

Planning and Injustice in Tel-Aviv/Jaffa

Urban Segregation in Tel-Aviv's First Decades

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Abstract

This major paper attempts to establish the sources of ethnic segregation in Tel-Aviv-Jaffa, Israel, through a comparative study of the city's development and that of Casablanca, Morocco; through historical research specific to Tel-Aviv's development prior to the establishment of the State of Israel and the city's unification with Jaffa; and through the case study of a segregated neighbourhood in the city's heart. This study is informed mainly by Lorenzo Veracini's theorization of settler-colonialism and Carl Nightingale's work on segregation. Settler-colonialism's imperative to control the land and the population economy relies on continuous and expanding segregation. Both of these imperatives in turn benefit the real-estate economy, and all three rely on a planning framework as their rationalization and as a solution for their internal and mutual contradictions. The population hierarchy that developed under pre-state Zionism and after the formation of Israel relied on a division between Jews and non-Jews, as well as between ethnic classes of Jews. An exploration of this latter division is central to this work, and relies on insights from several Israeli scholars, as well as on Edward Said's conception of orientalism.

Tel-Aviv, as a settler-colonial city, has relied on a buffer population of internal others to mediate its antagonistic relations with its progenitor, Jaffa, and the artificial social hierarchy thus created has had its own internal contradictions with repercussions that reverberate to this day. Tel-Aviv both drew from Zionism's ideology and helped shape it as it quickly became Palestine's largest Jewish settlement and the centre of Zionist institutions in Palestine.

This paper's relevance is heightened by the recent political and cultural resurgence in Israel of Palestinian and subaltern Jewish groups, including the more established Mizrahi population, as well as more recent immigrant groups such as Ethiopian- and Russian-Israelis. A study of the historical sources

of segregation could form the basis for an understanding of its contemporary manifestations, as well as inform attempts at its dissolution.

Foreword

This Major Research Paper is the culmination of two years of study towards a Master's degree in the Planning stream of Environmental Studies at York University. I have long had an interest in urban planning, but had not pursued it academically and professionally for a variety of reasons. However, a year of interning at the Israeli parliament (the Knesset) under Member of Knesset Dov Khenin, during which I worked on transportation issues, as well as on general correspondence with the public, exposed me to planning issues, especially the negative side of planning. I saw how planning was used as a tool to further marginalize the disenfranchised, and to maintain an ethnic hierarchy through unequal allocation of resources and discriminatory practices, though always with the appearance of order and procedure. Such was the case of several Palestinian towns that were denied approval of their town planning schemes—and consequently, any new developments—with the excuse that they were not connected to a sewage treatment facility, despite the fact that the municipalities blocking the construction of such a facility were Jewish, some of them in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and which themselves were not prevented from approving new developments.

It was with this in mind that I chose “Planning and Injustice” as the area of concentration of my plan of study, with the intent of studying planning from a critical perspective. Through coursework and independent reading at FES, I was introduced to the history of planning as a regressive tool in a wide range of contexts, and to the social, geographical, and historical processes that formed the background to this history. The insights gained from this learning process allowed me to look at current planning processes through a critical lens, and to seek their historic origins, which led me to look at segregation in Tel-Aviv-Jaffa and to try to discover its roots. Through my research I discovered that modern segregation has its roots in economic and ideological processes, stemming in the case of Israel/Palestine from the intersection of settler-colonialism and the real-estate industry. A field-experience internship with Israeli

planning-rights NGO *Bimkom* during the summer of my first year of studies exposed me to several cases of unequal treatment of Jewish and Palestinian localities, including neighbouring towns and mixed cities. Through this work I realized that the planning institutions in Israel promote an uneven development of the two populations, with differential allocations of planning rights and land uses. This uneven development relies at its core on physical and economic segregation, thus allowing planning decisions to appear rational and place-based, rather than ethnic-based.

Lorenzo Veracini's theorization on settler-colonialism and Carl Nightingale's work on segregation form the basis of my discussion in this work. Settler-colonialism's imperative to control the land and the population economy relies on continuous and expanding segregation. Both of these imperatives in turn benefit the real-estate economy, and all three rely on a planning framework as their rationalization and to solve their internal and mutual contradictions. The population hierarchy that developed under pre-state Zionism and after the formation of Israel relied on a division between Jews and non-Jews, as well as between ethnic classes of Jews. An exploration of this latter division is also central to my work, and relies on several Israeli scholars, as well as on Edward Said's conception of orientalism.

In the preparation of this paper I am indebted to several people. My academic supervisor Stefan Kipfer, who helped me not only with finding a direction for this specific paper, but also through his teaching sparked in me an interest in historical and comparative processes, and for his critical engagement, encouragement, and feedback. I am also indebted to my advisor, L. Anders Sandberg, and to Ute Lehrer and Roger Keil from the Faculty of Environmental Studies at York University, and to Laam Hae from the Department of Political Science at York, all of whom have taught me so much. I am further indebted to Dov Khenin for showing me that it is possible to tirelessly fight for a better world, and succeed against overwhelming odds. This work would not have been possible without the previous work of all of the scholars referenced in it, to whom I am grateful for sharing their wisdom. I would also like to thank my union, CUPE 3903, for the solidarity and for constantly fighting to make the university a better

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Introduction

The main research question of this paper is: What was the space and place of internal others in the early days of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa?¹

Tel-Aviv has its roots in a small group of Jews from the city of Jaffa, including both *Mizrahi*² (of North African, Asian, and Balkan origins) and *Ashkenazi* (of Central and Eastern European origins) Jews, yet it soon developed into an Ashkenazi city, with Mizrahi Jews segregated in buffer neighbourhoods. It is my intent in this research paper to explore ethnic relations in the early formation of the city of Tel-Aviv, and how they are reflected in the built environment of contemporary Tel-Aviv-Jaffa.

To prepare for this major paper, I undertook an extensive reading program on themes of urban planning, segregation, colonialism and settler-colonialism, as well as historic material pertaining specifically to Tel-Aviv/Jaffa. In addition, I undertook more than a month of primary research at the Tel-Aviv-Jaffa municipal archives, during which I read source material on the management and planning of the city during its first decades, concentrating specifically on the first two decades between 1909 and 1929, which saw the city grow from a small garden suburb to a populous coastal town, but also from a separatist neighbourhood trying to come to its own under Ottoman rule, to a city trying to assert its dominance over its surroundings under the shift to a British Mandate rule. The archival research was concentrated mostly on minutes of municipal council meetings, though planning documents were also consulted. I believe this paper would have benefited from a more extensive archival research program, in terms of both time and scope, incorporating other sources from the Tel-Aviv-Jaffa archives, from other archives in Israel, and perhaps from Archives in the UK and Turkey, where an outside look at

¹ Throughout this paper, when referring to the unified municipality of Tel-Aviv and Jaffa, I will use the official Tel-Aviv-Jaffa naming convention. However, for the title I chose to use Tel-Aviv/Jaffa, to connote that they two cities are still separate ideologically and discursively, and were physically and administratively separate during the first half of the 20th century, to which period most of this paper refers.

² In this instance I use the term *Mizrahi*, which is the currently prevailing label for this diverse group. However, several terms are, and have been used for the same group, including *Sephardim*, and *Arab-Jews*. A good historical analysis of the evolution of the terminology is provided by Goldberg (2008) and Lehmann (2008).

processes occurring in Tel-Aviv could have provided a different perspective. A decade of living in Tel-Aviv-Jaffa, in central and southern neighbourhoods as well as in Jaffa itself, has resulted in an attachment to the city's eccentric and seemingly unplanned layout, but also in many questions on its historic origin that were not answered by the official historiography of a city born from the sands a short century ago. Two years of study toward a Master's degree in the Urban Planning stream of the Faculty of Environmental Studies at York University have enabled me to answer some of these questions, but also raised countless more.

The common story told about planning's evolution as a field of study and practice is that it developed as a progressive response to issues of health and safety in the late-19th and early-20th centuries. However, many scholars have shown that planning has been used as a regressive tool for social control and for the accumulation of capital by elites.³ Throughout this work, I will attempt to highlight examples of urban planning's regressive aspects as it came to be expressed in Tel-Aviv-Jaffa.

Understanding Israel to be a settler-colonial state is imperative to the study of the spatial dynamics within it, and several writers provide a theoretical framework for its understanding,⁴ while others have concentrated specifically on the urban colonial question.⁵ Lorenzo Veracini, one of the foremost scholars on settler-colonialism, posits that one of the central requirements and characteristics of settler-colonial polities is "the exercise of autonomous control over indigenous and exogenous others: keeping both at bay, or selectively distributing the right to reside within the bounds of the settler polity."⁶ Even before they established their own state, and while they were living under the political rule of others, Zionists insisted on and implemented this policy through the creation of autonomous settlements—urban and rural—whose populations were strictly controlled.

³ Flyvbjerg, 1996; Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002; Yiftachel, 1998; Nightingale, 2012; Abu-Lughod, 1980

⁴ Cooper, 2005; Fanon, 2007; Veracini, 2006, 2010

⁵ Abu-Lughod, 1980; King, 1990; Kipfer, 2007; Wright, 1987

⁶ Veracini, 2006, p. 67

Another systemic contributor to spatial dynamics is racism, as theorized by Lipsitz⁷ and Nightingale.⁸ Nightingale traces the history of segregation to the dawn of cities themselves, but draws a distinction between the earlier segregations that were prevalent throughout most of urban history, and the racial forms it took beginning with European colonialism. He sees racial segregation as originating in a colonial reality but drawing on metropolitan practices of economic segregation, with both forms drawing from each other ideologically and intellectually. Nightingale's analysis places the birth of urban racial segregation in the relationship between London and Calcutta, whose colonial relationship brought into being the three institutions that would enable segregation to spread to other parts of the world: modern government institutions, networks of intellectual exchange, and the modern capitalist real-estate industry, which especially since the late 19th century has become dependent on the urban planning profession.⁹

One of the foremost scholars on regressive planning practices within a settler-colonial context in Israel is Oren Yiftachel, who formulated the concept of ethnocracy. Within an ethnocracy, a façade of democracy conceals a non-democratic seizure of the country's territory and institutions by one ethnic group to further its interests, power, and resources.¹⁰ Alexander (Sandy) Kedar, a frequent collaborator with Yiftachel, has shown how legal geography has played a major part in dispossessing one ethnic group of its land title and transferring ownership of it to another ethnic group.¹¹ Another contributor to the study of the legal geography of Israel/Palestine is Robert Home, whose time scale is broader than Kedar's.¹² Describing spatial injustice, Yiftachel developed the concept of 'gray spaces' as being those

⁷ Lipsitz, 2007, 2011

⁸ Nightingale, 2012

⁹ Nightingale, 2012, p. 5

¹⁰ Yiftachel, 1999

¹¹ Forman & Kedar, 2004; Kedar, 2003

¹² Home, 2003

spaces between the “‘whiteness’ of legality/approval/safety, and the ‘blackness’ of eviction/destruction/death”.¹³

Within the framework of the Israeli ethnocracy, the dominant group is commonly believed to be Jews in general. However, it is one group of Jews—those of Eastern European (Ashkenazi) extraction—which has dominated the pre-state and state apparatuses, marginalizing both the indigenous Palestinians and Jews of Asian, North African, and Balkan (Mizrahi or *Sephardi*) —and more recently of Ethiopian and Russian—origins.¹⁴ The pre-Mandate Jewish population of Palestine included a large Mizrahi population, of whom a large proportion—if not the majority—supported either an Ottoman or an Arab identity as opposed to the Zionist one.¹⁵ One of the purposes of this paper is to localize this internal conflict of the Jewish population of Palestine to the Tel-Aviv-Jaffa area. Edward Said’s conceptualization of Orientalism¹⁶ can be used to describe the attitude of the Zionist Ashkenazi ruling class toward the Mizrahi population, as recent scholarship has shown.¹⁷

A historical and comparative analysis is important for understanding urban processes, finding connecting threads, as well as gaining differing and sometimes competing perspectives.¹⁸ Several writers have written thought-provoking historical geographic analyses of Israel/Palestine. Mark LeVine has conducted an in-depth study of the colonial history of Tel-Aviv and Jaffa;¹⁹ Daniel Monterescu recently published a study of contemporary Jaffa and its contradictions;²⁰ Sharon Rothbard writes about the myth of Tel-Aviv as the ‘White City,’ concealing a ‘Black City’ both in its history as well as in its contemporary south;²¹ Yossi Katz has written about the Zionist origins of Tel-Aviv;²² and Benny Morris

¹³ Yiftachel, 2009

¹⁴ Massad, 1996; Shenhav, 2006; Shohat, 1988, 1999; Yonah & Saporta, 2002

¹⁵ Jacobson, 2003; Klein, 2014; Behar & Ben-Dor Benite, 2014

¹⁶ Said, 1978

¹⁷ Hazkani, 2015; Raz-Krakotzkin, 2005

¹⁸ Hay, 2000; Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003

¹⁹ LeVine, 2005

²⁰ Monterescu, 2015

²¹ Rothbard, 2014

²² Katz, 1986

and Ilan Pappé have both published books on the Palestinian dispossession during the *Nakba* [Arabic for Catastrophe]/1948 War.²³ Janet Abu-Lughod's history of Rabat, Morocco, provides an in-depth look at historical urban processes in that city specifically, but also in Morocco in general.²⁴

From its early conception, Tel-Aviv was to be an ordered Jewish suburb, based on the ideals of Ebenezer Howard's Garden Cities. This order was to include both its built form, and its population make-up, which was envisioned as "100% Hebrew," a vision that would be enshrined in the suburb's regulations, which "forbade selling or letting houses in the Tel-Aviv suburb to Arabs".²⁵ However, we know that early Zionist leaders also saw non-Ashkenazi Jews as a threat to the Zionist project and stressed the importance of physical separation.²⁶ The question to be answered in this work is whether Tel-Aviv developed with the same 'ideals' as those held by the wider Zionist movement.

Ever since Ashkenazi Jews, those of Central and Eastern European origin, became a numerical majority and the hegemonic group within Palestine's Jewish community in the late-19th and early-20th centuries, other Jewish groups living there have been labelled in relation to them, rather than as a result of an historical-cultural analysis. One such label, Sephardic Jews, in fact referred originally to Jews of Spanish extraction. While they lived in the Iberian Peninsula, Jewish communities maintained distinctive regional identities, such as *Castilian*, *Andalusian*, or *Portugesi*, but following the forced conversion and expulsion of Spain's (and several years later, Portugal's) Jews, these diverse communities came to be known by a unified label of Sephardic, for the Hebrew name for Spain since medieval times – Sepharad.²⁷ Following the expulsion of Iberian Jewry in the 1490s, Sephardic Jews spread to different

²³ Morris, 2004; Pappé, 2006

²⁴ Abu-Lughod, 1980

²⁵ Katz, 1986, p. 408

²⁶ Massad, 1996, pp. 54-55. Massad's piece gives several examples of early Zionist notables from across the political spectrum denigrating 'Oriental' Jews, and advocating for segregation from them and against miscegenation with them. Another piece dealing with this subject is Ella Shohat's *Sephardim in Israel: Zionism from the Perspective of its Jewish Victims*.

²⁷ Goldberg, 2008, p. 169

parts of the Muslim Mediterranean, to Western Europe, and to the Americas,²⁸ where Jewish communities had already existed for centuries and in some cases for millennia. Though they shared several commonalities with these communities, they sometimes maintained their separation from them.²⁹ In addition, there were non-Ashkenazi Jewish communities that had little contact with these Sephardic exiles, including those of Babylonia (modern day Iraq), Persia (Iran), and Yemen. By the late 18th century, as European Orientalism took hold, dividing the world into a Manichaean east/west binary, the division within Jewry also became more binary, partly ignoring locally and culturally specific distinctions in favour of all-encompassing categories. However, this process was in no way complete, and “plural systems of categorization ... coexisted with Orientalist binary perceptions.”³⁰ During the late-19th- and early-20th-century migrations of Jews to Palestine, newcomer communities maintained their cultural distinctions, for example in the case of Yemenite Jews, who saw themselves and were seen by others, both Ashkenazi and Sephardi, as distinct.³¹ However, already in the first decades of the 20th century there were cases of Ashkenazi leaders and workers in Tel-Aviv setting themselves apart (and above) from all other categories of Jews, perhaps beginning a process that would reach its culmination after the establishment of the State of Israel, when the binary distinction would become common categorizations, both colloquially and within government bureaucracy.³²

I noticed the first sign of historical segregation in Tel-Aviv-Jaffa while researching the essay that would become chapter three of this paper. A single line in one of the sources about the displaced communities that would become the residents of the Givat Amal Bet quarter in Tel-Aviv-Jaffa stated that they were refugees from buffer neighbourhoods, and that they were mostly Mizrahi. Having learned the official history of Tel-Aviv as a city of European settlers choosing to build a modern city in the sands, I wondered

²⁸ Lehmann, 2008, p. 82

²⁹ Goldberg, 2008, pp. 169-170; Benbassa & Rodrigue, 2000, p. xix

³⁰ Goldberg, 2008, p. 171

³¹ Goldberg, 2008, pp. 172-173

³² Though the actual terminology used would be debated and changed for decades (Goldberg, 2008, pp. 175-176).

where these Mizrahi settlers came from, and why they were in the buffer neighbourhoods during the 1948 war. Existing critical geographies of the city focused mostly on its relation to the Arab city of Jaffa, from which it grew, and on the relation between the two, both during Tel-Aviv's early years, and following the latter's annexation of Jaffa after the 1948 war. However, I found that there is a lack of literature on the space and place of the southern neighbourhoods in both periods, and on their population. My aim was to find the sources of this ethnic segregation, if it in fact existed. Was this a question of personal choice based on cultural affinity to Arab Jaffa, of economic necessity, or was it that they were not wanted in Tel-Aviv? Though the results of my research are inconclusive, I believe that it shows a clear bias by Tel-Aviv's early leaders and power-brokers against Mizrahi Jews, and a continued policy of neglect applied to their neighbourhoods. I believe there is room to expand on this question, as due to time and resource constraints my research was far from exhaustive, especially as it pertains to primary archival sources.

The research question for this paper has its roots in an assumption that current geographic inequalities in Tel-Aviv-Jaffa are based on ethnicity, with a largely Ashkenazi north dominating a largely Mizrahi south.³³ In order to answer this question, we must first confirm that segregation and inequality exist.

A 2004 analysis of 1,000 respondents in Tel-Aviv found that 63% of those who identify as Ashkenazi³⁴ lived in northern neighbourhoods, while 54% of self-identified Mizrahi and 90% of self-identified Bucharians (Central Asian non-Ashkenazi Jews) lived in southern neighbourhoods, with between 10%-20% of each group living in the central neighbourhoods. Interestingly, African asylum seekers, who could

³³ The marginalization and discrimination of Jaffa's Arabs is not within the scope of this work. For a recent analysis see Monterescu, 2015.

³⁴ 39% of respondents self-identified as "Israelis". "Israelis are those who do not assign themselves any sub-identity either because they were born into ethnically mixed marriages or they are at least three generations in Israel and they chose not to assign their origin any significance." The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, which used different definitions, finds a higher representation of Ashkenazim and Mizrahim in Tel-Aviv-Jaffa than Schnell & Benjamini's survey (Schnell & Benjamini, 2004, p. 452).

be said to occupy the lowest rung of the current Tel-Aviv-Jaffa social ladder, are also concentrated overwhelmingly in the south.³⁵

As for inequality, on the national level, a recent study found that in 2014 Ashkenazi workers' wages were 38% above the national average, while Mizrahi workers' wages were 12% above the national average.³⁶ Another recent study based on Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) data found that 28.8% of second-generation Mizrahi immigrants have a university degree, as opposed to 49.6% of second-generation Ashkenazim, despite both groups having been born in Israel and educated in ostensibly the same education system.³⁷ Within Tel-Aviv-Jaffa, residents and activists in the city's south have complained for decades about the lack of an academic high school in the south, having only technical schools available. The Ministry of Education itself recognized the inequality inherent in the system, and initiated a school integration reform, which saw large numbers of students from the south bussed to schools in the north (but not the other way around). However, rather than integrating, this reform did much to highlight the differences between the two 'classes' of students, and has had less than optimal results.³⁸ In the southern neighbourhood of Neve-Sha'an an 28.2% of residents do not have a high-school matriculation certificate, and only 15.3% have an academic degree. In the northern neighbourhood of Ramat-Aviv Gimel only 8.5% of residents do not have a high-school matriculation certificate, while 45.9% have an academic degree. In Neve-Sha'an an, 27.8% of residents are considered white-collar workers and 34.6% are considered unskilled workers, while in Ramat-Aviv Gimel 72.3% are white-collar and only 1.2% are unskilled.³⁹ A shift to semi-privatized management of Tel-Aviv's schools almost two decades ago, which allows the schools to rent out facilities after hours and use the income as they see

³⁵ Schnell & Benjamini, 2004, p. 454

³⁶ Swirski et al, 2015, p. 14. Arab workers' wages were 29% below the national average. Mizrahi and Ashkenazi in the survey refer to Israeli-born second-generation.

³⁷ Kashti, O. (2015, November 9). Study: Mizrahi-Ashkenazi Higher-Ed Gaps Wider than Ever. *Haaretz*. Retrieved from: <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.684990>.

³⁸ Dorfman et al., 1994

³⁹ "Sub-Quarter," 2013, paras. 9-10

fit, has shown that current inequalities will only be exacerbated: southern primary schools earn an average of 7,853 New Israeli Shekels (NIS) a year under this scheme, while northern primary schools average an income of 125,741 NIS. Southern high schools earn 32,200 NIS on average, compared to the 178,450 NIS on average earned by northern high schools.⁴⁰

The following work is divided into three chapters: Chapter 1 is a comparative historical narrative of the development of Tel-Aviv and of Casablanca, Morocco. The two cities developed as European colonial outgrowths of traditional Arab cities along similar timelines. As such, they were informed by the same climate of modernist colonial planning, as well as by similar notions of European exclusivity and the need for segregation from 'native' cities. However, the two cities also developed under different imperatives, with Casablanca developing within a colonialist regime, and Tel-Aviv developing within the logic of settler-colonialism. Therefore, though similarities are helpful, it is the dissimilarities that best help to explain the dynamics of development. In conducting this comparison, I try to locate the place of internal others in both cities, both literally and figuratively, as a buffer population between the colonizing Europeans and the indigenous majority. Chapter 2 provides a more in-depth study of the space and place of Mizrahi Jews in Tel-Aviv during its formative years. As stated above, there is a lack of primary data and secondary knowledge on this specific issue, and therefore this chapter will include the primary sources I could find, as well as secondary sources that are partly not Tel-Aviv specific, but which, by pointing to certain tendencies within the larger Jewish establishment and community in Palestine, could shed some light on processes within Tel-Aviv itself. Chapter 3 is a historic study of the aforementioned Givat Amal Bet neighbourhood, which was a Palestinian farming village before Tel-Aviv expanded around it, and whose residents were displaced during the 1948 war only to be replaced by Jewish refugees from the city's southern neighbourhoods. This neighbourhood was recently the site of a second expulsion, as these refugees and their descendants were removed to make way for a luxury

⁴⁰ "School," 2013, para. 5 and graph

condominium development. I believe that the case of Givat Amal Bet encapsulates and highlights the contradictions of settler-colonial urban development and its segregationist drive within an existing indigenous geography, as well as the underlying role of real-estate in promoting as well as hindering both.

