Dreamscapes of Dubai: 
Geographies and Genealogies of Global City Status 

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Abstract

This dissertation asks how Dubai’s dream and position as a ‘global city’ impacts on and is impacted by the experiences of a migrant-majority population; and, simultaneously, how the operation of highly exclusionary citizenship regimes and everyday ideologies work to justify and rationalize social hierarchies. It explores the making of Dubai’s global, developmental trajectory through a multiplicity of dreams and temporalities as they shape urban landscapes and social hierarchies in the city. Methodologically, it operates through an understanding of the simultaneity of social scales, which allows, in part, for an examination of how the ‘everyday’ offers insight as a counterpoint to the spectacle of globality. Theoretically I argue that understanding the construction of particular subjectivities created through relational identity formation and processes of ‘Othering’ based on privilege and exclusion allows for a more complex understanding of the social, political, economic and imaginary realms through which we might challenge social hierarchies and the subsequent violence(s) they engender as somehow natural, inevitable, increasingly acceptable, and at times, necessary in the making of neoliberal globality. It is argued that migration is an integral and foundational aspect of Dubai’s development and global allure, illustrated by mapping the diverse routes that comprise geographies of migration to the city, while simultaneously ‘unmapping’ the historical genealogies that accompany migrants on their journeys to the city. Together, these examinations allow us to trace histories of race, nationality, class and gender, operating at different scales, and in different forms and temporalities, to rationalize, normalize, and even, legitimize violent landscapes and hierarchies.

Keywords: Dubai, global city, migration, citizenship, nationality, neoliberalism, race, nationality, hierarchies of entitlement, othering, privilege, lived experiences, ‘everyday’ narratives, and ideologies of ordering, genealogy, geography, imaginaries of the global.
Dedication

For my mother, who endured and sacrificed so much to make our dreams possible.
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“Never mock a pain you have not endured”
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Introduction

Dubai’s Dream and Dubai Dreams

Money connects us all. Everyone wants a decent life. A normal life. For some people those dreams become real, and for others they remain just that. A distant dream. (Rebecca, Egyptian)

No labourers ever say they want to buy property here. That is a dream of expats. So this is just a shortcut to their dream [Back home]. (Mario, Egyptian)

Dubai is a cow that we are all trying to milk. When the milk runs out, we will all move on. (Adonis, Canadian/Jordanian)

In considering the Dubai dream, this study reflects on how the dream of living and working in Dubai is understood in a diversity of ways. Referenced to the idea of the ‘American dream’, interviewees considered what a Dubai dream is, how it is created and methods of differentiation between sectors of the resident population. The most significant outcome of these reflections is the understanding that there is no single hegemonic dream that motivates all, but rather the overarching promise of Dubai articulated through diverse sets of dreams dependent on where one stands in the world.

The American dream is still here… but in Dubai you are not dreaming of Dubai for your whole life. (Peter, Egyptian)

It might be the same dream, but it is just different where you finally settle. You are here to build, to reach your dream in your home country. (Sara, Canadian).

The American dream is somewhere people go and leave their country for the land of opportunity… making money, raising children. Maybe you are a taxi driver, but your kid will be a doctor. In Dubai, you come for three years, leave and take your money, and move on to the next place… they come here to make money and leave. So the Dubai dream is just that. (Natasha, Emirati)

Some of the most popular dreams of Dubai are promoted to the West, and the global North more generally, through tourism, popular media and the national government. These popular images often present Dubai through orientalist and infantilized representations, but always promote the city as decadent and desirable, a popular portrayal that is commonly referred to as ‘Brand Dubai’. As interviewees discussed, this dominant Dubai dream is an exclusive one, which can include living in a
penthouse, driving a luxury car, ordering 10,000 AED (United Arab Emirates Dirham) bottles at a club, having a young wife, having a maid and driver, access to luxurious yachts, hotels, restaurants, tax free salaries, gaining experience and career building for young professionals, golfing, ‘ladies that lunch’, year-long sunshine and beautiful beaches. Very simply, the dominant Dubai dream is based on a highly exclusive, excessive and capitalistic idea of ‘living the life’. Though this dream is made possible by the nightmarish living conditions and experiences of ‘Third World’ or poor, working class migrants, Dubai’s allure remains strong at both extremes of a historically embedded, globally infused, locally instituted social hierarchy. Through a critical, relational analysis, it will be shown that the creation and maintenance of ‘undesirables’, referred to here as ‘Others’, generates preferred subjects who are then able to live the dream that is the global city of Dubai. Importantly, it is necessary to recognize the ways that dreams of Dubai extend beyond the privileged world of ‘Western’ expats, Emirati citizens, or elites from the ‘second’ and ‘third’ worlds, to also shape the ambition of migrants from the Global South.

When an American or British guy thinks of coming here, he thinks to buy a Porsche, a yacht…and live on the Marina…coming from a Third world country, it is different, [they think] of stability and money to feed my kids and a good education… it is a totally different dream from this side and that side. No one common dream for all. (Karen, Canadian)

Different dreams for different classes. (Mohamed, Canadian)

I think people dream because they have seen Dubai, their dreams are inspired from here. And because they can’t have this lifestyle back home, they imagine Dubai is a vacation where you can make money tax-free, have a nanny and driver lifestyle. (Reda, Emirati)

As interviewees explained, many migrants come for a short stay, make money and leave to retire somewhere else. However, many come thinking it will be short stint and end up staying a decade or longer. Other interviewees described those who come for most of their adult lives and are forced to return ‘home’ on retirement, or those who come repeatedly over the course of several decades on short contracts, while others come and never leave, living on the fringes of society in their illegality. The motivations can differ. For many low wage migrants it can be about making money to send back home to
support a family, putting food on the table, paying school fees or building a home, dreams, however, that are always constructed through reference to ‘back home’. Some discussed the stories of women who migrate to escape violence from abusive relationships or to gain independence from difficult familial situations ‘back home’. For many Westerners who were interviewed, Dubai is seen as a place to make money and live a luxurious life for a short time. For those expat professionals coming from the Global South, their dreams of Dubai are often seen as one stop on their journey towards another permanent place to settle with family.

It is important to consider for which populations dreams are constructed in relation to spaces in Dubai, and for which ‘Others’ are dreams relegated to spaces ‘back home’. These ideas shape how desirable subjects are constructed through the exclusion of ‘Others’ and are a significant example of how differentiated are the ideas of belonging and entitlement. These ideas of who dreams from and to where are significant in shaping the material realities of the lives of different subjects in the spaces that constitute Dubai. Thus, the consideration of how different geographies of migration come to meet in the global city of Dubai needs to be understood through a genealogical approach, including ‘unmapping’ the historical, structural factors and forces that shape global hierarchies of race, gender, class and nationality over time and space, as they in turn shape the routes of migration and the ideologies which accompany people on their journeys. Through this conceptualization, the ‘dream’ becomes one major example/force of consideration in understanding the construction of different subjectivities, and the creation of particular categories of humanity where matters of life and death are conceptualized and made to govern over who matters and who does not, for whom certain conditions are allowable and for whom they would never be tolerated. In short, these processes create binaries of deserving and undeserving, human and alien, thereby also legitimizing violence and exclusion through the maintenance of rigid social hierarchies that shape everyday life.

My dream is to get out of Dubai and move to the West, to raise my kids with less discrimination. (Rebecca, Egyptian)

You cannot have equality here. That is bullshit. (Mohamed, Canadian)

It depends on how you live in your own country. You want more than what you already have. (Anna, Canadian/Egyptian)
Dubai keeps getting better, and Egypt, the alternative, is going down hill. (Zain, Egyptian)

Many of the interviews from professionals coming from the Global South are shaped by their insecurities in going ‘back home’ after living a life of relative privilege in Dubai. In addition, as alternatives diminish back home with ongoing instabilities, the idea of going home is challenged by the promise of the Dubai dream. A significant factor that became clear through the interviews was the idea of where you are from, as a highly influential factor in the individual understanding of Dubai and his or her dreams. For many low paid workers from the Global South, Dubai is imagined as ‘Sonapur’ (Hindi word for ‘the City of Gold’) but this dream is extremely complex and diverse, as one taxi driver remarked, “They promise you green fields, but when you come here all you get is desert” (Mohamed, Pakistan). Surmounting debts, and/or endless greed lock different types of migrants into situations of precariousness, albeit to different degrees. Consider American expat Carlos,

… You never leave. You always want to say, yeah two years and I’ll leave and then you say another year, and then just one more year … and then you start making money, and think you need to buy a house, but then you start dreaming bigger, as in a bigger house with a bigger pool, so that’s another two years. It is a leech. You know when a leech sucks your blood, and it keeps on sucking and sucking and sucking, this is what Dubai does to you, and then you get used to it, so you eventually stay for the rest of your life. It sucks you dry. Just like my father. (Carlos, American)

Various definitions of a dream can be considered in the conceptualization of Dubai’s allure. Psychoanalytically, dreams have been considered as part of unconscious desires (Freud, 1913/1900); neuroscientifically, dreams are considered a response to changes in brain activity (Hobson and McCarley 1977); while in popular culture, dreams are understood as imaginative experiences of waking life that feel like a dream, a state of mind that represents a release from reality, a vision resembling a dream life state, something notable for its beauty, excellence or enjoyable quality, a strongly desired goal or purpose, something tied to the fulfillment of a wish (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). Pushing past the dominant brand Dubai image of the dream, we see a multiplicity and diversity of Dubai dreams that are shaped by the interplay of race, class, gender, nationality and
employment. These Dubai dreams are a series of wishes, hopes, ambitions, goals and possibilities differentiated and based on where one stands/is ranked in the world, and entirely shaped by how one enters into the city.

This dissertation asks how the aspirations and position of the Dubai dream as a ‘global city’ impacts on and is impacted by the experiences of a migrant-majority population and, simultaneously, how the operation of highly exclusionary citizenship regimes and everyday ideologies work to justify and rationalize social hierarchies. To do this we begin by, first, examining how these haunting interdependences amidst diverse dreams are historically embedded in a global genealogy that is expressed through the broader international political economy and contemporary migratory patterns, and, second and simultaneously, how narratives, different subjectivities and hierarchies are created, understood, legitimized, utilized or challenged in the ‘everyday’ context of the ‘global city’.

Context

Located at the crossroads of Asia, Europe and Africa, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has rapidly become recognized as an important global economic center beginning in the late 20th century and continuing into the 21st century. Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the two leading city-states of the UAE, are often described as the epitome of global cosmopolitanism, uncritically described as combining ‘traditions of the East’ with ‘comforts of the West’. In a nation built entirely on temporary migrant labour with a migrant-majority population, the UAE is a dynamic and complex web of social relations.

Dubai has arguably experienced one of the fastest processes of urbanization in the contemporary period. These shifts have largely occurred during the period of ‘globalization’ from WWII onwards, accelerating in the 1980s and continuing into today. While the historic role of the Gulf and the UAE in particular has shaped its entrance into the contemporary global political economy, so too have regional developments within the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) made up of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain. However, simultaneously, the current, ambitious leader of Dubai has prioritized a vision of Dubai that is intimately propelled by notions of the global
which have set Dubai apart within the UAE, within the Gulf region, and arguably, within the world.

Dubai is often presented as an exemplary model for rapid urbanization and development, with emerging city centers around the world with global ambition looking to the remarkable economic and infrastructural growth that characterizes contemporary Dubai\(^1\). In particular, Dubai represents a neoliberal paradise, with the ‘Dubai model’ representing “an apolitical, consumer-mad, citizenship-free society” (Escobar, 2006), “an oasis of free enterprise without income taxes, trade unions, or opposition parties (since there are no elections)” (Davis, 2006, 61), a place where “immigrants … totally renounce their political rights on the altar of economic improvement” (Escobar, 2006). Thus, the neoliberal capitalist logic that is embedded in Dubai’s development, combined with historical political and economic conditions that allow for the accumulation of surplus petrodollars and seemingly endless supplies of poor migrant workers, and unique conditions of local development have all impacted the developmental ‘global’ trajectory of Dubai.

The result is a hyper-globalised city-state where non-citizens make up over 80% of the population and where European and Asian influences pepper a sophisticated cultural scene. A little vulgar? Maybe - it’s been slated as ‘Vegas-meets-Disney-in-the-desert’ by its critics. Yet it is impossible not to admire the vision behind the crafting of the emirates. In economic and evolutionary terms, Dubai’s transformation has been nothing short of dramatic - a rapid trajectory of change unrivalled by any other city on the planet. (Woods 2009)

Popular representations such as this, that describe Dubai as a ‘global city’, are rich in tourist materials\(^2\) often representing Dubai as a cosmopolitan city of the world. Dubai is also represented as bringing together ‘East and West’ and, as I argue, ideas of tradition and modernity that follow this binary. To investors, developers, corporations and tourists, the city is marketed as ‘multicultural’ and ‘modern’ (Time Out Guides Ltd, 2007). This international acclaim cannot be overrepresented, if only for the sheer number of an estimated 12 million visitors in 2010 (Woods, 2009, 7). At the same time that the UAE continues to be recognized in popular sources for its remarkable development and

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\(^2\) McAuley, 2008; Time Out Guides Ltd, 2007; Walsh, 2008; Woods, 2009
achievements, those who build and maintain the global city face a rigid ethnic division of labour that impacts entitlements and protections by the state. International organizations such as Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) have documented growing cases of exploitation and violence against both construction workers and female domestic workers.3

This study was motivated by the gross inequalities and lack of effective policies in protecting vulnerable workers in the UAE. However, it very rapidly became apparent that any study of these geographies and urban landscapes would require a historical analysis of the larger processes that have shaped the international division of labour as it intersects with contemporary forces of neoliberal globalization in the emerging global city of Dubai. Additionally, the overt acceptance and normalization of these hierarchies in everyday life demanded insights from residents of all ranges and backgrounds in the city, in order to develop an understanding of how processes of normalization and legitimization were created and perpetuated to uphold hierarchies that shape entitlements for different groups of residents, the vast majority of whom lack access to formal citizenship. Although rapid industrial capitalist development in the UAE is relatively recent, taking shape in the 1970s, a historical genealogy accompanies the spatial composition of the UAE at many different levels. Additionally, amidst considerable diversity in lived experience, there are remarkable similarities in the conceptualization of the UAE by, for example, expat professionals, tourists or national citizens, whether it refers to the notion of Dubai as caught in-between two worlds; ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, ‘East’ and ‘West’, ‘First’ and ‘Third’ worlds, or the citizenship-based entitlements which create an ethnic occupational hierarchy that is easily narrated by any visitor to the UAE.

Understanding Dubai’s globality through these historically situated concepts is one of many reasons why a genealogical analysis is a key component in understanding the reproduction and re-creation of seemingly older tools and knowledge(s) of colonial and imperial conquest. Whereas the metropolitan cities of the West are tied to legacies of colonialism, global cities in the non-Western context also participate in, and benefit from, ongoing hierarchies through the international division of labour. In particular, as this

analysis argues, if mapping migrant geographies is an integral aspect of understanding Dubai’s contemporary development, and if we understand contemporary forms of globalization as leading to the creation and maintenance of global cities such as those in the UAE, then it is necessary to explore the historical legacies and genealogies that accompany geographies of migration for labour, and that shape the UAE’s relationship to colonialism, and global capitalist development more broadly. In addition, the emphasis here on ‘everyday’ lived realities and socio-spatial hierarchies is linked significantly to the historical lineages that accompany migrants on their journeys. Through this, we are able to see how ideologies of race, class, gender, nationality and labour intersect in the local (global) context of the city to create and sustain inequalities. This is significant as the underlying racial logics embedded within many of the policies and practices that both target labour migrants, and privilege expat professionals are connected to broader colonial legacies and histories. Understanding how the geographies and genealogies of Dubai’s development are thus linked to a specific set of methodological commitments conceptualized broadly as ‘unmapping’ will be elaborated in Chapter Two.

**Research Questions**

The major research questions guiding this study include: How does global city status impact the experiences of diverse groups of residents in Dubai? And in turn, how does a migrant majority population impact global city status? How do social hierarchies create and maintain hierarchies of entitlement? And how does this complicate traditional understandings of citizenship? How can we account for contemporary forms and experiences of labour migration to the UAE by simultaneously mapping geographies of migration, and unmapping historical genealogies, such as the international division of labour, under contemporary forces of globalization? How do colonial continuities shape geographies of migration to the global city? What legacies are embedded in the making of rigid social hierarchies in Dubai? How is space related to neoliberalism, and neoliberalism related to the making of different subjectivities? How do histories and modes of citizenship operate to generate social hierarchies and subjectivities?
Theoretical Considerations

Several key methodological and theoretical considerations shape these analyses, which are presented here broadly but explained further in Chapter One. Firstly, the analysis operates through an understanding of the simultaneity of social scales, which allows for an examination of how the ‘everyday’ offers insight as a counterpoint to the spectacle of globality. This in turn works to unmap the historically imbued narratives of race, nationality, class and gender, as they operate on different scales, and in different forms and times, to rationalize, normalize and even legitimize socio-spatial hierarchies. Together understanding the construction of particular subjectivities made through relational identity formation and ‘Othering’, privilege and exclusion allows for a more complex understanding of the social, political, economic and imaginary realms. Through these understandings we might challenge ‘violence’ as somehow natural, inevitable, increasingly acceptable and, at times, necessary in the making of neoliberal globality. Additionally, the broadest objective of this project is to understand how the position of Dubai as a ‘global city’ impacts the lives of a migrant-majority population.

Methods

In order to address these questions, I examine/map migratory patterns and developmental histories which have led to the growth of contemporary global Dubai, and simultaneously ‘unmap’ how interdependencies between contexts are generated. This is carried out through a genealogical analysis of the historical legacies and colonial continuities that manifest within the unequal international division of labour, broader political economy and migratory patterns as well as the subsequent social hierarchies that shape entitlements and ontologies, in the ‘everyday’ context of the ‘global city’ of Dubai. In part this pushes us to rethink temporalities such as the present by radically reconceptualizing them through a genealogical mapping of the past as it is embedded in the current and implicated in possible futures. In particular, examinations of what makes the system possible, and also how it is maintained and reproduced, rationalized and lived are explored through extensive fieldwork and interviews, as well as reviews from key scholars and popular media representations. These data sets are in turn analyzed in
relation to the lifestyles and insights of three identified broad categories of the population, Emirati citizens, Expat professionals, and Low waged Migrant Workers.

The different levels of analysis here include first, historicizing the conditions that give rise to migration among sending states and the demand for migrants in receiving cities in the UAE, through a genealogical analysis of the legacies of colonialism, development and the impact of neoliberal globalization on the international division of labour. At the national level, through the examination of the UAE, and particularly, Dubai, I ask what this case study allows us to understand about neoliberal economic globalization and the role of migrant labour? Also, what does this case study allow us to understand about citizenship and immigration/migration policy within global cities? Overall, I ask what are the relationships between the global cities under contemporary forms of neoliberal globalization and the international division of labour?

Organization

Dreamscapes. The dissertation is presented and organized as a dreamscape, a concept I am using to bring together ideas of landscapes, spatiality and the imaginative realms of dreaming that are developed and activated in shaping migrant and developmental trajectories of Dubai’s globality. Migration is understood here as a central aspect of Dubai’s development and the ‘dreams’ that shape and accompany migrant geographies, which are central to the landscapes and everyday lives that inspire, create and uphold Dubai’s global dreams. Thus, dreamscapes are also significant in the conceptualization and implementation of the hegemonic Dubai dream tied to global city status, and influence how dreams of globality shape the physical landscapes, as well as how dreams circulate to catapult the city into global consciousness. Therefore, the dissertation begins with ‘the dream’, as dominant and hegemonic, and ‘dreams’ as multiple and heterogeneous, together allowing us a unique entry into a world of colliding, colluding and coalescing visions and versions of the ‘global’ as they are made in and beyond the city.

The conceptualization of Dubai through ‘dreams’ emerged as a major theme through fieldwork interviews and participant observation, during which many different people described the city and their experiences. In addition, the physical landscapes of Dubai are infused with dream-like qualities and are marketed as global icons representing
realms beyond our everyday reality. Thus, Dubai’s landscapes are built and represented as beyond our waking consciousness, they represent what most see as ‘dreamlike’, as beyond our reality, without boundaries. The seeming impossibility of dreams is thus made real in Dubai, which can therefore be seen as a ‘dream’ world in which many diverse sets of visions interact. However, as we will see through our analysis, the genealogies that accompany migrant geographies, as well as the genealogies embedded in Dubai’s development, are important forces in shaping whose dreams are made reality. In fact, deeper examinations of the social hierarchies that operate as ‘normal’ everyday relationships in the city awaken a far more nightmarish version of the global, Dubai dream.

At the simplest level, any visitor to Dubai can attest to the dream-world qualities that the city exudes, bursting with grandeur, the lights blind and heights strain. The city continually boasts some of the most unique, groundbreaking and obscene developments as part of its allure, catapulting it into global significance. However, at the same time, these innovative and unique developments house a city of extreme inequality, hidden behind ideas of ‘diversity’ that is justified through everyday rationales. Much of this is based on references to existing global hierarchies that are said to determine worth, and subsequently, wages. Thus, these geographies of the city’s landscapes, as well as the geographies of migration that bring migrants to the city, are continually related to genealogies beyond the immediate materiality of the city.

Dreams therefore connect these diverse actors, landscapes and levels in which a diverse range of subjects engage in the making of their own dreams via Dubai. However, we will see that where one stands in the world impacts how one’s dreams are realized, and it is thus significant to note that not all dreams are intended to be made or lived within Dubai, although they are linked to the city in important ways. For example, the value of workers is based on highly racialized and gendered ideas of work and worth that are historically implicated. In addition, some workers are more welcome than others, with Western passport holders paid salaries to sustain Dubai’s global cosmopolitan lifestyle, while Others are paid salaries affording their better life, ‘back home’. These differences are not just about labour sector but represent entirely different scales. Thus, we could argue that some are paid first world salaries, while others are paid third world wages,
despite both living and working in the same city. For the majority of low waged migrants, Dubai is therefore seen as a tool to reach their dreams ‘back home’, which is not solely a matter of personal choice but is systemically enforced through policies and practices that exclude these poor workers from living the dominant Dubai dream. As this research will show, this can range from things such as policies tied to income based requirements which exclude this category of workers from bringing their families, or short term, temporary work contracts that deny these workers any chance of settling in Dubai, to the physical segregation of workers in labour camps accommodations. Thus, while in theory all migrants are ‘temporary’, as citizenship is a highly exclusive status not open to foreigners in general, this study shows that some are more welcome or able to live their Dubai dreams while in the city, while ‘Others’ are forced to imagine their dreams ‘back home’ via their access to Dubai through migration. These considerations raise a number of interesting questions such as the substance of different dreams that bring people from around the world to Dubai. What images, ideas and possibilities exist for different people, and what are the criteria influencing who dreams of Dubai, how and of what? At the same time, this study raises questions about how Dubai’s development trajectory has been imagined and built and the ways in which ideas of the ‘global’ and global city status shape its direction and influence lived experiences for different groups.

In regards to globality, the hegemonic dream of Dubai as well as the multiplicity and diversity of Dubai dreams are explored as they operate through allure and desire, implicating historical genealogies, which undergird contemporary geographies of migration. The chapters follow the building of this dream through the development of a dream cycle. They therefore begin by examining the imaginative realm as the ‘making’ of, laying the foundation and preparing for dreaming. This moves to a state of living the dream, the stage where dreaming actually takes place in the cycle, characterized by diversity and exposing the exclusions and complicity that are masked by the glamour of globality. In turn, we are awakened by the nightmarish realities that shape and legitimize social hierarchies based on constructions of degrees and modes of humanity.
Chapters and Connections

Dreams are explored here in a diversity of ways, including some sociological and scientific explanations, which are examined in more detail in the next chapter. To understand how the idea of dreaming is used to develop the chapter, we begin by examining how dreams are linked to sleep. This is conceptualized as a cycle, culminating in Rapid Eye Movement (REM), the space where the most vivid dreaming occurs. While dreams can arguably occur in any of the stages of sleep, the most memorable dreams happen in the last stage (Simons, 2009). The different stages of Dubai’s development are organized here in relation to changes in brain activity and to the stages of the dream cycle. As Breus (2015) notes, dreaming can be understood as a form of consciousness that unites past, present and future by processing information from the past and present as part of preparations for the future. With regard to globality, the hegemonic dream of Dubai and multiplicity and the diversity of Dubai dreams are explored as they operate through allure and desire, implicating historical genealogies (representing the ‘past’) that undergird contemporary geographies of migration (lived in the ‘present’), and shape the possibilities of Dubai’s globality (linked to ideas of the ‘future’).

The dissertation begins with Chapter One on Methodology, which highlights several strands of the research plan and objectives, as well as insights from reflections on the processes of conducting fieldwork as they impacted the insights that were collected. In addition, this section also operationalizes some key concepts that guide the analysis that follows, including genealogy, ontology, subjectivity and violence. In this section, I turn to explain/map the dreamscape as it relates to dreams of Dubai, and Dubai’s dreams and development as a global city.

In Stage One, the body is preparing to drift off, thus one may experience periods of ‘dreaminess’ which are likened to ‘daydreaming’, except we are beginning to fall asleep (Walcutt, n.d.). Some have characterized this initial phase as a transition period between being awake and asleep, understood as a restful place where you may experience hallucinations (Walcutt, n.d.). Physically, the body experiences muscle relaxation and a slowed heart rate as it prepares to enter deep sleep (Simons, 2009). Here, Chapter Two “Imagining the Dream” is linked to representing this first stage of sleeping as part of the preparation necessary to dream deeply. This chapter explores Dubai in the global
imaginary as a ‘global city’, thereby examining the imaginative realm as represented in a diversity of sources and spaces. Some of these perspectives include UAE leadership, popular tourist publications, novels, interviewees and scholars. Through these initial examinations we find the idea of the ‘global’ city emerges as a prominent theme that is linked to different dreams. We also see how Dubai’s globally induced, aspirational, developmental trajectory, as linked to a multiplicity of dreams and different spatial and temporal dimensions that collide and collude, shapes urban landscapes and social hierarchies (spatiality) in the city. From these popular representations of the global, I turn to a thorough scholarly review of global cities, which explores key features and criteria of global city status, as well as theoretical insights into postcolonial and critical scholarly works. Together, these diverse data sets help us to lay the foundation for a critical engagement with colonial continuities that are embedded in the geographical and genealogical aspects of Dubai’s global dreams. This section explores the notion of the ‘global’ not just as an imagined idea or aspiration, but also as a spatial location. It reviews major scholarly contributions to the field and develops a critical postcolonial theoretical framework to analyze the complex historical genealogies that influence contemporary global city dreams.

The second and third stages of sleep are best understood as preparation for dreaming during REM sleep. In these stages of the sleep cycle the body’s temperature drops and heart rate slows (Simons, 2009). It is the stage in which the immune system repairs the day’s damage, thus conceptualized as a stage necessary for sustainability. Here, Chapters Three and Four follow along as part of the preparation for dreaming, entitled “Making of the Dream”, Parts I and II. The major goal of these chapters is to ask how the aspirations/position of Dubai as a ‘global city’ impacts and is impacted by the lives of a migrant-majority population and, simultaneously, how the operation of highly exclusionary citizenship regimes and everyday ideologies works to justify and rationalize unequal social hierarchies. Part I of Chapter Three begins by examining the current status of Dubai and explores past and present economic and political developments that together lay the historical and theoretical background necessary in understanding contemporary processes. It paints a contemporary picture of Dubai, exploring insights related to its population, political structure, and development over time, examining pre colonial,
colonial and post war developments as they are linked to its contemporary role in the neoliberal global capitalist order. Overall, through this genealogical analysis we are able to contextualize the contemporary manifestations of Dubai’s globality - linked to its ability to optimize its limited resources and geographic position as it moves towards attaining its desire for global city status as a node connecting ‘East’ and ‘West’ - which is contingent upon the maintenance of a neoliberal, global order that maintains and perpetuates gross inequalities. Overall, Chapter Three examines the developmental trajectory of Dubai and the UAE more broadly within the regional and international arenas, providing the scholarly review and historical context necessary to understand the development of the city.

The fourth stage of sleep is characterized as a deep sleep, although not the deepest, a phase in which, for instance, sleepwalking may occur (Walcutt, n.d.). Thus we are still in preparation for dreaming but are deeper into the cycle and thus able to experience more dream like qualities in our sleep cycle. Here Chapter Four, or Part II of “Making of the Dream” continues to build the background insights into Dubai’s development but examines more specific processes that are significant for Dubai’s contemporary development. It builds the analysis of how geographies of migration are central to the creation and maintenance of the global city of Dubai by examining how histories and processes of migration are integral to the development of the city’s physical infrastructure, daily operations and maintenance, as well as in creating its global allure for migrants of all socio-economic statuses. Thus, Dubai is examined in more material dimensions such as through the international division of labour and histories of demand for labour and development. In addition, this chapter examines state policies on citizenship, migration, and labour, against the backdrop of migrant experiences as interviewees articulate why and how they migrated, and how they relate to Emirati citizens. Through these processes of development, we can see how different articulations of the Dubai dream shape desires for migration from North and South, as well as how the conditions tied to processes of neoliberalism impact the making of these geographies. Thus we are able to understand how the processes of migration and labour are central to the formation of Dubai as a global city, and this means examining geographies of migration in relation to their genealogies. Together, Chapters Three and Four provide the
background to prepare us for the next chapter in which the Dubai dream is lived and realized, wielding highly unequal and violent practices necessary to sustain the global dream.

Stage five is the final phase of sleep in which the most vivid dreaming occurs. It is a phase characterized by REM (rapid eye movement), an increased respiration rate and brain activity. It is also known as ‘paradoxical sleep’ because while the brain and other body systems are more active, the muscles become more relaxed, even paralyzed (Walcutt, n.d.). Thus, interestingly when the most vivid dreaming occurs we are simultaneously paralyzed or immobilized. Here we enter Chapter Five, “Living the Dream” and examine the lived realities and spatial logics of migration and labour in Dubai as they manifest into rigid social hierarchies. This begins with a focus on how practices of citizenship in relation to precarious, third world migration can be seen as a contemporary metropolitan counterpart of imperialism. It explores how dominant images of Dubai’s globality compare to the lived realities articulated by interviewees. Each of the three major categories of residents (low waged migrant workers, expat professionals and Emirati citizens) reflect on issues related to the Dubai dream, lifestyles, the role of citizenship and nationality, and their relationships to other sectors. From these insights we are able to see how the Dubai dream operates as a lived experience for various residents in Dubai in order to highlight both the structural and ideological forces that impact the creation of social hierarchies. Through these insights we see the historical and ideological genealogies of race, class, gender, and nationality as they shape the engagement of various subjects with the spatial geography of the place. The relations embedded in the space both shape and are shaped by forces such as the broader political economy, as well as national discourses, policies and practices, while historical genealogies, which undergird the geographies of migration, implicate broader histories of the colonialism and the international division of labour in the making of various subjectivities. Overall, in this chapter we see how the ‘everyday’ operates as a counterpoint to the spectacle of globality. Theoretically I argue that various subjectivities are constructed through relational identity formation and processes of ‘Othering’ based on privilege and exclusion. These considerations allow for a more complex understanding of the social, political, economic and imaginary realms through which we might
challenge social hierarchies and the subsequent violence(s) they engender as somehow natural, inevitable, increasingly acceptable and, at times, necessary in the making of neoliberal globality. Thus, when we dream Dubai dreams we imagine ourselves as ‘free’ when in reality we are paralyzed.

Chapter Six represents the “Awakening”, through theorizations and reflections on how the Dubai dreams and dreams of Dubai might be reconceptualised through the uncomfortable experiences of a nightmare. This in part explores the insecurities of the nation through the making of the ‘Other’, in which the façade of the global dream is made and the consequences are felt. Thus, we link the global geographies, which meet in the global city through a methodological unmapping of the genealogies that are embedded in these contemporary journeys and landscapes. Together, these examinations allow us to trace histories of race, nationality, class and gender, as they operate on different scales, and in different forms and times, to rationalize, normalize and, even, legitimize violent landscapes and hierarchies. Overall, this chapter awakens from the Dubai dream of the global city to the nightmares of seemingly informal social hierarchies, which are linked to ideologies of ordering that have normalized hierarchies of entitlement based on the dehumanization of others. This is seen in the ways in which these inequalities are often formally regulated but become common sense and perpetuated at the ‘everyday’ level. It explores in more detail the role of citizenship in influencing these hierarchies and social organization more generally, and also examines how the absence of citizenship for the majority of migrants impacts their experiences of the Dubai dream. Furthermore, we will see that when national identity is seen as under threat and national insecurity becomes a dominant socio-political concern, the social consequences are felt differentially based on social locations within the urban hierarchy. Thus, we will explore the role of exaltation and othering as it impacts subject making. In addition, we solidify the argument for a genealogical analysis that exposes both the historical lineages that accompany migrants on journeys of migration and the forces that have shaped Dubai’s global city based developmental trajectory. This is linked to notions of belonging, entitlement, and valuations of humanity that are linked to both formal processes and policies at the state level to control and regulate social relations, as well as to the broader everyday narratives and experiences of belonging that are employed to
justify, excuse, rationalize, and even legitimatize the exclusion and exploitation of the majority of poor, low waged workers. Thus, hierarchies of entitlement are made possible through the dehumanization of others by creating narratives of disposability and normalizing violence through relational identity formation. It seems in the end that the dreams of some become, or are based on, the nightmares of others, which in turn make possible the global city dreams of Dubai.

**Dreams, Webs and Threads**

Dubai was a dream I once had. Alluring. Its promises haunting. I knew better but I wanted to dwell and dream for a while, however dangerous. (YYZ to DXB Diary)

Turning back to how the city is imagined, the collusion of various dreams of Dubai, which coalesce to create one space, is an important thread connecting the different levels of analysis throughout the dissertation. The dream world operates at various spatial levels and temporal realms within which the dominant images promoted by the state are always contested and contrasted by the dreams of those bodies who move through spaces in the city, imbuing them with life and often death. Thus, the different spatial levels are significant in understanding how the Dubai dream, both imagined and real, creates lived spaces. In another way, the Dubai dream or Dubai dreams also become a challenge to linear time as different dreams play with different times by imagining the city as future, as past, while lived in the current.

When considering the question of ‘What is the Dubai Dream?’ interviewees referenced the dominant notion of the ‘American Dream’, popularized by generations of immigrants in the postcolonial period who embarked on the life changing journey to the ‘West’ where they were told of unlimited wealth and possibility, opportunity and equality. This dream however is much more nightmarish in reality as, lurking behind the white picket fences, are histories of slavery and racism, coupled with all types of exploitation and imperialist wars that were necessary to make possible the dreams of some. In a similar vein, the dominant images of Dubai also work to mask a reality, the majority migrant labour force that makes possible the glittery façade, who are hidden and devalued in the social imaginary, as well as physically segregated into labour camps and ghettoized areas of the city, often on the outskirts away from ‘Brand Dubai’. These
workers are thus necessary tools in the making of binaries between self and other that work to hierarchically order the population.

The field research presented here is an important challenge to the dominant images of Brand Dubai as the Dubai dream model. This complexity is examined through a plurality and diversity of voices from a wide range of perspectives and positions. Throughout the dissertation we can consider how histories impact the creation of dreams, whether and how dreams matter, and the important ways that Dubai dreams specifically challenge the hegemonic appeal of the American dream with important insights into the continuities and ruptures of the current neoliberal period of globalization. Taken together this impacts how we think of citizenship, migration, labour, race, class, gender and nationality and how emerging global cities in the non-western context are connected to the broader global city landscape. While power and privilege play a significant role in whose dreams come closer to reality, the most powerful aspect of dreams is that they need never be realized to be real. This is significant both theoretically and methodologically as dreams allow us an avenue into examining the present through different temporalities thereby endowing us with new tools in conceptualizing different intersections and layers of the living pasts that shape our dreams for the future and haunt our waking lives in the present.
Chapter One: Methodology

“There are no new ideas. There are only new ways of making them felt” (Lorde, 1984, 39). In considering methodology, it is important to understand how power operates to create knowledge. Thus, imagination, affect and lived experience are all important in the production of knowledge(s) about the Dubai dream(s). These epistemological underpinnings are connected to the broader methodology of this project through the collection and dissemination of data, but also on reflections of everyday realities, experience and encounters. Recognizing the power of embodied knowledge allows us to challenge the traditional Cartesian mind-body dualism in which only the mind matters, and the body becomes a mere object. However, knowledge in the form of diverse human experiences can be articulated in a variety of forms and, thus, the data that forms this project is cognizant of the multiple forms of knowledge and their diverse articulations.

In addition, by expanding the notion of ‘knowledge’ to include embodied experience we can consider levels of inquiry such as the everyday, the local, or social spaces in conjunction with the verbal articulations of interviewees. Thus, we can ask how everyday actions and forms of being are implicated within broader structures of power and how they carry within them a rich genealogy. We can ask how myths and dreams operate in realms of the imagined with material impacts, how ideas of the ‘global’ are implicated within narratives of innocence allowing subjects to safely and comfortably distance themselves from the immediate inequalities and violence(s) of their ‘everyday’ lives, or how everyday actions and rationales both conceal and reveal, and ultimately create possibilities for social change. The contradictions and negotiations between these levels of experience, forms of knowledge and historical legacies are part of the methodology of this project.

The remainder of this chapter examines the methodological considerations that shaped the research plan from the stage of the proposal to reflections and insights from the processes of undertaking fieldwork in the UAE. This includes a discussion of the steps leading up to the research plan, drafting the proposal and experience of the ethics review procedures. It explores both the experiences of doing fieldwork and how the research plan shaped and was shaped by being on the ground, and reflections on the
changes and issues encountered as a researcher and subject implicated in the space. In addition, a detailed examination is provided on the fieldwork plans in Dubai including considerations such as the motivations for this research, major aims, strategies and the techniques employed. This chapter is organized into three major areas: 1) Research Design; 2) Fieldwork Reflections, and; 3) Key Theoretical Concepts and Methodological Tools.

Section One focuses on the Research Objectives, including the aims and process of going to Dubai and rationales for the decision to conduct interviews as the source of the bulk of research data. In addition, previous fieldwork experience in Dubai is explored and reflections given on its impact on the current research. Section One then discusses the major research questions, the initial plan, exploring the ethics review process, the initial design, scope, and subsequent changes, as well the process of selecting informants, and locating sites for observations. Overall, in this section, the initial plans, ideas and assumptions and major obstacles, limitations and changes are discussed in relation to the original research plan.

Section Two focuses on Reflections on Fieldwork, and begins with experiences that relate to methods. These include some defining experiences that shaped my research in Dubai, and me as a researcher in the field, both as a visitor to the city and as an academic. These roles intertwined in interesting ways with often profound mental and physical consequences in terms of methodological considerations that shaped the collection and analysis of data. These insights not only are significant in the analysis provided here, they offer as well broader insights into the experience of research fieldwork, with interesting considerations for methods more generally.

Section Three examines key theoretical concepts and methodological tools that are important in providing a set of navigational tools to map the analyses, but also in operationalizing and contextualizing key concepts that inform the study.
Section One: Research Design

**Major research objectives.** The broadest objective of this project is to understand how the position of Dubai as a ‘global city’ impacts the lives of a migrant-majority population. To do this, I intend to map the geography of migratory patterns and simultaneously ‘unmap’ or uncover a genealogical analysis of historical legacies that manifest within the unequal international division of labour. This objective was informed by wide previous research experience on the issues of workers’ rights and exploitation in the region more generally, and with previous research experience in the UAE in 2005 as I undertook fieldwork for my Masters (MA) thesis project. That earlier project examined the experiences and treatment of domestic workers and construction workers in the UAE, based heavily on the narratives of expat professionals who had employed or sought to employ domestic workers in their homes. My master’s thesis examined how this sector of expats related to Emirati citizens, and the vast low waged migrant working class and documented their experiences, outlooks and issues within these relationships. In addition to fieldwork research, an extensive review of secondary sources was carried out, including scholarly works on migration and labour in the region\(^4\) and reports from international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) such as Amnesty International (AI) (2005), the International Labour Organization (ILO) and Human Rights Watch (2006, 2009). The strength of these publications lies in their extensive documentation of issues and experiences of domestic and construction workers as a key aspect in establishing a basis for understanding the problems they face, and also in the identification of policies and programs that support the systems that make possible these types of exploitation. However, the limitations of these works are in the very limited historical and political contexts that accompany the migratory geographies that make possible this temporary workforce. There are significant gaps, in the existing research tied to a lack of analysis of the ways in which contemporary forms of neoliberal globalization and policies and programs related to migration and citizenship are related to historical forces of power that significantly generate, shape and maintain international

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flows of capital. This implicates both the global North and South in the creation of new ‘global cities’ such as Dubai.

While the major research objectives of the current project may have been built out of my previous research experience, the initial phases continued to focus primarily on the experiences of the majority population of low waged migrant workers from the Third world. However, as the project evolved, the broader spatiality in which subjectivities of all three categories were constructed and experienced became increasingly significant in understanding the relationships and interconnectedness between these dynamic relationships. While ‘hierarchies of entitlement’ in terms of rights, protections and access to resources were clearly identified as a major structural force in the social landscape of Dubai, it was only within this matrix of relationships and through the relational creation of these different categories that these hierarchies could be adequately analyzed. Additionally, while many of these practices are enforced and legitimized by the state apparatus, there was also a sense of normalcy in the daily operations of the city, which was upheld by a diverse range of actors, not limited to the state or to workers themselves. Thus, after MA fieldwork new questions emerged to be used in examining these dynamics, such as what are the global economic and political forces that make possible the movement of workers from North and South towards the city? Additionally, how are the interactions between different categories of workers influential in upholding systems of exploitation in the city? What are the historical forces or legacies that are embedded in the migrations of different populations and how do these ideologies impact the construction of different subjects? How and why are western subjects continually privileged at the expense of racialized third world migrants for instance, and where are Emirati citizens located in this matrix?

These questions informed the broad research objectives noted above that consider the larger history that gives rise to, and continues to maintain, the international division of labour, and also, to understand the particular social, political, economic and cultural dynamics of the global city thesis in the UAE, thus examining both what makes the system possible, and how it is maintained. The fieldwork is based on an exploration of three broad major population categories within the UAE, (1) Emirati citizens referred to as ‘Emiratis’ or ‘nationals’, ‘(2) migrant professionals referred to as ‘expat professionals’
or ‘expats’ and (3) migrant workers referred to as ‘low waged labourers’, employed primarily in the construction, domestic and service sectors. While both categories of migrants are temporary and non-citizens of the UAE, there is a very significant and obvious differentiation between those privileged professionals from both North and South, and the majority of poor, working class populations primarily from the Global South. Within these three extremely broad categories there exists considerable diversity but on a general structural level many of the experiences discussed by interviewees fall within these three popular understandings of social stratification. As will be shown, within each group there are important markers and elements of differentiation that determine the relationships between sectors, and influence the spatial composition of Dubai. Thus, the project critically examines the underlying historical influences that shape understandings of racial and gendered subject formation.

**Research and fieldwork plans.** The current research study passed through a relatively stress-free ethics review process, despite the political climate of the Arab Spring in the broader Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in 2010. This was in contrast to a full ethics board review required at McMaster University for the MA process in 2005. The review was dominated by a general lack of knowledge on the context and the stereotypes and assumptions about the ‘Middle East’ more generally. Preparedness from previous experience allowed me to avoid any issues or questions with the review process at York University.

This project has a qualitative, multi pronged research plan that includes fieldwork in the form of semi structured interviews and participant observation, as well as substantial scholarly reviews and ethnographic reflection. The initial design for fieldwork was a complex methodological project based on selecting three major sites/locations, each specifically relevant to one of the three groups, with interaction and observation between the groups. The sites were anticipated to function as spaces in which different levels of power were in action, allowing for an examination of social relations within corporate workspaces, observing relations to illuminate the function of citizenship, race, gender, class and other markers of identity utilized to differentiate groups and shape the organizational hierarchies that impact relationships and entitlements among different
sectors. However, the feasibility of this project was questioned early on because of the lengthy approval processes and exposure and involvement of corporate and public officials. Securing permission from corporate entities that do not want internal practices exposed was very difficult, beside which there was an increasingly intense level of restrictions over politically charged research and conversation on ‘controversial’ topics in the country at the time of my fieldwork. This fieldwork coincided with the Arab Spring, with its continual media discussion of the growing insecurities amongst Gulf monarchs. In the UAE in particular, the ruling elites were being reported by major international news sources such as The Economist, BBC, and Times Magazine (Shah, 2011, Yom 2012) as enticing their citizenry with material benefits from the state in exchange for political silence, while those who choose to speak out against the state were being arrested, jailed, and when possible deported. Importantly, these forms of surveillance and expulsions were ongoing experiences, especially for migrant workers who attempted to change jobs, organize unions, protest or demand their rights or better entitlements. The combination of the corporate and political climate would have limited my access to potential interviewees, and as such I amended the research design once in the field to allow for a richer, more insightful and open dialogue with participants. Thus, I chose to work outside of formal channels and instead conducted a smaller number of in-depth interviews with people from the three major social categories under examination.

The final design was organized into three major areas: 1) participant observation and ethnographic reflections; 2) formal and informal interviews; and 3) an extensive scholarly review. This design allowed for the integration of interviews and observation based on qualitative fieldwork through formal, semi-structured and informal interviews, as well as participant observations in my navigation of the city, organizations and cultural events, and personal reflections that documented the experiences of conducting fieldwork/research. Additionally, extensive scholarly reviews were undertaken on global cities literature, as well as work on Gulf studies, and I participated in two major Gulf studies conferences in 2012 held in the United Kingdom (UK).

First, in terms of participant observation I explored the multiplicity of social interactions between different subjects through navigating diverse sites in the city, and
reflections about my experiences as a researcher and visitor navigating the city. Some of the spaces included locally organized community events with artists, local galleries, social clubs, private corporate functions, malls, public institutions, university campuses, taxi, buses and the Metro, hotels, malls, and various other social meeting spaces. This was done consciously in an attempt to engage a diverse range of informants and document a variety of different groups and backgrounds. These observations were documented with extensive written notes, which were then supplemented with ethnographic reflections on the places and people, as well as structures and access to various spaces in the UAE. In addition, I collected and examined an extensive range of artifacts, including for example, popular news media, which circulated stories and information related to the themes of migrant workers, expats and Emiratis. The outcome of all of this data collection was approximately a hundred pages of field notes and reflections, which were written up during the three months of intensive fieldwork. These insights are referenced throughout the dissertation as ‘Fieldwork Notes 2011’. In addition, since much of this work is about experiential insights, it was important to keep note of the ways in which my subjectivity both as a researcher and visitor were implicated in the work. I documented these experiences in a more personal account and have shared this throughout the dissertation as an integral methodological feature of undertaking fieldwork that illustrates the ‘becoming’ and undoing of self as researcher and subject, referenced here as ‘YYZ (Toronto Pearson International Airport) to DXB (Dubai International Airport) Diary 2011’.

The second major data set came from formal and informal interviews that were carried out from April to August 2011, and which compose the primary insights of the study. These interviews were based on a multi-pronged, multi-sited research design, which includes 20 formal interviewees with expats, 11 formal and informal interviews with Emirati citizens, and 17 informal interviews with low waged migrant workers. The formal interviews were based on semi-structured questions, which were organized into two areas: demographic questions such as country of origin, employment history and current employment, living situation, how long have they been in the UAE. The second part of the questions was based on open-ended questions that allowed subjects to narrate
their own journey to the UAE and to highlight some key experiences and interactions with various other categories. These interviews were open-ended in the sense that they would be guided by questions such as: how and why they chose to come to the UAE, their views on working conditions and labour policies in the UAE, their relationships to other sectors and categories of society. In addition, interviewees were located primarily through an organic process whereby existing contacts and professors working in the UAE were able to provide contacts to others to identify. They were contacted with different emails that contained the broad parameters of the study and major research questions (Appendix A).

While conducting interviews was a key method in allowing participants from different sectors to reflect on their experiences, it is significant to note that the majority of formal, recorded interviews were conducted with expats and Emirati citizens, while all low waged migrant workers were engaged through informal interviews that were immediately documented and analyzed on the day of the interview. The differences here are tied to the difficulties for low waged workers to meet outside of work, and the tremendous insecurities they face with their precarious status, making formal interviews dangerous for their livelihoods.

Once formal interviews were arranged with Emiratis and expats, a location was agreed upon, primarily in public settings such as coffee shops, while low waged migrants were engaged at their places of employment or nearby on their ‘breaks’ outside of the surveillance of their employers. Formal interviews began with an introduction of the research questions, background information on my objectives and key terms (Appendix B). Each participant was informed of their right to terminate the interview whenever they might choose, with no consequence or harm. I garnered verbal consent after answering any questions they might have about the study, risks and dangers of participation, and how to gain access to the work after completion.

The interview questions were designed to explore how subjects understood the city of Dubai itself, within a broader global context. In particular, the questions asked subjects to reflect on how Dubai is understood globally and if and in what ways Dubai can or is understood as a ‘global city’. This concept was not defined but was left open ended to allow subjects to articulate how global status was defined and understood
through their experience. To encourage participants to reflect on their experiences with these issues it was important to tailor interview questions to suit their broad experiences. Interviews with ‘local’ Emirati citizens asked them to reflect on three areas: personal experiences/history, focused analysis and a general perspective area. In the first section, they were asked to describe their family history and origins with regard to being born citizens or becoming citizens, how citizenship and nationality operated, experiences of growing up in Dubai for an Emirati, insights into the society and culture of Dubai, how they related to labourers and expat professionals within Dubai, to describe some of the issues facing each group, what factors impacted the life and experiences of different groups and how the local population related generally to the migrant majority population and the impacts of this demographic composition of the UAE on Emiratis (Appendix C).

For the expat sector, the same three general areas of questions were tailored to reflect on the migration experience, as well as the imagining of Dubai before they came, and how this changed, was confirmed or challenged on arrival (Appendix D). In addition, participants were asked to consider the major push factors that motivated migration, and the pull factors that encouraged them towards Dubai. Comparisons were sought between home countries and Dubai. In the focused analysis, they were asked to consider dominant narratives or ideas about Dubai and how their experiences would either challenge or confirm these ideas. Additionally, they were asked to discuss Dubai as a global city, and the factors that contribute to this status, as well as how Dubai had changed since they came, and the issues they faced in the city itself. They were also asked to discuss the societal structure and cultural elements of the city, focusing on the two major city-states of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The ‘relationship to other sectors’ was most significant here as they were able to reflect on being in the middle of the hierarchy between locals and labourers in the workforce. Additionally, this group was also asked to consider the idea of ‘belonging’ in Dubai, as well as how or whether nationality or citizenship status impacted their lives while in the city. Finally, in the general perspectives, they were asked to discuss the ‘personality of Dubai’ and how the idea of the ‘American dream’ had been taken up in Dubai with reference to the ‘Dubai Dream’? And whether there was such thing as a Dubai Dream, or Dubai Dreams?
While this category represents the most extensive set of interview data, it is significant to note that in the analysis that is presented here, the insights from each category are analyzed in relation to both extensive scholarly data and reports from notable international organizations. Thus, I attempt to balance the analysis against too heavy an influence from just one set of interviewees by recognizing the diversity within categories of residents; and by analyzing each group in relation to the factors that shape its experience, both as they discussed, and through data on the histories of migration, the international political economy and urban development, and insights into forms of power such as race, class, gender, and nationality. Furthermore, the questions and analysis put these different categories into conversation with each other and pushed us to recognize that identities and hierarchies are created in relation to each other and the interdependencies and intricacies cannot therefore be separated.

Informal interviews were conducted with the majority of low waged migrant workers, who face the harshest conditions and have the fewest entitlements. As anticipated from my research design, access to conduct long interviews in a formal process with these workers would not have been possible or desirable, as many work extremely long days, moved from ‘home’ to work on transportation provided by employers, or have limited opportunity/mobility to move or meet outside of their work, whether on a construction site, in an employee housing unit or, in the case of domestic workers, within a home. The majority of these interviews, in particular those with taxi drivers and workers on public transportation, domestic workers, service sector workers in malls and restaurants, workers in government run offices and lavatories and workers on construction sites were conducted informally through whatever access was possible and through informally through whatever access was possible and through informal conversations in a mix of English, Hindi, and Arabic. All of these included a set of standard basic questions to begin conversations including how long have you been working in Dubai? What motivated you to come here? How is Dubai imagined? How do you describe your work and life while in Dubai? In addition, other personal and background information was obtained through conversations, directed in large part by what was significant to each participant. This method allowed subjects great openness to articulate what they saw as important to share, and how they might understand their own
experience. These interviews were some of the most insightful experiences as subjects directed conversations based on their own personal experiences and their interests, issues or opinions.

In methodological terms, these sets of interview data are remarkably complex. Each of these three categories of subjects was integral to a deep and nuanced understanding of socio-economic-spatial relations within the global city. Taken together, they offer us insights into a variety of diverse subjects as they negotiate their own identities and social locations. They connect individuals from the local, to the national, regional and global, and allow us to pursue different scales of analysis from the personal and everyday accounts, to their implications within the social as it is shaped and shapes national policy and global constructions and imagining of Dubai as a ‘global city’. From these data sets we can see that Dubai very simply is a space of multiple worlds that are conflicting and adapting, ordinary, peaceful and conflating, while simultaneously conflicting, colliding and erupting. As we will continue to see, the space of the ordinary and mundane ‘everyday’ is a significant and radical methodological shift that allows us to glean the global and national from the local within a matrix of experiences.

The third area of data is based on an extensive review of scholarly work in a range of areas. The first area can be broadly understood as works on the political science, economics and history of ‘globalization’, spanning themes of political economy, ‘development’, migration, citizenship and labour studies. Another area is related specifically to the ‘global city’, where I have compiled an extensive review of literature in three broad areas: some ‘key’ (dominant) global city scholars, critiques of the global city thesis, and global city analysis of new Asian and Gulf cities, with Dubai as a specific focus. The third major area is a review of works in a range of scholarly disciplines and popular mediums on the context of the Gulf region, with a specific focus on the United Arab Emirates and Dubai.

In addition to these literature reviews I attended two important scholarly conferences on Gulf Studies in 2012 - the Gulf Studies Conference hosted by the Center for Gulf Studies at Exeter University; and the Gulf Research Meeting organized by the Gulf Research Center held at the University of Cambridge.
Important here to note is that as fieldwork unfolded and the analysis of collected data began, the theme of the ‘global city’ became an increasingly central/focal point in understanding the relationships between individuals and their motivations for migration, as well as in understanding the relationships between sectors and the global location of Dubai - geographically, economically, politically and ideologically. Therefore, it became an important anchoring point in understanding the many layers and levels that constitute the space of Dubai. As a result, the attempt to compartmentalize the levels of analysis for the proposal, as a way to address the major levels of influences involved in constructing the research process, was challenged by the simultaneity of social relations, which became the major force in narrating lived experience of workers across sectors. This simultaneity was also tied to the anchoring of the ‘global city’ as the analytic tool in developing an analysis of how subjects relate to the city and create the city, and are created as subjects of the city. Furthermore, the lived experiences of different subjects, conceptualized in part as ‘dreams’ of and within the city, are in turn related to experiences and understandings of the globality of Dubai.

In addition, the analysis of this data is presented throughout the dissertation through the integration of diverse narratives that are used as the theoretical threads that connect the various subjects and insights, written with the intention of piecing together parts of living histories that would allow us to understand the epistemological underpinnings of different subjectivities. In addition, it attempts to add complexity to debates surrounding exploitation and violence by presenting the insights of various subjects whose narratives neither necessarily reject nor accept popular discourse on the subject of workers’ rights, but instead highlight complex negotiations including considerations often overlooked in traditional labour studies, or international political economy. The focus on these tensions also highlights the need to question top down, Eurocentric attempts to exceptionalize the context, often based on racist notions of Arab and Muslim ‘otherness’ in the contemporary period, and also to question international human rights based or developmental attempts to expose exploitation without historical considerations. Taken together we will see the relational nature of power and privilege, which implicates a larger genealogy based on colonial and imperial projects, as they
become embedded in contemporary neoliberalism and globalization, allowing for masked complicity through the glamour of contemporary globality.

Section Two: Fieldwork Reflections

As noted previously, the data for the dissertation brings together different forms of research, including formal and informal interviews, a rich body of insights as a researcher in the form of a diary, a collection of cultural materials including print, film and participation in various artistic spaces, in social spaces such as malls, restaurants and in public transport, in exhibitions, airports and work places, homes and social gatherings. Some of the first narrations of my experiences within the first few weeks of arriving in Dubai were documented and contrasted with experiences and insights that evolved throughout the course of fieldwork. Here I will highlight two major areas of insight: first, some experiences that impact the researcher in the field, both as a visitor to the city and also as an academic. Together these roles intertwine in interesting ways with often profound consequences revealed in both mental and physical ways that can be seen as part of the methodological considerations that shape the collection and analysis of data. In the second area of insight, we can consider some theoretical notes on broader findings and analyses that emerge from the experiences of research and from an analysis of interviews which together become significant insights for the project but also for the process of conducting research more generally.

In reflecting on my position, I considered my role as a researcher, my status as a Western passport holding, non-white, yet somewhat racially ‘ambiguous’ woman, entering as a relatively privileged ‘professional’ expat, all of which shaped my level of access and entitlement in the city. However, simultaneously my status as a researcher made me vulnerable to surveillance and induced, at times, a sense of fear in political participation. The reflections implicate both social and cultural experiences of navigating different spaces and also raise questions regarding methodology and the ways in which many Eurocentric/western-centric assumptions often erase other knowledges, the barriers in communication and access to certain people and places, and the general feelings of belonging, otherness, privilege and lack there of.
The following themes begin with those considerations related to fieldwork and research, which inform the project, followed by considerations of the theorization of these different narratives and experiences. These themes do not summarize the findings of this dissertation but rather offer windows into the experience and influencing factors on fieldwork both in terms of methodological and theoretical considerations.

**Passports and privilege.**

“What passport?” asked an Emirati airport official dressed in a crisp white dishdasha, as he texted on his phone. “Over there”, pointing to an enormous line, comprising primarily South Asian and Filipino passengers. I turn with a look of confusion as groups of white passengers are directed to the empty lanes adjacent to us (Fieldwork Notes 2011).

The organization of nationalities begins upon arrival into DXB as you are shuffled into different lines based on passports. GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) citizens enter into their own private expedited section; and all EU, United States and other privileged nations citizens enter in another area, right next to the area where all ‘Others’ are sent. At the time of this fieldwork, Canadians had lost their special status due to conflict between the Canada and the UAE states, one consequence being the mandatory visa requirements and loss of military related arrangements. There is an immediate sense of privilege present in the arrangement of nationalities, and the racial and class based elements are extremely apparent, as the majority of ‘Others’ are labourers and other less privileged working class migrants primarily from the ‘third world’. Very easily, the broader global economic system is made apparent in major world airports such as DXB.

Noticing the confusion on my face, the official says, “Canadians have to wait.” “Leh astana” (why are we waiting?), my partner asks.

“Your government” he replies without looking up from his iPhone screen.

“Eh el moshkila? Khalas ma’thebena” he jokes (Why? You don’t like us anymore?)

He looks up and smiles with a warm and polite smirk, then turns to join a group of fellow Emirati workers huddled together chatting and laughing on the side. Despite this setback, there is a sense that you do not belong in this line by virtue of your citizenship status, there is a privileged sense of entitlement that engulfs you as you wait next to masses of labourers. You feel the difference. You feel the insecurity of some, and the entitlements of others (Fieldwork Notes 2011).

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5 These visa policies were adjusted in 2013, when the government of the UAE announced that Canadians would no longer require special visas to travel, once again elevating the status of Canadian nationals to that of other privileged categories. While these changes did not effect my experience, it is significant to note the changes and how this impacts the status of Canadian citizens as a privileged group once again.
As an interesting note, my partner’s visa was garnered through work contacts in the UAE, who did not physically bring the visa to the airport that evening. However, with a little bit of conversation, UAE officials allowed him to enter the country by leaving his passport with them on the condition that he would return the next day to present his documents and retrieve his passport. The shock of the informality with which such an agreement was made continued to shake me for the rest of the night. Coming from the West in a climate of intense regulation of particular identities such as Arabs and Muslims in general, there is a growing sense of uneasiness and trepidation with regards to travel and securitization.

What are the odds that someone named Mohamed, born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia would be allowed to enter without a proper visa? In the West he would have been held in a detention center as a criminal attempting to deceive the government with false documents. I felt a sense of relief in the moment and on early reflection. What a nice change I thought, a young Muslim man not being the extreme target of border regulation. It felt radical in the moment. Later on I would realize that this is how they dupe you. (Fieldwork Notes, 2011)

On reflection of this experience, it was clear that there was an immediate difference in the obvious ways that ‘Muslimness’ is understood and experienced, markedly different than in the West, because you do not face the same obvious, immediate, and rampant Islamaphobia. However, as you realize, this acceptance is contingent on other markers of identity such as class, race, and nationality. Thus, within the broad category of the ‘Umma’ (global Muslim community), where you are from continues to over-determine the degree of privileges or belonging you experience. For instance, as a Muslim you may feel a sense of community, as an Arab a sense of confidence in communication, but as an Egyptian or Palestinian this is lessened as your nationality is seen as a marker of class, as an Indian, racialized representations permeate your experiences, but as a wealthy Indian you may feel a relative sense of privilege in some ways as you are able to buy/consume your way into ‘belonging’ and then simultaneously you may then be dehumanized again through discrimination in finding a home or deskilling at the workplace. The intersections and complexities are infinite but the deception looms ever present, and extreme measures of surveillance silently ensure compliance.
Upon arrival, setting up a temporary life in the city was generally an easy experience, although communication was often a difficult element to overcome in daily interactions. The dominant language of communication was English though this was infused with a range of other languages, as one subject remarked, “Everyone here speaks a broken version of English, Arabic, Hindi, Urdu and Tagalog”. The search for an apartment, car and phone number was seamless. Much of the city is set up for these types of transitory stays, daily, weekly, and monthly rentals are common, though highly contingent on what passport you hold.

Altruism as activism. “Dubai is great, it’s easy to feel like a good person” (Sean, American). Referring to the altruistic feelings generated by living in a city dominated by exploitative and unequal relationships between sectors of the population, one interviewee exclaimed that Dubai allows one to become a selfless person by virtue of simple, everyday politeness. The basic nature of this altruism is considered in the context of intense hierarchical relations that often create master-servant dynamics that are ongoing topics of uneasiness for some, affirmation for others and intense conversation for many in the city. As Davis argues in his discussion of social hierarchies in Dubai, “Dubai is expert at catering to colonial nostalgia” (Davis, 2006).

In many ways it is found that subjects come to know themselves, in terms of privilege and identity in relation to others. This relationality is most obviously articulated in the case of altruistic feeling emerging through interactions between expats and low waged migrant workers. One immediately enters into a state of privilege and entitlement in relation to Others, which in turn allows one the power to ‘smile’ or speak to those serving with a polite demeanor and tone that is then internalized as an altruistic gesture, reaffirming the innocence of expat subjects who conveniently remove themselves from any responsibility.

The idea of ‘responsibility’ is linked to the state and local Emirati citizens who are the only sectors of the population with formal access to citizenship, and thus to belonging and state sponsored entitlements. Many expats feel in a state of perpetual temporariness because of this lack of belonging and exclusion from formal political participation and with it the lack of ability, or need, to speak, work or advocate for social
and policy changes. This in turn, as I argue, generates a sense of innocence on the part of expats who feel no responsibility for perpetuating social hierarchies. While it is true that they have no avenue to political participation, as we will see, their role in upholding hierarchies of entitlement and their benefiting from the low waged labour of migrant workers continue to uphold their privileged status in ways that are far from passive. Thus, complacency can be seen as a form of complicity, which must be considered in understanding how power and privilege are made into everyday realities. From this position, as many interviewees alluded, simple ‘politeness’ can become contextualized into a form of ‘activism’ that allows the privileged an entry into absolution. Many subjects remarked in subtle, and not so subtle, ways that their response to the inequality of relationships between workers and themselves was rectified because of their personal better ‘treatment’ of individual people. Better treatment is expressed as “She is like a part of our family”; “We love our worker”; “She gets a day off every week”; “She can’t go out after work, in case something happens to her”; or “She gets a place to live, food to eat and a ticket to visit back home.” These statements are seen to justify the confiscation of passports, substandard living quarters, unlimited working hours, differential standards of pay, and countless other ‘exceptions’ which are said to protect workers, benefit them, or be ‘enough’ or ‘acceptable’ for them. ‘Enough’ and ‘acceptable’ are of course based on where the workers are from and the commonly held misconceptions about ‘back home’. As we will examine later, policies and programs also work to structure these relationships in a way that enforces unequal relationships, such as the linking of sponsorship for workers to employer visas through the Kafala sponsorship system that makes employers ‘responsible’ and fearful of reprisal from any wrongdoings or harm to ‘their’ workers. The forms, outcomes and factors influencing these relationships will be discussed at length, but of critical importance here is the way that privilege allows for a sense of accomplishment when, for example, expats attempt to perform their kindness through the mere changing of tone or gesture towards ‘Others’. This in turn generates a feeling of altruism, often seen as a source of ‘activism’, in which these behaviours are seen as radically different from the socially acceptable behaviours of treating the working classes in derogatory and degrading ways. However, critical reflection on these insights can argue that altruism and egotism are here conflated allowing privileged parts of the
population to see themselves as benevolent and beyond systemic forms of inequality and encouraging a popular form of privileged absolution that continues to support and benefit from a system of rigid social inequality.

**On paranoia, safety and other myths of Dubai.** While many of my fears never materialized in the particular ways that they were imagined, they often impacted my outlooks on research, who I would engage with, who I would avoid, and they most definitely impacted how I spoke with people I had just met, what information I would share, and what topics I would discuss. As such, these fears became very real. As Smith (2010) argues, “one cannot understand why Dubai’s landscape has emerged as it has and does the work that it does without recognizing the transformative impacts of multiple trajectories and varieties of fear” (Smith, 2010, 264). Through his examination of landscapes, he argues that fear can become a major locus of operation, highlighting several types of fear such as anxieties about Arab Gulf prosperity understood through orientalist representations of the Arab ‘Other’, fears of oil running out, fears of migrant dependency or fears of ‘bachelors’. Thus, fear, in its multiplicity and diversity, flows through the landscapes of Dubai (Smith, 2010, 279). Furthermore, in thinking through how fear impacted the fieldwork process we can, as Smith argues, “trace our fears back through the landscape and see how they work in order to enliven the object we study” (Smith, 2010, 280).

One major example of how Dubai presents itself through a myth of security and safety is as “the safest city in the world” (Zain, Egyptian). There are constant references to the ‘safety’ of the city by expats. However, the part of the city in which one stands definitely shapes experiences and notions of security and safety. I never considered conducting fieldwork in the UAE a dangerous endeavour, but the context was shifting with the Arab Spring revolutions underway and political tensions high. I was continually disciplined in many ways to not fall for the false sense of freedom and security that the city blanketed you with. In my first meeting, a Professor at Zayed University cautioned me about ‘sensitive’ topics, particularly for a researcher without a local institutional affiliation. He warned me to proceed with caution. “There is a tremendous false sense of security”, he warned. “There is always surveillance, although most often invisible, it does
not mean that it is not happening”. He continued, “Trust me. You do not want to go to jail here.” He also made reference to a colleague who had recently been jailed for a book he wrote (Fieldwork Notes, 2011).

In another meeting with a female professor from the American University in Sharjah, a conversation about academic life led to her criticisms related to a lack of security, tenure and academic freedom. She explained, “You can’t say whatever you want… you are very restricted” (Fieldwork Notes, 2011). She explained that her most recent project proposal with another Professor was rejected (since research needs institutional approval) because of the sensitive context related to the Arab Spring. Jumping between themes, she abruptly turned to me and said, “Did you know that Black Water has a contingent here?” (Fieldwork Notes, 2011). As it turned out later, it was in fact true that the UAE government had recently hired 800 private forces to supplement the UAE military (Sengupta, 2011). The interweaving of academic and political freedoms, and increasing securitization and militarization were significant themes in the perpetuation of regimes of fear.

Another Canadian expat working in Dubai highlighted the general fear of expats, particularly white, often British, who are afraid of and frustrated by rules that they believe can get them into trouble because of their lack of knowledge. “You can get in trouble a lot by mistake,” (Sean, Canadian) remarked.

My friend who had been in Dubai for a year was driving in a rental car from Dubai to Abu Dhabi when he was in a pretty severe car accident. He was fine physically, but the car was a write off, and normally, insurance for the rental car would cover the loss, but in this case, the police found a bottle of alcohol in the trunk and this is illegal in the UAE. As a result, his insurance policy with the rental company was invalidated and he was forced to repay the fine, and cost of the vehicle on his own. (Sean, Canadian)

So in this case his friend spent the next year working to repay the rental company for the car because of a ‘simple’ mistake of not knowing the rules. “He was so afraid. He couldn’t even go home,” he continued.

During fieldwork, I often wrote about the many stories and experiences/feelings of paranoia, which were intensified after my interactions with numerous professors working in the UAE. I wrote many times in my reflections that I did not know if this sense of insecurity was real, in that it never materialized in my time there through arrest
or deportation but, nevertheless, the idea that one is not protected by any political rights left me with a sense of fear that impacted how I proceeded with my interviews, who I contacted, and what I discussed with people I did not know and thus did not trust. I found myself often checking over my shoulder, questioning whether I was being followed, ripping up outlines or questionnaires and reviewing and deleting data from my hard drive as fast as possible. At times I found myself redefining my research as an exploratory work examining the globality of the city, and how people understood their experiences and relationship to each other, making sure to exclude any more critical questions. Whether or not these fears were ‘real’ become increasingly less relevant as I watered down my preambles and refused to carry with me research papers or information I collected. Consider the following example from my experience conducting fieldwork where I believed that I was being followed by two police officers,

I pulled up to the villa, sweating and short of breath, as if I had been running in the fifty-degree heat. I ran to the door, unlocked it and tried to rip off my shoes as I tripped towards the room. I closed the door and locked it. Damn it, I thought. There are no curtains. I grabbed a few cushions from the couch and put them up to block the last bit of light and sat silently in the dark, listening and waiting for a knock. Some time passed, and the officers I imagined never materialized. I slowly turned on the lamp, noticing my shaky hands. Opened my bag and pulled out the papers. “Great!” I thought to myself, “Are you an idiot?” Research questionnaires and consent scripts piled casually into my purse. I sat for an hour quietly and methodically tearing them into thousands of tiny pieces. (YYZ to DXB Diary, 2011)

This particular entry was written at the culmination of two months of paranoid conversations with different professors and interviewees. On this particular evening, I had stopped by Spinney’s, a British supermarket chain, against the advice of my friend who told me that only ‘snobby British people’ shop there for overpriced goods. I went anyways to explore this space, and he was right, white Brits everywhere I looked shopping in their mini dresses and flip flops, with their posh steps and civilized demeanors, gathering prepackaged, ready to heat dinners. Then I noticed two police officers enter the store after me.

I made eye contact with one officer and looked away quickly. I quickly got a paranoid anxiety wondering, what if they are following me? I made my quick purchase and darted out of the store, in my rental car and back on the road. I tried to talk myself out of my paranoia. I am not doing anything wrong? Am I? I plan
what I am going to say before I get caught. I have to note that I am generally already a pretty paranoid person, growing up with a single mother fleeing an abusive relationship, living in a sexist, misogynist society where stories of rape and assault against women are a daily occurrence, especially for women of colour who know that our bodies are seen as more exploitable and disposable, often leaves us pretty fearful of the potential of violence. On my drive home, I noticed the two officers in an unmarked car behind me. I was terribly afraid. When I turned onto my street, I spotted another cop car that was unmarked, and this seemed to confirm to me that something was happening. I felt stupid, but also afraid. After I finished tearing up my proposal and questionnaires, I put them into a plastic bag, which I tied tight and shoved to the bottom of a large garbage pail. I then uploaded my data to my email and deleted any traces of it from my computer. (YYZ to DXB Diary, 2011)

That night, I slept in fear of who might come knocking. Although, no one actually came, this was another case where whether or not the threat was real, the possibilities existed enough to create a real sense of fear. It felt real. And it was possible. Whatever it was, it worked. The intended outcome of surveillance was achieved. It disciplined my behaviour by making me constantly question my security, and most definitely changed how I spoke about my project from then on.

**Insecure and Inadequate.**

My rental car is really slow. It’s new…just really, really slow. Or so it feels. It’s probably just relative. This must be the millionth time I am driving on Sheikh Zayed road, trying to change lanes, when I get cut off by some massive SUV… Mercedes, BMW, Porsche, Range Rovers, and who even knows what else. You name it. I have been cut off by it. Every time it happens, I find myself just barely escaping being run off the road and every time I find myself lamenting, “I am a human being too!” Though I am careful to heed the warning of a friend, “Don’t ever give anyone the finger on the road. You never know who it is. It could be a local… and then you’re screwed”. So I always swallow it and continue on down the road feeling less important, less valuable, less capable, less human than them… albeit still with the privilege of driving a car… just not equal and not good enough. (YYZ to DXB Diary, 2011)

There were many moments while living in the city when I found myself re-evaluating my self worth. I found myself questioning the basis on which to demand respect. To consider the basic fact of my humanity? Nationality? Education? With a lack of political and civic rights for the majority of the population, one feels a sense of insecurity in understanding their sense of self worth as a ‘non’/member of a place to which you are continually reminded that you do not ‘belong’. Many interviewees and
scholars I interviewed mentioned that belonging in Dubai is contingent upon consumption, and this was reinforced by many experiences I shared during fieldwork.

You can never be pretty enough, skinny enough, rich enough… but no one cares if you are smart. Or at least it feels like no one cares about anything. So, things are superficial, what else is new? So is the rest of the world, except, there is something different in how that pressure feels here, because there is no other basis from which to claim your legitimacy or access. Not through rights, or obligations, or universality. You can’t yell back demanding to be treated with equal respect as other people who are dressed well on the basis of some kind of relative universality of our humanity, because that is not in fact recognized in any legal or political way as a right or truth. (YYZ to DXB Diary, 2011)

The seeming neoliberal dream being lived in Dubai pushes us to question how power operates to discipline different subjects, as Davis argues, “Dubai, indeed, has achieved what American reactionaries only dream of - an oasis of free enterprise without income taxes, trade unions or opposition parties (there are no elections)” (Davis, 2006, 61). What is the basis on which one knows oneself in relation to other people and to the place? How does it feel to be in a place where there are always more possibilities of wealth, all the time, all day? Is it possible as one informant asked, “to not get caught up in the life?” to not strive for the ‘Dubai dream’. However different this may be for different people, the overarching reach remains the same. As a researcher I felt insecurity for particular reasons; as a visitor and as a women I felt it again, and again, continually reminding you that you are inadequate, and as a result you become insecure in more ways than one.

**Epistemology, Subjectivity, Inculcation and Consumption.** Inculcation is understood generally as a process of influencing oneself into particular ways of being or knowing through continuous or repetitive mention or action, influenced by environmental conditioning. Ontology is understood as the philosophy of understanding the nature of being, becoming, reality and categories of being and their relations (Stanley and Wise, 1993, 190), whereas ‘epistemology’ is a framework for understanding the “constitution and generation of knowledge about the social world; that is, it concerns how to understand the nature of ‘reality’” (Stanley and Wise, 189). Although there are important distinctions between the two, as the theory of knowing and the theory of being, it is important to note that it is not possible to separate the two entirely. Thus, throughout the
analysis, mention of ontological constructions refers to the making of particular subjectivities, in effect influencing notions of their being through particular epistemological frameworks, and ‘knowledge’ based on ideological constructions of race, gender and class for example. Subjectivity is understood as “historically and socially contingent, shaped in and through social relations, as contradictory and fragmentary, inherently unstable and in constant flux” (Thobani, 2007, 8). Many contemporary theories draw upon Foucault’s theorizations regarding modern subjectivity as shaped by knowledge and power within discursive formations. Thus, as Thobani explains, Foucault discussed the constitution of the human being in the modernist guise of the individuated ‘subject’ through disciplinary power called bio-power (Thobani, 8). Foucault argued that disciplinary forms of knowledge produced about/by this subject organize the particular “field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realized” and that power shapes the “parameters for subjection/subjectification” (Thobani, 8). Thus, subjectivity cannot be understood without situating it in the context of discursive power. In modernity, technologies of government changed from the “prohibition of participation acts to life-controlling and subject-shaping management of action” (Thobani, 8). This knowledge/power nexus produces the subject as an effect of power. From here, Thobani then goes on to argue that nationality has been used as technology of exaltation with important and significant consequences.

In the example here, we can consider patterns of consumption and how they impact/influence ways of being based on access to, and consumption of, various goods and services. In turn we can consider how these ideological and routinized behaviours and ways of being influence the making of different subjectivities, supported by the epistemological considerations that explain and justify the hierarchical impacts.

Life in the city can be disciplined by many different elements, such as policy, citizenship status, employment, or nationality, but an overarching form of inculcation occurs through consumption. Scholars have examined consumption as a form of conspicuous belonging (Kanna, 2010; Vora, 2008). Those who have the power to consume more than others become more worthy of entitlement and wield a greater sense of belonging than those who lack the ability to consume in the same manner. The
glittering malls, cafes, five star resorts and restaurants, shiny new high-rises, or expensive cars all elude exclusivity and privilege, which is tied intimately to consumption patterns. But it is by this same logic that individuals are also disciplined by what they do not have as there are always going to be others who have more. This constant reference to what one does not have also works to shape subjectivity.

Through these mechanisms of social organization and discipline it seems people become alienated from themselves and each other. People feel a sense of loss to determine their lives and to define their relationships to others. As one subject mentioned, "Living here for too long does something to you. You change from being a social being to one who sees others only as tools, as instruments to meet your needs...", "Why? Because you can and because they have no choice" (Fieldwork Notes, 2011).

