SECULAR BODYSCAPES:
CORPOREAL AND EMOTIONAL INTERSECTIONS OF SECURITY AND SECULARISM IN THE TURKISH MILITARY

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the security discourses of the Turkish military from the 1980s to 2000s in relation to the rise of political Islam and explores the sexual and corporeal co-constructions of security and secularism in protection of the sovereignty of the modern Turkish nation-state. As a grassroots identity movement, political Islam has always been perceived as a threat to secularism, as a political principle and a cultural practice, since the beginning of the Turkish Republic (1923). However, particularly from the 1980s onwards, Islamism gained power in party politics and cultural visibility in public space and it entered the Turkish military’s security agenda. In its capacity as the guardian of the republic, the Turkish military constituted a crucial force in securitization of Islamism both in political platforms, in public space and within the military structure with expressive reference to embodiment of such risk by women’s Islamic headscarf.

This research examines the security discourses of the Turkish military through the bodily and emotional experiences of women in military families in order to understand the sexual and corporeal constructions of political Islam as a threat to national security. I analyze the results of ethnographic research conducted in Turkey in 2011, which includes participant observations in military bases in Mugla and Istanbul, in-depth interviews with wives and daughters of the currently active and former military officers, as well as my experiences as a researcher from a military family. I explore how female subjectivity is positioned at the intersection of religious and secular discourses and how the military’s security discourse identified, regulated and excluded particular manifestations of religious identity by designating them as risk to national security. By looking at women’s everyday, bodily and emotional experiences I demonstrate that
the security regulations of the military operate at the same time as secular risk governance. I reveal how the security discourses of the Turkish military take place within the larger frame of secular governmentality, which aims to securitize spaces through bodies and emotions.

Research findings demonstrate that women’s bodies and their sexual identities are shaped at the merger of security discourses that are based and build upon particular constructions of secularism in Turkey. Examination of women’s corporeal and emotional experiences in military spaces, particularly in relation to the military regulations on Islamic headscarf, reveal how the female body is constructed as the ground on which secular/religious distinctions become clarified. I discuss the centrality of corporeal and emotional dispositions in creating the vagueness and ambiguities that secularism dwells on. Through the concept of secular bodyscapes, I demonstrate how corporeal and emotional constructions of spaces operate in the exercise of modern sovereignty in the shape of military authority.
Dedication

To my beloved grandmother Sükran Arık...

and my wonderful mother Hacer Arık
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

On June 27th, 2013, the Turkish parliament passed a bill that significantly redefined the purpose of the Turkish military (“TSK’nın 35. Maddesi Değişti - 30 Temmuz 2013” 2014). This bill restricts the military’s involvement in domestic threats and redirects its authority towards external ones. In other words, it puts an end to the political autonomy of the military, and shifts the political control that the Turkish military has had over civilian politics for decades to parliament.1 From the 1980s onwards, political Islam was the primary domestic security threat for the military, signalled by the growing power of Islamist political parties and the increasing visibility of headscarved women in public space. The Turkish military perceived this significant political and cultural transformation as a risk of Islamization that threatened the accomplishments of secular modernity. The military therefore securitized Islamist identities in the spaces and organizational structure of the military. The Turkish military focused, in particular, on the representations of women’s bodies and their headscarves, extending and embedding institutional security regulations into everyday life. An intense and extremely gendered political polarization was created between Islamist and secularist discourses by the military. Such influence continues to shape the Turkish socio-political landscape by reinforcing a religious/secular divide over the categories of security and risk in sexually and corporeally specific ways in daily life.

1 According to article 35 of the Internal Service Regulations the original task definition of the Turkish Armed Forces read, “The military is responsible for defending both the Turkish Father-land and the Turkish Republic as defined by the Constitution.” This was changed in the following way: “To protect the Turkish mainland against the threats coming from outside, to reinforce the military power of the Turkish state and to discourage such threats and dangers from outside, to carry out tasks as authorized by the parliament abroad and to help maintain international peace.” (“TSK’nın 35. Maddesi Değişti - 30 Temmuz 2013” 2014).
In this dissertation, I examine the security discourses of the Turkish military from the 1980s to end of the 2000s to explore the sexual and corporeal co-constructions of security and secularism within the modern Turkish nation-state. The Turkish military is the main security actor of the Turkish state and the guarantor of its sovereignty, whose task in the last few decades has been to protect and safeguard secularism in response to Islamist politics and identities (Sakallioglu 1996; 1997; Akca and Balta-Paker 2013). I explore the sexual and corporeal constructions of security and risk by looking at the social and official regulation of military spaces through the voices and lived experiences of women in military families, the wives and daughters of commissioned and non-commissioned officers (CO and NCO hereafter). I investigate the enclosed and securitized social spaces that the military provides for its personnel in the form of residences, schools, health and social facilities either within or adjacent to military headquarters. Through the everyday, bodily and emotional experiences of the wives and daughters of military officers, I reveal how security regulations of the military operate at the same time as secular risk governance. My positionality also influences my research and my own ethnographic observations as the daughter of a retired non-commissioned officer. I analyze how security discourses of the Turkish military fit within the larger frame of secular governmentality in the protection and maintenance of modern sovereignty.

I explore gendered constructions of secular governmentality through ethnographic research in military bases in Turkey. I particularly examine the entrance regulations in military spaces that govern the style of the Islamic headscarf and pressures on officers’ wives and daughters for removal of the headscarf; surveillance over religious observance and lifestyle through house visits and in social spaces; testing of sakincali (suspicious) and potentially irticai (fundamentalist) individuals in their capacity to engage in “modern” and secular forms of
sociability; and finally the self-regulatory practices by individuals of their dress choices and comportment, as well as public displays of religious practice.

Women’s day-to-day experiences of the security regulations and the spatial constructions of female subjectivity are particularly central to conceptualizing modern power in this research. Their bodily and emotional accounts of the construction of military spaces based on secular and religious conceptions of security and risk are probed. I employ a Foucauldian theoretical framework attuned to disciplinary power and governmentality to locate the particular constructions of spaces and bodies as a form of security apparatus (dispositif de securite) to protect modern sovereignty. This way, I investigate the socio-spatial constructions of female subjectivity at the intersections of secularist and religious discourses, and delineate how women negotiate their identities and boundaries in space. I introduce the concept of secular bodyscapes not only to accentuate the co-construction of bodies and spaces through secularist security discourses, but also to foreground the sexual and corporeal foundations of secularism whose vagueness and instabilities gain salience in spatially and temporally differentiated ways in the service of modern patriarchal sovereignty.

My research objectives are fourfold. First, I present a historically specific account of secularism in Turkey within the context of Islamic revivalism from the 1980s onwards when it became the central security discourse of the nation state. A study of secularism through the military and through the experiences of women who live in military spaces provides a guide to understanding the socio-cultural particularities of secularism in Turkey. Such a view challenges the liberal political discourses in which secularism is most frequently invoked and discussed.
Second, I contribute to critical and post-structuralist geographies of secularism by presenting a bodily and emotional account of secularism’s conceptual foundations. Critiquing the dominance of disembodied forms of knowledge in the study of secularism, I present a range of ways in which the lived and embodied formations of the secular and religious can be observed. I incorporate feminist geographies of the body and emotional geographies as key analytical frames and methodologies for critical explorations of the religious and secular. This way I demonstrate how female subjectivity is differentially constructed at the intersection of secular and religious discourses.

Third, I introduce novel forms of critique to critical security, as well as military and militarism studies, by focusing on gender and the constructions of the female body. As a critical intervention to androcentric knowledge production in these fields, at the level of nation-states and internationally, my research problematizes the taken-for-granted notions of security and risk through a gender based analysis.

Finally, I contribute to the geographic research in understanding how modern sovereignty operates. I do this through a critique of secularism in its salient capacity to define the security of modern sovereignty. I inquire the complex ways in which the binary categories of the secular and religious, as well as security and risk, are discursively constructed within the Turkish military in order to safeguard secular sovereignty. I develop critical questions that reveal the sexual and corporeal constructions of modern power by placing the female body at the center of my analysis. In doing so, I foreground spaces and bodies as they co-constitute each other in the construction of the security of the nation-state and in governmental strategies of modern patriarchal sovereignty.
The remainder of this introductory chapter is divided into four sections. First, I outline the literature on military studies, political Islam and secularism in Turkey, as well as the nascent literature in critical security studies and secularism in the Western academy, where this research is situated. Second, I define the concept of secular bodyscape as the key analytical frame and present a conceptual glossary where I define the main concepts of this research. Third, I present a detailed overview of the social and historical background of the Turkish context. Finally, I summarize the central arguments of the subsequent chapters.

SITUATING THE RESEARCH

This research is situated at the intersection of secularism studies, security and gender studies, both within the Turkish context and transnationally. In what follows, I provide a review of the scholarship that surrounds and inspires this research. I move from a discussion of civil-military relations, military geography and militarism studies in Turkey and beyond to a consideration of political Islam and secularism, before narrowing my focus further to consider interdisciplinary studies of Islamic identities and Muslim women’s headscarves in public space. My discussion emphasizes the necessity of examining the securitization of Islamic identities through women’s bodies and representations of their religious and secular identities in public space.

The relationship between the Turkish military and politics is not uncharted territory. Various studies have explored the historical and political significance of the Turkish military from the early 19th century late Ottoman through to the formation of the modern Turkish state (Zürcher 2004; 2010; Ahmad 2010; Tokay 2010; Celik 2008). These studies explored the early-
established sphere of political influence that the military enjoyed over centuries, as well as the continuation of the military power and autonomy into the 20th century that significantly defined the trajectory of civil-military relations in modern Turkey. The politically autonomous status of the Turkish military is marked by three major coup d’états in 1960, 1972 and 1980 and many other political interventions at various scales, which have been extensively researched (Heper 1986; Hale 1993; Hale 2011; Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 1993; Heper and Gunes 2000; Karpat 2011; Narlı 2000; Demirel 2004; Karabelias 2008; Uzgel 2003; Bayramoğlu 2006). These studies have explored the political and legal influences of the military in Turkish politics, as well as the transformation of the notion of national security through historical contingencies (Gencer 2010; Balta Paker 2010; Cizre 2003) and in the contexts of international relations and geopolitics (Aksu 2010; Bilgin 2010; Uzgel 2003).

Over the past three decades, the rise of political Islam and the transforming sphere of military power have been major foci in military studies (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Cinar 2003; Sakallıoğlu 1996; Sakallıoğlu 1997; Kaplan 2002; Zürcher 2010; Heper 2005; Tank 2005). These studies have detailed the particular processes through which the Turkish military responded to the rise of political Islam as of the 1980s (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Cinar 2003). More recently, military studies have directed attention to the shifting political power dynamics and the loss of power experienced by the Turkish military in relation to political Islam and as part of the EU integration processes (Bakiner 2013; Ahmad 2010; Akca and Balta-Paker 2013; Ünlü Bilgiç 2009). However, such studies remain confined to analysis of political discourses at institutional levels, with a few exceptions that look at the incorporation of religion into militarist discourses.
of the nation-state (Gürbey 2009) and the case of Islamic conscientious objection (Kemerli 2015).²

A particularly productive field of inquiry has emerged in looking at the intersection of militarism and nationalism. From the 1980s onwards, studies of Kemalism and Turkish nationalism gained significant momentum (Ayse Gul and Bora 2003; T. Bora 2004; Sen 2000; Akyaz 2002) with a focus on the integration of militarist discourses and Kemalism to national education (Altinay 2005; Altinay 2004; Kanci 2007). These studies, however, rather focus on main institutional actors and do not explore the microphysics of power between the state, nationalism and militarism, which Paker and Akca (2010, 17) identify as a main gap. Scholars responded to this gap by focusing on the construction of Turkish masculinity through the lived experiences of men in the military (Altinay 2005; Sinclair-Webb 2006; Selek 2008; Sen 2000), specifically those involved with the Kurdish conflict (Mater 1999). A recent edited collection (Sunbuloglu 2013a) contributes to this field through ethnographic studies of militarism and masculinity in the processes of nation-building (Oztan 2013), martyrdom (Aykac 2013), veterans (Sunbuloglu 2013b) and queer identities (Biricik 2013). Additional research has focused on conscientious objection (O. Cinar and Usterci 2008; Kardas 2006; Kemerli 2015). However, As Balta Paker and Akca (2010) observe, there still remains a dearth of studies examining the

² Other studies explore the Turkish military’s institutional and legal background in terms of the military’s elite status and autonomy (Sen 1996; 2011), its economic status and power (Gunluk-Senesen 2009; 2004; Akca 2004), and its strategic status in front of transnational actors such as EU or NATO (Akay 2009a; Dedeoglu 2009). In terms of the magnitude of military resources and institutional dimensions (such as figures on military lodgings and facilities), TESEV’s almanac (Bayramoglu, Insel, and Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı 2009) remains so far the most detailed and up to date study. Beyond these, there are only few examples of sociological and fieldwork based studies that explore the internal processes and functioning of the military, regarding the livelihoods of military officers, in terms of demographics and their socialization processes at military schools (Birand 1986; Kislali 1974; Unsaldi 2008). Also as Balta Paker and Akca (2010) comment, such a gap in the literature is due to the culture of confidentiality of the military of its security regulations. Only a few autobiographical pieces provide exceptions by narrating the social life in the military based on personal experiences and observations (Koc 2004; Ozden 2004).
construction of religious identities within the context of military security, despite the immanence of political Islam on the military agenda and militarist discourses.

Securitization of political Islam in public space in Turkey is another field of research that aligns with my analysis. As I explore in greater detail in the historical context section below, these studies constitute a strong background to critiques of secularism as a liberal ideal in the making of the modern Turkish nation-state (Davison 2003; Gole 1997). They also reveal the complex ways in which Islamism has transformed urban space and created its own everydayness that challenge the spatial allocations of the secular and religious by secularism (Komecoglu 2006; Gole 2002; Gokariksel and Secor 2010; Turam 2008; 2013).

Within this scholarship, studies of Muslim women’s headscarves and the headscarf bans in state offices, public employment and education have most reflexively explored the gendered and sexual constructions of Turkish secularism. By analyzing the public and political debates on headscarf bans (Arik 2012; Cindoglu and Zencirci 2008), and by looking at headscarved women’s bodily experiences, these studies have revealed the gendered constructions of the conceptual dichotomies of secularism (Cindoglu and Zencirci 2008; A. Cinar 2005; A. Cinar 2008; Gokariksel and Secor 2012; Gokariksel 2009; Gokariksel 2012; Ozcetin 2009). This line of research has also explored the involvement of the Turkish military in headscarf debates at the state level (Cindoglu and Zencirci 2008). While these studies provide a glimpse of the military’s internal regulations on the Islamic headscarf (Kavakci Islam 2010), they do not provide an experiential account of how national security discourses have unfolded within the military in gender specific ways.
With this research I also aim to contribute to geographies of militaries and militarisms. As Woodward comments (2014, 41) traditional approaches continue to define military geography and landscape as the “interplay between military strategy and landscapes or the ‘terrain and tactics’”, and fixate on the scale of the battle field (see Palka, Galgano, and Corson 2005; Carman 2006; Doyle and Bennett 2002). In response, critical studies on military landscape produced accounts of the wider politics that construct geographies of war and violence (Gregory 2004; 2011; Dalby 2010; Cowen and Gilbert 2008; Fluri 2009) and the broader frames of power that produce landscapes of human settlement and mobility (Hyndman and De Alwis 2004; Hyndman 2013). These studies problematize the taken for granted and gendered constructions of militarism both as an ontological category in understanding world affairs (Enloe 2000; Lutz 2002; Woodward 2005) as well as its conceptual predominance in the academy based on a civil/military distinction (Bernazzoli and Flint 2009; Woodward 2014). Importantly, critical and feminist geopolitics have especially destabilized normative understandings of militarism as well as security and violence by foregrounding experientially differentiated and embodied understandings of security contexts and military conflicts (Hyndman 2001b; 2010; Fluri 2009; Dalby 1994). With this research, I contribute to feminist geopolitics and military geographies by presenting embodied conceptualizations of security and geopolitics through women’s experiences in the Turkish military.

The last line of scholarship that I examine is the intersections of security studies and secularism. From within critical security studies that explore the Western security agenda in the post-9/11 paradigm, scholars have problematized the unquestioned acceptance of secularism as the normative framework for studies of world politics (Hurd 2007; Bilgin 2008; Gutkowski 2011; Mavelli 2011; 2013). In his analysis of the “securitization of Islam” in Europe, Mavelli
(2013) draws connections between the security agenda on “war on terror” and headscarf debates in France and explores the construction of Islam as the “deviant” other. Likewise, Gutkowski’s (2011) analysis of the security strategies of the British state against “Islamist terror” examines how religion is constructed as a form of risk within a secularist framework.

Within the Turkish context, Bilgin (2008) develops a powerful thesis about the “securityness of secularism” at the foundation of the Turkish Republic. She argues that the adoption of secularism as a political principle was a “security move” by the newly emerging Turkish Republic in early the 1920s to gain legitimacy as a nation-state against Western imperialism. While making powerful analytical connections between security discourses of the nation-state with secularism, this approach still refrains from making direct links with the more recent and explicit agenda of the Turkish military to securitize political Islam. Despite the primacy of Islamism within the security agenda of the nation-state in the past few decades, the sexual and gendered construction of security and risk have not been the subject of sustained academic scrutiny.

My dissertation therefore presents a timely contribution to a field that concerns not only understanding the security discourses of the nation-state through the Turkish military, but also the making of Islamic identities at the interstices of secularism and gender. Even though the political authority of the Turkish military has been comparatively diminished at present with the increasing authority of the JDP government (as I indicate at the opening of this chapter), its legacy on the experience of secularism and perception of religious identities persists. My research adopts a unique approach to examine this legacy and focuses on women’s experiences by using a feminist methodology in order to delineate the subtle ways in which power operates in
secularist security discourses of the modern nation-state. I provide not only a comprehensive analysis of how political Islam has become a national security concern, but also reveal the gender specific ways in which secularist discourses operate in political, social and cultural realms.

FROM SECULAR BODYSCAPES TO MODERN SOVEREIGNTY: A CONCEPTUAL GLOSSARY

*Bodyscape* is a key analytical concept that I use to critically explore the gendered constructions of secularism as they materialize within the security discourses of the Turkish nation-state. I use bodyscape to assert the co-constitution of bodies and spaces through the oeuvre of feminist geography. By association, this concept also draws theoretically from *landscape*, which has been a key concept for geographers to problematize the power relations embedded in cultural, social and political constructions of space. Both of these lines of scholarship contribute to my research as they offer critical insight into how state power operates institutionally and, more significantly, how it infuses into social and cultural realms to regulate bodies and spaces. In this section, I introduce the concept of bodyscape and other pivotal concepts in this research such as: *body, emotions, everyday, landscape, the secular, patriarchy and modern sovereignty*. These concepts constitute the complex tools through which I inquire about secularism and modern sovereignty, and the forms of power they mobilize in shaping bodies through spaces, and spaces through bodies.

The concept of *bodyscape* was first used nearly three decades ago by Douglas Porteous (Porteous 1986; 1990) in his examination of landscape and the human body as a form of analogy.
and a metaphor that is pervasive in male-dominated Western literature (1986, 4). In another study of Western art and visual culture Nicholas Mirzoeff (1995) likewise conceptualizes bodyscape as an assemblage composed of the materiality of the body, its representation and the array of meanings that surround the body. In this research, I use the concept of bodyscape along with its analogical associations, and envision it as “a terrain of competing forces that arrange bodies across a segment of space” (Eadie 2003, 75). It is a useful concept to reflect upon bodies at multiple scales to draw attention to how bodily differences, “from different bodies as they move through space to the micro-landscape of individual bodily differences”, are essentialized to reinforce normative ideas about a society’s socio-corporeal organization (Geller 2009, 504).

The body has been central to feminist geographical scholarship for decades (Butler 1990; Grosz 1994; Longhurst 1997; Shilling 2012). In feminist political geography, the body is considered the finest scale of political space (Hyndman 2004). The edited collection by Nancy Duncan (1996) Bodyspace: Destabilizing Geographies of Gender and Sexuality, emerged as one of the initial works that directly correlate and foreground the construction of spaces and inspires my efforts to emphasize the co-construction of bodies and spaces. In line with critical approaches to the body in feminist geography, in this research I define the body as a material and symbolic entity that gains tangibility only through social and political discourses that construct it within particular spaces, in relation to intersecting hegemonic structures of hetero-patriarchy, religion and secularism. The body takes a corporeal form that involves bodily fluids, sexual organs, skin color, emotions or diseases that are referenced to reduce understandings of certain groups or individuals to their bodies.3 Following the lead of feminist researchers who take the body and the

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3 This has been examined in the construction of the female body through its leaky boundaries, such as lactation, menstruation and pregnancy (Grosz 1994; Davidson 2001; Shildrick 1997; Longhurst 2000), as well as
corporeal as tools of analysis and objects of inquiry, I explore in this research the complex relationship between theory and bodily subjective experience (Alcoff 1996; Gatens 1997).

As a form of bodily experience, emotions constitute a central motif in this research. Perceived as personal feelings and forms of relating to the world, emotions have been long ignored within the masculine dominated practice and knowledge of geography. However, as Anderson and Smith (2001) argue, emotions are intractable aspects of all geographies and modalities that are imbued with political and gendered power relations (Thrift 2004). Emotional geographies aim to cover the “uncharted emotionally-charged” (K. Anderson and Smith 2001, 8) construction of spaces and demonstrate how “emotions emerge from, and re-produce, specific socio-spatial orders” (Davidson, Smith, and Bondi 2007a; B. Anderson 2009, 188). In this research as well, emotions constitute an unassailable aspect of bodyscapes in revealing the cultural and specific gendered constructions of spaces and places.

My deployment of the concept of bodyscape as a corporeal and emotional construct is inspired by critical approaches to landscape, which has been a central object of investigation and organizing principle in geographical research (Wylie 2009, 409). The centrality of landscape to the discipline of geography has been critiqued in terms of its failure to recognize the colonial and patriarchal legacies embedded in the practice of geography (G. Rose 1993). Ideological visualizations of the landscape and the perceived objectivity regarding the “observer’s eye” was targeted by cultural geographers (Cosgrove and Daniels 1989; Wylie 2007; G. Rose 1993). Landscape thereby has been conceptualized as “a way of seeing and representing the world” (Wylie 2009, 409) and as a discourse with significant bearings of authority and control (Wylie

representations of bodies in public space through dress, as in the debates over the Muslim women’s headscarf (Fadil 2011; Fernando 2009; Scott 2007; A. Cinar 2008).
Feminist geographers, particularly, have scrutinized discursive constructions of landscapes within the logic of patriarchy that imprint and perpetuate gender hierarchies (Bondi 1992; Nash 1996).

In this research, I use Foucault’s (1995) analysis of modern power and discourse as the main theoretical framework for conceptualizing bodyscapes as landscapes of modern sovereignty. Through a genealogy of state power from 19th century onwards, Foucault explores the significant shift in the focus of state power from the physical body (public torture in punishment) to discursive practices and disciplinary power that create docile bodies and target the entire population (Foucault 1995; 2008). Rather than a coercive conceptualization of power that is owned and exercised by the authority (mostly the state), Foucault argues for a horizontal and anonymous form of power that is distributed through diffuse networks of discourse. In his genealogy of modern sexuality too, Foucault reveals how modern power works through disciplinary regimes and discourses of biopolitics in order to control the body and exercise societal control over individuals (1990).

In this light, I analyze the construction of bodyscapes through power and knowledge regimes within the logic of existing hegemonies. Deriving from critical conceptualizations of landscape, I take bodyscape as a discourse that can make certain bodies appear as “unusual, marginal or unnatural” while normalizing others (Wylie 2007, 111). I perceive bodyscapes as products of governmental regimes, that is security apparatuses (dispositif de securite), that operate “across wide ranges of fields and scales, practices to regulate and ‘improve’ the behaviour of subjects through both formal and official codes, and through actions taken by subjects themselves” (Wylie 2007, 114). Within the Turkish context, I demonstrate how security
discourses construct a particular landscape through bodies based on particular understandings of security and risk.

In my analysis of the bodily and emotional constructions of bodyscapes, I position everyday life as the main site of inquiry for exploring the military base. I define everyday life as the “ordinary, routine and repetitive aspects of social life” which are infused with power dynamics and cultural meanings that are key in the socio-political organization of the society (Pinder 2009). Critical approaches to everyday life draw upon Marxist traditions that explore the complicity of “ordinary” places within modern systems of capitalist exploitation and oppression (Lefebvre 1991; Certeau 2011), as well as sites of social interaction and performance (Simmel 1972; Goffman 1959), cultural production (Williams 1983) and resistance (Certeau 2011). Feminist researchers have significantly complicated these perceptions of everyday life by positioning it as the key locus for reproduction of gender relations and power imbalances (Christie 2006; Katz 1994; Vaiou 2006; Pain and Smith 2008). In this research too, the everyday constitutes a perspective and a question of methodology in which micro-bodily patterns and relations are observed in the ways that systematically continue or challenge governmental regimes at multiple levels.

Discussing secularism and security within the context of everyday also destabilizes the scales in which theoretical debates have been produced. As Staeheli (1994) suggests, scale is a social construct that has historically determined the extent and content of the political debates in a particular context. Asserting the everyday as a scale of analysis challenges the established frames of thought that have historically silenced the racialized and gendered experiences (Hyndman 2004). The everyday constitutes a finer scale of analysis, in Hyndman’s (2004) terms,
where we can observe the complex ways in which power infuses into micro spaces and interactions. The everyday is the scale where the embodied and emotional character of secularism can be examined as a cultural practice that is conversant with political discourses, rather than simply a term employed within policy and institutional discourses.

In this research, I take secularism as the prevailing form of governmentality and the concept of the *secular* as its prime discursive construct for analyzing the construction of bodyscapes. In defining the secular, I adhere to post-structuralist critiques of secularism pioneered by Talal Asad (1993; 2003) and William Connolly (1995; 2000) that seek to complicate the taken for granted dichotomy of secular/religious in the practice of secularism in politics and in cultural realms. I take the secular not in opposition to “the religious” or as a simple break from its continuity, but a relational value that gains currency within the context of Western modernity. The secular is a dynamic set of “concepts, practices and sensibilities” (Asad 2003, 16) infused with the moral and ethical values of Christianity embedded in Western modernity’s experience with secularism and through the processes of the very construction of a secular/religious dichotomy. In my research, the secular emerges as a dynamic and hybrid concept that borrows from the separation of state and church in the West and the triumph of science and rationality, yet infuses them with the idioms of a Sunni-Turkish religious and cultural identity in everyday life and politically. The secular and religious emerge as discursive constructs through the culturally and historically specific experience of secularism in Turkish society, intrinsically conjoined with the gendered liberal ideals of equality and freedom.

*Patriarchy* is another key concept that I use for the critiques of secularism and the security of modern sovereignty in this research. I define patriarchy not as a simplistic top down
imposition of masculine hegemony but as a complex set of discursive relations that have advantaged particular constructions of masculinity over femininity, in historically and geographically specific ways (Bain and Arik 2015). In such context, patriarchy emerges not as a power relation that shapes gender relations but a mediator of all powers that shapes women’s lives (Brown 1992). As I explore in this research, patriarchy is a key dimension of state sovereignty as it defines secularism through marginalizing particular groups and identities. Patriarchy constitutes a key discursive ground on which secularism operates in safeguarding the nation-state as a governmental regime.

Finally, I conceptualize secular bodyscapes as a proxy for modern sovereignty in critical examination of how sovereign power spatially operates. Sovereignty broadly refers to the authority that a political entity holds over a certain territory or populace with the power to classify individuals to grant life or death (Agamben 1998; Steinberg 2009; Elden 2007). The conceptual triangle of “sovereignty-discipline-government” (Foucault, Senellart, and Collège de France 2008) has been influential in Foucault’s understanding of modern sovereignty as the “interconnected systems of government, or governmentality, aiming at security by targeting the population” (Nadesan 2008, 7). Rather than a top-down imposition of state power over a certain territory or population, sovereignty here is perceived as the state’s regulatory capacity over and within social life, that is “co-constituted along with the social domains to which those capacities are directed” (Agrama 2012, 48–50).

In this research, I demonstrate the interconnectedness of secularism with modern sovereignty. I take secularism as the background to Western modern sovereignty and the forms of governance and governmental regimes it operates with. Modern sovereignty is perceived to
gain legitimacy with the transferral of the basis of sovereignty from religion to the nation (Yilmaz 2007, 483; Fernando 2013). Studies on secularism in modern Europe as well as in Turkey, trace the establishment of the modern nation state to the control and limitation of religious authority in government, and its replacement with tools of representative democracy (such as electoral parliamentary systems). Therefore I argue that modern sovereignty is conditioned to protect secularism and I rephrase it as *secular patriarchal modern sovereignty.* With this research, I demonstrate how secularism is a form of governmentality that operates in sexually and corporeally specific ways in order to protect and safeguard modern sovereignty. In the next section, I outline the historically, socially and culturally specific context in which the modern Turkish state sovereignty has emerged and I examine its relationship with secularism.

**SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

In this section, I provide the socio-historical developments and contingencies that have produced this research and made it necessary. I start with the history of the modern Turkish Republic from the early 1920s onwards with a focus on secularism as the main organizing principle for political and societal transformations, particularly in the construction of gender identities. Then I present the emergence of political Islam and the ways in which it has been perceived as a challenge to secular modernity, particularly by the Turkish military. I discuss the historical significance of the Turkish military and its emergence as the protector of secularism against the risk of Islamism both in politics and society. I then present the background to the military’s securitization of Islamism within its personnel and finish with structural information on the military. Through this historical and background information, I provide context specific definitions to concepts such as
Western modernity, secularism, Islamic and Islamist, risk of Islamism, securitization and sexual morality that are key to this research.

Turkish Modernization and Secularism

Evolving from an age-old empire into a modern nation-state at the turn of the 20th century, the Turkish Republic presents us with an exemplary for the project of Western modernization. The Turkish Republic was established in 1923 following World War I and the anti-imperialist independence war fought against European occupation (1919 – 1923).4 A new republic was founded based on the principles of republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, reformism and finally secularism, (Zürcher 2004). Marking a continuum of the Westernizing reforms at the end of the nineteenth century,5 republican reforms of the 1920s and the 1930s instigated a rapid and radical modernization process that would “raise” the new nation-state up to European standards (Zürcher 2010). Under the leadership of the founding father Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881 – 1938) and the Western educated urban elite and bureaucracy, fundamental revolutionary reforms took place in civil law and in various facets of social life and culture. This reformatory spirit was

4 Between 1919 and 1923 a multinational resistance force was formed against the invading British, French and Italian powers following WWI. Independent from the Ottoman state, informal cliques of resistances were united by 1923 under the leadership of a group of young Ottoman officers who were headed by Mustafa Kemal (Zürcher 2004).
5 Tanzimat (the regulation) refers to a series of reforms and regulations (1839 – 76) implemented by the Ottoman state to modernize the legal, legislative and state institutions of the empire (Zürcher 2004). Restructuring of legal systems and the judiciary based on Western European legal systems (Özman 2010) constituted part of the efforts by the Ottoman state to secure territorial integrity from nationalist separatist movements by shifting the center of loyalty from the sultan to a more broad understanding of legal citizenship and promotion of “Ottoman” citizenship (Yavuz 2005; Azak 2010).
consolidated under the official state ideology that was named Kemalism after the founding father, and constituted the basis for the creation of a secular and modern nation-state with political and cultural aspirations of Western modernity.

The understanding of modernity that defined the experience of the Turkish Republic is a political, social and cultural project of “progression” that was modelled on the particular historical experience of Western Europe. Commonly referred to as the transformation of traditional societies into a capitalist market economy, modernization involves the adaptation of the rule of institutions of the state, bureaucracy, and capitalist enterprise (Strohmayer 2009, 474; Bozdoğan and Kasaba 1997). As an epistemic paradigm modernization mobilizes concepts such as “citizenship, civil society, public sphere, human rights, equality before the law, public and private distinction, democracy, popular sovereignty, and scientific rationality” all of which are rooted in European thought and history (Chakrabarty 2007, 4). Imposing value-laden Enlightenment ideals, modernization processes in non-Western contexts, such as in Turkey, are critiqued as top-down “elitist, centralist, statist, and positivist processes that see people as objects of the Westernizing state” (Ozyurek 2006, 14; Ozdalga 2010; Zürcher 2004). Therefore, critical analyses of modernity, as this research aims to perform, are compelled to recognize the normativity that Eurocentricism holds in shaping societal and political processes as well as the local conditions that specify each modernization project (A. Cinar 2005).

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6 Zürcher (2004) defines Kemalism as a set of attitudes and opinions rather than a coherent and all-embracing ideology, the basic principles of which were laid down in the Republican People’s Party’s program of 1931 as: “republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism and revolutionism (or reformism)”; for further readings, see Zürcher, E. J. (2004).

7 Conceptualizations such as “alternative modernities” or “creative adaptation” (Gaonkar 2001) are therefore introduced to explicate the state of modernity in non-Western contexts and explain them as a “result of neither servile imitation nor an inorganic imposition from outside or above” (A. Cinar 2005, 2).
Modernization of the new Turkish state has likewise been a multifaceted process of adoption of Western norms, styles, and institutions that have most noticeably pivoted around the notion of secularism, both as a political principle and a cultural practice. Secularizing reforms in Turkey started with the abolishment of the Caliphate (Islamic leadership) and Sharia law in 1924 (Davison 2003; Zürcher 2004). This was followed by introduction of the Swiss Civil Code and the Italian Penal Codes in 1926, as well as closures of religious schools and organizations in 1928 via the introduction of five-year compulsory national coeducation with a secular curriculum (Azak 2010; Davison 2003; Ozdalga 1997). Secularizing reforms were set out to cleanse the state apparatus from the hold of a “backward looking traditional and religious order” and impose a “progressive” way of life in the public sphere on which modern sovereignty would be based (Saktanber 2002; Gole 2002).

Secularization processes in modern Turkey took place under the principle of laiklik, which is a direct adaptation of the French word laïcité. Although largely used synonymously for related processes, laïcité and secularism have differing connotations. As I explore in greater detail in Chapter 3, in principle, secularism defines a negative relationship to religion by way of secularization processes that prescribe the decline of religion both at institutional and cultural levels (Asad 2003; Davison 2003; Casanova 2006). On the other hand, laïcité refers to an institutional arrangement between the state and religion through separation of the laity (people, community of believers) from the clergy (clerical strata) (Davison 2003). Likewise, based on the French model, Turkish laïcité was intended as the separation of state and religious affairs, and established as the state’s control over religion. Defined as republican, or “assertive” secularism

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8 Opposed to the efforts in the last period of the Ottoman state which aimed to provide social cohesion through Islamic Sunni identity under the leadership of the Sultan as the religious leader, the republican reforms aim at a radical break from the past and introduced a secular, or laicist, order (Zürcher 2010, 63).
(Kuru 2007), this form of arrangement idealizes a public life exempt from religious signs (Gole 2010), rather than providing warranty over free public expressions of all religions by a religion-free state (e.g. US model of secularism).

Similar to the critiques of liberal secularism, the experience of Turkish secularism was a complex double-edged process that constructed and promoted only a particular understanding of religion and established state control over it (Gole 1997). Like the Catholic underpinnings of French secularism,9 Turkish secularism imposed a normative understanding of Sunni Islam as part of the national identity (Gole 2002; Gokariksel and Mitchell 2005). The Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA) was established in 1924 following the abolishment of the Caliphate to integrate all public religious affiliations and practices under state authority (Davison 2003). Through the DRA the Turkish state tried to establish a rigid separation between religion and the public political realm on one hand, and on the other sought to accommodate and incorporate Islamist politics into the system (Sakallioglu 1996; Gürbey 2009). Sunni Islam was integrated into politics and everyday life as a source of national unity and public morality to create a “modern” republican subject (Gokariksel and Mitchell 2005, 152; Zürcher 2010).

Besides the law and the state apparatus, modernizing reforms stretched across everyday life and into cultural realms. Even though they do not target a particularly religious establishment, adoptions of Western time and metric measurements and the Latin alphabet (1928) (Kandiyoti 1996b) carried secularizing undertones as they aimed to dismantle the deep-rooted cultural and historical connections with the Islamic past and to form new cultural ties with the West. These were the standardization and centralization efforts of a newly emerging nation-

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9 The case of state funding of Catholic schools (Asad 2003).
state to construct national unity and cultural homogeneity. A new national history and language theory was written to emphasize the uniqueness of the Turkish identity, which allegedly had Asiatic roots that was claimed to be more “progressive” than the Islamic heritage (Kocak 2010). And, importantly, new cultural forms such as Western music and melody such as ballroom dancing were introduced with the aim of “socializing and incorporating the ‘modern’ individual into a new condition of societal membership” (Yumul 2010, 352). Marking the cultural aspects of Western modernization in Turkey, these reforms aimed to create a new body politic in which transformation of gender identities were specifically highlighted.

The Gender of Turkish Modernity

The regulation of gender identities and the specific emphasis on women’s visibility and rights constituted a crucial part of a new public space that is inhabited by “modern and civilized” identities (A. Cinar 2008, 898). Reforms related to gender started in 1926 with the abandonment of the Ottoman fez, the traditional male headgear, as part of the construction of modern, national Turkish masculinity (Yumul 2010, 350). However, the most emblematic feature of the new official state discourse was the reforms on gender equality and women’s rights with claims to “emancipate” women from the “confines” of the Islamic patriarchal regime (Gole 2002; A. Cinar 2005; Saktanber 2002; Cindoglu and Zencirci 2008). The new civil code that replaced Sharia law (1926) granted women equal rights in inheritance, marriage and divorce and sanctioned religious marriages and polygamy (Arat 1998; Kandiyoti 1996a). In 1930, women were granted the right to vote in municipal elections and in 1934 in national elections (Arat 1998; Kandiyoti 1996a; Turam 2008). These reforms set the ground for modernizing the new nation-state by making
women publicly visible and socially and politically active in a mixed-gender public sphere (Gole 2004; A. Cinar 2008).

Besides these egalitarian legal reforms, the introduction of a Western style of dress and the abandonment of Islamic forms of dress and veiling constituted the centerpiece of the republican agenda. The initial stages of the republic witnessed campaigns for adoption of Western forms of dress through nation-wide campaigns and encouragements (Parla 2001; Gokariksel and Mitchell 2005). As Cinar (2005, 63) argues, the state actively promoted a public space in which women would be dressed to engage in “modern” activities, such as waged work or politics. However, unlike the post-1980 headscarf bans that I will come to later, the regulation of dress was done through local governments and administration of by-laws (Ozcetin 2015). These reforms established a strong connection between secularism and gender equality (Ozcetin 2009), that is infused with manners, behaviour, and daily customs commensurate to a Western lifestyle (Cindoglu and Zencirci 2008, 794).

Despite a government-led modernizing agenda, women’s identities were still confined within hetero-patriarchal structures. As Kandiyotı (1997) argues, the reforms that aimed to “liberate” women did not necessarily replace patriarchal structures with egalitarian ones, but they integrated a particular construction of “liberated” femininity into the nation-building process. Even though the Civil Code brought progressive provisions into the family law, it failed to establish gender equality due to “several articles and clauses that placed men first among equals” (Kabasakal Arat 2010, 175). This created a state of illusion in which women perceived themselves as equal and liberated even though they were still subordinated (Ozcetin 2015; Kandiyotı 1987).
The conservatism of the gender reforms was also due to a heavy emphasis on female sexual morality, which was based on honour, chastity and modesty (Akkoc 2004; Sirman 2004). As Sirman defines (2004) honour refers to the ability of men and women to live up to the standards of femininity and masculinity, which are asymmetrically defined. While a man’s honour is measured by his ability to undertake his social responsibilities, and to control his own sexuality as well as that of the women in his family, a woman’s honour is linked only to her own sexuality and her ability to maintain chastity and modesty (Sirman 2004; Akkoc 2004). Primarily defined within the private sphere, femininity is constructed on the basis of female honour that is judged by her sexual accountability to the family and the community (Sirman 2004), and even to the lineage and the nation at more symbolic levels (Kandiyoti 1988).10

Despite the liberating and modernizing agenda, gender reforms and dress regulations of the new republic were based on particular constructions of female sexuality and sexual morality. Not far at all from traditional and Islamic notions of honour and chastity, the ideal republican woman was encouraged to dress in a modern fashion yet she was expected to maintain a level of modesty through dress and regulation of behaviour (Arat 1997). Republican reforms took the Islamic patriarchal order as the base of moral codes and sought to control female sexuality through repudiation of pre-marital sex, limited intimacy with “illicit” men, and the adoption of modest dress (Mernissi 1987; Guindi 1999; Ozctin 2009). As Arat (1997) argues, due to the historically established adversity towards European sexual moral culture, republican discourse cautioned the modern Turkish women not to “mimic the European conduct and behaviour” nor their “promiscuity”, but to keep their own traditional norms of modesty and “virtuous attitude”

10 There is an entire scholarship on the constructions of the nation and borders of the nation-state through women’s bodies (Yuval-Davis 1997a).
Republican secularism relied on a particular understanding of sexual morality that assigned women with the task of holding a delicate balance between norms of Western modernity and Islamic traditions, which I define as being *modern-but-modest* in this research.

**The Rise of Political Islam and Secularist Reactions**

A significant challenge to the delicate balance in the sexual regime of the republic came with the rise of political Islam from the 1960s onwards and the parallel increase in the visibility of headscarved women in public (A. Cinar 2005). Being one of the most impactful dynamics in Turkish politics and society, political Islam, or Islamism, can be defined as a complex and multilateral identity based movement that has challenged the secular/religious distinction that Turkish secularism has prescribed at the level of politics and cultural practices. Political Islam emerged through mobilizations of successive series of political parties that were distinguished by their marginalized, and yet dynamic, religious discourses (Yavuz 2005; Azak 2010). The common markers of political Islam in Turkey can be listed as frequent verbalization of Islamic texts and references, adoption of public religious dress and practices, such as the headscarf, denouncing of political and economic solidarities with Western nations and a certain appeal across economic classes through religion based solidarity (Yavuz 2005; Gulalp 2001).

Due to their centrality to the historical and ethnographic analysis of this research, the concepts of Islamic and Islamist (or political Islam) require clarification. As Gulalp (1997, 53) succinctly remarks, “Islamism in Turkey, as elsewhere in the region, is a recent and historically distinct phenomenon that arose after a period of dominance of secular nationalism and as a
response to its crisis.” Therefore, Islamism or political Islam is defined in this research as a discourse that integrates into the political discourse religious codes and references that typically challenge the hegemony of Western norms in politics, culture and everyday life (Gole 2010; Gulalp 2001; A. Cinar 2005).

The term Islamic, on the other hand, commonly denotes the norms, customs and practices that emerged from sources of Islam (the Quran and hadith, the life and sayings of the Prophet Mohammed S.A.V.). Islamic is invoked as a noun and an adjective that refers to Islam as a religious faith and arguably “non-politicized” spheres, such as the believer's conscience and personal faith-life. Within the context of Turkish secularism, the distinction between Islamic and Islamist therefore emerges as a political one that is superimposed over to the distinction between secular and religious. Therefore, in this research, I refrain from asserting a clear distinction between Islamic and Islamist, and yet cautiously use political Islam (or Islamist politics) to refer to the identity-based political movement that is perceived to diverge from secular politics. And I use Islamic as an adjective to define the concepts and socio-political phenomenon that relates to Islam, which still denotes a certain form of politics and lifestyle.

Islamist trends in politics can be traced back to the government of the Democratic Party (DP), which was the first political party to win elections after transition to a multi-party period in 1946. The reign of the Democratic Party (1950-60) was marked with a “slight decline” in strict secularist Kemalist discourses and therefore was closed down after the first coup d’état in 1960 (Zürcher 2004). Following that, several Islamist political parties attempted to provide previously marginalized rural Muslims with a guide of conduct for daily life and new forms of political expression (Gole 1997; Gulalp 2001). Yet they were closed consecutively in response to
secularist anxieties and pressures.¹¹

It is compulsory to note that the rise of political Islam was paralleled and supported by a new Islamic middle-class that emerged through access to modern education and upward social mobility (Gole 1997; Delibas 2009). Also, with the neoliberal economic policies of 1980s, the new Islamic middle class obtained social and political power and started appropriating urban space in tune with an Islamic lifestyle (Gokariksel and Secor 2009; Komecoglu 2006; Seckinelgin 2006; Gole 2002). ¹² Besides a new class of Islamist capitalist entrepreneurs (for the case of MUSIAD, see Insel 2003; Keyman 2013), the emergence of the veiling fashion industry (Gokariksel and Secor 2009), the establishment of cafés and restaurants serving only non-alcoholic beverages, and everyday spaces, such as segregated beaches (Komecoglu 2006; Seckinelgin 2006), became the markers of the rise of Islamism and Islamist politics in Turkey.

