‘A Flag that Knows No Colour Line’: Aboriginal Veteranship in Canada, 1914-1939

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ABSTRACT

Historians have rightly considered the period from 1914 to 1939 as the time when Canadian Indigenous soldiers and veterans of the First World War faced unique challenges because of their legal status as Indians. But their acceptance of the idea that Indigenous veterans were victims of discrimination has led them to overlook the unique nature of these Indigenous peoples’ identities as “Indians” and veterans. The prevailing assumption is that Indigenous veterans were not an influential group politically, socially, or culturally and Indigenous veterans’ political awakening occurred only in the mid-1940s.

This study contends that Indigenous veterans’ relationship with the state in the interwar period was more complicated than previously thought. Their war service created a fundamentally different and important legal relationship with the state from other soldiers or Indigenous peoples. Military service suspended soldiers’ Indian status temporarily, and this experience created a new set of expectations for Indigenous men upon their return home. As veterans, they expected material benefit and recognition for their sacrifices, and support for killed or wounded soldiers and their families. These expectations did not fit with government officials’ understanding that Indigenous men returning from the war would re-integrate into their communities as Indians and wards of the state.

The dissertation offers an overview of Indigenous war service in the context of debates over status and citizenship, and then sketches how these debates informed developments in soldiers’ demobilization, re-establishment, re-integration, and restoration. Through the examination of Indigenous soldiers’ service records, pension and Soldier Settlement case files, and government records, this work argues that Indigenous soldiers’ and veterans’ experience
from 1914 through 1939 should not be seen primarily as victims of the state, but rather as a
group whose complicated identity of Indian and veteran, and as citizens, began to coalesce.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have many people to thank for their role in actualizing this dissertation. Many of these acknowledgements are long overdue. From first to last, my doctoral committee deserves enormous credit for their incredible patience and for their hard work on a tight timeline to bring this towards a defence. Marcel Martel has been a warm, supportive, and positive force, whose encouragement nudged me to stick with York for a PhD. I am glad I did. Craig Heron’s presence on my committee brought a weight of academic precision that improved this work immeasurably, but I wish to thank him especially for listening patiently to me when I felt lost and pointing me in the right direction with grace. This patience helped me narrow my topic and pursue focused research questions. Lastly, William Wicken and I worked together first as I did my Masters of Arts and continued on for this dissertation. I started my Masters at 22 years old with an abundance of self-assuredness and a paucity of life experience. I learned how to become an historian exclusively through his guidance. His gentle suggestions for me to systematize my research and writing led me to push myself. His commitment in 2016-2017 to read, comment, and edit my work is incredible, so I thank you wholeheartedly.

Of course, none of this would have been possible without the generous financial support of the Avie Bennett Historica Dominion Fellowship and Ramsay Cook scholarship, and the additional funds and employment opportunities provided by the outstanding Department of History at York University. William Wicken, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, and R. Scott Sheffield offered me additional research advising work towards the end of my period of active scholarship
at York in 2011 and 2012, and this work helped me transition towards non-academic employment so I could keep this project alive.

Additional scholars, historians and otherwise, deserve credit. Folks at the various research institutions and libraries that I have accessed have been eager to help. In that regard, I need to thank the staff at LAC and the Archives of Ontario for helping me understand the organization of such a giant beast as RG 10 and other voluminous records relating to Indigenous peoples in Canada. To their unending credit, the staff at the Glenbow Museum and Archives offered to arrange for me to work outside of their operating hours during my whirlwind trip to Calgary, which earns them a special place in my heart. The friendly staff at the Conestoga College library helped me on my lunch breaks to track down additional sources. I should also mention the joint York – U of T political history reading group whose reviews in 2012 helped me focus early work which eventually wound up as sections of Part I and Part II.

Moreover, I had the tremendous pleasure to attend York University’s Department of History at the moment when a great many impressive minds were studying simultaneously. I’ll refrain from writing out the list of an entire Department of people whose company, humour, and intelligence was inspirational and aspirational. The list is simply too long! That being said, a few good friends deserve special mention. Angela Rooke and Alban Bargain both deserve special credit for their open-heartedness and cheerful encouragement from day one in the program. I value their friendships greatly. Additionally, Andrew Watson, Ian Milligan, and Tom Peace all served as eleventh-hour guides, helping me in the final months to improve specific sections and parts, and so I owe them each a hoppy beer. Thanks, friends!

Reading thousands of pages that describe physical and emotional trauma, violence, and death is grim work. At times, I had to shut off at home after a day of academic work so that I
could process what I had encountered in the archives. I thus dedicate every word of this dissertation to my home support network, Helen and Milo.
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INTRODUCTION: THE MAKING OF INDIGENOUS VETERANS

Introduction

July 19, 1919 marked Peace Day across the British Empire, a day dedicated to celebrating the signing of the Treaty of Versailles three weeks earlier and the official end of the First World War. Unlike later commemorative events that evolved into somber remembrance ceremonies, Peace Day was a celebratory occasion.¹ Communities across Canada held parades, concerts, athletic competitions, pageants, luncheons, and other special events.² Many Indigenous peoples from across Canada shared in these celebrations, after more than 300 bands had participated actively in the war effort by sending recruits to the front and even more contributed voluntary donations to the war effort. At the Mount Elgin Industrial Institute, near London in southwestern Ontario, the St. Thomas Journal columnist Louise D. Hatch, writing under the pseudonym “A. S. Paragus” recorded a series of speeches by Munsee and Delaware Chiefs in an article entitled “Indian Chiefs Confident of the Future of Their Race.”³ Speaking in turn, each Chief referenced the sacrifices of the thousands of Indigenous soldiers that served overseas, the loyalty and patriotism of Indigenous communities, and touched on a hope that the war’s end would bring

¹ For example, at Fort Francis, Ontario, Peace Day featured sports, racing, and fireworks, a “monster parade held of autos bicycles and floats” along with a band, canoe races, and a “real snappy game of ball.” See Fort Frances Times and Rainy Lake Herald, “Peace Celebration at Fort Frances,” July 17, 1919. Similar Peace Day celebrations in Vancouver, Halifax, and other metropolitan areas were well attended and featured a celebratory atmosphere. Jonathan F. Vance, Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997), 16-18. Crowds of veterans, civic leaders, and community members joined together to mark the occasion of victory over “Hunnism” and burned effigies of the Kaiser.
² Vance, Death So Noble, 16-18.
³ A.S. Paragus, “Indian Chiefs Confident of the Future of Their Race; Loyal to the British Empire,” St. Thomas Journal, July 2, 1919. Not all celebrations went smoothly. The gathering was nearly derailed by “uncomfortable moments” when a deputation of veterans and chiefs interrupted the ceremony to present the Indian Superintendent and other public officials with a list of grievances relating to outstanding band issues and trouble with a new land settlement program, Soldiers’ Settlement. Elsewhere, at Lennox Island, Prince Edward Island, the community gathered to hear speeches from band leaders and local officials which honoured the sacrifices of the band’s returned men and casualties. See The Charlottetown Guardian, “Grand Celebration at Lennox Island Yesterday,” 31 July 1922. See also the Brantford Expositor, “Indians and the Great War,” 22 January 1919.
peace, stability, and prosperity at home and abroad, as well as special recognition to this class of veterans who had sacrificed their bodies and minds to the war effort. During a flag raising ceremony in which a flag (perhaps the Canadian Red Ensign or Union Jack, though its specific design is not mentioned) was raised and saluted, Munsee Chief Scobie Logan turned to the crowd, raised his arm to point at the flag, and loudly declared that veterans could be proud of their patriotic service, as “theirs is a flag that knows no colour line,” and that Indigenous soldiers’ patriotic service would almost certainly lead to a prosperous future for the community.

Though their numbers were quite small in comparison to national rates of participation, the 3800 Indigenous soldiers that returned home as veterans of the First World War were an influential group that formed significant numbers in many communities. This dissertation assesses the experience of Indigenous soldiers when they came home, the problems that they encountered, and how the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) became involved and managed this process. I contend that the relationship between Indigenous veterans and the state is more complicated than historians have thought and argue that the state did not acknowledge Indigenous returning soldiers as having the same rights as all veterans automatically, only recognizing these men’s status as veterans in the mid-1930s after sustained pressure.

The re-integration of Indigenous veterans into normalized life after the war, and the problems they encountered, affected their interactions with the state. In the following pages, I

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4 Based on records of mobilization and demobilization collected by the DIA, at least 157 members of the Caradoc Agency, Munsee, Delaware and Chippewa of the Thames soldiers enlisted in the CEF during the First World War. See Appendix for explanation of sources.

5 Chief Logan’s son Arnold Logan enlisted September 15, 1914 with the 1st O.S. Battalion and was killed in April 1916 during the action at the St. Eloi craters. See Arnold Logan’s service file at RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 5711 – 64. Chief Logan had earlier advocated for Indigenous rights, and in a New York Times article from August 1917, journalist Verne De Witt Rowell’s article “Canadian Indians at the Front” mention Logan as “an ardent advocate of his people in their claim to citizenship.” Verne De Witt Rowell, “Canadian Indians at the Front,” The New York Times, August 1917.

6 Paragus, “Indian Chiefs Confident of the Future of Their Race.”
contend that the categories of soldier, veteran, and citizen are not fixed, but rather represent mutable classifications that took on new meaning when placed against a “colour line,” or when men racialized as “Indians” assumed these identities. As wards of the state, Indigenous peoples occupied a distinct place within the nation. However, when they joined the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) they theoretically transcended their racial boundaries. In England and France, these men lived outside the jurisdiction of DIA oversight and enjoyed the privileges afforded to other soldiers. They became subject to military discipline and regulation. However, because they were “Indians” legally, their status at times invited DIA involvement. This was more likely to occur when they were in Canada and not in Europe, though at times, family members did appeal to the DIA for assistance. After all, Agents were then and would continue to be the principal link between government and on reserve people. When men returned home to live on reserve, the DIA again became an important aspect of their lives. Unlike other veterans, Indigenous peoples encountered a distinct layer of administration operated by DIA officials rather than other state actors. Government officials of interwar Canada pushed a vision of immutable distinction, that Indian and veteran were fundamentally exclusive categories of being. Policies developed for returned soldiers intended to enforce this racial exclusion. Yet Indigenous returned men, their families, communities, and other veterans contested the “colour line,” arguing that these soldiers were privileged men whose indigeneity and veteranship were mutually reinforcing.

*Thesis, Themes, and Sources*

In Peace Day and other ceremonies marking the cessation of hostilities and the military victory, participants celebrated and idealized the returned soldiers’ place in society. In parades, speeches,
and banquets, participants both contested and affirmed veterans’ place in the social order. These public rituals recognized and endorsed both social boundaries and imperial nationalism, drew from mutually-understood gestures, and amplified designated social roles. Society venerated soldiers’ ultimate expression of physical vitality, independence, and adventure that proved one’s masculinity. They also reinforced traditional traits of manliness, which war service seemingly enhanced. Chief Scobie’s pronouncement, that the flag promised a new place for Indigenous veterans in the social order, drew from both language and designations that would have appealed to an English Canadian audience as well as Indigenous peoples. Insofar as these gatherings were an opportunity to venerate returned men, Scobie’s speech demonstrates that celebratory events like Peace Day also served as a forum for officials and participants to contest the meaning of race, veteranship, and citizenship.

From the outbreak of hostilities to Peace Day, dozens of newspapers and magazines printed stories that celebrated individual heroics of Indigenous men as enlistees and soldiers at

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7 Historian Robert Rutherdale’s study of the hometown experience of the Great War and its aftermath in Canada suggests that the rites of return, public speeches and banquets, were social gatherings that carefully rearticulated social order amid the celebratory atmosphere. See Robert Rutherdale, Hometown Horizons: Local Responses to Canada’s Great War (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004), 267-268. See also Robert Rutherdale, “Send-offs During Canada’s Great War: Interpreting Hometown Rituals in Dispatching Home Front Volunteers,” Social History/Histoire Sociale 36, 72 (November 2003): 425-464. Nathan Smith suggests that, though related to re-establishment, these speeches and the receptions in general, were similar to the addresses of public figures at events celebrating the sending-off of soldiers overseas, a clear indication that they were rooted in a discourse that promoted a vigorous war effort. Nathan Smith, “Comrades and Citizens: Great War Veterans in Toronto, 1915-1919,” PhD diss., (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2012), 62.

8 Using the example of a GWVA banquet at the end of 1918 in Lethbridge Alberta, Rutherdale discusses how the ritual served these purposes. Rutherdale, Hometown Horizons, 267-268.


the front, and also lauded Indigenous communities’ voluntary activities, such as war bond purchases, box socials, and knitting bees. In the *Saturday Night* Magazine, the Deputy Superintendent General of the Department of Indian Affairs Duncan Campbell Scott’s editorial “Indians and the War” had celebrated the “brave spirit of their race,” proven by the estimated 4,000 Indigenous enlistees with the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF), which approximated 35% of the adult male population, and made financial donations to war funds such as the Canadian Patriotic Fund (CPF). An article entitled “Our Indian Brothers” from the Belleville *Intelligencer* submitted that the war was going to bring “opportunities and wealth” to Indigenous communities as a reward for their service. This idea that end of the war was catalyzing great shifts in society seemed demonstrable in multiple contexts, and the idea that momentous changes were coming for returned soldiers and communities was a notion shared by participants, observers, and government officials, even if the true meaning was contested. For some observers, the presence of Indigenous returned soldiers in their communities was proof of racial progress: now that the soldiers had proven their loyalty and civility through military service, the state could accelerate efforts to separate, integrate, and assimilate Indigenous peoples into dominant Anglo-Saxon culture. For others, their return home, and their exemplary war records, meant that soldiers and communities had earned a special credit from the state and society, perhaps one that

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12 Belleville *Intelligencer* “Our Indian Brothers,” 1919.
Indigenous peoples could exchange for recognition of land or treaty rights, economic opportunity, or even the protection of modes of political organization and cultural practices. These multiple, contested meanings of Indigenous returned soldiers were contradictory and destabilizing.

This dissertation brings to light the complexity of First World War Indigenous veterans’ identity and their unique relationship with the Canadian state, which ranged from discrimination to partnership, advocacy, and recognition in the interwar period. Beginning with the first enlistments of Indigenous men in August 1914, I trace the state’s complex and contradictory responses to issues of Indigenous recruitment, demobilization, and veterans and explain Indigenous veterans’ and communities’ reactions to these policies by first quantifying and then aggregating these experiences through existing records and testimonies. The presence of men whose identity and legal status straddled two worlds as both “Indians” and veterans, I argue, undermined colonialist authorities’ goals of assimilating of Indigenous peoples into dominant society and erasing Indigenous forms of political, social, economic, and cultural expression. The presence of Indigenous soldiers and veterans abroad and at home exposed contradictions about their status in society and the limitations of the DIA’s legal and bureaucratic colonialist governance. For some veterans, government officials, politicians, and veterans’ organizations, the war and its aftermath created agonizing questions about race, citizenship, and the place of Indigenous peoples in society. These questions coincided with protracted debates about treaty rights, land, resource access, enfranchisement, and the conduct and place of women and families in society.

At certain moments, the policies and practices that informed the Indigenous veterans’ relationship with the state were discriminatory and led to personal and community hardship.
Protracted battles for the recognition of returned soldiers as entitled veterans spanned more than twenty years, a period in which Indigenous soldiers and veterans in coalition with other groups fought to assert their rights as veterans and access the privileges afforded veterans. Throughout the interwar period, Indigenous veterans endured a contradiction that they simultaneously shared key characteristics, and yet were inherently different from other soldiers due to their status as Indians and wards of the state. This contradiction underpinned Indigenous soldiers’ experience with the state through the course of their military service and as veterans. The centrifugal identities of veteran and “Indian” unraveled state policies designed to enforce this difference while providing similar veterans’ services. Without understanding the impact of policy on Indigenous veterans, we cannot understand the significance of the First World War for Indigenous communities.

As this dissertation explains in due course, by the mid-1930s, Indigenous veterans’ struggle for recognition as privileged men gained traction. Tacit recognition from government officials that veterans deserved a special place in society, and that this place transcended race, led directly to administrative changes in how the state managed Indian Affairs. In the mid-1940s, veterans from both wars pushed for revisions in the Indian Act. Once the state began to see Indigenous peoples as veterans more than as “Indians,” questions around fair treatment and access to programs became more salient. The acknowledgement of Indigenous returned men’s status as veterans precipitated a broader recognition of the mistreatment of Indigenous peoples and changes to the bureaucratic mechanisms that preserved racialized mistreatment.

One of the reasons why the First World War has received so much attention from historians of Canada, as discussed below, is because of the conflicts that the war created and
escalated, including political and social crises enflamed in the last two years of the war. The same can be said for the first three decades of the twentieth century for historians of Indigenous peoples, a period in which the policies and practices of the DIA were dominated by the perplexing figure of Deputy Superintendent General Duncan Campbell Scott. Under Scott’s tutelage, the DIA honed a bureaucracy of colonialism which enforced a crackdown on cultural, social, linguistic, and religious modes deemed threatening. The First World War and its aftermath influenced many issues relating to the government’s administration of Indigenous peoples.

This dissertation has used a series of historical records to build a quantitative foundation.

The most important set of sources it uses are the records produced by the DIA and contained

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within Record Group 10 (RG10) held at the Library and Archives of Canada (LAC) and the military service records of the soldiers of the CEF, Record Group 150 (RG150), also held at LAC. To facilitate a rigorous, systematic study of Indigenous veterans, I deployed a database of 4,293 entries in 20 columns, containing 85,860 fields. I entered this data individually and manually from RG10 enlistment and demobilization paper records recorded by DIA field agents and transferred to the care of DIA Headquarters in Ottawa. I also added the data from 640 pension and 468 Soldier Settlement individual case files contained within RG10. This data was cross-referenced against the records for each available soldier whose digitized personnel files through LAC’s “Soldiers of the First World War: 1914-1918” database could be identified. I also referenced casualties in the unit-level records and recorded this reference where they could be identified in the Battalion Diaries contained within Record Group 9 (RG9). I rendered aggregations from this database into a series of twenty-one charts and graphs that are embedded in the chapters as close to where the data is used as possible. Source material for these charts and graphs were derived from my database unless otherwise indicated. The Methodological Essay provides more specific information regarding the methodological approach to this database, as well as the possibilities and limitations of the data.

Military and civilian officials produced and preserved records relating to Indigenous soldiers’ lives in more detail than the average non-Indigenous soldier. As with all soldiers, the Department of Militia and Defence (DMD) recorded and maintained forms tracing each Indigenous soldier’s attestation, war record, distribution of pay and awards, medical treatment, and discharge, as well as the exploits of their battalions and divisions. Additionally, DIA officials maintained a parallel set of records recording much of the same information, collected by Indian Agents and forwarded to DIA Headquarters. These parallel records often disagree with
one another. Similarly, bureaucracies such as the Military Hospitals Commission (MHC), Board of Pension Commissioners (BPC), and Department of Soldiers’ Civil Re-Establishment (DSCR) maintained records on veterans accessing their programs, not all of which have survived to the present day. DIA Field and Headquarters staff meticulously documented Indigenous veterans’ access to these programs. In terms of access to or denial of service from programs for First World War veterans, Indigenous veterans are almost certainly the group for which the greatest volume of official documentation exists.

When placed together, this data offers historians the opportunity to trace the experience of these soldiers and veterans in great detail. In some cases, these records also reveal intimate details from a soldier’s enlistment through to their eventual demise regarding their family status, economic circumstances, physical and mental health, and the pervasive influence of state agencies into their lives. Files contain the austere decisions of senior military and civilian officials, technical notes from medical practitioners, gossip from field agents, individual letters, petitions, wills, receipts, and a host of other sorts of personal and detached records relating to these soldiers’ and veterans’ lives. Accessing these records in tandem provides a personal portrait of how these veterans’ experiences shaped how others understood them and how they represented themselves as Indian and veteran. They are also deeply intimate records that, at times, convey a sense of tremendous physical and emotional trauma and can be difficult for a researcher to process.

Supplementing these main sources are a sampling of archival selections, newspaper articles, government publications, and reports of committees, Annual Reports of the Department of Indian Affairs plus data from other government publications. I have deployed data from these sources in-text to illustrate key statistical points and broader trends as well. These documents
collectively assist to trace the development of policies relating to Indigenous veterans – and
Indigenous peoples more broadly – as well as the evolution of institutions relating to the same.
Initiatives designed to assist, aid, or restrict Indigenous veterans in their reintegration from
overseas service were developed as a product of conflicts and compromises between government
stakeholders. The initiatives’ outcomes rarely reflected the intentions of their original framers.

As Katherine Pettipas identifies in *Severing the Ties that Bind*, state policy towards
Indigenous peoples in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was neither inevitable nor
seamless, but developed as a series of haphazard decisions lurching between points of
disagreement organized around the central theme of maximizing available lands in the west.\(^\text{15}\)
Pettipas describes her methodology as “pointillism,” in which each individual dot, when taken
together, illustrates a broader and more comprehensible pattern that tells a visceral story. We can
say the same of state policy towards Indigenous veterans, similarly a product of haphazard and
contradictory decision-making, compelled by the sense that Indigenous veterans occupied a
figurative place in society somewhere between “Indian” and “veteran.” Far from being passive
victims, Indigenous veterans, their families, and communities agitated, engaged in a dialogue
with, and pressured government officials to acknowledge their position as privileged men. When
stymied, they pursued multiple paths of resistance and made hard-fought gains that benefitted all
Indigenous peoples, veterans, and Canadians.

*Indigenous Soldiers, Veterans, and the State: An Historiography*

An explosion of research and writing on Indigenous people and the First World War has
considered the question of Indigenous soldiers and their experience with the state. The first work

to address the question of Indigenous soldiers and frame the debate was Fred Gaffen’s *Forgotten Soldiers*, which in 1985 suggested that the public has overlooked Indigenous soldiers’ contributions in the world wars, or were “forgotten” and deserve recognition for their sacrifices.\textsuperscript{16} Gaffen developed this work for a popular audience and includes sections on the First World War, Second World War, and a comparative section with regards to Indigenous military service in Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. Themes first developed in Gaffen’s contribution – patterns of recruitment, martial prowess, and the “forgotten warrior” narrative – were later extended by John Moses’s short article on the context of Indigenous enlistments and Janice Summerby’s more substantive contribution on the Veterans’ Affairs website, *Native Soldiers Foreign Battlefields*, both of which stress the importance of acknowledging the high rates of Indigenous enlistments, community voluntary donations, and combat achievements of soldiers in the field.\textsuperscript{17}

Among the first academic treatments of Indigenous service in the First World War, L. James Dempsey’s *Warriors of the King* looked regionally but more substantively at the issue, trying to integrate the First World War into an academic understanding of Indigenous history by thinking about the war in the context of treaty-making in the Prairie region.\textsuperscript{18} Dempsey focuses on the question of recruitment but explicitly states that the purpose of the work is to move beyond a chronicle, towards integrating the motivations of Indigenous enlistees and the persistence of a “warrior ethic,” something also explored in some of his tangential publications.\textsuperscript{19}

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\textsuperscript{18} L. James Dempsey, *Warriors of the King: Prairie Indians in World War I*, (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre & University of Regina, 1999).
\end{flushleft}
Dempsey’s work builds off James Walker’s earlier *Canadian Historical Review* article “Race and Recruitment in World War One,” which has influenced military and Indigenous historians. Walker’s illustrates how race can be inserted as a category of analysis when discussing recruitment policy during the First World War and compares the experience of Indigenous, Chinese, and Black communities and their experience with recruitment, though situates neither issues of recruitment prohibitions nor conscription in the context of DIA policy.  

More substantial treatments on those issues were developed by Timothy Winegard in his doctoral dissertation and subsequent publication *For King and Kanata*. For Winegard, Indigenous involvement in the war is best understood in an imperial context, as he argues that the British Overseas Ministry directive in 1915 calling for imperial troops represented a fundamental shift in thinking about Indigenous peoples as a source of recruits.  

Looking at the war in the context of Indigenous communities’ responses has been a concurrent theme academically. Katherine McGowan’s dissertation and publications have emphasized the responses of Indigenous peoples to the war, arguing that participants framed questions of recruitment and financial donations against ongoing debates regarding land, resources, and status. Other historians have added to this question of context domestically, assessing the war

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and its impact on communities. P. Whitney Lackenbauer has curated edited collections and produced original content on a wide range of issues related to Indigenous communities and the war, generally following the theme of how community responses to the war were more complicated than previously thought, and remonstrating previous historians for not studying the question more rigorously.\(^\text{23}\) Robert Talbot’s article adds to our understanding first advanced by Lackenbauer and McGowan by assessing the absence of support from other communities, recognizing that not all young men nor communities were singularly enthusiastic about recruitment or the war effort.\(^\text{24}\)

Occasionally, general studies of the Canada and the First World War briefly reference Indigenous peoples as well. Jonathan Vance’s *Death So Noble* includes a discussion of Indigenous soldiers in its conclusion regarding how the consolidation of a national war myth limited alternative narratives. Vance also takes aim at the historiographic narrative of the “forgotten warrior” as not quite right, since most celebratory narratives of the war included a salutary reference to the contributions of Indigenous enlistees (if framed in racialized language and conception).\(^\text{25}\) Indigenous veterans have received passing reference in a number of surveys

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\(^\text{25}\) Vance, *Death So Noble*, 247.
of the period. Popular biographies of noteworthy Indigenous soldiers and veterans, such as Francis “Peggy” Pegahmagabow and Mike Mountain Horse, have emerged from time to time, though these do not focus on the soldiers’ experiences as veterans extensively.

Unsurprisingly, American academic literature on race, war and veteranship is more fulsome. Jennings C. Wise first propagated the “Forgotten Warrior” mythos as early as 1931 in the American context. Thomas A. Brittain’s extensive survey furthered the genre. His work on the warrior ethic, differing motivations for enlistments, and treatment on the home front offers a standard account. Brittain writes that the war years brought about a decline in standards of living on reservations, and that Indigenous soldiers returned home to worse conditions from when they left. Brittain also argues that the 1924 Citizenship Act was essentially an assimilationist tool. Russell L. Barsh’s influential article first introduced rigorous microdata analysis in his “American Indians in the Great War,” which enumerated enlistments and arrived at the figure of 6509 American Indigenous enlisted by studying local agency records across the US, and concluded that “war service led to the emergence of a new tier of leadership that was

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more Americanized, disciplined, and materialistic, but at the same time less intimidated by the Indian Office. The new leaders were active in the movement for citizenship land claims settlements in the 1920s.\(^{30}\) In this sense, Barsh sees the high rates of enlistment precipitated a watershed moment for the rights of Indigenous peoples in the United States of America. Michael Tate furthers this view by suggesting that the war precipitated a discursive shift, seeing Indigenous men as potential “doughboys” rather than just military scouts, as had been the case over the previous 120 years.\(^{31}\) Alison Krouse’s ethnographic study examines 2,846 post-war surveys of Indigenous veterans collected by photographer Joseph K. Dixon, which detail the soldiers’ experiences overseas and at home and the influence of this work on the passage of citizenship rights in 1924.\(^{32}\)

Though studies of Indigenous soldiers and the First World War has proliferated in the past decade or so, this field shares a set of conclusions that replicate the same well-worn anecdotes and come perilously close to an “interpretive orthodoxy,” as P. Whitney Lackenbauer and R. Scott Sheffield have cautioned.\(^{33}\) However much the recent contributors to the field would resist the characterization, later works have scarcely moved beyond the “Forgotten Warriors” narrative first conceptualized in the mid-1980s. These studies generally fall into an uncritical narrative of Indigenous participation in Canada’s martial effort, connected to a broader


\(^{32}\) Though the source material is enviable, Krouse occasionally wanders into “forgotten warriors” narrative structure, including the main conclusion that war service exposed “promises broken” in the postwar period and frustrations of “disappointed” veterans. Susan Applegate Krouse, *North American Indians in the Great War: Photographs and Original Documentation by Joseph K. Dixon,* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2007), 177-178.

\(^{33}\) Lackenbauer, “Moving Beyond Forgotten.”
phenomenon in which historians of Canada’s soldiers appear to feel strictly obliged to commemorate and remember sacrifice, and little else.\textsuperscript{34}

Virtually every book-length study has been premised upon the question of why Indigenous men enlisted voluntarily, addresses the features of discrimination when enlisting and in the service, and laud the noteworthy contributions of a number of Indigenous soldiers who conducted themselves gallantly on the battlefield. These works generally share some key conclusions regarding war and memory, suggesting that, as a country, we need to collectively remember the gallant contributions of soldiers and have not done enough to recognize the service and sacrifice of Indigenous soldiers. This type of conclusion contends that the narrative of Indigenous peoples and the war should be shaped by the story of “warriors” fighting and dying willingly for an ungrateful nation, and that the celebration of these soldiers’ brave sacrifices rectifies the 90 or so years of overlooking these people. Second, these works share common subjects, focusing on Indigenous soldiers, military officers, and government officials, especially those from within the DIA. Earlier studies have focused almost exclusively on recruits and the government, while later academic studies have begun to explore the diversity of experience, including those individuals and communities that did not enlist. These are reasonable conclusions. We should continue to publicly acknowledge Indigenous contributions to Canada’s military past. Second, understanding complexity of Indigenous communities is an intriguing development. Communities were not monolithic; we need to use this as impetus to understanding further how this was true, especially regionally, and also add in complexity of state actors.

Virtually every study holds a sustained focus on the period of military mobilization, with little or no attention to demobilization. As discussed below in the context of veterans’

historiography, this is a key oversight. As with studies of the state more broadly, histories of
Indigenous soldiers include virtually no understanding of mechanics of return and contribute
very little attention to veterans. Some limited studies have attempted to assess the experience of
Indigenous veterans, usually as a book-end piece. The last chapter in Dempsey’s *Warriors of the
Crown* discusses veterans, as does a published article which expands on the same work; both
pieces excoriate government policy towards Indigenous veterans as downright catastrophic,
exacerbating broken treaty promises; yet Dempsey conflates wartime policy with postwar
veterans’ initiatives and does not clearly separate the regional or individual circumstances that
aligned with, or challenged, national policy initiatives.  

Both McGowan and Winegard see the
administration of Indigenous veterans as a continuity of prewar assimilationist government
policy and as dominated by the *Indian Act*. McGowan fails to acknowledge or reference the
policy variations on initiatives related to Indigenous veterans, nor the similarities and differences
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous veterans. Winegard similarly casts the 1920s and 1930s
as a period in which Canadian state policy towards indigenous peoples did not change, and
proposes that the entire postwar period represented a reassertion of “paternalistic and
authoritarian [government] policies,” which is very broad characterization.

Notwithstanding the magnetic focus on recruitment and war service, Indigenous veterans
have received some limited academic attention. Yet no extensive dissertation or book-length

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35 Dempsey, *Warriors of the Crown*. See also, Dempsey, “Problems of Western Canadian Indian Veterans.”


37 These studies include Sarah Carter, “Infamous Proposal”: Prairie Indians Reserve Land And Soldier Settlement
reserve land and soldier settlement after World War I,” *Manitoba History* 37 (Spring/Summer 1999): 9-21; Robin
Jarvis Brownlie, “Work Hard and Be Grateful: Native Soldier Settlers in Ontario After the First World War,” in
Franca Iacovetta and Wendy Mitchinson, eds., *On the Case: Explorations in Social History* (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1998), 181-203; Dempsey, “Problems of Western Canadian Indian Veterans,” *Native Studies Review*
5, 2 (1989): 1-18; Moses’ study of the place of veterans in the political order of the Six Nations Reserve John
Moses, “The Return of the Native: Six Nations Veterans and Political Change at the Grand River Reserve, 1917-
1924,” in *Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Military: Historical Perspectives*, eds. P. Whitney Lackenbauer and
study of Indigenous veterans of the First World War exists. What became of 35% of male population touched by war, and incrementally many more families, in the years after their service? Do they cease to exist after November 1918, as some studies seem to imply? If we accept the conclusions of historians like Arthur Ray, Olive Dickason, J.R. Miller, and Donald Smith that the 1920s and 1930s were a period of political, economic, social, and cultural difficulty for many Indigenous peoples, how do veterans fit into that narrative? Current studies do not address this question.

The gap in literature likely persists due to the nature of the sources. Unlike Kenneth Dixon’s documentation of American Indian veterans in the American context, it appears that no comparable resource exists whereby officials or communities compiled testimony or records of Canadian Indigenous veterans systematically. National and regional archives hold documentary sources disparate ly between them and include a blend of government publications, DIA case files, and military files.

The use of the documentary record represents a second shortcoming of the existing literature on Indigenous peoples and military service in Canada: a reliance on narrative files in LAC’s holdings of records relating to the Department of Indian Affairs, RG 10, particularly the Red Series set of records from the numeric designation “452.” The specific scope, range, and shortcomings of this series is discussed in detail in the Methodological Essay, but the overreliance of historians of the topic on this resource simply cannot be stressed enough. This group of scholars have relied on accessing documents that discuss narrative developments, and

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Craig Leslie Mantle (Kingston: Canadian Defense Academy Press, 2007): 117-128; and Robert Alexander Innes, ‘‘I’m on Home Ground Now, I’m Safe.’’: Saskatchewan Aboriginal Veterans in the Immediate Post-War Years, 1945-6.” American Indian Quarterly 28 (Summer & Fall, 2004): 685-714. Each of these studies are intriguing but limited in scope and geography.
have not yet deployed numeric data relating to enlistments, discharges, and service outcomes, which is surprising considering the intensive focus on enlistments. Similarly, scholars have tended to focus on broad narrative discussions of veterans’ programs without accessing and aggregating data to see the individual, and collective, results of the programs on Indigenous veterans. In short, no historian has attempted a systematic study of men and their families, their experiences of war but also of return, and how they encountered the state. Outside of anecdotes, scholars have not identified how these individuals expressed themselves, how their relationship to the state evolved, or whether their officials accepted or rejected these claims. These historians do not really engage with thousands of First World War veterans though, nor assess what were their experience, how were they understood by the state, and how did they contribute to these changes. Essentially no historian has used a widespread study of the DIA’s case files of Indigenous veterans nor the military service files available in RG150, outside of a narrow selection of examples.

If historians have overlooked Indigenous veterans, the same can be said more generally of Canadian veterans. An important exception is Desmond Morton and Glenn Wright’s influential work on veterans and the Canadian state, *Winning the Second Battle*, which assesses the growth of institutions, political organizations, and key figures relating to veterans of the First World War in Canada.\(^3^8\) Though many historians position the First World War as a defining moment in Canada’s history, few have treated its aftermath with any systematic rigor. David Gerber has written that veterans are a “neglected” group and suggests that academic literature on

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veterans is “fragmentary”. Certainly Canadian writings on disabled veterans, and veterans in general, are fragmentary. Marc Humphries’s, Serge Durflinger’s, Kellen Kurchinski’s, and Nathan Smith’s recent works represent the scant few that aid our understanding of war, veterananship, and disability. Though the First World War is a traditional topic of study that sees multiple annual publications, veterans of that conflict – and all conflicts, generally – remain a neglected group by historians of Canada. These works’ scope, opacity, and sources are limited. A few other works, primarily focused on collections of documents or celebrating the development of the Canadian Legion, are all that exists of the Canadian literature on the topic.


Outside of the extensive treatment by academics of Europe, veterans have received more extensive academic study in both America and Australia than Canada, though these have generally fallen into the economics-and-policies approach with only a few notable exceptions.43 Studies on war, culture, and memory have incorporated veterans in Canada and elsewhere, most notably in the Canadian context by Jonathan Vance’s Death So Noble.44 As much as the Indigenous field has slotted Indigenous veterans into prescribed spots in more general studies of the time period, historians of the First World War have occasionally featured veterans more generally in their studies.45


45 See Rutherford, Hometown Horizons; Ian Miller, Our Glory and Our Grief: Torontonians and the Great War, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002); and James Pitsula, For All We Have And Are: Regina and the Experience of the Great War, (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2008); Tim Cook’s two volume survey, At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1914-1916, (Toronto: Penguin, 2007) and Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1917-1918, (Toronto: Penguin, 2008) includes returned soldiers and veterans into the narrative, especially the final chapters of Shock Troops, while John Herd Thompson, The Harvests of War: The Prairie West, 1914-1918 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978) occasions returned men slightly more space, as does Craig Brown's and Ramsay Cook's, Canada, 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974). This slight attention is also endemic to Benjamin Isitt, From Victoria to Vladivostok: Canada's Siberian Expedition, 1917-19 (Vancouver, Toronto: University of British Columbia Press, 2010). Veterans are generally credited with the growth of public institutions and social security in the interwar period, and studies usually refer to the narrative first advanced in Morton’s and Wright’s When Your Number’s Up to suggest that the veterans’ advocacy on pension reforms precipitated a broader reform in social security.
Conceptually, these studies collectively assert the importance of bringing demobilization into the narrative, a worthy mandate. Particularly in Canadianist historiography, these works use archival materials widely and are exemplary for using case studies, published reports, meeting minutes, testimonials, private papers, and service files to weave a national narrative. In this regard, these works represent a technical achievement in the craft of writing history. Desmond Morton’s works in this regard is outstanding, as is the recent contribution by Kellen Kurchinski showing a depth of case study research. For Indigenous veterans, this dissertation seeks to replicate that depth of study by harnessing the rich sources of data from case files and service files, as well as the printed reports and DIA records. The historiography on veterans’ studies generally tend to fall into a two-part argument: first, that veterans struggled terribly after the First World War against unrelenting economic and political crises and austere policy, and second, that veterans’ mistreatment led to political organizing, agitation, and thus the development of a better deal for the next generations with the Veteran’s Charter after the Second World War, as well as lasting institutions for all Canadians (e.g., CNIB, Legion). This is sometimes called a “lessons learned” narrative, where society learned from the lessons of the First World War veterans’ struggles and contributed to a better deal for future veterans.46

46 See Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle: Canadian Veterans and the Return to Civilian Life,); Desmond Morton, “The Canadian Veterans’ Heritage from the Great War,” in The Veterans Charter and Post-World War II Canada, eds. Peter Neary and J.L. Granatstein (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998), 15-33; England, Discharged: A Commentary on Civil Re-establishment of Veterans in Canada; “Introduction” in Peter Neary and J.L. Granatstein, eds., The Veterans Charter and Post-World War II Canada, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998); Jeffrey A. Keshen, Saints, Sinners, and Soldiers: Canada’s Second World War (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004); Peter Neary, On to Civvy Street: Canada’s Rehabilitation Program for Veterans of the Second World War, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011). For a rebuke of the liberal narrative in the British context, see Bourke, Dismembering the Male Body. According to Bourke, disabled and mutilated veterans were celebrated during the war as icons of sacrifice, which bled over into “crippled” and “paupers” expecting that the new focus on disability may improve the status of impoverished and disabled non-veterans. Yet the seemingly-deserving veterans “siphoned” the valuable resources away from civilian “cripples” and eventually shunned and ignored themselves by postwar society, which wished to dis-remember the war even as it became increasingly focused upon the soldier-like male beauty that would be sacrificed in the Second World War.
The historiography of veterans in Canada is limited in scope. This scholarship is largely silent on race and ethnicity. Indigenous veterans are either completely absent from the few studies that explore veterans in Canada, or else receive the briefest mention without any extended analysis of how these thousands of men challenge our understanding of who was and was not a veteran. As discussed above, the Indigenous-military historiography has produced a limited number of articles (but no book-length studies or dissertations) on the question of Indigenous peoples and veteranship, though these studies are oriented towards the war. The works of Americanist and Europeanist scholarship on race, military service, and veteranship has not yet made an impact into Canadianist studies of veterans’ policy, organizations, and experience. Nor, for that matter, have historians thoroughly interrogated veterans’ identity and experience: while most studies stick to a national scope and discuss institution-building, these works display little awareness for local circumstances or how policy met with lived experience. Few works have followed up on the early reconnaissance by Canadianists into the politics of memory, identity, and representation in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

*Indigeneity, Veteranship, & Citizen-Solider: Critical Definitions and Key Terms*

The historiographic gap regarding Canadian Indigenous veterans is likely due to the poorly-organized and intimidating volume of records relating to them, and also the challenge around defining exactly what the phrase “Indigenous veteran” implies. Both historically and presently, terms identifying Indigenous peoples are fraught with pitfalls and implications. For these reasons, any study involving Indigenous peoples in Canada requires careful thought on the politics of language.47 In the period of this dissertation, the government considered many

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47 As Steffi Retzlaff argues, “Labelling has real-world-consequences as the term ‘Indian’ is not value-free but rather negatively connoted and these connotations continue to shape both the direction of federal policy and popular
Indigenous peoples “Indians,” following the Indian Act, first passed in 1876 and dominating Canadian policy towards Indigenous peoples through the period of study. The notion that “Indians’” social, cultural, religious, linguistic and economic ways of life were inferior to dominant Anglo-Saxon culture was the foundation for the Indian Act. State officials justified a condition of wardship in which the DIA would play the role of surrogate parent on “Indians’” presumed racial inferiority and child-like qualities. In the period 1914-1939, the notion of “Indians” was rooted in a matrix of blood purity, parentage, and marital status that drew from chauvinistic and social darwinistic racism.

Precise definitions of an “Indian” versus a “half-breed” were mutable and not set concretely, particularly as Provincial laws often contained slightly different conceptions of who was and was not “Indian.” Systems of definition and enforcement of racial distinction were “tangled” and “nebulous,” legal historian Constance Backhouse insists, but state actors were consistent throughout the period to draw a colour line of racial boundaries to “concretize distinction and to create a hierarchy of racial designation.” The category itself was an imposed identity by state officials with little consultation for self-representation or community membership. For these reasons, the term “Indian” refers more to a murky legal reality, a “status” rather than the lived experiences and self-expressions of peoples and communities. Even the


48 Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens, 254.
49 Backhouse, Colour Coded, 22.
50 Ibid., 27.
legal reality was unstable: this status could be lost through status women marrying a man who was not status, through enfranchisement and renouncing their status, and through a series of other lineage-related conditions. Observers from 1914 to 1939 would have referred to Indigenous peoples as “Indians,” though “half-breeds” and Métis were sometimes included in that vocabulary, casually if not legally. Because of the imposed nature of this category of identity, the word “Indian” is rooted in a racialized legal category that today is largely associated with racist discrimination. More recently, “Aboriginal” has been used as a term to describe “Indians,” a practice that evolved from resistance in the late 1960s to the White Paper and a push for inclusion of Métis and Inuit peoples as part of a broader coalition of peoples. This term was used in the 35(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982 (“Definition of ‘Aboriginal peoples of Canada’”) to describe three groups of people: those who were previously considered “Indian,” Inuit and Métis people, and those groups all collectively. More recently, this term has been rejected by some scholars and communities as problematic.

For reasons explained above, I have chosen to adopt the term “Indigenous” rather than “Indian” or “Aboriginal” in this dissertation. My usage of “Indigenous” refers to people who the state considered “Indians” during the interwar period according to the Constitution Act’s first representation, and excludes Métis and Inuit peoples who were not included in the DIA records pertaining to Aboriginal soldiers and not considered Indians under the Indian Act. Many scholars and officials still refer to this group as “Aboriginal peoples,” and my choice of “Indigenous peoples” is for consistency’s sake, and to reflect the rejection of “Aboriginal” while

52 The Supreme Court of Canada decided that ”Eskimos” were defined as “Indians” and placed under the supervision of the Indian Act in 1939, in the case Re Eskimos. See Backhouse, Colour Coded, chapter 2.
affirming status and rights of Indigenous peoples. I have also chosen to capitalize the first letter in “Indigenous,” since failing to do so is often a signal of intentional disrespect and the perpetuation of an attitude of superiority of non-Indigenous societies whose grammatical proclivities include the capitalization of national peoples but not Indigenous ones.⁵³

Beyond the term “Indigenous,” further definitions require clarification before proceeding. Central to this study is the question of identity and representation, oriented along the twin axis of the imperfectly-defined terms “veteran” and “citizen,” conditions of which being “veteranship” and “citizenship,” and both problematized when placed adjacent to “Indigenous” (the form of which as “indigeneity”). Indigenous peoples and government officials deployed both terms variously at times, in different contexts to justify or contest public policy. Government officials and contemporary observers understood and represented Indigenous peoples who had served with the CEF during the First World War as soldiers and veterans according to a specific set of colonialist modes of thinking. As with other veterans, Indigenous peoples were motivated by and defined themselves separately and in resistance to state representations: through their masculinity and shared service with non-Indigenous soldiers and veterans.

The category of “veteran” is a complicated and unsettled one. Current definitions of “veteran” by the Department of Veterans Affairs considers a veteran to “any former member of the Canadian Armed Forces who releases with an honourable discharge and who successfully underwent basic training.”⁵⁴ These two basic conditions may satisfy a bureaucratic definition, but

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⁵³ See Retzlaff, “What’s in a Name?,” 610. Perhaps running against this standard convention, when referring to communities in their historical context, in many places I use the place name from that time period for geographical rather than their current names. Doing so was to ensure I was referring to a specific geographic entity that may have later been altered or refers to something different from its historical context.

adding the suffix –ship, as in “veteranship,” signifies that a “veteran” is more than that, as a state of being, a member of group, and a marker of status. This is a good way to start thinking about defining what a “veteran” represents. Notwithstanding the emotive and political markers of veteranship, it is essentially an experiential category. In this study, I use the terms “returned soldier” and “veteran” as synonymous and switch between these terms for the sake of variation, as these terms were used interchangeably in the first years after armistice. A returned soldier and veteran represents an individual whose physical or administrative status has changed from being overseas (or even just in uniform) to one who has been returned from overseas or discharged from service. This is a literal category, though still contingent and relational since veterans from overseas service saw themselves as distinct from veterans of the home service or administrative discharge in Canada, and soldiers sometimes derided their comrades who had escaped combat for their presumed cowardice or selfishness.55

Separately, as discussed below, a veteran is also a returned soldier who expresses a self-definition through a series of experiential and administrative characteristics. While experiential studies of soldiering in the First World War have multiplied in Canada and internationally, historians have not expanded their scope to discuss the experiences of veterans or the post-war social experience. Most studies of veterans shy away from experiential approaches to instead focus on veterans as political actors and situating the soldiers’ “re-establishment” in national economic and political context, first adopted in Canada by Morton and Wright but following the

55Jonathan Minnes’s recent publication argues that the internal politics of veterans’ identity has played an important role in shaping the political influence and aims of the veterans’ movement in Canada. As Minnes writes, “Class distinctions between veterans may seem artificial to outsiders but they play an important role in the way different groups interact and advocate for themselves. For instance there were Canadians labeled D-Day dodgers, who supposedly had an ‘easier’ time fighting up the Italian peninsula in battles like Ortona compared with those who fought in Northwest Europe.” See “Law and Justice: Scott v. Canada and the History of the Social Covenant with Canadian Veterans,” Canadian Military History 25, 1 (2016): 1-32.
international trends in the field. Stephen Ward’s edited collection on veterans discusses how soldiers’ shared military service forged inexorable bonds, which that translated into powerful political forces in the interwar period.56 While First World War historians have been concerned with framing the relationship in political terms, Nathan Smith’s recent insertion of cultural modes of analysis is promising. Smith assesses how veterans “represented themselves and how their contributions to wartime and postwar public debate help us understand who they were and the nature of Canadian society.”57 Building on earlier work that suggests citizenship in English Canada was integral to nationalist discourse in the interwar period, Smith agrees with the exploratory conclusions of Lara Campbell that veterans in Ontario understood themselves in terms of Britishness, manliness, and shared experience in the service.58 The political and cultural identities of veterans, Smith argues, necessitates a study of their imperial identity, which historians have more broadly examined the contest of ethno-nationalist pageantry in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.59

57 Smith, Comrades and Citizens, 21.
58 Carl Berger’s sense of Canadian nationalism to 1914 was “grounded upon a definite conception of Canada’s past, her national character, and her mission in the future,” something that veterans would have generally shared. Carl Berger, The Sense of Power: Studies in the ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 259. See also See Nathan Smith “Comrades and Citizens”; Lara Campbell, “‘We Who Wallowed in the Mud of Flanders’: First World War Veterans, Unemployment and the Development of Social Welfare in Canada, 1929-1939,” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 11 (2000): 125-149, in which Campbell argues that veterans were a vocal, articulate, and politically aware constituency that developed during the post-war discontent. By the 1930s, veterans were engaged in political protest against the effects of unemployment and government policy on ex-servicemen. This protest was crucial to the development of government support for broader ideas of economic and social security and the idea that social welfare was a right associated with the benefits of full citizenship, 125; Lara Campbell, “‘A Barren Cupboard at Home’: Ontario Families Confront the Premiers During the Great Depression,” in Ontario since Confederation: A Reader, Ed. Edgar-Andre Montigny and Lori Chambers, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000): 284-306.
Few observers contested that Indigenous returned men’s military service was honourable. Yet in the twenty years after armistice, these soldiers had limited access the social privileged that veteranship implied. Informally, Canadian veterans had shared experiences in the service that bound them together, and this shared bond inspired formal organizations dedicated to supporting and advocating for veterans’ rights. Soldiers related to one another through their experiences of serving overseas and observing intimate emotive, physical, and cultural experiences together. They also connected through the shared experience of return and homecoming, reintegration, and rehabilitation. Veterans expressed these bonds in carefully articulated individual and group discourse, and even in moments of explosive violence; both sorts of behaviours were motivated, in part, by their understanding of their rights as privileged men. The historiography on identity and the war, led by American literature, has focused on how citizenship was a central component of veterans’ identity; even while as soldiers, the vast majority of recruits were “civilians in uniform” rather than regular troops. The CEF’s composition primarily of volunteers with little professional military experience, and its oversight and occasional scrutiny by civilian bodies underscored this theme, as did the great importance and public debate placed on the soldiers’ vote in 1917.

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Americanist historian Jennifer Keene’s work on the “citizen soldiers” argues that the identity of “doughboy” became a powerful marker of identity, whose shared markers of masculinity and nationalism trumped the soldiers’ racial, ethnic, and linguistic differences and created a new contract between citizens and the government; this certainly aligns with Michael Tate’s argument specific to Indigenous enrollees in the United States of America. For Keene, soldiers and veterans had negotiated a “social contract” through their service, determining the precise meaning and value both during and after military service. Other historians have suggested the ways in which masculinity reinforced the ideal of military service and connected manliness with the nation. Canadianist historians have considered questions of masculinity and nationalism reinforced the category of soldier and veteran: Mark Moss’s work on the “militia myth” explains how militarism and manliness were core features of education for young boys in Ontario, while other historians have further explored the class and ethnic features of militarism prior to the war. Popular interpretations of Canadian soldiers were that they represented “exemplars of sacrifice, manhood, nationalism and duty” that would “purify and validate” Canada as a nation, though most soldiers seemed to have rejected this lofty expectation in favour of a more pragmatic self-identity.

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62 Keene argues that racialized minorities in the American Expeditionary Force learned that “actions could make a difference in the global fight against racism,” Doughboys: The Great War and the Remaking of America, 128.
63 Ibid., 1.
64 See, for example, Hannah, Manhood, Citizenship, and the National Guard: Illinois, 1870-1917. See also Stephen Dudink, Karen Hagemann and John Tosh, eds., Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History (New York: Manchester University Press, 2004).
If veteran is a loosely defined concept that owes some allegiance to the notion of citizenship, “citizen” itself is a muddled concept, especially in the Canadian context. Scholars have described Canadian citizenship as “fugitive, fragmented, culturally constituted, and politically contested,” and without any fundamental or fixed meaning, but rather a product of historical experience.67 In the first half of the twentieth century, the concept of Canadian citizenship did not exist legally, and many—though not all—people living in Canada held the rights of Imperial British citizenship. The establishment of a legal category of Canadian citizenship distinct from a British one with the passage of the Citizenship Act after the Second World War was premised both on the legal rights and obligations of citizenship (such as enfranchisement and taxes) along with the less defined “social citizenship,” implying a sense of belonging to a shared national community and a sense of “ethnic solidarity,” shared history, and shared national values of democracy, liberalism, and freedom.68

During the interwar period, definitions of citizenship were founded on racialized conceptions of virtue. Historian Matthew Frye Jacobson describes this constellation of virtues as “disciplined, virtuous, self-sacrificing, productive, farseeing, and wise traits,” all of which were part of the eighteenth century lexicon of racialized Euro-American thinking.69 In defining Canadian Indigenous peoples’ relationship to citizenship in the interwar period, Robin Jarvis Brownlie argues that whiteness was both a “shorthand for full citizenship and a prerequisite for

it” and that the qualities most emphasized for Indigenous peoples seeking become citizens through enfranchisement were “self-discipline, virtue, and productivity, as well as, for men, that quintessential requirement of Western masculinity, the status of a successful breadwinner.”

These concepts were fundamentally at odds with dominant Canadian Anglo-Saxon constructions of Indigenous racialized traits, which depicted Indigenous peoples as dependent on government support, lacking energy or vitality, and failing to contribute to the nation. Jacobson’s and Brownlie’s exploration of indigeneity and citizenship in North America during the interwar period further underscores the importance of studying Indigenous veterans. Indigenous soldiers were not white, but was their service not suggestive of self-discipline, virtue, and productivity? If enlistees served in France and Belgium, was that not proof of energy, ambition? Did they receive deserved benefit for their wholesale bodily and spiritual contribution to the nation? Was their demand to access programs for veterans that accentuated breadwinning premised on the same conceptions of masculinity? Perhaps Indigenous soldiers and veterans did not fit into either category cleanly.

In both legal and social citizenship, Indigenous peoples were placed at the margins: “Indians” were excluded from federal franchise until 1960 (and provinces variously from 1949 to 1969) and were generally denied legal redress available to citizens. As social citizenship included a form of ethnic nationalism and implied some notion of belonging and fealty, citizenship for Indigenous peoples was “perilous and potentially obliteratorative,” since being subsumed into the nation-state could imply the extinguishment of indigeneity and associated

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71 Ibid., 48.
rights. For this reason, historical and contemporary debates regarding the applicability and value of placing concepts of indigeneity alongside citizenship is, as legal scholar John Borrows argues, “uncertain.” Uncertainty stems partly from the continuity in state policy directives towards Indigenous peoples, which has contained a consistent strain: assimilation into the dominant society and culture. The very concept of “Indian” was a legal creation that formed part of the process of turning Indigenous peoples into citizens. This category possessed both legal and cultural traits, some of which persisting after enfranchisement and the extinguishment of Indian status. Moreover, state policy prevaricated on embracing enfranchisement fully, considering the financial and spatial ramifications of widespread enfranchisement. Up to and including this period of study, state enfranchisement policy did not create equal citizens but rather maintained

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75 For example, regulations on alcohol transcended enfranchisement status. Robert A. Campbell has suggested that “Alcohol restrictions directed at Aboriginal peoples thus served the state nicely. Liquor was denied to those people who dressed or lived like status Indians, even when they were not legally recognized as such.” Robert A. Campbell, Making Sober Citizens: The Legacy of Indigenous Alcohol Regulation in Canada, 1777-1985,” in Journal of Canadian Studies 42. 1 (Winter 2008): 105-126.

social, cultural, and economic marginalization of Indigenous peoples. Assimilation meant an education in “perpetual inequality,” as Jean Barman has thoughtfully asserted.\textsuperscript{77}

Though the concept of veteran or “citizen soldier” was a negotiated identity, “Indian” was strictly a non-Indigenous creation that did not adequately reflect the self-conception of Indigenous peoples. As historian Claude Denis has identified, the choice for Indigenous peoples was to keep a “devalued but meaningful Indian status,” or else “abandon their Indigenous identities as the price for acquiring Canadian citizenship.”\textsuperscript{78} Both categories of “Indian” and “citizen” require careful navigation, since embrasure of indigenous distinction buttressed the notion of partnership with the crown but potentially reinforced the negative implications of wardship. Indigenous groups have at times embraced and at other times rejected that nomenclature.

While we can assert neither “veteran” nor “Indian” as having a singular, or even firm, definition, historical agents applied these labels to others and themselves. We need to understand what they meant, and the tension between categories of “Indian” and “veteran” (or the somewhat analogous “citizen”) are contingent on context. These terms formed a loose framework that has dominated state policy for the past 150 years and longer. For most of this period, implicit to state policy was the understanding that an “Indian” could never fully become a “citizen” even after legal enfranchisement, and that “Indian” was a transitory category. The idea that citizenship was both an aspirational and a permanent state was problematic. As the Indian Act made plain, Indigenous peoples were not persons legally. For that reason, the very notion of Indian or


Indigenous and veteran or citizen were fundamentally at odds. “Indian” implied non-personage, while veteran suggested a special term of status-personage or citizenship, almost at opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of social status and access to state power. Yet in another sense, both were strikingly compatible and mutually reinforcing, as these terms represented people who had a unique relationship to the state, and a special status. Military service bound Indigenous soldiers to their comrades in arms. They also asserted an identity premised on masculinity, particularly the opportunities to access steady pay, alcohol, and sex workers. In this way, these veterans met two of the three essential criteria laid out by Campbell and Smith as forming the foundation of a veteran’s identity. That these men were not British, nor defined themselves according to “Britishness” but rather by a complementary indigeneity is subject to further interrogation in the following sections and parts.

This study disentangles these shifting representations in its analysis of Indigenous veterans’ encounters with the state, or their articulation of themselves as veterans, and the state’s view of their status. Government officials understood the categories of Indian and veteran as fundamentally incompatible and made administrative decisions to support the separation of Indigenous men from inclusion in the benefits of veteranship and citizenship. Indigenous veterans articulated a version of self in which their military service complemented rather than supplanted their identity as Indigenous. This is best represented by the notion of “intersectionality,” whereby participants saw neither category as zero sum, but relational and reinforcing.79 Asserting themselves as being, and having the same rights as all veterans, did not

suggest that these men were necessarily surrendering their indigeneity, nor did their indigeneity obliterate their claim to a preferential place in society as a veteran.

A Study in Five Chapters

This is an ambitious project, with two large historiographies and extensive documentary resources to consult and reference. To make sense of all this, I have framed this study around key themes concerning soldiers and veterans in Canada: recruitment, repatriation; re-establishment; and rehabilitation. These categories of issues each reflect a set of big questions, first posed by Desmond Morton and Glenn Wright in *Winning the Second Battle*, and worth repeating. This set of categories represents a lens for viewing veterans that is worthy of reusing while studying Indigenous peoples and the state. In each subsequent chapter, I position the content as a more substantive discussion of each of the themes of recruitment, return, reintegration, and rehabilitation in the national context, and then proceed to provide an in-depth contrast of Indigenous experience using extensive primary sources discussed in a Statistical Appendix.

Chapter I focuses on how the social boundaries of the citizen-soldier and Indigenous non-citizen became fluid during the war years, which casts the issues of recruitment for the CEF in a new light. Who could and could not serve in the CEF, and eventually who must serve via conscription were questions that dominated national discourse from 1914 to 1918. This was as true of Indigenous peoples’ place in the nation as it was for non-Indigenous peoples. The outbreak of hostilities in 1914 led to difficult questions for DIA officials, military figures, and the government who had conflicting and uncertain views of how Indigenous peoples fit into the composition of the CEF. These people were understood to be wards, initially, who were entirely

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bound by the Indian Act and did not fit into the mold of citizen-soldier and were thereby exempt from service under a general prohibition. As the context of recruiting and manpower needs of the CEF changed, officials began to re-conceptualize Indigenous peoples’ eligibility and the meaning of this eligibility for their legal and social position. Officials in the DIA settled on an uncomfortable compromise, a tacit acknowledgement of a new sort of status for Indigenous soldiers who would share some rights and obligations of non-Indigenous citizen-soldiers, but with ostensible limits. At home, wartime regulations applied to reserves, but were managed and prosecuted by DIA officials. In this way, the war brought about a destabilizing influence to the enforcement of the Indian Act. Indigenous enlistees used the war as an opportunity for employment and adventure, but entire communities pushed for destabilization of the Indian Act; soldiers were in a position to make a claim upon the state, and used the narrative of loyalty to boost land and treaty rights claims. For both Indigenous and non-Indigenous observers, the system of colonial governance appeared more tentative in 1919 than it had in 1914.

Chapter II discusses issues regarding repatriation and return, the experiences of physical and administrative discharge from the CEF. We see from the service records that Indigenous soldiers shared similar experiences with other CEF members in terms of their discharge from military service, and a broad diversity with experiences of repatriation and return, reinforcing the notion that Indigenous soldiers’ service bound them together experientially with non-Indigenous comrades. The DIA played a small role functionally advising on militia issues, but government officials tended to agree that Indigenous soldiers were categorically “soldiers,” and therefore the responsibility of DMD officials. These returning men were transgressive figures whose status as wards was in question in 1919, after being able to vote in the 1917 election and enjoying the relative equality of service overseas. At end of war, during mass mobilization, DIA officials
expressed anxiety over the status and position of returned Indigenous soldiers, which led to the development a special system of demobilization rituals that existed only for Indigenous soldiers. These rituals were intended to reinforce the authority of DIA field officers over returning Indigenous men and stabilize the question of Indigenous peoples’ inferior status on reserve. Indigenous returning men used this opportunity to assert themselves as “veterans” premised on their experiential bonds with other soldiers, and their position of privilege as masculine figures.

Chapters III and IV focus on the question of re-establishment, reintegration, and resistance. Chapter III traces the course of participants’ and observers’ enthusiasm and trepidation for the postwar world. Observers celebrated Indigenous soldiers’ return to reserves as “Missionaries of Progress.” DIA, church, government, newspapers, and private commentators commented that armistice represented a moment of fundamental divide for Canadian society, and a moment for which the goal of assimilation of Indigenous peoples into dominant society would finally materialize. DIA officials intended for these benefits to fit within pre-war policy aims rather than fit a new economic, social, and cultural reality in the postwar world. After a series of discussions, senior government leaders decided that any initiative to reestablish Indigenous soldiers would have to conform to the Indian Act, and that their status as Indigenous men was more important to affirm than their rights as veterans. Having asserted their claim to privilege as veterans in demobilization rituals, Indigenous veterans demanded recognition and material reward for their military service on similar grounds as their non-Indigenous comrades. The resultant Soldier Settlement provisions added to the Indian Act, was a program designed especially for Indigenous veterans that enforced this notion of separation or distinction from other Indigenous peoples and from other veterans and was disruptive to existing social and economic structures on reserves. Chapter IV continues with the narrative established in Chapter
III as it follows the catastrophic failure of Indigenous Soldier Settlement through the mid-1920s and into the 1930s and shows that this was due, in part, to DIA provisions that enforced this distinction. Indigenous veterans’ push for the state to recognize and redress the program’s failure led to administrative changes to the program and a broader recognition of Indigenous veterans’ claims as privileged men.

Chapter V assesses the issue of rehabilitation for soldiers whose bodies and minds were damaged, and restoration for families whose fathers’, son’s, or brothers’ lives were diminished or extinguished because of their military service. Framed as “helpless Indians” by government and public observers, the state administered programs for the disabled and their families paternalistically and with extensive state surveillance, which enforced a strict social and moral code of conduct. Rehabilitation programs included family support funds, retraining programs, pensions, and the distribution of estates. Officials permitted Indigenous soldiers and families to access most programs during and immediately following the war, though access was tentative and contingent upon a middle-class Anglo-Saxon patriarchal expectations of conduct for recipients. After the armistice, Indigenous returned men’s access to programs and funds depended upon special administrative rules that placed the DIA bureaucracy at the center of their rehabilitation. Officials denied Indigenous men access to some veterans’ programs on the grounds that their legal status as wards precluded their status as veterans and were strictly “helpless Indians.” Indigenous veterans joined coalitions with other veterans to successfully press for recognition, leading to an investigation of the issue of Indigenous veterans’ poverty, and access to all veterans’ programs.

Following the five sections, a Statistical Appendix elucidates the methods that I used to construct data used throughout the parts of this dissertation. It also discusses the features and
scope of research sources and how I used them in this study. This appendix explains parameters of the methodology used to build a database of records, evaluates the strengths and limitations of the approach, and explains the features of the documentary and numeric data from which I compiled the data.

Through each section, we shall see that Indigenous soldiers negotiated, subverted, or even outright rejected these imposed identities of ward, warrior, “Missionary of Progress,” and “Helpless Indian,” and instead asserted themselves as veterans. Their battle for recognition as such was a struggle against long odds and over many decades, but whose victory was remarkable.
CHAPTER I – “INDIANS OR BRITISH SUBJECTS”?:
INDIGENOUS SOLDIERS AND THE CEF

Introduction

In the Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the Year Ended March 31 1914, Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs Duncan Campbell Scott made the first official, public note of the conflict and its effect on the Department. Explaining that the hostilities in Europe “would seem to be a circumstance very far removed from the life of the Canadian Indians,” Scott warned that the conflict “has affected them to a considerable degree.” For Scott, the conflict had an important disruptive influence on the lives of many Indigenous peoples across the dominion, and one that might upset a delicate balance: fur prices were plummeting. As Scott recorded, “The war has interfered with the fur trade; the European market for furs has disappeared for the time being. Under these conditions the results of the hunt, upon which so many of our Indians depend, are without appreciable value.”\(^1\)

Internally, in the first wartime Department circular, Scott warned Outside Service employees of the DIA that, “owing to depression in the fur trade, it will be a matter of considerable difficulty for the Northern Indians to dispose of their fur catches, at a price sufficiently high as to enable them to live on the proceeds of their trapping.”\(^2\) Scott’s concern that the war might have an influence on the price of fur demonstrated a misapprehension of what was to become a defining epoch for the DIA.

Scott’s primary misapprehension that the war would affect Indigenous peoples economically appears wishful in retrospect: by the end of 1918, as many as 35% of the Indigenous male population of military age had enlisted (based on Scott’s estimate of 4,000

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\(^1\) Dominion of Canada, *Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the Year Ended March 31 1914*, (Ottawa, King’s Printer, 1914), 28.

\(^2\) LAC, RG 10 volume 3086, file 279,222,1A. Scott, DIA Circular, 21 September 1914.
enlisted, see Figure 4) and regional enlistments reached over 60% in Prince Edward Island (see figure 6). At least 200 Indigenous soldiers died while in service, and many hundreds more returned home with mental or physical scars, some unable to return to prewar occupations or provide for themselves or their families economically (see Chapter V). Indigenous soldiers’ experiences overseas had a transformative effect, which led them to challenge their status as wards of the state and “Indians.” Generally the war’s outbreak and escalation created difficult questions for government officials, public observers, and Indigenous peoples: as Indigenous peoples were wards of the government, should the state include or exclude them from the notion of citizenship that a citizen army implied? What role would the DIA have compared with other government departments in managing recruitment or the application of wartime regulations on reserves? If Indigenous peoples were to be included in the CEF, would they cease to be “Indians” under the Indian Act, or would the Act’s provisions supersede a military attestation? How could the DIA effectively gather and disseminate information to know about which Indigenous men had and had not enlisted, and what their war service meant? Would compulsory registration and military service be extended to Indigenous peoples? As we shall see, answers to these questions influenced the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the government for decades thereafter.

