Imagined Communities of ‘Whiteness’: Racial-Nationalist Origins of Settler-State Formation in Argentina and Canada, 1840–1914

Jessica Evans

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Graduate Program in Political Science
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Abstract
This dissertation sits at the intersection of critical international political economy and a decolonizing, anti-racist approach to empirical political science. Specifically, I examine how liberal state forms are presupposed by and premised upon illiberal practices of sorting, policing, and defining populations. Rather than view such practices as anomalous to the modern state form, I view them as productive. I depart from the dominant literature in this field of study (postcolonial theory) with a typical focus on discursive and local practices, and instead advance a defense of Marxism rooted in an examination of the material practices of states responding to global political-economic pressures. This analytical and methodological focus stems from an engagement with the theoretical and empirical work conducted through Political Marxism, and through an engagement with the concept of uneven and combined development.

I compare instances of racialized nation-building from the nineteenth century, focusing on the ways in which the creation of racialized hierarchies of belonging were seminal to the production of liberal state capacity and legitimacy. I examine the cases of Canada and Argentina to explore how the dispossession and management of indigenous peoples served to foment vast networks of bureaucratic, fiduciary, and coercive state capacities. Such capacities were necessary in the project of constructing competitive liberal economies to respond to pressures generated by an emergent global market in agricultural goods. This work sheds new light on the role of race and racialization in the formation of the nation-state system, while responding to and contesting common assumptions about the legal equality assumed to underpin Western nationalism(s).
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As with the paths of state formation I trace out in this dissertation, my road to completion has been far from linear. The final product has been the result of many reformulations, tangents, and circuitous processes of trial and error. Throughout this, my supervisor Hannes Lacher has been there to discuss, refine, redirect, and work through this circuitous path with me. Through the early days of backyard thesis discussion groups, to later Skype conferences spanning time zones, Hannes has been instrumental in guiding me towards greater precision, clarity, and theoretical rigour. Many thanks and gratitude are also in order for David McNally. David has been a constant source of assurance, a repository of information and inspiration, and a gentle and generous interlocutor. Finally, I am deeply grateful to Dennis Pilon for stepping in at a late stage.

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Since the early 1970s, following significant transformation a post-racial, colour-blind rhetoric has come to dominate North American, and more broadly Western European understanding of self (see for example Bonilla-Silva, 2006; Goldberg, 2008; Lentin & Titley, 2011). Whether through concepts such as multiculturalism or the melting pot, a widespread belief is that race no longer constitutes a salient category of inclusion or exclusion in Western democratic nation-states. While critics of this position emerged early on, the idea of post-racialism has dominated official policy, media, entertainment, and school curriculum. Over the past decade, following the global financial crisis, the spectre of racialized violence and oppression has become increasingly visible and is now acknowledged outside of the critical circles of academia and activism. Recent developments in Europe (the rise of the far right, racist and xenophobic political campaigning in Britain, France, and Greece, among others), in the United States (the increasingly publicized murder of black community members by police forces, the election of Donald Trump with his promises of border walls and immigration policies to deport and detain Mexican and Muslim populations, and the recent white supremacist violence in Charlottesville), and in Canada (draconian immigration and deportation policies, white nationalist organizing, proposals from Conservative party leadership candidate Kelly Leitch to institute a Canadian ‘values test’ for immigrants) have all served as potent examples of the virulence of racialized oppression today.

However, despite recognition of the contemporary rise in racist and xenophobic organizing, there has been a tendency to continue to treat such phenomena as either a) an historically contingent development, stemming from the current manifestation of neoliberal
capitalism, b) the violence of ‘traditional’ holdovers, or c) the acts of aberrant individuals/organizations (the so-called ‘bad apple’ thesis). What implicitly underpins these kinds of analyses, however, is the bourgeois assumption that liberal capitalist democracies are de facto premised on equality of citizenship—that is, equal political and legal rights and freedoms. Thus, when characteristically illiberal practices emerge, they are read as either an individual aberration (in the West) or a vestige of ‘backward tradition’ (in the ‘non-West’) (Mann, 2004, 3-4, 18). Western democracies, however, are steeped in and premised upon fundamentally illiberal practices (Mann, 2004, 4). Motivating the historical analysis that will be the subject of this dissertation is my strong belief that to grasp the contemporary moment, including the rise of overt, xenophobic racism, it is necessary to understand the foundational role that markers of political and juridical difference have had in the constitutions of ‘liberal’ forms of rule. It is necessary to grasp the violence\(^1\) and limitations on marginalized groups’ economic, political and juridical freedoms today, not as a rupture in liberal rule, but as continuous with and fundamental to the nature of liberal statehood.

Considering the above, there are two related problems to attend to. The first is to account for variability in liberal capitalist state forms,\(^2\) while the second is to account for the fundamentally illiberal premises that underpin such state forms. If liberalism is, theoretically, a rule that operates from the principle of the freedom and equality of abstract individuals, there is limited capacity for the political state to intervene in the social relations and arrangements of its citizens, and little political or economic significance attributable to cultural differences (Losurdo,\(^1\) Following Mann (2004, 12), I understand violence to involve not only physical repression, murder, and genocide, but also institutional forms of coercion, which in my cases will include things like forced cultural assimilation, legal segregation, expulsion, and so forth.\(^2\) That is, in general, it is necessary to demonstrate how the liberal state form under capitalism has always been ideologically and institutionally differentiated. The ‘laissez faire’ model of the state under British industrial capitalism has been the exception rather than the rule.
Accordingly, should we read those states that manifest politically mediated inequality of status amongst citizens as ‘illiberal’? If so, do we then read these spaces as self-consciously evoking liberalism while practicing despotism?

The position that this dissertation takes in response to these questions is in the negative. I will argue that ‘illiberalism,’ or violent, interventionist, and coercive state practices to divide and order populations, is consistent with, indeed productive of, liberalism. For if the commitment to equality contained within liberalism was simply vacuous and insincere, “it would not succeed in inspiring people and generating real social activity, and would be condemned to impotence” (Losurdo, 2011, 40). The exclusions, interventions, and inequalities contained within liberalism do not indicate a fundamental ‘ruse’ of the philosophy (Uday, 1997, 61). Rather, the idea of formal equality has always been presupposed by a privileging of a range of psycho-social qualities (i.e. ‘rationality,’ individualism, thrift, market adherence, etc.) (Uday, 1997, 62), and the capacity to exert these qualities has itself always been presupposed by the exclusion and domination of one group in the service of another (Losurdo, 2011, 35; Mann, 2004, 56; Sayer and Corrigan, 6; Uday, 1997, 63).

Domenico Losurdo’s analysis of liberalism and slavery’s twin birth confirms this thesis. Through an impressively researched ‘counter-history’ Losurdo argues that liberalism in England and in the US was established through and in tandem with the rise of chattel slavery: “Slavery is not something that persisted despite the success of the three liberal revolutions. On the contrary, it experienced its maximum development following that success” (Losurdo, 2011, 35). Scholars of Antebellum slavery such as David Roediger (2007) and Barbara Fields (1990) implicitly confirm this idea. For them, slavery and notions of racial difference developed alongside conceptions of liberty for white property holders and later indentured servants. For Roediger and
Fields, this duality was owing to a need to break up class collaboration amongst servants and slaves, wherein liberty was promised as the exclusive purchase of ‘whiteness’ and as a result led to different strategic considerations for black slaves and white servants. For Losurdo, the explanation lies in the rise of modern property rights, wherein the erosion of absolute, centralized despotic power led to its concentration in the hands of individuals as property owners. This allowed for the individual, discretionary exercise of authority over slaves, creating substantive distinctions in the liberty of populations (2011, 39).

At the core of either of the above analyses is the essential argument that liberalism (as universal equality) rests upon the fiction of a homogenous population. In the context of real, material inequality and difference, liberalism must fabricate its foundational universalism. This occurs through violence and coercion, elimination and assimilation (Mann, 2004, 5). Homogenization and universalization do not occur in a power vacuum; rather, they always involve the elevation of a dominant group’s conditions of rule and consciousness (Sayer and Corrigan, 6). In fact, despite liberalism’s fetishization of the ‘individual,’ “the rights and regulation of groups have actually been more central for liberal democracy” (Mann, 2004, 5). This has meant an inherent formulation of “the citizen body as being internally stratified. Indeed, citizens’ rights were at this time also stratified, since the people were entitled to ‘active’ citizenship, while the populace enjoyed only ‘passive’ citizenship” (Mann, 2004, 56).

The arguments addressed above are important in that they weave together ideological and material currents of liberalism, class power, property, and production. This is a critical counter-point to what are, otherwise, potent critiques of political economy, which suggest that materialism inhibits anything but a superficial explanation of culture (specifically, I am concerned with postcolonial critiques). In this dissertation, I extend these histories of the illiberal
constitution of liberalism through an analysis of the settler-colonial Atlantic world. I will argue that settler colonies were materially and ideologically condensed through institutionalized hierarchies of belonging predicated on ‘white nationalism.’ The formation and policing of a white national identity was deployed as a means to liberal capitalist state development, and these exclusionary premises of belonging were central to the legitimization, centralization, and consolidation of fiscal, coercive, and administrative state apparatuses.

To accomplish this task, I turn to a comparative study of Argentine and Canadian national-state development throughout the nineteenth century. The comparison is instructive for many reasons; perhaps most importantly because, despite the fact that both states are founded on indigenous genocide and dispossession, and both states erected a racialized conception of nationhood vis-à-vis a grammar of ‘whiteness,’ Argentina is often read in terms of the failure of liberalism, while Canada is viewed through a framework of liberal triumphalism. For example, a seminal historian of Argentine state-building, David Rock (1985), tends to see Argentina’s long path of militarism as rooted in the legacy of Spanish colonialism, and particularly, caudillo rule read as ‘pre-modern’ power relations, while scholars of Canada, such as Ian McKay (2010), have viewed state consolidation as occurring through a form of passive (bourgeois) revolution from above. I challenge both of these readings by demonstrating that so-called liberal and illiberal modalities of rule have been inextricably bound into the modern project of liberal-state building.3

3 My distinction between liberal and illiberal policies and practices should be qualified. I am of the belief that liberalism, from its genesis, has always required illiberal strategies (indeed, I show precisely this in Chapter Two). However, my distinction is between the ‘formal’ understandings of liberal/illiberal practice. Thus increasing state intervention/manipulation, while consistent with liberal practice empirically, was not formally part of its ideological moorings. That state builders in the case studies I examine adopted both formally liberal strategies, and combined them with outwardly, formally illiberal practices, is the problem to which I attend. In pursuing a developmental strategy that valorized British laissez-faire principles, why was it that these state builders adopted strategies fundamentally antithetical to such principles?
Moreover, my cases are chosen for the form of state they represent; namely both countries can be broadly understood as ‘settler colonies,’ which are instructive spaces for my argument. It is in the settler colony that processes of national state and capital formation were simultaneous and interpenetrated, in contrast to many of the initial European capitalist states, whose processes of nation formation were temporally separated from that of capitalist transformation. I will suggest that in the settler colonies, nationalism was advanced as a means to capitalist development, with consequences for the ways in which populations were named, distributed, differentiated, and governed. Ultimately, nationalism in the settler colony, irrespective of purported liberal objectives, was the core of the explicit systematization of white racial identities, alongside and in a position of power and privilege to ‘racially other’ identities. Though racial hierarchies are not exclusive to settler-colonial states, I will argue that ‘race’ in the settler colony is unique in its productive function, and this is because of its simultaneous formation alongside the national state form. Thus, while showing how such identities emerged in Argentina and Canada, I am more specifically interested in making an argument about the productive power of such identities, specifically to capitalist social and material relations. Rather than simply cultural or ideological designations, or vestiges of a premodern time, I argue that racial designations in the context of liberal state building were productive of the very materiality of the modern capitalist state. Furthermore, I show how, despite similarities, the erection of a white racial nation contributed to very different material constellations of state power, with consequences for subsequent conventions of ordering populations.

Both Canada and Argentina were settler colonial spaces, populated predominantly throughout the mid-late nineteenth century, and integrated into the global economy on the basis of staple wheat production. Both colonies perpetrated physical and cultural genocide against the
original peoples of the territories, and constituted their national states as spaces of racial
‘whiteness’. However, while Canada was a British colony, Argentina was colonized under the
Iberian empire. These distinct origins came to form the generative conditions upon which capital
and state formation took place. The manifestation of racialized oppression, and the means
through which ‘whiteness’ was produced, reproduced, and protected, was unique in each space.
As such, the comparison between Canada and Argentina is a useful one.

The Canadian state followed a path of legally coded racial hierarchy, a policy of
apartheid and segregation, with an emphasis on racial difference. Official recognition of
difference (as threat) meant that racial oppression occurred through explicit and named
exclusions, set out in legal code and state policy, which involved the erection of significant state
administrative capacity. This argument has meaningful implications for the present; it has meant
that legal and constitutional challenges to the state constitute the primary means for challenging
racialized and racist practices. This path is particularly complicated for indigenous groups, for
whom the only means for accessing redress and demanding change is through the affirmation of
the state, whose very existence is contested.

In Argentina, the state produced racialized subjectivities—or one subjectivity, namely
‘racial whiteness’—through processes of assimilation (predicated on hierarchies of civilization),
erasure, and domestic tactics of exclusion, which required far greater investment in the
centralization of coercive state capacity, rather than administrative powers. In denying the
existence of difference, the Argentine state produced very different obstacles for populations that
were subjected to racialized oppression. With a state that officially recognized only sameness
(coded as whiteness), populations subjected to differential, exploitative, and oppressive treatment
have lacked the bureaucratic and legal pathways to challenge such treatment. These differences
can be seen, furthermore, in the different tactics of census collection in each space. In Argentina, every census between 1895 and 2010 has omitted any racial designation, relegating all peoples to either *argentinidad* or foreigner (Demuro, 2017, 548). In Canada, on the contrary, every census collected since Confederation has included a category for recording racial (later termed ethnic) origin (Prevost & Beaud, 1996).

The intervention that I make through a comparative analysis of these two case studies is to demonstrate the ways in which such ‘illiberal’ practices of exclusion were not simply anomalies, or purely cultural legacies of a pre-modern politics, but constitutive, as they continue to be, of the very materiality of the liberal state. In Argentina, the creation and policing of racial whiteness led to an accumulation and centralization of state coercive capacity, as well as its external legitimization vis-à-vis foreign investors. In Canada, the production of racial whiteness led to the establishment of a vast centralization of bureaucratic and fiduciary state power. Alongside each of these, importantly, the state legitimized itself to domestic populations through the consolidation of a national project.

**The External Limits of Liberal Equality? Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities**

If my argument is that the liberal settler colonial state was constituted and sustained through an internal hierarchy of racialized belonging, it is necessary to first deal with literature that has understood formal equality amongst internal populations to be the constitutive feature of modern liberal states. Perhaps one of the strongest statements of this nature is Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities*. If the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were the era of nation formation, and nations were understood as bastions of (at least formal) horizontal camaraderie, then the historical process within this timeframe has been one of progressively perfecting the liberality of rule in the modern world. While Anderson’s work is seminal in
contemplating the structuration of inequality and exclusion between territorialized configurations of identity, he nevertheless encounters substantial difficulty in accounting for inequality within such spaces (Miles, 1987a, 24).

Anderson’s work has been essential in that it decisively demonstrates how ‘nations’ are actively constructed and central to the modern capitalist world. Whereas dynastic polities were consumed with the expansion of power through increasing control and authority over greater populations—achieved through territorial expansion (though not necessarily contiguous)—and the formation of allies through strategies of intermarriage and military conquest, the modern political state is concerned with the enclosure of peoples and territories over which a bounded sovereignty is to be enacted. The protection and management of a bounded territory of property, resources, and population, rather than perpetual expansion, is what characterizes the modern state. In this process, the modern state has presumed, or at least aspired to, the enclosure of a largely homogenous population (Anderson, 2006). Such an argument has been essential in our capacity to debunk the myth of an historically given ‘people’, and instead historicize the generation of politically and culturally bounded territorial units.

Despite such central contributions, however, Anderson’s work is itself mired in a form of mythologizing that is central to liberal capitalist modernity. That is, the fiction that the modern state is in fact a state of formal juridical equality. This implicit assumption in Anderson’s work has been aptly identified by nationalism scholars such as Rogers Brubaker, Neil Davidson, and Claudio Lomnitz, as well as critical race scholars such as Robert Miles, David Theo Goldberg, Michael Omi, and Howard Winant. For all the essential historical and theoretical groundwork laid by Anderson, his work ultimately supports this liberal myth and thus suggests that states not

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4 Significant works bringing together the study of race and nation include Bauman (1989), Mosse (1995), Balibar (1991), and Miles (1987b).
undergirded by the national myth and formal juridical equality are somehow anomalous to or outside of modernity. Indeed, Anderson is perhaps most controversial for his insistence that racism and nationalism are mutually incompatible forms of marking ‘peoplehood’ (Miles, 1987, 24). Anderson suggests that nations cannot be conceived of on the basis of a racialized order as the former’s underlying logics are antithetical to those of the latter: “The fact of the matter is that nationalism thinks in terms of historical destinies, while racism dreams of eternal contaminations. . . . Niggers (sic) are, thanks to the invisible tar-brush, forever niggers . . . . no matter what passports they carry or what languages they speak and read” (Anderson, 2006, 149).

It appears that for Anderson membership in the nation anticipates a ‘choice’ made by the participant (whether real or implied) to join the community based on shared cultural, moral, or political qualities, whereas race is denoted by ‘unchosen’ traits that acquire an aura of naturalness and are thus positioned outside of history and human agency. While the nation suggests a chosen path of fulfillment and destiny, race is said to condemn and contaminate the destiny of particular groups. As a result, race is said to deny the very idea of the nation.

The near hegemony of Anderson’s work has made it, in many ways, difficult to conceptualize and theorize the relationship between modernity and internal social closures. While it is broadly accepted that the modern state posits an external form of social closure through the evocation of a border and national peoples, it is tacitly accepted that within the state, formal equality prevails, and where it does not, it is owing to the persistence of pre-modern predilections, or ‘tradition.’ The conundrum that is presented is thus: is the nation-state an apt model for understanding dominant modes of politically configured belonging, given the clear prevalence of politically mediated hierarchies of subjectivity that have permeated states throughout the modern period? Can the near hegemonic understanding of modern political
association *qua* the nation-state be accommodated and adapted to the realities of racialized and stratified membership, or do we require different conceptual tools to make sense of variable political formations within capitalist modernity?

It appears there are two possible paths through which to respond to this query. On the one hand, it is possible to problematize the national-state’s equation with universal, homogenous, and consensual membership. To this end, it becomes necessary to parse out the relationship between liberal and illiberal practices and political forms. On the other hand, perhaps it is more instructive to think in terms of alternative state forms to be considered alongside the national-state, in light of the argument that the nation-state form cannot conceptually account for the totality of models of political-territorial organization and membership. In this case, it becomes a matter of accounting for ‘modern’ political configurations that are distinguishable as either liberal or illiberal forms. This path acknowledges the modernity of ‘illiberal’ state forms and practices, but effectively separates them analytically from ‘liberal’ modes of rule.

To begin, it is instructive to ask what, for Anderson, the national community provides an answer to. To what ends are nationalisms pursued? These are different questions than what makes possible the nation, and quite often the answers provided for the latter tend to overshadow those provided for the former, in assessing Anderson’s contribution to an understanding of nationalism. To begin with Anderson’s ostensible birthplace of nationalism, nationalism is said to be deployed and developed in the Americas by creole intellectuals as a means of effecting and uniting anti-colonial independence movements against the Spanish Crown. While capitalism is implicated in these processes, in so much as print capitalism is a condition of possibility for national consciousness, capitalism is itself not responsible for nationalism in any clear fashion. For Anderson, Spain’s ‘recolonization’ of the Americas through its Bourbon Reforms (decidedly
non-capitalist practices) generated ‘emotionally plausible, and politically viable’ communities based on colonial administrative units, which were given broad common psychic experience through print capitalism and the territorial limits of economic life, connecting and binding a ‘people’ (Anderson, 2006, 64). These increasingly plural American identities would then come to form independence movements in the rejection of Spanish dominance, forming nation-states throughout the early nineteenth century. Nationalism, then, is at root a cultural development, the spread and territorial reach of which is influenced by capitalism and colonialism, but the content of which appears decidedly apolitical and dematerialized. In Europe, similarly, many early incarnations of nationalism emerged, unconsciously often, through the combination of emergent administrative vernaculars and anti-dynastic revolution. The result of such revolutions was a political entity bound together and imagined as common in historical spirit, through territories demarcated by their respective administrative vernacular (Anderson, 2006, 81).

The first issue that needs to be raised, then, is that Anderson fails to consider the impact that exogenous material developments have on the specific content of nationalism. Exogenous factors, for Anderson, influence the replication and territorial reach of nationalist articulations, but do not specify or influence its internal symbols, coherence, or criteria of membership. Rather these things are ostensibly already at hand, and what is imagined is the way these cultural materials and symbols are attached to a particular, delimited population and given social meaning. By abstracting the cultural content of nationalism from political-economic histories, focusing on sociological or local-level causation to the exclusion of global processes, Anderson is able to posit, seemingly unproblematically, his definition of nationalism as characteristically horizontal and fraternal.
However, capitalism did more than provide a material-temporal expedient for the transmission of nationalism’s cultural content. According to Neil Davidson, the politics of nationalism’s cultural content can be found in the fact that nationalism provides an answer to—a psychosocial compensation for—the disruptions and alienations created by capitalist transformations. Importantly, for Davidson, nationalism was a vehicle by which non-capitalist state forms were overcome, providing the material through which the variety of oppositions to dynastic and absolutist rule could be brought together. Thus, the content of nationalism had to be something that could bind together a socially disparate group on the basis of, quite often, the lowest common denominator (Davidson, 2016, 56). Of course, this never erased a very real and visible social hierarchy, though it did present a form of imagined interests and common frame through which to bind exploiter and exploited under capitalism (Davidson, 2016, 71). Once state transformation had been achieved, nationalism continued to function to provide states with citizens to pay taxes and conscript to armies, because of the belief held by the masses of workers that they had more in common with those who exploited them at home than they did with any exploiters or fellow exploited abroad. Once established, this means of unifying an economically divided population in order to consolidate state apparatuses and finances could then be adapted, borrowed, and combined with a range of existing social contexts and their particular patterns of internal fissure (Davidson, 2016, 75).

What forms of real and visible social hierarchies persisted in the first nationalisms? Perhaps the most obvious would be the status of women and children who, while not presenting as full members of the nation-state, nevertheless identified with the nation. To this end, Claudio Lomnitz’s definition of a nation is useful: “(it is) a community that is conceived of as deep comradeship among full citizens, each of whom is a potential broker between the national state
and weak, embryonic or partial citizens whom he or she can construe as dependents” (2001, 338). This definition serves to further buttress Neil Davidson’s assertion that it would be wrong-headed to suggest that the existence of other partial interests within the nation somehow disproves nationalism, since nationalism is simply a means through which other partial interests are advanced. What gives the nation its distinctiveness is that it fabricates a common experience that is felt and articulated through an identity of interest amongst some and against others perceived as holding different interests. When this common experience and interest are articulated within territorial political and economic configurations, a nation-state emerges, but this of course does not mean that it eclipses any or all other partial interests within the territory; only that the dominant glue that comprises the common national interest is hegemonic.

Having thus argued that the nation does not necessitate deep horizontal fraternity, but in fact is complicit with multiple internal heterogeneities and hierarchies of subjectivity, it is now necessary to ask how race is understood in relation to nation. Can the nation be racially defined and stratified? If not, is it more appropriate to speak of racial states in addition to nation states? I will suggest that the answer is yes—but a qualified yes. The content of the nation is not determined a priori. All that is necessary is that it provides that ‘glue’ which can fill the psychosocial needs of an alienated population to find a common frame for experience, or for ruling classes to provide some means of generating common interest amongst exploited and exploiting classes within the territorial state to facilitate centralized fiduciary and administrative capacity (Davidson, 2016, 75; Omi and Winant, 2015, 76). Race can be created for and yoked to these very ends. Indeed, as David Goldberg suggests, “race and nation overlap, more or less isomorphically” (2002, 247).
Now, for Anderson, the main objection to race being a defining feature of the ‘nation’ is the alleged voluntarist versus ascriptive qualities of culture and race respectively. The nation, Anderson argues, allows for the naturalization of individuals (regardless of the practical limitations of such processes) while race, by its nature, prohibits entry into membership. Race is a reduction to determined physiognomy, while nation is chosen. This qualification, as I will show in subsequent sections, is rife with historical-factual and conceptual errors. Race is not reducible to physiognomy—the physical markers of race are historically and socially constructed and thus changeable. History is rife with examples of the racially othered ‘becoming white’ (Bonnett, 1998; Ignatiev, 2008). Race is a moving marker and cannot be assigned to the kind of unmovable destiny that Anderson makes of it. Beyond this, however, is the critical problem that attends to Anderson’s voluntarist understanding of ‘nation.’ For Anderson, the markers of nation are of ‘cultural’ content. These can only be assumed to be voluntary and inclusive if we evacuate culture of its political and economic moorings. To draw out this point, it is useful to turn to Rogers Brubaker’s work on ethnic versus cultural or civic nationalism.

For Brubaker, there is a tendency within the scholarship on nationalism to distinguish and dichotomize nationalisms on the basis of their purported ‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’ bases. The former is thought to be egalitarian, democratic, inclusive, and acquisitive, while the latter is predicated on illiberal, ascriptive, and exclusive characteristics. The former more readily aligns with Anderson’s understanding of nationalism, while the latter tends to encapsulate those qualities of mass political and cultural membership that deny or override ‘nationness’ (2004, 133). As Brubaker aptly demonstrates, what is ‘ethnic’ (and I will argue to extend this to ‘racial’) is not

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5 Alistair Bonnett provides a comprehensive overview of how ‘whiteness’ historically became the exclusive identity of Europeans, while Noel Ignatiev provides an account of the transition the Irish experience, from racialized other, to ‘white.’
common descent, but precisely a shared (whether exogenously imposed or endogenously identified) common culture. At the same time, if civic nationalism is purely liberal, voluntarist culture, its existence is almost defined out of history, as very few nationalisms have ever been fully universalist and voluntary (Brubaker, 2004, 136-139). Indeed, while the basis of civic nationalism might ostensibly be moral or political creed, morality, political creed, rationality, and so forth are frequently racially coded (Brubaker, 2004, 142). Thus, rather than thinking in binaries of culturally or ethnically ordered polities, Brubaker argues that “in fact all understandings of nationhood and all forms of nationalism are simultaneously inclusive and exclusive. What varies is not the fact or even the degree of inclusiveness or exclusiveness, but the bases or criteria of inclusion and exclusion” (Brubaker, 2004, 141). From this vantage point, there is no reason to deny that race may be constructed as the basis upon which national inclusion is articulated.

Though there is nothing necessarily inclusive or fraternal about nationalism, if race as a criteria for nation building is theoretically compatible, it is still worth exploring whether it might be more analytically and conceptually productive to think in terms of different modern state forms—national states, racial states, and so forth. The question, then, is whether we should distinguish between ostensibly liberal (as national) and illiberal (as racial) state forms. In addressing this question, I turn to the work of David Theo Goldberg, who has been foremost amongst those developing an understanding of ‘racial states’ (2002). While the ‘racial state’ concept is crucial in drawing attention to the relationship between state-making and race-making, it does not itself do away with the need to understand nationalism as a potentially racialized phenomena, and the ways in which illiberal politics are productive of liberalism itself.
For Goldberg, the idea of the racial state is synonymous with the modern state: “Race marks and orders the modern nation-state, and so state projects, more or less from its point of conceptual and institutional emergence” (2002, 234). However, Goldberg distinguishes among historicist and naturalist racial states. The former conceptualizes race on the basis of historical stages of development, thus holding out the possibility of full citizenship acquisition should the subject in question ‘acquire’ the necessary skills, etc., to be conceived of as a fully modern political member, whereas the latter conceives race as a biological or genetic disposition that precludes the acquisition of full citizenship rights indefinitely, and speaks to projects of racial segregation and exclusion. Goldberg further goes on to suggest that racial states can be either active in sanctioning racist practice, or passive in turning a blind eye to such practice, though the two are likely to comingle in any given state (2002, 239-244). These distinctions are useful; however, I argue that racial nationalism requires analytical distinction precisely because of the overwhelming imbalance towards active racist state policies in some modern states under the guise of liberal order. In other words, the idea that the nation can and has been formed through an understanding of ‘racial’ identity remains crucial to understanding specific modern nation formations.

The cases I will review below, though through various methodologies of racial imagining (naturalist and historicist), were active in promoting and producing a ‘white’ state predicated on a racial founding mythology. While nationalism is the assumed or assigned cultural marker that indicates common origins or belonging, and race may be one conceptualization of that imagined marker, not all states (irrespective of their racial projects) are tied to an understanding of a peoples bound together by race. This is a deliberate practice and distinction that merits its own analysis, and thus I contend that while the concept of the racial state is analytically useful in
understanding the pervasive relationship between race-making and state-making, it is conceptually too broad to distinguish those states with implicit racial projects from those whose very formulation is existentially tied to racial subjectification. This distinction is imperative for understanding the materially productive role that ‘race’ has played in the constitution of liberal settler states. Thus, it remains fruitful and necessary to explore the particular historical milieus within which racism and nationalism congeal to produce racial nationalism.

**Marxism’s Liberal Assumptions?**

While the dominance of a bourgeois understanding of the ‘nation’ has done much to frame liberalism as de facto a system of non-coercive rule over juridically equal individuals, Anderson and liberal nationalist discourses are not alone responsible. Indeed, it has been vociferously argued by postcolonial theorists that this is precisely the kind of problematic reading of modernity that many Marxist theories provide. In other words, because of Marxist political economy’s emphasis on coercion and exploitation occurring within the labour process rather than through political relations, there is no room or capacity for Marxists to account for the vastly differential experiences of modern polities. Where overt political coercion and inequality prevail, postcolonial theory argues, Marxists are too ready to relegate such practices as indicative of ‘tradition’—they are not read as part of capitalist social relations.

The accusation of liberal assumptions within Marxist theory is perhaps most heated and contested within the field of so-called Political Marxist (PM) theory. Referring broadly to the work of Robert Brenner (1982) and Ellen Meiksins-Wood (2002), PM is a variant of Marxist theory that is rooted in an historical understanding of the relationship between social property relations, reproductive strategies, and ‘market-compulsion.’ Because Brenner and Wood identify market compulsion as the central referent of capitalism, which in turn hinges on ‘market
dependence,’ it is often claimed that PM can only account for exploitation within wage-relations (or the ‘economic realm’); it cannot account for forms of politically mediated surplus extraction. Thus, for example, Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nisancioglu (2015) have argued that, in focusing on ‘market compulsion,’ Brenner prioritizes too narrow an event—the freeing of labour—in too local a context—rural England—such that the subsequent understanding of what capitalism is becomes wholly dependent on an assumed universalization of the liberal political subject, ‘free’ from political coercion and engaged in ‘free’ waged labour. To this end, in the remainder of this introduction I critically review some of the postcolonial arguments offered as an alternative to Marxism. This is done in advance of and in justification for the content of the next chapter, in which I begin to outline how practices of political coercion within liberal capitalist states are, in fact, quite capable of being explained through PM, which provides a more fulsome account than the postcolonial alternative. I address these critiques thematically, as they will form the basis of each subsequent chapter.

Broadly speaking, postcolonial theory sustains a critique against Marxist political economy on the basis of its historical methodology, which is said to subsume all phenomena under a totalizing, progressive narrative rooted in Western categories (Bhabha, 2004; Chakrabarty, 2000; Young, 2004). If this is the case, Marxism is critically flawed in: a) its incapacity to theorize rupture and discontinuity, instead tending to read back into history a linear developmental trajectory, and b) its incapacity to deal with contingent and local developments, once more subordinating these to the deterministic and higher order mechanics operating at the level of total capital (Anderson, 2006, 158; Chakrabarty, 2000, 6). More specifically, the critique is that deviations from bourgeois liberalism (read as the apolitical rule of abstract, formally equal individuals) are relegated to a historical past, mere tradition (including all modes of rule through
the politicized hierarchies of domination viz. culture, religion, caste, ethnicity, and race), rather than constitutive of liberal modernity in their own right. A perceived inability in Marxist political economy to account for variation and contingency in the formation of modern polities and cultures has thus manifested in four related foci in the postcolonial canon. First, at a general level, there is the presentation of multiple modernities as a solution to the totalizing history of capital. Second, there is the presentation of nations/nationalisms as fractured processes of political Westernization articulated with cultural localism. Third, there is the critique of Marxism’s inability to account for subjects who cannot be captured by the wage-relation, and the forwarding of the category of the ‘subaltern.’ And finally, perhaps the pièce de résistance of postcolonial critique, there is the hybrid figure; that is, the subject who is not fully subordinated to the demands of modern exploitative power (especially colonial and bourgeois power), asserting agency in equally ambivalent and potentially threatening ways, to occupy spaces that are neither subject to total control nor total agency.

In one of the seminal texts in postcolonial studies, Provincializing Europe, Dipesh Chakrabarty develops a critique of historical materialism that has become a central text in the critique of Eurocentrism, a bedrock for postcolonial and subaltern studies. Provincializing Europe begins with a definition of political modernity as “the rule by modern institutions of the state, bureaucracy, and capitalist enterprise” (2000, 4). Chakrabarty argues that the contemporary state of academic and philosophical thought makes it impossible to think of any space in the world today without reference to these categories, which in themselves rely upon a secular-universal vision of the human (Chakrabarty, 2000, 4). It is argued that contemporary analyses of modernity must be structured by categories such as citizenship, the state, and civil society, which are of necessity characterized by their secular universality (or impersonal equality). Political
modernity, in other words, is always viewed from the vantage point of the absence or presence of these categories. Where they do not exist, they are explained away through history (which is understood as a totalizing and teleological force).

Now, Chakrabarty’s understanding of historical materialism is bound into notions of teleological progress—an understanding of history that is by no means universally held by Marxists (more specifically, those engaged with the concept of uneven and combined development, which I attend to in the next chapter). It is suggested that to account for difference Marxists need to posit it as premodern in the march of historical progress. In more sophisticated variants, it is argued, *uneven* development is invoked. However, this still assumes an historical trajectory of progress that makes it possible to identify some elements as archaic. For Chakrabarty, the peasant, for example, is not premodern or archaic but a constitutive part of modernity. The political organization of the peasant around religion, ethnicity, caste, etc., is not pre-political but thoroughly political. This, of course, is true. But it does not follow that this expression of modernity cannot be accounted for through historical materialism.

While, to be sure, there is much historical materialism that posits an ‘outside-in’ model of causation, whereby all localities follow slavishly to the beat of global capital, the postcolonial position, too frequently, fully neglects the global level, insisting on the relatively insulated operation of colonial contestation and culture within the locale. In other words, methodologically a tension is presented whereby in the first instance, international levels of causation are privileged, while in the second case, sociological levels are given primary consideration. This methodological division, furthermore, manifests in what Radhika Desai has called an intellectual or disciplinary division of labour whereby the study of capitalism as a global or international

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6 For example, World-Systems Theory (Wallerstein, 2004) and Dependency Theory (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; Frank, 1966)
force is given to the discipline of political economy, while the more local study of nations/nationalisms are studied as purely cultural phenomena. It is easy to see how this kind of divisionary analysis would result in the kind of liberal/illiberal binary that sits at the core of this dissertation. Political economy and capitalist social relations, absent a consideration of local specificities and cultural (understood broadly) proclivities, can *abstractly* be understood through the kinds of universalizing liberal rhetoric that is so readily critiqued. Similarly, localist analyses can readily be tangled in a narrative of culture to the exclusion of political economy, when the relationship between the local milieu and international processes is foreclosed. It is for this reason that Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler call for the treatment of global metropoles and colonies within a single analytic field, fostering a more dynamic relationship between analyses of culture and of political economy. To do so is to recognize that both global processes and local struggles are constitutive of social transformation (1997, 3).

Recognizing that capitalism has universalizing tendencies, which nevertheless do not necessitate repetition and replication, is at the core of uneven and combined development, which I attend to in Chapter 1 (UCD). However, at an abstract level, Vivek Chibber makes the argument that the universalizing tendencies of capitalism do not mean: a) capitalism will replicate a particular sequence of development in all places, and b) that capitalism can and does tolerate differences in institutions, culture, subjectivity, etc., so long as these do not threaten the basic premise which *is* universalised—that is, the conditions necessary for the production and accumulation of surplus value (Chibber, 2013, 110). The spread of capitalism encounters infinite variations in social, cultural, and political organization.

. . . . the social whole—the ensemble of social relations in any geographic region—need not be subsumed under one particular set of rules. The various practices that comprise the whole can be governed by very dissimilar internal logics, even as
capital universalizes. . . . practices necessary to capital’s reproduction will fall under its sway. . . . But there will continue to be practices that retain their integrity. . . . Hence, theories affirming capital’s universalizing drive do not have to efface historical diversity (Chibber, 2013, 239).

Furthermore, where local practices do internalize the logics of capital, it is not necessary that these then become mirrors of European institutions. Within Europe there exists a variety of institutional configurations of capitalist modernity. Europe’s transition to liberal and capitalist arrangements involved concerted forms of state intervention and assistance, contrary to the oft-cited understanding of these politico-economic arrangements as inherently ‘laissez faire’ (Davis, 1997, 75). That capitalism spread through political mediation is, in fact, the result of capitalism’s internal tensions and contradictions. In managing these contradictions, capitalism was externalized, and in so much as this occurred, it was through combined development, a form of directed political intervention to manage internal development in the face of competitive pressures, that capitalist globalization was realized (Desai, 2015, 453; Teschke, 2003, 265). The interaction between the universalizing drive of capital and local conditions, consequently, is how variable forms of capitalist organization were produced (Chibber, 2013, 239). “The individual political and economic circumstances of separate states meant that, one way or another, there were endless derivations in the way liberalism, and commercial liberalism developed” (Davis, 1997, 80).

Thus, in Chapter 2, I engage with precisely these internal tensions that produced the uneven and combined spread of capitalist social relations globally. In so doing, I emphasize, firstly, the historical and geographical contingency of the ‘classic’ liberal subject in England. I demonstrate how, rather than a natural accompaniment to capitalism, it was only the conditions of possibility that capitalism provided. Ultimately, it was through deliberate political intervention, specifically the 1834 Poor Law Reform and the ‘Revolution in Government’
occurring through the 1830s and 1840s, that anything resembling a politically disinterested, formally equal and transparent liberal state and subject emerged. Once consolidated, however, British capitalism was faced with the fundamental contradiction posed by the mode of production: the inevitability of market gluts. The resolution to this tension, as I argue, was through the global expansion of capitalist social relations.

Now, as I have alluded to above, and will develop more thoroughly in Chapters 1 through 3, polities outside of Britain sought to erect and legitimize a national state capable of directing development and regulating land, population, and taxation in response to the geopolitical and competitive pressures unleashed by a globalizing capitalism. The global rise of the ‘nation’ was, in many ways, a strategy of combined development. That the nation, analytically, has been cited as explanatory of variation between territorial states is something we have dealt with above, through Anderson. However, for postcolonial theorists, the nation was also a means to explaining internal variation in the operation of political rule. Rejecting Anderson’s explanation of the nation as a form of civic, inclusionary, horizontal equality with limited modular forms, postcolonial critics instead sought to argue that nationalism, outside of the colonizing core of Europe, was productive of internal stratification. It is to this argument that I now turn.

**Chatterjee, Nationalism and Colonial Difference**

The most explicit postcolonial engagement with nationalism, vis-a-vis Anderson, is provided by Partha Chatterjee, whose *The Nation and its Fragments* critiques Anderson’s suggestion that early nationalisms formed modular templates to be replicated throughout the world. Chatterjee objected to this claim, noting that “If nationalisms in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined community from certain ‘modular’ forms already made available to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to imagine?” (Chatterjee, 1993, 5).
Crucially, Chatterjee argued that the replicability of older nationalisms does not accord “with the evidence on anticolonial nationalism . . . (which was) posited not on an identity but rather on a difference from the ‘modular’ forms of the national society propagated by the modern West” (1993, 5). In India, for example, systems of internal stratification such as caste persisted in the modern nation-state, and as a result, Indian nationalism, owing to its organization of internally differentiated political subjects, cannot be understood as simply a modular replication of Western nationalisms. However, it was not just Anderson’s explanation, but further Marxist attempts to understand nationalism that were unable to explain the persistence of formally stratified levels of citizenship predicated on a hierarchy of socio-cultural criteria. Both cases presumed, Chatterjee argued, that the ‘Western’ model of the nation as internally homogenous could be applied in all other spaces. Where Marxism was said to hold on to the model of national homogeneity because of the requirements of abstract capital, for Anderson this was owing to the ostensible comparative effect of nationalisms that marked off the limit to which departures from the dominant models could be affected.

According to Chatterjee, the primary problem in both theories was to conflate the political-economic dimensions of nationalism with the cultural. Nationalism in the postcolonial context, for Chatterjee, is not a purely politico-economic project; it is also a distinctively cultural project, and the logics of the latter may at times work in contradiction to those of the former. Thus, in the example of India, anticolonial nationalism pursued two distinct paths; on the one hand, in the material realm, there was the struggle for identity or sameness, while in the ideological or cultural realm, it was difference that formed the basis of nationalism. The former was characterized by efforts to obtain equal inclusion in the state and bureaucracy, while the latter path was occupied with asserting and valorizing the fundamental differences that
characterized Indian peoples. Amongst such differences were those of religion and ideas of authority and order. Such a condition led to the paradoxical result of postcolonial nationalism combining elements of the modern Western state, yet undergirding this with systemic stratification of the citizen population according to caste (Chatterjee, 1993, 16-18). Chatterjee argues that it is necessary to regard these differences as issuing from a non-Western history and logic, such that they cannot be contained within the history of capitalist universalization. For, if modern nationalism is read through the Western history of capitalism, then it becomes necessary to account for Indian nationalism as merely a continuity of ‘backwardness’ or ‘tradition’. To do so, however, ignores the profound ruptures that colonialism brought about in Indian society. Instead, it is preferable for Chatterjee to read Indian nationalism as fragmentary, comprised of multiple and at times competing histories and logics, which are not reducible to a single, unitary or stable character (Chatterjee, 1993, 26-27).

This logic of separating the ‘traditional cultural’ from the ‘modernizing political’ aspects of nationalism misses a crucial aspect of national state formation in the context of global capitalist social relations and can be traced back to the methodological and intellectual division of labour I identified earlier (that of opposing the international as political economy to the national as culture). Rather than an ‘either-or’ ultimatum, it is instead instructive to think of these levels as mutually constitutive. The spread of capitalist social relations and their attempted reproduction has far-reaching consequences for traditional practices of elite reproduction. In Ethiopia, for example, Fouad Makki shows how the politically dominant Shewa Amhara sought to respond to capitalism’s expansionary dynamics by displacing parcellized sovereignty upwards in the form of an absolutist state, while naturalizing its dominance through the politicization of its own ethnicity via official nationalism (2011, 277). In this case, centralization of power was
fused with politically and ethnically constituted property relations in a way that distinguished Ethiopian modernity from modern sovereignty, but which nevertheless transformed existing dynastic practices to produce something completely new (Makki, 2011, 268). Ethiopia’s cultural-ethnic aspects of nationalism were inseparable from material practices, demonstrating the veracity of Desai’s insistence on the materiality of nations, and the poverty of analytically separating political economy from culture in the study of nations (2008, 2013, 2015).

The spread of capitalism will not necessarily subsume and obliterate all that came before it. In many cases traditional practices and institutions of social hierarchy and elite reproduction will persist. However, their interpolation with the profoundly altered material environment within which social reproduction takes place will also serve to alter these traditional practices. The outcome is neither an archaic, traditional and cultural ‘past’ nor an unencumbered, homogenizing modernity. Rather, the resultant conceptualization of socio-spatial, economic and political organization will represent a combination or amalgam of both. The combination of capitalist political institutions and organization with the uneven and variegated social ordering of authority, belonging and rights will result in novel configurations of political identity. It is in this way that we can begin to grasp how nationalist organization can come to embrace an internal heterogeneity of legal and political statuses.

If for Anderson, the nation cannot be built upon criteria that posit a de facto hierarchical ordering of the national population, for Chatterjee, this condition is an empirical reality, which nevertheless cannot be explained through Marxist political economy. Rather, it requires the positing of multiple, distinct but interactive histories that are propelled by unique ontologies and epistemologies. In Chapter Three, I turn to my case studies: Argentina and Canada. In both cases, I argue, the ‘nation’ was a deliberate political construction that affected combined
development in the face of growing competitive pressures in the global market for cereals production. In each case the nation came to be defined by racial ‘whiteness’, instilling political and juridical hierarchy amongst its political subjects. I aim to argue that elite modalities of reproduction became fused with so-called modern institutions and practices associated with capitalism, leading to a unique configuration of national political identities. Rather than simply a vestige of ‘tradition,’ I demonstrate that racial ascription was a modern category of identity formation, informed by the locally specific dynamics of social and property relations—importantly, the necessity of indigenous dispossession, elimination, assimilation, and subordination.

The differential status accorded to the world’s indigenous populations, notably in settler colonial contexts, is a primary example of a subject status that, arguably, cannot be accounted for through Marxist class categories. Indigenous peoples in the settler colony were historically excluded from burgeoning labour markets and regarded as relics of the past, certain to disappear with the march of progress. Indeed, indigenous populations have historically constituted precisely the kind of group with which subaltern studies have been occupied. In the next section, I critically assess the subaltern position with reference to indigenous peoples in settler colonial spaces and establish the argument that I lay out in Chapter 4.

**Accounting for Non-Market Subordinated Populations: The Subaltern**

Developing first amongst scholars of India, notably Gayatry Chakravorty Spivak, subaltern studies argued that for those ‘left outside the mode of production narrative,’ the subject disappears from history (Spivak, 1999, 244). Indeed Spivak argues that “If . . . the mode of production narrative is the final reference, these (subaltern) . . . . are insufficiently represented or representable in that narration. We can docket them but we cannot grasp them at all” (1999,
It is thus quite sensible on the face of things to use the lens of subalternity to look at the ways in which indigenous peoples have historically (though not exclusively at all) rejected or been excluded from the capitalist labour market.

For Spivak, the problem with Marxist theory is that “the mode of production narrative is so efficient because it is constructed in terms of the most efficient and abstract coding of value, the economic. Thus . . . the ground-level value-codings that write these (subaltern’s) lives eludes (analysis)” (1999, 244). If this is the case, then how are we to account for those people who do not occupy the traditional spaces of the capitalist social relation, as either buyers or sellers of labour power? However, this problem is only so with a narrow view to capitalism; it is important to see capital as a social relation, in the totality and specificity of each space. Thus, for example, indigenous peoples’ experiences and subjectivity can be understood through the referent of capitalism, if we understand that what constitutes the capitalist social relation is not limited to a dyadic or triadic structure of capitalists, labourers (and landlords). Indigenous dispossession was a prior condition for the development of a property regime and the social relations necessary to capitalist development, and thus it is impossible to understand indigenous oppression and subjectivity outside of capitalist social relations. This does not, however, mean analyzing indigenous peoples according to whether they fit into any of the aforementioned class positions. Again, this is where uneven and combined development is instructive, as it enables us to grasp the variable nature of political and class structures under the capitalist mode of production, as a result of capitalist logics and technologies combining with distinct pre-capitalist arrangements. The results of these combinations are manifold compositions of political, property and production structures.
Along with the question of whether the ‘subaltern’ can be adequately analyzed by Marxism, Spivak is further concerned with whether the “men and women among the illiterate peasantry, Aboriginals, and the lowest strata of the urban sub-proletariat’ are positioned to both speak, and be heard” (1999, 269). This too bears resonance with indigenous communities who, when seeking redress, are forced to do so in ways commensurable with state sovereignty and legal norms. This suggests once more that the terms upon which modern polities (and thus their analysis) are predicated are not adequate spaces from which indigenous peoples can speak and be heard. If Indigenous peoples can only be heard when speaking through the bureaucracy of alien, colonial ‘sovereignty’, this is a profound mis-hearing of indigenous voices and claims (predicated, as they are, on a rejection of colonial sovereignty). Among those who, cautiously, find that the category of the subaltern has something on offer for critical indigenous studies are Jodi Byrd and Robert Warrior. For them, the category of subalterneity is one that allows for a heterogeneous understanding of the temporal, spatial and ontological/epistemic location of marginalized and excluded voices.

