THE “PARIS PROBLEM” IN TORONTO:
THE STATE, SPACE, AND THE POLITICAL FEAR OF “THE IMMIGRANT”

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ABSTRACT

The “Paris Problem” in Toronto addresses contemporary debates on place-based urban policies in the “immigrant neighbourhoods” of Western metropolitan centers. Taking the ideologically constructed figure of “the immigrant” seriously, I emphasize the need to examine the relational formation of urban and imperial policies and politics of intervention. Focusing on Toronto (Canada), a city celebrated for its diversity management and tolerance, the central thesis of this dissertation is that the material force of the ruling classes’ political fear of non-White working-class populations and neighbourhoods is central to the formation of place-based urban strategies. This political fear feeds upon a territorialized and racialized security ideology that conceives of non-White working-class spaces as potential spaces of insecurity, political disorder and violence. It is based on this security ideology and its link to “race riots” that the “Paris problem” has become a common reference point in policy circles in Toronto since 2005. I show how this territorialized and racialized security ideology is camouflaged within a liberal humanitarian ideology that renders non-White working-class spaces as spaces simultaneously in need of securitization and tutelage. Such a rendition parallels the perceptions of “ungoverned spaces” in the “war on terror.” I examine major place-based social development policies (Priority Neighbourhoods, Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020), place-based housing redevelopment policy (Tower Renewal), and national and urban policing strategies, providing the first comprehensive socio-historical analysis of place-based urban policy targeting non-White poverty in Toronto that began in the 1990s. I have traced the ideological formation and transformation of major policy techniques like mapping and policy concepts such as: poverty, security, policing, development, empowerment, social determinants of health, equity and prevention across various scales and temporalities. Instead of eradicating or reducing poverty, the goal of such policies is to constitute a liberal “post-colonial” poor, one who is eminently less threatening to the political stability of imperialist capitalism. My research shows that the state can mobilize place-based policy as a modality of neo-colonial pacification. Not reducible to a product of neoliberalization, such a policy recomposes colonial relations of domination by moderating violence and pacifying perceived threats to the existing order.
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INTRODUCTION

The “Paris Problem” in Toronto

On January 15, 2015, just a week after the fatal shootings at the office of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris, on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean Christopher Hume, the “progressive” columnist of the Toronto Star, warned the readers of Canada’s highest-circulation newspaper about the similarities between “the French capital’s notorious banlieues” and “the old inner suburbs of Toronto.” Hume began his article by reminding readers that the Kouachi brothers were born and raised in the banlieues of Paris, where they “faced lives of poverty, frustration, anger and alienation.” For him, this scenario is not unique to France. Rather, it is “a familiar narrative of rage and resentment [that] is being played out across Europe and North America” (Hume 2015a). And Toronto is no exception.

Hume’s concern with a possible outburst of violence in Toronto is place-specific (“the old inner suburbs of Toronto”) and has a particular demographic composition (“60% immigrants”). While these neighbourhoods “are not as bleak as those around Paris,” Hume argued that “they can be just as isolating – physically, economically and socially. The building stock – mostly concrete and highrise – offers little in the way of a public realm, and what does exist is often degraded and dangerous.” While Toronto is “more tolerant and inclusive,” “many highrise suburban communities desperately need to be remade to 21st-century standards.” How is this twenty-first century development project possible? Interestingly, Hume directed readers to the latest place-based housing redevelopment policy of the City of Toronto: Tower Renewal. “We need,” he signed off his article, “more programs like tower renewal” (Hume 2015a; also see Hume 2015b).

Why the comparison between Paris and Toronto? Why propose the City’s housing redevelopment project as a strategy to nullify a potential spread of violence? Was Hume’s comparison a logical outcome of sensational journalism? It is tempting to nod yes and move on. After all, in the “post-9/11” world order, the Western countries’ tolerance of insecurity within their own borders has shrunk to zero. And without a doubt, there is a dose of sensationalism in Hume’s fear-mongering about Toronto’s postwar suburbs.¹ Yet, this is not the whole story. As I argue in this

¹ Throughout this dissertation, I use “postwar suburbs” as a reference to the urban spaces produced in the postwar era, from 1945 to the late 1970s. After the 1998 municipal amalgamation of the old City of Toronto and its postwar suburbs, these latter areas are referred to as “inner suburbs” in policy and public discourses, with “inner” signalling a reference to being within the municipal boarders of the City of Toronto. My use of
dissertation, nothing about Hume’s article is purely sensational or a matter of coincidence. More than sensational, Hume’s fear is political. It is about the political fear of the precarious, poor non-White working class (referred to in state and public discourses as “the immigrant”) in Toronto. This dissertation is about the relational formation of urban policy and imperial policy through examining the ideological production of the figure of “the immigrant” and “immigrant neighbourhoods” as the objects of political fear and as the targets of state intervention. I do this by providing a socio-historical analysis of place-based urban policy targeting non-White poverty in Toronto that began in the 1990s.

What is the figure of “the immigrant” in Toronto? It is important to differentiate between the immigrant as an official status in Canada that is defined by Statistics Canada and the figure of “the immigrant,” which is the reference of analysis in this dissertation. Statistics Canada’s latest approved definition of immigrant status refers to a person who is or has ever been a landed immigrant/permanent resident. A landed/permanent resident is a person who has been granted the right to live in Canada permanently by immigration authorities. Immigrants are either Canadian citizens by naturalization (the citizenship process) or permanent residents (landed immigrants) under Canadian legislation. Some immigrants have resided in Canada for a number of years, while others have arrived recently. Most immigrants are born outside of Canada, but a small number are born in Canada (Statistics Canada 2011).

What I refer to throughout this dissertation as the figure of “the immigrant” is different from official immigrant status. The figure of “the immigrant” is an ideological construct produced by state and public discourses. It is not a reference to all those with immigrant status. Rather, as an ideological construct, the figure of “the immigrant” is a historically specific articulation of the racist and class-based structures of Canadian society and economy. “The immigrant” is an abstract and racialized figure that, given the geopolitics of immigration to Canada since the late twentieth century, signifies non-White populations and increasingly non-White working-class populations.

2 Unless stated, the category of non-White in this dissertation does not include the indigenous populations in Canada. The lack of attention here to the indigenous question is partly related to the limited scope of the dissertation and partly due to the fact that none of the policies under study directly target the indigenous populations in Toronto. However, as we will see in Chapters One and Seven, there are some historical links among the policies under scrutiny here and state targeting of the indigenous populations in Toronto and Canada.

3 Throughout this dissertation, I focus on and refer to a particular form of urban policy: place-based urban policies of development and policing targeting neighbourhoods characterized by the concentration of predominantly non-White poverty.
regardless of their place of birth or official status in Canada. While the current figure of “the immigrant” encompasses various forms of racism (anti-Black, anti-Muslim racisms), not all forms of racism in Canada (for example, anti-indigenous racism) are codified by it. There are of course other racialized, gendered and stigmatized figures in Toronto (e.g. the figures of the native, the migrant, the Black, the Muslim, the single mom). We will see that these have their own specific ideological histories, which are also intertwined with and help construct the figure of “the immigrant” in Toronto (e.g. the Black, the Muslim). My overall point is, however, that “the immigrant” has become a homogenizing reference point for (poor) non-White working class populations in Toronto precisely because of the abstract, racialized and class-based logic it embodies.

My focus on “the immigrant” should not be taken as an attempt to homogenize the uneven characters of the working-class and non-White working class populations in Toronto, and, to simplify the complexity of the structural and socio-spatial relationships between immigrant status, racism, gender and class relations in Canada. Rather, my focus here has to do with the prominence of the figure of “the immigrant” among the policymakers and place-based policies targeting the concentration of non-White poverty in Toronto. In fact, in focusing on the figure of “the immigrant” my aim is precisely to highlight how the ideological construct of this figure has erased the uneven realities and complexities of immigration, racism, gender, and class relations in Toronto (and Canada). The figure of “the immigrant” and consequently the conceived spaces (Lefebvre 1991) of “immigrant neighbourhoods” that are under scrutiny in this dissertation are grounded in (and abstracts from) real-existing but complex spatial concentration of non-White working class and non-White poverty in Toronto.

Christopher Hume was not the first to compare Toronto and Paris by mobilizing a security discourse focused on peripheralized urban spaces. Rather, his concern for Toronto’s postwar suburbs is the latest manifestation of a security ideology central to what has become known as the “Paris problem” in Toronto. This particular way of comparing Toronto and Paris goes back to 2005, when France witnessed one of its most intense rebellions against state power. In the same year, Toronto faced a spike in gun-related murders among its non-White youths across the city’s

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4 My focus on the figure of “the immigrant” here is quite specific in relation to state security and racial ideologies in Toronto, Canada. Given space and time limitations, I have not explored in detail other aspects of the figure of “the immigrant” such as its gendered dimension, which I believe requires a separate focus of its own to hash out its complexities.

5 This means they cannot be uncritically generalized to other geographies of non-White populations in the Greater Toronto Area or other Canadian cities.
postwar suburbs, which resulted in 2005 being called “the year of the gun.” More than temporal proximity, however, it was a territorialized and racialized security ideology that brought Toronto and Paris together in that particular year and afterwards.

In December 2005, a young White female bystander was accidentally shot dead on Boxing Day in downtown Toronto. This penetration of gun violence into the social space of Toronto’s supposedly prosperous and peaceful downtown quickly fixated attention on marginalized highrise neighbourhoods in the city’s postwar suburbs inhabited by majority non-White working-class populations. Suddenly, a “new problem” was named in Toronto: the “Paris problem.” Media pundits and politicians found much in common between Toronto’s “growing immigrant underclass” and those who ignited the “ethnic uprisings” in the Parisian banlieues (Valpy 2005; Jouanneau 2005).

As I discuss in this dissertation, Toronto’s “Paris problem” was not born out of the blue in 2005. The “Paris problem” is a reinvention of the pre-existing “immigrant” problematic. “The immigrant” problematic in Toronto (and Canada more broadly) is an ambiguous question loaded with its own historical specificities. Facing a labour shortage in the aftermath of World War II, by the late 1960s the White-settler colony of the British Empire in North America had adopted a seemingly colour-blind immigration policy to attract labour from outside of the United States and Europe. At the same time, the political fear of Quebec separatism, coupled with other European ethnic recognition demands, culminated in 1971 in the federal policy of multiculturalism. Since then state recognition of the (non-White) immigrant – albeit as a second-class citizen – as part of Canada’s multicultural identity has been used to showcase Canada’s “tolerance,” “openness,” and “peaceful” diversity. It was in reference to this liberal multicultural identity that in 1998 the newly amalgamated City of Toronto chose its current motto: Diversity Our Strength!

Yet alongside this flowery, culturalized image of Toronto’s (and Canada’s) diversity, an image essential to Canadian identity since the late twentieth century and celebrated by all political parties (including many on the left), there exists the dark side of “the immigrant” problematic. The lack of political will to unsettle systemic racism in the labour market and beyond combined with neoliberalization and uneven development has only reinforced economic apartheid, spatio-racial

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6 The postwar era is in fact the period that Whiteness in Canada changed meaning. Official inclusion of non-White Others in Canada’s labour force and “multicultural” identity resulted in the Whitening of Other (non-British, non-French) Europeans from Southern and Eastern Europe, as well as the Irish and the Jewish populations. One can refer to the election of the Jewish Nathan Phillips (a member of the Conservative Party) as the mayor of Toronto in 1949 as a symbol of the already weakening rule of the Orange Order and the changing meaning of Whiteness in this period.
fragmentation, and the concentration of non-White poverty in the country’s major cities. As the demographic compositions of major cities have actually become more diversely colourful, the figure of “the immigrant” (increasingly a non-White working-class body) and their everyday living spaces have become the target of a systematically normalized White anxiety. “The immigrant” and their everyday spaces, the very raw materials for Canada’s labour force and commodified cultural tolerance, have been demonized, with varying intensities, for being a “threat” to Canadian “values,” “way of life” and democracy and for causing the “threats” of concentrated poverty, “gangs and guns,” drugs, “violence,” “radicalization,” “terrorism,” and even the recent rise of hard-right populism in electoral politics in Toronto (Razack 1999; Kinsman, Buse, and Steedman 2000; Bannerji 2000; Sharma 2001, 2011; Siciliano 2010; James 2012; Kipfer and Saberi 2014).

It is in this broader context that the blazing uprising of the French banlieues in 2005 was echoed in a discourse of security beyond TV channels and newspaper pages in Toronto. Within the last decade, influential forces, from media pundits to the Toronto Board of Trade (the major voice of capital in local politics), the United Way (the major philanthro-capitalist body in local politics), and urban policy makers as well as architects, urbanists, and academics have all implicitly or explicitly pointed to the “Paris problem” as a threat to Toronto’s “peaceful” diversity, competitiveness, and world-class reputation. These socio-political forces have also been aggressively advocating for spatially targeted intervention (or place-based urban policy) in Toronto’s poverty-ridden neighbourhoods.

In the same year, these forces quickly linked Toronto’s “Paris problem” to the concentration of non-White poverty in the city’s postwar suburbs. In early 2006, the City of Toronto and its civil-society partners rolled out Toronto’s first place-based urban policy in targeted neighbourhoods across postwar suburbs. This pre-emptive place-based urban policy was composed of a spatially targeted social development strategy, the Priority Neighbourhoods (PN) strategy, followed by a spatially targeted policing strategy, Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS) (Siciliano 2010:11–15). The phrase “priority neighbourhood” soon became a stigmatized code word for Toronto’s “ungoverned” spaces characterized by concentrated non-White poverty and violence.

It was not a matter of coincidence that a decade later, Hume (2015a, 2015b) linked “priority neighbourhoods” to “radicalization” and advocated the Tower Renewal program as a constructive urban strategy to counter “home-grown radicalization.” Tower Renewal is a continuation of the above-mentioned place-based urban policy in Toronto. It is an ambitious long-
term multi-phase project of housing renewal *without* demolition, specifically targeting rental apartment buildings and their surroundings in the majority non-White, poor neighbourhoods in Toronto’s postwar suburbs. This housing renewal strategy is part of the City’s latest place-based urban policy, *Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020* (TSNS 2020), which replaced the *Priority Neighbourhoods* strategy in 2012.7

**The Relational Formation of Urban and Imperial Policies and Politics**

The rolling out of place-based urban policy to tackle urban poverty is not new. Within the last two decades, place-based urban policy has increasingly become the mantra and blueprint for states’ strategies of targeted intervention in the poor neighbourhoods of metropolitan centres across North America and Western Europe. The solution to geographical and “racialized” concentration of poverty and extreme uneven development in imperial metropoles is, we are told, to target problem localities and to craft particular policies to address their particular plights. Targeted state-spatial strategies have become the new dominant ideology among policymakers, and their use is not limited to social and physical development strategies. Increasingly, state strategies of policing and security have also mobilized localized approaches (i.e., community policing, targeted policing) and, for the most part, have become officially intertwined with development strategies in both urban “priority zones” of poverty and gentrified zones of supposedly vibrant urbanity – albeit in different forms.

In English-language critical urban literature, the recent popularity of place-based approaches in urban policy is conceived as the result of the processes of neoliberalization (Harvey 1989a, 1989b; Jessop 1994, 2002, 2009; Brenner and Theodor 2002; Brenner 2004; Smith 1996, 2002; Peck and Tickel 2002; Peck 2004; Wacquant 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b, 2010). While these analyses have been constructive in many ways, the articulation of urban policy is only realized in relation to the political economy of capitalism rather than to the totality of neo-colonial

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7 Throughout this dissertation, “the City” is a reference to Toronto’s municipal government, the City of Toronto.

8 In recent years in the Canadian context, the term racialized has come to stand for non-White. As Himani Bannerji (1995, 2000) has argued, this association is problematic precisely because it erases and normalizes the historical complexities of power relations in the colonial project of racialization through which White people are also racialized as White.
imperialist capitalism.\textsuperscript{9} For example, scholars have paid little to no attention to the role of state-led strategies of development and policing in neighbourhoods characterized by the concentration of predominantly non-White poverty and the neo-colonial dimensions of state power and everyday life in the imperial metropole.\textsuperscript{10} This is important in our case, since a mere emphasis on neoliberalism does not tell us much about why the spectre of the “Paris problem” carries such weight in justifying state-led urban intervention in Toronto’s poor neighbourhoods.

This gap in knowledge about the politics of state urban intervention in poor neighbourhoods also has serious political implications for understanding the complex and uneven nature of the working-class reality and state strategies aiming to nullify working-class resistance and unrest in Western metropolitan centres. This is even a more urgent issue in Toronto, where critical urban research is still in its infancy. Although the current place-based urban policies targeting poverty in the city goes back to the early 1990s and have been implemented in the “priority neighbourhoods” for more than a decade now, aside from a few studies on selected aspects of such state-led interventions (Kipfer and Petrunia 2009; Siciliano 2010; Heroux 2011; Cowen and Parlette 2011; August and Walks 2012; Kipfer and Goonewardena 2014) there does not exist any comprehensive critical analysis of the formation of place-based urban policy targeting poverty. My dissertation provides this important yet missing socio-historical analysis of the ideological dimensions of actually existing state-led interventions. This analysis is also important for understanding the trajectory of urban politics in Toronto, precisely because these urban interventions are the product of the systematic contradictions of uneven urban development under imperialist capitalism and the contradictions of former state interventions.

In writing the socio-historical analysis of place-based urban policy in Toronto, while engaging with and building upon the current critical urban literature, I also differentiate my approach from that literature in three important ways. First, I take as my entry point the subject position of those human beings whose subjectivities and living spaces are the targets of state-led

\textsuperscript{9} By neo-colonial, I refer to the continuity and re-composition of colonial relations of domination after official decolonization in the early second half of the twentieth century. The concept does not apply to the indigenous question in Canada.

\textsuperscript{10} Throughout this dissertation I use imperial metropole as a reference to metropolitan centres of the imperial core. These are major Western metropolitan centres that have functioned as centres of imperialist power (historically and presently). Toronto, for example, is not just Canada’s major global city, the biggest and most populated and diverse city in Canada. Toronto is also the centre of major political-economic forces of Canadian imperialism. Toronto’s Stock Exchange, for example, is the seat of the mining finance, one of the major forces behind Canadian imperialist intervention across the world. See Klassen (2014); Gordon (2010); Gordon and Webber (2016); Shipley (forthcoming).
strategies of intervention: the precarious non-White working class, codified in public and official discourses as “immigrants.” In doing so, I highlight the centrality of the figure of “the immigrant” and the perceived spaces of “immigrant neighbourhoods” in the formation of place-based urban policy. I emphasize the material force of the ruling classes’ political fear of “immigrant neighbourhoods” – or in other words, the non-White working class (spaces) – in the formation of place-based urban policy targeting poverty and the ways such policies reinforce and reify the political fear of the non-White working class in the imperial metropole.

Second, in my political analysis of place-based urban policy I go beyond the emphasis on neoliberalism. As we will see, historically, this is a false premise. The emergence of place-based urban policy goes back to the 1960s conjuncture in the United States of the Black urban rebellions and Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on Poverty. The fundamental logic of Johnson’s War on Poverty was based on mobilizing development to pacify threats to the existing social-colonial order and to secure that order. Third, following Antonio Gramsci (1971), in engaging with politics and the political fear of “the immigrant” (neighbourhoods), I go beyond the liberal separation between domestic and international, military and civil, and state and civil society, examining the relational formation of urban and imperial policies and politics.

The revival of “the local” in state spatial strategies of development and security has not been limited to imperial metropoles. Rather, since the 1990s, “the local” has increasingly become the sacred lens and space through which development and security strategies addressing the problematic of poverty are being conceived, perceived, and materialized at various scales and in different geographies. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, a vast array of social and political forces, from the policy-circles of the supra-national institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Union (EU), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Coalition Forces to national, regional and metropolitan governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), think-tanks, academic institutions, and urbanists and on to grassroots organizations and oppositional movements – all have mobilized “the local” and celebrated localism along with its affiliated notions of neighbourhood and community. The multi-scalar and multidimensional revival of “the local” in state-led strategies of intervention in “ungoverned” spaces, I suggest, directs us to think through the relational formation of state-led urban and imperial policies and politics.
State, Urban Policy and Neo-colonial Pacification

One of the premises of this dissertation is an understanding of the (bourgeois) state form as a concrete abstraction (Marx) that is composed of the material condensation of relations of forces in society. This understanding follows the insights of Antonio Gramsci (1971), Nicos Poulantzas (2000 [1978]), and Henri Lefebvre (1976b, 1991, 2009). Opposing the conceptual opposition (and spatial separation) of the state and civil society in liberal thought and so following Marx, Gramsci conceptualizes the bourgeois state form as the “integral State.” The integral state is not limited to the machinery of government and legal institutions, but includes the latter; the concept captures the dialectical unity of the moments of civil society and political society embodied by the bourgeois state form (Gramsci 1971: 206–75).11

Almost half a century after Gramsci, Poulantzas (2000:128-29) mobilized Gramsci’s insights to argue for conceptualizing the state as the material condensation of a relationship of forces among classes and class fractions at any historical moment.12 Gramsci and Poulantzas both aimed their formulations to oppose and avoid “the impasse of that eternal counter position of the State as a Thing-instrument and the State as a Subject” (Poulantzas 2000: 129). In a manner similar to Gramsci, Poulantzas criticized the tendency (in particular marxist and liberal articulations) to think of the state only in terms of either ideology or repression.13 Rather, he insisted on the active role of the state in a positive fashion to create, transform, and make reality (Poulantzas 2000: 30). The complexities and contradictions of this active role of the integral state through mobilizing place-based urban policy constitute the subject of this dissertation.14

Writing in the same conjuncture, Henri Lefebvre (1976b, 1991, 2009) provided perhaps the most nuanced articulation of the materiality of the integral state as a condensation of forces. Lefebvre provided a comprehensive analysis of the state’s relation to the material spaces of the national territory, the core and periphery relations, and the state’s own inherent spatiality as a territorial–institutional form. If Gramsci and Poulantzas rightly highlighted that civil society is the

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11 Any reference hitherto to the state is a reference to the integral state, understood as the condensation of relations of force and the dialectical unity of political society and civil society.
12 For the influence of Gramsci on Poulantzas, see Jessop (1985); Sotiris (2014).
13 Poulantzas (2000), for example, directed this critique at Max Weber and Louis Althusser. He found some of Michel Foucault’s insights on the productive dimension of power useful, even though Poulantzas (2000: 36, 44, 149) was critical of Foucault’s conception of power and the state.
14 In fact, Poulantzas argued that for sustained domination and hegemony, “the State continually adopts material measures which are of positive significance for the popular masses, even though these measures represent so many concessions imposed by the struggle of the subordinate classes” (2000:31).
true ground of the state (Gramsci 1971: 193) and as such the state’s policy and intervention must be seen as the result of the class contradictions inscribed in the very structure of the state as a relationship (Poulantzas 2000: 132), Lefebvre pointed out how the state mobilizes diverse spatial strategies and policies not only to manage all at once the intensely volatile social relations of capitalism on worldwide, national, and local scales, but also to create and manage a homogenized, hierarchized, and fragmented social reality, politically, ideologically and spatially. This particular form of social reality is essential for the hegemony and survival of imperialist capitalism (Lefebvre 1976a, 2009; Kipfer 2008).

Building on and extending these insights, the major contributions of this dissertation can be summarized in four theoretical–political claims based on empirical investigations. The first underlying claim is that precisely because of its role in reorganizing space and everyday life, state intervention in the form of place-based urban policy is essential to deepening and sustaining the hegemony of neo-colonial imperialist capitalism. Following Lefebvre (1991), I understand space not as a thing, but as a social product. There is a politics of space, Lefebvre argues, precisely because “space is political and ideological” (2009:171). I argue that place-based urban policy is as much about (reproducing) relations of accumulation (as political-economic-inspired studies tell us) as it is about (reproducing) relations of domination. “Ruling ideas” and ideological struggles, having the aim of recomposing relations of consent and coercion, play important roles here. As the late Stuart Hall reminded us, “ruling ideas are not guaranteed their dominance by their already given couple with ruling classes” (1986:19). Rather, ruling ideas “can only become hegemonic when and where they enter into, modify and transform organic ideologies” – ideologies that touch practical, everyday common sense. Through reproducing relations of domination, place-based urban policy has an important role in making ruling ideas hegemonic.

The second underlying claim is that place-based urban policy’s role in reproducing relations of domination is not simply about individual responsibilization (as neo-Foucauldians have it) or empowering the penal state (as Loïc Wacquant argues). Rather, there is a complex neo-colonial dimension to the function of place-based urban policy. A focus on the political fear of “the immigrant” (neighbourhoods) is eye-opening in this regard. Unpacking the reification of the territorialized and racialized security ideology central to the political fear of “the immigrant” (neighbourhood) is helpful for understanding how, through place-based urban policy targeting non-White poverty, the state recomposes (while reifying) colonial relations of domination in the imperial metropole – what I refer to as the neo-colonial dimension of state intervention. Such
place-based urban policies are imperative to the active role of the state in creating, transforming, and making social reality. Through place-based urban policy, the state aims to secure the production of a neo-colonial urban order by simultaneously recomposing and “humanizing” colonial relations of domination and accumulation through a moderation of the inherent violence of such relations.

The third underlying claim is that to understand the complex and contradictory function of the state as a condensation of the relations of force, we need to situate urban policy in relation to the totality of neo-colonial imperialist capitalism. This requires engaging with the relational formation of urban and imperial policies and politics. To approach this relational formation, one of the major foundations of this dissertation is an engagement with the ideological dimension of the political philosophy of liberalism. De-fetishizing the hagiography of liberalism and its false promises of peace, security, liberty, good order, and democracy has three epistemological consequences for our analysis. First, following Karl Marx (1976), Friedrich Engels (2009 [1845]), Antonio Gramsci (1971), and Michel Foucault (2003), we must reject the liberal ideology of civil peace and instead understand war not as opposite to peace, but as a social relation. Critical urban scholars have taken for granted the liberal ideology of civil peace to the point that this powerful ideology has become invisible in the imperial metropole. One major upshot here is the lack of attention to the role of the state and its ideological apparatuses in the construction of the Excluded Others as the target of political fear, as the “internal enemy,” the “enemies of order.”

Herein lies the second consequence: the liberal ideology of security. As a key concept of liberalism, the ideology of security has been crucial in justifying violence to facilitate a form of liberal order-building in the name of freedom (Neocleous 2008; Losurdo 2011; Bell 2011a). In its liberal rendition, security is about the freedom of capital and private property; it is about the security of socio-spatial relations of domination and accumulation under imperialist capitalism (Bell 2011a; Neocleous 2008). Liberal security has been fundamental to rendering particularized forms of freedom as universal and to coding war as peace in the processes of reordering the social world here and there, near and far. De-congealing the liberal ideology of security directs us to the importance of scrutinizing the developmental and policing dimensions of state intervention in “immigrant neighbourhoods” not as oppositional (which has been the case in critical urban literature), but as necessarily complementary.

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15 Following Bannerji (2011: 36), I use the term de-congeal as a process of unravelling the conceptual fusions and representational bundles of ideology.
The fourth underlying claim is that the convergence of the urban and the military in state interventions is not limited to urbicide and urban militarization and securitization (as the advocates of the “new military urbanism” have it [see Graham 2010]). Rather, in engaging with the relational formation of urban and imperial policies, we also need to scrutinize the productive dimension of war. One way to do so, I suggest, is to translate the recent critical research on pacification (Neocleous 2010, 2013, 2014; Neocleous and Rigakos 2011; Bell 2011b, 2015; Wall, Saberi, and Jackson 2017) into the analysis of place-based urban policy. This is not simply an intellectual exercise in abstract conceptualization and speculation. Rather, once concepts and practices of development, security and state intervention are historicized and spatialized, it is impossible to ignore the historical confluence of localized state strategies of development and security and the practice of pacification. The genealogy of this confluence goes back to the conjuncture of modern colonization, when liberalism found in (international) law a way to capitalize on the productive dimension of war by codifying war as peace and security (Neocleous 2013).

State urban strategies are no exception in this history. I have already traced the historical confluence of town planning, urbanism, and pacification in the colonial context (Saberi, 2017). While the strategic use of town planning in colonial pacification goes back to at least the conquest of the Americas in the late sixteenth century, the systematic appropriation of urbanism as a strategy of pacification with the aim of moderating the violence of colonial domination was born out of the social revolution of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly in the fields of architecture (and later urban planning) and colonial warfare. Here, I highlight the continuation of this confluence in the history of community development throughout the twentieth century, from the Japanese internment camps in the United States of the 1940s to the rural areas of the India of Nehru to the CIA’s pacification strategy in the Philippines, Johnson’s War on Poverty in the American “Black ghettos,” and the US army’s pacification strategy in Vietnam (Immerwahr 2015).

If the history of pacification is an undeniable part of the histories of colonialism, imperialism and war, it is also greatly intertwined with the history of liberal humanitarian ideology. This is perhaps most evident in our “humanitarian present” (Weizman 2011). Since the

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16 In 1573, Phillip II of Spain replaced the idea of conquest with the idea of pacification (Neocleous 2011). In the same year, Phillip II also put forward the “Prescriptions for the Foundations of Hispanic Colonial Towns,” which eventually gave birth to the grid pattern in town (and latter urban) planning. In The Production of Space, Lefebvre (1991) captures this moment in the production of the colonial town, pointing to the imperative spatial dimensions in what Neocleous depicts as the birth of pacification. For more discussion see Saberi (2017).
mid-1980s, we have witnessed the increasing ascendancy of humanitarianism in both international politics and development (Duffield 2010; Roy 2004; Wilson 2012) as well as in imperialist wars (Duffield 2007; Dillon and Reid 2009; Foley 2010; Weizman 2011). Liberal humanitarian ideology, however, is not a phenomenon of the late twentieth century; it has its roots in eighteenth-century liberal thought and the attempts of fractions of the bourgeoisie (and their missionary allies) to ameliorate the violence of industrial capitalism, slavery, and colonization in order to sustain capitalist–colonial domination and accumulation. Liberal humanitarianism is an ideology anchored in a politics of compassion for the misery of the wretched of the world, whether at home (the poor, the immigrants, the homeless, the youth) or farther away (the slaves, the colonized, the victims of famines, epidemics, and wars) (Fassin 2012).

It is useful to recall Frantz Fanon’s emphasis that colonial rule was never based solely on naked force; rather, it was heavily contingent on the more complex and mediated form of violence that is the construction of the colonial subject (Fanon 1967a, 1967b, 2004). It is the critique of the pacifying force of colonial recognition (its psychological, ideological, and material force) that is at the heart of Black Skins, White Masks, a theme later taken up again in The Wretched of Earth. Far from being a source of human emancipation for the colonized, colonial recognition is itself a productive force that reproduces colonial relations of domination (Fanon 2004). If the condition of possibility for humanitarian politics of compassion is, as Fassin (2012) notes, the recognition of the wretched Others as humans (albeit still subordinated), what necessitated the birth and survival of such compassion (albeit in different forms) has its roots in securing domination through the moderating violence (Lester and Dussart 2014; Wilson 2012; Duffield 2010). This is why humanitarian recognition has never recognized the wretched Others as equals. Humanitarian recognition has always worked within the limits of colonial–liberal recognition (Wilson 2012; Fanon 1967), and that is precisely why it has been central to pacification.

The contemporary shift toward “humanitarian” ways of war and development is not limited to the zones of neo-colonial occupations and extractions in former colonies. In fact, in their latest works, the American gurus of pacification such as David Kilcullen (2013) and John Nagl (2014) have shifted their attention to the necessity of conducting pacification in the peripheralized urban spaces of metropolitan centres worldwide. Grasping the fact of an increasingly urbanized world and grounding their analyses in the Malthusian conception of surplus population, the Hobbesian notion of war of all against all, and the Darwinian politics of the survival of the fittest, for Kilcullen and Nagl future insurgencies will increasingly spring from the slums of the Global South and the
banlieues of the Global North rather than from the mountains of Afghanistan. The military, we are
told, should shift its focus to urban pacification and resiliency and to learning and appropriating
lessons from the fields of community policing through to urban planning. Taking this history
seriously directs us to the ways place-based urban policy can function as a modality of neo-
colonial pacification in the imperial metropole of the early twenty-first century.

Methodology and Methods

To historicize is to humanize, and to detach ideas from their own material and
practical setting is to lose our points of human contact with them. (Ellen Meiksins
Wood, 2008:14)

Ideology is indeed a mystification; however, it is a mystification that arises from –
and thus corresponds to – a particular moment in the historical development of
human social and productive relations. (Himani Bannerji, 2016:210)

[H]ow could we come to understand a genesis, the genesis of the present, along
with the preconditions and processes involved, other than by starting from that
present, working our way back to the past and then retracing our steps? (Henri
Lefebvre, 1991:66, emphasis in the original)

While actively engaging with various disciplines and sub-disciplines (urban studies,
political geography, social and political theory, international relations, critical security studies), I
consciously refuse delimiting my research to disciplinary boundaries. Rather, I envision this
project as a contribution to critical knowledge of the dialectics of space, politics, and revolution.
My aim is to provide the socio-historical analysis of place-based urban policy in Toronto. For this
purpose, I follow the tradition of historical materialism. Besides the works of Marx and Engels
(1976), my approach to historical materialism has been influenced by the insights of Himani
Lefebvre (1991). Bannerji’s work on knowledge and ideology, Wood’s work on the social history
of political theory, Smith’s institutional ethnography (IE), and Lefebvre’s work on space have
formed and sharpened my understanding of historicizing and spatializing ideas.

Following Wood’s thinking in writing socio-historical analysis of place-based urban policy,
my aim is to explore the historical conditions in which such policy was invented and how it has
developed in the specific historical context of Toronto of the late twentieth and early twenty-first
elaboration of Marx’s historical-materialist method – is useful. Lefebvre’s dialectical method entails
starting from a description and observation of the present and its contradictions, then moving on to an explanation of the historical production of the present (by returning to the emergence of concepts and exploring their concrete affiliations, detours and associations, and how they are linked to the general history of society and philosophy), and from there progressing to the present and evaluating future possibilities and impossibilities present in the current contradictions (Kofman and Lebas 1996:9).

In writing this socio-historical analysis, I am most concerned with what in *The German Ideology* Marx and Engels called “ruling ideas,” or dominant ideologies:

> The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e., the class which is the ruling *material force* of society is at the same time its ruling *intellectual force*. The class which has the material means of production at its disposal, consequently also controls the means of mental production, so that the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are on the whole subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relations, the dominant material relations grasped as ideas; hence of the relations which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. (Marx and Engels 1976: 67)

It is through the critique of ideology and ideological knowledge that I write about place-based urban policy and its role in the construction of “the immigrant” (neighbourhoods) as the object of political fear and the target of state intervention in Toronto’s working-class neighbourhoods. Why such an emphasis on ideology and urban policy? The question of ideology is at the heart of the question of knowledge. As Himani Bannerji has stated in another context:

> no revolutionary, that is, genuinely emancipatory, social transformation is possible without a comprehensive and reliable knowledge of the society that needs to be transformed. (2011:24)

Within the last two decades, the ruling classes have become aware of the contradictions of the socio-spatial and racial relations of capitalist uneven development in Toronto. The mainstream popularity of certain concepts such as exclusion, socio-economic polarization, spatial segregation, marginalization, and equity speaks to an awareness of specifically urban contradictions in society. This awareness, I suggest, is linked to the ruling classes’ political fear of a crisis of the entire social formation in Toronto, both its economic content and its political form – to speak with Gramsci. The ideological dimension of a crisis, as the late Stuart Hall and his co-authors (1978:219) emphasized in *Policing the Crisis*, is crucial in producing consent to “the interpretations and representations of social reality generated by those who control the mental, as well as the material,
means of social reproduction” and “to the measure of control and containment which this version of social reality entails” (1978:221).

Today, in comparison to state policies of austerity, the state’s mobilization of urban policy to target concentrated (non-White) poverty in imperial metropolitan centres and its relation to everyday struggles of the working class hardly occupies any space in left politics. Part of the reason is that the urban question has not yet firmly registered on the radar of marxist political analyses of the conditions of the working class in the imperial metropole. For the most part, the urban question is relegated to the realm of specialists: geographers, urbanists, architects, planners, and policymakers. It is the knowledge produced in these specialist realms about the crisis of concentrated non-White poverty that is the focus of my critique and analysis. This is not to say that any form of specialist knowledge is ideological in essence. Rather, the point is to scrutinize the specific relations between science–knowledge and dominant ideologies and the ways state power is ideologically legitimized in the modality of scientific technique (to speak with Poulantzas). More than forty years ago, Lefebvre too highlighted the ideological power of specialist knowledge in The Production of Space.

Surely it is the supreme illusion to defer to architects, urbanists or planners as being experts or ultimate authorities in matters relating to space. What the “interested parties” here fail to appreciate is that they are bending their demands (from below) to suit commands (from above), and that this unforced renunciation on their part actually runs ahead of the wishes of manipulators of consciousness. The real task, by contrast, is to uncover and stimulate demands even at the risk of their wavering in face of the imposition of oppressive and repressive commands. (1991[1974]:95, emphasis in the original)

Ideology, in the sense that Marx and Engels defined it in The German Ideology, is not only about representations or a constellation of a body of ideas and discursivities. Rather, as Bannerji emphasizes, for Marx and Engels ideology is “an epistemological procedure rather than merely an amalgamated content” (2016:210). Ideology, Bannerji (2011:236) argues, “is the [epistemological] process of creating a dehistoricized and dehistoricizing body of content – of representations of reality” that simultaneously also erases and distorts reality. The solution to the problem of ideology in Marx’s sense, Bannerji notes, “lies in considering the “content” of ideology or ideological thought objects as crucial for an understanding of hegemony” as “the productive process of ideology” (2011:35). As Smith (1990, 2004) reminds us, ideology’s social organization is an aspect of ruling regimes. Geographical and urbanist procedures legislate a reality rather than discover one – to paraphrase Smith.
Besides engaging with the content of “ruling ideas” in the formation of place-based urban policy, I also engage with their producers as well as ruling individuals and the socio-spatial relations of the content of their production. For this purpose, I used three tools for my empirical investigation: textual analysis, key informant interviews, and participant observation.

Textual Analysis of Policy and Media Sources:

Textual analysis of policy and media sources is one of the major methods in this dissertation. Following Dorothy Smith I approach texts as constituents of social relations (1990). I understand the aim of textual analysis as being the uncovering of the ideological practices that produce a certain kind of knowledge practical to the task of ruling. From this perspective, policy texts are a form of construction of ideological knowledge through the practices of historical blocs that also come to shape the materialization of those very practices – albeit ones riddled with contradictions. I conceive historical-materialist textual analysis as being different from discourse analysis (dominant in Foucauldian approaches), as the former has a commitment to ideology critique that aims to situate the text within the broader context of and in relation to the overall process of knowledge production, including the process and context of the production of the text. Another differentiated aspect is a commitment to relate textual analysis to concrete social reality by investigating how such policy discourses, once implemented, come to affect people’s lived experiences. Textual analysis is thus more than an interpretation of the utterances of policymakers. A historical-materialist analysis of policy texts is an attempt to uncover the social relations that allow such utterances to become common sense – to speak with Gramsci.

For this purpose, I highlight the a priori claims implicit in policy texts (i.e., essentialism, homogenization, ungrounded abstractions, ahistorical universalism) that invite us to perceive and conceive social reality (i.e., poverty, violence, security) outside of history, thereby occluding socially lived times, spaces, and experiences. I also scrutinize the political role of academics, experts, and specialists in normalizing the rampant ideological deployment of common-sense concepts (such as the immigrant, suburb, neighbourhood, security, development) and generalities (such as culture, violence, and democracy) in policy texts under the guise of objectivity and scientificity. I draw attention to how the illusion of objectivity reifies socio-spatio-historical relations and practical political imperatives that rest within the prevailing common-sense racism.
integral to stereotypes such as “the immigrant” while legitimizing the coexistence of capital, class, and spatio-racialized inequalities.

For this purpose, I drew on three types of policy texts: 1) official policy papers released by supra-national institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, OECD and WHO; 2) official state proceedings, press releases, and policy papers produced by federal, provincial, and municipal governments and their police agencies; and 3) policies, reports, and research papers produced by NGOs and academic institutions in Toronto. For this latter set of texts, my focus was directed towards four interrelated socio-political forces of knowledge production, including philanthropy (United Way, CivicAction), private sector/business (Toronto Board of Trade), academies (University of Toronto), and specialists/urbanists (E.R.A. Architects, Centre for Urban Growth and Renewal).

I used the media as a source for analyzing the public discourse pertaining to the questions of non-White poverty, “the immigrant,” postwar suburbs, policing, and violence in Toronto. The primary sources of mainstream media texts are The Toronto Star, The Globe and Mail, The National Post, and Toronto Life. Where appropriate, I also looked at alternative media sources and the reports and public statements of BASICnews and the Jane-Finch Action against Poverty. For the analysis of the media, I created an archive of articles pertaining to different themes of the policies under study. Part of this archive was generated through daily reading of newspapers and later supplemented through keyword searches in media databases (between 1990 and 2015). I organized these articles by coding them based on specific themes (Cope 2010) such as “the immigrant,” poverty, crime, (in)security, priority neighbourhoods, underdevelopment, territorial stigmatization, racialization, policing, and so on.

Key Informant Interviews:

Between June 2013 and March 2014 I conducted 37 key informant interviews with individuals within and adjacent to organizations and institutions involved in the production and implementations of place-based urban policy in Toronto. These included: City of Toronto (11 interviews); local politicians (3 interviews); United Way (3 interviews); Toronto Police Services (3 interviews); Academics (3 interviews); Community organization staff (4 interviews); Urbanists (2

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17 Interviewees were given the option of remaining anonymous or not. Almost 95% of the interviewees chose to remain anonymous.
interviews); Community activists (6 interviews); Rental high rise landlords (2 interviews); Public Interest research institute (1 interview).

The interviews were an hour long on average. They were semi-structured (Longhurst 2010; Valentine 2005; Fontana and Frey 2000), given that my goal of interviewing key informants was to gain partial insights into the meanings people attributes to their actions and the processes that operate in particular social contexts. In this regard, I concur with Gill Valentine’s argument that “choosing who to interview is therefore often a theoretically motivated decision” (2005:112). All interviews were transcribed line-by-line and coded thematically to supplement the specific lines of inquiry identified through textual analysis of policies.

Participant Observation:

Between December 2012 and April 2015, I conducted fifteen participant observations. These included public meetings, community consultations, town halls, and a design workshop organized by Architecture for Humanity Toronto and Ryerson University (see Appendix B). The majority of these events were organized by major players involved with the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 and Tower Renewal. I recoded field notes for each event and thematically coded these data to augment my textual and interview analyses of specific aspects of policies under study.

The Dissertation in Brief

This dissertation is organized in three sections. Section One provides a theoretical intervention in the current critical urban literature on place-based urban policy. Chapter One starts with an overview of the existing critical urban literature on place-based urban policy. The bulk of this literature has been influenced either by the political-economic or neo-Foucauldian theoretical perspectives, or a combination of both. From urban geography to urban sociology, scholars have linked the popularity of place-based urban policy to the revival of “the local” in state spatial strategies in North America and Western Europe. They have examined the revival of “the local” more rigorously in relation to the processes of neoliberalization since the late 1970s. Engaging with this literature and “the local” turn at various scales, I identify three major inter-related pitfalls: 1) understanding place-based policy solely in relation to neoliberalism; 2) fragmenting the
development and security dimensions of state strategies; and 3) reading politics off of economic crisis, or reducing it to discourse.

I highlight the emergence of place-based urban policy in an earlier conjuncture – the 1960s, through Lyndon B. Johnson’s unleashing of The War on Poverty. The immediate (urban and national) and worldwide contexts of the late 1960s and early 1970s were imperative. It is in this conjuncture that poverty emerged as a national and an international security issue, closely linked to the political fear of the Black urban rebellion and Black radicalism in American cities and of anti-colonial wars of insurgency in (semi-) colonies. The centrality of the political fear of Black rebellions and radicalism in the emergence of place-based urban policy reminds us of the impossibility of reading politics off of economic crisis or reducing it to discourse. I suggest that the insights of Poulantzas on the state and those of Gramsci on hegemony, politics, and the integral state are useful for developing a historical-materialist approach to the analysis of the politics of state spatial strategies of development and policing that tackle urban poverty and their relation to the hegemony of a neo-colonial capitalist order.

Building on Gramsci’s and Poulantzas’s insights, in Chapter Two, I develop a conceptual framework for analyzing the place-based urban policies of development and policing targeting urban poverty in the imperial metropole. My specific aim here is to situate such state-led strategies in relation to the hegemony of neo-colonial imperialist capitalist order. As such, my starting point is based on two premises: the subject position of the Excluded Other in the imperial metropole and the ideology of liberalism. Directing attention to the current political fear of “the immigrant” neighbourhoods in the Western metropolitan centres, I highlight the historical roots of the current construction of “the immigrant” (neighbourhoods) as a threat to the “security and peace” of the imperial metropole – the bourgeois-colonial political fear of other historical figures in the history of capitalism and colonialism, from the witch and the rabble to the indigent pauper, the proletariat, the colonized, and the revolutionary. What all these historical figures have in common is their real and assumed exclusion from and subversion of capitalist-colonial socio-spatial relations.

Engaging with the liberal ideology of civil peace, I suggest that urban political theory can benefit from theories of social war for the purpose of linking urban politics to international politics in general, and in particular for politicizing and historicizing the racialized and territorialized security ideologies central to the construction of “the immigrant” (neighbourhood) as the object of political fear and target of state intervention. One way to do so is to translate the recent critical
research on pacification. Bringing together the works of Mark Neocleous, Henri Lefebvre, Frantz Fanon, and Himani Bannerji can allow us to translate the three fundamental ideologies (the internal enemy, order, participation) upon which pacification functions for examining place-based urban policy targeting non-White poverty in the imperial metropole.

Section Two focuses on a historicized account of the processes and socio-political forces central to the formation of place-based urban policy in Toronto. Chapter Three sets the broader historical context within which the local state targeted urban poverty and the poor in Toronto. In contrast to the current research that points to the 2004 publication of *Poverty by Postal Code* by the United Way and the “year of the gun,” I trace the “discovery” of the crisis of non-White poverty in Toronto to the 1990s. It was in the midst of multi-scale neoliberal restructuring, the shift to the “end-of-poverty” politics at the international scale, the re-articulation of the “immigrant problem” in Canada, the slow recovering of Toronto’s economy from the shocks of the 1989 recession, the increasing racial and political tensions in the city, the explosion of homelessness in downtown Toronto, and the gradual rise of an urban-based philanthro-capitalist force in urban politics that poverty became both the target of aggressive policing and an object of investigation and intervention for the local state.

I continue this discussion in Chapter Four by examining the ideological construction of concentrated non-White poverty as a security issue. A major contribution of this chapter is looking at how – at the time of neoliberal restructuring, extreme uneven development and socio-racial segregation in Toronto – an emerging powerful liberal humanitarian ideology would dehistoricize and distort social reality (poverty, non-White working class, uneven development, segregation, violence). Despite its innocent façade, this ideology is deeply intertwined with a territorialized and racialized security ideology focused on the figure of “the immigrant,” which simultaneously depicts poverty as a humanitarian crisis and as a threat to capitalist growth and political stability. This territorialized and racialized conception of poverty is linked, on the one hand, to the broader “immigrant problem” in the Global North as a source of insecurity and poverty and, on the other hand, to the dominant worldwide ideological trends of understanding poverty as risk, as the result of disconnection from the socio-spatial relations of imperialist capitalism.

I also look at the role of particular ideologies of space in the territorialized and racialized conception of poverty as security crisis. Hierarchized, fragmented, and homogenized conceptions of space are imperative here. It is not just poverty but concentrated non-White poverty in the peripheralized spaces of Toronto (homogenized and hierarchized as “inner suburbs”) that is seen
as the problem space. It is the concentration of non-White poverty in these peripheralized spaces that is perceived as a double-crisis: a humanitarian crisis and a security crisis. Throughout the chapter, I also examine the role of powerful fractions of the bourgeois ruling class, a coalition of pro-urban bourgeois forces, in framing poverty as an object of state-led investigation and intervention. Here in particular I focus on the role of the United Way as the most powerful philanthropic organization in local politics.

Section Three is based on the period from 2005 to 2015, during which time place-based urban policy became the policy solution to the problematic of concentrated non-White poverty in Toronto. Here I simultaneously look at the relational formation of development and security dimensions of place-based urban policy and the relational formation of urban and imperial policies. I start with the ideological formation of various state strategies of policing in Chapter Five. One of the major premises of this chapter is that police power has both coercive and productive dimensions. My contribution here is a critical examination of how police strategies in Toronto and Canada have increasingly gravitated towards pacification strategies through an emphasis on prevention and the social determinants of health. I examine how the ideological ascendency of prevention in community policing in Toronto has taken place, on the one hand, in relation to conceptualizing crime and violence as disease and the popularity of the concept in other places, particularly in the British policing strategies. On the other hand, prevention in community policing needs to be understood in relation to the primacy of prevention and resiliency in international security politics and the return to the fore of pacification in the imperialist strategies of the “long war.”

By focusing on the relational formation of “the gang” problem, “the immigrant” problem, and “terrorism” in Toronto, I also show the centrality of the political fear of “the immigrant” in the re-envisioning of community policing and examine how the ascendency of prevention in Toronto’s policy circles was the outcome of systematic policy mobilities across time, geography, and scale. This formation is linked to the elevation of prevention in imperial policies, from the coming to the fore of pacification strategies in zones of imperial war to health policies of the World Health Organization (WHO). Similar to imperialist pacification strategies, the goal of preventive community policing is not the elimination of the “enemies of order.” Rather, the goal is to moderate violence, to build resiliency among those considered “at-risk” of becoming “enemies of order,” and to nullify the gang-allure of “us” against the state.
Chapter Six focuses on the unfolding of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy (2005–2012) and its important role in the ideological construction of “immigrant” neighbourhoods and residents as targets of political fear and in need of humanitarian state intervention. I do so by tracing the importance of prevention and mapping in the Priority Neighbourhood strategy. Linking the main concepts of the Priority Neighbourhood strategy to those in current policing strategies and international development and humanitarianism, I examine the ideological dimensions of concepts such as empowerment, participation, and economic integration. I show how instead of eradicating or even aiming to reduce poverty, the goal of development for the “post-colonial” poor is about constituting a low-income individual, less threatening to the political stability of imperialist capitalism.

The ideological parallels in place-based urban policy in Toronto and imperial policy are not limited to the dominance of particular concepts. Here I also examine the increasing political and economic power of philanthro-capitalist forces, such as the United Way, in crafting and implementing urban policies of intervention in relation to the broader NGOization of politics and the corporatization of activism. The rolling out of the Priority Neighbourhood strategy also initiated the forceful ascendency of a knowledge production industry in Toronto. Here, my major focus is on mapping as a form of scientific (thus assumedly objective) knowledge. Challenging the objectivity of mapping and the conceptual links of maps in place-based urban policy to imperial maps of “ungoverned” spaces, I argue that maps and mapping simultaneously reify and reinforce the territorialized and racialized security ideology about “the immigrant” problem. Mapping has also justified the elevation of the scale of neighbourhood (detached from its broader context) as the quintessential territorial unit of analysis and intervention to solve the problem of urban poverty.

Chapter Seven continues this discussion by focusing on the formation of Toronto’s lasted place-based urban policy, *Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020* (TSNS 2020) from 2011 to 2015. I trace the relational formation of Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020 and imperial policies of development and security by focusing on two major components of the place-based policy: the social determinants of health and “equity.” While both components are being celebrated as a progressive move in place-based urban strategy, I argue they represent a positivist (i.e., a quantification of social problems) and liberal humanitarian shift. Tracing the conceptual and historical roots of these concepts from the conjuncture of the 1960s United States to the policy corridors of the WHO and the World Bank, I emphasize the relational formation of urban and imperial policies and the ideological functions of the state’s appeals to “equity” and the social
determinants of health. Taking this history seriously, I suggest, rather than challenging the processes of the production of poverty and violence, the emphasis on equity and social determinants of health are about prevention. The goal is moderating the violence of exploitation and dehumanization to prevent rebellion of the subaltern.

I also examine how the liberal humanitarian ideology that mobilizes equity and the social determinants of health in place-based urban policy has facilitated the reification of the powerful territorialized and racialized security ideology central to the political fear of the non-White working class (“the immigrant”) in Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020. Here in particular, I highlight how the political fear of “race riots” emanating from the city’s “priority neighbourhoods” is ingrained in the formation of Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020. Similar to the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy, Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020 also aims to reform the subjectivities of the poor without disturbing the socio-spatial and racial relations of domination and exploitation that produce poverty, inequality, and violence.

I continue this discussion by zeroing in on one of the main differences between the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy and Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020 in the final chapter: the introduction of a place-based housing redevelopment program. Chapter Eight focuses on the formation of the Tower Renewal program, the most pervasive place-based housing redevelopment project in Canada from 2008 to 2015. Here I follow the major discussions in the previous chapters, showing how the ascendency of mapping helped turn a particular residential urban form (the rental highrise concrete towers) into an object of investigation and quickly into the cause of concentrated non-White poverty. These residential buildings are the ones Christopher Hume found “bleak,” “isolated,” and “dangerous.”

The gradual unfolding of Tower Renewal has also brought new socio-political forces into the scene of place-based urban policy making in Toronto: those of urbanists, architects, and health authorities. Building on the political fear of “the immigrant,” these “experts” have rationalized a conception of highrise concrete towers as a securitized object of liberal humanitarian intervention: a “troubling” space of “vertical poverty” and violence, one that if left alone will become a threat to the prosperity of Toronto, but one that also has lots of “potentials” and “urban assets” to be “empowered” and “urbanized.” I show how, while Tower Renewal builds upon the racialized and territorialized security ideology around “the immigrant,” it also provides design solutions for urbanizing and integrating “tower neighbourhoods” and preventing the prospect of the “Paris problem” in Toronto. The emphasis on “vertical poverty” and “highrise towers” has implicitly
reinforced the comparison between Toronto’s postwar suburbs and the banlieues of Paris, equating non-White suburban spaces and residents with threats to the Western urbanity, “way of life,” and “civilization.” This is most evident in the popularity of Doug Saunders’ (2011) concept of “arrival city” in Toronto’s urban lexicon. Engaging with Saunders’ celebrated book, Arrival City, I show how in many ways Saunders’s ideas parallel the ideas of Kilcullen (2013) and Nagl (2014), the gurus of American pacification, in particular in its Malthusian conception of surplus population, a Hobbesian notion of war of all against all, and Darwinian politics of the survival of the fittest. Saunders indeed proposes a form of liberal humanitarianism that Kilcullen and Nagl suggest military strategists should adopt.
Part One:
Place-based Urban Policy in the Era of Neo-Colonial Imperialist Capitalism

Chapter One:
Critical Urban Literature and “the Local” Turn in State Spatial Strategies of Urban Intervention

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present an overview and critique of the existing urban literature on “the local” turn in state spatial strategies of urban intervention. In English-language critical urban studies literature, the recent popularity of place-based approaches in urban policy is conceived in relation to the processes of neoliberalization. Despite contributions, in the current literature the articulation of urban policy is only realized in relation to the political economy of capitalism rather than to the totality of neo-colonial imperialist capitalism. Scholars have paid little to no attention to both the role of state-led strategies of development and policing in neighbourhoods characterized by concentrations of predominantly non-White poverty and how these strategies relate to the neo-colonial dimensions of power and everyday life in the imperial metropole.

As I argue in this chapter, limiting our analysis of place-based urban policy to neoliberalism is historically inaccurate. Here I trace the emergence of place-based urban policy to an earlier conjuncture: the Black urban rebellions and Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on Poverty in the 1960s. Going back to its moment of emergence in the United States helps us to realize the explicitly colonial dimension of place-based urban policy, which above all was meant to tackle the question of “race” and revolution in cities in the context shaped by histories of slavery, imperialism and colonialism. My main argument is that we need to take this history seriously and bring into analysis the neo-colonial dimension of place-based urban policy. I suggest Gramsci’s and Poulantzas’s insights are useful for examining the politics of “the local” turn in state-led strategies of urban intervention.
The Multi-scalar Revival of “the Local”

In urban geography, the popularity of place-based urban policy is associated with the revival of “the local” in state spatial strategies in North America and Western Europe and has been examined most rigorously in relation to the processes of neoliberalization since the late 1970s. The bulk of the critical literature on “the local” turn in urban policy has been influenced by either the political-economic or neo-Foucauldian theoretical perspectives, or a combination of both. The cracks in the Fordist accumulation regime that started to show in the 1960s turned into a global crisis of capitalist accumulation by the 1970s. The results were new strategies for the survival of capitalism. By the 1980s, neoliberalism replaced Fordism and Keynesianism as the new regime of imperialist capitalism worldwide. The breakdown of the Bretton Woods monetary system in the early 1970s was followed by the forceful imposition of the Washington Consensus in the 1980s that brought multifaceted, multi-scalar processes of fiscal austerity, liberalization of trade and capital, privatization, and de- and re-regulation of markets as well as state restructuring both in the imperial core and the former colonies. The neoliberal coup in Chile, Reaganism in the United States and Thatcherism in England went hand in hand with the increased powers of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to impose loan conditions in much of South America, Africa, and parts of Asia – the (in)famous structural adjustment programs (SAPs).

Neo-classical marxist and regulationist geographers have situated “the local” turn in urban policy in relation to the political economy of capital accumulation (Harvey 1989a, 1989b; Jessop 1994, 2002, 2009; Brenner and Theodore 2005; Brenner 2004; Smith 1984, 1996, 2002; Peck and Tickel 2002; Peck 2004). The premise of these political-economy-inspired analyses is the recurrent accumulation crisis of capitalism and the need for new strategies of capital accumulation. The early phase of the revival of “the local” in state spatial strategies in the 1980s was essential to increase the competitiveness of particular localities in attracting footloose capital – a trend that still continues and is best manifested in regional/metropolitan strategies of competitiveness as well as in place-based strategies of gentrification and the commodification of mega-spectacles from sport events to culturalized festivals.

Neo-marxists have directed attention towards the role of “the local” as a spatial fix (Harvey 2006 [1982], 2001 [1985], 2003) or part of the scalar fix (Smith 1984, 2002) in the wider historico–geographical uneven development of capitalism, acting as sites for the temporary resolution of the competing requirements of cooperation and competitions among capitals. By
focusing on the local state and urban–regional politics, Bob Jessop (1994, 2001, 2002, 2009) and other regulationists have highlighted the active – albeit contingent – role of the local state and local politics in regulating the shift from Fordist to post-Fordist regimes of accumulation. For Neil Brenner (2004), locational policies of competitiveness have been imperative to rescaling and restructuring the Fordist state since the 1980s. Brenner mobilized Henri Lefebvre’s concept of “state spaces” to highlight how the new prominence that is given to the urban (understood as scale in Benner’s work) reflects a strategic turn in state policy from a Keynesian strategy aimed at spatial equity to a neoliberal strategy aimed at spatial differentiation and interurban networks of competition and cooperation. In this sense, the revival of “the local” itself has turned into a force in exacerbating uneven development in the imperial metropole.

By the early 1990s, the contradictions of the aggressive neoliberal restructuring (i.e., structural adjustments and austerity) manifested themselves in the form of increasing socio-spatial polarization, poverty, famine, and what since came to be increasingly known as “ethnic” wars in former colonies. Once again, there was a need to leash capitalism in order to secure capital accumulation. The result was “the social” turn in neoliberal policies, a turn in which neoliberalism metamorphosed into more socially interventionist forms (Mohan and Stokke 2000). As part of this social turn, civil society (understood as separate from the state) came to be conceived as a key force of neoliberal social intervention. The first memo for revisionist neoliberalism came in 1987, when UNICEF published a report, Adjustment with a Human Face, signalling the need for revising neoliberal policies.

A few years later, the World Bank, once again, put the question of poverty on policy tables. The 1990–91 World Development Report, Poverty, outlined the Bank’s emerging poverty reductions strategies by emphasizing the incorporation of the poor into the social relations of the market. The “Asian crisis” of 1997 and the anti-globalization movements of the late 1990s were influential in solidifying the revisionist turn of neoliberalism, bringing development strategies back to policy agendas, this time with “the social” as an accessory (Hart 2001, 2009). By the turn of the century, the 2000–2001 World Bank Report, Attaching Poverty, situated the trinity of “opportunity, empowerment, and security” at the heart of the Bank’s approach to ameliorating poverty. The Bank’s policy signalled an emphasis on social capital, civil society, and localism (Mohan and Stokke 2000; Hart 2009) as well as the increasingly blurred nexus of development and security (Duffield 2007; Best 2013) at the dawn of the “war on terror” in the twenty-first century.
The return of poverty and development as policy concerns accompanied by “the local” and “the social” turns was not limited to the agenda of supra-national institutions such as the World Bank. Along with the former colonies, metropolitan centres of the imperial core were also hard hit with the concrete consequences of state restructuring and rescaling of the 1980s. Since the 1990s, growing income polarization along with the racialization and the geographical concentration of poverty in and across cities have increasingly become the common features of imperial metropolitan centres.

To deal with these situations, the OECD states have also increasingly turned to social and urban policies with a strong “local” dimension (OECD 1998, 2006; Porter and Craig 2004; Bradford 2007, 2008; Theodore and Peck 2012). The result has been a mushrooming of place-specific policies targeting poor neighbourhoods with the stated aims of “anti-exclusion,” “inclusion,” “integration,” and “social cohesion.” The “local” turn to deal with the socio-spatial consequences of neoliberal restructuring was accompanied by an aggressive disciplining and containment of those most affected, marginalized or dispossessed by neoliberalization through a law-and-order agenda of (re)criminalizing poverty and the growing of the penal state (Davis 1991; Wacquant 2008; Gordon 2006).

The political economic-inspired analyses have been most constructive in highlighting the intersection between neoliberalism and urban development by examining the post-Fordist, growth-oriented, and competitiveness-driven approaches to state spatial policy that have been deployed since the late 1970s (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Brenner 2004; Peck and Tickell 2002). These scholars have broaden our understanding by emphasizing the path-dependent character of neoliberal reform projects (thus emphasizing processes of neoliberalization rather than a monolithic formula of neoliberalism), the processes of state rescaling and restructuring (rather than the withering away of the state), and the strategic role of cities in reproducing neoliberal capitalism. In these analyses placed-based “anti-exclusion” policies in the imperial metrople are conceptualized either as “crisis management” strategies (Brenner 2004) or as part of “roll-out” neoliberalism and its pervasive system of diffused power (Peck and Tickell 2002). In other words, the “local” and “social” turns in state strategies dealing with uneven development is understood as part of the strategy of consolidating the neoliberal turn of capitalism by subordinating social policy to economic policy (Jessop 2002).

For neo-Foucauldians, the turn to “the local,” particularly in the revisionist phase of neoliberalism since the 1990s, is understood as a disciplinary technique of advanced liberal
governmentality. Here, localism is a disciplinary technique of rule through which individuals become active and responsible subjects in the exercise of market rule (Rose 1999; Larner 2003; Larner and Butler 2005). The process of responsibilization often goes hand in hand with new or intensified invocations of community as a sector “whose vectors and forces can be mobilized, enrolled, and deployed in novel programs and techniques which encourage and harness active practices of self-management and identity construction, of personal ethics and collective allegiances” (Rose 1999:176).

The Multi-dimensional Revival of “The Local”

Since the late 1990s, “the local” has also become important to state-led strategies of development and security in international and urban politics. On the one hand, we have witnessed the emergence of what Michael Dillon and Julian Reid (2009) have called “the liberal way of war” – a systematic increase in liberal humanitarian interventionism and counterinsurgency in targeted localities in the peripheries of the imperial world order (codified as “ungoverned” spaces). On the other hand, we have witnessed an (increased visibility and) intensification of urban policing and securitization in imperial metropolitan centres.

The latter case is best evidenced in state strategies of policing and security that began to be implemented in the 1990s. Examples include the (in)famous zero-tolerance, law-and-order policies initiated in New York under the mayoralty of Rudy Giuliani in the 1990s (Burke 1998; Belina and Helms 2003; Mountz and Curran 2009), the increasing power of the penal state and its prison-industrial-complex, racially-targeted policing, community policing in poor neighbourhoods and around gated communities of the wealthy as well as pop-up armies during mass protests and the heavily militarized security projects for mega-events such as the World Cups and the Olympics.

The 1990s also witnessed a renewal of debates in urban policing. For the most part, these debates were influenced by the new technologies of policing practices in the 1990s: CCTVs or other forms of electronic surveillance. Thus the intellectual popularity of the panoptic theory of policing, suggesting that “post-Keynesian policing” is primarily done at a distance. These debates were theoretically indebted to Foucault’s notions of power, control, and governance as well as Ulrich Beck’s (1992) notion of risk society (O’Mally and Palmer 1996; Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Norris and Armstrong 1998; McCahill 1998). Highlighting the birth of a new form of policing
called “post-Keynesian policing,” scholars conceived “the local” turn in state strategies of policing (i.e., community policing) as the result of the withdrawal of the state in the post-Keynesian era and the related responsibilization of communities for managing risks and contingencies.

While mostly conducted from within the disciplines of sociology and criminology, these debates (with the exception of Mike Davis’ [1991] analysis) were silent about – or rather indifferent to – the spatiality of urban policing. Furthermore, as Todd Gordon (2006:7–26) argues in detail, these analyses suffered from serious shortcoming. Gordon criticizes the suggestion that neoliberal policing practices target the population as a whole (and as such fail to consider class, “race,” and gender), the erasure of the role of the state, and the prevalent techno-fetishism of this studies. Techno-fetishism has turned the relations between people into “a relation between things, a relation between electronic forms of surveillance and self-regulating docile bodies” (Gordon 2006:26).

It was not until the late 1990s and particularly in the 2000s that the spectacularization of security projects led to geographers becoming interested in questions of urban policing and security. A new series of analyses examined the place-specific dimension of these state strategies of securitization in relation to the political economy of space and neoliberal urban competitiveness. Here the major emphases were on processes of gentrification, the spectacularization of sport events, and place-branding strategies to market cities as suitable localities for capital investment (see Perelman 2012; Graham 2012b; Lacy 2008; Samata 2007; Smith 1996).

With the start of the “war on terror” in 2001 and the shifting of the academic and policy focus onto the nexus of development and security, the revival of “the local” in state security strategies was also examined in relation to the de- and re-territorialization of security politics in imperial metropolitan centres. This relatively young literature (broadly referred to as “new urban militarism”) is also theoretically indebted to Foucault’s (2007, 2008) concepts of governmentality and biopolitics as well as to Deleuze and Guattari’s (2000) and Hardt and Negri’s (2000, 2004) conceptions of diffused power. For the most part, the literature on the “new urban militarism” has aimed to spatialize some of the neo-Foucauldian debates on securitization in critical security

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18 In City of Quartz, Davis (1991) focuses on the militarization of policing in Los Angeles in the 1980s and relates this to the criminalization of poverty and in particular Black poverty.
19 Todd Gordon (2006) builds upon the insights of Mark Neocleous (2000) and marxist state theory. He provides a useful critique of the Foucauldian police studies. However, his work too remains deeply aspatial and indifferent to the spatiality of state police power.
studies and the literature on “new wars” (Kaldor 1999; Shaw 2005) by extending their arguments into the analysis of urban policing, security, and militarization (Graham 2010, 2012a; Coaffee 2013, 2009; Coaffee, Wood and Rogers 2008; Coaffee and Wood 2006).

Here, beside the birth of neoliberalism in the late 1970s, the historical-political premise is also anchored in what is claimed to be a “paradigmatic” shift in the rationalities of military and security doctrines of the post-Cold War, “post-9/11” era. The major argument of these analyses is that as the result of this paradigmatic shift, we have witnessed a (dis)location of the sources of security threats into “cities’ communal and private spaces, as well as their infrastructure – along with their civilian populations” (Graham 2010:xiii). The consequence of such shift, we are told, is a “radical blur[ing] [of] the traditional separation of peace and war, military and civil spheres, local and global scales, and the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of nations” (Graham 2012a:139; see also 2010). The result is the increasing merger of responsibility for responses to civil disturbances, terrorism and natural disasters, as well as a policy obsession with “resiliency” (Coaffee 2013; Coaffee and Wood 2008; Joseph 2013; Howell 2015).

The de- and re-territorialization of security has resulted in a new infrastructure and politics of resiliency based on the idea of responsibilization and de-centralization of risk-management responsibilities across a range of stakeholders (Coaffee 2013; Coaffee and Wood 2009). The question of security is thus rescaled, both in terms of its content and its institutions. No more simply a matter of national response, state security is a multi-scale apparatus. For security policymakers, “the local” – whether under the name “community” or “local citizens” – has found a key role in building resiliency from the bottom up (Coaffee 2013; Coaffee and Wood 2009).

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20 The concept of “new wars” was initially coined by Mary Kaldor (1999) and later was taken up by others such as Mark Duffield (2001) and Martin Shaw (2005). Despite some differences, for both Kaldor and Shaw “new wars” were born in the post-Cold-War era. They are different in their “mode of warfare” (Kaldor 1999) and “way of war” (Shaw 2005) from the earlier wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For Kaldor, “new wars” are post-Clausewitzian in the sense that they are not necessarily fought by and among the states; rather, they are fought and financed by a combination of state and non-state actors. Focusing on the wars in Africa and the Balkans and the debates on globalization, Kaldor further argued that ethnicized identity politics is fundamental to these wars in that political control over the population is more important than territorial gains. For Shaw, the Western “new wars” are “risk-transfer wars.” These wars are related to global surveillance warfare that is all about risk, in particular, about managing relationships between political risks and life-risk by minimizing risk for Western troops, states and populations. Shaw develops 15 rules that govern how new Western war work (2005:71–97).
“The Local” Turn and Its Blind Spots

Despite their contributions, there are some theoretical and political shortcomings in these analyses. To begin with the most general critique, state-led spatial strategies of development are, for the most part, disconnected from the state’s police and war powers. The analytical focus is either on security or development. Consequently, politics is disassociated from the shifting of the relations of force and their various social, political and military dimensions. The analytical and political result is the fragmentation of “the dialectical integration of hegemony with domination, or consent with coercion” (Thomas 2009:164). The dialectics of political domination, security, and violence do not have any theoretical and analytical force in the analyses of state strategies of development. Such disarticulation is not accidental; rather, it is the result of the theoretical premises of these studies.