However, the Islamic headscarf stands out as the most conspicuous and contested dimension of the rise of Islamist politics, which disrupted the Western, modern and secular order that “emancipated” women from religious patriarchal constraints. Due to their perceived discrepancy to the modern secular trajectory, by the 1980s increasing numbers of headscarved women were stigmatized as the symbols and agents of Islamist politics (Gokariksel 2009; Ozdalga 1997; Dağtaş 2009). In the following pages I introduce the debates on Muslim women’s headscarves in greater detail after a discussion of the Turkish military and its impact on the trajectory of Islamic identities in Turkey, in which headscarf regulations take precedence.


¹² These include market and trade liberalization, financial austerity measures, increased transnational capital mobility and the privileging of small-scale businesses more adaptable to flexible markets (Gokariksel and Secor 2009).
The Turkish Military: A Historical Account

With the rise of Islamist politics over the 1970s and 1980s, the Turkish military sharpened its secularist discourse, retaining its position as an institutionally strong and politically crucial actor in the history of the Turkish Republic. From the late Ottoman period onwards, the Turkish military maintained ties with the bureaucratic elite and played a constitutive role in the founding of the republic in the aftermath of WWI and European imperialist invasion (Zürcher 2004). Up until June 2013, the 35th article of the “Internal Code of the Turkish Armed Forces” defined the military’s task as “to protect and safeguard the Turkish mainland and the Turkish Republic”, providing the Turkish military with a strong degree of political autonomy. For less than a century this article was held as the legal basis for military interventions to protect the modern and secular nation-state from ethnic separatism, sectarianism, communism, and particularly in the past two decades from Islamism (Sakallioglu 1997).

As Sakallioglu (1996; 1997) observes, the military has taken an active political role for the protection of the “integrity, unity and modernity” of the nation-state since the transition to the multi-party period in 1946. Prior to this, the military was largely inactive because it was aligned with the interests of the state elite and identified itself with the official state ideology and the status quo under the rule of founding People’s Republican Party. Importantly, three direct

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13 Under the rule of the People’s Republican Party, the period from 1923 to 1946 witnessed strong measures for maintaining social and economic stability. Kemalist ideology was concretized through measures such as state controlled economic production and enterprise, suppression of ethnic and religion based separatist rebellions and movements (Zürcher 2004).
military interventions took place in 1960, 1971 and 1980, all of which had significant impacts in shaping the military’s capacity to interfere in political affairs (Zürcher 2004).

The first coup d’état took place in 1960, following the 10-year rule of the aforementioned Democratic Party (Zürcher 2004; Cizre-Sakallioğlu 1993) in response to deteriorating economic conditions and rise of identity based movements mobilized by the Democratic Party’s adaptation of Islam as a cultural tradition (Cizre-Sakallioğlu 1993; Sakallioğlu 1996). The coup of 1960 is crucial for exploration of civil-military relations in Turkey due to its long-term influences at various levels. As Ahmad (2010) observes, the 1960 coup significantly disturbed the process of formation of a much-needed civil society in the aftermath of transition to a pluralist democracy and set the tone for heavy military influence over civilian politics in the coming decades.14

The National Security Council (NSC), which has been the crucial medium of military control over politics, was also a product of the 1960 coup. Consisting of ministers from the cabinet as well as the Chief of the General Staff and military representatives, the NSC had a strategic role “in making decisions related to national security and coordination”, with the power to “convey” opinions to the government (Uzgel 2003; Sakallioğlu 1997; Ünlü Bilgiç 2009; Ahmad 2010). The NSC became active in setting the agenda of the government on matters ranging from economic privatization to programs on TV stations, from education to the contents

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14 Ironically, with the 1960 coup, came the most radically liberal constitution in history of Turkish Republic, which made political life more open to left leaning politics (Ahmad 2010, 97). It was within this liberating political atmosphere that class and identity based political and social movements gained power and visibility (Sakallioğlu 1996).
of the posters advertising Turkey abroad (Uzgel 2003, 191), and as an institution it inserted the concept of “national security” to the stream of political discourse (Gencer 2010).\footnote{The NSC functioned through special research units set up within the military, or under military supervision, specialized in each political issue (Karabelias 2008). One of them, the Prime-Ministerial Crisis Management Center, was established in 1996 for observing and reporting on “Islamic reactionism” and “ethnic separatism” (Karabelias 2008).}

In another major political intervention in 1971 the military issued a memorandum in response to escalation of the “political chaos” and violence that emerged from left-right conflict (Heper 2005). As Zurcher (2004, 258) comments, the military carried out such action because of the inability of the government to put an end to “anarchy’ and carry out reforms ‘in a Kemalist spirit’”. Unlike in other interventions, this time the military did not shut down and ban political parties, but instead forced the government to resign and replaced it with a government of technocrats instead.

Finally, the last military coup d’état took place in 1980 with lasting effects on Turkish politics in terms of the military’s political authority and autonomy. On 12 September the military assumed its guardianship role again in order to “restore” the regime and its main principles that have been under threat of “foreign” ideologies such as socialism, communism or Islamic fundamentalism (Heper 2005; Örs 2010; Ünlü Bilgiç 2009; Zürcher 2004). This time the military generals talked openly about the dangers of “perverse” ideologies, which included “Islamist reactionism” and violently suppressed left and right leaning political groups (Zürcher 2010, 64). After this coup, the military expanded their reach to social and cultural policy institutions and
gained the ability to scrutinize, control, and manipulate civilian politics from a distance and force the government to resign if deemed necessary (Sakallıoğlu 1997; Örs 2010).16

The 1980 coup constituted a significant turning point for the trajectory of political Islam. In order to set a balance between leftist movements and religious fundamentalist tendencies, the post-military state restored religion into education under strict state control to “buttress loyalty to the state” and as an antidote to protect the state from leftist and separatist tendencies (Zürcher 2010). A particular teaching of Sunni Islam was evoked with direct links to values such as “nationalism, the unity and indivisibility of the nation, respect for authority and militarism” (Zürcher 2010, 64). While defining national unity as a religious duty, this process led to the empowerment of religion in the public sphere in the following decades to the degree that ironically led to its coinage as a risk to national security.

**Emergence of the “Risk of Islamism”, 1980s to 2000s**

The most definitive aspect of the Turkish military’s political discourse from the 1980s until late 2000s is the orientation of the national security agenda around the increasing prevalence of Islamist politics and identities (Lesser 2010; Zürcher 2010; Ahmad 2010; Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Cinar 2003). As Ahmad (2010) contends, despite the predominance in security agenda of the threats by Kurdish separatist insurgency movements in South Eastern Turkey, by the 1990s the military generals established the imminence of Islamic fundamentalism, as greater threat to national sovereignty. I therefore argue that the trajectory of Islamist politics and identities in the

16 Institutions include the Higher Education Council, the Foundation for History, Culture and Language, and the Radio-Television Higher Council (Uzgé 2003, Unlu Bilgic 2009).
Turkish socio-political landscape can be best observed through the security discourse of the Turkish military. The military took actions at various levels to respond to the risk of Islamism; to ward off against a multi-faceted socio-political process and protect the achievements of secular modernity and national integrity.

Here I define the very integration of political Islam in to national security discourse as a threat as the *securitization of Islam*. My understanding of the securitization of Islam resonates with Mavelli’s (2013) exploration of the escalating construction of Islam in the West as a threat that legitimizes exceptional measures. Simply put, securitization can be defined as the process of presenting an issue in security terms and as an existential threat, yet different schools in security theory come up with different theorizations of securitization. In this research, I define securitization of Islam as a complex socio-cultural and political process that constructs threats based on the particular incremental meanings that are generated within history of Turkish secularism. It at the same time is a self-referential and performative process that constructs the threats that it seeks to securitize.

Through the 1980’s it was the Welfare Party (WP) (1983 – 1998), the successor of the National Salvation Party, that undertook the ascent of political Islam in Turkey with a critique of the top-down secularizing and Westernizing reforms of the republic. With landslide electoral

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17 **Copenhagen School of security studies (Buzan and Weaver 2003)** offers an internalist and self-referential account of securitization whereby the very utterance (speech act) of security becomes the performance of the security action with the potential to structure social practices (Stritzel 2007). As Stritzel (2007, 361) comments, “the main effect of uttering security is its potential to let an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have been obeyed” (Wæver, 2003: 11). However, critiques argued that the privileging of the process of articulation beyond the meaning of what is articulated decontextualizes it from the social conditions in which the power relations between the securitizing actor and the audience are established (Balzacq 2005). Thus an embedded understanding of securitization is demanded; one that takes the social context as an “explanatory variable that influences the ability of the securitizing actors to persuade an audience” (Balzacq 2005: 176, 178, cited in Hansen 2011: 359). This research aims to provide a contextualized understanding of the securitization of Islam within the Turkish context.
success from 1980s to 90s of the WP became a major force in Turkish politics (Gulalp 2001). The success of the WP was not just a rise of a political party, but also a mass movement composed of institutions and civil organizations that involved newspapers, publishing houses, Islamic foundations, labour unions and businessmen associations, which, despite their divergences, came together to support the WP (Yavuz 1997). The WP adopted a political discourse of advocacy for those who had been marginalized under Kemalist- and Western-oriented social and cultural policies that associated Islam and Islamic practices with backward ideologies. The WP demonstrated unprecedented success with a particularly populist discourse that mobilized Islamic solidarity across class or ethnic alliances (Yavuz 1997), and alarmed secular politicians, the bureaucracy, the Westernized urban elite, and especially the Turkish military (Gulalp 2001).

Such meteoric rise of the WP was perceived with some apprehension because of the Islamic revolution in 1979 in Iran that could potentially set a precedent for Turkey as well (Zürcher 2010). When Necmettin Erbakan became the first “Islamist” Prime Minister through a coalition government in 1996, these anxieties were significantly escalated. The military undertook a major political intervention that affected the trajectory of political Islam in major ways. On February 28, 1997, after a National Security Council meeting, the military declared “irtica”, that is “obscurantist reactionism”, as the most appalling threat to national security (Ahmad 2010). The NSC issued a list of measures to “reverse” the perceived Islamization of

18 Zürcher (2010, 56) also suggests that secularist anxieties over “encroachment” of Islamist politics was also reinforced in the post-Cold war security agenda of Western states and more so after 11 September 2001, when Islamism became a legitimized security threat.
Turkey and got several military tanks to roll down the streets in a small town in Ankara, creating a coup-like atmosphere (Cizre-Sakallioglu and Cinar 2003).  

Defined as the “February 28th process”, this intervention constituted a long lasting top-down suppression over Islamist politics and identities by the secular bureaucracy and the military up until recently (Cizre-Sakallioglu and Cinar 2003; Uzgel 2003; Sakallioglu 1997). It was also labelled as a “soft-coup” or “post-modern coup” by public media, because instead of a forceful intrusion, the military chose to engage in an education campaign, whereby prosecutors, judges, academics, journalist, businessmen were mobilized against the supposed Islamization of Turkey (Cindoglu and Zencirci 2008, 800). The military forced the “Islamist” Prime Minister to resign and triggered a constitutional court case demanding the closure of the WP for threatening the secular order (Cizre-Sakallioglu and Cinar 2003). Such actions demonstrated not only the far-reach of the military into the political realm, but also how political norms could be postponed until secular corrections were completed (Cizre-Sakallioglu and Cinar 2003).

The risk of Islamism was perceived as potentially an omnipresent threat that spread across all parts of the country and sections of the society, demanding legislation in areas from anti-terrorism, media and public order to political parties, education, civil rights and liberties (Cizre-Sakallioglu and Cinar 2003, 321). The security discourse around the risk of Islamism was integrated into various areas of public policy and significantly subordinated “individual and group rights and liberties to the demands of security” (Cizre-Sakallioglu and Cinar 2003, 321). As I argue in this research, the national security discourse based on the risk of Islamism

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19 The measures offered included alteration of primary and secondary school curricula so as to emphasize the secularist history and the character of the republic, the expansion of teachings on Kemalism, and were expanded, the previously tolerated prayer-leaders and preachers schools were scrapped by the introduction of 8 year mandatory primary education (Uzgel 2003).
instituted in every sphere of the society and politics a form of social governance that sought to define and control religion in public space.

Following the closure of WP, the Turkish military’s stronghold continued over its successors: the Virtue Party (1997–2001), the Felicity Party (2001 - present) and the currently ruling Justice and Development Party (2001 - ~) (Tank 2005).20 Through the 1990s to 2000s it was commonplace to read in the newspapers public statements by military officials on their solid stance against Islamism (Zürcher 2010; Ünlü Bilgiç 2009), most often on issues related to the Islamic headscarf and the Imam-Hatip (Islamic divinity) high school graduates (Kaplan 2002; Ahmad 2010). Imam-Hatip schools, which proliferated after 1980, were perceived as hubs where students were indoctrinated with Islamist ideologies to further infiltrate into state mechanisms and the military (Zürcher 2010; Ahmad 2010; Pak 2004). Imam-Hatip graduates, along with graduates from other vocational schools, were prevented from entering universities in the same capacity as other graduates and they were also barred from becoming lawyers, judges and more significantly, military officers (Ahmad 2010; Kaplan 2002). Such restrictions were challenged by Islamist parties, which received harsh secularist resistance from the military (Ahmad 2010, Kaplan 2002), since the Imam-Hatip graduates, like headscarved women, were perceived as signals of the risk of Islamism.

However, the Islamic headscarf stands out as the most conspicuous issue of tension between the military and Islamist politics (Turam 2008). The trajectory of headscarf bans date

20 Even though they emerge from the same lineage, FP and JDP demonstrate significant variations in their political discourse in their adaptation of Islam. While, FP remains closer to the critique of Western modernity that sanctioned economic and diplomatic relations with Western states, JDP adopted a more liberal and populist tone that embraced economic and political solidarities with the West, making integration in European Union one of its priorities in its first round of rule into the mid-2000s.
back to the 1960s, yet not much debate took place then due to the scarcity of headscarved women with claims to education and employment in urban space. It was with the “Dress and Appearance Regulation” of 1982 that the headscarf came to be defined as a symbol of Islamist politics and banned for public employees in state institutions and on university campuses (Olson 1985). The bans, which remained effective until 2013, were met with resistance and led to further polarization between secularist and religious political tendencies (Cindoglu and Zencirci 2008; A. Cinar 2008; Gokariksel and Secor 2010). It was also due to increased visibility of the traditionally dressed and religious second-generation migrant women in urban space through the 1980s that women’s headscarves were inscribed into the “semiology of Muslim identity” and became the most evident icon of the Islamization of Turkish society (Gole 2010). The Turkish military’s anxieties around the risk of Islamism have therefore paralleled the increased visibility of headscarved women in public space and political agenda, especially when Islamist political parties made attempts to remove the ban on the headscarf.

Parallel to the civil struggles of headscarved university students through the 1990s and 2000s (A. Cinar 2005), “headscarf crises” took place in public and at the level state sphere as a reflection of the tense and polarized relationship between Islamist politics and secularist establishment (Cindoglu and Zencirci 2008). The case of Merve Kavakci is a representative one. In 1999, Merve Kavakci was elected as the first headscarved deputy from the ranks of the Virtue Party. Her entrance to parliament wearing a headscarf was perceived as an immensely provocative move and a challenge to secular order by various secularist Leftist parties, the
government and the military (Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu 2008; Peres 2012; Kavakci Islam 2010).  

After the Justice and Development Party (JDP) came to power in 2003 as the single ruling party, the headscarf issue intensified as most of the wives of deputies from the JDP wore headscarves (Cindoğlu and Zencirci 2008). Labelled as “reception crises”, in several incidents headscarved wives of JDP deputies were barred from attending protocol events and national celebration receptions, or they were protested when they attended (Kavakci Islam 2010). The military generals played significant roles in these “crises” by either refusing to greet the headscarved wives of MPs or abandoning the room upon their entrance (Cindoglu and Zencirci 2008).

Importantly, the Turkish military’s adversity towards Islamist politics and the headscarf was most clearly reflected in the “e-memorandum” of 2007 on the Turkish military’s official website. In an electronic statement military generals indicated severe disapproval of the candidacy of Abdullah Gül from Islamist cadres for Presidency (Cindoglu and Zencirci 2008). The military’s protest against President Abdullah Gül was perceived as another major intervention that was also motivated by the possibility of having a headscarved first lady at the highest office the state. The military’s attitude was also mirrored by civil society organizations, especially secularist Kemalist women’s associations, that organized massive public protests in

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21 Subsequently, Kavakci was prevented oath taking of her office and stripped of her citizenship for not disclosing her United States citizenship (Kavakci Islam 2010).
several cities under the name of “Republican Meetings”, and openly protested against an Islamist president and a headscarved first lady (Cindoglu and Zencirci 2008; Kavakci Islam 2010).22

**The Risk of Islamism within the Turkish Military**

The Turkish military’s adversity towards Islamist politics and identities in the political arena were significantly mirrored in its own internal regulations and security policies. As early as 1990, purges of military officers who were defined as “religious reactionaries” who try to infiltrate into the military, were initiated (Ahmad 2010, 106). The military refrained from recruiting *Imam-Hatip* high school graduates (Ahmad 2010; Kaplan 2002) and it also started official surveillance of headscarved women, as is the main focus of this research (Dağtaş 2009; Kavakci Islam 2010). An internal military council, known as *Bati Calisma Grubu* (The Western Committee) was established to enforce security and surveillance practices over Islamist activities within the military (Kavakci Islam 2010, Ahmad 2010). This council, as Kavakci Islam (2010) argues, was also responsible for coordinating with civil society and media to mobilize a discourse of fear that Turkey was on the brink of turning to another Iran or Saudi Arabia, to be able to justify the “hard power” that military exercised in the political arena and within its own constituency.

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22 Eventually, Abdullah Gül was still elected president, but as Ahmad (2010) comments, relations with the army remained tense. “The top brass boycotted Gül’s swearing-in ceremony in parliament, the Chief of Staff refused to call Gül ‘my president’ even though he was Commander-in-Chief, nor were the headscarf-wearing wives of the prime minister and the president invited to ‘Victory Day’ celebrations on 30 August.” (Ahmad 2010, 112)
Securitization processes within the military took effect even more strictly since the military was not accountable to any authority other than itself (Kavakci Islam 2010). As I explore in this research, the Turkish military employed complex surveillance strategies over Islamist identities, which resulted in thousands of commissioned and non-commissioned officers (CO and NCO hereafter) being marked, pressured and expelled. The expulsions were carried out by Yuksek Askeri Sura (YAS, the High Military Council) whose decisions were exempt from appeal due to legal restrictions.

The exact numbers of expelled COs and NCOs are debateable because the decisions were listed under “lack of discipline” or “unbecoming conduct” (Kavakci Islam 2010). Ahmad (2010, 106) asserts that in 1990, 146 COs and NCOs were expelled for being religious reactionaries. In another study, Tank (2005, 8) suggests the number of expulsions was approximately 745 between 1995 and 2000. The association established by expelled military personnel, ASDER, on the other hand, maintains that 1650 officers have been expelled, and claims that the number increases to 5000 when those pressured to resign or retire are included in the count (“Derneğimizin Kuruluşu” 2014).

As I explore in greater detail in the following chapters, these personnel were expelled for a range of reasons including, performing five daily prayers, abstaining from alcoholic beverages, and having headscarved wives and daughters in family. Except for limited research that has acknowledged the military control over religious identities the Islamic headscarf (Kavakci Islam 2010), academic research has not yet provided an experiential and meaningful account of how secularism materializes into various forms of governance that construct the military spaces as secular bodyscapes. As I outline in the next section, with this research I provide a comprehensive
account of how political Islam has become a national security concern within the context of gendered and sexually specific operationalization of secularist discourses.

The Contemporary Turkish Military

After decades of authoritarian control over civilian politics, currently the status of the Turkish military seems to have significantly “faded” due to processes like the 2013 legislation I explored at the beginning of this chapter. Starting from the EU accession processes that began in 1999, demands for the consolidation of democracy gradually curbed the military’s political power (Ünlü Bilgiç 2009; Bakiner 2013). During the rule of the JDP, more transformations regarding the status of the military within the state structure took place, such as restrictions over the implementations of NSC decisions and removal of its independent status over civilian politics via annexation to the Prime Minister (Ünlü Bilgiç 2009). These regulations brought the military leadership under the tutelage of the government and the parliament.

Finalized with the aforementioned amendment in its task definition, the pressing authority of the military over civilian politics, especially Islamist identities, has been significantly reduced. Reflected in the media as “another victory of the Islamists”, since 2013 the JDP deputies have been able to join Presidential receptions with their headscarved wives (“Resepsiyonda Başörtüsü Yorumu” 2014). The Sledgehammer court case that tried approximately 250 high-ranking officers over a 4-year period for allegedly plotting a coup against the JDP government in 2003 has also reduced the military power. The consequence of many of the transformations that occurred during this research is that the military has lost much
of its legitimacy as the “master of the country” and the “guardian of the republic” (Ahmad 2010). However, its legacy since the beginning of the republic, especially over Islamist politics, continue to shape the ways in which secularism has been lived and contested in Turkish society.

STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION

In the following chapter, Chapter 2, I locate myself as the researcher and discuss the methodologies and research methods I employed. Here I introduce feminist theory and methodology as the main axis of this research, by locating the female body and emotions as central to my analysis. I make a detailed inquiry into positionality and reflexivity by inserting my own identity and body to complicate the discursive grounds of Turkish secularism and the particular constructions of “secular” and “religious” in this context.

I develop my conceptual framework in Chapter 3, “Interweaving Secularism and Security with Feminist Geography”. I start by grounding my project in feminist and emotional geography and then demonstrate how I insert it as a critical lens into the study of secularism and security. Post-structuralist approaches to secularism and risk-based security research constitute the main scholarships I engage with.

In Chapter 4, “Sexual Constructions of Security and Risk within the Context of Secularism”, I examine the particular constructions of security and risk through women’s bodies and sexualities. I explore the particularities of the military’s security regulations as they pivot around the headscarved body, defining and encoding risk through women’s sexuality.
In Chapter 5, “Understanding ‘Risk of Islamism’ as Secular Social Governance: Safeguarding Modern Sovereignty Through Secular Governmentality”, I explore how sexually and corporeally constructed forms of risk and security are operationalized as a form of social governance within the logic of secular governmentality. Here I tease out the official security processes and everyday surveillance mechanisms in the life of military families that seek to discipline and recuperate such risk.

In Chapter 6, “Secular Instabilities and Anxieties: Emotional and Corporeal Geographies of the Military Base”, I inquire into the emotional content of the experience of military wives to demonstrate the corporeal and sexual constructions of security and risk at the axis of secular and religious. I demonstrate, how space is constructed through emotions that emerge through the vagueness and ambiguities of secularism as a function of secular modern sovereignty. In the final chapter, Chapter 7, I conclude by outlining the major research outcomes through the concept of secular bodyscapes, along with the contributions of this research, its limitations and the prospects it offers for future research.
Chapter 2

WRITING LIKE A SECULAR MILITARY DAUGHTER: FEMINIST METHODOLOGY, REFLEXIVITY AND RESEARCH METHODS

Prologue

I recollect with great fondness the five years (1987-1992) I spent as a child living on a military base in Kocaeli, Turkey. I remember the exact moment when my father took this picture as I lay playing with my dolls on a sea of daisies on a sunny spring day. To my right, I could see the training field for soldiers surrounded by a wired fence, which was also where I played with my friends. Between the field and the lodgings area where we lived, was a wide concrete road that was a substitute runway for emergency landing of jets and also a racetrack for our bicycles. Where the road met the horizon was the shores of Izmit Bay and a huge, round metal structure that was one of the biggest mysteries of my childhood. When I was older I learned that this was
an “elephant cage antenna” set up to capture the radio signals from Soviet Russia by the US military, the former owners of the base.

As a child, I did not know that the life I enjoyed with all the surrounding military paraphernalia came at a cost of a deep embrace of a security paradigm in its various forms and subtleties. A particular form of militarism\(^{23}\) shaped the way I saw the world without me realizing it. Growing up in this place I did not question why the military existed, nor the kind of modern and secular outlook and comportment it prescribed. The militarist and nationalist stories we learned at school about the model modern citizens we should be also seemed to make perfect sense within the sheltered confines of the base. It was not with a set of rules but rather with the abundance of movie theaters, restaurants, bars and cafes and picnic areas, as well as the absence of religious spaces, that a particular lifestyle was promoted. With everyone wearing a contemporary and a European style of dress and adopting a particular form of social conduct, this vivid public social sphere inculcated us into being particular modern and secular Turkish subjects.

The complicity of secularism with the military struck me much later in my life when I found myself saying in answer to question, “No, I do not really know any headscarved woman closely”. But, was that true? Just before we moved to that military base, we used to live in an apartment building in a small town close by. Our landlady used to take care of me when my parents went to work. She was a pious woman and she used to cover her head and dress

\(^{23}\) Here I define militarism as a set of ideas and structures that glorify the practices and norms associated with militaries, yet transcend the purposes of militaries by expanding into socio-cultural realms (Altinay 2005; Chenoy 2004). It is the extension of military influence to civilian, economic and socio-political life in spatially and temporally specific ways (Woodward 2004, 3). Militarization, on the other hand, is a complex and tense social process through which civil society is organized to produce violence (Geyer 1989; Lutz 2002). It is a “step-by-step process by which a person or a thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend, for its well-being, on militaristic ideas” (Enloe 2000, 3).
modestly, both in and out of the house. From time to time she used to take me to her friends’ homes for religious gatherings, where I used to listen to their prayers and hymns, and enjoy the tasty refreshments that followed. Had I just forgotten about all these experiences and our old landlady who wore a headscarf, as well as the many other people in my extended family who practiced their faith? The answer was no; but secularism had enticed me.

Under the weight of the secular/religious divide I was trained to categorize her dress, and the headscarf she wore for whatever reason, as “traditional”; outside of the political connotations that the headscarf has now come to carry. I had also failed to recognize how my own body and sexuality were constructed within a normative system that defined the spaces and borders of secular modernity through women’s bodies. It is because of these childhood experiences that exploration of the invisible and seamless homology between security discourses and secularism in the construction of secular bodyscapes of the military, resonates so deeply with me. In order to dismantle the regulatory and dichotomizing lenses of secularism, I place the female body, as well as my own body and my conflicted identity, at the centre of this analysis. I go back to that child in the picture to revisit the very personal and emotional foundations of secularism.

**Introduction**

In her introduction to *Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism*, Elizabeth Grosz (1994, vii) asserts that “[b]odies have all the explanatory power of minds.” This statement broadly encapsulates the epistemological and ontological claims of much feminist scholarship – that it is necessary to insert the *body* into our perceptions of reality, knowledge, truth, politics, ethics and
aesthetics (Grosz 1994). The body moreover is not only the embodied knower, but also an object of inquiry and a category of analysis (Margaret Fonow and Cook 2005). The body, particularly the female body, is the epistemic and ontological category that I use in this research to generate deeper understanding of the particular constructions of secularism and religion as lived within, and securitized through, the Turkish military.

In this chapter, I establish the body as the main methodological and theoretical foundation of this research. I explain why and how I pursue a feminist bodily analysis as a research methodology and how I position myself as an embodied researcher within the complex web of power relations and contingencies from which this research has emerged. I demonstrate the significance of a feminist methodology by explaining why women’s bodily experiences, and the situated and reflexive form of knowledge they contain, reveal a great deal about the security discourses and risk technologies of the Turkish military as well as the unstable constructions of the secular/religious dichotomy. Thereby, I situate feminist methodology as the main analytical framework of this dissertation in the light of which critical examinations of secularism and security takes place.

This chapter is composed of three sections. First, I introduce feminist methodology by drawing on the ground breaking interventions that feminist scholarship has made into the domains of masculinist, white and Western knowledge production and research by introducing the body as a form of analysis (Grosz 1994; Longhurst 1995; Longhurst 1997; Longhurst 2000; Davidson 2001; Peake and Trotz 2002). I discuss bodily analysis also as a response to critical approaches to secularism and Islam as is constructed and experienced within the Turkish context (Asad 1993; 2003; Connolly 2000; Mahmood 2011; Scherer 2011; Hirschkind 2011). Second, I
draw on the formative scholarship of Haraway (1988) and Harding (1991), to explain my process of knowledge production and research methods with respect to the social, historical and geographical particularities and changing dynamics of Turkish society. I discuss my positionality and insider-outsider status (Acker 2000; Hill Collins 1991) as the daughter of a retired naval NCO and member of a “secularist” household; as a person who has an intricate relationship to the field and to the knowledge produced. I reflect on the ongoing struggles I have had with the categories of “secular” and “religious” as per my identity as the researcher and as a point to critique the supposed objectivity and secularity of academic knowledge (D. Rose 1993).

Finally, I present the field as an ongoing process, a site of constant transformation and negotiation (Hyndman 2001a). I introduce the research site and research methods within the framework of feminist ethno-geography (Nagar 1997). I discuss the use of qualitative ethnographic methods with sensitivity on the role of place and space for constituting identities, as well as in the production of knowledge itself, across the blurry boundaries of life and research.

Feminist Methodologies

The Body as a Form of Analysis

It can be argued that there is no particular method, methodology or epistemology that informs feminist research (Brooks and Hesse-Biber 2007) except for the body, which, as an object of inquiry, a category and a form of knowledge, has been defined as “the touchstone of feminist theory” (Nelson and Seager 2004, 2). As opposed to the mind, which claims to host rational and absolute truths, the body destabilizes the roots of “scientific” knowledge with its materiality,
docility and fluidity (Grosz 1994; Gatens 1997). Starting from Platonic idealism, and continued with the legacy of Descartes, the prioritization of the mind over the body (and the other dichotomies it encapsulates such as reason/passion, culture/nature, public/private, west/east and male/female) has been coined by feminist scholars as the dominant frame that constitutes colonialism, capitalism and patriarchy under various guises (Cranny-Francis 1995; Grosz 1995). Therefore, it has been the task of critical feminist theory and epistemology to challenge the establishment of Cartesian subjectivity at the base of Western philosophy and thereby expose the legitimation of the white, masculine and Western supremacies under the pretext of “objective” science (Alcoff 1996).

To counterbalance the elevation of consciousness above corporeality, feminist epistemology inserts the body into the “stuff of philosophy”, making it into a legitimate topic of philosophical inquiry (Grosz 1994, ix). Through the lenses of the body and the corporeal, feminist researchers have rendered more complex the relationship between reason, theory and bodily subjective experience (Alcoff 1996; Gatens 1997). As indicated in the introductory chapter, drawing on the legacy of feminist theory (Grosz 1994; Longhurst 1997; Shilling 2012) in this research I define the body as a material and symbolic entity that is constructed contextually at the intersection of hegemonic discourses of patriarchy, secularism and security discourses of modern sovereignty. Corporeality, or the bodily, likewise is constituted of the myriad ways in which bodies are described; physical features, feelings and forms of knowledge that are used to subordinate certain groups and identities.

In this research I foreground an analysis of women’s bodily experiences. To illuminate the particular constructions of secularism and security within the context of the Turkish military,
I employ a variety of qualitative methods to interpret the personal and bodily experiences of military wives and daughters in order to understand the security discourses that shape women’s lives in the everyday of military spaces. I take women’s bodies and their narratives of marginalization and objectification as primary sites in which secular/religious divergences occur; divergences that constantly shape and differentiate these bodies and subjectivities, and thereby draw and redraw the borders of military spaces. Therefore in my analysis, I focus on women’s narratives of how they feel, how they think others think and feel about them, and the tensions they experience with regards to their bodies as they become present in various spaces.

**The Emotional**

The legitimation of “emotion as a source of knowledge and a product of culture” (Margaret Fonow and Cook 2005, 2215) is an approach that informs this study. Based on the critique of artificial separation of reason (mind) and emotion (body), both feminist scholarship and critical secularism studies demand foregrounding of the emotional and bodily formations in the critique of the founding premises and concepts of secularism. As various scholars suggest (Asad 2011; Connolly 1995; 2011; Hirschkind 2011; Scherer 2011), it is only through emotional and corporeal forms of knowledge that a solid critique of the so-called secular and rational subject, who can dissociate itself from religion, can be made. Joining Verkaiik and Spronk (2011), I argue that the embodied and emotional character of secularism needs to be examined in everyday life as a cultural practice that is conversant with political discourses, rather than simply a term employed within policy and institutional discourses.
Thus, to present a more eloquent analysis of secularism, I complement my bodily analysis with a focus on the emotional aspects of women’s experiences in their narratives. Alongside feminist theories of the body, I largely draw on geographies of emotion to explore how secularism functions in subtle, indirect and non-reflective ways and articulates emotion and action (Thrift 2004; Davidson, Smith, and Bondi 2007b). As the forms of knowledge on whose denial secularism is built, analyzing the emotional and corporeal enables an elucidation of the subtleties that secularism establishes in the form of embodied, felt and sensed experience.

I use women’s personal accounts of their own feelings as a primary data source. Besides the explicit expressions and naming of their feelings, such as “I felt lonely” or “I felt excluded”, I pay specific attention to the tone of their voices, their manners and body language, since such expressions also point to the implicit intensities that my participants do not necessarily recognize or point out. For example, from an expression such as “Of course, we enter the base as we like” Gulseren (61, wife of retired CO), I elucidate feelings of content and pride that come along with a sense of entitlement, ownership and comfort. On the other hand, from an expression like “I regret those 20 years we lived in the military. Life outside is much more better and free” Gungor (45, wife of expelled CO), I tease out an undertone of sadness, discomfort, and exclusion due to experiences of oppression and exclusion. These emotions provide an account of how the secular bodyscapes of the military are constructed through the emotional and corporeal content that allocate certain bodies in spaces and exclude others.

Inevitably, undertaking an analysis of emotions presents difficulties and dilemmas that emerge from the very quality of the data. The attempt to breakdown and analyze emotions, either in their verbal expression or through body language, is a challenge due to the intangibility of
such material, which is one of the reasons for it having been ignored in social science until recently. I recognize that even though I directed full intellectual and emotional attention to understanding these individuals with an open mind and sensitivity to their experiences, I was (and I still am) limited in my capacity for a “full” understanding due to my positionality.

However, it also needs to be noted that privileging of partial and situated forms of knowledge, as this research aims, refuses the existence of “full” reality. Such an endeavour assumes already a non-complete and partial reality that can be narrated only through a particular perspective. Such a perspective assumes spatial and temporal discordances within the seemingly solid identity categories of the secularist and Islamist, and takes these discordances as the very condition of these identities, rather than as exceptions or inconsistencies.

My experience with one of my research participants illustrates the discordances I experienced; the temporal and spatial differentiation in the expression of emotions. In our private conversation, Latife (48), an “Islamist” wife of an expelled CO, explained to me the extent of pressures she received from her larger family to remove her headscarf. She said that during a conversation with her sister-in-law at the kitchen table, she got so overwhelmed and upset by the constant bickering and questioning about her “political” headscarf that it came as a relief when the conversation was interrupted by a steel pot falling off the kitchen shelf and onto the table. In describing this moment, she emoted feelings of sadness and frustration over an unfair treatment, which “coincidentally” got interrupted (June 22, 2011). However, when I met her again at a communal fast breaking dinner in Ramadan, she recited the same story from a completely different perspective in the company of others who had similar experiences. She narrated the falling of the pot as a timely warning to her sister-in-law by Allah, and an affirmation of her
religious identity (August 13, 2011). The second narration of the story demonstrates how the same person can recount the same experience through completely different sensations and emotions, based on time, place, and audience.

**Developing Feminist Terminology**

The bodily analysis I employ to complicate the rigid identity categories of “secularist” and “Islamist” is the major methodological contribution this research makes. By taking women’s bodily experiences and emotions as the starting point before categorizing them either as secularist or Islamist, my research reveals that these categories do not precede these discourses. Both secularist and Islamist categories are discursive constructions. Bodily and emotional forms of knowledge show that it is the particular task of secularism to create, dichotomize and at the same time conflate the categories of the secular and religious.

I initiate my analysis by exploring the notion of the Islamist, which occurs as a distinct risk category in the military’s regulations and the secularist discourses that inform them. Şüpheli and sakincalı, which respectively translate as suspicious and objectionable, are the most common ways of designating individuals into risk category, both in formal documentation and in everyday language. Islamists, who are categorized as suspicious and objectionable, are the individuals in the risk category whose particular outfits and lifestyle have been deemed as adversarial to a secular lifestyle and detrimental to the achievements of secular modernity. This category emerged as an imposition on people who are different and perceived as more traditional, more outwardly religious and appear in ways that do not exactly fit into the prescribed model of the
modern Western subject. As opposed to a unitary category, my “Islamist” participants displayed a range of subject positions, engaging in Islamic religious practices to varying degrees and adhering to disparate political views within the spectrum of liberal nationalism, conservatism and statism.

On the other hand, the participants who mostly identified as “secularist” and differentiated themselves from the “Islamist” are largely made up of individuals who are as pious and liberal or conservative, nationalist and statist as the “Islamists”. The majority of the “secularist” research participants carried out some kind of religious practice on a regular basis, but at the same time indicated that these practices should not be turned into a public identity marker. A bodily approach reveals that the polarizations between the secularist and Islamist do not do justice to the similarities these individuals have. This is especially the case for women whose primary difference from one another can remain at the level of their preference for religious covering, which can be worn equally for either ethical or religious purposes. Thus, I refrain from readily adopting these categories of secularist and Islamist and devise new ways of addressing my research participants. In describing a research participant, I use scare quotation marks in order to indicate my critical approach to concepts of “secular” and “religious”, which I argue are discursively constructed and imposed on individuals and significantly shaped the experiences of these individuals and how they identify in the given context.

The terminology I use when I refer to “Islamist” women is complex and non-unitary as it attempts to break down the homogenizing secularist gaze that these women are being subjected to due to the forms of dress and social conduct they adopt. The majority of scholarly literature on political Islam and women in Turkey refers to religious dress as a headscarf (Saktanber and
The term headscarf is the literal translation of the Turkish word *başörtüsü*, which has come to refer to a religious/conservative/Islamist middle-class identity that is perceived as a challenge to the secularity of public space and Western norms of female sexuality. As I also explore in detail in Chapter 4, the term “traditional headscarf” is often used to distinguish those who do not necessarily pose those challenges while still wearing a headscarf (Gokariksel and Secor 2012). However, since the distinction between the traditional and non-traditional headscarf is a highly politicized one, I prefer to not use headscarf as the main axis of my terminology, except for when my respondents explicitly use it. I rather analyze the construction of the difference between political and traditional when I evoke these terms. This way I seek to disrupt the secularist vision, which implicitly marks the “non-headscarved” as the invisible normative category and the headscarf as a form of deviance.

To avoid normative categorizations, I describe women’s clothing in various different ways. Regardless of whether women are “Islamist” or “secularist”, I refer to their clothing by choosing the closest terms that they use in their self-descriptions. I employ terms such as headscarf/headscarved24, veil/veiled, religiously dressed, turban/turbaned, covered, closed, open, modestly dressed, dressed in a European style. This intended inconsistency and lack of uniformity demonstrates the heterogeneity of the perceived categorizations of “Islamist” and “secularist” women, and also is a form of respect for women’s self-descriptions and self-identifications.

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24 The term “headscarved” has recently started being used as an adjective to denote headscarf-wearing women (Turam 2013, Genel and Karaosmanoglu 2006).
The Body as an Object of Inquiry: The Military Wife

This research is built on the premise that gender specific and differentiated perspectives of women – as the excluded and exploited “other” in a patriarchal society – provides a more inclusive and critically coherent point of view (Harding 1991; 1988; McDowell 1992). Feminists have asserted that grounding research in women’s experience creates space for an absent person and her absent experience, and contributes to production of counter-hegemonic narratives (Ong 1996 in Shope 2006; Mattingly and Falconer-Al-Hindi 1995; Brooks 2007). The application of a critical feminist lens to studies of militaries and militarisms is especially crucial given their predominantly masculine constructions (Enloe 1989, 2000, Cockburn 2004). As Enloe (2000, x) argues, despite the dominance of males, “militaries – and militarized civilian elites – rely not only on men but also heavily depend on, and manoeuvre to control, varieties of femininities in all their countless guises”. Thus, it is through feminist analysis that the complex webs of power relations embedded in predominantly masculine spheres of the military, diplomacy, international relations and geopolitics can be revealed (Hyndman 2001a; Fluri 2009; Dalby 1994).

In this research I take the category of the military wife as an object of inquiry as the Turkish military too is a predominantly masculine institution in which women’s accounts are largely marginalized and discredited by both the military authorities and in knowledge production. While heterosexual males are traditionally constructed as eligible for combat and national defense; women are defined in secondary, but still significant, positions to support the military as spouses and nurturing caretakers (Enloe 2000; Altinay 2005). I focus on the significance of women’s bodily representations in military families, specifically through the
normative category of the “ideal military wife” that is constructed through security discourses on the risk of Islamism. I analyze the category of the military wife, her religious embodiment and bodily representation, as key factors that determine the risk status of an officer as an “Islamist”, resulting in effects that vary from promotion to expulsion.

With rare exceptions (Poturgeli 2011), women’s first-person voices hardly ever find expression in official accounts and in publications that recount securitization processes (Hacimustafaogullari 2004; Erdem 2008; Caglayan 2011). Such discounting of knowledge was carried into interviews where women were reluctant to talk because they did not consider their experiences as important or relevant. In parallel, their husbands made uninvited contributions during the interviews, feeling compelled to provide a “better” or “more informed or accurate” accounts of the battle of the Turkish military with the risk of Islamism. I also observed that women who identified as secularist, and who were very outspoken in defence of secularism, held on to their supportive but secondary position as wives even though the “secularity” of their husbands was largely measured by their dress and comportment. At times, they defined their experiences as not as crucial. However, by allowing and sometimes insisting that women share their experiences, opinions and feelings, this research foregrounds women’s voices as a political endeavour to provide women more space, authority and agency. As it unfolds in the following chapters, women’s experiences as military wives provide the background story of a major political debate and a security struggle where nuances and subversive accounts get lost due to the predominantly patriarchal operationalization of security discourses.
GEOGRAPHIES OF POSITIONALITY: SITUATED KNOWLEDGE, REPRESENTATION AND REFLEXIVITY

One unassailable feature of feminist methodology has been the challenges it sets for the unlocatable, universal, and objective knowledge claims by demanding situated and embodied forms of knowledge (Haraway 1988). Such research practice foregrounds the body and vantage point that the researcher inevitably inhabits (Margaret Fonow and Cook 2005; Shope 2006), and reveals the relationship between power and knowledge by bringing forth the authoritative privilege white, heterosexual, able-bodied men have held in the academy (England 1994). Largely framed as “standpoint methodology”, such an intervention is based on an understanding that “dominant groups are not well equipped to identify the hegemonizing and oppressive features of their own beliefs and practices” (Harding and Norberg 2005, 2010). By prioritizing partial perspectives and situated knowledge, standpoint theories offer solid pathways towards de-universalizing knowledge and dismantling the power relations that perpetuate existing gendered, racial, sexual, religion and class based hierarchies. Situated knowledge disrupts dominant narratives by inserting into the stream of knowledge alternative versions of discursive power through perspectives and stories of marginalized groups (Ong 1996; Shope 2006).

Aligning with standpoint feminist methodology, this research is committed to the production of situated and partial knowledge that disrupts the mainstreaming effects of secular and religious discourses. I attempt such feminist research practice initially by introducing the category of the military wife as an object of inquiry and inserting the marginalized narratives of women and their bodily experiences. However, as prompted by Black (Collins 1999; hooks
1999) and post-colonial feminists (Mohanty 2003), even critical, standpoint epistemologies may fall into the same pitfalls as the universalizing knowledge system it is challenging when it draws only on White, Western and middle-class feminist perspectives in the academy. This opens up for scrutiny the tensions and dilemmas of knowledge production. Informed by the critical approaches of feminists of colour, I remain wary of the temptation to offer a “clearer vision of reality” based on the experience of those who are marginalized; for I too run the risk of reviving the essentialist claims that positivist science offers (Falconer-Al-Hindi 1997). Therefore, I raise questions about how to establish grounds for local and regional forms of knowledge, without promoting a “universalizing discourse” (Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002, 66).

One way to avoid universalizing knowledge is through a process of critical reflexivity that temporally and spatially contextualizes how knowledge is produced. For Rose (G. Rose 1997, 309) reflexivity is a process of looking “‘inward’ to the identity of the researcher, and ‘outward’ to her relation to her research and what is described as ‘the wider world’”. Reflexive practices cover broader discursive terrains that the research emerges within, and they contextualize the particular circumstances, political debates and conflicts, as well as the shifting power dynamics that shape the research process (Nagar 1997). It is at the same time a process of accounting for the choice of the research topic and its methods, and defining its goals with respect to the particular discursive field it enters to not re-inscribe dominant power relations (Wilson 2004; Margaret Fonow and Cook 2005). To this end, I discuss how the research process has been affected by the constantly shifting dynamics between the government and the military.

