resemble the *shape* of the flag’s elements can also be used to create novel associations. For example, in Figure 4.22 a rectangular field of barbed wire and circular wreath placed in the top left quadrant mirror the form of the ROC flag without relying on the national colours. The poster, presented as an invitation to sweep the tombstone of democracy, draws a web of associations between the SM (the wreath), the Nation (the flag shape), and democracy (mentioned in the text). After the police deployed barbed-wire topped barriers around the LY, the SM adopted images of barbed-wire as symbols of excessive government force (see also, e.g., Figure 4.26). The irregular, jagged lines of wire stand in stark contrast with the solid black background, adding to the ominous atmosphere of the composition (see also Chapter 6).

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88 This quote was used in a broad range of Sun-Yat-sen related imagery over the years, from commemorative posters of the 1927 Northern Expedition led by Chiang Kai-shek (see Fitzgerald, 1998, p. 260) to nationalist branding of domestically produced cigarettes (see H. Harrison, 2000, p. 183).
Figure 4.22: Announcement of a ‘grave cleaning’ ceremony for democracy (民主已死 馬上掃墓) consisting of barbed-wire and wreath in the shape of the ROC flag. Source: http://public.318.io/11857

As in many other SM images, Figure 4.22 associates the national flag with the movement rather than the KMT government by replacing the Shining-sun emblem with a sunflower motif. In this case, the flowers are arranged in a wreath, reinforcing the funerary theme of the poster. Mimicking the arrangement of elements in the flag with politically charged symbols creates a jarring comparison between the government’s actions in response to the SM and ‘national values’. The large white characters in the upper right corner proclaim, “Democracy is dead, now sweep the grave” (民 主已 死 馬 上 營 墓). Saomu, or sweeping and tidying of the family gravestone, is central to Qingming jie, a spring holiday important to Chinese ancestor worship traditions. In Taiwan Qingming is celebrated on April 5th (rather than following the lunar calendar as is typical elsewhere). The SM, which continued until April 10, used the occasion to make numerous references to the ‘death of democracy’ (see also Chapter...
5). There are a number of ironies in using the *Qingming* metaphor. For one, the metaphorical appeal to this quintessentially Chinese tradition is only meaningful in a particular cultural context, and it was precisely the idea of a shared Chinese culture that Ma Ying-jeou used to justify his policy of increased integration with the PRC.\(^8^9\) Moreover, in Taiwan the *Qingming* festival has explicit associations with KMT nation-building policy. After the death of Chiang Kai-shek on April 5, 1975, the government declared that date the official date of *Qingming* and a national holiday to commemorate Chiang (along with Sun Yat-sen) as the nation’s founding father.\(^9^0\)

Other SM images incorporate the ROC flag into compositions that visually connect it to sunflowers, rather than altering the composition of the flag itself. In such images the flag is anything but banal: if it is in the image, visual practices ensure we notice it, often before anything else. Size, saturation, and contrast make it one of the most visually salient elements in the images. The individual elements in the images are arranged to juxtapose the flag with other symbols. Light and shadow focus attention and intensify the affective ‘weight’ of the image. All of these visual practices facilitate the *transference* of signification to other elements (Williamson, 1978, p. 19). Specifically, the prominence of the ROC flag together with symbols of the SM frames the movement as representing ‘national’ interests.

For example, in Figure 4.23 the extensive use of black, negative space not only contributes to the overall ominous ambience, but also creates a backdrop against which the other elements appear dramatically illuminated. This effect both makes the sunflower and flag more salient and adds emotional intensity to the image (see Painter et al., 2013, p. 42). The minimalist depiction of the human figure, with the features (eyes especially) only suggested by shadows, make it a generic character onto which viewers can more easily project their own identity (McCloud, 1994, pp. 36–37; Painter et al., 2012, p. 33). This makes the bright, saturated colours

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\(^8^9\) Competing conceptions of ‘Chinese’ culture and history are discussed in Chapter 6.

\(^9^0\) On the KMT promotion of ancestor worship rituals, including *Qingming*, to reinforce notions of national and racial unity, see Poon (2011, p. 154).
of the flag on the left and sunflowers on the right stand out in sharp contrast, mediated through the stark white face and arms of the figure in the centre. The salience, symmetrical position, and emotional tone all visually reinforce the symbolic association of the flag and the SM. Nor is this transference of meaning unidirectional. By making the flag so central in visual rejections of KMT policy, these images simultaneously problematize the elision of party, state, and national identities. Put simply, rather than rejecting the flag as a symbol of Chinese national identity, images like these problematize the premise that the flag connotes Chinese national identity at all.

![Figure 4.23: A figure draped in a ROC flag and holding sunflowers.](http://public.318.io/13063)

**Flag inversions**

Another recurring motif in the SM’s displays of the flag was to show it hanging upside-down (e.g., Figure 4.24). In the first hours of the occupation, a group of protesters unfurled an inverted ROC flag from the second story of the LY (Figure 4.25; see also Figure 1.1). A photo of this act quickly became an iconic SM images, appearing in numerous newspaper articles.
Drawings and paintings made by SM participants associate the inverted flag with sunflowers and the occupied space within the LY, representing it as emblematic of the movement. An example is a watercolour of various iconic scenes from the occupation, which includes an inverted ROC flag rising up from a wreath of sunflowers, with another sunflower emerging from behind and mirroring the flagpole (Figure 4.26). This inverted flag is echoed by a (properly oriented) flag hanging behind Sun Yat-sen’s portrait in the occupied LY chambers. In Liu Tsung-jung’s painting ‘Illuminated Darkness’ (discussed in Chapter 5 with respect to images which appropriate Sun Yet-sen), the two iconic scenes are combined. It shows the ROC flag hanging upside-down behind Sun’s portrait (Figure 5.12).

Inverted flags also feature prominently in SM photographs. A large collection of black and white photographs was on display inside the LY during the occupation, including those in Figures 4.24 and 4.25. The collection also includes numerous copies of a photograph of seated protesters holding up an inverted flag facing a line of riot police holding shields (Figure 4.24). The visual representation of police in SM imagery is sufficiently complex that it warrants its own study, which is beyond the scope of the present analysis. In terms of national identity, however, what is of note here is the juxtaposition of the national flag with agents of state authority. Adopting the flag as a moral shield against the physical ones held by the police entails an implicit acceptance of the ROC as the legitimate national community, while simultaneously rejecting the (KMT-led) state as the legitimate representatives of that nation (Martin, 2015, p. 238).

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91 The SM’s representation of police varied dramatically over the course of the occupation, and this is reflected in the visual materials they produced. After police forcefully prevented an attempt to occupy the nearby Executive Yuan on March 23, the earlier narrative of national solidarity (exemplified in the slogan “Under the uniforms we are all Taiwanese”) was replaced by one representing the police as agents of state violence (Martin 2015, p. 238). The majority of the photographs in the display discussed here frame police in this way. For a time the narrative shifted back to a more positive portrayal when the police stepped in to prevent a group led by Chang An-lo (founder of the China Unification Party with links to organized crime) from forcibly evicting the protesters on April 1 (Martin 2015, p. 240). The images produced by the SM reflect this variable relationship with the police, ranging from graphic depictions of police (or KMT leaders depicted as police) attacking students with batons to idyllic drawings of smiling protesters and police exchanging flowers.
Figure 4.24: Seated protesters holding an inverted ROC flag, facing a line of riot police. (Black and white photograph).
Source: http://public.318.io/19491

Figure 4.25: Protesters on the second floor of the Legislative Yuan. An inverted ROC flag is visible near the centre of the frame. (Black and white photograph).
Source: http://public.318.io/19620
While the ROC flag appears frequently in the SM imagery in general, images of *inverted* flags frame the situation as a crisis or exception. This facilitates the SM’s efforts to dissociate the flag from *state* actors such as the police or elected government without appearing to reject the *institutions* of the state. In short, it positions the actor (or artist) as critical, but not radical. Inverting flags is a conventional distress signal used in shipping for instance. Displaying the ROC flag upside-down in non-emergency circumstances was first prohibited by the KMT government in 1931 (*Dangqi guoqi zhi zhizao ji shiyoung banfa* 党旗國旗之製造及使用辦法 [Regulations on the Manufacture and Display of the National and Party Flag], 1931, Article 13).\(^92\) By extension, inverting a national flag has also become a form of protest, metaphorically signalling that the nation, rather than a naval vessel, is in danger. While most investigations of inverting flags as a

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\(^92\) The convention of inverting the flag as a distress signal has its roots in American and British naval traditions (the British Naval ensign consists of the Union Jack in the top left corner against a white field, making it easy to identify the ‘top’). The inclusion of this article in the KMT’s 1931 regulations indicates that this convention had extended beyond the British Empire.
political act centre on the American context, it is also recognized as a gesture of protest in Taiwan: for example, long-time KMT supporters hung the ROC flag upside down in 2016 to show disapproval of Ma’s economic stewardship and treatment of veterans (Chan, 2016). Inverting a nation’s flag attracts attention precisely because it runs contrary to convention: it is not how we expect to see it. This attention-grabbing quality is what makes it a useful distress signal. Inverting the flag disrupts the conventional material order, which is easily extended to symbolizing a disruption in the social order (Firth, 1973, p. 362). As a display of dissent, however, it is also more ambivalent than other symbolic actions. Unlike flag burning, inverting the flag is temporary and reversible. This disrupts the normal symbolic order, but does not symbolically destroy or profane that order. Nor is it a replacement of one flag by flying another, such as at the 908 Campaign’s annual ‘alternate flag raising ceremony’ mentioned earlier. I suggest that inversion works because of its ambivalence. Straddling both distress and critique, these images embrace ROC symbols as Taiwanese symbols in order to criticize the government.

Conclusion

The Shining-sun flag of the ROC has been intertwined with KMT ideas of a Chinese nation for over a century. The KMT administration of President Ma Ying-jeou continued to trade on this symbolic blurring between party, nation, and state in imagery promoting closer cross-strait ties, including the CSSTA. On one hand this entailed banal nationalism, the routine flagging of national identity in the background of MAC documentary photographs. The more dynamic evocative photographs in MAC publications, on the other hand, were more than displays of non-partisan patriotism. These reproduced established associations between the ROC and KMT through visual allusions to zaoshi wanhui, the mass mobilization rallies that have long been

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93 Of particular note is Logan & Schnitou’s (2007) meticulous and nuanced study on the incorporation of inverted American flags in Lakota art over the 18th century. See also Sneed & Stonecipher (1989, p. 150) on the use of flags as symbolic speech against the Vietnam war.

94 This only applies for horizontally asymmetrical flags, such as that of the ROC, where it is readily apparent which side is the ‘top’.
central to election campaigns in Taiwan. In both cases, however, the images trade on sedimented associations of the KMT party with symbols of the ROC state, a union premised on a particular Chinese national identity.

Instead of accepting the ROC flag as a symbol of Chinese nationalism, the imagery produced by the SM regularly problematizes this equation of party-nation-state. As with other forms of parody, SM images which alter the composition of the flag are in effect visually deconstructing the conventional symbolism. However, by situating the flag in an international context, especially in juxtaposition with the PRC, the SM imagery frames the ROC as a distinctly Taiwanese polity. The following chapters look at how other symbols are similarly resignified in SM imagery to frame the SM as a more authentic voice of the nation than the KMT, first by looking at how the MAC and SM images construct very different versions of ‘national history’, and then by considering how each uses territorial representations of Taiwan to articulate different visions of relationships between the island, the nation, and the world.
In the first days of the SM a group of medical volunteers arrived to support the protestors occupying the LY. The group entered carrying portraits of medical practitioners who had been involved in different movements for Taiwanese autonomy over the previous century (see Figures 5.2 and 5.14-16). This brief procession framed both the SM protestors and the medical volunteers as a performative reiteration of a Taiwanese identity articulated through civil resistance (M. Harrison, 2014). Similar visual assertions of identity rooted in a particular history are exceedingly common in the SM imagery. A closer look at the photograph of the occupied LY chambers in Figure 5.1, taken near the end of the SM, indicates just how pervasive appeals to ‘history’ were. In this snapshot alone, we can see three of the portraits of the medical students mentioned previously (far right), a drawing of Taiwan independence activist and martyr Cheng Nan-jung (centre), and three different renditions of the founder of the ROC, Sun Yat-sen (centre, bottom centre, and upper right). History was very much present in the imagery of the SM.
This chapter turns from the ways that the SM appropriated the history of national symbols, discussed in Chapter 3, to the symbolic use of history itself. History is central to the construction and reproduction of national identities, or rather the selective assembling of one particular history from the vast assortment of places, people, and practices which existed in the past (E. J. Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Smith, 2005). Historical narratives make it possible to imagine a national community because they give the appearance of coherence and stability to a heterogenous and changing collective identity: “national history secures for the contested and contingent nation the false unity of a self-same, national subject evolving through time” (Duara, 1996, p. 4). Both the SM and MAC imagery draw on figures and visual styles from the past to frame their respective positions as a continuation of a ‘national history’. This use of history goes beyond an instrumental rationale of simply framing the CSSTA as in (or against) Taiwan’s national interest. Rather, in both sets of images, visually alluding to the past implicitly situates Taiwan as part of (or separate from) Chinese national history. These competing narratives of Chinese history frame cross-strait rapprochement in diametrically opposing ways. In the MAC imagery, references to Chinese history serve a legitimating role, whereas they perform a delegitimating role in SM imagery. Using visual cues and styles that evoke a common history, the MAC imagery legitimates increased economic ties with the mainland (which is represented as the mainland, not as the PRC, a point I develop further in the next chapter).

The framing of the trade agreements as rooted in a shared cultural history aligns with what numerous other researchers have identified as a re-sinicizing tendency in Ma Ying-jeou’s discourse and policies (B. Chang, 2018; Sullivan & Sapir, 2012). MAC images rely on sedimented
connotations of very selective cultural and political symbols to frame cross-strait rapprochement as a natural development based on a common Chinese history. Cultural references are most evident in the design or aesthetic of publications on cross-strait issues between 2008 and 2014, which draw on motifs conventionally associated with traditional Chinese arts and folklore (specifically the menshen, or ‘door gods’). Political history is evoked mainly through the figure of Sun Yat-sen, who was the founder of both the ROC and KMT and one of the first and most influential voices conceptualizing Chinese national identity in the early 20th century. The repeated and largely banal (Billig, 1995) appearance of Sun Yat-sen’s portrait in MAC images reinforces the conceptual elision between the KMT Party, the ROC state, and modern Chinese national identity by framing them in a common historical narrative. In this regard, his face functions in a very similar fashion to use of the ROC flag discussed in Chapter 4. Sun is also a well-respected figure in the PRC, which makes his image a useful (or at least safely ambiguous) symbol of a common Chinese political history (Ergenc, 2011; X. A. Wu, 2011). It is perhaps not surprising then that Sun Yat-sen is the only historical figure who appears in the MAC materials I examined. It is precisely the sedimented, ‘common sense’ connotations which permeate the MAC images which make the contestation of these histories in the SM imagery so striking in comparison.

Echoing the argument in Chapter 4, in this chapter I show how SM images typically engage in resignifying symbols from national history rather than in opposing them outright. Put another way, instead of presenting alternative symbols, the predominant strategy in SM imagery is to present alternative interpretations of common symbols. This process is most evident in the extensive and highly sympathetic use of Sun Yat-sen’s image, which stands out because he is such an iconic figure in historical narratives of Chinese national identity. There are similar appropriations of less widely known figures from the past as well, many of whom could also be framed as part of a specifically Chinese history. However, as my analysis shows, the SM images use compositions which emphasize associations between these historical figures and democracy, rather than associations with ‘China’. Meanwhile, the repeated appearance of
these figures alongside others from Taiwan’s democratization movement (such as Nylon Cheng) produces a context in which they appear as iterations in a common historical narrative. Taken together, these compositions and contexts frame the SM as the successor to a historical narrative centred on themes of democracy and civil rights, rather than one centred on Chinese ethnicity or culture. In one sense, the procession of portraits described at the beginning of this chapter can be taken as a metaphor for a more sustained process of using faces from the past to situate the SM in a history of struggle for democracy – a history which extends to and incorporates the KMT’s own founder. At the same time, while many SM images dissociate historical figures from any ‘Chinese’ connotations, others make overt (and often comedic) visual associations between Chinese history and Ma Ying-jeou in order to mock and delegitimate the president and his party. Such images are typically humorous or satirical, but in order to get the joke the viewer has to conceptualize Taiwanese and Chinese histories as mutually exclusive. Underscoring the political dimension of this satire, these SM images rely almost exclusively on references to political leaders from China’s past, rather than Chinese cultural markers. The final section looks at this use of symbolic and stylistic allusions to Chinese history to frame the KMT and Ma Ying-jeou as illegitimate by embedding them in a ‘foreign’ national history.

**MAC Images: Evoking Chinese History**

Visually alluding to China’s past can situate Taiwan as either part of or separate from Chinese national history. In the section that follows, I show how the MAC imagery does the former, using visual cues and styles that evoke a common, shared history. The imagery frames trade agreements like EFCA and the CSSTA as rooted in a shared cultural history. This sinicizing frame is evident in the overall design of many pamphlets outlining Ma’s cross-strait policy between 2009 and 2014. By evoking a shared Chinese history, the MAC imagery legitimates increased economic ties with the mainland. MAC imagery represents cross-strait negotiations, including ECFA and the CSSTA, as the natural outcome of a shared history by referencing
cultural idioms that are common to both mainland China and Taiwan. In doing so the MAC images avoid virtually any signifiers which might be readily associated with political authorities from Chinese history, such as landmarks, buildings, or leaders associated with imperial or early republican government. The one exception discussed above, Sun Yat-sen, is notable precisely because of his ambiguous status as an iconic ‘founding father’ for both the PRC and the ROC. MAC publications promoting cross-strait agreements often use visual elements strongly associated with classical Chinese art and folk tradition to evoke a sense of common history and culture. This can be seen in the overall design style of public relations materials for the Jiang-Chen talks and ECFA. As I will detail later, the SM images use visual references to Chinese history to the exact opposite effect, delegitimizing Ma Ying-jeou by framing him as a ‘foreign’ actor.
One especially rich example of stylistic allusions to ‘Chinese’ history appears in a book written by the MAC and Tianxia yuanjian publishing (2010) which summarizes the Ma administration’s cross-strait policy (Figure 5.3). The front cover shows a brightly lit doorway framing a map of Taiwan, placed below what appears to be a traditional Chinese landscape.
painting. Though closely cropped, the green tint and rolling, knobby forms suggest a mountain scene or trees. In comparison to the crisp-edged computer-generated island silhouettes (discussed in Chapter 6), the island in this image is drawn in ink, with shaded mountains and brownish tint. This suggests an antique, hand-drawn map.\textsuperscript{95} The imagined architecture also conveys an antique feel, with scalloped door brackets and posts framing a cobbled courtyard beyond. Although the angle and dark colour make it difficult to make out, the dimly lit, ruddy red-orange walls flanking the entry include a printed \textit{menshen} 門神, martial deities from Chinese folklore. Statues and paintings of these ‘door gods’ have been placed on either side of temple gates and household doorways since the Han Dynasty (Fong, 1989, p. 6), and they have become one of the most popular and distinctive examples of Chinese folklore (Shuhong Zhao & Gui, 2017, p. 53; see also Knapp, 1999 ch. 5). \textit{Menshen} are the fifth most common symbol in the MAC images examined (see Table 2.1), appearing in over a dozen publications between 2008 and 2014, as well as on banners and posters at official events promoting ECFA and the CSSTA. Their presence in these images frames cross-strait relations in terms of common traditions rooted in a shared, mythical past, especially when combined with other aspects of the image composition that further reinforce this framing.