Recruitment and enlistment has been among the most studied aspects of Canada’s involvement in the First World War. Ongoing scholarly efforts continue to refine our understanding of how military recruitment in Canada unfolded.⁴ Chris Sharpe writes that three enduring themes have carried along a sustained focus in recruitment: the problems created by

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Canada’s Imperial manpower commitments, which were too large to be sustained by volunteers and which led to conscription as a necessity; low rates of enlistment Canadian-born men; and the enduring rifts and national embarrassment caused by the low enlistment rate among French Canadian men. Earlier scholarly works have examined Indigenous enlistments in two respects: the first tradition has followed in the “Forgotten Warrior” genre, studying enlistments as a vector to celebrate the voluntary participation of great soldiers who achieved noteworthy accomplishments in spite of challenges. The second historiographic trend has used the question of enlistment to try to understand why Indigenous peoples enlisted at all, and in a higher proportion than whites. While these studies had advanced our understanding of how Indigenous

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6 This tradition carries forward from L. James Dempsey’s exploration of the idea that a “Warrior Ethic” had survived treaty-making, and influenced western Indigenous men to enlist. L. James Dempsey, “Persistence of the Warrior Ethic among the Plains Indians,” *Alberta History* 36 (Winter 1988): 1-10; The work of Katharine McGowan and P. Whitney Lackenbauer explore the possibility of Six Nations council’s request to form a separate battalion and its ultimate demise in “Competing Loyalties in a Complex Community: Enlisting the Six Nations in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1917,” in *Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Military: Historical Perspectives*, ed. P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Craig Leslie Mantle, (Kingston: Canadian Defense Academy Press, 2007) Tim Winegard places the imperial context at the center of the recruitment question, depicting Indigenous people as overwhelmingly enthusiastic for enlistments but stymied by shifting demands of state in his, *For King and Kanata: Canadian Indians and the First World War*, (Manitoba: University of Manitoba Press, 2012); Robert J. Talbot sees enlistments as a divisive issue, where some bands actively resisted recruitment because of “the land question” or threatened revolt on the grounds that enlistments were socially and culturally threatening. See “It Would be Best to Leave Us Alone”: First Nations Responses to the Canadian War Effort, 1914-1918,” *Journal of Canadian Studies* 45, 1 (Winter 2011): 90-120.
people were and were not included in the CEF, a broader understanding of the meaning of this service has yet eluded the historical community.

Chapter I of this dissertation offers another way of examining Indigenous participation in the war. Suggesting a different focus from previous scholars, Chapter I assesses the responses of federal officials to the question of Indigenous enlistments and their administration of peripheral war-related issues like desertion, hoarding, financial donations, and knowledge-production.

Robert Craig Brown’s and Donald Loveridge’s observation that Canada’s war effort experienced three phases: Militia, Patriotic, and Conscription is useful as a foil against which to place DIA planning and Indigenous responses to the war.7 Government responses to the question of Indigenous enlistments swayed variously from outright prohibition in 1914 during the Militia phase, to enthusiastic promotion in 1916 during the Patriotic phase, to cautious exemption in 1917 during the Conscription phase. Throughout these shifting policy responses, I contend that the government response was consistent in two important ways: first, reinforcing the distinction of Indigenous peoples from non-Indigenous peoples and the primacy of the DIA in administering all issues relating to Indigenous peoples. Second, Chapter I describes the sense of uncertainty and concern among government officials regarding the status of Indigenous peoples as wards in light of their military participation and the new circumstances that this civic participation brought. As policy shifted between the twin poles of exclusion and inclusion, I argue that this brought a destabilized view of where Indigenous peoples fit in society.

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Figure 1: Indigenous Population Totals, 1911-1941

Sources: *Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs, 1911* (Ottawa: King's Printer 1912); *Report of the Department of Indian Affairs, 1921* (Ottawa: King's Printer 1922); *Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs, 1931* (Ottawa: King's Printer 1932); Canada Department Of Mines And Resources Report Of Indian Affairs Branch for the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1941 (Ottawa: King's Printer 1941).
Figure 2: Indigenous Population by Province, 1911-1941

Sources: *Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs, 1911* (Ottawa: King's Printer 1912); *Report of the Department of Indian Affairs, 1921* (Ottawa: King's Printer 1922); *Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs, 1931* (Ottawa: King's Printer 1932); Canada Department Of Mines And Resources Report Of Indian Affairs Branch for the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1941 (Ottawa: King's Printer 1941).
Figure 3: Indigenous Population by Province as Percentage of Whole, 1911-1941

Sources: Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs, 1911 (Ottawa: King's Printer 1912); Report of the Department of Indian Affairs, 1921 (Ottawa: King's Printer 1922); Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs, 1931 (Ottawa: King's Printer 1932); Canada Department Of Mines And Resources Report Of Indian Affairs Branch for the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1941 (Ottawa: King's Printer 1941).
Figure 4: Indigenous Age and Gender Distribution, 1911-1941

Sources: Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs, 1911 (Ottawa: King’s Printer 1912); Report of the Department of Indian Affairs, 1921 (Ottawa: King’s Printer 1922); Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs, 1931 (Ottawa: King’s Printer 1932); Canada Department Of Mines And Resources Report Of Indian Affairs Branch for the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1941 (Ottawa: King's Printer 1941).
Figure 5: Number of Enlisted Indigenous Soldiers by Province Enumerated in Database

Sources: LAC, RG 10 and RG 150 (Selected Files)
Figure 6: Indigenous Enlistments as % Indigenous Population and % Indigenous Men of Military Age

Sources: LAC, RG 10 and RG 150 (Selected Files)
Recruitment: From Prohibition to Promotion

On 8 August 1914 Colonel W.E. Hodgins, the Officer Commanding the Number 1 Military District (Southwestern Ontario), wrote to Sam Hughes via the Militia Council inquiring whether Indigenous soldiers were allowed to enlist, as “It is intended that Indians who are anxious to enlist for service overseas are to be taken on the contingent.” A clarifying order was issued thereafter by Minister of Militia Sam Hughes (and repeated verbatim thereafter in correspondence with both military officers and DIA officials), to the effect that “while British troops would be proud to associate with their Indian fellow subjects, the Germans might refuse to extend to them the privileges of civilized warfare” and thus Indigenous peoples should not be allowed to serve overseas, though he hinted that service in Canada was possible. DIA and DMD officials adhered to the policy selectively. In June 1915, local recruiting officer Sergeant-Major P.J. Scott wrote to Sam Hughes asking if Indigenous peoples were able to enlist at Southampton, a local recruitment node near the Saugeen reserve. Sgt.-Maj. Scott noted that many local Indigenous men were enthusiastic about enlisting, but an identified source had informed him that recruiters would not accept the potential recruits. Indian Agent W.R. Brown wrote to DIA Headquarters that new recruits could be trained and quartered on the reserve at Fort William to

8 LAC, RG 24, volume 1221, file HQ 593-1-7. O/C First Division to Secty., Militia Council, 8 August 1914. The Militia Council was created per the 1904 Militia Act and was composed of the Minister as President; four Military Members (the Chief of the General Staff, Adjutant General, Quartermaster General and Master General of the Ordnance); a Civilian Member (the Deputy Minister); a Financial Member (the Accountant of the Department of Militia and Defence); and a civilian Secretary. It was intended "to advise the Minister on all matters relating to the militia which are referred to the Council by the Minister. See G.W.L. Nicholson, Official History of the Canadian army in the First World War: Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1962), 8.
9 Katharine McGowan and P. Whitney Lackenbauer notes this official prohibition, but states, “there is no evidence that this message was sent to any other division, nor that it was widely applied.” The presence of Sleivant’s correspondence contradicts that statement. See Katharine McGowan and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “Competing Loyalties in a Complex Community,” 95.
facilitate recruiting of Indians at Nipigon and Fort William. Brown estimated that twenty five or
more men were available, and already twenty-two men had enlisted with the 52nd battalion.\textsuperscript{11} Brown received in response a quote of Minister Sam Hughes’ statement to Col. Shannon about the “privileges of civilized warfare.”\textsuperscript{12} DMD and DIA officials, clearly aware of the prohibition, appear to have basically ignored the regulation in almost every instance, as evidenced by the volumes of correspondence relating to Indian enlistments throughout the period.\textsuperscript{13} Rather than establish a clear guideline followed by close interdepartmental cooperation, both the DIA and DMD opted instead to continue to permit local enlistments and only intervene in select cases. Ultimately, acceptance or rejection lay in the hands of local recruiting officers.\textsuperscript{14}

Official confusion from DMD and DIA officials regarding the applicability of enlistment regulations to Indigenous peoples is not surprising. Civilian and military leaders in virtually all combatant nations had expected, and developed mobilization plans to win a decisively short war.\textsuperscript{15} The early days of mobilization in 1914, as Brown and Loveridge propose, were the first “Militia” phase of recruitment. This phase was notable for “confusion and chaos.”\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{11} LAC, RG 24, volume 1221, file HQ 593-1-7. W.R. Brown to J.D. McLean, 8 October 1915.
\textsuperscript{12} LAC, RG 10, volume 3180, file 452-124-1. S. Sleivant to W.R. Brown, 28 October 1915
\textsuperscript{13} An August 1914 letter from the acting-Superintendent for the Six Nations H.M. Hill forwarded a list of eight Six Nations men who had enlisted, to which Scott responded, “I am very glad to have this information and to know that the Six Nations and the Mississaugas of the Credit will have representatives at the front.” LAC, RG 10, volume 3180, file 452-124-1. Letter from Scott to Gordon J. Smith, 21 August 1914. On 6 September 1914, the Bella Coola agent wrote to Headquarters reporting that Jim Kelly, a married band member expressed interest, and asking “what shall I say to him or Indians similarly disposed?” LAC, RG 10, volume 3180, file 452-124-1. Letter from Iver Fougner to the DIA, 6 September 1914. McLean responded, “Jim Kelly should be allowed to enlist if he so desires. A number of Indians throughout Canada have already enlisted.” LAC, RG 10, volume 3180, file 452-124-1. Letter from J.D. McLean to Iver Fougner, 13 October 1914.
\textsuperscript{14} The influence of recruitment officers is clear in the cases of Moravian residents Dan Stonefish, Ben Lewis, and Frank Noah had prepared to enlist and were given a ‘going away ceremony,’ were rejected by the London office on account of being Indian. LAC, RG 24, volume 1221, file HQ 593-1-7. J.C. Nethercott to Hughes, 11 October 1915. Similarly, Cape Croker’s Fredrick Lavallee, Wellington Pedomquott, and Wilfred Lamorandiere were also rejected by local recruiting officers on account of their Indian status. LAC, RG 24, volume 1221, file HQ 593-1-7. Duncan to DIA Headquarters, 29 November 1915.
\textsuperscript{15} See Margaret MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914 (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2013), 334.
\textsuperscript{16} Brown and Loveridge, 66.
Figure 7: Indigenous Enlistment and Discharge by Date

Sources: LAC, RG 10 and RG150 (Selected Files)
Sam Hughes’ call for volunteers was disruptive to the permanent force and previous mobilization plans. More volunteers were available than could be incorporated into the volunteer force, and restrictions based on preferred physique, the necessity of releases from wives of married soldiers, and the restriction on Indigenous men could be applied liberally in this atmosphere. By the end of 1914 almost 60,000 men and women had offered themselves for service in the CEF, though more than 70% were British born, and early warnings hinted that many native-born men were less excited about serving overseas.

Indigenous peoples comprised some members of the First Contingent. We see from Figure 7 that some young men enlisted at Valcartier with the First Contingent, and military officials did little to stop them. While the prohibition targeted “Indians,” those living off reserve like Lieutenant Cameron D. Brant, a casualty at Ypres in April 1915 slipped through. Recruitment officials neither specified nor prevented the Hamilton, Ontario resident from enlisting. Of the more than 200 young Indigenous men who enlisted prior to 1916, at least 50% list locations off-reserve as their place of residence on their attestation papers. The prohibition effectively targeted both those that lived on reserve and were seen as physically distinct from white society. We do not have good records of those whom recruiters rejected on these grounds outside from some battalion records that list these exemptions, but Scott premised his concern on rejected men from the First Contingent; see Nic Clarke, “‘You will not be going to this war’: The rejected volunteers of the First Contingent of the Canadian Expeditionary Force,” First War Studies 1, (2010), 163.


over fur prices on the idea of distinction. Minister Hughes’s order, that Indigenous peoples were separate from the rest of eligible members of society, further reinforced distinction. Following with the broader trends in recruitment, military and civilian officials applied Indigenous peoples’ exclusion selectively. Clearly, to recruitment officials, the exclusionary nature that “Indianness” conferred was neither widely circulated nor respected.

This lifting of the prohibition and approval of Indigenous enlistments coincided with a “Patriotic” phase in recruitment. This period, initiated in the fall of 1915, saw a shift away from the central direction of recruitment by the DMD in favour of efforts by zealous individual citizens and communities to raise battalions (provided the citizens and communities covered their own costs).20 This phase originated during the summer of 1915 when Prime Minister Robert Borden travelled overseas and observed both the immense scale and tremendous need for manpower. Borden’s reaction was to raise the Canadian commitment for troops to 250,000 men in the late summer, and up to 500,000 by December 1915.21 Having zealous citizens push recruiting, Borden and others thought, would bring that total closer to fruition.

In this context, the “civilized warfare” prohibition on Indigenous enlistments (however selectively applied) did not last. The contradictory approaches at Headquarters, stating both that they welcomed and prohibited recruitment, meant that rules needed clarification. On November 23 1915, the Officer Commanding 2nd Division wrote to the Secretary of the Militia Council noting that he understood that the Militia Order prohibited Indigenous men from enlisting, but asking if Indigenous peoples could join the 114th battalion, as the battalion commander was largely dependent on Indian recruits. The two parties settled the matter after a series of internal

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20 Brown and Loveridge, 70.
DMD debates on December 6, 1915. The Adjutant-General Colonel V. A. S. Williams wrote to the Officer Commanding the 2nd Division in a telegram with the news that “enlistment of Indians has been approved by the Minister.” With the prohibition lifted, full-scale enlistments began. As Figure 7 demonstrates, Indigenous recruitment peaked in the months following the lifting of the prohibition.

Up to the end of the prohibition, the DIA envisaged Indian military service as a question beyond the scope of its responsibilities, and responded to inquiries that Indians in the military were to be treated exactly the same as non-Indians. In a letter from 11 January 1916, DIA Assistant Deputy and Secretary J.D. McLean wrote to Joseph Cope, a King’s County, Nova Scotia, rejected Indian recruit and father of two active recruits, responding to a request for distinctive badges and privileges as Indigenous soldiers, that “it is not possible to ask for any special privileges for you. I am sure, however, that you will be treated with the same courtesy and consideration as other members of the regiment to which you belong.” DIA Headquarters articulated a vision in which Indian soldiers relinquished any distinctive status while in uniform. Chapleau recruiting committee chairman G.B. Nicholson again raised the issue when he wrote to DIA Headquarters asking “whether any inducement can be held out to the Indians in the way of special treatment after the war is over such as giving them the right of the franchise or any special concession on government lands?” Scott responded that no such special terms existed, but that “they have exactly the same rights as other soldiers” and “probably we might be able to consider individual cases of returned soldiers when the war is over.”

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22 LAC, RG 24, volume 4383, file 34-7-109. Adjutant General to the Officer Commanding, 2nd Division, 6 December 1915.
vision of equal treatment, the DIA’s intervention into a number of cases in the early years of the war contradict that view. DIA Headquarters took it upon themselves to serve as an intermediary between Indigenous recruits and the DMD, managing questions of military exemptions, underage recruits, and wounded discharges.26

DIA Headquarters articulated the two visions of jurisdiction through their governance of recruitment regulations: one of independent jurisdiction over soldiers in which the Indian Act remained a vital legislative guide versus the other in which the DMD’s needs in prosecuting the military effort subsumed DIA policies and jurisdiction. By proxy, these competing visions also suggested two different understandings of enlisted Indigenous soldiers: as men whose distinct legal status as “Indian” was more important than as soldier, versus those whose soldiering had either diminished the importance or obliterated their “Indian” status outright. These competing views came to a head when considering an important element of DIA legislation and its application to Indian recruits: the consumption of alcohol. In January 1916, Saskatchewan Magistrate J.W. McLennan wrote to the DIA asking “Whether [Indigenous enlistees from the region] are still to be considered as Indians or British Subjects as regards to procuring liquor [underlines in original],” and added that “Several of these Indians have demanded their right, as British Subjects, to be allowed their freedom to procure or purchase intoxicating liquor.”27 Scott

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26 The DIA selectively intervened into these cases. When Six Nations’ resident Margaret Crain asked Scott to secure a discharge for her wounded son, Scott responded that, “under the circumstances, I do not think that it would avail anything should I communicate with the Militia Department, because they will not make exceptions in any case.” LAC, RG 10, volume 3180, file 452-124-1. Scott to Margaret Crain, 13 August 1915. Yet a month later, when Scott was asked by Rev. S. Middleton, Principal of the Church of England Boarding School on the Blood Reserve, to secure a sick leave for Albert Mountain Horse, Scott responded, “I have sent a copy of your communication to the Deputy Minister of Militia and Defence, with a request that he carry out your suggestion.” LAC, RG 10, volume 3180, file 452-124-1. Letter from Scott to Middleton, 25 September 1915. Scott also intervened to block enlistments, such as the case when Mt. Elgin Industrial Institute Principle S.R. McVitty wrote to inform DIA Headquarters of the intention of a number of pupils’ intentions to enlist; Scott responded that “the Department does not consider that it would be in the interest of these boys, owing to their age, or of the school, that they should be allowed to enlist.” LAC, RG 10, volume 3180, file 452-124-1. Scott to McVitty, 25 Jan 1916.

27 LAC, RG 10, volume 3180, file 452-124-1. McLennan to Scott, 8 January 1916.
responded, “Indians who enlist still retain their status as Indians, and are subject to the provisions of the Indian Act.”

Though a simple statement, Scott’s decision offers a clue as to how the DIA’s understanding of jurisdiction was changing; rather than having “exactly the same rights” as their brothers in arms, Scott induced an important distinction: that the provisions of the Indian Act applied even to Indians in uniform.

A case of alleged discrimination helped clarify the matter further: a number of Walpole Island Indigenous enlistees were refused entry into a restaurant in London, Ontario, on the grounds that they were “Indian.” DIA Assistant Secretary McLean responded to the objection that, “if these Indians have any complaints as to their treatment in the regiment, they might be submitted to the Department [but] this, of course, is a matter over which the Department has no control.” McLean wrote privately to the Walpole Agent T.A. McCallum, “it may be that they are under the impression that because they have donned the uniform, they would be privileged to obtain liquor from bars on the same condition as white soldiers. This, of course, is not the case, as it is still an offense under the Indian Act to sell liquor to an Indian even if in uniform.” This case is important in two respects: first, this suggests that in the service, Indigenous men received separate treatment at home, even while dressed as a soldier and socializing with their white comrades. In this case, the importance of maintaining the distinction that “Indian” conferred over those who had “donned the uniform” overruled the social privileges afforded enlisted men.

The DIA’s understanding of Indigenous war service had changed from the first years and the Militia phase of recruiting: Indigenous peoples could serve in the army, but not entirely on the same grounds as non-Indigenous soldiers. Also refashioned was the assumption that the DIA

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could persist in its assimilationist program – albeit weakened with the departure of so many outside service employees – without wading into regulatory or jurisdictional matters relating to military affairs. By January 1916, whether on reserve in Canada or in the trenches in France, “Indianness” was to define conditions of service and relations to state. Far from the proclamations of equal treatment and unexceptional designations declared policy by Scott from 1914 to early 1916, the extension of regulations on alcohol consumption, even overseas, represented an important moment in which the hitherto-agreed upon policy of casually deferring to the DMD except in select cases was no longer deemed tenable. Even though local officers clearly ignored this order and Indigenous soldiers consumed alcohol the same as other soldiers (see Chapter II), the DIA-DMD agreement was important for establishing the roles and responsibilities of each Department. Henceforth, until the end of the war and even in the demobilization and re-establishment of returned soldiers, the DIA started to assume a more prominent role in governing military matters concerning Indigenous peoples.

In January 1916, at the same moment when they were considering the question of alcohol, DIA Headquarters also began soliciting enlistments more proactively. Part of the reason for DIA Headquarters’ reconstitution of recruitment policy has to do with the reconsideration of Hughes’ prohibition. Post-prohibition policy was designed to standardize what had hitherto been an inconsistent result when Indigenous men had attempted to enlist, and was done so at a time when community-volunteer recruitment was approaching an all-time low. The other broad constitutive change had occurred in London, with the requests of the War Office and correspondence of Canadian-born Colonial Secretary Andrew Bonar Law. As Timothy Winegard argues, two memoranda on 8 and 18 October 1915 by Bonar Law asked colonial governor generals and administrators across the British Empire to consider the “possibility of raising
native troops in large numbers.”

The importance of Bonar Law’s memoranda should not be overstated; the wishes of the War Office were not communicated to the DIA’s outside service via circular, nor has Winegard provided any evidence that Bonar Law’s memoranda were read by Scott, let alone acted upon. Nonetheless, the War Office’s inquiries are indicative of the broad changes in the conceptualization of the war at the end of 1915 and into 1916.

Conceptual changes, on the orders of his superiors or of his own volition, inspired Scott to act. On 19 January 1916, Scott wrote to Brigadier-General W.A. Logic of the 2nd Division stationed at the Exhibition Camp, Toronto asking if any specific orders existed to attach Indigenous men to the 114th overseas battalion after they enlisted. Scott stated, “I am anxious to do anything that is possible to promote recruiting from the different Indian Bands in Ontario, and if you can give me any information I would be very glad to receive it.” Logic responded that “Anything you can do to help along this recruiting, will be appreciated in the interests of the service.” Scott affirmed his intention “to make some special effort in recruiting for the 114th Battalion, so that it may have two full companies of Indians.”

The same day, Lieutenant-Colonel E.S. Baxter, Commanding Officer of the 114th, wrote to Scott asking him to instruct Indian Superintendents across the province to “render us every reasonable assistance in connection with the recruiting of Indians for this Bn.” Scott’s correspondence with Baxter in late January 1916 contained two important suggestions: Scott mentioned to Baxter that, “I had thought of interesting our Agents, and I had also in mind sending an Iroquois Indian, a member of this Department, whom I am sure would be of great

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31 Winegard, *For King and Kanata*, 54.
assistance in enlisting persons of his own race.”

Scott also sent a letter to Major-General G. H. Williams, Divisional Recruiting Officer, introducing Cooke, and writing, “Mr. Cooke is an Indian and speaks and writes the Iroquois language. I am sending him to certain reserves throughout the Province of Ontario with a view of stimulating recruiting among the Indians.” On 2 February Williams noted that Cooke “may be at our disposal for some time” and asked how to assign Cooke’s pay. Scott assured Williams that Cooke was to be at the DMD’s service indefinitely, and that the DIA would continue paying Cooke’s salary. The correspondence from late January reveals precisely how Scott’s understanding of departmental jurisdiction had evolved; though an admitted auxiliary in the recruitment process, Scott’s offer to place Cooke at the center of Indigenous recruitment meant the DIA would play an active role in military activities. A departure from the DIA policy of distanced ambivalence in the first eighteen months of war, Scott’s willingness to assign DIA personnel and personally “do anything possible” to help recruitment meant that the DIA would now participate directly in the management of recruitment.

Cooke’s work began immediately. Between 3 February and the end of the month, Cooke travelled to Hagersville, Caledonia, Ohsweken, New Credit, and Toronto attending nightly recruitment meetings in local churches and planning sessions with Williams. Cooke inspected the conditions of recruits stationed at an Agricultural Hall, spoke at recruitment concerts featuring the Six Nations Brass Band, and attended Baxter’s funeral at the end of the month.

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38 LAC, RG 10, volume 6765, file 452-7. Letter from Scott to Williams, 2 February 1916.


since a case of *la grippe* had proved fatal for the Major.41

In March, Cooke’s work took a new turn; though his efforts intended initially to encourage recruitment only at the Six Nations reserve, Cooke’s recruitment work between March and June focused on the north. His northward direction hints at both success and failure; military authorities, baffled by the complex politics and customs on reserves, were happy to extend Cooke’s work to other regions. Yet recruitment for the 114th had not reached its full targets, and officials expected to fill out the ranks through recruitment among other reserves.42 To achieve this goal, Cooke travelled to twenty-one reserves in three months. Stretching from Parry Island to Manitouwanning, he expected these reserves to generate a good number of recruits. Throughout this journey, Cooke had private meetings with local Agents and missionaries to sustain the recruitment process.

In a letter from May 1917, Scott told Cooke to return to Headquarters, and that his recruitment work was to end.43 However, Cooke reemerged in a recruitment role in February 1917 with a report for Scott of his work in Quebec recruiting for the 256th Overseas Railway Construction Battalion. Cooke notes that he had spent two weeks recruiting in Quebec at Akwesasne, Kahnawa´:ke, and Oka, and had opened a recruitment office at Akwesasne.

Throughout Cooke’s travels, Scott played an important role as intermediary between Cooke’s recruiting activities, the DMD, and DIA outside service employees. Having established the functional relationship in February 1916, Scott ensured all matters relating to Cooke’s efforts

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41 LAC, RG 10, volume 6765, file 452-7. Report from Cooke to Scott, for the week ending 19 February 1916.
42 Though the military privately rued the lack of recruitment success for the 114th, the media saw the 114th battalion’s Indian companies as an important symbol of the united war effort across regional, racial, and cultural lines. In a *Globe* article from 8 February, entitled, “50 Indians join 114th Batt.,” Cooke is celebrated as a key instrument in compelling Six Nations enlistments, namely because of his racial background and language skills. LAC, RG 10, volume 6765, file 452-7. “50 Indians join 114th Batt” Toronto *Globe*, 8 February 1916.
would be relayed to DIA Headquarters so that the DIA could direct him further, rather than have him directed by DMD officials. Scott demanded weekly reports of Cooke’s location, activities, and encounters with Agents, band councils, and individuals. In total, Cooke sent eleven detailed reports to Headquarters outlining his movements, activities, and encounters with Agents, military authorities, recruits, and band council members. While Cooke was a physical intermediary between DIA Headquarters and the DMD, Scott coordinated recruitment efforts at all levels of the DIA. Scott maintained an active posture, writing the local agents to ensure they would continue to help Cooke. Local recruitment initiatives might have been up to Cooke’s imagination, but coordination of DIA efforts were thoroughly up to Scott.

DIA Headquarters approached recruitment most systematically in Ontario and Quebec. Yet the influence of DIA Headquarters produced some noteworthy results in other regions as well. Scott forwarded a March 1917 proposal from Indian Inspector Tyson to raise an overseas forestry company to the DMD. The DMD agreed to commission Tyson as an officer and funded

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44 Reinforcing that the DIA was in control of Cooke’s activities, After each of Cooke’s recruitment circuits, military authorities contacted Scott for consent to maintain Cooke’s services and justified their need for his particular talents. Notably, on 28 February, Recruiting Officer Edwin Lee begged Scott to keep Cooke attached to recruiting efforts with the 114th, as recruitment at Cayuga had been pitiful, and Cooke offered the 114th a potential key to compelling enlistments. LAC, RG 10, volume 6765, file 452-7. Letter from Lee to Scott, 28 February 1916. While Cooke was a physical intermediary between DIA Headquarters and the DMD, Scott coordinated recruitment efforts at all levels of the DIA. Day-to-day operations were up to Cooke, but the broad initiative remained up to DIA Headquarters.

45 Scott was forbearing in demanding prompt deliveries of Cooke’s reports. One example of Scott’s forbearance came on 30 March, when Scott reminded Cooke that reports had not been received in some time, and “I should be glad if you would keep me regularly informed as to the progress you are making.” LAC, RG 10, volume 6765, file 452-7. Letter from Scott to Cooke, 30 March 1916.

46 Cooke’s correspondence noted the importance of local DIA employees in the recruitment process, particularly on 4 April when he remarked to Scott, “All the Indian Agents with whom I came in contact have been extremely untiring in their efforts to give me every assistance in my work.” LAC, RG 10, volume 6765, file 452-7. Letter from Cooke to Scott, 4 April 1916. Cooke noted the aid of the Agent at Manitowaning for his help explaining the “unceded land question” and the resultant lack of enlistment enthusiasm in the area. Cooke also cited a meeting between himself, Father Papineau, and Agents Lewis, Baxter, McTealfe, and McNab at Little Current to discuss recruitment and postwar farming initiatives. LAC, RG 10, volume 6765, file 452-7. Report from Cooke to Scott, for the week ending 22 April 1916.
his recruitment efforts in Military District 11.\textsuperscript{47} Lieutenant Colonel Glenylon Archibald Campbell, chief inspector of agencies, reserves, and inspectorates in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and the Northwest Territories, began recruiting among industrial school pupils in 1916 and expanded his efforts thereafter to raise a battalion of Indigenous recruits. Scott both endorsed and directed Campbell’s recruitment activities.\textsuperscript{48}

Part of DIA policy on recruitment reflected the trend of employee enlistment. As with the haphazard policy governing Indigenous enlistments prior to 1916, DIA Headquarters offered little governing policy on managing replacement workers. Aligning Departmental policy with P.C. 2102, employee salaries were maintained for enlisted individuals.\textsuperscript{49} Employees’ positions were to be made available to them upon return from active service. In May 1916, a recruiting officer was permitted to recruit in the offices of Headquarters.\textsuperscript{50} By November 1916, seventy-eight DIA employees had enlisted for active service, while the remaining employees had contributed almost ten percent of their annual incomes to the Patriotic Fund, excluding donations to other funds and charities.\textsuperscript{51}

The policies of the DIA and DMD had a strong impact on local recruiting patterns.\textsuperscript{52}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{47} Tyson’s efforts were short lived. Initially proposing to raise a force of between 125 and 250, Tyson had only managed to secure 17 recruits by mid-June. DMD officials opted to disband the company, as Tyson’s travels were deemed too expensive to continue. LAC, RG 24, volume 488, file HQ 54-21-4-66. A retrospective report on the recruitment failures accounted for a misapprehension amongst the Indians that Tyson was recruiting for combat units, that Indian soldiers wanted the vote, the unsolved issue of land, and high wages at home. Letter from the Officer Commanding the Forestry Depot, Vancouver to Col. Duff Stuart, 23rd Infantry brigade, Victoria, 9 June 1917. LAC, RG 24, volume 4645, file 99-4-103.
\item \textsuperscript{48} LAC, RG 10, volume 6766, file 452-13.
\item \textsuperscript{49} As Scott confirmed, “Government employees who leave for active service with consent of Head of Department entitled to Departmental salary during absence and to resume duties on return.” LAC, RG 10 volume 3180, file 452-124-1. Telegram from Scott to D.J. Campbell, 4 September 1914.
\item \textsuperscript{50} LAC, RG 10, volume 3180, file 452-124-1. Officer Commanding 207th Carleton Bn., to Scott, 15 May 1916.
\item \textsuperscript{51} Scott’s mention of the 78 enlistments was done as part of a Press statement to The Civilian. Scott does not provide further details of who enlisted, from which regions, or when. LAC, RG 10, volume 3180, file 452-124-1A. Letter from Scott Ernest Green, associate editor of The Civilian, 4 November 1916.
\item \textsuperscript{52} The data was gleaned from the systematic data sets on demobilization, LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-30 and LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-29; consolidated pension files, LAC, RG 10, volume 11190, file 1; general.
\end{itemize}
Figure 7, reflecting the number of recruits per month, demonstrates the relationship between broader DIA and DMD policy and individual enlistments. Spiking between December 1915 and June 1916, the rates of enlistment both demonstrate the importance of the sustained post-prohibition effort to gain recruits, but also the short-lived boom as a result of the efforts. The secondary spikes, in late 1916 and into 1917, in part reflects the secondary sustained effort in Quebec and British Colombia to recruit labour, railway, and forestry companies. Discussions about conscription offered very little stimulus for voluntary enlistments, as demonstrated by the trough in mid-1917 through to 1918. Generally, broader policy initiatives appear to have played an important role in the individual enlistments of Indigenous men.

Recruitment policy of the DIA altered course in 1916. Prior to the end of the prohibition on enlistments, Scott had issued halting and contradictory policy statements. Yet Cooke’s reassignment to the DMD and his subsequent recruitment drives on reserve demonstrates a shift in Headquarters’ stance towards this issue. Scott’s reconceptualization of the role of Headquarters as an important body that should direct manpower towards military service marked a departure from the first years of the war. Publicly, Scott denied that enlistment and discharge authority was placed at the hands of DIA Headquarters, and continued to underscore that all military matters were under the jurisdiction of the DMD. Privately, Scott’s micro-management of recruitment activities belied his true jurisdictional bent. The DIA had expanded its mandate into war files, LAC, RG 10, volume 3180, file 452-124-1 and LAC, RG 10, volume 3181, file 451-124-1A; records pertaining to applications for discharge, LAC, RG 10, volume 6767, file 452-15 pt. 1; and records on the return home, LAC, RG 10, volume 6767, file 452-17. Using the lists of recruits generated a list of names and regimental numbers, which were then individually entered per set of attestation papers. These transcribed attestation papers were collated and combined into a database from which broader data could be surmised.

53 For example, when asking the DMD as to who was responsible for matters relating to Indian enlistment, Agent W.R. Brown received the response that all matters relating to Indian enlistment were the sole purview of Scott and the DIA HeadquartersLAC, RG 10, volume 6767, file 452-16 pt. 1. Letter from W.R. Brown to Scott, 9 March 1917.
the direct management of recruitment processes, an assumption of responsibilities for administering military matters.

**Regulating the Home Front**

As with the conceptual changes in early 1916 that spawned an interventionist recruitment policy and saw a comprehensive approach to the question of financial donations, the DIA involved itself in the administration of an increasingly regulatory regime amid questions of domestic mobilization. Some of the administrative questions faced by the DIA concerned the relationship between the military and the home front, namely the problem of Indigenous deserters and the censoring of letters between Indigenous soldiers and their relatives. Other questions were strictly concerned with domestic patterns of labour and consumption; the DIA became involved with the enforcement of regulations against idleness and food hoarding. In both sets of administration, the DIA’s commitment to managing wartime policy hardened. As with the pattern of involvement in recruitment and fiscal regulation, by 1916 the DIA exhibited a broadened enthusiasm for wartime policy.

Historians have studied state efforts to direct, control, and repress the civilian population at home widely. Issues like military conscription (discussed in the next section), censorship and propaganda, and the internments of “enemy aliens” have received extensive treatment, though other aspects of wartime regulations like those against idleness or food controls have received less scholarly attention. Much of this literature focuses on whether Canada’s repressive response to dissent was excessive, a question that has sustained a healthy debate. Fundamentally, as Brock Millman has argued, dissent and repression during the First World War in Canada was one of “odd patterns,” with a tacit acceptance of some types of dissent, but excessive repression
regarding other types of dissent.\textsuperscript{54} Compared with other combatants, Canada featured a relatively harsh enforcement of conscription and stringent censorship program, and regulations against aliens were excessive even by comparative standards. The state developed repressive policies to assuage British Canadian society’s sense that they were shouldering a disproportionate share of the war effort, and therefore worked to “other” non-British Canadian identities.\textsuperscript{55}

At times, the government’s response was excessive. Gregory Kealey has argued that state efforts to repress labour and enforce propaganda and censorship efforts served the interests of the liberal order.\textsuperscript{56} Wartime regulations set a precedent for later developments like the 1919 enactment of Section 98 of the Criminal Code, used to outlaw “unlawful organizations” and persecute the left throughout the 1920s and 1930s.\textsuperscript{57} Government officials framed censorship by the notion that civil liberty should be suspended according to the needs of the national effort. Canadians were “besieged with messages propounding patriotism, duty, and honour” which hid the “grim realities” of modern trench warfare.\textsuperscript{58} Racist assumptions and paranoia fueled the surveillance and repression of racialized political groups, including the internment of presumed enemy aliens.\textsuperscript{59}


\textsuperscript{55} Millman, \textit{Polarity, Patriotism and Dissent.}, 7-8.


\textsuperscript{59} On racist assumptions, Allan Rowe has written that “Concern over the activities of the ‘wily,’ ‘mysterious,’ and ‘sly’ Chinese reveals the extent to which Canadian surveillance officials were informed by the same basic perception of Chinese ‘otherness’ so prevalent in other examples of anti-Chinese discrimination prior to the Great War. These racist assumptions fueled the surveillance and allowed those responsible for conducting it to reconcile
During this period, the state judged ordinary peoples’ actions against national imperatives through a lens of race, class, and gender. Though internment was the most extreme form of repression, a broad section of society was subject to some form of state surveillance. Moral regulation of women and families (discussed at length in Chapter V) was another vector in which the state censored and monitored people. By 1917, direct efforts to control public consumption of scarce resources led to a regulatory regime monitoring citizens’ consumption of resources and supply of labour. A Board of Grain Supervisors coordinated the sale of wheat. The Canada Food Board pushed regulations against hoarding. Local and regional governments managed shortages of electricity with school and industrial closures.

This section assesses how patterns of Government coordination and control fit with the DIA’s mandate to administer issues relating to Indigenous peoples in Canada. As with strictly military questions of recruitment, these new areas of administration were cultivated at an important moment in the war, when casualty rates, material commitments, and geo-political changes necessitated a broadening of the national commitment to the war effort. Community donations from band funds to war-related funds and charities meant the management of substantial sums of money from centrally-managed accounts. National registration and conscription necessitated an expanded effort to mobilize forces and prosecute those that shirked

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their responsibilities. Officials broadened censorship and social surveillance efforts to root out any suspected dissonant, and used them to appraise the supposedly-tenuous loyalty of non-Anglo Saxon groups. Material shortages became more acute after 1917, and spawned sharp regulations against any waste of food or fuel; similarly, an enforced labour regime, the regulations against idleness, attempted to force the question of domestic mobilization and imposed stiff penalties on members of the public who were not engaged in suitable work.

DIA administration pertaining to wartime domestic regulation followed a set pattern across its areas of responsibility. Administrative expansion was spurred by moral panic, that the Indigenous peoples were somehow engaging in behavior that was inimical to the prosecution of the war; shirking their patriotic duty by housing deserters, writing scurrilous notes to their families while overseas, idling in spite of a labour shortage, or consuming unreasonable amounts of fuel and foodstuffs. Administrative responses followed a pattern of inter-departmental negotiation, with the DIA generally staking a claim over the enforcement of regulations as they pertained to Indigenous communities. Enforcement was less important than jurisdictional expansion, as the DIA prosecuted actual transgressions sparingly.

DIA Headquarters’ management of band finances, namely voluntary donations and the purchase of war bonds, reinforce the trajectory of administrative practice from early-war haphazard management to post-1916 active intervention.61 During the first two years of the war,

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61 While happy to receive notice of charitable donations from band councils across Canada, DIA Headquarters dithered on the question of loans and bonds. In late 1917, when the band council for the Mississaugas of Alnwick in Eastern Ontario attempted to purchase $2,000 worth of Victory bonds, Headquarters rejected the request on the grounds that victory bonds were inferior to pure donations. A similar attempt by the Alberta Blackfoot Band Council received the same response. At issue were the band funds; held in trust by the DIA, the funds accrued five percent interest. Investments in victory bonds accrued six percent interest. For DIA Headquarters, if band councils bought victory loans, this would end up costing the bond’s issuer an extra one percent return on the bondholder’s investment. Scott responded to the two initiatives by telling the respective agents to commend the Indigenous for their patriotic intensions, but to refuse the victory loan resolution. These refusals illustrate the boundaries of loyal participation; a scheme to financially advance band investments might serve the band well, but would add costs to
DIA Headquarters made little direct comment on the voluntary contributions by bands and individuals towards various charities and war funds except to laud the voluntarism and patriotism of such donations, proof of a “spirit of loyalty,” proclaimed DIA Deputy Superintendent General D.C. Scott. Band and individual motivations for donations varied. With the Patriotic Fund, community relief likely played an important role; the fund was established to provide financial relief to families struggling with the loss of a primary income after the primary breadwinner had enlisted. With other voluntary funds, bands often donated community money as a reassertion of a long-standing military relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Crown. Regardless of the motivations, donations were an important feature of community participation in the war effort.

Yet by 1917, the DIA moved away from voluntary and local solutions to wartime problems in favour of a centrally directed campaign. Loyalty aside, careful monetary oversight

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62 In the 1914 Annual Report, Scott remarked, “I have pleasure in drawing attention to the fact that the participation of Great Britain in the war has occasioned expressions of loyalty from the Indians, and the offer of contributions from their funds toward the general expenses of the war or toward the Patriotic Fund.” Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the Year Ended March 31 1914, xxviii. Scott reinforced this sentiment in the 1915 Annual Report, noting, “Since my last report the Indians have given further evidence of their loyalty by enlisting and contributing, liberally to the patriotic or other funds,” Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the Year Ended March 31 1915, xxx-xxxi. The Colchester County Agent reported in the same document that “The Indians have as good an idea of the progress of the war as their white neighbours, and in common with the whites have made a contribution to the Patriotic Fund.” Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the Year Ended March 31 1915, Part II, 127. In 1916, Scott displayed his pleasure at a “laudable and gratifying spirit of loyalty [that] has been evinced by the Indians throughout the Dominion; their contributions to the various war funds have been most liberal, and they have signified their intention of continuing to offer them so long as the war may last.” Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the Year Ended March 31 1916, xxxv.

63 Katherine McGowan suggests the separate purpose of these donations; bands often intended to offer donations either in lieu of band enlistments or with expectations of postwar dispensation of goodwill on the part of the government. See Katharine A. McGowan, “‘Until We Receive Just Treatment’: The Fight Against Conscription at the Naas Agency and British Columbia, 1917-1918,” BC Studies 167 (Autumn 2010): 47-70.

64 On 26 September 1918, The Office of the Chief Inspector of Indian Agencies in British Colombia wrote to Scott with the idea of having DIA employees canvass reserves for individual band members to buy bonds, as “the Indians
meant that the DIA Headquarters positioned itself as the sole arbiter of how bands could participate in financial voluntarism. In justifying the centralization of financial management, Masset, British Colombia Indian Agent Thomas Deary argued, “The Indians do not appear to realize the benefits to be derived from purchasing War Stamps, or Victory bonds…These Indians are always gathering money, to build houses and launches. They take little interest in even placing money in Banks, for any lengthened period...They are people of to-day, and take little thought of the future.” The notion that Indigenous peoples were “people of to-day” confirmed the need to guide investment strategies into long-term bonds in order to boost personal holdings beyond ‘houses and launches’ and reinforce personal loyalties to the Crown and war effort.

For these reasons, Scott retained personal control over directing these programs. DIA Headquarters positioned itself as the authority on whether Indigenous communities had transgressed boundaries of respectable behavior, and how they should be censured. DIA Headquarters asserted a policy that Indigenous peoples must share the burdens of wartime society by abiding by legislative and social customs of practice. In this way, Headquarters expressed a sentiment of equality between Indigenous and white communities; both groups

of British Colombia have been enjoying considerable prosperity for the past two years” in light of wage inflation. LAC, RG 10, volume 6770, file 452-23. Letter from the Office of the Chief Inspector of Indian Agencies in British Colombia to Scott, 26 September 1918.

65 The question of band fund investments in war bonds was again raised in October 1918, when Chief Manass of Walpole Island in Southwestern Ontario had the Indian Agent write to Headquarters with a request to transfer $10,000 of band funds to Liberty Loans. According to the Agent, “This was done not as much for the extra percentage which is promised, as for the patriotic desire of the Council to help the Empire to win the war.” Scott’s margin scribble on the letter in capital letters rearticulated Headquarters’ position, stating “THIS WON’T HELP ANY.” LAC, RG 10, volume 6770, file 452-23. Letter from Walpole Agent to Scott, 30 October 1918. In November 1918, the Prince Rupert, British Columbia Indian Agent forwarded a telegram noting, “The Simpson Indians have subscribed eight thousand dollars victory bonds would you allow Metlakatla Indians to subscribe twenty thousand dollars from trust funds?” LAC, RG 10, volume 6770, file 452-23. Telegram from the Prince Rupert Agent to Scott, 16 November 1918. Scott again reinforced Headquarters’ position, stating, “As Indian trust funds already on deposit with government cannot re-invest in Victory Loan.” LAC, RG 10, volume 6770, file 452-23. Telegram from Scott to the Prince Rupert Agent, 18 November 1918. As with the Alnwick and Blackfoot requests of the previous year, in dealing with the Walpole and Prince Rupert Indian Agents, Scott maintained the stance that acceptable forms of Indigenous financial participation in the war effort were only to be concluded on voluntary terms.

should shoulder equally the hardship, shortages, and the grief of war. Yet in treating the prospective band investments, Scott contradicted this policy, expecting subservience among band councils to the financial necessities of government in a time of war. Unlike the rest of Canada, the DIA did not permit Indigenous peoples to participate in the meager benefits of wartime loan accruals.

If donations were expressions of loyalty, government officials considered desertion to be the opposite phenomenon. The prosecution of Indigenous deserters represented an important step for the DIA to claim regulatory jurisdiction from other official stakeholders. Desertion represented a blatant transgression of the loyalty covenant, and offered uncomfortable evidence that not all Indigenous peoples were as loyal as the DIA was publicly pronouncing in its annual reports and through the media. Officials and public elites framed this crisis as a question of moral failing; Indigenous deserters were insufficiently courageous or masculine to uphold their responsibilities to the nation. As a response to this problem, the DIA began to administer policy on the subject, dictating how the DMD should respond to the problem of desertion. In terms of DIA-military relations, the prosecution of deserters, along with the administration of recruitment policy, became one of the most important sites of the DIA’s post-1916 jurisdictional privilege. Yet the policy drafted to respond to enlistments was nuanced and forgiving when dealing with large-scale desertions at the community level. The DIA endorsed strict punishment in individual cases, where individuals transgressed the community’s broader sentiments. In cases of divided communities, however, the presence of larger numbers of deserters elicited a policy of careful negotiation.
DMD Deputy Minister Eugene Fiset first raised question of desertion in February 1917. Fiset wrote to Scott regarding the presence of up to twenty deserters from the Kahnawake and Akwesasne reserves in eastern Quebec. Challenging their masculinity, Fiset observed that “it would not appear that they are imbued with a great amount of courage.” Yet in a second letter, Fiset offered a consolation; “Where there is evidence of a bona fide intention on the part of any Indians, now deserters, to return to the Service, they will be allowed to enlist in Railway Construction or Forestry battalions.” Though Fiset noted that this stands explicitly against official DMD policy, “it is considered advisable to extend special leniency to Indians who have deserted the Service [Underline in Original].” In the opinion of the Mohawk DIA employee and recruiter Charles Cooke, the DMD “never had the least intention of shielding them for their dishonourable course of action,” but special provisions were necessary.

DMD Deputy Minister Fiset’s position echoed the DMD’s general provisions for deserters. Order-in-council P.C. 2814, approved on 24 November 1916, offered a temporary pardon for any deserters who were willing to rejoin their units prior to November 30. Scott offered a modified version of the order, noting, “Where there is evidence of a bona fide intention on the part of any Indian now deserters to return to the service, they will be allowed to enlist in Railway Construction or Forestry Battalions.” Scott noted, “this is a special concession made to

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67 Within the DIA, the problem of desertion had been raised as early as August 1916, when Clandeboye Agent F. R.W. Colclough notified Scott of the desertion of several Indians from the Agency, and asked if he might arrest said deserters, to which Scott responded “your powers as ex-officio Justice of the Peace do not under the Indian Act give you authority to arrest Indians who have deserted from overseas battalions.” LAC, RG 10, volume 3181, file 452.124-1A. Letter from Scott to Colclough, 22 August 1916.
68 LAC, RG 10, volume 6767, file 452-16 pt. 1. Letter from Fiset to Scott, 1 February 1917.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
73 LAC, RG 10, volume 6767, file 452-16 pt. 1. Letter from Scott to Cooke, 12 February 1917.
Indians,” and informed Cooke to be especially careful that any deserter not be prosecuted by local authorities upon returning to the Reserve for the purpose of re-enlistment. Though the provisions of P.C. 2814 expired on December 15 1916, DIA Headquarters was communicating the special amnesty concession up to July 1917.74

Between the winter of 1917 and November of the following year, Scott received specific correspondence noting the presence of Indigenous desertions from Agencies across Northern Ontario, such as Rat Portage, Port Arthur, Fort Francis, Perth, Temagami, Gore Bay, and Thessalon, as well as from Birtle, Manitoba. Between the files 452-29 and 452-39, the DIA received correspondence regarding twenty-six specific deserters. Of the records with a date of desertion attached, every record indicates that desertions occurred between July 1916 and August 1917. One proposal for solving the problem involved freezing treaty annuities for deserters, though McLean quickly warned any fast-thinking Agent, “there is no provision in the Act whereby an Indian’s annuity can be retained for this cause.”75

The promise of amnesty did not produce the desired results. Cooke dismayed that the deserters were directly challenging the “prestige and authority of the Government” and that it was time to have them “apprehended and dealt with…and thus bring back their senses to respect the law of the land.”76 Amnesty had failed: only one deserter had taken the offer, and Cooke began to agitate for punitive prosecution. Scott concurred; in a letter to Kahnawa´:ke, Quebec.

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74 For example, when Alex Paul of Temagami, communicated his desire to return from hiding in America and resume active duty to DIA Headquarters, McLean’s response to the Agent was, “I do not think that this man will experience any difficulty if he desires to return to Canada and re-enlist. My understanding is in cases of this nature that when a man desires to take up his standing as a soldier no punishment will follow his previous desertion.” LAC, RG 10, volume 3181 file 452,124-1A. Letter from McLean to Dunwoodie, 31 July 1917.

75 LAC, RG 10, volume 6767, file 452-16 pt. 1. Letter from McLean to W.B. Brown, 29 March 1916. This sort of reply was common to Agents with the idea to restrict annuities.

76 LAC, RG 10, volume 6767, file 452-16 pt. 1. Letter from Cooke to Scott, 28 February 1917.
resident P.J. Delisle, Scott wrote, “Am advised impossible for Department to take position that
Indians are not amenable to military discipline after having enlisted and taken the required oath
of allegiance.”

The DIA’s renewed interest in punitive measures coincided with Scott’s insistence that
the DIA should be in charge of prosecuting Indigenous deserters. On 14 May 1917, DMD
Deputy Minister Fiset informed Scott that a number of the deserters had returned to Kahnawa’:ke
and that they were not apprehended. In terms of further action, Fiset wrote, “The advisability of
proceeding further in this matter is a question entirely for your discretion.” The letter,
particularly the notation on DIA discretion, underscores the expanded set of regulatory
responsibilities for DIA Headquarters. Military and civilian authorities were deferential to the
DIA’s wishes; partly due to a practical concern that forays into Kahnawa’:ke would be a waste of
time without aid from DIA resources.

Scott’s reply to DMD Deputy Minister Fiset indicates the confounded, contradictory
nature of desertion prosecution, “I am of the opinion that it would not be wise at the present time
to take any proceedings against these Indians.” Rather than prosecute deserters harshly, Scott
chose a more pragmatic approach. In the face of sustained community resistance, in which large
segments of the community supported the deserters while living on reserve, Scott had little
choice but to tell Fiset to halt proceedings against the Kahnawa’:ke group of deserters.

The degree to which communities stood in solidarity with their deserted members
tempered the severity of punishments. Not all proceedings were as forgiving as the Kahnawa’:ke
decision, and the question of discretion was not publicly advertised. Though Kahnawa’:ke

77 LAC, RG 10, volume 6767, file 452-16 pt. 1. Letter from Scott to Delisle, 3 April 1917.
78 LAC, RG 10, volume 6767, file 452-16 pt. 1. Letter from Fiset to Scott, 14 May 1917.
elicited a conciliatory approach from the DIA, desertion in other locations did not receive the same special treatment; by the end of the war, records from the files 452-29 indicate that harsh sentences were applied to six deserters. In additional correspondence, DIA and DMD officials discuss deserters from Ontario, Manitoba, and Alberta. Punishments ranged from eighteen-month prison terms to five-year sentences. In one extreme case, the Ontario Indigenous member of the Mississauga of the Credit band Private Joseph Chubb Jr., serving with the 235th O.S. Battalion was arrested for desertion and died while incarcerated. Yet the documentary evidence is inconclusive as to whether officials applied punishments more widely, beyond these six cases and tangential references.

DIA Headquarters’ prosecution of Indigenous deserters reveals a number of key conclusions about the inconsistency of punitive policy at the upper levels of the DIA. Scott’s correspondence with General Fiset demonstrates that matters relating to the broad administration of punitive justice where systemic desertion practices prevailed were largely at the discretion of DIA Headquarters. Furthermore, in cases of systemic desertion, the DIA actually chose a pragmatic and conciliatory approach, opting to defer action in the communities that actively supported deserters. DIA and DMD officials did not treat individual, dispersed cases with the same leniency; intermixed with conciliatory policy were harsh, punitive sanctions against deserters across Canada, with resultant long periods of incarceration and even death.

Censorship provided another opportunity for the DIA to enforce a regime of social regulation, surveying the correspondence between soldiers and their families to ascertain whether breaches of conduct were occurring. A relationship between the Post Office Department of Canada (POD) and the DIA emerged in early 1917. On 5 April 1917, Deputy Postmaster General Dr. Robert M. Coulter, wrote to Scott asking for the department’s help with translating letters
written in Indigenous languages. In reply, Scott identified the letters as having been written by Kahnawa’ke, Quebec Mohawk band members to residents of America, “and I find that they are purely personal; one dealing with the sale of some wood from the Reserve and the other with the sale of bead-work and moccasins, etc., in the Western States, together with some personal remarks in each case.” Scott also noted to Coulter that the Department’s official interpreter had left from Ottawa but was soon to return, and would be able to assist in further interpretive matters. Coulter courteously responded that, “the information provided is quite sufficient for our purpose.” This set of correspondence represented an important step in establishing departmental boundaries as well as the way in which the DIA was to conduct affairs relating to Indigenous peoples during the war.

Timing of the censorship initiative reveals its purpose. As Scott noted, “it is evident that they are censoring all letters in Indian going to the United States.” With America entering the war on 6 April, a censorship of correspondence between Indigenous peoples on both sides of the border, namely to survey the sentiment in Western American bands, took new importance. Having not exclusively censored Indigenous correspondence prior to April 1917, the POD’s actions at this junction likely had more to do with concern over American Indigenous agitation than that of their Canadian counterparts.

The POD’s delegation of censorship authority was done for practical reasons, especially the necessity of POD officials to rely on the DIA’s expertise with indigenous languages. However, this scheme also indicates deference to responsibilities claimed by the DIA: that all matters relating to Indigenous would be processed and resolved with intradepartmental

resolutions. Hence, Coulter’s correspondence with Scott offers a concrete example of how the DIA’s asserted jurisdictional right had an important impact on daily functions in the federal government at war.

Having established a tentative relationship as to the interpretation and censorship of Indigenous letters, Coulter quickly sent more letters for interpretation. Coulter desired that the DIA “furnish [the POD]…with a translation of any passages of an objectionable or offensive nature.” Of the letters forwarded, plus those sent on 7 April, Scott responded, “These letters have been carefully read by our interpreter and are all found to be purely personal letters.”

Internally, Scott asked Indian Agents “whether you think there is any necessity for specially censoring their letters.” Scott was right to question the process; over the spring, the censorship efforts turned up nothing particularly scandalous. Scott identified one letter as “vulgar” because it mentioned the soldier visiting prostitutes. Another letter discussed the opposition to recruitment on reserve, but the Agent concluded, “there was - and is, no dissatisfaction among them in regard to the War; it was just because [Griswold elders] did not want the boys to go into danger.” Scott relayed the lack of findings to the POD concluding, “it is hardly necessary to censor the letters…Should we, however, at any time receive intimation of any restlessness among them, censorship might be advisable.” In this statement, Scott reasserted the rights of the DIA to manage the measures of control and security except if any exceptional circumstances were to arise.

87 LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-35-pt. 1. McDonald to Scott, 18 April 1917.
In spite of Scott’s reservations, censorship continued. On 24 September, Coulter forwarded 219 letters from soldiers at the front, written in “the Indian language” and transferred by the Chief Postal Censor with the request that the DIA translate and forward back to British Military Authorities in France. Coulter asked for translation of “any letter which is clearly conveying forbidden information,” but offered the DIA full discretion that “your assurance that the letter is harmless will be quite sufficient,” and the DIA only needed to forward cases of transgression. Only three letters contained information that necessitated any action. Censorship continued into the autumn of 1918, but uncovered little of substance. The occasional letter contained “forbidden information,” but the POD never found any information that warranted further action beyond a letter of reprimand.

The relationship between the POD and DIA Headquarters in 1917-1918 reinforces the broader point that by 1917, DIA officials had sorted interdepartmental jurisdiction to ensure that even matters relating to national security – censorship, in this case – were referred to the DIA when involving Indigenous peoples. The management of social censure was haphazard enough in this case, to question Jeffrey A. Keshen’s assertion that Canada’s censorship regime was “strictly authoritarian.” DIA and POD officials maintained extensive censorship efforts, if only for a short period, but failed to uncover any particularly seditious material and thereafter essentially abandoned the efforts. The censure and censorship of letters both from band members within Canada as well as from Indigenous soldiers demonstrate the ways in which DIA

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92 Ironically, the most egregious letter was not even written by an Indian. As Scott relayed to the POD, “it turns out that the letter is not written by an Indian but by a white man, and that a portion is in some private code.” The other two letters contained minor military details that violated the military’s secrecy rules. LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-35-pt. 1. Scott to Coulter, 20 October 1917.
Headquarters assumed new responsibilities during the war. When asked by the POD to engage in censorship, the DIA did so, in spite of Scott’s personal sentiment that the effort was unnecessary. For this program, Scott marshaled a number of linguistic specialists to complete the translations, but also assumed an interpretive role. Using his personal knowledge and prejudices supposing the patriotic disposition of Indigenous peoples across Canada, Scott often declined to fully engage with censorship. Because of the daily surveillance of many Indigenous peoples by Indian Agents, broad censorship of correspondence was largely redundant. Scott articulated this to the POD, even while continuing to interpret the correspondence. For Scott, special punitive regulations were unnecessary; the DIA had an established mechanism for dealing with social transgressions.

Where censorship of band correspondence was delegated to DIA officials out of practical considerations, so too was the management of regulations against “idleness.” To this end, the “Regulations against Idleness,” Privy Council order 815 of April 4, 1918 served both purposes. Section one demanded, “Every male person residing in the Dominion of Canada shall be regularly engaged in some useful occupation,”94 though provided some measure of exemption based on disability, age, education status, and the like. Section Three set the terms of punishment for violation; “Any person violating the provisions hereof shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on summary conviction before a Magistrate to a penalty not exceeding One Hundred dollars and costs, and, in default of payment, to imprisonment with hard labour for a period not exceeding six months in any common gaol or in any institution or on any farm owned by a municipality or province.”95

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95 Ibid.
During the spring and summer of 1918, JD McLean wrote to a number of Agencies reminding them of the new regulations. Though Headquarters maintained the distinction between Indigenous and non-Indigenous in matters relating to military service, land use, and food regulations, idleness regulations blurred distinctions between these two groups. Having found an effective method of forcing a labour regime that could further assimilationist aims, Headquarters gladly parroted PC 815 to its outside service.

PC 815 also provided means for the DIA’s suppression of Indigenous dissent. Tyendinaga, Eastern Ontario, Indian Agent G.M. Campbell wrote to McLean on 27 May 1918 requesting, “Will you please let me know if the Indians come under the Idleness act as their [sic] are some Indians who never work. Their [sic] is a man by the name of Thomas Walter Martin Secretary for the Thunder Waters who has not worked a day in three years and the Thunderwaters go out begging for him and feed him.”\(^\text{96}\) McLean’s reply closely followed the form of his other replies, advising, “Regulations regarding idleness apply to Indians as well as whites. I am attaching a copy of the Regulations for your guidance. If you consider that the case you mention should be dealt with, Sections 3 and 4 will serve as your guide.”\(^\text{97}\) As per the Indian Act, Agents held the power of a Justice of the Peace in addition to their responsibilities as Agents and thus were ultimately responsible for enforcing PC 815. The Program for the Council of Tribes identifies Thomas Walter Martin as the ‘Supreme Secretary’ in the September 1915 program for Thunderwater’s Council of the Tribes, and he seems to have been an indispensable ally in Thunderwater’s movement.\(^\text{98}\) Thunderwater’s actions in Western Quebec and on the Six Nations reserve – agitating for political rights, education, and the abandonment of the Indian Act

\(^\text{96}\) LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-27. G.M. Campbell to J.D. McLean, 27 May 1918.
\(^\text{97}\) LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-27. J.D. McLean to G.M. Campbell, 29 May 1918.
– elicited a strong response from the DIA to quiet this voice of dissent. The use of PC 815 to arrest a key member of Thunderwater’s organization represents the degree to which external regulations were flexibly deployed to further the aims of the DIA.

The regulations against idleness further confirm the notion that the DIA became involved with regulating the home front on the basis of a set of moral concerns; in this case, the idea that Indigenous peoples were not adequately responding to the Dominion’s labour shortages. In censuring the labour regimes on reserves, the DIA preserved their responsibility as an arbiter of military and civilian regulations as they pertained to Indigenous peoples, and also cultivated a useful, if sparingly applied, tool to enforce social cohesion.

As with regulations against idleness, the application of regulations regarding food consumption followed a similar model of moral panic, jurisdictional negotiation, and little actual enforcement. British Columbia Field Matron Frances Marsden’s “Report of Matron’s Work at the Sliammon Reserve,” prepared for DIA Headquarters in November 1917, warned of the “enormous wastage of food on these reserves [in the Powell River, British Columbia region].”

Marsden was concerned that the dozen ‘fat cattle’ owned by the reserve were being allowed to starve as “these Indians do not have to sell, as they all have abundance of money” as they were earning an average of $25.00 per day fishing salmon. For Marsden, “Considering...the bulk of this is spent on groceries, some idea of the wastage in food stuffs can be imagined.” Marsden ultimately warned, “at a time like this, when most of the world is being rationed, it seems a pity that these Indians should be allowed to continue in their callous and wasteful methods

100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
unchecked.”\textsuperscript{102} Marsden wrote a second report in June 1918 to the Office of the Food Controller in Vancouver, deploiring the hoarding and forestalling of the staples as “waste and greed.”\textsuperscript{103}

McLean wrote to the British Colombia Committee of the Canada Food Board responding that Indigenous peoples are “amenable to the food regulations the same as the whites” but that “it does not devolve upon this Department to see that Indians observe the food regulations.”\textsuperscript{104} Contradictory to the policy of controlling the regulations of band affairs in other matters, Headquarters established a tone of aloof disconnect regarding the regulation of food policy.

Throughout the summer of 1918, the DIA began to take a more active role. Two letters in June demonstrate the collaborative relationship between the two departments in establishing the parameters of regulation and enforcement of consumption. On 27 June, Headquarters of the Canada Food Board wrote to Scott responding that dried fruits were not yet being rationed – as per his earlier query – but requesting a list of stores in the Alberni region that were selling goods to the Indigenous peoples, so as to “warn them against selling” to Indigenous peoples if hoarding was suspected.\textsuperscript{105} This correspondence indicates a growing sense of jurisdictional boundaries, that the Food Board should manage the supply of goods to Indigenous peoples, but that the DIA would manage internal Reserve matters relating to Food Regulations. Thus the two groups settled their relationship in October 1918. Though McLean had responded to the Food Board in July that Indigenous peoples would be subject to Food Board regulations, he deferred the system of licensing. The Canada Food Board wrote two letters to the DIA in October 1918 responding to the licensing question. On 3 October, the Director of Licenses of the Canada Food Board

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{104} LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-28. Letter from JD McLean to the British Colombia Committee, Canada Food Board, 2 July 1918.
\textsuperscript{105} LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-28. Letter from the Canada Food Board to DC Scott, 27 June 1918.
inquired as to the status of three Kahnawa:ke, Quebec men engaged in retail sales without a license, and whether they were selling on reserve as Indians. The director similarly wrote on 11 October to inquire about the status of an “Indian Firm” at China Hat, British Columbia. In both cases, the Director of Licenses initially noted that Indigenous peoples selling on reserve would not require licenses, though his position had reversed by the end of October.

The DIA had established its role and responsibility for managing the issue, but practical concerns complicated the enforcement of food regulations. Residential schools required a significant stock of goods to feed the sizeable populations of students, though the Canada Food Board advised McLean that the schools might receive forty five or one hundred days’ supply of sugar and flour depending on their distance from a store. The practice of limiting supply had problematic consequences for supplying bands in isolated locations as well. A lack of communication between the two branches of government further complicated enforcement; when Job Chapais was charged by Special Constable C.W. Symonds of Long Lake, for hoarding twenty five sacks of flour, the DIA determined that Chapais had been conducting official DIA business on behalf of Fort William, Ontario Agent W.R. Brown. The faulty charges were probably trumped up by the Longuelac, Ontario Hudson’s Bay Company office, unhappy that Brown was trying to circumvent their local monopoly on the sale of flour, which the local magistrate had facilitated. The Chapais case is important because it reinforces the notion that

106 LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-28. Director of Licenses, Canada Food Board to the DIA, 3 October 1918.
107 LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-28. Director of Licenses, Canada Food Board to the DIA, 11 October 1918.
108 As the director wrote, “did not know of any reason why Indian Merchants on Reservations should not be required to obtain license to do business from the Canadian Food Board, pay the required license fee and obey [the Food Board’s] orders and regulations as do other residents or citizens of Canada.” LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-28. Director of Licenses, Canada Food Board to Scott, 30 October 1918.
110 LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-28. Letter from the Canada Food Board to JD McLean, 12 August 1918.
the DIA Headquarters reserved the right to prosecute home-front policy independent from normal legal channels. The fact that Chapais was conducting officially-sanctioned business and faced bogus charges is irrelevant to this point; the Food Board, magistrate O’Connor, and the Attorney-General of Ontario all deferred to Scott’s direction. From the first reports of the case to the final dismissal of the charges, the DIA asserted itself as the rightful arbitrator of home-front regulations; the other branches of the provincial and federal government happily concurred.

As of mid-October 1918, the Canada Food Board and the DIA had settled jurisdiction regarding licensing, supply, and enforcement. The Canada Food Board permitted schools and general stores to function so as not to interfere with the daily operations of the DIA, though still under the blanket of Food Board policy. The DIA’s administration of food policy matches the model established in the regulation of the home front. Spurred by a panic that Indigenous peoples were engaging in “wasteful” methods, the DIA sought to enforce regulations on reserves that matched federal initiatives. In doing so, however, the DIA negotiated with the Food Board to ensure that matters of enforcement were strictly the responsibility of the DIA. Matters of licensing, provisioning reserves and schools, and punishing offenders became a new realm of responsibility. Alternative nodes of enforcement were stifled, as evidenced by the Chapais case, when the DIA clearly articulated their jurisdictional privilege.

Whether managing financial donations, deserters, censorship, regulations against idleness, or the management of consumption, DIA Headquarters involved itself in the regulation of the home front with the understanding that inaction would only reinforce retrogressive social practices, disrespect for military regulations and the rule of law, and a violation of the social contract during a nation at war. With forty years’ experience regulating Indigenous societies, the DIA staked a claim to regulate these areas, seeking to uphold federal law while simultaneously
affecting some measure of “progress” in the crucible of a national crusade. The actual prosecution of transgressions occurred only haltingly. When compared to the legacy of surveillance and social control that originated well before the war, the DIA’s opportunities to continue to manage the home front through wartime regulations were essentially redundant.

“Historic Value”: The DIA and Programs of Knowledge, 1915-1917

On 18 November 1915, D.C. Scott wrote to all Indian Agents and Agencies across Canada asking for a complete list of enlisted men, containing names, rank, the unit which they had joined, and marital status. Suggesting that this information was being collected for its “historic value,” he added that each agent would need to balance care in the data’s accuracy, but yet send along such forms as expeditiously as possible. In Scott’s view, such data would be best deployed to understand the impact of Indigenous enlistments as well as promote Indigenous participation in the war to the popular press. Befitting the increased attention paid to Indigenous recruitment and home-front regulations, DIA Headquarters began crafting a body of statistics relating to this enlistment data. This collection timed closely to the lifting of the DMD prohibition on enlistment, and the intensification of the war effort.