Such critical contextualization is also inseparable from self-reflexivity, that is the detailed inspections of the ways in which the researcher’s personality and biography is part of the setting,
context, and the social phenomenon he or she seeks to understand (Schwandt 2007, 260). As Nagar (1997, 203) argues, being self-reflexive is crucial because “our exploration of the politics of communities and social identities is completely entangled with the multifaceted ways in which our own identities and background situate us in relation to our informants.” By accounting for our positionality, as researchers we locate ourselves and maintain a level of honesty “about what we claim to know, what we cannot apprehend, and the limits of our disciplinary practices that rely on highly stylized discursive practices” (Shope 2006, 181). I provide a biographical account of a life spent in the military and growing up as a military daughter in a secularist community as a way to sketch the contours of my ethnographic experience as a researcher, as well as to reveal the emotional content that drives and affects this research.

A considerable part of the research experience is also shaped by the complex insider/outsider status of the researcher, the impacts of his/her affinity to, and estrangement from, the research field (Collins 1999; Margaret Fonow and Cook 2005; Dyck 1993; Acker 2000; Pitman 2002; Wray and Bartholomew 2010). This debate basically complicates the assumed advantages and disadvantages of being in the categories of an insider and outsider, respectively. Drawing on the racially marginalized status of Black women intellectuals in the Western academy, Hill Collins (1991) has demonstrated how being “outsiders” adorns them with nuanced and sensitive lenses to perceive certain patterns of power imbued social relations better than those immersed in the situation. As partial outsiders they also hold the advantage for gaining people’s confidence due to a complex composition of nearness and remoteness. Likewise, being an insider also has its limitations. In response to the assumption that “insiders studying their own cultures offer new angles of vision and depths of understanding” (Clifford and Marcus 1986, 9 in Sherif 2001), methodological debates have revealed that “indigenous ethnographers and 'partial
insiders’” may well be constrained in their research and analysis both by disciplinary boundaries and by their own identities as shaped by gender and race hierarchies (Sherif 2001, 438; Gilbert 1994; Zavella 1993).

Discussing the complex forms of being both an insider and an outsider is a productive way to reflect on the fluidity of one’s identity and its impacts on the processes of knowledge production. Problems arise from the static and fixed formulations of the identity of the researcher; approaches that turn a blind eye to his/her fragmented identity that is constantly in the making (Nagar 1997; Sherif 2001). That is why, in line with Acker (2000), I argue that discussions of the insider/outsider status of the researcher is a productive way of problematizing my identity and positionality, rather than an attempt to determine and fully resolve such dilemma.

In this research, I also remain wary of the blunt assumptions of an a priori reality or unified identity that I as researcher can gain access to or reveal (Rose 1997; Katz 1994). As Rose argues (1997), research needs to be seen as constitutive (if not completely so), both of the researcher and of the other involved in the research process. By establishing an analogy between conducting research and crossing a river, Shope (2006, 182) argues “feminist methods is not about crossing the river, but diving into the water and soaking oneself in the contradictions and messiness of research.” Likewise, I argue that the researcher and research do not emerge as entities that need to be separately reflected on, but as formations that come into being and keep on changing through the course of the research.

Adhering to these critical approaches in feminist methodology, this research is built on the idea that elimination of the power-knowledge dilemma can never be fully accomplished
through reflexivity (Wasserfall 1997 in Shope 2006). Joining Rose (1997), I argue that despite the openness and honesty regarding one’s identity, the researcher can still hold the power to give direction to the flow of the research, to decide what to observe and how to interpret it. In order to situate knowledge production, in the following pages I start with the major conversations and political debates that effected the course of the research; which is then followed by an analysis of my complicated insider/outsider status, my emotions, and finally my dilemmas regarding the “secularity” of the research.

**Reflections on the Context**

As I discuss in the introductory chapter, the particular moment when this research took place, March to September 2011, coincided with major political upheavals in Turkey, regarding the power and status of the military. The guardianship role in relation to secularism that the Turkish military had claimed since the beginning of the republic and its tight grip over civilian politics was slowly being transformed not only through institutional reforms endorsed by the ruling Islamist JDP government, but also two court cases, *Sledgehammer* and *Ergenekon*. As Bakiner suggest (2013) these two prominent coup plot trials were major attempts to break down the military and civilian network that allegedly attempted to overthrow the JDP government in the early 2000s. These court cases strongly challenged the political autonomy and authority of the military, especially its power over the JDP, by condemning and punishing its alleged past “anti-Islamist” actions.
During the course of the research, more than 250 high-ranking military officers were arrested through these cases, which led to intense debates on the secularist discourse of the military and its decades long regulations to reduce the risk of Islamization. Such intense focus on this matter resulted in a more sharpened tone of polarization between the already existing categories of “secularist” versus “Islamist” within the military community. This invoked multiple conversations on the Turkish military’s secularist security discourses and its past actions that had affected the lives of thousands of military personnel, including my research participants.

Since I was investigating the secularist discourse of the military along the lines of these court cases, most research participants viewed my intentions and research motivations with suspicion and caution. Most of the “secularists” questioned my political views and beliefs as they assumed that I sidelined with the “Islamist” government, which they perceived was the major political force behind these legal cases instead of an independent judicial process. On the other hand, those who were labelled or identified as “Islamist” viewed me as an ally in their position and struggle with the secularist establishment. Most indicated that they felt empowered since the processes they suffered from would be somewhat addressed and penalized through these cases. However, as I narrate in the following pages, my identity as the daughter of a “secularist” military family has been the most significant determinant of the reception of the entire research.

**Researcher Reflexivity**

As I sought to define a research project I realized that my own life was a valuable research site. Questions I had long raised about women’s dress in public space were grounded in my
experience in living in military spaces and having a family, and a community, who spoke through and reproduced the secularist/Islamist divide. I enter this research as the daughter of a retired naval NCO who has lived her life in close relation to the Turkish military. My family and I have always had organic and socially networked connections to the military, both as an institution and as a community. Both during the time my father served the military and after he retired, being a military family has been a definitive feature of our family.

My father served in the navy for 25 years, with appointments at two major naval bases in Turkey. His occupation constituted the main axis of our middle-class family life. My mother, as an elementary school teacher, always worked at public schools close to my father’s deployments. We lived in various military lodgings, which were located next to military bases, for approximately 10 years. I went to elementary school in a military base for five years; all of my friends and playmates were military children. Even after my father retired we constantly visited military spaces to socialize.

From the political conversations that took place with our houseguests and the comments my father made about the evening news at our dinner table, I gathered that he sided politically with the status quo and favoured the dominant military perspective. Through my childhood, my father would always talk about the necessity of the 1980 military coup that came as a response to increased levels of violence and political turmoil in the country. This form of adherence to militarism and statist conservatism in our family culture evolved from the 1990s into the 2000s developing into an antipathy towards political Islam and the rise of Islamism as a grassroots movement. In line with the Turkish military’s staunch secularist stance, often I would hear comments at the dinner table about how the “Islamists” have a secret agenda to turn our “modern
and democratic” country into a “backward, religious fundamentalist” country like Iran. Being secularist and modern, thus not an Islamist, started to be more verbally spelled out as an identity marker and a source of pride in our social circles.

Such anxieties over the rise of Islamic identities in public space came into our conversations most often through the controversies over the ban on the headscarf in public employment and higher education. As a family, we adopted a Western and “modern” style of dress that was always accompanied by a strong notion of modesty. As I discuss in the next chapter, the modern-but-modest dress style was put forward as a “better” way of maintaining morality, which, according to my family was the “actual” purpose of the headscarf. Thus, while I did not wear any religious gear, throughout my life I was also strongly discouraged from adopting revealing forms of outfit. Such normative adoptions of a particular lifestyle and outfit also resulted in obliviousness towards the distinctions that secularism imposed, such as the naturalized dichotomization of the political and traditional headscarf.

However, this never equated to an advocacy of atheism or an irreligious lifestyle. My family, and I through my upbringing, have always identified as Muslims, even though we seldom formally practice our faith. Along with these political polarizations though, the not so visible and infrequent forms of Islamic practices and faith denominators, such as my father’s weekly practice of going for Friday prayers, ceremonies to mark births and deaths, came to be defined as better than the literal adaptations of the religion practiced by “Islamists”.

Such perplexities that I encountered in my personal life led me to explore the conditions that procured them. In other words, rather than me seeking a particular research topic, my own life unfolded in front of me in distinct ways and made itself into a research project and me into a
researcher. Confusions and dilemmas emerging from secularism’s discourses, and questioning of my life experiences constituted not only the basis of this research but also the establishment of an ever-lasting blurry distinction between my life and this research.

**Insider or Outsider**

Besides the impacts of being part of a military family, a discussion of my insider/outsider status with respect to disparate spheres of this research throws light onto how my identity factored into knowledge production. I describe my status both as a partial insider and a partial outsider with respect to the presumed spheres of the “secularists” and “Islamists” in this research. I identify as an insider within the context of the Turkish military and the “ secularist” military community. As a researcher working in her home country and community, I have had the logistical advantage of holding a military ID as the unmarried daughter of a retired NCO. Holding this card enabled my entrance to military bases and social facilities for NCOs.

In addition, growing up in military bases and having had close connections with the military community provided me with the specific contextual knowledge, tools and social skills to conduct this research. I was aware of the general political spectrum and thereby able to avoid contentious matters, such as the status and significance of the founding father Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, both as a political figure and as a person; the significance of the foundational secularizing reforms of the republic; the legitimacy of the Turkish Military as the protector of the republic; and the territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic. I tried to avoid these pitfalls by directing discussions to women’s everyday life experiences. When needed, I was able to make
references to my own experiences and my family’s to create affinity with my research participants. Personal anecdotes about life within the military, such as not seeing your father for long periods of time due to his deployments, or even commenting on the quality of food served in military cafeterias, helped me to connect with my research participants.

However, I also ran into some obstacles due to my insider status. Since debates and critiques of the risk of Islamism are so widespread within the military community the reasons behind the critiques were most often taken for granted. This made it more difficult for me to further question these reasons, which, according to my research participants were obvious. Specifically, at the beginning of the research, as I was still improving my interview skills, the questions I directed at my interlocutors appeared to demand the statement of the obvious because of my perceived insider status. In such cases, I needed to reassert myself as an outsider who has lived abroad for a long enough time to need a reiteration of “obvious facts”.

On the other hand, I stood out as an outsider due to my family background and my outlook amongst the “Islamist” research participants. Even though we all shared the common history of living in the military, our experiences were differentiated due to the various reasons that I explore in this dissertation. With a “modern” outlook I represented the values that the military sought to protect, whereas it was their dress style and religious embodiment that coded them as a risk for the secular order. However, I managed to overcome this obstacle by defining the purpose of the research as an attempt to foreground women’s marginalized experiences and to expose various sorts of discriminations they encountered within the military.

My positionality in the field was double-edged. I was both an insider and an outsider based on a fluctuating rather than a static identity. I tried to be open to engage with the
experiences of all my research participants in each interaction, which are all differentiated spatially and temporally. I also tried to remain in touch with, and be aware of, my own emotions, which constituted the main drive of this research, deserving of methodological reflection too. Because, as Fonow and Cook (1991, 9) rightfully assert, due to the masculinist foundations of scientific inquiry there has always been a tendency to avoid reflecting on the emotional dimension of the conduct of inquiry in the social sciences (Dickson-Swift et al. 2009).

Parallel to my methodological and epistemological grounding of this research on women’s lived bodily experiences and emotions, I situate my own emotions and frustrations and my struggles with myself and with my community as major variables that shaped the knowledge I produce. Feelings of empathy towards people due to their struggle with the identity categories that they are reduced to have been my main emotional drive. In some cases I deeply cared for the individual experiences of my research participants, which were reciprocated in some cases and turned into deep-rooted friendships. I also had to deal with negative feelings that were generated upon blunt expressions of xenophobia, racism, homophobia, sexism and Islamophopia during the interviews. In such cases I paid attention to the complexity of these experiences and questioned their meanings and incorporated them into my analysis (V. Taylor and Rupp 1991).

**Is Research Secular?**

“Is critique secular?” (2009) is the question that the influential scholars of secularism and identity politics, Talal Asad, Saba Mahmood, Wendy Brown and Judith Butler discuss in the edited volume titled with the same question. Their efforts to understand and debate the
foundational concepts of secularism and its presumed identities and subjectivities, as revealed through the Danish cartoons controversy\textsuperscript{25} or \textit{burqa} and \textit{niqab} bans in France and Belgium, rotate around the question of the secularity of critique. Brown sets the tone by stating that the “Western academy is governed by the presumptive secularism of critique” (2009, 8). This kind of critique of the critique, as Asad also puts it, is a way of problematizing the clear cut distinctions between the secular and religious, and perceiving them as interdependent and fluctuating notions that constitute a crucial domain of modern power and governance (Brown 2009). As they assert, academic research and critique are therefore confined within the epistemic framework of secularism and the abandonment of religious belief and authority, which fail to understand complexity of social phenomenon at multiple levels (Zine 2004).\textsuperscript{26}

The problematization of the secular and religious divide in knowledge production and my own identity as a researcher has been key to this critical inquiry. Wary of the temptation of resorting to authoritative mechanisms and discursive tools of secularism, I refrain to categorize either this research or myself, as secular or religious. Rather, I pose this research and its deep engagement with the notions of secular and religious, as a challenge to the mainstream affiliation of secularity with scientific authority. By critiquing the concept of the secular and not identifying with it, my goal is to create a conceptual conundrum that constantly questions the power claims made through secular scholarship.

\textsuperscript{25} Danish cartoon controversy is the series of public conversations and protests that took place in response to the negative and Islamophobic caricatures of Prophet Mohammed on the Danish newspaper \textit{Jyllands-Posten} February 5, 2006 (Lægaard 2009).

\textsuperscript{26} For critiques of secular epistemic frameworks and formulations of “faith-centered” epistemology see Jasmin Zine’s article (2004).
On a personal level, I have always questioned my identity as to my secularity or religiosity. However it was mostly after I left Turkey for the first time for my MA degree in Hungary that I was asked “Are you a Muslim?” or “Are you religious?” Only after that did I start thinking about my religious identity and the kind of Muslim I was. Sometimes I answered I am not a Muslim, neither Christian, or a Jew and that I do not think of “these things”, and then I was categorized as an agnostic. Sometimes I said I was an atheist, but then I was asked to make rational arguments for the non-existence of a God. The truth was that I carried all of these identities and I was confused most of the time. My problem was with the demand for consistency, that if I held a position or a belief, I needed to stick to it, defend it and be consistent with it. After years of questioning, and specifically after this research, I have come to the conclusion that I have an inconsistent identity, in the sense that my identity shifts depending on the time and places I occupy.

In my fieldwork, as I personally engaged with individuals who identified as “deeply religious” or pious, and as I tried to understand their worlds better, I felt more pressure on my presumably secular researcher identity. I engaged in intense conversations about Allah, religion, destiny and the never-ending quest for meaning. Instead of resisting the temptations of religious belief, I immersed myself in the research and let myself be influenced by what my research participants deemed important. What could have been seen as compromising my “secular” research identity became a way of critically and genuinely engaging with my research participants and their worlds. Methodologically, the entire research became a process of complicating the concepts of secular and religious at both academic and personal levels, which I believe is a critical intervention to the authority and power claimed through the secularity of academic research.
FEMINIST ETHNO-GEOGRAPHY: RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODS AND ANALYSIS

In this section, I expand on the research process, its design and methods as part of an effort to situate the knowledge production through reflexivity and positionality. Following Nagar (1997), I define my fieldwork practice as a feminist ethno-geography whereby I employ qualitative ethnographic methods, including participant observation and in-depth semi-structured interviews, with sensitivity to the role of place and space for constituting identities and communities, as well as in the production of knowledge itself (Nagar 1997). As Dyck (1993) argues, such qualitative ethnographic methods identify both researchers and subjects as active agents in knowledge production, by locating them in time and place and underscoring the importance of reflexivity in the research process (Nagar 1997). Ethnographic methods, with sensitivity to the significance of space and place, take into account the meaning of women’s experiences in the particular social and geographical contexts of their lives (Dyck 1993, 57). As Nagar (1997, 206) explains, such research practice works to reveal the importance of human action and the continuous construction of meaning, while allowing the researcher to describe women’s activities and record women’s own statements, perceptions and attitudes.

My methods are also informed by institutional ethnography, which is an approach to inquiry that looks at social relations within the frame of social organizations (D. E. Smith 1989; M. L. Campbell et al. 2006). Institutional ethnography is a method of inquiry that has historically shifted from macro to micro-level institutional frames and finer scales, where spatial arrangements and bodies have now fallen under scrutiny (Philo and Parr 2000). Informed by this method of inquiry, my research starts off by identifying women’s particular experiences in
military spaces, and explores the interrelation between the experience and the institutional structures and processes involved. In line with Billo and Mountz’s assertion (2015, 3), the institutional ethnography approach in this research concerns the daily empirical knowledge of the Turkish military as a security institution and “reveals the unevenness of institutional practices and effects.”

In this research, I approach fieldwork as simultaneously “a political, personal and professional undertaking” (Hyndman 2001a, 262). The field is not necessarily contained in space or time; neither does it exist as a place clearly separated from the researcher’s “real” or “academic” life (Billo and Hiemstra 2013; Katz 1994; Hyndman 2001a). As Katz (1994, 67–68) argues, conducting fieldwork is a continuous process of defining and reinstating the boundaries between life and field, which comes out of a power relation that imposes the fieldworker on the space-time of others. In line with this scholarship, I define my fieldwork as an endeavour to systematize the knowledge and personal experience I already have related to the issue, but with a more organized effort to fill in the gaps and explore the venues to which I did not have prior access. I used my fieldwork as an opportunity to tell the partial and specific personal stories that I deemed important and observed to fit into a pattern (Hyndman 2001a).

I start from a point of recognizing how the idea of this research came out of my own experiences and observations as being part of a military community, and that the process took place across blurry boundaries of research and life. My general knowledge of the research topic is constituted by my long-term engagement with it, reinforced by extensive reading of the scholarly literature and print media (news papers, journals, opinion pieces). The fieldwork research came together as a set of systemic efforts to talk to individuals, to understand their
feelings and experiences, as well as through extra efforts to create opportunities to talk to the people who I would not normally encounter, such as the “Islamist”. I conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews and I ventured into military spaces (predominantly NCO’s facilities) whenever I could with my military ID to observe how they function based on a set of written and unwritten rules. As a practice of feminist ethno-geography, I carried out these activities with specific attention to how military spaces, and the bodies therein, are constructed and contested along secularist and religious discourses. Thus, what I detail about fieldwork and research design is an outline of how I used my academic leverage to decide what counts as relevant to my research and in my everyday life, and how I extended my personal networks to find answers to my questions. As I present in the following section, my activities in the field as well as the extent of my reach to participants and resources gain significance with presentation of structural information of the Turkish military in terms of its size and content.

**Structural Information on the Turkish Military**

The Turkish military is one of the largest standing armies in the world and the second largest in NATO (Akay 2009b, 125). According to the latest figures, with 345 generals, 39,326 COs, 96,308 NCOs, and including a total of 175,666 specialized and contract personnel, currently there are 23,812 personnel in the military. The total number of personnel working under this institution reaches the number of 677, 285 when 7276 reserve officers and 393,530 privates as well as 52, 667 civil workers are taken into consideration (“TSK Personel Sayısını Açıkladı - TRT Türk Haberler” 2014). Due to confidentiality of military information, there are no concrete figures on the numbers of residences and facilities; however, the Almanac prepared by TESEV
in 2008 provides the closest figures. According to 2009 budget disclosed by the Ministry of Defence, there are 41,701 lodgings and 327 social facilities (Akay 2009b, 124). The military officers’ clubs are approximated to be 43, excluding the touristic facilities and holiday resorts of the military (Akay 2009b, 124).

Military spaces include Officers’ clubs, restaurants, ballrooms, cafés, hair salons, schools, hospitals, residences, holiday resorts, that are placed either in isolation or annexed to military headquarters. Entrance rules to these spaces can change depending on the type of the space and the occasions taking place. The Ministry of Defense leaves the Administration Regulations for Social Facilities for the military (including the dress codes for entrance) to be determined by the Head of Turkish General Staff (“Turk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Ordu Evleri, Askeri Gazinolar, Kısla Gazinolari ve Vardiya Yatakaneleri Ile Eğitim Merkezleri Yönetmeligi” 2015).

Research Locations

I conducted this research between March and September 2011, in two locations in Turkey, Mugla and Istanbul. Mugla is a medium size city in the southwest of Turkey, by the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. I chose Mugla because it is where my family and friendship network is based, a community of former and current military personnel and their families. From my parents’ home in Mugla I could comfortably access a major naval base, which offered a variety of social facilities and spaces where I could interact with friends and develop my network of research contacts.
The second site of my research was Istanbul, the largest city in Turkey and a strategic national centre of social, political and economic activities. Istanbul hosts several military bases and social facilities for navy, air force, and army personnel in the Turkish military. Having lived in Istanbul for 10 years prior to my doctorate, I am familiar with the city and the opportunities it presents for accessing the head offices of civil associations established by former/expelled and retired military personnel. Throughout the seven months of my fieldwork, I traveled back and forth between Mugla and Istanbul (approximately 700 km) to interview research participants and attend formal and informal events at civil organizations and in military spaces.

**Interviews: Semi-Structured and In-Depth**

In line with the methodological and epistemological concerns of feminism, semi-structured and in-depth interviews constitute the main form of data collection in this research. As Secor (2010, 195) outlines, interviews provide valuable way to access “the ways in which people represent themselves and the world in the context of a (very particular kind of) conversation”. Conducting interview-based research enabled me to reveal the ways in which “certain events, practice or knowledge are constructed or enacted within particular contexts” (Secor 2010, 199). In particular, in-depth and semi-structured interviews allowed considerable “flexibility so that a hierarchy of each woman’s concerns could emerge without precluding specific probes on points of interest” (Dyck 1993, 54). I used an interview guide (Appendix A1) to provide some structure and consistency across conversations while at the same time allowing them to unfold in organic ways in response to informants’ interests, leaving room for unforeseen topics to emerge.
My interview style was also tailored towards hearing life-stories which allowed me to hear about many different facets of women’s lives, which might be deemed “irrelevant” in a more rigidly structured interview format. As Nagar argues (1997, 218), such stories “are an essential tool to understanding how social actors characterize themselves, and how those characterizations are constructed in specific social and geographic contexts”. This way I could understand the broader social, cultural and political context of my participants’ lives, and offer a more nuanced and relational understanding of the meaning and relevance of their personal experiences.

I conducted 46 semi-structured in-depth interviews with women in commissioned and non-commissioned officers’ families (see Appendix B for list of interviewees with pseudonyms, date of interview and location).27 The majority of my informants signed informed consent forms (see Appendix C).28 I have used pseudonyms for each participant, and I have also changed the names of any private locations in order to maintain individual anonymity. Eighteen of the “Islamist” research participants were either expelled from the military or pressured to resign or retire (Group 1, hereafter). I accessed these participants through Adaleti Savunanlar Dernegi (ASDER, The Association of Defenders of Justice), which is a civil association established by these personnel. Each time I quote a participant I indicate their status as “force-retired” or “expelled” CO or NCO. As I indicate each time I quote this group of participants, the majority of these women adopt a particular religious outfit or practice that has been deemed as risky or Islamist by the military. The remaining 28 of my research informants are women from military families, who either identified as “secularist” or did not indicate any direct experience of

27 I also did additional 8 interviews with women in rank-soldiers’ families, which I explain below.

28 However, in some cases verbal consent was provided, as women were fearful of fraud or exposure, regardless of how much I sought to reassure them. See Appendix C for a copy of the informed consent form.
secularist pressures from the military (Group 2, hereafter). I refer to these research participants as “retired” or “on-duty” CO or NCO when I quote them, and I indicate if a person is wife and/or daughter of an officer for both groups.

For both of these interview groups, I used a snowball-sampling technique. I accessed the majority of my research participants in Group 2 through my personal and family network both in Mugla and Istanbul. However, for Group 1, I worked predominantly through civil associations in Istanbul. Some interviews were conducted in military cafés and restaurants, but the majority of were conducted in people’s private homes, which allowed me to observe and to better understand their life-worlds. In their private spaces, I was also able to have conversations with other family members, who were their in-laws, children or their husbands.

**Commissioned / Non-Commissioned Officers**

In my recruitment of participants, I sought to maintain a balance of wives and daughters from groups of both COs and NCOs, with a slight privileging of the COs’ perspectives. Even though I do not introduce significant distinction between these two categories in my analysis, CO’s and NCO’s statuses and the differences between the experiences of their families needs to be acknowledged.\(^29\) COs are defined as the core command structure of the military (TSK Ic Hizmet Kanunu ve Yönetmeliği 2011).

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\(^{29}\) Ranks in the Turkish military are composed of the categories of commissioned/staff and non-commissioned officers. Staff officers start from the highest status of General of the Army (Maresal) and Chief of General Staff (Genel Kurmay Baskani) and continue with full star general (orgeneral), lieutenant general (korgeneral), major general (tümgeneral), brigader general (tuggeneral), colonel (albay), lieutenant colonel (yarbay), major (binbasi), captain (yüzbasi), first lieutenant (üsteğmen), lieutenant (teğmen), third lieutenant (astteğmen). The non-commissioned officers ranks start from first sergeant (kidemli bascavus) and go down to sergeant (bascavus), chief petty officer (kidemli istcavus), staff sergeant (istcavus), sergeant first class (kidemli cavus) and sergeant (cavus) (TSK Ic Hizmet Kanunu ve Yönetmeliği 2011).
They take up the ranks from third-lieutenant to general of armies. Based on their rank status, COs participate in decision-making mechanisms and management of the military structure. On the other hand, NCOs stand as the intermediate command level between COs and the rank soldiers (*TSK Ic Hizmet Kanunu ve Yönetmeligi* 2011). Their tasks include the execution of the tasks that are determined by the COs, and they take up the ranks from sergeant to chief master sergeant.

The rank hierarchy between COs and NCOs also translates into a hierarchy of social standing and prestige. COs hold a lot more visibility in spaces of political significance (such as formal ceremonies, national day celebration events), as they hold the potential to go up to higher ranks in the chain of command. The power and authority disparity between COs and NCOs spills over from their occupational capacity, to the social status and economic privileges that their families gain in military spaces. COs’ families are generally perceived as holding a higher-class status compared to NCOs. And because of this, specifically within the context of the risk of Islamism, the COs have received more thorough inspections and their wives’ public representation have become a bigger issue compared to NCOs. Because of this, I tried to give more representation to COs’ families’ experiences. I interviewed 26 women from families of COs (ranging from the ranks of colonel and third lieutenant), and 19 from NCOs (from ranks of first sergeant to sergeant first class). Furthermore, my lifetime experience of living in military spaces as part of an NCO family is a significant factor that needs to be taken into consideration and balanced.
In terms of age, all of my participants are over the age of 18, mostly ranging from their mid-30s through to mid-60s. The ages of the participants matter in the sense that relatively older women, 40 to 60, lived through the intense securitization processes of the 1980s and 2000s, and the narration of their experiences have been more assertive and authoritative in the sense of “I have been there”. Younger women, such as on-duty officers’ wives and daughters of retired or expelled personnel focus more recent experiences and current changes. Ten of my participants are wives of active duty officers, younger women in their 30s. Seventeen women are wives of retired COs and NCOs from Group 2, ranging in age from their late-40s to late-60s. However, the ages of women in Group 1, whose husbands expelled or forced to retire, are more mixed as they range from 30 to 60.

**Interviews with Rank Soldier’s Families**

As I explore in Chapter 4, the construction of religious dress as a form of risk is a very classed phenomenon that takes place within the confines of the military, which has established its corporate identity and constituency based on middle-class and elitist groundings. Therefore I defined the contours of this research and the research question I explore within the socio-cultural spheres of middle classes. In order to test and validate this assumption, I conducted 8 interviews with women from lower class and rural backgrounds whose son’s of husbands have been to military service recently (see Appendix B and Appendix A3 for the interview guide). I reached my participants through a snowball sampling technique that I started with the wife of the village administrator, in the village where my parents live. I conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews where I explored how these women, who wear headscarves, but in the perceived
traditional way, experienced the security regulations of the military when they interacted with the military. Their attendance to oath taking ceremonies and visits to military bases to see their husbands or sons constituted the axis of our conversations.

**Coding and Analysis**

At the end of the fieldwork, I transcribed all of the interviews and coded them by using the qualitative data analysis software, Nvivo. I grouped all the common themes and narratives across the interviews into more than 150 categories and subgroups and I carried out a content analysis, where I examined stories told within the interviews with a critical vision on how these stories are put together. Instead of searching for “true” and fixed meanings that need to be the revealed through participants’ experiences, I tried to “explore how interview texts unfold into broader discourses” (Secor 2010, 202). I looked for repeated and common narratives, and constantly recurring words, as well as silences, paradoxes and unspoken assumptions that underlay these narratives as they get used in similar or different fashion amongst the participants.

The bodily and emotional forms of knowledge produced through this research presented me with coding and analytical challenges. The very clear-cut and structured format of coding through qualitative analysis software muted my appreciation of the complexities inherent in a narrative or an expression. To overcome this, I created a very detailed rubric that branched out to sub-categories that were constituted of further sub-categories, which eventually made it challenging to make cross-references between codes and see the broader picture. I also kept a research diary where I noted my own reflections of the research process, insights about the
encounters with research participants, and descriptions of the military spaces and the emotional content of these processes, which helped through coding.

My analysis of this research started long before I started the fieldwork. Researching a topic that is closely related to my personal life, I already had established notions and ideas of what would come out of this research. However, I tried to approach the field experience and my interviews with a fresh eye with an aim to see beyond what I already knew and I was ready to get confused. I tried to understand my research participants and empathize with their feelings, which was an exhausting and perplexing process.

**Research with Civil Associations**

*TEMAD: Türkiye Emekli Assubaylar Dernegi* (TEMAD), the Association of Turkish Retired Non-Commissioned Officers, is the first organization I made connection with in order to access research participants and introduce myself to the social spheres of military families ("Türkiye Emekli Astsubaylar Derneği - TEMAD" 2014). TEMAD is a nation-wide organization that demonstrates clear affiliation with the military’s secularist stance with a mandate to “pursue the path of our great leader Ataturk by following his revolutions and reformations”. For years my family and I have attended their events (such as New Year’s Eve dinners, religious and national holiday greetings gatherings and socials such as boat trips in summer), however for this research, I specifically attended a few women’s gatherings, such as tea parties and fundraisers, at the

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30 See Appendix A1 for the interview guide for the interviews with the representatives of these associations.
TEMAD headquarters in my hometown. I also had informal conversations with the directors of the association to develop a more informed view over the range of their activities.

TESUD: TESUD (Türkiye Emekli Subaylar Derneği) is the Turkish Association of Retired Officers, a civil organization established by retired military officers with the purpose of building solidarity and support among members (“Türkiye Emekli Subaylar Derneği Resmi Kurumsal Sitesi” 2014). Like TEMAD, TESUD aligns with the principles and reformations of Atatürk, and primarily to oversee and protect the rights and benefits of the members. I did not have any previous contact with TESUD and I needed to establish a trust relationship as the director and secretariat had interacted cautiously with me due to the prominence at the time of the aforementioned Sledgehammer Case. I could not attend any of the TESUD activities, however I had conversations with women who worked closely with the association. I also gained access to the issues of the bi-monthly TESUD journal and I browsed issues from 1994 to 2008. I procured a number of articles, which I did not analyze directly, but read to gain a clearer vision of the political culture of TESUD members.

Officers’ Wives Association and SEYDER: These are the two organizations that are established by COs’ and NCOs’ wives, with a strong alignment with Kemalist and “secularist” principles. I was first introduced to the Officers’ Wives Association at a military base in my hometown of Mugla, through a friend. Composed of both commissioned and non-commissioned active duty officers’ wives, this organization holds weekly gatherings in the military base to make handcrafts, such as woodwork or lacework, for an annual fair to fundraise for ill children. On the other hand, Subay Esleri ve Yakinlari Dernegi (SEYDER), the Commissioned Officers’ Wives and Relatives Association, is an official organization that is composed of retired and
active-duty officers wives, that aims to increase social ties between members of military families, to fundraise to provide scholarships for students, and that has a strong emphasis on the promotion of Kemalist reforms and principles. I attended a few dinners and meetings with them in Istanbul, and I got to know some participants who became influential in my research.

**ASDER:** ASDER is the civil organization that was established in 2000 by those individuals who received “unfair treatment” by the Turkish military. While ASDER defines its mission within the broad framework of “standing against any form of injustice that is directed from the state” (“ASDER - Adaleti Savunanlar Derneği” 2014), it works primarily to create solidarity and social support amongst the members who argued they were wronged by the Turkish military. I recruited most of my research participants from Group 1 through ASDER, by attending the social events and gatherings (e.g., dinners and picnics) where members’ wives and daughters come together. I also browsed through ASDER’s bimonthly journal issues in which members share their political views, and the books they published about the Turkish military and its struggles with political Islam.31

**Participant Observation in and out of Military Spaces**

As part of feminist ethno-geographic research practice, I conducted participant observation at the military base in my hometown. I had previously lived in the same military base for two years before my father retired; my brother’s wedding was held at the social facilities in this military

31 As few of these publications include *Ordu ve Islam Nasıl Ters Düştü? (How did the Military and Islam fall conflict?)* (Poturgeli 2010), *İki Darbe Arasında (Between two Coup D’êtats)* (Pala 2010); *Ben Disiplinsiz Değilim (I am not Indisciplined)* (Hacimustafaogullari 2005); *Mahzun Madalya (The Mournful Medal)* (Erdem 2008).
base; my parents have several friends who still live in the lodgings in this base, and from time to time I still visit the same base with the sole purpose of using the social facilities, such as the restaurants, hair dressers and the bowling hall.

During my fieldwork, I went to the same military base around five times to meet participants at the social gatherings and I had one weeklong stay at the military holiday resort near by. In these places, I examined the general profile of the people, paying special attention to how they were dressed and located differently within particular spaces in the base. I complemented my observations with special attention to the security procedures at entrances and examined how places are physically structured in terms of the locations of the lodgings, the proximity of the lodging to the social facilities such as the café at the beach, the restaurants (which serve alcoholic drinks of all sorts) and the sports facilities. I paid attention to the instructions and directions written on the placards at the entrance of restaurants with regards to rules of conduct and dress codes (such as “no bathing suits or slippers”) to gather a sense of the norms of social conduct and lifestyle expected in these spaces. The architectural politics of military spaces constituted a significant dimension of my analyses of how space is constructed in ways that is conducive to particular activities, and not others.

**Concluding Remarks**

The research process has been a very personal, emotional and passionate endeavour. Carrying out this project forced me to critically explore the ways I am implicated within secularist discourses and its dichotomies through the tools of feminist methodology. This was an
enlightening and inspiring process because I had the chance to witness how feminist methodology, with qualitative research methods and bodily analysis, enabled me to develop a terminology beyond those dichotomies and analytical tools that do not assign fixated meanings to individuals but reveal the fluidity of identities.

At the same time, it was a both a rewarding and exhausting process that made me revisit the ever-lasting dilemmas I had in my own faith-world, questions about what I believed in and why. Such questioning softened the sharp edges that the concepts of religion and faith had in my mental imagery. They both dissolved into what I call life; into the very tools we use to survive, the stories we tell each other, our relationships, and finally, the inner-strength we hold on to stay alive. Listening to so many people with an open heart took the notion of religion out of the concrete category it inhabits, and put it back into its place, as a background and a feeling, that inescapably diffuses into the intellectual and emotional content and the rhythm of our lives as an inextricable dimension of history, culture and politics. Gaining such a perspective helped to break down my mental categories and allowed me to see more clearly how secularism functioned and its dichotomies materialized, as I explore in the next chapters.
Chapter 3

INTERWEAVING SECULARISM AND SECURITY WITH FEMINIST GEOGRAPHY: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

My research brings together theories about secularism and security through the lenses of feminist geography, situating them within the historical and geographically specific co-construction of bodies and spaces. Based on feminist conceptualizations of the body and of methodology that I introduced in Chapter 2, the novel contribution of this research to geographic scholarship is the feminist and post-structuralist critiques I provide of secularism and security. With a framework that foregrounds women’s corporeal and emotional experiences of the security discourses of the Turkish military, this study reveals a particular story of the relationship between secularism and modern sovereignty within the context of political Islam in Turkey.

In this chapter, I introduce the critical scholarship on feminist geographies of bodies and emotions as the grounding theoretical framework for the explorations of secularism and security. I draw on the legacy of feminist geography to set the foundations of a particular vision that explores gendered constructions of bodies and spaces, as well as an epistemology that foregrounds bodily and emotional forms of knowledge. I contribute to an emergent literature at the intersection of religion, gender and public space that highlights the spatial constructions of religious and secularist discourses and the centrality of female embodiment and emotions.
I follow this discussion with a reflection on the critical post-structuralist approaches to secularism based on works of Talal Asad (1993; 2003) and William Connolly (1995; 2000). I present a framework that contributes to ongoing and important critiques of liberal secularism from a post-structuralist point of view based on the legacies of Michel Foucault (1979; 1980a) and Edward Said (1979; 1993). Embarking from a critique of liberal secularism, I demonstrate how a post-structuralist approach reveals the corporeal and emotional constructions of secularism and destabilizes the taken for granted conceptualizations of the secular and religious. I introduce the concept of the “secular body” as a means of revealing how secularism functions as a form of governmentality and a mechanism for the exercise of modern state power.

In the final section, I present a discussion of critical security studies and risk-based approaches to security, which critiques the normativity that secularism holds in security politics. I draw on works of contemporary scholars such as Claudia Aradau, Rens Van Munster and Michael Dillon who base their critiques of security on Foucauldian understanding of modern power and governmentality and thereby formulate an understanding of risk as a form of governance. Then I combine the discussions of risk as a form of governmentality with critical approaches to secularism to create a frame of analysis that reveals how religion is constructed as a form of risk. Thereby I formulate a particular perspective that delineates how secularism operates as a form of governmentality and a security apparatus (dispositif de securite) in the service of modern sovereignty. In my discussions of the convergence of secularism and security, feminist geographies of bodies and emotions, and critical feminist geopolitics constitute the main analytical grounds where I explore the secular and the religious, and their respective transference to the categories of security and risk.
Feminist and Emotional Geographies

Understanding Feminist Geography

With the transferal of the ideals of feminist movement into the discipline, feminist geography emerged in the 1970s as a force that made geography into the critical discipline it today is. Feminist geographers have critiqued the disproportionate representation of women (Zelinsky 1973; Rubin 1979) and people of color in the academy (Kobayashi and Peake 1994; Kobayashi 2006). Both as a sub-field and a critical force that reshaped the entire discipline of geography (Pratt 2009), feminist geography has also critiqued the inherent masculinism and whiteness in the practice of geography, its objects of inquiry and the knowledge produced (D. Rose 1993).

Feminist geography is a field of research that critically explores how gender and space are mutually produced and transformed through patriarchal and heteronormative structures that permeate everyday life and social institutions (Pratt 2009). In its debut, the main objective of feminist geography was to provide visibility to women as objects of inquiry (Domosh 1995, 411) outside of the traditional and undifferentiated representation of their experiences in the use of urban space, labour market and class relations (WGSG/IBG 1984; Monk and Hanson 1982; Little, Peake, and Richardson 1988; Tivers 1978). Feminist geography departed from three interlocked observations: 1) the gendered construction of space, as reflected by the design and use of built environment based on assumption of gender roles; 2) the active role of spatial organization in shaping human relations, rather than a neutral backdrop; and 3) the significance of gender as an important interpretive lens that influences human relationships and perceptions of both built and natural environments (Domosh and Seager 2001, xxi). Thereby, feminist geographers set out to explore how gender oppression and heteronormativity operate spatially in
society not only by drawing connections across different disciplines in social science, but also by emphasizing a strong commitment to situated knowledge and research reflexivity (Pratt 2009; Nagar 1997).

Feminist geographers pointed out the gender biases enmeshed within geographic rationality and they asserted the significance of the male/female dichotomy to the Cartesian dualism of the mind and body.\textsuperscript{32} As Peake (2010) observes, critiques of Cartesian production of knowledge in geography took the form of resisting the conceptualization of space as a container and a static backdrop to the social. These perspectives helped to explore how women’s lives and identities are coterminous with the construction of space, varying from sexual and gendered divisions in the domestic domain, community and urban space (Drummond 2000; Christie 2006; Pain 1991; Bain 2003), to constructions of public sphere and national borders (Ruddick 1996; Yuval-Davis 1997b; Sirman 2004; Nagel 1998; Sharp 1996). Articulations of women’s bodies bodily experiences, the spatiality of bodies and their centrality to construction of space, are among the main contributions of feminist geography (Nast and Pile 1998; Longhurst 1995; Longhurst 2001). In what follows, I introduce feminist theories about the body, followed by discussions about corporeal and emotional geographies and their connections to scholarly discourses about secularism and security.

\textsuperscript{32} Lefebvre’s fundamental argument that “(social) space is a (social) product” (1992, 26) has been taken as a foundational premise of critical human geography. Problematizing the Cartesian vision of space as given and a neutral container, geographers have unearthed the social, cultural and political hierarchies produced in and through spaces and places.
Feminist Theorizations of the Body

Explorations of the female body and bodily forms of knowledge have been key to feminist research as well as feminist geographies. As Grosz (1994) states, the equation of femininity with the body as opposed to masculinity, which is associated with the mind, has been a foundational challenge that feminism has critiqued. This dichotomy presents itself as a non-reversible and non-reciprocal one and it defines the contours of a system of patriarchal domination (Grosz 1989; Longhurst 1997). The body emerges as a “modern” masculinist illusion behind which various forms of power hierarchies function as part of the universalist Enlightenment ideals (Longhurst 1995; McNay 1991).

As Grosz (1994, x) critiques, the body has been colonized through discursive practices of natural and social sciences that represented it predominantly as pre-cultural and fundamentally biological. Specifically the representations of bodily differences between men and women have been dominated by prevailing social conceptions of the differences between sexes (Grosz 1994). As a response, Grosz (1994, x) suggests that “the body, or rather, bodies, cannot be adequately understood as ahistorical, pre-cultural or natural objects in any simple way; but at the same time they are not only inscribed, marked, engraved, by social pressures external to them but are the products, the direct effects of the very social constitution of nature itself”. Based on the grounding premise that gender is socially constructed, Grosz defines the gendered body as the

33 For example, this dualistic way of thinking has often been used to legitimize social inequality among races as well as the construction of the East and West dichotomy as “natural”. Edward Said’s ([1978] 1994) critique of Orientalism is the precursor in defining the epistemological and ontological distinctions between West and East, which constructs West as ‘superior’ and ‘civilized’ in opposition to the East marked as ‘inferior’ and ‘uncivilized’. Extending Said’s critique, feminists (McIntosh 1995; Yegenoglu 1998) have also analyzed how ‘Eastern’ women are doubly hierarchically constructed as the inferior ‘other’ as opposed ‘rational’ and ‘modern’ ‘Western’ women. See Yegenoglu (1998) and Mernissi (2002).
seemingly “natural” effect of a system that primarily defines femininity and masculinity through the respective categories of body and mind.

Judith Butler’s (1990; 2011) analysis of the categories of sex and gender have significantly shaped critical understandings of the body. Butler deploys a Foucauldian view of gender, which asserts the pre-eminence of discourse as a form of disciplinary power in the construction of gendered identities. She argues against the dominant perception of gender as a discursive construct that is inscribed on the sexed body, which is perceived as naturally given. In other words, Butler suggests that the body is not a pre-discursive entity or a container into which (gendered) experience is poured. In an attempt to move beyond the perception of gender construction as a one-sided process of imposition or determination, Butler reformulates the construction of gender identities through temporal repetition of practices (McNay 2000, 33). She offers the concept of gender performance, stylized repetition of acts, to describe how the sexed body emerges “naturally” in its materiality (1990, 1993). Butler argues that “‘sex’ is a regulatory ideal whose materialization is compelled, and this materialization takes place through certain highly regulated practices” which come to be understood as “natural” over time (Butler 2011, 1).

As McNay (2000) suggests, Butler’s notion of gender and sexual identity formation through performance signifies both a process of profound corporeal inscription and also a fundamental instability at the heart of dominant gender norms. By locating the materiality of the body at the core of performativity, Butler’s theory reveals that identities are produced by iteration and citation within interpretive frameworks, out of which subjects both produce and subvert meaning (Jones III 2010). Butler’s theory of gender performance in explaining gender as
an ontological category, in addition to feminist critiques of mind/body dichotomy, give significant direction to what I describe below as corporeal geography.