The idea of the border as it relates to the subaltern, in postcolonial thought, is also a pertinent concept to critical indigenous studies, as Kevin Bruyneel, Walter Mignolo, and others have attempted to show. More specifically, what Mignolo has called ‘border thinking’ has been deployed to examine the possibilities and spaces opened through a rejection or provocation of the fault lines that exist at the border between the subaltern and the dominant classes (2001, xxi). In indigenous studies, these fault lines appear at the literal and figurative border of the colonial state, where simultaneous claims to sovereignty and citizenship confound and protest the traditional understanding of these concepts, forged as they were through an inside/outside, foreign/national dichotomy of colonial national state formation. As Bruyneel suggests, the
position of subalternity from which indigenous peoples are said to come allows for a refusal of these dichotomies as false choices. There is a ‘third space of sovereignty’ that is defined both by ‘colonial impositions and postcolonial resistances’ (2007, 217). This is to say that, contrary to those who would like to claim that indigenous peoples, in making fiscal or representative claims to the state, while also claiming sovereignty, need to ‘choose’ whether they are inside or outside of the state, the colonial impositions that have degraded the resources and conditions of indigenous livelihood necessitate claims to citizenship or state resources without delegitimizing simultaneous assertions of sovereignty.

This solution is not one that is foreclosed out of hand by Marxist political economy. For, if as I have argued, the national state is bound into and premised upon the racialized subject status of indigenous peoples, it can be acknowledged that indigenous peoples have a rightful claim to sovereignty while also attending to the ways in which the colonial state is responsible to these same communities owing to its ongoing tactics of dispossessing and demolishing the very resources that are fundamental to political, cultural, social and biological reproduction. The idea of the sovereign settler colonial space is a fabrication built upon the destruction of indigenous peoples and their livelihoods, but the fictitiousness of the settler sovereign does not erase the debt owed to indigenous groups.

That said, to show that Marxist political economy can account for these problems is not the same as demonstrating why and how it should supersede postcolonial analysis. While postcolonial analysis and the concept of subalternity provoke essential questions, I ultimately want to argue that the solution is one that incurs more dangers than the potential benefits it offers. The problem, once again, is that there is an essential displacement of global processes of political economy in favour of an exclusive, localized emphasis on culture.
In its attempts to reject universalizing history, post-colonialism’s salve is, instead, a radical reinvigoration of the individual. However, in arguing vociferously for the refutation of the universal or collective subject, are postcolonial theorists not imposing a universal understanding of the ‘right’ kinds of struggle for subaltern colonial subjects? For example, an understanding of common and communal tradition, heritage, and identity underpins many indigenous groups’ claims to sovereignty, which constitute the backbone of an anti- and decolonial praxis. In its immoveable insistence on heterogeneity, however, it appears postcolonial theory denies these modalities of resistance (Shohat, 1992, 101; Weaver, 2005, 225). This brings to the fore the issue that not all (post-)colonial spaces are the same, and in the settler colony, the ongoing nature of colonization, combined with the very particular nature of settler-indigenous relations in the process of colonial state formation, may not be best served by the tools of postcolonial theory, if they are to deny collective identity.

A common rejoinder to this critique would be to suggest that the subjectivities of subaltern or indigenous groups are imposed by colonial discourse, and to lay claim to these is in fact to reaffirm the colonial power of discourse. Thus, for example, the historical demarcation of indigenous groups has not accorded with their own understanding of communal identity. Treaty relations, blood quantum, and the distribution of identities predicated on distinctions between status or non-status ‘Indians’ were all the product of a violent colonial exercise of power aimed at the subordination and elimination of indigenous voices. Yet, as Byrd argues, this rejoinder poses a great threat to indigenous resistance; if indigenous identities are claimed to be historical fiction, government and elites can deny responsibility to and oppose any claims for redress and reparation (2014a, xxxiv). In other words, the cultural understanding of indigenous identity is, in very concrete ways, woven into material claims around territory and restitution. From this
vantage point, the blanket accusation that all prior forms of communal past and identity are ‘idealizations’ is depoliticizing, and ignores the ways in which such judgements must be made in the political assessment of a context’s particular material and power relations. “It is no coincidence that just as the people of the Two-Thirds World (i.e., non-First World) begin to find their voices and assert their own agency and subjectivity, postmodernism proclaims the end of subjectivity” (Weaver, 2005, 225).

The fundamental danger at hand is that, in much the same way as postmodernism, “(postcolonialism) mistakes having deconstructed something theoretically for having replaced it politically” (Weaver, 2005, 226). To deconstruct and delegitimize indigenous identities, without also providing an alternative means to collectively assert sovereign rights to land and redress, is a dangerous proposition that threatens to instead subsume indigenous peoples into a liberal, pluralist realm of voluntary, immaterial difference. In Chapter Four I argue that the constitution of indigenous identities as subordinate, partial or non-citizens can be understood through a political economy grounded in uneven and combined development. Specifically, I argue that indigenous peoples’ differential incorporation into the settler-state served a very material end—the policing and denial of indigenous practice and culture provided the settler state with the conditions and legitimization for the generation and centralization of the material, coercive and administrative powers of the state. Once centralized, the state became an effective agent in the direction of competitive agricultural development.

If indigenous peoples were not, in the majority, subordinated and politically constituted through labour relations, it remains necessary to examine how politically stratified categories of belonging are structured around those who are contained within the labour relation. In the settler colony, the labour market was populated through a variety of forms of immigration, all of which
were allotted to differential political status on the basis of so-called race. In the next and final section of this introduction, I turn to the now ubiquitous concept in immigration studies: post-colonialism’s hybridity.

Hybridity as Banality?

The writings of Homi K. Bhabha have been central to postcolonial attempts to locate the particularities and differences of colonial identities. Moving through a series of developments, Bhabha aimed to replace universalism (understood in reference to capitalism) with multiplicities (understood in localized and cultural contexts) and thereby provide the basis for understanding modernity as heterogeneous. Through the concept of enunciation Bhabha argued that the power of discourse is in its active communication. The meaning and power in discourse arise at the moment of communication, defined by the relation between the speaker and the listener. Every speech-act, in other words, takes place within and constructs unique structures or (im)balances of power. As a result, there can never be a single instrumental intent on the part of the colonizer, nor can there be a singular subject formed through a given discourse. In contrast to the general pantheon of philosophy rooted in the Enlightenment, Bhabha constructed what he would suggest is a radical plurality, which is never fixed and which furthermore cannot be subjected to a single, linear history but instead is constitutive of diverse histories and temporalities (2004, 128).

In part, the context for enunciation is influenced by what Bhabha referred to as mimicry. Mimicry is that process wherein the colonizers attempt to impose their own form of knowledge in a space radically different from where that knowledge emerged—and in this attempt to recreate or mimic the colonial culture, it is radically transformed and reflected back onto the colonizer. The process of mimicry gives rise to ambivalence in the process of colonial subjectification, reconfiguring each enunciation of colonial discourse. In seeing the colonial
subject ‘mimic’ the culture of the colonizer, the colonizer is shaken and unsure about the superiority of those very practices that were assumed of a higher order (i.e. if the ‘barbarian’ can speak the tongue of ‘civilization,’ how superior is the culture of the ‘civilized’?). Mimicry serves to alter the balance of power between speakers, such that the colonizer no longer speaks with the same authority, opening space for resistance and manipulation by the colonized. Ultimately, this idea of mimicry is hinting at what for Bhabha is the central effect and contradiction of the colonial project: hybridization (2004, 128). For Bhabha the colonial subject is a hybrid subject in so much as this process of mimicry brings with it the introduction of ‘outsider’ forms of knowledge and discourse that are then reflected onto the colonizer. The introduction of these new forms of knowledge undermines the central authority base of the colonizer (its epistemological dominance), which can lead to a strategic reversal of power and open up grounds for intervention (2004, 129-130).

Robert J.C. Young, an adherent to postcolonial theory himself, has undertaken a considered reading and critique of Bhabha. Young identifies a methodological problem with the concept of enunciation, which is difficult for Bhabha to escape without some recourse to the very forms of historical method he rejects. For if enunciation is the source of discourse’s power in a given moment, whose enunciation are we to privilege? The enunciation of the historian (Young, 2008, 190)? Surely this is not Bhabha’s intent. However, in attempting to articulate the position of the colonizer and colonized, removed from that moment, does the interlocutor not have to fall back on some creeping historicism to provide the material grounds for understanding that moment?

Furthermore, in the concept of hybridization, Bhabha is equally prone to universalisms. As Young points out, the idea of hybridization assumes some a priori discrete and pure form of
culture/knowledge that is fixed and thus temporally universalized at a given moment (Young, 2008, 190). This furthermore requires falling back onto history as Bhabha must locate the moment of rupture or contact from which hybridization springs—this being the colonial moment that brings us back to the timeline of History.

Critical race scholar David Goldberg extends this line of critique and argues that the concept of hybridity not only assumes *a priori* fixity, but this assumption of monocultural priority itself would have to rely upon histories of repression—monoculturalism is always bought at the price of repression (Goldberg, 2005, 73). Hybridity cannot be understood only as a modern and active rejection of the colonial encounter because its absence is historically the product of coercive containment and repression. To restrict the temporal location of heterogeneity or hybridity, as the postcolonialists do, is to ignore the ways in which “modern states have predicated themselves on racial differentiation and racial exclusion and exploitation. Thus modern states fashioned themselves, not as heterogenous spaces, but as homogenous ones, falsely” (Goldberg, 2008, 74).

Bhabha’s deployment of the concept of hybridity is itself a universalization of the experience and ideology underpinning hybridity. That the concept is one that long predates the colonial encounter, while its meaning has shifted from a justification of racial categories to a celebration of cultural difference, suggests that hybridity needs to be contextualized by material and power relations for it to tell us anything of use. Absent such contextualization, hybridity is an historical banality, a descriptive device that could apply as far back as the first human migrations. Thus, as Shohat argues, there is a need to distinguish between modalities of hybridity; when does hybridity function as force, cooptation, conformism, and creative
resistance? These issues cannot be given by the concept alone, but must be informed by the historical and material context within which it is situated (Shohat, 1992).

This brings me, finally, to Acheraiou’s (2011) argument that Bhabha’s methodological individualism, his focus on the subject alone, prevents him from understanding the geopolitical context within which hybridity is situated. Bhabha’s ‘third space,’ the ostensible location between Manichean binaries that allows for the negotiation of hybrid identities, is not neutral. Rather, the ‘third space’ is always conditioned by ideological power, itself premised on universalist assumptions which then determine the framework for cultural exchange. Regardless of the abstract aspirations of Bhabha’s hybridity, the material and geopolitical world continues to operate along binaries, myths of purity, and rigid demarcations of inside/outside. Failing to acknowledge this, the concept is politically neutered; at best, it is ignorant of the continuing operation of oppressive subject constructs (e.g. race, nationality, gender, class), and at worst, it is directly complicit in maintaining such constructs.

The colonial construction of difference must be situated within its socioeconomic and geopolitical context for us to be able to grasp anything beyond the mere fact of ‘difference.’ Why are some constructed as acceptably different, and thus positioned as capable of such ‘creative hybridity,’ while others are deemed dangerously different, whose very prospect of hybridity is viewed as visceral threat? What are the different spaces within, and tools with which, such patterns of difference are constructed, articulated, and reproduced? It is with these questions that the final chapter is concerned. I argue that the ways in which hybridity is construed for different populations must be understood within the material and ideological framework established by the uneven and combined development of national configurations of political economic power and population.
Conclusion

This dissertation makes four key contributions to sociological, political and international literatures. In the first instance, I contribute to a range of scholarship that asks the question: how do we understand the relationship between violence and the modern liberal-capitalist state (Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015; Brubaker, 2004; Giddens, 1985, 1987; Losurdo, 2011; Mann, 2004; Marx, 1998)? Are we to understand violence as a vestige of, or return to, pre-modern political practice? If not, are we to view liberalism’s commitment to equality and consent as simply a ruse? As I argued above, neither of these positions ultimately satisfies. Rather, I will be arguing that state violence is a constitutive aspect of modernity, and that all liberal democracies are critically underwritten by periods of violence and exclusion (Mann, 2004, 3,4). However, departing from some of the aforementioned scholars, I will argue that this ‘illiberalism’ is more than simply a founding moment to liberal polities. Where, for example, Mann suggests that the recourse to such violence marks a breakdown of liberal democracy (2004, 4), I argue that the relationship between illiberalism and liberalism is enduring. This is even more so for the settler state, in which case state consolidation is an ongoing, contested project.

Related to this first contribution, then, in the second place, and more pointedly, I contribute to a body of scholarship on nationalism that debates the relationship between nation and race. Specifically, I intervene to contest Anderson’s insistence that nationalism and racism are discrete and incompatible modalities of social identification and organization. Throughout this study I draw on the examples of ‘white’ Argentina and Canada to show how nation became irrevocably defined through racial ascription. This level of argumentation relates to the first inasmuch as, ultimately, Anderson’s inability to capture race as an aspect of national identity formation rests on his tacit acceptance of bourgeois liberal mythology, denying the central role
that overt inequality and coercion plays in modern liberal polities. However, it is not only Anderson who has faced this critique; more broadly Marxist scholarship has been accused of denying the salience of overt coercion and violence to liberal capitalist modernity. Marxists allegedly too readily accept that under capitalism exploitation is purely a matter of economics.

Thus, the third contribution this dissertation makes is a defense of Marxism and political economy in the face of these potent critiques. Specifically, I frame this dissertation in dialogue with one of the most representative bodies of this position: postcolonial theory. Postcolonial theorists have launched a scathing critique of many economistic variants of Marxism wherein the assumption that exploitation through the labour process is the only way that oppression occurs under capitalism leads to an explanation of non-consensual politics as a resurgence in ‘tradition’. In response, however, postcolonial theorists have outright denied the salience of political economy and instead turned to the materially emptied category of culture. Drawing on Political Marxism and Uneven and Combined Development (UCD), I show that capitalism’s historical and geographical specificities cannot be determined \textit{a priori}, and further, that culture can be read, not deterministically, but relationally from the materiality of capitalism. This leads to the final contribution I make in this dissertation. That is, a methodological elaboration of the theory of UCD to take more seriously the constitutive role that ostensibly immaterial factors (culture, subjectivity, ideology) play in the reproduction of capitalist social relations.

In this study I use the concept of UCD to show how nationalism and race (seemingly cultural factors) were deployed as strategies of late development, or material ‘catch-up,’ in the context of an emergent nineteenth-century global agrarian market for cereals. I draw UCD out of its Eurocentric moorings by situating the fact of combined development in the contradiction- and tension-driven expansion of capitalist social relations throughout the Atlantic. In so doing, I
show that capitalism is always, and from the beginning, bound to heterogenous manifestations, and that the so-called immaterial practices of identity formation are, in fact, materially central and productive strategies for advancing capitalist state development. The concept of UCD allows me to respond to the postcolonial critique of Marxist theory, while the content of this critique allows me to creatively advance and extend the utility of UCD.
Chapter 1 Against the Bourgeois Myth of Capitalism as Homogenization: Geopolitical, Spatial, and Historical Heterogeneity in Capitalist Subject Formation

In this chapter I aim to lay out the theoretical premises of this study. To do this I will navigate several layers of analysis, moving through the specific, to the abstract, and then back to the specific. First, I will establish that Marxist theory is fully capable of accounting for variation in the expression of capitalist social relations. Specifically I will point to Political Marxism, and argue for its potential in explaining illiberal practices of population management and stratification within the capitalist mode of production. To do this, I review Robbie Shilliam’s work (2009a), which utilizes the concept of social property relations to argue that the ‘classical liberal subject’ of England was a contingent, rather than necessary, product of capitalism. Understanding the contingency of the liberal subject, Shilliam is then able to account for the very different forms of political subjectivity that developed in France. While not following blindly from the English model, the account of French subject formation is nevertheless understood with reference to capitalism. This analysis provides, at the most general level, the framework for my own examination of divergent and illiberal models of subjectivity in Argentina and Canada. However, this initial account from Shilliam is contained within Europe, and tightly bound into an understanding of geopolitical relations that were specific to the continental experience. As such, I build upon Shilliam’s argument to develop an explanation for the spread of capitalist social relations outside of Europe.

Underlying Shilliam’s specific analysis of the social property relations attendant to continental European subject formation is a unique appropriation of Leon Trotsky’s theory of
uneven and combined development (UCD). It is through the theory of UCD that Shilliam is able to explain how actors rooted in capitalist and non-capitalist social property relations interacted to produce novel, modern forms of political association. In order to move the analysis outside of Europe, I too pull from UCD, and thus in the next section I develop my own position within the UCD literature, addressing debates as to the causal role of UCD, its potential Eurocentrism and instrumentalism. I draw creatively from a number of UCD scholars to advance a framework shorn of its Eurocentrism and instrumentalism.

In the final sections, I apply the abstract principles discussed in the first half of the chapter to the settler colonial context, and propose a broad theoretical sketch of how I aim to illuminate the illiberal production of liberal states. That is, I lead the reader through an overview of the relationship between racial hierarchies of subjectivity and national-state formation within a capitalist world market. My argument is that ‘race,’ as an illiberal mode of political designation, was constructed and deployed in the interests of liberal state building.

**Subjectivity and Capital: The Contingency of the Impersonal Individual**

In this section, I examine Robbie Shilliam’s account of the origins of the quintessential capitalist subject in England to show that the form and content of subjectivity are not functionally determined by the mode of production. Rather, subjectivities are politically constructed with the objective of naturalizing the conditions necessary for the reproduction of dominant class forces—notably by legitimating the conditions necessary for the accumulation of surplus (Sayer and Corrigan, 1985, 6). Because the conditions necessary for class reproduction and surplus accumulation are embedded in historical and geographically uneven space, there can never really be a singular subject form.
This is true even under capitalism, which alongside liberalism relies on the myth of an abstract universal subject.

I will draw out the Political Marxist concept of social property relations, which refers to the ways in which the relations amongst individuals (relations of duty, obligation rights, reciprocity, etc.) are informed by the societal treatment and distribution of land as property. These relations, in early agrarian societies, defined the parameters of social reproduction and hence the relationship between political authority and subjects (Brenner, 1982, 87-89). I hone in on how variable social property relations were combined with the imperatives and institutions generated by competitive capitalist markets; what emerged were specific struggles and obstacles to the consolidation of a national-state in response to globalized competitive accumulation.

To explain the relationship between property, social reproduction, and political authority it is instructive to contrast feudal and capitalist social property relations in England. Within English feudalism, the relationship between peasants and lords determined unequal but reciprocal rights and duties of both parties. These relations were written into the copyholds of each manor, and accordingly, multiple, distinct, and at times overlapping sets of rights and duties co-existed (Shilliam, 2009b, 32). In general, peasants were granted access to land in order to fulfill their immediate subsistence needs, but subjected to political forms of surplus appropriation in exchange for this access. The peasant as a political subject was defined in relation to their immediate lord, dictating a differentiated relationship to subsistence and consumption. One was born into their rank, which was maintained through illiberal practices of coercion. This meant that within feudal England, political status was hierarchically organized, and authority was itself heterogeneous. Such arrangements of subjectivity have been understood as antithetical to the capitalist mode of production because there was little incentive to increase productive efficiency.
While situated in a constellation of political inequality, peasants held access to their basic means of reproduction, and so long as this was sufficient to meet their personal consumption needs and obligations to feudal landlords, there appeared no compulsion to increase productivity (Shilliam, 2009b, 31-32). Thus under feudalism the distribution of land (passed on through lineages of privilege) ensured that coerced and localized relations of reciprocal reproduction existed (the peasant relying on access to land, the lord relying on the production of the peasant), which led to multiple, personalized forms of political authority (that were determined between the specific lord and peasant).

In England, this arrangement of feudal power was disrupted by the Black Death and subsequent enclosure movement. The rate of taxation or rent imposed upon peasants was decoupled from custom and rose disproportionately owing to the drastic reduction of the peasant population. Peasants were increasingly forced to relinquish their tenures, losing direct access to their means of reproduction. As such, there arose a radical reformulation of political authority and the rights and duties associated with social reproduction. Importantly, land was removed from the socialized and reciprocal equation of rights and obligations. As property was increasingly privatized, its use was divested of any form of social obligation to reproduction. With the reallocation of reproduction away from political authority and onto the market, ‘neutral’ and disinterested market mechanisms rather than personalized political power dictated the distribution of socio-economic power. This surface-level extraction of political from economic power allowed for a potential levelling out of subjectivity, in that individual characteristics and qualities no longer formally governed hierarchies of status (Shilliam, 2009b, 33-34). Because access to land was no longer bound into political privilege, anyone could theoretically own property. Political subjectivity could then be understood through universal rights and obligations.
to an ‘economically disinterested’ and neutral state (Shilliam, 2009b, 34-35; Wood, 2012, 189).

The ‘individual’ thus existed in relation to an ‘impersonal’ sovereign—the state. Hence the transition to agrarian capitalism in England brought with it the rise of what Shilliam has termed the ‘impersonal individual.’

The levelling out of subjectivity rested upon the positing of a homogenous set of cultural qualities that would mark out state belonging. In The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution, Derek Sayer and Phillip Corrigan show how moral and cultural regulation were important tools used to mark out appropriate expressions of ‘Englishness’ from which personal liberty could be experienced (Sayer and Corrigan, 1985, 142). So, for example, Englishness rested on assumptions of masculinity, which de facto excluded women from the public domain and led to a differential capacity to access the state (Sayer and Corrigan, 1985, 133). In creating the conditions for formal equality of status, then, the state first had to segregate, exclude, and coercively regulate parts of the population. Rather than the ‘free and liberal’ worker emerging automatically from reconfigured production relations, the classical model of liberal subjectivity in England was itself produced and maintained through illiberal practices. Sayer and Corrigan’s argument regarding the formation of public identities, moralities, and state power in England resonates with the case studies to follow, with the crucial difference that in the settler colony, cultural formation is a thoroughly racialized phenomena. The neutral category, or assumed subject, is not only male, but he is white as well.

Political subjectivity mediates our relationship with historically and geographically specific constellations of political authority, modes of production and social reproduction. Understanding this allows for a view to the differential manifestation of political subjectivities and practices of exploitation that cannot be functionally reduced to an economic reading of the
laws of motion of the mode of production. Thus, while the subject was understood through the lens of formal equality in England, modern political power and relationships took on different forms elsewhere.

**Uneven and Combined Development and the Jacobin Subject**

One of the ways this differential manifestation of modern subjectivities assumed under globalizing capitalist social relations can be seen is in Robbie Shilliam’s analysis of the Jacobin subject in France. Shilliam shows how subsequent developments of political subjectivities were intimately bound into the geopolitical and economic competitive pressures generated by uneven development. The impersonal individual of England was “implicated in the Anglo-French colonial contest of geopolitical accumulation, creating a sense of comparative backwardness within the French ruling strata” (2009b, 32). Shilliam’s argument about the geopolitical contest over colonial spoils between Britain and France rests on the differentiation between sovereignties and military capacities possessed by each state.

In Britain, the depersonalization of politics meant the creation of a sovereign body that was divested of particularistic privilege. Thus, rather than the monarch, it was the parliament that incurred debt and was responsible for the collection of tax revenues. The collection of taxes, shorn of the feudal hierarchy of privilege and evasion, was now relatively transparent and systematic. This reliable and transparent system of tax collection lent the British parliament credibility when dealing with creditors. As a result, long-term borrowing soon replaced short-term and debt was accrued on the basis of the state’s ability to pay interest rather than to pay back the principle. This type of taxation also served to further entrench the centralization of political apparatuses. Geopolitically, this development had consequences for the colonial contest playing out in continental Europe. The British state was both financially and structurally better
equipped to make geopolitical decisions and finance those decisions through naval and military spending, and this would come to exert pressure on the French state (Shilliam, 2009b, 38).

In contrast, the French mode of tax collection was still mired in feudal systems of privilege, such that the collection of tax revenues was erratic and unreliable. Administered through the venal office, taxation was evaded in a widespread practice owing to the highly personalized nature of the crown. At the same time, because the collection of tax revenue was unreliable, state funds tended to be accrued through the sale of privilege over certain trades. In this sense, the colonial contest, rather than managed from a cohesive centre, was inconsistent due to the myriad and differential interests represented by each trade. Thus, in France, colonialism actually served to further entrench particular interests, as colonial and metropolitan markets were not linked in any systemic manner under the French. Finally, given the opacity of taxation and its unreliability, the king, rather than the French state, was the major debtor of the nation and this largely occurred through short-term borrowing on the basis of repayment of the principle (Shilliam, 2009b, 38-40).

These differences, revealed in the colonial contest, created within the French state a consciousness of its own political disadvantages and generated pressures to reform the system of taxation. However, the transparent and systematized taxation of the British state was, in large part, owing to the transformation of social property relations and subjectivities that posited an impersonal political realm of equality as separate from the economic realm. Thus, taxation was administered and collected without the trappings of personal privilege. In the French system, the persistence of hierarchical privileges and access to the crown rendered taxation an erratic and unpredictable system, creating uncertainty in revenues, hence the borrowing of the French state. The French could not, therefore, transition to a British model of taxation without a concomitant
reorganization of the underlying social property relations and a universalization of political subjectivities. Thus, when the French began to attempt to graft on elements of the ‘impersonal individual,’ it was without fundamentally reorganizing domestic social property relations. This combined form of development produced an amalgam political subject that Shilliam refers to as the ‘impersonal collective’ (2009, 21).

Because the French had not yet transformed their property relations, there existed no space within which formal political equality could be erected. In Britain, this space was ‘civil society,’ the result of the enclosures and the removal of property from the price mechanism attached to political privilege and manorial custom. In France, no such space existed in which to institutionalize free and equal rights of the subject (Shilliam, 2009b, 43). Thus, the French had to perform a substitution, taking the form of the Third Estate. However, the Third Estate was nevertheless structured internally by hierarchy: the bourgeoisie, urban workers and peasants (Shilliam, 2009b, 44). In order to resolve this contradiction, the Jacobin Constitution of 1793, while proclaiming the inalienable rights of property ownership, was nevertheless mediated by Robespierre’s conception of the general will, such that property (attached to personalized power) was to secure common welfare (collective), and citizenship was therefore defined as separate from property qualifications (Shilliam, 2009b, 46). The impersonal individual of England was transformed into the impersonal collective of Jacobin France. Thus, in contrast to England where property itself constituted the precondition for equal political rights, in France (given the absence of mass expropriation) it was the ‘general will’ or collective social obligations which provided this precondition.

I have argued, through a review of Marxist scholars Shilliam, Corrigan and Sayer, that the politically disinterested state and the ‘impersonal individual’ are not the natural outcomes of
capitalist social relations; rather subjectivity is politically constituted. In the next section, I begin to develop a theoretical framework that extends the geographically limited understanding of the uneven and combined development of political subjectivity outlined thus far. To do this, I first review the primary and secondary literature on uneven and combined development in order to specify my own position within what is a broader debate on the relationship of the concept to the capitalist mode of production. Having staked my position, I turn to examine how the globally uneven spread of capitalist social relations generated a form of combined development that entailed the concerted organization of political subjectivities through national articulations of the state. I argue that nationalism, understood as a product of combined development, rather than simply as a response to endogenous processes, reveals the ways in which so-called liberal political formations are underwritten by illiberal hierarchies of subjectivity, specifically as defined by ‘race’ in the settler-colony.

**Uneven and Combined Development: From Trotsky to Rosenberg**

In the first chapter of *The History of the Russian Revolution* Leon Trotsky argued that unevenness constitutes the most basic law of human existence; this law was understood as the product of differences in geographical, historical, spatial, cultural, demographic and technological characteristics. Given this basic law, Trotsky argued that the social development of societies would also be uneven, juxtaposing on a world scale the ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’ (Trotsky, 2000). This basic recognition in many ways accounts for the problematic posed by postcolonial theory—that de facto, starting points are materially, socially and politically different, such that we cannot assume a convergence of development. When situated within the capitalist mode of production, such differences are sharpened, and economic, political and military pressures to achieve similar patterns and processes of development emerge. For Trotsky,
the coercive power of capital creates a dichotomous image of the world as ‘advanced’ or ‘backward.’ However, contrary to the postcolonial critique, recognizing this power does not necessarily commit us to a normative conclusion about the moral-intellectual value of such differences. To suggest that capitalism creates a world in which societies are measured by their quantitative output in production and capital accumulation is not to suggest that the valuation of societies according to this metric is morally justifiable. Nevertheless, to ignore these very real socio-economic, political and military pressures to adapt would be historically ignorant.

Furthermore, recognizing the dominance of capitalism in the late nineteenth century, and its generation of pressures to adapt, does not entail a denial of actors’ agency. While capitalism exerts pressures to adapt, it is not the case that all actors respond in a process of automatic and unreflective repetition and reproduction. Indeed, Trotsky argued “a backward country assimilates the material and intellectual conquests of the advanced countries. But this does not mean that it follows them slavishly, reproduces all the stages of the past” (Trotsky, 2000, 2). For Trotsky, unevenness laid the foundation for processes of comparison and interaction, which compelled those societies whose historical condition was deemed unfavorable for continued production and reproduction to adapt the techniques and strategies of the more favourable socio-economic systems in order to ‘catch-up’ (Trotsky, 2000, 2).

Combined development speaks to the adaptation of ‘advanced’ mechanisms and technologies to so-called ‘backward’ social formations, implying that actors respond intentionally and discerningly to global pressures. As a consequence, unevenness enables a comprehension of differential forms of state formation and accumulation processes within the broader history of capitalist development. It departs from the idea that capitalism universalizes a particular political form, set of power relations, or production techniques. Instead UCD points to
the fact that what capitalism universalizes is a particular model of social reproduction, which is rooted in the production and accumulation of surplus value. How this production and accumulation are socially and politically organized, however, remains open to historical and spatial specification, depending on the conscious and unconscious strategies of local populations to prop up or maintain existing cultural, material, political and social institutions or practices in the face of pressures to adapt.

What Trotsky developed through these observations was a schematic for understanding the unpredictable and variable nature of capitalist transformations throughout the world, once the mode of production had acquired its universalizing tendency. Trotsky’s concept of UCD adds a lateral dimension to the explanation of the dynamics of change within capitalist production: that of competition (Ashman, 2009, 31). Methodologically this concept is unique in that it recognizes the interactivity between domestic and international processes, and it is for this reason that it has recently been revived in the field of international relations.

Leading this revival has been Justin Rosenberg, with his 1996 Isaac Deutscher memorial lecture, later published in New Left Review as “Isaac Deutscher and the Lost History of International Relations.” In these pieces, Rosenberg argued for the novelty and ingenuity of the concept in the study of international relations. For Rosenberg, the novelty of UCD was its potential to move beyond disciplinary silos focused exclusively on sociological or geopolitical mechanisms of causality (Rosenberg, 1996, 10). Methodologically, UCD could bridge these divides and show how international and domestic social processes interact meaningfully. It is on this basis that a robust literature on UCD has been generated. However, Rosenberg later departed from this initial argument, creating a rift within the community of scholars working with UCD, so I will need to clarify my use of the concept (Rosenberg, 2009, 108).
Rosenberg’s shift was a controversial one in that he sought to move UCD from a methodological frame (one that integrates sociological and geopolitical analyses) to a general theory. Specifically, he attempted to use UCD to explain the fact of ‘the international’ itself (2010, 175). This move required an extension of Trotsky’s concept beyond the capitalist mode of production, stretching it to become a generalized, universal phenomena. Because for Trotsky combined development occurred as a result of the coercive power of capitalist accumulation (Davidson, 2009, 19), many have suggested that Rosenberg’s newest project has emptied UCD of any explanatory or illuminating power. Indeed, this is how I read Rosenberg’s recent work, and as such it should be clearly stated that my deployment of UCD is one that is firmly rooted in an understanding of capitalism as the catalytic element of combined development.

In their contribution to the inaugural debate on UCD within the *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Jamie Allinson and Alex Anievas took up the problem of general abstractions within Rosenberg’s deployment of UCD (Allinson & Anievas, 2009, 49). While agreeing with Rosenberg that there is a latent, if mundane, way in which UCD can be read transhistorically, the authors firmly argued that its causal significance could only be fully activated under the conditions of capitalist competition (Allinson & Anievas, 2009, 48). Rosenberg’s method of abstraction, the authors argued, was fully at odds with the methodologies of Marxist sociological theory. Instead, they argued that as per Marx’s methodology, a general abstraction should be utilized as the basis from which to posit a presupposition, which could then account for a concrete general condition whose historical form is nonetheless explained by further categories and concepts (Allinson & Anievas, 2009, 56). In this more nuanced sense, UCD can be posited as a transhistoric general abstraction only if it is situated in a mode of
production analysis, which gives us the historical material with which to make sense of its particular operation within a given historical juncture (Allinson & Anievas, 2009, 55).

Likewise, Neil Davidson opposed Rosenberg’s extension of UCD, noting that

Before capitalism all societies, with the exception of those based on slavery, were based on variations of the same mode of production involving surplus extraction from a class of peasants and taking either a ‘feudal’ or ‘tributary’ form . . . . they were not sufficiently differentiated from each other for elements to ‘combine’ to any effect. The very terms that Trotsky uses in describing combination . . . were unthinkable until capitalism (2009, 18).

It was only under the dynamism unleashed by industrial capitalism that combination became “inescapable, as all aspects of existing society registered the impact on them . . . of this radically new means of exploitation” (Davidson, 2009, 18). Indeed, the early Rosenberg recognized this when he suggested that not only did the world change with capitalism, but the nature of historical change, its meaning and effects, changed also (Rosenberg, 2007, 456).

UCD is situated within a contested territory whereby two camps struggle over the appropriate interpretation and extension of the concept, and it is within this territory that I must necessarily situate myself. My usage of uneven and combined development is in keeping with the more limited, capital-centric camp, and as such, is in large part a methodological approach. It is a response to some of the critical issues that arise from Rosenberg’s initial intervention, namely a tension between sociological and geopolitical levels of analyses. It is also, moreover, an engagement with Radhika Desai’s call to move beyond a disciplinary division that has too often made analyses of capitalism the exclusive domain of political economy and nationalism, that of cultural studies (Desai, 2008, 398). In the former case, sociological forms of explanation have tended to assume purely endogenous analyses of development, often neglecting the role that inter-societal relations play in sociological developments. This neglect has often been the shortcoming of postcolonial theorisations, which view national formulations as purely cultural
phenomena responding to internal dynamics. On the other hand, however, purely geopolitical forms of explanation often take sociological developments to be the function of instrumentalism at the international level (which is in large part the critique levied by postcolonial theorists). In this case, the dictates of political economy are supposed to causally influence domestic formulations. Rather than take the colony (or nation) and empire (or the international) as distinct levels of analysis, it is instructive to follow Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler’s argument that both colony and metropole, culture and political economy, national and international, must be taken up in a common analytical framework (1997). This is where the import of uneven and combined development comes in.

Despite all of the promise held out by UCD, its dominant use has tended towards Eurocentrism and technological instrumentalism. I intend to draw from and develop certain critical and creative currents of UCD, found in the works of Radhika Desai, Robbie Shilliam, and Luke Cooper, among others. Each takes up Trotsky’s insights as to the nature of intersocietal transformation under capitalism to explicate the variation in state and subject forms produced under the spread of capitalist social relations.

**Uneven and Combined Development: Re-centering Capitalism’s Contradictions and Moving Beyond Technical Combination**

In his more recent work, Robbie Shilliam has developed a creative reworking that moves away from Europe, and instead posits the Atlantic as a crucial space for the promulgation of UCD (2009a). Specifically, Shilliam examines Caribbean colonization and the Atlantic slave trade to demonstrate how certain social and cultural developments functioned to draw together the ‘old’ and the ‘new,’ making possible diachronous socio-economic and political transformations. Indeed, “the development of European settler colonies rarely reflected the wishes of the metropolitan powers . . . who expected the European moral and social order to be
transplanted unproblematically” (Shilliam, 2009a, 78). Instead, what Shilliam finds are attempts to produce identities that articulated autonomy from their old European powers and that supplanted indigenous peoples’ claims to ‘nativity.’ These identities coalesced around a racial grammar of ‘black’ and ‘white’ in order to give colonial ‘nativity’ a common referent beyond ‘Europeanness,’ which was conceived in relation to the use of black slavery (2009a, 79).

Shilliam’s creative usage of UCD is a necessary departure from what has tended to be an often Eurocentric and rather technical debate. That is, most processes of UCD are seen as emanating from Europe and resulting in transfers of material technology that directly intervene in the class organization of production. What Shilliam advances is a process of UCD that *emanates from the Atlantic* as a space of uneven exchange between Europe, Africa, and the Americas. These exchanges, furthermore, entail social rather than material technological transfers to indirectly intervene in class organization through the production of subjectivities. However, Shilliam’s discussion is limited in its wider application as a result of the temporal constraints of his project.

The placement of the Atlantic as a vector of UCD throughout the eighteenth century offers no real ‘whip of external necessity.’ This lack is owing to the relative absence of a competitive market or geopolitical competition to act as the impetus for ‘catch-up.’ Up until the middle of the nineteenth century, the globe was dominated by modes of production that lacked the structural kinds of contradictions that impel expansionary tendencies, and as a result ‘combination’ could not be in operation. Instead, Shilliam’s Atlantic vector operates in an historical space dominated by a slave sugar plantation economy, which is subjected to the conditions of mercantilist colonialism. Under this system, the sugar trade was firstly limited to export to Britain under the Navigation Acts, which was, secondly, compensated for through a
preferential tariff, originating in the 1660 ‘Old Subsidy,’ and which thirdly, was bound into a reciprocal guarantee on the part of Britain to provide for the protection of the colony in cases of geo-political conflict (Livingston Schuyler, 1917, 432; Semmel, 1970). As such, the British West Indies were given a relative monopoly in the British sugar market, and were prevented from trading with other partners, meaning there was little incentive to revolutionize sugar production under conditions of competitive coercion; there was no impetus for ‘combined’ development. Furthermore, owing to the guarantee of imperial protection, the colonies did not suffer from the kind of geo-political pressures that might similarly stimulate a need to transform socio-economic structures. There was, in fact, no ‘whip of external necessity’ in the Caribbean colonies. Nevertheless, with some temporal repositioning, Shilliam’s insights are integral in order to elide the scholarly binaries often presented between political economy and culture, national and international, while giving life to the Atlantic as a formative space through which intersocietal relations take shape.

To achieve this temporal repositioning, I draw from Radhika Desai and her concept of geopolitical economy. Desai’s development of geopolitical economy achieves the kind of temporal repositioning of UCD that is necessary for my project. Rooted firmly in the contradictions of nineteenth-century British industrialization, Desai’s work shows how Trotsky’s ‘whip of external necessity’ was produced through a politically mediated expansion of the law of value. Focusing on crisis as the impetus behind the externalization of capitalist social relations thereby situates capitalist globality in the fact of combination; responses to crisis were sought in the extension of capitalist social relations beyond their European core, which would eventuate in ‘combined’ development. As I will show in the next chapter, this resolution to crisis was, importantly, resolved through an extension of the market throughout the Atlantic world.
Understanding capitalist globalization as combined development generates an interpretation of capitalist modernity that insists on its heterogeneity, rather than a homogenous liberal form (Desai, 2008, 2013, 2015).

This runs contrary to much of the nineteenth-century historiography (including Marxist) that reads the expansion of capitalism as the product of liberal free trade (2008, 398; 2015, 453). Instead, Desai identifies the national form as a distinct and deliberate response to the pressures of global capital, highlighting the central role of politics in mediating the universal tendencies of capitalism (2008, 398). The nation emerged as a strategy of combined development that could organize and advance political and economic exigencies, mobilizing legitimacy and support through culturalist discourses and claims of territoriality (Desai, 2008, 398). Nationalism in this late nineteenth-century period of crisis is thus rooted in the materiality of capitalist social relations, which nevertheless takes seriously the political and cultural forms that arise from or facilitate such expansion. This is what Desai refers to as the ‘materiality of nations,’ which refers to the “material importance of nations to the populations that compose them, to the pattern and pace of capitalism’s spread around the word, and to its world order” (Desai, 2012, 48). By positioning the nation as a strategic response to the pressures of globalizing competitive market relations, Desai is able to connect cultural and material relations without relying on economic determinism (2008, 405; see also Teschke, 2003, 265).

In working through the implications of Desai’s argument for my own interpretation of the ‘Atlantic as a vector of UCD,’ I am suggesting that the crisis tendencies of British industrialization created a centrifugal force in the Atlantic through the emergence of a competitive agricultural market subject to capitalism’s coercive pressures of adaptation. Specifically, the Atlantic vector developed through the ending of imperial preference and
through the emergent specter of U.S. agricultural goods (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989, Harley, 1980; Semmel, 1970; Rothstein, 1960). The repeal of the Corn Laws (1846) and Navigation Acts (1849) brought to an end the era of mercantilist imperialism, and ushered in an era of what Gallagher and Robinson (1953) have famously termed the ‘imperialism of free trade,’ or which, in a similar vein, Bernard Semmel (1970) refers to as ‘free trade imperialism.’ As I will show in Chapter 2, this transformation resulted from Britain reaching the limits of the ‘field of employment’ for domestic capital and labour, necessitating an outward expansion for profitable employment. In other words, the spread of capitalist social relations proceeded not through an inevitable superiority, but through a deliberate and political process of managing for the contradictions of capitalism itself (Desai, 2015, 453).

The outward expansion of capitalist social relations found expression in the migration of massive quantities of labour and capital across the Atlantic and into the New World, generating the first globally competitive commodity markets (Friedmann & McMichael, 1989). To make emigrating labour and capital productive meant to impress certain social relations into the ‘New World’ such that the expansion of capital was advanced through combined development (Desai, 2015, 453). Thus, labour and capital issuing from different sets of social property relations were combined with New World class and property relations and deployed in a project of socio-economic ‘catch-up,’ all of which provided the material for the national-state to politically direct developmental processes. In general, development in this period could not simply replicate the patterns established in Europe, but had to contend with specific local exigencies. In the cases I present throughout this dissertation, the central local contradiction was that of indigenous priority, which required that the nation be materially formed through practices of indigenous dispossession and elimination, and conceptually understood through racial distinctions.
In sum, I read the nineteenth-century growth of global capitalist markets as a key site through which to investigate the confluence of liberal and illiberal practices, and the material relationship between capitalism and the production of cultural and ideological referents for subjectivity. In this reading, the nation becomes the political and cultural node of mediation and direction, formed through the assimilation of ‘old’ and ‘new’ technologies with the objective of socio-economic ‘development.’

The ‘nation,’ for Desai, forms a material and ideological basis through which elite classes shore up their own reproduction and respond to unevenness generated by international competition (2008, 405). Primarily this occurs through attempts to achieve the centralization and monopolization of property, coercion, and fiduciary capacity. In the Atlantic context, this process occurs alongside the reality of indigenous priority and, as a consequence, nationalism and the parameters of ‘liberal inclusion’ have assumed a racial grammar. The modification of ‘liberal inclusion,’ however, is not exclusive to the settler colony. The idea of national universal citizenship has always been politically mediated by determinations as to who is included, and how. Rather, it is that these contours came to be expressed in racial terms, in ways that were in fact formative to the state itself, which is unique in the settler space.

**Subjectivities in the Settler Colonial Context**

In this final section I argue that the variable social relations that underpinned the settler state (in contrast to continental European states) generated the impetus to a confluence of racial and national boundaries. Understood in terms of social relations, settler colonialism is in a very meaningful way distinct from both the non-colonial state and the direct colonial state. Patrick Wolfe is perhaps the most prominent scholar to articulate this specificity in settler colonialism when he argues that the central logic of settler colonialism is *elimination*; this logic exists
because settler colonialism is driven by a thirst for land (rather than labour) (Wolfe, 2006, 388). Elimination was thus a material as well as social and relational necessity for the particular form of exploitation that settler colonialism embodied, with profound ramifications for the nature of state building.

This logic of elimination, as Lorenzo Veracini notes, is in sharp contrast to the logic of colonialism. The indigenous peoples who are to be eliminated under settler colonialism are instead retained and controlled for their labour power under colonialism (2015, 25). Likewise, it is important to recall that the expropriated peasants in England were integrated into labour markets following (and ultimately as an objective of) their dispossession, which distinguishes continental European state-building processes from those in the settler colony. What this means is that the types of relations between the exploiter and exploited in these different spaces are structurally distinct. While the subordinating relationship between the colonizer and colonized under colonialism must be ever-present and explicit, under settler colonialism the objective is for this relation to disappear. First, the logic of elimination suggests that the relationship between colonizer and colonized is a terminal one. With elimination as its objective, settler colonialism presupposes that a colonizer-colonized relation will be superseded. In the second instance, because settler-colonialism seeks to replace and occupy in perpetuity, the establishment of a façade of settler indigeneity becomes a necessary objective. This is to say that along with elimination, the settler asserts itself as the original inhabitant and hence erases from public view the original relation between the colonizer and colonized (Veracini, 2015, 26). The aim, then, of the settler relationship is the eventual non- or asymmetrical recognition of indigenous peoples as political subjects; either refusing to acknowledge the continuity of indigenous existence, or else placing indigenous peoples in a subordinate political relationship to the sovereign (see, for
example, Coulthard, 2015). Such refusal or subordination is necessary in the construction and maintenance of the settler as a political subject and de facto differentiates indigenous and settler political subjectivities.

As a means of asserting a sovereign claim over occupied land—a claim that displaces the indigenous population—a sense of ‘we’ the settlers needed to be formed over and above ‘they’ the indigenous. While the precise ways in which the settler population was bound was derived from each space’s configuration of social relations and the organization and distribution of property, the general condition of dispossession without political-economic inclusion represents a common attribute of the settler colony that generates this compulsion. The configuration of a ‘people’ is intimately bound into notions of economic development that eventuate the need for a reliable tax base, state legitimacy and borrowing capacities. A ‘national state’ and ‘national peoples’ are, far from simply cultural artifacts, material consequences of a universalizing law of value in an uneven and combined international system, as well as the material preconditions for specific capitalist formations (Desai, 2015, 451). This nation is all the more necessary in the settler context.

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7 Anthony Marx makes this argument in his examination of racial nation formation in the U.S., South Africa and Brazil. Marx suggests that a racial grammar of whiteness came to permeate national imaginaries as a means of quelling inter-elite conflict and asserting a united front against exploited black populations (Marx, 1998).
as settler populations are often spread over a large, infrastructurally and institutionally underdeveloped or fragmented territory, while settlers themselves are internally diverse, coming from varied European countries and thus lacking a common social bond. Thus, as Fouad Makki has argued, “rather than . . . an ancillary outcome of structural transformations, the nation-state . . . came to provide the very basis of state legitimacy (2011, 268). Official attempts to build a settler political subject was a tool used by the settler state to establish, regularize and normalize the social and material conditions necessary for the accumulation of surplus value.

In the settler colony, the conditions that had preceded the organization of a national and competitive economy in Britain, described by Tom Nairn as characterized by “slow and conventional growth” (2003, 7), such as mass expropriation, competitive and marketized land distribution, proletarianization, or the erection of a tax base to fund national economic development, could not find a universal referent in the way that the English had. Mass expropriation in the settler colony did not lead to a common market dependency, but instead required a) the non-recognition of the expropriated and their exclusion from the market and body politic, and involved b) a politically mediated distribution of land, apart from the market price. If broad market dependency as the condition for universal referents could not be attained in the settler colony, a process of substitution was necessary. I will argue that the idea of national whiteness was substituted as a means to build state legitimacy, the powers of central taxation and a monopoly on land (rather than as a condition of those processes, as was the case in England). This construction of whiteness would come to bind together settlers in a process of nonreciprocal subject formation, over and against indigenous and later immigrant populations.

