Race, Nature, and Accumulation: A Decolonial World-Ecological Analysis of Indian Land Grabbing in the Gambella Province of Ethiopia

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Abstract
This dissertation situates the post-crisis phenomenon of large-scale agricultural land acquisition, otherwise known as the global land grab, within the *longue duree* of the capitalist world-ecology. It does so by advancing a theoretical and historical framework, which I call the *decolonial world-ecological agrarian question*, that clarifies the key role played by the co-production of race and nature in provisioning the “ecological surplus” of cheap food that has historically secured the emergence and reproduction of capitalist development. This framework specifically foregrounds the racialized denial of indigenous human presence as the necessary condition of possibility for the reduction of the colonial frontier to a state of “unused” nature. While the racialized denial of the reproductive conditions of the colonial frontier’s fertile soils ultimately exhausts the latter’s surplus provisioning capacity, the longue duree of the capitalist world-ecology has been marked by successive attempts to overcome such exhaustion by forging, through technologies of racialization, new frontiers of “unused” externalized natures. The key premise of this dissertation is that, in light of the food price crisis indexing the exhaustion of the accumulation capacity of the neoliberal epoch of the capitalist world-ecology, the global land grab constitutes another such attempted moment of re-securing the cheap food premise through racialized frontier appropriation. This dissertation highlights the distinctive South-South dimensions of the contemporary global land grab by taking as its empirical site of investigation the case of Indian land grabbing in the Gambella province of Ethiopia. The central argument advanced here is that, within the neoliberal crisis conjuncture, the hegemonic resolution of the agrarian question in the “core” national space of India calls forth, through the practice of “global primitive accumulation,” the racialized construction of frontiers of unused nature in an emergent African zone of appropriation. Specifically, the cheap food imperative of Indian capitalist
development constructs the fertile soils and abundant waters of Gambella as “unused” natures hitherto wasted by the “primitive” practices of the indigenous Anywaa people. Indian state and capital thus simultaneously appropriate and erase the indigenous practice and knowledge which has been historically integral to the socio-ecological foundation of Gambella’s “natural” abundance.
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Introduction

We have been trying to convince people who’ve been making these [land grabbing] allegations that these are floodplains where nobody stays, where nobody can reside or graze their cattle because most of the time they are under four or five feet of water - Ram Karuturi, managing director of Karuturi Inc.

It’s because he [Karuturi] never consulted the local people about the seasons of planting, this is why he was victim of flood. There is no problem of Baro River for farming. He doesn’t listen to any local people – they listened to the highlander experts, but naturally we know the nature of the land – Ojulu, resident of Ilea village

The above comments offer contending socio-ecological interpretations of the series of floods that ultimately sunk the large-scale agricultural project initiated by the Indian multinational agribusiness firm, Karuturi, in the Gambella province of Ethiopia. I had been initially drawn to study, as the focal point of this dissertation, the Karuturi project on account of it widely being identified by journalists and NGOs as a paradigmatic case of an emergent post-crisis land grabbing phenomenon. My primary objective was to examine, through the lens of agrarian political economy, to what extent the institution of such large-scale agricultural production in the peripheral frontier province of Gambella was informed by the class contradictions and accumulation imperatives of capitalist development in India and, to a lesser extent, the core regions of Ethiopia. In this sense, I sought to understand the Karuturi land grab in relation to India’s unresolved agrarian question – how Gambella might be constructed as the provisioning source of the cheap food supply necessary for India to consolidate its transition from “less developed” agrarian socio-economy to developed industrial state. However, by the time I arrived to conduct fieldwork in Ethiopia in early 2014, the marquee Indian agricultural investment had clearly stalled, in significant part on account of the inability of the company to
tame the floods emanating from the Baro River. This surprising turn of events (how were the promoters of the project precluded from knowledge of the river’s rhythms?) compelled a deeper theoretical investigation into the paradoxical link between the constitution of Gambella as a source of “cheap food” and the ultimate demise of the project. As I undertook this inquiry, what struck me, in particular, was the manner in which Gambella’s reduction to a site of “pristine nature,” implying the absence of human presence, as contended by Karuturi in the first comment cited above, stood, from the indigenous perspective offered in the second comment above, as a definitive factor in the project’s failure. It is here that I stumbled upon what would become a key dimension of the argument forwarded by this dissertation: that the racialized construction of pristine nature, via the appropriation and erasure of indigenous human presence, was both imperative to the construction of Gambella as “cheap” and abundant while it simultaneously undermined the constituting socio-ecological conditions of such abundance.

This dissertation thus marks the entry of the theme of the co-production of race and nature into the land grabbing literature, which has until now been almost entirely conducted through the framework of agrarian political economy mentioned above. My intention here is not to dismiss the approach of agrarian political economy, but rather to expand and deepen it by elucidating how the (re)institution of the racialized society/nature distinction marks a fundamental qualitative condition of possibility for the achievement of the cheap food surplus which has historically underpinned capitalist development and further constitutes the key “post-crisis” motive force driving the global land grab today. In order to do so, it is necessary to engage in a theoretical and historical reconstruction of the agrarian question and its principle transformative mechanism of primitive accumulation, a task towards which this dissertation thus dedicates significant attention. It does so by situating the India-Ethiopia land grab within the
longue durée of a colonial-capitalist modernity marked by accumulation cycles that rise and fall in association with the constitution, and ultimate exhaustion, of global ecological surpluses provisioned through racialized society/nature regimes.

Global Land Grab: An Overview

The (re)emergence of the land grab in the first decade of the twenty-first century constitutes a central dynamic of the (post)neoliberal conjunctural crisis (financial, food, energy, ecological) of capitalist modernity. Land grabbing, or “large-scale agricultural acquisitions/investments,” has been most commonly associated, in both academic and media accounts, with the acquisition of large allotments of agricultural land in poorer countries of the Global South by foreign investors. The rapid explosion of such land deals in the aftermath of the 2007/8 food and financial crises – estimated to cover more than 50 million hectares globally, with a primary concentration in Africa – has increasingly drawn attention from academics, global developmental institutions, NGOs, and social movements concerned with questions of development, global justice, and environmental sustainability (Cotula, 2012). While land grabbing has involved a familiar North-South dynamic, much attention has been directed towards an emergent South-South, or East-South, dynamic (Schoneveld, 2011; Borras et al, 2011; Margulis and Porter, 2013). My dissertation, while concerned with the “land grab” in general as a constitutive process and relation of capitalist modernity, focusses specifically on the South-South dimension through an exploration of India’s involvement in land acquisitions and transformations in Ethiopia.

The enormous scale and transnational dimensions of these large-scale agricultural acquisitions are both profoundly reconstituting, and being constituted through, the socio-
ecological and geopolitical relations of areas targeted for investment and the home region of the foreign investors. While this transformative potential foregrounds the land grab as central to addressing pressing questions of global poverty, inequality, and ecology, an intensifying contestation has emerged among various actors (states, indigenous peoples, developmental institutions, peasants movements, environmentalists, investors) over what exactly this centrality means. For hegemonic developmental institutions, such as the World Bank, the massive amounts of capital infusion into agricultural sectors and regions that have been long neglected and “under-utilized,” signal a potential revitalization of prospects for the development project and its ostensibly central aims of eradicating hunger and poverty (Deininger et al, 2011; McMichael, 2012). For those critical of the land grab, the scale and transnational dimension of the transactions are an alarming sign of a potential neocolonial process that will only intensify the very problems and crises that it claims to address (GRAIN, 2008; OI, 2010; HRW, 2012).

There is, then, much at stake in the contestations over the meaning and potential of the land grab, and also therefore much to be offered by a rigorous empirical and theoretical study of the underlying socio-historical and politico-economic forces and dynamics.

The rapid explosion of the land grab, and the broader significance it is assuming, expresses a peculiar incoherence, an anachronism even, of the (post)neoliberal conjunctural crisis of capitalist modernity. While the evolutionary unfolding at the heart of modernist ideology is premised upon the progressive devaluation of agriculture’s role in the achievement of human prosperity and growth, the contemporary moment of capitalist development is one in which potentially epochal global crises of food, finance, ecology, and energy have converged to dramatically revalue agricultural land. This revaluation has involved national governments and (agribusiness and financial) corporations roaming the global South in search of “empty”
“under-utilized” lands for fuel and food production (Borras et al, 2011). While a burgeoning interest in these land deals can be seen in the numerous reports issued by concerned NGOs, developmental institutions, and social movements (GRAIN, 2008; OI, 2010; HRW, 2012; Deininger and Byerlee, 2010), recent scholarly interventions have highlighted the need for more systematic theoretical and empirical work that can address the ‘initial’ questions of what exactly the land grab involves in terms of actors, operationality, and scope, in order to then engage the larger questions of understanding the underlying forces and dynamics at play in (re)centering agricultural production and transformation in the global political economy (White et al, 2012, 620; Alden Wily, 2012, 752; Edelman et al, 2013). This project of study, with its focus on the case of Indian agricultural expansion in Ethiopia, thus constitutes an original contribution in so much as it both contextualizes the initial questions through empirical research, and elaborates a theoretical framework that further clarifies the higher order concerns that are at stake in the contestations around the land grab.

As White et al. (2012) and Alden Lily (2012) point out, the initial studies on land grabbing mostly focussed on immediate empirical questions, and amongst the various positions and responses articulated it is significant that none offered an uncritical celebration of large-scale land transactions, suggesting that there is serious potential for socially and ecologically destructive outcomes. Even the World Bank report titled *Rising Global Interest in Farmland: Can it yield sustainable and equitable benefits?*, one of the most systematic and thorough studies on the issue produced so far, recognizes a dominant pattern of investors targeting indebted or corrupt states in order to more easily acquire land that might be of central importance to poor rural communities (Deininger et al, 2010). However, the position of the Bank is not that these risks should restrict, or even prohibit, large-scale transnational agricultural land transactions, but
rather that investors should adhere to a voluntary “code of conduct” for responsible investment that will enable more sustainable and equitable outcomes. This reflects a faith in the power of profit-seeking capital, properly self-disciplined through the principle of “corporate social responsibility,” to mobilize and organize resources in the most productive and efficient ways possible, while delivering ecologically sustainable and socially equitable development (Li, 2011, 293). Specifically, for the World Bank, large-scale agricultural investments by capital abundant investors potentially constitute a mechanism for operationalizing the “agriculture for development” framework that was the theme of the Bank’s 2008 World Development Report and has since been central to its vision for breaking out of the “development impasse” (WB, 2008; Li, 2011; McMichael, 2012; ). By operating within a voluntary code of conduct, the World Bank believes that investors can bring much needed capital to lands that have been rendered “marginal” and “under-utilized” owing to a lack of available resources. In this sense, transnational investment can help in overcoming what the Bank identifies as massive “yield gaps” – the difference between actually existing and potential land productivity – and thus significantly increase agricultural production to levels that can address the world’s increasing demand for food and biofuel while offering positive developmental outcomes such as increased employment on large-scale industrial farms (Deininger et al, 2010).

More critical positions, often based on extensive empirical research, have been articulated by development and human rights NGOs, peasant and ecological social movements, and critical academic scholars of agrarian relations. Notable amongst these have been the reports issued by Oxfam (2012), the Oakland Institute (2011), and Human Rights Watch (2012), which have uncovered widespread displacement, and even outright dispossession, of indigenous people from ancestral communal lands as a consequence of the investor rush for the planet’s remaining
“virgin” soils. Theorists and analysts of agrarian relations have further questioned a key premise of the land grab, namely that what the World Bank and others have designated as “marginal” or “empty” land will often have crucial ecological, cultural, and even economic significance in ways not recognized by narrow productivist perspectives (Borras et al, 2011; McMichael, 2012). The loss of such lands, and their conversion into export-oriented industrial plantation farms, thus threatens the social, cultural, and ecological reproduction of indigenous peoples, as land that was used for local consumption now produces according to the imperatives of return-seeking foreign investors. Compounding the issue of dispossession, critical observers have noted that it is not clear how exactly plantation agriculture or any other sector can sufficiently provide the degree of employment necessary to ensure development objectives of social security and welfare (Li, 2011).

**Karuturi and the India-Ethiopia land grab**

The empirical findings of this dissertation’s “India-Ethiopia” case study, presented in chapter four, reflect the concerns emphasized by critics of land grabbing and cast further doubt upon the “win-win” potential of large-scale agricultural land acquisitions. I examine the India-Ethiopia land grab through a specific focus on the much-publicized case of the Karuturi investment in Gambella, a province located in south-western Ethiopia. This investment attracted much attention from international media and NGOs, as it was viewed in many ways as a paradigmatic case of land grabbing, particularly in so much as Karuturi, an Indian agribusiness firm centered in Bengaluru, was granted, in the midst of the food/financial crisis of 2007/8, a huge 300,000 hectare concession of prime fertile land from the Ethiopian state at a rate of one dollar per hectare per year (Seth, 2013). While Karuturi represented the land concession, on account of its fertility and low costs, as a launching ground for its ascension into global
supremacy in the agro-food sector (Dubey, 2012), the Ethiopian state, approaching the “land grab as development strategy” (Lavers, 2012), expected the project to facilitate national development by either enhancing food availability domestically or increasing the state’s access to foreign exchange reserves through commodity exports. Both the Ethiopian state and Karuturi dismissed land grabbing accusations by insisting that the land under question in Gambella was either unused or under-used by the local population, who thus themselves stood to benefit through expanded employment opportunities on Karuturi’s industrial farm (Rowden, 2011, Dubey, 2012).

As opposed to the “win-win” scenarios forwarded by the World Bank, the Ethiopian state, and Karuturi, wherein there is an imagined alignment of profits, poverty reduction, food security, and environmental sustainability, I found, through a combination of fieldwork at the Karuturi agricultural project in the Gambella province of Ethiopia, and secondary research, that the indigenous Anywaa community of the lands targeted for investment were not consulted as they were, variously, displaced outright (HRW, 2012; OI, 2010) or subject to the enclosure and degradation of ecological actors (forests, rivers, land) key to their livelihood security in order to make way for ostensibly more productive large-scale industrial agriculture. The area enclosed by Karuturi, thus, did not constitute unused or under-used land, but rather provisioned the Anywaa with essential means of subsistence. Immediate consequences for Anywaa communities included the loss of supplemental food, medicinal and home/building sources, land erosion, and intensified flooding. There was little to no evidence, on the other hand, of any significant poverty reduction benefits, in terms of employment generation, infrastructural development, or food availability, generated by the Karuturi investment in Gambella.
The empirical findings presented in chapter four further reveal that, not only did the Karuturi land investment in Gambella prove deleterious for local peoples and ecologies, it also failed in the other half of the “win-win” formula, as repeated flooding prevented the company from getting production off the ground (Seth, 2013; Davison, 2013). As a consequence, the costs of indigenous displacement/dispossession and ecological disruption were not offset by the expected benefits of development and profits. The Ethiopian state failed to secure increased food production and/or foreign exchange reserves, and the company, having invested large sums of capital which it was unable to recoup, was forced into bankruptcy by early 2015 (Fekade, 2015). In accounting for such an instance of failure, this study thus expands the empirical bounds of land grabbing debates which have yet to take collapsing projects, despite their increasing number (GRAIN, 2016; Edelman et al, 2013), into serious analytical consideration.¹

Theorizing the Long Ongoing History of the Land Grab

In order, however, to account for such failure, and to understand, moreover, why the land grabbing phenomenon continues to persist in the face of implementation challenges and pronounced criticisms regarding the socio-ecological consequences of the expansion of large-scale agriculture (GRAIN, 2016), it is necessary to engage in deeper theoretical and historical contextualization than has thus far been offered in the more empirically oriented literature. As White et al have noted,

faced with the rapid spate of big land deals in recent years and in all continents, there is plenty of reason for researchers, activists and policymakers to be concerned with the immediate problems of dispossession, exclusion and adverse incorporation that local communities face. Besides these immediate issues however, there is also a need to look for deeper understandings of the phenomenon and its longer-term implications for

¹ Though, for exceptions see Cotula, 2013 and Edelman et al, 2013
agricultural and rural futures, in other words to disentangle the immediate and fundamental dynamics at work (2012, 620).

This constitutes the central concern of this dissertation. I address it by elaborating, over chapters two and three, a theoretical and historical framework through which the global land grab in general, and the “South-South” India-Ethiopia case in particular, can be located within the longue durée of colonial-capitalist modernity. In so doing, the intention is to clarify, through the application of this framework to the case study in chapter four, the theoretical and historical significance of the motive forces and consequences of the contemporary global land grab.

This study’s longue durée focus takes as its point of departure the emphasis placed, by more theoretically inclined land grab scholars, on the importance of interpreting the global land grab in relation to two longstanding concerns of agrarian political economy – the agrarian question (Li, 2011; Akram-Lodhi, 2012; Oya, 2013) and primitive accumulation (Hall, 2013; Ince, 2014; Bush, Bujra, & Littlejohn, 2011; Levien, 2015). While primitive accumulation, with its emphasis on capital and labour formation through land enclosure, has been widely deployed as a theoretical framework, the agrarian question, surprisingly, has been very minimally engaged in the land grab literature. This is reflected in Carlos Oya’s remark that “there are no contributions to the vast recent literature on land grabs attempting to engage with long-standing debates about the agrarian question of capital and whether the current land rush marks a turning point in the resolution (or not) of this question” (2013, 1548). For Oya, this is a serious omission, as the agrarian question, centering as it does upon the link between agricultural transformation and capitalist accumulation, can elucidate further dimensions of the drivers and consequences of land grabbing.
Although it has existed, since at least the late 19th century, as a long-standing problematique of classical marxism (Engels, 1894; Lenin, 1899; Kautsky, 1988), the agrarian question was re-introduced, in the 1970s, as a key “development” imperative through the work of Terence J. Byres. Informed by the Marxian historical belief in the “agrarian origins of capitalism,” which holds that revolutionary transformations in land and labour relations in the agricultural sector were imperative to the historical emergence of capitalism in Western Europe, Byres identified the context giving rise to the agrarian question as one defined by the “continuing existence in the countryside of a poor country of substantive obstacles to an unleashing of the forces capable of generating economic development, both inside and outside agriculture” (2012, 13). The agrarian question, consists, then of investigating not only what specifically constitutes such obstacles in a given national context, but also, and more importantly, what transformative processes can allow for their progressive removal in the service of the “forces capable of generating economic development.” More specifically, the concern of the agrarian question is with advancing the labour and property regimes through which agricultural productivity can be enhanced to a degree sufficiently capable of shifting greater proportions of capital and labour out of low income agrarian sectors to higher value producing large-scale industrial production. The latter necessitates, in particular, a cheap food supply that can simultaneously ensure the reproduction of the industrial labour force and the wage repression necessary for accumulation to proceed. For Oya, then, the relevance of the agrarian question framework to the study of the land grab consists of the way in which it can frame large-scale agricultural land acquisitions as processes either facilitating, or hindering, the productivity growth necessary for states in the South that remain mired in what Tania Li has referred to as a “truncated agrarian transition” (Li, 2011, 294).
The potential link suggested here between land grabbing and socio-economic development is clarified through the concept of primitive accumulation, which captures the specific mechanisms through which the revolutionary transformations in land and labour relations necessary for the resolution of the agrarian question have been historically effected. For more orthodox Marxists, Europe, and especially England, constitutes the specific “originary” site within which the necessary changes in agrarian structure and relations occurs (Brenner, 1976; 1985; Wood, 2009; Byres, 2009). Specifically, processes of what Marx identified as primitive accumulation functioned to forcibly separate peasants, engaged in subsistence agriculture, from the means of production and reconstitute them as “capital” and “labour,” with both now being mobilized and marshalled according to the exclusive imperatives of competition and profit, thus allowing for the unleashing of hitherto repressed productive powers and accumulation possibilities. The immense productive powers of the market-dependent capital-labour antagonism are held to substantially increase food produced per unit of input, thereby enabling more resources to be applied to higher value producing industry. The process of separation from land together with the progressive development of the productive forces crucially enables, then, the transition from “pre-modern” agrarian sociality towards modern industrial civilization, which perhaps most significantly involves the profound reconstitution of rural peasants into a free urban proletariat. For regions of the South which have not yet resolved their agrarian question – in other words where low income agrarian sectors remain predominant – the land grab thus suggests, through the lens of primitive accumulation favoured by critical land grab scholars (Hall, 2013), a process reminiscent of the European enclosures which had centuries earlier induced short term pain in the service of long term economic growth.
The applicability of primitive accumulation to the study of the land grab has been questioned on the grounds that it seeks to fit the contemporary Southern agrarian context into a historical European experience which is no longer relevant (Levien, 2015; Martin and Palat, 2014). In particular, the South today faces distinctive challenges, on account of industrial technological development and globalization, in productively absorbing, within the national space, the surplus labour released by projects of enclosure and dispossession such as the land grab. There is no certainty, in other words, of higher income proletarian futures for dispossessed agrarian labour. It is for this reason that Tania Li (2011) characterizes the development impasse confronting Southern states as one of “truncated agrarian transition,” which the global land grab can only promise to intensify rather than resolve.

Rather, however, than discard the concept entirely, it is my view that primitive accumulation, and hence the agrarian question, can be made relevant to the study of contemporary land grabbing through its reconstruction as a “global” rather than national or endogenous process. Such a move emphasizes that, even in the classical European agrarian transitions, the surplus labour released through enclosures could not be sufficiently absorbed in the national space. Instead, “extra-national” enclosures in politically subjugated colonies, premised upon more exhaustive racialized forms of dispossession, underwrote agrarian transition in Europe by provisioning cheap food for the industrial proletariat and empty land, or terra nullius, for the settler-colonial absorption of surplus labour. The centrality of terra nullius further reveals that the global context of agrarian transition calls forth distinct conceptions of non-human natures. Combined, cheap food and free land thus prove essential to the hegemonic resolution of the emergent capital-labour contradiction in the transitioning core, as it specifically enables the reconcilement of the “right to live” demands of dispossessed labour and the wage
repression imperative of capital accumulation. Absent such a global, and ecologically informed, reconstruction, attempts thus far to interpret the global land grab through frameworks of agrarian question and primitive accumulation have been limited in their inability to perceive, and thus take into serious analytical consideration, the central role that processes of racialization/coloniality, and changing human-nature relations have historically played in securing the necessary “rightless” beings from whom surpluses of food could be exhaustively drawn. In this sense, the problem with received frameworks of primitive accumulation has less to do with an assumption of surplus labour absorption that no longer has relevance for the South and more to do with its occlusion of the processes through which such absorption, in the classical European cases, was made possible via racialized and anthropocentric forms of cost externalization which are increasingly unavailable, on account of the “postcolonial” state system and increasing environmental limits, to “transitioning” Southern states today. Reconceived in its “global” dimensions, the lens of primitive accumulation comes to center more prominently on how land grabbing implicates the ongoing agrarian questions of states, both North and South, encouraging their agribusiness capitals to expand production into the terra nullius of extra-national space.

Race, Nature, and Accumulation : Towards a decolonial world-ecological agrarian question

It is, of course, the case that world-systems and world-historical approaches to the agrarian question, associated most notably with food regime analysis (McMichael, 2008) and global value relations (Araghi, 2009), have done important work in advancing a global conception of primitive accumulation. However, these approaches have primarily focussed on global primitive accumulation as the hidden quantitative premise (stolen land and labour) of the supposed “productive powers” of the qualitative capital-labour relation in the core. This misses,
in my view, the centrality of the qualitative socio-ecological relations – *racialized ecologies* - associated with the colonial dimensions of primitive accumulation, particularly in so much as they are imperative to both the constitution, and exhaustion, of capital’s productive powers. The articulation of the qualitative racialized society/nature relations underpinning capitalist development and accumulation thus constitutes a key aim of this study.

I pursue this objective by combining the emergent theory of world-ecology with the concept of coloniality in elaborating a theoretical and historical framework that I refer to as the *decolonial world-ecological agrarian question*. Formulated through the path-breaking scholarship of Jason W. Moore (2010a; 2011; 2015), world-ecology comprises, in part, an expansive ontological reconfiguration of the agrarian question wherein the revolutionary transformations of primitive accumulation involve the institution, in addition to the exploitative capital-labour relation, of the “appropriative” society/nature ontological distinction. The latter distinction captures, for Moore, the “Cartesian” process whereby the separation of labourers from the means of production unfolds within society’s even broader, and more foundational, symbolic-material separation from, and mastery over, non-human nature. The latter comes to comprise a frontier zone of appropriation, wherein nature can be appropriated as “free gifts” in so much as it does not carry the reproductive costs associated with rational human value-producing labour. Historically, frontiers have been constituted by hegemonic states, in significant part, through the violence of colonial and imperial enclosures which release “unused” natures, such as fertile soils, minerals, forests, and abundant waters, for rational appropriation by the transitioning core. Seeking to transcend the Cartesian society/nature binary, Moore reconceptualizes such “free gifts” as having been constituted through the work performed by non-human natures over millennia, and it is the unpaid appropriation of such work that
provisions the “ecological surplus” of cheap inputs (especially food) necessary, in so much as it ensures wage repression, for the initiation and renewal of capitalist accumulation and development in the core.

Such a Cartesian paradigm, premised as it is upon a mistaken notion that nature is in fact a passive object which can be mastered by rational humanity, proves, however, incapable of recognizing signals of distress or resistance communicated by non-human natures in response to their attempted appropriation. The organizing Cartesian logic of appropriation thus eventually draws down, or exhausts, the ecological surplus, and thus threatens the conditions of accumulation, thereby producing a “developmental crisis” which has historically been overcome through a hegemonic re-centering of the world-system (e.g. Spanish to Dutch to English to American) and the forging of successive frontiers of “unused nature” through a new round of global primitive accumulation, or land grabbing, as is seen in the colonization of the Americas, Asia, the Scramble for Africa, and, perhaps, the contemporary land grab. The latter, in particular, can be understood as an attempted moment of frontier formation and appropriation in the service of an “ecological surplus” capable of overcoming the exhaustion of neoliberal accumulation that manifested in the 2007/8 financial and food crises.

A key omission, however, of world-ecology as it has been thus far articulated relates to the absence of any serious analytical consideration given to the key part played by capital’s encounter with the presence and agency of the indigenous peoples of the frontier in the constitution of the appropriative society/nature distinction. As a consequence of such an omission, we are not able to appreciate the extent to which the “free gifts” of the frontier zone of unused nature, such as soil fertility, are actively co-constituted by indigenous socio-ecological practice and knowledge in relation to the work performed by non-human natures that Moore
emphasizes. In order to better account for the analytical significance of indigenous presence and agency in the frontier, this dissertation stages a conversation between world-ecology and the colonality concept articulated by decolonial scholars (Dussel, 1998; 2014; Mignolo, 2013; Quijano, 2000; Maldonado-Torres, 2008; Wynter, 1995; 2003). Of most significance here, colonality foregrounds the colonial foundations of the Cartesian paradigm in arguing that the latter’s society/nature distinction emerges through the racialized relations of colonial conquest, wherein indigenous people are “biologically” collapsed into the sphere of irrational nature. The racialized foundations of the capitalist world-ecology’s society/nature distinction suggest, I argue, a “Cortesian” – reflecting the key role played by the conquistador Hernan Cortes in the colonality argument – rather than “Cartesian” paradigm. This dissertation further develops the Cortesian thesis by arguing that the collapse of indigenous people into the sphere of irrational nature effectively makes space for the colonial-capitalist appropriation and erasure of the indigenous socio-ecological practice and knowledge that has constituted the “natural” abundance of the frontier. The externalization, and appropriation, of nature, in other words, first requires that the racialized colonial register of global primitive accumulation erase indigenous human presence through the denial of the co-constitution of indigenous practice, knowledge, and the non-human natures of the frontier. The decolonial world-ecological approach to the agrarian question thus foregrounds the racialized appropriation and erasure of indigenous presence in frontier lands as imperative to the cheap food surplus underwriting, by facilitating wage repression, the productive powers of the capital-labour relation in the core. In so doing, it further

\[2\] I prefer to use the term “indigenous” rather than something more broad such as “local communities.” I do so since the identification of people as indigenous is key to asserting a prior human presence in frontier zones which are otherwise represented, by colonial forces, as spaces of “pristine nature.” The indigenous marker further points towards the deep place based knowledge and practices through which the “prior” human inhabitants have been integral to the co-production of the “extra-human” natures of the frontier.
suggests that the exhaustion of the ecological surplus, and its associated accumulation crisis, is the paradoxical outcome of both the subjugation of the indigenous practices and knowledges co-constituting the frontier and the anticolonial resistance waged by those subject to such erasure.

**The next/last frontier? Situating the Rise and Fall of the Gambella Land Grab within the longue-duree of the colonial-capitalist world-ecology**

The global land grab, and particularly its South-South dimensions, expresses the systemic colonial-capitalist logic of “ecological surplus” re-generation in the crisis context – rising food prices, economic recession – marking the exhaustion of the accumulation capacity of the neoliberal epoch of the capitalist world-ecology (Moore, 2010a; McMichael, 2012; 2014). The “cheap food” basis of neoliberal accumulation had been secured by a combination of the food surpluses provisioned by the expansion of intensive industrial agriculture across Asia and Latin America - the “long green revolution” – and the forced opening, or “liberalization,” of the national agricultures of the South to the dictates of the global market (Moore, 2015). This cheap food regime has been brought to crisis, signalled most evidently by the sustained food price rise, through a combination of the increasing costs associated with the ecological exhaustion of the long green revolution and the increasing resistance waged by both social movements and rising Southern states, such as India, to the Northern dominated neoliberal agricultural order that has compromised the livelihoods of cultivators and labourers across much of the “agrarian South” (McMichael, 2012; 2013). The renewal of capital’s accumulation capacity is contingent upon the construction and appropriation of successive frontiers of unused nature capable, on account of the racialized denial of its reproductive conditions, of provisioning the “free gifts” of soil fertility and water abundance necessary for the lowering of production costs and the subsequent return of cheap food.
While frontier formation and appropriation has historically corresponded with North-South geopolitical power relations, a novel feature of the conjunctural crises, or “Great Recession,” context of the global land grab consists of an emergent South-South dynamic potentially challenging the foundational North-South order as the driving force of a successive accumulation cycle (Borras et al, 2011; Cammack, 2010, Golub, 2013). This suggests, moreover, that emerging states of the South are responding to the problematic of ecological exhaustion and “truncated agrarian transition,” not through the derivative nationalist frame suggested by the Eurocentric paradigm, but rather by seeking to overturn the North-South character of the capitalist world-ecological regime in favor of alternative world-ecological arrangements that could recast such states as surplus appropriating, rather than simply surplus provisioning, zones. A crucial point of departure, I argue, for this challenge to the North-South framework of the capitalist world-ecology consists of the radical anticolonial socio-ecological articulations advanced by the indigenous inhabitants – peasants, pastoralists, forest dwellers – of the South’s frontier zones. In so much, however, as the imperative of the “rise of the South” would come to be captured within a “catch-up” developmental paradigm, thus bypassing the radical decolonial option, the South’s resistance has come to consist largely of challenging Northern world-ecological hegemony – what Samir Amin (2014) refers to as the “imperialist rent” – in order to make greater space for Southern led racialized frontier appropriation capable of resolving the South’s agrarian question. This, then, expresses a key argument advanced by this dissertation, namely that the South-South dimensions of the global land grab signify both a challenge to Northern world-ecological hegemony and the necessary post-crisis reinstatement, albeit along South-South lines, of the foundational racialized society/nature paradigm of capitalist development.
This claim finds particular expression in the attempted post-crisis transnationalization of Indian agricultural production into the Gambella province of Ethiopia. The combination of an internal ecological exhaustion of its green revolution frontier, expressed in declining soil fertility and water table levels, and increasingly mobilized constituencies of peasants and tribals constraining domestic agricultural frontier expansion, has resulted in a persistent food price inflation crisis in India since 2007 (Gokarn, 2011; IMF, 2016). At the same time, India, like other emerging states of the South, is increasingly wary of securing a cheap food supply through a global market dominated by Northern agribusiness corporations, and has thus taken the lead in stalling Northern attempts to consolidate such market dominance in the Doha round of the WTO negotiations (Rowden, 2011; McMichael, 2012; Hopewell, 2015). In the absence of an internal frontier appropriation capacity, and resistant to the global surplus provisioning capacity of Northern, and particularly American, agribusiness corporations, I argue that the Indian state has looked to support the global expansion of its own agribusiness sector in order to facilitate direct access to offshore food production. Within India’s capitalist development path, the constraints imposed on “internal” frontier appropriation by the “right to live” demands secured by peasants and tribals compels a “global” pursuit of *terra nullius* into extra-national space wherein indigenous peoples and extra-human natures are cast, on account of their irrational waste of abundant “free gifts,” as rightless beings incapable of making claims upon the “value” generated by their dispossession.

Deploying the framework of the decolonial world-ecological agrarian question, the central argument advanced by this dissertation is that, within the neoliberal crisis conjuncture, the hegemonic resolution of the agrarian question in the “core” national space of India calls forth, through the practice of “global primitive accumulation,” the racialized construction of
frontiers of unused nature in an emergent African zone of appropriation. As an examination of the expansion of Indian agricultural production into the Gambella province of Ethiopia reveals, the cheap food provisioned from the frontier remains premised upon the “Cortesian” racialized appropriation and erasure of indigenous knowledge and practice. Specifically, the cheap food imperative of Indian capitalist development constructs the fertile soils and abundant waters of Gambella as “unused” natures hitherto wasted by the “primitive” practices of the indigenous Anywaa people. Indian state and capital thus simultaneously appropriate and erase the indigenous practice and knowledge which has been historically integral to the socio-ecological foundation of Gambella’s “natural” abundance. In this case, however, this dissertation further argues that the Cortesian premise through which Gambella’s reproductive conditions were denied, in order to recast its soils and waters as a “free gift” of nature, would rapidly shift the frontier from a condition of “surplus” to “exhaustion” as socio-ecological movements of indigenous resistance and extra-human natures converged to sink the Karuturi project.

Overview of Chapters

Chapter one critically engages the implications of the agrarian question framework for the study of the global land grab. It begins by recognizing the important emphasis that the agrarian question framework places upon class struggle, particularly as it relates to an emergent capital-labour antagonism, as a key variable in agrarian transitions. While thus constituting a necessary response to the more celebratory accounts of transition forwarded in classical political economy, conventional approaches to the agrarian question, the chapter argues, nonetheless fall within what I call a “Eurocentric-anthropocentric” paradigm which privileges European humans as the exclusive originary agents of primitive accumulation and agrarian transition. This, consequently, reduces much of the non-European world to a derivative space destined to follow
the paths of transition forged earlier by autochthonous European societies. The chapter seeks to reveal that such an origins-diffusion framework informs much of the cautious optimism with which powerful developmental actors and organizations, particularly the World Bank, have identified the surge in global land deals as potential mechanisms for overcoming the stalled agrarian transition. It then considers the extent to which more critical world-historical approaches to the agrarian question have overcome the “origins-diffusion” premise, particularly through a foregrounding of the “extra-national” colonial basis of the classical European transitions, and what the implications, in terms of both potentialities and limitations, of such a “global” reconceptualization are for the study of the land grab.

Chapter two elaborates the central decolonial world-ecological agrarian question framework through which the dissertation, in chapter four, interprets the rise and fall of the Gambella land grab. It picks up from the world-historical approaches introduced in chapter one, but explicitly seeks to address the latter’s quantitative limitations by emphasizing the qualitative racialized society/nature relations through which peripheral zones of appropriation provision the “ecological surplus” securing the hegemonic resolution of the qualitative capital-labour relation in the core zone. The chapter further clarifies the key contradiction of frontier appropriation, namely how the racialized denial of the reproductive conditions of the frontier, while setting in motion the ecological surplus underpinning capital’s historical accumulation cycles, comes ultimately to exhaust the frontier’s surplus provisioning capacity. This “surplus/exhaustion” contradiction is shown to be central to the rise and fall of successive accumulation cycles from the emergence, via the colonization of the Americas, of the capitalist world-ecology in the long sixteenth century to the anticolonial exhaustion of the British-led accumulation cycle of the long nineteenth century.
Chapter three shifts focus to account for the “rise of the South” in the contested reconstitution of the accumulation capacity of the capitalist world-ecology over the “long-twentieth century.” In so doing, it elaborates the necessary historical and geopolitical framework through which “South-South” relations of land grabbing can be seen to simultaneously challenge the historically core Northern zone’s exclusive claim to control over the global ecological surplus while nonetheless reinstating, though now in service of capitalist development centered in the South, its underlying premise of racialized frontier formation that we elaborated in chapter two. Towards this end, this chapter combines the concepts of “triple movement” and “dewesternization,” advanced recently by Nancy Fraser and Walter Mignolo respectively, in order to emphasize that the active opposition articulated to the motive forces of capitalist development, by those consigned to “primitive human” or “extra human” status, figures centrally into both the exhaustion, and attempted reconstitution, of the ecological surplus underpinning capital’s accumulation capacity. The more radical dimensions of the anti-colonial rejection of the South as a “unit of nature” were, however, quickly abandoned, as postcolonial states such as India looked to secure their new found sovereignty in the face of recolonizing forces, in favour of a conception of “development as catching-up-with-the-West” (Chakrabarty, 2010, 53) which necessarily called for the “appropriation” of an “internal” ecological surplus oriented towards rapid national industrial development. In particular, the postcolonial Indian state did not so much as contest the underlying racialized society/nature distinction as it did seek to re-order it in the service of national development. A further argument of this chapter, then, is that the “long twentieth century” is marked by an ongoing North/South, or rewesternization/dewesternization, “dispute over the control of coloniality” (quoted in Gaztambide-Fernandez, 2014, 197) that,
more specifically, expresses control over the mobilization and circulation of the world-ecological surplus.

Chapter four applies the theoretical framework of decolonial world-ecological agrarian question to contemporary Indian land grabbing in Gambella, which necessarily situates the latter within the “longue durée” of the rise and fall of the successive cycles of the capitalist world-ecology. It locates the land grab in relation to the neoliberal accumulation crisis indexing the end of the long twentieth century, and thus considers how such attempted frontier formation potentiates the surplus necessary for a successive accumulation cycle. The chapter focusses specifically on how the neoliberal crisis, particularly as it involves a sustained food price rise, has compelled India to re-secure the cheap food imperative of its capitalist development path by pursuing, in “extra-national” space, the appropriation of frontiers rendered “naturally” abundant and unused by the racialized dehumanization of its indigenous inhabitants. It reveals such racialized frontier formation through an extended empirical discussion, based upon fieldwork conducted in Gambella in April/May 2014, as well as secondary research, of how the Karuturi agricultural investment is premised upon the appropriation and erasure of the socio-ecological practice and knowledge of indigenous Anywaa communities. The empirical discussion further captures how such erasure ultimately proved fatal to the project, as the epistemological inability to incorporate indigenous knowledge that accounts for extra-human agency left the company dramatically unaware of the particular socio-ecological dynamics of the Baro River ecosystem on whose floodplain the land concession was located.