At the same time however, this ‘life’ is understood through a Western secular liberal humanism that informs us of the ‘good’ life governed by private ownership, accumulation of wealth and the individual liberties that go along with it, all governed by a dominant global capitalist logic. At many moments, subjects challenged this epistemology and instead highlighted alternate worldviews that created a different ontology, governed by radically different ideas of self. We can consider here how the self is understood through a non-secular teleology predicated upon an understanding of one’s place in a world that is not regulated by Western secular time. Though not homogenous in its organizing principle, there was a sense of relationality that appeared to be radically different. Questions and explanations related to this were ever present. In a western capitalist worldview, freedom is understood in part as the liberties afforded to those under a system that allows for the accumulation of material wealth, a sense of ‘freedom to’, though in many encounters there was also a sense of ‘freedom from’ those pressures. Freedom to accumulate wealth is the individual liberty most respected under capitalist liberal democracies and the state must create the conditions for this dream as its foundational promise. However, in many of my encounters with low waged workers, I began to ask questions related to how ‘freedom’ was conceptualized,

Freedom to accumulate… freedom to indulge… freedom to explore the individual in all of its desires… sex… money… freedom to… but what does freedom from these things mean? Freedom from the excessive indulgences and distractions of materiality and allure and promise of consumption and capital as
the means of happiness… What about a freedom understood through a logic of discipline and introspective reflexivity predicated upon humility and freedom from the excesses of capitalism. (YYZ to DXB Diary, 2011)

One interviewee presented an important example of an alternative worldview. Asked how Sheikhs and leaders alike can justify their wealth and support systems of exploitation and inequality, she remarked, “I just thank God that I have not been burdened with the responsibility of that money because God will make you account for every cent you spent and the responsibility and weight of that burden is more than we will know” (Dee, Canadian). She continued, “Those who are last in this life, will come first”. This challenges the constant drive to push for understandings predicated on the lack of material life as the lowest, most absolutely detrimental state one might be in, and which can only be rectified through a redistribution of wealth. So what is the goal, one subject asked, “So that we can all equally buy and consume things?” Another subject reminds himself that perhaps the reason the wealth he seeks has not found him, is “Maybe God is protecting me because he knows that I am not ready for the responsibility. Who knows what would happen if tomorrow I have a million dollars. I know myself right now. What if I get caught up in the ‘life’, cheat on my wife, start drinking and waste all the money. Everything is written. Everything is Naseeb. My share is my destiny” (Imad, Egyptian).

As a researcher this theme of how different notions of the self are informed through either consumption or alternative worldviews challenged me to deconstruct the desire I have to continually only, or primarily, think in terms of structure and systems. Many of these encounters with subjects pushed me to consider how a radically different starting place might impact on an understanding of the space. How can we think outside of these dominant logics? How/or can we imagine possibilities beyond them?

There were many key moments from subjects who narrated this alternative way of understanding their life in the city. One Bangladeshi boat driver named Yassin, on an afternoon on Bur Dubai creek told me, when asked about how he liked his life here, “Dubai offers me clean food, mosques to pray…” (Yassin, Bangladesh). Others, such as a Filipino nail technician discussed how migration to Dubai for work allowed her the ability to leave her husband back home and build a life for her children who are cared for
by her mother. With divorce not legal in the Philippines, millions of women unable to
start a new life without ties to men who are no longer their partners see migration
becomes a strategy to break away. There is an infinite number of possibilities often
missed when we approach a particular subject with a singular lense and while we might
say this can help in understanding the why or how of its occurrence, it need not colonize
the way it is felt or lived.

I feel an intense frustration and tension with how severely I have been disciplined
to think through the predominant mode of understanding of structures and
systems. It limits what I can see and what I can hear, thankfully it hasn’t
colonized how I feel. What would it mean to start from a radically different
starting place? I am still caught thinking through the same logics I am trying
to deconstruct. How can one think outside or beyond these logics? Part of these
limits is the place where they are being written and the ways that they have to be
organized and translated into word, many encounters are far more affective and
embodied. How do we hold onto these feelings and view them as legitimate
sources of knowledge, as Audre Lorde says, “our feelings are our most
genuine paths to knowledge” … but what if they can't be translated into
paragraphs? Can I hand in teardrops, smiles, anxiety and love for my
dissertation? (YYZ to DXB Diary, 2011)

This was a question I wondered about at many moments during the fieldwork
journey. If how we come to know others and ourselves matters, and how we articulate
our position and subjectivity matters, how do we reconcile instances of those who do not
articulate their ‘unfreedom’ in the same way? Or perhaps as Zizek (2002) notes, the
modes we know as ‘freedom’ seem/feel as such only because “We feel free because we
lack the very language to articulate our unfreedom”? (Zizek, 2002, 16). We might not
agree on what it means to be free, but we can agree on what it means to be unfree. Or can
we? Furthermore, should we?

Section Three: Key Theoretical Concepts and Methodological Tools.

This section begins by exploring the Power of Dreams in shaping migrant and
urban developmental trajectories and explains how dreams emerged as a major theme and
organizational tool. It then turns to an exploration of the Levels of Analysis, which also
incorporates a discussion of key theoretical considerations, and operationalizes and
contextualizes theoretical concepts that shape this analysis. This latter section is
organized and explained through three major levels of analysis that help to locate where, in the multilayered and multidimensional analysis of global city making in Dubai, they find their prominence.

The first major methodological consideration is linked to an understanding of the ‘simultaneity of social scales’, which operates to constitute the space(s) of Dubai itself and must be considered in its relational and simultaneous nature. ‘Social scales’ refer both to different levels of analysis, such as those presented here as ‘global’, ‘national’, and ‘local’, as well as their presence/absence across time and space. In the case of the latter, contemporary processes, movements and landscapes, most prominently emphasized here as ‘geographies’, are simultaneously conceptualized through genealogies, thus emphasizing the historical legacies and continuities, which are embedded in social structures and processes. In the structure that follows, the interactions, intersections and inter-dependencies between different scales of analysis are emphasized in the levels of analysis as global, national, and local. Methodologically, this commitment requires us to weave together the histories and narratives that follow through their intersections and relationality, and ultimately emphasizes the complexity in ‘lived’, social structures and processes. This is in part motivated by tendencies to privilege the ‘global’, macro and most often, economic, as the primary force in the making of social processes. Importantly then, within these various scales, we find important theoretical considerations that emerge to shape the analysis, and in particular, the theoretical considerations of ‘geographies and genealogies’, linked to the methodological tool of ‘unmapping’ in supporting the simultaneity of social scales, particularly those related to time and space, which emphasize the connections between past, present and future in the making of various landscapes, geographies and dreams.

**Power of dreams.** The power of dreaming cannot be understated in relation to contemporary global city making. In the case of Dubai, dreams were a significant point of reference for the city’s development and for interviewees when discussing their motivations for migration. Organizing the dissertation through a sleep cycle led to interesting connections to dreaming, as well as to the way in which dreams are conceptualized more broadly in relation to Dubai. The dissertation is thus conceptualized
as a dreamscape in which the story of Dubai’s development builds alongside a sleep cycle in its quest towards dreaming, only to be awakened by the nightmarish global realities that undergird its developmental trajectory, which is embedded within a historically situated, uneven global economic system.

The creative process of thinking of dreams came from considering how dreams are popularly conceptualized. In this sense, dreams are often linked to ideas of ‘freedom’, conceptualized as an escape from reality, whereby the subconscious mind is able to unleash its boundless imagination in the safety of the dream state (Freud 1913/1900, Jung 1963). In other ways, dreams are not just about sleep, but are understood as linked to conscious life, allowing us to imagine our worlds or selves beyond our existing realities. They are often considered aspirational or motivational and as part of imagining more, better or different worlds. In Freud’s analysis, dreams were “those poems we tell ourselves at night in order to experience our unconscious wishes as real” (Simons, 2009). For Freud, dreams were very simply understood as an unconscious wish (Freud, 1913/1900) and although this idea has continued to be reproduced in popular culture, scholars have developed more nuanced reasons why dreaming occurs and its functions for our waking life. As Simons (2009) explains, “dreams allow us to be what we cannot be, and to say what we do not say, in our more repressed daily lives” (Simons, 2009). Thus, dreams here are conceptualized as providing a way to cope or deal with the limitations we experience in our waking lives by allowing us to imagine ourselves beyond its bounds. In addition, as we see here, dreams are also, whether built in our sleep or not, inspired or induced (made possible) by and in relation to Dubai itself. Thus, ideas of Dubai’s globality and landscapes are themselves tools in shaping how migrants imagine their futures. As one Filipina migrant worker explained, Dubai is a place that inspires dreams. Louisa wanted to bring her teenage son from the Philippines to Dubai so that he could dream of something beyond his everyday reality, and beyond the past, the ‘third’ and impossible spaces of Otherness, and towards and into the ‘future’ and seemingly endless possibilities offered by the global city. Dubai’s landscapes inspire ideas and notions of possibility, of other worlds that may have been previously unknown. People dream to come, people come to dream, people are linked by their dreams of and from Dubai. Despite the many interesting ways that dreams can be conceptualized, the
power of dreams in general cannot be denied. As many have argued, dreams have no boundaries and this makes them significant worlds of influence, allowing us to imagine things beyond our current realities, and inducing desires towards future attainment. Thus, the dissertation considers dreams in multiple ways and for different subjects, examining how dreams link different migrants and how dreams are built into the city’s landscapes. Thus, the focus of dreams related to Dubai all connect to ‘global city’ status, which gives direction and shapes the city’s developmental trajectory and inspires migrant geographies.

To consider the significance of dreams in both physiological and imaginative understandings, we might ask a basic, yet profound, question as to why we dream. Breus (2015) notes that there is no one reason but rather a number of theories that span many disciplines such as psychiatry, psychology and neurobiology. Here, I emphasize the idea that dreaming is linked to memory processes, and can be seen as an extension of waking consciousness such that we may reflect on experiences of waking life as constituting a space where we can work through difficult, complicated or unsettling thoughts, emotions or experiences. A brief overview of some major ideas related to dreaming can help explain the origins of popular representations of dreams and how contemporary science has added, challenged or enhanced these early understandings.

Hobson (2009) notes that dreaming has been a source of fascination, mystifying humankind for ages. Early understandings of dreams were often tied to the content of dreams, often understood as ‘messages’ undeliverable in any other way (Hobson, 2002). Whether from religious thinking as messages from God, or artistic tools acting as vehicles for artistic expression (Hobson 2002, 2009, Bulkeley 2008, Patton 2004). Patton (2004) argues that ancient cultures understood dreams in profoundly different and more significant ways for living. They have been considered as spaces for healing and for understanding the future (Patton, 2004). She explains that the ancients saw dreams as “enigmatic parable”, highly valued, and often see as potentially divinely sent “fraught with meaning about the future, and having the potential to heal or offer solutions to life’s biggest problems” (Leddy, 2013). Thus, dreams were understood as spaces of healing and had the potential to impact waking life. From these early conceptualizations, explanations for dream content formed the basis of most, early theoretical insights on dreaming. For
the most part, psychoanalysis dominated this thinking (which occurred well before the
discovery of REM linked to modern brain science), explaining dreams as part of
repressed desires (Freud), and complex reasoning in relation to mythic narratives (Jung).
This thinking is seen in opposition to contemporary brain science which largely
challenges the idea that dreaming is “meaningful, privileged, and interpretable
psychologically”, and rather argues that dreams are the “simple reflection of the sleep-
related changes in brain state” (Hobson, 2002, 1-2).

For Freud (1913/1900) “the interpretation of dreams is the royal road to a
knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind” (Freud, 1913, 608). In his
understanding, all dreams were the fulfilment of unconscious wishes or desires that were
repressed in society due to societal norms and expectations (Freud, 1913/1900). For Jung
(1962, 1974) rather than hiding our unconscious desires, dreams revealed more than they
concealed and were an expression of our imagination in which mythic narratives helped
to integrate conscious and unconscious lives through processes of individuation.

Building from here, modern researchers such as Hall (1966) explored the
cognitive dimensions of dreaming, well before the discovery of REM sleep. Hall
dismissed Freudian notions of dreams as covering up desires, arguing instead that dreams
“are the concrete embodiments of the dreamer’s thoughts; these images give visual
expression to that which is invisible, namely, conceptions.” (Hall, 1966, 95). As a
behavioural scientist, he argued that dreams help structure our waking lives, and thus the
content of dreams had coherent meaning. These ideas were largely challenged by
scholars such as Hobson and McCarley (1977) who argued that understanding dreams is
best accomplished by focusing on the formal features rather than content, and thus,
Hobson considered the perceptual (how we perceive), cognitive (how we think), and
emotional (how we feel) qualities of dreaming, regardless of content (Hobson, 2002, 1).

Hobson largely challenged the focus on psychological dimensions of dreaming
(which he did not altogether deny), by arguing that privileging this obscures what can be
seen as a simple reflection of sleep related changes in brain states (Hobson, 2002).
Hobson argued that studying the content of dreams does not necessarily explain what
caused the dreams. The bizarre content of dreams, which Freud argued was a
psychological defense against an unacceptable unconscious wish, Hobson argued, is a
function of “selective activation of brain circuits, underlying emotion and related precepts in REM sleep” (Hobson, 2002, 6). This also then meant there was an inactivation of other areas such as circuits and chemicals related to memory, logical reasoning, and self awareness (Hobson, 2002). Some interesting insights into the cognitive features of dreaming include “loss of awareness of self (self-reflective awareness); loss of orientational stability; loss of directed thought; reduction in logical reasoning; and, last but not least, poor memory both within and after the dream”: (Hobson, 2002, 5).

Since the discovery of REM sleep, researchers such as Winson (1990) have explored the neuroscientific aspects of REM sleep and memory processes together. For Winson, dreaming was very meaningful and significant and related to memory processes, a process through which we form survival strategies and evaluate current experience in relation to these strategies (Winson, 1990). Thus, dreaming here is a reflection of an individual’s strategy of survival, where the “subjects of dreams are broad ranging and complex, incorporating self-image, fears, insecurities, strengths, grandiose ideas, sexual orientation, desire, jealousy and love” (Winson, 64). Winson argues that the characteristics of the unconscious and associated processes of brain functioning however are very different from what Freud thought. Rather than being solely about untamed passions and destructive wishes, he argues that the unconscious is a “cohesive continually active mental structure that takes note of life’s experiences and reacts according to its own scheme of interpretation” (Winson, 1990, 67). Thus, rather than disguised consequences of repression, their unusual character is a result of the “complex associations that are culled from memory (Winson, 1990, 67).

With the discovery of rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, the neural underpinnings of dreams have generated new understandings of dreams (Hobson 2009). Understanding dreams in scientific terms begins by examining sleep architecture, which refers to the “basic structural organization of normal sleep” (Colten and Altevogt, 2006, 1). The ‘cycle’ is broken into two general considerations: Rapid Eye Movement (REM) and Non-REM sleep, which is further broken down into four stages which each have their own variations in brain wave patterns, eye movements and muscle tone. Scientifically defined, sleep refers to a “reversible behavioural state of perceptual disengagement from and unresponsiveness to the environment” (Carskadon and Dement 2011, 16). Furthermore,
NREM sleep is defined as “relatively inactive yet actively regulating brain in a moveable body” (Carskadon and Dement 2011, 17), while in contrast, REM sleep is defined by “EEG activation, muscle atonia, and episodic bursts of rapid eye movement” (Carskadon and Dement 2011, 18). Interestingly, during REM sleep, the state in which the most vivid dreams are experienced, the inhibition of spinal motor neurons by brainstem mechanisms that limit motor abilities is also simultaneously experienced, and thus REM sleep is also defined as “an activated brain in a paralyzed body” (Carskadon and Dement 2011, 19). While in REM sleep “motor neurons are inhibited, preventing the body from moving freely” (Winson, 1990, 59), “eyes move rapidly in unison under closed lids, breathing becomes irregular and heart rate increases” (Winson, 1990, 59).

Stage one plays a transitional role in sleep stage cycling, turning into stage two as a deepening of sleep, which in turn becomes stages three and four, characterized as slow wave sleep (SWS), all building up towards REM sleep. Both REM and NREM alternate throughout the night in a cyclic fashion, in which periods of REM sleep get longer across the night, and stages three and four may disappear all together as stage two sleep expands to occupy the NREM portion of the cycle (Carskadon and Dement 2011, 27). In an interesting parallel here, we can see the way that the background and historical genealogies (preparation) that shape the global imaginary of Dubai’s developmental aspirations (dreams) are obscured or disregarded in mainstream, privileged experiences of the Dubai dream.

In his most recent work, Hobson (2009) has revised this earlier hypothesis, to acknowledge the deep psychological core of dreams, albeit with a focus on brain stem activation. He argues that “REM sleep may constitute a proto-conscious state, providing a virtual reality model of the world that is of functional use to the development and maintenance of waking consciousness” (803). As he explains, waking consciousness is defined by awareness of the external world, our bodies and our selves and the awareness of our awareness, however, “When dreaming we are also consciously aware; we have perception and emotion, which are organized in a scenario-like structure, but we erroneously consider ourselves to be awake despite abundant cognitive evidence that this cannot be true” (Hobson, 2009, 803). Thus, when we dream, we wrongly think that it is
real (lived), as they are abstractions from fully lived conscious reality. When we consider the hegemonic Dubai dream we see that it is both lived and imagined simultaneously, but that it faces the problem that all dreamers and dreams face, which is the “failure to recognize its own true condition, its incoherence (or bizarreness), its severe limitation of thought” (803). Thus, dreams of Dubai and Dubai Dreams conceal and potentially ‘hide’ aspects of their reality. However, as Hobson highlights, dreams also can reveal and have implications for full consciousness. He explains that some argue that the connection between sleep and psychology is tied not only to the mere deprivation of sleep, but the denial of dreaming (occurring in REM sleep). Specifically, he argues that this is the most detrimental force in triggering cognitive deterioration (Hobson, 2009, 803). Dreams, are therefore understood as a necessary counterpoint to our conscious state, whereby as Hobson argues, the “integrity of waking consciousness depends on the integrity of dream consciousness” (Hobson, 2009, 803). Thus, “what we may need to navigate our waking world is an infinite set of charts from which we may draw the one best suited to an equally infinite set of real-life possibilities” (803). Hobson asks, if REM sleep precedes dreaming, what happens before dreaming appears? He argues that the brain is preparing itself for consciousness, “a lifelong process, an innate virtual reality generator, the properties of which are defined for us in our dreams” (Hobson, 2009, 803). Thus, dreams are both a necessary component for our conscious state and are implicated in our lived realities, and are simultaneously, inherently limited in their inability to recognize their state for what it is. Both Dubai’s dominant, state sponsored dream, and Dubai dreams, rely on the production and function of dreams to make possible our lived experience. However, these dreams can also be awakened to a reality with serious limitations that we cannot know from a dreaming state. Thus, dreams are as much preparations for waking consciousness as a reaction to it. “We are as much getting ready to behave as we are getting over the effects of our behaviour” (Hobson, 2009, 803).

Interestingly, just like sleep, dreams are also vulnerable to disruption from mental and physical health related problems. It is argued that depression and anxiety are more commonly accompanied by nightmares, and that the presence of nightmares may be an indication of the severity of depression (Breus, 2015). Thus we might see dreams in both their aspirational and nightmarish forms as in fact linked. When we awaken from Dubai’s
dreams what we often find is that the promises of Dubai’s dreams are not as they seem for many. They are not reflected, in the statement that Sheikh Mohamed makes, that “…Dubai is a city where you do not feel estranged or marginalized and where nobody lives on the fringes feeling dismal, because this is a feeling alien to Dubai” (Al Maktoum, 2012, 151). Dubai dreams are in fact much more violent and nightmarish than the vision of this Dubai dream implies. The fringes are in fact outside but within at once, embedded into the cityscape and expressed through spatial relations which can only be understood through a tracing of Dubai’s geographies and the genealogies that make possible its ‘globality’.

In addition, as we can see in popular culture, for individuals dreams have been tied to values and conditions of possibility, as escapes, as aspirational, as powerful motivations, as goals, and as ambitions, but they may be simultaneously, or additionally, tied to ideas of delusion and incommensurability, not bounded by the limitations of waking life. Either way, they are often the ‘freest’ we might be to imagine worlds beyond our own mundane reality. They are also seen as productive in that they induce a sense of aspiration, but can also be stressful, disturbing, frightening, recurring, haunting. As the chapters unfold here we will develop a deep, nuanced background and historically grounded genealogy of migration and the dependencies and relationships that shape the everyday realities of a diverse group of residents. Dreaming therefore is significant as it is the most “universal, enduring aspect of being human” (Breus, 2015), and thus we might ask about the influence of dreaming in our waking lives, and whether there is any way that dreams might help us live better. There are views that support the idea that dreaming is a creative portal and new studies argue that dreams may assist in daytime functioning, whereby “… dreams may be fertile territory for influencing and enhancing our waking frame of mind” (Breus, 2015). Therefore, dreams are not only abstractions but have real, lived consequences in our daily lives (Hobson, 2010). Overall, “dreams provide us with insight about what’s preoccupying us, troubling us, engaging our thoughts and emotions. Often healing, often mysterious, always fascinating, dreams can both shape us and show us who we are” (Breus, 2015). As in the case of Dubai, the dreamscapes that are built into the contemporary landscapes of the city are tied to a multiplicity of globally linked and historically situated processes, which include a
multitude of different dreams that together make possible the dominant Dubai dream of
global city status. Additionally, these dreamscapes also show us how unequal the global
landscape is, as it generates rigid everyday social hierarchies that highlight the ways that
the dreams of some are built on the nightmarish realities of Others.

**Levels of analysis.** We can begin by examining the interactions between
international/global, regional, national and local/‘everyday’ discourses and practices,
which allow us to understand historical processes that have shaped notions of the ‘global’
inside and outside of the ‘city’ itself. As de Sousa Santos (2008) highlights, debates over
definitions of globalization, for example, are a part of a “vast social field in which
hegemonic or dominant social groups, states, interests and ideologies collide with
counter-hegemonic or subordinate social groups, states, interests and ideologies on a
world scale” (393). Thus, as he explains, even while the hegemonic camp, referred to as
‘top-down’ or ‘globalization from above’ is fraught with tensions, “over and above them
there is a basic consensus among its most influential members” (393). These dominant
members can be identified as G8 leaders and nations, international financial institutions
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and the World
Trade Organization (WTO). This ‘consensus’ is what de Sousa Santos explains as
conferring globalization’s dominant characteristics, and is linked to a genealogy of
concepts such as ‘modernization’ and ‘development’. Furthermore, the dominance of
neoliberalism, often referred to as the ‘Washington consensus’, encompassing
liberalization, privatization and deregulation (Beaudet, 2011, 108) is most commonly
associated with contemporary globalization. These ideas are largely attributed to the
economists at the University of Chicago known as the ‘Chicago Boys’, such as Milton
Friedman, as well as the entrenchment of neoliberal thinking into international
institutions (de Sousa Santos, 2008; Harvey, 2006; Stiglitz, 2003). The tension is such
that,

On the one hand, if, for some, globalization is still considered a great triumph of
rationality, innovation and liberty, capable of producing infinite progress and
unlimited abundance, for others, it is increasingly an anathema, as it brings
misery, loss of food sovereignty, social exclusion for ever vaster populations of
the world, and ecological destruction. (de Sousa Santos, 2008, 395)
Thus, de Sousa Santos importantly challenges the linear, homogenizing, irreversible process of ‘hegemonic globalization’, instead pushing for a conceptualization of ‘globalizations’ in their plurality and diversity. Additionally, he challenges the domination of the global over the local, arguing that we “live in as much a world of globalizations as we live in a world of localizations” (393), and furthermore that “there are no global conditions for which we cannot find local roots” (396). It is the same process, he argues, that creates the global as dominant in unequal exchanges, which simultaneously produces the local as the dominated, and therefore “hierarchically inferior” (396). Thus, rather than assume that the ‘global’ operates above and outside of the everyday experiences of urban life, I work to develop a methodology that attempts to uncover genealogical histories embedded in geographies of urban development through a recognition of the simultaneity of scales. Additionally, recognizing the power and impact of ‘localized globalism’, allows us to challenge top down, purely macro-economic thinking, and broaden our view to examine the interrelated nature of diverse global processes at different scales. Thus, the global political and economic relations which shape the role of Dubai globally are simultaneously examined through the everyday lived experiences of various groups living in Dubai, Emirati nationals/citizens, Expat professional migrants, and migrant workers employed in the service, construction and domestic sectors.

In another example of the global scale we can see how the location of the UAE regionally, and Dubai internationally, can be understood as straddling a space between ‘East’ and ‘West’, ‘First’ and ‘Third’ worlds. It is significant to note that this dissertation understands the historic relations between ‘First’ and ‘Third’ world nations through the ‘international division of labour’, and the intersection of these hierarchies within the unique ‘national’ context of the global city of Dubai as integral to shaping the global, structural conditions giving rise to patterns of migration, labour, citizenship policy. The usage of terms such as ‘First’ and ‘Third’ world is done consciously to highlight the continued structural dominance of the international division of labour in relation to international labour migration, as well as the global history/knowledge that the forces of colonialism and development have created about the ‘third world’ and its peoples. As Escobar (1992) highlights,
… development can be described as an apparatus that links forms of knowledge about the Third World with the deployment of forms of power and intervention, resulting in the mapping and production of Third World societies. In other words, development is what constructs the contemporary Third World, silently, without our noticing it. By means of this discourse, individuals, governments and communities are seen as "underdeveloped" (or placed under conditions in which they tend to see themselves as such), and are treated accordingly. (Escobar, 1992, 23)

The socio-spatial mapping of the Third World has been made through powerful forms of Western intervention and domination both through colonialism and contemporary processes of ‘development’, generating important ideas about its places and people. These legacies also highlight the difficulties of (ideologically) locating the UAE, which is represented as both ‘first’ and ‘third’ world, depending on what aspects are being considered. For example, in many popular discussions, criticisms over the lack of ‘democracy’ are tied to orientalist notions of ‘backwardness’ and ‘underdevelopment’, while praise for neoliberal economic practices are lauded as signs of Dubai’s successful and ‘modern’ business environment. Thus, in either case, the scale of measurement and comparisons reinforce historically embedded conceptualizations of ‘modernity’, ‘development’ and ‘Otherness’, which generates important forms of knowledge about Dubai’s contemporary globality. In turn, what we will see in the analysis that follows is that ‘global city’ status in Dubai highlights the precariousness of being located ‘in-between’ worlds. While concepts such as Global North and South better highlight the growing transnational capitalist class, which challenges traditional First-Third world relations, the structural features of colonialism and development in the broader Global South continue to perpetuate stigma and discrimination for migrants based on their country of origin. Furthermore, the concept of the ‘New international division labour’, as criticized by globalization theorists, has challenged notions of comparative advantage in economic development by highlighting the hierarchies and legacies of colonialism that have continued to maintain divisions in the international system.

In addition, some of the impacts and pressures associated with globalization can be seen through attempts to reclaim footing through localization and nationalization of various aspects of social and cultural life, which have direct consequences for all non-citizens. These considerations highlight the impact of spatial, temporal and material
processes on shaping globally induced urban life and are particularly important in a context that is heavily tied to ‘world city aspirations’ and ‘spectacular urbanization’ (Mohammad & Sidaway, 2012, 607). Thus, as Mohamed and Sidaway (2012) argue, Gulf cities are significant to our understanding of urban studies today, and while much of the attention has been to “applaud their rapid development, impressive architecture, artificial islands, skyscrapers, cultural centers, free trade zones and shopping malls, they must also be seen as social spaces that demand scrutiny” (607). In particular, this scrutiny is linked to the acute dependency on migrant labour at all levels of development, and rigid social hierarchies that shape the socio-spatial urban structure. For Mohamed and Sidaway (2012), “excavating life in Abu Dhabi, is not about the ‘front stage’ of Gulf spectacle, but rather the mundane, back stage, inhabited by those whose labour makes possible the spectacle and the lifestyles of the elite” (610). Thus, linking the global processes to the everyday lived realities of residents helps us to explicate the strategies and practices of normalization, legitimization and rationalization that make permissible the rigid social hierarchies that dominate social life in the Gulf and, in this case, Dubai specifically.

Theoretically what we find in the analysis that follows is that the ‘global’ represents and is generated in relation to historical genealogies that shape contemporary processes, patterns and landscapes. Here, genealogy is understood as a methodological tool and theoretical argument for emphasizing the historical lineages of contemporary processes, best conceptualized as the ‘unmapping’ of various historical continuities. Thus, for example, tracing the various routes of migration from across the globe to the city is best explained by simultaneously ‘unmapping’ these geographies to uncover the genealogies that undergird migratory patterns, influencing the processes, motivations, limitations, and ideologies that accompany journeys to the global city of Dubai.

‘Unmapping’ as introduced here can be an important methodological consideration for citizenship and migration studies since it historicizes forces of ‘push’ and ‘pull’, extending the analysis beyond the purely economic and political to considerations that are linked to lived experiences such as space, dreams and desire, and temporality. This method helps us to theorize the formation of ‘hierarchies of entitlement’, which are generated to control and discipline the uniquely majority-migrant population. Thus, social hierarchies that dominate everyday life need to be historicized
through an understanding of the genealogies of race, gender, and class that generate the epistemological underpinnings of racialized categorizations based on nationality. Together, these understandings ultimately inform the ontological constructions of humanity based on racial constructions of otherness, expressed through categories of citizenship and influenced by notions of neoliberal globality in the contemporary period. We will see in the analysis that follows, how, for example, the ‘everyday’ logics of normalization impact social inequality, and the ways in which they are in fact linked to historical forms and forces of racialization that position certain entire categories of the populations as disposable.

The concept of genealogy can be traced to a range of different scholarly works. Here we can consider two major usages of the concept as a methodological tool, beginning with the work of Foucault. McLaren (2002) explores Foucauldian thinking on the concept of genealogy as a dynamic rather than static approach, oriented towards practices as well as discourses, and that introduces a dimension of power. Genealogies are understood as local and specific histories, but unlike traditional histories, genealogies are based on discontinuity rather than continuities, thus, they challenge the notion of progress and do not seek to define a point of origin (McLaren, 2002). This method allows us to ask how current practices, institutions and categories came to be the way they are, as well as how power operates as a relationship rather than a thing.

The genealogical method as discussed by Foucault develops his notion of power in relation to subjectivity and explores the ways in which “power operates on individuals through social norms, practices and institutions” (McLaren, 2002, 5). For Foucault, genealogy was not about finding origins, nor was it about substantiating linear development. Instead, he argued for plurality, stating that,

Genealogy retrieves an indispensable restraint: it must record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality; it must seek them in the most unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is without history - in sentiments, love, conscience, instincts; it must be sensitive to their recurrence, not in order to trace the gradual curve of their evolution, but to isolate the different scenes where they engaged in different roles. (Foucault, 2010, 76)

Thus, genealogy is about understanding the present more fully in order to transform it, which is done through historical inquiry, through the examination of
“techniques of production, techniques of signification or communication, and techniques of domination” (McLaren, 2002, 3). Thus, through the specific ‘unmapping’ of histories that accompany migratory patterns we are able to examine the specific contexts and histories that intersect through relationships of power such as those embedded in processes of colonialism and imperialism and that help to explain how current practices and categories came to be. Following McLaren’s analysis, we trace here a ‘history of the present’ not to understand the past, but to understand the present. As McLaren explains, “A history of the present allows one to see how the present came to be the way it is; it exposes the contingency of historical forces that created the present” (2002, 31).

More generally, genealogy has been invoked by feminist writers to highlight the (dis)/continuities and (re)/formulations of present, lived experiences. Thus, “the burden of persistent colonialisms” (Alexander and Mohanty, 1997, xiii), mixed with national and cultural genealogies as they intersect with current statuses, such as immigrant, or foreigner, challenge the possibilities of redressing the present. As Alexander and Mohanty (1997) argue, geopolitical shifts and forms of globalization in the contemporary period necessitate active, deliberate focus on questions of genealogies, legacies and futures in comparative feminist praxis (Alexander and Mohanty, xvi). In this body of work, the authors map the paths by which feminist communities, organizations and movements reflect upon moments in their own collective histories and struggles as they remember them. They explain that the use of words such as genealogies or legacies “is not meant to suggest a frozen or embodied inheritance of domination and resistance, but an interested, conscious thinking and rethinking of history and historicity” (xvi). Genealogies rely on a comparative, relational, and historically based methodology to explore the dialectic relationship between old and new, which provides the “theoretical and politics cues in understanding contemporary relations and hierarchies” (xxi).

In particular, through this genealogical tracing we consider in detail the role of colonial legacies in “continuities and fractures between historical and newly emergent forms of colonization” (Alexander and Mohanty, xxii). The concept of colonial legacies, which is explored throughout this analysis, is similarly meant to evoke an, “imagery of an inheritance and to map continuities and discontinuities between contemporary and inherited practices within state and capital formations” (xxi), and in the making of
various subjectivities and the ideological forces in the making of nationality through race, class and gendered notions of ‘Otherness’. Postcolonial life and genealogy are importantly linked because of the pervasive nature of the violence colonized people endured. Thus, as Mama (1997) states “to excavate the past, a genealogy of the conditions which foster this violence is necessary” (47). Thus, to understand the conditions that make possible various contemporary forms of violence or migration, for example, we must examine how the ‘histories of the present’ occurred and endured during the epoch of imperialism to understand how to better counter their development today.

Imperialism therefore is an important lens for studying dynamics, which have led to present conditions, not to simplify or impose homogeneity on the diversities within either region but to lay out a foundation which may direct our investigation of the specificities of particular contexts. (Mama, 1997, 48)

Overall, ‘unmapping’ towards a genealogical analysis allows us to examine the material, discursive and emotive aspects of migratory patterns that undergrid the making of the ‘global city’, which cuts across time and space, ultimately deepening our understanding of how the exaltation of some is created through a relational mechanism of differentiation that shapes entitlements and notions of belonging of others, all of whose histories have been largely ignored in understandings of the ‘present’, everyday realities and relationships.

Contemporary scholarship supports these theoretical interventions into rethinking temporalities. For example, Agathangelou and Killian (2016) present a complex and nuanced examination of how time and temporality may be negotiated in understandings of the present, arguing that “rather than understanding time as a backdrop before which the present passes into a shadowy history, postcolonial projects seek to unhang time from its presumed neutrality; at their most creative, they maintain an unwavering commitment to thinking about temporality in relation to an indeterminate future” (2). In this work, the reimagining of time and temporality allows for deeper understanding of the complexities of lived experience and, as they argue, opens us up to an understanding of different processes and structures as they undergo change in a variety of “overlapping social spaces, power dynamics and discourses and with the use of multiple devices and institutions of governance to secure a certain international order” (4). These attempts to
maintain the tension of multiple scales, temporalities and forms of lived human experience allow us a more complex ability to see how the “production of knowledge (science) and politics interact in co-producing the normative, epistemic, ontological, practical and technological aspects of life in modern societies” (4-5). The goal then, as is found within this work, is to search not to understand the “essence of a thing, but to probe the formation of phenomena to see how social imaginaries point to new existence and to ask what activates them” (5). Thus, as the use of a genealogical method here showcases, maintaining these tensions and attempting to think through processes of simultaneity and layers of human experience as they challenge ideas of linear time allow us to examine the ways in which the ‘present’ geographies which shape the making of global dreams continuously haunt our current realities and also influence our ‘indeterminate futures’.

The second major level of analysis we will explore the ‘national’ scale through a discussion of economic, political, social and cultural policies and realities that shape national discourses and dependencies on migrant labour, as well as intersections with and through these webs of relations between subjects. Thus, I consider how the scale of the national impacts workers by examining how place is reconsidered as space and how social relations of power impact on the ways in which physical places are experienced. From here we turn to consider the concept of ‘hierarchies of entitlement’, referring to both informal and formal mechanisms that operate in the city to create seemingly informal hierarchies which shape the rights, entitlements and treatment of workers, ultimately dictating who is worthy of what in the city. Additionally, in considering the making of different subjectivities, we see how identity formation is relationally constituted between different sectors of the population and, in particular, we consider how the identities of national Emirati citizens are constructed in relation to others, and in turn how the state and nationhood are considered under threat, thereby justifying and rationalizing state initiatives to minimize the impact of ‘foreigners’ on local, ‘indigenous’ culture. ‘Culture’ is often represented here as unchanging, static and homogenous, thus state sponsored ideas of ‘Emirati’ culture are often being fixed to an idea of a shared past, language and religion, and outsiders are constructed as a threat to this identity. However, as we will see the ‘culture(s)’ of the global city is/are very much shaped by forms and
forces of power that have historical genealogies. In considering how processes of exaltation generate Emirati identity as citizen-subjects in relation to ‘Others’ we see how Thobani (2007) presents an important analysis of these processes in which ‘exaltation’ is used not only to explain particular characteristics of untouchability, but also to explain the ways that exaltation impacts the regulation and disciplinary mechanisms that control all ‘others’, specifically those who come to stand outside the nation, seen in terms of belonging. In addition, she highlights that exalted characteristics provide an axis for grounding, unstable identities and offer a national structure to humanity. What we find, similar to the case study of Canada highlighted by Thobani, is that conceptualization of the nation as ‘vulnerable’ contributes to the distancing of citizens (and privileged expat professionals) from migrant-Others. To promote national unity, she highlights the importance of such practices as rituals and rites, which sustain citizenship of nationals in their daily encounters with each other, and with outsiders. Formally, these include: recitations of national anthems, raising of flags, the public pledges and oaths of allegiance to the sovereign, the celebrations of national holidays, parades, play and fireworks. While in addition, she argues, they include national violence such as lynching of Black men in US, swastikas on synagogues, “Paki-bashing,” the raping of women in war, burning of crosses, and pulling off Muslim women’s headscarves (79). She argues that it is in attending both the rights and rites of citizenship that an understanding of the full meaning and power of the institution in the lives of social subjects can be grasped. Overall then what we see is the ways in which the “…racialization of persons-on-the-move is central to their ontologization as aliens by exalted citizens, who claim inalienable rights for themselves while helping to destroy those of Others” (72).

Some of the guiding questions for this (national) scale of analysis include: what is unique about the context of the UAE? What is similar to or a reproduction of other contexts? In what ways are social hierarchies, visible in the UAE, based on race, gender, class, labour sector employment, national origin and citizenship statuses? What are the relationships between social hierarchies within the UAE, the international division of labour and the contemporary location of the global city of Dubai? What techniques and justifications are employed at various scales, global, international, national, municipal, local and lived to maintain structure? How does the state conceptualize itself in the face
of a migrant majority workforce? And, furthermore, how does this impact the experiences and treatment of workers from various sectors? In addition, I ask how notions of modernity and tradition, East and West, and First and Third world impact national mythologies as well as national identities.

Considering the level of the ‘local’ is primarily based on documenting and analyzing the narratives and experience of people working and living in the UAE. The analytic focus begins on those workers located in highly precarious and temporary sectors, but also involves examining relationships of power between different subject positions. Amidst the local we can consider the ‘everyday’ outlooks, practices and ideas that impact, and are impacted by, the ‘global’ that shapes and is shaped by Dubai as a city. It is important because it challenges the idea of ‘exception’ in that, instead of viewing, for example, an instance of violence such as a suicide or murder as something individual, shocking, or irregular, we would instead start to see a much more complex view of these situations which extend violence not at the instance of physical violence, but as a structural, systemic form of institutionalized behaviour and actions, which shapes and curtails possibilities for groups of people as they navigate their daily lives. This is difficult, primarily because we often view these situations through legal frameworks which individualize and target particular actions but are incapable of redressing collective or social forms of violence and exclusion, which themselves are forms of ‘everyday violence’.

Violence here is understood in multiple dimensions including, physical, psychological, social, economic, political, psychic, structural and spatial. It is useful to consider the discussions of Fanon (1968) in relation to violence in the colonial context to fully grasp the genealogies of contemporary violence(s). As Fanon discusses, these types of violences have their roots in economic and racial projects but extend into the daily regimes of policing and the creation of abject bodies.

The Manichaenian structure and the compartmentalization of society are seen in multiple manifestations of violence imposed upon the colonized. For Fanon, these spheres of violence intersect with each other, but are also internalized and experienced by the colonized against each other. He argues that without a permanent break, the process
of decolonization only works to reinforce unequal relationships. Fanon highlights both the material realm of violent domination and the psycho-affective realm that has consequences for mobilization in the aftermath of national independence. The retributive violence that Fanon insists on is a necessary means of resistance that can only be understood in relation to the violence perpetrated by the colonizer and its regime.

In regards to psychological violence, Fanon discusses the dehumanization of the ‘native’, through which the settler gains his humanity and meaning is given to his existence. This relationship is perpetuated both materially (through the exploitation of raw materials and property) and discursively (knowledge about the self, in relation to the Other). In terms of structural violence Fanon points to the ways in which state sponsored violence is legitimized, as opposed to violence as a form of resistance (Fanon, 1963). Further Fanon notes the contradictory appeals made by the settler to the native to use principles of reason and progress in negotiating processes of decolonization but asks how such notions enable the colonized to divest from a deeply entrenched and inherently violent colonial structure? Another structural feature is linked to the economic superstructure which is underpinned by distinct racial categorizations that will perpetually define the colonized as underdeveloped. In terms of geographical or spatial violence Fanon discusses the differences in living conditions between the native sector and the colonist sector, in which the native sector is,

...a disreputable place inhabited by disreputable people. You are born anywhere, anyhow. You die anywhere, from anything. It’s a world with no space, people are piled one on top of the other, the shacks squeezed tightly together. (Fanon, 1963, 4)

In contrast, the settler’s world is one of reciprocal exclusivity, “is built to last, all stone and steel. It’s a sector of lights and paved roads, where the trash cans constantly overflow with strange and wonderful garbage, undreamed-of leftovers” (Fanon, 1963, 4). This notion of reciprocal exclusivity is linked to the incapacity of the native ever to experience the livelihood of the settler, and vice versa, and has further psychological effects on the native.

The look that the native turns on the settler’s town is a look of lust, a look of envy; it expresses his dreams of possession – all manner of possession: to sit at the settler’s table, to sleep in the settler’s bed, with his wife if possible. The colonized man is an envious man. (Fanon, 2004, 39)
Finally, in considering yet another form of violence, Fanon considers the temporal in which the native is constituted through the violence of archaic primitive barbarity. The colonizer, being representative of advancement, is the edifying force that keeps time moving towards modernity. The colonized escapes violence by entering different temporal realms, in which dreaming is one way to escape temporarily. As he states,

…the dreams of the colonial subject are muscular dreams, dreams of actions, dreams of aggressive vitality. I dream I am jumping, swimming, running, and climbing…during colonization the colonized subject frees himself night after night between nine in the evening and six in the morning. (Fanon, 2004, 15)

However, as Fanon argues these escapes are fatalistic and work to justify the colonial condition. Of course Fanon’s discussion of violence in the colonial period is marked by extreme physical force and a kind of banality that is specific to the context. However, in considering the genealogies of violence that undergird contemporary processes, we can consider such insidious ways as those encapsulated in the ‘everyday’. This means that examining the ways in which daily violence is sanctioned, first by the state and then by the larger social body and normalized into commonsensical everyday practice, is important. Thus, the violence of expulsion from the ‘proper’ social body relegates particular bodies to the peripheries of the social, geographical and ideological landscapes in the city through the generation of hierarchies that shape notions of precariousness and privilege. In part, as the ‘everyday’ illuminates, the power of ideology is found in people’s abilities to reproduce it through their everyday practices and actions. This is part of the significance of my fieldwork in its careful attention to individual narrations of larger processes and the ability of individuals to locate themselves in a larger matrix of social, economic, political, cultural and environmental relationships.

The genealogical method therefore allows us to unmap the relations of production over time, which structure the relationships between the countries, states, and (non)-citizen subjects through the power of ideological and cultural narratives that work to normalize and create consensus through everyday production and practices. Significantly then, the seeming mundane nature of the ‘everyday’ is where an important tension exists and which is a counterpoint to the ‘global’, a place to anchor the reality of globality in the
everyday lives of the subjects and spaces that live the reality both shaped by and shaping the ‘global city’ of Dubai.

Taken together, these methodological and theoretical considerations help to navigate the complex and diverse narratives, histories and processes that shape the socio-spatial landscapes of Dubai’s globality. Furthermore, in considering how the dreams of some are sustained through dehumanization and the legitimization of violence towards Others, we will examine the realities of precariously and ‘temporariness’ for all migrants, as well as processes of dehumanization and systemic violence that shape the lives of the majority population of low waged migrants, and the relative degrees of privilege and exaltation of national Emirati citizens and expat professionals.
Chapter Two: Imagining the Dream

Dubai in the Global Imaginary

Geographically located in the Arabian Peninsula, the United Arab Emirates is a country bordering Oman to the Southeast, Saudi Arabia to the Southwest and shares sea borders with Qatar and Iran. Dubai is one of seven Emirates, including the capital Abu Dhabi, as well as Sharjah, Ajman, Ras al-Khaimah, Fujairah and Umm al-Quwain. The spatial location of Dubai in a broader global landscape is an important area to narrow in on, as it is implicated in many transnational networks and flows. Dubai’s global location necessarily impacts all levels of its political, economic and social development, and has significant impacts on the formation of national-citizen and migrant subjectivities.

This chapter is conceptualized through the first stage of the sleep cycle (NREM) reflecting the body’s initial processes of entering into a sleep state. Similarly, this chapter aims to set a foundation for the experience of dreaming by exploring the ways in which historical processes have shaped notions of the ‘global’ inside and outside of the ‘city’ itself. The significance of these conscious experiences of imagining ‘dream’ worlds is supported by more recent scholarship on sleep, in which scholars have argued that dreaming is linked to psychological and emotional states which impact the ways that dreaming occurs and influencing their content. Rather than repressed feelings that are generated from disturbing and harmful desires and impulses (Freud 1913/1900), dreams have been linked, in contemporary research, to various mental and physiological functions (Hoss, 2003). As Hoss (2010) argues in his review of numerous scholars in the field, the “dream is not meaningless random neural firings” (2003, 8). Instead, dreams are significant for memory processing (Zhang 2005, Hartmann 2011), emotional processing (Stewart and Koulack 1993, Griffin 1997, Stickgold 2009) and problem solving (Ullman 1959, Stickhold 2009, Foulkes 1982, Hartmann 1995, Barrett 1996). Dreams can therefore be seen as a reflection of, or having implications for our waking lives, and thus, we can relate these conceptualizations to the broader project of Dubai’s global city making trajectory as imagined by migrants and as represented in popular media around the globe.
These conceptualizations help us maintain a methodology that challenges a linear historical method, conceptualizations of the global dreams of Dubai are part of the various overlapping, intersecting, interacting, and multiply constitutive discourses and practices that shape the city. As it will be shown, the Dubai dream as imagined by various subjects and mediums, inside and outside of the city, is understood in relation to the making of a ‘global city’. From these general insights, the foundations for examining global city making are set in order to understand how ideas of ‘globality’ link dreams to, of and in, the city. Thus, the ideological elements combine with the material to shape the development of the city at many levels, implicating diverse set of ‘dreams’ and imaginary elements. We begin to see how Dubai’s globally induced, aspirational developmental trajectory is shaped by, and shapes, various diverse dreams, and we thereby set the foundation for how the notion of the ‘dreamscape’ is developed as a set of interactive narratives, imaginative stories and dreams, and experiential insights that are located in or connected to the broader political economy and its historical trajectories of development.

Dubai dreams are examined in relation to the making of the ‘global city’ in both the global imaginary (seen particularly through migrant dreams as well as popular media and tourism) as well as embedded within the developmental trajectory and ambitions of the city. Through a review of popular tourist materials, insights from interviewees and a review of key concepts and scholars on ‘global cities’, we set a foundation to examine how these ideas are embedded in the ‘making’ and ‘maintaining’ of the city and are integral to shaping the global geography of the city. Section I begins by exploring Dubai Dreams as they are tied to experiential dimensions of life in the ‘city’, as well as insightful discussions about the ‘personality’ of the ‘city’ by interviewees and selected tourism publications that attempt to market the city to tourists internationally. Section II builds from here to examine global city literatures, by reviewing key scholars of the field, focused on the growth and emergence of global cities in a broader historical landscapes. Here selective highlights from key scholarly contributions, which can be related to the case of Dubai, are considered. Section III explores critiques of mainstream global city literature and presents complex and nuanced epistemological considerations that will help to develop a more critical, postcolonial, racial analytic through which we can examine in
the subsequent chapter the making of the city in more concrete and material terms. This chapter lays the foundation for developing a theoretical framework that will allow us to evaluate global city status in Dubai by those living and working there through a critical engagement with scholarly work that complicates dominant approaches to global cities, which often mask and often oversimplify or ignore important historical and contemporary features of non-western cities.

Through these diverse data sets, we see how the construction of the Dubai dream through its global location, as caught ‘in-between’ ‘first’ and ‘third’ worlds operates as a central tool in shaping what things are possible in the policy and hierarchical ordering of populations and also how ideas of ‘East’ and ‘West’ help us think about the globalizing of race in the contemporary context.

**Section One: Popular representations of the global.**

Dubai has been described as a ‘global village’, as a ‘meeting place for the world’, and as the ideal model for a cosmopolitan metropolis. The global location of Dubai can be understood in a multiplicity of ways, which all work to show how the global operates or is expressed through the national, and often societal level. Using a global critical race analytic allows us to understand the growth of global cities in the non-western context through an examination of the temporal and spatial relations of its ‘globality’, ‘globalizing’, ‘globalness’, or ‘worlding’. The global, temporal and developmental aspirations whether globalized or globalizing, all shape imaginaries of global cities. To understand the complexities of what constitutes a ‘global city’ it is necessary to delve into the multiple imaginaries, which together constitute the ‘Dreamscapes’ of Dubai. With this in mind, the data that comes together to form this chapter comes from several sources, including popular culture through mediums such as newspapers, magazines, government tourisms websites, and popular tourist materials such as travel guides (McAuley, 2008; Time Out Guides Ltd, 2007; Walsh, 2008; Woods, 2009) and fictional novels (Bennett, 2010; Tatchell, 2009). In addition, the insights from interviewees on popular representations of Dubai as a global city are weaved together to tell the mainstream story of the phase of imagining the ‘global’ dream that is Dubai.
Global city status is often reproduced through popular media, tourism, state policy and discourse, recruiters, and migrants themselves. Some of the considerations include criteria such as the city’s relationship to global capitalism, migration patterns, developmental projects with global aspiration such as the landscapes, global icons and infrastructure, and are also shaped by the social relations. Often times the city is evaluated in terms of its ‘stage of development’ in the schema of modern global cities as articulated by scholars. While the global city aspirations or status of Dubai is tied to its global location, this does not mean that Dubai operates fully at the supranational, but rather that the global location of the emirate is impacted by, and impacts, the location of it in the global. However, it must be noted that the multiple imaginaries of Dubai’s globality can be different depending on the audience and who is speaking. However, there are still dominant images that are promoted and circulated about Dubai as a global city to the world that can be seen through the identification of a few major themes.

One major example is related to the global location of Dubai as imagined in popular culture and through different experiences of subjects. This location will be explored in relation to a historical process of world system making in regards to the ‘First’ and ‘Third’ worlds, which will be seen for example, through an examination of tourist materials, which make constant reference of Dubai as a global city between ‘East’ and ‘West. Additionally, these representations are often characterized through the implicit racist and colonial notions of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ as applied to particular orientalized ideas of Arabs, and Muslims more generally. As Said explains in Orientalism (1979), Western knowledge about the Eastern world often depicted the ‘orient’ as backwards, irrational, weak, in relation to itself, the occident, the rational, strong and modern. In addition, as Said explains, much of this need to create difference between ‘East’ and ‘West’ allowed the West to know itself, and was tied to traits thought to be inherent to Oriental peoples. He explains, Orientalism is,

… a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts; it is an elaboration not only of a basic geographical distinction (the world is made up of two unequal halves, Orient and Occident), but also of a whole series of ‘interests’ which, by such means, as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but also maintains; it is, rather than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to
control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) world. (Said, 1979, 12)

Thus, Said emphasizes that geography is expressed through spatial conceptualizations tied to power that create ideas of development and progress. As he states, “The boundary notion of East and West, the varying degrees of projected inferiority and strength, the range of work done, the kinds of characteristic features ascribed to the Orient: all these testify to a willed imaginative and geographic division made between East and West, and lived through during many centuries” (Said, 1979, 201). Thus these ideological forces are significant as they have important consequences for how the context is presented by the West, and how violence and exploitation are conceptualized and then refuted, rationalized or excused both inside and outside of the city. It impacts who can do what and why, as Said explains, in the popular mind, Arabs are thought of as,

… camel-riding, terroristic, hook-nosed, venal lechers whose undeserved wealth is an affront to real civilization. Always there lurks the assumption that although the Western consumer belongs to a numerical minority, he is entitled either to own or to expend (or both) the majority of the world’s resources. Why? Because he, unlike the Oriental, is a true human being. (Said, 1979, 108)

Similar to these conceptualizations of the Arab figure are examples of how Dubai and the Arab Gulf generally is represented as ‘in-between’ worlds. As Smith (2010) highlights, “…the Arab Gulf is not home to ‘colourful Others’ who make ‘authentic’ tourist handicrafts/textiles or aromatic cuisine or offbeat animation” (269). Instead, Gulf Arabs are known as a leisurely privileged class clad in traditional white dishdashas. Thus, they do not fit comfortably into categories: they are ‘non-western’ to be sure (in fact, their status as Muslim and all the discursive baggage it carries may over-determine all else that is known about them), but they are not notably poor. They live in one of the sparsest environments on Earth, yet consume resources, at per capita levels that exceed those of the UAE. Even other Arabs- especially in cities like Cairo and Beirut, with their long histories of cosmopolitanism and elite cultural production- resent the newfound wealth of people they would have considered backwards only forty years ago. (Smith, 2010, 269)

Thus, “Gulf Arabs are both simultaneously foreign and Other, but materially comfortable in ways all too familiar” (Smith, 2010, 270). This unique position between ‘East’ and ‘West’ has interesting implications in how globality is understood and
represented. These ideas will be furthered through examinations of how Dubai’s global position through these representations is linked to attempts to reclaim footing through localization and nationalization which impact significant aspects of social and cultural life, shaping the hierarchical ordering of the population and subsequent processes of exaltation and dehumanization. Together we can see how these examples highlight the role of considering the spatial, temporal and material processes which together shape the parameters for imagining the globally induced urban life that constitutes the cityscape of Dubai.

**General descriptions on Dubai and globality.** As noted above, insights from interviews provide a significant bulk of the data under examination in this dissertation. In particular, residents of the city have important insights into the ‘globality’ of the city. Interviewees were asked to reflect on the ‘personality of the city’ and whether or not, or how, Dubai can be considered a global city based on open ended questions and self-directed criteria. In addition, interviewees reflected on what gives a city ‘global’ status? And whether or not Dubai fits these considerations. In addition, to examine whether or not ‘global city’ describes Dubai best, the ideas of who the city is built for, and various aspects of development, infrastructure, environmental issues and working life are also examined. In thinking this through further, informants who migrated to Dubai were asked to reflect on ‘how they imagined Dubai before they came’ and how these ideas were either challenged or reinforced upon residency, while citizens were asked to reflect on how they believe Dubai is represented internationally and how these ideas of globality shape the changes taking place in the city over time.

In addition, tourist publications on the city that are targeted towards Western visitors have interesting representations, which can interestingly be considered alongside outward strategies of self-promotion and branding of Dubai from the state, as a ‘global city’. Together, these three major data sets are then examined and upheld or contested by various people living and working there. Taken together, we can see how the imagined ideological aspects of the city measure up the lived experiences or practical daily realities of various groups. From here we turn to examine literatures on ‘global cities’ as a way to
examine the criteria on which this status is gained, as well how scholars may help shed light or miss particular aspects of Dubai’s global city status.

Firstly, the official story on the Government of Dubai’s website tells us that it is, An emirate of more than 200 nationalities and cultures, living and learning from each other and creating natural vibrancy and globalization, Dubai is also strategically located between the great continents of Europe, Asia and Africa and attracts approximately 5 million investors and tourists on an annual basis. (“Dubai Free Zones Council”, 2016)

As an historical trading village, the city as a hub immersed in trade routes becomes seen as naturally progressing with the force of economic globalization, between worlds, its ontology is embedded in a developmentalist trajectory tied to the capitalist growth of the West. Although being written to place itself in the center of the world, it leaves unexamined the historical forces that made possible the growth of global capitalism in the current period and its role in relation to American hegemony, or its role and relationship to European colonialism. The global city of Dubai, generally assumes a model of cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism that is devoid of this historical context, and presents us with the glamour and hegemonic ideas of 21st century neoliberal economic globalization.


To date, our achievements have helped us catch up with the rest of the world in its drive to globalize. This process began slowly during the last two decades of the twentieth century, before accelerating exponentially in the new millennium, and can now be seen as a prelude to what is set to become the most important economic race that the world has ever witnessed. The prize is one of epic proportions and failure is not an option. (Al Maktoum, 2012, 12)

Developmentalism understood as the linear movement, growth and development of countries from ‘traditional to modern’ shapes much of Dubai’s economic ambition. This shift from underdeveloped to developed, marks an important element of representations on Dubai, which are made with reference to the unparalleled scale and pace of its infrastructural and economic development. Thus as Hvidt (2009) states, “Fifty years ago, Dubai was an insignificant, poverty-ridden settlement of 30,000. To- day it is a city–state of 1.4 million people expanding its global outreach and undertaking a range of
high-profile investments and acquisitions” (Hvidt, 2009, 397). This idea of the rapid, development and growth of the city from ‘nothing’ to something ‘amazing’ is popular in many academic and media sources. Furthermore, as Hvidt highlights of Sampler and Eigner’s (2003) analysis of Dubai’s developmental success, conscious state policies by a ‘late-late’ (states who joined development process after WWII) state was done in order to “catch up with the developed world” (Hvidt, 397). Thus the move from tradition to modernity, developing to developed is a significant aspect of many discussions of Dubai’s change over time. The histories which make possible this linear trajectory of development are not often seen as important aspects in how the story is told, although when we look at the legacies embedded within the emergence of Dubai as a global city, we begin to see layers and historical genealogies that have shaped the possibilities of Dubai’s drive and dreams.

To the business world, Dubai describes itself as the ideal neoliberal location, with many reasons to invest, some of which include being,

One of the safest cities in the world with a very low crime-rate, Dubai has a fair judicial system, a liberal economy, no income tax or corporate tax, no trade barriers, quotas or foreign exchange controls, 100% repatriation of capital and profits and strong investor incentives from the government of Dubai. (“Dubai Freezones,” 2016.)

Represented as the perfect neoliberal model for contemporary global capitalism and the place of opportunity.

With rampant development comes great opportunity- a fast that’s not lost on the tens of thousands of new residents who arrive in the city every month to seek their slice of the Dubai money pie. From South Asian construction workers to teachers from New Zealand and financial high-flyers from Europe and the US, the city is the new frontier for fortune hunters. (McAuley, 2008, 9)

Dubai is imagined as the epitome of contemporary neoliberal economic dream, embedded in its foundation,

The place was born of a western belief system, a belief system that took hold in the seventies and was championed by Reagan, Thatcher, and Wall Street. It was the belief in the free market, or if not free, as unfettered as it could be. It got its moral imprimatur from the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union. Since the Communists had so clearly got it wrong, the free marketers must have got it right. Dubai was and is a crystallization of that belief. It is the freest of free
markets. No taxes, no welfare, few scruples and the chance to create simple colossal wealth. So in they flocked, the banks and corporations, to a new world hub, and the hub blossomed. But the same qualities that made Dubai blossom, have also made it shady. The same qualities that have attracted the giant corporations have attracted the racketeers. The parasites and exploiters, the traders in misery, the organized crime syndicates fell in love with Dubai for all the same reasons and saw all the same possibilities. (Bennett, 2010, 239)

In his personally narrated semi-fictional/farcical journey of Dubai, author Joe Bennett (2010) describes the neoliberal dream championed by Dubai’s leadership and promoted to global corporate elites as the place of unfettered capitalism. Combining this notion of business with that of lifestyle, many representations of Dubai note its opulence and luxury for global elite consumption. As discussed by interviewees many imagined Dubai as a playground for the global elite, which is seen in the self promotion and investment in marketing of luxury to any and all who want to indulge, consider a surreal, almost alien vision of opulence (Bennett, 2010). This grandeur can never be overstated but its representation as ‘alien’ signals an exceptional case in which capitalism’s excess have been left to take on an other worldly dimension, one unmatched by any other place on earth. This alien quality can be extended as part of a broader process of exceptionalism that attempts to imagine Dubai as uniquely excessive, rather than as a space in an international linkage between global cities.

Many popular representations, particularly British, targeted to global elites, promote the ‘bespoke’ lifestyle, and representations such as the following are all too common, “Greater luxury simply can not be had… It enshrines a notion, of impossibly rich people…” (Bennett, 2010, 114). A critical point for many Emirati’s who were interviewed was that the popular representations of Dubai disregard the many complex layers of Emirati culture that extend beyond the glitz and glamour of Dubai’s ultra elite.

However, these representations of Dubai are endlessly described by informants, whether it be the incredible wealth and infrastructure of the city, epitomized by the ‘license plates’ and power and wealth signified by single digit plates, climaxed in the 2008 story of the 25 year old, Emirati from Abu Dhabi who paid 52.2 million dirhams (more than 14 million USD), for the number 1 license plate (Abdul Kader, 2008). In these stories, the ideal subject of Dubai is clearly the cosmopolitan, neoliberal elite subject and not the majority of poor, Third World migrant workers who build and maintain the city.
Dubai is often told in relation to the world largest theme park, biggest mall, tallest building, largest international airport and the biggest artificial island. As Davis highlights, Dubai confidently predicts that its enchanted forest of 600 skyscrapers and malls will attract 15 million overseas visitors a year by 2010, three times as many as New York City” (Davis, 2006, 49). The biggest, tallest, largest, busiest, first and only, all help to situate one of its iconic landmarks as part of what Davis calls the ‘Imagineered Urbanism’ of Sheik Mo (Davis, 2006, 50). As one developer discussed in the Financial Times, “If there was no Burj Dubai, no Palm, no World would anyone be speaking of Dubai today?” You shouldn’t look at projects as crazy stand-alones. It’s part of building the brand” (Davis, 2006, 53).

In a city fond of sound bites and self-promotion (the seven-star hotel, the manmade islands, the world’s tallest tower), Dubai’s most startling feature, its infancy, it often overlooked. Compared to most major cities, Dubai is in its formative years; but it’s growing up fast. (Time Out Guides Ltd, 2007, 6)

Another area of consideration is tied to comparisons of Dubai to other global cities. This is a theme that resonated heavily with the interviewees who often used comparisons to Western cities, or cities in the Global South to understand Dubai. In thinking of the defining features of globality outside of the specificities of state-city boundaries, other participants discuss the recognition of Dubai globally in a comparative style. Whereby for example, the marketability of Dubai points to its recognition as a global city, amongst others. Egyptian-Canadian resident Mohamed states “People always say, Dubai, New York, and then Paris, and then London. You know, whether or not it has similar qualities [is debatable], but the fact that it does raise that comparison is enough to put it on the list”.

Recognition from outside Dubai also tends to increase the feeling of its global city status, whereby for example, Egyptian-America Carlos, who grew up in AD, UAE, explains,

In the States, the first year I moved there, people thought you would get transported on camels, people actually asked me so you ride camels and they didn’t think we were that civilized in Abu Dhabi, but then I tell them I’m from Dubai, and they are like wow! How is it there? Like in the same conversation, they wouldn’t know Abu Dhabi, which is the capital, but then Dubai comes up…everybody knows. (Carlos, American)
Another key theme is related to the pace, economic growth and opportunity, which are used to evaluate the development of Dubai on this linear trajectory. This linear developmental model is used to both admire its remarkably fast paced infrastructure and economic development, but also to orientalize it.

…Time is passing, the clock is ticking, the world is racing, and no one will wait for us. We cannot ask our competitors to wait; we must rather develop and enhance our performance and ourselves. We can not stop now…It reminds us that if we were gazelles and stopping running, lions would devour us; and if we were lions and stopped running, we would starve to death…do we have any other alternative? (Al Maktoum, 2012, 68)

The capitalist race is embedded in the infrastructure of the place, this urgency and fear of being left behind can be seen in the race against time to build the city. But time takes on other meanings as well, whereby the history of the place is used as a marker of its achievement, but also its banality and infantilized inability to embrace markers of civility that the West so perfectly espouses.

A little vulgar? Maybe- it’s been slated as ‘Vegas-meets-Disney-in-the-desert’ by its critics. Yet it is impossible not to admire the vision behind the crafting of the emirates. In economic and evolutionary terms, Dubai’s transformation has been nothing short of dramatic- a rapid trajectory of change unrivalled by any other city on the planet. (Woods, 2009, 6)

These representations paint Dubai as a caricature-type city based on Western models, which in its infancy is excused for its brashness, while simultaneously valuing its rapid growth. This creates the vulgarity of Dubai through reference of “Vegas meets Disney in the Disney”, the city as a place of splendor and excessive capitalism and also a caricature or a young city attempting to mimic the West, in the orientalized context of the ‘East’. This is captured in statements such as “…welcome to Dubai. It may be young, brash and at times vulgar, but that’s half the fun. Prepare to be amazed” (Time Out Guides Ltd, 2007, 7), or “With its gleaming skyscrapers, love of modernity and apparent lack of anything over ten years old, you’d be forgiven for thinking that Dubai is a mere child of a city, albeit one undergoing an incredible growth spurt” (Time Out Guides Ltd, 2007, 12). What is clear is that Western representations of Dubai invoke ideas of modernity with a teleology and developmental schema that makes a mockery of its global city attempts, and also creates rationales for its misgivings such as a lack liberal
democracy and ongoing human rights abuse by excusing its dark side by attributing it to infancy, in which children do not yet have all the tools to understand what they are doing, that they haven’t get caught up, that they are not themselves capable of getting there and thus need ‘us’, or that they are in fact incapable of reaching the same level of Western modernity because of their inherent Eastern qualities.

Many representations of the city make reference to it being a ‘fake’ city, lacking substance, culture and history. As Canadian teacher Sean states, “I just feel like it is just so different from a normal city”. Expanded by British producer Hattie, “I think that there are no real spaces, like gathering spots. It is all a bit too refined”. Many expats critiqued the ‘lifestyle’ of Dubai as being about a ‘bubble’, out of touch with reality. In considering how subjects discussed Dubai as a global city. Canadian resident Mario discusses Dubai as a global city “by all means” and discusses criticisms of the city’s youth as deterring its ability to be compared to cities like London and New York. His comments highlight the consideration that culture is also tied into globality, in which many argue that Dubai is in fact a bubble or fake city. “It is not really a fake city, it is just a new city. Like you can’t come here expecting to walk through the city and see cathedrals or mosques that have been there for centuries, it is just not how the city was built, 40 years ago”. When asked what gives it this status he states,

It has one of the busiest airports in the world, it has anything you need really, a lot of companies move their headquarters here whether they are American, British or French, they all have their headquarters here, all operations run here. Again, the difference is that there is no history to it. I think that is the main difference, other than that, it is a global [in its operations]. (Mario, Canadian)

The idea of a global hub was exemplified in its bid for the 2020 World Expo, which it won in November 2013 with the theme of,

Connecting Minds, Creating the Future”, in which it was described by Dubai’s ruler, Sheikh Mohamed in the following terms: “In today’s highly interconnected world, a renewed vision of progress and development based on shared purpose and commitment is key. While a single human mind, an individual country, or a specific community is both unique and remarkable, it is by working collaboratively that we truly advance. (“Our Bid”, 2012).

Beginning with the location of Dubai globally in relation to business, British expat Hattie explains that “Dubai acts as a kind of central hub for the region. So culture is
exhibited and traded here from other parts of the world” (Hattie, British). Using the language of trade to describe cultural encounters with a diverse range of nationalities, estimated to be made up by over 200 nationalities from around the globe provides one important starting point for thinking of diversity and multiculturalism as a marker of globality. Building on this, Canadian expat Sean describes the relationship between migration and finance through a comparison between older global cities explaining that what defined New York and London as global, is the immigration and settlement of people from around the globe, while what defines Hong Kong is its role as an internal financial center. Supporting the focus on nationality and diversity, Egyptian-Canadian Mohamed states “the thing that makes a city global is a nice diverse population. Different cultures coming together and recognition and it has both”. Building here through a more specific example, Egyptian resident Zain gives the example of a university setting, particular American University of Dubai (AUD), where he explains “you had 10% locals, around 30% Arabs which included Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, around 20% of Americans, Canadians and a little bit of British, and then Iranians as the biggest majority in the university” (Zain, Egyptian). He explains further, “the way that I see it is that you get to see people from all over the world in one little, very tiny location, so I mentioned this before, you get to know a lot about different backgrounds, different religions, you get to learn how to communicate” (Zain, Egyptian).

In building on the role of diverse nationalities in the city space, Emirati national Reda explains that while the city has adapted to providing “something to cater to all nationalities”, this may not be a complete global city. Insinuating that ‘globality’ may mean a move from specificity in particular cultures, to a more cosmopolitan notion of globality beyond the confines of particularity. Supporting this idea, American expat Carlos states that while you may interact with a diverse group of people, befriending some and learning to communicate effectively, in the end “every community sticks together” (Carlos, American).

Examining population tourist data, primarily from the West allows us insight into the dominant images of Dubai that are perpetuated by the state. This can be contrasted with the images and ideas promoted to labour sending countries. How this popular media, and state branding operates to project a world image of Dubai is significant as we
contrast it with what interviewees have said, and how lived realities and the underside of Dubai pose threats, challenges and are often integral to the creation and maintenance of this global image.

The incredible influx of expats from all over the world has created not so much a melting pot as a salad bowl. This is still a city divided by class and creed, and a person’s experiences of Dubai today will depend very much on where they come from and what they do. (Time Out Guides Ltd, 2007, 22)

But the multicultural façade of community, collaboration and progress is quickly challenged by critiques of hierarchical orderings of the population. Although many publications from the West have orientalist representations of how and why this is unique to Dubai, for example, “In any case, visitors should be aware that, based on where they are from and what they look like, there will be some expectations of what kind of person they are, what kind of work they will do, and, consequently, some measures of their status in society” (Walsh, 2008, 46). That this is somehow unique to Dubai. Emirati citizen Natasha states,

It has all these things that you might not find elsewhere and lots to do… but in reality when you dig deeper it is not very global, in terms of, it is growing fast in terms of infrastructure, but because it has been way too fast, it has not really had the opportunity to catch up in terms of… social and civil liberties, or the social environment and so, I think in those terms it is not a global city because there is lots of things that I frankly see as underdeveloped. (Natasha, Emirati).

However, as much as multiculturalism defines its global allure, ideas about Emirati culture are often thought of in a static and singular way, and is often considered as an area of contention in the city, where some residents feel that while financially speaking, Dubai has become internationally recognized, its fast paced economic development has limited the development of a ‘rich’ historical culture, and as some describe, despite its fast growing physical infrastructure and economy it may still be underdeveloped in other areas. Building on this, Natasha is also cognizant of the fact that this may or may not be seen as criteria for evaluating its global city status, when she states “If we were talking about freedom of speech and things like this, these are issues of whether or not it is what a global city is” (Natasha, Emirati)
At first glance, Dubai seems like a city that’s easy to pigeonhole. From the outside the world’s fastest growing metropolis, famous for its shopping malls, year round sunshine and ambitious construction projects, appear as though it is losing a very public battle of style versus substance. Dig a little deeper, however, and you’ll discover that Dubai is a complex mix of ancient traditions and 21st century multiculturalism and innovation. (McAuley, 2008, 7)

Subjects commenting on whether or in what ways Dubai can be understood as a global city highlight a plethora of diverse elements of the city’s globality, such as its geographical location and travel networks, its developmental agenda, infrastructure, and political system and civil liberties, and culture. For almost all of my interviewees, the idea of globality was tied to multiculturalism, and the supposed idea of ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ cultural and developmental aspects. For example, the idea of ‘Eastern’ tradition and culture was highlighted, while this was consistently referenced to the idea its ‘Western’- style developments and infrastructure. Thus, Dubai acts as a space that is simultaneously, a meeting place for both ‘East’ and ‘West’, as well as a space ‘inbetween’ these two imagined spaces. These ideas have significant implications for the ways that the city is imagined as a global, and understood in the global landscapes with important consequences on the lived realities and spatial organization. In addition, the terms carry with them important historical genealogies that shape how the space is imagined and lived.

In considering the conceptualization of Dubai as linked to East and West, we can see how Dubai is presented as a hub, link, meeting place, as a node between several continents, including Asia, Europe and Africa. As a ‘center’ point in these connections, many describe Dubai as straddling both ‘eastern’ and ‘western’ spheres of culture and influence. As Egyptian resident Svetlana states, “The Emirates is somewhere in the middle between the West and the East. It has a good balance of you still being an Arab or an Eastern and still having some qualities of a Western country” (Svetlana, Egyptian). As a young person who grew up in the UAE, but has no formal entitlements to citizenship or permanent residence, she describes the multiple identities which characterize the many long term residents of the UAE whose families migrating from the ‘third world’ to Dubai, before either migrating again to the West, or sending their children for education abroad.
She states here “so you either move to Canada or the States, or anywhere in the West and you have the extreme Western country where you feel different, or back to Egypt or any Eastern country and you still feel like you are different. That is the problem with here as well. You have this double life” (Svetlana, Egyptian).

In the 1970s, what is now a sprawling orgy of malls and hotels was little more than sandy outpost, and even by the mid-1990s Dubai boasted few landmarks and even fewer tourists. But with the confidence that comes with youth, Dubai has burned itself on to the world’s consciousness. Through a mixture of ambition, audacity and a swathe of mega-projects, the city has transformed itself into one of the most dynamic centres on the planet: a cultural and economic hub linking East and West (Time Out Guides Ltd, 2007, 6).

The linkages between East and West are tied to ideas of economics and migration. Whether made explicit or not, the idea that Western economic development in an Eastern, or non-white place, is made global through the networks of economic and migratory flows that characterize it. Thus, since migration is an integral component to the contemporary development of Dubai, a foundational aspect of its growth and development, the importance of recognizing the histories through which these movements and subsequent ideas are made is significant in shaping not only discourses about Dubai’s globality, but also has important consequences for the lived realities of residents in the city. Important examples of the ways that these ideas have spatial consequences will be explored further on, here I will highlight the role of discourse in constructing the imagined global position of Dubai, and the following chapter will delve into the more material processes and conditions which are shaped by these ideas, and have important consequences for the hierarchical ordering of the population.

Traveling or living in the UAE can be a challenge. It is likely to involve moving beyond your cultural comfort zone but, having made the effort to bridge the divide, you will find people whose embrace of modernity is exhilarating and whose effort to combine the ancient and the modern is fascinating example of globalization. (Walsh, 2008, 9)

Dubai manages what many other Arab cities fail to achieve: a healthy balance between Western influence and Eastern tradition… (Woods, 2009, 197).

Not only is Dubai seen as a space that brings together East and West, but importantly, it may also be seen as a space being caught ‘in-between’ different worlds.
The global is imagined and constituted with reference to the binary of East and West with important implications. Dubai is seen in many instances as having Western qualities, which are generally tied to the high standard of living enjoyed by citizens and expat professionals, as well as the infrastructure and capitalist economic development practices, but then relegated to Other through the invoking of the East in reference to non-democratic political practices, migration and labour policies, religion and gender, and thus is tainted by its ‘Eastern-ness’, when necessary, ‘almost there but not quite’. As scholar, Springborg (2008) discusses in terms of concerns posed by Gulf citizens that their culture (understood as that which is being supported by the state as a static and singular version) was being eroded or dismissed, he highlights coexistence of mutually exclusive stereotypes of Gulf culture,

One view if that the Gulf is a backward region in which inadequate education, easy wealth, male dominance and persistence of tribalism have militated against cultural dynamism, so traditional cultural norms and practices persist. A contrasting view is that the region is super modern, with the rapid pace of globalization having thoroughly undermined traditional culture, replacing it with a cosmopolitan, international one in which women are leading the way. (Springborg, 2008, 10)

Together these representations of Eastern and Western influences complicate the idea of culture and identity in the Gulf. After further analysis from diverse sources, the questions to consider here are then are related to how and whether Dubai is seen as inherently incapable of attaining global city status, if incapable of shedding itself of its Eastern qualities. The struggle articulated here as about the struggle between a,

...balance of tradition and modernity., and the UAE today is a country of contrasts, embracing luxurious hotels and shopping centers while it black abayas and shayla clad women are mostly kept securely out of sight. (Walsh, 2008, 8)

Dubai can be understood through these representations then, as bringing the ‘First’ and ‘Third’ worlds into conflict, which is attributed to its non-western-ness, but also to particular modes of orientalist understandings of being Arab, Islamic or generally non-white. What is it about the place that is incapable of fully becoming modern? How does this inherent desire for modernity (whiteness) impact and shape policies and
processes in the city’s development and operation? But the in-between is also about retaining ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’, as significant state projects aim to ‘preserve’ an idea of authentic culture that is unique to the country and its Arab inhabitants. The drive to ‘protect’ national culture has been framed primarily by the growing influences of oil wealth, rapid ‘modernization’ and diverse global cultural flows (Khalaf, 2005). There are many examples highlighted by scholars (Davidson, 2008; Lawson & al-Naboodah, 2008; Rahman, 2008) in which external influences related to the nature of the UAE’s diverse migrant population are seen as threatening local culture. In this view, culture is not conceptualized in its plurality and heterogeneity, but is trying to be fixed as a static set of traditions and beliefs, supported by the state. The response by the UAE’s ruling families to ‘protect’ their version of the dominant ‘culture’ was to sponsor numerous clubs and agencies to promote local cultural preservation and dissemination. Thus, some of the projects include the Emirates Heritage Club in Abu Dhabi, The Folk Arts Society in Dubai, the Heritage Directorate in Sharjah, the Documentation and Studies center in Ras Al Khaimah, the Fujairah Cultural Organization who held lectures, seminars, festivals and celebrations to promote pre-oil era culture (Lawson & al-Naboodah, 2008). Another major center is the 1999 opening of the Sheikh Mohamed bin Rashid Al Maktoum center for Cultural Understanding, (SMCCU) which shares ‘Emirati’ culture with expatriates, also offering classes in Arabic and lectures on Islam (Lawson & al-Naboodah, 2008, 16). Additionally, in 2005, the government set up the agency called the Abu Dhabi Authority for Culture and Heritage (ADACH) which managed different aspects of culture, such as education, media, literature, arts, development of museums, conservation and development of cultural tourism (Lawson & al-Naboodah, 2008, 27). In addition, scholars note two key areas in which cultural preservation has been emphasized, one is in education (Haque, 2007), and the other is in national dress codes (Khalaf, 2005).