**Conclusion**
In this chapter I have argued, at an abstract, theoretical level, that Marxist theory is not bound to a universalizing, economically reductionist reading of capitalism. The problems with this kind of reading, as identified by the post-colonial theorists discussed in the introduction, are significant. For, if Marxist theory cannot account for variation in the manifestation and management of capitalism, it cannot take into account the different ways in which populations are violently coerced, the salience that ideological and cultural constructs can play, and the ways in which populations are divided by more than just class. If this is the case, then Marxism is at risk of replicating that which it was intended to contest—that is, the bourgeois myth of liberal affability, freedom and individualism.

In my defence of Marxist political economy and historiography I first argued that the so-called liberal political subject of capitalism, marketization by formal legal equality and freedom, was a contingent rather than necessary development. I made this argument through an illumination of Robbie Shilliam’s work, which, additionally, demonstrated the ways that Marxism, specifically Political Marxism, can account for and explain ostensibly immaterial phenomena (in this case, subjectivity). In this section I established the relationship between social property relations, modes of production, and subjectivities.

I then moved on to elaborate the premise of uneven and combined development (UCD) underlying Shilliam’s analysis. UCD, I posited, is necessary to illuminating the global spread of capitalist social relations through settler colonialism. Moving from the primary (Trotsky), to the secondary (Rosenberg), and finally the tertiary (Desai, Cooper, Shilliam) literature on UCD, I traced the evolution of the concept and its debates, offering creative substitutions to ameliorate the theoretical problems of instrumentalism and Eurocentrism; namely I drew on Desai’s concept of unevenness as generated by contradiction, and combination as realized through nationalism, in
order to reposition Shilliam’s concept of the ‘Atlantic vector’ of UCD. This temporal repositioning has allowed me to situate settler colonialism and the development of global agrarian commodity markets as a mechanism for activating UCD, which functioned as the mid to late nineteenth-century ‘whip of external necessity.’

Finally, I turned to settler colonial theoretical literature to show how socio-economic development in the context of the competitive coercion exerted by globalized agrarian commodity markets assumed national and racialized forms. Drawing on Wolfe, Veracini, and Coulthard, among others, I have argued that racial nationalism was the fundamental organizing principle of settler colonies, and furthermore that these identities were not effects of, but in fact formative to, settler state consolidation. In the next chapter I develop the empirical content of the first two of these arguments.
Chapter 2  From Poor Law Reform to Systematic Colonization: Generative Conditions for the Uneven and Combined Development of Capitalist Modernity

This chapter develops the wider context for the case studies that follow. I build up a history of capitalist development in England and its subsequent global dissemination, which would come to draw in settler colonial states on a sociologically, technologically and productively uneven and competitive basis. My central argument is that the height of English industrial capitalism realized several related tensions and contradictions from which uneven and combined development was generated. It was from the resolution to these internal crises that capitalist social relations were increasingly globalized, generating localized strategies of combined development through national-state formation.

In making these arguments I first provide empirical evidence for the claim that liberal subjectivity was and is a contingent and politically-led development. Specifically, I examine the pivotal role of the Poor Law Amendment Act in realizing the quintessential liberal subject. This analysis echoes John Davis’s argument that the form assumed by liberalism in England is a unique exception to, rather than the rule for, its broader emergence (1997, 80). I then show how these political interventions aimed at the molding of subjectivities were productive of state formation. This assertion will become key in the remaining chapters where I show how strategies of racialized subject formation were key to the development of national state capacities. Following this I advance the claim that the consolidation of the liberal subject and state forms in England precipitated both vast improvements in productive capacity alongside a growing reserve army of labour, generating a crisis of overaccumulation. The resolution to this crisis was found in the global displacement of capital and labour power, creating the so-called Atlantic vector of uneven and combined development. This development was the context in which settler
colonialism was proposed and realized, as the means to generate a globally competitive market
in agrarian goods.

**Universalizing Tendencies, Local Conditions, and Contingent Politics: The Production of
Political Modernity in England**

In the first chapter I argued that the ‘liberal subject’ is historically related to the
transformation in the conditions of social reproduction away from politically mediated
reproduction and towards market-based reproduction. Drawing upon Shilliam, I reviewed how
the enclosures provide the impetus for the generation of wage-dependency, which is said to be
the central criterion for liberal equality. However, historically it is clear that the transformation
of social property relations did not automatically in themselves produce a wage-dependent,
market-dependent class of labourers. Indeed, the relationship between the dispossession of
peasants from the land and the constitution of a national labour market was (and continues to be)
far from automatic. To this end, the quintessential labourer had to be *made dependent* through a
variety of extra-economic, coercive tactics, which limited and regulated people’s access to non-
market practices and means of (re)production whilst simultaneously endeavouring to instill what
would eventually become a ‘common sense’ understanding of market dependence. In short, even
in the quintessential model of liberal political subjectivity, illiberal and coercive strategies were
necessary preconditions.

In *Rethinking the Industrial Revolution*, Michael Zmolek, through an impressive array of
research, demonstrated that one of the primary differences between the transition to agrarian
capitalism and industrial capitalism was that of formal versus real subsumption of labour to
capital. According to Zmolek, what agrarian capitalism achieved most successfully was the real
subsumption of land to capital; however, the subsumption of labour was a much longer and more
protracted process (2013, 344). Even as factories came to dominate manufactures throughout the
nineteenth century, labour resisted total subsumption to capital, retaining control over the labour process in many spaces, owing to the slow pace of dismantling the monopoly of skilled labour over the production process. Dispossessed peasants did not automatically transition to industrial waged-labour as a consequence of their alienation from the means of reproduction. Rather, dispossession, in the first place, led in many places to a rapid rise in rural crime, as a means of securing access to subsistence goods. In short, throughout the three hundred years that separated the transition to agrarian capitalism and the industrial revolution, the real subsumption (or final commodification) of labour to capital was far from certain, and experienced tremendous ebbs and flows.

Zmolek argues that the key to ensuring the real subsumption of labour was the consolidation of the state and its combined power to legislate private property relations and coercively repress dissent. In large measure, the period of the Napoleonic and French Revolutionary wars commenced the consolidation of state power, while in the post-war period, the mass of decommissioned soldiers facing unemployment and poverty stoked dissent and revolutionary actions amongst the masses, necessitating centralized state action (2013, 260). Zmolek’s central argument comes through succinctly when he urges that “one must look at the long-term process shaping this moment of transition, one must account for the use of the workhouse, the regulation of poor relief and the application of machinery in structuring the social relationships in such a way as to allow the ‘invisible hand’ of the market ‘freely’ to regulate wage contracts and discipline labourers” (2013, 839). Central to the process by which social relationships could be structured to allow for the ‘free’ operation of the market was the project of altering subjectivities. In England, this modification of subjectivities was realized through a transformation of poor relief.
Poor Law Reform, Subjectification and State Centralization

In the context of the British transition from agrarian to industrial capitalism, two interrelated processes set into motion in the 1830s served to finalize the full subsumption of labour to capital. Both can be read as the combined objectives and effects of the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834. In this section I argue that the Poor Law Amendment Act was a response to the particular conditions of English capitalist development and served two primary functions: first, to finalize the project of converting political subjects from peasants with access to their means of reproduction to landless peasants, and finally, to fully subsumed wage labourers. While the Poor Law Amendment Act did not create the capitalist labour market, it was the final, crowning achievement of a long process of transformation and commodification (Patriquin, 2007, 150). The second and related objective of the Reform was to produce a drastic rearrangement of state power—what some have labelled a ‘revolution in government’—through processes of centralization, rationalization and bureaucratization (Parris, 1960, 22). These two outcomes, taken together, finalized the transition to wage dependency and the subversion of parochial power to realize the consolidation of state power. In response to the problem of parochialism and oligarchical political structures, as well as increasing discord amongst labourers, the political subject that emerged was one predicated on horizontal, juridical equality. This liberal form of equality must be properly understood in its historical, political and economic specificity.

The Problem of Pauperism, Ideological Formation, and the Disciplinary Construction of the Capitalist Subject

In the middle decades of the nineteenth century, it was recognized that though the ‘invisible hand of the market’ or the simple fact of dispossession was not enough to create a wage-dependent labour force, sheer compulsion through external coercive apparatus would not
suffice either (Polanyi, 2001, 118). In political-economic terms, accumulation cannot proceed through a complete dependence on investment of surplus in the coercive apparatus of the state (Dean, 1991, 164). Rather than a constant reinvestment in the powers to coerce wage labour, the New Poor Laws selectively targeted populations deemed potentially suitable for the exercise of liberal status, combining coercive and illiberal measures with productive capacity to educate and moralize individuals as citizens and subjects. Such a strategy, reliant on illiberal distinctions amongst the population, represented a strategic investment in domestic coercion so as to limit the ongoing costs of disciplining labour.

In order to make this argument regarding the objectives of the Poor Law Reform, however, it is necessary to first undertake an analysis of the Speenhamland system of poor relief, which predated the 1834 Reform so as to point to the ways in which this system could be perceived as an obstacle to capitalist development. The Speenhamland system of poor relief was established as a political response to a crisis of unemployment and the spread of radical ideas from the French Revolutionary War (Patriquin, 2007, 124). Speenhamland consisted of the provision of relief to anyone deemed to be without sufficient income “to keep them in leisure” (Polanyi, 2001, 91). This system was referred to as one of ‘outdoor’ relief and was based on supplements to income (regardless of ability or employment status) so as to bring individuals up to an established income level, determined by such things as family size, the cost of food, etc. Underpinning Speenhamland was the philosophical principle of the ‘right to live’ through its generalized provision of grants in aid of wages (Dean, 1991, 157).

Polanyi identified the Speenhamland system as a critical moment in the attempt to foment a national capitalist labour market, as well as an important obstacle to such a market. According to this interpretation, the central referent point is the repeal of the Act of Settlement and Removal
1662, which was in operation throughout the eighteenth century and functioned to restrict the movement of people to any parish but that of their own birth, excepted only by the presentation of a signed letter from parish authorities. Ostensibly this policy was concerned with preventing the abuse of parish poor relief through the development of the ‘professional pauper,’ who would seek out the parish with the best forms of relief to settle in. With the introduction and development of capitalism, however, it became increasingly necessary to restore the mobility of labour and thus the Act was repealed (Polanyi, 2001, 92). Accordingly, the mobility of labour introduced new forms of vulnerability to which generalized poor relief was the response—an attempt to reassert the primacy of the social over the economic (Polanyi, 2001, 92-3).

Larry Patriquin has recently contested this interpretation, arguing that the mobility of labour under the Settlement Act was not definitively restricted. Rather, the primary intent of the Settlement Act was not to restrict the movement of labour, but to prevent claims for relief in any but one’s own parish (Patriquin, 2007, 129). In general, labour was not subject to removal, only for those deemed a financial burden. Patriquin asserts that the majority of removals were families with several small children, pregnant single women, or single/widowed women (2007, 129). In conceding to Patriquin’s arguments, then, it becomes necessary to be conservative in how much we attribute the formation of national labour markets to the Poor Law Reforms of 1834. For Patriquin, the primary motive for the New Poor Law was to “to reinstate an ideologically powerful status distinction . . . such that the labourer could be considered ‘independent,’ ‘moral’ and ‘industrious’, while those forced to seek assistance would feel unworthy and ashamed” (2007, 136). In other words, the objective of the Amendment Act was to mold a new kind of political subject, one whose ideological conditioning would produce self-regulation.
This attempt to mold the subjectivity of the labourer arose in the context of the English agricultural crisis. Throughout the early nineteenth century, capitalist development of agriculture and increasing productivity through innovation resulted in declining employment. The percentage of the workforce employed in farming fell from 42 percent in 1801–1803, to 28 percent in 1831. Up until this point, few labourers were completely landless, thus having recourse to non-market means of reproduction. The Amendment, in part, functioned to make remaining in rural areas untenable by retracting able-bodied relief and encouraging rural-urban migration and market dependency (Patriquin, 2007, 149). The Poor Law Reforms, I argue, consisted of the unequal treatment of political subjects, directed at those persisting in rural, non-market production relations so as to coerce the so-called self-regulating liberal labour market.

Accepting Patriquin’s argument, it is possible to contextualize the heated philosophical, political, and economic debates that were articulated against the Speenhamland system at this time. While there were distinctions in each thinker’s take on the issue of poor relief, common amongst such individuals as Malthus, Townsend and Bentham was the notion that poverty was in fact the motive force behind progress. The problem with the Speenhamland system, then, was that it attempted to prevent poverty and thereby stunted progress and growth. That is, conditions of equality in access to the means of social reproduction were, in fact, an impediment to the realization of liberal order. While differing in their ‘solutions’ to the problem of poor relief under Speenhamland, I suggest that these thinkers were nevertheless bound to a common objective to alter the conditions under which poverty could or could not exist—to in fact politically fomenting inequalities in subject status—and thereby channelling the energies of the poor in productive directions.
In *The Constitution of Poverty*, Mitchell Dean refers to this philosophical position as the ‘poverty theory of labour.’ According to Edwin Chadwick, a former secretary to Bentham and perhaps the primary actor in the conversion of theory into practice,

poverty . . . is the natural, primitive, the general and unchangeable state of man; that as labour is the source of wealth, so is poverty of labour. Banish poverty, you banish wealth. Indigence, therefore, and not poverty, is the evil, the removal of which is the proper object of Poor Laws (as cited in Dean, 1991, 175).

Likewise, Townsend noted that

hunger will tame the fiercest animals, it will teach decency and civility, obedience and subjection, to the most perverse. In general it is only hunger which can spur and goad them (the poor) on to labour; yet our laws have said they shall never hunger . . . . hunger is . . . the most natural motive to industry and labour (as cited in Polanyi, 2001, 118).

The sentiments expressed above, however, were most famously advanced in Thomas Malthus’s *Essay on the Principles of Population*. In the *Essay*, Malthus argued that population tended to grow at a rate faster than that of the necessities of subsistence, and as such, the conditions, which arose from poverty and induced death throughout the population through starvation and pestilence, were simply nature’s checks against the untenable rise in population. The poor, according to Malthus, must either learn to become sober, industrial and frugal, thus contributing to the overall well-being of the population, or else they must perish (Malthus, 1998, 28). Poor relief, as a consequence, would for Malthus disrupt the natural process of balancing population with resource capacity; it was only the hunger-induced industriousness of the people that could potentially stretch the (finite) limits that land placed on population growth (Dean, 1991, 84-85; Malthus, 1998, 27).

Thus, at the close of the eighteenth century there emerged a philosophical tradition that equated poverty with the natural condition of humanity and attributed progress to the motive
force of poverty and hunger. From individual advancement under the duress and drive of poverty, it was argued that national wealth would flow. To intervene in an attempt to eliminate poverty would not only be undesirable but also impossible. Rather, it was the particular quality of character that arose from conditions of poverty, which was to be the object of intervention; the indigent poor must be made rational, self-fulfilling individuals. Of course, such a conclusion required that social policy be selectively applied to a politically differentiated population—the ‘undeserving poor’.

If Malthus was the philosophical architect of the general framing of poverty in modern political economic terms, Jeremy Bentham was the father of the administrative architecture of nineteenth-century Poor Relief. For Bentham, the outright removal of any poor relief (as Malthus would have it) was not necessary or even advantageous. What was necessary, however, was the differentiation of various categories of poor, such that the motive force that poverty could exert was not repressed. In effect, this meant a complete overhaul of the conditions under which the able-bodied poor were provided with relief. In effect, the New Poor Laws would seek to harness the poor for the general benefit of the nation (Dean, 1991, 117).

Bentham’s writings on Poor Law Reform, though scattered and at times contradictory, were most influential with regards to his propositions for the workhouse. According to Bentham, poor relief to the ‘able-bodied’ should cease to be made in any way other than through the workhouse. This relief would be predicated on the practice of less eligibility, the idea that relief would never exceed the status of the lowest independent labourers.

Furthermore, relief would be subject to a myriad of disciplinary measures such that it would be

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8 It is important to note here, as Dean does, that the concept and category of ‘able-bodied’ is socially constituted, and as such changes throughout spatio-temporal variation. At times the category of able-bodied would include or exclude women, children, and individuals based on their so-called race, religion, ethnicity, etc.
made far more compromising than independent labour, and as such only the most ‘defective’
would be inclined to seek relief (Bentham, 2011; Dean, 1991, 162-63). As an exogenous
influence, the workhouse served to negatively discipline would-be relief seekers by making
independent wage labour a far more attractive option. Endogenously, for those ‘desperate
indigents’ who sought out workhouse relief, a series of disciplinary measures would attempt to
reform the moral character of the individual in question and promote the desired characteristics
of a modern liberal subject.

Internal to the workhouse, discipline measures in the form of a separation of the sexes (to
discourage reproduction amongst the poor), the proscription of the use of tobacco or fermented
liquors, the restriction of mobility outside of the workhouse, and the policing and banning of
certain forms of celebration and festivals were amongst the most prominent (Dean, 1991, 181-
91). These measures were intended to “improve their industry, [by] increasing frugality,
increasing their wages, lessening improvident marriages and abating their discontent” (Dean,
1991, 162). In its disciplinary capacity, the workhouse form of poor relief sought to modify the
characteristics and behaviours of a population such that eventual self-regulation and reproduction
would be possible (indeed ‘rational’) without overt political intervention. “If labour was the
objective expression of the adherence of moral subjects . . . . then pauperism was a site outside
that act of moral constitution . . . . which presaged the demoralization of the individual and the
fall of civilization into the abyss of inertia” (Dean, 1991, 176). The moral and behavioral
‘defects’ of the pauper, then, became the primary site of intervention.

In sum, I have argued that in the context of Britain, the early transformation of social
property relations did not automatically produce wage dependency. On the one hand, wherever
possible, individuals divorced from their means of (re)production would in many instances seek
out alternatives, including parish relief. At the same time, the Speenhamland system of poor relief undermined the logic of market discipline by guaranteeing a minimum income to all individuals, irrespective of capacity to work; Speenhamland enabled a relatively equitable level of access to the basic means of survival. These two factors continued to undermine the full subsumption of labour to capital, making industrialization partial and protracted until the nineteenth century.

The Poor Law Commission, and most importantly Chadwick, seized upon the discoveries of Bentham, which understood that a continuous and elastic supply of labour required a self-regulating subject, incentivized to waged labour and unattached to any particular locale, owing to the existence of poor relief or land. The Commission, as a result, sought the forcible manipulation and transformation of subjectivity itself through its amendment. The workhouse, as poor relief, achieved a re-modelling of subjectivities through both positive and negative mechanisms of discipline, simultaneously encouraging ‘proper’ behaviours that inclined the individual towards personal achievement through labour and deterring improvident actions by making the conditions of workhouse relief so abhorrent that wage labour seemed the most attractive option. Finally, by attempting to present labour as an apolitical, rational universal, the 1834 Reforms began to break down the parochial divisions of populations predicated on personalized parish politics, instead transferring such powers, and the identities produced from them, to the level of the (increasingly national) state. Thus, at the same time that the Reforms of 1834 enacted a politically coercive policy of controlling specific bodies, they contributed to the more conventionally liberal ends of centralizing, neutralizing and anonymizing the political powers of the state. It is to this process of state formation that I now turn.
The Dissolution of Parish Politics and the Amplification of Central State Power

In addition to the formation of a political subject conditioned by the ideologies and practices of labour commodification, the exponential accumulation of British capital and its subsequent deployment in a concerted project of industrial development required a powerful state capable of ensuring the stability, transparency and financial resources necessary to assure potential investors and creditors. The administration of public policy in England until the 1830s had largely proceeded in a disorganized, often decentralized, fashion, either delegated to parish officials for interpretation and enforcement, or else altogether left to the parish to determine and devise its own policy (Roberts, 1959, 196). Nowhere was this more evident than in the provision of poor relief. Until the Amendment Act of 1834, more than 15,000 separate units administered poor relief, while in London alone, over 105 different acts governed the criteria and processes for relief disbursement (Driver, 1989, 271; Green, 2010, 87). This situation continued the dominance of the oligarchy in British politics, as local landed interests controlled the development of policy. Multiple, divergent, and predominantly agrarian interests could not establish the basis for a program of mass industrial development.

Edwin Chadwick was a vocal critic of the parochial administration of poor relief, and it was Chadwick who pushed forward the enactment of the reforms proposed in 1834. Chadwick preferred a more centralized and depersonalized administration of poor relief, through a Board of Governors (removed from the local politics of the parish itself), a systematized mechanism of accounting, a professionalized and routinized bureaucracy overseeing the construction and operation of workhouses, special schools for pauper children, and asylums, and as mentioned above, the consolidation of administrative units into a single Union. From the Poor Law Reform, under Chadwick, a revolution in administrative capacity served to both consolidate state power
and its institutional capacity, as well as undermine the oppositional power of the landed classes, consolidating bourgeois power within the state. As Driver has argued, regardless of academic disagreement over the extent to which the objectives of the 1834 Report were realized, its effects on administrative revolution are difficult to contest (1989, 275).

The first major institutional effect of the Reform Act was the consolidation of parishes into 630 unions. In this process, parish overseers were stripped of their responsibility for the disbursement of poor relief. Instead, they became agents of transmission, affecting the collection of rates, relaying such monies to the union treasurer, and completing various administrative forms (Care, 2011, 128). The goal was to mitigate the fracturing of politics within England, based on local ideological proclivities, and move towards a nationally consolidated politics of industrial development. This move elicited significant backlash from parish landowners who viewed the transformation as a shift to taxation without representation. Nevertheless, for the Reformers, the increases in both population and unemployment necessitated the professionalization and homogenization of rate collection and relief disbursement.

In addition to the consolidation of parishes into Unions, the Poor Law Commission further undermined the fracturing of power by condemning the old parish workhouses, which numbered around 2,000 with a capacity of 20 to 50 inmates each, and replacing these with new workhouses, holding as many as 200 to 300 inmates and numbering around 750 total (Driver, 1989, 272). As new workhouses would often straddle not only former parish boundaries but also those of the unions, the lines of parochial power over populations were further destabilized. At the same time, the enlargement of the establishment of the workhouse and its inmate population allowed for a standardized implementation of moral reform and workhouse discipline.
Finally, the Amendment Act also introduced a formal requirement for the replacement of personal (parochial) accountability with systematic reporting and recording, through a centrally administered program of double-entry bookkeeping. Systematic bookkeeping required the full settlement of accounts in cash before a file could be closed, which in turn necessitated extensive documentation and explanation of debts, increasing the accountability and transparency of public officials (Care, 2011, 124). In undermining the system of personalized accountability under parochial interests, the changes in accounting introduced under the Amendment Act transformed administration into a practice predicated on ostensible equality before the law and impersonal rule. At the same time, the process of relaying information up a chain of command made The Poor Law Commission a central administrative hub and furthered the consolidation of state administrative power. It established a hierarchy of bureaucratic administration, with paid officials operating at the Commission itself, at the level of the union, in the Board of Governors, throughout the workhouses, and eventually in the collection and remittance of rates (Care, 2011, 124). This move both built the necessary institutional and infrastructural capacity for central state administration, and served to ostensibly neutralize and equalize the politics of relief and administration throughout the country. In attempting to modify and regulate subjectivities, then, the Poor Law Reforms were further productive of state power and economic capacity. The argument I am making here points to the ways in which identities (or cultures), economics and politics are interwoven into complex relations of mutual causation rather than existing as discretely interacting spheres of sociality. The realm of (potential) illiberality (culture) is constitutively interwoven with that of ostensible liberality (political economy) under capitalism.

The above description of the ‘revolution in government’—the transition to impersonal and systematized rule—emphasizes the contingencies of local political organizations of power
and administration rather than abstract laws of the capitalist mode of production. It was in the
effort to undermine the power of an existing elite, whose conditions of reproduction ran counter
to those of industrializing capitalists, that the formal machinery of the state sought to erect itself
upon the idea of equality before the law and impersonality of rule. While the transformation of
subjectivities and the reorganization of political power are necessary aspects of the capitalist
mode of production (otherwise, on what grounds could we posit capitalism as a distinct mode of
production?), the content of these transformations must be situated in their histories of class
struggle and (re)formation, rather than assumed. In the next section, I further this line of
argument by suggesting that these historically specific processes in England established, in turn,
the groundwork for the uneven and combined spread of capitalist social relations, such that,
contrary to Chakrabarty, we cannot posit the universalization of the political forms associated
with capitalism as a consequence of their universalism. Rather, following Desai, I read
capitalism’s global spread as the product of its systemic contradictions.

The 1840s Recession and the Transatlantic Escape Valve

In many ways, the Poor Law Amendment Act was a success. From the mid 1830s, as
Zmolek shows, Britain experienced a massive upturn in capital formation, while rural labour was
increasingly migrating to urban areas, owing to the final subsumption of labour that workhouse
relief engendered. The boom in capital formation throughout the mid 1830s had many
contributing factors, such that it is difficult to identify a single causal mechanism. However, it is
likely that the amendment played a significant role in this, along with the contingencies of
favourable harvests from 1830 to 1837. The amendment contributed to this boom in its provision
of a massive urban labour force to be mobilized according to the requirements of rail
construction, which had come to occupy a space of utmost priority at this time, serving to absorb
the overabundance of incomes accruing to wealthy elites. At the same time, throwing an increasing number of people onto the market likely created a significant increase in the demand for consumption goods, while the enormous supply of labour would have pushed down wages, allowing for a massive increase in the rate of surplus accumulation. This upswing, however, was short-lived (Zmolek, 2013, 742).

In 1837, harvests were poor and rail speculation experienced a bust, throwing many into unemployment. The mechanization of agriculture, which began to pick up pace in this period, was also responsible for the ejection of large swathes of agricultural labour from the rural economy (Hobsbawm, 1999, 134). In response, many fled the rural economy for urban centers, yet the industrial economy had not yet developed to an extent that could adequately absorb this increased labour supply (Hobsbawm, 1999, 126). In addition, the period leading to the 1830s witnessed a massive increase in the number of handloom weavers, but as McMichael notes, from the 1830s onward, a shift from the industrialization of textiles to the production of capital goods gutted textiles, throwing many in the industry out of work. This was the beginning of a recession that would peak in the early 1840s, generating massive social upheaval (Davis, 1997, 69; Hobsbawm, 1999, 114; McMichael, 1984, 175). By 1838, the price of bread began to rise, placing further pressure on the meagre-to-nonexistent wages of the labouring populations. Discussions of repealing the Corn Laws began at this point, anticipating the eventual transition to free trade.

In 1836, as the first signs of crisis were being felt, the London Working Men’s Association was formed. In 1837, the People’s Charter was formed and began acquiring public support along the way (Zmolek, 2013, 749). As conditions worsened, the People’s Charter was transformed into the broader Chartist Movement, and by 1839 its Charter petition had acquired
1,283,000 signatures, and was delivered to Parliament. Public demonstrations and protests became commonplace throughout this period, and the move to free trade, along with an extension of franchise, was more frequently discussed to quell the masses. By 1841, the recession was moving into its worst period, and depression set in, while the Chartist’s National Petition grew to 3,317,702 signatures (Zmolek, 2013, 750, 764). Continued failed harvests, overcrowded workhouses, shrinking wages and the rising price of bread culminated in the general strike of 1842, with strikers demanding, among other things, the restoration of wages to pre-recession levels (Hobsbawm, 1996, 169). The creation of new jobs, however, was increasingly difficult in Britain, as the area of land under cultivation had nearly reached its limit by the 1830s, and capital increasingly accumulated in the hands of the business and elite classes, with few options for profitable investment (Manning Ward, 1976, 221). Indeed, Hobsbawm estimates that by the 1840s the annual surplus of capital needing investment was around £60 million (1999, 142). The rail boom in England, in part, mitigated this trend, absorbing around £200 million and providing as much as 200,000 jobs at its peak towards the end of the 1840s (Hobsbawm, 1999, 144). However, such job creation was by no means a total solution, and increasingly it was the global economy from which solutions were sought. By 1845, public disorder and deteriorating economic health were joined by the Irish potato blight, and Parliament began to strategize two related solutions to the social and economic crisis: the freeing of trade, notably through the repeal of the Corn Laws, and the settlement of temperate colonies in order to offload excess capital and population, thereby stabilizing the British economy.

The road to these practices, however, was not, during the crisis years, a foregone conclusion. Intense debates existed where there were those, on the one hand, following older schools of political economy, in the tradition of J.B. Say and (earlier) James Mill, and those, on
the other, developing a radical position in response to crisis conditions, later to be dubbed the Philosophical Radicals. Say’s Law stipulated that gluts would not occur under conditions of market freedom as industrial production would always correspond with levels of production. As a result, those wedded to this physiocratic argument denied the need for government intervention in the promotion of foreign trade and emigration (Semmel, 1970, 9). Then there were the Philosophical Radicals, picking up and developing from the works of Malthus and Ricardo, both of who saw the inevitability of overaccumulation, at least in the national context (Semmel, 1970, 10).

In this latter position, Richard Cobden advanced the doctrine of free trade as an inevitable and necessary solution to the problem of national gluts. Foreign markets, it was argued, could be obtained by Britain if it provided a consumer base for the raw materials and consumption goods of the agricultural nations (Semmel, 1970, 159). Furthermore, Cobden argued that under the Corn Laws, workers’ wages declined owing to the exorbitant rent accrued by landowners, such that the move to free trade would reduce this parochial drag on development and quell social unrest. In the context of the general strike in 1842, and the threat of popular revolution, this Cobdenite position, under Robert Peel, became a matter of necessity (Davis, 1997, 69; Williamson, 1990, 125). Thus in 1842, Peel began, contrary to his agrarian roots, to roll back tariffs, introducing a sliding scale on the corn tariff (Zmolek, 2013, 777; Williamson, 1990, 125). In 1846, under Peel, the Corn Laws were formally and finally abolished, under a plan of gradual reduction, culminating in their full abandonment by 1849. According to Zmolek, the repeal marked a cornerstone in the development of capitalism. Where prior to this, the economy was one of agrarian capitalism with an industrial sector as its complement, the repeal led the agrarian sector to be subsumed by a broader system determined by the full commodification of land,
labour and money, and the regulation of the market (2013, 777). However, the Philosophical Radicals were not limited to Cobden, and there were those who viewed his singular focus on the Corn Laws as shortsighted. Primary amongst those were Edward Gibbon Wakefield and Charles Buller, who argued that free trade alone could not restore Britain’s stability and prosperity. Rather, this measure had to be complemented by what he termed ‘colonization proper’ (Semmel, 1970, 169).

For Cobden, the idea of colonization was anathema to the goals of free trade capitalism. Colonialism was a drain on the public coffers, a strain on military resources. For Bentham, high administrative costs and the tendency to foment higher investment in military apparatus tended to encourage despotic forms of rule, running counter to the Utilitarian premises that underpinned much of Britain’s administrative reforms throughout the 1830s (Pitts, 2003, 206-8). However, for Wakefield, Buller, and the rest of a group emerging from the Philosophical Radicals known as the Colonial Reformers, if the repeal was not complemented by a plan of emigration and an extension of the ‘field of employment’ for both capital and labour, a glut would be an inevitable recurrence (Semmel, 1970, 169; Wakefield, 2001, 24). Free trade, it was argued, would stimulate trade and manufactures and increase competition amongst capitals, which itself would again drive down wages, reduce employment, etc. Furthermore, the continental reality of continued economic nationalism required seeking this field of employment outside of Europe. As H.G. Ward commented in 1839, “have we markets enough? Have we employment enough? Are wages high enough, and profits high enough? Is there no political discontent—no physical suffering? . . . . Is it not desirable, and wise, to open a safety valve . . . . promote the welfare of many millions of human beings” (Semmel, 1970, 172). The Colonial Reformers, then, saw in capitalism the
inherent tendency to produce an oversupply of labour and capital, and sought to remedy this surfeit with a new form of colonization.

Though Wakefield did not specifically use the terminology ‘settler colony,’ he was explicit in his writings that his view of colonization was fundamentally different from what was commonly understood to be colonization. In *A View of the Art of Colonization* Wakefield argued:

> By the word colony, I shall not mean such a country as either British India, which is a great dependency, or the Mauritius, which was a colony of France, but is only a dependency of England . . . . Of colonization, the principle elements are emigration and the permanent settlement of the emigrants on unoccupied land. A colony therefore is a country wholly or partially unoccupied, which receives emigrants from a distance . . . . To the process by which the colony is peopled and settled, and to nothing else, I would give the name of colonization (2001, 11-12).

Following this, Wakefield went on to argue that the subordination of the colony to the government of the ‘mother country’ was neither essential nor desirable. In this way, too, the differences between the settler colony and the dependent colony were established, and the concerns of Cobden, Bentham, et al. could be assuaged. It was not the dominance of the existing population by a coercive extension of the mother-government, but the *replacement* of an existing population with that of the mother country along with the self-government of the settlers themselves (Wakefield, 2001, 12-13). Settler colonialism, then, in a very concrete way exemplifies Desai’s argument that capitalism’s global spread and reproduction were produced through endogenous tensions and resultant processes of combined development (2015, 453). As I argue in the next chapter, in the settler colonies, this process marked a radical transformation of colonial practice and local conditions. In the settler colony, attempts to erect peripheral regions of agricultural commodity production for a globally competitive market were layered onto existing colonial configurations of feudal practices along with indigenous forms of political organization.
If the objective of colonization was to relieve industrializing spaces of the pressures incurred by the excesses of capitalism and to reproduce the social relations of capitalism in ‘terra nullius,’ Wakefield was nevertheless cognizant of the difficulties presented by this task (Pieterberg & Veracini, 2015, 460). Wakefield—very much in line with Bentham’s thought—found the replication of the social relations of the mother country to be difficult in the absence of interventions aimed at the political subjectification of the masses. Primarily, he was concerned that, despite the immediate condition of dispossession faced by emigrant-settlers, land was available in a cheap abundance throughout the colonies, and as such, resulted in the dispersion of populations and the prevention of ‘capitalist civilization’ (Pieterberg & Veracini, 2015, 462).

Against laissez-faire assumptions, Wakefield argued for the need to apply an aggressive form of market interventionism by imposing an artificial floor on the price of land. In this way, settlers could not transition directly to becoming owners of capital, but rather would be required to acquiesce to the discipline of wage labour for several years before they could expect to own land themselves (Kittrell, 1965, 34; Pieterberg & Veracini, 2015, 463). Furthermore, the artificial price of land would enable authorities to amass a capital fund to pay for the costs of emigration, thus relieving the motherland of its economic burden in administering settler colonization (Kittrell, 1965, 34). However, given the different colonial conditions and processes of indigenous land theft that characterized each region under this schema, the actual policies developed to subordinate emigrants to waged labour were variable, and resulted in a differential consolidation of subjectivities and state institutions to this effect.

**The Export of British Capital**

By 1846, the election of John Russell as Prime Minister and George Grey as the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies clinched the pro-colonization position that became a
matter of state policy. Thus, by mid-century, flows of capital and labour to the Atlantic world reached unprecedented heights that remained largely constant until the onset of war in 1914. In this section I argue that the massive flow of British foreign capital functioned to create the first nationally competitive global market, generating a strong impulse to reorganize, centralize and nationalize the settler state apparatus and populations, suited to competitive agricultural production. In other words, the transmission of British capital and labour over the Atlantic precipitated processes of uneven and combined development.

Once more, recalling the idea that Wakefieldian colonization entailed not simply domination and control, but rather the creation of spaces conducive to the absorption of surplus factors of production from Britain, which could provide for the foodstuffs of Britain following the repeal of the Corn Laws, it is important to note that for Wakefield, colonization was not reducible to dominion status (Attard & Dilley, 2013, 372). Thus, included in the concept of settler colonization are spaces such as Argentina, Uruguay and the United States, whose financial relationship with Britain render them analytically analogous to the British Dominions of settlement (the latter of which had formally ended its colonial status in the eighteenth century).

Between the 1830s and 1870, the value of foreign trade in England increased six-fold (Hobsbawm, 1977, 66). In this same period, the export of capital rose exponentially, totalling around £4,082 million by the end of the century (Cottrell, 1975, 27). By the onset of the First World War, settler economies absorbed almost two-fifths of the global flows of foreign investment (amounting to £3.7 billion), the large part of which was coming from Britain (Attard & Dilley, 2013, 371). In general, these flows of finance were aimed at facilitating settlement and promoting the production and supply of rural products for Britain. As a result, investment in government, utilities, and, importantly, rail infrastructure dominated the flow of British capital
into the colonies of settlement, which in turn transformed the relationship between colonizers and indigenous peoples, leading to genocidal histories of state formation (Attard & Dilley, 2013, 373). Estimates suggest that on the eve of the First World War, a total £3.7 billion was dispersed amongst the settler colonies as follows: approximately £1.5 billion was invested in the US, Canada received a total of £791 million, Argentina £606 million, Australia £370 million, New Zealand £62 million and South Africa £339 million (Attard & Dilley, 2013, 372). These figures, in turn, accounted for the 1,017,000 miles of rail laid in North America, the 54,000 miles laid in Australasia, and the 63,000 miles laid in Latin America (Hobsbawm, 1977, 70).

The massive demand for agricultural goods generated by the industrial revolution and complemented by the program of settler colonization was, in the short term, successful. Transformations in the organization of the British Empire generated a global system of agricultural production, and from 1840 to 1880, world wheat production expanded by 50 percent, which Herman Schwartz relates directly to the rise in continental European urban demand (2000, 106). By 1871, 90 percent of British imports by value were agricultural products (both food and non-food), and by 1890, 84 percent of its wheat, 37 percent of its beef, 47 percent of its mutton and 53 percent of its dairy and poultry was imported. Schwartz estimates that by this point nearly 60 percent of the total caloric consumption of Britain was imported (2000, 105).

The combination of agricultural production for international trade and the eventual legal separation of the colonies from Britain, were, as Friedman and McMichael argue, the precursors to a fundamentally new organization of the world economy, both politically and economically (1989). Principally, this period witnessed the emergence and consolidation of the nation-state, which we must be clear to distinguish from the state as such (see for example, Lacher, 2006). Crucially, a “central aspect of nationhood has always been one or another sort of economic
development domestically and its deployment and management in international activity abroad. . . poverty, inequality and backwardness were major motives of nationalisms” (Desai, 2008, 398). Understanding the specificity of the national-state form, Friedman and McMichael advanced the concept of food regimes, which denoted the ways in which the production and consumption of food are linked to dominant historical forms of capital accumulation internationally, and which therefore, shape forms of political units and relations within the system of states (Friedman & McMichael, 1989; McMichael, 1991, 74). The first food regime was argued to have lasted from 1870 to 1914, a period that coincides with our timeline for the consolidation of national-state identities and instruments within the settler colonial world. Furthermore, as I have been arguing, this first food regime was the product of the full subsumption of labour to capital in Britain, wherein the objective was to enable a complement to the development of intensive forms of accumulation with an extensive form involving the lowering of wage-goods in metropolitan spaces through the outsourcing of agro-commodity production in the temperate regions of settlement (McMichael, 1991, 74). While the colonial world market had been predicated on a system of production that integrated satellites into metropolitan production structures, this new system was one predicated on self-governing states with the capacity to regulate their own economies. This reorganization was underpinned by the trade in competitive temperate agricultural products and an international division of labour whereby settler regions produced the same products for export that had to compete not only with each other but also with the technologically advanced agricultural commodities of continental Europe and the United States (Friedman & McMichael, 1989, 96). During this period, American wheat constituted one of the primary competitive anchors in the Atlantic wheat market, where
following the civil war and the end of blockades, American wheat flooded the market as exports soared from 40 to 150 million bushels (Rothstein, 1960, 402).

Politically, this transformation contributed significantly to the consolidation of the national state system, as competitive production necessitated that sectoral relations be rearticulated as politically and spatially bounded, and stimulated a pattern of rival protectionism. Indeed, continental European states also erected national systems of agricultural protection in the face of settler agriculture. At the same time, in continental Europe, as Lacher points out, the national state form began to consolidate around the need to protect absolutist regimes in the face of British military superiority (2006, 17). By centralizing and organizing state populations and fiscal apparatuses, rival continental states were better able (temporarily) to forestall the erosion of absolutist legitimacy. Both in Europe and abroad, the period from the 1860s to 1870s witnessed a profound transformation in the nature of state forms.

Across the Atlantic, the settler colony came to represent both a political territory of (assumed) sovereignty as well as a sovereign space of commercialized and integrated sectors of production (Friedmann & McMichael, 1989, 100). Its national articulation reflected the combined imperatives to form a domestic market and a centralized banking system and to organize state resources (capital and labour) towards a common development project (McMichael, 1984, 3). This new world order was a contingent and paradoxical development that could not be read from some abstract generalization about the capitalist mode of production: it was a system of free trade, yet predicated on the concept of international competitive specialization, and thus combined with mercantilist principles (Davis, 1997, 75; McMichael, 1984, 1). Despite these common pressures and developments, however, the settler regions did not attempt to reproduce the British liberal state, but rather “in their responses to domestic and/or
international politico-economic pressures, they adopted certain constitutional and administrative principles that facilitated participation in the international division of labour” (McMichael, 1984, 11). In other words, as Neil Davidson points out, the invasion of external capital into commercially, industrially and productively ‘backward’ spaces affected a subordination to, and compulsion to adapt to, a global system of Western finance and banking (2017). In fact, what Trotsky noted of later European ‘catch-up’ was already underway several decades before in the settler colonies, wherein “Modern forms of production, transport and finance [were] superimposed upon and only partially woven into the worn and threadbare pattern of the past” (quoted in Davidson, 2017).

Turning back to the issue of capitalism, universalism, and subjectivity, it is useful to recall Sayer and Corrigan’s *The Great Arch*. According to the authors, the process of state building must be understood as a profoundly cultural as well as institutional and economic one. State institutions, regulations, and activities are not empty or neutral facts of political life, but are profoundly defined through their cultural content. While “social theory, both Marxist and sociological, often rests content with the demonstration in general theoretical terms of the functionality of the nation state to capitalist production,” the authors argue instead for the need to examine the ways in which state development impacts the formation and regulation of identities and subjectivities (Sayer & Corrigan, 1985, 2). State activities, forms and institutions will always advance partial or differential interests, but attempt to posit those interests as universal—as representing an imagined or ‘illusory community’ (Sayer & Corrigan, 1985, 4). This imagined or illusory community—the nation—always contains within it the categorization of ‘others,’ both internally and externally. Thus, while the national state became an active project in the latter quarter of the nineteenth century, its particular form and content could not be determined from
the English model. Instead, the legitimization of this particular politico-economic organizational strategy assumed novel forms when combined with the extant social class and property relations in each unique space. As I will begin to show in the next chapter, these novel forms assumed by the state in the colonies of settlement were unique in their explicitly racial definition of ‘the people.’

Conclusion

I began this chapter with the argument that Marxist political economy in general, and Political Marxism in particular, can reveal the ways in which political forms are the outcome of a contingent negotiation between abstract laws of development and local realities of the organization of power, class, property and production. To make this argument, I examined the passage of the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, a piece of legislation that was central in the development of the quintessential liberal subject and state form. I argue that the development and results of the Amendment Act were not determined by abstract political-economic theory, but instead the interaction of these theories with the structural and environmental contingencies of the period. Moreover, I argued that the achievement of these liberal models of subject and state were presupposed by fundamentally illiberal practices, suggesting that even in the ‘classical’ case of bourgeois state development, illiberalism was constitutive of liberal relations. Having demystified the supposed functionalism of juridical equality, rationalization, and depersonalization to capitalism, I then argued that there is no reason to expect this model to be replicated globally. In doing so, I showed how the realization of the liberal state model in Britain achieved the full subsumption of labour to capital, which, along with contingent environmental processes, produced a period of protracted economic crisis during the 1830s and 1840s. It was in this context that the capitalist mode of production was spread outside of England. In attempting
to combat the social and economic crises precipitated by depression, political leaders, at times contrary to the interests of dominant classes, sought the implementation of free trade, and an international division of production, wherein colonial settlements would produce the consumption goods necessary to fuel British industrialization. This implementation occasioned the development of the first world market predicated on competitive national production. Yet, precisely because this was the way capitalist social relations were extended beyond the metropole, the attempt to transplant British social relations onto foreign soil was constantly being reformulated, combined and adapted to the ways in which local exigencies were mobilized for the competitive agro-economy. This period was the advent of the Atlantic vector of uneven and combined development.

The ways in which states responded to the economic pressures of competitive production required a reorganization of social and productive relations along national lines under the aegis of market ‘rationality.’ Yet the ways in which such ‘rationality’ was interpreted and developed was, of necessity, in dialogue with existing conditions producing novel state and subject forms. In the remaining chapters of this study, I undertake a comparative study of settler-colonial Canada and Argentina. I explore the processes of state and subject formation in these two settler economies, and provide an account for the emergence of a state shot through with coercive, personalized power relations based on white supremacy. While making an argument about the broader trajectories of racial state formation in the settler colonies, I nevertheless demonstrate that the content of ‘whiteness’ as the political subject form and the state form differed substantially in each state, owing, in large part, to their uneven and combined integration into global commodity market production structures.
Chapter 3  Ideas of Backwardness in Settler-Colonial State-Building:
Nationalism as a Strategy of Political-Economic Catch-Up

As the British transition to industrial capitalism facilitated the consolidation of the modern national state, it became increasingly necessary for emerging economies to adopt a centralized and rationalized model of political authority, to assert a monopoly over the lands, resources, and loyalties of domestic populations. It was only with the adoption of this model that the settler economies could mount a competitive reformulation of their economies that was capable of sustaining themselves in the new global food regime. From the middle of the nineteenth century, the Atlantic became a centrifugal force of uneven and combined development whereby the rapidly expanding and increasingly free movement of goods, capital, and people created the conditions through which competitive coercion was exerted on the Atlantic’s temperate settler colonies. This context forced a reconsideration of colonial state structures and an acute awareness of so-called ‘backwardness.’

Whereas in England state centralization followed the consolidation of a monopoly over the land, in the settler economies such political organization was sought as the means of creating this monopoly. That is, in order to compete effectively, a central state was required to bind together a population and legitimatize and operationalize a sovereign monopolization of territory. Whereas in Britain the effective monopolization of land created the conditions of possibility for a common political subject, in the settler economies, the rhetoric of a common political subject was generated and dispersed in the absence of monopolization; national consolidation was deployed as a material strategy to achieve the political-economic structures capable of launching a competitive agricultural economy. Furthermore, because this nationalism was to be the means to the ends of monopolization, states needed to find a legitimization for the violent dispossessio
of indigenous peoples. This legitimacy was found by funnelling articulations of national identity through a racializing grammar of (un)acceptability.

In the next section I discuss how the different arrangement of social property relations in Argentina and Canada prohibited the operation of a market reliant on production structures. Following this, I turn to each of my case studies. Looking at Argentina and Canada, I begin by examining the trajectory of political and economic development from initial colonization until the mid-nineteenth century. Through this examination, I argue that racialized subjectivities cannot be understood as a vestige of ‘pre-modern’ practices but are instead constitutive of modernity itself. From here I argue that, in each space coming into the nineteenth century, political and geographical factionalism were identified as the primary obstacles to political-economic consolidation and growth. To this end, nationalism was actively pursued as both an ideological and material developmental strategy. Nationalism was to enable and legitimize the monopolization of territory in the service of binding together populations and amassing state administrative and fiduciary power. Because a central obstacle to the monopolization of land was its occupation by sovereign indigenous peoples, nationalism was given shape and legitimacy through the language of racial superiority and inferiority. The modern hopes and dreams of the nation were counter-posed to the ‘barbarism’ of indigenous peoples as obstacles to progress.