In light of the evident global inequalities, exclusions, and ecological exhaustion associated with the attempted reinauguration, via the global land grab, of the ecological surplus underpinning capitalist accumulation, this dissertation, concludes, in the final chapter, with some
brief reflections upon the challenges involved in forwarding more sustainable and equitable
decolonial socio-ecological relations in the contemporary context. The key tension identified in
advancing such alternatives consists of the contradiction between the desire of many in the
“agrarian South” to attain the “fuller life” (Li, 2010) of capitalist modernity, dependent as it is
upon the racialized separation from, and mastery over, nature, and the challenge posed to such a
paradigm by the insurgent socio-ecological resistance of global peasant movements such as La
Via Campesina.
Chapter One: The Agrarian Question and the Global Land Grab

This chapter takes as its specific point of departure Tania Li’s challenge of “scaling up the debate” on the global land grab to the level of the “agrarian transition in the global South” (Li, 2011, 294). Formulated by Byres (1977; 1996) as a key process in the successful resolution of the broader agrarian question problematique, agrarian transition signifies the process whereby radical structural transformations of the countryside enable poor developing countries to generate the agricultural productivity gains necessary to shift an increasing proportion of capital and labor out of the low income agrarian sector and into higher income industrial and service sectors. In this sense, the agrarian transition is further held to be expressive of the transition from stagnant pre-capitalist agrarian societies towards a wealthy and dynamic, if unequal and exploitative, capitalist modernity. The historical evidence for the centrality of agrarian transition to the emergence and consolidation of capitalist development is drawn from the successful achievement of European modernization during the course of the “long” 16th and 19th centuries, wherein leading European states are assumed to have undergone a series of revolutionary transformations in agrarian land relations and property regimes that enabled rapid and substantial increases in agricultural productivity. While the global South, upon achieving independence from the colonial powers, had been expected to follow a similar line of development, Li argues that the development impasse confronting much of the South today is largely attributable to a “truncated agrarian transition” (Li, 2011, 294). For Li, then, the central question at stake in the debates surrounding large-scale agricultural land acquisitions consists of the degree to which such deals promise to facilitate, or threaten to construct further obstacles towards, the overcoming of the truncated agrarian transition in the South.
This chapter examines, then, the implications of the agrarian question framework for the theoretical and historical interpretation of the post-crisis proliferation of large-scale agricultural land deals – the global land grab – in the South. While the framework of the agrarian question points us towards necessary questions on the broader socio-economic implications of agrarian change, I argue that its explanatory power in relation to the global land grab is limited in part due to a pervasive methodological internalism (McMichael, 2008; Bhambra, 2011) and anthropocentrism that has occluded from sufficient analytical and theoretical consideration the global and ecological dimensions of processes of agrarian transition. Such a methodological orientation emphasizes that political and socio-economic transformation of, and variation among, different human societies (e.g. underdeveloped agrarian societies, developed industrial/post-industrial states) is principally to be explained by endogenous social processes driven by self-contained (national, regional, racial or civilizational) human subjects. Delimiting the investigative focus in such a way, the initial historical examples of agrarian transition in Western Europe are understood as an outcome of internal transformations in class structures, and property regimes, and the subsequent prescription for “late developers,” particularly in the South, similarly places an exclusive focus on the national as the necessary scale at which to identify the obstacles to successful development. Conventional approaches to the agrarian question problematique, then, too often reproduce a Eurocentric “origins/diffusion” model of historical change (Blaut, 1993), through which it is assumed that transformative processes first set in motion in Europe will eventually be generalized to the rest of the world. As we will see in the first section of this chapter, such an “origins/diffusion” premise informs much of the cautious optimism with which powerful developmental actors and organizations, such as the World Bank,
have identified the surge in global land deals as potential mechanisms for overcoming the stalled agrarian transition.

The second section of this chapter considers to what extent the “Eurocentric-anthropocentric” limitations of conventional approaches to the agrarian question are addressed by critical scholars seeking to situate the problematic in a world-historical context. Analytical frameworks of world-systems, food regimes, and global value relations, reveal, significantly, how the agrarian question, since its inception, has been posed, resolved, and renewed in a global register. The transition, in other words, from agrarian to modern industrial capitalist society has, these approaches argue, historically been effected through global, rather than national, processes of land and labour transformations. More specifically, the historical transition towards higher productivity and self-sustaining growth in Western Europe was premised upon the extraction of an agrarian surplus from “rightless” labour in politically subjugated colonies. The world-historical approach to the agrarian question, thus, provides an important framework through which we can begin to elucidate the global dimensions of agrarian transition implicated in contemporary land grabbing.

A significant limitation, however, of the world-historical framework consists of the predominant quantitative emphasis it places on the global extraction and circulation of agrarian surplus from the peripheral to core zones of the world-system. The concern here is that this risks occluding the specific qualitative world scale socio-ecological relations forged in the making of agrarian transition. The global value relations approach has, to an extent, addressed this limitation in its foregrounding of the qualitative class relations comprising the world-historical agrarian question, particularly in terms of labour differentiation across the core (rights bearing labour) and peripheral (rightless labour) zones of the world-system. Nonetheless, it too has
failed to sufficiently articulate the specific socio-ecological relations – the co-constitution of race and nature – through which, I argue, the agrarian transition has historically proceeded on a world-scale.

**Agriculture and Development within the Eurocentric-anthropocentric Paradigm of Capitalist Modernity**

*World Bank and the Epistemological Foundations of Land Grabbing*

In the attempt to understand the deeper systemic dimensions of the global land grab, critical agrarian scholars have identified the World Bank as a principal epistemic actor in the mobilization, and legitimation, of large scale land deals as potential win-win scenarios through which the profit seeking imperatives of transnational capital can converge with the development goals of environmentally sustainable agricultural productivity enhancement and poverty reduction in the “agrarian South” (Borras et al, 2011; De Schutter, 2011; Li, 2011; McMichael, 2012; Deininger and Byerlee, 2010). Such an active role in the land grab debate reaffirms the Bank’s long-standing commitment to serve as the central knowledge storehouse for all questions relating to development, and to do so in ways that particularly foreground the superiority of capitalist development as the path that inevitably awaits the developing world (Goldman, 2006). In line with such a self-understanding, the Bank offered arguably the most robust policy response to the proliferation of large-scale land acquisitions in a detailed report titled *Rising Global Interest in Farmland: Can it yield sustainable and equitable benefits?* (Deininger and Byerlee, 2011), which presented the empirical need for the continuation of profit-driven, yet socially and environmentally responsible, investments in the undercapitalized agricultural regions of the South. While this report serves as an important example of the Bank’s response to the land grab
criticisms levelled by NGOs and human rights organizations (GRAIN, 2008; Oakland Institute, 2011), and it is one to which I will shortly return, critical observers (Akram-Lodhi, 2009; Li, 2009; 2011; McMichael, 2012; Watts, 2009) of the land grab have identified the Bank’s earlier 2008 World Development Report, titled *Agriculture and Development*, as a foundational epistemic text setting the stage for the mobilization and legitimation of large-scale agricultural land acquisitions in the years that have followed the report’s publication.

The 2008 World Development Report signified the first time in twenty-five years that the Bank centered agriculture as an economic sector and livelihood strategy vital to the development prospects of developing states in the South. The report was considered in some ways to be a welcome attempt to rectify a long-standing neglect of agriculture, which was largely an outcome of the Bank’s imposition of neoliberal loan conditionalities that forced indebted states in the South to remove public support for their agricultural sectors (Akram-Lodhi, 2009). At a more structural level, however, Haroon Akram-Lodhi (2009), in what is perhaps the most thorough review offered of the report, has argued that the attempted recalibration does not represent a “paradigm-shifting reimagining of the policy and practice of rural development,” but rather remains overdetermined by the Bank’s foundational self-constitution as a modernizing agent uniquely capable of, and therefore responsible for, uplifting a generic pre-modern agricultural producer – the peasant – who otherwise risks remaining trapped in a timeless poverty across much of the South. The peasant first came to figure centrally in the Bank’s imagination during what Michael Goldman (2006) has termed the “McNamarra era” (1968-1981) when, under the helm of former US secretary of defense, Robert McNamara, it sought to re-consolidate the hegemony of capitalist accumulation on a world-scale in the face of threats posed by militant, peasant-based, anticolonial nationalisms in the third world. McNamarra, as defense secretary
during the defeat of US imperialism in Vietnam, experienced the evident failure of military power to tame the unruly figure of the third world peasant, particularly in the era of decolonization, which propelled him during his tenure as World Bank president to center the potential of economic modernization and development in attenuating the threat of anti-imperialist radicalism emanating from “peasant wars.” This mandate, while centering the peasant as the baseline of development, ultimately sought to re-secure the hegemony of the capitalist North by casting it as the catalyzing agent in the transformation of the pre-modern peasant, “living on the bare margin of subsistence” (Goldman, 2006, 68) in a stagnant agrarian economy, into modern subjects, whether as productive capitalist farmers, waged farm workers, or urban-based factory workers.

The 2008 WDR, though claiming to think afresh the relationship between agriculture and development, recalls this foundational premise, of peasant as eternally entrapped in a timeless “original” condition of poverty, as it attempts to renew, in the context of the growing assertion of autonomous South-South initiatives that challenge the hegemony of the capitalist North, the Bank’s self-defined historical mission of leading the development project. Thus, the opening sentence of the report calls forth the 21st century’s signifier of the stagnant peasant, the “African woman bent under the sun, weeding sorghum in an arid field with a hoe, a child strapped on her back,” embodying as such the “vivid image of rural poverty” that secures the institutional and ideological mandate of development organizations such as the Bank (WDR, 2008, 1). This condition of life situates the peasant African woman in a wretched “original” state of dependence upon, and subjugation to, an adversarial natural environment from which she must be uplifted, for otherwise the “meager bounty of subsistence farming is the only chance to survive” (WDR, 2008, 1). The horizon against which the report measures the impoverished
African peasant is that of Europe (Li, 2009), understood as the civilizational space that occupies the lead in humanity's evolutionary promise of mastering, rather than being mastered by, nature, and in so doing reaching levels of agricultural productivity and efficiency that can facilitate the transition of a greater proportion of human labour out of the primitive stage of low productivity agriculture into the more properly human stage of scientifically based, technologically advanced industrial production. The resolution to the problem of the enduring poverty of the peasant in the agrarian South, then, is to apply the lessons revealed through the historical European evolution from agricultural to industrial society. Corresponding with such an evolutionary trajectory, the report categorizes the South into three worlds of agriculture: i) agricultural based countries (Africa); ii) transitioning countries (Asia); and iii) industrial countries (Latin America) (WDR, 2008, 31). These three worlds are assumed to signify the successive stages travelled by the early developers in Europe, and the report, reaffirming the "agro-pessimism" of modernist thought (Akram-Lodhi, 2008, 1153), ultimately calls for movement from the lower agrarian stages to the highest urban industrial stage. Recalling the specific preconditions of the European transition, the report foregrounds the centrality of capitalist market reforms, such as strengthening property rights, integration into global markets, and profit-driven production, which, when properly implemented, mobilize and harness a logic of competition exclusively capable of rationally utilizing agricultural resources in ways that ensure maximum productivity and efficiency (WDR, 2008; Akram-Lodhi, 2008; Li, 2009; Oya, 2009).

The theoretical and historical framework through which the report locates structural transformation in the countryside as central to harnessing "agriculture for development" draws upon, as several commentators (Akram-Lodhi, 2008, 1153; Watts, 2009) have noted, two of the most influential approaches to “agriculture and development” - modernization theory's advocacy
of the liberal capitalist path and the anti-capitalist Marxian problematique of the agrarian
tuestion. The antagonism between marxism and modernization theory regarding the superiority
of either capitalist or socialist development paths does not result here in a paralyzing
contradiction, as the report is more fundamentally drawing from the two schools of thought at
their broader points of convergence within what we might identify, building upon Enrique
Dussel's notion, as the “Eurocentric-anthropocentric” paradigm of modernity. Dussel (1998), in
reflecting upon the late twentieth century crisis of modernity, identifies a dominant Eurocentric
paradigm encompassing a wide range of epistemological orientations which locate the origins of
modernity, whether as an emancipatory or oppressive signifier, as an exclusive property of
Europe. The point of extending Dussel's conceptualization to include anthropocentrism as a co-
constitutive ideological and material force is to take seriously, though perhaps at a wider scale,
Marx's own insistence that the exercise of capital as a relation of power fundamentally rests upon
the mutually reinforcing domination of the earth and human labour (Bellamy Foster, 2000, 74).
In broadening Dussel’s conceptualization to the register of a Eurocentric-anthropocentric
paradigm of modernity, my claim is that European modernity’s founding moment of “mastery
over nonhuman natures” is bound up within the domination of the dehumanized non-European
other, and ideological approaches, such as modernization theory and Marxist developmentalism,
cultivated within such a paradigm reproduce such relations of power by re-affirming the
exclusion of the non-human and the de-humanized from the constitution of modernity. Such an
exclusion renders “nature” and the racialized non-European as passive figures to be acted upon
by the active, civilizing force of European modernity. In working through how the report has
been influenced by modernization theory and the Marxian problematique of the agrarian
question, the broader impact of this Eurocentric-anthropocentric paradigm on the question of “agriculture and development” becomes evident.

**Modernization Theory and the Defence of the Capitalist Path**

The report’s framing of "three worlds of agriculture," through which developing countries must pass in successive order to achieve the goal of development, constitutes a rather explicit re-statement of the "stages of development" evolutionary ontology forwarded by modernization theory in the immediate Cold War context in which the postcolonial era, and the question of the development of the South, emerged (Akam-Lodhi, 2008, 1157). Informing the constitution of the Bank's institutional self-identity (Goldman, 2006), modernization theory emerged as a defense of the superiority of the path of capitalist development at a moment when militant anti-colonial movements were increasingly rejecting integration into a Northern dominated capitalist world-system. Originally formulated by Walt Rostow (1950) as a "non-communist manifesto" for the decolonizing world, modernization theory sought to offer a powerful explanatory and analytical response to the central questions of the decolonial era, namely how to account for the historical divergence between the “advanced” developed world and the “backwards” underdeveloped world, and what measures might allow for a greater convergence between the two.

Reflecting the mid twentieth century hegemony of the “high modernist” valourization of scientific power (Scott, 1998), Rostow forwarded an evolutionary schema which held that while all human societies shared a common origin in a primitive "agricultural stage," only the most advanced societies had hitherto fulfilled their evolutionary potential of reaching full maturity through ascension to the fifth and final stage of "high mass consumption.” Within such a
schema, the "traditional society" of the initial agricultural stage is defined by "limited production functions," whose growth is constrained by its "pre-Newtonian attitudes towards the physical world" (Rostow, 1950, 4). For a society to achieve "take-off" from the primitive stage, it is necessary that the predominant agricultural sector experience exponential increases in productivity - more food and industrial inputs produced per unit of labour - that would enable sufficient quantities of capital and labor to be transferred out of agriculture and into the emergent modern industrial sectors. Rostow identifies the fundamental pre-conditions for the unleashing of such productive powers as the introduction of a Newtonian worldview, which is understood as signifying "that watershed in history when men came widely to believe that the external world was subject to a few knowable laws, and was systematically capable of productive manipulation" (4). This watershed moment is exclusively located as an endogenous epistemological innovation of 17th century Western Europe (31), where the concept first took hold that "man need not regard his physical environment as virtually a factor given by nature and providence, but as an ordered world which, if rationally understood, can be manipulated in ways which yield productive changes and, in one dimension at least, progress" (19).

Rostow's reduction of nature to an external world existing for the sake of human productive manipulation constitutes a re-affirmation of the anthropocentric "mastery over nature" epistemological paradigm which has long been widely held to constitute the distinctive orientation of modernity (Leiss, 1972; Connoly 1988). Deeply troubled by repeated outbreaks of plagues, famines, and wars, early modern European thinkers attributed such catastrophes to the untamed irrationalities of nature, which included the so-called human passions, and identified the pressing need to distinguish the rationality of the human mind from the irrationality of nature (including the base “unthought” desires of the body). Only through the effecting of such an
ontological distinction between mind/body and society/nature could the non-human natural world be apprehended in its objective truth, and thus subjected to the dominion of rationally developed and applied human knowledge. Within such a modernist epistemology, the mastery of nature, in so much as it allows for greater control and manipulation of the external non-human world, is held to secure human life against the vulnerabilities to which it is subjected by the irrational rule of nature. Such an epistemological and ontological shift, Rostow argues, has been the exclusive point of departure for the unleashing of humanity’s evolutionary potential of progressing to higher “stages of development.”

While the pre-conditions for “take-off” from the primitive agricultural stage to the higher industrial and consumerist stages are produced endogenously in Europe, through the innovation of the Newtonian worldview, for inhabitants of the non-European world, who enlightenment thinkers positioned closer to irrational nature than to rational human thinkers, such processes could only be triggered if their “traditional societies” were “taken over and organized” by the more advanced societies of Europe (Rostow, 1950, 107-109). In so doing, European colonial powers assumed their historical responsibility of “bringing about the transformation in thought, knowledge, institutions and the supply of social overhead capital which moved the colonial society along the transitional path” (112). Thus, modernization theory reconfirms the Eurocentric-anthropocentric paradigm of modernity, through which European scientific thought and practice is understood as the origins of the productivity enhancing mastery over nature praxis, which then can only be generalized through the diffusion of knowledge effected successively by the colonial and developmental projects.
Agrarian Question: Primitive Accumulation and Class Forces in the Transition to Capitalism

The principal critical alternative to the study of agriculture and development, and one which, as mentioned above, the Bank's 2008 report draws upon in addition to modernization theory, consists of the Marxian agrarian question framework (Watts, 2009). Originally conceived in the late nineteenth century by leading European Marxist intellectuals (Engels, 1894; Kautsky 1988; Lenin 1899) concerned with the place of pre-capitalist agrarian social classes, such as the peasantry, in anti-capitalist revolutionary movements, the agrarian question inquired into how capitalism was seizing hold of, and transforming, the agricultural sector. This concern can be understood in light of the historical complication of Marxism's own modernist evolutionary schema, which located the dissolution of the peasantry as a necessary premise of the transition from feudal agrarian pre-modern societies to industrial capitalist modernity. Deploying what anthropologist Johannes Fabian (1983) identifies as the allochronistic "denial of coevalness" upon the peasant, Marxism maintained that in the future emancipatory transition to communism the decisive contradiction was between the capitalist and the proletarian, with the latter's victory heralding the necessary transcendence of the capitalist epoch. Thus, the persistence of the peasantry in maturing capitalist societies posed serious questions for revolutionary strategies, particularly concerning the position that socialist parties and movements should take regarding potentially reactionary pre-capitalist feudal demands (Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 2009, 7). This led to a critical re-engagement with Marx's foundational inquiry into the role of agrarian change in the emergence of capitalist modernity, and whether, in particular, the peasant's unique mode of production could facilitate, or at least be incorporated into, transitions to first capitalist, and then socialist, modernities.
Reading the agrarian question back into Marx, then, highlights a further dimension of this analytical framework. Rather than focus on how capital was transforming the agrarian, Marx centered the question of what changes in agrarian structures and relations constituted the necessary condition of possibility for the generalized emergence of capitalist accumulation. This emphasis on the agrarian origins of capitalism (Wood, 2000) emerged out of his critique of both Hegelian idealist and classical political economy interpretations of social transformation and evolution. Hegelian approaches centered changes in human ideas and consciousness as the propulsive force of history, as evidenced in Rostow's identification of the "Newtonian worldview" as the force propelling the takeoff of human society beyond the stage of limited agricultural productivity. For Marx (1940), this represented an obfuscation of the primacy of the material transformations in social relations through which supposedly progressive forms of consciousness emerge. While classical political economy, as seen in particular in Adam Smith's explanatory account of the Wealth of Nations (1993), did center economic change as key to broader social transformation, for Marx (1946) this approach did so in ways that served to ideologically legitimize the supremacy of the bourgeois class in the emergent capitalist order. Seeking to challenge this supremacy, and in so doing facilitate the liberation of the subjected working class, Marx undertook the task of critically interrogating an underexplored, yet fundamental, premise - previous, or original, accumulation - of Smith's account of the rise of capital. It was in this historical reconceptualization of what Marx would term "primitive accumulation" that he uncovered material processes of agrarian transformation as the ground upon which capitalist modernity emerges.

While within an existing capitalist order the accumulation of capital proceeds through the appropriation of the surplus generated through prior investments of capital, a key theoretical
question for political economy consists of how such a process historically comes into being (Pearlman, 2000; Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 2010). In other words, how does a sufficient stock of capital initially come to be held by a class motivated by the imperative of competition and profit? Identifying such a moment as the previous accumulation of capital, Smith implied that this was largely a natural outcome of the innate human tendency to "truck, trade, and barter." Over generations, those who had been capable of saving and efficiency slowly came to accumulate the necessary stock of capital, while those, on the other hand, who had been incapable of saving, eventually were left without any assets (Smith, 1993, 159-161). In this sense, the “natural” concentration of capital was achieved, as those most capable of efficient use of resources came to direct the investment and production process, while those without such foresight were to, “naturally,” fulfill the requirements of manual labour (Marx, 1946, 736-737).

Marx, refusing to accept such naturalization of bourgeois class rule, emphasized, in contrast, the role of violence in the primitive accumulation of capital (1946, chapter 26). Reconceptualizing capital as a social relation of power, Marx argued that capital accumulation was more than simply the realization of profit from investments, but rather fundamentally consisted of capital's forced appropriation of surplus value generated by a class of dispossessed wage-labourers. Within such a framework of a "critique of political economy," the investigation of the original, or "primitive accumulation of capital," moved beyond the concern over the emergence of the initial stock of capital, and thus centered more on how capital as a social relation of power came to be constituted. The key question to consider, in particular, was the emergence of a class of dispossessed labourers with no means of reproducing their lives from one day to the next other than selling their labour to the class which held exclusive ownership over the means of subsistence. Contra classical political economy, which normalized such
inequalities as a natural and just distribution of capabilities, Marx centralized the violent enclosures which swept through Western Europe, and especially England, in the late medieval and early modern era (1946, 740). The enclosures specifically consisted of the forcible dispossession of self-sufficient agricultural producers - peasants - from lands, whether held privately or in common, by an emergent class of capitalist landlords, backed by the state, looking to enlarge the lands available for increasingly profitable sheep farming. It was, thus, out of these radical material transformations in agrarian relations and property regimes, that we could find the basis of capital's immensely productive powers. In particular, Marx's point was that feudal and peasant modes of production were based on social relations that had fettered the further development of the forces of production. It was only with the emergence of capital and proletarianized labor, and the unique set of relations through which these two classes encountered one another, that the productive capacities necessary for the transition to industrial society could be realized. Beyond just an epistemic shift towards a "mastery of nature", then, Marx's approach centered the concrete forces of violence, inequality, exploitation, and alienation as the ground upon which the necessary modernist epistemes of rationality, productivity, and mastery could be constructed.

While Marx provided, through his historical materialist account of primitive accumulation, the foundations for a critical agrarian political economy, he did not sufficiently elaborate upon his own theoretical and empirical innovations. A more robust historical materialist interpretation of the agrarian origins of capitalist modernity was provided by Robert Brenner in the 1970s and 1980s, in a seminal intervention into the renewed postwar debates amongst historians concerned with transitions to capitalist modernity (Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 2010, 196). Contesting the prevailing “demographic” and “commerce” orthodoxies, which
respectively argued that variations in population growth or trade levels were the primary motor of modernization, Brenner (1976) sought to shift focus on to the primacy of class struggle and underlying social property relations, particularly in the agrarian context. Building from the theoretical and historical framework introduced by Marx in his chapter on primitive accumulation, Brenner's premise recalled Marx's dictum that the potentiality of the objective forces of production is dependent upon the specific set of class based social property relations underlying a given society's reproduction. Thus, Brenner argued that variations in demographic trends and trade volumes assume significance for the transition to capitalism only when they can be mobilized by the right balance of class forces expressed in the capital-labor relation (1976, 31).

Following Marx in identifying agrarian England as the originary historical-geographical ground of primitive accumulation, Brenner argued that it was the specific English resolution to the class struggle that had emerged from the contradictions of feudalism which set in motion the necessary conditions for the establishment of capitalist class relations and the self-sustaining productivity growth they would engender (Brenner, 1976, 47). This resolution, or reconstitution of the balance of class forces, involved a “two-sided process of class development and class conflict” (ibid) that first freed the peasantry from the extra-economic coercion imposed by feudal landlords, and then, through the landlord class's attempt to reconsolidate its power via wide scale land enclosures, effectively dispossessed the peasantry from direct access to the means of subsistence that they had won in their earlier struggle against serfdom. The second moment did not, however, entirely negate the first, as the peasant's resistance against serfdom continued to deny the landlord class the ability to extract from them a surplus employing extra-economic coercion. The end result of this process, Brenner argues, was that neither landlord nor peasant
could reproduce themselves outside of increasingly competitive market relations (Brenner, 1985, 214-215). The landlord, unable to use extra-economic coercion to increase the proportion appropriated from a tenant farmer's constant surplus, was now compelled to lease out land to those capable of continually increasing their production levels. This emergent capitalist tenant class was, in turn, motivated to seek constant improvement to their agricultural methods in order to meet the increasingly competitive leases sought out by the landlord class. As a result of these common market based compulsions, there emerged a "landlord/tenant symbiosis which brought mutual co-operation in investment and improvement" (1976, 65). For the dispossessed peasantry, the loss of direct access to the means of subsistence left them with no means of securing their reproduction without selling their labour power to the emergent capitalist farmer. This provided the necessary exploitable class of labour required by the capitalist farmer in his quest to enact agricultural improvement.

Brenner thus concludes that "it was the emergence of the 'classic' landlord/capitalist tenant/wage-labourer structure which made possible the transformation of agricultural production in England, and this in turn, was the key to England's uniquely successful overall economic development" (1976, 49). While this recalls Rostow's emphasis on the link between agricultural productivity and the "take-off" into self-sustaining economic growth more broadly, for Brenner the point is that the emergence of a "technological rationality," or what Rostow might refer to as the "Newtonian worldview," through which the self-interest of each actor, regardless of class position, converges with systemic growth rather than stagnation, is itself grounded upon the material transformations of agrarian social property relations that produce a radical market dependence for social reproduction. Unable to reproduce themselves outside of competitive market relations, the emergent "economic" actors of the capitalist mode of
production were driven to maximize efficiency and minimize costs, which thus set free the hitherto constrained potential for technological innovation in the production process. This technological dynamism, in combination with the large-scale farms which came into being as a result of the enclosures and the dissolution of small-scale peasant holdings, enabled, in particular, more food to be produced per unit of labour, which had the wider systemic effect of propelling industrial production by provisioning both the necessary labor force and "home market" for industrial development. Specifically, increasing food surpluses facilitated the transfer of a growing proportion of labor from agriculture into industry, while the corresponding decline in food prices enabled more income for the purchase of industrial goods.

While the progressive resolution of feudal agrarian class struggles in favour of capitalist class relations is thus understood as the foundation for the self-sustaining overall economic development achieved first in England, and then eventually generalized to its home region of Western Europe, Brenner (1977) holds that the absence of such resolution in the non-European world is the primary explanation for global inequality, poverty, and "underdevelopment." The implication here is that efforts by poorer regions to achieve "successful overall economic development" must by necessity involve the right balance of agrarian class forces and property relations first introduced to the world by European modernization. Although Brenner does not, explicitly at least, endorse Rostow's insistence that the development of the non-European world is dependent upon its being "taken over and organized" by European colonialism, his thesis on the agrarian origins of capitalism remains, nonetheless, firmly rooted within the Eurocentric-anthropocentric paradigm identified above. For Brenner, as much as Rostow, the historical agents of modern social development are European humans acting autonomously of ecological forces and non-European societies. This
speaks, moreover, to a particular Eurocentric-anthropocentric moment in Marx that Brenner
draws upon\(^3\). This is the framing through which Marx himself interprets the transition to
capitalist modernity, where he not only locates the origins as a development endogenous to the
European center, but further identifies European imperialism as the historical force tasked with
transforming "barbarian" non-European societies into modern capitalist ones (Marx 2011, 224;
1853). Within this particular moment of Marx's historical materialist approach, we can also find
the reduction of non-human ecologies to passive material waiting to be mastered through the
capitalist transformation of property relations, generating in the process the “productive powers”
necessary to free human life from the vulnerabilities imposed by nature. The place of the non-
European and the non-human in constituting the original transition to capitalist modernity thus
remains obscured.

In terms of the agrarian question beyond the European experience, Brenner's explication
of a Eurocentric-anthropocentric Marxian account of the "agrarian origins of capitalism" was
complimented by Bill Warren's (1980) elaboration of Marx's diffusionary framework for
capitalist modernization in non-European societies. In particular, Warren looked to build upon
the dimension of Marx's thought which emphasized that capitalism, though incredibly
exploitative and dehumanizing, was, nonetheless, superior to all previous modes of production.
If, then, the poverty and stagnation of the non-European world was, as Brenner argued, primarily
attributable to their endogenous failure to revolutionize the agrarian class structures and property
relations underpinning their primitive modes of production, thus it was that Warren argued that

\(^3\) Marx's "Eurocentric-anthropocentric" tendency exists, of course, in tension with a more integral anti-colonial and
ekosically informed position that can be found elsewhere in his writings on primitive accumulation and the
metabolic rift (Marx, 1946). This other dimension of Marx has been taken up by world-systems (Wallerstein 1974)
and world-ecological (Moore 2015) approaches to the study of capitalism.
European colonialism provided the necessary exogenous force that would, following Marx's note on British colonization in India, provide the dual function of both destroying the old mode of production and implanting, with violence if need be, the more progressive Western capitalist mode of production. This reading of Marx led Warren to urge socialists to embrace imperialism as the driving force behind the emancipatory diffusion of capitalist development into the agricultural sectors of the underdeveloped world. In this sense, the European experience of capitalist transition is held to be generalizable to the rest of the world, and becomes the standard by which the development of 'other' societies is to be measured. Within agrarian and development studies, an influential "Warrenite" Marxian approach to the agrarian question in the South has emerged, which replaces the more controversial embrace of imperialism with an emphasis on globalization as an important exogenous force capable of facilitating transitions from low productivity small scale peasant agricultures to highly productive, large-scale capitalist farm enterprises employing wage labour (Kiely, 2009; Sender and Smith, 1986; Sender and Johnston, 2004; Kitching, 1989, 2001).

Broadening the Agrarian Question: Towards Differentiation and Diversification

The unilinear “path dependent” approach to the agrarian question forwarded by Warren and Brenner, which argued that the diffusion of an essential European model of agrarian change was critical to the development prospects of the South, was challenged by Terry Byres' important clarification and elaboration of the organizing problematics of the agrarian question. Byres' seminal intervention emerged from his specific location as a development scholar of Asia, which, although it impressed upon him the ongoing centrality of the agrarian question to the broader development project, also revealed the limitations of conventional approaches. A careful evaluation of the Asian context problematized, in particular, the notion that there was a singular
model of successful agrarian change against which all other subsequent attempts at modernization were to be evaluated (Byres, 1986, 5). This would unnecessarily constrain the analytical ability to identify, and construct, alternative resolutions to the agrarian question that did not accord entirely with the definitive features of the classic path articulated by Brenner and Warren. In an attempt to reconstruct its framework to account for greater diversity, Byres identified three constituent problematics - production, politics, and accumulation - of the agrarian question which, when considered in relation to one another, methodologically allowed for the illumination of a wider range of potential resolutions (Byres, 1986, 6-19; Bernstein, 1996/7).

The production problematic was concerned with agrarian transition - the processes whereby agrarian relations were transformed in favour of the capitalist mode of production. The politics problematic referred to processes of class struggle both underpinning, and re-shaped by, the transition, while the concern of the accumulation problematic was the means through which an agrarian surplus could be generated and transferred to emergent industrial sectors. The generation and appropriation of the surplus was itself informed by, and gave rise to, the particular balance of class forces present in a given social order. Thus, contra Brenner's exclusive focus on class struggle, Byres approach emphasizes the co-constitutive dialectic between the agrarian relations and forces of production (Heller, 2013, 48-49).

The particular historical synthesis of this dialectic within given national formations determined the characteristics of "peasant differentiation," the key process identified by Byres in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. The degree of differentiation within pre-capitalist peasantries determined, to a large extent, the particular context-specific resolution of the agrarian question. Contesting, with regards to the "classic" case of England, Brenner's thesis of a landlord led agrarian transition, Byres posited instead that the landholding peasant classes, that had
differentiated themselves from the now landless peasant population, were in fact the driving force behind the introduction of impulses towards continual agricultural improvement (Byres, 1986, 21). Thus, in so much as it centered relatively subaltern social classes, Byres argued that the classic English case was an example of an agrarian transition from below. In contrast to the singular transition path thesis of Brenner and Warren, Byres’ careful historical comparative analysis cautioned, however, against making the English case generalizable. In particular, Byres argued that a comparative approach to the study of multiple agrarian transitions revealed that alongside the "from below" model revealed by the classic English case, there existed an agrarian transition "from above" model in which the agents of transition consisted of a landlord-capitalist class which had more successfully contained the resistance of differentiating peasants. The classic case for the "from above" path was drawn from the transition experience of the Prussian region east of the Elbe (1986, 25-28). Within these two broad paths themselves existed considerably diversity, with Byres in particular noting the more radical articulation of a "from below" path in the American experience, where the presence of a sizeable "internal" land frontier combined with the absence of an established feudal landlord class, enabled the emergence of a class of "family farmers" who were able to combine innovative technologies, rich "virgin" lands, and the efficiencies of family labor, in producing low cost, highly productive agricultural outputs (1986, 29-34). With regards to Asia, Byres similarly argues that the instructive cases of Japan and Taiwan/South Korea, reveal unique context-specific articulations of "from below" and "from above" transitions informed by the particular synthesis between class forces and the means of production (1986, 43-58).

Byres’ historical comparative approach to the agrarian question thus makes the powerful point that the transition to capitalist social relations of production can proceed along a
multiplicity of paths, determined, in the end, by a given society's particular history of class struggle, state formation, and economic development. At the same time, however, the comparative method preferred by Byres reproduces, in spite of its emphasis on diversity and differentiation, the Eurocentric-anthropocentric paradigm for the study of agriculture and development forwarded variously by modernization theory and the more conventional Marxian approaches to the agrarian question. In particular, Byres explicitly identifies the "national" as the necessary scale at which to conduct comparative analysis, and the resulting methodological nationalism, while attentive to diversity across, and differentiation within, the selected cases, nonetheless assumes the existence of an autochthonous national developmental space (1986, 5; 1996). In other words, methodological nationalism precludes a consideration of inter-national, or trans-national relationalities, and further privileges the national human subject as the primary agent of transition (McMichael, 2013, 70). In this sense, the lessons that Asian states can draw from the diversity of historical models on offer are determined by the extent to which their own unique autochthonous national developmental trajectories bear similarity to, or express divergence from, the national characteristics of class struggle and economic development specific to earlier cases of successful agrarian transition. The non-European is again read as derivative here, as the "diversity" of agrarian transitions is conceived as degrees of convergence or divergence from the two definitive paths - from below and from above - first revealed in the originary and endogenous European experience (1986, 43-58; 2002).

This derivation from original European experience comes to more powerfully inform Byres' prescriptive arguments, wherein he appears to render developing states in Asia, and across the South more broadly, analogous to the economically backward late 19th/early 20th century Russian state that Lenin sought to modernize in favor of both development and justice. Lenin
argued that the "from below" American path offered the best model for Russian revolutionaries to emulate in their pursuit of agrarian transition, particularly on the grounds that it would involve much less social dislocation and violence than the Prussian "from above" path. Byres (1991; 2003) similarly seems to favor, for developing Asia, reforms that would remove landlord control over land, and thereby free an emergent enterprising peasant class that could forward agrarian transition along a more egalitarian path. However, due to the differentiation that such a "from below" path inevitably involves, Byres does caution that even here there will be considerable pain and dislocation as the peasantry divides into landholding and landless classes. In particular contexts, it may even be necessary to support the establishment of landlord dominated large scale capitalist farms. In either case, however, the pain of dispossession and displacement from rural to urban life are considered necessary costs that must be borne if developing societies are to transition from minimally productive agrarian societies to highly productive industrial states with higher standards of living. It is for this reason that Byres (2004, 41) has little patience for positions he terms as "neo-populist," which seek to defend small scale, ecologically sensitive forms of agrarian production, as they do not lend themselves to the national transformation necessary for the achievement of economic development.

The national scale at which Byres both historically compares the diversity of agrarian transitions, and prescribes the lessons therein learned for contemporary developing states, can also be found to constitute the unit of analysis and prescription in the World Bank's 2008 WDR. While the report, as was discussed earlier, explicitly takes as its foundations the "originary" European agrarian transitions, and follows modernization theory's stages of growth model in articulating its "worlds of agriculture" framework, the prescriptions offered by the report for effecting the "evolutionary" movement from lower to higher worlds within contemporary
developing societies draws specifically (if rather implicitly) from the sorts of Marxian reflections on agrarian question and transition offered by Byres, Brenner, Warren, and others. Thus, the report emphasizes, much like Byres' emphasis on diversity, a variety of possible policy measures with which states, depending upon the particular "world of agriculture" they inhabit, can effect agricultural transformation in the service of development. These range from "from below" small-farmer led improvements in land use and productivity to more "from above" corporate agribusiness led large-scale plantation agricultures which would involve a more classic division of agricultural production into relations of capital and wage-labour. The ultimate aim, regardless of the path pursued, is to follow the historical "national" paths first set forth by European societies, and mobilize agricultural transformation for the purpose of transitioning developing societies away from the agrarian and towards industrial and service centered economies (Li, 2009).

While the 2008 WDR reaffirms the methodological nationalist approach to the study of agriculture and development forwarded by modernization theory and modernizing marxisms alike, it was in the Bank's response to the global land grab that it drew on the diffusionary assumptions of the Eurocentric-anthropocentric paradigm that, as we saw earlier, are core to the Warrenite Marxian approach to the agrarian question. As Tania Li (2011) has observed, the Bank's response to land grabbing, in the form of its 2011 document titled *Rising Global Interest in Farmland* (RGIF), constitutes an attempt to conceive of the rapid explosion in transnational land deals as opportunities to operationalize the transition trajectory forwarded in the 2008 WDR. The RGIF centers, in particular, the power of properly self-disciplined foreign capital in

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4 Michael Watts (2009) has noted that such a convergence between the World Bank and historical materialism is reflective of the 2008 WDR being authored by the Marxist agrarian studies scholar Alain de Janvry.
resolving the persistence of the problem of "unused" or "underused" land in the underperforming, in terms of agricultural productivity, agrarian worlds of the South (Deininger and Byerlee, xxxi). The assumption here is that transnational capital can introduce the capital, technology, and management skills necessary for revolutions in agricultural production, something which underperforming agrarian societies have been hitherto unable to generate on their own. If the pursuit of profits through large-scale agricultural farms leads transnational capital to effectively displace small farmers and peasants from such "underused" land, the focus needs to be placed upon ensuring sufficient avenues for shifting such labour into waged work on plantations, non-farm rural industries, and urban sectors more broadly. As Li (2009) notes, the Bank thus envisions the spread of large-scale transnational agricultural projects as necessary to both the full productive realization of underused land in the South and the facilitation of an "exit from agriculture" for peoples of these regions who have been unable to initiate such a transition on their own. If, then, the 2008 report reaffirmed that the future for the developing world is to follow the paths of agrarian transition first laid down by the European experience of agricultural modernization, the 2011 RGIF report foregrounded the diffusionary framework of Warrenite marxism and modernization theory, which maintained that such movement could only be realized for the South by way of exogenous shocks that could overcome their endogenous inertia.