Chapter 1: A Comparative Study of the Early Years of Colonial Casablanca and Tel-Aviv

"The European city is not the prolongation of the native city. The colonizers have not settled in the midst of the natives. They have surrounded the native city; they have laid siege to it. Every exit from the Kasbah...opens on enemy territory" - Frantz Fanon, A Dying Colonialism

Introduction

The early decades of the twentieth century saw the birth and growth of two modern cities, both beginning as 'European' outgrowths of traditional Middle-Eastern walled cities, but in a short time outgrowing and outshining them. While French urban colonialism in Morocco, specifically in Casablanca for the purpose of this paper, was based on a policy of 'association'⁴¹, the Jewish colonization of Palestine, and specifically of Tel-Aviv, was based on what could be termed dissociation, a policy of physical and economic separation and segregation from the indigenous population.

The *Ville Nouvelle* of Casablanca grew out of the city's Muslim *Medina* in a planned process of French colonization, incorporating the lessons learned in the previous century in Algeria and Tunisia. Whereas the urban colonization of Algiers was initially based on the principle of physical assimilation of the indigenous population through the placement of colonists directly within the existing city, the establishment of a French protectorate in Tunisia fifty years later (1881)⁴² already saw the transition to a colonization of association. This transition was fully completed in Casablanca and other French Moroccan cities in the early decades of the twentieth century, when "as resident-general of the new

⁴¹ Wright, 1987, p. 298

⁴² Lewis, 2008, p. 802

protectorate of Morocco between 1912 and 1925, Hubert Lyautey refined his concept of the 'dual city' which we would call a form of geographical 'association.'"⁴³

The new Jewish city of Tel-Aviv grew out of the Arab city of Jaffa, but before the first cornerstone was even laid in the dunes to Jaffa's north, Meir Diezengoff, a Jewish leader of Jaffa and the future first and long-time mayor of Tel-Aviv, boasted about forming a "state within a state" in Jaffa.⁴⁴ During Tel-Aviv's first twelve years, while it was still officially a neighbourhood of Jaffa, its leaders attempted to make it "completely independent", a goal they would achieve through town planning.⁴⁵

In both cities, the different logics of colonialism and settler-colonialism played out differently, but both aspired to a physical and cultural segregation of different populations and both relied on a buffer population to enact their policies. The real-estate industry and professional urban planning had different effects in the two cities, in colonialist Casablanca property speculation interfered with planned segregation, while in settler-colonial Tel-Aviv it helped to promote it.

Historical Background

Both Casablanca and Jaffa have ancient roots, but both cities in the early twentieth century were in the process of recovery from complete destruction visited upon them centuries earlier. Casablanca's predecessor, Anfa, had already existed before the twelfth century, but was destroyed by the Portuguese in the fifteenth century and subsequently abandoned by its population. Three centuries would pass before the city was resurrected in 1770 by Sultan Mohammed ben Abdallah under the name Dar el Beida, though it would remain a minor coastal settlement until the twentieth century.⁴⁶ Jaffa, with a history spanning millennia, was completely destroyed by Salah ad-Din's forces in 1196, and though it

⁴³ Wright, 1987, p. 300

⁴⁴ LeVine, 1998, p. 40

⁴⁵ LeVine, 1998, p. 40

⁴⁶ Puschmann, 2011, p. 47

was rebuilt a couple of centuries later, a 1726 description of it says that “it has no walls, is ‘more like a farm than a city.’”⁴⁷

Precolonial Incorporation into the World Capitalist System

Between 1830 and 1852 Morocco was brought into the world capitalist system after years of self-imposed, mercantilist-motivated isolation in trade. In 1828 grain export restrictions were lifted and in 1831, following growing European demand due to technical innovations in textile production, the restrictions on wool exports were lifted as well. At the same time, imports of goods on a large scale also began, with tea imports skyrocketing from 3,500 kg in 1830 to 300,000 kg in 1840, and sugar imports climbing as well, though at a slower pace. Much of this trade was conducted through Casablanca, which grew in importance relative to older port cities such as Rabat, whose industrial base was undermined by the imported textiles and other manufactured goods.⁴⁸ The import of products such as textiles and candles, and the closing off of traditional trade routes to the Arab east and African south by European colonization led to a drastic change in Morocco’s domestic economy. Reduced demand for cotton by the domestic textile industry and for animal skins by the leather industry undermined the inland nomadic tribes’ economic base, as well as the urban leather and textile manufacturing sectors.⁴⁹

In 1840, the nine-year long Egyptian occupation of Jaffa ended following pressure from European countries, especially England. However, the Egyptian migrants who had followed Ibrahim Pasha’s army and remained behind improved the Jaffa orange groves, making Jaffa’s oranges famous thereafter.⁵⁰ In addition, businessmen from Beirut planted strawberry plantations around the al-Auja (Yarkon) river and

⁴⁷ LeVine, 2005, p. 29

⁴⁸ Abu-Lughod, 1980, pp. 85, 90

⁴⁹ Abu-Lughod, 1980, pp. 106-107

⁵⁰ The Egyptians are also credited with building the first neighbourhood outside the walls of Jaffa, Manshiyye.

set up a silk industry. At the same time, steam ships started frequenting Jaffa's port. A fledgling soap industry was also present in the city at the time, exporting its products to Syria.⁵¹

Lines of communication in Palestine began improving in 1868, with the first road adapted for wheeled carriages paved between Jerusalem and Jaffa, followed the same year by the Jerusalem-Nablus road. The Jaffa-Jerusalem railway, later connected to the Hadjaz railway, was laid between 1890 and 1892.⁵²

In 1885 Jaffa exported 106,000 crates of oranges worth 26,500 pounds,⁵³ that number rising to 200,000 crates worth 83,120 pounds five years later. Total trade in 1886 was valued at 360,435 pounds, and in 1890 at 706,821 pounds. In 1888 the city's walls were dismantled and a customs house was built, as was a boat house to handle increased port activity (Jaffa Port's rocky outcrops prevented docking of large ships, which would anchor offshore to be unloaded by small boats). The dock was enlarged, a new quay was installed, and new warehouses and stores were built by private individuals.⁵⁴

Most of the exports from Jaffa during the second half of the 19th century were of agricultural products to the European market, primarily cereals. Oranges were exported primarily to Egypt and Turkey, until 1873 when exports to Europe began as well. The next most valuable exports were sesame seeds for the European soap industry and olive oil. Cotton grown in the Nablus hills was also exported through Jaffa, especially following the sharp rise in prices on the international market during the Crimean and American Civil Wars. However, once prices dropped sharply in the 1870s exports dropped accordingly.⁵⁵ At the same time, imports of coffee, sugar, and rice increased.⁵⁶

⁵¹ Droyanov, 1936, p. 21

⁵² Bachi, 1976, p. 33

⁵³ The text is not clear about the currency.

⁵⁴ Droyanov, 1936, p. 31

⁵⁵ Owen, 1993, pp. 177-178

⁵⁶ Owen, 1993, p. 179

Prelude to Colonization

By the second half of the 19th century, Casablanca had grown in importance as a trading centre, being set up by European powers as a port to circumvent the Moroccan Sultan's power and becoming Morocco's prime port town by 1906, just before the establishment of the French Protectorate.⁵⁷ Jaffa's resurrection occurred earlier than Casablanca's, spurred by internal struggles for power and prestige within the Ottoman administration. By the early-19th century it had become the most important port in Palestine and by the 1830s new neighbourhoods were being built outside of the old city's walls, as it began to draw Arab immigrants from neighbouring countries as well as Jewish immigrants from both North Africa and Europe.⁵⁸

As the cities grew in size and trade volume, their sea ports began to hinder further growth. Jaffa's port was described in one report as "little more than an open roadstead,"⁵⁹ while Casablanca's port was so shallow that it could only support sloops, forcing steamboats to drop anchor offshore.⁶⁰ In 1906, shortly before official colonization of Morocco began, the European powers decided to expand Casablanca's harbour facilities, exemplifying the economic significance of colonization. In fact, an assault by Moroccans on European labourers employed in the port expansion project would be used as a pretext for a French military occupation of Casablanca beginning in 1907, which along with the military occupation of Oujda on the Algerian border would form the beginning of colonization, culminating in an official protectorate status in 1912.⁶¹ The port of Jaffa, on the other hand, would not be expanded despite several European and Ottoman proposals to that effect.⁶²

European countries tried to increase their influence over both Morocco and Palestine starting in the 18th century. Limited concessions given to European countries in Morocco in the 18th century were

⁵⁷ Puschmann, 2011, p. 48; Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 33

⁵⁸ LeVine, 2005, pp. 31-32

⁵⁹ LeVine, 2005, p. 34

⁶⁰ Puschmann, 2011, p. 48

⁶¹ Puschmann, 2011, pp. 49-50

⁶² LeVine, 2005, p. 34

renewed and extended in 1818, and a series of capitulation agreements were forced on the Sultan, by England in 1856, Spain between 1859 and 1860, and France in 1863.⁶³ France and Spain were negotiating the division of Morocco into respective spheres of influence in 1904,⁶⁴ and in response Kaiser Wilhelm II proclaimed Morocco's independence and integrity during a 1905 visit to Tangier.⁶⁵ European influence in Palestine grew following the Crimean War in 1856, when previously temporary capitulations made by the Ottoman Empire to European Empires became law. One feature of these capitulations was the protégé system, whereby Ottoman subjects could acquire a foreign nationality and the capitulatory privileges that came with it, including tax exemption and legal protection.⁶⁶ The more such protégés they had, the more influence the European powers could gain within the Ottoman Empire, which led to a competition over who would get to grant protective status to the Jews in Palestine.⁶⁷ Though the capitulations enabled European economic penetration into Palestine, political influence was not so easily gained despite the benefits of the protégé system, as local and Ottoman officials resisted it. To gain footholds in the territory, and as part of a struggle for influence, the French and British began to invest in schools and other cultural institutions, which were "considered by both the Ottoman government and the Europeans themselves [as] spearheads of European colonialism and imperial rivalry".⁶⁸ The Zionist colonial movement began to gain a physical foothold in Palestine in the 1880s, setting up 25 agricultural colonies between 1882 and 1905, while plans for an urban Zionist colonization would wait until the middle of the first decade of the 20th century due to a lack of initiatives and sources of funding.⁶⁹

⁶³ Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 85

⁶⁴ Puschmann, 2011, p. 49

⁶⁵ Oteri-Pailos, 1998, para. 15

⁶⁶ A similar protégé system was put in place in Moroccan capitulation agreements, greatly benefitting the local entrepreneurial class (Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 98).

⁶⁷ Oke, 1982, p. 333

⁶⁸ LeVine, 2005, pp. 36, 39

⁶⁹ Katz, 1986, pp. 404

Between 1907 and 1912, through a succession of economic, diplomatic, and military interventions, which in turn led to internal instability within Morocco, the French solidified their hold over Morocco, culminating in the acceptance by the *Makhzen*—Morocco’s governing elite—of a French protectorate over their territory.⁷⁰ In December 1917, British General Edmund Allenby rode his horse into Jaffa, ending centuries of Ottoman rule over the city and its environs and leading the way for the British Mandate of Palestine.⁷¹

Association vs. Dissociation

Colonization of Morocco in General, and Casablanca in particular, provided an opportunity for two professions just emerging in France to find official support for their expertise: urbanism and the social sciences. These social scientists and urbanists, along with the colonial administrators, championed a policy that would be called *association*. The earlier policy practiced in Algiers—assimilation—was based on an assumption of French cultural predominance in language, laws, and architectural style, and on displaying a military prowess through destruction of indigenous cities and towns and maintaining a visible military presence.⁷² This policy came under attack, for moral reasons as well as for pragmatic ones after it was found to be politically and economically inefficient. Association, on the other hand, called for the preservation of local cultural practices, provision of social services, and, assuming that the first two worked to counter local resistance, reliance on a smaller and less visible military presence.⁷³

Notions and practices of French colonial assimilation were introduced in the 17th century, when it was decreed that Indigenous people who converted to Catholicism would “be considered ‘citizens and natural Frenchmen.’” Following the French Revolution, the idea of religious conversion was translated into political assimilation (Betts, 1960, p. 12). The idea of assimilation carries with it its own assumption

⁷⁰ Puschmann, 2011, p. 50

⁷¹ LeVine, 2005, p. 83

⁷² Wright, 1987, p. 298

⁷³ Wright, 1987, p. 299

of French cultural and ideological superiority while calling for the equality of all people (though inevitably at the time, the references were to 'all men'), including subjugated indigenous and indigenized people of the colonies. It is a product of a unique mix of "Humanism, naïveté, and egocentrism."⁷⁴ This was a decidedly unequal equality, reminiscent of George Orwell's 'Animal Farm.'⁷⁵ What constituted as assimilation underwent several changes with the political upheavals in France, with the colonies undergoing a see-saw of emancipation and re-enslavement, representation and its reversal. In the case of Algeria, Emperor Louis Napoleon at first called for assimilation in 1858 to "extinguish" the Arab "armed and mettlesome nationality," only to declare five years later that Algeria was an Arab kingdom under the umbrella of the French Empire.⁷⁶ Though the merits of assimilation vs. association were continually debated in France, even when assimilationist policies were enacted by the metropolitan government for the colonies, and specifically in Algeria, these policies were often not implemented by the local administration in Algeria, which was dominated by French *colons*, who as settler-colonists had different objectives than the metropolitan government.^{77, 78} In the case of Algiers, though assimilation was the espoused colonial policy, the French in fact demolished and remodelled the lower city in their own image, while segregating the Algerian population in the upper Casbah, freezing it in time and space so that it could not develop organically.⁷⁹ When the French conquered Tunisia, they enacted a 'protectorate' status over it for practical reasons, thinking that having a Muslim figurehead as apparent sovereign would quell the eruption of Arab resistance, as well as quell resistance in Paris to further colonization. The relative success of the Tunisian experiment resulted in the protectorate becoming the preferred mode of French colonialism, and the post-facto theorization of the doctrine of

⁷⁴ Gershovich, 2000, p. 20

⁷⁵ "All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others" (Orwell, 2010, p. 112)(Needless to say, It is not my intent to compare any people with animals)

⁷⁶ Lewis, 1962, p. 135

⁷⁷ Heggoy & Zingg, 1976, p. 573.

⁷⁸ A more in-depth definition and analysis of settler-colonialism and its imperatives will be provided in Chapter 2.

⁷⁹ Çelik, 1997, p. 26

association, as opposed to the initial theorizing of assimilation and its subsequent unsuccessful enactment.⁸⁰

Zionist settler-colonization of Palestine, by contrast, would follow a policy that is best defined as dissociation—a purposeful distancing and distinction from the native population, geographically, economically, and administratively. Zionism emerged in Europe in the late 1880s as a Jewish national revival movement, which by the beginning of the 20th century was associated with a colonization of Palestine. Though Jews had lived in Palestine for millennia, and a continuous trickle of Jewish immigrants and pilgrims had always flocked to their historical homeland, Zionist thinkers were not satisfied with simply living in *Eretz Israel* [a traditional Hebrew name for Palestine], they wished to repossess it from an occupation by ‘strangers’.⁸¹ In order to take root in their new-old land they needed to provide a viable economic base for themselves and the large number of Jewish immigrants needed to fulfil their project. However, the Zionist leaders knew that “European Jewish immigrants could never compete with the low wages accepted by Arab workers, and thus sought to create a separate, exclusively Jewish economy.”⁸² While recent European Jewish immigrants were calling for dissociation, some in the more established Sephardic⁸³ Jewish community of Palestine were warning of the “danger of becoming a ‘separate people’ within Palestine.”⁸⁴ Arthur Ruppin, a senior Zionist functionary complained as late as 1914 of the unwillingness of the Jews of Jaffa to display Jewish national solidarity, “which he blamed on the fact that they lived in mixed neighborhoods with Arabs.”⁸⁵

The different approaches taken by the French in Morocco and the Zionists in Palestine are the result of the differing logics of, respectively, *colonialism* and *settler-colonialism*, which are seen as not only

⁸⁰ Gershovich, 2000, p. 23

⁸¹ Pappe, 2006, p. 11

⁸² LeVine, 1995, p. 2

⁸³ Sephardic Jews in Palestine at the time were those Jews who came from lands under Islamic control, and were distinguished from Ashkenazi Jews, who came from Central and Eastern Europe. A more thorough explanation of this division will be provided in Chapter 2.

⁸⁴ Campos, 2005, p. 476; Behar & Ben-Dor Benite, 2014

⁸⁵ Campos, 2005, p. 479

separate, but antithetical.⁸⁶ Colonialism is often represented as something that is exercised over colonized people, while settler-colonialism, often referred to as *colonization*, is exercised over a colonized land, with a disavowal of an indigenous presence.⁸⁷ An indigenous population is indispensable to the colonial experience, whose ultimate aim is the economic exploitation of a foreign territory through the extraction of surplus value, obtained by the mixing of native labour with the land.⁸⁸ In the settler-colonial context, on the other hand, the primary aim is the land itself, and the indigenous population is dispensable, with its future being not exploitation, but replacement.⁸⁹

The different practices of association and dissociation in Casablanca and Tel-Aviv, then, are the results of the different logics of the colonial and settler-colonial regimes practiced in them. In Casablanca, and Morocco in general, the indigenous population was a crucial part of the economic apparatus, and the relatively large number of French and other European settlers was necessary to maintain the exploitative economic relationship, but it never approached the numbers seen in Algeria, which was both colonial and settler-colonial (and thus shows the limits of categorical distinctions between different forms of colonialism). Because the native population was indispensable to the colonial project, its avowed segregation was never practicable. In Tel-Aviv, on the other hand, the main purpose was settlement and not economic exploitation, and therefore there was a need to create a separate economy which would sustain the largest number of settlers possible, even if in purely economic terms this was inefficient.⁹⁰ Therefore, we see in it an almost complete ideological, physical, and economic separation of populations.

⁸⁶ Veracini, 2010, p. 11

⁸⁷ Veracini, 2010, p. 14

⁸⁸ Wolfe, quoted in Veracini, 2006, p. 8

⁸⁹ Wolfe, in Veracini, 2010, p. 8

⁹⁰ For example, the Hope Simpson report, commissioned by the British Government to investigate land settlement, immigration, and development in Palestine in 1930, found that "Zionist settlements [are] not self-supporting," relying on a continued influx of capital by Zionist institutions, as well as forgiveness of debts (Hope-Simpson Report, pp. 34-35, British National Archive, CAB/24/215, pp. 53-54).

Early Colonial Settlement

In 1836, as a response to growing trade with Europe, a customs post was set up in Casablanca, then a “large village of around 1,000 inhabitants.” By the 1850s an undetermined European population was living in the growing town, composed mostly of Spaniards, but including “strong French, German, and British contingents.”⁹¹ By 1866, the town’s population increased to over six thousand, but the vast majority was still Moroccan. Janet Abu-Lughod asserts that it was Moroccan entrepreneurs from the interior, not Europeans, who were responsible for the city’s growing importance, as they tried to gain an advantage over established elites in the country’s traditional port towns. However, these same entrepreneurs were responding to a situation imposed on the country by outside forces, as France captured Algeria and blocked off traditional land trade routes to the north, and trade caravans from the south were being diverted to southern ports.⁹² Furthermore, the movement of rural Moroccans to urban centres was not the result of population pressure, as the natural rate of increase had not gone up at the time. Rather, it was the pressures “created by colonial expansion into the rural hinterlands, and [which] were intensified by the monetization of the tax system.”⁹³

By 1892, the European population increased within the city’s Muslim quarter to such an extent that the Moroccan Sultan Moulay Hassan built a European quarter in the city, Sur al-Jdid. However, this quarter remained empty at the beginning of the 20th century, and following French colonization would become a site for military installations.⁹⁴

Jaffa began attracting relatively large numbers of newcomers—Arabs, Jews, as well as Europeans—in the middle of the 19th century. Among the reasons cited for the city’s growth were improved security along overland trade routes, improvements to naval shipping with the introduction of steam ships, the

⁹¹ Cohen, 2008, p. 1014

⁹² Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 98

⁹³ Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 203

⁹⁴ Cohen, 2008, p. 1015

cancellation of internal tariffs, and the opening of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road.⁹⁵ American and German colonies were established by religious communities in the environs of Jaffa in the second half of the 19th century,⁹⁶ and Jewish immigration increased, mostly from North Africa, but also from Jerusalem.⁹⁷ By 1880, a tenth of the city's estimated population of 10,000 was Jewish, and this ratio would remain as the city quadrupled in population by 1914.⁹⁸ As the city grew in population it also grew in size, with new waves of immigrants forming new neighbourhoods outside the old city, such as the Manshiyyeh, Abu Kabir, and Rashid neighbourhoods populated by Egyptians who immigrated in the 1830s.⁹⁹ Jews followed their Arab neighbours and also began buying land and building neighbourhoods outside the city walls, with the first such neighbourhood, Neve Tzedek, established in 1887, and others soon to follow.¹⁰⁰ However, these new neighbourhoods were still part of Jaffa, in proximity as well as in style. "Homes had closed courtyards and high walls around them, with Arab-style roofs and arches; they were 'not just Arab in ownership but also in plan, construction and form'".¹⁰¹

By 1907, Casablanca was divided into three distinct areas, reflecting the divisions of the population. The Muslim quarter, covering two thirds of the city's area, was largely inhabited by Europeans; Jews were housed in the Jewish quarter, or Millah; Poor newcomers, mostly Muslim immigrants from the countryside, built *noualas* [reed huts] outside of the city walls in what was known as the Tnaker district.¹⁰² The French military occupation of Casablanca in 1907 made it a safe and attractive destination for Europeans seeking their fortunes in what began to be imagined in Europe as an 'El

⁹⁵ Ram, 1996, p. 30

⁹⁶ LeVine, 2005, p. 56

⁹⁷ Ram, 1996, p. 30

⁹⁸ Klein, 2014, p. 137

⁹⁹ LeVine, 2005, p. 38

¹⁰⁰ LeVine, 2005, p. 60

¹⁰¹ LeVine, 2005, p. 156, quoting Ilan Shchori

¹⁰² Cohen, 2008, p. 1015; Puschmann, 2011, p. 71

Dorado,¹⁰³ leading to an exponential growth in the European population of the city, from 1,000 in 1907 to 31,000 in 1914.¹⁰⁴

Dual Cities

General Lyautey saw his role as Resident-General of the French Protectorate of Morocco as that of a benevolent dictator, who would gradually introduce technical modernity to his Moroccan subjects without destroying their social forms. He despised the parliamentarianism of French politics, and “sought to form a new administrative elite, above politics, concerned only with the long-range public good.”¹⁰⁵ The urban planning legislation he passed in Morocco in 1914 reflected these views and was based on two principles: separation of native cities from new cities, and action by decree instead of by parliamentary legislation.¹⁰⁶ The new laws “reflected a sense of normalizing urban processes under the labels of hygienic features, traffic management and so forth. This normalization became the precursor of ideas that would be applied by avant-garde modernists.”¹⁰⁷ The separation of the colonial city from the *medina* was not just a “matter of conserving the native way of life” but also of separating the colonial districts from the “misery” of the *medina*.¹⁰⁸

After the 1907 invasion, the French started to build their new city to the southeast of the old *medina*. However, lacking a central plan, construction was random and diverse in terms of housing type and placement. As a response to the situation he observed in Casablanca in 1913, General Lyautey assigned the task of organizing the chaos of the city to Henri Prost.¹⁰⁹ Prost’s planning style relied on a zoning

¹⁰³ Puschmann, 2011, p. 73

¹⁰⁴ Rabinow, 1989, p. 36

¹⁰⁵ Rabinow, 1989, p. 33

¹⁰⁶ Rabinow, 1989, p. 35; “[Lyautey’s urban planning] included one essential condition: the complete separation of European agglomerations from native agglomerations. The European population centers must be separated from those of the indigenous populations for political, economic, sanitary, and aesthetic reasons, as well as for town planning purposes” - Henri Prost in Royer, ed., *L’Urbanisme aux colonies*”, quoted in Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 131.