In the case of the former, the concern over education is tied to concerns over culture and value systems as well. Younger generations are seen as being impacted negatively, and government agencies are necessary to “preserve and promote the national culture that is a blend of the Arab and Islamic traditions” (Haque, 2007, 14). Haque asks important questions in this area tied to how Emirati youth think their culture is being
influenced. To what extent do the young Emiratis value their language, ethnic background, religious beliefs, national pride, education on national history, traditional clothing, sports, ways of traditional healing, etc.? Do they know their indigenous culture and can they distinguish between their own and the modern western culture? Do they see any direct conflict with the modern western culture, and if they do, how do they go about resolving it? What suggestions do they have as individuals going through the process of identity development and change on preserving and/or promoting local culture among themselves? (Haque, 2007, 14). In the area of national dress, Khalaf explores how national anxieties about threats to their national cultural identity have led to increased pressure to preserve national dress as well as protecting other aspects of Emirati society and culture such as newly invented cultural traditions, social customs and heritage sports, like camel racing, traditional boat racing and falconry. In addition, Khalaf highlights how these broad national heritage-oriented discourses are also reinforced by religious Islamic discourse. Thus, “Emirati contemporary discourse on national dress is a fusion of multiple ideologies and value systems that include social traditions, heritage, Islamic values as well as national political symbols” (Khalaf, 2005, 261). Overall national dress is an important “boundary marker for maintaining their distinct national identity” (Khalaf, 2005, 265), this is often done vis-à-vis others in order to maintain their privilege as national citizens.

Overall, these attempts can be seen in certain ways as a response to the hegemony of Western capitalism and the liberalization of ‘cultural’ ideas and practices, but interestingly, the policies which stem from these insecurities are enacted upon the largest numerical force of migrants in the region, those low waged labourers and Others who are seen as more threatening to the place than Western professional expats. A recent post in the Wall Street Journal’s Expat blog (December, 2014), Dewolf discusses the ways that some are considered ‘expat’ while others are not, linking those who are to their roots in a Western country (Dewolf, 2014). Dewolf continues that Filipino domestic helpers for example, not matter how long they have lived in HK are just guests or migrants. He continues that, “A more current interpretation of the term “expat” has more to do with privilege. Expats are free to roam between countries and cultures, privileges not afforded
to those considered immigrants or migrant workers” (Dewolf, 2014). In another article published in March 2015, Koutonin of The Guardian writes “Why are white people expats when the rest of us are immigrants?”. Koutonin states,

Africans are immigrants. Arabs are immigrants. Asians are immigrants. However, Europeans are expats because they can’t be at the same level as other ethnicities. They are superior. Immigrants is a term set aside for ‘inferior races’.

(Koutonin, 2015)

The assumptions behind these logics is that ‘white’ people who migrate for work do so by choice, while Others do so out of necessity, reinforcing a hierarchy in which expat is a designation reserved for privileged Westerners. Overt forms of racism abound in the city, with almost all interviewees acknowledging explicit forms of discrimination in hiring policies, housing structures, labour policies and contracts, the organization of city spaces, and the law. Taken together, we will see how, even when not as blatantly obvious, the creation of more insidious forms of ordinary, everyday violence, experienced as safety, peace and multicultural harmony, and the orientalist framing of Dubai by the West, as well historical genealogical linkages from earlier colonial periods that have shaped the world into hierarchies of migration, together importantly shape its global ambition and imbue the city with a desire for ‘whiteness’ through the globalizing of race. Through an examination of popular representations through tourist materials and publications, we see the ways that these ideological representations in popular culture are supported by subjects living in the city.

Whether from tourist materials, informants, or the ruling elite in the UAE, the message is clear: the space that constitutes Dubai is caught in-between two worlds; ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ and ‘East’ and ‘West’. These quotes and the corresponding images have explicit spatial qualities. From the quotes provided here from tourist materials (McAuley, 2008; Time Out Guides Ltd, 2007; Walsh, 2008; Woods, 2009) it is clear that several themes emerge as markers of Dubai involving both physical infrastructure and symbolic representations. Dubai becomes spatially located ‘in-between’ the binaries of ‘East’ and ‘West’, ‘Tradition’ and ‘Modernity’ and ‘First’ and ‘Third’ World. What becomes clear from these examples is that Dubai must be assisted into modernity. The question then becomes, through what practices and processes is
Dubai at once ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’? What are the formal strategies that regulate this ambiguity? and how is this a function of the genealogy of migration as tied to colonial relations?

For many scholars on the Gulf, the UAE, and Dubai in particular, the forces of modernity such as ‘globalization’ are met or combined with a relentless traditionalism. For some, “… the Gulf Arabs synchronized a traditional ideology, with its own ethos of ‘knowledge’, with a modern lifestyle to create a multilayered cosmology” (Fox, Mourtada-Sabbah, & Mutawa, 2006, 9). In fact, as they explain, leadership in the Gulf constantly works to show “how tolerant Islam is as a religion so that globalization and development may continue to be bereft of indigenous reactions” (Fox et al., 2006, 9). Thus for these scholars, “globalization in the Gulf meshes with traditionalism…” (Fox et al., 2006, 9). The constant references to ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ shapes the global location of Dubai in significant ways with important implications.

Following Goldberg (1993) we can see that “Just as spatial distinctions like ‘West’ and ‘East’ are racialized in their conception and application, so racial categories have been variously spatialized more or less since their inception into continental divides, national localities, and geographic regions” (Goldberg, 1993, 185). Thus understanding Dubai as ‘in-between’ is itself a project of imperialism and a continuity of colonialism through the collision of various subjects in spaces constituted through racial hierarchies. The in-between-ness of Dubai is tied to spatial relations based on racial, colonial ideological constructs which position it as simultaneously caught in the ‘pre-modern’ barbarity of culture and tradition, as well as holding spaces of ‘white’-Western capitalist-modernity. This discussion helps us to introduce “the formative relations between the conditions for the subjective experience of knowing one’s (racial) place in the contemporary city, on one hand, and the social structures and discursive formations of (racial) space on the other” (Goldberg, 1993, 205).

We can ask here how and in what ways the position of Dubai, UAE as a ‘global city’, between ‘First’ and ‘Third’ worlds under contemporary forms of neoliberal globalization, impacts socio-spatial relations in the city? In addition, one may ask, with all the talk of Dubai as a global city, what are the criteria or requirements for attaining this international status? Can we see this status as impacting the lives of millions of
labourers from the ‘Third world’, and as state attempts to expunge national identity from the traces of ‘other’ following them into modernity? Do white bodies perform the function of perpetuating colonial racial hierarchies, which value the ‘West’ over the rest? Further, how and why are state fears related to national identity as under threat conceptualized as caught in between ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’? In addition, how do the influences of capitalist consumerism on indigenous culture become manifested into policies targeting those residents who are in fact the most marginalized from the social body? In many scholarly works on the region, there is no discussion on these questions. There is often no discussion of race, and how it is tied to nationality. How does one explain the migrants from ‘East’ and ‘West’ flocking to Dubai in search of the good life? How do migrants from various groups articulate their dreams, motivations, experiences and reflections on issues of migration, global city status, social relations and societal structures, culture and cultural practices and spaces?

The global location of Dubai linking East and West, and in-between First and Third Worlds, i.e. Tradition and Modernity, is a manifestation of global level ideologies that position the world in a historical, genealogical networks of racial thinking. In other words, the locations of East and West are not just about physical geography, they may be thought of in terms of the racialization of space and the construction of worlds of modernity. Thus, these representational systems have their origins in the colonial project, the development of global capitalism and broader European modernity. They are key in understanding how these legacies are embedded in the post WWII making of development and underdevelopment, and, as we will see throughout the analysis, in the making, ordering and evaluating of globality and global city status.

Importantly then, we can move beyond the nation to think about global landscapes of race which position the third world vis-à-vis the first world in a hierarchy of human ontology that shapes global possibilities. Within this, understanding the international division of labour historically helps us to map these ‘geographies of migration’ and un-map the genealogy that makes them possible and is embedded within them. In addition, the linear developmental model of modernization thinkers and economics alike, creates an understanding of time that shapes what is possible of the global city of Dubai, its position internationally, and shapes desirable subjects and subject
formation more generally. We will see this unfold through the latter chapters of the dissertation in which the making of citizenship is (de)/constructed through exclusions and differentiations between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, of which ‘them’ is based on a historical racialization of the world population, and places and spaces in it.

Through this analysis we see the development of Dubai’s dreams, both in terms of the imagined and ideological forces, as well as the material, political and economic forces, which are all at play in shaping Dubai’s developmental trajectory. The following sections of this chapter turn to examine scholarly insights into the making of the ‘global city’ including the criteria and impact(s) of this status.

**Section Two: Evaluating the Global City in Scholarly Works**

Building on the imagined and ideological apparatus of Dubai’s globality, this review examines a range of mainstream scholarly works on the global city before turning to some important critiques and contributions of scholars engaged with critical race and postcolonial studies in the field. Broadly, this scholarly review helps us to situate the notion of the ‘global’ in two major areas, global city literature that I will take up here, and globalization studies that will help explicate the contextual analysis of Dubai’s development in the following chapter.

The notion of the ‘global’ is examined not only as an imagined idea or aspiration, but also as a spatial location that has been taken up by scholars in reference to material and ideological criterion. Examined as an analytic unit by most scholars, the ‘global’ is often understood as a place based analysis of networks and processes that imbue certain spaces with global city status with sets of bounded criteria. Through this analysis we will see how the ‘global city’ becomes a dominant or hegemonic ideal that shapes and promotes urban aspirations around the globe. Furthermore, the study of urban social geographies requires a methodological commitment to multiplicity, relationality and simultaneity of social, economic, political, and cultural processes, as the urbanscape is a complex social and physical/geographical space comprised of layers, intersections and conflicting relationships that often take shape through the interplay with categories based on race, ethnicity, employment, status, and gender, which in turn generate hierarchical social arrangements.
On a more focused analysis of Dubai, we can keep in mind that whether accepted in mainstream scholarly criterion as having achieved this designation or not, the fact remains that notions of what the ‘global city’ represents shapes the developmental trajectories of spaces such as Dubai in ways that have profound implications for the processes of urbanization and experiences of a diverse range of actors.

**Key features.** The criterion by which to evaluate world or global status is vast. Most early analysis (Abu-Lughod, 1999; Beaverstock, Smith, & Taylor, 1999, 2000; Cohen, 1981; Friedmann, 1986; Friedmann & Wolff, 1982; Sassen, 2001; Sassen & Appiah, 1998) tended to focus on the number of headquarters of big corporations, or the existence of world financial centers, which often led scholars to already established capitalist industrialized cities in Europe and North America. Building on this, scholars began to expand their criterion and started to identify the existence and capacity to service the global economy through a focus on Advanced Producer Services (APS) (Brenner 1998; Castells & Castells, 1996; Sassen, 2001) which were seen through services such as banking and finance, accounting, legal services, or marketing and the availability of advanced communications technologies. This opened up the analysis to be less about place, and more about capabilities, which lent itself to the examination of cities within networks, and furthermore, emerging centers. Building on these criterion scholars (Derudder & Witlox, 2005; Kunzmann, 1998; Rimmer, 1998) have also examined levels of airport traffic and the links to airline networks as mapping important global geographical locations. Others have examined international labour markets and urban labour markets (Samers, 2002), levels of professional migration of highly skilled workers (J. Beaverstock & Smith, 1996), tourism and lifestyles or real estate (Haïla, 2006). Amidst all of these considerations, scholars (King, 2006; D. A. Smith & Timberlake, 2001; M. P. Smith, 2001/2006; Taylor, 1997) have also identified global hierarchies amongst these networks of cities, whereby a tiered system of cities becomes more visible. Thus the tier system of global cities tended, and still does tend to reinforce Western, Anglo-centric views of globality, which tend to focus exclusively on cities of the capitalist, industrialized North such as New York, London, and Paris. However, more recent studies (Marcuse & van Kempen, 2000; Massey, 2007; Olds & Yeung, 2004; J.
Robinson, 2002; R. G. Smith, 2003; Yeoh, 1999) have challenged this by examining alternative criteria and focusing on ‘emerging’ global cities or those integrated into global networks in different ways which allows us to expand our view to include cities in the periphery as tied to migration networks, producers of raw materials and manufactured goods, or those new emerging markets within Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. These studies (Malecki & Ewers, 2007; Rimmer, 1998; Shin & Timberlake, 2000) of global cities include discussions of Singapore, Hong Kong or Dubai, and growing symbols of globality shape their positions in the global imaginary. However, what we find generally is that the coveted status of ‘global city’ is not given to cities that have historically been integral to the development of capitalist industrialization in Europe for example, such as the colonies, which are perpetually designated to the peripheries of Europe’s globality.

David Simon (1995/2006) identifies the defining features of the global city as including the existence of complex financial services that provide support to global clientele, international networks of capital and information and communication flows, and a high quality of life conducive to attracting and retaining skilled international migrants, as well as the physical and aesthetic aspects of the environment but also perceived economic and political stability cosmopolitanism and cultural life (Simon, 2006, 206). These ideas summarize some of the dominant forces of global city formation, as they are understood to impact a few key cities, primarily in the Global North.

Friedmann’s work in the 1980s on what he called the ‘World City Hypothesis”, expanded further with Wolff (1982), identifies the world city as serving as a point of departure. Arguing that the existence of ‘global cities’ is not new, but rather the function of the world economic order through networks, which are “increasingly oblivious to national boundaries” (Friedmann, 1986, 69). The emphasis for Friedmann is on the economic power located in command and control functions of particular cities. In this view, the number of corporate headquarters for example is seen as a key feature of power in the new international division of labour. The ‘global’ city of the contemporary period is seen as a product of changes in technological capability, which in turn shapes the ways the economics and politics function. For Castells (2006) the defining feature of the
contemporary global city is understood in relation to the ‘informational city’, which articulates the functions of the global economy in a network of decision-making and informational processes. This new spatial logic is seen as characteristic of the informational city and is determined by the preeminence of space of flows over the space of places (Castells, 2006, 135). The space of flows is defined by a “system of exchanges of information, capital and power that structures basic processes of societies, economies and states between different localities, regardless of localization” (Castells, 2006, 136). We can see through these perspectives, the dominance of shifts and changes in characteristics related to economic globalization as the determining force through which global city networks are made and given significance.

Saskia Sassen, whose work has largely popularized the concept of the ‘global city’, has examined the relationships between London, New York and Tokyo as emblematic of the global city network. Methodologically her work challenges traditional notions of scale by highlighting the “the dynamics and processes that get territorialized at these diverse scales [which] can in principle be regional, national or global” (Sassen, 2001, xix). Her focus on the dispersal of activities through these geographic networks lends itself to the analysis of global cities in terms of their ‘functions’ and ‘capabilities’. However, as Sassen argues, amidst all of this de- and re-territorialization it is important to maintain a historical perspective that recognizes the relationships of power and capitalist development that have significant impacts in shaping the economic and political landscapes of networks of ‘global cities’, shaping priorities and desires of ‘globality’.

Similarly, Friedmann and Wolff (1982/2006) argue for the recognition of a dynamic historical perspective, one in which the role of different cities is never fixed, but changes in terms of function, relationships and spatial dominance. However, while they recognize the historical roots of the idea of a world economy for example, they emphasize that the present situation is unique.

Scholarly insights originating in the 1970s and 80s, such as those of Friedmann and Wolff (1986) tended to focus on shifts in the global economy, in which the ‘global’ over the international was being shifted through cities as nodes in a global network over national economies. In Friedmann and Wolff’s analysis, the post WWII era of post Fordist industrial structures that shifted towards a system in which capitalist institutions
become increasingly internationalized and freed from national constraints organizing global production and markets for their own interests was significant (Friedmann & Wolff, 1982/2006). This can be seen as the financialization and internationalization of world economy, which was seen as uniquely, engendering new modes and functions of global capitalism.

Not only were headquarters of major transnational corporations (TNCs) important markers of globality, but also as scholars such as Sassen argue, it is its capacity to produce financial services that makes them significant. Thus APS and the overall ability to support sectors such as law, accountancy, consulting and other essential features of increasingly global business operations are all characteristic of the necessary functions of a global city (Sassen, 2001). The push towards the centralizations of command and control capacities within agglomeration economies of major urban centers highlight how the “the more dispersed a firm’s operations across different countries, the more complex and strategic its central functions- that is, the work of managing, coordinating, servicing and financing a firm’s network of operations” (Sassen, 2001, xx). These shifts are tied to the growth of technological advances that allows corporations to coordinate production and investment regardless of location, which has meant changes in capital mobility and new information technology. Additionally, while capitalist production may always have been global in scope, the growth of the producer and financial services ‘complex’ represents a shift in that the role of the global city to provide a host of essential services that enable capitalism to carry out production and investment on a global scale (Sassen, 2001). Thus, whereby in the past central functions were carried out at the headquarters, today much of this is outsourced and many more firms are buying more of such inputs than producing them in house (Sassen, 2001). Thus through these functions for example, the global city becomes emblematic of both the local, placed based and of the global, transnational. Overall it can be said that since the 1980s, major changes in the new international division of labour (NIDL) have been generated to free TNCs from national constraints while they establish a global network of production and distribution (Hamnett, 1994).

In building on the importance of these shifts, Sassen (2002) also argues that while we are witnessing greater transnational flows and networks, the significance of these
functions is made through greater focus on how cities are integrated, not only as being hosts to an array of businesses and fostering the lifestyles conducive to this, but as being places of concentration of these functions. Thus, in her examination of the geography of globalization she sees a simultaneous dispersal of capabilities and mobilities, as well as the concentration of resources necessary for the managing and servicing of that dispersal (Sassen, 2002).

In considering in more detail the greater concentration rather than massive dispersal, Sassen highlights that while communication technologies may have the ability to facilitate dispersal, they also tend to strengthen the importance of central coordination and control, in for example, the need for state of the art resources and top professionals (Sassen, 2002). Thus, “economic globalization and telecommunications have contributed to producing a spatiality for the urban which pivots on cross border networks and territorial locations with massive concentrations of resources” (Sassen, 2002, 30). Additionally, she highlights the role of cross border mergers and alliances, as well as the denationalized agendas that they carry. This emphasizes the loosening of national attachments and identities for global firms, as well as the increased forces of neoliberalism through deregulation and privatization that have weakened the need for national financial centers.

Thus, according to Sassen, cities are important and strategic sites for examining global processes and major politico-economic processes. Additionally, she argues that they allow us to reclaim the concrete localized processes through which globalization exists. While much of what is popularly understood of Sassen’s work is tied to discussions related to global economic processes, she in fact is careful to emphasize the need to account for the city, communities and workers from a different scale. Thus, reclaiming place and production processes allows us to see how “global processes are structured by local constraints, including composition of the workforce, work cultures and prevailing political cultures and processes” (Sassen, 1996, 631). Instead of traditional conceptions of globalization in which the global, national or local are seen as a mutually exclusive, she pushes for a re-scaling of globalization emphasizing the ways that the “dynamics and processes that get territorialized at these diverse scales can in principle be regional, national or global” (Saskia Sassen, 2001, xix).
While scholars such as Sassen are seen as reemphasizing the significance of cities in the traditional capitalist core such as London, New York and Tokyo, others challenge representations of these allegedly ‘new type of cities’ referred to as ‘global’. While, for example, Lughod (1999/2006) notes that the ‘new age’ is one in which the global city is characterized by the internationalization of the market through changes in commerce due to revolutions in technologies, decentralizations of production and simultaneously concentration of control in the core region, in turn creating demands for FIRE services (Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate), she also notes the histories in which these cities are embedded. For example, she argues that in the case of New York City (NYC) the ‘seeds from which the present ‘global city’ grew were firmly planted in Manhattan during the middle decades of the nineteenth century” (Abu-Lughod, 1999/2006, 43). The major metropolitan agglomerations that service today as ‘world’ or ‘global’ cities were built over time as she argues. With a focus on US cities, she argues that even within the US, it is difficult to compare cities without a more specific historical and geographic contextual analysis from which they developed. Lughod highlights the role of cities at the heart of the world system, which she invokes through historical references to imperial capitals. However, as she notes the scale and reach of these networks was still very limited, though they did lay the foundation for processes of urbanization around the globe. She argues that “History does not end with globalization” (Abu-Lughod, 1999/2006, 47) and the present power of certain cities is tied to changing geographies of power, which in turn are tied to larger systems. For Ancien (2011) in Sassen’s analysis it is important to understand that “the emergence of these global cities is situated in time and is conditioned by a particular geohistorical material context: that of the financialization of the world economy, made possible through the development of information technologies in particular” (Ancien, 2011, 2475). This is typified by the early global city thesis (Friedmann, 1986) conceived in relation to traditional economic centers in cities in Western Europe (London, Paris, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, Zurich), North America (NY, Chicago, LA and Toronto), and East Asia (Tokyo, HK, Singapore).

For Sassen, while we have seen cross border networks in the past, what is different is the “intensity, complexity and global span of these networks, the extent to which significant portions of the economies are now dematerialized and digitalized and
hence the extent to which they can travel at great speeds through some of these networks” (Sassen, 2001/2006, 95), which in turn leads to a number of cities that are part of cross-border networks operating at vast geographic scales. This ‘new’ urban spatiality links cities across the globe, and contrasts with capitals of empires in the past, in which today’s global cities existing only in relation to each other, albeit within a global hierarchy of power.

In reviewing these earlier analyses, the focus on ‘traditional’ centers of economic power has been linked to the creation of ‘ideal’ model of ‘globality’ or ‘global city’ status. These epistemological assumptions are embedded in many analyses and have been criticized as generating certain biases in what signifies importance in the making of global networks of power and exchange. While the argument has been made that the focus on ‘Western’ cities is linked to structural tendencies in the making of world capitalism, it is also important to consider the assumptions embedded within the making of ‘case studies’ as exemplary models of what represents ‘global city status’. The implications of these seemingly rational cases, is the creation of a hierarchy through which ‘global-ness’ is measured, thus generating models to be emulated and developments to be desired without the necessary historical genealogy to help explain their rise. Scholars such as Robinson (2009) have critiqued these exclusive cities as eclipsing important urban growth and development in places ‘off the map’ such as those in the ‘developing world’ that account for over 95% of urban population growth for example (W. I. Robinson, 2009, 25). Robinson argues, that these theories often work to create a ‘normative’ model, which is “defined only by a handful of cities” (W. I. Robinson, 2009, 26). These critiques are taken up in more detail later on in this section.

In considering the politics of the global city in more detail, we can consider the “process through which cities try to achieve the status of the global city” (Haila, 1997/2006, 282). Of major significance here are the ways in which the global ‘image’ of a city plays a significant role in shaping, for example, investments and real estate. Additionally, image promotion and the media are important mediums linked to the symbolic power and politics that shape the city. In a more focused discussion on real estate, Anne Haila (1997) highlights the way that real estate is seen as a sign of success in
the world economy which is, “at once measured by, and visibly expressed through, the skyline of office towers and similar landmarks of economic success such as airports, ports, festival districts” (Haila, 1997/2006, 283). Thus, “Real estate capital has found an unexploited area of consumption, where it increases not only its own profits but also consumption through development of places of consumption” (Haila, 1997/2006, 283).

Haila argues, as per David Harvey (1989), that ‘entrepreneurialism’, which is distinct from managerialism, dominates urban governance. In this way, entrepreneurs are privileged at the expense of inhabitants, and as Haila argues, in specific, the real estate developers and investors are prioritized (Haila, 1997/2006, 283). Another novelty she highlights are the ways in which other cities are seen not as models for new ideas nor as lessons to learn from but as legitimation for certain measures. Overall, in thinking about the ‘global’ in relation to city formation, while many scholars emphasize networks as open, connected and dependent, she argues that the question we should be asking is what is the nature of this dependency? Thus, by examining the real estate or development in particular sites, you can see the global networks which make them possible. For example, the Petronas Tower in Kuala Lumpur is linked to construction companies including Japanese, South Korean and Australian firms and migrant labourers who are mainly Indonesian, Bangladeshi and Filipino. These important geographies highlight the global linkages and dependencies between real estate development, and also the shifting spaces of globality in which for example, the tallest buildings are now outside of the West (Haila, 2006, 287). Overall real estate is seen as a key example that exemplifies many of the politics of a global city, through which physical signs are written in the urban landscape (Haila, 2006, 286). Thus, buildings are not just frameworks for activities, or objects of investment but also “symbols of trophies, exclusivity and the image of fame, name and prestige” (Haila, 2006, 286). What we find as we link these priorities in global city development and the mythologies which surround them, is that the goal is to segregate and exclude in order to build luxury, exclusivity and fame.

Another major area of consideration here is linked to hierarchies between and within cities which are central aspects to understanding how cities are created in regards to networks, as well as how their mode of integration into networks is expressed within
urban spaces. Globality itself finds expression and meaning through networks, and these linkages are hierarchical and interconnected as ‘world city nodes’. These city nodes are also understood as command points of the global economy, the “new pillars of a late capitalism characterized by new conditions of rapidly increasing globalization, financialization and deregulation of the world economy” (Ancien, 2011, 2473). These forces of contemporary globalization and the transnational operations and linkages in global networks of capital and information whereby “these new, vibrant economic regions are spatially defined by networks of cities that may be more closely linked to cities in other countries than with other cities in their own countries” (Shin & Timberlake, 2000, 2260). Thus the linkages between cities often transcend their national borders and facilitate international connections beyond the nation state.

As urban studies was expanded in the 1970s to emphasize the need for cities not to be studied in isolation, growing emphasis on the international system and the subsequent creation of hierarchies amongst cities was exposed, through the groupings of first, second and third tier (W. I. Robinson, 2009, 11). Similarly, the ‘world cities hypothesis’ pushed this further and understood globalization in relation to the international division of labour emphasizing core, semi-peripheral and peripheral cities. Following world system theorist Immanuel Wallerstein, Friedmann and Wolff (1982) explained that the core refers to those already industrialized, often post-industrialized regions, which are home to the majority of corporate headquarters. Semi-periphery refers to those who play a significant role in mediating relations between core and periphery, many of whom are rapidly industrializing but are still dependent on core region capital and technological knowledge, and finally, the world periphery refers to what is left of the market economy, such as those who are “poor, technologically backwards and politically weak” (Friedmann & Wolff, 1982/2006, 311). These categories have arguably been substantially challenged in the contemporary period, as the growing divisions between core and peripheralized aspects of national economies have allowed some formerly semi or world periphery places to operate important functions for TNCs and other global transactions. Nonetheless, these hierarchies continue to dominant and influence how global city status is evaluated in many ways, with significant implications.
For Cohen (1981/2006) the ‘urban hierarchy’ is tied to the ‘new international division of labour’ (NIDL) and its relationship to Multinational Corporations, whereby changing locational patterns of MNCs that are shifting away from national webs of articulation move towards global networks. Thus, for Cohen this can be seen to be reflected in efforts to map the ‘new global urban order’, which was entrenching rather than loosening existing global power relations and North-South inequalities. Additionally, even within the core globalizing cities of the US, class based social polarization was intensifying as the process of globalization unfolded (Cohen, 1981/2006, 51). Cohen emphasizes the location and role of transnational corporations in relation to the NIDL and the urban hierarchy. He examined the increasing centralization of corporate linked functions within a few key US cities, as well as the increasing internationalization of operations. Even with the recognition of this hierarchy, its acknowledgement didn’t challenge the naming of ‘global cities’, which as Cohen argues could only be named if they have a wide range of international business institutions such as banking and strategic corporate services (Cohen, 1981/2006, 51).

Friedmann and Wolff (1982/2006) have argued that the global system gives rise to an urban hierarchy, at the apex of which there are ‘world cities’ that are interconnected through decision making and finance. This hierarchy is important in understanding the comparisons and evaluation of emerging global cities, as cities are linked through these networks and are shaped by their role and function in the global economy. However, as these cities are not equal in their functions, global city theorists have devised complex articulations of hierarchies amongst cities, ranking them based on differential criteria. Thus, it is not the population size that determines their character but rather the specific and fundamental ways in which these urban regions are becoming integrated with the global economic system. Their modes of integration being a key consideration, he also determines much of this world city status to the number of MNC headquarters that operate there. This then, for example, leads to the global urban hierarchy, which is a “reflection of the unequal distribution of economic power across the globe” (Shin & Timberlake, 2000, 2259).
In addition to the international or global hierarchies within which global cities exist, their mode of integration into these networks also shapes their internal dynamics, of which social polarization has been a key area of scholarly concern. They become the major points for the accumulation of capital and ‘all that money can buy’. They are luxurious, splendid cities whose very splendor obscures the functional relation: rich and poor define each other (Friedmann & Wolff, 1982/2006, 61).

For Sassen, processes of economic change have led to polarization in occupational structures, such as there “has been an expansion at the top and bottom ends of the occupational/income distribution at the expense of the middle” (Hamnett, 1994, 401). Much of this decline in the middle class is due to the changing nature of the economy in these cities, for example, the decline of industrial manufacturing and growth of advanced producer and financial services have contributed to these changing socioeconomic distribution patterns. Thus interestingly, the growth of APS for example is met with a growing proliferation of low skilled, low paid service jobs.

The connection is further explained by Friedmann and Wolff (1982/2006) who argue that these urbanizing processes such as the economic, social, and spatial elements that define life in the cities are reflections, to a large extent, of their mode of integration into the world system. Thus, the form and extent of a city’s integration into the world economy and the functions assigned to this city in a new spatial division of labour is key to understanding various structural changes. Central to this analysis is control over urban life, which is shaped by competing interests and demands, the priorities of which will shape experiences in the city. Thus, as Brenner and Keil (2006) describe the inequalities of the NIDL within their boundaries created simultaneous spaces of hope and gloom, “sites in which ‘citadel’ and ‘ghetto’ existed in uneasy proximity” (57).

In particular, these global control functions of world cities shape the structure and dynamics of production and employment sectors, which is turn impacts growth in finance, transport and communication, as well as business services such as advertising, accounting, insurance, and legal services. In addition, Friedmann also recognized here the highly dichotomized nature of the labour force split between high level professionals and an army of low skilled workers (Friedmann, 1986; Friedmann & Wolff, 1982/2006). This theme related to labour, has been characterized as reflecting the nature of global cities as
‘dual cities’ in terms of how global functions draw high skilled professionals and well paid skilled labour but also rely on unskilled, poor paid immigrant workforce to service global companies (J. Robinson, 2002, 546). For Sassen, this is the result of the downgrading of traditional manufacturing sectors and emergence of advanced producer and financial services. Rather than view the dominance of finance and professional services as growing at the expense of lower paid service sector workers, Sassen notes new economic regime relies on an army of low waged workers. Importantly then, this focus on cities and communities allows us to see a specific geography that encompasses the global scale as well as microgeographies.

In considering processes of labour and migration more closely, many scholars, such as Sassen argue (1988), that the transnationalization of production has created new conditions for the international mobility of labour (transnational migration of labour), while traditional economic theories assumed “the international mobility of commodities (that is, world trade) but the immobility of capital and of labour” (W. I. Robinson, 2009, 8). The ‘new international division of labour’ theory emerging in the 1970s and 1980s was characterized by increased FDI in developing countries, shift in manufacturing from North to South, spread of EPZs and increase decentralization of production (W. I. Robinson, 2009, 8). These shifts were dependent on a cheap labour force, which was importantly analyzed later through the ‘feminization of poverty’ and the gendered nature and impacts of an increasingly young, precarious, female labour force. In Sassen’s work, international migration was seen as a part of the processes of globalization, which also included flows of capital, goods, services and information (W. I. Robinson, 2009, 8). The linkages between industrialized and ‘developing’ countries highlight both the impacts of the global economy on restructuring the labour market of ‘sending’ countries, but also highlights the new conditions in developed countries which are tied to the expanding demand for low waged labour to be filled by immigrants. This analysis extends into the formation of global cities in which the economic conditions that allow these centers to service and manage the world economy create similar demands for new immigrant labour. Thus, as Sassen states “the same set of basic processes that has promoted emigration from several rapidly industrializing countries has also promoted immigration
into several booming global cities” (Sassen, 1988, 22). For Sassen, labour migration in the current period is intimately related to the historical development of world capitalism, in which growing pools of migrant labour in formerly colonized countries is key. As she argues, both global cities and export processing zones attract immigrant labour, and the “the growing concentration of immigrant labour in service jobs in developed countries can be viewed as the correlate of the export of jobs to the Third World” (Sassen, 1988, 53).

For Malecki and Ewers (2007) the importance of understanding the demand for the unskilled labour, which is available in peripheral regions, is tied to the growing consumption and demand for low skilled services by professional workers in ‘global cities’. The authors note that most analyses of global cities focus little on labour and more on APS and TNCs, which tends to construct global cities as linear and deterministic. In this schema global cities must have attained an APS base, and have been deindustrialized or postindustrialized in order to achieve the pinnacle of labour markets in the global capitalist economy. However as Malecki and Ewers highlight, in the case of the Middle East, many economies are bifurcated comprised of preindustrial resource extraction and postindustrial service activities.

In addition, Malecki and Ewers discuss the role of capital investment as key to attaining global city status, as those cities that do not, are often left out of traditional analyses. Furthermore, they agree with the dichotomized nature of the labour force whereby the division of primary and secondary, and formal and informal reign true, they state that “in segmented labour markets, employers match jobs with certain segments of the workforce based largely on socially constructed attributes of skill, race, sex or ethnicity” (Malecki & Ewans, 2007, 469). Thus what we see is labour processes in global cities which necessitates both high skill and high wage, and low skill, low wage labour, “to provide specialized knowledge based services on the one hand, and organizational flexibility and lower labour costs on the other” (Malecki & Ewers, 2007, 469). These changes in the global economic structure and division of labour lead to things like the ‘race to the bottom’, and thus, the global industrial restructuring and the rise of global or world command points, is met with a decline in industrial bases in many cities, while accompanied by rise in APS leading to unequal social and employment structures made
up of a transnational business class of professionals, and army of low skilled workers that “cater to privileged classes for whose sake the world city primarily exists” (Malecki & Ewers, 2007, 470).

In addition, they highlight the linkages between contexts, whereby the “Spatial manifestation of the global job market is seen in the urban continuum from global cities in core economies to towns and villages in peripheral economies” (Malecki & Ewers, 2007, 471). They note that in between world cities and peripheral cities are numerous other places that exhibit varying degrees of world city-ness.

In thinking about migration and labour supply, the authors note that the earlier world city hypothesis was largely focused on documenting APS and TNCs in order to also explain out migration and pull factors in developed countries. They argue that the demand driven theory of migration, leading to polarization, is not adequate, and that while demand can be initial reason for migration, cumulative causation gives momentum for successive migration decisions (Malecki & Ewers, 2007). Thus, labour demand is one of many reasons for migration to global cities, and there are additional push factors to consider. For example, changes in economic structure, demand driven processes, and income disparities, low wages and additional push factors in sending countries are all a part of the supply side processes. Thus, while some original theories emphasized destination countries in the developed world rather than the countries that supply most of the labour, the authors argue that not enough research focused on labour supply countries and how social organization operates within circuits of labour in global economy. Thus, from here they highlight a three circuit framework including, contract procurement, recruitment within sending countries, gaining access to employment and the reasons for why people take them. They also emphasize the role of the state in facilitating these movements by exploring examples such as that of Manila, where the government has created programs and projects to encourage migration as a development strategy since the 1970s.

In analyzing the impacts of these shifts, we can consider that while the city has typically been analyzed vertically, as Brenner and Keil (2006) argue, cities can also be understood horizontally in terms of the everyday lived experiences expressed in “diverse
social, cultural and political space”, in which different relations of power are “produced, contested and reworked” (Brenner & Keil, 2006, 4). Dissecting the diverse elements that together constitute the urban experience often exposes a collision of opposed social dynamics. In addition, it is important to recognize that these everyday experiences are not outside of the ‘global’. For example, in the case of Dubai, we can see how these scales operate simultaneously exposing the links and embedded nature of Dubai’s globality in a range of networks that shape both the lived everyday experiences of inhabitants, and also, the representations of the city in the broader global city landscape.

In considering the horizontal view of the city, the issues of social and spatial polarization become glaring. Friedmann and Wolff (1982/2006) for instance, argue that spatial polarization can be found at many scales, globally, between economies, regionally, and in metropolitan areas. Spatial polarization is thus caused by class polarizations found in three major facets: income gaps between elites and low skilled workers, large scale immigration from rural areas or abroad, and structural trends in the changing structure of the labour market and the types of jobs required (Friedmann, 1986). Thus spatial polarization is directly linked to labour and in particular, the types of jobs available. Building and expanding on this, Friedmann and Wolff offer a more detailed analysis of the changes associated with social restructuring in world cities by examining the lifestyles of transnational elites which dominant and shape employment structures. These cosmopolitan elites define affluence in the urban landscape and are predominantly males between 30 and 50 years of age (Friedmann & Wolff, 1982/2006, 63). They are contrasted with the underclass of the city,

They crowd along the edges of the primary economy- the ‘formal’ sector- or settle in its interstices, barely tolerated, yet providing personal services to the ruling class, doing the dirty work of the city. The ruling class enjoys permanent employment, steady income, complete legality; they do not have to justify their existence. For all practical purposes, they are the city. The underclass lives at its sufferance (Friedmann & Wolff, 1982/2006, 63)

Briefly noted in their analysis is the reality that the underclass is made up of a different ethnicity, and thus difference is measured through race and language, which gives many cities a ‘third world’ feel (Friedmann & Wolff, 1982/2006, 63). They give the examples of Puerto Ricans and Haitians in NY, Mexicans in LA and San Francisco,
‘barefoot Indians’ in Mexico City, ‘nodestinos’ in Sao Paulo, Jamaicans in London, Algerians in Paris, Turks in Frankfurt, Malays in Singapore, and I would add here, South Asians in Dubai. The authors highlight racism, segregation, and violence as part of the inherent contradictions of the city. Social polarization is expressed physically in the geography of the world city, and is spatially organized with the citadel and ghetto. Characterized as the following “with its towers of steel and glass and its fanciful shopping malls, the Citadel is the city’s most vulnerable symbol” (Friedmann & Wolff, 1982/2006, 64). In addition, there are private spaces, secluded spaces, overcrowded ghettos further divided by race and ethnic criteria, poor public service provision, and in many places residents of the ghettos are not allowed outside their zones only during working hours as “their appearance in the Citadel after dark creates a small panic… at night, ghetto residents belong to the ghettos. There, isolated like a virus, they can only harm themselves” (Friedmann & Wolff, 1982/2006, 64).

For Friedmann, the social costs generated by world cities often exceed the fiscal capacity of the state, and the costs of social reproduction such as housing, education, health, transport and welfare. In this sense, the clash between needs is seen as transnational elites emphasize their demands at the cost of the city’s poor. As he notes, state budgets reflect the general balance of political power, and the overall result “is a steady state of fiscal and social crises in which the burden of capitalist accumulation is systematically shifted to the politically weakest, most disorganized sectors of the population. Their capacity for pressing their rightful claims against the corporations and the state is further contained by the ubiquitous forces of police repression” (Friedmann, 1986, 79). Friedmann and Wolff (1982/2006) argue that there are ‘life spaces’ and ‘economic spaces’. In the economic space the logic of capital, individualized and profit motivate dominant, and in the life space, which people occupy, is space in which their dreams are made, people’s lives unfold (65). However a more critical spatial analysis (Sassen 1991, Lefebvre 1996, Soja 2006, Harvey 2001) recognizes the mutually constitutive nature of ‘citadel’ and ‘ghetto’ for example, challenging the reductionist duality of the ideas of ‘economic spaces’ and ‘life spaces’ and instead pushes for a dialectic understanding of the relationality and mutually constitutive nature of these forces.
In considering the lifestyles that characterize the global city, we can consider those valorization dynamics which are tied to high process and top of line restaurants, hotels, upscale shops, all of which cater to a new high income urban elite. However, this high income gentrification process needs and in fact, depends, on a vast supply of low wage workers (W. I. Robinson, 2009, 16). It is important for Robinson’s examination to highlight the duality of the glamorous and the impoverished. Since “the globalization of labour flows is part of the same process as the development of global finance and the global circulation of capital, so the worlds of difference represented in the global city spring from the same global processes” (W. I. Robinson, 2009, 16). The glamour exists because of those who do the ‘dirty work’. In global cities you see a concentration of new gendered and racialized transnational labour pools facing the casualization and informalization of work. Thus the “social geography of the global city is one of a spatial and class apartheid” (W. I. Robinson, 2009, 17).

In the social organization of cities, we can see how, as Hamnett (1995) argues, that these shifts have ramifications all over the cityscape for example, in the demand for housing, whereby gentrification takes place in parts of the inner city and the concentration of the “less skilled, in less desirable parts of the housing market” (Hamnett, 1994, 402). It is also interesting to consider the concept of the ‘peripherialization of the core’ in which immigration and low wage labour supply is said to be shaping the socio-economic dynamics of the global city in important ways through intensifying social polarizations and violence (Hamnett, 1994). Thus, what socio-economic dynamics were typically relegated to the ‘periphery’, are finding their way into the ‘core’ through immigration and the demand for low waged labour to support the professional and elite classes of the global city.

**Critiques of global cities scholarship.** While many of the traditional approaches to global cities research has focused on cities of the global North, and primarily those identified in the core, such as New York, London, and Tokyo, it can be argued that there is an implicit bias in these early approaches in which most theoretical work on global urban development is centered on the experiences of the West. While this is seen as a
necessary analysis as these cities often formed the core of expansion for global capitalism, more recent scholarship has shifted from criteria based on banks, stock markets, communication networks, transportation networks, etc. towards a relational approach that is more interested in the linkages and relationships between cities. While some maintain that global cities remain distinct in terms of their functions for management and coordination of global economic processes, others have argued that cities located outside of the core have been restructured in significant ways due to processes of globalization. These ‘geographies of capitalism’ have traditionally focused on Western Europe, North America and East Asia, which can be contested if we acknowledge the ways in which global capitalism was born out of colonial expansion in cities of the ‘global South’. Some scholars such as Shatin (1998) explore processes of globalization beyond these limitations and argue that we should view LDCs not as “an unfortunate footnote to the phenomenon of globalization and economic restructuring” (Shatkin, 1998, 378) but rather as integral to the processes of capital accumulation. One of the ways in which discussions of the global South have been integrated into analyses of global urban cities research has been through the conceptualization of ‘globalizing’ cities. Interestingly this conception is meant to highlight the ways in which processes of globalization are transforming these spaces, however, as I argue throughout this analysis, rather than being peripheral to the world economy, these spaces are integral to its production. The notion of cities ‘off the map’ and ‘globalizing’ seems to imply the developmental logic of ‘catching up’, when in fact these cities are often what makes the status of global cities in the North possible. Some of the features that connect these cities ‘off the map’ include the experience and legacy of colonialism, the era of ‘development’, and the impacts of neoliberal restructuring through Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and connections to international organizations such as the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations (UN).

Evaluating the ‘global’ aspects of cities has been based on diverse sets of criteria. As highlighted through mainstream scholarly works, the primary criterion for understanding globality is tied to economic globalization. However, critical interventions
in urban studies have helped add nuance and complexity to the ways in which ideas of the ‘global’ are said to operate at the macro level and are seen as the primary and dominant mode of influence in shaping cities in the global landscape. To critique the hegemonic notions of the ‘global’ scholars consider linkages and levels of analysis that push us to think beyond the economic center top down models of economic development. Thus, as Mohamed and Sidaway (2012) argue, this shift requires us moving “beyond commodity and merchant networks into variegated subaltern historical geographies of globalization that do not take the West as the only (or indeed principle) point of reference” (621).

For example, as Smith (2001/2006) argues the Global City thesis depends largely on a set of assumptions about the role of global economic restructuring, which is said to precede and determine urban spatial and sociocultural restructuring. This is done through “transforming localities by disconnecting them from their ties to nation-states, national legal systems, local political cultures and every-day place making practices (M. P. Smith, 2001/2006, 379). The implications of which are that the economic-centric models of understanding that are based on a grand economic narrative of globalization which is supported by those interested in the advancement of particularly western-oriented, modernization perspectives, these include transnational corporate and financial elites, heads of international agencies, state managers who embrace the IMF, WB and WTO (M. P. Smith, 2001/2006, 379). Smith argues that we need to question the ‘objective’ findings of these theorists who may be guilty of legitimizing this project by viewing these ‘realities of global cities’ as part and parcel “of an unstoppable process of economic globalization”, therefore “unintentionally, their epistemology thus becomes the ontology of global cities” (M. P. Smith, 2001/2006, 380).

This intervention pushes us to denaturalize the assumptions propagated by this most recent historical version of free market ideology based on neoliberalism. This means recognizing that ‘global space’ is not the natural or unchanging reserve of global capital, but instead “is a discursive arena and very much a contested terrain” (Smith 2001/2006, 380). Thus is it necessary to challenge the dominance of a purely economic interpretation of globalization and of the ‘global’ by recognizing the complex sets of processes, which implicate various actors, interests and institutions. Through this recognition, it becomes possible to hear the voices and concerns that do not fit into
dominant frameworks. This also opens up possibilities of understanding and imagining ‘global cities’ and other urban settings in more complex, nuanced, and localized ways.

Many globalization theorists have criticized the dominance of the ‘global scale’ and pushed for a reimagining of the global through the local for example, or for the ways in which different scales operate simultaneously through each other rather than in exclusivity. In this way, many scholars (Hannerz, 1980; Lefebvre, 1968; Sandercock, 2003) have shifted to examining the ‘lived experiences’ of cities, whereby some argue that “global cities are about the everyday lived experience of a globalized world” (W. I. Robinson, 2009, 26). Through these internal dynamics, social contestation and everyday politics of urban life we see that research on global cities is a political project that is not neutral, but rather is embedded “within ongoing struggles to shape and reshape the everyday geographies of social, economic and political relations within cities” (Brenner & Keil, 2006, 356).

In considering the context of analyses on global cities, Ancien (2011) asks whether most scholars on ‘global cities’ are focused more on the urban aspects of the city, or on globalization. While she does not deny the importance of analyzing globalization, she does advocate a multidimensional analysis in which we overcome the limitations of traditional global city’s thesis by emphasizing the geohistorical context as integral to understanding how cities are produced and reproduced, as well as where they are embedded in different scales such as the regional, national, and I would add, the local. Ancien argues for a multi-scaler, historical, geographical materialism which allows you to see “an interpretative framework which incorporates a powerful ability to set parts within the context of wholes whilst allowing at the same time for how the parts also construct the wholes” (Ancien, 2011, 2474).

For scholars such as Ancien, it is not enough to simply claim that global cities operate in a network linking them to other centers of ‘command and control’. This hierarchy of globality implicates important historical forces that are rarely considered as integral to shaping the forms that urban centers take in a global landscape. In fact, many critics (Ancien, 2011; King, 1991, 2006; Massey, 2007; J. Robinson, 2002; Shatkin, 1998; Simon, 1995/2006) argue that truly ‘global’ analyses should implicate a range of
factors, histories and forces, cities and spaces that make possible globalization. These critical scholars expand the idea of ‘push’ factors by exploring how linkages and networks go beyond economic decisions in the Global north, and thus consider additional networks, which sustain the formation of global cities. This can be found for example, in Massey (2007) who argues in her conception of ‘geographies of responsibility’, that we need to consider the links between London and the places of origin of many workers who are key to London’s economy, but are a loss to the development of their home countries. Although the connection between sending and receiving states is an important relationship to highlight, we can also question the idea of ‘loss’ and complicate it with an analysis of remittances and the state promotion of migration as a part of formal national development policies. Ancien advocates a less structured, more fluid approach located from the bottom up that allows us to understand “the multiple processes that constitute a global city” (2011, 2476). The starting point for most analyses of the ‘global’ has been focused on the impacts from the ‘top down’ in order to understand how global economic and political processes trickle downwards. However, if we start from the ground, from the lived experiences of city dwellers, and move up and outwards, from the past historical genealogies that are embedded in the contemporary moment that are also shaping futures, we can open up our analysis to a more complex understanding of how and why both material and ideological forces shape geographical developments, as well as human experiences.

The ideological, symbolic and imaginative dimensions of globality are also significant here. In trying to add complexity to the pull factors of the global city, Jennifer Robinson (2002) emphasizes the aspirational pull of the ‘global city’ in terms of shaping not only the common considerations of migrant dreams, but also how these ideas are linked to the political priorities of ‘development’. This developmental trajectory that I discussed earlier and will continue to examine further in the following chapter, is linked to the desires and dreams of being ‘global’, which as Robinson highlights, can orient policy makers to prioritize seeking global status, or reduce the problems of improving city life to the promotion of development (545). From a ‘developmentalist perspective’ many of these cities in poor countries are seen as lacking in city-ness, and thus become objects of Western intervention. These ‘ordinary cities’ as she calls them, should be
understood as “...diverse, creative, modern and distinctive, with the possibility to imagine their own futures and distinctive forms of city-ness” (J. Robinson, 2002, 546). The implications are that,

...neither the costly imperative to go global, nor developmentalist interventions which build towards a certain vision of city-ness, and which focus attention of the failures of cities, are very rich resources for city planners and managers who turn to scholars for analytical insight and assessment of experiences elsewhere. (J. Robinson, 2002, 546)

When scholars continually reinscribe such assumptions, they leave little room to imagine different futures for these cities ‘off the map’. Thus, Robinson calls for urban studies to ‘decolonize’ its imagination about city-ness, and the possibilities and limits of what cities can become “if it is to sustain its relevance to the key urban challenges of the twenty-first century” (J. Robinson, 2002, 546). Robinson argues that instead of pursuing postcolonial critique, urban studies “replicated this division by accepting the categories of world/global city as analytically robust and popularizing them in intellectual and policy circles” (548).

Building on this, we can examine how the criterion for evaluating global city status has significant implications for how hierarchies of global city status are built. One major form of this is the creation of ‘case studies’ that are used to exemplify these processes, creating ‘ideal types’ from which all others can be measured and evaluated. Simon warns scholars to think twice about the assumptions of these constructs as well being cognizant of the desire to ascribe universal ‘truths’ based on Euro/American and ethnocentric experience, paradigms and research (Simon, 1995/2006, 209). Critical scholars emphasize the ways that these typifications often reinscribe sets of assumptions and uncritically reinforce Westernized notions of ‘development’ and ‘globality’ that lack historical consideration. For example, case studies of New York, Los Angeles or London are applied as the case to which all cities can be measured in their globality. This in turn ends up creating and upholding particular standards and ways of being that are then enacted by various globalizing cities as the exemplary and primary mode of inclusion. Additionally, since a sole focus on the “global functions and connections, economic and financial, means that more cities, especially in the global South are left out of the analysis
and off the global map of urban studies” (Ancien, 2011, 2476), it is necessary to expand our analysis and to look beyond traditional centers of economic power and towards those historically embedded, newly emerging or differently engaged spaces.

For example, in Simon’s analysis of the political economy of world city formation, he examines the ways that these cities are related to international production, circulation and distribution through globalized networks. His interest in postcolonial urban development examines these capitals and other major cities in terms of their “mode of incorporation into the world economy” (Simon, 1995/2006, 204). In understanding much of Africa’s peripheralization, Simon highlights their role as producers for raw materials, which met the needs of European industrial capitalism and imperial ambitions, giving them a necessary resource base to exploit and shaped their development as ‘global centers’ which continues to have important ramifications today in how globality is understood and experienced. Thus, he argues that globalization is a fundamental aspect of world cities, and that various parts of the Third world are embedded and incorporated through differentiating criteria which is often tied to exploitation and unequal exchange (Simon, 1995/2006, 208). With this analysis however, he is cognizant to avoid the idea that Sub Saharan Africa for example, is particularly destined to remain peripheral and instead asks what meaning the ‘world city’ has for different inhabitants, and in particular, the most marginalized. This can also be considered through a methodological commitment to shifting our vantage point to engage with the everyday experiences and dreams of various migrant groups and their interactions and relationships to the city’s globalizing developmental efforts.

Ancien (2011) provides an interesting argument for the ‘political deficit’ that can be found in global city literatures, whereby there is a “very limited understanding of the processes and conditions that underlie, enable and constrain the production and reproduction of global cities” (2477). However, the growing focus on networks of cities, exemplified through concepts such as “globalizing cities” (Marcuse & van Kempen, 2000), or ‘Cities in globalization’ (Taylor, 2004), helps to highlight the processes of becoming, rather than solely on the materiality of places.

In addition, Ancien pushes scholars to consider more fundamentally the uneven geographical patterns of development. Here, a more complex understanding of
accumulation in relation to the particular histories and geographies of specific global cities are required. Thus, they are “characterized by particular spatialities of power and their legacies beyond and within the city” (Ancien, 2011, 2479). Following David Harvey (1984) she powerfully articulates the need to explain the “ensembles of relations, conditions and constraints over time and how they are both produced through particular spatial configurations and in turn produce certain geographies of capitalist development” (Ancien, 2011, 2479). The emphasis on multi levels of analysis, located through multiple spatialities (geographies), and most importantly over time and through an understanding of ‘historical geographies’ is key. This is heavily related to the argument for a methodology examining geographies and genealogies of globalization and migration. For example, as she states, Britain’s imperial history and its legacy are also “critical to understand the social reproduction of labour in the global city” (Ancien, 2011, 2480).

While much of Ancien’s work provides important insights into the history of capitalist development and related patterns of uneven geographical development, her analysis is again centered on the economic sphere without a critically engagement with regimes of power related to race, gender, or nationality as they impact and shape the experiences of diverse migrants in global cities.

Another significant aspect of this discussion that is often missed is the role of discursive and ideological power. In this sense, the state is an important actor not only in the material production and reproduction of the global city by also for discursive production. This can seen for example through state rationales that are utilized to support capital and the capitalist class, but also the ways in which the state understands its relationship to labour and migration. The state holds power to “provide the dominant social imaginary… in which policy issues are framed, political subjectivities mobilized and judged to be legitimate, rational” (Ancien, 2011, 2484). In fact, while global cities continue to be analyzed for their role in the global economy, increasing backlash has been documented in terms of conservative, racist and xenophobic notions of citizenship, belonging and national identity, which are also important in shaping the experiences of migrants, and in particular, the most precarious workers. I would also add here that the ideological apparatus of the state is significant for also defining and reproducing its
identity in the international system and within the global urban hierarchy. For example, the self-promotions of many emerging global city centers, such as Dubai can be highlighted here and the powerful role that ideology plays in constructing subjects. Thus, pushing the idea of the geohistorical context further, we can consider how in many instances, global cities are defined as an objective reality operating outside the social construction of meaning (M. P. Smith, 2001/2006, 378), which must be problematized.

Recognizing the geohistorical context also means understanding the linkages over time that are seen in analyses of globalization to link processes of economic and political imperialism to older forms of colonialism and development which are embedded in contemporary processes of global integration. In addition, the particular ways that assumptions based on linear, Eurocentric teleological assumptions create historical referents seems to erase their origins, making them appear neutral and devoid of historical context and meaning. This is linked to critiques by scholars such as Anthony King (1991), who argue that much global cities research has been dominated by a form of cultural imperialism grounding in western cultural forms and intellectual paradigms. In emphasizing the importance of these interventions I would highlight the need to challenge Eurocentric categories and narratives, which dominate a normative framework of urban studies on global cities. Anthony King explores how the emergence of knowledge regimes about the international, were in fact established through European hegemony in both the metropole and colonies, bringing the world under the Anglophone Euro-American cultural sphere. King argues that colonial legacies are embedded in the spatial structure of many postcolonial cities and argues that these legacies impact contemporary structures of power. In his discussion of analyses of globalization, King highlights the ways in which much of this work has attempted to correct earlier Eurocentric and ahistorical analyses by examining the viewpoint of those outside of the West, tracing earlier Islamic phases of globalization before European hegemony and tracing “1950s postcolonial globalization” (King, 1991/2006, 320).

In examining the impacts of imperialism and colonialism in relation to the historical forces of global urbanization, King argues that what we see as ‘global cities’ today are just the contemporary round of such formation in a long history of transnational influences of urban development. In his analysis of the formation of British cities he
argues that while colonial expansions influence on industrialization and capital formation is acknowledged, the urban and environmental implications of this are not, thus he states that “just as the emerging industrial system of Britain assumed its place in a developing international division of labour that is both social and spatial, so also the urban and environmental forms that result from this single, international system and global system of settlement and build environment” (King, 1991/2006, 197). Thus, all cities have historical forces of urban development that are linked to international production and consumption that shapes the international division of labour. Understanding the role of different cities also helps to explain the ways in which they are built. This can be seen for example in the ways in which colonial urban systems linked the interior of countries to ports, which in turn were linked to each other and then to the metropole (King, 1991/2006, 199). Just as cities have historical factors for their development, contemporary physical and spatial infrastructures in networks of global cities is also tied to restructuring of the social, cultural and political order, “through the creation of centers supporting new modes of consumption and transformation through ‘modernization’ and commodification, of social, cultural and political consciousness” (King, 1991/2006, 199).

Importantly then, as King explores, the colonial system was not just about the economy, but also political, ideological, social and cultural system, all of which, “need to be recognized if we wish to understand the way in which strands of yesterday’s colonialism are woven into, and influence the fabric of today’s world-economy and politico-cultural system” (King, 1991/2006, 201). We need to see the urban development of cities as part of the larger world system (Wallerstein 1974) whereby built environments are both a product and resources for understanding global processes.

King is also interesting in the ways in which cities are either grouped as ‘world cities’ or not, especially in regards to the current criteria being used to evaluate them such as the focus on APS. For King, recognizing the historical imperial and colonial origins and legacies of many world or global cities today is not just about getting the facts right, it is instead important “to draw attention to the ‘world city paradigm’ and its framing within a narrowly restrictive framework or urban political economy. And also to highlight the ahistorical and analytically feeble nature of the category of ‘global city’” (King, 2006, 321)
The postcolonial cultural, and economic linkages of world cities are also important for understanding world cities in the West. A major example of this can be seen through migration patterns to world cities, whereby historical, cultural and political power relations shape patterns of migration. For example, the relationships between cities in Europe and North America to migrant sending nations in the ‘Third world’, postcolonial societies, are shaped by their colonial histories which in turn shape their current relationships to power (King, 2006, 332). To analyze the historic and symbolic aspects of these power relations, King examines some key signs through architecture and buildings, for example. This is an interesting aspect of global city status whereby cities become invested in a contest and grouping with other cities, with whose ideas of modernity they share. This can be seen for instance through the building of Burj Khalifa, Taipei 101 or Jakarta Tower as spectacular architectural feats confirming the modern developments and globality of these cities. Interestingly, this type of ‘spectacular’ development has become emblematic of a postcolonial condition whereby for instance, a British architect remarked that if Malaysia’s Petronas Tower were built in the West it “would confirm the status of Britain as Third World country” (King, 2006, 323). Thus, this conceptualization of newly emerging global cities as suffering from ‘second city syndrome’ highlights the role of the modern ‘high rise’ as “prototypical sign of the global city” in the postcolonial period of many non-western global cities (King, 2006, 323).

Examining globalization through this critical lens importantly questions whether the social and spatial polarization, which is often highlighted as a key characteristic to the contemporary ‘world’ or ‘global city’, “is simply a continuation of the social, spatial, and racial divisions occupied by colonized and colonizer in the earlier layout of the city” (King, 2006, 324). King asks some significant questions, which ask us to critically examine what places are labeled as ‘world’ or ‘global’ cities “not only from a world outside the West, such as Asia, but also from a time, such as the future, that is beyond the present” (King, 2006, 324).

Building on this, Robinson (2002) provides a postcolonial critique of dominant urban studies approaches to global city theory arguing that mainstream approaches continue to implicitly be grounded in Euro-American, or Western bias in their normalization of the key features of what a ‘global city’ represents. She calls for us to
break free of the “categorizing imperative” that reinscribes many Western dominated forms of knowledge. The focus of her analysis is the ways in which those cities of the global South, those ‘off the map’, are seen as lacking the qualifying characteristics of ‘global city’ status and development. She argues for the need for contextual and historical analysis that challenges the epistemological shortcomings of the entire global city theory apparatus, which is premised upon on static, decontextualized categories and typologies. For her, the relevance of a city in the global urban hierarchy should not only be based on the location of transnational corporate activities but a range of global-local linkages. She argues that the un-reflexive use of categories such as ‘global, ‘world’, and ‘third world city’ limit our thinking and instead replace diversity with the unstated experiences of a few, small group, of mostly Western cities. In this way, cities that exist outside of the West are assessed in terms of this pre-given standard of ‘world city ness’ or ‘urban economic dynamism’ (J. Robinson, 2002, 532).

In addition, Robinson (2002) points out that while many scholars claim to emphasize connections and not characteristics/attributes, they tend to analyze in relation to a priori analytical hierarchies. Thus, scholars often reinscribe global hierarchies through their epistemologies, which normalize categories of globality through the creation of benchmarks which are then used to measure all Others without historical analyses that reveal the deeply embedded nature of these cities ‘off the map’ as actual integral to the making and maintaining of cities at the ‘top’.

In considering how this reorientation may help reveal globality in other ways, Robinson highlights the role of ‘development’ through understandings of the role of the IMF and WB, SAPs and their impacts. These alternative global connections which suggest that while global links may be changing, “It is quite another to suggest that poor cities and countries are irrelevant to the global economy” (J. Robinson, 2002, 538). In fact, as we see through our analysis, they are integral. In another example, we see that when we change the criteria for ‘globality’ we may in fact find those same cities currently ‘off the map’ at the center of our map. As Robinson highlights for example, mineral extraction which is crucial to the global economy is done in some of the world’s poorest countries, and if we change our view we will instead see that these places, rather
than being irrelevant or peripheral to the global economy, are in fact “central to sustaining it…” (J. Robinson, 2002, 538).

Linking knowledge production to policy, Robinson highlights how the drive to become global is based on calculated attempts that have had devastating impacts in terms of service provision and redistribution. An example is the creation of Export Processing Zones (EPZs), which are aimed at attracting global economic activities, often touted as a pathway to success. In the name of this, cities and national governments, and citizens primarily, pay a high price to become attractive, like lowering labour standards and environmental laws.

The categorization of a small group of cities as ‘global’ on the basis of concentration of management and coordination denies where success and power come from (J. Robinson, 2002). In fact if we consider the hierarchy that is created through these categorizations, argues Robinson, we find a familiar hierarchy that city managers around the world aspire to become like (J. Robinson, 2002, 547). Interestingly, this literature emerges alongside the growth of postcolonial literature, which critiques categorizations of the world, which are created in relation to differences based on deviations from a Western norm. Similarly, global city categorizations tend to reproduce a particular standard to which all cities should aspire. This is turn has serious implications related to the idea of being ‘global’ and the trajectory of development that is embedded in a Euro-American worldview that perpetuates the myth of globality as neutral and outside of the ‘Third world’, generating standards and norms from which all others are judged and displaced off the map. “Global cities have become the aspiration of many cities around the world; sprawling and poor mega cites, the dangerous abyss into which they might fall should they lack the redeeming (civilizing) qualities of city-ness found elsewhere” (J. Robinson, 2002, 548). From Robinson’s critique, the imperative to decolonize the field of urban studies calls us to expand the scope for theoretical imaginings and emphasizes that as with cities themselves, power relations and their geographies cannot be avoided.

Here we can consider the ways in which images of Burj Khalifa (the world’s tallest tower) are used to showcase their globality:
The iconic tower symbolized his pride as an Arab. It would cement his legacy as one of the great Muslim builders. The Sheikh’s project would become the most significant Arab monument since the Alhambra, built in Spain during Muslim rule in the fourteenth century. He would call it the Tower of the Arabs—Burj Al Arab…The Burj’s purpose was to put Dubai on the map. (Krane, 2009, 113)

The symbolic power of the Burj Al Arab is significant as it was envisioned by Sheikh Mohamed as a global symbol of the coming of age of Dubai. Overall we can consider the different ways in which the city is imagined as global, and how this in turn impacts the urban experience from different viewpoints and then in turn shapes and is shaped by the city.

For Grant and Nijman (2002), in their analysis of LDCs in relation to the corporate geography of globalization, they highlight the ways in which Western bias fails to consider cities positioning beneath the upper tiers of the global city hierarchy. They highlight the different models of urban development from colonial and postcolonial conditions. In particular, they highlight the spatial transformations which are important to the time period of the 1980s economic liberalization (Grant & Nijman, 2002, 320). They argue that global firms are transforming the sociospatial fabric of cities in the developing world, and that ironically, globalization studies embedded with a Western bias is not really as ‘global’ as it should be (Grant & Nijman, 2002, 320). They explore the changing urban geographies of cities in LDCs in the context of economic globalization. They argue that the internal spatial structure can be understood in relation to its evolving role in the wider global political economy. With these important historical forces, the claims to universal validity of world city literature needs to be seriously reconsidered. They argue that just as colonial landscapes exhibited “high levels of segregation of foreign and native commercial and residential activities, the economic geographies of both cities also displayed high levels of functional specialization and concentration” (Grant & Nijman, 2002, 326).

This tension between genealogies and contemporary processes relates to the analysis of macro and micro level processes as well. The tension is integral to reveal the rich nuances, which make up human geographies and urbanization. For example, becoming enthralled in the micro level relationships that sustain the everyday, allows us
insight into those rich complexities that reveal processes of negotiation in relationships between subjects. However, there is a point where scale assumes particular aspects of this specificity that can negate or erase structural, systemic forms of violence that are themselves inherent to the overall system. This can for example be seen in the everyday negotiations, which subjects undertake to rationalize their privilege for instance. Thus, while the micro level analysis illuminates certain things, it can also be used to relativize the systemic and structural, or historical exclusions that are reproduced in the everyday through the negation of its structural or institutionalized forms of violence. This can be seen for example through the individualized justifications that are used to rationalize the choice to hire particular nationalities to perform specific types of labour. Or the ways in which it is often heard that many believe maids to be treated badly, however this is never seen as a structural feature of the system, but rather is isolated as a problem of individual employers who chose to treat their maids this way. This is interesting because it highlights the ways in which violence becomes the exception, rather than the norm. This narrative in turn serves to absolve responsibility for the many, by denying the systemic or institutional factors that facilitate the systemic exclusion and violence against workers.

In considering rethinking ideal or model global cities, we can turn to an examination of labour in more detail to understand how the formation of working conditions within low income communities is tied to the massive expansion of informal labour conditions and downgrading of working conditions related to macroeconomic and spatial shifts in the urban labour market. For Buechler (2006) a methodological commitment to interviewing workers as a means to understand everyday experiences of engagement reflects a ‘globalization on the ground’ perspective. Her basic argument reiterates the idea that low income communities are an integral part of globalizing cities, and not only the financial districts that are normally the focus of the global economy. Rather than focusing on a narrow conception of the ‘global city’, Buechler focuses on broader dimensions of globalization to explore the spread of neoliberal ideologies, the growth and power of TNCs, growing unemployment and its impacts on labour conditions in the Third world. In particular, she highlights global trends such as growing international competition that has increased downward pressures on prices which in turn justifies low cost and outsourcing. Importantly, she pushes an understanding of the
different functions of various within a broader single economy, whereby for example, street vending, homework, or work in MNC banks, should all be viewed not as belonging to different economic spheres, but rather as components of a single global economic system. This is significant as it reinforces the mutual interdependence of these seemingly distant socio-economic systems. In addition, the international aspect of this analysis highlights the multiple outcomes and functions of the spread of neoliberal economic globalization which has consequences in both ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ states, in both the global city and its alleged ‘periphery’, which both operate together and rely on each other for their existence.

Interestingly the majority of urban studies research reviewed here assumes the rights of citizens to, however minimally, claim entitlements from the state. In many discussions, one key tension can be found between city subjects (citizens of the state) to make claims and challenge the policies and practices of the state, and the global positioning of the city. However, these ideas need to be considered in relation to neoliberal trends in citizenship and immigration policy as they relate to labour and migration. Here the idea of migrant labour as temporary, disposable and peripheral is continually overlooked with limited consideration of different immigration regimes and how this impacts the political participation of low waged migrant workers.

In broadening the scope of global cities beyond the traditional focus on cities in the industrialized West, is a rich and interesting body of research on globalizing Asian cities. Anne Haila (2000) discusses the traditional focus of Western scholars on ‘villages’ in Asia, and aim to bridge the gap between Asian studies focuses on villages and Anglo-American studies on cities. Interestingly, Haila notes “the more I have understood the land-lease system in Singapore and Hong Kong, the more I have understood the new policy of new home town Helsinki to sell its landed properties…” (Haila, 2000, 2142). Thus, she highlights that there are trends being spearheaded by emerging global cities that make other contexts intelligible. This pushes us to examine the underlying logic and motivating force behind these global trends, despite, as she argues, our limited vocabulary to speak of them.
Shin and Timberlake (2000) explore the growing world cities of Asia presenting an overview of export-oriented industrialized Pacific Asian countries such as Japan, NICs, ASEAN and China. Focused on mapping the ‘structural’ relationships among cities, they highlight that these new economic regions are “spatially defined by networks of cities that may be more closely linked to cities in other countries than with other cities in their own countries” (Shin & Timberlake, 2000, 2260). In comparison to what they identify as the top Western global cities of New York, London, Paris, Amsterdam and Los Angeles, they also highlight Tokyo, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taipei, Seoul, Osaka, Manila, Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur. It is said that this ‘new Pacific rim division of labour’ spearheaded by Tokyo as the head of the world financial command center, has become a ‘capitalist archipelago’ characterized by large reserves of low cost and highly industrious labouring masses (Shin & Timberlake, 2000, 2259).

Furthermore, Olds and Yeung (2004) echo the criticism of world city theory as being limited by case studies in the US, UK and Japan. They argue for the need to expand global cities research to challenge the origins of the world cities theory based in an Anglo-American worldview. They add complexity to the categorization of global cities by differentiating three major ‘types’. Hyper global cities referring to ‘classic’ global cities such as NY, London and Tokyo; emerging global cities in which national or local social forces and institutions are attempting to position themselves strategically in global economic system; and global city states such as those contexts of Singapore and HK which have unique institutional and socio-spatial arrangements (Olds & Yeung, 2004). They argue that the globalization of urbanization is happening along differential, contextually specific pathways. By this they mean to emphasize the differential paths through which cities globalize or are globalized.

Recognizing the historically and geographically specific ways through which ‘other’ global cities are formed allows us to understand how they are transformed and extended. If we follow this call, we are able to connect cityscapes to the historic and contextual considerations, which make them possible and to how globalized networks, images and ideologies shape their ‘globality’ within the global urban hierarchy.

Firstly, ‘hyper global cities’, for Olds and Yeung, have been historically integrated into a hierarchy of regional, national and global economies. These cities are
not only linked to their immediate global city region, but also engaged in competition with other city regions in the country. They argue that the level of competitiveness is shaped by the city’s role and function within the global city network, which transcends its specific context. Furthermore, in the context of those striving to become global cities, characterized as ‘emerging’, they highlight the ways in which significant resources and inputs from home countries and multilateral institutions are utilized to reach these particular developmental agendas. While these cities, such as Malaysia and Shanghai, do not facilitate outwards flows of surplus capital, they deploy substantial resources in the goal of transforming these cities into ‘global’ cities. The significance of this category can be contextualized within the current globalizing era, marked by postcolonial development in many ‘developing’ countries that are “engaging in discursive practices and mobilizing disproportionate material resources to construct representations of entrepreneurial global cities” (Olds & Yeung, 2004, 507).

In the case of the final category of Asian ‘global city states’ such as HK and Singapore we see unique historical and geographical realities because of the ways that the state “is contained with fully urbanized and spatially constrained territorial unit” (Olds & Yeung, 2004, 507). Thus, they are unique in their geography, as they do not have an immediate hinterland within the same national territorial boundaries. They are also heavily shaped by policies related to the strong financial role played by the state. They argue that these city-states are unique from hyper global cities in some fundamental ways. For example, these city-states have the ability to legitimize strategic resources to meet national objectives in ways unseen by other contexts, for example, in the lack of tension between national and urban politics. As Olds and Yeung argue there are no ‘intra-national regions or cities competing for material resources. Thus, the focus is on the strengths or weaknesses of policies rather than intra-national units who are more or less deserving of attention or resources (Olds & Yeung, 2004).

Interesting for our broader discussion is the ways in which both examples are products of colonialism and postcolonial political dynamics. Their colonial histories helped to shape their connections to global economy and built “an openness to constant change and outward oriented and relatively cosmopolitan sensibility”, as well as laying foundations for the “legal, linguistic and technology foundations for integration in to the
contemporary global economy” (Olds & Yeung, 2004, 510). In the case of these global city-states, we see a challenge to discussions in globalizations studies of the end of the nation state and instead witness key examples of the mere reshaping of this role. They highlight an interesting consideration of the ways in which some global city states, as well as having a role as command control nodes, are governed by a developmental agenda that may put the “global logic of capital above the local/national interests of citizens” (Olds & Yeung, 2004, 511). In this sense, state developmentalism may significantly impact the prioritization of a particular agenda. As a case study of Singapore highlights, there are a multitude of ways in which state directed institutions, policies, programs and projects have emerged to promote particular outward investment processes based on historical underdevelopment.

Another significant consideration for our broader analysis here is the form of immigration policies, which are tightly managed to facilitate particular labour market restructuring to meet the city’s needs. The level of control over the social and political life of citizens is also marked. Overall in this case you see the ways in which the “nation state becomes the city and the city becomes the (nation) state” (Olds & Yeung, 2004, 513).

In considering what differentiates Asian global cities from others, Hill and Kim (2000) discuss the role of the ‘developmental’ state in East Asian cities, highlighting the differences this implies from paradigmatic case studies such as NY or London. They argue that these differences undermine the applicability of global city theory beyond market focused, Anglo American world. As examples, they highlight Tokyo and Seoul which diverge from this ‘global standard’ due to the “lack of extensive urban socio-spatial polarization, the embeddedness of local financial institutions and the national industrial fabric, the persistence of manufacturing industries in the city, continued role of activist national governmental policies and national political elites in guiding urban development” (Child Hill & Kim, 2000, 170). Hill and Kim (2000) challenge the claims of global cities theorists such as Freidmann and Sassen who believe in a single global system that is superimposed on nation-states which are losing importance as a result, and instead argue for view of contemporary capitalism that sees that “the world’s major cities are strongly influenced by the national development model and regional context in which
each city embedded” and therefore not a singular overarching global regime (2188). These fundamental differences between contexts mean that understanding Tokyo and Seoul for example, necessitates a different understanding of the world system from the globalist version.

Gavin Shatkin (1998) builds this analysis in the case of ‘fourth world’ cities in the global economy, many of which he locates in ‘globalizing Southeast Asian city-regions’. Building his analysis against the tendency of global city theorists (Castells, 1993/2006) to argue that SSA, Asia and Latin America have been “structurally irrelevant to world economy” (Shatkin, 1998, 378). However, as Shatkin argues, these cities are shaped by global economic processes, even without significant foreign direct investment (FDI).

The econocentric focus on FDI as a marker of a city’s relationship to the global economy was heavily influenced by the 1980s rapid industrialization and growth in many newly industrializing countries (NICs), China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. However, the exclusion from this industry-led growth, and promoting the category of ‘fourth world’ is problematic to Shatkin as it ignores the ways in which many LDCs interact with the global economy. This can be seen through raw material exports, tourism and underground economies for example. Furthermore, as Shatkin argues, we need to consider the historical legacies that each country carries into the era of globalization, including “colonial heritage and geopolitical situations” (Shatkin, 1998, 382). Overall he argues that while LDCs may not be the main targets of FDI, they remain impacted by and impact processes of globalization. Connected to these insights we see how a related assumption tied to the alleged uniformity of globalization, leading to greater homogenization, is challenged by reality of unequal integration and differential incorporation in the network of global cities.

**Significance for Dubai.** This review of scholarly work on urban studies, both mainstream and critical, with a focus on global city formation, highlights several major contributions that help to create the theoretical underpinnings for the next few chapters. From these considerations, we can ask the following questions: what are the implications of conceptualizing Dubai as a ‘global’ city? How is global city formation impacted by
and shaping lived experiences of the ‘everyday’? How are the global city aspirations of Dubai tied to its global location?

In particular, we can see how the ‘global’ is examined in many different aspects of city formation, not as a geographical location but as a set of processes shaped by multiple scales and temporal realms. As we have seen urban geographers, anthropologists and sociologists have always been interested in processes of urbanization, primarily focused on the West. These studies have generally emphasized studies of larger socio-economic and political changes resulting in emerging urban cultures and forms of social organization. In the contemporary period, the growing focus on processes related to ‘globalization’ has again centered the city as a focal point for social analysis and debate. In particular, scholars locate the emergence of or renewed importance of global cities as important nodal points for understanding shifts in the global economy, with particular emphasis on financial capital and service based economies in the First world. In addition, scholars of migration and labour studies have scrutinized the underlying processes of labour and migration, which make possible the formal developments of cities into global ‘command’ centers of the economy with a growing political presence internationally. Most scholars agree that any discussion of the growing power and influence of global cities, must be understood through the dialectic between poverty and affluence, as growing social polarization and inequalities between groups is a central reality for most cities of this power. In addition, scholars have emphasized the role of ‘global cities’ in supporting a highly mobile transnational capitalist subject. Thus criteria such as air traffic and tourism have become important markers in the capabilities of global cities to allure global elites. Thus, the diverse processes that have been generally related to a particular period of global interaction accelerating in the 1980s has continued to influence how economics, politics and social relations are examined in the contemporary period. Of course, critical works on globalization push us further in thinking about the historical genealogies that shape contemporary processes, thus European colonialism and US hegemony in the post WWII period have shifted the world in important ways. Taken together, these insights help us to understand both, what aspects of the contemporary period are new or unique to this time, and those, which have earlier roots. Through our analysis of the case of Dubai we will see both the acceleration of certain economic
processes that coincide with the UAE’s growth and development as a state, as well as those historical legacies which are embedded not only in the international relationships that have shaped the UAE’s growth, but as those which can be found in contemporary processes of migration and labour which in turn shape notions of belonging, race, class and the role of nationality and labour regimes in the national context.