Agrarian Questions in the Age of Globalization: Limits of the Classical Approach

In a critical engagement with Byres' reconstruction of the agrarian question framework, Henry Bernstein (1996; 2006; 2009) problematized the application of what he called an "internalist framework," developed from the historical experience of European agrarian transition, to the Marxian study of agrarian change for contemporary developing countries. By internalist, Bernstein refers to approaches which conceive of the transition to capitalist modernity
as emerging out of endogenous agrarian modes of production and class struggles within "individual social formations outside any international framework" (2009, 242). While such a framework may have been appropriate to the study of the original European, and particularly English, experience of agrarian transition, the subsequent development of capitalist production and accumulation from national to global scales brings into question the continuing relevance of the internalist approach for contemporary developing countries with unresolved agrarian questions. The point here is that the emergence of capitalist social relations, though originally realized through endogenous transformation of national agrarian sectors, unleashes, due to the radical market dependence highlighted by Brenner, a logic of endless accumulation which necessitates the construction of new markets and, crucially, new frontiers which can provision the cheap inputs necessary for expanded reproduction. This expansionary drive is the means through which the remaining non-European pre-capitalist agrarian world, via coercive relations of imperialism and colonialism, is incorporated into the globalizing capitalist mode of production. Thus, the agrarian basis of transition - the agrarian question - while operating at the national level in the classical European experience, comes to be defined principally in world-historical terms for the colonized South. (Bernstein, 2009, 247) This non-internalist world-historical agrarian question thus considers the extent to which the globalization of capitalist production either facilitates or hinders the transition from pre-capitalist to capitalist agrarian property regimes and class relations in the South.

Contra Byres, then, Bernstein does not establish a common national scale at which the agrarian question for contemporary developing countries can draw comparative lessons from the classical cases of European transition. Instead, he points towards the incommensurability of the two experiences, arguing that "the transition to capitalism in social formations where it is
deemed yet incomplete are affected by both earlier transitions to capitalism elsewhere, and subsequent transformations within capitalism in its dominant formations and global circuits - the latter is exemplified by contemporary globalization" (2009, 247). The contemporary world-historical agrarian question for the developing South has, in particular, been profoundly reshaped by the "earlier transition" of the American path, which, beginning from the 19th century, introduced the modern industrial agribusiness form of agricultural production and accumulation. The enormous advances in productivity that this model eventually achieved, with technical innovations such as petroleum based fertilizers and chemical pesticides, in the second half of the twentieth century, promoted the globalization of agriculture in order to dispose of the massive surpluses generated through the industrial-scientific agribusiness model (Bernstein, 2009, 249-250). As a result, Bernstein argues, capital's foundational requirement of an agrarian surplus - what he calls the agrarian question of capital - has today been resolved for capital on a global scale. In other words, the prospects for effecting an agrarian transition in the South, and in the process enhancing agricultural productivity and surplus, today no longer has any relevance for capital accumulation on a world scale. The globalization of finance and trade has further rendered agrarian transition irrelevant to national development trajectories, as it has opened non-national, non-agrarian sources capable of funding investment in higher income industrial and service sectors (Lerche, 2013, 386). Bernstein thus, seeking to reformulate theory in light of capital's changing materiality in its globalizing manifestation, forwards the radical claim that the agrarian question of capital has been resolved, or rendered irrelevant, on both national and global scales.

The irrelevance of the agrarian transition in the South to capital accumulation across North and South does not, however, resolve what Bernstein calls the "agrarian question of
labor." Specifically, Bernstein's point here is that while agrarian classes are increasingly being rendered redundant by the massive productivity gains of globalizing "advanced capitalist" agriculture, there are limited prospects for shifting such labor into higher income industrial and service sectors, as is understood to have happened in the earlier national transitions of the European experience (2009, 250-253). Global capitalism, with its increasing dependence upon labor reducing technologies in both the industrial and service sectors, cannot offer a proletarian future to peasants in the South rendered redundant by globalizing industrial agriculture and global finance. It is in light of this problematic of "surplus" labor that Bernstein argues it is necessary today to conceive of an "agrarian question of labor." This reformulation urges agrarian studies to shift its focus away from the now resolved agrarian question of capital and center, in its place, the persistent question of what will become of agrarian classes of labor no longer relevant to capital, and unable to secure employment in non-agrarian sectors.

Bernstein's agrarian question of labor framework has significant implications for the global land grab debate, particularly in so much as it problematizes the national comparative premise of the classical agrarian question of capital which, as we saw earlier, informs much of the cautious optimism with which the World Bank has approached the intensification of large-scale land deals. These implications have been considered seriously by Tania Li (2011) in her penetrating critique of the Bank's RGIF report, where she argues that, in light of the context of contemporary globalization, the report proceeds on the flawed assumption that countries in the South today can, within a singular national frame, replicate the European model of agrarian transition. Seeking to "center labor in the land grab" debate, Li effectively uses the Bank's own data to reveal that the report's faith in industrial agriculture providing sufficient employment to absorb labor displaced by large-scale land acquisitions is undermined by such a production
model's dependence upon labor-displacing technologies (2011, 282-284). Beyond employment on large-scale farms, Li argues that there is likewise little evidence to support claims that non-agrarian sectors, whether rural or urban, can support displaced labor in making the celebrated "exit from agriculture" (Li, 2009). Thus, Li deploys the agrarian question of labor framework to highlight the impossibility of mobilizing large-scale agricultural land deals in the service of agrarian transition. In the absence of employment alternatives, Li insists that small farmers and peasants across the South are right to resist any attempts to dispossess them of land vital to their social reproduction, regardless of how “unproductive” their agricultural practices are deemed to be by development organizations and experts.

Proponents of the agrarian question of labor approach do not, however, propose that small-scale agrarian centered development futures are the only alternative to the impossibility of the agrarian transition. Agrarian transition, Li argues, often speaks to the desires of many agrarian populations to leave the poverty trap and isolation of locally oriented small scale agriculture, and access the fuller life, in terms of health, education, and connectivity, offered by urban modernity (2010, 84). Thus, those engaged in small-scale agriculture can be quite willing to accept being rendered redundant by large-scale industrial agriculture provided there is alternative employment or income security to be found elsewhere. In light of global capitalism's failure to provide such alternatives, the political and social mobilization of rural populations becomes imperative to resolving the agrarian question of labor intensified by the global land grab, whether this means the defence of labor-intensive small-scale agriculture, or securing the right to alternative forms of income security, such as a "right to employment" or a basic income grant. As an example of the form that such a resolution would take, Li highlights the political and social mobilization of agrarian classes of labor in India, in response to the agrarian crisis of
the late 1990s and early 2000s, which forced the Indian state to formulate and implement a national "right to employment" program titled the Mahatma Gandhi Rural National Employment Guarantee Act (2010, 82-83). The point here is that the cost-cutting imperatives of profit-seeking in competitive markets leaves capital structurally incapable of ensuring the social reproduction of those it renders surplus. Recalling Karl Polanyi's seminal history of the market, Li points out that even during the classical European agrarian transition - Polanyi's "great transformation" - socially inclusive development was dependent upon a sustained social and political countermovement against the logic of the capitalist market (2010, 79). Within the context of contemporary global capitalist accumulation, and the rapid advance of labor-displacing technologies, political and social mobilization of agrarian classes of labour is all the more central to the achievement of more inclusive resolutions to the "truncated agrarian transition" in the South today.

There is, however, a significant global, or extra-national, premise of exclusion underpinning the very condition of possibility for such socio-political mobilization and inclusion which remains obscured within the agrarian question of labor framework through which Li analyzes the global land grab. While Bernstein and Li are right to problematize the applicability of the national scale of the classical agrarian question to the South in the context of contemporary globalization, they do so in a way which reproduces the Eurocentric-anthropocentric assumption that agrarian transition in Europe was historically achieved through transformative processes endogenous to European national formations. The implication here is that the classical agrarian question is only coherent within national frames, and is thus rendered impossible within globalization's undermining of autonomous national developmental space. It is this assumption - that there ever was a national, or internal, basis to the agrarian question -
which I aim to problematize in the remainder of this chapter. In place of the national basis of the classical agrarian question, I engage world-historical approaches which reveal how the agrarian question has always been resolved in a global register and, moreover, that such resolution is not achieved once and for all, but rather must recur as a necessary basis for the renewal of globalizing capital's "systemic cycles of accumulation" (Patnaik and Moyo, 2011; Arrighi 1994). In this sense, the implications of the global land grab for agrarian transition are not reducible to societies receiving large scale investments, but rather also crucially involves how global capital, and its attendant political units of national states across North and South, are seeking to renew the global agrarian basis of capitalist development. The global dimension of what we might term the "ongoing" agrarian question, as revealed in the global land grab, necessarily draws our attention to how agrarian transitions involve more than just class forces, narrowly conceived. Specifically, a world-historical view of the agrarian question reveals the constitutive role played by relations of coloniality and racialization in enabling the costs of agrarian surplus making to be externalized. Thus, within the context of capitalist development, the social and political mobilization endorsed by Li, whether in 19th century Europe or 21st century India, is itself expressive of a global process of transition necessarily involving processes including national-citizen subjects, whether bourgeois, proletarian, or peasant, on the basis of the exclusion of 'extra-national’ rightless categories of labour. The elaboration of such a world-historical approach to the agrarian question, and how it can elucidate important dimensions of the global land grab, is the concern of the remainder of this chapter.

The World-Historical Agrarian Question

The era of globalization gave rise, in addition to Bernstein’s “agrarian question of labor” framework, to a second alternative re-thinking of the classical agrarian question, forwarded, in
this case, by Philip McMichael. Conceived in the same historical moment, both approaches sought to reconsider the classical agrarian question in light of the evident shift of capitalist accumulation and development from the national scale of the Keynesian-developmental regime to the global scale of the neoliberal regime. For Bernstein (1996), as we saw above, globalization signalled the death of the classical “agrarian question of capital,” which, on account of its national basis, was no longer relevant to either globalizing capital or developing states pursuing agrarian transition. While McMichael converged with Bernstein in identifying globalization as a fundamental challenge to the continued relevance of the classical agrarian question, it presented, for him, a radically different historical reinterpretation and subsequent set of contemporary implications than it did for Bernstein. Specifically, globalization did not render an earlier national basis “irrelevant,” but rather constituted an attempt to re-affirm, after the national Keynesian-developmentalist interregnum, the global basis of the agrarian question which had been established during the “classical” European transitions. McMichael’s initial intervention (1997) into the renewed agrarian question debates thus introduced two propositions: “first, that the agrarian question has always been a national interpretation of a global process; and second, that current processes of globalization crystallize this issue in new and challenging ways” (632-633). In emphasizing the agrarian question, whether situated in the era of European nation-state development or globalization, as a fundamentally global process, McMichael explicitly seeks to unsettle its “Eurocentric” foundations that occludes the role of the non-European world in effecting Europe’s “national” agrarian transitions (633).

Engaging attempts, such as that put forward by McMichael, to reconceptualize the agrarian question on a global scale, rather than simply discarding the problematic as bereft of any

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5 Both McMichael and Bernstein published their initial challenges to the ‘classical’ agrarian question in 1996/1997, and have been engaged in an increasingly contentious debate over the subsequent two decades.
analytical import, signifies a recognition, which is fundamental to this dissertation, that agrarian relations are analytically central to evaluating the conditions of possibility for a diverse range of socio-economic and socio-ecological formations. For the classical approach, as we have seen, agrarian relations were conceived on a national scale, and their transformation through endogenous processes of primitive accumulation are understood as giving rise to the ontological coordinates through which capitalist development could emerge. In particular, the emergence of the “holy trinity” (Brenner, 1976) of absolutely market dependent beings – capitalist landlord, capitalist tenant farmer, and dispossessed labour – is held as effecting the necessary shift towards a competitive profit driven, rationally organized, social order uniquely capable of initiating self-sustaining economic growth. The challenge, then, in rethinking the agrarian question on a global scale lies in articulating agrarian relations, and their transformation, on a wider geographical plane. This must necessarily involve a broader ontological conceptualization than that offered in the narrow class based horizon of the classical approach, so as to better capture how agrarian relations are configured beyond the bounds of formal socio-political units. Further, as we will see in the next chapter, this ontological broadening of the agrarian question must necessarily center relations between human and non-human ecologies as key to the reproduction or transformations of agrarian relations and, thus, broader projects of socio-ecological change, capitalist and beyond.

World-Systems Analysis

McMichael has most systematically attempted to reconceptualize the agrarian question on a global scale through his development, in collaboration with Harriet Friedmann, of the food regime concept (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989). The food regime concept emerged out of both authors’ training in world-systems analysis, an analytical framework that quite explicitly set
out to challenge methodologically nationalist or internalist accounts of capitalist development. Immanuel Wallerstein, who offered the most systematic articulation of the world-systems approach, argued that capitalist development could find its origins, not in endogenous agrarian transformations within Europe, but rather in the formation of a European centered world-economy organized around differentiated regimes of labor control. For Wallerstein, the transformation of agrarian relations remained central to such a process, but these processes and orderings were conceived on a world scale. In such an account (Wallerstein, 1974), the European centered world-economy emerged through Europe’s great expansions of the 15th and 16th centuries, which were themselves dictated by food needs arising out of the crisis of feudalism. Eventually the expansionary response to food crisis in Europe led to the formation, through violent processes of primitive accumulation, colonization, and subjugation, of three distinct labor regimes – wage labor (Western Europe), serf labor (Eastern Europe and the Americas), and slave labor (Atlantic sugar plantations). The minimal returns to labor in the peripheral (slave) and semi-peripheral (serf) zones enabled the “large-scale accumulation of basic capital which was used to finance the rationalization of agricultural production” in the core zone of wage-labor. For Wallerstein, then, the “solidarity of the system was based ultimately on this phenomenon of unequal development” in which “those who grow food sustain those who grow raw materials who sustain those involved in industrial production” (1974, 86). Broadening, then, the horizon of Eurocentric Marxian accounts of agrarian change, which identify the wage-labour relation in the core as exclusively responsible for the productivity increases underpinning agrarian transition, Wallerstein uncovered the “unfree” labor regimes sustaining, through the provisioning of cheap food and raw materials, the emergent capital-labor relation in the core.
Such a world-scale analysis, in so much as it identified the production, and transfer, of agrarian surplus, via the unequal returns afforded to differentially constituted and controlled labor, from the peripheral and semi-peripheral zones to the core, necessarily called for a more expansive and complex ontological framework than the class determined subjects of orthodox Marxism. Wallerstein (1979, 1991) thus sought to account for "differentiated" labor control by identifying racism as the central cleavage of the world system, enabling as it did the institution of a racialized hierarchy of being across the three zones, and thus providing ideological coherence to the "denial of consumption" for labour situated in the semi-peripheral and peripheral zones. This incorporation of race as key ontological concept in the emergence and reproduction of capitalist development constituted an acknowledgement that the labor and resources of colonially subjugated territories were configured as “other” in ways that enabled profoundly more exhaustive forms of appropriation and exploitation than those that could be visited upon the free labourers of the core.

While this insistence on the centrality of race does constitute a very necessary corrective to the Eurocentrism of orthodox Marxian approaches to agrarian political economy, Wallerstein’s articulation, nonetheless, does not entirely elide the “quantitative” or “circulationist” charge that Brenner (1977) directed against world-systems analysis. In particular, the central cleavage of race appears to simply stand here as justification of what is little else than the outright theft of the labor time and resources of the colonially subjugated peripheral zones. This theft is thus the quantitative origin of capitalist development, enabling as it does the initial “large scale accumulation of basic capital” which comes to ultimately “finance the rationalization of agricultural production” in the core. Such an emphasis on quantitative origins risks, argues Brenner, obscuring the qualitative import of the capital-labor relation which,
owing to its absolute market dependence, is uniquely capable of initiating the productivity gains necessary for self-sustaining economic development. Beyond simply revealing race as the ideological justification of the quantitative basis of the capital-labor qualitative relation in the core, the task, then, that this dissertation is undertaking, and one which I find necessary to a satisfactory theoretical account of the contemporary global land grab, is to articulate how race itself operates as a qualitative ontological relation fundamental to the conditions of possibility for agrarian transition and, ultimately, capitalist accumulation and development. Race, my argument will reveal, does not simply justify the theft of the originary “large scale accumulation of basic capital,” but more fundamentally makes possible the socio-ecological relations that enable the provisioning of the surplus necessary for the transition from agrarian to industrial society. Crucially, conceiving of race as a constitutive ontological force structuring agrarian transitions, will necessarily require, as we will see, that we center indigenous presence on colonized lands - both its erasure and restoration - within our analytical field of vision. This has been strikingly absent from not only Wallerstein's world-system account, but also much of the literature on race and transition more broadly, which has often focussed more exclusively on the role played by imported "unfree" labor (Blackburn, 1998; 2011; Williams 1961).

*Food Regimes*

Prior to articulating a deeper understanding of the role played by race, as core organizing world-ecological relation, in the world-scale constitution of agrarian transition, it is necessary that we first work through those approaches which have attempted to further employ the world-historical orientation of world-systems analysis in accounting for agrarian relations and agricultural production in the transition to capitalist development. This takes us back to McMichael and Friedmann's important conceptual innovation of the "food regime," which has
come, since it was first developed, to be established as a distinctive analytical approach, and field of study, explicitly focussed on the institution of successive international regimes of food provisioning and agricultural production associated with correspondingly successive eras of capitalist accumulation and development. Informed by the premise that "food and agriculture have all along invisibly underpinned relations of power and property in the world system" (Friedmann, 2004, 124), McMichael and Friedmann's intervention was further motivated by a desire to "offer a critique of the nationalist presuppositions that inform the literature on development and dependency" (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989, 94). Food regime conceptualization specifically sought to combine world-systems analysis with regulationist theory's focus on the emergence, within the 19th and 20th century, of international regimes - defined as those specific constellations of relationships, rules, institutions, and norms established and enforced across the state system by hegemonic powers - necessary for stabilizing capitalist accumulation and development.

The first food regime, organized under British hegemony in the late 19th century, signified the shift from the era of empires, in which food provisioning remained informed by mercantilist logics, to the era of capitalist nation-states co-producing one another through "international" price-based rules and norms governing the production, circulation, and exchange of agricultural and manufacturing goods. In particular, the first food regime involved European imports, via a "unified price-regulated world market," of wheat and meat produced by family farmers in settler-colonial states. The capital and labour necessary for organizing settler agriculture was itself exported from Europe which, combined with the highly fertile colonized lands being brought under cultivation, substantially cheapened the costs of agricultural commodity production. This access to consistently large, and cheaply produced, agrarian
surpluses enabled European states to transition more labour, capital, and resources away from agriculture and towards industry. The expansion of the wage labour relation, through which European industrial capitalist accumulation and production proceeded, was a direct consequence of the cheap wage foods flooding Europe from the settler colonial states.

The initial articulation of the food regime framework, however, did not go far enough in addressing the "circulationist" limitation of world-systems analysis, as the qualitative relations it sought to highlight failed to sufficiently trouble the Eurocentric disposition of debates concerning the transition from agrarian to industrial society. On the one hand, it did further advance the world-systems challenge to the classical Marxian account of endogenously produced agrarian transition, particularly in so much as it provided more specific and detailed "empirical mappings of class relations and geographical specializations" related to the international provisioning of cheap wage goods for industrial capitalist accumulation and development in 19th century Europe (Friedmann, 2009, 335). This emphasized the integration of wage labor and non-wage family farm labor within a unified, yet internally differentiated, global process of capitalist development. On the other hand, however, this narrow privileging of the link between wage labor and settler agriculture as the "core of the first food regime" (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989, 100), occluded the qualitative significance of the violent relations of appropriation and exclusion established by Europeans - metropolitan and settler alike - over both indigenous societies and unfree migrant labourers on colonized lands. Certainly, the food regime framework, particularly as it evolved, has been attentive to the forced dispossession of indigenous people, but only in so much as this provided a quantum of fertile land for settler agriculture (Friedmann, 2004). The possibility that relations between colonizing Europeans and indigenous peoples and their lands held a deeper qualitative significance for the forging of
international food regimes was not sufficiently considered. Moreover, while this thus reproduced Wallerstein's reduction of the non-European presence to a quantitative basis for the qualitative relations forged across European metropolitan and settler states, the food regime approach failed to analytically incorporate Wallerstein's important, if limited, emphasis on the role of race and racism in stabilizing inherently world-scale capitalist development.

**Global Value Relations**

The potentiality of food regime analysis to forward a richer world-historical, non-Eurocentric, account of the agrarian question, one which more substantively integrates colonial and imperial relations, has been significantly extended through Farshad Araghi's theoretical and historical interventions into global agrarian and food studies. While Araghi's intervention is premised upon a recognition that "the concept of food regime is central for a labour-oriented perspective on imperialism" (2003, 41) his critical engagement stems from a concern that "the theoretical omission of global value relations from food regime analysis has served to blur world-historical analysis of the peasant question" (2009b, 119). The conceptualization of "global value relations" here refers to the concrete spatial differentiation of labor relations through which the surplus value which constitutes and enables capitalist accumulation and development is produced, distributed, and transferred on a global scale. Though Araghi is quite careful to distinguish his approach from world-systems analysis, critiquing the latter for its functionalism, the introduction of global value relations into the food regime framework recalls Wallerstein's differentiation of three complementary zones of labour control across the world-system. Araghi identifies the central contradiction of global value relations as the realization of surplus value through the co-production of relations of underconsumption/underreproduction in the South and subsidized consumption/over consumption in the North, further recalling here Wallerstein's
insistence that the definitive, and contradictory, relation of capitalist accumulation on a world scale is the production of surplus value through both the "denial of consumption" in the peripheries and subsidized consumption in the core. More specifically, the low cost of the food and raw materials, which sustain the cycle of investment, production, consumption, and profit in the core, is itself actively produced through the imposition of underconsumption upon the "unfree" agrarian labourers of the peripheries.

This re-centering of colonial and imperial "global value relations," pivoting on the contradiction of under/over consumption, troubles the initial food regime premise that the specifically capitalist inter-national production and circulation of foodstuffs is defined by complementary exchange between settler and metropolitan states, organized in particular around classes of settler family farmers in the former and wage labourers and industrial capitalists in the latter. In particular, an insistence upon the colonial/imperial premise of global value relations compels us to look beyond emergent settler-metropolitan nation-state relations in the 19th century towards, instead, adopting a longer historical, and broader spatial/geographical, view of the emergence and consolidation of the implicit norms, regulations, and relations governing food production and circulation on a world scale. Araghi thus situates the emergence and reproduction of global value relations within the longue durée of what he terms "global primitive accumulation," which crucially extends beyond classical marxism's narrow Eurocentric focus on English enclosures to include processes of labour and capital formation through dispossession of colonized peoples.

Conditioning the rise of capital, the original era (1492-1834) of global primitive accumulation thus, on the one hand, involved the denial of non-market means of subsistence to peasants being expelled from the land via the Tudor and parliamentary enclosures in England,
while, on the other, marked the "beginning of systematic colonial and racialized enclosures in the Americas as well as in Castilian Spain" (2009, 120-121). In describing the enclosures as "racialized" in the Americas, Araghi makes clear that the concept of global primitive accumulation does not seek to transcend Eurocentric accounts of primitive accumulation by simply suggesting that the same form of enclosures through which the capital-labour relation emerged in Europe were simultaneously proceeding in the colonized non-European world. Rather, the colonial register of the original era of global primitive accumulation was fundamentally informed by a thoroughly more violent rejection of the presence of the dispossessed racialized “other,” and hence of any consideration of political inclusion, than was the case for those dispossessed via the English enclosures. This was manifested particularly in the brutal violence underpinning the enslavement of African labourers on plantation farms in the Americas, as well as in the "separation of indigenous populations from the land and the alienation of their customary (communal or tribal) rights to land usage either through massacre (white settlements) or enslavement (physical removal from ancestral or tribal land" (Araghi, 2012, 2). Within Europe, not only did the forcible separation of labour from the means of production not involve massacre or enslavement, but, moreover, those dispossessed were often able to find socio-political inclusion through participation in the genocidal colonial appropriation of non-European lands.

The unrestrained violence which marked global primitive accumulation in the colonies did more than simply provide colonizing European polities with access to a quantum of land - or what Wallerstein refers to as the "large scale accumulation of basic capital." Moving beyond such a narrow quantitative interpretation of colonialism (2003, 51), Araghi links the varied logics of global primitive accumulation across core and periphery to the emergence of a more complex
and contradictory qualitative capital-labour relation than the one visible through Eurocentric accounts of primitive accumulation (2009b). Whereas the English enclosures centralized by classical marxism are held to produce free labourers who participate, albeit unequally, within an emergent productivity enhancing, competitive market dependent mode of social reproduction, the colonial enclosures, Araghi argues, produce "global supplies of dispossessed, racialized, undocumented, gendered and rightless surplus populations [which] have given rise to highly uneven geographies of consumption" (2009b, 119). The key point here is that the racialized violence of colonial primitive accumulation institutes an unfree "rightless" category of "labor power stripped from social protection and social compact" (2009a, 124) upon whom the costs of "agrarian surplus" could be externalized in the form of underconsumption. This underconsumption, often taking the form of undernourished and over-worked unfree labour on plantation farms in the Americas, enabled the provisioning of cheap foods which subsidized the consumption of proletarianized labour in the transitioning European core. Expressive, then, of "global value relations," the "racial subsidy" of cheap food facilitated relative' capitalist surplus accumulation in the core by both repressing capital's wage and resource bill and enabling the proletariat, and urban consumers more generally, to access the purchasing power necessary to widen the home market for the consumption of industrial goods. The cheap inputs procured from the zone of underconsumption "eradicated the need for wage supports and non-market subsistence alternatives in the North" (Araghi, 2009b, 122), and the invisibility of the former allowed for the illusion of autonomous market forces driving productivity in the core (Blackburn, 1998). Araghi's global theory and history of primitive accumulation and value relations - the broad conditions of possibility for capitalist development - thus complicates the narrow capital-labour ontology of classical Marxian theories of agrarian change by incorporating within its field
of vision the racialized “other” labour whose "rightless" constitution enables the absolute market dependence that has been celebrated as the engine of transition in the core.

Historically, the first epoch of global primitive accumulation gave rise to global value relations organized around the provisioning of cheap stimulants and raw materials - particularly sugar, coffee, tea, and cotton - from the peripheries of the Americas and the Atlantic islands to the emergent proletariat and capitalists in the European core. As Mintz (1985) and Blackburn (1998, 2011) have shown in their seminal histories on slavery and capitalism, such stimulants were of particular importance in adapting the diets of European labourers transitioning from the countryside to the intensive work regimes of urban factories, while the unconstrained cotton supply facilitated consistent and rapid expansion of the English textile industry. In so much as the cheapness of these foodstuffs and raw materials were dependent upon the racialized violence underpinning land theft in the Americas and labour theft from Africa, Blackburn echoes Araghi in challenging the Eurocentrism of classical Marxian theories of agrarian transition by arguing that the "colonial and Atlantic regime of extended primitive accumulation allowed metropolitan accumulation to break out of its agrarian and national limits and discover an industrial and global destiny" (1998, 554). Moreover, Blackburn argues that the historical development and transformation of capitalist development and accumulation has not overcome this foundational relation, but instead has "repeatedly produced regimes of extended primitive accumulation" (1998, 554).

This notion of reconstituted regimes of extended primitive accumulation underpinning transformations in capitalist accumulation more broadly is further advanced by Araghi’s location of McMichael and Friedmann’s first settler-colonial food regime within a second epoch of global primitive accumulation, this time conditioned by, rather than conditioning, the rise and
consolidation of industrial capitalism. In particular, by the nineteenth century, capital's attempt to constantly increase its rate of relative surplus extraction from labour in the industrial core constrained the purchasing power of the proletariat, and therefore both heightened class conflict and reduced outlets for the sale of industrial goods. The "most immediate way out" of the nineteenth century accumulation crisis, Araghi argues, was to reconstitute global primitive accumulation on an even broader scale by incorporating, alongside the "continued extermination of indigenous populations and the seizure of extremely productive lands" in the Americas, land and labour colonized through the conquest of Ireland, scramble for Africa, and the subjugation of large parts of Asia (2009b, 122). The expansion of industrial production and accumulation necessarily involved an extension of political and economic rights to the proletariat, such as the shortening of the working day, and access to a broader basket of cheap foodstuffs and raw materials, particularly the massive quantities of wheat and cotton imported from the newly colonized regions of the Americas, India and Africa. The racialized underside of such expansion - the logic of underconsumption - has been powerfully revealed through Mike Davis' (2001) uncovering of the "late Victorian holocausts" which starved to death millions from the wheat and cotton exporting colonized lands.

Araghi’s theoretical and historical interventions, along with those offered by Davis, Blackburn, and Mintz, thus significantly advance the task of articulating a non-Eurocentric global account of the “original” agrarian transitions of European states during the long 16th and 19th centuries. While his emphasis on the centrality of rightless labour as the externalized figure upon whom the costs of agrarian surplus are ultimately visited, via underconsumption, constitutes an important widening of our ontological field of vision, the substance of racialization as a distinct ontological relation underpinning the constitution and resolution of the agrarian
question, remains underdeveloped. More specifically, Araghi reduces racialization to a function of capital's need for a fragmented global labour supply, and thus is not capable of thinking race as a distinctive social relation of power and being which puts in place qualitative ontological orientations not reducible to the market dependent logic of capital, yet still historically necessary for enhanced productivity and agrarian transition.

*Agrarian South*

We can push the "global value relations" perspective on the agrarian question further, on questions of race and colonial/imperial relations, by engaging more seriously with agrarian studies scholarship emanating, self-consciously, from the global South. While often ignored, or dismissed, by agrarian studies and development scholars of the North, a rich tradition of anti-colonial and anti-imperial praxis on the agrarian question has been forwarded by those situated in the South, ranging from political revolutionaries such as Mao, Fanon, and Cabral, to the radical world-systems scholarship of Samir Amin, and third world marxisms of thinkers such as Amiya Kumar Bagchi, Utsa Patnaik, and Sam Moyo. More recently, those working within such a tradition have launched a journal titled *Agrarian South*, which positions itself as a distinct South based school of agrarian political economy quite explicitly seeking to challenge the hegemony of Northern scholarship on the agrarian question, with a particular concern to trouble existing Eurocentric and economistic tendencies.

Taking issue with Bernstein's thesis on the death of the agrarian question of capital, the Agrarian South school adopts as its central premise a belief that the "agrarian question is the

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6 This is expressive of the epistemological colonization which continues to dominate North-South relations, with the North viewed as the space of theory/abstraction, and the South as the space of empirical observation. For a critique, see Dos Santos 2007.
most fundamental question of the twenty-first century” (Agrarian South Editorial, 2012, 1) and, further still, that the "classical agrarian question remains the pillar of all further struggles" (Moya, Jha, and Yeros, 2013, 111) for just and sustainable socio-ecological relations. The point here is not to oppose Bernstein's thesis by uncritically resurrecting the internalist approach that he has critiqued as irrelevant, but rather to engage in a critical world-historical reconstruction of the classical agrarian question in order to reveal the Eurocentric limitations of its historical, Northern based, formulations. In particular, the Agrarian South position argues that it is only by maintaining the Eurocentric historical misconception that the classical agrarian question operated within a national, or internal, framework, that one could possibly conceive, as does Bernstein, that it was ever fully resolved for the transitioning societies of the North during the long 16th and 19th centuries, let alone rendered dead through the transition to neoliberal globalization. By reconstructing the classical agrarian question as a world-historical problematic, we are able to grasp how its foundational relations, however much they have been obscured, center on North-South hierarchies enabling violent appropriations of the land and labour of the South. Moreover, such a "global" basis of the agrarian question is in constant need of renewal, and as such the classical agrarian question, reconstructed world-historically, remains relevant to both the reproduction, and the potential overturning, of colonial-capitalist development.

The Agrarian South school's empirical mapping of the world-historical reconstruction of the agrarian question has largely been undertaken by Utsa Patnaik (2003; Patnaik and Moyo, 2011). Patnaik's careful attention to historical data has led her to question whether in fact primitive accumulation in the English countryside, with its forwarding of the wage-labour relation and capitalist agriculture more broadly, produced the productivity enhancing agricultural revolution necessary for industrial transition, as claimed by Brenner and Byres. While allowing
that there were some gains in productivity, Patnaik nonetheless finds that these were insufficient
to "cope with the wage good (the basic necessities, such as food and cloth, bought by workers
with their wages) and raw material demands of industrial transition and these demands were
actually increasingly met by transfers from the heavily taxed peasantry and from the plantation
agriculture set up in subjugated colonies" (2011, 12). Beyond simply the insufficient quantity of
food and materials produced endogenously, Patnaik points to the further important material
constraint represented by the cold climate of the North, which is incapable of the range of crop
production necessary to provision the consistent supply of stimulants (sugar, tea, coffee, cocoa)
and raw materials (cotton) required for industrial transition. This latter constraint could only be
overcome by the North's colonization of the tropical lands of the South, an outsourcing relation
which remains fundamental, Patnaik argues, to the year round diversified food baskets and high
real incomes of the North (2011, 14-20). In this sense, the global agrarian basis of Northern
industrial development remains dependent upon access to tropical lands, and the agrarian
question can only be considered resolved if we accept the naturalization of the global hierarchies
upon which this is based.

The reduction of the South to abundant lands naturally endowed for provisioning the
"cheap inputs" required for the North's transition thus necessitated, as argued variously by
Araghi, Bagchi (2009), and Patnaik, that global primitive accumulation involve de-
peasantization, via enclosure, in the core, and a concomitant peasantization in the peripheries.
The colonial destruction of indigenous societies involved their subsequent reconstruction as
“naturalized” peasant societies inherently suited for working the land and producing the food and
other raw materials needed by the ostensibly higher value producing industrial societies of the
North (Bagchi, 2009, 84). However, Patnaik further argues the essential point that primitive
accumulation in the core, while certainly involving dispossession and de-peasantization, did not, in fact, sufficiently absorb, as proletarianized labour, those displaced by processes of land enclosure. Rather, the surplus labour of Europe's transitioning societies was crucial in propelling the levels of outmigration necessary for the violent colonial displacement of indigenous peoples, and the subsequent institution of the settler-colonial mode of frontier agrarian production. In addition to provisioning cheap foodstuffs and raw materials, colonial primitive accumulation thus offered the necessary outlet for absorbing the surplus labour of the European core, which crucially “allowed the industrializing nations to externalize the acute internal contradictions which would otherwise have torn their societies apart” (Patnaik, 2012, 7)

Informed by this broader historical-geographical vantage point of the agrarian question, Patnaik offers a radical interpretation of contemporary prospects for agrarian change. In particular, she argues that the contention surrounding the contemporary global land grab concerns more than what such processes mean for the South’s prospects for overcoming a “stalled agrarian transition” (Li, 2011; Patnaik, 2011). Rather, the rapid intensification of land acquisition across the Global South in the post-crisis context reveals that the resolution of the North’s agrarian question remains an ongoing and contested global process. The global land grab, Patnaik argues, signifies, in large part, an attempt by Northern based global capital and states to renew the global agrarian basis - the forced exploitation and/or displacement of peasant agriculture in the south - of capitalist accumulation (Patnaik, 2011, 49). Conversely, Patnaik emphasises, it is precisely the inability to access the historical conditions for colonial primitive accumulation - importing cheap foodstuffs and exporting surplus labour – and not some imagined shift from the era of nation-states to the era of globalization, as argued by Bernstein and Li, which precludes the South from today following the North’s path of agrarian transition.
Thus, the core aim of progressive social forces in the South should consist of forwarding an anti-imperial resolution to the ongoing agrarian question. This principally involves the militant defence of peasant agriculture in the South against attempts by global capital, whether through neoliberal agrarian restructuring or global land grabbing, to forcibly orient its labour and resources towards the productive and consumptive needs of the North. Such a defence would then enable the articulation of an agrarian based, peasant-centered alternative development trajectory for societies in the South for whom the historical conditions of possibility – global primitive accumulation – of the North’s agrarian transition remain foreclosed (Patnaik, 2011, 50-53).

Patnaik’s work thus further bolsters, particularly through her empirical focus on the colonized peripheries as both source of cheap inputs and sink for surplus labour absorption, Araghi’s ‘global value relations’ framework in forwarding a world-historical reconstruction of the agrarian question. The articulation, however, of the latter’s racialized ontology, which Araghi gestured towards but leaves underdeveloped, has been considered more seriously by fellow agrarian south theorists, Sam Moyo, Praveen Jha, and Paris Yeros (Moyo, Yeros, and Jha, 2012; Moya, Jha, and Yeros, 2013). Though converging with Araghi in identifying global primitive accumulation as a “basic determinant of industrial transition in England and Europe, which would have otherwise been stifled and reduced to a lesser event” (2013, 98-99), Moyo and his collaborators place more emphasis upon the “racialized global culture” (2012, 184) which both enabled, and was woven through, global primitive accumulation. In pointing out that such a racialized global culture has “yielded an enduring ‘hierarchy’ of peoples, including a special paternalism towards the African continent” (2012, 184) Moyo, Jha, and Yeros open space for a deeper conceptualization of the distinct logics of difference and othering that have situated zones
of underconsumption and rightless labour in the agrarian South. The “race consciousness” of “arrogant, bourgeois industrial society,” within which they locate Marx’s own denial of history to the “indigenous peoples and slaves of the old and new colonies” (2013, 106) effectively de-humanized the latter as unworthy of economic compensation and political inclusion, and thus set in place the necessary ontological conditions for the overconsumption/underconsumption contradiction at the core of the world-historical agrarian question. In centering racialized dehumanization as core to the European agrarian transition, Moyo, Jha, and Yeros argue that the world-historical agrarian question comes to fundamentally pivot on the reproduction, or overturning, of its racist, colonial foundations. In so doing, they continue, the “agrarian question becomes fully consonant with the national question [of anti-colonial liberation] and the victims of primitive accumulation fully human, thereby closing the circle which began with imperialist partition and ideological domination” (2013, 111).