One way of reinforcing a sense of tradition or historicity in Figure 5.3 is through the visual characteristics of the text (see also Figures 4.11, 5.4, and 5.5). The title of the book, loosely translated “Strength and ease of the turbulent strait” (\textit{haixia fengyun de qiang yu chi} 海峽風雲的強與弛) is printed down the centre of the doorway, with the characters ‘strength’ and ‘ease’ written in a flowing \textit{xinshu} (semi-cursive) script. These two calligraphic characters and the island map are repeated as background images on each interior page of the book, offering a constant visual reiteration of the historical narrative underwriting the text’s argument for closer

\textsuperscript{95} This appears to be a Dutch map from 1675, currently held by the National Nautical Museum in Amsterdam.
ties with the mainland.\footnote{The book opens with an introduction by the Buddhist monk Hsin Yun, who is a well known advocate of reconciliation with the mainland based both on compassion and, more controversially, a belief in a shared Chinese identity (Loa, 2009).} Government publications typically use more readable block \textit{hei-ti} fonts for most of their text but use calligraphy to accentuate key themes in titles or chapter headings. The visual aspects of a typeface or written script can act as a distinctive cultural marker, even apart from the meaning of the words it spells out (Soar, 2004). Chinese brush calligraphy in particular has a broader range of connotations than other types of lettering such as Gothic hand lettering, for example. Flowing brush scripts can appear on everything from business cards to canned coffee to evoke cultural refinement or education, as well as ‘traditional’ artistry (Bartal, 2013, p. 55; see also Yang & Hsu, 2016; Lin, 2015, p. 52). However, the combination of these scripts with other signifiers of antiquity anchor the former, so that the various individual elements mutually reinforce the \textit{preferred} reading of the whole as an expression of classical aesthetics.

MAC publications promoting the Jiang-Chen summits are especially likely to use a historicized aesthetic, emphasizing shared cultural histories to set the stage for building cross-strait ties. These summits between Jiang Bingkun (Chiang Pin-kung) 江丙坤, chairman of the ROC’s Straits Exchange Foundation, and Chen Yun-lin 陈云林, chairman of the PRC’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), were the main forum for negotiating cross-strait rapprochement under Ma, including both ECFA and the CSSTA (see Chapter 3). Typically (or stereotypically) ‘Chinese’ motifs and styles increased noticeably in 2010, when the design of public relations materials took on a more pointedly ‘classical’ aesthetic, as evident in the 2010 pamphlets promoting the fourth and fifth Jiang-Chen summits. Notably, this coincides with negotiations over ECFA, which was first outlined during the fourth summit in December 2009 (Figure 5.4) and signed at the fifth summit in June 2010 (Figure 5.5). The shift in visual strategy is evident when these are compared with the modern aesthetic of Figure 6.2, which is a pamphlet for the third summit held in April 2009.
As in Figure 5.3, the air of ‘history’ is achieved through both the purely visual elements as well as the visual aspects of the text. The background is made up of floral motifs styled after classical Chinese ink paintings, further reinforced by the red ‘seal’ in the corner of Figure 5.4. Compared to the 2009 pamphlets the colour palette is more monochromatic and less saturated (cf. Figure 6.2). In combination with the classical motifs, the colour palette adds to the overall faded, historicized ambiance of the images (see Painter et al., 2013, pp. 38–39). In both
pamphlets the two calligraphic characters *min yi* 民意 dominate the frame, and all the text is printed in the traditional vertical orientation. *Min yi* translates as ‘popular will’ or ‘will of the people’. Figure 5.5 includes the clarifying verb ‘approaching’ (*tiejin* 貼近) in a similar script, while Figure 5.4 includes a red seal with the word ‘reading’ (*yuedu* 閱讀) in the even more antiquated seal-script. Thus, the full titles of the pamphlets are “Reading the will of the people” and “Approaching the will of the people,” respectively. “Listening to the will of the people” was a central theme of the public relations campaign around ECFA. *Min yi* contrasts with the SM’s appeals to *minzhu*, “democracy,” or more literally “people’s rule,” implying a more direct or active role for the people (see below and Chapter 6).

The combination of historicized colour palettes, selective use of calligraphic script, and the use of architectural and visual motifs all work together to generate an overall impression of antiquity, specifically one rooted in Chinese tradition. The ‘China’ evoked in these images is primarily a *cultural* one, underscoring Ma’s emphasis on a shared cultural history as the basis for cross-strait relations. The MAC images avoid any allusions to Chinese *political* histories (with the significant exception of representations of Sun, discussed below), which could raise associations with the contentious history of conflict between the CCP and KMT, or the competing claims by the PRC and ROC to represent the Chinese nation. As I will show later in this chapter, the SM adopts the exact opposite tactic, evoking ‘Chinese history’ almost exclusively through political symbols and figures.

*Sun Yat-sen*

MAC images do include one figure strongly associated with Chinese political history, Sun Yat-Sen. Chapter 4 examined Sun Yat-sen’s role in developing and spreading symbols of the new Chinese nation. In this section I look at how Sun himself is used as a symbol of the nation. Sun Yat-sen is celebrated as the founder of modern China in both the PRC and ROC. The CCP had initially been a faction within the KMT, with the two parties only splitting after Sun’s death. Sun, along with Song Jiaoren 宋教仁, founded the KMT in 1911 and established the ROC in
1912. Sun also served as the ROC’s first president. As such, in Taiwan he has an almost mythical role in representations of the historical memory of both the state (ROC) and the party (KMT). He is commemorated in statues, school and street names across the island, and most monumentally, a seven-acre park and memorial hall in central Taipei. In addition to playing a leading role in the 1911 Xinhai revolution which overthrew the Qing Dynasty, Sun’s reputation as the father of the modern Chinese nation comes from his extensive philosophical writings. In these writings he stresses a unified national identity as essential to resisting Western imperialism. Intellectually, Sun is most strongly associated with his ‘Three Principles of the People,’ a series of lectures delivered in 1924 articulating a republican political philosophy built on nationalism (minzu zhuyi 民族主義), democracy (minquan zhuyi 民權主義) and welfare (minsheng zhuyi 民生主義). These three principles are often engraved under Sun’s statutes or portraits, and are often considered the ideological foundation of the ROC, even being officially cited as the symbolic meaning of the colours of the ROC flag (see Chapter 4).

Sun Yat-sen is the only historical figure to appear in the MAC materials promoting the Jiang-Chen summits, the ECFA, or the CSSTA. His ambiguous status as an iconic ‘founding father’ for both the PRC and the ROC allows the MAC to invoke him as a symbol of a common national identity. Sun’s portrait acts as a visual equivalent of the KMT’s ‘One China, different interpretations’ stance on cross-strait relations, sidestepping interactable political debate over which state legitimately represents the nation while simultaneously reasserting the fundamental Chineseness of that nation.

97 Although typically translated as ‘Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall’, the landmark’s proper name guoli guogu jinianguan 國立國父紀念館 is more literally translated as “national father of the nation memorial hall.”

98 For an extensive discussion of the development of and tensions between these principles, see Wells (2001), esp. chapters 6-8.

99 The CCP makes similar use of Sun Yat-sen as a unifying symbol, commemorating him more visibly and emphatically in response to perceived gestures towards independence by ROC leaders (Wu, 2011, pp. 258–259; see also Ergenc, 2011).
Figure 5.6: Sun Yat-sen portrait and ROC flags in the background of an official reception with President Ma Ying-jeou

Figure 5.7: MAC Chairperson Lai Shin-yuan seated under a portrait of Sun Yat-sen at a meeting with local authorities.
When Sun Yat-sen appears in MAC images, most often it is in the form of a portrait hanging in the background of photographs of government officials receiving foreign dignitaries or chairing meetings (Figures 5.6 and 5.7). In fact, the presence of these portraits helps mark the actors and events pictured in these photographs as ‘official,’ in much the same way as does the national flag (see Chapter 3). In these official publications Sun’s image contributes to what Michael Billig (1995) calls banal nationalism: the mundane repetition of national symbols which continually and often unconsciously reinforce the ‘naturalness’ of nations. Nationalism in this sense operates on two levels, particular and general. On one hand, it reinforces the apparent legitimacy of a particular national identity, reproducing as ‘common sense’ the idea that there is a single, essential shared Chinese identity, and that this identity is the self-evident basis for political unity. On the other hand, it also reinforces the general ideology that nations are the natural way of organizing human society (Gellner, 1983). Although the SM images I discuss next contest the nature of national identity in Taiwan, they do little to challenge this underlying ideology of the nation-state as the natural form for organizing political life.

**Sunflower Movement Histories**

As has been discussed, Taiwanese independence activists of the 1970s and 1980s were typically resistant to all things associated with China, including the ROC name, history, and symbols. By contrast, SM imagery often relies on drawing a conceptual distinction between ‘China’ and ‘the ROC’. This conceptual distinction makes it possible for them to indigenize ROC symbols as Taiwanese while conceding the PRC’s monopoly over Chinese national identity. Chapter 4 examined how SM imagery uses context and composition to resignify the ROC flag. The remainder of the present chapter considers how ‘history’ is used to similar ends. More specifically, I examine how visual references to the past frame the SM in a historical narrative woven around struggles for democracy and civil rights, contrasting this with a narrative of Chinese authoritarianism. The most interesting feature of these contrasting narratives is that they directly contest the history represented in MAC images by incorporating and resignifying
figures more conventionally associated with Chinese history. This resignification is most evident in how the SM lays claim to the image of Sun Yat-sen.

**SM appropriation of Sun Yat-sen**

As mentioned previously, Sun fills a mythological role in the national imaginary of the ROC. Founding figures serve as powerful legitimating symbols, often far exceeding their military or intellectual contributions to the state. As with the ROC flag, the SM imagery adopts the symbol of Sun and turns it against the KMT, rather than attacking it. One approach to claiming Sun’s image, and the legitimacy it implies, is by emphasizing connections to *minzhu*, or democracy, one of the three ‘Principles of the People’ central to Sun’s political philosophy. For example, Figure 5.8 is a drawing of Sun Yat-sen in an emblematic blue suit with tears running down his cheeks, flanked by the words “Democracy is dead” (*minzhu jisi* 民主己死), which was also a Twitter hashtag used during the early parts of the movement. The red stain splashed across the
image evokes blood, possibly a reference to the violent suppression of protesters on March 24, but also the red paint commonly used in Taiwan by activists to deface statues and portraits of contentious historical figures. Either interpretation implies that Sun’s legacy (specified here as democracy) has been tainted. By representing Sun as a sympathetic figure this SM artist begs the question of who is the ‘real’ culprit. Other instances of this ‘death of democracy’ theme is evident in the decoration of the portrait of Sun Yat-sen hanging in the LY as a memorial altar, complete with offerings and a black mortuary tablet for “democracy” (Figure 5.9. See also Figure 4.22). It is by no means self-evident that Sun Yat-sen would have appreciated the SM’s homage. It is true that ‘democracy’, or minzhu 民主, was one of his three core political principles, and his plan for the Republic included elements of direct democracy (Sun, 1928). However, Sun was also concerned that only the most capable should be involved in government, particularly at the national level, and this tension between populism and elitism was never fully resolved in his writings (Wells, 2001, pp. 81–83). Nevertheless, these images are not elaborating on a philosophical debate over Sun’s thought. Rather, they assert a claim that the political identity of Taiwan is rooted in a particular interpretation of minzhu which is entirely compatible with the Sun Yat-sen’s mythic status. The SM never challenged the image of Sun Yat-sen as their nation’s founding father, despite Sun also being used by the PRC government as a symbol of Chinese national identity. Rather, the repeated emphasis on minzhu anchors this Sun as the founder of a democratic nation, rather than a Chinese one.

The SM’s embracing of Sun Yat-sen as an iconic figure is even more evident when we look more closely at the composition, or how his face is incorporated into SM images. Often when his likeness appears in SM imagery, it is not Sun the historical figure, but representations of Sun’s portrait. Drawings of Sun are typically static, frontal head-and-shoulder views akin to a formal portrait (one exception is Figure 5.13). This is evident in Figure 5.8, where the two-dimensionality of the subject is subtly indicated by how the red ‘bloodstain’ flows across the
frame, rather than conforming to the contours and depth to Sun’s face.\textsuperscript{100} The overall effect suggests that this is a picture of a picture, not of the man.

The primacy of the portrait over the person is even more evident in the various mediated reproductions of the occupied legislative chamber dominated by a large portrait of Sun gazing down from above the podium. Throughout the entire occupation Sun’s portrait was never obscured,\textsuperscript{101} except for a small paper counter along the bottom tracking the hours of occupation. Numerous cameras set up in the chambers by the protestors were positioned so that the portrait dominated the centre of the frame, making it the centrepiece of hundreds of hours of live-streamed video and photographs. The continual reiteration of Sun’s image at the centre of the SM recontextualized the KMT’s founder, making his portrait into an icon of the occupation, if only for a short while.

The image of Sun’s portrait hanging at the front of the chamber surrounded by protest slogans became so emblematic of the SM that the scene became the subject of numerous painting and drawings made over the course of the occupation. By framing the portrait within an image, it becomes hypermediated, drawing attention to the process of representation (Bolter & Grusin, 1999, pp. 12–14; see also Mitchell, 1994, p. 8). Unlike the banal reproduction in the MAC images discussed above, hypermediation emphasizes the interaction of Sun’s portrait with the context within which it appears, either within a larger image or within the collage of images in the occupied LY. This hypermediation directs attention outwards from the portrait and toward the context, which works to resignify Sun in particular ways.

For example, Chen Jingyan’s oil painting (Figure 5.10) shows the chamber crowded with students with raised fists gathered in front of the decorated podium (note the inclusion of the

\textsuperscript{100} Photographs from the first week of the occupation show this image on display complete with the red stain, indicating that the stain was part of the original composition. See e.g., https://www.flickr.com/photos/cypherone/13389363475/ (accessed September 2, 2019).

\textsuperscript{101} The same cannot be said for other historical figures. A portrait of Chiang Kai-shek went missing during the occupation and was only recovered in 2017 in badly damaged condition (Chiu & Hetherington, 2017).
drawing of Sun crying (Figure 5.8) to the left of the central portrait). In yet another cycle of re-
mediating of the image, this painting itself appears in numerous photographs, resting against 
the speaker’s lectern directly underneath the portrait of Sun that it depicts (see, e.g., Figure 
5.1). Liu Tsung-jung’s painting ‘Illuminated Darkness’ (Figure 5.12) shows a similar perspective 
with the protestors replaced by a field of sunflowers. Liu’s painting is largely impressionistic, 
with the most naturalistic objects being the sunflowers in the foreground, Sun’s portrait, and 
the inverted ROC flag, making them the most salient parts of the image.
Figure 5.11: Watercolour montage of iconic scenes from the course of SM, is centred on Sun’s portrait, which is highlighted against the contrasting red ROC flag. Incorporating Sun into the SM iconography frames the movement as part of a much longer history, essentially co-opting the KMT’s narrative of the ROC as ‘Free China’ (see M. Harrison, 2006, pp. 11, 109).

The SM not only drew or painted images of Sun as a sympathetic figure, but organized and displayed the occupied space in ways that *accentuated* the Sun portrait that hung at the front of the LY chamber before the SM. In emphasizing the connection between Sun’s iconic image and their own vision of direct democracy, the SM framed itself as defending the founding principle of the ROC while implicitly casting Ma’s KMT as hypocritically undermining the ideals of its own founder. The use of Sun’s image by the SM demonstrates the polysemy of national symbols. In the context of a predominantly anti-Chinese movement like the SM, the
sympathetic portrayals of an iconic figure of *Chinese nationalism* seems virtually nonsensical. As a symbol of *democratic* principles, however, Sun can be a useful instrument for questioning the current administration’s practises. By using Sun’s image, either on its own or by incorporating it
into their representations of the LY chamber space, the SM images appropriate the symbolic capital built up around Sun’s image by decades of the KMT’s banal nationalism. This semiotic maneuver mirrors their physical occupation of the LY; the occupation of the putative space of democratic deliberation works to reinforce the symbolic reclamation of Sun’s legacy, or at least one particular interpretation of it. This move is only possible in the first place because there is an established association between Sun and the idea of democracy, however.

Figure 5.13: A muscular and shirtless Sun Yat-sen holding Ma Ying-jeou’s severed head. Source: http://public.318.io/13130

Appropriating Sun’s image also implicitly challenges the notion that Ma is Sun’s successor by virtue of his position as president of the ROC – a position first held by Sun in 1912 before he was forced out by Yuan Shikai. Most often the contrast between Sun and Ma Ying-jeou is implied, but occasionally the point is made more directly. Figure 5.13 is one gory example, showing Sun’s head on a shirtless, muscular body, holding Ma’s severed head. Four large Chinese characters surrounding the figures proclaim, “This horse (i.e., Ma) speaks without
shame” (*ma yan wu chi* 馬言無恥). The character ‘shame’ is emphasized in white text against a black square directly beneath Ma’s bloody head, in case the object of Sun’s disdain was not clear. The comically hyperbolic imagery is echoed in the language, with Sun presumably admonishing Ma: “Do not disgrace me with salutations. I will kill you this day.” (*Bie zai xiuru dui wo jingli, laozi jiu cha zhe tian shale ni* 別再羞辱對我敬禮 老子就差這天殺了你.) A conceptual association between Sun and Taiwan is driven home by the ‘Pray for Taiwan’ (*tian you taiwan*) tattoo on his bulging pectoral muscles. It is ‘Taiwan’, and pointedly not Ma Ying-jeou, that is framed as the inheritor of Sun’s legacy. I will return to the use of history to delegitimate Ma at the end of this chapter. For the moment, I wish to draw attention to the representation of Sun in opposition to Ma, which implicitly associates the SM with Sun by analogy. Thus, historical figures locate the SM within a much longer historical narrative of legitimate resistance.

*History of civil protest*

Symbolic moves to locate the SM in well-established histories of resistance were common throughout the occupation, and often even more overt than those using Sun Yat-sen. Consider
the procession described at the beginning of this Chapter, where medical volunteers entered the chambers bearing portraits of medical doctors who had also been vocal advocates for Taiwanese identity or autonomy (M. Harrison, 2014). These portraits remained on prominent display throughout the occupation (see the images on the right-hand side of the LY in Figure 5.1). These contributed to framing the SM as the latest in a literal procession of Taiwanese advocates stretching back nearly a century. Jiang Yushui (蔣渭水, 1891-1931, Figure 5.14) was a founder of the Taiwan Cultural Association (TCA), an influential social organization that pushed the imperial Japanese government for greater autonomy on the basis of a distinct Taiwanese identity (see Chapter 2). He was also the founder of Taiwan’s first political party, the Taiwan People’s Party, in 1927 (discussed in Chapter 2; see also Ching 2001, p. 55-6). Jiang, who was born in northern Taiwan in 1890 to ethnically Han parents, is a prime example of how representations of historical figures are open to multiple interpretations. Ma Ying-jeou’s 2008 election campaign invoked Jiang as a symbol of ‘nativized Chineseness’ because of his political activities under Japanese rule, pointing to Jiang’s advocacy of Taiwanese autonomy as a shining example of Chinese resistance to Japanese colonialism (Hughes, 2014, p. 123). Ma framed Jiang in a narrative of Chinese patriotism, but one that took place in Taiwan. This subsumes Taiwan within the history of the Chinese nation (or at least the KMT’s version of that history).

By contrast, the SM image’s location of Jaing’s portrait in this particular lineup of historical figures reframes his contribution as part of a series of struggles for Taiwanese democracy. He is located next to Loa Ho (賴和, 1894-1943, Figure 5.15), a doctor who had also been a member of the TCA. However, Loa was better known as a writer and poet who wrote extensively about the experience of life in Taiwan and was celebrated as an example of xiangtu, or ‘local’, literary movements. Li Zhenyan (Lee Chen-yuan 李鎮源, 1915-2001, Figure 5.16) is only one in the group whose political activities centred on resisting the KMT rather than the Japanese. Lee was a doctor and noted pharmacologist who later in life became involved in the Wild Lily student

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102 In 2019 the pro-China mayor of Taipei, Ko Wen-je, established a new political party of the same name, drawing criticism from Jiang’s family (Strong, 2019).
movement (1990) and was a vocal critic of the use of criminal law to suppress protests. In 1996, he became the first chairman of the Taiwan Independence Party. Mark Harrison (2014) writes that a fourth figure was included in the original set of portraits carried in during the procession of medical volunteers, namely that of Tu Tsunming 杜聰明 (1893-1986), the first Taiwanese PhD holder and founder of the Gaoxiong Medical College. This fourth image was not in the 318 archive, but is visible in photographs of the initial procession (see, e.g., https://4am.tw/photos/ accessed May 30, 2020). Taken together, these portraits anticipate the SM as the next beat in a rhythmic iteration of history presented as a pictorial lineage of political resistance in Taiwan.