Michelle A. Hamilton’s article “Anyone Not on the List Might as Well be Dead” has assessed the links between the census and colonialism by studying the process of enumerating Indigenous peoples in early censuses, concluding that the data should not be separated from the process of enumeration, and that the processes of collection and enumeration led to different systems of cultural identification. This work builds off Benedict Anderson, who has

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113 LAC, RG 10, volume 3182, file 452, 124-6. DIA Circular, 18 November 1915.
previously framed the census as influencing the way an imperial power envisages its colonial
communities, particularly in the way that it identifies, classifies, and separates racial or ethnic
characteristics of its population.\textsuperscript{115} In the Canadian context, as Bruce Curtis has argued, censuses
serve two purposes: producing data regarding the society of which data is being collected, but
also imposing an imaginary order on that very society that are linked with the state’s ultimate
objectives, as well as their efforts to both regulate and administer state citizens and wards. As
Curtis put simply, “censuses are made not taken.”\textsuperscript{116} The DIA’s efforts to enumerate Indigenous
soldiers were an attempt to make a category of identity.

This section seeks to insert this new understanding of data-making as part of the methods
by which the DIA sought to understand, control, and redefine Indigenous soldiers as existing in a
separate category from other Indigenous peoples but also other soldiers. As Michelle A.
Hamilton observes, the DIA had used data collection as a key component of its bureaucratic
regime prior to the war.\textsuperscript{117} The DIA from its inception collected information through annual
censuses, partly to manage band fund distribution lists, but also to offer evidence of the efficacy
of the assimilationist policy in the Annual Reports. Farming, education, health, and religious
information was collected annually by Agents and Superintendents across the Dominion to
emphasize progress or regress according to the scale of civilized behaviour. The 1915 circular
asking for name, rank, unit, and marital status similarly contained a request for practical
information; one ostensible purpose of this circular was to enable DIA Headquarters to manage


\textsuperscript{117} Hamilton, “Anyone not on the list might as well be dead,” 79.
resources to communities and individuals requiring a modicum of state support – namely families in need of financial support.  

Primarily, however, the data collected was to serve as a basis for claims made by the DIA about how Indigenous men responded to the call to arms. Scott anticipated the need to state the contributions of Indigenous enlistees in this program, and was setting up the means to make substantive claims. The reasons for doing so were transparent: in order to justify, promote, and mobilize support for the DIA and its program of assimilation, the DIA would have to stake a claim of participation in the war. For the DIA’s tenure of wartime population management to be publicly considered successful, the DIA would have to demonstrate that the broad social goals of the war, as conceived by the government, were enlistment, financial donations, statements of loyalty, and resource redistribution towards the war effort. Scott stood to gain political capital from a public dissemination of this data. In the launch of this program, Scott set a course to provide information towards staking the claim that Indigenous peoples contributed in those ways. The realization of these discourses, the dissemination of narratives of Indigenous war service, were based explicitly on this information, and are discussed further in Chapter II.

Scott’s reasoning that a complete list of Indigenous enlistments would have historic value reveals one of the most important purposes of the data collection. While the practical considerations that precipitated this data program were important, the fact that DIA Headquarters

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118 As mentioned, DIA circulars were not a new phenomenon. A quick way for Headquarters to disseminate information to targeted members of the outside service, circulars were in use throughout the scope of this study. Yet the wartime circulars relating to data collection are substantively different from many of the other circulars in their national scope, and their broad request for information. Most other circulars were more geographically limited – asking for information or clarifying policy to a few Agencies – and did not contain the sweeping requests of the Roll of Honour circulars. This assertion is based on a study of Headquarters circulars from 1911 to 1931 in the file entitled “Headquarters – Ottawa – Correspondence and Circulars from the Department of Indian Affairs to Indian Agents Throughout Canada Regarding all Agency Matters 1911-1917,” LAC, RG 10, volume 3086, file 279,222-1A, as well as the file entitled “Headquarters – Ottawa – Correspondence and Circulars from the Department of Indian Affairs to Indian Agents Throughout Canada Regarding all Agency Matters (Photographs of Lake Katepwa Beach and Golf Course) 1918-1931,” LAC, RG 10, volume 3087, file 279,222 1B.
launched this program at all speaks to the broad change in conceptualization of the war and its impact on band communities. The decision in late 1915 to understand the trends of enlistment demonstrates how DIA Headquarters began to re-conceive the war as the moment when longstanding assimilationist policy would finally come to fruition. That enlistment data might have historic value highlights Scott’s re-conceptualization of the war as an opportunity reinforces this point.

The public purpose of data collection started to reveal itself in June 1916, when Scott met with a reporter in Victoria, BC. When asked about the contributions of Indigenous soldiers to the War effort, Scott responded, “A large number of Indians...have joined the ranks of the overseas battalions, and are making good soldiers. I have requested the agents throughout the Dominion to prepare lists of the Indians who have joined, and a roster will be published later when the names are accurately compiled.”119 Scott’s statement again belabours the intention behind the data collation, reinforcing that this had a public, as well as a private, purpose. Scott’s resolve to publish the roster demonstrates how data collection was not simply part of the DIA’s mechanisms for knowledge – the census materials forming the base for Annual Reports – but rather a much broader scheme to locate, categorize, and project the names of Indigenous men into the public sphere as evidence of their loyalty.

In early 1917, Scott’s request for information was reasserted. A 22 February circular drafted by Scott read:

The Department is desirous of establishing a Roll of Honour to be made up of the names of all Indians who have enlisted for Overseas Service since the beginning of the War. It is considered most desirable to have this list as complete as possible, and I would as the cooperation of all Agents in securing an accurate enumeration of all Indians/enlisted: and in supplementing this information from time to time. Attached hereto you will find a form upon which this information should be noted. You will observe that the fullest possible

information regarding each case should be obtained. As it is particularly desirable to have a list showing EVERY Indian who has enlisted, considerable research work may be entailed. If you find it convenient, you may prepare this list when you are taking the Census for the Annual Report. It would be advisable, after bringing your first list up to date, to send in monthly returns of enlistments. Further supplies of forms may be had on application [capitals in original].

This circular maintained the essential characteristics of the 1915 program, though with a number of key modifications. First, the purpose of the study was more carefully articulated; rather than hinting at the ‘historic value’ of data collection, the 1917 circular contains specific reference to the desired compilation of a Roll of Honour. Second, Scott’s reiteration of the importance of the cooperation of all Agents in collecting and updating the files hints at some of the failures of the 1915 program, chiefly that the set of data was incomplete; the supplemental forms designed by Scott intended to fix these issues. For structural reasons, many of these problems remained unsolved into 1919. Yet the fundamental purpose appears to have remained unchanged. Scott still demanded accurate data with “fullest possible information” on each individual enlistment. Having moved beyond a scheme to outline the basic information of enlistment, Scott’s 1917 circular demanded a more rigorous methodology, but replicated the need to compile a list of enlistments for public purposes.

A letter from Scott to the Department of Militia and Defence drafted immediately after the transmission of the 1917 circular reinforces the inter-departmental relationship cemented by this collection process. On 31 December, Scott wrote to the Secretary of the Militia Council asking for nominal rolls of all battalions, “in order that the Agents could check up the names ... [so] that I may verify my lists of Indians here?”

As the 1915 circular and responses contain no indication that the DIA had corresponded with the Militia Department on matters relating to

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120 LAC, RG 10, volume 6767, file 452-17. DIA Circular, 22 February 1917.
121 LAC, RG 10, volume 3181, file 452,124-1A. Letter from Scott to the Secretary of the Militia Council, 31 December 1917.
nominal roles, the 1917 correspondence with the Militia Department reinforces the ways in which the 1917 collection of data was undertaken in a more systematic manner than its predecessor, the high importance placed on this campaign by Scott, and the new bureaucratic relationships being forged by the exigencies of war.

The circulars of 1915 and 1917 indicate a shift in policy stance for DIA Headquarters and the stirrings of a reconceptualization of the impact of the war on Indigenous peoples’ place in the state. Practically, the DIA intended for this bureaucratic knowledge production to aid the management of resources for individuals and communities located on reserves. Yet DIA Headquarters also intended for this data to both locate and understand who this group of enlistees were, what they represented, and how their experience may have been distinct from other Indigenous peoples. Using the framework first established by Benedict Anderson, Bruce Curtis, and Michelle A. Hamilton, we see how the DIA’s process of collecting data (and how this process was refined) as part of an effort on the part of state officials to redefine and classify Indigenous peoples as symbolically belonging in a different taxonomy from citizens. In thinking of this enumerated group, as we shall see in subsequent parts, the DIA began to understand enumerated men as belonging to either a group of “Missionaries of the Spirit of Progress” (See Chapter III) or as “Helpless Indians” (See Chapter V). Circulars in 1918 and 1919, very similar in concept and tone to the 1915 and 1917 circulars, extended the knowledge gathering process into the administration of returning soldiers and re-establishment, and provided a scarce but vital opportunity for Indigenous men to speak in turn, articulating and interpreting their experience neither as missionaries nor helpless, but as privileged veterans.
The Military Service Act

From August 1914 to 1917, the war had initiated a series of questions for government officials and Indigenous peoples regarding the rights and obligations of “Indians” during an unprecedented national event. DIA officials asserted jurisdictional control over matters pertaining to Indigenous peoples and Indigenous lands when representatives from military and civilian authorities presented these issues, such as the distribution of goods, censorship, the persecution of deserters, and even the policy and practice of recruitment. Indigenous peoples reacted to the war in varying ways – through public expressions of loyalty, recruitment, and financial donations that at times accepted the government’s authority and at other times resisted it. From the spring of 1917 to the winter of 1918, national military debates inspired the most fundamental question regarding Indigenous military service: would the Military Service Act apply to Indigenous peoples.
Figure 8: Enlistments and Losses in the CEF (all soldiers)

CEF Strength (All Ranks)

Appointments and Enlistments (Including MSA)

CEF Fatalities (by quarter)

By mid-1916, the flood of recruits had slowed to a trickle. The Indigenous recruitment rate detailed in Figure 7 matches the drop in all CEF recruits in Figure 8: for both Indigenous and non-Indigenous potential recruits, rates of enlistment plummeted after the spring 1916. Only 300,000 of Borden’s promised 500,000 had enlisted by the end of 1916. The spike in casualties during Spring 1917 compounded military urgency to the issue. Mounting casualties and the shortage of recruits made conscription a political necessity, culminating in Parliament’s passage of the Military Service Act in late August. The Act required men between the ages of 20 to 45 complete a form and present themselves for a medical inspection prior to November 17, 1917. The government promised exemptions for agriculture, industry, and medical necessity, though military and civilian authorities applied exemptions less liberally than what affected industries and families expected. “Shirkers” and “defaulters,” those not registering or reporting after having registered and been called upon, were sought out and arrested with prejudice.

From both contemporary observers and retrospective accounts, the question of compulsory military service in Canada represented a defining issue. More than any other issue, conscription exposed sharp social, cultural, and political divides that the war had hitherto obscured. One’s view of the conscription debate also came to represent their politics more broadly, and these debates continue to divide historical scholarship. For example, historians disagree on whether conscription was even a military necessity. J.L. Granatstein asserts that conscription was a military necessity that maintained the operational effectiveness of the CEF amid a spike in casualties and may have saved lives by forcing peace earlier than otherwise would have happened.¹²² Granatstein repudiates his earlier claim, shared by many others that the

net benefit of conscription was not worth the cost. Historian Tim Cook is among them, arguing that the 24,000 MSA recruits that made it to France, a relatively small number that likely did not dramatically affect the operational status of the Corps, was “may not have been worth the cost of nearly tearing the country apart during the conscription crisis.” The social cost was high, unquestionably.

Between May and November 1917, Chiefs, Band Councils, and others sent at least 54 separate inquiries and petitions to DIA and Military officials regarding the MSA. Each petition expressed a profound concern over the applicability of conscription to Indigenous peoples in light of treaty rights, political status as wards of the state, and the high rates of voluntary enlistments. For example, one petition from the Port Simpson, British Columbia Band Council articulated a sense of political alienation as cause for resentment, lamenting that “at no time have our Indians had any say in the making of the laws of Canada.” Asserting an alternative reading of the conscription issue, petitions did not express a disagreement with the theory of conscription, nor did they challenge the necessity of boosting the CEF’s ranks. Much as the

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124 Tim Cook, Shock Troops, 403.

125 These petitions were kept in a special file at DIA Headquarters. See LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 1.

126 Most of the resistance came from British Colombia, as well as the larger reserves in Ontario. A series of these petitions by the Naas Agency of British Colombia were shown to be expressed as part of a longstanding debate regarding land rights and negotiations with the Crown in Katherine McGowan, “Until We Receive Just Treatment.”

argument for a conscription of wealth or labour, these petitions asked for an exclusion while supporting the war effort, some even supporting conscription itself.128

One of the reasons that the MSA elicited such debate among Indigenous communities had to do with its ambiguity regarding their inclusion. Writing apologetically, Deputy Minister of Justice E.L. Newcombe communicated to DC Scott in September 1917 that the newly-passed Act had simply not considered Indigenous peoples when legislators drafted the Act.129 Indigenous peoples otherwise disenfranchised had been included in the Military Voting Act so long as they had enlisted, and so the MSA implied a similar inclusion. Nonetheless, Newcombe asked that the registration of Indigenous peoples proceed and be administered by the DIA, though the November 17 deadline would probably have to be extended in light of the geographic, bureaucratic, and linguistic obstacles facing the DIA’s registration. Scott publically supported the registration initiative, writing to Newcombe that Indigenous men on the home front were already engaged in critical war industries and would generally be exempt, and separately to Agents that Indigenous peoples in traditional modes of living did not need to be registered.130

Owing to the petitions, delays, and challenges of registration, on 17 January 1918, the Clerk of the Privy Council published an Order in Council, P.C. 111, exempting Indigenous men from compulsory military service. Recognizing disenfranchisement and tacitly acknowledging treaty rights by referring to an 1873 NWMP order, the Order in Council stated that Indigenous

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128 As James Walker has demonstrated, this issue was resisted “overwhelmingly”, regardless of the community’s involvement in enlistments or other voluntary initiatives; Walker, “Race and Recruitment.” The issue of conscription is among the more studied issues of Indigenous peoples and the first world war, receiving extensive treatment in Titley, A Narrow Vision, 39; Dempsey, Warriors of the King, 39-41; Lackenbauer, Battle Grounds, 88, 99 (referring to both the First and Second World Wars. Dempsey, “Alberta’s Indians and the Second World War,” 39-52; Stevenson, 205-226; Shewell, “James Sioui and Indian Political Radicalism in Canada,” 211-243; Sheffield and Foster, 53-74; R. Scott Sheffield, The Red Man’s on the Warpath: The Image of the “Indian” and the Second World War (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004), 46-57.


peoples’ status as wards and treaty people meant that they would not have to register any further nor respond to call-up on the basis of registration. In the end, conscription would not apply to Indigenous peoples for the very reasons expressed in the petitions and inquiries. Historians have celebrated this as a victory for organized indigenous resistance to state power, but have generally misattributed part of the reason for victory. In Katherine McGowan’s doctoral dissertation, for example, P.C. 111 was a defeat for the DIA, as “Scott would not yield. He wanted all Native men of eligible age and fitness to register with the Military authorities.” Mirroring the question of voluntary enlistments from 1914-1916 – from ambiguity to exemption to acceptance – the DIA expressed public support for the MSA, particularly as Scott corresponded with Deputy Minister of Justice E.L. Newcombe.

Historians need to reassess the DIA’s commitment to the MSA. In correspondence with Newcombe, Scott stressed the reasons registration was likely to fail, and the probability of blanket exemptions. Simultaneously, the DIA was both collecting and promoting large amounts of data to demonstrate the overwhelming voluntary enlistments, and hyperbolically celebrating the great patriotic fervor of Indigenous communities across Canada. With the data on enlistments, we can properly situate these recruitment patterns as consistent with non-Indigenous patterns, and reconsider the number of recruits to be more modest than originally proposed (see Figure 5 and Figure 6). Both the data collection and extensive press coverage pronounced this loyalty in 1917, especially as a foil against the public and political discourse which expressed French Canada’s lack of patriotism. In this way, the DIA was acting shrewdly to communicate that compulsory military service was not necessary for Indigenous men. Moreover, considering the administrative pattern regarding financial donations, state surveillance, desertion, and

131 McGowan, “We are Wards of the Crown,” 155.
Hoarding, Scott’s position was consistent with those issues as well; cautiously asserting jurisdiction over registration. If Scott was really unyielding, why were agents encouraged not to track potential recruits, for example? The DIA’s position was one of paternalism and protection, resisting a blanket registration procedure and posturing for a largescale exemption prior to the wholesale exemption.

While historians have focused on Scott’s position as coercive, this type of interpretation tends to overstress Scott’s explicit support and misses the latent reservations couched in the correspondence. Indigenous resistance to the MSA was consistent and not necessarily symptomatic of a broader disaffection with the war. Indigenous peoples asserted their expectations of equal status and land rights through donations and charity work, rather than by resisting the war effort. Voluntary enlistments (generally sparse in BC, see Figure 5 and Figure 6) were similarly an exercise of agency. Conscription ran contrary to these voluntary and purposeful expressions of support, and mitigated the power of voluntary action to assert other claims.

The policy debate sometimes ran contrary to the reality on the ground. Amid the intense public scrutiny of “defaul ters,” and ignorance of the exemption, Indigenous men were occasionally caught up in prosecutions. Two Indigenous men were arrested in July 1918 while travelling by train from Maniwaki to Gatineau in Quebec without proper registration documentation, inspiring a debate among DIA Headquarters’ officials about whether Indigenous men should carry a special status form made from linen to prove their exempt status. Police arrested Richard Inkster, from the Stikine Agency in British Columbia in

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132 McGowan, “Until We Receive Just Treatment.”
133 Anonymous letter to D.C. Scott, 3 July 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 3; Unsigned Memorandum to D.C. Scott 3 July 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 RG 10 Volume 3181 File 452,124-1A.
Vancouver as an unregistered eligible man, with no evidence that the DIA intervened in his case, as they had with the Maniwaki men. At least nine Indigenous men ended up being conscripted and serving in spite of the order, likely due to local officials’ ignorance of regulations. William Stevenson was living in Hamilton, Ontario at the time of registration, which explains why he found himself prosecuted but the drafts are difficult to explain for these other cases.

Similar to the enlistment issue in 1914, the compulsory service of Indigenous men was a blank spot legislatively. Legislators simply did not consider Indigenous peoples during the formation of public policy. As with enlistments and the regulation on the home front, Indigenous peoples became a “special case” administered by the DIA. Under Scott’s leadership, the DIA followed the same pattern as with each other major issue of the war, reticent to surrender authority. Scott shrewdly deployed both language and data collected on return of enlistments to demonstrate loyalty, and positioned MSA as likely not to work. This assertion was undoubtedly paternalistic, but also shrewd and actually allied with Indigenous participants’ expectations. Considering the degree of resistance expressed over summer 1917, Scott understood that applying MSA, especially when other issues were already tenuous – land negotiations in BC first and foremost – could damage relationship to such a degree that it would impact other areas and diminish the assimilationist goals of the Department. For Indigenous participants, the intense

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debate and sharp protests over MSA were a part of rather than distinct from longer-standing issues of land and resource rights, the interpretation of treaty obligations, and the question of who would wield political authority in each community. More than any other issue, proposed conscription was a flashpoint for debate about the parameters of Indigenous involvement in the war effort, and how the legal status of race trumped the necessity of military recruits. Scott and other senior military officials aggressively pursued voluntary enlistment drives, much like other organizations, yet did not push for conscription with similar zeal.

**Conclusion**

In retrospect, Scott’s misapprehension that the war’s primary impact for Indigenous peoples involved the disruption of fur prices was wrong on two counts. Though 1914-1915 saw fur markets decline to an historic low, the trade recovered as the war continued, and values rose steadily until a climax in 1919 with exorbitant prices, burgeoning demand, and abundant prosperity for Indigenous people involved in trapping.136 Scott was also wrong that this issue would be the primary effect of the First World War for Indigenous peoples, as critical matters such as recruiting prohibitions, promotion of recruiting, conscription, and home front regulations all produced dramatic conflicts of understanding between government officials and Indigenous peoples.

Movement by DMD and DIA officials towards a blanket exemption and prohibition in 1914 against Indigenous peoples serving in the CEF was designed to acknowledge and further reinforce the distinction between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. As non-citizen wards, Indigenous peoples were fully exempt from the privileges, but also the obligations of citizenship.

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136 Frank Tough calls these fur prices “almost unbelievable” in how high they rose through 1919. See his *As Their Natural Resources Fail: Native Peoples and the Economic History of Northern Manitoba, 1870-1930*, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1996), 264.
and belonging. Military and political realities after a spring and summer of bloodshed in Europe in 1915 nudged these same officials towards a reconceptualization of how Indigenous peoples could fit into the war effort and their relation to the state. Pushed by the contingent needs of new sources of recruits, and pushed as well by Indigenous field conduct and community patriotic displays, the DIA worked with government officials to lift the restrictions on Indigenous peoples’ enlistments and began to promote recruitment actively in certain areas. We see from the data collected that Indigenous peoples had largely accepted and even embraced this new social role by both observing the prohibition and then flooding to enlist in late 1915 and early 1916. DIA officials expressed concern with the negative influences for Indigenous soldiers serving in the CEF – alcohol and prostitution, primarily – though military officials did little of substance to prevent Indigenous soldiers’ access in spite of the idea that they maintained their legal distinction as “Indians” overseas. Further to that point, Indigenous soldiers’ enfranchisement in the election of 1917 was encouraged.

Amid the DIA’s and DMD’s push for Indigenous recruits, the two departments worked to establish and maintain administrative boundaries. After extensive debate between Federal and local officials, the DIA assumed responsibility for regulating Federal wartime orders, which fit with the DIA’s responsibility for monitoring social, economic, and political activities on reserves but provided an opportunity for field officials to conduct greater surveillance and control of Indigenous populations than had been done previously. DIA officials were paternalistic in their governance of these regulations, offering exclusions and exceptions that largely protected offenders such as those arrested for desertion, hoarding, or idleness. These exemptions benefitted dissenters, but also communicated a gulf of distinctness that kept Indigenous peoples separate from civil society. When the manpower crisis created the ostensible need for national registration
and conscription, D.C. Scott applied this paternalistic logic to successfully assert that Indigenous peoples should not be included as conscripts. The most important development from the war was the idea that a separate and parallel set of institutions should govern Indigenous soldiers and communities from those responsible for non-Indigenous soldiers. These incremental decisions building towards parallel but separate institutions had established an important precedent which set the course for the postwar administration of Indigenous veterans.

For the DIA, the war appeared to be an opportunity to expedite their mandate of enforcing assimilation as it had created a group of men exposed to the rigors of military service and which had engendered a greater sense of patriotic loyalty among communities engaged in the war effort. Yet the war had also destabilized the meaning of what Indigenous peoples’ place in society would be and what the legal category of “Indian” did and did not represent. From total exclusion in 1914 to total inclusion in 1916 to some inclusion but exemption in 1917, policymaking was haphazard and never solidified Indigenous peoples’ role in the national undertaking. Indigenous soldiers and their families premised their participation on a different set of qualifications, interpretations of the past and present, and economic rationales. Nonetheless, Indigenous returning soldiers saw themselves differently too, which began to manifest as an assertion of distinctness and privilege. These competing visions clashed directly in the offices of Indian Agents across Canada when Indigenous soldiers came home.
CHAPTER II: “A FULL BLOODED INDIAN?” THE CONTESTED MEANING OF REPATRIATION AND RETURN

Introduction

On June 6, 1919, Attawapiskat Cree Philip John George, James Kahtakwahbit, and Joseph Okimow paddled the last few strokes of a 250 km-long canoe trek down the Albany River from Pagwa, Ontario to Fort Albany on the shores of James Bay, temporarily stopping to ask for help from the fourth Anglican Bishop of Moosonee, John S. Anderson, before continuing on their journey home. As healthy, single hunters in their early twenties, George, Kahtakwahbit and Okimow joined the Canadian Forestry Corps in July 1917 with relative ease: they had travelled by steamboat upriver to enlist at Toronto. The three served with the 55th Forestry Company in Scotland through late 1917 and 1918. After the armistice, they joined the demobilization drafts in southern England in May 1919 and were discharged at the Exhibition Camp in Toronto. Though

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1 George, Kahtakwahbit and Okimow were among at least 25 other James Bay Cree from the Attawapiskat, Moose Factory, and Fort Arthur communities and surrounding Treaty 9 (1905) territory, a geographic entity administered by the DIA and referred to as the “Treaty 9 District.” The three, along with almost all other James Bay enlistees, had joined the CEF in 1917 with the so-called “Indian Draft,” which was an effort shared between the DIA and CEF officials to recruit Indians from the District to work in Railway, Labour, and Forestry Corps. Recruitment of these battalions was always fraught with difficulty, as efforts to secure recruits in 1917 coincided with broader questions of voting rights and the protection of labour battalions against active service or transfer to an active unit. See LAC RG 24 Volume 4645 File 99-4-103.

2 For details of military service for each soldier, their military files have been extensively referenced. For George, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 3476 – 31. For Kahtakwahbit, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 5005 - 28. For Okimow, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 7440 – 39. Xavier Kataquapit’s account of a family history from the Native Veterans Association of Northwestern Ontario provides an interesting alternative memory of return: “My dad’s father, James Kataquapit, made it back two and a half years later to the surprise and thankfulness of his family. He talked of frightening nights in war torn places and of strange and wonderful sights. He recalled that at the end of the war those young Cree men who had managed to survive and return were simply dropped off at the rail stop at Nakina and told to go home. Some actually walked the banks of the river retracing their two week canoe trip, all the way back to Fort Albany where they were taken back to Attawapiskat.” Xavier Kataquapit, “Under the Northern Sky: The Boys of Summer,” Accessed November 25, 2016. http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/205/301/ic/cdc/nativeterans/references.htm

3 The name “forestry company” is slightly misleading – while many companies were used for forestry purposes (like making sitprops, sleepers, sawlogs and axe handles), some were responsible for general labour duties like clearing, draining, levelling and grading sites for aerodromes, and the like. See LAC, “Introduction,” Guide to Sources Relating to Units of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, (2015): Accessed November 25, 2016. http://www.bac-
each member of the CEF received a travel voucher for the return home, these men had to purchase a canoe for $70 out of their own “last pay” dollars. Bishop Anderson successfully lobbied Colonel E.E. Clark, Director of Supplies and Transport, Military District No. 2 at Exhibition Camp in Toronto for a reimbursement of the canoe costs, arguing that it was the military’s responsibility for transport home.4

This image of George, Kahtakwahbit and Okimow paddling home to a remote community after the war fit with contemporary observers’ image of who Indian enlistees were, where they were from, and what skills they brought with them to military service. Government and newspaper elites celebrated the participation of Indigenous soldiers in the war effort, taking care to note that the value of these recruits lay in their skills at hunting, trapping, and bushcraft.5 This “noble savage” trope celebrated Indigenous peoples’ innate self-reliance, ability to use a rifle, and survival instincts, which made them ideal scouts and snipers.6 Deputy Superintendent


4 For Anderson’s correspondence with officials of Military District 2 at Exhibition Camp in Toronto, see: LAC, RG 24, volume 769, file HQ 54-21-6-165.

5 These discourses generally focused on the noteworthy “loyalty” of Indigenous recruits, and framed this against their pre-modern and parochial skills. See Brian MacDowall, “Loyalty and Submission: Contested Discourses on Aboriginal War Service, 1914-1939,” in The Great War: From Memory to History, eds. Kellen Kurschinski; Alicia Robinet; Jonathan F. Vance; Matt Symes & Steve Marti (Waterloo, ON: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2015).

6 Philip Deloria’s groundbreaking Indians in Unexpected Places suggested that much of the nineteenth and early twentieth century motif depicting indigeneity was to represent the “Indian” as outside from the forces of modernization that were causing non-indigenous society to reexamine the self, which is a useful way of thinking about the purposes of defining Indigenous soldiers in Canada as both noble and fundamentally “wild” as a counter-representation of the corrupting results of military service on a generation of young white soldiers. See Philip J. Deloria. Indians in Unexpected Places, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 6; generally, the myth of the noble savage is a pervasive anthropological and historical discourse first propagated in the 18th century but which has evolved over time to include any “mythic personification of natural goodness by a romantic glorification of savage life.” Terry Jay Ellingson, The Myth of The Noble Savage, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 1. In Canada, scholars have explored the contours of this myth generally in Daniel Francis, The Imaginary Indian: The Image of the Indian in Canadian Culture, (Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp, 1992); and more specifically as a justifying principle in the dispossession of Anishinabe lands during the administration of Upper Canada Lieutenant Governor Sir Francis Bond Head, see T. Binnenma and K. Hutchings, “The Emigrant and the Noble Savage: Sir Francis Bond Head's Romantic Approach to Aboriginal Policy in Upper Canada, 1836-1838,” Journal of Canadian Studies, 39, 1 (2005): 115-138; more recently, Rob Leblanc has suggested that the positioning of the warrior as a hyper-violent (non-noble) stereotype serves the settler-colonial purposes of the state by diminishing the decolonizing
General of Indian Affairs Duncan Campbell Scott and other officials in the DIA encouraged this racialized narrative both locally and nationally through correspondence with officials and newspapers, stressing loyalty and subservience of Indians most assertively amid the conscription crisis.

Among more recent observers, Canadian author Joseph Boyden has replicated this sentimental narrative for commercial and critical acclaim. His novel *Three Day Road* tells the story of James Bay Cree demobilized soldier Xavier Bird who paddles downriver via canoe to his home in Moosonee with his aunt Niska, a woman who has rejected European beliefs and culture and continues to thrive in the bush, living traditionally. Xavier’s detox from morphine addiction and his peace with military service happens as he physically transitions back from the metropole to the hinterland, and as he transitions spiritually away from the punishing rigor of military living towards an Indigenous existence from the with help from his aunt. Geographical distance from the railhead – from state power – increases the physical, cultural, and spiritual autonomy of Bird and Niska.

The demobilization and repatriation of Indigenous soldiers between 1915 and 1920 inspired a series of difficult questions among returning soldiers, their communities, and government officials, especially during the period of mass demobilization between the armistice and the final few demobilizations of Indigenous soldiers in late 1919: Did the DIA have a role to play in the discharge, demobilization, and return of Indigenous peoples from military service?

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For Indigenous peoples returning to reserve, what sort of homecoming would they receive?

Could an Indigenous government ward return to “civilian” life, if re-disenfranchised?

For the purposes of this chapter, demobilization refers to the administrative discharge from military service, both a physical process of completing paperwork and inspections, as well as a symbolic process of removing the uniform and becoming a civilian again. Repatriation in this context refers to the physical return of soldiers from overseas to Canada. For most soldiers, repatriation and discharge were consecutive processes between service and homecoming, with little time in between. For others, these processes were neither consecutive nor timely. This chapter discusses both experiences.8

Historical and literary descriptions of returning Indigenous soldiers stress the quaintness of return to remote locations devoid of other people or state power. Scott’s essay recalling the return of Indigenous soldiers and Boyden’s fictional account scarcely disagree in this regard, even though their publication dates are separated by almost 90 years. This chapter shows that the processes of demobilization and repatriation were complicated and multifaceted. We can render this complexity by looking at Indigenous soldiers’ lives, since many had entered the service

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under different circumstances than white soldiers, and this meant that their experience with service and discharge was also different. Returning to reserves meant returning to a different type of physical and representative space from white soldiers, and one in which paternalistic Indian Agents expected and enforced subservience of their wards through the provisions of the Indian Act. Indian Agents’ rearticulating a colonialist hierarchy necessitated separate and symbolic process of demobilization and repatriation for Indigenous peoples, where the return to reserve triggered a physical process of inspection and interview. For some returning soldiers, demobilization was an opportunity to contest the system of colonialism by asserting their status as veterans.

*Demobilization and Repatriation Prior to Armistice*

In August 1914, Albert Wilfred Laurier Crain was a 21-year-old, unmarried farmer living with his mother on the New Credit portion of the Six Nations reserve near Hagersville, Ontario. Notwithstanding the prohibition on Indigenous enlistments, Albert was one of the few Indigenous men to attest in 1914, doing so on September 22, 1914 at Valcartier Camp outside Quebec City with the 4th O.S. Battalion. The battalion sailed for England September 30, and for France in February 1915. On April 23, Crain was wounded at the Second Battle of Ypres, the CEF’s baptism of fire. His battalion had attempted a night action at 4:30am, encountering entrenched German position and machine-gun and artillery fire from 400m. Approaching the German position, a machine gun opened up on the advancing troops, with Crain receiving four bullet wounds: through both thighs, in the right shoulder, and through the groin. Perhaps owing to the seriousness of his wounds, or to the confusion of a night action, the military official in charge of records reported Crain on his record of service as “killed” initially, then “died of wounds” before correcting the record to state that he had been sent to a field station behind the
lines. Crain transferred as an invalided case from the French field hospital to the No. 4 General Hospital at Shorncliffe, England in June 1915 for further treatment. When sufficiently healed for transport, Crain returned to Canada as an invalided case in March 1916. After some time in a Toronto convalescent home receiving massage and electric shocks for his leg and groin injury, Crain was promoted to Sergeant Major and “bayonet fighting” instructor at the Military District 2 Depot. During this period, he also got married. Crain received discharge from service on April 14, 1917 at Toronto with the special permission of the Militia Department.⁹

After the Second Battle of Ypres in April 1915, where the CEF endured more than 6,000 casualties in 48 hours, the return of invalided soldiers from overseas service became a pressing issue for CEF and government officials. The influx of wounded soldiers requiring invalided medical care meant that military officials needed to clarify processes and outcomes more concretely than had been the case during the heady days of autumn 1914. One hundred wounded invalids were returning to Canada per week; maritime returnees arrived at Halifax, the rest at the main Quebec City Depot.¹⁰ Serious planning for accommodation of returning soldiers began earnestly in the summer of 1915 with establishment of the Military Hospitals Commission, as a response to this challenge. The war showed no signs of abatement, and the steady stream of casualties needed longer term solutions than had been established up to this point. As historian

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⁹ RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 2111 – 55. Crain’s unit, the 4th battalion’s diary explains the details of the engagement. RG 9, Militia and Defence, Series III-D-3, Volume 4915, Reel T-10707 File: 359. Albert Crain’s discharge prior to armistice was not uncommon; by armistice in November 1918, cases of medically unfit or invalided discharge plus the dead meant that more than 1/3 of the 619,636 members of CEF were no longer in the service on November 11 1918 Granatstein and Morton, Marching to Armageddon, 250. Officially, 51,748 Canadians were killed in action or died of combat wounds during the war and another 7,796 died from disease or accidents while in service. 172,950 were wounded but survived, with 138,166 of those wounds coming from battle Clifford H. Bowering estimates “between 117,000 and 137,000 were discharged medically unfit as a result of service in the Great War.” Clifford H. Boweriing, Service: The Story of the Canadian Legion, 1925-1960 (Canadian Legion: Montreal, 1960), 1.

¹⁰ Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 19.
Desmond Morton and archivist Glenn Wright detail in *Winning the Second Battle*, the various personalities and priorities of the appointed Commissioners meant that MHC Secretary Ernest Scammell developed policy with a free hand, favoring voluntary sources of care initially. Among these important policies was the decision in October 1915, consented to by the Provincial Premiers, that medical care rehabilitation and reintegration would be the responsibility of the Federal government, while the provinces would take care of economic reintegration.\(^\text{11}\) While the implications of this decision for Indigenous soldiers was critical, little of the MHC conversation permeated the DIA, whose primary concern at this time was resolving the question of Indian enlistments at a time of official prohibition. The DIA’s clear intervention into other provincial matters during the war (see Chapter I) suggests that Indian demobilizations and reintegration would exist in a bureaucratic structure outside from those governing non-Indian returnees.

Military files indicate that fewer Indigenous soldiers were invalided and discharged prior to demobilization relative to all of the CEF: 380 of the 2307 enumerated Indigenous soldiers, or 16.5% of those discharged before November 11 1918, compared with about 30% of the CEF in total. Examining timelines of enlistment help explain this phenomenon. As we see from Figure 7, only 246 Indigenous enlistments (10.6%) occurred before the winter of 1915-1916, meaning that the large majority (89.4%) of enlistees only joined the CEF in France by early to mid-1917.\(^\text{12}\)

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\(^\text{12}\) For example, more than two hundred Indians enlisted with the 114\(^\text{th}\) “Brock’s Rangers” Overseas Battalion between November and August 1916, primarily from the Six Nations, Kahnawa’ke, Tyendinaga, and central regions. We know from each soldier’s service record that the 114\(^\text{th}\) proceeded from Halifax to Liverpool in October-November 1916 aboard the S.S. Metagama. Upon arrival, the battalion was broken up to supply personnel to the 35\(^\text{th}\) and 36\(^\text{th}\) reserve battalions in England on November 11, 1916. Most former 114\(^\text{th}\) troops found themselves transferred to either the 107\(^\text{th}\) Pioneer Battalion or the 1\(^\text{st}\) Overseas Battalion. These soldiers did not see action until the spring, and most at Vimy Ridge.
Figure 9: Indigenous Soldiers’ Service, Marital, Age, Occupation Cluster

Service Location

Marital Status

Aboriginal Enlistment by Age Cluster

Aboriginal Occupation at Enlistment

Sources: LAC, RG 10 and RG 150 (Selected Files)
Battalions of the CEF that contained large numbers of Indian recruits, like the 114th, 149th, and the 135th, were formed in mid-1916 and only landed in England late in the winter of 1916-1917. As we will see, after the depletion of active service forces in combat battalions, these raised units were broken up and used to replenish the preexisting units. As these soldiers joined combat in 1917, the small trickle of invalided and discharged soldiers in 1915 and 1916 became a steady flow in mid-1917 with the arrival of large numbers of Indigenous troops into the field after the lifting of the moratorium on Indigenous enlistments. The service files of these soldiers tell of how those that suffered war-ending wounds were often repatriated only after long periods of convalescence. Invalided or physically unfit releases were discharged erratically, some after long periods of invalided care in England. Nonetheless, sharp spikes of invalided cases returned just after summer and fall 1917 – casualties from the Arras and Passchendaele campaigns, and again in summer 1918 during the One Hundred Days. Not all invalided cases necessarily coincided with active periods for CEF, as “wastage” casualties were common too.¹³

Invalided men’s journeys were difficult to streamline, and were often multi-staged. For a combat injury, soldiers were processed and stabilized, in the field; if their wounds were not serious, they were treated for a few days at a casualty clearing station and sent back to active duty. For more serious cases, once stabilized at the clearing station, the soldier was transferred to a medical station at Etaples, Rouen, or directly to a hospital England. Treatment in hospitals in Europe sometimes lasted days, weeks, or even months, depending on the injury. In cases where recuperation was not possible, invalided cases were transferred to Canada only after they had stabilized sufficiently to be eligible for a long-term convalescent solution.

¹³ “Wastage” was originally used by the British high command as a term to describe the seven thousand daily casualties from among the BEF, even in periods without an offensive. Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 41.
Casualties often spent months in an English or Canadian Military hospital in England before being transferred home on a hospital ship. As with most steps in a soldier’s life, formal discharge was a bureaucratic process, requiring adherence to a full set of regulations and mountains of paperwork to be completed. Standing orders on discharge procedures, governed by a standard discharge questionnaire, Army Form 268B, necessitated the collection of information.

Many pre-armistice invalided repatriation cases suffered difficult journeys. Leonard Creeley, from the File Hills Colony in Saskatchewan, was invalided to Canada in March 1917 after 28 days treatment in the field and five months invalided in England.\(^1\) Creeley was gassed and shot in the leg on September 28, 1916 “at the Somme” and suffered declining eyesight and “shell shock.” The medical records are inconsistent, variously reporting Creeley’s injury as a “SW [shrapnel wound] R. Leg”, “SW thigh”, and “GSW [gunshot wound] R. Leg”. Regardless, according to medical authorities, that wound had healed by January 1917. Casualties usually received medical treatment prior to discharge, but some received discharge directly to convalescent care whereby their administrative “discharge” preceded actual release from care.\(^2\) As an example, Charles Saylors of Chapleau, Ontario, was transferred at Toronto and granted a travel furlough to reach the Mowat Sanatorium for treatment for tuberculosis and received administrative discharge from service to care in July 1917. Saylors had been living at Moose Factory prior to attestation, and attested on September 7, 1915 with the 3rd Overseas Battalion.

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\(^1\) RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 2131 – 26. Creeley was discharged formally at the Quebec Depot on 17 March, receiving a medial inspection that determined a 25% disability – due to the eyesight – but not caused or aggravated by service; according to the medical board, as they decided that this was a pre-existing childhood condition.

\(^2\) Regarding Saylors, see RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 8681 – 21. Peter Bignell from The Pas was discharged from the service and placed in the care of the DSCR in March 1918 as an in-patient, as were Edward J. Hill of Six Nations and Alfred Vincent of Golden Lake in the same period. Bignell was originally diagnosed with “pleuro-pneumonia”, later upgraded to TB. See: RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 726 – 11. For Hill, see: RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 4346 – 52. For Vincent, see RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 134 – 45.
He sailed to England in December 1915, and to France in March 1916. Saylors did not last long in the field: growing “sicker and sicker” in France, and losing weight quickly (35 lbs in three months). He was invalided to England in June 1916; per his medical sheets, “Boarded for shell shock, gas, concussion at a rest station.” Saylors was put on light duty for a year, but his condition persisted and he was finally invalided to Canada on June 18, 1917, aboard hospital ship S.S. Letitia. He was granted 100% incapacity for one year, of which 50% deemed to be due to service, according to the Board of Pension Commissioners.

The processes of repatriation and discharge prior to armistice was mostly ad hoc, which is evident in the inconsistent collection and annotation of invalided military records from the period. Illnesses were a common cause of invalided or “medically unfit” cases; the conditions at the front, or scarcely improved conditions in camps in England or France meant that cases of “trench fever,” “trench mouth,” “trench foot,” mumps, measles, pneumonia, parotitis, scabes, and myalgia, among many other illnesses, were common. Many more soldiers’ service records include the initials “N.Y.D.,” signaling “not yet diagnosed” for soldiers suffering from mysterious or difficult to diagnose illnesses; these conditions usually served as cause for a temporary stay in a French or British hospital before returning to the front, but occasionally provided cause for discharge. Rheumatism commonly affected older recruits, though medical officials sometimes coded this condition as “aged” or “ailing” in reports. Influenza swept through the camps in waves, especially in February 1917 and again in 1919 with the “Spanish Flu” epidemic. Tuberculosis was a common threat that caused panic among the Army Medical Corps officers. In total, discharges for unfitness numbered just over one hundred, or about 5% of the total, though this number included those discharged after armistice but qualified as unfit. Not all ailments were infectious; some enlistees had congenital issues ignored or missed by
overzealous recruiters that were only uncovered once in service, or rendered apparent through training. For example, William Savage John suffered terribly in the service, receiving invalided care in England for multiple different conditional ailments, receiving a homecoming furlough and repatriation in December 1918.\(^\text{16}\) Similarly, Joe Cope never left Canada, suffering from myalgia, vision loss, hearing loss, and rheumatism. His entry in to the service and declaration of “fit” status on his attestation form is baffling.\(^\text{17}\) In these cases, discharge from service was an obvious conclusion to a series of misfortunes.

While discharge signaled an official release from service, individual soldiers’ experiences were complicated. Discharge did not always coincide with a homecoming or return to “civvy street,” and some soldiers did not truly enter service before being discharged. Soldiers occasionally received administrative discharge separate from their actual release from service. Indigenous soldiers discharged prior to the armistice were often recorded in documentation as “Discharged, Unfit” or “Discharged, Physically Unfit” to indicate their unsuitability for service due to a pre-existing physical condition that eluded notice by recruiters, age, or other reasons. Other reasons were the case, for example, with the entirety of the BC Forestry Draft in the Spring-Summer of 1917, whose soldiers were dismissed after clarification from the DMD and DIA that Indigenous peoples could not be pressed into service. Indigenous men from Stuart Lake were brought to Vancouver for training, but were discharged on June 20 because “their services were no longer required – Indian.”\(^\text{18}\) In another such case, Alexander Samuel Flett from Keeseekoowin’s Reserve, No. 61 in the Pelly Agency of Saskatchewan was “not likely to

\(^\text{16}\) See RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 4843 – 18.
\(^\text{17}\) See RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 1982 – 50.
\(^\text{18}\) LAC, RG 24 Volume 4645 File 99-4-103.
become efficient,” a reference perhaps to his inability to follow orders because of a language gap, and was thus discharged. As we see from Figure 9, more than one hundred Indigenous soldiers were over 39 years when they enlisted, and many of these men “aged out” at 45, or entered medical/ininvalided care for age-related ailments before discharge. As discussed in Chapter I, Indigenous deserters were treated leniently for the most part, often just administratively discharged from active service. Military officials “Struck off Strength”, literally crossing off names of men from nominal rolls who had deserted or otherwise. Not all administrative discharges related to desertion: for example, Six Nations Lieutenant Frank Weaver Montour was discharged administratively in April 1916, so that he could reenlist with a new commission for the 114th at Ohsweken the next day – his process included attesting and swearing in again with a different unit. At least eight Indigenous soldiers were part of the 3,800 Canadians held as Prisoners of War. Some of these cases were discharged and invalided before the armistice, such as Six Nations Prisoner of War William Foster Lickers. Lickers’ experience

19 RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 3150 – 24.
20 John Black of Waywayseecappo, Manitoba, for example, was “aged out” and suffered rheumatoid arthritis that made service impossible. See a representative set of correspondence from the DIA, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-29.
21 For example, Richard Henry Adams was discharged 1916 but reappeared four months later as having enlisted again, see RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 34 – 37. This was the same with David Altman of Walpole Island, see RG150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 128-24; see also Moses Fox of Manitowaning, who served fifteen days in prison before discharge in December 1917 RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 3255 – 22. James Deegan of the Standing Buffalo band in the Qu’Appelle agency was struck off strength from the battalion role for suicide, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 2405 - 32.
22 RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 6307 - 4
23 For some former prisoners, the return home was as difficult as life in the camps, as ex-POWs were treated neglectfully, generally, outside of brief moments in the 1920s and 1930s when sensationalized accounts of prisoner abuse periodically emerged. Jonathan Vance has estimated that three hundred prisoners died in captivity. Jonathan Vance, Objects of Concern: Canadian Prisoners of War Through the Twentieth Century, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1994), 26, 254.
24 See Brantford Expositor, 19 April 1938. Regarding the circumstances of his capture and release, see William Foster Lickers’ service file, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 3236 – 16. Regarding Richard Henry, see See RG 9, volume 4549 part 1, file 458. From Henry’s service file, we see that he was reported MIA on July 25, a status only updated on October 19 when he was reported as PoW. He was transferred multiple times; at Limburg-a-Lahn camp, treated at Garrison Lazarette, then to the Verden camp. According to medical inspection after repatriation, he was kept in a military hospital in Germany the entire time he was a PoW and had five separate operations. He was
was difficult; he later recalled that he was singled out by his captors as someone who chose voluntarily to fight and kill Germans (as opposed to conscripted soldiers) and was assigned particularly difficult work in an Austrian salt mine. His obituary from the Brantford *Expositor* in 1938 details his Austrian captors’ mistreatment of him as punching, kicking, and having salt thrown at him. Lickers’ experience is strikingly different from most other Indigenous prisoners, none of whom appear to have been singled out as volunteers. Richard Henry from the Caradoc Agency in Ontario was captured on July 24, 1917 with gunshot in his left leg that broke both bones while on a raid over the rail embankment at Lens-Arras outside Avion as part of the Battle of Arras. The battalion diary indicates the terrible nature of this battle with Canadian units attacking over slag heaps and through tunneled bunkers, suffering repeated poisonous gas attacks. Initially successful, German counterattack at night soon threw them back, which is presumably when Henry was captured, though he is not named in the war diary. From Henry’s service file, we see that he was reported MIA on July 25, a status only updated on October 19 when he was reported as PoW. He was transferred multiple times: first to the Limburg-a-Lahn camp, he was thereafter transferred and treated at Garrison Lazarette, and then to the Verden camp. According to medical inspection after repatriation, he was kept in a military hospital in Germany the entire time he was a PoW and had five separate operations. He was repatriated on May 21, 1918 and his discharge medical inspection showed that his leg had been shortened by three inches and was oozing pus. He had recovered sufficiently by the end of 1918 to be invalided and discharged as medically unfit. Whether as an exchanged prisoner, to accept a

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repatriated on May 21, 1918 and his discharge medical inspection showed that his leg had been shortened by three inches was oozing pus. He had recovered sufficiently by the end of 1918 to be invalided and discharged as medically unfit, though he mysteriously did not qualify for a disability pension. For Henry’s service file, see RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 4276 – 44.
commission, or because of desertion, discharge from service prior to armistice occurred because of a variety of reasons beyond age or health.

During the war, DIA Headquarters officials adjudicated more than forty applications for discharge based on unsuitability, most between 1915 and 1917. As early as June 1915, Scott received a petition for discharge on behalf of Richard Pine of Garden River, who also happened to be the Great Grandson of Shingwaukonse. The petition, signed by four members of Garden River, noted that Pine was not of age and had made a mistake in enlisting with the 37th Battalion.\(^{25}\) The DIA was also involved with the return of Blood member Lieutenant Albert Mountain Horse of the 4th CMR from Southern Alberta, who invalided home in November 1915 “seriously ill” with tuberculosis. Mountain Horse was one of the first invalided Indigenous soldiers, and his death in late November at Quebec City generated much discussion among the Agency and Headquarters, as it did as well among the band.\(^{26}\) As these sorts of cases became more regular, neither DIA officials nor band councils commented extensively on the return of invalided or otherwise-discharged men during or after the war. Yet some cases necessitated intervention by the DIA into matters generally governed by the DMD. Usually, these were cases where Indigenous soldiers and their families appealed to the DIA to have themselves or their family member discharged because of an underage soldier, ailing family members, or unusual circumstances.

While the DIA had little authority to overturn attestations, or make decisions about discharge, military officials seem to have taken DIA interventions seriously, especially in cases


\(^{26}\) RG 10 v. 6670 f. 452-124-1A.
of underage soldiers. Most discharges for “non-medical unfitness” related to age: as many were due to underage as overage, though not all underage soldiers were automatically discharged. Some, like Nelson Bombery of Six Nations, made it to England before being transferred to a “Youth Battalion,” designed to hold underage soldiers until they qualified for active service. In most cases, as with many of the underage discharge applications, DIA Headquarters communicated with the DMD to have the discharges completed; this was done in spite of the DIA Headquarters’ explicit position to Indian Agents and others that the DIA had no jurisdiction over military matters. Scott’s magnanimous approach to discharge also applied to compassionate cases, such as when an ailing parent or child required their family member to return, and the like. With the difficulty of securing enough recruits during the final years of the war, DIA magnanimity waned. By mid-1917, as numbers of Indigenous enlistments decreased, DIA

27 In some cases they got through. Sam Dowan of the Oak River band in the Griswold Agency, Manitoba ran away from his Industrial School to enlist at the age of sixteen; in April 1917, his arm was severed by shrapnel from a shell at Vimy, as recorded in both his Agent’s undated letter to DIA HQ, RG10 v. 6767 f. 452-30 and again in RG 10 v. 6771 f. 452-30 as well as his service file RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 2633 - 43. Roy Snake was thirteen when he enlisted according to his Agent’s correspondence in RG 10 v. 6771 f. 452-29, though his Attestation papers list him as eighteen years old, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 9130 - 24. On Bombery, see RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 864 - 73. In total, at least 2,200 underage soldiers died in the CEF.

28 Margaret Crain lobbied the DIA to have Albert discharged in order that he may help her with farm work LAC, RG 10, volume 6767, file 452-15 pt. 1. Letter from Margaret Crain to the DIA, 11 May 1916. All three of her sons had enlisted, and this had denied the necessary labour required to look after her farm. Scott lobbied Colonel Thompson of the 114th Battalion to have Albert returned, but the matter of harvest leave was tricky; Thompson wrote that he simply could not override Militia Orders. LAC, RG 10, volume 6767, file 452-15 pt. 1. Letter from Scott to Col. Thompson, 19 May 1916. See also letter from Thompson to Scott, 23 May 1916. Albert’s eventual release a year later, due to a special order from DMD, was possibly influenced by this earlier request from the DIA.

29 William Graham’s request for the discharge of Pte. David John of the Lytton Band, whose mother and brother were ailing with consumption and whose family ranch was falling into disrepair was met with intransigence: Scott coldly replied that the matter of discharge rested with the overseas military authorities. Scott’s response was only partially true, since the DIA had actively intervened into numerous military affairs pertaining to Indians during the latter years of the war. Scott also noted that, “in view of the exigencies of the service it is almost useless to ask for any discharge more especially of men physically fit. It is not, therefore, considered advisable to ask for this discharge.” LAC, RG 10, volume 6767, file 452-15 pt. 1. Letter from Scott to Graham, 31 October 1918. DIA intervention continued after armistice in Western Europe, including Agent T.H. Carter’s request for the discharge of two men of the Peguis Band who had joined the Siberian Expedition, but whose families were physically and financially ailing. LAC, RG 10, volume 6767, file 452-15 pt. 1. Letter from Carter to Scott, 14 November 1918. Also, as late as April 1920, DIA Headquarters was in communication with the Militia Authorities over the question of discharges for underage Indians in uniform. LAC, RG 10, volume 6767, file 452-15 pt. 1. Letter from McLean to the Militia Council, 1 April 1920.
Headquarters began to refuse applications for discharge, as did government officials for non-Indigenous recruits.

Excepting the applications for discharge based on various factors ranging from age-exemption to the necessity of farm labour, the DIA had similar experience in managing leaves, furloughs, and special exemptions prior to armistice. DIA Headquarters was reticent to disclose their autonomy when dealing with military matters, instead preferring to publicly pronounce that they had no jurisdiction over military matters while privately managing military matters as they applied to Indigenous peoples. Such was the case with Fred Ahetapew from the Kahkewistahaw band in southern Saskatchewan’s Crooked Lake Agency. Having enlisted in March 1917 with the 249th O.S. battalion and quickly rising to the rank of Lieutenant, Ahetapew was granted sick leave by the Officer Commanding to return to Broadview, Saskatchewan from October 22 to November 12 1917. On the date of return, Ahetapew wired the Officer Commanding for an extension of leave owing to severe kidney trouble. Thereafter, Ahetapew continued his leave at Broadview unlawfully. Ahetapew asked the Crooked Lake Agent to write DIA Headquarters so that he would be transferred to Military District No. 12 and gain medical treatment. Ahetapew asked for his case to be left “entirely in the hands of the Department.”

Repeatedly, in letters to applicants, Scott or the local agent told applicants that the DIA had no authority to interfere in

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30 LAC, RG 10, volume 3181, file 452-124-1A. Letter from E. Taylor to McLean, 24 November 1917. On 5 December, McLean asked the Militia Council for Ahetapew’s case to be reviewed. LAC, RG 10, volume 3181, file 452-124-1A. Letter from McLean to the Militia Council, 5 December 1917. In a separate case, John Capton of the Six Nations asked the DIA for his brother Clarence Capton of the 75th Battalion to be sent home if possible as their mother was very ill and “seems to have lost her mind.” LAC, RG 10, volume 3181, file 452-124-1A. Letter from John Capton to the DIA, 5 March 1918. John Capton expected that the return of Clarence would restore their mother to health. Indian Superintendent Gordon J. Smith wrote Scott in supplement to John Capton’s letter, recommending the return of John on the grounds that “Mrs. Capton’s health is seriously impaired through fretting over her two sons who are overseas,” and “Mrs. Capton would not ask for the return of her son under any other circumstances.” LAC, RG 10, volume 3181, file 452-124-1A. Letter from Gordon J. Smith to Scott, 6 March 1918. Importantly, Smith asked Scott to oblige the request “through the usual channels,” indicating that the processes of effecting discharges, as well as the authority of DIA Headquarters to do so, was well known within the outside service branch.” Ibid.
military matters. The next letter in the file was usually a DIA letter doing precisely that.\textsuperscript{31}

DIA Headquarters’ handling of cases regarding applications for exemptions and management of furloughs shows that they had periodically responded to questions of personnel movement and demobilization during the war. These interventions were limited but suggest the degree of interdepartmental authority the DIA enjoyed vis-à-vis the DMD. Part of this authority was strictly administrative. DIA personnel had access to reliable records and Agents were the primary point of contact between Indigenous peoples and the state; all the more so for remote communities. Yet the DIA derived part of their authority from the mandate to administer Indigenous peoples as expressed by the Indian Act. By 1918, DIA Headquarters had a clearly defined process for obtaining discharges from the DMD, and had won authority to do so, as it had with enlistments, MSA exemptions, voting rights, and the enforcement of wartime Orders in Council on reserve. Yet the increasingly difficult standards by which the DIA afforded requests for discharge illustrate how, by 1918, wartime manpower exigencies largely overrode sentimentality. Management of personnel and reintegration became a critical issue upon the arrival of armistice.

\textit{Mass Demobilization: Armistice and Repatriation}

By November 11, 1918, 424,589 of the 620,000 CEF enlistees had made the journey overseas to the UK and approximately 345,000 had served in France, Belgium, and Germany.\textsuperscript{32} At armistice,
100,000 soldiers were in France with another 100,000 in England in various capacities. The death toll was 59,554 killed, and another 43,000 in overseas hospitals. Getting these soldiers home was a challenge. As early as 1917, government and military officials had grappled with the challenge of returning a third of a million men and women from overseas. The DMD was aware of these difficulties. We can see from the pre-armistice returnees that the processes of return were streamlined by mid-1918, with the establishment of depots to receive men, medical inspections to determine further care or pensioned support, and a series of discharge forms to collect key information.

Prior to armistice, many different views on how to proceed with an inevitable demobilization circulated among government and military officials. Ideas for policies of return varied between a “first over first back” policy of prioritizing the return of “old originals” who had served since 1914 in order of enlistment date, to the civilian government’s preferred “pivotal men” plan, in which men would be returned according to their vocation on the assumption that high-demand and high-skilled labourers returning first would stave off an economic downturn. Arthur Currie and others expressed support for “sponsored returns,” in which units and officers would return as a collective group and disband at their point of muster. In the end, military officials struck a compromise with politicians; the CEF’s four divisions were sent back as units but the rest of the CEF returned in demobilization drafts.33

Anticipating a systematic need to process and care for returning cases of invalided men, the MHC incorporated as the federal Department of Soldiers’ Civil Re-Establishment (DSCR) in February 1918 with Senator James Lougheed as its first Minister. This act effectively transferred

33 Nicholson, Official History, 531; see also Cook, Shock Troops, 591-592.
control of more than two thousand convalescent and care beds to government control and ended the wide scale voluntary approach to invalided care that dominated the early years of the MHC. Militarily, in July 1918, the “Clearing Services” command was established, part of a substantial administrative improvement to the bureaucracy of military demobilization. For example, Army Order 93, originally established in 1917 to collect detailed information for demobilizing men in anticipation of mass demobilization, was quickly struck down. Concerned with processing thousands of men per day, the Clearing Services asserted that demobilization officials could ignore Order 93 with a stamp. Additionally, they established 22 demobilization depots to ensure men would have the chance to receive discharge closer to home than Halifax or Quebec City, points of debarkation.

In spite of administrative and governmental improvements, the period of mass demobilization that followed was as much an interruption to demobilization planning as it was a boon. Winter was fast approaching, which meant ice in ports and bad weather for the ocean crossing. Additionally, worn out railways and limited rolling stock in Canada, plus an Atlantic shipping shortage meant Canadian ports could only receive thirty thousand men per month. Halifax’s Pier II was operational as a main point of return, but was still missing its roof from the 1917 explosion. Many other parts of the city remained in ruins. Allied command initially saw the armistice as a break in fighting, with an occupation of Germany needed to ensure the Allied effort would maintain an upper hand. Two divisions of the CEF occupied Germany over winter, including all Indigenous soldiers not invalided or serving with non-combat service battalions. Those in the Canadian Divisions took positions at key bridgeheads along the Rhine River starting

on November 17. As Tim Cook suggests, occupation meant a “miserable winter for the Canadian troops.”36 As with all Divisional soldiers in Germany, Indigenous soldiers endured wretched conditions, boredom, and frustrations too.

In mid-January, the occupation drew to a close and Canadian divisions began pulling out of Germany for transport back to England. Patrick Brittain’s experience was typical. Brittain was a married blacksmith from the Duck Lake Agency in Saskatchewan, who spent the winter guarding a Rhine bridgehead before being returned to England on January 20 1919 at part of the withdrawal of forces.37 Similarly, Joe Dick from Kamloops served with the 29th and was among the later returnees to England, whose unit did so on April 11, 1919.38 Even with the return of the divisions from the continent, repatriation to Canada remained a desperately slow process for many eager men who had been in the service for years. With the waiting and terrible weather came a wave of influenza in early winter 1919, affecting 45,000 CEF members and killing between 800-4,000 Canadian troops.39 At least one in five Indigenous soldiers contracted influenza while in the service – possibly more, considering the number of unspecified “sick” or general “P.U.O.” (pyrexia of unknown origin) designations in their medical records – and many in early 1919.

Poor conditions brought bad behavior; with delayed return, a continuity of service in Germany after the armistice, illness and bad weather, both morale and discipline began to slip. A general breakdown in regimented discipline became apparent from November onward among Canadian troops, particularly during and after taking up positions in Germany.40 Officers

37 See RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 1079 – 41.
38 See RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 2504 – 50.
responded with an increased use and duration of “F.P. No. 1” (field punishment number 1, a serious punishment that often included an induced stress position, with a soldier being tied to a post or cross with wire or string) and F.P. No. 2. (field punishment number 2, a lesser punishment, with a soldier sometimes being punished by carrying additional packs, increased sentry duty, latrine maintenance responsibilities, or being placed in fetters and handcuffs but not tied to a location) to remedy minor infractions.\textsuperscript{41} Indigenous soldiers received the same discipline as non-Indigenous soldiers, with the use of both field punishments, as well as docking of pay appearing variably in at least ten percent of Indigenous soldiers’ service files. Alcohol was the source of at least 60\% of the infractions, broadly corresponding to the experience of non-Indigenous soldiers. For some, such as Hiram Hill and John Doota, the infractions occurred frequently. Hill was sentenced to Field Punishment on five separate occasions for being absent from his post, while Doota was charged with repeated drunkenness while on guard duty.\textsuperscript{42} Such infractions were common among all soldiers of the CEF, indicating the degree to which Indigenous soldiers were both integrated and acculturated to the norms of soldiering; whether drunkenness, absence from post or without leave, mishandling kit, or disobeying an order.

Notwithstanding the sort of petty infractions endemic to units in wartime, systemic indiscipline boiled over between March and June 1919 into thirteen separate “incidents” of unit-level breakdown in order. The most famous occurred at the transit camp Kinmel Park on March 4 and 5 1919, when 17,000 troops participated in a camp-wide “riot,” protesting the delays in demobilization and camp conditions in general, leading to localized destruction and loss of life.\textsuperscript{43}

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\textsuperscript{41} For details of Field Punishment regulations, including diagrams of the stress positions, see RG 9 III-C-3, vol. 4121, folder 2, file 6.
\textsuperscript{42} For Hiram Hill’s Service Record, see RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 4352 – 38. For John Doota’s Service Record, see RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 2601 – 58.
\textsuperscript{43} See Morton, “Kicking and Complaining,” 334-360.
Officials tried and convicted more than 50 leaders, including the Rainy River Cree soldier Robert Archie. Military police had arrested Archie near a storehouse in Kinmel Park the evening of March 5 and brought him to a detention barrack along with a group of about twenty others. For reasons unknown, a group of officers restoring order singled out Archie as a leader of the riot by and brought him to a detention facility at Liverpool to await court martial. The two official charges against him were “Joining in a mutiny in Forces belonging to His Majesty’s Military Forces in that he at Kim. Park Camp, on or about the 5th day of March 1919 joined in a mutiny by combining among themselves with their soldiers of the Canadian Expeditionary Forces to resist their superior officer and to attack camp” and the lesser charge of “not actively resisting mutiny.” In June 1919, a court martial board tried Archie separately from four others accused of similar offences. In the court martial records, testimony from three witnesses reported seeing Archie near a group of stables, shouting and waving his hat at officers, and later leading men on a charge towards a billet. In his defense, his advocate argued that, as he was

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44 Archie enlisted at Rainy River, March 6 1916 with the 141st Overseas Battalion, which arrived in England May 7 1917 aboard S.S. Olympic. He was thereafter taken on strength with 18th reserve battalion and sent to field with 44th battalion on June 30, 1917. Archie was wounded slightly on October 28 1918, and transferred on strength to a casualty company and invalided to England on December 7 1918 – possibly influenza. He was treated in hospital and transferred to Kinmel Park for transport to Canada before the riots hit. RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 214 – 4.


47 These court martial proceedings were legal in nature for which no jury presided, but rather the President and members of court were all commissioned officers. There was no system of appeals. Courts martial were divided into four types: regimental, district, general and field general, divided by the severity of the offence and the powers of sentencing that were provided to each kind. The most severe “general” and “field general” courts martial could try all ranks and could award sentences up to and including death. General court martial had a board of between five and nine officers; a field general court martial required three officers. These two types of court martial normally tried charges of mutiny. Given the seriousness of these types of charges there was normally a court martial officer appointed whose duty was to advise the court on procedures and issues of military law. However the prosecution and members could come from the accused’s unit or from elsewhere, as happened in Archie’s case. Most of the officers involved had minimal legal training. See Julian Putkowski, *British Army Mutineers 1914-1922*, (London: F. Boutle, 1998), 10; Morton provides the figure of 59 soldiers jailed at Liverpool to await court martial and others were tried summarily by their commanding officers. Morton, “‘Kicking and Complaining’, “ 350.
“full-blooded Indian,” he was not capable of being mutinous, as he was racially incapable of understanding that concept; the supposed cognitive simplicity ascribed to Indigenous peoples contributed to Archie’s substantial achievements on the battlefield – he was awarded with a citation for bravery after surviving separated from his unit in “No Man’s Land” for three days during the Canal du Nord attack – but meant he was not capable of being duplicitous. The defense suggested that he may have participated in the riot, but only because he could not help himself, his reasoned capacities being naturally deficient as an “Indian.” In the end, this defense seems to have been successful: in sharp contrast to the four others, Archie was found guilty of the second charge but not the first. Intentionally or otherwise, his defense advocate was able to deploy the predominant racial prejudices of the day shrewdly to reduce his exposure to harsh justice. Even the second charge carried a stiff penalty; Archie received a sentence of 23 months of hard labour, though he had his sentence commuted in October 1919. Archie returned quietly to Port Arthur on November 8, 1919.

The demobilization camp riots were an embarrassment and generated public outrage, but the results seemed to benefit the rioters: camp conditions were improved, and more ships materialized to hasten transatlantic shipping and hence the soldiers’ demobilization. By September, 267,813 men had returned to Canada; another 15,182 men took their release in the UK, in spite of official concerns, while 34 Canadian soldiers remained in prison, including Archie. For Indigenous soldiers, demobilization was winding down by late spring, as indicated in Figure 7.