While the engagement of neo-Foucauldian analyses with political rationality and governmentality has shown the importance of political domination (albeit not named as such) in strategies of development and security, the obsessive emphasis on the diffuse nature of power, discourse, and a generic notion of population has come at the price of erasing the role of the state and reading politics through the realm of discourse while falling short of examining the specificities of the class, gender, and racial dimensions of such strategies. Even in the literature on urban securitization that attempts to spatialize and scale security, the conception of a liberal security is taken for granted.21 The emphasis on security as diffuse power, the understanding that security is now everywhere and that everyone is a security threat side-steps the neo-colonial dimension of security and the ways the geopolitical aspects of imperialism and the broader politics of development and security affect the relations of centre-periphery within the imperial metropole.

As mentioned earlier, political economic-inspired analyses provide us with a more nuanced understanding of the imperative role of the state by shifting attention to the rescaling and restructuring of the state through processes of neoliberalization. Nonetheless, in examining state restructuring merely through the lens of the economic relations of capital accumulation, these analyses have ruptured and fragmented the integrity of the social (Bannerji 2005). As Antonio Gramsci (1971: 184–85) reminds us, we cannot read politics solely off of economic crisis. Reading

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21 The epistemological premise of all these studies takes for granted the liberal myth that (Western) civil society is a space of peace. Historically, this is a false premise. One only has to read closely the works of social contract theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke for how the liberal idea of civil peace is an ideological alibi for the consolidation of the bourgeois order. I will engage with this issue in Chapter Two.
politics off of economic relations has disarticulated accumulation from domination in the formation of state spatial strategies. This disarticulation has, in turn, resulted in the disavowal of the question of everyday life, violence, and the colonial dimensions of state spatial strategies. Herein the articulation of urban policy is only realized in relation to the political economy of capitalism rather than the totality of neo-colonial imperialist capitalism. Hence, in these analyses neither the question of political domination and how it is related to the formation of the social and state spatial strategies nor the question of security and the fact that the majority of localities of the imperial metropole that are the target of state spatial strategies are populated by majority non-White working-class population (many from the former colonies) have any analytical and theoretical force.

The Revival of “The Local” and the State’s Coercive Power

In his work on the relationship between (non-White) poverty and the state in the United States and France after the 1990s, Loïc Wacquant (2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b, 2013, 2016) has shifted attention to the links among political domination and violence and highlights the convergence and fusion of social policy and penal policy. Wacquant (2008a, 2009b, 2010) situates “the local” turn in state spatial strategies of dealing with urban “priority zones” of poverty in relation to processes of neoliberalization, in particular the de-socialization of labour and the dismantling of the social security buffers of the welfare state. Mobilizing a mixed Weberian (via Pierre Bourdieu) and Foucauldian approach, Wacquant’s (2008a, 2008b) sociological work is most useful for showing the crucial role of the state both in producing and targeting the geographical and racialized concentration of poverty. His concept of “territorial stigmatization,” highlighting the “crucial mediation of place as material container, social crossroads and mental imaginary” (Wacquant and Slater 2014: 1272; Wacquant 2008, 2016), has been mobilized by geographers and sociologists to analyze the state’s technique of targeting urban “ungoverned spaces” both as places of abjection and as places in need of social and punitive intervention.

Wacquant’s (2009b:128) emphasis on the construction of a “liberal-paternalist state” as a “political project which requires that we bring economic deregulation, the restriction of social assistance and the expansion of the penal sector into a single framework for analysis and actions” is helpful for integrating state security strategies into the analysis of the local turn in state-guided

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22 Wacquant mobilizes Weberian conceptions of the state and social class and infuse these with Foucault’s notion of governmentality.
spatial strategies in urban “priority zones” of poverty. Nonetheless, Wacquant starts from the premise of differentiating between and separating the penal and social dimensions of the state. Such a fragmented concept of the state is based on a liberal notion of the welfare state as an absolute social state, which sidesteps the compartmentalization of the social in the supposedly universal claims of the welfare state and erases the dialectical unity of the social and security states in that form of state (see Neocleous 2008). While a response to and product of the radical struggles of the early twentieth century, it is important to recall that the welfare state was above all a counter-revolutionary project, one aiming to rescue capitalism from the spectre of socialism and communism rather than treating all human beings as equal and providing for universal welfare.\(^2\)

While Wacquant’s concept of “territorial stigmatization” draws attention to the contradictions of state security and economic policies, he takes the nation-state as given (rather than a historical product) and thus falls into the trap of methodological nationalism (see Goswami 2004). Hence, the politics of fear around stigmatized neighbourhoods is disconnected from the ways in which the broader liberal ideology of security and neo-colonial relations of domination mediate the production of territorial stigmatization. As Stefan Kipfer has argued, Wacquant’s treatment of the nation-state as given has also resulted in the failure to deliver “the promised historico-geographically nuanced treatment of ‘race,’ class and state in the production of space” (2011: 2). Racism is thus understood as the property of the national state, with the United States being the ideal model having the power to export discourses of the ghetto, racialization and the penal state to Europe as part of the US practice of transferring its imperial policy across the Atlantic. The result is that the specific historico-geographical processes of racialization are disarticulated from the transnational articulations of racism.

While Wacquant’s emphasis on the role of the state in producing territorial stigmatization is imperative, his generalization of particular discourses around the “Black ghetto” as the quintessential way that the state, the media, and civil-society forces produce such stigmatization remains insufficient. He falls short of doing justice to the complexities and transformations of state

\(^2\) Building upon liberal notions of the welfare state is the case in most of the critical analysis of neoliberalism (albeit with different degrees), from the works of Bob Jessop and Neil Brenner to Loïc Wacquant. They not only take the “universal” claim of the welfare state for granted, but also erase the counter-revolutionary politics integral to the formation of welfare state around the mid-twentieth century. In *Critique of Security*, Mark Neocleous (2008) critically engages with this liberal conception of the welfare state as a social state. Focusing on the United States, he traces the idea of national security as it emerged in the late 1940s back to earlier debates about social security in the 1930s via the notion of economic security. His argument highlights the importance of the security logic of the welfare state targeted against the perceived threats of communism and socialism.
strategies. His sole emphasis on coercive strategies of abjection has left aside the “soft power” of the state as a force of abjection, thus understanding hegemony (as consent) as opposed to domination (as coercion), hence fragmenting the dialectical integration of hegemony and domination. Territorial stigmatization is conceptualized as a form of symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1991, Goffman 1963) that is based solely on the coercive abjection of stigmatized neighbourhoods (Wacquant 2008, 2013, 2009b:116–17).24

Beyond Neoliberalism? Historicizing the Emergence of Place-based Urban Policy

A common error in historico-political analysis consists in an inability to find the correct relation between what is organic and what is conjunctural.... The distinction between organic “movements” and facts and “conjunctural” or occasional ones must be applied to all types of situation; not only to those in which a regressive development or an acute crisis takes place, but also to those in which there is a progressive development or one towards prosperity, or in which the productive forces are stagnant. The dialectical nexus between the two categories of movement, and therefore research, is hard to establish precisely. (Gramsci, 1971: 178)

There is no doubt that the neoliberal passive revolution (Hall and O’Shea 2013) of the last four decades has been imperative to the formation of the current place-based urban policy. But place-based urban policy, as we know it today, emerged in an earlier conjuncture – the 1960s, through Lyndon B. Johnson’s unleashing of The War on Poverty in 1964 (Cochrane 2007:16–30). In the 1960s (the last decade of the welfare state), Johnson’s War on Poverty initiated a move away from the promotion of universal welfare services, which were deemed to have failed in eradicating poverty, towards state interventions targeting poor African-Americans and their neighbourhoods. Anticipating the neoliberal emphasis on “efficiency” and “participation,” the launch of programs associated with the War on Poverty also promised a more cost-effective means of tackling the problem of poverty and a way of involving the poor in helping to solve the problem of poverty through their own initiatives (Marris and Rein 1972; Peterson and Greenstone 1977).

24 Other scholars (see Pattillo 2009) have also criticized Wacquant’s generalization and typification of “the dark ghetto” for its reproducing and reinforcing of the discourse of marginalization. In response, Wacquant partly addressed this point by calling for a differentiation of “the social and symbolic strategies fashioned by the residents of disparaged districts according to whether they submit to and reproduce, or seek to defy and deflect” the dominant discourse of territorial stigmatization (Wacquant and Slater 2014:1275).
Johnson’s War on Poverty emerged in the context of major social and political crises both in the United States and worldwide. In the United States, the 1960s was witness to the unfolding of an urban crisis that swept across metropolitan areas populated by African-Americans. The urban crisis was organic (to speak with Gramsci) in the sense that it threatened the very foundation of the colonial-bourgeois hegemonic order in the United States. The urban crisis was the product of the specific contradictions of the socio-spatial and racial relations of capitalist uneven development in the United States – namely, the rise of concentrated Black poverty and unemployment in inner cities, the spread of the civil rights movement, police violence against African-Americans, and most importantly, the rise of Black Power and radicalism in inner cities, accompanied by the Black urban rebellions that shook large cities in the middle of the decade.

It was in the context of the sudden explosion of Black urban rebellions and radicalism and the overwhelming White moral panic associated with these that poverty was discovered as a domestic public policy issue to be tackled by targeted state intervention. Place-based urban policy emerged through legislations such as the Economic Opportunity Act (1964), the Model Cities Act (1966), and the Community Action Program (1964), which in turn were built on a series of earlier initiatives, most importantly the Ford Foundation’s Gray Areas Program (1950s–1960s) and the President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency (O’Connor 1996; Roy, Schrader and Crane 2014).

Yet, if the state mobilized the official discovery of concentrated Black poverty as the cause of the urban crisis in order to declare the War on Poverty (and thus to realize Johnson’s project of The Great Society), the state was not concerned with the root causes of African-American poverty. In fact, poverty, as a concept and reality, was disarticulated from the social, racial, and spatial structures of capitalist uneven development and was re-articulated to Black “culture” and “way of life” (Harrington’s [1962] “culture of poverty”) on the one hand and to the territoriality of the “Black community” on the other (Ryan 1976; Cruikshank 1994). As Nunes put it at the time:

A unique achievement of this Scheme is that zones of poverty are demarcated. Thus poverty is no longer seen as a condition which exists at a particular stratum within the social structure, but as a phenomenon of certain areas. These are labeled communities. (1970:15)

The roots of territorial stigmatization thus go far beyond the economic shift to neoliberalism. Johnson’s War on Poverty was, above all, a response to (a territorialized colonial politics of

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25 The rise of concentrated Black poverty was itself the outcome of a multiplicity of forces, including the last waves of the Great Migration of African-Americans to the Northern cities, the contradictions of the Keynesian state, state-guided mass-suburbanization and White flight to the postwar suburbs, the resultant state negligence of the inner cities, and urban renewal projects.
security around) the Black urban rebellion and Black radicalism that shook – albeit momentarily – the security of the social order of the United States in the 1960s (Light 2003; Cochrane 2007; Roy, Schrader and Crane 2014). The intensification and territorialization of security ideology shadowing upon the Black question had to do as much with the domestic as with the international context (Light 2003; Roy, Schrader and Crane 2014; Immerwahr 2015). Similarly, the formation of policy was based as much upon the social dimension of state intervention as upon the military dimension of state spatial intervention.

Jennifer Light (2003) has documented how, during this conjuncture, the state quickly framed the urban crisis – territorialized as the crisis of the “Black ghetto” – as a national security crisis. This re-articulation of a political urban crisis as a national security crisis took place in the historical moment when Black power appeared as a feasible alternative political force in and beyond the “Black ghetto.” The fact was that Black urban rebellions directly threatened the survival of neo-colonial relations of domination over African-Americans on a massive scale and that Black Power linked African-Americans’ struggles for liberation to the international anti-colonial struggles in the (semi-) colonies of the Third World (Bloom and Martin 2013). The re-articulation of this political crisis as a national security crisis in turn justified the partnership of military strategists and national security experts with urbanists and city managers to quell the crisis and bring “order” to the increasingly racially and socio-spatially divided urban cores (Light 2003).²⁶

The birth of place-based urban policy was mediated by and mediated the collaborative relationship between the military industrial complex and city planners, managers, and policymakers (Light 2003; Roy, Schrader and Crane 2014). Contrary to the claim of the “new military urbanism” literature, the blurring of the civil and military and war and peace is not a post-Cold War, post 9/11 phenomenon. It has longer roots and has been essential for sustaining the colonial liberal bourgeois order, both domestically and internationally, particularly at the conjunctures of political crises. At its moment of emergence in the United States, place-based urban policy had an explicitly colonial dimension. It was meant to tackle the question of “race” and revolution. Urban policy makers took examples from the state’s imperial-military strategies to quell anti-colonial insurgencies in the (semi-) colonies (Light 2003; Roy, Schrader and Crane 2014).

²⁶ This partnership was already under way since the 1950s, but accelerated and consolidated in the 1960s because of the urban crisis (see Light 2003).
The state-led mobilization of place-based urban policy to nullify the perceived threats of poverty was not limited to Johnson’s War on Poverty in the inner-cities of the United States in this conjuncture. Place-based urban policies targeting Black neighbourhoods in the United States in turn influenced the formation of “area-based” initiatives of urban integration targeting “immigrant neighbourhoods” to nullify “race riots” in the United Kingdom (Cochrane 2007). These spatially and racially targeted policies also found their way into Canada, this time for “civilizing” and integrating indigenous populations living on the reserves.

With the victory of the Liberals in the 1963 federal election, Canadian Indian policy shifted towards integration with a focus on cooperating with the indigenous peoples rather than their forcible assimilation. The federal government’s argument was that the severe poverty and exclusion of indigenous peoples had to do with lack of development and their exclusion from the Canadian economy. By 1964, community development (CD) became the main medium of integration and the foundation of Indian policy in Canada. As Hugh Shewell (2002; 2004) argues, the 1960s concepts of community development in the reserves were influenced by two models. “The first, the adult education model from England, was based on learning and communication theories. Implemented in British colonies to foster leadership and to promote social and economic development, it had also been applied in areas such as London’s East End, notably Toynbee Hall” (2002: 6). The second model was based on Johnson’s War on Poverty in the inner city Black neighbourhoods of the United States.

The emergence of poverty as a domestic security issue in the United States, the UK and Canada in this conjuncture went hand in hand with its emergence as an international security issue, particularly in the Third World. The War on Poverty was bound up, as Goldstein has argued, with “Cold War doctrines of development and modernization… as well as their anxieties about anticolonial insurrections and socialist revolutions” (2012:3). The national and international discovery of poverty as a security issue in the 1960s was closely linked to the political fear of the Black urban rebellions and Black radicalism and of anti-colonial wars of insurgency in the (semi-)colonies (Roy, Schrader and Crane 2014; Immerwahr 2015).

In their alternative history of community development programs of the 1960s in the United States, Roy, Schrader and Crane (2014) analyze the relational formation (what they call “the co-constitution”) of place-based urban policy and imperial policy.27 For them, “a history of

27 Roy, Schrader and Crane solely focus on community development, rather than urban policy. But community development policies were at the heart of place-based urban policies.
community development must necessarily be a history of pacification, and that such a history is in turn a global history” (2014). The mobilization of community, participation, communication, empowerment and the combining of policing and coercive powers with development in order to grapple with poverty and insecurity were not just the strategies of Johnson’s War on Poverty. They were also the major components of the United States’ pacification strategies in Vietnam and other parts of Asia for quelling anti-colonial insurgencies and the rise of socialism and communism (Roy, Schrader and Crane 2014; Schrader forthcoming; Neocleous 2008; Oppenheim 2012; Immerwahr 2015).

It was not accidental that Adam Yarmolinsky moved from his position as special assistant to the US secretary of defense to become deputy director of Johnson’s Task Force on Poverty, helping to administer the Community Action Program (Light 2003:169). In the global conjuncture of de-colonization, political concerns with sustaining colonial relations of dominations (codified as concerns around social “disorder” and integration) and fuelled by an urban colonial pathology formed the core logic of these targeted state interventions. The “race” question was at the heart of state targeted intervention in this conjuncture. If in the United States it was “the Black” question and its territoriality, in the United Kingdom it was “the immigrant” question and its territoriality, while in Canada it was the indigenous question and its territoriality that defined the security and humanitarian problems of the time.28 Later, in the 1970s, former US secretary of defense and subsequently president of the World Bank Robert McNamara proposed the notion of “defensive modernization,” which built upon fundamental ideological aspects of the War on Poverty in order to secure colonial relations of domination in the former colonies (specifically in Africa) and to preempt the spread of communism.

Why is it important to go back to the War on Poverty to understand place-based urban policy? Going back to the emergence of place-based urban policy in the 1960s is imperative for analyzing the politics of the current local turn in state spatial strategies of intervention. The centrality of the political fear of Black rebellion and radicalism in the birth of place-based urban policy and the ways place-based intervention were used to deal with the “race” question in the United Kingdom and Canada highlight the need to bring into analysis the importance of sustaining hegemony and neo-colonial dimension of this form of state policy.

28 “The immigrant” question in the UK was also a “race” question, targeting mostly Black and South Asian populations; see Cochrane (2007). Given the White-settler colonial history of Canada, place-based policies of development and integration in the indigenous reserves were also a colonial policy intertwined with the “race” question. For more on the Canadian case, see Shewell (2004).
The insights of Antonio Gramsci (1971) and Nicos Poulantzas (2000) are constructive for understanding the imperative role of state targeted intervention in sustaining hegemony – beyond the political economy of imperialist capitalism. Gramsci’s (1971) concept of hegemony is for the most part associated with the production of consent (as opposed to coercion), while civil society (separated from the state) is understood as the terrain of its efficiency. As Peter Thomas insightfully argues, this dominant framing of hegemony has reduced “the dialectical complexity of Gramsci’s concept, ultimately obscuring the novel analytical capacity assigned to it in the Prison Notes, its distinctively political focus, and, above all, its consequences for the strategies of the organized working class” (2009:160–61). Rather than separating and opposing hegemony and domination, Gramsci starts from “the dialectical integration of hegemony with domination, of consent with coercion, united in their distinction” (Thomas 2009: 164). The goal is to analyze political power and the process by which a historical bloc of social forces is constructed and the ascendency of that block is secured (Gramsci 1971: 57; Hall 1986). A class’ ability to lead depends on securing the consent of allies; however, it also relies upon its ability to coordinate domination over the excluded others just as its capacity to exert such coercive force depends upon securing consent (Thomas 2009:163).

Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is related to his conceptions of politics and the bourgeois state form that came into being in the aftermath of the “organic crisis” of the mid and late nineteenth century (e.g., the Europe-wide revolutions of 1848 and the Paris Commune of 1871) and which resulted in an epoch of passive revolution in order to restore the political power of the bourgeoisie. In his discussion on the “Analysis of Situations” in The Modern Prince, Gramsci (1971:175–90) warned against reading politics off of economic crises and emphasized the need to bring into analysis the movements of historical forces – “the relations of force, at the various levels” that constitute the actual terrain of political and social struggle and development (1971:184; cf. Hall 1986). For Gramsci, “relations of force” are composed of interconnected economic and political relations that are linked in turn with what he calls the relations of military forces, both technical military and “politico-military” (1971:175–85). Gramsci’s conception of “relations of force” is also deeply spatial (Kipfer and Hart 2013). For him, the analysis of relations of force cannot be limited to the national scale, but must focus on how “international relations intertwine with internal relations of nation states, creating new, unique and historically concrete
combinations” (1971:182). Moreover, the “relations between international forces and national forces is further complicated by the existence within every State of several structurally diverse territorial sectors, with diverse relations of force at all levels” (Gramsci 1971:182).

Opposing the conceptual opposition (and spatial separation) of the state and civil society in liberal thought, Gramsci, following Marx, saw civil society as the true ground of the state (Gramsci 1971:193).29 By conceptualizing the bourgeois state form as the “integral State,” Gramsci attempted to analyze the mutual interpenetration and reinforcement of “political society” and “civil society” (to be distinguished from each other methodologically, not organically) within a unified (and indivisible) state-form. The concept of “integral state” directs us to a dialectical unity of the moments of civil society and political society within the bourgeois state form (Gramsci 1971:206–75; Thomas 2009:137–47). It was precisely because of this dialectical unity that, for Gramsci, revolutionary politics needed to change its strategy from the “war of maneuver” to the “war of position.” “The massive structure of the modern democracies, both as State organizations and as complexes of associations in civil society,” Gramsci argues, “are for the art of politics what ‘trenches’ and permanent fortifications of the front are for the war of position” (1971:243). Securing the hegemonic power of the ruling historical bloc is thus contingent on its ability to constantly maintain in its own favour the balance of relations of force in their various social, political, and military dimensions and distinct scales (subnational, national, international). Ideological struggles with the aim of re-composing the relations of consent play important roles in maintaining the balance of relations of force in favour of the hegemonic historic bloc (Thomas 2009: 150–57; 164).

In his discussion on “The State and Popular Struggles,” Poulantzas (2000:140-145) too emphasizes the balance of relations of force and the dialectical unity of the moments of political society and civil society in the reproduction of (capitalist) hegemony. “The state apparatuses,” Poulantzas reminds us, “organize-unify the power bloc by permanently disorganizing-dividing the dominated classes, polarizing them towards the power bloc, and short-circuiting their own political organizations” (2000: 140). He relates this need for pacifying the dominated classes to the class-based nature of the capitalist state and the consequent implicit and explicit political fear of

29 Gramsci’s theory of hegemony emerged from the theoretical and political conjuncture of the organic crisis of the bourgeois social order of the mid and late 19th century. For Gramsci, this was a crisis of the entire of social formation, both its economic “content” and its political “form,” and thus began an epoch of bourgeois “passive revolution” and the consolidation of the “integral state” (Thomas 2009:145)
the working class. “The class enemy is always present within the State,” Poulantzas reminds us (2000: 141).

Poulantzas’s discussion on the politics and forms of State intervention is of particular interest here. First, state intervention to manufacture the consent of the dominated classes (including disorganizing and dividing them) and re-establish the relations of force in favour of the bourgeoisie is neither necessarily based on a coherent set of state policy crafted as the result of the total consensus of the dominant classes, nor simply it is a question of the dominant classes’ historical periodization (2000: 144). Rather state policy is best understood as a strategic response to structural contradictions and contradictions among the dominant classes and fractions themselves. The former set of contradictions are inherent in the logic of capitalist development and “the more or less direct forms of the contradiction between dominant and dominated classes” (2000: 143). The latter set of contradictions are the outcome of the mediated ways that popular struggles always exists within (rather outside of) the State “through the impact of popular struggle on contradictions among the dominant classes and fractions themselves” (2000: 143).

Second, as mentioned earlier, Poulantzas highlights the importance of scrutinizing the positive function of State intervention. While the presence of the dominated classes and their struggles is expressed by the State’s material framework, the State does not necessarily aim to confront its “internal enemy,” the dominated classes, “head on” through its coercive power (2000: 141). Rather the more strategic goal is “to maintain and reproduce the domination-subordination relationship at the heart of the State,” even by “continually adopt[ing] material measures which are of positive significance for the popular masses, even though these measures represent so many concessions impose by the struggles of the subordinated classes” (2000: 141, 31).

If Poulantzas directs us to the complexity of the politics of State strategies of domination and subordination of the dominated classes as the “internal enemy,” Gramsci alerts us that understanding the politics of state intervention requires unsettling the liberal separations between domestic and international scales, military and civil forms, State and civil society, and bringing into analysis the relational formation of the various social, political, and military forces, along with their distinct scales (subnational, national, international) and multiple historical temporalities.

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30 It is important here to underline that the bourgeoisie is not a homogenous entity. While in general the bourgeoisie as a group who has the ownership of the means of production stands vis-à-vis the disposed working class (Marx and Engels *), various fractions of capital (monopoly or non-monopoly capital, various forms of industrial capital, banking or finance capital, real-estate capital) have different, at times, contradictory interests. Furthermore, these fractions of bourgeoisie do not always stand in a uniformly contradictory relationship to the popular classes (Poulantzas 2000: 144-145).
(structural and conjectural). While not explicitly invoking, Gramsci’s (1971:183) emphasis on how politics constitute the central mediation between the development of social and military forces directs us to the importance of linking the politics of the “social war” in the imperial metropole (to speak with Marx and Engels) to the politics of the “long war” (aka the “war on terror”) in the imperial world. Translating Gramsci’s and Poulantzas’s insights in our context means, for a historical-materialist analysis of the politics of state-led spatial strategies targeting urban poverty, we need to understand the processes of the targeting of urban poverty in the imperial metropole in relation to the targeting of poverty and underdevelopment in international relations in our conjuncture.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I argued that the major pitfalls of the existing critical urban literature on “the local” turn in state spatial strategies of intervention are: 1) understanding place-based policy solely in relation to neoliberalism; 2) fragmenting the developmental and security dimensions of state spatial strategies; and 3) reading politics off economic crisis. Following Gramsci’s insights, I traced the emergence of place-based urban policy to a different (often neglected) historical conjuncture: the Black urban rebellions and Johnson’s War on Poverty in the United States of the 1960s.

The fundamental logic of Johnson’s War on Poverty was based on mobilizing development to pacify threats to (and to secure) the existing social-colonial order. This logic at the heart of place-based urban policy (in its moment of emergence) directs us, I suggest, to examine the relational formation of urban policy/politics and imperial policy/politics. For this purpose, we need to rethink the politics of such forms of state intervention in relation to the multi-scalar comeback of poverty and “disorder” in our conjuncture and to critically analyze the ways through which relations of domination mediates and are mediated by state strategies of targeted intervention in civil society.

Building upon Gramsci’s and Poulantzas’s insights, the next chapter situates the politics of state-guided spatial strategies in the “priority zones” of poverty in the imperial metropole in relation to the politics of state-imperial strategies of development and security in the “ungoverned spaces” of the imperial world order.
Chapter Two:  
Place-based Urban Policy and “the Immigrant” Problematic in the Imperial Metropole

Introduction

In this chapter, my goal is to develop a conceptual framework for analyzing the politics of place-based urban policies of development and policing targeting urban poverty in the imperial metropole. More specifically, I am interested in situating such state-led strategies in relation to the hegemony of neo-colonial imperialist capitalist world order. I do so by emphasizing the need to bring into analysis the relational formation of urban and imperial policies and politics. My starting point is based on two premises. First, I take as my entry point the subject position of the Excluded Others in the imperial metropole, those human beings whose subjectivities and living spaces are the targets of state-led strategies of intervention: the precarious non-White working class, codified and homogenized in public and official discourses as “immigrants.” In doing so, I emphasize (the material force of) the ruling classes’ political fear of “the immigrant” and their spaces in the formation of place-based urban policy targeting poverty.

Second, following Gramsci, in engaging with politics and the ideological construction of the political fear of “the immigrant” I go beyond the liberal separation between domestic and international, military and civil, state and civil society. Roy et al.’s (2014) emphasis on bringing into analysis the relational formation of urban policy and imperial policy is a welcome opening in this discussion. As seen previously, it is not a matter of historical coincidence that Roy et al. (2014) found ideological parallels between the American pacification strategies in Vietnam and Johnson’s War on Poverty in the American “Black ghettos” in the mid-twentieth century. Rather, as I argue in this chapter, a critical engagement with the concept and practice of pacification and its relation to development, security, space, the state and colonial relations is useful for analyzing the relational formation of urban and imperial politics, and in doing so re-thinking “the local” turn in state spatial strategies of targeting urban poverty.

“The Immigrant” and Security Crises in the Imperial Metropole

Since the recent attacks in Paris (January and November 2015), Brussels (March 2016), and Nice (July 2016), media and the state have zoomed in on neighbourhoods such as Gennevilliers,
Saint-Denis, and Molenbeek. For the state and the mainstream media, these peripheralized urban localities, homogenized as “immigrant neighbourhoods,” are the spaces of an “internal enemy.” These neighbourhoods are perceived as the local bastions of threats to social cohesion, “Western way of life,” security and peace. The commonality between “immigrant neighbourhoods” in the banlieues of Paris, the council housing estates of London, the inner-city neighbourhoods of Brussels, and the “tower neighbourhoods” of Toronto is not solely their location in the mainstream public discourse as stigmatized neighbourhoods affected by “advanced marginality” (Wacquant 2007). What they also share is similar demographic composition in that these neighbourhoods are increasingly populated by precarious, poor, non-White working-class populations, many from former colonies. It is these diverse groups of a non-White working class – codified and homogenized as “immigrants” – and their everyday lives and spaces that are the subject of political fear and the target of current place-based urban policies of development and security – policies that aim to induce containment and “integration.”

Today, references to “the immigrant” in public discourses refer less to those with immigrant status than to the poor non-White Others in the imperial metropole, many of whom are already nationals of their respective countries of residence.31 Boosted by the increasing political success of rightwing populism, the current fear of “immigrant neighbourhoods” has galvanized the psychic insecurities and racist anxieties across Europe in particular and the West in general. It is important, however, to keep in mind that the fear of “the immigrant” (neighbourhoods) is not simply a psychological fear. Rather, it is a political fear. Similar to other forms of political fear, the object of fear – “the immigrant” (neighbourhood) – is, first and foremost an ideological construction. It belongs to the realms of ideology and politics (see Robin 2004). If the shock-and-awe of the recent attacks in the heart of Europe has quickly re-galvanized “culture talks” (Mamdani 2004) about “immigrant neighbourhoods,” neither the neo-colonial representations of these localities as security threat, nor the left-liberal prescription of more integration as the solution to their supposed malaise are new.

While the “war on terror” has intensified the racialized and territorialized security ideologies targeting non-White populations in Western countries, let us recall the conjuncture in which “the immigrant” turned into the object of political fear in the West in the late twentieth

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31 The reference to “immigrants” and “immigrant neighbourhoods” in France, Belgium, the United Kingdom and Canada are not the same, of course. The figures of “the immigrant” in each of these countries have their own historico-geographical specificities. My emphasis here is that in all these Western geographies non-White populations are Otherized through the figure of “the immigrant” associated with “immigrant neighbourhoods.”
century. With the increasing movement of former colonial subjects to imperial metropolitan centres in the aftermath of official decolonization, the necessary role of the migrant for capitalist expansion has been increasingly occluded by a new concern for security (Ibrahim 2005; Marciniak 1999). Already by the 1990s, the discourse of human security explicitly identified international migration – particularly migration from the Global South to the Global North – as a security issue for/in the West (Duffield 2001, 2007).

It was in this context that imperialist geopoliticians, from Robert Kaplan (1994) to Mary Kaldor (1999), quickly re-imagined underdevelopment in former colonies as danger and provided political and intellectual backdrops for well-rehearsed neo-colonial cartographies of “ungoverned” spaces of violence, anarchy, and war worldwide. It was not accidental that at the dawn of the twenty-first century, the World Bank situated the problem of poverty in relation to migration and the increasingly blurred nexus of development and security (Best 2013; Duffield 2007). In this broader context, the “immigrant neighbourhoods” of the imperial metropole, with their increasingly precarious, poor, non-White working-class populations, have become the object of the state’s political fear and the target of place-based urban policy.

The current political obsession with the figure of “the immigrant” in the West speaks to the importance of scrutinizing its ideological construction for understanding the subject position of the non-White working class, and how and why the state facilitates and mobilizes the politics of fear around “immigrant neighbourhoods.” The equation of a territorialized and racialized figure with an “internal enemy” is not an invention of our contemporary political conjuncture. In his analysis of the capitalist state and the modern nation, Poulantzas (2002:93–120) situates the modern notion of internal enemy in relation to the need of the capitalist State to consolidate its power over the nation territorially and racially. The territorialized and racialized construction of the figure of the “the immigrant” as a threat to the “security and peace” of the imperial metropole has its roots in the bourgeois-colonial political fear of other historical figures in the history of capitalism and colonialism: the witch, the savage, the rogue, the vagabond, the criminal, the working poor, the indigent pauper, les classes dangereuses, the proletariat, the colonized, the Jew, the guerrilla, the militant, and the revolutionary.12 Stretching from the seventeenth to the twentieth

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12 In his recent work, philosopher Thomas Nail (2015) takes the importance of migration in contemporary politics seriously and argues that “the migrant is political figure of our time” (2015: 235). The historical disavowal of the migrant, Nail argues, is the condition under which societies have rendered a definitely mobile social body subordinate, secondary and invisible. The migrant has always been expelled from community, place, citizenship, membership and (often if not always) from humanity. The figure of the migrant, for Nail, expresses some of the worst modes of domination, subjugation, abjection and unfreedom.
centuries, what all these historical figures have in common is their real and assumed (exclusion from and) subversion of capitalist-colonial socio-spatial relations. For the bourgeois-colonial ruling classes, these figures of Excluded Others, of “internal enemies” have always been threats to the security of imperialist capitalist (world) order at various scales (Linebaugh 2003; Losurdo 2011; Hall 1978; Neocleous 2000, 2008).

It would be naïve to solely focus on the coercive and terrorizing processes in the contemporary ideological fabrication of “the immigrant” as an “internal enemy.” The growing targeting of immigrants and migration as security threats within the last three decades has been accompanied by the increasing implementation of state-led strategies of development and security in localities associated with “immigrant” threats. Herein, Poulantzas’s (2000) insights on the dialectics of the state and civil society and his warning against reducing state power to terror or internalized repression are constructive. The state, he argued, also acts in a positive fashion, “creating, transforming and making reality” (2000: 30, emphasis in the original). On the basis of his understanding the state as the material condensation of relationships among classes and class fractions, Poulantzas argues that

the relation of the masses to power and the State – in what is termed among other things, a consensus – always possesses a material substratum. I say “among other things,” since in working for class hegemony, the State acts within an unstable equilibrium of compromises between the dominant classes and the dominated. The State therefore continually adopts material measures which are of positive significance for the popular masses, even though these measure represent so many concessions imposed by the struggle of the subordinate classes. (2002: 30-31, emphasis in the original)

Poulantzas’s insights direct us to conceive the development and security strategies of state intervention not as dualistic and contradictory, but as complementary and necessary to the function of the state. Another important question here is, can we understand the politics of place-based urban policy targeting poverty in “the immigrant neighbourhoods” of the imperial metropole without unpacking the current political fear of “the immigrant” in relation to the multi-scalar

in human history. In an attempt to provide a counter-history of the migrant by prioritizing movement, Nail traces the genealogy of the contemporary figure of the migrant to other historical figures: the barbarian, the vagabond, and the proletariat. While my theoretical approach here is different from Nail’s Foucauldian-Deleuzian approach (a “kinopolitics based on a “social theory of movements” and “flows”), I do agree with his emphasis on the need to give more significant place to the figure of “the migrant” in our political theory and policy and in tracing the genealogy of what the media and the states have valorized as essentially a contemporary phenomenon: “the migrant”, “the immigrant.”
comeback of poverty and migration as security problems in our conjuncture? Not so much in my view.

As we saw in the previous chapter, almost a century ago, Gramsci (1971) emphasized that engaging with politics and political analysis requires unsettling liberal separations between the domestic and the international, war and peace, state and civil society. More recently, Henri Lefebvre (2003) reminded us, neither urban politics nor urban policies are local affairs. Urban politics is caught up in the contradictions between the macro-structures of capital, state and imperialism and the micro-worlds of everyday life (Lefebvre 2003). Urban policy is part of the diverse spatial strategies through which the state attempts to manage the intensely volatile and contradictory socio-spatial and racialized relations of imperialist capitalist urbanization all at once on various scales (worldwide, national and local) and levels (global, urban and everyday) (Lefebvre 2009). In extending Gramsci’s, Poulantzas’s, and Lefebvre’s insights, I emphasize the need to situate the politics of state spatial strategies of urban intervention in the “immigrant neighbourhoods” in the imperial metropole in relation to the politics of state-imperial strategies of development and security in the “ungoverned” spaces of the imperial world order.

Beyond the Liberal Ideology of Civil Peace

The first step for thinking through a conceptual framework for such analysis is to de-congeal (Bannerji 2011) the liberal ideology of peace. In the field of urban geography, the liberal ideology of civil peace – the ideology that represents civil society as the space of peace and security produced through the cessation of war, and war as “the state of nature” that is always already located outside of the territoriality of liberal society – has been taken for granted to the point of becoming invisible. In the imperial metropole, the birthplace and seat of the liberal ideology of civil peace, the material force of this ideology has played an imperative role in the production of knowledge about the relationship between the state and civil society, de-politicizing the role of the state and its ideological apparatuses in the production of political fear and consequently the analysis and conceptions of state spatial strategies of intervention in civil society.33

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33 Not only the political economic-inspired analysis of place-based urban policy has taken the liberal ideology of civil peace for granted, but also the recent debates on the “militarization of policing,” the “securitization of urban space,” and the “new military urbanism” are all deeply rooted and invested in taking the liberal ideology of civil peace in the imperial metropole as given, as part and parcel of the real.
In contemporary Western political thought, Michel Foucault redirected our attention to understanding war as a social relation. In a series of lectures from 1975 to 1976 (published under the title Society Must be Defended), Foucault (2003) began to develop an argument that rejected the liberal myth of peace which represents political-civil society as the product of the resolution of war and aimed to examine how power relations within society are invested with the force of war. Inverting Carl von Clausewitz’s (1918) well-known formulation that war is the continuation of policy by other means, Foucault insisted that “politics is the continuation of war by other means” (2003:48). For Foucault, the social relations that shape Western societies operated “dynamically through the inculcation and disseminating of the force of war” (Reid 2006:285). The task of political power, Foucault argues, is the “perpetual use of silent war,” inscribed into the institutions of society, the economic system, language and even bodies (Foucault 2003:12; Bell 2011b:318). Strategies of war may thus function in specific ways on the terrain of peace, entailing both productive and destructive dimensions within and outside the nation-state. Foucault’s (2003) emphasis on how the political framework of civil peace reproduces and sanctions relations of force manifested in war is not a complete departure from the position of Gramsci and his analysis of the “relations of force” nor from the position of Marx and Engels, who wrote in the Manifesto of the Communist Party of the “more or less veiled civil war” that takes place in bourgeois society with the development of the proletariat (2002[1848]).

Writing on the everyday life miseries of the working class in the birthplace of capitalism just a few years before the Europe-wide revolts of 1848, Engels begins The Conditions of the Working Class in England by declaring that “the social war, the war of each against all, is here openly declared” in “the great towns” (2009[1845]:37):

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34 Foucault (2003) differentiated his analysis from that of Marx by emphasizing that relations of domination are not just limited to the antagonistic relations between capital and labour. For Foucault, the bourgeoisie of the nineteenth century did not invent and impose relations of domination; rather, it inherited them from the disciplinary mechanisms of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The bourgeoisie modified and intensified some of these mechanisms and attenuated others. It was thus not labour that introduced the disciplines; rather, it is more a case of disciplines and norms making it possible to organize labour for capitalist economy (Fontana and Bertani 2003). As Poulantzas (2000:36–7) mentioned, Foucault’s eventual opposition to marxist analysis had much to do with his habit of confusing particular marxist analyses with Marxism in general. In relation to the notion of the State, for example, Foucault argued that for Marxism power is state power, localized in a state apparatus. Ironically, Foucault’s conception of the state is itself based on a juridical definition of the state, limited to the public kernel of the army, police, prisons, and courts. It is based on this narrow conception of the state that Foucault argues power also exists outside the state. As Poulantzas highlighted, many of sites of power that Foucault imagined to lie wholly outside of the State, such as the apparatus of asylums and hospital and the sport apparatus, are included in the strategic field of the state.
What is true of London, is true of Manchester, Birmingham, Leeds, is true of all great towns. Everywhere barbarous indifference, hard egotism on one hand, and nameless misery on the other, everywhere social warfare, every man’s house is a state of siege, everywhere reciprocal plundering under the protection of the law, and all so shameless, so openly avowed that one shrinks before the consequences of our social state as they manifest themselves here undisguised, and can only wonder that the whole crazy fabric still hangs together.

Since capital, the direct or indirect control of the means of subsistence and production, is the weapon with which this social warfare is carried on, it is clear that all the disadvantage of such a state must fall upon the poor. (Engels 2009[1845]:37–8)

Engels then takes his readers through “a more detailed investigation of the position in which the social war has placed the non-possessing class,” (2009[1845]:39), an investigation which takes into account the deaths from overwork and malnutrition, the housing conditions of the proletariat, the spatial segregation of “the great towns,” and the use of the law against any attempt on the part of the working class to resist such conditions. It is, the young Engels reminds his readers, “in the interest of the bourgeoisie to conduct this war hypocritically, under the guise of peace” (2009[1845]:39).

Marx also refers to “civil war in its most terrible aspect, the war of labour against capital” and in Capital Volume I writes about the struggles over the working day as a “protracted and more or less concealed civil war between the capitalist class and the working class” (1976:412–13). Later, writing on primitive accumulation, Marx (1976:915) links the social war in England to the colonial war and enslavement in America, India and Africa, situating these wars in relation to the structural and systematic violence through which capitalist order has been constituted and accumulation secured. Marx and Engels’ claims about the social war need to be taken seriously rather than rhetorically. After all, one only needs to recognize the extent to which the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century social contract theorists such as Thomas Hobbes (1991) and John Locke (1988) retained a notion of perpetual war and political fear within their models of the contract, despite the appearance of saying no to war (Neocleous 2010; Losurdo 2011; Robin 2004).

For Hobbes (1991), the perpetual war of the state of nature and the insecurity it produces can be overcome by the willingness of people to cede certain freedoms to a sovereign authority that in turn would impose peace upon civil society. The production of such willingness, nonetheless, is dependent upon the proper cultivation of political fear (both of the state of nature and the sovereign’s punitive power). Any rebellion of the multitude against the authority of the sovereign is also understood as a return of the state of nature. Thus, in Leviathan, the challenge of
authority, Hobbes argues, is “a relapse into the condition of warre, commonly called Rebellion… for Rebellion, is but warre renewed” (1991:219). In Behemoth, a follow-up to Leviathan, Hobbes (1990) indicates that the rule of law is not an exception to the rule by fear; it is the fulfillment of rule by fear. Political fear is a “form of collective life nourished by the conscious participation of individual subjects, authoritative elites in civil society, and institutions like the church and university” (Robin 2004:39).

Similarly, the introduction of government in Locke’s works through the logic of war, exercised in a permanent fashion against rebellious slaves, antagonistic “Indians,” wayward workers, and criminals – rather than the search for a liberal peace. In other words, the civil society created by the contract in the name of “peace and security” remains for liberalism a space of war. As Mark Neocleous notes, “liberalism has from its inception been a political philosophy of war, has been fully conscious of this and, as a consequence, has sought to bury this fact under various banners: ‘peace and security,’ ‘law and order,’ ‘police’” (2014:7).

Critical scholars such as Domenico Losurdo (2011), Mark Neocleous (2008; 2014), and Colleen Bell (2011a) have argued that liberalism’s key concept is not liberty, but security. Liberal liberty is conditioned by liberal security. The security in question was (and is) the security of property relations and the rising bourgeois-capitalist power. The common assumption that liberalism’s gift to human civilization is the concept of security as the foundation of freedom, peace, good society and democracy is an ideological hagiography. In Critique of Security, Neocleous (2008) shows the extent to which the liberal ideology of security has justified violence to facilitate a form of liberal order-building. Security, Neocleous (2008:80–1) notes, is a form of deployment of power, a key political technology behind coding war as peace for reordering of the social world.

After Foucault, theorizing the social character of war has been mostly the concern of critical political scientists focused on international relations and development. In the last decade, scholars in these fields have highlighted the (almost) disappearance of the language of war from contemporary foreign policy precisely at the conjuncture that war has become a major feature of imperialist policy. Since the mid-2000s, liberal interventionism has become a major force in state imperialist strategies of continuing the imperialist “war on terror” under the banner of the “long war.” Military strategists and politicians have replaced war with other concepts ranging from relatively technical operations (military training, security sector reform, non-lethal support for

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35 In Two Treaties, I, sect. 130, 131, II, sects 10, 19, 24.
rebels, state-building) or seemingly constructive ones (counterinsurgency, stabilization, development, de-radicalization) (Orford 2015). The liberal-interventionist wagging of the “war on terror” in the name of humanitarian ethos has shifted attention to the deepening nexus between war and peace, security and development, police power and war power, and the need to treat international politics and war in relation to (rather than distinct from) domestic politics and police (Holmqvist, Bachmann and Bell 2015; Neocleous 2014).

Urban political theory can benefit from theories of social war for the purpose of linking urban politics to international politics in general and, in particular, for politicizing and historicizing the racialized and territorialized security ideologies in the construction of “the immigrant” (neighbourhood) as the object of political fear and target of state intervention. Useful for this purpose is the recent research on pacification (or counterinsurgency as it is frequently referred to).36

**Pacification, Political Fear, and Community Development**

The official practice of pacification was largely abandoned among European powers with the decline of colonial rule in the second half of the twentieth century and among the American military forces with the end of the Vietnam War. Nonetheless, since the mid-2000s, pacification has re-emerged as a major strategy of the imperialist states in the “war on terror.” Influential fractions of imperialist military strategists in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada have advocated for pacification as the most effective way for combating “terrorism” and “insecurity” in the “ungoverned” spaces of the imperial world order. The revival of pacification marked a shift in imperialist policy from war with the aim of annihilating enemies to war with the aim of reforming potential enemies through an emphasis on civilian forms of interventionism.

Despite its humanitarian and peace-building appearance, pacification is essentially a counter-revolutionary strategy through which war is codified as peace. Critical analyses of pacification have explored the ways contemporary military strategists build upon the social and productive dimension of war with the aim of fabricating a liberal social order secure for imperialist-capitalist domination and accumulation. For this purpose, contemporary pacification

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36 The contemporary (Western) military terminological choices of seemingly post-imperial and post-colonial terms, such as “low-intensity conflict,” “operations other than war,” “the gray area phenomena,” and “counterinsurgency,” are strategically ideological moves to separate the history of colonial warfare from the recent “global war on terror.”

There is more to pacification and its relation to the survival of imperialist capitalism. The history of pacification goes beyond our current conjuncture and that of de-colonization in the mid-twentieth century. Neocleous (2014, 2013, 2010) has traced the theory and practice of pacification back to the colonial wars of conquest in the sixteenth century. In doing so, he situates pacification in relation to the processes of colonization, the transformation of the capitalist state, and the structural violence through which capitalist order has been constituted. His historical-materialist analysis shows that pacification has been integral to the continuation of war and, by extension, to the survival of imperialist capitalism.

For Neocleous, pacification is a productive force in constructing a new social order by reorganizing everyday life and the social relations of power around a particular regime of accumulation, while crushing opposition to that construction (2013:31). It is thus not surprising that at the conjuncture of the colonial and social wars of the nineteenth century, strategies of pacification became essential to the reorganization of the colony and the metropole, constantly travelling back and forth between the two geographies (Neocleous 2014, 2013; Rabinow 1989). In the colony, pacification strategies were fundamental to the imposition and sustenance of colonial relations of domination and accumulation. In the metropole, pacification strategies were imperative to the dialectical unity of political society and civil society. In both the colony and the metropole, pacification strategies were imperative to the reorganization of the colonial spatial and territorial relations of domination and accumulation as well as to “humanizing” the violence of these relations. The material force of the racial and spatial dimensions of pacification formed a major aspect of colonial urbanism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Saberi, 2017).

If pacification has been historically imperative to the ideologies of urbanism in the colony and the metropole (Saberi, 2017), how can pacification be mobilized today as a useful concept for analyzing place-based urban policies of development and security targeting “immigrant neighbourhoods” in the imperial metropole? I approach this question in two ways. First, I extend the historical link between localized development strategies and pacification in the twentieth century beyond Johnson’s War on Poverty and the Vietnam War. Second, I engage with a constellation of major ideologies that have formed the theory and practice of pacification and
highlight their usefulness for our analysis of the politics of place-based urban policy in the “immigrant neighbourhoods” of the imperial metropole.

In their analysis of the relational formation of urban policy and imperial policy in the 1960s, Roy, Schrader, and Crane (2014) take as their starting point the conjuncture of the 1960s. This starting point, however, is approximately the end of an historical era that had already started in the aftermath of the Great Depression in the United States: the era of community development programs. In his recent book, Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development, Daniel Immerwahr (2015) argues that before community development became the cornerstone of the War on Poverty in the “Black ghetto” and for pacification strategies in Vietnam, community development had already for three decades (1935–65) been an instrument of state penetration into the countryside, from the United States to South Asia.

As a project of state intervention in “troubled localities” and a reaction to the contradictions of industrial capitalism, community development was born out of the localist vision of communitarian rural sociologists (such as Carl C. Taylor and M.L. Wilson) in the United States of the 1930s. More interestingly for our purpose, the ideological formation of community development and, in particular, its link to the concepts of participation and integration goes back to the social unrests in the Japanese internment camps in the 1940s and the subsequent policies of the War Relocation Authority (WRA) to nullify the “threats” of the “internal enemy” of the time. The works of psychiatrist, sociologist, and dramatist Jacob Levy Moreno (1934) and anthropologist John F. Embree (1943) were influential in linking the causes of disorder and unrest in the internment camps to a “pathological” lack of integration and community cohesion. From the internment camps in the United States, community development made its way to the rural regions

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37 The roots of communitarian thought goes beyond the field of rural sociology. The genealogy of communitarian ideology goes back to the nineteenth century conservative and reactionary anti-modern thought, which in its critique of the individualism of the modern/industrial life/city nostalgically returned to an essentialized idea of group and community. One can trace the lineage of twentieth century communitarianism to the nineteenth-century social theorists such as Alexis de Tocqueville, Sir Henry Maine, Frederic Le Play, Ferdinand Tönnies, and Emile Durkheim. In the early twentieth century, the concept of community played an imperative role in the works of John Dewey, William A. White, Charles H. Cooley, Robert Park, and Jane Addams.

38 As Immerwahr (2015: 47–9) documents, the interest in the communal aspects of camp life only arose after a riot in the Manzanar camp, which killed two internees. This unrest resulted in the War Relocation Authority (WRA) inserting community development as a policy of making “harmonious communities” among the Japanese, turning camps into “ideal cities” and introducing “new stability and cohesiveness” into the internees’ lives; it speculated that the internees would be reluctant to leave.

39 Moreno (1934) ran against Freud’s argument that psychiatric disorder is the result of traumas within the life history of the individual and that therapy is about analyzing that history. For Moreno, disorder was essentially a problem of group integration (see Immerwahr 2015: 28).
of India of Nehru, particularly through the works of the architect and urbanist Albert Mayer accompanied by the support of the Foreign Operation Administration (FAO) (a precursor to USAID) and the Ford Foundation. It was after becoming central to the development apparatus of the Nehruvian state in India that the CIA introduced community development programs as a pacification strategy to nullify the threat of communism in the Philippines from the 1950s to the 1960s.

Immerwahr (2015) argues that the current “local” turn in state strategies of development (guided by the neoliberal policies of the IMF and the World Bank as we discussed in the previous chapter) is a reinvention of much older intellectual and state practices of community development and pacification. It was the localist vision at the heart of community development and a sole focus on the local scale detached from the broader social relations of imperialist capitalism that made community development a state apparatus for implementing internal and external pacification. Rather than reconfiguring social relations of domination and accumulation, community development programs directed attention away from the structural contradictions of imperialist capitalist system towards moderating the violence of such contradictions (i.e., poverty, famine) through small-scale development projects and the participation of the locals.

State-led community development is one dimension of pacification. At the heart of pacification, Neocleous (2013:32) points out, are the kinds of practices we associate with police power, that is: the political administration of “problem” population; the fabrication of social order; and the diffusion of the liberal ideology of security throughout civil society. Pacification is integral to the ways through which the state constitutes and secures civil society politically. Colleen Bell argues that pacification works as a constellation of ideologies and practices “that connect violence to order, force to persuasion, civil to military power;” it “sits at the intersection of battle and order, war and police” (2015:18–19). What are these ideologies? In what follows, I focus on three ideologies imperative to the practice of pacification, ideologies that are also useful for mobilizing the concept in relation to place-based urban policy.

The first ideology is the conception of the enemy. Pacification starts from the premise of the existence of an internal enemy in civil society that threatens the social order. The enemy figure is located within the population and associated with insurrection and rebellion, or rather with the possibility of spreading the will to revolt against an established/establishing authority. The “internal enemy” is not necessarily an existential threat to sovereign authority; rather it is, first and foremost, an ideological and political threat to the hegemonic power of dominant forces (Bell and Evans
2010; Bell 2011b; Dillon and Reid 2009). Consequently, political fear is directed towards this “internal enemy.”

It is based on this ideological conception of the “internal enemy” as the target of political fear that pacification builds upon the productive dimension of war. Rather than being annihilated, the “internal enemy” needs to be reconstructed as a proper liberal subject, one secured and subjugated to a degree that guarantees the stability of the social order of imperialist capitalism. It is also based on this ideological and political conception of the “internal enemy” that the targeting of fragments of the population, a targeting aimed at domination through “hearts and minds” strategies and the reorganization of everyday life, is an imperative dimension of pacification (Bell 2011b).

While the construction of the “internal enemy” is contingent upon the historical specificities of the processes of Othering and ordering (I will come back to this later), in its broadest sense the “internal enemy” is conceived and perceived as an “enemy of order” whose pacification is essential for the dialectical unity of political society and civil society and for maintaining stability and order at various scales.

In our conjuncture, the figure of “the immigrant” has become the most condensed embodiment of the “internal enemy” in the imperial metropole. “The immigrant” and their marginalized localities (“immigrant neighbourhoods”) stand simultaneously for concentrated poverty, crime, violence, “radicalization,” and “terrorism” and for perceived threats to social cohesion, democracy, the “Western way of life,” and the “security and peace” of the imperial metropole. The ideological construction of “the immigrant” (neighbourhood) as the object of political fear has as much to do with the historico-geographical specificities of the national question as it has to do with the racialized and territorialized security ideology targeting “ungoverned” spaces of imperialist world order.

The second ideology is order itself. Instead of defeating the “internal enemy,” pacification strategies prioritize order (Bell 2015). “Disorder,” posed as a domestic and international problem, is the most familiar trope of contemporary security ideology and discourse (Bachmann, Bell and Holmqvist 2015). The ideology of order directs us to see how pacification (as part of the state’s war power) builds upon the police power, and how police power, in turn, functions as pacification (Bachmann, Bell and Holmqvist 2015; Neocleous 2015). The concept of order has been pivotal in political theory (in the very conception of modern state) as well as in relation to the state’s war and police powers (Neocleous 2014; 2015, Bousquet 2009, Bachmann, Bell and Holmqvist, 2015).
The ideology of order has also been imperative to the reification of the ideology of security and the construction of political fear.

The link between (dis)order and (in)security first captured the imagination of political thinkers during the transition from feudalism to capitalism from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries. This is also the historical period of primitive accumulation and the formation of the modern state and its police power (Neocleous 2000). It is during this time that poverty and disintegration from capitalist social relations became associated with “disorder” represented as a threat to “peace and security,” an association that remains powerful to this day. The main task of the police has ever since been maintaining “good order” through preventing “disorder.” The “good order” in question has always been in relation to the security of private property and the socio-spatial relations of imperialist capitalism.

Liberal security, as Marx reminds us is “the supreme concept of bourgeois society” (1992 [1843]:230). As a concept and ideology, security emerged out of the bourgeoisie’s political fear – a fear that was deeply connected to the insecurity of capitalist social relations (Neocleous 2008:30). During the rapid expansion of capitalism, one central marker of the “good order” for which policing was needed had been the integration of the “disorderly” – that is the poor, the indigent and the idle – into wage labour (Neocleous 2000). This ideological conception of order re-articulates the basic interconnection between security and development – an interconnection that has been at the heart of “the local” turn in state strategies of intervention since the early twentieth century. The localized vision of community development owes its ideological power to turning the nexus of security and development into a common sense. The current return of poverty as both a domestic and international security issue that, we are told, would lead to crime, conflict, and violence (see Best 2013; Duffield 2010) builds upon the mutually reinforcing link between underdevelopment, poverty, and conflict among destitute populations. Such an ideological conception of poverty as danger is at the heart of the political fear of “the immigrant” and migration. Furthermore, the ideological construction of “the immigrant” as a threat to “Western way of life” builds upon selective interpretations of peace and urbanity as forms of “civilized” order.

40 In our conjuncture this association is best evident in the conceptualization of poverty as risk. From the World Bank and IMF to national and local states, poverty is perceived as a “risk” to the security of the market. I will discuss this point further in Chapter Four.

41 The insecurity of property relations plays an important role in forming and consolidating the notion of liberal security.
The third ideology at play in the practice of pacification is the concept of participation. Participation is at the heart of the productive dimension of war as pacification. If integration into socio-spatial relations of imperialist-capitalism is an important dimension of pacifying the “internal enemy” and fabricating the “good order,” that integration requires that the targeted subjects participate in their own pacification. From the *politique des races* of the French colonial pacification strategies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Charles Gwynn’s (1939) doctrines of British imperial policing in the first half of the twentieth century, community development programs of the early and mid-twentieth century, and Johnson’s “maximum feasible participation” strategy in the War on Poverty through to today’s participatory development projects aimed at “empowering” the poor and women, the ideology of participation has been essential to reifying neo-colonial forms of trusteeship and the role of the state in reorganizing everyday life and subjectivities of targeted populations (Wilson 2012; Immerwahr 2015).

It is not accidental that today participation has become an important feature of place-based urban policies targeting “immigrant neighbourhoods.” From community policing, community planning and consultation to distinguishing “community leaders,” resident participation is one selling point of state-led strategies of urban intervention. Rather than being genuinely democratic, the ideology of participation gives a democratic appearance to the processes of state-led intervention and the fabrication of order. Participation functions as a counter-revolutionary strategy for cultivating political domination from the bottom up, making use of everyday life insecurities, dissatisfactions, and contradictions for the purpose of crushing opposition, resistance, and radical politics. By building upon and mobilizing “organic ideologies” (Gramsci 1971) and focusing on “the local,” the ideology of participation aims to reorganize everyday life in a way that facilitates the construction of liberal citizen-subjects secure for the survival of imperialist capitalism.

**The State, Space, and Pacification**

Critical debates on pacification in political science have remained aspatial for the most part. As Engels (1992[1845]) reminds us, spatial relations play an important role in conducting the social war under the guise of peace. We know from urban marxists, researchers of colonial

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urbanism\textsuperscript{43} and urban militarization\textsuperscript{44} that capitalism, imperialism, colonialism, and war are all highly intertwined spatialized processes. Translating the concept of pacification for analyzing the politics of state-led urban strategies of development and policing requires historicizing and spatializing ideologies of the internal enemy, order, and participation. This is crucial for understanding how and why the state mobilizes spatial strategies of intervention to maintain liberal “peace and security.” In this regard, the theoretical insights of Henri Lefebvre (1976a, 1976b, 1991, 2003, 2009) are useful.

Lefebvre’s (2003) marxism offers a dialectical, open-ended, spatialized conception of social totality. In The Urban Revolution, Lefebvre (2003) made a distinction between three levels of social totality, “Global” (G), urban (M) and everyday (P), as levels of social practice that are related through mediation. With the explosion of the city and the arrival of the urban, Lefebvre states, “the second level (M) appears to be essential” (2003:89). The urban level, Lefebvre emphasized, “is nothing but an intermediary (mixed) between society, the state, global power and knowledge, institutions, and ideologies on one hand and habiting on the other” (2003:89). The importance of Lefebvre’s spatial theorization of social totality is that through the concepts of level and mediation, he integrates (rather than separates) the urban into totality – tying the macro-orders of political economy to the micro-realities of everyday life. Lefebvre’s conceptualization of the urban as both form and level of mediation, along with his theory of the production of space, are helpful in thinking through the relational formation of urban and imperial policies.

Lefebvre’s (1991) theory of the production of space de-fetishizes space in the same way that Marx did for the commodity. He takes the active processes of the production of space as the object of his analysis,\textsuperscript{45} analyzing differential aspects of spatiality: its role as ideology; historical product and stake of political struggle, as well as the central yet contradictory role of state institutions in producing and transforming the socio-spatial landscape of modern capitalism (Lefebvre 1991, 2003, 2009). His trialectical theory of the production of space – spatial practices (perceived space), representations of space (conceived space), and spaces of representation (lived space) – brings together the material forces of ideology, everyday life, and social practice.


\textsuperscript{45} The processes of the production of space encompass three dialectically interlinked dimensions: bodily–material, ideological–representational, and symbolic–affective (Lefebvre 1991).
The material force of representation is imperative in the production of space. Any representation, Lefebvre highlighted, “is ideological if it contributes either immediately or “mediately” to the reproduction of the relations of production” (1991:40). Representations of space (conceived space) emerge through the production of knowledge and ideology about space. A new set of intellectuals are involved in these processes. These are scientists, planners, urbanists, technocrats, developers, and politicians who have the power (and desire) to incorporate social imaginaries and state ideologies into their conceptualizations of space while using the very concepts of space as an organizing schema for re-organizing everyday life in accord with the logic of capitalism.46

In an approach similar to that of Gramsci (1971) and Poulantzas (2000), in *De l’Etat* Lefebvre (1976b) approaches the modern state as a contradictory condensation of social relations and practices, which while centralized and hierarchical, functions through everyday dimensions. Lefebvre emphasizes this mediation of the state as the presence of state-like thinking and symbolism in everyday life – a presence that is linked to the ideologies of space. In both *The Production of Space* and *De l’Etat*, Lefebvre elaborates on the central role of the state in the production of abstract – homogenous, fragmented, and hierarchical – space and the survival of capitalism (1976a, 1991). In so doing, he provided a nuanced spatial dimension to the marxist theories of uneven development and offers the first explicit theorization of hegemony as a spatial project (Kipfer 2008).

Most important for our analysis is Lefebvre’s attention to the relation between the crisis of colonialism in the mid-twentieth century and the role of the state in organizing domination through hierarchical territorial relations for the purpose of strengthening relations of domination. As Lefebvre states in *De l’Etat IV,*

Crisis... or, rather, the critical state *l’etat critique* shook up modern colonialism and its hierarchy. The movements of people rendered dependent (humiliated, dominated, exploited, with the primary emphasis on “humiliation,” which is underestimated by economism) loosened *relations of domination.* Their effectiveness had extended from peripheries to centers. It would be imprecise to limit their impact to countries in revolt. Should we forget that the last phase of the war in dependent counties in Asia and Africa found its extension in the

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46 Hence the reason why Lefebvre referred to conceived space as “dominant space” and emphasized that “in the spatial practices of neocapitalism, representations of space facilitate the manipulations of... [spaces of representation]” (1991:59). While ideologies of space are imperative material force in the production of space, Lefebvre’s trialectics also give space to the lived and living activities of human beings. This, nonetheless, requires a collective consciousness of how representations become ideological and also a critique of everyday life and of reified notions of space and time (1991:105).
contestations and protests of youth, women, intellectuals, the working class, the everyday, suburbs, in short, all peripheries, even those strangely close to the centers? (quoted in Kipfer and Goonewardena 2013:98)

Lefebvre’s nuanced attention to the exercise of domination over the former colonial subjects now living in the peripheralized spaces of the imperial metropole and his focus on the role of the state in organizing the relations of centre–periphery at various geographical scales and historical moments eventually culminated in his concept of “colonization,” which is a useful concept for analyzing how state spatial strategies of development and policing can function as strategies of pacification. “Colonization” refers to the political organization of territorial relations of domination (Kipfer and Goonewardena 2013:95).

The important aspect of Lefebvre’s contribution is his emphasis on how, in the aftermath of the colonial crisis of the mid-twentieth century and the movement of former colonial subjects to the imperial metropole, centre–periphery relations of domination and accumulation are extended from the former colonies to the heart of metropoles (Kipfer and Goonewardena 2013). “Internal colonization” in the imperial metropole, refracted through dynamics of uneven development, continues and transforms colonial rule, particularly in the aftermath of formal de-colonization (Lefebvre 2009:181). “Colonization,” Kipfer and Goonewardena elaborate, alerts us to a key aspect of how the state produces abstract forms of space: homogenous, fragmented and hierarchical.... Mediated by the urban level, “colonial” state strategies, while operating at the level of the social order as whole (level G), must be understood in their (contingent) capacity to organise everyday life (level P). (2013:96)

Lefebvre’s concept of ‘colonization’ is heuristic for specifying the concept of pacification, both historically and geographically. It helps us to de-fetishize the ideology of order through more specified historical-geographical analysis of the production of imperialist-capitalist social order, that is, bringing into analysis the role of the state, production of space, ideologies of space, uneven development and the political organization of the territorial relations of domination in the production of social order at various scales and temporalities. “Colonization” also allows us to connect the production of order and the mapping of disorder in far and near peripheries. By emphasizing the pivotal role of the state in the political organization of relations between dominant and dominated spaces, “colonization” offers us a way of tying the construction of the

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47 For an in-depth discussion on Lefebvre’s concept of colonization, see Kipfer and Goonewardena (2013, 2007).
“internal enemy” / “enemies of order” to the relations of centre and periphery within metropolitan regions on the one hand and to the scale of imperial world order on the other.

Colonial Domination and Recognition

Whether during the period of modern colonialism or in our neo-colonial imperialist world order, security ideology, political fear, and territorial relations of domination at various scales have been mediated by (neo-) colonial racism. Relations of domination wherein power has been structured into racially hierarchical social relations facilitate the systematic oppression and dispossession of the dominated (colonized) populations. We thus need to pay attention to the historical specificities of racialization as it pertains to the ideologies of the “internal enemy,” political fear, order, participation, and space. As Hall emphasized almost three decades ago, “[n]o doubt there are certain general features to racism. But even more significant are the ways in which general features are modified and transformed by the historical specificity of the contexts and environments in which they become active” (1986: 23).

For the purpose of our analysis, the insights of anti-colonial intellectuals such as Frantz Fanon and Himani Bannerji are instructive. While not directly engaged with the concept of pacification, Fanon’s (1967a, 2004) provides insights on the interplay between structural/objective and recognitive/subjective dimensions of colonialism. In particular, his analyses of the spatiotemporal character of colonization (see Kipfer 2008, 2011; Sekyi-Otu 1997) and his critique of colonial recognition (Coulthard 2014; Pithouse 2011) are constructive for defetishizing the historically specific processes of racialization and Othering that are fundamental to the ideological production of internal enemies/enemies of order/immigrants, order, and the racialized dimension of spatial relations of domination in former White-settler colonies transformed into liberal democracies such as Canada.

Fanon’s (1967a, 2004) nuanced analysis of colonization as a “spatial organization” and of everyday racism as a lived ideology and “alienating spatial relation” (Kipfer 2011b:94) alerts us that any analysis of space in the colonial context should take into consideration the spatially mediated colonial relations of domination. Colonial violence and domination are inscribed into

48 In his “Disappointments & Illusions of French Colonialism” in Toward the African Revolution, Fanon (1967b) briefly engaged with French colonial pacification strategies in Algeria.

49 For the usefulness of Fanon’s insights for analyzing the racialized dimension of spatial relations, see Kipfer (2011b).
and mediated through the spatial organization of colonization, its compartmentalized socio-racial order. This is the point that Fanon forcefully reminds his readers in “On Violence,” the opening chapter of *The Wretched of Earth*: “The colonial world is a compartmentalized world” (Fanon 2004:3). The compartmentalization of the colonial world is most vividly manifested in the spatial segregation and differentiation between the European town and the native town in the colony.

The colonial project of compartmentalization is also at the heart of the process of belonging/exclusion and racialization (Sekyi-Otu 1997:50). It is based on this understanding of colonization as a process of fabrication of a compartmentalized socio-racial order that de-colonization, Fanon argues, is “a program of complete disorder”; it is “the veritable creation of a new humanity” (2004:36). The colonial spatial relations of domination not only are integral to the political economy of capitalist-colonial exploitation and accumulation, but are also embedded in everyday racism, humiliation, and violence that shape the subjectivities of the colonizer and the colonized (Fanon 2004:41; Sekyi-Otu 1997:77). Colonial spatial relations affect the everyday life and consciousness of the colonized. The colonial spatial organization imposed a double “siege” upon the colonized, a simultaneous spatial “siege” and a “siege” upon their consciousness and existence (Sekyi-Otu 1997:80).

In a series of works from *Black Skin, White Masks* (1967a) and *Toward the African Revolution* (1967b) to *The Wretched of the Earth* (2004), Fanon emphasizes that colonial rule is not solely based on naked force; rather, it is heavily contingent on a more complex and mediated form of violence that is the construction of the colonial subject (Bernasconi 2011; Sekyi-Otu 1996, 2011; Coulthard 2014). Along with colonial spatial organization, colonial recognition plays an important role in the production of colonial subjects whose constructed “inferiority complex” would lead them to identify with the world-view of the oppressor (the colonizer).

Colonial recognition, with its ultimate goal of breaking the political will of the people so as to maintain rule and prevent anti-colonial revolution (Hallward 2011), is an important aspect of colonial pacification strategies. It is the critique of the pacifying force of colonial recognition (its psychological, ideological, and material force) that is at the heart of *Black Skin, White Masks*. There, Fanon challenged the applicability of Hegel’s dialectics of recognition and its hopeful end result in mutual reciprocity in the colonial context (1967a; see also Coulthard 2014). Far from being a source of freedom and dignity for the colonized, colonial recognition is itself a productive force that reproduces colonial relations of domination and consolidates a far-reaching “inferiority complex” (Fanon 2004:210). Everyday racism – understood as a lived ideology, “spatial relation”
(Kipfer 2011), and “the systematized oppression of a people” (Berasconi 2011) – is integral to colonial recognition and the fabrication of the colonized subject (Fanon 1967a).