Nonviolent protest became an increasingly prominent issue as tensions with police escalated over the course of the SM (Martin, 2015, p. 239). The SM imagery grounds this theme in historical references, framing the SM as the latest iteration in a narrative of nonviolence which spans generations. On March 23, a group of SM protestors attempted to escalate the protests by occupying the nearby Executive Yuan. Riot police forcefully evicted the protestors
with batons and water cannons, and more than 150 people were injured. Photographs of bloodied protestors began circulating in the news and on the internet (Figure 5.17), resulting in a huge boost in public sympathy for the SM (Martin, 2015, p. 231). The theme of violence became notably prominent in both the imagery and discourse of the SM. Government figures like Ma Ying-jeou and Premier Jiang Yihua were often portrayed as gangsters or riot police, but such images rarely include any overt historical symbolism. In contrast, the SM used historical portraits to frame the SM as part of a long tradition of non-violent political protest and by implication frame the government as on the wrong side of history.

One of the most popular SM images, that of Fu Sinian (傅斯年, 1896-1950), appeared in multiple formats ranging from palm-sized stickers (Figure 5.18) to 12-foot-long banners (Figure 5.19). Fu had been a student leader at Beijing University during the May Fourth movement, leading protests against the Chinese government’s anemic response to the Treaty of Versailles, which ceded Shandong province to Japan (Fan-sen Wang, 2000, p. 31). Fu later founded the Institute of History and Philology at Academia Sinica, then located in Nanjing. Fu moved to Taiwan along with the Academia Sinica when the institution was relocated by the KMT in 1949. He was also appointed president of National Taiwan University. Although he sided with the KMT when it split from the CPP, he was also a vocal critic of KMT officials he saw as corrupt

Figure 5.18: Fu Sinian sticker including the quotation: I have a request: When you disperse the students tonight, there can be no blood. If any student bleeds, I will resist”.
Source: http://public.318.io/21011
(Fan-sen Wang, 2000, p. 9). Fu ultimately died of hypertension after being questioned over accusations of recruiting students and faculty with communist sympathies. Fu Sinian was a particularly relevant historical icon for the SM to appropriate. His intellectual contributions to Chinese historiography centre on the importance of interpreting history through contemporary circumstances. According to Fu, the past provides the raw materials (cailiao) for national society, but not its substance (zhuyi), or more poetically, we must “use the ancient people, and ultimately not be used by those ancient people” (quoted in Jenco, 2017, p. 460).  

There is a certain symmetry in Fu himself being appropriated as a historical symbol.

The more immediate appeal in the SM’s images of Fu Sinian, however, is moral rather than intellectual. The quote in the banner comes from an incident in 1949 when Fu cautioned police

Figure 5.19: Fu Sinian banner outside the Legislative Yuan on March 30, 2014.  

103 For a more critical perspective on Fu Sinian’s views on the symbolic power of ‘history’ in producing a national subject, see Duara (1996, pp. 38–39).
who had come to arrest a group of students: “I have a request: When you disperse the students tonight, there can be no blood. If a student bleeds, I will resist you” (Wo you yige qingqiu ni jintian wanshang qu li xuesheng shi bugneng liuxue ruo wo gen ni pinming. 我有一個請求你今天晚上驅離學生時不能流血若有學生流血我要跟你拚命). The text itself is in two tones, the first a pale cream that reflects the colour of both Fu’s photograph and his printed name, while the second half of the quote is a dark umber that blends in with the black background. This emphasizes the association between Fu and the admonition of the police, while the threat of resistance is downplayed.

The use of Fu’s image along with the quotation adds both a historical and interpersonal dimension to the banner’s message than would be conveyed through words alone. The close-up of Fu in the banner is cropped from a larger portrait showing his full torso, often seen on his books and in museum displays. This moves Fu into an apparently close personal distance, as if he is in a private conversation with the viewer (see Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 124). This effect is accentuated by his gazing into the camera, engaging the viewer directly and demanding a reaction. The image is monochrome, but with a sepia tone and soft lighting that marks this as a historical photograph (see Painter et al., 2013, p. 39). This gives the image a much less dramatic tone than the pictures of the March 23 conflict with the police showing protestors with bloodied faces or scattered by water cannons (e.g., Figure 5.17). In addition to their violent content, these photographs use the high contrast, stark black and white style more associated with contemporary journalistic or documentary photography (see Kress & van Leeuwen, 2002). Certainly, some of these compositional elements are a consequence of the source material; Fu Sinian died in 1950 and the photographs of him that are available are

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104 Brian Hiroe, a participant in the SM who blogged extensively in both Chinese and English, translates the end of the quote as “I will personally hold you responsible,” suggesting moral condemnation more than bodily resistance (Hiroe, n.d.). The quote comes from the report of Peng Mengxi, the deputy commander of the local garrison who went to arrest the students in question. The accuracy and context of the quote are subject to debate (Zeng, 2019).


106 I consider the ethical demands of eye contact (or ‘focalization’) further in Chapter 6.
subject to the technological limitations of his time. Yet, it is significant that the anonymous designer of this banner chose to include a stylistically ‘old fashioned’ photograph rather than, for example, a more stylized version (such as in the images of Nylon Cheng discussed below), a drawing, or no image at all. The visual evocation of a historicized aesthetic contributes as much as the quoted words, framing the overall message in a longer historical context which adds an imagined moral authority. The visual composition of the banner works on multiple channels to evoke ‘history’ to criticize the police use of violence against protestors.

While the SM imagery adopted and resignified many figures more conventionally associated with Chinese history, it does not neglect figures from the Taiwan independence movement. The historical figure who appears most often in the SM imagery is Cheng Nan-jung 鄭南榕, typically referred to by his English nickname, Nylon Cheng (also transliterated as Nylon Deng). Cheng was a vocal advocate for Taiwanese independence and critic of martial law restrictions on freedom of speech. From 1984 to 1989 he published the *Freedom Era Weekly* (自由時代周

\[107\] In pinyin: Zheng Nanrong.
刊), an influential magazine for the dangwai movement. In 1989 police were sent to arrest Cheng for publishing a draft constitution for an independent Republic of Taiwan. He locked himself in the magazine’s offices and, after an extended standoff, burnt himself to death on April 7. Cheng subsequently became a powerful symbol of the struggle for democracy in Taiwan: the burnt office has been preserved as a museum and the street outside was officially renamed ‘Freedom Lane’ in 2012. He has subsequently become a powerful symbol for free speech, particularly in pan-green (independence-leaning) political camps.108

The Nylon Cheng Liberty Foundation, which operates the museum, also produces many of the books, shirts, and stickers of Cheng used by the SM, such as those seen in Figures 5.20 and 5.21.109 The iconic image portrayed on these items consists of an orange, pale yellow, and black graphic of Nylon Cheng with an upraised fist. The words wo zhuzhang110 我主張, roughly translate as “I stand for” or “I declare”, referring to Cheng’s iconic declaration “I am Cheng Nan-jung. I stand for Taiwan’s independence.”111 The orange background consists of a stylized pattern evocative both of birds, alluding to his ideals of freedom (of speech and for Taiwan), and of flames, a reference to his self-immolation. The design is a modern style, consisting of geometric shapes and clean sans-serif text integrated with visually bold, flat yellow and orange colour spaces. The overall effect is of a logo that feels ‘retro’ or dated, but not in the critical or mocking way of the anachronistic renderings of Ma Ying-jeou. In part this is because Cheng’s face is not distorted in the alienating way of the typical caricatures of Ma. Cheng’s image is abstract, rather than a highly naturalistic composition, using detailed shading and tone around facial contours and musculature. This is especially evident in Figure 5.22, which is directly

108 As an indication of significance as an icon anti-authoritarianism, in 2017 the DPP government designated April 7th as ‘Freedom of Speech Day’ to commemorate Cheng’s death (W. Lee, 2017).

109 Four months before the SM, the National Cheng Kung University administration overruled a student vote to name a new campus plaza after Cheng (“Students see Deng Nan-jung as the hero he was,” 2014).

110 This is often transliterated with the Hoklo pronunciation guá tsú-tiunn, reflecting the strong association of Taiwanese nationalism and Hoklo identity in the 1980s.

111 A video of this speech is available at https://youtu.be/Eg0qpsKsIuk
modelled on a famous photograph, but using a highly stylized, posterized three-tone design. Another adaptation of the same photograph of Nylon Cheng, this one in black marker on cardboard, can be seen in many pictures of the LY podium, centred directly underneath the portrait of Sun Yat-sen (see Figure 5.23). These images position the viewer quite differently.

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112 The drawing itself is not in the public.318.io archive, suggesting the original was removed or destroyed before the artifacts were collected.
compared with naturalistic paintings or photographs, such as those of Fu Sunian or Jiang Yushi discussed above. The latter steer the viewer toward engaging the depicted figure as a distinct, separate individual. Whether that relation is one of ethical obligation or antagonistic competition depends on the overall context of the image. In contrast, these more stylized portraits of Nylon Cheng subtly situate the viewer in “an empathetic stance, where common humanity is recognized and the reader stands in the character’s shoes” (see Painter et al., 2013, p. 33; see also McCloud, 1994, p. 36).

Perhaps the most literal example of the symbolic identification with Cheng’s ideals is in the use by SM protesters of masks of his face, which circulated widely in the LY as well as at nearby rallies in support of the occupation (Figure 5.24 and 5.25). Masks and masking are almost universal ways of signaling identity and changes in identity (Pollock, 1995). Cheng’s image not only decorate the occupied space, but were physically put on by the protesters in a metaphorical ‘re-placing’ of Cheng in the contemporary context and a framing of themselves as an iteration of a longer history of fighting for democracy. The implication of an intergenerational duty is echoed in the headband slogan ziji de guojia, ziji jiu 自己的國家自己救, loosely translated as “Save your country yourself.” The phrase is another example of the adaptation of KMT references by the SM, albeit an unintentional one. It entered the SM discourse printed on a T-shirt worn by some of the movement leaders. However, it has no connection to Cheng at all. Ironically, the phrase has its origins in a 1977 KMT propaganda song, Mo weiting 莫等待, encouraging youth to fight to reclaim the mainland. The designer of the t-shirt, Chen Weizhong, said that he was unaware of the origin of the phrase (Xie, 2015). In a move not unlike attempts to claim the ROC flag or Sun Yat-sen, the reiteration of this phrase in a novel context (including the visual association with Nylon Cheng) not only obscures its KMT connotations, but presents an alternative signification which is diametrically opposed to the KMT. This resignification has proven particularly enduring (most likely due to the relative obscurity of its origins), and the slogan has since taken on a new life as part of the broader anti-establishment rhetoric in Taiwan.
A final point to note about the SM images is that iconic historical figures are virtually all simple portraits. Unlike pictures that juxtapose Ma with dissonant symbols and actors to create a visual narrative, these images contain little else besides the face and perhaps a name or quote. I suggest that this directs the viewer outside of the image for cues to how to read the image. As I have argued, pictures are always informed by their context to varying degrees. In these examples, however, by including only a single participant, the political significance of these images is even more reliant on their physical surroundings (in this case, the occupied LY) than many of the images discussed previously which can rely on their more complex composition and contents to shape preferred readings of the image.

**Making Ma Chinese**

The SM imagery also makes extensive reference to ‘Chinese histories,’ but to the exact opposite effect of how ‘Chinese history’ is evoked in the MAC imagery. That is, ideas of a specifically ‘Chinese’ past are used as a marker of difference rather than commonality, framing KMT leaders in a national history separate from that of Taiwan. In contrast to the MAC imagery discussed above, the SM images use symbolic or stylistic connotations of Chinese history to delegitimize the KMT and Ma Ying-jeou by embedding them in ‘foreign’ national history. Such images are typically satirical. But ‘getting the joke’, implicitly requires conceptualizing Taiwanese and Chinese histories as mutually exclusive. In effect, this takes Ma’s sinicizing policy and discourse and turns it against him as a point of critique. As I argue in Chapter 2, a weakness of top-down theories of nationalism is that they fail to take into consideration precisely this kind of appropriation of official narratives and symbols (Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008; Goode & Stroup, 2015; E. J. Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 11). Underscoring the political dimension of this critique, such images rely almost exclusively on references to political leaders from China’s past, rather than cultural markers. In contrast to the MAC images, which frame cross-strait rapprochement as natural and normal consequence of cultural history shared by Taiwan and the mainland, SM images frame both Ma and the idea of a single, common Chinese nation as
anachronistic. And also unlike the MAC imagery, these images use signifiers which connote political authority, reinforcing the SM’s message that in their perspective the fundamental difference between ‘Taiwan’ and ‘China’ is political rather than cultural.

Among the SM images, an especially striking visual reference to Chinese history is a large (4.6 x 3.6 m) banner showing Ma holding a black box representing the closed-door CSSTA negotiations; he is portrayed standing in front of a cheering crowd waving red banners (Figure 5.26). The image is closely modeled on a 1971 poster of Mao Zedong (Figure 5.27), but layered with multiple KMT symbols. Ma is flanked by smiling members of the KMT, including legislator Chiu Yi 邱毅 on the left holding a bunch of bananas, a reference to his mistaking the bundles of sunflowers at the LY for piles of bananas, and Premier Jiang Yi-huah 江宜樺 on the right. All of the figures are wearing typical olive green or navy ‘Mao suits’, many adorned with a small KMT logo in place of the small red Mao badges in the original. The Presidential Office Building rises in the background. The slogan at the bottom of the parody poster in Figure 5.26 is a play on another Maoist poster from 1967, down to the slanted, tapering simplified Chinese characters that contrast with the use in the 1971 poster of the blocky slab font more typical of Cultural Revolution posters. The SM poster’s slogan reads “Cheering the great victory of [district chief] Ma’s economic and political line” (歡呼馬區長政經路線的偉大勝利), referring to policies furthering economic integration between Taiwan and the PRC. The socialist realism style and composition (a central figure with a raised arm, surrounded by smiling supporters with rosy cheeks) are all clearly evocative of Cultural Revolution propaganda posters.

113 The suits were initially popularized by and named after Sun Yat-sen (zhongshan suits), but became more strongly associated with Mao and the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution (Garrett, 2007, pp. 218–220).

114 Note that the red banner on the right is not marked with a KMT logo and turned into a ROC flag, suggesting a similar distinction between the KMT and the ROC discussed in Chapter 4.

Figure 5.26: Parody banner of Ma leading the KMT leadership as a Maoist icon.
Source: http://public.318.io/19941

Figure 5.27: “Unite to win still greater victories” Cultural Revolution poster of Mao Zedong waving, followed by crowd of workers, soldiers and peasants wearing badges, carrying little red books. (March 1971)
On the surface, the message of the banner at Figure 5.26 is clear: the insertion of these contemporary Taiwan elements into an iconic CCP composition implies an association between the Ma administration and the PRC. In turn, the composition questions Ma’s loyalties to Taiwan. This image’s composition strategy is intriguing for a number of reasons specific to the issue of national identity. First, by referencing Mao Zedong, the banner reproduces a narrative of Chinese political history focused on authoritarian rulers, a pattern repeated in many other images (e.g., Figures 5.28, 5.29, and 5.30). Second, by representing Ma and his compatriots in PRC history, even facetiously, the image also locates them outside of Taiwanese history. Put another way, the satirical bite of Figure 5.26 relies on a conception of Taiwan as irreconcilably distinct from the PRC, but it also reproduces that distinction. Conversely, there are no images linking Ma to contentious figures or events specific to Taiwan such as Chiang Kai-shek or the White Terror. As leader of the same political party that governed Taiwan under Chiang and was responsible for the White Terror, it would have been a small leap to connect the two figures. Instead, the SM images refused to connect Ma to Taiwanese history, even in order to criticize him.

A much more common way that SM images associate Ma with Chinese history is by representing him in imperial clothing. One especially elaborate example of the ‘Emperor Ma’ motif is Figure 5.28. It shows a caricature of Ma Ying-jeou wearing the mianguan冕冠 (beaded headdress) and yellow robes of a Chinese emperor emblazoned with the KMT logo, while the caption under the seated figure identifies him as “Tyrant emperor Ma” (mahuang baojun馬皇暴君). Other images only use the mianguan to make the imperial connection or combine drawings of Ma’s face with the characters 馬皇 (mahuang, or Emperor Ma). The surrounding

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116 The historical accuracy of the cartoon is less significant than the general use of imperial symbols. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that strictly speaking the mianguan in this image is that of a lower noble, while that of an emperor would have 12 strings of jade beads rather than five pictured. It is an open question whether this is an intentional attempt to mark Ma as a ‘lesser noble’ or simply an aesthetic simplification or an oversight.
text, “I will see you as a person. Will you see me as an emperor?” (Wo you ba nimen dang ren kan. Nimen you ba wo dang huangdi kan ma? 我有把你們當人看，你們有把我當皇帝看嗎？) is a play on a contentious statement Ma made during his 2007 presidential campaign, where he promised aboriginal people moving to Taipei to escape flooding in their communities that, “I will see you as people, I will see you as citizens” (Wo ba ni dang ren kan, wo ba ni dang shimin kan 我把你當人看，我把你當市民看). Critics argued that the comment was condescending and implicitly racist (‘‘Ba yuan min dang ren kan,” 2007). Many of the images of Ma as emperor use cartoonish caricatures with distorted features, rather than more naturalistic images, with which viewers might more easily empathize. Political cartoons typically use exaggerated features, such as Ma’s over-sized lips and elongated head in Figure 5.28, as this
makes the targets of critique easily identifiable while also alienating them from the audience (see Painter et al., 2013, p. 35). Satirical imagery also undermines Ma’s authority at the same time as acknowledging it.\endnote{117}{Brian Hiroe, a SM participant and blogger, notes that SM participants were cautious about using the ‘tyrant’ language too much in order to avoid overstating the president’s power and making resistance seem unachievable (Hiroe, n.d.).}

![Figure 5.29: Map of China filled by an ROC flag and Ma wearing an imperial headdress. Source: http://public.318.io/17598](image-url)

Figure 5.29 combines historical and territorial symbols to present the underlying ‘One China’ logic of the Ma administration as archaic and detached from current political realities (territorial imagery is discussed extensively in Chapter 6). The black and white map titled “Map of the Republic of China” (zhunghua minguo quantu 中華民國全圖) includes both the mainland, Taiwan and other areas claimed by the KMT, such as Outer Mongolia. The map

\addnote{117} Brian Hiroe, a SM participant and blogger, notes that SM participants were cautious about using the ‘tyrant’ language too much in order to avoid overstating the president’s power and making resistance seem unachievable (Hiroe, n.d.).
closely resembles those published in ROC yearbooks from 1951 and 2000 (B. Chang, 2015, pp. 48–56; see also Chapter 6).¹¹⁸ This expansive vision of the Chinese nation is filled in with the ROC flag balanced with an inset photograph of Ma Ying-jeou. The use of the ROC flag here differs from those discussed in Chapter 4, referencing rather than challenging associations with ‘China’. On one hand this reflects the polysemy of such symbols as well as the polyphony of voices in the SM: although there are clear trends, there is no singular interpretation of the flag within the SM images. On the other hand, the composition of Figure 5.29 is so saturated with visual allusions to ‘the past’ that this instance of the ROC flag can be read satirically. That is, the idea that the ROC includes Chinese history or territory is represented as so archaic that it is laughable. The rounded clerical script printed on the map is typical of early Republican propaganda, giving it the appearance of the Civil War or Chiang-Kai-shek eras (see C. Zhao & Baldauf, 2008). The portrait of Ma shows him in imperial Chinese robes and mianguan headdress, creating a collage of early Republican and imperial symbolism. Ma’s anachronistic outfit reinforces the visual framing of his policies as based on a concept of national territory that is outdated, but also one that is rooted in Chinese identity. This mocking critique is underscored by the text, which has Ma stating in local dialect (Hoklo) slang that “One country, two areas is no dream!! The mainlanders will be fooled, just like you!” (Yiguo liangqu bushi meng! Ala zi zaowan hui xian nimen yiyang bei wo pianle! 一國兩區不是夢！！阿拉仔早晚會像你們一樣被我騙了！). The “one country, two areas” is a reference to a framework proposed by KMT Chairman Wu Poh-Hsiung in 2012 as a working model for cross-strait

¹¹⁸ The base image (not including the text or picture of Ma) is a map with the ROC flag overlay which began circulating online around 2010, mainly in history discussions and, oddly, on video game forums asking users to post “funny pictures”. The discussion thread includes other apparently absurdly exaggerated KMT claims, such as the ROC flag over top of the entire solar system (see e.g., https://forum.gamer.com.tw/Co.php?bsn=60076&sn=12898193, accessed September 13, 2019).