48 “Private Robert Archie, 18th Reserve Battalion Regimental number 820363, 1919/05/30, charged with offence AA Section 7(3a), mutiny.” LAC RG150 - Ministry of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada, Series 8, File 649-D-13991.
The repatriation of Indigenous soldiers was essentially the same as non-Indigenous men. As with non-Indigenous soldiers, Indigenous returns varied in timing and experience: the range of service outcomes contributed to a diversity of returns, from the CFC forces that served in England, to the CEF units in Belgium over the winter, to the Vladivostock expedition, to Mesopotamia. Most, though not all, soldiers demobilized by the summer of 1919. The Overseas Expeditionary Force maintained a presence and personnel through 1920. No enumerated soldiers were a part of the headquarters service after armistice (though some had been involved in training and logistics roles after injury or wounds prior to armistice). For others, service roles meant their service extended past the majority experience. For example, Six Nations soldier Roland Buck enlisted in the 114th battalion in winter 1916, and suffered string of injury, illness, and wounds in service. Buck suffered influenza and an appendectomy upon arrival in England in November 1916, suffered a gunshot wound to the arm and a missing finger as well as “shell shock” during operations in 1917. Due to his permanent-injury status, Buck was reassigned to a new role in England with the Military Police as a guard at a detention facility. His return was delayed to November 1919 because of his role guarding mutineers of the demobilization riots. Some soldiers’ returns were delayed in this fashion.

For the majority of soldiers, their demobilization experience was one of bureaucracy and delay. Rationalized procedures did much to improve the efficiency in anticipation of armistice, but the processes were far from speedy. Each soldier completed thirteen different forms, in

49 See Roland Buck’s service file, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 1235 – 3. For some, repatriation preceded demobilization and discharge, as their medical care stretched into late 1919 and 1920. Unlike many invalided cases, Caradoc soldier Gilbert Stonefish was still in the service through 1920 as an invalided case, finally discharged in December 1920, as detailed in his service file, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 1405 - 5. Prince Edward Island Agency soldier Peter James Francis was repatriated in the winter of 1919, but remained in a Halifax hospital section from February through July 1919 RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 3265 – 32.
theory answering at least 363 questions. Troops endured long lineups, dental inspections, medical inspections, and venereal tests. At times, medical officials completed follow-up inspections to ensure the relative health and protect against future pension claims from the ranks. Collectively, these processes represented both necessary demonstrations of fitness in case of later claims for pension as well as elaborate rituals of collecting data and examining men’s bodies, a final counterpoint to the ritual of attestation. Inspections occurred on both sides of the Atlantic: the final medical exam for non-invalided cases occurred in both places, perhaps in case the injured soldier experienced a miraculous recovery while in transit, but more likely for a check and balance against any lighthearted medical official willing to help a grifting soldier faking injury. These initial cases of medical inspection went on to form key data adjudicating pension needs, even decades later. Soldiers in a rush to demobilize often accepted an underreporting of their state of disability as a tradeoff for a trip home.

In spite of issues with bureaucracy, inspection, and lineups, demobilization through the spring was relatively speedy. Some soldiers returned through the ports of Portland, Maine and St. John, especially wounded returnees and those returning alongside wives and families. Most soldiers were processed at Halifax’s Pier II, where boatloads of repatriated men returned by the thousands. Usually at port, the soldiers received their “last pay,” which was issued for any outstanding daily pay plus a potential clothing allowance. Soldiers also obtained “War Service Gratuity” payment as an additional payment contingent on length and location of service, which averaged $240. Some returnees were thereafter discharged at port and returned home.

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50 Without anesthetic and using rudimentary equipment, dental inspections were among the more dreaded aspects of the medical inspection processes. Maniwaki, Quebec’s Pierre Jocko had 4 teeth extracted. Even worse, James Bay Cree Walter Job suffered through the extraction of six molars. For Pierre Jocko, see RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 4840 – 12. See RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 4838 - 44.
51 Cook, Shock Troops, 590.
52 Morton and Granatstein, Marching to Armageddon, 253.
individually, though most others proceeded by train to their district headquarters for a final administrative discharge and celebratory reception. Even once in Canada, a soldier’s return was multi-staged and highly procedural.

Returns were staggered, even for soldiers from the same community and for those who had enlisted in the same unit at the same time. As overseas units from 1916 onward were usually broken up in England to replenish depleted combat battalions, surviving soldiers that had enlisted together often did not end the war in the same unit. Of the 263 enlistees from the Caradoc and Sarnia Agencies who enlisted, 139 Chippewa, Delaware, and Pottawatomi men did so with the 149th “Lambton” battalion in the winter and spring of 1916. The 149th battalion formed in November 1915 in Southwestern Ontario. This unit took up training at Camp Borden in July and sailed aboard the S.S. Lapland from Halifax and arrived April 7, 1917 at Liverpool England. From the Western Ontario Regimental Depot in Brampton, the Battalion was dispersed primarily to the 18th Overseas Battalion, with a smattering to the 1st, 47th, 48th, and 49th Overseas Battalions and often thereafter to service units; the Canadian Railway Company, Canadian Forestry Corps, Canadian Engineers, and directly to the Regimental Depot battalions. Those in combat battalions reached active service in France in the winter of 1917. Battallion command struck off strength a considerable number of men after discovering the soldiers were ill. These sick men later ended up in different units from their home battalion comrades. One year after enlisting, this cohesive group was scattered to at least 25 different units. Invalided casualties returned separately, as did non-medical discharges. At armistice, excepting those from the first division, these men received transfer to the Western Ontario Regimental Depot in England in the winter of 1919, organized into military district and regional groups, and then discharged in drafts through the spring and
summer. This group did not return as a group with their home unit, which also meant that they all returned home at different times.

This multi-staged return of repatriated troops was doubly true for Indigenous soldiers; the process of repatriation may have involved transit from a field position in continental Europe to a continental port, from the continental port to an English port, from English port to a transit Camp, back to an English port, from port to demobilization depot, and from demobilization depot to chosen place of residence. This final step from demobilization depot to place of residence was more involved for those Indigenous soldiers from remote reserves in the West. Soldiers listed their proposed place of residence on discharge documentation for those released before 1919, but officials struck this same information from forms during the period of mass demobilization. For Indigenous soldiers returning to a location at or close to a military district Headquarters, their return was relatively straightforward; for others, a much more challenging journey.

From the DIA’s perspective, the soldiers’ return was fraught with danger. Soldiers received a “War Service Gratuity” (WSG) of up to $480 in addition to any last pay owed, (the

53 The return of Six Nations soldiers from overseas is another example that illustrates how these enlistees were scattered throughout various CEF units. Many enlisted with 114th, transferred to two reserve battalions in England, then to the 107th Pioneers, which became the 1st C.E. Bn. Men split into different companies. Many end up with the 1st OS Bn instead, those that were sick in February and could not join the 107th. They went with 1st OS Bn in May 1917. After Armistice, they were organized into groups for demobilization. On a “Clear and Cold Day” in March 16, 1919 the battalion’s Hamilton Group, which included nineteen men from Six Nations, were organized and paraded at Boneffe, Belgium, and then struck off strength and sent to England for demobilization process. Alternatively Jacob Hess enlisted with the 114th, transferred to the 35th and 4th reserve battalions in England, then to the 1st OS Bn in France. Wounded in September 1918, treated at Princess Patricia Red Cross Hospital discharged from hospital in England October and transferred back to the 4th reserve battalion at Witley. Discharged in draft from Kinnel Park in January 1919 at London ON, while 1st division still guarded bridgeheads in Germany, 3 months before the 1st returned to London as a unit for discharge. 4-5 months before most six nations men returned if serving with 1st C.E. His brother in arms with the 114th, Ollie C. Hill, enlisted with 114th. Transferred to 35th, then to CFC. Encamped at Sunningdale after armistice, demobilized in draft from CFC April 1919. Even from the same area, same reserve, and same unit, these men had drastically different demobilization and repatriation outcomes.
final amount depended on the length of the soldier’s service and the vast majority of soldiers received far less than the maximum amount). With many journeys, discharged men had a number of stopovers, either after demobilization ceremonies with their units or else as part of a multi-stage transit process. With money in their pockets and a taste for life off reserve, DIA officials worried that these men would consume alcohol and solicit sex. Public debates about the role of alcohol and the pernicious threat of venereal disease as leading to moral and social decline in 1919 added an urgency to the government’s concern about soldiers’ homecomings, and the DIA’s specific concerns about returning Indigenous men. When “old original” Parry Sound Agency sniper Francis Pegahmagabow returned to Ontario from overseas, agent John M. Daly anxiously wrote DIA Headquarters to report that Pegahmagabow had received the maximum War Service Gratuity Payment but had not returned to the Parry Island reserve and was instead staying in a hotel in Toronto for “immoral” purposes. When the James Bay Cree returnees were stuck at Cochrane and Pagwa in northern Ontario, DIA Headquarters’ primary concern was that they be received by community members of the YWCA and monitored appropriately, to ensure no intemperate or immoral conduct occurred. Such expressions of paternalistic concern were

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54 Venereal rates reached almost thirty percent among active CEF members, seven times higher than cases of “trenchfoot”, Tim Cook, *Shock Troops*, 176. For specific casualty rates, see T.J. Mitchell and G.M. Smith, *Medical Services: Casualties and Medical Statistics of the Great War*, (London: HMSO, 1931), 74. On venereal disease and treatment in Canada see Suzann Buckely and Janice Dickins McGinnis, “Venereal Disease and Public Health Reform in Canada,” *Canadian Historical Review* 63:3 (September 1982): 337-354. Mary Louise Adams asserts that the perceived crisis that received an Ontario commission to study its impact was not simply a question of health and illness, but also involved the imposition of a “bourgeois morality”; see also Mary Louise Adams, “In Sickness and in Health: State Formation, Moral Regulation, and Early VD Initiatives in Ontario,” *Journal of Canadian Studies* 28 (Winter 1993): 117-130; and Jay Cassell, *The Secret Plague: Venereal Disease in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987). Regarding sex and soldiering, cultural historian Clare Makepeace’s article, “Male Heterosexuality and Prostitution During The Great War” suggests that soldiers visiting prostitutes was something that senior officers tacitly accepted as preferential to presumed negative health affects of prolonged abstinence, while soldiers themselves were primarily motivated by the desire for a proxy domestic space overseas. See Clare Makepeace, “Male Heterosexuality and Prostitution During The Great War,” *Cultural and Social History* 9, 1 (2012): 67.

55 See “Parry Sound Agency - Parry Island Band - War Record of Corporal Francis Pegahmagabow (chief ojibway tribe) - military medal and two bars - pension.” RG 10, vol. 6792, file 452-557.

56 RG 24 Volume 4645 File 99-4-103.
muted while these soldiers were overseas, but blossomed into multiple series of correspondence between field agents and Headquarters after armistice. The DIA only nominally cared about intemperance or immorality when men were overseas, and neither had knowledge of nor effected actions in the multiple cases of venereal disease and citations for drunkenness for soldiers overseas. Repatriation and demobilization demonstrated how geography dictated the limits of paternalistic colonialist supervision.

The Return to the Reserve
For all soldiers, repatriation and demobilization were bureaucratic and halting processes. For all the forms, officials, and logistics, these processes also contained intentional ritual and ostentatious displays of pageantry. Public, semi-public, and private ceremonies that marked the return of soldiers from overseas both at the place of disembarkation and at homecoming deployed ostentatious displays of pomp and circumstance. For some, disembarked men paraded before cheering crowds before their demobilization order and transport home, while the Red Cross, Boy Scouts, and other groups handed out coffee and cigarettes to the parading men. For repatriated units of the CEF that returned intact, their official discharge took place in the public spaces where they had embarked years earlier. At special rallies, civic leaders often gave speeches and hosted receptions for the repatriated men in public squares or in front of civic buildings before the final order to “dismiss.”

Semi-public ceremonies often followed the public celebrations. Volunteer committees, mostly formed over the winter of 1919, identified suitable spaces to host receptions and banquets, and arranged the transportation and lodging for returnees sojourning before their final

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destination. Private homecomings came last of all, and generally have the least documentation to piece together. Many returnees – especially before 1919 – were able to slip back to their home destination without public fanfare or ceremony.\(^{58}\) While some homecoming celebrations occurred immediately following the discharge of soldiers, victory celebrations extended into midyear. July 19 was set aside as a summer victory celebration, and many returned Indigenous men participated in these local festivities. The media attention given to these soldiers’ returns means we know a good deal about the symbolic pageantry of each occasion, though we know less about the private, family aspect of their homecomings that generally fell outside of the public gaze.\(^{59}\)

In public and semi-public ceremonies, both during and after the war, the soldier’s and veteran’s place in society was both celebrated and idealized. Robert Rutherford’s study of the hometown experience of the Great War and its aftermath in Canada suggests that the rites of return, public speeches and banquets, were social gatherings that carefully rearticulated social order amid the celebratory atmosphere.\(^{60}\) Using the example of a GWVA banquet at the end of 1918 in Lethbridge Alberta, Rutherford discusses how the ritual served the purpose of

\(^{58}\) Rutherford, *Hometown Horizons*, 266.

\(^{59}\) Private homecomings were a typical experience. Nathan Smith argues that they were rarely mentioned in media sources for returning soldiers in Toronto. See Smith, “Comrades and Citizens,” 30. Not all private homecomings were joyous: many men came home to family’s grieving a relative’s death from influenza (50,000 died in Canada). See Cook, *Shock Troops*, 591. This made for emotional returns. Three separate repatriated Cape Croker men, for example, came home to dead family members, recorded in terrible detail in the local newspapers. Even more heart rendering is the case of casualty Judson Pinnance from Walpole Island, whose wife died of influenza just a month before his death, leaving their infant daughter orphaned. See Pinnance’s service file at RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 7844 – 51; see also Return of Demobilization form from Agent to Headquarters, RG 10 v. 6771 f. 452-30. Such occurrences were likely common and serve as a poignant counterpoint to the common image of a joyous homecoming.

\(^{60}\) Rutherford, *Hometown Horizons*, 267-268. See also Robert Rutherford, “Send-offs during Canada's Great War: Interpreting Hometown Rituals in Dispatching Home Front Volunteers,” *Histoire Sociale/Social History* 36 (November 2003), 425-464. Nathan Smith suggests that, though related to re-establishment, these speeches and the receptions in general, were similar to the addresses of public figures at events celebrating the sending-off of soldiers overseas, a clear indication that they were rooted in a discourse that promoted a vigorous war effort. Smith, “Comrades and Citizens,” 62.
recognizing, endorsing, and affirming social boundaries and imperial nationalism, drawing from mutually-understood gestures, and amplifying designated social roles. Indigenous homecomings were no different.

These features of the rites of return were important aspects of demobilization ceremonies for Indigenous soldiers and their communities. Across Canada, Indigenous communities held their own ceremonies and at later points of commemoration to honour and celebrate their returned soldiers. For example, the Blackfoot Agency in Alberta expressed an interest in both raising funds for and erecting a specific monument to the community’s war dead to commemorate their service. Notwithstanding the community celebrations, for many non-Indigenous returned soldiers, transition to civilian life also occasioned the transition back to prewar social roles. For all soldiers, the ceremony of demobilization was a deeply important moment of crossing literal, physical boundaries – back to home soil, out of uniform – and also moving across imagined boundaries through pageantry, ceremony, and ritual.

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61 Rutherdale, Hometown Horizons, 267-268.
62 Not all homecomings involved DIA Officials. In Kwawkewith Agency, Indian Agent Iver Fougner reported in March 1919 that he had heard of some Agency soldiers returning anecdotally, but that the size of agency and its population of more than one thousand residents from multiple reserves meant he had not had the opportunity to meet with them and observe their patriotic service. Fougner’s primary challenge with returning soldiers was not the homecoming of reserve soldiers, but rather a group of non-Indigenous returned men demanding access to fishing grounds on account of their status as repatriated soldiers. Ian Fougner to DIA Headquarters, March 1919, see Kwawkewlth Agency Records, RG10, volume 1656, file 27,036. LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-29. Indian Agent, Blackfoot Agency to Scott, “Keen interest in Roll of Honour,” Newspaper unknown, n.d.
soldiers, repatriation and demobilization often preceded the return to a physical and imaginary space: in the period of mass demobilization, their return precipitated a very different ceremony. This was a physical and symbolic colonialist ceremony to enforce the return of Indigenous peoples as subservient wards – not to military authorities, but to the authority of DIA officials.

Indian Agents’ authority was considerable. As key figures in enforcing DIA policy, they performed many functions to protect and expand Euro-Canadian interests and values. Their functions included a host of practical and material efforts such as advising on subjects related to farming, grazing, woodlands, fisheries, protecting encroachment; supervising reformation activities including church-administered schools, provision of health care, election or appointments of chiefs and counsellors, settling differences with neighboring ranchers or settlers; overseeing maintenance; forest ranger responsibilities; instructing and supervising agricultural and livestock production, mining, logging, wage work, businesses; and initiating, collecting, and distributing government funds, such as treaty payments. Agents also performed symbolic responsibilities; as promoters of Euro-Canadian “civilized behavior”, they promoted land and sanitary practice through demonstration; enforced heterosexual monogamous relationships and

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often presided over the arbitration of marriage; and oversaw justice as a functional magistrate and prosecutor. DIA Headquarters expected Indian Agents to familiarize themselves with the “special character and habits” of each Indigenous ward in their agency and support this surveillance with extensive documentation.\(^66\)

In the context of demobilization, Indian Agents’ surveillance likely involved a careful watch for the consumption of alcohol. Indeed, alcohol was central to the distinction between an active and demobilized Indigenous soldier. As discussed in Chapter I, alcohol was a key feature in the discussion of whether Indigenous men were entitled to enlist, and whether status as “Indian” transferred and triumphed over the citizen soldier. On the home front, Indigenous enlisted men were often excluded from access to pubs, taverns, or purchasing alcohol even while wearing the King’s uniform. DIA Headquarters had intended for this exclusion to signify how the Indian Act was portable in all contexts, and represented a continuation of pre-war policy that prohibited the sale or consumption of alcohol by those deemed “Indians” by the Indian Act.\(^67\)

This prohibition did not survive the journey overseas. For most members of the CEF, alcohol was an important part of soldiering. Even prior to the war, alcohol was part of a retinue of unsavory working class behaviours during annual militia camps that resembled more a “wild holiday” than maneuvers.\(^68\) More than just a beverage, many enlisted men saw it as having a

\(^{66}\) Ibid., 109, 114.

\(^{67}\) Katherine McGowan uses the example of the prosecution of Chapleau Cree James Chum to illustrate this point. As McGowan asserts, “James Chum’s ordeal demonstrates how race trumped the rights and opportunities of the citizen soldier. This tension between both the legal definition of and the social assumptions about the Indian and the soldier, the former trumped the latter, as manifested in how Native men were recruited, what service they were thought capable of, and what they were allowed to do once in uniform.” McGowan, “We Are Wards of the Crown,” 84. The context here is that there was a confrontation between Chum and a game warden which led to a struggle, for which Chum was arrested. In addition to McGowan’s limited research in RG13, there is some evidence that Indian soldiers prohibited from accessing alcohol or entering taverns, which is discussed in Chapter I of this dissertation.

medicinal property, steadying shaky courage and fortifying trench-dwellers against wet, cold conditions. From top to bottom, rum was an institutionalized and regimented component of the soldiers’ ability to endure the war, argues Tim Cook.\(^{69}\) During active service, Indigenous soldiers drank alcohol along with most others in the ranks, and often received official reprimand from battalion Non-Commissioned Officers for over-consumption. This was not unusual, since drunkenness was common, under-reported, and produced more Courts Martials than all other infractions combined.\(^{70}\) Still, regular letters home (especially uncensored officers’ letters) meant that the problem of drunkenness in the ranks was quite widely known back home because of family letters. Indigenous peoples were likely aware of this privilege of enlistment through their communications with family members whom had enlisted.\(^{71}\)

Indigenous returnees came home to prohibition both as “Indians” under the Indian Act and also in a broader context. During the war, a coalition of groups pushed successfully to have alcohol prohibited in varying degrees in each province. In spite of the soldierly fondness of booze, temperance advocates argued that abstaining from alcohol was a supreme symbol of citizenship and patriotism, as temperance groups like the Young Men’s Christian Association and Women’s Christian Temperance Union cajoled citizens to fully commit to the nation’s cause, with “lollygagging” and drinking in pubs not helpful for the national war effort. Those who failed to give up drink, were, as Cook suggests, seen to be “hindering victory.”\(^{72}\)

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\(^{69}\) Tim Cook, ““More a Medicine than a Beverage”: ‘Demon Rum’ and the Canadian Trench Soldier of the First World War,” *Canadian Military History* 9, 1 (Winter 2000): 6-22, 7. Moreover, argues Cook, “soldiers viewed it as medicine, a combat motivator and a general reward for life in the trenches; designated as such, rum was also assigned social properties which were incorporated into trench culture.” 10


\(^{72}\) Cook, “More a Medicine than a Beverage,” 10.
could not help but notice the peculiar contradiction that society expected the men to endanger themselves for the cause, but were simultaneously barred from consuming alcohol because it could push them to immoral actions.\textsuperscript{73} Soldiers rejected, even rioted over explicit efforts to remove their access to the drink.\textsuperscript{74}

Insofar as provincial prohibitions intended to purify society, their imposition paradoxically reduced a substantial distinction between Indigenous and non-Indigenous. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, liquor restrictions helped delineate who was Indigenous and “Indian,” and who was not. As Robert A. Campbell argues, “When one considers the extent of intermarriage and ‘race mixing,’ liquor restrictions created a binary distinction between Whites and Indians that did not exist in reality.”\textsuperscript{75} Additionally, since this law imposed a prohibition on anybody that acted, looked like, or associated with “Indians” as defined by the Indian Act, this distinction was perhaps more fundamental than the legal category allowed. Renisa Mawani has added to Campbell’s suggestion by adding that British Columbia officials used liquor laws to enforce distinctions that included mixed-race peoples in addition to those with the legal status of “Indian,” and so liquor laws helped “police racial boundaries and to assert racial and spatial purity.”\textsuperscript{76} Adele Perry concludes that access to alcohol was a “lived marker of citizenship” for non-Indigenous peoples.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{73} Tim Cook, “‘Wet Canteens and Worrying Mothers:’ Alcohol, Soldiers and Temperance Groups in the Great War,” \textit{Social History} 35, 70 (2002), 323.
\textsuperscript{77} Adele Perry, \textit{On the Edge of Empire: Gender, Race, and the Making of British Columbia}, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).
Liquor was perhaps the most present and defining feature that separated Indigenous from non-Indigenous. Mariana Valverde reasons that “liquor laws governed racial status as much as, and perhaps more effectively than, they governed drinking.”78 As Indigenous soldiers encountered and consumed alcohol throughout, and probably after their repatriation, the assertion of the DIA’s right to surveille and prohibit returned soldiers’ access to alcohol was part of a broader move in which the DIA reasserted its power over their wards. Fundamentally, in this situation as with the question of Indigenous peoples and alcohol more broadly, citizenship, veteranship, race, and alcohol were entangled concepts.79 The Indigenous soldier’s return implied the end of access to alcohol, the relinquishment of claims to citizenship or veterans’ status, and the acceptance of their racial inferiority and status as wards of the crown. In that sense, the Indian Agent’s role, in part, was to monitor and ensure that Indigenous returned men were not accessing alcohol and repatriated back as wards and not veterans.

The return of Indigenous soldiers brought the practical and symbolic authority of each Indian Agent, and their responsibility for conducting surveillance into sharp focus. Following up on their systematic tracking of Indigenous enlistments, at demobilization, Scott asked for each Agency to conduct an interview with returning Indigenous soldiers and gather information from them regarding their war service. Intending to understand the extent of enlistments and their geographic patterns, Agents enumerated soldiers so that the DIA could appropriately respond to

wartime challenges of administration (See Chapter I). Scott also used data collection as a means to accumulate political capital by bringing form to the scope of Indigenous enlistments and replicate these facts in the media and government reports, generally around the themes of the “loyalty and submission” of Indigenous communities and soldiers.\(^80\) Immediately following armistice, Scott repeated this process by sending a number of Departmental circulars to Agencies across Canada to establish a body of statistics regarding returned Indigenous soldiers. DIA general correspondence includes two files containing the circulars and their responses; one dated December 16, 1918 containing responses over the next two months, and another from February 7, 1919 containing responses throughout the following spring. Earlier circulars designed to enumerate recruitment, including “Return of Indian Enlistments” forms served as a formatting guide, though the December and February circulars and sets of responses were specifically geared towards gathering information on returned soldiers and military service.

Scott’s December circular contained a brief message, asking agents across the Dominion to forward “as complete a record as possible of Indian enlistments during the war in your agency. [As well as any information] with regard to the record of any of the Indians from your agency at the front.”\(^81\) Regarding the February circular, Scott asked for a more detailed set of information from Agents, including name, regimental number, battalion, property or other assets, and whether the soldiers endured any physical disabilities. Scott asked the agents to describe the nature of these wounds and indicate whether the wounds were likely to be permanent.

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\(^80\) See MacDowall, “Loyalty and Submission.”

\(^81\) LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-29. All-agency Circular, 16 December 1918.
Scott received responses to the December circular from 68 Indian Agents detailing the service of 1,164 Indigenous soldiers. 82 Regarding the February circular, seventy Indian Agents responded with the requisite information for 673 Indigenous soldiers. 83 Some of the responses to the February circular overlapped with the December circular responses. Responses to Scott’s February circular follow a similar pattern. Many agents used the Return of Indian Enlistment forms, with some utilizing all fields in the form and others only indicating name and battalion. Some opted to write a single list of names while others included letters, newspaper clippings, and other addendums to their required information. The only noticeable difference in the responses to the February circular has to do with the level of detail. Because Scott defined parameters more clearly in the February circular, an increased number of agents included information regarding dependents, property, and disability than in the responses to the December circular. While some Agents replicated the abbreviated answers endemic to the December circulars’ responses and

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82 Responses to Scott’s December circular varied according to agent. Many agents opted to reuse the Return of Indian Enlistments form, providing stock responses. The Rama Agency agent, for instance, carefully indicated each soldier’s name, regimental number, band, agency, treaty status, whether the soldier served overseas or in Canada, whether the soldier was sick, wounded, killed, or returned, number and relationship of dependents, and further remarks on military medals, desertion, enlistment and discharge dates. LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-29. Rama Agency Return of Indian Enlistments, n.d.,

83 Of those writing custom responses, many lacked key details; the Saugeen Agent hand-wrote a version of the form, but only included names of enlistees and indicated if any were killed or wounded in one long list. LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-29. Saugeen Agency to the Department of Indian Affairs, “Names of Indians enlisting from the Saugeen Reserve”, 16 January 1919. The agent for the Southwestern agency in New Brunswick used the Return of Indian Enlistments form but only indicated name, battalion and reserve, and indicated regimental numbers for less than half of the soldiers. LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-29. South Western Agency, New Brunswick Return of Indian Enlistments, n.d. Agent Picotte of Christian Island reported on the status of Wilfred Coppegog and Cain Monague, both of whom fought with the 157th, but only indirectly mentions three unnamed enlistees, two of whom were rejected. LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-29. Indian Agent Picotte to DC Scott, 26 December 1918. While agents like Picotte did not provide reliable information, some agents provided a wealth of detailed information, providing an abundance of materials and detailed information. The agent for the Prince Edward Island Agency included excerpts from a series of letters written in a military hospital by Mi’kmaw private P.J. Francis to the reserve to provide colourful evidence of wartime heroism and sacrifice. LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-29. Indian Superintendent, Grand River P.E.I. to the Department of Indian Affairs, 21 December 1918. One agent, presumably from Port Arthur, included newspaper clippings with detailed stories of Indigenous soldiers. LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-29. “Indians Show Old Time Fighting Spirit, Memorial Cross to be Erected on Mt. Mc.”, Port Arthur Daily News Chronicle, n.d.
simply indicated name and battalion, most answers to the February circular included far more information on the questions of property holding and disability status. Many Indian Agents who responded in one file, however, did not respond to the other. Moreover, as the process of demobilization dragged well into 1919, many of the individuals named in the February file, particularly the responses dating to the summer of 1919, were not included in the December responses because they had not yet returned from overseas service.

The purpose and mechanism of data collected closely resembled the DIA’s collection of data for enlistment numbers. From the establishment of firm numbers of recruits, casualties (dead and wounded), occupations, landholdings, and other such information was a firm foundation from which to build postwar policy for returned Indigenous veterans. Much of this data was redundant: Military authorities and the DSCR were collecting similar information on every soldier upon their demobilization, a feature of the bureaucratic and paperwork-heavy procedures in England and Canada. Returned soldiers’ occupations, addresses, and aspirations were the subject of entire forms. Indian Agents conducted the DIA’s data collection to establish

84 As an example of the more detailed entries, a February 19 1919 response by the Gore Bay, Ontario Indian Agent detailed precise information about returned soldiers of the Agency. Instead of merely indicating name and battalion, this agent reported “I beg to inform you that David Debassige # 739912, 114th Batt. Wounded in both arms, permanent injury, but will be able to light work, pension only $5.00 per month, and it has been inadequate, and I asked Dr. Davis for a report on him some time ago but as yet have not received it and think he should have re-examination. He has been granted fifty acres of land on the Reserve and land is good no improvements, and application sent in for location ticket 14 January 19. This man should have larger pension and be helped to clear and build.” LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-30. Letter from Gore Bay Agent to the Secretary, DIA 19 February 1919.

85 On 19 December 1918, the Agent for Sturgeon Falls indicated 22 returned men from the Nipissing Band in response to the December circular. This response merely recorded each name in succession, and wrote in the margins indicating two who were “Killed in Action” and four who returned “Wounded.” The same agent responded to the February circular on 31 March 1919 indicating three men who had recently returned from overseas. These three men were already included in the 19 December list, though the 31 March letter also included the three men’s battalion, casualty state, property holdings, prewar occupation, and current occupation. T.A. Stout, Agent for the Mississauga of the Saugeen, also recorded the same information twice. He responded to the December circular with a Return of Indian Enlistment form, dutifully recording information in all required fields except “dependents,” and wrote a further series of notes in response to the February circular which indicated the required information for each soldier as they returned to the agency.
independent data that reflected their understanding of the war, not the DSCR’s experience. Scott was probably trying to make sense of the war, who was returning, and what their return meant.

The data collection also served another important purpose; the very mechanism of collection – Indian Agents’ personal interviews with returned men – symbolically rearticulated the colonial order on reserves.

All that survives of the meetings between Agents and returning soldiers are the information for 1,837 soldiers submitted by the Indian Agents to Headquarters, as neither group of participants recorded their interactions in further detail. We can reasonably speculate that the agent would meet with returning men at their point of disembarkation – such was the case with the Six Nations Superintendent and probably the case for other Agents with local offices – or else would send notice of the need to meet. Meetings would have involved a question and answer period, where the Agent asked these questions and received responses to their service record, details of pension, and physically review or inspect the bodies of the returned Indigenous soldier to see the extent and nature of their injury, if relevant. Having been through this multiple times in England and Canada, the interview process would probably not have been unusual for the returning men, yet this was not a process necessitated of other civilian men that had been demobilized; this was strictly for Indigenous peoples returning to reserve.

DIA demobilization returns are useful more as a source of understanding how the process of collecting information supported Canada’s colonial practices than as an accurate rendering of lived experience.86 Data collected by agents in their interviews with returning Indigenous

86 In Bruce Curtis’s study of the national census in Canada during the nineteenth century, he argues that the process of collecting information was more important in the context of Victorian nation building than the rendering of objective data itself; census data was essentially corrupted by the nature of its collection and was not particularly reliable. See Bruce Curtis, The Politics of Population: State Formation, Statistics, and the Census of Canada, 1840-
soldiers is not particularly valuable as an objective rendering of their military service; this information was available in abundance from a thorough military bureaucracy, pension boards, and the DSCR, albeit these agencies had a specific mission and institutional filter that led to biases in reportage at times. Agents conducting physical inspections of men’s bodies to assess the nature of the wounds was redundant for the returning Indigenous soldier – they had already had inspections in England prior to repatriation and again in Canada by military medical officials.

When comparing these documents, Indian Agents collected information appears fraught with inconsistencies and inaccuracies; not being medical authorities, Agents frequently misdiagnosed or misunderstood the nature of disabilities. When his Indian Agent inspected and interviewed William N. John, he reported as having suffered a training accident affecting his ankle in England, even though his medical records in his service file indicate he received discharged for defective vision and a bad shoulder that pre-existed service. Frank Froman had received separate gunshot wounds in each leg, but the Indian Agent reported this as a single injury in only one leg, as the other injury was not visible to him. Some were simply underreported. The Indian Agent’s description of George Blais King’s injury, that he had mostly recovered from a minor injury, seriously downplayed the critical nature of his permanent injuries.

1875, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002). Curtis reinforces this point by exploring Foucault’s concept of “Governmentality”, and how the “discovery of population” facilitated the process of state formation whereby the transition from police rule to liberal modes of government was completed. See Bruce Curtis, “Foucault on governmentality and population: The impossible discovery,” Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers canadiens de sociologie (2002): 505-533. Michelle Hamilton has made the same argument in her article, "’Anyone not on the list might as well be dead’: Aboriginal peoples and the Censuses of Canada, 1851–1916,” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association/Revue de la Société historique du Canada 18, 1 (2007): 57-79.
87 William N. John service file, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 4843 – 16.
from both shrapnel and bullets. Others were over-reported or elaborated, like William Henry Cote from Pelly Agency: discharged with “no deformity, maiming, or illness,” according to inspection at Kinmel Park on December 23, 1918 in spite of months of hospitalization for a shrapnel wound suffered September 1918 during an attack on the Drocourt–Quéant Line during the “100 Days” campaign. The Agent’s inspection upon return, however, revealed “Gunshot wounds in face, arm, and legs. Loss of teeth interfering with eating permanently.” The difficult standards established by a medical inspection boards in England meant that the boards often underreported or qualified injury or wound only by its presumed interference on one’s return to prewar occupation. Agents’ different standards of reporting wounds is thus explicable; relying on sight and with a small sample size, plus viewing the spectacle of a returned soldier with war injuries, Agents were more likely to designate the injury in non-medical descriptive detail. The level of description with both Agents’ returns and service files intended to communicate large volumes of summative data, which unsatisfactorily communicates both vague and inaccurate details.

Although medical inspections are perhaps the most questionable areas of the DIA’s data, other points of data are similarly unreliable. The agents’ correspondence with HQ contains a multiplicity of small factual errors and duplication issues. Some agents responded to the circular requests multiple times, meaning that the enlistments and return numbers can appear artificially inflated. Government officials enumerated Thaddeus Knockwood and some others from the Prince Edward Island Agency, for example, on the return of enlistments and demobilization.

89 RG 10 v. 6771 f. 452-30. RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 5165 – 33.
90 RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 2032 - 79
91 RG 10 v. 6771 f. 452-30
records at least four separate times. Agents were either sorting through data without carefully considering each case, were not taking proper notes, or simply did not have access to clear information. Occasionally agent records had the wrong information regarding enlistments, such as Maurice Prairie Hen reported having enlisted at Calgary, but who actually enlisted at Edmonton. These micro-errors in data clearly indicate the casual slippage of information between the transmission, reception, and recording of each individual’s record.

Occasionally, agents’ errors were more substantive. In enumerating some soldiers’ war records, these agents took artistic license to imagine details of their war records, or recorded major substantive details incorrectly. Frequently, Agents misreported tubercular cases as “gassed,” even when their military records indicate they simply suffered from TB and had not seen action. John Besito’s Agent said he was “overseas,” even though he did not make it to France because of illness and injury. The Indian Agent’s form forwarded to DIA Headquarters is contrasted by Besito’s own service record, from RG 150. Regarding TB, a representative example is that of Joseph Green from Six Nations, who was “gassed in battle,” wrote the Superintendent, even though his case was simply tubercular. Of the more troubling examples

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92 Appearing on the Agent’s correspondence with Headquarters in the following files: RG10 v. 6767 f. 452-29; RG 10 v. 6771 f. 452-30, (n.d., but pages 34, 38 and 314-315 in the file); this is in addition to the reference in service file RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 5232 – 46, the reference in the SSA file RG 10 v. 7524 f. 25057-11, and Pension files RG 10 v. 6780 f. 452-253. Comparing the agency records with military records demonstrates the sort of small clerical errors made by Agents, such as the enumeration of Claude Styers of Six Nations whose unit was indicated as the 125th, but who had actually enlisted with the 215th. The error is made in correspondence between the Superintendent Smith and DC Scott, which appears on pages 75-83 of file RG 10 v. 6771 f. 452-30. Styers’ service file corrects this error in both the attestation papers as well as the main documentation on service RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 9406 – 40.

93 See the agent’s correspondence with headquarters in response to the first circular, RG 10 v. 6771 f. 452-29 contrasted with Prairie Hen’s service record (especially attestation papers) at RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 7952 - 43

94 The superintendent’s report in RG 10 v. 6771 f. 452-30 contrasts with Green’s service record, see RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 3780 – 46. George Coming Singer, who “died of wounds” but actually died of TB that he probably caught while being invalided for a leg wound.
is the record concerning Nipigon, Ontario soldier Dennis Delaronde, who the agent said was the “first to lead battalion into trenches,” and thereafter died gloriously in a hail of bullets. However, the medical records in his service file shows that Delaronde did not die gloriously; he died in a work party repairing machine gun placements at a parapet, when a sniper shot him in the spine. Delaronde suffered an agonizingly slow death over four days as a paralyzed patient in a field hospital drowning in his own infection and blood. Either this agent had misunderstood the telegram which was included in neither the agency records nor Delaronde’s service file, or else he was taking narrative license; considering the other examples of clear misrepresentation elsewhere, it is probably that this is the case here. This agent, as others, consistently took literary license to editorialize in this manner. This editorialization communicated a standard of heroism to HQ that misrepresented the reality of the war.

Soldiers enumerated on the return of enlistment forms in 1917 often did not appear on the demobilization returns, and the reverse is true as well. In many cases, the returns were completed for some but not others. Moreover, men enlisting from off-reserve or returning to a location other than their reserve or agency were almost always left off the enlistment and demobilization forms, and we only know of their presence if they had later returned to reserve to apply as a soldier settler or whose pension or estate details were forwarded by government officials.

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95 See Denis Delaronde’s service file, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 2418 – 22.
96 The phenomenon of “record inflation” was a common feature of wartime reportage, and also representative of the self-censorship of individuals and an articulation of their special status as distinct from those that had not served overseas. See Jeffrey A. Keshen, Propaganda and Censorship During Canada’s Great War, (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1996), 197.
97 For example, the Kwawkewith Agency, British Columbia Indian Agent enumerated six enlistees from Alert Bay in the demobilization returns, but had only reported two as having enlisted in the return of enlistments two years prior. The Lunenburg Agent in Nova Scotia responded to both the return of enlistments and the original request in 1918, but did not respond to the 1919 circular. In many cases beyond these two examples, the returns were completed for some but not others.
Tracking these men down would have been difficult for agents, and demonstrates both how post-demobilization interviews were a personal process but also how agents’ rigid administration of Indigenous issues was largely geographically-contingent. At times, agents failed to enumerate dead or convalesced soldiers, and others that they did not encounter upon their return to reserve.98 While the records enumerate a few thousand soldiers, they are incomplete and may underreport the true number of recruits, dead, wounded, and non-reserve enlistees. Moreover, these errors suggest that either agents had ostensible gaps in their information – such as not knowing of a band member’s receipt of a next of kin death notification – or else an intentional ignorance of non-reserve happenings.

All that remains of these interviews and data collection are incomplete and contradictory records, probably less reliable than service records that military officials collected with the expressed purpose of carefully documenting war service and war-related injuries for posterity. The Agents’ sparse records reflect how they understood these interactions and framed by what they wished to communicate to Headquarters. Indian Agents intentionally filtered their records in this manner. In some cases, Agents may not have collected information through personal interviews, as the Kenora Agency Indian Agent in northern Ontario, for example, complained about only getting information at “treaty time” and that families of soldiers were not forthcoming with their correspondence with their kin.99 Indian Agents conducted many of the interviews in

98 A straightforward case of that happening is that of Joseph Crow from the Cote Band in the Pelly Agency, Saskatchewan. Crow died as “wastage” in March 1917. His agent did not enumerate him on the return form, so it looks like he never enlisted. RG 10 v. 6771 f. 452-30. His service file indicates otherwise, see RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 2179 – 19. 152 Six Nations enlistees were enumerated for the return of enlistments in 1917, part of RG10 v. 6767 f. 452-17. This same group was not recorded on the first circular responses and counted as only 57 in the second circular responses in RG 10 v. 6771 f. 452-30. Between these sources plus pension files and Soldier Settlers not included in the return of enlistments and demobilized, this study has enumerated 224 Six Nations soldiers, which is still missing about one hundred; we know that 287 soldiers from the Six Nations alone enlisted in the 114th overseas battalion, see Winegard, “Indigenous Peoples of the British Dominions and the First World War,” 122.

99 Letter from Kenora Indian Agent to Headquarters, October 17, 1918, in RG10 v. 6767 f. 452-17.
person, made plain by the correspondence between Agents and Headquarters regarding the challenges of tracking down and sitting with each returned soldier, but some were not. The written reports do not clearly identify when Agents produced records through personal meetings versus correspondence.

These challenges aside, the DIA’s production of demobilization data is fascinating. Indian Agents’ annotations in the recorded information, use of informal nicknames or Indigenous names, and sense of familiarity with the soldiers and their families is strikingly different from other government sources, like attestation papers or service record files. This local, intimate knowledge is generally lacking in the institutional and formal records of the DMD Headquarters. Demobilization interviews were not strict, ostensibly dispassionate or impartial inspections like the DMD medical or pension officials in Canada and overseas. These were intimate and familiar meetings, even if a paternalistic and colonialist framework bound them. We can learn how agents viewed Indigenous bodies, and how they understood these people; what they chose to communicate to Headquarters about the returned soldiers’ frustrations, excitement, even their desire to farm (discussed in Chapter III), was important for policymaking. Above all, reasonable evidence of a dialogue that went both ways. This dialogue is invaluable to showing how local officials understood the war, and how participants challenged or stretched those interpretations.

We can read Indigenous returned soldiers voices in the transcripts of these demobilization rituals. Participants purposefully “misremembered” their war service, asserting themselves as accomplished service members, and intentionally sanitized their war records. In retelling their injuries, service records, or medical treatments, Indigenous returned men often altered or exaggerated key details to present themselves and their comrades as heroic. Agents received and retransmitted this representation to Headquarters as truth; soldiers and their families were part of
a ritual of constructing and contesting the meaning of their military service and adjusted the
details to fit with their message. Moreover, for obvious reasons, these men often downplayed or
hid issues with discipline, citations for drunkenness, cases of venereal disease, or other issues;
Agents writing of a soldier’s conduct was universally “good,” even if their service records
indicate a more grainy reality.

Indigenous soldiers’ privileged self-representations were no different from how other
veterans represented themselves. As Nathan Smith discusses in his dissertation chapter on
“Returned Heroes,” heroism and comradery were common themes in veterans’ self-expression,
and the returned men entangled heroism with notions of public service part of a mutual discourse
in which society acknowledged that a debt was owed to those that had served. Demobilized men
asserted their right to a form of special “social credit,” and the public acknowledged this credit
through the media and at community events.\footnote{100 Nathan Smith, “Comrades and Citizens,” 38-70.}

Indigenous returned men had difficulty expressing the concept of a social credit on the
same terms as non-Indigenous veterans. Such a discourse was challenging in these meetings
between colonialist official and subaltern; asserting the concept of debt and credit was warped in
the context of the Indian Act; hence Indigenous soldiers’ assertion of privilege through heroism
was an act of reclaiming power when facing a colonialist figure who had hard power on reserve
and ability to seize money and land from them. Rather, the act of misrepresenting war records
and asserting themselves as heroic men was a way to contest colonialism. Indigenous veterans
expressing these accolades asserted themselves as skilled soldiers adept at killing and celebrated
warriors that achieved an accomplishment worthy of respect, rejecting the official narrative that
they were noble savages. For others who had enlisted off reserve or left reserve upon
repatriation, service was a method to remove the DIA’s ability to influence their lives. This does
not mean that the issue of race or status no longer mattered for them, but rather that the DIA
would play little role in administering their affairs. Indian Agents not counting Indigenous men
among these records as having returned home meant that they were not “special,” but just
another repatriated and demobilized soldier that experienced a private homecoming.

Colonialist ceremonies were a continuity of the DIA’s wartime data collection, yet
infused with a symbolism that blended the ritual of repatriation with the colonialist social order.
The purpose of these special demobilization interviews was to collect information about each
soldier’s war record, but also reintroduce the agent’s power; the DIA created categories and
assigned soldiers to them. This was an intrinsic exercise in power. The information collected was
not reliable or objective, and is not a great source for assessing Indigenous war service
accurately. However, it is a great source for assessing what the DIA Headquarters knew about
Indigenous soldiers at the end of 1918 and into 1919, as they were formulating key policies
about reintegration and re-establishment; this is precisely why this data is so important. These
are not objectively truthful collective statements of the soldiers’ experience. Rather, the body of
data is a representation of a colonialist practice. The collective information represents what DIA
Headquarters understood to be their subject population in 1919, and for whom the government
needed to formulate special policies and procedures. Headquarters undoubtedly noted the agents’
reports that these men were a group with high rates of serious war-related injuries, most of which
were permanent, and a group with many farmers, most of whom had locations on reserve but
with few “improvements” or equipment and only small numbers of stock. Chapters III and IV
explain how these findings came to shape DIA policy towards returned Indigenous veterans.
Conclusion

Indigenous soldiers’ experiences overseas and during discharge closely resembled that of non-Indigenous soldiers. From enjoying the federal franchise to consuming daily rum rations in the trenches, these men accessed a place of privilege that closely resembled the status of other citizen-soldiers and temporarily suspended their subjugated status as Indians and wards. Moreover, many Indigenous soldiers’ transfer from racially separated companies into mixed units, and their harrowing experiences in combat, created emotional and cultural bonds with other soldiers that reinforced how soldiering was a totalizing identity. Indigenous soldiers’ experience with repatriation was different for each soldier, which again stresses the diversity of service outcomes for each of the thousands of Indigenous men. This diversity also demonstrates how military and medical authorities did not treat Indigenous men much differently from other soldiers, and soldiers’ service files and regimental diaries generally lack evidence of systematic discrimination. In some cases, Indigenous men such as Private Archie, drew from their Indigenous identity and asserted it publicly as well. Insofar as Indigenous soldiers experienced the war, soldiering was a transformative experience.

Officials had clear answers to challenging questions regarding the role of the state in the return of Indigenous soldiers: the DIA would serve in an advisory role regarding Indigenous discharges. The experience of pre-armistice discharge – for age, ability, invalided status, desertion, or other reasons – resembles that of non-Indigenous soldiers closely and confirms that their treatment was functionally similar to all soldiers and returned men. Only with the intervention of DIA officials to assist with the release of certain enlisted or conscripted men did the experience of Indigenous soldiers differ, though advocacy of community leaders and organizations for non-Indigenous men was also common. These key interventions, though
limited, demonstrate the degree of paternalism with which these officials operated; demobilization followed the same process as enlistment, where the Department of Indian Affairs used the authority granted by the Indian Act to insert their jurisdiction over the process of demobilization and repatriation when required. This was, at times, to the benefit of the wards of state, as they actively intervened to secure the release of underage enlistees and in rare compassionate cases. They also advocated for the return of soldiers and were willing to ensure that demobilization officials took care of the soldiers, materially and morally. Through this process of intervening in Indigenous soldiers’ cases, the DIA contended that Indigenous men were similar but distinct from non-Indigenous soldiers and returned men.

Indigenous homecomings had the same pomp and circumstance of any returning soldier, though state officials resumed symbolic command of their bodies from military authorities. Indigenous soldiers were repatriated like other men, but demobilized differently: “re-placing” them in a colonialist system required a separate process to stress their inferior status as wards and distinction from other men. Following the precedent of the wartime collection of data, Scott requested that Agents collect data regarding the return of Indigenous soldiers to reserve. The process of collecting this data was part of a colonialist ceremony of return, in which the Agent asserted authority over the returning soldier, and symbolically marked his transition to “civilian” life as a ward of the state. Agents became key arbiters of a process that restored colonialist relations for those returning to reserve. This was both a physical and a symbolic ritual, and the end product was that Agents became the ultimate arbiters of Indigenous soldiers’ wartime experiences.

Demobilization rituals were also sites of contestation, where Indigenous men and DIA officials contested the ultimate meaning of the soldiers’ war service. Indigenous men asserted a
new identity for themselves as veterans, often manipulating or altering their service records to best represent themselves and subtly contesting the agent’s power. If the experiences of service indicated that war service temporarily suspended their subaltern status as wards of the government, these men were eager to share this resonant experience. They did so by communicating a carefully constructed image of themselves. It is with this image of self and other that both DIA officials and Indigenous soldiers began to articulate a vision of postwar reintegration, the subject of Chapter III.
CHAPTER III: “MISSIONARIES OF THE SPIRIT OF PROGRESS”: RE-ESTABLISHMENT

Introduction

In December 1921, Ben Sawyer wrote the Department of Soldier’s Civil Re-Establishment complaining of a lack of government concern for Indigenous veterans:

Before I went overseas I filled out a form...asking me what occupation are you going to take up providing you ever return to Canada. I marked my retire location stating a little farm close to Orillia...I haven’t got a square food [sic] of land anyplace in the province of Ontario where I can make a shelter. Is that the way the Government treats his returned men. Is it because I am an Indian not compare the same colour like my white brothers Canadians who served in active service in France. Do I entitle the same show as other boys. I’ve seen ex-soldiers right here in Rama never saw the firing line only went as far as England receiving a pretty fair pension. Not disabled, these ones well taken care of. As far as I am concerned, I can’t make start to have a fair living. If I have a bit of land and I am not asking too much for the Government, if I am favoured what I am asking for, so this will be all.1

As an agricultural labourer from Rama, Sawyer was 30 years old when he enlisted with the 157th Battalion in February 1916 at Orillia, Ontario.2 Sawyer received wounds to his eye and heel on separate occasions and received discharge as medically unfit after a period of invalided care.3 Shortly after his return, Sawyer applied for money from the federal government for land and farm machinery through a program called “Soldier Settlement,” but was rejection because of his status as an “Indian.” Sawyer’s anticipation that he would receive “a little farm” matched most other soldiers’ expectations: meaningful reintegration into the postwar society and economy, perhaps a little ahead of where he was before the war since military service supposedly conveyed some favour. Sawyer’s bitter resentment that he had not received “the same show as other boys,” especially those that did not see combat, echoed the resentment of returned men who felt a

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1 LAC, RG 10, volume 7502, file 25,024-6. WC Mariott, on behalf of the Director of Administration, Department of Soldiers Civil Re-Establishment to the Secretary, Soldier Settlement Board and forwarded to JD McLean, 23 December 1921.
3 LAC, RG 10, volume 7502, file 25,024-6. Letter from Chas Myers to JD McLean, 1 March 1922.
tangible sense of betrayal at perceived mistreatment by the state in the years after their return home.

Sawyer’s statement spoke to the heart of a series of profound questions facing participants and observers of the return of Indigenous soldiers to reserves: if they were truly “favoured,” what sort of “fair living” did they deserve? For DIA observers, did the return of Indigenous veterans fit with the “civilizing mission” of the department? How could Indigenous peoples fit into programs of familial, social, and economic restoration developed for other veterans? What would “reintegration” look like for government wards? Did they deserve the “same show as other boys”?

Regardless of longer-term physical and mental suffering and the high rates of trauma that war service inflicted on participants, most Canadian soldiers repatriated and demobilized “fit,” meaning that the military bureaucracy found them not to have a permanent disability as a result of service. Figure 20 demonstrates that this was a common service outcome for Indigenous soldiers as well. Most indigenous returned soldiers indicated on discharge paperwork that they intended to return to reserve and take up their prewar occupations, though military officials tracked this data inconsistently (see Chapter II). Some expressed in their repatriation interview with Indian Agents that they expected a symbolic or material reward from the state for their service. These calls for entitlements closely matched the calls from veterans and emergent veterans’ organizations for “re-establishment,” a fluid concept that often related to veterans receiving a secure occupation, a privileged place in civic society, and even a financial bonus for their service. Re-establishment also suggested something different from early-war expectations of “restoration,” as participants and officials recognized the immense social, economic, cultural, and political changes brought about by more than four years of total war could not be undone.
The federal government promised re-establishment explicitly, and veterans of Canada's wars had traditionally received free or cheap land on which to settle and farm. As part of their expectations of re-establishment, veterans regarded land as a reasonable outcome of service. While occupational opportunities and the financial bonus became sticking points around which governments and veterans faced off through 1919, Soldier Settlement became the premiere entitlement for “fit” soldiers. The Soldier Settlement Act (SSA) offered a system for veterans to receive a land grant and loans for stock and equipment. This popular initiative became a public disaster when a series of structural issues with the program caused widespread failures. Under the provisions of the Indian Act, Indigenous veterans could not qualify for the same entitlements of this program as other veterans; the DIA administered an independent soldier settlement program for these men, which took place on reserves. Indigenous veterans shared in the misery of failed reintegration, but within a different context.

As with many other topics relating to Canadian veterans, the rise and fall of Soldier Settlement remains understudied and misunderstood. Desmond Morton and Glenn Wright’s assessment in Winning the Second Battle that the program’s apparent failure in 1922 dispelled any remaining goodwill with the idea “reintegration” remains the singular focused treatment of a program for which close to 30,000 veterans attempted to eke out a living.4 Scholarly analysis of the role of the DIA and Indigenous peoples in this program is scarce, limited to a quick snapshot of the program in the context of national policy in the 1910s and 1920s, the controversy regarding the sale of reserve lands in the Prairie west, and a micro-study of loans in the Parry

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4 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 153.
Island Agency. Historians have not systematically addressed the root causes of the program’s rise and fall as it relates to Indigenous peoples and communities.

This chapter discusses the contours of the DIA’s version of Soldier Settlement for Indigenous veterans as it grew from a kernel of an idea in Western Canada in 1917 through to its first set of legislative revisions in the early 1920s. The DIA publicized Soldier Settlement as the principal benefit to non-wounded or recovered repatriated soldiers. Veterans saw settlement loans as an opportunity for much-needed capital investments in themselves, their land, and their communities. This examination will demonstrate how the veteran’s expectations for this program clashed significantly with Departmental officials’ expectations, who had structured it according key provisions of the Indian Act.

Calls for Reintegration

Ben Sawyer’s call for a “fair living” was part of a broader veterans’ movement in the early postwar period, often encapsulated by the concept of re-establishment. Initially proposed as an election promise of the Union government in 1917, “Full Re-Establishment” became a

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5 E. Brian Titley’s *A Narrow Vision* dedicates a small section to this program amid a broader discussion of land and enfranchisement policy in the postwar period. Titley’s assessment is that both land surrenders and the presence of Aboriginal settlers on reserve affected communities “profoundly,” which is almost certainly true, though in no place was their simultaneous surrender and presence of large numbers of Indigenous soldier settlers. The assessment of the program’s development is broadly correct, with some important errors in detail (corrected below). Fundamentally, Titley misunderstands the complexities of settler payment and administration structures when he suggests that most settlers were still on the land through the 1930s. See E. Brian Titley, *A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell Scott and the Administration of Indian Affairs*, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1986) 46-48. Surrender of Indian lands to the Soldier Settlement Board for the settlement of non-Indian returned soldiers was an important aspect of DIA policy. This part only touches upon this development, focusing instead on the way that DIA Headquarters managed policy pertaining to Indian settlers. For a sustained discussion of the question of reserve surrenders, see Sarah Carter, “‘An Infamous Proposal’: Prairie Indian Reserve Land and Soldier Settlement After World War I,” *Manitoba History*, 37 (1999): 9-21. An early reconnaissance of Indian soldier settlers in Ontario has been developed by Robin Jarvis Brownlie, but the limited scope of that work demands further study. See Robin Jarvis Brownlie, “Work Hard and Be Grateful: Native Soldier Settlers in Ontario After the First World War” in Franca Iacovetta and Wendy Mitchinson, eds. *On The Case: Explorations in Social History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 181-203.
demand in 1918 relating to the returned soldier’s place in society, particularly in terms of symbolic status as a citizen and being granted preferential socio-economic opportunities.⁶ Financial compensation beyond the War Service Gratuity was among the first tangible demands of demobilized men from a series of organized groups, first among them being the Great War Veterans’ Association (GWVA) which was formed in Winnipeg in 1917. They coalesced during a public meeting in Calgary in 1919, and some veterans groups began demanding a bonus of $2000 for men that served overseas, and $1000 for men that served in Canada to effect “re-establishment” and fix a perceived imbalance between those that suffered physically and materially overseas and those that had enriched themselves on the wartime economic boom.⁷

Contrasting the veterans’ demand for a bonus, officials fretted about the potential costs of reintegration, particularly any material benefit that may become the Canadian equivalent of a “Pension Evil,” the American bureaucratic and economic monstrosity that followed the Civil War and soaked up one in five Federal dollars spent in the post-Civil War period.⁸ Elites shared in the celebration of victory and saw the war as an important step towards nationhood, the true realization of the promise of Confederation.⁹ While soldiers had won the thanks of a grateful nation, this gratitude had limits: “The returned soldier,” proclaimed Montreal Daily Star owner and multi-millionaire Lord Atholstan, “must not be allowed to consider himself an unlimited

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⁶ A position was expressed by Robert Borden while campaigning around the Vimy campaign in April 1917. See Desmond Morton, Fight or Pay: Soldiers’ Families in the Great War, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004), 162.
⁹ John English argues this is how English-Canadian elites understood Confederation during WWI, as a natural, necessary antecedent to the war effort; the war was not a breaking point for Canada, it was the logical progression from colony to independent commonwealth nation. See John English, “Political Leadership in the First World War” in Canada and the First World War: Essays in Honour of Robert Craig Brown ed. David MacKenzie, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005).
creditor of the State, to be supported in idleness." The newly-formed Department of Soldiers’ Civil Reestablishment expected men to face a contracted economic reality rather than seek handouts from the state. For many elites, re-establishment represented an uncompromising dose of independence. Only wounded men would receive any form of financial support or vocational retraining program, and the rest would need to work hard and be grateful for what they had. A budget-conscious Parliament defeated the GWVA’s bonus campaign, indicating that the government’s enthusiasm for celebrating veterans’ heroism stopped at words.

Simmering veteran resentment against the postwar world boiled over in North America and Europe, fueled by a common belief that governments should do more. In France, veterans rioted against the expectations of back-taxes on military pay, while British veterans demonstrated for promised housing. German veterans joined revolutionary movements on both sides of the political spectrum and contributed to the upheaval during a “November Revolution.” In Canada, some returned soldiers joined labour actions that swept the country in 1919, including the violent Winnipeg General Strike. Others committed acts of violence against perceived social outsiders: labour organizers, restaurants, and shops were attacked. Many joined

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11 Morton, *Fight or Pay*, 162.


“radical” social movements, a signal that a failure to reintegrate soldiers into the preexisting social order could lead to a revolutionary political future.\textsuperscript{15}

Turmoil seemed infectious. An economic downturn starting in 1919 left 200,000 out of work, while a soaring cost of living was widely blamed on “profiteers.”\textsuperscript{16} Veterans steamed in anger at those that escaped service and benefitted, industrialists, and the seeming preference for “able-bodied” men over those with obvious war-related disabilities. Officials fretted about the apocalyptic forces of venereal disease, radicals, and social undesirables.\textsuperscript{17} Some treated even moderate political shifts at the ballot box as harbingers of a great unravelling.\textsuperscript{18} This became all the more abundantly clear in the first two years after armistice that Canadian economy and society had transformed: women’s place in society had changed; emboldened moral and social regulation campaigns were being promoted along with temperance; and in many respects, the government had become much more involved in ordinary people’s lives.\textsuperscript{19}

\begin{itemize}
  \item [15] Few returned soldiers were socialists, and their leanings tended to the political right, though with an egalitarian and radical edge Morton in Granatstein and Neary, \textit{The Veterans Charter and Post-World War II Canada}, 22. Amid the turmoil of 1919, many observers in Canada looked internationally for inspiration; Canadian labourers openly and excitedly drew from the example of the Bolshevik Revolution in, for example, the naming conventions of their publications. Craig Heron and Myer Siemiatycki, “The Great War, the State, and Working Class Canada” in \textit{The Worker’s Revolt in Canada, 1917-1925} ed. Craig Heron, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 3.
  \item [17] On venereal disease, see Part II. Regarding radicals, see Martin Robin, \textit{Radical Politics and Canadian Labour, 1880-1930} (Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1971); James Naylor, \textit{The New Democracy: Challenging the Social Order in Industrial Ontario, 1914-1925} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991); Craig Heron has argued that, during this period, “the clenched fist of working-class solidarity was raised defiantly throughout the industrialized world.” Craig Heron, “Introduction” in \textit{The Worker’s Revolt in Canada, 1917-1925}, 3.
  \item [19] As Ian McKay has written, “Everything seemed to be falling apart. The sky, once alight with patriotic fireworks as Maritimers headed for Europe, glowed with the light from incendiary fires set by rioting soldiers and civilians at the end of a war that had changed the world of 1914 beyond recognition,” Ian McKay, “The 1910s: The Stillborn
As repatriated soldiers, civilians, and government officials wrestled with the definition of reintegration, a broad consensus of these interests supported some form of agricultural initiative for repatriated men as a way to reintegrate them and their families to the post-war world. Rural and agricultural settlement offered means for veterans to find meaningful work, escape radicalism, and buttress the liberal order. South African War veterans had enjoyed such a program with popular appeal, and the very notion of “swords to ploughshares” had been a guiding ideal since the original land grants to the Carignan-Salières Regiment in the Richelieu valley in the seventeenth century, as well as War of 1812 veterans in Upper Canada. Reintegration through agriculture fit expectations for the restoration of soldiers’ economic wellbeing from the broadest possible coalition of interests.

From 1917, the government moved to facilitate civil re-establishment through an agricultural program by enacting the “Act to Assist Returned Soldiers in Settling Upon the Land and to Increase Agricultural Production,” which sought to create a system of agricultural loans to invest in soldiers’ civil reintegration while assuaging the emergent veterans’ demands for greater material reward from the state. Promising money for land and equipment, the program dovetailed with earlier homesteading initiatives by promising 160 acres and was expected to

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20 See 7-8 George V., Chapter 21 “An Act to assist Returned Soldiers in settling upon the Land and to increase Agricultural Production.” Assented to 29 August 1917.
further western settlement. Such a program was designed in accordance with the greater demand for agricultural production brought about by the war, and called back to the earlier program for South African War veterans with its terms and provisions. This 1917 Act was designed to serve disabled and invalided returnees by facilitating a transition to farming but was fraught with difficulty, the most significant being a lack of productive land upon which to settle applicants; only 2,000 settlers had been placed on the land by armistice, and government officials looked to revise the initiative.\(^\text{21}\)

Expanding the 1917 provisions more widely, the 1919 “Soldier Settlement Act” offered returned men extensive loans for land, machinery, stock, and improvements totaling up to $8,500 repayable at five percent interest over 25 years. For applicants lacking farming experience, the Act provided for a training program.\(^\text{22}\) By the end of 1923, almost 150,000 veterans had applied for and more than 30,000 received loans totaling more than $100 million dollars, or 20% of the 1919 accumulated national debt.\(^\text{23}\) As a loan program, this initiative escaped the “Pension Evil” of sunk government costs. Through a careful system of management and the settlers’ industriousness, the government expected each individual loan to be paid on schedule. Further protecting government interests, Settlement officials approved only those who seemed guaranteed to succeed: experienced farmers without serious permanent injury. Non-farming

\(^{21}\) Early trouble with 1917 proposal included a 5% failure rate in 18 months between mid-1917 and 1919, as applicants mostly disabled and invalided men for whom agriculture was to be a struggle, and finding suitable agricultural land. Morton and Wright, *Winning the Second Battle*, 143.

\(^{22}\) The soldier settlement handbook affirmed that “the settler must have the necessary knowledge and fitness to farm,” and the precedent for provisioning non-farming returned soldiers originated with the 1917 Act, section 7, which provided for “the placing of returned soldiers with farmers in order that they be instructed in farming; agricultural training stations for returned soldiers; farm instructors and inspectors to assist settlers with information and instruction in farming; and training in domestic and household science for setters’ wives and female dependents.” See The Soldier Settlement Board of Canada, *Handbook giving information regarding Land Settlement and Agricultural Loans for Returned Soldiers*, (Ottawa J. de Labroquerie Taché, n.d.), 6. See also The Soldier Settlement Board of Canada, *Loan Regulations of the Soldier Settlement Board of Canada*, (Ottawa: J. de Labroquerie Taché, 1918).

\(^{23}\) Morton and Wright, *Winning the Second Battle*, 144.
soldiers who had expected a new life as homesteaders resented being ignored, while agricultural officials and experienced farmers ridiculed their naiveté for thinking agriculture would assist with easy and prosperous re-establishment.

Such an investment in settlers and funds required an enormous bureaucracy to manage the program. From 1919 to 1920, the Soldier Settlement Board (SSB) grew from a few hundred to over 1,594 employees, responsible for helping administer the program both in Ottawa and on the ground. Two commissioners comprised the SSB, which supervised the program. Board members hired agricultural supervisors to maintain a close relationship with settlers, offering advice and surveying settlement efforts annually to ensure they were succeeding with their labour. The SSB faced a difficult task in creating a set of regulations that had to satisfy both the desire to provide a reasonable program to a large number of returned men and their families, but also protected the government’s investment. Protection of the granted funds remained foremost among the board’s concerns.

At its inception, the SSA was a popular measure that afforded a pathway for soldiers’ “reintegration” while protecting against perceived radicalism. Settlement might be a business proposition, but its intent was to “fortify the country against the waves of unrest and discontent,” argued Prime Minister Arthur Meighen. The program also served to reinforce ideals of industriousness, self-reliance, and rigorous labour. Settlement also offered “rural rejuvenation,” a concept that had become an important cultural theme within a broader regenerative movement in

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24 Ibid., 143.
25 As Morton and Wright explain, “From first to last the SSB would protect the government’s investment.” Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 144.
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This rural reformism was arcadian in its celebration of traditional pastoralism and anti-urban regeneration, but also pre-eminently modern in its belief that the application of new scientific techniques, knowledge, and technologies could fulfil the promise of boosted harvests and a greater connection between farmer and nature. James E. Murton effectively summarizes this system of belief as “alternative modernity.” With the loan system, agricultural advisors, and training program, the operations of the SSB were wholesale practitioners of alternative modernity.

Alternative modernity also fit with the DIA’s policies of pushing to “assimilate” Indigenous peoples into Euro-Canadian socio-cultural norms. Since the 1880s, the official policy of the DIA was to eradicate the traditional social, cultural, linguistic, and economic practices of Indigenous peoples through various provisions of the Indian Act, and facilitated through the paternalistic supervision of Indian Agents and other field officials. The state

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27 Some proposals even included social-reform experiments called “colonies,” in which disabled men and their families would settle in planned communities. One such colony was proposed for Kamloops Reserve No. 1, but was defeated in part by a concerted resistance from the Indian Agent and band council. See LAC, RG 10, Volume 7535, File 26, 154-1. Memorandum from Duncan Campbell Scott to Arthur Meighen, November 16, 1918. For a good survey of the ideology behind the rural regenerative movement, see John Herd Thompson, Harvests of War; W.L. Morton, Progressive Party in Canada; also Adam Crerar, “Ties That Bind: Farming, Agrarian Ideals, And Life In Ontario, 1890-1930,” Ph.D. Dissertation (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1999); Douglas Owram, Promise of Eden: The Canadian Expansionist Movement and the Idea of the West, 1856-1900, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992). Lougheed’s enthusiasm for agricultural regeneration and soldiers’ re-establishment has been well documented. As Morton and Wright explain, “From the moment Senator Lougheed assumed the chairmanship of the Commission on Natural Resources in October 1915 (in tandem with the presidency of the Military Hospitals Commission) a soldier-settlement plan was inevitable.” Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 100. As a former principal of the Manitoba Agricultural College, eventual SSB Chairman W.J. Black’s enthusiasm also makes sense.