Fanon’s analyses bring to the forefront how in actual contexts of domination, the terms of recognition are usually determined by and in the interest of the dominant group (the colonizer). In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon takes up the issue again, stressing that, “[i]t is the colonist who fabricated and continues to fabricate the colonized subject. The colonist derives his validity, i.e., his wealth, from the colonial system” (2004:2). The program of de-colonization and its “veritable creation of a new humanity” (2004:2) are contingent upon the negation of the hierarchical socio-racial colonial order and colonial recognition.

Do Fanon’s insights relate to our “post-colonial” era when the compartmentalized colonial spatial relations are more mediated and porous than Fanon’s times? Despite the liberal attempt to represent our conjuncture as “post-colonial,” the concrete realities of our world – from the continuation of the “long war” and imperialist aggression in former colonies to the systematic humiliation, exploitation, and marginalization of former colonial subjects (now “immigrants” and “refugees”) in the peripheralized spaces of the imperial metropole – confirm that “official” de-colonization did not mean an end to colonial relations of domination and accumulation. Rather, through a re-composition of colonial relations of domination and accumulation at various scales a neo-colonial order is produced. As Kipfer and Goonewardena (2013; also Kipfer 2011) have emphasized, Fanon’s insights about the spatial mediation of colonial relations of domination can be usefully extended to Lefebvre’s concept of “colonization” for analyzing the role of urban policies in re-organizing the racialized terrain upon which the neo-colonial order is fabricated, whether in “internal colonies” of the imperial metropole or in former colonies.

Glen Coulthard (2014) has highlighted the political usefulness of extending Fanon’s critique of colonial recognition for challenging the emancipatory claim of the current liberal diversity-affirming forms of state recognition in contexts such as Canada. While Coulthard’s focus is on the indigenous question in Canada and the ways that liberal politics of recognition reproduce and depoliticize colonial relations of domination over indigenous peoples, we can extend this critique to the state ideology of multiculturalism that was invented for the political administration of “immigrants” through the recognition of their “cultural identities.” For this purpose, the influential work of Himani Bannerji (2000) and her anti-racist, feminist marxist critique of the ideology of multiculturalism in Canada is a good starting point. Beneath the state’s claim of recognizing different cultures and diversity, Bannerji argues, resides a “selective mode of
ethnicization” that affirms the ethnic core culture as White Anglo-European, while around this core, Other “multi-culturals” – arranged hierarchically – are “tolerated” (2000:73) The “visible minority immigrant” embodies this hierarchical peripherality in English Canada; the ruling classes’ political fear of “the immigrant” in Canada feeds upon this hierarchical peripherality.

Fanon’s critique of colonial recognition and its associated “technocratic paternalism,” as Richard Pithouse (2011) has shown, can also be extended to a counter-colonial critique of the current politics of NGOs and intellectuals, including that of left academics and their role in crafting and justifying development strategies to “empower” the poor. This is particularly imperative for analyzing the functioning of the integral state in relation to place-based urban policy at a time when the neoliberal mantras of “partnership” and “participation” attempted to erase the role of the state.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I proposed a different framework for analyzing the relational formation of urban and imperial policies and politics. Translating the recent critical research on pacification is useful in this regard. While building on the insights of the existing urban literature (discussed in Chapter One), I expanded on them by thinking through a conceptual framework for situating state-led targeted urban intervention in relation to the hegemony of the neo-colonial capitalist world order. I differentiated my approach from the current literature by taking as my starting point the subject position of the Excluded Others in the imperial metropole. Bringing into our analysis the subject position of those whose subjectivities and living spaces are the targets of state-guided intervention directs us to the material force of the ruling classes’ political fear of the precarious non-White working class, codified and homogenized as “immigrants.” Following the insights of Gramsci (1971) and Lefebvre (1976, 1991, 2003, 2009), I argued that in order to comprehensively analyze state-led strategies of urban intervention, we need to bring into analysis the material force of the ruling classes’ political fear of “the immigrant” and think through the relational formation of urban and imperial policies/politics.

Bringing together the insights of Mark Neocleous, Henri Lefebvre, Frantz Fanon and Himani Bannerji allow us to examine the three fundamental ideologies of pacification (i.e., the internal enemy, order, and participation) for examining place-based urban policy targeting non-White poverty in the imperial metropole. This approach allows us to politicize the multi-scalar,
multi-dimensional revival of localism in state spatial strategies of development and security targeting poverty. This revival is about securing the production of a neo-colonial urban order by “humanizing” the relations of domination and accumulation and moderating the inherent violence of such relations. Translating the concept of pacification for urban analysis helps us to have a better grasp of how “the local” turn in state strategies of intervention has simultaneously mediated and reified the disassociation of “the local” from the broader socio-spatial of imperialist capitalism, thus functioning as a force in the production and survival of a neo-colonial urban order.

In the following chapters, I trace the development of place-based urban policies of development and security targeting concentrated non-White poverty in Toronto. I show how the political fear of “the immigrant” in the ruling classes affected the “discovery” and conceptualization of poverty and eventually the formation of place-based urban policy in Toronto. The political fear of “the immigrant” in Toronto is as much a national product as it is a transnational one. Focusing on the concept of prevention as a fundamental aspect of place-based urban policy, I show how the concept of prevention is extremely ideological; it is about preventing “security threats” emanating from “the immigrant” neighbourhoods rather than addressing the real social malaise of such localities. It is through the ideology of prevention that place-based urban policy functions as a modality of neo-colonial pacification.
Part Two: The Formation of Place-based Urban Policy in Toronto

Chapter Three: The Making of the “Immigrant” and Poverty Problems

Introduction

[In Poverty by Postal Code] we [United Way Toronto] found that poverty was quite spread throughout the city but it was concentrated in specific neighbourhoods.... We actually had an inverted U; there is downtown core and where we saw poverty really growing over time was in places like City of York, North York, Rexdale, and in areas of Scarborough. And that’s alarming because the shade of poverty, when you looked at them on a map, was getting significantly and dramatically worse in some neighbourhoods, and that told us that we’d better look at what’s actually happening in those neighbourhoods. And the first thing that we did was actually looking at what is it that we’re doing in terms of addressing some of those trends.... So the strategy that we developed and we said we’re going to do working with the city and many other partners was called the Strong Neighbourhood Strategy. (I23 2013)

The publication by the United Way of Poverty by Postal Code in 2004 and the reference to 2005 as the “year of the gun” are most often understood as the major events that led to the formation of place-based urban policy targeting poverty in Toronto. The publication is credited for putting the phenomenon of concentrated non-White poverty in Toronto’s postwar suburbs on the radar of municipal policymakers, while the 2005 incidents were quickly represented as a confirmation of how dangerous concentrated non-White poverty could become, threatening the peace, security, and prosperity of Toronto. In fact, both moments were imperative to the production of a territorialized public consciousness about the geography and colour of poverty and gun violence in the city and of a subsequent need for immediate state intervention.

Voices affiliated with the United Way often credit the philanthropic organization with the “discovery” of geographically concentrated poverty in Toronto in 2004 (I23 2013; I4 2014; I17 2013). It is, however, more accurate to talk about a particular representation of the rediscovery of poverty in 2004. In reality, it was not the first time that the phenomenon of poverty in Toronto made it onto the radar of policymakers and the state; urban poverty, its containment and de-concentration, had long been registered on the radar of the ruling classes in the city. The
construction of Regent Park, Canada’s first and biggest public housing project in Toronto’s downtown east in the aftermath of the Second World War was a calculated strategy of the national and local states to clean up the messy visibility and perceived threats of concentrated poverty at the heart of Cabbagetown. By the early 2000s, the concentration of non-White poverty in Regent Park became the target of another round of state-led destruction and redevelopment (Kipfer and Petrunia 2009), followed by the revitalization of other public housing developments in central Toronto.

Poverty in Toronto’s postwar suburbs has also been on the radar of the local state for few decades. In 1979, the Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto (SPCT) (1979, 1980) documented and warned about the economic decline and demographic change in Toronto’s postwar suburbs. Initially built for White middle-income families in the postwar era of state-led (sub)urbanization, by the end of the 1970s the rental apartment buildings scattered across Toronto’s then-postwar suburbs were gradually becoming the residential spaces of non-White working-class populations.

According to a senior City manager in the Social Development, Finance and Administration division, it was more the contradictions of the socio-political context and the aftermath of Poverty by Postal Code rather than the novelty of its findings that sparked the need for immediate state intervention:

You need to go back to [the Social Planning Council Report] Neighbourhoods under Stress. Because the old is new again…. There were two reports [Neighbourhoods under Stress and Suburbs in Transition] that came out a year or two apart. And the Suburbs in Transition really foreshadowed what happened in 2004. So Suburbs said, we have all of these parts of the city – Etobicoke, North York, Scarborough – that have urban design for nuclear family with cars…. We have a transition in the populations who are actually living in those areas –and the new population, the built form does not match the kind of needs and who the new population is. If we don’t start to address [this problem], then we are going to have problems. So Suburbs actually identified that 30 years ago in the 1980s… not enough was done – clearly. So when we did the Strong Neighbourhood Strategy [in 2005], it was basically saying: Okay, we talked about these in the 1980s, but we didn’t actually fix anything, and we are still here and it’s worse because now kids are picking up guns and shooting each other. So, we need to address that in the Strong Neighbourhood [Strategy]. (I3 2014)

How was that socio-political context of the mid-2000s produced over the years? How did “the immigrant” problem in Toronto’s postwar context form? How were poverty, suburbs, “race,” and violence suddenly linked together and so became policy issues? In her study of the formation of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy, Amy Siciliano argues that “the year of the gun” “served as an
instrument to accelerate, normalize and institutionalize ways of narrating and governing the growing racial and class difference between Toronto’s centre and periphery” (2010:195–96). The narrative of “suburban decline” informed the framework of the Priority Neighbourhood strategy. This narrative assumed a conception of suburbs that is essentially threatening to the city’s social order and “asserted that concentration of racialized [non-White] suburban poverty… explained the contemporary problem of gun violence in the city” (2010:41). Siciliano traces the narrative of suburban decline to “the anti-suburban ideology of the urban reform era” of the 1970s in Toronto (2010:84–6).

The legacies of Toronto’s urban reform movement (inspired by Jane Jacob’s [1961] work and activism) have been foundational in forming urban politics and policy in the city. But this is not the whole story. The purpose of this chapter is to prepare the broader historical and political ground of the formation and consolidation of place-based urban policy in Toronto. To have a better understanding of why and how “the immigrant” turned into a problem and non-White poverty and security (i.e., gun violence) became so politicized in Toronto by 2005, we need to look back at the conjuncture of the late twentieth- and early twenty-first centuries when poverty, what David Blaney and Naeen Inayatullah (2010) have termed “the wound of wealth” – a wound that continues to haunt bourgeois economic theory and practice – was identified as a major target for state intervention. This is a conjuncture in which poverty, international migration, and underdevelopment were increasingly targeted not simply as social problems, but as security threats both locally and internationally. As I show in this chapter and the one that follows, the targeting of concentrated non-White poverty and “the “immigrant” problem are anchored on the perception of both as “disorder,” as security threats to the White bourgeois socio-spatial order of not just Toronto, but also the Toronto region and Canada.

**State Restructuring, Economic Recession and Immigration Policy (1980s–1990s)**

In the aftermath of the accumulation crisis of Fordist capitalism in the 1970s, the decades of the 1980s and 1990s were a period of rapid neoliberal state restructuring and economic de- and re-regulation in Canada. The processes of neoliberalization in Canada have had their own specificities as they took place against the backdrop of the country’s “uneven spatial development” (Peck 2001:224) and its specific history of Fordism and post-Fordism (Peck 2001:213–60; Shields and Evans 1998). Neoliberalization in Canada went hand in hand with changing immigration
policy and public attitudes towards arriving populations at the time that the demographic composition of Canada, and particularly that of its main metropolitan centres, most notably Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver, gradually transformed from a White Christian majority to a more diverse demography as the result of the opening the country to non-European populations in the late 1960s.

The Liberal Party is most often credited for building the post-World War II national image of Canada as a multicultural and humanitarian peacekeeper country, different from the United States and other West European countries. In 1967 the Liberal government of Lester Pearson replaced Canada’s explicitly racist, White-only immigration policy by a formally colour-blind immigration policy characterized by an emphasis on labour skills. A few years later, in 1971, the Liberal government of Pierre Elliot Trudeau introduced multiculturalism as the foundation of Canada and Canadian identity. Contrary to the public myth dear to Canadians, these policies had less to do with the sudden humanitarian benevolence of the Canadian state than with economy and politics. The liberalization of the immigration policy had to do with the increased demand for skilled labour as the result of a declining labour supply from former sources in the British Isles and Europe. Multiculturalist policy was the result of dealing with Québécois claims of distinctiveness and other European “ethnic” recognition demands that followed this.

The 1970s were witness to both the liberal turn in Canadian immigration policy and the introduction of the preliminary moves towards neoliberalization by the federal Liberal government under Trudeau (Wolfe 1984). After coming into power in 1984, the Progressive Conservatives (PCs) under the leadership of Brian Mulroney intensified neoliberalization. The Mulroney government began the processes of state restructuring and the dismantling of the welfare state, limited fiscal transfers to the provinces in terms of equalization payments, cut the federal government’s direct spending on social programs, and reorganized the eligibility criteria for getting social assistance precisely at the time that industrial restructuring drastically increased the population dependent on welfare (Russell 2000).

Neoliberalism permeated various sectors, and the housing sector was profoundly affected. Already by 1985, the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) reduced its support for homeownership and, more importantly, for mixed rental-housing programs. The federal Liberal government of Jean Chrétien that came to power in 1993 reinforced the neoliberal turn in Canada. In the same year, the Liberals eliminated Canada’s national housing program and in 1994 announced slashing unemployment benefits by $5.5 billion over a three-year period. The Liberal
federal budget of 1995 drastically reduced federal contributions to social spending to the point that it is often considered to mark the end of the Keynesian welfare state in Canada (McBride 2005; Bakker 1995; Johnson and Stritch 1997).

The 1980s and 1990s were also a period of increasingly intense anti-immigrant debates about the nature of Canada’s multiculturalism and immigration policies that eventually resulted in the changing and tightening of the immigration system with the rolling out of the “war on terror.”

The public explosion of xenophobic discourses and ideologies in the 1980s and 1990s should be seen in relation to the specificities of the Canadian context and the broader anti-immigrant turn in Western Europe and international politics in the aftermath of official de-colonization ending in the mid-1970s. This is the conjuncture in which the figure of “the immigrant” became a security threat in the West (Ibrahim 2005; Duffield 2007).

Given Canada’s dominant history as a White-settler colony of the British Empire, immigration and migrant labour have been essential to maintaining labour force growth in order to sustain the economy and build the nation-state. Thus labour-market policy and immigration policy in Canada have been intensely linked together. The legacies of the White-settler colonial ideologies are of course still alive and aggravate the contradictions of liberal multiculturalism in the country. Even in the midst of overhauling the White-only immigration policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and despite the desperate need for cheap labour in the country, the state’s perception of non-White migrant labourers as security threats to Canada and the Canadian nation was alive and strong in parliamentary debates (Satzewich 1989; Sharma 2006). During the 1980s, implicit and explicit racist attacks on non-White immigrants – coded as debates on the “flaws” of the immigration system and the “diminishing quality” of immigrants – were voiced either in parliamentary debates about the “refugee problem” during the Mulroney government (Abu-Laban 1998) or through media-based opposition to the official multiculturalism policy penned by prominent journalists of the mainstream newspapers in both English Canada and Quebec (Karim 2002).

By the end of the 1980s the flowery promises of free market advocates confronted hard realities. In 1989 Canada entered into its most serious economic downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The recession was the result of a variety of factors: global economic restructuring; the (consolidation of) the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Canada and the

50 In 2002, the Liberal federal government finally replaced the 1976 Immigration Act with the Immigration and Refugee Protections Act.
United States; the federal government’s monetarist and anti-inflationary policies (directed by the Bank of Canada); and the resultant appreciation of the Canadian dollar which slowed down the export-based economy of the manufacture sector as well as the sudden burst of the real estate market balloon (Frisken 2007:190; Rachlis and Wolfe 1997).

The economic recession provided fodder for the public outburst of xenophobic and anti-immigrant debates around the “diminishing-returns” and the “human capital quality” of the incoming non-White immigrants (Galabuzi 2006:143–72). The result was that (non-White) immigrants were increasingly represented as potential security threats in and to Canada, rather than potential Canadian citizens, voters, and contributors to Canada (Abu-Laban 1998, Sharma 2006; Galabuzi 2007). For example, one of the initiatives of the Conservative Prime Minister Kim Campbell during her short term in office (June to November 1993) was the restructuring of the Department of Employment and Immigration by placing some of the functions of the former department in a new Department of Public Security (later disbanded by the Liberal government in the same year). Meanwhile, the small Department of Multiculturalism (created in 1989) was amalgamated with a new federal ministry of Canadian Heritage.

The politicization and problematization of immigration (and its value to Canada) in the 1990s was imperative for reforming immigration policy and the current state strategies in regard to immigrant settlement. Some of the foundational ideological tenets of the current “immigrant problem” were re-articulated in this decade. While the dismantling of the welfare state progressively diminished state responsibility for facilitating immigrant settlement processes, concepts such as “integration” and “social cohesion” – today’s policy buzzwords – popped up as solutions to deal with the contradictions of neoliberalization, multiculturalism and the racist structures of labour market in Canada’s metropolitan centers. Building upon the momentum facilitated by the outgoing Conservative federal government, the Chrétien Liberal government aimed at reforming the immigration policy by problematizing family reunification and putting greater emphasis on the economic self-sufficiency of immigrants. The Chrétien federal government shifted the former humanitarian discourse towards an emphasis on selecting potential immigrants who would “contribute” rather than drain “our” public resources. The result was “pitting (good) self-sufficient independent immigrants against (bad) family class immigrants” who then were implicitly blamed for stealing “our” Canadian welfare and “our” Canadian social and educational services (Abu-Laban 1998:11).
At the same time, the federal Liberal government mobilized a discourse of integration as a “Canadian approach” to the assumed problems of immigration (despite the wide use of the concept in Europe) (Abu-Laban 1998). In doing so, immigrants rather than state restructuring, government policies, and systemic racism became the problem to be solved. With the use of integration and its explicit dichotomization between (implicitly monolithic) Canadians or Canadian values on the one hand and immigrants on the other hand, the Chrétien Liberal government partially satisfied one of the Right’s main criticisms of multiculturalism as being a “threat” to Canadian unity in the 1980s and 1990s, since the burden to integrate rested solely on immigrants (Bannerji 2000; Abu-Laban 1998).

The emphasis on integration came at the time when the Liberals made it easier to deport permanent residents deemed security threats to Canadian society. In 1995, Bill C-44 amended the Immigration Act to include new provisions that allowed for the deportation, without a right of appeal, of permanent residents deemed a “danger to the public.” The government introduced Bill C-44 against the background of anti-Black racism and the targeting of Black men in Toronto as a security threat to the (White) public. It resulted in increased deportation of Jamaican nationals in Canada (Barnes 2009). These policy changes were also accompanied by the state’s emphasis on knowing immigrants. Since the mid-1990s, state-sponsored production of knowledge about immigration and integration in Canada’s metropolitan centres has become a bustling intellectual industry for universities, NGOs, policy-research institutions, and think tanks.

The concept of social cohesion helped frame and camouflage the inherent racism of this state-intellectual collaboration. In 1996, the Department of Canadian Heritage identified social cohesion as a part of critical policy issues and challenges that would arise over the next decades. In 1997, the Department of Justice Canada and Canadian Heritage co-initiated and co-led the Social Cohesion Network (SCN) of the Policy Research Initiative (PRI). The Network has been an

51 A “danger to the public” ruling was contingent on an individual being convicted of a criminal offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more could be imposed. The introduction of the bill took place against the background of two incidents involving Black men in Toronto in late 1994. The first was the Just Desserts café case, where four Black males attempted to rob the café and a young White woman was killed in the process. The second was the shooting of a White police officer on patrol from 12th Division in the Black Creek area by a young Black Jamaican male who was living in Canada illegally and had been previously ordered deported.

52 In 1995, the federal government announced a joint venture involving the national funding agency for academic research in the social sciences and humanities, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration to established centres of excellence for research on immigration and integration in Canadian cities – namely, Vancouver, Edmonton, Toronto, and Montreal.
imperative force in knowledge production about social cohesion since the late 1990s (Jeannotte 1999, 2003; Policy Research 2001; Stanley 2003).

The impacts of the economic recession of 1989 were felt more severely in Ontario and the Toronto region; there, the automobile industry and real-estate capital were hit harder than in many other parts of Canada. The recession, coupled with the anti-immigrant discourses, facilitated the election of the Conservatives under the leadership of Mike Harris in the 1995 Ontario provincial election. Under the populist banner of “The Common Sense Revolution,” the provincial Conservative government of Mike Harris implemented a Thatcherite-style revolution that qualitatively transformed the political, socio-economic, and spatial structures in Ontario and Toronto (Keil 2002, Boudreau, Keil and Young 2009).

Despite the ideological rhetoric of small government, the Harris government became perhaps the most interventionist government that Ontario and Toronto had ever seen. These neoliberal interventions drastically affected the lives of many residents and were influential in the production of poverty, specifically among non-White working-class populations. Among provincial policies implemented post-1995 that affected (urban affairs in) Toronto were: reducing provincial income taxes by 30%, reforming the property tax system; cutting welfare rates by 21.6%; making deep cuts to provincial transfer payments; tightening eligibility requirements for welfare and other forms of social assistance (including rent subsidies); dismantling the affirmative action and anti-scab laws; implementing law-and-order policy (the Safe Street Act directed against squeegee kids and panhandlers); facilitating the privatization of municipal utilities; and deregulating urban planning and development controls in the Toronto region (Boudreau, Keil, and Young 2009:59).

In 1996, the Conservatives shattered the already troubling affordable housing sector in Toronto. The construction of 17,000 units of social housing was cancelled and the cost of social housing, public transit, and other social programs were downloaded to municipalities. In January 1998, in one of its most dramatic and undemocratic structural changes in the name of “cost-saving,” “accountability,” “economic competitiveness” and “local democracy,” the Harris government dissolved the regional government of Metropolitan Toronto (formed in 1954) and its six municipalities (East York, Etobicoke, North York, Scarborough, York and the former City of Toronto) and amalgamated them into a single municipality called the City of Toronto (Boudreau, Keil and Young 2009:59). In June 1998, the Tenant Protection Act came into effect in the newly

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53 The amalgamation took place despite being overwhelmingly rejected in a municipal referendum in 1997.
amalgamated City of Toronto. The hallmark of the Act was the introduction of “vacancy decontrol” – which effectively removed rent control on units that became available and made it easier for landlords to evict tenants. The Act paved the way for the gentrification of downtown Toronto and affected housing affordability in the city for years to come (Slater 2004).

**Demographic Transformation and Socio-political Contradictions in Toronto (1990s)**

The 1990s turned into a socio-economically volatile decade in Toronto. With the hard collapse of its real estate market in 1989, Toronto underwent a deep recession that continued into the early 1990s. It took almost a decade for the real estate market to recover. The systematic gentrification and privatized, market-led transformation of downtown Toronto, facilitated by the local state, was a major force in this recovery (Lehrer and Wieditz, 2009). The economic recession turned into a cause for the acceleration of the restructuring of the local state, a process that by the end of the 1990s resulted in the consolidation of the “competitive city” model of urban governance (Harvey 1989a; Jacobs and Fincher 1998; Smith 1996), anchored on “a complex of class alliances and political coalitions, neoliberal planning and economic policies, multicultural diversity “management” and revanchist law-and-order campaigns” (Kipfer and Keil 2002: 229).

The 1990s also witnessed an increase in the number of immigrants arriving and settling in Toronto and its surrounding areas. Between 1991 and 2001, immigration-induced labour force growth was 132% for Toronto in comparison to 70% for Canada and 97% for Ontario. Immigrants composed 37% of the total population in 1991, 42% in 1996, and 44% in 2001. By 2006, immigrants were 45.7% of the total population, while non-White population made up 42.9% of Toronto’s population. The demographic transformation of Toronto was accompanied with a change in the geography of immigrant settlement in the Toronto region. During the postwar years, central Toronto was the major destination for arriving immigrants from Europe, attracted by relatively cheap housing prices as the result of the state-led suburbanization of the Canadian middle-class. The gradual gentrification of downtown Toronto (beginning in the late 1960s and then systematically accelerated since the 1990s) changed this pattern (Caulfield 1994; Magnusson 1983). Since the mid-1970s, immigrant settlement patterns have undergone an increasing peripheralization, with a concentration in the city’s postwar suburbs, in the regions of Peel and York and most particularly in the municipalities of Markham, Mississauga, Vaughan, and Brampton.
The recession, coupled with neoliberal restructuring, labour market deregulation, changes in immigrant settlement policy, and the consolidation of “city competitive” politics accelerated socio-economic and racial polarization and uneven urban development in the city (Ornstein 2000; Filion 2000; Khosla 2003; Kipfer and Keil 2002; Boudreau, Keil and Young 2009). By the end of the 1990s, it was hard to ignore the concrete manifestations of Canada’s “economic apartheid” (Galabuzi 2006) in the country’s major global city and its most diverse metropolitan centre. From 1991 to 1996, the incidents of poverty in Toronto grew from 18.9% to 28% (United Way 1999:5).

Given the already existing systemic racism in the labour market (Henry and Ginzberg 1985; Galabuzi 2006; Pendakur and Pendakur 2011), non-White working class populations, and particularly non-White women, were severely affected by the state neoliberal restructuring in the name of competition and the free market (Khosla 2003). In 1996, unemployment hit 18% among Arabs and West Asians while remaining less than 7% for British, Northern European, and Scandinavian residents in Metro Toronto (Boudreau, Keil, and Young 2009:91). By the mid-1990s, Toronto witnessed perhaps the most visible human costs of the neoliberal revolution: an explosion of homelessness and a crisis of affordable housing in the central city (Heroux 2011). In the fall of 1998, while developers were ecstatic about the booming recovery of Toronto’s real-estate market, homelessness was declared a national disaster in the city (Toronto Disaster Relief Committee [TRDC] 1998).

The 1990s showcased the intense bursting of the contractions of systemic racism, uneven urban development, and neoliberalization. The decade turned into a politically intense time in Toronto. With the demographic transformation of the city from the White Orange stronghold of the British Empire up until the late 1960s to one of the most diverse Western metropolitan centres by the 1990s, racism and racial tensions gradually became a common feature in the city despite the desperate political attempt of the ruling classes to sell Toronto as a multicultural heaven of “ethnic harmony” and “peaceful tolerance” (Coucher 1997). Already in the late 1970s and early 1980s, rampant racism prompted collective resistance against racism in policing and the public school system (particularly on the part of Toronto’s West Indian and South Asian populations) (Stasiulis 1989).

From around 1989, a series of killings or injurings of several Black people by the Toronto police once again brought the questions of “race,” racism, and crime into the public eye (Jackson 1994). The issue of “race and crime” became a hot topic in the 1991 municipal election. In 1992, following the Rodney King verdict in Los Angeles, a solidarity march on Toronto’s downtown
Yonge Street, organized by Black activists, turned into confrontations between the police and the demonstrators. It became known as the “Yonge Street riot” – Toronto’s version of what it is commonly and problematically referred to as “race riots.”

The “Yonge Street riot” shook Toronto’s self-constructed and self-congratulatory image of racial harmony, diversity, and tolerance (Jackson 1994). It was followed by an unprecedented series of official reports, including a specially commissioned report on Race Relations in Ontario (Lewis 1992) and an audit of the “race relations” practices of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force (Andrews 1992). The short-term result of the reports was the introduction by the NDP Ontario government of Fresh Arts, an arts program for non-White youth in poor neighbourhoods. These public-relations gestures, however, did little to change the actual racist practices of policing. Instead, a year after the “Yonge street riot,” by the fall of 1993 Toronto police introduced targeted policing (Project 35) into the poor neighbourhoods of the downtown core. By the summer of 1994, Project 35 was extended to public housing projects in the postwar suburbs of Scarborough and York. Project 35 became the precursor of systematic targeted policing in Toronto – a policing strategy that has reinforced racialized conceptions of crime and the equation of crime, non-White youth, poverty, and the “suburbs” (Heroux 2011).

The racial and class tensions of the early 1990s were followed by series of popular protests against the Harris government. From 1995 to 1997, Toronto was witness to impressive waves of popular mobilization against “The Common Sense Revolution” of the Harris government. Unprecedented in the city’s recent political history, popular mobilizations brought together labour unions, community groups, social justice activists, teachers and students and culminated in a week-long quasi-general strike in 1996, known as the Metro Days of Action followed by a province-wide political strike by teachers in 1997 (Kipfer 1998; Camfield 2000). These popular mobilizations were followed by another round of political mobilization in 1997, both in the central city and postwar suburbs, this time against forced municipal amalgamation (see Boudreau 2000).

1997 also marked the year that poverty was rediscovered as a policy issue in Toronto. The publication of a series of reports by the United Way was influential in pushing poverty to the table of policymakers in the city. It was not a coincidence that these reports, with their message of poverty as “risk” and as policy issue, came out in 1997. As already mentioned in Chapter One, the 1990s saw the comeback of poverty on the agenda of the supra-national institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the OECD, and the broader “social” and “local” turns in neoliberal
policies across the Global North and South. Particularly the second half of the decade also marked the period in which the figure of “the immigrant” was framed as a threat to social cohesion by the Canadian state and its intellectuals.

**An “Urban Agenda” and the Third-Way Turn in Toronto Politics (2000s)**

The 1990s was an influential time in the making of “the immigrant” problem in Toronto. The targeting of poverty, (non-White) immigrants, and disorder in the late 1990s coincided with the formation of a coalition of pro-urban bourgeois socio-political forces that would gain momentum in the early 2000s and would eventually become an influential force in urban politics and in the production of knowledge for place-based urban policy in Toronto. The Harris Conservatives rode their victory on an anti-urban ideology, mobilized through populist discourses focused on tax cuts, family life, urban crime, and anti-elites’ interests. While Harris’ Conservative government was closely linked to urban-based corporate transnational capital, its electoral and political bases were mostly located in the newly built, sprawling suburban and exurban districts of southern Ontario (Walks 2004; Dale 1999).

The 1995 victory of the Ontario Conservative Party under Harris, which marked the rule of the provincial Conservatives until 2003 under Harris–acolyte Ernie Eves, not only brought right populism to the centre of the Canadian heartland of liberalism (marginalizing the long dominant, mostly urban-based Red Tory fraction in the provincial Conservative party), it also changed relations of force to the benefit of anti-urban bourgeois fractions of the ruling class in Ontario and Toronto. The decade-long rule of the Conservatives in Ontario thus set the stage for political competition between two fractions of the bourgeoisie in the Toronto region with two different visions for neoliberal growth and global economic competitiveness in the twenty-first century. One fraction was deeply anti-urban, the other celebratory pro-urban. This competition within the ruling class, as we will see in the next chapter, would come to influence the fate of urban politics and policy in Toronto in decades to come.

The aggressive neoliberal state restructuring of the 1990s had two important and contradictory consequences for urban policy activism in Toronto (and Canada). On the one hand, the neoliberal rescaling and restructuring of the state in Canada exacerbated the fiscal crisis of local states. On the other hand, state restructuring and decentralization opened up a political space for the emergence of a pro-urban movement for institutional reform to give more political
power to big cities in Canada (Allahwala 2011). Beginning in the second half of the 1990s, big-city state, business, and community-based forces began voicing concerns about the political neglect of Canadian cities and how such neglect would affect Canada’s economic power and competitiveness in the coming decades (see Federation of Canadian Municipalities [FCM] 2001; TD Financial 2002a, 2002b; Rowe 2000).

Influenced by multi-scalar political and intellectual forces, the emerging pro-urban movement advocated for an “urban agenda” in Canada based on the economic competitiveness of city-regions and the role of human capital and diversity in that competitiveness. The pro-urban movement was influenced by the broader neoliberal emphasis on city-regional competitiveness in the globalized economy, on the one hand. On the other hand, it was influenced by the works of Jane Jacobs (a central figure in Toronto’s reform movement of the 1960s and 1970s, whose legacy has also been influential in shaping the territorialized urban vs. suburban debates in Toronto) and benefited from the political power of Toronto-based, pro-urban philanthro-capitalists.

Alan Broadbent, a powerful Toronto-based businessman, civic entrepreneur, and philanthropist, and an advocate of targeting the poor rather than the rich (Broadbent 2013), was an influential figure in initiating the new urban agenda in Canadian politics and public discourse (Allahwala 2011:104). In October 1997, Broadbent organized a conference, Jane Jacobs: Ideas that Matter, which was followed by a small invitation-only event, The Evolution of Toronto in the spring of 1999. The two events resulted in the publication of the book, Toronto: Considering Self-government (Rowe 2000), which galvanized a concerted Toronto-based discussion about the future of cities within the Canadian state architecture (Allahwala 2011:104). The 1998 forced municipal amalgamation and the subsequent political marginalization of the Toronto-centred pro-

54 A key argument in the debate at the time was that city-regions have become the engines of national economic growth in the globalized economy and that, in the Canadian case, the constitutional division of power (the power of provinces over municipalities) was preventing city-regions from nurturing and realizing their endogenous growth potentials and global economic competitiveness (see Allahwala 2011).

55 Broadbent is an influential figure in Toronto’s philanthro-capitalist circle and is the co-founder of a series of related philanthropic organizations in Toronto. In 1982, Alan and Judy Broadbent established the Maytree Foundation, and he has since been the chairman of the foundation. Through the Maytree Foundation, Broadbent co-founded in 1992 and chairs the Caledon Institute of Social Policy; Tamarack – An Institute for Community Engagement, Diaspora Dialogues in 2001; and the Institute for Municipal Finance and Governance at the Munk Centre, University of Toronto. In addition, Broadbent is also chairman and CEO of Avana Capital Corporation, chairman of the Tides Canada Foundation, advisor to the Literary Review of Canada, co-chair of Happy Planet Foods, member of the Governor’s Council of the Toronto Public Library Foundation, senior fellow of Massey College, a member of the Order of Canada, and a recipient of the Queen’s Jubilee Medal. In 2008, Broadbent published Urban Nation: Why We Need to Give Power Back to the Cities to Make Canada Strong.
urban bourgeois forces reinforced the need for building a coalition around this urban agenda. This pro-urban bourgeois-led coalition would play a central role in making non-White poverty and non-White immigrants into objects of state-led investigation and sites of state-led intervention.

The Toronto-centred calls for a renewed national urban policy found supportive echoes in the corridors of Parliament Hill in Ottawa, albeit mostly in rhetoric. In 2001, the federal Liberal government of Jean Chrétien established the Prime Minister’s Caucus Task Force on Urban Issues. By November 2002 the task force published its final report, *Canada’s Urban Strategy: A Blueprint for Action*. The report promised a “significant presence of the Government of Canada in urban regions” (Prime Minister’s Task Force 2002). In 2003, the federal Liberal government under Paul Martin released *New Deal for Cities*. At its official introduction in 2004, Martin (2005) proclaimed the “New Deal is a national project for our time.” The influence of global city formation and city-regional competitiveness in the political orientation of the *New Deal* was already articulated in the 2002 Speech from the Throne:

> Competitive cities and healthy communities are vital to our individual and national well-being, and to Canada’s ability to attract and retain talent and investment. They require not only strong industries, but also safe neighbourhoods; not only a dynamic labour force, but access to a rich and diverse cultural life. They require new partnerships, a new urban strategy, a new approach to healthy communities for the 21st century. (Government of Canada 2002)

For the most part, the *New Deal for Cities* remained a policy discourse rather than being implemented. With the 2006 federal election of a Conservative government led by Stephen Harper, an urban agenda did not have any place in their economic strategies that were based heavily on resource extraction, trade, and finance capital. Nonetheless, the introduction of the *New Deal for Cities* with its emphasis on an “urban and community lens” and strengthening and collaboration with the local state in regard to urban investment gave a political boost to Toronto-centred pro-urban bourgeois forces and their push for place-based urban policy. The 2003 provincial and municipal elections would change the political balance in Ontario and Toronto to the benefit of the pro-urban bourgeois forces. In Ontario, the Liberal party under the leadership of Dalton McGuinty ousted the Conservatives. Meanwhile in Toronto, David Miller, a social democrat, won the mayoral race.

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56 The *New Deal for Cities* had three basic components: predictable longer term funding for all municipalities; more tri-level government collaboration for area-based policy making; and an urban (an community policy) lens to assess and improve the impacts of federal policies in municipalities.
The embrace of city–regional competitiveness in the early 2000s by various levels of government was accompanied by a deepening securitization of immigration policy and a distinction between preferred and non-preferred immigrants in the political climate of the “war on terror” (Bell 2011). The Anti-Terrorism Act of October 2001 and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of June 2002 equated foreign nationals with the “internal enemy.” Refugees, immigrants, and citizens of Arab and Muslim descent have turned into the chief targets of Canada’s national security agenda (Bell 2011). At the same time, both provincial (Liberal) and federal (Conservative) governments increasingly shifted their labour market strategy toward the unfree labour of temporary migrants (Sharma 2006). This trend had already started in the mid-1980s, but gained more political urgency and momentum in the twenty-first century. However, the political effects of changes to immigration policy have gone beyond policy circles. Debated and popularized through mainstream media, parliamentary sessions, and official statements, the state targeting of non-White populations as a potential security threat, as an “internal enemy,” has affected public discourse and reinforced the conception of “the immigrant” as “disorder” and a security threat in Canada.

Place-based urban policy targeting concentrated non-White poverty and “gun violence” was rolled out at an important conjuncture in Toronto. The victory of David Miller in the 2003 mayoral election opened the way for the consolidation of a Third Way regime in the city. Miller managed to gain support from an array of influential forces in urban politics, including organized labour, centrist and social-democrat (sub)urban politicians, central-city-based liberal professionals and gentrifiers, people in the culture industry, environmentalists, and finance, development and philanthro-capitalists as well as the non-profit sector. While his Third Way regime retained a progressive and culture-friendly façade (particularly in terms of environment, transit, and cultural street festivals), Miller’s policies continued or expanded neoliberal policies and authoritarian initiatives that had already begun under the former conservative mayor, Mel Lastman (Kipfer 2010). By 2005, the competitive city ideology coupled with the creative city ideology had already become the modality for urban planning strategies, regulating and managing the processes of global-city formation in Toronto (Kipfer and Keil 2002).

Party as the result of the earlier strategies, partly as the result of Miller’s initiatives, the socio-spatial landscape of Toronto was qualitatively transformed in the first decade of the twenty-first century. During his two terms (2003–2006 and 2006–2010), Miller systematically facilitated the gentrification and privatized, market-led development of downtown Toronto and strategic
nodes in the postwar suburbs (downtown North York and Scarborough); the destruction and
gentrification of public housing developments in downtown (at Don Mount, Regent Park, and later
Lawrence Heights) under the rubrics of “mixity” and “intensification;” the monetarization of city
assets and public lands through Build Toronto;57 the continuous shift of the tax base from
corporate, industrial, and commercial to residential property taxes and user fees; and the
commodification of culture as a competitive asset of Toronto’s “creative city” status.

Despite the progressive façade of his Third Way politics, Miller continued austerity
policies, budget cuts, and union busting while advocating for public–private partnerships, and he
deepened law-and-order policies by expanding the police budget and the militarization of the
police force (i.e., TAVIS in 2006 and G20 security in 2010). During his second mayoral term,
Miller benefited from the centralization of decision-making at City Hall through the provincial City
of Toronto Act in 2006 – itself an outcome of the policy activism of the pro-urban bourgeois forces
in Toronto. While real-estate and finance capital, developers, gentrifiers, cultural corporations, and
the police force were the main beneficiaries of these processes, Miller’s Third Way regime
deepened uneven development, the concentration of non-White poverty in already peripheralized
northern pockets of the city, and the marginalization of an increasing number of non-White
working-class Torontonians. His strategies reinforced the territorialization and racialization of
wealth and political power in the city. By 2010, the contradictions of Miller’s regime were so ripe
that the hard-right populist Rob Ford easily tapped into these contradictions, mobilized a
territorialized war-discourse of “city versus suburbs,” presented himself as the saviour of the
ordinary people of the “suburbs,” and surprised the pro-urban bourgeois forces in the city by his
victory as the 64th mayor of Toronto (Kipfer and Saberi 2014).

Conclusion

This chapter provided a broad historical overview of how policies and ideologies resulted
in the transformation of poverty and made the poor into the targets of state intervention in the mid-
2000s. Current research has pointed to the 2004 publication by the United Way of Poverty by
Postal Code, the “year of the gun,” and the anti-suburban ideology of the urban reform movement
of the 1970s as the major influences that led to later strategies targeting the geographical

57 Build Toronto is a City agency created on the recommendation of the Fiscal Review Panel, an ad hoc
mayor’s committee dominated by power brokers and representatives of finance capital which also proposed
privatization Enwave, Toronto Hydro and the Toronto Parking Authority.
concentration of poverty in Toronto. Building upon the insights of Gramsci, Poulantzas, and Lefebvre, I pointed to different beginnings: the bursting contradictions of liberal multiculturalism, neoliberalization and systemic racism in the 1990s and early 2000s. It was in the midst of multi-scalar neoliberal restructuring, the shift to the “end-of-poverty” politics (Roy 2010) at the international scale, the re-articulation of “the immigrant” problem in Canada, the slow recovery of Toronto’s economy from the shocks of the 1989 recession, the increasing racial and political tensions in the city, the explosion of homelessness in downtown Toronto, and the gradual rise of an urban-based philanthro-capitalist force in urban politics that poverty became both the target of aggressive policing and an object of investigation and intervention on the part of the local state.

The late 1990s marked the rediscovery of non-White poverty and non-White immigrants, as “disorder,” as social problems in Toronto. By the time that place-based urban policy of development and policing were rolled out in targeted neighbourhoods of Toronto in 2006, the city had already been re-territorialized along racial and class lines. In fact, as we will see in the next chapter, it is more accurate to say the late 1990s marked the targeting of the non-White working class and concentrated non-White poverty as security threats in and to Toronto. This is a conjuncture in which the precarious non-White working class would become the embodiment of the figure of “the immigrant” in Toronto.
Chapter Four:
The “Paris Problem” in Toronto: The Political Fear of Concentrated Non-White Poverty

Introduction

The focus of this chapter is on the central roles of ideology, politics, and space in the birth of the “Paris problem” and the formation of place-based policy targeting urban poverty in Toronto. I look at how concentrated non-White poverty was “discovered” in Toronto and how it was framed as a crisis for the city’s prosperity and hence triggered a state-led urban intervention to deal with the “Paris problem” in Toronto by 2006. I trace the state-led targeting of concentrated non-White poverty as crisis to the late 1990s and suggest that rather than explicitly conservative and coercive ideologies, a liberal humanitarian ideology has played an influential role in this process. This liberal humanitarian ideology helps frame the crisis of the concentration of non-White poverty and has been reinforced through the increasing role of philanthro-capitalist organizations, such as the United Way, in knowledge production about poverty and place-based urban policy. The powerful role of liberal humanitarian ideology in place-based urban policy in Toronto is linked, on the one hand, to the contemporary comeback of humanitarianism in international politics and its becoming part of the imperialist wars (Duffield 2007, Dillon and Reid 2009; Foley 2010) and the imperialist capitalist development industry (Duffield 2010, Roy 2004; Wilson 2012) since the 1990s. On the other hand, it is linked to the specificities of urban politics, uneven development and the liberal ideology of multiculturalism in Toronto since the late twentieth century.

Toronto, “A Community at Risk:” The Political Fear of Poverty

In the tense socio-political and racial context of the late 1990s as Toronto’s restructured economy was slowly recovering from the shocks of the 1989 recession, a spectre of a poverty crisis haunted the city. The crisis was as real as it was ideologically constructed and appropriated – appropriated first for criminalizing poverty and later by the mid-2000s for declaring a humanitarian “war on poverty.” In the second half of the 1990s, poverty and its increasing visibility in the city became a subject of investigation for philanthro-capitalists and the local state. In 1997, the United Way brought poverty and homelessness to the agenda of policymakers
through the publication of three reports: *Metro Toronto: A Community at Risk* (1997a), *Beyond Survival: Homelessness in Metro Toronto* (1997b), and *Way Ahead: Focus on the Future* (1997c). The reports gave warning about Toronto’s poverty rate (rising to 19%, almost double that of the outer ring of the Greater Toronto cities at the time), the growing concentration of “households at risk,” the threats of “jobless recovery” from the recession of the early 1990s, the “demographic change” (both in terms of an aging population and the increase in non-White population – framed as “the changing origins of Toronto’s immigrant population”),\(^58\) and “the capacity of the social services infrastructure to respond to social needs.” The publication of these reports marked a shift in the United Way’s strategic reorientation from being a minor philanthropic organization in Toronto in the early 1990s to an influential philanthro-capitalist force in urban policy by the 2000s.\(^59\)

The progressively influential role of the United Way was partly due to the vacuum produced through neoliberal state restructuring and cuts to public funds for research, which necessitated the local state’s strategic partnership with particular fundraising non-profits. Leslie Pal (1997) described this trend as a “civic re-alignment.” One of City of Toronto’s senior policymakers involved with place-based urban policy explained how this move was as strategic on the part of United Way as it was on the part of the local state:

> I would say that they [the United Way] very intentionally moved towards more policy development and a greater advocacy role. They’ve really managed to raise a

\(^58\) The report implicitly mentioned the non-European and non-White character of the arriving immigrants by highlighting “the top 10 countries of origin for new immigrants – Sri Lanka, China, Philippines, Hong Kong, India, Jamaica, Poland, Guyana, Vietnam” (United Way 1999:14).

\(^59\) United Way’s increasing involvement in policy making and partnering with the local state began at a time when the non-profit sector in general was itself affected by the funding cuts at the federal level (Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto 1997; Shields and Evans 1998). By early 2000s, United Way would become the biggest source of funding for many community organizations and small non-profits across the city. The increasing financial power of United Way in the non-profit sector gradually resulted in the policing and shrinking of the advocacy power of the organizations funded by United Way. This trend, of course, is not unique to Toronto. In the United States, as early as the mid-1980s, Wolch and Geiger (1985) called attention to the role of corporate philanthropy in local politics and policymaking. In her influential study of non-profit sectors in the United States and Great Britain, Jennifer Wolch (1990) argued for theorizing non-profits as the “shadow state.” She conceptualized non-profits as “a para-state apparatus,” as “a complex and contradictory phenomenon” that has increasingly transformed non-profits into instruments of social control (Wolch 1990:xvi). In the mid-2000s, the INCITE collective (2007) proposed the notion of the “non-profit industrial complex.” The hallmark of their work has been an eye-opening emphasis on how capitalist interests and the state use non-profits to monitor, control, and co-opt political dissent and the struggles of racialized and marginalized people, from Native and African-Americans to the Palestinians. In his examination of the role of non-profit sector in the privatization of public housing in the United States, John Arena (2012) demonstrates how non-profits were influential to the production of popular consent for the privatization and demolition of public housing in New Orleans.
lot more funds…. Don’t forget that the last head of the organization [namely, Frances Lankin] used to be a MPP. And I have heard the phrase, out of that CEO’s mouth, “United Way and the other orders of government,” so that tells you a little bit about how she saw that organization. They very intentionally built a policy capacity. I don’t think that’s necessarily a bad thing. I think the bigger problem is that our capacity for research, evaluation, and policy development is actually relatively small. When they do research, they have so many more resources to do it than we have. And I’m not talking about the broad city, right? I’m talking about the unit I work in. There are other questions, other issues around how money is distributed across the city, like which areas receive focus and which don’t. But I think they [United Way] very intentionally built that capacity and their ability to intervene in policy at the local, the provincial, and the federal levels…. So we’re less and less organized around the idea of a government doing things, and more and more relying on those who can contribute money to develop the policy agenda. And the worst case of that is, of course, when people who are very wealthy are the ones driving the policy agenda. So I think United Way’s participation in the policy sphere is part of that broader trend…. I think their participation in the policy sphere is not any better or worse than, you know, the Fraser Institute’s participation in the policy sphere, right? It’s part of that same trend. (I25 2013)

To this picture we should add the political competition between the anti- and pro-urban fractions of the bourgeois ruling class in the Toronto region and the eventual ascendancy of the pro-urban bourgeois faction in the 2000s, without which, as we will see, the United Way could have not gained its current political power and authority in knowledge production and strategies for lobbying the local and regional states about poverty and place-based urban policy.

The 1997 United Way reports are also important for planting the seeds of what would become the dominant conception of poverty in urban policy in Toronto. Poverty in these reports is described and conceptualized in a language of “risk.” This conceptualization paralleled, to a great extent, the dominant ideological conceptualization of poverty propagated by the World Bank and the IMF at the turn of the century, one that would become hegemonic in the twenty-first century, in order to expand and sustain imperialist-capitalist relations of domination and accumulation in the former colonies. In this ideological framing of poverty as “risk,” poverty is understood as integral to growth (i.e., capitalist development) rather than a peripheral issue (which was the dominant framing in the 1980s). But this understanding of poverty as integral to capitalist growth is limited to the “threats” that poverty could pose to the smooth functioning of capitalist growth rather than being linked to the production of poverty through capitalist growth. Poverty here is understood as a disconnection from the market and thus conceived of as a risk to the security of the market and society (Best 2013). Solving the problem of poverty is, in turn, contingent on
“reintegrating” the poor into the market economy (see World Bank 2000, 2006, 2012, 2013, 2014; United Nations 2005). This solution is also being sold as essential to the broader goal of achieving sustained economic growth and sustainable development under imperialist capitalism.

Despite the new terminology of “risk,” the ideological foundations of poverty-as-risk have deep historical roots. Poverty-as-risk builds upon the bourgeois conceptions of order–disorder and the historical association of the poor, the indigent, and the idle with “disorder” in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, precisely because of their lack of proper integration into capitalist social relations (Neocleous 2000). This association has been foundational to the bourgeoisie’s political fear of the poor and the indigent and the formation of bourgeois colonial order and policing since the eighteenth century. Poverty-at-risk is a reinvention of this political fear that conceives poverty not just as a security threat to the market, but also as a security threat to the political stability of imperialist capitalist order. What modernization theory and theories of “small wars” and “failed states” have in common is a geopolitical vision based on conceiving a disconnection from the globalized socio-spatial relations of imperialist capitalism (whether called progress, globalization, or democracy) as security threats to the political stability of the bourgeois-colonial order.

The identification of poverty-as-risk as a social problem in Toronto paralleled the emerging worldwide political concerns with international migration as a security threat. We have already mentioned how this conception of immigration as a security threat penetrated and formed the debates about non-White immigrants in the second half of the 1990s in Canada. This was not a coincidence. The political-economic rationale of integration in “the immigrant” and the poverty debates have much in common. In both debates integration, disintegration, and exclusion are defined in relation to imperialist-capitalist socio-spatial relations. Furthermore, as we will see, the subjects of both debates – the poor and “the immigrant” – are sources of the state’s political fear precisely because both are perceived and conceived as “internal enemies,” as security threats to the political stability of Canada at various scales.

The 1997 United Way reports were important for building the ideological ground to frame the unfolding poverty crisis in Toronto as a double crisis: a humanitarian crisis and a security crisis. The 1990s (and particularly the second half of the decade) was also the period when poverty became the object of targeted policing in downtown Toronto (Heroux 2011). At the same time that poverty was equated with “disorder” and criminalized accordingly, the visibility of

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60 The work of Patrick Colquhoun (1745–1820) was important for framing this association. In Chapter Five I will discuss in more detail his conception of poverty and making distinction between poverty and indigence and their relation to policing then and today.
homelessness in downtown Toronto became a justification for a humanitarian cry for a policy to eradicate poverty – a call for a Toronto version of the “war on poverty.”

Introducing the Community at Risk report to the media, Anne Golden, then CEO and president of the United Way, noted: “You can’t walk around the homeless and the outstretched hands anymore. The numbers are too big and the trends are too alarming” (quoted in Homeless People’s Network 1998). With the report Way Ahead, United Way (1997c) established itself as a frontline organization and took the lead in addressing the problem of poverty. It launched four funding priorities with an explicit liberal humanitarian focus: Giving Yong Children a Healthy Start, Addressing Hunger and Homelessness, Assisting Abused Women and their Children, and Helping Newcomers to Settle and Integrate. In Beyond Survival, the United Way (1997b) emphasized its leadership role and called for the creation of a task force on homelessness in Toronto.

A few months after, in early 1998, the Conservative mayor Mel Lastman (the first mayor of the newly amalgamated City of Toronto) appointed Anne Golden to head a task force to investigate the city’s growing homelessness problem. While the task force gave the impression that the local state is keen to address the root causes of poverty, the list of members of the task force gives us a glimpse into the local state’s twin target: poverty and security. Besides the United Way president, the other two members of the task force were William Currie, then member of the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) and the Regional Commander for the Greater Toronto Region for that force since 1995, and Elizabeth Greaves, then executive director of Dixon Hall, a long-time community centre at the heart of east downtown Toronto servicing public housing neighbourhoods such as Regent Park and Moss Park, which have been the targets of policing since the rolling out of Project 35 in 1993 (see Heroux 2011).

The simultaneous identification of poverty and homelessness as social problems and the criminalization of both in downtown Toronto took place at the time of the consolidation of the “competitive city” as Toronto’s model of urban governance and its revanchist law-and-order campaigns (Smith 1996), which aimed to clean-up downtown spaces for gentrification (Kipfer and Keil 2002; Gordon 2006; Heroux 2011). By the end of 1998, Mel Lastman gave the green light to Toronto police to declare a war on street poverty, aggressively targeting and removing young panhandlers, squeegee kids, and the visibly poor from downtown public spaces (Esmonde 2002;

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62 Currie also served as United Way Toronto campaign director from 1989 to 1991.
Gordon 2006: 92). Empowered by the policy recommendations of the Ontario Crime Commission appointed by Mike Harris in April 1997, Mel Lastman’s “war on squeegees” would become the precursor to the “War on Poverty” in Toronto. According to Jim Brown, then the Conservative MPP representing Scarborough West, co-chair of the Ontario Crime Control Committee, and who was influential in leading the war on street poverty, “Mayor Mel’s war on squeegees... [was] a war on bad behaviour” (Brown 1998). From the perspective of the Ontario Crime Control Committee such “bad behaviour” by the poor was synonymous with “disorder:”

Disorder needs to be dealt with. There is important new evidence that social disorder such as aggressive panhandling, street solicitation, and graffiti, cause fear and are precursors [sic] to crime and community decay. (Ontario Crime Control Committee 1998)

By 1999 poverty was identified as a top policy issue in the newly amalgamated City of Toronto. A report by the Canadian Council on Social Development (CCSD) (1999), Summary Statistics on Poverty in Toronto, was followed by a United Way (1999) report entitled Toronto at a Turning Point: Demographic, Economic and Social Trends in Toronto. The publication of Toronto at a Turning Point indeed marked a turning point in the ideological representation and construction of non-White poverty as a threat in and for Toronto. In the report, the problem of poverty was set against three backgrounds: 1) A mythic construction of Toronto as a city with an “enviable reputation,” a city “built on a foundation of rich cultural diversity, healthy neighbourhoods, clean and safe streets, a modern and efficient infrastructure, and social cohesion;” 2) Toronto’s economic competition “on the global stage with other major North American cities;” and, 3) the city’s “immigrant” problem (referred to as “the demographic change”) that along with the economic recession has put “this foundation under stress” (United Way 1999:1). These themes would become imperative for the ideological construction of the figure of “the immigrant.” As we will see, they have been crucial in the ideological conception of the poverty crisis and the concentrated non-White poverty as a security threat to Toronto’s economy and political stability.

Toronto at a Turing Point (United Way 1999) was the first report to identify the problem of poverty as the problem of non-White poverty located in the city’s postwar suburbs. What is important about this report and the many others that would follow in the next decade is that the

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63 Gordon (2006) argues that the “war on street poverty” was also about conceiving the street poor as a sign of separation from the market and thus enforcing wage labour.
64 Mel Lastman’s “war on squeegees” was a policy transfer/adaptation of Rudy Giuliani’s war on the poor in New York City based on the “broken windows” thesis developed by Wilson and Kelling (1982). The policy transfer was greatly facilitated by the Harris Conservative government (DeKeserdy 2009).
increasing concentration of poverty in specific localities is disassociated from the broader socio-spatial and political relations at the heart the production of concentrated non-White poverty and concentrated White wealth in the city. Even though Toronto at a Turning Point mentioned the economic recession in the 1990s and structural changes in the labour market as the broader causes of poverty, these changes are presented as the new reality of globalization – a reality to be taken for granted rather than questioned or changed. Furthermore, there was (and still is) a deafening silence about the neo-colonial dimensions of the production of poverty. In the absence of any engagement with the reality of poverty and the explicit and implicit racist structures of Canada’s labour market, society, and polity, the report’s emphasis on “the changing origins of Toronto’s immigrant population” (from European to non-European), along with their changing settlement destinations in “Scarborough and North York in particular,” implicitly produced a territorialized and racialized imagery of poverty in the city; it implicitly equated non-White immigrants with poverty, if not the cause of poverty.

The production of this territorialized and racialized imagery should be seen in relation to the immediate political context of the time: on the one hand, “the immigrant” debates about integration and social cohesion in the 1980s and the 1990s, and, on the other hand, the amalgamation in Toronto. The report was published less than two years after the 1997 anti-amalgamation mobilizations. One of the lasting political effects of the resistance against amalgamation was a defensive territorialism both in the old City of Toronto (referred to as “the city”) and its postwar suburbs. Having its aesthetic and ideological roots in the urban reform movement of the 1970s (Siciliano 2010), this defensive territorialism was anchored upon ideological conceptions of “the city” and “suburb” as dualistic, fragmented, homogenized, and hierarchized spaces with their own ways of life, culture, and civility – or the lack thereof. At the time, this defensive territorialized politics, however, was deeply normalized and reified by the triumph of localism in the anti-amalgamation forces, best evident in their appeals to local democracy and local control over “the city” and “suburbs” (Kipfer 1998).

The territorialized and racialized imagery of poverty provided by the United Way helped rescale and re-articulate “the immigrant” debate in relation to the specificities of Toronto by representing the (non-White) “immigrant” poverty in the “inner-suburbs” as a threat to Toronto as a peaceful, diverse “city of neighbourhoods” and, to Toronto’s competitive economic power. This re-articulation and spatialization of the “the immigrant” debate also extended the security dimension of non-White poverty. The increasing concentration of non-White poverty, the report
argued, would make the broader economy and polity of the region insecure. To reinforce the link between tackling poverty, economic competitiveness, and “immigrant” debates *Toronto at a Turning Point* ended its first chapter on “the demographic trends in the City of Toronto” by a humanitarian call, emphasizing that “providing temporary support to new immigrants and refugees in the form of orientation services, housing help and language skills is a key ingredient in reaping the benefits of this valuable human resource” (United Way 1999:15; emphasis added).

At first glance, this seemingly benevolent, philanthropic statement appears as a compassionate plea to ameliorate the plight of the poor in Toronto. But it also reveals the contradictory logic of liberal humanitarianism. The political economy of liberal humanitarianism is perhaps best captured in the phrase “reaping the benefits of this valuable human resource.” The humanitarian cry around the poverty crisis at the turn of the twenty-first century in Toronto was less about the everyday violence of living in poverty than it was about how non-White poverty would affect “our peace,” “our way of life,” and “our” economic competitiveness. Anchored on the neoliberal economic rationale of city-regional competitiveness and a neo-colonial political fear of non-White populations, this liberal humanitarian ideology conceives of its mission the tutelage of the poor, the colonized, and the underdeveloped. As a form of neo-colonial trusteeship, humanitarian tutelage is, above all, about making the non-White, poor working class more profitable for “our” economy. As we saw in the previous chapter, these themes were also influential in the emerging “urban agenda” in the early 2000s. As we will see, they will become the foundations of place-based urban policy in Toronto by 2005.

**The Rise of Pro-urban Forces and the Political Fear of Concentrated Non-White Poverty**

The year 2002 marked a momentous year for philanthro-capitalist policy activism around the proposed urban agenda and targeting concentrated non-White poverty in Toronto. This was just a year before the Ontario provincial and Toronto municipal elections. In March 2002, United Way and the Canadian Council on Social Development published an influential report on the state of poverty in Toronto. The report, *A Decade of Decline: Poverty and Income Inequalities in the City of Toronto in the 1990s*, set the tone for the famous *Poverty by Postal Code* (United Way 2004). The explicit focus of *A Decade of Decline* was on “the geographical segregation of poverty” (mostly in Toronto’s postwar suburbs) and also on downtown public housing developments, which it saw as “a serious threat to the social and economic health of the city and its residents” (United

The spectre of Toronto turning into a city fragmented by “immigrant ghettos” was influential in making the urgency of Toronto’s poverty crisis more concrete for policymakers. The report linked its explicit focus on segregation to the “American ghetto”66 backed in turn by the growing literature on the growth of ghettoization in Canada (United Way 2002a:36) – a literature that is very much linked to the social-cohesion turn in “the immigrant” debate.67 The warning about the possibility of a ghettoized Toronto marked a shift from United Way’s hitherto humanitarian focus on “children health,” “seniors,” and “hunger and homelessness” (United Way 1997a, 1997c, 1999) to a concern about “alienated youth” and “growing violence in the streets” (United Way 2002a:43–6). This shift followed Mel Lastman’s war on street poverty and the consequent orientation since 2000 of the Toronto police under Julian Fantino, the new conservative Police Chief, towards targeting “youth violence” and “gangs and guns”.68 The report also emphasized the role of the United Way as the humanitarian trustee “in addressing community

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65 The report focused on four low-income neighbourhoods identified by their postal codes: the Jane-Finch Areas (M3N); the downtown-east area (M5A) (Regent and Moss Parks); the Thorncliffe area (M4H); and the Agincourt area (M1V) (United Way 2002a:40–3).

66 The reference to the “American ghetto” is clear in the section on “neighbourhood segregation,” where the report talked about how “the flight of the middle class from inner cities of the Unites States left behind populations of disadvantaged people.” Interestingly, the “ghetto” here is only understood in terms of its income segregation, drugs, and crime, without any reference to the questions of “race,” racism, and the colonial legacies of segregation. The same section went on to warn that “while the income segregation that occurred in US cities has not happened in Canada to the same degree, there is concern that our cities are moving slowly and surely in this direction, and that segregated pockets of high crime, drug use and persistent poverty are growing” (United Way 2002a: 36).

67 The 1990s witnessed two parallel academic debates: one on “the immigrant” problem focused on social cohesion and integration; the other, fostered mostly by urban sociologists, focused on immigrant settlement and the spatial concentration of poverty with an attempt to bring the literature on the “American ghetto” into the lexicon of urban research agenda in Canada. Zoltan L. Hajnal (1995) compared concentrated poverty rates in Canadian cities with data from the United States and noted growing similarities. Kazemipur and Halli’s (2000) The New Poverty in Canada became influential in coining the spatial concentration of poverty and in bringing the discourse of ghettoization into Canada.

68 When Julian Fantino became the chief of Toronto police in 2000, he identified “youth violence” as one of his high priorities. In 1999, the City of Toronto published a report on youth in the city, Toronto Youth Profile. Highlighting that half of the youth population in Toronto is non-White, the report looked at the increasing level of unemployment and homelessness among youth and warned about the consequences of these trends. A series of shootings in the spring of 2000 quickly turned into an excuse for galvanizing the “youth problem” and “guns and gangs” in Toronto. The Toronto police focus on “youth violence” coincided with Mayor Mel Lastman’s war on street poverty and the passing of the Safe Street Act in 2000. See Gordon (2006); Appleby (2000).

Representatives of capital in Toronto and Canada (such as the TD Bank and the Toronto Board of Trade) quickly backed United Way’s humanitarian call for “a suburban funding strategy” by giving it an economic logic. As mentioned in the previous chapter, major representatives of corporate capital in Toronto (that by now had fully embraced city–regional competitiveness) became active promoters of the urban agenda, linking Canada’s economic prosperity to public investment in cities. In 2002, TD Bank Financial (2002a, 2002b) and the Toronto Board of Trade (2002) published a series of reports on the importance of cities to economic competitiveness. Similar concerns about the fate of cities in Canada were also raised in the OECD (2002) report, *Territorial Review: Toronto, Canada*. Almost unanimously, these reports emphasized city–regional competitiveness as the cornerstone of economic power and growth, linked the economic prosperity of Canada to that of Toronto, and advocated for the greater involvement of the private sector in urban planning and governance. In doing so, these reports gave a seemingly scientific economic rationale to the importance of state-led urban intervention in solving the concentrated non-White poverty problem while reifying poverty as a threat to the economic and political security of Toronto.

We have already mentioned in the previous chapter how the aborted support of the federal Liberal government for the *New Deals for Cities* gave another layer of legitimacy to the calls of the pro-urban bourgeois forces for state-led urban intervention. At the local–regional scale, the pro-urban bourgeois coalition got a political boost with the formation of the first Toronto City Summit under then-mayor Mel Lastman in June 2002. The City Summit was led by an alliance of Toronto-based capitalists, philanthro-capitalists, the city’s community sector (under the leadership of the United Way), and members of Ontario’s old Red Tory regime (who had been marginalized since the 1995 victory of the Harris Conservatives). As an important step in the consolidation of a new

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70 Following the publication of *A Decade of Decline*, TD Bank Financial published two reports, *A Choice between Investing in Canada’s Cities or Disinvesting in Canada’s Future* (April 2002a) and *The Greater Toronto Area: Canada’s Primary Economic Locomotive in Need of Repair* (May 2002b). These publications were followed by a report by the Toronto Board of Trade, *Strong City, Strong Nation: Securing Toronto’s Contribution to Canada* (2002).

71 Besides the *New Deals*, Toronto’s Olympic bid and the subsequent plan to revitalize the city’s waterfront were crucial moments in strengthening the pro-urban bourgeois coalitions. See Kipfer and Keil (2002).

72 The spirit of this strategic alliance was materialized in the collective chairing of the summit. The event was co-chaired by Elyse Allan, then president of the Toronto Board of Trade, Frances Lankin, then CEO and
“city–regional regime” in Toronto (Boudreau, Keil, and Young 2009:47), the 2002 City Summit aimed at forging a strategic alliance among a downtown-oriented business elite and representatives of the city’s community sector as well as Toronto-based pro-urban politicians (social democrat, liberal, and Red Tory). Parallel to the broader international trend, the political ascendency of the City Summit and its ideological consensus marked the consolidation of the “social” and “local” turns of neoliberal capitalism in Toronto.

In the aftermath of the Toronto City Summit, Frances Lankin, then CEO and president of United Way, wrote an essay entitled Two Solutions for Urban Poverty, published through the Centre for Urban and Community Studies at the University of Toronto (Lankin 2002). The Centre would soon become the influential academic space for knowledge production on poverty and urban policy in Toronto (see Chapter Six). Lankin’s essay reads as yet another call for the urgent need of an urban agenda in Toronto, and particularly a call for spatially targeted state–civil society urban intervention in zones of non-White poverty (2002:4–9).73 Lankin identified “the concentration of urban, immigrant poverty” as a serious, immanent threat to the economic and political security and stability of Toronto (2002:3). Not surprisingly, the economic logic of her argument echoed previous reports on poverty and competitiveness by the United Way and TD Bank (United Way 1999, 2002; TD Bank Financial 2002a, 2002b), “the immigrant” debates on integration/social cohesion, and the works of Neil Bradford and Richard Florida on urban economic competitiveness and quality of life (Lankin 2002:1, 3–4). The growing political fear of poor non-White working class was one of tenets of Lankin’s intervention in the ongoing debates on targeted intervention in poor neighbourhoods. Recalling the history of “racial tensions” in the inner cities of the United States in the postwar era, Lankin (2002:10–11) closed her essay by warning about the spectre of “race riots” in Canadian cities, and particularly in Toronto:

The remarkable, peaceful, at times joyful co-existence of people that are racially, ethnically, religiously, linguistically and economically diverse is our country’s greatest accomplishment…. But the greatest threats to this remarkable achievement

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73 Parallel with the Toronto City Summit, in June 2002 the United Way launched a pilot project, Strong Neighbourhoods, Healthy City. The pilot project was composed of six multi-agency projects (involving 34 social service agencies), all in the postwar suburbs. It targeted “youth, especially newcomer youth of Caribbean, African, and South Asian background” (United Way 2002c). Strong Neighbourhoods cultivated the seeds for a new round of ideological construction of the links among youth, “race,” poverty, suburbs, and security. It became the predecessor of the City’s Priority Neighbourhoods strategy.
are also found in our large cities…. Should we squander the triumph of peaceful diversity, we will lose much more than a good feeling about our country. Should the social cohesion of our large cities be lost, the standard of living of every single Canadian – no matter where they live – shall suffer the consequences. (Lankin 2002:11)

United Way, Urban Policy, and Liberal Humanitarian Ideology

2003 is a landmark year at United Way…. [O]ur Board of Trustees adopted a new strategic plan, called Community Matters…. We plan to accomplish this by building public awareness of the issues affecting our city, strengthening the capacity of local organizations to meet the needs of their communities, and bringing together partners to find solutions to the social problems that are threatening Toronto’s stability and livability, now and in the future. (Lankin 2003)74

The year 2003 was a landmark for the coalition of pro-urban bourgeois forces in Toronto. Their political and ideological power gained considerable legitimacy by the victory of David Miller in the 2003 municipal mayoral election, providing them with more lobbying power and political allies within the local state apparatus. Meanwhile, the coalition successfully represented itself as a “progressive” force that would voice the concerns of “the people,” “the citizens” of Toronto. This strategic shift was important in turning the coalition’s version of urban agenda into the dominant ideology among policymakers, community organization staff and some progressive forces. At first glance, the coalition’s concerns seemed echoing the messy everyday life realities of those living in the most marginalized parts of the city. The pro-urban bourgeoisie strategically touched upon the realities of concentrated non-White poverty, the extreme uneven development across Toronto’s neighbourhoods, the city’s deteriorating infrastructure, and the lack of access to social services. At the same time, the pro-urban bourgeois coalition quickly re-articulated the everyday contradictions of life in Toronto for advancing their own political agenda of urban growth and competitiveness.