Social Property Relations, Uneven and Combined Development, and Substitution: Paths to Racial Nationalism Under Capitalism

In the following case studies, I seek to understand the development of nationalism and national state organization, articulating legal heterogeneity and racial difference through the political economy of social property relations and the uneven and combined development of capitalism. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the path to capitalism in England, and to the specific forms of statehood and legal-political subjectivity, was a contingent process, which
could not be precisely replicated elsewhere. I further argued that, once established in England, the conditions of capitalist development began to spread to other parts of the world, compelling competitive agro-production in the settler colonies. As the pressures to organize production and labour along competitive, market-dependent and capital-intensive methods spread, however, they encountered socio-spatial, legal and class relations unlike those that had pertained in England during and after the original agrarian transition. In the absence of these original conditions, a variety of substitutions were necessary to establish competitive capitalist production. I argue that one of these ‘substitutions’ came in the form of racial nationalism, which functioned to stabilize and unify the state and population as a precondition for the erection of an effective central state monopoly over the apparatuses of coercion, fiscal control, and land. That nationalism assumed a hierarchical and racial character was owing to the colonial nature of state formation.

In an unpublished dissertation examining the transition to capitalism in Upper and Lower Canada, Frantz Gheller gets us some way to understanding the unique nature of capitalist state formation in nineteenth-century Canada, which I argue is suggestive of the broader patterns of settler colonial state formation. Specifically, Gheller suggests that the fact of colonialism meant that settlers faced a very different set of challenges, owing to the nature of property relations (2015, 61). Similarly, Fleer and Tobler (2001), Adelman (1994), and Solberg (1987), among others, have argued that the nature of colonialism in Argentina established property and class relations that made it impossible to replicate either British or American transformations. The central challenge Gheller identified in both Lower and Upper Canada was the relative absence of the market imperative in order to effect capitalist transitions. This absence was, by and large, owing to the low population to land ratio, as well as to the types of activities upon which elite classes relied for the reproduction of their wealth and socio-political power (Evans, 2016, 141;
Gheller, 2015, 62). Similarly, in Argentina, colonialism had established a relatively insulated and self-sufficient agrarian elite satisfied with the profits reaped by the carrying trade, and as a result, was largely sheltered from any form of market imperative (Fleer & Tobler, 2001).

The absence of a market imperative, along with the population dynamics endemic to the settler state, led to tremendous difficulties in the extraction, organization, and implementation of centralized taxation. Given that the transition to agrarian capitalism would require access to funds for the purposes of labour-saving techniques, tools, as well as the infrastructure necessary to connect agrarian commodities to national and overseas markets, the absence of effective administrative capacity and taxation policies in the colony up to the middle of the nineteenth century made the organization of competitive commodity production a near insurmountable challenge (Gheller, 2015). In the absence of such tools, and facing competitive pressures from global markets in the middle-to-late part of the century, organizing production according to a national socio-political space became a necessary supplementary strategy.

While the Poor Law Reforms of 1834 and centralized taxation, administration and bureaucracy were among the chief tools deployed in the English context to bring about the full subsumption of labour and production to the market imperative, these options were largely unavailable in the Upper and Lower Canadas, and decentralized Argentina throughout the mid-nineteenth century. The absence of an expropriated peasantry, the presence of an entrenched semi-feudal landed elite, and the wide availability of land made the disciplining of subjectivities via legislation akin to the Reforms of 1834 an unlikely solution. The arrangement of property ownership and distribution along with the productive relations of the population further mitigated against the erection of a systemic, centralized and transparent apparatus of taxation (Gheller, 96, 2015). In the absence of these options, settler colonizers, I argue, turned to the task of actively
constructing a national population as a way of fomenting a collective objective and amassing administrative capacity and legitimacy through which centralized taxation could be effected, and populations could be disciplined, directed and organized so as to produce a competitive market economy. The construction of population along national lines, then, became a central tool in the project of state building and political subjectification organized around competitive capitalist production. In other words, while the organization of capitalist production in England eventuated in the centralization of state apparatus along national lines, in the settler colonies, this latter stage—that of national, centralized political organization—was deliberately fabricated and imposed on colonial territories and populations in advance of, and towards the ends of, capitalist production.

From Colonies of Empire to National Settler Colonies: Examining Argentina and Canada

In addressing the emergence of national populations in my case studies I want to recall the primary problematics that have been established vis-a-vis Anderson and Chatterjee. First, in response to Anderson, I will demonstrate that the development of nationalism in my case studies did not sublate racial categorization, but was fundamentally premised upon them. Furthermore, in response to the postcolonial critique that nationalism should be understood as a fractured process of the political and cultural articulations accorded to bourgeois and colonial classes respectively, I show how cultural formulations were advanced in the service of material objectives. These objectives were the result of the combined development of social forces.

Indeed, following the lead of Political Marxists, I show how ideas, culture and politics reflected the constraints imposed on class reproduction, such that social hierarchies cannot be thought apart from material, political-economic strategies (Gheller, 2015,161). Rejecting cultural essentialisms and structural orthodoxy, I follow Gheller, who reads political, legal, cultural and
military institutions as constitutive of production; underlying these institutions are relations of domination and the rights and powers of property to organize and govern populations for the purposes of production and appropriation (2015, 161). Understanding this, I argue that capitalism, while marking points of radical rupture, did not simply subsume all that came before to the logic of capital. Rather, capital interacted with existing cultural, social, political and economic configurations such that a mutual, co-constitution occurred, whereby the operation of capitalism, as much as existing practices and patterns of authority and domination, were transformed.

Demonstrating this interactivity, or combination, is essential in understanding the particular trajectories of state formation in each space; too often the era of nineteenth-century settler state-building has been framed in terms of either the successful dominance of liberalism (McKay, 2010), or the failure of liberal institutions to subordinate and subsume parochial power relations (Negretto & Aguilar-Rivera, 2000; Rock, 1985). Thus in Canada, the era of state building, and particularly of Confederation, is often read in terms of the triumph of liberalism, whereas Argentina is viewed in terms of its ultimate failure (despite the efforts of liberal state-builders). Viewed through the lens of uneven and combined development, however, it becomes possible to situate these politically constituted, legally heterogenous processes of capital and state formation within the broader liberal context of the nineteenth century, without being reliant on a narrative of triumph or failure.

**From Colonial Outpost to Colony of Settlement: The Beginnings of Nationalism in Argentina**

In this section, I analyze the conditions under Spanish colonialism in the Río de la Plata as they relate to national configurations and racial categorizations. I argue that under the Spanish colonial regime, there was no systematic ordering of peoples based on racial criteria. This was
not to come until the rise of nationalism in the ‘post-independence’ period. I trace these relations to show, in later sections, that the articulation of national imaginaries around racial criteria did not constitute simply a sphere of ‘cultural difference,’ nor was it purely the result of colonial rule, broadly understood as pre-modern and illiberal. Rather, what I will show is that such differential sorting of populations was formed under and towards liberal capitalist settler colonial relations, a colonial form distinct from the mercantile interests of the Iberian empire.

**Prelude to the Settler Regime: Spanish Colonialism in the Río de la Plata**

The Spanish first arrived at the mouth of the Río de la Plata in 1516, attempting to find a shorter route to Asia as well as to delay the southward movement of the Portuguese (Scobie, 1964, 41). Part of the reason that the region remained marginal to the Spanish was because of its (relatively) small and dispersed indigenous populations, who were dominantly unsettled and thus did not offer the economic incentive that the more populated regions elsewhere on the continent did; Argentina was merely a conduit to greater resources, both human and natural. Apart from the direct economic incentive of exploiting dense populations, the hunting, nomadic lifestyles of many of the regions’ indigenous populations made the establishment of Spanish towns difficult—they could neither rely on established agricultural development nor could they easily exert control over the land. Indeed, much of the lands of the Pampas, Patagonia, and Chaco were controlled by indigenous peoples throughout the colonial period and, even after independence, into the nineteenth century. Even the port city of Buenos Aires (the eventual commercial and political epicenter of Argentina) was to remain marginal to the colonial regime (despite being settled in 1580) until the eighteenth century, wherein the Bourbon reforms and the establishment of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata in 1776 officially sanctioned the city as the trading hub
of the Spanish Empire. Until that point, however, Buenos Aires proved unattractive to traders, accustomed as they were to the positions that had been already established along the Panama-Lima trading route, and owing to the security concerns posed by establishing trade routes through the sparsely settled Argentine interior (Scobie, 1964, 40-55; Shumway, 1991, 8-13). Furthermore, attempts to ‘settle’ the interior through the granting of indigenous lands and the assignment of indigenous peoples to work these tributary lands (what became known as the encomenderos) was largely ineffectual given the scope of indigenous sovereignty that remained at this time, hence their refusal to submit to Spanish assignment (Zimmerman, 1945, 3). Thus, at the end of the colonial period, Argentina remained a scattered agglomeration of isolated settlements (Scobie estimates about 14 cities, settled between 50 and 400 miles apart) with little to no political-economic infrastructure, and dominated by nomadic indigenous and gaucho groups (Shumway, 1991, 12; Scobie, 1964, 62). In effect, there was little socio-economic, political or cultural administrative colonial coherence to the region that would later comprise the national territories of Argentina.

The establishment of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata in 1776 was the last and shortest lived of the Spanish Viceroyalties and largely came about through an effort to shore up Spanish colonial rule in the face of the increasing pressure of Western European states (namely the British and Dutch). Long used as an illegal trading port by the British and Dutch, Buenos Aires had become a pivotal center around which competing powers were making commercial gains on the continent and challenging the Spanish hold on its possessions. In the hopes of establishing a bulwark against these encroaching forces, the Viceroyalty was created, making Buenos Aires its administrative and commercial capital. In this manner, it was hoped that the Spanish could regain control over this neglected but exceedingly important port city. The
establishment of the Viceroyalty, in turn, led to the legalization of trade through Buenos Aires in 1778, giving the interior provinces access to the world market (Tapson, 1962, 16). The opening of Buenos Aires to legalized trade with the world market and the interior provinces, therefore, generated an unquenchable thirst for arable land, bringing ranchers into direct conflict with the indigenous populations—and it was at this point, in the dying gasps of the Spanish colonial era, a mere 34 years before the declaration of independence, that any real semblance of an ‘Indian problem’ could be discerned. This is to say that the systematized, racial classification and subjectification of indigenous groups in the Río de la Plata was not conceivable until the close of the eighteenth century. And indeed, this general conclusion has broader applicability in Latin America, where most commentators point to the mid and particularly later part of the nineteenth century, following the publication of Darwin’s *Origin of Species*, as the period for the emergence of systematized, legitimized and increasingly politicized racial identities (Graham, 1990, 2).

**Colonial-Indigenous Relations in the Río de la Plata**

In part, it has been suggested that Argentina remained marginal to the Spanish colonial interest in the Americas owing to the ‘scarcity’ of indigenous labour to be exploited. To be sure, the regions comprising today’s Argentina were far less densely populated than other regions throughout the Americas. However, it is also worth noting that intense indigenous resistance to colonial submission was also a critical factor. It is commonly suggested in the literature on colonial Argentina that the largely nomadic indigenous groups peopling the pampas were notoriously and successfully resistant to the imposition of personal labour services by the Spanish colonists. Indeed, by 1599, there was said to be not a single indigenous person in imposed labour service of the Spaniards at Buenos Aires or any of its surrounding environs. Indigenous labour was so scarce that when, from 1605 to 1606, the indigenous populations were
radically reduced by the spread of the plague, the labour needs of Spanish colonists were so great that locals petitioned the Spanish crown in 1607 to be allowed to bring in African slaves from Brazil and Angola (Zimmerman, 1945, 4). And yet, this was hardly a solution as the labour requirements of the Spanish were dominantly in land intensive production, and thus were seasonal by nature. The fixed outlay of capital for a slave was uneconomical, and thus the Spanish resorted not to a system of forced labour exploitation of the indigenous, but to a nascent system of temporary indigenous immigration from the interior on the basis of wage contracts (Saguier, 1986, 72). Not only did this minimize the capital costs associated with production, but it also served as an attempt to strengthen ties with internal populations of indigenous groups, a necessary condition given the heavy reliance of Buenos Aires on trade routes that traversed the interior of the Río de la Plata, extending into the Viceroyalty of Peru.

Furthermore, the indigenous peoples, as largely nomadic and characterized by non-hierarchical organization, rendered the control and colonization of labour difficult as the Spanish lacked access to leaders with whom to negotiate, as well as settlements to threaten with destruction to subdue indigenous groups. In short, the indigenous populations of the Río de la Plata did not provide the same kind of labour services for the Spanish that were found elsewhere throughout the Americas (Campetella, 2008, 50). While a possible response to this argument may well be that Argentina was an exceptional case under the Spanish conquest of the Americas, such response would only serve to deepen the argument I am making regarding the necessity of linking material practices of production and reproduction to socio-cultural subjectivities and stratification. It was, after all, the material organization of labour practices that distinguished Argentina’s indigenous populations from many other indigenous populations under Spanish colonial rule.
If the colonial relationship between the Spanish and indigenous populations was not one predicated primarily on labour exploitation, one might ask what types of relationships did exist, and whether the eliminatory drive and racial ordering of a settler colonial relationship instead predominated. To this latter question, there appears little evidence to provide an answer in the affirmative. Rather, it appears that, though the Spanish interest in the indigenous peoples of the River Plate was not predominantly attributable to labour exploitation, the colonial population nonetheless exhibited numerous interdependencies with indigenous peoples, and thus sustained an interest in protecting, to a limited extent, the continuity of their cultural and physical lives. Central amongst these dependencies and interdependencies were relations predicated on navigation, security and trade (Schofield Saeger, 1985, 506-508). Such interdependencies, furthermore, inhibited the colonial compulsion to ‘civilize’ or ‘fix’ ‘barbaric’ indigenous peoples, as the utility of skills that could be provided were more pressing while the nature of these interdependencies rendered the bodies of indigenous peoples difficult to subject to control; navigation, trade and security provisions often required long periods spent in territories relatively unknown to the Spanish (Campetella, 2008, 74). In this way, the Spanish were often forced to negotiate under the terms provided by indigenous peoples themselves, a relationship denoting a level of implied autonomy and sovereignty rather than subservience.

For example, the introduction of feral herds to the pampas and Gran Chaco regions transformed the economies of Guarani and Pampas indigenous peoples such that they came to rely increasingly on barter for horse and cattle, rather than on traditional hunting and fishing livelihoods. These transformations led to adaptations of indigenous peoples in order to procure bartering material, one strategy of which was to capture Spanish colonists to trade for European commodities (Schofield Saeger, 1985, 496). In this way, extensive (though illicit) trading
networks were opened between the Spanish and indigenous peoples of the Río de la Plata, which became increasingly interdependent. Furthermore, the early colonial silver trade involved the transportation of mules from Buenos Aires to Potosi and silver in the reverse direction, covering an interior road that stretched 3,000 miles at an altitude of 12,000 feet in places, through the interior of the River Plate region (Wrigely, 1916, 116). In areas nearly inaccessible to the Spanish colonists, indigenous peoples were relied on to complete the more arduous and un-navigable stretches of the trade route.

The early Spanish colonists, then, were not engaged in an attempt to eliminate, assimilate, or categorize indigenous peoples through immutable categories of racial subjectivity. Rather, there was a degree of interdependency, predicated on some semblance of acknowledged indigenous sovereignty, which made such practices both undesirable and unrealizable. What we see is Spanish colonial rule operating as an external imposition upon and subjugation of indigenous peoples’ autonomy and freedom, without an attempt to actively intervene in the internal practices of indigenous communities. Spanish colonial rule thus introduced practices of violence and oppression, but they did not necessarily mark a fundamental rupture in socio-economic, political, and epistemic practices. The question of a foreign imposition of violence and oppression is not a uniquely modern phenomena. Rather, the relevant question is to what ends these practices are aimed and with what outcomes.

**Bourbon Reforms and the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata**

The Bourbon Reforms of the Spanish Crown, throughout the eighteenth century, were intended to ‘modernize’ Spanish manufacturing and trade relations, while reasserting supremacy over creole populations within Spanish American colonial communities. In many ways, these objectives forced a reconsideration of the hitherto forgotten external frontiers and borderlands of
the Spanish empire. Through illicit negotiations with creole populations in these frontiers and borderlands, Spain’s European rivals had been able to negotiate mercantile access to trading ports and interior routes to Potosi and Lima, and it was this access that the Spanish wished to put an end to with its ‘re-conquest’ of the imperial hinterland (Weber, 2004, 9). Thus, as was noted above, the creation of the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata in 1776, under the Bourbon reformers, brought the port city of Buenos Aires more firmly under Spanish colonial control, in an effort to block the access of British and Dutch merchants to the interior of Spanish America (Campetella, 2008, 1).

Under Bourbon reforms there was, as before, no single ‘Indian’ policy (Weber, 2004, 11). As previously noted, in many ways the opening of Buenos Aires to legal trade created pressures on creole producers to push the frontier further and further inland, coming into direct and violent confrontation with indigenous peoples in attempts to seize land for pasturage. However, of more pressing concern was the defense of the port city from both endogenous indigenous threats and exogenous British invasion, and it was this concern that perhaps led to a policy of prioritizing peaceful treaties with indigenous peoples over violent conflict for land (Weber, 2004, 21). While the former should not depreciate the severity of the latter, the point is to suggest that as of yet there was no systemic policy of elimination and assimilation. Because Buenos Aires became the pivotal commercial center for the Spanish Empire, its stability and peace, above all, was the central objective (Weber, 2004, 27).

With regard to securing peace from endogenous conflict, the Bourbon policy was generally one that sought to make peace treaties with the groups whose conquest was not immediately and easily possible. For much of the indigenous peoples of Argentina, notably the Pampas, this was the case. As a result, a series of peace treaties were negotiated throughout the
latter half of the eighteenth century. Such treaties often recognized the juridical equality of indigenous peoples and lacked any stipulations regarding mandatory tribute or evangelization (Robinson, 1970, 30; Schofield Saeger, 1985, 499-502; Weber, 2005, 10). With many of the Pampas, these peace treaties lasted until the end of the Spanish colonial period.

The provisions of peace through treaty negotiations were also often bound into commercial relations between the Spanish and indigenous peoples, such that during the 1806 British invasion of Buenos Aires, it was not only the bottom line of Spanish pillage and profits that was at stake. Having become dependent upon, and bound into, the commercial trade of Buenos Aires, many of the Pampas’ indigenous groups would have similarly been threatened by the British invasion. As a result, the Spanish defense of Buenos Aires was in large part secured through the assistance (which accounts appear to depict as ‘voluntary’) of the treaty indigenous peoples of the Pampas (Weber, 2004, 21). This, of course, is not to suggest that indigenous peoples sought to save the colonial regime. Indeed, when creole populations rebelled against the Spanish and asserted independence in 1810, there was little in the way of indigenous resistance. Rather, it was that the livelihoods of indigenous peoples were intrinsically tied into the continuity of commercial and treaty relations with Buenos Aires, and the British invasion of 1806 posed a plausible threat to this situation. And as has been demonstrated, the stability of Buenos Aires in turn depended on the Spanish forming peaceable relations with an indigenous population who could not otherwise be colonized. The importance of this analysis is to recognize that the early colonial period neither fully subsumed nor ignored indigenous peoples’ practices, but rather the indigenous and colonial existed in an often fraught series of interactions in which the forcible subsumption of one to the other was not a clear-cut matter.

Transition to an Independent State: The Nineteenth Century
In this brief section detailing the struggle for independence in Argentina, I want to demonstrate that there was no automatic or easy transposition of colonial administrative boundaries onto the new state (contra Anderson’s account of nationalist development in the Americas). Notably, the boundaries of Argentina remained highly unstable and contested owing to strategic differences between oligarchical and metropolitan classes until the latter half of the century. This suggests that the socio-economic organization of political territory and subjectivities that followed independence marked important discontinuities from the colonial regime. In other words, the settler colonial regime marked a distinct socio-economic and political formation that cannot be simply traced back to 1492.

As a result of the failed British invasions of Buenos Aires, in 1806 and again in 1807, the population of the port city had become highly militarized. Anyone who could bear arms did, which provided a significant revolutionary capacity for local anti-crown forces when internal Spanish turbulence opened space for revolution in 1810. Furthermore, Spain’s own intra-European rivalries stoked the flames of revolution in Buenos Aires. Notably, declarations of war on Portugal, though largely ineffectual within Europe, led to Brazilian attacks on the Banda Oriental in a conflict over supremacy for the River Plate, creating intense pressures on internal finances, while the Spanish declaration of war on Britain from 1796 to 1808 led to significant blockades on Spanish trade with Buenos Aires, eviscerating customs revenue for the city. Increasingly, merchants in Buenos Aires began to turn to Spain’s European rivals for imported goods, notably British suppliers (Adelman, 1999, 40-43). It was largely towards an attempt to rescue if not accelerate commercial prosperity in Buenos Aires that self-government was seized in a junta led by Saavedra, a military official and statesman for the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata (Shumway, 1991, 17).
On May 25, 1810 independence from Spain was declared by forces in Buenos Aires and the first government, La Primera Junta was formed, headed by Saavedra and Mariano Moreno (Shumway, 1991, 17). Claiming the date of 1810 as Argentina’s Independence Day, however, has been problematized, as the proceeding 60 years were riddled with civil conflict over which territories would be contained by the new republic and under what form of political organization (Criscenti, 1961, 367). Notably, a significant rift persisted between the Unitarians and Federalists, often associated with Moreno and Saavedra respectively. The former was policy-driven by European (notably British) influence, seeking to unify the River Plate region under the supremacy of Buenos Aires, and predicated on a commitment to liberalism and free trade (Shumway, 1991, 33; Rock, 1985, 80). The latter position was characterized by provincial interests and the fear of Buenos Aires supremacy, as free trade was seen to threaten internal production and manufactures, whilst enriching only the port city. The latter was also characterized by generally conservative values, and was suspicious of overly friendly and open ties with Europe. The relative weight and power of these two positions would vacillate over the course of the remainder of the century and give Argentina its peculiar arrangement of social property relations.

**Political-economic Vacillations: The Intercourse of Liberal and Conservative Politics in the Consolidation of the Argentine State**

Perhaps the earliest and best-known liberal figure associated with the Unitarian position was Bernardino Rivadavia. After the fall of Moreno, Saavedra had replaced the Primera Junta with the Junta Grande, extending it to include representatives from the interior and allowing for provincial juntas to gain recognition and representation (Rock, 1985, 85). However, the eventual loss of Peru from the loose federation of provinces under the independence junta led to the dissolution of the Junta Grande and its replacement, in 1811, by the First Triumvirate, a Unitarist
organization. At this point, only 39,258 square kilometers were under the direct control of Buenos Aires, and it was this problem to which Rivadavia would devote the majority of his attention. With the creation of the triumvirate, Rivadavia was appointed to the position of secretary and it was in this position that he began to articulate a liberal program, favouring the aggressive defense of Buenos Aires and the nationalization of land in order to achieve a ‘settler nation’ in the model of America (Rock 1985, 86; Zimmerman, 1945, 8).

As secretary, Rivadavia did not hold any voting power in the Triumvirate, but he was nevertheless vocal in proposing a system of land colonization through European immigration. In September of 1812 Rivadavia argued that any creole or foreigner willing and able to till the soil should obtain land from the state (Zimmerman, 1945, 8). Such proposals, however, did not gain very much traction in the early days of Argentine independence, and the First Triumvirate fell in 1812, replaced quickly by the Second Triumvirate, which dissolved in 1814. However, in this period, Rivadavia passed his second important piece of legislation, which was to end all special privileges that hitherto governed the distribution and occupation of land (such as titles of nobility), and decreed all public lands the property of the nation (Zimmerman, 1945, 9). Much of the political turmoil at this time hinged upon the costly war of independence with Spain, compounded by civil war with the interior provinces, which rejected the Unitarist stance of the triumvirate. Perhaps the biggest reason for this was that the costly wars of independence had left the provinces and state bereft of any revenue or means through which to pay soldiers. The only resource available to the provincial states was land, and it was through the endowment of titles to land to decommissioned soldiers that payment for service was made. In declaring all public lands the property of the state, Rivadavia had undermined the capacity of the provinces to manage and subordinate its decommissioned soldiers. Indeed, lacking any autonomous sources of revenue,
the provincial states also lacked effective monopoly over the deployment of violence, and the
nationalization of land further emaciated the provinces’ capacities to uphold authority and
control or limit conflict and political competition (De La Fuente, 2000, 19; Zimmerman, 1945,
10).

In February 1826, Rivadavia was named president of Argentina. Assuming the office of
presidency, Rivadavia immediately found that the national coffers were all but empty, owing in
large part to the vast military expenditures that characterized a state of ongoing warfare. Public
salaries were in arrears, and the treasury was empty, while public credit had all but vanished. The
solution Rivadavia sought was to turn to London for a loan of 15,000 pesos (Zimmerman, 1945,
11). However, to guarantee this loan, Rivadavia needed to establish national ownership of fiscal
lands. This was the context for one of Rivadavia’s most important acts as president, the Law of
Emphyteusis of 1826. Prior to this, land had continued to be administered in much the same
manner as it was under the Spanish; titles generally belonged to the state, though private parties
were mostly free to exploit that land. Following the frontier wars, under Rodriguez, and the
climbing government debt, however, it became a state imperative to lay claim to, administer and
adjudicate stolen indigenous lands. Under this law, lands charged a rent of eight percent of the
assessed value of pasture land or four percent that of crop land—though remaining state property
could be granted in the form of long-term rights of use and access (Zimmerman, 1945, 11). The
latent expectation of this arrangement, then, was that granting of land access in the form of long-
term leases would render quantifiable ‘improvements’ to the land. The productivity of ranchers
and farmers, after all, would ensure the payment of these rents, thus generating state revenue and
a promising domestic agricultural economy.
This being said, Rivadavia’s explicit objectives were mercantile in nature, as it was hoped that land rents would offset trade duties, enabling an expansion in national trade. In the long run, however, the Law of Emphyteusis was a failure. The administrative weakness of the government, along with the provincial-national rifts made the collection of rents difficult to enforce (Zimmerman, 1945, 12). Additionally, the law did not specify a limit to the area of land that lessees could claim, and resulted in ranchers being able to obtain increasingly large and concentrated tracts of land. An estimated 6.5 million acres of land were leased under a mere 122 emphyteusis contracts (Rock, 1991, 99). Large-scale landowners were interested in two things, neither of which accorded with Rivadavia’s objectives: cattle ranching and speculation. In fact, while unintended, Rivadavia’s land policy contributed to the rise of a large, concentrated, land-owning class.

In 1827, Rivadavia’s presidency fell and the newly constituted republic (created under Rivadavia’s 1826 Constitution) plummeted into two years of civil war, predominantly between the Federalists and Unitarists, but also characterized by external wars, notably with Brazil. It was amidst the chaos of these two years of war that the dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas would rise to power, assuming governorship of Buenos Aires in 1829 and remaining in office (with two brief, voluntary retirements) until 1852. To examine the legacy of Rosas is an enormous undertaking, and one that cannot be dealt with in any great detail here. For our purposes, however, there are a few critical aspects of his term(s) in power. I wish to draw attention to Rosas’s federalism and ranching bias, his frontier wars against indigenous peoples, and his introduction of private ownership.

A self-styled federalist, Rosas reversed the republican designation of Argentina under the 1826 Constitution through his signing of the Federal Pact of 1831, creating the Argentine
Confederation, which officially recognized provincial autonomy. However, this federalism was largely a lopsided affair, as his concerns were with the aggrandizement of his own province, Buenos Aires, to the detriment of all others (a goal that, in fact, fundamentally contradicted the general federalist goal) (De la Fuente, 2000, 8; Gautreau & Garavaglia, 2012, 31; Rock, 2000, 183). Indeed, it was through federalism that Rosas could ensure the containment of Buenos Aires’ revenues. Beyond his federalist stance, however, Rosas was born from a family of ranchers, and this bias was central to his government. In an attempt to reverse the Rivadavian emphasis on mercantile interests, Rosas completely re-engineered public spending, increasing rural spending three-fold from 1831 to 1834, while non-military urban spending halved in the same period. Important to the dismantling of Rivadavian policy was the decree in 1832 whereby Rosas ordered all renters to pay their arrears within three months. Those who could not pay (with Rosas’s discretion targeting Unitarians) would have their rental leases terminated, with the lands being sold to private individuals thereafter (Zimmerman, 1945, 13). This was the beginning of the privatization of land in Argentina.

In reorienting government spending to the military, Rosas was concerned with the further conquest of frontier lands, culminating in his enormous, so-called ‘Desert Campaign’ under which more than 100,000 indigenous peoples were killed and frontier fortifications were erected from 1836 to 1837. As a means of administering these newly acquired lands, Rosas disbanded the Law of Emphyteusis in favour of a paternalistic distribution of land to soldiers who had participated in the frontier campaign (Fleer & Tobler, 2001, 24). Ultimately, however, soldiers sold much of these lands to the large ranchers of the pampas, and in this way, under Rosas, the centralization of land under big ranchers was furthered (Adelman, 1999, 128). Land had, once again, become the primary means through which political power was produced, reproduced and
distributed (Adelman, 1999, 110). Thus, it was under Rosas that the first broadly successful campaign against indigenous dispossession was led, while the tensions between Unitarists and Federalists were exacerbated and the first attempts at (contained) land privatization began.

By mid-century, when the pressures of global market commodity production were beginning to impinge upon the arid cereal-producing regions, the Argentine state had neither the land nor the population upon which to rely for the collection of taxes for building public infrastructure, directing colonial settlement and administering a program of agricultural development (Adelman, 1999, 229). Further to this, those who did possess such resources were the large ranchers and land speculators whose reproduction would have been stymied by a shift to wheat production or the fragmentation of landholdings for the settlement of farming families (Adelman, 1999, 278; Solberg, 1987, 28). This, then, was the landscape of social property relations, on which capitalist pressures would impinge.

The fall of Rosas was a critical turning point in Argentine state-building. Rosas had begun the process of instituting private property; however he did so in a manner that was both intentionally and de facto protected from market pressures. In the first instance, Rosas had combined privatized property relations with cronyism, which dictated differential and politicized access to interior and international markets. As such, many producers were not given access to spaces in which competition impinged on productive activities (Adelman, 1999, 112). On the other hand, as a result of the Anglo-French blockade for several years under Rosas, the Argentine economy was denied access to important markets in which the competitive production of grains had begun to emerge (Adelman, 1999, 124-126; Rock, 2008, 53). Thus, it was only with the fall of Rosas that the full effect of London’s shift to free trade was felt.
Barbarism versus Civilization: The Generation of 1837 and the Consolidation of National ‘Whiteness’

In this final section I begin to trace the first efforts to organize and name a national population in Argentina, demonstrating that this conceptualization of nation was a) a fundamental strategy of state building and capitalist development which b) would come to be based on a racial hierarchy of political belonging. I hope to bring my critique of both Anderson and the postcolonial position around full circle by pointing to the following key factors. First, while not denying the centrality of epistemic, cultural and discursive practices in affecting colonial power and consolidating subjectivities, I demonstrate how these were fundamentally tied to a new project of socio-economic organization—that is to say, one was increasingly motivated by efforts to erect competitive capitalist agro-production targeted for world export markets. Faced, however, with the obstacles of administrative and fiscal weakness, the consolidation of a national identity was a strategy of substitution; it stood in for and became the foundation upon which the governing elite sought to develop its own administrative and fiscal centralization along with international credit-worthiness. Second, I demonstrate that the analysis of nation building cannot uncritically assume that success or failure hinges on a liberal bourgeois character and presumptions of civic homogeneity. The equation of capitalist modernity with a metropolitan industrial bourgeoisie is an erroneous reading, and misses the centrality of agrarian relations in the transformation of the productive landscape, in dialogue with, but not subordinated to, global and local bourgeois interests. Liberalism fused with, and in many instances advanced the interests of, existing landed classes of the provinces. As will be clear, the conceptualization of an Argentine nation, articulated in the latter half of the nineteenth century, was neither the product of the liberal Unitarists nor the provincial Federalists alone, but rather represented the interpenetration and combination of European ideas of liberal political economy
and traditional practices of social production and reproduction. Thus, contrary to the postcolonial critique it is possible to read the emergence of national formations that are neither fully liberal, nor fully traditional without relying on a ‘modernity/tradition’ binary, while nevertheless keeping capitalist social relations central. Importantly, we are able to explain how conventionally illiberal practices were foundational to the constitution of liberal states. Specifically, variable racialized formulations of political belonging were generative of and foundational to capitalist state forms in the nineteenth-century Atlantic world.

In the early 1830s, several prominent members of the Argentine intelligentsia would come together to develop a platform to make Argentina a ‘modern nation.’ Referred to as the Generation of 1837, the group was comprised of, among others, Esteban Echeverría, Juan Bautista Alberdi, Manuel Cané, Vincente Fidel López, Juan María Guitérrez and (future presidents of the republic) Domingo F. Sarmiento (1868–74) and Bartolomé Mitre (1862–68). Initially building upon the legacy of Rivadavia and against the policies of the Rosas dictatorship, the relationship between the Generation of ’37 and these two political figures is much more complicated than this simple juxtaposition suggests. Thus, for example, Alberdi would criticize Rivadavia’s attempt to falsely borrow European models without consultation with the ‘organic tendencies’ of ‘the people,’ while suggesting that his autocracy aside, Rosas did just this and provided a necessary stepping stone to the development of an organic and nationally unified democratic republic (Shumway, 1991, 123). Furthermore, both Alberdi and Sarmiento were critical of Rivadavia’s policies extending the franchise, instead insisting that liberal statehood would have to be preceded by a conservative process of liberal nation-building (Negretto and Aguilar-Rivera, 2000, 370). The people were not themselves capable of determining the course and interests of the nation, and had to undergo an education of sorts before gaining such
capability. Indeed, precisely because of the cultural movement represented by Rosas (tied to caudillo federalism and a political contest for power) Alberdi would formulate his nation-building project as “civil liberty for all, political liberty for a few” (quoted in Spektorowski, 2000, 84). As Lomnitz has argued, nationalism in the Americas did not crystalize around a single fraternal imaginary, but instead politically bifurcated a community otherwise bound by common loyalties; civil liberty for all was mediated by the distinction between full and partial, strong and weak citizens, whereby the strong functioned as intermediaries between the state and the politically partial citizen (2001, 338). Gabriel Negretto and José Antonio Aguilar-Rivera have further argued that the operation of liberalism in Latin America was more broadly concerned with the creation, legitimation and regularization of effective state authority (as in American republicanism) than with political liberty (2000, 369). Rather than read Argentine liberal nation-building as a failure to subordinate traditional authority and power structures, this dissertation makes clear that the Argentine state in the latter half of the nineteenth century represented neither the unimpeded continuity of parochial political power nor a replication of European liberalism; what emerged was a novel state form that erected political mechanisms of liberal ordering alongside stratified and hierarchicalized models of political subjectivity. In the tensions articulated by liberal state-builders, we can discern a consciousness of presumed socio-political backwardness and a willingness to borrow innovations from abroad, yet caution that such innovations would have to be reconfigured according to local conditions.

The Generation of ’37 identified, as its primary targets, the problems of unifying the provinces and of combatting the apparent problems posed by a vast and modestly populated land mass (Shumway, 1991, 112; Ward, 2007, 86). On the one hand, the Generation of ’37 sought to transform the so-called barren, barbaric and unproductive Pampean lands into a US-style
agricultural-led development and diversification process (Adelman, 1994, 67-69; Fleer & Tobler, 2001, 18; Rock, 2008, 63). It was thought that an alteration in the physical environment would precipitate a transformation in the ‘civilization’ of the peoples and thereby stimulate ‘progress’ in the style of the agricultural development of the United States (Shumway, 1991, 136). On the other hand, this symbolic juxtaposition of land occupation and progress was materially complemented by the post-Rosas objectives of stabilizing and unifying a politically and ideologically fragmented population. By 1852, after decades of non-representative political practice, the liberal regimes that followed required some semblance of popular legitimation. The heavy-handed authoritarian practices of the Rosas era had to be, at least nominally, replaced by civic institutions. However, this too required the deliberate fomentation of a population bound together by a common national character and developmental project, for the ‘environmental’ conditions of political factionalism and divided historical loyalties would mitigate the liberal agenda of an active and interventionist state (Szuchman, 2006, 336). The former problem combined with the latter to produce racialized understandings of national character and identity.

For the latter relied on the conditions of the former: to rally together and advance a centralized national-state project of development required, first, the consolidation of interior land holdings and the wresting of power from the provincial landed elite, which implicitly and explicitly denied the political and ideological merit and agency of those whose lands, labour and livelihoods were being alienated (Szuchman, 2006, 340).

The period from the 1860s to the 1880s marked the foundational years in the forging of the Argentine national state, which would decisively replace the provincial state as the primary locus of power, rights, and responsibilities (Rock, 2008, 178). In tackling the so-called environmental problem, the post-Rosas ruling elite sought to bring Argentine lands under a
common regime of property rights and establish an agricultural export economy that required both the building of a national rail system and the settlement of European immigrants to transform the arid grasslands. In the first instance, this strategy required the subjugation of indigenous peoples and the transformation of their lands into agricultural production zones. While the Rosas regime had played a significant role in frontier genocide and dispossession, it was the post-Rosas regime that established and codified Pampean property rights with the Rural Code of 1871 (Szuchman, 2006, 340).

On the other hand, it was recognized that none of this was possible in advance of a nationally consolidated state. “National organization, as he [Alberdi] and the liberals called the state-building project, would promote rapid economic growth. It would enable the opening of the country’s great rivers to domestic and foreign trade, the construction of railways and the attraction of European immigrants” (Rock, 2000, 179). However, from Rosas to Sarmiento lay a troubled path of fiscal uncertainty and political struggle over public coffers. The post-Rosas Argentine state builders were faced with several related obstacles, among which were: a) emaciated provincial states lacking a monopoly over the use of land and the deployment of force, making them beholden to the parochial interests of internal, provincial caudillos and estancia owners (De la Fuente, 2000, 19), b) a mercantile trade that was effectively demolished and a public finance system almost exclusively reliant on import duties (Adelman, 1999, 224), c) a chronic shortage of money and massive public debt, which begged the creation of an effective monetary regime (Adelman, 1999, 229), and d) the necessity of readjusting Argentina’s internal legal systems so as to discipline local practices to the exigencies of the global market, which had undergone significant transformations during the 1840s but had been neglected by Rosas (Adelman, 1999, 224).
The post-Rosas state builders, starting with Urquiza, followed by Mitre, Sarmiento and Avellaneda, emerged at a time in which, as we will recall from the previous chapter, the conditions for first global food regime were beginning to percolate. The international wheat market, commencing in 1846 and centred on England, was on a precipitous rise throughout the 1860s, peaking in the 1870s when US wheat flooded the international market, dominated British imports, and thereby exerted mounting pressure on new economies to make leaps in efficiency and productivity (Rothstein, 1960, 401-402). Liberal state builders in Argentina, in addition to addressing the above problems, were also faced with the pressures of an increasingly competitive and commodified global agricultural system. A common solution to all the above problems, for these post-Rosas leaders, was found in the unification of a national peoples and a strong, centralized state. Thus, the state builders following Rosas sought to appropriate and centralize a monopoly over the exercise of violence, restoring order and establishing centralized authority; they sought to transform the financial reliance on imports and inflationary policies that dominated Rosas by establishing a staples export economy to replace the dilapidated merchant system, which, in turn, would rely on substantial long-term foreign borrowing to establish the necessary infrastructure of an export economy (primarily rails and communication networks). Establishing the ‘creditworthiness’ of the state, necessary to relying on a policy of long-term debt, in turn required the establishment of the conditions necessary to engender trust and state capacity to enforce contracts and guarantee loans (Saiegh, 2007, 12-18). The state-builders in the latter half of the nineteenth century turned to the formation of a common set of behavioral norms to unify and legitimize state institutions and debt financing in Argentina.

The first attempts at unification were made under Urquiza, but ultimately failed. Urquiza established the first Constitution in 1853, and made its central goal that of unifying the provinces
under a central government (Adelman, 1999, 196). However, his sympathetic stance towards the provinces saw the Constitution making fiscal concessions that Buenos Aires found unacceptable. As a result, the Constitution was ratified without Buenos Aires, which would temporarily establish itself as an independent state (Shumway, 1991, 171). Nevertheless, Urquiza began the first major projects of transportation, attempting to bring together the interior provinces in a common commercial project of export agriculture. While the absence of Buenos Aires’s port revenues proved insurmountable, and the realization of major infrastructural projects would have to wait until some form of fiscal unity could be achieved, Urquiza’s government began the first centralized policy of unification through dispossession that would gather steam under subsequent administrations (Negretto and Aguilar-Rivera, 2000, 379; Shumway, 1991, 175). Thus, for example, the Urquiza government negotiated the first concession made by a central government with the American William Wheelwright to construct the Central Argentine railway, connecting Rosario to Córdoba. This concession induced foreign interests to invest capital in Argentina through a grant of land three miles wide on either side of the line and a guarantee of seven percent interest annually. However, continuing political instability owing to the secession of Buenos Aires from the Constitution, and the efforts of Bartolomé Mitre to wrest power from Urquiza, made foreign trust in such guarantees by the central government difficult, and it was only after the eventual victory of Mitre that construction would begin (Pulley, 1966, 66).

The construction of railways was pivotal to the project of national consolidation, and one that interpolated nationalism and racialized exclusions. As early as 1852, Generation of 1837 spokesman Juan Bautista Alberdi declared that “Without the railroad political unity cannot be had in a country where distance makes central political power impossible . . . . Political unity . . . can only be begun through territorial unity” (quoted in Pulley, 1966, 63). Political and physical
distance marred attempts to stabilize and unify a central government that could provide the legitimacy necessary to foreign lenders in a climate where endogenous capital was scarce. As Adelman notes, the contractual nature of such relations required some mechanism of fomenting internal solidarity (1999, 229). Of course, these lands, which were to be bound together through rail and land concessions, were not empty lands, but lands that had been coercively and violently appropriated from indigenous and gaucho populations of the interior. Characterizing the emptiness of the lands as ‘barbarism,’ the state builders of the latter half of the nineteenth century sought to position the populations of the interior as a problem to be overcome by a unified ‘civilized’ peoples (Shumway, 1991, 151). It was for this reason that, in the following decades, Sarmiento could appeal to the unity of Argentines in the nation-building project by qualifying thus: “when we say people, we understand noteworthy, active, intelligent people; a governing class . . . . For that reason, in our legislature one should not see gauchos, negros, nor poor people. We are decent people; that is to say, patriotic people” (cited in Shumway, 1991, 151). This graduated system of national organization accords with Omi and Winant’s suggestion that racial nationalism has as its core feature a continual, shifting capacity to simultaneously build and fragment the polity, “precisely because it allowed them to claim their whiteness, sometimes with ease and sometimes only after passing through extended ‘probationary’ periods” (2015, 77). While pursuing objectives classically associated with liberal and capitalist state-building, the Argentine political classes nevertheless sought recourse to conservative and interventionist strategies, which among other things modelled populations on a hierarchy of relations vis-a-vis the state.

As Peter Wade has argued with reference to Latin American nationalism, the very act of imagining and constructing a common referent for unity relied on the active construction of
difference. Representations of the nation depended “to some extent on the notion of indigenousness and blackness, even if the future was thought of in terms of progressive mixture and ‘whitening.’ Blacks and indigenous people, or at least the image of them, were needed as a reference point against which whiteness and a future of whitened modernity could be defined” (2008, 855). Furthermore, as Delaney shows with reference to Argentina, racial understandings of nationhood have served to obviate the European Romantic understandings of nation based on civic and political participation (2002, 639). Deploying the idea of race and racial hierarchy as the basis of national organization avoids the “disruption of political practices and social hierarchies [instead promoting] a nation building project based on the evolution of a [national] race, rather than political participation and civic incorporation” (Delaney, 1997). The Atlantic wheat market, in imposing competitive coercion on national production, led to a combined nation-building project that worked towards liberal ends, while nevertheless attempting to preserve, though in the course altering, traditional relations of political paternalism.

In Argentina, this racial model was predicated on what David Goldberg refers to as an ‘historical’ understanding of race, whereby those racially othered were seen as temporarily immature, to be eventually moralized, rationalized, and educated to the privileges and priorities of ‘whiteness’ (2002, 236). The idea of national ‘whiteness’ bound together disparate parts of the population based not on automatic full citizenship but a promised eventual full citizenship, deferred until adequate environmental and direct political tutelage could transform the political and moral character of the interior populations (Brubaker, 2004; Davidson, 2016; Goldberg, 2002). And yet, precisely because this nascent nationality was expressly articulated with goals of national economic growth and development, the promise of eventual full inclusion, rooted in a shared whiteness, gave common cause and identity to an otherwise fragmented and stratified
society. The chasms of region and class would be elided, not by an immediate full incorporation, but by the promise of eventual ascendance. And this, only once the nation and its people had done their part to launch Argentina to socioeconomic greatness—in order for the country to take its ‘true’ place as the bastion of liberal Europe in a ‘backwards’ America.

In sum, the shift from Spanish colony to independent statehood entailed a radical reorientation of the organization and distribution of political power, rights, and property. These conditions provided a unique backdrop against which Argentina’s engagement with a global capitalist market took place. In order to organize and consolidate populations, lands, fiscal resources and institutions for the project of agrarian transformation, nationalism became a supplementary strategy to legitimate and give common cause to an otherwise politically, geographically and economically disparate population.

In the next chapter, I deal with the ways in which this project of national consolidation came to embrace a racial hierarchy of political subjectivities through state-builders’ attempts to dispossess and direct indigenous peoples. Following this, in the final chapter, I examine how these patterns, once established, laid the ground for the application of racialized understandings of political rights to various groups of immigrants through the final decades of the nineteenth century, as well as the tools with which such ideologies of inclusion and exclusion were enacted.

**Contact, Conquest and Settlement in British North America**

While European contact with today’s North America has a lengthy history, the first perhaps explicit and sustained Euro-North American contacts were engendered by the sixteenth-century explorations by both the French and British. In 1497, in an attempt to find Japan for spices and other bounties of commodities, an expedition under the leadership of John Cabot happened instead upon the east coast of today’s Canada. At the time, believing this land to be
Japan, Cabot declared it English property and returned home to declare his victories. One year later, returning to what was thought to be Japan, Cabot and his son Sebastian headed an expedition, this time discovering the bounty of cod that populated the Atlantic waters surrounding eastern Canada (Ryerson, 1963, 57). In 1506, the French arrived and were the first to chart the Gulf of the St. Lawrence. While a few attempts to establish settlements were made from the early sixteenth century onward, these were generally a failure, and moreover were not deemed essential for European operations in the North Americas (Ryerson, 1963, 59-60). Indeed, increasingly protein-scarce conditions that arose from increases in population and the tensions between land usage for pasturage versus agriculture in Europe made exploration of the continental shelf in the Atlantic for cod fisheries a primary impetus for such early and sustained contacts. Thus, while throughout much of the sixteenth century cod fishing became the primary nexus of the relationship between Europe and North America, actual inland contact was rare as Atlantic fishing and the curing of cod could be conducted with little need to embark on North American shores (Harris, 2000, 6-8).

Towards the middle of the sixteenth century, however, new salting and curing techniques were developed that necessitated the procurement of timber from coastal shores and thus began a gradual inland movement of Europeans onto North American shores (in today’s Canadian east coast). Such incursions increasingly brought European fishers into contact with indigenous peoples and led to the discovery of the fur trade as a valuable corollary to cod fishing. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, in 1608, the French had moved inland and settled Quebec on the St. Lawrence to more fully establish a fur trade route. The French fur trade was heavily reliant on indigenous peoples for almost the entirety of the operation—everything from hunting, trapping and preparing the furs, to the customs and skills involved in the negotiation of trade.
Furthermore, intermarriage was often a strategy deployed in order to insinuate settlers into indigenous societies for the purposes of security, access to cultural resources, and so forth (Lawrence, 2003, 8). As such, the French relationship with indigenous peoples as it settled territories and built forts for the conduct of a fur trade necessitated the maintenance of indigenous peoples’ physical and cultural existence. “The main goal of the early Imperial presence was resource extraction through the fur-trade, an economic activity that absolutely depended on Native people’s labour and knowledge” (Mackey, 1999, 38). While, no doubt, violent and oppressive asymmetrical power relations existed throughout this period, they were not marked by a systematic attempt at indigenous disappearance; nor were they characterized by attempts to radically alter the nature of indigenous living. Rather, it was precisely these differences in material and cultural systems that created the conditions for an exploitative relationship. As Bonita Lawrence has argued, “the boundaries between who should be considered ‘European’ and who should be considered ‘Native’ (and by what means) have not always been clear” (2003, 8).