**Corporeal Geography**

By addressing the spatial corollaries of the mind/body dualism, feminist geographers have explored various aspects of female embodiment and corporeal construction of space. As Peake suggests (2010, 57), the assertion of bodies as sites of performance in their own right rather than merely surfaces for discursive inscription led to the flourishing area of corporeal geography, “an interest in the corporeal – the flesh – and of thinking through the body”. Parallel to the critiques of the perception of space as a transparent container of the social (Lefebvre 1992), feminist geographers have engaged with the notion of the body beyond a mere “tool” of subjectivity or of a given self-consciousness. As a form of critique of the construction of bodies and gender identities, corporeal geographies examine how gender and the sexed body are constructed spatially, and likewise, how social and political constructions of space are always and already circumscribed by discourses of gender and sexuality.

Corporeal geographies operate on the basis that the body, which is culturally, historically and geographically specific, is “both mobile and channelled, both fluid and fixed into places” (Nast and Pile 1998, 1). The body, along with place, emerge as sites of struggle because “bodies and places are made up through the production of their spatial registers through relations of power (Nast and Pile 1998, 4). As Nast and Pile (1998) argue, there is a need to “exemplify, demonstrate and clarify the particular ways in which spatial relationships, of bodies and places,
come together to make bodies and places” (1998, 5). Based on such directives, studies in corporeal geography have explored widely the spatiality of the constructions of the female body and subjectivity.

Geographies of pregnant bodies have been a productive field that opened to question subjectivity and embodiment and permeability of the boundaries of women’s bodies (Davidson 2001; Longhurst 2001). As Longhurst (1998) suggests, the absence of pregnant bodies from public imagery is a demonstration of how a city might produce or create bodies with certain desires and capacities, through mechanisms of the public gaze and touching, which constantly invades these bodies (Davidson 2001, Longhurst 2001). Similar studies demonstrate how the female body is constructed through its leaky boundaries, such as lactation and menstruation (Shildrick 1997) as well as disabled (Longhurst 2001) and disproportionate (LeBesco 2003). These studies have provoked significant questions in exploring the relationship between bodies and the construction of space along hierarchical grids of patriarchy and other intersecting systems.

Other scholarly studies have explored the relationship between sexed and gendered perceptions of the corporeal in relation to spaces, places and the urban. Peake and Trotz’s (2002) study of Afro-Guyanese women examines how female identities are historically and geographically grounded and constructed in both material and discursive terrains. Pratt’s (1998) case study of Filipina domestic workers in British Columbia, Canada, explores the process of inscription of domestic work and racial identities on Filipina bodies. In a similar vein, Kathryn McKittrick’s (2000; 2006) work on geographies of black femininity demonstrates how the black female body is spatially constructed outside of modern conceptions of rationality, citizenship and
belonging. Drawing on different social, cultural and political processes, these studies reveal how female subjectivity and embodiment are integral to the construction of spaces and discourses. With a particular focus on corporeality and emotions, feminist geographies of the body provide key insights into how gender hierarchies are reproduced and operationalized through various social structures of inequality.

**Emotional Geographies**

Emotional geography is the other field of research that I incorporate into feminist geographies of the body. As a bodily and non-representational form of knowledge, emotions play a crucial role in maintaining “geography’s critical edge” (Davidson, Smith, and Bondi 2007b). Studies of emotions resonate strongly with the premises of corporeal geography by challenging the legacies of Cartesian positivism. Defined as the study of the “dynamic, recursive relation between emotions and place and space” (B. Anderson 2009, 188), emotional geographies provide key methodological and theoretical insights that this research discusses within the broader frame of feminist geography.

The geographic study of emotions dates back to humanistic geography’s efforts four decades ago to understand the forms of sensibilities that shape everyday life (B. Anderson 2009). However, as Bondi and Davidson (2004) emphasize, the insertion of emotions into geographic inquiry emerged as a progressive force that contributes to, and is rooted in, feminist geography. Feminist interventions into the study of emotions attempted to “reclaim and give voice to emotional experiences” in order to reveal “differential and often gendered, emotional
experience” (B. Anderson 2009, 189). As I discussed in Chapter 2, feminist geographers questioned the significance of emotions in terms of methodology and they tried to account for fieldwork as an emotional undertaking (Bondi 2007; Hyndman 2001a). They also explore emotions in the making of the social and within the context of particular places (Sharp 2009; Davidson and Milligan 2004).

Emotional geography embarks from a point of recognizing “the inherently emotional nature of embodiment” and has therefore directed attention to the ways in which “we feel—as well as think—through ‘the body’” (Davidson and Milligan 2004, 523). Pointing at the circular nature of our attempts to understand emotion or make sense of space (Davidson and Milligan 2004), feminist geographers explore the “spatiality and temporality of emotions, with the way they coalesce around and within certain places” (Davidson, Smith, and Bondi 2007b, 3). These studies deal with “not just the emotions and feelings that women experienced in particular places/spaces” but also reveal how emotions frame and delineate sexed and gendered experiences of space (Pile 2010, 7).

Based on such theoretical grounding, feminist geographers have explored various aspects of emotional and gendered experience of bodies and spaces. Longhurst’s (1997; 2001) aforementioned studies reveal the enormous emotional intensity of the constructions of female subjectivity in the experience of pregnancy and motherhood. Davidson’s (2003) study on geographies of phobias and mental illnesses discusses the centrality of emotions, such as pleasure, fear, pain or loss that continuously and tangibly shape the way we perceive our environment and our own subjectivity. Likewise, Rani’s (2004) study demonstrates the ways in which emotions and embodiment are actively involved in institutionalizing heterosexuality and
the spatial reproduction of sexual and gendered inequalities.

In this research, I take emotions as the “situated self-feelings, which locate people in a network of human and non-human relations which literally make sense of the world” (Wood and Smith 2004, 534). Emotions matter not only in the making of subjectivities, but also in the ways individuals situate themselves in relation to people and places. I join the scholarship that holds a non-objectifying view of emotions and perceives them “as relational flows, fluxes or currents, in-between people and places rather than ‘things’ or ‘objects’ to be studied or measured” (Bondi, Davidson, and Smith 2007, 524). This perspective reveals dimensions of how “our sense of who and what we are is continually (re)shaped by how we feel” (Davidson and Milligan 2004, 524). Rather than taking emotions as entirely interiorized mental states these critical approaches study emotion “experientially and conceptually” and in terms of their “socio-spatial meditation and articulation” (Bondi, Davidson, and Smith 2007, 3).

My perspective on emotions is significantly shaped by Sara Ahmed (2004a; 2004b; 2008) who conceptualizes emotion through performativity and a form of relationship that is embedded in various sets of power relations in the society. Based on Butler’s (1990) theorization of gender performativity, Ahmed argues that “emotions shape the very surface of our bodies through repetition of acts overtime”, as well as through orientation towards and away from others (2004b, 4). She conceptualizes emotions as performances in that they establish the boundaries they seem to presuppose (Scharff 2011). According to this view, “emotions are not ‘in’ either the individual or the social, but they produce the very surface and boundaries that allow the individual and the social to become delineated as if they are objects” (Ahmed 2004b, 10). Emotions, therefore, constitute a substantial part in the reproduction of social distinctions and hierarchies, and in
maintaining them at an individual level on a daily basis. As a crucial part of corporeality and a form of knowledge, emotions operate within a set of discourses and construct spaces and bodies in particular fashions, such as along the lines of gender, religion and public space that I explore in the next section.

**Public Space, Religion and Gender**

The intersections of public space, religion and gender emerge as a key field of inquiry that has significantly advanced the understanding of the discursive intertwining of bodies and spaces. As I outline below, past decades have witnessed a proliferation of studies on religious embodiment and secular subjectivities in public space within the contexts of religious revivalisms and the crisis of secularism in Europe and North America. In these studies, the Muslim woman’s body, particularly as a religiously dressed and headscarved one, emerges as the axis of various competing discourses and normative regimes that govern public space. Categorized either as religious or secular, Muslim women’s bodies constitute a battleground on which the spatiality of power and discourse become delineated.

Critical research on secularism and feminist perspectives on headscarf debates has demonstrated the hegemony of a secularist epistemic framework that defines headscarved women’s bodies by default as a “disruption” to secular and democratic public space. These studies delineate the spatiality of secularist discourses that spatially restrict the religious body, and map its otherwise-presence onto a particular security agenda (Mavelli 2013). In such framework, the headscarved woman emerges as either “dangerous” or as a victim of “oppressive
Islamist regimes”, outside of any alternative forms of gender equality, liberty or freedom. An extensive scholarship has explored various dimensions of headscarf debates and female subjectivities both in Muslim-majority contexts (A. Cinar 2005; Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu 2008; Cindoglu and Zencirci 2008; Mahmood 2011) and in Europe and North America (Fernando 2009; Fadil 2011; Dwyer 1999).

In feminist geography, Secor’s (2002) work on Islamic identities and headscarf controversies has explored the challenges that headscarved women put against the strongly established traditions of republican secularism in Turkey. Secor examines the significance of veiling within the context of distinct spatialized normative regimes that shape women’s urban mobility and their perception of the city. In another study, Secor (2001) introduces the concept of feminist counter-geopolitics in explaining how women produce and challenge Islamic political practices at an everyday level. Gokariksel (2009) joins Secor in examining the emergence of veiling as a gendered and embodied spatial practice within the context of political Islam. At the intersection of Islamic ethic and neoliberal capitalism, Gokariksel and Secor’s (2009; 2012) collaborative studies on veiling fashion explore the complex spatial field of bodies, home and public space where veiling-fashion operates. Together they tease out the construction of the morally ambivalent spaces veiled women find themselves within the competing discourses on female modesty and sexuality (Gokariksel and Secor 2009; 2010; 2012).

Destabilizing the resilience of the secular/religious dichotomy has been one of the key achievements of the corporeal geographies of religion and gender. In her study of veiling fashion, Gokariksel (2012) critiques the reduction of the headscarf to a symbol of Islam and points at the ever-shifting meanings of this bodily practice across time and space. She
demonstrates how veiling transforms the self through bodily performances across different normative regimes (Gokariksel 2009). In a recent study, Turam (2013) examines the intersections of religion, urban space and gender. She re-asserts the centrality of headscarved women’s bodies in conflicts over public space, explaining the countless ways in which headscarved women have been perceived as transgressive bodies that aggressively violate the clear demarcations of Islamic and secular in urban space. Turam’s work (2013) distinctly points out the transformatory and liberatory potentials of spatial contestations between secular and religious identities (neighbourhood level) outside of an Islamic secularist divide.

While this scholarship presents significant insight into spatial configurations of gender and space, work remains to be done in two areas: first, how such configurations factor in the merger of secularism and security in an environment where religious identities are increasingly being more securitized; and, second, the role emotions play in the construction of female subjectivity within the sometimes non-contradictory discourses of secularism and religion. Thus, the very intimate bodily and emotional experiences of women as per their religious and secular identities remain unattended within the minutiae of a political landscape and security discourse that is defined by a secular/religious fault line. To address these concerns, in the following pages I present a post-structuralist critique of both secularism and then security, through the lenses of corporeality and emotions.
SECULARISM

Liberal Secularism and its Critiques

At its most basic, secularism refers to a separation between religion and politics. It constitutes one of the foundational principles of Western modernity and liberalism, both as a cultural form and a political doctrine. Rooted in Enlightenment philosophy and the triumph of reason, doctrines of liberal secularism seek to exclude theology by defining religion within the realm of particularistic passions and norms (Scherer 2006; Brown 2006). As argued by post-Kantian continental thinkers, such as Jürgen Habermas (1991) and John Rawls (2005), attaining liberal pluralism relies on a post-metaphysical political sphere that is driven by the force of reason as well as state agnosticism and neutrality towards issues of religion and morality (Habermas 2006; C. Taylor 2007). The separation of religion and politics in liberal secularism allows for the prioritization of the common good and allegedly universal concerns over cultural particularities, and thereby creates a space where deliberative politics can take place (Asad 2003; Mouffé 2006).

In tune with the Cartesian prioritization of mind over the body (Grosz 1994), secularism prescribes a progressive takeover and control of the religious by the secular, which has been a definite part of European Enlightenment teleology (Keddie 2003; C. Taylor 2007; Jakobsen and Pellegrini 2008). Such a “secularization thesis” prescribes a decline of religious beliefs and practices, a privatization of religion, and the differentiation of the secular spheres (state, economy, science) from religious institutions and norms (Casanova 2007, 7). At the institutional scale, secularism can lead to various arrangements that can be defined either as passive neutrality
to public religion or its assertive suppression (predominantly based on US and French models) (Kuru 2007). While at the individual scale, liberal secularism presumes “secular subjects” who can confine their religious belief to the private sphere and thereby transcend the bodily, passionate and “irrational” aspects of their identities (Asad 2003). With these presumed separations, religion is restrained as a force of personal commitment with its own private realm of political and legal authority (Jakobsen and Pellegrini 2008).

Liberal secularism remains a powerful force shaping world politics and the limits of our socio-political imaginations. In critiquing liberal secularism, I draw on post-structuralist analysis based on the legacies of Michel Foucault (1979; 1980a) and Edward Said (1979; 1993). This line of scholarship embarks from a point of situating secularism within a critique of European Enlightenment and argues that secularism justifies and legitimizes the hegemony of Western modernization. As Joan Scott (Scott 2007, 92) suggests, seeing secularism as the triumph of reason over unquestioned belief obfuscates how it functions as “a political mask for dominating others, a form of ethnocentrism or crypto-Christianity”. While it claims to be a universal principle, secularism is the product of particular histories of Western Christianity and the construction of the liberal democratic nation-state as a political model (Jacobsen and Pellegrini 2008, Scott 2007, Hashemi 2010; Kuru 2007).

The foundational categories of secularism, the “religious” and “secular”, can be interpreted as Eurocentric cultural and historic constructions (Bhargava 1998; Asad 2003; Scott 2007). As Connolly (1995) contends, secularism, like colonialism, imposes a unitarian conception of morality that is remarkably structurally similar to that of Christianity. Such scholarly perspective fits into critiques of Orientalism in its centering of an East/West
dichotomy. Therefore, it is particularly and pre-dominantly a Western and Christian understanding of religious subjectivity, community, institutions and secular politics that draw the contours of religious/secular categories, and the political credibility of the doctrine of secularism.

In this research, I adhere to a post-structuralist critique of secularism through a consideration of what is “post-secular” (Vries and Sullivan 2006; Bracke 2008), or, in more recent terminology, what is “post-secular-religious” (Dressler and Mandair 2011). Debates about what constitutes the post-secular have emerged in conjunction with discussions about the perceived failure of secularism due to the worldwide increase in public manifestations of religion (Casanova 1994). A post-secular-religious perspective perceives the current context not as the “rise or return of ‘religion’ taken in some predefined way within liberal theory” but rather as an “acceleration of challenges to dominant forms of secularism and the laws, habits, and institutions that underpin and reproduce them” (Cady and Hurd 2013, 21). Post-secular constitutes a paradigm that is conducive to forms of “subjectivity, alterity, politics and hermeneutics that are no longer grounded in the Enlightenment prejudice against religion, nor in theories of secularization that predicted disappearance of religion in process of rationalization” (Pandolfo 2007, 331). Such a post-secular-religious paradigm has encouraged studies of the particular experiences of Muslim migrants in Europe (Asad 2006; Scott 2007), and religious revivalisms across the globe (Mahmood 2011; Hirschkind 2006; Azak 2010) outside of the mainstream historical framework in which secularism has been understood.
Breaking Down the Secular

My research recognizes the alarming centrality of the secular/religious dichotomy for understanding politics and secularism, and engages with this dichotomy particularly through the analytical category of the secular, as per its history and genealogy. For this, I draw on the post-secular-religious strand of research (Dressler and Mandair 2011; Vries and Sullivan 2006) that is pioneered by Talal Asad (1993; 2003) based on the formative scholarship of Michel Foucault (1979; 1980a) and Edward Said (1979; 1993). When combined, the historical and genealogical perspectives of these scholars have provoked the exploration of the discursive constructions of the power of the modern state within the context of the Orientalist discourses of European colonialism. Such a framework offers a “discursive deconstruction […] of knowledge regimes of secularism and their respective religious others” within the context of Western modernity (Dressler and Mandair 2011, 5) and thereby unsettles the liberal epistemic paradigm in which the secular and religious emerge as unproblematic distinct opposites.

In his influential study of the genealogies of religion (1993) and secular (2003), Asad argues for a perspective that goes beyond the taken for granted dichotomization of the “secular versus religious”. Unlike the adherents of liberal secularism, Asad (1993; 2003) searches for the use and not the meanings of concepts of secular and religious, and thereby avoids the temptations to “essentialize either ‘religion’ or its supposed counterpart, ‘the secular’” (Dressler and Mandair 2011, 16–17). Termed as “religion making” by Dressler and Mandair (2011), religion as the category that we understand today has emerged as a modern phenomenon in Western knowledge and it is a distinct product of the construction of the category of the secular.
A critical approach to religious also takes the secular out of its implied taken-for-granted position as continuous with the religious or as a simple break from it (Asad 2003). In Asad’s words (2003, 16), “the secular is a variety of concepts, practices and sensibilities which over time have come together to form ‘the secular.’” Emphasizing the significance of historically contingent and diverse processes, Asad’s view challenges the clear demarcations that the secular holds with reference to religion, and the affiliations it has with the mind and reason as opposed to body and passion. William Connolly (2000) likewise draws attention to the “falsities” embedded in the dichotomist constructions of secular and religious in epistemic paradigms. Connolly argues that certain forms of morality, affect and “non-reason” have become a structural part of what is accepted as secular, “neutral” and reasoned knowledge and embraced by defenders of secularist discourses (Scherer 2011).

Critical interventions by Asad and Connolly to studies of secularism lead to two complementary lines of analysis that my research follows. The first deals with the deep-rooted connections between the secular and “rationality” within a framework of the mind/body dichotomy, and seeks to privilege the bodily and emotional forms of knowledge. In response to secularism’s claimed transcendent neutrality and its refusal to come to terms with its own subjectivity, this scholarship aims to undo the rigidity and legitimacy of the secular/religious dichotomy by demonstrating the corporeally constructed relationality and instability of these terms (Connolly 2000; Hirschkind 2011; Asad 2011; Howe 2009; Verkaaik and Spronk 2011). The second line of analysis situates such culturally and historically specific constructions of the concepts and separations of secularism within the discourses and power mechanisms of the nation-state. In particular, it explores how secularism is Incorporated into power/knowledge regimes (such as colonialism, militarism, nationalism, feminism) and becomes a tool for the
exercise of state sovereignty as a governmental regime (Mani 1998; Gürbey 2009; Scott 2007; Asad 2006). I explore these two lines of enquiry below.

**Secular Embodiment**

The first thread of analysis that my research takes is a critique of the secular as the transcendental and disembodied positioning as opposed to the religious, whose bodily and ethical cultivations have been closely scrutinized. Theoretically inspired by Asad and Connolly, I employ an analytical framework that goes beyond political discourse to critically examine how secularism works at the scale of the bodies and emotions (Verkaaik and Spronk 2011). Connolly (2000, 9), for example, asserts that the secular is “a host of historically contingent routines, traumas, joys, and conversion experiences [that] leave imprints upon the visceral register of thinking and judgement”. For Connolly, the secular is not a product of pure reason and rationality. Asad (2003, 25) likewise defines the secular as a concept that brings together “certain behaviours, knowledge, and sensibilities in modern life”. Such approaches to the secular foreground the significance of embodiment and provide new idioms through which we can explore the cultural and historical particularities that constitute this concept.

In this scholarship, “human sensorium” (Hirschkind 2011, 663), “visceral registers”, “affective orientations” (Connolly 2000), “embodied dispositions” and “sensibilities” (Asad 2011) all emerge as the vaguely defined conceptual tools for understanding the thick texture that the secular holds within our political imaginaries and everyday life. Even though each of these analytical concepts calls for a new depth to conversations around the secular, they also suffer
from lack of empirical content and conceptual clarity. As Hirschkind (2011, 635) comments, even though they set the ground for such critical engagement with the secular, neither Connolly (2000) nor Asad (2003) define what “sensibilities” and “visceral modes of judgement” actually mean, nor do they demonstrate enough how secular subjects are formed and expressed in a secular life.

In my research, I narrow these vaguely addressed conceptual tools down to the aforementioned key concepts of corporeal and emotional, and take cue from the analytical legacy that feminist scholarship has established in understanding secularism. I critique the lack of engagement that post-structuralist approaches to secularism have with feminist scholarship in terms of the pathways feminists have made in locating the mind/body dichotomy at the root of secular/religious distinction. Attempts by post-structuralist scholars to add “flesh” to the secular not only ignores the legacies of feminist scholarship’s explorations of the female body and corporeality, but also the nascent explorations of the secular subjectivities that challenge the rigidity of the secular/religious dichotomy through Muslim women’s experiences (Fadil 2009; 2011; Fernando 2009; Bracke 2008; Gokariksel 2009).

Therefore, the aforementioned scholarship on feminist theory, as well as on feminist geographies of bodies and emotions, constitute a significant intervention to studies on secularism. They challenge the masculine and “rational” forms of knowledge by way of methodology and theory, and capture the intent of what is offered as “affective dispositions”, “sensibilities” and “visceral registers” of the secular. By incorporating feminist methodologies of bodies and emotions, this research aims to reveal not only the hierarchies embedded within the so-called objective and neutral spheres of the secular, but also to provide the missing empirical
content of the discussions on secular body and embodiment.

“Is there a Secular Body?”

In order to formulate an analytical frame to explore the corporeal and emotional content of the secular, I find Hirschkind’s (2011) conversation with Asad and Connolly around the question of “Is there a secular body?” a useful entry point. As an initial response to this question, Asad (2011, 657) defines the secular body as a site of “sensibilities and convictions” that may or may not be distinguishable from the religious body. His response privileges the historical and experiential processes that give secular notions of liberty and freedom their emotional intensity (1993; 2003). In his analysis, concepts such as myth, the sacred, pain and the human emerge as secular not because they are not religious, but exactly “because they have been discursively identified and valorized through the discourse of secularism” (Hirschkind 2011, 639). Asad turns the question around and asks “what is involved when ‘the secular’ is invoked—who tries to define it, in what context, how, and why” (Asad 2011, 673). For Connolly (2011), however, the secular does not exist within the claimed dichotomized category that it holds within the logic of liberalism in the first place. He argues that supporters of a secular doctrine are always already instilled with “a spirituality of hubris, others with sentiment, others with cynicism, others yet with existential gratitude, and many with complex mixtures of such an abstractly described set” (Connolly 2011, 654). In other words, the secular body is always and already immersed in conceptual frameworks and dispositions that are arguably “non-secular”.

Drawing on Asad (2003) and Connolly (2000), Hirschkind (2011) presents a challenging
analysis of the “secular body”. Hirschkind argues that both of these foundational texts refrain from a rationalist, empiricist or materialist grounding of the concept of the secular by distinctly foregrounding the discourses and “process of differentiation structured by the binaries of religion–secular, belief–knowledge, sacred–profane” (2011, 641). For example, Asad’s (2003) genealogy of pain, which analyzes the shift from a transcendental Christian discourse on pain to a scientific vocabulary and methods, provides a case for formations of the secular. In his work, the secular body emerges not in opposition to the religious but through the processes of modernization and development of biomedicine (Hirschkind 2011). Based on this, he suggests that “the genealogy of the secular becomes fused with and indistinguishable from the genealogy of the modern” (Hirschkind 2011, 640), and “each time we attempt to characterize a secular subject in terms of a determinant set of embodied dispositions, we lose a sense of what secular refers to” (641).

In Connolly’s analysis too, the secular subject is one whose speech and comportment already recognizes the distinctions between the categories of the secular and religious. The secular subject is one “whose affective-gestural repertoires express a negative relation to forms of embodiment historically associated with (but not limited to) theistic religion” (Hirschkind 2011, 638). In both of these foundational texts, the secular emerges as a practice or a sensibility that strictly depends on, and cannot be abstracted from, the religious as it is constructed in Western modernity, and particularly the narrative of the progressive replacement of the religious by the secular (Hirschkind 2011, 641). What comes out of this conversation is that beyond the recognition of the historically specific and intertwined constructions of the secular and the religious, questioning of the secular body reveals the relationality and persistent instability of the category of the secular.
In other words, secularism actively brings together and distorts religion and politics and “its power relies crucially upon the precariousness of the categories it establishes” (Agrama 2010b, 495). Drawing on Agrama (2010b), Hirschkind states that the instability we face when we trace the “secular body” and the ensuing difficulty in distinguishing the secular from the religious “is not a limit on secular power but a condition of its exercise” (2011, 643). In such a framework, secular and religious emerge as fuzzy concepts, which lose and gain their concreteness through power. In this condition, it becomes necessary to explore the discourses and power structures in which the secular/religious divide emerges in culturally and historically specific ways.

**Secularism and Modern Power**

The second strand of analysis in my research situates secularism as a discursive mechanism and among the technologies of modern sovereign power within a Foucauldian analytical framework. In his analysis of the liberal and democratic modern state, Foucault (1995; 1980a) argues that power is exercised and sovereignty is maintained through a diffuse set of disciplinary practices and discourses rather than top down and coercive ways. Constructed as “truth regimes” at the conjunction of power and knowledge, discourses generate disciplinary mechanisms, and thereby create docile bodies “that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved”, and perform self-discipline and self-control (Foucault 1995, 136). Accordingly, power diffuses into every facet of life to limit, shape, and survey bodies through systems and institutions, and it creates disciplinary techniques to normalize behaviour and regulate society. It does so, not only in the form of unidirectional and concrete forms, as in juridico-political mechanisms, but also through
capillaries of discourse that include risk technologies, security practices as well as texts and speech acts.

Talal Asad incorporates the Foucauldian understanding of power and discourse into his analysis of the *Formations of the Secular* (2003, 183). Asad argues that “neither the supporters nor the critics of the secularization thesis pay enough attention to the concept of ‘the secular’, which emerged historically in a particular way and was assigned specific practical tasks.” Asad calls for an analysis of the power mechanisms and the “specific practical tasks” in the service of which the secular and religious become mobilized as distinct categories. In other words, he points at the necessity of understanding secularism as a form of discourse and situates it within the power architecture of the modern state.

Such an analysis would explore how the dichotomy of the secular/religious is produced as part of the discourses and power mechanisms of the nation-state (Gole 2010). Studies demonstrate that secularism is incorporated into nationalist, militarist and even feminist discourses to maintain national unity and sovereignty (Scott 2007; Gole 2010; Jansen 2013). As an example, Joan Scott’s (2007) analysis of the case of French headscarf controversies reveals how secularism becomes an explicit justification for the racist and colonial practices of the nation-state in cooperation with liberal feminism. Scott explores the processes of religious and ethnic marginalization of Muslim populations based on norms around gender equality and sexual morality that are established in relation to a particular notion of Frenchness. Likewise, Asad (2006, 507) interprets the banning of the veil as an “exercise of sovereign power, an attempt by a centralized state to dominate public space as the space of particular signs” with the intent of

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34 Emphasis added.
controlling religious and ethnic minorities. Similarly, Gürbey (2009) examines how particular distinctions between the secular and the religious are incorporated into Turkish militarist and nationalist discourses to justify military activities.

**Secular Governance and Governmentality**

As I discussed in Chapter 1, most studies of secularism reveal how it functions as a form of governance, at the level of regulations and separations imposed by the state such as the removal of religious references from political structures and restrictions on religious clothing. However, my research emphasizes how secularism also needs to be taken seriously as a form of governmentality (a code of conduct) and a cultural practice (Jahanbegloo 2011; Verkaaik and Spronk 2011). The concept of secular governmentality comes also from Foucault’s theorization of discourse and disciplinary power in his effort to account for the historical transformation of monarchical rules into modern sovereignty (Garmany 2010; Nadesan 2008; Gordon 1991). Foucault looks at a historical shift from older practices of geopolitical and territorial augmentation in governance towards mastery of the population as an instrument of power in modern sovereignty. He examines the centrality of disciplinary power to interconnected systems of government and discourses to maintain the security of the state through the population (Foucault 1991; Nadesan 2008).

35 However, these studies also indicate that secular governance does not merely erase religion from public space, but also confines it to state control. This can be exemplified with the establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (1924) that imposes Sunni Islam over other religions and sects of Islam to facilitate a homogenizing of the nation-state as a form of secular governance (Davison 2003). This is also reflected in the case of French laïcité where the state provides subsidies for Jewish and Christian schools in the form of “exception”, hence secular governance operates as a tool of nation-state to national homogeneity via the exclusion of Muslims (Asad 2006).
Foucault conceptualizes governmentality as the “conduct of conduct”, that is the form of “political government, and the forms of activity and technologies of power shaping everyday interpersonal and institutional life, bridging micro and macro levels of analyses” (Nadesan 2008, 1). Biopolitics has been coined as a prime form of governmentality that explains how modern power operates by inculcating institutions (such as hospitals and schools) with mechanisms of knowledge production (medicine or science). Biopolitics operates through institutions and disciplinary discourses to create specific bodies and subjectivities that self-regulate and self-discipline in line with the interest of sovereign power (Foucault et al. 2007, 1).

I envision secularism as a form governmentality that operates with the same logic of biopolitics. Secularism can be perceived in its extension from institutional and formal levels across everyday life and intimate spheres to shape and limit religious attachments and sensibilities of individuals. As Gole (2010, 47) asserts, secularism constitutes an “organizing principle in social life that penetrates into everyday life practices, [and] underpins politics of emancipation”. It not only operates through a set of institutional regulations but also as a set of moral values for self-governance across multiple spheres as well (Gole 2010, 47).

Studies of the public representation of the Muslim woman’s bodies and headscarf bans exemplify how secularism operates as a governmental regime. These studies reflect how the Islamic dress and headscarf are practices of ethical and religious self-fashioning that are shaped in relation to particular understandings and interpretations of secularism and Islam (Mahmood 2011; Deeb 2006; Fadil 2009; Gokariksel and Secor 2012; Jouili and Amir-Moazami 2006). As Fadil (2009, 442) observes, secularism enforces “a distinct epistemological realm (a specific understanding of the religious and the social), institutional arrangements and a particular
economy of pain and pleasure.” Therefore, only a “ground up” study of secularism in concrete historical and contemporary circumstances can reveal the “ways of life, disciplinary practices, habits and sensibilities associated with various formations and traditions of secularism” (Cady and Hurd 2013, 6).

In my conceptualization of secular governmentality in this research, I explore how it operates at the intersection of Western liberal feminism and republican nationalism (Fadil 2011). As Scott (2007, 157) and Ticktin (2008) observe, in tune with Western feminist discourse on gender equality and sexual liberation, secular governmentality prescribes a particular regime of sexuality whereby visual appreciation of women’s bodies by men constitutes the norm (Scott 2007; Fernando 2013). This makes the perception of the veil and covering of the body a psychological, sexual and social mutilation of femininity that needs to be removed to provide equality (Fernando 2013). The state imposes on the female body a particular composition of sartorial practices and demarcation of sexual privacy through secularism (A. Cinar 2008).

**Bodily and Emotional Geographies of Secularism**

As explored by the aforementioned geographies of veiling practices and women’s subjectivities, governmental regimes seek to construct women’s bodies and their religious embodiment spatially. Secularism operates on the basis of a public - private dichotomy that is manifest at the scales of the nation-state, the city, and the female body (Gokariksel 2009; Asad 2006; Scott 2007; Howe 2009; Wilford 2009). Studies explore various dimensions of how secularism enforces certain forms of socio-spatial subjectivity (Howe 2009), by controlling the visibility and
mobility of female bodies (Gokariksel and Mitchell 2005). The modern state exercises its power by controlling public space, defining who can exist there and in what form, such as in the case of headscarf bans (Asad 2006; A. Cinar 2008).

These debates bring to the fore the emotional and corporeal sides of secularism, which are denied in order to establish secularism’s legitimacy (Hirschkind 2011; Connolly 2000; Howe 2009). As I aim to reveal with this research, the spatial and conceptual dichotomies of secularism are rendered as particularly emotional and corporeal constructs, which then become part of an economy of emotions that shape the surfaces of bodies and worlds (Ahmed 2004a; 2004b). Because, as Ahmed (2004b, 4) suggests emotions are always bound up with the securing of social hierarchy. As attributes of our bodies, emotions become part of defining social hierarchies by “transforming what is ‘lower’ or ‘higher’ into body traits” (Ahmed 2004b, 4). Secularism emerges as a lived and felt relational spatial power dynamic when we take emotions (of the individual or a collective) as “dependent on relations of power, which endow others with meanings and value” (Ahmed 2004b, 2).

Bodily and emotional explorations of secularism also reveal the fluidity and arbitrariness inherent to secular governmentality. I look at secularism as a form of governmentality that can reveal the particular constructions of femininity and female sexuality within discursive and institutional formations of the secular and religious. Secular governmentality at the same time constitutes an enactment of state sovereignty in ways that regulate the constituent subjectivities and space in a normative vision. As I demonstrate in the following pages through an engagement with critical security studies, the sanctity of the religious/secular dichotomy to modern sovereignty becomes a lot clearer as we explore how religious identities are incorporated into
In this last section, I situate my research within critical security studies in order to analyze the meanings of security and risk for secularism. I critique the intricate yet unrecognized relationship between the security of the nation-state and the political doctrine of secularism. I then draw on risk-based analysis of post-9/11 Western security agendas to tease out how fears and anxieties are constitutive of security discourses. I conclude with a consideration of how security discourses operate at the scale of bodies and emotions as a form of social governance. In so doing, I formulate a framework for critically examining how risk governance transforms into (or already is) secular governmentality.

Critical Approaches to Security

Critical security studies emerged in the post-Cold War era as a critique of the symbiotic relationship between the nation-state and the military, which theretofore dominated the understandings of security in academia, as well as policymaking mechanisms. Drawing on Campbell’s crucial intervention, *Writing Security* (1992), Mutimer asserts that critical security studies operate based on the idea that theories about the world constitute that world and therefore have political effects. A critical approach is crucial in order to perform a politics of social emancipation and equality by condoning the forms of violence and injustice that are legitimized
through traditional approaches in the theory and practice of security (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010; Mutimer 2007).³⁶

Schools of critical security studies draw on disparate sets of theories, yet they are united in their critique of traditional approaches which had defined security studies majorly as “the study of the threat, use and control of military force” (Walt 1991, 212; Mutimer 2007, 57).³⁷ Traditional approaches (also termed the Realist or neo-Realist school of security) take the nation-state as the main security referent, and define threats militarily, and therefore aim to create military oriented problem-solving techniques (Mutimer 2007; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010). Critical approaches to security studies, on the other hand, try to move beyond the strictures of traditional approaches that remain complicit in the status quo of a world system made of nation-states. Instead, critical approaches focus on otherwise ignored “alternate” security problems (issues such as human security, environment, gender) that are structurally created, perpetuated and justified through states and militaries (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010).

My research shares with critical security studies an orientation towards social constructionism and an understanding of security that is beyond the military threats to the nation state (Eriksson 1999; Mutimer 2007). Critical approaches to security problematize the referent object of security as well as the notions of danger and threat as they “do not exist independently of those to whom it may become a threat” (D. Campbell 1992, 2). Beyond their taken-for-granted

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³⁶ As Mutimer states, formation of a critical security studies can be dated back to a conference held at York University in 1996. The edited collection by Williams and Krause (1997) that came out after this conference paved the way to diverging and creative approaches under this disciplinary/theoretical framework.

³⁷ Different approaches in critical security have been grouped under different schools with respective place names of origin such as the Welsh school, or the Copenhagen or Paris schools in security (Mutimer 2007).
militarized meanings, danger, threat and security are all taken as derivative concepts that are shaped by discourses and power relations within wider cultural frameworks (Booth 2008; Huysmans 1998). Such sensitivity to alternative and more inclusive understandings of security highlights different aspects of life (such as human security, environment, health, everyday life or sexual identity) that have been ignored in traditional approaches and explore the particular contexts of power relations that render certain individuals or populations vulnerable.

I align myself most closely with the post-structuralist strand of security research informed by Foucauldian theories of power. I draw on work by David Campbell (1992) and Michael Dillon (1996) that foreground the significance of Foucauldian understanding of discourse as the realm in which identities and meanings are constructed within particular set of power relations and truth regimes (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010). Post-structuralism in critical security studies can be explained as an approach that highlights the importance of representation, the relationship of power and knowledge, and the politics of identity in understanding domestic affairs and foreign policy (Hansen 2006). Deconstructing the “dangerous” and “threatening” other in international politics (D. Campbell 1992), questioning of the very notion of “politics” (Dillon 1996), security (Huysmans and Tsoukala 2008), and critique of Orientalist discourses in Western geopolitical imaginary (Gregory 2004; Dalby 2010) are some of the contributions of post-structuralist analysis in contemporary security research. This line of analysis appreciates the always unstable and contingent claims to knowledge and examines the discursive constructions of security and threat in relation to complex and context-specific power relations (Mutimer 2007).

Post-structuralist approaches in critical security studies cannot be limited of course to Foucault only, yet in this research I primarily focus on the studies. There are studies which draw also on Deleuze (Mutimer 2007; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010).
This research is also situated in feminist geopolitics, which emerged as a parallel critical turn that inserted critical conceptualizations of security into understanding of world affairs and geopolitics. Dalby (1994) broadly defines critical geopolitics as the critical and post-structuralist endeavours to resolve and deconstruct geographical configurations of power (see also Tuathail 1998). Critical geopolitics challenges the seemingly “self-evident, natural, and emanently knowable” representation of the world at the conjunction of geography and geopolitics (Tuathail 1996, 68). Feminist geopolitics makes contribution to this scholarship as it challenges the so-called objective geopolitical frames of analysis “by (re)situating knowledge production as a partial view from somewhere” (Hyndman 2004, 3). Thereby, feminist geopolitics offers “an embodied view from which to analyze the visceral conceptions of violence, security and mobility” (Hyndman 2004, 2).

As I argue elsewhere (Arik 2015), feminist interventions to security studies and geopolitics prove most productive with the insertion of the body as a scale of analysis where the material and discursive construction of the political takes place (Dowler and Sharp 2001; H. Smith 2005). Feminist geopolitics set the body as “a geographic space that is a symbolic, material and at times a violent agent of geopolitics” (Fluri 2011, 531). The body, especially the female body, emerges as the site of contestation in international relations and militarist security agendas, (Hyndman 2001b; Fluri 2009; Enloe 2000) as well as in political debates on public space and secularism (Scott 2007; Secor 2001). As studies on headscarf debates have demonstrated, the body of the “Islamist” woman in a headscarf enters the security agenda through an epistemic framework that perceives it by default a “disruption” to the secular and democratic construction of public space and citizenship (Asad 2003; Scott 2007; Gokariksel 2012; Mavelli 2013).
In this research, I adhere to critical and post-structuralist security studies and feminist geopolitics studies as I explore the social and cultural constructions of security and threat within a particular history and socio-political context of the Turkish Republic. Although I focus on traditional security actors and security referents – the Turkish military and the Turkish nation-state – my research does so critically by exploring a form of risk that is culturally and socially specific. I reveal how the security of the nation-state depends upon the protection of secularism as a political principle and a cultural practice, which, in turn, renders particular forms of sexual representation and religious embodiment as risk.

**Secularism and Security**

The unquestioned acceptance of secularism in the construction of critical security studies is a theme that is central to my research (Mavelli 2011; 2013; Gutkowski 2011; Bilgin 2008; Hurd 2007). The unproblematic connection between security and secularism within the structure of the liberal nation-state (Petersen 2008; Mavelli 2011; Gutkowski 2011; Bilgin 2008) emerged in the early modern era as an attempt to find a solution to the “intolerance, war, devastation, [and] political upheaval” caused by religion (Thomas 2000, 819). The “myth of religious violence”, which is traced to “wars of religion” in European history (Cavanaugh 2009), constituted the main frame for the necessity of the separation between politics and religion and the construction of religion as “slippery, uncontainable and mysterious” (Gutkowski 2011, 346), whose seepage into politics was considered a source of violence and risk.
My research also situates the analysis of the relationship between secularism and security within the establishment of the modern liberal nation-state. As I introduced in Chapter 1, Bilgin’s (2008) research on the construction of secularism as a security move to legitimize, and thereby safeguard, the newly founded Turkish Republic constitutes a major point of departure for this research. With her argument on the “securness of secularism”, Bilgin (2008, 594) throws light on the “intimate historical relationship between secularism and security” which also plays out strongly in recent studies on the post-9/11 Western security agenda and the experiences of Muslim minorities in Western countries.

Marking an epochal change from the security agenda of the Cold War and the ideological threat of communism, the events of September 11th 2001 and the global “war on terror” constitute landmarks that continue to shape the contemporary Western security agenda.39 This new security agenda is one where a new form of risk is created based on a fear of the “Islamic other” which had to be securitized through novel technologies of insurance and social sorting (Aradau and Munster 2008b; De Goede 2008; Amoore 2009) and biometric identifiers (Muller 2008; Oza 2007). These studies also point to the role of mobilization of fears and anxieties in the construction of security agendas (Mythen and Walklate 2008; Hyndman 2007).

However, the relationship between the Western security discourse and secularism, and consequent constructions of the cultural categories of the “dangerous other” and “religious”, receive scant attention in critical scholarship on security. Addressing this gap, Mavelli (2013) situates the post-9/11 security agenda within the frame of a broader Western epistemic paradigm

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39 As Gutkowski (2011) argues there is little written on the construction of communist ideology as a threat in risk studies other than technological and strategic explorations of state power (Kolko 1988).
whereby Islam is constructed as the “deviant” other. Likewise, Gutkowski’s (2011) analysis of the security strategies of the British state against “Islamist terrorism” from within the Western security agenda demonstrate the salience of secularism in constructing religion as a form of risk.

These studies perceive the Western security agenda as an extension of the already existing forms of separations and discriminations that have historically shaped the European socio-cultural landscape in relation to Islam. My research contributes to this strand of security analysis from a risk-based approach that considers how security and threat gain their particular meanings within the specific context of Turkish secularism and the rise of political Islam. In what follows, I discuss risk-based approaches to security and demonstrate how they are key to understanding the co-construction of security and risk through the respective categories of the secular and the religious.

**Risk-based Approaches to Security**

A shift occurred in security studies in the post-Cold War era from threat to risk-based approaches (Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, and Van Munster 2008) to offer a more nuanced and more-than-militaristic understanding of threat from various disciplinary perspectives (e.g., cultural studies, anthropology, and criminology) (Douglas 1994; Luhmann 1993; Beck 1992). A range of threats that had formerly been ignored, such as natural disasters, global warming (Beck 1992), health (Elbe 2008) and terrorism (Petersen 2008; Amoore and Goede 2008) became of interest to risk studies scholars (Zinn 2008, 3). By adhering to the concept of risk rather than threat, this approach committed to exploring the discursive constructions of threats within particular social
and political contexts.

My research adheres to the strand of risk-based security research that primarily builds on and critiques Ulrich Beck’s (1992) *Risk Society* thesis that is a study of modern societies as driven by risk awareness that challenge the borders of the nation-state (such as Chernobyl and global warming) (Zinn 2008). Beck formulated a new world order that is characterized by uncertainty and anxiety due to risks that can no longer be calculated, quantified or predicted (Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, and Van Munster 2008). A body of scholarship followed to focus on more mundane conceptualizations of risk and that are away from war and violence (Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, and Van Munster 2008). These studies explore a vast array of issues such as HIV/AIDS, environment, popular culture and art, insurance sector and terrorism (Elbe 2008; Lacy 2008; Aradau and Munster 2008b; De Goede 2008; Mythen and Walklate 2008) to reveal how security and risk are socially constructed in order to “tame uncertainty and contingency” (Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, and Van Munster 2008, 148).

Building on a basic definition of risk as the probability of an undesirable event happening in the future (Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, and Van Munster 2008), critical scholarship takes risk as a “family of ways of thinking and acting, involving calculations about probable futures in the present followed by interventions into the present in order to control that potential future” (N. Rose 2001, 7). Risk-based approaches explore how security and risk gain their meanings within particular culturally and historically specific discursive regimes rather than in terms of a

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40 As Zinn (2008) comments, Beck’s analysis stands at a significant juncture between realist understanding of risks and social constructionism, that have significantly shaped security research. Beck (1992) recognizes the significance of the realist approaches that carry out probabilistic calculations of material affects, as in military strategies and the insurance sector and combines it with social constructionist approaches to risk that problematize the very “reality” of those risks as well (Douglas 1994).
relationship between conflicting traditional actors, such as the nation-state and the military (Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, and Van Munster 2008; Huysmans and Tsoukala 2008). Risk-based approaches work to delineate “heterogeneous and diffuse sets of practices that cannot be represented through simple binaries of normality/exception and politics/security” (Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, and Van Munster 2008, 149) in which risk and security are constructed and governed.