¹⁰⁷ Radoine, 2012, p. 21

¹⁰⁸ Radoine, 2012, p. 25

¹⁰⁹ Puschmann, 2011, p. 54

framework, based on separation of functions but also of populations. The Ville Nouvelle he planned was intended only for Europeans.¹¹⁰ His plans called for three hospitals for three clienteles—civilian Europeans, the French military, and natives¹¹¹—as well as other public buildings using Beaux Arts placement, but native North African forms, or at least the European interpretations of those forms employing a neo-Mauresque style first developed in Tunisia.

As the European city in Casablanca grew, it became “a new dominant structure to which the pre-existing cities became increasingly subordinate,” reducing the Moroccans “to the status of a submissive partner, from whom resources, both material and human, were to be extracted.”¹¹²

With the native population rapidly expanding, but limited in development opportunities by the growth of the European city, Prost suggested building a new medina two kilometres away from the old one.¹¹³ The new quarter was built using modern technical infrastructure beneath a neo-Mauresque façade, however, “the houses lacked basic needs like private toilets and even kitchens.”¹¹⁴ The policy of separation of populations is best exemplified in a social urban experiment conducted in Casablanca—the construction of a new and separate prostitution district, with internal segregation of European, Muslim, and Jewish prostitutes. The rationale and design of the district were ostensibly based on principles of public health and hygiene, but Driss Maghraoui argues that it was in effect both a prison and a brothel.¹¹⁵

Despite Prost’s intentions for a separation of populations, the uncontrollable growth of populations and speculative development, coupled with a general disdain for his zoning policies, meant that there

¹¹⁰ Puschmann, 2011, p. 55

¹¹¹ Rabinow, 1989, p. 39

¹¹² Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 151

¹¹³ Rabinow, 1989, p. 41

¹¹⁴ Puschmann, 2011, p. 56

¹¹⁵ Rabinow, 1989, p. 43; Maghraoui, 2008

was no distinct separation of populations, and in fact there was widespread mixing.¹¹⁶ This trend conforms to other historic attempts at racial segregation, including in Spanish-American colonial cities in the 16th century, Portuguese “fortified factories” throughout their African and Asian colonies, Spanish Philippines, as well as British colonial outposts in Ireland and India. These segregationist attempts were never fully successful at separating populations, and the colour lines they tried to impose were always semi-permeable.¹¹⁷ What they did succeed in, though, was in creating an “instrument in institutionalizing what became a color hierarchy.”¹¹⁸ The colour lines thus created also helped implement a distinction in the allocation of public facilities, exemplified in French Morocco with Moroccans getting a fraction of the facilities that the European quarters received, but most importantly, in terms of allocation of space for growth.^{119 120}

As opposed to a separation dictated from above and largely ignored below, the situation in Jaffa was one in which the separation was wanted by a segment of the Jewish population that would have to struggle both against the Turkish authorities and other Jews in order to implement its vision. In 1906, sixty prominent Zionists from Jaffa founded a society called *Ahuzat Bayit* [Hebrew for housing estate] for the purchase of land and the construction of homes in the Jaffa region. In its first meeting, the society’s goal was described as the “founding of a new Hebrew” settlement, though “the word *modern* soon replaced *new*; that is, the goal quickly became defined as establishing a ‘modern Jewish urban neighbourhood in a European style in the city of Jaffa’.”¹²¹ Among the motives for the creation of a new settlement, much like the motivation behind the creation of previous new Jewish neighbourhoods, was the desire to alleviate overcrowding within the old city. However, the new neighbourhood differed from

¹¹⁶ Prost’s plan for a *cordon sanitaire* around Casablanca’s medina could not be implemented because of decades of European land speculation in the city (Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 147).

¹¹⁷ Nightingale, 2012, pp. 50-65

¹¹⁸ Nightingale, 2012, p. 65

¹¹⁹ Rabinow, 1989, p. 44

¹²⁰ Janet Abu-Lughod argues that “Rabat was the most successful exemplar of French ‘dual city’ planning in Morocco. In Casablanca, the ‘native’ original was too truncated, the foreign additions too undisciplined, and the pace of development too frantic to permit adequate control” (Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 155).

¹²¹ LeVine, 2005, p. 61

those earlier neighbourhoods in that it also had nationalist settler-colonialist motives: There was a desire to segregate new immigrants from the indigenous Arabs “in a place where they could nurture their national values by speaking Hebrew, developing Hebrew educational and cultural institutions, engaging in national activities, and the like;” there was also a desire to “stem the flow of Jewish capital into Arab hands through renting Arab houses;” and finally, there was a desire “to bolster Jewish national prestige as a prelude to raising the Jews’ political status.”¹²² Besides stemming the flow of capital to Arab landowners, the new suburb was also seen as a way of circumventing the Arab monopoly on agricultural trade.¹²³

The establishment of Ahuzat Bayit was also viewed as a way for Jews to escape the unhealthy and crowded conditions of the city, reminiscent of the crowded Jewish ghettos of Europe.¹²⁴ The previously built Jewish neighbourhoods were seen as replicating the crowded and unsanitary conditions of the main city.¹²⁵ The new neighbourhood, partly financed through a loan by the Jewish National Fund (JNF), would have to conform to planning standards set by JNF officials. The Palestine director of the JNF, Arthur Ruppin, was asked to formulate the neighbourhood regulations and in order to do so ordered the latest writings on urban planning, including Ebenezer Howard’s ‘Garden Cities of Tomorrow.’¹²⁶ The building regulations in the new neighbourhood would conform to those in force in European cities, as based on Stuebben’s *Handbuch der Architektur*.¹²⁷ When finally built, beginning in 1909, the houses were designed by Jewish and Christian architects on an individual rather than uniform basis, and

¹²² LeVine, 2005, p. 61

¹²³ Katz, 1986, p. 406

¹²⁴ In a passage of his book, *The Hebrew National Fund*, Zionist leader Yehiel Tschlenow justified a loan to *Ahuzat Bayit* by the Jewish National Fund thus: “It is with a feeling of some bitterness that we point out how Zionism found a way of life for itself in Palestine as unhealthy as that in the ghettos of the diaspora. The immigrants transferred the life of the ghetto to Palestine—the urge to live close together and the contempt for air and space, trees and flowers, which deformed the bodies of the Jews. To your surprise you see there the very image of what you see in London’s Whitechapel, in the Moscow *Zhidiya* and in the *Judengasse* in Vilna.” Katz, 1986, p. 411

¹²⁵ Katz, 1986, p. 405

¹²⁶ LeVine, 2005, p. 63

¹²⁷ Katz, 1986, p. 412

conformed to a Western style, similar to that employed in a nearby German colony, and lacking any traditional local elements.¹²⁸

The members of Ahuzat Bayit were themselves familiar with the notion of the garden suburb, and its bourgeois and cultural values suited their needs and aspirations, as they were all middle-class professionals, most of them recent European immigrants. Howard's emphasis on land and a return to the soil were especially suited to the similar Zionist ideals, which had previously only found expression in rural agricultural settlements.¹²⁹

As revealed by the minutes of one of the housing association's earliest meetings, it was declared that the new suburb was to be:

a Jewish urban centre in a healthy spot, beautifully arranged and ordered according to all the rules of hygiene, so that instead of the mire and filth of Jaffa would be found a quiet place among trees with pure air.¹³⁰

The early meetings also dealt with the exclusivity of the suburb, which was to be "100% Hebrew," and this decision would later be enshrined in the suburb regulations, which "forbade selling or letting houses in Tel-Aviv suburb to Arabs."^{131 132}

Though the new suburb was to be exclusively Jewish, it was also to be secular and modern. As opposed to French planning policy in Casablanca, which relied heavily on the construction of public facilities, the only public building called for in the initial plans for Ahuzat Bayit was the Hebrew

¹²⁸ Katz, 1986, p. 413

¹²⁹ Katz, 1986, p. 408

¹³⁰ Katz, 1986, p. 408

¹³¹ Katz, 1986, p. 408

¹³² At the time, *Hebrew* could refer both to the language and to the Jewish religion. In a discussion on observing the Sabbath in Tel-Aviv, the adherents of Rabbi Kook demanded that his formulation on observance be entered into the town's constitution: "In all of Tel-Aviv's territory, as a Hebrew city in the Land of Israel, the religious holiness of the Sabbath has a legal civil validity as far as public display is concerned." (Tel-Aviv Municipal Archives [TAMA], 206/10-02, p. 3 of Protocol 33, 07/05/1923.) In addition, there was an interest in promoting the use in Tel-Aviv of the Hebrew language, as would be enshrined in the town's by-laws, which required anyone running for town council to know the Hebrew language (TAMA, 207/10-01, p. 8). Another reasoning for the use of *Hebrew* could be explained by the idea of the Negation of Exile, where *Hebrew* is used to refer to the New Jew, the strong Jew who has returned and is connected to *his* land, as opposed to the old, Exilic Jew of the European *Ghetto* or *Shtetl* (Piterberg, 1996, p. 131).

Gymnasium (high school), named in honour of the father of Zionism, Theodore Herzl. No plans were put in place for a synagogue, which was a staple of other Jewish neighbourhoods in Palestine.¹³³

Growth of the new suburb was rapid, with 50 houses intended to house 500 residents completed in 1909, 116 houses and 980 residents by the end of 1912, and 204 houses and approximately 2,000 residents by the eve of the First World War (see Figure 1). In 1910, the name of the suburb was changed from Ahuzat Bayit to Tel-Aviv,¹³⁴ and in the same year its planning functions were taken over by the Tel-Aviv Committee, which maintained the policies of its predecessor.¹³⁵ Physical growth was achieved by purchases of land by the committee and by Zionist land-purchasing companies, and through unification with other associations and suburbs (which popped up following the success of Tel-Aviv). Tel-Aviv grew from an initial 85.5 dunums¹³⁶ to 570 dunums on the eve of World War I. Land purchases were intentionally made along a corridor leading to the seashore, with the aim of outflanking the northern Jaffa neighbourhood of Menshieh (Manshiyyeh) to both halt the further spread of Jaffa to the north, and to give the new suburb access to the sea and unrestricted northward expansion possibilities (see Figure 1).¹³⁷ In 1913, Jaffa's older Jewish neighbourhood of Neve Tzedek asked to merge with Tel-Aviv and was granted approval by the latter conditioned on the former's conforming to its strict sanitary conditions.¹³⁸

¹³³ Katz, 1986, p. 409

¹³⁴ LeVine, 2005, p. 72

¹³⁵ Katz, 1986, p. 413

¹³⁶ Turkish land area measurement unit, 1 dunum≈1,000 square meters

¹³⁷ Katz, 1986, p. 414

¹³⁸ LeVine, 2005, p. 72




Figure 1 - The built up area of Tel-Aviv in relation to Jaffa on the eve of the First World War. Source: *Survey of Egypt, June 1918, (as cited in Katz, 1986, p. 413)*

As Tel-Aviv grew, its city council came into conflict with the Jaffa Jewish council over whom would represent the Jewish population of Jaffa, a conflict that would continue well into the British mandate period.¹³⁹ This Antagonism between the Jewish communities of Tel-Aviv and Jaffa also included class antagonism, as Jaffa's growing Jewish working class was resentful of the new city's growing attraction for upper class and professional immigrants, while "to the workers' chagrin, facilities for 'the people' had yet to be built."¹⁴⁰

Early Land Speculation

Land speculation in Morocco was observed in the Rabat area as early as the 1860s, when the small minority of locals from Salé (a twin city to Rabat) who could mobilize capital began to buy up property and to lend money to others. Though no similar documentary proof is available for Casablanca at the time, it can be imagined that the pattern observed in conservative and insular Salé would have been at

¹³⁹ LeVine, 2005, p. 50

¹⁴⁰ LeVine, 2005, p. 51

least repeated if not expanded in more open Casablanca¹⁴¹. Right after the 1907 French invasion, real estate speculation in Casablanca became a major problem. As Europeans immigrated to the relatively safe occupation zone, their dreams of riches were confronted with the reality that there was no gold or oil in this new El Dorado, and their main avenues to riches were land speculation and commerce. Despite a legal restriction on European ownership of land, Europeans invested heavily in real estate with the expectation that France would officially take over and legalize their investments. Moroccans also joined in the speculation, and “land prices rose by as much as 600 times”.¹⁴² Some land in the city centre would change hands purely for speculative reasons long into the 20th century, leaving empty spaces while the city continued to expand further and further out, in many cases in the form of shanty towns built by poor rural migrants who could not afford land prices in the city proper.¹⁴³ This speculative activity would end up making the city “a random terrain, unsuitable for any master plan.”¹⁴⁴

In some cases, land speculation took the form of outright fraud, following the introduction of the Australian Torrens Act system of land registration in 1913. The new system required registration of land plots in special rosters, so that “each property [was] cleanly and distinctly delimited on the ground under a name and number in a particular order, with the proper topographic and juridical determinations, and with a definitive and precise statement as to its owner.”¹⁴⁵ Indigenous land owners were often reluctant to register their land under a French system that would require them to submit to French rather than to religious courts. Consequently, land transactions were open to fraud, and “foreigners began to register in the [rosters] land that they had not actually purchased, or had purchased from someone who did not really own it; and to register doctored deeds which included larger areas or more rights than they had purchased.” Though there was an appeal process, the window

¹⁴¹ Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 87

¹⁴² Rabinow, 1989, p. 36

¹⁴³ Puschmann, 2011, p. 56

¹⁴⁴ Radoine, 2012, p. 20

¹⁴⁵ Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 164

of appeal was short, and the registrations were published in French only. As a result, many native land owners lost their titles, and the only recourse they had when they found out was to fight the decision in a French court, which was tilted in favour of the colonists.¹⁴⁶

Between 1910 and the outbreak of World War I, much of the land surrounding Tel-Aviv had been purchased by Jews or was already in the hands of Jewish land brokers. So much land had been purchased by 1912 that a debate developed over the necessity of buying further land outside of the already built neighbourhood, with the realization that the land purchases were leading to rampant speculation. In order to combat speculation, the 'Syndicate for Purchasing Land' was set up in 1914 in order to buy land in the vicinity of Tel-Aviv that could be disposed of in an orderly manner.¹⁴⁷ However, Abraham Granovsky, a JNF land specialist, would later blame the municipality's own land policy for supporting speculation.¹⁴⁸ When asked by the new British Governor in 1919 about suspicion of land speculation in Tel-Aviv, the town committee replied that it knew of no speculation.¹⁴⁹ The next year, though, the council approved the purchase of land recently bought by a Mr. Bersky, but limited his profit to 10% "to avoid speculation."¹⁵⁰ For the next year, the issue of land speculation and ways to combat it recurred in council meetings.¹⁵¹ When a proposal to set up another land syndicate to combat speculation was brought up, one of the councillors raised the question of how to maximize the profits of the syndicate, indicating that perhaps the council's understanding of what constitutes speculation was limited.¹⁵² Land speculation in Tel-Aviv is cited as a reason for its rapid growth from a neighbourhood to a city, as well as for exacerbating rather than relieving the housing problem of Jews in Jaffa.¹⁵³ Since Zionism depended on the maximal control of territory under an initially hostile government, though

¹⁴⁶ Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 165

¹⁴⁷ LeVine, 2005, p. 73

¹⁴⁸ Kallus, 1997, note 9

¹⁴⁹ TAMA, 282/1, p. 232, Council Protocol, 1 October 1919

¹⁵⁰ TAMA, 283/1, Council Protocol 39, 8 December 1920

¹⁵¹ TAMA, 283/1, various Council Protocols, including Protocol 11, 19 February 1921; Protocol 15, 10 March 1921

¹⁵² TAMA, 206/10-7, p. 2, Council Protocol 28, 21 February 1925

¹⁵³ LeVine, 2005, p. 73

speculation might have hampered the city economically and presented a barrier for poorer residents, it could be said that it served the city's grander colonial purpose. For example, when a tax on undeveloped land was proposed to combat speculation, one member of council raised the fear that Jewish landowners might fictitiously transfer ownership to Arabs in order to avoid the tax, and that he would prefer that the land remain under Jewish ownership rather than be transferred.¹⁵⁴

Under Ottoman rule, land registration had begun to take hold, but was far from complete. Restrictions on Jewish purchases of land were circumvented by using middlemen, or by holding a separate, independent land registry for each settlement, in which transfers of land would be recorded.¹⁵⁵ After the establishment of the British Mandate, the system of land surveying and registration was expanded through the 1928 *Land Settlement Ordinance*, also based on the Torrens Act. The settlers' land registries would be recognized by the new system and incorporated into it.¹⁵⁶

The Physical and Social Place of 'Internal Others'

Ethnic segregation in Morocco in general, and Casablanca in particular, was hardly a French invention. Before the French invasion, the Jews of Casablanca lived in their own quarter, the Mellah, though unlike in other Moroccan cities, this quarter was not walled off, so that sometimes Jews lived next to Muslims on the same street or even in the same house. The Jewish population was extremely poor overall, with some members living in tents or the city's first *bidonvilles* [shantytowns].¹⁵⁷ After the French invasion of Casablanca, Jews formed a substantial part of the internal migration to that city, so that by the eve of the Second World War, 44% of Morocco's Jews resided in Casablanca. A small minority of Jews in Casablanca "became integrated in the modernisation process [the city was undergoing] while the rest

¹⁵⁴ TAMA, 206/10-7, p. 4, Council Protocol 33, 29 March 1925

¹⁵⁵ In October, 1916, in preparation for the arrival of an Ottoman commission tasked with investigating land sold to foreigners, the Tel-Aviv council decided to remove and hide all of the plans that were in the building (TAMA, 282/1, p. 29).

¹⁵⁶ Gavish & Kark, 1993, p. 78

¹⁵⁷ Rabinow, 1989, p. 37

were estranged from it and lived in its margins.” Many of the immigrants crowded into the already overcrowded Mellah, which soon became a slum.¹⁵⁸

Unemployment in the Jewish quarter in the early-20th century was high, but this would change as more Jews immigrated to Casablanca and their children enrolled in professional and primary schools established by the *Alliance Israelite Universelle* (AIU). The AIU was a Paris-based organization established in the mid-19th century with the purpose of advancement of Jews of the Middle East through the logic of *mission civilisatrice*.¹⁵⁹ As more and more Jewish youths enrolled in AIU schools, the latter’s graduates were increasingly employed in new and modern professions.¹⁶⁰ By 1936 approximately a quarter of the Jews in French Morocco were literate in French, and the first Moroccan inhabitant of Casablanca to qualify as a doctor was a Jew.¹⁶¹ Pre-colonial establishment of AIU schools in Morocco was assisted by French (and other European) Consuls, who viewed the Jews of Morocco favourably, for they considered “the Jews, more than the Muslims, as a potentially progressive element in the population who could serve European interests in the pre-colonial period.”¹⁶² However, once the protectorate was established, the French authorities were reluctant to enrol Jewish youths in schools intended for Europeans, thinking that “most Jews would remain loyal to France in any case, with or without receiving any educational and political privileges.”¹⁶³ Thus the protectorate was interested in having the Jewish community act as an intermediary population, but was unwilling to allow it the social mobility that would enable full integration within the new regime. Attempts to naturalize Moroccan Jews as French citizens, largely spearheaded by the AIU, repeatedly failed, with Protectorate authorities unwilling to grant citizenship to the Jews for several reasons, most of them consistent with the policy of

¹⁵⁸ Srougo, 2011, pp. 77-78

¹⁵⁹ Burrows, 1986, p. 121

¹⁶⁰ Srougo, 2011, p. 87

¹⁶¹ Pennell, 2000, pp. 250-251

¹⁶² Laskier, 1994, pp. 28

¹⁶³ Laskier, 1994, p. 29

association rather than assimilation.¹⁶⁴ In fact, despite the partial integration of the Jewish population into the colonial apparatus, the majority of Jews remained poor and disenfranchised, and it was these poor elements that would become fruitful ground for Zionist recruiters from the 1930s on.¹⁶⁵

Janet Abu-Lughod identifies Morocco's Jews under the protectorate as occupying a "'caste' position ambiguously attached both to the older indigenous system of production and distribution and to the foreign system." A majority of the Jewish labour force were employed in industry and trade, but largely in smaller-scale artisanal operations.¹⁶⁶

In Jaffa, the Jewish population at the turn of the century included an established Sephardi community, as well as a quickly growing Ashkenazi community. Though there was a lively debate within the established Sephardi community about Zionism and its dangers, many prominent members of the community continued to actively participate in land purchases for settlement, as well as act as 'straw men' after Ottoman regulations restricted land sale only to Ottoman subjects.^{167, 168} While Zionism concentrated on European Jewish immigration to Palestine, which interestingly, for Herzl, included Algerian Jews who had become French citizens in 1870 under the Cremieux decree¹⁶⁹, early in the 20th century a need arose for cheap Jewish labour to replace Palestinian labour. To fulfill this need, two thousand Yemenite Jews were recruited by Ashkenazi Zionist Shmuel Yavne'eli between 1910 and 1914. However, soon after their arrival they were deemed unsuitable workers and expelled from most Jewish settlements. Zionist leaders of all camps saw these non-Ashkenazi Jews as a threat to the Zionist project and stressed the importance of physical separation.¹⁷⁰ This separation can be seen in the development of streets and neighbourhoods of distinct ethnic composition in Tel-Aviv (including a Yemenite quarter

¹⁶⁴ Laskier, 1994, pp. 169-170

¹⁶⁵ Pennell, 2000, p. 252

¹⁶⁶ Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 219

¹⁶⁷ This division and the debate will be explored in Chapter 2.