That we should find this to be the case in both Canada and Argentina, settler states that nevertheless had different colonizers, is indicative of the necessity of understanding colonial endeavours within the wider remit of the international system and the development and spread of capitalist social relations. Indeed, in her analysis of changes in international legal regimes, Maïa Pal has argued that the objectives and conditions of empire have been historically variable in relation to the dominant social property relations of the imperial homeland. It was not until the late eighteenth century, owing to the particular dynamics of British social property relations, that the politics of empire became attached to attempts to develop jurisdiction over indigenous
populations on the basis of the colonizers’ own legal (as well as intellectual, moral, and productive) system (Pal, 2012, 157).

The distinctiveness of this colonial relationship can be captured through an examination of the 1763 Royal Proclamation, which, until the establishment of the Indian Act in 1876, was the legislation that governed the relationship between European and indigenous peoples. The Royal Proclamation emerged from a context within which the contest for territory amongst the American, French and British had been recently settled through a series of treaties, largely in favour of the British in what is now Canada. With the cessation of such rivalries over land, however, came the realization for the British that such treaties did not in fact give Britain authority over native territory—they only settled the competition for such territory amongst colonizing forces. Understanding this fact, the British sought a means by which the precarious relations with indigenous peoples might be stabilized into a partnership or tenuous alliance. One of the primary means through which this stabilization was to be achieved was the demonstration of the Crown’s good intentions, notably by mitigating the issue of white intrusion on indigenous lands (Slattery, 1984, 368). Additionally, the conditions of the Proclamation served as a buffer against American expansionism, which remained a potential threat. Indigenous peoples occupying lands along the boundaries between the provinces and America could be relied on to defend their own lands from intrusion and thereby reduce the costs of military expenditure required to defend lands more central to the economic goals of the colony (Hall, 2014, 3; Mackey, 1999, 40).

Amongst the main provisions of the Royal Proclamation were stipulations over the means through which indigenous land could come under the auspices of the Crown and/or British subjects. The public purchase of lands by the Crown became the only sanctioned means of
acquisition, while the granting of lands by the Crown, the settlement of land directly by British subjects, or the private purchase of land was prohibited (Slattery, 1984, 369). Indigenous peoples were, under these provisions, ostensibly entitled to the undisturbed possession of any lands that had not been ceded to or purchased by the Crown (Slattery, 1984, 370). These early articulations of an ‘Indian Policy’ had as their goal—at least rhetorically—the protection of indigenous peoples in the hopes of maintaining established trade relationships and military alliances while fostering new connections with those indigenous peoples who had previously been subjected to French colonial rule.

Furthermore, as Bonita Lawrence argues, the Royal Proclamation established and recognized a nation-to-nation relationship with indigenous peoples, signaling that the forcible subordination to or subsumption by the settler colonial ‘sovereign’ had not yet been established (2003, 6). Indeed, the administrative tools for dealing with indigenous peoples were established through the British Imperial Indian Department and beholden to diplomatic norms, rather than expressing a sovereign right to command (Lawrence, 2003, 7). To this end, the view of indigenous peoples as somehow inherently and racially inferior had not quite cemented; these ideas were far more flexible, as evidenced by Herman Merivale’s comments (appointed to assistant undersecretary of state at the Colonial Office in 1847) in 1840:

they (Indians) seemed possessed of higher moral elevation than any other uncivilized race of mankind, with less natural readiness and ingenuity than some but greater depth and force of character; more native generosity of spirit, and manliness of disposition; more of the religious element; and yet, on the other hand, if not with less capacity for improvement, certainly less readiness to receive it (as cited in McNabb, 1985, 88).

The fixing of racial difference, I will argue, resulted from the settler’s need to form a national identity in the aftermath of Confederation, which importantly was bound into the international development of competitive agricultural commodity markets and relied upon the acquisition of
land in the form of private property. As Mackey argues, it was at the moment that territorial boundaries began to assume an institutionalized form (such as property, reserves, land surveys, etc.) that the boundaries of so-called ‘race’ and culture began to harden (1999, 41).

**From Raw Commodity Export to the Beginnings of Domestic Production Structures**

By the early decades of the nineteenth century, permanent European settlements had been established in today’s Canada. Simultaneous with the collapse of the fur trade in Lower Canada was the rise of the timber trade in both Upper and Lower Canada. Historian Stanley Ryerson notes that the rise of the timber trade in the Canadas may have been heavily influenced by the Napoleonic Wars and the impetus it generated for ship-building (1983, 37). Unlike the fur trade, however, the nature of the timber trade required large quantities of labour and promoted the development of a home market as timber production engendered the development of forward and backward linkages for ancillary production activities (Ryerson, 1983, 37). Nevertheless, the land on which timber magnates reaped exceptional profits was governed by politically constituted rights, primarily associated with the absolutist regime in France. As such, timber, while generating distinctive geopolitical interests, was not itself conducive to a transformation of production relations.

However, these shifts did have the important consequence of generating a class of merchants whose interests were not automatically aligned with those of Britain, and who instead sought their fortunes within the colony. Thus, in part, the geopolitical ramifications of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars would have been to generate conditions conducive to a rapid expansion of the mercantile and financial classes in the provinces. This development, in turn, would become responsible for some of the internal opposition to formal imperial dependency in its consolidation of a domestic class of merchants and financiers.
For the emerging financial and merchant classes, the problems of imperial rule were generally linked to trade regulations that exerted extreme restraint on the capacity of local elite accumulation. The Navigation Acts, for example, restricted the shipment of goods to or from the colony on anything other than British ships, while further colonial regulations restricted the manufacture of clothing (1768) in Canada, and trade with the US and West Indies (1784) (Ryerson, 1983, 106). These conditions, when combined with the effects of the British Corn Laws on trade with Britain itself, effectively denied growth opportunities in Canada. Advocating from this position early on, William Lyon Mackenzie pushed for colonial reform, and eventually independence. *The Colonial Advocate*, a Reform newspaper edited by Mackenzie, decried British dependence in 1824:

> We earnestly desire to see established, throughout Upper and Lower Canada, New-Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, efficient societies for the improvement of arts and manufactures. We would like to see the manufacturer not quite four thousand miles from the farmer . . . . Our foreign commerce, confined and shackled as it is, and it has been, is entirely in the hands of the British capitalists: our lumber trade is merely encouraged to support British worn-out shipping. We are inundated, glutted with British manufactures (as quoted in Ryerson, 1983, 91).

By 1837, Mackenzie was demanding outright independence: “Until Independence is won, trade and industry will be dormant, houses and lands will be unsalable, merchants will be embarrassed, and farmers and mechanics harassed and troubled” (Ryerson, 1983, 108). However, the endogenous opposition to colonial rule tells only one side of the story, and indeed had international economic conditions not favoured a move towards free trade, it is doubtful whether independence would have been so easily granted to the Canadas. Thus, to gain a fuller understanding of the eventual Confederation of Canada, we need also to recall the contemporaneous problems in Britain of overaccumulation.
As we saw in the previous chapter, of central importance to the British solution to its problems was a policy whereby new territories were settled in order to absorb surplus populations and produce consumption goods for the metropolitan market. This policy is understood by Pal as extraterritoriality, whereby Britain could transform the politics of Empire in accordance with its own internally transformed social property relations and state structures. Specifically, Pal argues that with the transformation of British social property relations, new debates over land and its improvement were generated, leading to new definitions of property. Specifically, the doctrine of improvement enabled a definition of land as vacant—a primary mechanism for the extension of agricultural cultivation to the provinces (Pal, 2012, 172). The practices of extraterritoriality allowed the British to extend semi-sovereign status to the provinces while maintaining political and economic leverage through the diffusion of its institutional configuration—namely the apparent separation of the political and economic (Pal, 2012, 152-156).

One must be careful, however, not to overstate the imperial role in the shaping of Canada after the 1840s. For example, according to Ian MacKay, the Canadian state was formed through an imperial, top-down restructuring that accorded with the interests of free trade. This period was, for MacKay, a moment of passive revolution wherein local interests were selectively adapted to the colonially imposed legal order, so as to absorb and avoid popular resistance. As I show below, rather than passively accepting the imposition of foreign legal and institutional

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9 This process of domestic, non-capitalist merchant elite formation to promote the ends of independence from colonial rule was also present in the United States, as Post has previously noted of the northern colonies (2011, 186), suggesting that there is a particular dynamic trajectory of settler colonial class and property relations that should be understood as modifying the nature of capitalist transformations. Indeed, that the United States and Canada (along with settler colonial Argentina, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa) formed their states through articulations of white nationalism is telling; the path to capitalism in these spaces, marked by distinct colonial forms, requires the very type of social analysis that PM provides.
orders, Canadian state-builders from the mid-nineteenth century onward were active and selective in their adaptation of British technologies of socio-political and economic organization to locally specified material and social relations, such that substitution in the name of advancing locally determined objectives, rather than subordination of local objectives to imperial goals, produced the amalgam configuration of the state that emerged in Canada. Indeed, the concept of passive revolution, following from Mackay, does not illuminate the nature of Canada’s racial nation-state formation, if, as we recall, the British colonial venture in fact sought to avoid cementing such racial categories of exclusion and inferiorization/infantilization. If the Canadian state was formed simply through processes of passive revolution, it becomes much harder to understand how racial state-making emerged as a ‘concession’ to local populations. This would fail to specify precisely what it was that race performed in these spaces, and we get at this question only by examining the local functionality of ‘race’ to domestic class forces and projects.

Additionally, Andrew Smith has highlighted how McKay’s (2010) account overstates the triumph of laissez-faire liberalism in Confederation. While perhaps Smith goes too far in the opposite direction, suggesting Confederation was a triumph of Toryism, his argument nevertheless problematizes the far too frequent interpretation of Confederation as prima facie a project of laissez-faire liberalism (2008, 5). Kevin Henley echoes this critique in his assertion that there has been a tendency to far too readily accept that the ascendance of economic liberalism in continental Europe was experienced universally in developing capitalist economies. Rather than interventionist and mercantilist policies representing an exception to the rule, Henley argued that such policies were in fact the norm for colonial/post-colonial economies such as Canada; within these economies, a significant contingent of domestic political economic thought deemed free trade untenable (1989, 110). Such a critique advances my own project, which seeks
to understand the *confluence* of formally liberal and formally illiberal politico-economic structures and processes within nineteenth-century settler colonial state building. Significantly, this was a time in which the reign of laissez-faire liberalism was too often taken for granted. Yet, recalling my argument that capitalism spread not through economic processes, but through politically designed counterstrategies of defense (Teschke, 2003, 265) in the form of combined development (Desai, 2015, 453), it becomes evident that it is not the fact of state intervention itself that requires explanation, but its specific form and content.

**Obstacles to Agricultural Production and Public Finance in the Canadas Prior to the Act of Union**

The ability for local agriculture to respond to the imperatives generated by the British transformation of colonial administration and trade was substantially hindered by pre-existing production relations. This is to say that as the British attempted to enact the policy of extraterritoriality, the introduction of the British institutional separation of politics and economics had to take root in (or combine with) a very different set of social property relations (SPR), and as a result, class actors with their own objectives. As was argued by Gheller, and discussed above, a significant problem in transforming production relations was the fiscal and administrative weakness of the respective governments of the provinces. Emaciated public finance and politically fragmented authority made the capacity of productive activities to respond to market imperatives nearly impossible. Although each space was marked by different sets of social property relations and production structures, both Upper and Lower Canada experienced obstacles to centralized public financial administration, which stymied attempts to intensify the production of agricultural commodity exports.

Indeed, Charles Post found similar problems plaguing the Thirteen Colonies, noting that despite British North American colonialism being driven by the imperatives of British capitalism
to find profitable outlets for surplus populations, and to establish agricultural commodity producers for the British market, the British were “unable to reproduce the agrarian capitalist social-property relations . . . . [owing to] the inability of British merchants and landlords and their allies among local colonial elites to establish an effective social monopoly of landed property” (Post, 2011, 172). As with the Canadian case, Post attributes this colonial problem to a combination of both the fact of the frontier, which made land widely available for little labour beyond that necessary to clear and till, and colonial and local administrative weakness, which precluded an effective policing of settler squatting, following the massacre or otherwise removal of indigenous occupants from the land (Post, 2011, 173). In the northern colonies, squatters were even effective at organizing ‘claims clubs’ to resist landowners’ pressures to assert title or force squatters to purchase the land they occupied (Post, 2011, 181). These problems of administrative weakness in the face of an expansive and unmanageable frontier in the Canadas were underpinned by colonial social property relations and stymied efforts to organize production on a national scale.

In Lower Canada, under French rule as New France, Gheller argues that the nature of the French state as a colonial power with its own distinct class composition and internal reproductive conditions was such that it did not have an expropriated mass of peasants to commit to colonial emigration and settlement (2015, 117). Additionally, recalling Shilliam’s discussion of the French absolutist state, internal elite reproduction had been predicated on the appropriation of taxation, including duties and other benefits reaped via personal privilege in access to the rewards of the colonial carrying trade (Shilliam, 2009b, 38-40). In this sense, the French colonial state had an internal interest in fostering and maintaining colonial ventures of a mercantile nature, such as the fur and timber trade, and reproduced feudal-type property relations in the
colony via the seigneurial system, which could not be profitable on the basis of rents, but instead held land itself as the source of power that functioned as a means to the end of securing the profits of “politically constituted unequal exchange” (Bernier & Salée, 1992, 127; Gheller, 2015, 110). In New France, then, the colonial settlement’s social property relations and ensuing strategies of elite reproduction did not allow for a taxable population base.

While Upper Canada was colonized by the British, its creation of a centralized state with the powers of taxation to foster a plan of socio-economic development was not possible. Once again, the absence of a peasantry to expropriate made replication of Britain’s quintessential three-class model of agrarian capitalism impossible. In large, land was distributed and/or occupied through two dominant mechanisms. In the first instance, the establishment of Land Boards in the final decades of the eighteenth century facilitated a clientelistic pattern of land distribution. Initially intended to abate the illegal occupation of indigenous lands under the Royal Proclamation (which threatened Britain’s sought-after military alliance with indigenous peoples against the United States), the Land Boards came to be a means of advancing the position and holdings of land speculators throughout the province (Clarke, 2001, 104; Vosburgh, 2008, 82). The Land Boards were to receive petitions for land and examine the loyalty of the applicant to the British Empire. Upon approval, a location ticket for a 200-acre lot, valid for one year, would be issued (Clarke, 2001, 101). Many of these lots were awarded on the basis of militaristic loyalty and relations of political patronage. For those without the political connections necessary to apply to the Land Boards, the other major means of land access was squatting. Squatting, according to Clarke, was a dominant practice in the Upper Canadas throughout the latter half of the eighteenth century up until the Union, owing to the cumbersome and corrupt formal channels of land acquisition. Many such squatters, having emigrated with the goal of pioneer farming,
were able to make ‘improvements’ to the land, erecting buildings and tilling the earth. However, at this time, these improvements were geared only toward self-sufficiency, and as yet did not constitute a means to the capitalisation of agricultural production.

Recalling the colonial nature of these settlements, land was obtained through the dispossession and *exclusion* of indigenous peoples from the imperial polity, meaning that land was plentiful and its distribution was not subjected to market imperatives but rather to a clientelist system of distribution in which privilege and status were the main avenues to property; given this, there was scarce availability of wage labour, with most of the elite profiting from speculative activities and tenant-settlers preferring to erect a family farm model, providing the bulk of the labour themselves (Gheller, 2015, 170). In turn, this meant that until the middle of the nineteenth century, rents were paid in kind (often as a percentage of crop yield); there existed little incentive to improve the efficiency of agricultural production as market imperatives had yet to fully yield their effect, and consequently, there existed little opportunity or incentive to organize and centralize policies of taxation (Gheller, 2015, 187).

Throughout the 1830s the provinces experienced an economic depression, exacerbated by the unfinished project of the St. Lawrence Canal, which had incurred massive public debt and which would fail to generate revenue until long after its completion (Piva, 1990, 85). By the end of the decade, total public debt in Upper and Lower Canada had reached £1.44 million, while the means to generate public revenue for such debt was restricted to export customs collected in Lower Canada and the sale of Crown Lands in Upper Canada (Gheller, 2015, 196).

Customs revenues were never enough to meet the crippling debt accumulated in the provinces, nor were they adequate to engage in public spending on government salaries and infrastructural projects that may have aided the development of revenue-generating activities. At
the same time, the sale of lands to raise public revenue led the government of Upper Canada into a dependency on large landholders whose financial interests were bound into speculative and imperial mercantile relations. As Gheller notes, those who held lands through this massive public sale either sought land for its timber, thus continuing the mercantile system bound into imperial loyalties that had hitherto dominated the Canadas, or such lands were held for their potential to reap speculative profits (2015, 201). A constant shortage of public monies, then, hampered the provinces’ ability to service ever-growing debt obligations and to respond to changing global economic conditions (Piva, 1990, 82). These circumstances underwrote the imperatives driving responsible government—the need to build a centralized fiduciary and administrative state.

The ‘French Question’ and National Identity

If the British strategies of accumulation throughout the mid-nineteenth century required a refashioning of Empire, one that doled out aspects of sovereignty to its imperial possessions while maintaining fundamental loyalty or compliance to the project of Empire, the granting of responsible government to Canada faced at least one central obstacle: the relative position of financial and demographic power of the French in Lower Canada. Compared to Upper Canada, the French of Lower Canada had greater powers of population, less debt and greater access to financial resources, owing to their collection of customs revenue. In sum, the granting of political autonomy to the provinces would have posed the potential problem of allowing the French to gain ascendency and thus develop a national project unsympathetic to that of Empire. Indeed, this problem was recognized in Lord Durham’s recommendations for colonial responsible government, where he noted that only once the British had gained a majority would the plan be practicable in the Canadas (Ryerson, 1983, 141). Thus, before the Canadas could come into their own as a sovereign state, the Colonial Office sought to create the administrative
and infrastructural means to subordinate the French population. This came about, largely, through the Act of Union in 1841 (Creighton, 1958, 211).

The Act of Union was intended, among other things, to eradicate the distinctions between Upper and Lower Canada. Furthermore, given the hitherto ad hoc nature of financial administration and the crisis-prone indebtedness of Upper Canada, the Act additionally established a more systematized architecture for financial administration which conveniently redistributed French Canada’s financial advantages to the indebted British elements, while also establishing a firm separation between parochial and public interests (Piva, 1992, 258; Ryerson, 1983, 141). Upper Canada, in turn, was enticed into Union by promises of a £1.5 million stg. loan, something badly needed in the context of massive public debt and incomplete public works projects, notably the St. Lawrence canal (Baskerville, 1992, 232). Further elements of the Act intended to subordinate the French population were stipulations that all official documents be read in English only, and that the majority of seats be given to English speakers (for example, equal seats were allocated to Western and Eastern Canada, though the latter’s population far exceeded that of the former) (Ryerson, 1983, 149).

The constitution of the Assembly under the Act of Union was intended to avoid creating deep rifts that could crystallize and politicize into unmanageable party factions. However, in the process, as Ryerson has argued, by attempting to eradicate these sharp differences between the Upper and Lower Canadas, a bi-national coalition of anti-imperial reformists emerged. These reformers sought responsible government and rejected colonial control. As I show in the next section, it was on the basis of anti-imperial and anti-American sentiment that English and French Canada could find some common ideological and historical ground. This rejection of colonial control was able to bind the French- and English-speaking elements of Canada, which were
importantly brought together precisely because of the second hand of the British strategy of colonial reconfiguration—free trade.

The repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 began, in many ways, the long path to self-government and later Confederation. Thrown out of the system of imperial preference, and still dealing dominantly with a commercial mercantile economy, the occupants of the provinces found themselves increasingly under threat. In 1854, replacing the system of imperial preferences, a series of treaties of reciprocity were concluded with America. In this, it was still hoped that the provinces could continue to conduct their affairs as they had previously, focusing on commercial policy above anything else. With the onset of the American Civil War, however, the treaties were of little use, and by 1865, notice had been given for the formal cancellation of the treaties (Scott, 1942, 386). The provinces were once more faced with the task of developing a competitive national economy in the ‘bracing atmosphere’ of the free market (Crieghton, 1942, 46-50).

Beginning in 1846 and felt more painfully after 1865, then, was that ‘whip of external necessity’ that Trotsky identified as the first stimulus to processes of combined development. Indeed, that the latter half of the nineteenth century was a period of intense global economic pressure has been widely acknowledged by Canadian political economists, such as Harold Innis and those working in the tradition of staples theory. However, Innis and those following in his footsteps have too often overstated the role of external dependency in the shaping of Canadian political economy (Drache, 1982; Hutcheson, 1982; Innis, 1995). It is for this reason that uneven and combined development is instructive, for it shows the role of external forces as central without being deterministic.
It was, in the context of market pressures, having been ejected from the protection of imperial preference, and facing a hostile market environment vis-a-vis the United States, that merchant and financial classes of the Canadas became increasingly aware of their own socio-economic backwardness. No longer could they automatically align themselves with and reap the benefits of British supremacy. Rather, a great deal of the future trajectory of development would rest in their concerted efforts. The first step, accordingly, was to dismantle those structures that had maintained a form of colonial dependency; if the Canadas would not reap the benefits of British imperial power, they would not bear the burden of it either. Rather they would selectively adapt what was available to them from the imperial home, but to advance local exigencies.

The ‘whip of external necessity’ functioned as a force for class collaboration; the existing merchant and emerging financial and bourgeois classes of the Canadas could find common ground precisely because their business interests were increasingly conditioned by the necessity of modernizing state structures and tearing down restrictive and dependent colonial structures. Of course, because the architecture of Union had been intentionally unequal, a strategic element of incorporation was necessary to solidify a common and stable domestic base of colonial rejection premised on capitalist development, which occurred through the selective incorporation of small French-Canadian business and church elements into the administrative structures of the Union to provide a sense of equality (Ryerson, 1983, 169). In this analysis, then, the external environment did not ‘determine’ political and economic consolidation, but instead evoked strategic responses on the part of local class actors, whose actions could not be ascertained from economic criteria alone.

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10 I am pointing here to the ways in which my analysis departs from staples and neo-staples theory, which has suggested that state centralization was generated in functional response to external market pressures and internal geographical resource determinations (Hutcheson, 1982, 58).
Endogenous development was to produce and supply for global competitive agricultural markets, requiring a dismantling of some of the most pernicious of colonial trade regulations. In turn, agricultural development was to rely on infrastructure and immigration. As debt was an ongoing issue, it was determined that the revenue to service infrastructural debt would be found in the sale of Crown lands to create a Sinking Fund, a strategy that would transform the conditions stipulated under the Royal Proclamation (Piva, 1992, 259). These processes combined indigenous dispossession to raise fiscal revenues with the muting of Anglo-French antagonisms through the idea of common struggles and purpose.

In the lead-up to the Act of Union, a central means to shore up administrative capacity, build state revenue, and ensure the continued subordination of the French element to British interests, was through the 1837 Public Lands Disposal Act. The Act abolished the practice of free grants, and intended to make the distribution of Crown Lands subject to a transparent and administratively robust process, whereby public auctions were to be the primary means of land disposal, followed by the possibility of private sales (Vosburgh, 2004, 35). These conditions were renewed in 1839, and again in the Land Act of 1841 under Lord Sydenham, who would become one of the main administrative reformers of the Dominion. Under the Act, which would last until 1853, Crown Reserves were sold through the Canada Company at a cost of 8s. per acre, a price that required many to turn to money-lenders for credit (Gates, 1968, 267).

While the sale of Crown Lands to generate revenue was a central motivation behind the Act, there remained a tension between the bald fact of selling land for revenue (potentially to speculators) and the need to select for sales that would contribute to developmental objectives. Thus, reflecting Wakefield’s emphasis on governmental intervention in the distribution of land to promote development, agents of the Crown Lands department were given discretion to facilitate
the purchase of lands by squatters who had contributed to its improvement—the so-called bona fide settlers (Vosburgh, 2004, 35; Vosburgh, 2008, 82). That is, where squatters were concerned, and where they represented bona fide settlers (i.e. had made improvements to the land), opportunity was often advanced to give them first choice when it came to purchasing the land for themselves.

The sale of Crown Lands to generate government revenue marked the beginnings of market dependency as criteria for squatters’ and settlers’ eventual title to land rested on ‘improvement’ requiring capital investment. These conditions then led to a cash and credit dependency that would eventually stimulate market dependency (either through the sale of labour or of agricultural commodities) to fulfill obligations to money lenders and to ensure their consummation of land titles (Bilak, 1987, 180). At the same time, these criteria simultaneously provided the contours of racialized exclusion by distinguishing between deserving and underserving land occupancy on the basis of physical and technical improvements. The language through which indigenous peoples could be systematically dispossessed of their land was beginning to take shape.

In the 1850s legislation passed to create indigenous reserves served to establish settler rights to the majority of land within the united province by parceling off explicit and marginal pieces of land for indigenous peoples. Land sales, in turn, would provide the capital necessary to purchase public debentures, but to sell land in a manner that avoided the trappings of imperial dependency (as had been the case under previous sales of Crown Land), immigration would have to be increased to attract small farmer settlement (Piva, 1992, 260). To pursue the common goal of settled capitalist development, increasingly geared towards agricultural commodity export, a common national goal was identified that was premised on the rationalization and centralization
of state administrative apparatuses, independent policy making and infrastructural development to stimulate and aid the settlement and development of agricultural regions.

It was largely in response to these concerns that Confederation came about. The bracing environment of competitive free trade brought to the fore the issue of binding together and expanding the domestic market while overcoming the Anglo-French divide (Creighton, 1952, 217). From the beginning the question of political-economic unification was bound up with the problem of developing a national identity. Macdonald, for example, sought to form a strong, centralized government “charged with matters of common interest to the whole country” (Scott, 1942, 399). And yet, there were clear issues at hand in determining the ‘common interest’ of the country, given the enduring socio-economic asymmetries between English and French Canada. If the country was to survive amid rapidly transforming global economic relations, it needed a strong government capable of directing national economic development through a robust program of rail development, agricultural and industrial production. Yet achieving these ends could prove difficult in the face of entrenched regionalism and linguistic-ethnic cleavages. National state development had to be accompanied by the development of a new national identity.

Rejecting Colonial Dependency and American Annexation: Creating the “Northern Men of the ‘New World’”

In this final section I argue that the stimulant to nationalist organization within what became Canada was most firmly established by the changing conditions of the global economy, which came increasingly to be predicated on free trade and competitive commodity production. Both Liberal and Conservative versions of nation building and national identity formation in Canada responded to these transformations. Taking the Canada First Movement (CFM) and John A. Macdonald’s nationalisms as indicative of liberal and conservative variants respectively, I
demonstrate how both sought to foster the consolidation of a nation in response to perceived external threats. The combined geopolitical and economic threats posed by imperial Britain and America generated an urgency on camps within the political spectrum to secure the conditions necessary for endogenous national development. While each camp sought to secure these ends through different means, there was nevertheless a commonality inasmuch as the goal was to centralize the administrative and fiscal apparatus of the state and shore up its legitimacy by fomenting a national people (and consequently their investment in a national project).

It did not take long after Confederation for the recognition of a tension between colonial dependency and national growth to take hold of a small but active and vocal group. Only one year after Confederation, in 1868, the CFM was formed in Ottawa, and included George Denison, Charles Mair, William Alexander Foster, and Robert Grant Haliburton. Eventually becoming an official political party in the 1874 federal elections under the name of the Canadian National Association, the CFM produced a large body of work that argued intensely for the development of a national identity, distinct from Britain and the US, if Canada was to achieve internal development and progress as well as external recognition as sovereign (Berger, 1970, 49-53; Wallace, 1920, 154).

The problem with colonial dependency, for the CFM, however, needs to also be contextualized by the potential threat of annexation to the US. Indeed, the basis for the CFM nationalism was an environmental form of racism, which contrasted the robustness and self-reliance of so-called ‘northern races’ with the undisciplined laziness of the ‘southern races’ in the US (Berger, 1970, 53). Thus, the CFM favoured the racial character of its colonizer and encouraged immigration to this end, yet found danger to unity in the face of the US, given conditions of underdevelopment, an over-reliance on Britain, and the potential for disunity given
the diverse European backgrounds of settlers and immigrants to the new country (Berger, 1970, 59, 61). In his address titled “Canada First Or, Our New Nationality,” Foster argued

The citizen of the United States has a flag of his own, and nationality of his own – The Canadian has never had to look abroad for his. For years British policy isolated the Provinces, to prevent their absorption in the neighboring Republic, and in so doing stunted the growth of a native national sentiment . . . . Now that we are prosperous and united, vigorous and well-to-do; and now that some of the traditions of the past are gradually losing their hold on the imagination of a new generation, that sentiment which so long found an outlet in declamation over the glories of the Mother Land, will draw a more natural nourishment from native sources . . . . Young as we are, we are not too old to be abused without retort; weak as we may be, we are too strong to be bullied with impunity. (1871, 27)

Haliburton, too, echoed these sentiments in his 1861 lecture The Men of the North and Their Place in History, delivered to the Montreal Literary Club:

Man cannot live by bread alone, nor can a people become a great nation by its commerce only. National wealth without public spirits is like capital without enterprise. But national spirit is of slow growth, unless it is the offspring of a violent struggle or a great sacrifice. It can only spring from a faith in a bright future, or from the memory of a glorious past. What is our past? What is our future? . . . . Never did an infant nation crawl into existence in such a humdrum, common place, matter of fact way . . . . Confederation has been the work, not of the people, but of able statesmen and politicians . . . created as little excitement among the masses, as they would feel in the organization of a joint stock company . . . (Haliburton, 1869)

In Haliburton’s statement, there appears the recognition that the organizational and ideological unity of a state had typically followed a series of conditions that did not apply to Canada. While Haliburton cites ‘mass struggle,’ we should be careful not to miss what such struggles entailed and resulted in. This is to say, these struggles concerned precisely the reorganization of social property relations. The two most obvious examples Haliburton referenced were the British and the US. Of course, the mass struggle in Britain, as I showed in previous chapters, was bound into the protracted process of expropriation, the rearrangement of social property relations, and the monopolization of land. Likewise, Charles Post has shown how the Civil War in the US was
similarly rooted in contending sets of social property relations and the pursuit of a monopoly
over the use and distribution of land. Canada, however, had yet to consolidate a monopoly over
national territories. In response to such discrepancies, Foster advocated the *purposeful* and
*conscientious* construction of a national identity, which united diverse immigrants through a
common history grounded in *the struggle for material advancement* in Canada:

As between the various Provinces comprising the Dominion, we need some cement more
binding than geographical contact; some bond more uniting than a shiftless expediency;
some lodestar more potent than a mere community of profit. Temporizing makeshifts
may suit a futureless people. Unless we intend to be mere hewers of wood and drawers of
water until the end, we should in right earnest set about strengthening the foundations of
our identity; unless we are to become the laughing stock of the world, we had better not
lose sight of the awful possibility off sinking under self-imposed burdens of territory
(Foster, 1871, 29-30).

The CFM was to find this ‘common bond’ in the articulation of a distinctly Canadian racial
character, resulting from the self-reliance and liberality of the northern European ‘races’ striving
for survival and material progress in Canada. Thus, whereas a monopoly over land facilitated the
consolidation of a political state and population in the US and England, it was recognized that
Canada lacked the historical antecedents for this general pattern of ‘development.’ The CFM
thus sought to reverse the historical order of such developments, taking national identity in
advance of its antecedents, and in fact, as a means to them. Indeed, the idea of progress was
central to the ideological foundation of the CFM, such that conscious ‘catch-up’ and comparative
backwardness were always central.

For the CFM, progress and environment were bound into one another in a mutually
constitutive relationship. In 1868, George Parkin argued that “the minds of men are molded by
their surroundings” and in this statement, he reflected the broader consensus among liberal
imperialists that the moral and intellectual development of a peoples is conditioned by their
material activity. In so far as this was believed, it was argued that the work of the settler would be crucial to the intellectual and cultural development of a national ‘people.’ It would be through their material transformation of the land, and the advancement of their economic and productive activity, that a common culture and morality could be fostered (Berger, 1970, 111). Thus, the first articulations of nationalism in Canada emerged through a combined understanding of racial character, territorial defense, and material progress.

The new Canadian nationality was to draw on the heritage of the ‘dominant race’ of the British people, and yet go further still than the British in bringing together the many people who settled Canada on the basis of their supposed climatic advantage for superiority. Thus, in distinction from the British, the new Canadian nationality was, for Haliburton, to embrace the Celtic, the Teutonic, Scandinavian, Celt, Norman and Swedish elements, fusing them together into a new Canadian ‘race.’ These northern ‘races’ benefitted from histories of self-reliance, energy, strength and liberality, which would be tested and strengthened by the harsh climate of Canada and its effects of a rigourous natural selection process (Mackey, 1999, 43). This melding of environmental and biological or scientific racism, furthermore, allowed the CFM to elide the prominent cleavages between French- and English-speaking populations. Under the threat of American annexation, the CFM was willing to integrate into its conception of Canadian racial unity the French European (and Norman descendent) populations in the name of producing a territorial-racial conception of nationhood (Mackey, 1999, 44). The CFM accordingly sought to selectively minimize or even deny the salience of French-English conflicts, instead emphasizing the shared histories of territorial defense during the War of 1812 and the objective of material progress (Mackey, 1999, 44). As I show in the next chapter, this ‘national character’ would be
mobilized to legitimize the destruction of indigenous lives, resources, and cultures, and their subsequent absorption into the state as ‘racially inferior’ dependents.

The CFM could embrace the French in their vision of nationhood because of their essentially liberal, anti-imperial thrust. For the CFM, the primary threat posed to Canada’s socio-economic success was its dependent relationship with Britain, and as a result, it was the negation of this relationship that was ardently sought. In so much as the French could assist English Canada in its defense against the Americans, thereby ameliorating imperial dependency for the purposes of territorial defense, they were (if grudgingly) accepted into the national imaginary. In fact, it was precisely the unified consolidation of the Canadas that was deemed necessary to prevent annexation with the US. The two objectives were intimately bound into one another: to avoid annexation one had to avoid imperial dependency and consolidate the administrative capacity and autonomy of the state. Thus, for example, CFM member Edward Blake, who entered Mackenzie’s cabinet in 1875, focused on reducing the powers of the Crown in Canadian affairs through a negation of the role of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Clause 47 of the Supreme Court Act was the result of these efforts, which established that Canadian courts would be the final arbiter of internal matters (Graham, 1946, 112).

Like the CFM, John A. Macdonald was ardently opposed to the prospect of American annexation. And like the CFM, Macdonald saw one of the greatest bulwarks against American encroachment in the prospect of Canadian national economic growth. However, unlike the CFM, Macdonald wished to foster a Canadian nationality that relied heavily on its attachment and loyalty to the British Crown. Rather than negotiate for trade reciprocity with America, as the Liberals had done with the American Reciprocity Agreements, the Conservative government instead wished to rely on a protective tariff and continued preferential trade with Britain.
Centralized financial institutions, industrialism and tariff protections all became central aspects of the Macdonald National Policy. Yet, because of the geographical and demographic scope and variety of the new Confederation, such administrative reform in the direction of a centralized government was difficult to implement. Thus, Macdonald sought to bind together the Canadian state through the development of a new national spirit sustained by a national party (Farr, 1955, 17). This national spirit, it must be clear, was not tantamount to a re-articulation of British identity. Though Macdonald remained committed to the British crown, he was equally clear that Canada was to be an autonomous nation within the British Empire (Farr, 1955, 17). As I will demonstrate in the next chapter, these nationalist impulses within the new Confederation of Canada would construct the indigenous inhabitants as an obstacle to ‘progress,’ and as a consequence, the national people of Canada were increasingly defined by ‘racial whiteness’ in contrast to indigenous peoples.

While the Conservatives were attempting to foment a national identity based on a national protective tariff and anti-Americanism, the Liberals were no less interested in fabricating a national imaginary, though articulated differently, through reduced imperial dependency and an embrace of free trade. As with Argentina, the two contending national imaginaries reflected the variable class positions of merchants embracing open trade, on the one hand, and nascent agricultural and industrializing interests, which sought a protective tariff, on the other. In either event, I want to emphasize that the imperatives of national consolidation and imagination were stimulated by pressures (both material and ideological, internal and external) to develop a national economy and compete in a global agricultural commodity market. The differences in their respective nationalisms should not be read as too distinct, for they both emphasized the building of a national peoples based on racial whiteness; both sought to
centralize key aspects of state institutional and administrative capacity, and both sought to root their respective identities in the narrative of victimhood. For the Liberals, the source of victimization and oppression was the imperial motherland, Britain. For the Conservative elements, it was the Americans and the threat of free trade that posed the greatest external threat. Through the narrative of victimization, Canadian nation builders were able to posit an external threat that presented a clear danger to a (constructed) homogenous whole, while at the same time completely obfuscating internal processes of victimization perpetrated against minority groups (Mackey, 1999, 21).

In many ways, this brief history of settler colonization in Canada suggests that the phenomena of settlement emerged at the intersection of British transitions to increasing laissez-faire policies (both domestically and internationally) and the colony’s domestic transition away from merchant-based economies to more complex agricultural production and industries necessitating the development of internal markets, which could no longer be sufficiently provided for by the overseas British crown. Thus it should be emphasized that while the British impulse to transform the organization of its overseas possessions was critical in establishing settler colonialism independence, contradictory forces from within the colony’s burgeoning merchant, industrial, and labouring classes existed. Once independence had been granted, the problem of establishing an independent economic base posed itself to the early leaders of the settler-colonial state, and it was increasingly evident that this national economic base required the centralization of fiscal and administrative apparatus, the revenue for which would be found in increased appropriation of indigenous lands. Simultaneously, however, an independent national economy would necessitate the binding together of the hopes, aspirations, fortunes and interests of all the provinces of the Canadas.
Conclusion

To return to the central problematic of this study, the foregoing analysis of Spanish and British colonial relations in Argentina and Canada is aimed at illuminating how changing conditions in the global economy fundamentally transformed the direction and objectives of colonialism. Importantly, I have attempted to show how national and racial identities were not a vestige of premodern practices and attitudes, but were instead strategic responses to the problems posed by state formation in the context of an increasingly competitive laissez-faire global economy. I have further tried to demonstrate how the spread of capitalist social relations does not, of necessity, contribute to a homogenization of identities, but instead is actively productive of difference in subject identities. While, to be sure, during the early colonial periods there existed differentiated classificatory relations between and amongst the European and indigenous populations, these relations were not indicative of a racial or national ordering of population (Wolfe, 2015, 7). The interdependencies, and (perhaps at time rhetorical) recognition of mutual (tacit) sovereignty, which characterized the relationship between many European colonists and indigenous peoples, did not benefit from the hardening of social identities, but instead benefited precisely from their fluidity and the fuzziness of their boundaries. Race, as Patrick Wolfe has usefully pointed out, was temporally concordant with the transition from merchant trade to competitive capitalist markets (instigated by English industrialization), which transformed the social organization of colonialism. This transformed colonialism absconded with the centrality of the trading post, and instead configured production and consumption both at home and abroad to suit the needs of metropolitan capital. The indigenous middlemen and security forces, once integral to the colonial merchant networks, were thus rendered obsolete (Wolfe, 2015, 8).
These transformations in the global economy generated the conditions and imperatives that underwrote attempts at fomenting a national peoples and state. In exploring the genesis of settler nationalisms, I have furthermore attempted to counter some common problems arising in the works of Anderson and postcolonial theorists. Specifically, I sought to argue that a) nationalism can and has been fomented upon criteria of ‘race,’ dispelling the myth that nations are predicated on legal equality, b) such an acknowledgement can be accounted for by Political Marxist analyses without reducing national forms to a homogenous or modal ‘type’ nor to pure economism, and as a result, c) it is neither necessary nor possible to conceive of nationalism as a purely bourgeois-led project. In the next chapter, I delve more fully into how these nationalist impulses fundamentally reconfigured settler-indigenous relations. The combined imperatives of economic growth, predicated on a transformation of the landscape and the relationship between land, progress and national identity, would come to form a nexus from which the idea of national ‘whiteness’ could develop.
Chapter 4  Producing the ‘White’ Nation: Territorial and Political Consolidation Through Indigenous Negation

In the last chapter, I argued that the origins of settler nationalism were to be found in the uneven and combined integration of settler economies into global commodity markets from around the mid-nineteenth century. Drawing from Radhika Desai’s concept of the materiality of nations, I showed how nationalism was conceived as a means to specifically material ends—namely the consolidation of the state’s coercive, administrative and fiduciary capacity. I began to outline how such nationalism was both integral to the nature of settler state formation, and how it predicated itself on an internal identity of ‘whiteness’ counter-posed to an indigenous racial ‘otherness.’ Yet, I had only begun to gesture towards how this national construction of racial identity was actualized. In this chapter I seek to push this analysis logically forward and argue that the production of a national state and population predicated on ‘whiteness’ necessitated the material, cultural and racial othering of indigenous populations. In turn, such management of ‘white’ and ‘racially other’ identities were productive of the material and institutional development of the state. The construction of white national identity served to legitimize the project of monopolizing and centralizing territorial and fiscal resources and simultaneously undermined alternative claims to sovereignty. In managing territorial and fiscal resources while policing counter-claims to sovereignty, the state further developed significant bureaucratic and organizational capacities. However, the ways in which ‘white’ and indigenous racial subjectivities were constructed, including the tools used to realize and enforce indigenous dispossession, drew upon and produced novel configurations of social property relations. These differences would result in unique strategies of political-economic development, and hence of immigrant recruitment and subject stratification (the topic of my final chapter).
Before turning to the empirical study, however, it is necessary to address a potential theoretical objection. Framing settler colonial constructs of indigeneity in terms of race necessarily brings up several important critiques coming from the fields of critical indigenous studies. However, while these concerns are essential, I remain convinced that it is neither possible nor desirable to analyze settler-colonial constructs of subjectivity without a sustained analysis of the racialized and nationalized nature of capital formation in the settler colonies. Thus, in the next section I address such critiques while arguing that an analytical focus on racialization remains necessary to the project of unmasking and opposing indigenous oppression. I will forward that conceptualizing race as foundational to national state formation mitigates some of the concerns raised by scholars from within critical indigenous studies.

Following this initial theoretical engagement, I develop my comparative case studies, turning to Argentina and Canada respectively. I analyze the ways in which settler ‘whiteness’ and indigenous ‘racial Otherness’ underwrote the legitimation and institutionalization of centralized coercive, administrative and fiduciary state capacity that was necessary for organizing agrarian production in the face of competitive market integration. In other words, I argue that the very institutions of the state and the forms assumed by state and capital in the settler colony were premised upon racial exclusions and hierarchies. These internal variations were the product of the spread and combination of European ideas of property and state within existing configurations of power, production and privilege. This conclusion will establish the grounds for the final chapter of this study, wherein I will show that the means and ends to which immigrant populations were recruited and categorized towards the turn of the century were shaped by the cultural, institutional, and socio-economic framework established by the management of indigenous identities.
Indigeneity and Critical Race Studies

The argument I have advanced thus far understands the analysis of settler national-state formation as complementary to the framework of racial formation. Developed in the seminal work of Howard Omi and Michael Winant, racial formation refers to the ways in which racialization is not simply an effect of power, but formative to power in its own right (Omi & Winant, 2014, 112). Because racialization is active in the formulation and realization of particular social, political and economic projects, it is not reducible to a singular model of exploitation or identity construction but instead can be understood to produce heterogeneous modes of racialized societal rule and organization (Omi & Winant, 2014, 106). The advantages of examining settler-colonial state building through racial formation are that it brings together, in a common analytical framework, indigenous and racialized migrant groups.

This choice, however, does not come without its problems. Applying critical race studies to indigenous peoples can be problematic in that it risks collapsing indigenous peoples into a general category of ‘internal’ oppressed minorities. The key to this issue, as Jodi Byrd argues, is that the term ‘internal’ subjects indigenous peoples to the sovereignty and ontological/epistemological status of the settler-state (2014a, xxiv). Upon having identified indigenous peoples as internally oppressed minorities, the solution becomes one of finding state-legislated actions to ameliorate such conditions—for example, the Civil Rights movement sought the inclusion of racialized groups within the state. The problem, however, is that many indigenous peoples do not recognize the sovereignty of the state, nor do they seek inclusion within it (Byrd, 2014b, 133). To render solutions to the problems faced by indigenous peoples accessible only through the state is to re-impose the very condition of coloniality that produces such problems in the first place. Remediation, for many indigenous activists, is found precisely
in challenging the sovereignty of the state, not through being granted access to or accommodation by the state (Coulthard, 2015).

Indeed, as Bonita Lawrence and Enakshi Dua have argued, within anti-racist scholarship the question of land is rarely systematically investigated (2005, 126). Yet, land is essential to indigenous experiences of oppression, and further legitimates strategies and mechanisms of policing which other peoples of colour would not be subjected to. For example, the authors argue that subjection to militarized incursion continues to be a threat held over the heads of non-compliant indigenous groups, as resource extraction further encroaches on and destroys the marginal tracts of land that remain in the hands of their peoples. In obscuring the question of land, the legitimacy of indigenous claims to sovereignty is also denied (Lawrence & Dua, 2005, 128). Instead, a liberal pluralistic framework of ‘difference’ will serve to flatten and erase indigenous difference (as well as destabilize and fracture differences amongst and between indigenous communities themselves).

This problem is further complicated by the fact that conceptual conflation or universalization of the category of the ‘racial Other’ serves to obscure how immigrants, regardless of their racialized oppression, are nonetheless complicit in the settler colonial project (sometimes implicitly, other times explicitly) (Lawrence & Dua, 2005, 134). Immigrants, irrespective of status, participate in the ongoing occupation of indigenous lands, and (often) legitimize the settler state by engaging in official procedures sanctioned by that state to occupy said territories. (Of course, the equation is complicated when we deal with immigrants who enter territories in the absence of official, ‘legal’ channels.)

This, however, is not to say that race is not and cannot be an adequate mode of analyzing colonially-imposed indigenous subjectivities. The key, to my mind, and this seems to be echoed
by Byrd, Dua and Lawrence, is that the racialization of indigenous peoples must be viewed through the concomitant production of ‘white nationality,’ which functioned as a material precondition of the settler state. Such an understanding allows for a view to indigenous racialization as distinct from, yet related to, the racialization of immigrants of colour. The conditions for liberal freedoms, civic inclusion, and so forth are from the beginning premised upon the decidedly illiberal tactics of dispossessing and policing indigenous peoples. To acknowledge this fact is to be able to understand the profound continuities of colonial racism encapsulated in the liberal-pluralist model of inclusion and recognition; this is what the theorist Charles Mills has called a racial contract (Byrd, 2014a, xxv; Lawrence & Dua, 2005, 131; Mills, 1997). As I will show in the final chapter, the patterns and policies of exclusion through which immigrant groups have been differentially included or excluded by the state were informed by the political and economic structures that resulted from the ‘management’ of indigenous dispossession and the policing of white national purity. Having come this far, then, decolonization becomes the focal point for anti-racist organizing more broadly, rather than simply an aspect of it (Lawrence & Dua, 2005, 131).

The model I have been advancing thus far, I hope, is consistent with these requirements. I argue that a ‘racial contract’ of sorts was at the core of the establishment of a settler national state. To address racialized immigrant and indigenous oppression can mean nothing other than decolonization. In this chapter, I aim to detail the specificities of this ‘racial contract,’ a condition of the materiality of the nation, roughly spanning the 1860s to the turn of the century.