Another crucial dimension of risk-based security research is the consideration of fears and anxieties. Based on the idea of risk as a “specific relation to the future” with an intent to monitor, calculate, control and minimize its potentially harmful effects (Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, and Van Munster 2008, 149), risk-based studies evaluate the broader socio-cultural and political contexts to explore how fears and anxieties are manufactured through dystopic imaginations of the future (Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, and Van Munster 2008, 150). They examine the disproportionate fuelling of public fears and anxieties to the degree of threat and “culture of fear” (Furedi 2006), through catastrophic imaginations of the future, which are then exploited by governments, corporations and professions and states for legitimizing security measures (Isin 2004; Hyndman 2007).

Risk-based security research also demonstrates the heterogeneity of security strategies and risk technologies as well as the insurance techniques of data collection, modeling and speculations (Aradau et al. 2008, 148) that the post-9/11 security agenda has generated to eliminate the risk of “Islamist terrorism”. As Amoore (2009, 52) argues, risk technologies are contrived in such a way that everyday life details are connected with formal security procedures through algorithmic calculations to uncover the “hidden and subtle associations between people, groups, behaviours and transactions, which are then turned into actionable security decisions”.

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These connections are based on fears and anxieties within the context of racist and Islamophobic stereotypes and scenarios of “Islamist terrorism” (Oza 2007; Aradau and Munster 2008b; Hyndman 2010). With the idea of controlling and pacifying potential risks, extensive surveillance and counter-terrorism measures are employed (such as indefinite detention) and pre-emptive wars (as in Afghanistan and Iraq) are justified (Aradau and Van Munster 2007).

In light of these perspectives, I establish a risk-based analytical framework to understand how a security paradigm can be circumscribed with and by secularism. My attention is focused on understanding how fears and anxieties are mobilized within the context of political Islam, or the risk of Islamism, and how security is practiced by the Turkish military. I deploy a Foucauldian understanding of modern power and governmentality to explore how risk emerges as a form of governance that constructs risk and tries to eliminate and control it through secular governmentality.

**Understanding Risk Through Discourse and Governmentality**

A significant development in security studies scholarship is the incorporation of Foucault’s concept of governmentality – *dispositif de securite*. Examined predominantly in Foucault’s lectures on *Security, Territory, Population* (2007), *dispositif de securite* (security apparatuses) refer to ensembles of “discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions” (Foucault 1980b, 194) that operate as mechanisms to securitize modern

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41 The break of the NSA scandal in the US in 2013 presents an example to the pervasiveness of extensive security and surveillance mechanisms for control of populations.
sovereignty in the face of disparate sets of social problems (Aradau and Van Munster 2007). He explored the shifting technologies and strategies of power through the conceptual triangle of “sovereignty-discipline-government”; in which governmentality appears as a mechanism to maintain the security of the state through the population (Foucault 1991; Nadesan 2008).

Adopted by a new strand of researchers in security studies (Aradau and Van Munster 2007; 2008b; Dillon 2007), dispositif de securite offers a way to explore the construction of risk within particular contexts and as a form of governance. Specifically, risk-based analysis of the post-9/11 Western security agendas draw significantly on Foucault’s analysis of the relationship between modern sovereignty and biopolitics. These studies assert that biopolitics is a security apparatus in so far as it “regulates, strategizes, and seeks to manipulate the circulation of species life” (Dillon 2007, 9). They take the Western security agenda on “war on terror” as governmentality, as it constructs risk through an amalgamation of “rationalities and technologies to monitor and predict dangerous occurrences in the future” (Aradau and Munster 2008a, 30) and that is predicated on an ideal form of liberal and secular subjectivity.

Conceptualizations of risk through governmentality address risk in terms of how it “inscribes reality” that contains potential “dangerous irruptions and deploys technologies to avert these events in the future” (Aradau and Munster 2008a, 26). Risk is perceived as a form of governance whose identification and management becomes a way to organize reality, discipline the future, tame chance, and rationalize individual conduct (Dillon 2007). In the face of an unpredictable, but still imaginable and yet catastrophic future, the present day is perceived through evidences and potentialities that require monitoring and precaution, which leads to the coinage of the phrase “precautionary risk governance” (Aradau and Van Munster 2007; Aradau
and Munster 2008a). As Gutkowski (2011) notes, this is not necessarily the threat of imminent attacks by Islamist terrorists, but the risk of radicalisation spreading among a population. Therefore, renewed and extensive forms of surveillance and panopticism that encompass the whole population become the norm to identify the potential “terrorist” (Aradau and Van Munster 2007; Aradau and Munster 2008b).

Risk as governmentality creates subjects who are consistent with the neoliberal logic of capitalism as well as liberal secularism. By identifying risk through “deviances” in business transactions, anti-social behaviour, and adoption of religious dress (Gutkowski 2011; Mavelli 2013), risk governmentality interweaves secularism and the subjectivities along the distinctions of secular and religious. In line with secular governmentality, the risk of Islamism seeks to “normalize” bodies and subjectivities and regulates them by taking precautions against any kind of seepage between the secular and religious.

As this research aims to reveal, most of the distinctions between risk and security take place at a corporeal and emotional level that construct bodies and spaces at the intersections of secular governmentality and security agendas. As Hyndman (2007, 367) succinctly puts, “concerns about survival, security, and sovereignty are intimately linked to the production of fear at multiple scales.” In the context of the risk of Islamism, the focus of my research, women’s bodies and their sexualities constitute a significant part of the fears and anxieties and projections of an Islamist dystopia. I therefore incorporate critical geographies of emotion to my analysis to

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42 However, as Isin (2004) argues, formulations of risk as a form of governance do not also presume a subjecthood as the target of governmental strategies that manipulate him/her. Because, Foucault’s prime interest was to explain the power mechanisms in which the subject is governed through the freedoms embedded on governmental projects and not restrictions (Isin 2004; N. Rose 2001). For Foucault “governing oneself by calculating risks involves using various technologies but also it means that governmental authorities do not simply manipulate the subject but govern it as a free subject by encouraging, inculcating, and suggesting certain ways of conduct that increase their health, wealth, and happiness” (Isin 2004, 220).
explore the military base as the space where secularism and security gain their particular meanings at corporeal and emotional levels.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have established a theoretical framework for exploring the intersections of secularism and security through women’s bodies and emotions. In this framework, feminist geographies of bodies and emotions constitute the critical analytical frame whereby social, political and cultural constructions of spaces through bodies become clear. Specifically geographies of religion, gender and public space foreground bodies and bodily analysis for understanding the spatial configurations of either competing (such as secularism and political Islam) or parallel (such as secularism and security) discourses.

Critical post-structuralist approaches to secularism constitute the second body of scholarship that I incorporate into my analysis. Based on the understanding of secularism as a discourse that is integral to the experience and construction of modern sovereignty, I explore theoretically how the distinctions between the secular and the religious are also created at the level of corporeal and emotional registers. Understanding secularism as a regulatory ideal, both at the levels of governance and governmentality, delineates the complex ways in which it is incorporated into security discourses of the nation-state by constructing bodies and spaces and drawing boundaries through emotional and corporeal distinctions.

The final component of my theoretical framework is centered on critical security studies and the strain of scholarship that draws on post-9/11 Western security agendas and the
securitization of Islamic identities. My perspective critiques the taken-for-granted acceptance of secularism in understanding world politics and security. Following a school of critical security research, I too understand security and risk as discursive constructions that are delineated through risk governance of populations. A Foucauldian understanding of security apparatuses constitutes the frame whereby the self-regulatory practices of secularism and disciplinary forms of risk governance are revealed. Secularism and security operate through the same form of governmentality in the service of modern power, and they are driven by the same sources of fears and anxieties, which construct and regulate bodies and spaces.

In this dissertation, I explore the emotional and corporeal constructions of the secularist security agenda, and the *secular bodyscapes* of the Turkish military through women’s bodies and emotional experiences. Conceptualizing secularism as a corporeal regulatory ideal, that at the same time is a form of risk governance, renders the Turkish military base as a complex space that needs to be analyzed in terms of its corporeal and emotional constructions. In the following chapters, I critically examine how everyday encounters and experiences in the military base shape, and are shaped by, the corporeal and emotional instabilities of secularism which construct security and risk along the same lines of instability as a function of modern sovereignty.
Chapter 4

SEXUAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF SECURITY AND RISK WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF SECULARISM

Introduction

The “headscarf issue” has been the most outstanding point where the competing claims of secularism and political Islam materialize in Turkey. Especially when we look at the trajectory of this conflict through the security discourse of the Turkish military, which has been the most ardent and forceful defender of secularism, the headscarf issue reaches a new level of significance and clarity. Perceived by the military as the most visible sign of Islamist politics, the headscarf embodies the conflict between religious and secularist discourses, and reveals their corporeality. When examined at the level of entrance regulations of the military and through women’s experiences in military spaces, the headscarf and related forms of religious practice delineate the sexual and corporeal underpinnings of a security discourse that is built against the backdrop of secularism.

In this chapter, I explore the security regulations of the Turkish military with a focus on the sexual and corporeal configurations of security and risk within the context of the risk of Islamism. I look at the experiences of women in military families and demonstrate how the military integrates public representations of women’s bodies, sexualities and dress into its security discourses that operate across institutional levels and everyday life. Through this, I
explore the particular ways in which security and risk are mapped on to women’s bodies and sexual identities as the competing expressions of secularist and religious discourses.

The theoretical framework that informs my analysis in this chapter draws on the intersections of secularism and security and their constructions through corporeality. Feminist geographies of the female body define the contours of my approach. As a methodological statement, and a theoretical point of entry, I take women’s bodily experiences related to religious dress and Islamic headscarf as embodiments of particular discourses on female corporeality and sexual morality. I start by problematizing how religious identities become a threat to security based on political agendas that are embedded within a normative paradigm of secularism (Mavelli 2011; 2013; Bilgin 2008; Hurd 2007). With a critical approach that destabilizes the traditional and taken-for-granted understandings of security and risk, I explore how risk is constructed corporeally at the interstices of the secular and religious.

My analysis is based on post-structuralist critiques of secularism that call for bodily and emotional constructions of the concepts of secular and religious. As I explored in Chapter 3, secularism establishes its legitimacy based on the elevation of “pure” reason and rationality over corporeality and an array of bodily registers, such as emotions (Asad 2003; Connolly 2000; Hirschkind 2011). Emotions and corporeality constitute the critical entry point that I use in my analysis to problematize the facticity of secular/religious distinction in liberal secularist discourses. Examining how the secular/religious dichotomy is incorporated into the constructions of security and risk reveals how actually the conflict between religious and secularist discourses is a conflict over regulation of women’s bodies and their sexual moralities. Looking at women’s bodies through Turkish military’s regulations and exploring the reasoning behind them reveal
why and how a particular form of religious embodiment constitutes a problem for secular modernity and to the body politics and sexual regimes it endorses.

In what follows, I discuss women’s stories related to their bodily experiences and emotions of the secularist security regulations of the Turkish military. I begin by exploring how certain fears and anxieties were developed through a secularist security agenda by focusing on how women’s religious embodiment came to signify Islamist dystopia. Then I move on to examine the military’s security regulations on the Islamic headscarf in detail through women’s personal accounts to delineate the underlying meanings that are attached to this religious bodily practice. In this way I delineate how risk is inscribed on women’s bodies and the spaces they enter. I also provide women’s accounts of the everyday strategies they deploy to navigate security regulations in order to further demonstrate how security discourses operate in everyday levels. This way I also foreground the power and resilience women have held under oppression. In the final section, I discuss a few documents that demonstrate the centrality of women’s bodies and sexualities to the military’s regulations and security discourses. Through this I delineate the sexual and corporeal constructions of security and risk that are internal to my conceptualization of secular bodyscapes, which is the central analogy I draw on in understanding secular modern sovereignty.
An Embodied “Islamist” Dystopia

“Turkey will not be another Iran!” was a popular slogan in the 1990s and 2000s that captured public fears and anxieties about Turkey losing its identity as a secular republic. From public demonstrations to everyday conversations, becoming like Iran symbolized the collective secularist anxiety around the increasing power of Islamist political parties and public visibility of religious identities. Iran constituted the future catastrophe, the *Islamist dystopia*. Security regulations against the “Islamist” military personnel also played on dystopic and catastrophic imaginaries. Take, for example, my conversation with Sermin (61), the wife of a retired CO, in which she says:

> You know they [the current “Islamist” government] are now trying to pacify the army. They talk about even replacing the army with the police force... That can never work. The professional army can be paid off. The Iranian Shah had a professional army. One day he got up, they were all on the other side, against him. (March 21, 2011)

With specific reference to the Iranian revolution, Sermin emphasizes the significance of maintaining an army, whose officers are strongly committed to the secular republic. Her anxiety emerges from the risk of losing the secularist military to an Islamist one, which then could become complicit in an “Islamist” revolution like in Iran. These anxieties were translated into security regulations that labelled some officers as Islamist and perceived them through a connection to an Iran-like Islamist revolution. For instance, Elif (26), the daughter of an “Islamist” CO who was expelled from the military, says that her father was constantly suspected of joining a revolutionary army that would bring an “Islamist” regime in Turkey, and thus he was

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43 Turam (2013) suggests that the fear of an “Islamic revolution” like Iran in 1980s, that I also observe in my research, was transformed in the 1990s and 2000s to fear of a bottom up Islamization of the society, yet it still remained a significant concern in secularist segments of the society.
expelled (June 24, 2011). Such pre-emptive security strategies are based on an idea of risk that is modelled on a catastrophic future.

The idea of Iran dominates “secularist” narratives as a place where any kind of progress is impossible and where ignorance rules. Importantly the Islamic dystopia is a corporeal imagination that is embodied by women who would eventually be forced “back into black veils” under Islamic patriarchy. Nurgul (57), the “secularist” wife of a retired NCO shared her insights on the sudden transformation of “secular” and “modern” citizens into “religious extremists” in the 1980s. She said:

I had friends. They started telling me that I should wear the headscarf too... We are born and raised with Ataturk’s principles in the Turkish Republic. Why would we want to go back? Why would we become like Iran... I am worried about the future of my grandson. (March 12, 2011)

Nurgul connects the pressure to a wear a headscarf directly to the Iranian revolution, which she argues is evidenced by the increasing number of headscarved women in public space. The image of women who are “deprived” of their civil liberties and “forced” to veil enthrals the secularist imaginations of an “Islamist” dystopia. This leads to an encoding of women with headscarves as agents of risk and puts them at the center of security discourses and regulations.

The distinction between “traditional” and “political”, as discussed in studies on headscarf debates in Turkey (Saktanber 2002; Gokariksel and Secor 2010), dominates the military’s understanding and its perception of risk as well. In one of my visits to a non-commissioned military officers’ club in Istanbul, I inquired about the entrance regulations regarding dress codes and specifically the headscarf. The on-duty NCO explained:

If you have a triangle shaped headscarf tied with one simple knot under the chin and not
wear a bonnet under it, let a little bit of hair show on top under the scarf, then you can enter of course. Because, that is the traditional way that our mothers, our grandmothers used to wear. We never turned them away. (May 3, 2011)

This description encapsulates the assumptions underlying the military’s regulations and the distinction between the “traditional” and “political” headscarf that has been central to the construction of this embodied practice within secularist discourses. The particular explanation of what is allowed and under which conditions demonstrates the corporeal constructions of security and risk along the secular/religious fault line. In what follows, I engage with this description and the truth claims it forwards in construction of the “Islamist” subject that poses a risk to the secular order.

**Defining Risk 1: “...one simple knot under the chin and not wearing a bonnet under it...”**

The time frame that this research covers (1980 – 2010) through the accounts of individuals who lived within military spaces and through its regulations is defined as an intense period of securitization of the “Islamists” within the military. Described by some informants as a “witch hunt”, during this period the military grew suspicious of previously accepted forms of religious dress. A tendency to see everything through the lens of risk became dominant and it circumscribed women’s bodies and their corporeal experiences within military spaces.

The statement made by one on-duty officer that opens this section, “...one simple knot under the chin and not wearing a bonnet under it...” was mentioned repeatedly in the narratives of women in military families. Women who do not make a “simple knot under the chin” are considered as objectionable (sakincali), thus risky, and they are labelled as “Islamist”. The
requirement for the “simple knot under the chin” meant that the headscarf should not be worn “too tightly”; that it should not be secured and stabilized with a pin. Thus, the pin of the headscarf symbolizes the risk of Islamism, and therefore if was asked to be specifically removed at entrances to military spaces. Aysen (48), who is the wife of a CO who was forced to retire due to Aysen’s religious dress, told me about her experience with this regulation:

When I entered, I took off the pin of my headscarf and tied it the way they wanted. But then I changed it when I went in. The soldier was following me constantly to tell me to take off my pin again… I was making a knot, this way… and that way, trying to tighten it [showing with her hands on herself]… in two minutes it gets loose again. That’s what they want actually. (May 5, 2011)

As is reflected in Aysen’s interpretation, this security regulation demands more than just the removal of a pin. It is actually an attempt by the military to loosen her headscarf and thus her attachment to a religious practice. The same logic applies to the part of the regulation that refers to the bonnet, which is an accessory that is used to cover the hair that is above the forehead under the headscarf. The bonnet is also banned because, like the pin, it is also an indicator of too tight and inflexible a form of religious embodiment.

The form of judgement and the underlying meaning of this security regulation are more clearly reflected through the conversations I had with women who identify as “secularist” and approve of the military’s headscarf regulations. Common reactions are “So what, if they have to show a bit of hair? What is the big deal?” or in the most common form “Of course the headscarf should be banned because it is a political symbol.” Accompanied by these reactions are the accounts of interpretations of primary religious texts, the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet Mohammed, in a way that denies the necessity of a headscarf, or any form of religious dress all together. My respondents asserted the significance of reading the religious text for the moral
message for which it is intended and often emphasized that they can fulfil that by not dressing “revealingly”. Thus, women who stick to the religious text “too literally” fail to be “rational and modern”. For her, instead of adopting the moral message headscarved women resort to a “piece of cloth” in order to maintain a sexual morality. This perspective renders the headscarf and loose fitting religious dress as a form of “excess” (aşırılık) and “deviance” (çarpıklık), that is, too much of a practice that gets beyond the proper limits of “modest-and-modern dress”.

The form of reasoning reflected in Gulseren’s (61, wife of retired CO) narrative sets the ground for the security regulations against the “political” headscarf that is tightly worn with a pin. The secularist thinking that predominates the military’s regulations aims to eliminate the risk posed by the “political” headscarf by loosening it and transforming it into a “traditional” headscarf. As commonly reflected in the narratives, the “political” headscarf is defined as a form of “deviance” from the trajectory of modernization of gender identities. The security regulations aim to address this risk by a way of fixing the headscarved woman’s “failure” to modernize religion through her body and thereby recuperating the risk she represents through her body. As is reflected in Aysen’s (48, wife of force-retired NCO) quotation, “That is what they want.” The regulations by the military, which are situated within broader frames of reference to “proper” interpretations of religious texts and a notion of “true” Islam, try to tame and domesticate these women’s bodies. They aim to transform and accommodate them into a sexual and corporeal regime, which demands visibility of those body parts that are coded as sexual and private by the religious discourse.⁴⁴

However, the visibility that the republican sexual regime prescribes has its limits; it

⁴⁴ See also Cinar (2008) where she explains the disparity between religious and secularist discourses as to which parts of the female body are considered private and needs to be covered.
demands other forms of measures to maintain the sexual moral order. To understand these limits, the body of the woman wearing a “political” headscarf needs to be juxtaposed to the image of the “ideal” military wife. As I discussed in Chapter 1, the ideal military wife, like the republican woman, wears a European style of attire but she is still constructed through an agglomeration of traditional and religious moral codes, such as honour, chastity or virginity. Even though she appears as “liberated”, she is at the same time a highly regulated subject in terms of her sexuality and morality. What is hinted above in Gulseren’s quotation with the emphasis on “not dressing revealingly” gains deeper meaning in Emel’s (28, daughter of retired CO) account of an ideal military wife who needs to hold a “delicate balance” between her “modern” dress and sexual morality through modesty:

I think women’s bodies are used as tools for respect. How much you cover your body shows how respected you are. But, if you go extreme and wear a turban [political headscarf], then you are a religious fundamentalist, a radical. If you stand in between, wear a crew neck dress; wear your hair up like topknot, and wear flat shoes, then you are a respected person. You are awesome, you are the girl to marry, ideal wife, ideal mother, ideal bride…That’s how you should dress. (March 21, 2011)

The notions of “girl to marry, ideal wife, ideal bride” emphasize the significance of sexual morality that women need to maintain within the secular spaces of the military. The ideal military wife achieves a certain level of modesty with a European style of attire that is not too revealing, and also a level of modernity by not hiding her body behind a religious dress or a headscarf. Comments such as “I don’t wear a headscarf, but I don’t walk around in bikinis or miniskirts either” were reiterated by “secularist” women to defend their sexual morality and decency. These comments also underscore the significance of flexibility. They proudly emphasize their ability to adjust their bodies based on the space, time and the particular circumstances, unlike the “Islamist” headscarved woman who holds on too tightly to her belief
and headscarf. For example, a few “secularist” participants made reference to the military’s dress regulations that strictly ban the wear of swimsuit at any place other than the beach and asserted their own flexibility and adaptability to dress “properly” based on occasion and place.

The delicate balance that women are expected to achieve in terms of their dress is reflected in their comportment and everyday lives as well. For example most of my participants define being a military wife as a career that requires close attention to traditional gender roles and sexual morality. To be a good military wife requires that women be good mothers, supporting caretakers, and have the social skills to maintain good relations within the military community (Enloe 1989; 2000). However, these social relations also need to remain within the codes of sexual morality through “proper and decent” social conduct. As Neriman (46), the daughter of a retired NCO says: “My mother always had a good but a balanced relationship with my father’s friends. When we visit each other as a family, she talks and laughs. But if she runs into the guy without my father on the street, it is just ‘Hello!’ and ‘Good bye!’ That’s it.” (April 28, 2011) Such performance in social interaction is key to maintain sexual morality and decency for women.

However, it is clear that “secularist” women present such accounts of sexually moral behaviour in defence of their decency, which, as they perceive it, is challenged by the religiously dressed “Islamist” woman who makes visible and assertive claims to the same moral codes by hiding the parts of her body that are considered as sexual and private. In response to this challenge “secularist” women emphasize that they can remain “modern” and “modest” at the same time by regulating their sexual morality through modest dress and controlled social interactions (via maintaining a distance with other/illicit men). This makes the adoption of the
headscarf an indicator of a “different” agenda and an embodiment of the “risk of Islamism”.

Based on such forms of reasoning, headscarved women, who hold on to their religious dress “too tightly” and do not want to let go of their headscarves, are coded as too literal and too bodily. While the “secularist” woman can be moral without religious clothing, the headscarved woman “needs” the regulatory force of religion and religious dress to display a sexually moral behaviour. This makes “secularist” women appear as “more moral” and even “more religious” compared to the “Islamist” woman. I argue that this is the corporeal point of distinction between the constructions of religious and secular identities. Neither the “secularist” nor the “Islamist” women deny the place of religion in their lives, nor the significance of moral/ethical sexual codes that they are expected to conform to, but they perform it in different ways.

Nevertheless, the “Islamist” subject is identified through the “need” she has for the regulatory force of religion on her body and sexuality. Therefore she is perceived as bodily, as opposed to being rational. On the other hand, even though she embodies the same codes of sexuality and morality with the “Islamist” woman through her modern-but-modest dress, the “secularist” woman perceives herself “above” the level of the body and claims to be ruled by reason and rationality. As a result, the headscarved woman is coded as “Islamist” and risky due to her perceived lack of rationality and assumed subservience of her mind and reason to her body.

Such regulations motivated by negative judgements of particular forms of headscarf are also fuelled by the morally ambivalent position that women hold from an Orientalist Western perspective. Orientalism, as coined by Edward Said (1979) is the hierarchical epistemic framework that has historically constructed the East as politically, culturally and socially
stagnant and backward before Western superiority. Studies on Islam and gender contribute to this critique by emphasizing how veiling is perceived within an Orientalist patriarchal framework that not only constructs women as passive victims but also as overtly sexualized subjects (Yegenoglu 1998; Mernissi 1987). This literature analyzes the veil as a sexualizing practice that publicly marks the boundaries of sexual interaction in public space with women’s bodies. It is a practice that connotes what is forbidden: a woman’s sexual privacy, “underscoring the sexual dimension of any interaction between men and women” (Mernissi 1999, 491). This is why eroticized images of veiled women are dominant in Western imaginary and Orientalist discourses of the east (Yegenoglu 1998; Shirazi 2003).

Likewise, as Gokariksel and Secor (2012) argue, the fashionable, tighter and in some ways revealing religious clothing adopted by middle-class religious women in Turkey put these women in an ambivalent space which makes their identities “questionable” in terms of morality and “sincerity” in their religious devotion. The questionability turns into the following words of contempt in Gulseren’s (61, wife of retired CO) words: “On her eyes, there is five times more make up than mine, wearing a bright red lipstick, wearing stretchy pants, and (!) wearing a headscarf...so much for her headscarf!” (May 11, 2011) Gulseren is expressing her frustration that comes from the “overtly sexualized” body of the headscarved woman that contradicts not only the secular republican dress code by wearing a headscarf, but also the Islamic dress codes by not wearing it “properly”, in a way that is “too revealing” and “too sexy”.

In this way the secularist gaze objectifies headscarved women by questioning the “sincerity” of their devotion to the religion based on the very sexual moral codes they supposedly display through their own dress. These women are labelled as “Islamist” and risky,
not only because they refute to dress code of secular Western modernity but also because they challenge the delicate balance of sexual morality that “secularist” military wives work hard to maintain through their “modern-but-modest” style of dress and their regulated and sexually moral social behaviour. As I explore in Chapter 6, such emotional intensities and expressions also constitute the basis of the complex emotional geographies of the military base. Emotions, along with bodily experiences, constitutes a crucial part in how individuals perceive each other within the “secular/religious” dichotomy and how space is constructed through proximity of bodies to each other within the architecture of power of secularism.

**Defining Risk 2: “...that is the traditional way that our mothers, grandmothers used to wear.”**

In the second part of my analysis, I explore how the headscarf symbolically remains “traditional” and “true” through a combination of factors such as age, class background and education of the wearer. The figure of the grandmother dominates secularists’ definition of the experience of “true” Islam and “proper” religious embodiment in such a strong way that the military crafted an age based security regulation. In some military spaces only women over the age of 50, in some cases 60, are granted admission by wearing headscarves. Gonul (49), the “Islamist”-labelled wife of a retired CO, says:

> Once I wanted to go to my nephew’s wedding at an Officer’s club, I couldn’t enter because of my age. They look at your ID and reject you because you are younger than 50! I couldn’t enter even if I wore my headscarf the way they wanted without a pin. It didn’t matter. (August 12, 2011)

This security regulation enables the military officials to deny that there is a ban on headscarves,
by defining a “proper” headscarf wearer only by old age through the taken-for-granted category of the grandmother. However, a deeper reading reveals that the acceptability of the grandmother is also due to her politically and economically passive status. As studies on the Islamic headscarf indicate, the controversy over the headscarf emerges from the transferral of an essentially rural and domestic practice into the urban, with increased visibility in public space (Ozcetin 2009). The wearing of the headscarf is considered a traditional practice that is doomed to diminish with increased levels of urbanization and education of the migrant population. In this scenario, the grandmother does not pose a threat to military spaces because she is a traditional figure, who is still economically passive and domestic even in the urban setting. This is clearly reflected in the description of the “proper” headscarf through the figure of the peasant woman. Nermin (60), who is a “secularist” wife of a retired NCO, says:

I think these all happened after Iran’s Islamist revolution...Those types of covering [political headscarf] did not exist when we were young. The peasant used her muslin to filter the milk or the cheese. This other style [political headscarf] is because of tariqats. There is no such thing in Turkish traditions. (March 8, 2011)

Again via reference to the Iranian revolution, Nermin makes a claim to a “true” headscarf by associating it with the rural and places of lesser political significance. Thus, what makes the other type of headscarf “political” is not only its style, but also its presence and visibility in public space and in military spaces.

The “traditional” headscarf is also associated closely with domesticity and a lower education level. Gungor (45) is a lawyer and wife of an officer who was expelled from the military for being “Islamist”. Her experience regarding her religious dress style and headscarf in military spaces is an example of the general perception of socio-economic class and educational background in categorizations of the headscarf as “traditional” or “political”: 
Sometimes when I get really angry I tell people that I don’t know how to read and write. [Laughs] ... When I was living at the military lodgings, they used to ask me if I am a Quran School graduate. I say I am not. “Tell us where you studied.” And when you tell them, about your occupation or so, it changes the way they look at you...like more hostile. People treat you differently. (June 21, 2011)

As this quotation reveals, those women who break the positive correlation between ignorance and religiosity constitute a risk, because despite their education they consciously adopt the headscarf by sticking to a literal interpretation of the religious text. As reflected in Gungor’s quotation above, “secularist” women are at first surprised by her and then grow suspicious about her, because, even though she received higher education in secular institutions, Gungor still prefers to wear a headscarf. On the other hand, when the woman who is wearing a headscarf is undereducated, this judgement turns to a more sympathetic one since she is perceived, either as a passive subject who is “oppressed” under the “Islamist” patriarchal regimes, or a person who “lacks the ability” to interpret the religious text into the conditions of the day. Elif (26), the headscarved daughter of an expelled CO talks about the general cluster of meanings that the headscarved woman is defined through. She says:

Once I was helping my friends who live in the dormitory to get bread for breakfast. There was a line up, but since we had an arrangement we went around the line to pick up the boxes. Then someone yelled at us, “You closed ones are always like this, you never line up.” And then a woman interjected. A very fancy, modern dressed woman. She said. “No, don’t treat them like that. They haven’t been taught the modern ways, it is because of their ignorance.” (June 24, 2011)

Elif’s quotation reveals the general judgement and forms of reasoning that secularist discourses impose to understand younger women’s adoption of religious clothing. Their perceived ignorance and naiveté, with added passivity under religious patriarchal pressures, are offered as explanations for adoption of religious embodiment. Elif’s words also point at the respective value-laden association of “closed” and “open” with headscarved and non-headscarved women,
which, as Dagtas (2009) suggests, captures the metaphoric associations made between veiling and closure, that is, being closed to the new and modern. Those who do not fit this framework are interpreted as risky because they contradict the sexual regime that secularist thinking imposes by consciously adopting the headscarf outside of family pressures or ignorance.

The correlation between age and female sexual appeal is another relationship that needs to be unpacked to understand the configurations of risk through women’s bodies. According to more general understandings, veiling is a practice that aims to cover the female body with the purpose of reducing its sexual appeal in public space (Mernissi 1999). The prescription of loose fitting religious dress is due to the construction of the younger and “fit” female body as sexually attractive. This construction dominates the military’s regulations on the headscarf as well. Some of my participants responded to the age regulations in military spaces in ways that resist the secularist understanding of age and religiosity. Sonay (47), the headscarved wife of a CO who was expelled from the military said:

There were military wives for example, they do daily prayers but they say they do not have to wear a headscarf. I ask them, “How do you contradict Allah’s commands? There is a rule for covering.” They say, “No! You cover when you get old.” There is a strong thing about covering in old age… I got to Haj or I cover my head if I want to.45 I do not understand this age thing. Actually, according to our religion, some say, it is ok if you do not cover that much when you get old. You know... you are more attractive when you are younger. (April 27, 2011)

While religious discourse demands the younger and sexually appealing female body to be covered, secularist discourse challenges this by prescribing “proper” religiosity and religious covering to older women, who are less visible in public. This leads to an understanding of

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45 Haj is the name for religious pilgrimage, one of the five pillars of Islam.
younger women, who are considered as sexually appealing to be perceived as risky when they cover; the younger woman’s headscarf and dress serves religious principles by covering her sexually appealing body. In return, older women are considered less risky because they are perceived to not possess “sexually attractive” bodies that need to be hidden from public sight. In this way, older women’s headscarves are coded as “traditional” and therefore “safe”.

The conflict over headscarf in military spaces and terms of its acceptability as described heretofore also reflect the strong socio-economic class underpinnings of its formulation as risk. The conflict between “religious” and “secularist” discourses that materialize over women’s bodies within the context of the Turkish military emerges as a very middle-class phenomenon in terms of the cultural, political and social bearings of this category. The wives and daughters of military officers hold a middle-class and elite standing via association with the Turkish military already, which has asserted itself as an exemplary modernizing institution since the beginning of the republic. Taking place over and through women’s bodies, this is a contestation between two different forms of bourgeoisie who claim to inhabit and appropriate public space. The materialization of the “political” and “traditional” headscarf categories takes place through distinctions of upper and lower socio-economic class and rural/urban identities. Thereby the codification of the headscarved woman as a form of risk is related to considerations of her socio-economic class standing, which are closely tied to how urbanized, wealthy and educated she is.

To clarify the articulations of socio-economic class in to configurations of risk and to construction of identities as “Islamist” or “secularist”, I conducted eight interviews with wives and mothers of rank soldiers from lower class and rural background, and had informal conversations with a few more. With wives and mothers of men who are doing, or recently
completed, their compulsory six month to one year military service, I focused on the moments where they were in close contact with the military (e.g., oath taking ceremonies or regular family visits to the base). Most interviews evidenced that these women’s religious dress and embodiment did not matter as long as they remained outside of the confines of middle-class and politically significant places (such as the military officers’ mess, headquarters and VIP halls). Their experiences reinforced my general argument that one’s religious affiliation and embodiment is perceived as “political”, thus risky only in so far as they gain visibility in public space, or claim the cultural and political representation of middle-class subjectivity.⁴⁶

**Resistance and Strategies**

Women’s strategies around security regulations and the ways they resist constructions of risk through their bodies is another platform that reveals the complex ways in which secularist discourses operate. Throughout my research, women’s narratives of daily security regulations were always accompanied by stories of how they turned their bodies into tools of resistance within the everyday life of the military in order to subvert the extensive forms of surveillance and control mechanisms. In this section, I explore these strategies not only because they reveal more about the inner workings of the secularist security regulations of the military, but also because they foreground and recognize the power women hold in front of religious and secularist discourses that burden them by assigning meanings to their bodies.

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⁴⁶ As I also indicate as methodological note in Chapter 2, such class distinction presents itself in the distinction between the ranks of COs and NCOs and their families. Due to their perceived higher class standing, COs’ wives were taken with more seriousness by the military than that of NCOs’.
As I discussed in the previous sections, women who do not fit in a category of “ideal” military wife are subjected to various security regulations and forms of objectification in social spheres of the military. Defined as “Islamist”, these women recount daily struggles to be able to live in military spaces. They tried to adjust their bodies and their dress and to adopt behavioural strategies that would allow them to avoid risk categorizations of the military. Many of them indicated that they try to keep a low profile and reduce their visibility in military spaces. A few of my respondents say they rarely left their military homes and, if they did so, it was after dark.

Such accounts align with those of “secularist” military wives’, who, even though they do not fit in the risk category, would not allow their headscarved mothers or visiting relatives to walking around in military spaces on their own. For example, Nalan (34, wife of on-duty CO) said that when her sister came to visit her at home on the military base they would remain in the house rather than venture to the cafeteria or the restaurant (March 16, 2011). Likewise, the security personnel also demanded that she come and pick up her headscarved mother when she arrived at the base, saying that she should not be wandering around “like that” (referring to the headscarf) by herself. Remarks like these reflect the visual regime at work in the secular spaces of the military to control the expression of religious identities. For headscarved wives of higher-ranking military officers, keeping a lower visual profile could be more challenging as they are expected to attend dinners and cocktail parties. Nevertheless, last minute excuses were frequently used as a strategy to avoid such social situations.

Strategies to not get profiled and expelled also included nuanced social skills. As I explore in greater detail in the next chapter, adopting more active roles in the military community, being more socially adaptable and sympathetic to others, are some of the tactics that
headscarved women employed to compensate for the “disadvantage” of the headscarf. Nesrin (50, wife of force-retired CO) explains that as a headscarved wife she and her husband always try to be more inviting and open about their personal lives to prove that they have done nothing wrong nor have anything to hide. Likewise, Aysen (48, wife of force-retired CO) says that she has never resisted the attempts by the military officials and their wives to visit her house. In addition to these strategies, “Islamist”-labelled families demonstrate that they have reduced their social relations with other “Islamist” families to a minimum to demonstrate that, religion, as is perceived by the military, is not a major determinant of their social interactions.

Divorcing their headscarved wives is another common strategy used by “Islamist” officers to secure their career. Melek (44), wife of a force-retired CO, told me her story of their tactical divorce with her husband to keep him in the military long enough to be able to retire. As also reiterated by other research participants, Melek says that this became such a common strategy that military officials no longer trusted it (April 14, 2011). Elif (26, daughter of expelled CO), for example, said despite her father’s attempts to avoid expulsion by divorcing her mother, he still got expelled, because the officials searched more into their personal lives and found out that it was a divorce on paper rather than in practice (June 24, 2011). The divorce strategy worked for some officers and not for others, and in some cases contributed to family break-up.

Bodily strategies are also developed in the everyday to evade the risk categories that emerge from the meanings attached to women’s dress and headscarf. The most radical practice I encountered is the wearing of wigs on top of headscarves. As explored in Kejanlioglu and Tas’s (2009) study on headscarf bans at university campuses, strategic adoption of wigs was a common practice by headscarved women. In the “House Visit Survey” that I discuss in the next section,
watching out for wigs is one of the surveillance techniques used by the military. The military also requests entire personnel’s families’ portrait photos to detect the headscarved women in these families. Melek told me that they sent the military a photo of a non-headscarved cousin who resembled her; and Aysen (48, wife of force-retired CO) said that she went to a photo studio where there are only female photographers and staff and got herself a non-headscarved photo. In addition, Aysen added that they even created women only social settings and got her photos taken without a headscarf as if she was attending a mixed-gendered social gathering.

In response to the security regulations that fixated on their bodies, headscarved women made adjustments to their dress style in order to not be seen as risky. A few suggested that they wore smaller headscarves and took up jackets or shorter tops instead of long and loose fitting topcoats. Mukerrem (46, wife of expelled CO), for example, states that like many others in her position, she adopted denim or leather jackets to look more “modern”. This, she says, was accompanied by smaller and brightly coloured headscarves that were worn without pins.

Through such clothing modifications, headscarved women respond to the risk-bound categorical thinking that generated meanings through their bodies. However, these tactical performances are also based on the normative categories of secularist thinking regarding the riskiness of the female body and its representation in public space. Unless they touch on the key points that I discussed earlier in this chapter, such as the “showing of a little bit of hair” and the risk evaluation made through the age and class background, these tactical moves remain futile. For example, even though she wore a denim and shorter topcoat and even though she did not use a pin or bonnet to wear her headscarf, Mukerrem was still perceived as representing risk because she did not let her hair show and still closed her private body parts for religious purposes. She
argues that for these reasons she was perceived as a form of risk to military and therefore her husband was expelled.

In addition to all the aforementioned tactics, “Islamist” women and their husbands also challenged these categories with a non-compromising stance to the military as well. Most of the “Islamist” women I spoke to displayed a firm and confident stance against the military’s regulations. It should be noted that they displayed different responses to the military’s pressures based on their level of household income and degree of financial dependence on the military. However, these women indicated that they never questioned their own subjectivities and their own personal choices of dress, and they never compromised their ethics. Based on such a firm stance, Sevdeger (51, wife of expelled CO), for example, says that she acted deliberately in going to the Military Officers’ Mess: “I used to go there and sit there the whole day, with my headscarf and all, let the soldier serve me tea and coffee all day. I used to sit and knit.” (August 13, 2011) Likewise, Latife (48), an “Islamist” wife of and expelled CO, says she did not think for a moment to adjust herself or act as the military wanted: “My bread comes from Allah, not the military. I would never give in and do this and that. I always said to my husband too. If they expel us, let be it.” (June 22, 2011)

The firm stance that the “Islamist” personnel displayed, and various forms of strategies and resistance they adopt, represent a more holistic and balanced portrayal of a process that shaped lives of these individuals. The pressures and categories imposed by the military are always met with resistances that challenged the logic and reasoning behind the socially constructed notions of security and risk, as well as their determining referents of “religious” and “secular”. In the section below, I discuss how secularist security regulations evolve around
sexually constructed notions of risk and security, and the particular centrality of women’s bodies to the military’s security discourse.

**Securitizing Religion Through Sexuality**

The Turkish military’s risk configurations take into consideration a variety of components that I have described above. These regulations on the style of the headscarf and age of the woman, along with other variables such as education and class, demonstrate the fact that the military constantly manoeuvres to capture the risk of Islamization on and through women’s bodies. The centrality of women’s bodies in the systemic efforts to identify the “Islamist” personnel is reflected more clearly in the confidential security document that was released in the national news media as part of a legal investigation on the military (‘Başörtüsü Bağlama’ 2014). The picture below (Figure 1) is from a security document that is used to identify women’s “political” headscarf, giving specific instructions as to which religious group they belong based on the style of headscarf.

The newspaper articles that accompany the images in Figure 1 indicate that this document was used to identify the “Islamist” personnel and the specific religious group they belong to. This document matches, with its attention to detail and style, with the “Islamist” personnel’s narratives of trying to enter military spaces. The difficulties women faced at military checkpoints as well as the constant surveillance they experienced in their daily lives as to what religious group they allegedly belonged resonate with information on this document. Another confidential security document that was released, titled “House visit survey”, comprises a list of questions to be filled in after visits to suspected “Islamist” personnel’s houses (Başörtüsü Bağlama’ 2014). This survey comprises questions to be filled in after visits to suspected “Islamist” personnel’s houses.

Is there any evidence that the wife or daughters wear wigs?

Are there any negative findings as a result of the examination of the family photo album?

What kind of commercial brands are used in the house?

Is there any alcoholic beverage in the house?

Do they serve cologne or rosewater? 47

What are the author, titles and topics of the books and documents (books, magazines, newspapers, cassettes, CDs etc.) found in the library?

What are the brand names for the house and food? (Detergents, salt, biscuit, white

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47 Cologne is an alcoholic personal freshener and hand-sanitizer that is sometimes not preferred by devout religious people and replaced with rosewater.
appliances etc.)

Which TV channels are watched?

Are there any family friends who are politically active? Which political views do they have?

- Questions from the House Visit Survey (Source: Basortusu baglama, 2011)

These house visits are a crucial part of the surveillance techniques commonly used for identifying “Islamist” personnel. Through such visits the entire livelihood of an officer is evaluated across institutional and everyday levels based on the meanings that emerge from women’s bodies and abovementioned everyday life details. The “Islamist”-labelled personnel and their families indicate that they always felt that they were being watched and evaluated with random visits and drop-ins in their houses. These individuals were aware of the kinds of evidence that the military officials sought and they developed strategies to avoid getting profiled. The concerns and strategies they indicated match perfectly with the questions listed above. For example, Aysen (48, wife of force-retired CO) says that they boxed and carried all their religious books and texts into storage because she observed that in these visits, her guests were checking out the shelves and asking questions about the books they read. She says that, upon her friends’ suggestion, she even put up an Atatürk calendar on her wall to ward off all the suspicions and show that she respects Atatürk’s secular republic. ⁴⁸

However, it is the first question in the survey, the wearing of wigs (which is a common strategy used by women to cover up their headscarves (Kejanlioğlu and Taş 2009)) or outright

⁴⁸ Products with Atatürk theme and image, as well as Turkish flags became the marker of the “secularist” camp upon the rise of political Islam in Turkey (see Navaro-Yashin 2002).
use of headscarf, that is the key risk trigger. As also accounted by my participants who are labelled as “Islamist”, it is their “political” headscarves that make their husbands “suspicious personnel” (şüpheli personel) in the first place and put obstacles in their career path. Aysen (48), the “Islamist” wife of a CO who was forced to retire, says that military generals tried to convince her several times to take off her headscarf so that her husband could stay in the military. Also, a former officer, Mustafa explained to me that he deliberately delayed getting married until the age of 30 because he knew it would be a problem when he married a woman, whom he knew would be headscarved. As expected, after he got married, all other aspects of his life, his religiosity, his social circles and his praying habits came under scrutiny and started to be perceived in a negative way.