In April 2003 the Toronto City Summit Alliance (TCSA) released its first policy platform, Enough Talk: An Action Plan for the Toronto Region. It read as a political attack on the Harris Conservative government despite of being heavily indebted to neoliberal economic

74 In 2003, the United Way also initiated a Community Impact Strategy. As part of this strategy, two new units were born: the Community Capacity Building Unit and the Public Policy Unit. These two new units not only marked a transformation in the structure of the organization, but also its future policy activism.
competitiveness. At the time of its release, David Pecaut (2003:B4), then the chair of the Toronto City Summit Alliance, wrote: “there is a crisis being created in the city as a result of the Common Sense Revolution and the federal government’s downloading. If we want to maintain a sustainable city, we have to reinvest.” But in contrast to the popular social-democratic, left-leaning anti-Harris mobilization (from 1995 to 1997), the pro-urban bourgeois alliance of the Toronto City Summit Alliance strategically and successfully used a neo-reformist vocabulary (focusing on “quality of life” and “local democracy”) to advance its neoliberal agenda of enhancing the city–region economic competitiveness (Boudreau, Keil, and Young 2009:205). Homogenized, essentialized, and environmentally deterministic conceptions of city and suburb were integrated into quality of life (QOL) and urban competitiveness discourses. Meanwhile, as Allahwala (2011:131) has pointed out, despite all the talk about investing in cities, the political discourse of the Toronto City Summit Alliance naturalized and consolidated the neoliberal policy framework of competitiveness, diversity management, market liberalism, and economic globalization.

The pro-urban bourgeois forces of the Toronto City Summit Alliance have actively built an ideological consensus about the superiority of civil society as the ideal terrain for policy activism. This neoliberal consensus is anchored in classical liberal thought that understands civil society as separate from the state. The other side of this neoliberal ideology is the belief that government cannot solve social problems alone and thus the private sector needs to be involved. This neoliberal ideology reifies not only the workings of the integral state (Gramsci 1971; Poulantzas 2000), but also politics, the production of space (Lefebvre 1991), and capitalist uneven development. Building upon this ideological twist and mobilizing a populist politics, the pro-urban bourgeois forces have consistently and to a great extent successfully constructed a public image of themselves as part of “civil society,” representing the concerns of ordinary citizens and the voiceless poor.

By selectively capitalizing on the contractions of almost two decades of neoliberal state restructuring and rapid uneven development, the pro-urban bourgeois forces posited Toronto as a victim of federal and provincial neoliberalization and presented their own neo-reformist policy activism as a progressive response. Meanwhile, the Toronto City Summit Alliance coalition, particularly during the leadership of Pecaut (2002), actively attempted to represent the pro-urban bourgeois forces as “strictly non-partisan” and an “inclusive coalition” of Toronto’s civic leaders. Pecaut (2007) used to refer to the participants of the 2002 City Summit, which included high-profile philanthro-capitalists, CEOs of banks, insurance companies, and corporations, and elite
politicians, as “citizens.” This identification of influential political players within Toronto’s ruling circles as ordinary citizens dehistoricizes power, class, and racial relations and the role of the ruling class in the production of poverty, uneven urban development and state policies of urban intervention.

The Toronto City Summit’s action plan was followed by a United Way report, *Torontoans Speak Out on Community Values and Pressing Issues* (2003). Published just before the 2003 municipal election, the report reinforced the populist representation of the pro-urban bourgeois forces. It aimed to legitimize its statements not in the name of research per se, but in the name of “Torontoans.” This new report was an important shift in the United Way’s public discourse and the organization’s attempt to link ruling ideologies to organic ideologies and to reorient itself as the humanitarian trustee. The message implied that it was no more just the United Way or policymakers (those who live farthest away from poverty) that see poverty as a threat to Toronto’s prosperity and security; rather, Torontoans themselves (presumably those affected by poverty) conceive of “social problems at the neighbourhood level” caused by poverty as “threats to Toronto’s stability and livability” (United Way 2003:4).

Here again the threat of poverty was juxtaposed to Toronto’s livability, its harmonious, peaceful diversity and unique neighbourhoods. The report paved the ground for the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy, in particular the focus on the neighbourhood scale and the links among youth, violence, and “suburban” poverty. Building upon the poverty-as-risk ideology and territorialized and racialized conceptions of space, the report referred to poor neighbourhoods as “hotspots” (sic) and “stressed communities” (United Way 2003:11–14), a language very similar to the imperialist foreign policy language of targeting “weak and failing states” as “hot spots [sic] for civil conflict and humanitarian emergencies” (Wyler 2008). The “hot spots” of poverty in Toronto were identified, more explicitly than before, as “threatening” to “the cohesion and strength of community life” (United Way 2003:11).

Yet a closer reading of the report reveals that the rosy picture of Toronto’s “great diversity,” “livability,” and “cultural celebrations and festivals” was the picture painted not by the poor living in the city’s postwar suburbs, but by those fractions of Torontoans living away from the

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75 The report was an outcome of a consultation process from May to July 2003. United Way held 39 consultations, organized by political riding and involving community residents, local business, faith, youth, and community leaders and representatives of social services, health, legal, and educational organizations as well as police divisions (United Way 2003:3).

76 I will come back to the importance of scrutinizing the parallels between the languages of urban policy and imperialist policy in the next chapters.
“hotspots” of poverty (United Way 2003:7–9). For the first time, maps were used in the report as a visual technique of representing and targeting the geography of social problems (United Way 2003:19, 33). Two maps identified youth as the main social problem across the postwar suburbs. Calling for “the need to rebuild community” before it gets too late, the report suggested that the senior levels of government should facilitate funding for such a large scale of investment in targeted localities (United Way 2003:40).

_Torontonians Speak Out_ also constructed the United Way as the main humanitarian trustee in the “War on Poverty” in Toronto. The report began by stating United Way’s mission “[t]o meet urgent human needs and improve social conditions by mobilizing the community’s volunteers and financial resources in a common cause of care” (United Way 2003:3) and ended by identifying United Way as “the voice for the community.”

One way that United Way could help is to become the “human voice” for the community.... A better “voice” to represent the ongoing daily interests of our people would be a great benefit. (United Way 2003:46)

In a matter of a decade the neo-colonial trusteeship of the United Way and the image of the organization as “the voice for the community” would become hegemonic. In the fall of 2013, a former United Way policy analyst described to me the importance of the organization in a language that reiterated the closing lines of _Torontonians Speak Out_:

What United Way was able to provide was to be the voice of the community and to verbalize those sorts of insights that the government is not close enough to reality to be able to say and to recognize emerging program initiatives that would be promising. (14 2013)

United Way’s populist turn and its becoming the neo-colonial humanitarian trustee of the wretched of Toronto did not happen in a void. By 2003 United Way was a very different organization than it was in the early 1990s. In the context of systematic cuts to public funds for social and community services across the city (Shields and Evans 1998), United Way funding has increasingly become the main source of survival for many community organizations, particularly in poor neighbourhoods where accessible social services such as after-school and youth-centred

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77 Maps were also used in _A Decade of Decline_ (United Way 2002:85–90), but only at the end of the report. These are general maps showing street boundaries, neighbourhoods, etc.

78 _Torontonians Speak Out_ was followed by the City of Toronto report _Crack in the Foundation: Community Agency Survey 2003: A Study of Toronto’s Community-based Human Service Sector_ in early 2004, a report highlighting concerns “about the long-term stability and capacity of the sector” due the cuts to governmental funding and the increased monitoring, reporting, and evaluation requirements of non-governmental funders (City of Toronto 2004:7–8).
programs are in dire need (I31 2013; I6 2013). United Way managed to survive the neoliberal austerity attack on the non-profit sector by becoming the fittest of all, turning into “the largest source of non-governmental funding for its member agencies” across Toronto (United Way 2003:44). The organization has become the humanitarian frontline voice of the pro-urban bourgeois forces in Toronto while also acting as an influential lobbyist within the local and regional states.

As United Way has become the major source of non-governmental funding in Toronto, so has its authoritative power grown. Even though many community workers are aware of the contradictory and unsustainable forms of funding they receive from the United Way, they are extremely reluctant to vocally criticize the organization, fearing the loss of their funding and consequently their jobs (personal correspondence). In the absence of public funds and given the visible policy activism of the United Way, the organization has become “the voice of the community” as well as its financial lifeline. As a youth criminal justice worker at one of the community centres funded by the United Way explained to me,

[Since the late 1990s] United Way has put youth as a priority and started a larger discussion with larger stakeholders like governments to provide more funds for youth programming. The shortcoming is that there is no core youth funding from any form of government. So it’s project-based, it’s temporary…. United Way is working really hard in terms of creating youth hubs around the city, which is a great strategy. We’ve been here since the 1990s as a youth service, and we’ve grown our youth services. Now we have six staff, and we all have different expertise. We have several programs for young people. We’re open from Monday to Friday. So young people in this neighbourhood know that they can come here. They do come here to get their services and to work one-on-one with the staff…. For us it’s helpful, and for this community it’s helpful. I’m glad that United Way understands that and has started that in different parts of the city. (I31 2013)

**Territorialized Ideologies of Space**

Space is not a scientific object removed from ideology and politics…. Space is political and ideological. It is a product literary populated with ideologies. There is an ideology of space. Why? Because space, which seems homogeneous, which appears given as a whole in its objectivity, in its pure form, such as we determine it, is a social product. (Lefebvre 2009:170–71)

A few months after the publication of *Torontonians Speak Out*, in early 2004 United Way published its now famous and influential report *Poverty by Postal Code: The Geography of*
Neighbourhood Poverty, 1981–2001. Highlighting that the number of poor families in the City of Toronto increased by almost 69% between 1981 and 2001, Poverty by Postal Code was the first report to provide an explicit focus on “the spatial dimension, or the ‘geography of poverty,’” mapping the “suburbanization” of concentrated non-White poverty, and warning about its destructive effects in Toronto (United Way 2004:4).

The concept of “neighbourhood” (and the ideological representation of poor neighbourhoods) was central to Poverty by Postal Code. The report mobilized the concept of neighbourhood to justify the urgency for state-led spatial targeting of poverty. On the one hand, references to neighbourhood were used to reinforce the idea of Toronto as a “city of neighbourhoods” and to pay political due to Toronto’s pro-urban bourgeois forces. The report’s opening lines were ornamented with the words of Jane Jacobs, calling “[a] successful city neighbourhood…[is] a place that keeps sufficiently abreast of its problems so it is not destroyed by them” (quoted in United Way 2004:1). Later on, the report quoted David Miller’s inaugural speech (on December 2, 2003) who, as a Jane Jacobs follower, declared: “Neighbourhoods are what make this city great. We must value what is distinct about our neighbourhoods, and recognize that which has value beyond its cost” (quoted in United Way 2004:5). On the other hand, the report mobilized a particular ideological representation of poor neighbourhoods that was extensively built upon the growing literature on the “neighbourhood effects” of poverty. The 2004 report differentiated its humanitarian narrative about the rise of concentrated “suburban” non-White poverty by incorporating visualization, scientism, policy competitiveness, and localism into the logic of its arguments. None of these shifts were entirely new, and it is perhaps more accurate to talk about an acceleration and consolidation of some of the ideological trends in the urban agenda of pro-urban bourgeois forces.

First, visualization (the reliance on maps and pictures) was perhaps the one characteristic that visibly differentiated Poverty by Postal Code from previous reports. For the first time black-and-white and colour pictures of different neighbourhoods of Toronto decorated the front cover of the report and the margins of every single page. This visualization, through the display of pictures of neighbourhoods and people, would soon become a major feature of United Way’s reports, conveying to readers that United Way is indeed “the voice of community.” One can detect a similar form of visualization in United Way’s headquarters, located at the heart of downtown Toronto. The current interior design of the United Way head office is a neo-modernist take of 1970s modernist interior and furniture designs: solid bright colours, ornamented with images of
non-White people much reminiscent of the advertisements of the United Colours of Benetton. An endless collection of large- and small-print images of smiling beautiful non-White faces decorate the walls or hang from the ceiling of the lobby and office rooms of the head office. It is hard to miss how the interior design heavily builds upon the ethos of neo-colonial trusteeship and the aestheticized politics of Canada’s official multiculturalism (see Bannerji 2000). The visual message of the interior space conveys that the philanthro-capitalist organization is the voice and the hope of “the community,” of Canada’s multicultural Others living in Toronto. In turn, these multicultural Others owe their success, displayed through their smiling faces, to the humanitarian benevolence of United Way.

Maps, showing changes in neighbourhood poverty over three decades (based on 1981, 1991, and 2001 census data) and family poverty rate by neighbourhoods added another layer of visualization to Poverty by Postal Code (United Way 2004:7–10). I will discuss in more detail the role of maps and mapping in policy making in Chapter Six. For now, it suffices to say that colour-coded maps gave visual form to the hitherto territorialized discussion of concentrated non-White poverty. They turned the central message of the report into a visual message that could touch upon the already territorialized common sense of Torontonians. Colour-coded maps gave the illusion of revealing Toronto’s urban problems and locating them in specific localities.

The second shift was the explicit way that Poverty by Postal Code emphasized the threat the rising concentrated non-White poverty in the postwar suburbs poses to “the economic and social vitality of an entire region and everyone’s quality of life” (United Way 2004:2). The report praised the unfolding “renaissance of public policy attention to poor neighbourhoods” in the United Kingdom and the United States. “Canadian cities,” the report warned, “have not enjoyed the same kind of public policy attention,” a lack of attention that would harm Toronto’s economic competitiveness (United Way 2004:2). This sense of lagging behind in urban policy trends and mobilities (Peck and Theodore 2010, 2012) played an important role in creating a sense of

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79 The main place-based policy reference points in the United Kingdom are: the Single Regeneration Budget (1994–2000); the New Deal for Communities (1998–2008); and the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (2001–2009). In the case of the United States, the main place-based policy reference points are: The Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities of the 1990s; the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s HOPE VI; and the Choice Neighbourhoods. In 2012, United Way commissioned the for-profit research institute Public Interest to do a comprehensive research on the “best practices” of place-based urban policy. Public Interest was also the major third party that the City of Toronto hired to do community consultation in Regent Park prior to the demolition of the public housing project (Meagher, Lee, and Tolia 2012).
urgency for state-led targeted urban intervention.80 Almost a decade later, one of the City’s senior policymakers involved with both the Priority Neighbourhoods and the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 strategies explained that:

Canada, to some extent, lags behind a bit in terms of other international trends. Internationally,… [place-based policy] has been a bit of a focus. Certainly work taking place in Britain informed the Strong Neighbourhoods Task Force. It’s one of the reasons it was launched. (I25 2013)

The third shift in Poverty by Postal Code was an appeal to presumably scientific, evidence-based research, in particular with reference to the growing literature on the “neighbourhood effects” of concentrated poverty and “ghettoization.” The neighbourhood effects lens has been influential in crafting place-based policies of poverty de-concentration in the United States and the United Kingdom. The contemporary history of academic attention to concentrated poverty is of particular interest here, not least because this history is explicitly linked to the political fear of “race riots.” The systematic study of spatially concentrated poverty was born in the United States after the 1987 publication of William Julius’ The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass and Public Policy. It was in the aftermath of the 1992 Los Angeles riots that research on the spatial concentration of poverty became a field of study of its own (Burton 1992). The major tenets of the “neighbourhood effects” literature were already at the heart of the “broken windows” theory that was used to rationalize criminalization of poverty and homelessness in New York and Toronto in the 1990s as well as the U.S. counterinsurgency strategies in occupied Iraq by the mid-2000s (see Long 2006). By establishing a correlation between location and socio-economic outcomes, the neighbourhood effects literature suggests that living in neighbourhoods with high levels of poverty has a negative impact on social development and emphasizes the multiplying effects of concentrated poverty (Wilson 1987). The core of the argument is based on a tautology, saying less about poverty than constructing poverty as the cause of a vast array of social and urban issues. In this logic neighbourhood poverty causes crime, physical and economic decline, and anti-social behaviour, which in turn will deepen and spread poverty and its effects within and beyond the neighbourhood.

80 The report’s chapter “Poverty Amidst Prosperity: An Age of Extremes” starts with a quote from Kofi Annan’s speech at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Urban Development in Moscow on June 5, 2002: “With the shift to cities, many of society’s inequities and ills also becoming more and more urban. We seek stark contrasts: contrasts in wealth and opportunity; contrast in urbanization patterns; and contrast between housing costs and the salaries offered by labour markets” (quoted in United Way 2004:12).
The positivist epistemology and quantitative methodology of the neighbourhoods effects argument, however, have given an aura of objectivity to the tautological logic of this mushrooming body of literature. But as critiques have argued, neighbourhood effects literature is extremely problematic. Its tautological logic easily turns correlation into causation (poverty causes poverty, poverty causes crime, poverty causes decline) (see Cowen and Parlette 2011). In its emphasis on the “cycle” and “multiplying effects” of poverty, the neighbourhood effects literature does not go beyond the “culture of poverty” thesis of the mid-twentieth century (see Harrington 1962). A key difference, as Siciliano (2010) and Cowen and Parlette (2011) have mentioned, is that the responsibility for poverty is now assigned to the neighbourhoods themselves and only indirectly to the poor. Nonetheless, what has remained intact are the pathologization of poverty and the behaviour of those who live in neighbourhoods with a high concentration of poverty (Bauder 2002). In its obsessive focus on place and the physical attributes of poor neighbourhoods, the literature reiterates the ideological tenets of the Chicago School of urban ecology in the early twentieth century, in particular the social Darwinist-inspired and environmentally deterministic idea that spatial form determines social relations. The result is a dehistoricization of the processes of social production of urban space under imperialist capitalism (Lefebvre 1991).

These logical and analytical pitfalls are not limited to the world of academic research. Rather, they have had concrete influences in the formation of place-based urban policy in Toronto (see Siciliano 2010). They are now part of the dominant ways of conceiving and perceiving poverty among municipal staff, politicians, and community workers of various political orientations. A social democratic City councillor answered my question about the main social and political problems affecting the “priority neighbourhood” in his riding as being “poverty, poverty, isolation, single-parent families” (I2 2013). He explained:

what poverty creates is a neighbourhood context where it’s tough for people to move out of it; it’s tough for people to have different kinds of experiences. From a security perspective, poverty creates a number of social ills. You have kids organizing themselves into gangs or into groups. Those groups then fight for turfs; they fight for a neighbourhood base where it’ll be their area for selling drugs or other activities that they might be involved in, whether [it’s] prostitution, whether it’s lending money, whether it’s gambling. So then they fight for that turf and that creates all kinds of issues for the people in the neighbourhood. For example, sometimes, kids from a particular side of Finch can’t cross the street on the south side or people from the south side can’t cross to the north side. If you are from the Driftwood community and you go to the community centre of Oakdale, you’re putting yourself at great risk by doing that. And then when these groups have their differences, then everyone else is also being put on risk to some degree because

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you never know where you happens to be when these groups are committing violence on each other. (I2 2013)

**Neighbourhoodism and Politics: Contradictions and Pitfalls**

The ascendency of the neighbourhood effect literature into a policy rationale has resulted in the fourth shift in addressing poverty: localism. Pointing to turf politics and its related violence among youths as evidence that poverty and violence are territorialized problems in Toronto is common among the police, politicians, and the majority of policy makers with whom I talked (I11 2013; I2 2013; I20 2013; I25 2013). Turf politics, or rather “neighbourhoodism” as a youth criminal justice worker put it, is a reality – and at times a violent reality – for youth from poor neighbourhoods (I31 2013; I16 2013). This neighbourhoodism is very different from the neighbourhoodism of Jane Jacobs and the pro-urban bourgeois forces in Toronto. While the latter builds upon a celebration of particular aesthetic characteristics of a locality, the former is indispensably attached to the everyday contradictions of living within the arbitrary confines of territorially stigmatized localities:

In those larger [public housing] complexes young people tend to stay within those complexes, and they have this whole thing, not forming gangs per se, but ownership of those neighbourhoods, and because of the ownership they have in those neighbourhoods, they [believe they] represent those neighbourhood…. I will give you the example of Alexandra Park and Regent Park, very publicized through the media over the last few years in terms of their rivalry. So Yonge Street is the boundary. Neither one [i.e., certain youth from each area] can go past the boundary. Their neighbourhood issues, their isolation is real. In fact, young people from Alexandra Park fear going to the Eaton Centre because they may be running into someone from Yonge Street or from Regent Park who can target them just because they live in Alexandra Park. It doesn’t even have to be a targeted “You killed my brother, so I’m gonna kill you.” It could be as simple as “You’re from the neighbourhood that killed my brother, so I’m gonna kill you.” So it’s that [kind of] reality [that kids from poor neighbourhoods are subjected to]: “I have to stay in my hood to be safe.” And that happens all over the city. If you ask people in Scarborough or Malvern Galloway,… [they] have a similar issue. If you go up to Jane-Finch and Rexdale,… [they] have a similar issue. There are issues throughout the city, and different marginalized neighbourhoods have a beef with other neighbourhoods and there are certain neighbourhoods that have a beef with several hoods. So they are literally stuck in their four corners. (I31 2013)

How this specific form of neighbourhoodism is produced, however, has less to do with poverty and youth gangs per se than with systemic racism, economic marginalization, political alienation, territorial stigmatization and the criminalization of poverty by the state (the police, urban policy,
and the justice and the education systems) (I31 2013; I13 2013; I16 2013; see also James 2012a, 2002b). A youth activist involved with organizing against police brutality in the Jane and Finch neighbourhood explained to me how such neighbourhoodism easily falls into “horizontal violence” among the youths:

The violence in the community, what we like to term horizontal violence – so violence between youth in the community, often youth from the same nationality, is definitely a big concern in these neighbourhoods. It’s tragic to see that many young people living in the same conditions, and the violence is between each other, and the conflict is between each other, instead of against the power structures that are really putting them in those conditions in the first place. But I think it needs to be pointed out that that horizontal violence is a result of those conditions and is the result of, I think, quite a deliberate policy of placing young people in situations and conditions in which that’s the only outcome because, in terms of employment, in terms of all that, it is a form of violence and is another form of – when you talk about security concerns, unemployment, housing, all of that are major security concerns for people in the neighbourhood. But the resulting impact of that on young people, who are then involved in illegal forms of survival, or who are pushed out of the school system at a very young age, or who are even turned against each other by policing – and we can get into that further about the deliberate ways in which the police encourage and facilitate violence between young people in these neighbourhoods. The resulting impact of that is a situation in which there’s a lot of horizontal violence, a lot of – whether you call it black-on-black crime, or whatever, but that is definitely a huge concern in the neighbourhood. So I would say that it [i.e., violence] would be, in terms of subjectively on people’s minds, probably number one. But the number two security concern for people in these communities would be the police, whether it’s the carding policy that the police have or just stopping kids, not just kids but really anyone in the neighbourhood, and that’s huge. (I16 2013)

In reaction to the systematic violence that the youth from poor neighbourhoods are subjected to on an everyday basis, these youth take refuge in building a sense of ownership in their neighbourhoods to the point of grounding their identities within the geographical limits of their immediate localities within which they are obliged to live. The more the violent force of geography determines and contains the lives of these youth, the more they define themselves in geographical terms (neighbourhood, region, country) (I13 2013; see also James 2012a). In his studies of Black post-secondary students living in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) and those living in the Jane and Finch neighbourhood (one of Toronto’s poorest neighbourhoods and a targeted “priority neighbourhood”), Carl James (2012a) observes two different territorialized identities:

The Toronto-wide second-generation Black youth defined “community” in racial terms – Blackness, with little or no reference to regional or national difference.... The Jane-Finch youth – of Caribbean and African origin – talked of their
community first in terms of geography, with fixed physical coordinates or boundaries, and second in terms of ethno-racial identities. (James 2012a:75–6)

James (2012a, 2012b) relates such neighbourhoodism to the territorial stigmatization of Jane and Finch not just by the media, politicians, and the police, but also by the place-based education policies targeting “at-risk” youth in neighbourhoods having high concentrations of poverty. While education is sold to kids from poor neighbourhoods as the only way to get out of the misery of poverty and violence, the content and politics of that education reproduce and normalize the socio-economic, spatial, and racialized relations that have caused their marginalization and alienation in the first place. The very construction of “at-risk” designation, James (2012b) argues, is based upon and reproduces racist, classist, and gendered stereotypes of Black youth as “immigrants,” “troublemakers,” “athletes,” “underachievers,” and “fatherless.” Youth neighbourhoodism is partly a reaction to the systematic racist, classist, gendered, and territorialized domination over non-White youth in peripheralized parts of the city, partly the internalization of these forms of domination by the youth.

The police are also an influential force in reinforcing youth neighbourhoodism. Targeted policing strategies such as Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS) use divide and rule tactics to gather information and make arrests in “priority neighbourhoods.” One of the tactics is to put kids from different (rival) neighbourhoods together in one cell, in detention centres or prisons (I3 12013; see also Powel 2010). Being aware that whatever disputes happen in those cells will eventually unfold on the street, the aim is to get the rest of the “gang” members out on the street and arrest them (Powell 2010). Youth activists and social workers explained to me how this tactic has added to street violence, criminalization, and more territorialized rivalry among youths from different neighbourhoods:

So, it’s kind of well-known in these neighbourhoods that, although the police claim to be in these neighbourhoods to prevent the violence between youths, it has quite often the opposite effect in which officers directly and indirectly facilitate contradictions between people. For example... when they raided Driftwood [in Jane and Finch] in 2011,... a lot of those kids have a situation, or let’s say there’s a little bit of a situation with youths from Rexdale, and police deliberately put a lot of these youth into cell ranges.... Let’s say they would bring in one kid who was arrested in [Jane and Finch] and put him on a cell range that had all kids from Rexdale. So obviously these kids would be quite badly assaulted in prison. They would put them even in – like when it wasn’t their home jail, I guess the West Detention Centre, they would, quite deliberately, put young people in situations in which they would be facing people they knew to have street rivalries with, and this

81 I will discuss in detail TAVIS and other policing strategies in Chapter Five.
was done almost, very, very frequently, and other situations as well. The result of that was not just more violence within the prison, but also that played out on the street. And police are well aware of [these divisions]. I mean this is their job, to know every youth of colour in these neighbourhoods and what they’re up to. (I6 2013; also I31 2013)

Rather than addressing the siege of the youth within the boundaries of their neighbourhoods, state-led spatial strategies of targeting poverty in these localities fetishizes the neighbourhood. The scientific appeal of neighbourhood effects literature has justified a localized turn in understanding complex, multi-scalar socio-spatial issues such as poverty in general and non-White poverty in particular. This form of localism has become the rationale for taking “the neighbourhood” as the ideal scale for identifying, measuring, and dealing with social problems. A major message of Poverty by Postal Code was that “neighbourhoods must move to the top of the public policy agenda” (United Way 2004:15). And so it did. In both Priority Neighbourhoods strategy (City of Toronto 2005) and Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020 (City of Toronto 2012), “the neighbourhood” is taken as the unit of analysis. In fact, as we will see in Chapter Seven, this localized perspective would be reinforced in the Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020.

The celebratory justification of neighbourhood as the territorial unit of analysis rests, most often, upon two interrelated forms of rationalities. One strand of rationality appeals to scientism while the other appeals to the mythic image of Toronto. The former appeal is based on a positivist epistemology that takes for granted the objectivity of quantitative census data. The latter rationality builds upon Toronto’s mythic construction as “a city of neighbourhoods” – one that erases Toronto’s White settler colonial history and the city’s history of racial and class segregation and instead argues that the diversity and distinctiveness of the city’s neighbourhoods has always been one of the strengths of Toronto. We have already seen how this mythic construction has played an important role in framing concentrated non-White poverty as a security threat to Toronto’s political stability. This latter rationality also received an ideological boost from the City’s recent cultural policy and its heavy capitalization on the “creative city” discourse and the commodification of culture, diversity, and neighbourhood street life (City of Toronto 2003, 2008, 2011; Martin Prosperity Institute [MPI] 2009).\footnote{Richard Florida is the head of Martin Prosperity Institute at University of Toronto.}

There are qualitative differences between how the youth in poor neighbourhoods define the territoriality of their neighbourhoods (and thus their identities) and how the positivist scientism of place-based urban policy defines the neighbourhood as the territorial unit of analysis. While the
former is based on (at times violent) everyday experiences of the boundaries of public housing developments or a bundle of rental apartments on a city block, the latter is based upon population density and a cluster of Statistics Canada census tract territoriality. What these different forms of neighbourhoodism share in common, however, is a narrow focus on an arbitrary territoriality of the neighbourhood as either the unit of everyday defense or the unit of scientific analysis. In both cases the perceived space (Lefebvre 1991) of the neighbourhood disassociates the production of poverty and its racial dimension from the broader socio-economic, spatial, and colonial relations of capitalist uneven development and urbanization.

On the one hand, youth neighbourhoodism has narrowed how youth understand their own state of being besieged within the boundaries of poor neighbourhoods. According to a youth criminal justice worker,

> The youth of Toronto view their issues as their own. I don’t see many of them seeing outside of themselves or their neighbourhood. It’s very narrow. They view their problems as what’s going on in terms of what they can see and what they can feel, and they don’t see anything larger than their own community. They don’t go beyond their immediate [surroundings], and this gets into how they understand themselves and understand how [broader] issues can affect their community. (I31 2013)

It would be naïve, however, to take this situation as a fait accompli and generalize it to all youth living in peripheralized neighbourhoods in Toronto. There are critical voices among youth within these neighbourhoods; there are youth active in organizing against neighbourhoodism and police brutality and around housing issues (I16 2013). The point here, however, is to highlight the contradictions of a powerful trend that has shadowed the lives of youth living in these localities.

On the other hand, the localism of place-based urban policy has justified environmentally deterministic understanding of poverty and poor neighbourhoods and reified the territorialized and racialized security ideology that animates the conception of poverty-as-risk as a security threat to Toronto’s political stability. In Poverty by Postal Code, for example, “the aesthetic quality of the neighbourhood” was perceived as a fundamental characteristic of “strong and healthy neighbourhoods,” “the quality of life” and “economic prosperity” of not just the city’s neighbourhoods, but of Toronto in general (United Way 2004:6). The concentration of non-White poverty in pockets of postwar suburbs, in turn, was understood as the result of the movement of

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83 The City of Toronto has identified 140 neighbourhoods. These territorial units are not administrative in nature; rather they have a monitoring purpose. Each neighbourhood has minimum population of 7,000 to 10,000 and is composed of a group of a few census tracks, defined by income characteristics and physical (built and “natural”) features.
the poor and “the search for lower housing costs,” presumably in neighbourhoods of lower aesthetic quality (United Way 2004:3).

This view is not limited to United Way’s reports. The City councillor I quoted earlier on security issues in “priority neighbourhoods” gave me a very similar explanation as to why we are witnessing an increasing racial segregation in the city and how that is related to “the immigrant” problem in Toronto. According to him,

you have people who are coming here who have money, and they come here with money and start-up businesses. They locate in good neighbourhoods. They buy homes and properties that have considerable value. They won’t necessarily end up in some of the poor districts in Toronto. Then, you have some of the poor folks, or especially those that come as refugees, for example, who generally have little with them in terms of value and in terms of wealth. Then they will, more than likely, find themselves in one of the more difficult districts. Because we have high concentration of social housing, poverty, depressed real estate value – and depressed real estate value means that the rents that you’ll pay for housing and the kind of accommodation that you might be able to find will be in the poor areas. So as poverty concentrates, it has that drag on everything and regrettably, or I guess it depends on which way to look at it, un-regrettably, it makes things a little more affordable, so people with reduced means will find themselves located in these types of hoods. So, from that perspective, I guess, our form of immigration kind of concentrates newcomers into these hoods. The good thing about it is that, generally, newcomers to the country usually have a tendency to be hard-working and industrious, and while they’ll be living in these neighbourhoods for few years, they generally have a tendency to sort of plan their way out and move on. It’s the people that kind of get stuck that continue to stay, the ones that, for example, aren’t very well educated, the ones whose social networks and own families and so on break up, they kind of get stuck and then you have the soft perpetuation of the cycle that takes over. (I2 2013)

This statement shows an upside down picture of reality, a reification of uneven urban development under neo-colonial imperialist capitalism. The role of the systematic gentrification of downtown Toronto, socio-racial segregation, and the racist structure of Canadian economy and polity are erased. Rather, it is, according to United Way’s reports and the City councillor, “lower housing costs” and “depressed real-estate value” that are attracting the poor and causing concentration of poverty.84 In this argument, the production of concentrated non-White poverty is disassociated from the production of concentrated White wealth in downtown Toronto. This ideological

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84 At the first glance the argument that cheap housing attracts poor people appears logical. But this statement tells us nothing about why cheap housing exists in some parts of the city and not in other parts. How is this distribution related to urban uneven development? In its logical appearance, such statements smoothly abstract the questions of housing and poverty from the socio-spatial and racial dimensions of urban development (i.e., gentrification, racism, labour-market segmentation, commodification of housing). I will expand on this point in Chapter Eight.
argument around “lower housing costs,” as we will see, will be reiterated in years following upon the United Way report and will become influential in the formation and consolidation of place-base urban policy in Toronto.

The “Paris Problem” in Toronto: The Political Fear of “Urban Savages”

The 2004 publication of Poverty by Postal Code more forcefully brought the territorialized geography of concentrated non-White poverty in Toronto to the attention of policymakers. It was, however, a police-induced spike in gun-related violence among non-White youth in the peripheralized neighbourhoods of Toronto in 2004 and 2005 that brought the territorialized and racialized geography of poverty to the public attention of Toronto (Powell 2010; Siciliano 2010). Already primed by the territorialisation of poverty, the police-induced crisis of “gun violence” then brought “youth crime” and “at-risk” neighbourhoods into the frontline of policy. By mid-February 2004, then mayor David Miller proposed the Community Safety Plan (CSP).

The Community Safety Plan was based on a mix of enforcement and prevention measures designed by the City and the Toronto Police Services to target violence and crime in four low-income neighbourhoods in the city’s postwar suburbs: Jamestown in Etobicoke; Jane-Finch in North York; and Malvern and Kingston-Galloway in Scarborough. Despite the fact that, as Siciliano (2010:68) highlights, “police data showed them to have relatively less violent crime than other areas of the city,” the public discourse around gun-related violence and the targeting of these particular neighbourhoods gave new life to the warnings of Poverty by Postal Code and the ideological equation of the concentration of non-White poverty in postwar suburbs with the problem of gun violence in Toronto (Siciliano 2010).

In April 2004, United Way and the City of Toronto (with the support of the Government of Canada, the Province of Ontario, and the private sector) formed the Strong Neighbourhood Task Force (SNTF) “with the goal of building an action plan for revitalizing Toronto’s neighbourhoods” (2005:8). When the task force published its report in 2005, Strong Neighbourhoods: A Call to Action, it provided the first and most explicit call for “targeted investments in specific neighbourhoods,” and it became the blueprint for the Priority Neighbourhood Strategy (SNTF 2005:9). The report was a reiteration of Enough Talk (TCSA 2003), Poverty by Postal Code (United Way 2004), and Miller’s Community Safety Plan (City of Toronto 2004). It emphasized the link between concentrated non-White poverty and crime and identified “patterns of social exclusion
based on geography” as constituting “a threat to the health, well-being and prosperity of everyone in our city” (SNTF 2005:13, 4).

Emphasizing “best practices” and “international experiences” in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, the report recommended prevention through spatially targeted investment, social development, and community participation to de-concentrate poverty (SNTF 2005:16–17). The idea of prevention – fundamental to the Community Safety Plan – became one of the major pillars of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy. While appearing to be more progressive than policing enforcement, the emphasis on prevention reinforced the link between concentrated non-White poverty, violence, and postwar suburbs. One of the senior City managers involved with the task force at the time explained the process as follows:

In 2004, we had the development of gun violence and increasing incidents of gun violence. We also had a new mayor at that time, and Mayor Miller decided to develop the Community Safety Plan. The mayor was very clear that prevention is of equal importance, if not more so, to enforcement – and [he] really was interested at looking at the prevention side of the work. For him that broke in two primary pieces: one was increasing economic opportunities and the other was looking at place-based work, looking at those neighbourhoods that were experiencing violence and the kinds of infrastructure that they were lacking, and then trying to address that. So, the first safety plan identified three neighbourhoods, then four – we added Kingston-Galloway. At the same time that came out, about a year before, the first Strong Neighbourhood Strategy was released. So, we had these two kinds of tracks happening. The Strong Neighbourhoods had been struck a year before – actually under Lastman – and then, Miller came in and did the Community Safety Plan. We began implementing the Safety Plan and the place-based governance of it. Then the Strong Neighbourhood was released. Part of the job was to bring those two together, so that we have coherent public policy. We managed to do that and create [the] 13 [priority] neighbourhoods. (I3 2014)

While the City and United Way were busy crafting place-based policy to fight poverty and prevent “gun violence,” the number of gun-related homicides among non-White youth spiked in the summer of 2005. The majority of these deaths and shootings took place across the city’s peripheralized neighbourhoods. From October 26 to 31 2005, City Council debated and finally adopted the Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy as “a civic strategy of neighbourhood building” and in order “to strengthen priority neighbourhoods through targeted investment” (City of Toronto 2005). Thirteen “neighbourhoods” were designated as “priority neighbourhoods:” Jamestown; Jane-Finch; Weston-Mount Dennis; Lawrence Heights; Westminster-Branson; Crescent
Town; Flemingdon Park-Victoria Village; Steels-L’Amoureaux; Dorest Park; Eglinton East-Kennedy Park; Scarborough Village; Kingston-Galloway; and Malvern.85

As City councillors started debating Toronto’s “war on poverty and gun violence,” on October 27 Zyed Benn and Bouna Traore, two French youths respectively of Malian and Tunisian backgrounds, were electrocuted while being chased by the police in the Parisian banlieue of Clichy-sous-Bois. Their deaths sparked the largest uprising of non-White youth in France in history. As the blazing uprising of the French banlieues was televised across the world, a new security discourse dominated the framing of “gun violence” and concentrated non-White poverty in Toronto. The fear of the “U.S. ghetto” in Toronto was replaced with Toronto’s “Paris problem” as a security threat to the city’s celebrated peace and political stability.

Media pundits quickly fed the public with comparisons between Toronto’s “growing immigrant “underclass,” which by now had been territorialized in the city’s postwar suburbs, and the “ethnic uprising” of the Parisian banlieues (Valpy 2005; Jouanneau 2005; Friesen 2005). Joe Friesen (2005) of The Globe and Mail quoted an eighteen-year-old from Jane and Finch saying: “There’s a possibility of it happening here…. That’s how we feel about it. It could be a threat” (Friesen 2005). Friesen also quoted Margaret Parson, then executive director of the African-Canadian Legal Clinic, confirming that

the area [Jane and Finch] is a tinderbox that could explode in violence, just like the Paris suburbs did over the past few weeks. “It could easily erupt,” she said. “We can look at Paris as an example and prevent this from happening [but] I think the sense of despair, I think the sense of hopelessness, the sense of frustration [are all present].” (Friesen 2005)

The comparison between Toronto’s postwar suburbs and the banlieues of Paris was made easier by the temporal proximity of the two events. In reality, however, it was a territorialized and racialized ideology of security focused on peripheralized spaces that brought Toronto and Paris together in 2005 and afterwards. This comparison became more transparent when on Boxing Day of 2005 a White female bystander was accidentally killed in a gang-related shooting in downtown Toronto. This accidental death dispelled the comfort that the “gun violence” can be contained “over there”

85 The Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy soon became known as the Priority Neighbourhood Strategy (PN), confirming the weight of the state designation of the above-mentioned areas as “priority neighbourhoods.” The strategy recommended four immediate action-plans: “establishing a monitoring tool to identify needs and assess social infrastructure investment;” “integrated responses” in priority neighbourhoods; the creation of “intergovernmental partnerships;” and the founding of “new local partnerships” “with a broad range of residents, businesses, faith groups, service providers, organization and others local stakeholders” (City of Toronto 2005).
in poor neighbourhoods of the “inner suburbs.” The penetration of gun violence into the social space of Toronto’s supposedly peaceful downtown was quickly taken up as the object of political fear, a fearful spectre of a security crisis haunting the city.

In the aftermath of the Boxing Day shootings, politicians at all levels quickly shared their compassion and security concerns with Torontonians. “Yesterday’s shootings in Toronto,” then Prime Minister Paul Martin warned, “serve as a painful reminder that we cannot take our peace or our understanding for granted” (quoted in the Toronto Star 2005). The death of Jane Creba “stunned and saddened” then Mayor David Miller, “both as a Torontonian and a father” of a ten-year-old girl (quoted in Toronto Star 2005). Dalton McGuinty, then the Liberal Première of Ontario, touched upon the fear of the penetration of “gun violence” among “us,” stating that “with each loss of a young life to the insanity of guns, we are reminded that this could have been our own daughter, or own son or grandchild, and we are sickened and deeply saddened by this family’s loss” (quoted in Toronto Star 2005). The late Jack Layton, then the leader of New Democratic Party (NDP), reminded Torontonians of their resilience in the face of violence and the importance of a productive and preventive approach to save the city:

Thirty years ago, Yonge St. was condemned as going downhill and taking the city with it (with) the murder of Emanuel Jaques (a 12 year-old shoeshine boy who was raped and killed above a Yonge St. body-rub parlour). But everybody pulled together and said we will not let our city slip between our fingers. A whole series of initiatives was taken, and that has to happen now. (Layton quoted in Toronto Star 2005)

The Boxing Day shooting reconfirmed the still strong colonial legacies of the uneven and hierarchized value of humanity in Toronto. While 2005 was witness to 52 gun-related homicides, almost all of them young non-White youth, it is only the name of Jane Creba – the White young female bystander who was accidentally killed – that has become the name attached to the “year of the gun” and the crisis of gun violence in Toronto. As to the Other 51 dead bodies, no one except for their families and friends know their names and stories. Overnight, a colonial discourse of “them, the savages” against “us, the civilized” shifted and fixated public attention on peripheralized, highrise neighbourhoods inhabited by non-White working-class populations in Toronto.

Among media pundits, no one articulated this colonial discourse of demonizing and dehumanizing non-White youth living in peripheralized poor neighbourhoods with the clarity of Toronto Star columnist Rosie DiManno. Fuelled by an astonishing racist rage, DiManno reminded Torontonians that
Toronto has taken a boot in the gut [in] the last year. While most of us, in fact, have little to fear from the callous disregard for life exhibited by urban savages (except the hug-a-thug crowd won’t have us demonize these poor, misbegotten youth, so “victimized” by the root causes of their own misanthropy – Prime Minister Paul Martin, without any supporting evidence at hand, yesterday describe Monday’s dreadful incident as a tragedy and “consequence of exclusion”), we certainly should worry for distant neighbours, who cannot just shut the door to keep out violence. It follows them inside; it strangles their households. And there is always, as was proven on Boxing Day, the chance – however slim – the gunfire will come to us, in our shared communal spaces, to our innocent children, a parent rushing past with shopping bags in hand, an off-duty police officer. (DiManno 2005)

While DiManno’s racist rage differs from the above-mentioned concerns voiced by politicians, such difference should not distract us from the political fear of “the immigrant” – the non-White working class. DiManno (2005) and the elite politicians perceived the Boxing Day shooting as a security threat because for them “gun violence” had penetrated downtown Toronto – the assumed territoriality of peace, civility, and security. For them the non-White youths are part of the “internal enemy.” Thus, the lives of 51 non-White youths have less value than the life of one White girl, who was one of “us.” The difference in their stands is in the way they perceived the “internal enemy,” hence their solutions to the problem. For DiManno (2005), the “urban savages” are not “civilizable.” They are a lost cause. Whereas for the elite liberal and social-democrat politicians, “the immigrant” has the potential to become “civilized” with proper development, empowerment, and policing. That is to say, with proper trusteeship “the immigrant,” the non-White working class, has the potential to become a resilient liberal subject, no more threatening to the security and peace of neo-colonial imperialist capitalism.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I examined the ideological construction of concentrated non-White poverty as a security issue that required state intervention through urban policy. Following the insights of Himani Bannerji (2011) and Dorothy Smith (1990) discussed earlier, here I focused on both the content and the productive process of ideology. I looked at how particular interpretations and representations of social reality (poverty, non-White working class, uneven development, segregation, violence) dehistoricize and distort social reality. At the time of neoliberal restructuring, extreme uneven development, and socio-racial segregation in Toronto, I traced the political force of a liberal humanitarian ideology in state-led strategies of targeting concentrated non-White poverty.
The liberal humanitarian ideology that has animated place-based urban policy in Toronto is not simply fuelled by the innocent compassion of do-gooders taking up the mission of eradicating poverty and misery. Rather, as we saw, this ideology is deeply intertwined with a territorialized and racialized security ideology focused on the figure of “the immigrant.” This territorialized and racialized security ideology is fundamental to simultaneously depicting poverty as a humanitarian crisis and as a threat to capitalist growth, political stability and the security of the (predominantly White) ruling classes in Toronto. Meanwhile, poverty is actively disassociated from the socio-spatial and racialized relations of its production and the production of wealth in Toronto.

What is being erased is the fact that the socio-spatial relations that produce poverty are also fundamental to the production of wealth. The concentration of non-White poverty is the other side of the coin of the concentration of White wealth in Toronto. Instead, poverty is conceptualized as a territorialized problem of particular localities and as a racialized problem of non-White “immigrants.” This territorialized and racialized conception of poverty is linked, on the one hand, to the broader “immigrant problem” as a source of insecurity and poverty and, on the other hand, to the worldwide dominant ideological trends of understanding poverty as risk, as the result of disconnection from the socio-spatial relations of imperialist capitalism. This is precisely why the “Paris problem” easily became a signifier for the political fear of the non-White working class and the potential explosion of their anger on the streets of Toronto.

It was not the poor and non-White working-class people, those who live the everyday violence of poverty, who publicized concentrated non-White poverty as an urban policy issue. Rather, powerful fractions of the bourgeois ruling class, a coalition of pro-urban bourgeois forces, have been the major force in framing poverty as an object of state-led investigation and intervention. At the helm of this coalition of pro-urban bourgeois forces there reside influential philanthro-capitalists and their affiliated academics that have been the main forces in the production of knowledge about poverty and place-based urban policy as demonstrated by the role of United Way. In the next chapters I extend my analysis to the role of police, academic, and research institutions in the consolidation of place-based urban policy targeting concentrated non-White poverty.
Part Three:
The Consolidation of Place-based Urban Policy in Toronto

Chapter Five:
Prevention and Intervention: Community Policing in the “Immigrant Neighbourhoods”

Introduction

In the aftermath of the accidental death of Jane Creba, the City and United Way rolled out Toronto’s own version of the “war on poverty,” launching a place-based urban policy in the thirteen targeted “priority neighbourhoods” (all located in the city’s postwar suburbs) in early 2006. The intervention policy was composed of a place-based social development strategy – the Priority Neighbourhoods Strategy – and a provincially funded combined paramilitary and community policing strategy – the Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS). The rationale was that dealing with the crisis of poverty–violence–security requires both prevention and reinforcement in the “hotspots” of poverty and “gun violence” (I3 2014).

In this chapter, my focus is on the formation and the ideological dimensions of various state strategies of policing in the aftermath of the “year of the gun” in Toronto (and Canada). For the most part, critics have perceived and analyzed the Priority Neighbourhoods and TAVIS strategies as separate strategies, with the former mobilizing (social) development and the latter dealing with coercive policing. The very few critical studies on policing strategies in Toronto have only focused on the coercive dimension of policing and its link to the punitive law-and-order turn in Canadian public policy and legislation (Kishman, Buse and Steedman 2000; Heroux 2011; Siciliano 2010; Sewell 2010; Gordon 2006). Understanding policing as a coercive power is a common feature of many critical analyses of the police. While these studies conceive notions of crime and criminal as relational and socially constructed, they also conceive of policing as central to the repression of the working class and the reproduction of order through coercion (see Hall 1978).86

86 Given the focus of this dissertation, I do not go into detail on the various arguments on crime and policing. However, a few clarifications are in order. The concept of police has been the subject of intellectual debates since the seventeenth century. These debates were always in relation to functions of the modern state and the political economy of capitalism (see Rigakos, McMullan, Johnson and Ozcan 2009). In contemporary
One argument of this dissertation is the need to conceive the spatially targeted state-led development and policing strategies as relational precisely because they build upon the liberal nexus of development and security. Here, I follow the insights of Poulantzas (2000) on the positive dimension of state intervention and distance myself from a sole emphasis on coercive policing. While I do not dispute the coercive enforcement strategies of policing, I believe coercive policing is only part of the story. As Mark Neocleous (2000, 2006) has extensively argued, we should avoid falling into the “repressive hypothesis” of policing and instead critically engage with the productive nature of police power. In fact, the productive dimension of police power is essential for the continuation of coercive enforcement (Dubber and Valverde 2006, 2008), precisely because, as we will see, the productive dimension of policing is about moderating violence and “humanizing” the state-led fabrication of social order. In this sense, policing is a form of pacification.

I examine policing strategies as part of state strategies of reorganizing territorial and colonial relations of domination. Policing strategies are essential to what Lefebvre (1978) called “colonization,” as the political organization of territorial relations of domination. The rolling out of the PN–TAVIS strategies in 2006 brought three key shifts in the politics of state-led urban intervention in Toronto: 1) the consolidation of spatially targeted state-led intervention in “immigrant neighbourhoods;” 2) the ascendency of prevention in state development and security times, the largest literature on the question of policing is located in the field of criminology, where most often policing (like criminal law) is understood as no more than a set of strategies to manage something “evil” and “disorderly” called crime (see Neocleous 2000; Harcourt 2001). In conventional criminology, while the exercise of state power through policing is recognized, the state, its politics and mode of operation, is treated as unproblematic. In the last two decades another set of literature on policing has been developed, one that is influenced by Foucault’s works on police, power, and governmentality (see Chapter One). While in the 1980s and 1990s, these works were mostly focused on technologies of power and surveillance (see Chapter One), in the last decade some critical Foucauldian scholars have shifted their attention to scrutinizing the disciplinary and contradictory dimensions of police power. There are two major strengths to this later Foucauldian literature (e.g., Dubber and Valverde 2006, 2008). First, the focus of analysis has shifted from police as an institution to police as a form of disciplinary power that can be both oppressive and productive. Second, crime is understood as a social construct, influenced by dominant power relations in society. Nonetheless, similar to other Foucauldian studies, one of the major shortcomings of this literature is its lack of engagement with the state (see Chapter One). A third approach to policing is marxist studies of policing, which have paid attention to the role of the state and class relations. Here, however, the police is understood as a coercive power for oppressing the working class (see O’Connor 1975; Marenin 1982; Robinson and Scaglion 1987; Parenti 1999). In this dissertation, I follow Mark Neocleous’s (2000, 2006, 2008) historical-materialist approach to policing and police power. Similar to critical Foucauldian studies, Neocleous understands police power as both coercive and productive. At the same time, Neocleous follows marxist analyses and situates the police in relation to the formation of the capitalist state and social relations of wage labour. His contributions are very productive for scrutinizing the contradictory dimensions of what is today celebrated, even by sections of the left, as progressive policing.

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strategies of targeting poverty; and 3) a systematic focus on pacifying the perceived threats to 
security through emphasizing the participation, empowerment, and economic integration of “the 
imigrant.”

Besides limiting their focus to the coercive dimension of policing, analyses of urban 
policing in Toronto suffer from what John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge (1995) called “the territorial 
trap.” More than twenty years ago, Agnew and Corbridge directed our attention to an explicit 
assumption of the state as a “fixed territorial entity” in political theory, which “operat[es] much the 
same over time and irrespective of its place within the global geopolitical order” (1995:78). The 
privileging of the territorial national state in analysis of security and policing has resulted in a 
series of geopolitical assumptions, including the separation and opposition of the domestic and the 
(1995) focused on international relations, here I extend their point to urban policing. I argue that 
the police in Toronto’s urban politics (and Canada’s domestic politics more broadly) is linked to 
international politics and vice versa.

Attacking the “Paris problem” from Within

In January 2006, less than two weeks after the accidental death of Jane Creba, the Ontario 
Liberal government of Dalton McGuinty announced a new $51 million Anti-Gun Strategy. The 
provincial strategy had already been on its way since 2004 with the creation of a Guns and Gangs 
Crown (i.e., crown attorney) and the expansion of the Guns and Gangs Task Force in October 
2005 (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services 2011a). The additional investment 
in 2006 was mainly allocated to expand the police force and infrastructure in Toronto. In addition 
to the expansion of the provincial Guns and Gangs Task Force, this program included funding a 
Toronto-specific place-based policing initiative and “a new, state-of-the-art Operation Centre for 
the Guns and Gangs Task Force” in Toronto (Badge 2009:4–5).

Almost immediately then Toronto police Chief Bill Blair introduced the Toronto Anti-
Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS) – a spatially targeted, combined military and community-
based policing strategy. TAVIS was kicked off with an initial budget of $7 million for the first year 
and a yearly budget of $5 million for the following years until 2016.87 By June 2007, the McGuinty

87 In September 2015 the Ontario government announced dramatic cuts to the annual funding of TAVIS as of 
2016. The Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services cut the TAVIS budget from $5 million to 
$2.63 million effective January 2016. The Ministry’s spokesperson stated that rather than in the current form
Government had scaled up TAVIS to a regional scale. With $6.3 million in extra investment, the Ontario Liberal government established a Provincial Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (PAVIS) in 15 locations across Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services 2011b).

With an allocated budget of $26 million, the “state-of-the-art” Operation Centre was added to a new, 287,000-square-foot Toronto Police College on a 16-acre site located in Toronto’s southwest end. Opened in the late summer of 2009, the college was designed by architect Alan Mortsch from Shore, Tilbe, Irwin and Partners. The building came at a cost of $76 million and is the site where TAVIS and Guns and Gangs Unit forces gain their specialized, tactical, urban military training. The centre is also shared for training purposes between the Toronto Police Service and the Department of National Defence (DND), containing a “Tactical Village” that “simulates a city street complete with stores and offices that have two floors” and a 360-degree “Battle House” that “stimulates an enclosed space where officers can train for high-risk situations in close confines using simulations” (Badge 2009:4–5).

Known as the signature brainchild of then Toronto police Chief Blair, TAVIS is “an intensive community mobilization strategy,” “a multi-pronged approach” intended to “solve community problems” and “reduce crime and increase safety in Toronto neighbourhoods” (Public of TAVIS, the Ontario government is interested in focusing on “a proactive, collaborative, and community-based model of policing” (quoted in Gillis 2015). While the sudden cut to TAVIS funding was celebrated by many liberal and left critics, what has not gained attention is that the government will keep the Rapid Response Team, the militarized part of the force which is responsible for raids.


The college is located at 70 Birmingham Street, near Islington Avenue and Lakeshore Boulevard in South Etobicoke.

In 2010, Shore Tible Irwin & Partners merged with the giant international architecture and design practice, Perkins+Will.

William (Bill) Blair was appointed Chief of the Toronto Police Service on April 26, 2005. He had extensive experience in community-based policing and organized crime enforcement in Toronto and remained as Police Chief for two mandates until 2015. Blair has been an influence and active figure in policing and security circles in Toronto and Canada. He served as president of both the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) and the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police (OACP). He has served as co-chair of the CACP Counter-terrorism and National Security Committee and the Organized Crime Committee. He also served as chair of the Public Safety Canada Audit Committee from 2009 to 2013. Blair has a long history in “civic” activism. He is on the Board of Directors at Covenant House Toronto and served as chair for the United Way Public Sector Campaign from 2008 to 2010. For more information, see www.torontopolice.on.ca/bios/blair.php.
The strategy has three components: high visibility; high enforcement; and high suppression (I11 2013). First, Rapid Response Teams (RRT) are composed of four teams of 18 officers equipped with military gear. They are responsible for targeting “high-risk” locations “based on intelligence-led policing information” and for accompanying the Guns and Gangs Unit in raids. Second, Divisional TAVIS Callbacks allow the Toronto Police Service’s 17 divisions to call back off-duty officers to perform high-visibility policing in targeted locations. Third, the Neighbourhood TAVIS Initiative (NTI) is a place-based summer program in two or three targeted “priority neighbourhoods” each year. Here, Neighbourhood TAVIS officers are responsible for “empower[ing] community,” by “engage[ing] with community members” and “partner[ing] with other agencies and community organizations” (Public Safety Canada 2013a; Toronto Police Services 2016) through a variety of community activities from planting flowers and cleaning parks to playing basketball with (mostly male) youth.

TAVIS targets selected neighbourhoods based on “crime trend analysis, occurrence mapping and community consultation” (Toronto Police Services 2016). Targeted neighbourhoods are the ones that “are experiencing a disproportionate level of criminal activity for their size” (Toronto Police Services 2016). “Troubled,” “broken,” and “high-risk” are the exchangeable names that the police use to refer to targeted neighbourhoods (I11 2013; I12 2013). While TAVIS rationalize their targeting with reference to assumedly scientific police crime statistics (I11 2013), the territorialized and racialized security ideology at the heart of targeting concentrated non-White poverty in Toronto plays a crucial role in focusing on particular spaces and subjectivities for intelligence gathering. In fact, key tenets of the neighbourhood effect literature are at the heart of the police’s perception and conception of “troubled neighbourhoods.” According to a high-rank TAVIS officer, the major issues that affect security in “priority neighbourhoods” are “lack of social cohesion” and urban design (I11 2013). Violence is thus conceived as the result of the breakdown of social cohesion in poor “immigrant neighbourhoods” and the design of particular buildings, public housing projects, and parts of neighbourhoods that are both isolating and inaccessible to police.

The implicit and explicit environmental determinism in the police conception of “troubled neighbourhoods” is not limited to TAVIS. While such a conception has been influenced by the neighbourhood effects literature on crime and poverty and the state-led strategies of targeting

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92 Initially, the Rapid Response Team started with one team of 18 officers. After a few years, the unit was expanded to four teams with 18 officers in each.
concentrated non-White poverty in Toronto, it is also rooted in the long history of understanding street gangs as territorialized and racialized phenomena. This history goes back to the influential theories of Robert Park and Fredric Thrasher, major figures of the Chicago School of urban sociology, in the early twentieth century (Siciliano 2010:132–33). For Thrasher (1927), gang formation and urban violence were territorialized and localized phenomena. It was the high level of neighbourhood “social disorganization” in the poor “immigrant” enclaves and slums of Chicago that had turned these areas into breeding grounds for street gangs.

If territorialized notions of space and gangs play an important part in understanding street gangs, so too are the racialized perceptions of the gangster. In Park’s and Thrasher’s understanding of street gangs in early twentieth-century Chicago, the de facto racialized figures of the gangster were the Irish, the Polish, and the Italian “immigrants.” In twenty-first-century Toronto, that racialized figure is most often the Indigenous and the Black youth (Caribbean and African) living in poverty-ridden areas of the city (Tator and Henry 2006; Smith 2007; Comack 2012). A City staff person involved with “at-risk” youths in the City’s Youth Development Unit (himself a non-White person) explained to me that

when TAVIS first arrived into the city, I was one of the few persons [who] was asked graciously to present to them [information about the neighbourhoods]. So they brought all the options and we did the presentation and explained [that this is] what you’re going to be facing when you enter the neighbourhood. And it was actually kind of scary because lots of those guys had already had a pre-conceived notion of what the person they’re going after looks like. (I13 2013)

Changes to Canada’s criminal code have further normalized the territorialized and racialized conception of gang members as a security threat. In Canada, the vaguely defined category of gang was only criminalized in 1997. In 2001, under the Anti-terrorism Act, Canada’s criminal code was amended to decrease the number of members required for the charge of “organized crime” from five to three individuals. These changes have not only increased the intensity and scale of police surveillance and raids in the name of fighting “guns and gangs;” they have also contributed to the criminalization of entire families and neighbourhoods. As a youth criminal justice worker recounted:

I had a young person who had older family siblings who were involved in gangs. He was not…. He was deemed a gang member and was sent to probation on Guns and Gangs [charges]. And I argued at that point, and unfortunately there was no way to take him off that label. So just because you’re from a neighbourhood, just because you may have a family member who is involved in gangs – there are seven different criteria that it takes to be in Guns and Gangs. You can’t be taken off that label and that’s unfair. So that is also a huge barrier in marginalized communities
because just because I’m from this ‘hood doesn’t mean I’m a gang member, because I’m a young black male…. It shouldn’t happen but these are the things that have been happening on the streets. (I31 2013)

**Historicizing Targeted Community Policing in Toronto**

Soon after its introduction, Mayor Miller and Police Chief Blair lauded TAVIS for its “progressive” implementation of community policing. Yet, neither the move to community policing nor any aspects of TAVIS were entirely new. As Heroux (2011) and Siciliano (2010) have mentioned, place-based policing and the military-style raids built upon targeted policing strategies in poor neighbourhoods of downtown and postwar suburbs since the 1980s. Since 1982, the Metropolitan Toronto Police (which became the Toronto Police Service after the 1998 amalgamation) has been involved in the development and implementation of community policing in selected poor areas, such as Parkdale and Jane and Finch (Murphy 1988). By the end of the 1980s, community policing became an important topic of debate among police forces and policymakers in Canada – as it did in the United States and the United Kingdom.

In 1990, the Solicitor General of Canada released a report, *A Vision of the Future of Policing in Canada: Police Challenge 2000* to stimulate public debate on the topic (Normandeau and Leighton 1990). The report highlighted that community policing is an important strategy for strengthening the connections between the police and the citizens they serve. It also asked whether a multicultural Canada warrants special initiatives in policing (Normandeau and Leighton 1990; Ungerleider and McGregor 1991). James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling’s (1982) “broken windows theory” was extremely influential in reviving the debates and strategies of community policing in the United States and Canada in the 1980s and 1990s (see Leighton 1991; Ungerleider and McGregor 1991; Harcourt 2001). TAVIS practices of “carding” and “high visibility” policing have their policing rationale in the broken windows-based community policing strategies of “carding” and “high visibility” policing have their policing rationale in the broken windows-based community policing

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93 Targeted policing strategies such as Project 35 and Project 40. See Chapter Three.
94 Public policing in pre-amalgamated Toronto fell under the administration of Metropolitan Toronto, meaning that the old City of Toronto and its postwar suburbs had the same police force.
95 A year later, the Solicitor General of Canada, Barry N. Leighton (1991: 486), wrote an article in the *Canadian Journal of Criminology* on various visions of community policing as “the most progressive approach to contemporary policing.”
96 It is important to highlight that Wilson and Kelling’s “broken windows theory” was also imperative to the coercive turn of the 1990s. In urban policy literature, “broken windows theory” is usually mentioned with reference to coercive policing, which was the most visible aspect of policing in the 90s. The importance of the “broken windows theory” to the revival of community policing is only highlighted in the literature on policing within the field of criminology and police studies. For a critical take on the “broken windows theory,” see Harcourt (2001).
strategies such as the “stop-question-and frisk-program” in New York City in the 1990s and 2000s. Adapted versions of these strategies had already been practiced in Toronto in the late 1990s.

In the aftermath of then Mayor Mel Lastman’s “war on squeegees,” City Council introduced community policing in Toronto in 1999. Known as Community Action Policing (CAP), the strategy mandated police officers to target specific “hotspots” and particular behaviours in order to prevent “uncommitted crime” (CSTP 2000: 8). Increased police presence and “stop and chats” were two of the main components of the strategy. Neighbourhoods such as Regent Park, Parkdale, the downtown eastside, Jane and Finch, and Rexdale were the major targets of Community Action Policing. In 2000, in response to the violence of community policing in Toronto, the Committee to Stop Targeted Policing (CSTP) published a report and criticized the resulting over-policing and disproportionate targeting of homeless people, squeegees, panhandlers, non-White people, natives, psychiatric survivors, street-level drug users and prostitutes (CSTP 2000:20).

The history of militarized policing in Ontario (and Canada) also goes beyond the introduction of TAVIS in Toronto. Canada’s first militarized police unit, the Tactics and Rescue Unit, was established in 1975 by the Ontario Provincial Police in order to securitize the 1976 Summer Olympics in Montreal. By 2000, there were already 65 Emergency Task Forces (ETF) units operating in Canada within the federal, provincial, and municipal jurisdictions (Siciliano 2010:130). In Toronto, poor neighbourhoods with public housing projects, such as Lawrence Heights, Malvern, and Jamestown, were the targets of Emergency Task Force raids during the 1980s. At the time, residents talked about these raids as occupation “by a foreign army” (Jacksons 1999:226). As mentioned earlier in Chapter Three, the 1990s was witness to police raids in poor areas. Rather than initiating new policing strategies, the rolling out of TAVIS systematically intensified many existing policing strategies in Toronto and elsewhere.

The first spectacular raid targeted by TAVIS took place in the early hours of May 16, 2006 in Jamestown, located in the northwest of the city. Six hundreds officers in military gear using rams and stun grenades targeted the Jamestown public housing project in the largest raid in the history of Toronto police. Around 100 people were arrested and more than 1,000 criminal charges were

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97 The Safer City Task Force recommended CAP to city council in early summer 1999. It got the nearly unanimous support of city council in July of that year. With a budget of $1.9 million, the program was to run for 11 weeks in the summer of 1999. CAP received support from some organizations in low-income neighbourhoods, including community–police liaison committees, business improvement associations (BIAs), and ratepayer groups. For more information and critique, see Who’s the Target? (Committee to Stop Targeted Policing 2000).
laid (many were later dropped). In a police raid with “military precision,” “the leadership of the Jamestown Crew [was] surgically removed from the community,” Police Chief Blair informed the media later (CBC 2006, emphasis added). Similar to the residents’ accounts in the 1990s, residents described the neighbourhood during the raid as “a war zone” that, in their view, was not that different from the televised scenes of Kandahar under the occupation of the Coalition Forces (Friesen 2006).

Since 2006, TAVIS has facilitated and participated in at least one major raid every year. With the introduction of PAVIS, these militarized raids are increasingly scaled up and intensified. The major raids include: Jane and Finch (2007); Regent Park (2008); Scarborough (2009, as part of a GTA-wide raid with more than 1,000 officers); Rexdale (2010); Jane and Finch (2011, as part of a regionally and nationally co-ordinated raid with 900 officers involved from Ottawa to Surrey, British Columbia); multiple locations in Toronto (2012); Rexdale (2013), and the southern Ontario-focused Project RX and Project Battery (2014).

The Violent Contradictions of “Anti-violence” Police Intervention

Despite being lauded by the Toronto police, the city’s mayors (Miller and Ford), mainstream media, Toronto Community Housing (TCH), and residents, the spectacular violence of the joint military-style raids of TAVIS Rapid Response Teams and the Guns and Gangs Unit have raised eyebrows and criticisms. In fact, there is no clear evidence that TAVIS has helped mitigate gun violence and gang-related violence in the “priority neighbourhoods.” On the contrary, some community workers, activists, and academics believe that the whole processes of “intelligence-led policing,” raids, and the subsequent detentions and imprisonments have exacerbated evictions,

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98 The yearly raids go back to 2004 (Malvern in 2004; Galloway and Jane-Finch in 2005). As mentioned in Chapter Four, the Malvern raids in 2004 were influential in the sudden increase of gun violence in the postwar suburbs in 2004 and 2005.


100 During this raid, the Toronto police and OPP targeted various locations in Toronto, Peel, York, Durham, Waterloo, Guelph, London, Brantford, and Niagara.

101 Toronto Community Housing is Toronto’s public housing authority.

102 Spectacular raids taking place at dawn, as well as over-policing and the controversial practice of carding in “priority” and other targeted neighbourhoods have increasingly been criticized.

As part of “intelligence-led policing,” TAVIS forces are mandated to “connect” with different partners in targeted neighbourhoods. Landlords and particularly Toronto Community Housing are among these partners (I11 2013, I31 2013, I16 2013). The partnership between Toronto’s public housing authorities and the Toronto Police is not new. Since 1988, Toronto Community Housing and the Toronto Police have had an agreement that lets the police act as an agent of Toronto Community Housing on their properties to enforce Ontario’s Trespass to Property Act (I31 2013). However, neither Toronto Community Housing nor the Toronto Police publicized this agreement until 2013 (I31 2013). The consequence of such opacity was that “a lot of young people in [public housing] communities didn’t understand why they were being questioned when they were on those properties, and that resulted in high volumes of cardings and harassment,” emphasized a youth justice worker (I31 2013).

The (at times violent) practice of stopping, searching, and questioning people (particularly non-White male youth) on Toronto Community Housing’s properties has caused tensions between residents and TAVIS (Winsa and Rankin 2013a). Getting into trouble in these police encounters and being arrested during the raids most often means collective punishment: the criminalization and eviction of the whole family. Community activists have been vocal about the violence of such practices, even though their voices remain unheard:

Besides exposing the violent and brutal tactics used by police, raids are also an example of how landlords and cops work together to oppress our communities. For example, after the 2005 raids on Jamestown (in Rexdale), which arrested around 100, TCH (Toronto Community Housing) evicted the families of many of the youth arrested – before the youth were even put on trial! Many tenants have already been kicked out, while others have (and continue) to fight the notices (Joshi-Vijayan 2008).