¹⁶⁸ Campos, 2005, p. 475

¹⁶⁹ Laskier, 1994, p. 32

¹⁷⁰ Massad, 1996, pp. 54-55

that predated Yavne'eli's recruitment effort),¹⁷¹ and in the economic, political, and cultural exclusion suffered by Yemenite and Mizrahi Jews in Tel-Aviv, where "the Ashkenazi majority imposed its standards and conventions in many areas."¹⁷² Yemenite workers were excluded from employment in Tel-Aviv to such an extent that as late as 1936 the *Histadrut*—the main Zionist labour organization—admitted that it was not doing nearly enough to help Mizrahi workers.¹⁷³ As the city grew and attracted new immigrants, its southern neighbourhoods, those adjacent to Jaffa, would become slums, mostly populated by Middle Eastern and North African Jews.¹⁷⁴

The physical and social position of the internal others in early Tel-Aviv needs to be explored further, as most literature on the subject of Mizrahi Jews in Israel deals with the period following the creation of the state. Though there are sporadic references to them (as in the reference by Golan, above), their role and place in the creation of the new city and in its relation to its Arab progenitor deserve deeper inquiry.

Conclusion

Both Casablanca and Tel-Aviv developed in the early 20th century as colonial outgrowths of native towns, and though the aim of the French in Casablanca was the implementation of colonization by *association*, and that of the Zionists in Tel-Aviv was for colonization by *dissociation*, both developments followed similar patterns. In both cities, the colonists used the relatively new profession and language of town planning to attempt to rationalize and differentiate the new suburbs from the old city. The use of planning, with its emphasis on health and hygiene, was seen as a modern response to what ailed both the local medina and the European cities the planners left behind. However, as both cities quickly grew in population, rampant speculation in land quickly followed, hampering continued orderly growth, and leading to rapid territorial expansion and the creation of slums. Though similarities in both cases

¹⁷¹ Helman, 2011, p. 136

¹⁷² Helman, 2011, p. 141

¹⁷³ LeVine, 2005, p. 98

¹⁷⁴ Golan, 2002, p. 121

abound, it is important to also stress the differences between them, whose source, in my opinion, is in the two divergent logics of colonialism and settler-colonialism.

This paper touched on only a few aspects of the two cities, but leaves room for future inquiry into unexplored or underexplored aspects, such as the economic development of the dual cities; the modernist aspects of the two new cities; an exploration of the two master plans developed for the cities by Prost in Casablanca and Geddes in Tel-Aviv; architectural styles—neo-Mauresque in Casablanca, International/Bauhaus in Tel-Aviv; and a deeper exploration of the place of the internal other in both cities.

Most importantly for my research purposes, in both cities an internal other social group was used as a physical as well as social buffer between the dominant colonial group and the previously dominant local population. In Casablanca, some of the Jewish population was partly assimilated into the French culture and economy through special schools supported by the authorities. In Tel-Aviv, poor Middle Eastern Jews were used as precarious labour to replace local Palestinian labourers, while more economically established Middle Eastern Jews were used as land agents and straw men to facilitate land purchases. The next chapter will deal with the space and place of internal others in Tel-Aviv in more depth.

Chapter 2: Urban Segregation in Early Tel-Aviv

*"FATHER, Mother, and Me
Sister and Auntie say
All the people like us are We,
And every one else is They.
And They live over the sea,
While We live over the way,
But - would you believe it? - They look upon We
As only a sort of They!" - Rudyard Kipling, We and They*

"The question, of course, is how the individual got to be in this 'social role', and how the particular social organization (with its property-rights and structure of authority) got to be there. And these are historical questions. If we stop history at a given point, then there are no classes but simply a multitude of individuals with a multitude of experiences. But if we watch these men over an adequate period of social change, we observe patterns in their relationships, their ideas, and their institutions." – E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, p. 10

Introduction

During a Tel-Aviv Council meeting held on 9 February 1921, dealing with the question of annexation of nearby Jewish neighbourhoods, council member Dr. Theodor Zlocisti recommended that the communities in question be annexed even against their will, stating that the council had "a cultural mission, and therefore must influence those who are resistant to European culture, especially in matters of health, so that we may cure the bad places, and we ourselves have an interest in thus forcing them for the interest of our own health."¹⁷⁵ Zlocisti had only recently arrived in Palestine from Germany¹⁷⁶, but he was not the first to rely on sanitation and health as an excuse for urban policy in Palestine, or indeed in Tel-Aviv. Itzhak Khayutman, in his memoirs, wrote that the idea for a separate Hebrew neighbourhood in Jaffa formed in his head in 1905, when he became the agent for the Singer sewing machine company in Jaffa. Among the reasons he cited for the new neighbourhood were the "clean and

¹⁷⁵ Tel-Aviv Municipal Archives [TAMA], 422/283b, pp. 185-186

¹⁷⁶ Obituary in Jewish Telegraphic Agency [JTA], 1943, retrieved from <http://www.jta.org/1943/12/28/archive/dr-zlocisti-veteran-german-zionist-dies-in-palestine>

healthy air” the residents would be able to breathe, as well as a distancing from the “moral corruption that was worse than the actual stench” of Jaffa. He further lamented that “the daily proximity of our children to the sons of our neighbours, who from childhood are used to express profanity and immoral expressions of all types, has done harm to the education of our children, which was no less hard on them than the harm to their health.”¹⁷⁷ The notion of racial moral corruption among Jaffa’s Arab natives, tied to degraded sanitation, was not a novel one at the time, having originated at least half a century earlier in British colonial discourse regarding the Indians of Calcutta and in Atlantic discourse regarding Africans.¹⁷⁸

The establishment of the first Jewish neighbourhood outside of Jaffa, Neve-Tzedek, was also justified on the grounds of sanitation and health, but it did not share the same claim to the moral superiority of its residents over the moral degeneracy of the natives. In Neve-Tzedek’s book of regulations, the reasons cited for the creation of the new neighbourhood were the crowded living conditions within Jaffa, the rising housing prices, as well as the need for fresh air.¹⁷⁹ In their vision, Neve-Tzedek’s founders saw a clean and well-planned neighbourhood with straight and clean streets and sidewalks, and though they would be considered narrow by later standards, at the time they were considered broad and spacious.¹⁸⁰ The residents of this and the other new Jewish neighbourhoods that would soon follow continued to view themselves as an inseparable part of Jaffa.

In his book chronicling the history and development of urban segregation, Carl Nightingale identifies three institutions that were instrumental at first to the implementation of segregation in Calcutta, but later to replicating segregationist ideas and practices worldwide: the administration of a modern

¹⁷⁷ Shchori, 1990, p. 21

¹⁷⁸ Nightingale, 2012, pp. 85-86, 125; “In India...concerns about white racial survival and race mixture fused with early Victorian beliefs about gender, age, and class. The Anglo-British elite increasingly imagined the hill stations...as 'cradles of the ruling race'...places where white women could keep their moral purity and health and British children could grow up without losing any of their ruddy-cheeked Anglo-Saxon racial vigor to the sapping torpor of the lowlands” (p. 125).

¹⁷⁹ Droyanov, 1936, p. 30

¹⁸⁰ LeVine, 2005, p. 156

colonial empire, networks of intellectual exchange among professional scientists and urban reformers, and a multi-continental market in urban real estate.¹⁸¹ It is my intention in this chapter to show that the early leaders of Tel-Aviv, initially lacking the first institution and later using that of the British Mandate in Palestine, were able to use the other two institutions to effect an urban segregation of their growing city. Arabs were excluded from residence in the city from its very beginnings,¹⁸² and attempts were also made to prohibit Arab workers from involvement in its early construction. I will also venture to show that within the Jewish community itself there was a segregationist drive to separate those Jews of European origins (Ashkenazi) from those of Asian, African, and Balkan origin (Sephardi) as well.

I will first elaborate on the conceptual categories that divided the Jewish population in Palestine and the world at the time of Tel-Aviv's founding, and still do today though some of the terminology has changed. I will then attempt to show that Zionism, and Tel-Aviv as its urban flagship, were (and still are) settler-colonial projects, and as such exhibited the traits of a settler-colony, as elaborated by Lorenzo Veracini. I will finally touch on Zionist Orientalism and how it affected attitudes of the early Zionists toward the Palestinian Arabs and toward their Sephardi co-religionists, and how the Zionists viewed themselves within its framework, before moving on to the main topic of the chapter, segregation in Tel-Aviv.

Sephardim and Ashkenazim – Conceptual Origins of the Terms

The Jewish world at the end of the 19th century was divided into three main groups: Mizrahi (literally, Eastern) Jewry—those Jewish communities that trace their history to the Babylonian exile of Jews from historic Judea in the sixth century BCE, and who congregated in modern day Iraq and Iran and from there spread to the Arabian Peninsula and South, Central, and Eastern Asia. This group, sometimes referred to as Oriental Jews, also includes those Jews who migrated at the same time to Egypt, and from

¹⁸¹ Nightingale, 2012, pp. 5, 75

¹⁸² Katz, 1986, p. 408

there to other parts of the eastern Mediterranean; Sephardic (from the Hebrew word for Spain – Sepharad) Jewry, which includes those Jews who lived in the Iberian Peninsula, first under Roman rule and subsequently under Christian and Muslim rule. Following the Reconquista of Spain and the expulsion edict by King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella in 1492, this group was forced to either convert to Christianity or to leave Spain (and in 1497, Portugal). This expulsion saw the Sephardic communities spread around the Mediterranean, including lands of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, Turkey, and North Africa, as well as the independent Moroccan Empire, where they mixed with the existing Oriental Jewish communities. In addition, small groups migrated to parts of Western Europe as well as the New World; and Ashkenazi Jewry, which descended from Jews who settled in the Rhine River Valley and northern France during the late Roman era and subsequently moved to Eastern Europe following a series of expulsion edicts and the persecutions that accompanied the Crusades. From its founding until the modern era, Ashkenazi Jewry “developed and matured solely within the context of Christian-majority culture.”¹⁸³

The main division between these groupings, as suggested by Bernard Lewis, is between those Jews who lived under the strict religious edicts of Christendom (Ashkenazi) and those Jews who lived under the generally more tolerant rule of Islam (Sephardi and Mizrahi). Due to the intolerant environment in which they lived, Ashkenazi Jewry turned inward and developed stricter religious observances, while Oriental and Sephardi Jewry, living under more tolerant conditions, was more open to cultural and intellectual exchange with its surroundings,¹⁸⁴ and held more permissive religious views. Though the two groups follow the same basic religious tenets, they hold different outlooks and customs, including liturgical and ritual differences.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸³ Zohar, 2005, p. 6

¹⁸⁴ For example, one of the most highly regarded Sephardi religious scholars, Maimonides, was also a philosopher and physician (Zohar, 2005, p. 9).

¹⁸⁵ Zohar, 2005, Ch. 1

Zionism as Settler-Colonialism

As theorized by Lorenzo Veracini, settler-colonialism is distinct from colonialism.¹⁸⁶ Whereas the latter refers to exogenous domination of an indigenous population, space, and economy, the former additionally refers to a permanent movement and reproduction of communities.¹⁸⁷ And whereas in a colonial situation, the indigenous population is necessary and integral for the survival and success of the colonial project, in the settler-colonial situation, as defined by Patrick Wolfe, the indigenous population is dispensable, for “the primary object of settler-colonization is the land itself rather than the surplus value to be derived from mixing native labour with it.”¹⁸⁸ One of the central characteristics of the settler-colonial situation is settler control over the population economy of the colonized land.¹⁸⁹ To this end, a dynamic system of relationships is established between three different agencies: the settler colonizer, the indigenous colonized, and a variety of exogenous others. The settler colonizers attempt to dominate and control this system of relationships, and to progressively make the indigenous and exogenous others disappear in a variety of ways, including extermination, expulsion, containment, and assimilation.¹⁹⁰

Another central characteristic of settler-colonialism is a specific consciousness developed by the settlers, in which the colonizers develop a certain perception of their situation and a number of paranoid dispositions.¹⁹¹ These include disavowal, the settler gaze, the primal scene, and screen memory. In disavowal, the settlers disavow any violence they necessarily inflicted on the indigenous population in order to gain control of territory, for any gain of territory by the settlers is ultimately based on the de-territorialization of the indigenous population. Though they disavow any founding violence, representing the country as empty and the settlement as peaceful, the settlers nonetheless

¹⁸⁶ Veracini, 2006, p. 2

¹⁸⁷ Veracini, 2006, p. 3

¹⁸⁸ Wolfe, quoted in Veracini, 2006, p. 8

¹⁸⁹ Veracini, 2006, p. 12

¹⁹⁰ Veracini, 2006, p. 16

¹⁹¹ Veracini, 2005, p. 75

fear revenge.¹⁹² The settler gaze is the tendency of settlers to depopulate the country of indigenous peoples in representations and to perceive the land as empty.¹⁹³ The primal scene, a concept borrowed from Freud, refers to the first time that a child sees its parents engaged in sexual intercourse. This painful acknowledgement of an origin that is not perfect, often leads to denial of this origin, as discussed above regarding disavowal. In a settler-colonial situation, the primal scene may refer to the 'discovery' not only of an indigenous other, but also of exogenous others, which may include previous settlers.¹⁹⁴ Screen memory, another Freudian term, refers to an inaccurate reconstruction of actual events in order to obscure what really happened, and a disregard of history that preceded the arrival of the 'first' settlers.¹⁹⁵

In terms of the settler population economy, if we look at the early history of Zionism and Zionist immigration and colonization of Palestine, we can see clear instances of control of and manipulation of the population economy. Even before the advent of political Zionism, in 1839, British philanthropist Sir Moses (Moshe) Montefiore commissioned a census of the Jewish population of Palestine. Montefiore was influenced to commission this and subsequent censuses following the implementation of the census in England in 1801 and civil registration in 1837.¹⁹⁶ At the time, Montefiore's activities in Palestine were limited to direct financial support of the Jewish population, which was largely dependent on donations¹⁹⁷ from diaspora Jews, though less than two decades later he would begin to support settlement activity, including purchasing land outside of Jaffa in 1855.¹⁹⁸ These land purchases,

¹⁹² Veracini, 2005, p. 81

¹⁹³ Veracini, 2005, p. 82

¹⁹⁴ Veracini, 2005, p. 87

¹⁹⁵ Veracini, 2005, p. 90

¹⁹⁶ Feldman, 2007, p. 1. The censuses are available online at <http://www.montefiorecensuses.org/>

¹⁹⁷ *Haluka* in Hebrew

¹⁹⁸ Today's Montefiore neighbourhood in Tel-Aviv

however, were still for philanthropic purposes, as they were meant to support Jewish families already in Palestine, and the profits from them were meant to support Jewish scholars.¹⁹⁹

During World War I, the Palestine Zionist Office conducted a census of the Jewish population for welfare and research purposes. In 1924, the Jewish Agency for Palestine established a Department of Statistics, which conducted yearly estimates of the Jewish population as well as several censuses in 1927, 1936, 1941-42, and a comprehensive survey of the Jewish population in 1944 that included detailed analysis of immigration, demographics, and natural growth of the Jewish population. In 1925, the Tel-Aviv municipality conducted its own survey, and in 1938 the Jewish community in Haifa did the same.²⁰⁰

In the 1930s, the *Haganah* [Defence], the illegal paramilitary arm of the Jewish Agency, together with the Jewish National Fund, began conducting a survey of all of Mandatory Palestine's villages, including detailed mapping using aerial photography, as well as detailed statistics of the male population, the name and occupation of residents, the clan membership and political affiliation of the residents, as well as their economic class.²⁰¹

Before the establishment of the state of Israel, the Zionist organizations could not control who entered or left Palestine, but as far as recruiting individuals to the Zionist project, they were very selective of certain groups.²⁰² When Yemenite workers were brought to Palestine by Zionist functionaries in the first decade of the twentieth century, those selected for importation were chosen for characteristics that would make them good agricultural workers, in what Ella Shohat has called "quasi-eugenic selection," which would be repeated for Moroccan immigrants shortly after the establishment of Israel.²⁰³ Furthermore, once they were in Palestine, they were prevented from

¹⁹⁹ Halevy, 1976

²⁰⁰ Bachi, 1976, pp. 402-403

²⁰¹ Pappe, 2006, pp. 19-20

²⁰² Bloom, 2007, p. 341

²⁰³ Shohat, 1988, pp. 14-15

participation in land ownership or membership in cooperative settlements, thus relegating them to the role of wage-earners.

As far as a specific settler consciousness, early and later Zionists exhibited many of the perceptions and paranoiac dispositions elucidated by Veracini. Land purchased from absentee Arab landlords was depopulated from its peasant Arab population by the JNF, leaving it with no source of subsistence. Though it was done legally, there is an inherent violence to this depopulation, especially when it is done punitively, on lands that the new owners have no intention of cultivating.²⁰⁴ Then of course, there is the much larger-scale depopulation of the Nakba, when hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were removed from their homes and not allowed to return.²⁰⁵ In both cases, the Zionist narrative relies on the legality of the eviction or the personal choice of the Palestinians to flee despite the exhortations of the army commanders. However, even if the latter were true, the fact that they were not allowed to return and their land subsequently became the property of the Israeli state tells the lie of these claims.

The early settlers of Tel-Aviv were experts at the settler gaze, portraying the early days of their town as existing within a sea of empty sand dunes, while in fact they were surrounded by cultivated land and already existing settlements and neighbourhoods, both Jewish and Arab (as well as two German colonies).²⁰⁶ This is also an example of screen memory, whereby Tel-Aviv's official narrative is that of the original Jewish neighbourhood outside of Jaffa, embodying some sort of special pioneering essence that drew all of the neighbourhoods that would follow it and that preceded it to it, when in fact, it was mostly its abundant water supply that made it so attractive and gave it such power over its neighbours.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁴ Pappé, 2006, p. 18

²⁰⁵ Pappé, 2006

²⁰⁶ LeVine, 2005, ch.5; Rotbard, 2015, pp. 43-50, 74-75

²⁰⁷ The protocols of Tel-Aviv council meetings in the first two decades of the twentieth century are full of references to the city's water supply, and its sale to other neighbourhoods, including threats of cutting off the water supply as a sanction against non-compliance with Tel-Aviv's regulations; Droyanov also elaborates on the power the fledgling town exerted over its neighbours through its water supply (1935, p. 209, note 2).

The primal scene is best exemplified by the case of *Kvutzat* Kinneret, one the first Zionist communal settlements in Palestine.²⁰⁸ Established in 1913, it is celebrated for its pioneering spirit and as a symbol of the young settlement's Zionist idealism. Yet a group of Yemenite Jews had arrived at the same spot in 1912, and though at first they coexisted for a few years, after seventeen years the pioneers were able to evict their Yemenite predecessors, forcing them to move to another part of the country entirely and erasing them from the settlement's narrative. When asked in a documentary movie about this eviction, several of the Kvutza members profess that it was done for the Yemenites' own good, as they had no proper housing and many of them died during those pioneering years.²⁰⁹ Today, the Yemenite settlers are completely absent from the narrative of the Kvutza, and the only testament to their presence is in the settlement's cemetery.²¹⁰

Zionist Orientalism

Though the term Sephardim originally referred to Iberian Jews, by the end of the 19th and early-20th centuries it had come to include all non-Ashkenazi Jews. This was a reflection both of the historical influence Spanish Jews had on Jewry in the Ottoman Empire and Morocco, as well as an indication of Ashkenazi Orientalism.²¹¹ As Zionism took hold in Europe toward the end of the 19th century, it developed an "obvious Orientalist dimension."²¹² Zionism adopted the Orientalist dichotomy, seeing itself and the modern Ashkenazi Jewry that it represented as an enlightened West, opposed to a backward, though sometimes romantically idealized, Oriental Jewry (as well as seeing itself in opposition to the old, exilic European Jewry). For example, Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, a Russian Zionist credited with the revival of Hebrew as a spoken language, though he had a complex and often oppositional relationship

²⁰⁸ Kvutza – Hebrew for group; the predecessor to the Hebrew term *kibbutz*, Hebrew for grouping.

²⁰⁹ Feige, 2011, pp. 179-180

²¹⁰ The documentary film "The Unpromised Land" traces the history of this settlement and expulsion, <http://www.amythosmedia.com/projects/films/the-unpromised-land/>.

²¹¹ Cohen, 2005, p. 36

²¹² Raz-Krakotzkin, 2005, p. 166

with Palestine's Sephardic community, chose to use the Sephardi Hebrew accent prevalent among the Jews of Palestine rather than the Ashkenazi accent of Europe. This decision stemmed in part from the Zionist concept of "negation of exile,"²¹³ which saw Zionists as the 'new Jews' as opposed to the exilic Jews of Europe, but also from the (mistaken) belief that the Sephardic pronunciation was closest to that used by biblical Jews.²¹⁴ To the early Zionists, the act of immigration to Zion²¹⁵ was seen as transformative, regenerating the exilic Jew, perceived in Orientalist terms as backward and static, into the 'new Jew'.²¹⁶ By leaving Europe and the self-image of the exilic Jew behind, Zionists paradoxically moved to the Orient in order to join the Christian West. In their perception they came to an empty land, in order to transform and redeem it, and through it, redeem themselves. Though they were aware of the existence of a native population, including centuries old Jewish communities, their negation of exile easily translated into a negation of the inhabitants of their new home, through the same settler gaze described above. In this negation the native population was viewed in Orientalist fashion as an essential group embodying either a romanticized, idealized antiquity, or a violent and irrational backwardness. In either case, it was not the Arabs themselves that the Zionists were willing to incorporate into their settler project, but only their image, and even that only to a limited extent.²¹⁷ Thus the first Jewish fighters of the *Yishuv* [settlement],²¹⁸ the members of *HaShomer* [the guard], a group that would hire its members out as guards for Jewish settlements, adopted the attire of the Arabs, including the *kafiya*, *abaya*, and native weapons and accessories.²¹⁹ By appropriating the traditional garb of the natives, or rather a hybrid of Eastern European, Cossack, and Bedouin attire, the settlers were in essence replacing

²¹³ Raz-Krakotzkin, 2005, pp. 166-167

²¹⁴ Cohen, 2005, p. 37

²¹⁵ Zion was one of the many names of Jerusalem in Jewish tradition, and Zionists saw their immigration to Palestine as an act of ascension to Zion, their biblical homeland.