The original map appears to have been online since at least 2004: the first instances of this map I could identify are from a website commemorating Chiang Kai-shek: http://freeman2.com/9008si20.htm (accessed September 13, 2019), although the exact source is difficult to pin down.
relations.\textsuperscript{119} It is generally considered to be largely a reiteration of the One China policy, which is essentially an agreement that there is only one political entity known as China (including Taiwan), despite differing opinions on the legitimate government. ‘History,’ or, more specifically, various histories that envision Taiwan as a part of China, are interwoven in this one image to frame the CSSTA as part of an archaic and even absurd national imaginary.

A similar use of imperial history to parody Ma is Figure 5.30, which shows the front page of a fake newspaper with Ma’s face pasted onto an image of the Empress Dowager. As in Figure 5.26, Ma is flanked by other prominent KMT figures, this time on the bodies of ladies of the court. The historicizing is combined with a derogatory feminization, a use of drag as parody that is widespread in political satire.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure530.png}
\caption{Fake newspaper showing Ma as the Empress Dowager and KMT officials as ladies of the court. Source: http://public.318.io/13394}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{119} This should not be confused with the One China, Two systems policy which guides PRC administration of Hong Kong and has been proposed by the CCP as a potential framework for reunification with Taiwan (Mo, 2012). See also the discussion of the 1992 Consensus in Chapter 3.
All of these images use visual techniques to critique Ma Ying-jeou and his cross-strait policy in three mutually reinforcing ways. Representing Ma in anachronistic outfits and styles does more than simply poke fun at the president: it also frames his political vision (or the SM’s interpretation of Ma’s vision) as archaic. The SM represents the idea of ‘One China’, which is the cornerstone of Ma’s cross-strait policy, as an articulation of a national imaginary that is hopelessly stuck in the past. This is especially evident when combined with the territorial imaginary seen in Figure 5.29, which uses stylistic elements to reinforce the message that this is an antiquated vision of the (Chinese) nation. Unlike the MAC images which evoke abstract notions of a shared Chinese past to imply continuity, by emphasizing political figures the SM images use history as a marker of difference between Taiwan and China. Moreover, they locate Ma in a specifically Chinese history. This is significant because this frames Ma as more than simply a poor or foolish leader, but also as an outsider. These images also reinforce an understanding of Chinese history as fundamentally distinct from Taiwan’s. Finally, associating Ma with authoritarian leaders of the past locates him in an explicitly anti-democratic history. Representing Ma as a latter-day emperor frames the CSSTA as an existential threat to core political values, rather than simply a controversial economic policy. This both relies on and reproduces a conceptual elision between Chinese identity and authoritarianism on one hand, and Taiwanese identity and democracy on the other.

By evoking Qing emperors or Mao Zedong, the SM imagery frames the president in two complementary (but uncomplimentary) ways. On one hand, representing Ma as an authoritarian ruler reinforces the broader framing of the CSSTA as the result of undemocratic ‘black box’ policy making. On the other hand, the predominance of specifically Chinese historical references adds a nationalistic layer beyond a simple visual reductio ad hitlerum; 120

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120 The phrase, coined by Leo Strauss as early as 1950, refers to the unfortunate argumentative tactic of equating anything disagreeable with Adolf Hitler. Some SM images do represent Ma as Hitler, but these are far less common than representations of him as Mao or a Chinese emperor. For a brief overview of the evolution of the reductio ad Hitlerum fallacy, see Teninbaum (2009).
these images reinforce the conceptual opposition between ‘China’ and ‘Taiwan’ and at the same time pointedly frame Ma as part of the other (Chinese) nation.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined how both the MAC and SM imagery use visual allusions to the past to frame their respective positions in different historical narratives. When MAC images evoke ‘the past’ it is typically in one of two ways: either through the banal inclusion of Sun Yat-sen as the founder of the nation, or through allusions to broad cultural traditions and aesthetics which are common on both sides of the Taiwan strait. These images justify cross-strait negotiations and closer ties with the PRC by evoking Chinese culture and traditions as a shared history. In contrast, the SM imagery situates the movement as the successor of a century-long history of political struggle, not for the Chinese nation, but for minzhu, or democracy, and civil rights.

The appeal to heroic figures from the past is central to the reproduction of national identities. By representing the national ideal as people from the past “not only do we establish the historical continuity of the national community through time, we also identify with these heroes. Heroes thus fulfil a psychological need that other national myths cannot: they provide the nation with concrete, human form” (Hutchins, 2011, p. 650). By placing iconic figures from the past in their imagery, the MAC and SM imageries frame the CSSTA as the consequence of contradictory historical trajectories, one positing cross-strait integration as a ‘natural’ result of cultural affinity and shared history (in the case of the MAC) and one positing Taiwan as distinct from ‘China’ because of its generations-long struggle for democracy (in the SM’s case). Given this, what is surprising in the SM images is the degree to which they draw their heroes from the same historical pool as the KMT, particularly figures involved with Chinese nationalist struggles. Of the historical figures that regularly appear in the SM imagery, only Nylon Cheng could be called a Taiwanese nationalist unquestionably. As I showed with the ROC flag in Chapter 4, national symbols are not fixed signifiers, but open to contestation and appropriation, albeit
within the constraints of broader ideology of nationalism. The polysemous and contested nature of national symbols is also evident through the way SM artists use composition and context to resignify heroic or political figures, especially in the case of a venerated founding figure of Chinese nationalism, Sun Yat-sen. By emphasizing minzhu or ‘democracy’ and incorporating portraits of these figures extensively into their imagery, the SM images attempt to localize them in a national history built on democratization rather than Chinese culture. In this way, they subtly but fundamentally constitute a historical narrative markedly different from that offered by the MAC images, one that sharply distinguishes the PRC from Taiwan.
In 1930, Huang Shih-hui 黃石輝 wrote “You are Taiwanese. Over your head is the Taiwanese sky. Your feet walk on Taiwanese soil. All you see are the conditions of Taiwan. Everything your ears hear is Taiwanese news. What you undergo is Taiwanese experience” (quoted in Hsiau, 2000, p. 39). In a campaign speech 53 years later, a vocal opponent of KMT Martial Law, Xu Rongshu 許榮淑, stated: “Our feet tread Taiwan’s earth, our mouths drink Taiwan’s water, and sitting down we eat Taiwan’s rice” asking her audience, “do you drink Yangzi River water? Do you eat rice from the Yellow River?” (quoted in Jacobs, 2005, p. 31). Although separated by

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121 Huang was a prominent radical leader in the Taiwan Cultural Association (see Chapter 3, and the discussion of Jian Yushi in Figure 5.14). He wanted to foster a proletarian Taiwanese identity to resist Japanese rule. Xu, already an
half a century and under different regimes, both Huang and Xu grounded their vision of Taiwanese national identity in the island’s physical geography – its sky, soil, water. National space is much more than a collection of material features, as these quotations make clear. It also entails mental and social relationships between the physical space and the people who live there and give it meaning (Escobar, 2001, pp. 143–145; Lefebvre, 1991, pp. 11–12). For Huang and Xu the island called ‘Taiwan’ is more than a piece of land which happens to be occupied by a distinct group of people: it is a fundamental element of a distinctly Taiwanese experience. Moreover, these relationships are not one-directional or deterministic, with physical space producing local identity (including national identity). There is nothing in the water that makes imbibers Taiwanese. Rather, the social process of attributing significance to this water, this soil, this sky, is what makes that space Taiwan (or China). Imagining features of the physical environment as quintessential aspects of a distinctive national experience is part of the symbolic process of constructing and reproducing national identity: “geography is not mere geography, or physical setting: the national place has to be imagined, just as much as the national community does” (Billig, 1995, p. 74).

The question that arises is: how do representations of space in the MAC and SM imagery frame Taiwan? How do context and composition reinforce or obscure particular conceptions of Taiwanese national identity? This chapter considers how MAC and SM imagery contribute to the imagining of Taiwan as a ‘national place’ by looking at maps and map-like representations of geographic space. As in previous chapters, I begin by tracing common patterns in MAC publications related to cross-strait negotiations. MAC publications show Taiwan in a highly de-territorialized way, avoiding visual associations between the space of Taiwan and political boundaries or claims of any kind. The MAC images invariably show Taiwan as part of a world which appears to be devoid of political context or concerns, including territorial borders. The world pictured in MAC publications is borderless, a post-national utopia. I suggest that this influential dangwai politician, became immensely popular for vigorously condemning the KMT’s crackdown on the pro-democracy magazine Meilidao during the 1979 Gaoxiong Incident (see Chapter 3).
draws on a neoliberal conception of Taiwan as part of a global marketplace rather than part of a distinct political territory. A vision of a borderless world may be admirable as a political ideal, but as an interpretive framing of a specific policy like the CSSTA it pointedly ignores Taiwan's position at the centre of an intractable territorial dispute with one of the most powerful states and economies in the contemporary world. The PRC vigorously rejects any notion of Taiwanese sovereignty, periodically asserting the right to (re)claim the island, by military force if necessary. Because of this persistent threat, claims of statehood and the maintenance of territorial integrity are existential questions in Taiwan. However, by instead using logo-maps to frame Taiwan in an apparently stateless world, the MAC imagery evades the thorny question of Taiwanese statehood, thereby sidestepping debates surrounding Taiwan's international status and its relationship to the PRC. In particular, despite the MAC being the government department explicitly tasked with managing relations with mainland China, the mainland is noticeably absent from MAC imagery. Basic visual elements such as colour, line, and spatial arrangement all situate Taiwan at the centre of global connections and flows. This effaces potentially contentious representations of Taiwan as contested territory or even the idea of sovereign territory.

The MAC’s borderless world stands in sharp contrast to the one produced by SM images, which instead use compositions which are saturated with geopolitical connotations and which differentiate it from the PRC. SM imagery stresses the vulnerability of the nation in three overlapping ways. Some use personified figures to attribute agency to outside forces while representing Taiwan as both vulnerable and powerless. These images mobilize support by implicitly demanding that the viewer act. A second, related approach in the images involves the use of formal composition to produce affect or ‘ambience’ (Painter et al., 2012, pp. 35–39).

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122 Throughout this chapter I use the term ‘mainland’ to emphasize the physical space of the continent, in contrast to the island of Taiwan. ‘Mainland’ sometimes carries associations with Chinese identity in Taiwan, especially as the term ‘waishengren’ is commonly translated as ‘Mainlander’ (see Corcuff, 2000). However, this is not how I use the term here. Whether or not different actors represent ‘China’ or ‘PRC territory’ as synonymous with the mainland (and only with the mainland) is often implied by how the island of Taiwan is represented, as the analysis which follows will show.
These images use line, space, and colour to frame the nation as spatially and emotionally isolated from the international community. The images are typically paired with English text which appeals to democratic values, implying a solution to this isolation. Juxtaposing these discursive appeals to an international democratic community with the visual evocation of isolation works to align Taiwan with the ‘Western’ world (rather than the sinosphere). Finally, the PRC is invoked in SM images in ways which highlight Taiwan as a distinct political territory. Unlike in MAC images, not only is PRC territory often visible as a point of contrast in the SM imagery, but other PRC symbols mark aggressive or violent actors. This politicizes the space of the island through the act of opposing logo-maps of Taiwan with (purportedly foreign) political forces (see Campbell, 1992). So, where the MAC imagery constructs a borderless world, the SM imagery (re)inscribes national borders as both a physical and conceptual line of difference between Taiwan and the PRC.

Put more simply, the primary difference between the symbolic use of the island of Taiwan in SM and MAC imagery is that the former represents that space as national territory and the latter does not. ‘Territoriality’ here refers specifically to the spatial demarcation of political authority, especially state sovereignty (Agnew, 1994, 2005; Sassen, 2006, p. 33 ff). This is most evident in maps and map-like representations of space. Representations of the space occupied or claimed as a nation’s sovereign domain speak volumes not just about where it is in the world, but how it is in the world. An image of territorial borders tells us a great deal about the values being ascribed to the people who live within those boundaries and their relationships with people living outside of them, often much more than the image communicates about their physical location. The regularity and ubiquity of modern maps render territory visually recognizable independent of geographic context. Benedict Anderson refers to this as a “logo-map” (2016, p. 175), where the shape of the nation-state gradually becomes recognizable by itself, without reference to labels, topographic features, latitude and longitude, or neighbours. The mere silhouette of national borders can function as a symbol of national identity, quite detached from its physical location. Even though these deceptively simple maps are typically
devoid of any internal detail, they are often loaded with deeply emotional connotations. In fact “the simplest of maps may serve most effectively in helping us recognize places that have unique positions in our minds or what some might call our national psyche” (Francaviglia, 1995, p. 12). That is, the minimal detail of logo-maps makes them particularly amenable canvases upon which to layer other symbolic associations. Logo-maps thus function similar to flags in the sense that their visual simplicity makes them both readily identifiable as conventional symbols of the nation and open to a wide range of potential signification. Such logo-maps have become “pure sign, no longer compass to the world... available for transfer to posters, official seals, letterheads, magazine and textbook covers, tablecloths, and hotel walls. Instantly recognizable, everywhere visible, the logo-map [has] penetrated deep into the popular imagination” (Anderson, 2016, p. 175). In this sense logo-maps should be approached not so much as representations of space (which entails a claim to topographic or mimetic accuracy) but as representational spaces which operate primarily on a symbolic level (Lefebvre, 1991, pp. 38–39). The question of what is being symbolized, or how the nation is being represented, is once again dependent on the context and composition in which particular instances of logo-maps appear.

By no means are maps and logo-maps the only representation of physical space which can represent national identity. Landscape photography, for example, is closely linked to assertions of territorial boundaries (Sörlin, 1999) and articulations of national identity and values (Daniels & Cosgrove, 1993; Jaworski & Thurlow, 2010). However, I focus on maps and logo-maps for two reasons. The first is their sheer frequency in the images studied. Visual representations of the island of Taiwan are the second most common symbol to appear in both the SM (15%) and

123 Landscape photographs in MAC publications during the Ma Ying-jeou administration often show agricultural scenes, while under the subsequent Tsai Ying-wen administration there is a greater emphasis on scenes of rugged, uncultivated nature. A comparison between DPP and KMT representations of national space is beyond the scope of this project, but is a promising avenue for future research.

For an extensive discussion of the role of geographic imagination in Taiwanese national identity, see Chang Bi-yu (2015).
MAC (6%) images I examined.\(^{124}\) Virtually all of these qualify as logo-maps, given their visual simplicity and lack of geographic or spatial context: considered \textit{in situ} they connote abstract ideas about Taiwan rather than its geopolitical location or features. The handful of MAC images which do include more of the conventional features of topographic maps are significant in how they avoid representing Taiwan as political territory (see Figures 6.3, 6.7, and 5.3). Not only does this make the island of Taiwan a significant motif to consider, but the frequency of logo-maps in both sets of imagery allows sustained comparisons between MAC and SM imagery.

Taiwan – the physical space of the island itself – is mostly coterminous with the effective territorial jurisdiction of the ROC state.\(^{125}\) This leaves it ambiguous whether a given logo-map of the island represents political or physical boundaries; the limits of sovereign jurisdiction or, simply, the end of dry land. The MAC imagery discussed below embraces and reinforces this ambiguity. Recalling Gellner’s point that nationalism is a claim that the national and political unit should be the same, the MAC imagery takes an unusual tack. Instead of asserting a Chinese national unit (as MAC images do through historical references, as discussed in Chapter 5), these images avoid or obscure symbols associated with ‘China’ or Chinese identity. The end result is that MAC imagery de-territorializes Taiwan by dis-placing it from the geopolitical context of the PRC and ROC’s competing territorial claims. The SM, in contrast, emphasizes the island as national territory, its edges framed as coterminous with the political unit.

The second reason I focus on maps and logo-maps is because they are instrumental in constructing the nation. Maps are not neutral, objective representations of the physical world, but visually inscribe discretely bounded space. Rather than simply reflecting an objective ‘truth’

\(^{124}\) Neither percentage fully reflects the repetition of the same image repeatedly. During the SM a simple blank island silhouette was used as a template for messages of support, resulting in dozens of photocopies being posted around the LY chamber. MAC documents often include a logo-map as a header image on every page of a booklet. As my aim has been to examine the range of representations, in each of these cases it has only been counted as a single image. The number of times someone attending the occupation site or reading the MAC Report would encounter a visual representation of the island would be far higher.

\(^{125}\) The ROC also controls the smaller Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu islands, as well as claiming a number of other islands in the South China Sea. These outlying islands do appear in some images.
about the world, maps shape our understanding of the world. The representation of discrete national space contributes to the construction of a common identity for the people who inhabit that space (Anderson, 2016, pp. 174–175). Territory is a pervasive idiom for imagining and (re)producing even the most abstract or intangible aspects of national identity (Agnew, 1994). Visual inscriptions of borders on paper or screen not only mark the location or result of claimed territorial sovereignty and national identity, but participate in their production and reproduction (Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p. 4). Maps play a pivotal role in the production of national identity both by marking the spatial limits of who is considered part of the nation and by articulating the relationship between a nation and the rest of the ‘outside’ world (Callahan, 2010, p. 93; Winichakul, 1994). Images of territory are important sites where national identities are constructed and reproduced, both in terms of how the space of the nation is represented, and as a representational space within which more abstract ideas of nationhood are articulated (Lefebvre, 1991). Modern cartography served as a quasi-legal method of legitimizing the spread of European imperial power by representing the world as “specific, tightly bounded territorial units” (Anderson, 2016, p. 175). Foucauldian scholars argue that maps function as a site of knowledge-power which privileges as valid some ways of viewing and conceptualizing the world while marginalizing others (Crampton, 2001; Harley, 1988, 1989). Maps not only mark political claims over territory; they also indicate a way of thinking about the social world and the relationships between the people that inhabit it (Mignolo, 2000; Shapiro, 1997). The usefulness of maps in constructing and challenging national identity has not been lost on ROC governments in the past. For example, in 2003, the DPP government issued a series of “Maps from Taiwan’s Perspective” featuring unconventional orientations (e.g., with west at the top, placing mainland China below Taiwan), with the explicit aim of fostering a Taiwanese subjectivity (B. Chang, 2004, par. 51, see also Callahan, 2010, pp. 118–121; B. Chang, 2017).126 Logo-maps do not always entail the same implicit claims of supposed objectivity as these more

technical maps purport to. However, the recognizability of such shapes depends on and reproduces cartographic conventions.

The title image for this chapter (Figure 6.1) offers one example of how easily visual composition can fill simple territorial outlines with emotional associations. Two of the characters in this political cartoon have logo-maps for heads, making it immediately clear that they are metaphorical representations for the PRC and Taiwan.\textsuperscript{127} The white gown and feminine body attached to Taiwan introduce gendered connotations of naivete and vulnerability (see e.g., Mostov, 1995), while the PRC’s suit and splayed legs suggest a casual and perhaps boorish masculinity.\textsuperscript{128} These characteristics are easily transferred to the represented nations, readily communicating both an unequal power dynamic and a moral evaluation of the parties and motivations involved in the CSSTA. This is elaborated in the text, in which Taiwan expresses concerns over marrying the PRC due to ‘his’ past aggressive behaviour, while the deer-headed figure standing in for Ma Ying-jeou assures ‘her’ that they could get a divorce after three years – echoing the terms of the CSSTA. The logo-maps in this image convey no information about the spatial relationship between Taiwan and mainland China. The significance of the image stems entirely from metaphorically ascribing collective values, emotions, and dispositions to territorially defined political entities. This chapter examines the range of ways in which such images use composition and context to evoke dramatically different conceptions of national identity, even while representing the same physical space – the island of Taiwan.

\textsuperscript{127} It is not immediately apparent if Taiwan is equivalent to the ROC in this image. This ambiguity between island and state is discussed below.