Unlike Patnaik, however, Moyo, Jha, and Yeros do not reproduce the South as an undifferentiated geographical space when considering contemporary prospects for agrarian change. Taking seriously the role of Southern states and capital in the global land grab, particularly in the case of emerging economies such as China and India acquiring agricultural land on the African continent, they argue that the "enduring hierarchy of peoples, including a special paternalism towards the African continent" yielded by the "race consciousness" of colonial-capitalist modernity, while remaining "deeply rooted in the Western psyche," risks now being reproduced by the "new non-Western competitors" for African agrarian labour and land (2012, 184). Whereas, then, Araghi and Patnaik point the way towards reconceptualizing the global land grab as expressive of a broader world-historical, rather than Eurocentric-anthropocentric, agrarian question, Moyo, Jha, and Yeros shift our attention towards accounting
for the significance of the global land grab’s “South-South” dimensions, particularly in terms of what this means for the integral “race consciousness” of capitalist development. In following Moyo, Jha, and Yeros, we can begin to examine the global land grab as a “contested transition” wherein states and capital across both North and South seek to variously renew, or fundamentally re-constitute along “South-South” lines, the racialized global agrarian surplus through which “national” agrarian transitions have been historically (re)produced.

**Conclusion**

In order to more fully forward such a reconceptualization of the global land grab, we must build upon Moyo, Jha, and Yeros’ critical intervention here by articulating, in further theoretical and historical detail, how “race consciousness” operates as a core ontological relation in the material constitution of the world-scale agrarian surplus underpinning national agrarian transitions. This will necessarily compel us to consider, in particular, the key historical function of racialization within the ontological distinction between an active, rational humanity and an irrational, passive nature which has been, it will be argued, the fundamental condition of possibility for capitalist productivity. We thus return, here, to a deeper investigation of the Eurocentric-anthropocentric paradigm of the agrarian question, wherein the conditions of transition involve the co-produced externalization of non-human natures and non-European peoples. Whereas the first section considered the Eurocentric-anthropocentric paradigm in terms of how agrarian scholars ignored the presence and agency of colonized people and non-human natures in their account of historical European agrarian transitions, we will now turn, in the next chapter, to explicating how precisely such presence and agency, and its political and ideological externalization, have been indispensable to both the constitution and collapse of the world-ecologies through which capitalist accumulation and production has proceeded.
Chapter Two: The Decolonial World-Ecological Agrarian Question

My objective in this chapter is to build upon the interventions of food regime theory, global value relations, and the Agrarian South school, in articulating an approach to the agrarian question problematique capable of elucidating how the co-constitution of race and nature is an integral dimension of contemporary agrarian transitions – stalled or in motion. I will do so by combining theories of world-ecology and coloniality in elaborating a framework I call the *decolonial world-ecological agrarian question* which centralizes, in particular, the global intersections and co-constitutions of racialization, coloniality, and ecology in the historical interplay between ostensibly “national” agrarian transitions and the rise and fall of successive cycles of the capitalist world-system. In elaborating such a framework, I forward the argument that the achievement of agrarian transition, and the resolution, in the process, of the broader agrarian question, is historically premised upon the violent and hierarchical forging of world-scale, racially differentiated, socio-ecological relations of power and production. The socio-ecology underpinning, and further affirmed by, agrarian transitions, is principally defined by the transitioning society’s epistemological and ontological distinction from, and mastery over, non-human nature, which fundamentally includes, in this instance, bodies racialized as less evolved humans. Such a hierarchical distinction enables colonizing states to forcibly, and exhaustively, appropriate from extra-national colonized “virgin” lands, rendered unoccupied and unused through the violent dehumanization of racialized indigenous people, the surplus of cheap agrarian inputs required to provision the “internal” national transformations of class structures and property regimes associated with the emergence and consolidation of industrial capitalist society. The second dimension of this argument is that particular world-ecological regimes of capital have their own internal contradiction, principally that the human mastery over nature
paradigm which mobilizes an agrarian surplus on a world-scale simultaneously sets in motion the exhaustion of such a surplus, and the subsequent need to identify and colonize further frontiers of virgin lands from which the cheap inputs necessary for a successive cycle of colonial-capitalist production and accumulation can be drawn. Taken together, this theoretical and historical articulation of the decolonial world-ecological agrarian question will then enable the contemporary global land grab, and particularly its South-South dimensions, to be understood as a conjunctural moment in which the attempted (re)institution of emergent racialized world-ecologies by states in the South seeking to overcome their own “stalled agrarian transitions” converges with the broader global systemic imperative of capital to reconstitute its socio-ecological regime in light of the ecological exhaustion of the neoliberal accumulation cycle.

**The Ongoing World-Ecological Agrarian Question**

*Ecological Marxism*

Beyond the evident Eurocentrism, the agrarian question approach has generally neglected to consider seriously the ecological transformations and consequences involved with the transition to industrial capitalist modernity. It has, rather, clearly reproduced an anthropocentric framework concerned exclusively with investigating how changing agrarian social relations impact the productive capacities of human societies, and what this means for broader socio-economic development. This, it can be argued, reflects the dominant anthropocentrism of the 19th century Marxian revolutionaries who originally conceptualized the agrarian question, and whose belief in the moral imperative of progressive human mastery over nature has contributed to the exclusion of non-human ecologies from the analysis of agrarian change undertaken by scholars influenced by the agrarian question framework (O’Connor, 1998). With the risks posed
to the ecological conditions of life by human activities, however, becoming increasingly evident
by the closing decades of the twentieth century, there has emerged a growing recognition of the
need to construct historical and theoretical frameworks of transition, development, economic
growth, etc., which account for the presence of non-human natures as both agents of change and
sites of impact. Concerned that emergent ecological analyses - or green theories - of social
change and development erred too far the other way in centering non-human ecological forces
and discounting the importance of social ones, Marxist theorists (O’Connor, 1998; Burkett,
1999; Bellamy Foster, 2000; Moore, 2003; Castree, 2008; Kovel, 2002) have initiated a critical
socio-ecological re-reading of Marx’s texts with the aim of articulating a framework which could
better capture the dialectical relationship between social and ecological forces and consequences
in the emergence and reproduction of capitalist modernity.

Prominent early attempts at advancing such a socio-ecological marxism included
O’Connor’s (1998) thesis of the capital-nature relation constituting a “second contradiction” of
capitalism (in addition to the primary contradiction of the capital-labour relation), Burkett’s
(1999) “red-green” synthesis which sought to emphasize labour exploitation and ecological
degradation as “mutually constituted aspects of a single class-contradictory whole” (3) and
Foster’s (2000) elaboration of Marx’s concept of the metabolic rift. These interventions have
been critical in uncovering the hitherto underappreciated ecological insights offered by Marx,
particularly in terms of how the emergence and consolidation of capitalist production involved
fundamental material and conceptual changes to society’s relationship with nature which
threatened the latter’s sustainable reproduction. Such attempts at a non-anthropocentric account
of capitalist development were limited, however, by a shared Eurocentric premise which
conceived of the transition to capitalism, and the society-nature relations this entailed, as a
process first endogenous to Europe that was ultimately generalized to the rest of the world through colonialism. In so doing, ecological marxism forwarded a singular society-nature relationship which assumed that a class differentiated humanity had been alienated from nature and thus did not give serious consideration to how extra-European relations, particularly those established through colonialism, had been fundamental to changing conceptions of the natural environment.

This key task of articulating a non-anthropocentric and non-Eurocentric framework for understanding the emergence and reproduction of the capitalist mode of production has been significantly advanced in recent years by the “capitalism as world-ecology” approach developed by Jason Moore. In forwarding such an approach, Moore does not discount the significance of the socio-ecological insights revealed by the ecological marxism of O’Connor, Burkett, and Foster, but rather broadens and deepens their dimensions by synthesizing their key concepts with world-systems analysis (Moore, 2000, 124). In particular, the world-ecology approach is centrally informed by the ecological Marxist rethinking of primitive accumulation which reveals that, in so much as capital’s founding dispossession separates the primary producer from the soil, it institutes, in addition to the capital-labour contradiction, a contradictory capital-nature relation wherein nature is reproduced as external to society (O’Connor, 1998) and, as a result, is rendered non-consequential to the human labour-centered production of value (Burkett, 1999). Moore, however, extends such a capitalist “production of nature” by considering how primitive accumulation has operated, since capital’s inception at multiple scales across varied geographical zones (Moore, 2000, 125). Further, Moore closely engages with Foster’s elaboration of Marx’s metabolic rift concept, which argues that intensifying ecological degradation, ranging from declining soil fertility to climate change, is an outcome of the disruption imposed by capital on
the metabolic exchange between human society and the natural environment. Specifically, the
metabolic rift both enables, and is further reproduced through, the generation and transfer of
agrarian surplus from the agricultural sector towards urban industry where it is ultimately
rendered “waste” rather than metabolized back into the rural landbase from which it was
originally extracted. This has the dual effect of both increasing pollution and exhausting nature’s
“free gift” of soil fertility. Moore, however, takes issue with Foster’s emphasis on Europe’s
nineteenth century industrial agricultural revolution as the origins of the metabolic rift, and
instead maintains that a fuller account of the metabolic rift is possible by locating its emergence
in capital’s world-scale becoming during the long sixteenth century. In so doing, Moore
maintains, we are better able to move beyond the Cartesian society-nature dualism and
understand how the capital relation, though ideologically premised upon an externalization of
nature from society, itself constitutes a world-ecology co-produced by both human and extra-
human natures.

*Agrarian question as world-ecological*

Moore’s world-ecology approach, while sharing the foundational concerns of the agrarian
question, namely the relationship between changing agrarian relations, agrarian surplus, and
industrial capitalist modernity, is premised upon a critical rethinking in which the “agrarian
question is also the question of nature, and therefore it is also the question of ecological crises in
the modern world” (Moore, 2008). This conceptual broadening from agrarian question to world-
ecology further rests upon the recognition of agriculture as a particularly acute expression of
“how humans make the rest of nature, and of how nature makes human organization” (Moore,
2015, 247). In expanding the ontological coordinates of agrarian relations to include the co-
constitution of human and non-human natures, the world-ecology approach forces us to move
beyond the anthropocentric register of the classical agrarian question wherein the production of agrarian surplus centered, as we saw earlier, on the productivity enhancing changes in intra-human agrarian social relations. Neither exclusively privileging or discarding the import of the competitive compulsion of the market dependent capital-labour relation, world-ecology forwards an expansive analytical frame which can reveal how changing society-nature boundaries and relations are fundamental conditions for the production of the "ecological surplus" underpinning the possibility of capitalist accumulation.

Articulated through the wider ontological frame of world ecology, surplus is conceived as ecological rather than simply agrarian, and consists of what Moore identifies as the four cheaps - food, labour power, energy, and natural resources - which enable capital to repress its wage and input costs and thus sustain the cycle of investment, production, consumption, and accumulation (2015, 17). Crucially, the production of ecological surplus necessarily involves a geographically expansive, and differentiated, production and appropriation of nature's "free gifts." Specifically, this expansive and differentiated geography involves the formation of Wallerstein's core-periphery relation, alternatively conceived by Araghi as the institution of zones of underconsumption/overconsumption. However, unlike the world-systems and global value relations approaches, Moore extends the analysis of surplus value extraction beyond the appropriation of coerced "rightless" labour to consider how it is the latter's imbrication with the mastery and appropriation of non-human natures that enables the emergent capital of the core to produce, and appropriate, the ecological surplus of the colonized peripheries (2015, 16). The synthesis of ecological marxism and world-systems analysis, making possible the transcendence of the former's Eurocentrism and the latter’s anthropocentrism, thus defines the capitalism as world-ecology framework. This synthesis, and the particular way it reveals the co-production,
on a world-scale, of rightless labour and externalized nature, enables, as we will now see, the
world-ecology approach to move beyond the limitations we encountered with Araghi’s global
value relations framework in articulating the qualitative ontological relations set forth through
global primitive accumulation.

Moore’s spatio-temporal mapping of the ontological framework – the constitutive beings
and relations – of the capitalist world-ecology centers the geographical expansions of the “long
sixteenth century” as the necessary point of departure. The ‘long sixteenth century’ (1450-
1640), a periodization borrowed from the Braudelian historiographical approach of world-
systems analysis, signifies here the epoch within which the crisis of the European feudal world
gave way to the emergence of the first hegemony of historical capitalism organized under
Spanish leadership. Contra the dominant social property relations approach of the agrarian
question, which privileges the intra-human feudal class struggle, the world-ecology framework
reads the crisis as irreducibly socio-ecological in so much as collapsing soil fertility combined
with an empowered peasantry to undermine the symbolic-material reproduction of the feudal
world (2015, 126). Further problematizing the agrarian question’s Eurocentric-anthropocentric
disposition, the emphasis of “capitalism as world-ecology” constitutes a reaffirmation of the
world-systems and global value relations insistence that the productive, surplus generating,
resolution of the feudal crisis could only be advanced through the institution of world-scale
‘European’ and ‘extra-European’ relations which enabled differentiated forms of labour control
(Moore, 2003, 358). However, Moore’s emphasis on the irreducible ‘socio-ecological’ character
of both the feudal crisis and its resolution extends his analysis beyond the social anthropocentric
concerns of world-systems and global value relations. In particular, the world-ecological
account of the rise of capitalist development considers the geographical expansions of the
European centered world-economy as constitutive of the co-production of European/extra-Europeand and human/extra-human relations that simultaneously enabled the production and capture of the rightless labour forces and fertile lands necessary to overcome the socio-ecological crisis of the feudal world.

Concretely, world-ecology locates the conditions of possibility for this ontological framework (capital, labour, nature) of capitalist accumulation in the waves of primitive accumulation, operating at local, regional, and global scales, unleashed by the early global capitalist hegemonies of the Spanish and Dutch states (ibid). This involved the expansive separation of producers from the soil, expressed in particular through the massacres, and expulsions from their lands, of indigenous peoples in the Americas, the enslavement of African labourers, peasant enclosures within Europe, and the imposition of a second serfdom in Eastern Europe. Combined, primitive accumulation as a global process formed an emergent capitalist world-ecology, consisting in particular of what Moore refers to as the “global Baltic” and “global Atlantic” regimes through which the “ecological surplus” of grain, sugar, silver, and labour-power was produced and transferred from the peripheries and semi-peripheries of the Americas, Africa, and Eastern Europe into the core commodity producing zones of Western Europe (2015, 87). While this emphasis on surplus transfer from the peripheries to the core is quite evidently influenced by Wallerstein’s world-systems analysis, Moore joins with Araghi’s global value relations approach in conceptualizing such transfer beyond a quantitative “large-scale basic accumulation of capital,” as Wallerstein describes it, to more fundamentally understanding the production, capture, and circulation of the surplus as expressive of the qualitative ontological relations, constituted within and across the differentiated zones of the world-system, defining capitalist development’s immanent global structure (Moore, 2015, 105). However, as we noted
earlier, Araghi’s ontological framework, though offering a vital global corrective of differentially constituted rightless and rights-bearing labour in zones of under/overconsumption respectively, nonetheless reproduces classical marxism’s emphasis on capital-labour as the definitive relation of capitalist development. For Moore, such an exclusive focus on the capital-labour relation fails to capture how the co-production of the distinctive zones (core-periphery, under/overconsumption) of world-scale capitalism involves a fundamental reorganization of not only the relation between labour and the means of production, but of society and nature more broadly.

The qualitative society/nature distinction and the surplus/exhaustion cycles of the capitalist world-ecology

In order to elucidate the qualitative dimensions of the core-periphery, or under/overconsumption, dialectic beyond the capital-labour relation, Moore reconceptualizes the co-constitutive zones of the capitalist world-ecology as consisting of what he terms the zone of appropriation and the zone of commodification/exploitation (Moore, 2015, 66-73). While the zone of commodification/exploitation signifies the site of the endless accumulation of capital through the capture of relative surplus value from exploited labour in the core, and thus can be apprehended through the capital-labour relation, it is premised upon an enabling zone of appropriation, located predominantly in the imperially subjugated peripheries, signifying the qualitative production of the distinctive society-nature relations of capitalist modernity. These co-productive relations of appropriation and exploitation express what Moore identifies as the two principal abstractions both informing, and further constituted through, global primitive accumulation: i) abstract social labour, encompassing capital formation via labour dispossession, and ii) abstract social nature, encompassing the "Cartesian dualism" advancing human society's separation from, and mastery over, nature (2015, 21, 199-202). The process of forcibly
separating the producer from the soil involves, in addition to the imposition of the exploitative capital-labour relation organized according to profit and commodification, the elevated distinction, on account of its capacity for rationality, of the properly active human subject from an irrational passive nature (Moore, 2015, 48). Enclosure of land, in other words, both effects and is effected by, an emergent rational epistemological and ontological orientation - the "Cartesian dualism" - that aims to objectively isolate, apprehend, and manage the interests of the human self against the multitude of non-human natures.

Within Cartesian dualism, the rational human can alone actively harness the latent potentiality of the "free gifts," or resources, bestowed upon, but not realized by, an irrational passive nature. This renders natures left undeveloped by human rationality as "waste" or "unused" lands. In so much, then, that rational human activity, in the form of both management (capital) and labour, can alone produce value, its other, nature, is constructed as a non-value producing space whose appropriation does not thus involve any reproductive cost (2015, 54). Within such a distinction, the evident reproductive costs - food, housing, clothing, fuel - of the human production of value are not applicable to nature, where soil fertility and water abundance, for example, are not viewed as actively re-produced by a diversity of extra-human natures, but rather as simply given, or "virgin" (2015, 60). This reduction of nature to a bounty of unharnessed “free gifts” finds concrete expression in the displacement of sustainable cyclical forms of socio-ecological metabolic exchange with a linear extractive form through which extra-human natures are appropriated for the “higher” value of rational human industry without accounting for the reproductive costs of the former. Moore’s zones of appropriation and commodification, then, signify, through global primitive accumulation and its attendant knowledge regimes, the qualitative production of a specifically capitalist world-ecology
comprising socio-ecological relations which partition the world into invisible non-human realms of non-value, where work, on account of its naturalization, is not recognized and therefore "unpaid," and the more visible human arenas of value, where the struggle over wages, profits, and productivity is engaged. The realm of non-value, or zone of appropriation, is associated predominantly with the colonized peripheries, whereas the value producing zone of commodification corresponds with the metropolitan core of the capitalist world ecology.

The production of an externalized nature - what Moore refers to as "frontiers" beyond human presence - which can be acted upon by human rationality without concern for its reproductive conditions enables the extraction of the ecological surplus of cheap food, energy, resources, and labour which constitute the fundamental condition of possibility for capitalist accumulation and development to proceed in the zone of commodification/exploitation (2015, 17). Recalling that the frontier emerges, by and large, through the colonial dimensions of global primitive accumulation, externalized nature thus includes, alongside extra-human natures such as virgin soils, the categorization of particular forms of human labour as “naturalized,” and thus not expressive of the value producing capacity of rational human management and labour. The labour of “human nature” corresponds with Araghi’s deproletarianized or rightless labour, and is qualitatively produced through gendered and racialized distinctions which assign particular bodies a naturalized capacity for labour (2015, 63-73). Such labour, in so much as it is an expression of nature rather than rational human activity, does not produce value but rather constitutes a "free gift" which thus does not carry reproductive costs and can be appropriated for the services of the "higher" value producing rational human. Moore's attention to the differentiation of labour through the society-nature boundary recalls the long standing emphasis feminists (Federici, 2004; Mies, 1986) have placed on the centrality of unpaid women's work -
constructed as such through the naturalization of women's bodies with domestic labour - to the emergence and reproduction of capitalist modernity, and points to a further elaboration of the claim advanced by the Black Marxist tradition (James, 1980; Robinson, 2000) regarding the naturalization of enslaved racialized bodies with forms of agrarian and extractive (i.e. mining) labour.

Combined, the unpaid work of nature - both human and non-human - provisions the cheap inputs mobilizing the capital-labour relation in the zone of commodification/exploitation to initiate and sustain the cycles of investment, production, consumption and accumulation necessary for the progressive growth of capitalist development. The constitution and penetration of frontiers of “unused natures” under the Spanish hegemony of the long sixteenth century involved the application of the enslaved labour of indigenous Americans and African migrants to the "virgin" colonized lands of the Atlantic islands and the Americas, enabling thereby the surplus production of the food, minerals, and resources necessary for effecting the transition from agrarian to industrial society in the European core (Moore, 2010b, 2015; Mintz, 1985; Blackburn, 1998). The production and mobilization of ecological surplus, then, involves more than the competitive profit driven logic of the market dependent social antagonism (capital-labour) or the world-scale differentiation of "rightless" and rights bearing labour. Rather it is fundamentally dependent upon a particular epistemic frame of seeing and constructing nature as consisting of separable "free gifts" whose efficient and productive realization beyond "waste" can only be facilitated by superior human rationality. Thus, for example, soil fertility and enslaved racialized labour, in so much as they are separated from their wider socio-ecological entanglements, can be intensively drawn upon for the singular aim of provisioning rational human activity. Informed by such a Cartesian dualism, the emergent Spanish state-capital nexus
of the long-sixteenth century deployed enslaved labour to mobilize, or bring to productive life, what Moore (2015, 220) refers to as the millennia of stored nutrients hitherto contained in the colonized soils of the Americas.

The logic of abstract social nature organizing the production of the frontier of "unused nature" from which the ecological surplus necessary for accumulation can be drawn does, however, express a fundamental contradiction undermining the systemic reproduction of capital. The production of nature as a passive externalized object necessarily denies how a variety of ecological actors co-produce one another in forging, and responding to, a wider ecosystem. In occluding nature's own reproductive conditions, and subjecting it instead to the imperative of "endless accumulation" driving rational human activity in the zone of commodification/appropriation, the capitalist world-ecology simultaneously secures an ecological surplus while undermining its condition of possibility (Moore, 2015, 114-115). Specifically, the conception of nature as passive and external, and the occlusion of its reproductive conditions, precludes the recognition of nature's agency in both constituting the conditions of possibility for capital's ecological surplus and in responding to the latter's logic of endless accumulation. As a consequence, Moore argues, the very abstraction - the Cartesian dualism through which society ostensibly masters nature - which enables the ecological surplus ultimately exhausts the frontier of "unused nature" from which the surplus is drawn, thereby undermining the cheap inputs necessary for capitalist accumulation and development in the zone of commodification. Where the millennia of stored content of the frontier's fertile soils once lowered costs, on account of its abundant productive capacity, the soils’ eventual exhaustion requires the application of more capital (e.g. machinery, artificial fertilizers) to sustain production, which has the effect of raising commodity costs to a degree which renders wage and
profit levels unsustainable for the accumulation and re-investment of capital in the zone of commodification/exploitation (Moore, 2015, 111).

Ecological exhaustion in the zone of appropriation, combined with the class struggle (over the distribution of the shrinking surplus) which it engenders in the zone of commodification, undermines the hegemony of the state-capitalist bloc which had constituted the frontiers of “unused natures” and broader world-ecology necessary for capitalist accumulation and development. Moore emphasizes that exhaustion should not be understood here to signal solely the quantitative limit of finite natures such as soil fertility, forest cover, minerals, etc., but rather more fundamentally expresses the exhaustion of the qualitative bundle of human(extra-human relations expressing the particular society-nature boundary enabling the constitution of the frontier of “unused natures” (2015, 123-125). More specifically, exhaustion signifies the inability of the particular society-nature configuration – what Moore also refers to as "historical natures” – forged by the hegemonic state-capital bloc to compel extra-human and human natures to co-operate with the imperatives of capitalist accumulation. Such an exhaustion of relations can include, for example, the death of enslaved labourers from the absolute appropriation of their “natural” labour, the increasing resistance to such slavery, soil degradation in the frontier, indigenous resistance to colonial land appropriation, and flooding or drought in response to hydrological disruptions.

Engaging Giovanni Arrighi’s (1994, 2007) "longue duree" framework for the study of historical capitalism, wherein capitalist development has proceeded on a world-scale through the rise and fall of successive "systemic cycles of accumulation" organized by particular (Spanish, Dutch, British, American) state-capital hegemonic blocs, Moore locates the production of the ecological surplus, and its eventual exhaustion, as fundamental to both the constitution and
collapse of "all great waves of capital accumulation" (2010, 392). Capital, owing to its foundational “mastery over nature” Cartesian epistemic premise, cannot respond to the exhaustion of its ecological surplus with a heightened concern for the reproductive conditions of the human and extra-human natures co-producing its world-ecology. Such a concern would, after all, fatally compromise the fundamental conditions of possibility - appropriating nature's free gifts - for the accumulation of capital. Rather, exhaustion of the ecological surplus of a particular "systemic cycle of accumulation" of the capitalist world-ecology, though undermining the accumulation capacity of the existing state-capital hegemony, propels emerging capitalist states and empires to organize successive “historical natures” capable of delivering the necessary ecological surplus. This primarily involves the production and mobilization of new frontiers of “unused” natures through a combination of imperial violence and scientific knowledge production. Thus, the ecological exhaustion of what Araghi terms the first epoch of global primitive accumulation, corresponding roughly with the early Spanish and Dutch state-capital hegemonies which had mobilized an ecological surplus via serfdom in the semi-peripheries of the “global Baltic” and the slave holding plantations of the “global Atlantic,” was overcome by the violent institution of new frontiers, first in the American Midwest and Ireland, and subsequently in South Asia and Africa, by an emergent British imperial hegemony (Moore, 2000, 2010). These new frontiers were constituted as “unused” dormant natures by what we might call the British scientific-colonial power-knowledge regime, expressed most prominently in the Lockean theory of property and the Kew gardens botanical research institution.7

Conceived as "free gifts" hitherto “wasted” by an irrational passive nature, the colonized

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7 I will expand upon the role of knowledge production in the externalization of nature below. For further information on the role of the Kew gardens as a site of producing nature, please see Moore 2015.
frontiers of British North America, Australia, South Asia, and Africa, were mobilized as “virgin” fertile soils and "natural" agrarian labour sources underpinning a global agro-ecological revolution capable of delivering the ecological surplus of cheap inputs which enabled British industrialization to serve as the engine of accumulation for a reconstituted zone of commodification/exploitation. Inevitably, the logic of externalized nature and endless accumulation, in so much as it denied the reproductive conditions of the soils and labours of the frontier, would come, by means as varied as anti-colonial revolt and ecological degradation/disruption, to exhaust the ecological surplus of the British hegemonic organization of the capitalist world-economy.

*Reading the Global Land Grab through a reconstructed world-ecological agrarian question*

Contra, then, the classical Marxian approach, where an exclusive focus on national, or internal, intra-human transformation of agrarian social property relations enables a linear temporal conception of a resolved agrarian question giving way to a higher stage of industrial capitalist development, Moore’s world-ecological intervention reveals not only how the production of the surplus underpinning the European agrarian transitions of the long 16th and 19th centuries involves an expansive ontological reconfiguration of society-nature relations on a global scale, but moreover how the latter’s organizing episteme - the Cartesian dualism – propels both the exhaustion and reconstitution of the surplus across capital’s “systemic cycles of accumulation.” Conceived world-ecologically, the agrarian question thus remains ongoing, rather than fully resolved, even for leading capitalist states, as exhaustion of the ecological surplus, something not considered by classical marxism, poses the agrarian question, and its requirement for a world-scale society-nature ontology capable of delivering cheap inputs, anew for each successive accumulation cycle of the capitalist world-economy. While the world-
ecological conceptualization of an “ongoing agrarian question,” whose renewal constitutes the basis of successive accumulation cycles, recalls the temporal structure of capitalist development advanced by food regime analysis and global value relations theory, it extends, as we have now seen, beyond the latter’s limitations in so much as it articulates a more qualitative interpretation of the core-periphery, under/overconsumption, dialectic of world-scale capitalism. In particular, the renewal of the underlying conditions of capitalist accumulation involves more than simply the differentiated reconstitution of the capital-labour relation across zones of rightless and rights bearing labour, as suggested by global value relations theory in its account of the shift between the first and second epochs of global primitive accumulation. The vital contribution of Moore’s world-ecological approach consists, rather, in the emphasis placed on the (re)institution of the logic of abstract social nature organizing the frontier as the basis of the renewal of abstract social labour, and hence accumulation, in the core. More precisely, the ontological occlusion of the wasteful/irrational “non-being” of nature, encompassing both human (racialized and/or gendered) and extra-human natures in the colonized peripheral zones of appropriation, enables the (re)emergence of the visible value producing rational human “being,” encompassing both capital and labour in the core zone of commodification, uniquely capable of mobilizing the free gifts wasted by nature for the service of the “higher value” of human industrial development.

As the final chapter of this dissertation reveals, reconceptualizing the agrarian question as an ongoing world-ecological problematique has important implications for how we situate and interpret the contemporary global land grabbing phenomenon. While consistent with the Agrarian South school’s emphasis on the global land grab as an attempted reconstitution of the global agrarian basis of capitalist development, whether across North-South or South-South lines, an ongoing world-ecological agrarian question framework deepens such a
conceptualization by drawing attention to its spatial, temporal, ontological, and epistemological structures, transitions, and relations. Specifically, this framework centers as a pivotal point of departure the role that the exhaustion of the American-neoliberal accumulation cycles’ ecological surplus, organized through its particular historical nature of “long green revolution” (Patel, 2013), has played in the “multiple crises” or “Great Recession” epoch that has taken hold following the global food and financial crises of 2007-2008. Situated within this context, the global land grab constitutes a potential “ecological surplus” generating response pursued, both in competition and cooperation with one another, by particular state-capital blocs seeking to advance their own particular “national” or “regional” developmental interests in the succeeding accumulation cycle. Following the historical constitution of earlier accumulation cycles, the ecological surplus here continues to be pursued through the co-productions of global primitive accumulation and Cartesian knowledge production, instituting as they do zones of appropriation and commodification/exploitation. In this instance, powerful developmental actors, such as the World Bank, intervening states, and profit-seeking capital, have advanced an emergent post-neoliberal frontier, or historical nature, organized through the episteme of the “yield gap” – suggesting “dormant” free gifts of irrational nature awaiting mobilization by value-producing rational human production – and secured through practices of global primitive accumulation dispossessing indigenous peoples across the targeted lands of the South identified as “virgin” and “unused.” Thus, while the Eurocentric-anthropocentric paradigm mobilizes the “yield gap” concept to advance a colonial-Cartesian solution to the crisis of neoliberal ecological exhaustion, wherein the rational management and organizing capacity of transnational capital can bring development to the “virgin” lands of the South, the world-ecological approach reveals the violence, occlusion, and exclusion of “ecological surplus” generating processes which deny the
reproductive conditions of those spaces constructed as frontiers of “unused natures” in order to subsidize, via cheap inputs of food and energy, the reproduction of the accumulation capacity of the capital-labour relation in the core zones of commodification/exploitation.

*Indigenous practice and knowledge in world-ecology*

It is the task of the last chapter of this dissertation to elaborate in greater empirical detail how the global land grab constitutes an emergent “historical nature” potentiating an ecological surplus, and hence successive accumulation cycle, capable of overcoming the ecological exhaustion of the American-neoliberal accumulation cycle. Thus far, we have combined food regime analysis, global value relations theory, the Agrarian South school, and world-ecology, in articulating a theoretical and historical framework of an “ongoing world-ecological agrarian question.” There remains a further step we must take in order to articulate an approach through which we can, building upon Agrarian South theorists’ important opening regarding race and the agrarian question, theorize and historicize the global land grab in ways which center race and coloniality more prominently as foundational relations in the constitution of the society-nature boundary underlying capitalist accumulation, and therefore move more comprehensively beyond the Eurocentric-anthropocentric paradigm. Araghi’s global value relations and Moore’s world-ecology approach have, without question, deepened our understanding of the role that race plays in the qualitative relations structuring the differentiated zones of the world-system. In particular, the conceptualization of racialization rendering “rightless” labour as a central category of irrational nature, alongside the fertile soils of the frontier, reveals the distinctive qualitative orientation – the Cartesian “mastery over nature” – mobilizing the production and appropriation of “ecological surplus” across the core/periphery or commodification/appropriation zones. However, racialization is not considered here beyond the “unfree” labour put to work by the
appropriating “mastery over nature” logic in the frontier, which precludes any substantive engagement with the qualitative significance of both the presence and attempted erasure of indigenous peoples of the colonized “virgin lands.” It is, I would argue, this analytical occlusion which allows Moore (2015, 18) to conceive of race as a secondary, or derivative, binary which functions more as an effect of what he terms the foundational Cartesian “nature-society” binary. In so much as the “Cartesian” label suggests origins endogenous to early modern European philosophical debates regarding the nature of knowledge, Moore risks here reproducing a Eurocentric “origins-diffusion” approach in which an episteme of externalizing and mastering nature is first produced in Europe, and subsequently comes to motivate and organize the colonization of the non-European world. This is no mere academic concern, as an unintended consequence here can consist of diminishing the role that indigenous presence/erasure play in both constituting and disrupting projects of mastery, such as the global land grab. In light of such consequences, and in line with Kay Anderson’s important call to refuse the “rush to cast race as above all a legitimatory discourse” and instead consider how racialization itself shapes the human/nature distinction (2007, 24), we now turn to articulating a more “decolonial” world-ecological approach to the agrarian question.

In seeking to articulate here the qualitative significance of the presence, and attempted erasure/displacement, of indigenous peoples in the constitution of the frontiers of unused nature, we take as our epistemological and methodological point of departure the emphasis placed by Schneider and McMichael (2011), in their critical intervention into the “metabolic rift” literature, on centering agrarian labour practices in order to, on the one hand, deepen our understanding of capital’s reshaping of society-nature relations, and, on the other, think beyond capital in advancing sustainable forms of socio-ecological reproduction. Their intervention is motivated
by a concern that the conceptualization of the metabolic rift, as the defining relation of capital’s socio-ecological regime, has hitherto remained too abstract, thereby limiting our ability to identify vital socio-ecological forces both beyond, and constitutive of, the emergence and reproduction of the capitalist world-ecology. In order to move the analysis of capital’s socio-ecological regime onto a more concrete plane, Schneider and McMichael suggest two key sites of agrarian labour practice which should be incorporated into the concept of the metabolic rift: i) where practice leads to the degradation of the soil and the worker and ii) where practice leads to sustainable socio-ecological reproduction. Moore, they argue, has contributed significantly to this project in so much as he has engaged in rich empirical articulation of how capital’s specific world-ecological practices have degraded both human and extra-human natures. Particular credit is given here to Moore’s detailed historical illustration linking the erosion and exhaustion of soil and enslaved labour “on the Atlantic island of Madeira in the late fifteenth century to intensive agricultural practices employed to produce sugar for the world market,” and how he further illustrates how subsequent relocations of sugar production to Brazil and the Caribbean have been mobilized, and exhausted, by agrarian labour practices associated with specific accumulation regimes of capital (Schneider and McMichael, 2011, 475). However, Schneider and McMichael note the absence in Moore's work of agrarian labour practices which sustain, rather than degrade, the human and extra-human natures co-producing particular socio-ecological orders. In other words, while Moore does well, on the one hand, to identify how capital, by instituting particular exploitative and alienating labour practices, externalizes, mobilizes, and exhausts human and extra-human natures, he fails, on the other, to identify, and analytically incorporate, the significance of socio-ecological labour practices which actively produced, and sustained, the fertility of the soils which would come to be constituted, and acted upon, by capital as "naturally
fertile" virgin lands whose hitherto state of irrational "waste," could become capable, when mobilized by superior human rationality, of lowering production costs and, thus, transferring a greater proportion of energy from low value nature to higher value human industry.

Schneider and McMichael suggest that such sustainable practices, both in their presence and displacement, enable the conditions of possibility (soil fertility and the externalization of nature) for capital’s appropriation of unused natures, and, thus, further argue that a “fuller analysis would explore how the soil and conditions of soil fertility present at the time of the transition to capitalism (for Moore)…came to be, taking into account the role of soil management” (470). The absence of such an accounting in Moore’s world-ecology framework risks, paradoxically, the suggestion that the fertility of the soils is reproduced exclusively by extra-human natures, rather than co-produced socio-ecologically. Pointing the way, instead, towards a “fuller analysis,” Schneider and McMichael engage the works of Colin Duncan (1996) and Harriet Friedmann (2000), who have investigated the productive and sustainable labour practices of the early modern English “high farming” model “present at the time of the transition to capitalism.” These analyses reveal how the fertile soils enabling the transition were themselves produced, and sustained, through agrarian labour practices, and the ecologically embodied knowledges informing them, which recycled nutrients back into the land from which they were extracted. However, such practice and knowledge, in so much as it affirms the intimate co-production of human society with extra-human natures, precludes the possibility for appropriating an externalized nature, and thus, the material and epistemic displacement of agrarian producers embodying such practice and knowledge via processes of primitive accumulation constitutes a key condition of possibility for the Cartesian epistemic premise – the metabolic rift – underlying capital’s originary agrarian, or ecological, surplus.
While Schneider and McMichael thus provide an important opening to consider the significance of both the presence and displacement of sustainable local agrarian labour practices and embodied knowledges they do not, unfortunately, develop their approach beyond an endogenous focus on the transition to capitalism within Europe, and specifically England. The question of analytically incorporating the practice and embodied knowledge informing how the “conditions of soil fertility present at the time of the transition to capitalism…came to be,” in so much as it is not engaged through a world-ecological framework, does not come here to bear upon the organization of colonized lands as frontier zones of appropriation. Thus, Schneider and McMichael, while centering the practice and embodied knowledge of English high farmers in the production of fertile soils, do not engage in such an analytical approach when referencing the settler agriculture of the “Great Plains in America” which, they argue, undermined, on account of its production of cheaper grains, the sustainable high farming model of England. In particular, they argue that in so much as settlers took “advantage of nutrients stored and cycled in grassland soils over thousands of years…[s]oil fertility, in the early years of American monocrop agriculture, was not a problem” (474). This makes clear how capitalist agriculture acted upon the fertile soils of the Americas but occludes, however, what role indigenous socio-ecological labour practices and embodied knowledges played in constituting the “nutrients stored and cycled in grassland soils.” In so doing, Schneider and McMichael reproduce Moore’s repeated emphasis on the Americas providing millennia of stored nutrients for capital to appropriate as ecological surplus. This risks, in so much as it suggests that soil fertility in the Americas was “naturally” given by nutrients stored over millennia, reproducing the very “virgin lands” episteme mobilizing capital’s appropriation of these soils as unused frontiers of nature. As a consequence, we are not able to recognize the co-constitution between indigenous practice,
knowledge, and the millennia of stored nutrients, and how their subsequent disarticulation from one another is fundamental to the emergence and reproduction of capital’s Cartesian episteme. It is here, in attempting to overcome this occlusion of the qualitative significance of both the presence, and erasure/disarticulation, of indigenous practice and knowledge in the forging of capital’s foundational society-nature distinction, that the racialized ontology of the world-ecological agrarian question is revealed. We now, then, turn to this task of constructing what I will call the “(de)colonial world-ecological agrarian question.”