²¹⁶ Raz-krakotzkin, 2005, p. 167

²¹⁷ Raz-Krakotzkin, 2005, pp. 168-169

²¹⁸ "The Hebrew reference to the Jewish society of Palestine from the 1880s to 1948" (Zerubavel, 2008, p. 316).

²¹⁹ Zerubavel, 2008, p. 325

the natives and making them superfluous.²²⁰ The members of HaShomer were trying to take over guard duty from the Arab guards who were traditionally employed by the settlements, in an oft repeated attempt of replacing Arab labour with 'Hebrew' labour.

While the native Arabs could be excluded and dispossessed by the settlement project, the Zionists could not do the same to the native Jews and Jewish immigrants from the Muslim world. Seeing and advertising itself as a redemptive movement for world Jewry, they had to incorporate the Mizrahi Jews into their project. However, in order to be incorporated, the Mizrahi Jews had to integrate, shedding their traditions and culture and adopting the Western culture of the Zionist elite, which was seen by the latter as modern and universal.²²¹ The attitude of the Zionist establishment and of the European Jewish immigrants toward the Mizrahi Jews was not consistent throughout the period of colonization. At first it was an attitude of romantic admiration to what was viewed as an authentic tradition, as seen in the adoption of the Sephardi pronunciation of the Hebrew language, and in the description of the Yemenite Jews as the 'authentic Jews'. However, in time this attitude shifted to one of ridicule and contempt, and forced shedding of any 'authenticity.' I believe, though I have found no sources to conclusively substantiate this claim, that as long as Zionism was operating under Ottoman rule, European immigrants were forced to view the East and its inhabitants with some semblance of respect, as they were themselves subjects of the East in Palestine. Once Ottoman rule was replaced with British rule, these immigrants could shed any Oriental attire and consciousness, and re-adopt European ones. However, even in this case, they would deny their own 'eastern backwardness'²²² and adopt the Ashkenazi identity, which originally was reserved for German Jewry only.

²²⁰ Raz-Krakotzkin, 2005, p. 169

²²¹ Raz-Krakotzkin, 2005, p. 171

²²² Eastern European Jews were looked at with contempt by the Jews of Germany and Northern France, which in Hebrew came to be known as *Ashkenaz*. The Eastern Jews of Poland, Lithuania, and Russia would derisively be called by the 'true' Ashkenazi Jews as *Ostjuden*—Eastern Jews—well into the twentieth century. (Elazar, 1984, p. 149).

Segregation in Early Zionist Thought and Action

In reference to Zionism as a segregationist movement, Carl Nightingale notes that Zionism embraced

Many of the same currents of thought and institutional forces involved in urban segregation elsewhere in the world. Early Zionists freely mixed secular ideas about racial hierarchy, the dangers of assimilation and crossbreeding, and providential claims to 'natural' homelands with such biblical ideas as the chosen people, the long exile, and the Promised Land.²²³

Arthur Ruppin, who formulated Tel-Aviv's original regulations based on the technical writings of, among others, Ebenezer Howard, was a great believer in eugenics, and theorized and wrote about it extensively.²²⁴ Before his immigration to Palestine, Ruppin worked at and ultimately headed the Bureau of Jewish Statistics in Berlin, whose aim was to curb Jewish assimilation and fight anti-Semitism in Germany using statistical data.²²⁵ During his time in the Bureau it collected and organized the first bank of data of Jewish statistics and demography, which would become the basis for numerous negotiations concerning the Jews in the 20th century, and a "crucial step in the unification of the Jews as a modern nation represented by the Zionist movement."²²⁶ In his book *Jews of the Present*, Ruppin asserted that throughout their history, Jews were able to preserve their racial purity through religious observances that prevented assimilation. Once the Jews began secularizing, the future of the Jewish nation was in danger of annihilation, and the only remedy Ruppin saw for that was Zionism. He further asserted that the leaders of the Jews throughout history were not only religious leaders, but "first and foremost physicians and administrators—the equivalent of modern medical authorities and sanitation officials—whose task was to preserve the physical and moral health of the *Volk* [German for people or nation], a

²²³ Nightingale, 2012, p. 412

²²⁴ Bloom, 2007; Morris-Reich, 2006

²²⁵ Bloom, 2007, pp. 337-338

²²⁶ Bloom, 2007, p. 338

position that Ruppin would very soon assume in the newly emerging Jewish Volk.”²²⁷ In order to preserve the Jews, Ruppin thought that he must transform the Jews through a long process of biological improvement, beginning with discouragement of racial mixing through intermarriage, which “weakened...the ‘race character,’” and by “[preserving] Jewish separatism.”²²⁸ By concentrating in separate, closed communities and promoting a new Jewish culture based exclusively on the East-European Jewish culture, Ruppin believed that he could thus preserve the physical and moral health of the Volk. Thus we see that segregation was central to Ruppin’s eugenics planning.²²⁹

Also central to Ruppin’s theories was the belief that the Jews were descended from non-Semitic Indo-Germanic tribes, who, once they mixed with what he called Semitic Bedouin blood, lost their touch with the land and developed an “uncontrollable mercantile instinct,” thus becoming the proverbial wandering Jews.²³⁰ Ruppin located the pure, original Jews as being from Eastern Europe, and asserted that the Sephardic and Oriental Jews were unsuitable for eugenic regeneration because they carried Semitic elements. He further asserted that they were in a process of “biological degeneration” and were inferior to Ashkenazi Jews “in all fields.”²³¹

Through his position as founder and head of the Palestine Office of the Zionist Organization in Jaffa, Ruppin had considerable influence over both land acquisition and settlement activity, and Zionist immigration policy. As we saw in Chapter 1, Ruppin formulated Ahuzat Bayit’s first set of building regulations and also had considerable influence and control over Kvutzat Kinneret discussed previously. Though it is possible, as Amos Morris-Reich argues,²³² that Ruppin was able to separate his racial ideas from his administrative role, it is far more likely that they affected the myriad critical decisions that Ruppin made throughout his career as one of the Yishuv’s chief planners and administrators.

²²⁷ Bloom, 2007, pp. 338-339

²²⁸ Bloom, 2007, p. 339

²²⁹ Bloom, 2007, p. 339

²³⁰ Bloom, 2007, p. 340

²³¹ Bloom, 2007, p. 340

²³² Morris-Reich, 2008, p. 118

As mentioned before, Nightingale asserts that urban racial segregationists depended on three institutions to promote their ideas: “governments, networks of intellectual exchange, and the institutions associated with the modern capitalist real estate industry.”²³³ Though the early Zionists lacked a government, and worked within the sometimes hostile Ottoman administration of Palestine, they were quick to set up separate governing institutions for the growing Yishuv in Palestine. Pre-Zionist Jewish society in Palestine (the Old Yishuv) had communal organizations and institutions, but these were local community organizations responsible for the local affairs of the Jewish community, with little coordination between them. After political Zionism was established in the late 19th century, international and national institutions were set up to direct and coordinate settlement efforts,²³⁴ though local institutions, either transformed or newly made, still retained a central role in decision making.²³⁵ The Zionist Organization, founded in 1897 by Theodore Herzl and holding annual or biannual congresses until 1913, was one such institution, which in turn was responsible for the foundation of other institutions. The various Zionist Congresses passed resolutions that would found other institutions to provide the framework upon which organized colonial settlement activity could proceed. Following the second congress, a bank was incorporated in England in 1899, whose subsidiary, the Anglo-Palestine Bank, established in Jaffa in 1903,²³⁶ would be instrumental in funding future settlements, including Tel-Aviv. The fifth congress established the Jewish National Fund (JNF), tasked with collecting money exclusively for the purchase of land in Palestine and Syria.²³⁷ Ruppin’s opening of the Palestine Office of the Zionist Organization in Jaffa in 1908 marked the beginning of that organization’s systematic work in

²³³ Nightingale, 2012, p. 5

²³⁴ Until the middle of the 20th century’s first decade, the Zionist organizations, both in Palestine and abroad, actually worked to deter immigration in order not to overburden the Yishuv and sponsoring bodies, and not to raise the ire of the Ottoman authorities (Shilo, 1994).

²³⁵ Robinson Divine, 2000, pp. 265-266

²³⁶ Lehn, 1974, p. 77

²³⁷ Lehn, 1974, p. 78

Palestine, which included instigating settlement activity and providing information to prospective immigrants.²³⁸

The members of the Zionist Organization were described as young professionals, fresh out of university, and representing the same group that Theodor Herzl described in his utopian novel *Altneuland* as “an unfortunate surplus of trained men who could find no work, but were at the same time spoiled for a modest way of life. They could not, like their Christian colleagues, slip into public posts.”²³⁹ Some of these young men were trained in the same professions that would prove crucial for earlier segregation efforts in colonial empires: medicine, law, and engineering. They included Ruppin, a trained lawyer; Zlocisti, a physician who wrote a book about climatology and pathology in Palestine,²⁴⁰ and co-wrote a book on the organization of healthcare in Palestine with the Zionist Organization’s construction engineer in Palestine, Richard Michel;²⁴¹ and Pinhas Rutenberg, an engineer instrumental in the design and implementation of hydraulic resources in Palestine for irrigation and electricity production. All three would play important roles in the creation and expansion of Tel-Aviv.

The pioneering technocrats of political Zionism in its first two decades were largely from Central Europe, and adapted mainly Central European models to Zionist concerns,²⁴² though they were highly influenced by British town planning as well. Many of Zionism’s earliest activists took inspiration from the garden city movement in England. Theodor Herzl, in his 1896 book *The Jewish State*, suggested building “detached houses in little gardens...united into attractive groups,” while rejecting contemporary European worker housing as “miserable rows of shanties.”²⁴³ Arthur Ruppin, when formulating the building regulations for Ahuzat Bayit, consulted the works of Ebenezer Howard, among others.²⁴⁴

²³⁸ Shilo, 1994, p. 607

²³⁹ Quoted in Berkowitz, 1993, p. 16

²⁴⁰ *Klimatologie und Pathologie Palästinas*, 1937

²⁴¹ *Aufgaben und Organisation des Sanitätsdienstes in Palästina*, published in 1920 (Harpaz, 2013, p.53nn19).

²⁴² Penslar, 1991, p. 42

²⁴³ Herzl quoted in Harpaz, 2013, p. 19

²⁴⁴ LeVine, 2005, p. 63; Katz, 1986, p. 412

Architect Alexander Levy, who made many proposals for public and private construction in Palestine, also incorporated the garden-city concept into his plans, though only as one of several different types of housing.²⁴⁵ Levy, who applied for, but was rejected from, positions with the Palestine Office of the Zionist Organization, went on to found an organization in Berlin, the Association of the Builders of the Land of Israel, with the support of the Association of Jewish Architects and Engineers. The goal of the new association was to “resolve the problem of building and housing in Palestine” ahead of planned mass immigration, and in this capacity it dealt with research, planning, and advocacy.²⁴⁶

Though Herzl was an Austrian, in his formulation of political Zionism in *The Jewish State*, the financial institutions he proposed would be “subject to English jurisdiction, framed according to English laws, and under the protection of England” with their center in London.²⁴⁷ Though he provides no reasoning for this location, London at the time was the centre of a world-spanning colonial empire, with all of the necessary institutions for a colonial undertaking already headquartered there, as well as being a centre of knowledge of colonial matters.²⁴⁸ As Nightingale says, Zionism’s “earliest successes stemmed from its leaders’ meetings with one of the foremost figures of segregation mania, British colonial secretary Joseph Chamberlain, and his senior colleague, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Arthur James Balfour.”²⁴⁹

In the early years of the 20th century, several real estate companies formed in Palestine and abroad for the express purpose of purchasing land in Palestine. Some of these companies were motivated purely by nationalistic sentiments and were not intent on making a profit, while others, though motivated by Zionism, were premised on profit-making. In 1908 the Palestine Land Development

²⁴⁵ Harpaz, 2013, Ch. 4

²⁴⁶ Harpaz, 2013, p. 34

²⁴⁷ Herzl, 1896 [1989], p. 15

²⁴⁸ In his 1919 book, *The History of Zionism*, Nahum Sokolow wrote that “All the great achievements of British peaceful conquests encouraged the Zionist Movement with its trusts and funds. Cecil Rhodes, with only a million pounds to start with, created Rhodesia with its 750,000 square miles. The British North Borneo Company has a capital of £800,000 and dominates over 31,000 square miles...” (Sokolow, 1919, p. xlvii)

²⁴⁹ Nightingale, 2012, p. 413

Company was established in London, and started operating two years later under the leadership of Arthur Ruppin. The company's methods borrowed from German colonization methods in Posen, in which land was systematically purchased out of the hands of Polish landowners and transferred to German settlers in order to change the province's demographic balance.²⁵⁰ Another company, the *Geula* [redemption] *Society*, was set up in 1902 by the *Hibat Zion* [love of Zion] organization, headquartered in Odessa, Ukraine.²⁵¹ The motivator for the founding of the company, and its first secretary, was Meir Diezengoff, who would later be instrumental in Ahuzat Bayit's formation, and would become Tel-Aviv's first and long-standing mayor. The motivation for the founding of the company was the economic recession Palestine experienced in the late-19th and early-20th century, the sources of which were determined to be a lack of land for expansion of settlement and a reliance by settlers on handouts from abroad instead of on productive work. The Odessa Council therefore decided that it should cease financial support of individuals and shift its resources to land purchases. However, since the Council's resources were meager, it was decided that it would act as a facilitator for private capital investment in land in Palestine. The Council was also fearful of large-scale land purchases in Palestine by European capitalists, as its importance as a potential transportation hub had drawn wide interest in the territory, and German capitalists had indeed already started purchasing lands there in 1901-1902. Another motivation for the founding of the society was the recent decision by the Zionist Organization to found the Anglo-Palestine Company Bank (known by the Hebrew acronym AFEK) in Jaffa, as it was assumed that as an English registered bank, AFEK could facilitate the purchase of land under Ottoman restrictions.²⁵²

²⁵⁰ Reichman & Hasson, 1984, p. 61

²⁵¹ Hovevei (or Hibat) Zion—Hebrew for lovers (or love) of Zion. Hibat Zion was a Zionist organization of Russian and Romanian origin, largely motivated by the 1881 pogroms against Jews in Russia that followed the assassination of the Tzar, and by the deteriorating condition of the Jewish communities of Romania following its independence in 1878 (Katz, 1988, pp. 63-64).

²⁵² Katz, 1987, pp. 5-10.

Another such company was the American Zion Commonwealth Inc. (*AMZIC*), which was established in New York in 1914 for the purpose of purchasing land in Palestine to aid settlement and to secure for its “members and their descendants rights, interests and privileges in lands occupied” by the company.²⁵³ American Zionists would play an important role in the policy shift of the JNF in 1920 that would see, in addition to JNF funds acquired philanthropically, a concurrent use of private capital for the development of Palestine. ‘Public’ money provided by the JNF would be used to improve the infrastructure, built and human, which in turn would “ensure more conducive conditions for investment.”²⁵⁴

By the 1920s, we know that real estate and homeownership in Tel-Aviv were a lucrative business. From the minutes of a 1927 council meeting we learn that 500 landlords owned approximately 10,000 rooms in the city, and that close to 3,000 houses are owned by absentee landlords.²⁵⁵ Though at least the latter number is debatable, as Droyanov puts the total number of houses in the city in 1927 at 3,281,²⁵⁶ the fact that two councilors raised the issue during a meeting dealing with an acute housing shortage and high rents shows that the housing stock in the city was already by then used to extract profit on a large scale.

Segregationist Tendencies in Early Tel-Aviv

In the founding of Tel-Aviv, we find the convergence of the three institutions mentioned by Nightingale and expanded on above. The idea for a separate quarter based on health and hygiene, whose planning would be based on European standards and ideals; supported by various Zionist quasi-governmental organizations, including a bank founded specifically for the settlement of Palestine; on land purchased with the help of one of the first real-estate companies in Palestine.²⁵⁷

²⁵³ Glass, 2002, pp. 181-182.

²⁵⁴ Glass, 2002, p. 183.

²⁵⁵ TAMA, 207/10-03, Minutes of 18th council meeting, 22 June 1927, pp. 181-182.

²⁵⁶ Droyanov, 1936, p. 323.

²⁵⁷ Geula Society provided a substantial loan for Ahuzat Bayit Society’s purchase of the Kerem Jabali lands, with the land itself standing in assurance of the loan (Katz, 1987, p. 100).

Of the first Jewish neighbourhoods outside of Jaffa, several were of mixed Ashkenazi-Sephardi make up, while others were strictly Yemenite. Neve-Tzedek (established in 1887), the first neighbourhood, was of mixed residency and ownership.²⁵⁸ It was built by a public company, Ezrat Israel, whose original aim was to provide Ashkenazi immigrants medical and financial assistance, but which soon turned to settlement activity and consequently neglected its aid mandate.²⁵⁹ The second neighbourhood, Neve-Shalom (established in 1890), was built by a private real-estate developer, Zerah Baranet, and was also of mixed ethnicity.²⁶⁰ Land purchases in the Jaffa environs for settlement purposes expanded following the establishment of these two neighbourhoods, peaking in 1891. The same year saw the establishment of many real-estate companies, mostly by private entrepreneurs for profit, but some by cooperatives strictly in order to fulfill the housing needs of groups and individuals.²⁶¹ However, the next Jewish neighbourhood would only be established in 1896. This neighbourhood, Yaffe Nof, was also of mixed ethnicity, as attested by its regulations.²⁶² Next to be built was the Akhva neighbourhood, built by ultra-orthodox Ashkenazi residents of Jaffa in 1899. Mahane Yehuda was built in 1903, and was composed entirely of Yemenite Jews, who built mostly windowless hovels, with a few stone structures interspersed in them. Mahane Yosef and Ohel Moshe were built in 1904, by a mixed population of Yemenite, North African, and Ashkenazi Jews.²⁶³ 1906 saw the establishment of the last Jewish neighbourhood before Ahuzat Bayit; later to be known as Kerem HaTeimanim, but at the time known as Mahane Yisrael, or Kerem Karton,²⁶⁴ the neighbourhood was also of mixed populace, though Yemenite Jews formed an overwhelming majority.

²⁵⁸ Ram, 1996, p. 128

²⁵⁹ Ram, 1996, pp. 99-100.

²⁶⁰ Ram, 1996, pp. 128-129.

²⁶¹ Ram, 1996, p. 130.

²⁶² Ram, 1996, pp. 132-133.

²⁶³ Ram, 1996, pp. 134-135.

²⁶⁴ Kerem HaTeimanim – Hebrew for Yemenite Vineyard. Kerem Karton – Cardboard Vineyard, a reference to the building materials originally used in its construction.

We see then, that by the time Ahuzat Bayit's council was formed in 1906, several Jewish neighbourhoods had existed outside of the Jaffa walls, and most of them had a mixed ethnicity. Ahuzat Bayit, though it also had several members from Jaffa's established Sephardi families, was mostly an Ashkenazi association, and later, neighbourhood. Its members were mostly businessmen who preferred to keep their capital invested in their businesses, and therefore sought a large loan with a low interest rate to pay for the land and for construction costs.²⁶⁵ Their association coincided with the establishment by Arthur Ruppin of the Palestine Office of the Zionist Organization, whose first initiative in Palestine was securing approval for the aforementioned loan from the heads of the Zionist Organization in Europe.^{266,267} As opposed to previously built neighbourhoods that considered themselves inseparable from Jaffa, "The creation of a separate community, a hallmark of the Zionist movement, did not occur in Jaffa until Tel-Aviv's founding."²⁶⁸

The next neighbourhoods to be built outside of Jaffa would already follow in the footsteps of Ahuzat Bayit, including applying for loans under the same conditions from the Zionist Organization, parceling land into similarly sized lots, and using modern land planning regulations modeled on Ahuzat Bayit's.²⁶⁹ Nahalat Binyamin [Benjamin's bequest] merged with Ahuzat Bayit, by then renamed Tel-Aviv, in 1912,²⁷⁰ after discovering that the neighbourhood had no ready supply of water.²⁷¹ Following the same

²⁶⁵ Letter dated 23 June 1907, from Ahuzat Bayit Council to the Jewish National Fund main office in Cologne, Germany, quoted in Droyanov, 1936, p. 75.

²⁶⁶ Ram, 1996, p. 238.

²⁶⁷ Ruppin saw the work of his office as "being similar to that of the Colonization Commission working in Posen and Western Prussia. The JNF will buy land whenever it is offered by non-Jews and will offer it for resale either partly or wholly to Jews." (Reichman & Hasson, 1984, p. 61). The Posen Commission's mandate was to transfer land ownership in German-occupied Posen to German landowners. Reichman & Hasson point to the similarities between Zionist colonization of Palestine and the Prussian colonization of Posen.

²⁶⁸ Ram, 1996, p.85, note 7

²⁶⁹ Ahuzat Bayit's original planning regulations, formulated by Arthur Ruppin, called for maximum lot coverage of 30% (Droyanov, 1936, p. 157). The Tel-Aviv planning regulations, adopted in 1910, already allowed coverage of 33% of lots (Droyanov, 1936, p. 161). Nahalat Binyamin, the first neighbourhood built after Ahuzat Bayit, allowed construction on 40% of lots (Droyanov, 1936, p. 195). However, once the two neighbourhoods were joined, Nahalat Binyamin agreed to adopt Tel-Aviv's regulations going forward.

²⁷⁰ LeVine, 2005, p. 72

²⁷¹ Ram, 1996, p. 241; Droyanov, 1936, p. 180

model, other neighbourhoods were built and soon joined Tel-Aviv, including Hevra Hadasha [new society] in 1912 and Merkaz Ba'alei Melakha [craftsmen's centre] in 1913.