29 Assimilation has two specific definitions in the history of Indigenous policy in Canada; first, as cultural assimilation, which is referring to the “loss, by an individual, that served to distinguish him or her as a member of one social group” Deborah Davis Jackson, Our Elders Lived It; American Indian Identity in the City, (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2002), 74. The second definition of assimilation is that of legal assimilation, discussed below. See Martin Cannon, “Revisiting Histories of Legal Assimilation, Racialized Injustice, and the Future of Indian Status in Canada,” Aboriginal Policy Research Consortium International (2007): 35-36.

30 The classic discussion of the variations of political philosophies behind Indian policy in Canada is John L. Tobias, “Protection, Civilization, Assimilation: An Outline History of Canada's Indian Policy,” Western Canadian Journal
deployed education, religion, and police powers as key tools to enforce cultural assimilation.\textsuperscript{31} As Tina Loo writes, the Indian Act was particularly powerful in both its “coercive and its symbolic or ideological dimensions,” which stemmed from the state’s monopoly on what is a legitimate use of power reinforced by statutory and common law.\textsuperscript{32} In this way, Loo and others have argued that the presumed neutrality of the Indian Act – and Canadian law more generally – reinforced a specific social order that privileged propertied, heterosexual, Anglo-Saxon, white, men and labelled those outside of these categories as “others” who required social, economic, and political sanction and regulation.\textsuperscript{33} Constance Backhouse has reasoned that the law was one tool among many in the work by authorities and opinion makers to create and enforce a “primary colour scheme selected by the officials, with bold strokes of reds.”\textsuperscript{34} The Indian Act was certainly used for this purpose. By the early 1900s, the DIA began to assert its powers to restrict cultural practices deemed retrograde, shift band councils from hereditary to a system of elected chiefs and counsellors, and use industrial and residential schools to fundamentally reshape Indigenous communities.\textsuperscript{35} As Scott remarked in 1920, “our objective is to continue until there is


\textsuperscript{34} Backhouse, \textit{Colour Coded}, 4.

\textsuperscript{35} On potlatch ban, see Katherine Pettipas, \textit{Severing the Ties that Bind: Government Repression of Indigenous Religious Ceremonies on the Prairies}, (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1994); Tina Loo suggests that the law, particularly the law against Potlatch is best understood as a “way of arguing,” in “Dan Cranmer’s Potlatch,” 135; and Douglas Cole and Ira Chaikin, \textit{An Iron Hand Upon the People: The Law Against the Potlatch on the Northwest Coast}, (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1990); regarding education, see, for example, J.R. Miller, \textit{Shingwauk’s Vision: A History of Native Residential Schools}, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996).
not a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic and there is no Indian question.”36 Erasure was the explicit and expected outcome of colonialist policy in the early 1900s.

Agricultural settlement was cornerstone of colonialist policy in Canada.37 Promoting a form of proto-landholding, personal financial management, and agricultural labour for Indigenous peoples had been an important part of the DIA’s assimilationist policy in the late 1800s and early 1900s, particularly in the Prairie region, as a means to instill values of liberal capitalism, especially regarding gender, labour, and property.38 Scott extolled the great modern potential of the farm-family homestead in his 1919 essay as part of his broader discussion of the impending modernity for reserve populations and lands, predicting:

Each [returning soldier] will be a missionary of the spirit of progress, and their people cannot long fail to respond to their vigorous influence. Thus the war will have hastened that day, the millennium of those engaged in Indian work, when all the quaint old customs, the weird and picturesque ceremonies, the sun dance and the potlatch and even the musical and poetic native languages shall be as obsolete as the buffalo and the tomahawk, and the last tepee of the Northern wilds give place to a model farmhouse.39

This reflection is an important glimpse at how the DIA understood the true impact of the war on Indigenous peoples; according to Scott’s reflection, enlistment and service were to have

37 In 1828, Major-General H.C. Darling, the Indian Superintendent for Upper Canada, suggested a system of model farms as a method to “civilize” Indigenous peoples. See Dickason, Canada’s First Nations, 232.
39 Scott, The Canadian Indians, 327.
served as an evangelizing experience, where each returned soldier would missionize “the spirit of progress” upon his return. The progressive influence of returning soldiers would have eradicated traditional customs, ceremonies, and languages more quickly, though Scott’s reference of this day having been “hastened” indicates that soldiers were not the catalyst but rather an accelerant for this process. Most importantly, Scott foresaw that the “model farmhouse” would replace traditional modes of living and stand as a symbol of Indigenous assimilation into Euro-Canadian society and integration into the agricultural economy. Indigenous peoples had a place in the new millennium, though that place was in an agricultural role and not part of the urban industrial order.

Benedict Anderson has written that contemporary observers of any period tend to read their own national histories “up-time”, as if events have unfolded backwards from an “originary present.”^40^ John A. English has used Anderson’s model to demonstrate how, during the First World War, Canadian elites saw the global conflict as the moment where the full promise of confederation, prosperity and global influence, would finally materialize.^41^ Scott similarly saw the conclusion of the war as a crystallizing moment in the DIA’s efforts to integrate, assimilate, and eliminate Indigenous peoples, societies, and cultures. While other elites worried about the future of the nation amid growing radicalism and unhealed national wounds, DIA officials professed optimism: the war did not interrupt colonialism in Canada, but rather complemented it. The postwar world, proclaimed Scott, was the penultimate moment to assimilate Indigenous peoples to the cultural and racial norms of Canadian society. After all, soldiering exposed

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enlisted men to the English language, harsh military discipline and an experience of world through their travel overseas. As a benefit, some even received education directly at “Khaki University” or through battalion training programs in 1919. On the home front, families and communities developed more of a shared experience with the dominant culture, which they expressed through knitting bees, box socials, and voluntary individual or band donations. From the perspective of DIA Headquarters, these war activities were evidence of racial and biological as well as social progress.

As the First World War drew to an end, the DIA developed specific policies to accelerate this perceived progress. Legal assimilation was one such way to remove the “Indian problem” by converting one’s legal status from “Indian” to “Non-Indian;” such a pathway existed from 1857 in one form or another. Among these accelerated postwar measures included an amendment to the Indian Act in 1918, Section 122A to simplify the enfranchisement process and effect legal assimilation. Enfranchisement through the 1920s and 1930s, Jarvis Brownlie has observed, tended to affect Indigenous peoples living off reserve, and accentuated the urbanizing trend by which they were leaving reserves and their failing reserve economies.

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44 Legal assimilation describes the process of losing “Indian” status in Canada, which originated in 1850 with the Act for Protection of the Indians in Upper Canada from Imposition and the Property Occupied or Enjoyed by them from Trespass and Injury’ and part of the policy in 1857 to encourage civilization of tribes, which established the concept of “Indian” and “Non-Indian” as racialized categories. See J.R. Miller, Lethal Legacy: Current Native Controversies in Canada (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2004), 17. Beyond 1918, these enfranchisement procedures were again redeveloped in 1951, when various criteria also added the provisions for involuntary enfranchisement of Indian women marrying Non-Indians and wholesale band enfranchisement. See Martin Cannon, “Revisiting Histories,” 39.
assimilation was an ongoing process for the DIA to impress upon Indigenous peoples incrementally, legal assimilation was a defined process. The DIA also promoted the integration of Indigenous peoples into the agricultural economy during the war. Particularly in the Prairie west, government officials saw reserve spaces as potentially untapped resources for both labour and productive land. Initiated by the DIA’s Western Commissioner William Graham, a “Greater Production Campaign” pushed for higher yields on reserve lands, ostensibly through the labor of Indigenous farmers but practically through a system of leases to white farmers. Agricultural yields increased during the campaign, nudged upward by the rising prices as much as by Graham’s program. Soldiers expected to share in this boom.

Indigenous soldiers expressed their vision of reintegration to Indian Agents in their demobilization interviews and through correspondence with their families, communities, and other government officials. Many showed active interest in settlement and farming to their agents, military authorities, or directly to Headquarters. Returning soldiers articulated a desire to receive funds from Headquarters for farming or land improvements, and in some cases expressed concern at a lack of locations on reserve for them to pursue these pursuits. 

46 In the end, total expenditure on the project far exceeded meagre revenue, even though Meighen was supporter of scheme and Graham was its booster. Scott remained skeptical of its value and was vindicated as its utility waned by the end of 1918. See E. Brian Titley, A Narrow Vision, 42.

47 On the Greater Production Campaign, see Bruce Dawson, “Better Than A Few Squirrels:’ The Greater Production Campaign On The First Nations Reserves Of The Canadian Prairies,” Master’s Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 2001. As Western Commissioner, William Graham’s position was only outranked by Scott; indeed, the Deputy Superintendent and Western Commissioner had been of equal rank bureaucratically in the nineteenth century. This strained subordination coloured much of Graham’s and Scott’s interactions; Graham was widely expected to assume Scott’s post after Scott’s retirement, but his career was ruined by personal scandal in the 1930s. See E. Brian Titley, The Indian Commissioners: Agents of the State and Indian Policy in Canada’s Prairie West, 1873-1932, (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2009).

48 Part of the expressed purpose of the circulars was to figure out how a settlement program might apply to Indians. As Scott commented in a margin note to agent Charles Myers, Rama, “please state whether these injuries [on the enumerated form] will be permanent and will incapacitate the man for work. It is probable that a large number of these men may apply for solders settlement benefits and we wish to know exactly what they will be able to do - what they are used to, what they own, and as much general information as possible.” LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-30. Margin note from Scott to Charles Myers in letter from Myers to Scott, 28 February 1919. Corporal
improvements meant a tangible benefit for service, and a substantial upgrade in property and earning potential for some agricultural labourers who had only worked for white landholders prior to military service. As with non-Indigenous men, many returned Indigenous veterans also expressed interest in non-agricultural programs, such as grants for small commercial enterprises, basic land improvements, or upgrades to trade implements and materials.

Entire communities expressed enthusiasm for settlement. The Mud Lake band council in Eastern Ontario, preempting government initiative, offered two acres per returned soldier, so “that recognition be made for our returned soldiers and those who have yet to come from overseas that will perpetuate the remembrance of their services for the protection of our King and Empire and for maintenance of justice and liberty.” In the Treaty 9 district of James Bay, settlement inspired interest from a number of returned soldiers who compelled the local Anglican minister and boarding school teacher, Reverend Haythornthwaite to inquire to Headquarters “on

Samuel Glode in Bear River asked “to settle and have a home and would like very much for the Dept to assist him in procuring a house and some good value land on reserve.” Glode’s words were transcribed, and possibly modified, by his Agent, R.A. Harris. As was the case with demobilization interviews, we are left with the words of Indian Agents rather than demobilized soldiers themselves, and do not have a clear representation of what was expressed outside of a filtered colonialist lens. LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-30. Letter from Harris to Scott, n.d. Additionally, Samuel Glode had served thirty two months in the trenches, and was wounded on a number of occasions. A fishing and hunting guide for white sportsmen before the war, Glode enlisted in September 1915 at Sussex, New Brunswick. See RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 3588 – 45.

As Morton and Wright detail, many alternative suggestions floated around to benefit non-agricultural returned men; David Loughnan of the veterans’ publication The Veteran wanted $5000 housing loans for urban soldiers, for example. See Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 149. A “Fisherman’s” version was suggested elsewhere, part of keeping Canada’s west coast white against perceived floods of Japanese immigrants, Ibid.

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the matter of taking up land on the Reserve with a view to farming,” asking for subdivided lots and farming grants.\textsuperscript{52} As Haythornthwaite editorialized, “some of the returned soldiers seem very anxious to make a beginning and seem to think that they should receive special treatment.”\textsuperscript{53} Manitoba’s Griswold and Fisher River Agency agents echoed this sentiment.\textsuperscript{54} Agricultural reintegration was a popular idea among Agencies in the north and west broadly.

Not all returning soldiers, however, were singularly enthusiastic about farming. Alternative visions of reintegration, job retraining, and re-establishment were expressed by a number of Indigenous returned soldiers, but were summarily rejected by DIA and military officials. Perhaps misconstruing the DIA’s re-establishment plans, famed Parry Island, Ontario sniper Francis Pegahmagabow wrote to the Soldiers’ Aid Commission “the Indian Department is quite willing to help the Indian return soldiers as to give us whatever we wish to carry on [our] labour or farming.”\textsuperscript{55} Other returned soldiers expected the same sort of help; Windsor, Nova

\textsuperscript{52} LAC, RG 10, volume 7523, file 25,044-1 pt. 1. Letter from Haythornthwaite to McLean, June 1919. The enthusiasm was tempered by departmental reticence to engage in any investment of funds or personnel to allot lands or aid farming initiatives. Donald Robertson, surveyor with the inside service, wrote to Lougheed that “The number who would avail themselves of farming in this locality would undoubtedly be very few and the extent of the farming would for some years to come in all probability be restricted to the growing of potatoes.” LAC, RG 10, volume 7523, file 25,044-1 pt. 1. Letter from Donald Robertson to Hon. Sir James A. Lougheed, August 1919.


\textsuperscript{54} James McDonald, agent for Manitoba’s Griswold Agency, wrote to McLean to report a keen interest by returned soldiers in the agency. The returned men asked McDonald to inquire with headquarters whether it “would assist them to locate on farms under the same conditions as the white farmers,” and expressed concern that if they stay on reserve they would not get the same treatment.” LAC, RG 10, volume 7523, file 25,044-1 pt. 1. Letter from Haythornthwaite to McLean, June 1919.

\textsuperscript{55} LAC, RG 10, volume 7502, file 25,022-5. Letter from Francis Pegahmagabow to Soldiers’ Aid Commission, 15 October 1919.
Scotia returned soldier Joseph William Morris, a labourer by trade, expressed to his agent a desire for “training in motor or automobile work. As he has use of his hands he thinks he would be able to drive a motor.” Similar to Morris, Private Alfred Settee from Norway House, Manitoba was also wounded and expressed to his agent “that he would like to learn some mechanical trade.” Settee had been a hunter and trapper prior to the war, but could no longer support himself in that manner, owing to having been gassed and having his eyes permanently damaged. The Queen Charlotte, British Columbia agent wrote to Headquarters that settlement for returned soldiers in the agency would be problematic, as “none of these [returned soldiers] will take to farming, all are fishermen.” Individual interest in settlement funds understandably articulated a broad vision of how reintegration could encompass a broad variety of options, from direct farming, to house improvements, to a forgiving loan schedule. Some expressions of alternative visions bypassed the notion of farming altogether, advocating for a broader investment in retraining or business enterprises.

Towards a Soldier Settlement Program

Between January 1918 and May 1919, DIA Headquarters came to assume responsibility for administering the Soldier Settlement Act as it applied to Indigenous returned soldiers. Headquarters was compelled to involve itself in the settlement scheme because of the insistence of Western Commissioner William Graham, the necessity of providing some measure of benefits to Indigenous soldiers, and the possibility that settling soldiers could help reinforce the

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56 On his prewar occupation, see LAC, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 6392 – 1. His desire to be trained in motorized vehicle work probably came from being seriously wounded overseas. Awarded the DSM and MM with three gold bars, the agent called him a “bright young chap, anxious to get ahead.” LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-30. Agent to the DIA, n.d
57 LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-30. Agent to the DIA, 2 April 1919. On his injury, see Ibid. For his hunting and trapping status before the war, see RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 8782 – 5.
58 LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-30. Letter from the Agent to the DIA, 2 June 1919.
assimilation of Indigenous peoples. The assumption of administrative responsibility for the program as it pertained to Indigenous peoples followed the jurisdictional trajectory established during the war years, in which matters relating to “Indians” became part of the DIA’s duties. Dual sets of legislation, the SSA and the Indian Act shaped DIA involvement in re-establishment. Their desire to closely monitor and manage settlers on reserves ensured that DIA officials developed policy purposefully.

On 21 January 1918, Western Commissioner William Graham wrote to DIA Secretary J.D. McLean at Headquarters that “the time is now at hand when something will have to be done for our returned Indian soldiers.”59 Though armistice was still nine months away, Graham’s apprehension stemmed from the fact that “Some of these lads are now back and others are returning from time to time...Some of them will never be able to return to their former occupations because of having lost limbs.”60 Because the process of reintegration had preceded the armistice and the DIA became involved with the demobilization process through applications for discharge before the war’s conclusion, Graham’s concerns came from a practical observation that the war had fundamentally altered participants’ abilities to reintegrate back into civil society. Primarily focused on the promotion of recruitment and enforcement of civil regulations, the DIA had offered precious little information as to how demobilization was to occur, and what soldiers would do afterwards. As to “doing something” for returned soldiers, Graham observed, “The question is very important and I have heard nothing from the Department as to its policy.”61 Having Indigenous returnees participate in the Soldier Settlement scheme under the 1917 terms was an option for reintegration, and Graham advocated for this course of action. From his view,

60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
Indigenous men with farming experience could use loans of only $1500-$2000 to cover basic needs. With wartime inflation pushing agricultural products to record highs (see Figure 10), such an investment in agriculture looked attractive. In terms of oversight, Graham suggested that the DIA and SSB could partner, so that DIA officials could make recommendations of which Indigenous soldier possessed the agricultural experience to succeed, and the SSB could manage the financial terms.

Through 1918, as questions of demobilization and reintegration were spreading, Graham’s intervention sparked an important discussion within the DIA. In July, DIA Headquarters began discussions with the SSB regarding a potential partnership, stressing the possibilities for reintegrating Indigenous returned soldiers with disabilities through agricultural work and the abundance of unimproved reserve lands on which Indigenous soldiers could farm.

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62 Having engaged with Headquarters over the winter and spring of 1918, Graham decried the lack of planning for returning soldiers, and admonished Headquarters for not providing systematic policy to agencies that were dealing with the return of wounded men. Noting the financial difficulties of some of the wounded returned soldiers in his agency, Graham asked, “Are these men entitled to anything under the Soldiers’ Settlement Act? If they are, and we could get 1500.00 to 2000.00 for each we could solve the difficulty.” LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. Letter from Graham to McLean, 4 March 1918. Offering further advice on how the DIA could involve itself in the settlement program, Graham advised Scott that “the nature of the assistance granted should be determined on the ground whether or not the grantee is likely to prove successful.” LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. Letter from Graham to Scott, 10 June 1918.

63 Graham wrote the DIA Headquarters to add further refinements, “My opinion is that no assistance should be given an Indian without the strong backing of the local Agent, whose recommendations should be thoroughly investigated by the Department before the case is submitted to the Soldier Settlement Board. LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. Letter from Graham to Scott, 20 August 1918. As the SSB already had a system of agricultural advisors in place, Graham’s suggestion was simply that agents would replace these figures, and that each application would be formally reviewed.

64 Specifically, DIA Secretary J.D. McLean wrote to SSB acting-chair (and later Secretary) Samuel Maber “what arrangements could be made to grant assistance under the Soldier Settlement Act to such returned disabled Indian soldier as may be found deserving.” LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. Letter from McLean to Maber, 24 July 1918. Noting that Graham had compelled Headquarters to consider the question of settlement, McLean guaranteed Maber that lands would not need to be secured for veterans, as the abundance of unimproved land on reserves would be adequate for these purposes. As McLean understood, “it will be necessary to provide seed, equipment, and probably a certain amount of cash to enable them to make a start.” Following Graham’s suggestion to Scott, McLean assured Maber that “It would not be my intention to recommend any assistance until each one has been investigated.” Ibid. Promising reserve lands for Indigenous soldiers was likely done to resolve a complex question for the SSB: a lack of suitable lands on which to settle applicants; that Indigenous soldiers could settle on their own reserves promised that Indigenous settlers would not detract from the settlement of white soldiers.
While agreeing that all soldiers should be eligible in principle, SSB representatives suggested that Indigenous peoples may not qualify for loans since the Indian Act was a unique set of laws that set them apart from non-Indigenous peoples. SSB Chairman Samuel Maber furthered that Soldier Settlement may collide with the Indian Act, and wished to know whether pre-existing law disqualified Indigenous returnees from the program.

The challenge of applying provisions of Soldier Settlement to Indigenous soldiers was twofold: first, Indian Act provisions interfered with soldier settlement benefits. Nothing explicitly forbade

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65 Legal enfranchisement offered one way around that challenge; Maber responded that the SSB would be happy to extend settlement benefits to returned Indian soldiers, but carefully noted that this would have to be done within the confines of both the Soldier Settlement Act and the Indian Act. Maber also raised an important point, asking whether returned Indian soldiers “should cease to be a ward and would be given a grant on the reserve in his own right, which he could hypothecate to the Soldier Settlement Board.” LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. Letter from Maber to McLean, 7 August 1918. Further correspondence between Graham and Scott corroborated that this question of securing the loans would be problematic, as Graham noted that “there is nothing in the Act that I can see that will permit of a mortgage on the land being given to the Board as security for advance, nor do I think it would be wise, in the case of Indians to place the land in this position.” LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. Letter from Graham to Scott, 20 August 1918.
Indigenous returned men from participating in soldier settlement, except for Section 164 of the Indian Act which prohibited “Indians” in the Western Provinces from receiving homestead land grants, to which Western settlers were entitled in addition to settlement lands. Second, prospective Indigenous settlers could not use land on reserves as security against a SSB loan since it was land held in trust collectively. Indigenous soldiers could have hypothetically settled off-reserve, perhaps even enfranchising in the process, but the DIA did not pursue that option since doing so would have taken precious land away from white settlers and remove the Indigenous men from the watchful eye of the Indian Agent. One possibility was to locate Indigenous settlers on reserve with a “location ticket,” a transferrable certificate granting them protective rights to a specific plot on reserve but without fee simple ownership.

These challenges led Scott to recommend to Minister of the Interior Arthur Meighen, (whose portfolio included the Department of Indian Affairs) that the DIA should develop and manage its own version of soldier settlement, designed as a customized program only for Indigenous returned soldiers and responsive to the challenges of the Indian Act and reserve economies. Nominally equal in terms, Scott promised this to be a cost-effective endeavour that would not interfere with the re-establishment of non-Indigenous soldiers, as “The needs of an Indian farmer would not perhaps be so extensive as the needs of a white farmer,” and the

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66 Yet, as Scott noted, that provision may not apply to the SSA, as “The provision made for grants of land to settlers under the SSA is in consideration of services rendered by soldiers in the present war and in addition to any previous consideration” LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. Departmental Memorandum, Scott to Meighen, 15 October 1918.

67 As to the question of security, Scott addressed this by suggesting that Indigenous settlers “be under the supervision of the Department and to leave available land outside of reserves for other applicants.” Ibid. Noting the relative scarcity of land on eastern reserves, Scott suggested that perhaps applicants from eastern Canada could join Prairie bands, and most important, informed Meighen that “it would be advisable if necessary to amend the Soldiers’ Settlement Act to enable the Board to entrust the Superintendent General with the granting of such loans and the enforcement of the repayment...in order to avoid dual authority over the lands of a reserve.”

68 Scott went on to explain that the Department’s present financial distribution system and network of field officers would ensure a recovered investment and success for veterans. LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. Departmental Memorandum., Scott to Meighen, 15 October 1918.
Department already possessed the bureaucratic machinery to process and transmit local knowledge about settlers. Scott also took a moment to extoll the virtues of having the DIA command its own settlement program, as it would promote “manhood, the sense of duty and responsibility” already germinated among enlistees, and that recognizing their service would “be an object lesson to the other Indians indicated to them that their best interests lie in moving forward and supporting the Government rather than in lagging behind and being indifferent or hostile.” Scott also suggested that Indigenous soldiers could automatically enfranchise in the process of securing a loan, ostensibly obliterating their status as Indians simultaneously. In this way, Scott articulated a vision in which Soldier Settlement could support the longstanding efforts of pushing the cultural and legal assimilation of Indigenous peoples, but could also serve as a method to remonstrate those that offered resistance to the DIA’s primacy. On both accounts, Scott placed gendered normative behaviour at the center of government policy initiatives.

Scott’s arguments to have the DIA administer a version of settlement for Indigenous soldiers separately was persuasive: in March 1919, officials from the Ministry of the Interior, DIA, and SSB gathered to formalize this new arrangement. Meighen asked for the following concession from Scott: the program needed to focus on Central Canada rather than the Prairie west, and that enfranchisement not become a condition of settlement.

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69 *Ibid*. Scott’s views on the relationship between masculinity, assimilation, and domesticity both made and unmade by a form of domestic agricultural settlement are best explained by turning to the literature on gender and colonialism; as Anne McClintock as suggested that colonialism has long stood as a process whereby middle class participants and observers sought to constitute their identity around presiding identities of domestic values such as “monogamy, thrift, order, and accumulation” with clear affiliations, distinct boundaries, and separated values [from the colonial other]. See Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest*, (New York: Routledge, 1995) 167-168. Similarly, Anne Laura Stoler offers that the domestic sphere, more than the public sphere, “where essential dispositions of manliness, bourgeois morality, and racial attribute could be dangerously undone or securely made.” Laura Anne Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), 108.

70 Regarding settlement in the West, Meighen warned that “Many Indians enlisted who previous to the war had not settled down to farming, although they had every opportunity to do so.” LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1.
groups agreed that extending this program was a means to extend a reward to loyal Indigenous volunteers but ensuring the government closely supervised Indigenous farming efforts until the returned soldiers had proven themselves capable of farming and managing personal property without constant oversight.\(^{71}\) As a compromise for giving up responsibility for Indigenous returned soldiers, the SSB asked that the DIA assist to obtain more productive lands in the Prairie west for white settlement.\(^ {72}\) This compromise was received warmly; from the perspective of DIA officials, an added benefit to a settlement program this was the opportunity to discharge further reserve lands, which would generate money for the Department.

News of this new program disseminated quickly. As the SSA portions of amendments to the Indian Act were being drafted, Scott noted to Meighen in late March, “We are now obtaining almost daily applications from Indians who have been overseas, and who are entitled to the benefits of the Soldier Settlement Act.”\(^ {73}\) On 1 May, Scott finalized with the SSB that all

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\(^{71}\) As Meighen declared, DIA’s oversight of Settlement was means to reward “our loyal Indians who have answered the call to arms and volunteered and gladly enlisted for active service” would be accomplished by giving “wise and close supervision until they have advanced sufficiently to warrant all restriction being removed.” \textit{Ibid.}\(^ {72}\) LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. WJ Black to Scott, 3 February 1919. Part of the meeting, as Black indicated, involved “Discussing plans whereby portions, or the whole, of Indian reserves throughout the Western Provinces of Canada might be made available for soldiers’ settlement.” Shortly afterwards, Scott informed to Meighen that “We are now drafting legislation to give this Department the power to deal with the land settlement of returned Indian soldiers.” Letter from Scott to Meighen, 18 February 1919. On 10 March, in a letter between Scott and Meighen, this matter was further discussed. Available lands had been sold to the SSB, with other agreements being voided in favour of the settlement board. Bands in possession of the remainder of un-surrendered land were beings solicited by Graham to sell. LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. Letter from Scott to Meighen, 10 March 1919.

\(^ {73}\) LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. Scott to Meighen, 27 March 1919. Graham noted the frustration of potential applicants, and criticized the proposed centralized procedures, that the process whereby each soldier would apply, be inspected by agents, and for Headquarters to respond would take weeks to complete LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. Graham to Scott, 5 April 1919. At the same moment, individual Agents were similarly writing to Scott, such as the the agent for the Peguis band, who wrote to Scott, explaining: [The returned soldiers] have approached me with the desire to be informed as to what they can expect from the Government through the
Indigenous settlers were now officially under the administrative jurisdiction of the DIA, and that funds could be disbursed. Scott informed SSB now-Secretary Maber that he would take personal responsibility for general administration, while Headquarters would run the program in central and eastern Canada, Commissioner William Graham would administer the Prairie Provinces, and the local inspectors would deal with applications from British Columbia.\textsuperscript{74}

On April 14 1919, Scott detailed the “Necessary steps in connection with Soldier Settlement,” outlining five steps that would govern how settlement was going to work. First, a prospective settler was to complete the form and submit this to the local agent.\textsuperscript{75} Second, the Agent was to report upon the applicant’s military service, physical capacity to farm, and knowledge and experience of farming. Third, the Agent was to inspect the land upon with the applicant desired to farm. Fourth, the Agent was to forward applications to the local inspectors for approval. Fifth, if the loan reached approval, the Agents would work in cooperation with the district advisors and band councils to act as an advisory board along the lines of the SSA.

\textsuperscript{74}\textsuperscript{75} LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. Scott to Maber, 8 May 1919. The administrative boundaries for central Canada were further refined in correspondence between Abraham and Scott. After planning between T.H. Abraham, LaMothe, and MacKenzie, it was decided that Abraham would be responsible for Walpole, Sarnia, Muncy, Saugeen, Cape Croker, Six Nations, New Credit, Moravian, Georgina Island, and Rama in Southwestern and Central Ontario. Mr. Conroy would be responsible for Alnwick, Rick and Mud Lakes, Scugog, Tyendinaga, Akwesasne, Kanehsatà:ke, Kahnawa˚:ke in Eastern Ontario and South West Quebec, and other eastern and Quebec reserves. Livestock and implements to be dealt with be Hilton Hill at Six Nations, Agent Stout at Saugeen and Cape Croker, and Abraham on Muncy and Moravian. Various Indian agents would be responsible for individual cases on other reserves. LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. Letter from Abraham to Scott, 10 June 1919.

LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. Memorandum, 14 April 1919. These procedures were disseminated in an all-agency circular. LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. DIA Circular, 30 April 1919.
Graham advocated providing between $800 and $1000 per loan, along the lines of what the Western Superintendancy facilitated for ex-pupils of the industrial schools in the Prairie west, conforming to Scott’s expectation that Indigenous farmers would not be provided with loans that approached the maximums under the 1917 SSA. On 8 May, the DIA forwarded a funds request to the SSB for a $10,000 early disbursement to help start the process. DIA Headquarters also began drafting forms to be sent to Agencies, shaping the bureaucratic process by which the program would operate. The settlement program had begun.

Settlers

Settler applicants represented a broad spectrum of wartime experience. Each application along with additional documentation, is held in an individual case file in RG 10. Each case file tells the story of the individual settler’s experience to some degree, though these records are spotty. DIA Headquarters preserved 590 case files for 273 soldiers and their families, accounting files, and agency-level settlement records from 42 Agencies, spanning 1918 to 1957. Rejected applicants’ files were usually kept at the local level and not forwarded to Headquarters, and those that were often ended up being destroyed, making it difficult to assess rejection criteria cleanly. Moreover, each file is poorly organized, and some end abruptly, while others are missing key information. Yet using these sources in tandem with the data produced from enlistment and demobilization records plus attestation papers and service files, we can assess the characteristics of this group of applicants.

76 LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. Graham to Scott, 1 March 1919
77 LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. In posterity, it is only with tremendous irony that McLean wrote to R.H. Abraham that “it is the wish of the Department to obtain as simple a form as possible.” Letter from McLean to RH Abraham, 13 May 1919
The data from Settler case files tend to fall into one of two camps with shared demographic and social traits. The first camp were a group of older, married men with large families and a fair-sized location on reserve. At least 111 applicants were married, and additional 13 were widowers or separated. Of this group, 56 are identified has having children, the average family size being 3.2 children. Exactly 50% of applicants had some form of location on reserve, with the average being 44 acres, though only 17.4 acres on average cleared for cultivation. These men had an average of two horses and three head of cattle, and each applicant had equipment and implements, though an inventory of this equipment was not usually included with their application or agent’s notes.

The second camp of soldier settlers tended to be much younger, unmarried, and without a location ticket on reserve. At least 118 applicants listed themselves as “single” at attestation, and did not have any location on reserve or other forms of housing or property, though a number of these men did have access to family locations and, upon receipt of a loan, purchased the location ticket from another. Half of this group (24% of the total number of applicants) came from occupations not associated with agriculture, a group discussed below.

In spite of the differences between these two groups, both shared some important commonalities between one another and with all other Indigenous soldiers. The average of 26 years old among applicants was only 0.5 years older than the average for all Indigenous men. Marital status was somewhat different. Comparing Figure 9 to the settlers, the group of settlers were more likely to be married. Figure 9 does not account for the fact that many soldiers married during the war or in 1919-1920 since it is a snapshot at enlistment, and thus settlers are likely a representative sample of all Indigenous soldiers in terms of marital status. Of the entire group, 143 served in France, 17 in England, and seven in Canada. Six were deserters (but four of six
were either arrested and opted for military service rather than incarceration or else voluntarily reenlisted and served). Additionally, 166 were wounded or ill at some point; only 50 made it through the war without injury, and we do not have information on the remaining 57 outcomes.

Following the program’s design, farming and agriculture dominated the chosen occupations of settler applicants; 76% of applicants worked in agriculture - 134 of 244 applicants were listed as farmers, with an additional 52 listed as “labourers” which commonly indicated that they worked as agricultural labour for white farmers off reserve. As Figure 9 indicates, this is broadly representative of the farming and wage labour occupations commonly available to Indigenous men. Of the remaining 24% of applicants, this group was extraordinarily diverse in occupation, from six fisherman, to three schoolteachers, four machinists, two trappers, a glassmaker, a police officer, and a chauffeur among other craft and rail occupations.78 For these men, settlement was an attractive proposition initially.

The group of settler applicants represented in the DIA’s case files includes only 49 rejected applicants. Most other rejected applicants’ applications were stillborn at the agency level, and the paper documentation was never completed. Yet through the small sample of rejections plus DIA field and Headquarters correspondence, we can assess the suitability criteria and reasons for rejection. Agents and Headquarters annotated each application, judging their suitability for a loan. For non-Indigenous men, screening criteria involved service, reference, fitness, and farming experience; this functionally excluded women and disabled men, until the government wrote their exclusions into the 1922 SSA revisions explicitly.79 For Indigenous men,

78 Their non-agricultural occupation did not necessarily mean they did not have agricultural experience, as many of these men would have undergone intensive agricultural courses as part of their residential school curriculum, or in Southern Ontario, as part of Agricultural Exhibitions, competitions, and fairs. Sarah Carter, Lost Harvests: Prairie Indian Reserve Farmers and Government Policy, (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1990), 174.
79 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 145.
the DIA rendered judgments according to the same criteria. Yet agents interpreted this criterion differently, and rejected applicants had little recourse with no formal appeal mechanism.

For both Indigenous and non-Indigenous applicants, their ultimate success or failure to receive funds was not a process governed by impartial civil servants operating according to rational legalistic principles enshrined in the 1919 SSA, but rather prejudicial arbiters of moral temperament. Applicants’ agricultural experience, location on reserve, or even war service mattered less than their perceived character and industriousness. A discussion of individual applications in this period best illustrates importance of moral governance in the administration of this program. This section discusses some of the trends associated with loan adjudication.

For Indigenous applicants, personal relationships were very important to each applicant. If an Indian Agent did not like the applicant, even if all other aspects would lead to a successful loan application, the agent could delay processing, write a negative review or otherwise delay and poison proceedings. Adam Montour’s application shows the confluence of personal disagreements and moralistic categorization. Montour was a member of the Kanehsatà:ke reserve, born in 1888, and designated a prewar “labourer” on his returned soldier form (likely an agricultural labourer). According to his Attestation Papers, Montour was Methodist, and illiterate at the time of enlistment – a fascinating designation considering the central role his letter writing would play in his application. On December 18 1916, Montour enlisted with the

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80 For Montour’s returned soldier form, see LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-30. Letter from Bertrand to DIA, n.d. Montour’s case of Agent-applicant sour relations was by no means isolated. Francis Pegahmagabow, the oft-lauded sniper with 347 wartime ‘trophies’ experienced similar difficulties. Complaining to the Soldier’s Aid Commission about his Agent’s mishandling of the application, Pegahmagabow wrote, “he speaks very nice and proud but I suspect him to swear at me on my back by not taking no steps to [submit the application].” LAC, RG 10, volume 7502, file 25,022-5. Letter from Francis Pegahmagabow to the Soldier’s Aid Commission, 19 October 1919. Agent Alexander Logan, Pegahmagabow’s Agent, disliked the political organizing of this “returned soldier chief” and purposefully mishandled his application as retribution for Pegahmagabow’s lack of deference.

81 LAC, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 6307-1.
77th Overseas Battalion CEF, but was transferred to the 24th when he arrived in England. He took sick in England and was discharged in November 1918 without having seen action in France.

The summer after his return, Montour applied for Soldier Settlement to secure a loan for farming, an occupation he had enjoyed before the war, working on his father’s mid-sized Kanehsatâ:ke farm. The local Indian Agent withheld Montour’s application for months over an unspecified slight between the two: Montour’s appeal directly to Headquarters was simply redirected back to Bertrand, further reinforcing the animosity.

As distributors of patronage, Agents used their roles to reward and punish applicants, part of a broader trend in which Agents’ actions could be petty and exacting. 82 Scott had praised his Agents as having “a personal knowledge of the capabilities and needs of Indian returned soldiers belonging to their respective agencies, and are, therefore, able to supply the information and assistance required in the same manner as the [Soldier Settlement Board].” 83 This “personal knowledge,” practically translated, meant Agents could use their new powers to enforce discipline on their agencies.

Moral concerns often lay at the heart of unsuccessful applications. DIA officials immediately discounted applicants whom Agents deemed not sufficiently industrious, temperate, or civilized. Agents tended not to even submit these applications to local Inspectors, though they were referenced in correspondence between Agents and the DIA Headquarters. For example, the Duck Lake, Saskatchewan Indian Agent characterized Azarie “Dogtail” Blackman as “Fond of

82 As purveyors of patronage, see Noel Van Dyke, What is the Indian “Problem”: Tutelage and Resistance in Canadian Indian Administration, (St. John’s, Newfoundland: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1991); as exactors of petty retribution, see Jarvis Brownlie, “Man on the Spot: John Daly, Indian Agent in Parry Sound, 1922-1939,” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, 5 (1994): 63-86.
travelling, unsettled, a flirt” and claimed Abel McLeod was “not a good worker.” Alternatively, returning men that had demonstrated the ability to return home with the majority of their pay intact often won their agent’s regard. Agents, the two agricultural representatives, DIA field inspector Charles A. Cooke, Department Secretary J.D. McLean and Scott all adjudicated morality and temperance variously. Depending on the application, agent’s determination of prewar or postwar “character,” a visit from Agricultural Inspector E.J. Sexsmith or J.D. Moses, an investigation from Cooke, or the simple reference to census or other types of data determined the applicant’s morality and temperance. While the DIA used farming to elicit “civilized” behaviour, the SSA application process worked in an opposite fashion – applicants who did not meet some arbitrary standard of civilized behaviour received outright rejections while those who had already met this standard received loans.

Aside from moral concerns, soldiers’ applications failed if they were too indirect about how they intended to manage their loans, or if they did not have a specific plot of land to work from. Returnees often had to provide their pensions as crude collateral. If they did not have a location ticket already, they had to secure a plot for sale, or have a family member cede the

84 LAC, RG 10, volume 6761, file 452-30. Duck Lake Agent to DIA, 2 May 1919. Charles Cooke declared Adam Montour “insufficiently temperate”, partly because of his prewar seasonal work in lumber camps north of the reserve, and also because his intemperance had shown no “improvement” after military service. LAC, RG 10, volume 7502, file 25,020-2 pt. 1. Report from Charles A. Cooke to the DIA, 15 November 1919. Cooke’s determination was all the more bitter because he and Montour had a prior relationship – during the recruitment troubles in 1916-17, Montour had protected and defended Cooke while recruiting to a hostile populace on the Kanehsata:ke reserve. Cooke’s adherence to bureaucratic proceduralism trumped any sense of loyalty to a former friend and ally; Cooke’s letter was the singlehanded reason for Montour’s rejection.

85 The application of Wesley C. Jacobs, an Indigenous returned soldier from Shawanaga Reserve in the Parry Sound Agency is one such case. According to his application, Jacobs was a thirty nine year old Methodist in 1919, married to a forty eight year old woman and without children. Jacobs enlisted in December 1916 at Parry Sound, after the moratorium on Indigenous recruitment was lifted, served with the Sixth Battalion, C.E.F., and was discharged in April 1919. Though a lumberjack before the war, Jacobs had a farm in operation as of June 1919, and seems to have made a favourable impression with his agent. Agent Alexander Logan deemed Jacobs “a good Indian and has a little money saved up.” LAC, RG 10, volume 7502, file 25,022-2. Letter from Alexander Logan to JD Mclean, 25 June 1919. Jacob’s was given a loan of $1500 from the DIA to add 100 acres to his previous holdings. Ibid., Letter from DC Scott to Logan, 9 April 1920.
location ticket to them; this process took time, and could get quite messy.\textsuperscript{86} Even when the intention to sell was clear, other hurdles complicated proceedings.\textsuperscript{87} In most cases, the DIA denied benefits to anyone without sufficient collateral or a preselected plot of land. A non-treaty member, a half-breed, or a new arrival to a band had their application summarily dismissed. Some agents were not even aware of the applicability of the SSA to Indigenous returned soldiers, and actively discouraged them from applying.

Disability further excluded applicants. Because the DIA was interested in securing repayments beyond all other considerations, they excluded any returned soldier with a wound not completely healed. This contingency seemingly makes logical sense – wounded men could not reasonable have been expected to have their large-scale farm reach profitability in two years. Disability exclusion was codified in the July 7 1919 SSA legislation, though it contradicted disability pamphlet “Private Pat,” which promised disabled veterans the opportunity for land and loans to farm.\textsuperscript{88} Yet the group of 273 applicants were a group that had seen active service; many were wounded men. More often than not, officials made medical decisions on moral grounds. Agents systematically categorized Indigenous returned soldiers with a poor relationship as recovered or healthy, even if they had serious lingering combat or non-combat injuries. Granted, this worked both ways: while medical boards for non-Indigenous wounded veterans refused to deal with post-traumatic stress or any manifestation of “shell shock,” some Agents proved more empathetic on the matter, recognizing shell shock as a legitimate category for disability claim

\textsuperscript{86} Rama’s Wilfred B. Naneguishking’s application took eleven months to process, all because a quit claim deed transfer was contested by the mother of the selling party. LAC, RG 10, volume 7502, file 25,024-5.

\textsuperscript{87} Adam Montour secured the intention of Maximilian Decaire to sell a portion of 35 acres to Montour, but also fought to receive the Seminary’s blessing as this was technically on Church land. The Seminary wholeheartedly supported Montour’s application, and begged the DIA to reverse their rejection by citing Montour’s outstanding military service record. In this case, the DIA had unilaterally declared Montour’s potential “subject to speculation”, and refused to reverse their decision. LAC, RG 10, volume 7502, file 25,020-2 pt. 1. Report from Cooke to the Department of Indian Affairs, 15 November 1919.

\textsuperscript{88} Morton, \textit{Fight or Pay}, 288.
through the DIA. Yet the majority of categorizations were scattered and moralistic. This meant that some men who had legitimately recovered from their wounds did not receive SSA loans because of their purported disability; while others who were suffering from actual injuries did not receive pensions and were encouraged to seek farming loans.

Some DIA officials put absolute primacy upon a previous knowledge of farming when evaluating SSA loan applications from Indigenous returned soldiers, while others did not. The SSB allowed for applicants who had no knowledge of farming to undergo training, attend seminars, and have agricultural supervisors help with the initial ploughing, planting, building construction, stock purchase, and land improvement projects. Indigenous returned soldiers, applying through the DIA, had no such program of training. DIA officials sometimes rejected soldiers with even a decade or more of experience working as farm labour. Linking farming knowledge with land ownership, the DIA was primarily concerned with securing loans for men who had worked their own land.

The presence of wives and children in Indigenous SSA applications is not directly proportional to success or failure. 89 This disregard for the category is surprising, considering the centrality of women’s and children’s labour to farming in this time period. Many historians of women in Canada have discussed the central importance of women’s labour to the success of the family farm. 90 Children too further enabled the division of tasks and allowed for expanding

89 Women were automatically excluded from applying themselves; Canada’s nurses and two women soldiers were not eligible for SSA loans, as Soldier Settlers were supposed to be exclusively “Bona Fide” farmers. With the importance of female labour in farming communities across Canada during the war, the notion that women were not “Bona Fide” was rooted in gendered demobilization policy and coupled with patriarchal assumptions of farming stability. See Morton, Fight or Pay, 288.
90 For the centrality of women’s labour to farming in this period, and how these roles were changing by the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, see Marjorie Griffin Cohen, Women’s Work, Markets, and Economic Development in Nineteenth-Century Ontario, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988). Though premised upon working peoples in Montreal from 1861-1890, Bettina Bradbury’s Working Families explains structural inequalities in families, the role of women’s labour within families, and how this changed during the latter half of the nineteenth
productivity on the farm.\textsuperscript{91} However, we may be able to explain this absence by reviewing the process by which applications were accepted or rejected. DIA Headquarters did not forward details on what categories were deemed more important than others, so Agents filled out the forms according to their own predilections. Occasionally, some employee from the Agriculture Department could offer their own expertise, dubiously constructed as it was, into the application. However, regardless of the initial phase of the application, all applications ended up on the desks of either McLean or Scott, with advisement from the DIA’s accountant for financial considerations. This triplet of decision makers were thoroughly alienated from the processes of daily farming, and would not recognize the centrality of informal labour on farms. Moreover, these applications were strictly a negotiation between men, though of disparate access to power. Women did not have a voice on the application forms. Ignoring their importance might reflect the prevailing view of farming and landholding as exclusively masculine endeavours. Most likely, the absence of women reflects disconnect between the DIA Headquarters and actual lived experience on reserve. With McLean and Scott wielding absolute power and authority in the DIA, yet practically alienated from practices on reserve outside of infrequent inspections, their policy decisions stemmed from their own imaginative determinations, void of any practical appreciation of family labour in farming.

The application process, when reviewed according to the case files of prospective settlers, reveals a system that operated very differently from how Scott projected the program to the SSB and public. DIA Headquarters applied personal prejudices, moral determinations, and arbitrary

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\textsuperscript{91} Sandra Rollings-Magnusson argues, “although farm children (those aged four to sixteen) did not receive payment or documented recognition for their economic contributions, boys and girls expected, and were expected, to work and did in fact perform essential duties and necessary tasks that contributed to the success of farms and family survival.” Sandra Rollings-Magnusson, \textit{Heavy Burdens on Small Shoulders: The Labour of Pioneer Children on the Canadian Prairies}, (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2009), 11.
\end{flushright}
conceptions of ability variably when adjudicating the loan applications. This meant that they rejected qualified applicants in some cases, while accepting unqualified applicants in others. The prejudicial system of arbitration ultimately undermined the efficacy of the program.

**Administering Soldier Settlement**

Between May 1919 and December 1921, government stakeholders defined the core of DIA policy regarding settlement. As well, the DIA distributed the core of loan applications and settlement loan grants in this period; by the end of 1920, they had spent $290,214.27 on loans to 160 Indigenous returned settlers. The early draft of the DIA’s settlement act included non-farming applicants to receive assistance “where he may pursue the trade or calling to which he may be accustomed or adapted,” an investment in land and equipment of up to $500. Yet Headquarters dropped this provision in the final version of the legislation, which merely stated that Indigenous returned soldiers would be allowed to access the privileges of the Soldier Settlement Act, but that this would be administered under Scott’s discretion. Moreover, as a comprehensive system of re-establishment, government officials envisaged Soldier Settlement through 1918 as a broad initiative to resituate returning soldiers on lands, or in special colonies. As with the SSA for non-Indigenous settlers, a standardization of procedure slowly narrowed the definitions of settlement to the point that DIA Headquarters preferred experienced, capable farmers. As Scott relayed in a DIA notice to returned soldiers, to solicit applicants, “No one need apply who does not intend to make farming his life work.” Moreover, DIA officials announced that they would keep loans to minimal amounts. Alternatives had quickly eroded.

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92 LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. Draft of an Act to Amend the Indian Act, part III.
93 LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. DIA notice to returned Indian soldiers, n.d.
94 Inspecting lands and capabilities of applicants, Agricultural inspector Conroy confirmed Scott’s earlier sentiment that Indians would not require the same level of funding as white soldier settlers, see LAC, RG 10, volume 7484,
Scott asked Indian Agents to seek applicants from suitable, qualified returned soldiers over the summer. By 20 August, twenty-six soldiers had been granted loans, with another 18 applicants in process. 95 The release of funds was a problem, as the bureaucratic practice for securing loans was overly complicated. 96 This meant that delays in the granting of loans slowed the process considerably. Moreover, Headquarters was still uncertain about the question of loan security. Initially raised as an issue that ultimately ensured the transfer of responsibility for Indigenous settlers’ loans to the DIA, the problem of securing loans was only sorted out in September, when A.S. Williams informed Scott that when soldier gives a mortgage for a loan, “all he mortgages or can mortgage is his interest in the lands he holds. If he should default...his interest would be sold and as no one but a member of the band has a legal right to occupy land on such reserve, his interest would have to be sold to a member of the band.” 97 This provision became particularly important during the conflict between DIA Headquarters and the Six Nations’ Council of the Confederacy Chiefs in 1922, discussed in Chapter IV.

Because the securities situation had improved, and the demobilization process had been largely resolved by autumn 1919, settlement adjudications steadily rose. As of November 11

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95 LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. Letter from Conroy to Scott, 6 August 1919. More generally, the DIA justified the lower loans in the 1919 Annual Report on the basis of repayments, writing that “the department has endeavoured to keep the loans as low as possible in order not to burden the settler with too large a repayment.” Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the Year Ending March 13, 1919, 29.

96 For example, when Six Nations Superintendent Gordon Smith required funds to allot to successful applicants, LaMothe wrote Scott for the permission to release funds to Abraham to release to Smith LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. Letter from LaMothe to Scott, 14 August 1919.

97 LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. Letter from AS Williams to Scott, 10 September 1919. Section 77 (3) of the 1886 amendment to the Indian Act forbade Indigenous peoples from holding mortgages on reserves, stating “No person shall take any security or otherwise obtain any lien or charge, whether by mortgage, judgment or otherwise, upon real or personal property of any Indian or non-treaty Indian, except on real or personal property subject to taxation under the next preceding section; but any person selling any article to an Indian or non-treaty Indian may take security on such article for any part of the price thereof which is unpaid.” Indian Act, R.S.C. 1886, c.28, s.77 ss. 3. http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/205/301/iic/cdc/aboriginaldocs/m-stat.htm
1919, one year after the armistice, the DIA had received 100 applications, granted eighty loans, and had distributed funds to seventy-three. For the seventy-three distributed loans, the DIA had expended $95,000 in funds, averaging $1,300 per loan.\textsuperscript{98} Considering the maximum amounts available through the 1919 Soldier Settlement Act, this amount was quite modest.

Loan applications and expenditures rose steadily through 1920. Anticipating that the spring of 1920 would be the most crucial for re-establishment and settlement, Scott wrote to Minister of the Interior Arthur Meighen that “It is our intention to inaugurate a careful system of supervision to begin with the Spring work. This will be consistently carried out in order that the returned Indigenous soldiers may derive the fullest possible benefits from the opportunities that are offered to them.”\textsuperscript{99} As of 12 January 1920, DIA Headquarters had granted 100 loans, and as Scott informed SSB Chairman William J. Black, “this number is being steadily increased. We have picked our settlers with great care, authorizing loans only to those whom we were satisfied would make a success of farming operations and would be in a position to not only make a good living for themselves but to repay the amounts advanced to them.”\textsuperscript{100} Providing a detailed statement of expenditures, Scott wrote the SSB in May 1920 that 130 settlers had received loans totaling $192,397.46, an average of just under $1500 per loan.\textsuperscript{101} Scott also informed Chairman Black that the largest loan granted was $4,500 that the DIA anticipated less than 100 more applications, and an estimated $250,000 more in appropriation would cover the full costs of administration. By November, Scott informed the SSB that the DIA had granted 160 loans with a total expenditure of $290,214.27.

\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Ibid}.


\textsuperscript{100} LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. Letter from Scott to Black, 12 January 1920.

\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Ibid}.
Statistics from the 1921 report “War to Peace: Tabloid Statement of Soldier Settlement Board Operations” provide a basis of comparison between Indigenous and non-Indigenous settlers. The average DIA-administered loan by November 1920, $1,103, was considerably lower than the average for non-Indigenous settlers. Across Canada to that point, the SSB had granted $80,302,649 in loans to 19,931 settlers, averaging $4,030 per loan. As Figure 11 demonstrates, the realities of allotment reveal that Scott and Conroy had operationalized their sentiment about Indigenous requiring less.

The differences between Indigenous and non-Indigenous soldier settlers was of no trouble to DIA Headquarters. A November 1920 Memorandum cheerily pronounced the early successes of the scheme. Only four settlers had failed thus far, and in all cases another returned soldier salvaged the land, equipment, stock, and outstanding debt. Crops in 1920 had been good, with a bountiful harvest. The increased prosperity and rise in value of reserve lands occasioned celebration. Generally, as the memorandum pronounced, “the returned Indian soldiers who have been granted loans have worked in a most satisfactory manner and will be a credit to any community. The settlers once given the opportunity to commence operations on the proper scale have demonstrated by industry and enthusiasm the benefits of modern farming operations. Others have followed their example.”102 With settlers leading by example, compelling reserves towards a modern and prosperous future, Scott’s predictions in 1918 seemed to be coming true. It was a time for celebration, as the seemingly-trifling matter of loan repayment was still on the distant horizon and the only matter was to reproduce the early efforts on a larger scale.

Figure 11: Loan Distributions, Indigenous and Non-Indigenous Settlers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indigenous Settlers</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Non-Indigenous Settlers</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equipment/machinery</td>
<td>$84,310</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>$22,619,759</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>$105,437.02</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>$57,682,890</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc.*</td>
<td>$100,467.25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>N/A**</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>$290,214.27</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>$80,302,649</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average/Settler</td>
<td>$1,103.48</td>
<td></td>
<td>$4,029.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: RG 10, Thousand Series (Selected Files)

*Note: “Misc.” refers to expenditures on “land improvements,” such as housing; fencing; barn or stable development or repair; non-agricultural equipment; seed; and other expenditures.

**Note: Non-Indigenous soldier settlement expenditures on items in the “Misc.” category were included in the “Equipment, Machinery” tabulation.

Conclusion

Ben Sawyer’s question as to whether he “entitle the same show as other boys” was an earnest inquiry into a bigger question: how Indigenous returned men fit into the postwar world. In public, semi-public, and private encounters with family members, government officials, clerics, and community members, Sawyer and other returned men suggested that their war service had bound them together as a group of veterans. Veterans, they argued, deserved to be “re-
established,” a concept that veterans interpreted variously but generally revolved around a financial bonus, land, and official recognition. Indigenous soldiers asserted their rights to re-establishment privileges the same as other veterans, and claimed that they should be treated no differently.

Elected officials, bureaucrats and military commanders had a different sense of whether veterans had entitled the right to be “re-established” and whether Indigenous returned men deserved to be included in re-establishment. DIA officials, led by D.C. Scott, venerated Indigenous returned men as “Missionaries of the Spirit of Progress” but stressed that their “Indian” status precluded veteranship. Indigenous soldiers were wards of the state, DIA officials argued, and they represented a stark example of the progress of the Department’s “civilizing mission.” Any initiatives for these men, DIA officials reasoned, must further the cause of Indigenous social, cultural, economic, and political assimilation.

In the first years after armistice, the state met veterans’ demands for material and commemorative recognition with delay and inflexibility. Veterans’ calls for preferred employment opportunities led to a half-hearted federal program. Parliament rejected veterans’ demands for a financial bonus outright. Veterans’ political associations stumbled to find purchase and a unified message. Nonetheless, a program for land settlement, first enacted in 1917 and expanded considerably in 1919, proved a mutually-agreeable form of re-establishment for which all groups could support.

Both veterans and the state saw Soldier Settlement as an attractive form of re-integration for veterans, who would receive cheap or free farm land and modest funds to purchase land improvements, stock, equipment, and seed. For those who lacked farming experience, the government promised a system of agricultural training and ongoing advising. As independent
yeoman farmers, this program appealed to veterans’ assertions of masculinity. With wheat prices peaking in 1919, the program also appealed to veterans’ expectations of financial reward for their war service. Indigenous soldiers shared in the popular excitement for Soldier Settlement, and suggested through their Indian Agents at demobilization meetings, in correspondence with local and federal officials, and through interviews with local newspaper reporters that they wished for economic opportunities and land on reserves the same as other returned soldiers.

Government officials also supported Soldier Settlement wholeheartedly. Pushing veterans into farming promised a vision of “alternative modernity” that advanced the liberal order and could diminish soldiers’ radical or even revolutionary potential. Since the program offered loans, the government could recover expenditures over time with limited impact to the public purse beyond the upfront costs. These reasons were doubly attractive to the DIA, who saw a settlement program as consistent with their longstanding efforts to promote farming and patriarchal single-family landholding.

The possibility of Indigenous veterans and Soldier Settlers was also destabilizing for the DIA. Indigenous returned soldiers asserted a claim to a social credit that could not be reconciled with their status as wards. Channeling this credit into demands for land and funds did not fit with the provisions of the Indian Act that retarded property ownership or financial indenture. Government officials faced a stark choice: either Indigenous returned soldiers could be acknowledged as having the same claim of privilege as non-Indigenous veterans and participate in the Soldier Settlement program fully, or else denied this claim of privilege and rejected as veterans in favour of being “Indian” status and subject to the Indian Act. The former could have undermined the primacy of the Indian Act by intimating that a category outside legal
enfranchisement granted special status beyond “Indian”, while the latter meant betraying men whose service was supposedly exemplary and whose return the DIA saw as missionizing.

In a key meeting between DSCR, DIA, and Ministry of the Interior representatives, the three groups of interest struck a key bargain whereby Indigenous soldiers’ service would be acknowledged through a program of Soldier Settlement, but that this would be a separate program administered by the DIA and in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Act. By mid-1919, government officials’ position was clear: though they may have been missionaries of the spirit of progress, returned Indigenous men were not and could not be veterans.
CHAPTER IV: “FORGOTTEN ELEMENTS IN THE MAD RUSH FOR GOLD AND FAME”: REINTEGRATION AND RESISTANCE

Introduction

On January 11, 1919 the Edmonton Journal published an article entitled “Indian League of Nations,” which discussed how, amid the political developments in Europe to create a League of Nations that “preserves peace and order,” Indigenous peoples in Canada were similarly organizing. The article continued on to state that “the war has had something to do with it, for the fact that hundreds of the red men have fought overseas has given them the idea that they have principles to stand for at home as well.”\(^1\) DIA officials were less at ease with these developments. Indian Agent A.D McNabb wrote to the Departmental Secretary J.D. McLean at DIA Headquarters to report of a “returned Soldier named Loft… as far as I can see he is [organizing a meeting at Garden River, Ontario] to try and stir up trouble between the Department and the Indians.”\(^2\) DIA Headquarters suggested that the Indian Agent closely monitor the meeting to understand Loft’s purposes.

Lieutenant Frederick Ogilvie Loft was a Mohawk First World War veteran and influential political thinker, born on the Six Nations reserve in southern Ontario in February 1861. A Toronto-dwelling politically connected accountant first appointed to a patronage position by Ontario Premier Oliver Mowat, Loft had pushed for a political organization to represent Indigenous peoples in the 1890s. After enlisting with the CEF in 1917 at age 56 (he lied about his age to enlist) and serving overseas with the Canadian Forestry Corps, Loft returned with a renewed sense of mission regarding the political union of Indigenous peoples in Canada. Writing on November 26, 1919 from his home on 75 Madison Avenue in Toronto, Loft sent an address to

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potential League members with the principles of the League. Loft suggested that Indigenous peoples’ struggles could draw inspiration from labour radicalism and, if the League should successfully unite Indigenous peoples nationally, this would lead to “better conditions, morally, socially, politically, and industrially.”

Commenting on the government’s commitment to Indigenous veterans, Loft wrote sourly that “We are the forgotten elements in the mad rush for gold and fame.” In spite of Loft’s frustration with the treatment of Indigenous veterans and his modest vision for a League, Deputy Superintendent General Duncan Campbell Scott and others in the government conspired to successfully undermine, discredit, and prevent Loft’s vision from moving forward through coercive measures and changes to the Indian Act. Though his vision inspired later leaders like Andrew Paull after the Second World War, Loft’s death in 1934 meant that he never lived to see his vision realized.

In studies of Indigenous peoples and the First World War, Historians often use the story of the rise and fall of the League of Indians of Canada to illustrate the betrayal of Indigenous veterans’ vision for postwar prosperity. Loft’s brilliantly articulated vision of a national organization that advocated for Indigenous rights and his treacherous betrayal by conniving civil servants like Scott is striking. Scholars often depict Loft’s experience as representative of the betrayal of Indigenous veterans’ expectations in the interwar period too. Yet Loft’s experience as a returned soldier was distinct from most other veterans. Not all communities shared the vision of a League of Indians of Canada. Some Indigenous peoples rejected Loft’s efforts to unite disparate groups around a common cause and to venerate veterans. To explore these

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3 Ibid. F.O. Loft, Terms of the League of Indians of Canada, November 26, 1919. Ibid.
4 Ibid.
complexities, this chapter is framed by three important questions: First, if the 18-24 months immediately following armistice were consumed by optimism and competing expectations of societal change (as documented in Chapter III), what happened to change this optimism? Second, why did the programs design to re-establish Indigenous soldiers fail? How did communities respond to these initiatives, and how did this unit or divide these communities? Third, at what point did the DIA acknowledge a failure of reintegration, and how did their acknowledgement of this failure contribute to the recognition of the status of Indigenous men as veterans?

By mid-1919, Indigenous returned soldiers’ reintegration was increasingly limited to participation in a Soldier Settlement program, designed specifically for them and administered by the DIA. This program mirrored a separate program for non-Indigenous veterans by the same name. Both programs were failures, though historians have disagreed over the reasons why they were unsuccessful. The decline and fall of the Soldier Settlement Act and non-Indigenous soldier settlers in Canada as received some attention by Canadianist historians. Scholars tend to fall into two groups in their explanations for settler failures. The first group argue that the program’s failure was primarily due to structural changes in the Canadian agricultural sector and the decline of crop prices in the early 1920s, exacerbated by climatic conditions in the Prairies in the 1930s, and secondarily aggravated by poor administration by the Soldier Settlement Board including their allowance of unqualified settlers. The second group argue that the administration was the

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6 Morton and Wright, *Winning the Second Battle*, 144. Peter Neary takes a nuanced approach, dividing ownership of the program’s failure among structural and administrative forces, and traces the “troubled” program’s end to the establishment of the VLA in 1944 but also suggesting that it was the “hard hit” environmental disaster in the 1930s which did in many of the Settlers. See Peter Neary, *On to Civvy Street: Canada’s Rehabilitation Program for Veterans of the Second World War*, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2011), 26, 156. Following in this tradition, in her M.A. Thesis on the Veterans’ Land Act, Tricia E.G. Shulist devotes considerable time to discuss the SSA failure, arguing that “There were many conditions which contributed to this extremely high failure rate, including the unstable economic conditions of the inter-war period: high inflation, unemployment, and economic depression,” and this was exacerbated by “inadequate program fundamentals, such as the acquisition of inferior land and the acceptance of unprepared veterans, and could possibly have been guarded against through
primary issue, with broader structural changes being secondarily important in dooming settlers to failure.⁷

Insofar as scholars of Indigenous peoples in Canada and the First World War have acknowledged the presence and experience of Indigenous returned soldiers at all, Soldier Settlement has received scarce attention. The historiographic interpretations on the failure of Indigenous soldier settlers lacks even the whiff of debate that the broader SSA has inspired among historians. Where the SSA is referenced at all in the broader surveys like Miller’s *Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens*, Arthur J. Ray’s *Illustrated History of Canada’s Native Peoples*, or Olive Patricia Dickason’s *Canada’s First Nations*, it is done in the context of land surrenders in the Prairie west or simply cast as part of the broader mistreatment of Indigenous veterans without explanations of why or how.⁸ Targeted studies of Indigenous peoples and the war sometime make a point to mention that Indigenous peoples had their own program and that its failure was embittering for participants, but these tend to jump over explaining how and the
program failed. Sarah Carter’s work on Soldier Settlement references this issue extensively, but frames it as part of the process to alienate Western Reserve land. Carter’s work does not explicitly reference Indigenous settlers nor the experiences of non-Indigenous settlers. Tim Winegard’s *For King and Kanata* argues that Indigenous Soldier Settlers were examples of how “Indians accrued little direct benefit from service,” and that they did not receive “equitable treatment as veterans” though he does not explain how the program’s failure contributed to mistreatment. Rebecca Bateman’s work on Indigenous farming in the nineteenth century discusses the direct influence of meddling officials as a key factor which undermined Indigenous farming. Bateman writes, “preconceived assumptions about Indians gave shape to a policy that undermined Native peoples’ ability to adapt successfully to an agrarian life.” Yet whether

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9 L. James Dempsey considers the failure of the SSA only in the slightest manner, arguing that Indigenous veterans were “Still under the yoke of government bureaucrats and treated like irresponsible children. Some became angry, but most became bitter or disillusioned by the fact that the better world they had fought for did not extend to the boundaries of their own reserves…The hopes of Indian Nations not only failed to materialize, but their economic status actually decreased from what it had been before the war.” Dempsey did not break down accounts, payments, structures of SSA procedures except to note that this conflicted with provisions in the Indian Act. See Indians and the First World War, Problems of Veterans. Doesn’t explain failure, or see DIA’s role in failure. Dempsey, “Problems of Western Canadian Indian Veterans,” 7,9. P. Whitney Lackenbauer sees the SSA as a process of creating “bitterness of broken promises and shattered dreams,” though similarly does not explain why or to what degree community fracture played into that bitterness. Lackenbauer, “The Irony and the Tragedy of Negotiated Spaces,” 185. Keith D. Smith sees the land surrenders as a primary issue surrounding SSA, but does include the presence of Indigenous veterans and settlers, but concludes that their failure was simply part of their broader “exclusion” from the socio-economic ladder. See Smith, *Liberalism, Surveillance, and Resistance*, 231. Katherine McGowan doesn’t address the question of veterans nor SSA directly, but argues that “The many responses to war programs contributed to and cemented crucial debates about the legal identity of Indian,” McGowan, “We are Wards of the Crown,” 233.

10As Carter writes, “It appears that the soldier settlement scheme which greatly affected Indian reserve land had little impact on the larger issue of the vacant lands of the West. Despite the amendments to the Act of 1919 intended to assist in the purchase of these lands the average ex-serviceman still found them beyond his means.” Sarah Carter, “‘An Infamous Proposal’: Prairie Indian Reserve Lands and Soldier Settlement after World War I,” *Manitoba History* 37 (Spring/Summer 1999): 9-21.


structure, bureaucracy, or personality ultimately doomed Indigenous Soldier Settlers is beyond Bateman’s scope.