In the next chapter I turn from Dubai Dreams, and the Imagined Globality of cities more generally, to a more focused analysis on the ‘Making of the Global City’ of Dubai with an emphasis on how processes of globalization have shaped the role of Dubai within the global political economy, and its national development strategies. Within this, I will argue that integral to the formation of Dubai’s policy is the orientation towards the global, shaping its ambition and forms of development, and the formative networks of labour migration that made and continue to make its global city ambitions possible. Thus, through a more focused analysis we will see the ideological forces of imagining Dubai as a ‘global city’ which have come to materialize in formal development strategies and programs.

Part of the difficulty in undertaking this analysis, is that the Gulf often confounds traditional methods of understanding in International Development, Globalization studies, and Urban studies. The division of the world into two prominent political and economic spheres of ‘first’ and ‘third’ worlds has shaped thinking about ‘globalization’, with particular focuses on ‘development’ and colonialism implicating the Global North and South, while analytically erasing the Gulf. Interestingly, as Dubai is also positioned between ‘east’ and ‘west’ by many, we see that the ideological limitations created by this historical divide impacts how and where we can understand Dubai. Interestingly what I have found is that the Middle East in general and the Gulf in particular are skipped almost entirely in these areas of scholarly study and relegated to area studies or IR. It is not that knowledge of the Middle East is not produced, in fact, much has been written and continues to be written about the region, but it does not analytically figure into simple dichotomies of First and Third. Interestingly, this opens up space for discussion of its global location. This present absence extends into other realms of scholarly work once again. In particular the centering of the ‘global’ as Western, either European or North America is embedded in global cities literature, with serious analytic, and political
implications. As Mohamed and Sidaway (2002) highlight, “it is perhaps time to liberate Arabia’s… history from the area studies paradigm and the postwar concept of the Middle East” (622), and as Hanieh (2011) argues, to understand the Gulf as a major mode of world capitalism (2).

Overall, I underscore the importance of the global city and the aspirations and promises it induces, as transnational spaces that showcase the historically embedded interdependences and processes that work to uphold neoliberal globalization, and the wide array of localized, every day practices that work to sustain global processes at the ground level. The focus on the global is significant in this case study because the global location of Dubai necessarily impacts all levels of its development and the formation of national and subject identities. It also informs its location amidst the international division of labour, as well as global ideologies of race, not limited to national boundaries but instead sets of globally related ideas, which find meaning in the ways they are expressed in local conditions, but are not bound by them.

Thus the following chapter turns to a more focused discussion on processes of globalization, which shapes the role of Dubai and the UAE within the global political economy. In addition, it explores a more contextual discussion of the historical forces of development in Dubai, including broader features of colonialism, capitalism and neoliberal globalization as they shape the city. Building from this chapter’s focus on the ideological apparatus of global city status and desire, the chapter considers examples and insights about the material infrastructure, development and economy, as they are linked to processes of migration and labour that together make Dubai possible. Thus, I examine the processes of making the dream of Dubai a reality.
Chapter Three: Making of the Dream I

Contemporary processes of neoliberal globalization have arguably further entrenched global inequalities and relationships between the Global North and South, most prominently seen through growing highly precarious networks of migration and labour. In addition, ideas of ‘modernity’ and ‘development’ have been recast through desires for global city status in non-western spaces around the globe with important and unique implications. The previous chapter established a scholarly foundation for the role of global cities as nodes of capitalist accumulation in the contemporary, postcolonial period, and the role of these processes in creating a hierarchical global system connected largely through cities, paving the way for Dubai’s emergence. In this chapter, following Hanieh (2011), I locate the role of the Gulf as central to the development of global capitalism after WWII, rather than secondary or peripheral.

In this chapter, tracing the genealogy of Dubai’s historical development helps to situate the contemporary form of the city’s globality, and allows us to implicate the continuities of colonialism, for example, in the making of capitalism and neoliberal globalization as they shape the city. Additionally, if as it is argued, dreams are expressions of human emotions that are integral to memory processing, then understanding the background and broader economic and political situation in more detail also substantiates the arguments in Chapter Four that link migratory regimes as a central tool in the making and maintenance of Dubai’s dream at all levels.

Overall, Chapters Three and Four represent a joint section entitled ‘Making of the Dream’. They are organized as such in order to examine the developmental trajectory of Dubai and the UAE more broadly within the regional and international context, providing the historical, scholarly review necessary to understand the ‘making’ of the city over time. In terms of our movement towards dreaming, we consider the deepening of sleep from stage one’s transitional phase between being awake and asleep, and build towards Stage Two NREM sleep. Here the body continues preparation for dreaming in REM sleep by arguably doing the ‘work’ of making dreaming possible. Here, the body’s temperature and heart rate slow in order to repair damage from the day (Simons, 2009).
Current Dubai

It is so different. It is almost like someone built this place out of Lego blocks and expected it to follow the same sort of life as a real place (Sara, Canadian)

They are skipping that step but they are still getting to the same goal somehow. The way I see it is that this place grew up so much from nothing to this, regardless if its copying other cities or wanting to be the best, or being really focused on infrastructure, it has grown so much to a point where I see that they have done so much for the country, putting it on the map. Fine, they are fake maybe, maybe they are imitating some other cities, or building the same looking things, but the skyline of Dubai looks like the skyline or New York…so they did it. From nothing. From Zero. It’s like someone who had no education owning one of the biggest companies in the world. (Zain, Canadian)

Dubai is precisely the sort of decent, modernizing model we should be trying to nurture in the Arab-Muslim world…Dubaians are building a future based on butter not guns, private property not caprice, services more than oil, and globally competitive companies, not terror networks. Dubai is about nurturing Arab dignity through success not suicide. As a result, its people want to embrace the future, not blow it up. (T. L. Friedman, n.d.)

Yasser Elsheshtawy (2010) in his important study of the urban politics of Dubai, asks not just whether or not there is such thing as a Dubai model, but also, whether it is desirable or sustainable. Scholars (Elsheshtawy, 2010; Mohammad & Sidaway, 2012) highlight that Dubai is often touted as the exemplary model for global city development in the contemporary period, especially for many postcolonial states or other states in the non-Western world. As they highlight, Gulf cities, such as Dubai, represent a distinctive model of urban modernity and encompass unique sociospatial dynamics. They are different from classical colonial cities, from other ‘Arab cities’ and from postcolonial cities in Africa, Asia or elsewhere (Mohammad & Sidaway, 2012, 608). Before the 2008 financial crisis, and even after, Dubai had often been cited as a success story in hyper-development and urbanization. In addition, scholars note that the ‘model’ is popular because of its exportability (Elsheshtawy, 2010). Interestingly, as discussed and promoted by international media, the tourism industry, and residents within the city, Dubai is rarely discussed in relation to its historic role as a mercantile city, or the successful diversification strategies that have made it into an important intermediary in trade, finance and travel, and instead the focus is largely on the Dubai brand. These
representations have been globally popularized by the media and exported from Dubai’s administration itself. Furthermore, as Mohamed and Sidaway (2012) argue, Gulf studies today offer important insights for urban studies in their promotion of “spaces of accumulation, consumption and display” (608). These cities are now seen as amongst those spaces, such as megacities in Africa, the Americas and East Asia that have “increasingly defined the experience and meaning of urban modernity” (621). As they further highlight, the rulers of Dubai often describe the Emirates as the center of the world geographically, weighted towards Asia. With this in mind, the authors argue that the traditional centering of the West which posited the rest of the world as peripheral to Western led capitalist urban development needs to be rethought (621).

Representations of Dubai are vast and various markers used by institutions around the globe have attempted to rank and quantify its developments. The range is broad but includes many of the following elements; exact numbers are difficult to find, but a survey of different sources highlights that in 2012, Dubai’s tourism was approximately 9.9 million. In 2009 Dubai International Airport (DXB) received 46 million international transit passengers, making it the fourth busiest airport in the world. In 2014, the government says it became the number one airport for international passengers, according to the Airports Council International, handling more than 70 million passengers in 2014, up 6.1 percent from 2013. Passenger numbers are projected to reach 79 million in 2015 and 103.5 million by 2020 (“Dubai Airports: Factsheet,” 2015). In 2009, Dubai ranked highest in the Middle East, and 11th in the world for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In the same year, Dubai’s investment in the global market was estimated to be around $120 billion dollars through government and semi-government owned companies such as Dubai International Capital, Emaar, Jumeirah Group, Dubai Ports World and Limitless (Kazim, 2010, 87). Remittances from Dubai are estimated to be between 15-20 billion dollars transferred by non-locals in the UAE, broken down by percentage as: 10 percent to Europe, 25 percent to Arab world, 40 percent to Asia, and 25 percent to rest of the world (Kazim, 2010, 87). Between 2000-2009 Dubai’s annual economic growth was 18 percent, and from 2006-2008 property prices increased 80 percent (Pieterse, 2010, 16). At the same time, Dubai ranked as the world’s seventh most expensive office market, more expensive than Paris (Pieterse, 2010, 16). It is also home to the “eighth wonder of the
world’ the man-made Palm Jumeriah island (Pieterse, 2010, 16), and the self-proclaimed, world’s only seven star hotel the ‘Burj Al Arab’. Contemporary Dubai is represented by many superlatives, tallest, biggest, best, highest, the largest tower, largest mall, largest man made island, biggest underground car park, biggest indoor ski slope…” (Pieterse, 2010, 16). These spectacular forms of development comprise the dominant imagery being projected into the world, continuously showcasing its desire for global city status, with a focus on luxurious high rises and endless consumption. These representations were a dominant theme in many interviews during the fieldwork, with interviewees discussing the attempts of Brand Dubai to project particular images to the world that both revealed and concealed certain realities. Subjects used a range of descriptions to describe the city including: fake, materialistic, flashy, superficial, brash, and snobbish. As Canadian expat Sarah said, “Dubai is very indulgent, very greedy, selfish, soul-less, materialistic, flashy, extravagant, fancy, transient, non-committal” (Sara, Canadian). In contrast, Emirati national Natasha discussed Dubai as “Very dynamic, very young, very warm and kind of open. I think generally, for everyone it is a very warm, inviting place… but definitely superficial” (Natasha, Emirati). Building on these insights, Egyptian national, Laura, described Dubai as “Confused, very dependent, ignorant, and unstable”, adding further, “…but I love Dubai”. In addition, Dubai has often been described in the interviews in reference to its youth, its ambitious drive, and its need for attention, as Emirati national, Reda discussed,

Dubai is an attention seeker screaming ‘Look at me! Look at me!’ I have always kind of said Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Sharjah are siblings. Abu Dhabi is the older city, where you kind of listen to what it says, Dubai is the middle child, the total attention seeker, and Sharjah is the humble, cultural one, the educated one, who is going to carry on doing things and thinks ‘I don’t care what other people think about me’. So Dubai’s personality is always the attention seeker. Like that is to me, the perfect description of Dubai. (Reda, Emirati)

Adding to these ideas of seeking attention, Karen, an Egyptian expat describes Dubai as,

Trying too hard to fit in the map, like ‘I’m right here! Look at me! There is my tallest tower, its right there, come to me!’” It’s really trying too hard. Like seriously, come on? The Guinness world records of everything right now are in Dubai. Come on, its not a coincidence, they are just trying so hard. (Karen, Egyptian)
It seems apt that Dubai can be seen as “trying to obsessively build itself into significance” (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 103). Accurately referenced to the reality that up until 2008, approximately 25 percent of the world’s cranes were in operating in Dubai alone (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 122). It has been described as “A new kind of global city” (Pieterse, 2010, 17), described by some as the ‘Bangkok of the Middle East’, ‘The Las Vegas of the Middle East’, or ‘The Paris of the Middle East’. Some scholars and commentators argue that the ‘Dubai moment’ is about showcasing the global integration of Dubai in the broader region, and that it is tied to a sort of Arab Renaissance, a return to the rich histories of the region, with Dubai as the center of a new world, connecting ‘East’ and ‘West’. Some scholars such as Khalaf (2006) have even sought to model a ‘Gulf city type’ based on the articulation of an oil economy and globalization, characterized with additional features such as a sharply segmented labour market that is expressed socio-spatially in the urban structure (Mohammad & Sidaway, 2012, 609). Dubai visionary, Sheikh Mohamed, ruler of Dubai since 2006, highlights the success of the Dubai model for development in the region as tied to a particular vision,

...Our mission is for Dubai to become an international, pioneering hub of excellence and creativity, and we are already striving to make it the world’s premier trade, tourism and services destination in the twenty-first century... Dubai will never settle for anything less than first place. (Al Maktoum, 2012, 8)

The race for ‘first place’ is a dominant theme throughout Sheikh Mohamed’s 2012 English edition of his book entitled “My Vision”, where he sets out the ideological and practical visions he has for Dubai’s global model for success. He highlights a ‘survival of the fittest’ model of racing towards development and ‘modernity’. Sheikh Mohamed’s tone of relentless ambition can clearly be seen as embodied within the physical infrastructure and spatiality of the city in terms of the pace, the style, and the goals of propelling Dubai into the global arena as a leader in the world, providing a hub of finance, trade and travel, connecting the world through its world-class

At the time, however, many criticisms of the ‘Dubai model’ have been tied to the feasibility of this model in terms of sustainability, both environmentally and economically. In addition, it has been criticized for focusing exclusively on a brand based on attracting wealthy elites and tourists from around the world, focusing on luxury high rises and development, through a developmental model that blurs the lines between
public/private whereby most developments are controlled by the state and a few wealthy merchant families. Subjects in my fieldwork often discussed the urbanscapes of the city as uninhabitable for many and criticized the city’s infrastructure for not fostering effective urbanisms. Canadian expat teacher, Sean, exemplified these concerns in the following comments,

See that patch of grass over there that they just put in by my school? Oh! It’s so green, it’s so nice. It takes a barrel of oil a day to desalinate the water to keep it green, but that takes a barrel of carbon out of the ground? It is ridiculous. ‘Oh so its bad for the environment to have grass in the desert?’ Yes! Only desert plants should be in the desert. I am glad I have been teaching you biology for 2 years and you seem to have not listened to me. (Sean, Canadian)

In addition to the environmental unsustainability, many expat subjects commented on the lack of connections between places, often lamenting the troubles they had in navigating the city without cars, which still proved difficult even with the main artery of Sheikh Zayed Road connecting and disconnecting so many places simultaneously. In the case of migrant labourers and those employed in lower waged service industries, the issues of travel, distance and accessibility were amplified by the locations of worker camps on the outskirts of the city, or those who were bussed into Dubai from neighbouring Emirates, who were virtually disconnected from the central locations of the city. The experiences were vastly different, but all amount to important issues with the development and infrastructure of the city. Dubai has been described not as a city in the conventional sense but as a “set of cities connected by a network of highways, where there is hardly any pedestrian circulation and everything is geared towards consumption” (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 206). Of course this dominant imagery of Dubai is self-perpetuated and also based on many sensationalist accounts of a city seen to be without culture, history or belonging for most residents.

When subjects were asked to describe Dubai, many of them fixated on the idea of ‘luxury’ and ‘consumption’, American expat Katie described Dubai as the following,

Its just hotels, restaurants, crazy cars, some of the most expensive things are here. There is a book that I was just reading at Borders the other day. It’s the top 100 most expensive things in the world, and 30 of the things were here in Dubai. Its like seriously, all over the world and it has to be here. The most expensive yacht, the most expensive car, the most expensive license plate. Like come on! Some dude paid 20 million dollars for a license plate. Do you know
about the license plates here? Like the most expensive license plate just has the number 1, like whatever, and some dude paid 20 million dollars for it, and that’s not even the car, that’s just the metal plate. And that is the type of thing you hear about. And then there is the negative stuff say, like people say, like before I came, someone I worked with last year, they said they are doing awful things to slaves there. I don’t know… kind of a mix of stories… kind of funny…like there are indoor ski place… (Katie, American)

Fixated on Dubai as it is being experienced and sold to her, American teacher Katie shuffles between the luxurious side of Dubai, and then makes references to the majority migrant labour force which she refers to as ‘slaves’. Throughout the interview, her demeanor showcased her fear of reprisal for talking critically about the politics of the country, where she often began to open up, critically, and then would self-sensor and shut down quickly. In particular, her fears, as she explained, were linked to the broader context of the Arab Spring and the strong fear of ‘speaking out’ against the government. It seemed there was a dark cloud hanging over the city at the time. However, her weaving of the absurdity of certain levels of Emirati wealth, coupled with her privileged experiences and social elevation in accessing luxury she had never experienced before, in relation to ‘slavery’ and seemingly ‘absurd’ developments such as indoor skiing, all played a role in her descriptions of Dubai. The contradictions of her analysis are important examples of many insights by interviewees, not only because they highlight the complex relationships at play, but also because in her analysis, her privileges are never examined or questioned and are continually ‘relativized’ in relation to Emirati status.

Building on questioning the ‘reality’ of the Dubai lifestyle for privileged groups of expats and citizens, Egyptian passport holder, Laura, born in the UAE, explains her shock in moving to Egypt for the first time during university. She highlights that in reflection she was extremely “naïve, because I thought that everyone was nice, and everything is perfect and everything is clean. I thought Dubai was the real world, you know what I mean?” (Laura, Egyptian). Reflecting on the ‘perfection’ Dubai offers, her reality check came in visiting her ‘home’ country, only to realize the bubble she had been living in. She focused on highlighting that Dubai’s perfection is in fact not the ‘real’ world when met with the ‘reality’ of Egypt’s political, economic and social ‘disorder’ which she viewed as the ‘chaos’ of real life, not found in her experiences of the UAE.
Further criticisms of Dubai can be found in numerous international newspapers and media outlets. Many include highly orientalized descriptions of the region, and most of these criticisms center on the ideas summarized in the following quotation from journalist Escobar Pepe,

Welcome to the ultimate sociopolitical model for the 21st century: a Blade Runner-esque melting pot of neoliberalism and ‘subterranean’ economy, Sunni Arab Islam and low taxes, souks and artificial islands, a giant warehouse and a tourist paradise, life in the fast lane and post-modern slavery. The model spells out an apolitical, consumer-mad, citizenship-free society. (Escobar, 2006)

These criticisms build on the experiences articulated by many interviewees who found adapting to life in Dubai a difficult experience because of its corporate, often sanitized, and highly divided nature. These ideas are exemplified in the experiences of British expat Lo, reflecting on the difficulties of ‘fitting in’ to a model found to be ‘foreign’:

Constantly contradictions the whole time. I think that is Dubai’s biggest challenge now, and it is what will make it a place where people actually stay and not see it as a place of transition, where people will stay and invest more of there time. I think its because you need all of those sides, that’s what makes a city so rich, is its diversity and I think at the moment, they are too much of a contradiction, there needs to be that middle ground where you blend the two together. At the moment, it is not a blend, everything is segregated, and it started to mix but its not fully blended. (Lo, British)

Lo’s experience in Dubai’s art world has given her experience in discussions and tensions between supporting ‘local’ Emirati arts and culture and the divides within Dubai, which are often taken up by privileged migrants more explicitly. This model under criticism is related primarily to the status and experiences of the majority of the migrant population in contrast to the privileged, ‘exalted’ status of local Emirati citizens. In particular, the majority of migrants hail from the Global South, and form the seemingly ‘endless’ supply of cheap labour necessary for Dubai’s development.

Discussion of the social hierarchies of Dubai are described by Davis (2006) with the Al Maktoum family at the top, then the native 15 percent of the population (many of them originally Arabic speakers from Southern Iran) which he describes as “a leisure class whose uniform of privilege is seen through the traditional dress of the white
dishdasha” (Davis, 2006, 64). Davis argues that obedience to the dynasty by citizens is rewarded by income transfers, free education, subsidized homes and government jobs. Below them are the British expats, along with other European, Lebanese, Iranian and Indian managers and professionals, “who take full advantage of their air-conditioned affluence and two months of overseas leave every summer” (64). He argues this is led by the biggest cheerleaders for Al-Maktoum’s paradise, David Beckham and Rod Stewart, as “Dubai is expert at catering to colonial nostalgia” (65). At the bottom of this social pyramid are the majority of migrants such as South Asian contract labourers, legally bound to a single employer and subject to what he calls, “totalitarian social controls” (65). As Davis states,

Dubai’s luxury lifestyles are attended by vast numbers of Filipina, Sri Lankan and Indian maids, while the building boom (which employs fully one-quarter of the workforce) is carried on the shoulders of an army of poorly paid Pakistanis and Indians, the largest contingent from Kerala, working twelve hour shifts, six and half days a week, in the asphalt melting desert heat.(65)

In the absence of adequate labour laws and regulation, little or no environmental regulations and a lack of NGOs, labour unions or democratic political rights, many cases of abuse, exploitation and violence have been documented in local and international media and NGOs. Thus, while the image of Dubai is discussed as based on luxury, the ‘dream of Dubai’ also has a nightmarish ‘dark’ side. Pakistani taxi driver Imran, describes the experience of the majority of low-skilled labourers in Dubai as, “They promise you green fields, but when you come, all you find is desert” (Imran, Pakistan). In his reflection on the dreams of Dubai, he contrasts the ideas that were sold to him back home by family, friends, and recruiters with the reality he found once he arrived. The failed dream included the inability to save and to surmount debts from recruiters, visas, and the cost of living in unsanitary and inhumane shared accommodations with strict controls and regulations over movement, and an overt lack of personal freedom. This can be illustrated best in the pervasive practice of passport confiscation by employers, withheld or delayed wages, and the looming fear of deportation or imprisonment for any union type organization or protest amongst workers.

The ethnic, racial, class, and gender based ‘hierarchy of entitlements’ that has been narrated in many variations to reflect the dominance of national citizens over all
expatriates, who are then subdivided by race, class, nationality and gender to create a division of labour, is easily reiterated by any visitor to the Emirates. As Pieterse highlights, a Pakistani saying sums it up well, “The Emirates in the UAE stands for English-managed, Indian-Run, Arabs Taking Enormous Salaries” (Pieterse, 2010, 17). The hierarchies in relation to ‘entitlements’, by which populations are divided by nationality and class into categories that are given differential criteria for entry, residence, employment, and legal protections, are created and maintained in two main ways. First by formal policies and practices like the ‘Kafala’ sponsorship system that binds worker visas to specific employers, and by the important seemingly informal, everyday mechanisms of identity formation centered on ideologies of power such as race, class, gender, nationality, employment that create subtle and not so subtle forms of social acceptance and normalization of violence, justified through important racialized histories and ideas. This is a significant area to examine in the coming chapters, as the formal and informal everyday realities between groups become untangled through the examination of the genealogies that accompany diverse migrant geographies to the city.

This ‘other’ side of Dubai described by interviewees is in fact being carefully kept away from the dominant global image. As I argue, even though many formal strategies exist to segregate and exclude this poor majority of the population, the obvious and well known inequalities are rationalized through narratives that normalize, excuse and even sanction this structure, and these can all be found in the daily operations and encounters between sectors of the population. Davis has described Dubai as “Milton Friedman’s beach club”, adding that “Dubai has achieved what American reactionaries can only dream of – an oasis of free enterprise without income taxes, trade unions, or opposition parties (since there are no elections)” (Davis, 2006, 61). Similar sentiments are reiterated by journalist Pepe Escobar (2006) when he states,

The result is immigration without citizenship - a model that fascinates assorted American neo-cons and neo-liberal right-wingers, with the added bonus that unlike Mexicans and Central Americans in the US, immigrants to Dubai totally renounce their political rights on the altar of economic improvement. Neo-liberals refer to Dubai as proof that Islam is not incompatible with globalization. (Escobar, 2006)
It is clear that the making of this new ‘Middle East’, as it is referred to by many, is modeled by neoliberal agenda makers but needs to be contextualized through a longer genealogy of regimes of trade and commerce since 500 AD.

A significant point of criticism of Dubai’s ‘development model’ surfaced during the 2008 global economic downturn. The ‘recession’ exposed important limitations in the supposed ‘model’, but also reaffirmed Dubai’s position globally. While the impacts are highly debated amongst commentators, scholars and interviewees, certain important ideological and practical outcomes can be seen as generally agreed upon, such as the idea of ‘debt’, the ‘exodus of migrants’, and the need for ‘transparency and accountability’.

Recession?

Once the manic burst of building has stopped and the whirlwind has slowed, the secrets of Dubai are slowly seeping out. This is a city built from nothing in just a few wild decades on credit and ecocide, suppression and slavery. Dubai is a living metaphor for the neo-liberal globalized world that may be crashing – at last – into history. (Hari, 2009)

In 2009, Johann Hari published an article in the newspaper, The Independent, telling the story of Dubai’s burst bubble. Through the experience of Karen Andrews, a Canadian expat who had been living in Dubai with her husband, Hari reports her ‘awakening’. “We were drunk on Dubai.” Soaking in all the privileges and luxury Dubai could offer, Karen and her husband fell deep into debt, culminating in his eventual imprisonment for not paying his debts – with no possibility of declaring bankruptcy, debt default is criminalized and punishable by imprisonment. She is ‘found’ by Hari, in a luxury hotel parking lot, living in her Range Rover. Hari states, “This is not where her she thought her Dubai dream would end.” In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis that reverberated around the globe, ‘maxed-out expats’ found themselves without jobs, homes or savings, having to flee Dubai, abandoning their luxury cars in airport car parks with notes apologizing. In the sensationalist reports (Bond, 2012; Hari, 2009; Lewis, 2009; Triggs, 2009) that flooded Dubai’s way, reporters condemned the Dubai model for the expat dreams it had promised and then destroyed. The response was highly problematic, in that these expats, having reaped the benefits of Dubai’s boom - champagne to their hearts desire, driven around by chauffeurs, nannies to care for their children, maids to cook meals clean homes, often far beyond the means they had available ‘back home’ -
began demonizing the place. Dubai had duped them; they had been lied to; the once reverend, now ‘backwards’ and heartless figure of the Gulf Monarch had failed to live up to their ‘civilized’ standards. In effect, when things were good, Dubai was a ‘civilized’ Arab city that offered their whiteness the privileges they believed they deserved; when things were difficult, the system was ‘backwards’, ‘archaic’, and ‘uncivilized’. The idea that they too had participated and benefited from said system rarely came into question. As, Karen states in reflection of her time in Dubai,

The thing you have to understand about Dubai is – nothing is what it seems. Nothing. This isn't a city, it's a con-job. They lure you in telling you it’s one thing – a modern kind of place – but beneath the surface it's a medieval dictatorship. (Hari, 2009)

The racist and orientalist descriptions of the ‘backwards’ Middle Eastern city go to highlight the unstable, contingent status of Dubai’s modernity, one tied to its ‘Western’ sensibilities. But as we can see from these insights, expats like Karen, are quick to return to a comfortable place, distancing themselves from the non-white Other when times get tough.

The recession of 2008 brought about important criticisms of the Dubai model, leaving many wondering whether the ‘bubble’ had burst. The dark side of Dubai was being exposed by newspapers and books, such as Davidson’s “The Vulnerability of Success” (2008) or Ali’s “Dubai: Gilded Cage” (2010), exposing money laundering, prostitution, arms trade, exploitation and violence against workers.

The subjects in my study articulated various aspects of these discussions in their own experiences, but as their presence indicated, they did not return ‘home’ like many others, they rode it out and waited and hoped for the best.

Abu Dhabi is the oil rich emirate, and Dubai is not. Dubai is 120 billion dollars in the hole in debt. They went on all these massive real estate projects that they couldn’t afford, and they basically owe all the banks money, and just because they are a country, they don’t have to pay... They are trying to [repay], but you know the point is that they defaulted on their debt. They tried to reschedule their debt, which is what any bankrupt company does. I just, you know… I think its just poor form that the royal families feels the need to live on their extremely extravagant level when they owe people money essentially and are refusing to pay. That doesn’t bode well with me… it doesn’t sit well with me. (Mohamed, Canadian)
As Mohamed continues to explain, the structure of the UAE is such that locals receive intense material benefits and privileges, which, he argues creates a particular attitude and culture of ‘laziness’ that is spawned by money.

I think its BS, because that attitude is spawned by the money they have gotten from the oil, and let’s face it, the tap is going to run dry at some point, and you are going to be left with a giant problem because you know, it’s just not sustainable. People are going to leave and I think what will be left is just a giant shell of a city which is what it is now, to me, with all these massive real estate projects that are not complete, you know, show me some immigration numbers and that’s the reason that the government has zero transparency. (Mohamed, Canadian)

Mohamed’s experience in the financial sector in the heat of the ‘crisis’ exposes many important criticisms and problems that were discussed, such as the vulnerability of its success, the lack of transparency with regards to finance, a lack of government accountability, ‘unfair’ laws regarding debt and bankruptcy, and different/double standards for different sectors of the population. Many have described Dubai as one of the worst hit cities in the world, highlighting the many halted construction projects, layoffs of thousands of workers, debt collection crisis in financial institutions, and the exodus of migrants returning home. The crisis was heavily felt in many respects. Real estate was hard hit. Prices, at their peak in 2008, began dropping below the purchase price in less than a year, with buildings left vacant, construction stopped and were leaving in large numbers. It had been reported that between the end of 2007 and the first half of 2010, available office space in the city grew by 140 per cent – more than double – to 48 million square feet (Spencer 2010). In the lead up to the global financial crisis, Dubai’s office vacancy rate was less than 5%, which sparked a rise in commercial developments. The vacancy rate increased to 22% in 2009, increasing as more offices were completed (Jones, 2014), with some estimates putting vacancy at 50 percent (Spencer, 2010). However, the major focus was on the fact that Dubai was caught in billions of dollars worth of debt, exemplified through Dubai World, the emirates flagship holding company and owner of Nakheel, the largest of Dubai’s construction market, which defaulted and sought restructuring of its $22bn debt. Thus, the asset bubble was said to have finally burst. The Government of Abu Dhabi and The Central Bank of the UAE, came in with a bailout, providing $10 billion dollars to state run Dubai World. “The bailout
announcement calmed the nerves reassuring investors, financial and trade creditors, employees, and common people that the government will always act to uphold the market principles and globally acceptable business practices” (Hasan, 2010).

All of the subjects in this study, who had lived in Dubai prior to 2008, discussed the impacts of the crisis whose extent and effects were felt differently. Emirati national Natasha saw the recession as a reality check for many people. Rather than as the ‘end of Dubai’, she saw it is part of a larger economic cycle that happens over and over again. She compared the impacts to Canada or the US, where unemployment is a constant long-term challenge, but in the Emirates you witnessed it visually as people just suddenly had to leave.

Suddenly you had people who were overleveraged, huge amount of debts, because everybody is living this lavish Dubai life that they suddenly couldn’t afford and you know, suddenly they didn’t have a job and didn’t have a visa, and there were no jobs anywhere because no one was hiring in the middle of the crisis. So unlike maybe the US or Canada where they have to lay low for a while, these people were like seriously screwed. Either they go to jail or they run away. (Natasha, Emirati)

For many scholars such as Pieterse (2010), Dubai’s default in 2009 can be seen as a shock, but not as a surprise. He argues that Dubai’s real estate sector had long been seen as a ‘bubble waiting to be burst’. However, in his analysis of the crisis, he highlights that the breakdown of Dubai World’s debt was mainly tied to iconic projects, and not to the ports and free zone world, which, he argues, were on more sound footing and are the backbone of the economy, not oil or tourism as many believe (Pieterse, 2010, 25). To challenge the fatalist portrayals of Dubai’s default, and the financial crisis, he uses context to shed light on the fact that while the “Disneyland Dubai” may have crashed, the core business model remains sound, in the sense that Dubai still remains a central hub in the region with ports and airports unmatched in the Gulf. As Sheikh Mohamed has said, “People think we’re just building Dubai. But no, we're accommodating 1.5bn people in the central world, here between east and west” (Pieterse, 25). What is important then, is to follow a longer historical perspective to understand the role of the GCC, the UAE, and Dubai in a broader historical period, as well as in the larger political economy and examine its role as a global city in the globalized, neoliberal world economy.
Despite discussions of the degree of impact in the financial and economic sectors, what the crisis most definitely did was shed light on the lack of transparency, weak institutions and legal systems, and the need for better legal rights for expats. In particular, and related to this, many argued that the hardest hit group was the majority of low waged migrant workers who suddenly found themselves without jobs, being sent home without being paid and carrying huge debts. In Hanieh’s (2011) analysis of how the financial crisis impacted the relationship to migrant labour, he highlights how the Gulf was able to spatially displace the crisis by impacting migratory flows in which large state and private companies stopped hiring workers and repatriated thousands through the cancellation and postponement of hundreds of projects (Hanieh, 2011, 177). In 2009, the Indian consulate reported that UAE construction firms had removed 20,000 workers through block booking entire planes (Hanieh, 2011, 178). Hanieh argues that because of the dependence of many South Asian countries on GCC labour markets and their lack of citizenship rights, it was “possible for the Gulf States to transfer the worst impacts of the crisis onto migrant labour and – by extension - the surrounding region, with little regard for its social consequences” (Hanieh, 2011, 178). Thus the spatial fix embedded at the core of Gulf capitalism permitted the spatial displacement of the crisis (Hanieh, 2011, 178). In 2010, figures from main labour exporting states confirmed these decreases. For example, Bangladesh saw a 45 percent decrease in annual overseas employment in GCC between 2008 and 2009, and India with a 25 percent decrease in workers to the Gulf (Hanieh, 178). Even professionals from North America, Europe and Australia saw a 10 percent decrease (Hanieh, 179). Remittances also fell significantly, and working conditions deteriorated leaving workers stranded and increasingly vulnerable to severe forms of exploitation and suicide. For example, in Kuwait in 2010 it was found that migrant workers were committing suicide at a rate of one every two days (Hanieh, 179). In the UAE specifically, local and international newspapers published stories of migrant labourers committing mass (families) or individual suicides due to high debt or unemployment. The National, a UAE newspaper, reported that,

More than 700 Indian expatriates have killed themselves in the past six years, a suicide rate of more than two a week. In the first eight months of this year, 59 committed suicide - and even that figure pales into insignificance compared with
2008, at the height of the financial crisis, when 176 Indian expatriates took their own lives. (The National, 2013)

Deepening financial crisis, lack of security and safety nets, continuous exploitation and hopelessness turned, and continue to turn, the ‘Dubai’ dreams of some into nightmares with tragic endings for ‘Others’. These cases of suicide highlight the extent of hopelessness that many find in a system, which is made possible through their labour, but labels and treats them as disposable.

These tensions highlight the significant differences between the reality for many and the dreams of Dubai that are projected into the world as the dominant images. This representation of ‘Brand Dubai’ or ‘Dubai Inc.’ follows the same popular tale we have examined thus far, and is reinforced through displays such as the one discussed by Emirati ‘Reda’ on the launch of the Palm Island in November 2008,

I will never forget the day the Palm Island opened and it was like a big party. I was in London at the time… but that evening Palm Island was happening, big fireworks and celebrities that came. And a few weeks before, that’s when things were crumbling around the world, the economic crisis had happened everywhere, and Dubai was still going ahead with this multi-million dollar fireworks show. And its like, ‘How obnoxious’ and I was in London… the news I was getting was, ‘we are in Dubai now, and what crisis is this? Things are great in Dubai’. And I was like, ‘This is terrible’ and I am in the tube and people are reading the newspaper, and it’s like, ‘what crisis? Dubai is throwing this big party’, and I am like ‘This is so uncomfortable’. And then they threw the big party and then the following day things are falling a part. Like people lost their jobs and things started crumbling here, its like, was it necessary? It was awful. On fireworks for god’s sake, you know? It’s just awful. This is just so upsetting and infuriating. (Reda, Emirati)

These tensions highlight the importance of considering different scales of analysis, where understanding the broader historical development of Dubai’s political economy can help shed light on the development of the city, while the global context helps to situate Dubai’s development in a broader context that sheds light on developments that are transforming the globe, and in particular for this study, between migrant ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ nations. From here, the everyday urbanisms that are discussed offer another rich and complex dimension for understanding these tensions. Thus, not only do we examine the physical developments, policies and practices here, but also the ideological apparatus that shapes how social hierarchies are upheld and lived.
The importance of these genealogies will continue to be seen through the examples that follow.

**Past and Present: Economic and Political Development in Dubai**

In the late 1990s, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman) had a total population of 27.7 million, of whom 10.6 million were temporary migrant workers – including 7.4 million women - and their families (Shah, 2004, 183). By, 2006 the GCC population was 37 million, or approximately 12 percent of the total Arab population of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, but the economy accounted for more than 55 percent of the Arab world’s $1.25 trillion economy (Elsheshtawy, 2009, 24). Per capita income for nationals of the UAE was $38000, higher than many advanced industrialized countries (Elsheshtawy, 2009, 29).

In 2013, the UN reported that the UAE had a total population of approximately 9.2 million, of whom 11.5 percent were nationals, while 88.5 percent were non-nationals. In other words, the UAE is home to some 7.8 million migrants (Malit and Youha, 2013). Dubai Statistics Center reports the population of Dubai to be around 2.2 million (Dubai Statistics Center, 2014). Dubai is also home to the highest number foreign born residents of any city, at 82%, followed by Miami, at 51%, making it demographically unique. Estimates put the Emirati population around 10% of the population, yet some argue that this number is closer to 4 or 5% (Elsheshtawy, 2009, 213). While expatriates make up approximately 80% of the total population, they make up 95% of the workforce (Khondker, 205). In addition, 75.77 % of Dubai’s population is men, and 24.23 % are women (DSC, 2014). The top countries of origin of foreign-born residents in the UAE are estimated to be India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iran, Egypt and the Philippines.

While each of the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (established in 1981) confronted significant development changes at different decades, nonetheless, as these countries approached the end of the twentieth century scholars argued that they shared many similarities in the development of their socio-economic and political structures, so much so that some scholars (Khalaf 2006, Davidson 2008, Heard-Bey 1982, Zahlan 1970, Kanna 2010) argue that they together constitute a societal type
particular to this oil-rich region (Khalaf & Alkobasi, 1999, 272). In addition to the social composition, drastic ‘modernization’ and economic growth is believed to have led to the achievement of all material aspects of life on an unprecedented scale, while “socio-cultural and political organization remain relatively traditional and conservative” (Khalaf & Alkobasi, 1999, 272). Scholars argue that these relatively small societies within the oil-rich Gulf stand distinctively in political, social and economic terms and are thus characterized as a unique societal paradigm different from “developed capitalist industrial societies or those of the developing Third World” (Khalaf & Alkobasi, 1999, 272). Prior to the accelerated process of modernization and industrialization, the Gulf was relatively homogenous with village and rural settlements. However, they have become leading commercial capitals that are linked to the cosmopolitan cities of our day (Khalaf & Alkobasi, 1999, 272).

In terms of the political structure, the UAE is a federation of the seven former Trucial states: Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain and Fujairah and Dubai. It is based on a presidential monarchy, which has a President and Prime Minister, as well as the Supreme Council made up of the Amir’s (Princes) of the seven states. The two most powerful states are Abu Dhabi, followed by Dubai. One of the most powerful figures in the history of the UAE was former President Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, Ruler of Abu Dhabi who was succeeded by his son, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan in 2004. Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan is understood as the single most important man in UAE history. The history of Abu Dhabi from 1905 onwards was confronted with frequently changing leaders resulting from murders by family members, in contrast to Dubai, which had peaceful transitions. The Bani Yas, a tribal group, have traditionally been the main rivals of the Qawasim, who lost power because of treaties with Britain after 1820. After this time, a succession of leaders took place by means of takeover and murder/assassination (Zahlan, 1998, 108). However, Sheikh Shakbut bin Sultan (1928-1966) finally retained power after the instability, and did much to strengthen the power of Abu Dhabi through successful negotiations with coastal towns and villages (Zahlan, 109). In 1958 oil was first discovered in Abu Dhabi, however the leader of the time feared the disintegration of the social fabric and thus restricted the
spread of wealth, until he was forced out of power by family pressure and British influence (Zahlan, 101). He was replaced in 1971 by Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan, easily the most revered and cherished leader in the UAE until his death in 2004. As Zahlan highlights, at the same time that the extent of oil reserves in Abu Dhabi became known, the British government announced that it would withdraw from the Gulf by late 1971. Sheikh Zayed settled historic disputes with Dubai’s leaders and worked to bring together a federation of seven states (Zahlan, 110-111).

The present ruling family of Dubai is the Al Maktoum, rulers since 1912 through successions of son, grandson, and great-grandsons of Sheikh Maktoum bin Hashar who ruled from 1894-1905. Under Sheikh Maktoum bin Hashar “a bustling and flourishing trading community was thus established well before the oil era began” (Zahlan, 2002, 112). Sheikh Said bin Maktoum (1912-1958) was succeeded by his son, Sheikh Rashid bin Said Al Maktoum, who was succeeded by Sheikh Rashid Al Maktoum (1959-1990). Sheikh Rashid Al Maktoum, was characterized as a strong businessman who administered Dubai like a large corporation (Zahlan 2002, 114). He was however, reluctant to give up the individuality of Dubai to join a federation but realized there was no way that Dubai would survive on its own, once British protection was removed (Zahlan, 1998, 113). Sheikh Rashid was elected Vice President but it was soon clear that he and Sheikh Zayed had different opinions of power sharing, with Sheik Zayed opting for centralized and strong integrated administration, and Sheik Rashid wanting more local autonomy. Although there was gradual federalism and integration, Dubai still retained much of its independence.

Sheikh Rashid died in July 1990 and his oldest son Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid Al Maktoum succeeded him and named, not his son but, his brother Sheikh Mohamed bin Rashid Al Maktoum successor. In 2006 after the death of Sheikh Maktoum, the brother Sheikh Mohamed bin Rashid Al Maktoum came to power. Thus, the ruler of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Khalifa is the President of the UAE, the head of state and the ruler of Dubai Sheikh Mohamed is the Prime Minister of the UAE, the head of government.

The political structure as outlined by the government of the UAE is a legal system based on civil law systems and Sharia law, and has both civil courts and Sharia courts. In terms of administration, the UAE is a federation of seven emirates with their own
monarchical ruler, each emirate retains considerable power including control over mineral rights such as oil and revenues. The constitution separates power into executive, legislative and judicial branches, which are divided into federal and emirate jurisdictions (UAE Interact, 2015).

The federal system comprises the Supreme Council, the Council of Ministers (Cabinet), a parliamentary body of 40 elected members called the Federal National Council (FNC) and the Federal Supreme Court. Also, the Supreme Council elects a president and vice president from leads of the seven Emirates to serve for a renewable five-year term (UAE Interact, 2015). The Council of Ministers, the ‘executive authority for the federation’ is headed by the PM, chosen by the President. Many commentators remarked that although it is unofficial, the Presidency is de facto hereditary to the leader of Abu Dhabi and the Premiership is hereditary to the tribal clan of Dubai. Generally this is linked to the financial power of each emirate, whereby the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, the UAE’s main oil producer, is President, and the Vice President and Prime Minister coming from the UAE’s dominant commercial center in Dubai.

The al-Majlis al-Watani al-Ittihadi is the UAE’s legislative body made up of 40 members, half of whom are appointed by the rulers of their respective emirates, and the other half, holding no real political power and seen rather as advisors are elected by an electoral college whose members are appointed by their emirate (UAE Interact, 2015).

**Theoretical considerations.** The history of the Gulf States provides an important connection into contemporary processes and relationships under globalization. The relationships with European colonial powers, as well as more contemporary relationships with the US, have been a major force in shaping the relationships in the region and in positioning individual states in a global network. However, while most historical accounts of the UAE have described Dubai as emerging out of nothing, Dubai has a “distinguished history” whereby it was able to “optimize its limited resources and its geographical position” (Elsheshtawy, 60). In addition, globalization is arguably not new to the region, as it retains a history of long distance trade and commerce. This challenges the largely Eurocentric view of the ‘Trucial Coast’ as one that was disconnected from European modernity until the 1970s when rapid modernization emerged in relation to oil exploration. These representations often miss important linkages not only to colonial
powers but also to precolonial forms of trade and networks of commerce that existed between Asia and the Middle East and which helped to shape certain contemporary processes in the region such as the expansion of migratory and commercial networks.

In addition, arguing that the rapid and dramatic developments that characterize the Gulf are based on historical linkages between the Gulf and the world economy, Hanieh (2011) highlights that at its peak the GCC’s nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was over 1 trillion, just under two percent of the world’s total, and that in 2008, the GCC registered a per capita GDP three times the world average (Hanieh, 2011, 2). Hanieh argues that the GCC as a major mode of contemporary world capitalism, in which processes of class formation are related to an internationalization of social relations tied to the development of what he refers to as Khaleeji (Gulf) Capital, used to describe “those capitalists whose accumulation is most thoroughly and consistently grounded in the internationalization of capital across the GCC space” (Hanieh, 2011, 2). To review these historical influences, we will turn to an examination of different periods in which the ‘global’ has been made and remade in class and state formation in the UAE.

**Precolonial and colonial period.** Roger Ballard (2010) explores the emergence of Dubai as a global trading hub through a historical examination of its shifting role in relation to external forces. In considering the precolonial histories of the region, Ballard argues that while city states acting as trading hubs is not new to the Indian Ocean region, Dubai is unique in that it is a product he identifies as part of the current phase of globalization. Historically, trading hubs emerged as somewhat autonomous city-states, there to facilitate trade and thus became poly-ethnic in character and were largely driven by trade rather than military conquest (Ballard, 2010, 42). He challenges the largely Eurocentric assumption that the post-Columbian period is one which saw unprecedented globalization, rather he argues that while European colonialism eventually “proved to be a major turning point in global affairs”, these ‘achievements’ were in no way “transcribed onto a tabula rasa” (Ballard, 2010, 42). Challenging the pervasive Eurocentric account of the precolonial world as being ‘untouched’, ‘uncivilized’, ‘backwards’ and thus justifying European imperialism and the need for white, Christian salvation, he argues that in fact, “generally speaking the Europeans came relatively late into the field of oceanic voyaging,
compared to their Asiatic counterparts” (Ballard, 2010, 42). He examines complex systems of long distance mercantile exchange for cotton, silks, textiles that linked China, India and the Gulf. He argues that, “By the end of the fifteenth century, levels of prosperity in the oriental part of the Asiatic land mass were far superior to those enjoyed by the inhabitants of its far western fringes” (Ballard, 2010, 42), whereby, at the time, Muslim, Chinese and other networks were far more ‘spectacular’.

In addition, Ballard highlights the role of ‘free money’ from the silver mines of Mexico and the Andes, in making up for the inferior European technology, which had little to offer in exchange in Asia. This conquest provided the financial foundations of the next Eurocentric phase of globalization, which he identifies as taking almost three centuries to complete. When Europe’s ability to circumnavigate the globe became possible, they lacked a basis on which to participate in the markets of Asia because, very simply, they had nothing to sell. Thus, piracy emerged as their alternative option, and through the extraction of silver from the mines of the ‘New World’ through the use of slave labour from Africa they were able to develop a new basis for growth. Ballard summarizes this by highlighting that “Production was low, scale of silver was enormous, and demand for silver in India and China was great. They had finally found a way to buy into the thriving marketplaces of South and East Asia” (Ballard, 2010 48). As Europeans became bigger players in the expanding global economy, new trading hubs gradually began to emerge in locations that suited their priorities, such as Hormuz, Manula, Goa, and Macau, which Ballard identifies as early Iberian favourites, followed by Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, Singapore, and Hong Kong, which came to the fore as the British East India Company built its own favoured hubs (Ballard, 2010, 49).

In this historical account, he identifies that Europe’s limited influence in Asia was due to its restricted number of hubs, but as centuries passed, the profits extracted from their colonies in the Americas grew steadily larger, particularly because of the “ever more extensive use of slave labour” (Ballard, 2010, 49). As Europeans began to borrow and merchandise Asiatic manufacturing technologies, and to invest heavily in military training, the picture began to change. In the 17th century they began to extend activities well beyond confines of narrow hubs, and with military growth began to overturn Asiatic empires. “During the first decade of the 20th century (five centuries after the first phase of
Asiatic globalization reached its apogee), the second (Euro-American) phase of globalization achieved an even more dramatic position of virtually unchallenged global hegemony” (Ballard, 49).

Within this broad historical account of European colonial roots, Ballard situates contemporary Dubai as developing at a time in which many regions of the world that were subjected to two centuries of Euro-American imperialism had begun to “turn the tables on former hegemons” (Ballard, 39). He argues further that Dubai has emerged as one of the world’s most significant trading hubs by playing the role of brokerage. In this vein, three interrelated activities in Dubai are examined: the circulation of value through huge volumes of hard currency tied mainly to remittances, the circulation of goods largely driven by the import/export activities of dhows (an Arab sailing craft) in the Dubai Creek, and by the long distance container port and, finally, in the circulation of people through airports, as showcased through Emirates airline. He argues that all of these activities are linked to a global scale, in a unique plural character where two thirds of the population is migrants, most of whom have ties to the Indian subcontinent (Ballard, 39).

Building on the idea that Dubai’s development is closely connected to shifts in the broader global political landscape, Zahlan (1989) discusses two major themes that characterize the experiences of the Gulf: first, the history and influences of the past, which influenced the rush to modernization; second, the role of international forces and interests on the people and society. As Zahlan states, “the Gulf states were molded and shaped according to considerations which rarely had anything to do with local criteria” (Zahlan, 5). In a similar vein Kazim examines the social and historical construction of Dubai as a globalized city through its role as an ‘intermediary’ in the postcolonial global system. His argument is that the transformations of Dubai are linked to changes within the global system, whereby “Today, Dubai links the Arabian Gulf, the rest of the Middle East, and the former Soviet republics with Asia, Africa and Europe, as well as the Americas, through movements of multinational corporations (MNCs), labourers, financial transactions, goods and bond investors, real estate investors, homeowners, etc.” (Kazim, 2010, 74). Kazim argues that Dubai’s contemporary role as an important intermediary emerged in relation to the departure of traditional colonial powers and the
formation of new states. He situates Dubai within three ‘global’ periods, firstly the global system that lasted until 600 AD, the global system between 600-1500 AD, associated with the rise and decline of Muslim empires, and the transition period of 1500-1800, and the global colonial 1800-1971 and postcolonial 1971- present period. Scholarly works on Dubai’s historic development are best organized into the colonial and postcolonial periods as the city emerges alongside broader global shifts.

Kazim (2010) argues that British control of the Gulf led to the destruction of existing commercial systems and reconstruction of cities to serve the colonial interests (Kazim, 75). Kazim notes the role of the British in the destruction of the Al-Qawasim, and the signing of treaties in 1820, naming the region as the Trucial Emirates. The Al-Qawasim were an Arab mercantile grouping coexisting with a tribal confederation called the Bani Yas who lived in the area, establishing commercial bases and ports. Zahlan argues that the British had a direct interest in the region, as a major route to India and outlines the role of the British as seeking to consolidate their hegemony to ensure no competition from outside interests. The British saw the existing Qawasin tribe, with influence over the areas that are now the Emirates and having a sizable maritime fleet, as a threat to their territorial ambitions. As a response to the Qassimi trying to charge the British for navigational rights in the Gulf, Britain attacked Ras Al Khaimah in 1805 and ultimately defeated the Qassimi in 1819, establishing British colonial rule. Thus as Kazim argues, the mercantile cities had been destroyed by the time of the British treaties, and most of the commercial ports and fleets were destroyed in the war again the Al-Qawasim (Kazim, 75). British rule then lasted until 1971.

Dubai’s growth can be attributed to a dispute within the Abu Dhabi ruling al-Nahyan clan, which saw the Al-Maktoum clan and a group of merchants moving up the coast to Dubai, where they took control and increased wealth by encouraging commercial activities. It is thus seen that Dubai’s commercial establishments are not simply due to the convenient location of the Dubai Creek, but rather to the initiatives unleashed by the Al-Maktoums, who in contrast to their neighbours, largely encouraged trade and commerce (Ballard, 2010, 51). “Merchants from distant lands received a warm welcome and customs fees, port fees and vessel license fees were largely abolished” (Ballard, 2010, 51). By the turn of the century, Dubai’s Souq had become a key hub for
distribution of goods throughout the entire lower Gulf, from Qatar to Muscat, and from Bushehr to Bandar Abbas on the Northern coast.

In terms of British rule, Ballard (2010) shows that British rule came in the form of a series of imposed ‘agreements’ on local tribes, culminating in the signing of a ‘Perpetual maritime Truce’ in 1853 that recognized the sovereignty of five tribal sheikhs (Ballard, 50). This provided them with protection from each other and outside forces in return for allowing their administrations to be ‘guided’ by a ‘British resident’ responsible to the Governor of the Bombay Presidency (Ballard, 50). It is generally accepted that the British Resident, there primarily to ensure that the Emirs, whose authority they guaranteed, were strong enough to resist any piracy, used only the ‘slightest of touches’ in exercising their power (Ballard, 50). Similarly, Zahlan (1989) notes that the British officials living in the region never exceeded four or five persons in the entire Arab and Persian coasts (Zahlan, 22). She argues that they rarely interfered with social and cultural development, and most rulers of the states retained much of their own power and were left to organize and develop along their own lines. In this period, as Kazim argues, British imposed containment is said also to have led to poverty faced by the sheikhdoms of the Trucial Emirates, as shown in statistics whereby at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the aggregated population of the Qasimi areas of the Trucial Emirates was 390,000, which by the early twentieth century had fallen to 50,700 (Kazim, 2010, 75).

The major problems arose from the containment of economy of the Emirates, and destruction of former long distance trade, which left Indigenous populations with fishing industry and agriculture, which mainly met internal demand. Kazim argues that it was through the pearl industry that the British linked Trucial Emirates via Dubai to the global economy by generating demand in Europe for Gulf pearls (Kazim, 2010 76). In addition, in 1904, Dubai was a major port of call for steamers, with the Sheikh of Dubai, Maktoum bin Hashar (1894-1906) encouraging trade by abolishing customs duty and declaring Dubai a free port. Overall, Kazim examines how Dubai was constructed in the context of British colonialism, with the subsequent rise of the ruling class and intermediary merchant classes of Dubai. During this time, he highlights the role of the Trucial Emirates as the producer and exporter of the single commodity, pearls. The period 1820-1945 saw the destruction of Trucial Oman’s long distance trade and the remolding of the
merchant classes to replace the long distance mercantile stratum that had been so significant in earlier periods. Dubai is said, then, to have entered the “twentieth century under the security of the British imperial umbrella” (Ballard, 2010, 51), at a time when significant expansion in global trading networks and the shift from sail to steam were taking place.

This period of British influence, as Zahlan highlights, worked in two major ways: on the one hand, each state had been given sovereignty; on the other hand, they became isolated from the rest of the globe, which is seen as a major reason for the stunting in their socio-political development. During this period, “most of the Gulf states had no recognized legal status within the British Empire. They were not colonies, mandates or protectorates; they were simply described as being in “treaty relations with Britain” (Zahlan, 1989, 20). However, after 1947 with Indian independence, they were then referred to as British protected states. Until independence, the UAE states under British ‘control’ were extremely isolated in their Arab relations, and were primarily trading with Indian merchants. It was not until the 1920s and 1930s that the powers of Saudi Arabia and Iran, and later Iraq would begin to enter the political arena. At this Britain introduced strong diplomatic efforts to contain their influence through the ‘Triple Containment Policy’. Thus, the creation of the ‘Trucial states’ had many important consequences. Each of the five sheikhdoms enhanced political and spatial integrity, and reinforced the security of their markets under the umbrella of British suzerainty (Ballard, 2010, 50).

In addition, scholars (Elsheshtawy 2011, Hanieh 2011, Kazim 2000, Davidson 2008) highlight that these treaties were significant in the formation of the UAE eventually. One treaty of 1922 stipulated that, in the event of oil discovery, concessions would not be extended to any non-British entity, an agreement that Elsheshtawy argues had several implications. The first was the creation of Oman and Trucial Oman, which then divided into separate sheikhdoms leading to segmentation; and the construction of a social hierarchy as a result of treaty leading to signatories and their descendants as defacto rulers. “Through this shrewd policy, power was conferred on the mercantile/trade families who signed these treaties thereby establishing hierarchical relationships - thus giving rise to the current power base of Shuyookh (elders, rulers)” (Elsheshtawy, 2011,
63). Again this has worked as highlighted previously to politically separate them from the rest of the Arab/Muslim world.

Overall, as Hanieh highlights, at the cusp of the oil era that began to emerge from the 1920s onwards, most of the Gulf was tightly linked to British colonialism (with the exception of Saudi Arabia). Each future state within the Gulf was controlled by a ruling family that relied on a network of powerful merchant families and colonial backing. These early families became the proto class that came to underlie Gulf capitalism (Hanieh, 2011, 9). Zahlan (1989) notes that the first major shift in power would be initiated after World War I with the advent of oil companies and concessions in the region. These shifts would come to represent three important early changes: first, the official demarcations of geographical state boundaries and increasing separate and individualized identities through individual state oil concessions; second, the increasing foreign presence from the necessity for both skilled and ‘unskilled’ labour; and third, the new relationships with other Arab states as well as new forms of wealth (Zahlan, 25). Through these processes the position of each ruler was furthered established and throughout the period they continued to increase their power through their growing authority on economic development. It is at this time, during the 1930s, that the traditional economic source of pearling was shattered.

As others highlight with the decline of the pearl industry, Dubai’s merchants in import and re-export of external goods blossomed. While most of Dubai’s merchant class remained interconnected as importers of British goods and other goods brought by British India shipping lines, transformations after WWII led to the growth of Dubai’s government revenues, changes in Dubai’s administrative system and implementation of development projects in Dubai and elsewhere, and the influx of immigrant labour (Kazim, 2010, 79).

Many significant developments occurred in this period in collaboration with the British, the establishment in 1947 of the British Bank of the Middle East in Dubai, setting up Dubai as the seat of the Trucial Emirates council. Establishment of Dubai Municipal council, Police Force, court system, Customs services, Dubai lands department, the Water supply department, the postal department, Dubai state telephone company and Dubai petroleum, airport in 1960 (Kazim, 2010, 80). During this period of Sheikh Rashid
implemented important development projects, and as Dubai’s external trade was rising, Import trade rose from 3 million sterling in 1958 to 81 million in 1969 with the UK, Japan and Switzerland the leading partners. Also, after 1945 Dubai became the center for the re-export of Gold, which the British mined in Southern Africa, transported to Dubai by air, and channeled through the British Bank of the Middle East, Dubai branch (Kazim, 2010, 82).

Kazim (2010) argues that these development projects reflect Dubai government’s role in accommodating import oriented merchant classes and diverse British colonial interests by borrowing money against anticipated oil revenues and using these revenues for implementing infrastructure development projects, with most contracts awarded to British firms.

The post WWII period saw significant shifts as well when oil was discovered in 1966. The British companies to which all these contracts were granted needed cheap labour, which was readily available from India and Pakistan, displaced from jobs in the independence/partition period. Many came from other places, such as Iran, Europe and the Arab countries, and by 1968, 50% of the population of Dubai was made up of immigrants. Thus, in the period 1945-1970, the composition of Dubai changed because of the need for low wage labour to implement development projects Thus, the period of 1945-1970, composition of Dubai changed in terms of workers and merchant, foreign workers began to enter, partly because the largely British companies to which the government had awarded contracted needed low wage labour to implement these development projects (Kazim, 81). The impact of this influx of foreigners worked to strengthen the identity of locals in relation to immigrants, creating a sense of nationalism.

In addition, as Zahlan highlights, oil concessions provided new possibilities for income, relief and political power for the rulers, which in turn allowed them to create the foundations for a welfare state. This is seen through their generosity in socio-economic development projects, while at the same time the traditional and informal relationships between rulers and their subjects was increasingly widened (Zahlan, 1989, 30). Once major oil revenues started to pour in, government became increasingly complex with a growing bureaucratic structure that distanced the ruler from citizens.
Building on the political structure, many scholars (Dresch & Piscatori, 2005, Fred Arnold & Nasra M. Shah 1984, Myron Weiner 1982) have discussed the ways in which older tribal structures based on differences and delineations have been adapted to the modern structures of contemporary Gulf States. Most of the powerful elites, who comprise the current monarchies, are descendants of historical tribal rulers. As Khalaf & Alkobasi (1999) highlighted above, these nations experienced massive wealth, improvements in social and economic indicators, with very few changes in basic social, political and cultural-organizational structures. They also argue that underneath modern structures, these older political orders have largely remained intact, even with unprecedented amounts of oil wealth. All of the states created constitutions after the end of their treaty agreements with Britain. The constitution of the UAE discusses the idea of a society built on equality, social justice, law, order and security, protection of private property, in which all citizens are assured health care, and personal freedom (Zahlan, 1989, 85). Zahlan notes that similar to the history, the “states today cannot be described as absolute monarchies or dictatorships; nor are they constitutional monarchies”. Further, “they are a group of Arab states with a unique political system” (Zahlan, 1989, 89). In relation to this, all executive and legislative power is retained by rulers, including the Council of Ministers, which they appoint. However, it should be noted that they are not believed to retain dictatorial power, as they are bound by Islamic law (Shariah) and age-old tribal customs and values consolidated through the process of ‘Shura’ (consultation) by religious advisors (Zahlan, 1989, 90).

Overall, Zahlan explains that the more traditional balanced relationship between ruler and ruled had been disturbed by the growth of individual and private wealth accumulation from oil exploration. Although the authors do not attribute this explicitly to outside influence, it is clear through an evaluation of this literature that European interest, combined with other Western influences, drastically impacted the economic and political models of these states.

**Postcolonial period.** Theoretically, most analysis of the region and issues of state and class formation in the period following colonialism are dominated by rentier-state theory. Mahdavy (1970) explains rentier states as those that “receive on a regular basis substantial amounts of external rent [which are] rentals paid by foreign individuals,
concerns or governments to individuals, concerns or governments of a given country” (Hanieh, 2011, 428). Examples of this could be rent for pipelines or transportation routes. Originally tied to an analysis of Iran, as explained by Mahdavy, this was a turning point in Middle East when states were able to gain a greater share of oil revenues, which enabled the government to embark on large scale public expenditure programs and other state spending without having to resort to taxation (Hanieh, 2011, 10) and led to government becoming a dominant factor in the economy (Hanieh, 10). In addition, Mahdavy (1970) argues that this could lead to social and political stagnation as the revenues of the government were derived from external rents rather than from exploitation of the population, thus relieving governments from any pressure to implement political reform.

Hanieh shows that several of the characteristics of the rentier state highlighted over time include: a link between Rentier states and autocratic regimes, a high degree of autonomy in economic decision making, and bias towards the service sector rather than value added production (Hanieh, 11). Additionally, decisions from the state are said to benefit elites through redirection of oil revenues rather than by their direct involvement in oil, which is controlled only by the state (ruling family). But because state is no longer reliant upon merchant class for financial support, the state/ruling family coalition with leading merchant families is reworked in the wake of large influx of oil rents (Hanieh, 12).

While Hanieh argues that rentier theory has helped to explain some important aspects of postcolonial development in Gulf States, his analysis departs from this in several important ways. The most fundamental difference for Hanieh is from rentier state theory’s reliance on a notion of ‘relative autonomy’ in which the state is seen as a distinct sphere of political economy, free from constraints of a capitalist class (Hanieh, 12). The problem for Hanieh is that the state is viewed as a separate object – severed from the class relations of Gulf society (Hanieh, 12). Instead, in Hanieh’s analysis, the state is not seen as a ‘thing’ but as particular expression of class formation, which is understood as a set of social relations that is continually in the process of coming-into-being (Hanieh, 12). In a Marxist conceptualization, he argues then that the state, as a relation, operates in a capitalist society to articulate and manage the interests of the capitalist class (Hanieh, 13).
In the GCC, Hanieh argues, the ‘internal relation’ of the state and the capitalist class is more pronounced. Thus the idea of relative autonomy of the state in ‘rentier theory’ is inaccurate.

There are many examples in the GCC, Hanieh argues, in which high-ranking members of state are also a part of the ‘private’ capitalist class. In the Gulf, the state is a reflection of social relations but not the reason for them. Instead Hanieh argues that in order to explain the nature of class formation in the Gulf we must understand its development alongside that of a global capitalist system (Hanieh 16). Therefore, the GCC is not a ‘sealed bubble’ but rather is a regional space “constituted through the relations that exist between it and global capitalism as a whole”, and particularly after WWII (Hanieh, 16). In order to understand this, he insists on a rethinking of the nature of the oil commodity, which is a major differentiating factor in the region. Thus, for Hanieh, oil is not a ‘thing’ but a commodity, which is tied to sets of ‘globally determined’ social relations. Rather than fetishize oil as a commodity, it is necessary to understand the “wider motion and tendencies of the capitalist world market that confer a particular meaning to oil as a commodity centrally located within the reproduction of the system as a whole” (Hanieh, 16).

Additionally, we can consider two key concepts he highlights to help us contextualize and understand the post WWII shifts that are linked to the development of capitalism in the Gulf, namely, internationalization and financialization. Internationalization, Hanieh argues, represents a new set of social relations tied to the interlocking of “geographically dispersed circuits of capital” (Hanieh, 23). In addition, he highlights the ways that a regional circuit is elaborated through patterns of cross border flows, which in turn means that each member state of the GCC is more aligned “to the imperatives of regional accumulation” (Hanieh, 24). Therefore, regional integration has led to the internationalization of GCC capital through new sets of internationalized social relations, which embodies the process of class formation captured in Hanieh’s concept of Khaleeji Capital (Hanieh, 24).

Turning to the work of geographers Henri Lefebrve (1991), Doreen Massey (1988), and David Harvey (1985), Hanieh (2011) also emphasizes the importance of the production of space as a ‘social product that both reflects the nature of capitalism’s social
relations and can also be used as a means of control and hegemony (Hanieh, 24). Building on this work, he turns to David Harvey’s conceptualization of the ‘spatial fix’ in which capitalism could switch between different spatial structures to overcome crisis. This approach then affirms that the way “human beings conceive of, utilize, and structure space is a product of struggles shaped by capitalist social relations” (Hanieh, 25). From this, the production of space acts reflexively on “these social relations by placing limitations and shaping the process of capitalist accumulation itself” (Hanieh, 25). Hanieh argues that the process of class formation in the Gulf has been spatially structured, and institutionally reflected in the heavy reliance on temporary migrant labour and restrictive notions of citizenship. Thus, “this spatial configuration of accumulation has acted as an important spatial fix for Gulf capitalism, helping to maintain the enduring stability of the system as well as enabling a super exploitation of workers drawn from the peripheries surrounding the GCC” (Hanieh, 26).

Post war developments. The WWII period saw some significant shifts in the world system, with the decline of British hegemony and rise of the US, and the anti colonial movements of 1945-1965. With British imperial interests exhausted, scholars highlight that the British withdrew ‘peacefully’, while ensuring that oil concessions remained and that British firms would be awarded the contracts, and that there was a stable political structure to ensure the power of ruling elites and prevent armed resistance (Elsheshtawy, 2011, 66). In 1971, the newly constituted United Arab Emirates emerged, coinciding with the knowledge that vast oil fields existed in the territories of the Gulf. Once operations had been nationalized, OPEC succeeded in doubling the price of oil in the late 1970s with the result that the region’s oil rich jurisdictions suddenly had access to untold wealth (Ballard, 2010, 52).

Ballard (2010) highlights a few important events, which she claims have had a dramatic effect on the structures of these nations. These include the British withdrawal in 1971 after one and a half centuries in the region; the oil embargo that followed the Arab-Israeli war in 1973 and subsequent rise in oil prices; the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran; the war between Iran and Iraq; and, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent establishment of US military forces in the region.
Zahlan (1989) offers further important considerations on the consolidation of regional power, as well as important historical moments that shape the course of the contemporary structures and attitudes of the Gulf. The Gulf Cooperation Council was formed in May 1981, two months into the war between Iran and Iraq. The major motivations at the time were to coordinate a security body, but also an economic integration of the six states, including the UAE, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. It was also founded to counterbalance superpower manipulation of oil prices in fairly lightly populated oil states, and to serve as a council for discussing economic and political issues of mutual interest (Pieterse, 2010, 20). Thus, this regional bloc provided support for their insecurity at the time, and their initial ideas of internal security were challenged with the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, to which no state could offer any serious support. The inability of any of the states to provide minimal intervention promoted their search for alternative protections in the form of the US led UN troops in their territories. Overall, the authors characterize the political and economic level of integration well over the strength of their defence. Thus many of their policies aimed to make the flow of goods easier with common markets, common regulations, a number of decisions to strengthen trade included the removal of custom duties, only a low tariff on imported foreign goods exists, and goods passing from one GCC country to the next being exempt from duties or taxes (Zahlan, 1989, 161). Furthermore, it is important to note that Saudi Arabia has strong dominance in the GCC. Last, some authors go so far as to argue that the “GCC provided Saudi Arabia with the institutional structure to exercise its influence” (Zahlan, 162).

In addition, although the Gulf States were providing financial aid for Iraq, as a fellow Arab state, they remained politically ‘neutral’. However, Iran turned towards retaliation against other Gulf States, with Qatar and Kuwait as its major targets, and more specifically, at French and US interests. During this time, Kuwait was the most vulnerable due to the close proximity and divisions between Shia and Sunni Muslims continued to create further tensions between the groups (Zahlan 1989, 176). In November 1985 with ongoing fighting and bombings, the GCC countries had a new ideology based on the neutrality of Gulf States towards Iran. The contradictory US involvement on both sides continued to create tensions and unreliable information about the realities. Some
authors argue that it was an attempt to create a stalemate between the two while others point to the economic incentives of arms sales “no less than 27 countries had been supplying both Iraq and Iran with the arms and ammunition to keep the war alive” (Zahlan 1989, 176).

As Zahlan notes, throughout the war Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain remained on one side of the debate while the other four members of the GCC maintained good relationships with Iran. By 1984 the US had rebuilt its relations with Iraq, which was now their third largest trading partner in the Middle East, after Saudi Arabia and Egypt (Zahlan 1989, 179). By the summer of 1987 US military presence had grown in the Gulf and it was “said to be the largest assembly abroad since the Vietnam War” (Zahlan 1989, 181). The Mecca Riots on July 31st, 1987, during the holy time of Hajj when Iranian demonstrators protested, caused many casualties and created major disturbances and anger towards Iran, which ultimately shifted Saudi Arabia’s neutral policy. The Amman Summit in November 1987 was a significant milestone in Arab politics as 22 heads of state in the Arab League got together to discuss their security. The incorporation of Egypt back into Arab relations was key for US interests. These deliberations finally led to the UN resolution 598 agreement, the outcome of which left almost everything intact (Zahlan 1989, 183).

Iraqi forces, which invaded Kuwait on August 2nd, 1990, focussed their anger on Iraqi economic decline. This occupation was seen as a major blow to the GCC countries and they looked for an international response, which was spearheaded by the US and the UK. The US refused to acknowledge the demands of Iraq to end the Palestinian occupation by Israel, and on January 16, 1991 Operation Desert Storm began massive aerial bombing in Iraq (Zahlan 1989, 185). By February 26, 1991 Iraq had no choice but to evacuate Kuwait unconditionally, as the US led attack had destroyed Iraq economically, and shattered the society. This was furthered by UN sanctions on imports of any kind, which were devastating to the citizens of Iraq.

Overall, these histories have played an important role in shaping the future of the Arab world more generally, and the GCC more specifically. Since the end of the war the GCC states have spent billions of dollars on arms purchases alone (Zahlan, 1989, 189). In addition, popular criticisms about the US and the Israeli occupation of Palestine have
grown, and are fixated on the continued punishments of the Iraqi peoples. US involvement grew considerably and in September 1991 it entered a 10-year-long agreement with Kuwait to access ports. The US then re-established its Fifth Fleet, which has not been in existence since the 1940s, with headquarters in Bahrain (Zahlan 1989, 190). In more recent developments, the ‘dual containment’ of Iraq and Iran was turned into policy by the US Clinton Administration, and characterized both as threats to US interests. On the other side, the US supported UAE in peaceful efforts to resolve the Tunbs and Abu Musa islands problem with Iran (Zahlan, 1989, 190). These histories point to the ways in which the US involvement greatly differed from that of Britain, which has no interest in internal politics. The questions, left unanswered by these authors because the relatively dated nature of their histories have not touched on the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq by the US and allied forces, are based on what has occurred in the most recent years in the Middle East. For a further discussion it would be necessary to interrogate how these more recent events have impacted the GCC, if at all? And, in what ways does US imperialism shape the future of the GCC?

As Davis highlights,

> In many complex and surprising ways, Dubai actual earns a living from fear. Its huge port complex at Jebel Ali, for example, has profited immensely from the trade generated by the US invasion of Iraq, while Terminal Two at the Dubai airport, always crowded with Halliburton employees, private mercenaries and American soldiers en route to Baghdad or Kabul, has been described as ‘the busiest commercial terminal in the world’ for America’s Middle East wars. (Davis, 58)

Kazim (2010) argues that the formation of the UAE in 1971 coincides with particular shifts relevant to the post-WWII period of contemporary globalization. “Dubai adapted itself to play a new role in this postcolonial system” (Kazim, 74). While Dubai’s ongoing role as a major commercial center for the Gulf continued, he argues, that the commercial role changed during 1971-1995, and then again from 1995 -2010. These shifts are substantiated again by the argument made by (Hanieh, 2011) that Dubai has developed in relation to shifts in the broader political and economic global environment. Of particular interest here are the processes of decolonization, rapid developments in transportation and communication technologies, the growing transnational power of MNCs in the postindustrial service economy, the rise of China and India as powerful global economies, the integration of former Soviet republics into the capitalist system,
soaring oil prices after September 11, 2001, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, all of which, as Kazim argues, have served in the rise of Dubai.

In Hanieh’s analysis, the destruction of WWII and the subsequent decades, which followed, witnessed drastic shifts in the global economy. The ‘golden age’ from the 1950s to late 1960s saw the rise of US dominance in the global economy, in part due to their position after the destruction of much of Europe and Asia. This can be seen in part through the Marshall Plan, which saw some $13 billion go towards European reconstruction alone, and the cementing of the US dollar as the main currency of the international monetary system in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference (Hanieh, 2011, 30). Some additional shifts highlighted by Hanieh include the growing demand for harmonization of laws, regulations and institutions in a period of growing global accumulation. Thus, in this period, US dominance grew, but simultaneously, the conditions that enabled this growing internationalization also were strengthened. Thus, “the position of the hegemonic guarantor depended on the consent of the other rival capitalist powers, which flowed from its ability to maintain and deepen conditions of capital accumulation – and therefore its own strength - at the global scale” (Hanieh, 2011, 32).

To understand the shift in the nature of capitalist production, Hanieh (2011) also explores the importance of technological and scientific innovation, related in great part to growing reliance on petrochemicals, and to the growth in the geographical scale of production. The earlier German innovation in chemicals derived from coal was replaced by US dominance in the industry with the use of petrochemicals and natural gas, and the creation of synthetic commodities (Hanieh, 33). Thus, taken together, these shifts and the growing reliance on oil and gas were initially met by increased American and European production until it was realized that more accessible and affordable oil and gas were to be found in the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran and other smaller Gulf states (Hanieh, 36).

Deepening internationalization thus depended upon the integration of the Gulf region into global capitalism, and for this reason, the underlying basis of US power increasingly came to rest upon domination of the Middle East and the incorporation of the Gulf states into a US-led global order. (Hanieh, 36)
This tremendous role and power of the Gulf States in relation to US hegemony was economic and political, in a period in which there was also a shift away from British to US ownership of oil reserves (Hanieh, 36).

The growing anti-colonial struggles of the 1950s in Iran, Egypt and Iraq and elsewhere became significant in the Gulf as well and were reflected in growing assertions of national sovereignty through control over oil resources (Hanieh, 37). Eight international oil companies (IOCs), five American, one British, one Anglo-Dutch, and one French were owners of oil concessions in the region, for which they paid the ruler a royalty or tax from their production, and then refined the crude oil in North America or Western Europe. Hanieh highlights the history of this process, which culminated in the creation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela). Eventually, state owned companies would replace ownership by IOCs (Hanieh 38).

The financialization of capitalism’s internationalization was in large part linked to the integration of the Gulf region into the broader global economy (Hanieh, 42), prompted by the important shift beginning in 1973 that saw the IOCs begin to give up control of established concessions. In 1972 eight IOCs owned 91 percent of all crude supplies through concession agreements with Gulf monarchies, and by 1980, this control was completely reversed, with IOCs owning less than a third of the crude oil location outside of the US (Hanieh, 43). This meant greater control and influence over the price and supply in the world market. With this new power, the Gulf became recipients of huge amounts of ‘petrodollars’, revenues from oil reserves (Hanieh, 43). Hanieh notes that this represented not only the Gulf’s links to the global economy through hydrocarbon exports, but “also linked to the ways in which its petrodollars were utilized in global financial circuits” (Hanieh, 43). Much of these flows from the Gulf, and particularly from Saudi Arabia went to North American and European banks (often those in Euromarkets) where they in turn were used for loans to MNCs, governments and others (Hanieh, 43). In another way, Hanieh highlights the role that Saudi petrodollars were invested in US bank accounts, equities and treasury bonds. The links between OPEC reserves, the use of US dollars for oil trade and the US protection to Saudi Arabia are all highlighted as important aspects of the US financial dominance as linked to the Gulf States.
At the same time, the role of neoliberalism and its impacts in the Global South are significant to understanding shifts in the 1970s and 1980s, which led to growing privatization, cuts to social spending and worker protections, deregulation and reductions in taxes and tariffs (Hanieh, 46). In the South, Hanieh highlights, neoliberalism played a role not just to impact the domestic economic policies of these states, but also to enhance internationalization and financialization by ensuring conditions for capitalist reproduction at a global scale. The South became important for exploitation of cheap labour and other resources and was linked to the growth of internationalized production chains that rested on the implementation of neoliberal policies linked to loans and debt.

US political and military power in the region was strengthened through the war between Iran and Iraq in 1980, following the 1979 Iranian revolution that removed Iran from US influence. The GCC, put together in 1981, was a major ally of US power in the region and signaled the growing military presence of the US in the Gulf, highlighted in the US military role in the First Gulf War. Hanieh highlights the fact that during the Gulf war, around half of the entire US army was located in the region, and of the total $61 billion that is cost to remove Iraq from Kuwait, $36 million was paid by GCC states (Hanieh, 53). The ‘New World Order’ ushered in by George W. Bush in 1991 highlights these shifts, and how control over the Gulf became a defining “element of power in the global economy”, as well as how the Gulf was a central element of growing US power in the postwar period (Hanieh, 53).