When in 1913 the older Jewish neighbourhood of Neve-Tzedek asked to be connected to Tel-Aviv's water supply, the latter agreed to do so, but in the process "took it upon itself to educate its neighbour at the least about good order," including clauses in the water supply contract forcing Neve-Tzedek to pave its streets and install sidewalks, install outhouses and cesspools, clean its streets and lawns and remove garbage from the neighbourhood on a daily basis, and forbidding the drying of underwear in plain sight of the streets.²⁷² In case any of these clauses was not kept, after an initial warning, Tel-Aviv maintained its right to cut off the water supply for any further infringements.²⁷³ Similar water-supply contracts were subsequently signed with other neighbourhoods that were not part of Tel-Aviv, including Merkaz Ba'alei Melakha and Kerem HaTeimanim, in both cases forcing these neighbourhoods to comply with Tel-Aviv's current and future land-planning ordinances.²⁷⁴

During World War I, the city's development was halted and its residents expelled by the Ottoman authorities. The end of the war saw a shift from Ottoman to British rule, which markedly affected the growing city. Before the war there was discussion of building a great synagogue, with the Tel-Aviv council proposing a large hall for Sabbath and High Holiday observances, and two smaller adjacent halls for weekday observances, one for Ashkenazi liturgy and one for Sephardi liturgy. However, following discussion it was decided to build a single great hall, with a committee composed of nine Ashkenazi and one Sephardi members appointed to put the plan into action.²⁷⁵ The war put a halt to plans for the synagogue and when it was finally completed in 1926, it was to be an Ashkenazi synagogue, which the Jaffa-Tel-Aviv Sephardi chief Rabbi already knew in 1924, when he petitioned for funds from the Tel-Aviv

²⁷² Droyanov, 1936, pp. 198-199

²⁷³ For a full year after the signing of the agreement Tel-Aviv's council refused to connect Neve-Tzedek to its water supply, only relenting once the latter's residents started complying with the planning and sanitation regulations stipulated in the agreement (Droyanov, 1936, p. 199).

²⁷⁴ Droyanov, 1936, pp. 209-210.

²⁷⁵ Droyanov, 1936, p. 201.

municipality for a Sephardi synagogue. The town's deputy mayor responded, suggesting that Tel-Aviv was a unified Jewish city where "all Jews are equal" and therefore he should find a way to pray at the Great Synagogue, which "did not belong to any particular ethnic community." Thus, though in its earliest years Tel-Aviv purported to be a home for diverse Jewish communities, it soon became one in which the dominant Ashkenazi community set the tone to which the other communities had to conform. In the end, a Sephardi synagogue was built with municipal help, though this came about only after the city's Sephardi residents refused to pay the special construction levy meant for the great synagogue.²⁷⁶

Once the war ended, growth of the city and its surroundings was renewed. In 1920 the Tel-Aviv council declared that all those who purchased lands surrounding Tel-Aviv must conform with certain planning regulations; those who did not would not be provided water from Tel-Aviv's water sources, and their lands would be formally disavowed by the council.²⁷⁷ At the same meeting, a suggestion was made to negotiate with the "Yemenites living around Tel-Aviv" about trading their houses and lands for land near the sea, "by which we will order and fix the whole area of Tel-Aviv."²⁷⁸ However, two weeks later it was decided in principle that these lands and their residents should be amalgamated with Tel-Aviv.²⁷⁹ During a February 1921 meeting discussing the amalgamation there was disagreement within the council over whether these neighbourhoods should be persuaded to join Tel-Aviv or whether they should be allowed to decide for themselves. It was at this meeting that Dr. Zlocisti made the statement that opened this chapter, about forcing these neighbourhoods to join Tel-Aviv as part of a "cultural mission."

Following an Arab assault on Jews in Jaffa in May 1921, which saw many casualties on both sides, though more so on the Jewish side, and an influx of Jewish refugees into Tel-Aviv, the Mandate authorities decided to grant Tel-Aviv Township status, which would see it gain semi-independence from

²⁷⁶ Helman, 2011, pp. 140-141

²⁷⁷ TAMA, 422/283A, pp. 38-39.

²⁷⁸ TAMA, 422/283A, pp. 40-41.

²⁷⁹ TAMA, 422/283A, no page number.

Jaffa. During the border negotiations following this decision it was decided that those neighbourhoods with Jewish majorities would be included in Tel-Aviv, including Neve-Tzedek, Neve-Shalom, Mahane Yosef, Mahane Yehuda, Ohel Moshe, and Kerem HaTeimanim. However, actual amalgamation would be delayed by several years, as the residents of these neighbourhoods demanded proportional representation within the Tel-Aviv council²⁸⁰ as well as the preservation of neighbourhood autonomy.²⁸¹

After amalgamation, these neighbourhoods, and particularly Kerem HaTeimanim, complained of continued neglect of their needs by the Tel-Aviv municipality. In a meeting in 1925, a Yemenite member of the council complained of discrimination in the city's schools, saying that teachers refused to allow Yemenite children into class, claiming that they are sick, and estimating the number of children thus affected to be approximately 200.²⁸² Earlier that year, another councilor complained that on Allenby Street, which borders on the Yemenite quarter, houses of six stories were allowed, while in the latter not even two stories were allowed; "We are being surrounded by a fort,"²⁸³ he stated. A 1926 letter from the Kerem HaTeimanim neighbourhood council to the acting mayor of Tel-Aviv complained of continued neglect of street cleaning, street lighting, and security in the neighbourhood.²⁸⁴ In 1927 one council member complained of a lack of paved roads and electric lighting in Kerem HaTeimanim and Neve Sha'anana, while new roads were being paved in new neighbourhoods in the city's north.^{285,286} In 1938, the residents of Kerem HaTeimanim wrote a letter to the Tel-Aviv municipality complaining of years of neglect, with their meagre taxes being diverted to the richer neighbourhoods of the north while they had been left in the same state they had been in for 15 years (since joining Tel-Aviv): "The noise

²⁸⁰ During a council meeting on 21 May 1921 a Yemenite representative requested that representatives from the Yemenite neighbourhoods (Mahane Yosef, Mahane Yehuda, Kerem HaTeimanim) be appointed, but the council decided that no new arrangements will be made, though neighbourhood representatives will be invited to all important meetings between the council and committee (TAMA, 422/283B, p. 255).

²⁸¹ Ram, 1996, p. 341.

²⁸² TAMA, 206/10-02, protocol no. 10 dated 17 October 1925, no page number.

²⁸³ TAMA, 206/10-07, protocol no. 26 dated 24 January 1925, p. 4.

²⁸⁴ TAMA, 1065/2207A, letter dated 15 July 1926.

²⁸⁵ TAMA, 207/10-02, p. 118.

²⁸⁶ Complaints about lack of lighting in the Yemenite Quarter were also raised in 1924 (TAMA, 206/10-06, protocol no. 12 dated 30 August 1924, no page number).

and the filth, the density and the noise all are here, only roads are lacking, sewers are lacking, improvements are lacking, only taxes and taxes, trials and payments, fines and an emptying out.”²⁸⁷

Another indication of the status of Yemenite residents in the city can be gleaned from a council meeting in 1924, when 29 participants are listed by name, while the end of the roll call lists “3 Yemenites”, without providing their names.²⁸⁸ A year later, complaints of discrimination against Yemenites by the Tel-Aviv Electoral Committee prompted a boycott of elections by Yemenites throughout the Mandate territory.²⁸⁹

In 1924, the Jewish neighbourhood of Neve-Sha’an an was also amalgamated into Tel-Aviv. The neighbourhood was built in 1921, on land purchased with the help of the Geula land company and the Tel-Aviv municipality,²⁹⁰ by a group of 400 Jews, both new immigrants and internal refugees who fled the violence in Jaffa the same year. They were proud of their mixed population, including nearly a quarter who were Yemenite and Sephardi, and envisaged their neighbourhood to be a mix of town and village, hoping to supply Tel-Aviv with at least part of its food by growing crops on their land.²⁹¹ However, this neighbourhood, which was on the opposite side of the railway tracks from the rest of Tel-Aviv, was envisioned by the city to be an industrial area, as attested by the city’s chief planner in a 1940 report to British town planner Patrick Abercrombie, ahead of his planned arrival in the city as a consultant.²⁹² In the report, Yaacob Ben-Sira (Shifman), who was the city’s chief planner from 1929 to 1950, asserted that “for many years past we had hoped that the south-eastern part of Tel-Aviv known as Neve-Shaan an might become such a light-industrial area.” A year after writing the report the

²⁸⁷ Bernstein, 2008, p. 58.

²⁸⁸ TAMA, 206/10-04, protocol no. 61 dated 24 May 1924. Diezengoff opened the same meeting by welcoming a Dr. Henska as a distinguished guest, but made no mention of the Yemenite observers. Having read dozens of Tel-Aviv council meeting minutes, this was the only case I saw in which participants were not named but rather given an ethnic designation.

²⁸⁹ Robinson Divine, 2000, pp. 265-266.

²⁹⁰ TAMA, 422/283C, protocol no. 55 dated 20 October 1921, p. 452. Rotbard gives the year of amalgamation as 1927.

²⁹¹ Rotbard, 2015, pp. 142-144.

²⁹² TAMA, 1138/2605C, p. 4. The planned visit apparently never happened because of the war.

municipality constructed its central bus station in the neighbourhood, effectively cutting it off from the rest of the city, “hiding the neighbourhood behind a smokescreen of buses.”²⁹³ In the same report, Ben-Sira writes on the possibility of developing Holon, a Jewish town to the south of Neve-Sha’an, so as to provide Tel-Aviv with its industrial needs and housing for its working population, suggesting a class-based segregationist drive by the city.²⁹⁴

Neve-Sha’an was the last southern neighbourhood to be joined to Tel-Aviv until the 1940s, though Jewish neighbourhoods continued to be built to the south. Future annexations were not possible for several reasons, including Jaffa’s reluctance to give up any more territory to Tel-Aviv. However, we must also consider Tel-Aviv’s reluctance to annex these neighbourhoods. In a special meeting of Tel-Aviv Council held on 19 December 1926, David Bloch, mayor of Tel-Aviv between 1925 and 1927, talked about a proposed change in the township’s constitution that would see its residents unable to vote in the Jaffa elections, a right they maintained after their initial separation from that city:

Understand, that just as we do not have the possibility of influencing the municipalities of Nablus or Jenin so long as we do not sit within their territory, the same is true for Jaffa, and *we have no other recourse than to attempt to bring Jews from the diaspora, of which there are many, who will settle in these cities and in Jaffa.*²⁹⁵

Thus we see that Tel-Aviv’s leaders, while wishing to disengage from Jaffa, still wished to maintain influence over it, and to do this they needed the southern neighbourhoods to act as both a buffer and a Jewish colony within Jaffa’s territory.

The new Jewish neighbourhoods that were built to the south had their own reasons to maintain their separateness from Tel-Aviv, chief among them were the lower taxes collected by Jaffa, or no taxes at all

²⁹³ Rotbard, 2015, p. 146.

²⁹⁴ TAMA, 1138/2605C, p. 6.

²⁹⁵ TAMA, 207/10-01, p. 4. Emphasis added. Bloch goes on to say that there are enough Jews in the diaspora to possibly bring into and influence purely Palestinian cities such as Nablus and Jenin.

in at least one case: the Shapira Quarter, which was built in 1924 by Lithuanian-born American entrepreneur Meir Getzel Shapira. Shapira purchased a large tract of land in the Abu-Kabir orchards south of Tel-Aviv and east of Jaffa, to which he hoped to draw industrialists, claiming that the land was neither in Tel-Aviv nor in Jaffa, and therefore could not be taxed, nor its buildings regulated.²⁹⁶ In the end, he subdivided the land into small lots, less than half the size of standard lots in Tel-Aviv,²⁹⁷ and sold them to new immigrants from Bukhara (Central Asia), Eastern Europe, Turkey, Bulgaria, Afghanistan, Persia, and Thessaloniki (Greece).²⁹⁸

The Florentine Quarter was built by Jews from Thessaloniki, Greece, in 1927, and they were soon joined by immigrants from Turkey, the Balkans, and Bukhara.²⁹⁹ It was built to the south of Neve-Tzedek, but within the boundaries of Jaffa, as a working-class residential neighbourhood with light industry.

HaTikva Quarter was built in 1935 by Mizrahi Tel-Aviv municipal workers, on land to the southeast of Tel-Aviv, who were joined by Yemenite refugees from Tel-Aviv following the 1936 Arab uprising.³⁰⁰

1925 was the last year of large-scale land purchases in the jurisdiction of Tel-Aviv until 1933.³⁰¹ Further expansion was largely limited by the cultivated lands of the German colony of Sarona to the east, and the Arab village of Sumayl, which was within Tel-Aviv's jurisdiction. The same period saw the population of the city more than double, though it remained mostly stable between 1926 and 1930.³⁰² The last census of Tel-Aviv to include ethnic affiliation was conducted in 1925, and found that 98.8% of the population was Jewish, and of that, 85.4% was Ashkenazi, 7.7% Sephardi, 5.5% Yemenite, and 1.2%

²⁹⁶ According to Shapira's son, Nathan, his father could have had the neighbourhood annexed to Tel-Aviv, but preferred not to do so because of the city's high taxes (Rotbard, 2009, no page number).

²⁹⁷ The Shapira lots were a quarter of a dunum, approximately 250 sq. m. (Rotbard, 2009, <http://readingmachine.co.il/home/books/1240134698> (Hebrew)). The Tel-Aviv lots were on average 588 sq. m. (Droyanov, 1936, p. 295).

²⁹⁸ Rotbard, 2009, retrieved from <http://readingmachine.co.il/home/books/1240134698> (Hebrew).

²⁹⁹ "Don't try to change Florentine", 2008, para. 2.

³⁰⁰ The Yemenite Quarters of Tel-Aviv were adjacent to the Jaffa neighbourhood of Manshiye and were partly evacuated following commencement of hostilities. By 1947 the HaTikva quarter is described by the Lydda District Commissioner as a "purely Jewish, mainly Yemenite, slum quarter." (ISA, SF/10/39, p. 387).

³⁰¹ Droyanov, 1936, p. 296.

³⁰² Droyanov, 1936, p. 342.

“other Easterners.”³⁰³ Droyanov’s descriptions of Tel-Aviv in the mid-1930s shed some light on ethnic class divides within the city. In his description of the major intersection of Allenby, Nahalat Binyamin, HaCarmel, and Sheinkin Streets as a place of congregation of workers, he describes one side of the intersection as a gathering spot for male jobseekers, while the other side was occupied by female houseworkers, “an overwhelming majority of whom are of the Mizrahi communities.”³⁰⁴ The people observed on the sidewalks of the city’s business district along Herzl Street are described as brandishing hats and walking sticks, “typical stock-exchange people who are observed in every city, in which Eastern European Jews are present and involved in trade.”³⁰⁵ The upper end of HaCarmel Street bordering on Jaffa was (and remains) the city’s main market, where Arab and Mizrahi greengrocers had shops, and where “the spoken languages, and the shouts and faces of the vendors lend this corner the character of an eastern bazaar.”³⁰⁶ The market at the lower end of HaCarmel Street had “huts arranged in a European order and the vendors are all Jews, overwhelmingly Ashkenazi. The look is akin to that of a market in a modern Polish city.”³⁰⁷ Neve-Tzedek’s main street, Shabazi, had stores of two varieties, “Arab-Jewish and Eastern-European-Jewish, with the latter on the ascendancy. The Jewish vendor of Western Europe is still not seen here.” Ben-Yehuda Street, on the other hand, “has the appearance of a shopping street in a quiet suburb of a Western-European metropolis or one of the summer resorts next to the metropolis, such as Baden near Vienna.”³⁰⁸ The Yemenite Quarter was described as “the only neighbourhood of a special community.” Its small, hut-like houses were being replaced along Allenby

³⁰³ Droyanov, 1936, p. 345. The distinction between Sephardi and Easterners is not explained, but likely means Persian, Central Asian, and Iraqi Jews.

³⁰⁴ Droyanov, 1936, p. 316.

³⁰⁵ Droyanov, 1936, p. 315.

³⁰⁶ Droyanov, 1936, p. 316.

³⁰⁷ Droyanov, 1936, p. 316. Droyanov distinguished this market from the noise and crowd that were the hallmarks of Jewish markets in the Pale of Settlement (a western region of the Russian Empire, encompassing part of Poland, to which Jewish residence was limited), thus marking Tel-Aviv as a modern European town, distinct from both Arab Palestine and from the Jewish *Shtetl* [village].

³⁰⁸ Droyanov, 1936, p. 316.

Street by new houses, where Ashkenazi residents were beginning to insert themselves into the neighbourhood, and its “exotic poverty is facing extinction.”³⁰⁹

Though there are no exact statistics for ethnic composition of the Jaffa neighbourhoods, we saw above that many, if not most of them were non-Ashkenazi. The explanation for this ethnic segregation is not simple and straightforward. We can assume that Jewish immigrants from Arab localities had a cultural affinity to Arab Jaffa more than they did to the mostly Ashkenazi Tel-Aviv, especially as European immigration to that city picked up pace following World War I. This would also include Jaffa residents, who after the 1921 Jaffa riots that resulted in the death of 47 Jews decided to leave Jaffa proper, but still wished to remain in its environs. However, residents of the Florentine Quarter, comprised mostly of Jews from Greece, would not have necessarily felt this affinity as they came from a non-Arab country, though one with recent Ottoman heritage. From correspondence in the 1940s between the “Joint Committee of Jewish Quarters in the Jaffa Area,” the Tel-Aviv municipality, and the National Council of the Yishuv, it appears that the former were unwilling to commit to any plan as regards retaining their semi-independent status under Jaffa, or annexation to Tel-Aviv.³¹⁰ The higher taxes of Tel-Aviv meant that homeowners in these neighbourhoods refused to be annexed to that city,³¹¹ however, the lack of proper services (in the residents’ opinion), including education, caused the neighbourhood committees and residents to petition for unification in the 1940s.³¹²

The rise in Ashkenazi population in Tel-Aviv was accompanied by outspoken derision of Mizrahi culture, and the conflation of Ashkenazi culture with a new singular culture of the Yishuv. We have seen

³⁰⁹ Droyanov, 1936, p. 318.

³¹⁰ TAMA, 4/2208D.

³¹¹ Tel-Aviv’s residents paid almost 3.5 times as much in municipal taxes than Jaffa’s residents (Droyanov, 1936, p. 398).

³¹² This request, both by the Jewish quarters of Jaffa and by the Tel-Aviv municipality was repeatedly denied by the Mandate authorities. In a confidential letter from the Acting District Commissioner of Lydda District (to which Jaffa and Tel-Aviv belonged) to the Chief Secretary of the Mandate government dated 2 February 1946, the former admits that the inclusion of HaTikva within the Tel-Aviv Town Planning Boundaries would be the best solution to the problem of illegal construction in the quarter, but that he has rejected all such applications for political reasons. (Israel State Archives [ISA], SF/10/39, p. 331).

this in the case of Tel-Aviv's Great Synagogue, and the attitude of the city's deputy mayor. We have also seen the attitude of Dr. Zlocisti to "those who are resistant to European culture."³¹³ Another case is that of Ya'acov Rabinovitch, a prominent Ashkenazi intellectual, who in a 1913 article attacking a prominent Sephardi intellectual (more on this below) linked Sephardi Jews' "'lack of culture' with their affinities to Arab culture, defining this connection as a threat to Zionism," with the only road "to becoming 'one national division'" being the "erasure of Arab culture and enforced enculturation of European culture."³¹⁴

In their article on pre-1936 Middle-Eastern Jewish intellectuals, Moshe Behar and Zvi Ben-Dor Benite show that "'European Zionist behaviour'" is revealed in the writings of Sephardi intellectuals in Palestine. Hayyim Ben-Kiki, a Tiberias-born scion of a distinguished Moroccan Jewish family, attacked the European leaders of the Zionist movement in a 1921 article. He accused them of arrogance and ignorance concerning the local Arabs, and a demeaning attitude towards Sephardic Jews.³¹⁵ The latter's awareness of European Zionists' interest in "the Arab Question" resulted in their being "[disgraced] and [ridiculed] by the Yishuv's prominent [Ashkenazi] men."³¹⁶ Thus, the 1913 advocacy by Sephardi intellectual Dr. Nissim Malul to include the study of Arabic as a compulsory subject in Hebrew-Jewish schools was described by Ya'acov Rabinovitch as an "internal threat," and he further advised Yishuv members "to keep away from Arabised Jewish intellectuals who advocated for the cultivation of such a relationship."³¹⁷

We must also consider the change from Ottoman to British rule in Palestine, and its effect on the attitude of Ashkenazi residents toward both the Palestinians and Sephardi Jews, including those who had lived in Palestine for generations. Following the institution of British rule in Palestine the Ottoman

³¹³ TAMA, 422/283b, pp. 185-186.

³¹⁴ Behar & Ben-Dor Benite, 2014, p. 11.

³¹⁵ Behar & Ben-Dor Benite, 2014, p. 1.

³¹⁶ Behar & Ben-Dor Benite, 2014, p. 6.

³¹⁷ Behar & Ben-Dor Benite, 2014, pp. 8-9.

office of *Hakham Bashi*, the Jewish religious leader, was abolished in favour of a civil leadership in the form of European-Zionist organizations, while the Christian and Muslim leadership of the country remained in the hands of the Patriarchate and Mufitah, respectively.³¹⁸ The Hakham Bashi had usually been a Sephardic rabbi, and this institutional change from above would do much to “[codify] the Zionist ‘new order’ in Palestine that displaced the ‘Old Yishuv’ (which consisted of Sephardic-Mizrahi and Ashkenazi-Orthodox Jews).”³¹⁹ In Tel-Aviv, this shift can be seen in an April 1921 discussion on the maintenance of the office of the Jaffa Hakham Bashi, shortly after the British edict nullifying the office. In a Tel-Aviv council meeting on the subject, the chairman explained that it had been decided by the Jaffa-Tel-Aviv Jewish community council that the Hakham Bashi’s office should continue to be maintained, and that Tel-Aviv needed to contribute toward this expense. Several members supported this motion, while several others opposed it and opposed any discussion of the matter. In the end, no decision was made, and in fact, the office remained vacant after the Hakham Bashi left Palestine for Thessaloniki, where he was offered the position of Chief Rabbi.³²⁰ However, when a decade earlier the office of Hakham Bashi for Jaffa was first instituted following a change to the Ottoman constitution, Ashkenazi members of Tel-Aviv’s council advocated for it, citing the benefits that could be accrued to the settlement from having a representative who could freely access the Ottoman authorities. Among the supporters of the appointment of Hakham Bashi were Arthur Ruppin, who wrote that the selection of a Sephardi candidate over an Ashkenazi opponent was a good one as he would be effective in his ties with the authorities.³²¹

Though in the late-19th century Sephardi and Ashkenazi communities in Palestine were differentiated by religious, cultural, and economic attributes, these differences did not prevent cooperation in Jaffa,

³¹⁸ Behar & Ben-Dor Benite, 2014, p. 9.

³¹⁹ Behar & Ben-Dor Benite, 2014, p. 9.

³²⁰ TAMA, 422/283B, p. 247. Jaffa’s Hakham Bashi, Rabbi Uziel, would return several years later to become Tel-Aviv’s Chief Sephardi Rabbi, the same one mentioned earlier in the Great Synagogue case.