Another criticism of TAVIS relates to its use of divide and rule tactics to gather information. As mentioned in the previous chapter, TAVIS officers arrest youth from different neighbourhood and intentionally detain them together in one cell in the hope of getting their followers out to the streets (see Chapter Four). Another police tactic is to systematically exploit tensions among various “ethnic” groups in order to gain information about the racialized figures of the gangster (African

103 Eventually the increasing public criticism of TAVIS resulted in the provincial announcement that the funding for the strategy will not be renewed as usual for 2016; see footnote 85.
104 TAVIS is also in contact with other private landlords and their hired private security forces. See Chapter Seven.
and Caribbean Blacks) in the targeted neighbourhoods (Powell 2010, I16 2013; I31 2013). For this tactic, TAVIS capitalizes on already existing deep-seated and hegemonic forms of racism in Toronto, in particular, anti-Black racism and more recently anti-Muslim racism. They also exploit the vulnerability of non-White working-class families who struggle to make ends meet and desperately hope for a different future for their children. A youth activist against police brutality explained to me:

[TAVIS] community policing is to divide the community, to find people they can work with... new immigrant communities that maybe don’t have as much experience dealing with police harassment, who can then be used against the more problematized sections of the community, whether that be the Jamaican community, or the Somali community, and other segments who may not have their kids as involved in illegal activities... for example, the South Asian community, or the East Asian, like Vietnamese [and] the Filipino community. I think police attempt to exploit them because, let’s say, their children don’t face the same conditions as African children as not as many of them are pushed out of school. Expulsion and suspension rates are definitely lower for these communities and although they’re living in those same buildings, and living with the same poverty, the police, I think, feel that they are better able to relate, or better able to convince these communities into endorsing further police occupation. (I16 2013)

This racialized divide-and-rule has exacerbated antagonisms among various sections of the non-White working-class population. It has intensified and normalized specific forms of racism as well as forms of horizontal violence among the non-White working class youth (see Chapter Four).

Criticism of TAVIS is not limited to community workers and activists. Some current and former politicians have increasingly become vocal against the violence of TAVIS. It is not uncommon to find criticism of TAVIS among policymakers and staff at the City either. Among the ten City staff whom I interviewed, from senior managers and directors to community development and youth development officers, all were critical of and at times very disappointed with TAVIS. For some, TAVIS’s “high visibility” in the “priority neighbourhoods” was the major problem and the cause of tensions between the community and the police (I13 2013). Others see the racist implementation of policing strategies and the lack of proper informing of and democratic engagement with the community as major issues (I13 2013; I18 2013; I26 2013). The contradiction between the violence of the Rapid Response Teams and the “positive” and “friendly”

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105 Among these politicians, the most vocal and popular are Jagmeet Singh, NDP MPP for Bramalea-Gore-Malton (who since his election in 2011 has become a vocal critique of the carding practice), John Swell (the former mayor of Toronto in 1979–1980), and the current co-coordinator of the Toronto Police Accountability Coalition. See Taber (2015) and www.johnsewell.org/.
strategies of the TAVIS Neighbourhood Officers was the most common criticism (I13 2013; I18 2013; I19 2013; I26 2013).

Policymakers at the City argued that this contradiction has had the exact opposite results in the targeted neighbourhoods, producing increasing fear among residents and a pervasive dislike and hatred of the police among non-White youth (I13 2013; I18 2013; I19 2013; I26 2013; I15 2014). This contradiction in turn has blocked any attempt to have any meaningful partnership with “the community,” implement bottom-up community-based policing, and build social cohesion (I26 2013; I19 2013; I18 2013). A City staff person working with “at-risk” youth shared his frustration about TAVIS and how the strategy has, in practice, added to violence in the neighbourhoods:

[What] is challenging… is [that] half of the TAVIS division is the Neighbourhood Initiative Officers (the ones who are on the bikes). They are smiling. They are happy; they are doing their thing…. The other half is the crash team [the Rapid Response Team]. Those are the guys who come with 18 black[-dressed] men, dark thing on their faces, and grate through the doors. They put handcuffs on the moms. They throw kids in handcuffs. They tear apart the house for drugs and then they leave. And unfortunately for the guys who are doing the good [police] work, they get to face the aftermath of what happens after these guys go into a neighbourhood [for raids]. So you have, on the one hand, a neighbourhood [which] lacks trust…. They don’t believe the city has their best interest. Then these guys [TAVIS] come in and prove them right, and then we expect them [people in the neighbourhood] to kind of play along when something like a shooting happens…. A shooting happens. I want to tell them [the police] that it happened. But those are the same guys who broke into my house and tore down my grandma, or tore down my neighbour’s grandma and handcuffed her. You want me to go and talk to them? No way. So now, you have the criminals, the real criminals in the neighbourhoods who know these guys will never talk because we all don’t trust you [the police]. So there is this kind of divide and conquer mentality that comes from this unbalance of policies around, on the one hand, we gonna be nice to them, and on the other hand, we gonna punch them in the mouth. (I13 2013)

“Carding” is another controversial aspect of TAVIS policing. “Carding” is a reference to an increasingly common practice of police officers who upon stopping a person, fill out “contact cards” to record personal information for intelligence purposes.106 Since the early 2000s, many community activists and residents have been voicing their concerns about the systemic racism embedded in carding and police stops that greatly increased after the rolling out of TAVIS in

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106 Toronto police document people on forms called Field Information Reports, which include personal details including skin colour, the reason for the interaction, location, and names of others – or “associates” who were involved in the stop. Most of these stops involve no arrest or charge, and are said to be for reasons such as “general investigation” related to traffic stops or loitering. Other reasons include bail compliance checks and trespassing (see Rankin and Winsa 2012a).
In 2008, after an Ontario court ruling on the case of a Black man, Fitzroy Osbourne, who refused to stop and talk to TAVIS officers, Chief Blair (2007) openly admitted his force has a problem with racial profiling. Blair, however, saw racism in the Toronto Police Service as a problem of individual “bias.”

It was not until the Toronto Star – following a hotly contested freedom-of-information request – obtained information of over 1.7 million civilian contact cards filled out by the Toronto Police officers between 2003 and 2008, that the racial dimension of the police carding practices was publicly criticized as more than the problem of few bad apples, confirming earlier studies (see Tator and Henry 2006; Smith 2007). In February 2010, the Toronto Star published a special series, Race Matters, based on obtained police data, arguing that “male black aged 15-24 are stopped and documented 2.5 times more than white males the same age” (Rankin 2010). In 2012, the Toronto Star updated its data analysis and published another series, Known to Police, with fresh data of 1.25 million contact cards (involving 788,000 individuals) from 2008 to mid-2011 (Rankin 2012a). The updated analysis confirmed the earlier one in highlighting the fact that “Toronto police stop and document black and brown people far more than whites” (Rankin and Winsa 2012a, 2013).

The argument was also backed up by influential academics, particularly by criminologist Scot Wortley at the University of Toronto (also see Tator and Henry 2006). Wortley and his students argue that the non-White population in Canada “suffer from racial profiling as well as from relatively harsh treatment with respect to arrest decisions, police use of force, pre-trial decision making and sentencing” (Wortley and Owusu-Bempah 2012:24). Blacks, they argue, are

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107 The Ontario Human Rights Commission (2003) gathered detailed testimonials from over 800 people in Ontario – most of them Black – who felt that they had been victims of racial profiling (Wortley and Owusu-Bempah 2012:16).
108 On Chief Blair’s position, see the Toronto Star’s interview “The chief on race, crime and policing” (Toronto Star 2010). Then Police Chief Blair’s reaction was very different from the former Police Chief Fantino in 2003, who countered allegation of racism in the Toronto police force with a 337-page testimony (see Toronto Police Service 2003) to the force’s “proud tradition” of race relations.
109 The racialized dimension of policing is not limited to Black people or other non-White populations; Indigenous peoples are also one of the major targets of racial policing in Toronto and Canada. See Razack (2011) and Comak (2012).
112 Toronto Star kept on updating its contact cards data. The paper undated its Race Matters series in 2013, this time with information about how many cardings an individual TAVIS officer would do. One high-rank TAVIS officer, for example, received credits on 6,600 contact cards from 2008 to 2012; this was the second highest count of all officers (Rankin and Winsa 2013).
over three times more likely to experience multiple police stops than Whites or Asians and are three times more likely to report being searched during these police encounters (Wortley and Owusu-Bempah 2011). They concurred with Carl James (1998: 173) that the adversarial nature of these police stops contributes strongly to Black youth’s hostility towards the police (Wortley and Owusu-Bempah 2012:15).

The Toronto Star’s investigations publicized the contradictions of Chief Blair’s policing strategy to fight violence and pushed the Toronto Police Services Board to call for an independent review of police contacts with citizens (Rankin and Winsa 2012b). The Toronto Star and academic arguments on the contradictions of TAVIS gained additional public attention when a few young Black male activists stepped forward and publicized their own experiences with police. In 2013, Kina Singh, a 39-year-old law student and activist, and his friend shared with the Toronto Star the results of their freedom-of-information request for contact card data (Toronto Star 2013). On the same day, then Toronto Police Services Board chair Alok Mukherjee stated, “TAVIS [has] lost its way in terms of the community components” and warned, “TAVIS ultimately becomes simply synonymous with an enforcement piece. And that’s when it becomes, in my mind, counterproductive” (quoted in Winsa and Rankin 2013b). A couple of days later, the Toronto Star (2013) published an editorial call for a “reform [of the] ‘carding’ system that targets minorities.” These public criticisms of police carding as racial profiling pushed other mainstream media to pick up the issue. The peak of this media attention was the May 2015 edition of Toronto Life. The trendy bourgeois-inspired magazine allocated its cover to Desmond Cole, a Toronto Star columnist, who has been one of the most vocal critics of carding and featured a long article by Cole (2015) entitled “The skin I’m in.”

City staff and community workers I talked to had similar concerns about TAVIS. In their views, TAVIS has been ineffective in building “social cohesion” in the “priority neighbourhoods.” As discussed earlier, for many involved with place-based policy in Toronto the major problem in these poor neighbourhoods is disconnection from mainstream economy and society in general. The alienating experience of marginality, so the argument goes, has resulted in a growing number of youth disassociating themselves from Canadian society and the Canadian state and taking their lives into their own hands. In this argument, gang formation is one consequence of this

113 Although never arrested, Toronto police had 50 pages of data on Kina Singh (only some of which was related to traffic stops).

114 In early 2014, a group of lawyers and activists (including Kina Singh) moved ahead with a human rights compliance and accused the Toronto police practice of carding as racially discriminatory (Winsa 2014).
disconnectedness (and its quasi-sense of autonomy) (I13 2013; I26 2013; I1 2014). The critics believe that the naked violence of TAVIS adds to the alienation of non-White youth and their distance from Canadian society. Indeed, the violent police raids and the practice of carding have ultimately changed the neighbourhood opinion in that they [the non-White youth] no longer [consider themselves] Canadian, no longer Torontonian, no longer part of the society that they live in and as a result they create their own subcultures, which in a lot of ways follow that of gang-USA kind of ghetto mentality of Us against Them. [That mentality includes:] we have to create our own trade system, our own economic system, our own way of defending ourselves. And a code that says, if I get hurt or someone victimizes me, I can’t go to the police because those are the people who were beating me up the last 6 weeks. I need to get it done and do it myself, which is where the violence begins to kind of stem from. So you have racist policies or policies that were not necessarily racist in intent but in delivery. Racial profiling is of that nature, which led to people being kind of segregated and separated apart, which led to youth being able to be kind of into this system of violence, sex and drugs, and then not being able to return. (I13 2013)

In this argument, gangs are not a problem of urban violence per se. They are also a problem of nation building, which is where the question of social cohesion comes in. The “ghetto mentality of Us against Them” is not simply about (“them”) the police, but rather more importantly (“them”) the state via the police. These critics are neither opposed to state spatial strategies targeting concentrated non-White poverty nor community-based policing. Rather, their opposition is to naked violence and its unwanted consequences:

There is community policing as a theory and there is community policing as practice. And I think community policing is an important way for the community to establish a relationship with the police service and for the police service to establish a relationship with the community. When I say a relationship, I don’t mean just knowing the local officers but understanding the system, the services that exist within the police service as a whole. I think it’s a very important relationship that for many reasons gets tainted and twisted in all sorts of ways. It’s just that the Toronto police are another service provider that is in the neighbourhood. They have a role that potentially could be enforcement. We have to look at how the community accesses that service, to understand how it works and how it navigates and how it responds in some situations. I think community policing is just building that relationship. I also think that it’s not an isolated service. So if we talk about community policing, versus just policing, it’s about [the question of] how is police service embedded into place-based strategies. (I26 2013)

The Toronto police are well aware of these critiques, although they doubt their validity. In my interview with two high-rank TAVIS officers, they stated that they did not believe there is any contradiction between the functions of the Rapid Response Team and the TAVIS neighbourhood
officers. These two “arms” of TAVIS are complementary in their view.\textsuperscript{115} The real problem, they argued, lies in the gap between community \textit{perceptions} of police work and police work in reality. The pervasive hostility towards the police in “priority neighbourhoods,” in their view, was mainly based on “media representation,” the “emotional reaction of the community,” and “people’s ignorance” of what policing is about. Policing, for these officers, is about “protecting life and property,” and that is exactly what TAVIS forces are doing through their raids and neighbourhood relations.

These two TAVIS officers also denied any systemic racial profiling. Similar to former Police Chief Blair, they acknowledged incidents of racism as the result of individual bias, but forcefully emphasized that there is no racism in the police system. In their view racial profiling by the police is not the result of systemic racism, but rather of management inefficiency. In response to my question about the police data on carding obtained by the \textit{Toronto Star}, TAVIS officers argued that what appears as over-policing and racial profiling has to do “with our service delivery” and management. It is the result of the lack of efficiency in “service delivery,” which, so the argument goes, could be solved by better coordinating various police officers assigned to patrol the same neighbourhood.

\textbf{Preventing the “Paris Problem” in Toronto: Community Policing in the “Intervention Zone”}

Critics of TAVIS have focused on the naked and spectacular violence of policing. This is understandable partly due to the intensification of militarized policing and security initiatives in Toronto\textsuperscript{116} and partly due to the extremely tough task of criticizing the police (Sewell 1985, 2010; I1 2014, I15 2014, I18 2013).\textsuperscript{117} There is, of course, an urgent need to stop or at least mitigate the violence that non-White youth living in working-class neighbourhoods have been subjected to on an everyday basis. Nonetheless, the one-sided emphasis on the coercive force of TAVIS has provided a limited understanding of current policing strategies and the politics of state-led urban

\textsuperscript{115} TAVIS officers also argued that TAVIS does not perform the raids and as such the force should not be blamed for the raids. The Guns and Gangs Unit performs the raids and the only reason people think TAVIS forces are involved in the raids is that after the raids the arrested suspects are taken away in TAVIS cars. Yet in my interviews, every single City staff member and community worker as well as a major community-policing consultant of the OPP and TPS all emphasized TAVIS’ participation in raids (I3 2014, I13 2013, I18 2013, I19 2013, I26 2013, I31 2013).

\textsuperscript{116} Policing at the G20 Summit attracted much attention as a prime example of militarized policing.

\textsuperscript{117} Criticizing police in Toronto has been a risky business even for members of the Toronto Police Services Board. See \textit{Hogtown: The Politics of Policing} documentary by Min Sook Lee (2005) on the 2004 Toronto police budget debates.
intervention in Toronto (and Canada). In the rest of this chapter, my goal is to examine the productive dimension of community policing in Toronto’s “immigrant neighbourhoods” in order to prevent the “Paris problem.” The emphasis of the productive dimension of community policing is on prevention, social development, and moderating the violence of targeted policing.

The rolling out of TAVIS also reignited discussions about and experimentations with the idea of embedding community policing in social development strategies (see Russell and Norman 2014). Since the 1980s, community policing has been the dominant definition of “progressive” policing in North America (Murphy 1988; Leighton 1991; Ungerleider and McGregor 1991). In the 1980s and 1990s, in Toronto (and Canada), police justified the turn to community policing as a strategy to “rebuild” and “strengthen” the relations between the police and the community (Ungerleider and McGregor 1991; Leighton 1991). Today, the goals of community policing are framed through notions of prevention, resiliency, and intelligence (Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police [CACP] 2003; Russell and Taylor 2014).

In this regard, Mayor David Miller’s emphasis on prevention and social development in the 2004 Community Safety Plan and the 2005 Priority Neighbourhoods strategy (see Chapters Four and Six) built on policing strategies in Toronto and Canada. Already in 2003, the Crime Prevention Committee (CPC) of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (2003) underscored the need for a shift towards social development in police prevention strategies. The association argued that the shift to social development-based prevention with its core emphasis on “community” has the benefit of combating “complex social, economic and cultural factors that contribute to crime” and of connecting “criminal justice practices with community-based initiatives” (Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police 2003:11).

The shift to social development-based community policing to prevent the “Paris problem” in Toronto has formed in relation to the broader imperialist strategies of security, including those used in the “war on terror” and in other countries. This shift should be understood in relation to international trends in process of formation at that time (for example in the WHO, the World Bank,

118 With the rolling out of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy in 2005, the City also opened a Community Crisis Response Unit (CCRU) (with three staff members). The Unit works across Toronto and responds primarily to shootings, stabbings, assaults, and gun activities. It has three pillars: prevention; preparation; and intervention. The prevention pillar is about education (working with residents and parents, looking at potentials risk factors for the youth, and communicating those with the residents). The preparation pillar concerns developing safety committees and networks across the city, which has developed a community crisis response protocol in various neighbourhoods (a plan that gets activated when a violent incident occurs to ensure that there is effective communication). City staff members implement the intervention pillar in the aftermath of the violent incidents (I26 2013).
the United Nations, the Coalition Forces) on the one hand and on the other in relation to the earlier critiques of community policing in Toronto.\textsuperscript{119} The past decade witnessed increasing policy mobilities between police and military forces at various scales (Bachmann, Bell and Holmqvist 2015). With the return to the fore of pacification (counterinsurgency) in the imperialist “war on terror,” the question of what form of policing is best in terms of “internal enemies” has gained a new urgency in Western countries, including Canada. In 2008, following the recommendation of the Canadian High Commission in London, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police conducted and published a discussion paper, *Building Community Resilience to Violent Ideologies* (Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police 2008). The paper focused on Prevent, the (in)famous policing component of the United Kingdom’s counterterrorism strategy called CONTEST.\textsuperscript{120} The report examined the suitability of the Prevent strategy for policing practices in Canada’s metropolitan centres.

*Building Community Resilience* highlighted the “key lessons” of the United Kingdom’s Prevent strategy for Canada. Among such lessons was “the importance of a coherent whole-of-government approach that is highly centralized at the policy level, and highly flexible at the implementation level” (Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police 2008:9).\textsuperscript{121} A whole-of-government approach to community policing, the report explained, “must also involve health authorities, school boards, social and community services, faith-and ethnic-based groups and non-governmental organizations” (Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police 2008:9). In fact, “non-police, non-security partners play a significant role” in prevention-focused community policing strategies (Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police 2008:12). The report also emphasized the neighbourhood scale as crucial to the success of the Prevent strategy. At the end, the report...

\textsuperscript{119} For example, the critiques of the Committee to Stop Targeted Policing in 2000(2000) is a good example. Among their recommendations to the Toronto police was a social development approach to crime and policing.

\textsuperscript{120} Since the July 2005 attacks in London, the Metropolitan Police have increasingly utilized the logic of the United Kingdom’s counterterrorism strategy known as CONTEST. CONTEST has four pillars: prevent; pursue; protect; and prepare. It is the PREVENT pillar of the strategy that has become the foundation of community-based policy and counter-radicalization strategies in “troubled (majority Muslim) neighbourhoods” of London, Birmingham, and other British metropolitan centres. For more discussion and a critique of the Prevent strategy, see Kundnani (2009).

\textsuperscript{121} The Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police report goes on to discuss United Kingdom’s police initiatives such as “Neighbourhood Policing approach” (facilitated by the 2002 Police Reform Act) that in practice works out of neighbourhood premises rather than police stations, mobilizing a mix of sworn police officers and Police Community Safety Officers (PCSOs) who are recruited from the local population (CACP 2008:9–10). At the core of the United Kingdom’s Neighbourhood Policing Strategy are Safe Neighbourhood Teams (SNTs) that have limited power, but provide reassuring uniformed presence in the neighbourhoods (Institute for Strategic International Studies 2008:10).
recommended the adaptation of the Prevent strategy for the Canadian context and only briefly mentioned that the Prevent strategy’s focus on “a specific ethno-cultural community [i.e., Arabs and Muslims] is at odds with Canada’s long-standing approach to multiculturalism and community engagement” (Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police 2008:4).

An important part of the concept of prevention is about police engagement in social development. The emphasis on a whole-of-government approach is part of this attempt to embed policing in social policy. There is, however, more to the whole-of-government approach. The popularity of this approach in domestic policing strategies is in relation to its prominence in imperial military strategies of the twenty-first century and in particular in the Coalition Forces’ counterinsurgency strategies in the “war on terror.” Already in 2006, the Canadian government advocated the usefulness of a whole-of-government approach in the war in Afghanistan (Canada 2006; Bell 2011a). By 2008, the whole-of-government approach formed an important pillar of Canada’s counterinsurgency strategy (Canada 2008; Bell 2011a) – itself an adaptation of the counterinsurgency strategies of the United Kingdom and United States (Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom 2007; United States Army and Marine Corps 2006).122 Canadian police forces, including the Toronto Police Service, have been active participants in Canada’s “war on terror” in Afghanistan (Badge 2009:1), thus the Toronto Police has been familiar with the whole-of-government framework in counterinsurgency before bringing them back “home” for policing strategies.123

In 2009, the Institute for Strategic International Studies (ISIS), the research institute of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (and recently renamed Executive Global Studies) devoted its annual research report, The Intervention Zone, to youth violence, community policing and prevention (Institute for Strategic International Studies 2009).124 The “Paris problem” and the figure

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122 For a critical discussion of Canada’s whole-of-government approach in Afghanistan, see Bell (2011a).
123 Over the last two decades, Canada’s police forces (including the Toronto Police Service) were active in over 50 countries. In 2009, for example, the Toronto Police Service announced that ten police officers would leave for Kandahar, Afghanistan to train the Afghan police. It estimated that within the next five years (until 2014) another 500 police officers would be deployed. These officers would get about six weeks of military training before their deployment. For more information, see Badge (2009).
124 Initially known as the Institute for Strategic International Studies (ISIS), the Institute was conceived in 2001 in the wake of the “war on terror.” It was owned and operated by the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police. Every year, police services from across Canada nominate a mid-level or senior officer to spend a year going around the world and studying what other services are doing to deal issues that police forces also face in Canada (I12 2013). The goal is to “introduce new competencies and global perspective to Canada’s current and future leaders in policing and related public safety agencies, while enhancing the collective and individual capacities of the organizations that comprise the Canadian criminal justice community” (About Us, cacglobal.ca). To date, 130 police leaders representing 26 agencies have conducted global policing
of “the immigrant” (youth) as its potential agent – and thus a potential security threat to Canada – is central to *The Intervention Zone*. The report starts from the premise that for a country like Canada, which relies on immigration, domestic politics is always connected to international politics. Policing in Canada thus requires, we are told, a new approach before youth violence gets out of hand and turns into a threat to the state:

Canada is part of a world system and as such, what happens elsewhere can and often will happen here…. Canada is a country that relies on immigration as a means to thrive, and new immigrants bring their experience, history, and culture…. but they can sometimes bring younger new Canadians into conflict with Canadian values and social norms…. [A] new approach must be embraced to address emerging trends in youth violence, and that Canada must act before the country is faced with a youth violence problem that is insurmountable…. If Canada reaches the point where enforcement is seen as the only option in response to youth violence, as is now the case in some countries studied, police here risk eroding years of community policing efforts and making the re-establishment of important relationship a significant challenge for the future. (Institute for Strategic International Studies 2009:5–6)

In its search for best policing practices to prevent “immigrant youth violence,” the report looked at the successes and failures of community policing strategies across the world from Latin America (Chile, Colombia) to Africa (Egypt, South Africa), continental Europe (France, The Netherlands) and the United Kingdom. Once again, the British Prevent strategy was highlighted as one of the best practices. One can detect the echoes of the “Paris problem” in the way the report cautions about the case of France: “With regard to demographic and social change,” stated Debra Frazer, the director general of the Ottawa Police Service, “we are France – that’s us (Canada) in a few years – and this could be a disturbing picture of our own future if we don’t take this opportunity to act now” (quoted in ISIS 2009:10). For too long, Canada has been “a reactive country,” according to Mike McDonell, RCMP-GRC assistant commissioner (quoted in ISIS 2009:6). Canada needs, he continued, “to change the policing and governance cultures towards preventative measures and earlier interventions” (Institute for Strategic International Studies 2009:6).

The implicit reference to the “Paris problem” through the explicit emphasis on “immigrant youth” and their potential “violence” in these reports speak to the explicit and implicit political fear of unrest caused by non-White youth. The report’s proposed solution to the “Paris problem” and the perceived threats of “immigrant youth” is a new vision for social-development-based research in 29 nation-states around the world. Given the similarities between the acronym for the Institute (ISIS) and the English acronym of Daesh (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS), in 2015 the Institute changed its name to Executive Global Studies Program. For more information, see http://cacpglobal.ca.
community policing: the “intervention zone.” The “intervention zone,” we are told, is “a reconceived field of engagement where police can work with other social system actors in a new service delivery model” (Institute for Strategic International Studies 2009:13–14). However police, the report emphasized, “need to actively minimize their involvement in strictly social development issues except for contributing to key areas as identified by police” (Institute for Strategic International Studies 2009:16, emphasis in the original). This is imperative to the new vision of social development-based community policing, not least because:

both domestic research and global studies tend to reinforce that when police interfere too much in the social development zone, they risk being labelled as an extension of the repressive state, and might even increase perceptions of marginalization among some citizens, which in turn can raise the risk of anti-state motivations for youth. Such unwelcome interference can also lead to public charges of racially biased policing or over-policing. (Institute for Strategic International Studies 2009:13)

The concept of social development-based community policing is not limited to policy discussions of the national level of police forces in Canada. In 2010, the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police (OACP) unveiled Ontario’s New Community Policing Model. The new model, framed as “mobilization and engagement model of community policing,” has four (coloured) components: “enforcement and crime suppression” (in red); “community engagement and liaison” (in green); “community mobilization and crime prevention” (in orange); and “community safety and consultations” (in blue) (Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police 2010:24). An emphasis on “crime prevention through social development” is highlighted as one of the main drivers for such change toward a “new model” (Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police 2010:5). Inspired by the ideas of Robert Peel, in particular his famous dictum that “the police are the people and the people are the police” (I12 2013), the new model of community policing, we are told, differs from the previous one in that “past models depicted community policing as a philosophy for the way officers do policing. This model emphasizes roles, responsibilities and philosophies for non-police community members as well.”

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125 Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police had already started its focus on social-development community policing since 2006. See Russell and Taylor (2014).
126 Quoted from the Ontario Provincial Police pamphlet on community policing.
Prevention and Intervention in Toronto’s “Immigrant Neighbourhoods”

Have these internationally mobile policy discussions at the highest levels of policing in Canada and Ontario affected policing strategies in Toronto? They have. The coercive enforcement strategies that were rolled out in the aftermath of the “year of the gun” in 2005 were accompanied by preventive policing strategies that gradually shifted their focus more systematically towards social development.

Parallel to TAVIS in 2006, the Toronto Police also kick started a three-year social development pilot project in “priority neighbourhoods:” Youth in Policing Initiative (2006–2009). The goal of the initiative was to “improve the relationship between the police service and the community, build relationship and decrease gang recruitment” (Public Safety Canada 2013a). The initiative started as a summer employment program for youth (14 to 17 years old). Since 2009, it has become a permanent strategy with secured funding from the Ontario Ministry of Children and Youth Services. In 2012, the initiative turned into an all-year-round program by adding the Youth in Policing Initiative Afterschool program, which focuses on youth between the ages of 15 and 18 years who resides in “priority neighbourhoods” (Toronto Police Services 2013b).

In 2007, Jordan Manners, a 15-year-old student, was shot dead in his high school in Jane and Finch neighbourhood. In early 2008, then Police Chief Blair approached the Toronto District School Board (TDSB) and the Toronto Catholic District School Board (TCDSB) to implement a new school-based policing project as part of the overarching TAVIS strategy called School Resource Officer. The McGuinty provincial government allocated a one-year grant of $2.1 million to place up to 30 officers in Toronto schools. The police argued that the school environment is “an excellent opportunity for positive police interaction with young people outside of traditional enforcement activities” (Toronto Police Services 2011:5).

Today the program has become permanent and has been extended to 45 schools in “priority neighbourhoods.” The overall goals of School Resource Officer program are to: “improve safety and perception of safety in and around schools,” “improve perceptions of police,” “improve the relationship between students and police” (Toronto Police Services 2011:6). The officers are mandated to bridge the gap between the police and youth by building “trust” among students (Pugash quoted in Benitah 2009). They “have set up after-school homework programs,

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127 Youth in Policing had a funding amount of $685,000 in the first year, continuing with $585,000 in the subsequent years (Public Safety Canada 2013a).
128 For a list of schools with Resource Officers, see www.torontopolice.on.ca/d31/sro_assignments.php.
have started coaching school sport teams... they've become real mentors,” according to Mark Pugash, spokesperson for Toronto police (Benitah 2009).\(^{129}\)

TAVIS also mobilized popular culture and art in an attempt to connect with youth in “priority neighbourhoods” and to enhance the public image of the police. In July 2009, TAVIS partnered with Mixed Company Theatre to create theatre for social change with the participation of youth affected by gang violence.\(^{130}\) The Toronto Police Services Board gave Mixed Company Theatre a $30,000 grant to create *DISS*, a hip-hop based play (Leong 2010). Written by award-winning playwright Rex Deverell, *DISS* used “hip-hop, choreography and theatre to draw a voice out of [gang-affected youth]” according to Duncan McCallum, the play’s director (Badge 2009:8). Incorporating a mixture of ethnically diverse professional actors and community performers with previous gang experience, *DISS* was toured in schools across the “priority neighbourhoods” from 2009 to 2011.\(^{131}\)

Using hip-hop as an intervention-prevention tool to deal with “at-risk” or “high-risk” youth is not a creative strategy limited to the Toronto Police Services. In fact, the police force may have received the idea from strategies in the United States, United Kingdom, and France, where “hip-hop is being enlisted in a broad ideological offensive to counter domestic terrorism” (Aidi 2014:206). In *Rebel Music*, Hisham Aidi (2014) has analyzed in detail the ways in which the United States government has mobilized a “hip-hop diplomacy” domestically and internationally since the 2005 youth uprising in the French *banlieues*. When in 2007 the Home Office introduced Prevent in the United Kingdom, it made sure that hip-hop figured prominently in the policing strategy (Aidi 2014:221–58). Hip-hop intervention, Aidi (2014) suggests, should be seen as a kinder, gentler corollary of the United States’ pacification initiatives in Iraq, Somali, and Afghanistan; one that is directed at the peripheralized spaces of the imperial metropoles.

The criminalization of gangs facilitated the involvement of Public Safety Canada in prevention strategies in Toronto’s “immigrant neighbourhoods.” In September 2008, Public Safety Canada provided the City of Toronto with a five-year contribution of $4 to $5 million per year to

\(^{129}\) The program came under harsh criticism by the fall of 2009. The Neighbourhood Organized Coalition Opposed to Police in Schools (NO COPS) – a coalition of concerned parents, students, teachers, and community members who were monitoring the SRO program since its implementation in September 2007. The coalition publicly criticized the ineffectiveness of the program and Toronto police evaluation of it and the decision to make it permanent (see No Cops 2009; Benita 2009).

\(^{130}\) Founded as an artist-run collective in 1983, Mixed Company Theatre claims to use Forum Theatre and interactive arts to educate, engage, and empower audiences in schools, communities and workplace.

\(^{131}\) Besides the Toronto Police Service, other sponsors included Ontario Trillium Foundations, Ontario Arts Council, Toronto Arts Council, CIBC Bank, and the Catherine and Maxwell Meighen Foundation.
kick off a new youth gang prevention research project focusing on the three targeted
neighbourhoods of Jane and Finch, Weston-Mount Dennis, and Rexdale. In December 2009,
the City rolled out its Prevention Intervention Toronto (PIT) program. The program continued until
March 2013. As one of the main managers of the project at the City explained:

The program started with the Crisis Response team and two of the Community
Development Officers at the time [in 2009], realizing that we had a challenge with
gangs in the neighbourhoods.... There were lots of goals [for PIT]. But overall, the
goal for the program was NOT to actually save young people. It was to figure out
what the City of Toronto could do for that type of youth... What we needed to
figure out was what strategies should we develop to work with the youth furthest
away from opportunities, furthest away from the labour market, furthest away from
jobs, furthest away from economic opportunities. How would we work with those
young people? Who are they? What kind of things they need? And how to work
with them? So in that conversation PIT was born. (I13 2013, emphasis added)

The Prevention Intervention Toronto program was an intensive targeted and integrated case
management approach to “at-risk” and “high-risk” youth. The program targeted those kids who
were “at risk of ending up in violence that would end up at jail” (I13 2013). These youth were
targeted through schools and community centers, in malls, on the streets and buses, or they were
referred to the program by other youth (I13 2013).131 Part of the rationale behind the program was
that coercive enforcement is not effective on its own. Without preventive social development
strategies implemented by non-police agencies, police enforcement would only further alienate
the youths. TAVIS officers were not part of the program; they only co-operate with it if needed.
This was due to the fact that although police “are very good at suppression, they are not so good at
prevention: because most of the guys they are intervening [with] already hate the cops” (I13 2013).

It should be emphasized that youth with immigrant status are not the main target of the
program. In fact, second and third generations Black youth (Jamaican and African) composed the
clear majority of the youth targeted by the Prevention Intervention Toronto program. According to
a City staff, most of these youth did not consider themselves “Canadian” (I13 2013). As mentioned
earlier, this lack of national belonging is perceived as one of the reasons that gangs are attractive
and is said to be the result of systematic marginalization. One of the aims of the program was to
experience how to undo these forms of identification and ways of thinking through intensive

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132 The funding came through the National Crime Prevention Centre’s Youth Gang Funding. In May 2012 the
City asked Public Safety Canada for an extension to funding; the funding was extended until March 31, 2013.
131 Throughout its five-year existence, 312 youth, aged 13 to 24 years (72% male and 28% female) attended
the program. A caseworker would work with individual youth for a period of 36 weeks.
management intervention. The same City staff – himself a non-White person – explained his understanding of the situation:

[For] every kid that came to the program we did a pre- and post-survey with them. We asked them: Where are you from? And they all said, Jamaica, Africa.... Number one place was the Caribbean, and two was actually the Middle East, and three was West and East Africa. So, when we changed the question to where were you born? 100% were Canadian.... The problem with the link between the gang problem in Canada and Canadian youth in Toronto is that their parents were never settled... as the result of horrible immigration policy.... People are told to come to Canada... and then there is no support when they get here, no jobs. [They] ended up driving taxis, or did whatever they could to survive. Their kids were the ones who were born here and as the result of unsettled policies, poor settlement policies, and again that kind of displacement around justice program, education programs, their kids are committing crimes.... So there was a really important lesson for us to learn that these kids who are newcomers to Canada are doing way better than their Canadian-born counterparts. Because, they have, if you wanna call it, back home, educational standards in their heads that education is good for you. Whereas in Toronto or Canada, many of the kids have seen that [education] doesn’t make a difference. Dad has three degrees, he came from Jamaica and he can’t find a job. Why should I get three degrees? Stupid.... And then they go to school and they get treated and marginalized and the racism that starts there. Then they leave school and police are giving them a hard time.... They don’t recognize themselves as Canadian. They are not Canadian in their heads. They are from wherever they parents are from. Even though they have absolutely no idea of where they parents are from. They... have no understanding of being Canadian. So actually [they] don’t have a culture. So then the culture becomes BET [Black Entertainment Television], or MTV, or Much Music.... And what do those things preach? Primarily sex, violence and drugs use.... This is why nowadays you see that the guys getting killed and the killers are 15 years old, because they had 15 years of nothing but forced television, racism and now super high access to guns and this kind of I’m-not-Canadian, I-gotta-be-a-tough-guy mentality for the last little while. (I13 2013)\(^{134}\)

As mentioned earlier, the policy shift towards prevention has resulted in policy mobilities at various scales and experimentation with different strategies of police intervention. In May 2012, a number of delegates from Toronto went to Prince Albert, Saskatchewan to examine the usefulness of a new community policing strategy for dealing with crime and violence in Toronto. The delegation was made up of members of the Toronto Police Service, the City of Toronto (Crisis Response Unit), United Way, and Albion Neighbourhood Services (a community centre located in Rexdale). The new strategy, Prince Albert Community Mobilization Initiative (or the Hub Model),

\(^{134}\) Michelle Alexander (2011:169–72) has similar discussions on the situation of Blacks and their increasing incarceration in the United States.
The Hub Model is “an evidence-based collaborative problem solving approach that draws on the combined expertise of relevant community agencies to address complex human and social problems before they become policing problems” (Murphy 2014). The rationale of the model is a shift from “incident-driven” policing to “risk-driven” policing with an early multidisciplinary, multi-sector preventive intervention strategy (McFee and Taylor 2014; 112). In this rationale, risk (i.e., crime, violence) is conceived as predictable and thus preventable through early intervention (McFee and Taylor 2014). Here prevention works through engaging and empowering the agencies of those “at risk” of crime or victimization. According to the Toronto Police delegate, Sgt. Greg Watts:

The most attractive thing is that it [the Hub Model] talks about a multi-disciplinary approach to community safety. And I think that’s what grabs most people, because at the end of the day we have a lot of places and a lot of agencies (Toronto police, city services and community-based organizations) that are out there on a daily basis doing really good work. But, can we imagine what we could accomplish if we started working together on those things?” (quoted in Haggen 2012)

The Toronto Police were not alone in finding McFee’s signature project attractive. In less than five years, the Hub Model attracted “city delegations from across Canada and the US, from front line practitioners to a Parliamentary Committee and the Governor General of Canada” (McFee and Taylor 2014:13). The Conservative premier of Saskatchewan, Brad Wall, was so supportive of the model that within a year of its implementation, McFee retired from the Prince Albert police force to become Saskatchewan’s deputy minister of Corrections and Policing in 2012. In 2015, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) used the example of the Hub Model as a successful preventive policing strategy for Canadian urban centres (FCM 2015:9).

By the fall of 2012, the Toronto Police Services, the City of Toronto and United Way designed a new prevention intervention project called Furthering Our Communities, Uniting Services, or FOCUS. In January 2013, the City started FOCUS as a pilot project in Rexdale with the aim of reducing crime and improving resiliency in that neighbourhood (I26 2013). Partnership is a fundamental component of FOCUS. The project has three co-coordinators – representing the three

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135 Toronto Police delegate, Sgt. Greg Watts, heard about the Hub Model in the 2011 Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police conference, where McFee presented the strategy (Haggen 2012).
main forces behind the strategy: Greg Watts (Toronto police), Jamie Robinson (United Way), and Scott McKean (City of Toronto). For the city and the Toronto Police, FOCUS is an attempt to experience with a “multi-stakeholder intervention” in crime reduction through prevention (I26 2013; I11 2013). The project brings together existing community agencies to provide a targeted, integrated approach to supporting individuals, children, youth, and families who are targeted by one or few agencies as “at-risk” (I26 2013).

According to the Toronto Police, FOCUS “is not a police project” in its conventional sense (I11 2013). As McFee put it back in 2012, “[a] lot of people might think that the police are more about being hard on crime and different agencies and social services could potentially be perceived as soft on crime and this approach is just a smart on community safety approach” (quoted in Haggen 2012). By the end of June 2016, the City had announced that in partnership with the provincial government and Public Safety FOCUS would be extended across Toronto. Introducing the city-wide initiative, Ralph Goodale, the Liberal Minister of Public Safety, stated:

The Government of Canada is anxious to work with provincial, municipal and community-based partners to build stronger, safer communities. We all need to get beyond jurisdictional stovepipes to ensure seamless collaboration, and we need holistic approaches to focus proactively on crime prevention. Federal initiatives are in place to combat gangs, interdict illegal weapon and boost community safety. We will build on these, while also investing in more resilient neighbourhoods through better housing and transit, better access to learning and skills, and better job opportunities for young people. (quoted in City of Toronto 2016)

This “smart” preventive policing strategy started with targeting one of the most targeted “priority neighbourhoods” in Toronto and later extended targeting to other “troubled neighbourhoods” is the outcome of policy mobilities across time, geography, and scale. The genealogy of the multi-stakeholder community mobilization in crime prevention policing goes back to the Boston of the late 1990s and the work of criminologist David Kennedy in combating gang violence in that city (I11 2013, I12 2013). Kennedy, then a researcher at Harvard University, designed “Operation Ceasefire” to deal with Boston’s gang problem in 1995 and soon became a

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136 While TAVIS as a force was not involved with FOCUS, Greg Watts, who was the lead person in initiating the Prince Albert visit and FOCUS, was a member of TAVIS at the time.
celebrity crime prevention expert nationwide. At the heart of “Operation Ceasefire” (also known as the “Boston Miracle”) is the principle of inter-agency cooperation by engaging gangs and reallocating existing criminal justice, social service, and community resources in targeted neighbourhoods.

A decade later in Scotland, Karyn McCluskey and John Carnochan at the Strathclyde Police picked up Kennedy’s work. In 2005, McCluskey (a trained nurse and police intelligence analyst) and Carnochan (a police detective with three decades of experience in homicide, drugs, and organized crime) initiated the Violence Reduction Unit (VRU) at the Strathclyde Police. Partnership and multi-sector co-operation are at the heart of the VRU. Similar to Kennedy’s initiatives, the Violence Reduction Unit has also gained much national and international praise, particularly from governments and police forces. Following the 2011 social unrests in England, then Prime Minister David Cameron told the House of Commons that initiatives such as Ceasefire in Boston and the Violence Reduction Unit in Glasgow should become a “national priority” in combating gangs in the United Kingdom (quoted in Knight 2011).

The Violence Reduction Unit first came to the attention of the police in Canada in 2008 and 2009 through the international case study works of the Institute for Strategic International Studies. In 2008, the main tenets of the Institute for Strategic International Studies annual report were “ongoing alignment of policing resources,” “multidisciplinary partnership,” and “community-

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137 David Kennedy’s model in Boston was taken up by other cities in the United States, including Chicago, New Orleans, Baltimore, and Oakland, among others. Kennedy is currently the director of the National Network for Safe Communities, a project of John Jay College of Criminal Justice at CUNY in New York City (see www.jjay.cuny.edu/faculty/david-kennedy). In 2011, Kennedy published another book on his preventive policing model, Don’t shoot: One man, a street fellowship, and the end of violence in inner-city America (Kennedy 2011). The book received praise from several politicians, chiefs of police, civic leaders, and academics. In the same year a documentary based on Chicago’s adaptation of Kennedy’s work (the Chicago Project for Violence Prevention) was released. The Interrupters, directed by Steve James, takes place in Englewood in Chicago’s South Side. The Interrupters gained few awards in seven festivals from Sundance Film Festival to Little Rock Film Festival. It was broadcasted in Canada on the CBC News Network documentary series The Passionate Eye on January 28, 2012.

138 Kennedy’s “Ceasefire” should not be understood as a total turn away from tough-on-crime policing. In fact, one of the major aspects of “Ceasefire” was that if the gangs rejected the “ceasefire” and cooperation, then the “entire might of the law be brought down upon them.”

139 In 2008, the Violence Reduction Unit established the Community Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV) to tackle gang violence in Glasgow. Today the initiative is extended to other jurisdictions and is known as the Scottish Violence Reduction Unit. For more information, see www.actiononviolence.org.uk/.

140 Gang members are approached by the Violence Reduction Unit and invited to attend a “call-in” meeting that is mainly used to communicate two messages: enforcement and social development – firstly, that there will be a zero-tolerance police response if the violence does not stop, which will impact every gang member, and secondly, a pledge from assorted agencies and charities that if youths do renounce violence, they can get help with education, training, and job-finding.
based actions.” In 2010, Norm Taylor, who was the CACP-ISIS program director in 2008 and 2009, wrote a consultation report for the government of Saskatchewan in which he stated, “it would take more than a policing system to reverse the disturbing trend of high crime and violence in Saskatchewan” (quoted in McFee and Taylor 2014:5). Soon after, then Prince Albert Chief of Police Dale McFee teamed up with Taylor to design the Community Mobilization Prince Albert initiative. This initiative has been in place since February 2011 with the financial support of the Province of Saskatchewan and Public Safety Canada (Public Safety Canada 2013d). A couple of years later, Taylor became a consultant in the FOCUS project in Toronto.

Historicizing Preventive Community Policing

Why have these initiatives attracted so much attention across the Atlantic? The policy emphasis on prevention is partly related to the latest economic crisis. This is evident in the recent discussion about the economics of policing in Canada. This debate was born in the aftermath of the global economic crisis of 2007–2008 and the resultant turn to aggressive austerity politics. Aware of the rapid growth in the cost of police services despite the continuous decline of crime rates, police forces in Canada have become concerned about budget cuts and public legitimacy (Public Safety Canada 2013, 2014; Huggins, Wright, and Murphy 2014). As the highest state institution in charge of policing in Canada, Public Safety Canada is one of the major forces behind the focus on the cost of policing.

Public Safety Canada has allocated a separate section on its website on the Economics of Policing, highlighting that “[a]t the time of fiscal challenges,” the economics of policing “is about the evolution and sustainability of policing” (Public Safety Canada 2016). Speaking at the
Economics of Policing Summit in January 2013, former Conservative Minister of Public Safety Vic Toews reminded attendees that:

Police services face two options – they can do nothing and eventually be forced to cut drastically, as we have seen in some countries; or they can be proactive, get ahead of the curve, and have greater flexibility in designing and implementing both incremental and meaningful structural reforms” (quoted in Ruddell and Jones 2014:8).

One of the proposed solutions is proactive crime prevention. In their report to the RCMP on the already implemented practices in the United Kingdom and the United States, Ruddell and Jones recommend four venues through which Canadian policing can be re-envisioned. These venues include: “the expanding role of private police;” “the civilianization of the police;” “police–community partnership;” and “traffic and safety enforcement” (Ruddell and Jones 2014:63–71).

According to Ruddell and Jones (2014:67), “[p]artnerships between the police and organizations that provide health, education, social and welfare services to at-risk populations” are “a move away from the traditional reactive model of policing and instead take a proactive crime reduction approach.” The authors mention the Prince Albert Hub Model as one of the successful attempts to implement such an approach (Ruddell and Jones 2014:67–8).

This economic rationale has been rarely discussed in the public. Most often governments and police highlight the effectiveness of social development-based community policing by pointing to their statistical success in reducing crime – a claim that is disputed. The police and their consultants in Canada also justify experimenting with such initiatives to promote the whole-of-government approach and police–community partnership (112 2013; Institute for Strategic International Studies 2009; Russell and Taylor 2014). Here the argument is that such a shift in policing represents a much more comprehensive, bottom-up approach to security and order. Proponents of prevention mobilize the works of Robert Peel, the nineteenth-century British statesman and one of the founders of the modern Conservative Party in England, who established the Metropolitan Police Force for London in 1829. In particular, they rationalize the focus on police–community partnerships with reference to Peel’s “ethical policing” and his belief that “the police are the public and the public is the police” (112 2013). These proponents also advocate police–community partnership as a way to align police funding with the recent discussions about
the “Economics of Policing” and the importance of efficiency and financial sustainability of policing in Canada.\textsuperscript{144}

The appeal to Peel, however, is more ideological than historical. The current emphasis on prevention in community policing (in Toronto and elsewhere) goes back to the works of the eighteenth-century Scottish merchant, statistician, and police theorist Patrick Colquhoun, the founder of the Thames River Police.\textsuperscript{145} Let us briefly look at Colquhoun’s work in this regard. Prevention was central to Colquhoun’s conception of police (Neocleous 2000; Rigakos et al. 2009:243–76).\textsuperscript{146} In his 1799 text \textit{The State of Indigence}, Colquhoun provided a strategy of prevention based on a distinction between poverty and indigence. Colquhoun saw poverty as inseparable from the production of capitalist wealth and the function of wage labour. The labouring poor are not only “a most necessary and indispensable ingredient of society,” without them, “nations and communities could not exist in the state of civilization” (Colquhoun 1806:7–8). “\textit{Indigence} therefore, and not \textit{poverty},” Colquhoun argued, “is the evil.”

The problem with indigence was not excessive destitution, rather, it was the refusal to integrate into social relations of wage labour (Neocleous 2000:55). The indigent’s disconnection from capitalist social relations was at the core of Colquhoun’s conception of what counts as insecurity and threat to the bourgeois society of the late eighteenth century. Similar to Hegel (1967 [1821]), Colquhoun (1806) developed an account of the policing of the poor within “civil society” as a fundamental part of capitalist social relations (Neocleous 2000:58–62). Peter Linebaugh notes that if a single individual could be said to have been the planner and theorist of class struggle in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century metropole, it would be Colquhoun (2003: 427). The problematic of indigence is at the heart of Colquhoun’s concepts of prevention and police:

\begin{quote}
This is due to Colquhoun’s fundamental belief that “from indigence is to be traced the great Origin and the Progress of Crimes.” The key to Colquhoun’s science of police is that the Criminal Police deals with the criminal “underclass” (Hegel’s “rabble”), those who have fallen from indigence to crime. The Municipal Police is
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{144} The increasing top-down focus on the economics of policing is evident in the research literature (see Griffiths and Stamatakis 2012; Leuprecht 2014; Ruddell and Jones 2013) and several conferences and summits hold throughout 2013–2014 and organized by Public Safety Canada (Charlottetown in January and September 2013, Vancouver in March 2014) (Public Safety Canada 2014).

\textsuperscript{145} For an in-depth discussion on Patrick Colquhoun’s conceptions of policing and crime see, Neocleous (2000; 2006) and Rigakos et al. (2009).

\textsuperscript{146} Colquhoun did not invent the idea of prevention. Earlier eighteenth-century thinkers, such as John A. Fielding (1721–1780) and Cesare Beccaria (1738–1794) had already emphasized that preventing crime is better that its punishment (see Rigakos et al. 2009). What was original to Colquhoun, as Neocleous (2000: 49–50) points out, was that he integrated “the general idea of prevention into a theory of police.”
there to prevent the class of poverty from falling into indigence. (Neocleous 2000:54)

Colquhoun’s Municipal Police has much in common with what later in the twentieth century came to be known as social policy (Neocleous 2000) or today’s social development-based policing strategies. It is about the administration and overseeing of the condition of labour through the political management of poverty. Colquhoun’s Municipal Police directs us to an understanding of police beyond the uniformed police officers and the police as an institution. Rather, the necessity of the Municipal Police alerts us to the historical link between police, policy, and the urban. This directs us to think of police also as “social police:” a force in pacifying the perceived threats to the security of bourgeois society. Such security “involves not just the prevention and detection of crime, but more importantly, the imposition of a form of social police” (Neocleous 2000:61).

Curing the “Parasites” of Terror and Violence

Have these ongoing attempts to re-envision policing brought any changes in the conceptions of crime and violence? More importantly for our discussion, in what ways are the conceptions of crime and violence in the imperial metropole related to those in international relations? These are important questions not least because in many ways, today’s conceptions of poverty as risk and threat are reinventions of Colquhoun’s notion of indigence. Similarly, the current emphasis on prevention in community policing, I suggest, is a reinvention of Colquhoun’s social police. This reinvented social police is the product of the conjuncture of the crisis of imperialist capitalism, austerity politics, imperialist wars, and neo-colonial relations of domination. Its aim is to moderate the violence of poverty and coercive policing. It is thus important to think about prevention in community policing in the “immigrant neighbourhoods” in relation to pacification strategies in the “ungoverned” spaces of the imperial world.147 Furthermore, for police in Toronto (and Canada) initiatives like the Hub Model and FOCUS are seen by many as an integrated part of the future of policing (I12 2013; I26 2013; McFee and Taylor 2014; Russell and Taylor 2014).

Projects like the Scottish Violence Reduction Unit and FOCUS in Toronto (appear to) have a deliberate emphasis on the social causes and dimensions of violence and crime. In fact, for

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147 For how pacification strategies in “ungoverned spaces” of the imperial world order have increasingly functioned as policing strategies, see Bell and Holmqvist (2015).
police the emphasis on the “social determinants” of safety and violence is the novel dimension in these preventive community-policing strategies (Russell and Taylor 2014:5). The emphasis on social determinants of safety/violence is also justified for being “scientific” and “evidence-based.” Increasingly, community workers and activists have welcomed this apparent social turn in community policing (I22 2013; I31 2013; I1 2014). Today, talking about the social determinants of safety and violence is becoming a new common sense in policy circles and community centres in Toronto.

I want to challenge the claims about the “scientific” and “progressive” attributes of the current policy focus on the social determinants of safety. In doing so, my aim is to highlight the dangers of taking for granted the lesser evil of social development-based community policing, particularly in relation to normalizing racism. I argue the prevalence of the social determinants of safety is the latest ideological turn in policing (and security) strategies in an attempt to deal with the contradictions of coercive policing and the increasing public reaction to the naked violence of coercive policing. The genealogy of the social determinants of safety/violence in the policing lexicon is complex and deeply intertwined with the genealogy of contagion. As I discuss in the following pages, the emphasis on the social determinants of safety is based on a “public health” framework of crime and violence. Having its roots in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century debates on public health and disease, this framework is part and a parcel of the broader nexus of development and security, and the collusion of imperialist capitalism, militarism, and medicine (O’Malley 2010; Neocleous 2016).

The Scottish Violence Reduction Unit is celebrated for deliberately adopting a public health approach to violent crime, drawing inspiration from similar projects in the United States148 and adopting the principles of the World Health Organization (WHO).149 In their report on FOCUS, Russell and Taylor (2014) also emphasize the usefulness of adapting the WHO “social determinants of health” for crime prevention in Toronto (and Canada).150 But if the public health framework reinforces the shift towards prevention (see Commission on Social Determinants of

148 The most famous of these public health approaches to crime are Cure Violence, based on the works of former WHO epidemiologist Gary Slutkin (2012), founder and executive director of Cure Violence. Cure Violence proposed behavioural change and epidemiological control methods to reduce violence. For more information, see http://cureviolence.org/.
150 Russell and Taylor (2014) refer to the WHO’s 2011 Rio Political Declaration on Social Determinants of Health.
Health 2008; Akers and Lanier 2009), the turn to a public health framework in policing approach is based on conceiving violence and crime as *disease*. For McCluskey, the genius of the Scottish Violence Reduction Unit was based on understanding that violence works “like an infectious disease” (quoted in Henley 2011), and for Russell and Taylor, “focusing on crime” is like “focusing on disease” (2014:6). This line of argumentation is fascinated with the new subfield of “epidemiological criminology” (Akers and Lanier 2009; Slutkin 2012) that treats violence as an “infectious disease.” Within the last decade, epidemiological criminology has become one influential ideological foundation in combating crime, violence and “terrorism” through a “public health” approach in cities in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, South America, the Middle East, and Africa.151

Conceptualizing crime and violence as disease is not new, however. The pathologization of crime (as insecurity and disorder) and the criminalization of (what is perceived as) disease were the hallmarks of the growth of capitalism and colonialism, along with the confluence of biology and politics in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Michel Foucault captured part of this history in his *History of Sexuality* (1978) and *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison* (1995). In the nineteenth century, the bourgeoisie’s perception of the industrial city was as a space of “social contagion,” populated by “infectious” classes, “races,” and women. To a great extent, this perception was related to the sudden movement of dispossessed peasants to the industrial city for labour and survival. As Neocleous (2016:62) highlights, “this is why migration of any sort is a recurring theme in the police power: contagion occurs with movement and the City is the site of movement as well as migration.”

Contagion was a fundamental feature of the police power in the colonial context. The colonized (most often perceived as criminal and diseased) embodied the collusion of such pathologization and criminalization, as Frantz Fanon reminded us in *The Wretched of the Earth* (2004) and *Black Skins and White Masks* (1967a).152 Colonial genocide was, from the colonizer’s

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151 *Cure Violence* is a good example. Since 2000, Slutkin’s public health approach has been used in many cities in the United States, including New York, Chicago, Baltimore, Buffalo, etc. It has also been used in Latin America and the Caribbean (Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, Jamaica, Guatemala, El Salvador), the Middle East (Iraq, Syria, the West Bank, Israel), as well as in South Africa, England, and Canada (Halifax). WHO is among the “Strategic partners” of *Cure Violence*. The organization is active in the WHO Global Campaign for Violence Prevention. For more information, see http://cureviolence.org/partners/ and www.who.int/violenceprevention/about/participants/cure_violence/en/.

152 Fanon (1967a) not only criticized the racism inherent in the colonial conception of the colonized as diseased and criminal, as a psychiatrist he also extended his analysis by examining how the colonial system does produce pathologized subjects among the colonized as well as the colonizer (Fanon 2004).
perspective, both preventive and curative. Pathologies of “immigrant neighbourhoods” and “immigrant” families were at the heart of Thrasher’s (1927) conceptualization of gangs in Chicago. The fascism of National Socialism in twentieth-century Germany also built upon the conflation of disease, “race,” and crime. Adolf Hitler imagined himself to be the political incarnation of Robert Koch, the famous German bacteriologist (Peckham 2014:1).

This long history reminds us that the contemporary epidemic imaginary of crime and violence is neither innovative, nor innocent. The contemporary epidemic imaginary of crime is the outcome of the relational formation of urban and imperial policies and the politics of security and development. It is not accidental that its comeback to the table of policymakers and academics has paralleled the comeback of another kind of epidemiological imaginary: “terrorism” and the figure of “the terrorist.” In the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan, on January 29, 2002, in his State of the Union Address, then US President George W. Bush highlighted the crushing of the “terrorist parasites” lurking in “remote deserts and jungles” and hiding “in the center of large cities.” After the invasion of Iraq, in an address to Congress in July 2003, then UK Prime Minister Tony Blair similarly warned that “a new and deadly virus has emerged. The virus is terrorism, whose intent to inflict destruction is unconstrained by human feelings” (quoted in Lippens 2004:126).

This intertwining of public health with security is not limited to imperialist “anti-terrorism” strategies in former colonies. In the fall of 2005, the French media were quick to mobilize an epidemiological metaphor to represent the uprising of the French banlieues as “contagious” (Keck 2014). In the aftermath of the 2011 youth unrests in England, Gary Slutkin (2011), one of the most influential voices in epidemiological criminology, wrote an article in The Guardian arguing that “rioting is a disease spread from person to person – the key is to stop the infection.”

Why are the concepts of contagion and disease reinvented in policing and security strategies? It is important to de-congeal the political fear associated with the current popularity of conceiving disorder as disease and contagious. Historically political fear has been fundamental to the conception of social contagion. In tracing the genealogy of contagion, Neocleous (2016:61–5) notes:

Indeed, the concept of contagion is much less a question of microbiology or epidemiology than it is a question of how ideas circulate.... With its connotations of “touching together,” contagion connotes danger or corruption, in particular the kinds of danger or corruption that occur in “promiscuous” social spaces when ideas can circulate among the crowd. Moreover, implicit in the concept of
contagion is the belief that revolutionary ideas are inherently contagious. (Neocleous 2016:63)

Whether or not the current emphasis on the social determinant of safety/violence represents a progressive step on the part of the police is thus a key question. After all, pointing to the social dimensions and roots of violence has always been one of the left critiques of coercive enforcement policing strategies. The current emphasis, however, appears to be progressive. And yet such appearance is deeply ideological. To de-congeal the ideology of social determinants of safety/violence, we need to look at the conjuncture in which the phrase “social determinants” became a buzzword in WHO public health policies. This is imperative, as we will see in Chapter Seven, since in 2012 the City of Toronto also mobilized the ideology of social determinants of health (inspired by the WHO Urban HEART project) to reform its priority neighbourhood strategy.

The analyses of the social determinants of health approach found their way into the WHO corridors by the early 2000s, influenced by the 2000–2001 World Development Report Attacking Poverty, the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals (2000), and the 2002–2003 SARS outbreak. The 2003 election of Lee Jong-Wook as WHO director-general on a platform of renewed commitment to the social determinants of health perspective was imperative in this regard (Irwin and Scali 2007). In 2008, the WHO Commission on Social Determinants of Health published an influential report entitled Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health Equity through Action on the Social Determinants of Health (Commission on Social Determinants of Health [CSDH] 2008), which has since become the bible in public health.

The idea of tackling the social determinants of health, however, is hardly novel. In fact, the history of the social determinants of health is intertwined with the history of contagion and capitalist urbanization. Once again it is useful to look back at history. At least since the cholera epidemic of 1832 there has been awareness, among the ruling classes and their organic intellectuals, of the relationship between people’s social class, their everyday life, and working conditions and public health.153 Engels’ (1992 [1845]) study of the conditions of the working class in the “great towns” of nineteenth-century England uses many official reports that were the outcome of public officials’ increasing awareness of the social determinants of health. Acting upon the socio-spatial determinants of health was central to policing strategies and the sanitary and social reform campaigns of the nineteenth century as well as to the birth and evolution of modern

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153 It should be noted that many advocates of epidemiological criminology also go back to the 1832 cholera epidemic and the eventual birth of social epidemiology in the mid-twentieth century (Akers and Lanier 2009; Sultkin 2012, 2011)
public health and urban planning in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the aftermath of the Second World War, WHO itself was constituted, at least on paper, based on a broad definition of health understood as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being” (WHO 1948).

The more immediate policy roots of the current emphasis on the social determinants of health goes back to the 1978 Alma-Ata Declaration and then director-general of WHO Halfdan Mahler’s project of “Health for All” (Mahler 1981; CSDH 2008). In his May 2003 speech to the 56th World Health Assembly, Lee Jong-Wook declared the revival of the Alma-Ata Declaration through the renewal of “the fundamental commitment to equity expressed by the notion of “health for all” as the new mission of the WHO (Lee 2003). Lee’s speech is even more important for our purpose for his emphasis on “equity” (rather than equality) and his attempt to squarely situate the WHO “health for all” mission in relation to global peace, security, and development.

According to Lee:

The world leaders who drafted the UN Charter saw that peace and security depended on establishing what they called “conditions under which justice... can be maintained.” The WHO Constitution, signed in 1946, takes up this theme; if it is true for global politics, it is equality so for health. (2003)

Recalling that the core values of security and justice are inseparable, Lee (2003) emphasized that the new commitment to the social determinants of health is essential for maintaining global peace and achieving the United Nations millennium development goals (MDGs). It is precisely through such emphasis on equity and linking health to security and development (as defined by

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154 Halfdan Mahler, who became director-general of WHO in 1973, proposed “Health for all by the year 2000” as the new agenda of the organization at the 1976 World Health Assembly. “Health for all,” Mahler (1981) argued, “implied the removal of the obstacles to health – that is to say, the elimination of malnutrition, ignorance, contaminated drinking water and unhygienic housing – quite as much as it does the solution of purely medical problems.” This new agenda took centre stage at the International Conference on Primary Health Care, sponsored by WHO and UNICEF at Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, in September 1978 (WHO and UNICEF 1978a). The conference embraced Mahler’s goal of “Health for all by the year 2000” with primary health care as the means. The adoption of the Health for All/primary health care strategy marked a forceful re-emergence of social determinants as a major public health concern (Irwin and Scali 2007:239–40).

155 I will engage with the problematic aspect of the recent focus on equity instead of equality in Chapter Seven where I discuss, how in an attempt to silence the hotly debated questions of racism, the City of Toronto’s policy makers have picked up equity as the new foundation of place-based urban policy.

156 The millennium development goals were initially adopted by 189 world leaders from rich and poor countries as part of the Millennium Declaration signed in 2000. In 2002, then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan established the UN Millennium Campaign and commissioned the Millennium Project to develop a correct action plan for the world to achieve the goals. In 2005, the independent advisory body headed by Professor Jeffrey Sachs presented its final recommendations to the secretary-general in a synthesis volume, *Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals*. 153
the United Nations and the World Bank) that we can trace the reified notion of the social in the WHO social determinants of health. Despite an attempt to situate health in its broader societal context, the WHO Commission’s conceptualization of the “social determinants” of health is deeply dehistoricized. As Vicente Navaro (2009) has argued in his critique of the 2008 WHO CSDH report:

The report’s phrase “social inequalities kill” has outraged conservative and liberal forces, which find the narrative and discourse of the report too strong to stomach. And yet, this is where the report falls short. It is not inequalities that kill, but those who benefit from the inequalities that kill. The [WHO] Commission’s studious avoidance of the category of power (class power, as well gender, race, and national power) and how power is produced and reproduced in political institutions is the greatest weakness of the report. It reproduces a widely held practice in international agencies that speaks of policies without touching on politics. … Disease is a social and political category imposed on people within an enormously repressive social and economic capitalist system, one that forces disease and death on the world’s people. (Navaro 2009:440)

The dehistoricized conception of the social and the implicit linking of contagion, health, and security are evident in Commission’s emphasis on the UN Millennium Project’s Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals (2005). While the broad scope of the goals – poverty reduction, health improvement, and the promotion of peace, human rights, gender equality, and environmental sustainability – appear to include socio-political and ecological dimensions of development, a closer look at how these goals are defined and measured as achieved illuminates that the emphasis on the social take place at the same time that the concrete socio-spatial relations of imperialist-capitalist uneven development are dehistoricized and naturalized. Investing in Development conceives poverty as the source and cause of war, conflict, and insecurity. Both Investing in Development and the Commission on Social Determinants of Health’s Closing the Gap in a Generation firmly situate their rationales within the broader liberal discourse of development and security, wherein the goal of development is neither the eradication of poverty nor the development of human potentials but rather the containment of threats to the security of the imperialist-capitalist world order emanating from zones of poverty near and far (Cowen and Shenton 1996; Duffield 2010; Neocleous 2008).

Recent emphasis on the social determinants of health has paralleled the primacy of prevention and resiliency in security politics both internationally and domestically. The shift to prevention in security politics was accompanied by a shift in the locus of securing agency from Western actors to the fragile or failing states (perceived to be) in need of capacity building (Evans
This shift was a reformulation of a bottom-up, more “empowering” approach to human security (which was born in the 1990s) (Chandler 2012). Rather than a focus on the economic, political, and socio-spatial relations (of the production) of conflict, war, and violence, parallel to the neoliberal ethos, the focus shifted onto individuals (as decision makers) and the immediate influences on their choices. The goal is not to eradicate the causes of violence; rather, it is to moderate the effects of violence. The problem hence is how to “empower” agents (on an individual and societal basis) and enable them to overcome their vulnerabilities in order to become resilient in the face of violence. Herein the conception of the subject-target of security and policing is also imperative to the emphasis on the social determinants of safety. In the reformulated human security ideology of prevention and resiliency, the subject is no more the passive victim in need of protection. Rather, the subject of preventive security politics is a particular active subject: always the vulnerable subject in need of enabling agency to become resilient (Wilson 2012; Chandler 2011).

This is precisely how strategies such as the Hub Model, FOCUS, and Prevention Intervention Toronto approach the problems of crime, gang, and violence while mobilizing the rhetoric of the social determinants of safety. The focus of these strategies is on the targeted “at-risk” individuals or families and their choices. In fact the very conception of crime and violence as an infectious disease builds upon this dehistoricized conception of crime and violence. The aim is thus to cure the disease or to prevent the contagion of the infection by means of changing the immediate context and subjectivities of the “at-risk” subject-targets. It is here that the social development dimension of community policing and the emphasis on the social determinants of safety come into policing. Preventive intervention focuses on the empowerment and responsibility of agency at the local scale. In their praise of the Prince Albert Hub Model, Ruddell and Jones observes that “while this collaborative model has yet to formally evaluated, it represents a step forward toward crime reduction by solving problems in the community one person or family at a time” (2014:68).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I focused on the ideological formation and contradictions of various state strategies of policing in the aftermath of “the year of the gun” in 2005. One of the major premises of my analysis was that police power has both coercive and productive dimensions. The
productive dimension of policing is about the moderating violence and fabricating a secure social order. It is essential to the political reorganization of the territorial relations of domination, what Lefebvre called “colonization.” I showed this by scrutinizing the territorialized and racialized security ideology around “the immigrant” and the way in which concentrated non-White poverty is also central to policing strategies (for example, the conceptions of the criminal, gangs, troubled neighbourhoods).

In my engagement with the productive dimension of policing in Toronto, I focused on the prevalence of prevention and the social determinants of safety in re-envisioning community policing. Tracing the development of these concepts both historically (from the eighteenth century onward to our conjuncture) and geographically, I argued that both concepts are deeply ideological. In order to de-congeal their ideological dimensions, we need to analyze state development and security strategies not as oppositional, but as relational. Furthermore, we need to go beyond the liberal separation of the domestic and the international in security and policing politics. The ideological ascendency of prevention in community policing in Toronto has taken place, on the one hand, in relation to conceptualizing crime and violence as disease and the popularity of the concept in other places, particularly in British policing strategies. On the other hand, prevention in community policing needs to be understood in relation to the primacy of prevention and resiliency in international security politics and the return to the fore of pacification in the imperialist strategies of the “long war.”