In specific reference to the making of a capitalist class in the Gulf, Hanieh argues that this has been subordinated to and integrated with the extension of US power in the region. The significance this formation is related not just to the accumulation process by owners of capital, but rather to the formation of the labouring class that produces (and reproduces) capital itself, hence the unique formation of the working class in the GCC by temporary migrant workers with no citizenship rights (Hanieh, 54). “Class formation in the Gulf has occurred through its spatial restructuring, and this feature is linked to the role the region plays in the global economy” (Hanieh, 54).
Contemporary period. Pieterse (2010) argues that “Dubai’s façade is iconic, but iconic Dubai is not Dubai’s strength” (24). He contends that “if the GCC is an outlier in the Middle East, Dubai is an outlier in the GCC” (Pieterse, 24), in the sense that the GCC states, except Oman and Bahrain, are oil based economies. In particular, while the 1980s position of the Gulf with about 40 percent of worldwide oil reserves and 23 perfect of worldwide gas reserves was clearly built on oil exports, Dubai derives only approximately 6 percent of its GDP from oil. Additionally, while the role of the state in national development can be seen in the assertion that the “largest 10-20 companies in each GCC country are owned by the state, either in full or via majority stakes (all national oil, utilities and telecom companies, airlines, SABIC, Bourage, Dubai holding, Dubai aluminum, major banks like Emirates Bank, etc.” (Pieterse, 20), nonetheless it is argued that the private sector is growing considerably beyond rent based contracting from the state.

Dubai’s economy is based on trade and services, and its strengths emerge not only from its emerging global city status, but through investments in infrastructure, particularly in container ports, roads, and communication links and networks, in attracting the human capital to make its system work (Pieterse, 2010, 24). Jebel Ali port, the world’s largest man made port, set up by Sheikh Rashid beginning in 1972, and completed in 1976 with financing from newly formed UAE, and inaugurated in 1979 (Kazim, 2010, 83), as well as business parks and free zones, such as Jebel Ali Free zone, inaugurated in 1985, becoming the first free zone to be built in the Gulf region, have established Dubai as an entrepot economy and commercial hub. “The Free Zone was designed to enable MNCs to take advantage of Dubai’s ports, facilities and location, while bypassing the 51 percent local investment allowance that was required of all international investors in the UAE” (Kazim, 83). It is extremely significant, as the rise of MNCs in this period meant that Dubai could become a distribution center for MNCs seeking to enter markets of the Arabian Gulf, the rest of the Middle East, and the Central Asian market (Kazim, 84). The building of Jebel Ali Free Zone allowed for a piece of land within the newly independent country of the UAE to be set aside for special trading purposes, thus allowing MNCs seeking proximity to sought after markets to set up branches there, without restrictions from the host country, or customs duties. Within the
free zones, other extremely significant aspects are the freedom from restrictions on recruitment of expatriate personnel (low wage, non unionized labour) and freedom of companies, for the first 50 years, and with rights to renew, to repatriate 100 percent of capital and profits, free from corporate taxes (Kazim, 84).

Thus, Dubai is understood as “the commercial and tourist hub of a region that encompasses [the growing] markets of South Asia, emerging Africa, oil-rich Russia and the Gulf states, Iran, Central Asia and [the] Caucasus, Europe and China” (Pieterse, 24). With this new diversified economic structure, sectors in petrochemicals, heavy industries, utilities, services and tourism continue to grow (Pieterse, 19). He notes that for decades oil revenues left the region for “Swiss banks, American arms, luxury consumptions and investments in the West” (Pieterse, 19), but from this earlier pattern, the Gulf has emerged as a major region for accumulation, breaking with earlier patterns of ‘rentier’ economies.

Ballard (2010) highlights the growth of financial services within Dubai as a result of the influx of migrant workers needing to remit money back home. Dubai’s forms of finance, in conjunction with well established trading networks, are able to provide these services more reliably and cheaply than the British Bank of the Middle East, which was initially the only European-style bank in town (Ballard, 61). As construction projects grew, so migration patterns increased, and the demand for value transfer services grew as well. Dubai was well placed to act as settlement hub through which resultant flows of liquidity could be brokered and redistributed on a global scale (Ballard, 61). The exchange houses of Dubai emerged as a major hub in the global financial services sector, operating largely, but not exclusively, on behalf of an Asian clientele (Ballard, 64). It is estimated that migrants in the UAE transfer $15-20 billion yearly to respective countries as remittances (10 percent to Europe, 25 percent to Arab world, 40 percent to Asia, and 25 percent to rest of the world) (Kazim, 87).

Furthermore, linkages between Dubai and the West have been apparent, but the growing importance of Dubai within a network of cities in Asia such as Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Mumbai as major financial centers and ports is significant. Linkages between the Gulf and Asia continue to increase and, while still tied to oil, they are becoming increasingly tied to investments in infrastructure, construction, telecoms
and other financial links. This ‘East’- ‘East’ cooperation has been referred to as the ‘new Silk Road’, where oil is the new silk and these emerging global cities have been described as “going global by going east, not west” (Pieterse, 27). However, the interdependencies of the global capitalist system may suggest a more interconnected system, rather than a bi-polar one. This is furthered by Hanieh’s critique of traditional analyses’ ‘methodological nationalism’, typified in examinations of the Middle East, that works under the assumption that the nation-state is a self contained unit, and thus neglecting the interconnected and interdependent nature of the national scale with regional and international scales. Shifting to a more relational understanding of these relationships helps provide a nuanced understanding of global capitalist development as it implicates the historic and contemporary role of the Gulf in the world economy.

Dubai’s trading relationships shift after 1980 with trade during the colonial period based primarily on imports and exports from and to the West, and Japan; and since the 1980s, with Europe and Asian countries, for almost equal shares of total monetary value of UAE imports, with by 1991 the share of Asian countries surpassing that of European countries (Kazim, 85). This highlights for Kazim, that the postcolonial period saw a break with older patterns with colonial powers in that the diversification of the UAE economy generated new patterns with the emerging powers. Overall then, these shifts go to show how the role of Dubai as commercial city changed in relation to the postcolonial global system, whereby Dubai sought to accommodate the new system being developed by MNCs (Kazim, 85).

Overall, then, in the twenty first century, Dubai is also seen as product of three major factors: firstly, that it is located in an oil-rich region, and is immediate neighbour to Abu Dhabi, whose ruling family share common ancestry with the al-Maktoums, hold close to ten percent of global oil reserves, and thus securing financial capital for the foreseeable future; second, its location is ideal for establishment of a global aviation hub; and third, Dubai’s globally networked entrepreneurs have utilized the power of telecommunications to engage in networks of globalization (Ballard, 60).

The period 1995-2010 identified by Kazim has attracted diverse multinational investors, and seen Dubai itself become a global investor. In 1995, Sheikh Mohamed bin Rashid Al Maktoum became crown prince, and this signaled changes in the building of
infrastructure projects in Dubai. In addition, Dubai benefited from social, economic and political factors such as the second Gulf War in 1990, the end of the Cold War, the decline of the Soviet Union, the integration of the former socialist states into a new global system after 1990, the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1991, the rise of East Asia after 2001 when China joined the WTO, the destruction of the World Trade Center in 2001, the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, and the rise in oil prices since 2002, all of which impacted Dubai (Kazim, 86). These shifts attracted diverse investors and merchants and talented entrepreneurs, enhanced by Dubai’s role as an intermediary in relation to Russia and the former Soviet republics in a new capitalist system, as well as by the rise of India and China. Additionally, Dubai saw increased diversity of merchants, MNC activities, and expansion of free zones such as Dubai Internet city, Dubai media City, Dubai Financial District, Dubai Healthcare City, and more. The model of free zones was first applied in Jebel Ali Port and since then a range of Free Zones has been created allowing 100 percent freehold ownership of land and businesses (Kazim, 88), which in turn has led to a significant construction boom, met with growing numbers of migrant construction workers.

Of particular significance, the events of 9/11 have been seen as an important catalyst for criticisms of Dubai, and for shifts in investment outlooks. New York needed to solidify its position once again as an unchallengeable hub, which, although Ballard argues that this was not explicitly stated, became evident through the introduction of the US Patriot Act, which passed through Congress within six weeks of 9/11 (Ballard, 65). Touted as combating terrorists, drug smugglers and other criminals, the creation of a global regulatory regime, to which all formally constituted banks would have to comply, regardless of location of domestic jurisdiction, if they wished to sustain their footholds in NY, was significant. Ballard argues that the ultimate goal was to permanently institutionalize the US Treasury’s and the NY money market as central in the global financial order (Ballard, 65). One outcome has been that the major exchange houses in Dubai have strengthened their strategic alliances with major Wall Street banks and, in the face of a credit crunch, Euro-American financial institutions have become more interested in tapping into the exponentially rising volume of migrant remittances as well.
The resulting fear of assets being frozen because of the US Patriot Act led to Gulf Arabs pulling tens of billions of dollars out of their US assets and sending the money home (Krane, 2009, 188). The US markets were thought to be ‘tanking’, while those in the Gulf were on the “upswing” tied to rises in oil prices that continued over the next seven years (Krane, 2009, 119). Staggering figures from the World Bank showed that Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries invested as much as $25 billion a year into US investments, and that between 2001 and 2003, the figure reached only $1.2 billion (Krane, 2009, 199). The ‘missing’ money was largely rerouted from America to Dubai, where “investing at home became a matter of pride” (Krane, 2009, 199). The economic impacts in the Gulf were astounding as the UAE’s GDP rose by more than 60 percent between 2001 and 2008, in comparison to the US economy, which grew by only 18 percent in the same period (Krane, 2009, 199). Dubai, whose growth became emblematic of the Gulf developmental trajectory, grew at 13 percent a year between 2000 and 2005, faster even than China. In the meanwhile, the population of the UAE doubled between 2001 and 2008, reaching 2 million (Krane, 2009, 119). In addition to the large repatriation of Arab investments from America, since 2001 the rising price of oil to more than $140 a barrel in 2008 led to Gulf oil revenues of an estimated $600 billion dollars in 2008, in contrast to a decade earlier when oil brought in just $61 billion (Krane, 2009, 121). These developments also coincided with growing infrastructure and services in banking, stocks and real estate.

An example of ‘shifting’ allegiances can be seen through the story of Dubai World ports. In early 2006, the US congress erupted over Dubai Ports World’s imminent takeover of the London based Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, which operates docks from New York to Miami. Despite Bush’s support, Dubai was forced to withdraw from the deal after accusations of the supposed dangers of ceding control over American commercial ports to Middle Eastern governments, much of which was linked to anti Arab bigotry (Davis, 57). Eventually, DP World was sold and pulled out of the operation. It was clear that anti-Arab racism influenced the deal, highlighting the contingency of Dubai’s acceptance into the ‘global cities’ club. The DP World situation highlighted the ignorance of many Americans about the Gulf though, as Krane
argues, “some good did come of the episode. Suddenly, Americans, heretofore oblivious to Dubai’s emergence, knew about the place” (Krane, 2009, 145).

Despite these interesting political tensions, Kazim argues that Dubai, through a combination of old and new merchant classes, old and new MNCs and enterprises, creative and talented classes, and a huge influx of low wage service and other workers, has become one of the most globalized cities in the world because of its demographic diversity and global interconnections (Kazim, 87). Some of the most significant features of Dubai’s developmental success have been based on the development of ports, traders, exchange houses, and airports. The vision of Dubai’s future is based on the development of services such as travel, trade, transportation, logistics, and tourism. As highlighted by contemporary Dubai visionary Sheikh Mohamed,

Dubai used to be a station along the East and the West trade routes, but it is now a gateway to the four corners of the world. The countries of the central world need an economic capital, and we believe we can fill this role because we have the necessary infrastructure, and because we are actually playing part of it already. We will keep developing our role in the future, until Dubai becomes the economic capital of this world. (Al Maktoum, 2012, 204)

The rise of commercial cities such as Dubai is significantly linked to several key features, including a strong merchant class, the presence of MNCs, and of course, one of the most significant aspects of Dubai’s development, access to a surplus labour force. While we have seen the highly diverse character of the region’s history, we must too recognize the current role that migrants play in advancing the dreams of Dubai. At all levels of development, migrant workers, be they professional, or labour based, supply vital labour for the development of the city. However, the social hierarchies of the region are such that the ruling elites and Emirati citizens occupy a privileged status unattainable by ‘Others’. While most accounts of these relationships point to simple divides between citizens and all others, I add complexity to these realities, in the next chapter, by exposing and examining the layers of power that play out in everyday experiences of residents in the global city, through an analysis of historical genealogies which are embedded in the social geographies of the city space.
Conclusion: Migrant Dependency

This chapter showcased the immensely rapid economic and political development that the UAE has undergone, as well as its role in the global landscape over time. By tracing Dubai’s historical development through a few key periods, we have examined the city’s role as a mercantile city, facilitating important networks of trade and commerce. Turning to the role of colonialism and the reorientation of Dubai in the interests of the British, and later the US, we see how the economic and political structures have developed over time in relation to global trends. In the postcolonial period, we can see how the role of Dubai as an intermediary has intensified, and combined with oil revenues and diversification, building the city into the global city it is today with important antecedent historical webs that have shaped its global significance. Thus, the ‘global’ developmental trajectory of Dubai in the contemporary period has been importantly shaped by its historic relationships transnationally, a process that has this under the period of neoliberal globalization. The relationships generated by the processes of neoliberalism globally link the contexts of North and South in important ways, have generated new patterns of accumulation and wealth, and intensified disparity. Neoliberal processes are linked to policies of ‘development’ that have further marginalized many poor populations, promoting migration as a survival strategy in the contemporary period. At the same time, the role of neoliberal capitalist shifts in the Global North, and of global city centers such as Dubai, has encouraged the demand for low waged migrant workers. Thus, in the following chapter, we will examine the issues of migration in more detail, centered on the 1970s massive development projects initiated through the huge advent of oil revenues that led to the recruitment of large numbers of migrant workers.

As we will see, while the state worked to protect ‘national’ interests that were largely about capital, issues related to labour and the protection of workers were not included. Thus, the historical features of the migratory regime in the Gulf which are essential to its development at all levels, the role of the ‘Kafala’ sponsorship system, in combination with the exclusive and highly restricted citizenship system, have justified the state’s role in protecting its own citizenry against the cultural threats of ‘Others’, and has worked to externalize the issues of migrant workers to sending states, and the broader
global political economy. Through this genealogical analysis we will see how the experiences within receiving countries must be coupled with an examination of the conditions in sending countries, as they are relationally defined. Thus, I will also explore a broader political economy of this period in order to understand the pressures related to processes of migration, shaping policy, nurturing dreams and motivating migrants.
Chapter Four Making the Dream II

The build up to dreaming continues in this chapter, in which we continue to examine the conditions that make possible the Dubai dream. This section reflects stages three and four of NREM in which the body continues its preparation for dreaming, falling deeper into sleep, experiencing more dream like qualities. Specifically, this chapter, by examining scholarly works on the background, histories and policies that shape these geographies of migration, argues that migration is a central tool in the development of Dubai’s global city aspirations. In addition, to fully understand the impact and character of these geographies of migration, we ‘unmap’ a genealogical analysis of the movements at different levels. In keeping with the deepening of sleep in the quest for a state capable of experiencing dreams we contextualize the processes of globalization as they relate to migration in the making of ‘dreams’ that both ‘pull’ migrants to the global city in search of new possibilities, and of the ‘push’ factors that motivate migration in the search of new livelihoods or survival strategies.

Interestingly, these last stages before one enters REM sleep occupy less time in subsequent cycles, and may disappear all together (Carsakadon and Dement, 2011). Similarly, genealogies of migration, and the broader global histories and conditions that give rise to global city possibilities, are erased or eclipsed in the quest for globality. These erasures obscure the global, historically situated forces and networks that shape contemporary trends of migration and globalization as they shape the making of Dubai’s globality, but also as they influence ideas of citizenship, nationality, race, gender and class. Thus, through an examination of these processes of development we also see how different articulations of Dubai dreams and dreams of Dubai shape migration from all over the globe towards the city, and how broader political and economic processes such as those embedded in trends of neoliberal globalization impact the making of these geographies over time. Thus, the mapping and simultaneous unmapping of these geographies and genealogies provide the analytic tools and insights necessary to understand the deeper, more profound and insightful explanations and motivations about social hierarchies that organize the resident population of the city, all of which are set against the backdrop of global city dreams.
Unmapping Geographies

Just as none of us is outside or beyond geography, none of us is completely free from the struggle over geography. That struggle is complex and interesting because it is not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings. (Said, 1994, 7)

Edward Said in Culture and Imperialism (1994) discusses the role of ideology in legitimating imperialism. The struggle over geography, he argued, was not just about controlling physical land, but about the ideological apparatus that operates simultaneously to justify, legitimize and obscure, in order to control and influence the ‘hearts and minds’ of people. In conceptualizing geographies more broadly, we can move towards an understanding of the geographies of migration, to understand the multidirectional, complex layers of movements, both new and intensified, operating alongside forces and forms of geography that have become important sites of struggle for migrants around the world, especially those in formerly colonized regions. Thus, just as ideas form important components of imperial conquest, the ideologies that follow migrants on their journeys and intersect in new spaces highlight the significance of examining the genealogies of race and empire as they relate to the making of the ‘migrant-Other’, which can be seen as the contemporary counterpart to the older forms of colonialism.

I underscore the importance of migration as a central feature of the development of Dubai’s global city status in the contemporary period, as well as an integral feature of Dubai’s society and city life. The genealogies that accompany geographies of migration to the city importantly influence the experiences of migrants at all levels, in relation to national citizens. In addition, understanding the role of citizenship in subject making and the strategies of national identity formation by the state is significant. Adding complexity by examining the everyday encounters and the ideological basis of diverse subjectivities also helps to shed light on the social geography of the city and the role of global city status making. This includes considerations based on understandings of different subjects and their navigation of city spaces, state policies and practices related to citizenship, and labour and migration. It examines both the informal and formal mechanisms of these regimes, at the level of the everyday, examining the complexity of related ideas of innocence, privilege and power, relationality and relativity, and the role of race, gender,
class, nationality, all as they are implicated historically in structures that influence global labour regimes as well as their contemporary manifestations in the current neoliberal political and economic system. Simply put, using the everyday as a counterpoint to the making of the global city at the macro level, we can see how negotiations at the ‘everyday’ level, seemingly innocent and mundane, have significant historical lineages that have constructed migrants through ideologies tied to race, labour/class and gender which intersect with both formal and informal processes of subject making through policies and practices of citizenship. These ideological forces shape notions of belonging, create and sustain hierarchies of entitlement, and help to illuminate the complex workings of these relationships and dependencies between different sectors. In particular, these complex relationships exist between not only Emirati citizens and low waged migrant workers, but expat professionals as well, whose privileges are generated through historical forces that manifest in their everyday encounters with citizens and ‘Others’ (low waged migrants from the Global South). Thus, importantly here, we can examine how subjectivities are constructed through these relationships and examine various, seemingly mundane rationales and justifications both by the state, and by residents at all levels to sustain and reinforce hierarchies of entitlement which shape who belongs and who does not, but also who is worthy of what and why.

Connecting this focus on migration explicitly to the themes of dreams, in and of the global city as discussed by scholars and subjects in this study, we see that the imagined elements of Dubai’s developments have significant impacts on how migrants imagine the city before they arrive and, importantly inform how migrants imagine themselves while in the city, all of which contribute significantly to the ways in which residents of the city relate to each other. Thus, we can see how dreams of Dubai are shaped by historical processes that engender different motivations for migration to the global city. In addition, once migrants arrive, we can see how the urban form itself importantly shapes relationships at the level of the everyday and also informs the complex negotiations that residents engage in with each other. These spatial relations are implicated in historical genealogies that are embedded within social hierarchies based on nationality and labour in the city.
The urban form as discussed through the explicit priorities of iconic Dubai as presented to the world is based on developments that “do not add up to a coherent whole” (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 122). Dubai’s development is “characterized by building to make itself a global player, using well established real estate and architectural tactics to achieve its global dreams” (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 124). He gives the example of Burj Al Arab, seen as the official symbol of Dubai, despite the reality that most residents of Dubai have never and will never set foot in the Burj. Thus, the focus on iconic Dubai is based on ideas of ‘exclusivity’ and ‘luxury’, which lead to social exclusion and the creation of a non-egalitarian environment (Elsheshtawy, 130). The focus of iconic Dubai is found in luxury real estate developments, housing policies which are explicitly allocated to different groups, government preference to citizens for free land, and access to loans, and the simultaneous development of worker camps on the outskirts of the city and the informal and formal policies of exclusion that work at “sanitizing the city in a way by displacing its poor who should be kept out of sight for fear of spoiling the carefully crafted ultra luxurious cityscape” (Elsheshtawy, 125). The landscapes of the city importantly influence belonging and access, creating exclusion and reinforcing unequal access, but this is a manifestation of deeper rooted issues of ‘Othering’, creating distance between groups by simultaneously reaffirming the privileges of some through the exclusion of ‘Others.

Turning back to what made these ‘developments’ possible, we look to scholars who argue that migration has been a central component of Dubai’s development at all levels (Malecki and Ewers 2007, Zahlan 1998, Shah 2008, Khalaf 2005, Hanieh 2011). The significance of migration is underscored by Dubai’s unique status as a migrant majority city, where ‘foreigners’ outnumber citizens at a ratio of approximately 9:1, with no access to gaining formal citizenship. Rather than being a system of the past, the ‘Dubai’ model is often seen as an exemplary model, based on neoliberal economic policy, rapid urban development and temporary migrant regimes, for future development in the Middle East with implications towards broader trends across the world, particularly in traditional immigrant receiving states such as those in Europe and North America. Thus, Dubai can also be seen as the dream scenario for neoliberal policy makers on citizenship and migration around the globe.
Significance of Migration in the Global

In 2007, for the first time in history, more people lived in cities than in rural areas (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 17), with the majority of new residents poor, living in inadequate housing and lacking equitable access to resources. The 2013 UN International Migration Report states that globally, there were 232 million international migrants. While the majority of these migrants still found their way to developed countries, the world’s developing regions hosted 41 percent of migrants, and since 2000 the South has outpaced the rate of growth in migrant stock globally. Generally, the report highlights that between 1990 and 2013 the number of international migrants rose by over 77 million or by 50 percent, with much of that growth between 2000 and 2010. Europe (72 million) and Asia (71 million) hosted nearly two thirds of the world’s international migrants in 2013 (Asia includes here the countries of the Gulf in the UN categorizations). The report also highlights that the Asia-Asia corridor was the largest migration channel in the world. Highlighting the significance of the Gulf in Asian migration statistics, it was also found that in 2013, over 51 percent of all international migrants in the world lived in ten countries, which included Saudi Arabia (9 million) and the United Arab Emirates (8 million). In addition, between 1990 and 2000, of the 10 largest bilateral migrant corridors, and the three in Asia, one included India and the UAE. In 2000-2010 bilateral migration corridors were split 50-50 between destinations in the South and North. Of these, the top ten corridors were between South Asian countries and oil producing Western Asia, namely Bangladesh-Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh-UAE, and India-UAE. In addition, from 2000-2010, the US, Spain and the UAE were the top net immigration countries, whereas Bangladesh, Mexico, and India were the top net emigration countries (UN International Migration Report, 2013). The volume of international migrants annually highlights the significance of South emigration, and is continuing to grow in significance. In addition, statistics between South Asia and Western Asia, and the Gulf in particular, we see a significance dependency that has been compared to the situation of Mexican migrants to the US in significance in terms of exchange and dependencies.

Globalization in the contemporary period is examined through a diverse range of economic, political, social, cultural and technological processes, most of which have been dominated by scholarly perspectives that tend to fixate their interests on the post WWII
period and with the consolidation of US hegemony in the postcolonial period. While this ‘moment’ indicates significant shifts in the global order, critical scholars have highlighted the necessity of mapping the geographical and temporal genealogies embedded within these growing global networks of capital. In particular, migration has played a pivotal role in helping us to elucidate the pressures and shifts of the neoliberal period of global restructuring in both Global North and South.

Additionally, situating studies of the ‘global city’ amidst scholarly work on contemporary forms of globalization should be informed by a framework for thinking about processes of globalization beyond the many Eurocentric assumptions that undergird the conceptualization of ‘global city’ status. As part of the more specific examination of the role of migrant labour in the context of global city making in Dubai, it is necessary to examine the dialectic between ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors in migration studies, as well as historical genealogies of colonialism, imperialism and ideologies of race, class, gender, nationality and the impacts of migration on citizenship and nation-hood under forces of neoliberal globalization. Rather than isolate the 1980s as the only point of departure, I hope to reflect on this ever so prominent moment in many fields of study to shed light on the historical developments of Dubai, which happen to generally coincide with these shifts in the 1970s and 1980s.

This involves an analysis of factors that encourage migration as they relate to the international division of labour, colonial legacies embedded in development projects in the third world with particular focus on Asia and the Arab world, as well as discussion of globalization, migration and development strategies that lead migrants to Dubai. Thus we consider the role of the international division of labour, postcolonial ‘development’ strategies in the Third world, the impact of SAPs and the IMF and WB, cycles of debt and the emergence of migration as a development strategy and the role of remittances, impacts of migration on sending countries, relationships between sending and receiving states, waves of migration and gendered labour.

While ‘globalization’ continues to be a highly debated concept, it can generally be understood as a process referring to the creation, interdependence, interconnectedness and interactions amongst global actors at various scales. Debates continue about the
varied impacts and consequences of processes resulting from the differential positions of various nations, economies and workers in the global economy. While traditional divisions between the First and Third world continue to be complicated by a growing transnational capitalist elite, the structural features of these legacies remain central to many Third world economies in particular ways. Uniquely, ‘global cities’ can be seen as the link between First and Third world economies through unique spaces of neoliberal governance and dependency. Additionally, while the traditional ‘global cities’ of the West have dominated most studies of migration, citizenship and globalization, the growing acknowledgment and prominence of global cities of the Global South complicate these Eurocentric assumptions prevalent in many studies on the subject.

In particular, the 1980s is seen as marking a pivotal moment for neoliberalism, understood generally as a market driven ideological paradigm governing economic, cultural, social and political policies and practices uses market rational based on privatization, liberalization, deregulation and flexibility. These shifts have had significant impacts in both the ‘First’ and ‘Third’ worlds, with implications for the role of the state, restructuring of the economy, privatization of essential services, and general reorganization of relationships between citizens and the state in many parts of the world. In particular, the former colonized countries of the world face significant challenges with regards to the imposition of neoliberal agendas spearheaded by the Washington institutions that importantly shape the geographies of migration and labour. Generally, it can be argued that it is within this increasing neoliberal, globalized world that many populations in the Global South turn to migration as a survival strategy in new, renewed, profound, and often, gendered ways. Within the context of global cities, migrant workers globally face significant issues in regards to their precarious status, exploitation, mistreatment and abuse, and vulnerabilities with regards to their entitlements, protections, and status as temporary workers, and are generally regarded as flexible, disposable subjects at the bottom of a global hierarchy based on nationality, employment, race and gender.

It should be noted that while I am seemingly focused in this section on the historic relations between ‘First’ and ‘Third’ world nations through forces related to the ‘international division of labour’, I am cognizant to connect these histories to the
intersection of hierarchies within the unique national context of the global city of Dubai. Thus, the usage of terms such as ‘First’ and ‘Third’ world is done consciously in relation to the ‘New international division of labour’ in an attempt to highlight the continued dominance of structures of the international division of labour in the period of globalization. While concepts such as global North and South better highlight the growing transnational capitalist class, which challenges traditional First-Third world relations, the structural features of colonialism and development continue to perpetuate stigma and discrimination for migrants based on their country of origin, ideologically. Furthermore, the concept of the ‘international division of labour’, as criticized by globalization theorists, has challenged notions of comparative advantage in economic development by highlighting the hierarchies and legacies of colonialism that have continued to maintain divisions in the international economic system that impact the experiences and entitlements of the subjects of this study and in scholarly work more globally.

**The Making of and Endless Supply.**

Processes of neoliberalism in the 1970s and 1980s led to significant changes in the economies of the Global South, and significantly altered the relationships between state, market and citizens. As Hanieh highlights, neoliberalism impacted not just the domestic economic policies of these states, but also enhanced processes of internationalization and financialization by ensuring conditions for capitalist reproduction at a global scale (Hanieh, 2011). Thus, the South was linked to the growth of internationalized production chains that were linked to the policies of loans and debt (Hanieh, 2011), which also led to the creation of an abundant and cheap labour supply. Overall, this economic restructuring in ‘developing’ economies has played an important role in transforming existing livelihood strategies. From the perspective of developing economies, processes relating to neo-liberal globalization have dramatically reconfigured the issues surrounding poverty, work, and migration. The post-WWII reconfigurations of power through the creation of international institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) played a significant role in restructuring the newly independent nations. The postcolonial period was met with increasing ‘aid’ from these
Washington based institutions, bringing them closer under the control of the US dominant position in the world landscape. The debt crisis of the 1980s was met with the introduction of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) by the World Bank and the IMF, which dramatically altered the direction and possibilities of postcolonial independence for many developing economies. SAP conditionalities pushed desperate governments to adopt neo-liberal economic policies aimed at creating ‘business-friendly’ environments, based on privatization, de-regulation and trade liberalization in exchange for foreign ‘aid’. In addition, debt servicing has substantially intensified these economic collapses as they fail to provide any safety nets for their citizens. Saskia Sassen (2000) points out that the “South has paid its debt several times over, and yet its debt grew by 250 per cent” (Sassen, 2000, 513). The negative effects on domestic economies, rural livelihoods and labour participation led to the intensification of income disparities, unemployment and rampant, widespread poverty.

In addition, writing about the global South, many feminist scholars⁶ have contributed significant insights through gendered analyses of globalization. They have highlighted the gendered consequences of SAPs, such as the dependence on the provision of women’s unpaid labour to compensate for a loss in the level and quality of social service provisions, which significantly impact women’s abilities to provide the basic necessities of food, health and sustainability for millions of households. Thus, “women’s increased and unpaid work operates as a shock absorber to promote the apparent ‘efficiency’ of market-oriented mechanisms” (Stasiulis and Bakan, 2005, 40). In addition, current trends of offshore production and factory work have pushed many women to fill the demand of global capitalist production in an attempt to ensure the survival of households. These pressures have increased the migration of women into precarious work such as factory work and domestic labour, as well as informal economies such as petty vending and sex work. In particular, the volume of ‘Third World’ migrants seeking domestic service jobs in the ‘developed’ world coupled with the demand from wealthy ‘developed’ economies have created an international economy and global business, with many serious consequences.

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The process of recruitment of migrant women workers to perform paid domestic labour in developed capitalist states is structurally linked to the uneven process of international economic development, international migration patterns and regulations, as well as racially and ethnically specific ideologies. Despite the end of formal colonial dependence, the legacy of imperialism has combined with modern conditions of indebtedness to generate large pools of Third World migrant labour. (Stasiulis and Bakan 2005, 46)

Building on these themes, Saskia Sassen (2000) highlights the ways in which neoliberal globalization has led to significant changes in both receiving and sending nations. The gendered nature of global migration is tied to both the production of global cities and survival circuits. Workers are needed to sustain both strategic service work and the lifestyles and consumption patterns in both formal and informal sectors and today we are witnessing the return of the “serving classes in globalized cities around the world, composed largely of immigrant and migrant women” (Sassen, 2000, 510). She locates the global supply of these low waged female workers at the feminization of survival, and argues that ‘cross border circuits’, which make possible the movement of these workers, are also used for a whole host of operations that produce revenue on the backs of the truly disadvantaged. For Sassen these circuits make up the ‘counter-geographies of globalization’ whereby the global economic system’s formal institutional support for cross-border markets and money flows has become the infrastructure for informal circuits of migration (511). The feminization of survival, which makes these movements possible, is again linked to the histories of development and debt servicing, through which, as she states, “Thirty-three of the officially namely forty-one highly indebted poor countries paid $3 in debt service to the North for every $1 they received in development assistance” (513). From this, the ‘alternative survival circuits’ that emerge through these processes are created by unemployment, poverty and lack of state support for social services. Overall Sassen argues that, “the growing immiserization of governments and economies in the global south is one such condition, insofar as it enables and even promotes the migration and trafficking of women as a strategy for survival” (Sassen, 2002, 273). Thus, women emerge as crucial economic actors in both global cities and survival circuits, and evaluating these dimensions of globalization allows us to link
sending countries, receiving countries and different scales and processes that comprise globalization(s).

Overall, it is clear that SAPs have dramatically altered the survival strategies of families, communities and entire nations. In these contexts, migration for labour plays an important role in countering high rates of unemployment and poverty, and governments in the global south are increasingly reliant on remittances from migrants as a source of foreign currency and a poverty reduction strategy. The World Bank reports that global remittances, as cash sent home, amounted to some 276 billion dollars in 2006 (Elsheshtawy, 20). India’s remittances by foreign migrants are highest, taking in 32.7 billion dollars in 2005, and estimated 26.9 billion in 2006 (Elsheshtawy, 20). Gender continues to be an important factor in understanding experiences of migration, recognizing that since the mid 1990s women have represented more than half of all transnational migrants in migratory flows between developing countries (Elsheshtawy, 21).

The difficult scenarios that promote migration from sending countries are intensified by conditions in receiving countries where, as Parrenas (2001) explains, the result is the partial citizenship of migrant Filipina domestic workers and other low wage migrant workers. ‘Partial citizenship’ refers to the stunted integration of migrants in receiving nation states, often seen, for example, through the denial of reproductive rights, for example (Parrenas, 2001, 1130). These workers therefore, provide care for the citizenry of various receiving nations at the cost of the denial of their own reproduction and membership in the nation state that they are helping reproduce.

In considering the relationships between migrant workers, working conditions and sending nations, we see how Halliday (1984) examines these connections to sending countries by exploring how traditional economic theory constructs the mutually beneficial relationship that may emerge between the two states, allowing for three possibilities open to sending nations: remittances can become a force for building in productive resources; migrants can acquire skills and experience therefore enriching their human capital; flow of labour from overpopulated and underemployed populations is rise a productivity (Halliday 1984, 8). However, Halliday questions whether remittances actually get put back into the local economies or are used for imported consumer goods.
Further consequences are also based on the ideologies behind capitalist modes of production, where there is unequal distribution of wealth, a necessity in forging relationships under the conditions of capitalism. The outcomes of migration to oil-producing states seem to resemble the North–South relationships of inequality, and Halliday states “even where such a ‘New Economic Order’ is created, it will, under capitalist relations of production, reproduce exploitation and rapacity seen already in north-south relations” (Halliday 1984, 10).

Humphreys (1993) discusses the ways in which these trends of indentured labour serve the interests of labour receiving states where foreign workers have no rights, no political voice related to their employment conditions and little legal protection. He notes that foreign workers must rely on their sending government to ensure protection, which can be very difficult (Humphreys 1993, 7). These issues of responsibility are tied to the effects of remittances on sending countries, which include inflationary pressures induced by remittances, the introduction of expensive lifestyles that depend on imports, and the economic consequences of losing professional or skilled workers within the labour-exporting countries (Zahlan 1984, 988).

Additionally, we can ask further questions such as about the long-term effects of dependency on labour export. What are the impacts of governments in the Global South depending on remittances, what vulnerabilities do state-sponsored projects of exporting labour produce? How do regimes of labour and migration intersect with global hierarchies such as those seen in networks of global cities? Have employment opportunities abroad actually transformed the lifestyles of migrant workers, or have they deepened relationships of dependency?

Examining Dubai as a case study of contemporary issues related to global city formation, migration, labour and citizenship helps to push the boundaries of traditional discussions on globalization, moving beyond the polarizing debate of globalization through a binary framework of proponent/critic, good/bad, towards mapping a genealogy and geography of globalization that interrogates both its spatial and temporal dimensions, as well as locating emerging global cities associated with globalization as processes of political, economic, social and cultural shifts. In addition, we can consider interrogating the epistemological underpinning of mainstream political economy approaches to
globalization, which are almost exclusively anchored in the West. This entails examining globalization through various scales and through the experiences of actors who are not primarily seen as shaping globalization, but who are in fact actively working to subvert, challenge and (re) direct the outcomes and trajectory of global flows, hence affirming again the need to consider the workings of the everyday as a counterpoint to the top down approaches we see primarily.

Through this brief overview of what constitutes ‘globalization’ as it pertains to contemporary trends in migration, we can see the significance of embedded historical genealogies. This includes histories of colonialism and ‘development’ in the postcolonial period, the impacts of SAPs and neoliberal policies in both First and Third world contexts, and finally, the growth of migration as a development strategy by sending governments, as well as the dependency on remittances; all of which are related to global city formation. Rather than view globalization as a ‘neutral’ process, we can consider the role of the historical legacies of colonialism and imperialism embedded in the contemporary making of global relations and global cities specifically. The shifting realities of immigration, migration, labour and citizenship, which are impacted by global processes, take on localized (Sassen, 2001). This re-territorialization of processes of globalization is an integral aspect of the critical outlooks on globalization, which seek to reclaim the place-based realities of everyday experiences. In this regard, the case study of the UAE is an important intervention in traditional discussions of global cities as located in the First world, connected to the Third world through labour migration.

In the detailed examination of Dubai’s development we see the importance of a historically grounded analysis of the UAE’s dependency on foreign labour, as well as its location within the global economy. In addition, locating its relationship to traditional centers of power in the West, the need for a more situated and concrete analysis of the relationships to and utilization of traditional division of labour in the global economy, as they intersect with local conditions, will help to explore the structural inequalities which shape the rights, entitlements and protections of the migrant majority workforce. This allows us to ask questions about the role of the state and nation building, through an exploration of national mythologies, political, economic, social policies and gender relations. Overall, Dubai’s case helps to locate how new and emerging centers of power
participate in and create new and intensified dynamics through the international division of labour.

The motivations highlighted by many migrants are interesting insights into why diverse groups of people migrate to the city, and what they believe the motivations of other groups to be. A major finding from these insights is that where you are from shapes your desires to migrate in significant ways and this impacts how you imagine yourself in Dubai in terms of issues such as belonging or entitlements. Much of this is tied particularly to what passport a person holds, and whether or not you they have a Western passport and the privileges associated with it. We can consider the insights of a range of Western passport holders, who discuss the lifestyle and motivation to migrate as about gaining international experience, living the life,

Working for an American or British company and they are provide a really good salary that are tax free and maybe their accommodations are paid for, and free schooling at the best schools for their kids, vacation packages. So basically, they are living the life and that is why they love Dubai, because it seems all too amazing to make really good money, live extravagantly. (Sara, Canadian)

Living the Dubai ‘expat’ dream, Sara explains that both families and singles find their desires of Dubai in different places but hold on to similar ideas. For singles, Sara refers to a ‘culture of indulgence’ which as she explains as “you do go kind of crazy because you don’t have any responsibilities and you have no purpose except for working and you are done by 5 or 6 and then you are going to indulge in what Dubai offers and basically you can get really sucked into it” (Sara, Canadian). American teacher, Katie, discusses her status as a new graduate and the difficulties she had starting her career,

Back home I was working like crazy. You get a classroom, you work with teachers but you don’t get paid. You are working unpaid 40 or 50 hours a week, so then what I would do, is on Friday, Saturday and Sunday I would do my work as a nanny for a family. Between taking care of 4 kids and having no money, and comparing to the potential. For example, I might be getting paid the same here and at home, but my expenses were so much higher at home. At the time I thought, the contract is two years? In your head, your like, what is two years and Christmas and summer off, it’s kinda just like… I don’t know… summer camp or something. (Katie, American)

Emirati, Reda discusses how she understands the motivation to migrate, through the following narration,
… back home it was grey and cold most of the year. And yes, you have to go and you know drop your kids, there is no driver, there is no maid at home, and so here that kind of lifestyle is not normal. There is no shame in saying I have more than one maid, it seems very normal. It is very normal amongst Arabs and now you see it more and more normal amongst expats. And you know you see the wife, you have heard of the Jumeriah Janes, or the golfers. They drop off the kids and then they go golf or they go to play tennis. The very leisurely housewives and because the husbands are working for a big company and the house is provided and the education for the kids, and there is a lot of companies that pay for that, and there is no way in hell they would have that lifestyle back home. (Reda, Emirati)

Those like Jo, Egyptian expat, like many other women who follow their husbands, also highlighted how Dubai offered her a working lifestyle that, compared to home, offered much more potential for her future.

I just felt like in Egypt, a lot of times you are just stuck and very stagnant where you are and people are in the same positions for 10 or 15 years as opposed to out here in Dubai where there is potential for growth and you are being recognized on a yearly basis. It is a much more structured environment, and although there are rules in Cairo, they are not so much enforced. (Jo, Egyptian)

For another Egyptian expat Peter,

The main thing was that in Egypt we work a lot but we cannot get what we deserve. All the salaries and stuff are low. I cannot build my life like this. I can have an easy life. The salary, the average is always below the requirements of life but there was a lot of differences, not only money, but in the UAE I can live freely and I can build my life and career. But the first thing is freedom. (Peter, Egypt)

Interestingly, Peter expresses the discontents of Egypt’s difficult economic situation for middle class workers, but also discusses what he views as ‘freedom’ in Dubai, as different from Egypt. This is primarily tied to his background as belonging to a traditionally marginalized group in Egyptian society, the Copts (Orthodox Christians). His discussion highlighted the ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘freedoms’ he viewed in Dubai’s everyday life for an expat such as himself. Of course this view negates the actual legal and political factors of the UAE in which he lacks ‘equal’ rights to citizens, or any political rights to participate in decision making, but at the everyday level, many migrants view ‘freedom’ through a very narrow capitalist conception in which profit making and the accumulation of wealth is protected by the state for individuals, and the neoliberal
model of privatization in health and education, as well as lack of regulation and growing economic liberalization. This trade off between political rights and entitlements, economic incentive and perceptions of ‘freedom’ as tied to the accumulation of wealth are very significant features of the everyday negotiations that expats engage in in making their decisions.

The lifestyle, discussed by many middle class migrants is reiterated again in relation to the length of stay. As discussed by many residents who have been raised in the UAE for their entire lives, their parents came with the following temporary mindset, I am just going to come for a couple of years, then they start getting comfortable and used to it, some luxuries and privileges you have here that you don’t have back home but then you go back home and you are like ‘what is this?’ I miss having it easy over there (Svetlana, Egyptian).

Emirati, Natasha discusses why she thinks people keep migrating to Dubai as primarily financial, but also about access to different resources,

Money. I think it is a really great place to live in terms of safety and comfortable lifestyles and people generally are happy and live life very comfortable, for the majority of people its about money. And for others, a high standard of living. For others, it is not just money in terms of salary but in terms of where they are living, what they have access to… (Natasha, Emirati).

In considering the relationship between motivating ‘push’ factors and ‘pull’ factors, it is necessary to examine some of the historical forces of Dubai’s development to better understand its dependency on all levels of migrant labour.

**Development and Migration**

It has been widely cited by scholars that the GCC states have the highest ratio of migrants to population in the world. Migrants make up a huge percentage of the working population: UAE 88 percent, Qatar 83, Kuwait 81 and Saudi Arabia 72, Bahrain 55 and Oman 54 percent (Khodker, 2010, 209). In considering the factors that have shaped migration to the GCC, and the UAE in particular in the contemporary period, oil wealth has been linked to the increase in standards of living and investments in infrastructure in these states at different times, which in turn fueled the demand for construction, domestic and service sector workers.

In regards to the UAE specifically, the UAE National Bureau of Statistics report of 2011, states that 7,316,073 of 8,264,070 people making up the UAE population in
2010 were non-nationals. This equates to some 88.5 percent of the population. Additionally, the private sector workforce is said to comprise 95 percent migrant workers (HRW, 2014, 11). While this seems to signal immense diversity, a closer look reveals highly unequal numbers by nationality, for example, 67% come from India and Pakistan, of whom 51% are from India and 16% from Pakistan, 11% are Arab, 9% Bangladeshi, 3% Filipino (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 212). In addition, the female to male ratio is highly unequal with the population dominated by males at 75.5 percent, and 24.5 percent female (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 213).

In terms of the breakdown of the population, Human Rights Watch (HRW) has reported that there are more than 5 million low paid workers employed in the UAE (HRW, 2015, 20). In particular, there are over 500,000 ‘bachelors’ who lived and worked in the city but were too poor or did not meet the basic requirements to bring their families. They are largely seen as a problem for the city’s image, and many formal and informal strategies operate to exclude them largely from Dubai’s dominant image. Of these construction workers, 26% of Indian workers live in apartments, another 27% in portions of apartments, 15% in rented rooms, and one third live in worker camps (Elsheshtawy, 214).

There are an estimated 2.4 million people employed as domestic workers in the Gulf, predominantly women. This number has more than doubled in the last twenty years, largely attributed to the growing wealth and living standards associated with the oil boom in the region, and the growing economic base. Saudi Arabia is the largest employer with 1.2 million domestic workers (2014), following by Kuwait with 593,272 (2011), Oman with 224,000, UAE with 236,545, Bahrain with 105,203, and Qatar with 84,000 (ITUC Report, 2014).

In 2013, the ILO reported from a 2008 government survey that there were 236,500 domestic workers in the UAE, of whom 146,000 were female, though many reports say this number of female workers might be higher because numbers have not been reported accurately by the government (HRW, DW, 12). The majority of female migrant workers employed in domestic work come from the Philippines, Indonesia, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Ethiopia (HRW, DW, 2).
Remittances play a huge role in understanding the impact of migration on both sending and receiving states, where statistics show that in 2009, for example, India for more than ten years continued to be the world’s top remittance earner, at US$55 billion per annum, followed by the Philippines US$18 billion and Bangladesh at US$9 billion (Khondker, 2010, 211). Whereas today, according to the WB (2016), those numbers continue to increase and are closer to $69 billion, $28 billion and $15 billion respectively.

The situation in the GCC states is unique in that formal citizenship does not apply to migrants, and is next to impossible to attain by foreigners. Uniquely, some scholars have highlighted that close to 20% of the population of ‘foreigners’ have been in Dubai since birth, but citizenship does not apply to any visitor, regardless of how long they stay. The government uses terms such as ‘non-national’ rather than ‘non-resident’ and ‘temporary contract labour’ rather than ‘migrant worker’ to highlight the transient nature of their status (Khondker, 2010, 212). In addition, Emirati citizens see themselves as minorities, or an indigenous population outnumbered and sometimes culturally under ‘threat’ by foreigners. The further significance of these processes will be discussed further in the following section when the role of citizenship in the making of social hierarchies is analyzed.

Historically, migration has been seen as a central feature of the Arab world. “Migration is not a new feature of the Gulf economy, traditionally Arabia has been the location of many population movements” (Third World Quarterly (TWQ) 1982, 530). Different types of migration to the region are reflective of spatial, political and ‘tribal’ connections. Martin and Richards (1983) further this discussion by characterizing the Middle East as holding a history of migration and movements in traditional Arabia and connect these histories to Hajj or pilgrimage which they state “is almost certainly the largest multinational gathering on earth, with some 1.5 million pilgrims coming each year” (Martin & Richards, 1983, 461). However, the authors are quick to highlight that the majority of these movements are built not so much around religious or nationalist Pan-Arab ideologies, but economic pressures and contend that the oil boom of the 1970s and 1980s created a demand for migrant labour at all levels of development, including highly skilled and ‘unskilled’ workers.

Furthermore, Humphrey (1993) reminds us that the 19th century development of
the trans-Atlantic slave trade, and the emergence of indentured labour systems, all worked to serve as the basis for capitalist development in the world market. He explores how the international transfer of labour was introduced after the local Indigenous populations of the America’s began dying off due to disease and maltreatment, creating the need for ‘indentured labour’. Many Asians were used as indentured labour to other European colonies, and it is estimated that between 1834 and 1937, 30 million Indian workers found themselves dispatched on labour contracts throughout the British empire (Humphrey, 3). Humphrey also discusses the ways in which the industrialization of Europe also required unskilled workers from closer, poorer neighbouring countries. “Capitalist colonial expansion promoted the development of world labour and capital markets but at the same time increased the social and political differentiation of the world into national societies” (Humphrey, 4). The immigration of workers to European states promoted legislation that “did not reduce the number of immigrants so much as change their character” (Humphrey, 4). While Humphrey focuses a lot on the emigration of Middle Eastern peoples to Europe and North America, he also touches on the issues of migrant labour in the Middle East. He makes connections of older colonial forms of indentured labour to the new foreign recruitment of labour in the Gulf, noting “Oil wealth stimulated a new South-South migration organized as contract labour system which treats labour strictly as a commodity” (Humphrey, 5). “In this system, nationalism is the criteria by which foreign workers are located within national labour hierarchies” (Humphrey, 5). He explores the dramatic change in composition of workers and residents of the Gulf: first, the Asian workforce who was regarded as more politically compliant and removed from Arab nationalism and Islamism; second, importing states made private contractors responsible for recruiting workers; and, third, the presence of non-Arab workers “undermined class-based politics and accentuated the difference between citizen and non-citizen along racial and cultural lines” (Humphrey, 7). He also discusses shifts in the 1980s related to the growing feminization of labour to other regions, and highlights the ways in which this is contrasted to the gendered segregation in occupations in which women can be employed. Thus, contrary to his statement, it is not that there isn’t an increasing feminization of labour, but that these trends are silenced, made invisible and segregated. But Asian workers and non-Arabs always dominated among these women.
Fred Halliday (1984) writes about the inequalities between the two sets of Arab nations, those with oil wealth and those without, and discusses the role of access to oil products, noting that “far from assisting their less fortunate fellow-states of the Third World to break the bonds of poverty, the oil producers have in fact imposed new relations of exploitation” (Halliday, 1984, 5). Although the supposed ‘naturalized affinity’ between ‘Third World’ countries is highly debatable, he does point to some important trends through which could be judged the differentiating demographic composition of the region. He explores four categories of Arab migration: within states to urban centers, Arab countries to other countries, one Arab state to another and, the last, outside of the Arab world to Arab states. The statistics given from 1975 by Birks and Sinclair (often referenced during these writings) reflect the general trends we see today in the UAE - continued migration of Asians, dominated by Pakistani and Indian migrants over other Arabs (Halliday 1984, 5).

Significantly the roots of capitalism can be traced back to the use of indentured labour, which has a long history between European colonialism and what became ‘Third World’ economies. These discussions have largely been based around the differences and inequalities between Europeans and ‘Others’. However, the case of the Gulf is unique in that its growth into the international capitalist economy has been characterized by unique histories that cannot be easily lumped into the same developments that characterize the West.

Labour migration to the Gulf is arguably one of the most significant aspects of its development at all levels. Expertise and experience from the Global North, and the seemingly ‘endless’ supply of service sector employees, labourers and domestic workers from the Global South, are integral components to the city’s development and maintenance. The Gulf states all face similar situations, but Dubai’s case provides the most striking example of reliance on migrant labour, in a situation where over 95% of all private sector employees are foreign temporary migrant workers. In a recent study, Malecki and Ewers (2007) argue that unlike many other contexts in which TNCs may play a central role in shaping global city status, in the Arab Gulf labour flows can be seen as an “enabling process in global city formation” and as a significant indicator of ‘world-city-ness’ (Malecki and Ewers, 473).
Importantly, Malecki and Ewers (2007) discuss the ways in which labour processes create demands at both the high and low skilled range for migrants, and analyze this in relation to the idea of social polarization with particular reference to the policies and processes engaged in by the state in regulating and encouraging migration. They argue that social polarization is both a cause and effect of global labour processes. In particular, in the Gulf, flows of labour are key processes in global city formation even though they are not included in traditional indicators of world city status. The unique dependency of these states on labour migration can be seen as an “embodiment of globalization” (Malecki & Ewans, 2007, 473). In addition, recognizing the particular historical development trajectory based on oil development rather than diversified APS also impacts their growth and development (Malecki & Ewans, 2007, 473), although this has been argued by scholars in terms of Dubai’s diversification strategies.

A review of numerous scholars (among them, A. Zahlan 1984, ‘Third World Quarterly (TWQ) 1982, Martin and Richards 1983) who have written about early migratory patterns of workers generally attributes the large influx to two major factors: the quadrupling of the price of oil in 1973-74 and the doubling of these prices in 1978-79. The paper published by TWQ (1982) explores the uses of the ideas of ‘oil rich’ or ‘oil poor’, as well as ‘population rich’ and ‘population poor’ to explain some of these population transfers. It outlines the ways in which capital rich nations such as those oil-rich Gulf countries comprising the GCC contrast with capital poor countries such as Egypt, Yemen, Sudan and Jordan with large populations. Population rich countries, such as Egypt, are able to supply the capital rich countries with much needed labour. Sabban (2005) highlights four major periods that affected labour import and policies in the UAE: the oil embargo in the 1960’s and early 1970’s which is characterized by high Arab, Indian and Pakistani labour importing and low female migration and labour participation; after the embargo from the 1970s through the 1980s, which experienced a deluge of labour from Arab and Asian countries; and before the first Gulf war, and after, which have similarities in the Asianization of the labour force, and the ways in which after the Gulf war governments evicted other Arabs such as Jordanians, Palestinians, Yemenis, and others (Sabban, 2005, 17).
Until the 1950s the number of expatriates was small, but this grew dramatically after the oil boom in 1973 (Zahlan, 1984, 982). This influx was furthered through the growth of the construction industry in the aftermath and, thus, “construction activities (in 1984) exceeds $100 billion annually, and is the third largest market after the US and Japan” (Zahlan, 1984, 985). This growth also played an important role in the growing numbers of migrants in fields such as domestic service, child care, cooks and chauffeurs, which all reflect the dramatically shifting lifestyle from increased oil wealth.

It must be carefully noted that not all migrants can be categorized in construction and service sector employment. In 1975, early on in the economic boom, the entrepreneurial assets of migrants are also addressed. In the UAE alone, Asian expatriates established 8,475 businesses (Zahlan, 1984, 981). Additional considerations can be found in the numbers of refugees in the Middle East during these times, such that, as Humphreys highlights, the region’s dependence on foreign labour and its weak national structures lend themselves to instability. Furthermore, these issues of citizenship and labour migrants are complicated by the growing cultural diversity, as well as colonially imposed borders and elitist politics. Humphrey’s discussion leads us to investigate the ways in which diverse migration patterns to the region create the foundations for restrictive citizenship laws that restrict access even for citizens (Humphrey, 1993, 2).

Within the Gulf, the cities that show world or global formation are Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Manama and Riyadh with Doha and Kuwait showing aspirations (Malecki and Ewers, 2007). The authors highlight that, the case of Dubai with small oil wealth set to run out soon stands out in two major ways: tied to spectacles and competition for super rich tourists, and massive investments in trappings of major nodes of knowledge. In both cases, both South Asian construction workers and Westerners and others with skills in IT are key. Dubai clearly demonstrates its aspirations to join in the global knowledge node through developments like ‘internet city’ and ‘media city’, with the attraction for footloose capital and workers linked to state of the art facilities and lifestyles. One of the challenges identified has been to attract all given major categories of highly skilled global migrations, including managers and executives, engineers and technicians, academics and scientists, entrepreneurs and students. This idea of ‘enticing’ professionals has been seen as a part of the justifications for higher wages, better living conditions, and more
entitlements than low waged workers, who are viewed as needing less to encourage their migration.

**Impact**

The UAE has experienced some of the most dramatic impacts of migration, as well as tremendous growing wealth, which have together led to drastic changes in the composition of its population. In addition to the large numbers of construction workers and professional who migrated to the UAE, the vast wealth that was pouring in to the country in the 1970s, has drastically impacted the lifestyles of local Emirati’s and their use and dependence on migrants in the fields such as domestic service, childcare, cooks and chauffeurs. A reoccurring image of city life follows,

> Despite the proximity of Asian labour to all aspects of Emirati life, a general appeasement, a sense of normality and consent overwhelms the place. You drive through the streets of a city in the UAE, at any time of day, you observe dark skinned (mostly Indian, Pakistani, Punjabi, and sometimes Filipino and Indonesian) workers in their orange, blue, or universally coloured uniforms, planting flowers on side walks or watering trees, or even dusting, cleaning, or newly paving the streets. In the crowded fish and vegetable markets, salesmen are either longtime immigrants from India or Pakistan, or lower caste Yemenis. Other poor Indians and ‘new arrivals’ work as porters and fish-cleaners. Similarly, in malls and old markets, salesmen are Indians, Iranians, Filipino, Moroccan, and other immigrants. The image of an ethnic division of labour repeats itself in all aspects of life and social interaction in the UAE. Yet life continues very peacefully (Sabban, 2005, 18).

These observations highlight the ethnic occupational segregation and social hierarchies visible in the UAE. This simple description is an insight into the seeming ‘contradictions’ of the ‘hyper’ modern ‘global city’ of Dubai, and the underclass migrant work force that helps sustains the economy. The sense of ‘normality’ and ‘peace’ is evidence of the formal strategies that have been employed by the state to control, regulate and maintain these divisions between ‘nationals’, ‘expat professionals’ and ‘labour migrants’. As such, social hierarchies control and dominate the majority of people living and working in the UAE, but also provide a source of national mythology to ensure that hierarchies of entitlement and privilege benefit ‘nationals’ and expats and exclude ‘others’. The inequality between groups based on gender, ethnicity, citizenship and
occupation becomes seemingly ‘natural’ in order to provide legitimacy and ‘exception’ for social exclusion, and normalizes subsequent violence.

Demarcations between legitimate and full citizenship are complicated and often contradictory in the Gulf. The ‘banning’ of foreign marriages, and subsequent social engineering projects on behalf of the government, has been based on a highly negative outlook on the influence of ‘foreigners’ on Emirati culture. These ideological projects are aimed at shifting and challenging the changing realities of demographic composition and have continued to form the basis or backdrop for additional discussions on the presence of larger numbers of foreigner workers. In addition to the highly exclusive issues of family, marriage and citizenship rights and status, is the issue of the increasing minority status of citizens or nationals. These discussions highlight the issues of migrant workers, through a more internal perspective on traditional political structures. Therefore, it is necessary to highlight how the mass migration of workers plays into these settings.

One of the most striking and controversial programs relating to temporary migrant workers is the Kafala system. This is a private non-governmental sponsorship system in all GCC states that ties workers’ visas to particular employers or ‘sponsors’ (Khodkher, 2010, 218) and severely restricts their right to change employers, on penalty of deportation (HRW, 2015, 23). In addition, it leaves workers at the will of their sponsors, who are entitled to revoke sponsorship at will. The system was originally created to make Gulf nationals responsible for the “conduct of foreign workers they employed” (HRW, 2015, 23) and “…instead of governments simply limiting the overall number of foreign residents and assigning their distribution to the market or to sate control, foreign residents are placed directly under the control of specific individuals and local companies who act as the foreigner’s Kafil, or sponsor” (Dresch & Piscatori, 2005, 23). The Kafala system has attracted the attention of scholars\(^7\) and international human rights organizations\(^8\). Migrant workers require a local sponsor in order to obtain a work visa and subsequently, sponsors have authority over legal identity cards. The sponsors also have control over the termination of a contract, and workers must receive formal permission to change

employers or renew their visas (HRW, 2015, 20). Anh Nga Longva (1999) discusses how this sponsorship system, in effect in most GCC countries, limits the ability of workers to change employers, even in the event of abuse. ‘Sponsorship Laws’ tie workers to specific employers highly restricting their freedom of mobility and protection. To complicate matters, recruitment agencies are interested in protecting the ‘purchases’ of employers and rarely offer any support to workers.

Some of the major problems identified within this sponsorship system are the difficulties in changing employers, inability to change employers, confiscated passports, and payment of fees to recruiters, which keeps people in debt, and prohibition of worker strikes, collective bargaining and worker associations (Ali, 2010). These factors contribute to a situation that has been compared to forced labour, “making it virtually impossible for workers to leave even abusive employers, notwithstanding the non payment of wages, dangerous working conditions, and sub-standard housing conditions” (HRW, 2015, 20). A prominent example is the long hours and extreme heat. The summer heat, which often rises to 50 degrees Celsius and while a 2005 government ban prohibits outdoor construction work during the hours from 12:00 to 2:30, the enforcement is lax and fines too low to keep companies compliant (Ali, 2010, 83). However, in 2009 the government seemed to be taking the issues more seriously and conducted nearly 2000 inspections in the first week of July in Dubai and Abu Dhabi and found 73 firms in violation of the ban (Ali, 2010, 83).

The issue of passport confiscation, which effects the majority of low waged workers, is arguably an outcome of the Kafala sponsorship system holding employers responsible and liable for workers (Ali, 2010), in turn creating a relationship that entices employers to retain control over their workers by taking passports. In addition, as HRW reports, “when a sponsor reports that a domestic worker has ‘absconded’ they are required to hand in the worker’s passport to the authorities” (HRW, 2014, 39), a situation that encourages confiscation of passports by employers, reflecting a key element highlighted by the ILO as creating situations of forced labour (HRW, 2014, 40). Khondker (2010) highlights that these practices can ‘blur’ the boundaries between labour migration and human trafficking, as UAE Minister of Labour argues that “giving wages
below the amount promised and tricking the worker to take up work different from that which has been promised ought to be treated as trafficking” (Khondker, 2010, 220).

This system is comparable to the Canadian Live-in Caregivers Program (LCP) or the Temporary Workers Program, which ties workers to individual employers through government programs. Thus, although the program in the GCC countries may be more dismal with no possibilities of citizenship or permanency, both programs work to create a flexible and disposable work force, which becomes internally governed and restricted to the control of private employers. “[I]n both cases wealth is generated by enforcing differential access for capital and labour; in both cases local populations may find the logic obscure or indeed objectionable. But the Gulf option gives citizens a seeming precedence at home” (Dresch & Piscatori, 2005, 23).

Issues. While scholars have examined complex issues related to social organization and urban development, international organizations such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), Amnesty International (AI), and Human Rights Watch (HRW) have published the most relevant reports documenting the exploitation and abuse faced by workers in low waged labour sectors in the UAE, particularly construction workers and domestic workers. Much of this work is focused on policy changes in hopes of pressuring governments to adopt internationally recognized labour standards. In addition, they have documented many of the government’s initiatives in amending existing labour laws and the Kafala system.

With regard to male migrants, particularly construction workers, HRW reports that the Gulf represents one of the largest recipients of migrant labour in the world. As a specific case study, the UAE is believed to have one of the largest construction booms in the world, employing primarily male construction workers. Hanieh (2011) notes that earlier flows of Arab labour were replaced by South Asian labour during the 1970s and 1980s when many workers came to relate to the Arab and Palestinian causes. Demanding more permanence and benefits, many Arabs were expelled from settling or bringing families. By 2002 the Arab proportion of migrant workers in the GCC fell to around 25-

29 percent, down from a level of 72% in 1975 (Hanieh, 2011, 64). The shift to South Asian labour increased the flow of remittances to South Asian countries and their dependency on these relationships.

With regard to the law, while the federal laws provide some protections to workers, these remain largely unenforced. Labour laws in the UAE are supposed to apply to both nationals and migrant workers, but in reality, this is not the case. In the 1980s minimum wage requirements continued to be violated by extremely profitable construction companies. On average, these companies pay US $175 per month, in contrast to the average per capita income of $2,106 a month in the UAE (HRW November 2006, 7). In Dubai, Hanieh (2011) notes that construction workers may earn around 50-80 cents per hour working ten-hour days, six days a week (64).

Overall, it is clear that inequities in wealth operate at the expense of an entire labour force of poor, ‘disposable’ migrant workers. These non-governmental organizations have noted some UAE government amendments to the Kafala system in which workers will be legally able to change employers when the latter fail to comply with ‘legal and contractual obligations’. In addition, the amendment allows workers to exchange employers after two years. Previously, workers could only exchange employers at the end of contract with written permission of the previous employer in the form of a “No Objection Certificate” (NOC); if refused, the worker would have to leave the country for at least six months before being eligible again for employment in the country (HRW, 2015, 23). This change allows workers to change employers at the end of the contract without permission, and also allows them to change prior to the expiry of contract without penalty and without employer’s permission if the employer violates his ‘legal or consensual’ obligations. However, as HRW documents, this ministerial decision does not provide a comprehensive list of the obligations that may be violated, but provides an example of ‘nonpayment of wages for sixty days’ (HRW, 2015, 23). The organization highlights mixed messages for workers, whereby a Ministry of Labour official was quoted saying foreign workers still need an NOC to change jobs and that they would impose one-year ban on those who tried to change without permission (HRW, 2015, 24). Thus, as we see there is a discrepancy in what the authorities have acknowledged and what is being practiced on the ground.
In addition, recruitment fees paid by workers in home countries before migrating have been an ongoing and substantial feature of their exploitation. Workers often find themselves heavily indebted before beginning their new jobs in the UAE, and often find themselves in precarious situations facing delayed or non-payment of wages, or being paid much less than promised. This situation has been seriously condemned by scholars and NGOs alike who have both argued these conditions to be comparable to a situation of debt bondage in which workers are forced to work in order to pay back debts. In a 2012 HRW report, ‘Saadiyat Island’, Abu Dhabi’s major new international tourist destination, costing between US $22 and 27 billion dollars, has been a site of immense controversy. This island would become home to a campus of New York University, and museums including branches of the Guggenheim and the Louvre. In this study (2012) almost all of the workers interviewed stated that they had paid fees between $2000 US (Ali, 2010, 86) and US$4,100, or between one and three years of their home countries’ annual GDP per capita, to recruiters in order to get their jobs (HRW, 2012, 13). In 2010, UAE authorities were able to force domestic based recruitment agencies to reimburse workers found to have paid recruiting fees and revoke or suspend their licenses. Although, the UAE labour law has prohibited employers from making workers pay recruitment fees since the 1980s, HRW has documented (2006, 2009, 2012) that the practice is systemic and customary (HRW, 2015, 25). These workers pay recruiters in their home countries, who then work with recruiting agencies or employers in the UAE. In response to these reports, the UAE government affirmed the prohibition on workers paying recruitment fees and strengthened domestic regulations on recruiting agents (HRW, 2015, 25). These fees are explicitly outlawed, and recruitment agencies may be made to refund the monies whether paid inside or outside the country (HRW, 2015, 25). There was no available information found by HRW on whether or not any recruitment agencies were found in violation, although the government says that they conducted 1070 visits in 2012 (HRW, 2015, 25).

A 2015 HRW report on updated Saadiyat Island developments highlights steps taken by UAE authorities, primarily through two organizations: the Abu Dhabi Executive Affairs Agency (EAA) and the Tourism Development & Investment Company (TDIC). They highlight what the EAA calls ‘The 14 points’, which requires contractors to adhere to more rights-protective standards on recruitment fees, passport confiscation, working
hours, wage payment and worker accommodation (HRW, 2015, 6). It appointed engineering, management and development consultant Mott McDonald to monitor compliance by contractors. TDIC also created its “Employment Practice Policy” (EPP) which applies to all projects under TDIC’s purview, and TDIC appointed PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) to monitor compliance (HRW, 2015, 6). While these have been important steps in rectifying some of the major issues faced by workers, HRW found significant difficulties in gaining access to information, and has documented ongoing abuses that violate the 14 points. The main problem they identify has been the inability or unwillingness to penalize contractors who violate terms of their codes of conduct.

In 2010, a resolution required firms to provide bank guarantees to cover, among other things, payments to workers in the event of non-payment of wages and fines for violating regulations on accommodations, to a maximum of $2.72 million USD, and corresponding to the number of workers they employ. However, the resolution states that companies or firms established or co-owned by the Federal Government or local governments are excluded from these guarantees. According to the Ministry, 3033 disputes were settled during 2012, and $8.58 million of companies’ guarantees liquidated. However, as HRW highlights, there was no transparency or indication of what fines were paid, and by whom.

In terms of wages, UAE labour law provides a minimum wage (although never implemented for low paid sectors like construction), maximum working hours, annual leave and overtime pay. In an attempt to address the frequent complaint by workers of non-payment of wages, a 2009 Resolution requires wage protection by making companies transfer salaries electronically using banks in the UAE. This has been to some extent effective in deterring some companies from withholding worker’s wages (HRW, 2015, 27), although the ministry data indicates that the number of complaints of unpaid wages continues to rise (HRW, 27).

With regard to passport confiscation, HRW documents that in 2001 and 2004, Dubai court ruled the practice of confiscating passport to be illegal, but UAE never passed legislations expressly prohibiting it (HRW, 2015, 22). In addition to the lack of effective implementation HRW documented additional issues such as the difficulties
faced by workers in filing complaints with the Ministry of Labour, where offices close on Friday, the usual day off for most migrant workers in the construction sector. In addition, their complaints must be filed in Arabic and on official forms. Of the 94 workers interviewed for this report, all said they were fearful of being fired and deported if they used official channels to complain about abuses (HRW, 2015, 28).

Construction workers regularly work six days a week of eleven hour shifts, and another half day on Fridays, in often very dangerous conditions with more than 700 deaths on the job and 90 suicides per year (Ali, 2010, 83). Additionally, the ILO found “no documented labour inspection strategy or enforcement policy”, but the Ministry of Labour indicates that they have a large body of labour inspectors conducting large number of inspections daily. When HRW sought confirmation of the number of labour inspectors employed, they got no response (HRW, 2015, 21).

Living conditions are also a key indicator of the status of workers outside of even their jobs (Ali, 2010, 91). A large number of Dubai’s construction workers live in labour camps located on the outskirts of the city. The largest of these is sarcastically referred to as ‘Sonapur’ (a Hindi word meaning ‘City of Gold’), home to some 200,000 people (Ali, 2010, 91), where 88 percent live in rooms with average occupancy between four and eight (Elsheshtawy, 214), although many sources report a higher number even than eight per room. “As the number of Dubai’s skyscrapers and malls grows, so does Sonapur. As the Burj Khalifa is now the world’s tallest building, complete with luxury condominiums and an Armani hotel, so Sonapur mirrors it in grotesque grandiosity” (Ali, 2010, 91). The living conditions are said to be filthy, overcrowded, with shared toilets and kitchens with poor drainage, often surrounding by stagnant sewage (Ali, 2010, 92). While these inhumane living conditions have been criticized, as Ali highlights, these workers may be considered ‘lucky’ as their housing is provided by employers. Other low waged workers are forced to pay their own way and have been documented to be crowded with as many as eight or more men into a single room in a house or apartment, paying an average of 500 AED or so for a ‘bed space’ (enough room for a single bed) (Ali, 2010, 93). When formal housing is not possible, as documented by Ali, creativity abounds, seen for example in one company who housed 2000 of its workers in cargo containers, 16 workers in each 300 square foot container, with a separate container for sick workers (Ali, 2010,
94). It has been documented that in Dubai and Sharjah some people have been renting car trunks for the night for 5 AED per night (Ali, 2010, 94).

HRW highlights that in 2015 they were prevented from conducting research openly and from conducting interviews at the Saadiyat Island site (HRW, 2015, 7). Additionally, in 2014 the UAE authorities denied a senior HRW representative permission to enter the country, and permanently blacklisted two other staff members as they were leaving the country (HRW, 12). In this ‘repressive rights climate’ they note that it is difficult to do research with the ongoing crackdown on freedom of expression for journalists to publish articles. Of course it should also be noted that strike action is illegal and many workers are being summarily deported for going on strike (HRW, 2015, 22). There are numerous cases of workers going to strike to protest withheld wages, low wages, lack of overtime pay, inadequate housing and living conditions, poor treatment and abuse. However, the reason in almost all cases is to deny the claims of striking workers, or deport workers who do not comply. Ali (2010) notes that in 2005, Gulf News reported that there were 24 strikes involving more than 7,000 workers over these issues (89). Davis (2006) highlights several important cases of protest and social unrest in Dubai specifically, such as in fall 2004 when several thousand Asian workers marched down the eight lane Sheikh Zayed highway towards the Ministry of Labour only to be met by riot police and threats of deportation. In September 2005, an estimated 7000 workers demonstrated for three hours, the largest protest in Dubai history. In March 2006, security workers ignited a riot at the Burj Dubai tower site where some 2500 workers marched towards the construction headquarters. The following morning, workers refused to work until a Dubai based company raised wages and improved living conditions. At the time of the strike, thousands of construction workers at a new airport terminal also joined in. In another case in July, hundreds of labourers at the Arabian Ranches project rioted to protest the chronic shortage of water for cooking and bathing at their camp (Davis, 2006, 67-68). Ali also notes a 2007 example in which 3,500 workers went on strike demanding pay rises. The strike was peaceful and ended by 11 am the same day and workers went back to work. The next day 200 workers were deported after many rioted following the company’s announcement of pay increases of just 2 AED per day (Ali, 2010, 89). Three days after the riot, 65 workers had been deported without arrest, trial, or due process of
any kind, and the company was given 250 additional work permits free of charge to replace the workers (Ali, 2010, 89). These examples all showcase the contrast between government action to protect Dubai’s image and construction, and the “snail’s pace at which the government acts to curb the exploitation of labour” (Ali, 2010, 89). It is important to put these strikes, essential protests for basic living conditions and wages, in the context of the multi-million dollar globally iconic projects for which they toil. Thus, what makes possible the global allure of Dubai’s development are the thousands of workers on whose labour these projects depend, but who are continually relegated to the lowest spaces in urban social hierarchies, and who are constantly dehumanized to such a degree that their lives and deaths are trivialized. “[A]s human beings they are socially invisible, interchangeable and ultimately disposable” (Ali, 2010, 81).

It is within this environment that HRW has found that 9 of 11 of the International Labour Organization (ILO) list of “11 Indications of Forced Labour” are occurring in the UAE, including “abuse of vulnerability, deception, restriction of movements, intimidation and threats, retention of identity documents, withholding of wages, debt bondage, abusive living and working conditions, and excessive overtime” (HRW, 2015, 28). The consequences of these failures has been felt by workers themselves who often face segregation into enclaves, whether culturally or geographically in working camps or housing accommodations outside of key city sites. Halliday (1984) discusses how all migrants are restricted from political rights, but there are differentiations between what social entitlements various sectors of workers are given. Among the ‘unskilled’, “migrants have no political rights, and no rights to organize, publish or strike. Like serfs or slaves, they are usually tied to one particular employer” (Halliday, 6). Migrants themselves are generally isolated, not only from Indigenous populations, but from other migrants, both in location and language, which is said to effect their inability to mobilize a resistance (Halliday 1984, 8). Halliday also discusses the ways in which migrants themselves view their relationships to the state, often being more concerned with their home country or sending governments. Therefore, even when coming from countries with strong histories of political unionism or organizing, migrants are more interested in politics back home than where they work. “A migrant faces a choice - to organize politically with reference to the country of employment, or with reference to country of
origin” (Halliday 1984, 7). However, to add to these insights, it is important to consider the limitations of organizing in the context of the Gulf, the lack of political freedom and tremendous crack down on any form of organizing (especially unions, as they remain illegal), combined with the ongoing temporary and transient nature of their ‘belonging’ in the UAE.

**Status of female domestic workers.** The ILO reported in 2013 that there were 236,500 domestic workers in the UAE (HRW, 2014, 12). Most workers come from the Philippines, Indonesia, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Ethiopia, although numbers fluctuate due to temporary bans or restrictions that sending governments impose in response to abuse or disagreements with UAE authorities. It has been documented in interviews with Emiratis and professional expats that they can afford to employ live in domestic workers, especially as the sector is poorly regulated, and there is no minimum wage or requirement to pay for overtime work. In a report (2014) entitled “I already bought you”, HRW documented exploitation and abuse against female migrant domestic workers in the UAE, implicating employers, recruiters in sending countries, agencies in receiving countries, sending governments and the state. Some of the major issues documented include physical, psychological and sexual abuse, the all too common practice of confinement to the home, failure to pay wages due, excessively long working hours without breaks or days off, denial of adequate food, poor living conditions and lack of adequate medical care. Countless cases of extreme violence and abuse such as torture and murder have been documented in local newspapers. This can also be seen in the fact that in 2008, the Philippines Consulate in Dubai reported that they had four runaways a week as a result of physical abuse, rape and non-payment of wages (Ali, 2010, 97).

International organizations all agree that labour laws in many Gulf States, and particularly in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE, all ‘categorically’ exclude women from even basic labour law provisions. In particular,

Women workers might suffer from a double discrimination in employment: first because they are foreigners and hence subject to the same discrimination as male migrant workers; and second because they are women and as such often victims of entrenched traditional attitudes in their country of origin or of employment. (HRW, November 2007, 114)
Amnesty International (AI) reports that female migrant domestic workers living and working in the GCC countries face continual discrimination, and often violence. They are obviously denied the rights accorded to citizens but also those of other workers, and are said as well to face not only as workers, but also as women (AI, 2005, 47). Furthermore, their employment in an unprotected sector means that they work in unregulated and undervalued environments, a breeding ground for human rights abuses.

These workers also suffer under the Kafala sponsorship system and the lack of protection by the UAE labour law. Domestic workers are explicitly excluded by UAE labour law and from basic protections that are afforded to most other workers, such as limits on working hours and provisions for overtime pay. Their work is not regulated by the Minister of Labour, and is therefore excluded from Ministry of Labour regulations that apply to other sectors, and instead falls under the Ministry of Interior’s General Directorate of Residency and Foreign Affairs (the immigration department) (HRW, 2014, 27).

With regard to wage exploitation, not only are domestic workers paid substantially less than their male counterparts, they also face unpaid or withheld wages, debt bondage incurred from travel costs and fluctuating wages. HRW reports that in the UAE, the official monthly salary for a domestic worker is speculated to be around 550 dirhams (US $150), the actual monthly salary is estimated at 400-450 dirhams (US $109-123), which amounts to an hourly wage of US $0.20 for an average 16-hour day (HRW November 2007, 40).

Another major issue faced by women migrants is confinement to the home, and confiscation of identity documents. Many international non-governmental organization’s (INGOs) have documented the experiences of women workers, finding that employers from around the globe generally make use of similar techniques to control and maintain a hold over their employees. These techniques include limiting their ability to speak to their families, friends or neighbours, forcing them to remain in the home, and confiscating their passports and other forms of identification. In one study by Gambard (2009), half of the domestic workers interviewed in the UAE have never left the house of their employers for the two years in which they worked in the country (Hanieh, 66). The confinement of women to the home and (often enforced) language barriers signify a
severe limitation of their freedom as they are isolated from the outside world and therefore unable to communicate with anyone outside of their immediate work environments.