³²¹ Ram, 1996, pp. 231-232. Sephardi Rabbi Ben-Zion Meir Chai Uziel was selected over Ashkenazi Rabbi Yisrael Porat, who was endorsed by Turkey’s Hakham Bashi, even though the majority of those voting were Ashkenazi.

though they presented barriers that had to be crossed.³²² By the early-20th century, and especially following the large-scale immigration of European Jews beginning in the 1920s, which coincided with British rule of Palestine, the different communities, including the Yemenite community, were essentialized by Ashkenazi leaders and intellectuals to such an extent that cooperation on an equal footing was often impossible. Thus, a 1924 article noted that higher mortality rates among Eastern Jews was the result of “a lower cultural level,” while Ashkenazim’s lower mortality rate was due to their “cultural and moral superiority.”³²³ Therefore, even though one of the main justifications for the establishment of Tel-Aviv and its differentiation from both Jaffa and slightly older neighbourhoods was the question of sanitation and housing and their effects on health, by the 1920s we see that these factors were not used to explain highly divergent mortality rates, and instead cultural differences were cited as the underlying causes.³²⁴

Following the commencement of the Arab revolt of 1936, when many Jews of Jaffa moved their businesses to Tel-Aviv, we can see an increase in complaints by neighbours in the city’s southern quarters about the ‘Oriental’ cafes that began to appear there. These complaints both “highlighted the difference between the European and the Eastern and at the same time blurred...the difference between the Mizrahi Jews and the embodiment of the Arab east.”³²⁵ They included descriptions of the cafes’ patrons as “lazy or rather like the usual crowd in the Arab cafes of Jaffa,” playing card games, backgammon, and dominos, whose clicks, along with the piercing shrieks in Arabic “make the residents go mad.”³²⁶ Even before the revolt, though, Tel-Aviv banned the sale of Arak³²⁷ and the playing of dominos and cards in cafes. Though there is nothing to suggest that the consumption of Arak and the

³²² In Jerusalem the differences were more pronounced and cooperation was rare.

³²³ Helman, 2011, p. 136

³²⁴ Gershon Shafir, citing housing conditions in the agricultural settlement of Rehovot during World War I, notes that Yemenite workers and their families, who lived in tents and stables, suffered a 40% mortality rate, while Ashkenazi residents, who lived in houses, suffered an 8% mortality rate (Shafir, 1990, p. 179).

³²⁵ Bernstein, 2008, p. 67.

³²⁶ Bernstein, 2008, p. 69.

³²⁷ An anise-flavoured alcoholic drink popular in the Middle-East.

playing of cards were only the hallmarks of Mizrahi residents, to the city's European population they must have signified them as such, and this ordinance, unique to Tel-Aviv, "sharpened the difference between 'European' Tel-Aviv and the Orient that surrounded it." It was an attack on the owners and patrons of these establishments, who were "ostracized as deviants from the norm."^{328, 329}

Documents from the social service department of Tel-Aviv from the 1930s, and referred to by Deborah Bernstein,³³⁰ further highlight the way in which Mizrahi residents, and specifically women, were described in Orientalist terms, with essentialist characteristics ascribed to them. Thus, their families were designated as "uncultured" and the young women as possessing a "bounteous sexuality" that needed to be blocked. In a 1936 document, the Tel-Aviv social service department explained the sources of the "fallen teenage girl problem." Designating three categories of teenagers: working-class, middle-class, and Mizrahi, the document asserted that the first two are less in danger of moral corruption due to the high cultural and moral level of their surroundings, while the Mizrahi immigrants "mostly arrive from countries with low culture" and consequently their appreciation of women is low. "These immigrants bring with them a double poverty: material and spiritual...it falls to us of Western and Eastern European extraction to bring them closer to us by raising their cultural level."³³¹ As Bernstein notes, the document brings together the Western and Eastern Europeans as one social entity, while in Europe the distinction between the two was of utmost centrality.³³² This united *Eretz-Israeli* European Jewry is now opposed to the Mizrahi Jewry, and is tasked with a *mission civilisatrice* towards

³²⁸ Bernstein, 2008, p. 70.

³²⁹ This was not a ban on alcohol consumption in general, but a targeted ban on a specific beverage favoured by Middle-Eastern drinkers.

³³⁰ Bernstein, D. (2008). *Women on the Margins: Gender and Nationalism in Mandate Tel-Aviv*. Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi.

³³¹ Bernstein, 2008, p. 281.

³³² Bernstein, 2008, p. 281. See note 196 for background on the distinction of *Ostjuden*.

their Oriental brethren. Furthermore, the document shows that for its writer, only the European Jews had internal class distinctions, which were absent for Mizrahi teenagers.^{333,334}

A 1938 report by the newly established “school for Mizrahi working girls” described the “typical Mizrahi teenager” as:

Loud, wild, cunning, primitive, having an almost childlike egoism, with no consideration for others...like all primitives who come in unmediated contact with civilization they absorb from it mainly negative aspects: an inexplicable externalization and an imagined freedom. Their close contact with the Ashkenazi families for which they are employed in housework leads them to forego their original character and customs, songs, dances, and handicrafts...instead they become accustomed to the foxtrot, and the tasteless copying of European dress and makeup.³³⁵

Thus, not only do they come from low-cultured households, they are also unable to absorb the refined European culture, reduced instead to only a “tasteless copy” of it.

Conclusion

The reasons for the ethnic segregation of Tel-Aviv’s Jewish residents are many and varied. Personal choice and cultural affinity by the Mizrahi residents themselves must have played a part in their overwhelming numbers in buffer neighbourhoods between Arab Jaffa and mostly Ashkenazi Tel-Aviv. However, as the many examples of an Orientalist attitude by Ashkenazi leaders toward their Mizrahi coreligionists attest, the possibility of an equal partnership between the two groups was slim. Tel-Aviv was born of a segregationist drive, at first directed primarily at separation from the Muslim and

³³³ the specific teenager referenced in the document had a father who was a porter, and a mother who was a laundress, yet she was not regarded as working class, which at the time and place of the writing of the document must have been a cultural category as much as, if not more than, an economic one.

³³⁴ Bernstein, 2008, p. 282.

³³⁵ Bernstein, 2008, p. 283.

Christian Arab population of Jaffa, but also from its earliest conception treating Arabized Jewish neighbourhoods with contempt and derision.

The shift from separate and sometimes conflicting urban religious communities in 19th century Palestinian cities, to cooperation under more secular conditions later in the century, and then to an Ashkenazi segregationist drive in the early 20th century was a gradual one. Both Lorenzo Veracini's theorization of settler-colonialism and Carl Nightingale's conceptualization of the sources of urban segregation help to explain the segregationist drive and segregated reality of pre-1948 Jaffa-Tel-Aviv. Early examples of racist attitudes held by several key members of the Zionist enterprise, and specifically of key figures in the establishment of Tel-Aviv such as Arthur Ruppin and Itzhak Khayutman, make way in the 1920s and 1930s to more structured forms of racism, as European immigration to the city increases, but also, and perhaps more importantly, as Palestine and Jaffa transition from a Middle-Eastern, Ottoman-ruled province, to a British Mandate. Under Ottoman rule, Sephardi Ottoman citizens often had advantages over Ashkenazi immigrants, though the latter group was also subject to the capitulation regime, and therefore had advantages of its own. Both groups contributed to the expansion of Jewish Jaffa's geographic footprint, but Sephardi land entrepreneurs and community leaders were indispensable to it, acting as land agents and as middlemen and go-betweens for the community and the authorities. Following the takeover by Britain of administration of Palestine, the advantages of the Sephardi members of the community were nullified, and the settler-colonial and segregationist attitudes of European immigrants could come to the fore unchallenged by practical concerns.

In the geographic context of Tel-Aviv, this segregationist attitude prevailed first in a continuous drive to separate physically and administratively from Arab Jaffa, but also to either assimilate Mizrahi residents into an Ashkenazi hegemonic culture, rebranded as an Eretz Yisrael culture, or to segregate those unwilling to give up their culture, forming a buffer area between largely Ashkenazi Tel-Aviv and largely Arab Jaffa.

Chapter 3: Evictions Past and Present in Tel-Aviv-Jaffa



Figure 2 - Residents of Givat Amal being evacuated on 21 September 2014. (photo credit: Tomer Neuberg/Flash90) source: <http://www.timesofisrael.com/police-clear-out-tel-aviv-neighborhood-for-second-time/>

*“This land denies,
cheats, and betrays us;
its dust can't bear us
and grumbles about us -
resents and detests us.
Its newcomers,
sailors, and usurpers,
uproot the backyard gardens,
burying the trees.” - Taha Muhammad Ali, Ambergris*

Introduction

The photo on the cover page captures the moments after the demolition by police-escorted bulldozers of a residential neighbourhood at the heart of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa. In the foreground, an elderly man leans on a cane and on a younger man, his shirt says: ‘Givat Amal – Fighting for our Home.’ In the background, the bases of high-rise luxury apartment buildings can be seen. But the real background of the image extends decades into the past, when the site of this economically motivated eviction was also the site of a previous one, motivated by nationalism.

The neighbourhood of Givat Amal is the geographical continuation of a long-standing Palestinian agricultural village—al-Jammasin al-Gharbi—that was first surrounded by an expanding Tel-Aviv, and then abandoned by its residents in the months of violence leading to the official commencement of the 1948 war. The village residents were soon replaced by mostly Sephardi Jewish refugees from war-ravaged neighbourhoods on the buffer of Tel-Aviv and Jaffa, to the chagrin of the municipality of Tel-Aviv, which had its own designs for the development of the land. Al-Jammasin al-Gharbi/Givat Amal is an exemplar of the intersection of settler colonialism, segregation as a planning tool for economic development (and its failures), and the space and place of buffer populations in the modern segregated city.

Al-Jammasin al-Gharbi

The Arab village of al-Jammasin al-Gharbi was located in marshland approximately 6.5 km north of the city of Jaffa, in the coastal plain of Palestine. The name of the village can be translated from Arabic into ‘water-buffalo breeders, west,’ a reference to the villagers’ primary occupation and source of livelihood, and a geographic distinguisher from a twin village further to the east. An early reference to the villagers, if not the village, can be found in Ottoman tax registers of 1596, in which a tribe called Jammasin is mentioned in the Nablus sub-prefecture, and whose members paid taxes on water buffalo. By the 18th century the village had been established, consisting mostly of conical or pyramidal huts made of tree logs and branches, with some adobe brick buildings as well. The population of the village was approximately 200 people in 1922, and over 1,000 by 1944.³³⁶

The residents of al-Jammasin al-Gharbi raised buffalo and marketed meat and milk in Jaffa, and cultivated citrus, bananas, and cereals as well.³³⁷ According to LeVine, as late as the 1990s, Jaffa residents had fond memories of Jammasin, as that is where their milk came from.³³⁸

Tel-Aviv

The rapid increase in population was not only restricted to al-Jammasin al-Gharbi and other Palestinian villages and towns, but was also quite substantial with the Jewish population of Palestine, and specifically in this case, of Jaffa and Tel-Aviv, largely through immigration from Europe.

When it was established in 1909, Ahuzat Bayit (later Tel-Aviv) stood about halfway between Jaffa and al-Jammasin al-Gharbi. The founders of Ahuzat Bayit envisioned their neighbourhood as the nucleus of a new Jewish city, completely independent of Jaffa. The founders’ goal was the economic conquest of Jaffa, and this included the expansion of the new town’s territory.³³⁹

³³⁶ Khalidi, 1992, p. 244

³³⁷ LeVine, 2005, p. 195

³³⁸ LeVine, 2005, note 170, p. 282

³³⁹ LeVine, 1998, p. 40

Tel-Aviv was established under Ottoman control of Palestine, and local Ottoman leaders attempted to curb its expansion, administratively by leaving it as a neighbourhood of Jaffa, and geographically by trying to prevent its access to the sea through public works.³⁴⁰ However, following the British conquest of Palestine in 1918, and its award of a colonial Mandate over it by the League of Nations in 1921, Tel-Aviv was granted municipal status, and its already rapid expansion increased. This expansion was led by both a settler-colonialist desire to control as much as possible of Palestine's coast for economic and strategic reasons, as well as by "the rapid increase in population and the speculative rise in land prices in both Tel-Aviv and Jaffa that it fuelled."³⁴¹

As the city expanded in size, it eventually "ran out of uncontested land on which to expand. Even within the municipal boundaries, much of the sandy land in the north was still owned by Arabs and was becoming more difficult to purchase."³⁴² These difficulties would lead to creative solutions by the city's leaders and planners, utilizing the inherited Ottoman land designations and the British desire to reconcile land registration.

Ottoman Land Designation and British Land Reform

The Ottoman land law of 1858 divided land into six classes, which allowed for different levels of private and public ownership, including private usage of public lands.³⁴³ Much of the land surrounding and included in the municipal boundaries of Tel-Aviv was designated as *Matruka*—public or communal land such as roads or pasture. In the Jaffa-Tel-Aviv region, this land type was especially important due to the presence of at least three villages with semi-sedentary Bedouin populations who relied on livestock grazing for a living (this includes the villagers of al-Jammasin al-Gharbi).³⁴⁴

³⁴⁰ LeVine, 1998, p. 40

³⁴¹ LeVine, 1998, p. 41

³⁴² LeVine, 1998, p. 41

³⁴³ Home, 2003, pp. 296-297; LeVine, 1998, p. 37

³⁴⁴ LeVine, 1998, p. 37

According to Robert Home, land was central to colonial projects and control of land was achieved through an array of legal instruments. Differential territorial control had an important role in regulating social relationships and in excluding and marginalizing unwanted social groups.³⁴⁵ The British utilized several colonial tools in land administration, including the Torrens land registry system established in Australia. In addition, the British had experience with Ottoman land law from their protectorates in Cyprus, Egypt, and Sudan. The British Surveyor-General of Egypt (Dowson) introduced ‘scientific survey’ to the adjudication of Palestinian land rights, and the Scottish municipal engineer of Khartoum introduced planning regulations to Jerusalem.³⁴⁶ British colonial policy between the two world wars followed a Lugardian ideology that “recognized a separation of systems of law and government within a ‘dual mandate’.”³⁴⁷ This ideology saw the role of the colonizer as bringing scientific progress to the colony while interfering as little as possible with native customs and modes of thought.³⁴⁸ The dual mandate required a separate development strategy for colonizer and colonized, further complicated by immigrant racial groups, which the British both encouraged and sought to curb in the interests of protecting the ‘natives’ (not only in Palestine—Chinese in Malaya, Indians in East Africa). In Palestine, the British Mandate both promoted the Zionist project and acted as ‘trustee’ of Palestinian interests, two irreconcilable aims.³⁴⁹

The Mandate administration passed no less than 40 ordinances on land matters in its first 15 years, in what has been called “a masterpiece of how colonial regimes occupy legal systems.”³⁵⁰ Soon after occupying Palestine, the British closed the Ottoman land registers, prohibited all land transactions until a new registry was installed, and transferred jurisdiction of all land matters from *Sharia* [religious] courts

³⁴⁵ Home, 2003, p. 292

³⁴⁶ Home, 2003, p. 295

³⁴⁷ Home, 2003, p. 293

³⁴⁸ Reminiscent of the French colonial policy of association discussed in Chapter 1.

³⁴⁹ Home, 2003, p. 293

³⁵⁰ Home, 2003, p. 295

to new, secular land courts.³⁵¹ Under British law, three of the land-use designations were brought under tighter state control, becoming *de facto*, if not *de jure*, state land. The rigidity of the new law would not support the old system whereby villages made use of land when needed and left it fallow at other times.³⁵²

Town Planning Legislation under the British Mandate

The Mandate government's 1920 Land Transfer Ordinance had two main purposes: stimulation of economic growth and capital investment that accompanied land 'development,' and regulation of the purchase of land to prevent speculation and protect small landowners and tenants from eviction. During the following decade the ordinance restrictions that were to assure the second purpose were gradually stripped away, and the ensuing mass evictions and displacement of Arab cultivators were subsequently found to be the main cause of large-scale riots that erupted in 1929.³⁵³

A series of town-planning ordinances granted the High Commissioner of Palestine and the Town Planning Commission the exclusive power to designate town-planning areas and to regulate planning and development, powers that until then had rested with municipal councils, such as the Jaffa municipality. "The High Commissioner was also empowered to grant public bodies (such as municipal corporations) and private individuals or bodies (such as Zionist land purchasing organizations) the power to expropriate land, as long as it was designated for 'public use'."³⁵⁴

Tel-Aviv's Growth at the Expense of Arab Villages

One of the first by-laws passed by the Tel-Aviv Council was one prohibiting the sale of land to non-Jews.³⁵⁵ Continued land purchases from Arabs by Jews without the possibility of selling land in the other

³⁵¹ Home, 2003, p. 295

³⁵² LeVine, 1998, p. 38

³⁵³ LeVine, 1998, p. 38

³⁵⁴ LeVine, 1998, p. 39

³⁵⁵ LeVine, 1998, p. 40

direction has been likened by Oren Yiftachel to “a black hole into which Arab land enters but can never be retrieved.”³⁵⁶

Mandate ordinances passed in 1927 and 1934 further separated Tel-Aviv from Jaffa, and a 1933 municipal law gave municipalities greater power to expand their borders. However, even with an expanded municipal boundary, Tel-Aviv’s growth was hampered by Arab-owned land to its north.³⁵⁷ It was during this time that Tel-Aviv tried to gain control of the Arab land surrounding it, including the Jaffa neighbourhood of Manshiyya, the village of Summayl, and al-Jammasin al-Gharbi. In the case of Manshiyya, the rationale was that the Jewish population of the neighbourhood was “dependant economically upon the development of Tel-Aviv, and their material condition depends on the improvements that the township introduces.”³⁵⁸ In the case of Summayl, the rationale was that the land was sparsely populated and presented the only possibility of expansion for the city.³⁵⁹ At a 1937 meeting to determine the boundary between Tel-Aviv and Jaffa, the former’s mayor “explained that Tel-Aviv would offer municipal privileges to all owners of the lands it sought to annex and that some owners had already asked for pipelines.”^{360, 361}

Though the issue was left unresolved, Tel-Aviv would continue its attempts to annex Arab land in its environs throughout the Mandate period. “Such lands were still considered ‘practically undeveloped,’ and it was thought vital to bring them under ‘complete municipal authority’ because only the ‘legal and administrative machinery of a municipal corporation’ would have the power to draw up a ‘creative or positive machinery of development.’”³⁶²

³⁵⁶ Yiftachel, 2006, p. 110

³⁵⁷ LeVine, 1998, p. 41

³⁵⁸ LeVine, 1998, p. 42

³⁵⁹ LeVine, 1998, p. 42

³⁶⁰ LeVine, 1998, p. 42

³⁶¹ This is yet another example of the tendency of Tel-Aviv to use its abundant water supply to control and annex neighbouring communities, as discussed in Chapter 2.

³⁶² LeVine, 1998, p. 44

Despite the failure by Tel-Aviv to fully control al-Jammasin al-Gharbi's land, Jewish land purchases of the village's lands continued such that by 1944, slightly more than half of it was under Jewish ownership.³⁶³ In a confidential letter by Lydda District Commissioner to the Chief Secretary of the Mandate government, dated 2 June 1947, "[Summayl], the Jammasins and Jarisha" were described as having "been practically swallowed by Tel-Aviv already," and Sheikh Muwwanis as being "surrounded but not yet surrendered completely."³⁶⁴

The 1948 War and al-Jammasin al-Gharbi

In February 1947, following rising violence between Palestinians,³⁶⁵ Jews, and the British, and having given up on finding a solution on its own, the British government "transferred the question of Palestine to the United Nations."³⁶⁶ A United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) recommended partition of Palestine into two federated states, one for Jews and one for Palestinians, and this recommendation was passed in November 1947 as UN General Assembly resolution 181.³⁶⁷ According to the partition plan, the Jews, who owned less than six percent of the total land of Palestine and constituted no more than a third of its population, would get more than half of its total territory. Within the proposed future Jewish state, Jews formed a small majority of approximately 60% overall,³⁶⁸ but were a small minority in many districts.³⁶⁹

The Palestinians and the Arab League dismissed the partition plan, while the Zionist leadership made preparations to repel a potential attack from neighbouring Arab states and to occupy as much of the country as possible, and hopefully all of it.³⁷⁰ An eventual Arab attack materialized, but only on 15 May

³⁶³ Khalidi, 1992, p. 244

³⁶⁴ ISA, SF/10/39, p. 386.

³⁶⁵ Palestinians refers to the indigenous Muslim and Christian Arab population of Palestine.

³⁶⁶ Pappe, 2006, p. 31

³⁶⁷ Pappe, 2006, p. 31

³⁶⁸ Pappe, 2006, p. 48

³⁶⁹ Pappe, 2006, p. 34

³⁷⁰ Pappe, 2006, p. 42

1948, on the day following implementation of the partition plan, and five and a half months after the partition resolution had been adopted. In the intervening period, Jewish military operations had already begun.³⁷¹ The leader of the Zionist movement in Palestine, David Ben-Gurion, had already said in 1937 that the absence of a Jewish majority in a future state “would compel the Jewish settlers to use force to bring about the ‘dream’ [of a] purely Jewish state,” and on 3 December 1947, he reiterated his commitment to ethnic cleansing in order to achieve a Jewish majority.³⁷²

The initial plan for cleansing the future state of Palestinians was based on the assumption of Palestinian attacks on Jews, and forceful retaliatory counterattacks. However, to the chagrin of the Jewish leadership, the Palestinian citizenry continued life as normal and attacks by them were rare.³⁷³ When the Palestinian attacks failed to materialize, Ben-Gurion’s advisers suggested creating an atmosphere of terror for the Palestinians by “destroying the traffic (buses, lorries...and private cars)...sinking their fishing boats in Jaffa...The initial reaction may be riots, but eventually they will understand the message.”³⁷⁴ This new policy of intimidation was soon implemented, beginning with what the Haganah—the principal paramilitary organization of the Jewish community—called “violent reconnaissance,” in which Jewish units would enter Palestinian villages in search of ‘infiltrators,’ and if any resistance was encountered the Jewish troops, would fire at random and kill several villagers.³⁷⁵

In early December 1947, some villagers had evacuated Jammasin.³⁷⁶ During December 1947 and January 1948, the leaders of several villages in the area of Tel-Aviv, including Jammasin, met with Haganah representatives and expressed a desire for peace.³⁷⁷ However, small armed Arab gangs began using the village as a sniping post, and in response a Haganah patrol was sent in. The Haganah troops

³⁷¹ Pappe, 2006, p. 47

³⁷² Pappe, 2006, p. 48

³⁷³ Pappe, 2006, p. 52

³⁷⁴ Pappe, 2006, p. 54

³⁷⁵ Pappe, 2006, pp. 55-56

³⁷⁶ Morris, 2004, p. 126. No specific reason is given for this evacuation, though it was not an isolated case, as other villages also began to send away women and children at the same time, some to nearby villages, thus contributing to demoralization within them, and others to villages and towns in the hinterland, known today as the ‘West Bank.’