\textsuperscript{128} Figure 6.1 is unusual in its overtly gendered representations of the nation in the SM imagery. Images which include symbols of the nation in stereotypically gendered roles (e.g., nurturing or in need of protection on one hand, or active and heroic on the other hand) associated these symbols equally with masculine or feminine (or androgynous) characters. Two notable exceptions to this are the exclusively male faces of ‘history’ discussed in Chapter 5, and a number of images which use highly sexualized metaphors of Ma Ying-jeou’s relationship with the PRC.
MAC Imagery: Taiwan in a Borderless World

Logo-maps of Taiwan are the third most common motif in MAC imagery. Not only are these frequent, but they often feature prominently on the front covers of pamphlets and annual reports. Considering the preceding discussion of the usefulness of logo-maps for representing national identity, it is not surprising to find depictions of national territory throughout government publications. A closer examination of the MAC imagery reveals something quite unexpected, however: these logo-maps appear to de-territorialize Taiwan. The compositions of these images consistently frame Taiwan as part of a borderless world. The geographic context in these images almost always lacks any indication of political distinctions at the state level, such as political borders or national flags. Visually, this locates Taiwan in a narrative of global economic integration, rather than one focused on political division. In contrast to the arguments in previous chapters, I suggest that in this case it is the MAC imagery which engages in resignification, using composition and context to shift the preferred reading of logo-maps of Taiwan from a distinct political territory to a seemingly apolitical space detached from competing territorial claims. It is the SM images which rely far more on the conventional associations of logo-maps with political territory, a point which I explore further below.

In emphasizing global connectivity, the MAC imagery frames cross-strait rapprochement – including the CSSTA – in terms of neoliberal economic globalization, made up of unbounded global flows and exchanges, rather than states with borders and competing territorial claims. Neoliberalism refers to an ideological claim that trade liberalization, deregulation, and competitive advantage are inherently beneficial to society (Harvey, 2007, p. 5), or a political rationality which evaluates all aspects of social and political life through the economic lens of cost-benefit analysis and return on investment (W. Brown, 2015, pp. 38–39). As a number of

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129 The economic focus of the MAC’s global imaginary is underscored by the prevalence of photographs of shipping containers, cargo ships, and suited businessmen shaking hands. At the extreme, the cover of the 2011 report abandons any references to territory, showing only a blank white space, the title, and a large cash register receipt. In contrast, the 2007 MAC report published by the previous DPP administration prominently features a surface to air missile on the first page.
scholars have noted, neoliberal ideology does not so much replace national identities with
globalized ones as reformulate national identity giving ever greater emphasis to economic
advantage (Harmes, 2012; Jansen, 2008). In the Taiwanese context, a neoliberal imaginary
directs attention away from the PRC and its persistent territorial claims to Taiwan. In the
neoliberal global marketplace, states have increasingly shifted from geopolitical frames of
reference concerned with territorial security to “the search for recognition though the market-
driven mechanism of branding” (Browning, 2015, p. 196). Rather than withering away into a
homogenized global culture, under neoliberal logic national identity is re-imagined as a
‘national brand’ which seeks to bolster the country’s competitive advantage in attracting
investment, trade, tourism, and skilled labour (Aronczyk, 2013; Jansen, 2008). In other words,
national identity is increasingly re-imagined as an instrument for economic gain in a world
conceived of first and foremost as a global marketplace.

By emphasizing connectivity to the rest of the world, the MAC images downplay the
geopolitical tensions between the ROC and PRC. In fact, the Ma Ying-jeou administration
continued to fixate almost entirely on the potential economic benefits of the CSSTA even in the
face of mounting public concern over the potential of increased PRC political leverage over
Taiwan (M. Ho, 2015, p. 80). Below, I examine in detail how the MAC imagery visually
emphasizes connectivity in a borderless world while effacing geopolitical concerns. This imagery
resignifies maps and logo-maps, shifting away from a politically charged symbol of Taiwanese
identity to a national brand seemingly detached from territorial claims over the island.
Some of the most overt examples of the deterritorialization of Taiwan in MAC images appear in publications promoting the benefits of the high-level summits between Jiang Pin-kung and Chen Yunlin (see Chapter 2). The covers of pamphlets for the second (November 2008) and third (April 2009) rounds of the Jiang-Chen talks prominently feature the island in a golden yellow, floating in front of a world map (Figure 6.2; compare these to the pamphlets for later summits in Figures 5.4 and 5.5, which replace geographic symbols with cultural ones). The maps situate Taiwan in a regional frame, covering much of South East Asia and the Indian Ocean. The world map on the front cover continues across the back cover, extending the frame to a global scale; it is also repeated in the headers throughout the interior of the pamphlet (see
Figure 6.3: ECFA pamphlet showing a blue map of Taiwan with domestic jurisdictions.

Figure 6.2). This image quite literally frames Taiwan against a world backdrop. The main text, printed across the island in high-contrast blue-on-white text, anchors the global connotations of the imagery, urging the reader to “cross the strait, look to the world” (kua zu liang’an fangyan quanqiu 跨足兩岸放眼全球). A similar effect is used in Figure 6.3. In this image, the large “ECFA” title blends into the blue background, whereas the text along the right margin describing the agreement as “a steppingstone to return to the world stage” (chong fan shijie wutai de qiaomenzhuàn 重返世界舞台的敲門磚) is in a bold, eye-catching yellow. While the subject matter of the text anchors the imagery in a global context, the colour and contrast also highlight those phrases referring to a global frame. Thus, the text and imagery work in a mutually reinforcing arrangement. In contrast to the SM imagery I discuss below, Taiwan simply does not appear as a logo-map in the MAC imagery in isolation, but always connected to or
embedded in the wider world (and as I discuss more below, a world without national borders). This pattern extends to the small visual flourishes in margins: even here, MAC images place the island against a backdrop of a world map or globe, rather than as a stand-alone visual object (see, e.g., Figure 6.2). The repeated presentation of the island and world maps together frames both Taiwan and the Jiang-Chen summits in a global context, rather than within the more politically controversial context of cross-strait relations with the PRC.

Juxtaposing Taiwan with the world does not automatically imply that the two are in conflict. Quite the contrary, the MAC images continually emphasize connection, integration, and embeddedness in that global environment through the use of line, colour, and spatial arrangement of visual elements. Formal elements including curving lines and bright, repeated colours reinforce impressions of connectivity. For example, the wispy white lines in the bottom of Figure 6.2 resemble contrails or motion lines, as if the island were swooping in across Australia from the Pacific, mirrored by curving arcs across the top half of the image. Often this active, mobile connotation is anchored through the text, which uses engaging transitive verbs such as "look toward" kuazu 跨足 and "return to" chongfan 重返. The composition of the MAC images continually reinforces the association between Taiwan and the global context, rather than contrasting the two. The arrangement or position of elements, colour, and lines all contribute to this effect.

All of these compositional elements can be seen on the covers of the MAC's Annual Reports. The report for 2009, the year the ECFA negotiations began, shows a blue island framed by a circular photograph of a chess game in progress, which is set against a global map in the background (Figure 6.4). This logo-map, as always, is borderless, and is made up of regular, pixelated dots evoking digital media (discussed more below). The inset image of the chessboard itself has faint longitude and latitude lines which turn the circular frame into a globe. This is reinforced by the semi-transparency of the chess image, which allows the world map to be visible underneath. Encircling arrows emphasize the dynamism of the globe, with the most
prominent arrow directing attention toward North America. In fact, only the Americas and a slice of Western Europe are clearly visible, balanced in size and position with Taiwan, framing Taiwan as integrated into the 'Western' world rather than, for example, a sinoncentric one (Figures 6.2 and 6.5 situate Taiwan more in the regional frame of South East Asia, which de-emphasizes mainland China as a geopolitical reference point). At the same time the shape, size,
and position of the hand moving a black bishop chess piece mirrors the island, which is itself poised above the matching white piece. Taiwan is not necessarily portrayed as a literal participant in the chess game, but the symmetrical composition does frame it as *conceptually* equal to the active, strategic figure implied by the player’s hand. The arrangement, colour, and lines all integrate Taiwan into the borderless global context pictured in the background.

Figure 6.5: Taiwan sitting on an outstretched hand below doves flying in a blue sky, in front of a grey map of Eurasia. Source: 行政院大陸委員會年報（民國九十九年）(2011). Retrieved October 11, 2017 from http://ws.mac.gov.tw.
The cover of the 2010 MAC Annual Report (Figure 6.5) incorporates many similar motifs and styles. It shows a gleaming orange Taiwan superimposed on a borderless map of Eurasia. Mainland China is hidden, along with most of East Asia. As with the other MAC images, there are arrows arching out from Taiwan connecting it to South Asia and North America, accentuating its position as a bridge or intermediary between 'East' and 'West'. It is also haloed by an abstract pattern of circles and arrows made up of clean, tapering geometric lines. This adds the impression of energy flowing and circulating around Taiwan. A hand sits below the island, palm up, as if offering Taiwan to the viewer and the world. The position of this hand is such that it clearly belongs to a third person: Taiwan is presented to the viewer, not by the viewer. This positions the viewer as an external, passive observer of the visual information (see Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 119). As I discuss later, this is quite different from the many SM images which use viewer positioning to engage the viewer directly and demand an ethical response. In this sense the MAC images are depoliticizing not only in how they avoid representing politically contentious territorial boundaries, but also in how the framing does not anticipate any action (or even the possibility of action) from the viewer. Such images inform, they do not invite or demand.

Even publications specifically on bilateral trade agreements between the PRC and ROC, including ECFA, use imagery that obscures the PRC as a territorial entity and instead locates Taiwan in a borderless global frame. In fact, the thorny issue of the extent of PRC territory is often avoided by obscuring the mainland entirely. The 2009 pamphlet promoting ECFA mentioned earlier (Figure 6.3) shows the island sitting over top of Asia. Dotted lines arching out from Taipei and Tainan connect those cities to unspecified destinations abroad, evoking travel or trade routes. The island in this instance is the same cerulean blue as the world map behind it, so that Taiwan visually blends into the world. As with the other images I have discussed, the other signatory to ECFA – the PRC – does not appear anywhere in the pamphlet, but rather is strategically obscured by Taiwan. Similar strategic placement occurs in Figures 6.2, 6.4, and 6.5. Representing Taiwan as distinct from the mainland is a hot-button issue in cross-strait relations,
as incorporating Taiwan remains a key pillar not only of PRC (foreign) policy but to the CCP's vision of Chinese national identity (Callahan, 2010 ch. 2; Hughes, 1997). The perennial problem of how to represent Taiwan and in relation to the mainland on maps is avoided in these images by simply removing 'China' (however vaguely defined) from the frame entirely. This frames cross-strait rapprochement as an opportunity to engage with 'the world', which seems to have little to do with the PRC at all.


It is not only PRC territory that is missing from these maps. No international boundaries of any kind appear in any of the MAC publications examined. This highlights the borderless-ness of the world maps in the background. (This absence of international borders is even more evident when compared with the inclusion of Taiwan domestic administrative boundaries – county and municipal jurisdictions – in Figure 6.3). The extent to which MAC images avoid even the
suggestion of political borders is most evident in a 2010 booklet summarising the talking points that Ma Ying-jeou presented during a televised debate over ECFA (Figures 6.6 and 6.7). This is the only MAC publication between 2008 and 2014 in which mainland China is portrayed visually at all. As such, it demonstrates clearly how visual composition can deterritorialize geographic space. Even though a map that includes mainland China appears on the back cover (Figure 6.6, left panel), it is de-centred in multiple ways. The cover consists of a greyscale globe dominated by South East Asia and the Pacific Ocean, which fades into a golden haze along the bottom half of the frame. The front cover of the booklet shows Ma Ying-jeou sitting in front of a highly stylized world map with his head framed by Africa and Australia. The section of Asia which includes mainland China is obscured by the booklet’s subtitle. The diagonal latitude lines and top-heavy placement of the continent draws the eye down and to the right, away from China, as does the brighter, bold text across the middle of the frame. The text itself literally and figuratively underlines this focus on South East Asia, encouraging the reader to "Let Taiwan re-emerge as a leader of Asia’s four little dragons" (rang Taiwan jingji zai chufa lingxian yazhou sixiaolong 讓台灣經濟再出發 領先亞洲四小龍, original emphasis).

The booklet shown in Figures 6.6 and 6.7 is also a notable exception in another way: it is the only MAC document on cross-strait negotiations under the Ma administration that includes the flags of other states. Page nine incorporates the flags of South East Asian countries over a map of the region (Figure 6.7). Yet even here, the geopolitical context is downplayed. As with all of the previous images, international borders are absent: it is a representation of physical space that pointedly avoids political territory. The PRC flag is hinted at, but conveniently cut off by the edge of the page such that its distinguishing yellow stars do not appear. This map is the closest any MAC image comes to acknowledging the existence of the PRC as a political entity, much less its role in cross-strait trade agreements. And even then, its presence is diluted by the flags of a dozen other states that, unlike the PRC flag, are shown in their entirety. The flags are also

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130 The debate with DPP Chair Tsai Ying-wen was the first televised policy debate between a sitting ROC president and a leader of the opposition party.
all the same size and colour saturation, suggesting a conceptual equivalency between the units represented – in this case, states (see Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 79). These flags are placed over empty, borderless space, consistent with all of the MAC imagery. What is most striking about the inclusion of these flags in this map is that none of these states have any

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131 Kress and van Leeuwen argue that a fully conceptual composition (e.g., a family tree) would indicate equality between represented units through a symmetrical layout (in addition to the similar size, detail, colour depth, etc.). This image is not a ‘pure’ conceptual representation, but rather it stands out because although it is a political map of the region, it avoids the conventions of such maps.
direct involvement with ECFA, the topic of the booklet in which this map appears. Representing Brunei or Laos as effectively equivalent to the PRC reframes the latter country as only one of many stakeholders in ECFA (and a marginal one at that), rather than as the other party to a bilateral trade agreement. Overall, even when national symbols are used in regional maps, composition and text steer the viewer away from geopolitical concerns or related questions of national identity. As far as the MAC is concerned, the PRC literally does not appear as a significant factor in cross-strait negotiations.

**Colour in MAC imagery**

In earlier chapters I have drawn attention to how colour makes particular objects in an image more salient (e.g., the flags in Chapter 4) or creates a historicized aesthetic (e.g., the sepia-toned photographs in Chapter 5). In this chapter, I consider how both the MAC and SM imagery use colour to ‘ground’ territorial representations of Taiwan in particular connotations. This provides an opportunity for a closer examination of how colour shapes interpretation on an interpersonal level: how it situates the viewer in relation to the contents of the image.

Drawing on functional language theories, Painter, Martin, & Unsworth (2012) propose that colour can perform three communicative functions. The first function is at an *ideational* level. This level is the object or idea represented by the symbol – its communicative content (Painter et al., 2012, p. 35). This includes both denotation (the object or action pictured) and connotation (conventionally associated concepts or ideas). For example, a blue field can denote part of the image of a clear sky, but also connote associations with KMT party colours. In terms of ideational content, colour often connotes party affiliations in the MAC imagery in just this way (see also Figures 3.1 and 4.12). The predominant colour scheme in publications under the Ma administration is blue-and-white. This contrasts sharply with MAC reports published under both previous and subsequent DPP administrations (2005-7 and 2016-7),\(^\text{132}\) which use a green

\(^{132}\) Although the MAC did publish annual reports long before 2005, only text versions without images were available for comparison.
and brown palette. Blue and green are primary political colours in Taiwan, loosely comparable to the colour coding of ‘red states’ and ‘blue states’ in the USA. Political parties, newspapers, and civil society organizations that favour Taiwanese independence are referred to as ‘green’, while those that are associated with pro-China stances are considered ‘blue.’ Thus, the widespread use of blue-sky motifs in MAC imagery allowed the KMT to ‘brand’ the MAC publications with their party colours (compare this with the elision of ROC and KMT emblems in Chapter 4). At the same time, it subtly reproduces associations between the geographic space of Taiwan and the pan-blue camp of KMT-affiliated parties.

On a textual level colour can be used to link elements within or between images or to make an element stand out from others (Painter et al., 2012, pp. 91–93). The repetition of colour connects elements within the image as well as across multiple images. Although not always the case, in the majority of MAC publications the island of Taiwan is the same blue as the background, whether this is a blue sky or a map of the world (e.g., Figures 6.3 and 6.4). This creates a ‘colour axis’ that connects the elements semiotically, ‘transferring’ connotations from one object in the image to another (see Williamson, 1978, p. 21). As a result, the image links Taiwan with the borderless world behind it even without connecting lines and arrows. By also representing the rest of the ‘borderless’ world in shades of blue, the island space does not take on the territorial connotations that contrasting colours spaces would suggest (consider how political maps commonly use contrasting colours to differentiate countries). Colour is thus used to convey similarity, rather than differentiation.

On an interpersonal level, colour can evoke different feelings and associations in the viewer (Painter et al., 2012, pp. 15–16). On this level, colour is less about providing ideational content (what the image represents), but rather predisposing the viewer to interpret the contents of the image in a particular way (how to view the image). The cool, nearly monochromatic shades of Picasso’s Blue Period, for example, convey a doleful or pensive overtone which is distinct from (but complements) the subject matter, such as poverty and human frailty. The sepia-toned photographs I discussed in Chapter 5 are another example (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2002;
see also Kress 2006, p. 346). On the interpersonal level, the bright, saturated colours of the MAC images have an exuberant, positive affect. The ubiquitous blue is complemented by rich golds and yellows, or it is anchored by white birds, clouds, and shining suns (again echoing the KMT logo). Bright blue hues are also strongly associated with technology and digital interfaces (Rose & Willis, 2019, p. 419), which in combination with the abstract, geometric lines in MAC imagery situate Taiwan in cyberspace more than in the (politically contentious) geopolitical world. As I explain below, this results in a very different tone than the sombre blacks that dominate SM imagery.

To summarize how Taiwan's space and place in the world is framed in MAC imagery: Taiwan is visually situated in a global context free of territorial conflicts or concerns. The island does not appear in maps, but over top of them. These representations of the world are largely conceptual rather than topographical: they imagine Taiwan as part of an abstract global marketplace which is 'out there', not a material location with territorial borders with other states. This deterritorialization of space is furthered by avoiding geopolitical borders or symbols other than the logo-map of the island of Taiwan itself. The Taiwan represented in the MAC imagery appears to exist in a 'post political,' borderless world. Moreover, the Chinese mainland is almost never visible in the MAC images, much less marked as the PRC. Most often, in fact, the mainland is hidden behind the image of geographical Taiwan. Even the single exception to this rule literally marginalizes the PRC and dilutes its visual salience. Meanwhile, the composition of most MAC images that include Taiwan emphasize connectivity, flows, and circulations more suggestive of economic globalization than geopolitical tension. This impression is furthered by the prevalence of saturated and high-contrast colours, especially bright blues, giving the images an energetic, technological, and dynamic atmosphere. The Taiwan constructed by the MAC imagery is dynamic, self-sufficient and competitive, and not in any way associated with any geopolitical concerns which might require the attention of its citizens.
Sunflower Movement: Taiwan as Political Territory

Whereas the MAC imagery constructs a borderless world, one devoid of geopolitics, the SM imagery constructs Taiwan as a territorial entity – a space coterminous with national identity. Specifically, the SM imagery emphasizes the geopolitical vulnerability of the nation. This is achieved in three ways. First, SM artists use personified figures to attribute agency to outside forces while representing Taiwan as both vulnerable and powerless. The tragic subject matter depicted in these images implicitly asks the viewer to act. This move is furthered by compositions that use eye contact, close framing, and imploring gestures to interpellate the viewer. Second, the images use colour, line, and space to produce affect and ‘ambience’. These elements of formal composition visually separate the nation from the PRC both spatially as well as emotionally. In combination with text which appeals to an international democratic community, the images align Taiwan with the ‘West’. Finally, the SM images not only continually reiterate the existence of the PRC, but use the PRC to construct Taiwan as vulnerable and bullied in order to evoke international sympathy and support.