The issue of sexual abuse by employers, family members and friends is also a reoccurring and violent reality for female migrant domestic workers. Since many women are denied any privacy in their workplace, are not given adequate living space, and are often unable to leave the confines of the home, they are the most vulnerable to sexual and physical violence. In addition, reports (2006, HRW 2007, AI 2005, ILO 2004) include information on the ways in which ‘morality’ laws in the Gulf, function to control women migrants through their freedom of association, sexuality, speech and general social participation. In many cases, abused workers who ‘run away’ are painted as threats to national security and treated as criminals (Ali, 2010, 97).

Workers who flee abusive scenarios do not always get the help they require. This can be tied to formal legal structures in which domestic workers who leave employers without consent are seen to have ‘absconded’ and as such have committed an administrative offence that can result in deportation and bans on their future employment (HRW, 2015, 5). The UAE also criminalizes those who ‘harbour’ a migrant worker without a visa, including workers who have fled abusive employers, with penalties ranging from fines to imprisonment (HRW, 2014, 5). HRW also notes that workers who report abuse are frequently returned by their recruitment agencies to abusive employers or confined to agency offices.

Overall, it is clear that women face specific impediments to their protection under the law in GCC countries, not only in their working status as ‘unskilled foreigners’ but also as women. It can be noted that the UAE has slowly implemented changes to legal labor regulations for the protection of migrant workers. In 2007 the UAE Labour Ministry published a draft of new laws on the Internet and invited public comments. It has been found that the revisions discriminate against women in substantial ways, namely the explicit exclusion of domestic work. In addition, the laws include limitations on women’s access to certain types of employment and the sanctioning of punishment for male ‘guardians’ who violate the law. In effect, women are treated as dependents, rather
than as “competent adults with full and independent legal capacities” (HRW March 2007, 2).

Specifically in response to domestic work, the UAE implemented a standard contract in April 2007 (HRW, November 2007), which is said to protect workers but does not include provisions on limitations to working hours, rest days, over time pay, or compensation, and only provides unspecified ‘adequate breaks’ and every two years, a one month paid vacation. This contract can be compared to the labour laws for their male counterparts, which include an eight hour limit on working days, and a guaranteed weekly rest day, a one hour daily rest period, overtime pay, a one month of annual paid leave, and workers’ compensation for occupational injuries (HRW, November 2007, 133). Comparatively, the Kuwaiti government implemented a similar standardized contract for domestic workers, which specified a minimum wage and must be signed by both employer and employee. However, both contracts in the UAE fail to implement a regulatory mechanism to ensure compliance and solidify workers’ rights under the labour law.

The current contract for domestic work, in use since June 2014, requires employers to pay domestic workers in cash at the end of each month, and with seven days of the due date. The update in 2014 also includes a minimum eight hours rest in each day, one day of leave per week with compensation, and annual paid vacation. Much of the tension lies in the high costs employers pay to obtain workers, which pits employer and workers against each other, rather than promoting reform in fees by the state or legal agencies. In addition, HRW argues that a stronger contract is not a substitute for labour law protections. In the most recent discussions in November 2014, GCC representatives met to discuss a unified contract, which remains a mystery, as most of the draft has not been released. In addition, while the UAE voted in favour of the ILO convention on domestic workers, which came into force in 2013, they have yet to ratify it as their own laws and practices fall significantly short of the requirements (HRW, 2014, 6).

In response to many of these issues, many labour sending countries have implemented measures to protect their nationals. However those countries have been seen as largely unable to provide adequate protection from abuse and exploitation once in the UAE. This can be seen in the case of Pakistan, which has for years refused to allow its
citizens to come to Dubai as housemaids; or in countries such as Ethiopia, the Philippines, and Indonesia, which have, all at different times placed temporary bans on migration for domestic work.

Scholars working and living in the region (Sabban 2005, Slama and Jandaly 2005) report that the UAE governments have publicized there direct interest in changing the negative experiences of domestic workers. The most recent change in 2005 was the official penalty of a life long ban on any employer found to have abused a domestic worker. Sabban also states that, “an extra overtime-payment for a day off is more practical to be implemented at such stage, than giving domestic workers the liberty to take a free day, and be free of the employer (sponsor) control” (Sabban, 2005, 28). However, the UAE proposal to introduce a standardized contract for domestic workers is not sufficient, and does not compensate for their exclusion from equal protection under national labour laws. So although domestic work operates in the privacy of homes, workers remain the most vulnerable to the aforementioned types of exploitation and abuse because of these exclusions, which is particularly heightened due the lack of adequate monitoring systems to curtail these abuses and enforce compliance with basic provisions and in effect thereby creating an environment of impunity for employees.

The popular rhetoric on the issues of domestic workers has been based on the perceived negative impacts of dependency on foreign maids for culture and family life. “No published study described them as a necessity for the area’s changing lifestyle. No one emphasized their integral part in development, furthermore, no one put their lives at the center of the study”, all the while the issue is gaining increased importance in local reports (Sabban, 2005, 23). Local reports are almost entirely centered on the abilities of employers as mothers to fulfill their reproductive duties because of their quest for consumerism and class status. Additionally, this ‘neglect’ is also linked to corrupting Emirati children through defective socialization and the abuse of local norms and values, which they are not believed to share.

In understanding the processes of differentiation it is important to consider ideologies of race, gender, class, and belonging, which intersect with policies of citizenship to significantly impact the migrant majority population. As formal citizenship only applies to a small part of the population, and migrants have no ability to apply for
citizenship, all categories of migrant therefore remain effectively temporary, although as we will see, ideas of belonging are importantly differentiated, creating important hierarchies, not only amongst Emirati citizens and all migrants, but between migrants at different levels in society.

Conclusions: ‘Foreigners’ in the UAE

From a more focused examination of the background, policies and histories of migration in this chapter, we can see that in the history of the UAE migration is such a key component to development that it has been described as a dependency. Given the historical features of Dubai’s development as a global city within a broader global political economy, the histories of colonialism, capitalism and ‘development’ have created an international division of labour in which migrants from the global South have increasingly been on the move in search of livelihood opportunities that often push them towards migration. In the UAE, however, both highly skilled and low waged migrants are in high demand, though these workers have been incorporated, through particular national policies and practices, hierarchically into the social body to maintain strict social divisions. The working conditions, experiences, treatment, opportunities, and protections, both formal and informal, have importantly shaped ‘hierarchies of entitlement’ in which all residents of the city find themselves experiencing different worlds with different possibilities. Global cities in the ‘non-western’ context, such as Dubai, have been largely ignored by traditional scholarly inquiry, but are significant as they bring together diverse locales in unique ways. In addition, they are also embedded in longer historical trajectories that shape not only the geographical patterns of movement in migration, but also carry important ideological forces that follow migrants on their journey, shaping their lives and the possibilities that exist for them.

As scholars and NGOs have examined, the formal strategies related to migration importantly shape the entrance of workers into the UAE context. However, we see that existing laws and policies have failed to adequately protect workers from a range of exploitations and abuses, and furthermore that informal practices continue to influence the experiences of workers from all sectors. These workers have helped to identify the highly unequal status of citizens in relation to Others, despite the state’s and society’s
tremendous dependency on foreign workers. The insecurities that fuel tensions between groups can be seen in relation to the migrant majority population of the UAE, which has been constructed and perpetuated as a source of insecurity for the state, as well as a threat to the social fabric of Emirati society. Thus, as the next chapter will explore, these histories are important features of Dubai’s emergence as a global city that is highly dependent on migration. It will begin with insight into the role of citizenship in demarcations between legitimate and full citizens and ‘temporary workers’ from diverse categories of labour. We will see how formal attempts by the government to exclude and limit the impact of migrants are tied to xenophobic ideas of the ‘negative’ influence of ‘foreigners’ on Emirati culture. In addition to the highly exclusive issues of family, marriage and citizenship rights and status, is the issue of the intensifying minority status of citizens.

Through this analysis we can see important nuances in the making of racialized subjectivities as they operate through the neoliberal global city. Furthermore, whereas the Gulf is often exceptionalized in many instances, we will see how in fact, these processes represent important shifts in the global division of labour and represent not so much a ‘past’ as they do the future of migration, citizenship and labour policy and practice. We will also explore how it is not only the state, national and international forces that shape geographies of migration, but also the everyday relationships between sectors that sustain these inequalities, and reinforce them through the internalization of ‘temporariness’ and relativization. Thus, we will see how ‘dreams’ of Dubai are linked to the politics of ‘where you are from’ overwhelming ‘where you are at’, based on genealogies of race that are embedded within geographies of migration that are remade into national hierarchies of citizenship and labour.
Chapter Five: Living the Dream

If you are not careful you can drown in your Dubai dreams. I have seen it. It is easier than you think. (Adonis, Canadian/Jordanian)

This chapter is linked to the final stage of the sleep cycle, which culminates in REM (the only place where vivid dreaming occurs). In this stage of sleep the brain is most active, but the body in many ways is more relaxed. Dreaming occurs because of increased brain activity, but paralysis sets in to protect the dreamer (Walcutt, n.d.). Thus, when we are the freest to fully experience our dreams, we may also be immobilized. This chapter examines the experience of ‘Living the Dream’ where one is free to finally experience the dreams one has been preparing for and, through the collision of various dreams in the making of Dubai’s dreamscapes, we will see fully the significance of unmapping the genealogies that accompany geographies of migration to the city as they impact the making of hierarchies and everyday relationships.

We explore the dreams of residents as they are linked to social geographies, lived experiences, and everyday logics that create, maintain and legitimize hierarchies of entitlement within the urban landscapes of Dubai’s globality. Furthermore, we see how dreams are best mapped through a genealogical analysis that exposes the forms of power that shape and make possible both migrant dreams and the dominant Dream of Dubai’s globality. To do this, we consider insights from groups of residents on their motivations for migration, descriptions of their lifestyles, reflections on their relationships to other sectors, and the experiences and impacts of citizenship and nationality on their everyday lives. Thus, different perspectives – at the macro and micro levels, as well as levels of analysis such as the global, national and local, and temporal realms, past, present and future - are linked through the ‘everyday’, which is a counterpoint to the spectacle of globality in which hierarchies are made, reproduced and maintained. Overall, what we find upon closer examination of the power and impact of dreams is that when people are in a position to live their Dubai dream, they falsely believe themselves to be free, when in actuality they are immobilized and unable act, think or challenge the limits set forth for them. Thus, whether dreaming is experienced as restorative or as disrupted, there are consequences both real and imagined.
While much of the contemporary data on the plight of low waged migrant workers has been importantly documented by international organizations such as those discussed in the previous chapter, there remain significant gaps in these analyses. Much of these gaps are related to the broader ‘human rights’ discourse in which these reports are situated, which often lacks a nuanced historical contextualization of the issues being documented. Thus, in order to avoid ahistorical, essentializing views that erase the significant historical and ideological complexities that shape lived experiences, we need to explore how the specific structures of the Gulf, in combination with neoliberal trends in the global political economy and the broader historical context, work together to create structural and systemic forms of urban social inequalities.

Additionally, the insights found in the interviews emphasized the need to link the ideological basis that fuels xenophobic attitudes towards foreigners to a broader historical dependency. This chapter explores how categories of workers are complicated not only in relation to nationals but to ‘other’ expats, such as those working in professional jobs. Also, exploring how transnational communities are created and accommodated by the state and civil society exposes the participation of non-nationals through newspaper and media in the making of urban cultures. Taken together, these analyses work towards theorizing practical yet radical policy and political changes that work beyond merely holding the state and wealthy Emirati’s accountable by implicating the role of history in making possible these networks and the subsequent policies, as well as the complicity of foreign interests, sending governments, and individuals caught in a matrix of globalized inequalities and the everyday negotiations that form the hierarchies embedded in the urban spatiality of Dubai’s global city aspirations.

In the last chapter we saw how histories and processes of migration are integral to the development of the city’s physical infrastructure, daily operations and maintenance, and in creating its global allure for migrants of all socio-economic statuses, as well as building its industry and expertise. Thus, Dubai was examined in more material dimensions, through examinations of the international division of labour, histories of demand for labour, and development. Building here, this chapter explores state policies tied to citizenship, migration, and labour, which are set against the backdrop of the
experiences of migrants themselves as they articulate why and how they migrated, and how they relate to Emirati citizens. Thus, we see the lived realities and spatial logics of migration and labour in Dubai as they manifest into rigid social hierarchies. These arguments about contemporary citizenship regimes are theorized as the metropolitan counterpart of imperialism. Exploring these imperialist geographies and their manifestations into neoliberal spaces of ‘globality’ in the making of Global Cities such as Dubai exposes the creation of modern subjectivities/ontologies based on the exploitation of racialized, gendered labour and the supremacy of whiteness, capitalism and subsequent ideas of innocence. Working together these processes produce the exaltation of particular subjectivities, creating preference, exaltation and humanity for some through the abjection of ‘Others’. Interestingly, all subjects interviewed in this study were able to articulate a pervasive hierarchical categorization of labourers, primarily based on the mechanisms of citizenship, status and labour. This was generally presented as dominated by the few, but powerful, subject of the Emirati national, followed by Western expats, primarily white professionals, followed by elites from the Third world, then by other Arabs, followed by Africans, Asians, and South Asians, the majority of whom work in construction or service sectors, and are considered Dubai’s underclass. It is too simple to reduce these hierarchies to a simple analysis of class relations, and instead it is necessary to examine how genealogies of race and gendered notions of work operate in the making of preferred citizens/subjects in a context of majority migrants living in their relative levels of ‘temporariness’. Why some migrants are preferred is not only a matter of class, but an important matter of race and gender, and the historical making of categories of humanity and privilege, which bring with them ideas about race and belonging, most clearly seen through understandings of nationality in the making of urban hierarchies.

The Power of the Seemingly Mundane in the Everyday

As was shown, the major scholarly works on globalization and the global city have largely reproduced the dominant Eurocentric framework for evaluating ‘globality’ as an economic and political force with social consequences. Thus, the top down, macro, econo-centric formulation through which many scholars operate tends to reinforce notions of the hegemonic, seemingly inevitable power of capital to dictate the function
and forces of cities, and all relations therein. On the other hand, the everyday is understood as an important “counterpoint to global city literature on emphasis of space of flows” (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 177). Thus, we can consider two key concepts here that help us to explore these ideas: the ‘everyday’ and ‘space’.

The power of ‘everyday’ negotiations and relationships is found in the reflections of subjects, as well as in insights into the social organization of places in the city, embodied in the conceptualization of ‘space’. The everyday both conceals and reveals important insights into the hierarchies of entitlement that shape the experiences of residents in Dubai. These insights lend themselves to the broader conceptualization of genealogies of migration that work to expose the temporal and spatial features and realities of various subjectivities and the ontological (im)possibilities, which are realized through epistemologies grounded in racial formations in contemporary processes of neoliberal globalization.

The popular ‘façade of glittering high rises and luxurious shopping malls’ lends itself to an ahistorical and decontextualized representation of Dubai as being ‘fake’. As Elsheshtawy argues, “…its everyday life shows a place full of aspirations, struggles, encounters taking place in all sorts of settings” (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 1). Thus the everyday is seen as a site of possibility through negotiations, resistances and alterative worldviews. People are not simply being ‘duped’, they engage in complex practices that, … Circumvent these spectacular developments seeking instead an experience that is not tied to imagery or appeal of spectacle, they are not passive, nor does the proliferation of the spectacular cause them to be unwitting participants in capitalist exploitation. (Elsheshtawy, 187)

In the making of ‘everyday urbanisms’ we see that through the seemingly mundane and banal operations of daily life, complex relationships and ideological negotiations are taking place in which subjects engage in making ‘sense’ of their lives. While the potential that is explored here is linked importantly to issues of empowerment and agency, we can also, as I argue, see it as tied to the normalization and legitimatization of particular practices that contribute to the creation of hegemonic/commonsensical ideologies.

From these considerations and the focus of the everyday as a scale of analysis, we can also map the social geography of the city, in which, as Elsheshtawy highlights, we
can see the differences in the constitution of daily experiences of residents. However, as I argue, the mapping of social geographies, and migrant geographies for that matter, necessitates that we simultaneously ‘unmap’ these geographies beyond both material places and ideologies to uncover the historic underpinnings and workings of racial ideologies and structures that imbue the everyday with its most salient, insidious feature, the creation of different ontologies, subject positions and relations through practices of ‘Othering’.

For Henry Lefebvre (1991) the schema related to the ‘Production of Space’ encompasses both production of space through professions and planning, and its everyday life. For Chase et al, (1999), the everyday highlights a range of possibilities, which should be mapped through the social geography of the city based on differences in experiences of the space. Traditionally, place has been very simply understood in its physicality, in the infrastructure and its geographical development. Of course the construction and physical aspects of the city are extremely important in shaping social relations, but for this analysis, the idea of space is significant in understanding the social relations that give meaning to place. In particular, this means thinking more explicitly about denaturalizing spaces by asking how race, for example, constitutes space. Through the work of notable scholars on critical race and spatial theorists\(^\text{11}\) we see that this framework allows for the examination of multiple systems of oppression. First, as Sherene Razack (2002) argues, spaces are organized to sustain unequal social relations, and these relations in turn also shape spaces. Furthermore, building on Ong’s critique of the ‘spaces of flows’ argument in globalization theory, the inability of traditional frameworks to deal with the simultaneity of multiple systems of oppression is supported by critical spatial methodology. If we follow that racial hierarchies are produced through spatial relations, then we see how “place becomes race” through various practices (Razack, 2002, 1).

Second, Henri Lefebvre’s concept of ‘social space’ highlights the dialectical relationship between spaces and bodies, in which both the material and symbolic work together to create and constitute space. Thus, this discussion explores the relationality of identity, whereby positions are secured in relation to others. In this sense, spaces and the

relations embedded within them only exist in so far as they are understood in relation to another, or in this case, as citizens are understood in relation to ‘Others’. Expanding this further through the work of Razack and Thobani (2007), we need to explore the creation of subjects in relation to the constitution of national space, which is explored in more detail in the upcoming sections of this chapter.

Overall the major issues raised through this discussion involve several threads, all of which are based on how to (un)map and denaturalize the spaces of Dubai. In this framework, (un)mapping requires thinking about the spaces as tied to social relations that are organized hierarchically based on colonialism and the racial logics embedded in these histories. In the case of Dubai, a spatial methodology comes into significance not only in theorizing subject positions that are produced in and through space, but also to understand how the nation is conceptualized in the global capitalist economy.

In a more practical way we see that ‘periphractic space’ is relational,

… it does not require absolute displacement of persons to or outside city limits, to the literal margins of urban space. It merely entails their circumscription in terms of location and their limitation in terms of access - to power - to (the realization of) rights, and to goods and services. (Goldberg, 1993, 188)

Therefore, the geographical and social organization of spaces whereby certain bodies are considered illegitimate and denied access or have their mobility controlled is one way of limiting the impact these bodies can have. The segregation of ‘labour’ workers into worker camps, or apartments on the outskirts of town or in neighbouring Emirates, in accommodations provided by their employers means that the people who sustain the economy are being kept away from the ‘image of Dubai’. This segregation need not always be explicitly enforced through fences, because it can also be imagined.

When formally sanctioned exclusions are no longer politically possible, private preferences to exclude may be sustained under more generally acceptable principles like freedom of expression, or association, or un-coerced property contracts dictated by free market forces. (Goldberg, 1993, 195)

This can be seen in examples of policy that govern and enforce these inequalities through less explicit means, such as government controls on entrepreneurial ownership, property ownership and public strategies to promote the shift from public to private participation of nationals. Another major example can be seen in the idea of contractual,
temporary employment and limited visas, whereby workers are kept ‘in line’ by being continually reminded of their inability to settle, bring their families or gain permanent residence in Dubai. Migrants are thus disciplined through their temporality, non-belonging and the precariousness of their status and visas, all of which combined, although differentiated by gender, produce insecurities amongst migrants that limit their ability to produce organized resistance.

The necessity of a spatial analysis is shown by asking how the creation of subjectivities in this space is linked to the suppression and exploitation of racialized labour and the supremacy of global capitalist values, which work together to produce privileged citizens and expats/tourists in relation to ‘migrant-Others’. To explore these ideas, I examine both the materiality of places and landscapes, but also the imaginative spatialities, which work together to constitute subjects through hierarchies of citizenship in Dubai. In this sense, citizens, expats and tourists all need the bodies of ‘migrant-Others’ to reaffirm their position and superiority. A spatial analysis in this way then, explores multiple scales of analysis in relation to multiple systems of oppression over time. It considers how these relations both collide and collude together to form structural and systemic relations that are both upheld and challenged in our traditional assumptions through the voices of diverse informants.

To consider a few examples, in the case of the global we can see how critical scholars have identified the dialectic relationship between neoliberal restructuring, in the global North and South under globalization. Examining the ways in which neoliberal logics connect the consequences of development and free trade, embodied in SAPs, to the disproportionate burden on Third World peoples, and particularly to women – through the processes of domestic welfare reform in the “First World” – who are then tied to the restrictive immigration and welfare policies in receiving countries, through which migrants are filtered. While many have focused on ‘First’ and ‘Third’ world relations, we can see how these structural features shape Dubai in significant ways whereby the city participates in upholding these structural features of the international division of labour, while simultaneously enforcing extremely exclusionary models of citizenship, which together can be seen as constituting the neoliberal dream. This new model of urbanity
highlights Dubai’s unique adaptation of neoliberal economic policies and geographic position within the division of labour internationally.

In considering the space through more nationally based examples, Elsheshtawy highlights some important relationships at the everyday level in Dubai. The idea of ‘transience’ is a dominant theme in many subjects’ descriptions of life in Dubai. Scholars have tied these insights to physical spaces, which, in the case of Dubai’s globality, are created to deter or inhibit attachment. “[t]hey do not seem lived in” (Elsheshtawy, 2011, 13). This is further supported by many of my interviewees who also articulated how their belonging was made precarious through their status as temporary migrants without formal citizenship or any basis on which to make claims on the state, but also by the places themselves. In an interesting vein, Elsheshtawy like many subjects in my study argues that ‘lived’ spaces are found in older, less gentrified spaces such as ‘Satwa’, and parts of Deira and Bur Dubai, made up of a mix of inhabitants. In this sense, “The superficial, homogenous urbanity of the Jumeriah walk or Bastakiya Souq is no substitute for the real life mix of people in Meena Bazaar. Or along shores of the creek…” (Elsheshtawy, 2011, 14). These aspects of the more informal Dubai are parts of the city that most tourists need not see on their trip, as they are primarily made up of South Asians.

In addition, the consideration of uneven geographies in which exclusion takes place is highlighted in the context of ‘spectacular Dubai’, a model being exported elsewhere. Elsheshtawy argues that Dubai based developers have built new developments in places such as Cairo, which, unlike Dubai that has no contextual constraints, has large pockets of poor people who seem to create an unstable juxtaposition of extreme wealth and abject poverty, that he argues will inevitably result in “social problems and unrest” (Elsheshtawy, 2011, 201). However, when we consider the theoretical underpinnings of this analysis we see that despite the ‘differences’ in the contexts, there are significant commonalities that make Dubai as problematic as Cairo in terms of exclusion and poverty. In fact, much of the problem with Dubai for Westerners and other elites is that it makes many people feel ‘uncomfortable’ as it brings the Third World into too close contact with the First World.
The spectacle of Dubai not only segregates and separates people, it also generates and sustains social hierarchies tied to notions of race and histories of unequal global development, which are also important sources of nation building and help to shape public perception on acceptability, inevitability, and often, necessity. As scholars such as David Harvey (2006) have shown, social organization is further impacted by the forces of neoliberalism, which creates uneven geographies in urban development by building ‘exclusivity’ and catering for the wealthy.

Diversity in Migrant Experiences

Here we explore how the dominant images of Dubai’s globality compare with the lived realities articulated by subjects. Subjects were asked to discuss issues such as multiculturalism, the Dubai dream, lifestyles of different groups, the role of citizenship and nationality in determining what they were entitled to in their jobs, housing, benefits, as well as the experience itself and different considerations for different groups, the experiences of nationals in relation to migrants, the role of racism and gender stereotypes in determining the treatment and experiences of groups, the impact of where they came from in shaping their understanding of the Dubai dream and their experience within the city, lifestyles and personality of the city and who the city is built for. These insights are organized into three subsections, beginning with insights into the ‘personality’ of the city, the dominant characteristics and aspects of city life as they experience it. Subjects reflected on the different lifestyles and experiences they had, and I compare and contrast these with reference to scholarly works and insights and analysis on the social geographies of the city. In addition, this section turns to examine the major features of social organization in the city and how subjects reflect on these hierarchies. This section works to reiterate the significance of ‘unmapping’ as a methodological tool in uncovering the genealogies embedded within geographies of migration to the data to elucidate factors and forces that impact and shape notions of belonging and identity, before we turn to the impacts of citizenship on the making of the ‘nation’.

Dubai is a huge contradiction. It’s difficult to describe Dubai in one word…in some ways you want to say inclusive, because it is a place where people live with so many different cultures and religions, yet its this superficial side of Dubai that
stops it from fully integrating and becoming one word that makes sense for the entire place. (Lo, British)

Amidst tremendous diversity, subjects reflected on the reality that while Dubai is a multicultural city, there are still forces at play that encourage divisions between places and people. Many provided insights into these exclusionary trends, which primarily highlighted the extreme inequities between low waged labour migrants and Emirati citizens, as well as the movement and segregation between the ‘global city’ spaces of Dubai, and the ‘Other’ places such as Satwa and Bur Dubai for example, as inherently violent. These spaces are older, more diverse and accessible, and most importantly, they are dominated by labourers and other racialized workers, and stand in contrast to the spectacular developments such as the Dubai Mall, Palm Jumeirah, Burj al Arab, or Burj Khalifa. In addition, these places are often described through biased depictions such as being the ‘ghetto’ of Dubai, often represented as crime ridden, dangerous and fringe. While Dubai attempts to distance labourers from the dominant image of Dubai, all residents, visitors and citizens can articulate similar descriptions into the social hierarchies that organize the city. In fact, the significance of these hierarchies is found not in ‘hidden’ places, but through the spaces that showcase the relationships between different sectors in any one place, where the contrast between relative levels of power and privilege are most obvious. “Exclusion, poverty and violence are on the rise as the sense of belonging, social cohesion and the very notion of citizenship are threatened” (Elsheshtawy 2011, 21). These divides are characteristics of Dubai’s development as a global city, and highlight the priorities which shape Dubai’s rapid development trajectory into the global sphere, giving rise to iconic buildings and infrastructure that work towards establishing its place in the global city network. Thus, focusing on “well established real estate and architectural tactics to achieve its global dreams” has been a key priority of the city (124). The focus on development therefore has been to attract wealthy GCC nationals, Western tourists and professionals, as well as wealthy elites from India, Iran, Russia and other non-Western countries.

Many critiques of the real estate sector center on the priorities of luxury that tend to ignore or disregard the needs of its migrant majority population, many of whom live in dismal conditions in labour camps, shared apartments, rooms and bed spaces. In effect,
there are processes through which the city works in “sanitizing the city in a way by displacing its poor who should be kept out of sight for fear of spoiling the carefully crafted ultra luxurious cityscape” (Elsheshtawy, 2011, 125). The focus on luxury has been built on the idea of exclusivity and this has led to extreme social exclusion, which has arguably lead to an environment that is non-egalitarian in nature, with the international and national systems operating to uphold existing global inequalities and reinforce these structures through the formal policies and procedures by which migrants enter the city. In further considering how subjects discuss and explain the lifestyles and experiences of different sectors we can turn to some major themes and insights, which are organized through broad categorizations of ‘low waged migrant workers’, expat professionals and Emirati citizens.

**Low waged Migrant Workers.** “Life is there. Money is here” (Waseem, Pakistan). On a taxi ride took one afternoon, I meet a driver, Waseem, who has been working in Dubai for over 18 years. He has two children back home, and his wife and parents to support. His experiences of Dubai are based on the reality that “people just come to grab money here, but mostly its not there”. He shows me his bank slip highlighting his paycheck for the month of 1000.60 AED (275.42 USD), of which 25 AED must go to pay for his uniform, 500 for fees, and 400, which he sends home. Waseem explains that over the years he has been employed in numerous sectors such as construction, but that the current job is much easier although it still does not pay him well enough to live comfortably and grow.

Most of Waseem’s insights are tied to his dreams. He talks profoundly about the dreams he has to buy a car of his own to drive. He explains that he would invest in a bus, and drive people to work, back and forth, but the cost is too high, 50,000AED and a down payment of 2,500AED, which he doesn’t have, and cannot likely foresee based on his current situation. He quickly turns to another dream, “But the best jobs you could have is it your own a cafeteria, making small 5, 10, 15 AED foods, best business where you are happy, serving hamburger, sandwiches, drinks. This is the dream job”. For Waseem, having dreams beyond the reality of his work experience, affording him the freedom to start his own business is the real dream. With almost two decades of work
experience in Dubai, he knows too well that the cycle of poverty he faces cannot be resolved in his current job, though his dependency on the meager salary he receives, combined with his family’s insecurity back home, furthers his necessity to maintain any income, no matter how little or exploitative. His continued struggle and hustle are tied to his endless dreams.

“They offer you green fields, but when you get here all you get is desert” (Adeel, Pakistan). Informal discussions with ‘Adeel’, a taxi driver, highlight the false and failed promises of Dubai’s dreams for workers such as himself. Lamenting the promises sold to him and many of his coworkers back home by recruiters, Adeel says, “How can I save? Nothing is as it was promised”. He explains that wages are not as promised, living conditions are harsh, and freedoms are severely constrained. In Adeel’s five years working in Dubai, he discusses a difficult life, working 12 hours a day, living in an accommodation block housing 3000 workers, living six men to a room. “What many people don’t understand is that we must pay for everything, all expenses out of our small salaries” (Adeel). He explains that he must pay 400 AED a month for his bed, even on his vacation months and sends almost 2,500 of his 3,000 AED monthly salary home. He highlights the limited health insurance, which he argues would make you pay if you were actually ill in any way. He also paid a recruitment fee of 9,500 AED (2,586.75 USD) before coming to Dubai. He explains that he has no base fee for this work, but rather is paid a percentage of the monies he earns. Overall he articulates that it is unfair to require him to pay for basic requirements for his work, such as a uniform and housing fees for a bed.

In the quote above, Adeel talks of the Dubai that is represented as a lush and bountiful place of abundant wealth and unlimited potential, only to be awakened by the reality of its desert landscape, seemingly uninhabitable, harsh and scarce. “Work is very hard here. There is no social life, no family, no friends… but some people have worse situations than me…” (Adeel). He tells the story of his close friend, a construction worker who died a week before our meeting. “He woke for work at 5 am and had a heart attack when he arrived to work. Do you know that it took five days to give his body to his family, who must also pay the fee to send his body back home! Meanwhile they are crying” (Adeel, Pakistan). Adeel fixated on the five-day return of his body, which he
understood as outrageous for Muslims who must bury the body of the deceased as quickly as possible. He explains that the company did not pay anything for his family, so he and a few workers had made a box to collect donations until a manager said to them “throw this away, forget this, you will not send this to them, or you will leave”. He explains that organizing amongst workers is tightly regulated, and that even charity is looked upon with suspicion when it comes from workers. Another practice amongst taxi drivers in Dubai was, if someone died while on the job, each worker would put 100 AED of their salary toward a large sum like 60,000 AED to send to his family. However, with many attempts being undermined by employers, they were forced to abandon the practice for threats of being fined, fired or deported.

Overall, Adeel explains a similar, well documented narrative of the struggles of labourers,

They can’t leave, they have to pay debts. They take their passports and if they want to leave, they have to pay. The places they live are very bad, with sickness, dirty and overcrowded. They work very long hours. They have no health care. If company has financial problems, they will not pay workers. They are promised ten times more money and then they come and they are lied to... Dubai’s dream is a trick. Their dreams are ruined. Their dreams are not real. They come because there are shortages for jobs back home. If you try to go out one day, you will spend something, and he already has nothing...so. (Adeel, Pakistan)

From this topic, Adeel turns to his own story, explaining that he has four children back home in Pakistan that he must support. In reflecting on his family, Adeel shares this story,

My eldest daughter is twelve, and then I have another daughter that is ten years old, I have one son who is eight years old, and one little baby of two years old. The other day I called home, and my eldest daughter said, ‘Papa I am fasting’. Even my other daughter, who is ten, is also fasting. She asked me if she could drink even though she fasted for most of the day. I told her there is only half a day left, so I told her to be patient and wait. And she did.

Adeel couldn’t contain his happiness as he retold the story. His smile didn’t leave his face. His eyes stared far into the distance and the contentment and satisfaction of having helped his daughter to persevere through her first day of fasting during Ramadan was clear. This story is evidence of the complexities in how people articulate their lives, considering those things that give them meaning, those that make the difficulties of their
everyday struggles slightly more bearable and which subjects choose to share on their own to describe their lives.

In this sense, the understandings that different workers have of their own situations are often tied to stories of exploitation and struggles or hardship, but are also often iterated with ideas of what gives their lives value or meaning. In many cases, these are linked to alternative worldviews that are often in tension with the dominant, hegemonic logic of capital that inflects many analyses of Dubai’s social geography. This is not to diminish the importance of a class based analysis of labour, but it is necessary to highlight a significant example of how life/meaning/value is challenged by alternative understandings. My own experience as a researcher, and my academic background, has focused on examining inequality and exploitation as the dominant theme of migrant workers lives, while potentially neglecting other elements. Throughout the experience of fieldwork and upon reflection, it was clear that many of my questions centered largely around exploitation, labour, working conditions and policy, which were often challenged by the subject’s own stories that were not explicitly based on this conceptualization of their life’s most important feature and instead reoriented their experiences through alternative criteria. The following reflection attempts to unpack these epistemological differences through the experience of fieldwork,

Sometimes you have to trust your heart, because sometimes your mind limits what you know you feel but can’t explain. (YYZ to DXB Diary)

So they are here now. They are getting ready to ‘work’. They are taking their positions on the base of this building. They are wearing blue coloured uniforms, and hard hats. It is hot, but it is not impossible heat. The sun is going down on this side of the building now. And they will begin working soon. And I am sitting here looking down on them. From the last building they built. (YYZ to DXB Diary)

In reflections on the fieldwork experience I often found myself caught between what I felt compelled to ask workers about their experience in Dubai, primarily those things linked to their working conditions and stories of exploitation and abuse, and what they chose to share themselves. In addition, what my interactions with many workers highlighted was that many of these people, despite their struggles and unfair working and living conditions, wanted to share parts of their lives that extended beyond these concerns. Thus, as captured in the following entry, Yassin, a Bangladeshi boat driver on
the Dubai creek, challenges my insistence on ‘work’ by shifting the focus onto what mattered to him in his experiences.

You are a boat driver, Yassin, from Bangladesh who has been working on and off in the UAE for 13 years of his life. Since he was 20 years old, to his 33 years today. You are the one with a wife and a six year old son who rely on your work here. You smile so much, maybe more than anyone I have met in Dubai yet. You speak of your life here as difficult but worthwhile. You are specialized in your work. Working 16 hour days, beginning at 4 am everyday, making an average of 1,200 AED a day. But you explain, it is summer now and in this impossible heat things are slow. Everyday you have to pay 300 AED to the owner of the boat, who provides your accommodation, and takes you from home to work. But it is hard you explain, living in one room with twelve other men. It is not clean you said. You also said what bothers you most is that the government problems in how they get rich and make you pay for your visa to come work here. The best part of Dubai you said is the amount of work and trade between people, the mosques, the quality of food and the clean streets. Then you very quickly switched topics and told me that your mother died recently. It seemed that all of our talk about your working conditions and your experiences in Dubai were eclipsed by the reality of your mother’s passing, which you chose to share. This is what is so interesting, is that even though I didn’t ask, what you choose to share with me was this. This boat ride was so beautiful and the views were extraordinary. It was so peaceful, all I could hear was the sound of the engine pushing the boat, smelling some gasoline and seeing your smile. You forced me to see the beauty in the least expected places, and inspired the thought in this city, sometimes the people with the least, smile the most. You make what is dreamt, possible. Are you a hero, or a victim of an evil exploitative process? It seems you are both. Forget Marx. Yeah… yeah… and you will say now, “but who will you use in your theoretical framework?” and I will say, “I don’t know… maybe Yassin, from Bangladesh. (YYZ to D XB Diary)

What the encounter with Yassin highlights is the ways in which people negotiate their lives based on criteria that often extend beyond the materiality of their existence. Thus, the issues of importance as identified in my questions seemed to create a schema of what must matter most to working class migrants and, while these issues do shape their lives, people also have complex and diverse realities that help them to make sense of their everyday experiences. Many of these ideas shape the various iterations of Dubai Dreams for low waged migrant workers in industries such as construction, domestic work, service and retail related sectors. The diversity in lived experiences is highlighted through the complex set of negotiated realities that impact how individuals understand their situation.
in Dubai based on considerations such as where they are from, their working conditions, their support networks, and their motivations for leaving ‘home’.

These ideas helped me to reflect on the experiences of fieldwork and to consider in more detail how epistemologies help to shape ‘knowledge’ about the place and people within it in amidst their immense diversity and complexity. Thus while I am telling particular stories in this dissertation, I am very cognizant of how these encounters were shaped by particular epistemologies and the need to try and unpack the many assumptions which are embedded in any and all encounters. It should be noted that many of the insights I garnered from low waged workers during my fieldwork were conducted in informal settings, largely due to the precarious status that impacts the ways many workers work and live. Generally speaking, many people were hesitant to participate in formal interviews because of the general aura of suspicion that marks their lives in Dubai. Furthermore, their temporary status is such that any behaviours that are seen as a disruption may end up costing them their livelihoods. Additionally, because of the tight regulations many of them face in their working life, which simultaneously structure their life outside of work, it is often difficult or not encouraged for them to meet in their limited time ‘off’. In many instances, it was not permissible for me to visit them at their residence, which was provided by their employers, and in other cases they lived extremely far away, such as the case of ‘Shahina’ who was bused into Dubai daily from a neighbouring Emirate. Other times, they were extremely difficult to reach, and their schedules were extremely rigid and consuming, leaving them with little time to do laundry, cook food, or sleep, let alone meet for an interview.

Generally speaking, the majority of low waged workers I spoke with articulated a similar reality, which was based on promises of prosperity that were met with realities of exclusion. Ideas of high wages, savings and economic incentives were the main allure to the city; the realities of social exclusion, unfair or unequal treatment and tight regulations created general feelings of uneasiness and disappointment. These experiences were in turn impacted by additional considerations such as the community or company in which one worked. For those who were working with similar ethnicities and genders, they were afforded a level of comfort in a shared language and culture, while those who did not have these networks were further marginalized and excluded from any informal social
supports. This can be seen in the stories of two different women workers; Shahina, a bathroom attendant employed by the Dubai Municipality, and Louisa, who worked in a nail salon inside of one of Dubai’s many malls.

The gendered aspects of global migration cannot be understated, and as scholars argue, ‘gendering migration’ as an analytic strategy exposes the increased precariousness through which women make decisions to migrate, often leaving behind children and family, in order to provide for that very family. In addition, issues related to gender inequality often shape the decision making process to migrate for labour. Through a focus on two key subjects in my fieldwork we will see the complexity in understanding the experiences of low waged migrant women workers.

But I am working here because I want to give my children more than my husband. I want my kids to know that their mother gave them all of these things. So no matter what, I will do anything, so that they will know that I gave them more than him. They must know that. (Louisa, Filipina)

Louisa is a Filipino woman in her thirties who works in a nail salon in an older mall in Dubai where the local Emirati presence is much more felt. Her story begins and ends with her failed marriage, which began at 15 years of age and is one of many that highlight the gendered nature of migration and women’s work in the global city, tied to issues of patriarchy, religion, economic necessity, addiction and survival. Louisa begins by telling her current situation in Dubai for the last four years, where she works six days a week, from 9 to 6 pm, and is then bused back to her accommodation, an apartment that she shares with four other women who work in the salon. The ladies rotate days off, which means they don’t get to share days off. The average salary she explains is between 1500 and 1700 AED per month, more than she would be making at home in the Philippines. She pauses her story, and interjects saying,

You know, I never had a Toblerone before I came to Dubai. I could never afford this in the Philippines because I have to choose between this chocolate and two pounds of rice, so when you are trying to survive you cannot have money for luxuries. Here I can have good food. I can have fruits… You know back home I never had fruits, only on Christmas we had some grapes or an orange. But we cannot afford to have these fruits. That is one reason why Dubai is good. (Louisa, Filipina)
Louisa, like many other workers understands her situation beyond only the economic, which like for almost all workers is better than back home, however minimally. Most are just trying to make ends meet, to survive.

When asked if she was married, she smiled and said, “I am separated now, and that’s why I wanted to leave, to get away from my husband”. She explains that many of the women working in the salon also have similar stories where they needed to leave their husbands. She explains that there is no divorce in the Philippines, which means she is stuck now. She will never marry someone else in her life and she is trapped by the fact that she must carry his name. This is something she repeats several times in the course of the two-hour interview. “I have to carry his name”, “I wish I could get rid of his name”, “I just wanted to be free of his name but it follows me”. But she assures me that she is over him. She realized she doesn’t love him anymore, and she explains the circumstance of her separation by saying that “he just drank. He would spend all our money on alcohol and my children would cry”. He didn’t have a job and wouldn’t look for one, and instead would drink away the little money they did have. She then begins a discussion about the lax state of laws back home. She explains, “I wish we had some rules. They sell alcohol to 15 year olds, to 11 year olds. You see 11 year olds doing drugs and smoking on the street. No one tells them no. I can’t have this happen to my oldest son, and I am fearful that he will start drinking, like his father”. Louisa explains that she will bring her eldest son next year to Dubai for a visit. She is saving as much as she can so that her son can see what is possible, where he can work. She wants him to come so that “he can dream of things”, these dreams she explains are ones that he can’t have back home. Thus, for Louisa, bringing her son is a way for him to see the city and dream, so as to motivate him. “He wanted to be dentist, but now I don’t know. He is changing now. He is in the last year of high school and is quiet now and distant”. She fears that his unstable family life has impacted his personality. “When you are young, you don’t understand these things that are happening to you, so you don’t know what to do.”

“You know many Indian girls I know have the same story”, Louisa continues, and tells the story of an Indian woman working in the salon who came to Dubai to escape her abusive husband. “She cannot leave him back home because of her family obligations and her child. How will she live?” Louisa then shakes her head. “It’s too hard, this life”.

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After turning back to telling more of the details about her husband’s downward spiral into addiction, and her family situation back home, she changes the subject, and again begins discussing her fears for her son, “My mother is getting old, she can’t keep chasing my son. The same for my daughter in third grade who is a troublemaker”. On the subject of her husband she explains,

My husband is a good man until he drinks… but sometimes the pressures to provide for the family are too much. My husband was always saying ‘look at all of my friends from college, they have jobs, businesses, and I have nothing’. I used to say, ‘Just go look for a job… but he did nothing’. (Louisa, Filipina).

Her insight into laws in the Philippines that do not allow for divorce was that many young women choose to be single mothers, not getting married to avoid the issues of divorce. “There are so many women here leaving their husbands because we cannot get a divorce, so what will we do? We are stuck. The only way we can leave is for work”. She discusses the difficulties in finding work in the Philippines where jobs are precarious, and even with a job, poverty is a chronic feature of daily life. She continues,

If I had a choice I would go to Canada or United States, but it is too difficult for us. Then I would get a citizenship and bring my kids with me. Here everything is temporary, you cannot stay here, and you cannot get citizenship here. That is one bad thing about here. I could work for 12 years and still I would not get anything, no citizenship. I will always have to go back… and I don’t want to live there but we must go back. (Louisa, Filipina)

Louisa’s main motivation in coming to Dubai is to provide for her children. “I miss so many things about them. My daughter was five when I left for three years, and when I finally went back home to visit she was eight. That is so hard. You are always worried about back home, and you know you cannot go easily”. The difficulties of being a mother away from her children continue to dominate much of her discussion. But similarly, her husband seems to motivate her equally,

But I am working here because I want to give my children more than my husband. I want my kids to know that their mother gave them all of these things. So no matter what, I will do anything, so that they will know that I gave them more than him. They must know that. (Louisa, Filipina)

“There is no happiness for me in this life… life is too hard. Husband is no good”. (Shahina, Bangladesh). On another evening, sitting on Jumeirah Beach, often referred to as ‘Kite Flying Beach’, created as an open waterfront space, busy on weekends, filled
with a mix of residents and visitors to the city. The sight on this afternoon is a mix between a few young Emirati men, several white European sunbathers in bikinis, a few Muslim families, other Western expat women, and a few South Asian men. I had sat down on a towel I had brought to the beach and was enjoying the sounds of the waves crashing onto the shore, reflecting on some of my most recent encounters when I get a call to meet a friend nearby. I pack up my bag and begin to walk towards an outhouse facility. I notice a South Asian women sitting on a plastic chair in front of the washroom entrance. She catches my eye and gestures with her hand for me to come to her. I approached her and she said, “Alone you are?”, “Yes. I am just sitting here alone. It was so beautiful. How are you?” I said. “Okay, Alhamdulillah (Thank God)”, she says. Somehow I found myself sitting on the floor, while she sat on the chair next to me and we chatted. She gestured for me to sit on the chair, and I refused, at which point she joined me on the floor. I asked her to remain seated on her chair but she refused. The common courtesy of respect for elders was replaced with the racial/class dictates. She tries to speak to me in Arabic but I explain that English is fine. We manage to piece together a conversation, but truthfully, much of our encounter defies spoken word, feelings need not be expressed in words to become real. I asked her many questions, like “how long have you been in Dubai?”, “Do you like this job?”, “Are you married?”, “Do you have a family”? From our conversation I gathered that she was been here for 1 year and 3 months so far, out of her two-year contract. She makes approximately 700 AED/month, and works 10am to 10pm where she is picked up to go to Ajman, a neighbouring emirate that takes approximately two hours to get to everyday. There she lives with 16 other women in a single room provided by her employer. She works for the city municipality but through a private contractor who brought her from Bangladesh. She wakes up everyday to cook for herself at 6 am and gets one day off every one month. She also tells me about her two daughters, one who is 14 years old and the other is 10. I said, “But you look so young” and she laughs, before bursting into tears, lamenting, “Husband is no good”. She explains that he drinks alcohol and has treated her poorly. As she wipes her tears with her black abaya, an Arab expat walks out of the washroom, passes her a bill, and makes a hand gesture for her to get up, pointing inside the washroom. Her gesture makes the impression that the washroom needs attending, and the money is a
confirmation of this request. “What’s your name?” I ask, “Shahina” she says while showing me her work badge. She has worked in Dubai before, as a domestic worker, but most recently got this job. She turns her sights towards a couple holding hands walking along the beach, and says, “There is no happiness for me in this life.” She says that everyone is in love, but for her there is no love. “My life is to be alone.” She points to a hole in her nose, where a ring used to be, and tugs at her ears, to show that all of her jewelry is missing. Her husband requested all of her valuables to buy alcohol, as he did not have a job. She begins to cry again. Every mention of her husband seems to bring her to tears. She came to Dubai because all of the children in her village were going to school except her daughters. “They cry everyday because they want to go.” She made the decision to find work abroad in order to support her two daughters back home. She knew of Dubai from her sister and one brother who have been working in Dubai for a combined eleven years. She began her employment in Dubai as a housemaid in an Arab house but the work was too hard. “No sleep. When I go to rest, every minute they would call me to do work.” She says this job is better but she lives far, has no time for herself, money is “too little”, and again, “Husband is no good”.

Shahina’s insights highlight the motivating force for her migration as a survival strategy to support her children back home. Facing difficulty in her marriage, impacted by employment, alcoholism, and abuse, she continuously links her husband to her lack of happiness and love. She describes her life as “suffering” where there is no ‘love’ for her.

It is interesting again to note what migrants, such as Louisa and Shahina choose to discuss versus what questions I imagine would be most important to their lives. In fact, while most low waged workers I met easily narrated their working conditions as little more than factual information, what was interesting on reflection on these encounters was the information they shared on their own, and what they narrated as important to shaping their lives. Much of this was linked to gendered inequalities that shape their livelihood strategies in migrating to support children and families back home, and to escape patriarchy in the home and systemically. What migrants articulated as important to their experiences of migration did not always fit into the narrow confines of a simple analysis in which labour dominates and shapes all of one’s life. Instead people negotiated their experiences in complex ways that did not always fit neatly into the limits of an
‘academic’ analysis. Thus, the emotional and spiritual components to one’s worldview often help us to see the complexities in understanding the experiences of migrants from different sectors. Shahina is certainly an exploited worker, but she also migrated as a strategy for survival, and to escape domestic violence. Louisa used migration as a strategy to gain independence, and to find alternatives to patriarchal state and cultural practices that make divorce impossible, and to be an agent for change for her children. Shahina is emotionally distraught over her loneliness and the partner and love she lacks, and Louisa highlights the benefits of her migrant journey through the access she has to food and goods she could not access back home. These different motivations, experiences and focuses are all a part of their Dubai Dreams, as are the structural conditions that push people to migrate for labour, and the policies that shape their experiences, and the working conditions that dominate their every day lives.

Expat professionals. “It is easy to say a lot of crap about Dubai, but it is… kind of amazing and everyone needs to remember that it is amazing, even if it is not right in some ways” (Sean, Canadian). The broad category of ‘expat professionals’ refers to those working in relatively privileged professional sectors, comprising diverse sets of migrants, including those from the West, as well as professional migrants from the ‘Third world’. This category is easily identified in the context of Dubai, but of course has its own important diversity and complexity, particularly related to degrees of privilege, related heavily to nationality. For the purposes of understanding the relationships between sectors, workers in this category self-identify as expat professionals, which creates important insights into their roles and relationships vis-à-vis local Emirati citizens, and the majority of low waged migrant workers from the Global South. The interviewees include expats from the West (including Canada, USA, and the UK) and from the global South (including many from the MENA region, particularly Egypt, Palestine via Jordan or Lebanon, or South Asia).

“It’s shopping, it’s luxuries, and I think it is very different on who you are marketing to” (Lo, British). The theme dominating many representations of expat life is a luxurious dominates, to which they have access as a result of their rank in the social hierarchy as a group of relatively privileged migrants. This privilege of course can only
be understood relationally in comparison to local Emirati citizens, and in relation to the majority of less privileged low waged Third world workers who dominate the industries that provide the luxurious life of Dubai for many expat professionals. In relation to Emirati citizens, their status is contextualized as privileged but with important limitations, specifically in terms of political and state based entitlements such as citizenship to which they do not have access and that in turn impacts ideas of belonging. Their relative privilege can be seen in many of their insights on what brought them to Dubai, as well as how they relate to other sectors of the population.

Beginning with the typical expat lifestyle, subjects described a luxurious life, living in the nicest villas, condos, with high tax free salaries, free accommodations, free education for their children at the best schools, and extravagant vacation packages. Many expats live a lifestyle that far exceeds that back home. Canadian expat Sara, working as a teacher in an American school in Dubai, gave some very interesting insights into the transitory nature of Dubai’s life for single, young, expats. She describes Dubai as based on a ‘culture of indulgence’, in which her fear of “not getting sucked in” seems harder than she thought to maintain. “Sometimes I think what happened to my life? It is not stable. And it is very easy to become extremely materialistic, very easy…” (Sara, Canadian).

Sara discusses the ways that she transitioned into Dubai life with ease, with English spoken almost everywhere, and life that seemed very “westernized”, except the cultural shock of communicating with taxi drivers. She discusses the lifestyle she had access to in Dubai as including,

… the fanciest, nicest hotels, huge buffets, access to beautiful pools… everything is really, really just too extravagant…You get a very luxurious life…Life is too easy here because of that. Because of the fact that, I hope that I don’t become like that, this is why I am worried for myself, because I just feel like I was more disciplined when I was home. At home you were forced to be harder working and I kind of like that because you kind of feel like you earned certain things. We enjoyed going on vacations we saved for all year, now I bet you if I went I’d be like, this is what I do everyday. I don’t think I would enjoy it anymore. So if life is too easy, it is like nothing seems good anymore. (Sara, Canadian).

For another Canadian expat named Sean the typical expat life was similar, simply put, “you’re probably just going to go to brunches a lot” (Sean, Canadian). The ease with
which expats articulate the inequalities in social status are a frightening reality in which their privilege is found and maintained. However, the interesting complexity here is the ways they are disciplined as a result of their relative ‘lack of entitlement’ in comparison to Emirati citizens, which seems to create a sense of insecurity and is an important factor in shaping their feelings of belonging and their sense of precariousness, albeit a privileged version. Thus, what was found in many articulations of the expat lifestyle was a sense of entitlement dotted with insecurity in their temporary status and lack of political entitlements or permanent citizenship status. This force of ‘temporariness’ creates a bargain whereby expats trade in formal citizenship for the privileges of expat lifestyles in status and treatment. Another important outcome of these insights is the ways in which nationality impacts one’s feelings of insecurity. As we will explore further on here, those holding passports and citizenship from more privileged places in the West were better able to accept the trade offs than those from Third world countries whose lack of formal citizenship created more insecurity and was a more dominant feature of their criticisms of Dubai. Thus, the idea of ‘where you are from overwhelming where you are at’ continued to shape all expat and migrant experiences, but the degrees and impacts were felt differently based on ‘where one is from’, thus reinforcing broader global hierarchies of nationality and ideas of race, class and gender which significantly impact individual and collective understandings of belonging in Dubai.

In another way, where you were from impacted how you understood Dubai’s lifestyle for expats. For many British expats the ‘culture’ of Dubai was too heavily dominated by corporate, consumer culture rather than by what they identified as the ‘real’ culture found in Britain’s well-established arts and culture scene. Hattie, a British expat who accompanied her journalist husband to Dubai, expressed her ‘culture shock’ in terms of the consumer lifestyle she believed dominated cultural life.

It’s like everybody is living this kind of… wait, not everybody, I should say a lot of people here are living the kind of rich life, they want to hang out, they want go to really expensive restaurants, they want to go to expensive bars… I am a great consumer like anyone, but its not real life for me. (Hattie, British)

She lamented the difficulties she found in navigating Dubai’s corporate culture, and critiques the lack of ‘real’ culture that she finds in Dubai’s expat scene. “Your
currency is based on consumerism in a way, because that’s a shared thing and it’s a bit of a dull and dangerous thing to, you know. You can’t go plop in front of a Matisse at the Tate Modern…” (Hattie, British). Similar sentiments about the lack of history and culture in the cityscape and lifestyles of Dubai featured prominently in other understandings of culture in the city, but were always referenced back to the allegedly ‘real’ cultures of Europe.

For others, who face insecurities related to their home countries, such as Copt Egyptian expat Svetlana, the comforts of Dubai, and the ‘multicultural’ atmosphere creates an important factor in shaping her family’s experience in the UAE. She describes a comfortable life, which she bases on her experiences of Egypt. On the expat lifestyle, she states,

We enjoy it. It is a very, lets just put it this way, a comfortable life. And that is the main difference between Egypt, is that it is so comfortable, the school is 10 minutes away, you have your office, everything is just near and people treat you nicely, having this multicultural thing, you have respect for other cultures and religions. So it is comfortable but then you need a Plan B. It gets to a point where you realize ‘what am I going to do next? (Svetlana, Egyptian)

Thus, the benefits of Dubai’s multicultural life are again limited by her insecurities in planning ahead for what comes after Dubai based on where she is from and the nationality/passport she holds.

God no! The first time I went to a spa was here and I was like ‘Oh. What do I wear? Am I going for a massage, do I have to wear nice underwear, what are they going to think?’ And you go in and it is actually so easy. And now I go to the spa like all the time. It’s disgusting. We first come here and we are not sure and we are feeling it out, now we get our hair blown out and get manicures and pedicures all the time…but sometimes, I don’t know… I am 23 years old and I have a cleaning lady… like ‘awesome?’ An apartment that I don’t pay for…it is cool but its just not… One thing that is hard is that it doesn’t feel like real life. And I think that a lot of people have accepted that this is their home, but I never could… (Katie, American)

Canadian expat Sara also discussed the benefits of a cleaning lady, explaining that it is way more expensive back home. For example, as she states,

I pay 90 dirhams for my maid to come clean for two hours and she like cleans everything and you can pay her to cook for you too. People do that at my work… you can just call someone and they will come at all hours of
nights… Once, I forgot milk and you just call them and they will deliver milk to you in 2 minutes. (Sara, Canadian)

Continuing the discussion of expat luxury, Lo, a British expat working in the arts and culture scene of Dubai, discusses what changes have shaped her lifestyle,

There is the thing about what kind of person I have turned into. Like I have a cleaner, I have family come and visit me, I have a cleaner who cleans my house and does my ironing, and my family are like… you have changed… (laughing)… When I first started working in the place where I work, the company was set up and run by an Indian lady and we had support staff, and we had a driver. When I first started here, I found it incredibly strange and unusual to ask somebody to make me a cup of tea, when I could get it myself, whereas it is completely commonplace for an Indian family to have a member of staff that will make tea, and bring them a cup of tea. Atrociously I have done things like… I have been busy at work and I haven’t been able to take a dress to the dry cleaners that I need to wear it on New Years Eve, and I have sent the driver, you know? (laughing)... something I would never do. So yes, it could be… it could be… kind of… say egotistical, superficial, whereas you could say yes to describe the place, you could describe sometimes how people act, which I think is the impact of living here and being used to certain lifestyles and certain ways of being, but then there are other things. There is so much more to this place. (Lo, British)

Explaining the easy access to these services, most Western expats also discussed the ways in which low waged workers were treated in Dubai’s social hierarchy and found this to be a hugely shocking at first. However, as most subjects discussed, the hierarchy that was at first ‘foreign’ to them, became an integral part of their experience of Dubai. Most subjects never questioned the social organization as something that they also participated in upholding, benefited from or, in fact, perpetuated. Instead of focusing on how they too were complicit in these gross social inequalities, and how low waged workers were essential in providing them with access to the luxurious life they found in Dubai, they generally embraced it as a ‘natural’ social phenomenon. A significant point raised by numerous interviewees related to the social acceptance and subsequent normalization of these inequalities found in the constant, daily bombardment of cheap labour for any and all services, which became more and more natural. As Sara describes,

You know what’s funny. You don’t even notice the workers anymore after a while…you have opened my eyes to them again, because I was like you when I first arrived but then once you live here for a while you become blinded to them by accident. I don’t know why. It’s because the culture establishes that way that
people act towards them. They are very much like lower classes. It’s just funny how I have changed and just because you just adapt to the way people act around. By accident. You just get sucked into it. (Sara, Canadian)

In addition to its pervasiveness in all aspects of social life, hierarchies are also rationalized in important ways, as ‘helping’ provide jobs, or in comparing their low wages in Dubai to their worse off situation ‘back home’ as justification for their low pay compared to others. Thus, much of the justification of the lesser treatment of migrant labourers is tied to comparisons of ‘back home’, again linked to notions of where you are at, versus where you are from.

Interestingly, in some cases expats discussed the ways that their own temporary status in Dubai without formal avenues to political rights, no matter the length of their stay, left them feeling like perpetual visitors who had no right or ability to shape the model of migrations or impact policies or laws. This was then seen as making many feel outside of the structural features of the systems and as a reason for their silence or inability to speak out or work towards any kind of social change.

In reflecting on whom the city was built for, Mohamed, Canadian expat states, “No one. They did not consider human beings, but purely profit” (Mohamed, Canadian). In another way, Egyptian expats Laura and Zain highlight the same structural tendencies. “They need rich people to make this country go on…” (Zain, Egyptian), and , “They need poor people to make this country go on…” (Laura, Egyptian). Mohamed, Zain and Laura highlight that while Dubai’s image and development has been shaped by promoting tourism, high end luxury and spectacular developments, the necessary component for this vision has been the low waged workers who build, maintain and service the city. Thus, what we find is not that these realities are hidden or unknown, but rather it is the very obviousness of their existence that helps to solidify the status of expats and Emirati’s, and the rationalization of these inequalities that creates the normalization of the everyday social hierarchies that dominate city life.

In relation to inflexible divides, Lo explains the social structure as based on,

Constant contradictions the whole time. I think that is Dubai’s biggest challenge now, and it is what will make it a place where people actually stay and not see it as a place of transition, where people will stay and invest more of their time. I think is because you need all of those sides, that’s what makes a city so rich, is its diversity and I think at the moment, they are too much of a contradiction, there
needs to be that middle ground where you blend the two together. At the moment, it is not a blend, everything is segregated, and it started to mix but its not fully blended. (Lo, British)

In considering these issues in more detail, we find that the culture catering to the rich is of course but one part, but a significant force in shaping many Emirati, and expat lifestyles, and it simultaneously shapes, and is built on the less then desirable lifestyles and status of the city’s majority poor, migrant labourers. This relationality however is not always an obvious fact as most subject positions have been normalized in such a way to create a sense of normalcy and peace in everyday interactions. Additionally, contradictions of space and social/spatial segregation make it difficult for expats to interact both with Emiratis and the city’s underclass of workers.

It is very difficult city to be natural in because you have roles to play and if you don’t fit into it, it’s quite difficult to navigate. But also those roles are quite all encompassing, they kind of define your life here pretty much and it’s quite difficult to exist outside of those. So I think it’s very, in a way, it’s a very inflexible divide… (Hattie, British)

**Emiratis.** Emirati citizens comprise an extremely small numerical minority in the broader population of the UAE, but represent extreme privilege in their status and entitlements, primarily based on their highly exclusive citizenship status; which is denied to foreigners, no matter the length of their stay, and affords immense privileges and benefits from the state. With regard to the relationships between Emiratis and the migrant majority population, the narrative of Emirati culture ‘under threat’ has utilized their minority status to generate social anxiety and panic over the alleged erosion of ‘Emirati’ culture in the face of a growing foreign population who are represented as a threat to the identity and social cohesion of Emirati culture and society. The rapid neoliberal, capitalist growth and development of Dubai as a global city, combined with the majority of poor labourers from South Asia, is represented in popular culture as a threat to the social body, which in turn lends itself to measures of social control and regulation to control the impact of the migrant majority population, as well as attempts to protect and preserve Emirati culture. The pressures on cultural identity manifest through the enactment of distancing measures between citizens and ‘Others’ through employment equity
provisions, state subsidies and grants for example, and are represented as initiatives to ‘protect and preserve’ what many refer to as ‘indigenous culture’.

Interestingly, while both Western culture and influences are sometimes the target of concern for the majority Muslim population of Emiratis, who often lament the lack of respect for cultural practices in terms of appropriate dress, mannerisms and consumption of alcohol, the majority of measures aimed at protecting ‘indigenous’ culture do not in fact target the dominance of Euro-American cultural influence, but rather the majority low income South Asian migrants who are seen as a danger and threat to both the nation and national identity. How this occurs is a significant and important occurrence within the broader social landscape that reaffirms racialized hierarchies based on nationality and class, and justifies and legitimizes differential treatment of various categories of workers.

Another major area of insight found through interviews is tied to the highly orientalized and racist representations of Emiratis, Arabs and Muslims in Western media coverage of expat related issues. These ideas are found in many popular news outlets, as well as tourist materials, and even ‘fictional’ novels - Diamond in the Desert by Jo Tatchell, Hello Dubai by Joe Bennett - often taken as historical texts rather than fiction.

Beginning with the idea of a cultural threat, Emirati national Reda confirms that these ideas exist in relation to the idea of being a ‘minority’ that needs to be protected, raising the commonly held belief that expats “come and go, and exploit the country, taking our jobs” (Reda, Emirati). But Reda is quick to point out that much of Dubai’s history has been linked to living with “hundreds of different nationalities” and, compared to the other Gulf states, the UAE has always been one of the most multicultural because of the role of trade and commerce in its history.

Another Emirati national, Natasha, takes this up.

There is this very strong discussion… I mean, you see it in the way that most Emirati’s dress. They still wear the kandora, Abaya. It is seen as pride, to dress a part of your country, which people forget but not every culture in the world does that anymore. Generally, the world is very globalized, people don’t dress the same. There are a few cultures or nationalities or ethnic groups who dress in a certain way to differentiate from the rest of the population. (Natasha, Emirati)

Clothing and the preservation of these traditions have been seen as both a tool in the preservation of culture, and an issue of pride.
She discusses issues related to language, a major source of concern and debate. As an Emirati she is expected to speak Arabic in public, which she does not often do,

If I am in a government office or some place where for example, I am passing on my ID or at the airport customs where they see I am Emirati and if my first words are not in Arabic, they are always like why don’t you speak Arabic? They openly say it. (Natasha, Emirati)

In her view, the culture is not disappearing, but there is a sensitivity about it, a kind of “paranoia” that is seen as needing to be protected. The government works actively to “promote the culture, and keep it alive, investing in old sports and traditions” (Natasha, Emirati).

In Reda’s interview she explores the dramatic shifts Dubai has experienced in her lifetime, and the search for an ‘authentic’ Emirati culture that attempts to fix culture in a particular historical moment in the past, away from the current shifting reality. There have always been many different people who make up Dubai, but concern is growing concern over Emirati culture being destroyed by diversity,

At the time the country was setting up, they obviously imported lots of teachers and doctors from the Arab region, and Indians… I have always been them around. And again, maybe once in a while there is questioning ‘oh they are taking over’ just like the red Indians. And its like ‘No, we invited them all of these people, please’. This comparison is just the most nonsense ever. And they are here. I never hear enough gratefulness, like you know, a lot has been built thanks to hard effort. It’s never hats off, lets respect the labourers. Instead there is this attitude, if you don’t like it, then go back. And if someone critiques anything here, they are like, well why do you want to come here? Like you are here you must follow our rules… I don’t have any specific examples, but you know, like when you are in the West and you still kind of, you don’t necessarily adapt, it’s a two-way thing. We have invited them and there should be a right to respect. Fine, sometimes you hear, oh in the malls, the women, she swore at me and used foul language, or walking in a mall and you are not dressed well and that is offensive and that is not following the rules and respecting our culture, so it becomes this big incident… but I am just as offended by other Emiratis and the way they behave towards other people. Or who drive badly, or who have a maid carrying their bags walking behind them. You know what I mean? Why is what you are offended by rightful, and if someone has a problem with you, it isn’t good enough? (Reda, Emirati)

Further lamenting her frustrations over the making of an ‘authentic’ Emirati culture, Reda uses the example of “Ask Ali” a column written by an Emirati national for
a newspaper called The National. Describing the column as ‘condescending’ and ‘awful’, she states, “Sometimes I read it and think that these can not be real questions. I feel like they make them up, and the answers are so unsophisticated”. She believes Emiratis often become utilized instrumentally in the attempt to be ‘represented’.

When they don’t have an Emirati, and they want one to fill a page in a paper or want one to be involved in any kind of thing… so we can’t talk about… Because we can’t address anything serious. Or if there was a writer writing about a political issue, even then, we really don’t want you to write, and so it’s like… then can you just not. Just don’t write. (Reda, Emirati)

She explains that this lack of “intelligent representations” from Emiratis in English papers contrasts with sophisticated articles in Arabic papers that take up social problems. She argues that none of these issues are addressed properly in English papers, “It’s almost like it doesn’t matter because this is for the expats, as if Emiratis don’t read English” (Reda, Emirati). She describes the ways that knowledge about the emirates is differentially offered to Arabic and English readers. This in turn is tied to the audiences who are invited to engage in conversations over cultural and social issues and those who are marginalized in these debates, but also filled with ‘misrepresentations’ of Emiratis and Emirati cultures that fit the parameters of what is seen as expat participation. Reda explained that thirty or forty years ago when the expat communities were being established it might have been more understandable that dialogue was not established, but now that people had been living there for decades, dialogue was necessary to deepen understandings, rather than publish “where an expat can go for brunch” as the only important issue that expats should care about (Reda, Emirati). There were several significant threads in her analysis, such as the ways that the idea of ‘cultural threats’ is seen as an Emirati-only issue that need not involve the insight of or dialogue between groups. Thus, culture is seen as a self-contained Emirati issue to be taken up by the state through projects based on ‘cultural preservation’ rather than dialogue and exchange between residents. These divisions lend themselves to social divisions that many find difficult to transgress. In particular, many expats highlight that they have never spoken directly to an Emirati national, and many never feel that they ‘can’ engage them at any level, for any reason, because of their relatively ‘untouchable status’. Similarly, many
Emirati’s feel that expats do not respect the social and cultural mores of their society enough to be engaged respectfully. Migrant majority low waged workers are not at all included in these dialogues but face the brunt of the restrictions and regulations aimed at protecting ‘indigenous’ culture against the intrusions of ‘Others’. Reda comments on these divisions between expats and Emirati’s highlights,

I feel like it is on both ends. On the one end, some people came here just to live a certain kind of lifestyle and make their money and leave, that was always there intent, they really don’t care if they don’t go past the Marina, but then there are those people who have stayed longer and who want to explore but I think it just takes a bit of effort to find it. And it is hard, because, like, okay, for example, a man just can’t suddenly approach and start talking to an Emirati woman. And then the Emirati men always hang out in packs, and interests are the same, like sports or that kind of thing. I do understand that it is a challenge and that it is not easy. And I do find Westerners who are really chummy… sometimes I feel like it is brown nosing, horrible from my side. And its like that’s all they are trying to do. Brown nosing from the Westerner to the Emirati. (Reda, Emirati)

Reda also discussed the ways in which, as an Emirati, she is often tokenized to represent the ‘Emirati’ perspective and often finds relationships of this kind to be inauthentic.

Importantly, she discusses also the hopes she believes many Emiratis share in terms of Dubai’s development and the ways that this has been carried out.

In the spirit of the ‘Can Do’ city and the city with a big dreams and ambitions and hopes. And it is all well intentioned I don’t doubt that, or it’s how things are done, and how fast. And sometimes it is better to do things like in phases versus trying to do everything. So I mean, there is nothing wrong with trying to be a top city but we want to be respected. So then do it well. Can we not do it where, just because we have the money we do it, but because we have the brains and the intelligence and we know what to do with it. And not always relying on hiring someone else to do it. And this is what like I want Dubai to move away from. You know, for the longest time, we have got the money, we have got the money, but what about us and how we feel. Are we always going to rely on someone else to do our dirty work? Or be there to consult us to do what is right? This is sometimes where it just worries me, on where or how Dubai is growing. But like I said, at the end of the day, it works. I like that I can work, and there is the South Indian shops and you can have a shawarma here, and yes the ridiculously named places in Satwa. As much as we are trying to, we are still not there, then fine, that is where the true colours show. I feel like there is a lot that can be done by the Emirati’s instead of just moaning, and wallowing about the culture… (Reda, Emirati)
Reda expresses the frustrations of many Emirati’s who feel that the developmental trajectory of Dubai has been carried out without the consultation of Emirati’s themselves who feel that their voices are lost in the rush towards development, as well as being built at the expense of the many, who are integral to building the city, but are treated as though they are disposable.

In considering popular representations of Dubai, several Emiratis discussed variations of their frustrations in the highly orientalized descriptions and assumptions about Dubai, and Emiratis. For example, Natasha, discussed what she views as a dominant theme of Dubai, spearheaded by the West, as either only about excessive money and wealth, or repressive, Muslim cultures and traditions.

So whenever I go anywhere, everyone is like, ‘Oh my God, Dubai! You must be so rich! And you have money money! Dirhams Dirhams! Gold! Gold!’ So there is that perception of luxury and glamour, which definitely there is some of that, but it is not the whole experience for everybody who lives here. So when you come and live here you totally see that immediately. But at the same time, it is an idea that is completely perpetuated by Dubai itself. This is what they put out there. They put out this, scenes of Burj Al Arab, Burj Khalifa and the beach, hotels and Rolls Royce and things made of gold and that is the only thing some people have taken away from it. That is one impression. And then, the other impression is like this whole middle eastern… you know, I don’t know how to explain it… like… really strict kind of repressed society, there is a lot of that especially in the British tabloids. (Natasha, Emirati)

Frustrated by the ways in which Dubai is dichotomized by two extreme views, Natasha discusses the one view of money, gold and glamour, and the other of a highly orientalized notion of Arab/Muslim ‘Otherness’ propagated by Euro-American tabloids. Natasha gives another important example of the ways in which European orientalism towards Arabs and the Emirates in particular operates to create ideas of ‘Eastern’, ‘backwards’, ‘irrational’, ‘repressive’, ‘Arab-Muslim’ culture through the example of a British expat couple who were arrested on a beach in Dubai for having sex. In the European media the story was presented as ‘the crazy backward Arab country’ who jailed a women and tried to control her sexuality, thus in effect, curtailing her ‘freedom’. The story was told in many versions but Natasha’s understanding was that a couple was seen having sex on a public beach in bright daylight told them to stop immediately. He went away but the couple continued, and when he returned he again told them to stop and
again left. When he came back and the couple had still not stopped, the woman began shouting and attempted to assault the officer. She was arrested for insulting a police officer and taken to jail. In her telling of the story, Natasha asks, “If you were on a beach somewhere in New York or LA, would you be allowed to have sex in broad daylight? I think not. But of course, those ‘crazy Arabs and their third world laws trying to control women is the story we are told” (Natasha, Emirati). As many explained, the British tabloids often represent Dubai as repressive at times, and simultaneously a dream world. Reda also is concerned over what she calls the idea of “the evil Arabs” who are represented as greedy and guilty, but as Reda states, “a lot of the same people are guilty of buying or investing here, so everyone is guilty” (Reda, Emirati).

**Real Culture?**

In another way, many expats highlighted that their view of locals was based on limited interactions with Emiratis, and was based on their social status, rumors and relationships and ideas of their power and privilege. These views, built mainly on speculation, are encapsulated in the following exoticized representation of Emirati women.

Their lives are so fascinating… they wear fancy abayas, expensive abayas, and they are like 3000 dirhams or more, and you can’t see what they are wearing underneath, so the way they dress up is with their really high heels, their purses and their abayas open up so they wear the tights and clothes underneath. The only time I see Emirati’s or their culture is possibly when they enforce certain dress codes or have areas of how they frown down on public displays of affection… (Lo, British)

On differences in cultural interests, Sean argues that most foreigners are not that receptive to Emirati culture. For example, he argues that expats, “don’t want to get up at 6 am and watch camel racing. Maybe you go to falconry once and then you cannot drink and sit separately from your spouse. I don’t know it is just so culturally different” (Sean, Canadian).

Expats had different ideas about the ‘threats’ faced by Emiratis in the wake of a majority migrant population. Karen, a Canadian expat, comments on viewing citizens as an ‘indigenous group’ that is often seen as part of a spectacle.
Sometimes I try to look at it from their point of view and it is their country and okay… Not about the unequal part, but there are certain things they have to do because they are the minority and sometimes I feel like they have the right to be… Sometimes I feel like they are angry. Sometimes I walk in the mall and I can not see one Emirati instead and I just feel like… One time I went to the salon and it was filled with Brits and other nationalities and this one national walked in and she was like an alien, like ‘what are you doing here?’ Everybody was just staring at her and I feel bad for them. If you are living in your own country and it is invaded by other people, then you are going to put rules to like… protect it.
(Karen, Canadian)

However, in contrast, another Canadian expat, Svetlana explains,

I’m sorry but it is not invaded. These people and these expats are the ones who helped build the country. It has been 37 years, I am sorry but the Emiratis would not have been the Emirates without the expats. Basically then expats came and built the country and then right now they are treating them like, oh okay, now we are becoming more and now we are trying to encourage whatever, localization.
(Svetlana, Canadian)

Many long time expats such as these subjects articulated similar feelings of isolation and frustration with what they viewed as unequal treatment, “We respect their culture, we respect their lifestyle, we respect everything and everything related to their traditions and their culture and then they just… we are just not treated equally. Not like normal citizens” (Rebecca, Egyptian).

In addition, many discussed the ways in which culture was being represented in a time capsule. “I feel like it is an invented heritage. It is complicated between what is real and what wasn’t and trying to shoehorn Emirati’s into the world histories” (Hattie, British). In considering how these themes are taken up by expats we find a range of perspectives on culture and identity. Some highlight the ‘newness’ of the city, as Mario explains in his experience.

You don’t come here expecting to walk and find Cathedrals and Mosques. It is a 2000 year old city. No one is going to say that. It’s a 40-year-old city. It is a choice you make. Most people, wherever you are, if you move to Canada, and live there and criticize everything, then why are you there? You were in a different place, then why did you come? You come here willingly and then you criticize everything, then just leave, no one is forcing you to stay here. (Mario, Canadian)
The ‘real’ Dubai many informants argue is in-between these two extremes. Thus, Dubai is based on a “unique urban condition, which can not be explored by looking only at its spectacular projects” (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 1).

These diverse insights into some of the major lifestyles and relationships between groups help to provide insight into the many complex issues and negotiations that subjects are engaged in. In terms of the relationships between sectors, as subjects have articulated in various ways, whether explicitly or implicitly, all residents of Dubai are situated within a complex social hierarchy that is both formally and informally maintained. In addition, as highlighted previously, the historic development of the area that would become modern day Dubai has been shaped by significant international forces that, taken together, have manifested themselves into the global city trajectory that importantly shapes the city’s priorities and forms. At the same time, the UAE represents an important contemporary example of global city-making with unique contextual forms such as the majority migrant population, exclusive citizenship policies and a global location, both in imagined terms and in geographical and migratory pathways between ‘East’ and ‘West’. As home to over 200 different nationalities, each group brings with it unique histories and conditions that interact with local conditions to shape everyday lives in diverse ways.

Multiculturalism?