**Cartesian or Cortesian? Race and the Externalization of Nature**

The decolonial world-ecological agrarian question approach, in so much as it constitutes an effort to overcome a lingering (capital-o-centric and Eurocentric) structuralist determinism in world-ecological theory by analytically incorporating indigenous socio-ecological practice and knowledge, echoes Eric Wolf’s much earlier vital corrective to world-systems theory’s exclusive structural focus on investigating “how the core subjugated the periphery” (1982, 23). Wolf was concerned, in particular, with how such a structuralist “choice of focus” leads world-systems theorists’ to “omit consideration of the range and variety of such [peripheralized] populations, of their modes of existence before European expansion and the advent of capitalism, and of the manner in which these modes were penetrated, subordinated, destroyed, or absorbed, first by the growing market and subsequently by industrial capitalism.” Taking up such a consideration of the “modes of existence” of the indigenous peoples of the peripheries constituted the key point of departure for Wolf’s seminal text *Europe and the People without History* (1982), as it was only in so doing that we could come to “understand how Mundurucu or Meo [signifying specific indigenous life worlds] were drawn into the larger [modern capitalist world-] system to suffer its impact and to become its agents” (1982, 23). This corresponds with our concern to afford more
central consideration to both the presence (the moment of agency) and erasure/disarticulation (the moment of suffering) of indigenous socio-ecological practice and knowledge (or “mode of existence”) in the constitution of the capitalist world-ecology. Following Wolf, our construction of a decolonial world-ecological agrarian question thus furthers the epistemological and ontological shift through which knowledge and being are unmoored from their exclusive location within the European self, and are instead reflective of the play of power, appropriation, and resistance mobilized within, through, and against the colonial encounter by differentially present knowledge bearing subjects expressing an ongoing contestation between colonial-capitalist and “other” indigenous modes of socio-ecological existence.

In articulating the theoretical-historical approach here as the “decolonial world-ecological agrarian question,” I am signalling that this shift towards a non-Eurocentric and non-anthropocentric epistemology and ontology necessarily draws global value relations and world-ecology into conversation with the field of decolonial scholarship which has advanced, in recent years, the paradigmatic concept of coloniality. Originally conceived by Peruvian scholar Anibal Quijano, and further developed by a community of decolonial scholars with roots in Latin America and the Caribbean (Wynter 2003; Maldanado-Torres 2008; Mignolo 2011; Dussel 1998, 2014), the concept of coloniality refers to how the constituting epistemological and ontological relations of modernity emerge through, rather than precede, the colonial encounter. In other words, there is no pre- or postcolonial capitalist modernity, as the foundational relations expressed by the concept of coloniality constitute, even after the formal end of colonial rule, the “dark underside” of modernity. Race is posited as the principal structuring framework for these foundational epistemological and ontological relations of (what we will now refer to as) colonial-
capitalist modernity and, as such, remains an ever present force informing the “development” of political, economic, cultural, and epistemic processes across the world-system.

*Coloniality and the Cortesian premise*

In terms of the task that we have currently set out for ourselves, that of addressing the structuralist, Eurocentric limitations of world-ecology, decolonial theorists have been particularly concerned with centering the emergence and operationality of the Cartesian dualism of rationality/irrationality within the conceptual field of coloniality. As argued variously by Wynter (2003), Quijano (2000, 2007), Dussel (1995, 2014), and Maldanado-Torres (2008), the roots of the Cartesian separation of the active, rational mind/subject from the passive, irrational body/object, rather than reflecting endogenous intra-European philosophical innovation, can be traced to the supremacist colonial impulse initiated in response to the “unsettling” effects that were inflicted upon European Christian subjectivity through the "originary" colonial encounter in the Americas which initiated the long sixteenth century and the transition to the capitalist world-ecology.

This question of the Americas "unsettling" the Euro-Christian worldview has been most actively engaged by Sylvia Wynter, who has argued that the "theocentric," or "by-God," ontological frame carried with the Spanish colonizers across the Atlantic proved incapable of adequately rendering the Americas intelligible, and hence incorporable, within the broader Christian world of the Spaniards. Specifically, Wynter (2003) argues that “the theological grounds of the legitimacy both of Spain’s sovereignty over the New World and of its settlers’ rights to the indigenous people’s lands…had come to founder upon a stubborn fact…the indigenous peoples of the New World could not be classified as Enemies-of-Christ, since
Christ’s apostles had never reached the new world, never preached the Word of the Gospel to them” (293). Thus, indigenous Americans could not be cast, since they had never rejected the word of Christ, as infidels, a “central obstacle” which negated the theological legitimation that the “lands of non-Christian princes were terra nullius and as such justly expropriable by Christian princes.” It is here, in response to the failure of the theocentric frame of believer/unbeliever to offer legitimacy to Spanish sovereignty over the Americas that, Wynter argues, Spanish scholars forward an emergent legitimating framework of “race” wherein Christian sovereignty over pagans “could be said to rest on the nature of the people being conquered, instead of the supposed juridical rights of the conquerors” (283). Expressive of a shift from a theocentric, “by-God,” hierarchy to a “by-nature difference,” this emergent framework of race, or what Wynter refers to as “coloniality of being,” posited that beings – human or otherwise – could be distinguished and ranked according to their degree of rational perfection/imperfection. Through such a framework, the “indigenous peoples of the New World, together with the mass-enslaved peoples of Africa, were now to be reclassified as ‘irrational’ because ‘savage’ Indians, and as ‘subrational’ Negroes” (296), thereby legitimating the rational Spaniards’ “ongoing expropriation of New World lands and the subsequent reduction of the indigenous peoples to being a landless, rightless, neo-serf work force” (290). This “ratio-centric” ontological distinction between those “determined by nature to be the possessors of reason, and those predestined by it to remain enslaved to a lack of such reason” (304) constitutes, for Wynter, the “foundational basis of modernity,” enabling as it does both the “large-scale, one-sided accumulation of lands, wealth, power and unpaid labour by the West” (295) which set in motion capitalist development, and the separation of society from nature as a “new order of human cognition” (305). The society/nature distinction underpinning the capitalist world-
ecology thus emerges out of, rather than prior to, the unique challenges posed to European settler-colonial subjectivity in distinguishing itself from, and hence legitimating, its rule over the indigenous people of the Americas.

This point has been further emphasized and elaborated by Enrique Dussel (1998, 2014), who, in a line of inquiry he terms “anti-Cartesian meditations,” has argued that an emergent “I conquer therefore I am,” or “ego conquiro,” subjectivity articulated by the Spanish conquerors of the Americas forms the protohistory of the Cartesian “I think therefore I am,” or “ego cogito” (1995, 38-43) subjectivity constituting what Moore has identified as the capitalist world-ecology’s founding society-nature distinction. Thus, rather than privileging an intra-European Cartesian innovation, Dussel argues that modern human subjectivity finds its origins in the conquering perspective with which Spanish conquistadors, beginning with Columbus, viewed the subjugated indigenous peoples of the Americas, and which ultimately fully “surfaces in the person of Hernan Cortes presiding over the conquest of Mexico, the first place where this ego effects its prototypical development by setting itself up as lord-of-the-world and will-to-power” (1995, 26). The significance of Cortes, for Dussel, lies in how his personal transformation from poor Spanish noble to invincible lord of Mexico powerfully expresses the larger shift that the Euro-Christian Iberian world was experiencing from periphery of the Islamic Mediterranean world to center of an emergent Euro-American Atlantic world. The materiality of conquest – the subjugation of the indigenous Other – is what enables the Spanish conqueror to elevate a superior rational human subject-ego over and against an inferior irrational object-body. In so doing, the conquistador covers over the distinct ways of knowing and being of the indigenous Other and instead reduces the latter to a “docile, oppressed instrument” to be put to its proper use by the rational ego of the conquistador (1995, 44). In so much, then, that this “ratiocentric”
distinction between rational human self and irrational barbarian other would come to constitute the “obligatory context of all reflection on subjectivity, reason, the cogito” (1996, 133) I suggest here that it is more apt to speak in terms of a “Cortesian,” rather than “Cartesian,” dualism framing the capitalist world-ecology’s frontier zones of appropriation. This move from “Cartesian” to “Cortesian” centers the racialized “by-nature” distinction between the rational settler-conqueror and the irrational subjugated-indigenous other as a fundamental condition of possibility for the articulation of the society-nature distinction.

Anibal Quijano engages, and further elaborates upon, Dussel’s Cortesian thesis, arguing that the rational “individual differentiated ego” upheld as the “mark of modernity” was “not constituted from the individual (nor from the collective) subjectivity of a preexisting world” but rather “began with American colonization” and thus “has a place not only in Europe but also in the entire world that American settlement configured” (2000, 546). Emphasizing a co-constitutive “confluence between coloniality and the elaboration of rationality/modernity” (2007, 172) Quijano specifies in particular how the ratiocentric distinction legitimating the Spanish conquest of the Americas enables the emergence of the more generalized subject/object, or society/nature, distinction integral to modern epistemology. The settler/conqueror underpins the conception of the self-referential rational subject, uniquely constituting “itself in itself and for itself; in its discourse and in its capacity of reflection” (2007, 172) while the conquered indigenous other underpins the conception of the object, which is held to be, by its very nature, passive material external to the subject and, hence, whose purpose consists of being studied and acted upon by the active, thinking subject. Elucidating further how Wynter’s “by-nature” ratiocentric distinction grounds an emergent society/nature dualism, Quijano clarifies how the subject comes to stand as the “bearer of ‘reason’, while the ‘object’ is not only external to it, but
different nature. In fact it is nature” (2007, 173). This necessarily calls forth, for Quijano, an emergent Eurocentric-anthropocentric conception of the “history of human civilization as a trajectory that departed from a state of nature and culminated in Europe” (2000, 546) thus assigning the uniquely rational European human subject the natural-historical responsibility of acting upon those beings remaining trapped in a state of irrational and passive nature. Such a distinction, Quijano further argues, must necessarily simultaneously appropriate and deny the place of indigenous peoples of the Americas in the “history of the cultural production of humanity” (2000, 552) as recognition of the latter would undermine attempts to configure the indigenous as “objects of study…bodies closer to nature” (2000, 555).

Thus, a central dimension of the Cortesian framework is what Nelson Maldanado-Torres (2007), in his own important elaboration of Dussel’s thesis, has identified as a “racist/imperial Manichean misanthropic skepticism” which signifies how just as the “ego conquiro predates and precedes the ego cogito, a certain skepticism regarding the humanity of the enslaved and colonized sub-others stands at the background of the Cartesian certainties and his methodic doubt” (245). Maldonado-Torres offers a powerful articulation of the significance of this misanthropic skepticism as enabling the conditions of possibility for the Cartesian dualism:

The Cartesian idea about the division between res cogitans and res extensa (consciousness and matter) which translates itself into a divide between the mind and the body or between the human and nature is preceded and even, one has the temptation to say, to some extent built upon an anthropological colonial difference between the ego conquistador and the ego conquistado (2007, 245)

The Cortesian framework, as advanced by decolonial scholars thus far, emphasizes, then, that the misanthropic skepticism directed towards the humanity of the indigenous others of the Americas, racializing them as it did within the emergent ratiocentric order as “bodies closer to nature” who “by-nature” were to be acted upon by the superior organizing capacity of the rational European
human subject, constitutes an integral moment in the unfolding of the particular society/nature distinction of the capitalist world-ecology. As Maldonado-Torres argues, the ratiocentric distinction enables the “redefinition of the purpose of land as being one for us, whereby for us meant for us who belong to the realm of Man vis-à-vis those outside the human oecumene” (2007, 246-247). The denial of indigenous people as thinking beings, as contributing to the “cultural production of humanity,” must thus be considered as integral to the constitution of a frontier zone of externalized nature that can be acted upon without regard for its reproductive conditions. Racialization of the other is not, in other words, to be situated as one amongst many other irrational “natures” – such as soil fertility, water abundance, etc. – externalized as an effect of an a priori society/nature binary. Rather, a key implication of the shift from the “Cartesian” to the “Cortesian” frame for the world-ecological analysis of the ongoing agrarian question consists in centering the imperative of denying the humanity of indigenous peoples, of collapsing them into the sphere of nature, to the production and appropriation of frontier zones of unused natures capable of delivering the “surplus” necessary for effecting the transition from agrarian society to capitalist modernity.

Our move here in pushing world-ecological analysis of the agrarian question in a decolonial direction is definitively marked, then, by the shift from the “Cartesian” to the “Cortesian” premise of the capitalist world-ecology. However, the Cortesian frame, as articulated thus far by decolonial scholars, while pointing us towards the integral racial/colonial basis of the society/nature distinction, has not adequately, I argue, engaged the analytical significance of the presence and disarticulation/erasure of indigenous socio-ecological practice and embodied knowledge in the constitution, and penetration, of the frontier of externalized nature. In failing to do so, it risks reproducing the indigenous other as a figure whose
dehumanization, whose denied presence, is a consequence only of the way in which it is seen and
acted upon by the conquering ego. Whether the conquering ego confronts the limitations of an
earlier theocentric framework, or seeks to make sense of its move from periphery to center, the
moment of conquest, and hence subjugation of indigenous peoples, is already assumed, thereby
rendering indigenous practice and knowledge irrelevant to the articulation of the emergent
legitimating framework. Recalling here Schneider and McMichael’s challenge of analytically
incorporating within the world-ecological framework the agrarian labour practices that
constituted the “soils…present at the time of transition,” it is necessary that we consider how the
Cortesian premise of the colonial-capitalist world-ecology constitutes a response – both
appropriative and disarticulating – to indigenous socio-ecological practices and embodied
knowledges not reducible to an assumed premise of conquest. This will enable us to further
uncover critical dimensions of the co-constitution of race, coloniality, and the society/nature
distinction in the emergence and reproduction of the frontiers grounding the systemic cycles of
accumulation of the capitalist world-ecology.

Re-centering indigenous presence in the frontier

In place of an assumed premise of conquest, what I will suggest here is that the
“misanthropic skepticism” of the Cortesian thesis be rethought as expressive of a profound fear
and anxiety generated within European settler subjectivity by its dependence, for survival in the
“new world,” upon the deep place-based socio-ecological practice and knowledge of a prior
human presence. Such a focus on settler-colonial fear and anxiety has been, to some extent,
advanced by Anne McClintock’s psychoanalytical account of what she calls the “augral scene of
discovery” of the colonial frontier of the Americas. McClintock (1995) argues that this
originary moment of encounter is marked, in particular, by the settler’s “fear of engulfment” (27)
by the prior indigenous human presence which, in affirming that the “lands are already peopled,” proves the lateness of discovery and the impossibility of settler-colonial claims over such lands (29). Settler-colonial acts of discovery are evidently compromised by their dependence, in particular, upon indigenous geographical knowledge and practice, which ‘guides’ the settler across the “newly discovered” landscape. The anxiety generated by such dependence – the “fear of engulfment” – is overcome by the settler-colonial “myth of the virgin land” encompassing the “new world,” for, McClintock argues, “if the land is virgin, colonized peoples cannot claim aboriginal territorial rights” (30). We can thus consider how the “fear of engulfment” marking the “augral scene of discovery” initiating the long sixteenth century of Spanish America necessitated the construction of an externalized nature – virgin lands – which denied the humanity of indigenous peoples and, in so doing, enabled settler-colonial subjectivity to “publicly disavow the creative agency of others…and arrogate to themselves the power of origins” (29).

McClintock’s valuable articulation of the settler’s “fear of engulfment,” enabling as it does an understanding of the Cortesian “misanthropic skepticism” as constitutive of the public disavowal of the “creative agency of others,” gestures towards the indispensability of indigenous practice and knowledge – both in its presence and erasure/disarticulation – for the constitution of the frontier zone of appropriation. We can further clarify and deepen the significance of the formation of settler-colonial subjectivity in response to the dependence upon, and hence fear/anxiety of, indigenous “creative agency” by engaging with the rich, empirically grounded, perspective forwarded by the field of “historical ecology.” This field of inquiry was constituted as a challenge to the key premise of the epistemological divide between science and the social sciences/humanities, which held that a “pristine nature,” or “wilderness,” beyond the
contamination of human agency could be objectively studied separately from the ‘subjective’
parameters of human society. Identifying the European encounter with the Americas as the
fundamental condition of possibility for the conceptualization of such “pristine nature,” scholars
of historical ecology (Sauer, 1966; Cronon, 1983; Denevan, 1992; Sluyter, 1999, 2001) have
focussed, in particular, on challenging the virgin/empty lands narratives that promoted a view of
the lush forests, fertile soils, and abundant waters of the “new world” as constitutive entirely of a
sphere of nature external to human activity. As opposed, then, to a conception of pre-colonial
American lands as sparsely populated, and materially undisturbed, by a singular category of
“primitive humans,” historical ecology has documented the presence of a diversity of indigenous
peoples abundantly populating, and materially co-producing, vibrant socio-ecological worlds.
Insisting on an ecological “philosophy that recognizes the significant role of people in the
evolution of landscape” (Denevan, 2011, 582), historical ecology scholars have revealed how
even those natures externalized as most pristine, such as the Amazon ecosystem or the fertile
grasslands of North America, were fundamentally co-produced by the deep relation between
indigenous practices, knowledges, and extra-human natures.

In regards to the “augral scene of discovery,” or the originary frontier zone of
appropriation – what Moore calls the “global Atlantic” – of the capitalist world-ecology, Carl
Sauer, considered to be the founding scholar of the historical ecology school, has argued, in his
seminal text “Early Spanish Main” (1966), that the deep place-based socio-ecological practice
and embodied knowledge of the indigenous peoples of the Caribbean were indispensable to the
survival of the first waves of Spanish settlers encountering the “new world” at the dawn of the
long sixteenth century. The combination of starvation and homesickness that confronted the
Spaniards at the end of their crossing generated, argues Sauer, an intense mood of anxiety and
insecurity that was initially offset by the generous hospitality and provisioning capacity of the indigenous Taino people of the Caribbean. Such capacity was not the reflection of the free gifts rendered by a bountiful “pristine nature,” but rather expressed the Tainos’s “creative agency” in co-producing, in relation with the non-human ecology, a complex “mixed planting system [that] gave the greatest range of terrain usable without regard to steepness or regularity of slope” (68). Combined with a careful selection of “plants grown [that] were neither demanding nor exhaustive of soil fertility,” this system was “productive as were few parts of the world” and, hence, capable of immediately provisioning the starving Spanish settlers whose survival would otherwise not have been ensured (76). However, this generated, in so much as their survival depended upon the provisioning capacity of the other, a profound feeling of vulnerability, and, hence, inferiority/insecurity, on the part of the settlers towards the indigenous peoples’ socio-ecological practices and embodied knowledges (Sauer, 1966, 84; Mendoza, 2006, 939). As Judith Butler (2004) has argued, albeit in more existential terms, such moments, in which the dependence of the self upon others is powerfully revealed, potentially trigger the self to initiate, in the hope of overcoming the associated vulnerability, projects of mastery over the latter. Following Breny Mendoza, we can consider, as such, how the Spanish settler-colonial self sought to assuage its vulnerability and associated inferiority/insecurity complex – the “fear of engulfment” – with the initiation of a project of mastery over peoples and lands externalized as nature (2006, 939).

_Appropriation and erasure of Indigenous socio-ecological practice and knowledge_

The particular supremacist response to the vulnerability revealed by the settler’s dependence upon the “creative agency” of indigenous peoples involved the advancement of what Andrew Sluyter (1999, 2001) has identified as “material-conceptual” landscape transformations
that aimed to effectively disarticulate the co-constitutive relations between indigenous practice, knowledge, and extra-human natures. The “conceptual” dimension in Sluyter’s formulation emphasizes “the colonial recategorization of the Americas as a pristine wilderness” (1999, 379) which echoes, and in fact offers a substantive elaboration upon, McClintock’s “myth of the virgin land.” Like McClintock, Sluyter’s notion of the “pristine myth” references efforts to reconceptualize the Americas as a “land without people,” but goes further in empirically detailing how such a construction of “unused nature” necessarily obscured the role of indigenous practice and knowledge in co-producing the soils, forests, and waters of the emergent colonial frontier. This specifically involved the inability, or refusal, of Spanish colonizers to recognize the complex, place-based, socio-ecological presence of “native orchards and agricultural fields,” which were instead reconceptualized as “baldios or yermas – as wastelands or wild lands, as wilderness in the sense of empty, idle, unimproved land” (1999, 390). While such a view may have been suggested by the land being “fallow at the time of inspection and thus overgrown with grass and thickets,” it should more properly be seen as a fundamental misrecognition, driven by the desire to overcome the “fear of engulfment,” of lands co-produced, even in their fallow state, as “part of the native subsistence system.” In denying the role of indigenous practice and knowledge in co-constituting the productive capacity of the landscapes upon which the settlers’ survival depended, the emergent colonial “conceptual landscape” maintained instead that “native cultures therefore lacked the rationality to effectively use their lands” (1999, 378). Such a lack was expressive, moreover, of an evident failure, on the part of indigenous people, to extricate themselves from the sphere of passive, irrational nature, and realize the rational capacity for productive resource development (or “improvement”) distinctive to fully formed human subjectivity.
The “conceptual” dimension of colonial landscape transformation involves, then, a simultaneous disarticulation and re-articulation of indigenous peoples and landscapes. Disarticulation expresses the obfuscation of the co-constitutive role of indigenous labour practices and embodied knowledges in shaping the productive capacity of the soils, forests, and waters of the landscape, whereas re-articulation signifies how such obfuscation necessarily calls forth the collapse of indigenous people into the sphere of irrational nature. Such re-articulation renders both indigenous people and the “idle lands” into which they are now subsumed as primitive forms of a “given nature” that has been “wasted” in so much as it has not been acted upon by the superior organizing and productive capacity of human rationality. It thus falls upon the rational Euro-Christian settler to both “improve” the wasted landscape and civilize the primitive indigenous other. As was the case with the “coloniality” approach, Cortes, and in particular his “pastoral vision” for the development of what he perceived to be the bounteous, yet idle, lands of central Mexico, is elevated by Sluyter as a significant reference point for the simultaneous disarticulation/rearticulation of the relationship between indigenous peoples and the non-human natures of the Americas (1999, 389).

Sluyter’s “material-conceptual” framework suggests that such conceptual transformations were both generative of, and further reinforced by, material landscape transformations involving the violent physical removal and depopulation of indigenous people from the landscapes they had co-produced in order to make way for Spanish settlement. As indigenous people increasingly resisted settler-colonial encroachment, often by refusing to provision the latter’s food needs, the Spanish settlers responded by violently disrupting what Sauer had identified as the existing socio-ecological balance (Sluyter, 1999, 392). Key to such a process was the coercive measures imposed on indigenous people to force them to work for
settlers as both a source of extractive mining labour and as provisioners of food goods. The resulting neglect of indigenous orchards and fields, allowing as it did the overgrowth of uncultivated plants and grasses, further reinforced the conceptual transformation being forwarded – that the lands of indigenous peoples were “wastelands or wildlands.”

Combined, the colonial “material-conceptual” landscape transformation effected in the Americas both appropriated and erased the “creative agency” of indigenous peoples, in so much as their place-based labour practices and embodied knowledges were both fundamental to the co-constitution of the bounteous “idle” lands and interruptive to the settler-colonial claims to such lands. The disarticulation of indigenous socio-ecological co-constitution enables the settler-colonial subjectivity to displace its own “fear of engulfment” through the re-articulation of the Americas as a passive frontier of bountiful nature awaiting its rightful mastery by the rationality embodied in the person of the Euro-Christian settler. This formulation of the “pristine myth” of the Americas would, Sluyter further argues, infuse and become “axiomatic to every expression of the Western worldview, from science to literature” (1999, 380). The colonial “material-conceptual” landscape transformations of the Americas constitute, in particular, the “originary” ground for the emergence, in inextricable concert with one another, of the “two conceptual dichotomies axiomatic to modernism”: European/non-European and society/nature. Based upon such a reconceptualization of the “augral scene of discovery” of the Americas as generative, rather than derivative, of the epistemic and material transformations informing capitalist development, Sluyter suggests that historical ecology’s uncovering, and problematization, of the “pristine myth” unsettles the Eurocentric-anthropocentric premise of both modernization theory and the Marxian agrarian question framework:
If some could argue that through Westernization ‘traditional societies’ would ‘take off’ and eventually ‘catch up’ to the West, then others could argue for a similar progression through ‘primitive accumulation’ and ‘advanced capitalism,’ albeit with a somewhat different telos in mind. In both cases the transformation of natives and landscapes is immanent to Europeans, who are assumed to arrive in North America, for example, with ‘capitalism in their bones’ (2001, 417)

In place of such a Eurocentric-anthropocentric thesis of the transformative application of a pre-formed Cartesian-capitalist modern subjectivity upon the passive natives and landscapes of the Americas, the historical ecology thesis centers the encounter of European settler subjectivity with the “creative agency” of indigenous socio-ecology as the fundamental condition of possibility for the emergence, in concert with one another, of modernity’s axiomatic society/nature and European/non-European dichotomies.

*The racialized Cortesian premise of the colonial-capitalist world-ecology*

Informed by the “historical ecological” interventions advanced by Sauer and Sluyter, along with McClintock’s psychoanalytical examination of settler-colonial subjectivity, we can now clarify the role of the presence and erasure of indigenous practice and knowledge in the formulation of the Cortesian premise of the decolonial world-ecological agrarian question. We are now able, in particular, to advance a non-Eurocentric account of the construction of the Americas as the capitalist world-ecology’s original frontier of externalized nature. Moving beyond Moore’s articulation of the frontier’s emergence through a pre-formed European Cartesian subjectivity acting upon the millennia of stored nutrients of the Americas – suggesting as it does non-human natures hitherto undisturbed by human agency – our first step consists of revealing how the nutrient base of the frontier, rather than being stored passively, was actively co-produced by the “creative agency” of indigenous people. The settler subjectivity’s drive to master the vulnerability – or “fear of engulfment” – triggered by its dependence upon such
agency propelled a “material-conceptual” landscape transformation which functioned to simultaneously disarticulate indigenous socio-ecological co-production and re-articulate the indigenous peoples and lands of the Americas as primitive beings within a sphere of externalized nature. Our Cortesian thesis thus insists that the erasure, via racialized dehumanization, of the integral role of indigenous practice and knowledge in the formation of ostensibly non-human natures such as soils, forests, and waters constitutes a fundamental condition of possibility for the emergence of the qualitative society-nature distinction underpinning the frontier zone of appropriation of the capitalist world-ecology. Such erasure is, furthermore, vital to the construction of externalized nature as simply given as free gift, rather than reproduced through a complex co-constitution of indigenous practice, knowledge, and non-human agency. Recalling our earlier discussion of Moore’s original world-ecological formulation, it is this qualitative denial of the reproductive conditions of the frontier of externalized nature – now revealed to include the erasure of indigenous “creative agency” – which enables the mobilization of the ecological surplus of cheap natures underpinning the transition to capitalist development.

Having clarified the foundational significance of indigenous presence and erasure in the constitution of the colonial-capitalist frontier, the central thesis of this work can be finally articulated regarding how race operates as a core ontological relation in the world-scale generation and transfer of agrarian, or ecological, surplus across the distinctive zones (core/periphery; over/underconsumption; exploitation/appropriation) of the capitalist world-ecology. Moving beyond the functional notion of race as “legitimatory discourse” sanctioning a rightless category of labour, as one amongst many “irrational natures” derived from the foundational society/nature binary, my argument is that the racialized figure of the “primitive” or “savage” human, whose humanity is rendered suspect – the act of “misanthropic skepticism” –
on account of its inability to extricate itself from the sphere of nature and, hence, productively act upon and shape it, stands as the necessary category of "non-being" against which the rational, uniquely value-producing, human can emerge and realize itself. The “appropriation” of the surplus of cheap natures from the colonial frontier operates on an assumed premise of “primitive humans” whose subjection to dispossession and appropriation need not require any form of compensatory accounting as they had not contributed any value, through the application of rational knowledge unique to fully realized humanity, to the rich, yet idle, virgin lands they had, therefore, hitherto “wasted.” It is this racialized ontological framework, privileging as it does the rational value-producing human while simultaneously appropriating and denying the presence of "primitive humans," which sets the stage for the former to set in motion, by exhaustively acting upon the frontier lands without concern for their reproductive conditions or limits, the world-ecological surplus of cheap natures necessary for effecting the transition from agrarian society to industrial capitalist modernity. The appropriation and transfer of this surplus subsequently enables, through the repression of basic reproduction costs, the emergent core zone of commodification/exploitation to shift more capital and labour towards value-producing industry. The "cheap natures" transferred from the non-value producing peripheral zone of appropriation stands, furthermore, as the invisible other to the value ascribed to the "finished" goods produced by rational human activity, governed by the "market-dependent" competitive calculus of the organizing capital-labour contradiction, in the core zone of commodification/exploitation. The racialized ontological framework of the capitalist world-ecology thus consists of the visible space of value-producing being - capital and labour in the core zone of commodification/exploitation - and the invisible space of "non-value" and "non-being" wherein
the distinctive knowledge and practice of the "primitive human" is simultaneously appropriated and erased.

The Cortesian thesis, and the racialized ontological underpinnings of the capitalist world-ecology it reveals, emphasizes, furthermore, the centrality of indigenous presence and erasure to Moore’s innovative articulation of the paradoxical “surplus-exhaustion” cycles through which the enabling conditions of the surplus - the denial of the frontier's reproductive conditions - simultaneously ensures its eventual exhaustion. While the reduction of indigenous people to "non-value" producing "primitive humans" makes clear the centrality of the racialized erasure of indigenous practice and knowledge, the latter's presence nonetheless remains a haunting force constituting the materiality (the millennia of stored nutrients) of the colonial-capitalist frontier. Haunting here signifies the pending “exhaustion” of the surplus on account of the incapacity of the Cortesian ontology to recognize indigenous agency as imperative to the constituting reproductive conditions of the frontier’s bountiful “free gifts” of nature. Sauer has documented how the violent settler-colonial disruption of the indigenous peoples’ “excellent but delicate ecological balance,” while enabling rapid mobilization of the nutrient and mineral wealth of the “new world,” simultaneously undermined such wealth’s reproductive conditions and, as such, exhausted, in relatively short order, the productive capacity of the indigenous peoples and lands of the Caribbean islands (1966, 203). The Cortesian ontological frame informing this original “systemic cycle of accumulation” of the capitalist world-ecology compelled the Spanish settler-colonial regime to respond to such exhaustion, Sauer argues, by shifting “attention to neighbouring islands” whose frontier of “pristine nature” had not yet been acted upon (1966, 157). Ultimately, however, the entirety of the “early Spanish Main” – Sauer’s term for what we would identify as the capitalist world-ecology’s original frontier zone of appropriation - would
experience an “exhaustion” of its particular racialized society/nature configuration, resulting in the destruction of both the indigenous peoples and non-human natures of the frontier (1966, 294).

As our initial discussion of Moore’s world-ecological theory revealed, such exhaustion of a particular society/nature configuration, while undermining the state-capital hegemonic bloc that constituted it, is transcended by the expansion of the capitalist world-ecology’s frontiers by a succeeding state-capital hegemony capable of renewing the ecological surplus of cheap natures. In light of the exhaustion of the previous cycle’s distinctive racialized society/nature order, the successive hegemon’s frontier expansion must inevitably extend the racialized technology of “misanthropic skepticism” to newly encountered indigenous peoples. Our Cortesian reconceptualization of this moment of renewal of the “ongoing” world-ecological agrarian question thus emphasizes the centrality of the simultaneous appropriation and erasure of indigenous socio-ecological co-production to the particular society/nature distinction forged, in order to deliver the ecological surplus capable of underwriting a renewed “cycle of accumulation,” by the succeeding hegemon.

Within Araghi’s first epoch of global primitive accumulation, the Dutch ascension to hegemonic status in the wake of the exhaustion of the Spanish cycle of accumulation involved the expansionary construction of “new” racialized frontiers of externalized “pristine” nature across the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, and Southern Africa. As Michael Niblett (2011) has

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8 In associating the constitution of each cycle with the racialized premise of “misanthropic skepticism,” I am no doubt insufficiently attending to how racialization and othering have taken distinct and variegated forms in the complex evolution of the capitalist world-ecology. I intend to more fully address such concerns in subsequent elaborations of this project. For now, the point that I want to emphasize is that each cycle, in so far as it is premised upon a frontier zone of appropriation, involves the racialized denial of the co-production of indigenous knowledge, practice, and the extra-human natures of the frontier.
shown in his particular account of the renewal, via Dutch colonialism, of the Caribbean frontier, the construction of an “externalized nature” depended, fundamentally, upon the appropriation and disruption of indigenous socio-ecological co-productions. Niblett identifies a key moment in the Dutch conceptual landscape transformation of the Caribbean as a space of externalized nature in Walter Ralegh’s late 16th century declaration of Guinea as a

virginal land whose “Maydenhead” has yet to be penetrated; ‘she’ is a place of marvellous landscapes and exotic encounters, a fount of untold riches requiring only the industrious hand of the European to convert her into a hive of productivity. (238)

Niblett identifies the link between such an accounting of the Dutch Caribbean and the emergent Dutch cycle of accumulation, clarifying that “behind the discursive construction of new and wondrous lands lay the material demands of the emerging capitalist economies on the other side of the Atlantic” (239). Such discursive construction, or conceptual landscape transformation, was fundamentally premised, Niblett’s work further reveals, by both an appropriation and denial of the “closed-cycle system” of indigenous subsistence agriculture which had been essential to both bringing into being, and sustaining, the “fount of untold riches” that had activated Ralegh’s fantasies regarding the productive transformation possible under the “industrious hand of the European.” The material dimension of such conceptual landscape transformation involved the “destruction of the indigenous system of subsistence agriculture and the imposition of the plantation economy” (241), which led, moreover, to the “clearance of huge areas of forest” (240). Such appropriation and erasure of indigenous socio-ecological practice and knowledge enabled the “material-conceptual” construction, and penetration, of the Dutch Caribbean as a space of externalized nature capable of delivering the ecological surplus of cheap natures necessary for the successive accumulation cycle driving the renewal, and expansion, of Europe’s transition from agrarian to industrial society. Niblett puts such surplus appropriation and transfer
from the zone of appropriation to the zone of commodification/exploitation more clearly, arguing that the Dutch “integration of the Caribbean into the capitalist world-system was thus also its integration into a flow system, where it became the external nutrient supply for the industrializing nations of the core.” However, the Cortesian denial of the “haunting” presence of indigenous “creative agency” as a key constituting reproductive force of the frontier’s “fount of untold riches” sets in motion the eventual exhaustion of the latter’s ecological surplus, or “external nutrient supply.” In this case, Niblett argues that the “destruction of the indigenous system” had the effect of disrupting “nutrient cycles and exacerbated soil depletion, as well as dramatically increasing rates of soil exhaustion” (240).

While the capitalist world-ecology emerged through the Spanish conquest of the Americas, and was initially renewed through Dutch frontier expansion, it achieved a more thoroughgoing consolidation under the British accumulation cycle. Marking the emergence of the “long 19th century,” and corresponding with the emergence of the “settler-colonial food regime,” the hegemonic ascension of the British state-capital nexus was underwritten by, and further advanced, processes of global primitive accumulation that re-secured the visible value producing capital-labour relation of the core zone of commodification, premised as it is on the provisioning of cheap food, through expansionary colonial frontier production and appropriation across North America, South Asia, Africa, and Australia. Within North America, Cedric Robinson (2000) has articulated the supremacist response of “mastery” forwarded by early British settlers to overcome the heightened vulnerability, or “fear of engulfment,” triggered by their initial dependence for survival on the deep place based practice and knowledge of indigenous people. Robinson’s citation of Edmund Morgan’s reconstruction of the “relations of the earliest Virginian colonists with native peoples” is particularly instructive in this regard:
If you were a colonist...[t]he Indians were supposed to be overcome with admiration and to join you in extracting riches from the country. But your superior technology had proved insufficient to extract anything. The Indians, keeping to themselves, laughed at your superior methods and lived from the land more abundantly and with less labour than you did. They even furnished you with the food that you somehow did not get around to growing enough of yourselves....So you killed the Indians, tortured them, burned their villages, and burned their cornfields. It proved your superiority (77)

Such “material” landscape transformation was accompanied, Robinson proceeds, by a conceptual transformation in which indigenous people were reduced, in spite of the cornfields which the settlers felt compelled to burn, to non-cultivating hunters who could only take from, and not productively harness, the rich bounty naturally given by the virgin soils of America. The productive realization of the land’s hitherto wasted potential, and the civilized maturation of the Indian, was dependent, according to the settler supremacist response, upon the rational capacity of British settlers. Combined, such “material-conceptual” landscape transformation functioned, in so much as it rendered the “dependence of ‘new Comers’ on natives already reversed,” to cover over the settler inferiority complex with the “curtain of supremacist ideology” (77-78).

Such an ideology, Jacob Pandian (1985) has argued, in so much as it denied the constitutive role played by indigenous practice and knowledge in the shaping of the American landscape, allowed the British to resolve the “problem of the Indians’ possession of the land by refusing to accept them as humans” (66-67). This refusal implied that the lands were being wasted by the irrationality of both primitive humans and non-human natures, a point explicitly captured in Pandian’s citation of an early Virginian settler:

Although the Lord hath given the earth to children of men...the greater part of it [is] possessed and wrongfully usurped by wild beasts, and unreasonable creatures, or by brutish savages. (67)
These early settler-colonial encounters would come to ground the emergent racialized society/nature ontology governing the frontier expansions that provisioned the “global agrarian surplus” underwriting the British accumulation cycle.

This particular rearticulation of the Cortesian premise of the capitalist world-ecology was advanced, most prominently, in the liberal political philosophy articulated by the English philosopher John Locke. While Locke's foundational arguments regarding nature, property, and individual rights are often situated, in more Eurocentric accounts, in exclusive relation to the English enclosures, postcolonial environmental scholarship has emphasized the centrality of the settler-colonial encounter with prior indigenous presence in North America to the development of Locke's human/nature philosophy (Moore et al, 2003). The material-conceptual recategorization of North America as pristine, undisturbed nature, was vital "empirical" evidence for Locke regarding the transformative capacity of rational human labour and the relation to land - private property - it entailed. In particular, Locke's theory of human development was premised on his assertion that “[i]n the beginning all the World was America,” which suggested an original pristine nature, bestowed with bountiful potential, common to all of humanity in its primitive state (Moore, Kosek, and Pandian, 2003, 7). The productive realization of nature's free gifts depended, Locke argued, on the rational application of labour which is unique to fully formed human subjectivity, and which is definitively achieved with the practice of agricultural cultivation. It is only in so doing that the rational human can claim sovereign appropriation of the portion of the "primordial commons" its labour has improved through cultivation. In so much as the British material-conceptual landscape transformation of North America reduced them to non-cultivating hunters, who took from, but did not improve upon, the bounty of nature,
indigenous peoples could make no claim of sovereign appropriation of the lands they inhabited, which therefore remained in their original condition of "primordial commons."