Taiwan and personification

One of the most common ways that the SM imagery represents Taiwan's relationship with the world is through personification, characterising either the island or outside forces as people. This technique is a staple of political cartoons such as Figure 6.1, rendering abstract political and social forces as interpersonal relationships which may feel more familiar or emotionally charged to the (hypothetical) average viewer. In contrast to the heavy use of clean, abstract arcs and arrows of MAC images, the SM images rely on much more visceral representations. In these images, ‘Taiwan’ is represented as a body rather than an abstract idea. Bodies in pain, and particularly the visual representation of such pain, can produce (or reinforce) an ethical or empathetic relationship between the viewer and the pictured body (Dauphinee, 2007, pp. 150–151). And by showing Taiwan as a body acted upon by outside actors, the images frame the nation as the victim of those forces.
Figure 6.8: Sketch of a rat and horse carving up Taiwan. The text reads “Shameful table manners!” *chixiang nankan* 吃相難看)
Source: http://public.318.io/18509

Figure 6.9: Zombie devouring Taiwan alongside the character *fan* 反 (resist, reject).
Source: http://public.318.io/16063
The visceral personification of Taiwan in SM images often shows the island being consumed by external agents. For example, Figure 6.8 portrays a rat and a horse drooling over a dish of Taiwan being carved up. The cutlery is labelled with the characters ‘fu mao’ – a shorthand reference to the CSSTA (see also Figure 6.17 below, showing a panda eating the island).

Similarly, Figure 6.9 uses a gratuitously bloody image of a cartoon zombie devouring the island alongside the character 反 (resist or oppose, as in the SM slogan ‘oppose the CSSTA’ fanfumao 反服貿). The zombie is portrayed with rows of teeth dripping blood. These corporeal representations of space stand in for a bounded social entity called ‘Taiwan’. After all, it is not the physical island that is injured by the alleged failures of the policy review processes, but rather a distinct and autonomous imagined Taiwanese community. The idea of collective injury is integral to the construction and reproduction of collective identities such as the nation: it inscribes a powerful moral distinction between Self and Other by attributing cause or culpability for the injury to some people and collective suffering to others (see Ahmed, 2004, pp. 20–41; Protevi, 2009, p. 33 ff). Put another way, an image of ‘them hurting us’ begs the question of who is included under the notions of ‘them’ and ‘us.’ To imagine injury to the community as a community (and not just to individual members) presupposes imagining the existence of that very community which is somehow analogous to a physical body, a discrete entity whose boundaries can only be punctured, divided, or abraded only to the detriment of the integrity of the whole. The extensive use of violent imagery is more than simply a call to action by SM artists, though that is certainly part of what is evoked. These images also reproduce the core idea of Taiwan as a nation, an imagined community which suffers collectively, and which consequently needs defending.

The metaphorical substitution of physical space for national identity is especially noticeable in images which personify the logo-map (e.g., Figure 6.1). And yet, even when the nation is represented with human attributes, it has no more agency than when it is represented as a piece of food being consumed by outside forces. As I expand on below, this works along with other aspects of image composition to evoke an affective response in the viewer; the passive
victimhood of the nation implies an ethical obligation to act. Bodily metaphors are a common trope in nationalist imagery. Sometimes images add features like faces and hands to national symbols. Others personify abstract values and ideologies that supposedly sustain or threaten the nation: ‘Lady Liberty’ in the USA, ‘Mr. Democracy’ in China’s May Fourth movement, or France’s Marianne, seen in Figure 4.1, for example (de Baecque, 1997). What is most striking about the SM images in this regard, especially when they are considered in aggregate, is the overwhelming passivity of the nation that is portrayed. In contrast to the dynamic compositions in the MAC imagery, personified logo-maps of Taiwan are virtually always drawn as weak and helpless. The content of these images plead for someone to act on behalf of a victimized nation. As the images which follow demonstrate, composition often positions the viewer as the ‘someone’ to whom this plea is directed.

Figure 6.10 is a strong example of this combination of content and composition imploring the viewer to intercede. It shows the island as a character with a face, arms, and a necktie, with a large nail driven through its head, superimposed over a broken heart. The sketch is mainly in blue marker, though the blood flowing from the wounded island is black, drawing attention to the injury. The English caption "Taiwan is hurt" further drives home the idea that Taiwan is threatened. In addition, Taiwan’s limp and dangling arms give the impression that it is also unable to take any action to protect itself. Similarly, Figure 6.11 places Taiwan behind bars, locked with the phrase yizi bugai 一字不改, referring to the government’s stance of "not changing a single letter" of the CSSTA. Other images show a personified island weeping and being held like an infant. In all of these images using a personified logo-map, the nation is imagined as helpless as well as vulnerable, unable to respond on its own.
In terms of positioning the viewer, both Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.11 are what Kress and van Leeuwen call ‘demand’ images (2006, pp. 117–118; see also Painter et al., 2013, pp. 18–22). The personified nation gazes directly out at the viewer, which demands a response (even if that response is to ignore the demand). Eye contact positions the viewer as a participant in the scene, rather than as an external, seemingly objective observer (compare this to Figure 6.5, where the island is simply offered to the viewer). The classic example of a demand image is the army recruitment poster which shows a stern male face intently staring and pointing out at the
viewer, with the caption "I want you to join the army." Such images implicate the viewer as a participant in the image, rather than positioning them as seemingly uninvolved observers. In this way, demand images function similarly to what Althusser termed interpellation: being vocally hailed by an authority (a guard calling out, "Hey you there") places the person hailed in a particular subject position. But the context and other elements of the image inform the nature of the demand. For example, although a recruitment poster and a perfume ad may both use direct eye contact, they elicit very different responses by using gendered compositions. In Figures 6.10 and 6.11, a weak and vulnerable nation gazes out at the viewer. These images work to make the viewer a rescuer, responsible for correcting the injustice inflicted upon Taiwan.

The image of the Taiwanese as a people left to fend for themselves is a reoccurring theme in both literature and politics. Qiu Fengjia 丘逢甲 (1864-1912), one of the founders of the 1895 Republic of Taiwan (see Chapter 3), first connected Taiwanese identity to a sense of being abandoned by the Chinese motherland: “Taiwan belongs to us Taiwanese. How can it be given and take by others? The Qing court abandoned us, but how can we abandon ourselves?” (quoted in Shozo, 2012, p. 69, emphasis added). The quintessential expression of this narrative was Wu Zhuoliu’s 吳濁流 novel, Orphan of Asia (2008, Japanese: ajia no koji アジアの孤児), originally published in Japanese in 1956 (H.-C. Chang & Holt, 2007, p. 132). During the 1970s and 1980s, advocates of bentuhua, or the indigenizing (and de-sinicizing) of Taiwan’s culture, argued that Taiwanese identity had developed under fundamentally different historical conditions than those in mainland China, where the central narrative was of a “declining ancient empire besieged by a legion of imperialist powers” (R.-R. Wu, 2003, p. 163). In this view, Taiwan’s history was one of neglect rather than unwanted (imperialist) attention. The Orphan of Asia conception of Taiwanese identity was taken up in Taiwanese literature in the

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133 While the first these recruitment posters featured Lord Kitchener, the British Secretary of State for War from 1914-16, the design was copied by governments around the world. Notably, many of these later iterations use generic personifications of the nation (e.g., Uncle Sam, John Bull) rather than specific individuals (Ginzburg, 2001).
The opposition magazine *Yazhouren* 亞洲人 drew on the Orphan of Asia narrative on the front cover of a 1983 special edition, using it to describe America’s decision to recognize the PRC as the legitimate government of China and to allow it to replace the ROC in the United Nations and on the United Nations Security Council. The articles included in this magazine equated the USA’s abandonment of Taiwan with that of the Qing 80 years before, citing this as evidence of the need for Taiwanese autonomy (Jacobs, 2005, p. 32). The message in these abandonment narratives is that the people of Taiwan had to look out for themselves, because no one else would. By constructing the nation as helpless, personified images make a similar moral and emotional appeal for the viewer to act on the nation's behalf.

*Compositions of isolation*

The second way that the SM imagery stresses the vulnerability of the nation is through elements of formal composition – colour, line, and space – which isolate the nation spatially and emotionally. SM artists commonly use minimalist designs and vast expanses of negative space in their imagery. For example, many SM images use ‘flat’ design, which shies away from any shading, detail, or impression of depth (e.g., drop shadows and bevels) in favour of simple, uniform colour spaces and geometric shapes (see Curtis, 2015; Greif, 2013). SM artists also employ unadorned sans-serif fonts to reflect this simplicity. In contrast, the MAC compositions are often flowing and energetic. The effect of the SM images, especially cumulatively, is to create an atmosphere of anxiety or isolation comparable to that in the images of an injured Taiwan, even without personifying the island.

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134 This style is influenced by the Swiss or International design style popular in the mid-twentieth century, but has been repopularized by recent trends in user interface design for computers and mobile devices.
Figure 6.12 is a quintessential example of a minimalist design choice. It shows a solid black poster with plain white English text that proclaims, "Voice of people voice of democracy". The only non-text element in the image, the tiny white silhouette of the island of Taiwan, sits alone on the extreme right margin adrift in a large arc of negative space. The small, flat, unconnected logo-map of the island is a common motif in SM images. Figure 6.13 maintains the same flat style, with simple, geometric shapes that lack shading or texture, although the overall image contains more visual elements than Figure 6.12. It shows a single white eye with a large grey teardrop against a solid black background, with "Democratic crisis" printed across the bottom two thirds of the frame. The second "i" in the word 'crisis' has been replaced with a logo-map of Taiwan. Both images are asymmetrical, with the centre of gravity off to one side. This draws the viewer's eye to the left, emphasizing the emptiness on the right of the frame. Even though the island is integrated into the text in Figure 6.13, the sparse and unbalanced composition suggest a lonely and precarious setting. This is before even drawing attention to the obvious emotional message of the weeping eye.
The sense of isolation or vulnerability is further entrenched through colour. SM imagery often uses a white-on-black colour palette which visually frames the island as isolated. White printing on a black page (such as in Figures 6.12 and 6.13) results in a different tone or atmosphere than black printing on a blank white page. The former frames the image in negative space, but one which is intentionally negative rather than neutral. Unlike a figure against an otherwise blank canvas, black negative space denies or forecloses many potential associations: "our response to black margins and pages is not simply neutral as with a white page. Rather our inclination to relate emotionally to the setting is frustrated by a choice of black" (Painter et al., 2012, p. 41). In the SM images, the negative space is negative in both the compositional and emotional sense, leaving a void which surrounds the island.

Most of these white-on-black affective spaces in the SM images also include explicit references to democracy. In Figure 6.12, for example, Taiwan and democratic ideals are connected not only by the simple presence of the word 'democracy' on the same page, but also through visual means. In this image, both the text and the island are white. Using the same
colour ties the two together while contrasting them both against the solid field of black. Quite often the island’s logo-map is in line with and the same height as the text (Figure 6.12), and in some cases it replaces a letter or character (Figure 6.13). Compositions that equate or integrate text and visual elements reinforce the association between the concepts of 'Taiwan' and 'democracy'. This association has two effects. On one hand, read in the context of a political protest, it frames the issue of contention (the CSSTA) as both a failure to respect democratic values or procedures and as a question of national interests. Put another way, such images bridge national identity and democratic frames, linking the two ways of understanding and critiquing the CSSTA (Snow & Benford, 2000b, p. 624). On the other hand, linking the text and map-logo narrows the preferred reading of 'Taiwan' to specifically democratic conceptions of national identity (rather than historical or ethnocultural ones), especially when the minimalist compositions offer few other associations within the image itself.

The images I have discussed so far do not show the world beyond Taiwan. However, they do imply that outside world as an audience. The preponderance of English in these images is not neutral. Using English text anticipates an English-speaking audience, which is invoked almost exclusively in images which reference democracy. This is perhaps most evident in the full-page 'Democracy at 4 am' advertisement (Figure 6.14), which SM supporters ran in the New York Times on March 29 and 30, 2014. Taiwan’s isolation from the international community is framed as a problem which needs fixing, and the audience for this (sometimes literal) cry for help is an English-speaking, democratic community of nations. The same small, flat logo-map against a black background appears on numerous other stickers and posters appealing to ‘save democracy’ in English, as well occasionally in Dutch and Czech, and Spanish. In much the same way as the personified demand images discussed above interpellate the viewer through eye contact (Figures 6.10 and 6.11), the SM images discussed in Figures 6.12 and 6.13 accomplish a similar interpellation by combining text with affective compositions. The interpellation I describe here is a quality of the image composition, not the intention of the artist (although the two may work together, as seems likely in the case of the ‘Democracy at 4 AM’ advertisement).
By representing Taiwan as vulnerable and isolated, the images also imply an ethical responsibility for liberal democracies to step in and defend 'one of their own.' Such appeals frame Taiwan not only as a distinct nation, but one which belongs to a category of nations defined by (purported) democratic values. These logo-maps are marked as political territory through these layered direct and indirect associations with ‘democracy’ as a distinguishing quality. We can infer from the context of the SM that what Taiwan is being distinguished from is most likely the (undemocratic) PRC, although this contradistinction remains ambiguous in the preceding images. The final section of this chapter turns to images framing Taiwan as political territory through explicit juxtapositions of logo-maps of Taiwan with various symbolic representations of the mainland, the PRC, or ‘China’.

135 In this regard the SM images echo the narrative of the ROC as 'Free China' which underwrote American support of Chiang Kai-shek's government during the first half of the Cold War, although they abandon the 'China' half of the phrase, replacing it with Taiwan.
Democracy at 4am

Morning without YOU is a dwindled dawn.

After the President and ruling party failed to respond, the students expanded their protests on March 29th. The authorities sent police to remove the peaceful protesters with batons, clubs, and tear gas. The protesters, who had their hands tied to shields, were brutally forced to retreat. The police even went as far as to shoot tear gas at them.

Taiwan needs your attention and support. Today, we ask you to join us as thousands of Taiwan students, teachers, and others from all walks of life join in the protests in support. We need you to help bring us home.

In this final section, I examine how SM images which include logo-maps of Taiwan invoke some notion of ‘China’ to frame Taiwan as a distinct national territory. Specifically, I show how images which juxtapose the island of Taiwan with symbolic representations of ‘China’ rely on compositions which ground that ambiguous concept as PRC territory. The SM imagery continually reiterates not only the existence of the PRC, but does so in ways which further frame Taiwan as both distinct and vulnerable territory. Figure 6.15 offers one of the more straightforward examples of this juxtaposition. It shows a Trojan horse unloading armed stick-figures wearing red hats and rushing toward Taiwan. The left-to-right vector indicates that the source of this invasion is mainland China, on the left. This is further reinforced by the matching red of the hats and the distinctive 5-star emblem of the PRC's flag. The English text on the horse informing the viewer that this is a "Troy horse from China" is almost redundant. The Trojan horse itself has a double meaning in this context. On the one hand it frames the CSSTA as a trap which would open Taiwan's gates to PRC control. On the other hand, it acts as a visual
reference to Ma Ying-jeou’s surname (the character 馬 meaning 'horse' in Chinese). The territorial extent of the PRC (excluding Taiwan) is clearly demarcated, itself a simple logo-map. In fact, the PRC is the entire geopolitical context in this image, with none of its bordering countries are even suggested. Contrast this with the MAC images discussed previously, almost none of which show mainland China at all. In the solitary MAC publication which does include visual representations of the mainland (Figures 6.6 and 6.7), China is so marginally positioned that it almost drifts off the page. In contrast, the spatial arrangement and vectors (direction of action) in Figure 6.15 focus attention on the PRC. By placing Taiwan and the PRC on opposite ends of the page, the picture juxtaposes the two, framing the CSSTA and the Horse/Ma between them. This kind of triptych composition, with two polarized elements mediated by a central figure, is especially common in SM images attacking Ma Ying-jeou (see also e.g., Figure 6.1). As the only colour in the SM image other than the red on the stick figures’ hats, the red of the 5-star emblem stands out from the almost completely monochrome drawing. Not only does this make 'China' a more salient element, but it specifically emphasizes the political symbols associated with the PRC.¹³⁶ That is to say, the state emblem and borders make it evident that the 'China' being opposed here is the PRC specifically. This in turn reinforces the reading of the logo-map of Taiwan as territorialized space, rather than mere physical space or as some conceptual ‘brand logo’ completely abstracted from geopolitical concerns.

The SM images do more than just identify the PRC as a political entity distinct from Taiwan. Most often, the composition of such images also represents the PRC as active and aggressive, in contrast to the vulnerability of Taiwan. For example, while the territorial representation of the PRC in Figure 6.15 appears static, the direction of motion and the echoing red in the emblem and hats marks it as the source of hostile activity. Taiwan, in comparison, is entirely on the receiving end. It is positioned well below the horizontal axis of the page and tilted to the right,

¹³⁶ In her seminal study of semiotics in advertising, Judith Williamson shows how using the same colour produces a conceptual connection between disparate objects (e.g., a cigarette and a celebrity, or a sunset and a cup of coffee) (1978, p. 20-14). This connection forms the basis for the transfer (Williamson’s terminology) of connotations from one signifier to another.
making it seem like the island is off balance and falling (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 57). Unlike images of Taiwan by itself, compositions that include 'China' typically show the island prone in this way (see also Figure 6.17 and Figure 6.18). The visual articulation of a power imbalance contributes to framing the relationship as unjust. As Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson (1992, p. 33) note, such injustice frames often play a powerful role in legitimating and mobilizing social movements.

Figure 6.16: Fist marked with PRC logo squeezing Taiwan into a coffee cup.
Source: http://public.318.io/17714
Images indicating PRC aggression do not always include the geographic space of the mainland. Symbolic references to the PRC are often juxtaposed with the island of Taiwan, framing the latter as political territory by contrast. Figure 6.16 shows the island logo-map being squeezed by a fist marked with the 5-star PRC emblem on the forearm, dripping black liquid into a cup labelled "fumao" (services agreement). Although the island has some stylized personified features, a single eye with the white Shining-sun logo of the ROC as its pupil, as usual the nation here is only capable of weeping. The black text beside the dripping fluid asks "So black, how can you drink it down?" (zheme hei zenme he de xiaqu? 這麼黑怎麼喝得下去?), alluding to the lack of transparency surrounding the CSSTA negotiations, followed by the white English text declaring "Taiwan Democracy Crisis." As with the images of affective isolation I discussed in the previous section, the appeal to democratic values appears to be directed at a 'global' (read: English-speaking) audience.

In addition to juxtapositions of the island of Taiwan with PRC emblems and flags, pandas are another common stand-in for ‘China’. Most often this iconic animal is further anchored by other elements which reinforce associations with the PRC specifically, rather than treating it as a more ambiguous symbol of Chinese identity. Figure 6.17, for example, shows Taiwan in the jaws of a panda, but this is anchored by the bright red background echoing the PRC flag. The text also anchors the meaning in a specifically political context. The primary text reads, "Repeal the services agreement, defend democracy" (tui fumao, han minzhu 退服貿、捍民主). The high-contrast white characters for 'fumao' (services agreement) and 'democracy' make those words more salient than the rest of the text, so that the implied opposition between the two is underscored visually as well as rhythmically. The black sub-text offers a further explanation, "Don't let Taiwan become a second Hong Kong" (buyao rang Taiwan chengwei di er ge xianggang 不要讓台灣成為第二個香港), alluding to concerns that Hong Kong's apparent

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137 A sunburst on its own is most often used as a symbol of the KMT. As discussed in Chapter 4, the SM imagery typically draws a distinction between the sunburst as a KMT logo and the same emblem as part of the ROC flag (or red-and-blue object which evokes the flag). In the case of Figure 6.16, however, I suggest that the island itself grounds the sunburst as a symbol of the nation rather than of the KMT.
autonomy under the One Country, Two Systems policy has gradually been eroded. Referring to both democracy and Hong Kong connects this island-eating panda with the PRC political system, rather than, for example, with broader associations with Chinese culture.