For some expats, from the Global North and South, the multicultural aspects of Dubai’s globality are a significant change from back home. Lo, a British expat describes the area she comes from in the UK as very ‘white’, and therefore, for her, “Cultural integration isn’t something that I have always felt done very well in the UK, or there are many obstacles for people. And I think one of the things that I found here, is the cultural acceptance” (Lo, British). She explores different symbols of this diversity in her discussions of Diwali in Bur Dubai or the spirit of Ramadan, and her exposure to the religions and cultures that make up Dubai’s residents and believes many migrants who come to Dubai may be open to learning about other cultures since they are willing to leave home for the experience of living abroad. Furthering these ideas, Jo, an American expat, discusses the daily interactions with diversity.
Here there are people here from all sorts of backgrounds so you are not dealing with one sort of mentality or one culture, you are dealing with … your grocer is different from the people you are working with. You are dealing with all sorts of cultures. In a day, I have an Indian, Pakistani and Kenyan security guards. The grocer is Filipino. My Pilates instructor is Tunisian, and there is another girl that is Chinese. And then there is you, but everyday you are going to at least bump into at least 10 cultures… there are British people and South American, there are just so many cultures. There is everything. It’s because it’s so naturally seen on a daily basis that you never think about it… when someone asks you to think about, you have to put in effort because when you see something so frequently you just sort of block it out. (Jo, American)

For others, such as Egyptians Svetlana and Anna, living in Dubai taught them “respect for other cultures and religions” (Svetlana, Egyptian), “Here I feel that everyone are equals. Muslims and Christians. I don’t feel that they are unequal” (Anna, Egyptian). For Zain, another Egyptian expat, university life showcased this diversity tremendously with, in his university, 10% locals, around thirty percent Arabs including from Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt, around twenty percent Americans and Canadians, a little bit of British, and then Iranians as the biggest majority in the university.

The way that I see it is that you get to see people from all over the world in one little, very tiny location. So I mentioned this before, you get to know a lot about different backgrounds, different religions. You get to learn how to communicate with someone who doesn’t understand where you are coming from. I don’t know, it is very comfortable in such an environment. (Zain, Egyptian)

Another Egyptian expat discusses how respect for other cultures is a major part of his appreciation of the UAE. He compares the UAE to Egypt, and then argues that Dubai’s peaceful coexistence of diverse groups is based on the fact that the strict ‘rules’ of the UAE foster respect amongst diverse populations. For Emirati Natasha, the multicultural aspect of Dubai is reflected in people who grew up in Dubai, who are generally open to a vast variety of cultures, speak different languages, and have experience dealing with different cultures. And although interact with each other, for the most part people tend to retain their culture no matter how long they have lived in Dubai.

Maybe that is because they don’t get naturalized. But if you have been here for 20 or 30 years and you are from China, let’s say, you still think of yourself as Chinese and that kind of applies to all the nationalities. There are people from 100s of different countries here, and they all behave that way. (Natasha, Emirati)
While many discuss the ‘multicultural’ makeup of the population, all subjects interviewed for the study, as well numerous scholars on the region, have documented strict social hierarchies that significantly impact the everyday lives of different groups. As discussed, these divisions are heavily based on highly racialized ideas of class and nationality, and are supported by state based ideologies and commonsensical knowledge(s) created about different groups. Therefore, realities of privilege and complicity are masked by ideas of cultural ‘threats’ and survival that work to create distance between groups through ideas of ‘us’ and ‘them’, or the racialized construction of the category of the ‘Other’. The social organization of Dubai is heavily based on hierarchies of entitlement that shape access to resources, standards and conditions of work and life, and the possibilities of belonging. As Elsheshtawy points out in his study of the social geographies of Dubai,

While a city such as Dubai defines itself for the most part as a multicultural melting pot of sorts, it is more of a polyglot, a confused mix of ethnic groups, where, in spite of the existence of numerous nationalities, each has its own dedicated space and encounters take place only in controlled settings such as shopping malls. (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 27)

Similarly, subjects articulate a range of important considerations in how these social hierarchies are experienced and lived, as well as how they are shaped and understood. For American expat Jo society is divided into ‘local’ citizens and everyone else, and “everyone else is where you find all of the different cultures clustered together. I see all these clusters together and they create their own, they recreate their own culture and their mini culture here” (Jo, American). Further, “there is no one culture here and when they do end up mixing like the different cultures together, it is a very superficial mixing” (Jo, American). In supporting this idea of cultural organization, Lo notes the clubs that cater to different nationalities at specific places and events. “For instance, the 400 Club, it will be a Lebanese club. If you go to Nassimi it’s a very Arab crowd, sometimes it would be Arab on one side and expat on the other. Chi, which would be very English, and then on another night, depending on the music, Indian” (Lo, British).

American expat Carlos notes that while you may learn communication and tolerance, in the end “every community sticks together” (Carlos, American). For Emirati, Reda, diversity has always been a part of her life in Dubai. She explains that the British
dominated the expats when she was young, but over time more nationalities migrated to Dubai, each congregating in its own space.

There is definitely a split and depending on which part of town you go to, you know what you are going to find and see, and that is fine and good having a multicultural society. Yes we are not all integrated and I think it’s… again, it’s different backgrounds, and lifestyles, and you know the money makers versus the non-money makers. So I can understand, socially we don’t all mix but there is still once in a while we might… (Reda, Emirati)

For others, the openness of the UAE has its limits, as Rebecca asks in an exchange,

How many people have ever met someone Jewish here? You can’t say I am atheist. You have to put a religion. A lot of my French friends would be so mad because their parents would be atheist, and they would have to put Catholic if they wanted to come to the country. I think it is open-minded but not as open minded as people think. (Rebecca, Egyptian)

These insights all beg the question of what best describes Dubai’s diversity. Melting pot? Mosaic? Meeting place? What is clear is that the façade of multiculturalism is superficially understood by most as merely acknowledging the existence of different communities, but the spatial geography of the city clearly highlights the immense social hierarchies, which dominate relations between groups.

Considering how Dubai’s ‘multiculturalism’ is put into practice, while many low waged labourers may be forced out of malls and face explicit discrimination in many spaces, at other times their exclusion is more intangible and thus difficult to pinpoint for many. The simple feelings of ‘not being welcome’ are in fact tied to larger social understandings of who belongs and where and thus operate as mechanisms of discipline and social control. Elsheshtawy (2010) highlights several other mechanisms at play in creating these seemingly informal types of segregation. The Mall of Emirates or Madinat Jumeirah are both located far from the traditional city core, designed to be accessed by car, and next to impossible to access without. This is seen as geographical distancing and biased infrastructural development that implicitly leaves certain people out (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 215). In addition, geographical distancing can be seen through the accommodations provided to many low waged labourers who often explained that they lived on the outskirts of town or even in neighbouring emirates, making it immensely difficult to
reach these major centers and forcing them into a form of social isolation. The reality of long hours, inadequate rest days, and illness, combined with poverty and the exclusionary forces of ‘luxury’, all work together to exclude many people from accessing many popular spaces, but also in feeling a sense of belonging or entitlement.

However, as Elsheshtawy (2010) also highlights, alternative spaces do exist in Dubai, which cater to different needs and where ‘Other’ communities gather beyond the spectacular spaces of Dubai. But, while many romanticize these places as ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ spaces, with their ‘decay’, ‘disorder’ and less sanitized areas (Elsheshtawy, 2010), they have in fact been created as a response to the needs of low income and marginalized communities, which gives insight into the extreme social inequalities that dominate much of the city’s development and social life. Formal policies also work to shape access to certain spaces, explicitly outlining areas for expatriates and locals, as well as giving tremendous benefits to citizens, including land grants, housing allowances and loans. “Taking care of your own would be fine, if it wasn’t at the expense of everyone else who did all the work” (Adonis, Jordanian).

In the ‘Other’ Dubai, one finds the disenfranchised majority who generally live in substandard living situations, facing eviction, arrest and detention, or confinement to camps. The ‘plight of bachelors’ (Khalaf and Alkobaisi, 1999), is a reality faced by married or single men unable to bring their families because of minimum income requirements that they do not meet. Scholars highlight the ways that ‘bachelor’ life is highly racialized, and not equally applicable to all residents but rather works to regulate the lives of low income populations. Two important spaces are the largest labour camps of Al Quoz and Sonapur, military style camps that encourage segregation by nationality, and are located on the outskirts of the city to keep workers away from the dominant image of Dubai. The ‘Othered’ spaces are often not extremely isolated from the city and may often be visible and accessible but socially distanced through negative, racialized representations as spaces of danger and crime because of their inhabitants.

The importance of this study is connected to the fact that while many important scholarly works on Dubai have been published in the last ten years, there are also large numbers of works that are riddled with grand generalizations, that while sometimes
thoughtfully considered, lack the necessary historical analysis that situates particular forms of power and subjectivity in relation to states practices or the lack there of. Overall, there is very limited analysis that attempts to deconstruct or map historical trajectories which consider how race, nationality, push factors, and other social considerations may have both created and perpetuated the ‘general’ lifestyles. Here however, I will highlight a few significant works that connect to the broad themes of the socio-spatial hierarchies operating in Dubai.

The extreme differences in lived experience between expats, Emiratis and low waged workers highlight the highly unequal status and entitlements faced by different groups. The insights examined by different groups highlight the ways in which social life in the city is organized and maintained both in material and ideological terms. In particular, the everyday experiences, as a scale of social analysis, illuminate the ways that seemingly invisible, yet formal and historical mechanisms, create and maintain hierarchies based heavily on citizenship and nationality. The existing scholarly research available on these issues makes clear that any adequate analysis on the contemporary experiences of migrants to this region must be rooted and explained through a historical understanding of the processes that have worked to create highly racialized and exclusionary structures of social and political rights and entitlements. The hierarchies of entitlement between nationals and foreigners cannot be understood without revealing the complicated relationships between citizens themselves, as well as the historical legacies of European and American interests and what shaped the modern Gulf state as we know it today. In addition, the significance of gender in differentiating the experiences of workers is significant, as numbers of female migrant workers continue to grow, while many of their vulnerabilities continue to be ignored as issues taking place in the private sphere with little or no regulation. A range of scholars support these ideas, and add different elements for further consideration in the subsequent chapter, as we turn to examine the formative features of citizenship that shape national mythology and the creation of exalted and preferred subjects.

To begin, Malecki and Ewers (2007) explore the labour networks that link labour demand in booming Gulf cities to sources of supply in poor, yet labour rich countries.
This relationship, which is embedded in the conceptualization of ‘unmapping’, acknowledges the need for a relational analysis in explicating social relations. Malecki and Ewers acknowledge the existence of discriminatory hiring practices tied to nationality. They point to the example of hospitals where nurses are primarily Filipino and Egyptian, unskilled janitorial positions are taken up by Sri Lankan and Bangladeshi workers, while Americans and Europeans fill senior hospital administration, medical and head nurse positions (Malecki and Ewers, 2007, 475). Many interviewees referred to the explicit preferences in hiring for certain nationalities in certain jobs, as well as the practice of paying different nationalities different salaries for the same job, based on where they are from. The authors note the unique contextual features of the UAE having no avenue for formal citizenship for migrants, and highlight the differential treatment of workers, many of whom cannot bring their families because their incomes do not meet the basic requirements.

The authors point to unique and complex variations of social polarization in the Gulf. They highlight the widening inequalities in many cities, and the marked ethnic and social exclusion found in many multi ethnic cities. In the case of the Gulf, they argue that polarization of the labour force has sharper divisions from elsewhere in the world as a result of the strong need to import labour. Because each group has a function, they argue that instead of binaries between skilled and unskilled, or areas with social and economic power and those without, “there are multiple layers of distinct divisions between public and private sector, between national and expatriate and between male and female (Malecki & Ewans, 2007, 477). This is seen in the discussion of diverse lived experiences in the city where expat professionals and low waged workers are differentiated based on their employment sector and nationality, thus reinforcing the multiple layers of differentiation that work to organize social life. The authors point to a trichotomous social division between local Arabs, skilled Western expats and low skilled mainly South Asian workers. Although it is necessary to acknowledge the diversity that exists within these sectors, as gender and nationality for example dictate differential status and treatment, the authors still support the popular understandings of social hierarchies with indigenous Arabs at the top with posh government jobs and unparalleled social contracts from the government. This, in their view, leads to unsustainable practices in the entire private
where almost all employed are expatriates. Age demographics add pressure to these divisions with over half of the GCC population under the age of 25, and almost half of that under 15 (Malecki & Ewans, 2007, 477). In the case of the second division, skilled workers are recruited, because capital accumulation in the Gulf can pay foreign firms and foreign workers unparalleled wages and fees to build highly specialized physical and service infrastructure. Finally, in the third division, are low skilled, low waged migrant workers, the highest numbers of whom are construction workers and domestic workers. They also argue that different groups live in distinct housing areas, which is an important feature of the urban social geography and is one of the key physical embodiments of polarization. In general it is important to highlight that these divisions are more varied and complex than dichotomies, thus, “The social status of individuals in this kaleidoscopic mélange is a fundamental representation of social polarization in the region” (Malecki & Ewans, 2007, 478).

This can be seen in the ways in which Westerners occupy the highest social strata after local Arabs - even other Arabs, depending on their levels of education and economic status, can be second to westerners - and then Asians who are described as “outcasts in a society that depends on them for its basic functioning and whose infrastructure their efforts build” (Malecki & Ewans, 2007, 479). In addition to these divisions, further inequalities exist in wage differentials where Indians are paid more than Bangladeshis and Sri Lankans.

With the female labour force there are even more divisions and issues faced by women from Asia and Africa who occupy the lowest levels of the social hierarchy, which in turn shapes the type of work they are given within the home. Domestic workers in general are treated as extremely disposable although integral to everyday living. “Housemaids in the Middle East are like luxury goods regarded as indispensable for maintenance and upkeep of the large homes and comfortable lifestyle which the population is used to now” (Malecki & Ewans, 2007, 479).

Several important scholarly works on expat communities build on the complexities between sectors, and the role of ethnic, racial and gendered criteria in organizing labour by examining important forces such as the layers of differentiation tied to ethnic, racial, and gendered criteria, in relation to methods of recruitment and the low
wage flexible and disposable workforce, in contrast to high skilled, high wage global cosmopolitan lifestyles.

The recent work of two notable scholars on Dubai specifically shows how these issues operate through important historical conditions. First, the work of Walsh (2010) on British expat communities in Dubai importantly highlights the ways that analysis of Dubai’s rise as a model for global city development is often devoid of any adequate examination of the role of race, class and migrant status. Walsh discusses the impacts on Dubai in its post-Federation economic diversification strategies, which are heavily tied to a migration regime that has been called an “immigrant gateway” by scholars. In her examination of urban spaces in this emerging global city, she discusses the ways in which migrants negotiate spatial relations. It has been widely documented that a strong racialized and classed social hierarchy exists between nationals and migrants, and even among migrants, depending on their place of origin. Her focus is on the interactions between high skilled British migrants and low skilled migrants from Asia and the Middle East, exploring the role of postcolonial notions of race, class and nationality, as they relate to the imperial histories of Britain and discussing these racialized encounters in relation to political economy and imperialist legacies. Her work strongly supports the theoretical analysis being presented here around the ways that power works through racial histories to create informal processes through which power is “asserted, accepted, contested or subverted” (Walsh, 2010, 237).

She presents important insights about the ways that the racialization of urban space represents localized power relations, resulting from global and transnational interconnections, past and present (Walsh, 2010, 237), thus acknowledging not only the broader global political economy in which Dubai is situated, but the significance of the temporal and genealogical histories that influence the racialization of everyday life and urban space, discussed here through a spatial analysis.

She importantly highlights the ways in which white British migrants utilize race for privilege and simultaneously deny its existence, and thus displacing whiteness in a processes of racialization. She invokes the work of numerous postcolonial scholars who focus on ‘colonial continuities’ between nationals and expats. Importantly, however, other scholars give importance to the relations between a diverse range of groups to
highlight how ‘displaced’ postcolonial encounters work to transfer colonial continuities into contemporary processes, relationships that are informed but not limited to historic relations. Thus, spatialized processes of racialization contribute to the formation of migrant identities. As Dubai has the highest percentage of foreign born residents in the world, the issue of segmented labour markets is marked by gendered and racialized processes through which employers, as discussed by subjects in my study, make known explicit preferences for specific nationalities, and it is openly acknowledged that different nationalities will be paid according to their citizenship based status, even in cases of the same labour.

Not all British migrants, as those discussed here have highlighted, would be considered ‘highly skilled’ or ‘transnational business class’, but as a group, primarily based on their nationality, itself highly racialized, they become privileged in the social hierarchy. She unmaps these geographies of migration to expose the historic links between Britain and the protectorate relations it held with the UAE from 1892, until the federation of the UAE in 1971. She highlights the ways in which imperial relations remain visible through the Visa system, where British migrants move with relative ease and freedom to the Emirates. Most significantly here, as I have argued previously, the links between historic forces of race and class, as they intersect with local inequalities, shape their privilege (Walsh, 2010, 239). Of course in her analysis, Walsh is focused on British migrants who experience whiteness in obvious physical ways. However, as we will see in further analysis of the role of race, nationality and citizenship in shaping privilege, power and disposition work to create social hierarchies with significant consequences in the everyday lives of all residents of the city.

Walsh highlights the work of Mike Davis, analyzing British complicity and contributions to the exploitation of low paid Asian migrants. Thus, both contribute to analyses that push beyond simple dichotomies of migrants and nationals, and interrogate the levels of relationships which afford privilege to many migrants, such as Third world elites and Western expats, as seen in the lifestyles discussed by subjects above. Overall, their whiteness and imperial legacies, which shape their nationality, afford them privilege vis-à-vis the disempowerment of Others. Thus, we see through her analysis the postcolonial space of encounter - postcolonial not with regard to ongoing imperial
relations between British and Emirati nationals, but postcolonial in relations between highly skilled European migrants and low skilled migrants from Asia and the Middle East. “In encounters between these groups, there is a sense of historical relations from elsewhere being reproduced in the urban spaces of this emerging global city, a kind of displaced postcolonial encounter” (Walsh, 2010, 251).

The second work, by Neha Vora (2008), explores the experiences of middle class Indians in Dubai through two modes of diasporic subjectivity, racial consciousness and consumer citizenship. Vora works to challenge the underlying assumptions in many Indian diasporic literatures that prioritize the economic domain as the foundation for diasporic formation and culture (Vora, 2008, 378). Instead she explores a range of diasporic subjectivities and practices constituted through migration to Dubai and the experiences of living there (Vora, 2008, 403). In terms of racial consciousness, Vora’s examples highlight through the insights of informants high levels of systemic discrimination and racial hierarchies in Dubai. However, while most informants experienced discrimination based on race and nationality, they still maintained a particular middle class subjectivity, tied to their belief in the globalized free market, which was ‘supposed to offer opportunities for everyone” (Vora, 2008, 388). Importantly, Vora notes that middle class status, a status that is constructed in relation to other categories and groups of migrants, was a significant status that middle class Indians used to differentiate themselves from labourers, and to argue that they deserved “less racism”, thus making them feel superior (Vora, 2008, 390). Vora’s informants focused many of their experiences of racism on Goras (Hindi word for fair skinned or white) (Vora, 2008, 385). Their negative experiences were seen as failures of Dubai’s free market, which were being threatened by whites and locals. However, while they connected their struggles to other classes of South Asians, they still promoted neoliberal discourses of self management and attributed failures to individual inefficiencies, as in the case of lower paid workers who should practice more self-management and greater self respect to create a less discriminatory system (Vora, 2008, 391). Overall then, racial consciousness emerged out of experiences of discrimination but was influenced by their middle class status and belief in the free market economy (Vora, 2008, 395).
With regard to consumer citizenship, Vora argues that despite a lack of formal access to citizenship and segregation from Emiratis and other expatriate groups, Indians in Dubai displayed forms of belonging through their consumption practices. Neoliberal technologies of belonging and subjectivity were understood by middle class Indians in Dubai through the idea of the ideal citizen as an entrepreneur of himself. This was understood in relation to Indian elites who were conceptualized similarly to Emiratis, as “excessive consumers, lazy, did not want to work hard and unfairly got wealth off of the labour of others” (Vora, 2008, 394). Interestingly, then, racial consciousness which arose from experiences of discrimination was a part of a new subjectivity for these migrants, but this oppression was not a challenge to their middle class status or their belief in the free market (Vora, 2008, 395). Thus, issues such as racism were considered to be failures of globalization in Dubai, which should be outside and separate from issues of identity and social relations.

From these analyses of the understandings of different groups of residents in Dubai of their social status and lifestyle relative to others in the city, we find that there are important factors, both structural and ideological, that impact the creation of social hierarchies. The relations embedded in the space both shape and are shaped by forces such as the broader political economy, national discourses, policies and practices, while, historical genealogies that undergird the geographies of migration implicate broader histories of the colonialism and international division of labour in the making of various subjectivities.

Although the concept of the ‘the international division of labour’ may be considered an outdated conceptualization of international labour migration, with scholars of development, for example, pushing more contemporary concepts of Global North and South to illuminate the shifting global terrain, the historical conceptualizations of ‘First’ and ‘Third’ worlds have important historical continuities of ideas of race, class and gender in the contemporary period. Despite important shifts in the global political economy, these divisions exist in so far that they help to create and maintain national hierarchies that privilege the ‘West’ over the ‘East’, and reinscribe Orientalizing notions
of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, which help to explain popular conceptualizations of Dubai as a nation ‘in between’ two worlds.

The endless engagements of diverse groups with each other and the city space generate important modes of being. We can see, for example, that when low waged workers articulate their difficult struggles and experiences in the city relative to the promises of Dubai dreams, the articulation is linked to the lifestyle of the professional expat communities of the city. Similarly, when expat professionals from the Global North discuss their lifestyles in Dubai, then is shown the making of their ‘relative’ privilege vis-à-vis this majority of poor workers from the Global South, and their relationships to Emiratis. Furthermore, the experiences of Emirati citizens as they are engaged in social contestation over issues of culture, identity and ‘indigeneity’ shape their relationships to other sectors, and create a sense of normalization of social inequalities based on ‘hierarchies of entitlement’ that shape who is deserving of what with interesting, albeit problematic, rationales.

**Conclusion**

In exploring the hierarchical social relations of space that together constitute the identity of the city and its subjects, the many overlapping, intersecting and conflicting geographies must be examined through a genealogical analysis that allows us to make sense of the simultaneity of social processes constructed around migration, labour, and citizenship in various spatial arrangements, at various levels, that allow for the reproduction of racial, gendered and class based hierarchical configurations. Together, they produce a broad based social consensus about the roles and rights of Others, through the everyday interactions that provide the manifestations of various global regimes of power relations into the socio-cultural landscapes, both physical and symbolic.

The impact of understanding what is behind the hegemonic ‘Dubai Dream’ means exposing the ideologies of ordering in which the seemingly informal social hierarchies that dominate everyday interactions in Dubai become normalized. This means exposing the ways in which these inequalities are often formally regulated, but become common sense and perpetuated by the ‘everyday’. Examples include the naturalization of hegemonic ideologies of ‘us’ and ‘them’, which shape relationships that are not limited to
Emirati-Migrant relations. These ideologies work to create dehumanized categories of people that reinforce hierarchies, which in turn impact the entitlements of various subjects. The basis of much of these entitlements has been linked to ideas and histories embedded within the broader historical context of migration for labour, and the making of Dubai’s global city dreams.

Within this matrix, migrants from all over the world, and Emiratis themselves, are made as subjects within the global city space constituted both through formal and informal processes.

The following chapter explores in more detail the role of citizenship in influencing these hierarchies and the overall social organization. In particular, it examines how the absence of citizenship for the majority of migrants impacts their experiences of Dubai Dreams. It also examines the role of citizenship, both Emirati and ‘foreign’, as it reinforces the national identity and privilege of certain categories. In addition, as we will see that, when national identity is seen as under threat, and national insecurity becomes a dominant socio-political concern, the social consequences are felt differentially based on one’s social locations within the urban hierarchy. Thus, we will explore the roles of exaltation, and Othering as they impact subject making.

We continue to deepen our understanding of the histories that accompany migrants on journeys of migration, as well as how these forces have shaped Dubai’s global city based developmental trajectory, through notions of belonging, entitlement and citizenship. These processes in turn are accompanied by policies and projects at the state level to control and regulate social relations, which are implicated in broader narratives and experiences of belonging. As will see, these processes are linked to the ideological forces that justify, excuse, rationalize, and even legitimatize the exclusion and exploitation of the majority of poor, low waged workers from entitlements, thus enhancing the role of dehumanization in creating disposability and normalizing violence.
Chapter Six: Awakening, Citizenship and the Making of the ‘Other’

Dubai is a place where it looks like a dream. On the outside it looks beautiful and then on inside you realize it is no good, it is selfish and mean, it is a nightmare. (Alice, Filipino)

‘Your vision will become clear only when you look into your heart. Who looks outside, dreams. Who looks inside, awakens.’ Famously attributed to Carl Jung, the statement connects well to the themes of awakening examined in this chapter. From the outside, the dream of Dubai, as explained by low waged Filipino migrant worker Alice, is a beautiful façade, enticing and inviting, only to be met with the nightmarish awakening to the conditions that many low waged workers face. Significant here is that the core, the heart of the body, project, or dream, is a central tool of understanding the realities and conditions influencing its functioning, abilities and possibilities.

Cesaire (1972) proclaimed in his examination of colonial rule, “A significant thing: it is not the head of a civilization that begins to rot first. It is the heart” (Cesaire, 1972, 28) and argued that the heart of European civilization, in its greedy, quest for colonial domination, with all the violence and destruction wrought on colonized peoples leading to the rotting of its ‘heart’, could not be separated from its body. He described the historical legacies that live on in Western cultures as the ‘heart’ of its civilization, representing the ‘core’, and speaks of the diseased and rotten nature of its operations. In an important example, Cesaire discusses the origins of fascism within colonialism, a supreme barbarism that manifested in Nazism. Thus, Europe is responsible for the emergence of Nazism, and importantly, that what is unforgivable about Hitler is not the particular Nazi crimes themselves, but “the crime against the white man, the humiliation of the white man, and the fact that he applied to Europe colonialist procedures, which until then, has been reserved exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the coolies of India, and the blacks of Africa” (Cesaire, 1972, 14). In this example he highlights that the violence of colonialism does not incite public outcry and contestation by the general population because the ‘thingification’ of the colonized is so pervasive that there is no recognition of its inhumanity, let alone the fact that it destroys the colonizer in the process. “That a nation which colonizes, that a civilization which justifies colonization - and therefore force – is already a sick civilization, a civilization that is morally
diseased…” (Cesaire, 1972, 18). Cesaire uses this example to highlight that no matter how ‘civilized’ a man, the activity, enterprise, and conquest of colonialism will dehumanize and destroy anyone, that through these processes “a poison has been instilled in the veins of Europe and, slowly but surely, the continent proceeds towards savagery” (13). The functions of both the heart and the brain can face deterioration when sickened or facing moral constraint.

In the case of sleep, we see that awakening, an unavoidable aspect of sleep, may also be experienced as a nightmare. A disruption stemming from our waking life (Neilson and Lara-Carrasco, 2007), our actions and histories, which awaken us with a frightening set of realizations of our inward character, center, our heart if you may. Thus in this chapter, the Dubai dream is reconceptualized as a nightmare through which the dream is made and lived by some, and not by ‘Others. We examine here how histories of race, nationality, gender and class influence ideologies of ordering that manifest into hierarchies of entitlement, as they operate to rationalize, normalize, and even, legitimize violent ‘dreamscapes’.

As the analysis of social hierarchies that structure relationships between residents of Dubai deepens, we find that the issues are in part related to the construction of migrants as ‘Others’. In particular, we see how the making of the ‘Other’, as a threat, serves important purposes in the making of nationhood. As Castles (1999) has highlighted, “the migrant has always been the ‘other’ of the nation-state, who could undermine the myths of cultural homogeneity and national identity. In the era of globalization, states welcome flows of capital, trade and know-how, yet frequently reject flows of people” (Castles, 7). In the case of the Gulf more specifically, given its demographic reality, as Khodkher (2010) highlights, the Gulf has little choice in its dependency on migrants. Rather than rejecting flows, what we find in many contexts, including Dubai, are modes of differential incorporation, which play an important role in the creation and affirmation of national mythology and identity. Therefore, the creation and maintenance of the category of the ‘Other’ is the necessary counterpart of the national citizen, and the hierarchical levels of entitlement which privilege citizens over ‘Others’ are reinforced to reaffirm the status and power of the citizen. Furthermore, it is
necessary to consider how the case of global city making in Dubai complicates simple dichotomies between ‘us’ and ‘them’ through the dreams of diverse migrant subjects. Within the different layers of migration that form the majority of the population, we find that different forms of power operate through markers such as nationality and employment. In turn these are raced, classed and gendered, and implicate all residents, albeit in different ways. As has been highlighted through the insights from different subjects in the city, the ideological apparatus that accompanies the formal and structural conditions of sending countries, and the national policies and practices that incorporate different groups into a hierarchy are just as significant in maintaining the everyday normalization of ‘exaltation’ and ‘privilege’ of some, and disposability of ‘Others’.

In particular, it can be seen through an examination of how race operates, not only through physical markings on the epidermis, although this is a significant form, but rather through the ideological representations and meanings given through processes of racialization that are tied to nationality. Processes of racialization are explained as,

Those instances where social relations between people have been structured by the signification of human biological characteristics in such a way as to define and construct differentiated social collectivities…. The concept therefore refers to a process of categorization, a representational process of defining an Other (usually, but not exclusively) somatically. (Torres et al., 1999, 7)

A simple example found in many interviews is tied to the open and commonly accepted practice of differential salaries given on the basis of nationality. Many have argued that this is largely a function of the economy in which competitiveness amongst firms dictates that attracting talent from the ‘First’ world requires more incentives to come to work in Dubai. Although these seemingly ‘neutral’ economic processes are often more difficult to unpack, the flip side of this clearly shows the highly discriminatory and racialized process through which different subjects, based on their nationality, are organized hierarchically to create a system of valuation in which certain subjects are more highly sought for reasons of prestige, status and more valued ‘experience’. This is based on sets of ideas in which people of colour, dominated by those from the ‘Third’ world, are painted as desperate, less experienced, less valuable, less desirable and thus, more easily disposable or replaced. The image of the ‘desperate’ starved ‘Third world’ masses plays prominently into the process of racialization in which skill and value are
determined through sets of ideologies that create seemingly neutral structures of
differentiation that actually have much larger historical and colonial legacies. The
genealogies that accompany different migrants on their journeys can clearly be seen in
the case of domestic workers, for example, who are commonly assigned tasks in the
home depending on social perceptions of the worker and their value, based on their race
and nationality (Khodhker, 2010, 222), or higher salaries and better benefits for Western
passport holders for the same job. In addition, we find that the role of nationality in
creating differential status and treatment/entitlement is based on ideas of what is seen as
acceptable for certain people, who are then expected to work under conditions that no
other worker would be asked to work under, especially not an expat from the West, and
absolutely never an Emirati citizen.

Understanding how race operates through space, as well as how national subjects
are constituted vis-à-vis Others, especially within complex social spaces such as the
global city of Dubai, provides important insight into how race shapes ideas of
‘humaness’, endowing particular nationalities with racial characteristics and qualities
that allow some more privilege and entitlements than Others. As Torres et al. (1999)
explain, the power of ‘race’ is not related to its having any biological basis for dividing
the human species into groups based on physical traits, but it does exist as part of “a
classificatory system through which a racialized social order is reproduced and
maintained” (Torres et al., 1999, 5). As scholars note, this often takes the form of
us/them, self/other, and white/black. The power of race is then tied to its,

Adaptive capacity to define population groups, and by extension social agents,
as self and other at various historical moments. It has thus facilitated the fixing of
characteristics of inclusion and exclusion, giving an apparent specificity otherwise
lacking to social relations… [it is] able to signify not so much in itself as by
adopting and giving naturalized forms of prevailing conceptions of social group
formation at different times. (Goldberg, 1992, 558)

Therefore, although race is not natural it becomes as such through the social
“construction and rationalization of orders of difference, making group relations appear
as if they were natural and unchangeable” (Torres et al., 1999, 5). This also explains how
certain groups are seen as an existential threat to national security and identity at different
times, and currently, in the face of growing migration, globalization and the growth and
dominance of capitalist consumer culture. Interestingly, earlier discussions of the role of Dubai’s global position between orientalized and racist notions of ‘East’ and ‘West’ also significantly impact policies, practices and ideologies of the global location of Dubai as to what is permissible and ‘natural’ in the ‘non-western’, ‘non-democratic’, Islamic, Arab cultures of the ‘East’. These racial logics also show why and how the ‘Third world’ is represented in ways that normalize exploitation as part of their ‘nature’, devoid of historical context, which simultaneously promotes ideas of innocence and benevolence on behalf of Western expat professionals and Emirati nationals who actually all benefit and uphold these hierarchies of power and privilege for their own benefit. Of course these issues are complicated by citizenship regimes that create a temporary population with no political or civic voice.

Overall, we see here how race and citizenship operate to create the ideological tools necessary in upholding hierarchies of entitlement, which shape the experiences of diverse groups of residents in the city. This chapter begins with an analysis of the broader context of citizenship in relation to neoliberal globalization and then turns to connect this specifically to processes of racialization. In turn we will examine in more detail the making of the ‘nation’ in the UAE in relation to issues of migration and citizenship. In particular, histories of citizenship in the UAE will be examined to support the analysis of relational identity formation, and conceptualizations of the ‘nation under threat’, thereby legitimizing processes of exclusionary citizenship and the regulation of particular migrant identities. In particular, we will see how in the context of Dubai, specifically, processes of ‘exaltation’ and Othering operate in relation to genealogies of racial categorizations of geographies and migrants. From here two major methods through which these processes operate are examined: first, as ‘where you are from’ overwhelms ‘where you are at’; and second, how relativity operates as a mode of rationality and justification. To begin, we can examine the shifting terrain and processes through which regimes of citizenship operate as important markers of subject making and tools for nation building.

**Globalization, Neoliberalism and Citizenship**

In considering the broader political and economic context, scholars note the growing global anxiety of nation-states in relation to migration. With regard to
globalization, Torres, Miron and Inda (1999) argue that the current situation is one in which globalization’s labour practices and the working conditions for low income people, for example, depict systematic enforcements and exploitation of gender, racial, ethnic, and national hierarchies. The ideology of poverty ‘over there’ is tied to the repression of circumstances experienced by low-income people of colour ‘here’. While they are discussing the case of the US, we can see how the logics remain similar in the global city context as local policies are often influenced by global hierarchies (10). In addition, shifting conceptualizations of contemporary racism(s) in the context of demographic shifts, changing class formations, and new forms of global dislocations play a significant role in the construction of the nation and the citizen versus the alien, the foreigner, the stranger, the immigrant - the ‘threat’ to the nation.

Scholars have long challenged the universalistic claims of ‘democratic’ citizenship by arguing that there have always been inequalities within nation states between those who are not capable of fully belonging. Castles and Davidson (2000) argue that globalization is creating new challenges for citizenship whereby the growing international mobility of people questions the basis for belonging within the boundaries of the nation-state. They argue further that the boundaries of the nation state are being eroded when millions of people have multiple citizenships or live in more than one country during their lifetimes. They begin then by exploring European notions of modernity, in which the essence of nation-states is tied to the institution of citizenship (Castles and Davidson, 2000, 3) arguing that globalization affects citizenship in three major ways: questioning the notion of the relative autonomy of the nation state; undermining the ideology of distinct and relatively autonomous national cultures since homogenization is at the core of nationalist projects; and embodying the rapidly increasing mobility of people across national borders (Castles and Davidson, 2000, 8).

The authors advocate for a theory of citizenship for a global society, tied to a separation of nation from state, in which the state is based on a shared political community and not cultural identity (Castles and Davidson, 2000, 24). If we consider the pressures of globalization on the state, we can see how the threats to national identity
may have more to do with neoliberal shifts and the interconnections of the economy than with the influx and influence of ‘foreigners’. For example, increasing cuts to social spending and privatization under neoliberalism impact the economy and social services in ways that squeeze people’s access to resources, which are then often represented as pressures due to an influx of foreign migrants. Thus, migrants often become important scapegoats when citizenship is linked explicitly to notions of ‘cultural homogeneity’, and consequently in the processes of national building at different times. Overall then, the nation state has a tendency to create difference and to create racialized minorities, not only through discourses but through various forms of political and social action that separate and differentiate members of minorities from mainstream population (Castles and Davidson, 2000, 69).

Seyla Behabib and Judith Resnik (2009) argue that migrations related to globalization involve the increased movement around the world of goods, services, information and capital of all kinds, as well as of legal, political and moral norms. They highlight the complexity of the current nation-state system and the commitments of the international order to the human rights regimes, of which citizenship rights are central. While some argue that we are witnessing the end of the nation state, they note that though the meaning of state sovereignty may be under revision, nation states remain a critical form of organization. “Porous borders continue to define networks of obligation and constitute real barriers, rendering some persons alien” (4). Analysis of gender are often missing from reforms aimed at addressing the meanings of citizenship and sovereignty, and understanding gendered impacts changes the picture and adds complexity. They argue, for example, that women’s migration is rarely a simple matter of the movement across state boundaries of a single, isolated individual as their mobility is a nodal point in a network of relationships. Overall, they emphasize the need to examine globalization, borders, migration and citizenship through an interdisciplinary analysis that brings together law, politics and theories that highlight the way gender categories illuminate and enriched the analysis of ‘the right to have rights’ (31).

Linda Bozniak (2009) examines how citizenship is often considered the most desirable condition, and the highest fulfillment of democratic and egalitarian aspiration. However, “while the concept is commonly invoked to convey a state of democratic
belonging or inclusion, this inclusion is usually premised upon a conception of a community that is bounded and exclusive” (Bozniak, 2009, 127). Bosniak argues that citizenship itself represents an axis of subordination, and that if the problems are seen only in all or nothing citizenship-terms then practical protections, such as work hours and wages, are forestalled because of the complexity of the large political and legal challenges presented when various migrant groups seek protection. Thus, in discussions of transnational migrant labour, gendered notions of work and citizenship mean not only thinking about equal citizenship but also about citizenship as an exclusionary national status. Tracing genealogies of nationality and the underlying factors that influence the differential status of diverse migrant categories helps trace the deeper and broader historical forces that shape the citizen subject and Others, generating hierarchies that are influenced by regimes of citizenship. She asks, “What does it mean that, whatever equal citizenship some women in wealthy countries may achieve through market sphere work, it is often facilitated by the employment of people from poorer countries who themselves lack status citizenship in the country in which they labour?” (128). Here we can extend these questions to include how entitlements and privileges are built not only on exclusion of migrants from formal citizenship, and how notions of ‘nationality’, race, gender and labour all impact migrant subjectivities and national identity.

In speaking about national borders, Bosniak argues that despite increasing economic globalization, national borders remain rigid when it comes to movements of persons including workers. Highlighting the inclusion and exclusion inherent in the concept of citizenship, she highlights both the inward looking and boundary conscious approaches arguing that the citizenship of the border follows into the interior, and thus citizenship is not always a prerequisite for enjoyment of many important rights. In the US, aliens formally enjoy expressive and associational rights, procedural rights in criminal and civil contexts, contract and property rights, and the right to attend public schools with other children (Bosniak, 2009, 143). Thus, she argues that it is analytically possible to enjoy aspects of equal or democratic citizenship without being a formal citizen (Bosniak, 2009, 144). It is therefore not “incoherent to speak of the citizenship enjoyed by aliens” (Bosniak, 2009, 144). Overall then, citizenship rights and citizenship status are not always coextensive or mutually entailed, which further supports the need to
understand citizenship and the practices that flow from its conceptualization beyond formal policy.

The important issues that emerge through these texts include: the tensions between the universalistic claims of citizenship and states, and the particularistic constructions of nations; the increased mobility of capital and people and the effects on national sovereignty; the importance of gender and race in citizenship-based struggles; and the contradictions between expanding citizenship at the expense, or in the face of, the citizenship-less-ness of the nation’s ‘Others’.

In considering the role of neoliberalism in the making of a seemingly endless supply of workers, we can also consider the role of neoliberalism is attracting workers. Considering how forms of power impact ideas related to work, and impact and are impacted by policies such as labour and citizenship that relegate migrant workers to the periphery is significant. Rhacel Salazar Parrenas (2001) discusses Evelyn Nakano Glenn’s (1992) concept of the ‘racial division of reproductive labour’, highlighting the context of the US to explore how domestic labour is tied to racial, gender, and class privilege based on an interdependency connecting women (61). Glenn’s analysis heavily focuses on the relationship between white women and women of colour and the ways in which privileged women are shifting reproductive responsibilities without challenging them. Parrenas’ analysis extends this to the international terrain to consider issues of globalization and the feminization of wage labour (62). Through this, the ‘international transfer of caretaking’ emerges out of a three-tier transfer of reproductive labour among women in sending and receiving countries of migration, where class privileged women purchase the low wage services of migrant Filipina domestic workers, who in turn purchase the even lower wage services of poorer women in the Philippines (62).

To understand the impacts of neoliberalism as a technology of governance, Aihwa Ong (2000, 2006, 2009) explores how neoliberal logics impact sovereignty and regimes of citizenship in non-western contexts, through the management of migrant populations based on market driven calculations and neo-conservatism, leading to the elimination of social programs and promoting big capital business. She argues that a new mode of political organizing is emerging, that is reconfiguring relationships between governing and the governed, power and knowledge and sovereignty and territoriality (Ong, 2006).
Ong (2006) identifies many implications for new ways of thinking about neoliberal citizenship and sovereignty. First, she explores why neoliberalism as technology of governing is an important concept for inquiry into mutations in citizenship and sovereignty. Here she highlights that we must explore neoliberalism not as culture but as a “calculative technique of governing that can be decontextualized from their original sources and recontexualized in constellations of mutually constitutive and contingent relationships” (Ong, 2006, 13). Second, Ong explores the concept of citizenship as an ensemble of elements that can be delinked and relinked to market based rationalities, exploring how contemporary flows of capital and of migrant labour have interacted with sovereignty and rights discourses in complex ways to disentangle citizenship claims once knotted together in a single territorialized mass. Third, Ong explores how neoliberal exception is an important analytic tool for rethinking sovereign power as a shifting and flexible ensemble of heterogeneous calculations, choices, and exceptions that constitute security, life and ethics (Ong, 2006, 15). Special Economic Zones and Special Administrative Regions in China have created new spaces through techniques of calculative choice, institutionalized in mechanisms and procedures that mark out special spaces of labour markets and investment opportunities, spaces in which there exists an option of exception that has led to the carving out of different territory for ‘better’ economic engagement. Finally, she highlights articulations of the neoliberal project and moral economies, which can both strip human beings of citizenship and become realigned in the interests of protecting bare life.

In highlighting the difference between ‘neoliberalism as exception’ and ‘exceptions to neoliberalism’, she notes the former is tied to sites of transformation where market driven calculations are being introduced in the management of populations and administration of special spaces. At same time, exceptions to neoliberalism can be found in political decisions to exclude populations, such as through protecting social safety nets or by stripping away all forms of political protections (Ong, 2006, 3-4). Overall then, exceptions to neoliberalism can both preserve welfare for citizens and exclude non-citizens from benefits of capitalist development. Through these shifts, new forms of governing, of being governed and what it means to be human are emerging (Ong, 2006, 6).
To develop these ideas further, Ong (2006) brings together several key concepts. First, Foucault’s insights on ‘governmentality’, which are explained as an array of knowledge and techniques concerned with the “systemic and pragmatic guidance and regulation of everyday conduct” (4). Here neoliberal governmentality results from an infiltration of market driven truths and calculations into the domain of politics. The second concept is ‘exception’ and here Ong uses Agamben’s notion of exception as a fundamental principle of sovereign rule predicated on division between citizens in juridical order and outsiders stripped of juridical-political protections (5). She pushes this further by viewing exception as deployed to include and exclude certain bodies and argues that we need to explore the hinge between neoliberalism as exception and exception to neoliberalism, the interplay among technologies of governing, disciplining, inclusion and exclusion, and giving value or denying value to human conduct (5). Overall Ong argues that ‘bare life’ does not dwell in zones of ‘indistinction’ (Agamben), but ‘becomes’ through interventions of local communities, NGOs and even corporations, which shift and recognize various categories of morally deserving humanity (24). In the end, there are a myriad of disarticulations and rearticulations made possible through the logic of exception with which we “transform the elements we used to associate with a unified concept of citizenship into values placed on humanity that are increasingly varied, fragmented, contingent, and ambiguous, but permanently subject to ethicopolitical critique” (27).

Further, Ong (2006) introduces her concept of ‘graduated sovereignty’ to explain the relationship between global forces and the actions of emerging Asian states to show how neoliberal logic reconfigures the territory of citizenship. Here she argues that emerging countries are compelled to be ‘flexible’ in their conceptions of ‘sovereignty and citizenship if they are to be relevant to global markets” (76). The implementation of graduated sovereignty means that market driven logic creates political policies in relation to corporate interests, so that development decisions favour the fragmentation of the national space into various zones and “promote the differential regulation of populations who can be connected to or disconnected from global circuits of capital” (77). Thus, Asian ‘postdevelopmentalism’ is a geography of governing resulting not from an anemic state apparatus, but from deliberate neoliberal calculations as to which areas and which
populations are advantageous or not advantageous in appealing to global markets. Overall, graduated sovereignty refers,

… to effects of a flexible management of sovereignty, as governments adjust political space to the dictates of global capital, giving corporations an indirect power over the political conditions of citizens in zones that are differently articulated to global production and financial circuits. (Ong, 2006, 78)

In relation to graduated citizenship, Ong (2006) highlights how in post-developmental governments there is a mix of disciplinary, regulatory, and pastoral technologies aimed at instilled self-discipline, productivity, and capacity to work with global firms (79). A mix of market calculations is undertaken subjecting different populations to different technologies (79). She explores two major case studies, Malaysia and Indonesia, to show “how graduated sovereignty is the effect of market driven strategies that are not congruent with the national space itself but that are biopolitically and spatially attuned to the workings of global markets” (96).

Ong asks how people make themselves stable in an unstable world. These are the processes and genealogies that when uncovered help us to map the forces which shape the ideological and structural processes that lend themselves to national projects aimed at ‘protecting’ citizens and nation-states from the polluting power of the poor, racialized, migrant majority. It is the added postcolonial complexities of being situated between worlds that also lend themselves to the neoliberal rationality in policy and practices related to citizenship and sovereignty that highlight the significance of global city aspirations in the contemporary period for non-western cities and spaces.

In considering Dubai more specifically, Kanna (2010) relates her discussions of neoliberal subject making to young professional citizens in Dubai. The aspects of neoliberalism as described by Kanna include,

The emancipation of capital from the oversight of the state, the commodification or marketization of realms of life that were previously the prerogative of the state, the apotheosis of the entrepreneur as a creative genius, the analogization of society as a corporation - are translated in the ideologies of powerful local institutions such as corporations and privileged sectors of the state. (Kanna, 2010, 101)

Kanna (2010) highlights the unique ways in which Dubai’s flexible citizens appropriate neoliberal discourses, arguing that this shows how neoliberalism is not
monolithic but rather is inflected with local meanings, discourses and histories (102). Following Ong, Kanna explores neoliberal governance as a sophisticated, population focused, and responsive instrument of state adaption to market pressures (102). Thus, “the ways neoliberal ideologies resonate with and are made persuasive within local formations of identity, conceptions of self-hood, and idioms of citizenship are essential to their appropriation by the subjects targeted by neoliberal modes of governance” (102). For Ong, Singapore exemplifies the ways the state mobilizes its populations to adapt to increasing global market pressures. Repositioning the city globally also means a reformulation of state sovereignty into zones of governance. Ong is also interested in cultural processes by which the state aimed to create ‘valuable citizens’ in line with neoliberal tenants, and also reflect a reorganization of ethnical norms. Kanna argues that in the case of Dubai, and the vast outnumbering of citizens by low waged migrant workers, the issues of citizenship are not framed in terms of economically valuable citizenship, but in terms of national ethics and modes of proper and authentic citizenship (Kanna, 2010, 104).

As we can see from these insights, citizenship in the context of neoliberalism and postcolonial urbanity in the context of globalization is influenced by nationality, race and gender which impact experiences of migration and labour in integral ways, both at the structural level and the ideological. Here we can consider in more detail how processes of racialization operate in the making of citizens and ‘Others’.

**Race in the making of Citizens and ‘Others’**

... Analytically, these issues are the contemporary metropolitan counterpart of women’s struggles against colonial occupation in the geographical third world. In effect, the construction of immigration and nationality laws, and thus appropriate racialized, gendered citizenship, illustrates the continuity between relationships of colonization and white, masculinist, capitalist state rule. (Mohanty, 1991, 23)

Struggles related to ‘citizenship’ can be seen as the contemporary manifestation of earlier struggles against colonial occupation, particularly in the ways in which race, gender and class are embedded within constructions of ideal citizens and of ‘Others’, and the way in which these ideas work to maintain rule for an elite, capitalist class, itself
highly gendered and racialized (Mohanty, 1991, 23). In particular, Mohanty explains how race operates as an ideology that “legitimates the exclusion of nonwhite people from particular areas of social and economic life, simultaneously promoting a tolerance of these inequities on the part of the ruling class” (23). What we see on the economic level is the ways in which “the differential allocation of workers, the composition of the ‘underclass’ and ‘welfare recipients’ are all constitutively dependent on race as an organizing principle” (23). Thus, the construction of different ‘migrants’ entitled to differential treatment on the basis of their nationality also uses race as a central organizing principle and, as she argues, “race is a primary consideration in the definition of ideas of citizenship” (23), not limited to the context of most scholarly studies in the US and UK. In both historical and geographical contexts, race has always been tied to a longer colonial legacy and ideas of modernity, which have operated, and continue to operate, transnationally through regimes of citizenship and migration. Thus, colonial legacies shape racism through continuities that are not limited to formal colonial occupation or imperialism. These genealogies are thus embedded in the making of contemporary geographies of the migration, and the forces of nationality embedded in regimes of citizenship that accompany and await them.

Several scholars have explored the ways in which race shifts its referent through time and context. Torres, Miron and Inda (1999), highlight the work of Stuart Hall on discourses justifying slavery in the US, highlighting the role of binary oppositions in which symbolic boundaries between ‘normal’ and ‘deviant’ were constructed, and linked to physical features that worked to create the difference between black and white (8). While Torres et al (1999) argue these crude biologisms still exists, they also highlight ‘cultural racism’ (Gilroy 1990, Giroux 1993) neo-racism (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991), and cultural fundamentalism (Stolcke 1995). In the case of ‘cultural difference’ (Stolcke, 1995) we can see how ideas of ‘insurmountability’ are used to justify racism in multicultural settings. Here cultural racism assumes a set of symmetrically opposed counter concepts, such as ‘national’ citizen versus the alien, the foreigner, the stranger or the immigrant. In the latter grouping, the ‘Other’ of the nation is most often construed as a political threat to national identity, which is linked to immigrants’ ‘cultural diversity’, which challenges the nation-state’s ‘bounded and distinct’ community, set on a shared
sense of belonging and loyalty often based on a common language, cultural traditions, and beliefs (Stolcke, 1995). Furthermore, “this ‘other’ then, since ‘it’ poses a threat to the nation, is relegated to the margins of society, often blamed for all the social and economic ills that befall the nation” (Torres et al., 1999, 9).

Building on the ideologies of the state, Goldberg’s (2002) discussion highlights not only how the state is implicated in reproducing the local conditions of racist exclusion but “how the modern state always conceived of itself as racially configured” (Goldberg, 2002, 2). Goldberg argues that the modern state is “nothing less than a racial state” (2), whereby race is integral to the emergence, development, ordering and transformation of the modern nation state. Tied to earlier projects of colonial ‘discovery’ and ‘voyages’, racial configurations are necessary to the discursive production and ideological rationalization of modern state power (4). Arguing that in a moment of unprecedented heterogeneity, the modern nation-state must promote racially conceived and configured homogeneity through sets of institutions and ideologies. Furthermore, if as Goldberg argues,

The modern state founds itself not just on exclusions, those absences that render invisible, but on the internalization of exclusions...[then] inclusions, those privileged by and in the modern state, assume their privileges in virtue of the exclusions the state at once renders possible conceptually and technologically. (Goldberg, 2002, 9)

From these insights we can see how the modern nation-state is conceived in relation to racialized, social (in)/exclusion in the form of formal regimes of citizenship, and informal social hierarchies. Further, in the contemporary period of neoliberal globalization, Goldberg (2002) argues that a central component is the growing idea of ‘racelessness’, which serves to “extend the routinization of racial states of being as a sort of civic religion behind the façade of privatized preferences” (12). This insight has implications for the ways in which the nation under globalization is conceptualized through (neo)liberal notions of capitalist accumulation, constructing it as allegedly devoid of any ideological tools or racial underpinnings. Focusing on the national scale lends itself to important questions about the role of the state and the construction of national identity under the unique conditions of the migrant majority population of the UAE. The national scale allows us to examine the hierarchies of entitlement that
accompanied the geographies of migration implicated in a colonial genealogy. These ideologies of ordering, tied but not limited to the colonial context, in turn shape the national identity of Emirati citizens in relation to ‘Others’ through the construction of ‘threats’ to the nation. Thus, how nationhood is constructed is also implicated in this genealogy, as well as in the constructions of global city status, and the positioning of Dubai between conceptualization of ‘first’ and ‘third’, ‘west’ and ‘east’.

In the case of Dubai, racialized conceptualizations of citizenship statuses create the hierarchies of entitlement that shape subjectivities and spatial relations in the city, and which are best understood through the lived realities of different groups at the everyday level, maintained and negotiated relationally. The exaltation of Emirati citizens, and the preference for Western (white) expat professionals and, to a lesser extent, Third world elites, are made in relation to low waged migrant workers from the ‘Third’ world and non-western context. Also, as the data highlights, important invisible, yet formal and historical, forces are at play in the making of these hierarchies, at the crux of which are racialized conceptualizations of citizenship as an ontological marker. The exclusionary practices and structures of social and political rights and entitlements cannot be understood without reference to these three broad categories, as well as to the historical legacies of colonial and imperial conquest that have shaped the development of modern Gulf states as we know them today. The recent developments in the UAE for example, are complicated, dynamic and diverse, and thus need to be understood within a larger discussion to bring to light the situation of foreign workers and expose the exclusionary histories on which they were based and currently operate through.

Here histories of citizenship in the region and in UAE history in particular, and a focus on the implications of such practices and discourses for the making of different subjectivities of migrants and national citizens, are all related to processes of racialization. Khodhker (2010), in his analysis of citizenship and state belonging, highlights how the discussion of citizenship, labour rights and democracy typically associated with talk of citizenship regimes takes on different meanings in the context of the Gulf with its highly exclusionary citizenship policies and residency requirements. At the same time, we can contextualize citizenship regimes globally, highlighting the ways in which different permanent residence programs are being remade and growing numbers
of states, from North America and Europe, to the UAE or Singapore, are funneling migrants through temporary guest worker programs.

The erosion and shifts in formal avenues for citizenship must be contextualized in relation to contemporary neoliberal regimes of labour migration operating under the current globalized world order. In the Gulf, citizenship is not an option for foreigners, while countries like Singapore have selective citizenship policies, where professionals are given PR status on a short-term basis, but foreign labourers are rarely granted citizenship. In addition, workers in lower income bracket are restricted from bringing their families. Khodhker gives an example of Singaporean policy in its highly racialized thinking, whereby “policy is based on implicitly meritocratic ideology, which welcomes ‘talent’ but believes that such talent is only concentrated among people in certain age groups and racial communities” (Khodhker, 2010, 224).

These explicitly racialized programs and policies of citizenship and migration around the world highlight the pressures and forces that poor low waged migrants must contend with in the contemporary period. Whereas citizenship has traditionally implied access to rights and entitlements vis-à-vis the state, we see how discourses around cosmopolitanism and forces of neoliberalism are reshaping notions of belonging and of ‘ideal’ subjects. Citizenship in this sense becomes a currency through which entrepreneurial subjects are made, and schemes of valuation are made through colonial continuities and contemporary regimes of empire building. What is unique in the case of Dubai is how difference and entitlements are shaped in a context with a majority population of temporary residents. Thus, the shared temporariness of Gulf migrants pushes us to consider more deeply how ‘temporary’ status is differently lived by examining how notions of ‘belonging’ and degrees of entitlement are generated. To understand these functions, it is necessary to explore, both in material and ideological terms, the relationships between the state and citizens, as well as how processes of racialization operate differently based on nationality to generate more complex, differential scales of belonging and subsequent ‘hierarchies of entitlement’, which work to create and justify difference through the dehumanizing processes of othering discussed here.
In particular, the implications of the UAE’s citizenship regimes and its relationship to broader historical genealogies of race, for example, help to examine the reasons why the experiences of expat professionals is so different from those of the low waged labouring class, although both face the reality of ‘temporality’. Additionally, we can see the ways in which most low waged workers may not be qualified to bring their families based on insufficient income, which is turn pushes, and is based on, the limiting of ties of this particular category of workers to the UAE. Overall, while all migrants face the idea of ‘temporariness’, it is this majority of low waged workers who face the most significant impacts as they are continually reminded of their non-belonging through formal and informal, material and ideological mechanisms of ‘distancing’ and ‘Othering’.

Realties of ‘temporariness’ are mitigated and shaped by one’s nationality and class such that privileged Western expats for example do not necessarily face or live the same pressures of non-belonging as Others. What we find on closer examination is that ‘where you are from’ continues to overwhelm ‘where you are at’ in many different ways. Through the interviews and review of scholarly research conducted here, it is found that one of the major forces in these differences is tied to how citizenship is constructed in a global hierarchy, and the subsequent interaction of these valuations in the local context. Many subjects who held citizenship from the Global South were more vocal at and frustrated by not being able to gain citizenship in the UAE, whereas others, primarily citizens of Canada, the US, or the UK, were less invested in gaining citizenship. Canadian expat Sara explains that “subconsciously, when you know you are a Canadian citizen, you feel more secure” (Sara, Canadian), and British expat Jo reflected on being ‘temporary’ by saying that, “It doesn’t really bother me. You have to accept it in some ways because it’s not your home” (Jo, British). Another Canadian, Mohamed, says that this temporary stint in Dubai is not something he would ever want to be permanent. “I view it as a good place to make money, not paying any sort of taxes or anything like that, and then hopefully just go home.” For American expat Carlos, originally Egyptian and has lived his entire life in the UAE, “I am here to make money and soon as that is accomplished, I am gone and I will probably never come back here again, ever”. In contrast, Peter, an Egyptian starting his career in the UAE explains, “I feel that I would like to live here as long as I can, but at the end… I am not an immigrant, I am a worker”
(Peter, Egyptian). Svetlana who recently acquired Canadian citizenship, but previously held Egyptian citizenship,

The problem is that you will be living here for 25 years, as in my dad’s case, and helping to build the country but when he retires, they are not going to renew his residency visa… he has to get out of the country. So basically, you work your butt off here for 20 years or 30 or 40 or 50 years but then when you retire… you are out of the country. So this is why, no matter what, you are living here but you still feel like this is not stable. You still feel like you need a plan B. My dad decided to get us Canadian citizenship because he had to have a back up plan because he doesn’t want to go back to Egypt and be treated like crap or be discriminated against. (Svetlana, Canadian)

Many holding citizenship from the Global South explained their hesitation, anxiety or need to have a back up plan. As Anna (Egyptian) explains,

I have been dreaming for a long time to get the citizenship here, but it is so hard. There is no reward when you work all your life here and you at any point you can be send back to your country…you just have to enjoy it right now and if you have to go back then you should have a Plan B. (Anna, Egyptian)

Furthermore, as Karen explains, where you are from definitely impacts how you understand your status in the UAE.

You find a lot of people who stay here a long time, mostly Arabs with unstable countries. You’ll find some Brits and Americans and things, but they come, they make money, and they leave…you get comfortable and you don’t want to leave but then you retire and it’s a big question mark? (Karen, Egyptian)

For Zain, another Egyptian expat, the lack of options motivated his desire to belong more securely in the UAE, “I have no where to go except here or Egypt…Egypt can not offer me anything right now. As an Egyptian in Egypt and as an engineer in Egypt, it is worthless” (Zain, Egyptian). Thus, much of this is based on where one is from, what citizenship is held and the prospects of home, and the privileges given and experienced in the UAE relative to each group. In addition, many rationales are given for why Western expats are treated differentially, such as situating the global political economy as part of the rationale for the lesser treatment of low waged workers in particular.
This often works through discourses that argue that highly skilled global professionals must be enticed with more than their ‘Third world’ counterparts. To begin, low waged workers are often thought to be making considerably more than ‘back home’. Karen thinks that many low waged workers are exploited and that they are not aware of the conditions before they come, “But why do they stay if they can leave? Because even though they are getting exploited, they are getting paid, and maybe to us it is nothing, but for them, it might be a fortune” (Karen, Egyptian). Reda explains that while everyone is being exploited here,

If you are blonde and blue eyed then things change, but if you are Arab then you do know that you are going to come here and you are not going to have the same rights and you still accept it because you know that if you go back to your country it is going to be ten times worse. (Reda, Emirati)

Egyptian expat Laura explains that “back home a good salary is like half of what they are paying. So they know they are giving you really bad compared to the rest… but the idea is that you have to be thankful because they offering you something you can’t get back home” (Laura, Egyptian). Karen further explains the mentality,

For an Indian to come you don’t have to convince them by much. But to bring someone from South Africa (White) with a better education, then you have to convince them to leave their homes and come and live in the UAE where they know no one, differences in culture…so you have to pay them more to convince them to come. They need more professionals, so to convince someone from England, they have to convince him to come here and live in the desert. Whereas someone from Indian who could barely feed their families, would rather come here and they would come and work for less. (Karen, Egyptian)

In Karen’s explanation, regardless of occupation or class, workers from the Global South are continually considered more desperate than their Western, or white counterparts. Furthermore, ‘professionals’ from the West are seen as more valuable regardless of experience or skill, as their education and passport are believed to represent their higher worth. This is arguably related to Brand Dubai as they attempt to sell their worth by showcasing whiteness as an entry into ‘modern’ and global living. Emirati Natasha explains the conditions as highly problematic, going so far as to say that conditions in labour camps represent a lifestyle that “might as well not be in Dubai” for its starkness to the rest of the city.
I see the conditions as problematic. I see the lack of minimum wage as problematic, and a lot of people argue that well they are coming here for the work and you know, it is their choice to come here, but I find that it is a very weak argument to say that, it’s kind of exploiting the desperate. So I find it very weak to say that well if you want the job, but the kind of environment, the work environment which is created by them is being done in the UAE, and whether they come from X country or Y country or not, is kind of irrelevant to me. I do find it problematic and yeah the conditions are really bad and worse than anything is that they don’t really have a voice. (Natasha, Emirati)

The idea of disposability also factors in highly, with expats from the Global South also feeling that they are highly replaceable, “There are a lot of us. So, if you don’t like it, we can find someone else…” (Zain, Egyptian). Building on this, Mohamed (Canadian) sees the reasons behind these distinctions being linked to needing ‘experts’.

When this place first kicked off, they had nothing. And they needed experts to get it going. And the reason that all this starts is basically that you have to bring in Americans, British, because they were at the forefront of every industry basically, and you know, that was seen as valuable talent that you were bringing in. Those biases seem to have stuck, even though in my opinion, the level of professionalism that expats from Europe and the States are bringing to the table has gone down big time. So it just seems that you know, just a little bit old fashioned at this point. (Mohamed, Canadian)

Laura explains that comparisons are made with where you are from, despite the fact that you live in Dubai. Through these logics, she contends that you are continually seen as privileged,

Indians or Filipinos would get paid less, because they know that they would be earning nothing back home, and they think of it as this salary will buy him a home in India, but what if he never wants to go back, it wont buy him a home here, but it will buy him one there. (Laura, Egyptian)

Overall, through the considerations of ‘where you are from’ we find in the making of the citizen-subject, ideal migrant ‘subject’, and the ‘Other’ of the city a highly racialized, relationally defined set of processes which are embedded in colonial histories, implicated in broader structures of inequalities through the new international division of labour, forces of neoliberal globalization and deeply intertwined in the developmental agenda of emerging global cities.
Insecure nationhood/ Nation under threat

In the Gulf, and the UAE more specifically, since formal citizenship applies to a small minority of the population, different labour sectors are endowed with ‘privatized’ notions of entitlement. Citizenship status thus represents intense benefits and legal status incomparable to those of foreigners, while the benefits and entitlements of non-citizens are based on their nationality, race, class and gender.

In considering the tremendously different context in which Gulf citizenship operates, we see that the GCC population was 37 million in 2006, about 12 percent of the total Arab population of the MENA region, but its economy accounted for more than 55 percent of the Arab world’s 1.25 trillion economy. In the case of per capita income, the averages for Qatar are $63,000, and the UAE $38,000, higher than many advanced industrialized nations. Much of this difference is tied to oil wealth and the ability of the state with its enormous levels of sovereign wealth to provide immense benefits to its relatively small population of citizens, which in turn furthers divides between non-citizens and citizens.

Paul Dresch (2005), discussing marriage and nationality in UAE, outlines the patrilineal relations of lineage and the ways in which all governments in the Gulf have some definition of kinship and its subsequent relationship to citizenship. Some Gulf states have strict bans on the marriage to foreigners including those from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman; while the UAE does not do so explicitly it has begun to undertake some drastic reconfigurations of ‘private’ life (Dresch & Piscatori, 2005, 136). Within mixed marriages there are obvious class based hierarchies. One of the major motivations for increased government control in marriage is based on the continued fears of minority status and the dependency on foreign labour. These problems have been represented as a historical feature of the smaller Gulf States, which are characterized as always struggling with intense pressures of self-identification (137). As a result, marriage does not only represent a personal and family symbol, it becomes a marker of the nation. According to Dresch, the UAE’s capital, Abu Dhabi, has undertaken, and other emirates have followed, many initiatives for its citizens, including material incentives such as residential land, commercial property, and grants at marriage of DH 900,000 towards a house. Dubai’s aid to citizens recently has been Dh500, 000 in
the form of a free loan, with Sharjah’s offering Dh 200,000 (139).

The major provisions for defining citizenship status are based on the ‘Nationality and Passports Law’ of 1972\textsuperscript{12} where nationality may be acknowledged by law, dependence, or be granted (Dresch & Piscatori, 2005, 139). Even without the official citizenship categories, there are great complexities in older tribal relations, mixed families and lineage on both sides, thus it is thought that in many ways there are also different strata of citizens within the UAE. Furthermore, nationality is almost always passed through males, and women nationals who marry foreigners cannot confer their nationality to their husbands or their children (143). The Federal Law of 1975 amended the provisions and entitled citizenship to those, who by law were defined as ‘Arabs’ or who were residents at the critical date. Another interesting point is the numbers of foreign, such as Indian or Egyptian, wives taken by Emirati men, who would need a sponsor if they were divorced or widowed (145). In 1986 the UAE began discussions around changing these laws and by 1992 there was a full state sponsored project entitled the “Marriage Fund”, which worked to encourage marriage amongst Emiratis, by providing financial help, curbing marriage by Emirati men to foreign women and promoting the alleged stability of family life (147). Throughout the project, the government consistently referred to the ideals of Emirati Society, such as campaigns targeting women not to become over reliant on foreign maids, and promoting the idea that men should not seek foreign women. This marked a massive attempt at social engineering that included mass weddings, were all undertaken under the general rhetoric of the stability and security of national families. In particular, as Dresch and Piscatori (2005) note, Emirati families were seen as being tainted by foreigners, Muslim or non-Muslim, and thus “the private concerns of family life were made the subject of appeals to generalized morality and public order” (154). The discourse used in 1999 to discuss the issues faced by Emiratis was rooted in a language of those who needed to ‘protect’ their society through demographic control, and was furthered through the ideologies of Emirati

\textsuperscript{12} This law is based on the Kuwaiti model of patriarchal lineage, which ensures that anyone resident in the country before 1925 can be named an Emirati citizen, as well as anyone born to an Emirati father. Another process of naturalization is that Qataris, Bahrainis and Omanis who have been a resident for three years can have nationality, other Arabs must show ten years residence, at least five of which must fall after the date when the law was issued. Others may be eligible if they have been a continuous resident in one of the emirates since 1940, with a proper means of livelihood and good Arabic, or for 30 years, of which 20 years must fall after the law came into force. Lastly, nationality may be granted to persons giving noteworthy service to the state at their discretion (Dresch & Piscatori 2005, 140).
culture in its Arab-Islamic roots.

Suad Joseph (1996) introduces a gendered reading of these policies and the larger role of the state in Middle Eastern familial and political identity. She argues that marriage regulations are used as boundaries of the nation state. Joseph’s discussion relates to earlier insights into the ways in which women are tied to ideologies of the state, and how “at time, preservation of the nation results in moves to assume greater control over women than had existed in some imagined past” (Joseph 1993, 6). Furthermore, this analysis can be tied to the fear of overpopulation and the subsequent xenophobia that has become a dominant concern in Emirati social life.

Joseph (1996) argues that as scholars that we need to continue to locate the continuities and discontinuities through a framework that is based on de-essentializing stereotypes of the Middle East. In popular feminist discourse, gender is seen as the sole source of identity through which oppression functions. In contrast, Joseph’s discussion promotes recognition of a multiplicity in forms of social identification, which intersect in women’s lives. She highlights issues of class, race, ethnicity, religion, kin or other issues like age or marriage that influence women’s political status. In addition, we can consider how levels of citizenship in turn impact the gendered nature of women’s oppression. Her discussion is based on the experiences of ‘citizen’ women but is additionally useful when contrasted with the experiences of migrant women, and specifically domestic workers, who are located at the bottom of social and political hierarchies.

Overall, citizenship policies and the ideologies that foreground their appeal are largely constructed through the idea of the citizen population as a family, with the ruler retaining the responsibility of governing their functioning. Thus women become important sources of experience and knowledge, both as nationals and non-nationals, and as tools for understanding the boundaries of the state. These ideologies, however, have serious implications for the majority-migrant work force, and have led to the creation and perpetuation of ideas of migrants as a threat to national security, stability and the national ‘family’. Rachel Silvey, a feminist scholar on Indonesian migrant workers to Saudi Arabia, suggests, “The lack of state capacity to protect these women is not a coincidence. Rather it is reflective of class-, nationalist-, and gender-specific norms about tolerable crimes and acceptable victims” (Silvey, 2004, 249). Thus the major question to consider
here is how particular migrants are regulated to create distance and to limit social, cultural, and political impacts while maximizing their economic contributions.

The influx of foreigners, including exorbitant numbers of Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi labourers brought in to build this city, has marginalized Emirati’s and their way of life. (Time Out, 35)

…now that Emirati people are much wealthier than the more numerous migrant workers in their country, they have become accustomed to consider foreigners to be, at least to some extent, employees who might represent a threat of some sort. (Walsh, 45)

These statements reflect popular ideas of how migrant workers are seen to be impacting Emirati culture and the nation more generally. The idea of ‘insecure’ nationhood is tied to the construction of a threat posed by migrant-Others and is targeted through policy and everyday practices, including both formal and informal mechanisms. To begin, it is important to highlight the process through which the national-citizen subject is constituted. This relational and dialectic process is such that the identity of ‘Emirati’ citizens can only be understood in so far as it is explored in relation to the status and positioning of various ‘migrant’ categories within the social stratification of hierarchical entitlements. In addition, the colonial legacies of this system of valuation are based on racist ideologies that tie particular bodies to the global economic order embedded within the international division of labour. These institutionalized preferences and privileges for citizens through their differentiation from other groups, organized on the basis of racialized understandings of citizenship and nationality, work to spatially segregate and socially distance ‘Others’ from citizens.

In part much of the rationale for restrictive citizenship rights is linked to xenophobia, which is linked to national insecurities. Thus, as scholars highlight, “Behind the huge stress on citizens’ rights and identity in the Gulf case, lie specific conceptions of society encouraged by current circumstances” (Dresch and Piscatori 2005, 24). Much of the basis for these policies on marriage, as well as the highly restrictive citizenship regime, is rationalized through ‘fear’ related to the idea that culture and the nation are under threat from a migrant majority population, and insecurity tied to the dependency on foreign labour for all levels of development. A key site on which these fears and
insecurity are enacted is control and regulation between sexes, and in particular, on women who are seen as ‘mothers of the nation’. Furthermore, growing fears are attributed to local concern about the effects of materialism and consumerism on their culture though, as Dresch highlights, the idea that these changes reflect Western and not Gulf culture is often a myth. He further states, “consumption and commoditization govern young people’s lives in Saudi shopping malls just as in Californian malls” (Dresch & Piscatori, 2005, 27). The major question left to discern is through what processes, and from where, do these fears of the ‘Other’ originate? How do xenophobia and racialization work to construct the figure of the ‘Other’? And furthermore, how are these ‘issues’ constructed through discourses that are maintained through a hierarchical structure and filtered through a top-down approach to governance?

In considering Thobani’s (2007) insights on processes of exaltation, we see the ways in which mechanisms of differentiation are inscribed into state practices that institutionalize the differential rights of nationals in relation to their Others, thereby realizing very tangible and material consequences in the social order (10). The category of the Other, or migrant, is thus differentiated from citizen-subjects by markers such as gender or class, but operates through structures carrying within them colonial genealogies and imperialistic violence(s) that mark particular bodies as ‘outside’ the realm of citizenry, and therefore not needing or deserving protection from the state. This generates populations of ‘Others’ who are seen as inherently exploitable and disposable. As Thobani highlights,

Relations between citizens and their Others – which were forged in the labyrinth of the global market economy, binding slave and master, colonizer and colonized, developed and underdeveloped, North and South together in a vice that has not loosened much in the current phases of globalization. (Thobani, 71)

Thus, from Thobani’s insights we see: first the ways in which the national identity of citizens is relationally constituted; second, how racialization is implicated through ontological considerations related to the making of migrant subjectivity; and third, the historical genealogies of colonialism, and their manifestations in the contemporary period of neoliberal globalization.

In specific reference to the Gulf region, Ang Nga Longva (1997), who has written extensively on migration and Kuwaiti society, reaffirms that the status of Kuwaiti women
is understood within the ‘ethnic composition’ of the population as well as through the relationships between nationals and expats. Though Longva does not articulate their socio-economic position in particular, but she seems to be assuming that the majority of these migrants are those who form the basis of lower economic and class positions that are racialized in relation to the privileged ethnic minority of Kuwaiti citizens. Feelings of superiority and the inequalities in status and treatment between nationals and expats extend into almost all realms of social life, where, for example, citizens will seldom be expected to stand in line behind an expat. These ideas are further reinforced by the dress code of ‘dishdasha’ for men and ‘abaya’ for women, national costumes that are an immediate “symbol of social power and privilege” (Longva, 1997, 448). While there are differences in the ideas attached to men and women’s clothing, Longva confirms that the general understanding is rooted in the ‘politics of ethnic stratification’ (Longva, 1997, 448). Connecting to Thobani’s discussion, she states, “…exaltation has been key to the constitution of the national subject as a particular kind of human being, a member of a particular kind of community, and hence, ontologically and existentially distinct from the strangers to this community” (Thobani, 2007, 5).

These ideas of relational identity formation are supported by the fact that the Gulf represents one of the largest recipients of migrant labour. Emirati identity therefore is inextricably linked to the relationships between nationals and various categories of ‘migrant workers’ including privileged ‘expats/tourists’ and ‘migrant-Others’. In addition, shifting lifestyles play a role in the ways that citizen identities are constructed, with ‘culture’ considered a huge issue that is undergoing change. As explained by interviewees, these ‘cultural’ changes can be largely attributed to two major forces: the influx of and dependency on migrant workers who are not believed to share the same moral and cultural values that citizens embody, and the constant mention and negotiation between ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ as a feature of daily life. As a result of these insecurities, huge development projects are implemented to protect indigenous heritage, culture, sense of national identity, language, national dress, integrity of family life, the orientation of youth, and the education system. However, we can see that many of these ‘static’ conceptions of culture and identity have been actively invented and promoted as
Emirati ‘tradition’, seen as part of a past that exists outside of the contemporary, modern developmental trajectory of Dubai.

Dresch and Picatori (2005) highlight what they call a “Globalising monarchy” in which economic and political insecurity is linked to the perceived “assault on culture” (27). The major threats are conceptualized not only around the influence of globalization on goods and images but also in the numbers of foreigners who inhabit the region. The outcomes are growing social isolation and division, in which “The rich and the poor have everywhere in the Gulf become more widely separated; distinctions among families have become more pronounced; and within broader family groupings age makes a great difference” (16).

Generally, the ‘threat’ of the overpopulation by foreigners is largely brought about through the 1971 official independence, and subsequent oil boom. It is in that moment that large numbers of workers at all skill levels came into high demand and, as the economy began to develop, the smaller Gulf States, such as the UAE, became increasingly dependent on foreign workers. As Khodhker (2010) discusses in his work on migration, the nation and morality, popular discourse in the UAE and amongst policy makers works to ensure that the national identity of Emiratis is not threatened by the influx of migrant workers, “who outnumber them four to one and in Dubai, for example, 9 to 1” (227). The idea is that foreigners bring their own culture and tradition, which, because of the sizeable majority they form, threaten to undermine UAE culture. However, as he argues, “migrant workers actually pose little threat to nation building in the UAE, as they remain socially and even physically excluded” (Khodhker, 2010, 228). The life of a low waged migrant worker is shaped by the global economy, national politics, and their social networks and connections play a prominent role in their lives (Khodhker, 2010, 228). Thus, the ‘threat’ to the nation is socially constructed to ensure political and economic dominance of preferred subjects, through the exclusionary practices of differentiation and distancing.

In exploring how the nation is conceptualized as particularly vulnerable it is necessary to explore how it is considered under ‘threat’. The examples above based on population constitute one of the major ways that national identity is constructed, through the threat posed by migrants because of the minority position of nationals. This fear of
being outnumbered is regulated by increased restrictions on the social and economic impact that migrants might have on the culture of Emirati nationals. In addition, the exclusivity of formal citizenship, which applies to the minority of national citizens, means that different sectors of the economy are entitled to ‘privatized’ notions of entitlement. These entitlements are of course based on the genealogies of migration, which impact the valuations of different citizenship statuses. It is important to note that this xenophobic threat is not only related to the culture of hyper-capitalist consumerism that controls many aspects of social life, but rather is fixated on the impact of ‘lower’ class, largely South Asian migrants who are seen as the largest numerical force in the region. These insecurities are then embodied in the category of ‘migrant-Other’ and filtered through various forms of structural racial, class, and gender based violence. Following this, the influx of professional migrants from more developed nations or the elites from Third world nations are not considered threatening in the same regard. There is no question that this differentiation is based on racist, colonial legacies that have affected the class position of these various groups, and have been institutionalized through formal policies that give preferences and privileges to citizens and, to a lesser extent, to elite migrant groups.