**Indigenous Elimination on the Pampas**

In the previous chapter, I showed that the consolidation of the Argentine state was predicated on objectives of national unity and the development of a national Argentine people.
This project of national state and economic development was conditioned by transformations in the global economy, which positioned Argentina as a potential competitive producer of temperate agricultural commodities. In this chapter, I argue that national goals of material and territorial consolidation acquired a racial character through the reality of indigenous priority and the necessity of dispossession and colonization. Dispossession and colonization were legitimized and rationalised by positioning indigenous peoples as a material and socio-cultural obstacle to national goals. Through the framing of indigeneity as a ‘disease’ characterized by ‘racial barbarity,’ national consolidation became fused to a rhetoric of triumphant racial whiteness. However, because this racial myth was rooted in a Darwinian narrative of civilization versus barbarism, the persistent existence of indigenous bodies had to be forcibly assimilated. National whiteness was produced through violent military genocide, first, and then cultural assimilation. The productive power of racialization emerged in this process of creating and policing racial whiteness vis-à-vis indigenous dispossession and assimilation. State capacity was built in a) the consolidation of the legitimate means of coercive capacity, and b) the generation of international credit-worthiness, and hence of state fiscal resources.

The case study of Argentina is important in demonstrating the centrality of violence and coercion (ostensibly ‘illiberal’ practices) in the constitution of modern liberal state orders. For example, a seminal scholar of Argentine history, David Rock, views Argentina’s modern cycles of military dictatorship and decline as rooted in its pre-modern colonial period and the result of white exploitation of indigenous peoples through tributary institutions backed by parochial and inflexible economic structures (1985). While Rock is right to point out the centrality of indigenous exploitation to modern Argentine nation formation, he fails to see how coercive relations and economic structures are—far from inflexible—profoundly transformed in the
modern period. This is precisely because traditional actors were defending their positions in response to an altered global economic climate. My argument is much more in line with scholars such as Tulio Halpérin Donghi or Jeremy Adelman (1994), who view the latter half of the nineteenth century as a transformative period for Argentina. Specifically, Adelman’s attention to property relations highlights that liberalism and capitalist modernity in Argentina are not ‘failed’ projects. He insists, as I do, that we dispense with the myth that there is one path to capitalism. That Argentina’s ‘modernity’ looks different from other agricultural developers at this time is instead indicative of the fact that actors rooted in specific constellations of property relations responded to global economic forces in ways that produced heterogeneous courses of social change.

I will argue throughout the remainder of this study that the coercive powers consolidated in this period, while informed by pre-capitalist social relations, were not simply an ‘archaic’ element of political life that could not be liberalized or modernized. Rather, these were new forms of coercive power, informed by and deployed towards liberal consolidation. Coercive capacity was indeed related to the Spanish colonial legacy, the power of landed classes, indigenous exploitation, and the years of anti-colonial and then civil wars that followed independence. However, through the latter half of the nineteenth century coercive power was deployed to eliminate and assimilate indigenous peoples so as to push forward the national project of interior development, as well as to demonstrate legal and physical security to foreign investors. Indigenous elimination marked a departure from previous exploitative relations (as I showed in the previous chapter) and was importantly tied to an outwardly oriented project of socio-economic ‘catch-up.’ Through indigenous elimination, scattered provincial militia were progressively defeated and consolidated into a national standing army. In this process, the
Argentine state became a unified entity legitimated by its coercive capacity internally, and its creditworthiness externally. This marked a shift from the personalized and parcellized coercive capacity of local caudillos to the centralized and depersonalized coercive power of the state.

**The Militarization of ‘Civilized Whiteness’ over ‘Racial Barbarity’**

The project of national unification and economic development in Argentina began in earnest in 1867. Under President Bartolome Mitre, the Argentine Lands Act was passed, which established the transfer of huge swathes of land to interior ranchers. Along with this, a decree was passed ordering the army to occupy all territory from the Atlantic to the Andes, establishing it as ‘National Territory’ (Dodds, 1993, 318). These policies combined were the impetus for the final wave of territorial occupation and indigenous dispossession, culminating in the Conquest of the Desert (1875–84). From the 1870s onward, a series of military campaigns sought to brutally dispossess indigenous peoples from the Pampas and Patagonia in the 1870s and the Chaco region in 1884 (Delrio et al., 2010, 141; Dodds, 1993, 322-23; Trinchero, 2006, 126). All told, estimates suggest that anywhere from 10,600 to 12,335 indigenous peoples were killed in the Pampas, Patagonia and Chaco regions (Shwittay, 1999, 53; Trinchero, 2006, 133). From the end of the 1860s, military expenditure as a direct result of frontier campaigns increased exponentially, accounting for, at times, more than half of the national budget (Trinchero, 2006, 126).

The decision to pursue a brutal policy of military genocide against Argentina’s indigenous peoples must be understood in terms of the existing social property relations that I described in the previous chapter. To briefly recap, however, land was primarily concentrated in the hands of the caudillos whose reproduction relied on an extensive ranching practice along with intense speculation and localized coercive capacity. As such, those with territorial control were uninterested in, even hostile to, the centralization of political power and the opening of
borders to immigration and trade (Evans, 2016, 1067). The decades preceding the most successful military offensives such as the Conquest of the Desert and the Chaco campaigns were for years riven by civil warfare between provincial caudillos and urban liberals. As a result, Buenos Aires, as the administrative center of Argentina’s liberal forces, acquired significant military capacity, while provincial caudillos commanded a variety of personalized militia power. Because “landowners had more power than merchants . . . a powerful military emerged that assisted state formation” (Rock, 2000, 178). In other words, one “reason for the genocidal policies [of indigenous dispossession] was the expansion of military power made necessary by ranching interests and political forces” (Martínez Sarasola, 2010, 214).

The state of expanded but dispersed coercive capacity throughout the Republic posed two main problems. First, the aggrandizement of Buenos Aires’s coercive capacity, while significant, had not yet been unified by a common program of operation or conduct; state military power was, as yet, not fully nationalized and thus could not be an effective front in the assertion of centralized state power. On the other hand, so long as the ‘national’ armies remained relatively undisciplined and fragmented, local militia would continue to pose a veritable threat to state unity and legitimacy (Gordillo & Hirsch, 2003, 9). Beginning under Sarmiento, though most fully developed under Julio A. Roca, the indigenous genocidal campaigns carried out through the 1870s and 1880s provided impetus to professionalize and formally centralize a national army capable of suppressing both indigenous populations’ and local caudillos’ challenge to central authority (Goldwert, 1965, 190; Trinchero, 2006, 126). Indeed, this helps to explain the ways in which the ‘civilization versus barbarism’ narrative was applied to both caudillo and indigenous populations (de la Fuente, 2000, 3; Trinchero, 2006, 125). Both posed threats to the internal
expansion of state authority and legitimacy, and as such both served as obstacles to ‘progress.’

The national army was thus positioned as the institution of modernization.

In 1869 Sarmiento established the Colegio Militar to provide a unified standard of training for military officers, and through this, he sought to suppress, once and for all, the gaucho militias under caudillo command throughout the provinces. By 1880 these militias had been formally suppressed, and the city of Buenos Aires was federalized (Goldwert, 1965, 190). It was at this point that the army began to occupy an increasingly central role in the construction and legitimization of the national state. Having defeated this first element of ‘barbarism,’ the military’s consolidation and centralization of legitimate coercive capacity would now come to center on the bodies of indigenous peoples, and in this way, it was unified and professionalized through a project of racial policing (Trinchero, 2006, 126). Indeed, indigenous elimination was articulated as a ‘war’ against an internal yet ‘foreign’ or ‘other’ invasive element (Rodríguez, 2016, 129; Trinchero, 2006, 123). By the time of the Conquest of the Desert, the rhetoric of opposition between indigenous ‘barbarity’ and Argentine ‘civilization’ had reached an existential pitch—it was a matter of the life or death of the nation. This was made clear by Roca, then minister of war in 1877, when he argued

In this campaign you are not armed to injure compatriots and brothers estranged by political passions or to enslave and ruin peoples or conquer foreign territories. We arm for something greater and nobler, to fight for the security and enlargement of the Fatherland, for the life and fortune of millions of Argentineans and even for the redemption of these very savages who, so many years living by their own instincts, have weighed like a scourge on the wealth and wellbeing of the Republic (cited in Martínez Sarasola, 2010, 218).

Likewise, Sarmiento drew upon theories of social evolution to legitimize the violent genocide of indigenous peoples as a ‘natural conflict’ (Dunstan & Peñaloza, 2017, 610). Such conflict was ‘natural’ because, as a so-called prehistoric race, the indigenes represented “stubborn animals
with no capacity for civilization” (cited in Helg, 1990, 40). The violence of the state, hence, was legitimized by the fact that it was simply following the course of nature. This, of course, is in line with all settler colonial projects, for which the first objective is always a process of physical and/or cultural destruction of the original indigenous occupants (Wolfe, 1999, 27). Only after total destruction could national material and cultural production begin.

Thus, throughout the 1880s, and in line with the needs of the Conquest of the Desert, the army was increasingly professionalized and modernized under Roca. While in many instances, Roca utilized the army as his own praetorian guard, he nevertheless shifted the general structure of coercive forces in Argentina away from a politics of parochial command and towards a more routinized, meritocratic, impersonal and modernized bureaucracy at the service of the state. Throughout the 1880s and 1890s Roca introduced modernized weaponry, erected a professional army corps, and created a war academy for the training of general officers (Goldwert, 1965, 190-91). In 1884 the Military Topographic Office was established, incorporated into the armed forces, and charged with mapmaking, topography, and the inspection and survey of territories, notably those newly acquired from indigenous raids (Goldwert, 1965, 190; Trinchero, 2006, 126).

However, while physical genocide was the primary objective of these campaigns, understood as the natural and inevitable outcome of civilizational conflict, there was no conclusive elimination of the indigenous groups of Argentina. The clear disconnect between racist Darwinian assumptions and reality led to Argentina’s long-standing, contradictory policy on indigenous peoples, which enunciated extinction while practicing coercive assimilation and creating a form of second-class citizenship (Dunstan & Peñaloza, 2017, 612). And once more, the policing of Argentine racial whiteness through strategies of indigenous assimilation
contributed to a deepening and widening of the state’s coercive capacities. It was in fact the Ministry of War that would take charge of indigenous peoples throughout the nineteenth century (Shwittay, 1990, 54).

The Problem of Indigenous Continuity: Assimilation into ‘Whiteness’

The fact that indigenous peoples did not, as a matter of history, simply cease to exist following the military campaigns clearly raised problems for the myth of Argentine national whiteness, articulated through a Darwinian evolutionary schema. However, beyond this, indigenous continuity posed significant political-economic problems for state-builders. Recalling that historically indigenous groups of Argentina possessed significant capacity to assert and maintain sovereignty through violent attacks, such as the malones, state builders were determined to prevent the re-composition of indigenous political organization (Gordillo & Hirsch, 2003, 5). Indeed, an editorial for La Prensa in 1878 articulated clearly the ‘danger’ posed by any continued indigenous organization: “Let us destroy that race morally, let us annihilate its authority and political organization, may its tribes disappear, and if necessary, let its families be divided. This dispersed and broken race will, in the end, embrace the cause of civilization” (cited in Dunstan & Peñaloza, 2017, 613). In this way, to continue to reproduce indigenous identity through policies of reservation and segregation was unwelcome and politically counter-productive. The goal was to eliminate indigenous peoples as a differentiated population (Dunstan & Peñaloza, 2017, 615).

Personal secretary to Roca and famed social Darwinist José Ingenieros tried to reconcile these antinomies when he suggested that “we [Argentineans] belong to a privileged race, the Caucasian race, better gifted than any other known race . . . Who could stop our forward march? (cited in Dunstan & Peñaloza, 2017, 619)” and thus
To campaign in support of the inferior races is to be antiscientific. The most we might do is to protect them in such a way as to allow their gentle extinction, facilitate the provisional adaptation of those few who are capable of it. These discarded bits of human flesh are to be regarded with pity. They should be treated well, at least as well as the centenarian tortoises of the London zoo, or the trained ostriches of Antwerp (cited in Dunstan & Peñaloza, 2017, 618).

Rather than representing proof of the inadequacy of the theory of racial extinction that underpinned indigenous genocide, assimilation was forwarded as a final, humanitarian gesture to a dying race. These ‘barbaric’ elements would, where possible, be trained to occupy a subordinate position within the new Argentine nation, transformed into nominal citizens, and a cheap labour force, until eventually, they could be fully eliminated (Rodríguez, 2016, 127). In contrast to Benedict Anderson’s assertion that “nationalism thinks in terms of historical destinies, while racism dreams of eternal contaminations” (2006, 149), the Argentine case suggests that the very content of the nation combined both of these. To be a full citizen was to embrace the ‘historical destiny’ of assimilation, while to continue to embrace traditional practice was to be ‘eternally contaminated’ by a secondary, or partial, form of citizenship.

The militarized coercion of indigenous assimilation took on numerous forms of separation and dispersal. In the Chaco region, military fortifications were used to debilitate access to traditional livelihoods and forms of political organization. As the General in charge of the Chaco campaign, Benjamín Victorica, argued

It will be difficult now for the tribes to re-organize due to the impact of the punishments they have suffered . . . Deprived of their fishing resources by the military posts along the rivers and impeded from hunting in the way that they used to do, the scattered members of the tribes will make haste to appeal to the benevolence of the authorities and run to the forced settlements or the sawmills where already many are living and benefitting from civilization. (1885, 15, quoted in Carrera, 1982, 15-17)

The concentration camp was another significant mechanism of elimination and segregation established to separate and redistribute indigenous peoples in a manner that would prevent the re-
composition of traditional socio-political organization and encourage assimilation into ‘white’
Argentina. In the camps, women and children were separated from the men, and families were
forcibly dislocated so as to prevent physical (and cultural) reproduction. Amongst the most
populated of these camps were the Castro Fort and Valcheta, both in the Río Negro, in today’s
province of Neuquen (with estimates of up to 20,000 prisoners) and the infamous Martín García
Island, a major site for indigenous concentration beginning in 1879 following the Desert
Campaigns (Delrio et al., 2010, 141-42).

Children were often forcibly separated from their mothers and ‘adopted’ into white
families for the purposes of a ‘civilizing education.’ This was to be a responsibility borne by the
army, as sub-lieutenant Miguel Malarín, in 1878, argued “Indian children must be distributed
amongst the Republic’s families . . . . to civilize the savage until he achieves adulthood . . . The
goal is to give a civilized education to these vagabond and dangerous people” (cited in Dunstan
& Peñaloza, 2017, 615). Women were then sent into urban domestic service, which prevented
contact with indigenous men while cultivating the acquisition of European customs. It was under
the tutelage of proper ‘white’ Argentines that indigenous children and women were to be guided
into ‘civilization’ (Delrio et al. 2010, 139; Dunstan & Peñaloza, 2017, 616). For children, this
strategy was one of effecting the elimination of indigenous identity, while for women the policy
was one of preventing the biological reproduction of indigeneity and promoting liberal domestic
values associated with the nuclear family.

Men, in their turn, were often compelled to provide military service, or were forcibly
assimilated into a growing waged workforce (Carrera, 1982, 22). In many ways, the former
strategy was yet another attempt to ensure the physical disappearance of indigenous peoples, as it
was anticipated that most of those forced into military service would be killed in the line of
‘duty’ (Carrera, 1982, 22-23). In the latter case, the violence underpinning state formation is all the more visible, as it was only through forcible displacement that the agricultural sector of northern Argentina, the cattle ranches of the Chaco, and the sheep farms in the Pampas and Patagonia could meet their early labour demands (Gordillo & Hirsch, 2003, 11).

In the event that these coercive tactics did not fully eliminate the remaining indigenous populations, further strategies of administrative elimination and assimilation were deployed. For example, the 1895 Census of the Central Pampas recorded no category for ‘Indian,’ but rather provided only a choice between ‘Argentinian’ or ‘foreigner’ (Chamosa, 2008, 78). The lack of a statistical count for indigenous peoples reinforced the nation-building myth that the indigenous peoples belonged to a developmental prehistory of Argentina. When indigenous peoples attempted to make claims against the state, as Lazzari argues, the government could not recognize their distinctive claims, as they had already been erased from bureaucratic memory. Instead, when continued displacement and an ad hoc indigenous policy resulted in still many impoverished and homeless peoples, the government created an agricultural colony of 80,000 hectares on which to transplant those who continued to make claims against the state. Once more, the title of agricultural colony served to erase the indigenous presence in the Argentine Pampas, positioning those who lived within the bounds of the Colonia Pastoril Emilio Mitre as ‘settlers’ rather than original peoples (Lazzari, 2010, 65). Terms such as peón (farm-hand), pablador (dweller) and puestor (worker) would instead be used to describe these indigenous groups (Lazzari, 2010, 28-9). Additional administrative tactics included baptizing indigenous children with Christian names and overstating the number of casualties in the ‘desert wars’—all measures designed to feed the fiction that Argentina was an empty land awaiting its European civilizers (Lazzari, 2010, 55).
Though not constitutionally excluded from the Argentine state, indigenous peoples were subjected to and placed under a very different set of political relations vis-a-vis the state—namely those of politically designated dependence (Shwittay, 1999, 53). While nationality was increasingly invoked to describe Argentina’s ‘white’ population, subject to its project of economic development, the exclusion of indigenous populations helped to define the parameters of national inclusion while holding out the promise of improvement through racial assimilation (Wade, 2001, 848-849). While technically meeting the birth requirement for citizenship, indigenous peoples were confined to an intermediary space of political existence. According to an Argentine Congressman in the late nineteenth century,

the Indian, with his ignorance, his preoccupations and vices, does not meet the requirements to be a citizen . . . But if . . . he adopts the habits of cultured life, then he will be ready to . . . perform his role as Argentine citizen. (cited in Dunstan & Peñaloza, 2017, 618)

Given these statements, it might be tempting to conclude, following Anderson, that precisely because of this internal stratification of political membership, what emerged in Argentina was not nationalism. Indeed, modern nationalism, for Anderson, followed from the Latin American leadership of creole classes in asserting a binding identity that was neither ‘indigenous’ nor ‘European’ but, through processes of *mestizaje*, uniquely ‘American.’ According to Anderson, this process of national formation led to an *embrace* of the indigenous as *fellow citizen* (2006, 50). And yet, what I am forwarding is the suggestion that in Argentina, national identity was formed through a *rejection* of indigeneity and *all aspects of mestizaje* in favour of white European identity.

The confusion is owing to the fact that “Anderson’s culturalist reading of nationalism is so general and abstract that it fails to clarify the politics of community production” (Lomnitz,
2001, 349). As Lomnitz argues, and as is further echoed in the work of Cooper (2015, 579) and Desai (2008, 398), these political conditions should be understood as responding to both internal and external pressures. Even more important, however, is the recognition of nationalism as productive of state power and resources, which is highlighted by these authors. Where for Anderson, the nation can be understood as produced through ‘modern’ productive forces, I am emphasizing the fact that, in some spaces, nationalism precedes such modernization and is, in fact, a key to the transformation of productive activities, including through the reorganization of political authority. In addition to binding together a population then, nations form to mobilize domestic resources in response to external (here capitalist) pressures. The particular political conditions necessary to mobilize resources in response to advanced capitalist organization may in fact lead to the consolidation of a national peoples, not based on homogeneous fraternity, but a stratified distinction between full and partial citizens, wherein the full citizen brokers and mediates the political dependence of the partial citizen in preparation for potential absorption into the body politic (Lomnitz, 2001, 338).

This caveat is particularly important for understanding Argentina whose pattern of nation formation is widely held to depart from the general template established in the rest of Latin America (Dunstan & Peñaloza, 2017, 614; Rodríguez, 2016, 128). Whereas in much of Latin America, an inclusive identity premised upon mestizaje and promoted through creole functionaries was indeed the norm, in Argentina national identity was consolidated through an exclusive focus on whiteness and denial of the reality of centuries of miscegenation (Rodríguez, 2016, 128). It is precisely owing to the political and economic dimensions of state formation, understood in relation to exogenous as well as endogenous pressures, that these differences can be understood.
Indigenous dispossession and fiscal insolvency in the Argentine interior

Finally, the centralization of military capacity through indigenous dispossession served a financial purpose for the Argentine Republic. However, this centralization was not through the nationalization of indigenous lands and their use as a fiscal resource as had been anticipated; the state was ultimately unable to assert a monopoly on ‘liberated’ territory. In the process of dispossession, throughout the military campaigns of the 1870s and 1880s, the state distributed land as rewards to military personnel, hoping that as private property, land would be used by decommissioned soldiers to contribute to the national project of agricultural development. Frontier Commanders were to receive 8000 hectares, Regiment Commanders received 5000 ha., Sergeants 4000 ha., Captains 2500 ha., Lieutenants 2000 ha., and other miscellaneous personnel received 1500 ha. (Trinchero, 2006, 127). However, soldiers sought monetary reimbursement, not land, and many of them quickly turned around and sold their titles to speculators (Zimmerman, 1945, 24). All told, under President Julio Roca, six million hectares were disposed to officers who had serviced the desert campaigns, while an additional three million hectares were sold to pay for other miscellaneous costs of the wars. Given the historical practice of using land as a security on foreign debt, the state was unable to preserve its credit, and in 1890, under the stress of a financial crisis, what little remained of public lands was liquidated (Adelman, 1994, 68-69). In Argentina, efforts to generate a national monopoly on seized lands were met with resistance owing to the indebtedness of the state to the military personnel who advanced these campaigns of dispossession. Introducing private property to replace the politically constituted property regime under Rosas did not, despite efforts, contribute to advancing a mass project of agricultural settlement. Instead, private property rights served to re-inscribe and empower the class dominance of ranchers. Such lack of advancement placed severe constraints
on the capacity of the state to internally generate national resources for the implementation of state development projects (Evans, 2016, 1067).

While genocide and militarized indigenous dispersal were conceived of as necessary for the theoretical introduction of settlement and transportation infrastructure, they were also necessary to attract foreign investment. Absent a domestic base of taxation, the Argentine state relied primarily on foreign capital to fund its rail development, which in turn, either directly or indirectly depended on indigenous dispossession. In the first instance, foreign investors (primarily the British) were unwilling to invest in rail systems without assurance of the security of their investments from indigenous raids. Attempts to attract foreign capital to construct railways prior to the period of the so-called ‘desert campaigns’ were unsuccessful. For example, the construction of the Central Argentine railway was consistently disrupted by indigenous raiding (Ford, 1971, 651; Goodwin Jr., 1977, 619, 626). It was only from the 1880s onward that foreign capital began to pour into Argentina, following the conclusion of the military offensives against indigenous people; throughout the 1880s British investment amounted £7,600,000, growing to £64,600,00 in the 1890s, and by the onset of World War I, reached a peak of £225,000,000 (Pulley, 1966, 66).

In the second instance, “not without significance for the overseas investor was the assumption of power by a strong federal government that seemed capable of maintaining law and order and safety of property” (Ford, 1971, 651). Indeed Alberdi recognized this truth when he argued that foreign loans, while necessary, could not be obtained without national credit based on the united liabilities of the state: “Unite as the body of a nation, consolidate the liability of our present and future revenues and fortunes and you will find someone who will lend you millions to provide for your local and general needs” (Alberdi, 2013, 144). The dispossession of
indigenous peoples through the ‘desert wars’ aided in this strategy by necessitating and maintaining the national unification of the army, which had been divided throughout the years of Buenos Aires’s secession (1854–59), thereby giving the national state stability and legitimacy in the eyes of foreign lenders through its monopolization of violence. Bureaucratically, the assessment of agricultural colonies necessitated a rationally administered process of reporting, policing, and so forth, thereby contributing to the erection of national state instruments. Finally, throughout the 1860s a series of laws were passed through which the federal government increasingly assumed the debts and liabilities of the nation, which were declared the responsibility of all the revenues of the state (Saiegh, 2007, 17).

The political unification and nationalization of Argentina throughout the final decades of the nineteenth century relied upon overt racialized constructions of indigenous people as a visceral threat to the development of ‘true’ and ‘civilized’ Argentines. It was through this narrative of racial threat that the state was to finally construct an image of unity, understood both materially and ideologically. The racial language of superiority and inferiority was not simply a residual effect of pre-modern prejudice, but was in fact productive of modern state power. Through the production and policing of racial whiteness (read as ‘civility’) Argentine state builders were able to finally assert a monopoly over the legitimate means of coercion and transform the parochial and factionalized nature of coercive power into a routinized, professional national army. Such capacity served to legitimate the state, understood increasingly in national secular terms, both internally vis-a-vis its power to suppress provincial powers, and externally in its ability to attract foreign investments through its guarantee of the security of property within its territories. Turning now to the case of Canada, I will argue that while indigenous dispossession legitimized through the national imagery of ‘whiteness’ was similarly productive
of state capacity and power in the late nineteenth century, it was of a very different nature; namely, in Canada, the process of structuring internally heterogeneous categories of belonging was productive of legal and bureaucratic state capacity.

**Canada’s Indigenous Apartheid: Segregation and Elimination Dispossession and the Creation of Fiscal Crown Lands**

As I showed in the previous chapter, the Dominion of Canada was born into a global political economy increasingly premised on competitive agricultural trade. However, the extreme regionalism that had preceded Confederation (and would continue until the end of the century) had meant that the very things required to pursue an intensification of agricultural commodity production were lacking, fragmented and in general disarray. Of central importance for such a project was a reconfiguration of the relations established between settlers, indigenous peoples, and land. Land was necessary as both a source of public revenue, and as a site of settlement and cultivation, especially in the Western prairie regions, where wheat cultivation would become dominant. However, even outside of the major agricultural regions, the search for fiscal lands was insatiable, and served to finance the government through sales to railway, mining and other industrial interests. The demise of the mercantile system of British imperialism was to radically transform the established patterns of indigenous-settler relations; it was at this point that relations assuming a nation-to-nation diplomacy were transformed into relations of domination, assimilation and elimination.

The nature of indigenous-settler relations, historically or contemporarily, then, cannot be disembedded from this critical historical transformation of material, social and property relations in the context of capitalist globalization. When discussing disparities of power, it is critical to note the profoundly material basis for these structures of oppression, while nevertheless understanding that they conditioned and were conditioned by a variety of cultural, political and
ideological relations. In this section, I seek to trace out and explain, in terms of the shifting political-economic terrain of the new state, the transformation of indigenous land policy by the settler-colonial government. I argue that changes were, in fact, crucial to the very process of national state formation that was being undertaken at this moment. This is to say that the dramatic shift in policies towards indigenous peoples’ land was not simply an effect of the new settler state, but constitutive of it. These policies established a public monopoly over lands that conditioned, differently from Argentina, the possibilities for intensive agricultural innovation by amassing national state capacity and legitimacy.

Two dominant trends for economic development existed in the provinces leading up to Confederation: west of Ottawa primary production of wheat and the timber trade predominated, while the eastern areas centered on Montreal sought to support nascent industrial and financial interests. The former saw no benefit to be had from tariff protection while the latter sought to support industrial development through the erection of a tariff (Miller, 2009, 127-129). Furthermore, as shown in the previous chapter, direct taxation remained a vexing question, as regional imbalances and dominant social property relations did not allow for an easily taxable population base. The question of taxation was especially protracted when negotiating the concessions of the eastern provinces, for which debt was far less, and resources much greater—they did not want to enter Confederation only to have their resources taxed away to serve western debt (Smith, 2008, 7-9). Confederation was crucial to solving the fiscal and developmental crises of the settlers’ political economy. Confederation furthered the centralization and consolidation of authority over indigenous lands, which could then be transformed into public fiscal lands. In this way, the new Dominion could pursue a strategy of settler agricultural and rail development, financing the cost of these projects through the
appropriation and sale of indigenous lands. Macdonald echoed this objective in 1880 when, discussing the construction of the Canada Pacific Railway, he assured that “not a farthing of money will have to be paid by the people of Canada” (quoted in Martin, 1973, 11). To enable this, the British North America Act contained two critical provisions: the first allowing for the later incorporation of western regions (here the acquisition of the Hudson’s Bay Company lands was of paramount importance), and the second assigning jurisdiction over indigenous reserves and lands to the federal government (Miller, 2009, 129).

Up until the transfer of Rupert’s Land from the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) to the Dominion Government, indigenous land had been occupied, sold, and alienated through the conditions set out under the Royal Proclamation. These relations had generally incorporated indigenous traditions and practices, and were conducted on the basis of diplomatic relations between two sovereign nations (Miller, 2009, 138). In fact, under the Royal Proclamation there was explicit acknowledgment of indigenous title (Hall, 2014, 4). However, with the transfer of the lands west of the original federation of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, covering an area more than five times that of the original four provinces, settler-indigenous relations were transformed. In part, the transfer of such land in one single negotiation both allowed for and necessitated the creation of a vast system of public survey, bureaucracy, accounting and policy for the administration of said lands (Martin, 1973, 9). Land transfers had the effect of shifting authority from the respective provinces to the central state for the purposes of land administration.

Much of this process had been anticipated in the lead up to Confederation, wherein by 1857 the Select Committee of the British House of Commons argued that in the coming years settlement would become a priority and thus recommended that the HBC cede its authority and
lands to the government of Canada (Martin, 1973, 3). The goal was to create a vast system of public fiscal lands that could then be directed towards the ends of Dominion (rail development and agricultural settlement) while providing the necessary revenue for such endeavours and avoiding regional disagreements. At this point in time, the HBC itself had become less hostile to settlement, as the development of vast rail systems in the United States had led to intense competitive pressures in the carrying trade (Miller, 2009, 123). The development of land, in this context, began to appeal to the HBC. In 1868, negotiations with the HBC for the transfer of Rupert’s Land to the central government had been formalized in the Rupert’s Land Act. With the act, the vast territories from the Hudson’s Bay basin to the North-West Territories were incorporated into the Confederation, in exchange for £300,000 cash, up to 50,000 acres of land in the areas of trading posts and forts, as well as one twentieth of the fertile land in the region (Martin, 1973, 5). In one single negotiation, the settler-state was able to assert an effective monopoly over land.

The preparatory surveys and the incursion of central government into the Red River region did not go unnoticed by the Métis inhabitants. The Red River Rebellions, led by Louis Riel, was a response to the clear danger posed to indigenous peoples of the lands under HBC control, with the impending transfer to the new settler state. Thus, in addition to the conditions established in the Rupert’s Land Act of 1868, the Manitoba Act of 1870 provided for 1,400,000 acres of land to go to “the benefit of the families of the half-breed residents.” However, to be clear, this agreement overrode existing agreements; all lands that had been granted by the authority of the HBC were to be converted into freehold grant for the Crown. This provision allowed for the allocation of sub-optimal lands to the Métis; as one Commissioner noted in 1885, “if it had been the object . . . to select the poorest land available, then they had succeeded”
Thus, the public monopoly on land conditioned the state’s ability to establish a reserve system, but one that would presumably not have impeded upon the overall national objectives.

The year following the Manitoba Act saw the addition of British Columbia to the federation. With this addition, the government was bound to a commitment to begin construction on a transcontinental railway within two years, and to complete it within ten. The railway was to bind together disparate geographical regions of the union and create a nation from the Dominion. With the impending deadlines of rail construction now set, the government had to rapidly settle and cultivate the west, both to finance rail construction, and to make such construction practicable and viable by creating an interior market for commerce (Miller, 2009, 148).

Having by 1871 massively expanded the land area of the union, the Dominion government sought to legitimize the accompanying transformation of power within the federation. Macdonald defended the centralization of authority that occurred under the ambit of Dominion Lands policy, arguing “it would be injudicious . . . to have a large province which would have control over lands and might interfere with the general policy of the Government in opening up communications to the Pacific, besides the land regulations of the Province might be obstructive to immigration. All that vast territory should be for the purposes of settlement under one control, and that the Dominion legislature” (quoted in Martin, 1973, 12). In part, what became necessary was a centralized and systematized policy for managing indigenous-settler relations, so as to clear away the inconsistencies and discrepancies that were beginning to emerge.

Between 1871 and 1877 the first seven of the numbered treaties were concluded. The early treaties, one to three, were conducted to exchange lands for reserves, agricultural assistance
and the right to continue to hunt and fish. The agreement was to “cede, release, surrender, and yield up to the Government of the Dominion of Canada, for Her Majesty the Queen and her successors forever, all their rights, titles and privileges whatsoever to the lands included within the following limits . . .” (quoted in Miller, 2009, 172). These treaties covered the Chippewa, Swampy Cree, Saulteaux and Ojibwa groups of Southern Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Southeastern Ontario. Treaty Four was concluded in 1874, covering the Cree and Saulteaux in Southern Saskatchewan, and introduced ‘blanket extinguishment,’ wherein surrender involved “all their rights, titles and privileges whatsoever to all other lands wheresoever situated within Her Majesty’s North-West Territories, or any of them, to have and to hold the same to Her Majesty the Queen and her successors forever” (quoted in Miller, 2009, 172). Additionally, as conditions worsened and indigenous peoples began to see treatymaking as their only option, Treaty Four allowed for additions to the original treaty, though this meant that latecomers had no voice in the negotiations and had to accept the treaty as it was. From 1875 onward, the treaties conducted separated the issue of ceding land from that of reserve conditions, making it clear that pretences regarding the protection of indigenous peoples were no longer necessary (Miller, 2009, 172-173).

Further changes were conducted in the language of the Manitoba Act, which reflected the rapid effacement of protection with bald policies of land acquisition and assimilation. In 1874, changes were made to limit land grants or scrips to Métis heads of families, rather than to the children of heads of families. These changes served to limit the generational obligation of the government to the Métis of the Red River region. Later, after the introduction of the Indian Act in 1876, yet more changes would remove land grants from the system and instead promise only scrip worth $160 for the purchase of Dominion Lands; this latter provision served to reverse
previous language that had, if latently, acknowledged the Métis’s prior claims to the land. With this final change in the language of the Manitoba Act, the Métis’s claims could only be processed with the mediation of the market, thereby extinguishing pre-existing, natural rights to the land (Martin, 1973, 21). When coupled with the 1869 Gradual Enfranchisement Act, which denied status and thus claims to women marrying ‘white’ men, it became clear that the direction indigenous policy was taking was that of elimination. Those who could rightfully make claims to land were quickly being defined out of ‘Indianness’ (Lawrence, 2003, 12). In effect, the first systematic attempts to institutionalize indigenous racial difference arose from the imposition of a public monopoly on land, which introduced, for the first time, ideas of land as property. This shift signaled a very new configuration of the relationship between land and social relations.

All of this said, however, there remained much of the West to be fully appropriated, including the recently negotiated reserve lands. It became clear that to furnish the state with the lands, security and revenue for agricultural settlement and rail development, title to land would not be sufficient—rather more enduring strategies of subject formation that simultaneously legitimized the national state project and undermined the cultural, symbolic and ideological legitimacy of indigenous peoples as a nationally sovereign people were necessary. Thus, in 1876, the Indian Act was established. Perhaps the central contribution of the Indian Act was its attempt to consolidate and systematize a definition of what it meant to be an ‘Indian,’ as well as to legally codify a differential and dependent political relationship between the ‘Indian’ and the state. Once the conditions of defining a ‘rightful Indian’ had been met, it would become possible to either push to the very margins and police the conduct of those who qualified as ‘Indian’ or else to eliminate, and thereby hope to assimilate, the non-status ‘Indian’ who could no longer threaten the settler states’ claim to territorial sovereignty. ‘Indian’ identity served to define a
political position of dependence with the potential for the full acquisition of citizenship with assimilation to ‘racial whiteness’ through cultural and material norms supporting institutions of private property, settlement, and Lockean conceptions of productivity (Losurdo, 2011, 24).

**Defining the ‘Indian’ Out of land rights**

The first attempts to legally define the ‘Indian’ developed in the lead-up to Confederation, through the Gradual Civilization Act of 1857. The Act clearly stated in its preamble that the goal of this legislation was to facilitate the acquisition of land and the eradication of a distinct, indigenous claim to national sovereignty:

> Whereas it is desirable to encourage the progress of Civilization among the Indian Tribes in this Province, and the gradual removal of all legal distinctions between them and Her Majesty’s other Canadian Subjects, and to facilitate the acquisition of property and of the rights accompanying it, by such Individual Members . . . (1857, 3)

In effect, the Act established the grounds upon which indigenous reserve lands could be converted into plots, which were then alienable by indigenous men wishing to become enfranchised. The enfranchised ‘Indian’ was he (only men could become enfranchised) who was willing, through the acquisition of British standards of education, morality, literacy and work, to renounce his ‘Indian’ identity and become a subject of the Crown (Tobias, 1985, 43-45). To become enfranchised thus meant to relinquish claims to an indigenous identity, whilst simultaneously removing pieces of land from the jurisdiction of the Royal Proclamation (Tobias, 1985, 43) Political subjectivity clearly operated on a hierarchical plane, wherein relations of political dependence continued to define and discipline those whose life-worlds posed a threat to settler sovereignty. However, to renounce the collective identity and materiality of those life-worlds led one on a path to full political inclusion in the national peoples, a subjectivity shorn of its overt and obligatory relation of political dependence. This, however, was not simply an
ideological manifestation of racial whiteness in Canada. It was in this way that the land held in reserve for indigenous peoples became subject to private sale and settlement by immigrant groups, a central pillar of the post-Confederation national development agenda (Boswell, 1970, 94-96). The binding of racial identity to property relations formed an aspect of the very materiality of the nation in Canada, facilitating and legitimizing a national project of agricultural settlement through the sale of ‘public’ lands.

Thus, the distinction between the enfranchised and non-enfranchised ‘Indian’ went beyond legal definitions of subjecthood and land tenure. The ‘Indian’ was constituted through racialized criteria, defined in contradistinction to the Canadian national subject; enfranchisement not only meant a different form of political subjectivity, but also a partial transformation of one’s externally imposed racial identity. As Sunera Thobani has argued, the constitution of a juridical national subject in the form of the Canadian or ‘enfranchised Indian’ thus allowed the ‘Indian’ to be construed as contrary to the legal subject (Thobani, 2007, 13-15). Thus the ‘Indian’ was classified as of a lower racial order, living in a constant state of dependence and lacking the tools and drives for progress and productivity, education and morality (Carter, 1990, 16). Indeed, the term ‘Indian’ was initially used to homogenize into one racial category a variety of diverse cultural and ethnic groups; and in so much as this was the case, it could just as easily have been disaggregated as became necessary to the project of assimilation, elimination and nation building. The racialization of the ‘Indian’ was partially open-ended in so much as the acquisition of the various qualities deemed to be lacking in indigenous peoples would render them amenable to admittance into the national configuration of political subjectivity. This is because racial nationality functioned not simply as an ideological-cultural category, but as a profoundly material one as well.
Thus, part of the initial distinction between the ‘Indian’ and the ‘enfranchised’
pivoted around a racialized understanding of land tenure. This understanding is visible in the fact
that prior to Confederation, to be accepted as ‘Indian’ one need only declare oneself as such for
the designation to be accepted. In contrast, after Confederation, status as ‘Indian’ hinged on
membership to a band, defined in relation to collective interests in land and/or money (Boswell,
1970, 79). In the post-Confederation era, particularly under the Indian Act of 1876, the idea of
blood quantum was introduced so that an ‘Indian’ was any male person of so-called ‘Indian’
blood, or any child or wife of such an individual who lived on reserve. To move off the reserve
for more than five years meant the loss of such status. Land and geography functioned as a
spatial boundary distinguishing between full or partial, dependent or ‘autonomous’ membership
in the settler state (Boswell, 1970, 79).

To live on a reserve meant to live under the political and economic (and later cultural)
custodial jurisdiction of the Canadian state. While ostensibly reserve life was to be for the
‘protection’ of indigenous peoples and their lands, the conditions of the Indian Act 1876 clearly
suggest otherwise. The goal of the reserve was to either segregate and eliminate or else prepare
for the acquisition of and assimilation to Western liberal values by contributing to the federal
government’s fiscal land reserve and agricultural development (Barron, 1988, 26; Carter, 1990,
24). Placing indigenous peoples in a custodial relationship to the state enacted a differential
modality of social reproduction wherein indigenous peoples were dependent upon and bound to
the dictates of the state in ways that, on the surface, full citizens were not. Thus, within the Act,
reserve lands could not be sold or alienated unless they were surrendered to the Crown; inter-
band trading, gifting, bartering and selling of the land and any implements therein (provided for
by annuities) were prohibited, as was the use, occupation, settlement or hunting of lands not of
the same reserve in which one lives, whether by consent of the occupying reserve or not. These policies served to increase the dependence of indigenous peoples on the Canadian state and reduce traditional modes of social reproduction that served to inhibit the settler project of national economic development. In so doing, the settler state sought to coercively ‘encourage’ the entry of indigenous land and labour into the market economy, diminishing any resources that could be read as inducements to or complicit in traditional livelihoods (Shewell, 2004, 24).

**Land, moral regulation and racial state formation**

As much as the policies around enfranchisement and land were central to the settler state’s attempt to nationalize the agricultural economy, in practice, these policies were less successful than hoped. Indeed, very few indigenous peoples were interested in acquiring the electoral rights and freehold tenure promised by enfranchisement, and this lack of participation meant ongoing fiscal obligation by the federal government to indigenous peoples, as well as the task of managing conflict between indigenous practices and agrarian, pastoral and infrastructural projects (Boswell, 1970, 97). Indian Commissioner Edgar Dewdney at the time suggested that the bureaucratic response could be nothing less than “sheer compulsion” (cited in Miller, 1990, 389). As a result, increasingly draconian legal policies of punishment were erected in order to enforce moral regulation on the reserve and encourage enfranchisement. The 1876 Indian Act, to be sure, contained a number of such policies, as there was a clear acknowledgement of the need to apply coercive pressure in order to maintain the integrity of the reserve system. However, subsequent amendments to the Act ratcheted up the severity and scope of the role of the penal system in the management of indigenous peoples, casting those on the reserve as inherently contra-legal, thus furthering the codified divide between the citizen-subject and the racialized ward of state. Indeed, as Sherry Gavigan has argued, the application of criminal law to the
indigenous populations on reserves was less about ‘criminalizing’ such peoples and more about ‘Indianizing’ or racializing them (Gavigan, 2012, 25).

The application of criminal law to indigenous peoples followed the creation of the pass system and the North-West Mounted Police (NWMP) in the prairie regions of Canada in the 1870s and the subsequent amendments to the Indian Act. Central to the transformation of ‘Indian Policy’ and its integration into the criminal law system was the extension of criminal law to some of the most intimate and personal aspects of indigenous lives. These were practices that continued to condition social production and reproduction and which challenged the settler-colonial project of asserting sovereignty predicated on a particular moral-cultural order and pursuing capitalist national development, both economically and socially. Key changes in this regard were the criminalization of polygamy, the sharing, gifting or exchanging of reserve resources, the consumption of alcohol, trespassing, horse theft and cattle killing, among other things.

Perhaps one of the central generative conditions for the integration of criminal law with ‘Indian Policy’ was the pass system. The pass system was a segregationist practice, dominant in the prairie west, which required that indigenous peoples wishing to leave their reserve obtain a pass signed by an Indian agent or farm instructor indicating the reason and duration of their absence from the reserve. While historians have tended to argue that the pass system arose as a response by the Canadian government to the uprising occurring through the North-West Rebellion in 1885, Baron and Gavigan both argue that the pass system must be thought of as part of a wider strategy of control which both predates and supersedes the anxieties surrounding the North-West Rebellion (Barron, 1988, 27; Gavigan, 2012, 33-37). According to Baron, the origins of the pass system are to be found in the actions of Assistant Indian Commissioner Hayter Reed
who, prior to the Rebellion, sought to curb the movement of indigenous peoples by paying annuities only in the home reserve and withholding rations from those who spent too much time off the reserve. The regulation of movement was to ostensibly encourage the development of productive agriculture by indigenous peoples, a central pillar in the ‘civilizing’ project of the reserve (Barron, 1988, 29; Carter, 1990, 15). As Reed stated:

I am adopting the system of keeping the Indians on their respective reserves and not allowing any (to) leave without passes — I know this is hardly supportable by any legal enactment but we must do many things which can only be supported by common sense and by what may be for the general good. (cited in Barron, 1988, 29)

The resistance of indigenous peoples to assimilation, as well as the ‘disruptions’ and ‘security concerns’ raised by pastoral, agricultural and rail interests, was the impetus behind the government’s erection of these increasingly draconian and coercive manipulations of freedom of movement. Underlying this differentiated system of political subjectivity, therefore, were political-economic incentives; namely the need to foment competitive agricultural commodity production (Carter, 1990, 19). However, as Reed noted, the pass system itself had no legal basis—these distinctions among political subjects could not find legal footing. Indeed, the treaty-making process, which had created the system of reserves, guaranteed that no such curtailment of movement could be exercised by the settler government over indigenous peoples. And yet, the application of these practices lacking a basis in liberal legal doctrine were evidently viewed as crucial to the larger project of erecting a liberal political-economic order. To resolve this tension, the extension of criminal law to myriad indigenous practices would de facto create a legal footing for the pass system (Barron, 1988, 30). Such practices of criminalization created hierarchies of belonging within the national population. Theoretically, liberality and equality of
rights were to be extended to all bodies, but embodied practices distinguishable according to racial designations could legitimize the withholding of such rights.

Enforcing the pass system initially took the form highlighted by Reed; namely the withholding of rations and other forms of so-called privilege from those who did not comply with the requirements to obtain a signed pass in order to move outside of the reserve. These compulsions, however, did not prove effective and eventually criminal offences were made out of indigenous practices which conflicted with the policy of containment. Thus, participation in dances and rituals—such as the Sun Dance, which would take people away from the reserve for several days at a time, often during seasons crucial to the development of agricultural practice—was banned under an amendment to the Indian Act in 1895 (Barron, 1988, 38). In 1880, the criminalization of horse theft became a central focus of the NWMP as this was a central means of circumscribing the movement of indigenous peoples. As Hubner has argued, the theft itself was not a concern of the NWMP, as often the so-called victims and perpetrators were both indigenous and it is unlikely that either party would have called on the NWMP to deal out ‘justice.’ The elimination of horse theft through criminal prosecution instead served to suppress traditional livelihoods in a manner that reinforced the generation of agricultural practice on the reserve, reinforced the treatment of natural resources as ‘property,’ and prevented movement that was viewed as ‘disruptive’ to local economic development (Hubner, 1995, 283).

The killing of cattle similarly became a central object of criminal prosecution throughout the 1880s and 1890s. According to Satzewich (1996), the criminalization of cattle killing by indigenous peoples was most prominent amongst the Treaty Seven First Nations, located in ranching rather than grain-producing regions of the prairies. Amongst Treaty Seven First Nations the number of criminal charges laid for cattle killing between 1887 and 1892 numbered only four
while in 1894 alone a total of 20 charges were laid against indigenous peoples for the ‘crime’ of cattle killing. The criminalization of cattle killing was intimately linked to the Department of Indian Affairs’s rations policy towards Treaty Seven First Nations as it related to the ‘civilizing’ project on the reserve and the national development policy off the reserve. On the one hand, Treaty Seven made no formal statements about the provision of rations, and yet the loss of buffalo in southern Alberta and ensuing starvation of Treaty Seven First Nations meant that, without rations, Indian Affairs’s efforts to contain and settle indigenous peoples in order to promote agricultural and ranching practices would be stymied. Indian Affairs attempted to settle on a policy that provided enough rations to keep peoples on the reserve whilst not allowing them to become dependent upon such rations. Ultimately, this policy, combined with later efforts at cost cutting, meant the reduction of rations to a point of near starvation, provoking resistance in the form of cattle theft and killing. Because these acts of resistance and survival ultimately negated the attempt to induct Treaty Seven First Nations into settled agricultural practices, cattle killing and theft posed a direct threat to the national development policy of the Canadian government. Additionally, however, off the reserve, southern Alberta was a central location for the development of the ranching industry, a central feature of Macdonald’s National Policy and strategy of economic development. In order to promote the ranching industry, rations to Treaty Seven First Nations were purchased by the state from area ranches. Cattle killing, then, also disrupted the wider economic development strategies of the Canadian state and posed a direct challenge to the development of self-sufficient market industries.