³⁷⁷ Morris, 2004, p. 91

told the remaining inhabitants “that there was nothing to fear,” yet on that day or the next, the remaining inhabitants “began ‘to leave in a panic,’” moving to Kafr Qassim and Jaljulya.³⁷⁸

Though the prevalent Zionist discourse about the Palestinian flight is that they left voluntarily except for a few isolated cases, Pappe argues that they “left with the full intention of returning to their homes again later, only to be prevented by the Israelis from doing so,” and that “not allowing people to return to their homes after a short stay abroad is as much expulsion as any other act directed against the local people with the aim of depopulation.”³⁷⁹ As we will see next, in order to prevent the possibility of return, the Zionist authorities quickly settled Jewish refugees in the village.

Jewish Settlement in al-Jammasin al-Gharbi

“In mid-January 1948, the total number of Jewish war refugees in Tel-Aviv stood at approximately 7,000, and they lived in temporary dwellings: tents, public structures, warehouses, and even the lobbies of Tel-Aviv apartment buildings.”³⁸⁰ These internal refugees were “poor former residents of southern Tel-Aviv slums and mostly of Middle-Eastern or North-African descent.”³⁸¹ According to Ella Shohat, “European Zionists were not enthralled by the prospect of ‘tainting’ the settlements in Palestine with an infusion of Sephardi Jews. The very idea was opposed at the first Zionist Congress.”³⁸² At the same time, Zionists recognized early on the economic benefits of bringing in “Jews in the form of Arabs” to the “land of Israel” as a cheap workforce to replace the Arab *fellahin* [peasants] of Palestine.³⁸³ However, once they had come to ‘Zion,’ these immigrants were marginalized physically, economically, and

³⁷⁸ Morris, 2004, p. 126

³⁷⁹ Pappe, 2006, p. 54

³⁸⁰ Golan, 2002, p. 120

³⁸¹ Golan, 2002, p. 121

³⁸² Shohat, 1988, p. 15

³⁸³ Shohat, 1988, p. 14

culturally by the dominant European Jews, and relegated to slum neighbourhoods in the buffer area between Jaffa and Tel-Aviv.³⁸⁴

The Tel-Aviv municipality began confiscating abandoned Arab property in early December 1947, using an abandoned house in the village of Sumeil as a school and home for Jewish children displaced from their homes by the fighting. Displaced Jewish families were soon housed in al-Jammasin al-Gharbi and Sumeil, in a move initiated by a Haganah commander who lacked the troops to properly garrison the villages. By the end of February there were 170-180 families in Jammasin, and by February 1949, when the village was officially incorporated into the Tel-Aviv municipal area, it had more than 1,000 Jewish inhabitants.³⁸⁵ The Tel-Aviv municipality did not look favourably upon the settlement of refugees in al-Jammasin al-Gharbi, as it would have to provide them with services at its own expense, and also as the village was already part of its planning area and was designated for redevelopment following the demolition of the Arab built-up area.³⁸⁶

Many of the village's new residents were living in structures that were previously used as barns and stables, and quickly began construction of new shacks to replace them. Though the municipality approved additional construction according to a plan that its planning department would design, the residents were not willing to wait and began construction without official permits. Following clashes between the new residents and city officials, who brought in Haganah forces as an escort, and after the city decided to cut services and postpone construction of public buildings in the village-turned-slum, the residents agreed to help prevent further illegal construction.³⁸⁷ Following the surrender of Jaffa on 13 May 1948, many Jewish war refugees returned to their former homes, however, many others could not do so, either because their homes were destroyed, their landlords would not have them back, or because they did not want to return to the slums from which they came. Many of these refugees

³⁸⁴ See Chapter 2 of this work, as well as Golan, 2002, p. 121; Helman, 2011, pp. 136, 141

³⁸⁵ Morris, 2004, p. 384

³⁸⁶ Golan, 2002, p. 120

³⁸⁷ Golan, 2002, p. 121

crowded into al-Jammasin al-Gharbi, swelling its population to more than 1,000. While the Tel-Aviv municipality could not evict the Jewish refugees from the former Arab village, it did very little to improve their living conditions as residents.³⁸⁸ The land of al-Jammasin al-Gharbi was considered as the main potential for further development of the city's European (Ashkenazi) middle- and upper-class residential areas, and the eviction of the poorer refugees, mostly of Middle-Eastern and North-African (Mizrahi) origin, was seen as "essential for the implementation of any future development plan."³⁸⁹ Besides the Tel-Aviv municipality, national-level institutions also had their eye on the lands of al-Jammasin al-Gharbi for the development of housing estates for their constituents. The new residents of al-Jammasin al-Gharbi, seeing their new homes threatened by new development, appealed to Ben-Gurion, now the Prime Minister of the new state. Ben-Gurion, who led a socialist party and did not want to appear as the enemy of the destitute, declared that although illegal squatting "would not be tolerated, no steps would be taken to evacuate shantytown residents until a permanent housing solution was found." Following this declaration, the municipality gave up on evacuating the village, and began to improve the level of municipal services provided to its residents, in essence recognizing their occupation of the former Arab village.³⁹⁰

Though the new residents of Jammasin were allowed to remain in place, the former Palestinian village, soon to be renamed Givat Amal, would remain a poor slum in the heart of affluent north Tel-Aviv.

From Arab Lands to State Lands

With its Palestinian residents gone, and new Jewish residents moving in, how could ownership of the land of al-Jammasin al-Gharbi be transferred? Though slightly more than half of the village's land was in Jewish hands at the onset of the 1948 war, the rest remained under Palestinian ownership. However,

³⁸⁸ Golan, 2002, p. 121

³⁸⁹ Golan, 2002, p. 121

³⁹⁰ Golan, 2002, p. 122

the Palestinian owners were gone and they would not be allowed to return. This was a problem that would confront the new state throughout its territory, where private Jewish or state ownership accounted for only 13.5% of the land.³⁹¹ To solve this problem, a legal process commenced that would take twelve years and would proceed in four phases, relying on new legislation, as well as Mandate ordinances and Ottoman land designations.³⁹² It would also be inspired by a 1939 British law regarding confiscation of property of those charged with trading with the enemy, and by Pakistani legislation dealing with the same land-ownership problem Israel faced, following Pakistan's own war of independence and population transfer with India.³⁹³ The full process is quite interesting and complex, but there is no room in this paper to discuss it in any detail. The Forman & Kedar article cited here provides a very thorough understanding of the process.

A similar process of confiscation of property by a state happened shortly after the creation of the state of Israel, when the Iraqi government 'allowed' its Jewish citizens to renounce their citizenship and leave the country, but only by giving up their property. This process was seen as a "gift from the gods to the Israeli government," which would use it to offset its own confiscation of Arab property, in what Yehouda Shenhav has likened to 'double-entry bookkeeping.'³⁹⁴

From State Lands to Private Lands

When the legislative process ended in 1960, the State of Israel, along with the Jewish National Fund and the Israel Development Authority owned 93% of the land in Israel. This included the formerly Palestinian-owned land of Jammasin, which was transferred by the state to the Israel Development Authority. In 1961, following the final resolution of the land ownership question, the Development Authority sold the land of al-Jammasin al-Gharbi to a private company, B.P. Housing Co., which was

³⁹¹ Forman & Kedar, 2004, p. 812

³⁹² Forman & Kedar, 2004, p. 814

³⁹³ Forman & Kedar, 2004, p. 815

³⁹⁴ Shenhav, 2006, p. 125

owned by the nation's largest bank. The sale was contingent on the new owners building a neighbourhood of 440 apartments and providing each of the families living on the land with a home of equal value to the one they would be evacuating.³⁹⁵

B.P. never built the apartments and was never sanctioned by the state in any way for its failure to do so, nor was the land renationalized. The land was subsequently sold to a succession of developers, the last of whom hold building rights to five apartment buildings in what has become one of the most exclusive areas of Tel-Aviv (and from whose development the municipality stands to significantly benefit as part owner of the land). The residents of Givat Amal have expanded their homes over the years, and their children have built homes in the neighbourhood as well. The newest owners and the residents have been locked in legal battles over their rights to the land, but the Supreme Court of Israel eventually ruled that the residents have no rights to the properties or to any compensation,³⁹⁶ which brings us back to the image at the beginning of this paper.

Who Benefits?

It is interesting to note that while ownership and control of land is central to the Zionist ideology, and any potential loss of land through sale to private interests is seen as having catastrophic consequences,³⁹⁷ the Development Authority was quick to sell the lands of Jammasin to private interests. This double standard would repeat itself throughout the state's history, and as Yiftachel argues and Yonah & Saporta support through case studies, is rooted in the hierarchical ethnic mix of Israel as an ethnocratic state. Yiftachel's term for this ethnic stratification is ethnoclass, with the Ashkenazi ethnoclass benefitting from occupying "the upper echelons of society in most spheres",³⁹⁸

³⁹⁵ "Tel-Aviv's", 2014, para. 4

³⁹⁶ "Tel-Aviv's", 2014, paras. 9 & 10

³⁹⁷ see Yonah & Saporta, 2002, p. 92

³⁹⁸ Yiftachel, 2006, p. 103

and thus having access to better Palestinian housing in Jerusalem (see below), or being able to purchase formerly Palestinian land in Tel-Aviv.

As we have seen, most of the land of the State of Israel was Arab-owned at the time of independence, and was transformed through a legal process to state ownership. Many former Palestinian villages were razed, while others were used to house Jewish refugees and immigrants, such as al-Jammasin al-Gharbi and Salame in the Tel-Aviv area, and Lifta in the Jerusalem area.³⁹⁹ Internal refugees and immigrants were the first ones to be settled in these areas, one could say as placeholders. But as can be seen from an example in Jerusalem, soon after the war, allocation of formerly Arab housing for lower class residents was confined to “those apartments that were in such bad shape that the cost of renovation was too high,” while “houses in the elegant neighborhood of Talbiyya were reserved exclusively for senior officials and those with important connections, such as judges and professors at Hebrew University.”⁴⁰⁰

In Yiftachel’s theory of ethnocracy, an ethnocratic society is based on “deeply ingrained patterns of segregation...resulting in three major ethno-classes: founders, immigrants, and indigenous.”⁴⁰¹ In the Jerusalem case above, the founders and immigrants and their differential allocation of resources are clearly seen. In the case of Jammasin/Givat Amal, the founders—in this case the Tel-Aviv municipality as well as other Zionist institutions—were shut out of the neighbourhood by decree, but in the long run they had the resources and patience to claim for themselves that which they were temporarily denied.

Imagined Geography

The indigenous group, the Palestinians, is absent both physically and in the popular Israeli narrative of both Talbiyya and al-Jammasin al-Gharbi. As Edward Said says, “Perhaps the greatest battle Palestinians

³⁹⁹ Shoshan & Bronstein, 2006

⁴⁰⁰ Krystall, 1998, p. 18.

⁴⁰¹ Kedar, 2003, p. 403. This division reiterates the one expounded by Veracini in his theorization of settler-colonialism: the settler colonizer, the indigenous colonized, and a variety of exogenous others (Veracini, 2006, p. 16).

have waged as a people has been over the right to a remembered presence.”⁴⁰² The initial historical erasure of al-Jammasin al-Gharbi and its residents was in renaming a Palestinian village called al-Jammasin al-Gharbi as a Jewish neighbourhood with a Hebrew name—Givat Amal.⁴⁰³ This renaming is “an act of taking possession, much like other rituals of appropriating land such as raising a flag or planting a cross,”⁴⁰⁴ and is a step in the process of ‘imagined geography.’ This term, coined by Said, describes “a process initiated by groups with territorial ambitions who reinvent meanings about the landscapes they covet, and frame discourses justifying why they are entitled to take control of the places being reinvented.”⁴⁰⁵

Said’s ‘imagined geography’ has been developed by Gary Fields into the concept of ‘enclosure landscapes,’ the outcomes on the landscape of re-imagining and remaking geography.⁴⁰⁶ The practitioners of enclosure reorganize sovereignty and stewardship by three means: cartographical, legal, and architectural.⁴⁰⁷ In the case of al-Jammasin al-Gharbi, these means were renaming and splitting the village into two neighbourhoods—Givat Amal A (since redeveloped as luxury condominiums known as Akirov Towers) and B; the legal process briefly described above that transformed Arab lands into state lands, which were then sold into private lands; and the soon-to-be-built new luxury towers.

Recent Developments

The past few years have seen a number of forced expulsions of residents, and a series of lawsuits and countersuits. The latest lawsuit, brought by two displaced residents of Givat Amal, is aimed at the Tel-

⁴⁰² Said, 2000, p. 184.

⁴⁰³ In a series of letters from the village’s new Jewish residents to the provisional Israeli government, requesting that a road passing through the village be paved, the renaming of the district can be seen as a work in progress. In the original handwritten letter, dated 29 November 1948, the reference by the village council head is to Jammasin B village. Several subsequent internal government memos refer to the village by the same name (one naming it Jammasin A). However, in a typewritten copy of the original letter, provided by the State Labour and Construction Ministry on 10 February 1949, the village is already referred to as Gvaot (plural of Givat) Amal-Jammasin, thus altering the original letter. (ISA, ISA-NetiveiIsrael-NetiveiIsrael-000o1vx).

⁴⁰⁴ Fields, 2011, p. 190.

⁴⁰⁵ Fields, 2011, p. 182

⁴⁰⁶ Fields, 2011, p. 183

⁴⁰⁷ Fields, 2011, p. 184

Aviv-Jaffa municipality and the Israel Land Authority. The plaintiffs claim that the neighbourhood was deliberately neglected by the authorities for seventy years, and that when the residents were given a chance to formalize their settlement and gain ownership of the land, the municipality interceded to prevent such an outcome. The lawsuit brings as evidence the minutes of municipal meetings from the past sixty years, in which high-ranking municipal officers attempted to block any resolution in favour of the residents, and which reveal a plan to wilfully neglect the neighbourhood's needs in order to compel the residents to leave on their own.

When the residents turned to the Development Authority in 1960 to purchase the rights to the land they were living on, the mayor of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa, Mordechai Namir, asked the Authority to stop any such sale. In a meeting between the mayor and his deputies two days later, it was decided to prevent the purchase by residents, and to turn to a private development company instead, which would guarantee housing arrangements for the residents. This plan followed a similar one undertaken at the time with another neighbourhood in the city, Nordia, in which Eastern-European immigrants were residing. However, one of the deputy mayors, Yehoshua Rabinovich, was sceptical about the success of the same model in Givat Amal, as "the human element in Givat Amal is different from Nordia's."⁴⁰⁸

In a municipal-council meeting held in August, 1987, the mayor responded to a question from Givat Amal residents about a 22% increase in municipal tax rates to the same level of surrounding neighbourhoods, despite the former not receiving the same level of services, by saying that "the situation there is really bad, and I intend for there to be even worse services...so that they will understand that I have no intention for them to continue living there forever."⁴⁰⁹

Meanwhile, the developers have already begun marketing one of the projects proposed on Jammasin/Givat Amal's land, as the advertisements that greeted me at the airport on my arrival for my research show:

⁴⁰⁸ "For Decades", 2016, para. 6

⁴⁰⁹ "For Decades", 2016, para. 9



Figure 3 - Promotional sign for Park Bavli development. Captions read "High-End Residence in the Heart of Tel Aviv" and "We Won't Tell if You Won't Tell." Source: Rotem Erez



Figure 4 - Promotional sign for Park Bavli development. Caption reads "No One Needs to Know That You Live Right above the Park". Source: Rotem Erez

The proposed projects include the four-tower, 46 story “Park Bavli” development, which will include approximately 700 condominiums, and the 44 story “BeReshit Tower,” which will have 174 condominiums. The Park Bavli advertisement campaign follows a theme of secrecy, with the ads saying such things as “nobody needs to know that you live right above the park” and “nobody needs to know that there’s a secret spa in your building.” This supposed secrecy is meant to give the project a sense of prestige that is only available to those in the know, yet the greatest secret of the project, which is not advertised to the potential purchasers of units in the project, is that the secret park in which the towers will be built covers the ruins of a neglected urban slum, built on the ruins of a depopulated Palestinian village.⁴¹⁰

⁴¹⁰ In his analysis of the advertising campaign, Itay Ziv likens the park to the supposed sands on which Tel-Aviv was built, and which Sharon Rotbard has called a moral alibi for the city (“They Won’t,” 2015, last paragraph).

Conclusion

The case of al-Jammasin al-Gharbi/Givat Amal B/Park Bavli demonstrates the interconnections of the logics and policies of settler colonialism, segregation as a planning tool for economic development, and the role of buffer populations in both. Tel-Aviv's early segregation into a largely Ashkenazi city, with Mizrahi residents relegated to southern buffer neighbourhoods, and the existence of Palestinian villages within its planning jurisdiction, came together during the 1948 war to create several islands of neglect in which Mizrahi refugees from the buffer neighbourhoods 'interfered' with the city's orderly planning. Yet as the quotes above from municipal officials attest, instead of accepting these residents' unplanned settlement in their city, the municipality has continuously attempted to get rid of them so that it could continue with the job of providing value to itself and to its valued residents through so-called rational planning practices, which are only rational when the right population is present. This is also an encapsulation of the contradiction between Zionism's claimed intent of creating a homeland for all Jews, and the continued practice of favouring one ethnic group of Jews over others. Soon, Givat Amal B, like al-Jammasin al-Gharbi, will no longer exist and for all intents and purposes will never have existed within the popular discourse. Instead, the soon-to-be-constructed luxury condominiums of Park Bavli will overlook the luxury condominiums of Akirov Towers, and the displaced Mizrahi residents will be forgotten, much like their Palestinian predecessors.

Conclusion

As the three chapters of this paper show, Tel-Aviv, as a settler-colonial city, has relied on a buffer population of internal others to mediate its antagonistic relations with its progenitor, Jaffa, and the artificial social hierarchy thus created has had its own internal contradictions with repercussions that reverberate to this day. Tel-Aviv both drew from Zionism's ideology and helped shape it as it quickly became Palestine's largest Jewish settlement and the centre of Zionist institutions in Palestine. Though there were similarities between the early development of Casablanca and Tel-Aviv, the two cities did not follow similar logics, as the former was a colonial city while the latter was a settler-colonial city. Thus, while attempts at segregation in Casablanca (and Moroccan cities in general) failed due to the precedence of economic exploitation over that of population control, in Tel-Aviv the latter imperative took the ascendancy over the former, though profit making through real-estate speculation was still prevalent. In cases where segregated populations 'broke through' the lines of segregation, such as the al-Jammasin al-Gharbi/Givat Amal case, the municipality did not know how to respond except to box the 'invading' population in and leave its neighbourhoods in a continued and deteriorating state of neglect, waiting, hoping, and actively working toward their final 'voluntary' departure. Yet when this departure showed no signs of coming through, the municipality had private developers take on the task of removing the residents forcefully, with the aid of the police and judicial system.

The archival research I conducted at the Tel-Aviv-Jaffa archive was limited in time, and therefore concentrated mainly on city council meeting minutes. However, as the examples from Deborah Bernstein's *Women on the Margins* (2008) have shown, an expanded search of the city's social service department records as well as other sources from this and other archives could expand the narrative and strengthen the arguments made in this paper. Furthermore, while I concentrated on the origins of urban segregation in Tel-Aviv, the research could be expanded to explain if and how it has been actively

maintained, especially since the formation of the State of Israel, which brought about the formal annexation of the southern Jewish neighbourhoods as well as of Jaffa itself, and the influx of large numbers of Mizrahi immigrants to the country. A current resurgence of Mizrahi activism, largely centred on cultural issues, also calls into question the history of culture in this divided city, whose official culture for most of its existence has been 'Israeli,' which like in the synagogue debate mentioned in Chapter 2 was a code-name for Ashkenazi. Looking to the future, it would be interesting to explore how the forced segregation and cultural and economic marginalization of Mizrahi and Arab populations could form the basis for a unified struggle for recognition, equality, and for the possibility of a true rather than contrived coexistence.⁴¹¹ The recent formation of two Mizrahi activist groups, one favouring a struggle for cultural recognition within Zionism⁴¹² and the other calling for a joint struggle of Mizrahi and Palestinian activists,⁴¹³ has to some extent formalized and politicized the recent Mizrahi resurgence, and has shown that it is not a singular phenomenon, but one with different visions and tactics. It is interesting to note the role of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa in this resurgence, with many of the activists residing, creating, and organizing in the city and its environs, especially in the southern neighbourhoods and Jaffa, which are home to several alternative community groups and cultural venues.⁴¹⁴ A further resurgence is seen in Jaffa, where the narrative of the Nakba is continually and increasingly voiced by

⁴¹¹ I borrow the term 'contrived coexistence' from Daniel Monerescu's *Jaffa Shared and Shattered* (2015), whose final chapter, based on a paper co-written with Noa Shaindlinger, shows the possibilities as well as limits of a unified struggle.

⁴¹² Tor HaZahav [The Golden Age] calls for strengthening the Israeli periphery, traditional (Mesorti) Judaism, and the "Zionist-Mizrahi story". They claim to have grown tired of the old public debate about, among other things, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and are searching for "an alternative Mizrahi Zionism: a Zionism of the pioneers who built the cities of the periphery, created magnificent communities, and created an original Israeli culture." (<http://www.tor-hazahav.org/> (Hebrew))

⁴¹³ Mizrahit Meshutefet (Joint Mizrahi) calls for "an Eastern Joint Initiative – 'Mizrahi Palestinian Partnership,'" calling on "all the oppressed groups in Israeli society to join hands and walk together: Palestinians, Mizrahim, Ethiopians, Russian-speakers, the people who are living in conditions of poverty, everyone that is pushed to the periphery and the social margins, and anyone that strives to fundamentally change the existing situation and fight oppression." They view the formation of the mostly Palestinian *Joint List* political party as an "historic opportunity to establish a partnership." (<https://mizrahipalestinianpartnership.wordpress.com/2016/05/10/open-call-an-eastern-joint-initiative-mizrahi-palestinian-partnership/>).

⁴¹⁴ These include the *Achoti* [sister] Mizrahi feminist organization (http://www.achoti.org.il/?page_id=414), Café Gibraltar (<http://cafe-gibraltar.com/> (Hebrew), the Albi Café, and Anna Loulou Bar.

both Palestinian and Jewish activists, who insist on sharing and publicizing the Palestinian history and present in the city, and imagining its future.⁴¹⁵

⁴¹⁵ Monterescu, 2015, pp. 277-278

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