The centrality of women’s bodies is also reflected in the strategies these individuals developed and the challenges they set to the security regulations of the military. As I explored in Chapter 1, “lacking discipline” has been the common pretext for expelling “Islamist” officers. During the course of my fieldwork, the “Islamist” personnel who were expelled gained their rights back after a constitutional addendum in 2010 that opened the High Military Council’s rulings for expulsions. Starting from 2011, the expelled personnel files were re-examined and the considered for restitution of their rights and benefits, such as pension and military IDs or redeployment of job in a government office. Sevdeger (51, wife of expelled CO) told me that after they received their military IDs (the first time her photograph showed her wearing a headscarf), her husband insisted that they go to visit a Military Officers’ Mess. Her story and the way she acknowledges the centrality of her body are reflective of the significance of women’s sexuality to the security regulations of the military.
When we first got our cards back, Musa [her husband] said, “Lets go. We are on duty now.” I was like, “What duty?” He said, “We will start from Cevizlibag Officers’ Mess.” I said, “Musa, don’t do this. Do not make me go back to 15 years ago. You can go. Leave me alone. Do you want me to go through the same suffering?” Because, I do not know how they will receive us there. He said “But I cannot go by myself. They don’t notice me without you.” You know… because of my headscarf. I said, “Do something else. Put on a praying cap, grow a beard!” Of course, I was joking. I would not leave him alone. This is our struggle. We went together. Of course we had problems entering, again because of my headscarf. (August 13, 2011)

Sevdeger’s quotation reflects the corporeal construction of the risk of Islamism and its centrality to the military’s security regulations, as well as the centrality of this construction to the strategies and challenges that individuals put up against the military. When her husband insisted that she has to come too, it is because he knew, as did the military officials, that the way Sevdeger embodies religion is the problem. Her body is considered as a “risk” that binds her husband as well.

The determinacy of women’s headscarves and religious embodiment is also reflected in everyday practices. Aysen (48, wife of force-retired CO) says that in everyday life, her headscarf has been the major determinant in the perception of the spaces she enters and people she socializes with, which otherwise remain unremarked upon:

They [non-headscarved military wives] were doing religious gatherings at the military lodgings to read the Quran. It doesn’t matter even if they are 30 people. They said, “You are headscarved, but you are not joining us. How come?” I told them that there would be complaints if I join. But they insisted and I said okay. Right the following week after I went, the host of the gathering had an investigation. (May 5, 2011)

As this incident shows, the headscarf constitutes the most evident determinant in the military’s regulations. As evidenced in the example of the Turkish military, the headscarf is a corporeal and spatial practice. Emerging at the interstices of secular versus religious distinction, the body of the
headscarved woman embodies the spatial and corporeal constructions of risk. The headscarf changes the meanings of a woman’s body and the spaces she enters due to a non-compromising adoption of religious principles that challenges republican norms of female sexuality and morality and the places she enters. What otherwise is seen as “normal” religious gathering, as evidenced in Aysen’s (48, wife of force-retired CO) experience, gets perceived as “political” and “risky” once she steps in. Sexual and corporeal constructions of risk are set at the center of risk analysis processes and they give direction to security regulations to construct military spaces as secular bodyscapes.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explored the security discourses of the Turkish Military in terms of the bodily configurations of security and risk, as well as competing forms of female sexuality and morality. To securitize the secularity of military spaces, entrance regulations distinguish between the “traditional/safe” and “political/risky” headscarves, based on which women are categorized as secularist or Islamist. This dichotomy emerges from seemingly minute details such as the pin or the bonnet, as well as the age, education level or class background of the wearer, combinations of which gain their meaning within a framework of secularist and religious discourses. Particular meanings of risk emerge based on the style of the headscarf, or the body of the woman who wears it. According to the calculations of secularist thinking, the “Islamist” woman fails to be “rational” due to her too literal and too tight attachments to the religious text and her subservience to a bodily religious practice to regulate her sexual relations and morality.

Controversy emerges from within the secularist discourse of the military, which puts the
“Islamist” woman into a position where her intentions and sincerity are made open to question. As she makes claims to sexual morality and chastity via reference to religion, the “Islamist” woman is judged through the “inconsistencies” she may create, either through her tight or fashionable dress or make-up or through her perceived “refusal” to be modest (sexually moral) and modern at the same time. On the other hand, the “secularist” woman makes claims to sexual morality through her dress and comportment. She represents the “delicate balance” between modernity and modesty.

The “Islamist” woman, on the other hand, is perceived as deviating from a rational modern subject position because she defies the secularist teleology for the progressive transformation of religious subjectivities into secular ones, based on age, education and class. She is considered as a risk because she does not follow the trajectory that secularism prescribes based on liberal Western notions of gender equality and freedom. This places the “Islamist” woman in between dichotomies that code her either as “ignorant or oppressed” or “an agent of Islamist politics”. These women are perceived as both the signal and embodiment of risk that is evaluated based on an idea of “true” Islam by the military as well as the “secularist” military community.

The forms of resistance and challenges that women put up against the security regulations that encroach upon their lives and bodies throw a different light on the construction of security and risk at the interstices of secularism and religion. Women who are labelled as “Islamist” used various strategies to manoeuvre around security regulations and to avoid categorical thinking that encapsulates their bodies and subjectivities. “Islamist”-labelled women and their families adopted certain practical solutions, such as being open and inviting to their private spheres to
avoid getting profiled. Women also made stylistic adjustments to their dress and headscarves to look more “modern” and gain acceptance and to look less “risky”. However, regardless of their efforts to “modernize” their bodies, these women still remain risky as they still hold on to their headscarves “too tightly”. Yet, contrary to their conception as passive victims, some “Islamist”-labelled women hold a firm stance against the security regulations of the military. The majority of my research participants indicated that they never questioned their lifestyle or dress choices despite the hardships and pressures they experienced.

In conclusion, constructed as risky or safe based on the meanings that emerge through dress and claims to morality, women’s bodies become objects of inquiry in the Turkish military’s efforts to safeguard secularism. As reflected through dress regulations at the entrance of military spaces, or security processes for identification of the “risky” personnel, women’s bodies constitute the core sites on which political distinctions materialize. These distinctions emerge from the constructions of female sexuality in “secularist” or “Islamist” discourses, and the seemingly competing claims they make to sexual morality. The military securitizes religion by putting women’s bodies and sexualities at the center while defining risk. As I explore in the next chapter, an entire network of security regulations and surveillance mechanisms are based on the meanings of security and risk through women’s bodies, which form into a risk governance to safeguard secular modernity.
Chapter 5

SECULAR GOVERNMENTALITY AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE RISK OF ISLAMISM AS SOCIAL GOVERNANCE

Introduction

In this chapter, I explore how sexually and corporeally constructed notions of security and risk operate in a broader frame of secular risk governance within the context of the Turkish military. As I explored in Chapter 4, concepts of security and risk gain their meanings through women’s bodies and their sexual identities at the intersection of religious and secularist discourses. These constructions pivot around the figure of the headscarved military wife, who embodies both the competing and overlapping constructions of gender and sexuality in public space. Secularist discourses and security converge to regulate such embodied religious practices based on notions of “excess” (aşırı) and “deviance” (çarpık) that are defined in relation to “acceptable” and “normal” forms of religiosity as I will explore in this chapter. Based on the secular and religious distinction that secularism offers, the risk of Islamism mobilizes broad based security practices and encompassing surveillance mechanisms at institutional and everyday levels. Thereby, securitization of Islam operates as a form of social governance within the parameters of secular governmentality.

The theoretical framework of this chapter is based on critical security research that draws on Foucauldian understanding of power and discourse. Building on works of scholars like David Campbell (1992) and Michael Dillon (1996), this line of research foregrounds the discursive
constructions of security and risk through power relations and truth regimes. Beyond the traditional approaches that focus on the nation-state and the military, critical approaches to security look for alternative understandings of security and risk as they gain their meanings in particular contexts. I adopt a risk-based approach to security that explores how certain fears and anxieties of a future catastrophe are used to legitimize secularism as a security discourse. I explore how risk is constructed within the frame of secularism in order to operationalize disparate and heterogeneous yet connected sets of security practices, as well as broad based and encompassing surveillance mechanisms across institutional and everyday spheres.

I draw on studies that take security and risk as discursive constructions and consider how risk is instituted as a form of social governance within the governmental regimes and security apparatuses of modern sovereignty (Aradau and Van Munster 2007; 2008a; Dillon 2007). Foucault (2007; 1991) explains how modern sovereignty is maintained through governmental regimes that are operationalized in the face of disparate sets of social problems. Rather than top down and direct regulatory forms, modern power works through capillaries of discourse that penetrates each and every realm to establish self-regulatory mechanisms in order to create subjectivities and spaces on its own accord. Looking at governmental regimes, I specifically refer to the unproblematized incorporation of secularism into the security apparatuses of the nation-state as a form of governmentality, which constructs religion as risk. Here secularism is conceptualized as not the separation between religion and politics, but a system of governance that is “commensurate with modern sensibilities and modes of governance” (Mahmood 2009, 837). As the “conduct of conduct”, secularism too operates through disciplinary technologies and discourses to create specific bodies and subjectivities that self-regulate and self-discipline for the interest of sovereign power.
In this context, risk emerges as a form of secular social governance as it amalgamates “rationalities and technologies to monitor and predict dangerous occurrences in the future” (Aradau and Munster 2008a, 30). As I explore in this chapter, secular risk governance merges with secular governmentality in constructing particular forms of religiosity as a threat based on notions of “excess” (aşırı) and “deviance” (çarpık). It governs the present day by constructing secular subjectivities and spaces by mobilizing formal and informal security regulations, such as policing and surveillance in combination with disciplinary and self-regulatory practices in everyday life.

In what follows, I start my analysis with a discussion of the systematic efforts that the military has made to securitize religious identities by examining a confidential intelligence report. Then I follow to examine the notions of “excess” and “deviance” that pivot around women’s bodies as they become key to security procedures like background searches. The remainder of the chapter considers how religious practices and spaces have been monitored within the military through formal and informal security procedures. I conclude by considering how surveillance mechanisms and disciplinary practices are incorporated into the everyday life of the military base and thereby control religious identities.

**A Systemic Effort Securitize Religious Identities**

As I discussed in Chapter 1, the risk of Islamism gained predominance in the security discourse of the Turkish military especially through the 1980s to 2000s. The “soft” military coup in February 28th 1997 was the hallmark of an era of security politics that were operationalized
around the concepts of irtica (religious reactionism) and irticai (Islamist reactionary) as they were officially declared as national security threat and listed as priority in the defence agenda. As much as they were verbalized in public and media statements of military generals, irtica and irticai became also priority in the internal security regulations in order to prevent the Islamization of the military and to clear it out from “Islamist infringements”.

A confidential document that I accessed at the onset of this research, entitled “The Personnel Proposed for Expulsion” (see Appendix D), demonstrates the predominance that irticai gained in military security procedures and it reveals the strategic and systemic effort that the military put to confine the risk of Islamism. Signed by an intelligence colonel, the document presents names of more than 800 military personnel and military school students located at various headquarters and military academies across the North East Regional Garrisons of Turkey. The list involves names, ranks and task locations of the personnel, and the nature of their “suspicious” (şüpheli) behaviour. The categories range between “extreme Turkish nationalism”, “Kurdish nationalist/separatist tendencies” and “reactionary behaviour/tendencies”. Military intelligence compiles this information through various channels based on which the High Military Council, the highest decision making body, decides whether an officer should be expelled, prevented from promotion, or demoted.

49 I accessed this document through a research participant but it was also leaked to internet and was available online in the following link: https://www.lcgc.com.tr/turkiyeyi-saldiriya-ucan-askeri-olaylari-dole-sahip-kanca.html
However, I was made aware of the existence of such confidential leaked document by one of my research participants at the beginning of this research. I made further research to verify the reliability of this document and found out that the colonel who signed the document is now a retired brigadier general and he was amongst those who were tried with lifetime imprisonment in the Sledgehammer case. The biographic information I found out about this person (http://www.kccoo.com.tr/goster.php?mid=12) verifies that between 2000 and 2005, when this document was produced, he served as Chief Intelligence Officer for the 1st Regional Army, to which this document pertains.
The key significance of this document is that amongst these categories the “reactionary (i.e. Islamist) behaviour/tendencies” heading takes up more than two thirds of the list and it is composed of more than 10 sub-categories, such as: “holds reactionary views, displays reactionary tendencies, is related to people who hold reactionary views, belongs to an Islamist community or a tariqat, defends Islamist political views, reads Zaman Newspaper50, does daily prayers during working hours”, and finally “his wife holds reactionary views; wears reactionary clothing”. As evidenced, the profile of the “reactionary” officer is listed with a lot more complex detail than any other risk category, and with particular attention to his wife and her outlook, demanding surveillance across a wide spectrum in institutional and everyday spheres.

Such large representation and attention to detail demonstrates the existence of a complex security apparatus that pivots around women’s bodies and their sexual identities.51 As I explore in this chapter, it is a complex security apparatus that emerges as a form of risk governance and operates through various forms of security regulations that impact daily lives. Individuals are either regulated formally or they exercise self-regulation based on particular understandings of security and risk. Such understandings rely upon on notions of excess or deviance, which are monitored across the blurry boundaries of public and private, and official and informal.

50 A conservative “Islamist” newspaper.
51 The categories in the list also match with the “House visit Survey” (see Chapter 4), which is another confidential security document that I discussed as part of the risk evaluation practices of the military.
Looking for the “Deviant” and “Excessive”

“Deviant” and “excessive” religiosity that are defined in relation to “normal” and “accepted” on the basis of a religious/secular divide, emerge as key words that give direction to the military’s security regulations and the secularist logic behind. In one of my visits to a military base, a retired navy officer invited himself to our conversation with his wife, feeling compelled to clarify a few issues that he overheard from a distance:

They [headscarfed women] overdress you know. It is an ugly outfit because it is considered excessive (aşırı). But you know we do not consider anyone’s headscarf as a symbol. Now if a person walks in here [a café in a military base] with a shalwar, would that be nice? They also do not let people in with mini-skirts or swimsuits. Swimsuit belongs to the beach. The dress code here is skirts and blouse. (May 25, 2011)

Exemplified by the headscarf in this quotation, notions of excess and deviance are frequently reiterated through my research in conversations related to the perception of religious identities within the military. As I discussed in the previous chapter, a woman’s religious dress or the headscarf gets easily defined as deviant or excessive as it is considered inappropriate both spatially and temporally for the military base. The “excessiveness” and “overdress-ness” of headscarf is defined in comparison to other excessive and revealing forms of dress, which are not well received in certain places as well. Like the perceived deviance of a swimsuit in any place other than a beach (which has been consistently reiterated out through my research) the headscarf emerges as a form of transgression in public space and in any context that is not temporally and spatially defined as religious and private.

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52 Traditional loose pajama like trousers.
Similar understandings of excess and deviance dominate the military’s security discourse as they are defined in relation to perceived notions of “normal” and “acceptable” religious behaviour. The risk of Islamism is observed, detected and securitized along the lines of deviance and excess that occur through transgressions of spatial and bodily designations of the religious/secular divide. Excess and deviance occur through perceived aberrations across the secular/religious divide and risk emerges spatially and temporally when, what is otherwise perceived as normal steps outside of its designated sphere. In what follows, I reveal how security practices are devised based on the assumption that the risk of Islamism resides as a potential in every individual in the form of religious faith, which is considered normal and safe as long as it remains within the private sphere and the conscious of the individual. In other words, I argue that the potential of religious faith turns into risk the very moment it crosses over the secular/religious divide. What other times is considered normal and acceptable becomes excessive and deviant, and necessitates everyday incursions into individuals’ lives, which I describe as secular risk governance.

The Turkish military mobilizes security practices and surveillance based on the notions of excess and deviance that occur through such spatial and temporal transgressions. Various forms of surveillance and monitoring in the following spheres are most frequently reiterated by my research participants: 1) the type and frequency of religious practice, 2) women’s religious embodiment, 3) forms of sociability and practices of gender segregation, 4) decoration and design of their houses (including books, TV channels, religious texts and prayer materials), 5) “Islamic” consumption habits, 6) and connections to religious groups or political parties.
Observed in these six different spheres, an individual or a religious practice might be considered “excessive” or “deviant” if, 1) he/she strictly observes daily practices; 2) (as a woman) she wears a “political” headscarf and religious dress; 3) he/she strictly practices gender segregation with reference to Islamic principles; 4) if he/she has preference for “Islamic” art (Quranic calligraphy, illumination, Ottoman miniature, or pictures of Mecca or other religious spaces on the walls) over European forms of painting and sculpture, reads religious books or watches religious/Islamist TV channels, 5) if he/she displays strict adherence to *halal* food and completely disavows alcohol consumption, and finally, 6) if he/she predominantly socializes with religious people or holds gatherings to read and discuss Islamic texts. Through observance and control of such evidence, either in isolation or in combinations, precautionary forms of risk governance trace the potentials that reside in the uncertain and blurry boundaries of the secular and religious, to detect the “Islamist” officer who “deviates” from secular norms.

**Background Security Checks**

Background security checks have been the most frequently reiterated and common form of security practice in securitization of the “Islamist” officer. These security checks start from the level of candidacy when individuals apply to go to military school and continue throughout their military career even after they are accepted. These checks are conducted across a broad range of spheres and connections that surround the life of a candidate, his family and acquaintances. They lead up to significant decisions over the career of the officer that might range from expulsion to promotion.
When I inquired about what constitutes a background security check, Merve (35), the “secularist” identified wife of an on-duty CO, defined it as a routine security process that takes place every seven years, involving intensive interrogations about the officer and his family. In her experience, she recounts: “I heard that they questioned even the janitor at my parent’s place. If my mom is closed or not; if we belong to any tariqat... Do we drink excessively? Do we use guns? Questions like that.” (April 7, 2011) These checks skim over all aspects of the life of an officer for any other forms of liability. In this account, being part of a religious community, a tariqats, is perceived as a form of “deviance” that would pose a risk to the military comparable to alcoholism or gun violence. Indicators of risk are sought in one’s private life and family connections.

Similar to Merve’s (35, wife of on-duty CO) experience, Melek (44, wife of force-retired CO) explains how background security checks operate at the blurry boundaries of public and private, to search for lifestyle and embodied traits that do not fit in the definition of a “modern” and “secular” individual.

[Islamist] Reactionary... What they mean by that is a connection with a radical Islamist group who wants to bring sharia. They would say, “He has connections to a community; his mother or father are from that group.” They would go all the way to people’s houses. They would go to the cities where the officer’s family live. If his father belongs to a group they would follow him, photograph him. If that is not enough, they would go to the city where his wife’s family live. They would collect information that would all go into a file. They send all the files to the High Military Council for demotion.53 (April 14, 2011)

This quotation reveals how the military employs a variety of research and surveillance mechanisms to find out about an officer (or a candidate), his family and his larger community to

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53 The High Military Council is the top Military administrative unit whose decisions cannot be appealed. It is the judicial board where “risky” officers are decided to be officially expelled or not.
assess his potential to become an “Islamist”. Several research participants who were labelled as “Islamist” referred to the routine background security checks that their family went through and the cloud of judgement that surrounded their lives due to such reports. Nesrin (50), wife of a CO who was forced to retire, described how security reports created a preconceived suspicion and negative views of their lives even before new colleagues could get to know them at a new deployment site.

Once something is put in your background security report, it follows you everywhere. People judge you before they even know you… Because of my headscarf, my husband got discriminated a lot. I was even worried because the security report would even cause trouble for my sons when they seek employment in government later. (May 12, 2011)

As indicated in Nesrin’s narrative, background security reports constitute a major force in securitization of religious identities within the military. It is a main official documentation that compiles all the information on an officer’s personal and family background in relation to his “reactionary” tendencies in a way that effects his future relations and even career prospects for his children. In these security checks, starting from the “political” headscarf of the women in the family, various aspects of the life of an officer come under scrutiny, including regular observance of daily prayers; practice of gender segregation in the family and in social spheres; avoidance of non-Islamic consumption and habits, such as alcohol and gambling; and social connections with religious groups or Islamist political parties. Notions of excess and deviance are sought in these security processes through combination of various surveillance mechanisms. I now detail how risk is defined from within such everyday forms of evidence that are matched with appropriate security practices to trace and confine these risks. I start by demonstrating the significance of such risk configurations in the military’s official strategies to categorize and control religious practices.
Monitoring of Religious Practices

Studies on Turkish secularism indicate that institutional reforms, as well as state discourse on secularism, prescribe an individual’s relationship to religion that is to be maintained as a personal form of conduct within the confines of the private sphere (A. Cinar 2005; 2008; Cindoglu and Zencirci 2008). However, within the security practices of the military, even private and individualized forms of religious practices have come under scrutiny as potential indicators of “Islamist” politics or identities. For example, Mukerrem (46), the wife of an expelled CO and the sister of one who also was expelled from the military, said:

My brother, when he was in military school ... they start examining people early as then. Before, it wasn’t that tight. Later on they started checking the crease in people’s trousers even, if it is flattened, then it means that person does daily prayers. For example, he goes to the washroom, he is going to roll up his sleeves to wash hands or his trousers to keep clean, if he starts like this [demonstrating with her hands], they say “Ahha! This guy is used to performing ablution.” (August 16, 2011)

The time period that Mukerrem mentions is the mid-1990s, when the first Islamist political party came to power in a coalition government. As I discussed in Chapter 1, when Islamist political parties came to power, the military stiffened its security procedures and intensified profiling activities for potential “Islamists”. Part of what I identify as precautionary form of risk governance in this research, military candidates were observed as per the form and frequency of their religious practice, which is perceived as a potential for that person to become an extremist. As Mukerrem’s account suggests, even if an individual tries to hide his daily prayers and conducts them in privacy, he is still traced and identified through evidence on his body and dress.
Most of my respondents, who were expelled from the military or forced to resign for being an “Islamist”, indicate that if they practiced daily prayer rituals, it would be recorded in their personnel files. Likewise, attendance at communal Friday prayers at the mosque is also cause for documentation. Several respondents indicate that they specifically refrained from attending Friday prayers at a mosque because they knew there would be an intelligence officer who would make a list of the attending officers.

Questioning the reason why individuals were blacklisted for practising daily prayers or Friday prayers, or just because of their wives’ headscarves leads us to question another dimension of the conceptualization of risk through excess. My research participants, who identified as “secularist”, particularly assert that performing religious practice could never be the sole reason for profiling personnel as “Islamist”. A secularist identified retired navy officer for example insisted: “If a person is blacklisted, there must be other reasons too.” This is a rationale that perceives excess and deviance either in isolation or through combination of a number of risk factors, the most evident of which is women’s headscarves. If an officer’s wife is wearing a “political” headscarf, and if he is a successful high-ranking officer with the potential to reach higher status in the military structure, and if he at the same time socializes with other potentially “Islamist” individuals, all these factors are considered in concert. Aysen (48, wife of forced-retire CO) for example, suggested that her headscarf was always a factor that kept them under scrutiny, but surveillance got harsher for her family when they socialized with other families where women wore headscarves. Thus, while having either one of these evidences might be manageable with constant monitoring, a combination of a few is considered excessive and a likely reason for expulsion from the military.
Religious Spaces within the Military

The profiling of military personnel based on religious practice is apparent in debates about the availability of religious spaces within the military. These debates reveal not only the attitude of the military towards the public representation and practice of religion, but also the understandings of what constitutes a “proper” or “normal” form of religious observance. Religious space in this context refers to mosques and mescits (prayer rooms), which are intended for either officers and their families or conscript soldiers. In our conversation, Sami (60), an “Islamist”-labelled retired CO, said that there remain a few religious prayer spaces within military compounds. However, he adds that they could only have been constructed long before the February 1997 military intervention after which securitization of religious identities became a lot stricter. He also adds that regardless of their availability, “it requires [for people] some courage to go there”. A few other former officers also support this statement by saying that religious spaces within the military were either abandoned or rendered inactive at the height of securitization of religious identities.54

On the other hand, military wives and personnel who identify with the secularist stance of the military take a position of defence and argue that the absence or scarcity of religious spaces is due to lack of attendance rather than the military’s securitization of religious identities. This position is frequently backed by the argument that a “true” believer does not need to physically go into a mosque, but can conduct his or her prayer in any place that is intended as a space for

54 As I inquired through my interviews with the military personnel (expelled or retired) and in the official documentation to which I had access, there is no standard procedure or criteria for providing a religious space within military zones.
prayer. For example, in our conversation, Gulseren (61), a “secularist” wife of a retired CO, explained how her family preferred to pray within the comfort of their own home, even though there was a mosque in the military base where her family lived. Even though they identify as secularist, Gulseren and her family still carry out religious practices, yet they prefer to do it privately.

The discrepancy between these perspectives and experiences stem from the non-standardized and arbitrary implementation of security regulations within the military on the one hand, and from competing interpretations and adaptations of secularist and religious discourses, on the other. Similar to debates over the headscarf I discuss in the previous chapter in terms of its necessity, the practice of going to a mosque is also interpreted as another “redundant” and “archaic” form of religiosity, the use of which needs to be revised. From this particularly “secularist” perspective, since the intended purpose of going to a mosque is for conducting prayers, it might as well be substituted with other spaces for the same purpose, private space in this case. On the other hand, a religious discourse confronts this vision by emphasizing the social functions of the mosque (as in Friday prayers, communal Quran readings or religious holiday celebrations), and the value of praying in a mosque. From this perspective, as indicated by my participants, going to a mosque is a necessity that cannot always be substituted by praying in private space. For example, the Friday prayer is set as a form of prayer that has to be carried out in a mosque, based on the particular understanding of Sunni Islam. The same argument goes also for performance of any other daily prayer, and that individuals should feel free to go to a mosque if they want to.
However, as I previously discussed, the conflict regarding the “proper” form and place of religious practice is rooted in the way religion is constructed through secularism. The value of the mosque as a space for social gathering and interaction falls beyond the function it is assigned according to the “secularist” interpretation of Islam. The social functions of the mosque are perceived as a form of transgression over the boundaries of secular/religious divide and procure the public conduct of daily prayers as a form of deviance and therefore a risk to secularism.

Risk awareness towards public forms of religion is best exemplified by one of my respondents, who told me about two of her neighbours, two military colonels, who live in the same apartment building. Emel (28, daughter of retired CO) said: “Even though they are good neighbours who talk and socialize regularly, these two officers never talked to each other and they never walked together when they attended Friday prayers in the same mosque.” (April 18, 2011) This example demonstrates that consciousness over the “proper” place of religion is strongly incorporated into understandings of risk within the military, and that even the individual performance of religious practice can be considered a “potential” risk that needs to be carefully managed. According to this view, religious practice needs to be conducted in isolation and privately even if it is in public, because it can easily become risky once it turns into a mechanism for social affiliation and interaction in public.

**Broad Based Surveillance and Security Practices**

As I have so far demonstrated, the Turkish military deliberately looks for the “reactionary/Islamist” officer in its internal security procedures by seeking his deviance from the
“secular and modern” subjectivity. This requires a set of security practices that would operate within a broad field of conceptual uncertainty and over the whole military community to trace the incipient potentials that individuals possess. This form of secular risk governance opens every aspect of an officer’s life to interrogation and observation, for which a multiplicity of actors needed to be commissioned across formal and informal spheres. The most common form of securitization is a house visit, which, as I explored in Chapter 1, itemizes what constitutes significant information to detect and confirm the status of an officer as “risky”.

House visits, however, do not always have an official character and they are not always carried out in a systematic way. Such visits could take place either as official visits by the military personnel, or as friendly social interactions between neighbours, as well as through use of illegal techniques, such as breaking in to people’s houses. For example, Aysen (48, wife of force-retired CO) said:

I used to make point lace at home. The wife of the regiment commander and the wife of the intelligence officer used to come to my house just to look at my point laces. I told them “There is no need for you to come. I can bring it in.” They were like “No, no! We want to come and check your house too.” They used to search for stuff in the house you know. If I have trinkets, or praying carpets, or Quran... I told them once that I have two Qurans in the library there, and praying carpets...everything. They were like, “Oh we really love you. Don’t get us wrong. We don’t want anything bad to happen to you. We cannot control everything. Be careful, they might come search your house.” (May 5, 2011)

As she was warned, one day she came home and found muddy prints of soldier boots, all the way from the bathroom window and around the house. Melek (44, wife of force-retired CO) also gave me an example of her friend’s case of another break in to a “suspicious” officer’s house for evidence collection. She says: “When they were on vacation for 20 days, they broke in and searched the house. They have such rights. Even the Quran is an evidence for them, and praying
carpets, praying scarves...” (April 14, 2011) Through such intrusions into people’s private spheres, the military collects evidence of what is, or what might become, a risk to the secular construction of military spaces.

In addition to such intrusions, random drop-ins are also part of the security practices in which military wives were heavily involved. In Latife’s (48) experience as the wife of an “Islamist”-labelled CO who was expelled from the military, even when they were living outside of the military base, her husband’s colleague’s wives used to drop in without notice. She says: “Even when I said I am not available, she would insist and pressure me that I should at least offer her a cup of tea, and that I was being rude and so... But I knew what they were after. Everybody like me was going through similar things” (June 22, 2011). These narratives portray the complexity of security mechanisms that the military has employed to identify and control the “suspicious” and potentially “Islamist” personnel. Since the potentiality of being an Islamist resides in the minute details of everyday life, it becomes a necessity to inculcate military wives in to security practices within the broader frames of friendly and neighbourly relations.

Whether it takes place formally by the officers or informally by their wives, the house visits function to itemize every detail of an officer’s life that might give away his “Islamist” tendencies and potentials. My participants, who are considered as “suspicious” indicate that when people came over to their houses, they paid attention to a number of things such as: the brand names of consumption materials or major appliances, if they are from a line of Islamic businesses, pieces of art and decorative material they use; whether they have any alcoholic beverages in the house (which is perceived as unusual for an Islamist person); books and other
print materials as per their topics and their relevance to Islamist politics; and also presence of prayer accessories, such as praying carpets, beads, or relevant clothing.

Besides the material evidence, the “suspicious” officer and his family’s behaviour are also monitored and tested in terms of their capacity for “secular” and “modern” forms of sociability. As I also explored in the previous chapter, secularism requires the regulation of sexual relations in public not by segregating spaces but through control over behaviour. Thus, men and women are expected to socialize together to demonstrate that they are not constrained by religious principles and they are ruled by reason, which is an indication of their “secular” and “modern” capacities. A number of participants indicate that when officers and their wives come over for a visit they specifically observed if the officer’s headscarved wife is able to socialize in a mixed-gendered space. For example, in Sonay’s (47, wife of expelled CO, April 27, 2011) experience, when the officials figured out that they practiced gender segregation in their visit, their expulsion followed shortly after. Because the practice of gender-segregation is considered as another form of “backward” and “excessive” form of religiosity that structures people’s social interactions away from the demands of secular modernity.

Aysen’s (48, wife of force-retired CO) account of their efforts to balance the perception of her family as “Islamist” and a risk to the military due to her “political” headscarf also demonstrates the logic of the security practices of the military and show how they operate in combining several risk factors. Aysen says that in order to alleviate the pressures and to divert the suspicions regarding their “Islamist” identity, they always remained very active and kept good relations within the military community. She says that she and her husband had “very good social skills that could win people’s hearts”; and to compensate for her “fault” of wearing a
headscarf, they always attended dinner parties and social gatherings as active members of the community. They socialized so as to demonstrate that they are adaptable guests who can make pleasant conversation with a range of different people and are not constrained by a religious lifestyle. Aysen adds that they also took precautions and acted discreetly about their religious beliefs and practices. For example, they instructed their children to say that their parents are “doing sports” rather than doing prayers at home, if anyone inquired. By combining these identity management strategies and demonstrating their ability in engaging in “modern” and “secular” forms of sociability, Aysen’s husband was able to delay expulsion and retire on a military pension.

Other forms of testing take place to measure people’s level of “secular” and “modern” character. In Aysen’s (48, wife of force-retired CO) experience, her tolerance and her ability to deal with “modern” or “non-Islamic” forms of dress was measured in a social gathering. She said that at a social gathering to her house at the military lodgings, the intelligence officer’s wife walked in with a very short mini-skirt, even though it was a snowy and cold day. Aysen says:

She came in like that and I said “Oh hottie! It suits you so well” and I spanked her. “How beautiful you look!” Et cetera. Her legs were really beautiful. [Laughing] I don’t wear things like that but I spanked her ass, “Wow nice!” You know. Later on she told me she went to her husband and said that I am not that kind of a person. (May 5, 2011)

In this process, Aysen, as a woman who wears a “political” headscarf, is tested to reveal if her headscarf and her religious practices constitute an impediment for her to socialize with those who are not like her. Moreover, her perceived “deviance”, that is her headscarf, is confronted by another deviance, that is the miniskirt. This way the military observes if she can be accommodated into the moral sexual order of the military and handle a situation that remains outside the Islamic sexual order that she is perceived to belong to. Similar to the observations on
the practice of gender segregation, observations are also made as to whether an officer would shake hands with other women. Such security and surveillance practices aim to gauge the ability of individuals to integrate into “secular” and modern” environments, and evaluate if their religious belief influenced their everyday interactions.

Pressuring and Controlling Religious Identities

As a precautionary form of risk governance, the Turkish military’s security practices also work to pressure and transform individuals, and thereby recuperate the risk they pose towards the secular construction of military spaces. As I explored in the previous chapter, a woman’s headscarf is a major criterion for the detection of the “risky” officer. In this section, I demonstrate that, due to its outstanding significance, the headscarf becomes a major pressure point whereby religious/risky identities addressed and aimed to be recuperated. That is to say, military wives who wear “political” headscarves have been forced to change the way they wear it or remove it completely, or threatened to be expelled from the military if not. In some cases, the military officials, generals and intelligence officers, approached these women directly to take off their headscarves. Aysen’s (48, wife of force-retired CO) case is an excellent illustration of how pressure is applied through a house visit. She says:

One day they [the officers] came again... The general said, “Look Aysen hanim, you are being a bad example to your surroundings. You are encouraging other people to dress like this. We know you. You are good people. We don’t want to hurt you. But you need to take off your headscarf. Do you want your husband to be kicked out of the military? Don’t you think of your kids’ future? Why don’t you, just now, go and take off your headscarf, and comb your hair and come here.” (May 5, 2011)
As this narrative demonstrates, with her religious dress Aysen’s body represents religion outside the confines defined by Turkish secularism and it fails to conform to the ideal construction of “modern”, “secular” and “rational” subjectivity. Similar to Aysen’s experience, various other participants indicate that they were frequently pressured to change their style of dress. Such pressure was either through direct verbal command, or as in the experience of many, in the form of denial of their right to have military ID and health cards. Various participants indicated that military officials would frequently refuse to print pictures for identification cards unless they presented a photo without a headscarf.

These pressures also take place informally through the semi-formal and hierarchic relationship between military wives in the form of intimidation and bullying. Wives and even children of officers are informally ranked amongst themselves based on their husband’s rank, whereby the wife of the highest-ranking officer is authorized to organize social events such as tea parties, house visits and cocktails. Like everyone else, headscarved wives are told that they are expected to join and actively participate in the social circles and events, on the other hand, they are made clear that they cannot present themselves as they are, and that they need to change. Suna’s (36, wife of expelled CO) narrative tells a lot about how these mechanisms work to pressure individuals to either to transform their religious embodiment or exclude them from the military spaces entirely. Suna says:

I used to receive invitations. Verbally, they were telling me that at this hour tonight there is a cocktail at that place. There is a meeting. I would like to go! I would like to help them too. But if they are not going to let me in because of my headscarf, if they are not going to let me through the gates, or if I have to take off my headscarf … I won’t be able even help myself, let alone helping others. I wished people accepted me as I am. (April 17, 2011)

Her husband adds:
I was working at a large garrison. There were many people under my command. There were socials. When I didn’t show up with my wife, they asked me, “Where is your wife? You should have brought her.” But, when we go together, she won’t be able to enter at the gates. [Laughs.] (April 17, 2011)

As in Suna’s experience, headscarved women can be isolated in various ways through social exclusion, objectification and the power of the gaze. Aysen (48, wife of force-retired CO) tells me about the first time she attended a tea party, an experience that resonates with Suna’s:

They told my husband that they would start an investigation on him if I don’t go to that gathering. It was like two months after we got married. I said, “Okay, I will go.” We went to the place. The guard said, “Sorry Madam, you cannot enter!” It’s because the wife of the commander general has already entered. As if she is the headliner. My husband said, “It’s OK, it does not matter, let her enter,” and then I went in. I mean I tried first. I tried to open that door, which was kind of weird. One of those old accordion doors. I shook the door. It made a lot of noise. When I opened it, everyone was looking at me. I blushed so much! Everyone is looking at me and no one said a word! I walked in not knowing what to do. (May 5, 2011)

As in Aysen’s experience, securitization of “Islamist” identities take place through various social mechanisms that pressure individuals to transform themselves to accommodate to “secular” and “modern” normative expectations of dress and comportment.

Children are not exempt from social pressures imposed on “Islamist” identities. Burcu (22), who is the daughter of an “Islamist”-labelled force-retired CO, told me about how she felt pressured at high school by her teachers who were “secularist” identified military wives. She told me how her teacher at school used to talk to her to convince her mother to remove her headscarf. She said:

They even try to convince you against your mother. It was very upsetting. They say ‘your father is going to be expelled, you will not be able to get a job in the state’s offices, you will be influenced by this, even your husband may not want you because of this’. (May 5, 2011)
Burcu talked further about how her friends at school also became part of this scheme. Such securitizing and regulatory mechanisms, which inculcate officers’ children, are proof of the extent and the reach of security practices which seep in to social spheres and everyday relations.

**Disciplinary Mechanisms and Self-regulation**

Pervasive risk awareness and security practices against the risk of Islamism trickle down to daily lives and spaces of the military community as well. The construction of “secular” and “modern” subjectivities is enforced through diffuse disciplinary practices that regulated individuals in terms of their dress and bodily representation, as well as codes of social interaction and lifestyle. The truth regime established in the military’s secularist security discourse defines what “true” and “proper” Islam is and it constitutes a disciplinary mechanism according to which individuals regulate themselves and each other. These “modern” and “secular” identities become also highly sensitized and vigilant towards presumably excessive and risky manifestations of religion.

The outstanding and visible place of women’s headscarves within the security processes of the military also exposes women to various forms of official and social pressures to remove their headscarves, which many of them have done. The transformations headscarved women are willing to undertake are interpreted in different ways. On the one hand, removing one’s headscarf is portrayed as a sacrifice made for the career of their husbands and children. On the other hand, it is portrayed as a form of “liberation” from an “oppressive” patriarchal practice. For example, Lale (45) who is the “secularist” identified wife of a retired NCO gives example of her friends who removed their headscarves:
A directive was sent from the office of Chief of General Staff to all those closed families, to take off their headscarves. I had many friends who wore the headscarf, in many different ways. They just opened up...I think they always wanted to open up. They started wearing short sleeves. (May 9, 2011)

For Lale the transformation process is unidirectional, involving women complying when requested to do so. For other women, however, dropping the headscarf has been a more complex process; it involved more than just taking off a headscarf in response to military official directives.

For example, Nesrin’s (50, wife of force-retired CO) experience with removing her headscarf tells more about the complexity and multiplicity of the regulatory and disciplinary processes that drew on her religious embodiment. Nesrin was one of those who were labelled as Islamist due to her headscarf, which she eventually took off in order not to be expelled from the military. In her narrative, she indicates that in her decision she had personal conflict between the security of her children’s future and her personal integrity and her faith, and she did not do it due to pressures from her social circles. However, once she took off her headscarf her friends suddenly became more appreciative and inclusive, and started making tacit suggestions to her for further transformations to her body and her dress. Nesrin says:

When I first took off my headscarf, I went to my next-door neighbour and I told her that I finally did it. She was the wife of the commander. She said “Well done. You did the right thing for your children’s future.” Of course she is going to say that. What else to say? And then she said: “Let me give you a blouse and one of my two-piece suits.” She gave, and I wore it. And then we went to the tea party. (May 12, 2011)

As in Nesrin’s example, taking off the headscarf is never an isolated act. Rather it is part of a larger process of conforming to a different secular sexual and moral order. As evidenced in
Nesrin’s experience, a new form of dress and style that were deemed “more modern” were imposed.

Taking off the headscarf is just the beginning of transformations that takes place as a chain reaction and it disciplines bodies for further self-regulation. “It never stops there” is a common refrain. These women try to accommodate their bodies and their comportment into an order that demands further transformations. For example, Gungor (45, wife of expelled CO) told me her observation of those women who took off their headscarves as follows:

When you take off the headscarf, you know, the hair gives you away. It looks like she just opened up and came in. It is not done or anything. Looks very simple. The other ones have their hair dyed and blow dried and so. This one’s look sticky...you know they later on started getting their hair done too. But you cannot also just go without any make up. Then they started putting on slight makeup…and then short sleeves and so on…it goes on like that. (June 21, 2011)

Aysen (48, wife of force-retired CO) and Melek (44, wife of force-retired CO) also make similar observations, concluding that taking off the headscarf is just the beginning of a process to train bodies to use of alcohol or to inhabit mixed gendered space, that is to incorporate them into a new life style. As Aysen says:

After you open your head55 and go to dinners and so...then they ask, “Why does not she dance with her husband?” They receive warning or they feel the pressure...and then they start dancing. And in the end, they send alcohol to the table. Then you are tested if you are able to drink. This happened a lot of times. (May 5, 2011)

As all of these experiences demonstrate, the security practices work to both identify the “Islamists” and also transform and recuperate them into “safe”, that is “modern” and “secular” subjectivities. Security procedures are amalgamated with mechanisms of social control and

55 Opening one’s head is a common reference for taking of the headscarf.
discipline, which, either pressure individuals directly, or surround them closely so that they end up disciplining and transforming themselves. Individuals who are considered as a risk are tested in terms of their willingness to give up on their religious attachments and their ability to participate in mixed gendered spaces in a “modern” outfit, and if they are able to indulge in habits such as alcohol consumption that are discouraged in Islam.

The pervasiveness of risk technologies that target “Islamism” also discipline individuals to become more open and more transparent about their private sphere. As a headscarved woman, Nesrin (50, wife of force-retired CO) says she always felt she was under constant surveillance within the military. As she, and other women who went through similar processes, indicate, the prevalence of such regulatory mechanisms forced them to be open and be transparent about their private lives and homes. Nesrin says:

When you close yourself down, they grow more suspicious. They think, “This one is not mingling with us, so she must be thinking of something, planning something. What does she do in her house? How is her house? What does she hang on her walls?” They become curious. But when you open your door and welcome them in…For example, they used to search every corner in our house. Even in our bedroom. We are like: “We don’t have anything to hide. Come and see!” They used to check our books and stuff. (May 12, 2011)

As is evidenced in this quotation, being open and transparent in all facets of one’s life has rapidly become a norm to which many personnel and their families feel forced to comply. Such disclosure of privacy transforms individuals’ everyday behaviour in significant ways that limit religious prayer or activity into smaller spheres. Aysen (48, wife of force-retired CO), for example, was reported to the officials once because she was reading a religious text in her own living room. The military lodging where she lived was on the ground floor and, unless the curtains were drawn, people could see in. She says: “Somebody reported me for leading irticai
[reactionary] activities in my own living room, can you believe that?” (May 5, 2011) Aysen’s account indicates the pervasiveness of a mistrustful culture of spying on one another. Such intrusions into individual privacy lead to complete awareness and care regarding religious activities in private sphere and shape them in significant ways.

Similarly, individuals who identify as “secularist” also feel the need to monitor and regulate their religious activities even though they are not in the immediate risk radar of the military. Hanife (61) is the wife of a retired navy officer who identifies as secularist; she does not wear religious clothing or a headscarf but she is a pious person who practices her faith. She told me that her son was born when they were living in military lodgings, and she did not want to hold the Quran reading ceremony in her house in the military base (April 13, 2011). Even though she was not considered “suspicous” (şüpheli) due to her “modern” outlook, she acted with caution given the security agenda of the military. Such experience also coincides with Gungor’s (45, wife of expelled CO) recounting of her friend who still does her daily prayers in her bedroom with the door locked, even 15 years after they were expelled from the military (see Chapter 6). All of these examples demonstrate how a sense of insecurity can be created through secular risk governance, in ways can permeate all aspects of a person’s life, invading their privacy and imposing significant transformation in religious embodiment and comportment.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have explored how Turkish secularism constructs the risk of Islamism as a form of social governance within the context of secular governmentality. I examined how sexual and corporeal constructions of security and risk are operationalized within a wide and complex set of
security practices that I call secular risk governance. Tracing the notions of “excess” and “deviance” across the secular/religious divide, I demonstrated how secular risk governance mobilizes diverse and heterogeneous sets of security practices in institutional levels that merge with disciplinary and self-regulatory discourses in everyday life. I argued that within the context of the Turkish military, the risk of Islamism emerges as a form of social governance that functions within the discursive sphere of secular governmentality to protect modern sovereignty by micro-managing and surveying subjectivities and spaces.