As we saw, the “Paris problem” and the related political fear of “the immigrant” are central to the current re-envisioning of community policing in Toronto (and Canada). I examined the relational formation of “the gang” problem and “the immigrant” problem in Toronto and its resultant political fear and targeting. The figure of “the immigrant” (youth) shows up as the potential “enemy of order” who could cause the “Paris problem” and who needs preventive intervention. The political fear of “immigrant” youth violence is also in relation to the political fear of “terrorism.” This is most evident from the conceptions of crime and violence as disease and the ascendency of prevention in policing strategies. Prevention is not a concept limited to policing strategies in Toronto, as we saw. In fact, the ascendency of prevention in Toronto’s policy circles was the outcome of systematic policy mobilities across time, geography, and scale. It is linked to its elevation of prevention in imperial policies, from the coming to the fore of pacification strategies in zones of imperial war to public health policies of the WHO.
Similar to imperialist pacification strategies, the goal of preventive community policing is not the elimination of the “enemies of order” – whether they are gangsters or “at-risk” or “radicalized” youth. Rather, the goal is to build resiliency among those considered “at-risk” of becoming “enemies of order” so as to nullify the gang-allure of “us” against the state. It is precisely the recognition that the naked violence of enforcement (as much as it is believed to be necessary) is not sustainable for maintaining order. Prevention is an ideological concept. The ideology of prevention is less about preventing violence than about moderating the violence of enforcement. It is based on this ideology that policy forces have been increasingly framing community policing as social development and with reference to a whole-of-government approach. The preventive turn in policing does not mean less or soft policing, rather, it is about embedding policing in social policy and mobilizing social policy as part of the state strategies of neo-colonial pacification. As we will see, in the next three chapters, the concept of prevention has also become the cornerstone of place-based urban policies of development.
Chapter Six:
Prevention and Development in The “Priority Neighbourhoods”

Introduction

In this chapter, I examine how place-based urban policy facilitated the ideological construction of “immigrant neighbourhoods” and their residents as targets of political fear and as being in need of state-civil society humanitarian intervention. Looking at the unfolding of the Priority Neighbourhood (PN) strategy (2005–2011), I focus on the working of the ideology of prevention by examining major components of the place-based urban policy such as empowerment, participation, and economic integration along with the whole-of-government approach. I also examine the continued role of United Way, particularly its neo-colonial trusteeship in the formation and implementation of place-based urban policy as preventive strategy. The state-led rolling out the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy facilitated the rapid growth of a knowledge production industry about urban poverty in Toronto. This industry and its link to major academic centres in the city has in turn consolidated place-based urban policy as the solution to concentrated non-White poverty in the city’s postwar suburbs.

The political fear of the non-White working class, coded as “the immigrant,” remained central to the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy. One can detect this centrality from the contents and forms of the knowledge production for place-based urban policy in Toronto. Since 2004, the who questions (“Who are we?”, “Who lives here?”, “Who works minimum wage?”, “Who lives in poverty?”, “Who are the working poor?”), with no attention to the how and why questions, has turned into a major aspect of almost all published research and policy papers. In this thriving knowledge production industry, maps and mapping are used as a new “scientific” tool of looking at the city and its residents.

Preventing the “Paris problem”: Empowerment and Participation

As mentioned in Chapter Four, the founding rationale of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy was that underdevelopment and poverty are the main causes of insecurity and gun violence in Toronto’s “priority neighbourhoods.” The official narrative of spatial targeting thus emphasized the need to implement development by directing investment towards building physical and social infrastructure in targeted localities. Similar to the broader discourse of
international development in the Global South, in Toronto as well concepts such as empowerment, participation, and economic integration became the buzzwords of place-based urban policy.

This component of the policy, with its focus on the agency of residents, was justified to cultivate collaboration and networks across public, non-profit, and community organizations in targeted localities. The City started the implementation of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy by initiatives within its own departments and in the targeted neighbourhoods. Within the municipality, the City set up Neighbourhood Action Teams (NATs) in each of the 13 neighbourhoods designated as a priority to coordinate service delivery across municipal departments. The Neighbourhood Action Partnership (NAP) was composed of City workers, social services staff, and community members with the aim of information sharing and collaborative planning across different organizations and sectors.

The Priority Neighbourhoods strategy also paved the way for the pro-urban bourgeois forces to get involved with policy implementation, particularly through United Way. United Way gained an opportunity to extend its trusteeship and political power beyond policy circles and small pilot projects to the “priority neighbourhoods” through funding, building community infrastructure and organizing capacity. Parallel to the City’s Priority Neighbourhood Strategy, United Way announced its own Strong Neighbourhood Strategy. A key piece of this strategy was the Action for Neighbourhood Change (ANC) initiative in the “priority neighbourhoods” – much similar to the City’s Neighbourhood Action Partnerships.

While United Way community infrastructure appears to be separate from that of the City of Toronto, in practice they closely work together and follow by and large the same lines of intervention. A former United Way policy analyst involved with the Strong Neighbourhood Strategy explained that the birth of the Action for Neighbourhood Change was the result of a political discussion between the City and United Way about how we are going to work within communities [given] that we recognize that place is as important as other targets – such as specific populations, Black males, or seniors – or as important as targeting social problems, such as focusing on dropouts or new immigrants.... The other dimension was to make sure that residents were engaged.... We knew about efforts down in the [United] States and in the United Kingdom, that the change would be slow and the only way that it would be sustained and meaningful would be if you involve residents. So it was with those lessons [in mind] and having watched what happened in Boston or [what was done] by the Aspen Institute or other large foundations that have been doing this kind of work. They came up and talked to us about what was going on. So United
Way said, “We’ve got the community agencies, we’re on the ground, we’re going to do that.” So that’s how the initiative for the ANC started. (I4 2013)

It would be misleading to understand United Way’s seemingly separate yet intertwined and parallel community infrastructure as simply a humanitarian endeavour of the pro-urban bourgeois forces. The organization’s community infrastructure has important political functions. First, United Way’s seemingly separate place-based strategy and its role as the City’s foot soldier have greatly reinforced the illusion that it is not the state but “civil society” that is involved in community development projects in the “priority neighbourhoods.” Second, United Way uses initiatives such as Action for Neighbourhood Change centres and Community Hubs as concrete examples that the organization is “the voice of the community” (I4 2013; I17 2013). Third, the parallel community infrastructure has reinforced United Way’s lobbying power. At the same time, United Way’s community infrastructure has been used to reinforce the organization’s claim that its work is strictly humanitarian and non-partisan.

This latter claim of course stands in sharp contrast to the organization’s actual politics of lobbying the local state behind closed doors. One of United Way’s Neighbourhood and Community Investment managers explained to me the organization’s “very skilful way” of lobbying the city:

I’ll be honest, they [the City] have their strategy and we have our strategy. Our work is often running parallel but we’re not in the same lockstep together, because they have a political agenda. So for us to lobby the city, we have to do it in a very skilful way, we can’t just go in there and say, Mayor Ford, what the hell! We actually have to go and sit on the Economic Development Committee and share issues and talk. That’s how we operate at United Way…. [W]e do a much more subtle lobby[ing]. We can’t even call it lobbying, it’s more we discuss it and share what we learned from the ground…. Our Public Affairs team works with the folks [City councillors] in the [political] middle. So they [the Public Affairs team] spend a lot of time keeping them [councillors] up to date on the impacts of their policies. So when they come to vote on whatever, they have a knowledge base. Because we know the right wing [councillors], we’re not going to change them really and truly. The left[wing] ones are already on our side. So let’s move on that middle, and that again is through discussions and sitting on committees, and that’s how we lobby. (I17 2013, emphasis added)

Neighbourhood and Community Investment managers work with the Action for Neighbourhood Change centres. Their role is to build and maintain relationships with United Way members and funded agencies as well as key stakeholders in its Building Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy. This task includes managing the funding review process, analyzing social and community issues, assessing government funding initiatives and policies, supporting external partners in the effective delivery of the strategy – including Action for Neighbourhood Change, Community Hubs, and Tower Neighbourhood Renewal – and recommending appropriated roles and responses for United Way.
Finally, the Action for Neighbourhood Change centres and Community Hubs are meant to provide the space and resources for the “empowerment” and “participation” of the poor residents (I23 2013). The idea of empowerment, as a former United Way policy analyst put it, “was around building social capital for people” (I4 2013). According to a former manager of an Action for Neighbourhood Change in the northwest part of the city, the goal of the Action for Neighbourhood Change is predominantly looking at how can we engage residents so that they can empower themselves to do the things that they are able to do because they have got all the skills and tools.... So really looking at it as an asset-based model vs. a deficit model.... That is sort of the kind of concept we follow when we are working with residents. (I29 2013)

The current emphasis on empowerment and asset-building in Toronto’s place-based urban policy is heavily indebted to the broader discourses of “social capital” and resiliency that are also central to international development and humanitarian policies and practices (Mayer 2003; Walker and Cooper 2011; Wilson 2012; Duffield 2011; Perrons, and Skyes 2003). As critics have mentioned, in this liberal humanitarian language of development, empowerment appears to be a progressive step forward but in practice it de-socializes capital as a social relation (Mayer 2003). Rather than aiming for structural change, empowerment functions as an ideology. It is limited to the recognition of the poverty of the poor (Perrson and Skyes 2003) in order to involve them more actively in the management of their wretched everyday life.

For the most part, policymakers mobilize empowerment and participation as preventive strategies to nullify the socio-political impacts of poverty and marginalization. A senior manager at the City highlighted, policymakers were always clear... that Strong Neighbourhoods or place-based work is not going to achieve the kind of systemic change that is required to address poverty. That has to do with income distribution, much broader societal challenges. That’s not what place-based work is about.... What place-based work could do is mitigate some of the impacts of those systemic issues and at least not magnify the impacts of those systemic issues so to take away the disadvantage that sometimes comes with place

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158 Through the Action for Neighbourhood Change initiative, United Way mainly provides space for other community services, such as tax, English as Second Language (ESL) classes, immigrant settlement, consultation, and afternoon classes. While this in itself is a good idea and a needed initiative in many poor neighbourhoods across Toronto, of course neither the choice of the services nor the form of education that are provided through these services are neutral; United Way has the final say on what should be going on at the ANCs. In this sense, the ANCs are part of United Way’s trusteeship.

or to mitigate it. The polarization of income, the growing gap, is perhaps the most critical social development issue facing us. And our work, whether it’s newcomers strategy, youth equity strategy, Toronto neighbourhoods, senior strategy, really we’re doing the best we can. But unless we find more effective ways of addressing the growing gap, that challenge would be there. (I3 2013)

United Way also shares this position. One of the senior executive members of the organization explained:

So what brought us into this strategy was the concentration of poverty. But… we had to be realistic about our ability to have an impact in those neighbourhoods that was real. So we knew that it would be virtually impossible for United Way with the resources that we have to come into the neighbourhood and move the needle on poverty [laughter]. It’s a little bit outside of our scope. But we knew that some elements in terms of getting to reduce poverty that we had some control over. So we can invest in social programs, we can bring residents together and we can advocate and bring other partners at the table and get them to use the same lens that we have to focus investment toward where it is needed the most. We never set out through the United Way’s programs to reduce poverty because we know that’s impossible. But we wanted and we’ve been successful to some extent to bring other partners at the table, particularly the senior levels of the government, and get them to use the 13 Priority Neighbourhoods as their lens for investment. (I23 2013)

It is important to highlight that many of poor residents are already integrated into the labour market. In fact, it is the very specific form of their economic integration – as precarious cheap labour – that has resulted in their poverty. This is precisely what is overlooked in the ideological concepts of empowerment, participation, and economic integration in place-based urban policy. By treating poor people as potential participants in their own economic and spatial rehabilitation, the goal here is not to eradicate or reduce poverty. Rather, there is a tacit recognition that development for the “post-colonial” poor now consists of constituting a low-income individual less threatening to the political stability of the imperialist-capitalist order and more adaptable and resilient to the violence and humiliation of poverty and exploitation (Walker and Cooper 2011; Wilson 2012; Duffield 2010; Pithouse 2011).

The emphasis on participation and empowerment in spatially targeted (social) development in Toronto is neither an aberration from policing strategies, nor from the territorialized and racialized ideology of security that animates the politics of targeting “priority neighbourhoods.” The focus on prevention in the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy was and is based upon the belief that there is a direct relation between development and security (I23 2013; I3 2014; I19 2013; I16 2013; I25 2013; I11 2013). In this perspective, bringing development into Toronto’s “hotspots” and “no-go zones” is a way of nullifying the potential threats (assumedly)
emanating from these neighbourhoods by strengthening “social cohesion.” According to the above-mentioned member of the United Way’s senior executive team:

At United Way, we said one of our priorities is youth violence. Community safety did become a huge thing partly because the province invested millions of dollars in terms of the Youth Challenge Fund.... [But] one of the three priorities was let’s engage residents and a big driver of the strategy has been a whole number of mechanisms to enable community ownership. So in every Priority Neighbourhood, we seeded an Action for Neighbourhood Change office. They get annual funding to have space, to hire co-ordinators to hire some animators and to create different associations. There is a fund that we have just for community-based projects, everything from, yes, community safety audits, community gardens, community kitchens, street festivals, any kind of activity that is about bringing the community together and creating social cohesion and finding solutions to shared problems. (I23 2013)

It is not hard to grasp how these arguments are rooted in the liberal conception of development and security going back to the early nineteenth century, ones that argue that development and integration into capitalist socio-spatial relations would bring “progress” and nullify the threat of the poor/the working class/the colonized, thereby providing security (Cowen and Shenton 1996). We have already mentioned (in Chapter One) how mobilizing development, participation, and empowerment to pacify the Black urban rebellion of the 1960s formed the foundation of Johnson’s War on Poverty and the birth of place-based urban policy. This logic is also at the heart of the emphasis on economic integration, opportunity, and participation in the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy. As a senior City manager involved with the Priority Neighbourhoods and Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 strategies explained:

The other focus [of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy] was looking at economic opportunities and trying to make sure that we have the right kinds of programmatic support for those youth [who] are most distanced from the labour market, to help them to get engaged in the labour market, to give a productive alternative to becoming involved in guns and gangs. That’s really been the focus. We haven’t done the job when it comes to creating the kinds of support that is needed to assist youth who are most distanced from the labour market. And so, we released a couple of reports, one last summer, one tomorrow, under the Youth Equity Strategy, saying notwithstanding the provincial Youth Action Plan, we are still not done the job to provide the right kinds of supports to those youth most vulnerable to violence and crime. (I3 2014)

For the City’s policymakers, empowerment means giving opportunities to the poor, “the immigrant.” Opportunity, more than anything else, means economic integration; it means the opportunity to be integrated into capitalist socio-spatial relations. This valorization of empowerment reifies the fact that once mobilized by the state and its civil-society apparatuses,
“relations of empowerment are relations of power” (Cruikshank 1994:3). In this project of empowering “the immigrant,” the state and its civil-society apparatus define the content and form of the empowered liberal subject and the kinds of necessarily partnerships and programs for the construction of such subjects (I6 2013; I16 2013; I22 2013; Cowen and Parlette 2011). For these policymakers, liberal empowerment is essential to security. Many programs that target Toronto youth, for example, are required to partner with police, explicitly or implicitly, to the point that some consider it as the unwritten rule for getting funding:

A precondition for a lot of the funding – that is if you’re doing anything relating to the youth or crime prevention – you have to work with the police. You can’t just do your own thing in the neighbourhood because the police are the crime prevention. What do you mean you’re going to work on crime prevention and not have the police there, because that’s who you should be working with. That’s what they tell these social service agencies, and I’ve seen very progressive people who go into these things disliking the police and having to work with them. They have to work with them, and not only is that obviously counterproductive because you’re letting in an element that is not concerned with the safety of people, but in fact has a history of abusing and brutalizing youth of the same age that are in this program. (I16 2013)

We can see how the ideological allure of empowerment and participation erases the ways the state embeds policing into social development services. Despite its alleged democratic rhetoric, liberal empowerment stays at the boundaries of liberal-colonial recognition of the poor as powerless and as potential security threats. It assumes that the powerlessness of the poor, not the actions of the powerful and the socio-structures of imperialist capitalism, is the root causes of poverty. The object of reform is thus not the socio-spatial and neo-colonial structures of imperialist capitalist exploitation, which are taken for granted and are understood as a reality to adapt to and to work within its limits. Rather, the object of reform is the subjectivities of the “pos-colonial” poor. Participation and empowerment both work to constitute the “pos-colonial” poor into proper liberal, resilient subjects, always ready not just to “bounce back” but also to “bounce forward” upon encountering violence, poverty, and crisis (Cruikshank, 1994; Walker and Cooper 2011; Pithouse 2011; Howell 2015).

The end goal is to give the “post-colonial” poor limited forms of voice, skills, and resources that would moderate the violence of everyday exploitation and domination for them. The conception of the targeted subject in preventive social development is similar to the one in preventive policing (as seen in Chapter Five). This is of course a far cry from the radical, albeit short, history of popular political empowerment in anti-colonial, anti-imperialist movements and
Black radicalism of the mid-twentieth century (Georgakas and Surkin 1998; Bloom and Martin 2013). In the current valorization of empowerment, the idea of popular empowerment is depoliticized, reduced to capacity and asset building to enhance service delivery. Many community activists in “priority neighbourhoods” are aware and critical of some of these contradictions – albeit their voices are marginalized in the public discourse on the concentration of non-White poverty.

For some, United Way and the City have, in the name of empowerment, gained more control over grassroots activism on the ground (I22 2013; I6 2013). This control is implemented through a variety of ways, including: 1) channelling funds to the community centres which United Way and the City see as political allies rather than those that actually have roots in neighbourhoods and access to the youth who need help the most (I22 2013; I6 2013); 2) getting community elites to become the agents of implementing development policies, hence controlling grassroots and activists in the name of “the community” itself (I6 2013; I16 2013); and, 3) the constant micro-managing of community activism and the threat of cutting funds if residents do not comply to the politics of the United Way (I6 2013; I29 2013).

United Way and the Pacification of Community Activism

The uncritical focus on empowerment and asset-building through residents’ participation also erases the importance of the political economy of empowering “the immigrant” to the political economy of imperialist–capitalist development (Wilson 2012). Activists have also been critical of the political economy of participation and philanthropy. As a community activist in Rexdale explained:

I think what people saw was a) there’s an economic benefit because if you reduce the violence; then we are able to get more businesses coming into the city, and b) there’s a little bit of a self-serving factor because a lot of these are NGOs – so this was going to be a great way for them to marshal even more money for their organizations. So United Way raised almost $45 million, in addition to the annual fundraising that they already did; they were able to grow their business on the backs of the violence that happened. (I22 2013)

By the time the City rolled out the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy in 2006, United Way had already been the major funder of non-profit community organizations in Toronto for few years. By 2012, United Way provided direct investment to its network of about 200 health and social service agencies across the city (Teotonio 2012). United Way’s involvement in the City’s place-
based policy greatly facilitated the expansion of the organization across Toronto (see Figure 1). According to the ranking of Charity Intelligence Canada, with a donation net worth of $116,900,000, United Way was the 6th largest charity in Canada in 2013.

From 2003 to 2006, United Way’s revenue jumped from $93,588,500 to $140,243,014, while its expenditures jumped from $91,250,000 to $107,317,000 respectively (Canada Revenue Agency 2016). The organization also had a funding reserve of $116 million by 2013. In 2014, United Way’s declared revenue was $152,928,367, while its total expenditure was declared as $147,279,431. In early 2015, the organization chapter in Toronto scaled up its centralized management to the Toronto region. The boards of United Way Toronto and United Way York Region voted to merge the two organizations under the leadership of the Toronto chapter. The York Region board members celebrated the merger as an “opportunity to leverage our deep understanding of local issues with Toronto’s world-leading fundraising capacity” (quoted in Armstrong 2015).

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160 According Charity Intelligence Canada, Canada’s top 10 largest charities in 2013 were (in order): World Vision Canada; Canadian Cancer Society; Salvation Army; Canadian Red Cross; Heart and Stroke Foundation of Canada; United Way Toronto; SickKids Foundations; Plan International Canada; Aga Khan Foundation; and Princess Margaret Cancer Foundation. For more information see Charity Intelligence Canada (2013).

Figure 1: The increasing reach of United Way across Toronto from 2005 to 2012
Source: United Way (2012:3)

United Way’s fundraising campaign in Toronto is the largest United Way campaign in North America. Susan McIsaac, then CEO and president of the United Way,\textsuperscript{162} celebrated the success of the 2012 fundraising campaign by concluding that “people care about our city. They take pride and want to... build a strong city ensuring we have infrastructure to take of the most vulnerable” (quoted in Ferenc 2013).

\textsuperscript{162} In January 2016, United Way announce that Susan McIsaac will step down as the CEO of the organization. Vince Timpano, chair of the charity’s board of trustees, praised McIsaac for building United Way’s campaign in Toronto into the biggest in the world. At the time, United Way said the organization would announce McIsaac’s replacement in time for its annual general meeting in June 2016 (Battersby 2016).
In reality, however, rather than on “people,” United Way relies heavily on the donations of about 700 companies and organizations in the city (Teotonio 2012). Within the last decade, United Way has developed a sophisticated and professionalized system of fundraising, one that is frequently the topic of mainstream newspapers in Toronto. From hiring high-profile figures – such as former Toronto Police Chief Bill Blair to Gerry McCaughery, president and CEO of the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (Canada’s fifth largest bank) – as the chairs of its fundraising campaign to having a team of 40 sponsored employees ready to go to companies that do not have the “fundraising know-how” to help with training or running campaign events, United Way’s yearly fundraising campaign is one highly professionalized and competitive spectacle of philanthro-capitalist feel-good politics in Toronto (see Teotonio 2012). The political economy of this spectacular fundraising should not be downplayed. Individual and company donations are not just about “care” and “pride,” as McIsaac framed it for the media; the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) provides federal and provincial tax credits to individual and company donors for donations to registered charities.

United Way’s spectacular fundraising reifies the ways in which capitalist interests and the state use the aura of philanthropy to mask their role in producing and sustaining the socio-spatial and racialized relations of domination and accumulation. Take for example the list of major donors to the much celebrated United Way community infrastructures projects such as Action for Neighbourhood Change (ANC) and Community Hubs (United Way 2012:17). Besides 12 private foundations run by rich, old White families, the top four Canadian banks (BMO Financial Group, RBC Capital Markets Employees, RBC Foundations, Scotiabank, TD Bank Group) and major national and global companies such as Enbridge Gas Distribution (Canada’s largest and oldest gas distribution company), Rogers Communication Inc., and Procter & Gamble Inc. are among the donors.

Alongside this list of old money, corporate and finance capital, other important donors include eight major regional, national, and North American real estate and financial holding companies and developers, such as Brookfield Asset Management, Cadillac Fairview Corporation, Callow REI, First Capital Realty, The Minto Foundation, Retrocom Mid-Market Real Estate Investment, SmartCentres, and The Conservatory Group. These real estate companies have been

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163 Bill Blair served as chair for United Way Public Sector campaign from 2008 to 2010. Gerry McCaughery was the chair of United Way 2012 fundraising campaign.
164 This list is based on donations of $10,000 and higher (United Way 2012:17).
165 For example, in 2011 Enbridge Gas Distribution invested $400,000 in United Way’s Resident Action Grants (United Way Annual Report 2012:2).
directly involved in and have greatly benefited from Toronto’s real estate boom and the market-led land development and intensification projects in and across Toronto. Directly and indirectly, they have been vital forces in the production of Toronto’s unevenly developed urban space.

Endowed with political and financial power by the pro-urban bourgeois forces and the City, United Way in Toronto has become one of the major nodes in what Dylan Rodriguez (2007) of the INCITE! collective coined as “the non-profit industrial complex” and an important force in the “NGOization of politics” (De Souza 2013; Dauvergne and Lebaron 2014: 116, 117–18, 133). In 2008, United Way published a policy paper entitled Building Leadership in Toronto’s Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector emphasizing the opportunities that today’s “world of shrinking budgets and expanding social needs” have opened up for the non-profit sector. Arguing that the sector needs a “leadership of the highest order,” Gibson and Macklem write: “[n]ever before there has been such an opportunity for the sector to become more engaged at the decision-making table. Never before has society’s need for the sector to play a leadership role been greater…. The leadership that is required is leadership of the highest order” (2008: 11).

Mobilizing the rhetoric of “integrated” “leadership of the highest order,” the policy paper not only called for the centralization of power in the non-profit sector, but also announced United Way’s “intend to take on a leadership role in leadership development in the philanthropic and community-based sectors” (Gibson and Macklem 2008:9). The conceptual parallel with the whole-of-government approach in security and policing politics and the new vision of policing in Canada (centralized at the top, but flexible on the ground) should not be dismissed. Of recommended responsibilities of this new centralized leadership were, not surprisingly, an emphasis on “single-issue activism” and “partnering” with “private sector partners” and “investors,” as well as connecting with “communities of thought leaders” (Gibson and Macklem 2008:4). Given the broader “corporatization of activism” (Dauvergne and Lebaron 2014), United Way’s politics, policies, and actions are neither surprising nor innovative. In fact one may say these are adaptation and refinement of the broader international and local NGOization of politics and aid (Wolch 1990; INCITE! 2007; Hearn 2007; Roy 2004; Polsky 2015).

Knowing “The Immigrant” and the Production of Knowledge

The Priority Neighbourhoods strategy was also accompanied by a new wave of knowledge production that soon consolidated the turn to place-based urban policy as the only “scientific”
solution to combat the deepening and geographical concentration of non-White poverty in the city. While the pro-urban bourgeois forces and their organic intellectuals have remained at the forefront of knowledge production about urban poverty, since 2005 new players have entered the game. Besides United Way and policymakers at the City, other influential forces are major academic institutions, urbanists, and for-profit and not-for-profit research institutions in Toronto. The participation of these new players is greatly facilitated by funding opportunities and support from the City, United Way, and other philanthropic organizations (e.g., the Maytree Foundation), all founded and managed by the pro-urban bourgeois factions of the ruling class in Toronto and Ontario.

The Centre for Urban and Community Studies at the University of Toronto (later incorporated into the now defunct Cities Centre) played an important role in legitimizing and normalizing the local turn in urban policy in Toronto. It was this Centre that published Frances Larkin’s warning about “immigrant poverty” and the prospects of “racial tensions” in Toronto back in 2002 (as seen in Chapter Four). Through a five-year SSHRC funded Community–University Research Alliance Program (CURA) for the Centre’s proposed research on “Neighbourhood Change and Building Inclusive Communities from Within” (2005–2010), prolific researchers affiliated with the project published a series of research papers on public policy and the shifting geography of poverty (Bradford 2005; Torjman 2006; Leviten-Reid 2006; Hulchanski 2007, 2010; Fair and Hulchanski 2008).

Motivated by the federal government’s New Deals for Cities, the research papers coming out of this state-funded project strongly advocated place-based urban policy as part of “a new urban and community agenda” in Canada and other OECD countries at the time that “place” has become imperative to capital investment and competitiveness (see Bradford 2005). This emphasis on “place” was accompanied by linking place-based policy to resilience (Torjman 2006), underlining the role of United Way as a “community builder” (Leviten-Reid 2006) and suggesting the expansion of business improvement areas (BIAs) and social mixity as strategies to fight the concentration of poverty (Hulchanski and Fair 2008). At the same time that United Way and the City were busy implementing the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy, the research project provided a “scientific” vibe to the ongoing fascination with neighbourhood as the unit of analysis.

166 The most influential among the non-profit research institutions are: Tamarack; Caledon Institute of Social Policy; Canadian Policy Research Networks; and Public Interest.
In 2007, the Centre for Urban and Community Studies merged with the newly established Cities Centre at the University of Toronto. Parallel with the state-led promotion of university-community joint research initiatives as part of the neoliberal turn in academic research funding, Cities Centre started its research activity based on a twofold mandate: “to promote and undertake university-based, interdisciplinary research” and “to work in partnership with governments in all levels, community groups, NGOs, the private sector, etc. to not only disseminate its research but to bring this research into practical application within urban regions at the local, national and international levels.” During its short yet influential life from 2007 to 2013, the Cities Centre and its academic and research affiliates became an important force in the consolidation of place-based urban policy in Toronto.

In 2009, the Cities Centre partnered with United Way, E.R.A. Architects Inc., and planningAlliance (two influential planning and architecture firms in Toronto) to found the Centre for Urban Growth and Renewal (CUG+R). As we will see in Chapter Eight, through its research on rental apartment buildings in the poor neighbourhoods in postwar suburbs CUG+R has played an important role in designing and incorporating into the City’s latest place-based urban policy.

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167 The Cities Centre was established in the fall of 2007. Its opening was part of the University of Toronto’s strategic plan that identified urban issues as a component of the University’s five strategic priorities for moving forward into the twenty-first century. From the start, the Cities Centre perceived itself as a portal for the two-way flow of information, ideas, and techniques between the University of Toronto and the various communities within which the university exists and interacts. By the fall of 2013, the Cities Centre had closed its doors mainly because the University of Toronto cut its funding. Ironically, its closure too was part of the University of Toronto’s strategic plan for enhancing its role in the worldwide knowledge production industry about urban issues and neoliberal governance. The university instead opened another research centre, The Global Cities Institute, in September 2013 (under the directorship of Patricia McCarney of the Department of Political Science and Richard Sommer of the John H. Daniels Faculty of Architecture, Landscape and Design). At the time of its closure, many pro-urban political figures contested the decision. For one, Toronto’s former mayor David Miller wrote a letter in support of the Cities Centre. On December 16, 2013 City Council received a motion (moved by Councillor Joe Mihevc and seconded by Councillor Mike Layton) concerning the closure of the Centre. For more information on The Global Cities Institute, see the Institute’s website.

168 The University of Toronto is not the only academic institution involved in knowledge production about urban policy in Toronto, rather it is the most influential one (even after the closure of the Cities Centre). The other two major academic institutions in Toronto, York University and Ryerson University, are also involved in making postwar suburbs into a problem and object of urban policy. Entering the game later and slower than the Cities Centre, the City Institute at York University has also been involved in knowledge production and joint community–university projects in the postwar suburbs. The activities of these university-based research institutions are deeply territorialized to the point that each institute has its own community-research turf, situated in the vicinity of its own geographical location. For example, the City Institute at York University is active in the Jane and Finch area (the very area that York University has stigmatized for the last twenty years (see James 2012)), while the Cities Centre was working in and the University of Toronto academics work in Scarborough and Mount Dennis.

169 The Cities Centre mandate is no more accessible from its own website after its closure in 2014. A version of it can be accessed through the Centre for Urban Growth and Renewal. See http://cugr.ca/partners/.
Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 a place-based housing renewal strategy known as Tower Renewal. In 2012, Hulchanski and his academic allies at the Cities Centre managed to secure funding to expand their research on neighbourhoods through another major seven-year SSHRC-funded research initiative on six Canadian urban centres entitled Neighbourhood Change Research Partnership (2012–2019). These academic initiatives were accompanied by state-sponsored calls for place-based interventions.

After the 2005 shootings, then Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty appointed a committee to look into the causes of youth violence. The appointed committee published its report, *The Review of the Roots of Youth Violence* in 2008. (McMurtry and Curling 2008). While many progressives and community activists have applauded the report for its emphasis on racism and systematic marginalization as major factors in youth violence, less attention has been paid to the report’s strong emphasis on place-based policy as a strategy to combat youth violence (McMurtry and Curling 2008:16–17, 34). In the following years, United Way and policymakers at the City would use this report to justify the need for a comprehensive place-based policy in Toronto’s “immigrant neighbourhoods” (I23 2013; I13 2013). The Toronto Board of Trade quickly backed these calls for place-based state-led intervention and linked their necessity to city-regional economic competitiveness. In 2009 and 2010 in two major reports, *Vote Toronto 2010: Framework for a Better City* (2009) and *Lifting all Boats: Promoting Social Cohesion and Economic Inclusion* (2010), the board, more explicitly than before, warned about “the economic impact of becoming more spatially polarized by income and segregated by ethnicity” and emphasized the need for more systematic place-based strategies to “transform the economic and social character” of the city’s “priority neighbourhoods” (Toronto Board of Trade [TBOT] 2009:19, 20).

What was most distinguished in these reports was the Board’s linking place-based urban policy, non-White poverty, and the “Paris problem” through a comparison between Toronto’s postwar suburbs and the banlieues of Paris. In *Vote Toronto 2010* (Toronto Board of Trade 2009), the Board for the first time compared Toronto and Paris. Highlighting that “much of Toronto’s immigrant population is concentrated in suburban enclaves that are at risk of becoming permanent

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170 For more information on the project see the Neighbourhood Change website.

171 The emphasis on racism in *Review of the Roots of Violence* is not without problems. While the report condemns racism, it takes for granted the notion of “race.”

172 The economic rationale for targeting poverty articulated in these reports was not different from the one already put forward by the pro-urban bourgeois forces in Toronto City Summit Alliance back in 2003 (Toronto City Summit Alliance 2003) or the TD Bank Financial Reports (2002a, 2002b) and the board’s earlier report.
poverty traps,” the report warned about Toronto’s “creeping toward the ‘Paris problem’ – an affluent core surrounded by a ‘middle ring’ of a marginalized and vulnerable population, encircled in turn by an outer layer of affluent suburbs” (Toronto Board of Trade 2009: 18). In Lifting all Boats, the Board explicitly linked Toronto’s “Paris problem” to “the state of “middle ring” housing” in the city (Toronto Board of Trade 2010:12) and called for place-based policies to address the housing situation in “priority neighbourhoods.” Such place-based policies, the report emphasized, should be understood in relation to the City’s place-based strategies, from the United Way’s Strong Neighbourhoods Task Force, to the City’s Priority Neighbourhoods strategy and Tower Renewal program, on to the Toronto Community Housing Corporation’s Community Revitalization plans in Don Mount, Regent Park, Lawrence Heights, and Alexandra Park (Toronto Board of Trade 2010:10–15).

Both reports based their warning about Toronto’s “Paris problem” on United Way’s (2004) Poverty by Postal Code and David Hulchanski’s (2007) The Three Cities within Toronto published by the Cities Centre. By introducing mapping as part of the scientific techniques of tracing poverty across the city, both reports were imperative in giving a visual form to the hitherto territorialized, text-based discussion on concentrated non-White poverty and “the immigrant” problem in Toronto. Maps and mapping have also been influential in both reproducing and reifying the territorialized and racialized security ideologies that animated the formation and consolidation of place-based policy in Toronto. It is worth to have a critical look at the recent fascination with mapping in Toronto.

“A New Way of Looking at Toronto:” Mapping “The Immigrant” Problem

And we [United Way] openly laid a map of our programs and services over a map of poverty in the city of Toronto…. We also overlaid on top of that where [there] was the highest incidents of youth violence, and what we said was that we’re going to deliberately shift our strategy to invest more and more in those neighbourhoods. (I23 2013)

[Poverty by Postal Code] made a big splash. Because it talked about poverty in the same way that the earlier works had, but this time there were maps. The people could suddenly see themselves in the city. (I4 2013, emphasis added)

People create maps only when their social relations call for them, and the social relations that most insistently call for maps are those of the modern state, wherever in the world. (Wood 2010:19)
The publication of maps of concentrated poverty at the neighbourhood scale by United Way in 2004 was followed by the maps of the 13 “priority neighbourhoods” in 2005, giving a clear-cut graphic visualization of the spatial boundaries of “hotspots” and “stressed communities” (United Way and City of Toronto 2005). This mapping was followed by another series of maps of the City’s Community Safety Neighbourhood Areas in 2006, published by the Tri-Level Committee on Gun/Violence (appointed by the City of Toronto), depicting the 13 “priority neighbourhoods” this time in relation to gun violence and the spatial boundaries of place-based policing across the city (City of Toronto 2006).

In 2007, as part of the Cities Centre’s project, David Hulchanski published an influential report, The Three Cities within Toronto: Income Polarization among Toronto’s Neighbourhoods, 1970–2000. In the opening lines of The Three Cities, Hulchanski affirms:

[This report provides a new way of looking at Toronto’s neighbourhoods – who lives where, based on the socio-economic status of the residents in each neighbourhood, and how the average status of the residents in each neighbourhood has changed over a 30-year period. (2007:1)]

In a matter of few years, this “new way of looking” through maps became the dominant mode of understanding the city. Today maps and mapping are the medium for conceiving not just social problems, but also urban space, social life, and politics in Toronto.

For the first time, Hulchanski’s report represented on paper the “growing gap in income and wealth and greater polarization among Toronto’s neighbourhoods” (2007:2). He argued that this income gap has resulted in “a sharp consolidation of three distinct groupings of neighbourhoods,” “even three different cities” (Hulchanski 2007:4). As shown in Figure 2, “City #1,” the White rich city, included only 17% of Toronto’s population. It approximately covered downtown Toronto and the areas around the two subway lines along Yonge Street (north) and Bloor (west) and Danforth (east) streets. “City 3,” the increasingly non-White poor city, included 40% of the city’s population. It comprised large pockets of Toronto’s postwar suburbs, including the 13 “priority neighbourhoods.” “City 2,” the majority White, middle-income city, included 42% of the city’s population. It was located in between the other two cities. Toronto, Hulchanski warned, is no longer a “city of neighbourhoods;” rather, it is a “city of disparities” (Hulchanski 2007:4–5).

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173 The research was funded by a grant from the Community University Research Alliance (CURA) program of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada and the University of Toronto’s funding of its then new Cities Centre. The research was also done in partnership with St. Christopher House, a multi-service social agency.
While Hulchanski’s maps depicted recent demographic and economic change across Toronto’s neighbourhoods, his analysis did not provide enough critical examination of why and how such segregation based on income and “race” has happened since the 1970s. Although he mentioned the gentrification of the downtown as a factor, he shied away from engaging with the economic structural forces behind gentrification (see Smith 1996). For Hulchanski, gentrification is simply the outcome of aesthetic choice of individuals, the result of the “decisions” of the rich to move into working-class neighbourhoods because of a vague and aestheticized category of “desirability” (2007:2). It is important to mention that the main concern of Hulchanski’s analysis was less the plight of the poor than the increasing “decline of the number of middle-income people” in Toronto from 1970 to 2000 (2007:5).

In the absence of situating gentrification in the broader context of “city competitiveness” and the ascendancy of real-estate capital, Hulchanski’s analysis was also infused with environmental determinism. Much similar to United Way’s earlier analysis that blamed the concentration of non-White poverty on the poor in search of affordable housing, Hulchanski (2007:10) also identified “the development of highrise apartment buildings, including many that

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174 Hulchanski argues that “the price of housing is a key determinant of neighbourhood stability or change in societies where the real estate market governs access to housing, with only limited public intervention.” He goes on to say that “if a lower-income neighbourhood has characteristics that a higher-income group finds desirable, gentrification occurs and displacement of the original residents is the inevitable result” (2007:2).
contained social housing” as the cause of the demographic change in City #3. Not surprisingly, his maps of Toronto’s “three cities” were rapidly reproduced within academic and policy discussions (Social Planning Toronto 2009). It was with reference to these maps that the Toronto Board of Trade warned about Toronto’s “Paris problem” in its influential reports in 2009 and 2010.

By 2010, mapping and maps made their way into the mainstream media. Colour-coded maps, based on aggregated data, suddenly turned into the quintessential medium of making visible the apparently invisible social issues, from concentrated poverty to “visible minority” populations, “disorder,” violence, and politics in Toronto. When in February 2010 the Toronto Star published its special multi-part series, Race Matters, maps were an integrated part of the series, maps that looked at the geography and demography of the Toronto Police stop-and-search activities from 2003 to 2008. While one of the major aims of the series was to highlight the practice of racial profiling by the Toronto Police, the publication of a series of maps depicting “where Toronto police lay criminal charges” (Figure 3) reinforced the stigmatization of “priority neighbourhoods” and the links between “suburbs,” concentrated non-White poverty, non-White youth, and “crime” (see Bruser 2010; Welsh 2010).

![Figure 3: Mapping firearm charges across Toronto (Race Matters series)](chart)

Source: Toronto Star (2010)

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175 This is a somewhat misleading statement since only 20% of the rental highrise apartment buildings that Hulchanski refers to here are public housing; 80% of this form of housing stock in Toronto is privately owned by individual owners and small and big property-management companies.
After the victory of the populist Right-wing Rob Ford as the 64th mayor of Toronto on October 25, 2010, maps became the hegemonic medium for grasping local politics in Toronto. Colour-coded maps (Figures 4 and 5) dividing the territories of “Ford voters” (in postwar suburbs) and “Smitherman voters” (in downtown) were used as objective evidence for confirming a territorialized political and cultural war between the assumedly “progressive,” “civilized,” “urbanized” “city”/downtown, and the “traditional,” “uncivilized,” “anti-urban” suburbs. The latter territory was quickly affiliated with an “immigrant-led working-class uprising” (Valpy and Leblanc 2010), “Toronto’s angry (non)-white voters” (National Post 2010), and later, with the “Ford Nation” (also see Kipfer and Saberi 2014).

It was the force of these territories and their “angry” non-White immigrants, so the arguments go, that brought Rob Ford into power in 2010. By providing and normalizing a territorialized explanation for the ascendancy of hard-Right populism in Toronto’s politics, these maps and the analysts and commentators who heavily relied on these maps as the representation of reality easily blamed the ascendancy of hard-Right populism on non-White working-class populations living in the city’s postwar suburbs. In doing so they simplified the historical and spatial complexities of the shift to the Right in politics in Toronto and Canada and normalized territorialized conceptions of politics, urban space, and everyday life (Kipfer and Saberi 2014).

Figure 4: Toronto’s electoral map after the 2010 municipal election
Source: Torontonist (2010)
By mid-December 2010, Hulchanski published an updated version of his 2007 report, *The Three Cities within Toronto: Income polarization among Toronto’s neighbourhoods, 1970-2005* (Figure 6). The updated report reiterated the message of spatial segregation in Toronto while also highlighting the link between crime and poverty and projected the erasure of the “middle-income” Torontonians from the map of Toronto by 2025 (Hulchanski 2010:27). The publication of Hulchanski’s updated report went beyond the usual policy and research circles (mostly affiliated with the pro-urban bourgeois forces in Toronto).\(^{176}\) Benefiting from the extremely territorialized political context of the post-municipal election in 2010, Hulchanski’s updated report forcefully made it on to the public radar, thanks to the raving attention it received from the mainstream media.

\(^{176}\) The 2010 release of the updated *Three Cities* came out almost a month after a symposium on the future of the Tower Neighbourhood Renewal project that was held at the Cities Centre in November 2010.
The media attention it received was partly due to the fetishization of maps and partly to the message of the report: the disappearance of the middle-income Torontonians. The Neighbourhood Change Research Partnership compiled an 81-page report of the media coverage of the release the report on December 15, 2010 (Cities Centre 2010). On the morning of the report’s release, Matt Galloway, the host of CBC Radio One Metro Morning, invited Hulchanski to his popular morning talk show to tell Torontonians about the “Tale of Three Cities.” Hulchanski not only highlighted the findings of his research on segregation and concentration of non-White poverty in Toronto’s postwar suburbs; he also reinforced the link among “suburbs,” violence, and poverty by reminding listeners that although “poverty does not lead to violence,” still “it creates the preconditions for that when you have so many neighbourhoods where people feel they have no place to go” – which is why, he continued, “social scientists worry about [poverty] when they look at this kind of data” (quoted in CBC 2010).

The main message of the report deploiring “the loss of the middle class” was hysterically echoed by the mainstream media and other research institutions. CBC News headlined “Toronto’s middle class shrinking rapidly.” The Globe and Mail allocated its December 15 front page to Hulchanski’s maps of the geography of income polarization in 1970, 2005, and a projection for 2025 under the title: “Toronto a city of extremes, losing the middle ground.” In reference to the
findings of the research, Carol Wilding, president of the Toronto Board of Trade, emphasized that this “continuing trend risks creating pockets of the city that become ‘no-go zones,’” making “it more challenging for business to want to get in there to invest in those neighbourhoods” (quoted in Paperny 2010). Released in the midst of the most politicized moment in Toronto’s urban politics since the 1997 amalgamation and the broader trend of mapping politics, Hulchanski’s maps gave a persuasive “scientific” affirmation to the territorialized depictions of social reality in the city.

A fetishistic fascination with mapping has haunted the fate of urban politics and policy in Toronto. Mapping crime after every shooting accident is now just as a routine ritual of the mainstream media as it is with mapping politics after the elections in 2010, 2014, and 2015 (Toronto Star 2010, 2011, 2012, Florida 2013). Colour-coded maps, along with pictures of poor neighbourhoods and their residents, have become part and a parcel of an increasing number of research papers that build up the seemingly scientific dimension of place-based policy making (and justification) in Toronto. From 2012 to 2015, studies have mapped the concentration of non-White poverty in “tower neighbourhoods” (United Way 2012; CUG+R 2012), “the working poor” (Stapleton, Murphy, and Xing 2012, Stapleton and Kay 2015), unemployment and prosperity “gaps” (Toronto Board of Trade and United Way 2014), neighbourhood walkability (Toronto Public Health 2012a), the health effects of poverty (Toronto Public Health [TPH] 2012b; Urban HEART@Toronto 2014), and diversity in Toronto (Toronto Community Foundation [TCF] 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013).

As map-mediated representations of Toronto’s social geography have increasingly become the hegemonic medium to provide a seemingly objective, scientific visual form of social reality, maps themselves, their function as a mode of expression, their production and the forces behind their production are taken for granted.

The (Geo)Politics of Mapping the “Paris Problem”

Maps and mapping are most often understood as scientific and hence objective. Yet, maps are anything but neutral. In fact, maps are profoundly political constructions (Harley 1988; Black

177 Since the mid-2000s, mapping has become a favourite technique for depicting and talking about social and political issues, not just in Toronto, but also in the United States, the United Kingdom, etc. This is an issue that requires proper research and reflection, which is beyond the scope of this chapter and dissertation.

178 The mappings of Zack Taylor (former professor at the University of Toronto, currently at the University of Western Ontario) are a good example here; see his blog, http://metapolis.ca/?tag=toronto.
Invented in the midst of the Renaissance rediscovery of linear perspective in the sixteenth century, the map was essential to the production of a new conception of space—what Henri Lefebvre (1991) called “the abstract space,” a space dis-embedded from lived and social relations, the space of capital (see Jardine 1997). It was through representing this dehistoricized and depoliticized conception of space as rational, scientific, empty, and measurable that the map became fundamental to the consolidation of capitalist socio-spatial relations, facilitating the production of private property, state formation, and primitive accumulation in Europe and the colonies. By assuming a God-like vision, the map presented the state as an already existing thing, having a shape and visual form, thus obscuring the origins of the modern state in history and violence (Wood 2010:32). Cartography, surveying, and mapping the land were at the heart of the project of capitalist colonization and the establishment of colonial-capitalist property regime, emptying out the colonized land from its hitherto history, erasing the colonial violence of dispossession, and rendering space as an object of calculation and commodification (Blomley 2003; Scott 1998; Godlewska 1994; Harley 1988).

One could easily argue that the colour-coded maps ornamenting policy and research papers on concentrated non-White poverty in Toronto are different from the maps of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. Proponents of mapping perceive the map as an interpretive frame to understand and study spatial organization and segregation of metropolitan centres. In this argument, maps based on aggregated census data reveal the most neutral visualization of the social reality thanks to technological advances in computerization and data processing of geographical information systems (GIS) in the last decade alone. Maps would allow us, so the argument goes, to study spatial organization and demographic characteristics at various scales. By focusing on a small scale such as the neighbourhood, these maps, we are told, give us a bottom-up tool of observing the story of poverty and its effects in different neighbourhoods.

Yet, none of these rationales are either exclusive to mapping or entirely new. When urbanists and planners started using aerial photography in the aftermath of WWII, they too made very similar arguments about the scientific power of aerial photography and its objective use for solving urban problems (see Haffner 2013). The problem with the above arguments is not that they lack novelty. Rather, the problem is twofold: on the one hand, arguments in favour of the current ascendancy of mapping in policymaking are blind to the inherent techno-fetishism of their rationales; on the other hand, these arguments easily assume the apparent authorless condition of maps and ignore the function of maps as ideology and the state apparatus— that is, they ignore the
actual social and material relations and institutions that mapping practices help consolidate (Scott 1998; Neocelous 2003:118–24; Hakli in Herb et al. 2009; Wood 2010; Haffner 2013). To be clear, the issue is not whether maps are bad or good. Rather, the issue is that there is a politics of mapping, because maps are political and ideological (to paraphrase Lefebvre’s (2009) famous dictum on space and the politics of space). The mobilization of maps as a technique for conceiving and perceiving space always requires bringing into analysis the politics of mapping.

Why should we be cautious about the increasing normality of giving maps the power to reveal social reality? In what ways are maps ideological and political? Maps are two-dimensional graphic forms that most often compartmentalize space according to the particular norms, forms, and features of social groups targeted as “problems” (i.e., as objects of political fear). What we see on the maps are, then, visualizations of this flattened-compartmentalized space through the cacophony of various colours and shades, reducing social space and poverty to abstract entities – quantifiable, measurable and traceable. The spaces and “problems” that these visual forms reveal thus flatten the complexity of urban life by detaching it from the socio-spatial relations of neocolonial imperialist capitalism. Think about the very act of mapping poverty. To map poverty, one must first conceive poverty as something mappable, a thing, with definitive edges – rather than a social relation linked to capital as a world system. To map the territory of neighbourhood poverty means to formally define space along the lines set within a particular epistemological and political experience, a way of knowing and dominating. Maps of concentrated non-White poverty, in turn, establish the shape of a bounded space for non-White poverty, the shape of “the dark side of the nation” living in poverty (Bannerji 2000). In doing so, maps give a visual form to the non-White Other and to poverty. In Toronto, this visual form has fluctuated from postwar suburbs and “inner suburbs” to “priority neighbourhoods” and recently to “tower neighbourhoods.”

Mapping and quasi-ethnographic research focused on the who question have been influential in making the non-White working class and their spaces of everyday life into objects of investigation, one that can be visualized on paper and computer screens, showcased in presentations, studied, analyzed, problematized, and ideally transformed by “experts” and through the participation of the objects of intervention – the non-White working class themselves. The view from above that the colour-coded maps of concentrated non-White poverty or elections in Toronto provide is a metonymy for a more general verticalization and hierarchization of class, racialized, and spatial relations of domination and accumulation in the context of an intensified social war in the name of prosperity and competitiveness in the city. Featured through a hierarchy
of alarming colours such as red, orange, yellow, green, and so on in various shades of intensity (which are also used in policing and military visual language), these colour-coded maps are graphically designed to attract the viewers’ eyes toward the “hotspots” of social problems, the “no-go zones” – depicted in dark red or orange, concentrated in particular localities across postwar suburbs. These growing “hotspots” and “no-go zone” are seen simultaneously as being “out there” and yet “close to us” (downtown).

The politics of verticality-hierarchy enmeshed in the politics of mapping contradicts the claims that colour-coded maps reveal the bottom-up reality of Toronto. What they do in practice is to define problems and then abstract them from the reality of their production. If mapping is used as an objective interpretive frame to understand and study spatial organization and segregation in Toronto, a frame that avoid dominant ideologies, why is it that we never see a map of landlords who illegally discriminate against certain “immigrant” groups or tenants? A map of properties of the major real estate companies who donate to the United Way? A map of where major landlords and donors along with their nannies and housekeepers live? A map of the geography of police killings? Rather than de-coding the territorialization of wealth, politics, and power in Toronto, mapping as a “scientific” way of conceiving social reality has turned territorialized politics, policy, and public consciousness into common sense. In doing so, proponents of mapping have masked the ways mapping can contribute to the construction of “the immigrant” as the target of political fear. It was not accidental that the Toronto Board of Trade suddenly became interested in mapping the “Paris problem” in Toronto’s “middle ring.” Maps of concentrated poverty provided the Board with a “scientific” alibi for its imperialist-capitalist politics of fear to normalize the social war in Toronto.

One can detect striking parallels between the politics of the Board’s mapping of the “Paris problem” in Toronto and the imperialist geopolitical mapping of “ungoverned spaces” worldwide. Thomas Barnett’s mapping of a “functional core” and “non-integrating gaps” in his much-celebrated The Pentagon’s New Map (2004) helps us situate mapping “the immigrant” problem in its broader geopolitical context. There are striking parallels between Barnett’s mapping of the “non-integrating gaps” that pose a security threat to international peace and American imperialism and the mapping of concentrated non-White poverty and violence in Toronto. In the logics of both mappings, connectivity is the key, while danger is defined as disconnection. Those places that are unconnected to either the Toronto regional economy (the “middle ring”) or the global economy (the “non-integrating gaps”) are the places where problems will arise, where their problems would
affect not just their localities but would be real threats to the security of the whole system – and thus requiring state–civil society intervention.\footnote{See Toronto Board of Trade (2010:4–11). For analyses of Barnett’s \textit{The Pentagon’s New Map} and its relationship to the “global war on terror” and American imperialism, see Elden (2009) and Dalby (2007).}

Barnett’s argument that globalization in the long run promotes democracy suggests that the middle classes are key to the stability of liberal democracy (Dalby 2007:298). This perception of the middle classes as the cornerstone of political and economic stability is also at the heart of the politics of fear around the “Paris problem” and the construction of the poor non-White working class as the target of political fear in Toronto. Recall how the “loss of the middle income” was and remains the main anxiety of Hulchanski (2007, 2010), the mainstream media, the United Way, and the local state in Toronto. In its depiction of Toronto’s “middle ring,” the Toronto Board of the Trade (2010) underlined the political fragility of these localities as a threat to the city’s economic prosperity. We may juxtapose the “fragile” highrise estates of Toronto’s “middle ring” to the “fragile” states such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Libya and Syria. The former is the space of former colonized subjects marginalized in the “badlands” of the imperial metropole. The latter is the space of former colonies in the “badlands” of our imperial world.\footnote{For the Afghanistan case, see Bell (2011b).} Maps help us conceived both zones as humanitarian spaces in need of tutelage and aid, and as danger zones in need of securitization.

\textbf{Conclusion}

In this chapter, I examined the role of place-based urban policy in the ideological construction of “immigrant neighbourhoods” and their residents as targets of political fear and in need of humanitarian intervention. I did this by tracing the importance of prevention in the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy and the ideological function of mapping. I directed attention to how similar to the broader discourses of international development and humanitarianism concepts such as empowerment, participation, and economic integration have become central to the intervention strategies of the local state in Toronto. These concepts are central to the developmental dimension of state intervention in “problem” localities. Rather than eradicating or even aiming to reduce poverty, I suggested, the goal of development for the “post-colonial” poor is about constituting a low-income individual, less threatening to the political stability of imperialist capitalism. This is best evident in the ways that the current emphasis on empowerment ignores the embedding of
relations of power in relations of empowering the poor and the forms of liberal-colonial recognition inscribed in these relations. It is precisely because of the ideological mobilization of empowerment, participation, and integration that today the main goal of state-led intervention is to “reform” the subjectivities of the targeted populations, whether in the “immigrant neighbourhoods” of the imperial metropole or in the “ungoverned” spaces of the imperial world.

These ideological parallels in the state-led intervention in “problem” localities are not limited to the dominance of particular concepts. One can also situate the increasing political and economic power of philanthro-capitalist forces (e.g., the United Way) in crafting and implementing urban policies of intervention in relation to the broader NGOization of politics and the corporatization of activism. In emphasizing the ideological construction of the “immigrant neighbourhoods” as targets of political fear and state-led intervention, I also directed attention to the forceful ascendancy of a knowledge production industry in Toronto. I focused in particular on mapping as a form of ideological knowledge and the ways mapping can direct us to the relational formation of urban and imperial policies and politics. Challenging the objectivity of mapping, I argued maps and mapping simultaneously reify and reinforce the territorialized and racialized security ideology about “the immigrant” problem. Mapping has also justified the elevation of the scale of neighbourhood (detached from its broader context) as the quintessential territorial unit of analysis and intervention to solve the problem of urban poverty.

In the next chapter, we will see how the City’s reforming of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy since 2012 and the policy mobilities between the local state in Toronto and the World Health Organization cannot be understood without bringing into our analysis the relational formation of urban and imperial policies and politics.
Chapter Seven:
Making Prevention Productive: Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods 2020

Introduction

In early 2012, Council adopted a new place-based policy – the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 (TSNS 2020) – with the aim of reforming and expanding the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy. Despite the City’s emphasis on community consultation, the initial adoption of Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 took place silently. It took almost two years for the policy to be captured by the media. In March 2014, the news of the City’s attempt to reform its place-based urban policy and extend the number of targeted neighbourhoods finally made it into the mainstream media. In this chapter, I extend my analysis of the roles of ideology, politics, and space in the formation of Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020. I trace the relational formation of urban and imperial policies and politics by focusing on policy mobilities among the local state in Toronto and international organizations such as the WHO and the World Bank.

At first glance, the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 appears as a progressive turn in the City’s place-based urban policy. The new policy wants to de-stigmatize the “priority neighbourhoods” by adopting a softer way and a more positive language of targeting. What appears as a positive turn, however, is better understood as a positivist and liberal humanitarian turn, evident in a more intensified fascination with scientism and the incorporation of an urban health measurement tool designed by the WHO – Urban HEART – in the City’s place-based urban policy. I trace the transfer of WHO’s Urban HEART to Toronto and the emphasis on the concepts of equity and the social determinants of health in Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020. I also look at the role of academic institutions and political forces in the production and legitimization of the City’s latest place-based urban policy. Most importantly, I show how state spatial strategies of targeting still build upon the political fear of “the immigrant.” The Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 is also informed by a territorialized and racialized security ideology.
A Liberal Humanitarian Turn

After five years of implementation, the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy came under (at times fierce) criticism. A great part of this criticism came from residents and community workers living and working in the “priority neighbourhoods.” As Cowen and Parlette (2011:6) note with reference to the implementation of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy in Scarborough, the territorialized dimension of the strategy “oversimplifie[d] the spatial complexity of social networks and everyday life” in these neighbourhoods.

Such strategies create arbitrary boundaries for residents and non-profit agencies in accessing resources. Targeted investment creates particular challenges for social service agencies outside of priority neighbourhoods in accessing resources, even as these agencies may often serve residents from within priority neighbourhoods. (Cowen and Parlette 2011:6)

At the same time, the territorialized and racialized dimensions of the Priority Neighbourhoods and TAVIS strategies greatly contributed to the deepening stigmatization of the “priority neighbourhoods” as Toronto’s “no-go zones.” Many residents rightly recognized and reacted to the systematic abjection of their subjectivities and living spaces. At times they appropriated the very “empowering” spaces provided through the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy to criticize the de-humanizing experiences of being Otherized. It became common among youth groups from the “priority neighbourhoods,” for example, to use spoken word, poetry, theatre, and music to debunk the territorial stigmatization of their neighbourhoods as bastions of violence, misery, and vice.181 Many argued that the very designation “priority neighbourhood” and particularly the way the media portrayed these neighbourhoods add to their stigmatization, marginalization, and alienation (James 2012). In my interviews, the problem of stigmatization was a common concern voiced by community activists, community workers, City staff working in Neighbourhood Action Teams, Community Crisis Response, and youth programs.

By the end of June 2011, the Community Development and Recreation Committee under the chairmanship of the Conservative councillor of York-West Giorgio Mammoliti, directed the City’s Social Development, Finance and Administration Department to review and update the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy (City of Toronto 2011). How did this sudden move happen? Did the City embark on reforming the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy because of the criticisms of

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181 The group Nomanzland is one example. Created in 2006, the loose group of youth and artists meet once a week at the West-Side Arts Hub in Jane and Finch to create theatre, poetry, music and art that represent struggles related to marginalization and oppression.
residents and community workers living and working in the “priority neighbourhoods?” The reality is more complicated than a simple yes or no answer. The City’s embarking on policy reform was the result of the contradictions of the place-based urban policy. Parallel to the growing criticisms of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy from those designated by the policymakers as “the community,” other (more powerful) political forces questioned the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy. By 2011, some of the major donors to the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy pressured United Way and the City to show evidence of the results of their investments in these neighbourhoods (14 2013). At the same time, homeowners adjacent to designated “priority neighbourhoods” became more vocal and persistent about their opposition to such a designation.

The official demand for reviewing the policy came from the anti-urban bourgeois forces at the City. It was the Conservative councillor of Etobicoke North, Vincent Crisanti, who initially sent a letter to councillor Mammoliti and proposed the review of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy, emphasizing the need to remove the “priority neighbourhood” label (Crisanti 2011). Between June 2011 and February 2012, the City organized a small-scale community consultation about the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy. Rather than involving residents, however, the consultation involved community organization staff members, City staff, councillors and their staff, members of the Toronto Board Trade, the Toronto Police Service, Toronto Public Health, and representatives from CivicAction.182 Less than a year later, in the early days of March 2012, City Council adopted a new place-based policy, the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 (TSNS 2020).

The most important changes that aim to differentiate Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 from the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy are: a) a shift of policy focus from “community safety” to “the development of the broader opportunities” in order to “ensure that [already achieved] advances in community safety at the neighbourhood level are maintained” (City of Toronto 2012a:7); b) adopting a new designation terminology – “Neighbourhood Improvement Areas” (NIA) – for naming the targeted neighbourhoods; c) basing the territories of the NIA on the boundaries of the City’s 140 social planning neighbourhoods (City of Toronto

182 The so-called public consultation involved a survey of 102 participants in the City’s 13 Neighbourhood Action Partnerships during summer 2011. A series of focus groups were held during Fall 2011, in which 72 residents attended 9 resident engagement sessions, 107 service providers attended 8 sessions for community partners, 44 staff of participating City divisions and City agencies attended two City sessions. Also 10 councillors and 11 councillors’ staff participated in two consultations sessions for City councillors. See City of Toronto (2012b)
d) adopting a monitoring, evaluation and targeting process based on Urban HEART@Toronto; e) an emphasis on equity; f) adding a place-based housing redevelopment strategy (Tower Renewal) to the City’s place-based policy; and g) officially expanding the involvement of United Way in Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020, particularly by bringing together the City’s Tower Renewal Program and United Way’s Tower Neighbourhood Renewal initiative (City of Toronto 2012a:12–13).

The adoption of Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 in 2012 confirmed the consolidation of place-based urban policy and its localized emphasis on a “neighbourhood perspective” in Toronto. It also signalled two interrelated shifts in state-led targeted spatial strategies of development and security in Canada’s major global city. First, there appeared to be a shift in the City’s place-based urban policy, evident in the rhetorical emphasis on development (rather than security) and in the change of the designation terminology of “priority neighbourhoods.” Second, there was an intensified positivist emphasis on scientism and quantitative measurement of social issues, evident in the adaptation of the WHO Urban HEART tool for measuring “neighbourhood equity scores.” As the discussions in the previous chapters show, none of these shifts were entirely new. Rather they were in the making for more than a decade.

Similar to the changes in policing strategies, the seemingly positive shift in place-based development strategies is better understood as a full-fledged turn to a liberal humanitarian ideology in the City’s place-based policy. Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 appears to contradict some major aspects of Wacquant’s (2008) conceptualization of territorial stigmatization. No more “publicly labelled as a ‘lawless zone’ or outlaw estate,” Toronto’s poor neighbourhoods and their majority non-White working-class populations are instead represented in a liberal humanitarian language of need, development, empowerment, and resilience. This liberal humanitarian turn does not mean we are done with the territorialized and racialized security ideology that has been fundamental to the formation and consolidation of place-based policy in

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183 Despite this decision, the City retained the territorial boundaries of the 13 “priority neighbourhoods” as the first Neighbourhood Improvement Areas (City of Toronto, 2012a: 8–9).


185 Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 emboldens the localist dimension of place-based urban policy by calling for a “neighbourhood perspective” to inform the “broader municipal, regional, provincial and national policies, programs and funding priorities” (City of Toronto 2012a:2).
Toronto. However, such a turn does speak to ideological shifts in the politics of state spatial strategies, which should concern critical analysts, activists, and residents. After all, naming in politics, as Bannerji explains elsewhere, is anything but neutral:

[T]here is much invested in the fact of naming, in the words we use to express our socio-political understandings, because they are more than just words, they are ideological concepts. They imply intentions and political and organizational practices…. Contrary to Shakespeare’s assertion that a rose by any other name would smell as sweet, we see that not to be the case in political-ideological matters. In politics the essence of flower lies in the name by which it is called. In fact it is the naming that decides what flower we have at hand. To say this is to say explicitly that discourse is more than a linguistic manoeuvre. It is a matter of putting in words, mediating and organizing social relations of ruling, of meanings organized through power. (2000:41)

According to the City staff members I talked to, the City’s change of designation terminology from “priority neighbourhoods” to “neighbourhood improvement areas” was “a political move” to ameliorate the contradictions of the former policy, by distancing place-based urban policy from the stigmatizing aspects of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy (I22 2013; I23 2013; I192013; I29 2013; see also City of Toronto 2012a:8) and to give a “better image” to the City’s strategies (I21 2013; I19 2013). This political move had partly to do with the contradictions of the place-based policy and policymakers’ recognition that there is a growing public frustration about the stigmatizing effects of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy. A senior City manager involved with the Priority Neighbourhoods and Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 strategies explained that the change in the terminology was a Council decision. Certainly many on Council identified a concern with the term “priority neighbourhood.” There were many residents in priority neighbourhoods that expressed concern with the designation. Actually a fair number of youth started to raise the issue. So, you know, obviously, I listen to council and I care what council has to say, but I also care when youth in the neighbourhoods are expressing challenges with the designation. So, we consulted and went back to council and said, “Here are some options,” and Council chose Neighbourhood Improvement Areas [NIA]…. The thing I like about “NIA” is that we’re trying, to certain extent, to normalize the language, so that it’d be related to BIAs [business improvement areas] or Community Improvement Areas, under planning legislation. So, it was trying to also kind of align the terminology with the existing city terminology. (I3 2014)

While the City did aim to de-stigmatize the designation terminology of its place-based policy, it is important to ask what the policy meant by stigma. Who is the subject of stigma? And who is supposed to benefit from the City’s attempt to de-stigmatize? On closer examination, one
realizes that the City’s attempt to de-stigmatize “priority neighbourhoods” are itself rife with contractions. There was an important political-economic dimension to the Council’s “political request to change the name, not to change the designation,” as a policy analyst at the City put it (I25 2013). In his letter to the Community Development and Recreation Committee, Councillor Crisanti (2011) argued the removal of the “priority neighbourhood” tag “would assist in attracting private investment and contribute to a sense of pride among residents of these neighbourhoods.” The City staff report to council in February 2012 reiterated this concern and linked the problem of stigmatization to the devaluation of real estate in the “priority neighbourhoods.” The report stated “there has been a concern that the term sometimes has a stigmatizing effect, making potential business investors or homebuyers apprehensive about locating there” (City of Toronto 2012a:8).

Both councillors Crisanti and Mammoliti, who were behind the motion to change the designation terminology were concerned about the complaints of middle-income (majority White) homeowners living adjacent to the “priority neighbourhoods” in their ridings (I22 2013; I6 2013; I4 2013). As a former United Way policy analyst explained:

it was people like Mammoliti who were so appalled that his area was named part of the PN [Priority Neighbourhoods] or Crisanti as well. So they are just responding to that call of stigma. Get the focus off of my neighbourhood… I think in each neighbourhood… most of those who push back were from middle-class enclaves, and so they pushed back and came to the city council saying why are you calling our neighbourhoods this? The condo owners in Crescent Town absolutely were saying that before anyone else. (I4 2013)

The stigmatized residents living in the “priority neighbourhoods” were the last to hear about the City’s benevolent attempt to de-stigmatize their living spaces. When I was doing fieldwork during the summer and fall of 2013 (more than a year and a half after the City’s adoption of the NIA terminology), the new terminology was news to many community activists and workers in the “priority neighbourhoods.” This lack of information was partly because the City never had any real community consultations with residents in these areas (I22 2013; I6 2013; I29 2013). At least in the “priority neighbourhoods” of Jane and Finch and Rexdale that fall into the ridings of councillors Mammoliti and Crisanti, no genuine community consultation was organized. A community activist in Rexdale highlighted that:

there has been no authentic consultation. Crisanti only scheduled one, and there was barely any advertisement. He uses his website, and says that’s how he gets the word out to people…. He made sure that he had two of his supporters, and they were supposedly at the meeting, and supposedly they were the ones saying, “We don’t want this priority neighbourhood labelling…. Giorgio Mammoliti has taken that and said, you know, “Priority Neighbourhoods gives my neighbourhood a bad
A senior staff member of United Way Action for Neighbourhood Change in Jane and Finch explained to me:

I don’t know if the consultation happened.... Even myself as a staff member, I just found out about this maybe two or three months ago when we had a meeting [with the City’s] NAPs [Neighbourhood Action Plans].... So we found out from our [NAP] community development worker.... She said, “We don’t call it that [priority neighbourhood] anymore.” It was just like that. It wasn’t even like, “Here’s the change;” it was more like just in passing, “Oh yeah, we’re not supposed to say priority neighbourhoods anymore, it’s supposed to be called blah blah.” I was like, “When did that happen?” So as a staff member, I just found out about it very recently, just randomly.... I didn’t get any e-mails of any consultation, because I usually get things like that and then I pass it on. (I29 2013)

Normalizing the designation terminology of targeted neighbourhoods was also due to the City’s official claim to broaden the focus of its place-based policy beyond community safety to other aspects of development. Part of the critique of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy was directed towards its sole focus on security and youth (I3 2014; I19 2013). In crafting the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020, policymakers at the City instead chose to mobilize a liberal humanitarian discourse and ideology embedded in international development and health politics. Instead of an emphasis on community safety and security, Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 thus focuses on “equity” and the “social determinants of health” in neighbourhood development and incorporates targeted housing redevelopment as part of the strategy. I will focus on the housing question in Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 in the next chapter. For now, let us see how the adoption of the social determinants of health and equity have made their ways to the corridors of the City of Toronto.

**WHO in Toronto: Measuring Poverty and Equity**

On March 9, 2014 the Sunday edition of the *Toronto Star* ran a front-page article notifying Torontonians that the “City wants more areas added to ‘priority’ list” (Doolittle 2014a). It was the first public announcement of Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 and an upcoming policy recommendation to City Council to increase the number of designated “priority neighbourhoods” from 23 to 31 neighbourhoods. Announcing the news a week ahead of Council’s
vote, the *Toronto Star* anticipated heated debates about the new strategy (Doolittle 2014a). Yet the reality of the spread and deepening of poverty in Toronto was quickly buried under the weight of the introduction of a new technique for measuring poverty. The new technique, essentially an assessment tool, is said to provide each neighbourhood with a “neighbourhood equity score:” “a single number designed to capture the total weight of unnecessary, unfair and unjust differences faced by neighbourhood residents” (City of Toronto 2014b). The City analysts calculate “equity scores” by using Urban HEART@Toronto, itself an adaptation of the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Urban HEART, which monitors health-related factors in and across the cities in the Global South.