Figure 6.17: Panda holding Taiwan in its jaws against a red background. Source: http://public.318.io/13395

Figure 6.18 combines a number of these motifs in one image, including a rather feral-looking panda emerging from the mainland and sweeping toward the green island of Taiwan in the lower right of the frame. The panda in this case is blocked by a Formosan bear projecting a yellow heart, possibly echoing the common theme of illumination and the sunflower motif both
common in the SM imagery. Formosan bears (indicated by the white v-shape on its throat) appear somewhat regularly in SM images in a protective or defensive role. In this sense the bear takes on some of the active roles that are typically denied to territorial symbols of Taiwan. However, most often the bears’ actions are limited to cradling other, more passive symbols such as personified islands and flags (discussed in Chapter 4). Even in Figure 6.18, the bright colours make the panda, the heart, and the island the most salient elements, whereas the active bear blends into the black paper. As a result, this visual framing emphasizes an aggressive 'China' acting against a prone Taiwan.

![Figure 6.18: Panda emerging from the mainland to attack Taiwan, deflected by a Formosan bear projecting a yellow heart. Source: http://public.318.io/16713](http://public.318.io/16713)

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138 This image demonstrates the limitations of an overly codified approach to interpreting the iconography of colour. Considering the anti-“Chinese” sentiment conveyed by the rest of the image, and the context of the SM more generally, it seems unlikely that the yellow of the heart is connected to the colour’s classical connotations of imperial dynasties and power (compare this image with the yellow robes of the emperor Ma caricature in Figure 5.28).
The SM imagery consistently frames the conflict surrounding the CSSTA as a contest between nations by juxtaposing logo-maps of Taiwan with symbols connoting ‘China’, and by visually specifying that conception of ‘China’ as the PRC. These images allude to (and reproduce) a more general anxiety about PRC political and economic influence. In doing so, they concretize the imagined threat which is only implied in the images of an isolated Taiwan discussed earlier. However, including symbolic representations of the PRC within the image also actively reproduce a China threat narrative. The fact that the MAC imagery so systematically avoids representing ‘China’ is itself a strong indication of the salience of this narrative in Taiwanese society. Rather than try to provide a positive spin on increasing ties with the PRC, the MAC imagery completely sidesteps the hot-button issue by almost completely avoiding representations of the mainland. This goes beyond merely avoiding representing PRC (or ROC) territory in maps or logo-maps. The MAC imagery completely sidesteps even the possibility of implying territorial claims by either party to the CSSTA (which would almost inevitably be contentious) by replacing the mainland with images of other parts of the world. Looking at the MAC images we get the impression that ECFA and the CSSTA have nothing at all to do with the PRC.

On the other hand, the outside world fills two distinct roles in the SM imagery: ‘China’ as the source of threat and the world as a witness. Only the former is actually represented in images, while the latter is interpellated through language and composition. The images discussed in this section use representations of Taiwan as vulnerable and under threat. This bodily and emotional vulnerability subtly reinforces the idea that ‘Taiwan’ is both a physical and social entity, a community that is imagined as the island. The political dimension of this community is emphasized through visual associations of that bounded space with the idea of democracy, as well through juxtapositions with the PRC. Some of these juxtapositions are explicit, or visible in the content and composition of the image itself. However, often they are implicit, needing to be interpolated from the context of the movement even when the source of threat is not pictured. By juxtaposing Taiwan with aggressive and powerful representations
of the PRC, however, the images discussed here both tap into (and reproduce) specific anxieties in Taiwanese society and direct them toward opposition to the CSSTA. In doing so, they also appeal to (and reproduce) a nationalist framework, one which elides territory and population.

Conclusion

The analysis in this chapter is the mirror image of that in Chapter 4, where I discussed how the MAC imagery relies on and reproduces sedimented connotations of the ROC flag while the SM imagery deploys jarring or disruptive compositions to open conceptual space to resignify the flag as a distinctly Taiwanese symbol. In the case of maps and logo-maps, it is the MAC imagery that uses composition to move away from conventional associations with territory and encourages a preferred reading of ‘Taiwan’ as a space removed from geopolitical concerns. In contrast, it is the SM imagery which emphasizes and elaborates on conventional associations between logo-maps and political territory. This analysis shows that images which include representations of the island of Taiwan do not necessarily reproduce ideas of Taiwan as a nation. The prevalence of logo-maps of Taiwan in MAC imagery could at first glance be interpreted as the Ma administration adopting a more Taiwan-centric framing of national identity. However, looking more closely at these images in context paints a different picture. Even though the MAC imagery incorporates maps and logo-maps of Taiwan, these government publications virtually always use compositions which frame Taiwan in a global economic context seemingly free of geopolitical concerns. The world, and Taiwan’s place in it, are framed as abstract networks of economic flows, presented as if such flows exist separate from political forces. This stands in stark contrast to concerns that the economic flows enabled by the ECFA and CSSTA threatened Taiwan not only economically, but politically due to China’s economic power. As such, the representations in the MAC imagery rely on and reproduce an artificial separation of ‘economy’ from ‘politics’ (Strange, 1997, p. 4). Further, these images not only refrain from showing the specific, competing territorial claims of the PRC and ROC. They avoid representing territoriality, or politically bounded space. National boundaries are conspicuously
absent, evoking a world which is borderless and geopolitically uncontested. A comparable tendency has been noted in Ma Ying-jeou’s use of the concept of ‘New Taiwanese’ during his 2008 election campaign. When the term was first coined by Lee Teng-hui in the 1990s, it indicated a collective identity which transcended ethnic divisions between *waishengren* and *benshengren*, essentially subsuming such identities within a larger *national* identity of Taiwanese (Corcuff, 2002b, pp. 186–187; see also Chapter 3). Close readings of Ma Ying-jeou’s campaign discourse suggest that for him, ‘new Taiwanese’ means something closer to “Taiwan’s local version of Chinese identity” (H.-C. Chang & Holt, 2009a; Sullivan & Sapir, 2012). What we see in the MAC images published during the Ma administration is a similar pattern of evoking an abstract idea of ‘Taiwan’ (a category that a majority of the population identifies with to some degree) while subtly but consistently detaching this from questions of political autonomy or sovereignty. In neither case can we take at face value that a signifier which denotes ‘Taiwan’ – whether the word or the logo-map – also carries connotations of a Taiwanese national identity. The MAC imagery shows how composition and context can also frame space in ways that efface political divisions, de-territorializing space when such territorial claims are politically inopportune. The island of Taiwan is clearly an important *place* in the KMT imaginary, but it is pointedly not coterminous with *national* territory.

In contrast, in SM imagery logo-maps continually reproduce Taiwan as a distinct and discrete territorial entity, eliding physical, political, and social space. On the most overt level this is accomplished by juxtaposing logo-maps of Taiwan with territorial and metaphorical symbols of ‘China’. Moreover, unlike the MAC imagery, these images most often reinforce rather than obscure the elision of ‘China’ with the PRC. These visual assertions of Taiwanese nationhood reinforce ideas of Taiwanese national identity through compositions which stress

139 In a 1998 televised exchange between Lee Teng-hui and Ma Ying-jeou (then a mayoral candidate for Taipei) Ma adopted Lee’s popular new term, describing himself as ‘New Taiwanese’. Echoing the quote from Xu Rongshu at the opening of this chapter, Ma declared “I am a new Taiwanese who grew up drinking Taiwan water and eating Taiwanese rice, a true Taipeinese born in Wanhua” (quoted in Corcuff, 2002b, p. 187). A charitable interpretation is that this claim was metaphorical, as Ma was born in Hong Kong.
Taiwan as a distinctive and discretely bounded geopolitical space. Personifications of the island present the metaphorical national body as a literal one. Images of injury presuppose the integrity of a national body, implying that there is a whole there to be violated. Compositions that evoke a generalized atmosphere of fear, isolation, or vulnerability convey a similar metaphor through the production of ambience, or an affective frame for the image (Painter et al., 2012, p. 35). The combination of these affective compositions with direct appeals to democracy further directs the preferred reading of the logo-map as a symbol of a distinct political community.

The differences between how the MAC and SM images incorporate logo-maps show how visual representations of the same space can convey contradictory messages about the extent or basis of national identity. This is especially true in the case of an island such as Taiwan, where natural boundaries and political borders (or more specifically, the borders according to some claims) largely coincide. Nonetheless, the observations made here speak to many of the same concerns raised by critical scholarship on maps and modern cartography (Agnew, 1994; Crampton, 2001; Harley, 1988). Namely, the representation of space as territorialized is a political act, articulating not only a vision of the limits of legitimate authority, but of the boundaries of the national community. This is not to suggest that such visions reflect reality: at minimum, foreigners living within those borders, expatriates living outside of them, and zones of extraterritorial jurisdiction all complicate the myth of a tidy congruence between national community and national territory. As with nationalism more generally – which presents a heterogenous or variegated population as if it were a unified and clearly delineated collective identity – visual representations of national territory efface difference and hybridity within and across spatial boundaries. What I have done in this chapter is to examine some of the ways in which representations of the same physical space reproduce different understandings of social and political community. Spatial boundaries inscribe lines of difference between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, to be sure. But lines do not only divide: they articulate particular criteria for division. And by extension, they imply certain ways of relating across those boundaries (e.g., combative
or cooperative), and what qualities supposedly bind the ‘insiders’ together. The images discussed here demonstrate that although the MAC and SM seem to agree on the overall shape of Taiwan, they have profoundly different conceptions of Taiwan’s place in the world.
Chapter 7 – Conclusion

Summary

This dissertation has looked at how national identities were evoked or represented visually as part of the SM. It has shown how the context and composition of images shapes the preferred readings of symbols of the nation, steering the viewer toward less conventional interpretations of signifiers associated with national identity. This fine-grained analysis of how imagery framed the conflict over the CSSTA shows that the SM was about much more than a disagreement over policy. Rather, the conflict between the SM protestors and the KMT government was rooted in opposing conceptions of the national identity of the inhabitants of Taiwan. Nor was this simply a difference of opinion as to whether or not Taiwan is part of China. My analysis has shown how MAC and SM images construct and reproduce different conceptions of what constitutes ‘China’ and ‘Taiwan’. Unlike previous advocates of a distinct Taiwanese identity, the SM imagery does not simply reject the KMT’s official Chinese nationalism, but uses context and composition to realign the conceptual boundaries of both Chinese and Taiwanese identities.

In order to highlight these different conceptions of national identity, I compared 1023 images from the public.318.io archive of SM artefacts and 466 images from MAC publications during the Ma Ying-jeou administration. I identified common motifs in each of these sets of images, singling out those conventionally associated with national identity – common symbols of the nation. Three common themes emerged from this analysis: the use of the ROC flag, historical narratives, and logo-maps of Taiwan. Each analysis chapter (Chapters 4-6) examined how one of these thematic groupings of symbols constructs ‘the nation’ differently in the MAC and SM images. Because the referent of national symbols is often elusive, quantitative approaches such as content analysis alone (e.g, Skey, 2017) tell us very little about national identity. As I have shown, this is true even in contexts such as Taiwan where both political institutions and informal conventions have sedimented ROC symbols with official (‘Chinese’)}
associations. In order to address the polysemous nature of these symbols, I adopted a social semiotic framework to analyse how the composition and context of these images direct the interpretation or preferred reading of their contents. This approach highlights how similar signifiers or themes can frame the same issue in dramatically different lights, with national identity being evoked to advocate both for and against cross-strait trade agreements between the ROC and PRC. These images frame specific policies, actors, and political actions as legitimate while others are framed as illegitimate by associating or dissociating them from symbols evoking an imagined community. Notably, there is a large overlap between these two sets of images in the symbols used to represent the nation, even when the images clearly depend on very different conceptions of that nation’s identity in order to be intelligible. In other words, the imagery considered here demonstrates how ambivalent or polysemous ‘national’ symbols are. Underlying the political struggle over the CSSTA was a symbolic struggle to define the nation.

The resulting analysis offers novel contributions to research on politics and social movements in Taiwan, to the study of nationalism, and to the application of visual analysis in both of these fields. First, this project elaborates the relationship between the SM and the question of Taiwanese national identity. Other studies have noted the role of anti-Chinese attitudes in the SM (Au, 2017; F.-Y. Chen & Yen, 2017; Hsu, 2017). My analysis indicates a more complex picture: while the SM imagery does reproduce Taiwanese identity defined in contradistinction with Chinese identity, it also shifts the conceptual boundaries of those identities in novel ways. These images do not simply reject Chinese identity, but selectively appropriate conventionally ‘Chinese’ symbols and localize them. Such moves allow the SM images to challenge the KMT at its symbolic core: the equation of the KMT party with the ROC state. On a more general level, based on imageries studied, this project suggests that the common conceptions of national identity have been undergoing a generational change in Taiwan. For many of those born before 1980 Taiwanese identity was primarily defined in opposition to a KMT vision of Chinese identity, including its symbols, heroes, and history. In
contrast, the SM images discussed here represent ‘Chineseness’ as synonymous with the PRC. There is no sense of contradiction between ROC symbols and Taiwanese identity in these images, because both are represented in contradistinction with that PRC Chinese identity. Symbols such as the ROC flag or Sun Yat-sen do not carry the same Chinese nationalist significance for this younger generation, in part because they have been effectively indigenized as symbols of Taiwan. Such a shift in how national identity is understood has political implications beyond the CSSTA debate. Political leaders who cling to increasingly anachronistic ideas of ‘Taiwanese’ and ‘Chinese’ identity do so at their own risk. This message was sent to the KMT not only by the SM and its supporters in March 2014, but by the electorate at ballot boxes later that year and again in 2016 and 2020, where the KMT continued to struggle. This project also adds to the analysis of framing processes, or collection action frames, which are key dynamics in contemporary social movement theory (Snow & Benford, 1988, 2000b). I have demonstrated how SM imagery framed the issue (the CSSTA), its purported causes (Ma Ying-jeou), and the proposed solutions (direct democratic action and civil disobedience) through an overtly nationalist lens. This complements other studies of the SM from a social movement perspective which focus on political opportunities and mobilization strategies (M. Ho, 2015, 2018), public opinion (C. K. S. Wu, 2019; Y. Wu & Hsieh, 2014), the role of social media (Hsiao & Yang, 2018; Tsatsou, 2018), or media representation of the movement (Brindle, 2015), but which have neglected the framing strategies used by SM and their explicitly nationalist character.

Drawing from the empirical context of Taiwan and emphasizing visual representation, the present study offers support to the theoretical proposition that nations and national identity are contingent and ongoing processes, not substantive entities or fixed properties (Brubaker, 1994, p. 6; De Cillia et al., 1999, p. 154; Duara, 1996, pp. 8–10). My analysis of the contrasts between the SM and MAC imagery shows how nations are constituted through ongoing and contested visual processes of representation and interpretation. As my use of social semiotic analysis makes clear, even seemingly self-evident national symbols can take on radically
different significance depending on the context and composition in which they appear. As my study has shown, contestation can be more complex than simply reiterating conventional connotations in order to critique them, such as burning a national flag might convey. Rather, I have argued that images which resignify national symbols, such as flags, figures from history, and territory both reproduce and alter underlying conceptions of the nation they purport to represent. Images do not merely reflect an imagined community. Rather, they are acts of imagining (and re-imagining) the national community. The SM imagery does more than assert a pre-existing notion of Taiwanese identity against a similarly preconceived Chinese identity. Instead, it shifts the conceptual boundaries of those identities so that some actions, actors, and values fall into the ‘national’ frame, while others are de-nationalized.

My analysis examines the three most common motifs used to articulate these contested conceptions of national identity in the SM imagery. In Chapter 4 I considered the surprising ambiguity of the ROC flag. This chapter highlighted the ways in which the context and composition of an image can have a major impact on the preferred reading of national symbols, even those with deeply sedimented connotations. In this way, the present analysis directly addresses the polysemy and ambiguity of seemingly self-evident national symbols by focusing on how a single symbol, the national flag, can be a powerful symbol for both sides of a contentious political debate. Through most of its century long history, the flag had epitomized the KMT’s efforts to blur the lines between the KMT party, the ROC state, and the Chinese nation. In the current political system of competitive multi-party elections, KMT imagery has continued to simultaneously draw upon and reinforce these associations. My analysis shows how this goes beyond rejecting the flag as representing the ‘wrong’ nation, as earlier Taiwanese independence movements have. Unlike other opponents to the KMT, the SM imagery discussed actively embraces the ROC flag, going so far as to raise it as a symbol of resistance against the party that created it. Changing the composition of the flag turns the KMT’s party-state-nation equation into a critique by reframing it as a question: is this administration really protecting ROC sovereignty? Is their nation the same as our nation? Is the KMT trying to align the political
unit (the ROC) with the national unit as we understand it, or with an anachronistic notion of the Chinese nation? By problematizing the symbolic association of the KMT and the ROC flag, the SM images open a conceptual space in which it is possible to lay claim to the symbolic capital of the official national flag. This contestation is also more complex than each side simply claiming to be a more authentic voice of the nation represented by the flag. The SM flag imagery poses a significantly different national identity as the referent of the ROC flag from that of the KMT. The Taiwan case is especially useful for exploring such efforts at resignification precisely because the connotation of the ROC flag as a symbol of official Chinese nationalism has been so heavily and intentionally sedimented both through formal institutions and informal conventions.

In Chapter 5, I turn from the ambiguity of signifiers to the ambiguity of the signified concept by identifying how the SM and MAC imagery differently draw on history to construct ‘Chinese’ identity. Where the MAC imagery represents Chinese identity as encompassing Taiwanese identity, the SM images evoke ‘Chineseness’ in contradistinction to Taiwanese identity. However, the SM images also appropriate figures strongly associated with Chinese history and embed them instead in a narrative of Taiwanese national identity. The ambiguity of identity categories is easily overlooked when focusing on words, such as in surveys that ask respondents to self-identify as ‘Chinese’ or ‘Taiwanese’ without unpacking those categories. Visual representations add a greater degree of particularity because of the ways they concretize abstract concepts through visual metaphors – representing ‘the nation’ as a person, place, or object with its own connotations. Many MAC images use Sun Yat-sen in a similar way to the ROC flag: to evoke the KMT’s long connection with the nation, in this case its founding father. More subtly, the MAC imagery also uses designs reminiscent of classical Chinese aesthetics. Appearing extensively in promotional materials for the ECFA and CSSTA, this design choice frames cross-straits trade agreements as outcomes of a common Chinese history. This approach contrasts with that of the SM imagery, which uses symbols and styles associated with Chinese history as markers of difference. The Chinese historical narrative is distinguished from the democratic narrative of Taiwan, the latter having its own heroic figures. Notably, however, in a
complex symbolic move the SM imagery also lays claim to the sedimented political legitimacy attached to Sun’s image while simultaneously resignifying him as a key figure in that democratic narrative. Such images appear alongside others which deploy symbolic references to Chinese history in order to satirize or critique the KMT and Ma Ying-jeou as not authentically Taiwanese. A closer look at such images, however, shows that they rely on allusions to authoritarian political figures, suggesting a more nuanced relationship between Chinese histories and contemporary Taiwan. Other studies have noted that people in Taiwan will identify as Chinese in some situations and not in others, depending on social context (M. Chang, 2000; M. J. Brown, 2004). My analysis shows that a similar contingency informs visual representations in expressly political contexts, such as a protest movement. ‘Chineseness’ is not a static concept which must be accepted or rejected in toto, but rather an array of symbolic resources which are individually vulnerable to resignification.

Finally, Chapter 6 considered how MAC and SM images use representations of geographic space to frame Taiwan in relation to the rest of the world. As in the preceding chapters, my analysis shows how seemingly similar signifiers can articulate dramatically different conceptions of national identity depending on the context in which they appear. The MAC imagery consistently shows logo-maps which downplay or even actively distract from geopolitical questions, particularly the PRC’s and ROC’s competing claims over Taiwan as part of their sovereign territory. This is accomplished by positioning Taiwan in a borderless and interconnected world, literally and figuratively obscuring the Chinese mainland and the competing territorial claims that complicate economic and political rapprochement. As these geopolitical tensions lay at the heart of the SM’s concerns with the CSSTA, it is not surprising that the PRC features prominently in SM images. Logo-maps of Taiwan are territorialized – marked as political space – through juxtaposition with both logo-maps and symbols of the PRC. The compositions of the images convey an alternate pattern of territorialization emphasizing a profound sense of uniqueness, even isolation, of the island, while anchoring the image in references to democracy. The continual repetition of this motif frames Taiwan as a nation
based on its democratic values and institutions, rather than ‘Chinese’ culture or history. Representing the physical space of the nation thus achieves more than simply demarcating territorial claims. The logo-maps considered in this chapter reveal underlying conceptions of which principles or values define the national community, and which presumably ought to inform its relationships with other nations. Maps and logo-maps can thus be a powerful visual indicator of how people see their place in the world.