Locke's reduction of America to an original state of non-appropriated pristine nature was premised upon the erasure of both the cornfields cultivated by indigenous peoples, and later destroyed by settlers, and the larger indigenous socio-ecological co-production of landscapes, such as the great plains and forests of North America, which, though not perhaps immediately discernible as "cultivated," had been fundamentally shaped by practices and knowledges embodying the co-constitution of indigenous and extra-human "creative agency." In terms of the latter, scholars of historical ecology have emphasized, in particular, how indigenous people participated in the reshaping of the ostensibly uncultivated plains of America by employing fire to "keep down underbrush and create the open, grassy conditions favourable for game," leading to the conclusion that "rather than domesticating animals for meat, Indians retooled whole ecosystems to grow bumper crops of elk, deer, and bison" (Mann, 2002). The "uncultivated" designation is further problematized in its application to the expansive forests of America, whose formation, as William Cronon's seminal work has revealed, was fundamentally co-produced through "selective Indian burning" and preservation of a variety of plant species which "promoted the mosaic quality of New England ecosystems, creating forests in many different states of ecological succession" (1983, 51). Thus, while indigenous practice and knowledge was fundamental to both the cultivated cornfields and "uncultivated" plains and forests ensuring settler survival and prosperity, the paradigm of "mastery over nature" through which settlers could overcome the "fear of engulfment" triggered by such dependence, would necessitate the disarticulation of such a socio-ecological order in favour of Locke's rearticulation of primitive hunters and pristine lands "evoking the fallow condition of a continent awaiting the redemptive
touch of European labour and private property” (Moore et al, 2003, 7). In this emergent racialized colonial socio-ecology, we can see the embodiment of the Cortesian subjectivity in the British settlers self-awareness of themselves, in so much as they had "alone received the divine command to subdue and replenish the earth," as redeeming figures of those natures which had been "unjustly neglected" by "wild men" embodying the new world's "unpardonable laziness" (Merchant, 2003, 143).

Reflecting Michel-Rolph Trouillot’s insight that the “conquest of America stands as Europe’s model for the constitution of the Other” (2003, 14), this racialized production of externalized nature, though originally centered in the Americas, would, as an integral component of the British accumulation cycle’s thoroughgoing consolidation of the capitalist world-ecology, serve as the enabling framework for an exponential increase of frontier expansion into India, Africa, and Australia. The cheap natures underwriting the British accumulation cycle of the long nineteenth century necessitated, in particular, the frontier expansion of “two types of tropical agriculture, namely, peasant agriculture and plantations, [which] emerged as the solutions to the problem of dramatically increasing the supply of crops for the world market” (Phillip, 2004, 87). Within colonized India, the advancement of both of these “types of tropical agriculture” was fundamentally premised upon a “misanthropic skepticism” directed towards, in the case of plantation production, the shifting cultivation practices of indigenous peoples inhabiting forested regions and, in the case of the intensification and expansion of peasant agriculture, the pastoral practices of nomadic communities of the northern plains of Punjab.

With regards to the “material-conceptual” recategorization of the forested regions of south-western India, Kavita Philip has demonstrated how the British state-capital nexus, on the one hand, appropriated indigenous knowledge and practice essential to the sustainable
reproduction of the Western Ghats forests (2004, 67), while, on the other, erased such co-
constitutive presence by reconceptualizing the particular local “kumri” shifting cultivation
practices as wasteful of the “pleasant climate and rich soil of the region” (116). Such waste was
evidence, from the British colonial gaze, of the indigenous peoples’ “nonproductive relationship
with nature” (116), which suggested, moreover, that they had failed to “separate themselves, as
self-acting autonomous subjects, from their surroundings, in order to truly act upon a separately
conceived nature” (36). Since the Europeans had achieved the uniquely human rational capacity
of thought and labour that such a society/nature separation enables, British colonial officials and
planters argued that

forest clearing must be done under the supervision of Europeans, and must be for the
purpose of planting crops other than the kumri crops, paddy and millet. It is only the
plantation crops that truly bear the potential for the liberation of the land from its
unhealthy state and of the population from its parochial agricultural practices (51).

A further statement from a colonial official in South India captures the explicit link between such
frontier expansion and the accumulation imperatives of the core zone of commodification:

[T]he northern powers will not permit that the rich and as yet comparatively undeveloped
countries of the tropics should be entirely wasted by being devoted merely to the supply
of the food and clothing wants of their own people, when they can also supply the wants
of the colder zones in so many indispensable produc

Thus, by erasing the co-constitutive force of the “creative agency” of indigenous kumri
cultivation in shaping the Western Ghats landscape, British colonial forces were able to recast
the forested regions as comprised of primitive humans and pristine “unused” natures. In so much
as this suggested that the bountiful resources of the Western Ghats were passively “given” as
“free gifts,” rather than actively co-produced by indigenous peoples and extra-human life forces,
such landscape recategorization set in place the conditions for appropriating, without “payment”
to indigenous people and extra-human natures, the “rich soil of the region” as cheap natures – in
this case coffee and tea plantations – serving as “external nutrient supply” for the metropolitan core.

While colonial plantations provisioned stimulants such as coffee, tea, or sugar, the vital imperative of securing a consistent and cheap supply of grains to support the reproduction of the capital-labour relation in the core involved the intensification and expansion of settled peasant agriculture. Within India, this particular form of frontier expansion was concentrated in the northern plains of Punjab, and involved the appropriation and erasure of the labour practices and knowledges of nomadic pastoral communities. At the time of British colonization, the socio-ecology of Punjab consisted of semi-arid regions inhabited by nomadic pastoralists and cultivated agrarian regions inhabited by peasants, which combined “formed two distinct geo-ecological zones, intimately related in complex ways” (Bhattacharya, 1996, 59). In short, the complementarity consisted of cyclical nutrient recycling involving the flow of manure and cattle from the pastoral zones to the agrarian zones, contributing to the rich soil fertility of the region, and the reverse flow of grain and feedstuffs from the agrarian to the pastoral zones. However, informed by the particular racialized Lockean society/nature premise of the British accumulation cycle, in which cultivation was taken as the affirmative sign of the distinctively human act of separation from, and mastery over, nature, the colonial regime obscured this agrarian-pastoral co-production of the Punjab landscape and instead dismissed nomadic pastoralism as an irrational activity which “contributed nothing to augment or regenerate the productive capacity of the soil” (72). This reconceptualized the pastoral regions as externalized pristine natures, whose redemption from a state of idle waste was contingent upon the rational application of human cultivation. Such conceptual landscape transformation expressing a “contrast between pastoral land – subject to uncontrolled, untamed nature – and agricultural colonies where we
‘feel ever the beneficent hand of man’” (75) had, as its material component, processes of racialized enclosure wherein “over twenty lakh acres of grazing lands were taken over by the state, pastoralists were expropriated, agricultural colonies were set up, canals were constructed, and blocks of lands were granted to the ‘sturdy peasants’ of Central Punjab” (74). The racialized dehumanization of the pastoralists, enabling as it did the appropriation and erasure of their co-production of the Punjab landscape, was thus vital to the conversion of the former pastoral regions into a key frontier for the provisioning of cheap wheat supplies to the “post-agrarian” industrial labour of the British metropolitan core.

Beyond India, similar processes of constituting, and appropriating, racialized frontiers of pristine natures and primitive humans, were advanced across Australia (Povinelli, 1995; Anderson, 2003), Kenya (Neumann, 2005), and Southern Africa (Magubane, 2003). Combined, these racialized frontiers formed the expansive zone of appropriation necessary, in so much as it delivered the cost reducing surplus of cheap food to the core zone of commodification, for the provisional resolution of the “renewed” world-ecological agrarian question posed to the hegemonic British state-capital nexus in its drive, over the long 19th century, to enlarge the accumulation capacity of the capitalist world-ecology. More specifically, such appropriation and redistribution of the ecological surplus enabled what Arrighi refers to as an enlargement of the “spatial and social foundations” of accumulation (1994, 80) in so much as cheap food allowed for a greater measure of consent for, and participation in (as consumers), the system of capital accumulation on the part of dispossessed labour in the core. However, the logic of the Cortesian racialized society/nature distinction organizing the zone of appropriation, obscuring as it did the frontier’s constituting conditions of indigenous and extra-human “creative agency,” would, as with earlier accumulation cycles, come to exhaust the ecological surplus underwriting the core’s
industrial development during the long 19th century of British hegemony. In this instance, such exhaustion of the prevailing society/nature complex, though manifesting at one level in the “late Victorian holocausts” (Davis, 2001) of millions of colonized peoples starved to death across the varying frontiers of the British capitalist world-ecology, was most prominently driven by the anti-colonial resistance waged by inhabitants of the “agrarian South” against the racialized socio-ecological regime which had both denied their humanity and disrupted their own longstanding place-based co-constitutive relations with extra-human natures (McMichael, 2007, 220).

Conclusion

Having now both articulated our theoretical framework of decolonial world-ecological agrarian question, and deployed it to clarify the racialized global agrarian basis of capitalist development across its successive accumulation cycles, I will now conclude by briefly gesturing towards its implications for the analysis of the global land grab. Put simply, the global land grab, in our estimation, signifies, in the context of the increasing ecological exhaustion of the society/nature regime of the accumulation cycle of the “long twentieth century,” the logic of racialized frontier formation and appropriation, advanced by contending state-capital blocs, in the “contested transition” over the successive accumulation cycle. The deployment, by promoters of the land grab, of the concept of the “yield gap” to signal frontiers of unused nature, calls forth, yet again, the racialized appropriation and erasure of the co-constitutive creative agency of indigenous peoples and extra-human natures comprising the frontiers marked for investment.

Prior, however, to articulating a decolonial world-ecological reading of the global land grab, it is necessary that we first account for the theoretical and historical significance of...
distinctive “South-South” dimensions. While some analysts (Margulis and Porter, 2013) have rushed to interpret the increasing role of Southern actors in global land grabbing as evidence of the collapse, and hence irrelevance, of the North-South paradigm of the capitalist world-ecology, I will emphasize instead that “South-South” processes of land grabbing constitute a simultaneous challenge to the North’s claim to “exclusive access to the planet’s resources” (Amin, 1978, 2014) and a reinstatiation of the racialized frontiers of unused nature. In the next chapter, we will thus account for the significance of the “rise of the South,” both in terms of the socio-ecological promise of its origins in the anti-colonial movements exhausting the British-led accumulation cycle, and the “compromise” of such a promise as Southern states increasingly centered the need, across the contested “long twentieth century,” to “catch up” to the core Northern zone through a strategy of rapid industrial development.
Chapter 3: The ‘Rise of the South’ in the Capitalist World-Ecology

In this chapter, we shift our focus to accounting for the “rise of the South” in the contested reconstitution of the accumulation capacity of the capitalist world-ecology over the “long-twentieth century.” In so doing, the aim is to elaborate the necessary historical and geopolitical framework through which “South-South” relations of land grabbing can be seen to simultaneously challenge the historically core Northern zone’s exclusive claim to control over the global ecological surplus while nonetheless reinstating, though now in service of capitalist development centered in the South, its underlying premise of racialized frontier formation that we elaborated in the previous chapter. Since I will focus, in the following chapter, on the case of the involvement of the Indian state-capital nexus in land grabbing in Ethiopia, I will specify, in this chapter, the “rise of the South” through the various “agrarian transition” strategies employed by India across the long twentieth century.

Towards this end, this chapter combines the concepts of “triple movement” and “dewesternization,” advanced recently by Nancy Fraser (2013) and Walter Mignolo (2011) respectively, in order to further develop our decolonial world-ecological approach to the agrarian question. Specifically, I will emphasize that the active opposition articulated to the motive forces of capitalist development, by those consigned to “primitive human” or “extra human” status, figures centrally into both the exhaustion, and attempted reconstitution, of the ecological surplus underpinning capital’s accumulation capacity. Extending beyond the limitations of the Polanyian double movement framework, I argue that this represents a “triple movement” contestation between what I will identify as an anti-colonial socio-ecological articulation, emanating from the experiences of those discounted in the zone of appropriation, and the
hegemonic resolution of the capital-labour contradiction in the core zone of commodification.

This triple movement dynamic captures, then, the centrality of anti-colonial socio-ecological movements, defined by a militant rejection of the consignment of the South as a “unit of nature,” to both the exhaustion of the colonial-capitalist world-ecology of the long nineteenth century and its contested reconstitution, marked particularly by the challenges posed by the “rise of the South,” across the long twentieth century.

The more radical dimensions of the anti-colonial rejection of the South as a “unit of nature” were, however, quickly abandoned, as postcolonial states such as India looked to secure their new found sovereignty in the face of recolonizing forces, in favour of a conception of “development as catching-up-with-the-West” (Chakrabarty, 2010) which necessarily called for the “appropriation” of an “internal” ecological surplus oriented towards rapid national industrial development. In particular, the postcolonial Indian state did not so much as contest the underlying racialized society/nature distinction as it did seek to re-order it in the service of national development. In so much, however, that such a “national developmentalist” strategy placed obstacles in the way of the realization of the global ecological surplus necessary for the centering of capitalist accumulation and development in the North, it would trigger an attempted “re-appropriation” by the latter, via the hegemonic US state-capital nexus, in the form of neoliberal structural adjustment. A further argument of this chapter, then, is that the “long twentieth century” is marked by an ongoing North/South, or rewesternization/dewesternization, “dispute over the control of coloniality” (quoted in Gaztambide-Fernandez, 2014, 197; Mignolo, 2011, 49) that, more specifically, expresses control over the mobilization and circulation of the world-ecological surplus. The chapter concludes by situating the collapse of the accumulation cycle of the “long twentieth century” in relation to both the rising Southern resistance to the
neoliberal “re-appropriation” of the global ecological surplus and the deepening ecological
exhaustion implied by such a “North/South” contestation’s abandonment of the decolonial
option.

**The “triple movement” of the ongoing decolonial world-ecological agrarian question**

Our location of the anti-colonial socio-ecological articulation within the “triple
movement,” a political framework recently introduced by Nancy Fraser (2013) in her attempt to
move beyond the Eurocentric and androcentric limitations of the Polanyian double movement
framework, draws attention to how the capitalist world-ecology’s reproduction, via global
primitive accumulation and the Cortesian racialized society/nature distinction, both generates,
and is informed by, complex and contradictory contestations for and against its foundational co-
constituting zones of exploitation/commodification and dehumanization/appropriation. In this
sense, we are seeking here to both build upon and critique, or “use and transcend,” recent efforts
by Massimo De Angelis (2001, 2004, 2007) to deploy Polanyi’s double movement framework to
reveal how capitalist society is both challenged and reproduced through social struggles for and
against the constitutive “capital-labour” antagonism instituted through “ongoing” primitive
accumulation. Operating within the limitations of the “Eurocentric-anthropocentric” paradigm
we identified in the opening chapter, De Angelis identifies primitive accumulation as capital’s
constitutive form of violence, centering in particular how the forced enclosure of common lands
denies the emergent dispossessed proletarian class non-market means of social reproduction.
Rather, however, than submit to the total subjection of human social life to the commodity form,
which would risk, beyond the immiseration of dispossessed labour, the destruction of society
itself, marginalized social classes (proletariat and peasantry) engage in ongoing social
contestations to secure non-commodified forms of social reproduction. Engaging Polanyi’s
double movement framework, De Angelis locates such a “self-preserving action of the community” (Polanyi, 210) as expressive of the “other movement of society” which, in aiming to construct institutions through which dispossessed social classes could reclaim a critical measure of autonomy over their social reproduction, constitutes a fundamental challenge to the very basis of capitalist development.

The Polanyian double movement framework thus forces a rethinking of capital’s founding violence of primitive accumulation as a site of social contestation rather than an uninterrupted coherent linear transition from pre-capitalist agrarian society to capitalist society and it, as such, reveals further dimensions of our agrarian question problematic. The implications of the double movement for the agrarian question have been considered, as we discussed briefly in Chapter 1, by Tania Li (2010), who argues that, even in the classical European cases, primitive accumulation, in and of itself, has not historically been sufficient to secure the conditions necessary for the emergence of the capitalist development path. Li’s point here is that the forced separation of peasants, and direct producers more generally, from the means of production, does not automatically produce, for those dispossessed, a straight line into market determined, and hence highly productive, capitalist employment sectors. Rather, capital’s cost-repressing imperative creates a survival crisis for large portions of the dispossessed who are rendered structurally surplus to the emergent capitalist system. Recognizing the incapacity of the emerging capitalist market society to ensure their livelihoods, those rendered dispossessed by the founding violence of primitive accumulation engage in social struggles which generate a crisis of legitimacy for ruling classes overseeing the transition. Thus, for example, in the paradigmatic case of England the legitimacy of agrarian transition was secured, as Polanyi reveals in an early identification of the double movement, through the introduction, in
the late 18\textsuperscript{th} century, of state subsidization of “wages on a scale related to the price of bread, thereby countering the emergence of a ‘free’ market in labour, and inventing the ‘right to live’” (Li, 2010, 79). Beyond legitimation, the state’s intervention on behalf of the “other movement of society,” in the form of non-commodified subsidization of livelihoods, invests the dispossessed and marginalized social strata with the higher real incomes necessary for the broadening of the “home market” capable of absorbing, via consumption, the goods produced by the emergent, market dependent, industrial capitalist sector.

While the “other movement” against capital’s constitutive relations of dispossession and commodification thus proves, on the one hand, necessary to securing the agrarian transition, both in terms of its legitimation and material reproduction (broadening of the home market), it simultaneously, on the other hand, forces into sharp relief the potentially fatal contradictions of the social relations underpinning capitalist development. The securing of non-commodified means of social reproduction places, by necessity, limitations upon the “endless accumulation” imperative of capital, whether in the form of welfare institutions which exclude particularly critical sectors of social reproduction (health, education, water provisioning, etc.) from commodification, or in terms of the upward pressure that state subsidies place upon wages demanded by labour no longer exclusively dependent upon the market for social reproduction. Viewed thus, the “other movement” forces an accumulation crisis upon capital, which the latter, De Angelis argues, responds to by renewing its foundational movement of primitive accumulation, involving, in this instance, the dismantling (privatization, withdrawal of subsidies) of the obstacles placed by dispossessed classes to the “reproduction of their separation from the means of production” (De Angelis, 2001, 13). The double movement, consisting of an ongoing social contestation, then, between capital’s (re)assertion of its founding premise (ongoing
primitive accumulation) and the “other movement” against such a premise, paradoxically constitutes both the enabling conditions of capitalist development and the latter’s moments of crisis and transition between its successive accumulation regimes.

The application of the Polanyian double movement concept to the processes of primitive accumulation integral to the agrarian question problematizes, as demonstrated by Li and De Angelis, approaches, including the decolonial world-ecological approach as I have articulated it thus far, which give insufficient analytical weight to movements constituted in opposition to the motive forces of capitalist development. Conventional approaches to the agrarian question too often assume that, once instituted through primitive accumulation, capital subsequently imposes its logic upon the social and, in so doing, sets in motion a “self-sustaining” productivity enhancing developmental path. Within such a “concept of capitalism that cannot be tamed or directed” (Li, 294), both the crises – whether of overaccumulation or underproduction – that confront capitalist development, and their inevitable resolution or transcendence, are attributed wholly to the structural contradictions and capacities of capital. Thus, while orthodox Marxian theory has long held overaccumulation crises to be expressive of constraints imposed on profitability by markets oversaturated by capital, even the “underproduction” crises central to Moore’s world-ecological reconceptualization remain expressive of the “ecological exhaustion” generated by capital’s denial of the reproductive conditions of externalized nature. Our own attempted decolonial intervention into world-ecological theory has only gone as far as centering how such ecological exhaustion must fundamentally be linked to the colonial-capitalist denial of indigenous knowledge and practice in the constitution of the frontier. Here, indigenous presence and agency matters only in so much as it has been appropriated and erased, and not in terms of how it actively opposes and reconstitutes the capitalist world-ecology. In each of these
approaches, moreover, it is capital which, via the spatial fix (Harvey, 2001), resolves its own contradictions by, in the case of overaccumulation, expanding into new spheres of profitable investment or, in the case of underproduction, penetrating and mobilizing newly constituted frontiers of externalized nature. In contrast to such structuralist limitations, the merit of the Polanyian double movement framework consists of revealing how the “other movement” of society, constituted in opposition to the commodifying movement advanced by primitive accumulation, is fundamental to the materiality and legitimacy of the “agrarian transition” to capitalist development, its conjunctural crises, and the renewed constitution and resolution of the agrarian question posed to the successive “post-crisis” accumulation regime.

While, from both analytical and ethical perspectives, it is necessary to take seriously the imperative of accounting for how the “other movement” challenges and reconstitutes the capitalist world-ecology, Nancy Fraser (2013) has recently foregrounded how the Polanyian framework’s Eurocentric and androcentric limitations obscures both the externalizations and exclusions upon which the double movement is itself, however provisionally, resolved, and the other “other movements” constituted in opposition to such cost externalization. In relation to the specific concern motivating this dissertation, that of challenging the Eurocentric-anthropocentric paradigm of capitalist modernity, Fraser notes that anti-colonial and anti-imperial movements problematized the “double movement” framework by criticizing the national framing of first-world social protections, which were financed on the backs of postcolonial peoples whom they excluded; they thereby disclosed the injustice of ‘misframed’ protections, in which the scale of exposure to danger – often transnational – was not matched by the scale at which protection was organized, typically national (5).

Returning to Li’s affirmative example of “double movement” securing the English agrarian transition, the celebrated late 18th century state subsidization of “wages related to the price of
bread,” proving in short order to be incompatible with capital’s accumulation drive, would, as Araghi (2003, 2009b) has argued, give way, over the course of the “long 19th century,” to a strategy of reducing the price of bread via the imposition of forced underconsumption in the colonized peripheries. As we have further argued, this replacement of the wage subsidy with the cheap food strategy is further premised upon the racialized construction of frontiers of “primitive humans” and “virgin lands” that could be appropriated without accounting for their reproductive conditions. The “other movement,” in its confrontation with capital’s commodifying logic, ultimately, then, comes to secure what Li calls the “right to live” through the obscured arenas of global primitive accumulation wherein “rightless” beings – human and extra-human - are rendered absolutely exhaustible.

Rather than suggesting, however that, in light of such limitations, we entirely discard the Polanyian emphasis on the key role played by oppositional movements in securing and challenging the transition to capitalist development, I further follow Fraser here in extending such an imperative to account for what we might call the other “other movements” calling into question the cost externalizations securing the resolution of the double movement in the core. For Fraser, this “missing third” movement interrupts the Polanyian contestation between marketization and social protection with a struggle for emancipation from the oppressive imperial/colonial, racialized, gendered, ableist, and anthropocentric structures through which “rightless” beings are externalized in order to bear the costs of the struggle between marketization and social protection. In juxtaposing this missing third movement of “emancipation” alongside the already visible arena of contestation between “marketization” and “social protection,” Fraser argues that it is necessary to go beyond the double movement
framework and reconceptualize the contested reproductions of capitalist market society in terms of a triple movement.

For our purposes here, the implications of this extension from double movement to triple movement are clarified when we recall our earlier extension of primitive accumulation from its conventional methodologically nationalist register to the scale of “global primitive accumulation.” Whereas conventional approaches, such as the one offered by De Angelis, identify primitive accumulation as a process of enclosure or separation bringing forth the capital-labour relation and its associated commodification of social reproduction, our approach has utilized a more expansive concept of “global primitive accumulation” which renders the “internal” zone of commodification dependent upon an “external” zone of appropriation constituted through racialized colonial enclosures. If, then, De Angelis’ methodologically nationalist conceptualization of ongoing primitive accumulation foregrounds the Polanyian double movement of social protection against commodification, our expansive reconceptualization of ongoing “global primitive accumulation” elucidates Fraser’s “missing third” movement of emancipation, which in this case centers upon the fundamental opposition constituted by colonized indigenous peoples to the racialized technologies of “misanthropic skepticism” through which their socio-ecological knowledges and practices are appropriated and erased in the service of the cheap food regime resolving the double movement in the core.

The triple movement approach furthers, then, our decolonial world-ecological agrarian question, in so much as it emphasizes that the latter encapsulates both the colonial appropriation and erasure of “cheap natures” from the colonized frontier as well as the anticolonial opposition to this foundational premise of the colonial-capitalist world-ecology. In this sense, the triple movement corresponds with Moyo, Jha, and Yeros’ vital intervention that, reconceived from the
vantage point of anticolonial movements, the agrarian question comes to consist of the “emancipatory” imperative of restoring the humanity of the victims of racialized primitive accumulation (2013, 111). Such a restoration is necessarily premised upon the re-forging of agrarian socio-ecological relations by decolonized subjects informed by a recognition of the co-constitutive reproduction of indigenous/peasant knowledge, practice, and extra-human natures.

*The “third movements” in the collapse of the accumulation cycle of the long 19th century*

While our concern here is to show how this triple movement dimension of the decolonial world-ecological agrarian question assumes particular prominence as a disruptive/re-constituting force over the course of the rise and fall of the British-led accumulation cycle of the “long nineteenth century,” and the subsequent transition to the American “long twentieth century,” it is useful to first briefly engage the early example of the Haitian revolution as an instructive case of both an other “other movement” against the racialized frontier of appropriation and the remobilization of ongoing “global primitive accumulation” in light of the challenges posed to the foundational ontological relations of the capitalist world ecology. As argued by Robbie Shilliam (2008), the Haitian anti-colonial movement was fundamentally constituted in opposition to the “racialized nature of political being in the Atlantic world order,” whereby the key “cheap nature” of sugar was provisioned to the visible human arenas of the core zone of commodification on the basis of the ascription of the status of political “non-being” to enslaved plantation workers (791). In opposition to this relation between political “non-being,” or racialized dehumanization, and export oriented, ecologically exhaustive, plantation agriculture, insurgent Haitian claims to political being were tied to the replacement, by force, of the plantation system with an “‘African’ form of agrarian autonomy” signifying the revalorization of the particular agrarian knowledge of emancipated peasants on smallholder plots (790).
However, the success of the Haitian revolution in overthrowing the slaveholding plantation order, in so much as it called into question the racialized ontological basis of the capitalist world-ecology, brought forth a renewed project of militarized ongoing “global primitive accumulation” seeking to resecure such a basis. Anticipating the postcolonial national developmental constraints of the “long twentieth century,” the post-revolutionary Haitian elite was itself compelled, by the imperative of maintaining “national” independence from the re-colonizing forces of the capitalist world-ecology, to engage in a “catch-up” or replication strategy that effected the “re-separation of peasants from the direct access to their means of reproduction that smallholding farming had so far fleetingly afforded” (792). This “re-separation” made the necessary space for the reinstitution of the plantation system, and, in so much as this maintained the supply of cheap sugar to the core zone of commodification, thus pointed towards the “postcolonial” reproduction of the racialized cheap nature basis of the capitalist world-ecology.

As we have suggested above, such anti-colonial socio-ecological articulations, simultaneously mobilized and arrested in the Haitian case, would converge to constitute a profoundly disruptive force for the capitalist world-ecology of the long nineteenth century. Substantive evidence, produced from across much of the colonized world, of the unfolding of this “triple movement” dimension, can be drawn from two magisterial studies – Eric Wolf’s *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (1968) and Mike Davis’ *Late Victorian Holocausts* (2001) – on the position of the colonized indigenous peasantry in the capitalist world-ecology. Wolf argues that a common theme motivating revolutionary anti-colonial movements in Mexico, Cuba, Vietnam, and Algeria, consisted of an abiding offense experienced by the peasantry over the socio-economic, ecological, and cultural devastation wrought by the racialized colonial enclosures which had disrupted indigenous socio-ecological praxis premised upon a “stable
combination of resources...underwrit[ing] a minimal livelihood” (280). It was thus, Wolf further argues, that at the centre of these great revolutionary movements was a demand for the restitution, via land reform, of indigenous land rights, and their associated socio-ecological and cultural frames, through which the question of production could be re-inscribed within a larger imperative of the survival and prosperity of the human and extra-human inhabitants of the newly decolonized lands. Similarly, Davis, citing examples from across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, has centered the socio-ecologically exhaustive “drought-famine” crisis confronting the colonized indigenous peasantry as central to the “eschatological ferocity” of the anti-colonial “millenarian movements that swept the future ‘third world’ at the end of the nineteenth century” (13). Further elaborating upon this critical “juncture between nineteenth-century famine and twentieth-century revolutionary politics,” Davis documents the extent to which the question of land relations – in their varied socio-ecological dimensions – were placed at the center of anticolonial movements by a “poor peasantry for whom the stabilization of the natural and social conditions of production...had become a revolutionary life and death issue” (209).

The conceptualization of an anti-colonial socio-ecological articulation, and its primacy in the exhaustion of the British hegemonic cycle of the colonial-capitalist world-ecology, has been further elaborated upon, both theoretically and empirically, in the seminal “environmentalism of the poor” political ecology framework advanced by Ramachandra Guha (2000). Corresponding with our own problematization of “pristine nature” as a colonial construction, Guha’s thesis constitutes an important corrective to the dominant tendency in “environmentalisms of the North” to organize around a conservationist conception of unspoilt nature under threat from poorly informed, potentially irrational, local resource users in the South. The emphasis, rather, should be upon how, from the onset of its colonial subjection as a “unit of nature” (Phillip, 2004,
96-97) for the North, the construction of “pristine nature” in the South – whether to be more rationally exploited or conserved – has had particularly adverse livelihood implications for the indigenous peoples of these lands. Focussing, in particular, on the socio-ecological implications of the British colonization of India, Guha has centered how the response of peasants, pastoralists, and forest dwellers constituted what he calls an “environmentalism of the poor” which foregrounded the link between local autonomy, livelihood security, and environmental sustainability in the anti-colonial movement.

Guha, in a series of collaborations with Madhav Gadgil, explicitly situates this triple movement dynamic of colonial socio-environmental degradation and indigenous anti-colonial socio-ecological regeneration as expressive of the ecological surplus/exhaustion cycle encompassing British colonization of India. Centering in particular the imperative of what we earlier, following Moore, referred to as “cheap natures” in the achievement of capitalist development, Gadgil and Guha argue that

one expects an imperial power to withdraw from a colony when the value of resources usurped is no longer attractive enough to offset the cost of such usurpation. When the British conquered India in the later eighteenth century and early nineteenth centuries it had a substantial surplus of agricultural production. This surplus had largely disappeared by 1920…for the British this meant that the costs of usurping the dwindling resource base of their colony were becoming excessively high (1995, 12).

The disappearance of the surplus, and the end of the “cheap nature” relations it implied, was an outcome, Gadgil and Guha’s work reveals, of the convergence of the increasing exhaustion of extra-human natures, on account of the racialized denial of their reproductive conditions we detailed in the previous chapter, and the growing anticolonial reassertion of indigenous claims to their “customary” rights over the lands which the colonial state had sought to appropriate as frontiers of externalized nature. Such resistance was particularly prominent in the forested
regions of India which, via their racialized “material-conceptual” transformation into frontiers of primitive humans and virgin lands, provisioned, as we saw in the previous chapter, the British accumulation cycle with key low-cost agrarian inputs for the industrializing core. Gadgil and Guha argue that such displacement, in the forested regions, of indigenous systems of shifting cultivation with monocrop plantations, focusing as they did on the industrial imperatives of the colonial state to the detriment of the sustainability of the pre-existing socio-ecological balance, was “acutely felt by different [indigenous and peasant] communities” (1992, 176). Indigenous groups responded by launching tribal uprisings which, through acts such as the burning of lands appropriated for plantation crops, sought to restore the primacy of the “subsistence orientation of the hill peasant.” In particular instances, these uprisings constrained the colonial state’s ability to further extend, “for fear of renewed unrest,” the plantation economy deeper into the forested regions (Arnold, 1984, 116), which, combined with the exhaustion of those forested regions that were brought under commercialization, accounted substantially for the “disappearance of the [ecological] surplus” provisioned, as the necessary “cheap nature” premise of British industrial capitalist development, from the colonized Indian zone of appropriation.

As Guha, and other subaltern studies historians (Pandey, 1988; Arnold, 1984; 1996) have shown, these tribal and peasant uprisings, motivated by the restoration of indigenous socio-ecological practices, constituted some of the earliest and most sustained forms of anti-colonial insurgency which, when brought into the “organized” independence movement led by the Congress, “swelled the tide of anti-imperialist agitation in the latter part of British rule in India” (Pandey, 241). Contesting both colonial and elite nationalist historiographies, which reduced peasant insurrection to either “a sign of manipulation by ‘outside agitators’” or “evidence of mobilization by popular urban leaders” (Pandey, 241), the subaltern school emphasized the
active role that peasants and tribals played in clarifying the motive forces of both colonial rule and its anti-colonial negation. Such a reorientation is similar to Frantz Fanon’s (1961) earlier elucidation, in the Algerian context, of the unique capacity of the peasantry, on account of its relative “autonomy” from the urban core of the colonial state, to clarify, for intellectuals and trade union leaders lacking such autonomy, the centrality of land relations in the (anti)colonial contestation. As Pandey notes, far from being passive instruments of elite urban actors, tribal and peasant insurrections, in making clear that independence from colonial rule involved more than the “narrow vision of the eviction of the white man from India,” advanced instead the “real and immediate possibility of an anti-imperialist movement very different from any until then contemplated by the urban nationalist leadership” (277-278). This deeper articulation of anti-colonialism influenced the broader nationalist movement to link liberation, and the claim to political being, to the overthrow of the colonial agrarian regime and the restoration of free and common access to forests and waters existing in a vital co-constitutive relationship with indigenous agricultural knowledge and practices (Guha, 1989; Pandey, 1988). Evidence of such a peasant reorientation of elite urban-centered nationalism can be most prominently found in what Gadgil and Guha identify as Gandhi’s “political ‘appropriation’ of the peasantry” (1992, 180) wherein the most influential anticolonial voice came to celebrate “village society as providing building blocks for the construction of an environmentally and socially harmonious alternative to modern industrial development” (Guha and Arnold, 1996, 19).

As an anticolonial world-ecological force, indigenous peasant insurrections expressed, then, the “third” movement of emancipation which accelerated the disappearance, or exhaustion, of the ecological surplus underpinning the British-led accumulation cycle. Extending De Angelis’ claim regarding the obstacles placed in the way of capital’s founding “separation” by
society’s “other movement,” we can conceive of these “missing third,” or other “other movements,” in their advancement of the socio-ecological basis of emancipation from colonial rule, as placing obstacles in the way of the construction of the racialized frontiers enabling capital’s accumulation capacity. In particular, the emergent “postcolonial” international state system, by way of the newly “independent” states of the South, informed as they were by peasant insurrections, would constrain the capacity for “colonial-capitalist” agencies to freely roam the earth in the pursuit of successive zones of appropriation. Rather, however, than heralding the terminal collapse of the capitalist world-ecology, emergent state-capitalist agencies regrouped to resolve a renewed world-ecological agrarian question fundamentally defined by the contradictory imperative of securing the “postcolonial” dismantling, via “ongoing global primitive accumulation,” of the anticolonial obstacles to “cheap natures” forged by indigenous peasant insurrections. It is to this “reconstructive” and “legitimating” moment of the triple movement of the “long twentieth century” (Arrighi, 1994) to which we now turn.

**India and the pursuit of ecological surplus over the long 20th century**

Gesturing towards the “triple movement” contestations constraining and enabling the reconstruction of the capitalist world-ecology in a “postcolonial” international state-system, Adams and Mulligan (2003) have argued that the end of direct political control might have been expected to open the way for more independent thinking about the relations between society and nature, perhaps based on non-Western traditions and cultural fusions. This did not happen. From the late 19th century onwards, the decolonization process had involved the creation of ‘modern’ nation states that were built, essentially, on European models and traditions, and the deep ideological legacy of colonialism endured. (5)

In seeking, through an examination of the Indian experience, to elaborate upon why “this did not happen,” and how colonially endued into the postcolonial era, it is necessary to first emphasize
that the project of advancing decolonial socio-ecological relations, through which could be realized “an environmentally and socially harmonious alternative to modern industrial development,” was beset from the outset by the contradictions inherent to the integration of the indigenous peasant movement with the “elite” led nationalist movement (Gadgil and Guha, 1992; Pandey, 1988; Gupta, 1998). While the organized national movement did, on the one hand, as we argued above, recognize the insurgent socio-ecological claims of peasants and tribals, it was, on the other hand, significantly driven by the colonized society’s elite rural and urban classes and castes who had served as the local proxies implementing, and benefitting from, the colonial state’s project of frontier formation via racialized enclosure. In particular, the colonial state’s “material-conceptual” production of the frontier of externalized nature, undermining as it did socio-ecological regimes organized around “the commons” in favour of private property rights, entrenched the surplus appropriating power of large rural landlords who subsequently profited, as the revenue collecting local proxy, from the colonial agro-export regime. In addition, elite anticolonial agitation had eventually come to force the British colonial state to allow greater space for an emergent industrial capitalist class to itself draw upon the cheap nature regime and accumulate profits and power as an indigenous intermediary provisioning the core zone of commodification (Gadgil and Guha, 1992). However, both the landlord and capitalist class would come to recognize that their overall share of power and capacity for profit taking would be enhanced if they could wrest political control over India’s resource mobilization, in the service of national development, from the colonial state. Thus, while “Indian nationalists had charged the British with exploitation of the peasantry,” the landlord/capitalist nexus of support, in tension with the more decolonial socio-ecological articulation, advanced a “catch up” or “replication” strategy wherein the emancipation of the
peasantry would be linked to the reorientation of Indian resources towards the imperative of national industrial development.