Like a mesmerizing smell of a rose, the positivist aura of Urban HEART@Toronto washed away the pain of the thorny reality of poverty in the city. Health researchers involved with crafting Urban HEART@Toronto heralded the new technique as “a quick way to take the pulse of a city,” an “objective, user-friendly tool to identify health inequalities and plan actions to reduce them” (quoted in Shepherd 2014). For senior managers at the City, such “an evidence-based standard for measuring the well-being of Toronto’s neighbourhoods” (City of Toronto 2014b) was “ground-breaking work” (quoted in Strobel 2014, Doolittle 2014b) in producing data and tracking the impacts of investments. Urban HEART would allow “each neighbourhood to be measured, a little like a blood pressure reading or body temperature taken,” explained Sarah Rix (a senior policy development officer at the City) at a consultation session on the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 (quoted in Baldwin 2014).

Meanwhile, the mainstream media reiterated the positivist representation of the City’s new technique of targeting poverty. The new tool, *The Globe and Mail* confirmed, is a “more sophisticated model” (Church 2014). Urban HEART, according to the *Toronto Star*, is “a solid, evidence-based” strategy which “this city needs to help draft programs improving the lives of the residents at risk” (Toronto Star 2014). In anticipation of the City Council vote on March 17, the *Toronto Star* ran two editorials reminding the councillors (and the public) that the “Urban HEART program… can point the way to a better Toronto” (Toronto Star 2014a), hence, “[l]et new data guide the way” (Toronto Star 2014b). The new strategy of targeting, a *Toronto Star* editorial of March 10 applauded, is “a bold shift in direction.” For their part, supportive councillors from different political spectrums publicly declared their trust in the “robust” research method that is able to give Torontonians “the clearest possible picture of where the needs are” (quoted in Church 2014).
On March 17, City council approved the expansion of designated targeted neighbourhoods and re-approved the use of Urban HEART@Toronto as the major tool for the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 to monitor and target poverty in and across the city. In what appeared as a consensus among social democrat, liberal, and Third-Way neoliberal forces, words such as scientific, objective, and evidence-based turned into common adjectives describing the new state strategy of measuring and targeting socio-spatial problems. The few quick references to the WHO in the media and by researchers and policymakers were all meant to reinforce the “scientific” dimension of the new strategy. The public was to believe that if the WHO researchers design a framework, it should be scientific and objective by nature.

This positivist fascination with Urban HEART has pushed aside more substantial, political questions about the formation of the City’s latest place-based urban policy of targeting poverty. How did Urban HEART make its way to the City of Toronto? Why did Canada’s global city suddenly invest in adapting a strategy drafted for cities in developing countries? What are the epistemological pillars of defining and measuring equity? Objectively speaking, how is it possible to deal with a socio-political and spatial phenomenon such as poverty by quantitatively measuring equity like blood pressure, body temperature, and pulse?

Urban HEART stands for Urban Health Equity Assessment and Response Tool. Toronto is the first (and so far the only) Western city to mobilize the WHO Urban HEART framework. The framework has its roots in the broader social determinants of health movement and the emphasis on prevention in the WHO. As mentioned in Chapter Five, this policy direction was heavily boosted under the former WHO Director-General Lee Jong-Wook from 2003 and particularly after the launch of the WHO Commission on Social Determinants of Health (CSDH) in 2005. Soon after, in a joint project the WHO Centre for Health Development in Kobe (Japan) and WHO regional offices as well as city and national officials from the Global South developed the Urban HEART tool. It was first introduced in 2008 as a pilot project to “facilitate the process of proactively addressing health inequities” in major cities of developing countries in order to meet the United Nation’s millennium development goals (WHO 2010:3).

\[186\] City council had already approved the use of Urban HEART@Toronto in 2012, when it approved the first draft of the new Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 policy. What was new in 2014 was the application of Urban HEART and the actual targeting and designation of the “priority” neighbourhoods. \[187\] Jong-Wook was director-general from 2003 to 2006. Under his leadership, action on social determinants of health was identified as key to strengthening global “health equity.” In his address to the 57th World Health Assembly in May 2004, Lee announced WHO’s intention to create a global commission on health determinants to advance equity and strengthen the organization’s technical and policy support to member states, particularly developing countries (Lee 2004; Irwin and Scali 2007:251).
After two years of running pilot versions of Urban HEART in 17 cities in ten countries of Global South, the WHO officially launched the Urban HEART framework in 2010. The opening lines of the official document explicitly situate Urban HEART in relation to the 1978 Alma-Ata Declaration of “Health for All” (WHO 2010:4). The aim of Urban HEART is said to be tackling public health challenges in the rapidly urbanizing cities of the developing world. As such, the framework is meant to “guide local policy-makers and communities through a standardized procedure of gathering relevant evidence and planning efficiency for appropriate actions to tackle health inequities” (WHO 2010:5). Two years after its official adoption by the WHO, Urban HEART in 2012 found its way into Toronto’s policy circles via the Centre for Research on Inner City Health (CRICH) – a research centre affiliated with the University of Toronto and St. Michael’s Hospital.

While Urban HEART®Toronto is celebrated for its scientific allure (CRICH 2014:20, 3; City of Toronto 2013; 2014b), its arrival in Toronto’s urban policy corridors had less to do with robust, scientific research than with the increasing hegemony of Third Way multi-sector, multi-scale partnerships and policy mobilities as well as the broader strategy of the WHO to extend the application of Urban HEART beyond the Global South (WHO 2010). One of the City’s senior policy development officers involved with Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 described the arrival of Urban HEART in Toronto as such:

We were involved in an intersectoral table that was looking at health equity and the table didn’t have a specific mandate at that point.... We recognized we were all involved in what could be broadly seen as equity or health equity issues that would intersect of their own nature, and tried to see if there was something we needed to do together or to co-ordinate. The idea about trying to adapt the Urban HEART model came up as part of that table, and a few of us thought it was a good idea to look at adapting this model because it wasn’t for urban contexts like Toronto. One of the partners, the Centre for Research on Inner City Health, had been involved in developing the original tool [with the WHO] and they were interested in adapting it to Toronto, seeing if it would even work. So we got a research grant. It was sort of one of these opportunity things. The opportunity to partner with people to adapt it arose, and it provided us with, you know, a defensible and reasonable framework for looking at the equities across the city, which is something we wanted to do, as part of [Toronto] Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020. We don’t have the internal capacity to develop and adapt such a tool ourselves. It was done by others, which is a good thing, I think. So that was

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188 These cities include Guarulhos (Brazil); Jakarta and Denpasar (Indonesia); Tehran (Iran); Nakuru (Kenya); State of Sarawak (Malaysia); Mexico City (Mexico); Ulaanbaatar (Mongolia); Davao, Naga, Olongapo, Paranaque, Tacloban, Taguig, and Zamboanga (Philippines); Colombo (Sri Lanka); and Ho Chin Minh City (Vietnam).
basically how it came out. We didn’t go searching for all the possible ways to look at the social determinants of health or to see whether the “social determinants of health” was the framework we wanted to use. (I25 2013)

The above-mentioned intersectoral table was a planned initiative of the Centre for Research on Inner City Health (CRICH) as part of the WHO’s attempt to broaden the application of Urban HEART. A senior director at WoodGreen Community Services, one of the organizations partnering in the development of Urban HEART@Toronto, explained that,

...It was the Centre for Research on Inner City Health (CRICH) who came forward to United Way and the City and said, “Hey, we have this new project, we think it’s really important to talk about health equity and [it is] important to remember that it’s a health equity tool….” So they said, “We want to develop this new tool and spark the policy dialogue of what are the different impacts of community structure that create health problems for people.” United Way and the City said, “Yeah, let’s do that.” The Toronto Public Health, with their health mandate, also came and said, “We would be partners on this.” But as the project unfolded, the City recognized that it could be one of the important tools that they can use as part of their measurement for this neighbourhood strategy that they have. (I4 2013)

With the City’s partnership research grant and under the directorship of Dr. Pat O’Campo, Centre for Research on Inner City Health initiated and led the process of adapting the WHO Urban HEART framework for Toronto in partnership with United Way, “civil-society” organizations (e.g., WoodGreen Community Services, the Toronto Local Health Integration Network (LHIN), the Canadian Institute of Health Research), and the local state institutions (the City of Toronto Social Planning, Finance and Administration Department, Toronto District School Board). The result of this multi-sector, multi-scalar partnership is Urban HEART@Toronto, a data-gathering and targeting tool that forms the cornerstone of the “neighbourhood lens” of the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 to assess and map equity and to craft policy for targeting social problems associated with concentrated poverty.

Conceptually, Urban HEART@Toronto is a replica of the WHO Urban HEART. In a show of allegiance to the WHO, the Toronto version even uses the same logo and colour on its cover page and in its page headers. The WHO Urban HEART emphasizes the social determinants of health by focusing on four main policy domains: physical environment and infrastructure; social and human development; economics; and governance (Commission on Social Determinants of Health 2008; WHO 2010a). Urban HEART@Toronto “measures neighbourhood-level indicators of local health and well-being in five main domains: “economic opportunities; social and human development; civic engagement; physical environment and local infrastructure; and physical and
mental health” (CRICH 2014: 5). TSNS 2020, in turn, takes these five domains as the “5 keys to neighbourhood wellbeing” based on which the City will constantly measure, monitor, map, target, and designate the neighbourhoods in need of state intervention (City of Toronto 2014a:3). It is this framework that the City policymakers used to designate the 31 neighbourhoods as “priority neighbourhoods” in 2014.

At first glance, Urban HEART@Toronto and the City’s focus on equity and targeting “inequity” appear as a move towards more progressive policy making. After all, in the midst of austerity, the fact that the City of Toronto and its policymakers show concern about residents’ well-being and “neighbourhood equity” across the city is, in itself, a promising move. But so far, this emphasis has only been a shallow façade of the policy. In fact, the new place-based urban policy is very vague on the responsibilities of the state in regards to residents’ well-being. More than the Priority Neighbourhood strategy, the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 emphasizes and builds upon the role of the private sector and “civil society” to do place-based policy making and implementation. This is specifically important given the fact that one of the major critiques to the Priority Neighbourhood strategy was the issue of funding sustainability and, in particular, the lack of stable government funding for projects (I6 2013; I13 2013; I18 2013; I22 2013; I29 2013; I31 2013). With its heavy emphasis on the private sector and United Way, the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 has failed to address this criticism.

While the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 is in the early steps of design and implementation, and it is yet to be seen how it would unfold on the ground, so far there are no guarantees in the policy that the City would provide more stable and democratic forms of funding in the targeted neighbourhoods. It is particularly because of this aspect of the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 – its silence on the role of the local state – that conservative councillors have lined up in support of the City’s latest place-based urban policy (I25 2013). But the policy’s vagueness does not mean a shrinking role of the local state. According to a community activist in the Jane and Finch neighbourhood, by having United Way and the private sector on the frontline of funding and policy implementation, the City has deepened the corporatization and co-optation of community activism (I6 2013).
Prevention and the Social Determinants of Neighbourhood Health: A Travelogue

The current focus on the social determinants of health did not simply emerge from objective, scientific evaluations of previous health policies and their pitfalls. The concept of prevention was imperative to the popularity of the concept in international health policy and beyond. The by-now popularized emphasis on the social determinants of health emerged in a global context characterized by a few interrelated conditions, namely: 1) a growing awareness of deepening world poverty and a policy move towards “the end of poverty” (Roy 2010); 2) the resultant “local” and “social” turns in development and re-emergence of neo-colonial trusteeship (Hart 2009); 3) a deepening of the nexus of security and development, with poverty being increasingly associated with violence, “terrorism,” and social unrest (Duffield 2008, 2010; Kaldor 1999; Barnett 2004); 4) the intensification of imperialist aggressions and wars in the Global South; 5) a politicized xenophobic obsession with migration flows; and 6) a growing awareness of worldwide urbanization.

We have already mentioned how the concept of the social in the influential 2005 WHO commission on the social determinants of health is dehistoricized (see Chapter Five). I now want to direct attention to relations between the current emphasis on the social determinants of health and the geopolitics of development and security. The links among poverty, disease, and security are central to the WHO emphasis on the social determinants of health. We can trace such links to the way the WHO situated Urban HEART and social determinants of health in relation to achieving the United Nations’ millennium development goals (United Nations 2005). The major goal of the millennium development goals is said to be facilitating “the means to a productive life” for the poor (United Nations 2005:4). How to define and actualize “a productive life” is of course an extremely ideological and political struggle. In fact, one could say that actualizing “a productive life” has been the ideological and political struggle since the dawn of capitalism.

\[^{189}\text{The year 2000 marked the publication of the World Bank 2000–2001 World Development Report,} \textit{Attacking Poverty} \text{and to what Anaya Roy has called a shift from “the end of history” to “the end of poverty” among development policy makers (2010:16). The year 2000 also marked the adoption of the “United Nations Millennium Declaration” for setting the values and principles of development. In 2005, the United Nations Millennium project taskforce published its report} \textit{Investing in development: A practical plan to achieve the Millennium Development Goals}. \text{While the broad scopes of the millennium development goals – poverty reduction, health improvement, and the promotion of peace, human rights, gender equality, and environmental sustainability – appear to include socio-political and ecological dimensions of development, a deeper look at how these goals are defined and said to be achieved illuminates how the concrete socio-spatial relations of imperialist-capitalist uneven development are dehistoricized and naturalized.}\]
Marx’s (1992 [1844]) critique of the political economy of capitalism in *Capital Volume I* and in the *1844 Manuscripts* is based on a defence of a humanist conception of productive life, one that would facilitate the development of human potentials that are denied under capitalism. This denial of a humanist productive life is precisely because of the alienated nature of humans’ relation to their productive activity. Productive activity in capitalism is, for Marx, “active alienation, the alienation of activity, the activity of alienation” (1992[1844]:326). Rather than an affirmation of human capacity, capitalist productive activity progressively diminishes the qualities that mark a person as a human being, denying the fulfillment of human’s productive activity.

From the very beginning pages of the United Nations report, it is clear that the adjective “productive” in the project of building “a productive life” for the poor refers not to human capacity, but to capitalist productivity:

A healthier worker is a more productive worker. A better-educated worker is a more productive worker. Improved water and sanitation infrastructure raised output per capita through various channels, such as reduced illness. So, many of the Goals are part of capital accumulation, defined broadly, as well as desirable objectives in their own right. (United Nations 2005:4)

The goals of poverty reduction, health improvement, the promotion of peace, gender equity, and so on are set to facilitate and secure capital accumulation. Poverty alleviation is only possible through the integration of the poor into the market economy. Productivity functions as a code word for domination over the poor and the excluded.

Those subject positionalities (the poor, the working class, the former colonized) that are constantly (re)produced by socio-spatial relations of imperialist capitalism are also the ones that constantly need to be contained (and kept under domination) since they are conceived as security threats to the system that feeds upon their exploitation. Not surprisingly, in its conception of poverty and strategies of alleviating poverty, *Investing in Development* (United Nations 2005) reiterates the 2000–2001 *Attacking Poverty* report (World Bank 2000). Poverty is conceptualized as “risk” and “vulnerability,” an unfortunate result of disconnection from or lack of proper integration into the market. The *Millennium Development Goals* report goes on to declare poverty reduction as “a linchpin of global security:”

Poor and hungry societies are much more likely than high-income societies to fall into conflict over scarce vital resources.... Many world leaders in recent years have rightly stressed the powerful relationship between poverty reduction and global security. Achieving the Millennium Development Goals should therefore be placed
centrally in international efforts to end violence, conflict, instability and terrorism.
(United Nations 2005:6)\(^{190}\)

It is this link between poverty and global security that is central to the ascendency of prevention in the politics of development and security. This argument lies at the heart of the geopolitics of the empire of capital (Wood 2003) and its “war on terror” turned into the “long war” (Klassen and Albo 2013). Arguing that poverty is the source and cause of war, conflict, and insecurity, *Investing in Development* (similar to *Attacking Poverty*) erases the ways that poverty and violence have been historically produced as the result of capitalist uneven development, colonization, imperialist wars, and exploitation. The report firmly situates itself within the broader liberal discourse on development and security, wherein the goal of development is neither the eradication of poverty nor the development of human potentials, but rather prevention – the containment of potential threats to the imperialist-capitalist world order that emanate from the zones of poverty (Duffield 2010; Wilson 2012; Immerwahr 2015).

The obsession with worldwide poverty has also resulted in compelling geographical imaginations of poverty and insecurity, from “Africa” to “failed states” and “slums.” The focus on “slums” has shifted attention to the phenomenon of worldwide urbanization. The 2008 report of the WHO Commission on the Social Determinants of Health was accompanied by the organization’s renewed focus on urbanization after the modernization era of the 1950s and the 1960s. It is important to mention that the focus on urbanization is a focus on urban poverty rather than on the production of urban poverty through capitalist urbanization, displacement, and dispossession. The goal is to manage and contain urban poverty through “participatory urban governance” and “urban planning and design” (WHO 2008b: ix, xi, 21, 30, 33, 39, 53, 55).

In 2008, the Knowledge Network on Urban Settings (KNUS), a research body established by the WHO Commission on Social Determinants of Health, published its report for the WHO Commission, *Our Cities, Our Health, Our Future: Acting on Social Determinants for Health Equity in Urban Settings*. The report emphasized “urban development and town planning” as “key to creating supportive social and physical environments for health and health equity” (WHO 2008b: iii). *Our Cities* further linked poverty, health, and security by highlighting urban poverty not only

\(^{190}\)To back up this argument, *Investing in Development* quotes statesmen such as King Abdullah of Jordan (January 23, 2004), former British Prime Minister Tony Blair (October 7, 2004), former US president George W. Bush Jr. (March 14, 2004), former French president Jacques Chirac (May 26, 2004), former Brazilian president Luiz Lula da Silva (September 21, 2004), and former German chancellor Gerhard Schroder (2001), among others. All had stressed “the fight for global security – to stop war, internal violence, terror, and other ills of profound instability – requires success in the battle against poverty as well” (United Nations 2005:7).
as the source of “unhealthy living” (WHO 2008b:viii), but also as the source of “urban violence and crime” (WHO 2008:ix) and lack of social cohesion (WHO 2008:x). None of these reports question the very principles of capitalist urbanization. Rather, here too the goal is to “empower” the poor and integrate them into the market economy through more “efficient” urban planning and governance. Urban poverty is perceived less as a threat to the poor as human beings than as the threat that the poor (out of their frustration with unending circles of poverty) pose to the imperialist-capitalist order.

WHO Urban HEART (with its policy emphasis on the social determinants of health in urban contexts) was produced in this broader context. In 2010, when the WHO officially rolled out Urban HEART, the organization also sponsored the Global Forum on Urbanization and Health in Kobe, Japan, with Canada as one of the participants at the Forum. The forum emphasized the role of cities in concentrating “opportunities and risks to health” and the need for “particular attention” “to the urban poor and disadvantaged:”

City planners and policy-makers must have a clear picture of the social and economic health determinants – information broken by neighbourhood, gender, age, employment – and use the data to guide effective health actions. (WHO 2010b:4)

The forum also gave its collective support to “scal[ing]-up Urban HEART implementation to new countries and cities through WHO Regional Officers” (WHO 2010b:5). The interest of the University of Toronto Centre for Inner City Health, in adapting Urban HEART for Toronto, came out of this already set strategy of “scaling up” Urban HEART implementations.191

When seen from this broader perspective, it becomes clear that the emphasis on the social determinants of health is neither anchored in a genuine concern about the well-being of human beings as human beings nor in a concrete grasping of the role of socio-spatial and racial relations in the production of urban poverty. Fearful of and obsessed with a need to prevent threats to the global security of imperialist capitalism, the emphasis on social determinants of health is rather about moderating the violence of poverty, smoothing the hard edges of capitalist development, extending the geographical depth of the markets, facilitating capital accumulation and producing a proper labour force in order to secure (the hegemony of) the imperialist-capitalist order.

191 The Centre for Research on Inner City Health was a participant of the 2010 WHO forum (WHO 2010b).
The Fetish of Equity in Place-based Urban Policy

What about the recent emphasis on equity in Toronto’s place-based urban policy? One comes across the term equity a few times on every page of the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 (City of Toronto 2014b). Outflanking creativity, equity is now the new buzzword that can be added to anything and everything. We have “neighbourhood equity score,” “neighbourhood equity benchmarks,” “equity across all neighbourhoods,” “Toronto Youth equity strategy,” “neighbourhood equity measurement,” “equity area,” “equity-focused,” “place-based equity work,” “population-focused equity efforts,” “equity issues,” “equity-building,” “equity lens,” “equity indicator,” and “equity index.” What is the definition of equity? Why such obsessive emphasis on equity rather than equality at our current conjuncture?

Equity and policy are not strangers to each other, of course. The history of their institutional marriage goes back to the late 1960s in the United States. In 1971, H. George Frederickson (1971) introduced the term “social equity” into the canon of public administration theory (Guy and McCandless 2012). Since the 1990s, equity policies (e.g., affirmative action, positive discrimination) with the official goal of diversifying the workforce and challenging systematic forms of racism and sexism, have (increasingly) become part of (the strategies of) public institutions in the Anglophone world and parts of Europe. Today, these equity strategies are an important part of diversity management in public institutions in countries such as the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom (Ahmed 2012).

Since the mid-2000s, the rhetoric of equity as fairness has also made it into the international development policies of the World Bank and the WHO. The current emphasis on equity in Toronto’s place-based urban policy has its immediate roots in this latter trend. It was under the leadership of Paul Wolfowitz that the World Bank first popularized the concept of equity in relation to development with reference to “fairness” and “justice.” The World Bank 2006 World

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192 These policies of course have not been immune from criticism both from the right and the left. While for the right, such equity policies are seen as a discrimination against the White population and particularly against men, for some of the left critics such equity policies (more than challenging systematic racism and [hetero]sexism in institutions) have turned into a tool for diversity management, with the aim of containing conflict and dissent related to systematic forms of discrimination. For a critical take on equity policies in public (academic) institutions, see Ahmed (2012).

193 The goal of WHO Urban HEART is the “assessment” of “urban health equity” and the eradication of “inequity in health,” which is defined as “a difference in health that is systematic, socially produced (and, therefore, modifiable) and unfair” (WHO 2010:8, 9). Urban Heart® Toronto and Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 reiterate and build upon this conception of equity as fairness (CRICH 2014:5; City of Toronto 2014).
Development Report entitled *Equity and Development* announced equity as a fundamental dimension of poverty reduction and market prosperity.\textsuperscript{194} Heavily indebted to John Rawls’ (1971) theory of justice (World Bank 2005:19; 77), the 2006 report defined a liberal conception of equity based on two basic principles: “equal opportunities” and “avoidance of deprivation in outcome” (Wolfowitz 2005:xii). Equity, defined as such, is not antagonist to “the major emphases in development thinking of the past 10 to 20 years – on markets, on human development, on governance, and on empowerment” (World Bank 2005:17). Rather, equity as such “builds and integrates” and “extends existing approaches” (World Bank 2005:226).

The World Bank’s two principles of equity are translations of Rawls’ second principle of justice as fairness, wherein social and economic inequalities are not to block “fair equality of opportunity” and “are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the *difference principle*)” (1971:42–3). Writing from the chambers of Harvard University,\textsuperscript{195} Rawls published his theory of justice in the same year (1971) that Frederickson released his theory of social equity. But unlike the latter, which remained limited to mainstream debates on public administration, Rawls’ (1971) theory of justice, which he later linked to international relations and foreign policy (see Rawls 1999), has been influential for the development of liberal thought in the late twentieth century.

The influence of his theory has less to do with the depth of Rawls’ thought than with the way his theory of justice functions as a political and philosophical legitimization of an unjust liberal capitalist society, at best moderating the violence of exploitation and domination in the name of fairness. With the idea of justice as fairness, Rawls (1971) attempted to redefine the social contract for late twentieth-century liberal society. His two principles of justice as fairness aim to provide a just design for political constitution (first principle) and to regulate fair economic institutions (second principle).\textsuperscript{196} Rawls, however, takes the capitalist market, private property, and social relations of capitalism for granted and hence treats inequality as a problem of distribution of goods. He thus constructs justice not against, but rather from existing legal, economic, and political relations and practices of imperialist capitalism. As a result, he erases the injustice that is

\textsuperscript{194} In the same year, equity was the focus of the Human Development Report of the UN Development Programme.

\textsuperscript{195} Rawls was at Harvard University for almost 40 years, starting in 1962.

\textsuperscript{196} Rawls’ first principle of justice as fairness is “each person has the same indefeasible claim of a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all” (1971:42–3).
embedded in and integral to capitalist relations, private property, and the market economy (Wolff 1977).

Rawls’ (1971; 1999) conception of liberal society is extremely dehistoricized and blind to socio-political and racial relations of domination and exploitation. Yet, if his theory of justice is abstract and detached from history, his attempt to legitimize injustice in the name of justice as fairness was the concrete outcome of the historical conjuncture of the mid-twentieth-century United States. Confronted with the surge of Black radicalism and a crisis of the entire social formation, both its economic content and political form, the White liberal American establishment of the 1960s witnessed one of its most volatile periods of hegemony. It was in this historical context that Frederickson (1971) put forward his theory of social equity in public administration and Rawls (1971) proposed his theory of justice with an emphasis on “equal opportunity.”

It is thus not surprising that some thirty years later the World Bank policymakers found political utility in Rawls’ theory of justice to frame their development strategies with reference to equity. Inequality is understood not as a barbaric feature of our human civilization under capitalism, but as an unfortunate reality that without intervention would turn into a major cause of “civil conflict” and an imminent threat to the security of imperialist capitalism (see World Bank 2005:118, 129, 161). Equity as such is imperative for the efficiency of the market and the stability of market growth (World Bank 2005:89, 129). Equity is about “achieving more equal access to markets” (World Bank 2005:178), facilitating the integration of the poor and the wretched of the earth into the socio-spatial relations of imperialist capitalism, as if they are not already the products of those same relations.

How have urban policymakers translated these concepts into place-based urban policy in Toronto? In its emphasis on the social determinants of health, the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 and Urban HEART@Toronto are concerned with the symptoms of urban poverty and uneven development rather than their causes. The “5 keys of neighbourhood wellbeing” – economic opportunities, social and human development, civic engagement, physical environment and local infrastructure, and physical and mental health – are all the outcomes of the socio-spatial, economic, and racial relations of capitalist urbanization in the Toronto region. At the very best, the aim of the policy is to modify some aspects of these outcomes, rather than tackling the processes of their production.

197 Part of this shortcoming relates to Rawls’ epistemology. Rawls’ (1971) conceptions of citizens and society are very abstract, based on pure reason, and detached from society and history. This is most evident in his conception of an “original position.”
The very quantification of equity (as in “neighbourhood equity score” or “equity measurement”) is only possible by flattening, abstracting, and fragmenting the racialized socio-spatial relations of inequality and poverty. Equity thus works as an ideological tool for the management of urban poverty. How is it possible, for example, to address neighbourhood equity and social determinants of poverty and health in a city like Toronto without understanding racism, racial domination, and exploitation as keys to people’s “wellbeing?” Racism, as Fanon (1967) forcefully reminded us, is a lived ideology and an alienating social relation that is mediated through spatial organization (Kipfer 2011). And yet, the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 easily and smoothly erases racism from the production of space and the everyday reality of concentrated non-White poverty in Toronto. Not only is racism not considered as key to urban-human wellbeing, but it also does not show up in any of the 15 benchmarks of measuring equity and fairness.

Ironically, the erasure of systemic racism has taken place at a time when research on the “immigrant problem” in Toronto has shown the systematic impacts of racism in labour and housing markets (Block and Galabuzi 2011; Stapleton Murphy, and Xing 2012; Block 2013). Such erasure is the result of a politically conscious decision to not wrestle with power relations. The consequence is an ideological conflation of causes and symptoms of systemic racism. One can see this in the way that policymakers at the City justify sidestepping the problematic of racism in urban policy. A city staff person involved in framing the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 told me:

[Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020] doesn’t surface the issues of racism or sexism directly…. These [five] keys are based on a modified social determinants of health framework that came to us from the Urban Heart tool. That tool specifically focuses on things that are actionable, and then looks at the populations afterwards, who are affected; and the reason for that [lack of focus on racism] is that race is not actionable. (I  25 2013)

The ideological mobilization of equity and the social determinants of health were also evident in the processes of “community consultation” after the City adopted the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 in 2012. From October 3 to November 5, 2013 the City organized nine (first eight and later another) community consultations on “the key issues facing Toronto’s neighbourhoods.” Given that “participation in decision making” is one of the five “keys of neighbourhood well-being,” one would think that the City would have facilitated the participation of residents from the “priority neighbourhoods” in crafting the policy, which would directly affect their life. Alas, it did not.
Out of the initial eight community consultations, only three were located in the “priority neighbourhoods” – two in Scarborough and one in north Etobicoke. 108 The lack of community consultation in neighbourhoods already struggling with poverty and targeted by the City as “priority neighbourhoods” infuriated residents and community activists in some of these areas. In particular, the residents of Jane and Finch did not take lightly the absence of their neighbourhood from the consultations. On October 8, 2013, the resident-based anti-poverty group Jane-Finch Action against Poverty (JFAAP 2013) wrote an open letter to the City of Toronto “denouncing the City’s phony ‘consultation:’”

Those who have limited access to private and public means of transportation or internet and who live in “priority” neighbourhoods, such as our area, have clearly been excluded from the process. We are dismayed that there will be no consultation in the Jane and Finch community and for that matter the whole North West North York…. The persistence of a very high level of poverty, unemployment as well as targeted policing and a wide-range of other socio-economic barriers in racialized neighbourhoods like Jane and Finch means that we need to have stronger voices in order to achieve real social and economic justice…. We are therefore calling on the City of Toronto and those in charge to expand these consultations in order to ensure that community residents will have easy access to these meetings. (Jane-Finch Action against Poverty 2013)

Confronted with an unexpected resident-based backlash, the City announced on October 23 the addition of a “community conversation” in the Jane and Finch neighbourhood to take place on November 5. As opposed to other community consultations in which City staff members and (out of the area) professionals numbered more than residents, more than 200 residents attended the meeting at Oakdale Community Centre. Residents and activists were concerned about the content of consultation, and in particular, the city’s sole emphasis on the “key” social determinants of health. It was argued that:

Those attending were presented with a set of meaningless “keys” instead of addressing true needs of our communities. These were crudely adapted from a model used by the World Health Organization which deals with global poverty (i.e., access to clean drinking water, education, sanitation, etc.). This excluded issues of local concerns such as access to housing, low minimum wages, transit city, City cutbacks, over policing, etc. All of these were brought up by community

108 These consultations were held at 91 Eastpark Boulevard on October 3, 2013 (12:00–2:00 pm), 2450 Birchmount Road on November 1, 2013 (7:00–9:00pm), 430 Burnhamthorpe Road on October 18, 2013 (7:00–9:00pm), 1 Hanson Street (downtown east) on October 7, 2013 (7:00–9:00 pm), the City of Toronto on October 21, 2013 (6:00–8:00pm), 851 Mount Pleasant Road (a mid-town gentrified neighbourhood) on October 22, 2013 (7:00–9:00pm), and 430 Burnhamthorpe Road (south Etobicoke) on October 18 (7:00–9:00pm).
residents in the follow-up meeting, but none of these issues were addressed. (Jane-Finch Action against Poverty 2014)

Jane-Finch Action against Poverty and local residents were not the only ones who criticized the abstractness of the City’s “key” areas of action. This concern was also voiced loudly in at least three other consultations in Scarborough, downtown east, and midtown. The City also failed to provide residents with the results of community consultations. More importantly, none of the concerns voiced during the consultation meetings were included in the final drafting of the policy, which came out in 2014 (City of Toronto 2014d). The policy that appears to advocate equity as fairness easily undermined fairness and equity in the process of its own decision-making.

Has the current emphasis on equity and the social determinants of health signalled the end of the political fear of “the immigrant” and the racialized and territorialized security ideology of targeting poverty? The short answer is: not at all.

The Recurring Spectacle of the “Paris problem”

As the City staff embarked on reviewing and updating the “priority neighbourhood” strategy in 2011, once again the spectre of riots emanating from Toronto’s poor “immigrant neighbourhoods” haunted the imagination of the media pundits in Toronto. On August 4, 2011 the London Metropolitan Police Service (LMPS) fatally shot a Black youth, Mark Duggan, in Tottenham Hale district of London, United Kingdom. Following the death of Duggan, Tottenham and several other London boroughs quickly turned into the sites of youth unrest between August 6 and 11. As the unrests in London spread to other towns and cities in England between August 8 and 11, their vibrations and fear were also felt in Toronto. Christopher Hume (2011) was quick to remind the Toronto Star readers: “it’s a long way from Tottenham to Toronto, but not as long as we might like,” since here in Toronto “many of same conditions prevail.” Hume’s (2011) comparison is evidenced, “[t]o begin with, there is a growing number of young men, aged roughly 15 to 20, largely immigrant, who feel little connection to the larger community. This sense of disenfranchisement, mixed with growing inner-suburban decay, perceived police hostility, overcrowding and lack of decent jobs, do not bode well for the future of Toronto.”


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199 This is based on my own observation at these consultation meetings.
suburbs” to Brampton, Vaughan, and Markham. He did not shy away from propagating a territorialized and racialized politics of fear. The exodus of the middle-income populations from the “inner suburbs” is not just a threat to these areas; rather, he reminded the readers, it is also a threat to downtown Toronto.

In the British experience, rioting is neighbourhood-focused and occurs on the nearest high street. The communities most at risk in Toronto – priority neighbourhood such Jane/Finch, Rexdale and Eglinton/Kennedy – have no equivalent district. There are malls, highways and subdivisions, none particularly conducive to a riot. This means that the violence here would probably unfold downtown, where context and opportunities abound. (Hume 2011)

John Michael McGrath (2011) reprinted Hume’s article in Toronto Life the next day, stating, “Hume has a point. There is some evidence that… periods of government austerity lead to riots and civil unrest.” A day after, on August 11, Torontoist published a brief history and video of Toronto’s “race riot” in 1992 entitled, “There’s a riot goin’ on down Yonge street” (Bradburn 2011). On the same day, Haroon Siddiqui, Toronto Star’s editorial page editor emeritus, wrote another warning article about “The lessons of Britain’s rainbow riots.” Bringing together the “riots” in Britain since the 1980s with those in the Parisian banlieues in 2005 and 2007, Siddiqui reminded his readers: Canada has not been immune. In 1992 we had the mini-riot on Yonge St. Stephen Lewis wrote an eloquent report on the need to be inclusive. In 2008, Roy McMurtry, former chief justice, wrote a report on youth crimes: “The sense of nothing to lose and no way out that roils within such youth creates an ever-present danger.” He, too, called for tutoring the young to keep them in school, recreational programs to keep them off the streets, mentoring to guide them into a career, etc. Reached yesterday about the events in Britain, he said: “They should serve as a wake-up call.” (Sidddiqui 2011)

Both Siddiqui and Hume took the youth unrest in England as an opportunity to revive the territorialized and racialized security ideology at the heart of the political fear of the non-White working class in Toronto. At the same time, they were both critical of then Harper Conservatives’ and then Mayor Rob Ford’s tough-on-crime strategy, finding it counter-productive. Instead, they both strongly proposed development as the only preventive strategy to pacify the threat of “riots” in and by “priority neighbourhoods.” Mobilizing the Canadian liberal and multicultural ethos, they proposed liberal humanitarian intervention as the most logical way to deal with the unwanted consequences of the increasing racialization and territorialization of wealth and urban life in Toronto.
The political fear of the “Paris problem,” that is the political fear of the non-White working class and their sudden unrest and taking to the streets (“race riots”), is not limited to the sensationalism of mainstream media. As mentioned in previous chapters, the fear of racial unrest and tensions have always been a political force behind the local turn in state-led urban strategies of intervention in Toronto since the 1990s. We have already mentioned how, since 2010, the political fear of Toronto’s “Paris problem” – propagated by the Toronto Board of Trade and academics – also became a political justification for more comprehensive place-based urban policy. The political fear of the “Paris problem” also had echoes within various levels of governments. One of the City’s senior policy analysts involved with crafting place-based urban policies in the last two decades mentioned to me:

I was in Paris for a [municipal] dialogue [in 2010], when the federal government brought us forward to talk on two totally separate issues, one: youth violence, and the other one: immigration…. I don’t think we’re fundamentally that far off [from the “Paris problem”]. There [in Paris] seems to be racialization, poverty, lack of opportunities, social exclusion and they are taking to the streets…. And we’ve had our moments [in Toronto]… I don’t think we’re too far from the Paris instability. (I19 2013)

In 2013 and early 2014, interviews with senior City managers, City staff involved with “at-risk” youth and United Way personnel involved with different aspects of Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 all pointed out that the reference to the “Paris problem” in policy circles speaks to the potential prospect of “race riots” by the non-White working class (youth) in Toronto.

We’ve already seen the riots. We had the Yonge St. riot. We’ve seen elements of it and given the demographics of our population, we can’t afford not to have those people in the labour market, which otherwise will cause us trouble, similar to what we’ve seen as the Paris problem. (I3 2014)

I think it [Toronto’s “Paris problem”] is a bit of fear-mongering; to be honest, like we better do something or those Black people will start causing us problems. So there’s some of that, for sure. I think there’s some well-intentioned warnings if we don’t address inequities now and how they’re manifested, these things are not going to go away on their own, and one of the consequences could be violence. So, yeah, I think it probably comes from both sides. I think people also recognize that there is a serious level of disengagement and marginalization in society, and it’s not getting better, and that it’s not all populations that are equally affected by that. So I think that’s part of where that’s coming from. (I25 2013)

In terms of riots, I think there is always the potential. We just had this unfortunate shooting of Sami Yatim and people mobilized that day. There were marches through downtown. I think people have discovered that [taking to the streets]. Now
it's the role of the community to let the system know what we need to do. And I think there is an interesting opportunity that we have, so we don't get to the place of riots. If left unattended to and not thinking of the city as a whole, I think we could potentially end up there, which [happens] often in politics. Because it's more based on downtown versus suburbs. (I26 2013)

I don't think when people make that comparison they are necessarily going beyond the surface level of what they saw on TV in terms that the Paris riots being young people, many of them from racialized communities and newcomers who have been left out of economic opportunities, who are socially and economically excluded and not seeing an stake in society and reacting to that…. We have many of the same dynamics around social and economic exclusion of young people from racialized and newcomer backgrounds, living on the outside, literally geographically separated from the downtown core. And we have seen expressions of the dissatisfaction with this situation that have been a little bit indirect…. and it reminds us that what's happening in the inner suburbs not just a contained challenge of those people, it's actually something that concerns all of us…. Has that exploded into the kind of social upheaval that we saw in Paris? Not just this time around…. Thankfully it's never manifested itself that way in Toronto. But that doesn't mean that we don't have many of the same issues here, it's just that it's manifesting itself in different ways…. So just because things are not literally on fire, doesn't mean that there as not some serious issues…. I'd say it [the prospects of riots] is an immediate concern. (I23 2013)

So the comparison between Toronto and Paris is because we're having increasingly suburbanized poverty and ethnic over-concentration…. and to be honest with you, the postwar suburbs aren't the only ones that people should be thinking about. The inner suburbs are increasingly the site of new arrival and new settlement; the outer suburbs are increasingly the site of new arrival and new settlement. The fastest growth, if you look at a map of the pace of growth in settlement, what you see is the outer suburbs trumping the inner suburbs by a country mile…. (I27 2013)

The abovementioned comments voiced by actors involved in various aspects of Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 speak to the powerful force of the racialized and territorialized security ideology that fuels the political fear of non-White poverty – “the immigrant” problem, the “Paris problem” – in Toronto. These concerns with the possibility of racial tensions in the near future also point to the importance of prevention as a fundamental pillar of Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020. The “Paris problem” was a concern for those at the senior levels of policymaking, whether at the City or at the United Way. Junior City staff, those working on the ground in the “priority neighbourhoods” and those working at community centres and organizations, had not heard about the comparison between Paris and Toronto or the phrase the “Paris problem.” It would appear, then, that the “Paris problem” is a political concern for political elites within and without the City of Toronto. Interestingly, however, almost all the above-
mentioned interviewees quickly differentiate Toronto from Paris with reference to the powerful role of liberal multicultural political ideology in Canada. It was argued repeatedly that Canada’s multiculturalism has made the inclusion of immigrants easier in Canada and, hence, the sense of exclusion and alienation is less in Toronto than in Paris.

The premise of such an argument is that the liberal-colonial recognition at the heart of Canada’s multiculturalism is itself a state strategy for preventing racial tensions. So far, the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 has been above all about injecting a liberal-colonial politics of recognition into place-based policy targeting poverty. The emphasis on equity and social determinants of health and safety take place within the limits of liberal-colonial recognition (Fanon 1967). Similar to the efforts of liberal humanitarianism on the international scene, the proposed remedies on the part of the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 do not attempt to disturb the socio-spatial and racial relations of domination and exploitation that produce poverty, inequality, and violence. The goal is to construct the “post-colonial” poor as resilient liberal subjects, who take responsibility not only for their wretched poverty, but also for their becoming empowered, smart, creative, entrepreneurial, “peaceful” and “civilized.” Instead of unsettling the violent barbarity of imperialist capitalism, the “post-colonial” resilient liberal subject is destined to internalize violence and bounce back stronger than before – to reform themselves in tune with the exploitative requirements of the market and to integrate despite being besieged within the walls of exclusion, discrimination, and dispossession.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I focused on the formation of Toronto’s latest place-based urban policy, Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020, which took place in the context of increasing criticism of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy in the early 2010s. I traced the relational formation of TSNS 2020 and imperial policies of development and security by analyzing the roles of ideology, politics, and space. In particular, I zeroed in on the major components of Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020: the social determinants of health and “equity.” What appears as a progressive shift in place-based urban policy in Toronto, I suggest, is better understood as a positivist and liberal humanitarian shift. The former is best evident in the policy obsession with the quantification of social problems (i.e., measuring equity). The latter is best evident in the current policy emphasis on “equity” and social determinants of health and safety,
which is part and parcel of the ideological shift to liberal humanitarianism in international development and security strategies.

The emphasis on equity has its immediate roots in the adoption of the Rawlsian concept of liberal justice by the World Bank and the WHO policymakers. For these imperialist international governing bodies, linking equity and development is imperative for the security of imperialist capitalism precisely because Rawlsian justice builds within rather than against imperialist-capitalist socio-spatial relations of accumulation and domination. The concept of equity, as we saw, entered the lexicon of liberal political theory and policy in the context of the urban crisis and Black radicalism in the United States of the 1960s: the conjuncture of the emergence of place-based urban policy. Equity was part and a parcel of the broader state-led attempts to pacify the threat of Black radicalism and uprising. Rather than challenging the processes of the production of poverty and violence, equity is about prevention. It is about moderating the violence of exploitation and de-humanization to prevent rebellion.

The emphasis on the social determinants of health, as we saw, is also in relation to the ascendency of prevention in the politics of development and security. Dehistoricized and disassociated from “the development of capitalism as geographically uneven but spatially interconnected processes of creation and destruction” (Hart 2009:119), the discursive emphasis on structural determinants, urban planning, and daily life – as components of “the social” – easily shrink the concept of social determinants to yet another form of environmental determinism – albeit pronounced in a seemingly progressive language of liberal nicety.

I also suggested how the liberal humanitarian ideology that mobilizes equity and the social determinants of health in place-based urban policy has facilitated the reification of the powerful territorialized and racialized security ideology central to the political fear of the non-White working class (“the immigrant”) in the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020. The political fear of “race riots” emanating from the city’s “priority neighbourhoods” also points to the importance of prevention as a fundamental pillar of Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020. Similar to the Priority Neighbourhood strategy, the City’s latest place-based urban policy also aims to reform the subjectivities of the poor without disturbing the socio-spatial and racial relations of domination and exploitation that produce poverty, inequality and violence.

In the next chapter, we will see how urbanists and the local state have mobilized liberal humanitarian ideology and the political fear of the “Paris problem” to rationalize the need for the most pervasive place-based housing redevelopment project in Toronto, Ontario and Canada.
Chapter Eight:
Prevention, Integration and Housing: Urbanizing Toronto’ “Faulty Towers”

Introduction

One of the main differences between the Priority Neighbourhood strategy and the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 was the introduction of a place-based housing redevelopment program (Tower Renewal). The lack of an official housing redevelopment component in the Priority Neighbourhood strategy had differentiated place-based urban policy in Toronto from those in Paris, London, or American cities. While major public housing redevelopment projects, such as the Regent Park Revitalization, had already started even before 2005, these projects were not officially part of the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy. The developmental dimension of the Priority Neighbourhood strategy was mostly focused on social development projects and the construction of seven neighbourhood Hubs within already built spaces owned by the City of Toronto.

The introduction of Tower Renewal into Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 brought urban redevelopment to the forefront of the City’s spatial strategies of targeting urban poverty. Tower Renewal has also facilitated the inclusion of urbanists and architects into the heterogeneous group of experts involved in the knowledge production processes of these strategies. In comparison to other housing redevelopment projects in Toronto, Tower Renewal is unique in its scope, form, and duration. The program is an ambitious long-term (20-30 years long), multi-phase project of housing and urban redevelopment without demolition. Tower Renewal targets some 915 privately-owned rental apartment buildings (eight stories and more) and their surroundings. These residential buildings were built during the postwar boom (between 1945 and 1985) and are mostly located across Toronto’s postwar suburbs.

Policymakers and City Council justify the incorporation of Tower Renewal into Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 based on the 2011 report by the United Way, Vertical Poverty, which identified rental “apartment towers” in postwar suburbs as the major nodes of

200 This is not to say that in Toronto public-housing redevelopment strategies are unrelated to the City’s place-based urban policy targeting concentrated non-White poverty. As we will see, not only have projects such as the Regent Park Revitalization become examples of “best practices” for Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020, but also people involved with public-housing redevelopment strategies have become involved in Tower Renewal and Toronto Strategy Neighbourhood Strategy 2020.
concentrated non-White poverty. The program’s official goal is the green refurbishment and integration of these privately-owned residential rental apartment buildings into the rest of the city through mixed-used zoning, social mixity, renovation, and intensification.

In this chapter, I show how the political fear of “the Paris problem” has also been imperative in the Tower Renewal program by analyzing the relations among politics, space, and ideology in the formation of the policy. Underlining the urgency of a real affordable housing crisis in Toronto, I examine the political forces behind Tower Renewal and whether the project, as it is currently framed, can function as a solution to the housing affordability problem in the city. While the formation of the Tower Renewal program goes back to 2004, similar to Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 the program is still in its initial stages of implementation, and it has yet to be seen how it will be implemented on the ground. What is obvious from a closer look at the formation of Tower Renewal is that the racialized and territorialized security ideology that has been fundamental to the political fear of the “Paris problem” and the targeting of non-White poverty in Toronto since the mid-1990s play an important role in the formation of Toronto’s most ambitious urban redevelopment project.

Mapping “Highrise Towers”

The picture that emerges from our examination is troubling: It not only shows that poverty in Toronto has continued to intensify geographically, in Toronto’s inner suburban neighbourhoods, it also shows that poverty is becoming increasingly concentrated vertically in the highrise towers that dot the city’s skyline. (McIsaac 2011)

In Toronto, an unusually large number of high-rise apartments poke above the flat landscape many miles from downtown….[T]his is a type of high density suburban development far more progressive and able to deal with the future than the sprawl of the US…. (Buckminster Fuller 1968, quoted in Stewart 2008:23)

The “highrise towers that dot the city’s skyline,” in the words of then United Way President and CEO Susan McIsaac, are not a reference to the highrise towers that one sees in any tourism image of Toronto’s skyline, featuring Canada’s most diverse city by Lake Ontario. The latter highrise towers, with their shiny glass facades, luxury residential apartments and amenities, and costing from half a million to few million dollars dot Toronto’s downtown and midtown. For United Way, municipal policymakers, and urbanists, these phallic concentrations of real estate
capital are neither troubling nor “highrise towers.” Rather, they are condominiums. They are the residential spaces of Richard Florida’s (2002) cherished “creative class” – (relatively) mixed groups of young and old (petty-) bourgeois and a minority of super-rich. These glass towers are conceived of as Toronto’s “vertical prosperity” – a sign of the city’s booming (or ballooning) real estate economy facilitated by gentrification, the reign of private property and big developers, and footloose international capital.

Toronto’s “troubling” highrise towers are from a different era, located in different (yet connected) territories. Built during the postwar decades of economic and urban growth, these residential highrise concrete towers were the products of the municipality of Metropolitan Toronto’s experimentation with regional planning and top-down regulation. Perhaps the main similarity between these concrete highrise towers and today’s glass condominium towers is that they too were constructed by private developers and financed by the boom of the 1960s and 1970s. Inspired by Le Corbusier’s tower-in-the-park concept, modernist planners and private developers envisioned and built these highrise concrete towers across Toronto’s growing postwar suburbs as “complete communities” for the rising White middle-income families of the postwar era.

The highrise concrete tower soon became a significant feature in the postwar urbanization of Metropolitan Toronto. The verticality of 1,189 residential highrise towers frequently erupt the horizontality of Fordist bungalow urbanism across Toronto’s postwar suburbs. Morphologically, these selective interpretations of modernist planning and architecture have brought Toronto closer to European cities than to the sprawling horizontality that typified North American postwar urbanization. It was this particular feature of Toronto’s regional landscape of the late 1960s that

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201 Formed in 1954, the municipality of Metropolitan Toronto was a senior level regional municipal government overseeing the municipalities of the (old) City of Toronto and its postwar suburbs: the townships of East York, Etobicoke, North York, Scarborough, and York. Metro Toronto had the power to tax real estate and was responsible for arterial roads, major sewage and water facilities, regional planning, public transportation, policing, and administration of justice, metropolitan parks, and housing issues. With the passage of the 1997 City of Toronto Act, Metropolitan Toronto and its constituents were amalgamated into the present City of Toronto. The construction of high-rise concrete towers in the old City of Toronto’s postwar suburbs was among Metropolitan Toronto’s experimentation with urban expansion through regional planning and designing modern “complete communities.” At the time, high-rise apartments symbolized a new world and a confident nation after the war. Built for the most part by private developers, residential towers were also highly profitable real estate ventures.

202 These high-rise concrete towers are usually referred to as the legacies of “modernist” urban planning in Toronto. It is, however, important to highlight that their design and production were based on selective interpretations of modernist architecture and urban planning that flourished in the first half of the twentieth century.
fascinated Buckminster Fuller as a progressive form of urban planning in 1968. With the rise of Toronto’s urban reform movement in the 1970s, however, the modern highrise concrete towers lost their progressive appeal. For close to forty years, the Jane Jacobsian pro-urban bourgeois forces have lamented these residential urban spaces as “suburban” and oppressively lifeless. They relegated them to the margins of urban discourse and politics.

In Toronto, the marginality of the highrise concrete tower as an urban form went hand in hand with the systematic marginalization of its inhabitants. With the opening up of Canada’s immigration system, the demography of the inhabitants of the postwar highrise concrete towers changed dramatically in the decades after the 1970s. From its majority White and middle-income demography of the 1960s, today the majority of the approximately 500,000 inhabitants of these highrise concrete towers are non-White working-class populations, many struggling with poverty, systemic exploitation, racism, and police brutality. In fact, the comparison of Toronto’s postwar suburbs to the banlieues of Paris has much to do not only with the form of these legacies of Le Corbusier, but also with their demographic transformations.

By the late 2000s, the fate of these stigmatized spaces and their residents took another sharp turn. With the ascendancy of mapping as a “major way of looking” at Toronto and the publication of United Way’s Vertical Poverty (2011), the highrise concrete tower once again came into the forefront of urban debates and politics in Toronto. This time, however, it was neither cherished as progressive, nor explicitly demonized as oppressive. Rather, from urbanists to United Way researchers and policymakers, they all carefully presented the highrise concrete towers as a securitized object of liberal humanitarian intervention: a “troubling” space of “vertical poverty” and violence – one that is not just a threat to the health and wellbeing of its inhabitants, but to the prosperity of Toronto. Nonetheless, these towers of “vertical poverty,” we are told, have lots of “potential.” They are “urban assets” that only need to be redeveloped, empowered, and integrated in partnership (United Way 2011:iv–x).

In January 2011, United Way published Poverty by Postal Code 2: Vertical Poverty: Declining Income, Housing Quality and Community Life in Toronto’s Inner Suburban High-Rise Apartments. Confident of the organization’s role in fostering the urban agenda for the Toronto region, the report situated its significance in relation to the importance of cities and place-based policy, the “new economy,” and Toronto’s competitiveness (United Way 2011:9). Loyal to the gurus of urban competitiveness, Vertical Poverty started with Richard Florida’s (2007) observations of the perceived threats of economic polarization and income divide to Toronto’s competitiveness.
(United Way 2011:16). The report reiterated the previous emphasis on “Toronto’s neighbourhoods” as the city’s greatest strength (United Way 2011:7), the conception of poverty-as-risk, and mapping the concentration of poverty.

In mobilizing mapping to trace and analyze the concentration of non-White poverty, *Vertical Poverty* narrowed down its focus on “the role of highrise housing” in the trends of the growth of concentrated non-White poverty in postwar suburbs. The “apartment towers,” as the report referred to them, and in particular, the privately owned, rental apartment towers, became the new object of investigation and intervention.\(^{203}\) Using long-term census data to track the growth in spatially concentrated poverty over the 25-year period from 1981 to 2006 and a survey of 2,803 inhabitants of apartment towers,\(^{204}\) *Vertical Poverty* mapped “the continued growth in the spatial concentration of poverty in Toronto neighbourhoods, and in highrise buildings within neighbourhoods” (United Way 2011:ii). It also looked at the housing condition in these highrise towers, focusing on six aspects: affordability; physical structure; building environment; the protective and safe place dimension; social environment; and building infrastructure (United Way 2011:7).

If the scale of analysis was shrunk to buildings, the tautological logic of the neighbourhood effect literature remained central to the report’s argument. In the absence of any concrete analysis of the production of the geographical concentration of non-White poverty, the fact that “highrise apartment buildings have increasingly become sites of concentrated poverty within neighbourhoods” (United Way 2011:v) was used to imply that highrise towers are the cause of the concentration of non-White poverty. As an executive member of the United Way commented:

> One of the explanations for why there is such a high concentration of poverty in some neighbourhoods is because there is such a high concentration of affordable rental housing in those neighbourhoods…. It’s only NY that has more high-rises than the city of Toronto. It’s a really essential part of the city that we’ve built and those towers were built in a completely different time. They were built in the 1950s and 1960s for a middle-class population. The model was “tower in the park.” [It was] intended [for the] intensification of the suburbs. People were supposed to drive to downtown to work and then take the highway back, and life was supposed to be just fabulous. Of course, over time situations changed, and those towers that were built for a different time and a different population, different needs, have now

\(^{203}\) There were 1,925 (eight story and above) apartment towers in the Greater Golden Horseshoe built between 1945 to 1985, and approximately one million people live in these apartment units; 62% of this housing stock is in Toronto (1,189 apartment towers), 77% of Toronto’s apartment towers are rental (915 apartment towers), and the rest is public housing.

\(^{204}\) The survey was competed in the summer and fall of 2009. A series of focus groups were conducted in the fall of 2009 and winter of 2010 (United Way 2011:iv).
become the sites or settlements for, essentially, access to affordable housing. (I23 2013)

Figure 7: Mapping the concentration of low-income families in highrise towers

Besides building on United Way’s previous research and activism around issues related to the concentration of non-White poverty in Toronto’s postwar suburbs, Vertical Poverty announced the organization’s interest in rental housing redevelopment in poor neighbourhoods. Why did United Way, a philanthropic organization, suddenly become interested in Toronto’s highrise towers and, particularly in those that are privately owned? According to the above-mentioned executive member,

It’s just a fact that the vast majority of the affordable housing stock in the city of Toronto is privately owned. And the vast majority of low-income people live in privately-owned rental apartments. We had – just by virtue of working in
neighbourhoods and doing engagement – it just stares at you in the face that the people with whom you’ve been working live in high-rise apartments – and that when you begin to engage people in a conversation about what’s wrong and begin to ask, “What is it that we can fix?” In terms of real tangible change, people inevitably turn to places [where] they live, right? And the fact that there are issues in the stairwell, with the quality of housing, safety, and how they feel isolated from the people they are living within the building. So it was inevitable that as we engaged with residents in terms of what their needs were, they inevitably pointed us to towers. We thought it was really important for us to actually get a sense of what was happening in those towers. That’s why we got out [there] and we have a data… And it just so happened that in our sample we really prioritized the private rental market, because we felt that was an area that was really missing in the policy debate…. We felt that the private sector conversation was missing something and we really want to put our focus in. So we did Vertical Poverty. (I23 2013, emphasis added)

This is an arresting statement that touches upon all the official mandates of the United Way, its humanitarian mission to care for “the people,” to work with “the people” and to lessen their sufferings. Recall Susan McIsaac’s appeal to “the people” in reference to the organization’s sources of fundraising in 2012. And yet, as was the case with the organization’s fundraising politics, the reality on the ground is always less flowery than such public-relation statements imply. The reason that United Way became involved with highrise concrete towers had less to do with residents’ voices, needs, and sufferings and everything to do with already unfolding plans for a housing redevelopment plan at the City, namely, Tower Renewal. In fact, Vertical Poverty explicitly tied itself to the Priority Neighbourhoods strategy and the Tower Renewal program (United Way 2011:3–4).

Similar to Poverty by Postal Code (United Way 2004), Vertical Poverty (United Way 2011) quickly became an influential report on the rental housing situation and its relation to the state of non-White poverty in Toronto. As mentioned earlier, it was with reference to this report that policymakers at the City incorporated Tower Renewal into Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 and officially expanded the role of the United Way in early 2012. The report gave the City the opportunity to justify Tower Renewal as a strategy for combating the concentration of non-White poverty (I3 2014). Why did Vertical Poverty become so influential? Was it because of the report’s findings about the crisis of affordable housing, poverty, “densely populated” housing, sub-standard living conditions in the towers, and so on?

When Vertical Poverty was published in 2011, there was nothing fundamentally new about a crisis of affordable housing in Toronto or the notorious housing situation that most often affect the non-White working-class tenants. Already by 2000, researchers involved with the Centre for
Equality Rights in Accommodation (CERA) had highlighted the increasing number of illegal evictions and the complicity of the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal (ORHT) and the Tenant Protection Act (TPA) in the evictions of low-income tenants (CERA 2000).\(^{205}\) Other studies pointed to the consequences of withdrawing subsidies for new rental housing (Skaburskis and Mok 2000). In the early and mid-2000s, more studies by an array of institutions – from the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation and the Centre for Urban and Community Studies at the University of Toronto to the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives and the Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario (ACTO) – warned about a crisis of affordable housing in Toronto (and Ontario). These studies zeroed in on the “de-housing” consequences of the Harris government’s neoliberal housing policies (Shapcott 2003) and the impact of racial discrimination against non-White populations in accessing proper rental housing in the city (Deacon et al. 2002; Murdie 2002; Paradis et al. 2008; CERA 2009). By 2003, the crisis of affordable housing even became a topic of discussion and caution for (the pro-urban bourgeois forces, such as) the Toronto Board of Trade (2003) and TD Economics (2003).

If the crisis of affordable housing was not new, neither was the crisis of overcrowded housing, or what Vertical Poverty framed as “densely populated” housing. Overcrowded housing or “hidden homelessness”\(^{206}\) is an increasingly common situation wherein two or more families live in a space designed for one family. It is easy to blame the lack of affordable housing for such a flourishing phenomenon, as many policymakers do. Less attention has been paid, however, to how overcrowding happens and what role landlords play in exacerbating such a situation. One of the major reasons for hidden homelessness among non-White working-class populations in Toronto’s “tower neighbourhoods” is increasing class and racial discrimination through the illegal demand of landlords, from particular ethnic groups, for rent deposits in advance.\(^{207}\) As a member of the Scarborough Housing Help Centre (SHHC) explained:

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\(^{205}\) While the Tenant Protection Act was repealed in 2007 and replaced by the Residential Tenancies Act 2006, the major aspect of Tent Protection Act – dismantling rent control for vacated apartments – remained intact in the Residential Tenancies Act.

\(^{206}\) “Hidden homelessness” is the preferred term in the current research on overcrowded housing; see Murdie and Logan (2010); Preston et al. (2011); and Paradis, Wilson, and Logan (2014).

\(^{207}\) Rental agreements are under the jurisdiction of the province of Ontario. Under the Ontario Residential Tenancies Act (ORTA), it is illegal for a landlord to demand or to collect a rent deposit of more than one month, or if it is less, then one rental period. A landlord can demand a last month’s rent deposit on or before the landlord and tenant enters into the tenancy agreement. This deposit may only be applied to the last month’s rent. It is not considered a damage or security deposit. The landlord must pay tenants interest on the rent deposit every 12 months.
it is common knowledge that in order to get rental housing you have to pass a three part test. So, you need proof of income, you need credit checks and then you need references. Since the newcomers don’t have any of these things, the landlords will make them an offer, saying, like: “If you pay me six months’ rent up front, as a deposit, then I’ll allow you to move into a rental unit.” And that is where the problem starts because the newcomer is probably not informed that this is illegal…. There are multiple ways in which racism intersects with the issue of housing. I know certainly, for example, of landlords who are very uncomfortable with renting to newcomers. I mean, newcomers, not due to the fact that they probably can’t pay, or [because] you have lost the ability to continue paying rent, but because of the way they [newcomers] look, the way they talk. So there is an issue with strong smells, that’s always an issue that comes up. I think, it’s not as bad in Scarborough, but in Peel they actually put up posters saying: “No strong smells or children.” That kind of a thing; so that kind of racism is still seen and sometimes it is subtle, sometimes it kinda just confronts you in the face. (I9 2013)

In my interviews with City staff members at the Social Development, Finance and Administration Department and Newcomer Office, they all mentioned the City is aware of the growing phenomenon of “hidden homelessness” in rental units and the illegal discriminatory practice of landlords. They also acknowledged that this has been the situation for at least the last two decades (I30 2013, I3 2014). A City staff member at the Newcomers Office told me:

It’s not a new phenomenon. It has been there when I immigrated to Canada, and when I worked for the Red Cross, we, the Red Cross, were very much aware of people being under-housed, and hidden homelessness was an issue in the late 1990s and early 2000s too. So it’s not a new phenomenon; it may be that the impact on newcomers is now more prominent than before, or on some other populations, I’m not certain. And there’s definitely a fact that the rents have increased hugely in Toronto. (I30 2013)

The above-mentioned member of the Scarborough Housing Help Centre also confirmed that the illegal practice of landlords “has been going on for at least the last twenty years, if not longer. If you talk to people who came here twenty years ago in the 1990s, even they seem to have such a similar situation” (I9 2013).

Vertical Poverty was absolutely silent about how such phenomenon, whether we call it “densely populated” housing or “hidden homelessness,” has happened. There are no mentions of racism, racial discrimination, and the illegal practices of landlords in the 200+page report. Instead, the report strategically and implicitly took side with landlords. As opposed to previous reports, it also downplayed the racial dimension of the highrise towers by breaking down the demography of

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208 The report frequently contradicts itself in this regard. While it used the problem of disrepair in most of the highrise towers under study as a justification for recommending revitalization as a solution, it also mentioned how “most” of the landlords are good with dealing with repairs.
the poor inhabitants throughout the report into female, single parent, families with children living at home, low income, rely on social assistance, older immigrants, “racialized” communities, and less educated while emphasizing the two categories of female single parents and families with children living at home (United Way 2011:viii).

What attracted attention to Vertical Poverty was the detailed focus of the study on highrise towers, its appeal to residents’ surveys, the way the report linked the miserable state of highrise towers to the urban agenda in the Toronto region, and its call for the revitalization of highrise concrete towers and restoring social mixity in the “troubling” tower neighbourhoods (United Way 2011:xi–xv). Vertical Poverty explicitly identified zoning by-laws as an obstacle to the economic prosperity of these neighbourhoods. It applauded the public housing redevelopment projects taking place in Regent Park and Lawrence Heights as successful practices of injecting mixity – sanctioning the systematic gentrification of downtown and the erosion of affordable housing (United Way 2011:156). Sponsored by the Social Housing Services Corporation (SHSC), Toronto Public Health, Toronto Community Housing, and the Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Vertical Poverty came out after an intensified multi-sector, multi-scale interest in the idea of Tower Renewal in Toronto. The popularity of Vertical Poverty had to do with the way the report represented its findings as a scientific justification for the urgency of starting the Tower Renewal program as part of the state-led spatial strategy of targeting the concentration of non-White poverty in Toronto.

If Vertical Poverty situated its mandate in relation to the City’s place-based urban policy targeting non-White poverty, the report also mobilized the racialized and territorialized security ideology central to such strategies. While heavily loaded with the neoliberal, neo-colonial development and humanitarian buzzwords of need, assets, potentials, empowerment, and social cohesion, Vertical Poverty implicitly brought to the forefront the comparison between Toronto’s postwar suburbs and the banlieues of Paris. As the report warned about the “deteriorating housing

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209 Vertical Poverty is based on a survey of 2,803 residents of highrise towers. The survey was developed by Public Interest, a private company (social enterprise), which since 2002 has been involved in community engagement, research and policy, and non-profit capacity building. The company is funded on a fee-for-service basis (I27 2013). Chosen by the City of Toronto, Public Interest was also the major player in organizing community engagement in Regent Park for the revitalization of the public housing. In 2012, Public Interest also did a research policy paper for the United Way on the merits of place-based approaches; see Meagher, Lee and Tolia (2012).

210 For critiques of public housing redevelopment in Toronto, in particular the ongoing Regent Park revitalization project, see Kipfer and Petrunia (2009); August and Walks (2012). For critiques in mainstream media, see August (2014), McKnight (2014) and Fiorito (2014).

211 In 2012, Social Housing Services Corporation was replaced with Housing Services Corporation.
condition, crime and social disorder” in “tower neighbourhoods,” its cover page and the opening pages of its chapters were decorated by grim pictures of high-rise concrete towers in Toronto’s postwar suburbs (see Figures 8 and 9). Aesthetically and symbolically, the report reproduced the abjection of the marginalized, “suburban” highrise neighbourhoods inhabited by non-White working-class populations. Since its publication in 2011, the image of this particular form of residential space – the postwar highrise concrete tower – has increasingly become the symbol of concentrated non-White poverty in Toronto. And increasingly, Tower Renewal has become the one bold solution to Toronto’s “faulty towers” and their deepening poverty.

Figure 8: Left: Cover of the Vertical Poverty report; right: Opening image of the report’s Chapter Six
Source: United Way (2011)
Tower Renewal: Urbanizing Le Corbusier and Toronto’s “Faulty Towers”

Yet regretfully, Toronto’s aging towers remain off the radar. Recent financial support for “greening” of the city, such as the federal government’s commitment to infuse hundreds of millions of dollars into sustainable growth, is welcome news. Yet, in a missed opportunity, tower restoration is not part of these plans, nor is it in the city’s official green strategy. Overlooked, these buildings are underutilized, blighted, and extremely inefficient. Programs are needed to encourage public and private investment that will allow them to reach their potential. With international precedent, broad awareness of the climate, and a growing number of “at risk” neighbourhoods associated with apartment towers, greening and investment in these projects have moved beyond an interesting speculative exercise to an issue fundamental to the ecological and social sustainability of the GTA. It’s time to get on with it. (Stewart 2007)

The idea of Tower Renewal was born through studies undertaken by academics at the University of Toronto and architects at E.R.A. Architects between 2004 and 2006. Initially, building engineer Ted Kesik and architect Ivan Saleff (2005) at the University of Toronto’s John H. Daniels Faculty of Architecture, Landscape and Design studied the cost-effectiveness of retrofitting highrise concrete towers in Toronto. Graeme Stewart, then a graduate student at the University of Toronto and an architect at E.R.A., expanded on this idea in his master thesis. Stewart looked into the revitalization of similar buildings in cities such as Amsterdam, London, and Moscow. Right
after his graduation in May 2007, Stewart was introduced to then Mayor David Miller (by his colleagues at the University of Toronto and E.R.A.) to present his big idea for Toronto’s “faulty towers.”