In sum the integration of Canada’s early Indian Policy with criminal law served to inhibit the movement of indigenous peoples outside of their reserves, which suppressed or made increasingly difficult existing mechanisms of social production and reproduction in such a way
as to structure differential political relationships between state and subject. The aim of this policy was to transform the racialized ‘Indian’ into a ‘civilized’ enfranchised member who would contribute to the goals of national development through cultivation of the prairies. In the transition from racialized ‘Indian’ to enfranchised subject, the territory of the reserves would be parceled out into freehold tenure, thus securing on a wider scale the material conditions for a settler political economy. In the criminalization of particular indigenous practices, those on the reserve were reified as racial outsiders whose access to the ‘freedoms’ and ‘rights’ of the liberal state were qualified by their partial status as fully autonomous political subjects. Their construction as such legitimized the illiberal treatment of indigenous peoples as dependent wards of the state, which a) enabled the increasing appropriation of indigenous lands as fiscal resources, and as I will argue below, b) led to the development of increasing administrative and bureaucratic state capacity. At the same time, these constructions of the racialized ‘Indian’ served to bolster the basis for a common identity amongst Canadian nationals as predicated on individual thrift, grit, self-reliance, moral temperance, and rationality.

**Policing ‘Race,’ Producing the ‘State’**

Thus far, I have established that a transformation of indigenous land policy followed Confederation to provide the new federal government with the fiscal resources to bind together the provinces in a unified, centrally administered national development project. I have shown how the continued enforcement of these radically transformed, oppressive land relations required further buttresses in the form of racial-moral regulation of indigenous practices. At its core, racial identity in Canada was undergirded by settler-indigenous property relations. However, while I have shown that the racialization of indigenous peoples was central to the material conditions of national economic development, I want to further demonstrate how these practices
also contributed the formation and centralization of state apparatus and legitimacy. I have begun to point to these developments in the above, but will here review with more precision how the racialization of indigenous peoples led to a ‘rationalization’ of state administration, accounting, and bureaucracy. This review will be of particular relevance to the final chapter of this study, which examines the ways that varying state capacities impacted ‘developmental’ trajectories and immigrant integration, segregation, and/or expulsion in Argentina and Canada.

Bruce Curtis has advanced one of the more novel theses on Canadian state formation in the past two decades of Canadian historiography. At the core of his argument is the idea that administrative practices (for his purposes census-making) are foundational to state-building through their identification and formation of political subjects and the centralization of knowledge: “As a practice that creates social equivalencies, census making is further bound up with the formation of states. It serves to increase the possibilities for intensive administration” (2001, 1). For Curtis, the practice of counting and ordering subjects creates and subordinates citizens to national identities in ways that can pave over conflict, while simultaneously creating the administrative infrastructure to begin systematizing knowledge about that population (2001, 2). At the core of his argument, then, is not simply a technical project of counting and applying policy to population, but a moral-ethical project of producing subjectivities themselves: “In principle, the consequences of such categorizations depend on the extent to which occupants of categories can be induced or coerced to conduct themselves in terms of them, or on the extent to which their life changes are determined by such categorizations” (2001, 25).

Curtis pulls from Corrigan and Sayer’s contention that the materiality of state formation relies on a simultaneous project of building a cultural-ethical community. In so much as this is the case, Curtis’s work does much to support the argument advanced here. Curtis’s focus is on
the process of counting and forming the population of Canadian citizens and thereby producing knowledge about the content of ‘Canadianness’; his focus, however, is inward-looking, examining the societal boundaries of inclusion without attending to how the policing of population exclusion was also seminal to state formation. While an analysis of racial formation is not his project, I argue that the analysis provided herein adds a necessary dimension to our understanding of state formation as simultaneous material and cultural formation, by suffusing Canadian ‘cultural’ and ‘national’ formation with its de facto ‘racial’ content. Indeed, Stanley has made a similar argument, suggesting that implicitly in Corrigan and Sayer, as well as in Curtis, is a project that view practices of knowledge-production and legitimation as central to state-formation; Stanley points out that racial subjectivities as forms of classification with the objectives of ordering populations for different ends are similarly productive of knowledge and state legitimating discourses (2016, 9-10). It is necessary to shed light on the ways that enumerating and policing the contours of population, not only in terms of the included, but also those actively excluded, provided the state with administrative and fiduciary capacity. It produced both forms of knowledge and the means of acquiring and organizing knowledge, as well as a crucial legitimizing strategy vis-a-vis fiduciary concerns.

As Neu and Graham point out, fiduciary concerns (and their transformation over time) have been central to the formation and transformation of indigenous-settler relations (2006, 47). As the settler-state increasingly appropriated massive tracts of land from indigenous peoples, negotiated treaties, and carried out fiscal responsibilities to indigenous populations on the reserves, a new, centralized system of bureaucracy, accounting and rationalization was needed. Following the conclusion of the first seven treaties, the office of Indian Affairs was developed. Initially, in 1878, this office employed only 54 people, and administrative capacity was limited
owing to the small number of officers and inefficiency in the organization of administrative units, which corresponded directly to the treaty area. Given the dearth of personnel and the large size of administrative units, the capacity of the state to directly intervene in indigenous practices, to constitute the indigenous subject as compatible with the settler agricultural development state, was minimal. However, the implementation of the National Policy (itself made possible by the prior appropriation of indigenous lands) allowed for a legitimized expansion of the state bureaucracy and by 1881 the size of Indian Affairs had increased to 131 officers. Such bureaucratic expansion enabled the settler state to partake in much more strategic and direct interventionist practices so as to affect the moral regulation and transformation of both settler and indigenous peoples (Neu & Graham, 2006, 50).

Accounting practices were central means by which the federal government could translate such colonial objectives of indigenous elimination and moral regulation into concrete practices (Neu & Graham, 2006, 48). The use of accounting contributed to the state-building project through the extension of the moral-cultural formation of the settler state, but also necessitated and affected the rationalization and systematization of state practices, legitimized by the translation of moral or normative questions into the neutralized language of efficiency and the necessary concomitant—the production of statistical knowledge (Neu and Graham, 2006, 51). First, accounting practices were effectively able to intervene in the cultural-moral makeup of indigenous communities by shifting social reproduction away from traditional practices of hunting, fishing and so forth, and forcing their reliance on government payment/resource distribution, which required reporting practices and a radical reorganization of band governance (Neu & Graham, 2006, 49). Manipulation of these ‘payments’ (for example replacing provisions of hunting equipment for agricultural implements, or making payment only receivable in the
reserve territories themselves) in turn served to ‘contain’ indigenous peoples on the reserve, reinforcing the settler project of moral-cultural regulation towards settled agricultural practices, and the use of land as property, productive of value. The forcible destruction of indigenous reproduction amounted to a policy of physical and cultural genocide; however the translation of these policies into quantifiable data for accounting practices served to neutralize and legitimize a politics that would otherwise have induced more broadly ethical-normative concerns and tensions with the nation-building narrative of freedom, prosperity and liberalty (Neu & Graham, 2006, 51).

Finally, it is necessary to note how the regulation of indigenous livelihoods and mobility according to this racial doctrine enabled the state to institutionalize a national monopoly on the administration, adjudication and punishment of violence in priority areas of settlement through the erection of the NWMP, later to become the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The NWMP and its monopoly of state violence were importantly legitimized in the context of the post North-West Rebellion containment and subsequent hardening of the racist and racializing project of indigenous subjugation. The introduction of the NWMP, as demonstrated earlier, was precipitated by the need to monitor and regulate indigenous mobility and behavior. When initiated in 1872, the NWMP was presented alongside a package of legislation proposing the establishment of a court system, magistrates and a council within the North-West Territories (Macleod, 1978, 5). The final proposal was passed in 1873 under the title “An Act respecting the Administration of Justice, and for the Establishment of a Police Force in the North West Territories” (Macleod, 1978, 5). This presence of ‘law and order’ in the region, furthermore, symbolized the safety of settlement, which increased quickly in the areas around major police
posts after the emergence of the NWMP (Macleod, 1978, 8). The movement of peoples and capital to northwestern Canada could now be assured of access to legal and physical protection.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have argued that the racialization of indigenous peoples in settler colonial contexts served a productive function. The process of racialization, in these instances, served to impel the consolidation, centralization, and legitimization of state institutions, finances and instruments. The process of creating modern, rational, and importantly, liberal states was formatively underwritten by illiberal practices of racialized and hierarchicalized subject formation. In this sense, it may be useful to once more evoke Phillip Corrigan and Derek Sayer’s *The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution*. The idea of state formation as cultural formation is an important intervention and response to the theoretical problems I began this chapter with. It allows us to simultaneously make sense of the political-economic transformations that occur under capitalist reorganization and the socio-cultural meanings that public identities are imbued with in this process. For even those officially negated are integral to the constitution of a particular form of public life. The ‘subaltern’ is not forgotten in this analysis; indeed it is precisely those who do not ‘fit’ into the dominant expression of public identities that are integral to its construction. Thus, in England, women and the ‘non-deserving poor’ all marked the negative category through which proper ‘Englishness’ was construed. In the settler colonies, it was the indigenous other who, denied an official public identity, served as the basis for construing what appropriate Canadian and Argentine cultural-moral conduct comprised. Fundamentally, because of the nature of settler-indigenous relations under capitalist reorganization, a racialized discourse served to legitimize indigenous dispossession by equating communal land relations with barbarism and private property with ‘civilization.’ This racialized
language would then extend to all forms of social, cultural and moral behaviours which were built upon communal land relations.

The regulation of indigenous identities and practices, the management of their reservations and public payments, the separation of their families, isolation and segregation of the sexes, instruction in proper conduct, violent and coercive confinements, and the manipulation of their existence through census data, all contributed to the state’s monopoly on land and the legitimate means of administration and violence, which in turn, contributed to the development of a functional, centralized national fiduciary state capable of directing and effecting agrarian capitalist transformation throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. Thus, while the racialized indigenous identities that emerged under the settler-colonial state, are indeed fabrications, it is also important to understand that “what is defined as real . . . is real in its consequences” (Corrigan & Sayer, 1985, 142). The forms of state capacity and property relations that resulted from the combination of European ideas of property and state, with existing social arrangements, then established the conditions upon which development in response to global competitive pressures could be pursued, and the means by which immigrant labour would be incorporated. The result in each space was a differential structuration and management of ‘race’ and ‘difference’ within the body politic. This is the subject of the next and final chapter.
Chapter 5  Labouring Bodies and the Specter of Racial Hybridization

Following indigenous dispossession, the final strategy of settler-colonial development was to be a project of mass immigration. Once lands had been violently and coercively removed from indigenous peoples, who were in turn segregated to marginalized tracts of land, killed, or assimilated, it became necessary to import and condition a body of labourers to both farm the land, and construct the necessary infrastructure to connect agrarian producers to international commodity markets. To meet their diverse labour needs, settler states sought to politically stratify different streams of mass immigrant recruitment. Crucially, there were those immigrants who could be, at least potentially, incorporated into the white national imaginary, and there were those for whom national integration would be denied on the basis of racial exclusions. Different immigrant subjects would be subjected to diverse apparatuses of the state to control the rights of relative freedom and unfreedom. Thus, within the developing capitalist settler colonial state, there were variations of status accorded to the first settlers, indigenous peoples, free and assimilable labour, as well as unfree, unassimilable labour. Such designations are not only consistent with the settler national-state but were, in fact, productive of it.

The content of this final chapter engages critically with one of the central concepts of postcolonial theory—that of hybridity. Where Marxism is said to fail to account for difference, hybridity is argued to offer both analytical and emancipatory promise in the recognition of the heterogeneity and agency of immigrant subjects. In contestation of monolithic binaries of colonizer/colonized, capitalist/labourer, the idea of hybridity is argued to represent a complex, negotiated, and at times contradictory process of subjectification and identification. I argue, however, that the concept of hybridity too often presents as a banality empty of any real analytical force. Indeed I will argue that hybridity cannot be understood without an attendant
examination of the ways in which discursive and cultural fields are “grounded in and constitutive of specific relations of production and exchange” (Stoler & Cooper, 1997, 18). By situating national formation and immigrant subjectification within a global process of uneven and combined development, I will show how variable constructions of immigrant communities must be understood in the complexity of their cultural, political and economic injection into the colonial community. Rather than a free-floating expression of pure, radical agency, immigrant agency was articulated with and through the narrative of a national, political, and economic community (a material order). The limits of immigrant agency were often defined, coercively, in reference to a master category of racial whiteness. Without attention to the ways in which cultural and political economy interact, the coercive and/or coerced elements of hybridity are rendered invisible. Taking up my case studies of Argentine and Canadian, I examine how the ‘white nationalist’ project was disrupted by the labour market needs of a developing national economy. I then argue that these tensions were resolved through the erection of a public health administrative apparatus which conflated hygiene and race to reinforce the geopolitical and internal borders of the nation. In Argentina, this resulted in a public hygiene apparatus that focused on coercive assimilation, while in Canada exclusion and segregation became the dominant strategies. I will argue that the different approaches to policing racial hygiene were the product of the different social property relations in each space which dictated the level of ‘threat’ that racialized foreigners posed.

**Argentine Social Property Relations and the Dynamics of Migration**

In the last decades of the nineteenth century agricultural development in the interior and industrialization in Buenos Aires was conditioned by a dearth of both labour and capital, and as a result, the governing classes looked abroad for the importation of both (Adelman, 1994; Solberg,
The importation of labour, however, served a further, and perhaps more vital purpose, than economic development alone for nation builders. Immigration of the ‘white races’ of Europe was intended to bring together and advance the racially diverse and ‘degenerated’ populations of Argentina, creating a truly national people (Beltz, 2010, 3). Indeed, the language of Argentine nation builders was explicit in linking the ‘whitening’ of Argentina to economic success, whereby immigrants would both transform and populate the recently ‘cleared’ interior lands, and further would serve to transform the presumed backwardness of the remaining indigenous, and criollo colonial, populations through the importation of racially and culturally superior qualities (Bastia and Vom Hau, 2013, 478). This is precisely what Alberdi meant when he sent out his rallying cry ‘to govern is to populate.’ However, state-builders of the latter half of the nineteenth century faced significant obstacles in this plan and were unable to attract either permanent or Anglo-Saxon ‘white’ immigrants.

As I showed in previous chapters, indigenous dispossession and state formation in Argentina resulted in a private rather than public monopoly of land held by provincial ranchers. This set-up of property relations was such that the state was significantly limited in the extent to which it could implement its ideal program of immigrant settlement and agricultural production. The interests of landed classes were tied into ranching through an extensive exploitation of the land, and thus the landed classes had little incentive to intensify their production strategies through the deployment and exploitation of waged labour (Evans, 2016). Rather, landowners’ capital continued to be invested in the acquisition of land, both for ranching and speculative prospects.

Because of the relative balance of social property relations in Argentina, those who dominated the control of land had little interest in fostering immigrant settlement. In contrast to
the American model of the family farm, so idealized by Argentine state leaders, those who had the capacity to dictate the distribution of land actively stymied state efforts to implement a homesteading (Fleer & Tobler, 2001, 19). By 1890, following a financial crisis, the state sold what remaining lands it held title to, and thus permanently closed off the option of homesteader settlement (Fleer & Tobler, 2001, 30). While in the late nineteenth century, ranchers would diversify the use of their lands, turning to cereals production in response to global market demand, this diversification remained peripheral to their own class reproduction. Land and speculative profit continued to be the primary source of elite reproduction in Argentina, and as a consequence, the cereals industry was built upon a structure of leasehold or tenancy production (Adelman, 1992, 278).

Given the entrenched position of the landed classes, agricultural migration to Argentina was limited to short tenancy contracts of three to four years. Unable to attract immigrants with land, the state was therefore limited to subsidized passages which had little appeal to the Anglo-Saxon emigrants seeking an escape from wage labour and the chance to become frontier smallholders (Adelman 1994, 113-14; Solberg 1987, 30). Instead, immigration to Argentina was dominated by Italians, largely from the rural southern regions, as well as by Spaniards.

The role of class in colonial state formation, however, cannot be understood from an exclusive vantage point of the dynamics of class formation within the settler space. As Anne Stoler and Frederick Cooper (1997) have argued, “class impinged in the making of empire in other ways: constraining who came to the colonies, what visions they harbored, what features of European class culture were selectively reworked” (27). In Argentina, Italian immigration in particular became a dominant source of rural and urban labour in Argentina for several reasons that would prove consequential to the shape and content of the settler state. First, the continued
presence of feudal relations in southern Italy meant that emigration was sought as a temporary expedient to deal with peasant landlessness and poverty. As I have argued elsewhere (Evans, 2016), these endogenous property relations in Italy meant that Italian emigrants were well suited to the type of opportunities in Argentina; their sojourn was undertaken to accumulate financial goods that would then be reinvested at home.

The result, in Argentina, was that immigration, though massive through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, tended to be circular in nature, rather than permanent. That circular migration patterns dominated Argentina’s early period of state formation was the result of the uneven and combined processes of nation-building which had occurred from the 1860s to 1890s in the course of indigenous dispossession and state consolidation (addressed in Chapter Four). That said, while individual immigrants may have been temporary, the fact of immigrants as a massive portion of the national population, at any given moment, was a matter of relative permanence throughout the late nineteenth century and up until World War I. As a result, it became necessary to make the realities of mass, ‘non-white’ immigration consistent with the binding fabric of the nation—white European racial superiority. The fragile unity and legitimacy that had been achieved through a project of ‘white’ racial nation-building needed to be preserved and defended.

**Immigration Policy and the Problem of ‘Racial Degeneration’**

The first articulations of an immigration policy at the level of the state can be found in the 1853 Liberal Constitution. The Constitution expressed an extremely laissez-faire approach to immigration, stipulating that there would be no restrictions to entry and that immigrants resident within Argentina were to be given rights with only minor differences from those accorded to individuals with full citizenship (Bastia & Vom Hau, 2013, 477). However, this stated preference
to foster immigration fell well short of an actual programme or law governing immigration, and
in 1876 the government of Nicolas Avellaneda passed the country’s first law on immigration (Du
Toit, 1991, 79). Amongst the key provisions of the 1876 law was the subsidization of travel from
Europe and accommodation in Buenos Aires for a short period upon arrival, free passage from
Buenos Aires to the immigrants’ final destination and the offer of access to tenancy and seeds for
those immigrants deemed suitable for colonization (Bastia & Vom Hau, 2013, 478).
Additionally, an institutional presence was created in the form of the Office of Public Lands and
Colonization, which was housed under the Department of Immigration (Du Toit, 1991, 79). The
1876 law, however, did not fundamentally transform the liberal character of Argentina’s
approach to immigration, with the exception of stipulating the exclusion of “those with
contagious disease or organic defect that makes them unable to work; the demented; and
beggars, convicts or criminals (article 32),” which was nevertheless sporadically implemented.
Rather the 1876 law created the administrative means to carry out an active project of attracting
and settling immigrants to populate the republic.

The outcome of Argentina’s open door approach to immigration surpassed, by far, the
expectations of many. Between 1871 and 1914 nearly six million immigrants arrived in
Argentina, the bulk of them towards the close of the nineteenth century (Rodríguez, 2006a, 24).
However, as I have already indicated, this increase in population through immigration was
ultimately a disappointment to state builders as most came from Italy, Spain, and to a lesser
extent Eastern Europe (Rodríguez, 2006a, 24-25). According to the mix of biological and
environmental racism that permeated the Argentine intelligentsia, the Italians and Spanish were
situated on the outer limits of a racial hierarchy of white acceptability and were generally
thought of as a ‘race apart.’
Despite official intentions to use this immigration to populate the interior provinces, providing a labour market for the agro-export industry, an unanticipated number of immigrants would not move from Buenos Aires itself (where immigrants entered through the port), owing largely to the vested and oppositional interests of the estanciero owners of the interior (Evans, 2016, 1068). As a result, the population of Buenos Aires soared from 286,700 in 1880 to 1,563,082 in 1915, while the population occupying squalid tenements in the city rose to about a quarter of the population in the same period, and concentration within tenements rose from 35 persons per structure to over 42 (Black Welder & Johnson, 1982, 361). This massive urban concentration of immigrants was paralleled by problems of overcrowding, political and labour unrest (notably in the form of anarchism), crime, social disorder and disease. Collectively, these issues would come to be known as the ‘social question,’ and would challenge the very tenuous stability and legitimacy of the state. In attempting to reinforce state legitimacy, the ‘social question’ would be answered dominantly through the pseudo-scientific language of public health—a discipline that, from its inception, has been thoroughly racialized (see Bashford, 2004).

The conundrum facing the state at this time was that immigration was a pivotal part of the development and nation-building platform of the Argentine elite. Immigration was both necessary, and a threat to, the project of national-state consolidation. The central question, as a consequence, became one of how to preserve ‘healthy’ immigration and deter, assimilate, expel or segregate the ‘degenerative’ immigrant populations (Rodríguez, 2006a, 24).

Ultimately, the group of state-builders and intellectuals (known collectively as the Generation of ’88) who would deal with this problem turned to the founding Darwinian and neo-Lamarckian racial rhetoric which had accompanied the eventual assimilation of indigenous peoples; namely that the Argentine environment itself had a ‘whitening’ effect (Rodríguez, 2006a, 25;
Zimmerman, 1992, 37). This position was given further credence by the Argentine sociologist and jurist Carlos Octavio Bunge who claimed that the Argentine environment would prohibit the reproduction of non-white racial categories owing to the deleterious effect of the Pampean winds, and other climatic features, on those of a less robust physiological racial character (Rodríguez, 2006a, 20). Through this ideological touchstone, coercive assimilation came to dominate the resolution to the immigration problem.

The above provides historical and empirical substance to my argument that it is necessary to understand that the social property relations established through uneven and combined processes of nation formation imprinted fundamentally on processes of immigrant incorporation, differentiation and exclusion. Hybridization, as it were, was adapted as a necessary condition owing to Argentina’s inability to attract the desired ‘racial’ demographic of immigrants. Instead, those less desirable were selectively admitted or excluded, assimilated (hybridized) or segregated, based on a hierarchy of so-called racial degeneration. This strategy conditioned the tools through which assimilation or exclusion would be enacted. As I show below, in Argentina racial subjectification and exclusion by the developing Argentine state were deployed less at the border than within the state itself. This is to say that racialized immigration posed a threat less to the geopolitical frontier than to the internal or social frontier. The deployment of penal power internally, to coerce and force assimilation, would serve to maintain the state legitimacy created through the façade of a robust ‘white nation.’

That said, there were at least two important exceptions to this claim: policies that provided for the public health inspection of immigrants arriving on ships which could result in

11 Ann Stoler uses the concept of ‘interior frontier’ to show how “at the level of the individual, frontier marks the moral predicates by which the subject retains his or her national identity . . . [it entails that] the purity of the community is prone to penetration in its interior . . . and [that] the essence of the community is an intangible ‘moral attitude,’ a ‘multiplicity of invisible ties’ (1997, 199).
immigrants being turned away if they were found to be incapable of labour, and the 1910 Social Defense Law, which codified the prohibition of known or suspected anarchists from entering Argentina. In both of these cases, issues such as disease, mental illness and so-called political deviance were bound into criminological and socio-psychological understandings of racial inferiority, but to such an extreme that the individuals denied entry were seen to be incapable of self-reliant, rational and morally sound decision making and thus of providing labour and potentially becoming assimilated.

**The National Border as Discipline**

Throughout the 1880s and 1890s Buenos Aires experienced a rapid spread of contagious diseases such as tuberculosis and syphilis, heavily concentrated in the overpopulated urban areas and attributed to immigration (Rodríguez, 2006b, 357). Contagion at this time became a central anxiety amongst Argentine nation builders and impelled President Avellaneda to establish funds through the national treasury to build the Immigrant’s Hotel, train public health inspectors and police, and create a system of immigration inspection and confinement at the port in order to ostensibly stem the spread of disease (Costanzo, 2007; Rodríguez, 2006a, 190). Upon arrival, immigrants in the second and third class passages were to be inspected by a group consisting of the Immigration Inspector, Sanitary Doctor, and the Official of the Maritime Prefecture. Inspection consisted of the counting and categorization of immigrants according to nationality, education, health and any sign of visible stigma. Those found to be chronically ill and unfit for work were deported immediately owing to the supposed threat to racial degeneration that they posed. Furthermore, the port inspections allowed for the collection of data coded by race, which could provide a language of legitimation for the project of nation building predicated on ideas of ‘civilized whiteness’ (Rodríguez, 2006a, 190). Indeed, given the limited reach of the public
health inspections in the face of more than six million immigrants coming through the ports, it is likely that this latter purpose was more integral to nation building than the actual capacity to reject and deport immigrants. As Julia Rodríguez notes, “the real goal of the sanitary inspections was to communicate ideals not only of health, cleanliness and industriousness but also of racial and spiritual unity” (2006a, 189). Nonetheless, the capacity to legally and administratively select for immigration was, at least rhetorically, an objective goal of Argentine statesmen. By 1909, an amendment to the immigration act made it a legal imperative to target second- and third-class passengers (which to this point had operated on a de facto basis), and the racial objective of this amendment was echoed in 1910 in a statement that declared that by “selecting the immigration current to incorporate healthy elements, we will be able to have a good future race, physiologically well-constituted on a purified ethnic base” (Rodríguez, 2006b, 270). The Argentine physician and scholar Lucas Ayarragary (Zimmerman, 1992, 29) similarly echoed these sentiments in 1910, making the case for ‘scientific’ criteria for selective immigration, stating that “we do not need yellow immigration, but rather European fathers and mothers of the white race to improve the hybrid and miscegenated elements that constitute the base of our nation’s population” (Rodriguez, 2006a, 373). Indeed, for Ayarragary, as for the Generation ’37, ‘white European’ immigration was deemed absolutely necessary for successful political and economic development through the adaptation of Western institutions, which were deemed to require a racially ‘capable and rational’ as well as homogenous population (Zimmerman, 1992, 29).

Beyond mechanisms of border control that racialized and excluded physical disease, measures were also erected to provide for the exclusion of so-called moral and political disease. Understood as disease, these exclusions too were coded in a language of racial inferiority and
barbarity (Salvatore, 1992, 279). The immediate context of these forms of exclusion was to be found in the proliferation of labour unrest and recurrent general strikes throughout the 1890s, frequently organized by anarchist groups whose national base was (apparently) dominantly formed by Italian immigrants. Indeed, by the early 1900s, rapid unionization and the widespread use of the general strike literally paralyzed export production (Salvatore, 1992, 290). The 1902 Law of Residence and the 1910 Social Defense Law were the result of such labour actions. However, before examining the laws themselves, it is important to take a step back and examine the dominant racial theories which bound anarchism and labour action to so-called racial barbarism.

The influence of Italian criminology on the development of a legitimating language and technique of ‘scientific’ racial exclusion cannot be understated in the case of Argentina. Significantly, Cesare Lombroso (largely regarded as the founder of criminology) and his text *Criminal Man*, published in 1876, formed an essential cornerstone of Argentina’s socio-medical sciences. According to Lombroso, criminality was an inborn, biological pathology and could be detected by a variety of physical features such as a large jaw, low and narrow forehead and large ears. Lombroso’s physical typology was then further connected to the established European racial hierarchy, whereby southern and eastern Europeans were found to possess these physical traits at a much higher frequency than Anglo-Saxon Europeans. Lombroso further found that anarchists too could be physically detected, marked by a biological degeneration owing to the presence of deformed ears, inferior jaws, forehead depressions and facial asymmetry. Because this biological theory of criminality dispensed with classical ideas of free will and individual responsibility, the treatment of crime and anarchism in Argentina was to be found not in
punishment but in the protection of society through social isolation or exclusion (Zimmerman, 1992, 35).

Owing to the relationship posited between biology, race and disease (political and physiological), the influx of anarchist and socialist ideals was perceived as a threat to the racial purity and strength of the nation. Furthermore, because anarchism was deemed an inborn rather than acquired defect, the primary means of protecting national racial purity were initially through mechanisms of exclusion and expulsion. To this end, the 1902 Law of Residence, the first law to explicitly target foreigners, stipulated powers of the executive to expel any foreigner convicted or pursued by a foreign criminal court on the grounds of political disturbances, as well as anyone deemed to threaten public order or national security. Within the first week after the passing of the Law of Residence, more than 500 foreigners were expelled from Argentina. The response within the immigrant and labour community at large, however, was not one of acquiescence as expected. Rather, in the years following the passing of the 1902 law, anarchist and socialist organizing and demonstration expanded, and by 1910 Congress was meeting once again to debate, and ultimately pass, the Law of Social Defence (Costanza, 2007). In this debate, Ayarragary once again forcefully expressed his views on the racially degenerative and barbaric qualities of anarchists, calling them a “gang of degenerates and fanatics who reject civilized struggle” and concluding that “since the country’s population already includes ethnic components of a quite inferior nature, it must counteract this by bringing in superior components, selecting the migratory flow in order to . . . . have a physiologically healthy population in the future on the basis of ethnically cleansed individuals” (quoted in Costanza, 2007). To this end, Ayarragary strongly supported the passage of the Social Defence Law, which stipulated legal procedures for selection and exclusion at the border. The Social Defence Law effectively
extended the provisions made for the executive under the Law of Residence to the policing of the border, prohibiting the entry of anarchists, and providing for the jailing of anarchists attempting to repeat entry after an initial denial for up to six years. Internally, the Social Defence Law further prohibited the organization and public association of anarchist, socialist and labour groups (Costanza, 2007).

Whether under the guise of physical disease or political dissidence, what is important to note is that the selection and exclusion of immigration at the border were fundamentally aimed to protect and promote liberal civilization, read through the master category of ‘whiteness.’ Immigrants, for example, were the carriers of disease, not because of overcrowding conditions on ships and in tenements, but because they lacked the rational capacity to exercise sexual self-control, appropriate self-regulation of hygiene, nutrition, addiction and financial management. At the same time, labour activists were characterized as biologically inferior because of the threat they posed to this same civilized citizen construct. In either case, it was the potential of liberal disruption posed by particular immigrant groups that marked them as inferior and subject to exclusion. Their inclusion in the national population undermined the proper functioning and ideological legitimation of the liberal nation-building project.

To return to the problematic posed at the beginning of this chapter, it is clear that the conditions through which a ‘third space’ of ‘hybridity’ could result from the colonial encounter cannot be universalized. In Argentina, a mixture of biological and environmental racial theory established a hierarchy of racial acceptability which dictated how ‘others’ would be excluded from, or assimilated to, the ‘whitening’ environment of Argentina. However, given the difficulties of recruiting immigrant labour, which were tied into the social property relations that had emerged as a result of the initial nation-building phase, an open immigration policy
remained the most politically and economically expedient solution to the problem of labour. As such, racialized subjectivities were chiefly constructed through internal mechanisms of assimilation—indexed to, as David Goldberg has argued, European ‘whiteness’ (2002: 200).

**Policing Whiteness: The Internal Frontier and Assimilatory Hybridity**

Despite the implementation of institutional mechanisms of border control and racially selective immigration criteria, the majority of the immigrants to Argentina prior to the First World War were not turned away. Thus, the construction of a racially ‘white’ Argentine nation, through the identification and discipline of the so-called racially ‘inferior,’ occurred largely within the borders of Argentina. The hope, as was noted above, was of course to use the leverage of Argentina’s environmentally ‘whitening’ effects to ‘discipline’ and ‘civilize’ the undesirable immigrant flows. Where this proved impossible, measures of cultural, educational and health discipline were drawn upon and, in the last instance, the unassimilable would be quarantined and deported.

The two dominant apparatuses to enforcing and securing the internal racial frontier were the penal system and the public health system, which in practice, overlapped. As Alison Bashford has argued, the practice of public health drew from and modified techniques of liberal governance that had been based in penal systems (2004, 7). The spectre of the so-called ‘social problem’ or urban pathology relied heavily on language and scientific methods which pathologized physical illness and crime. Because these ‘pathologies’ were dominantly the result of a lagging labour market in the context of ongoing, mass immigration, crime and illness appeared to be overrepresented in immigrant communities, such that they were quickly and readily accepted as the sources of racial degeneration. The problem of crime and disease, when posed in the language of public health, was one that shaped and informed national identities.
(Bashford, 2004, 116). It resolved a tension in liberal governance between those who could act freely and voluntarily, and those who would against their will be committed, for the protection of the public, to exclusionary spaces aimed at the forcible instruction of responsible conduct (Bashford, 2004, 13, 51).

In order to address both crime and disease (along with so-called moral depravities associated with gambling, alcoholism, vagrancy and prostitution) in a manner that holistically addressed the supposed threat of race degeneration, the concept of public health became the central organizing problematic and legitimizing language which could deploy scientific rationalism and positivism in the project of ‘racial purification’ (Comte, 2013, 9-12; Zimmerman, 1992, 23). Throughout the 1880s, public works projects simultaneously pushed poor immigrants in Buenos Aires southward into the tenements of the barrios (which would come to house most urban immigrants by the 1890s) while failing to adequately provide employment or additional housing for the masses of incoming immigrants (Rodríguez, 2006a, 27). This situation was compounded at the end of the century when, between 1899 and 1902, Argentina was simultaneously struck by economic crisis and its peak period of immigration, while epidemic disease accounted for 46 percent of all death around this same period (1872–1906) (Rodríguez, 2006b, 361; Salvatore, 1992, 282). Though the source of these problems was, largely, socio-economic, state builders were quick to suggest that the immigrant populations of the tenements were themselves the source of squalid living conditions which bred disease, crime and moral turpitude. It was in this context that the state created the National Department of Hygiene (1893) and injected a massive amount of state spending into public health infrastructure to build public hospitals (reserved for the poor and typically racialized, as the wealthy were
treated at private institutions\textsuperscript{12}), mental health and vagrancy asylums, and prisons, as well as to train an army of sanitary inspectors and police who would be charged with the inspection, regulation, discipline and quarantining of those found incapable of exercising appropriate standards of self-care, thrift, foresight and work ethic (Rodríguez, 2006b, 361). Panic over racial degeneration, then, fuelled a surge in institutional capacity building, largely in the form of coercive or penal institutions.

Throughout the end of the nineteenth century the idea of Argentine national health (understood largely in terms of standards of racial civility) was determined through the metrics of disease, morality and crime: “public health and nationalism are both modern projects connected with the complex emergence of political economy and with the development of liberal democracy and concepts of citizenship” (Bashford, 2004, 115). To this end, as Rodríguez suggests, the primary means for establishing the distinction between political nationals versus internal outsiders was through the identification of germs, behaviours and ideas thought to be the product of racialized immigrant nationalities. Thus, for example, the spread of tuberculosis was associated with a series of ‘risk factors’ disproportionately associated with immigrants, such as alcoholism, unsanitary living conditions, poor nutrition, hygiene and general predispositions to ‘excesses’ (Rodríguez, 2006b, 180). Indeed, an 1890 report on the issue of disease and epidemics suggested that the cause of illness was the low quality of immigrants themselves, and thus the defense against epidemics became, as physician Luis Agote declared in 1898, “a defense against exotic migrating diseases” (Rodríguez, 2006b, 362-3).\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12} This stratification of public health measures echoes Bashford’s analysis of settler-colonial Australia wherein ‘white’ disease was treated through voluntary admission into private sanitoriums, while ‘racial’ disease was treated through measures of forcible isolation (2004, 58).

\textsuperscript{13} Again, this close association of disease and ‘foreignness’ specific to the settler colony is echoed in Bashford’s Australian study (2004, 81).
In addition to the external controls that were erected to guard against the immigration of ‘exotic diseases,’ then, a series of internal measures were further erected which targeted immigrants as the sources of communicable disease. The objective of these policies was less to protect against the spread of disease as it was to protect against the moral and behavioural degeneration of the national population. Disease was so often and closely associated with work ethic (or rather a lack thereof) that it is difficult to extricate disease prevention measures from the project of liberal nation-building (Guy, 1990, 300). To this end, immigrants were admitted into the country and absorbed into the national population only to the extent that they could acquiesce and adapt to the standards of an increasingly market-governed society. When these qualities were deemed absent or threatened, a series of ‘public health’ policies were erected which could systematically target, inspect, reform and assimilate or extricate the ‘diseased.’ The expansion of the public health apparatus in the face of epidemic diseases was one such mechanism. In these cases, hybridization was not a voluntary or radical act of agency, but was instead a tactic of social control and racial policing of the national body of whiteness. Hybridization, here, functioned less as a means of asserting difference, and instead signalled the erasure of difference—to hybridize was to fuse with the dominant ‘white’ population in a way that would eradicate racial deviance and/or difference. As Mariela Rodríguez has argued, hybridity (or mestizaje) in Argentina was aimed not at the creation of the mestizo but of ‘whites’ (2016, 128).

While official Argentine policy did not explicitly discriminate against foreigners deemed as racially inferior, such policies tended to explicitly target the occupants of tenements which, as was noted above, came to house most of the immigrant population of Buenos Aires by the 1890s (census figures suggest between 66 and 72 percent of the tenement population was foreign-born), when public hygiene policy was in its ascendancy (Rodríguez, 2006a, 183). Additionally, the
language used to describe predispositions towards disease and illness, which legitimized the targeted inspection of tenements, was the very same language that attributed a biological and racial predisposition to ‘social pathologies’ such as crime and anarchism. The targeted inspection, removal, education and isolation of tenement populations thus should be understood as yet another strategy to police the boundaries of a ‘white Argentina’ and promote educational and environmental ‘whitening’ through institutional reform measures.

In response to outbreaks in yellow fever, cholera, and later tuberculosis, ordinances were passed in 1872 that made the reporting of transmissible disease mandatory, with a fine of up to 3000 pesos and/or imprisonment for up to eight days for those who failed to report (Guy, 1990, 305). Shortly following this, in 1874, the first so-called pest house was built to isolate men with contagious diseases, who until then had been kept in the same hospitals as men with non-contagious illnesses (Guy, 1990, 305). In 1875 committees were named by the municipal council to begin inspecting ‘suspect’ neighborhoods, and in 1879 Hygiene Commissions were officially charged with the targeted and systematic inspection of tenement houses and working-class restaurants. The houses and establishments of the wealthy and white were notably absent from any form of regulated inspection (Guy, 1990, 306).

Following inspection, a series of possible outcomes could occur. The most likely was eviction from, and even the destruction of, the tenement itself. Men with tuberculosis and other infectious diseases were often sent to the newly constructed pest houses, where, in addition to medical treatment, they were subjected to ‘moral’ education through the provisioning of appropriate reading material, literacy classes and games, while political and religious discussion as well as alcoholic beverages were prohibited (Guy, 1990, 310). Given the relationship posited between anarchism and alcoholism with disease in general, and racial degeneracy in particular,
this subjectification is not surprising and only serves to further the argument that the public hygiene hysteria was about policing the internal ‘colour line’ (Rodríguez, 2006a, 187). In these cases, racial constructs served to identify those deviants who were potentially capable of assimilation—fit for hybridity—and to extricate them from those who could not escape their ‘biology’ as racially fixed.

The illness of men was, more often than not, associated with a ‘criminal’ lack of work ethic, often rooted in alcoholism. As such, public hygienists sought to pathologize and police alcohol consumption. Dr. Emilio R. Coni, a prominent public hygienist in Argentina, argued that inebriation was the source of the production of a permanent criminal class whose inherent immorality predisposed them to avoid work (Guy, 1990, 302). Coni argued for the hospitalization of alcoholic men to prevent crime and promote their rehabilitation for work (Guy, 1990, 310). While these proposals were never implemented in full, the disproportionate arrests of immigrant men versus Argentine-born men for public intoxication, coupled with the revocation of certain civic rights, suggests that the policing of alcohol use was yet another means of addressing the threat of racial degeneration through the vector of public health.

The ‘prevention’ of venereal disease, likewise, showed itself to be as much a policy of policing so-called race. The targets of efforts to contain the spread of venereal disease were exclusively women, more specifically prostitutes operating out of tenements (Guy, 1990, 300). Statistics as to the nationalities of these women are sparse and unreliable, as prostitution was legal until 1936, and women arrested on proxy charges would often give a different occupation. However, the concentration of poor immigrant women in the tenements that would have been required to seek income strategies outside of the home suggests that, once again, these tactics had an explicit racial component, as prostitution was identified with biological degeneracy
(Rodríguez, 2006a, 187; Rodríguez, 2006b, 362; Solberg, 1969, 232). Furthermore, as Donna J. Guy notes, the marginalization and social exclusion of prostitute women were tied to their incapacity to fulfill certain moral standards of behaviour, whereby it was expected that women should provide the socially reproductive labour of the home to support the generation and maintenance of an able-bodied, robust male working class. To be seen working outside of the home, in any manner, let alone in prostitution, was registered as a violation of public morality and challenged the legitimacy of liberal state building (Guy, 1990, 301). Of course, the need to work outside of the home was in turn associated with a failure on the part of both men and women to exert appropriate behaviours of thrift, hard work, savings and general self-regulation. In short, the woman working outside of the home posed a visible challenge to attempts to erect a self-regulating liberal workforce. Again, these socio-economic conditions must be understood so as to differentiate between those immigrant women subject to potential racial assimilation (the housewife) and those to be segregated (the prostitute, worker, etc.)

Amongst the most prevalent measures enacted against prostitute women for the ostensible purposes of guarding against the spread of venereal disease were laws that mandated the registration and medical examination of all female prostitutes. In 1875, this mandate was added to by stipulating that upon the satisfactory passing of biweekly medical examinations, prostitutes could only operate out of residences whose sanitary conditions had been approved, and which were confined to one story houses to be located at least two blocks from churches, theaters and schools. Women were prohibited from leaving these premises at night, and during the day were required to carry identity cards with them at all times (Guy, 1990, 301). Thus, the most basic civil rights granted to most residents, those of freedom of mobility, were restricted for women suspected of possessing less than civilized standards of morality and rationality. This
amounted to an informal segregation from the general population, subjection to invasive physical and environmental examinations, and unfree conditions of mobility.

Finally, reforms to the Criminal Code and penal system served to systematically link work ethic with criminality and to isolate and ‘reform’ offenders. Indeed, in 1882 the first legal definition of the vagrant was established, which effectively criminalized all forms of unemployment, or at least posited a strong link between the former and the latter. According to the legal definition, a vagrant was “First: those who have no trade, are not day laborers, and lack any legitimate means of support. Second: those who have a skill or trade but do not practice it regularly and have no other legitimate means of support. Third: those who have inadequate means of support but do not engage in some other honest work, instead frequenting gambling houses and other dubious establishments. Fourth: those who have no disability but engage in begging” (Bonaudo, 1999, 74). Interestingly, and as Guy notes, the constructs of criminality in the turn of the century Buenos Aires functioned in opposite ways based on sex, where working outside the home was a deviant act for women, and unemployment was a sign of a man’s weakness of morality and character (Guy, 1990, 300). Thus, further complicating the possibility of immigrant inclusion and/or exclusion was the matter of gender as it articulated with the morality of political economy. Such ‘work ethics,’ furthermore, were never tied to the high seasonality of labour and periodic declines in domestic demand, but rather to individual biological, moral and intellectual abnormalities (Salvatore, 1992, 280-81).

Perhaps one of the central reasons immigrant populations were linked to constructs of criminality, especially through the idea of vagrancy, was that, as Salvatore notes, the types of jobs on offer to immigrants were often transient and as such made the implementation of work discipline difficult (1992, 280). This is to say that, in the absence of regularized labour-employer
relations, the discipline and assimilation of the racialized ‘other’ into Argentine ‘white civilization’ was rendered problematic. Indeed, during the period of mass penal reform throughout the last two decades of the nineteenth century, casual (often day) labour was the dominant occupation of the city of Buenos Aires’s immigrants as well as accounting for nearly 45 percent of all new job creation (Salvatore, 1992, 282). That arrest rates may have had more to do with policing the racial nation appears to be corroborated by statistics covering the period from 1885 to 1914, in which arrests for public drunkenness and disturbances far exceeded those for crimes against persons and property. As Black-Welder and Johnson argue, the overrepresentation of immigrant arrests in the ‘order maintenance’ category of arrests (drunkenness and disturbances) is likely a reflection of the fact that these types of arrests were determined by highly subjective criteria for establishing a violation, and thus left to the (often prejudiced) discretion of the police themselves (1982, 368). Order maintenance arrests could thus be deployed as a means of regulating and disciplining the behaviour of immigrants lacking the morality and discipline of ‘whiteness.’

If the dominant form of arrests targeted immigrant communities with highly subjective criteria, sentencing and the penal system’s approach to ‘reform’ were even more suggestive of the ultimate ends to be served. The overhaul of the national penal system towards the end of the century involved the creation of the National Penitentiary of Buenos Aires, which introduced the idea of rehabilitation and a graded system that would allow for the modification of sentences according to the individual’s adaptability. Sentencing was thus ultimately discretionary and subject to clinical appraisals which sought to isolate and remove deviant behavioural patterns, replacing them with productive and rational motivations. Consequently, the idea of confinement, once in the penal system, was used less as the primary punishment, and was instead a form of
negative incentive to adapt to and internalize the requisite social norms. Once again, the liberal objectives contained within these coercive practices are evident; repression and punishment through the coercive power of the state were replaced with efforts to optimize the capacity of population (Bashford, 2004, 8). Within the penal system, social norms were disseminated through literacy and public education courses, as well as ‘redemptive work’ intended to instill the strong work discipline which, José Ingenieros among others, suggested was a key missing factor in the biological delinquent (Salvatore, 1992, 293-298). Under such conditions, any aspect of hybridization occurred under threat and coercion, requiring the asymmetrical adaption and subjugation of one racialized culture to the other.

The identification and legal discipline of immigrants as vagrants, sexual deviants, criminals, diseased, or morally corrupt were fundamentally underpinned by efforts to protect the fragile liberal order of ‘white’ Argentina from the threat of degeneration. Underpinning all of these diagnoses was a mixture of social Darwinism, neo-Lamarckian racism and biological criminology, which rooted so-called barbarism in qualities and behaviours understood to be ‘racially’ determined. By positing these individuals as distinct from ‘white’ Argentina, they were then rendered legitimately subject to a series of disciplinary and assimilationist strategies, to be ‘whitened’ by the superior European culture of the state.

**Assimilatory Hybridity: Strategic Responses to the Porous Labour Market**

Patrick Wolfe has argued, throughout his oeuvre, that racialization emerges at the point at which colonizers are threatened to share space with the colonized—when the frontier can no longer be pushed back, and indigenous peoples must become part of the body politic, or when black slaves are emancipated and come to occupy a social-spatial proximity to colonial peoples (2015, 14). This insight is useful for further distinguishing the forms and mechanisms through
which racialization is performed. In Argentina, where immigrant labour ‘threatened’ the body politic, racialized practices were enacted. However, the policing of racial boundaries followed principles of assimilation and absorption. Racial ‘others’ were to be subordinated to, and swallowed by, the ‘whiteness’ of the Argentine peoples. What made assimilation palatable, I argue, relates to the degree to which social space as shared space was seen as threatening. To what extent did racialized others pose a challenge to, or stand in competition for, state membership and resources? This question, in turn, can be explained, I argue, by the uneven and combined development of the Argentine nation state and its attendant social property relations.

To review the argument, the state in Argentina, following its initial phase of nation building, lacked an effective monopoly on ‘national’ territories which had been expropriated from indigenous peoples. Agrarian transformation to competitively produced cereals and meats was subject to the whims and preferences of the large, entrenched landowners. Landowners, in turn, derived their means of reproduction through extensive ranching, coupled with secondary cereals production, and as a result, had little interest in relinquishing title to land so as to implement a policy of small-scale, settler farming. Instead, a policy of land tenancy abounded which entailed a pattern of circular migration. The threat of naturalizing immigrants, therefore, was not central. Indeed, less than two percent of immigrants during the nineteenth century naturalized, despite the liberal conditions for doing so. Because social space was only threatened by the racialized foreigner in the short term, it was more palatable to pursue a policy of gradually assimilating those foreigners to the cultural, political and economic norms of the Argentine ‘nation’ so as to make transient labour migration as functional and tolerable as possible.

In addition, we should keep in mind that the effective organization of class power in Argentina meant that the agrarian rather than urban bourgeois state builders held a
disproportionate degree of influence over the national trajectory. This condition severely undermined the state’s capacity to implement policies which could expand the fiduciary and bureaucratic reach of the state, such that the financial and institutional capacity of the Argentine state to implement an effective and stable regime of immigrant segregation was further limited. Instead, the state’s central power rested in its coercive capacity; penal power became the central means of defending the racial nation.