I grounded my analysis within the framework of critical security studies to explore the discursive and contextual constructions of security and risk. Embedded within a hegemonic secularist paradigm where concepts of secular and religious are mapped onto security and risk respectively, security mechanisms and encompassing regulations are mobilized across institutional levels. With the confidential security document that I analyzed at the beginning of the chapter, I demonstrated the systematic effort that the military has undertaken in the face of the risk of Islamism. Routine security procedures, called “background security checks” constituted the premium example of securitization of religious identities through extensive surveillance mechanisms that look for “excessive” and “deviant” forms of religious practice. Pivoting around the epitomized figure of the Islamic headscarf, as I explored more deeply in Chapter 4, security mechanisms expand and surround individuals’ lives in order to capture the potentials that might pose a risk to secularism.

In furthering my analysis of the risk of Islamism within the Turkish military, I draw on risk-based security research that incorporates Foucault’s analysis of modern power and governmentality. Formulating risk as a form of social governance, these studies highlight the
deep-rooted connection between the security agendas of the nation-state and the governmental regimes that operate as security apparatuses to protect modern sovereignty. Religion emerges as a form of risk that necessitates secular social governance that operates across social and institutional spaces. The risk of Islamism governs multiple spheres that range from the way individuals dress or decorate their houses to attendance to public prayers. It constructs a self-regulatory and self-disciplinary discursive sphere where subjectivities and spaces come to meet the demands of secularism governmentality.

I demonstrate how risk merges with secular governmentality across institutional and mundane realms to safeguard modern sovereignty by maintaining secular subjectivities and spaces. Based on the establishment of secularism as the core principle of modern sovereignty, securitization of religious identities become synonymous with the protection of the modern nation-state. Even though it is a traditional security actor, the Turkish military protects secularism through novel security practices to establish secularism as a political and cultural framework that is inhabited by “secular” and “modern” bodies.
Chapter 6

SECULAR INSTABILITIES AND ANXIETIES: EMOTIONAL AND CORPOREAL GEOGRAPHIES OF THE MILITARY BASE

Introduction

There is a psychological war. You live in it constantly. Even though they do not tell you “do this, do that” you feel the pressure. Constantly you feel the weight, the constant gaze directed upon on you. Your actions are being examined, the way you walk. You get the feeling like that. For example, when I first went to Balikesir, I was just a young girl. I did not know anything about nothing. They used to tease out lots sorts of things from whatever I say. You do not even know what to talk about (Gungor, 45 wife of expelled CO, June 21, 2011).

The quotation above is a response given to a question I posed of what it felt like to live on a military base being labelled as an “Islamist”. Gungor, now a lawyer working for the municipality of Istanbul, had previously lived on several military bases as the wife of an air force officer. Her husband was eventually expelled from the military. The experiences and feelings she conveys are closely connected to her headscarf, her religiously dressed body and her family’s non-discrete observance of Islam, which made them subject to strict scrutiny within the military. As I explored in previous chapters, within the context of the risk of Islamism security and risk are defined sexually and corporeally along the fault lines of the secular and religious dichotomy. Most conspicuously pivoted around the headscarved body, security and risk are operationalized as a form of secular social governance that regulates and disciplines individuals across official and everyday levels and within the parameters of secular governmentality. As revealed in Gungor’s narrative as well as the stories of others categorized as Islamist or who self-identify as
secularist, security regulations and surveillance mechanisms that crosshatch the spaces of the military give corporeal and emotional content to the ways in which the religious/secular dichotomy is lived and reproduced daily.

In this chapter, I explore the construction of military spaces through emotions and corporeality. I analyze stories of women who were labelled as “Islamists” like Gungor, and others who were pushed into the category of the “secularist”, as the narratives of inclusion and exclusion that constitute the everyday geographies of secularism. In these narratives, I tease out the particular moments when the secular/religious dichotomy is reproduced in everyday life and consider how it becomes either more distinct or blurry based on its emotional and corporeal foundations. I aim to reveal how secularism constructs spaces emotionally and corporeally via arrangement of bodies in space and their proximity to each other.

In my theoretical framing, I draw on corporeal and emotional geographies to challenge the very rationalist grounds through which secularism has been perceived to operate discursively. Focusing on corporeal and emotional experiences, I tease out the spatial segmentations and bodily calibrations that secularism forfeits in carving out secular bodyscapes. In doing so, I join the scholarship that holds a non-objectifying view of emotions and perceives them “as relational flows, fluxes or currents, in-between people and places rather than ‘things’ or ‘objects’ to be studied or measured” (Bondi, Davidson, and Smith 2007, 3). I draw on Sara Ahmed’s (2004b; 2004a) scholarship and conceptualize emotions as performances in that they establish the boundaries they seem to presuppose (Scharff 2011). I explore how “emotions shape the very surface of our bodies through repetition of acts overtime, as well as through orientation towards
and away from others” (Ahmed 2004b, 4) while they secure a social hierarchy, defining what is higher and what is lower through bodily traits and dispositions (Ahmed 2004b, 4).

I merge my critical focus on the spatiality of emotions and corporeality with post-structuralist approaches to secularism (Asad 2003; Connolly 2000). As I explored in Chapter 3, secularism establishes its legitimacy through denial of emotions and corporeality based on a rationalist paradigm and the superiority of mind over the body (Hirschkind 2011; Connolly 2000; Howe 2009). Therefore an emotional and corporeal approach to secularism reveals the conceptual volatilities and instabilities of the secular and religious dichotomy behind its discursive rigidity. I join Agrama (2010a) in arguing that the corporeally and emotionally constructed ambiguities and instabilities of secularism also constitute the reason for the problems in the practical separation of religion from politics. I explore the complex ways in which the concepts of secularism are always already “suffused with affects, sensibilities, and anxieties that mobilize and are mobilized by power” (Agrama 2010b, 500) and demonstrate how secularism operates to secure state power by actively blurring and then reinstating the distinction between politics and religion.

I situate myself within the security scholarship that problematizes the existence of a normative security paradigm that is circumscribed with the conceptual boundaries of secularism (Hurd 2007; Mavelli 2013; Gutkowski 2011). Drawing on risk-based approaches, I explore the social construction of security and risk through mobilization of fears and anxieties (Isin 2004; Hyndman 2007) and demonstrate how emotions and bodies are constituted within a secularist security discourse. I introduce emotions and corporeality to my analysis of security and risk to understand how they are superimposed over secular and religious dichotomy within the context
of the risk of Islamism. I reveal instantiations of what Gungor (45, wife of expelled CO) described as: “the gaze directed on you”, “the weight you feel” in these spaces, and “the meanings teased out from your words” in the corporeal and emotional constructions of military spaces as contested spaces. In particular, I demonstrate how these everyday encounters, experiences and intensities shape and are shaped by the conceptual and corporeal “instabilities and indeterminacies” (Agrama 2010b, 500) that secularism imposes in the making of the secular bodyscapes of the Turkish military.

In what follows, I first explore pride as a form of emotion that resonates with the notion of propriety of the “secularist” military wife and countering feelings of loss and exclusion that surround the “Islamist” military wife. I then move to examine how the categories of secular and religious are constructed corporeally and emotionally by looking at women’s experiences with the Islamic headscarf. I demonstrate how the secular/religious dichotomy is challenged in terms of its clarity and rigidity through vagueness and ambiguities that are produced at the level of the female body and emotions in everyday encounters. Then I show how vagueness and ambiguities play out in the institutional regulations of the military and operate to further create emotional and corporeal discordances between people and push them further to opposite sides of the secular/religious spectrum. I conclude with an exploration of how emotional geographies in their construction of fears and anxieties are rooted in secularism’s ambiguities based on construction of religion as “out of place” (Cresswell 1996) and construction of space through what I define as “bodily calibrations”.

Pride and Propriety: The Secularist Military Wife

Consideration of the category of the “proper” military wife, as to how she is expected to behave and appear in public, is where I start my analysis of the emotional and corporeal geographies of the military base. Pride, as a feeling of respect or importance for oneself or the sense of being better, is the primary form of emotion that comes to the fore when I inquired the category of the “proper” military wife. As I explored in previous chapters, the “proper” military wife is defined primarily through her secular outlook and lifestyle, which places significant emphasis on being “modern-but-modest”. While the ideal military wife does not adopt religious dress or a headscarf, she makes claims to modesty and sexual morality by not dressing revealingly and by regulating her social behaviour in public space. Such propriety is strongly associated also with patriotism and being able to sacrifice oneself, or one’s own career, for the husband’s “sacred duty”.

“Proper” military wives narrated a sense of comfort with their identities such that they felt confident with their bodies and comportment that falls in line with the secularist political stance and regulations of the military. There is an established sentiment of pride that just by being themselves they exercise being “secular” and “modern” in their daily lives and become compatriots in serving the military to safeguard secularism. The construction of propriety is primarily positioned against the notion of the “Islamist” military wife and the secular risk governance that surrounds her religiously dressed body and sexuality. The construction of secularist pride and feelings of contentment combined with patriotism in serving the military are most clearly reflected in the reactions of women who were labelled as “Islamists”. Melek (44), wife of an officer who was forced to retire from the military, observed and lived through these
emotional components as they operate in her everyday life. In our conversation Melek said that in her social circle she was constantly confronted with the prejudices, which defined her as “Islamist” and made her the target of a security agenda:

One day one of those women said, “My family is very rich; we own farms and stuff but I have a mission in this military. We are staying here just because of that mission. Otherwise we do not need this salary to live on.” They are both Alevi and from a leftist background you know.\textsuperscript{56} It is just to not leave the place to right-wingers and Islamists. She designed such a mission for herself. Can you believe that? (April 14, 2011)

As reflected in Melek’s experience, being “secularist” provide women a sense of entitlement to use their bodies as tools in support of the mission of the military to protect secularism. However, she talked about this anecdote as an expression of her disappointment and frustration because she, as a headscarved woman, was at the target of it and she was left out of any patriotic mission due to her perceived incompatibility with secularism. Another participant, Suna (36), who is the “Islamist”-labelled headscarved wife of an expelled CO, also expressed to me similar feelings. She said that during their limited time in the military, she was constantly judged by the larger community due to her dress style and she was left out of social occasions since she was perceived as a “misfit” (April 17, 2011).

As such, the “Islamist” military wife’s experiences are constituted of negative emotions in which being objectified and excluded preside. She is perceived to be “lacking the capacity to represent” her husband or the military because she does not have a “proper outlook”, as it also appeared in the personnel records of their husbands or in verbal comments they received from military officials (“Paşa Evime Kadar Geldi Eşiime ‘Başımt Aç’ Dedi - Yenisafak.com.tr” 2015).

\textsuperscript{56} Alevi/Alevism is the most common form of Shia Islam in Turkey. With their religious practices, which significantly diverge from most Sunni traditions, Alevi have been perceived to have a more compatible lifestyle with secularism (Dressler 2011).
Having to go through multiple security regulations and surveillance mechanisms at official and everyday levels, “Islamist”-labeled women’s experiences are primarily shaped by the attention to their failure in “properly” inhabiting mixed-gendered spaces in public and not dressing “appropriate” to the place and time. In contrast to the “secularist” women who use their bodies as tools for the mission of the military, “Islamist”-labelled women are discouraged due to their religious embodiment and they are pushed out of military spaces with feelings of loss, sadness and deprivation. As I elaborate in the following section, the construction of military spaces along these emotional and corporeal intensities are based on distinct categorizations of the secular and religious, in which the outstanding visibility of religious embodiment as opposed to secular embodiment comes to the fore.

**Contested Visibility of Religious Embodiment**

As I discussed in Chapter 4, wearing or not wearing a headscarf and the particular style of the headscarf (which is deemed either as “political”, tightly worn with a pin and bonnet, or “traditional”) have been, in most cases, the visible marker and the measure of the blunt distinction between “secularist” and “Islamist” bodies. These distinctions, and the security agenda that surround them, construct the particular emotional and corporeal geographies of the base in ways that further reproduce and polarize these distinctions. In this section, I explore the complex formations of the secular and religious through contestations over religious embodiment in public.
As a reaction to the overtly embodied forms of religiosity, which in this case is the adoption of the headscarf and religious dress, most “secularist” identified women in my research emphasized alternative forms of religious embodiment. In opposition to wearing a headscarf which is perceived as a visible bodily practice, “secularist” identified women emphasized the strength of inner belief. Common to their argument is the emphasis for preference for modest dress and decent sexual behaviour supported with a spiritual dedication, which does not need to be displayed or proven with “a piece of clothing”, that is the headscarf (see also Chapter 4). I conceptualize this kind of religious attachment as secular embodiment. Akin to Fadil’s (2011, 102) discussion of “non-veiling” as an ethical practice among Maghrebi Muslims in Belgium, I engage with “secularist” identified women’s dress choices as an ethical and corporeal practice that cannot be grasped solely through the secular/religious dichotomy of liberal secularism.

This idea first occurred to me during a conversation I had with Aydan (62) “secularist” identified wife of a retired NCO on a public transit bus. As we discussed my research, she pointed with her head towards the young headscarved students standing in front of us and said: “You know... I was thinking of closing up57 myself after my husband gets retired. But now I have changed my mind. One open counts.” (March 17, 2011) By saying that she meant that despite her desire to resort to Islamic clothing as a religious practice and a form of modesty, she will not because she does not want to be perceived as part of the “Islamist” camp. According to her, being open is an active and bodily enactment of secular politics. She further added that in this given political situation, where “religion has become a toy for political ends”, not putting on a headscarf is the form of action, and almost a political statement against Islamism. Despite her

57 Closing up or opening up are the terms used with specific reference to adopting religious clothing or abandoning it.
religious belief and desire to wear headscarf, she chooses to not wear it as a bodily enactment of secularism, as an attachment to the “progressive” route of modernity and to guarantee religious freedoms.

Association of religious attachment or devotion with not adopting religious clothing and concealment of certain religious practices is a common narrative shared by “secularist” identified women. With Nurgul (57), who is the wife of a retired NCO, we talked about religion and her life in the military. She stated that she has grown increasingly concerned about the “Islamist takeover of public space and politics” over the past decades with rise of Islamist political parties. Nurgul affiliates public display of religion only with “ politicized religion” and holds a strong view of how “true” Islam needs to be lived:

For one thing, I believe religion, politics and the military should be separate things. Religion belongs to the person himself/herself. Why would I have to become a member of a group or a tarikat? Why would I need to put a mediator between Allah and me? I do not necessarily do five times daily prayers either. Maybe I am a very, very good person. Maybe I am filling in the gap through that? If you bring these things inside the military, then you are not considered as a Muslim, if you are not part of tarikat or do the daily prayers. Hey! Who knows if I am a Muslim or not? Being a Muslim is not about covering or not covering your head. It is something between a person’s conscience, her heart and Allah. This is how I believe. (March 12, 2011)

Her emphasis on the meaning of religion as something related to the heart and to the conscience is accompanied by denial of visibly embodied forms of devotion and attachment. What makes these women like Nurgul “secularist” is not necessarily their attachment to the ideals of scientific rationality of modernity, but their negative relation to the visibly embodied forms of religion in public space.
Such “invisible” embodiment of religion by secularist-identified women is also accompanied with evident emotions of pride and confidence that delegitimizes those who embody religion visibly. Nermin (60), a retired teacher and the wife of a retired NCO explains:

While I was working for the city [after she retired from teaching] even when I did not fast I never ate anything amongst people. One day Saban said: “Hoca hanim, I neither know, if you fast or if you do not. You just do not eat.” I said: “I would not grill *sucuk*\(^{58}\) next to my friend who is fasting. I respect him.” But now the ones in power are using this for their gains. They do not even give jobs to the ones without a *turban*\(^{59}\). (March 8, 2011)

As this example shows, hiding one’s religious practice is perceived as a form of personal maturity that comes with the strength and ingeniousness of faith and virtue of a “secular” Muslim. *The more a person hides her religious belief, the stronger it is.* And yet, such perception constitutes also the source of resentment of the “Islamist” other. The headscarved woman who does not conceal her religiosity in public is despised because she takes religion outside of its “proper place”, which is the conscience and the heart, and she turns it into public display. As I explore in the following section, such contestations over the visibility of religious embodiment also constitute the female body as the ground on which secular religious distinctions are further reproduced.

**Corporeal Distinctions**

The rigidity that the secular and religious hold as identity categories in liberal secularist discourses can be most effectively challenged through women’s emotional and bodily accounts

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\(^{58}\) Traditional spicy Turkish salami.

\(^{59}\) A commonly used term to refer to “political” headscarf.
of inhabiting these categories. In this section, I will explore the accounts of military wives who adopt, or get pushed into, these severely polarized identity categories through their stories, anecdotes, and confessions, which reveal their personal dilemmas and contradictions and thereby delineate the instability of secularist-Islamist dichotomy. I look at the corporeality of the secular/religious distinction as it reproduces and reinforces the conceptual instabilities and ambiguities of secularism.

Gulseren (61), who I met through the association of the Retired Military Officers, is the wife of a retired CO. She does not self-identify as a devout Muslim nor does she wear a headscarf. However, like the majority of the “secularist” identified women, she says she is a pious Muslim. As we chatted in a coffee shop, she asked me to pause when she heard the ezan (the call for prayer) coming from outside. As I was waiting, she moved her lips silently, saying the prayers. After this she described her religious practices to me, explaining that from time to time she holds Quran recital gatherings in her house and that she tries to do her daily prayers in a sitting position (because of a problem with her back). Further into our conversation I asked about her ideas on the headscarf. She explained:

I do not believe that it is a religious duty. I do not believe that a bunch of hair needs to be covered. We cut off that hair. Also, the ones under your arm and the ones in your private parts. I do not believe that covering is a religious duty. If a person commits a sin, he/she does it with the eye. Then you must cover your eyes. You can’t do wrong with your hair. But, while you are praying it is okay. Praying has its rules; of course we will cover then. We all cover. But apart from that... I am not a person who dresses revealingly anyways. (May 11, 2011)

Like other military wives, Gulseren also holds a “secularist” vision of Islam, which she considers as the “true” version. Her ideas about the headscarf reflect how she accepts sexual modesty in public space as the moral lesson at the root of this religious practice. As I explored in detail in
Chapter 4, she foregrounds the spiritual and moral aspects of religious practice and refuses the visibly embodied adoptions that fixate on women’s hair and their bodies. Gulseren’s approach also puts responsibility on men who are perceived as the other actors within the public heterosexual realm. Accordingly, it is not the hair but the eye that beholds women’s sexuality in an “improper” way and commits the sin. A similar interpretation is found amongst a few of the “Islamist”-labelled pious women who adopt religious covering yet at the same time refer to men’s responsibility in the protection of the sexual and moral order.

Gulseren’s (61, wife of retired CO) views on head covering during prayer, however, reflect another dimension of secularist discourses. Veiling in public space, as well as veiling during prayer, are contested issues in Islamic cultures. Not only do people conduct their daily prayers in significantly different ways, but they also choose to or not to cover their head during the prayer. While Gulseren refuses the requirement of head covering in public space by substituting it with modern-but-modest form of dress, she waives that same rationality when it comes to head covering during the daily prayers. While she argues that there is no need for covering a “piece of hair” in public, she refrains from employing the same logic for daily prayers which women carry out mostly in private or in women only spaces. By saying “[p]raying has its rules”, she situates head covering during prayers within the realm of uncontested customary religious practices that are not necessarily deemed as “political” as head covering in public. However, her views on head covering in public and in private spaces do not indicate necessarily an internal dilemma or contradiction that she personally has. Her seeming contradictions point at

60 Namaz (daily prayer) and covering of women during namaz are practiced differently in Shia and Sunni sects of Islam, as well as in their internal fractions as well. For example, Ismailis, the second largest branch of Shism do not cover their heads during namaz, which they practice three times a day as opposed to Sunni Hanefi tradition which prescribes five times daily practice with head covered.
the challenges that the category of the secular has at the level of bodily analysis as it fails to contain the complexity of her identity.

A similar challenge to the category of the religious emerges in the narratives of “Islamist”-labelled women. Aysen (48, wife of force-retired CO) is a military wife who has faced various forms of official and informal pressures and marginalization within the military because of her religious embodiment. Aysen wears a headscarf accompanied by a loose topcoat, a style that she finds compatible with the teachings of Islam. In her interpretation of Islam that is based on her upbringing in a relatively religious and conservative environment, she adopts Islamic veiling in a way that she sees is compatible with the sexual moral codes that Islam prescribes and her own understanding of modesty.

With Aysen we talked about the practice of wearing chador, which revealed certain aspects of her identity that does not necessarily fit with a presumed “Islamist” category. Chador is a full-body-length semicircle of black fabric, which is open on the front. Unlike the headscarf and topcoat combination, the chador is an a lot more loose fitting form of attire that hides the curves of the body more. It is usually worn in a black color, which is a source of its negative associations to “backward” religiosity. Even though chador is adopted in the same Islamic sect and community as her, Aysen finds the chador a little “too much” and “unnecessary”. In our conversation Aysen went on to explain why she does not like the chador and why she disapproves it despite having friends and family who wear the chador:

61 Akin to enlightenment valorization of light and whiteness over dark and blackness in Western thought, within the Turkish context as well progress and modernization are associated light whereas backwardness is associated with black.
My mother used to wear it in our hometown. But you know as part of tradition... [I]t was not for religious clothing. They used to take it off when they were hot. I first saw chador here with Neslihan abla62 [her friend]...I was never sympathetic towards chador. My husband used to suggest that I should wear sometimes, and I was like “Eww...Never! Even if you buy me 10 golden bracelets.” There is no such concept in Quran. It just tells you to wear loose dress. It says put your scarf through over your shoulders... It never defines completely. You do not have to stick to one thing... The purpose is to cover the curves of the body. (May 5, 2011)

While explaining her views and preferences on different forms of veiling, like Gulseren, Aysen refers to the actual purpose of the practice, which in both of their accounts comes off as the regulation of female sexuality in public. Aysen makes an argument for her own perception of the moral reason at the root of this practice. She adopts this as a bodily practice in tune with her own understanding of sexual morality and modesty that is shaped by her own personal history, the communities she grew up with and the neighbourhood she lived in. Based on her own particular experience, Aysen argues that her headscarf and loose topcoat perfectly suit the purpose of the religious text and practice of sexual modesty in public space that she is very comfortable with and she therefore she doesn’t need to wear chador.

On the other hand, Gulseren explains her own preferences in maintaining sexual modesty in a different way. While she accepts veiling during prayers as part of religious practice, she denies the necessity to do so in public space. Gulseren explains it with her words “I don’t dress revealingly anyways” by which means she substitutes the necessity for covering in public space for the purposes of sexual modesty by dressing modestly. Based on her own understanding of sexual modesty, Gulseren argues that she does not contradict religion in the ways in which most “secularist” identified women are perceived to do so from an “Islamist” perspective.

62 Elder sister.
Both Gulseren (61, wife of retired CO) and Aysen (48, wife of force-retired CO) are pious Muslims and they use the same form of reasoning in explaining their views on head covering; yet they inhabit the opposite ends of a political spectrum as “secularist” and “Islamist”. The differentiation between Aysen and Gulseren as “secularist” and “Islamist” occur at the point where they decide to start to rationalize religious practice based on their own understandings of sexual modesty. The point they diverge is where they draw the line on their own bodies in terms of their attachment to the religious principle; that is their decision to wear or not wear a headscarf, which is based on their own understandings of the religious obligations of sexual modesty. While Gulseren’s practice of wearing headscarf remains within the private sphere, Aysen goes into public space with her religiously dressed body. The difference in the political categories they inhabit as “Islamist” or “secularist” comes from this distinction. It is defined by the likeliness that the line they draw on their bodies will match with the line between public and private spaces designated by the secular governmentality. In other words, it is the moment these women step into public space that their bodies are perceived as either Islamist or secularist depending on the chances of the line they draw between their own public and private selves to overlap with the public/private divide drawn through secular governmental practices of the state and the military.

The line that separates the “secular” from “religious” has been defined by critical scholarship of secularism as the “power of the secular” (Hirschkind 2011; Scott 2007) or “secular power” (Agrama 2010b). Secular power defines the distinction between the secular and religious through the public and private as mapped onto women’s bodies. As I explore in the following section, such corporeally defined distinctions play out in both social interactions in military bases and
also in the military’s institutional regulations, as a source of ambiguity and instability, which is central to the operation of secular power.

**Ambiguity and Vagueness of Secularism**

Such corporeal and emotional constructions of the secular and religious play out in institutional regulations of the military as a form of vagueness and ambiguity. Context specific associations of the secular and religious with security and risk lead to situations where what once is considered as “religious” and “risky” in one context can easily become acceptable and “normal”, even necessary, in another. This has most vividly come out in the narratives of “Islamist” military wives in the instances where their religious identities are not taken into consideration as a form of threat to the military. Aysen (48, wife of force-retired CO) and Gungor (45, wife of expelled CO), as headscarved women who were securitized through the military’s secularist security agenda, told me how things were different when they served in the Eastern part of Turkey, during “terror times”. Gungor said, in her experience the officials were more concerned with more impending threats that emerge from Kurdish armed resistance against the Turkish state and therefore there was less pressure on her and people alike:

> Since it is a little more conservative there, they did not put much pressure on the headscarf issue… Also, by then, there was the terror issue, and the Gulf War. Patriot rockets and so... They used to distribute gas masks. It was wartime. You lived in fear. So, they did not have time to deal with your headscarf. After the war was over, they started bothering us again. (June 21, 2011)

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63 “Terror times” and “terror issue” in Turkey refers to armed conflict between the Turkish state and guerrillas of Kurdistan Workers’ Party as of 1980s in the eastern and south eastern part of Turkey. Especially mid 1990s are referred to as times of intensified war between the Turkish military and the Kurdish organization (Keyman 2012)
This narrative shows how the sensitivity of security regulations in one context does not play out in the same manner in another. This is determined partly due to prioritization of other forms of risks due to spatial and temporal differentiations. In the quotation, Gungor indicates that she felt less pressured because the surrounding environment was more religiously conservative, which eventually made her dress and outlook less outstanding, and thereby less of a security concern.

Another example of such contextual shift is reflected in Aysen’s (48, wife of force-retired CO) account as well. In our conversation she said that during their deployment in Eastern Turkey the officers were advised to go to Friday prayers by the military officials. To her, this was a contradictory move by the military, because going to Friday prayers in their previous locations was what got them blacklisted as “Islamists”. She explains this discrepancy through the persistence of other security threats passed by the Kurdish movement. By other informants too, this was explained as a move to make the Turkish military look more sympathetic to the Kurdish majority local population to build support and alliances within the community. These demonstrate clear examples of how the notions of secular and religious are sometimes intentionally shifted in order to establish power and authority.

The vagueness and ambiguity of the military’s institutional regulations regarding the risk of Islamism also shape the experience of “secularist” identified military community as well. An incident from my trip to the Karasu military holiday resort clearly demonstrates how ambiguities on security regulations in the everyday life of the military base and how they function to further the conceptual instabilities of secularism. In May 2011, my parents and I went on a weeklong vacation in a military holiday resort at the closes military base to our town. This was also an alumni gathering for navy school graduates of 1969, where approximately 50 of my father’s
classmates, all retired officers, got together. Half way through my weeklong stay, one of my father’s friends had a heart attack and unfortunately passed away. As is the usual practice following a funeral, my father’s friends’ wives wanted to hold a Quran recital gathering for the dead, which did not end up taking place. I heard conflicting views about why the recital did not take place which reflected significantly on how the conceptual ambiguities of secularism operate on the complex and contradictory foundations of the secular and religious.

To inquire about why the recital did not occur, I first talked to Meltem (47, wife of retired NCO) who said they talked about holding a gathering but then concerns were raised about being misunderstood; that is being mistaken for “Islamists” by carrying out a public religious gathering in a military space (May 12, 2011). As I discovered through my research, holding religious gatherings in their homes is not an unusual practice for women who identify as secularist. However, in this military resort, since the residences are hotel-like and do not have big living rooms, it would not be possible for them to have the meeting at a private indoors space. The only venue that would hold them was the cafeteria or the restaurant, which needed to be reserved specifically for this gathering. Meltem told me that they grew concerned and decided not to hold the gathering after all since it required appropriation of a military space for religious purposes.

I talked to Nurgul (57, wife of retired NCO) to confirm what I heard from Meltem. However, Nurgul gave a different account. She said that they decided not to hold the meeting because of the objections raised by more religiously knowledgeable women amongst them and due to practical reasons. Nurgul said:

The more religious ones amongst us said ‘no’ because these spaces are open air. In theory, men should not be able to hear women’s voice. Those places are all occupied by
soldiers who are waiters. Because of that we decided to hold smaller gatherings of groups of two or three and read the Quran in our motels. (May 12, 2011)

In the end, the Quran recital gathering did not take place in its initially intended form, as a large gathering of all women; instead, it took place in small groups in the hotel rooms.

The different accounts that I was offered for not holding a larger event provides us with a few claims to the secular/religious dichotomy in relation to its vagueness and ambiguity. First, this experience complicates the presumed rigidity of the category of the “secularist” by revealing the internal conflicts and dilemmas that easily becomes part of a “secularist’s” experience. It at the same time demonstrates how a secularist logic foregrounds the actual purpose of a religious practice over its public representation. Just as in secularist women’s explanation for not wearing headscarf in public space and their preference to regulate their sexual morality through modest dress, in this case the religious gathering of smaller groups in private spaces is taken as a valid substitute for a large-scale performance of a communal ritual, as it serves the same purpose.

Another conclusion that can be made from this incident relates to how the vagueness and ambiguity of military regulations leave these women confused about what is “appropriate” religious activity in military spaces. This is a state of confusion that emerges from the ambiguity of the notions of secular and religious, whose distinction ends up being defined in spatially and temporally differentiated ways. Therefore, such ambiguity, or instability in Agrama’s (2010b) terms, emerges as an intended consequence of secularist discourses. I argue that, as mobilized through the Turkish military’s security discourses, secularism actively blurs the secular/religious dichotomy, and redefines them each and every time as a function of the exercise of state sovereignty. Secular state power is exercised through particular social risk governance (Chapter
5), which disciplines and regulates bodies, which, as I explore in the following section, constructs the emotional geographies of the base through anxieties.

**Emotional Geography of the Base: Secularist Ambiguities and Anxieties**

Corporeal formations of the secular/religious dichotomy, and the vagueness and ambiguities integral to these concepts construct the emotional geographies of the military base through confusions and anxieties. In this section, I explore the emotional geographies of military spaces as shaped by a security discourse that mobilizes certain fears and anxieties based on ideas of an “Islamist” dystopia and the “Islamist” other (see Chapter 4). As I explored through the notion of secular risk governance in Chapter 5, particular constructions of security and risk are integrated into systems of surveillance and disciplinary security mechanisms in order to monitor, recuperate or purge the “Islamist” other. Primarily based on women’s bodies and their corporeal dispositions, such heightened security dynamics construct an emotional socio-space through confusions and anxieties. Because of the assumed rigidness of the categorizations (“secularist” or “Islamist”), and the political claims made through them, the differences between the ways these women interpret and embody religion open up a field of conflict that take place in everyday interactions and encounters in military spaces.

The vagueness and ambiguity that surround the military’s regulations have constructed particular emotional registers through a culture of anxiety that shapes how people perceive each other and the space around them. In implicit and untold ways, the secularist anxiety and feelings of mutual negative judgement constitute a major portion of these women’s experiences. This was
initially reflected in my conversations with women who identify as “secularist” in their repeated expressions of anxiety about the unknown “other”. More than a few times as we were talking about the “Islamists” in the military, statements such as “we do not know what is going on when they all come together” or “our next door neighbours are chadori women, they used to have gatherings, who knows what they are doing” appeared. The “Islamist” as the “Other” is encapsulated as the unknown – something to be feared and judged with a negative attitude. In response to that Nesrin (50, wife of force-retired CO), who is on the other side of the spectrum as a military wife who was forced to take-off her headscarf, told me how the feelings of being feared shaped “Islamist”-labelled women’s behaviour and experiences. What I explored in Chapter 5 as self-disciplinary practice produced by secular risk governance emerged in Nesrin’s narrative this time as a form fear and compulsion to clear themselves of negative judgements. She said, “They [the “Islamists”] had to open up their houses and their lives as much as possible to convince them that they are not doing anything suspicious (şüpheli) or wrong”. (May 12, 2011)

The persistence of this suspicion and mistrust shaped “Islamist” women’s perception of military spaces and their surroundings as well. Mukerrem (46) is the wife of a CO who was expelled from the army due to allegations of being an “Islamist”. When she lived on the military base, she had to go to the military hospital to get her daily injections. She said that even though they had female nurses in the day, for the night shift they never kept any female nurses and that she had to get her injections from a male nurse. Regardless of the evidence of any intentionality, she read the situation, as “they never paid attention to our sensitivities as religious people”

64 The “Islamist other” has been explored as predominant figure in the literature on political Islam in Turkey after 1980s (Olson 1985; A. Cinar 2005; Gole 1997).
This example demonstrates that emotional registers shapes the way people sense and understand their environment. Her experience and understanding of space is significantly determined by feelings of exclusion from the social spaces of the military due to her religious outfit. Mukerrem’s experience exemplifies Ahmed’s (2004b) understanding of emotions through performativity in so far as they shape the surfaces of bodies and construct spaces within an economy of social hierarchies. Her experiences are shaped by the emotional registers of secularism, which continue to further the secular/religious divide that she already perceives and presupposes.

The day-to-day interactions and encounters in military spaces are also embedded in the emotional and visceral constructions of the secular/religious divide. Nesrin (50, wife of force-retired CO) told me a story, which reflects clearly how people’s vision and interactions are shaped through secular anxiety and upon the ambiguities that a person could be “Islamist” or not.

They [secularist military wives] provoke each other. We were at a gathering. There is this woman whose head is covered. I do not know that woman. The ones who know her turned out later. She was wife of a non-commissioned officer. Those colonels’ wives, immediately, went to the wife of the general, saying things like “she is covered, like this and that...” They kept on saying provocative things. Then a friend came, and said, “I know that woman. She has cancer. She is receiving chemotherapy. That’s why her hair is falling out... That’s why she is covering.” Hearing this, the general’s wife paused. But those one who provoked her...If that friend did not come over to explain the situation, that woman would have been ruined. (May 12, 2011)

As exemplified in this quotation, corporeally constructed notions of security and risk along the ambiguities of secular and religious divide permeate the social spaces of the military and the relationships within the community. The ambiguities that arise from the categories of secular and religious and the anxieties that spring from them determine the ways individuals see each other and construct the emotional geographies of the military along social hierarchies. The feelings of
pride and contentment that dominate the emotional spheres of “secularist” identified military wives, as I explored in an earlier section, provide them the sense of entitlement and power to navigate around secularism’s ambiguities as well. This way the social spaces of the military become laden with social hierarchies that are defined along the lines of secular and religious. In the case of the “Islamist” women, such hierarchy translates to a state of being gazed upon and objectified, and constructs for them the social spaces of the military with lack of a sense of belonging and attachment. Unexceptionally, in the stories of each “Islamist” labelled women, there is a feeling of alienation and marginalization through the secularist gaze. Statements such as “they used to look at us as if we came from outer space” and “they looked at us as if we are Negros” are commonly expressed. The experience of people of color in white western settings and racism are seen as a comparable equivalent to that of “Islamist”-labelled people within military spaces. Gungor’s (45, wife of expelled CO) words on the gaze and the disrespectfulness she felt through spatial arrangements are clearly conveyed in the following account:

When you go there [to military wives’ gatherings] the gaze pushes you to the side. You can never come to the fore. When the wife of the general sees you, she sends a message “She can take off her headscarf here. It is all women here.” But she does not think of the soldiers who wait. She does not consider them as men. They just think like that. “Take off your headscarf, your topcoat, relax.” (June 21, 2011)

As the quotation at the very beginning of this chapter also indicates, Gungor characterizes the emotional intensity of her experience in military spaces as a “psychological war”. In this quotation too, she emphasizes the pervasiveness of pressure to change one’s behaviour and adapt to the normative construction of space through peer pressure.

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65 Zenci is the original word that the informant used that translates to “negro” in English. As opposed to siyah/siyahi, which is the word for “black” in English, “negro” is a better equivalent for zenci since it is a derogatory racial slur that refers to the racialized experience a person with different phenotype or skin color.

66 The original word she used in Turkish is “bakış”, whose meaning is fully conveyed with the word gaze.
Many of the women I interviewed echoed this sentiment, talking about how they would have to navigate around social spaces in order to get away from pressures. These pressures could vary from mild suggestions to violent encounters that try to shape their religious sensitivities, which were reflected in the ways “Islamist”-labelled women dress, eat, drink and socialize. These mostly result in “Islamist”-labelled women closing themselves up at home and not stepping outside, as they feel they are being watched and judged. Elif (26), an “Islamist”-labelled daughter of an expelled CO, remembers feeling overtly conscious of her body when she lived in military spaces:

For some time the headscarf issue was so elevated that I had to hide in the back seat of the car while entering [military spaces]... When I wasn’t picked up by car I remember entering the lodgings from the backside, jumping over the walls instead of the front gates. It was a short time. Even while I was looking outside from the window, I felt like I was being watched. It was very interesting... It leaves a deep scar inside of you. The feeling of not being wanted. The feeling of not considered deserving. Very difficult. (June 24, 2011)

The pressure that “Islamist” women felt in these spaces was so intense that it further shaped their habits and their perceptions of their environments. Gungor (45, wife of expelled CO) says that even after they left the military, she felt strongly against anything associated with the military:

Near my work place in Uskudar, there are air force lodgings. There are shuttle busses that carry soldiers. I wasn’t able to look at them, do you know? There I see it coming from a distance. Blue. I used to turn my head the other way. I felt like I was going to die because of sadness. It is just a bus! It is funny to not be able to look at a bus! I was angry with myself but I could not look at it. (June 21, 2011)

Gungor also talked about her friend who went through a similar process:

The other day I talked to a friend. She said that she is always doing her daily prayers in her bedroom. I asked, “Why?!” She said, “That’s how I got used to it at the military lodgings, I got so used to praying secretly, I go to the bedroom and lock the door and then
pray. It has been almost 15 years since we were expelled from the military.” Can you imagine the pressure she feels? She still prays like that. (June 21, 2011)

As reflected in Gungor’s anecdote, the ways people regulated their behaviour even long after they left the military demonstrates the pervasiveness of the pressure they lived through in its continued effects. Their experience amount to being transgressive bodies, who do not feel welcomed or appreciated due to their religious embodiment. On the other hand, in the narratives of “secularist” women there is a strong sense of confidence and comfort that permeates their experience of inhabiting military spaces. While “secularist” women constantly refer to military spaces as “our spaces” which, in their opinion, “of course need to be regulated”, Islamist labelled women’s accounts show lack of attachment and belonging and ensuing feelings of sadness, disappointment and anger. Military spaces are constructed through these emotional registers that are cut along the secular/religious divide. As I demonstrate in the following section, emotional registers constitute major force in determining the proximity of bodies to each other based on perception of religion as “out of place”.

**Religion “Out of Place”**

As we see, emotional geographies of secularism give direction to feelings of anxiety that shape how people self-identify, the mood and tone of their daily interactions, and their perception of particular situations, as well as each other. Here emotions emerge as constitutive of power relations that regulate bodies and spaces (Ahmed 2004) in tandem with the desires of secularism. In explaining how emotions operate in constituting the religious body as a form of transgression, I employ Cresswell’s (1996) term “out of place” as a metaphor to further delineate the normative
architecture of secularism that produces particular configurations of religion as out of place, therefore a source of anxiety and subject to regulation. With a few examples, I demonstrate below how secularism defines the range in which bodies can move and how it controls the place of religion within the context of the Turkish military.

A taken-for-granted notion of spatial and bodily calibration emerged as a result of my efforts to understand what constructs religion as a source of anxiety and how people navigate the religious/secular divide in a securitized space. I employ the term calibration because it provides the sense of an almost technical fine-tuning of spaces, defining the ways in which bodies are permitted to behave and be dressed. During my visit to Akagac military base, I interviewed Nalan (34), the wife of an on-duty CO, who dresses in a “modern style”. She said she is a religious person, a believer, but does not strictly perform religious duties in everyday life. When we started talking about “Islamist” identities in military spaces and the entrance regulations regarding them, she provided an example of her sisters, who wear turban, the style of dress that the military does not approve of. She says:

Nalan: They [headscarved women] can enter [the military base]. They can even come here [the cafeteria], though I did not see any in the guest hall. I do not know about that. But I have related experience, my mother is closed, so is my sister. For me it is not a problem. You should wear it if you want, if you do not want, then do not... I find the distinction they [the military] make unnecessary. What they call turban is the style that young women wear it, just to look more pretty, more modern.

Hulya: Have you brought your sister to these spaces [cafeteria and the restaurant]?

Nalan: Well, if I need to put it this way, I haven’t brought my sister here ever. She came to my house. But, to be honest, it is in case something happened while we are here. Not because I am embarrassed of her but because I did not want anything bad to happen. (March 16, 2011)
Nalan’s perspective is that of an insider who is familiar with the experience of those who are labelled as Islamist. Living in military spaces and having observed securitization of religious identities therein, Nalan knows and acts according to the secular sensibilities of the military. The discrepancy between admittance and toleration of religiously dressed bodies, such as the one between headscarved women entering the military base as opposed to them entering cafeterias and restaurants, demonstrates how space is governed through tacit understandings of secularism. The fact that the religiously dressed woman is acceptable as long as she remains in and closer to the private spheres within the military spaces is an indicator that ambiguously configured understanding of risk is constructed to not necessarily eliminate the religious body, but to govern its visibility and mobility.

Similarly, Deniz’s ideas about what kinds of bodies are accepted in what kinds of spaces are demonstrative of how secularism designs spaces by arrangement of bodies therein. Deniz (32) is a banker and wife of an on-duty CO. She adopts a Western style of dress and identifies as a non-practicing Muslim. In our conversation on the secularist stance of the military and its regulation of religious identities, she placed particular emphasis on the bodies of headscarved women whose access and mobility in military spaces are governed in a complex and spatially differentiated manner:

Deniz: Every place has its rules you know. If you stick to the rules there is no problem. Turban is a no go. They [military officials] make you wear it headscarf style. There is no problem with that. You can enter any place like that. I am having my guests entering the lodgings like that. My mother wears a headscarf, so does my mother-in-law. This can be an issue when you are entering spaces where there are higher-ranking officials. For example, while entering the Military Academies.

Hulya: Not in the lodgings, but maybe when there is a reception, in the ballroom of the Military Officers’ Mess?
Deniz: You can’t enter with turban style, but with headscarf style. But you may not be able to enter based on the rank of the people there. In theory you can enter, but no one would have the courage to do that. In the military you know there is the chain of command. In some way the other this would come back to you [if you enter]...I would not have any problems in the lodging area but while entering the military academies there can be problems. There are staff officers. (March 21, 2011)

Deniz’s comments reveal that it is not necessarily what happens, but what people think will happen that matters. This reflects how “what is right, just, and appropriate” is shaped based on normative structuring of landscapes (Cresswell 1996, 8). A dominant regime of secular risk governance constructs emotional geographies of the military and shape people’s understanding of what is right and acceptable in tacit ways. As reflected in Deniz’s narrative, the traditional headscarf is a “non-political”, and therefore an acceptable form of dress that does not threaten the secularity of military spaces. The trope of the grandmother that I discussed in Chapter 4 in detail emerges here again to define the military’s desires. However, even the traditional headscarf can be acceptable based on certain spatial and temporal parameters. Accordingly, while the headscarved body is acceptable in and around private spaces, it becomes out of place in official spaces and in presence of higher ranked officers. Therefore, as much as the particularities of a certain religious practice, such as the style of the headscarf, it is the existence of religion in a particular place that constructs it as a form of risk. Religious/secular dichotomy emerges here as a spatial divide as religion is mapped on to risk only when it is out of place.

As these examples show, secular/religious distinction takes place on and through bodies in space and through power relations embedded in emotional registers. These examples demonstrate that the secularist discourse of the military authority draws and reinforces borders between public and private on women’s bodies, not only to construct spaces of its power and authority and blur the distinctions between the secular and religious in the process of doing so.
By defining what is secular and what is religious contextually and refining a security discourse based on that, the secular power defines the place of religion as the private. The notion of private, in this context, is not employed in its common sense meaning as in the public and private distinction, but rather as a gradual term whose borders are designated rather fluidly so that they can shift based on time, space, and political priorities. Such design mobilizes secular anxiety, which emerges as a reaction against religion that is perceived as “out of place”.