Contributions

This project presents a sustained engagement with the role of national identity in the SM, a relationship which has by and large received only passing attention. As my analysis shows, the SM actively engaged in the (re)construction of national identity. The imagery produced by the SM suggests new formulations of what constitutes both Chinese and Taiwanese identity, even while it remains constrained by those same categories and by the underlying ideology that the nation is the most legitimate political unit. Previous research on the SM has focused on the institutional and organizational factors that shaped the trajectory of the movement and its objectives. Factional divisions within the ruling KMT created political opportunities which the SM was able to exploit (M. Ho, 2015, 2019a), while both the demands issued by the SM and the tactics used during the occupation were deeply influenced by tensions between the many different interest groups which participated (Hsu, 2017; Martin, 2015; C.-M. Wang, 2017). When scholars have engaged with the impact of national identity on the SM, it has been approached as the political backdrop of the SM’s demands to suspend the CSSTA (F.-Y. Chen & Yen, 2017; Hsu, 2017). In contrast, this project has sought to foreground national identity as the object of study against the background context of the SM. While the SM images do draw on symbols with deeply sedimented connotations of Taiwanese or Chinese identity, in many cases the context or composition of the images problematize those connotations. By no means does the SM imagery reject or displace national identity categories; the valorization of ‘Taiwanese’ and the denigration of ‘Chinese’ is a central theme in this imagery. However, repeatedly
contesting the connotations of national symbols also shift the boundaries of those associated identity categories. This is most evident in the appropriation of the ROC flag and figures such as Sun Yat-sen, but also in images which make democracy a definitive feature of a Taiwanese territorial imaginary. These subtle strategies of symbolic contestation are easily missed in studies which take national identities as givens. Moreover, while the MAC imagery represents Taiwan as integrated into the flows and connections of the global economy, the SM imagery – particularly the map-logo images of Taiwan – can be seen as a defensive reinscribing of nationalist territoriality in response to those same global economic forces. Again, a singular reading of visual symbols overlooks a critical site of political debate, in which different visions of the nation and its place in the world are articulated and challenged. In order to understand the ebb and flow of different conceptions of national identity circulating in society, it is essential to look beyond simply which symbols (verbal or visual) are used to evoke ‘the nation,’ and how often. We must also pay attention to how different political actors compete over how ‘the nation’ is to be understood. These competitions are important because creating symbolic associations with the ideal of ‘the nation’ frames certain policies and political actors as more legitimate than others.

The present study demonstrates that visual materials are especially useful sites to explore the contestation of national identities. National identity is more than a simple policy preference or survey checkbox. It is a kind of political habitus – a set of both conscious and unconscious attitudes and assumptions about how the world is organized and how to behave in it. The analysis of visual materials is an underutilized way to access the implicit attitudes and dispositions which inform how national identities are represented. Communication is increasingly visual, in no small part because technology has significantly reduced the cost of producing and disseminating images. And yet the tools for analyzing this mode of communication are far less developed than discourse analysis. While we are taught critical reading and listening from early in our education, both in the academy and in everyday life we are less practiced at critical viewing. As I have shown, national symbols stand in for different
and sometimes opposing conceptions of who constitutes ‘the nation’ and what rights and obligations that such membership entails (see also Duara, 1996, p. 18), but this tension is obfuscated by the visual similarity of the signifier itself. My choice of a visual methodology thus serves two ends. First, it gives us one window into the implicit assumptions about the nation that make these images intelligible while at the same time reproducing and reinforcing those assumptions. Second, this dissertation contributes to the development of theoretical and methodological tools for a more fine-grained and context-sensitive visual analysis in political science and nationalism studies.

As with other abstract concepts, national identity is reproduced in images through metonymic and metaphorical symbols. Such symbols are most effective when they are easy to distinguish and recognize at a glance, through a combination of visual simplicity and constant reiteration.140 We cannot show an entire nation (however conceived) on a single page, so something must always stand in for it—a flag, a face, a map. In semiotic terms, the nation cannot be denoted, so its representation is always in the realm of connotation. As I discussed in Chapter 4, the power of national symbols stems in part from how they make dissimilar things similar by the very act of marking them as ‘national’. Visual symbols are particularly well suited to representing the nation because they give the literal appearance of singularity and homogeneity to variegated and heterogenous populations.

However, this necessity presents an opportunity to explore different conceptions of the nation, because the choice of what stands in for the nation in any given instance also undermines the ambiguity of national identity. Replacing the word ‘Taiwan’ with a ROC flag on a “I [heart] Taiwan” souvenir, for example, suggests a particular range of connotations for the concept ‘Taiwan’ which the spoken or written word leaves open to interpretation. Using a logo-map of the island instead would suggest a subtly different range of connotations. Because visual symbols are mimetic—they look like the objects they represent—they also include clues

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140 Many symbols such as national flags become recognizable through both simplicity and repetition, as I discuss in Chapter 4 (see also Billig, 1995).
as to what underlying principles are being invoked to circumscribe the nation. Unpacking the context and composition of images which include such symbols lays bare the often-implicit assumptions and tensions inherent in this alchemical slight-of-hand.

By no means does this mimetic quality completely resolve the inherent ambiguity of national identity into a single uncontestable signification. The meaning of abstract symbols such as flags is especially slippery, but my analysis has shown how even more concrete signifiers are vulnerable to creative resignification. Nonetheless, abstract art aside, the mimetic nature of visual images entails a concretization of what are typically abstract notions of national identity. This makes visual analysis useful for trying to ‘pin down’ what national identity means to different people and in particular contexts.

The context, composition, and symbolic content of images directly influence how conceptions of national identity are constructed and reproduced. Content has received the most scholarly attention, mostly through the study of the inclusion of symbols conventionally associated with a given nation. Which flags are flown, which faces appear on currency, which landscapes are deemed iconic, all reinforce certain ways of imagining the nation as more authentic or legitimate than others. Context too, has received some consideration, mostly in terms of looking at how symbols of a nation are used to infuse a space or event with national significance. Less attention has been given to how context directs the interpretation of visual symbols themselves. This is even more true with regards to the impact of visual composition on the preferred reading of images which include conventionally ‘national’ content. The relationships between elements in an image which direct the preferred reading of its national content require analytical tools quite different from those commonly used to analyse linear, non-mimetic communications such as speech and text. By using a social semiotic framework, the present analysis has shown how context and composition interact to shape the reproduction of national identity in images.

My analysis of the imagery produced during the SM shows that these three factors – content, context, and composition – interact to reproduce a range of national identities. On one
hand, the sheer frequency of conventionally nationalist symbols in SM imagery – from flags to
historical heroes to territory – indicates that nationalism as an ideology (in the Gellnerian
sense) or as a bounded political community (in the Andersonian sense) remains the basic
principle of political organization. National symbols are not infinitely open to interpretation.
Indeed, that would undermine their usefulness as symbols of the nation. The SM did not appeal
to cosmopolitan, post-national values, but to international (Wilsonian) norms of national self-
determination. The images considered here never problematize the opposition between
Taiwanese and Chinese as categories. While the images question what constitutes
‘Chineseness’, they nonetheless reproduce the idea that ‘China’ is the Other by which ‘Taiwan’
is understood. So although the SM imagery demonstrates a novel strategy of contesting the
margins of national identity, it does not radically reject such identities. Ambiguity does not
mean that national symbols are floating or ‘empty’ signifiers, open to infinite interpretation and
reinterpretation. In contesting the nature or boundaries of the nation, these images reproduce
a deeper ideological nationalism that is based on the premise that bounded nations are the
fundamental unit of political life.

On the other hand, within that ideological framework the SM imagery consistently and
forcefully contested the official conception of Taiwan’s national identity using many of the
same symbols as the government. That is, the national identity question was contested mainly
at the level of signification – a competition over what symbols mean rather than which
signifiers to use. This is an indication that nationalist imagery remains a powerful tool for
political mobilization. This contest over signification is most evident when comparing MAC and
SM imagery. MAC images rely heavily on sedimented connotations, reproducing well-worn
associations between the KMT, the ROC, and a historical narrative of Chinese national identity.
In contrast, the SM imagery often relies on the pointedly unconventional context of a LY
occupied by protestors rather than legislators to raise questions about the national symbols it
so frequently displays. This is most evident in the remediated images of the LY chambers
discussed in Chapter 5, but informs all of the images discussed.
The analysis presented here further highlights the limitations of purely quantitative measures of aggregate national identity, both in Taiwanese studies and in general. This is a methodological oversight common in both textual and visual approaches to national identity. As with checkboxes on a survey, counting symbols such as flags may give a hint of the prevalence of nationalism as a general ideology, but alone it cannot take into account the vital influence of context (e.g., Dumitrice, 2019; Pottie-Sherman & Wilkes, 2016; Skey, 2017). The ambiguity of national identity makes any given instance of identifying with a nation, visually or verbally, a highly contingent act. If we wish to understand the ebb and flow of national sentiment, with all of its political consequences, we must look at trends in signification, not just signifiers. Counting the number of flags, or portraits of a founding figure, or maps of national territory, reveals very little about what those symbols are being used to signify. Worse yet, treating such conventional symbols as fixed signifiers of ‘the nation’ reproduces the myth that there is a single, essential national identity to be represented in the first place.

This project also offers an important counterpoint to top-down approaches to understanding national identity. On one hand it shows that not only did the official identity narratives of the Ma Ying-jeou administration at the time of the SM fail to connect with (or convince) the general public, but that its symbols can be turned back against the government as a form of critique. On the other hand, the SM case clearly demonstrates that the visual construction of national identity is deeply contested. Although this imagery is only one site of visual representation at the time of the protest, it highlights the importance of analyzing bottom-up or dissenting uses of national symbols if we wish to develop a fuller picture of the processes and dynamics of national identity construction and reproduction in any given case. This is especially true for research in the visual construction of national identity, where far more attention has been given to media controlled by the state, such as currency (e.g., Gilbert, 1998; Unwin & Hewitt, 2001) or stamps (Brunn, 2001) than to bottom-up imagery. Citizens do not passively reproduce the official narrative of national identity, even when they rely on the same symbols as the government. There are countless studies of separatist movements which have
rejected an official national identity and proposed an alternative one. This study has focused on contestation at the less studied symbolic level, showing that nationalist movements may challenge what national symbols signify as much as the official signifiers themselves. So, while it is important to pay close attention to how official discourse and policy seeks to shape national identity, it is equally important to develop analytical tools to look at how members of the public respond to those top-down identity narratives. The present study offers a partial, but significant window into what some of these those bottom up responses looked like in Taiwan during the SM. More broadly, this project demonstrates one effective approach to the empirical study of national identity ‘from below’. As Jon Fox (2017) has noted, one difficulty in researching nationalism ‘from below’ is that it is often difficult to ascertain the implicit attitudes and latent beliefs in the general public. One solution is ethnographic observation. Another possibility is to look at ‘breaches’ – situations where the contradictions between different conceptions of national identity come to the foreground. The SM is a prime example of such a breach. The contrasting use of national symbols in the SM and MAC images reveals profoundly different understandings of Taiwan’s national identity.

Finally, on a theoretical level, I have sought to unpack national symbols by teasing out the relationship between signifiers and signifieds. I have done this by showing how conventional symbols of the nation can connote differing conceptions of what that nation is. This relationship between the signifier and signified is mediated by the composition of the image and the context in which it appears. The 'preferred reading' or most salient connotations are malleable. Each of the empirical chapters examined how many of the same signifiers appear in both the SM and MAC imagery to frame their respective position on cross-strait trade agreements. And yet what is signified in each are opposing conceptions of national identity. As I discussed previously, an important implication of this is that national symbols are so powerful precisely due to their ambiguity: they can mean different things to different people while maintaining the surface appearance of commonality. It is only when contradictory interpretations come into
direct conflict, such as in a political struggle over a specific policy, that internal contradictions become apparent.

Limitations

My analysis is partial, in multiple senses of the word. The public.318.io archive is quite extensive, but not exhaustive. To the best of my knowledge it was not curated or selected, but rather volunteers gathered whatever materials were on site on the last day of the SM (Hsiau A-chin, personal communication, December 4, 2017). However, this necessarily leaves out materials which were destroyed over the course of the occupation, or kept by participants. On the other hand, images which were reproduced en masse are more likely to have at least one copy in the collection than single, handmade images (such as the two oil paintings discussed in Chapter 5, for example). As such, it is likely that some images which would complicate (or reinforce) my analysis were simply not available to be analysed.

Additionally, I selected my sample image sets based on thematic relevance to the question of national identity, rather than through a rigorous random sampling of the entire public.318.io archive of images. While I have sought to complement my interpretive analysis by using content analysis to establish the frequency of the motifs and themes in question, the aim has never been to perform a statistically significant quantitative study. Thus, what the project gains in depth and nuance, it sacrifices in generalizability. For example, my research has shown that it is possible in contemporary Taiwan to understand ROC symbols as distinct from – or even opposed to – Chinese national identity. Otherwise many of the images discussed throughout this dissertation would be largely unintelligible. That should not be taken as a claim about what conceptions of national identity are most prevalent in Taiwanese society more generally, or even in a given demographic of Taiwanese society. One of my central arguments has been that the interpretation of national symbols depends heavily on context, in this case the context of a protest against a cross-strait trade agreement. That does not mean that we should read subsequent appearances of the ROC flag or Sun Yat-sen as markers of anti-KMT or anti-Chinese
sentiment, any more than we should read them as inextricably associated with the KMT or Chinese national identity. Attempting to extrapolate a definitive picture of contemporary Taiwanese identity from the analysis I have presented would not only be unjustified, but contrary to the entire premise of the project; that national identity is an ambiguous, contingent, and contested process.

Similarly, the comparison of the MAC and SM images comes with certain caveats. While this comparison is useful for highlighting general trends, they are also not perfectly matched datasets. The MAC documents cover a six-year period and a range of cross-strait topics, while the SM images represent a much narrower window in terms of both time and subject matter. The context of the SM imagery was thus much more clearly defined. At the same time, unlike the decentralized and improvised SM materials, government publications are typically produced and approved as part of a well-defined public relations strategy which is beyond the scope of the present study. My analysis has sought to identify general tendencies in framing, but in light of these very different production contexts, claims regarding ‘the government narrative’ and ‘the SM narrative’ should not be overstated.

A related limitation is that the SM images are almost all anonymous. This makes it impossible to draw conclusions about the people who made the images and the social conditions that inform their stylistic choices. We know that the majority of the participants of the SM were urban university students, but sizable minorities from other age groups and educational backgrounds also participated (W. Chen, 2014). Thus, while it seems plausible that the national identity manifest in the SM imagery represents a perspective more prevalent in the post-1980 generation, we should not assume a direct correlation between age and attitudes. The extent to which SM imagery represented perspectives marginalized by previous conceptions of Taiwanese identity, including Hakka and Aboriginal ethnic groups or rural populations, is also unclear. Similarly, the present study does not consider how different audiences respond to and make sense of images. While I have focused on polysemy inherent in the semiotic encoding of images, as Morley (1999, p. 151-2) demonstrated in his ground-
breaking work on television audiences, the *decoding* of images also entails active interpretation where viewers may resist or even reject preferred readings. The widespread support for the SM cannot be taken as a wholesale public endorsement of the conceptions of national identity explored here. My attention to the composition of images and the context of their circulation is not intended to offer a definitive reading. Such a reading would foreclose questions about their reception. Rather, problematizing the notion that national symbols have a single, self-evident meaning (or referent) at the site of the image also implies that there are multiple legitimate interpretations of those symbols at the site of the audience. However, attempting to explore polysemy at both the encoding and decoding stage in the same project would lead to more confusion than clarity, I suspect. Investigating the reception of SM imagery by different audiences is one promising direction for future research, but beyond the scope of the current project.

Finally, I am neither a native speaker of Chinese nor native of Taiwan. I approach the material here as a cultural outsider. As such, without a doubt there are cultural nuances and connotations which I have missed, and other ways in which I have ascribed connotations that make sense from a White Canadian cultural perspective, but have little resonance in the original social context. This is a work of translation, both from a Taiwanese to a Canadian cultural milieu and from image into text. And like all translations, something is inevitably lost in the process. My hope that something is also gained in terms of our broader understanding of the dynamics of national identity and the importance of visual communication in reproducing these identities, both in Taiwan and beyond.

**Directions for Future Research**

The limitations of this project also present a number of opportunities for future research. As mentioned above, for theoretical and practical reasons the authorship of individual artworks was not a factor taken into account in my analysis. I purposefully chose the image as my site of analysis, but it is equally valid to analyse images at the site of production or consumption – the
A study based on interviews would offer insights into the artistic intention of the creators of specific works, telling us more about the degree to which claims of national identity was a conscious factor in design choices. Conversely, as I mention above, the present study does not address how different audiences responded to the SM imagery. Interviews or focus groups with participants, aimed at understanding their interpretations of the images, could also offer insights into the effectiveness of national symbolism in evoking particular responses.

The visual methodology used in the present study can also be extended to numerous other cases. The social semiotic approach used here offers a systematic method for analyzing visual materials in the social sciences, one which is neither purely quantitative nor narrowly ideographic. In-depth case studies in other locations would provide useful bases for comparison and more general theorizing of visual materials in the construction and reproduction of national identities. Hong Kong, where a similar tension between local and Chinese identity is playing out, would be an especially pertinent comparison. Similarly, a visual approach applied to the case of nationalism within the PRC may reveal tensions between official and popular conceptions of nation. This methodology could also help researchers avoid many potential ethical and practical difficulties that arise in doing human participant research (e.g., interviews or focus groups) on politically charged topics, particularly in authoritarian countries.

In the context of Taiwan, comparisons across time are especially promising avenues of research. Looking at the changes in nationally charged symbols between DPP and KMT administrations would complement other, existing discussions of the discursive framing of national identity. As I have briefly mentioned, a number of studies have briefly touched on visual material used in Taiwan’s extremely colorful political campaigns, and a more sustained study of these materials is also a promising area of research. Alternately, comparing the visual

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141 Some possibilities include some of the artists mentioned in this study who have spoken publicly about their artwork during the SM, including Chen Zhiliao aka Lao Dan (elements of Figure 4.1), Yung-Chen (Aaron) Nieh (Figure 6.14), Liu Tseng-Jung (Figure 5.12), and Cheng Jing-yuan (Figure 5.10).
materials of the SM with those of previous major protests (the 1990 White Lily movement, for example, or the 2006 “Million Voices Against Corruption” campaign), would offer insights into the changing visual conceptions of national identity used as justifications for political protest.

**Concluding Thoughts**

As my analysis has shown, images containing national symbols do not simply re-present a static and self-evident national identity, but participate in active contestation over how national identity is understood – its content, boundaries and values, origins and collective future. These images show us how people see the nation, both in the sense of presenting an explicit perspective on what the nation is (or should be) and the implicit understandings of what the nation is (or should be) that make the image intelligible. In the case of Taiwan, my research findings echo others who suggest that a categorical distinction between ‘Chinese’ and ‘Taiwanese’ is too simplistic (e.g., M. Chang, 2000). Such a distinction implies that those identities are fixed and discrete from each other. Rather than reify such categories by treating them as self-evident units for analysis, it is useful to consider how people use these categories (Brubaker et al., 2006, p. 11). What criteria of inclusion and exclusion are implied and how are boundaries defined? What values are valorized and which behaviours or policies are justified? Which histories are elevated, and which erased or rejected as foreign? The MAC’s imagery implies a particular vision which locates Taiwan within a larger (and somewhat ambiguous) Chinese national identity as well as in a globalized economy. The SM imagery counters with appeals to a distinctly Taiwanese national identity, asserting an affinity with other democratic political communities. And yet this was not simply a rote reproduction of the conceptions of Taiwanese identity which informed TIM activists in the 1980s, or the ‘New Taiwan consciousness’ of Chen Shui-bian’s DPP. In reiterating claims of Taiwanese identity (and accusations of Chinese identity), the SM images make small but significant shifts in the conceptual boundaries of those two concepts at the centre of contemporary Taiwanese political life.
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