The policy of immigrant assimilation in Argentina, as I have noted, should be read as distinct from the otherwise dominant mode of racial state organization in Latin America—that of Mestizaje. Where Mestizaje registers a literal melding of peoples to produce ‘new’ racial and ethnic identities, the assimilatory polices of the Argentine state were to subordinate and swallow all that was not ‘white’—to turn it into ‘white’ or else to reject and make invisible difference through policies such as those noted in the previous chapter (Goldberg, 231). Rather than biological purity, racial nationhood was to proceed through a process of deracialization or the elimination of difference through the homogenization of the white imaginary.

**Canadian Property Relations and the Dynamics of Migration**

In Canada, indigenous labour, following the initial phases of colonial settlement and the transition from merchant trade to settled production, was ultimately deemed superfluous. Indigenous resistance often worked against efforts to proletarianize indigenous peoples, while at the same time the logic underlying the segregation of indigenous peoples to reserves was precisely one that relied upon the construction of indigenous peoples as presently incapable of labour (Coulthard, 2014, 12; Wolfe, 2015; 23). However, in contrast to Argentina, the state in Canada was able to impose a public monopoly on all lands seized from indigenous peoples. At the same time, because no entrenched landed interest held sway, business and merchant classes
were the primary potential allies and obstacles to national economic direction. As it happened, however, these classes were generally dependent on a national tariff, which could only be maintained through the earnings generated by the export sectors. Thus, the promotion of agricultural settlement was both within the capacity of the state, and generally supported by internal dominant classes.

The result, then, was a state directed process of immigrant settlement. Under the national Dominion Lands Act (1872) the state sought to promote the settlement of small family farms by offering deed to land in exchange for a $10 administration fee and a guarantee to cultivate the land for at least three years. While there did exist a private market for land sales through companies such as the Canadian Pacific Railway and the Hudson’s Bay Company, these sales contributed little to grassland settlement as there was little that they could offer compared to the nearly free distribution of state land through the Lands Act (Adelman, 1994, 23). This broad support and capacity to promote the settlement of the interior for the production of cereals in turn helped in the long-term consolidation of state administrative capacity, culminating in the National Policy of 1876 under John A. Macdonald.

For my purposes, key to the National Policy was that it endowed the state with the power and capacity to select for immigration. In contrast to Argentina, Canada had something to offer potential immigrants, and it was given broad class support to do so. Thus, initially, the state pursued a highly selective and racialized policy of immigrant recruitment, limiting its active targeting to the ‘preferred races’ of Anglo-Saxon and Nordic origin, as well as qualified exceptions for eastern and central Europeans. These were immigrants who would come to settle and reside in Canada permanently. In sum, owing to the configuration of class and institutional state power consolidated during the early nation-formation period, the Canadian state was able to
recruit a sizeable mass of Anglo-Saxon and Nordic immigrants—those deemed racially desirable (i.e. ‘white’). However, while the state could select for its ideal ‘stock’ of settler-farmers, it could not, in turn, enforce their proletarianization. To amass a sizeable labour force, the Canadian state needed to draw upon other, less ‘desirable’ populations, creating a social situation that articulated and defended ‘national whiteness’ through official and named difference rather than through a dominantly assimilatory practice.

The Labour Problem in Canada: Stratification through Immigration Policy

Colonial settlement alone, then, was inadequate to supply a growing demand for wage labour, as determined by the need to attract foreign capital in the promotion of agricultural export production, infrastructural construction, and nascent industrialization. As Wakefield had recognized in the 1830s, the availability of extensive land and capital in the settler space (indeed the very motive for settler colonization) functioned as a disincentive for proletarianization (this was not a problem in Argentina, where the estanciero held a monopoly over land). It was for this reason that Wakefield had suggested the creation of an artificial floor on the prices of land. In Canada, however, the development of the Dominion Lands Act instead placed an artificial ceiling on the price of land to attract settlers, and thus had the effect of turning many potential labourers into small farm owners (Adelman, 1994, 40-45). In contrast to Argentina, then, the availability of an exploitable class of workers could not be met by undifferentiated, open-door immigration. Instead, immigration would have to occur through a dual process which distinguished between those desirable for small farm operation and petty bourgeois activities, and those to be cordoned off through coercion and exclusion as a hyper-mobile, malleable and punishable labour force. The conditions of colonial incorporation and/or exclusion were, once
more, established by the extant configuration of social property relations consolidated during the early nation-building phase.

It was this problem—the need to satisfy the population requirements for a farming and labouring class—that made visible the tension within liberal nation building. This tension again demonstrates the fundamentally illiberal practices which presuppose liberal state building within a global capitalist market. As Donald Avery has argued, the bulk of Canadian politicians and social and labour organizations prioritized what they saw as the ‘quality’ of immigrants, defined primarily in racial terms of assimilability, while capitalists sought an open immigration of any person capable of labouring in the myriad skilled and unskilled positions which needed to be filled—in other words, their approach to immigration policy was to encourage mass quantity (Avery, 1972, 135-38). Nationalist forces were faced with the problem that those deemed ‘desirable’ immigrants provided an unstable pool of labour, willing to work the rails or extractive projects only until they could settle land. This dual and differentiated immigration stream meant that because some immigrants were legally allowed and desired to settle as national citizens, those who were not desirable required formal, legal exclusions.

Thus, in contrast to much of the literature, which explains immigrant racialization as a result of intra-class competition and conflict, the immigrants who became subject to legal mechanisms of racialization were rarely in direct competition with so-called ‘white labour’ in Canada. Indeed, it was not uncommon for segments of the racialized labour force to attempt to organize against employers in order to demand better working conditions and pay, thereby contributing to a broader platform of class struggle (Goutor, 2008, 45). Instead, I will argue that the differentiated rights extended to particular classes of immigrants were materially and
ideologically rooted in the patterns with which national state consolidation had been established, and by which it would then have to continue to legitimize itself.

As with Argentina, Canada’s first Immigration Act (1869) was open-door and laissez-faire in nature. The main exception to this open-door policy was with regard to the restriction of immigrants with certain physical disabilities, those with criminal records and those likely to become dependent on charitable organizations upon arrival (Kelley, 2010, 62). Amongst politicians, however, this ‘open-door’ policy was further qualified by the idea of ‘acceptable’ ethnicities, capable of assimilation and of agricultural settlement so as to expand the frontier of the new state. And yet, the precise type of immigrant deemed ideal to the political classes of Canada was the antithesis of that required by capital. To open up the frontier for settlement required the building of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR), and as CPR President Thomas Shaughnessy argued, the labourers needed to build the railway were of a different character than those who would settle the frontier:

Men who seek employment on railway construction are, as a rule, a class accustomed to roughing it. They know when they go to work that they must put up with the most primitive kind of camp accommodation . . . I feel very strongly that it would be a huge mistake to send out any more of these men from Wales, Scotland or England . . . it is only prejudicial to the cause of immigration to import men who come here expecting to get high wages, a feather bed and a bath tub (as cited in Avery, 1972, 138).

On the other side of the equation, from the perspective of politicians, there was little desire to utilize the preferred ‘races’ of immigrants for the unskilled labour needed on the rails and in the mines. According to the BC Supreme Court Royal Commissioner Dr. John Hamilton Gray, “It is fortunate . . . this cheap labour can be obtained, for it enables those whose minds are capable of higher development and whose ambition looks to more ennobling industry to follow pursuits in which they will rise rather than toil and slave in groveling work, which wears out the
body without elevating the mind” (Anderson, 1991, 36). The very possibility of settlement, then, created the conditions through which a formally bifurcated immigration policy would emerge.

The first major group of immigrants who were constructed as inherently outside of the Canadian nation were the Chinese, who migrated largely to British Columbia, and it is to this group that I will devote my attention. Chinese migration to Canada was fairly minor prior to Confederation, with figures from 1858 to 1859 citing approximately 2,000 Chinese, largely to supply labour to the goldfields of the Fraser River (Anderson, 1991, 34). Major immigration from China to Canada, however, occurred towards the end of the nineteenth century, at which point the pool of ‘ideal’ rail workers in the form of the Irish Catholic navies was beginning to dry up (Avery, 1972, 136). Considering this labour shortage, part of the condition for bringing British Columbia into Confederation was a promise on the province’s part to contribute the necessary resources to expedite the building of the western leg of the Canadian Pacific Railway (Kelley, 2010, 93). Unable to attract workers from central Canada into the West, or to pull American rail workers north into BC, rail contractors looked to China, where poverty was rampant, and transportation to the west coast was easier and cheaper than the alternatives. Throughout the 1880s, over 15,000 Chinese labourers were thus brought into BC to complete the construction of the CPR’s western leg (Kelley, 2010, 94).

The onset of large-scale migration from China to (primarily) British Columbia occurred within the context of a Canadian economic depression, which had begun in 1873. By the 1880s, considerable agitation had been mobilized against Chinese immigrants from organized labour (Goutor, 2008, 37), which led to more than 100 anti-Chinese bills or acts being put forward through the provincial legislature, though many would be deemed unconstitutional. Macdonald, while recognizing the growing agitation around Chinese immigration, would not concede to fully
restrict such immigration, arguing that Chinese immigrants were “valuable, the same as a
threshing machine or any other agricultural implement” in 1985 (Kelley, 2010, 109), but that
there was “no fear of a permanent degradation of the country by a mongrel race” (Dua, 2007,
451). However, the conditions of the Canadian frontier at the time, and the offer of cheap and
expansive tracts of land to all those who could afford it, threatened the resolve of Macdonald
regarding the impermanence of Chinese immigrants. In order to make such platitudes a reality, it
was necessary to legally and politically encode the exclusion of Asian immigrants to the body
politic.

The basis for articulating and legitimating such exclusions was through the construction
of the Chinese ‘racial’ character as unsuitable to the larger national objectives of liberal
economic development. Thus, for example, the Chinese were constructed as transient of their
own accord in such a manner that suggested that they would be incapable of settling the prairies
(Goutor, 2008, 39). These arguments were bolstered by the legal restrictions against female and
family migration, which was said to, once more, depreciate the standards by which Asian
immigrants could subsist and contribute to a depression of the general wage. The depreciation of
the general wage was viewed as an inhibition against the ability of white settlers to accumulate
savings through labour, and to therefore eventually be able to homestead on the expanding
frontier, a key to the economic development of Canada.

Furthermore, the supposed transience of the Chinese was posited as a drain on the
economy inasmuch as the Chinese were said to come to Canada, work for poverty wages, and
subsist on next to nothing so as to be able to bring back as much of their wages as possible to
China. The Industrial Banner in 1906, for example, claimed that “a coolie he was born and a
coolie he will die, and while he undersells legitimate labour he hoards up his money with the
intent of returning to China and spending it there” (cited in Goutor, 2008, 60). The Chinese (and Asian populations more broadly) were thus constructed as a net loss to the economy of Canada, failing to contribute to the generation of domestic commodity markets and leading to potential crises of overproduction and stagnation (Goutor, 2008, 39). In so much as this was the case, then, the presence of Chinese labour could be construed as threatening the establishment of a national economy in Canada and undermining the expansion and development of settler property relations. Rather than threatening the interests of labour alone, then, the Chinese immigrant was framed as a threat to the very (economic) viability of the Canadian state itself.

**The National Border as Exclusion**

Attempts were initially made to legally mark out Chinese immigration as substantively different, and thus subject to legal mechanisms of coercion, through the Act To Restrict and Regulate Chinese Immigration (1885). The language of regulation allowed Chinese immigration to be included as a *transient* labour supply and involved the application of a $50 dollar head tax, which at the time was low enough to restrict only the most impoverished, while ensuring that those who came would contribute some amount of capital to the national economy. Indeed, in debating a proposal to raise the head tax from $50 to $100 in the House of Commons in June 1900, MP Edwards asked, “Now what is the purpose of this legislation? Is it for the purpose of excluding Chinese from Canada, or is it for the purpose, in an indirect way, of collecting taxes from them?” (cited in Cho, 2002, 2). The fact that labour brokers and ship captains (to whom the Chinese became indebted), not individual Chinese labourers themselves, were responsible for the immediate payment of the head tax further lends credence to the assertion that the head tax’s primary objective was not one of exclusion but conditional inclusion (Cho, 2002, 8). Thus, while attempting to mitigate the fears of ‘white’ nationalists by marking the Chinese as ‘Other’ and
transient, the Chinese head tax served to allow for the inclusion of subjects whose labour could be dispensed with after the task of consolidating a Canadian nation through the construction and completion of the railway. In Canada, then, the first means to distinguishing migrant streams between those fit and those unfit for national membership occurred at the border. The Act established legal channels to control (not deny) the entry of Chinese immigrants and mark them as \textit{inassimilable}. In contrast to Argentina, then, ‘undesirable’ immigrants were indefinitely relegated to a legally differentiated status.

The Act to Restrict and Regulate remained the only significant piece of exclusionary immigration policy (operant at the border) for much of the nineteenth century.\footnote{In the twentieth century, diplomatic agreements and amendments to the Immigration Act—The Gentleman’s Agreement (1907), and the Continuous Journey Regulation (1908)—were made to limit Japanese and Indian migration.} Under Minister of the Interior Clifford Sifton (1896–1905) contestations over controlling the entry of ‘non-white’ immigration occurred in an ad hoc and piecemeal fashion. However, this began to change at the turn of the century. The early twentieth century saw the introduction of medical inspection at the border, which became the first channel through which immigration decisions would be made, overseen by Chief Medical Officer P.H. Bryce (Sears, 1990, 96). Acts of quarantine, as Bashford points out, have been central technologies of public health through which the national state affirms and legitimizes its national status externally, through the consolidation of administrative capacity to detain and eject (2004, 115). Quarantine, in the settler context, further established the national border as a public health and racialized immigration restriction line (Bashford, 2004, 13). Medical inspections, applied unevenly at the borders, targeted eye disease (likely borne from unsanitary and unsafe ship passages that ‘undesirable’ migrant groups were subjected to), ostensibly linking cultural practices with a lower, ‘unclean’ civilizational order.
The introduction of medical inspection as a key intervention in immigration marked the initial shift away from laissez-faire policies and rapidly became coupled with psychiatric assessment, all in the name of managing ‘public health.’

By 1905 the position of Minister of the Interior had been inherited by Frank Oliver, whose primary objectives included the introduction of measures to deal directly with the so-called undesirables. These objectives were made evident in Oliver’s 1906 Immigration Act, which defined the ‘undesirable’ and ‘inadmissible’ as the insane, epileptic, deaf and dumb, blind, infirm, contagious, pauper, destitute, prostitute, pimp and convict of crimes of moral turpitude (Kelley, 2010, 136). Though physical ailments had already been evoked as a justification for exclusion or expulsion, this new legislation formally bound diseases of the body with those of the mind and morality. More precisely, what was declared mentally and morally defective were those precise characteristics that worked against the construct of ‘white’ liberal capacity. Indeed, it was a genetic failure of character to exercise the qualities associated with liberal nationhood, which led, in the minds of policy makers, health practitioners and the general public, to conditions of cognitive and bodily disease.

**Policing Whiteness: The Internal Frontier and Exclusion**

However, as I have already established, ‘racialized’ immigration could not be absolutely excluded. Yet practices at the border did serve to impress upon subjects their legal precarity and differential status as they entered the Canadian state. Given the wide availability of land, however, the tangential inclusion of Asian labour throughout the late nineteenth and early

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15 My focus in each case is on the predominant group of racialized immigrants. However, I would be remiss to exclude any mention of, for example, the Italian in Canada. As in Argentina, Italian immigrants were viewed as racially ‘other,’ and in Canada differentiated on the basis of being unsuitable for settlement. Italians were only to be included as (initially) a transient labour supply. Thus for example, in *Strangers Within our Gates* (1909), Woodsworth describes “An Italian! The figure that flashes before the mind’s eye is probably that of an organ-
twentieth century continued to stoke the fear of Asian immigration and its impact on the ‘white settler.’ The threat of shared social space was too close for comfort. Indeed, Charles Wilson of the BC legislature commented in 1882 that, “we must not overlook the fact that we are establishing a white country” (cited in Dua, 2007, 447). These fears peaked in the first decade of the twentieth century (notably with the anti-Chinese riots in Vancouver, 1907, speared by the Asiatic Exclusion League)—a period that marked the rising ascendency of eugenics as a science of population management (McLaren, 1990, 23-30). Once more, the links between public health, race management and nation building are evident. However, in Canada, public health management assumed a different form than it did in Argentina; assimilation was out of the question, and thus practices rooted in a fear of biological contamination predominated.

The eugenics movement in Canada, which peaked in the 1890s and 1920s, reflected the concern that the health of society was the sum effect of the ‘health’ of individuals (MacKenzie, 1976, 500-02; Aldrich, 1975, 34). This acknowledgement revealed the tension in bourgeois theory, as the maintenance of public health would necessarily come into conflict with laissez-faire doctrine (Bashford, 2004, 51). Rather, states were required to manage both population and economy; in Canada, this practice drew upon the administrative and legal capacity consolidated during the early nation-building phase.

grinder with his monkey . . . we see dark, uncertain figures, and someone whispers, “the Mafia – the Black Hand” (160). And this distinction manifests in the relative freedom or unfreedom of movement for Italians; as MP William Lucas of the United Farmers of Alberta Party argued, “I would say we must not move towards too free a movement among certain Italians, if you need them, for settlement; if you need them for railways or for digging drains you cannot get anything better than the Italians” (cited in Fitzgerald et al., 2014, 158). Thus, while I deal with Asian immigration to Canada as the dominant example of exclusionary policy, the reader should bear in mind that the dual-streaming of immigration (those to settle and assimilate, those to labour and be maintained apart) applied beyond Asians alone, and extended to Italian, Ukranians and other central-southern Europeans who were to be imported for rail and mine work, but thought generally unassimilable (Wayland, 1997, 37).
In Canada, public health assumed the position that the “overall physical, mental and moral well-being in the interest of usefulness to the nation” (Sears, 1990, 97), which consisted of personal sovereignty and the exercise of rational, individual will (Malleck, 1997, 268). While none of this was particularly new, in contrast to Argentina where an environmental model of race predominated, Canada retained a biologically deterministic view of race which saw moral, mental and physical ailments as hereditary and thus not curable through educational and assimilationist strategies. The key to maintaining the health of the nation, then, lay in controlling the genetic make-up and purity of the population. This objective figured itself into policies concerning immigration, sterilization, hospitalization, and miscegenation, among other things.

Perhaps the first of these to become prominent was the threat of Asian sexuality. Indeed this ‘threat’ pervaded public and political debate throughout the final decades of the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth. According to Peter Ward, Chinese women were commonly thought to be either prostitutes or concubines and were frequently presented as preying on the ‘innocent youth,’ corrupting their moral and mental integrity. Indeed, frequent reference was made to the descent into so-called lunacy that these ‘innocent youth’ suffered after a visit to a brothel in the Chinese quarter (Ward, 2002, 8-9). According to this lore, then, the white men entered a brothel ‘rational and civilized,’ in full possession of their mental capacities, but would come back depraved, uncivilized, psychologically and mentally disturbed and beyond rationality. During this period, social policy sought to link infectious disease with mental health in so much as the former was thought to trigger the latter, particularly in the case of STDs (Chadha, 2008). Indeed, as it turns out, what many of these men were leaving brothels with was, unsurprisingly, syphilis, the spread of which indisputably predated the rise of the Chinese brothel in the West.
Nevertheless, Chinese prostitution continued to evoke the idea of moral and mental depravity, which threatened the social health of the nation.

Along with the fear of prostitutes’ impact on the health of individual citizens, further concerns were raised regarding Chinese sexuality and its threat to the racial stock of the nation. Again, this threat was construed in ways that consistently painted the Chinese as of another, discrete form of being which lacked the morality, discipline and rationality of the ‘white race.’

As Comeau has commented, “the darker, presumably non-Northern races were thought to be prone to sexual excess, and their reproductive potential was believed to threaten the order of the whole nation” (as cited in Comeau, 2001, 154). The idea of sexual deviance being linked to an anti-liberal character is further supported by Valverde, who suggests that the undesirable immigrants were understood as ‘‘savages’, that is, people who could not control their sexual desires and were thus unlikely to lead orderly and civilized lives, saving for rainy days and postponing gratification” (cited in Valverde, 2008, 177). Thus, fears of miscegenation were not simply about the phenotypical consequences of ‘mixing’ but rather were profoundly linked to a fear of the spread of (assumed) genetic predispositions, which did not support the thrift, grit and self-regulation required of a liberal economy. These supposed threats stemmed from both the idea of prostitution, under which conditions many argued for the need to restrict Chinese female immigration, as well as from the very fact of single male immigration, in which case the threat was posed by the potential coupling of lonely Chinese men with ‘innocent white’ women (Dua, 2007, 446).

The treatment of Chinese male sexuality suggested there was something reprehensible and morally vacuous about the ability of these men to migrate to Canada without their families, while at the same time vehemently opposing the introduction of familial migration (which was
legally prohibited). Thus, the Chinese man was somehow morally deficient, barbarous and uncivilized in his assumption of familial responsibilities. The outcome of this supposed character deficiency was the influx of a population of single men whose solitude in Canada would ostensibly lead to the sexual abuse of young ‘white’ women or the solicitation of ‘white’ female prostitutes. This fear was so widespread that it even led to the proposal in a House of Commons debate on the 1885 Report on the Royal Commission that the solution to the specter of the single Asian male was to officially promote sexual relations between Chinese men and indigenous women (Dua, 2007, 155). While this proposal was eventually rejected, it nevertheless suggests a strong eugenic current within the sorting of Canadian immigration policy, which relegated deeply racialized forms of exclusion to Asian immigrants based on familial, sexual and moral tropes. In the project of building Canadian settler colonial nationality, legal border exclusions were selectively deployed in order to enforce the transience of Asian immigrants, while simultaneously fostering wide public outrage and panic over the moral and physical specter of the racialized immigrant. This panic allowed both the needs of capital and race nationalists to be satisfied. The conditions of progress and economic development could be achieved through the strict regulation of racialized immigrant labour, while the national population remained ‘white’ through legal measures that ensured the temporary and segregated nature of the racially-coded immigrants (i.e. through the prevention of female and family migration).

Aside from the prevention of female and family migration, further mechanisms drawing on the psychiatric, medicinal and criminal systems were generated to limit, constrain and eject the ‘non-preferred’ classes of immigrants. These mechanisms, which found expression in policy and legal code, were selectively enforced such that they allowed for the attraction and retention of a labour-force subject (who could and would be expelled when the requirements of the market
shifted) to myriad forms of coercion. In so much as this was the case, a tentative reconciliation between the needs of capital and broader aspirations to economic development and nationalist forces could be reached.

The introduction of the Act to Prohibit the Importation, Manufacture and Sale of Opium for Other than Medical Purposes (The Opium Act) in 1908 should be read in this light. The Act was erected, in large part, to target and *expel* Chinese workers when their utility to the labour market had been exceeded. As Malleck points out, drug and opium addiction had a place in the Canadian state long before the so-called deluge of Chinese labourers, and in so much as this was the case, it is necessary to read the Opium Act as a concerted effort to render temporary the so-called threat of the Chinese to the body politic of Canada. The construct of the Chinese opium addict was, in large, connected to broader cultural stigma of slavery and oppression which had been attributed to the Chinese, considering their supposed capacity and seeming willingness to work under conditions of effective servitude in Canada. Opiate addiction was further read in this light and was linked to an inherent genetic failure of individual character to postpone immediate gratification. This failure, it was said, led to an inability to work hard, save, and exert control over one’s baser, bodily needs. In short, the Chinese opiate addict was a ‘slave’ to his base needs, rather than an enlightened and rational actor whose foresight allowed for him to contribute to the long-term goals of the national project (Malleck, 1997, 267-70).

With regards to the ‘white’ population, the Chinese opium dens were seen to threaten the physical and mental virility of the national population, which was manifest in terms of the loss of self-control and foresight, but further in the decline of the physical vigour of the settlers in terms of their labouring and reproductive capacities (as opium addiction was linked to a decline in sterility). Thus, the Opium Act would impose upon violators a $1000 fine or three years of
imprisonment. This latter strategy, in light of the 1906 Immigration Act, would in turn allow for the deportation of Chinese labourers once their labouring capacity was determined to be compromised (Malleck, 1997, 271-73).

In the late nineteenth century, leprosy in Canada was construed as a public health crisis in which moralization of the disease in connection to race and nation was the primary mover. While smallpox and tuberculosis were far more communicable and rampant than leprosy, only leprosy evoked drastic responses in its ‘containment’ measures, which were largely removed from any medical concern. Indeed, popular medical science at the time held that leprosy was not communicable and hence should not result in forcible segregation and quarantine. That the dominant response to leprosy consisted of such measures, as Bashford notes, should direct us to the functional utility of public health instruments as forms of racial management (2004, 88).

That the leprosy panic was one of racial contamination rather than biological threat can be evidenced by BC’s extreme response in the form of the D’Arcy Island Asylum, a leper colony that operated on an island off the coast of Vancouver from 1891 to 1924. In 1872, an amendment to the Dominion’s Quarantine Act provided City Health Officials with the legal means to apprehend and isolate anyone suspected of being infected with leprosy. Yet, leprosy’s symptoms were often confused with those of other common diseases and as a result this amendment provided an easy means for targeting and removing racialized subjects from the population. In 1891, this amendment culminated in the opening of the D’Arcy Island Asylum, which emerged out of a proposal by the mayor of Victoria that allowed for the coercive removal and indefinite segregation of those suffering from leprosy. The asylum, however, very clearly had little to do

16 Sec. 33 stipulates that, "Whenever in Canada an immigrant has, within two years of his landing in Canada, become a public charge, or an inmate of a penitentiary, gaol, prison, or hospital or other charitable institution, it shall be the duty of the clerk or secretary of the municipality to forthwith notify the Minister . . . . with a view to the deportation of such immigrant.”
with medical concerns. Rather, those exiled to the island were almost exclusively Chinese (though racialized Japanese also formed part of this population) and received no medical treatment or pain relief. By 1906, when the federal government assumed control over D’Arcy Island, though treatment became a part of the asylum’s purview, the deportation of (suspected) carriers was also introduced. Indeed, Mawami (2003) argues that the asylum’s apotheosis was as a deportation detention center. Until its closing in 1924, 21 inmates were deported, of which 20 were Chinese and the last a Japanese man (Mawani, 2003). These findings are consistent with Bashford’s argument (2004) about the different objectives of public health spaces. In Canada, the management of leprosy contrasts with the variety of public health asylums and sanitoriums that arose in Argentina, where the objective was ‘productive’ in the sense of promoting racial assimilation. Instead, the leper colony was a form of public health segregation operating on the basis that assimilation was not possible, and contact was subversive and dangerous—hybridity was to be avoided at all costs (Bashford, 2004, 89).

**The Threat of Shared Social Space: Exclusion, Segregation and Deportation**

In contrast to Argentina, immigrants to Canada were funneled through a dual immigration recruitment program which distinguished between the racially assimilable and non-assimilable populations. As in Argentina, the tools for policing the racial unity of the nation from the immigrant ‘threat’ were dominantly public health apparatuses. This is consistent with the broader trajectory of settler colonial racial thinking during this period, which bound biology, culture, and health. As Bashford (2004) has shown, the racialization of public health measures and discourses throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was productive of national political bodies. I have shown how these practices contributed to the production of internal and external spatial boundaries, legitimizing the state and its territorial authority and
integrity. However, unlike in Argentina, in Canada these measures sought to segregate and eject the ‘diseased’ rather than educate them into assimilation. These distinctions can be read as the difference between naturalist and historicist racial regimes, identified by Goldberg (239). In the latter case, marginalized populations are seen as biologically (and always) inferior and hence a permanent threat to the body politic. I suggested throughout this chapter that this distinction (in contrast to a more historicist, assimilatory regime in Argentina) can be read as a product of the social property relations established in the early phases of ‘white’ nation building in Canada. Canadian nation building, in short, produced social property relations which were reliant upon, and welcoming to, agrarian immigrant settlers (of the ‘appropriate racial stock’). Because permanent settlement was a possibility, immigration could not remain open-door; there needed to be mechanisms for marking out and excluding those deemed ‘racially undesirable.’

The 1906 Immigration Act to exclude or deport on the basis of mental and physical defect was a legal basis for creating endogenous forms of racialized exclusion from the body politic of ‘white Canada.’ That exclusion was applied within the state as the consequence of the tension between a need for labourers willing to contribute what ‘white’ settlers would not and the need to police the boundaries of racial inclusion. Legally defined exclusions could be applied in a post-hoc fashion after the immigrant in question had contributed his or her labour, rather than being used to exclude racialized immigrants altogether. The key to this new practice were stipulations concerning deportation, which allowed for the ejection of any immigrant found to violate public health standards within two years of admittance (Immigration Act, 1906). Thus, the application of medical, psychiatric and eugenic criteria for immigration and citizenship effectively enabled the inclusion of racialized populations within Canada’s labour markets, while marking off these same groups from the project of nation building. Racism did not simply
operate to exclude certain groups—such groups were in fact integral to the building of a national economy and peoples. Their inclusion, however, was one circumscribed by myriad forms of racialized conditionality such that, in the long run, many faced political isolation and exclusion from citizenship, which relied on “the candidate’s ascribed aptitude for reasoned, rational, and intelligent participation in public and private affairs” (Menzies, 1998, 140).

In contrast to Argentina, then, Canadian immigration proceeded through a system of dual streaming and management. The wide and cheap availability of land in settler-colonial Canada, owing to the state’s effective monopoly, meant that incoming immigrants, if given the freedom of political membership and rights, could all, with relative ease, acquire property in the state and establish a permanent presence in the Canadian landscape. Equality of political membership, then, needed to be carefully circumscribed and conditioned so as to maintain the stability and sanctity of the fabric that bound together the nation—whiteness. At the same time, given the consolidation and centralization of state fiduciary and bureaucratic capacity, the means through which to administer a broadly federal program of immigrant segregation and labour subjugation were much more readily available than in Argentina.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have argued that to understand immigrant subjectivities, a focus on cultural adaptation and/or refusal (vis-à-vis hybridity) cannot provide an adequate picture in the absence of a sustained and material analysis of relations of power. In fact, the concept of hybridity, as with many of the conceptual foundations of postcolonial theory, tends to take for granted—even fetishize—liberal individualism and pluralism. What is critically missing from theories of hybridity is an analysis of the unequal relations of power that promote or inhibit hybridity. It is ultimately through recourse to material analyses of power and production that it
becomes possible to explain how and for what reasons some subjects are constructed as frozen in their ‘difference’ while others are afforded the flexibility to adapt or assimilate. Furthermore, without such an analysis, it is not possible to ascertain whether hybridity will proceed as a matter of coercion, or whether it will proceed through a voluntary process of incorporation. With its focus on discourse and individual level analyses, postcolonial theory is not able to consider the wider landscape of power relations which give hybridity its content.

Through my analysis of Argentine and Canadian practices of immigrant recruitment, I have shown that the uneven and combined processes of state formation in the context of indigenous dispossession influenced the form and extent of state and class power which would bear upon immigrant management strategies. When it came time to activate a policy of immigrant recruitment, each state was endowed with differential capacities to recruit and retain immigrants and police the boundaries of the racial nation.

In Argentina, the politics of policing racial purity entailed greater emphasis on assimilation. Rather than reading this emphasis as a product of the relative assumptions of ‘civility’ attributed to Italian and Spanish, compared to Chinese populations, it is instead instructive to look to the material conditions that determined the scope of possible actions the state could pursue. Being unable to assert an effective monopoly on national territories, the state was forced to pursue an open door immigration policy, characterized by circular patterns of immigration from Southern Europe. This approach meant that the ‘protection’ of racial nationhood occurred through a variety of internal mechanisms of forcible integration and assimilation. Thus, the necessity of casting a wide net for immigration prevented the construct of racial otherness from outright foreclosing the possibility of assimilation. In Argentina, the ‘environmental’ over the ‘biological’ construct of race more easily supported the economic
objectives of the state, and ‘white’ nation building proceeded through a positive pattern of eugenics. In Canada, where the extant property and class relations enabled a permanent settlement of migrants, the state sought to construct a legal hierarchy of immigrant groups, developing strategies of active expulsion and exclusion from the subject population in order to police the boundaries of desirable and undesirable immigration. In Canada, the existence of permanent forms of immigration along with the relatively greater state financial and bureaucratic capacity made the refusal of assimilation the preferred strategy for maintaining national ‘whiteness.’ The relative proximity and possibility of permanence for racialized immigrants led to a favouring of ‘biological’ over ‘environmental’ constructs of race.

These different strategies, furthermore, established and entrenched state forms inasmuch as the Argentine state continued to rely, predominantly, on the coercive apparatus of the state to enforce racial nationhood, while the Canadian state pursued these ends through a system of bureaucratic administration and official policies of legal exclusion. When examining developments of state form in the proceeding century, Argentina adopted the symbol of a ‘melting pot’ (*cresol de razas*), whereas in Canada, later state forms came to embrace ‘multiculturalism.’ These differences are not simply cosmetic, but point to very different state strategies to maintain the racial boundaries of ‘whiteness’ while officially denying its salience; the one ignores all that is different while the latter politically enunciates difference. These differences are consequential in that indigenous and immigrant populations in each state face different obstacles, and require different strategies to dismantle racial-colonial oppression. The implications of this differentiation will be more fully explored in the conclusion. The manner in which ‘hybridity’ figures into these state forms is not a neutral matter, and cannot be abstracted from these historical and material conditions.
Conclusion

Following the achievements of the civil rights era, many Western societies gradually slipped into a comfortable, post-racial rhetoric. With the extension of legal rights and equality of political membership to racialized peoples, race, as with class, was assumed to be a thing of the past (Bonilla-Silva, 2006, 3). Official state policy and legal codes adopted race neutrality, while most whites claimed that they ‘did not see colour, only people.’ As official racial imagery declined in its representativeness of ‘the nation,’ it was replaced with imagery such as the ‘salad bowl of multiculturalism,’ and the ‘melting pot’ of assimilation. Liberal pluralism served to neutralize difference, though it did not mean the abandonment of exclusionary practice. Instead, difference was emptied of its political content and replaced with the relatively neutral and banal ‘diversity’ (Bannerji, 2000, 18). As Glen Coulthard has shown, the politics of ‘diversity’ have served to reproduce the very real material colonial inequalities they were intended to resolve (2014). This is because the legacy of exclusionary and racialized practices is embedded and enduring.

As I have argued throughout this dissertation, racialized hierarchies of political belonging and/or exclusion have been central to the very constitution of the state, its institutions, and its bureaucratic, disciplinary, and policy proclivities. While overt racialized practices receded for a period, the institutions of the state have remained thoroughly racialized. The roots of these ostensibly liberal institutions have always been undergirded by illiberal policies of coercion and exclusion, which in the settler state are understood in racial terms. Because, as Patrick Wolfe notes, settler colonialism is a structure, not an event, these formative conditions must be consistently reproduced, as indigenous populations are never fully eliminated, and consequently persist in threatening the alien sovereignty of the state.
Throughout this study, I have argued that central to the constitution of racialized national subjectivities was the uneven and combined development of capitalist social property relations. Conceptually and theoretically I have advanced a defence of Marxist historiography through Political Marxism and the complementary insights provided in Trotsky’s theory of uneven and combined development. This defense was advanced in light of the proliferation of postcolonial studies and analyses which condemn Marxism for its ostensible universalist and homogenizing assumptions. As an alternative to Marxist ‘universals,’ the postcolonial school has launched a research program that emphasizes heterogeneous localisms through an analysis largely derived from the politically and economically emptied category of culture. The postcolonial gaze, in fact, generates much of the same racial (class, and gender) blindness we find in liberal pluralist constructs such as multiculturalism and the melting pot.

In the first chapter, against the claims of postcolonial theorists such as Chakrabarty, I made the argument on a theoretical level that there was no need to assume that an analysis of inequity through Marxist historiography necessitates the assumed imposition of European norms, benchmarks, and political attitudes onto the colonized world. I argued instead that, when approached from the perspective of social property relations, Marxist analyses can shed considerable light on the formation of subjectivities in a manner that does not presuppose an inherent and automatic liberal, wage-dependent, politically equal subject. The work of Robert Brenner, Robbie Shilliam, Ellen Wood, and Larry Patriquin, all working from the standpoint of social property relations, reveals the so-called quintessential political subject of capitalism to in fact be an historical contingency—even an anomaly. I then argued that once set into motion, the liberal subject of England modified capital accumulation in such a way that it produced internal tensions and contradictions which required, as their solution, the broadening of the horizon of
capitalist social relations. Understanding how capitalist social relations were extended to and transformed non-capitalist spaces, including for our purposes the settler colonies, requires an analysis of societal transformations through the concept of uneven and combined development. Thus, I argued that capitalist social relations were adapted to uneven social arrangements, and when attempts were made to organize a national, globally competitive agrarian commodity production structure, they necessarily encountered and combined with radically different social class relations. In the end, novel substitutions were required to develop a political state capable of directing socio-economic transformations.

In the second chapter, I gave this theoretical sketch more sustained historical examination. Specifically, I examined the trajectory from the erection of the so-called liberal political subject in England, to the centralization and rationalization of state institutions, to the crisis of accumulation of the 1840s, and finally to the resolution that was found in a transformation of the world economy and the colonization of temperate regions predominantly based in the Atlantic. I demonstrated how this colonialism was profoundly different from all that had come before, and argued that its impact on the development of global political economy was singular. With settler colonization came a fundamental drive to transform rather than command existing social arrangements, radically altering the relationship between social classes and land. These changes were the basis for generating the first globally competitive capitalist market, wherein the national organization of political economy became a central strategy of managing for competitiveness. Importantly, this chapter established the historical basis for the ‘Atlantic vector’ of uneven and combined development, arguing that, contrary to postcolonial critics, this deployment of Marxist historiography recognizes, indeed views as inevitable, the differential nature of capitalist transformations outside of England. The nature of the 1840s crisis, and its
resolution, transformed the global economy in ways that necessarily constituted different conditions for the transformation of non-capitalist spaces.

In the third chapter, I argued that the transformation of global economic conditions, imposed on settler colonial spaces, had significant political consequences regarding the consolidation of the state. Whereas in England, the enclosures of common land to produce a structure of private property resulted in a population primarily dependent on wage labour, and the management and discipline of such labour led to a vast centralized system of state bureaucracy, the paths of settler colonies were profoundly different. In the first instance, dispossession was carried out against a population marked for elimination and exclusion. Rather than transforming the dispossessed into wage labour, the resistance of indigenous peoples and their ontological view of land as social, common, and inseparable from the body itself made them an inassimilable force which was targeted for expulsion, elimination and invisibilization. Second, the class context in which these processes occurred, and the class forces that effected indigenous genocide, created obstacles to political unification. In response, state builders sought to both justify indigenous extermination and bind together a political population over which and from which sovereign rule could be exerted, through discourses and practices of nationalism. Unlike in England, then, nationalism became the primary means for organizing and producing a version of capitalist social relations. In the context of a geographically dispersed and politically fragmented population, appeals to shared, ancestral whiteness were advanced to politically unify the colony of settlers. This argument was positioned in dialogue with theories of nationalism advanced by Anderson and Chatterjee, both of whom, for their own reasons, rejected the capacity of Marxist analyses to account for nationalism.
In the fourth chapter I addressed more pointedly the construction of racial nationalism, and the ways in which stratified, coerced relations of subjectivity are consistent with the capitalist mode of production. Thus capitalism is not simply the effect of capital and labour, but the effect of a politically constituted relationship between capital, labour and land. I further demonstrated how efforts to dispossess and racialize indigenous populations established state institutional and ideological developments which differed in both Canada and Argentina owing to the historical conditions of class reproduction. This chapter addressed itself specifically to the postcolonial preoccupation with the subaltern, a category that postcolonial scholars have argued can account for what Marxists allegedly miss: those who do not fit into the binary of capital/labour. The idea of subalternity has been cautiously taken up by some in critical indigenous studies to account for indigenous political status in settler colonial, capitalist states. This account, however, is lacking in that it a) buys into the myth of capitalism as a purely economic system, whereas the Marxist framework I have deployed accounts for capitalism in its totality of social, cultural, political and economic forces, and b) inscribes a form of universal subjectivity and vilifies all traditional cultural practices as colonial. In this way, the subaltern position misses what is central to the status and oppression of indigenous peoples in settler colonial states: access to and control over land. The relationship of indigenous peoples to land, far from externalizing them to the history of settler capitalism, is precisely that which is used to give form to the settler subject. ‘Whiteness’ and ‘civility’ constituted a decidedly non-indigenous approach to land. This is true both in the ways settlers imposed upon indigenous peoples, and in the ways that indigenous groups resisted and reacted against such impositions.

In the fifth and final chapter, I turned to the racialization of immigrant groups and confronted the postcolonial category of hybridity. My goal in this chapter was to first counter the
utility of ‘hybridity’ as an analytical category, arguing that the heterogeneity of so-called hybridity is itself inscribed by socio-economic and political relations of power. As such, hybridity is a self-evident banality, which describes rather than critically analyzes or explains the variegation of political-economic and social subjectivities. In the second instance, my goal in this chapter was to situate immigrant and minority racialization in a shared conceptual framework with indigenous racialization, while nevertheless acknowledging the profound differences in the social relations that constitute each group’s exclusion. I argued that the ways in which immigrants were racialized and excluded, the models along which exclusion occurred and the state instruments that were deployed and/or developed to these ends, were themselves the product of the outcome of indigenous-settler relations, and the uneven and combined development of property relations within a global capitalist market. The degree to which formal, legal and bureaucratic mechanisms of segregation and expulsion—versus strategies of assimilation—predominated relied upon the differential balance of social property and class relations in the settler state.

Where land was theoretically freely available for occupation, and state centralization was robustly and institutionally entrenched (Canada), legal policies of segregation and expulsion predominated. Thus the illiberal presuppositions of Canadian liberalism chiefly took form through juridical and bureaucratic practices. That is, named exclusions with a focus on isolating, policing, and deporting difference predominated. Conversely, in Argentina, where a landed class held a monopoly on land, immigrants were consequently temporary, and the state was institutionally weak. Here the illiberal presuppositions of liberal state formation were rooted in coercive and carceral strategies of assimilation, of making difference invisible, and of forcing the adaptation of ‘white’ values and behaviours. These measures were largely decentralized, taking
effect at provincial and local levels while being framed and directed by broader national objectives.

The conclusions reached by the end of the fifth chapter point us to the contemporary relevance of this research. In Argentina, the contemporary language of race neutrality is promoted through an assimilationist model of political membership—the *cresol de razas* (broadly, melting pot). In Canada, however, a different model of race neutrality predominates in its celebration and solidification of ‘difference,’ which is translated into the politically neutered ‘culture,’ and which finds form in multiculturalism. Historically, this difference pivoted around the perceived threat of shared social spaces; in Argentina, the long-term threat of shared social and political space was muted by the de facto transience of labour immigration. There was little concern that Italian immigrants, for example, would pose a permanent threat to racial purity. Rather, because of their temporary, non-citizen status, efforts were made to whitewash any temporary demographic deviation from the ‘white’ dream. Assimilationist training and education could achieve this dream by either hiding or transforming ‘racial deviance’ with the expectation that such norms could be passed on to future sojourners. In Canada, because the state possessed a monopoly on land and its cheapness made it potentially attainable by the so-called undesirable ‘races,’ strategies of immigrant assimilation posed a real threat of permanent racial contamination. Rather than whitewash difference, then, the strategy of Canadian nation builders was to deliberately strengthen and ossify constructs of difference, and subject them to legal forms of exclusion.

Now, during the latter decades of the twentieth century, a shift occurred throughout much of the world to present a formal policy of inclusiveness and non-discrimination. The discriminatory and illiberal foundations of liberalism have become much more elusive. However,
something of import remains. In Argentina, as in the past, there is still a focus on sameness, such that official statistics rarely record the racial makeup of the nation. In 2001, for example, government sources reported that Argentina was 97 percent white and three percent mestizo (HRDC, 2001). However, indigenous peoples alone are thought to make up at least four percent of the population, while the even more extensively (bureaucratically) eliminated Afro-Argentine population are not even recorded. In Argentina, the rights of full citizenship are heavily circumscribed by measures of assimilation, and within the span of the twenty-first century, policies have made school children wear white dust coats over their clothes (which could ostensibly mark ‘foreignness’), and even prohibited parents from giving their children ‘exotic’ names. The pervasiveness of the myth of white Argentina is such that any visible, non-white minority is generally understood to be ‘foreign’ irrespective of status, and as a result, their struggles, exclusions, and disadvantages are not a matter of state (Grimson, 2005). To fight for the institution and protection of minority rights, after all, requires that the state first recognize the existence of minorities within the national population.

In Canada, difference has been enshrined in national law, but it has been largely translated into a politically vacuous category. While the right to linguistic and cultural equality and access to services that accord with those differences is necessary, it is not a sufficient means of addressing racialized inequality. At its core, racialized inequality remains a matter of politically and economically mediated status, which continues to impose limitations on and obstacles to the rights and opportunities of membership. The roots of inequality in Canada, predicated on race, continue to be based on conditions and practices entrenched in the Constitution and institutions of the state. While respect for indigenous culture may be formally recognized and can, in some spaces, contribute to addressing aspects of inequality,
fundamentally the issue at hand and the means through which subordinate subjectivity is racially inscribed and reproduced remains: that is, the foreign assertion of sovereignty over occupied lands (Coulthard, 2014, Pasternak, 2016). At the same time, for many racialized immigrants today, while an appearance (one that is quickly eroding) of inclusive and welcoming culture frames immigration, the continued legal forms of inclusion and exclusion tied to labouring occupations and racialized bodies remains (Ferguson & McNally, 2015; Walia, 2010). Even through this ostensibly benign ‘post-racial’ period, access to membership and the rights and protections of the state continue to be determined by racialized constructs of labouring bodies and the policing of their impermanence.

However, in the twenty-first century, there appears to be a resurgence of the formally exclusive and at times violent models of statehood. My argument throughout this dissertation has been that such exclusionary models are constitutive of formal liberal equality, rather than an aberration from it. As such, my analysis points to the essential continuity of recent surges of illiberal politics, rather than their rupture with some pristine period of liberal inclusion. Importantly, the argument I have presented demonstrates that exclusionary practices are bound into the legitimizing project of nationalism and state consolidation in the service of capitalist accumulation. As the conditions for capitalist accumulation change, so too do the conditions through which state power and legitimacy can be stabilized. To this end it should be noted that recent surges in xenophobic, racist and exclusionary politics have been coincident with the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008.

The examples of this violence and exclusion that I cite in my introduction must be read against the backdrop of the financial crisis, but not as a rupture in the liberal order. Rather, I would suggest that moving forward, it is important to attend to the ways in which the conditions
of global economic recovery have precipitated a reformulation of the content and extent of state power and sovereignty such that models of political membership and geopolitical organization have also been transformed. Current articulations of exclusionary population management, I would argue, are indicative of the renewed struggles and legitimizing practices necessary to secure state legitimacy in the interests of stabilizing liberal political regimes and renewing capitalist accumulation.

Significantly, two changes in the global economy have generated obstacles to states’ recovery and development strategies which bear upon the reconstitution of subjectivities: the end of cheap food and the end of cheap fuel. Because both food (wage-goods) and fuel (productive inputs) are instrumental in determining the efficiency of production, the end of these cheap inputs has imposed severe limits on states’ recovery and future growth. In this light, two parallel strategies have served as the new ‘development and growth’ model; the substitution of trade in food and fuel for direct access to such inputs (often labelled land-grabbing) as well as a general shift from accumulation through productive activities, to accumulation through financialization (McMichael, 2013; Moore, 2010).

To secure non-market access to fuel and food resources, states and firms alike are increasingly engaged in large-scale land expropriation. Economic recovery and growth has therefore resulted in a new cycle of global dispossession (Ferguson & McNally, 2015; Moore, 2015; Moore, 2010). States are thus faced with the question of how to legitimize such disposessions, and then manage those made extraneous by so-called development (Pasternak, 2016; Simpson, 2016). The question that should be posed moving forward is: how are the boundaries of liberal political inclusion being reconfigured today, and with what consequences for conventional categories of political membership?
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