This section contends that the failure of the DIA’s Soldier Settlement program for Indigenous soldiers is an overlooked yet vitally important part of Indigenous veterans’ experience towards political mobilization. Drawing from extensive documentation on the demise of the program, including Soldier Settlement case files and official reports, I argue that scholars have failed to understand the relationship between bureaucratic measures and broader economic, social, and political context, and how the local and national circumstances interacted during the program’s demise. Unlike previous scholarly research on the topic, I have accessed the payment receipts for each Indigenous Soldier Settler’s account to trace the rise and fall of the program. By doing this, I am able to assess the program’s failure with more accurate data than ever before. Using this in concert with Agency files and case files, I contend that the influence of DIA bureaucracy managing Soldier Settlement aggravated community tensions and led to bursts of violence. Yet the direct intervention of colonialist officials managing Soldier Settlement were proximate causes to the program’s failure. Far more important were the ultimate causes of failure, including the broader economic decline in agricultural prices and sector-wide shifts in the Canadian agricultural sector. While the program’s structural and contingent weaknesses led to violence for communities and misery for settlers, the ultimate outcome was a reconsideration some of the provisions in the Indian Act: when the program’s failure was finally acknowledged in the mid-1930s by the new Deputy Superintendent General of the DIA (thereafter the Director of the Indian Affairs Branch of the Ministry of Mines and Resources) Dr. Herold W.G. McGill, this acknowledgement aligned with and reinforced a broader recognition of the status of Indigenous peoples as veterans on equal terms to non-Indigenous men.
Revising Settlement Procedures

Settlement procedures were largely established in the months following armistice. Yet in the first years of the 1920s, economic and political changes meant that the DIA needed to adjust Soldier Settlement to fit certain realities. In February 1922, DIA policy regarding the loan procedures was refined considerably from the practices laid out in April 1919. Sending a circular to thirty-four Indian Agents and Agency Inspectors in regions where settlement had been facilitated, Scott defined precisely what steps would be taken. Maximum loans were broken down to afford $4,500 for land, $1,000 for permanent improvements, and $2,000 for stock and equipment. These loans were set on a repayment schedule detailed in the 1919 Soldier Settlement Act. Funds for land, encumbrances and permanent improvements paid in twenty-five equal installments with interest at five percent. The DIA paid the loans on stock and equipment in four equal installments, compounded with five percent interest, and released over four years. Both sets of payments were due in the first November after the loan’s disbursement. The DIA expected settlers to forward payments to the Agent, who would then forward them to Headquarters. Affirming the policy outlined in 1919, DIA Headquarters and Indian Agents were to monitor loan disbursements carefully. Headquarters expected Agents to define appropriate purchases narrowly: as the disbursement section read, “No advances will be made for anything that cannot be classified as necessary to agricultural production. No advance will be made for tractors, automobiles, gas engines, electrical engines, or wiring.” Accordingly, loans were supposed to provide funds for basic purchases so that the settler could engage in small-scale homestead

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13 LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 20001-1A. “Advice to Agents and Inspectors re: Soldier Settlement Loans,” 20 February 1922.
farming. DIA Headquarters discouraged larger scale industrial farm efforts by the application of this rule, that only the base necessity would dictate investment.

One such enterprising settler was Nelson Misquades of the Shawanaga band in the Parry Sound Agency in Ontario. He wanted a $500 loan for a team of horses to suit his business needs. A general labourer before the war, Agent Logan reported that “He is no farmer. He has worked in sawmill and lumber camp and thinks he can make a living if he had a team,” and that he was “industrious.” Misquades was not seriously wounded during military service, a “good worker,” and had saved up $100 to start a lumbering operation. In response, Headquarters ruled that Misquades could not qualify for a loan because SSA funds were only for farmers, and his annuities and interest would not be enough to cover the interest payments even if he did want to farm. Eli Commandant from the Gibson Reserve (now known as the Wahta Mohawk Territory in Muskoka, Ontario) asked for a loan for a wood cutting machine, but was rejected as well, as loans were only supplied to “bona fide farmers.” Wesley C. Jacobs accepted a loan for farming purposes, but redirected the funds towards running a store. When Headquarters found out, McLean suspended his account, noting:

As the approval of the department was given to the soldier settlement loan to this Indian on the understanding that he was a bona fide farmer, and now he is not fulfilling this part of the obligation, the approval of the loan must be withdrawn. It is considered that Jacobs being in business he should be able to pay for the lumber and the pig and the same not referred to this department for payment, and no further purchase should be made for Jacobs until the department is assured he is actually engaged in farming.

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16 LAC, RG 10, volume 7502, file 25,022-4. JD McLean to Alexander Logan, 4 November 1919.
17 Winegard, For King and Kanata, 154. The phrase about bona fide farmers is comical, considering Commandant was a farmer before the war. See RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 1900 – 35.
18 LAC, RG 10, volume 7502, file 25,022-2. Letter from McLean to Agent Daly, 5 December 1922.
McLean’s concern over Jacobs’ enterprising use of the loan typifies Headquarters’ view of the purpose of the SSA: the funds were intended to invest in farming, not any other sort of alternative practice. DIA Headquarters categorically rejected the strong interest in investment for non-farming ventures, expressed by returned soldiers, in favour of a strict interpretation of the purposes and function of the SSA.

Systematic underinvestment in the necessities of commercial farming matched the rejection of farming alternatives. In addition to land purchase, the DIA granted for the purchase of a few stock, some basic machinery, and minor improvements to buildings farm property. Concerning stock, settlers often received a team of horses, a cow or two, and perhaps a few pigs. Machinery purchases most commonly featured a plough, disc harrows, wagon, set of harnesses, mower, and rake. Land improvements usually implied minor fencing, lumber for house or barn repair, and occasionally some masonry supplies. Underinvestment in farming had been a previous unofficial DIA policy: DIA Western Commissioner Hayter Reed’s insistence against supplying western Indigenous peoples with farming machinery in the late nineteenth century stemmed from prejudicial notions of the progressive influence of laborious hand-farming techniques, and essentially stultified western Indian farming efforts in the late nineteenth century.19 Under Scott, the DIA’s investment in SSA stock and equipment had advanced to some degree from Reed’s appreciation of the necessities of Indian farming; machinery was offered to each settler to ensure that they could engage in the basic functions of planting and harvest.

The detailed procedures also further defined who qualified for loans, noting that the applicant must be a member of the reserve he was applying to receive a loan upon, must own sufficient land to be a successful farmer or gardener, and must be personally vetted by either an

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agricultural representative, provincial inspector, or other authorized departmental employee. The procedures required the purchase of fire insurance and allowed the purchase of farm machinery from only a select number of firms with which the DIA had arranged for special prices. If the settler defaulted, local field officials would solicit another returned soldier to “salvage” the loan, or if the Agent could not find another settler, a civilian member of the band could assume the land, stock, and equipment on a ten-year amortized term.

The advice to agents and inspectors was matched by an internal document detailing how various branches and Headquarters would work together to adjudicate and assign loans, a process of twelve steps encompassing aspects ranging from legal advice to accounting procedures. This section, along with the advice to agents, affirmed two general principals: first, all aspects of the application process and management of successful loans were to be carefully monitored. The most important step in the application process was the recommendation from the Agent or agricultural representative. Successful applicants were supposed to have their farms carefully planned by the agricultural representatives to maximize the farm’s crops and stock profit. Second, both the outside and inside service instructions reiterated the central administrative function that Scott would fulfil. Each application, expenditure on behalf of successful applicants, and repayment notice and receipt required Scott’s explicit, written advice and approval. Centralized authority made for a carefully managed scheme, but also a cumbrous bureaucratic program that could not quickly respond to the potential exigencies inherent to agricultural production.

The consolidation of application procedures in 1922 illustrates how DIA Headquarters had come to understand Settlement, what procedures needed to be put in place in order to ensure

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the success of settlers as well as the protection of the government investment, and how they would manage local initiatives. This consolidation came late, in the sense that most of the eventual successful applicants had already received at least a portion of the funds by 1922 (see below). The clarification of DIA practice was also useful in light of the broader changes to the Soldier Settlement Act, and how these changes would affect the administration of Indian settlers.

In 1922, amid a crisis of repayment among non-Indigenous soldier settlers, the SSB amended the SSA to lessen the burden of repayment and grant “relief.”21 SSB circular 296, from 23 June 1922 detailed an amendment that consolidated the loans.22 Prior to consolidation, the provisions intended for funds for land to be repaid over twenty five years in equal installments with 5% interest, and the repayment with interest would be applied in the first November after the loan was granted. However, the funds for stock and equipment were set at a repayment schedule of four equal annual installments to begin in the third year after the settler received the loan. After consolidation, the SSB combined Soldier Settlers’ separate land and stock and equipment loans, with the Settler responsible for paying the single loan schedule of twenty-five years, with 5% interest.23 The SSB intended for these changes to reduce the burden of repayment and relieve some of the financial pressures so that settlers could establish their farms before having to face substantial payments on their stock and equipment loan; to further this end, the SSB also included an amendment whereby they would not charge interest until November 1924.24

A 1925 reduction in outstanding loans on livestock sought to further aid the problem of

21 LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 20001-1A. SSB Head Office Circular 295, 27 June 1922.
24 Ibid.
outstanding loans.\textsuperscript{25} A 40\% reduction in livestock loans applied to settlers who had received their loans prior to October 1920 to try to adjust for falling stock prices. A 20\% reduction applied to those who had received their loans after that date. Notwithstanding the 1922 consolidation and the livestock reduction, problems of repayment persisted. The SSB revisited question of amending the SSA in 1927. They added a further amendment to the SSA to allow the remaining settlers to apply for a reduction of their loans. The SSB made these further changes to rectify for non-Indigenous Settlers the problem of cost-purchase discrepancy that had been exacerbated by the inflation of the early 1920s. Between 1927 and 1930, of the 11,119 soldiers still in occupancy of their farms and with outstanding loans, 8,047 had their loans evaluated, and 7,672 settlers received a reduction. The average reduction per loan was 24\% of the original amount.\textsuperscript{26} Scott had informed DIA Agricultural Inspector E.J. Sexsmith in April 1927 that revaluations, under the amendment to section 68 of the Soldier Settlement Act, required Sexsmith’s full attention, along with purchasing seed and judging agricultural fairs.\textsuperscript{27} DIA Accountant and Purchasing Agent F.H. Paget wrote to SSB Chief Accountant Willoughby that the SSA amendment reevaluated a total of $15,458.38.\textsuperscript{28}

The minor reduction for Indigenous settlers, less than ten percent of the total amount owing, suggests some of the important differences between the how the SSB and DIA administered settlers. Flat-rate, standardized evaluations on reserve lands negated the need for revaluation, DIA Headquarters argued, as the land purchases in the early 1920s were not as vulnerable to the fluctuating prices.\textsuperscript{29} Paternalistically explaining why the Indigenous settlers had

\textsuperscript{25} Canada Year Book, 1925, 963.
\textsuperscript{27} LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001-1 pt. 3. Letter from Scott to Sexsmith, 23 April 1927.
\textsuperscript{28} LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001-1 pt. 3. Letter from Paget to Willoughby, 13 May 1927.
\textsuperscript{29} LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001-1 pt. 3. Sexsmith to McLean, 18 May 1927.
been mostly excluded from revaluations because of the flat-rate phenomenon, Sexsmith informed McLean that “a settler for whom land was bought and under such conditions, could hardly expect any reduction although a case of this kind might necessitate a very plain, thorough and satisfactory explanation to the Indian settler.”30 Notwithstanding the participation in the 1922 revaluation, the DIA expected Indigenous Soldier Settlers to make repayments on intact loans, and were primarily excluded from the parliamentary efforts to reduce the burden upon settlers in the late 1920s. Plain and thorough explanations might have rationalized why Indigenous settlers were set apart from their non-Indigenous settler comrades, but they were probably not satisfactory.

Soldier Settlement Trends

Between November 1920, when 160 settlers received loans and the 1924 application deadline, DIA Headquarters approved another 105 Soldier Settlers’ applications. DIA Headquarters kept records of the numbers of settlers and status of loans only haltingly, so a clear picture of the shape of settlement is difficult to establish. Figure 12 shows the growth of loan grants between August 1919 and August 1934. The sharp spike in Figure 12 between August 1919 and December 1920, illustrates the quick establishment of both loans and applications. The DIA Annual Reports discuss having granted 265 loans, though Headquarters’ tracking of case file data indicates that they only ever disbursed 227 loans.31 The additional thirty-eight loans were either never disbursed or quickly defaulted without salvage. Headquarters did not systematically trace rejected applications, but in the 1921 Annual Report Scott mentions that the 180 successful applicants came from a pool of 330 applications. This ratio of applicant to recipient, standing at

30 Ibid.
31 Dominion of Canada, Annual Report Of The Department Of Indian Affairs For The Year Ended March 31 1936 (Ottawa: King’s Press, 1937).
about 1.8:1 is a reasonable guide to assuming the broader trend of application to rejection. This means that if that ratio was indicative of rejection rates, and the DIA Headquarters granted 265 loans, then they would have received about 475 applications by the end of the eligibility period in 1924.

As mentioned above, 77 of the 80 approved settlers in November 1919 were located in Ontario. In early 1920, DIA Headquarters recognized this imbalance; noting that “the most disappointing feature has been the showing from the West, as Commissioner Graham has only reported three solitary cases.” The overwhelming privilege afforded central-Canadian applicants continued throughout the application process. Far more prohibitive than in central Canada, only one in ten applicants from the Prairies was successful. A DIA Memorandum from 1 November 1929, entitled “information in connection with Soldier Settlement Accounts for Fall 1929” of all 223 settlers in 1929 displays the Agency location of each settler. Figure 13 consolidates this data. Ontario settlers dominated the totals: 183 of the 223 loans, 82% of the total, were in that province alone. Considering the important role played by Commissioner Graham to inspire Headquarters to become involved in the scheme, and his insistence that the delay in DIA policy formulation was disheartening to veterans from the Prairie region, the lack of western involvement in the scheme is surprising.

There are a three primary reasons for the regional imbalance: as Minister of the Interior, Arthur Meighen’s precondition for the DIA establishing its own settlement program was to favour Ontario over other provinces, since in the western provinces, “Many Indians enlisted who

32 LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. DIA Memorandum to Scott, 11 November 1919.
33 For some of the unique problems facing the twenty-three Prairie Indian soldier settlers, see L. James Dempsey, *Warriors of the King: Prairie Indians in World War I*, (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1999), chapter 4.
previous to the war had not settled down to farming, although they had every opportunity to do so. As Sarah Carter has explained, the failure of prewar agricultural intensification on western reserves was a not a matter of settlement, but rather a complex matrix of misguided expectations, supply failures, and inadequate farm machinery available. Yet from Meighen’s perspective, further investment in the west was likely to fail.

Figure 12: Indigenous Soldier Settlers, 1919-1934

Source: LAC, RG 10 (Thousand Series)

34 Part of the “opportunity” Meighen was discussing was likely to do with a system of band loans for agricultural machinery and stock, available to western Indigenous peoples, so long as they were residential or industrial school graduates. LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. Letter from Meighen to Scott, 8 November 1918.


36 Scott shared this opinion. Western bands were considered less “civilized” than the central Canadian bands, and Scott directly addressed this issue in correspondence with Meighen, writing that a proposed $1,000 limit for Indian settlers was regionally dependent, as when Scott drafted that recommendation, he was “thinking more of the Western then [sic] the highly civilized Indians of Ontario.” LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. Letter from Scott to Meighen, 12 June 1919.
The second reason for the imbalance in settlement patterns is the way the DIA promoted the program. DIA Headquarters directed Agricultural Inspector T.H. Abraham to travel through southern Ontario in July 1919 seeking applicants for the program. Abraham visited the Sarnia, Caradoc, Six Nations, Cape Croker, and Alnwick Agencies in southern and eastern Ontario to explain the program and distribute application materials. Conroy reported to Scott that returned Indigenous soldiers were enthusiastic for settlement lands, but many bands were wary of the implications that settlement regulations might have on their land rights. 

The third factor is due to both regional population disbursements, and enlistment patterns. As demonstrated both by Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4, eligible Indigenous men from Ontario represented the largest group for potential Settlers. British Columbia represents the largest underrepresented population by this measure. But the west’s underrepresentation matches patterns of enlistment; from Figure 5 the majority of enlistments were from Ontario, which generally corresponds with Figure 13. Also, British Columbia had the smallest proportional level of enlistments, only Prince Edward Island’s proportional enlistments do not match the proportional share of settlement. Structurally, fewer eligible men were available to apply in the west, and conversely explains the high concentration of applicants from places of high enlistment, such as the southwestern Ontario Agencies of Six Nations, Saugeen, and Caradoc. Stringent application procedures aside, the population disbursement and large number of enlistees means that Ontario was always likely to dominate the program.

In 1925, after the deadline had passed for new applicants, the DIA traced both the loan amounts and land holdings for each of the 227 settlers that had received loans. 

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37 LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001 pt. 1. Letter from Conroy to Scott, 6 August 1919.
38 See LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 20001-1A. List of Soldier Settlement loans, April 1925.
comprehensive data set provides a good general image of both loan averages and land disbursements. DIA Headquarters enumerated seventy-seven settlers in name only, but the remaining 150 entries reveal that the outstanding balance for these loans was $216,943 and the average loan was about $1,450, slightly lower than the $1,814 average from November 1920. The western loans were lower still, averaging just under $1,075. As an average across all regions, Indigenous Soldier Settlers received fifty-seven acres of land, though we do not know whether this only represents land that settlers received from the program, or includes the pre-loan holdings that were included as security. Nonetheless, this was considerably less than the half sections allotted to non-Indigenous settlers.

Headquarters also tracked rates of failure, abandonment, and salvage. The fact that only four loans failed in 1920, as mentioned above, seemed to indicate that the scheme was working. By 1924, after the beginning of the repayment schedule, four of the 218 granted loans had been repaid in full, while 191 were still active. The remaining twenty-three were “salvaged.” Yet by the summer of 1925, forty-two of the 227 enumerated soldiers had abandoned their farms, and DIA Headquarters had salvaged thirteen additional farms. Correspondence between the DIA and SSB in 1927 mention that the fifty-three failed Indigenous Soldier Settler loans remained steady, with no more failures happening in the intervening two years. The DIA had managed to replace all but two of the loans. Additionally, the correspondence mentions that twelve Soldier

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39 Total expenditure on Soldier Settlement by the DIA up to 1925 amounted to $387,009.95. The seventy seven unenumerated settlers account for a part of the discrepancy between the $216,943 and $387,009, while the expenditure on surveying, staff, and other “sundries” accounted for the rest. LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 20001-1A. Paget to Scott, internal memo, 1925.
40 See LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 20001-1A. List of Soldier Settlement loans, April 1925. The lower investment in the Western loans is corroborated by LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25000-101 pt. 1.
41 See LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 20001-1A. List of soldier settlers, 1923-1924.
42 LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 20001-1A. List of Soldier Settlement loans, April 1925.
Settlers fully repaid loans. In 1934, seventy-six had abandoned farms voluntarily or through foreclosure, and 189 loans were still active.\textsuperscript{44} With failure rate approaching 30\%, the scheme was clearly rigid in its application. This failure rate compares with the 50\% failure rate of non-Indigenous soldier settlers by 1938.\textsuperscript{45} A seemingly better plight by Indigenous settlers obscures the reasons for the slightly lower failure rate, located in some of the administrative practice of DIA Headquarters.

The slower rate of abandonment among Indigenous settlers obscures the precipitous drop in repayments after the early to mid-1920s; Figure 15 illustrates this drop, showing that by the early 1930s, repayments totaled half of what was due annually to the SSB. DIA Headquarters had adopted a number of measures to prevent abandonment, such as personal moral suasion, with agents and agricultural representatives using a series of threats and rewards to keep settlers on their farms. The DIA also siphoned interest payments from abandoned farms, structurally embedding indebtedness even beyond abandonment. The slower rates of abandonment combined with the repayment table show a marked difference from the non-Indigenous settlement trend, a sharp spike and crash. Because of the personal and financial pressures deployed by DIA personnel against Indigenous settlers, wholesale abandonment and debt recovery played out differently for DIA Headquarters.

The data in figure 15 are notable for the erratic payment amounts, with a number of sharp spikes punctuating a somewhat steady repayment pattern. The early payments in 1920-1921 and

\textsuperscript{44} LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001-1 pt. 3. “Question No. 44,” 12 February 1934. The numbers don’t quite add up. As indicated above, the DIA’s description of 265 loans in operation at the program’s peak is not matched by the correspondence in 1923, 1925, or 1929. That number probably includes salvage loans as independent loans. Moreover, even taking the 265 number of loans on face value, the seventy six failures leaves 189 in operation, as Murphy indicated. Yet this does not account for the twelve loans fully paid by 1927.

\textsuperscript{45} Canadian Annual Review, 1937-1938, 126.
1921-1922, $13,342 and $22,105 respectively, reflect payments made when the schedule for repayment demanded the pre-consolidation payments on stock and equipment in four equal annual instalments. The 1928-1929 spike, nearly a 30% spike in repayment from the year before, stemmed from the consolidation credits applying to accounts, not an actual anomaly of repayment; the funds applied retrospectively. The declining repayments from 1928 to 1933 illustrate the sagging repayments, a slow decline to the point where only half of the outstanding balance was repaid.

**Figure 13: Indigenous Soldier Settlers by Province**

Sources: LAC, RG 10 and RG 150 (Selected Files)

DIA Headquarters’ discussion of repayments initially promoted the high probability of success.\(^{46}\)

Though not perfect, at least 78% of Settlers’ payments had come in on time, and DIA officials

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\(^{46}\) Commenting on the repayment in 1922 when forwarding the sum payment to the SSB, McLean wrote, “‘I am pleased to report that the Indian soldier settlers are making their payments on loans quite satisfactorily, and, the outlook in spite of last year’s failure is promising.’” LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 20001-1A. Letter from McLean to SSB, 12 April 1922. In a letter from Scott to Barnett on 27 March 1923, Scott wrote that “it gives me great
were hopeful of better returns in the following year. In light of the troubles plaguing the SSB with non-Indigenous settlers, it seemed as though the DIA-administered program was more secure. Yet from 1924 to the revaluation amendment, as the sum repayments started to wane, the DIA began to express concern over the prevailing repayment deficit and challenging weather conditions.47 Explaining further why payments in the mid-1920s had been carrying a structural deficit, Scott wrote:

Dealing with Indian settlers is very different from dealing with white settlers...as they require more instruction, guidance and encouragement. There is also the difficulty of dealing with Indian lands in a reserve...The Indian settlers have now been long enough under the loan system that the incapable have dropped out and the best left so that the Department can reasonably and confidently hope that these now having loans appreciate the opportunity given them to acquire good homes for their families and will make good.48

This sentiment, that attrition had finally removed the incapable settlers and repayments would return to a reasonable level, was not matched by Scott’s private letters with Agricultural Inspector E.J. Sexsmith the following year, to whom Scott wrote, “The payments by soldier settlers on their installments which were due in November have not all been what the Department could wish for.”49 From the perspective of officials worried about securing payments, the trouble would only get worse.

pleasure to inform you that our Indian settlers are doing well and the collections show that approximately 78% of the amount due during the year has been paid. From the way the settlers have met their payment it is evident that they appreciate the Government’s effort to aid them by consolidating the loans, thus making the payments smaller.” LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 20001-1A. Letter from Scott to Barnett, 27 March 1923.

47 A letter from Scott to Barnett in 1924 called the repayments “fairly satisfactory” but blamed the “unfavourable season” of the previous year’s growing season. LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 20001-1A. Letter from Scott to Barnett, 23 April 1924. This discussion of the weather again surfaced in correspondence between Scott and SSB Chairman Col. J.G. Rattray in 1927, when Scott blamed the low repayments on the 1926 harvest as having been poor “owing to weather conditions.” LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001-1 pt. 3. Scott to Col. J.G. Rattray, Chairman, SSB, 25 November 1927.

48 Ibid.

When discussing the fifty-five failed farms as of November 1927, Scott informed SSB Chairman Colonel J.G. Rattray that “Where resale has taken place at a loss on the amount spent for the original settler the difference has been collected in a number of cases through retaining the Indian’s interest money, which is cash distributed to certain Indian Bands each spring and fall.”\(^{50}\) Offering justification for this extreme measure, Scott assured Rattray that “Dealing with Indian settlers is very different from dealing with white settlers.”\(^{51}\) This controversial practice elicited comment from Alexander Lewis, the secretary-general of the support-granting organization The Canteen Fund, who forwarded to the SSB a complaint from the Six Nations. The basis of the complaint, noted Lewis was clear:

> There is a discrimination in the administration of the [SSA] as it applies to Indians and as applied to white men. [The Six Nations deputation] claim is that if an Indian who has purchased a farm under the [plan] finally abandons the farm and turns it back to the [SSB], he is held liable for the balance of the purchase price. They particularly complain that if the farm resold by your Board and the resale price is not equal to the balance which is owing to the organization the Indian is still held liable for the unpaid balance. They claim that this latter condition does not apply to a white man who turns his farm back, but that upon resale he is relieved from further liability.\(^{52}\)

Harold McGill drafted a reply, blaming Six Nations “troublemakers” for raising this issue, and affirmed that “The department is justified in making collections from money due Indians who owe on soldier settlement loans... and in the event of the Department having to take over a farm, the sale is restricted to members of that band only, thus you can see that there is great difficulty in realizing what the farm may be worth.”\(^{53}\) Headquarters instructed Six Nations Agency Superintendent Colonel Morgan to continue to collect Six Nations settlers’ interest money to settle band loans, settlement loans, and seed advances.

\(^{51}\) Ibid.
\(^{52}\) LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001-1 pt 3. Letter from Lewis to the SSB, May 1934.
\(^{53}\) LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001-1 pt 3. Letter from McGill to the Superintendent General, 9 November 1934.
In the mid-1930s, Indigenous veterans’ issues first came to the attention of the Royal Canadian Legion (discussed at length in Chapter V). By this time, DIA Headquarters’ longstanding practice of withholding interest money to pay failing settlers’ loan obligations became another aspect of the government policy to come under public scrutiny. Lewis’ letter could be dismissed, but the Legion Dominion President General Alexander Ross could not. Ross personally contacted Director McGill, who sheepishly agreed that the practice would stop. When Legion official Captain Reynolds travelled to Ohsweken to establish a branch, he recalled McGill’s agreement with Ross to Colonel Morgan.\(^5^4\) As a consolation, McGill forwarded instructions to Agricultural Inspector E.J. Sexsmith that thereafter, any shortfall in repayments would have to be collected by seizing any produce found on settler farms after harvest, selling the crops at market, and applying the proceeds against the loan.\(^5^5\) The DIA backed down from the extreme practice of seizing money from failed settlers, but the damage was done.

**Resistance**

Indigenous peoples resisted the DIA’s administration of Soldier Settlement from its inception in 1919. Participants and their communities were not passive victims of the troubled policy, but active participants who shaped the contours of the program with often unexpected results. During the program’s development in 1919, with applications in the early 1920s, and through repayments in the 1920s and 1930s, Indigenous Soldier Settlers agreed with government policy at certain moments, and contested this policy at other moments. Communities encouraged and resisted the program, part of a broader discourse about processes by which DIA Headquarters sought to encourage socio-economic assimilation on reserves. The program of settling returned

\(^{54}\) LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001-1 pt 3. Letter from McGill to the Superintendent General, 12 February 1935.

Indigenous soldiers was part of a broader set of state interventions that, at times, directly conflicted with the aims and ambitions of individuals and communities. A series of conflicts on the Six Nations reserve near Brantford in southern Ontario during the early post-war period illustrate the connection between settlement, policy, and broader socio-political transformations, and offer a challenging view of the emergent role of returned soldiers caught in the middle of a larger conflict.

By 1914, the Six Nations of the Grand River were the most populous band in Canada with 4,606 registered members.\footnote{56 Dominion of Canada, \textit{Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs}, (Ottawa, King’s Printer, 1914).} As loyal allies of the crown, the Six Nations – a confederacy of Mohawk, Cayuga, Onondaga, Oneida, Tuscarora, and Seneca peoples originally from what is now upstate New York – had a long tradition of supporting British military efforts. In the American Revolution, many from the Six Nations including Joseph Brant fought alongside British forces and received an allotment of land called the Haldimand Tract in Southern Ontario from the mouth to the source of the Grand River and along ten kilometers of either bank as a gift to Brant and 1500 settlers for their service.\footnote{57 Miller, \textit{Skyscrapers Hide Heavens} 77-78; Weaver, “The Iroquois,” 220.} In 1812, the Six Nations again responded as loyal allies of His Majesty by providing key forces that were instrumental in defending Upper Canada from American forces.\footnote{58 See Carl Benn, \textit{The Iroquois in the War of 1812}, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998).}

At the outbreak of war, the Council and members heard the call of military service as allies once again. While a series of economic and political issues had eroded Six Nations sovereignty and position, the Council framed war participation as an important continuity of previous practice. More than 300 reserve members enlisted mostly with the 114th “Brock’s Rangers” Overseas Battalion in 1915-1916, in spite of the Imperial War Department not
contacting or consulting the Council directly about the request for volunteers (a point of contention for Council). The war exposed and hardened political divisions on the reserve between competing religious and political factions, which influenced how the Council responded to issues like financial donations, recruitment, registration, conscription, and home front regulations.59

Throughout October and early November 1917, a number of the Chiefs and band members, in particular those belonging to the traditionalist Longhouse religion, promoted disobedience with conscription regulations among the Six Nations men, leading to physical altercations.60 The community remained divided between those who actively supported recruitment activities and those who resisted the military initiatives, and this cleavage generally split along religious and political lines.61 Physically violent confrontations over the question of national registration on reserve were telling antecedents to what was about to happen over the soldier settlement question.62

As early as April 1919, the question of soldier settlement brought challenges to the Six Nations community. Returning Six Nations soldiers, meeting with Superintendent Gordon J. Smith, expressed an interest in participating in a re-establishment program.63 Scott saw the Six

59 Regarding reserve conflicts at Six Nations, see Lackenbauer and McGowan, 89-115.
60 McGowan, “Until We Receive Just Treatment,” 52-53.
61 Though the Six Nations’ contributions were publicly lauded as generous in both recruits and charitable donations, community divisions over the war question were explicitly addressed by both the Superintendent and Cooke in 1916. Some members of the council actively spoke out against the war both at council meetings and at recruitment events. See LAC, RG 10, volume 6765, file 452-7. See also LAC, RG 10, volume 3181, file 451-124-1A.
62 On National Registration, see LAC, RG 10, volume 6770, file 452-26 pt. 1.
63 Superintendent Gordon J. Smith wrote to headquarters of a “rumor amongst returned Indian soldiers on the reserve that a department for Indian soldiers has been organized at Ottawa for the purpose of assisting returned Indians to purchase land either on the reserve or elsewhere and as I have had many enquiries from returned men. LAC, RG 10, volume 7504, file 25032-1. Letter from Smith to the DIA, 7 April 1919. As elsewhere, interest in a settlement program among returning soldiers blossomed faster than DIA Headquarters’ ability to formulate policy on the matter.
Nations as a primary recipient of the benefits of the program, as it was designed to reward soldiers who “returned to find their machinery rusted...and their stock depleted to such an extent that assistance was absolutely necessary...the system of Soldier Settlement was, therefore, instituted not only for the benefit of the individuals to whom the loans were granted but for the benefit of the community at large.”

Through the summer, returned soldiers turned to the superintendent and visiting Agricultural Inspector T.H. Abraham for advisement on their applications.

Not all on the Six Nations reserve shared this enthusiasm. Unlike other reserves where soldiers applied for loans, the Six Nations Council did not support the program, and issued a series of resolutions in 1919-1921 to try to block returned soldiers from taking settlement loans and securing locations on the reserve. The Council’s resistance related to three connected issues: Foremost among the council’s concern was the issue of land. The Council expressed concern that settlers, having already been temporarily enfranchised for the 1917 election, would become legally assimilated and whose location would become alienated from the reserve, or that defaulting settlers’ land would be sold to whites. The misapprehensions of the Council about

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64 Ibid.

65 Among the first resolutions was in June 1919 that that any returned soldier wishing to farm would have to do so from a band loan As part of the initial circuit preparing reserves for settlement, Abraham reported to Scott that “The Six Nations Council are making a great kick against [Soldier Settlement] and are advising the returned men not to have anything to do with it,” this in spite of the marked excitement of many returned soldiers who talked with Abraham about getting a loan. LAC, RG 10, volume 7504, file 25032-1. Letter from Abraham to Scott, 7 June 1919. For Scott’s circular, see LAC, RG 10, volume 3087, file 279 222-1B, DIA circular, 6 May 1919. For the band council opposition, see LAC, RG 10, volume 7504, file 25032-1. Copy of Minutes of Council Meeting, Smith to the DIA, 3 June 1919.

66 Smith reported that at a council meeting, “Objection was taken in the first place to sell land to returned soldiers on the Reserve, because it was alleged that these soldiers having taken the oath of allegiance and voted in England or in France at the last Dominion election they became white men and therefore the land sold to them would cease to be Indian land. A further objection was taken to the clause providing of the sale by Order-in-Council of the land of any soldier who defaulted in his payment.” LAC, RG 10, volume 7504, file 25032-1. Letter from Smith to the DIA, 3 June 1919.
the erosion of landholdings was rooted in historical experience, in which Six Nations land had been considerably reduced over time by a combination of aggressive European settlement expansion in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century as well as government-sponsored surrender.67

Second, the Council’s resistance hints at a broader division within the community: outstanding tensions between the fifty hereditary chiefs and the “Dehorner Party” advocating for the establishment of an elected council.68 Though generally divided along religious lines, between “pagan” Longhouse and denominational Christian beliefs, a number of Christian converts continued to support the hereditary council, including a group known as the “Mohawk Workers,” an Anglican group dedicated to supporting the policies of the council.69 As we see from Figure 14, these religious affiliations were imbalanced through the interwar period. By 1941, enumerated Indigenous “pagans” in Canada had dropped by more than 50%, while Anglican numbers had almost doubled. These pressures added to the conflict between the two groups.

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68 The council itself was comprised of fifty hereditary chiefs, elected by clan mothers, representing the five original nations: the Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, Oneida, and Mohawk. In opposition to this council and its perceived conservative outlook were the “Dehorner Party,” comprised primarily of Christianized Tuscarora and Delaware farmers, who had been advocating for a change to elected council (and thus “de-horn” the “antlers” of the powerful hereditary council, hence the name) in part because of perceived corruption during the hereditary council’s tenure. See John Moses, “The Return of the Native: Six Nations Veterans and Political Change at the Grand River Reserve, 1917-1924,” in Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Military: Historical Perspectives, ed. P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Craig Leslie Mantle, (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defense Academy Press, 2007), 119.
69 Ibid., 119. Members of the Six Nations’ Longhouse pagans practiced a religion based on Handsome Lake’s promotion of the idea of an “Indian Way” enshrined in his Code. Lake’s early nineteenth century code promoted Iroquoian language, agricultural ritual, and separation from denominational Christians. The Council House at Ohsweken was a place where both denominational Christian Dehorners and Longhouse people would mix. See Weaver, “The Iroquois,” 214-217.
Third, Council resistance was related to an assertion of sovereignty. An October 1919 resolution passed by the council resisted settlement on the grounds that “the Parliament of
Canada has no authority to interfere with the lands of the Six Nations.” Further, the council moved to prohibit Superintendent Smith and Agricultural Inspector Abraham from visiting the Six Nations lands. Through 1921, the Six Nations council accepted the presence of settlers, but continued to resist the settlement program.

The conflict boiled over in 1922. An innocuous provision in the DIA’s settlement provisions, seed relief disbursement, was the ultimate cause of direct confrontation between the council and the DIA. Because of the difficult weather conditions, DIA officials granted settlers on the Six Nations reserve access to funds to purchase seed in the spring for planting. The Superintendent distributed the money with Headquarters’ blessing, as the farmers could not access non-governmental credit for seeds because of section 102 of the Indian Act, which forbade securing a loan with real or personal property. The Soldier Settlement Act (1919) provided limited provisions for government-sponsored relief “in cases of sickness, misfortune, fire, crop failure, rendering personal relief to a limited extent necessary.” In these cases, the SSB authorized loans of up to $400 for advances on seed, taxes, or insurance for Settlers to repay in the following year at 5% interest. In the spirit of moral reform and the Victorian doctrine of “self-improvement,” the SSB assured the public that they would apply emergency relief sparingly, as “a liberal policy in advancing for such personal purposes in the board's opinion would be a deterrent to success in land settlement of men without the self-reliance and personal resourcefulness necessary in the case.” Emergency relief was not to be a substitute for

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70 LAC, RG 10, volume 7504, file 25032-1. Copy of Minutes of Council Meeting, Smith to the DIA, 8 October 1919. Again in May 1921, the council issued a declaration “vigorously protesting against the land settlement Act of Indian returned Soldiers as illegal and an infringement upon the rights of the Six Nations whose Council only has the right to decide questions of titles to the Six Nations Indian lands.” LAC, RG 10, volume 7504, file 25032-1A. Copy of Minutes of Council Meeting, Smith to the DIA, 17 May 1921.
71 Ibid.
72 Soldier Settlement Act (1919) section 59 subsection H.
industriousness.

The SSB’s careful enunciation of their intention to use relief provisions sparingly seemingly aligned with the DIA’s assimilationist mission. Yet on the Six Nations reserve, the necessity of securing harvest profits for repayments trumped parsimonious sentimentality. On 1 April, Abraham secured authorization from DIA Headquarters for seed relief for fourteen settlers.\(^74\) Abraham’s solicitation of the order for these fourteen settlers in mid-March inspired the Council to issue a declaration rejecting the offers of relief and seed, “protesting against the Department in its persistency if taking orders for seeds from the members of the Six Nations.”\(^75\) Rather, the Council argued, the DIA should give $85,000 to the council to disburse among the settlers for seed and relief.

In spite of the Council’s protest, Abraham intended to take further orders for seed. On 7 April, Agricultural Inspector Abraham, Dehorner Parker, and Six Nations Superintendent Smith came to the Council hall to meet with the council, inspect settler farms, and take seed relief orders. Upon arriving at the Council hall and announcing that the seed disbursements would come from Headquarters’ SSA funds instead of band funds, and with the Council in a “very ugly mood,” the three were told to leave the reserve immediately.\(^76\) During this episode, Six Nations hereditary leader and political activist Deskaheh (also known by the Christian name Levi

\(^74\) Relief in this case included 657 bushels oats, 154 bushels barley, 124 bushels feed oats, fifty seven bags potatoes, sixteen tons hay, thirteen bushels timothy, six bushels plus 280 pounds alfalfa, and three bushels red clover. LAC, RG 10, volume 7504, file 25032-1A. Letter from McLean to Smith, 1 April 1922.

\(^75\) LAC, RG 10, volume 7504, file 25,032-1-2 pt. 1. Minutes of council, 4 April 1922. On further protests, see Ibid., Telegram from Parker to Scott, n.d.

\(^76\) LAC, RG 10, volume 7504, file 25,032-1-2 pt. 1. Letter from Parker to Scott, 7 April 1922.
General) began to take a lead role in agitating against seed disbursements. Parker detailed the encounter at length:

When I came before the council General asked me if I had received a communication from the Council. I informed him I had. He asked me if I intended to stop taking seed orders and I replied I did not. I told him that I intended to carry out the instructions of my superior officers. He asked me if it was my intentions to disobey the orders of the Council. I informed him that the Council had no control over me whatever and that so long as it was possible to do so, I intended to carry out my instructions. [Levi General than made a] very impassioned speech...who called upon the chiefs and warriors to rise up and demand, what he called, their rights, and see that I was made to stop by force [shot] if necessary. In Parker’s estimation, the Council’s confrontational tone contrasted with the majority of settlers who “seem very anxious to take advantage of the assistance offered hem by the Department in obtaining seed.” The solution, Parker proposed, was that DIA Headquarters should dissolve the hereditary Council, not least because “They are at the present time doing everything possible to annoy and hinder the soldiers who have taken advantage of the [SSB] with a view to so discourage them that they will finally default on payment.” Abraham concurred, informing Scott that “the Council are getting out of bounds. They have stated openly that they will not rest until they have every soldier on the reserve put off the land and their own people put on, notwithstanding that the soldiers are members of the Band,” and the elimination of the hereditary Council was the “only solution.” The recommendation to dissolve the hereditary Council was not new; both DIA officials and members of the Six Nations community had agitated for this

79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
change since the late nineteenth century. The conflict over seed disbursements simply added further justification the Council needed to change change in the early 1920s.

Beyond seed distribution, the allotment of quit claim deeds was another aggravating point of conflict. Land management processes enflamed tension between the Council and DIA Headquarters in May 1921. A number of cases had occurred regarding the location of settlers on reserve in which the band Council acted independently of DIA personnel. The Council also occasionally supported settler claims in defiance of the DIA. In order to reinstate their authority over the settlement process, and to confront the Council’s intransigence, DIA Headquarters decided to make an example out of one Council-supported community member who was not part of the soldier settlement program.

When Soldier Settler and returned soldier Enos Williams defaulted on his settlement loan in early 1921, the DIA salvaged his property and gave it to Joseph Hill, a Six Nations member. In April 1921, Hill permitted his son-in-law, George Vyse, to take possession of part of the property as a rent on shares to expire on 1 October, but upon expiry, Vyse took possession of the

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82 For example, when William Davis’ farm was purchased for the purpose of settling returned soldier Lloyd Green, Davis was paid for the land and signed over the quit claim deed to Green. Yet the council advised Davis to remain on the land. See LAC, RG 10, volume 7512, file 25,032-41 pt. 1. Additionally, When Frank Joseph’s farm was sold to returned soldier Charles Porter, the council ignored the allotment and located Robert Jamieson on the location instead. LAC, RG 10, volume 7507, file 25,032-17 pt. 1. This also happened when land was purchased for “Doxtator,” in which case the council located Chief David John on the land. Doxtator’s identity is unclear, but is mentioned in Parker’s correspondence with Scott. See LAC, RG 10, volume 7504, file 25,032-1-2 pt. 1. Letter from Parker to Scott, 7 April 1922. This might have been Warren Doxtator, who is listed in September 1923 as having defaulted on his loan. LAC, RG 10, volume 7504, file 25,032-1-2 pt. 1. List of Defaulted Settlers, September 1923. When Fred Hill was settled on Emilia Garlow’s farm, and even after he ploughed twenty-five acres, the council forcibly located George Garlow on the land and forced Hill out. LAC, RG 10, volume 7516, file 25,032-67 pt. 1. The council also occasionally supported settler claims; Walter Martin defaulted on his SSA payments, but the council told him to remain on the land and not vacate under headquarters’ salvage order, see LAC, RG 10, volume 7506, file 25,032-12 pt. 1.

83 Walter Martin defaulted on his SSA payments, but the council told him to remain on the land and not vacate under headquarters’ salvage order LAC, RG 10, volume 7506, file 25,032-12 pt. 1. William John used SSA funds to purchase land, made no payments, but was selling timber on the advice of the council LAC, RG 10, volume 7509, file 25,032-26 pt. 1.
whole property and refused to vacate when Hill asked him to leave.\textsuperscript{84} According to Scott, the council began to support Vyse’s claim on the Williams property to undercut DIA authority over settlement procedures.\textsuperscript{85} Brant County Sheriff J.M. Westbrook dispatched a Brant County to remove Vyse but was met by a “very strong armed force” and was forced to leave the property; the council had passed a resolution locating Vyse on the property and was willing to defend this claim by force.\textsuperscript{86}

Scott also issued an ultimatum for Smith to read at a special meeting with the hereditary chiefs. Scott had Smith warn that the government would preserve law and order “by force of arms,” and that “any offenders shall be severely dealt with. Sufficient armed forces are being provided to preserve law and order.”\textsuperscript{87} On the April 19, the police sent a force of arms to deal with Vyse once and for all. As a large group of Deskaheh’s men had foiled the first attempt, this time the Sheriff send the High Constable with three assistants. The four made initial progress, removing about half of Vyse’s items from the house before a large crowd materialized.\textsuperscript{88} Without warning, the crowd began attacking the four lawmen, pelting them with “stones, stove lids, and any other missile that came handy” and threatening to stab them with pitchforks.\textsuperscript{89} The

\textsuperscript{84} Hill secured a writ to evict Vyse, but Brant County Sheriff J.M. Westbrook was reticent to execute it because of uncertainty over jurisdiction on the reserve. At Hill’s behest, Scott contacted Deputy Minister of Justice M.L. Newcomb about the legality of a writ of possession to evict Vyse. Newcomb affirmed that the course of action would be perfectly legal. LAC, RG 10, volume 7504, file 25,032-1-2 pt. 1. Letter from Newcomb to Scott, 30 December 1921.

\textsuperscript{85} LAC, RG 10, volume 7504, file 25,032-1-2 pt. 1. Memorandum from Scott to Charles Stewart, 18 March 1922

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., Letter from Abraham to Scott, 7 April 1922. In mid-April, Newcomb reaffirmed the DIA’s authority to evict the interlopers by force, and McLean proposed the idea that warrants for all trespassers should be executed at once to circumvent another confrontation, \textit{ibid.}, Letter from Newcomb to McLean, 13 April, 1922.

\textsuperscript{87} LAC, RG 10, volume 7504, file 25,032-1-2 pt. 1. Letter from Scott to Smith, 15 April 1922.

\textsuperscript{88} How the council managed to mobilize such a large group of people to intervene at key moments and locations to resist DIA actions on reserve was finally explained in June 1922, when it was discovered that Dominion Constable Harry Martin, who had up to that point “done his duty fairly well,” had recently taken sides with Levi General and others in opposing the rulings of the Department and was informing General when and where the law was to be enforced, and “how to get groups of men to oppose” the intrusions. LAC, RG 10, volume 7504, file 25,032-1-2 pt. 1. Letter from Smith to McLean, 29 June 1922.

\textsuperscript{89} LAC, RG 10, volume 7504, file 25,032-1-2 pt. 1. Letter from Smith to McLean, 20 April 1922.
“defending force,” wrote Smith, overwhelmed the four men and compelled them to quickly retreat.\(^9\) This second attempt was an unmitigated disaster, and all four officers sustained injuries, though none was severe.

The second effort to evict Vyse only strengthened the council’s resistance. Deskaheh wrote to the Governor General on 24 April that the DIA were “presently engaging in encroaching upon rights ...we still hold as sacred” and in view of the right of council to authorize dispensation of land on reserve, “this we will defend until the bitter end.”\(^9\) The council also declared that Vyse’s rights to stay on the farm were absolute, and that “he should not be interfered with in any way.”\(^9\) Vyse’s occupation of the Williams property became of such importance that the council was willing to place all measures at their disposal to defend their authority in locating him.

Cooler heads prevailed thereafter. Over the next two months, the DIA took a conciliatory approach. Minister of the Interior Charles Stewart met with a deputation in Ottawa, and again at Ohsweken. Stewart publicly declared support for the notion of lifting loans on reserve lands and only maintaining security on stock and improvements; he also stated his opposition to compulsory enfranchisement, and admitted that Scott’s April ultimatum was in poor taste. In an interview with the Ottawa Citizen on the matter, Stewart publicly declared his support for Indian veterans, stating, “Anything that may have been done for the soldiers I want to stand behind. We cannot do too much for them”\(^9\) League of Indians of Canada founder Fred Ogilvie Loft also publicly commented on the negotiations, and the challenge of balancing the needs of settlers

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\(^9\) Ibid.
against band sovereignty, noting that the cause of friction on the Six Nations reserve stemmed from “Disapproval of the extraordinary powers and rights conferred upon the Deputy Superintendent-General of Indian Affairs by Parliament in administering the provisions of the Indian Act,” and added that “it does not appear to be in the bounds of fair and just reasoning that when the state undertakes to [assist returned soldiers], it should be done by seriously impairing the moral and sovereign rights of a band to have something to say as to the dispossession of the their property.”

The Farmer’s Sun agreed with Loft, publishing an article that decried the “sinister appearance” of DIA SSA policy, calling the SSA a “Subtle device for impairment and penetration of communal rights.” With conciliation in mind, Six Nations Superintendent Smith struck a deal with the council that Vyse could stay on the land and reap the season’s crops. The Council agreed not to interfere with the DIA’s prosecution of other cases of trespass, and in return the DIA would not grant any further settlement loans on reserve.

In October, McLean informed Stewart that the DIA intended to amend the third section of the Indian Act, governing SSA regulations, to further reinforce that lands would not be subject to surrender through resale.

Conciliation only lasted until December 1922. November settler repayments were disappointing; Abraham explained to Scott that the lack of repayments was because “the Six Nations Council have advised all of the settlers that they do not have to make payment.” In light of the repayment problems, DIA Headquarters’ tolerance for the council-supported alternative settlers evaporated; on 6 December, Scott arranged with the Brantford police to

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95 “The Case of the Six Nations Indians” The Farmers’ Sun, 23 May 1922.
96 LAC, RG 10, volume 7504, file 25,032-1-2 pt. 1. DIA memorandum, 1 June 1922.
execute outstanding warrants on the squatters, though this attempt was again thwarted when Smith warned Scott that Vyse and the council had fifty men “armed with shotguns and rifles to resist eviction by the RCMP” patrolling the roads with the intent to resist eviction or arrest.  

Moreover, any eviction would be temporary, as the men would simply return to the farms as soon as the police left. On 26 December, Scott announced to Smith that he had arranged with the RCMP to have a post permanently established on reserve, settling the issue. With Deskaheh in Europe advocating on behalf of the Six Nations to the League of Nations, political resistance to this move was less forceful than had he been present.

Part of the RCMP’s mandate on the Six Nations reserve was to resolve the settlement conflict. Seed disbursements the following April were completed without confrontation.

Repayments in 1923 remained weak, but the DIA became more active in repossessing stock and equipment. Aided by the RCMP detachment, the DIA began to seize the stock and implements of delinquent settlement accounts and auction them in Brantford. Scott also solicited the help of the RCMP to work on enforcing repayments among the rest of the settlers, writing to RCMP commissioner Lieutenant-Colonel Cortland Starnes that “A goodly number [of Six Nations soldier settlers] have disregarded the agreement entered into with the Department, and it is thought that if you instruct your men on duty on the reserve that they may persuade these delinquents to fulfil their obligations.” In March 1924, newly-appointed superintendent Colonel C.E. Morgan wrote to DIA Headquarters about the “four types of settlers” on the

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100 In April 1923, the stock and equipment was seized from William John, John Johnson, Roland Buck, George White, and Leonard Martin and brought to Brantford for auction. LAC, RG 10, volume 7504, file 25.032-1-2 pt. 1. Letter from Abraham to Scott, 14 April 1923. For William John, see LAC, RG 10, volume 7509, file 25.032-26. For John Johnson, see LAC, RG 10, volume 7517, file 25.032-73. For Roland Buck, see LAC, RG 10, volume 7519, file 25.032-87. For George White, see LAC, RG 10, volume 7515, file 25.032-64 pt. 1. For Leonard Martin, see LAC, RG 10, volume 7506, file 25.032-12.
reserve; the first two types were honest and genuine settlers, one type having found success and the other having been handicapped by circumstance and unable to make repayments. The other two types were “shiftless and lazy” who took farms but work at other jobs and do not farm, and the Mohawk Workers and friends who “took up farms to get all they can from the Government, who do not mean to pay at all.” During 1924, seizures became more frequent. When the DIA dissolved the hereditary council in October, the disfavored settlers mentioned by Morgan began an “exodus,” generally abandoning their stock and equipment and leaving reserve. Conflicts over repayments persisted into the late 1920s, though the sort of concerted resistance on behalf of settlers in arrears had been effectively broken after the establishment of the RCMP post and the dissolution of the hereditary council.

The Six Nations case was unique, as the concerted resistance on the part of broad sections of the community to the provisions of the SSA do not appear to have occurred in other locations. For the council, in the early 1920s, sovereignty trumped veteranship, though in Deskaheh’s speeches and writings, he was never explicitly anti-veteran. Rather, he used the rhetoric involving military service to reinforce the case for sovereignty. In 1923, Deskaheh told the New York Times that “My tribe sent 400 men to fight in the late war, forty of whom were killed...I will pursue this claim relentlessly until it is recognized.” Using the war as justification for

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102 Morgan’s appointment directly precipitated Scott’s planned transition of the council. As Brian Titley argues, Morgan was arrogant, puritanical, and antagonistic. Titley, A Narrow Vision, 125.
pursuing sovereignty was a useful strategy for Deskaheh, but somewhat disingenuous considering the politics of settlement on reserve, and his role in blocking the settlement of veterans. In his final public utterance before his sudden death in 1925, Deskaheh referenced the Six Nations’ involvement in the war, arguing, “In some respects, we are just like you. We like to tell our troubles. You do that. You told us you were in great trouble… Many of our young men volunteered and many gave their lives for you. You were very willing to let them fight in the front ranks in France. Now we want to tell our troubles to you.”

War service was part of, not necessarily separate from, Deskaheh’s political movement.

As some veterans had been active in the dehorner movement, petitioning Ottawa to abolish the hereditary council, council members likely saw the settlement question as a way to respond to these antagonisms. The Council supported some defaulting settlers, though a desire to further disrupt DIA officials’ Settlement business motivated Council. The Council’s resistance was harmful to the settler prospects, but Council took aim at DIA Headquarters’ all-important repayments in this way. The conflict over soldier settler allotment occurred amid a broader struggle between the DIA and the hereditary chiefs, and enforcing settlement regulations inspired the DIA to abolish the hereditary council and establish a RCMP post on reserve. Fundamentally, DIA officials understood resistance as an expression of anti-modern forces looking to stultify progressive developments on reserve, rather than a manifestation of decades of conflict over authority and jurisdiction. This failure to appreciate the true roots of the conflict prevented more meaningful interactions between all community members and the state for decades to come.

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107 For the involvement of veterans in dehorner politics, see Moses, 121.
### Figure 15: Cumulative Payments Made by Soldier Settlers, 1922-1933

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Principal Paid</th>
<th>Interest Paid</th>
<th>Total Paid</th>
<th>Amount Due</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1919-1920</td>
<td>$585</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>$585</td>
<td>$0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1920-1921</td>
<td>$13,342</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>$13,342</td>
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<td>$4,755</td>
<td>$22,105</td>
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<td>$3,695</td>
<td>$12,715</td>
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<td>$3,945</td>
<td>$13,180</td>
<td>$14,380</td>
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<td>$8,376</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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Source: LAC, RG 10, Thousand Series (Selected Files)

Note * - The figures for payments in 1919-1920 and 1920-1921 are presented in sum, not broken down into principal and interest. Thus the 585 and 13342 are cumulative totals.

Note ** - These figures do not include the amount due on the stock and equipment loans, so do not actually reflect the seeming overpayment by settlers in those years.

Note *** - The data for amounts due is only available up to 1924-1925. However, considering that 227 settlers were active in 1925-1926 with $387,009 in repayable debt outstanding, a hypothetical repayment schedule can be established. Following the post-1922 consolidation repayment schedule of twenty five annual installments at 5%, this would equal about $16,117 due in 1925-1926. Considering the upward trend in amounts due from 1919-1924, this seems to be a reasonable, if clumsy, figure.
Reassessing Failure

If the DIA misunderstood the causes of resistance to soldier settlement, virtually all observers tended to misunderstand the failure of soldier settlement as it unfolded. Soldier Settlement officials tended to blame both non-Indigenous and Indigenous settlers for their farms’ failures; amid a worsening agricultural crisis in 1921, the SSB’s second chairman, the CEF veteran and New Brunswick Lawyer Major John Barnett argued that failed farmers simply lacked a “thriftiness in the preservation of their money.” Agents, agricultural advisors, and DIA Headquarters similarly blamed Indigenous settlers’ failures on a lack of industry, money management, or agricultural acumen. Only in the late 1930s did officials start to understand the structural problems with the program.

For both Indigenous and non-Indigenous returned soldiers, farming programs for demobilized men and their families were miserable failures. Half of all non-Indigenous soldiers had walked away from their loans and farms by 1929. A third of Indigenous settlers had abandoned their farms by that time, only for the DIA to replace them with new Indigenous Soldier Settlers or civilians from their communities who “salvaged” the loans and tried to make it work themselves. For those who stayed, less than 5% had paid off their loans by the mid-1930s. After erratic peaks and troughs through the 1920s, cumulative repayment plummeted from 1928 to 1933. In the 1936 DIA Annual Report, soldier settlement was proclaimed by Scott’s replacement, DIA Deputy Superintendent General Dr. Harold W. G. McGill, to have been an important step towards self-sufficiency. McGill wrote “The granting of these loans has enabled the department to establish a large number of Indians on the land where they and their

108 Barnett, as quoted in Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 147.
children will become an asset to the country and be removed from that state of dependency that
so many were inclined to fall into.”109 Correspondence between McGill and Deputy Minister of
the Department of Mines and Resources, Charles Camsell offered a more earnest appreciation of
the program in 1943. When addressing the question of assistance to Indian soldiers in the Second
World War, McGill wrote, “We are not convinced... that Indians, as such, should qualify for
special concessions or special treatment in the immediate post-war period. The Soldier
Settlement Act, from the standpoint of the Indians who took advantage of it, has been in no sense
a success.”110 After 24 years, the DIA finally admitted to the program’s failure.

This earnest, retrospective assessment of the program was important in the context of
contemporary debates regarding benefits for veterans of the Second World War. Deputy
Superintendent General McGill’s assessment also spoke to a larger truth: the Indigenous veterans
who had participated in the SSA were probably worse off than if they had not taken on the debt.
After decades of publicly declaring the program a great success, and part of a broader transitional
movement whereby Indigenous returned soldiers would serve as the vanguard for a new,
modern, and prosperous future, McGill’s frank consideration of the program’s failure affirms the
DIA’s private appreciation, that settlement was fraught with difficulty.

The reasons for failure for both groups were common: soldier settlers in Canada were
victims of circumstance. Morton and Wright argue that international economic fluctuations were
the single most important factor in dooming soldier settlement to failure, and this argument holds
true for Indigenous settlers as well.111 Particularly for the early applicants who had received

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110 LAC, RG 10, volume 6772, file 452-40. Memorandum, McGill to Camsell, 1943. The placement of the
correspondence in relation to the rest of the file, as well as the subject matter, indicate that this letter was written
sometime between September and November 1943.
111 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 151.
loans in 1919 and 1920, the cost of purchases of farm equipment and stock were at the highest they would be until the Second World War. Figure 10 demonstrates the wartime inflation of equipment, machinery, and farm wages to the peak in 1919. Wartime inflation, having driven the price of agricultural staples and farm wages to more than double the prewar levels, remained high in the immediate postwar period. The costs of purchasing equipment and stock followed the inflationary trend, peaking in 1919. SSB and DIA officials distributed Settler loans in a period when the costs were at their highest, meaning that returned soldiers paid a premium on this stock and equipment.

Compounding the deflated worth of implements, agricultural prices dropped precipitously between 1920 and 1922. As Settlers made loan repayments after the decline, they could do little to generate funds even on successful harvests. Figure 16 reflects the wartime inflation of crop prices, the postwar decline in prices, and the second decline during the early years of the great depression. The declining fortunes of Settlers across Canada were largely due to this structural economic adjustment. SSA amendments in 1922, 1925, and 1927 attempted to adjust repayments to forgive the discrepancy between inflated stock and machinery prices and declining crop prices, but these stopgap measures did little to slow the falling repayments.

Indigenous Settlers were uniquely impacted by the broader economic trends in two respects; first, the greater proportion of funds expended on stock and machinery than non-Indigenous settlers, about 30% compared with 24%. This made Indigenous Settlers especially vulnerable to the deflated crop prices, though this was somewhat offset by the smaller loan sizes and lack of DIA investment in the most expensive and sophisticated farm equipment. Second, though the DIA’s participation in the 1922 consolidation was wholehearted, the application of the 1925 and 1927 loan relief amendments was tentative at best. Few Indigenous settlers
received the loan reductions, making their stagnating loans proportionally higher than their non-Indigenous Settler comrades.

As a contributing factor, unsteady weather conditions during growing seasons created poor yields. The drop in prices and relative lack of experience of some settlers meant that the crop-margin dependency was extremely tight. Through the first years of settlement, slight reductions in yields meant potential disaster. The unpredictable weather, especially in 1920 and 1921, was
disastrous for farms across Canada, and seem to have done the worst damage in the southern Prairies. When the DIA attached correspondence to the repayments in 1921, 1924, and 1926, they cited weather as the primary cause of the shortfalls.112 With poor farming conditions, a lack of feed grain or seed, or cash from crops to purchase feed or seed, for the following year often forced settlers into a cycle of further indebtedness, and these unsteady yields were inordinately affected by the climate cycle during planting and harvesting. More extreme weather patterns in western Canada in the 1930s further aggravated settlers, though Indigenous settlers were somewhat protected being mostly located in southern Ontario.

Moreover, demographic cycles might have also contributed to the difficult settlement adjustment. The average age at enlistment was 26 for non-Indigenous soldiers and 25.5 for Indigenous enlistees. For both groups, the average age of the settlers at the final date of repayment, according to the twenty-five year schedule, was sixty-two. Engaging in a full-scale agricultural effort with horse-drawn plough and harrows over the age of sixty to attend to repayments was likely unattractive, and explains the high rates of settlement farm turnover in the 1930s and 1940s.

Even settlers’ levels of experience may have contributed to failure. Enthusiasm for settlement by prospective settlers, program administrators, and public officials meant that a liberal distribution of loans to returned soldiers exceeded the capacity of many settlers to fulfill

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112 For example, a 1925 report from Graham to Scott reported that “threashing [sic] operations generally throughout the two provinces have been considerably retarded on account of weather conditions,” and would likely contribute to a smaller repayment from western settlers for the 1925-1926 season. LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25000-101 pt. 1. Report from Graham to Scott, 22 October 1925.
their obligations. Far from serious and experienced farmers, some loan recipients had little or no farming experience. The initial design of the SSA afforded training initiatives for uninitiated farmers, but these initiatives largely failed. This serious flaw in the composition of settlers worked to undermine the prospects of the program; inexperienced settlers demanded an investment in training and personnel, and could not quickly generate large yields sufficient to begin paying their loans. For the DIA, rigid application standards ostensibly stressed that only experienced Indigenous farmers could apply with only a few exceptions. DIA Headquarters

Figure 17: Crops Sown and Harvested (Bushels) on Aboriginal Reserves, 1921-1941

Note: aggregate data not available for 1911.

Sources: Report of the Department of Indian Affairs, 1921 (Ottawa: King's Printer 1922); Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs, 1931 (Ottawa: King's Printer 1932); Canada Department Of Mines And Resources Report Of Indian Affairs Branch for the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1941 (Ottawa: King's Printer 1941).

\[113\] Morton and Wright see this as a secondary driver of failure for the program, behind economic fluctuations. See Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 151.
accepted the notion advanced by Meighen that non-farming returned Indian soldiers already had a chance to learn agriculture, and if they had not already done so, they could not apply for a settlement loan. Yet the discussion of settlers above demonstrates that a large majority of Indigenous applicants did not have direct experience running a farm, or that their experience was as an agricultural assistant rather than farm owner.

Both Indigenous and non-Indigenous settlers encountered inflexible and inefficient bureaucracies. The Board pushed agricultural inspectors to drive settlers to “efficiency,” the same as Headquarters expected DIA’s agricultural inspectors to complete bi-annual agricultural inspection for each Indigenous soldier settler. Lack of inspections meant that settlers did not actually receive the sort of intensive management that the DIA promoted to the SSB and codified with the 1922 list of regulations. DIA Headquarters relied upon Indian Agents to fill any gaps in the administration. Headquarters’ J.D. McLean acknowledged this issue in correspondence with Superintendent Smith when he wrote that “It is recognized that the Soldier Settlement work will greatly increase your duties, but it is hoped that you will [sic] be successful in keeping your men at work.”¹¹⁴ Five years later, Colonel Morgan complained that he could not possibly satisfy the extra work accompanying the administration of soldier settlement, considering both the large numbers of settlers and overstretched staff.¹¹⁵ Headquarters closely monitored and directed the movements of agricultural representatives, limiting inspectors’ autonomy and suppressing their knowledge of local conditions. DIA Headquarters also frequently intervened in the application

¹¹⁴ LAC, RG 10, volume 7504, file 25032-1. Letter from McLean to Smith, 22 September 1919.
¹¹⁵ 25001-1. Letter from Morgan to Scott, 23 June 1924. The problems were only aggravated further in 1927, when R.H. Abraham died. For the disruption this caused, see, for example LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25001-1 pt. 3. Letter from Sexsmith to Scott, 29 March 1927.
process, purchasing of stock and equipment, and repayment scheduling. A lack of local flexibility made the program all the more cumbersome to run effectively.

The SSB and DIA pushed settlers towards agricultural practices that were not suited for their regions and did not fit with broader economic trends. For non-Indigenous soldier settlers, SSB advisors pushed (primarily western) settlers towards practicing labor-intensive small-scale polyculture, meaning that instructors advised farmers to keep small amount of a variety of livestock and plant a number of different crops. This was happening at a time when the nature of Canadian agriculture in the west was pivoting towards monoculture, intensive farming practices, and concentrated landholdings. As James M. Pitsula asserts, the wartime prosperity and sharp postwar drop was a “cruel trick” that sustained “treadmill of cereal monoculture” unnecessarily. Non-Indigenous settlers in western Canada suffered from an uncompetitive and backwards-focused approach that contributed to their failure.

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116 Agents and agricultural representatives’ itemized accounts were frequently picked apart by Scott for minor errors in arithmetic, or for failing to provide corroborating documentation in a purchase on the department’s behalf. Moreover, Scott intervened whenever a local official acted on initiative to secure stock or equipment beyond what was authorized. For example, Scott chastised R.H. Abraham for the purchase of a cow when only a pig was authorized, and the granting of a few dollars of carpentry work when Scott had not approved this expenditure. As Scott remarked, “it is a difficult matter for the Department to closely supervise the Soldier Settlement loans if you are going to authorize extensions to the loans without first advising the Department of the need of the same and receiving authority to do so.” LAC, RG 10, volume 7484, file 25000 pt 1. Letter from Scott to Abraham, 23 November 1923.


118 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 148.

119 James M. Pitsula, For All We Have and Are: Regina and the Experience of the Great War, (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2008), 195.
Conversely, Indigenous farmers and soldier settlers in the 1920s and 1930s, trended towards wheat monoculture, demonstrated by Figure 17. These Ontario farmers and settlers were in a better position for agricultural success than their Western non-Indigenous comrades were: escaping the worst of the “dust bowl” drought in the 1930s should have saved Ontario settlers from the struggle of the west and higher crop yields, ensuring prosperity. Yet Ontario’s agricultural sector was pivoting towards market gardening and dairying to serve the growing urban centers. Indigenous Soldier Settler files show a reduction in crop diversity and declining outputs across Ontario through this period, at the precise moment when polyculture was relatively a better proposition.