The secular and religious do not occur just within themselves but in relation to the spaces they exist. It is the power of the secular that decides where to draw the border between the public and private, and thus render some identities as secular, and others not. The exercise of secular sovereign power in drawing borders can take place either on the body (as in women’s decision to adopt religious dress or not) or in space (as in carrying out religious rituals in military spaces or not) through the ambiguities they invoke. The sovereign power as embodied by the military draws these borders in the best possible manner to carve out subjectivities and spaces that are congruent with the vision of secular Western modernity.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I explored the emotional and corporeal geographies of the military within the context of a security discourse that is shaped along the lines of a secular/religious divide. Drawing on critical scholarship on emotional and corporeal geography and relating it to critical approaches to security and secularism I examined how the secular/religious dichotomy is constructed through women’s bodies and their sexual identities. I looked at particular moments
when the secular/religious dichotomy is reproduced in everyday life through women’s bodies and the emotional content of their interactions and personal narratives.

I started my analysis by exploring the sense of pride, which is the primary form of emotion in the narratives of secularist military wives in giving them the sense of content and confidence with their modern-but-modestly dressed bodies. I demonstrated how such emotional disposition provided them with a sense of entitlement and ownership to military spaces in constructing their bodies as part of a patriotic duty in tune with the political discourse of the military. This in turn revealed the negative sensations of sadness, loss and exclusion, which define the experience of religiously dressed military wives who were made feel unwanted in military spaces and undeserving of military affiliation.

These emotions take effect in response to the visibility of religious embodiment as a source of contention. Secularist identified women placed emphasis on inner belief and concealment of religious practice in public in articulating a more “sincere” attachment to religion and they constructed non-veiling as an ethical practice. This in turn constructed the headscarf as a disingenuous and bodily practice due to its perceived visibility within the normative constructions of military space as a secular space.

Being the main site of conflict and contestation, I looked at women’s personal accounts of their own bodies and sexualities with regards to their choices to veil or not veil. By analyzing how both “Islamist” and secularist women rationalize their dress choice and bodily dispositions, I revealed how categories of religious and secular emerged as unstable and ambiguous categories whose distinction materialized contextually and based on one’s own understanding of sexual modesty. I explored how the distinction between secular and religious is mapped on to a
public/private divide, which is constructed corporeally as revealed in women’s accounts. Women’s bodies emerge as secularist or Islamist depending on the likeliness of women’s own understanding of their sexual privacy to match with the public/private, which is a distinction that is imposed by the secular state. The process of defining that distinction emerged as the exercise of state power through secularism, which has been described in the literature as power of the secular.

I then demonstrated how such corporeally and emotionally defined constructions constitute the basis of vagueness and ambiguities, which become the condition of their operation. Drawing on examples from the Turkish military’s context specific security regulations on religious identities, I showed how the military holds the power to decide what passes as religious and secular, and the processes through which it extends its power and exercise authority. Such vagueness and ambiguity in military’s regulations regarding the religious/secular divide constructs the military base with a sense of anxiety that shapes people’s actions in terms of their own religious practice and also their perception of a secular or religious other at the opposite ends of a religious-secular spectrum. Individuals view each other and the spaces they live in with fear and anxiety, which added to feelings of further objectification and exclusion in social spaces.

Finally, I explored how construction of religion as “out of place” constitutes a source of anxiety in governing space. I argued that the spatial configurations of religion that are outside of the properly deemed allocations of secularism construct religion as out of place. It is the spatial coordinates of the headscarved body and its “out of place-ness” that construct it as a risk in military spaces. I also revealed how public/private division is determined gradually based on
time and space. The military exercises the power to decide where to draw the line between the secular and religious, and it carves out context-specific meanings and connotations of these concepts.

In conclusion, I argue that the modern state power, in the shape of military authority, constructs space via control over the visible expression of religious identities. It generates bodily and spatial instabilities and ambiguities within the emotional and corporeal geographies of the military base to construct spaces of its own design. Thereby, secularism operates as a function of state sovereignty in constantly blurring and reconstructing a secular/religious divide through corporeal and emotional vagueness and ambiguities.
Chapter 7

CONCLUSION: A DISCUSSION OF KEY FINDINGS, LIMITATIONS AND NEW DIRECTIONS

In this research, I have examined the construction of modern sovereignty through the concept of secular bodyscapes. I have explored the co-constitution of bodies and spaces at the intersections of secularism and discourses of national security within the context of the Turkish Republic. I have used secular bodyscapes as an umbrella term under which I brought together feminist geographies of bodies and emotions with critical studies in secularism and security. I have contributed to each of these bodies of scholarship through an intersectional analysis that manifested most clearly on women’s bodies, their emotions and sexual identities. Through the findings of ethnographic qualitative fieldwork research, the theoretical discussions of which adds a new critical edge to feminist methodology, I have offered new insights into critical perspectives on secularism and security by demonstrating the corporeal and emotional basis of their discursive foundations.

This final chapter serves a number of purposes. First, I establish the umbrella term secular bodyscapes as the main explanatory framework in which the purpose of this dissertation can be capsulated. Second, I review the central findings of each of the analysis chapters and discuss their concluding arguments by demonstrating how they fit together under the broader framework of secular bodyscapes. Third, I discuss how this dissertation contributes to critical feminist geography, scholarship on feminist methodology, geographies of secularism and
security. Fourth, I discuss the problems, limitations and gaps that inevitably crosscut this research. And, finally, I reflect on potential directions for future research.

**From Secular Bodyscapes to Modern Sovereignty**

With this dissertation I offer a comprehensive analysis of the security discourses of the Turkish military by situating the female body at the intersections of secularism and security. I have looked at a particular time frame in the history of the Turkish Republic, from the 1980s until the late 2000s, when political Islam emerged as one of the most impending threats to national security. I have explored how the Turkish military (re)articulated Islam as a security discourse and as the *risk of Islamism* in sexually and corporeally specific ways. I have brought these analyses to fruition with the concept of secular bodyscapes, which I offer as an analogy and corollary of the gendered constructions of modern sovereignty as they materialize within the security discourses of the Turkish nation-state. With this concept I have situated the centrality of the Islamic headscarf and women’s bodies to the Turkish military’s security discourses as the most conspicuous markers of Islamist politics and identities. Through the concept of secular bodyscapes, I assert the co-constitution of bodies and spaces in the gendered constructions of modern sovereignty and the exercise of modern power at the intersections of secularism and security.

The taken-for-granted construction of the liberal nation-state based on the principles of secularism constituted the entry point for my formulation of secular bodyscapes as an analogy to modern sovereignty. I take secularism as an essential condition of modern sovereignty in so far
as it transfers political legitimacy from a religious reference to that of the nation (Agrama 2012; Yilmaz 2007). As argued in theories of political liberalism (Habermas 1991; Rawls 1993), secularism establishes legitimacy by separating politics and religion and thereby constructing a political public space that presumably operates on the basis of rationality and reasoned individuals. Such public space presumes a secular/religious dichotomy that takes effect not only in public political discourse but also at the level of individuals who distinguish between their secular and religious identities (Asad 2003).

In my analytical framework I take secularism as the condition of modern sovereignty as the base of my argument. As witnessed with the rise of religious revivalisms, any threat to secularism and the dichotomies it prescribes at the level of public political discourse and subjectivities can be perceived as a threat to the power and legitimacy of modern sovereignty. Therefore the protection of modern sovereignty can equate to securitization of religious identities in politics and public space. It is in this framework that I have envisioned the Turkish military’s struggle with political Islam and the construction of the risk of Islamism as a threat to national security. I have explored how the Turkish military assumed the role of the protector of secularism in response to the Islamization of politics and public space. The securitization of “Islamist” politics and identities, both at the political arena and in military spaces, has constituted the main topic of this dissertation.

I have formulated secular bodyscapes as the socio-spatial and sexual construct that encapsulates the securitization of religious identities in the Turkish military’s efforts to protect secularism and modern sovereignty. As I review in the following section, I initiated my study of secular bodyscapes with the sexually and corporeally specific constructions of security and risk.
based on a secular/religious dichotomy. Then I looked into how such discursive constructs operate across everyday and official spheres as a form of social governance. And then I explored the emotional and corporeal constructions of the military base. I establish secular bodyscapes as the main conceptual framework of this dissertation and its main thesis as it presents a concise example of how disciplinary regimes and governmentalities function in sexually and corporeally specific ways as security mechanisms to protect and safeguard secularism and modern sovereignty.

**Discussion of Key Findings**

**Sexual and Corporeal Constructions of Security and Risk**

My research has revealed that the military’s securitization efforts are first and foremost concerned with women’s bodies and their sexual identities. In Chapter 4, I carried out a close examination of the headscarf regulations in military spaces to show how the sexual and corporeal constructions of security and risk correspond to the secular/religious dichotomy. In doing so, I took into consideration the categories of “Islamist” and “secularist” women and “political” and “traditional” headscarf since they are the most conspicuous distinction in the military’s securitization efforts of religious identities.

I started my analysis by demonstrating how headscarved women’s bodies are situated at the center of fears and anxieties of an Islamist dystopia. References to the 1979 “Islamic” revolution in Iran emerged as the primary point of reference in justifying the securitization of the Islamic headscarf through the meanings that inscribed a secular/religious divide on women’s
bodies. I investigated how women’s bodies are ascribed to categories of security and risk in sexually and corporeally specific ways, by close examination of a security statement. I revealed how a distinction between “political” and “traditional” headscarves was made through the seemingly minute details such as the pin and bonnet of the headscarf that were evaluated in combination with other factors such as the age, education level and class background of the wearer. Such distinctions constituted the backbone of security regulations and the system of social governance that are based on an Islamist/secularist divide and work to further reproduce such distinction.

I have explored the logic behind these security regulations through the narratives of women who stand on both sides of the categorizations that these security regulations enforce. My research revealed that, if worn by an educated middle- or upper-class woman and tightly secured with a pin or a bonnet, the headscarf is perceived as an indicator of risk to the secular construction of military spaces. Wearing a headscarf is perceived as a too literal and tight attachment to religious teachings whose main goal is defined as maintaining modesty in dress and thereby protecting sexual morality in public space. Women who identified as secularist and stood behind the military’s security regulations interpreted the headscarf as an unnecessary, if not irrational, practice by arguing that sexual modesty can be maintained by dressing modestly and acting “decently” in public too. In their perceived refusal to adopt modern-but-modest attire, headscarved women emerged either as irrational subjects who are incompatible with the construction of a modern democratic public space, or as dangerous agents of an “Islamist” political order.
The social class and age of the headscarved body emerged as major determinants in designations of the headscarf as “political” or “traditional” in correspondence with categories of security and risk. The security regulations in military spaces revealed that a younger and educated woman constituted a higher risk than an older and undereducated woman, who is not perceived to have much visibility or social standing. Religious attachments, which do not diminish with higher education or greater access to wealth, are perceived to be risky and a form of deviation from secularist teleology that prescribes a progressive transformation of religious subjectivities into secular ones with increased education and class status.

I have demonstrated that younger women’s adoption of the headscarf is also perceived as problematic as it fulfills the purpose of covering a presumably “more attractive” body more than it would on an older woman’s body that is deemed “less attractive”. Younger women challenge the norms of a sexual public regime that demands visibility for women’s bodies and seeks to regulate sexual relations in public through modest dress and “decent” behavior. Sexual modesty and faith, which are represented by the headscarf, are practiced by “secularist” women through internalized faith and adoption of modern-but-modest forms of dress accompanied by “decent” behavior. The headscarf thereby emerges as a risk because it shifts the medium of regulation from reasoning and action to women’s bodies and sexualities.

The headscarved woman is rendered *irrational* as she not only refuses to remain modest yet appear as modern, but that she is perceived to place too much emphasis on her body and sexuality by hiding it from the public gaze. Especially when the presumed moral ambivalences of headscarved women are taken into consideration, in the form of wearing make-up and sexually attractive dress, they are more easily judged and targeted because they cross secularist
and religious norms of sexual morality in public space. Disparities between secularist and religious discourse in terms of regulation of women’s bodies in public space constitute the conceptual ground on which secular/religious divergences take place and in the form of security and risk.

I have also argued that the headscarved women’s strategies to avoid the securitization efforts of the military and the secularist military community also demonstrate how security and risk are mapped sexually and corporeally. By being open and inviting to the community of the privacy of their homes and by “modernizing” their dress style that is deemed “political” and dangerous, “Islamist” women’s efforts revealed how their bodies are at the center of risk calculations. I have thus demonstrated how women’s bodies emerge as the primary indicator of the risk status of an officer. Headscarved women constituted a central and visibly targeted figure that places both the officer and their families under the radar of a formal and informal network of security regulations and self-disciplinary practices.

**Understanding the Risk of Islamism as a form of Social Governance**

In Chapter 5, I explored how Turkish secularism constructs the risk of Islamism as a form of social governance that prescribes “secular” and “modern” bodies and lifestyles and forms of interaction within the context of secular governmentality. I used the risk of Islamism to refer to the security practices and risk constructions of the Turkish military in relation to political Islam and to capture sexually and corporeally constructed forms of risk. By situating women’s bodies at the center of my analysis, I have examined a wide network of security practices that coalesced
to control and eliminate, or to recuperate the risk of Islamism. I have explored how the risk of Islamism is constructed as a form of social governance in regulating bodies and spaces within the logic of secular governmentality.

In my analysis, I have framed secularism as a governmental regime in which discursive constructions of security and risk materialize based on a secular/religious dichotomy, as part of a security apparatus (dispositif de securite) to safeguard modern sovereignty (Foucault 1991; Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991). This perspective situated the normative construction of modern sovereignty against the backdrop of secularism as the legitimizing ground for securitization of religious identities and practices. I have explored the Turkish military’s securitization efforts in official and everyday levels to maintain secular spaces and subjectivities. Drawing on risk-based approaches to security that explore how risk is constructed as a form of social governance in context of governmental regimes (Dillon 2007), I have demonstrated how religion is constructed as risk through a discursive regime and a system of governance within the context of secular governmentality.

My exploration began by demonstrating the systematic strategies of the military in profiling the “Islamist” officer and how it based its security regulations and surveillance on certain notions of ‘excess’ (aşırı) and “deviance” (çarpık). Analysis of a leaked security document showed the centrality of women’s religious embodiment in the designation of an officer to a risk category and gave evidence of heterogeneous security practices that operated across everyday and official levels. Sakınçalı (objectionable) and şüpheli (suspicious) are the common terms that are used in this blacklist document and throughout my research for designating individuals into risk categories. My excursions into everyday life on the military
base revealed that excess and deviance were defined primarily in relation to women’s religious embodiment and took into consideration various factors such as the type and frequency of religious practice, gender segregation, lifestyle evidence such as layout and decoration of their houses (including books, TV channels, religious texts and prayer materials) and consumption habits, as well as the capacity to engage in “modern” forms of entertainment and connections to religious groups or political parties. These venues would be where “Islamist” tendencies would be traced as a potential that resides in everyone in the form of religious faith. Adoption of a religious headscarf or dress constitutes the primary signal of religiosity that seeps out of its designated space, that is the mind and consciousness of the individual, and becomes a public marker.

Control and surveillance over such risk demanded extensive background security checks. Evidence from people’s everyday lives and private spheres were collected and connected to each other through formal and informal procedures. The risk of Islamism permeated each and every sphere on the military base across a vague distinction of formal and informal procedures, and operated as a form of social governance that regulated individuals’ behavior and interactions. From dinner parties for rank promotions to friendly relations in a house visit, everyday social interactions on the military base were defined within the context of risk governance based on a secular/religious divide.

Vaguely defined across informal and official levels, the securitization of religious identities took place in social and everyday spheres through disciplinary practices to construct military spaces as secular bodyscapes. The risk of Islamism operated as a form of social governance in conducting people’s interactions and their self-regulatory practices to create
modern and secular subjectivities and spaces. From confining one’s religious practice to private space to the adoption of more “modern” yet modest forms of dress, to demonstration of the ability to inhabit mixed-gendered social spheres, individuals were pressured to control and regulate their behavior and keep each other in check as well. Regulation of the military base through a social risk governance demonstrated how secularist discourses merged with security and presented a clear case of secularism as a governmental regime, and a security apparatus. In other words, secularism emerged as the discursive construct that protected modern sovereignty as a governmental regime through secular and modern subjectivities that inhabit the military base in emotionally and corporeally specific ways.

**Emotional and Corporeal Geographies of the Military Base**

In the final stage of my analysis, I explored the construction of the military base as an emotional and corporeal battleground based on a secular/religious divide. I demonstrated how the sexual and corporeal constructions of security and risk, and the operationalization of the risk of Islamism as a form of social governance, construct the military base in corporeally and emotionally specific ways; determined the relationships between individuals, arranged their proximity to each other and their allocations in space. I examined women’s accounts of their own bodily experiences and interaction with others within a theoretical framework that intertwined geographies of emotions and corporeality with critical approaches to security and secularism. I focused on particular moments when the secular/religious dichotomy is experienced and reproduced in everyday life through women’s bodies and the emotional content of their interactions and personal narratives.
I demonstrated how a sense of pride shapes the emotional and corporeal experiences of women who identify as secularist and with the security regulations of the military. Conjoining a sense of confidence and pride with their own “secular” bodily representations and with the secular constructions of military spaces created a sense of belonging and ownership in the experience of “secularist” women, which became a primary drive for the negative emotions that “Islamist” women experienced in return. The everyday life and spaces of the military are constructed through the power relations that were emotionally and corporeally constituted. The intensified articulations of a secular/religious divide through security discourses and in the everyday spaces of the base manifested through personal confrontations, negative judgments, experiences of feelings of resentment and exclusion, as well as confidence and entitlement that were also accompanied by fears and anxieties.

My analysis of women’s embodiment revealed that both the religious and the secular emerged as unstable and ambiguous categories whose distinct dichotomization took place contextually and based on one’s own understanding of sexual modesty. The conflict between secularist and religious discourses emerged therefore as a disagreement about what is public and what is private that is determined on and through women’s bodies. I have argued that it is the ambiguity inherent in the secular/religious dichotomy that enables the military to exercise control and to expand its authority.

I have also argued that such vagueness and ambiguity in the military’s regulations regarding the religious/secular divide constituted the root cause of fears and anxieties that shaped people’s actions, how they navigated military spaces and their perception of other people. A negative attitude towards public manifestations and embodiment of religion is experienced with
unsure-ness and anxiety, which can augment feelings of objectification and exclusion from social life. By tracing the fears and anxieties of religious identities in military spaces in terms of how they come to be perceived as risk, I demonstrated that it is the spatial coordinates of religion that makes it a risk to secularism. Women’s religious embodiment and other public manifestations of religion fall under the scrutiny of security regulations in the perception of religion as “out-of-place”. Through my analysis, I have demonstrated that military spaces are constructed as secular bodyscapes through a security discourse that constructs and allocates women’s bodies in particular ways across public and private spheres.

**Key Contributions**

This research has made significant contributions to feminist geographies of emotions and the female body, as well as to secularism and security studies. First, it brings to the fore the construction of the female body in space at distinctive discursive intersections. It focuses on how women’s bodies, their sexual identities and their own understandings of sexual modesty and morality are shaped at the merger of security discourses that are based and build upon particular constructions of secularism in Turkey. It has demonstrated that the socio-political construction of public space through secularist discourses take the female body as the ground on which secular/religious distinctions become clarified as part of a security discourse. It has also revealed the vagueness and ambiguities of corporeal and emotional constructions of space as a key aspect in the exercise of sovereign power that is in the shape of military authority.
Second, this research makes significant contributions to critical post-structuralist approaches in secularism studies by presenting a bodily and emotional analysis of the conceptual dichotomies of secularism as well as their operationalization in the exercise of state power. By demonstrating how secular/religious dichotomy materializes in women’s bodies and their bodily experiences, this research has critiqued how these concepts operate in liberal political discourses. Within the Turkish context, this research has revealed how the secular and the religious are both discursively constructed and mobilized in dialogue to serve particular purposes in the exercise of modern power. It expounds upon how modern state power is exercised through the ambiguities that secularist discourses create on the basis of corporeal and sexual constructions of its core concepts. Thereby, this research has presented a crucial example of how modern power disperses into everyday spaces and shapes people’s bodies, their actions and interactions through the discursive mechanisms of secularism.

Within security studies, this research contributes to the recently emerging literature that looks at the intersections of secularism and security. Emerging from within studies on the post-9/11 Western security agenda and securitization processes of Islamic identities, this scholarship takes a risk-based approach to explore how risk is constructed as a form of social governance. It brings a feminist approach to these studies and situates women’s bodies at the center of the discursive mechanisms that risk operates through and demonstrates how secularism and security converge and construct securitized spaces through women’s bodies and their sexual identities.

Finally, this research contributes to the challenges feminist methodologies present to the dominant epistemic frameworks of Western academy. It does so by addressing the unproblematic underpinnings that secularism holds in knowledge production mechanisms. I
have argued that even the critical strains and reflexive scholarship that challenge scientific objectivity by situating knowledge (Haraway 1988) are based on a secular/religious divide. Referring to the critical debate over the question “Is research secular?” (Asad et al. 2009), I discussed how knowledge production, even situated and partial perspectives, tend to assume a secular position that is cut off from any “messy” relationship with religious institutions or individual faiths. As a point of critique, I have recognized the religious/secular dichotomy as the framework in which this research will be received and discuss the difficulties and dilemmas that research with religious participants posed. Most significantly, I admit that I let myself be influenced by my participant’s religious faith and worldviews. But I hope that in doing so I have turned what could have been seen as a compromise of my scientific authority into a resourceful research experience, providing a more connected interaction with my research participants and a process of self-transformation. I have grounded the entire knowledge production process on a critique of secularism’s concepts and authoritative knowledge claims made through them. Thereby, I have complemented the theoretical and empirical objectives of this research in complicating the secular/religious conceptual dichotomy also from a methodological perspective.

**Limitations**

Drawing on the main tenets of feminist methodology, Hyndman (2001a, 267) critically asserts that it is not only that the experience of fieldwork is an insufficient condition for certain knowledge, but also that one’s findings in the field never capture the whole picture. Feminist research is based on the basic premise that no whole picture exists; that whatever findings we
present should, and eventually will, remain partial. Inevitably, this research has its own limitations.

*Working with a defense institution*

One of the main conditions that largely shaped the course of this research, and the type of data I could gather, has been working with a defense institution. Besides the problems of an ingrained culture of secrecy and confidentiality that one comes across while recruiting research participants in a security institution, there have been significant barriers to accessing written internal documents and “grey literature” (Deschaux and Beaume 2012). For this reason, I faced limitations in accessing “factual” data regarding the material size and dimensions of the Turkish military, which I could have used to better explain my research sites and design of research methods.

Budgetary information regarding the military is publicized as part of annual ministerial budget adjudications. I accessed this information through the TESEV Almanac (Bayramoğlu, Insel, and Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı 2009) which is the most recent compilation and analysis regarding military data on its size and quantitative information. However, with regards to the specific security policy of the military in relation to political Islam, I could not access primary data. My analysis relied on the news coverage of the military’s statements in which they define political Islam as a threat to national security, and the secondary academic literature that has heretofore analyzed the civil-military relations in Turkey. Due to a
dearth of such factual information, I limited my data primarily to ethnographic and interview-based qualitative research methods.

**Heteronormativity**

Another limitation that defines this research is its circumscription within the conceptual borders of heteronormativity. Critique of heterosexual patriarchy informs the backbone of this research as I explore how patriarchal structures operate hand in hand with political discourses. With regards to militaries, feminist researchers have explored how systems of nationalism and militarisms work in ways that normalize heterosexuality (Biricik 2013).

Therefore, I situate this entire research within the frame of heterosexuality, which emerges as the taken-for-granted structure in which gender identities are formed. One of my participants, Kader (20), who is a lesbian woman and the daughter of an NCO, shared with me her experiences of coming out to her family. She stated that it has been a drastic experience, as her father was concerned about how her “not so normal” sexual orientation would damage his own reputation and career in the military (June 23, 2011). Her experience has demonstrated that homosexuality is clearly not welcomed within the military community and in militarist ideals. Likewise, Gulsen (35), who is the daughter of a retired NCO, told me her experience with one of her father’s friends’ son. She said that after his son came out as gay, his father became very concerned and disowned him claiming he “ruined his reputation in the military” (August 12, 2011). These experiences demonstrate the significance of sexual orientation and normalization of heterosexuality within the gender structure that is pervasive within the military. However, I did
not present data analysis regarding this issue both due to spatial restrictions and also because it remains outside of the immediate focus of this research.

**New Directions**

I conducted this research at a period of time that corresponded to the end of an era for the Turkish military. The amendment of the task definition of the military (“TSK’nın 35. Maddesi Değişti - 30 Temmuz 2013” 2014), as I state in the first chapter, has been an indication, more or less, of the end of military authority and its autonomous political status. Turkey is currently governed by the AKP government and the military no longer displays the same character and assertiveness that I explored through the lives and experiences of women that I talked to. In this context, even though it is early I think the transformation that the military is undergoing is emerging as a new research topic. I believe the changing status of the political assertiveness of the military and the newly emerging power dynamics within the “Islamists”, witnessed through the form of corruption scandals in 2014, are reflected within the military’s security discourse. These formations lead up to new forms of securitization and require a renewed scholarly attention.

I also argue that extensive research on the LGBT and queer identities within the military structure and in the military’s security discourses also require scholarly attention. As I indicated above, confining my analysis within a heteronormative structure is one of the limitations of this

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67 Starting in December 2013 various corruption scandals broke out in ways that significantly challenged the power and authority of the AKP government and the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. These scandals have allegedly been revealed as part of a power rivalry within the AKP camp, by Fetullah Gulen who has been a crucial religious/political figure that has supported the rise of AKP (Arango 2013).
research. The new and productive research field that bridges various aspects of political geography with queer and feminist research (Wright 2010) can benefit from a deeper analysis of articulation of queer identities within security discourses. Therefore, I suggest that research can be done to explore how LGBTQ identities configure within the security paradigm based on a secular/religious divide in the construction of military spaces and the permanent military personnel.

Finally, I argue that new research projects are most in demand due to the challenges that political Islam, or Islamic revivalism, pose to secular and civilian politics both in Turkey and globally. While the AKP government has garnered its political power and authority more strongly in the past decade, concerns regarding the global rise of “Islamic fundamentalism” have reached another level. This makes understanding the tension between the secular and religious in shaping politics all the more necessary. Defined as the rise of Islamophobia in global North and the militant revamp of Islamist politics in public space within the domestic context in Turkey, the construction of the “Islamic” other still requires deep and careful analysis. The Western security agendas and international politics still operate through a problematic discourse that vilifies Islamic communities and religious groups and practices in public space based on the assumed epistemic incompatibility of Islam with Western modernity.

Therefore, I suggest that a more serious engagement is necessary in order to understand these currently emerging and sharpening discursive terrains where the “Islamic other” constitutes the key subject. In the context of the global North, this urgency comes from the increasing centrality that the “radicalized” Islamist subject is gaining in security discourses and in regulation of public space and politics through secularism. This issue requires immediate
attention as it constitutes another arena whereby secularism operates as a regulatory and oppressive governmental regime and a form of governance. In Turkey, this urgency is rooted in the dramatic incursions of religious discourse into the public sphere and politics. The reaction to the secularist appropriation of public space and politics that I examined through the Turkish military is now causing a more escalated level of anxiety and crisis in politics, in which religious discourse is perceived as an authoritarian and oppressive form of governance. Understanding what constitutes “Islamic” and “religious” is therefore important in order not to lapse back into a secular/religious divide. I therefore argue that exploration of religious identities and complication of the religious/secular divide from the assumed position of the “Islamic” other is crucial for future research.
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Appendices

Appendix A: Interview Guides

A1: Interviews with Association Members
For the interviews I will conduct with the associations:

1) Who established this association? When and where?
   a. How many branches do you have? Which locations?
   b. What is the number of your membership?

2) What is the main purpose for the establishment of this association?
   a. (To ESEY and TEMAD) Does your organization have any formal relation to the military as an institution?
   b. (To ASDER) Do you hold any ties with the military apart from your members’ once being a part of it?

3) Who can be a member of this association and benefit from its functions?
   a. (To ESEY and TEMAD) Do you (can you) have any members who are currently working as professionals within the military? Why and Why not?
   b. (To ASDER) Do you have any members who are currently members of the military?
   c. (To ASDER) Is your membership formed only of the former military personnel who have had problems with the military?
      i. If no, How do you define your membership profile?
      ii. If Yes, What kind of problem or dispute does the member need to have in order to become a member?

4) What kind of activities and facilities do you organize? How often?
   a. Are the activities geared towards to exchanging views about certain issues regarding the membership and/or politics?
      i. If yes, what kind of issues constitute the agenda?
      ii. If Not, Are the activities geared towards social interaction between the membership?
   b. Are all activities open to all membership and their families?
      i. If Yes, What do you take into consideration for entertaining families during your events? Do you offer anything special to enhance sociability between families?
      ii. If No, How do you decide who gets to attend?

5) Who is invited to the activities and events?
   a. Do they have to be from the membership? If not, How do you decide whom to invite?
   b. Do you organize joint events with other associations? If Yes, with what other kind of associations do you work with? What kind of criteria do you hold in making these decisions?
6) What kind of media do you use to publicize events?
   a. Website or newsletter? How often do you publish/update?
   b. For what purposes do you use these channels?
      i. Do you publicize news about these events and organizations?
      ii. Do you use it for publication of political discussions?

7) Does your association hold a particular political agenda? What kind?

8) Do you try to open space, in your events and organizations, for political discussions in your events?
   a. If Yes, Do you think political discussions create tensions or attractions between the membership?
   b. If No, How do you control or introduce limits to these social spaces?

Appendix A2: Interviews with Wives and Daughters of COs and NCOs
For the semi-structured in-depth interviews the following themes/topics will be introduced to the research participants:

1) Theme: The general experience of inhabiting military lodgings or using military facilities. Life-style and the social environment.
   Questions:
   a. What is your experience with military spaces? Have you resided in military spaces? Or Have you made use of them while living outside of military spaces. (For the interviewees who resided in military spaces)
   b. Do you think there are differences between living in military lodgings and living in the city? If Yes, What kind of differences can you name?
   c. Have you experienced any benefits to living in military spaces? If Yes, What kind?
   d. Are there any criteria you have to meet in order to take residence within the military? (Such as the number of years your husband has to serve within the military or so)
   e. Do you think living in a military space entails a particular lifestyle? If Yes, Could you please elaborate? (For the interviewees who did not reside in military spaces)
   f. Not living in military spaces: Was it a choice or a matter of convenience/opportunity? What were the reasons and/or motives for making this kind of choice?
   g. Have you made use of military spaces (social facilities etc.)? What kind? How often?
   h. What do you think of military spaces in general? Did you observe any differences between military spaces depending on their location in a city or a small town? (In terms of the facilities they offer and entrance regulations as well)
   i. What kind of residential areas did you choose to reside outside of the military? (Criteria based on income level, lifestyle, community, security or closeness to the work place, etc.)

2) Theme: Feelings about representing the military as a woman. Reflections on the attitudes and appearances/clothing.
   Questions:
a. Does it feel different being a military family member? How? If No, Do you think people see you in a particular way because you belong to a military family? How?
b. Do you think being a military family member creates a sense of community? How?
   i. If yes. Do you think this changes depending if you live in or outside of military spaces?
   ii. If No, What are the obstacles do you think in front of community formation? (i.e. What stops this group of people from being a community if your understanding?)
c. Do you think being a woman in military spaces has specific entailments considering the military as a male dominated institution/space? How?
   i. Also if Yes, Do you think it changes according to the rank of one’s husband or father or the location/significance of the military zone? How?
d. How do you think women socialize in military spaces? (friend groups, social gatherings etc.)
e. (If visited or lived in military spaces) Did you encounter any remarks or regulations regarding clothing or decorum in military spaces? What kind?
f. What is your experience with clothing preference in military spaces? Did you ever feel you need to dress in a specific manner because you are within a military space or while visiting a military space? How?
   a. If Yes, Do you remember any example (incidence) regarding this issue?

3) Theme: Different uses of the spaces within the military, such as residential, entertainment, leisure, work.
Questions:
   a. What kind of military spaces have you been to/made use of?
   b. When you resided in military lodgings, have you utilized any other social facilities within the military? If yes, what were the advantages or limitations? If No, Why?
   c. Did you realize any differences between the types of spaces in terms of who has access to them or regulations around how to use them? What kind? (Interviewees who have previously resided in military spaces while wearing a headscarf)
   d. When you were living in the residences, how did you socialize? What kind of social facilities did you have access to and felt comfortable to do so?
   e. While you resided outside of the military spaces, did you make use of military facilities? Why? Why not?

4) Theme: Entrance regulations. The kinds of regulations/arrangements they encounter.
Questions:
   a. While residing in military spaces or making use of them from outside, what kind of entrance regulations did you encounter?
   b. What is your experience with these entrance regulations? How? (feelings of restraint or limitation?)
c. Did you observe any transformations in the entrance regulations since first you got to know them? *If yes,* What kind of changes did you observe?

d. Do you know of any person who has been restrained by entrance regulations different than your experience? How?

e. Why do you think these entrance regulations are in place, apart from security reasons?

f. Do you know of any variations between entrance regulations depending on the location or strategic significance or the popularity of the urban location?

5) **Theme:** The headscarf issue in military spaces.

**Questions:**

a. What do you think of the regulations on the headscarf in military spaces? What do you think is the reason behind such precaution?

b. Can women wearing headscarves access military spaces at all? Did you experience in the past or now any headscarved women accessing these spaces? *If Yes,* what kind of spaces within the military do they access?

c. Have you experienced any difference in the implementations of headscarf regulations in different spaces within the military? What kind?

*(To interviewees who do not wear the headscarf)*

d. What is your experience in sharing the same spaces with headscarved women within the military spaces?

e. How do you think the political discussions on the headscarf in public space have affected the lives of women living in military space?

*(To interviewees who wear the headscarf)*

f. What is your experience about the headscarf regulations within military spaces?

g. How, do you think, it has affected the lives of women in military spaces?

h. How, do you think it affects women’s lives who reside outside of military spaces? How?

6) **Theme:** The potential problems/tensions that may arise in relation to entrance regulations, strategies for dealing with the restrictions/problems.

**Questions:**

a. Have you ever experienced a situation where you needed to negotiate (for yourself or someone close to you) with the military authorities regarding the entrance regulations? How?

b. Have you witnessed any conflict or tension within your family arising from the regulations in military spaces? Why and how?

c. Do you ever think that the regulations had extending affect in to your everyday lives? (such as extended family members who cannot enter due to the restrictions)

d. Have you experienced any discussion regarding these issues within the close community around you? How?

e. How do you think people (women) deal with these situations? How do they cope with these situations? What kind of strategies and negotiations do women develop?
7) **Theme:** The ways these issues are taken up within the friends and family circles.

   **Questions:**
   a. Did you ever think that the headscarf issue within military spaces has fed into your personal relationships within your family and friends circles? How?
   b. Have you experienced any issues arising from the headscarf regulations within your social circle? What Kind?

8) **Theme:** The attitude of the military towards religion. Practising religion within military spaces.

   **Questions:**
   a. What do you think of the attitude of the military towards religion?
   b. What is your experience about practicing religion in military spaces? Does it show variation according to different military spaces such as the Officer’s club or residential areas? How?
   c. What kind of regulations/spaces does the military offer for religion within its boundaries?
   d. What is your experience with the regulations on religion in military spaces?
   (To the interviewees who wear the headscarf and who do not belong to the military anymore)
   e. What is your experience regarding practising religion within military spaces?
   f. Did your experiences transform the ways you perceived religion and your clothing preferences? How?

9) **Theme:** The headscarf, clothing and sexuality

   **Questions:**
   a. Do you think the headscarf debates made you more conscious of the way you dress? How?
      i) Do you think you started paying more attention to the ways you dress while going into military spaces or in general? *If yes, what were your major concerns and motives?*
      ii) Do you think your clothing preferences vary according to the kind of military spaces you plan on attending?
      (To the interviewees who wear the headscarf)
   b. Do you think these debates got you consider the meaning of wearing a headscarf?
   c. Have you experienced any debates or discussions among your family or friends circle regarding the meaning of wearing a headscarf for women? How?

**Appendix A3: Interviews with Mothers and Wives of Rank-Soldiers**

Themes for the semi-structured interviews with women in the families of rank soldiers:

1) **Theme:** How they came to interact with the military in particular (through the military service of their husbands/sons) and in broader terms (military as an institution).

   **Questions:**
a. What is the status of your relationship to the military? How do you define it? Is it through
the male family member who is doing military service? How would you define your
perception of the military apart from that?
b. Have you had any interaction with the military spaces before your son/husband/brother
started their military service? How?

2) Themes: Their experiences particular to the time period of the military service, either in the
form of visits to military headquarters, oath-taking ceremonies, or funerals.

Questions:

a. What kind of spaces/events have you attended in relation to the military? (either through
a visit to the military headquarters, oath-taking ceremonies or funerals)
b. What is your general experience in participating in these spaces? What do you think of
regulations introduced by the military? (either in entering these spaces or appropriation
of public spaces for the military – such as the funerals)

3) Theme: Their experiences in terms of clothing and bodily representation. (Regulations
regarding dressing style, either non-written or strictly regulated.)

Questions:

a. What was your experience in clothing and decorum related regulations in the interactions
you had with the military?
b. Do you think you received different treatment regarding your clothing which may show
your religious preferences? How?

4) Theme: Their understanding of their roles or positions towards the military, through the male
family member who is doing military service.

Question: What do you think of your role as a mother/spouse/sister of a soldier? What do you
think is expected from you in these positions? How do you think you fit into these expectations?
How do you think your clothing preferences factor into this?
Appendix B: List of Interviewees

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Appendix C: Informed Consent forms, English and Turkish

Informed Consent Form

Date:

Study Name: Exploration of Secular Spaces Through Bodies

Researcher: Hulya Arik

Graduate Student, Ross Building South 413B, Department of Geography, York University

Purpose of the Research: With this study, I aim to answer questions on the construction of the female body and sexuality within the context of secularism and militarism in Turkey. This will form the basis for my doctoral dissertation. (Please see the following page)

What You Will Be Asked to Do in the Research: Participants will be asked to take some of their time away from daily activities, approximately 1-2 hours, to discuss issues and activities related to their experiences of living in military spaces or being related to the military as a female person. As much as they volunteer to, they will be asked to share their feelings on their experiences that formed their political perspectives on “political Islam” and “secularism”.

Risks and Discomforts: We do not foresee any risks or discomfort from your participation in the research.

Benefits of the Research and Benefits to You: Benefits could include sense of satisfaction in helping to document baseline data in the area so as to assess future changes.

Voluntary Participation: Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and you may choose to stop participating at any time. Your decision not to volunteer will not influence the nature of your relationship with the researcher or with York University either now, or in the future.

Withdrawal from the Study: You can stop participating in the study at any time, for any reason, if you so decide. Your decision to stop participating, or to refuse to answer particular questions, will not affect your relationship with the researchers, York University, or any other group associated with this project. In the event you withdraw from the study, all associated data collected will be immediately destroyed.

Confidentiality: All information you supply during the research will be held in confidence and unless you specifically indicate your consent, your name will not appear in any report or publication of the research. Data will be collected by handwritten notes and when possible, digitally recorded. Afterwards, notes will be typed and saved to a password-protected, separate hard drive and only research staff will have access to this information. The data will be stored until the completion of PhD project and after completion it will be kept on a password-protected drive in locked locker. Five years after the completion of the PhD data files will be deleted completely. Confidentiality will be provided to the fullest extent possible by law.

Questions About the Research? If you have questions about the research in general or about your role in the study, please feel free to contact me or my Graduate Supervisor Prof. [ ] either by telephone at [ ] or by e-mail. Also, you can contact the Geography Graduate Program Office at York University with questions by telephone at [ ] or by email at [ ]. This research has been reviewed and approved by the Human Participants Review Sub-Committee, York University’s Ethics Review Board and conforms to the standards of the Canadian Tri-Council Research Ethics guidelines. If you have any
questions about this process, or about your rights as a participant in the study, please contact the Sr. Manager & Policy Advisor for the Office of Research Ethics, 5th Floor York Research Tower, York University (telephone: 416-736-5914 or e-mail: ).

Legal Rights and Signatures:

I (fill in your name here), consent to participate in (insert study name here) conducted by (insert investigator name here). I have understood the nature of this project and wish to participate. I am not waiving any of my legal rights by signing this form. My signature below indicates my consent.

Signature ___________________________ Date ________________

Participant

Signature ___________________________ Date ________________

Principal Investigator

Description of the Study

This research investigates the gendered aspects of convergence of militarism and secularism by looking at the experiences of women in military families. Turkish military has been an important actor for defending secularism against the rise of political Islam in the past few decades and it has taken several forms of actions in order to do that. These have varied from making direct political intrusions to regulation of the personnel and their families in their public appearances. In this matter, the debates on the ban on Muslim women’s headscarf at higher education and public employment have been significant for the military, as well. The military has taken women’s headscarf as religious symbol and banned it at its own social spaces, which can be considered as common spaces, or a ‘quasi-public space’, intended only for the military personnel and their families. From a feminist perspective this research aims to address the experiences of the female members of military families who have gone through the limitations induced by the military. I will try to understand how women’s experiences are shaped in relation to secularist or Islamist understanding and configurations of spaces and the forms of limitations and violences that these ideological constructions impose on the female body.
Bilgilendirme Onay Formu

Tarih:

Arastırmının adı: Beden Uzerinden Seküler Mekanların Arastırılması

Arastırmacı: Hulya Arik

Doktora Ögrencisi, Ross Building South 413B, Department of Geography, York University, Toronto, Kanada

Arastırmının Amacı: Bu çalışma ile militarizm ve laiklik ekseninde kadın kimliğin, bedeninin ve cinselligin nasıl oluşturulduğunu araştırmayı amaçlamaktayım. Bu çalışma doktora tezimin temelini oluşturacaktır. (Lütfen 2. Sayfayi okuyunuz)

Bu Araştırmada sizden beklenen: Katılımcıdan günlük yaşamından 1-2 saat süren ayırmaları ordu mekanlarındaki yaşamaları veya ordu ile aileleri üzerinde kurdukları ilişkileri ile ilgili deneyimlerini paylaşmalari için edilecektir. Paylaşmak istedikleri kadardıra sekülerizm ve siyasal İslam ile ilgili görüşlerini oluşmasını sağlayan deneyimlerini ve hislerini aktarmalari beklenedir.

Risiler ve Olumsuzluklar: Katılımcının bu araştırma çerçevesinde herhangi bir risk veya olumsuzluk ile karşılaşıması beklenmemektedir.

Arastırmının Katılımcıya Katılımları: Huzur arastırılmamış, politik onemli sahip ve bir çok insanın hayatını etkileyen bu konunun feminist bir araştırma çerçevesinde incelenmesine katkıda bulunuyor olmak.


Etik Talimatları standartlarına göre onaylanmıştır. Bu konuda veya katılmci olarak bu araştırmadaki haklarınız hakkında sorunuz varsa luften Etik Arastırmaları Ofisi Yönetimi ve Police Danışmanlığı ile temasaya geçiniz: 5th Floor York Research Tower, York University (telefon 00 e-posta cccccc)

Yasal Haklar ve İmzalar:

Ben, __________________________ Hulya Arik tarafından yürütülen Beden Uzerinden Sekuler Mekanların Araştırılması isimli çalışmaya katılımaya rıza gösteriyorum. Çalışmanın kapsamını anladım ve katılmayı kabul ediyorum. Asağıdaki imza katılmayı kabul ettigimimi gösterir.

____________________________
Katılmci

____________________________
Araştırmacı

Araştırmانın Tanımı

Bu çalışma ordu mensup ailelerdeki kadınların deneyimlerine bakarak militarizm ve sekülerizmin toplumsal cinsiyete (kadınlık/ erkeklik tahayyülere) etki eden yönlerini araştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Son çeyrek asırda Türk ordusu güçlenen siyasal İslam akımı karşısında sekülerizmi savunmayı hedefyen önemli bir unsur olma özelliğini de de bunun için önemli adımlar atmıştır. Bunlar direk olarak siyasal düzleme etki etmekten, kendi personelinin ve ailelerinin, onların yaşadıkları orduya ait sosyal mekânların düzenlemesine kadar uzanmaktadır. Bu aşamada, özellikle “turban sorunu” kapsamında kamusal alanda dini sembollerin tartışıması da Türk ordusunun hakkındaki politik söylemlerin gündemine oturmuştur. Feminist bir bakış açısıyla bu araştırma ordu mensuplarının ailelerindeki kadınların deneyimlerini, türbanlı veya başörtülü olup da olmasın, kadın bedeni üzerinden yapılan kamusal alan tartışmalarına isik tutmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu araştırmанın sonuçlarına dayanarak mekânların seküler veya İslami olarak tahayyülü çerçevesinde kadınların deneyimlerini nasıl şekillendiğini, çeşitli ideolojilerin kadın bedeninde nasıl ifade bulunduğunu ve de bunun genel anlamda erkek egemen düzene, ataerkil düzene nasıl katkıda bulunduğunu irdelemeyi amaçlıyorum.
Appendix D: Copy of the leaked security document

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