The emphasis, by the elite social forces, on overthrowing colonial rule in order to free India to catch up with the developed core of the capitalist world-system through a program of rapid national industrial development, stands in marked contrast to the more “independent thinking about the relations between society and nature” advanced by the Gandhian appropriation of the peasant and tribal insurrections against colonial appropriation. Guha thus refers to the “apparent paradox” of the “juxtaposition of a peasant-based politics with the increasing influence of Indian capitalists over the Congress organization.” This paradoxical “catch up” orientation would come to characterize the decolonization movement more generally, evidence of which can be found, as Dipesh Chakrabarty has shown, in the organizing themes of the historic Bandung conference of “Afro-Asian solidarity” against colonialism. Chakrabarty (2010) argues that

the discourse and politics of decolonization in the nations that met in Bandung often displayed an uncritical emphasis on modernization. Sustaining this attitude was a clear and conscious desire to ‘catch up’ with the West. As Nehru would often say in the 1950s, ‘What Europe did in a hundred or a hundred and fifty years, we must do in ten or fifteen years’… This emphasis on development as a catching-up-with-the-West produced a particular split that marked both the relationship between elite nations and their subaltern counterparts as well as that between elites and subalterns within national boundaries. Just as the emergent nations demanded political equality with the Euro-American nations while wanting to catch up with them on the economic front, similarly their leaders thought of their peasants and workers simultaneously as people who were already full citizens – in that they had the associated rights – but also as people who were not quite full citizens in that they needed to be educated in the habits and manners of citizens (53)

The elite project to contest attempts to reconsolidate Western hegemony by recasting decolonization as a developmental strategy of “catching-up-with-the-West,” suggesting as it might an indigenous replication of the racialized basis of the capitalist world-ecology, recalls the
contradictions and tensions revealed in our earlier discussion of Haitian attempts to secure “postcolonial” independence in the face of “re-colonizing” forces. Walter Mignolo (2011) has elaborated a useful framework for capturing such tensions, wherein he specifically identifies three distinctive trajectories – rewesternization, dewesternization, and the decolonial option – animating the contestation over the postcolonial geopolitical order (27-76). Such a framework helps in further elaborating Guha’s “apparent paradox” of the co-existence of the peasant and landlord/capitalist bases of the independence movement, with the former’s more “independent thinking about the relations between society and nature” signifying the decolonial option, and the latter’s “catch up” orientation expressing the trajectory of dewesternization. While both dewesternization and the decolonial option share a premise of what Samir Amin (2010; 2014) refers to as a calling into question of the “imperialist rent,” specifically referring here to the Southern challenge to the Northern imperialist claim to monopolize “access to the planet’s resources” (2010, 108), the two approaches diverge in defining the ultimate aims of such a challenge. In particular, Mignolo’s framework suggests that while the decolonial option articulates an anticapitalist and anticolonial socio-ecological future, the dewestern trajectory engages the forces of re-westernization in a “dispute for the control of coloniality” (Gaztambide-Fernandez, 2014, 197). The dewestern approach does not, then, fundamentally challenge the racialized colonial basis of the capitalist world-ecology but, rather, seeks to re-order it in order to secure the “cheap natures” premise of the rapid industrial development necessary for Southern states to achieve a measure of equality, and hence sovereignty, in confronting the re-westernization trajectory.

The rewesternization/dewesternization contestation, defined specifically by the “dispute for the control of coloniality,” has been fundamental to the shaping/constraining of the attempted
expanded reconstitution of capitalist accumulation and development over what Arrighi (1994) refers to as the “long twentieth century.” The evident marginalization this suggests of the “decolonial option,” as much as it troubles the “emancipatory” promise of the collapse of the British cycle, should not, however, lead to a dismissal of the historic shift signified by the dewestern challenge to the Northern claim to exclusive access to the “imperialist rent.” It is thus that we follow Araghi (2003; 2008; 2009b) here in questioning conventional world-systems influenced periodizations of the long twentieth century, including those of food regime analysis and world-ecology, which assume, in their emphasis on the shift from British to American hegemonic leadership, the ongoing power of Western states in determining the production and circulation of the “cheap natures” underpinning the capitalist world-ecology. By contrast, and in place of the food-regime characterization of the “US mercantile-industrial food regime” or the world-systems/world-ecology identification of the “US accumulation cycle,” Araghi (2009b) speaks of an era of “long national developmentalism” that I would characterize as being defined by the dewestern challenge to the North’s exclusive “access to the planet’s resources.” While the dewestern “catch-up” orientation is premised upon an enduring coloniality, it does, in its promise of protecting and “appropriating” the ecological surplus provisioning capacity of national resources for the project of rapid national industrial development, nonetheless present “nationalist” obstacles to the capacity of colonial-capitalist agencies to roam the earth unencumbered in the aim of constructing successive racialized frontiers of externalized nature. However, as we will also see, the “apparent paradox” besetting postcolonial development planners – that of advancing the “peasant basis” of decolonization within the dewestern “catch up” orientation – would simultaneously replicate the surplus/exhaustion cycle and constitute an
ongoing opening for forces of “re-westernization” to reconsolidate Northern hegemony over the capitalist world-ecology.

*Land reform and “internal” frontier expansion*

Initially, as anticolonial movements produced independent postcolonial states, the peasant/elite paradox would both shape, and ultimately undermine, an “agrarian question of development” (Araghi, 2009) which emphasized the necessity of increasing agricultural productivity, in order to propel the rapid industrial development that would enable a “catching-up-with-the-west,” through radical institutional and organizational agrarian reforms that empowered the direct producing agrarian classes. While the post-revolutionary “Cardenismo” agrarian reform in Mexico during the 1930s constitutes an important early example of such a “productivity with equity” agrarian program, the initial agrarian program of independent India was intended to be modelled upon Chinese efforts to advance agricultural productivity through agrarian reforms which freed control over production and distribution from rent-seeking intermediaries, such as moneylenders and landlords, in order to invest it in a cooperatively empowered and organized peasantry (Gupta, 1998, 48-50). However, unlike the more coherent anti-landlord peasant basis of the Chinese anti-imperial revolution, and the political institutions it birthed, the incorporation of landlord/capitalist interests into the Indian anticolonial movement preserved the latter’s control over the state and village level institutions through which agrarian land reforms were to be ostensibly enacted (Varshney, 1998, 46; Das, 2007, 425-426). While important gains in land reform were achieved in the immediate postcolonial context, particularly through the abolition of the colonial system of absentee landlordship (zamindari) and the redistribution of the lands therein freed to the middle peasantry and intermediate castes, the ongoing power of landed interests more generally did not allow for thoroughgoing land reforms
“where ceilings would be placed on holdings, and excess land handed over to the landless” (Guha, 2007, 220). In so much as such a “second stage of land reforms…was a task that the government was unable or unwilling to undertake,” lower caste landless agrarian classes were generally left unaffected by redistribution via land reform, thus frustrating the promise of a program of expanded agricultural surpluses via equitable institutional and organizational reform.

In light of such limitations on the redistribution of existing agricultural lands, the Nehruvian Indian state, remaining committed to both the dewestern “catch up” orientation and the “peasant basis” of decolonization, mobilized a particular dimension of the British colonial state’s frontier strategy for the provisioning of the ecological surplus of “cheap natures.” Specifically, employing colonial era land acquisition technologies, the Nehruvian state promoted the redistribution of fertile forested lands – which it, deploying the racialized ideology of the colonial state, characterized as wasted by its indigenous inhabitants – to peasant cultivators celebrated for their potential to provision the cheap food supplies necessary for India’s rapid industrial development (Guha, 2007, 219; Varshney, 1998, 42). While peasants and forest dwellers had historically varied relations, ranging from competition over land use to a mutual recognition of one another’s rights in a broader socio-ecological co-constitutive reproduction (Bhattacharya, 1996), the developmental state intensified the antagonistic dimension by remobilizing the colonial state’s privileging of the rational developmental promise of settled cultivation over the irrational waste signified by the shifting cultivation practices of “primitive” tribals (Gadgil and Guha, 1992, 1995). In addition to this strategy of frontier expansion, tribal populations were further displaced by the Nehruvian state’s emphasis on enhancing production through large scale irrigation projects which would provision the agricultural sector with more assured water supplies. In so much as such agricultural frontier colonization and irrigation
expansion secured the initial ecological surplus underpinning postcolonial Indian industrial
development (Varshney, 1998), it reinforced the foundational relationship, though here within
the “national” space, between the production of “cheap nature” and racialized frontier formation.

This speaks, moreover, to how the primacy of the dewestern “catch up” orientation,
dependent as it is on re-securing the surplus provisioning zone of appropriation, not only
marginalizes the decolonial option but, in fact, re-introduces relations of coloniality through
which dehumanized and extra-human beings are rendered rightless. It is thus that Chakrabarty
argues that “this emphasis on development as a catching-up-with-the-West produced a particular
split that marked the relationship between…elites and subalterns within national boundaries”
wherein the latter “were not quite full citizens in that they needed to be educated in the habits
and manners of citizens.” While this split constitutes the reaffirmation of coloniality, it is
important that we not collapse all “subalterns” into a singular category of “rights-compromised”
subjects, as the initial Nehruvian “agrarian transition” strategy involved the differential
incorporation of peasants as settled cultivators, who were celebrated as subjects capable of being
developed, and thus being able to contribute to the industrial development of the nation, and
indigenous inhabitants of the forested regions whose shifting cultivation practices, and hence
“rights” to the land, were more fundamentally discarded through the lens of “misanthropic
skepticism.”

This strategy of increasing agricultural yields through a combination of limited land
reform and acreage expansion into frontier zones, while resulting in a marked increase in
domestic food availability as compared to the colonial era, was not, however, capable of securing
the food surpluses necessary for the stated aim of rapid industrial development. The failure of
the “productivity and equity” approach has been largely attributed to either the obstacles posed
by the ongoing power of the dominant rural classes to a more comprehensive cooperative empowerment of the peasantry or, when such empowerment was advanced through institutional reform, to the lack of state investment in small scale agriculture (Varshney, 1998, 46; Gupta, 1998, 51-52). Further emphasis has been placed on the limited scope of “internal” frontier expansion within the Indian state, as many regions had already experienced substantial exhaustion under colonial rule and the opposition of the indigenous inhabitants of frontier regions to such expansion continued on into the postcolonial era (Varshney, 1998, 49; Gadgil and Guha, 1992; Farmer, 1974). Such “internal” constraints on surplus provisioning forced the Indian state, almost immediately after independence, to rely upon the “global” ecological surplus provisioning capacity, in the specific form of food aid imports, of the US state-capital nexus.

This import dependence, while relatively manageable over the first decade and a half of independence, became considerably more consequential once agricultural production stagnated on account of the “expansion of arable land [being] virtually exhausted by the mid-1960s” (Varshney, 49).

The contested “postcolonial” world-ecological regime: food-aid and the era of long national developmentalism

The evident dependence of India’s rapid industrialization strategy upon the ecological surplus mobilized by the ascendant hegemonic leadership of the US highlights the distinctive world-ecological regime forged in the face of the obstacles posed to racialized frontier appropriation by the “postcolonial” international state system. Recalling Moore’s argument on the surplus-exhaustion cycles of the capitalist world-ecology, successive cycles of accumulation are secured by state-capital blocs whose hegemony is fundamentally premised upon their capacity to produce and mobilize frontier zones of appropriation which, on account of the
“ecological surplus” of cheap natures provisioned therein, reduce production costs to the degree necessary for capitalist development to proceed on a world-scale. With its consolidation as a “continental state,” the US was uniquely positioned to assume this hegemonic responsibility. Specifically, such a continental scope freed the US state-capital nexus from the encumbrances confronting competing state-capital blocs – namely the exercise of sovereign power by newly independent Southern states - in their capacity to freely roam the earth and secure the necessary zones of appropriation. As Arrighi further elaborates, what distinguished the US from, in particular, German efforts to succeed British hegemonic leadership in the reorganization of the accumulation cycle was that the US state enclosed an economic space that was not only much larger and more diversified, but also far more malleable than the economic space enclosed by Imperial Germany – a space, that is, that could be depopulated and repopulated to suit the requirements of high-tech agricultural production more easily than the smaller and more densely populated German economic space could (1994, 301).

The US, in other words, did not need the external empire that Germany unsuccessfully pursued since it had essentially secured such imperial/colonial conditions by reorienting its “development” from “outward territorial expansion to the integration of the acquired territories into a cohesive national economy” (Arrighi, 1994, 300). These “acquired territories,” through which the US “became continental in scope,” consisted of the violent “wrestling of the continent from the native Indian population.” The “material-conceptual” landscape transformation that followed, involving the appropriation and erasure of the socio-ecological “creative agency” of indigenous peoples “depopulated” from the American Midwest, enabled the emergence of a model of large-scale, “high-tech agricultural production” provisioning a “large and growing
The historically unprecedented scale of this surplus was central to US hegemonic ascension, particularly in so much as it promised newly independent states in the South access, in exchange for accepting integration into the US led accumulation order, to the cheap natures necessary for rapid industrial development. The strategy of India, and postcolonial states more generally, to recast “development-as-a-catching-up-with-the-West” led ironically, then, to dependence upon the leading “Western” state, the US, for access to the ecological surplus mobilized from the racialized zone of appropriation.

As we mentioned earlier, however, it is important that we not uncritically follow conventional world-systems periodizations which erase the significance of the postcolonial “rise of the South” in an overly hasty confirmation of the determinative power of US hegemony in shaping the successive world-ecological regime of capitalist accumulation and development. A key point of Arrighi’s (2009b) reconceptualization of the immediate postcolonial context as an era of “long national developmentalism,” in place of the “US mercantile-industrial era” designation favoured by McMichael and Friedmann’s (1989) food regime framework, is to shift emphasis on to the force exerted upon the reconstitution of the capitalist world-system by anticolonial and socialist movements, however much their more radical promise might have been compromised in favour of the catch up orientation. Thus, the American provisioning of agrarian surpluses, as food aid, in service of the rapid industrial development of the South, is significantly informed by the imperative of containing the expansion of the radical socialist anticolonial path

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9 US hegemony is built, then, upon an often neglected reality of the “postcolonial era” – the ongoing colonial/racial subjugation of the indigenous peoples of the Americas. Indeed our own analysis of the exhaustion of the previous British cycle privileged the anti-colonial disruptions emanating from the “South,” while neglecting the significance of the continued subjugation of indigenous people in the Americas to the renewal of the capitalist world-ecology. In suggesting the link here between US agricultural power and the appropriation of indigenous “creative agency” of the Midwest, it is hoped that such an omission has been somewhat addressed.
which, as the Chinese case demonstrated, threatened an outright rejection of integration into the capitalist world-ecology in favour of more autonomous development (Ross, 2003, 449-450). With China representing, in particular, the loss of a significant potential source of accumulation, Araghi suggests that the capitalist bloc of the cold war, led by the US, was compelled to underwrite the development of the South in ways that would not foreclose the accumulation imperatives of Northern capital.

*Green Revolution and National Agricultural Development*

The “food aid order” (Araghi, 2003) proved, however, inadequate to sustaining the “development compromise” (Araghi, 2009b) between dewestern and rewestern forces that defined the “era of long national developmentalism.” In particular, the contradiction between “autonomy” and “catching-up-with-the-west,” would inform both the rejection, on the part of particular Southern states such as India, of the dependence implied by the “food aid order” and the embrace of technologically intensive agricultural production as an “internal” ecological surplus provisioning resolution. While the latter resolution – the “green revolution” – has been commonly interpreted as dictated by emergent US agro-industrial interests, Varshney (1998) has shown that for Indian planners the food shortage crisis of the mid 1960s – brought forth by a combination of “internal” frontier exhaustion, drought conditions, and state underinvestment – revealed, in so much as India became increasingly dependent upon food imports from the US that compromised national sovereignty, the pressing need to shift towards an agrarian transition strategy centered upon intensively increasing the productive capacity of existing agricultural lands. It remained the case, nonetheless, that such an “internal” resolution called for engagement with, or dependence upon, the US state-capital nexus that had exclusive access, on account of its “continental scope,” to the inputs (hybrid seeds, chemical fertilizers, chemical
pesticides) necessary for “high-tech agricultural production.” From its perspective, the US actively supported those within India’s planning apparatus advocating such a shift, as it suggested a comprehensive break from the more radical path of broad based “peasant empowerment” and broadened the market for the emergent US agro-industrial complex.

The “development compromise” shifted, then, from the “food aid order” towards a new “internal” agrarian surplus provisioning strategy of “green revolution” that de-linked productivity from the advancement of equitable agrarian relations via institutional and organizational reform of the countryside (Varshney, 1998; Gupta, 1998). Exclusively privileging productivity, the green revolution strategy emphasized the transfer of technologically-intensive agricultural inputs to cultivators who already possessed the scale of land ownership, and access to irrigation resources, necessary for the successful application of such inputs. In de-emphasizing land reform, and the broader empowerment of the peasantry and landless agrarian labour force, the green revolution marked, then, a definitive disavowal, by the Indian state, of the decolonial option, and its alternative place-based socio-ecological articulation, in favour of an exclusive concern with development as “catching-up-with-the-West.” As a necessary implication of such a reorientation, the green revolution strategy recalled, and further extended, the agricultural frontier conditions mobilized by the British colonial state. Whereas the plains of Punjab and Haryana were once transformed, via racialized enclosure under the British colonial state, from the “waste” of nomadic pastoralism to the “value” of export-oriented wheat production, their identification as the most suitable lands for the advancement of the green revolution involves their subsequent transformation from the “waste” of “primitive” forms of agricultural knowledge and practice to the “value” of scientifically informed “high-tech agricultural production” (Gupta, 1998). The green revolution involved, then, an intensification
of the denial of the reproductive socio-ecological conditions of the agricultural heartlands of Punjab and Haryana. In particular, indigenous agro-ecological techniques of water preservation, polycropping, seed saving/selection, and field rotation were discounted in favour of the intensive application of water, hybrid seeds, petroleum based fertilizers, and chemical pesticides on farms exclusively oriented towards maximizing production of a single crop.

In discounting the reproductive conditions of the agricultural plains of Northern India in favour of the singular goal of raising a food surplus sufficient for the aim of rapid industrial development, the green revolution paradigm enabled a more intensive appropriation of the soil mineral wealth and water resources of the region, which resulted in a massive increase in the agricultural production of grains such as wheat and rice (Varshney, 1998). While thus suggesting, on the one hand, an eventual ecological exhaustion, this grain surplus, on the other, enabled the Indian state, by the early 1970s, to cease its dependence upon food-aid imports of American grain surpluses, and further pointed towards the dewestern “re-appropriation” of ecological resources in favour of national industrial development (Varshney, 1998; Gupta, 1998; Guha, 2007). The extent to which such an internal “ecological surplus” would provision a broader social basis of development was driven by the ongoing threat posed by insurgent peasant movements, such as the initial incarnation of the Naxalites, who, though unsuccessful in the fight for land reform, were nonetheless instrumental in compelling the Indian state to institute socially protective measures, such as price supports and input subsidies for agricultural producers, and food subsidies for the proletariat and other marginalized social classes (Das, 2007). However, as Araghi (2009b) argues, such a broad basis was fundamentally purchased at the expense of the exhaustive appropriation of the soils and waters of the frontline green revolution lands. Such exhaustion has come, ultimately, to undermine the surplus provisioning capacity of the green
revolution paradigm, the implications of which, particularly as they bear upon India’s participation in the global land grab, we will take up further in the next chapter.

*The Neoliberal reclamation of the Imperialist Rent*

Whereas the ecologically exhaustive implications of the green revolution would manifest over the middle run, the more immediate threat to the “re-appropriation” of an internal ecological surplus was posed by the “structural adjustment,” from the national developmentalist paradigm to neoliberal globalization, imposed upon the South by Northern dominated international financial institutions seeking to resolve the over-accumulation crisis that took hold in the 1970s. The centrality of the “re-opening” of the South as a “unit of Nature,” via “ongoing global primitive accumulation,” to the resolution of the over-accumulation crisis reflects, as Arrighi (2007) argues, the determinative role played by the “rise of the South” in compromising the global basis of capitalist reproduction in the North. While Arrighi is more concerned with how the rapidly rising industrial output of select Southern states undermined the accumulation capacity of Northern industrial powers, particularly in so much as it constrained the latter’s profitable disposable of industrial goods, I emphasize the implications of the “national developmentalist” paradigm of agricultural production for the “cheap natures” premise of global capitalist accumulation. The “national developmentalist” re-appropriation of ecological surplus, in service of national industrial development, undermined the capacity for the US state-capital nexus to secure the conditions for accumulation through the exercise of control over the mobilization and distribution of the “global” ecological surplus. This manifested in the growing “crisis of profitability” confronting US agribusiness in the 1970s, centered upon, in particular, the constraints that the protection of national agricultures in the South posed to the profitable disposal of American grain surpluses (McMichael, 2005).
A further implication of the protection of national agricultures in the South consisted of the disruption it posed to the strategic resolution of the double movement in the North. This became particularly significant as the Keynesian social democratic compromise in the North, involving as it did high wages and protected non-commodified forms of social reproduction, proved increasingly incompatible with the accumulation cycle driving capitalist development (Harvey, 2003; De Angelis, 2001, 2007). The imperative of reconciling the “right to live” demand of the “other movement” with the “endless accumulation” demand of capital would, in so much as the latter called for wage repression and the commodification of key sectors of social reproduction, remain frustrated so long as the dewestern “re-appropriation,” via the protection of national agricultures, of the Southern ecological surplus, precluded the shift, which we earlier detailed during the English agrarian transition, from a strategy of non-market wage subsidization to one of wage repression via an enlarged appropriation of frontiers of unused natures capable of substantially reducing the input/consumption costs of the North.

The overcoming, then, of the accumulation crisis of the 1970s, would necessitate that the hegemonic US state-capital bloc advance a strategy of “ongoing global primitive accumulation” capable of dismantling the “third movement” obstacle of “protected national agriculture” hindering the global North’s claim of “exclusive access to the planet’s resources.” As I argued in the previous section, the national agricultural strategy of green revolution, though marking a definitive break with the anti-colonial socio-ecological articulation, nonetheless provided the necessary protections, in the form of price supports, and food and input subsidies, for the cultivating classes to direct their growing surpluses towards the cause of rapid national industrial development. Informed by the broader “neoliberal” hegemony favouring deepening marketization as a solution to the over-accumulation crisis, Northern dominated international
financial institutions, such as the World Bank, advanced a “material-conceptual” transformation of this “national developmentalist” agrarian landscape which reconceptualized the latter as an “irrational” misuse, and hence waste, of the potentially abundant value producing capacity of the South’s agro-ecological resources (Goldman 2005, 9-10). In particular, the neoliberal reconceptualization posited that the protection of national agricultural sectors from American grain surpluses, and their subjection to the “statist-developmentalist,” rather than competitive market based, logic of national food self-sufficiency, resulted in the inefficient allocation of scarce agricultural resources towards the production of grains that could be more cheaply procured from the US. A more “rational” approach would involve the subjection of the South’s agricultural resources to the “competitive” dictates of the global market, which would, on the basis of the Ricardian “comparative advantage” principle, compel cultivators in the South to privilege production of those crops which both cannot be produced more efficiently by producers in other regions, and for which they could get the highest “global” price.

In order to advance the “material” dimension of such a neoliberal transformation of the agrarian South, the US exploited the deepening debt crisis confronting much of the South in the 1980s and 1990s by imposing loan conditionalities that required states to dismantle the protective measures they had instituted in support of the project of “national agriculture.” Such a strategy was clearly articulated by the US agricultural secretary who, in the midst of the Uruguay round negotiations over the liberalization of agricultural trade, argued that

[t]he push by some developing countries to become more self-sufficient in food may be reminiscent of a bygone era. These countries could save more money by importing more food from the United States…. The US has used the World Bank to back up this policy, going so far as making the dismantling of farmer support programs a condition for loans, as is the case for Morocco’s support for the domestic cereal producers (Agricultural Secretary John Block, cited in McMichael, 1997, 65).
Signifying the strategy of “ongoing global primitive accumulation,” the “dismantling of farmer support programs” of input subsidies, price supports, and trade controls, deepened the expropriation of peasantries from control over the means of production, shifting in the process the organization of agricultural production in the South from use-values of local/national food provisioning to exchange values determined by global commodity relations. More specifically, while direct agricultural producers, and rural and urban food consumers, could make claims upon the national developmental state for non-market based measures of social reproduction, neoliberal conditionalities, imposed as they were by global financial institutions such as the World Bank, weakened such claim making capacities. Rather, however, than produce a “Ricardian” paradise, the removal of public supports for cultivators, in the form of input subsidies and trade controls, combined to both raise their input costs, which were already substantial owing to the escalating application of fertilizers and pesticides required by the growing ecological exhaustion of the green revolution, and lower their output prices, on account of the exposure to the more capital intensive, and hence competitive, American agricultural sector.

Combined with state withdrawal of agricultural infrastructural investment, and the failure of private capital to pick up the slack, contrary to the promise made by the neoliberal agrarian landscape transformation, the outcome for agricultural sectors across much of the South included declining yield increases and growing debt loads for cultivators (Reddy and Sharma, 2010; Patnaik, 2003). This, when not leading to outright land dispossession, compelled peasants to increasingly shift towards cash crop cultivation, which was often organized and financed, via contract farming, by transnational agribusiness oriented towards the global North. Within a neoliberal evaluative framework, this might suggest a successful transformation of the “waste”
of national developmentalist agricultural production, irrationally focussed as it was on the inefficient production of foodgrains, into the “value” of export-oriented cash-crop production. From our longer run “triple movement” perspective, on the other hand, the shift from national foodgrain production to cash crops oriented towards the global North, signifies the “re-appropriation” of the agricultural lands of the global South in service of the “cheap natures” strategy necessary for reconciling the “wage repression” imperative of capital accumulation with the “right to live” demanded by the “other movement” of society in the North. The neoliberal “re-opening” of the South’s agrarian landscape enabled, in particular, a diversified expansion, via the provisioning of “off-season” fruits and vegetables otherwise inaccessible for much of the year, of “cheap” year round food baskets for consumers in the global North (Patnaik, 2003, 2011).

Within India, where neoliberal reforms were aggressively pursued in the 1990s and early 2000s, the consequences of this shift towards export-oriented agricultural production, and the reduction of state support for cultivators, consisted of an overall decrease in national food availability and the entrenchment of what has been referred to as an “agrarian crisis” marked, most dramatically, by an epidemic of “farmer suicides” driven by escalating debtloads (Reddy and Sharma, 2010). Such consequences recall the earlier subjection of India’s agrarian landscape as a “unit of nature” under British colonial rule, and further imply that the neoliberal “material-conceptual” transformation constitutes an appropriation, in the service of capitalist accumulation and development in the core, of the socio-ecological basis of “national agricultural” development. In particular, the enhanced production capacity of India’s “green revolution” agricultural sector, originally developed to provision the “internal” ecological surplus necessary for the rapid industrial development promoted by the dewestern catch up
paradigm, comes to be “appropriated” into the neoliberal “global” ecological surplus organized under the hegemony of Northern dominated financial institutions. In addition, then, to the exhaustion of indebted farmers, the neoliberal appropriation of the “green revolution” further threatens the ecological exhaustion of soil and water resources. The achievement of the “cheap food” regime of neoliberal agriculture, rather, thus, than reflecting increased rational use, expresses the deepening of the denial of the socio-ecological reproductive conditions of the agrarian lands of the South.

Conclusion: Neoliberal crisis

The ecological surplus appropriated in service of the neoliberal accumulation cycle would, in so much as it was premised upon a deepening of the ecological cost externalization of the green revolution and the discounting of the “right to live” of peasants and workers in the agrarian South, begin to manifest signs of its exhaustion as extra-human natures and agrarian social movements increasingly disrupted and contested the subjugated zone of appropriation. Most spectacularly, the food price shock of 2007/2008 and the food riots which followed, suggested, as Moore has argued, an end to the neoliberal cheap food regime and an exhaustion of the underlying ecological surplus from which it was provisioned. While Moore has centered the role of extra-human natures, such as superweeds, declining soil fertility, and arable land availability, in exhausting the surplus provisioning capacity of the long green revolution, I would further emphasize the significance of the re-emergence of the decolonial and dewestern rejection of the core Northern zone’s claim of “exclusive access to the planet’s resources.” The decolonial option finds its most evident expression in the radical socio-ecological resistance and alternatives forwarded by the global peasant movement la via campesina, while the dewestern movement is signified in the growing refusal of Southern states to submit to the “structural adjustment”
dictates of Northern dominated international financial institutions such as the WTO and IMF. This combination of the collapsing surplus provisioning capacity of the long green revolution, the “right to live” demands placed upon the Indian state by agrarian social movements, and the Southern challenge to the structural adjustment regime, constitute the neoliberal crisis context informing, I argue, the India-Ethiopia case as a “South-South” instance of the global land grab. I now turn, in the final chapter, to further elaborating, through the India-Ethiopia case, how the global land grab constitutes a potential “South-South” ecological surplus re-generating response to the neoliberal accumulation crisis.
Chapter 4: A decolonial world-ecological reading of the global land grab

In 2008, the Indian multinational agri-business firm, Karuturi, made international headlines when it signed an agreement to lease 300,000 hectares of land over a period of fifty years in the Gambella province of Ethiopia (Sethi, 2013). Having been offered what it believed to be a huge allotment of prime arable land for next to nothing (one dollar per hectare per year), Karuturi, at the time the world’s largest rose producer, framed the deal as key to realizing its ambitions of global supremacy in food production and distribution (Dubey, 2012). Dismissing those who critiqued the deal as a paradigmatic example of global land grabbing, the company, along with the Ethiopian government, claimed the land was either unused or not being put to proper use by the indigenous peoples of the province (Rowden, 2011; Dubey, 2012). Noting the incredibly rich organic content of Gambella’s soils, along with the abundance of water resources available in the Baro-Akobo river basin in which the land was located, Karuturi’s management expressed confidence that, with the proper application of modern industrial farming technology, the company would be able to extract from the land its full productive potential (Bose and Mehra, 2012). Such expectations were frustrated, however, by the very landscape that had seemed so inviting, as the Baro River repeatedly flooded Karuturi’s land concession, leaving the future viability of the investment in serious doubt, despite the company having invested a considerable sum of capital (Sethi, 2013; Davison, 2013). Rather than serve as the staging ground for its launch into global food supremacy, Gambella’s rich soil and abundant water sunk Karuturi, as the losses incurred left the company with insufficient capital to carry out the operations at its flagship rose farm in Kenya (Badrinath, 2014).
The spectacular rise and dramatic fall of the Karuturi agricultural project can be made sense of through the theoretical and historical framework of decolonial world-ecological agrarian question developed in chapters two and three. This chapter considers, as such, how the Gambella land grab, informed by the contradictions posed to Southern states such as India by the neoliberal accumulation crisis, mobilizes racialized world-ecological processes of global primitive accumulation that re-inaugurate the foundational Cortesian society/nature distinction in forging an emergent frontier zone of appropriation. It does so by focussing, first, on how the ecological exhaustion of the long green revolution and the “third movement” force of peasant resistance to the neoliberal zone of appropriation, while bringing the neoliberal accumulation cycle to crisis, pose particular problems, at both national and global scales, of ecological surplus re-generation to Southern states in pursuit of “development as-c catching-up-with-the-West” (Chakrabarty, 2010). In India, more specifically, the protective measures and large scale welfare schemes the national state has been forced to institute in response to counter-movements generated by the neoliberal agrarian crisis, when combined with the ecological exhaustion of India’s green revolution frontier, have contributed to a persistent problem of food price inflation that threatens the ongoing consolidation of capitalist development. Propelled, then, by the imperative of enhancing the agrarian surplus in order to secure the cheap food basis of capitalist development, the transnationalization of Indian agricultural production into the Gambella province of Ethiopia signifies the “triple movement” logic wherein the hegemonic resolution of the contradictions of primitive accumulation in the core national zone necessitates “global primitive accumulation” in extra-national spaces. The land grab in Gambella thus constructs the necessary frontier zone of unused nature that can be exhaustively drawn upon to provision India’s cheap food imperative.
Key to such frontier formation in Gambella, I will further argue, is the central role of racialization in collapsing indigenous peoples into the “inferior” sphere of unthinking “irrational” nature, and the corresponding elevation of a “superior” human rationality, embodied in the state-capital development nexus, uniquely capable of productive and efficient resource mobilization. Such a Cortesian epistemological framework privileges the “developmental” knowledge of the Ethiopian state and the “productive” knowledge of Indian capital as central to the urgent task of mastering nature and bringing dormant land to life, while at the same time it necessarily discounts the indigenous peoples and non-human life forms of Gambella as beings incapable of efficient and productive economic activity. However, as we have seen, such epistemic and ontological denial of the reproductive conditions of the frontier, while imperative for the production of nature as cheap or free, ultimately comes to exhaust such surplus provisioning. Thus, while such knowledge production and mobilization has been critical to Karuturi’s construction of the Gambella land concession as a staging ground for its launch into global prominence in agro-food provisioning, it has also proved fatal to the project, as the epistemological inability to incorporate indigenous knowledge that accounts for extra-human agency left the company dramatically unaware of the particular socio-ecological dynamics of the Baro River ecosystem on whose floodplain the land concession was located.

Land Grabbing and the crisis of the neoliberal accumulation cycle

The contemporary global land grabbing phenomenon references the rapid expansion of large scale agricultural land acquisitions, often of a transnational character, across much of the Global South in the aftermath of the global economic crisis of 2007-2008. An initial “literature rush” was propelled by journalists, NGOs, policy experts, and academics motivated by immediate empirical questions regarding the scope, actors, location, implementation, and
potential consequences of such large scale land grabbing (Edelman et al 2013; White et al, 2012; Borras et al, 2011; Wolford et al, 2013). Perhaps the most comprehensive overview of the rapid post-crisis increase in global agricultural land acquisitions was undertaken by the World Bank (2011), in a report titled *Rising Global Interest in Farmland*, where it argued that

> the demand for land has been enormous. Compared to an average annual expansion of global agricultural land of less than 4 million hectares before 2008, approximately 56 million hectares worth of large-scale farmland deals were announced even before the end of 2009. More than 70 percent of such demand has been in Africa; countries such as Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Sudan have transferred millions of hectares to investors in recent years. (Deininger and Byerlee 2011, xiv)

The early literature was further able to foreground important links between transnational land deals and the global economic crisis, particularly in terms of the key role played by surging food and commodity prices in motivating states and corporations across North and South to acquire “cheap” land wherever it could be found in order to secure food/fuel security (for states) and/or profits (for both agribusiness and financial corporations). However, the limitations of the immediate empirical focus of this initial “making sense period” were soon noted by critical scholars who sought to initiate a second phase of research more concerned with elaborating the deeper theoretical and historical significance of the land grab (Edelman et al, 2013). The point here was to advance theoretical and historical frameworks through which the immediate crisis context of the global land grab could be apprehended within the “*longue duree* of the development of capitalism,” and further elucidated through a “deepened engagement with long-standing discussions in agrarian political economy” (Edelman et al, 2013, 1528).

Primitive accumulation, a key concept, as we have seen, in historical materialist approaches to the emergence and development of capitalism, has been widely deployed by critical agrarian studies scholars in the efforts to situate land grab research within larger
theoretical and historical frameworks (Hall, 2013; Borras et al, 2012; Borras et al, 2011; White et al, 2012; Levien, 2015; Ilce, 2014; Makki, 2014; Makki and Geisler, 2014). In my estimation, however, such attempts, for the most part, have failed to move beyond the “Eurocentric-anthropocentric” frame of primitive accumulation critiqued in the first chapter. They have, in particular, interpreted the global rush for land precipitated by the global economic crisis as another moment of the extension of capitalist social relations – conceived narrowly as capital-labour – through processes of land enclosure that, in so much as they simultaneously transform land into capital and dispossess local land users, recall the historical origins of capitalism in rural England. The “origins-diffusion” framework suggested by such methodological internalism cannot adequately capture the relational global differentiations and historical specificities of the land grab/crises conjuncture within the longue duree of the capitalist world-ecology. It is for this reason that I have, throughout this dissertation, elaborated instead a concept of “global primitive accumulation” capable of apprehending the differential ontological categories ascribed, through enclosures, to the core “human” zone of commodification and the peripheral “extra-human” zones of appropriation. A similar critique has been advanced by Onar Ulas Ince (2014), who has undertaken a theoretically sophisticated “de-colonial” consideration of the applicability of primitive accumulation to the land grab. Concerned that the critical agrarian political economy approach to the land grab “ultimately risks miring the concept of primitive accumulation in a diffusionist imaginary, first in Europe, then elsewhere,” Ince argues that “one way to cast primitive accumulation in a nondiffusionist mold is to decenter the British experience and train our focus on the global topography of primitive accumulation” (109). In so doing, we will be more attentive to how what is at work in the land grab is “less a replay of the English enclosures
qua eviction of the peasantry but [more] an articulation of different social forms of production mediated and overdetermined by global circuits of capital’’ (125).

This expansive concept of global primitive accumulation is central, moreover, to the framework of decolonial world-ecological agrarian question through which this chapter situates the land grab/crises conjunctures as a moment of “contested transition” between contending state-capital blocs over the reconstitution of the accumulation capacity of the capitalist world-ecology. The conceptualization of the land grab as signifying a historically specific moment of transition between accumulation regimes, rather than standing as a “replay of the English enclosures,” has been thus far most significantly developed through McMichael’s food regime analysis which, in its foregrounding of the “contradictory dynamics” undermining the neoliberal corporate food regime, “situates the land grab as something other than simply a contemporary enclosure of land for capitalist expansion” (2012, 682; 2013; 2014). For McMichael, the key point of departure is that the “rush to acquire land…is symptomatic of a crisis of accumulation in the neoliberal globalization project” brought about by three converging forces: ecological exhaustion, agrarian counter-movements, and Southern state opposition to the Northern control of global food and agricultural relations via international organizations such as the WTO. These three forces each emphasize a deeper historical context to the food price crisis of 2007/2008 than what was suggested by the early land grab literature’s predominant focus on ephemeral factors such as commodity speculation and rising demand from the middle classes of emerging economies. An engagement with the deeper history of the food crisis, through an elaboration of what McMichael has identified as its three underlying forces, can further clarify how it signals both the undoing of the Northern dominated neoliberal corporate food regime and the ‘contested transition,’
embodied in the global land grab, towards an “increasingly multi-centric global food system” (McMichael, 2013, 684).

Ecological exhaustion of the Long Green Revolution

Informed by Moore’s world-ecological account of the rise and fall of successive accumulation cycles, ecological exhaustion as a determinative force of the food crisis references, for McMichael, the rising contradictions of the industrial agricultural production model – what Patel (2013) refers to as the “long Green Revolution” – which had earlier secured the ecological surplus of cheap food across both the developmental and neoliberal eras of the “long twentieth century” (Arrighi, 1994). The cheap food surplus of the long green revolution was provisioned through a furthering of the radical simplification and intensification of many of the frontier lands – from the American Midwest to the Punjab – converted to commercial agricultural production under the British led accumulation cycle of the long nineteenth century. Within the long green revolution paradigm, simplification involves the removal of non-value producing practices and life forms, such as fallow land and polycropping, in favour of the total dedication of land to a single crop (e.g. rice, wheat, corn, soy), which is then productively grown and harvested through the water intensive application of industrial inputs such as inorganic, petroleum based, fertilizers, chemical pesticides, and hybrid seeds (Moore, 2015; Patel, 2013; Weis, 2010). This institutes, then, a society/nature regime of “metabolic rift” wherein soil minerals and water resources can be intensively appropriated, and weeds/pests exterminated, without having to account for the costs that such appropriation and extermination impose on the reproductive conditions of the fertile soils and abundant waters being acted upon. In its initial stage, as an earlier engagement with Moore’s work has shown, such a denial of the reproductive conditions of the frontier lowers production costs in so much as it constructs “extra-human” nature as a provisioner of “free gifts”
such as soil fertility. During its specific upward swing from the 1950s to the 1970s, the massive, historically unparalleled, agricultural productivity gains of the long green revolution were achieved through the intensive application of the free gift of cheap oil, in the form of petroleum based fertilizers and tractors, upon the free gift of fertile soils in the agricultural heartlands of the capitalist world-ecology (Moore, 2015, 252; Weis, 2010, 320).