In sum, failure for all soldier settlers was driven by many factors out of the control of participants and officials; international economic trends, weather patterns, demographics all worked against these participants. Factors entirely within the control of participants and officials exacerbated structural problems, like program design, administration, and the inspection process. Indigenous and non-Indigenous settlers seemed to have suffered equally against these difficult conditions; even the administration of the two programs were similarly inefficient, inflexible, and exacting. Yet the loan amounts, areas of investment, and relief measures in 1922 and afterwards did not apply equally to Indigenous and non-Indigenous Settlers. Indigenous Settlers’ lower loan amounts and less investment in critical equipment suggest that government officials perceived and administered these men differently. Although this did not contribute substantially to their farms’ failures, lower allotments for Indigenous veterans furthers the notion that they did not receive the same opportunity to reintegrate as other men.
Conclusion

By 1936, Ben Sawyer’s questions about the reintegration of Indigenous soldiers seemed to have been answered: they did “entitle the same show as other boys,” deserving of a program of land settlement as veterans, but they were not “favoured” men and received little support or flexibility from government officials. As with their non-Indigenous comrades-in-arms, they had won access to a program of agricultural loans, designed in 1919 to balance the need for providing some form

Sources: Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs, 1911 (Ottawa: King’s Printer 1912); Report of the Department of Indian Affairs, 1921 (Ottawa: King’s Printer 1922); Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs, 1931 (Ottawa: King’s Printer 1932); Canada Department Of Mines And Resources Report Of Indian Affairs Branch for the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1941 (Ottawa: King’s Printer 1941).
of reward for veterans against the necessity of fiscal constraint amid concerns of a burgeoning public debt and threat of an American-style “pension evil.” Neither set of interests were particularly concerned in 1919; looking at the wartime inflated agricultural prices, virtually all observers expected settlers would succeed and prosper. When these two needs came into conflict in the 1920s amid declining agricultural prices and deflated farm equipment value, concern for the public debt had largely won out. Non-Indigenous soldier settlers began abandoning their farms and settlement loans, and those that stayed had their loans adjusted to account for the bad debt and make success a possibility. For Indigenous soldiers, similar reasons for failure led to far more punitive outcomes: abandonment was nearly impossible since DIA officials seized interest payments and even pensions to secure monthly interest payments on the loans regardless of the settler’s presence on their location.

Early visions from DIA officials, Indigenous soldiers, and communities alike saw this program as a method of reintegrating wounded soldiers into the socio-economic fabric of the nation, but this vision lost out to a narrower system of loans for established farmers. Reintegration meant the return of “missionaries of progress,” and veterans’ initiatives mean that the government placed Indigenous soldiers in locations on reserve to advance the community’s assimilation into liberal capitalist order; a good fit with longstanding government aims. Not all groups accepted this assimilation; on the Six Nations reserve, community members met the intrusion of Settlement with resistance, even outright violence. Swept up in broader trends, even the most acquiescent soldier settler struggled against desperate circumstances and a broader movement away from agriculture on reserves through the 1930s (See Figures 17 and 18).

Contingency is important to understanding the contours of the DIA’s version of the SSA. Administrative features were developed ad hoc, and alternative proposals were slowly shut
down. Interest in program, expectations of soldiers similar to non-Indigenous; loans lower, but
difficult to adjust for land purchases of non-Indigenous. The timing was simply off, in terms of
macroeconomic trends. Agricultural paradigms were shifting away from smaller family farms
and polyculture. These issues affected non-Indigenous Soldier Settlers as much as it affected
those administered by the DIA.

While the reasons for Indigenous settlers’ difficulties were similar to non-Indigenous
SSA participants, much of the program’s administration was not. Settlers from southern Ontario
dominated the program by design. Western participants were discouraged from doing so locally
and federally. Moreover, the sustained rigidity of the DIA’s was unique for soldier settlement.
DIA Headquarters did not permit Indigenous participants to discharge Settlement loans through
sale, and excluded Indigenous men from even modest federal measures to ease the burden on
Soldier Settlers. The context of the Indian Act and the push for legal enfranchisement in the
1920s explains this unique approach to policy. Part of the issue is that re-establishment
necessitated that Indigenous peoples be kept on reserve and kept from moving into the city
unless they were willing to become enfranchised. In a sense, the DIA’s version of the SSA
program preceded the enfranchisement process. Being settlers tied Indigenous men and their
families to the reserve, and particularly in southwestern Ontario. The DIA developed a method
that functionally preventing them from discharging or abandoning their loan without total
financial ruin, seizing profits of sale and even their pension entitlements. Doing so eventually
produced negative press and the official rebuke from veterans’ organizations By the mid-1930s,
DIA officials backed down from such an extreme position. For soldier settlers, as was the case
for disabled veterans, depression and exclusionary policy changes exposed a bitter reality behind
the woolly praise for such loyal and patriotic men.
CHAPTER V: “HELPLESS INDIANS”: RESTORATION AND REHABILITATION

Introduction

On April 23, 1929, fifty-four-year-old Johnson Pandash wrote to Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King to inform him that a “great many of the disabled Indian veterans are not getting any pension and also, the fathers and mothers, who have lost their sons during the war, are not getting any allowances. Possibly this may be owing to an oversight on the part of the administration and helplessness on the part of the Indian veteran.” ¹ As an Indigenous veteran of the First World War from Rice Lake in eastern Ontario, Pandash offered a solution to the problem: “appoint a sympathetic white man on the pension board who will look after the interest of the Indians.”² Pandash’s remonstrations were symptomatic of a broader disaffection shared among the vast multitude of veterans from across Canada, Indigenous and non-Indigenous alike, that had felt betrayed by a punishing and inadequate system of remuneration for the 12,000 war widows and more than 78,000 CEF members – at least 857 of whom were Indigenous – who had sought a pension by 1935.³ Pandash’s letter to the PMO reflected an angst on behalf of

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¹ According to the Agent’s responses to the circular of December 1918, Pandash had enlisted on November 11 1914 at Kingston, served with the 21st Overseas Battalion, had a wife and four children listed as dependents, was not seriously wounded, and returned in 1918. His attestation papers list his occupation as a farmer, and state that he was 39 years old when he enlisted. LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-29. Pandash’s regimental number is listed as 59449, but his attestation papers are listed under the number 59779, likely an issue of the Agent misreading the form and converting the fours into sevens. The attestation papers also list his name as Johnston Paudash, though in his own correspondence and that of the agent he spells it Johnson Pandash, not Paudash. LAC, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 7655 – 45. Attestation papers for Johnston Paudash.

² LAC, RG 10, volume 3181, file 452-124-1A. Letter from Johnson Pandash to PMO Secretary Harry Baldwin, 23 April 1929.

³ King’s letterbook and personal diary suggest that he did not respond directly to this letter. King’s private secretary Harry Baldwin seems to have summarily forwarded this letter to DIA Headquarters. When confronted by allegation by Baldwin, the DIA responded, “This Department does not deal with the question of obtaining pensions for Indian Veterans except in certain cases where representations have been made to us on behalf of disabled Indians. In these cases any information in our possession has been laid before the Department of Pensions and National Health who deal with them on their merits. If any cases of merit are brought to our attention in the future we are prepared, as in the past, to take up the matter with the Department of Pensions and National Health.” The matter did not proceed
Indigenous soldiers specifically, but all veterans more generally, regarding their perceived mistreatment by government officials and the feelings of helplessness against an obstinate bureaucracy. The nation had promised to do right by its soldiers and families in 1914, making Pandash’s criticism all the more poignant.

From humble beginnings in August 1914, Canadian officials by the armistice were administering an expansive system for providing medical care, invalided and longer-term care institutions, and other programs and services for wounded and disabled soldiers. Employment retraining programs promised reintegration for those that could not return to former occupations. Disabled soldiers, widows, and families ostensibly benefitted from the world’s most generous pension rates. Additionally, provinces, municipalities, and non-government organizations chipped in to offer supplemental aid and programs. As with the promise of reintegration for returning “fit” soldiers, government officials were keen to balance the needs of the soldiers against a stretched public purse. Moreover, program administrators worked to ensure disabled soldiers, widows, orphans, and others should not have to suffer, but equally concerned themselves with preventing any coddling through excessive supports either, lest a “dependent” became accustomed to undue care.

Officials and the public often treated individuals and families requiring support with skepticism. Elected officials, newspapers and magazine reporters and editors, and private citizens obsessed over the perceived glut of malingerers’ false claims, misattributed disabilities, deathbed marriages, or other conditions they saw as fraudulent. Suspicious government officials treated pension claimants with profound skepticism over the nature of their disability, the level of

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further. LAC, RG 10, volume 3181, file 452-124-1A. Letter from McLean to Baldwin, 02 May 1929. On Pension numbers, see Kurchinski, 419-421. See also Cook, Shock Troops, 603.
support they required, and how they could support themselves. Women as pensioners, widows, or dependents encountered substantially greater levels of surveillance as recipients of state support than male recipients.

Government officials initially congratulated themselves on establishing enduring rehabilitation institutions that balanced the needs of wounded and disabled men with the necessity of fiscal restraint. Yet economic fluctuations and political trends demonstrated the tenuousness of rehabilitated veterans’ place in society in the first two decades following the armistice. Waging a “second battle,” veterans organizations vigorously advocated for reform to pensions, estates, better insurance plans, and an increase in funds available to veterans and their families. Government commissions in the 1920s and 1930s generally outlined the symptoms, but did little to alleviate the condition of veterans’ poverty. Only by the late 1930s were more successful changes in place, precipitating a broader recognition of the need to try again with Second World War veterans and systematically improve reintegration and rehabilitation programs.

Indigenous soldiers experienced both the triumph and tragedy of Canada’s rehabilitation institutions. From accessing provisions for family support in 1914 through to “Last Post Fund” support to bury impoverished veterans, these “helpless Indians,” as Pandash called them, confronted challenges related to an imperfect administrative partnership between the DIA and other military and civilian organizations. Indigenous men presented a fundamental set of questions regarding the care for war’s victims: if the “missionaries of progress” seemed to foretell vast progressive changes coming to reserves, what did this helpless group of wounded, disabled, sick and impoverished veterans and dependents represent? Did this group have a greater claim to state benefits than other impoverished, disabled, or sick Indigenous peoples that
did not serve with the CEF? Which government agency would tend to these soldiers now unable to return to work? Who would support their families, widows, orphans, siblings now denied their primary wage earner or caretaker? What organization would generate, distribute, monitor, and manage any monetary aid?

A small but vibrant historiographic tradition has emerged around the topics of the First World War, family supports, and pensions in Canada. Most of these studies have focused on the relationship between public institutions and service recipients, usually feeding the larger narrative in which the struggles of veterans, families, and committed radicals suffered through the 1920s and especially 1930s, but won important gains from the state that evolved into lasting public institutions. As with much of the scholarship on veterans in Canada, Desmond Morton’s

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Fight or Pay and his work with Glenn Wright on *Winning the Second Battle* remain the most complete studies of pensions and rehabilitation in a national context. More recently, historians such as Mark Humphries and Kellen Kurchinski have explored how the presence of war related disabilities in Canada was a potential threat to masculinity and nationalism. This chapter adds to recent scholarship on disability and veteranship by adding Indigenous peoples and assessing how race complicated disability care. Humphries writes, “In postwar hearing rooms, pensions and compensation for indignant soldiers framed the negotiations between citizen and state.”\(^6\) With that consideration in mind, to what degree did the presence or absence of Indigenous men from these spaces signify a greater or lesser definition of indigeneity, veteranship, and citizenship? Could non-citizens negotiate compensation from the state? Did they need to become citizens to do so? The limited historiography on Indigenous peoples and the First World War has neglected the presence, experience, and influence of Indigenous peoples and their experience as casualties, widows, recipients of state support, and struggling veterans in the 1930s. This focus connects to the recent historiographic turn by including Indigenous peoples as part of that story, and suggesting the ways in which the presence of Indigenous peoples adds a layer of complexity to the story of institution-building in Canada.

Chapter V presents information from DIA demobilization interviews, Indigenous soldiers’ service files, and 857 case files created and maintained between 1915 and 1951 by the DIA for 571 recipients of state support, including family supports, pensions, and estates. These files document Indigenous service members’ accounts, interactions between state institutions, and the relationship between the DIA and other military and civilian administrative authorities. Connecting these resources means we can begin to understand the layers of overlap between DIA

officials and military, medical, and civilian authorities. While the 857 files may not necessarily represent all pensioners, due to challenges explained in the Methodological Essay in the Appendix, these sources broadly explain how Indigenous veterans fit into the national system.

Indigenous soldiers and their families did not really fit into a wartime and postwar aid system, which created a level of administrative friction, besides the friction which governments already had in terms of working out jurisdictions and getting assistance to veterans. I argue that a confounding and complex web of relationships was forged, strengthened, and broken during the administration of Indigenous war wounded, dead, and disabled. Paternalistic rhetoric framed these relationships, but beneath the rhetoric lies a series of meaningful interactions that at times benefitted Indigenous veterans and their families. Contradictions in that system simultaneously condemned some while benefitted others. By the 1930s, the national discourse on veterans (especially Indigenous veterans) had turned unequivocally towards a story of victimhood and tragedy, something that persists to this day, which has obscured the nuanced reality of state support for Indigenous veterans and their families.

Supporting Soldiers’ Families

The average CEF soldier was single, as only 20% of Canadian soldiers were married. For Indigenous soldiers, this proportion was substantially higher: 39% were married. Figure 9 shows this variance. Many other family members were widowed, estranged, had children, elderly infirmed parents, or other dependents that relied on their earnings for economic stability. The presence of wives, children, parents, and siblings presented a challenge for military and civilian officials, who pondered how the state should support families for the sake of social cohesion and military morale.
Canada’s support for soldiers and families during the First World War was unprecedented. The common soldier’s family was usually an economic victim of service. In earlier wars, when men marched off, families were castoffs, abandoned to charity or extended family and friends.\(^7\) With the advent of citizen armies, mass enlistments, and focus on morale at home and at the front, public and private society needed to do better for the soldiers’ families. To that end, during the war, Canadians came to build the largest single national charity that had developed to that point, the Canadian Patriotic Fund.\(^8\) The Fund assisted families in need, supplementing other more official sources of family support. The first and most important source was the soldiers’ own pay assigned to family members on their behalf. The common private soldiers’ pay at $1.10 per day drawn from militia rates for active service was given little consideration in 1914 when Sam Hughes’ mobilization plan considered action first and logistics a distant second. Soldiers could voluntarily assign up to 80% of their pay to a family member.\(^9\)

Secondly, a September 1914 order-in-council confirmed that soldiers’ families were entitled to an additional source of support, a “separation allowance” of $20 per month for a private, $25 for a sergeant, and incrementally more for upper ranks. The separation allowance was a stipend intended to secure some of the basic necessities for families who had lost their primary wage earner. Receipt of support was contingent on need, as senior officials instructed Separation Allowance & Assigned Pay staff to deduct “other earnings” from this allowance. Even with full

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\(^7\) Morton, “Supporting Soldiers’ Families,” 194.

\(^8\) The fund had actually been developed during the nineteenth century to support soldiers’ families, and was revived by the Governor General, the Duke of Connaught in 1914. Its tremendous expansion during the war and entanglement with official systems of support are detailed exquisitely in Desmond Morton, \textit{Fight or Pay}.

assigned pay and a maximum separation allowance payment, families’ $40 per month barely covered the adjusted cost of living in 1915 in central and eastern Canada, and fell as much as 30% short of monthly expenses west of Ontario. Military and civilian leaders expected charity to meet the remaining needs for those on the home front, and the Canadian Patriotic Fund was the foremost among these offerings which granted a stipend to fulfill the remaining financial gaps.

The system of family support through assigned pay, separation allowance, and charity was far from seamless. Since assigning pay was voluntary, some soldiers left their families in a difficult position. Home service soldiers received lower pay, could assign less pay to their families, and yet their families were not entitled to additional support and therefore struggled incrementally more. Any alternative or untimely relationships were excluded from benefits: common law marriages were not recognized, and new brides married after August 1914 were purposefully excluded from benefits, as officials from the Assigned Pay & Separation Allowance of the DMD as well as private charities were concerned with a perceived threat of false marriages that intended to glean state support undeservedly. Forestry and labour battalion soldiers’ families often received little sympathy from top-up funds like the Canadian Patriotic Fund, as Fund members and benefactors sometimes regarded this sort of service as shirking, since the enlistees were not sharing in the danger of trench warfare. Soldiers and their families often contested and resisted these unfair rules and struggled against inadequate levels of support.

For the duration of the war, officials were generally dismissive of the rank-and-file complaints from ungrateful recipients of government and charitable largesse. Military authorities, civilian agencies, and charity workers were administrative partners that worked to

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generate and distribute relief funds in tandem. The coalition also had a “third responsibility,” argued some, to morally regulate its beneficiaries and safeguard against spending extravagances or hints of immoral conduct. Using various methods such as means testing, home visits, and informers, these administrative partners conspired to exercise powerful influence over soldiers’ families.\textsuperscript{11} Often couched in expectations of normative behavior, agencies and authorities promoted middle-class practices and punished any deviation.\textsuperscript{12}

For DIA officials, the “third responsibility” was part of its mandate well before the outbreak of war. Robin Jarvis Brownlie discusses the DIA’s system of relief as a “rudimentary safety net,” which was offered in exchange for recipients surrendering certain economic, social, and political freedoms.\textsuperscript{13} Similarly, Hugh Shewell argues that the DIA’s control of relief funds served as a method of control and assimilation: the reserve system itself forced dependency by diminishing bands’ economic independence and ensuring reliance on the Department’s inconsistent and paternalistic flow of relief.\textsuperscript{14} Fundamentally, the DIA’s economic interventions into Indigenous peoples’ lives matched their intervention on other issues, such as restrictions on movement, control of the consumption of alcohol, or the eradication of cultural practices.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{11} Official and charitable officials encouraged the development of “Next of Kin” associations, mothers’ meetings, and women’s lectures to share information on infant care, motherly crafts, and temperance among other moral regulatory topics. Recipients often rejected these official purpose and used “Next of Kin” associations for soldiers’ wives, and groups of mothers meetings to their own purposes; advocating and organizing – along with socialist groups frequently – for higher rates of support along with broader demands for wages, higher taxes on the rich, and equal pensions regardless of rank. See Linda Keeley, \textit{Enlisting Women}, 205-206.


\textsuperscript{13} Brownlie, “‘A Better Citizen than lots of white men,’” 33.

\textsuperscript{14} Shewell, “Enough to Keep them Alive,” 4-5, 9, 85-95.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 91; see also Frank Tough, \textit{“As Their Natural Resources Fail:” Native Peoples and the Economic History of Northern Manitoba, 1870-1930} (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1996), 217-8; Robert A. Campbell, “Making Sober Citizens: The legacy of Indigenous Alcohol Regulation in Canada, 1777-1985,” \textit{Journal}}
Ostensibly, Indigenous peoples were eligible for assigned pay, separation allowance, and the funds from private charities the same as any other soldier or soldiers’ family. To that end, the DIA sent a circular to its Agents detailing military Separation Allowance payments of $20 a month and CPF.

**Figure 19: First World War Pension Claims Administered by the DIA, by Year of Application 1915-1949**

Sources: LAC, RG 10 (Selected Files)

*of Canadian Studies* 42,1 (Winter 2008): 105-126; Brownlie, *A Fatherly Eye*, 99, 123, 143. As discussed in chapter 3, “unacceptable” cultural practices were often linked to moral character, see Loo, 139-141, 143.
payments of up to $42 per family per month depending on the number of children under 15.16 Agents reassured Native men that their status as soldiers would be “the same as the white men…they will receive the same benefits and consideration.”17 Equal support was an important promise that reassured potential recruits that the DIA would take care of their families while they served. Some anxieties early in the war regarding the CPF not including Indigenous families, drew sharp rebuke from both DIA and CPF national officials; loyal Indigenous soldiers and families were entitled the same as any other, provided they were judicious with their expenditures.18

Injudicious expenditures came to the attention of DIA Headquarters in mid-1917. On June 2 1917, Moravian Indian Agent Edward Beattie in southwestern Ontario near London wrote to J.D. McLean that “Indian women with husbands at the front are occasionally misconducting themselves.”19 Beattie mentions one case in which Catherine Jacobs, the spouse of Pte. John Jacobs of the 135th Middlesex Battalion “gets drunk and gets 5.00 from Patriotic Fund 15.00 [from] Husband’s wages 20.00 Separation allowance with no children a total of 45.00 per month. This party went to Detroit and brought some liquor on reserve and got up a spree with liquor. She was fined for some in Chatham [Ontario].”20 Beattie emphasized the problems of this

16 LAC RG 10 Volume 6762 File 452-4; circular to British Columbia Indian Agents from D.C. Scott 1 February 1917; Militia Circular for Separation Allowances of Forestry Battalions 1 February 1917; Circular to Indian Agents from D.C. Scott 7 February 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13.
17 LAC RG 10 Volume 6766 File452-13, DIA circular, 1 February 1917.
19 LAC, RG 10, volume 3181, file 452-124-1A. Letter from Beattie to McLean, 2 June 1917. In his letter to McLean, Beattie outlined the three objections of this behavior. First, that a woman was having a “good time” at a moment of national crisis and while her husband suffered overseas. Second, that this behavior was done publicly, which undermined the sense of unity and patriotic coalescence that the DIA was actively promoting. Third, that some women were living well, and had such extra funds at their disposal that they could travel for the purposes of purchasing liquor. Beattie warned McLean that “these are like cases on other reserves,” and something must be done by way of headquarters’ regulations to combat this behavior.
20 Ibid.
behavior, that their conduct was “exciting some comment among the public,” and recommended against “giving a women as above so much money in one month to have a good time on while her husband is away.” 21 Beattie asked to know “in the event of bad conduct or imprudence if the department could in any way take charge of the allowances directly from the militia department ...there should be some way in which the Department could handle the checks from the militia department in cases like one I cite...Or does the militia Department upon representations delay payments where it is found there is some gross misuse of the same.” 22 In other words, Beattie wished to know if there was there a way to punish women who deviated from a carefully proscribed standard of behavior.

DIA Headquarters expressed alarm at Beattie’s allegations, and worked with the Separation Allowance Branch of the DMD to reconfigure Catherine Jacobs’ Separation Allowance and Assigned Pay. On July 31, McLean phoned the DMD and told the Major C. McAngall of the Separation Allowance and Assigned Pay branch to forward to DIA Headquarters all cheques payable to Catherine or John. 23 The DMD forwarded the September and October payments, twenty dollars in Separation Allowance and fifteen dollars in Assigned pay each month, to the DIA without issue. 24 Management of this trust would not be doled out in entirety, but piecemeal (if at all) and the distribution of funds would be entirely contingent upon the Agent’s inspection as to the manner of living. Even though John Jacob earned his Assigned

21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 The telephone call is referenced in the written response from the SA & AP Branch. See LAC, RG 10 volume 6775 file 452-114. Letter from Maj. C. McAngall to McLean, 31 July 1917.
24 The four bank receipts are on file without comment, indicating that these deposits were made without problem. See LAC, RG 10 volume 6775 file 452-114.
Pay honestly while serving in combat, neither he nor his wife had any control over how much – if any – of these wages would be at her disposal.

Though this was the first case in which the DIA intervened to seize the account of a woman deemed to be misconducting herself, it became a precedent for which officials censured many other women’s accounts. DIA Headquarters deemed Lennox Island, Prince Edward Island soldier Peter Lamobe’s estranged wife an “immoral character,” and Lamobe’s personal effects including his war medals were forwarded to DIA Headquarters instead of to her after he was killed.25 The Agent at Tyendinaga in eastern Ontario denounced John H. Maracle’s widow as a “shiftless creature,” particularly owing to her fondness for music and dancing.26 Invalided King’s County soldier Joseph Cope and his wife Sarah were regarded as imprudent, unworthy of further state support even though Joseph was partially paralyzed from an illness suffered while in service.27 By the end of the war, the DIA had intervened in at least 211 total cases of soldiers’ dependents. Fundamentally, DIA Headquarters and field officials drew ostensible boundaries around codes of conduct and punished women and families deemed to have violated this code.

Many moral reformers framed the war as an unprecedented struggle overseas and also at home, and they saw the social ills – alcohol, venereal disease, unwed mothers – as another front

25 Specifically, a typed memo in Labobe’s service file reads: “The military estate of the above mentioned was distributed through the Dept. of Indian Affairs. Soldier is survived by a widow who deserted him. It is understood that the regulations of the Dept. [of] Indian Affairs do not permit turning over of assets to a person of immoral character. Therefore the medals should be forwarded to the Dept. of Indian Affairs, Ottawa, with covering letter.” RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 5276 – 28. In correspondence between Lennox Island Agent and DIA Headquarters, the agent explained that Labobe’s wife had deserted him after he had gone overseas. See RG 10 v. 6771 f. 452-30.
27 See RG 10 Volume 6773 File 452-61.
in the crusade for civilization.\textsuperscript{28} Though ostensibly designed as a system of supporting soldiers’ families, officials and benefactors managed government and private sources of funds on the condition that recipients behave according to middle-class ideals of social conduct. Private and public officials used various surveillance techniques to monitor the social and economic habits of fund recipients. Stakeholders publicly denounced those whom had violated the social contract on which the funds were based. For Indigenous women and families, their moral censure by government officials was entangled with a longstanding history of DIA relief practices and discourses on race, temperance, and morality. These same considerations also affected how military and civilian officials treated wounded and disabled Indigenous soldiers.

\textit{Disability}

Service on the Western Front from 1914 to 1918 exposed 350,000 Canadians to the horrors of industrialized warfare. The final tally of dead and wounded were 51,310 killed in combat, and a further 138,166 wounded in action. Nearly half of all soldiers who survived were hospitalized as a result of combat injuries at least once.\textsuperscript{29} Approximately 55\% of CEF members suffered a wound during service, though Tim Cook estimates that number jumps to 70\% if accounting only for only those serving in France.\textsuperscript{30} The 172,950 does not include illnesses, including the 40,000 cases of influenza and more than 8,500 cases of TB alone. Considering these numbers, it is no surprise that more than 200,000 soldiers had left the service before armistice. Across all theatres, fatal CEF casualties, including diseased or accidental deaths, were 59,544. Non-fatal casualties


\textsuperscript{30} Tim Cook, \textit{Shock Troops}, 613.
including wounded and sick totaled 172,950. Including casualties and the dead, this brought the total to a breathtaking 232,494. This figure represented at least one in four men of military age in population of a country of approximately eight million was either killed, wounded, or sick as a result of the war.

The terrible toll that the First World War wrought upon its participants inspired a passionate effort from military and civilian authorities to medically control, manage, and cure the disabilities of its participants. Authorities created, expanded, and professionalized the Canadian Army Medical Corps, a dedicated military system of care to tend to war wounded. At home, a small but growing set of institutions – the Military Hospitals Commission and later Department

31 Depending on the calculation, the number of wounded men as a percentage of eligible men of military age in Canada in 1919 was perhaps as high as 28% or as low as 21.6%. Scholars have calculated the number of men of military age and number of eligible men in different ways. For example, the number of males aged 18 to 45 in the 1911 Census is 1,726,873, but Brown and Loveridge quote the 1913 Canada Year Book to arrive at the number 1,888,825. Stacey estimated a total national population of 7,993,000 in 1916 from figures listed separately in the the 1938 Canada Year Book. These rough totals obviously do not correspond with totals of eligible population, (as this number includes un-naturalized aliens and men over 45, for example, who were ineligible). Sharpe estimates the eligible population at 811,948 (the CEF incorporating about two in three eligible men) and the total population of men of military age at 1,073,577. See Chris Sharpe, “Enlistment in the Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1918,” 26.

32 A.F. Duguid, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 1914-1919, Vol. 1: From the Outbreak of War to the Formation of the Canadian Corps, August 1914-September 1915 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1947), and G.W.L. Nicholson, Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War: Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1962), Appendix C. These casualties are modest compared with the enormous mobilizations of men and bloodletting on all fronts. Austria-Hungary and Germany mobilized 18.8 million soldiers, and of which 3 million died or were killed. France, Britain (plus Empire), Italy and Russia mobilized 32.2 million of whom 4.4 million were killed or died. See Michael Howard, The First World War: A Very Short Introduction, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), Appendix II.

of Soldier’s Civil Re-Establishment – grew to provide services to thousands of wounded and long-term care patients, and later influence the growth of the public healthcare system in Canada.\textsuperscript{34} Wartime medical advancements allowed many more men to survive terrible war wounds than had ever before been possible, but also left countless survivors with a permanent physical disability, mental and physical anguish, and chronic pain. Their presence both during and after the war raised unanticipated questions about morale, the soldier’s return, and postwar society.\textsuperscript{35}

Military and civilian officials and observers generally hoped that they could save wounded men from a life of infirmity and restored to military or economic usefulness through proper care, retraining and discipline. The Canadian soldier stood as a symbol of national, racial, and imperial vitality; and the health of the citizen-soldier was connected to the vitality of the nation; failure to provide adequate care thus posed a military and moral dilemma.\textsuperscript{36} As Kellen Kurchinski states in his doctoral dissertation, the public met Canada’s model for rehabilitation with great enthusiasm as it spoke to both individual and collective apprehensions regarding the negative bodily and material impact that the war was having on Canada’s men, and thus the future of the dominion.\textsuperscript{37}


\textsuperscript{37} Kurchinski, 44.
Figure 20: Service Outcome per Indigenous Soldier

Sources: LAC, RG 10 and RG 150 (Selected Files)

Figure 21: Service Outcome per all CEF Soldiers

What did this national apprehension mean for Indigenous men? Did they inspire the same anxieties? Were they entitled to the same or similar benefits? Looking at service records, we know that Indigenous soldiers disproportionately appeared on the casualty rolls (both combat and non-combat, as well as illness). Of the 2307 service outcomes available through research in RG10 and RG150 my research has revealed that of the 1846 whom had served in France, 1623 died or were killed, wounded, or otherwise hospitalized as a result of service. This 88% casualty rate was substantially higher than the 70% casualty rate for all CEF members that served in France, and substantially higher than for all CEF members, though the Indigenous casualty rate includes hospitalization for serious illness and so the comparison is misaligned slightly. Of the Indigenous men that served in France and were discharged for demobilization, rather than as medically unfit, only 60 of the 600 demobilization discharges did not receive some form of treatment for illness or wound. Indeed, 90% of all cases discharged as “fit” had received medical care at some point, and many of these men would later claim that their malady was pensionable and caused by service. For both Indigenous and non-Indigenous soldiers, the 88% and 55% represent service totals that include those who were later discharged as unfit due to age, non-service-related malady like rheumatism, flat feet, varicosis, or other, and those whom served only in Canada or England in “Bomb-proof” jobs with minimal risk to body or mind. The average Indigenous soldier that served in France received treatment 2.6 times for wound or illness, though the data sample is relatively small. As we see from Figure 20 and Figure 21, Indigenous discharges for medical unfitness exceeded CEF totals considerably. Indigenous soldiers suffered tremendously as a result of combat.

38 Casualty rates for all CEF members was 55%. See Macphail, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 1914-1919: The Medical Services; Cook, Shock Troops, 613.
Unique recruiting patterns and circumstances of service explain the high rates of casualties. Few indigenous men served in home guard units. Almost all escaped the Military Service Act draft, where large numbers of non-Indigenous draftees were still in training at armistice (and thereby lowering CEF casualty rates). Also, few Indigenous peoples served in Headquarters divisions or “bomb-proof” jobs, though some drivers, cooks, and clerks did find themselves in these positions. Those Indigenous soldiers who found themselves in rail or forestry battalions often were wounded, through the dangers of that type of labour if not from combat, though these wounds were not usually fatal or even too serious. Also, some Indigenous Forestry soldiers ended up in France, and transferred voluntarily to combat battalions in 1918 amid internal recruiting drives. For both Indigenous soldiers and the CEF generally, casualties spiked in 1918, owing primarily to the German spring offensives and later the open warfare conditions of the 100 Days campaign. For all combatants, warfare of maneuver was significantly more costly than trench warfare.39

Indigenous soldiers’ wounds came from by many different types of combat and non-combat experiences. The service files and descriptions from their demobilization interview with their Indian Agent (however unreliable) describe catastrophic traumatic injuries that these men endured. I briefly discussed these wounds and illnesses in the context of demobilization in Chapter II. In each soldier’s service file, the descriptions of wounded soldiers’ wounds, medical treatment, and rehabilitation are difficult to read. Soldiers’ bodies were shot, stabbed, clubbed, blown apart, gassed, crushed, shredded, and twisted by industrial military technologies. Water-filled and vermin-infested trench conditions led to outbreaks of serious diseases. Others suffered

39 For example, 50% of the French Army fatalities occurred in the first 15 months of the war. See Leonard Smith, Annette Becker and Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, France and the Great War, 1914-1918, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 69.
psychological trauma, variously described as “shell shock” or “neurasthenia.” While front-line wounds were devastating, casualties also mounted “behind the lines”; even bomb-proof jobs could be dangerous, and training injuries were common. The timing of enlistment and service also explains a trend that sets Indigenous soldiers apart from non-Indigenous soldiers. The cause of Indigenous soldiers’ war wounds broadly corresponded with the wounds of all CEF members except in one important respect: the divergence in shrapnel and gunshot wounds. For all wounded CEF members, two out of every three wounds were caused by shrapnel, and just under one in three caused by bullets. The remaining tiny percentages were due to gas, bombs, grenades, bayonets, and other weapons. Fundamentally, artillery shells were the overwhelming cause of injury for soldiers. Yet, the numbers are reversed for Indigenous soldiers: insofar as the soldiers’ records indicated the cause of their wound, bullets caused about two thirds of wounds, and less than one third caused by shrapnel.

This is largely due to the timing of when Indigenous soldiers entered combat. Shellfire casualties spiked earlier in the war, particularly as gunners mastered trench fire shell-burst techniques. As the German industrial capacity shrank during the later years of the war, the blockade of German ports had reduced their ore intake, reducing their ability to replace overused and burned-out artillery pieces. Soldiers encountering trench warfare in 1917-1918 faced proportionally less shell fire and more bullets than their counterpart. Looking at the data in Figure 7, we see that Indigenous enlistments spiked through 1916, with few enlistments before that date due to the enlistment prohibition (discussed in detail in Chapter I). Once through the Atlantic crossing and training in England, the vast majority of soldiers’ journeys to the front did

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40 *Ibid.*, 614-615. MacPhail’s official history and 1927 study are only contemporary resources; this is reproduced, in part, in the table from Desmond Morton, *When Your Number’s Up The Canadian Soldier in the First World War*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993); percentages from *Marching to Armageddon*. 
not occur until spring 1917, in line with a tapering of German shellfire and uptick in bullet casualties

Of the aggregate data on Indigenous casualties, the 1623 soldiers suffering some malady during service (though not necessarily attributable to service, see below) represented a substantial number of potential claims for a pension, estate, or other means of support. We know that the DIA administered 571 in total, and commented on another 286. In total, 864 files of 2307 “known” soldiers means at least 37.4% of all Indigenous soldiers had made a pension claim, or had their estate or other war-related fund managed by DIA (or application thereto). DIA was actively involved in about half of the claims, which indicates that Headquarters and Field staff were part of administering support for wounded Indigenous men, an issue discussed further in the following section. Of the entire CEF, about 25% of returned soldiers or families make claim of support and only 20% receive support, so Indigenous soldiers received proportionally greater state support for their war-related injuries or as support for a killed family member, broadly aligning with their service outcome discrepancy.

As early as 1916, the Canadian government had prepared specific plans to economically rehabilitate and reintegrate disabled veterans through a specific program of institutionalization, physical rehabilitation, and employment retraining. Designers did not intend for occupation retraining to be a charity, but rather as a way of easing a potential pension burden of thousands of men who could not return to their prewar occupations. Walter Segsworth, the director of the Military Hospitals Commission Retraining Program (which later morphed into a branch of the DSCR) intended for retraining to re-establish wounded veterans in occupations closely related to their prewar occupation. For example, a former carpenter would be retrained as a cabinet-maker;
a railway brakeman would be retrained as a telegraph operator; and the like. Planners saw this strategy as a way to cut training time and cost to the state.

Using the data collected in the two sets of circular responses in 1918 and 1919 (see Chapter II), DIA Headquarters sought to control the pace and nature of re-establishment of Indigenous veterans by making decisions about suitable vocations and placements on their behalf institutionalizing their employment recovery. On October 6 1919, the DSCR received the DIA’s blessing to allow Indigenous soldiers the benefits of vocational training to “Allow them to avail themselves of the chance to obtain re-education to assist and justify their faith in their position as subjects of their ‘Great White Father’ beyond the seas to whom as it is written in their treaties, they have pledged their loyalty ‘as long as the grass grows and the waters flow.” 41 In reality, the program of re-establishment had little to do with assisting Indigenous social citizenship, but rather the exigencies of a penny-pinching DIA and fiscally exhausted federal government meant that retraining followed MHC Director Segsworth’s rigid retraining program to the letter.

Retraining did not allow for the expansion of occupational skills. Rather, according to one list of occupational appointments from September 1919, program officials channeled wounded soldiers into specific, approved vocations with a system for training and perceived demand, with a preference for clerks, messengers, bookkeepers, paymaster, general labourers, teamsters, and farmers. 42 Though most soldiers showed a preference for motor mechanics and engineering, program officials stressed basic labour, particularly agricultural labour, especially for occupational retraining programs in the west. 43 The DIA worked with the DSCR to promote

43 James M. Pitsula, For All We Have and Are: Regina and the Experience of the Great War, (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2008), 235.
these occupations and dissuade alternatives. Such was the case with Private Joseph Ackabe: when Ackabe requested retraining in light of an amputated leg, DIA Agent W.R. Brown responded “I hardly think that a tailoring job would suit this man as he has always been used to outside work. Should think that a railway job such as a watchman or jump man would be more in his line or could he be pleased as teamster on one of the Western reserves?” DIA and military officials often identified wounded or disabled Indigenous soldiers during demobilization rituals and subject to an extended correspondence between local Indian Agent, DIA Headquarters, and DSCR officials. As with Soldier Settlement, the explicit agreement between these two partnering agencies was that Indigenous disabled cases were absolutely entitled to retraining programs, but the implicit understanding that Indigenous men would not crowd useful occupations and limit the reintegration of white soldiers nor seek retraining on occupations.

In spite of the promises of equal treatment, proper care, and an investment in modernizing initiatives, military authorities and the DIA did little to alleviate the plight of disabled soldiers. Retraining initiatives were often woefully inadequate to respond to the large-scale transitions needed to reintegrate the thousands of disabled soldiers back into civil society. As the DIA came to define its jurisdictional boundaries and adjudicate race-based retraining initiatives, it channeled disabled Indigenous ex-soldiers into retraining schemes that afforded them few options and a diminished hope of reasonable reintegration. Rather than producing

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45 Ben Sawyer, the same quoted in the introduction to this chapter, further highlights this trend. Sawyer wrote a series of scathing letters to DIA, DSCR, and Militia officials demanding fair treatment and compensation for his wounds. The Indian Agent in coordination with DIA agricultural representatives offered what little they could: Sawyer could qualify for a Soldier Settlement Loan so long as he undertook a commercial farming endeavor. According to the agricultural representative, “The fact that he lost one eye and a heel in the war should not, I think, interfere with his ability to farm.” LAC, RG 10, volume 7502, file 25.024-6. R.H. Abram to J.D. McLean, 9 March 1922. Sawyer’s experience represents the callousness of re-training, as his particular concerns are subsumed into the general retraining narrative of either farm or work as a labourer, and his disability is downplayed to fit the constrictive options of re-establishment.
better and more progressive citizens, as Ontario Vocational Officer E.R. Tucker had promised, disability retraining schemes produced a structurally-defined class of pension-dependent veterans.

Disabled Indigenous veterans did not fit cleanly into the national narrative that represented men’s bodies as a symbol for national vitality. They received comparable rates of wounds, illness, and death, speaking to their front-line presence and active service roles. These men encountered standards of institutional care that largely matched that of non-Indigenous soldiers, but some encountered sharp episodes of discrimination at the hands of medical authorities. Intended to rehabilitate white soldiers back to economic independence, Indigenous soldiers were an awkward fit with most retraining programs; DSCR and DIA partnered to ensure Indigenous veterans needing occupational training were placed in roles that would not interfere with white rehabilitated soldiers or the industrial economy of the 1920s. Their struggle with pensions was similarly fraught with challenges.

Pensions and Estates
The very question of how and why military and civilian authorities should administer pensions became a principal issue during and after the war. Until the intensification of the war effort in mid-1915, Canadian authorities had placed little thought to the matter of pensions and relief. Operating from the assumption that support was not entirely a state responsibility, early advocates relied on a combination of charitable, private, and state-sponsored support networks. Up to July 1915, Morton and Wright argue, governmental pension support remained fundamentally unchanged from the system devised to support veterans of the 1885 Northwest
Rebellion.\textsuperscript{46} The intensification of the war, resulting in ever-greater numbers of seriously wounded and disabled soldiers, demanded a concerted state response. The Canadian Pensions and Claims Board, the ensuing institution, emerged in 1915 to address questions of pensions and state support comprehensively. Run as a professional, apolitical bureaucracy, this institution sought to navigate a third path of pension administration, operating somewhere between the British precedent of penury for its common-rank veterans and the American Grand Army of the Republic’s “Pension Evil” of pension attorneys, claims managers, deathbed widows, that claimed one in five Federal dollars spent in the post-Civil War period.\textsuperscript{47} This Board ran as a separate entity until its amalgamation with the DSCR in 1921.

Theoretically, regulations adopted to govern the operations of the Pension Board in 1916 were significant improvements over the earlier ones. The board improved rates substantially, and officials doubled the pension maximum to $480 per year plus $6 per child. They also created a “schedule of pensionability,” with various injuries receiving percentages of the total disability.\textsuperscript{48} The Board made allowances for medical attendants to visit homes, and assured funds for children and widows, providing that widows did not remarry. Most importantly, the 1916 regulations established set of procedures that governed how the pension bureaucracy was to operate. First, a prospective applicant would make his claim, and a local medical board would inspect him. The

\textsuperscript{46}Morton and Wright, \textit{Winning the Second Battle}, chapter three.
\textsuperscript{48}These were drawn up in tables, based on an earlier system developed in France. Class 1 received the determined total disability of 100\%, such as loss of both eyes, both hands, incurable TB, or both legs. Class 2 received a demarcated 80\% disability, with examples of one hand and one foot, both feet, one leg. Class 3 – loss of tongue or nose. Class 4 – deafness, 1 eye, two thumbs. All the way down to Class 5 – 20-40\% - 1 thumb, ankleosis. Class 6 – one finger. The total for a class 1 was not to exceed 100$/month. See P.C. Order 289, “pensions to be granted o officers and men disabled or partially disabled….or the dependents… should they be killed on active service,” April 29, 1915.
medical board would then describe the nature of the disability and provide a detailed report to a Board of Pension Commissioners. This board would examine the report and make decisions on pension distribution, with virtually no appeal mechanism; the Board intended for its decisions to be final. In autumn 1917, amid the conscription debates, pension officials expanded categories of disability, and tightened regulations against remarriage.\textsuperscript{49} The Board’s strict regulations and lack of concern for appeals earned it a reputation as a capricious institution.\textsuperscript{50}

In spite of a clear set of regulations, practices, and customs, the establishment of a pension bureaucracy contained a number of troubling oversights. For the rationality of the pension system, with its charts and tables of disability, medical and civilian adjudicators were afforded little room for flexibility or discretion. The system also did not clarify the very question of “attributability” systematically: the governing phrase of the regulations, that pensionability was defined by disabilities “aggravated or created by service as soldier” did not address the relationship between certain illnesses and aggravation, such as tuberculosis, or ear and eye infections. Soldiers whose ailments medical officials deemed to fall outside of ones created through service would not receive care. These issues became very important for a number of Indigenous claimants in the 1920s.

By 1920, Canadian pension rates were among the highest in the world. Full disability warranted a $900 pension per year. With dependents, the total could reach as high as $1,380. Yet amounts awarded to recipients were unstable, as annual medical inspections meant that any perceived “improvement” in condition meant that pension officials could reduce recipients’ allotments. Notwithstanding that fact, between 1 April 1918 and 31 March 1920, pension costs

\textsuperscript{49} Desmond Morton, \textit{Fight or Pay: Soldiers’ Families in the Great War}, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004), 162.
\textsuperscript{50} See Cook, \textit{Shock Troops}, 603.
rose from $7.27 million to $25.18 million. Disability pensions grew from 15,335 to 69,203. By the end of 1920, 177,035 men, women, and children were supported in part by pensions. Yet by the end of demobilization, the generosity of the government had waned. At the behest of Col. John Thompson, in 1920 and again in 1921, the legislators altered the precise wording of section 11 of the Pension Act to make new claims more difficult. The Great War Veterans’ Association sharply criticized these changes, along with a number of other changes, whose trenchant denunciation inspired a Parliamentary commission. As a result, an appeals process was established. Some limited changes in 1925 and again in 1928 afforded slightly higher benefits, created and improved an appeals process, and codified the “temporary bonus” afforded returning soldiers in 1920 to offset inflation. The broader changes only came in the 1930s, when the Legion influenced Parliament to reappraise the underlying assumptions of pension administration.

The DIA became first aware of, and involved with, the issue of pensions in September 1916. Following the spike in enlistments in fall 1915 and winter 1916 after DMD officials lifted prohibitions on Indigenous enlistments, the first large groups of Indigenous enlistees reached England in the late summer of 1916. Casualties mounted quickly, and the DIA was in a position where they needed to respond systematically to questions regarding pensions, estates, and family support. As McLean wrote to Pension Commission official Colonel J.S. Dunbar, “There are constant inquiries from Indians and Indian Agents throughout Canada regarding pensions and separation allowance.” McLean was likely spurred by John Watson Labobe’s case. As a Lennox Island enlistee, Labobe was killed in action as part of the Somme offensive through the

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52 RG 10, volume 6773 file 452-51, letter from J.D. McLean to Colonel J.S. Dunbar, 12 September 1916.
summer of 1916 and the Agent was inquiring whether this soldier’s family would be entitled to some form of support, as American Civil War soldiers had been. As the Indian Agent wrote, “When he arrived at manhood he would naturally be looked upon as likely to assist his brothers and especially his sister. When he became of age to help them he enlisted and gave his life for his country. I do not know the regulations of pension in Canada, I only requested the Dept. to find if he was entitled to the division. He made the supreme sacrifice.” The expectation was that Indigenous soldiers and families would qualify for pensions and the dispensation of estates as with any other case, provided this did not conflict with the Indian Act. The DIA had been administering cases of assigned pay and separation allowance since 1915, safeguarding public expenditures and looking to regulate immoral women the same as other administrative officials had done for non-Indigenous women, and this partnership worked smoothly as it generally acceded with both the provisions of the Indian Act and the spirit of DIA policy. Pensions and estates did not fit as smoothly.

In late 1917, amid conversations regarding national registration, the prosecution of those who had violated wartime regulations, and increasing numbers of Indigenous casualties, the DIA worked to refine this partnership between military and civilian agencies and resolve issues regarding the Indian Act. The first issue involved jurisdiction. While the military had the authority to dispense with estates and personal effects to deceased soldiers’ families and the BPC had authority for pension administration, Scott asked in November 1917 for the DIA to assume this responsibility, in light of the Indian Act’s sections 6 and 25-32, which delineates the authority of the DIA to manage Indigenous peoples’ affairs, and their sole jurisdiction of the descent of property. While strictly relating to the dispensation of property for inheritance, the

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53 RG 10, volume 6773 file 452-51, letter from Lennox Island Agent to DIA Headquarters, 7 September 1916.
DIA also used this provision to justify the government taking direct control of Indigenous pensioners’ accounts. The DIA’s reasoning was paternalistic; as Scott explained to Colonel Dunbar, “I have asked to have pension paid through this Department only in order to protect the Indians, by being in a position to see that the money is properly expended, without waste or injudicious purchases.” The DIA’s oversight, Scott argued, would ensure pension and estate recipients would behave according to proscribed standards of behaviour. The BPC gladly concurred.

54 LAC, RG 10 volume 3181 file 452-124-1A. Letter from Scott to the BPC, 12 December 1917. At the same moment, Scott and the BPC began negotiations on the matter of control of pensions, and the administration of select pensions by Headquarters or Outside Service personnel. On 11 September, the BPC wrote to Scott for clarification on the pension issue, and its important correspondence is replicated at length: “As this Board views the situation the question appears to resolve itself in this way: That there are three classes of Indians. (1) Those Indians who, under treaty, owe their allegiance direct to the Crown and who do not come under the management and control of your Department. (2) Infranchised [sic] Indians who have been given the full rights of citizenship and released from the management and control of your Department. (3) All other Indians who do come under the management and control of your Department. If this is right it would seem as though ...Indians coming within the first two classes would be entitled to have their pensions paid to them direct, but that pensions for the Indians in the third class should be paid to your Department for them. Are you in accord with these views? The BPC’s confusion was justified, though their categorization was incorrect in their reference to category one. The BPC’s reference to class three, that all Indians that come under control of the DIA would have their pensions paid directly to the DIA illustrates that there was little debate about the authority of the DIA to manage these pensions. Scott’s response was important; on 12 December, he wrote: “all “Indians”, whether treaty or non-treaty, come under the control of this department. I have asked to have pension paid through this Department only in order to protect the Indians, by being in a position to see that the money is properly expended, without waste or injudicious purchases. There are far more cases where pension is paid direct to the Indian – cases where the Board is not aware of the status of the soldier, or where it is considered that the dependent is sufficiently educated and capable of managing his own affairs. Through the Indian Agents I have every opportunity of overseeing the proper expenditure of the pension, and of guarding the interests of the children. If, before awarding pension, the Board desires me to do so, I can investigate any cases brought to my attention, and report to you whether, in my opinion, it is desirable to have the pension paid direct to the dependents, or through this office. I may observe that it is in my desire, whenever possible, to retain a small part of the pension, to be funded here for the children, in order that when they come of age, they may start out in life with a small credit in their favour.”

Ibid.

55 The following day, Scott reiterated his point, further clarifying the terms of DIA Headquarters intervention, “In cases where it has been brought to my attention that the pension was being wasted and the children of the pensioner were not receiving proper care you have been requested to have the pension paid through this Department for the purpose of safeguarding the Indian’s interest. This Department does not wish to intervene in other cases of pensions to Indians.” LAC, RG 10 volume 3181 file 452-124-1A. Letter from Scott to the BPC, 13 December 1917. On 17 December, the BPC agreed to Scott’s terms. As the BPC Secretary noted, “the Board is perfectly willing, and will be very pleased, if it is your Department’s wish, to pay pensions to Indian women and children direct, except in such cases where it is found in the pensioner’s interests that the monies should be paid through your Department. LAC, RG 10 volume 3181 file 452-124-1A. Letter from the Secretary, BPC to Scott, 17 December 1917.
While earlier interventions by DIA officials to monitor the accounts of women in receipt of family support while their husbands were in the service, DIA Headquarters expanded their control of accounts in winter 1918. Previously, DIA Headquarters had been interested only in managing the finances of Indigenous peoples that had violated terms of the Indian Act, and who required oversight to maintain temperance and moral hygiene. Scott’s correspondence with the BPC indicates a shift, emphasizing that the burden was on the pension recipient to prove they are “sufficiently educated and capable” and that DIA Headquarters was to oversee the pensions’ expenditure directly with the Agent only as a conduit for information. Lastly, Scott fixated upon the idea that the DIA should manage trusts for children of deceased soldiers, justifying DIA intervention because these children would be inadequately cared for unless Headquarters intervened to sever a portion of the pension account to establish a trust.

From the perspective of the BPC, this arrangement was ideal. The DIA had the “the machinery already organized,” would care for Indigenous children through education and trusts, and would oversee the judicious expenditure of funds through the “close personal touch” of local agents. In the DIA, the BPC saw natural partners to watch out for “rehabilitated” cases that would no longer require a pension, women who had remarried and would no longer qualify, or pension fraudsters who had not incurred a legitimate service-related disability. In February, the BPC and Scott worked to streamline a system whereby the BPC would forward Indigenous soldiers’ claims to DIA Headquarters for vetting.

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57 Specifically, Scott wrote, “My proposal is that you notify this Department when a pension is granted giving the name of the grantee, and the band to which she belongs, and the amount of the pension. I shall then communicate with our officer having charge of the band of which the pensioner is a member, and if it is ascertained that the funds are not being carefully and wisely spent, I shall notify you accordingly, and in such a case payment of the pension may be made through this Department.” LAC, RG 10 volume 3181 file 452-124-1A. Letter from Scott to the Secretary, BPC, 06 February 1918.
With machinery and tradition of distributing treaty payments, annuities, and broadly governing political, financial, and social affairs on reserves, DIA officials had machinery to coordinate payments, which is likely what BPC officials were referring to in 1917. Indigenous peoples generally accepted the DIA’s role in coordinating payments, particularly in remote communities or where language barriers existed. Moreover, the DIA had a longstanding tradition of moral regulation and a substantial bureaucracy to monitor and affect the material status of those not conforming to social and departmental expectations. Much of the challenge in 1914-1916 involved issues caused by the raising of the first and second contingents, such as errors with pay, delays, and structural issues. Battalions produced an average of 50,000 documents for processing before departure, but Sam Hughes’ direction of mobilization showed little concern for administration or order. In a rush, officials did not always follow procedures and complete forms properly. These errors cause problems for claimants for years afterwards.

By 1919, DIA officials were using this arrangement to manage more than 350 pension and estate accounts, totaling over $43,000 held in trust. As detailed in Figure 19, that number had grown to 571 cases by 1940, though the DIA had closed some accounts by that point. As

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58 Morton, “Supporting Soldiers’ Families,” 208
59 In the 1918 Sessional Papers, Scott explained the system of Headquarters’ trust management, noting that in addition to all estates of deceased soldiers, Headquarters manages the separation allowance and assigned pay “in all cases where the recipients might not be in a position to deal with the full allowances themselves. In such instances pensions are also paid to the department in trust, and are expended for the benefit of the pensioners...Between 200 and 300 cases are now under the supervision of the department.” Dominion Of Canada, Annual Report Of The Department Of Indian Affairs For The Year Ended March 31 1918, 15. Cape Croker agent J. Lennox wrote to Scott in December 1918 to deride the seemingly-injudicious expenditure of women on the reserve, explaining that “[the women advocated for] Every dollar they could in any possible way and I think some of them will by sorry the war is over when the Patriotic money stops coming as they have been having a good time at other peoples expense.” LAC, LAC, RG 10, volume 6771 file 452-29. Letter from Lennox to Scott, December 1918. Saugeen’s agent Stout wrote to headquarters that the pension for Mrs. H. Maron should be sent to him, for he promised to ensure “that the money is properly spent.”LAC, LAC, RG 10, volume 6771 file 452-30. Letter from Stout to the DIA, n.d. By May 1919, according to a statement prepared by DIA clerk Mr. L.H. LaMothe to Scott, over $25,000 was being held in trust, in accounts ranging from $5 to $1,300. LAC, RG 10 volume 3181 file 452-124-1A. Memorandum from L.H. Lamothe to Scott, 7 May 1919.
much as the DIA stressed the need to control personal finances to ensure “Proper” expenditures, Scott said so publicly in the 1919 Annual Report, explaining that, “In many cases, where the department thought that the pension or assigned pay might not be judiciously expended, it has administered the money for them.” The war had presented a challenge whereby soldiers and families could access funds directly without DIA oversight, but DIA Headquarters had worked with BPC officials to expand their authority and control these funds. Through the 1920s, the DIA retained management of hundreds of pensions and estates of Indigenous veterans, war widows, and orphaned children as a natural offshoot of other areas of their administration.

The DIA’s administration of pensions and estates is partly a story of excessive, paternalistic oversight. Indigenous pensioners encountered a layer of colonialist subjugation that

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60 The following year’s Annual Report indicated that the funds being administered had risen to $38,478.54, a thirty percent increase over the funds being managed the previous year. Dominion of Canada, Annual Report Of The Department Of Indian Affairs For The Year Ended March 31 1919, 26. In 1921, the last Annual Report of the 1920s to directly address the question of DIA management of pension funds, Scott remarked, “It is interesting to note that more than seventeen families have a savings credit of over $1,000, thirteen between $500 and $1,000, twenty-eight between $100 and $500, and twenty-four under $100. This total of $43,000 is nearly one-half the total individual savings on all counts held by the department.” Dominion of Canada, Annual Report Of The Department Of Indian Affairs For The Year Ended March 31 1920, 12. As Scott remarks, “Early in the war the department undertook to administer the estates of Indians who enlisted for active service overseas and to take charge of pensions, assigned pay and separation allowance, when called upon to do so. At one time the department had over 400 active accounts, but this number has gradually decreased as the soldiers returned from overseas and took up their civil occupations. Where minor children received pensions, owing to the death to the breadwinner, this pension was placed to the credit of their savings account, and the department has today a total of $43,209 actually saved, which will be available to start the children in life when their education has been completed, It is interesting to note that more than seventeen families have a savings credit of over $1,000, thirteen between $500 and $1,000, twenty-eight between $100 and $500, and twenty-four under $100. This total of $43,000 is nearly one-half the total individual savings on all accounts held by the department.” Dominion of Canada, Annual Report Of The Department Of Indian Affairs For The Year Ended March 31 1921, 17.

61 This system continued into the 1920s. DSCR employee W.C. Marriott’s correspondence in March 1925 gives the only systematic data regarding the DIA Headquarters’ management of pension funds. Marriott wrote to McLean with the enumeration of another fourteen files forwarded from the DSCR to DIA Headquarters for oversight. Marriott asked for information into the status of the cases, noting that “No reports have been received for a considerable period regarding these cases.” LAC, RG 10 volume 3181 file 452-124-1A. Letter from W.C. Marriott to McLean, 07 March 1925. MacKenzie responded to the DSCR that “all the pension money referred to is being carefully administered. In some cases it is being conserved for the future benefit of the persons interested. In other cases it is being expended for personal use, and in still other cases it is being spent for educational purposes.”

was largely absent from non-Indigenous pension recipients. Having to prove their worth as recipients, even the most standard case experienced a high degree of surveillance. Take, for example, Mike Foxhead, whose pension administration was typical of the relationship between the Military and Re-establishment authorities, DIA, and pension or estate recipients. 63 Foxhead was from Blackfoot Agency’s Running Rabbit Band in Alberta (now known as Siksika Nation), and his occupation was listed as a “cowboy” on his attestation papers. He enlisted on 9 October 1916 at Calgary, having just turned eighteen years of age two months earlier, and joined the 191st Overseas Battalion. As part of his paperwork, Foxhead completed the “Form of Will” and “Particulars of Family of an Officer or Man Enlisted in C.E.F.” forms. He indicated that neither his mother nor his father was still alive, and he listed his brother Lindon as his benefactor. He was transferred to the 50th Battalion on 9 September 1917, and was killed in action a month later during the unit operations as part of the third battle of Ypres. On 2 May 1918, the Director of Military Estates contacted DIA Headquarters asking if Foxhead was a Treaty Indian. With an affirmative response from McLean, the Director forwarded the estate - $94.48 in funds – to DIA Headquarters, noting Lindon Foxhead as the benefactor. The process of layered bureaucracy, in which military or civilian authorities worked with DIA Headquarters, who in turn worked with local officials, created a system for multiple checks placed on any estate or pension recipient. Opportunities for moral censure were plentiful.

63 LAC, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 3257 – 41. Attestation papers for Mike Foxhead. On his benefactor, see Form of Will’ and ‘Particulars of Family of an Officer or Man Enlisted in C.E.F.’ for Mike Foxhead. On his death, see“Casualty Form – Active Service.” Regarding the request from the DMD, see LAC, RG 10 volume 6778 file 452-204. Letter from the Director of Military Estates to the DIA, 02 May 1918; Letter from the Director of Military Estates to the DIA, 10 June 1918. As an aside, the Director also noted that none of Mike Foxhead’s personal effects were to be forwarded, as “His personal effects were lost at sea when the transport carrying them was torpedoed.” McLean contacted Agent Gooderham on 15 June, forwarding the cheque and asking him to “kindly hand it to the next of kin.” LAC, RG 10 volume 6778 file 452-204. Letter from McLean to Gooderham, 15 June 1918. The process was done without fuss, with neither DIA Headquarters nor Gooderham intervening to withhold funds from Lindon.
Yet the role of DIA officials was often more complicated than simply surveilling colonial wards. Local field officials served as a conduit for mail, news, and were a consistent contact point listed in at least 7% of Indigenous soldiers for next of kin notifications and conduit for the distribution of Assigned Pay and Separation Allowance funds. Indigenous enlistees listed agents on official paperwork – particularly on wills – as a key contact, and this was largely pragmatic. Especially in the north and west, Indian Agents’ offices at the local town or railhead were a point of reception for Indigenous peoples’ mail. DIA officials served as interpreters and worked with pension applicants and BPC officials to share information, often following up on behalf of applicants for more information or to ensure the BPC was processing the Indigenous person’s claim. This was the case of the mother of Dennis Delaronde at Port Arthur, Ontario, whose death was intentionally misrepresented by the Indian Agent, as discussed in Chapter II. When Dennis died, his infirmed mother was herself a widow who could not speak, read, or understand English, wrote Col. Dunbar of the BPC to J.D. McLean on 12 April 1917. The agent offered translation and practical help to intervene and serve as an intermediary to ensure the Delaronde’s claim was processed.64

When shifting family status caused dependents to become exposed, field officials and DIA Headquarters generally worked quickly to shift the accounts to the appropriate benefactor. This was the case in 1917 with the Jacobs brothers of Kahnawa’:ke. John, Mitchell, and Louis Jacobs had all enlisted, and John and Louis served together in the 107th Battalion while Mitchell served in the Forestry Corps at the No. 1 Base Depot in Scotland. On 24 April 1918, the Jacobs’ father Noel called McLean to inform him that the Assigned Pay of John and Louis had not been received to the family after the Mother’s death on 14 September 1917. McLean immediately

64 See RG 10 volume 6774 file 452-81. See also RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 2418 – 22.
contact the S.A. & A.P. Branch to compel them to pay arrears to Noel, noting that the boys had transferred their recipient from their mother to their father upon the mother’s death, but that this transfer had not resulted in a receipt of Assigned Pay since the mother’s death. The S.A. & A.P. acted accordingly, illustrating the intermediary role played by DIA Headquarters to negotiate between recipients and state provision. Yet this was not always the practice: DIA Headquarters’ handling of the Jacobs case is contrasted by their response to the protestations of John Splicer, also from Kahnawa´:ke. On 28 December 1920, John inquired to DIA Headquarters whether he would qualify for the pension of his late son, Pte. Angus Splicer. Unlike the Jacobs’ case, the DIA coldly informed John that “the matter of pensions is one which you should take up with the Board of Pension Commissioners.” Officials’ interventions were inconsistent, as DIA officials intervened in some cases but not others depending on the circumstances of the case, personalities involved, and broader political and social context.

Even more important than the pragmatic purposes, DIA officials often advocated on behalf of, or even collaborated with Indigenous peoples to secure and enhance their pension claims. Partly, this was an extension of paternalism, with agents’ roles to protect and care for their wards. At times, DIA officials stressed the independence of the DSCR’s pension mechanism, emphasizing even to the most sympathetic case that the DIA had no bearing on DSCR decisions. Yet many of these officials truly believed veterans had a social credit and

65 LAC, RG 10 volume 3181 file 452-124-1A. Letter from McLean to Louis Jacobs, 24 April 1918.
66 LAC, RG 10 volume 6785 file 452-408. Letter from McLean to Splicer, 05 January 1921.
67 There are many such examples, including Bazil Beaudry’s, where her adopted son Pte. George A. Allen, 87th Battalion. He had been killed on 18 November 1916, leaving Bazil and her husband impoverished as the two were “getting feeble and my husband is now laid up with Rheumatism.” LAC, RG 10, volume 3181, file 452-124-1A. Letter from Bazil Beaudry to MacKenzie, 27 November 1924. MacKenzie’s response matched the responses to Splicer, that the DIA played no role in the administration of pensions and that all requests must be forwarded to the DSCR. LAC, RG 10, volume 3181, file 452-124-1A. Letter from MacKenzie to Beaudry, 02 December 1924.
pushed to have that credit recognized nationally. As Robin Jarvis Brownlie discusses in *A Fatherly Eye*, Agents also helped and advocated for the rights of Indigenous peoples at times, though paternalistically.68 Veterans’ and widows’ pensions were another example where this complicated relationship played out. Field agents and Headquarters often wrote on behalf of rejected pensioners, “rehabilitated” cases, or destitute recipients to ask for a reconsideration of their cases, with some limited success.69 In many cases, DIA Headquarters enthusiastically supported Agents’ efforts to win support for Indigenous peoples living in poverty, thus reducing the amount of departmental relief needing to be doled out. Mitchell Douglas’s infirmed parents struggled terribly for ten years before receiving basic support from the DIA and then DSCR, while the two agencies fought over who should support them. Mitchell’s mother Tekakwitha Douglas wrote to Charles Cooke on March 7, 1919, “my son got killed at the front, the government promised me that when the war is ended he will give me something. My son told me when he was leaving for the front he will give me his share if anything happens to him. You don’t have to sent it [sic] to my husband cause he’ll all drink with it, so you better sent it to me. That’s why he gave me his share, cause he knew him alright. I went to Montreal today and they

68 Brownlie recognizes that agents were a key component of the DIA’s bureaucracy, but that they also represented a "third party in the power struggle", that often challenged or resisted national policy according to their own reinterpretation of the needs of their wards. In essence, the “fatherly eye” had a benevolence that could simultaneously champion resource rights and resist enfranchisement all while morally regulating band members and vetoing council decisions. Robin Jarvis Brownlie, *A Fatherly Eye: Indian Agents, Government Power, and Aboriginal Resistance in Ontario, 1918-1939*, (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2003), 32.

69 For example, Principal of the St. Paul’s Industrial School, Reverend S.H. Middleton wrote on behalf of Chief Owl and the mother of Albert Mountain Horse to have their pension claims redressed, successfully renegotiating with the BPC to have their dependents’ claims approved. RG 10 volume 6771 file 452-52 Letter from Principal Rev. S.H. Middleton to McLean, April 16, 1919. Middleton wrote, “I have successfully negotiated two pensions for the dependents of soldiers on the blood reserve [Mountain Horse and Chief Owl]. Since the death of mountain horse the pension money has been paid direct to Mrs. Mountain Horse through me as I was appointed as the late soldier’s executor. In view of the cessation of hostilities and of an early peace settlement I would far rather now that the money be controverted through the usual official channels, i.e. to be administered by the Indian Department. I have today written the Department of Militia advising the above course.”
told me he was there at the Drummond Building.” Agent Letourneau’s intervention on May 14, 1927 was to write that “This couple of Indians are presently in destitute circumstances. Their children, some of them being married have to care for their own families, others unmarried are presently learning livings outside of the reserve and do not seem to care for the support of their old parents.” Letourneau’s intervention brought reconsideration from the DSCR, who granted support to the parents. Moreover, Indigenous soldiers and family members approached local and Headquarters DIA officials as part of their strategies to push for support. Families’ strategies for obtaining support were often dynamic and multi-faceted. When DIA were in charge of administering funds, or when DIA officials resisted assisting pension applicants’ claims, Indigenous soldiers and families sought alternative pathways to advocacy, including other government agencies, clergy, lawyers, veterans’ organizations, and former soldiers or officers. In various ways and often for different reasons, DIA officials, Indigenous veterans, and their families collaborated to push for pensions.

In cases where administrative challenges were causing friction for veterans and families, DIA officials helped recipients sort out clerical errors – a common problem for which officials expected pensioners to repay overpayments years afterward. This was the case with Walpole Island pensioner Edgar Newakedo, whose assigned pay and separation allowance from 1917 to 1919 had vanished without explanation. Newakedo’s case was reviewed by Agent Highfield on Headquarters’ request in 1929, and it was ascertained that “the monies he is inquiring about is his wife [sic] allowance while he was over seas ... In this case his wife received her share for

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71 Ibid. Agent Letourneau to Headquarters, May 14, 1927.
72 See, for example, RG 10 volume 6773 file 452-61; RG 10 volume 6773 file 452-80; RG 10 volume 6773 file 452-81.
some time then some one [sic] reported misconduct on her part and her pay was stopped and
neither Mrs Nowakatoo or Mr Nowakatoo ever received this back pay. Late agent Thomas
McCallum told Mrs. Newakado that her cheque was returned to Ottawa each month, presumably
on account of her misconduct. Both the DIA and CPC conferred on the case, each separately
confirming that no money was in any account for Newakedo. As the transferred amount was
alleged to have been $35 per month, the account should have contained over $1000 in trust.
Newakedo’s statement summed up the problems with Headquarters’ management, that “I feel if
this money was withheld, half of my working pay is really belong to me, which I suppose to
share up with my wife at the time and the soldiers wives allowance, also being discontinued to
her... am sincerely hoping you will give me report, if possible, what happened to those checks,
while I served my country in Flanders Field.” 73 As with many other veterans, the ability to
access entitlements often required a frustrating and multi-year struggle.