Various scholars (Silvey 2004, McMurray 1999) have highlighted the ways in which the ideas of ‘society’ have changed over time, and some even compare the ways in which kinship is comparable to Western histories and associations of race, which are now expressed in terms of ‘culture’. In furthering these ideas, Kuwaiti sociologist Muhammad Rumaihi discusses the ways in which the modern systems of government are imbedded with socio-political contradictions. He points out that the modern infrastructure of the state has dramatically expanded and changed since the advent of oil revenues, while the power of the ruling families remains largely intact. “… the motive force of the society is not production but the distribution of revenue by the state; actual production of oil is carried out entirely by foreigners, the local populations playing a virtually insignificant role in the productive process” (Dresch 2005, 86). Ramaihi analyzes these trends by concluding that the oil industry has not been integrated into the political fabric of the Gulf, which means that there is no middle class of nationals who work in the production of oil. Thus the role of the state is the allocation of funds, rather than the generation of
Alan Richards and Philip L. Martin (1983) point to an interesting difference between the Gulf states and Western nations, highlighting the ways in which the West has moved into a highly complex hierarchy of desire among workers for upward mobility, while disdain for manual labour derives from, “pre-industrial social norms and from the role of a paternalistic state” (463). They continue:

The age-old symbolic tension between agriculturalists and pastoralists in the region underlies the latter’s rejection of manual labour. Former Bedouins typically became soldiers or drivers, shunning manual labour as a task for fellahin (peasants) and thus beneath their dignity. Consequently, a principal potential source of manual labour has bypassed any industrial work rather than having ‘moved through’ it. Direct government payments and subsidies for housing, medical care, education, and other services further reduce the incentives for the local population to assume jobs in the construction or service sectors. (Richards & Philips, 1983, 463)

The authors summarize their discussion by highlighting some major characteristics of migration to the Gulf: occurs in basically laissez faire environments; comprised of highly skilled and unskilled labour; contains relatively high proportion of workers producing investment goods (like construction); fill jobs which locals are either untrained for or have a disdain for, based on pre-industrial tradition and state policy; and, most importantly, and unique to this region, “move from poor to rich countries but not structurally less developed to more industrialized nations” (Richards & Philips 1983, 463). They also highlight the ways in which the state’s welfare policies, and material benefits to citizens helped to shape the disdain towards foreign-born workers by further socially distancing them. Dresch (2005) furthers these ideas by highlighting how citizens are given direct material benefits in the forms of state sponsored education, medical treatment, home ownership and utilities at a fraction of the cost. In addition, Fred Halliday (1984) introduces the ways in which the indigenous population’s outlook on migrants is extremely hostile, and the ways in which the government works to restrict the employment of migrants in certain sectors, as well as working to protect their industries, their political voices and, most importantly, to ensure their compliance with the status quo.

Through these politics, Gulf governments maintain strict controls on industries,
and “foreigners can only do business by having a partner who is a national; and no foreigner can own more than 49 percent of any company” (Dresch and Piscatori 2005, 87). Arguably the outcome is that all nationals are given the priority over private ownership in industry; and, in contrast to the supposed neo-liberal globalization advocated by the West, the government in effect controls and regulates business. Citizens constitute a majority in public sector jobs and government administration, both of which are largely reserved for citizens, and particularly, in the case of the latter, members of the royal family. However, in contrast, access to land is undergoing serious transformations in the Gulf, with Dubai giving leaseholds, even freeholds, to foreigners, who can now sponsor their own employees, though foreign investment remains prohibited in key areas. Dubai also now allows foreign ownership of property, and Abu Dhabi grants 99-year leases. These regulations though are often arbitrarily drawn up as some scholars highlight, so that “In one sense these countries are extremely open. In another they are among the least open societies on earth” (Dresch & Piscatori 2005, 27). Overall, the shifting policies towards foreign ownership highlight dramatic shifts in the privatization of industry and increasingly global networks.

Hanieh (2011) argues that the significance of understanding class formation in the region is related not just to the accumulation process by owners of capital, but rather to the formation of the labouring class that produces (and reproduces) capital itself. Thus, Hanieh highlights the unique formation of the working class in the GCC by temporary migrant workers with no citizenship rights. He argues that “class formation in the Gulf has occurred through its spatial restructuring, and this feature is linked to the role the region plays in the global economy” (Hanieh, 2011, 54). Since citizenship is restricted to a small minority who benefit from cheap housing, education, economic grants, contracts, and a range of other state sponsored material benefits (Hanieh, 2011), Hanieh argues that the working class was transformed through its spatialization, which means that workers brought from outside who lacked all citizenship rights existed alongside citizens who moved up the ladder, in terms of positions, and wealth. For Hanieh, it is these two features of class formation; the spatial fix of systemic reliance of migrant workers, and the development of a capitalist class through redirection of oil revenues to merchant families and elites that led to a powerful system of control over the resident population.
and the allegiance of the citizenry (Hanieh, 2011). Additionally, Hanieh challenges the popular arguments related to population pressures or the lack of adequate workforce in the explanation of migrant labour dependency. He discusses the spatial structuring of class that links the dependency on migrant labour to the highly exclusionary citizenship rights, and repressive policies, that control and curtail the rights of migrants. The situation is such that “class is congealed spatially around temporary migrant labour flows and was demarcated through the institution of citizenship” (Hanieh, 2011, 63). Highly restrictive citizenship policies were in fact embedded in processes of state formation itself, which was deliberate, with the spatial configuration of space having two major outcomes. First, the structural reliance on temporary migrant labour worked to increase the amount of surplus value extracted, based on the value of migrant labour as commodity being measured relative to social conditions ‘back home’ rather than in the country in which they perform their labour. Second, the spatialization of class acts as a powerful mechanism of social control in which social relations are constituted through the reproduction of capital and not through birth or citizenship rights, with workers becoming illegals when employment contracts are severed and forced to return home.

Building on this, we can consider in more detail the ideological apparatus of the nation. Sara Ahmed (2000) explores the idea of ‘strange encounters’ beginning with the idea of aliens and humans and arguing that aliens are not those who we fail to identify, but the ones we already know as alien. “The alien is hence only a category within a given community of citizens or subjects: as the outsider inside, the alien takes on a spatial function, establishing relations of proximity and distance within the home(land)” (3). Ahmed argues for an analytic intervention where through these encounters we understand how the stranger and the self are produced relationally. Using postcolonial theory, she pushes us to rethink how,

… colonialism operated in different times in ways that permeate all aspects of social life, in the colonized and colonizing nations. It is hence about the complexity of relationships between past and present, between histories of European colonization and contemporary forms of globalization. (Ahmed, 2000, 11)
Thus, we can see how colonialism as an encounter involves territorial domination in shaping contemporary manifestations of ‘first’ and ‘third’ worlds, or Global North and South, but can also be found in discourses and the subsequent ontologies related to its populations. Thus, the histories which affect the ways in which various groups of bodies enter the space are important in understanding how these hierarchies are maintained by all levels of participants. “The production of people in the international division of labour also involves the production of spaces: spaces, as well as people, are utilized for differential production and capital accumulation” (Ahmed, 2000, 168). These insights lend themselves to thinking about how diverse nationalities are imbued with particular notions of work, entitlements and protection. However, the formation of these ideas is informed heavily through processes of racialization, which attach particular bodies with sets of ideas of their humanity, and set standards for acceptable ‘treatment’ and living conditions. What is interesting in this case study is the ways both in which individual bodies are coded through these racial logics, and spaces, such as entire communities, nations and regions of the world are racialized to create knowledges that seem to justify and legitimate the exploitation and disposability of workers in a global landscape. Thus, one may often hear the remarks, “At least they have jobs here”, “They get paid more than they would at home”, or “They don’t know any better, so they don’t mind”. The interesting point here is that these everyday normalizations and knowledge about Others allow distance to be constructed between ‘us’ and ‘them’, which in turn works to rationalize the plight of low waged migrants based on certain racialized knowledges that construct Others as less capable, less knowledgeable and, ultimately, less human.

The racialized ontologies of persons and places also lend themselves to another unique manifestation of Dubai’s identity: its unstable and precarious status in ‘modernity’. The processes of racialization which distance Emirati citizens from low waged migrant Others do not fully erase its non-white, non-western character. Thus we find that if the nation is considered under threat by overpopulation of non-nationals, specifically Third World labourers, then the global city status of Dubai between ‘East’ and ‘West’ is also threatened. As I have highlighted earlier, Dubai is often positioned between worlds, ‘first’ and ‘third’, ‘east’ and ‘west’, tied to orientalized notions of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, in which Dubai’s status as a global city is contingent on its
ability to cater to Western capitalist values and lifestyles. Additionally, as scholars have noted, under globalization the growing interconnectedness of processes of economic, political, social, cultural, and environmental forces, both from above and below, has been tied to growing national insecurities related to sovereignty, which increasingly views (im)migrants as threats to national security. This often operates in seemingly ‘multicultural’ spaces to justify the intensified regulation of borders and the public order. In the case of Dubai’s global city status, we can argue that the unique space between ‘east’ and ‘west’ creates anxieties based on its contingent status. This is often discussed following logic whereby “people hate Dubai because it brings the third world into view of the first world” (Bennett, 2010, 256). Bennett continues that it is easier to ignore poverty when it stays over there, “than if it comes to live in an ostensibly first-world city alongside western businesses and western tourists” (Bennett, 2010, 256).

Interestingly, in these representations, all aspects of labour exploitation or human rights violations are tied to the ‘third world’ character of Dubai’s in-between status. Thus, one often hears arguments related to the juvenile, inexperienced or growing character of Dubai, which excuses its shortcomings, and also simultaneously infantilizes the city through an orientalist reading of the ‘native’ as not quite ‘caught up’ or capable of reaching Western standards of modernity. As commonly portrayed in tourist materials we find the following, “with its gleaming skyscrapers, love of modernity and apparent lack of anything over ten years old, you’d be forgiven for thinking that Dubai is a mere child of a city, albeit one undergoing an incredible growth spurt” (Time Out, 2007, 12). What we see here is Dubai as conceptualized from a Western epistemology that imagines Dubai as a growing child, experiencing an intense growth spurt but only beginning to learn the ropes of Western capitalism, and must be excused for inadvertent mistakes like the exploitation of labour under what have been referred to as “slave-like” conditions. Various interviewed expats likened the situation of low waged workers to slavery. American teacher Katie recalled being warned that there are both amazing things in Dubai as well as the “awful things [they do] to slaves…” Anna compares nannies to back home (Egypt), “I think here it is more of a slavery thing. They see these people as slaves and they (Emiratis) think they are very superior to them” (Anna, Egyptian). Similarly, Reda, “I have only seen Emirati’s and gulf nationalities who have nannies and drivers
and all that stuff. And when you see them treating them, it is like, “He is not a slave”. I have seen the way they treat the office boy… he is treating him more like a slave and not a human being” (Reda, Emirati). Overall, in many ways these conditions are linked to a logic that tends to relegate ‘backward’ practices such as ‘slavery-like’ conditions of workers, a lack of democratic political systems, or universal citizenship rights to its ‘third-worldliness’, thus reducing exploitation to inherent deficiencies in Emiratis (Muslim, Arab, Other).

In this sense, as Goldberg explains, the idea of degeneration must be avoided and thus the impetus to segregate and limit the impact which ‘Others’ have on the body politic is increased and “the paranoia about losing power assumes the image of becoming ‘Other’ to be avoided like the plague” (Goldberg, 1993, 200). This is a very important point, as much of the intensified regulation of these ‘Othered’ subjects is tied to the contingent status that Dubai holds in relation to modernity. This contingency is tied to the ability of citizens and the nation to suppress the Other within since the modernity of Dubai is constituted by those citizens and expat subjects who can attain subjectivity, whereas, migrant workers remain outside and connote difference, strangeness, and otherness. In the case of conceptualizing Dubai as inside and outside simultaneously, these relations become intertwined through the racist legacy of orientalist fantasies propagated by Western tourists and entrepreneurs and those utilized by citizen subjects to exalt their statuses. Citizens, Western expats and tourists all see themselves then in relation to the Migrant-Other. But the Western subject also views him/herself in relation to ‘the orient’ where their whiteness is a marker of civility, able to assist the ‘East’ into modernity through a contingent belonging conditioned upon the production of a capitalist structure and exploitation of the ‘Other’ within.

In considering in more detail how Western expats or elites from the Global South view themselves in relation to both the oriental space of Dubai as located in the ‘Middle East’, and as privileged and innocent, we can consider the insightful work of Katie Walsh (2010) on British expat subjects in Dubai. She highlights many of the important ways that privilege is enacted in unconscious ways, and explores how racialized encounters are negotiated and made sense of by British expats. An analysis of the interviews conducted here more generally shows that while individuals may have been able to locate their
relative privilege in social hierarchies in terms of their lifestyles, they rarely were able to implicate themselves as complicit in upholding these inequalities. In many ways, this was informed by their ‘shared’ sense of ‘temporariness’ in a place where they did not belong, and in which they felt they had no power, responsibility or right to voice their criticism of the politics of the city. They have been disciplined by state surveillance and the constant looming threat of deportation. In addition to their own inability to ‘change’ the system, many expats, as highlighted by Walsh, actually justify their status and role in Dubai through popular narratives regarding ‘desperate workers’ who can be paid low wages because of where they are from and, in many instances, expats come to believe in their benevolence towards these ‘poor’ workers by providing them jobs, allowing them in effect to help with their children’s education back home (Walsh, 2010, 245).

Furthermore, as Walsh highlights, many expats also negate their responsibility in upholding or making possible these global hierarchies by pointing to local hierarchies, which means that although some recognize practices as negatively contributing to inequality, they are justified through claims that they are spatially specific and therefore temporary (Walsh, 2010). Thus, since Brits do not constitute the highest tier, which is reserved for Emirati nationals, in the social hierarchy they then work to distance themselves as merely workers in a larger national and global economy. Following this logic, Walsh highlights that Brits claim that “everyday life in Dubai itself generates racism with no consideration of the wider patterns of the negotiation of race in postcolonial spaces” (Walsh, 2010, 246). In considering whiteness, and race in more detail, Walsh argues that we need to consider the instability of whiteness where there are multiplicities of white identities that need to be understood. For example, British subjects are often seen as more foreign than other groups because of their whiteness, as they are viewed as not sharing the culture, religion or language of Arabs, but at the same time, they are also privileged in most urban encounters in Dubai as they hold a higher status than other migrant groups. For much of these privileged groups, whiteness appears as neutral and invisible, where white Britons feel unmarked by race in their everyday encounters. Furthermore, as Walsh highlights, gendered, sexualized, classed and racialized bodies are perceived differently, and thus British status is a particularly privileged category, compared for example to the whiteness of Eastern European sex
workers. Overall what we find for privileged expats in general is that the globality of the city of Dubai emerges, not in isolation, but through lived and negotiated relations of postcoloniality in which race, class, and gender create different experiences of belonging, identity and status. British expat identities then, as Walsh argues, are produced, in part, through their everyday interactions with other categories of migrants, and are tied to cultures of imperialism elsewhere.

Among Emirati nationals, we find, of course, gendered differences between citizen subjects and strategies through which, as Razack highlights through the work of Foucault, the early bourgeois citizen of the state knew himself through his “distance between lower orders and aristocracy” (Razack, 2002, 10). The tourist, expat or elite subject must self-regulate himself from those degenerates, who threaten his status. Thus the Emirati citizen is at once inside and out, through logics of contingent belonging predicated upon his ability to expunge the ‘Other’ from within his socio-cultural worldview and his body. In the colonial project, the bodies of racialized Others need to be “killed or colonized, slaughtered or saved, expunged or exploited” in order to protect the body politic (Goldberg, 1993, 187). “Threatening to transgress or pollute established social orders necessitates their reinvention, first by conceptualizing order anew and then by reproducing spatial confinement and separation in the renewed terms” (Goldberg, 1993, 187). Thus, modes of social exclusion and segregation are tied to maturing capitalism and modernity in general and have been effected in terms of “racialized discourse, with its classificatory systems, its orders and values, and its ways of seeing particular bodies in their natural and social relations” (Goldberg, 1993 187).

The discussion comes full circle in exploring how genealogies of migration tied to colonial relations structure and constitute spaces embedded with racialized-hierarchical social relations, which in turn produce various subject positions and the subsequent hierarchies of entitlement, and uneven urban geography within the city. In the case of Dubai many of the major examples, which explicitly highlight these processes, are based on the segregation of spaces and the social hierarchies that are constituted both formally and informally, and are rationalized and justified to legitimize the structural and everyday forms of violence and exclusion towards Others that create privileged statuses.
To enact and support many of these processes, the state develops projects to reaffirm the privileged status of Emirati citizens, Western and elite expat professionals and tourists through the creation of spaces that are organized to sustain unequal relations, through, as Razack (2002) highlights, racial hierarchies. As she argues, we must examine the spatial and legal practices that maintain, in her example, a white-settler society, and in our case, a globalized, neoliberal city. Razack highlights the need to challenge the idea that spaces exist prior to or separate from the subjects who image and use them (Razack, 2002) and introduces the work of Henri Lefebvre to discuss the dialectic relationship between spaces and bodies, and the material and symbolic processes of spatial relations. Lefebvre’s concept of ‘social space’ highlights: perceived social space; conceived space; and, lived space (Razack, 2002, 9). In all of these aspects, space is a social product by which both respectable and abject bodies are produced. From Razack’s work we see that to interrogate bodies traveling in spaces is to engage in complex histories of (un)mapping spaces and bodies in relation to multiple systems of domination. Here we can highlight two important aspects of an interlocking analytic approach: first, how the systems are mutually constitutive of each other; and, second, how all the systems of domination operate at the local level, a task facilitated by attending to material and symbolic constitution of specific spaces. Significantly here we can consider the making of spaces through the ways that different bodies engage, thus, the inclusion of some, exclusion of Others are all part of the processes of making subjects who are constructed differentially through hierarchies of race, class, gender and nationality. A clear theme found throughout the interviews is the extreme differences in experience and diverse notions of Dubai dreams, all based on where one stands in the nation, and a reflection of one’s place in the broader global, capitalist landscape. The range in background, motivations and experiences can include Dubai as “all inclusive vacation” or as a survival strategy. Dubai is,

A great place to live in terms of safety, comfortable lifestyles and the people are generally happy here and live life very comfortably, and I think the vast majority of people come here for money because it is a tax free society. So financial is the main thing, and plus there is a high standard of living. (Natasha, Emriati)

Fresh graduates such as Canadian expat Mohamed and American expat Katie both came to Dubai for better job opportunities. For Karen, Dubai meant that she could
exchange unpaid teaching placements backhome that forced her to ‘nanny’ on weekends for the possibilities of Dubai and living what she describes as an “all inclusive vacation”. Expats from the Global South, Jo and Peter both described limited opportunities in Egypt, which pushed them to look abroad. “In Egypt we work a lot but we cannot get what we deserve”, (Peter, Egyptian) and thus, Dubai became a place of possibility to move away from their “stagnant” careers. Other expats from the Global South highlight that the luxuries and benefits of living in Dubai make going ‘home’ difficult, and thus while they do not have permanent residence in Dubai, “they go back home for summer and think ‘I just wanna go back to the UAE’. They get comfortable and never want to go back there, but when they retire it’s a big question mark” (Karen, Canadian/Egyptian).

For many of the female migrant workers I spoke to from the Global South, the themes of gendered migration, patriarchy, religious sanctions, economic necessity, addiction and alcohol linked their stories together and Dubai was directly linked to their survival strategies. For Louisa, Dubai opened up opportunities and experiences that she may never have had back home, such as increased access to food, and ‘luxury’. Louisa also describes how Dubai induces dreams, representing a place of possibility. For Bangladeshi Shahina escaping an abusive husband and providing money to support her children’s education back home motivated her but as she cried, “I will never be happy”. For Mohamed, a Pakistani taxi driver, Dubai’s dreams were broken promises that never lived up to the expectation. “They promise you green fields, but when you come here all you get is desert” (Mohamed, Pakistan). The range and diversity in experiences is vast and as Bannerji (2000) states, “If one stands on the dark side of the nation…everything looks different” (104). Thus, the idea that where one stands can shape one’s entire experience is significant in the case of Dubai, as the claims of a neutral, open, welcoming, multicultural global city become questionable when considering the majority of its temporary, foreigner workers/residents who live in extremely unequal conditions that are used to sustain the privileges of the few.

As a result of these struggles to claim its location as a nodal point in the network of global cities in a global landscape, intense social regulation serves to also reclaim footing through processes and policies of localization and nationalization in various aspects of social and cultural life. While much of the dialogue surrounding the loss of
Emirati culture is discussed in relation to the need to preserve ‘tradition’, tied to religious and cultural practices, what we find is that the practices which ensue to protect ‘indigenous’ culture target low waged migrant workers instead of shifting patterns of consumption and consumerism linked to a growing capitalist culture.

Aihwa Ong (2009) shows how ‘moral economies’ affect the treatment and experiences of migrant workers, and more specifically female migrant workers, beginning with the “underpaid, starved, and battered foreign maid, which has become the image of the new inhumanity in the Asian metropolis” (157). “Low-skilled foreign women circulate in zones of exception that support the citadels of Asia’s new rich” (158). She argues that the ‘neoslavery’ of migrant women emerges out of a “postcolonial intersection of racialized nationalities, neoliberal strategies, and disjunctive moral economies based on kinship and ethnicity” (160), with postcolonial nations built on questions of who is considered human or subhuman.

Ong (2009) discusses the idea of ‘transient aliens’ or foreign domestic workers who are subjected to “household-based disciplinary regimes and to techniques of securitization at the national level” (161). Because of their mobility, they are not considered attachable to moral economies despite their reproductive labour and as a result are considered both undesirable aliens and threats to the security of the nation’s society. Moral economies are understood as a “web of unequal relationships of exchange based on morality of reciprocity, mutual obligation and protection” (161). The moral obligations of the family and kin have created opportunities for the state agencies and labour syndicates who seek to channel migrant women to overseas markets, as in the neoliberal strategy of the Philippines of employing programs that create contractual agreements with foreign countries to hire Filipino workers (162). The government works to promote the image of the docile and flexible Filipino female worker, while at the same time creating the patriotic duty of modern day heroes to earn needed money overseas, which Ong describes as the feminization of migrant labour and the masculinzation of their national roles (162). Here she highlights how NGOs play an important role in reinforcing the moral economic justifications of overseas employment as well as sustaining the moral economy of the family, through the moral connection between free-choice in seeking employment overseas as well as the moral indebtedness to their
families. Ong contrasts this strategy to the case of the Indonesian government, which does not play a direct role in organizing the trade, but instead relies on moral economy systems to mobilize young women who are then trained by NGOs (163). Overall, Ong is interested in the interplay between moral economies, state policy and NGOs, which she argues, creates conditions under which many women sent across these boundaries experience two major technologies of control: the housebound form of labour incarceration, and a technology of securitization that treats them as potential political threats (164). Interestingly, she notes that in both Singapore and Hong Kong, these workers are seen as remainders of a not too recent past from which they emerged, and thus represent threats to the ethnoracial distinctions that characterize postcolonial Asia (165-166).

Overall, Ong highlights the ways in which neoliberal restructuring, combined in the Third world with a dependency on women’s paid and unpaid labour to absorb losses in government administered social services and supports, are linked to the hierarchies of citizenship amongst women in the home/workplace, as well as in an international system of hierarchically organized nation-states. She also highlights the non-economic factors that motivate migration; the ‘emotional’ or ‘affective’ aspects of gendered labour; the importance of sending states in constructing nationalist identities through remittances, as well as through transnational linkages amongst workers around the globe which allow them to situate their belonging within a global economy; and, the role of colonialism, racialization and dehumanization in the construction of migrants as a threat to the nation thereby justifying the need for subsequent moral regulation.

In considering how processes of racialization operate, we can turn to the everyday negotiations, which are often more difficult to break apart as they become hegemonic and seemingly natural in order to legitimize the story or myths they wish to protect. In this sense, the following two examples highlight some of the methods through which strategies of control operate and the subsequent justifications of social hierarchies in the context of neoliberal global city making in Dubai. These insights, which resonate with many subjects, residents and visitors to the city, help to add complexity and nuance to the lived experiences of different groups, pushing us to ask questions and denaturalize violence and the dehumanization of Others, implicating ‘silence’ as complicity rather
than as neutrality and innocence.

**Where you are from vs. where you are at.**

In Dubai, everything that is good is beyond our reach so it’s best to be content with nothing. We get bored here because we can’t afford anything - this place is built to cater to the rich. (Time Out, 23) from Diyal Chand, 24-year-old electrician.

One of the most salient themes in considering influences on the experiences of diverse groups of migrants stems from a line of thinking we can refer to as “where you are from”. This force becomes the most significant determining factor in one’s experience and place in the hierarchy of entitlement. Not only does it shape the privileges of some, through the exclusion of others, it also works to influence how different groups of migrants think of themselves and their experiences in the city, their ideas of belonging and, often, their levels of criticism or frustration. In other ways, ideas about the ‘Third world’ and common myths circulating in the city are often used to legitimize, justify and sanction or encourage particular policies and practices towards low waged migrant workers, both service sector and construction workers, and domestic workers. Thus, the idea of ‘where you are from’ is constructed through gendered, racialized and class based ideologies that position people from different places into hierarchies that are seen as natural, inevitable or necessary. Before we explore the many different examples of how this idea operates, and the strategies and outcomes it encourages, we can consider some scholarly background and insights into its conceptualization.

Ien Ang (1994) explores the role of diasporic identity formation through hybridity, often based on the mythic notions of the homeland, the politics of minority status and the experiences of non-belonging. Ang draws on her family history and her inability to speak Chinese as issues that complicate her own identity. Furthermore, “not speaking Chinese” is seen as an example of her non-authentic status, as it relates to the issues of “Where you’re from vs. Where you’re at” (10-11). Further, she discusses the political pressures that influence people to come to identify themselves in racial or ethnic terms. These pressures relate to the colonial politics of divide and rule and are implicated in modern ideologies of nation state, and raise confusion in the conditions of existence.
for those who are never really going to belong to a specific place (11). Further, Ang discusses the processes of self-ethnicization as a confirmation of status in western white culture, as a sign of non-belonging, based on the credentials of ‘authentic’ essentialist notions of ethnicity, as well as the social policies that imposed the acknowledgement of these differences from the majority (11). This constitutes the politics of diaspora as it relates to both the desire to keep ‘western cultures white’ and the imagined idea of where you are from as a form of marginalization in the place you are at (15).

Borrowing the idea of the ‘third space of hybridity’ from Homi Bhabha, Ang (1994) highlights how the diasporic subject can “never return home” (15). This liminal space of hybridity is inextricably linked to these experiences and is based on the reality that the ethnicized diasporic subject is never fully able to become a part of the dominant culture. Ethnicization of the diasporic subject means that they are unable to fully become part of dominant culture, “governed by the unerased traces of ‘where you’re from’, no matter how mediated, but ultimately framed by the possibilities and limits offered by ‘where you’re at’ (17).

Overall the use of ethnicity as an identity is political in the sense that we hope to find roots and to belong to experiences. However, in this process we often justify colonial politics of modernity to categorize ethnic identities. This is where Ang (1994) highlights Spivak’s idea of ‘strategic essentialism’ to challenge hegemonic definitions of where you’re at and to insist on being heard from the particularities of history and experience as they are based in ‘global distributions of power’. Ang ends her article, “In short, if I am inescapably Chinese by descent, I am only sometimes Chinese by consent. When and how is a matter of politics” (18).

Although much of Ang’s discussion is tied to her example of being a part of an Asian ethnic minority in a ‘white’ Western country, the insights on the processes of identity formation, and the role of lived experiences of subjects in and through national boundaries and borders provide insight into the ways in which people are produced by, and resist dominant constructions of subjectivity and belonging. From here, we can also link these insights to the role of identity formation in relation to state sovereignty and citizenship in the production of these subjectivities and strategies of governance. Not only does the function of ‘where you are from’ continually work to maintain distance...
between Emirati citizens, professional expats and tourists, it also functions to marginalize people in the place they are at, based on an imagined idea of where they are from.

Once they retire, they are going to go back there and live as kings compared to how they used to live, so they have come a long way and they have achieved a lot in their life, and they do acknowledge that they probably would not have reached that if they had stayed there. (Mario, Canadian)

This idea is tied to questions of why low waged workers continue to migrate to Dubai, and to popular arguments that promote the idea that these workers should be ‘grateful’ for the opportunities afforded them by the state. When questions of exploitation, mistreatment, abuses, deplorable living conditions, and general inequalities in experiences in Dubai are raised, many subjects create responses that are based not on the city and spaces in which they currently reside, but on imagined ideas of ‘where they are from’. Thus, where they are from is tied to an imagined idea of the ‘Third world’, full of desperate, impoverished, brown and black bodies, waiting for the opportunity to be saved from their misery, who come to Dubai, work on short contracts, remitting large sums of money (by their standards), and who will return home to live lavishly, as ‘kings’ compared to the slum-life from which they came. Thus, Dubai becomes a place of opportunity, to fill the needs of the desperate millions, a benevolent role to play, rather than a culpable one.

Scholarly opinions on the subject of labour range in the extremes from the Marxist view in which workers are victims of a larger economic system, without any consideration of the social and cultural factors of migration, to another economic view in which migration is seen as economic freedom driven by the market, allowing workers to send remittances as a development strategy. If we consider what migrants themselves say about whether or not they are better off, many in my study, highlight the difficulties they have in maintaining a significant remittance flow, because of debts, the cost of living, and significantly lower wages than promised. According to the International Organization of Migration (IOM) (2013), many rate their lives as similar to or worse than those of ‘matched stayers’ in the home country, i.e. (persons of a similar profile who did not migrate). The IOM states that,

Consequently, South–South long-timers consider themselves to be worse off than if they stayed in their home country – reporting, for example, difficulties in
obtaining adequate housing. Migrants from the South generally report that they have more difficulty in achieving a satisfactory standard of living and do not consider themselves to be better off than if they had stayed at home. (IOM, 2013 report)

This strongly contrasts with the view commonly held by residents of the city and challenges the idea of pure economic mobility and, with it, freedom. One may argue that in the contemporary period, ‘chains’ have been replaced with economic coercion, which, in conjunction with the growth of migration for labour, acts as a powerful tool in binding workers to employers. In another line of argument, expats claimed that these workers know what they are getting into as “no one forces them to come”. However, as we know, survival strategies in the Global South in which migration has been used as a strategy of ‘development’ are increasingly under pressure. Thus, as the global economic system continues to intensify inequalities between and within nations, growing numbers of impoverished citizens must find alternative survival strategies.

So we come. You say we know the rules before we come. But does that necessarily mean the rules are fair? Oh, but you never said the rules were fair, you just said those were the rules. So why do I play this game you ask? Well, it’s because before I was born, there was a bet made on my behalf, and my debt grew and grew, even before there was the slightest caress. This is the burden of my existence. That if I will survive, I will play the game by your rules. This is my colonial inheritance. The burden of my breaths. Will we change the rules? Change the game? Can we change this inheritance? (YYZ to DXB Diary, 2012)

Some scholars highlight these justifications of ill or unfair treatment, and related cases of abuse as resulting from ‘individuals’ acting poorly, rather than as part of structural and systemic forces that allow for these abuses to exist and to be rationalized. Thus, the international division of labour in combination with contemporary forces of migration for labour is seen as a rational consequence of inequalities of wealth between nations. In this sense, as Walsh highlights, “Asian labour diasporas are represented as poor, needy and unskilled, which serves to legitimize the inequalities of the labour relationship including the neglect of human rights” (Walsh, 2010, 245).

Additionally, as Walsh (2010) highlights in her case study of British expats, domestic workers are often conceptualized through racist logics that seek to justify their lesser status and treatment in ways that relate explicitly to where they are from. Thus, as
she highlights in the racialization of domestic workers and the domestic work itself, Asian workers are seen as ‘unskilled, immature, inexperienced’, which, as she points out, is not as explicitly racist as the Emirati conceptualization of ‘tea boy’ or ‘house girl’, but nonetheless works to justify the low wages and long hours. What Walsh finds in her study resonates with what is being discussed here, in that these imagined ideas of ‘back home’ are used as part of strategies that justify and often encourage the need for training, surveillance, and discipline of low waged workers. In addition, if we consider the policies and practices of hiring foreign workers, and the visa/sponsorship system, we find that in fact the racialization of places from which they originate, in conjunction with programs that tie workers to employers, create highly precarious situations for domestic workers in particular, in which employers routinely confiscate passports to protect themselves from the flight of workers for whom they will still be responsible, or to lock up workers within the house, or to deny them freedom of mobility outside the home on days/time off, in an effort to ‘protect them’. In the case of British expats Walsh argues that the management of domestic workers within the home helps to reaffirm their ‘postcolonial Britishness’ in which the ‘everyday encounters’ of many Britons “with those positioned beneath them in Dubai’s social hierarchy, structured by migrant status, are informed by the sense of imperial capital that they carry with them” (Walsh, 2010, 243). In similar forms, I would argue that these justifications based on ‘where you are from’ work to reaffirm the identities of all residents in the city. For Emiratis, the foreign, temporary status of all workers, and the clear privileges and preferences they receive from the state confer them with a status incomparable to any other group. In addition, all expat professionals find their privilege based on notions of where Others are from by distancing themselves from these low waged workers. In the case of white subjects, it is often easier than for non-white professional expats in which issues of race and nationality must be more clearly explicated through encounters and enacted through other means such as class privilege. For example, many subjects discuss practices at work that clearly ask for nationality as a determinant in allocating salaries,

Its very obvious here. I was volunteering in a hospital and even if people are working the same job, they get paid differently based on where they are from. So the South African nurse gets paid more than the Indian and both are getting paid
less than an Australian nurse. This isn’t something you have to hide because everyone knows how much they are getting paid. (Anna, Canadian/Egyptian)

A similarly idea is highlighted by Carlos who says that once his sister had received her American citizenship, “…she refilled her paperwork as an American, from her previous status as an Egyptian and her salary doubled” (Carlos, American). He very adamantly and clearly states that, “You get treated differently based on your salary.” This statement is neither a secret nor something taboo, is highly problematic, yet widely known and ‘accepted’. Overall then, Third world migrants can be paid and treated relative to ‘back home’, while expat professionals are also treated based on ‘back home’ but hierarchies and higher values are given to Western passports and persons, particularly whites. Thus, Third world migrants are relegated to Otherness and continually treated as outsiders, while residents and citizens are paid and live in the ‘global city’.

The question of where you are from overdetermines where you are at in many significant ways that often take explicit forms such as passports and paychecks. As I have highlighted previously, this idea impacts and shapes not only one’s experience, access and lifestyle, but also one’s entitlements. This can be seen most blatantly in discussions of wages and working conditions, in the case, for example, as one interviewee discussed, of two expats working professional jobs, holding Western passports, who each make well over 20,000 AED (approx. $5,400 USD) a month (Dee, Canadian). They work in international firms and have a full time live in nanny/domestic worker. She works everyday with unregulated/unfixed hours and receives a half day off once a week. Her monthly salary is around 1,500 AED (approx. $400 USD). This is understood as a higher salary than many would receive. However, when we consider the cost of living, $1500 AED is not enough for anyone in the city to live off. This can be compared to the salaries of construction workers who earn around 50-80 cents per hour working ten hour days, six days a week, living in squalor (Hanieh, 2010, 64). As interviewees and scholars both highlight, the lack of minimum wage in the private sector and the differences in wage levels are tied to ‘where you are from’ (the home country of workers), rather than the country in which they work (Hanieh, 2010). This spatialization of class, according to Hanieh, acts as “powerful mechanism of social control”, a result of the lack of
permanence, repressive laws and existing barriers of race, religion, language, etc. that make class consciousness difficult to build (Hanieh, 2010, 65).

This idea of creating differential standards based on where one is coming from dominates the rationalization. When asked about this, many expats and Emiratis pointed out that the salaries of domestic workers did not calculate benefits such as the costs to employers if the work not always the same and fluctuate tremendously in practice (as some employers illegally make workers pay these costs by taking it out of their salaries). Regardless, through discussions with various individuals, it became clear that if Dubai is understood as a meeting place, the space allows you access to two worlds, ‘first’ and ‘third’, or ‘East’ and ‘West’. Although we need to challenge the idea of a bi-polar world order, the international division of labour still characterizes the majority of migrants, and is connected to Dubai as a global city, where those professional making ‘first world’ salaries can have access to labour from the ‘third world’ at relative cost. Professionals are arguably paid based on living in Dubai and their privileged status as Westerners, while low waged workers get paid based on back home.

They compare you to where you come from, and to them, it is a privilege. Your living here is a privilege, and they let you know that it is a privilege. Or you just feel it… Like the salaries. Yeah, you know that’s why he said that, you know. Indians or Filipinos would get paid less, because they know that they would be earning nothing back home, and they think of it as this salary will buy him a home in India. But what if he never wants to go back, it wont buy him a home here, but it will buy him one there. (Laura, Egyptian)

This is however highly contested, as while ‘success’ stories of building a life back home are touted as the opportunity afforded to poor migrants by the global city of Dubai. In almost all of my encounters, low waged workers did not see their salaries as affording them a huge economic leap, but rather as part of their survival, to pay school fees for their children or to provide basic living expenses back home. Another major explanation is tied to the cost of living which employers believe is a burden they bear that is not included in the wage itself. In addition, many employers pay for a return ticket for their workers to visit home, and although it is widely believed that this is a yearly trip, it is rarely enforced. In addition, expats highlighted the popular notions of “they need jobs”, “at least it is better than back home”, or that “Dubai gives them an opportunity”. There are many considerations that challenge these myths, such as whether or not this
‘luxurious life’ they are allegedly building back home is actual ‘real’ or just a popular myth? To what extent and for how many? In reality, for most low waged migrants, the debts incurred, the physical and mental abuse, the insecurity and the exploitation are never compensated because of their largely unregulated work environments. Nor are issues such as the disposability of workers in these sectors, the living conditions, the double standards, why some jobs and wages are legitimized for certain workers based on where they are from, versus the living standards assumed by others, are not considered. In addition, non-economic criteria also influence decisions to migrate, and the difficulties of leaving families and young children ‘back home’ also impacts the experiences of migration for many. This can be seen in the insights of Shahana (Bangladesh) or Louise (Phillipines) who both discussed their children, abusive spouses and difficult familiar situations as reasons for migrating.

In one example, an interviewee expressed her shock that her friend from the West, living in a luxurious villa, could legitimize having a ‘bedroom’ that consisted of a mattress on the floor and an old dresser for their nanny who was the primary caretaker for their children, something incomprehensible for some, and completely ‘normal’ for others, And why? The logic again was tied to it being ‘better’ than an imagined ‘back home’. Back home is based on a racist, colonial based set of ideologies, which dehumanizes ‘Third world’ migrants and legitimates their abuse and exploitation as naturally suited to them. Why some are paid ‘Third world’ salaries, while others are paid ‘First world’ salaries is a continual feature of everyday dynamics. The precariousness faced by low waged workers is impacted by many other factors as well, including differential laws, expectations and visas, health requirements and other limitations. Additional factors also impact common practices in the Gulf such as the confiscation of passports, not allowing workers to leave the house in their time off, or even locking the doors to force workers inside. These are also impacted by racist ideologies, but also are influenced by state policies, such as the ‘Kafala’ sponsorship system in which workers are tied to employers, and employers are told that if anything happens to their employees, or if they commit any crimes, they, the employers, will be held accountable, which empowers and encourages them to carry out these measures to protect themselves, even if it is justified under the logic of benevolence in an effort to protect them. In the end, ideas of race, gender and
class work to create beliefs that infantilize and dehumanize workers to normalize and legitimize these actions, from their meager salaries to physical confinement.

Additionally, these logics also impact other, more privileged workers, who often note the common practice of discrimination in the workplace on the basis of their race or passport they hold. Schools are one major example of contracts and salaries for teachers created based on origin. The same school can have two teachers doing the same job being paid drastically different salaries, one that affords a life in the city, the other that affords a life ‘back home’ (or so it is claimed). Why two workers in the same job are treated so differently is again legitimized through this logic, and is an example that many find highly problematic. Why are expats from the West paid to maintain a luxurious lifestyle in Dubai, and others, for the same work, are paid relative to ‘back home’. While many argue that this is a way to entice workers from the West, who require more incentive than those from the Global South, a broader global hierarchy of states, nationalities that place higher values on Western education, experience and passports legitimizes these practices as tied to neutral economic determinism. As Jo remarked on whether her American passports benefits her,

Yes. Always. There are two reasons. There are different classes - an American passport and bearing a pure American name, and then there is having an American passport and having some other nationality (shown through your race or name) and then there is just having another nationality all together. The best out of the three is being an American with a white name. The difference between the two is that a lot of times, some employers will be like, ‘Okay well you’re American but you are actually Arab in origin’, so they might not be as keen on giving your benefits as they would if someone would have an American passport from American descent. (Jo, American)

Benefits and pay are allocated based on these differences, thus for Jo, many employers will ask, because of her name, if she speaks Arabic, where she feels compelled to deny that she is Arab, to be entitled to the same benefits as others in the company. Further,

I think because they are a minority here and the fact that I am Arabic and we are in an Arabic country, I feel like… I don’t know how to say it… but I just feel like… its funny because my dad said the same thing because we used to live in Saudi Arabia and my dad worked in an American company there…That it was almost like a disadvantage to be Arabic, even though you are living in an Arabic country when you work for an American company… they have preferences for
expats who are British, American or Canadian. They almost have this hierarchy feeling as if Arabic people are like lower. It is just weird…they think they are better. They actually do. (Sara, Egyptian)

However, Jo and Sara agreed that while racist ideas and practices position them lower than white Westerners, these same logics also work to place non-Arabs, such as Africans and South Asians below them.

The preferences for Western professionals can be seen clearly in the case of teachers.

There are these request forms for teachers for the next year. I would say that there are at least 50-60 requests for next year, which say that I would like my son or daughter with someone that has a strong American accent. Or they say certain nationalities that they do not want their son or daughter to be with. (Katie, American)

The racism is both explicit and neutralized at the same time, where wanting ‘white’ educators is neutralized and hidden in the desire for ‘American accents’, while racism is implicitly involved in excluded non-white teachers. Another way that ‘where you are from’ operates is in the ways that different subjects understand their experiences in the city, and the city in general. Depending on your nationality, and as possibilities diminish ‘back home’ for many ‘Third world’ professional migrants, the desire to stay or appreciate Dubai’s stability increases.

In 2000 even it was just sand and water, but then 15 years later it is full of towers and it is like a different country. I didn’t find this in Egypt, but I found this in Dubai or the UAE. The traffic is great. In Egypt it is a disaster and everyday it is a disaster. It was like Egypt was a disaster and everyday it comes more of a disaster. This is why I love Dubai. (Peter, Egyptian)

This view could be challenged if the relationships between the UAE and Egypt were better understood, thus exposing the ways in which the global capitalist system has shaped and led to increasing impoverishment and instability in the global South, to the benefit of global cities in the non-western context, and to the Gulf states in particular.

To understand the implications of these logics on the everyday experiences of different residents, we must see how ideas of ‘belonging’ are shaped through these pressures of where you are from. The insights provided by different subjects show how genealogies related to power relations embedded in various nationalities impact how
groups and individuals understand their relationships to Dubai. Very broadly, for example, in my interviews I observed that in many instances informants who held ‘Western’ or ‘First world’ passports and nationalities were often much more critical of Dubai than were those who held passports with ‘lesser’ status. Interestingly here, we can consider the question of where you are from overwhelming where you are at, and how the idea of where you can or will be in turn impacts the feelings and desires of various migrants, especially expat professionals, to stay, invest or desire more from Dubai.

Similarly, and interrelated with this logic, is the idea that this is a temporary home. For some, based on their level of privilege, Dubai offers a less temporary life in terms of building or affording a life while working, and for others the temporary life, which may last decades, is based on their lack of entitlements and their inability to build a stable life. Important to consider is whether or not this is an intended goal, which in turn will impact the understandings different subjects have in their experience. So then we can see how some workers, based on race, class and, often, gender, are seen as more ‘welcome’, belonging or deserving than others. This regulation extends to many other entitlements and governs access to many aspects of life, such as where one can live, whether based on affordability or ability to gain residence in certain areas. Worker camps and accommodations provided by employers push many to the outskirts of the city, in neighbouring emirates or generally out of view, away, as one informant described, “from the dominant image of Dubai”. This reality is popularly referred to as the ‘dark side’ of Dubai.

**Relativity as a mode of justification**

Another significant theme to consider is how different residents come to understand the city and to make sense of or normalize certain practices or realities through the idea of relativity. ‘Relativity’ works through different practices as a rationale to create exceptions for certain everyday realities that work in turn to create normal, acceptable, inevitable and, often, necessary practices.

You will find exploitation in any city in the world, and you will find greater exploitation, and greater poverty and greater injustice in hundreds of third world cities, the cities that many of Dubai’s workers come from. Which is why many of them choose to stay. (Bennett, 2010, 255)
Not only does this sentiment relate to the overwhelming power of where you are from, but it also works to relativize the exploitation of low waged workers in Dubai as somehow better than ‘back home’, which is itself a highly contested idea. The existence of exploitation in other cities is obvious, as exploitation is not exclusive to any one place but is clearly integral to the capitalist mode of production. The exploitation existent in Dubai is not negated by the existence of exploitation elsewhere and, particularly, not based on the racist logics that confine ‘Third world’ people and places as naturally suited or bred with inequality in their blood. In a related manner, this logic operates to relativize Dubai’s issues as like ‘any other city’ with a history of exploitation. Some interviewees explained that most Western countries were built on colonialism, slavery and exploitation and thus Dubai is no different. This logic in fact seemed to create an idea of relativity as exception - most nations in the world have been built on the exploitation and dehumanization of Others so Dubai should not be seen as exceptional. Indeed, for some the exploitation taking place in the city is seen as excusable on the basis of relativity. In other ways, it is seen as a necessary or inevitable element to the building of a new city. Again this links back to the temporal element of ‘developmental’ lineage in which Dubai has not yet ‘caught up’. This misses the important analysis or connection to the reality that many other nations are creating more and more temporary programs, that many of these nations have been built on notions of insider and outsider from their inception, and most importantly, that the Gulf and the UAE in particular play a significant role in the development of contemporary capitalism. In a similar vain, justifications of the city are also interestingly tied to the right of Emiratis, as ‘Indigenous’ to the country, to create exclusionary policies of citizenship and settlement to protect their culture and identity.

Additionally, while Dubai’s social hierarchies are not nationally bound or limited, as has been argued through this analysis, it is significant to contrast the labour and other policies in Dubai, as an emerging global city, with those programs and policies that are shifting around the world. Neoliberalism as a ‘technology of government’ and mode of rationality operates to distance citizens from governments in terms of their entitlements, and the contemporary period of neoliberalism has eroded existing notions of entitlement and protection from the state, alongside ideas of universality and equality through
citizenship programs in liberal democratic regimes. Many subjects made reference to, and numerous scholars have articulated, how North America and Europe are seeing growing numbers of temporary foreign work programs, and an intensification of hierarchical visa systems, where naturalization and citizenship, though always regulated through particular political criteria, are increasingly difficult to attain and were much more common in the past. This reality lends itself to another important point of consideration, which is the ways in which some Western analyses and representations of the ‘East’, the ‘Oriental’, the ‘Middle Eastern’ as ‘backwards’, a place and people of the past, seem to relativize the problems of Dubai’s migrant majority workforce as somehow natural and exclusive to its context, rather than a globally interconnected and historically embedded system of labour, solidified through European colonial expansion, and US capitalist hegemony, further solidified and supported through its proxies around the world, generating and intensifying patterns of wealth and impoverishment throughout the Global North and Global South.

Another example of how this relativity operates is to create cultures of normalization surrounding these social hierarchies. Thus, as noted in my research journal and in my encounters, privilege is such that, “Day by day you learn to swallow it (Dubai), and it seems to get easier and easier… you forget how to live without it. It’s scary the power it wields” (YYZ to DXB Diary). It is this everyday acceptability and normalization of social hierarchies of inequality and violence that pushes individual thresholds for what is acceptable or normal further and further. Many interviewees confessed that they began to accept certain realities over time because they were so widely occurring and accepted in society at large. This operated in relation to domestic workers, the living and working conditions of construction workers, inequalities in status and wealth, and of course all of these justifications were linked to the above noted mythologies of labour and migration.

In many different ways the logic of relativity operates to depoliticize and pacify outrage towards inequalities and injustice, and the logics of temporariness and threats of non-belonging and eviction work to discipline subjects. Many interviewees remarked on the differences in a society in which only a few held exclusive access to state benefits, entitlements and protection, while the majority were temporary, ‘disposable’ workers. This lack of citizenship based rights also created difficulties for some subjects in how to
understand themselves and to articulate the problems in a system where ‘equality’ was not a recognized right of all individuals, but that treatment and entitlements were largely privatized and based on where one is from, which is turn is constructed in relation to colonial and capitalist histories of race, gender and class, working to uphold an international system of inequality, and masking it through complex webs of national articulation by both national citizens and privileged expat professionals.

Turning back to Filipina migrant worker Alice then, the Dubai dream when interrogated critically is much more dark and nightmarish. As Alice articulated, Dubai’s global dreamscapes are in fact much more haunting than the ‘global’ city façade allows us to see. The genealogies embedded in these myriad of processes, ideologically and material, all highlight the ways in which race and citizenship have always been intimately connected to the Dubai dream. Thus overall, the dream of Dubai was awakened to the frightening, nightmarish realities of social exclusion, violence, Othering, and dehumanization. Together these processes work to legitimize the social hierarchies and subsequent entitlements, both in formal and informal processes, and implicated in processes at multiple scales, bringing together different temporal realms embedded in the geographies and genealogies of diverse migrant journeys and developmental trajectories.
Chapter Seven: Conclusion

This dissertation has examined the role of Dubai’s aspirations/development trajectory towards attaining global city status, its impacts on the migrant majority population, and how citizenship regimes and everyday experiences and ideologies are shaped by, and shape, notions of the Dubai dream. In considering further the impacts of the dream, scholars have begun to ask important new questions about how dreaming may influence our waking lives, and how and in what ways dreams may in fact help us live better in our waking lives. Breus (2015) highlights new research suggesting that dreams may “assist in daytime function and performance, especially as they relate to creativity and problem solving”. Thus, we can ask what productive power do dreams hold for imagining different possibilities.

The uniqueness of Dubai lies in there being “no other region on the planet that has seen such a remarkable transformation in such a short period of time” (Hanieh, 2011, 1). Repeatedly lauded for its developmental achievements, its monumental and spectacular spaces, its luxury and all things unbelievable, Dubai is surely a place of dreams and a space for dreamers, a space not only shaped by dreams, but whose representations also induce dreams. Dubai is a place to dream from and for. And so people do. But amidst the glittering facades of its towers nestled deeply into the skies, dreams are built and broken. Despite the spectacular levels of violence necessary in the making of Dubai’s hegemonic global dream, both exclaimed and whispered, Dubai dreams both conceal and reveal insights for the future of citizenship, migration and the developmental desires for ‘globality’. It is within this context of both the spectacle and mundane that a sense of normalcy and consent overwhelms the space, albeit with extremely diverse lived experiences. These ‘peaceful’, safe, and ‘normal’ everyday dreamscape are based on the generation of relationships of privilege and exclusion, consent and coercion. All of these insights together, beg the question, as Jasbir Puar (2007) asks, “If we feel that things are calm, what must we forget in order to inhabit such a restful feeling?” (xviii).
This place is a place of dreams. They meet each other here. Colliding. Colluding. They have found a rhythm that seems to effortlessly bring them together. But can the dreams of some negate those of Others? Some are locked into our dreams, while some decide which dreams are fulfilled. But this can only be the case if you allow them to dictate the material of our dreams. If we dream beyond their means, in other worlds, we will surely fly free, above their towers and lights. (YYZ-DXB Diary, 2010).

What must we forget when we applaud Dubai for achieving the dream? What can we awaken to find when we examine Dubai dream(s) in their multiplicity? We implicate the role of dreams as abstractions, as temporary releases from reality, but we also actively cultivate desire through dreams that have implications in the conscious state. When we consider the hegemonic Dubai dream we see that it is both real and a dream simultaneously, but faces the problem that all dreamers and dreams face, which is the “failure to recognize its own true condition, its incoherence (or bizarreness), its severe limitation of thought” (Hobson, 2010, 803). The dreams of Dubai conceal and potentially ‘hide’ aspects of its reality. When we awaken, what we often find is that the promises of Dubai’s dreams are not as they seem for many. They are not reflected, for example, in Sheikh Mohamed’s statement that “…Dubai is a city where you do not feel estranged or marginalized and where nobody lives on the fringes feeling dismal, because this is a feeling alien to Dubai” (Al Maktoum, 2012, 151). They are in fact much more violent and nightmarish than the vision of this Dubai dream implies. The fringes are in fact outside but within at once, embedded into the cityscape and expressed through spatial relations that can only be understood by tracing Dubai’s geographies and the genealogies that make possible its ‘globality’.

This research has explored the multiplicity of dreams, colliding and colluding, through geographies of migration and neoliberal globalization, as they connect to historical genealogies and temporalities in the making of a contemporary global city, Dubai. The dominant promises of Dubai’s Dream, embedded in the aspirational, developmental trajectory of global city making is explored in its manifestations in the geographical landscapes of the city and in shaping the rigid social hierarchies that organize and govern Dubai’s resident population. In addition, how these social
hierarchies are constructed and maintained to create a seemingly ‘normal’ and ‘peaceful’ set of everyday relationships between diverse groups of residents has been explored through a genealogical analysis.

The dissertation began with an exploration of the idea of (the) Dubai Dream(s) as a way to examine the allure of global city-induced notions of possibility and ‘progress’, and as part of shaping desires for migration. It examined the dominant notions of the Dubai dream as embedded within the making of the city’s global city status and the subsequent development trajectory of the city, as well as how dreams shape understandings and motivations for migration. Through an examination of scholarly insights on the making and qualifying of global cities generally, we were able to see how Dubai is situated within these discussions and also how this case study challenges traditional assumptions and adds complexity to these debates.

To situate these discussions, the historical development of the city was examined within the broader national, regional, and international political economy, as well as through examinations of how temporal and ideological forces impact the conceptualization of Dubai’s dreams. Examining the ways in which migration has been central to Dubai’s foundational dreams highlighted how migration is key in shaping the city in many ways. Insights from interviewees highlighted the impacts of migration as a strategy for development in Dubai’s dream, and the rigid social hierarchies that exist to shape the different levels of access to entitlements (protection, rights, benefits, privileges) of different groups in the space. Importantly here, the role of subject making in relation to issues of race, class, gender, and nationality are argued as significant markers in the generation of different categories of persons. We ‘unmapped’ geographies of migration by exploring and historicizing the conditions that give rise to migration in sending states through a genealogical analysis of the legacies of colonialism, development and the impact of neoliberal globalization on the international division of labour, as well as the ideologies that accompany migrants on these journeys. Also examined here are histories and contemporary processes of subject making, citizen-subject identity construction and how citizenship policies and practices shape issues of belonging and entitlements. In particular, we examined the spatiality of the city, through the scale of the ‘everyday’ to examine how outlooks, practices and lived experiences and ideas on the ground are
impacted by the ‘global’ that shapes and is shaped by Dubai as a city in a global landscape. Also mapped here are the geographies of migration that are embedded in Dubai’s developmental trajectory as a global city and through a simultaneous unmapping we examined the genealogies (colonial continuities and historically implicated relationships of globalization) that accompany migrants on their journeys and within their Dubai dreams. In a practical way this helps to illuminate the historical forces and factors that have created and maintained the international division of labour that shapes migratory patterns and experience linking the Global North and South in the unique context of Dubai.

The last chapter more specifically examined the role of citizenship in the making of subjects, and the implications of these regimes for the lives and experiences of groups, and their relationships to each other. For many, it is the absence of citizenship that creates situations of precariousness but, as this research has shown, it is not only the absence but the differential conceptualization of various citizenship statuses and nationalities that shape the urban landscape in the neoliberal model of global city development that Dubai exemplifies. Thus, the ideological apparatus that leads to distancing between Us and Them and the creation of Others as threats shapes hierarchies of entitlement and socio-spatial landscapes. It is within these processes of naming and knowing, ignoring and rationalizing that notions of deserving and not are constructed. These explicitly racialized processes are historically implicated, which means thinking beyond the narrow conceptions of national citizenship and towards a broader global genealogy of migration and its contemporary manifestations.

When we consider the significance of Dubai as a case study, we can see that, Dubai, then, is a unique kind of social space, a social experiment in the construction of a new kind of global city and postmodern reality. It is in Dubai where the dreams of laissez faire economists are finding their ultimate realization. The state rarely interferes with and indeed goes to great lengths to support business interests, and the bulk of the population are treated merely as ‘factor of production’; from maids and construction workers to architects and business executives, expatriate guest workers are there simply to do a job. Dubai is the ‘market society’, George Soros worried about, where civil society is squeezed out. While on the surface this relation seems highly exploitative of expatriates, the reality is more complex. (Ali, 2010, 13)
Several significant contextual considerations about Dubai and the Gulf in general make it an important and unique case study. These include its status as a migrant majority city, with a higher percentage of foreign born residents than any other city in the world; its dependency on foreign labour at all levels of development, and in particular, the necessity of a majority workforce of low waged, temporary workers; its highly exclusive citizenship policies; and its unique location and role in the broader political economy. While these considerations highlight the uniqueness of Dubai as a case study, it does not mean that the situation of migrants in Dubai is exclusive to only this context, but rather we must see it as part of a continuation and remaking of older forms of the international division of labour. Furthermore, its uniqueness as a non-Western city, neither First nor Third world, ruled by a monarchy, and branded as a global city, are all significant for understanding the role of neoliberal citizenship regimes in the making of contemporary globality and the important continuities embedded in these geographies of labour that reproduce and remake genealogies of race, class and gender through constructions of nationality and citizenship across the globe. Thus, whereas the major metropolitan cities of the West that largely dominate global city thinking are more clearly tied to legacies of colonialism, global cities in the non-Western context also participate in and benefit from ongoing hierarchies through the international division of labour and their role in the global political economy. Thus, if we understand neoliberal globalization as leading to the creation and maintenance of global cities such as those in the UAE, it is necessary to explore the historical legacies (genealogies) that accompany geographies of migration for labour. By exploring the historical lineages that accompany migrants on their journeys we see how ideologies of race, class, gender, nationality and labour intersect in the local (global) context of the city to create and sustain inequalities. This is significant as the underlying racial logics embedded within many of the policies and practices that both target labour migrants and privilege expat professionals are connected to broader colonial legacies and histories.

In particular, this study reveals several key contributions to various fields of research. First, global city status and the ranking and criterion through which cities aspire to be recognized are implicated profoundly in the historical legacies and colonial
continuities that are necessary in the making of contemporary capitalism. Amidst this context, we have been how the aspirational claims of global city status as part of a developmental schema shape national priorities and in turn shape labour regimes. In addition, the genealogies embedded in the developmental aspirations expose and implicate conceptualizations of ‘East’ and West’, ‘First’ and ‘Third’, ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ with important consequences for formal and informal practices that impact social hierarchies in the making of the global city. Overall, this research builds on critical scholarship in global city and urban studies to highlight the biases that are generated in the understanding and making of global cities, as well as the desires that are induced from rankings and statuses based on this designation. Thus, globality operates as a dreamscape, lucidly implicated in the making of (im)mobilities. In the case of Dubai, whether or not it is accepted in mainstream scholarly criterion as having achieved this designation, the fact remains that notions of what the ‘global city’ represents in the global imaginary have shaped, and continue to shape, the developmental trajectories of spaces such as Dubai in ways that have profound impacts and implication for the processes of urbanization and the experiences of a diverse range of actors. These ideological impacts are significant not only for how we evaluate and think of the city, but for the racial logics that code the city in the global landscape, and which are very much invested in the maintenance of a particular global, capitalist class.

Second, in the analyses of migration and labour, many conceptualizations of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ have not considered the role of temporality and genealogy in the making of contemporary processes. The genealogies that accompany people through their migrant geographies implicate not only a historical lineage as practices of the past that shape the current, but as a continuity into the present made possible through this past, generating and generated through new forms and spaces, shifting and evolving but also incorporating. Thus, geographies of migration are an integral part of the processes of making the global in and through the city. So, if we want to understand social relations, we must begin by ‘un-mapping’ through a genealogical analysis that allows us a nuanced examination of the ‘present’ to challenge the temporal and linear historical configurations of now, by understanding the past, present and future possibilities of the city, as
constituted by the historical developments that operate simultaneously in contemporary patterns of global city formation.

This takes us to the third area in which these processes are understood by recognizing the operation of simultaneity in scales and levels in analyzing different levels and temporalities as co-constitutive and relational, rather than prioritizing material over ideological or global over local. This is partly accomplished by foregrounding the importance of lived experiences of three general categories of subjects living in the UAE - Emirati nationals, expat professionals, and low waged labourers. These experiences are mapped through the notion of the ‘everyday’, a social scale that examines how outlooks, practices and ideas on the ground impact, and are impacted by, the ‘global’ that shapes and is shaped by Dubai as a city. This methodological consideration helps to illuminate the historical forces and factors that have created and maintained the international division of labour that shapes migratory patterns and experience linking the Global North and South.

Fourth, in understanding the significance of the ‘everyday’ we consider how violence operates through social hierarchies. This was in part made clear through an understanding of racialized nationalities that are used to generate a social structure that governs how different groups of people are entitled to various rights and possibilities. These hierarchies of entitlement were analyzed in relation to the racialization of citizenship and nationality, which not only creates schemas of value but also, importantly, generates ideologies to support and rationalize these inequalities in status. Thus, racialization in relation to nationality operates not only to exclude, devalue and dehumanize low waged workers, but also to confer significance, value and privilege on expat professional workers, particularly those from the Global North, and simultaneously to use local conditions to generate forms and scales of belonging and entitlement for privileged groups, including Emirati citizens. These contributions were linked to the fields of migration and citizenship studies as they examine labour and development, and are significant in the linkages between postcolonial conceptions of racialized nationality, the influence and impacts of neoliberalism in the making of development trajectories and the subsequent conceptualization of nation and citizenship, as well as the ideological apparatuses that generate knowledge(s) and rationalities about social stratification. Taken
together, these considerations help us understand the complex negotiations that residents are engaged in on a daily basis to contest, affirm or rationalize in order to promote the ‘innocence’ of a few, culpability of some, and the legitimacy necessary in ‘othering’ Others. Thus, the ultimate considerations which emerged through these analyses, are linked to questions of who belongs and who does not, and ultimately lead us to ontological questions about who is considered fully human in 21st century global cityscapes.

From here we might ask ourselves how citizenship, migration and labour studies understand the example of Dubai as a global city. “We spent so much time dreaming of the future, when it was here being built all the time” (YYZ to DXB Diary, 2011). Is Dubai a city of the future or a city of the past? How this question is answered is contingent upon several theoretical and conceptual considerations, including the role of race in coding the idea of ‘modernity’ that is linked to understandings of globality and the future trajectory of capitalism by means of neoliberal globalization. These shifts are reshaping relationships between states and citizens, as well as migrants and (im)mobilities. In the consideration of Dubai, many readings of the city have attributed its ‘human rights’ failures and abuses to aspects of its ‘traditional’ policies and structures, often described by such as, “There is luxury and squalor, a mobile elite served and enriched by an army of transient workers, an architectural hotchpotch of pristine newness and ancient disorder which is ‘the kind of thing you see everywhere’” (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 15). ‘Ancient disorder’ is the type of evidence that is cited as part of the ‘pre-modern’ (non-liberal or democratic) character of the city, as in the many practices that have resulted in a situation of exploitation is considered ‘unique’ to the non-western world. These ideas are then cited as evidence of either the failures of ‘development’ in political and social terms such as those documented by international organizations and agencies, or through an orientalist reading as evidence of its ‘barbaric’, ‘traditional’ (i.e. Muslim, Arab), ‘Third worldness’. However, closer considerations in globalization studies suggest that neoliberalism is reshaping notions of citizenship around the globe, in which many emerging global cities are becoming seen as models of the ‘future’, found in the “spaces outside of the spectacle, in the shadows of skyscrapers” (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 15). Thus, the majority of low waged, racialized workers can be seen as the ‘real’ face,
cost or reality of contemporary processes of labour and migration, in which a permanently, temporary workforce is generated.

Although Dubai and the Gulf more generally are often seen as exceptional cases, this model of development and the policies that accompany it are increasingly being replicated around the globe, with Western countries increasingly adopting policies similar to those found in the Gulf, such as the US H1B visa program that limits the ability of professionals from overseas to stay, and ties them directly to their employers (Ali, 2010); or the Canadian seasonal agricultural workers program that bring workers on a temporary basis and places heavy restrictions on what they can do and where they can go; or in the UK (Miroff, 2013) where more than half of skilled workers from non-European union countries arrive on ‘intra-company’ transfers (Ali, 2010). These moves create a situation similar to that of Dubai with expats being legal, yet impermanent residents.

This social and spatial isolation is a key component of the neoliberal citizenship regimes that govern temporary or guest workers, whose lives are shaped by categorizations that create differential regimes of belonging in which their entitlements are shaped based on notions of ‘where they are from’, and not ‘where they are at’.

Currently, Dubai’s system of sponsorship controls the ability of migrants to stay in the country and links their residency to explicit conditions and specific entitlements that are tied to their class and nationality. While formal policies such as those embodied in the ‘Kafala’ system encourage unequal and exploitative power relations between groups, the ideological force of Dubai’s global location, in conjunction with the seemingly ‘informal’ everyday knowledge(s) that attempt to rationalize and justify social hierarchies, are equally significant in shaping the everyday lives of different groups. With these considerations in mind, further research can relate these insights to a larger analysis of the trends in global migration regimes, including a focus on growing restrictions on citizenship, the expansion of guest worker programs in the West, and the seeming contradiction of free economic flows and restrictive immigration policies. These questions can build on the common connections between forces of neoliberalism and citizenship policies, as well as on the ongoing processes of racialization of non-citizens or ‘Others’ through which both privilege and exclusion are generated as mutually
constitutive. Ali asks, can we consider what impacts these policies have on the “non-assimilation” situation amongst expats in Dubai, communities of adults who are “essentially in the country, but not of it” (Ali, 2010). What impacts does this ‘temporary status’ have on feelings of belonging? How does it impact feelings of helplessness or innocence on behalf of privileged workers? Taken together, these insights from the case of Dubai, with its ‘permanently impermanent’ population, would look less unique and more like a “prescient harbinger of the future experience of incorporation - or lack thereof” (Ali, 2010).

Elsheshtawy argues that the juxtaposition of slums with luxury developments is not yet as characteristic of Dubai as it is of Amman or Cairo, for example, and when the Dubai model is replicated through megaprojects and enclaves of the ‘new Dubai’-type areas, it is “inherently rife with explosive socio-political issues” (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 275). In this view then, explosive potential for social unrest only exists in the extreme discrepancies of wealth in contexts where existing histories of social inequality exist. However, when we consider the historical genealogies accompanying geographies of migration and development in Dubai we are able to ask, what processes and practices are at work to uphold and perpetuate these systems? Further, how are cultures of ‘innocence’ sustained in the ideas of the status quo? Through these considerations we see issues such as ‘slum-like’ labour camps or rigid, social hierarchies become increasingly normalized, and often sanctioned as necessary to protect the social, economic and political interests of the neoliberal state and its benefactors. Perhaps, as Pramoedya Ananta Toer highlights,

> Just as politics cannot be separated from life, life cannot be separated from politics. People who consider themselves to be non-political are no different; they’ve already been assimilated by the dominant political culture – they just don’t feel it anymore. (Elsheshtawy, 2010, 262)

Thus, one of the most frightening aspects of the Dubai dream is the insidious ways in which various groups are inculcated through cultures of neoliberalism that rationalize, excuse and often legitimize the violent nightmarish realities necessary in building the global city dream. “We will keep chasing that high until we can not fall any lower” (Adonis, Jordanian/Canadian).

Everyday outlooks, practices and ideas impact, and are impacted by, the ‘global’ that shapes and is shaped by Dubai as a city. This is significant as it challenges the idea
of ‘exception’ in that instead, for example, of viewing an instance of violence in a suicide or murder as something individual, shocking or irregular, we would instead start to see a much more complex view of these situations that extends violence not only as physical, but as a structural, systemic form of institutionalized behaviour and action that shapes and curtails possibilities for groups of people. This is difficult primarily because we often view these situations through legal frameworks that individualize and target particular actions, incapable of redressing collective or social forms of violence and exclusion, which themselves are forms of ‘everyday violence’. The fact that much of this daily violence is sanctioned, first by the state, and then by the larger social body and normalized into commonsensical everyday practice is important. The power of ideology is found in its abilities to be reproduced in everyday practices and actions without notice, and this is part of the significance of this fieldwork in Dubai, and the attention it brings to local, everyday narrations of larger processes and the ability of individuals to locate themselves in a larger matrix of social, economic, political, cultural and environmental relationships. Franz Fanon (1994) reminds us,

"Sometimes people hold a core belief that is very strong. When they are presented with evidence that works against that belief, the new evidence cannot be accepted. It would create a feeling that is extremely uncomfortable, called cognitive dissonance. And because it is so important to protect the core belief, they will rationalize, ignore and even deny anything that doesn't fit… (Fanon, 1994)"

So, turning back to Puar’s (2007) question, “If we feel that things are calm, what must we forget in order to inhabit such a restful feeling?” (xviii). Let us all ache for an anxiousness that is restless, moving beyond dreams towards nightmares that keep us awake and haunted.
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Mohammad, R., & Sidaway, J. D. (2012). Spectacular urbanization amidst variegated geographies of globalization: learning from Abu Dhabi’s trajectory through the


Walsh, K. (2010). Negotiating migrant status in the emerging global city: Britons in


Appendix A: Simple Participant Email

Hello,

I hope that this email finds you well. My name is Alisha Ticku and I am currently a third year PhD student at York University in Toronto, Canada. I am working on a research study that looks at the experiences of different groups of people working and living in global cities. It explores issues of migration, citizenship and labour. In specific, my project explores Dubai, UAE as a case study of a contemporary global city. I am looking for people to participate in this study through a variety of different ways: (1) Interviews; (2) Identifying a site; (3) Meeting informally or connecting me to other friends or people you know who may be interested or able to support this work.

The tentative title of this study is “Dubai Dreams: Exploring Globalization in the Gulf”. Here are some of Major Research Questions:

• What this case study (Dubai) allows us to understand about citizenship and immigration/migration experiences and policy within global cities?
• What is unique about the context of the UAE, and how does this effect people’s experiences of migration?
• How do different people in the UAE relate to each other, and how do they understand each other?
• What are the motivations that different groups have for migrating to the UAE?
• How do different groups of workers relate to each other?
• How, if at all, does nationality or citizenship affect different groups?
• Is Dubai a global city? If so, what aspects of it give it this status?

Thank you for your interest in this research study. I really appreciate you taking the time to read a little bit more about the project and how you, or people you know, may be able to participate. Please consider letting me know if there are other people you know who would be beneficial to this study. I am open to contacting others and am interested in making new contacts in the UAE regardless of whether they participate formally in the study or not.

Also I have attached and pasted below, additional information here in the form of a letter that provides more details on the major themes that you could help support. If you feel that you or other people you know would be interested please contact me with any questions.

Thanks in advance for your help and consideration. Looking forward to hearing back from you and learning from your experiences.
Hi Professor,

I hope that this email finds you well. My name is Alisha Ticku and I am currently a third year PhD student at York University in Toronto, Canada. My major areas of study are in Women and Politics, Globalization Studies and International Development Studies. Currently, I am working on a research study that looks at the experiences of different groups of people working and living in global cities. In particular my research explores issues of migration, citizenship and labour using Dubai as a case study of a contemporary ‘global city’. The project that I want to introduce to you is tied to my interests in political economy as well as the ways in which individuals make sense and narrate their own journeys of migration to global cities.

I am writing this email in regards to your research interests and areas of teaching. I believe that your work in the areas of …. will provide valuable insights into my research.

It might be useful to provide some introductory information about my research study to see whether you feel your work might provide some insights into these topics:

My fieldwork in the UAE provides one piece of my larger dissertation project which focuses on the historic relations between ‘First’ and ‘Third’ world nations through the ‘international division of labour’, and the intersection of these hierarchies within the unique ‘national’ context of the global city of Dubai. The major research questions for my dissertation are inextricable interrelated in an attempt to account for the simultaneity of social processes. I ask, how can we account for contemporary forms and experiences of labour migration to the UAE by simultaneously mapping geographies of migration, and unmapping historical genealogies, such as the international division of labour, under contemporary forces of globalization? Furthermore, how and in what ways does the position of Dubai, UAE as a ‘global city’, between ‘First’ and ‘Third’ worlds under contemporary forms of neoliberal globalization, impact migrant workers? The goals for my fieldwork include conducting interviews with different sectors of the population, locating four major sites for observational data, collecting data and meeting with people working and teaching on related issues.

I will be traveling to the UAE at the beginning of June 2011 and staying for the duration of the summer to conduct some interviews and collect ethnographic data. If you are available over the summer from June – August to meet informally to discuss your research interests and current or previous work that could help provide insight into any of these issues I would really appreciate the opportunity to meet. Overall, I would really like to get a sense of the academic community in the UAE and see what kinds of important and critical work you are engaged in and learn more from your experiences. In addition, if possible, you may also be able to provide some important direction in terms of locating resources, additional contacts or your own experiences that will prove invaluable to my overall research project.
Appendix C: Guiding Questions for Emirati Interview

Personal Experiences
1. Can you describe your family history/origins in terms of becoming or being born a citizen of the UAE?
2. Can you explain how citizenship and nationality operates in the UAE? And how does your citizenship status affect your life living and working in the UAE?
3. Can you describe growing up in Dubai for a local citizen?
4. How you describe the society or culture of the UAE? And more specifically, the society or culture of Dubai?
5. Can you describe how you relate to other groups of people living and working in the UAE? Consider both expat professionals and less skilled labourers?
6. Can you describe the relationships between the major groups of people in Dubai? From local Emirati citizens, to expats employed in professional sectors, to those migrants working in low-skilled jobs? What are some of the issues currently facing each of these groups?
7. Can you tell me what factors you think impact life and experiences different people have in the UAE?
8. Can you describe how local citizens relate to the migrant-majority population? And how, if at all, the demographic composition of the UAE affects Emiratis?

Focused Analysis
9. Can you narrate the story of Dubai and its growth and how it has changed over time?
10. Can you describe the dominant international ideas about Dubai? How would you challenge or confirm these ideas?
11. Is Dubai a global city? If so, what factors have contributed to and impact this status?
12. Can you describe what you believe the major factors are that bring people to Dubai?
13. Can you describe some of the major issues you think face Dubai currently?
14. How would you compare Dubai and Abu Dhabi? Also, can you describe what is unique about Dubai to any other cities, whether in the Gulf or internationally?
15. Can you evaluate the idea of ‘belonging’ in Dubai? Who belongs here and why?
16. Can you describe how, if at all, citizenship statuses or nationality affect people coming to, and while in, Dubai?

General Perspectives
17. How would describe the personality of Dubai?
18. We have heard the idea of an ‘American dream’, can you describe a Dubai Dream, or Dubai Dreams? Is there a dominant dream or scattered dreams?
19. What do you think the major differences are between an Emirati’s dream of Dubai and other groups of migrants?
20. Who is this city built for?
Appendix D: Guiding Questions for Expat Interview

**Personal experiences:**
1. Can you describe how you first found out about Dubai? Describe how you imagined Dubai would be before you come?
2. Can you describe the major factors, which pushed you to leave your home country and those factors that pulled you to Dubai?
3. How would you describe the differences or similarities from Dubai to the country or city you came from? (Infrastructure, culture, society, work environment)
4. Can you describe the major different in your life in Dubai form your country of origin or countries where you have lived and worked before?

**Focused Analysis:**
5. Can you describe dominant international ideas about Dubai? How would you challenge or confirm these ideas?
6. Is Dubai a global city? If so, what factors have contributed to and impact this status?
7. Can you describe the major reasons/push factors that bring people to want to work in the UAE?
8. Can you describe the major pull factors that bring people to want to work in the UAE?
9. Can you describe the major changes Dubai has experienced overtime?
10. Can you describe the major issues that currently face Dubai?
11. How would you describe UAE society and culture?
12. How could you compare Abu Dhabi and Dubai? Also can you describe what is unique about Dubai compared to other global cities (name city of comparison).
13. Can you describe the relationships between the major groups of people in Dubai? From local Emirati citizens, to expats employed in the professional sector, to those migrants working in low skilled jobs. What are the major issues currently faced by each group?
14. Can you evaluate the idea of ‘belonging’ in Dubai? Who belongs and why?
15. Can you describe how, if at all, citizenship statuses or nationality affect people on coming to, and while in, Dubai?

**General perspectives:**
16. How would describe the personality of Dubai
17. We have heard the idea of the ‘American dream’, can you describe a Dubai dream? Is there one dominant dream or scattered dreams? Dream dream or Dubai dreams?
Appendix E: Guiding Questions for Expat Interview

1. Can you describe how you first found out about Dubai? Describe how you imagined Dubai would be before you come?
2. Can you describe the major factors, which pushed you to leave your home country and those factors that pulled you to Dubai?
3. Can you describe the story of your journey to Dubai? (Include as many details as possible, visa, work arrangements, living arrangements, saying goodbye)
4. How would you describe the differences or similarities from Dubai to the country or city you came from? (Infrastructure, culture, society, work environment)?
5. Can you tell me what factors your think impact life and experiences different people have in the UAE? Start firstly with yourself, what factors do you think impact your life and experiences in the UAE? And then highlight what factors impact the experiences of other groups in society?
6. Can you describe how you believe an outsider might think of Dubai? How would you describe Dubai as a global city for an outsider with your insight?
7. How would you compare Dubai and Abu Dhabi? Also, can you describe what is unique about Dubai compared to other global cities (name city of comparison).
8. How would you describe the society or culture in Dubai?
9. Can you describe your relationships to other groups of workers and people in the population here (locals, expats, labourers)?
10. Do you see yourself as belonging in Dubai?
11. Can you describe the major differences in your life in Dubai from your country of origin or countries where you have lived and worked before?
12. We have heard the idea of the American dream, can you describe a Dubai dream?
13. How would you describe the personality of Dubai?