At the time, the issues of greenhouse gas emissions, sustainability, and green energy were hot political topics at the City and Mayor Miller in particular was keen to coin his name as an environmentalist mayor. Stewart, in turn, had what appeared to be the most rational and revolutionary idea. If the City was serious about strategies for a significant reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, then it could not ignore “the opportunity inherent in Toronto’s extensive stock of hundreds of bulky concrete residential ‘slab’ (i.e. big) high-rise apartment houses” (Stewart 2007). If Toronto wants to keep its image of a progressive city in North America, it only has to look east, to Europe:

For many years, the European Union has been actively restoring its enormous stock of tower blocks as a key component of its environmental strategy. Across both Eastern and Western Europe, the carbon-saving potential of aging Welfare State and Soviet-era towers has been exploited to achieve greenhouse gas reduction targets. In my own tour of European tower districts last fall, the abundant examples of regeneration, “greening,” intensification and retrofitting were truly eye-opening. (Stewart 2007)

From the beginning, Stewart (and his E.R.A colleagues) envisioned Tower Renewal not just as an environmental project, but an urban renewal project (I10 2013). In sharp contrast to other urban redevelopment projects, Stewart rejected the idea of demolition in favour of retrofitting and revitalizing the existing structures alongside infilling in the vast open spaces around the “towers in the parks.” Tower Renewal, according to Stewart (2007), is a win-win project for all – the City, the developers, landlords, and “at-risk” neighbourhoods. Fascinated by the bold idea, Miller soon established a working group on the topic. On September 24 and 25, 2007 City Council approved the Mayor’s Tower Renewal Project and Opportunities Book. Council also approved the establishment of the Tower Renewal Office (TRO) at the City. Miller argued that Tower Renewal is an opportunity to make tremendous progress on the major themes of city-building contained in my mandate. By dramatically improving the energy efficiency of the more than 1,000 high-rise residential concrete frame buildings located throughout Toronto, Mayor’s Tower Renewal will reduce greenhouse gas emissions by between three and five per cent for the urban area. The Mayor’s Tower Renewal will also generate social, economic and cultural benefits by creating local green jobs, increasing on-site small-scale retail and markets, upgrading green space around the buildings, providing more space for neighbourhood meetings and interactions, installing solar, wind and geothermal energy solutions, and green roofs where appropriate, increasing water conservation and on-site management of
waste, increasing the demand of locally-produced green and clean technology, and fostering community ad urban agriculture at the sites. (quoted in City of Toronto 2008)

The establishment of the Tower Renewal Office at the City kick-started a systematic production of knowledge about highrise concrete towers and their renewal in Toronto. The City itself published the first report, Tower Renewal Guidelines: Projects Brief in August 2008. Written by Ted Kesik, Ivan Saleff, Robert Wright, Graeme Stewart, Nick Swerdfeger and Jan Kroman, the report was financed by the City of Toronto, the Toronto Atmosphere Fund (TAF), and Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation. It framed Tower Renewal as

a social, economic and environmental imperative of the City of Toronto. It is a timely initiative that aims to preserve affordable housing stock, protect the investments and assets of property owners, and reduce energy use, water consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. It also promotes the creative redevelopment of lower building sites to accommodate much needed social services and amenities that strengthen the vitality of diverse communities and improve our quality of life. (Kesik et al. 2008:iii)

With the support of E.R.A., Graeme Stewart soon became not just the major architect behind the project, but also the public urbanist face of the project. A confident, friendly and energetic public speaker, Stewart’s mission has since been to rationalize the idea of Tower Renewal not only for the City bureaucrats and politicians, but also for the larger urbanist and architectural community, pro-urban bourgeois forces, and residents’ of the “faulty towers” in Toronto. In accomplishing this mission, he has also established himself as a savvy strategist. Stewart, who in 2014 won the Jane Jacobs Prize on account of his work on Tower Renewal, started his mission by voicing a critique of Toronto’s urban reform movement, Jane Jacobs’ ethos of urbanity, and the resultant demonization and marginalization of the postwar suburbs. He revived the “pro-active legacy” of modernist planning in Metro Toronto as progressive, even reminding his audiences and readers of how Metro Toronto was the refuge of communist and socialist European planners:

Much of the mythology surrounding Toronto is focused on the image of a “city of neighbourhoods,” enabled by the city’s early rejection of modernism through citizen groups and the Reform council. Yet, what is perhaps of equal interest is the thoroughness and completeness with which Toronto accepted the modern project prior to this point…. In the wake of the formation of Metro, Toronto became an attractor for international, particularly European trained, modern planners.... Among the leaders of international planners at work in Toronto were Englishman Gordon Stevenson and German émigré and card-carrying Communist Hans
Blumenfeld, both of whom left the United States for Canada during the turbulent years of McCarthy politics. (Stewart 2008:23–5)

But as much as Tower Renewal project starts from a critique of Jane Jacobsian-demonization of “tower neighbourhoods,” its discourse about highrise concrete towers is not fundamentally different from the former. Although Stewart came out in defence of postwar highrise concrete towers, for him and for the advocates of Tower Renewal the problem with these spaces is precisely their lack of urbanity; the conception of urbanity for Stewart (and in the Tower Renewal program) is not much different from Jacobs’ celebrated urbanity. In both cases, urbanity is perceived as a “way of life” and a Western, bourgeois “way of life,” leaving aside the socio-spatial relations in the production of urban space. In both cases, urbanity is conceived through an environmental deterministic lens.

Where Tower Renewal differs from Jacobsian ideology is that the project and its architects believe these abjectified towers have the “potential” to become “urban” through design interventions. If for Jacobsians environmental determinism is too strong to save these sub-urban spaces, for Stewart and Tower Renewal advocates, environmental determinism can bring the necessary transformation into these “faulty towers.” Despite (or because) of its positive view of highrise concrete towers, Tower Renewal builds upon the racialized and territorialized security ideology around the “Paris problem” in Toronto. In fact, part of Stewart’s argument is that urbanizing and integrating these “faulty towers” is perhaps the best way to prevent the prospect of the “Paris problem.”

New research from University of Toronto outlines that Toronto is currently suffering from startling and increasing income polarization. While the historic centre is becoming increasingly wealthy, areas of the city considered “Priority Neighbourhoods” of acute poverty and lacking services are all examples of the postwar communities in question. The recent Paris riots reinforce the inequality and social tensions that may arise if this trend is to continue. As issues of climate change and social inequality become central political concerns, reengaging this aging and significant housing stock is becoming a key priority. (Stewart 2008: 28)

So when we got to the notion of Tower Renewal, it was actually interesting to ask, how do we, as a starting point, a) treat these [high-rise towers] as a good thing? (to say we’re lucky to have these) and b) how do we move from here? (basically

212 The traces of a Western conception of the urban way of life in Tower Renewal is evident in the exposition of the best practices that Stewart and others have put forward as inspirations for the project. Despite the celebration of the diversity of the inhabitants of highrise towers, all the provided examples of best practices for Tower Renewal are from Europe, displaying European forms of street life, public space, and everyday life. Even though this civilizational vision has come under criticism by residents (see Fiorito 2014), Stewart and other proponents of Tower Renewal still holding to such visions.
they’ve been in a state of gradual decline for about four to five decades). So what are the ways that we can understand these and integrate them as part of our urban future? (I10 2013)

Urbanists and the Production of Knowledge

The economic crisis of 2007–2008 turned beneficial for those involved with the Tower Renewal project. Following the federal government stimulus package in 2009, the Province of Ontario and the City of Toronto allocated part of the federal government’s Infrastructure Stimulus Fund to boost research on high-rise concrete towers for two consecutive years (2009–2010) (I23 2013). A senior executive member of United Way highlighted that the money was crucial for starting a series of foundational research that took place on the topic (I23 2013). Not surprisingly, between 2010 and 2012 ten major research and report papers on high-rise concrete towers were published, while between 2012 and 2014, at least ten public professional events were organized – all with the aim of justifying and facilitating the Tower Renewal project.213

In the era of neoliberal austerity, capitalizing on any large-scale urban renewal project is complex. Tower Renewal’s financing was even more complicated given that 77% of highrise concrete towers (about 915 buildings) in Toronto are privately owned. The problem of financing was thus framed as a question of how to engage private owners (and how to sell Tower Renewal to landlords). In May 2010, Morrison Park Advisors published a study (commissioned by the City) on Tower Renewal Financial Options. The report suggested that the only way the City would be able to convince private owners to participate would be to provide a form of financing that is “both low cost from an interest rate perspective, and not consume high value of building owners’ equity” (Morrison Park Advisors 2010: 2). For Morrison Park Advisors, “Tower renewal will only succeed in attracting the participation of skeptical building owners if it can be demonstrated that Renewal projects will have positive impact on an owner’s financial performance” (2010:7):

The solution to these constrains is believed to be a credit-enhanced capital tool, backed not by mortgage security but rather properly tax-based security. In this

213 Between 2008 and 2010, the City of Toronto alone commissioned five major studies to develop a citywide strategy for Tower Renewal. These included: Tower Renewal Guidelines, Technical Guide to overcladding (John H. Daniel’s Faculty of Architecture, Landscape and Design, co-sponsored by the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, City of Toronto and the Toronto Atmospheric Fund), Tower Renewal Community Energy Plans (Arup), Tower Renewal Waste Management Strategy (Genivar), Tower Renewal Financing Feasibility Study (Morrison Park Advisors 2010), and Tower Renewal Financing Implementation Study (by WHO).
scenario, private sector funds would be raised by a dedicated Tower Renewal
Corporation in order to finance projects (Morrison Parks Advisors 2010:2).214

The chief concern of the City and the Tower Renewal Office has been how to make the
project attractive for major rental property-owner companies, which own the majority of highrise
concrete towers in Toronto (I21 2013). Policymakers at the City found the most practical solution
in Morrison Park Advisors’ suggestion of credit-enhanced capital. In October 2012, the Ontario
Liberal provincial government amended the City of Toronto Act to permit the City to offer
financing to a property (rather than an individual). In July 2013, City Council passed the City staff’s
proposed energy and water efficiency initiative for the residential sector to grant the City financing
authority to a property.215 The City later initiated a three-year pilot program, the Highrise Retrofit
Improvement Support Program, or Hi-RIS, to help residential property owners pursuing energy and
water efficiency and conservation improvements.216

The promise that credit financing would not affect the real estate value of the properties
and that future redevelopment and infilling would add to property values have gradually helped
sell Tower Renewal to landlords. As the idea of Tower Renewal was gaining momentum in 2010,
the Cities Centre tried unsuccessfully to inject Tower Renewal into the 2010 mayoral election
debates. In July 2010, Andre Sorenson from University of Toronto Scarborough wrote a discussion
paper to promote Tower Renewal as an important feature of then Mayor Miller’s public transit
expansion plan, Transit City, into Toronto’s postwar suburbs. “Transit City,” Sorenson argued,
“also promises to accelerate the rate of investment in the Tower Renewal projects by promising
more attractive neighbourhoods, increased property values, greater opportunities for intensification
and mixed-use projects and making reinvestment in aging building more attractive” (2010:5).

The most important event in the production of expert knowledge was the founding of a
new non-profit research institute. In 2009, the E.R.A, planningAlliance and regionalArchitects

214 Implementing this financing option requires provincial amendment of legislation or regulations pertaining
to property tax, and to certain City of Toronto powers. In addition, a new Tower Renewal Corporation
would be required to create and manage the capital pool and associated programs. The suggested credit-
enhanced capital pool is envisioned to be “funded primarily by the capital markets, through the issuance of
bonds.” The City’s contribution is suggested to “range from 3% to 10% of the total funding” (Morrison Park
Advisors 2010:10).

215 City staff provided a long list of letters to the City in support of this form of financing and the voluntary
nature of the program. The list included letters from the social democrat councillor Mike Layton, Mitzie
Hunter (chief executive officer of CivicAction), Daryl Chong (president and CEO of the Greater Toronto
Apartment Association [GTAA]), Anna Hannah (president of the Toronto Real Estate Board [TREB]), and
organizations and companies such as the Toronto Atmospheric Fund, Blue Green Consulting Group Inc.,
and Project Neutral. For the full list of supporters and more information, see City of Toronto (2013b).

216 For more information see High-Rise section on the City of Toronto’s website.
(later renamed to SvN), in collaboration with the Cities Centre at the University of Toronto and the United Way founded the Centre for Urban Growth and Renewal (CUG+R). CUG+R’s mission is “to engage in cross-disciplinary research initiatives fundamental to achieving livable and sustainable urban, suburban and rural environments.” Capitalizing on the ideological appeal of non-profit organizations as part and a parcel of “civil society,” CUG+R was meant to formalize the role of E.R.A and SvN (both major private, for-profit architecture and planning firms involved with urban development projects) in the formation of the Tower Renewal project.\(^{218}\)

One of the founders of CUG+R explained the need to have a non-profit organization at the forefront of research and activism around Tower Renewal:

> let me start with E.R.A…. They’ve invested a lot into this [Tower Renewal] project, in terms of funding and continued research, research projects for the project or engagements or whatever that is not funded, they financed it themselves. Also we have a close working relationship with planningAlliance and they also wanted to work on this as well. So we realized that [CUG+R] is the vehicle for both us together. But also I was doing lots of collaborative research with the University of Toronto, as well as York [University] and Ryerson [University]. And we thought if we start a non-profit we would be able to officially liaise with other types of entities, like academic intuitions, which would be a lot more difficult as a private company. Also the work we’ve done with United Way has been through our research non-profit. The idea is that they fund the research for us…. We are able to create MOUs [memorandums of understanding] about sharing data and research. I do a lot of engagement and speaking engagement. And part of it for us, it’s really – we need to get this message across. It’s still, even though there is a lot of proof for the concept – it’s still the everyday Torontonian doesn’t think about these things. So how can we have a culture shift, so that people realize the importance of this [Tower Renewal]. And by having a Centre for Urban Growth and Renewal, we can sort of say, “I represent that” and speak to an audience. It’s not like a private company trying to sell them something. (I10 2013)

\(^{217}\) For more information, see http://cugr.ca/.

\(^{218}\) Both E.R.A. and planningAlliance (renamed to SvN) have been involved in many other development projects across the country (SvN has also had international projects). E.R.A., for example, is involved in the heritage revitalization project in downtown Peterborough, Ontario. One of the current projects/ideas of SvN is about the urbanization of the mid-Canada corridor, where major resource extraction sites and disputed indigenous lands are located. In 2014, John Van Nostrand (the founding principle of planningAlliance) wrote an article in *The Walrus* advocating the settlement of mid-Canada through urbanization. The idea that urban development would benefit all is crucial to their rationale. Ensuring benefits for all through urbanization is even more important in Van Nostrand’s argument particularly given the political threat of indigenous peoples: “Every resource-based project in the country, from pipelines in British Columbia to fracking in New Brunswick, is going to encounter resistance from First Nations, Métis and Inuit communities, as well as from any non-Aboriginal communities. We need to act effectively, and to ensure benefits for all” (Van Nostrand 2014:39).
Commissioned by the Ontario Ministry of Infrastructure, CUG+R published its first major research report in November 2010 entitled, *Tower Neighbourhood Renewal in the Greater Golden Horseshoe: An Analysis of High-rise Apartment Tower Neighbourhoods Developed in the Postwar Boom (1945–1984)* (Stewart and Thorne 2010). Decorated with gloomy images of the aging highrise concrete towers across southern Ontario and shiny examples of revitalized towers in Europe, the report had a twofold goal: it mapped and analyzed 1,925 “apartment towers” across southern Ontario, and it examined the potential for expanding Tower Renewal project to support Ontario’s development policy objectives.

In a language very similar to neoliberal, Third-Way development discourse, the report rendered the aging highrise concrete towers as “opportunity” and an “urban asset” (Stewart and Thorne 2010: 45). It also argued renewing this vast housing stock (which compromises one third of the Greater Golden Horse’s rental housing stock (Stewart and Thorne 2010:25) is completely aligned with the broader project of neoliberal growth and development in Ontario. The report particularly underlined how Tower Renewal is in line with the province’s regional transportation plan (The Big Move), poverty and crime reduction strategy (Breaking the Cycle), environmental strategy (Go Green Action Plan on Climate Change), and Places to Grow, the growth plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe (Stewart and Thorne 2010:iv–viii).

*Tower Neighbourhood Renewal in the GGH* directed attention to three major challenges in implementing the Tower Renewal project: 1) the private ownership of almost 80% of this housing stock and the fragmented nature of this private ownership divided among multiple owners; 2) planning policy framework and zoning restriction, given that almost all high-rise towers are located in single-use, residential zones; and 3) “ensuring equity” and maintaining housing affordability once Tower Renewal is implemented (Stewart and Thorne 2010:29–31). The report reiterated Morison Park Advisors’ suggestion that achieving Tower Renewal in the GGH “will require the establishment of an investment framework attractive to market interests, as well as a means by which multiple owners can effectively co-ordinate renewal efforts” (Stewart and Thorne 2010:28). It strongly proposed the need for new zoning by-laws, and shortly mentioned that addressing the equity challenge “may include agreements with owners for rent freezers in exchange for density bonusing and renewal financing, as well as facilitating partnership with affordable and public housing providers” (Stewart and Thorne 2010:31).

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219 On the neoliberal dimension of Tower Renewal, see also Poppe and Young (2015).
The CUG+R’s report (Stewart and Thorne 2010) turned the urban design and the built environment of “tower neighbourhoods” into a new object of investigation in Toronto. Following its publication, the Cities Centre and Jane’s Walk published *Walkability in Toronto’s High-rise Neighbourhoods* (Hess and Farrow 2010). Hess and Farrow identified their report as “the first of its kind to focus on suburban high-rise neighbourhoods where low-income suburban pedestrians have very limited access to cars” (2010:13). It was within and in relation to this broader context that United Way shifted its research focused on privately owned highrise concrete towers and published *Vertical Poverty* in January 2011. Few months after its publication, in September 2011 the City of Toronto (2011a) published *Tower Renewal: Implementation Book*.

**Urban Design Solutions to the “Paris Problem” in Toronto**

The sudden interest in “tower neighbourhoods” went beyond the usual players such as urbanists, the City of Toronto, and United Way. Building on the momentum of the policy popularity of the social determinants of health, public health authorities in Toronto also found this newly “discovered” territory an interesting object of investigation. In response to the findings of the *Vertical Poverty* report, the Board of Health directed Toronto Public Health to develop strategies to improve the health and well-being of residents of apartment neighbourhoods facing poverty and to identify policy barriers (Toronto Public Health 2012:3). The result was three major studies focusing on the relationship between urban design and public health by mapping the concentration of particular health problems (for example, diabetes) and walkability across Toronto’s postwar suburbs and overlaying these maps onto the maps of concentrated poverty (see Figures 10 and 11). These reports included: *Healthy Toronto by Design* (Toronto Public Health 2011), *The Walkable City: Neighbourhood Design and Preferences, Travel Choices and Health* (Toronto Public Health 2012a), and *Toward Healthier Apartment Neighbourhoods* (Toronto Public Health 2012b).
Figure 10: Mapping the geography of non-White poverty and diabetes
Source: Toronto Public Health (2012a)
Figure 2: Utilitarian Walkability in Toronto

Source: Toronto Public Health (2012a)

Figure 3: Distribution in Low Income Households

Source: Toronto Public Health (2012a)

Figure 11: Mapping poverty and walkability across Toronto

Source: Toronto Public Health (2012a)
The goal of these reports was to rationalize “how public health objectives can be achieved through design interventions directed at apartment neighbourhoods” (Toronto Public Health 2012b:7). The final report also advocated for changes in zoning restrictions and diversifying tenure options as part of design interventions that would enhance public health in these neighbourhoods. If the message of the final report by Toronto Public Health nicely resonated with the particular goals of Tower Renewal, it was not surprising. Graeme Stewart, Jason Thorne, Michael McClelland, and George Martin, all members of E.R.A., were among the eight co-authors of *Toward Healthier Apartment Neighbourhoods* (Stewart et al. 2012).

A few months before the publication of *Toward Healthier Apartment Neighbourhoods*, in May 2012 CUG+R had already published another major report, *Strong Neighbourhoods and Complete Communities: A New Approach to Zoning for Apartment Neighbourhoods* (Stewart et al. 2012). Reiterating the main messages of *Vertical Poverty* and the need to revitalize and redevelop highrise concrete towers, the major focus of *A New Approach* was on zoning by-law barriers in “tower neighbourhoods.” Almost all “tower neighbourhoods” are located within single-use, residential zones. The residential zoning by-law, a legacy of postwar functionalist planning, is undoubtedly problematic in its simplistic separation of different spheres of life into neatly delimited territories of residence, commerce, recreation, and industry. What is also important for our discussion is the relation between zoning by-laws, property values, and gentrification in the absence of any progressive rent regulation aiming to reserve housing affordability.

Since the Harris government’s “vacancy decontrol” in 1998, which allows landlords to raise rents after a previous tenant vacates to whatever the market will bear, the increasing shift to mixed-used zoning in Toronto has become one of the first steps of gentrification processes. *A New Approach*, however, was not concerned with gentrification. Quite to the contrary, in its critique of the functionalist single-use, residential zoning of tower neighbourhoods, *A New Approach* directed attention to the “benefits” of the City’s previous zoning changes in downtown:

> While our city’s avenues, transit corridors, downtown “kings” neighbourhoods and central waterfront are benefiting from policy shifts in support of revitalization, many apartment hoods continue to face complex and rigorous zoning barriers to positive interventions both small and large. (Stewart et al. 2012:2)

Without any discussion of how rezoning was part of the systematic gentrification and a force behind the concentration of (predominantly White) wealth in the above-mentioned areas in Toronto, *A New Approach* proposed a similar treatment for “tower neighbourhoods,” starting from

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220 Other co-authors were Brendan Stewart, Kim Perrotta, Shawn Chirrey, and Monica Campbell.
the liberalization of zoning restrictions. The report envisioned the implementation of Tower
Renewal in three long-term phases:

This proposal contemplates a “ tiered” approach of varying degrees of
permissiveness…. The first tier focuses on broadening land use permission to
enable a wide range of community, commercial and institutional activities…. The
second tier would expand on this permit as-of-right changes to the physical form of
the building or property in order to accommodate modest additions or small
buildings to house new uses. Tier 3 is intended to support more significant
changes, such as new mixed-used infill development, and is therefore envisioned
to apply only to select apartment neighbourhoods in the city. (Stewart et al. 2012:3)

To facilitate renewal and investment in “tower neighbourhoods,” A New Approach further
proposed a new “Apartment Residential Commercial” zone for tiers one and two (Stewart et al.
2012:41) and an “Apartment Neighbourhood Reinvestment” zone for tier three, which would
“consider potential for larger, infill development on under-utilized apartment site” (Stewart et al.
2012:42).

CUG+R’s Strong Neighbourhoods report (Stewart et al. 2012) was quickly followed by a
short United Way report, Building Strong Neighbourhoods: Closing Gaps & Creating Opportunities
(2012). The official inclusion of United Way into the Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy
2020 has boosted the organization’s lobbying and political power. Decorated with smiling faces of
non-White kids and adults, assumedly the residents of “tower neighbourhoods,” the report was a
celebration of United Way’s role in empowering “people who wanted to improve their
community” and making these neighbourhoods’ safe (United Way 2012:1). To confirm its role as
an influential lobbying force in urban politics and policy, United Way quoted the praise of a
variety of political figures, from Dalton McGuinty (then Premier of Ontario) and Roy McMurtry
(former attorney general and chief justice of Ontario, and co-author of the Roots of Youth Violence
report [McMurtry and Curling 2008]) to Bill Blair (then Toronto Chief of Police) and Rob Ford
(then mayor of Toronto):

United Way Toronto is a leading champion for stronger communities and a proven
change-agent in tackling complex problems through a hood lens. UW is a valuable
partner of the ON government in our drive to extend opportunity for all, including
our partnerships on the Youth Challenge Fund, Community Hubs and our Poverty
Reduction Strategy. (McGuinty quoted in United Way 2012:5)

Ontario is at the crossroads with regard to youth development. The place-based
approach of UW Toronto and its local partners has been powerfully transformative.
(McMurtry quoted in United Way 2012:7)
Crime is down across the city, but that’s not all due to great police work. My officers tell me that UW’s hood investments and efforts to empower residents are helping make our city safer. (Bill Blair quoted in United Way 2012:11)

On April 3 and 4, 2013, City Council adopted a new city-wide zoning bylaw that included the creation of the new Residential Apartment Commercial (RAC) zone. By the end of January 2014, the City’s chief planner, Jennifer Kessmaat, proposed selected areas for implementing the RAC zoning (City of Toronto 2014b). In early May 2014, Council approved the finalized list of nearly 500 apartment properties across the city (City of Toronto 2014b). The question of rent control and the possibility of displacement still remained unclear, even though the concern over rent increase was acknowledged, and there were questions as to whether the new permission might result in increased rents. Units covered by the Rental Housing Protection Act can have their rents increased only based on improvement to the residential part of a building. Improvement related to commercial uses cannot be transferred to the residential portion of the building for the purpose of rent increase. However, the commercial improvements may result in an increase to the property tax for the commercial uses (City of Toronto 2014b).

From “Faulty Towers” of Poverty to Entrepreneurial “Arrival Cities”

The modern arrival city is the product of the final great human migration.... The arrival city is often barely urban, in form or culture. (Saunders 2011:21, 23)

In justifying the need for re-zoning in “tower neighbourhoods,” A New Approach referred to an increasingly popular new concept in the Toronto urban lexicon: “arrival city;” the report suggested that “tower neighbourhoods” are what Canadian journalist Doug Saunders (2011) has called “arrival city.” “The key attribute of a successful Arrival City,” the report stated following Saunders, “is the ability to support and nurture small enterprises that directly service the community” (Stewart et al. 2012:21). As one of the main architects of Tower Renewal noted:

The main trust with [re-zoning] is actually about social investment to make sure the quality of life and economic and entrepreneurial potentials [of these neighbourhoods] – kind of like Doug Saunders’ Arrival Cities. These communities are where newcomers live and they don’t have the tools of the arrival cities to invest and start businesses, to collaborate and to do all those stuff. (I10 2013)

What is an “arrival city”? In 2009, Doug Saunders, a foreign correspondence for The Globe and Mail, published a book entitled Arrival City: The Final Migration and Our Next World. Therein,
Saunders painted a picture of the last civilizational transformation of human history fuelled by “the final great human migration... from village to city” (2011: 21). He coined the term “arrival city” to define and bring together the arrival spaces of what he characterized as “villagers” to urban centres (2011:18). The arrival city is both populated with people in transitions and is itself a place in transition (2011:10). “Arrival city” is an all-encompassing, homogenized concept across time and space; it includes “the slums, favelas, bustess, bidonvilles, ashwwaiyyat, shanytowns, kampongs, urban villages, gecekondular and barrios of the developing world, but also the immigrant neighbourhoods, ethnic districts, banlieues difficiles, Plattenbau development, Chinatown, Little Indias, Hispanic quarters, urban slums and migrant suburbs of wealthy countries” (2011:19).

Arrival City received international and national attention. From conservatives to liberals and social democrats, all applauded the book for its attention to public policy and foreign affairs. Gordon Brown, former UK prime minister, called it “a remarkable achievement.” The Guardian praised it as the twenty-first century version of Jane Jacobs’ The Death and Life of Great American Cities. In Toronto, it was not just CUG+R that linked the Tower Renewal project to arrival city (Stewart et al. 2012). Saunders’ book and its concept of arrival city quickly gained popularity among urbanists and the City’s planners and policymakers as well as community organizations in “tower neighbourhoods.” Linking suburban apartment-dwelling to Canadian identity, Saunders himself identified Tower Renewal and the works of Graeme Stewart and United Way as influential for “transforming [Toronto’s] postwar slab farms into thriving urban-style neighbourhoods” (Saunders 2013).

In October 2013, Toronto’s Chief Planner Roundtable had a specific focus on Arrival City as part of the City’s attempt towards having “a better understanding of what’s going on” in our suburbs” (Keesmaat 2013). In May 2014, Architecture for Humanity Toronto (AFHTo) organized a lecture series on “Incremental Strategies for Vertical Neighbourhoods” and a design charrette

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221 Arrival City won the Donner Prize (an award given by the conservative Donner Canadian Foundation) for the best book on public affairs in Canada. The book was among the five finalists for the 2011 Lionel Gelber Prize (a literary award for the world’s best non-fiction book in English on foreign affairs). It was also nominated for the Shaughnessy Cohen Prize for Political Writing (presented by the Writers’ Trust of Canada to the best non-fiction book on Canadian political and social issues). Steven Paikin from TVO interviewed Doug Saunders on The Agenda in October 2010 (Saunders 2010).

222 For more information, see Chief Planner Roundtable Report (City of Toronto 2013c).
inspired by the City’s Tower Renewal program at Ryerson University. Part of the aim of the design charrette was to use opportunities in the new RAC zone to re-design “vertical neighbourhoods” as successful “arrival cities.” Graeme Stewart and Eleanor McAteer (then the Project Director of Tower Renewal Office at the City) attended the charrette as juries. In December 2014, Cities of Migration (an initiative of the Maytree Foundation and Ryerson University) organized a public talk on Arrival Cities: Global Framework + Local Discourse.

In 2015, four major events were organized around Saunders’ concept of “arrival city.” In January, the Cities of Migration’s City Book Club launched an online reading of Arrival Cities, inviting urbanists, migration experts, practitioners, and advocates from across the world to join a guided reading and global discussion of the book. In March, Cities of Migration organized a webinar on Tower Renewal in the Arrival City, featuring Graeme Stewart and Gerben Helleman (from Rotterdam, Netherlands) discussing the relationship between Tower Renewal and “arrival cities.” In April, as part of its Cities of Arrival program, The Ismaili Centre, Toronto in collaboration with York University City Institute organized an event, Arrival Cities: How Immigration Succeeds and Fails on the Edge of the City. In July, Heritage Toronto organized another public event, Thorncliffe Park: Canada’s Arrival City, focusing on the history and current situation of Thorncliffe Park, which Saunders had identified as a successful “arrival city” in his book.

Why has the narrative of a liberal journalist, mostly writing on international matters, suddenly become such an important concept in the urban visions of redevelopment in Toronto’s postwar suburbs? Arrival City is neither a revelation nor has any scientific and analytical depth. There is nothing new to its argument of an increasingly urbanized world. By conflating different historical periods, geographies, scales, and forces of migration and immigration, Saunders has homogenized and caricatured the complexities of migration in our conjuncture. The figure of the

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223 At the inaugural event of the lecture series, Fillipe Balestra of Urban Nouveau was invited to speak about his work in the informal settlements of India. Balestra was the major advisor of the design charrette on May 3, 2014. For more information on the event see Whelan (2014).
224 Speakers included Dough Saunders, Emily Paradis (University of Toronto) and Alina Chatterjee (United Way).
225 For more information, see Cities of Migration (2015).
226 Saunders presented his argument at the event. His lecture was followed by a response from Linda Peake, then director of the City Institute at York University. A feminist geographer, Peake (2015) has juxtaposed Saunders’ “humanist” take of global urbanization with the abstractness of recent discussions on “planetary urbanization,” popularized through the works of Neil Brenner at Harvard University (see Brenner 2014). For more discussion on Brenner’s take on planetary urbanization, see also the Urban Theory Lab at Harvard University.
“villager” represents a condensation of this homogenization and abstraction of migration processes and forces. Rather than its analytical value, it is the epistemology and political message of *Arrival City* that are attractive and useful for popularizing the Tower Renewal program and normalizing the political fear of “the immigrant” in Toronto (and perhaps elsewhere). Taking for granted the socio-spatial relations of imperialist capitalism, Saunders provides his readers with a liberal humanitarian vision-cum-mission: if we want to save “our urban” world from the threats of the poor “villagers” living amongst “us,” “we” need to empower the poor to urbanize themselves.

The civilizational epistemology of this liberal humanitarian vision builds upon notions of colonial-capitalist progress and development and is imperative to Saunders’ differentiation between the “urbanites” of the Global North and the “villagers” of the Global South. The culturalized and hierarchical separation between “urbanity” and “rurality,” “urbanites” and “villagers,” builds upon the histories of separations and differentiations between the civilized and the uncivilized, the colonizer and the colonized, the modern and the traditional, the developed and the underdeveloped, the liberal democratic and the terrorist. Such civilizational separation, differentiation, hierarchicization, and abstraction are at the heart of the conception of “arrival city.” “Arrival city,” in the words of Saunders, is

> a place of transition. Almost all of its important activities, beyond mere survival, exist to bring villagers, and entire villages, into the urban sphere, into the center of social and economic life, into education and acculturation and belonging, into sustainable prosperity. (2011:10)

One of the celebratory aspects of Saunders’ account is his attempt to portray “the villager” as having the potential to become “urbanites,” of joining the “urban civilization.” Thus his call for facilitating access to entrepreneurship, small business, property ownership, and citizenship for “the villagers” in order to transform them into safe liberal subjects as well as his call for the redevelopment of arrival cities. Saunders’ recognition of “the villagers” is deeply rooted in the colonial-liberal form of recognizing the colonized and the subaltern, a recognition that aims to construct colonial-liberal subjects whose “inferiority complex” – to speak with Frantz Fanon (1967) – would lead them to identify with the oppressor and the state.

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227 Nowhere in the 351-page book that claims to cover the migration stories in 20 cities in countries as India, Bangladesh, Iran, Turkey, Kenya, Brazil, China, France, Germany, United States, and Canada does one come across capitalism, colonialism, imperialism, and war as forces of migration. Instead, we are told, urbanization, characterized as a natural force sprung from Europe and its benefits are what have attracted “the villagers” to leave their villages and voluntarily move to cities.
Spatial form plays an important role in Saunders’s liberal-colonial recognition. Calling himself an environmental determinist (Saunders 2010), Saunders strongly argues that “a good part of the success or failure of an arrival city has to do with its physical form” (Saunders 2011:32–3). The force of this environmental determinism (and its implicit social Darwinism) is such that “it serves as a sorting and selection mechanism” (Saunders 2011:39). What arrival cities “produce, through this cycle of selection, are among the most inventive and resilient population groups in the world” (Saunders 2011:47).

For Graeme Stewart and the architects behind Tower Renewal, Saunders’ liberal humanitarian narration of environmental determinism and “the immigrant” problem are most attractive for the redevelopment of “tower neighbourhoods.” As one of the main architects of Tower Renewal said:

Again going back to Doug Saunders, I think this [i.e., Tower Renewal] is more of an idea of how do you create agency in people, and provide the tools for individual agency in these neighbourhoods. The way I look at it is that [these towers] were designed and planned as though they were state-owned, and that the zoning was so restrictive. It was mostly done in that sense because they were designed for middle-income people who drove cars, and you just drive to the mall for shopping. And now they need to function as a village where people are walking, do things locally…. It’s been groups like myself and United Way and other people who have been fighting and working with the City… to sort of challenge the status quo to liberalize these spaces and to allow these things from sort of a regime that would be happy to see them just frozen in time, which is something totally inhuman. (10 2013)

The colonial-liberal recognition has deep-seated roots in Toronto, even among non-White population. The above-mentioned member of the Scarborough Housing Help Centre – himself a non-White person – explained to me how in his view the lack of agency among “the immigrant” tenants of highrise concrete towers is one the reasons there has not been any class-action lawsuit against the illegal practices of landlords:

[M]uch of the immigration that we see to Canada is from developing countries. I think in many of the developing countries what happens is the old concept of challenging the law is something that is usually not encouraged. So what happens is they bring that mentality with them when they come here. By stepping on Canadian soil you cannot sort of, say, reverse thirty years of thinking from your own native country. So when you draw their attention, many of them are not aware of the fact this is illegal and that you can bring a class action lawsuit. To bring a class action lawsuit you need somebody who is brave enough to step forward and say, “Yes, I will take this to court.” But you will not find anyone who has this kind of courage, because of their own experiences in their own native countries. And then, here they are trying to settle in. So the attitude has kind of created another
problem. So the lack of information, the lack of will to make these kinds of things happens within from the community, and that has affected them the most. And since they will not do anything, there is very little incentive for the other side to do anything. Right. So, there is no class action suit and I don’t see this happening in the near future either. (I9 2013)

Saunders’ liberal-colonial leanings are detectable in his celebration of the potentials of “the villagers” and his call to empower such potentials to guard against their political threats and the prospect of the “Paris problem” in Toronto. Left to itself, the arrival city could turn into a “place of failed arrival.” Recalling the “Paris… riots in 2005, London in the 1980s, Amsterdam… in the first decade of this century” (Saunders 2011:19), the “African-American ghetto” (Saunders 2011:25), and the “Islamist terror plot” designed in Mississauga (Toronto) in 2006 (Saunders 2011:318); Saunders ends his book by reminding his readers that if “the villagers” of arrival cities “are driven out or trapped on the margins or denied citizenship or an ownership stake in the larger city, they will turn into a far more expensive threat” (2011:323). This spectre of urban subaltern uprising threatening the peace and security of urbanites also parallels the racialized and territorialized security ideology at the heart of the “Paris problem” in Toronto. “The new arrival cities of Europe and North America,” Saunders reminds his readers, “have plumbing, sewage and internet access, but they are sometimes as alien and threatening to their native populations as the slums of Asia are to their cities’ established residents” (2011:31).

Saunders’ particular liberal humanitarian ideology is also another reason for the praise the book has received. Arrival City is a celebration of liberal imperialism. Saunders’ conception of “resilient villagers” parallels Bernard Lewis’ (2002) conception of the “good Muslim” (see Mamdani 2004), which has been fundamental to the United States’ imperialist policy. Both conceptions are based on the philanthropy of the West. Not much different from Lewis, who emphasized the need to support the “good Muslims,” one of the major messages of Arrival City is to push the state (and its civil society apparatuses) to cultivate a loyal constituency among the subaltern using the opportunity of appropriating their aspirations to transform them into secured liberal subjects. His conception of “failed” arrival cities parallels Thomas Barnett’s (2004) conception of global “gaps” that has been influential in targeting “failed” and “failing” states as spaces of danger. In both conceptions, threats are perceived in the disconnection from imperialist-capitalist relations. Thus for Saunders, making “the villagers” small entrepreneurs and homeowners, giving them “paths into the ‘core city,’” and increasing the real-estate value of
“arrival cities” through redevelopment are among the most strategic ways to pacify the threat of the subaltern and prevent uprising (2011:20–1).

In this sense, Saunders’ narrative affirms the conceptions of “faulty towers” and “tower neighbourhoods” as securitized objects of liberal humanitarian interventions. Arrival City confirms and justifies the political fear of the non-White working class in Toronto. Saunders’ silence about the concrete forces of imperialist-capitalism, his celebration of neoliberal ideology, his fetishization of the informal economy, and his promotion of home ownership all resonate well with policymakers in Toronto. The latter, too, have shown a deep-seated reluctance to deal with the concrete causes of the production of non-White poverty and the crisis of affordable housing in the city.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined the formation of the most pervasive place-based housing redevelopment project in Canada as part of the latest place-based urban policy targeting poverty in Toronto. I showed how the ascendency of mapping and the localized lens of state-led urban intervention turned a particular residential urban form (the rental high-rise concrete towers) into an object of investigation and quickly into the cause of concentration of non-White poverty. Tower Renewal, a state-led project of housing redevelopment without demolition, has brought new socio-political forces into the scene of urban policy making in Toronto. Alongside the City, United Way, and academic institutions, urbanists, architects, and health authorities also have become influential forces in the production of “expert” knowledge about how to tackle the concentration of non-White poverty in Toronto.

I showed how liberal humanitarian ideology and the political fear of “the immigrant” have also been important in the formation and rationalization of Tower Renewal. This is best evident in the ideological depiction of highrise concrete towers as a securitized object of liberal humanitarian intervention: a “troubling” space of “vertical poverty” and violence, one that if left alone will become a threat to the prosperity of Toronto, but one that also has many “potentials” to be “empowered” and “urbanized.” The ideological influence of liberal humanitarianism can also be traced in the language of “urban assets” and “potentials.” Despite its claim of celebrating the “assets” and “potentials” of “tower neighbourhoods,” Tower Renewal has reinforced the civilizational ideology central to the political fear of “the immigrant” in Toronto.
As we saw, Tower Renewal builds upon the racialized and territorialized security ideology around “the immigrant” while providing “design solutions” for urbanizing and integrating “tower neighbourhoods” and preventing the prospect of the “Paris problem” in Toronto. The emphasis on “vertical poverty” and “high-rise towers” has implicitly reinforced the comparison between Toronto’s postwar suburbs and the banlieues of Paris, equating non-White “suburban” spaces and residents with threats to the Western urbanity, “way of life” and civilization. I examined the influence of this ideology not only in the current “expert” knowledge on Tower Renewal, but also by scrutinizing the popularity of Doug Saunders’ “arrival city” in Toronto urban lexicon.
BY WAY OF CONCLUSION

This dissertation was born out of a series of questions based on my observation of Toronto’s politics in the current conjuncture. In a city that has prided itself for its diversity and tolerance, why and how has the “Paris problem” become a reference point in public discourse and among urban policymakers about poor “immigrant neighbourhoods?” Why is the fear of these poor “immigrant neighbourhoods” located in the city’s postwar suburbs? Why is it important to take this comparison to Paris as more than just rhetoric in order to understand the complexities of state-led interventions and the working-class fragmentation and fragmented politics? Why have left groups only paid attention to the postwar suburbs and yet never taken seriously the comparison between the banlieues of Paris and Toronto’s postwar suburbs? The easy answer to these questions is that the comparison is the result of sensational journalism and politics typical of our “post-9/11” era, and for that matter is not worth our attention – or rather distraction. Such an answer, however, is a way of avoiding the questions. After all, neither sensational journalism nor sensational politics function in a void; their sensationality is grounded in common-sense ideologies.

I decided to investigate these ignored questions not as an intellectual exercise in abstraction, but because my everyday experiences as a non-White immigrant from Iran and my on-and-off engagements with left politics in Toronto in the last ten years led me to think such an investigation would be constructive for rethinking left politics in this city and, perhaps with qualifications, in other imperial metropoles where the “immigrant neighbourhood” has become the target of state-led intervention. As I delved into my research beginning four years ago, I realized the importance of the “Paris problem” in Toronto’s place-based urban policy cannot be explained with sole reference to neoliberalism. As we saw in Chapter One, a sole emphasis on neoliberalism as the impetus for place-based urban policy is historically inaccurate. Invented in the United States of the 1960s as a state strategy of targeted intervention to deal with the then-urban crisis fuelled by Black radicalism and uprisings, place-based policy as we know it today has had a dimension strongly rooted in colonial history. At that conjuncture in the 1960s, the state mobilized a targeted intervention to pacify the rising Black power and to secure the colonial-capitalist order of the United States.

I followed this history across time and geography in Chapter Two and argued that the political logic of state targeted intervention has its roots in the theory and practice of pacification
that itself goes back to the colonization of Americas in the sixteenth century. Immersing myself in this fascinating and disturbing history led me to realize that urban theory has much to learn from theories of social war. After all, today’s policy buzzwords, such as inclusion, exclusion, empowerment, participation, equity, community development and community policing, are not just celebrated by urban policymakers. Military strategists involved with counterinsurgency and de-radicalization practices in former colonies are also busy capitalizing on these concepts; one only has to look at the counterinsurgency manuals of the American, British, or Canadian forces, as well as the latest works of the gurus of counterinsurgency (see Kilcullen 2013; Nagl 2014) to see this.

The lineages of the “war on terror” and that war itself have already pushed some scholars to examine the links between urban and military practises in the last decade (see Light 2003; Gregory 2004, 2010; Weizman 2007). With the exception of a few works (Light 2003; Roy, Schrader and Crane 2014; Immerwahr 2015), the scholarly focus has been limited to the coercive dimension of war, leaving aside the conception of war as a social relation and its productive dimension. Furthermore, the major focus of these studies has been on the United States, the United Kingdom, or France. In fact, one rarely encounters Canada in these debates. The liberal myth of Canada as a multicultural, humanitarian, and peacekeeping country has been so strong that talking about Canada as an imperial power has only recently found its way to academic circles (see Gordon 2010; Bell 2011a; Klassen and Albo 2013; Shipley 2013, forthcoming; Klassen 2014; Gordon and Webber 2016). While I have not directly engaged with Canada’s imperialism overseas, I hope this dissertation will be a contribution to the ongoing work of de-mystifying Canada’s innocence, this time from within the heartland of its most populated and major imperial metropole.

Instead of limiting myself to the disciplinary boundaries of current debates on place-based policy, I embarked on writing a socio-historical analysis of spatially targeted state intervention in Toronto informed by a historical-materialist approach and a multidisciplinary engagement with debates in urban geography, political geography, political theory, international relations, critical security studies, counter-colonial debates and history. The result is the first socio-historical study of the ideological dimension of actually existing state-led interventions in “immigrant neighbourhoods” in Toronto that began in the 1990s. As mentioned in the Introduction, following the work of Ellen Wood I have been particularly keen to explore the historical conditions within which the ideas of place-based policy was invented and developed. The focus of my investigation
and analysis has been on the form, content and production of dominant ideologies, or ruling ideas – to speak with Marx and Engels. Following Himani Bannerji’s reading of Marx, I understand ideology not simply as a constellation of ideas and discursivities, but rather as an epistemological procedure for producing knowledge and understanding of the world – and indeed for fabricating it.

Why such an emphasis on dominant ideologies? First, the question of ideology is at the heart of the question of knowledge, knowledge of our world and knowledge about how to change it (Marx and Engels 1976). Perhaps more than any other time in modern history, for thinking through revolutionary politics today we need a sustained and rigorous critique of ideology. Given the mainstream consensus on the “withering away of the state” on the one hand and the far-left consensus on a politics “outside of the state” on the other, the critique of dominant ideologies is an imperative task for historicizing and scrutinizing the ways the state has legitimized its power as common sense, in the form of dominant ideologies, and as a modality of scientific knowledge – to speak with Bannerji and Poulantzas. Second, the critique of ideology is essential for undoing what Lefebvre called the presence of state-like thinking and symbolism in everyday life, a presence that is linked to the ideologies of space. Third, the critique of ideology helps us to scrutinize the liberal separation of the state and civil society, the domestic and the international, war and peace – to speak with Gramsci. Forth, as Neocleous reminds us, without a critique of ideology, one cannot have a full grasp of the productive dimensions of state-led strategies of targeting and intervention; with such a critique, we can understand the productive and coercive dimensions of state strategies not as opposites but as complementary. This latter point, as we saw in Chapter Two, is important for examining the productive dimension of war and the complementary relation between state-led strategies of development and security.

Why is a focus on dominant ideologies and urban policy important for left politics? Let me address this question briefly by way of an example of a current trend among activist circles in Toronto. In recent years, the idea of “de-colonize” has become popular among some left groups composed of majority non-White young activists.228 Partly as the result of the publicity of indigenous activism and of the solidarity of a new generation of left groups with indigenous struggles in Canada, partly as the result of the prevalence of postcolonial identity politics, today

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228 To reiterate my note in the Introduction, my reference to non-White activists and mobilizations of the slogan “de-colonize” does not include indigenous activists. Even though at times similar critiques can be directed towards indigenous politics, here my critique is directed towards non-indigenous, non-White groups such as No One Is Illegal and a whole series of student-activist groups on and off campus, particularly in Toronto and Vancouver.
we come across all sorts of claims to de-colonization in left politics (broadly defined). We have calls to de-colonize Canada, de-colonize the left, de-colonize the mind, de-colonize the land, de-colonize activism, de-colonize feminism, even calls to de-colonize particular university departments and conferences in social sciences. Yet this frenzy of de-colonizing any and everything has remained for the most part at the level of rhetoric. As much as one hears about the calls of duty to de-colonize, one rarely hears about how to de-colonize, or who the colonized are and how they are colonized. It is not an exaggeration to say that, in certain activist circles, uttering the term de-colonize has become a ritualistic salute to the converted and a symbolic act to confirm an initiation.

While sympathetic to some of the intentions behind the focus on de-colonizing, my position is that a mere repetition of the symbolic turns into an ideology, one that is dehistorized and dehistoricizing. To go beyond the symbolism of speech and not fall into the trap of ideology, we need to engage with the concrete reality with all its messy, and at times hidden, complexities and contradictions. An important task is to understand how colonization has survived the era of anti-colonial struggles and official de-colonization in the mid-twentieth century and has revived into the neo-colonial dimension of liberal democracy in the imperial metropole of the twenty-first century. What role has the (imperial) state played in the survival of the colonial in the form of the neo-colonial in the imperial metropole? What forms of knowledge and processes of knowledge production have helped to normalize and dehistoricize this survival? What socio-political forces have been involved in these processes? These are complicated questions with no straight, ready-made answers. Needless to say that answers to these questions vary depending on the historical specificities of various imperial geographies.

And here is what I believe is the main contribution of this dissertation to the quest of thinking through a counter-colonial, anti-capitalist politics for our time: providing a historical-materialist analysis of the neo-colonial dimensions of urban life and politics, here and now. My contribution and intervention is limited to engaging with a very specific, yet neglected, question: What are the roles of the state and place-based urban policies targeting non-White poverty in the production of a neo-colonial urban order in Toronto? In answering this question, I set myself two intertwined tasks. First, I investigated the characteristics of the historical conditions within which place-based urban policy was invented and developed as a form of state intervention (Chapters One and Two). Second, I examined the development and translation of place-based urban policy
targeting poverty in the specific context of Toronto of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries (Chapters Three to Eight).

Embedded in this socio-historical analysis are what I consider to be two original contributions that I hope will challenge the boundaries of academic debates on place-based urban policies in “immigrant neighbourhoods” in the imperial metropoles of North America and Western Europe and which for left activists will bring to the fore the importance of engaging with urban policy. First, I have argued that in order to understand the complex role of the state and the neo-colonial dimension of state-led interventions in the imperial metropole, we need to examine the relational formation of urban and imperial policies and politics. Here I highlighted the urgency of de-fetishizing the liberal ideology of civil peace and of engaging with the theories of social war. Second, I have pointed to the territorialized and racialized security ideology at the heart of place-based urban policy in Toronto, whether policies of policing or social and urban development. This security ideology has been fundamental to the construction of “the immigrant” and “immigrant neighbourhoods” as the objects of the ruling classes’ political fear and the targets of state-led interventions. More than sensational politics, it is this territorialized and racialized security ideology that has justified the comparisons between Toronto and Paris, or Toronto and London, and quickly normalized such comparison as common sense.

This latter point is even more important in the Canadian context, where the hegemony of liberal multiculturalism has also become the Achilles’ heel of the left. As I have argued in this dissertation, the figure of “the immigrant” is a homogenized code word for the poor non-White working-class. The territorialized and racialized security ideology in the construction of non-White working-class populations as an “internal enemy” works within the parameters of liberal multicultural ideology in Toronto (and Canada) (Chapters Three to Eight). The hegemony of liberal multiculturalism in Canada and the specificities of its immigration processes have necessitated the articulation of the political fear of “the immigrant” in Toronto within the boundaries of a liberal humanitarian ideology (Chapters Four to Eight). With its roots in the eighteenth-century humanitarian thought about the wretched and the colonized of the world, today’s liberal humanitarian ideology has a strong neo-colonial dimension to it. Recall how those socio-political forces that have lived farthest from poverty aim at addressing the problem of concentrated non-White poverty in Toronto, or how the United Way has become the “voice” of the wretched in the city and has taken on trusteeship for their empowerment. Similar to eighteenth-century humanitarianism, in today’s liberal humanitarian ideology the targets of humanitarian intervention
– in our case, “immigrant neighbourhoods” – are simultaneously conceived as spaces of securitization and tutelage. Not surprisingly, when it comes to intervention policymakers have found much utility in prevention through development rather than in sole naked violent coercion.

Throughout Chapters Five to Eight, I followed the ascendancy of the concept of prevention and its function as an ideology in place-based policies of policing, social development and housing redevelopment. In Chapter Five, I traced the history of prevention in policing to the ideas of Patrick Colquhoun and his concept of social police in the late eighteenth century. Starting from the premise that poverty is integral to social relations of capitalism, Colquhoun proposed prevention as a productive strategy for the political management of poverty and of the working class along with what we would call the reproduction of capitalist social relations. Colquhoun’s conception of prevention has powerful echoes in today’s frenzy around this topic. Following policy transfers and translations across time, geographies and scales, I argued that the current popularity of the concept prevention in Toronto’s policy circles is also related to the centrality of the ideology of prevention in imperial policies, from counterinsurgency strategies in the “war on terror” to international development and health strategies of the IMF, the World Bank and the WHO in the former colonies. In all these strategies, the concept of prevention functions as an ideology. Rather than preventing violence, poverty, or disease, prevention is about moderating the violence of policing, poverty, uneven development, war and occupation. The specific forms of the ascendancy of the concept of prevention in urban and military strategies in our conjuncture, I argued, direct us to the ways place-based policies of targeting non-White poverty function as a modality of neo-colonial pacification.

In addition to the ideologies of prevention and liberal humanitarianism, I have also traced the neo-colonial and pacifying dimensions of place-based policy in Toronto by pointing to the parallels between the perceptions and conceptions of threats in state strategies involving targeting and intervention at the urban and international scales. It is impossible to scrutinize the territorialized and racialized security ideology in the construction of “the immigrant” (neighbourhoods) without tracing the links between the urban and the imperial. Think about ideologies of space that I discussed in previous chapters. Territorialized, homogenized, hierarchized, racialized and fragmented conceptions of space are predominant in the conceptions of “troubled neighbourhoods,” “hotspots,” and “no-go zones” of crime and violence in the literature on “neighbourhood effects,” which as we saw has formed the so-called scientific pillar of urban policy in Toronto. I traced similar ideologies of space in imperial policy in relation to
conceptions of “ungoverned” spaces, “hotspots,” and “failed-states” in the narratives of “small wars,” “humanitarian wars,” and the “war on terror.”

These ideologies of space owe their validity to an ideology of order. We have seen how a particular ideology of order that has been historically linked to the insecurity of private property and capitalist social relations has animated the targeting of “enemies of order” at the urban and international scales. This ideology of order has been imperative for the reification of the liberal ideology of security, policing and the construction of political fear of “enemies of order.” The ideology of order rearticulates the interconnection between security and development, an interconnection that has been at the heart of “the local” turn in state strategies of targeting and pacification since the early twentieth century.

The popularity of the ideology of poverty-as-risk was born out of this context. This ideology came to international prominence through the policy activism of supra-national, imperial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF in the early 1990s. In this articulation, while poverty is understood as integral to capitalist growth and development, unmanaged poverty is also seen as a threat to the smooth functioning of capitalism. Poverty here is understood as the result of a disconnection from the market, rather than the result of particular, necessary forms of integration into socio-spatial relations of uneven development under imperialist capitalism. By the late 1990s, the conception of poverty-as-risk entered Toronto’s policy lexicon through the policy activism of the United Way. As we saw, the ideology of poverty-as-risk has been imperative to targeting the poor as the cause of insecurity and disorder in Toronto. For policymakers the problem with “immigrant neighbourhoods” is that they are not connected to Toronto’s economy. Their solution is to integrate these localities into Toronto’s economy and urbanity.

The ideology of poverty-as-risk has also helped revived the ideology of contagion in state policy. From the discussions of reforming community policing to reforming social development and housing redevelopment strategies in Toronto, we saw the revival of the nineteenth-century ideology of danger and poverty as disease. I argued that this revival is in relation to the recent policy popularity of the concept of the social determinants of health and its emphasis on prevention. Following policy mobilities concerning the social determinants of health, I pointed to the role of the WHO and to the predominance of similar ideologies in the “war on terror.” Therein, a focus on “the local,” detached from the broader socio-spatial relations of imperialist capitalism, has been fundamental to the state-led imperial and urban strategies of targeting poverty and insecurity. We have seen the function of this localist vision in state strategies of intervention.
since the early and mid-twentieth century (Chapter Two) and in relation to the “ungoverned” spaces of the “war on terror,” as well as in the current focus on the neighbourhood scale in Toronto’s urban policy (Chapters Six to Eight).

Appeals to science and objectivity have been fundamental to making these ideologies seemingly innocent, invisible and rational. I have particularly focused on quantification and visualization as two major techniques mobilized by policymakers, academics and urbanists. We saw how policymakers have mobilized seemingly progressive concepts such as the social determinants of health and equity as quantitative tools to give a constructive and positive aura to place-based policies of community policing, social development, and housing redevelopment (Chapters Five, Seven, and Eight). Borrowed from the chambers of the Work Bank and the WHO, such appeals to equity and the social determinants of health have greatly reified the violent contradictions and consequence of structurally uneven development in Toronto and indeed worldwide. While such appeals are quite recent in Toronto and implementation outcomes are not yet clear, so far the state has used these appeals as a way of pacifying radical claims.

If quantification has turned into a scientific alibi for policymakers to comfortably shy away from engaging with questions of systemic racism and uneven development, visualization in the form of maps and mapping is another way of claiming objectivity. The ascendency of visualization as a scientific technique of comprehending reality has brought a new level of abstraction in state-led urban and imperial strategies of targeting. I have shown this by problematizing mapping as an instance of the ascendency of the visual not just in perceiving and conceiving target localities, but also in understanding urban politics. Mapping non-White poverty and violence has solidified territorialized and racialized conceptions of poverty and insecurity in Toronto. We saw for example the logical parallels between the maps of Toronto’s “Paris problem” and Thomas Barnette’s (2004) geopolitical mapping of the dangerous “gaps” in the imperial world. Uncritical endorsements of mapping as a way of revealing reality have ignored these parallels and resulted in normalizing the violence involved in the production of “immigrant neighbourhoods” and “ungoverned spaces,” here and there, near and far. At the same time, an aura of scientificity, produced by academics and professionals and popularized by the media, has normalized mapping’s erasure of violence.

The ascendency of quantification and visualization has also resulted in the simultaneous prevalence and normalization of environmental determinism in state-led strategies of intervention. The current popularity of “design solutions” has gained its justification from the normalization of
environmental deterministic visions. We saw this in community policing, social development and even more so in housing redevelopment strategies in Toronto. With its emphasis on the potential of urban design-inspired localized interventions, liberal humanist depictions of poverty and the poor, community participation for fostering economic integration, empowerment, and its implicit and explicit aim to pre-empt social unrest, Tower Renewal is the most condensed embodiment of the penetration of this environmentally determinist thought in current urban policy. Tower Renewal is not a stand-alone project, however. The logic behind it is part of the broader trend in urbanist thought that currently is gaining momentum and which is variously referred to as “tactical urbanism” (see Gadano 2014a; Lydon, Garcia and Duany 2015), “acupuncture urbanism” (see Lerner 2014), and “incremental urbanism” (see Balestra and Göransson 2009).229 This is an urbanist thought that celebrates informality and advocates local intervention and participation for tackling the hard-to-avoid reality of socio-spatial and racial polarization and poverty across and within metropolitan centres worldwide.

From November 2014 to May 2015, a visionary showcase of this trend in urbanist thought was exhibited at the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) in New York City entitled Uneven Growth: Tactical Urbanisms for Expanding Megacities (Gadanho 2014a). Directed by Pedro Gadano, the architect curator of MoMA’s department of architecture and design, the goal of the exhibition-cum-project was to provide urban-design solutions to the crisis of the “dramatic polarization between enclaves of wealth and sectors of poverty” in our cities (Cruz 2014: 49). Focusing on six major metropolitan centres (Hong Kong, Istanbul, Lagos, Mumbai, New York and Rio de Janeiro), Uneven Growth (and tellingly not uneven development) brought together groups of local practitioners and international (Western) researchers to provide visionary solutions to the conditions of the urban wretched of the earth. The exhibition was also accompanied by a book (with the same title) to which Gadano, along with a few other major architects and celebrity left intellectuals such as David Harvey and Sasskia Sassen, have contributed.230 Despite its progressive

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229 Architecture for Humanity Toronto invited Filipe Balestra to Toronto to give a talk about incremental urbanism and his projects in May 2014. Balestra was also the major advisor of the design charrette organized by Architecture for Humanity Toronto and Ryerson University on Tower Renewal. The workshop, “Incremental strategies for vertical neighborhoods,” was held at Ryerson School of Architecture on May 3, 2014. At the end of the one-day workshop, Graeme Stewart and Eleanor McAteer, then Project Director at Tower Renewal Office at the City, joined the design charrette to evaluate the designs.

230 Other contributors to the book include: Ricky Burdett (professor of urban studies and director of LSE Cities and the Urban Age Programme); Teddy Cruz (founding principal of Estudio Teddy Cruz and professor of public culture and urbanism at the University of California, San Diego); and Nader Tehrani (founding principal of the NADAA and professor of architecture at the MIT).
appeal, particularly given the contributions of Harvey (2014) and Sassen (2014), military-imperial thought plays an important conceptual role in Gadanho’s argument. In explaining the importance of searching for tactical strategies to prevent the consequences of “uneven growth” in our urban future, Gadanho proudly mobilizes the thinking of American military strategist and system theorist Herman Khan in connection with work done at the RAND Corporation think tank in the 1950s (2014b:25).

A critical engagement with the exhibition requires its own separate treatment; nonetheless, a few dimensions of this mega-project of “small-scale acupuncture projects” (Burdett 2014: 34) are relevant to my discussion. First, the foundational premise of the MoMA project is that poverty and its urban manifestations (concentrated poverty, lack of housing, unemployment, etc.) are here to stay. The solution requires selective, localized interventions with the aim of ameliorating the everyday harshness of poverty and marginalization rather than structural change. Second, tellingly similar to Toronto’s case, it is the spectre of the social unrest of the poor, repeatedly coded as “urban crisis,” “urban catastrophe,” “urban contingency,” “urban asymmetry,” “social emergency,” and “urban conflict,” that is mobilized as a justification for the urgency of intervention (for example, with projects named tactical urbanisms). Third, there is an implicit or explicit liberal humanitarian dimension in the celebration of informality and the emphasis on the power and creativity of the poor, which, the assumption goes only need to be developed and channelled properly (this time by architects and urbanists). Forth, public–private community participation is at the core of the project. One of the main goals of the project is to engage design thinking with policymakers and community participation in order to link formal and informal, bottom-up and top-down urban development, and in the process address the “activist” role of architects and urban designers. It would be naïve to consider these parallels coincidental. Rather, these parallels speak to the depth of our “humanitarian present” (Weizman 2011) – one that has been normalized in the name of science.

The production of the aura of scientificty has not been a simple, transparent affair. As we saw, a whole array of diverse socio-political forces have been involved in the knowledge production industry surrounding place-based policy in Toronto. These socio-political forces go beyond policymakers within the institutions of the state and include a good portion of “civil society” forces, from charity organizations such as the United Way and non-profit and for-profit research institutions to major banks, academic institutions and a series of seemingly progressive academics and on to urbanists and architects. The social and political diversity of this large web of
forces involved in the production of knowledge to target “immigrant neighbourhoods” directs us to Poulantzas’s emphasis on the state as a condensation of relations of force and crystallizes Lefebvre’s point about the ways in which state-like thinking and symbolism penetrate into everyday life and turn into common sense.

Some readers would argue that the very diversity of these socio-political forces could turn into an opening for democratizing knowledge production about “the immigrant.” Perhaps. But I am less optimistic, not because I believe in the total hegemony of the state, but because of two other crucial parallels between urban and imperial policies. First is the phenomenon of the whole-of-government approach. As we saw in previous pages, the state has been actively intensifying ideological dominance over policy making and implementation. The whole-of-government approach is about the political management of this vast knowledge production and policy-making industry as well as that of policy implementation through community centres and selected grassroots groups. An increasingly popular approach in military and civil governance, the whole-of-government approach can be seen as the latest strategy to sustain the balance of forces in favour of the ruling classes.

Second is the conception of the subject-target of security in state intervention. The ideology of prevention is anchored upon a particular neo-colonial conception of the subject-target of security, whether in policing-security strategies or in social development strategies. Having its conceptual roots in discourses of human security that came to international prominence in the 1990s, the subject of preventive liberal intervention is not a passive subject. Rather, s/he is a particular form of an active subject, always the vulnerable subject in need of enabling agency to become resilient. In imperial policy, the shift to prevention in security politics was accompanied by a shift in the locus of securing agency from Western actors to the fragile or failing states (perceived to be) in need of capacity building and humanitarian intervention. The revival of counterinsurgency in the “war on terror” came out of this context. In place-based urban policy, we can trace this shift in targeting “at-risk” individuals or families and their choices or “priority neighbourhoods” and their physical characteristics. In fact, the very conception of crime and violence as infectious disease and the logic of “design solutions” build upon this conception of the subject-target of security. Such a conception of the subject-target of security directs us to the powerful force of dominant ideologies and their deep penetration into everyday life and common sense. As we saw, even the progressive fractions of the socio-political forces involved in the
production and implementation of place-based policy in Toronto have deeply internalized such ideologies.

This is not to say, and should not be taken as a declaration, that the state has total domination. As I have emphasized throughout this dissertation, spatially targeted state intervention has been the product of the contradictions of the socio-spatial and colonial relations of imperialist capitalism. If targeted intervention has been a state strategy to solidify domination, its necessity has been crystallized in times of crisis, when there are cracks in the hegemony of imperialist capitalism. This is why the political fear of the “enemies of order” has been so central to such state strategies, whether the “enemies of order” are the Black radicals of the “American ghetto” of the 1960s and 70s, the indigenous activists in Canada of the 1960s, or the non-White youths in the banlieues of Paris, the “sink estates” of London, or the “tower neighbourhoods” of Toronto of the twenty-first century. Saying that ideology has been central to the ruling classes’ political fear of the non-White working-class population does not mean that such fear is a delusion. As the worldwide urban upheavals of the last decade have demonstrated, we are living in an extremely politically volatile time.

The socio-historical analysis that I provided here gives us a very complex, contradictory, and messy picture of reality in Toronto. Still, this is only one aspect of our current conjuncture – that is, the aspect of the ideological dimension of actually existing state-led interventions in “immigrant neighbourhoods.” Another important piece of the puzzle is to examine the on-the-ground resistance within and without “immigrant neighbourhoods” and to historicize various forms of resistance across time, geography, and scale. I have touched upon some forms of resistance and appropriation of place-based policy by activists. The question of what forms of resistance have managed to be born and survive has not been the primary analytical focus of this dissertation. As I mentioned in the previous chapters, the subaltern in Toronto are in no way absent from the various offices and arenas of the integral state. In fact subaltern struggles have been crucial in the formation of place-based urban policy in Toronto. While not systematically organized, there are pockets of resistance scattered across the city (from downtown to postwar suburbs). Recall the timely intervention of Jane and Finch Action Against Poverty that pushed the City to add an extra consultation session for Jane-Finch neighbourhood, or the works of youth activists against police brutality in postwar suburbs. One can also think of Black Lives Matter Toronto as a resistance movement. While the movement got its name and inspiration from south of the borders, it has also been the direct outcome of the contradictions of place-based policing.
strategies such as TAVIS and racial profiling, the main subject matter of Chapter Five. It is still to be seen how much and how deeply movements such as Black Lives Matter Toronto can influence strategies of policing in Toronto.

While some forms of resistance are more grounded and have opened up space for future organizing, others point to the role of state intervention in dividing, indeed spatially localizing reactions. Place-based policing can reinforce territorialized reactions among youth. In Chapter Four, I have called this phenomenon a form of neighbourhoodism. While such neighbourhood politics is full of contradictions and can be a reactive form of identity politics, we should not erase the fact that territorialized youth neighbourhoodism has its roots in youths’ responses to their alienation and territorial targeting. The real dangers of youth neighbourhoodism is its localized vision and siege of consciousness (to speak with Fanon (1967a, 2004)). These cases direct us to urgently needed research projects on the complexities of struggles. I hope those closer to the ground of grassroots resistance than I am will pursue such projects soon.

This is not to say that what Lenin asked in 1902, which is the question of “what is to be done?” is not an important question. On the contrary, I believe revolutionary politics needs to engage with this question; otherwise, it will always remain within the limits of anti-politics rather than being able to set the parameters of a counter-politics. I reiterate my position that for engaging with the question of “what is to be done?,” we first need to have a comprehensive understanding of reality. Secondly, engaging with that question cannot be the task of intellectuals solely. Rather, it requires sustainable and camaraderie engagement and willingness to learn from various fractions of working-class politics and activistisms. I intentionally and politically refuse to end this conclusion by performing the academic ritual of preaching about “what is to be done.” Rather, I hope the limited contribution of this dissertation will facilitate and encourage writing the other half of the social history of place-based policy: the stories and struggles of those who have been living and resisting the everyday violence of poverty and state-led targeted interventions.
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Appendix A
List of Interviewees

11 Member of Toronto Police Accountability. Interviewed February 27, 2014.
12 City Councillor, City of Toronto. Interviewed September 13, 2013.
13 Senior manager, Social Development, Finance & Administration, City of Toronto. Interviewed January 13, 2014.
15 Retired City staff, policy researcher, City of Toronto. Interviewed October 16, 2013.
17 Activist, Ontario Coalition against Poverty. Interviewed March 10, 2014.
19 Senior staff, Scarborough Housing Help Center. Interviewed November 6, 2013.
22 Community justice consultant for the OPP and the TPS. Interviewed October 15, 2013.
23 City staff, Youth Development Unit, Prevention and Intervention Toronto, City of Toronto. Interviewed September 16, 2013.
25 Member of Toronto Police Accountability. Interviewed February 5, 2014.
29 Senior manager, Social Policy, Analysis & Research, City of Toronto. Interviewed October 24, 2013.
30 City Councillor Executive Assistant, City of Toronto. Interviewed August 7, 2013.
31 Tower Renewal staff, City of Toronto. Interviewed August 27, 2013.
33 Executive Team Member, United Way Toronto. Interviewed September 18, 2013.
I24 Community Development Officer, Crisis Response Unit, City of Toronto. Interviewed August 20, 2013.
I25 Senior staff, Policy Development Officer, City of Toronto. Interviewed November 27, 2013.
I26 Senior staff, Community Development Unit, FOCUS, City of Toronto. Interviewed September 24, 2013.
I27 Senior staff, Public Interest. Interviewed November 22nd 2013.
I29 Senior staff, Action for Neighbourhood Change, United Way Toronto. Interviewed September 8, 2013.
I30 Senior staff, Newcomer Strategy, City of Toronto. Interviewed December 3rd 2013.
I31 Youth Justice staff, St. Stephen’s Community House. Interviewed October 25, 2013.
Appendix B

List of Participant Observation

Tower Renewal: Update from Toronto & Melbourne (Innis Town Hall, University of Toronto, December 11, 2012)
Mobilizing private investment in affordable housing: Lessons from the United States (Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance, Toronto, April 16, 2013)
Sweden: Low-carbon neighbourhood design (OISE, University of Toronto, April 16, 2013)
Closing the gaps: Toronto’s 13 priority neighbourhoods (Innis Town Hall, University of Toronto, April 25 2013)
Family homelessness in Jane & Finch (Finch Community & Family Centre, Toronto, July 17, 2013)
Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 Community Conversation (Cedarbrook Community Centre, October 3, 2013)
Toronto’s growing socio-spatial divide: What’s racism got to do with it? (October 17, 2013)
Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 Community Conversation (City Hall Rotunda, October 21, 2013)
Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy 2020 Community Conversation (Northern Secondary School, October 22, 2013)
Regent Park: After the mix (Toronto Reference Library, Toronto, April 29, 2014)
Incremental strategies for vertical neighbourhoods – design workshop & lecture (Ryerson University, May 3, 2014)
Precarious housing among migrant communities: A multi-sectoral discussion (OISE, University of Toronto, May 15, 2014)
Arrival Cities: Global framework + local discourses (Centre for City Ecology & Cities of Migration, Toronto, December 9, 2014)
Youth violence, communities and faith (Ideologue Forum, Toronto, January 26, 2015)
Arrival Cities: How immigration succeeds and fails on the edge of the city (The Ismaili Centre, Toronto, April 11, 2015)