With the administration of pensions, hundreds of wounded Indigenous veterans applied
for and received state support for their disabilities, and many more struggled against an inflexible
system that challenged whether their wound was attributable to service, whether an infirmed
parent, wife, or child’s status allowed for support on behalf of their son, husband, or father. The
DIA established its role in managing these funds in 1917 under the auspices of the Indian Act
and moral regulation, and eventually saw DIA Headquarters managing tens of thousands of
dollars on behalf of more than 800 cases. This paternalistic control was challenging for families
whose access to funds was contingent on local agents’ expectations of standards of behavior. Yet
the relationship was more complicated than just coercion. Indigenous veterans, family members,
and dependents used DIA officials as a conduit to applying for and appealing the results of

73 LAC, RG 10, volume 6796, file 452-581. Letter from Newakado to the DIA, 14 May 1936.
pension administration. Particularly when facing destitute applicants, DIA officials were
generally willing to forward their claims and worked to secure a better deal for them. The BPC
fiercely guarded its independence, and DIA Headquarters did not seek to challenge the pension
administration’s primacy in these matters. Yet Scott was pragmatic; the DIA worked to help
veterans and families who needed bodily and economic rehabilitation, with the added benefit that
these funds would not have to come from DIA sources. Having an alternative advocate worked
to Indigenous veterans’ advantage.

*Looking forward: Pensions, Estates into the 1930s*

The final years of the 1920s seemed to hold some promise for veterans. The Department of
Pensions and National Health had assumed responsibility for the administration of veterans’
benefits in 1928, and the Pension Act amendments in 1930 allowed for a Veterans’ Bureau, a
body to advocate on behalf of would-be pensioners. Moreover, agitation on the part of veterans’
groups had won a number of important gains in the amendment, namely the reinstatement of a
number of commuted pensions and the granting of pensions to widows that had married disabled
pensioners prior to 1930.74

A catastrophic economic disruption that brought unemployment to 32% nationally and
completely disrupted agricultural production in the west wrought had a dreadful impact on
veterans as well. The Great Depression hit veterans particularly hard. Many veterans were
employed tenuously through the fragile 1920s as they had surrendered experience, training,
seniority and energy during overseas service. Theirs were the first jobs cut after the Depression
hit. During the 1930s, chronic unemployment plagued many veterans, who complained of

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74 Durflinger, 136. See also Peter Neary, “‘Without the Stigma of Pauperism’: Canadian Veterans in the 1930s,”
systematic discrimination by employers that did not want to hire a veteran lest that employer experience retribution on having to let the veteran go.\textsuperscript{75} Pension applications rose steadily through the new appeals provision from the 1930 Pension Act, but huge backlogs plagued the system and most were rejected anyway. Veterans with permanent disabilities continued to suffer from chronic pain, reduced opportunity, and suffering.\textsuperscript{76} Legion officials began describing many veterans as “burn out” cases, men whose age, physical and emotional scars, and exhaustion made employment difficult.

Though veterans suffered inordinately, the federal government was not forthcoming with special supports, and non-disabled veterans would have to seek funds from municipal relief programs same as anyone else. Pensioners would continue to receive funds, but begrudgingly considering the scale of the national problem. Fundamentally, this meant suffering for pensioners and non-pensioners alike, since pensioners’ funds were stable but the government intended the funds to be a supplement for earning wages, not as means to live on. The government offered a basic relief program for pensioners in 1932, and 14,000 disabled veterans qualified out of 56,996 total pensioners (25\% of the total).\textsuperscript{77}

In addition to basic poverty relief for disabled pensioners, veterans could potential access two supplementary funds: the War Veterans’ Allowance and the Last Post Fund. War Veterans’

\textsuperscript{75} See Morton and Wright, \textit{Winning the Second Battle}, 214.

\textsuperscript{76} The 1930 Amendments to the Pension Act had an immediate impact on the claims of Indigenous veterans. From claims for reinstatement to reassessment based on new ‘attributability’ qualifications, DIA Headquarters was approached by a number of new claims, with the responsibility of forwarding these claims to the DPNH. Between February and April 1931, DIA Headquarters was notified of the applications of John Tomigo, Monroe Pheasant, Henry Ward, William Tremble, and William Semia among others. For Tomigo and Pheasant, both were asking to have their disability reconsidered according to the 1930 Pension Act amendments. The Board of Pension Commissioners communicated to the DIA that these men require a medical certificate and evidence showing proof of the relationship between disability and service. LAC, RG 10, volume 6762, file 452-1, pt. 1-5. Letter from G.N. Urie, BPC, to MacKenzie, 16 February 1931.

\textsuperscript{77} See Morton and Wright, \textit{Winning the Second Battle}, 215.
Allowance (WVA) emanated from the 1930 changes to the Pension Act and served as a system of relief for “burned out” cases.

Figure 22: Indigenous Band Earnings by Sector, 1911-1941

Note: Fishing/Hunting/Trapping data not available for 1911.
Sources: Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs, 1911 (Ottawa: King's Printer 1912); Report of the Department of Indian Affairs, 1921 (Ottawa: King's Printer 1922); Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs, 1931 (Ottawa: King's Printer 1932); Canada Department Of Mines And Resources Report Of Indian Affairs Branch for the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1941 (Ottawa: King's Printer 1941).
Built around old age security, enacted earlier in 1927, the WVA was intended for veterans over 60 or unable to work otherwise, for physical or mental reasons. In total, 5,790 veterans qualified for this benefit of $480 per annum in 1933. Many more veterans applied but received rejections, since poverty alone was not a qualifier. With more than 38,000 veterans out of work, the WVA offered scant relief.

By the mid-1930s, veterans’ troubles inspired a change in governance and discourse. The Legion pushed for an official study of the issue, and in response the Bennett government organized a commission headed by Calgary Conservative personal acquaintance and pension appeals chair Judge Hyndman. Hyndman’s final commission report recommended changes to veterans’ benefits and rationalized access and appeals for pensioners, poverty relief, and funds for veterans’ burials. He also promised a national study of veterans’ unemployment and a committee to develop local job initiatives. Unlike the Ralston commission’s outcome nine years earlier, the government actually put Hyndman’s recommendations into practice: the return of a Liberal government in October 1935 inherited the Hyndman commission’s changes and also brought veterans and former GWVA men into prominent positions within the pension bureaucracy, something perceived to be lacking from Bennett’s Conservative cabinet and appointments.78 Changes to the Pension Act in 1936 and again in 1939 finally resolved some of the most outstanding veterans’ grievances. In terms of discourse, the Legion shifted focus from veterans’ advocacy on pension and funds towards commemoration, nudging public discourse on war memory towards a solemn recognition of noble sacrifice of thousands of war dead. A consistent, if contested version of the “war myth,” promoted a way of understanding the war

78 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 203.
based on heroic virtue and national sacrifice. Public memorial services on Armistice Day, the spatial presence of monuments and sculpture, and the infusion of literary and iconographic media reinforced the nation-building elements of memorialization and culminated in a national pilgrimage to Vimy in 1936.

Indigenous economic opportunities in the 1930s were more tenuous than non-Indigenous Canadians. As John Lutz has argued, Indigenous peoples’ participation in the economy was in decline compared to a few decades earlier. Prior to the Depression, Indigenous participation in the economy was diverse; fully participating in mainstream economic activity and in a wide range of sectors and roles. The Great Depression accelerated the trend towards Indigenous peoples’ marginalization from mainstream economic activity, and a narrowing of the range of options available to them. As Figure 22 illustrates, overall band earnings had dropped 50% in the wage economy from 1921 to 1931, with a similar drop in agriculture. The only sector with a noticeable increase during this period was in hunting, trapping, and fishing, symptomatic of the exclusion of Indigenous peoples from the wage economy during the depression. Adding to the misery, DIA officials stressed austerity measures that sought to restrict band expenditures and relief funds.

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79 Vance, *Death So Noble*, 3-12.
82 On 23 February 1931, a DIA circular was sent to each Agency with specific instructions. In light of the emergent financial crisis, MacKenzie informed the Agents and Superintendents that “it is the desire of the Department that careful economy be practiced in respect of expenditure from public funds.” LAC, RG 10, volume 3087, file 279-222-1B. DIA Circular, 23 February 1931. Again on 1 August 1931, a Headquarters circular from Scott underscored that “the promotion of self-support among the Indians is a first principle...it is important to direct attention to these instructions with increased emphasis.” LAC, RG 10, volume 3087, file 279-222-1B. DIA Circular, 01 August 1931.
Indigenous veterans shared in the economic misery of the 1930s as both Indigenous peoples and veterans. Indigenous veterans did not always share in the benefits afforded other soldiers, most notably the Last Post and WVA funds.\textsuperscript{83} Between February and May 1932, DIA Headquarters negotiated with WVAC Chairman W.S. Woods over both the applicability of the fund to Indigenous veterans, as well as the jurisdiction of veterans’ benefits when concerning Indigenous men.\textsuperscript{84} Though originally asking that the DPNH financially support Indigenous veterans, the DIA eventually agreed to support impoverished Indigenous veterans living on reserves. In fear of any veteran “double dipping” into sources of support, officials promised to share information on potential recipients of these funds.\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{83} The Last Post Fund was a Montreal-based charity established to provide funds for military funerals of indigent veterans, providing funds of up to one hundred dollars for a grave plot, headstone, casket, and service to ensure ex-soldiers were spared a pauper’s grave. The federal government, at the advice of the Ralston commission, began providing grants of $10,000 per annum to the Fund in 1922. Morton and Wright, 176. For a history of the Last Post Fund, see Serge Durflinger, \textit{Lest We Forget: A History of the Last Post Fund 1909-1999}, (Montreal: The Last Post Fund, 2000). For the purposes of this study, and the sake of brevity, the discussion of the War Veterans’ Allowance includes the non-age-based unemployment relief funds. As these funds were more applicable to the Indian veterans that had not reached the minimum age requirement, the ‘WVAC decision’ implies the denial of unemployment relief funds as well.

\textsuperscript{84} On 9 February 1932, Woods wrote MacKenzie noting “The Committee is informed that assistance by way of relief to returned soldiers who are Indians is denied if they are living on reservations for the reason that such men are wards of your Department. The Committee is also informed that the privileges of the Soldier Settlement Act were denied by the Soldier Settlement Board to returned soldiers who were Indians on the grounds that settlement privileges were available only through your Department. The Committee wishes to be informed whether in your opinion, any obstacles exist towards extending the benefits of the Veterans’ Allowance Act to returned soldiers who are Indians and living on reservations.” LAC, RG 10 volume 6762 file 452-1, pt. 1-5. Letter from Woods to MacKenzie, 09 February 1932.

\textsuperscript{85} Specifically, Scott had conversed with Scammell, and “it was agreed that the Department of Indian Affairs would undertake the alleviation of distress of any Indian returned soldiers living on reserves.” LAC, RG 10 volume 6762 file 452-1, pt. 1-5. Letter from Murphy to McLaren, 22 February 1932 Scammell disseminated this news to District WVAC Administrators on 9 May, noting, “The status of Indian pensioners, in relation to relief, has been discussed with the Department of Indian Affairs, and it has been decided that as those who reside on reservations are wards of the Department of Indian Affairs any assistance required by them will be granted by that Department in accordance with its regulations. Therefore no relief will be issued by the Department of Pensions and National Health to this class of veterans. District Administrators may issue relief, if the need for such assistance has been established and they are otherwise eligible, to enfranchised Indians and non-enfranchised Indians not living on reservations, providing that it has also been established that an applicant in the latter class has not moved from residence on a reservation for the purpose of securing relief through this Department.” LAC, RG 10 volume 6762 file 452-1, pt. 1-5. E.H. Scammell, Department of Pensions and National Health Inter-Departmental memorandum to all District Administrators ‘Re: Unemployment Relief – Indian Pensioners File C.I. #2526’, 9 May 1932.
The DPNH and DIA agreement to exclude Indigenous peoples was done as a cost-saving measure, firmly rooted in the wartime and postwar pattern of providing benefits to Indigenous veterans on a separate scale from that of non-Indigenous veterans. As with Soldier Settlement, government officials colluded to ensure that DIA Headquarters was responsible for the provision of veterans programs for their wards. The decision to deny Indigenous WVAC funds was one of Scott’s last contributions to the administration of Indian Affairs, as he retired from his post on March 31, 1932. Consistent to the last, Scott’s administration of Indigenous veterans was firmly rooted in the stirrings of wartime consolidation, the DIA Headquarters’ active management of war resources – both material and human – in 1916. This decision was part of a longstanding process by which DIA Headquarters had assumed military and re-establishment jurisdiction over Indigenous soldiers and veterans.

Indigenous veterans resisted their exclusion for two main reasons: DIA support was substantially less than WVAC support, and their identity as veterans trumped their status as “Indians.” Inadequate relief was particularly unfair, argued Six Nations Ontario veteran William Powless, as Indigenous peoples had fewer opportunities and a greater need for support, since many were suffering from “destitution and distress.” Kahnawa’:ke, Quebec veteran Angus Goodleaf expressed resentment at his separate treatment, arguing that, “Two years ago I received employment relief from the DSCR in Montreal and I was given $36.00. $28.00 for food and $8.00 for fuel and wood, and [?]. I am entitled to that from the DSCR. I am getting $7.00 a

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86 Specifically, Powless argued that “It appears that there is an arrangement with the Indian Department by the organization that has the work of distributing relief among destitute returned men, whereby the Indian Department carries [sic] on that work among our returned men who are pensioners. The injustice... lies [sic] in the fact that returned men, other than pensioners, are not entitled to relief though they are in greater need and also that the amount allowed is only about half of that allowed on the white side. LAC, RG 10 volume 6762 file 452-1, pt. 1-5. Powless to Smoke, 04 November 1932.
MONTH from the Indian Dept for a family of 5, and no more and the kids go to school... There is plenty of money for the white men, but his Indian comrades now there isn’t any.” 87 Pension advocacy boards chimed in to support Indigenous veterans’ complaints. In October 1933, Secretary of the Pensioners’ Protective Association Branch 1 [London, Ontario] J.E. Pearce wrote to the DIA to criticize the inequitable treatment afforded Indigenous veterans, writing “We as a Soldier Organization feel that these Exservice [sic] men on the stated reserves are not being treated fairly owing to the fact that they are unable to receive adequate relief and finances to provide them and their families with the necessities of life.” 88 Further, Legion representatives reproached the DIA for their lack of adequate financial support for destitute Indigenous veterans and the administrative practice of managing accounts on behalf of pensioners. 89 On the Matter of the Last Post Fund, Dominion President of the Canadian Legion, Brigadier-General Alexander Ross stepped in to warn both DIA and DPNH officials that “it is obviously unfair that Indian Funds should be called upon to defray the expenses of the funerals of overseas men.” 90 This coalition pressed federal officials to make meaningful changes to the system of supports, pensions, and funds, and provide relief to Indigenous veterans.

In the new Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, these voices of resistance found some purchase. A Calgarian veteran and political appointee, Dr. Major Harold Wigmore McGill had been selected as Bennett’s permanent replacement after Scott’s retirement. 91 McGill

87 LAC, RG 10 volume 6762 file 452-1, pt. 1-5. Angus Goodleaf, Kahnawa:ke, to Secty, DIA, 2 Dec 1933.
88 LAC, RG 10 volume 6762 file 452-1, pt. 1-5. Letter from Pearce to the DIA, 20 October 1933.
89 LAC, RG 10 volume 6762 file 452-1, pt. 1-5. Letter from DIA Solicitor A.F. MacKenzie to Royal Canadian Legion Branch 79 (Simcoe, Ontario) Secretary Frank Bennett, 12 August 1933.
90 LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-37. Letter from Morgan to the DIA, 23 March 1935.
91 McLean had retired in 1930, after serving dutifully as Scott’s mouthpiece and occasional acting-Deputy Superintendent General during Scott’s absences. McGill’s appointment was fraught with controversy, as Western Commissioner William Graham thought himself fit for the title prior to his scandalized retirement in the same year. Departmental Solicitor A.S. Williams acted as temporary Deputy Superintendent during the search for a permanent replacement, and was considered a viable candidate. Dirty politics, lobbying, and intrigue coloured the search; in the
has been characterized as an individual with “force of character, [and] strong opinions,”\(^92\) and as a former CEF officer and veteran, someone whose correspondence and memoirs indicates the depth to which the war had impacted his thinking.\(^93\) Shortly after his appointment, the entire Department was subsumed by the Department of Mines and Natural Resources, precipitating a broader shift away from the DIA’s emphasis on legal and cultural assimilation – fixing the “Indian Problem” (see Chapter III) – and towards land and resource management.\(^94\)

McGill supported the claims of Indigenous veterans too, arguing to DPNH Deputy Minister R.E. Wodehouse, “Personally, I am unable to see why any line should be drawn between Indian and white pensioners.”\(^95\) Calling the situation of Last Post exclusions outright “discrimination,” McGill worked with Legion officials to lobby the DPNH for a change to policy.\(^96\) At least 47 Indigenous veterans had died in impoverished circumstances in the fifteen end. McGill, the Calgary physician and war veteran was selected. For the intrigue of Scott’s retirement and the search for his permanent replacement, see Titley, *A Narrow Vision*, 198-199.

\(^{92}\) Prior to the war, he was the Sarcee Reserve medical officer, and in 1914 enlisted with the CEF and served in France. Throughout the war, he maintained a lengthy correspondence and courtship with Emma Griffis, who he eventually married in 1918. In one letter to her, he remarked, “sometimes I feel that I have never known any other life than this of campaigning with its associations of blood and sudden death.” Harold W. McGill and Marjorie Norris, *Medicine and Duty: the First World War Memoir of Harold W. McGill*, (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2007), 343. In a less sentimental letter, he complained of the probability of an armistice, stating “I do wish though that some of the people in their comfortable homes in Canada could see the things I have seen during the past month. They would not then be ready to make any armistice with Heinie, especially now that we are getting the heel of our boot planted firmly over his wind pipe. He will squeal for mercy like the bully he is, but the louder he cries the harder we should hit him.” Letter from McGill to Griffis-McGill, 21 October 1918, as quoted in McGill and Norris, 337-338.

\(^{93}\) Following the war, he returned as medical officer for the Sarcee Reserve, before joining the Calgary Medical Society and the Medical Council of Canada. He won a conservative seat in the 1930 election. His appointment to Deputy Superintendent was as much owed to his personal relationship with R.B. Bennett as with his managerial capacities. “When his departure from Calgary was assured, the Calgary Herald wrote of him, “Citizens of all classes will regret his departure from the city but at the same time extend him hearty congratulations on this federal recognition of his many sterling qualities...he is popular among all classes of citizens, and particularly among the war veterans. He has always displayed a keen interest in their welfare,” see “Ottawa Honours Calgary Citizen,” Calgary Herald, 10 October 1932, as quoted in McGill and Norris, 343-344.

\(^{94}\) See Titley, *A Narrow Vision*.

\(^{95}\) LAC, RG 10 volume 6762 file 452-1, pt. 1-5. Letter from McGill to Wodehouse, 23 November 1933.

\(^{96}\) LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-37. Letter from McGill to Wodehouse, 24 March 1936.
years following the armistice, and only four received a proper burial. The Legion’s Ontario Convention in 1935 at Ottawa passed a resolution that specifically addressed this discrimination. In May 1936, the DPNH relented, and in a meeting between DIA, Legion, and DPNH officials, the groups agreed that Indigenous veterans would be eligible for these benefits in a draft resolution. As the resolution reads, “from this date and forthwith, cases of indigency amongst franchised or unenfranchised North American Indians who have at any time served in His Majesty’s armed forces; at death, will be treated exactly on the same basis as any other case coming under the jurisdiction of this society.” The state finally recognized Indigenous veterans on equal footing to other veterans.

By the mid-1930s, a concerted effort by the new administration of Dr. Harold W.G. McGill, Dominion Secretary General and Last Post Fund founder Arthur Hair, and Legion President Brigadier General Alexander Ross, among others, had worked to undo some of the clear discrimination faced by Indigenous veterans. By mid-1936, Indigenous veterans could make equal claims to both the Last Post Fund and WVA support the same as any other veteran. Indigenous veterans needed these changes desperately; in early 1936 as part of a national study on veterans, poverty, and unemployment, 152 Indigenous veterans and widows were identified as living in impoverished circumstances. Taking the conservative figure of 1880 soldiers (the

97 The Agent for Carlyle, Saskatchewan reported that one ex-soldier’s funeral expenses and headstone had been covered by the DSCR. The Messima, Alberta Agent oversaw four funerals on reserve, and two had proper headstones; one was purchased by the man’s sister, while the other was funded by the Last Post Fund, though the two others were not. At Massett, the two ex-soldiers’ graves had headstones ‘purchased by the War Department.’ See LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-37. See especially Letter from Scammell to Morgan, 14 January 1933.
98 LAC, RG 10, volume 6771, file 452-37. Letter from Herwig to Wodehouse, 08 February 1936.
100 Notwithstanding the seventy unemployed or permanently disabled pensioners, the occupations of employed pensioners predominantly focused on farming, casual or handicraft labour, and hunting, trapping, and fishing. According to the 1931 Department of Labour report entitled “Numerical and Percentage Distribution of Wage-Earners, by Occupation Groups for Canada, 1931,” nearly half of the wage earners in Canada were engaged in manufacturing, transportation and communication, or service industries. “Numerical and Percentage Distribution of
sum of the 2307 for whom outcomes included active service), this represents approximately 8% of the total of Indigenous veterans. The data suggests that a majority of these pensioners worked in industries hit hardest by the Depression, and those in which Indigenous peoples had seen fewer opportunities. Yet the data is contradictory. In the key findings of the Hyndman Commission Report, Judge Hyndman found that 38,000 of 425,000 veterans were unemployed or living in poverty, which represents approximately 9% of the total. Poverty was a pervasive issue for both veterans and Indigenous peoples, but an issue that is difficult to disentangle. Indigenous veterans’ rates of poverty were categorically approximate to non-Indigenous veterans, though their experience of poverty was aligned with the exclusion of Indigenous peoples from large sectors of the economy and became narrativized as correlated phenomena.

Conclusion

When Johnson Pandash wrote to the PMO asking for relief for “helpless” Indigenous veterans, his expression was part of a broader disaffection from among Indigenous veterans that their status as “Indians” seemed to trump their status as veterans. Less than one year after Pandash’s letter, the state confirmed his sentiment: the state excluded Indigenous veterans from basic relief measures for veterans who were victims of the Great Depression. As political, economic, and social circumstances evolved, the state eventually redressed some of these issues, but because of concerted efforts of Indigenous veterans, and veterans’ organizations. Changes in the DIA and

Wage-Earners, by Occupation Groups for Canada, 1931,” in the Canada Yearbook 1936, 745. Agriculture, fishing and logging, unskilled labour only accounted for one quarter of the total occupational distribution of the Dominion. Clearly, Indigenous ex-soldiers occupied economic positions at the fringes of the labour market, notwithstanding their predominantly rural locations. In terms of wage comparison, the 1935 Fair Wages and Hours of Labour Act – in this case only pertaining to federal construction works, but still a reasonable index for low-end wage rates – specified a thirty-cents-per-hour wage and a forty-four hour work week. The “Rates of Wages and Hours of Labour in Various Trades and for Unskilled Factory Labour in Certain Cities of Canada, 1935” corroborates that thirty cents per hour is a reasonable average, with the skilled trades earning substantially more, and unskilled factory labour earning between twenty and sixty cents per hour based on a twenty to sixty hour workweek. “Rates of Wages and Hours of Labour in Various Trades and for Unskilled Factory Labour in Certain Cities of Canada, 1935” Canada Yearbook 1936, 794.
the DPNH meant that by 1936, along with changes to the DIA’s SSA policy, Indigenous veterans were on the same footing as non-Indigenous veterans and could access the same sources of state support. Dr. Harold W. G. McGill’s sentiments asking “why any line should be drawn” between Indigenous and non-Indigenous veterans in terms of pensions and benefits echoed Chief Scobie’s desire for a flag to know “no colour line” and represented a profound departure from earlier government policy.

Rehabilitation was an important concept that framed military and civilian authorities’ thinking about the postwar world and the presence of permanently disabled returned soldiers. Indigenous veterans returned home with proportionally higher rates of severe wounds and permanent disabilities than non-Indigenous veterans. As with all veterans, the nation owed these men and their families a system of rehabilitation, as much to restore the nation’s perceived waning vitality as for pragmatic reasons. Between 1915 and 1919, Canadian military and civilian officials developed systems of state support that were among the most advanced in the world, but still suffered from challenging shortcomings in terms of eligibility and dispensations of support. For Indigenous soldiers, at least one in three made a claim to this support, and the DIA became involved in administering the funds for eligible veterans and their families, depicting these men and their families as “helpless Indians” that required a higher degree of paternalistic support and the management of their most intimate personal affairs than other Indigenous peoples.

The issue of war wounds, disability, and state support for the war’s victims illustrates the complex relationships between Indigenous veterans, their families, and the state. In some important ways, the government treated Indigenous soldiers as distinct entities: both with medical care in the service and after discharge, race sometimes played an important role in determining care. DSCR officials granted Indigenous rehabilitated men access to retraining
programs, but with a more narrow scope of options for economic reintegration than non-Indigenous soldiers. On the home front, concerns over “immoral” women whom officials argued represented a threat to DIA’s mission inspired a system of regulation. Moreover, Indigenous soldiers, especially those wounded in service, and their families experienced additional layer of scrutiny concerning their personal finances. Injudicious spending, hints of intemperance, or immorality were all grounds for the DIA to seize funds from the individual and place them in the hands of Indian Agents. This worked to both stifle and restrict access to funds and contributed to a narrative that Indigenous veterans were mistreated compared to their non-Indigenous veteran comrades.

Public discourses on race and femininity framed officials’ concerns over Indigenous women’s conduct while their husbands served overseas, but this was symptomatic of a broader concern over women and middle-class conduct during war. More broadly, challenges faced by Indigenous pension applicants were essentially the same frustrations shared by all veterans: restrictive eligibility requirements, extensive exclusionary categories, and stiff penalties on war widows; Indigenous veterans did not appear to have experienced undue or excessive censure when applying for these funds, though further scholarly research could confirm this fact. Most important, as much as Indian Agents worked to restrict and regulate war fund and pension recipients, they also at times served to advocate on their behalf, even forming meaningful partnerships at times.

The plight of disabled Indigenous veterans through the 1920s broadly corresponded with that of non-Indigenous veterans, struggling against an inflexible pension bureaucracy and low rates of support. In early 1930s, however, Indigenous veterans suffered inordinately amid the great depression and a broader exclusion of Indigenous peoples from diverse roles in the labor
market. Indigenous peoples’ exclusion from two funds for impoverished veterans seemed to cement the notion that rehabilitation was contingent on race. A series of political moves in the mid-1930s, coupled with the scandal of veterans’ poverty compelled policymakers to undo these exclusions. The status of Indigenous soldiers and their place in the colonialist state had tipped towards a recognition that their veteranship had complemented and cemented their status as privileged men, rather than as “Helpless Indians.”
CONCLUSION: “THESE PRIVILEGES SHOULD ALWAYS HAVE BEEN EXTENDED TO THE RETURNED INDIAN SOLDIERS”

“A Flag that Knows No Colour Line”? In the DIA’s 1936 Annual Report, Minister of Mines and Natural Resources and concurrent Superintendent General of Indian Affairs Thomas A. Crerar wrote, “It is gratifying to the Indian veterans and the Department of Indian Affairs that the rights of our Indians in Canada have been finally recognized. The Indian veterans are now entitled to all the privileges that their white comrades have been granted. These privileges should always have been extended to the returned Indian soldiers.”1 Crerar’s admission that Indigenous soldiers should have always had access to these programs acknowledged the negative effects of Indigenous veterans’ exclusion and separation from entitlements, as well as their hard-won status as veterans.

Crerar’s recognition of Indigenous veterans’ struggles seemed to precipitate broader changes. On November 22, 1938, Indian Affairs Branch Director Dr. Herold W. G. McGill sent a circular letter to all Indian Agents informing them that he was contemplating Indian Act revisions.2 McGill asked Agents to submit their views on how to improve administrative practices and streamline existing legislation. Through the 1930s, public officials began to see concepts of indigeneity as potentially compatible with full Canadian citizenship, and disavowed the contentious forced-enfranchisement schemes.3 Along with a steady growth of the Indigenous population through the first half of the twentieth century (Figure 1), this notion spurred McGill’s

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1 This was the final Annual Report before the DIA was officially transferred to the Department of Mines and Resources as the Indian Affairs Branch, and new Minister and Superintendent General was T.A. Crerar. See Dominion of Canada, Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the Year Ended March 31, 1936, (Ottawa: J.G. Patenaude, 1937), 13.
2 McGill was formerly the Deputy Superintendent General of the DIA. His title changed because of departmental reorganization explained in note 1.
suggestion that the Indian Act required changes. By mid-summer 1939, the Indian Act review was underway. Clarence Jackson, chief executive assistant to Minister Crerar, queried branch officials about when draft legislation might be available for ministerial review. Canada’s declaration of war on September 10, 1939 disrupted the review process, and the Indian Act updates became an administrative holdover until after the war.

Chief Scobie’s promise in July 1919 that the flag flying for veterans “knows no colour line” and that the nation did not see any difference between Indigenous and non-Indigenous veterans seemed to have failed in the months and years following armistice. Although enlistment brought the promise of better treatment to Indigenous soldiers by obliterating their “Indian” status while overseas, they again encountered a “colour line” upon their return home. While in uniform, soldiers enjoyed special privileges that they would not have otherwise had as “Indians.” They enjoyed a form of social citizenship not placed at odds with indigeneity. During demobilization, these same men expressed an expectation that they should continue to enjoy these privileges as veterans, since they were now part of a group that had entered into a special covenant with the state. Yet in the months and years following armistice, government officials excluded Indigenous veterans from access to veterans’ programs and benefits equal grounds to non-Indigenous soldiers on the grounds that their status as “Indians” outranked their status as veterans. In this way, “Indians” could not be veterans since they were denied access to the markers of veteranism. Only starting in the late 1930s was his promise starting to materialize with the official recognition from veterans’ organizations, DIA officials, and others that Indigenous people were veterans. After years of struggle, veteranism emerged as a meaningful social category that diminished the racialized division between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples.
The government’s acknowledgement of Indigenous men rights as veterans seemed unlikely considering what happened to the soldiers when they came home and the problems that they encountered during and after demobilization. As wards of the state, Indigenous people occupied a distinct place within the nation. However, when they joined the CEF they theoretically became something analogous to citizen soldiers, though temporarily. In England and France, these men lived outside the DIA’s jurisdiction and subject to military discipline and regulation. However, because they were “Indians,” their status at times invited DIA involvement. This, however, was more likely to occur when they were in Canada, and not in Europe. DIA interventions were occasionally invited, as family members did appeal to the DIA for assistance when required, rather than to other institutions. After all, Indian Agents were then and would continue to be the principal link between government and Indigenous peoples living on reserves. When men returned home to live on reserves, the DIA again became an important aspect of their lives, and this observation by state officials is what makes Indigenous veterans distinct. Unlike other veterans, Indigenous men were subject to a different set of rules that set them apart as “Indians.” Though scholars have examined Indigenous involvement in the First World War, they have not examined what happened to these men when they returned home, nor the complexity created by Indigenous soldiers’ and communities’ participation in the war effort.

Scholars who have studied veterans in Canada collectively agree that veterans waged a “Second Battle” after their return home. The hard-fought victory for veterans matured after the Second World War: a Veterans’ Charter to better re-establish Second World War veterans, and meaningful entitlements for Canadians. The failure of entitlement programs for First World War veterans produced the victory for the next generation. Revisions created a permanent

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4 For example, Morton and Wright write that the government’s programs and policies for veterans “became the cradle of Canada’s post-war welfare state.” Winning the Second Battle, 222.
organization for veterans, the Royal Canadian Legion; a better-designed version of Soldier Settlement, the Veterans’ Land Act; and lasting rehabilitation institutions like the Canadian National Institute for the Blind. Indigenous veterans were fellow combatants in the “Second Battle, though theirs was on a different front, on reserves, and often against the DIA.

During and immediately following the First World War, improvements to the DIA’s internal bureaucracy made the Indian Act more enforceable than in previous decades. For veterans, the experience of military and civilian bureaucracy was consuming on both accounts. In its design and operation, DIA was a bureaucratic entity even before the war. Indigenous and non-Indigenous veterans’ encounters with state officials meant that they shared a kindred brotherhood in dealing with paperwork, policies, and petty officials. Yet there was also something unique about DIA and its colonialist bureaucracy: DIA officials pervasively administered discharges, dispensed benefits, and arbitrated disputes in a manner that set Indigenous veterans apart from other returned soldiers. DIA officials were powerful government representatives who had the ability to control, isolate, and manage the personal affairs for returned men in a manner distinct from non-Indigenous veterans. This, combined with DIA Deputy Superintendent General Duncan Campbell Scott’s measures to eliminate most forms of organized political resistance, made it difficult for Indigenous veterans to resist state control effectively.

Indigenous people’s enlistments with the CEF inspired discussions of great changes for them and for society more generally. Though Indigenous men were originally exempt from military service in 1914, the CEF’s need for new recruits forced a reconceptualization of the place of Indigenous peoples in society as non-citizen-soldiers. This new status exempted them from conscription on the grounds that Indigenous peoples were distinct as wards, but Indigenous
soldiers and their families enjoyed privileges and entitlements that went along with military service.

Discussions during and immediately following the period of mass demobilization in 1919 illustrated the degree to which Indigenous returning soldiers’ place in society was uncertain. DIA Headquarters established a process of demobilization that re-asserted the DIA’s authority and the returning men’s subordinate status as “Indians,” an identity that overrode veteranship. “Indians” may be entitled to some measure of social reward, DIA officials pontificated, but this reward would have to fit within existing legislation and power structures. Indigenous soldiers’ interviews with their agents demonstrate how these men contested this imposed identity and constructed their self-image as masculine, independent veterans who were bound experientially to other veterans and entitled to a special place in society plus material reward for their service.

As Indigenous soldiers returned to reserves across Canada, they demanded access to entitlements such as Soldier Settlement, a system of land and financial support which had been available to some veterans since 1917. Indigenous returned men understood Soldier Settlement as a reward for their service, a credit that they could cash in for having exposed themselves to combat on behalf of the nation. These men articulated themselves as being owed the same “show” as other boys, and believed that the government would provide for them, their families, and their communities in credit of their service.

In contrast, state officials understood Indigenous veterans differently, as “missionaries of progress” whose presence heralded a moment for which the goal of assimilation of Indigenous peoples into dominant society would finally be attained, though with the stipulation that assimilation, in practice, meant an inferior status and the continuation of discriminatory treatment. DIA officials intended for these benefits to fit within pre-war policy aims rather than
create a new social context. Policy-makers framed Indigenous re-establishment according to their “Indian” status, rather than as veterans. The resultant Soldier Settlement Act, a program designed especially for Indigenous veterans, enforced this idea of separateness, in which Indigenous returned soldiers were neither citizens nor veterans. Indigenous peoples met some attempts to settle these men with violent resistance in southern Ontario. We can speculate that similar local resistance occurred outside the Six Nations context in places where larger numbers of Soldier Settlers existed. The program’s ultimate failure by 1930 was due to a series of factors, among which was the enforced distinction that separated Indigenous men from other veterans. Notwithstanding the program’s widespread failure, Indigenous Soldier Settlers pressed for recognition as veterans and the rights to dispense with their settlement loans, a right granted in 1936 that placed them nominally on equal footing with other veterans.

Traditional scholarly definitions of veteranship have been experiential. Canadianist historians have suggested that veterans defined themselves by their military service, masculinity, and shared sense of Britishness. As this dissertation has demonstrated, the traditional scholarly definition is incomplete. Adding indigeneity to this matrix problematizes Britishness as a defining feature. Indigenous men expressed their intersectional identities of Indigenous and veteran as complementary, and often rejected the state’s attempt to impose and enforce Anglo-Saxon modes and values. Indigenous and non-Indigenous soldiers’ experiences overseas were not significantly different, and their shared belief that they were owed special credit and recognition by the state bound them together. Veterans’ sacred covenant with the flag overrode other divisions or identities.

The need for rehabilitation for soldiers whose bodies and minds were damaged, and restoration for families whose members’ lives were diminished or extinguished because of their
military service brought attention to another group who were seen less as “Missionaries of Progress” and more as “Helpless Indians.” During and after the war, this group required family support funds, retraining programs, pensions, and the distribution of estates. The state permitted Indigenous soldiers and their families to access most programs available to non-Indigenous veterans during and immediately following the war, though access was granted tentatively and contingent upon middle-class Anglo-Saxon patriarchal expectations of conduct for recipients. This reinforced their status as privileged non-citizens. However, after armistice, Indigenous returned men’s access to programs and funds hinged upon special administrative rules that placed the DIA bureaucracy at the center of their rehabilitation. The state denied Indigenous peoples access to some veterans’ programs on the grounds that their status as “Indians” precluded their status as veterans.

In the 1920s and 1930s, Indigenous veterans joined coalitions with others to successfully press for recognition. This political work achieved varying degrees of success, but by the mid-1930s contributed to an investigation of the issue of Indigenous veterans’ poverty. The final result of this work was for Indigenous men to have access to veterans’ entitlements, and official recognition that their veteranship complemented their indigeneity. In this battle with the state, Indigenous soldier settlers resisted the imposed identities of “Missionary of Progress” and “Helpless Indians” and instead positioned themselves as privileged men. The Legion played an important role in the 1930s, advocating for the expansion of entitlements to all men, regardless of race. Though state institutions continually drew and redrew racialized boundaries to exclude indigeneity from veteranship, veterans’ own push for justice strove for the principle of a flag that “knows no colour line.”
When war clouds gathered over Europe a mere twenty years after armistice, at least 3,090 Indigenous peoples enlisted in the Canadian forces and more than 200 were killed as a result of service.\(^5\) Bands again committed individual and communal funds to patriotic causes. Unlike in 1917, however, national registration and conscription applied to Indigenous peoples with few exceptions, reinforcing how conceptions of Indigeneity, citizenship, and soldiering had shifted in the intervening decades. After the war, the state granted Indigenous veterans access to the same programs for all veterans, though the Indian Act continued to frustrate land settlement because of issues with locations, indenture, and transfer which had dogged the Soldier Settlement Act and retarded application of the Veteran’s Land Act (VLA) for all Indigenous veterans.\(^6\)

Amid this movement for reform, government officials, church authorities, voluntary and professional organizations, and Indigenous activists all agreed on the necessity to change the Indian Act and reposition how the administration of Indian Affairs operated. The Mackenzie King government struck a review of the Indian Affairs Branch, ran by an investigative

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\(^6\) See P. Whitney Lackenbauer, John Moses, R. Scott Sheffield, Maxime Gohier, *A Commemorative History of Aboriginal People in the Canadian Military*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defense, 2009), Robert Alexander Innes, “‘I’m on Home Ground Now, I’m Safe,’: Saskatchewan Aboriginal Veterans in the Immediate Post-War Years, 1945-6.” *American Indian Quarterly* 28 (Summer & Fall, 2004): 685-714. As Lackenbauer, Sheffield, Moses, and Gohier argue, equal access to programs outside of the VLA were also contingent upon such factors as geographic location, relationship with local Indian Agent, and personal knowledge of such benefits. Lackenbauer, Moses, Sheffield, Gohier, *A Commemorative History*, 153.
committee made up of members of the Senate and House of Commons. These Special Joint Committee on the Indian Act hearings which took place between 1946 and 1948 became the catalyst for the considerations of the future of Indigenous policy in Canada. The final report released in 1948 proposed changes to the Indian Act which removed some of the most disagreeable features. Moreover, it unequivocally acknowledged that Indigenous veterans had faced unacceptable discrimination in their access to VLA programs, and administrative changes to Indian Affairs were necessary to prevent this discrimination from recurring. Preventing discrimination in how Indigenous veterans access services has been an aspirational goal that has not always reflected a reality; pushed by the work of the Saskatchewan Indian Veteran’s Association which was formed in the 1970s and worked through the 1980s to document the cases of mistreatment under the VLA, the demand for equal access as veterans led to further discussions and ultimately to a national roundtable in 2004.

The new Indian Act (1951) that emerged from the Joint Committee’s report did not fundamentally reshape Indigenous relations with the crown. Yet it removed some of the previous Act’s most detestable provisions. First World War Indigenous veterans were central to political agitation that led to conditions for changes to the Indian Act, whose political influence and legacy matured during the interwar period and continued for decades after their return home. As with earlier advocacy for the rights of Indigenous veterans in the 1930s, the Legion adopted resolutions demanding that Indigenous peoples secure the federal franchise, receive greater band council powers, and have access to better health care.

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8 These limited changes represented some measure of progress away from the most difficult provisions of the Indian Act, though, as J.R. Miller has argued, the removal of "obnoxious" elements of Indian Act was due in part because assimilation was deemed to have already been well on its way and did not challenge the hegemony of the “civilizing mission.” Miller, *Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens*, 326.
Veterans were a sustained force who actively resisted and partnered with other organizations to resist and clearly led to demands for change. Recognition of Indigenous veterans as veterans was a battle where the tide had turned by 1936. A victory did not protect them from discrimination during and after the Second World War, especially because the Indian Act was still a prominent piece of legislation that governed their lives, and the veterans’ entitlements still did not fit with the existing Indian Act. Historians have traditionally seen the Second World War as the impetus for changes to the Indian Act of these changes, but this dissertation demonstrates that those changes originated earlier than 1945. Veterans were actors who pushed for reform, a people that undeniably deserved better treatment. The state had a difficult time rebuking their claims of privilege. By the mid-1930s, Indigenous soldiers had won their second battle to be acknowledged as veterans.
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**Theses & Dissertations**


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APPENDIX: DATA METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

Introduction

This section explains how I built the database that served as the foundation of this dissertation. I also describe the features and scope of research sources and how I deployed them in this study. The first section outlines the parameters of the methodology used to build a database of records. It offers some observations on the strengths and limitations of my approach. The second section discusses the features of the two key sets of resources from which this dissertation has drawn its conclusions: the records contained within the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) Record Group (RG) 10, and the Canadian Expeditionary Force’s (CEF) service records plus the files contained within the Department of Militia and Defence. Both the methodology and sources sections explain how I modified this information into workable data.

Database Methodology

The nature of sources regarding Indigenous peoples and their involvement in the First World War necessitates a systematic approach to data collection and research.² Records held at Library and Archives Canada (LAC) relating to Indigenous peoples and the twentieth century contain references to Indigenous soldiers and the administration of communities during the First World War, but these files and documents are scattered. An individual’s or community’s experience of

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² To date, the historiography on Aboriginal peoples and the First World War has tended to rely on anecdotal evidence. Earlier studies, such as Fred Gaffen’s Forgotten Soldiers and L. James Dempsey’s Warriors of the King rely on case studies of “notable” soldiers celebrated for their martial success through contemporary essays by contemporary observers, and do not look at the number of enlistments systematically. James Walker’s Race and Recruitment in the CEF looks uncritically at published annual reports by the DIA but does not try to assess actual numbers or critically contrast rates of enlistment to the population. Tim Winegard’s For King and Kanata and Katherine McGowan’s dissertation both use DIA Headquarters records, published reports, and departmental aggregations plus individual case studies for anecdotal reinforcement but don’t use the records systematically. No scholar has systematically reviewed the return of enlistment or demobilization forms, let alone enumerate each source and then compare the findings to military sources.
the war and its aftermath may be documented in many different files, perhaps spread across
different series of files. No master finding aid or key explains exactly which files contain these
individuals’ documents. Hence, when I began to research, I found it imperative to understand
who was being referenced in each case and if it was the same soldier or veteran, or a different
person entirely. Building a database was a way to be able to coordinate and track each
transaction back to the individual, even though separate file or file groups hold each of those
encounters with the state.²

Tracking the name of individual Indigenous soldiers as they enlisted seemed like a
sensible place to begin. From 1915, DIA HQ requested Agents collect data on soldiers enlisting
from their Agencies and record it on “return of enlistment forms.” These forms and related

² Having a quantified historical approach was necessary for this study. While scholars’ previous focus on Indigenous soldiers in Canada has been strictly anecdotal, a rich tradition of scholarship in Canada and internationally has brought weight to the applicability of historical data and analysis. Amid questions of fracture versus synthesis in the historical tradition, historians such as Lyell Dick, Peter Baskerville, Adele Parry, Ruth Sandwell have variously asked how “microdata,” the counting of individuals and individual experience, can offer exciting new approaches that bring historical practice back from privileging grand narrative in search of synthesis. Much of this debate was captured in the Canadian Historical Roundtable “Exploring Fragmentation and Synthesis in Current Canadian Historiography,” later republished in Active History as http://activehistory.ca/papers/roundtable/. A key finding, suggested by Baskerville, is that contrary to the practitioners of “New Cultural History,” for whom historical numbers present a fundamental incompatibility with discourse and narrative, data and numbers offer a version of reality that can be useful for historical practice. As Baskerville suggests, “Both need to be understood first in terms of their provenance. Neither offer complete answers to any set of questions. Moreover quantification in history is not a school or a sub discipline. It is a tool.” I have positioned my work similarly, that the data is not the beginning and end of my dissertation, but rather a tool that helped understand the issues of the time more systematically than had been done previously. Further important methodological considerations derived from Eric Sager and Peter Baskerville, “Canadian Historical Research and Pedagogy: A View from the Perspective of the Canadian Century Research Infrastructure,” Economic History Review, 62, 4 (2009), 893-925; David L. Hoover, “Quantitative Analysis and Literary Studies,” in Susan Schreibman and Ray Siemens, eds., A Companion to Digital Literary Studies, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), Chapter 28; some historians have elected to resort to data mining to access aggregates from “Big Data,” for an historian’s use of data mining see Chris Drummond, Stan Matwin and Chad Gaffield, “Inferring and Revising Theories with Confidence: Analyzing Bilingualism in the 1901 Canadian Census,” Applied Artificial Intelligence 20, no.1 (2006), 1-33. Stephen Ramsay, “Databases,” in Susan Schreibman, Ray Siemens and John Unsworth, eds., A Companion to Digital Humanities, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), chapter 15, http://digitalhumanities.org/companion/ ; Donald A. Spaeth, “Representing Text as Data: the Analysis of Historical Sources in XML,” Historical Methods, 37, 2 (2004): 73-85.
correspondence have been preserved in the First Series in RG10, file 452-17. These Return of Enlistment forms had been organized to track each soldier’s name, regimental number, attestation date, unit, occupation, marital status, dependents, Band or Agency, and other defining remarks. My database started with these fields (but I subsequently modified it to capture fields of data listed below). Starting with the first page of the Return of Enlistment forms, I worked sequentially to record each name and associated data.

After enumerating soldiers’ enlistments, I next tracked their demobilization. From 1918-1919, DIA Headquarters requested that Indian Agents use similar forms from the Return of Enlistment ones to track the demobilization process for these same soldiers, recording information on their return home to reserves. RG10’s First Series, files 452-29 and 452-30 contains these forms and correspondence. I added each soldier’s name and associated data to the sheet. Where a soldier had been referenced through the work on enlistments, I entered them a

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3 The first series is a set of files which are consisted of the DIA Headquarters’ central registry files classified according to the duplex numeric filing system, which was introduced in 1923 to sort files by subject. Some subject blocks have many thousands of associated files; subject block 452, for example, contains 965 separate files, many in multiple volumes. Not all files are available as some are restricted access while others have been moved or refilled since creation. Files in this series from 452-1 to 452-50 (Microfilm reels C8509 through 8516) relate to topics on war service, including enlistments, censorship, financial contributions, the MSA, and others. Also included are WWII records, often as a second or third volume attached to the original file (e.g., Censorship volume 1: WWI, volume 2: WWII.). In total, these files are comprised of about 15,000 documents that provide an overview of the DIA during the war. My early research focused extensively on each file in this grouping, originally strictly available as a microfilmed resource at LAC, though now available as a digital resource through the web resource heritage.canadiana.ca. Much of the correspondence and headquarters-level policy discussed in this study came from this source. Within these records are enlistment reports and demobilization reports that formed the backbone of the data compiled for the database. Files 452-51 volume 6773 (Microfilm reel C-8516) through to 452-965 volume 6806 (C-8530) are pension, estate files that contain information about pensioners, correspondence between Indian Agents, Headquarters and Pension Officials on each case. In total, this group of files is comprised of more than 35,000 pages of records and some files contain only one or two documents, while others contain well over 1,000 documents. Individual case files that serve as a complement to each soldier’s service records and were a key resource for the content on pensions and estates. See http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/ Aboriginal - heritage/first-nations/indian-affairs-rg10/pages/introduction.aspx
second time under a new line. I also expanded the database fields at this point to incorporate the new fields on the demobilization forms, such as “landholdings.”

Once I had collected the data on enlistments and demobilization, I next consulted the DIA’s Soldier Settlement case files contained within RG10’s “Thousand Series” to identify which individual cases were connected with a soldier (compared to a soldier’s family or “inheritor” of the loan), and whether they had been enumerated in the enlistment or demobilization files. Lastly, I enumerated the case files for individual soldiers contained within the First Series in RG10 to cross-reference this list and add applicable names that had not been captured.

Working through each RG 10 source sequentially, I identified references to each soldier’s name and recorded this data. I wanted to record duplications separately for the enlistment and demobilization, so I ensured that each time a public or government official referenced a soldier in these documents, they would receive a separate entry. This meant that each name entered

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4 The “Thousand Series” consists of central registry files classified according to a modified Dewey classification system (the “Thousand Series”) introduced at department headquarters in 1923. The Series contains files relating to the general administration of Indian Affairs throughout Canada. Topics include enfranchisement, band loans, rights of way, mining rights, surveys and surrenders, mining, manslaughter and murder, oil and gas, soldiers settlements, timber, land applications, dyking, handicrafts, and fur farming, Agricultural fairs, bridges, churches, council houses, dams, ditches and drains, gravel and sand, irrigation, Canadian Aviation school, land leases location tickets, case files, rules and regulations, reserve surveys, waterworks and wells, wharves, water licences, debts, amalgamation and separations The subject of Soldier Settlement of Indigenous soldiers was assigned the block of “25000,” and the subject of soldier settlement on reserves by non-Indigenous soldiers was granted the block “26000”. Veterans’ Land Act administration was granted the block of 45000. Each subject block is further sub-divided by agency classification and file number. Soldier settlement of Indigenous soldiers is held from volumes 7484 to 7530 and spans 573 files in total, counting each file volume separately. For example, the agency code for Six Nations was “032”, so the files relating to Soldier Settlement of Indigenous soldiers on the Six Nations reserve would have the file title “25032” and be followed by an individual number, “-01”. The first or first couple of files was usually designated to general agency correspondence on the subject, so the files RG10 volume 7504 file 25032-1 part 1 was entitled “SIX NATIONS AGENCY - SOLDIER SETTLEMENT – GENERAL”; the next file, RG10 volume 7504 file 25032-2 part 1”SIX NATIONS AGENCY - SOLDIER SETTLEMENT - FRANK FROMAN” and from then on.
where it appeared, meaning someone counted as enlisted, discharged, would be entered twice. If
Indian Agents or other officials had recorded the Indigenous soldier as having enlisted on two
separate documents plus once on a discharge document, I entered the Indigenous soldier on three
separate lines. These duplicate records were removed when collating data and preparing findings
for the appendix, but served as a useful source when these records disagreed with one another on
any data point. My focus on reliability meant that I intended to collect as much information as
possible, especially where contradictions between the data existed (I saw disagreement in terms
of any one or more field as a research opportunity). I also recorded any additional details related
to the established fields during this process, such as regimental number, unit, or date of
enlistment. I organized the database around the original format of the DIA Return of Enlistment
forms and modified to add additional fields. In cases where the record had been handwritten and
illegible, or the reproduced document on the microfilm was unreadable, I chose to include these
records as “Unnamed.”

For my research, I created a list of 4,293 separate entries from RG10 sources, each listing
a name or reference to an individual having enlisted. Of the total number, 912 entries were
soldiers whose names could not be verified for various reasons explained below, including a lack
of clarity over their name or a vague reference to a group without individual identification.
Removing these, just under half of the remaining sum were duplicate or triplicate entry – at a
ratio of about 1.9:1 – and I filtered them too. Thus controlling for non-annotated and repeated
records, I found 2307 unique, identifiable soldiers. Figure 23 explains my enumeration of
soldiers in each file group, and how this data corresponded with rates of duplication or unavailability of further information.

**Figure 23: First World War Indigenous Soldiers in RG10**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REFERENCE</th>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>PAGES OF RETURN</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SOLDIERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RG10 VOLUME 6767 FILE 452-17</td>
<td>Return of Enlistments</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>1359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RG10 VOLUME 6771 FILE 452-29</td>
<td>Demobilization Returns 1918-1919</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>1164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RG10 VOLUME 6771 FILE 452-30</td>
<td>Demobilization Returns mid-1919</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RG10 VOLS. 6773 TO 6806, FILES 452-51 TO 452-965</td>
<td>First Series Pension, Estate, and War Case Files</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RG10 VOLS. 7484 TO 7530, FILES 25000 TO 25165-3</td>
<td>Thousand Series Soldier Settlement Case Files</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL SOLDIERS** | **4293**

**DUPLICATE OR “UNKNOWN” ENTRIES** | **1647**

**NET TOTAL*** | **2307**

Sources: LAC, RG 10 (Selected Files). *Note: the totals do not include 339 “marginal” cases.

Though the revised database was a useful research tool, inconsistencies with data collected and disseminated by DIA officials became apparent quickly. As mentioned above, duplication of records was a challenge: Agents often enumerated soldiers as having enlisted with one unit on a Return of Enlistment form, and again as having enlisted with a different unit on a demobilization record. I explore reasons for these inconsistencies in Chapter II, and felt that they were an important part of the dissertation. Even though these inconsistencies were interesting
from a research perspective, they were a problem for the data’s reliability. Using a second set of sources to verify the DIA data from return of enlistments and demobilization data was important in terms to establish the relative accuracy in each data point. Considering the availability and ease of access, I determined that each soldier’s attestation papers could be used to cross-reference the names, age, religion, occupation, birthplace, marital status, physique, place and date of enlistment, and unit (if provided). Where available, full service records could also add more colourful detail to their experience with the CEF.

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5 Canadian Expeditionary Force volunteers were asked questioned where they enlisted, which was recorded on a 2-sided “attestation paper,” which included key information such as name, address, place of birth, marital status, date of birth, occupation, religion, “complexion”, and physical attributes. The forms also recorded the date and place of attestation. Attesting men were expected to swear an oath of service and sign to indicate their willingness to serve overseas. Before 1915, the form did not record place of birth and draftees after the 1917 Military Service Act completed only a 1-page form. The Library and Archives of Canada holds attestation papers for approximately 620,000 soldiers in RG9, II B8, Vols. 1-654, and online though a searchable database.

6 The service files of CEF members consist of 50 pages of documents, on average, dealing with enlistment, training, medical and dental history, hospitalization, discipline, pay, medal entitlements and discharge/notification of death. They include attestation and discharge papers, medical examinations, accounts of movements to and from units and theatres of operation, pay sheets, and, if applicable, hospital records, citations for meritorious actions, and disciplinary proceedings. These poorly arranged records in many cases may only include minor details on hospitalizations or treatment. A single line on a hospital card or medical history sheet is common, even for severe injuries. While some files contain extensive information regarding service outcomes and expected postwar reintegrated labour and residence plans, others contain a scarce reference to discharge by “medically unfitness.” While some context may be missing, the files represent a key source in detailing the experience of each soldier with the CEF. A copy of the Attestation paper or Military Service Act Enlistment form is generally present on the file. Cases of deserters are notoriously short on documents, while an “old original” that enlisted in 1914 may have a file of more than 100 pages. Service files indicate the locations of postings in England, but do not provide similar information for service location “overseas,” which can only be ascertained through consultation with War Diaries. From the start of the First World War, Canadian Expeditionary Force units were required to maintain a daily account of their ‘Actions in the Field’. These logs, War Diaries are a record of a unit's administration, operations and activities during the First World War. Paper originals of the service files are described by Library and Archives Canada as (RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Boxes 1-10,686). I had to make decisions about regimental numbers and searching in database, occasionally uncovering different names and records. Sometimes this was because of a pseudonym or common name different from what Agent used. Other times, errors in transcription exist. Entering the regimental number of one soldier occasionally brought up a different name. Sometimes, this indicated the use of an alternative name or pseudonym. In other cases, this is clearly a transcription or duplicate regimental number issue. Attestation papers can be unreliable, as both the forms and potentially the data contained on the forms were modified over time. For example, the forms did not include “place of residence” as a question for recruits prior to 1915. Data regarding “date of birth” are notoriously unreliable, often due to under or over-age recruits intentionally misrepresenting themselves to pass the 18 (later 19) to 45 age range for passing eligibility requirements. Moreover, these forms did not systematically track ethnicity, race, or language, though the “complexion” question usually covered race implicitly. Indigenous soldiers were almost always categorized as “Dark” for complexion. This means that these sources can reveal some important data from outside of DIA sources, but do not reveal much to verify if a soldier was Indigenous, or authoritatively present objective and verifiable data.
These supplementary records were accessed primarily through LAC’s “Soldiers of the First World War: 1914-1918” database. This database contains 620,000 service files of CEF members and is organized by name and searchable through a search function, with which a researcher can identify an individual soldier’s records based on their given or surname, unit, or regimental number. LAC has digitized almost every soldier’s attestation papers, available for viewing online in a searchable database. As the time of writing, 333,687 of 640,000 full service files are available online and downloadable as a .pdf file. Each name (or regimental number, where available) that was collected from the RG10 sources was entered in the search bar. The database produced attestation papers for most soldiers, but not all. Some soldiers identified in RG10 sources enlisted under pseudonyms, while recruiting officials spelled others’ names differently between DIA and military sources.

Additionally, only half of the 2307 Indigenous soldiers’ full service files were available. These digitized records were as a “convenience sample” to supplement the data collected from the RG10 sources. In cases where the soldier had not been identified from return of enlistments or demobilization records in RG10, but whose name was identified on a Soldier Settlement or Pension/Estate case file, they were entered in the database with the data from the service record.

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7 The Soldiers of the First World War database is a searchable digital resource that organizes the service records held by Library and Archives Canada for CEF participants (soldiers, nurses, chaplains). These records were originally held in boxes of 50, and each service file is held in an envelope. The database was produced by entering the name and number found on the outside of each of the file envelopes. When the attestation papers and enlistment forms were digitized from the Attestation Registers (RG 9, II B8, volumes 1 to 654), the images were linked to the database entries.

8 While the attestation papers are a hazy source, service files offer much more in terms of volume, but are erratic in what they contain. Some files contain extensive documentation on each aspect of the soldier’s service, while others are scarce in detail. Even among the most extensive files, there is little in terms of a “voice” of individuals, as these are administrative and medical documents primarily. The same problem exists with Battalion Diaries – spotty record-keeping, rarely mentioned individuals, and difficult source because of coded data so needs to be verified separately. Most importantly, authoritative aggregate data on the CEF is not really available through primary or secondary sources. Few attempts have been made to take enlistment or demobilization data and cross-tabulate
I also added additional fields to fill in annotated notes from the DIA or Military Records, plus further details from service files.

List of fields in database:

1. Record (originating document Record in RG10, volume, file)
2. Document (Specific page number/numbers on which the individual was referenced)
3. LAC Reference (attestation papers or service file number). This field was exclusive of “Record” field
4. Name (Sorted by surname, given name)
5. Regimental Number
7. Address at Enlistment (not captured for soldiers that enlisted prior to 1915)
8. Band
9. Agency (if applicable)
10. Place of service (coded as Canada, England, or “Overseas” per the parlance of the DIA forms)
11. Casualty (recorded per the parlance of the DIA forms, so variety not coded).
12. Dependents
13. Occupation at time of attestation
14. Landholdings, Buildings, Stock, or Equipment
15. Agent’s Remarks (margin notes)
16. Date Enlisted
17. Date Discharged (recorded as “KIA” if killed)
18. Soldier Settlement Application
19. Pension/Estate Administration
20. Province

By the end of data collection, I had a list of 4466 rows, 1880 unique rows, 20 columns, and more than 86,000 data points! Without a firm stop, this data collection and collation process could continue indefinitely: additional service files, all Battalion Diary entries, supplementary Veterans’ Affairs Canada records, and both 1901 and 1911 census records are good sources for further verification. Baptismal and marriage records could also add key verification details to fill

against other factors. GW outside of what was prepared in a few key sources, like G.W.L Nicholson’s appendices offers some data in his Official History, pages 539-595, and the DMD attempted to aggregate data in 1927, much of which is reproduced in the appendices to Desmond Morton’s When Your Number’s Up.
in data gaps. More agency-specific band records could add information about lived experience or fill in gaps in key items like landholdings. Time and focus were limiting factors here.

**Annotated Research**

Some things missing from the spreadsheet that were captured elsewhere; alongside building the database, I also kept a running Word document of my own annotated research notes for each soldier, writing a paragraph relating to their war service. I intended for this to be a more fulsome description of each individual’s experience as opposed to the dry data from a spreadsheet. I had intended to write these annotated notes to assist in developing anecdotal examples in relevant sections of the dissertation. For example, in the case where an agent had indicated that a soldier was “KIA”, I recorded their casualty status and demobilization date both as “KIA”. Yet this descriptor was insufficient to capture the spectrum of human experience. My annotated notes captured the more intimate details of service and veteranship. In each case where the information was available, I consulted with their service file and reviewed their battalion’s diary for additional information and to assess the circumstances of service, wound, or death. Hence, though the entry on the spreadsheet may indicate “KIA”, the written paragraph would include when and how they died or were killed, as well as any additional details regarding the discharge of their estate or details of their will. It was in this section that I recorded each soldier’s age, religion, place of attestation, and place of discharge, in addition to the information also contained in the spreadsheets (dates, units, etc). I also recorded any remark regarding the soldier being “Indian”, whether on attestation papers or in the service file.
Details recorded on Annotated Document (for each case, if applicable):

1. Agency  
2. Band  
3. Name  
4. Age  
5. Marital status  
6. Occupation  
7. Religion  
8. Date and place of enlistment  
9. Unit transfer from and to, plus dates of transfer  
10. Date of travel to England  
11. Date of travel to France  
12. Date and detail of medical treatment, inspections  
13. Date and detail of discharge documents, intended place of residence, intended occupation  
14. Details of next of kin, will, separation allowance, assigned pay  
15. Date and details of pension application  
16. Date and place of discharge  

Challenges to Validity and Reliability

Research involving RG10 records is challenging. This record group is comprised of millions of documents organized into multiple series, each organized into a file group. Each file group in the series contain many thousands of files, and many files alone span many thousands of pages in multiple volumes. RG10 is organized poorly. From the seventeenth century through to 1923, RG10 records were organized chronologically, an approach that meant that documents pertaining to the same time period or same theme may not be housed in the same file. Many files originally organized chronologically ended up being combined with other files, or parts of files were split into new files; the annotations in the original finding aids for related series in RG10 is proof of this process. The Thousand Series, for example, is particularly rife with disorganized and partial files that departmental or archival staff have reorganized over time. Many records pertaining to
Indigenous peoples and the First World War are spread among at least 1500 files, and some documents relating to one file have ended up in another file, possibly during this reorganization. The three primary series from which I drew data for the database contained records that were organized erratically, and I had to make decisions to include or exclude reference to data not contained within the five primary sources on an ad-hoc basis.

Even when files remain intact, production quality made interpretation challenging. Military officials produced many of the records “in the field,” as they were hand-written in pencil or ink. My transcription of this information into a digital format was dependent entirely on my ability to read the data. Return of enlistment forms – very frequently handwritten on legal-sized paper - are only partially legible. Some forms are simply illegible or ripped, and I included these among the number of “unknown” references that I filtered during collation where I could. Reproduction quality of microfilms is also a problem. Even where the officials’ wrote or typed records legibly, LAC later photographed and compiled these photographs on microfilm reels that may or may not be readable. This means that some relevant information may have been excluded.

Some errors of omission are plainly obvious: as is discussed in Chapter II, few soldiers living off-reserve at the time of enlistment was enumerated in return of enlistment forms. Similarly, soldiers that were demobilized and repatriated off-reserve and who did not return to a reserve were also absent from demobilization records. Some areas have obvious gaps; large numbers of SSA or pension applicants from one community – Six Nations, for example – indicates a presence of hundreds of returned soldiers, yet Six Nations Superintendent Gordon J. Smith recorded fewer than 70 returnees. In other communities, the same problem with the records exist; agents did not do the work to fully complete these forms. Without reference
through additional military or DIA documentation, it is impossible to independently verify the presence of Indigenous soldiers.

About one in four enumerated soldiers were added by filling in gaps in enlistment demobilization data using SSA, Pension, and Service Record. Because of my method here, the data may over-represent those seriously wounded or killed while serving with the CEF, and those that were in a position to apply for the SSA. Also, the data probably underrepresents those soldiers who were living off reserve who did not return to reserve. This was a “top-down” research approach that favoured the DIA’s Headquarters records rather than at the Agency-level records. This may account for strong Ontario numbers and weaker western numbers of enlistments, and could influence the numbers recorded for SSA (see Chapter III). In the interest of preserving the study’s integrity and replicability, I chose to exclude names and data from individuals referenced anecdotally through contemporary media or other secondary resources, or on some haphazard lists that are available online. Moreover, in choosing to accept “unnamed” sources, I have allowed the possibility that I accidentally duplicated records not removed during my sorting and collation of data. Adding to that, my own errors of transcription or misspellings could make some records appear to be separate entries when in fact they refer to the same individual. I had to make decisions based on common sense to assume who was the same person and which duplicates were in fact different people. Research findings contained herein accept that these gaps likely exist and hope that further studies will uncover more cases of these missing individuals.

Conclusion

While other historians that have assessed Indigenous participation in the First World War, few have done so with systematic rigor. This dissertation’s scope and sources made a purpose-built
database necessary to assess both DIA and Military records accurately and synthesize the results properly. As with any data set, it is important to acknowledge some of the inherent limitations. Challenges with the production of data from a century ago, its storage and rearrangement, as well as my own limitations in interpreting and reproducing data points means that the points of data, key findings, and each part of the dissertation may not represent the absolute definitive database and statistical survey of all Indigenous peoples that served or were affected by the First World War, but rather a more limited report of a group for which reliability was modestly stressed over accuracy. From its outset, this research exercise was not to try to find every Indigenous soldier of the First World War and enumerate his every characteristic. My purpose was rather to identify a group with some degree of reliability, gather key data points, and compare this data to the historical discourses on war and veteranship as well as key data on non-Indigenous soldiers and veterans, where possible. I accept the limitations of these consulted resources and their nature as “slippery” sources. Nonetheless, with the reliable set of soldiers collected from the RG10 and RG150 sources, and with many of these soldiers’ service files cross-referenced for reliability, interested parties should consider the collated data a significant step towards understanding the Indigenous population that served in the First World War. In terms of the collected data and findings, I am able to make claims with relative confidence. I believe these findings are within margins of error and make a credible contribution to our understanding of Indigenous peoples, the First World War, and its aftermath.