As Moore further argues, however, the industrial model of the long green revolution has not resolved, once and for all, humanity’s food problem, as its promoters promised, but rather has increasingly confronted the exhaustion of the “free gifts” and the increasing resistance posed to extermination by extra-human natures such as “superweeds” and “superpests” (2010, 400). Thus, the steady deterioration of soil fertility, on account of the disruption to nutrient recycling effected by monocropping and inorganic fertilizer use, contributed, from the mid-1980s onward, to the marked slowdown of global agricultural yield growth in relation to world population growth (Weiss, 2010; Patnaik, 2009). Of perhaps even greater significance, the capacity to maintain some measure of yield growth has necessitated that declining soil fertility be offset by the even more intensive application of increasingly costly industrial fertilizers and pesticides (Weiss, 2010, 320). This rising capitalization of industrial agriculture, as capital is now forced to carry the costs that “extra-human” natures increasingly refuse to bear, figures centrally into the reversal of the neoliberal cheap food regime and its ultimate denouement in the food price crisis of 2007/2008 (Moore, 2010, 391). Such entrenchment of a secular, or irreversible, rise in agricultural capitalization and food costs, in so much as it further increases the reproductive costs of labour, signals, for Moore, the historical onset of the ecological exhaustion of the accumulation capacity of the neoliberal cycle.
Countermovements to the neoliberal agrarian crisis

In largely focussing on the evident centrality of the ecological exhaustion of industrial agriculture to the neoliberal accumulation crisis, Moore, along with more “eco-centric” analyses (Weis, 2010), risks, however, covering over the key role played by cultivators and labourers in the “agrarian South” to both the constitution of the neoliberal cheap food surplus (via the appropriation of national agricultural space) and its potential exhaustion. While Moore does, significantly, link the achievement of the neoliberal cheap food regime to the debt-enforced “structural adjustment” of the national agricultures of the South towards an export-orientation (2015, 259-264), he does not take into serious analytical consideration the role played, in bringing the neoliberal regime to crisis, by the determinative resistance exercised by those subject to the exhaustive appropriation unleashed by structural adjustment. It is precisely such concerns which have motivated this dissertation, as seen in chapters two and three, to stage a conversation between world-ecology and decolonial theory in order to elaborate a framework – the decolonial world-ecological agrarian question – capable of foregrounding both the racialized/colonial basis of the ecological surplus and the decolonial basis of exhaustion. Specifying the triple movement dynamic securing, and undermining, the particular global agrarian transition associated with each accumulation cycle, my own argument, as shown in the previous chapter, locates the neoliberal cheap food regime as an expression of the Northern re-appropriation of the agricultural surpluses the “dewestern” catch up orientation of Southern states had sought to protect and appropriate in the service of rapid national industrial development. The racialized dimensions of the neoliberal cheap food regime are expressed both in its organizing conceptual premise regarding the “irrationality” imposed on Southern agricultural land use by protected national agricultural sectors, and in the re-affirmation, as a
result of the switch from national developmental to export orientated agriculture, of historical colonial patterns of over/underconsumption (Araghi, 2003, 2009).

While the neoliberal re-appropriation of the South’s agricultural surplus was vital, as argued in chapter 3, to the resolution of the double movement contradiction in the North between the imperative of wage repression and the “right to live” demand of labour movements, it ultimately had to contend with the “third movement” launched in advocacy of more sustaining “decolonial” socio-ecological co-productions of the peoples and natures of the “agrarian South.”

Arising out of the agrarian crisis – rising indebtedness and dispossession, stagnating yields, declining food availability – enveloping much of the South during the neoliberal regime as a result of the removal of protective trade controls and input/output subsidies, peasants across the South collectively organized to pressure their respective states to refuse the dictates of Northern dominated institutions and further advanced, outside the formal state system, the radical decolonial option of “food sovereignty” in place of the impoverished neoliberal market based conception of food security. The decolonial character of the food sovereignty movement rejected the racialized Cortesian premise of the capitalist society/nature distinction by reimagining food production and consumption as socio-ecological relations co-productively sustaining, through more localized and organic cultivation and circulation of food, the health of “extra-human” natures, such as soil and water, in addition to the livelihoods of peasants and labourers in the agrarian South.

The force of this “third movement” against the cheap food premise of the neoliberal accumulation cycle manifested in the rising pressure exerted, through protest and ballot, upon the states of the South to more actively contest structural adjustment imperatives, and in the physical disruption of successive WTO ministerials in Seattle (1999), Cancun (2001), and Hong Kong
(2005) by large-scale street actions organized by international peasant movements, such as la via campesina. Pressured internally by rising peasant protests, and emboldened internationally by the growing consensus amongst transnational social movements regarding the gross injustice, in favour of Northern states, of the WTO’s agricultural regime, Southern states aligned to reject the conditions that were sought to be imposed upon them during the WTO’s Doha round (Hopewell, 2015). McMichael (2012) has been exceptional amongst land grab scholars in foregrounding the role played by the Southern challenge, both at the state and social movement scale, in bringing the neoliberal regime to crisis, arguing succinctly that

Southern state opposition to the hypocrisy of Northern ‘food dumping’ contributed to the breakdown of the Doha Round and WTO paralysis in the first decade of the twenty-first century, accompanied by a mushrooming ‘food sovereignty’ countermovement with an alternative vision of democratic food security arrangements embedded in socio-ecological relations on local and regional scales. These institutional and political-economic contradictions combined with the reversal of food price trends in 2007-2008 as cheap food came to an end (682).

Concretely, the opposition to the Doha round was accompanied by the re-introduction of a variety of protective measures, ranging from trade controls to input/output subsidies,\(^{10}\) which further undermined the organizing socio-ecological relations of the neoliberal cheap food regime.

Focussing on the convergence between the Southern challenge to the WTO regime and the ecological exhaustion of the long green revolution in our reading of the neoliberal accumulation crisis clarifies the particular propulsion the latter gives to the global land grab.

While the rising capitalization of green revolution agriculture, in the form of intensified fertilizer and pesticide application to offset soil deterioration and “super weeds/pests,” raises food prices

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\(^{10}\) Trade controls, particularly on the export of food, were intensified by Southern nations in the context of the 2008 food crisis (Mittal, 2010). With regards to farmer and consumer support subsidies, both India and Brazil, for example, increased the level of input and food subsidies in order to reduce costs for farmers and prices for consumers (Lerche, 2013; Hopewell, 2015; McMichael, 2012).
and threatens the neoliberal wage repression strategy, the Southern rejection of the unprotected opening of its agricultural sectors to the dictates of the “free” global market problematizes efforts to re-secure a global ecological surplus through neoliberal governance technologies. In my estimation, this further exacerbates the existential crisis that Moore (2010) argues the neoliberal crisis poses for the reconstitution of the accumulation capacity of the capitalist world ecology. For Moore, as opposed to earlier cycles of surplus and exhaustion, capital, in its post-neoliberal moment, confronts the potential impossibility, on account of the arguably planetary scale of exhaustion, of the reconstruction of the frontier zone of “unused” externalized nature. Such a challenge of constructing and mobilizing the frontier is all the more enhanced in a context in which Southern states increasingly reject dependence upon transnational agricultural markets dominated by Northern agribusinesses, as was witnessed in the increased controls on agricultural trade imposed by Southern states as an initial response to the food crisis. As I will argue further below, the land grab, and particularly its South-South dimensions, is forged out of the capitalist world ecology’s dual necessity, however materially impossible, of constructing the necessary “post-WTO” global governance regime which can legitimize new frontiers of unused nature capable of overcoming the exhaustion of the long green revolution and neoliberal “North-South” geopolitical relations.

Capitalist development’s fundamental dependence upon “cheap nature,” organized as it is through the Cortesian racialized society/nature ontology, compels state-capital blocs, seeking hegemony in the reconstituted accumulation cycle, to attempt to overcome neoliberal exhaustion and forge a new ecological surplus through the construction and mobilization of new frontiers of unused nature. This frontier pursuit, I argue, has been a central propulsive force driving the global land grab in general, as much of the rapid proliferation in large scale agricultural
investments has been mobilized by the belief, promoted by the World Bank in multiple post-crisis reports, that there is tremendous profit to be realized through the closing of what it characterizes as the “yield gap,” which represents the difference between current and potential production levels on land identified as either ‘unused’ or ‘under-used’ (Deininger and Byerlee, 2011, xxviii; McMichael, 2012). Viewed through our “post-Cortesian” lens, elucidating as it does the socio-ecological foundations of even the most “pristine” landscapes, the yield gap conceptual premise functions as a technology of “misanthropic skepticism” enabling the appropriation and erasure of the socio-ecological knowledge and practice of the indigenous inhabitants of those frontier lands whose productive capacity has been hitherto wasted. Beyond the individual profits to be gained, the closing of the yield gap, through the rational application of the necessary capital and scale to “underused” land, is represented as having the potential to satisfy the general systemic demand for affordable food supplies, and, in so doing, resolve both capital’s accumulation crisis and the developmental crisis of states in the South (Deininger and Byerlee, 2011; McMichael, 2012).

South-South relations of land-grabbing

A key distinction, though, from previous global transition conjunctures resolved through conventional “North-South” relations, wherein Northern based “rational” agencies act upon the “irrational” South as “unit of nature,” consists of the evident prominence of “South-South” relations of global land grabbing. Leading Southern states – particularly those included within the BRICS designation – have furthered, it seems, their challenge to the WTO regime by actively seeking to secure a post-crisis world ecological surplus of “cheap nature” through emergent South-South trade and investment frameworks capable of overriding the domination of the international food trade by Northern agribusiness. This distinctive feature of the
contemporary land grab corresponds with the rising geopolitical assertiveness of Southern powers seen more generally in the post-crisis context, and which has generated considerable debate, amongst critical scholars within the fields of international relations and development studies, regarding the “emancipatory” implications of the “rise of the South” for the international state system and global political economy. While some have argued that the increased prominence of “South-South” relations embody the spirit of a “new Bandung” (Arrighi, 2007; Nederveen Pieterse, 2011; Desai, 2013), wherein the emancipatory promise of Southern “autonomy” and “de-linking” from Northern dominance is finally realized, other positions have emphasized that, in so far as rising Southern assertiveness is invested in the renewal of global capitalist accumulation, it constitutes a fundamental break from the decolonial and anticapitalist promise of earlier Southern advocacy in support of a “New International Economic Order” (Cammack, 2012; Bond, 2016; Golub, 2013). Advancing such a position, Golub argues that the major actors of this systemic shift are realising what generations of nationalist anticolonial and postcolonial leaders had fought for – upward mobility and greater international equality through a redistribution of world power at economic and political levels – by embracing and restructuring the world capitalist system from within rather than by exiting it from without (1002).

It is further argued, by Bond (2016) and Cammack (2012), that this Southern embrace of global capitalism does not signify a fundamental challenge to Northern imperialism, as the latter instead accepts, and even encourages, the “rise of the South” as a “sub-imperialist” motor necessary for the post-crisis renewal of accumulation. For Golub, this “role of postcolonial states as drivers of a new phase of capitalist globalisation has blurred and in some cases completely erased the emancipatory message and critical vision of early anticolonial nationalism” (1002). This erasure reflects, in particular, how such capitalist globalisation, even in its “South-South” guise, must reproduce the exhaustive and hierarchical socio-ecological premises of capitalist development.
When the role of Southern states and corporations in advancing the global land grab is taken into account, some IR scholars have argued that the new global inequalities produced through such actions reveal that, rather than presaging a challenge to the injustices of global capitalism, the implications of the “rise of the South,” for the transformation of the international political system, consists of the declining relevance of the “North-South” framework for the analysis and interpretation of global poverty and inequality. Margulis and Porter (2013) have, for instance, argued that “the institutional arrangements associated with US dominance and the earlier colonial period of land grabbing are being replaced by more complex, polycentric ones operating in an increasingly multipolar global political economy, rendering the previous North-South and West-East cleavages less relevant” (66), a key implication of which is that “traditional concepts of South-South solidarity or other traditional forms of interstate political conflict are therefore less relevant to understanding the [contemporary] type of global politics of land grabbing” (79). Furthering such a thesis, McMichael (2013), while centering Southern resistance in the collapse of what he terms the market based “corporate food regime” of the neoliberal era, expresses concern over the social and ecological implications of transition, embodied in the global land grab, towards what he has identified as a polycentric “security-mercantilist” food regime governing the transnational production and circulation of cheap food. Expressing a deep mistrust of the Northern dominated global agricultural commodity trade, leading Southern states have engaged, through direct offshore land acquisition “for the purpose of repatriating agricultural products,” in a post-crisis project of what McMichael describes as “‘re-territorialization…designed to avoid dependence on markets, or more particularly, market intermediaries. Thus: ‘China wants to cut out the soy middleman. It clearly does not trust the large American-owned commodity traders like Cargill and Bunge’” (2013, 50-51). In so far,
however, as such “re-territorialization” is effected through coercive ‘land grabs,’ involving the displacement of indigenous peoples in order to make way for the expansion of ecologically destructive large scale industrial agriculture, the “polycentrism” of the emergent “security-mercantilist” food regime further questions the usefulness of “North-South” as a marker of international inequality and “South-South” as a marker of emancipatory solidarity.

While such skepticism is important, particularly in so much as it helps to uncover the appropriation and exploitation obscured by the language of “South-South” solidarity and cooperation in agriculture (Mittal, 2013), it itself risks obscuring, under the guise of an emergent equivalence between North and South, how North-South hierarchies, and the importance of challenging them through South-South trade and partnerships, remain significant, even in the land grab. For Fantu Cheru and his collaborators (2013), who have been prominent amongst those calling for cautious optimism regarding the emancipatory potential of “South-South” agricultural projects on the African continent, the latter have been unfairly weighed down by the burden of the history of European colonialism in Africa. It should not, in other words, be a priori assumed that the rise in “South-South” transnational agricultural investments in Africa constitute a replay of the grossly extractive, rather than productive, role played historically by the “foreign direct investment” of colonial powers in the “underdevelopment” of African agriculture. Cheru et al further question why the charge of “neocolonialism” has been “disproportionately directed against foreign investors from China and India, while Western investors have not been labelled ‘neocolonialists’ and ‘land grabbers,’” even though “Western multinationals are still the largest investors in African agriculture” (26). Troubled by the “infantilization” of Africa that this suggests – namely, that African states are passive in South-South partnerships – Cheru et al instead seek to center the agency of the African state in attempting to leverage the rising
investment capacity of the “emerging economies” of the South in order to overcome the
dependence upon Western aid and investment that marked the post-Cold War international order. A key distinction, moreover, between emergent South-South partnerships and the North-South investment pattern consists of the unique perspective on appropriate technologies and practices for enhancing agricultural productivity that Southern states can transfer to one another on account of the similar challenges they confront in overcoming the historical declines of their national agricultural sectors during the neoliberal era.

The drive on the part of African states to leverage Southern investment capacity in order to increase agricultural production, and thereby lessen dependence upon Northern dominated aid and international food markets, might lead us to question the utility of the concept of the “land grab” to describe what are, in fact, consensual transfers of land from host governments to investing states and corporations. However, the utility of the land grab concept is better apprehended when we consider that the land identified for transfer reflects the racialized distinctions of frontier formation forged “internally” by states quite explicitly informed by an “agrarian transition” imperative. In other words, the emergence of the “land grab as development strategy” (Lavers, 2012) reflects an understanding by African policy makers that “underused” land must be mobilized to provision the cheap food necessary for transition from agrarian to industrial based economy. The land identified as such often belongs to communities involved in forms of nomadic pastoralism and shifting cultivation that the state views as an obstacle, in so much as such land uses leave productive land fallow for long periods of time, to productive development. The permanent settlement, or displacement, of these communities, is thus necessary in order to transfer the lands they inhabit to investors. Rather than the aggressive takeover of land from weaker African states by the emerging economies of the South, the “land
“grab” is thus better conceptualized as the collaborative appropriation of the lands of marginalized indigenous groups by both host and investor states united in their pursuit of an ecological surplus of “cheap food” capable of initiating, or renewing, the path of industrial capitalist development.

Rather than conclude that such displacement indeed reaffirms the declining relevance of the frames of “North-South” inequality or “South-South” solidarity, my own position is that the “South-South” dimensions of the global land grab reveal the renewed prominence of what, following Mignolo, was identified in the previous chapter as the rewestern/dewestern “dispute for the control of coloniality.” While this dispute involves, as in the earlier national developmental era, the suspension of the more radical decolonial option, in this case the food sovereignty movement, the dewestern project to re-appropriate Southern lands and resources in the service of the “catch up” imperative constitutes, as Mignolo himself argues, an important challenge to the reduction of the South as “unit of nature” for the North. The land grab signifies, then, a medium of contestation over the control of the production and mobilization of the frontier necessary for underwriting the expanded reconstitution of the accumulation capacity of the capitalist world-ecology. For Southern actors, the significance of such a contestation consists in the degree to which land grabbing potentiates the world-scale relations necessary for overcoming the obstacles that have contributed to what Li identifies as the “truncated agrarian transition” in the south. As we have seen, however, the dewestern project of converging with the North through global agrarian transition, in so much as it is premised upon a cheap food strategy, must necessarily reinstantiate the racialized society/nature distinction of capitalist development. I will now specify the historical context and argument mapped out here through the case of the collaborative land grabbing initiated by the Indian and Ethiopian states, along with Indian capital, in the peripheral Ethiopian province of Gambella.
The Rise and Fall of the Gambella Land Grab

The “cheap food” imperative and the transnationalization of Indian agricultural production

From the late 1990s to mid-2000s, the Indian agricultural sector, on account of the rising socio-ecological contradictions besetting the neoliberal world-ecology which we detailed in the previous chapter, was in the throes of a deep and persistent agrarian crisis marked by increasing indebtedness, declining food availability, and stagnating yield growth. With farming increasingly an untenable livelihood, many small and medium scale producers were subject to market-based displacement and, in the extreme, indebtedness fed into a tragic epidemic of farmer suicides (Reddy and Mishra, 2010). The agrarian crisis in India reflected the convergence of the ecological exhaustion of the green revolution and the neoliberal subjection of agricultural production to the dictates of the global market. With soils deteriorating, and weeds and pests proving more resilient, farmers were forced over time to substantially increase the rate of fertilizer and pesticide use, thereby raising the cost of production (Ghosh, 2011; Yadav, 2013). The implementation of the neoliberal removal of public supports, in the form of public infrastructural investment, input/output subsidies and trade controls, only further tilted the balance between costs and prices more unfavourably against Indian farmers (Reddy and Sharma, 2010). For lower income consumers of food, stagnating yield growth combined with a growing export orientation to reduce the overall availability of food grains, thereby resulting in increasing levels of malnutrition and hunger amongst marginalized social groups in India (Patnaik, 2003, 2011; Reddy and Mishra, 2010).

The crisis was further exacerbated by the neoliberal Indian state’s strategy of expediting “agrarian transition” – all the more necessary, it was claimed, on account of the faltering
agricultural sector – by forcefully acquiring land from farmers, via the colonial land acquisition act, for the purpose of instituting “special economic zones” (SEZs) where higher value goods could be produced for export (Levien, 2011). Following the classical capitalist script, SEZs were represented as essential to India’s development trajectory, as they promised to both increase outlets of profitability for global and domestic capital and transfer labour out of the low paying agricultural sectors and into the higher waged industrial sectors (Vaswani, 2006). Such a script, as we have seen, however, is constructed on a false premise, one that specifically forgets the historical role that “settler-colonial” migration has played in providing an outlet for the surplus labour that the industrial sector is incapable of absorbing. In the absence of such a settler-colonial option, the SEZ strategy only further contributed, alongside the neoliberal agrarian policy regime, to increase the under-employment crisis triggered by neoliberal dispossession and displacement (Rawat, Bushan, and Surepally, 2011).

However much it reflected the necessary “cost externalization” strategy of the neoliberal cheap food regime, the agrarian crisis proved unsustainable within the context of the legitimation imperative that Kalyan Sanyal (2007) has suggested constitutes the distinctive logic of “postcolonial capitalism” in Southern states such as India. The rights based legacy of decolonization, wherein all citizens of postcolonial India are constitutionally accorded the “right to live,” has, argues Sanyal, posed serious obstacles in the way of efforts, by either the state or capital, to further capitalist development via processes of primitive accumulation (185). While it is clear that such a right to live has been unevenly distributed, with subaltern groups, such as tribals, Dalits, and peasants, bearing a particularly disproportionate burden of the costs of India’s postcolonial development trajectory, these same groups, through the avenues for contestation opened to them through postcolonial electoral democracy, have forced what Partha Chatterjee
(2008), in an important elaboration of Sanyal’s thesis, has identified as an “economic transformation” towards the distinctive regime of “postcolonial capitalism.” For Sanyal, as opposed to the historical Western European experience,

the context today has changed radically and the conditions of capital’s reproduction have become far more complex. The discourses of democracy and human rights have emerged and consolidated themselves to form an inescapable and integral part of the political and social order. As relatively autonomous discourses, they have constituted an environment within which capital has to reproduce itself. A crucial condition of that reproduction is that the victim of primitive accumulation be addressed in terms of what Michel Foucault has called ‘governmentality’—interventions on the part of the developmental state (and non-state organizations) to promote the well-being of the population—and what I identify as a reversal of primitive accumulation refers to this realm of welfarist governmentality: the creation of the need economy is an imperative of governance. (60)

In other words, the dispossession and immiseration effected by capital’s reproduction via primitive accumulation simultaneously generates, through the “discourses of democracy and human rights,” a legitimation crisis for capital which can only be resolved through a “reversal of primitive accumulation.” It is thus that Sanyal argues that “it is this simultaneous process of primitive accumulation and its reversal…that characterizes the arising of capital in the post-colonial context” (61). In so far as postcolonial capital proves incapable of absorbing the totality of labour released by primitive accumulation, the denial of access to non-commodified means of social reproduction, particularly for those rendered surplus, must, in order to “secure the legitimation of its [postcolonial capital’s] existence,” be reversed through the institution of welfare schemes which enable the “dispossessed producers inhabiting the outside [to] be reunited with means of labour so that they can subsist by engaging in economic activities outside the domain of capital” (59).

Sanyal associates the emergence of the distinctive form of “postcolonial capitalism” with the legitimation crisis posed soon after independence by the “failure of [economic] growth to
improve the conditions of the poor,” which subsequently forced the state to implement, within the green revolution paradigm of the 1970s and 1980s, large scale welfare schemes “aimed at improving the condition of small and marginal farmers on the one hand, and creating employment opportunities for the landless agricultural labourers and artisans, on the other” (186). This original articulation of “postcolonial capitalism” was quickly taken apart, as we have seen, by the renewed project of “global primitive accumulation” marking the neoliberal accumulation cycle. In particular, Sanyal argues that the “universal regime of property rights and market rules…enforced by the WTO is severely circumscribing the post-colonial nation states by denying them the space” to effect the reversal of primitive accumulation. However, the latter’s constitutive force – the sustained rights based mobilization of subaltern social groups – would be re-activated in response to the resulting agrarian crisis, the evidence of which was most powerfully seen in the 2004 general election where the “unabashed neoliberal agenda” of the ruling BJP was rejected in favour of the United Progressive Alliance coalition which had centered its campaign on a “critique of the NDA’s reforms in neo-liberal style and its consequences in terms of inequality, unemployment, and loss of livelihood” (250). While the UPA government, in its guiding governance framework – the Common Minimum Program – remained, on the one hand, committed to the path of industrial capitalist development, it was compelled, on the other, to mitigate, or reverse, the effects of primitive accumulation entailed by such a path. This consolidation of the distinctive logic of postcolonial capitalism under the UPA government specifically involved the enactment of several large welfare schemes and protective measures – the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA), Land Acquisition Act, Food Security Act, and Forest Rights Act – which combined to contain and
reverse the impacts of neoliberal primitive accumulation by provisioning dispossessed surplus labour with access to non-market means of social reproduction.

In so much as such concrete forms of reversal clashed with the WTO’s “universal regime of property rights and market rules,” as was particularly the case with the Food Security Act, the Indian state was compelled to assume greater leadership of the Southern resistance to Northern hegemony during the WTO Doha round (Hopewell, 2015). In the immediate context of the 2008 food and financial crisis, such resistance was informed, as India’s trade minister at the time argued, by “concern about the livelihood of poor and subsistence farmers,” and centered in particular upon the right of Southern states to impose trade controls and institute subsidy programs (Stewart, 2008). This insistence on placing the “right to live” ahead of the cost repression premise of profit maximization would bring the Doha round into a state of paralysis from which it would not recover, as India, along with other Southern states, ignored WTO norms in responding to the food crisis with enhanced input subsidies and a higher tariff regime for agricultural products.

As a result of these “reversals of primitive accumulation,” some observers have argued that India has been able to lessen the severity of the agrarian crisis (Lerche, 2013). In particular, the MNREGA has functioned to guarantee living wages for dispossessed surplus labour, while many of the other measures have secured the land rights of farmers and forest dwellers, and increased food availability. This non-market based livelihood security, in so far as it secures legitimation for postcolonial capital, signifies, for Sanyal, the transcendence of the agrarian question’s “transition” problematic for postcolonial states. While the agrarian question centers upon the transfer of capital and labour, through primitive accumulation, into commodified industrial production, the impossibility of the totality of surplus labour being absorbed by
postcolonial capital truncates the agrarian transition. This “truncated agrarian transition” has been identified by Li as definitive of the development impasse confronting states across the South, and she thus follows Bernstein in pivoting towards an “agrarian question of labour” focussed upon the problem of accounting for the livelihoods of redundant surplus labour. Li, in this sense, converges with Sanyal and Chatterjee in thinking beyond the “transition” problematic of transferring such labour into commodified industrial production, emphasizing instead that politically mobilized peasants and labourers can resolve their livelihood crisis through securing the “reversal of primitive accumulation,” or what Li calls the “right to live,” from the state. Li further follows Sanyal and Chatterjee in centering the large scale welfare schemes of the UPA government, and particularly the MNREGA and Food Security Act, as indicative of the sorts of “right to live” measures necessary for resolving the “truncated agrarian transition.” The persistence of peasants and surplus labour in spaces of non-capital need not, in other words, signify a “lack” of transition, but rather can, and indeed does in the Indian context, represent the “complex hegemonic” order of postcolonial capital wherein the latter’s legitimation imperative calls forth the provisioning of non-market based means of social reproduction.

A significant blind spot, however, of Sanyal’s formulation of “postcolonial capitalism” consists of an apparent inability to recognize that the simultaneous advance and reversal of primitive accumulation recalls the Polanyian double movement dynamics of European agrarian transition across the long 19th century. Li, by contrast, has explicitly conceptualized the MNREGA and Food Security Act as recalling the “right to live” measures that were necessary for securing the “classical” English agrarian transition. Indeed, this is how Sanyal’s thesis, and Chatterjee’s elaboration, were interpreted by scholars debating its relevance in a recent collection
of essays regarding “understanding India’s new political economy” (Corbridge et al, 2012). The editors of this collection asked in particular

to what extent can one understand the changes that have taken place in the Indian political economy through the idea of a ‘double movement,’ to use Karl Polanyi’s well-known phrase developed in reference to the historical European case, in which the attempt to create a market-oriented society from above compels a movement from below to moderate its severely dislocating effects? (Corbridge et al, 2011, 2)

Thus, rather than signifying a distinctive break from earlier forms of transition and accumulation, Sanyal’s thesis works better if reformulated to argue that postcolonial capitalism re-affirms the foundational double movement – conceived here as the advance and reversal of primitive accumulation – which has historically constituted the legitimating conditions of capitalist development.

More significantly, attention to the longer history of the double movement compromise reveals, as we saw in chapter three, that “reversals of primitive accumulation” are, paradoxically, key to both the hegemonic consolidation and crisis of capitalist development and accumulation. In other words, the re-introduction of non-commodified bases of social reproduction, while necessary for the hegemonic incorporation of the surplus labour that capital is structurally incapable of absorbing, proves in short order to be incompatible with the cost repression imperative of capital’s accumulation drive. Neither Sanyal, Chatterjee, nor Li, recognize this potentiality of the reversal of primitive accumulation to bring forth an accumulation crisis, and they thus cannot further consider, within their “methodologically nationalist” analyses, how both state and capital are subsequently compelled to search out other avenues for cost repression capable of resolving the contradictory imperatives of the double movement. In the case of the post-neoliberal reconstitution of Indian postcolonial capitalism, the welfare schemes and protective measures constituting “reversals of primitive accumulation” have compromised the
“cheap” nature’s premise of capitalist accumulation by raising, through the MNREGA, agricultural wages, and imposing higher costs, through the reformed Land Acquisition Act and Forest Rights Act, on attempts, by either state or capital, to consolidate large-scale agriculture through frontier expansion. These “obstacles” to capital have combined with the even more substantial rise in costs associated with the ecological exhaustion of the green revolution to generate, for the first time since the late 1960s/1970s, a crisis of persistent food price inflation (Bhattacharya and Gupta, 2015). While the origins of India’s food price crisis coincides with the more generalized global food price hike of 2007, it has been “striking that even after global food inflation moderated, Indian food inflation persisted” (Gokarn, 2011). An increase in food prices, particularly in India where food occupies a substantial portion of household costs, has the effect of raising production costs more generally and thus constrains the accumulation capacity of postcolonial capital. It is for this reason that both Indian capital and the Indian state have been increasingly preoccupied with resolving the food price inflation which has persisted since 2007 (Anand, Kumar, Tulin, 2016).

It is important to note here that the reversal of primitive accumulation through welfare schemes such as the MNREGA and protective measures such as the Forest Rights Act, though generating inflationary crisis for capitalist development, can, if viewed from an alternative socio-ecological lens, represent restorative rather than crisis inducing measures. This has been noted by Jayati Ghosh, who has suggested that the MNREGA, through challenging capital’s cheap nature’s premise, can advance what McMichael and Schneider have referred to as agrarian labour practices regenerating, rather than exhausting, soil fertility. Ghosh (2011) argues that what may be most alarming of all is how farming costs have been rising because of much heavier input use, which is required because of declining soil fertility and degradation of land. But this is something that the MNREGA can help to fix, because it can be used to
engage in activities that improve soil quality over time. Indeed, it is precisely on this issue – of halting the drastic decline in land productivity and enabling more sustainable input use – that both farmers and rural workers can be brought under the MNREGA. This would involve, specifically, a shift from petroleum based capital intensive industrial agriculture to labour intensive agriculture oriented more towards socio-ecologically sustainable production. Moreover, the Forest Rights Act (FRA) has the potential to redress the historical cost externalization that has been inflicted upon forests and their inhabitants through their reduction to key frontiers of “cheap nature” across both the colonial and postcolonial eras. In centering, rather than denying, the co-production of the forests’ socio-ecology through indigenous knowledge, practice, and extra-human agency, the FRA, if properly implemented to empower “forest dwellers with the authority over decision-making and forest governance,” enables communities to manage “forests sustainably for meeting their needs relating to food, livelihoods and ecosystem services” (RRI, 2015).

However, the radical decolonial promise of the “reversals of primitive accumulation,” in so much as it threatens the foundational basis of the capitalist development path through which Indian state and capital remain committed to “development as catching-up-with-the-West,” compels both state and capital to search out frontiers of cheap natures, particularly those that can relieve the persistent food price crisis by enhancing supply. In light of the “postcolonial capitalist” compromise and the exhaustion of the green revolution, such frontier formation is increasingly foreclosed within India. This point has been made by official reports on food inflation, which, as the deputy governor of the Reserve Bank of India has argued, show that though “there is no alternative to curbing food inflation than raising supply rapidly…raising productivity is itself a serious challenge, given the pressures emanating from both labour costs and, over the longer horizon, what appears to be a structural reduction in the absolute amount of
rainfall” (Gokarn, 2011). This “serious challenge” of internally securing cheap food is all the more pronounced when further costs, notably the severe deterioration in soil fertility, water table collapse, and the land constraint imposed by social movements, are taken into account. At the same time, however, the existing international framework for “externally” securing cheap food is proving inadequate as India, like other “rising” Southern states, has grown “wary of relying on global markets [for enhancing food supply] due to the volatility in supply and prices,” particularly in so much as such “volatility of global food market prices is due in part to the increasing dominance of international grain and food markets by a handful of international corporations who use their position to extract windfall profits” (Rowden, 2011). In challenging the WTO regime upholding such a Northern dominated global market, the Indian state can thus be seen to be simultaneously advocating for the “livelihood of poor and subsistence farmers” and seeking to construct the enabling conditions through which Indian capital can provision the necessary world-ecological surplus “autonomously” of the North.

It is thus that we can make sense of the juxtaposition of the collapse of the Doha round in 2008 with the organization, in that same year, of the first India-Africa forum. This initial forum was particularly centered on how such a South-South partnership could be of mutual benefit in advancing food security and agricultural development. From the Indian perspective, Africa was clearly understood as containing large frontiers of “unused nature” that could potentially resolve India’s food price crisis, with Indian observers noting in particular that “Africa has 60 percent of the world’s uncultivated arable land, making it ripe for a green revolution of the kind that changed Brazil and large parts of Asia” (Mitra and Bhuvaa, 2011). Based upon such conditions, the Indian commerce minister argued that “agriculture is one of the seven priority sectors of India’s engagement with Africa…we import pulses and we will be more supportive of more land
being brought under cultivation and for value addition – and India is the market” (cited in Rowden, 2011). This promotion of an offshoring food production strategy, where cheap food in particular is secured through preferential bilateral frameworks rather than the “free” global market, reflects the shift, seen concretely through initiatives such as the India-Africa forum, from the neoliberal corporate food regime to what McMichael has referred to as an emergent “security-mercantilist food regime.”

The crisis generated for India’s capitalist development path by the “reversal of primitive accumulation,” and, more importantly, the impetus that its attempted “cheap food” resolution gives towards the transnationalization of agricultural production, reveals a significant limitation of the frameworks through which India’s “new political economy” is read as a successful compromise between the imperatives of capital accumulation and those of livelihood security for surplus labour. In so far as Sanyal’s “postcolonial capitalism,” Li’s “agrarian question of labour,” and Chatterjee’s “democratic economic transformation,” foreclose, in their methodological nationalism, a global view of India’s ongoing agrarian question, these approaches prove incapable of recognizing the link between India’s participation in global land grabbing and the “complex hegemonic” (primitive accumulation and its reversal) order of its “new political economy.” By contrast, the framework of decolonial world-ecological agrarian question, as elaborated in chapters two and three of this dissertation, articulates this link as being reflective of the racialized ontology of the capitalist world-ecology wherein the hegemonic resolution of the capital-labour contradiction remains dependent upon the construction of an external zone of unused nature where “rightless” beings are incapable of making “right to live” claims. In this particular case, and viewed through a triple, rather than double, movement lens, the hegemonic resolution of the contradictions of primitive accumulation in the “core” national
space of India calls forth, though the practice of “global primitive accumulation,” the construction of frontiers of unused nature in an emergent African zone of appropriation. As an examination of the expansion of Indian agricultural production into the Gambella province of Ethiopia reveals, the cheap food provisioned from the frontier remains premised upon the “Cortesian” racialized appropriation and erasure of indigenous knowledge and practice.

However, it is important to foreground that the Gambella frontier is not, recalling Cheru et al.’s concern that land grabbing literature too often reduces African states to passive objects in transnational land acquisitions, solely imposed by active Indian agencies upon passive African objects. Rather, the core constituencies of the Ethiopian state have been central to Gambella’s conceptualization as a frontier of unused nature by drawing on long standing “internal” racialized distinctions between “civilized” highlanders and “primitive” lowlanders. It is necessary, therefore, to clarify how India’s agricultural expansion into Gambella is actively enabled and embraced by the Ethiopian state in its own pursuit of a cheap food strategy capable of advancing the national project of agrarian transition.

The “internal” frontier in the Ethiopian “land grab as development strategy”

Included within the World Bank’s identification of yield gap regions (Deininger et al, 2011, 189), the Gambella province of Ethiopia has been a particularly prominent, and controversial, site of the global land grab, due in large measure to the attention it has attracted from international human rights NGOs concerned with questions of rural livelihood security and environmental sustainability (OI, 2011; HRW, 2012). While the post-crisis concern with global food production has focused increased attention on fertile lands such as Gambella, the province itself has long existed as a frontier within the Ethiopian state. Forcibly incorporated into the
highlander dominated Ethiopian state, via imperial conquests, in the late 19th century, Gambella has historically come to be known, by successive governmental regimes – imperial, the socialist Derg, and the contemporary Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPDRF) – as containing lush and fertile lands that, in so much as they were “unused,” could resolve the land constraint in the northern highlands and potentially serve as a breadbasket region for Ethiopia, provisioning the cheap inputs that could underwrite the desired national transition from agrarian to industrial economy (Makki, 2012, 83-84; Markakis, 2011, 6). Reflecting the integral role of racialization as a condition of possibility for frontier making, the ecological centrality of Gambella's 'virgin' lands to the modernizing mission of the Ethiopian state is enabled by an ontological distinction between civilizing highlander elites, and the indigenous peoples of Gambella, who the imperial highlanders have historically considered to be primitive and backwards (Makki, 2012, 84).

While the 19th and 20th century imperial regime promoted “settler-colonial” migration of farmers and investors from the land-hungry highlands to Gambella, such initiatives were constrained by the resistance of the indigenous Anywaa people of Gambella and by ecological challenges, particularly the intense heat and the heavy presence of malaria spreading mosquitos (ibid). The socialist Derg regime, which overthrew the imperial regime in 1974, was more successful in resettling highlanders to Gambella, particularly after the devastating effects of the 1984 famine. For the modernizing Derg, the famine was evidence of the backwardness imposed on Ethiopian society due to the prevalence of low productivity practices such as nomadic pastoralism, and the regime thus sought to rally Ethiopians to “free farming from the ugly forces of nature” (Scott, 248), which, beyond the promotion of settler farmers from the highlands, involved the introduction of large scale mechanized state farms into Gambella (ibid). However,
as with the earlier efforts of the imperial regime, the Derg’s modernizing thrust was constrained by both ecological feedback, in the form of the abnormal flooding that the deforestation associated with large-scale agriculture triggered in the region (Woube, 1999), and by armed indigenous resistance to the re-settlement of highlanders and large-scale land appropriation (Markakis, 2011).

The current regime of the EPRDF, which overthrew the Derg in 1991, has continued with the modernizing thrust of the previous regimes, but did initially shift the focus to achieving a program of what they termed “agricultural development led industrialization” through the empowerment, rather than displacement, of small-holder agriculture which would localize development initiatives through greater political decentralization (Lavers, 2012, 108-109). The EPRDF, having come to power on the basis of widespread peasant mobilization and support, believed that the empowerment of small farmers would facilitate increased production and livelihood security, and thus offer a more sustainable and equitable path to industrialization than those attempted by previous regimes (Makki, 2014, 85). However, the failure of this program to achieve the desired gains in productivity and income, and thus facilitate industrial transition, compelled the EPRDF to pursue a dual track strategy of protecting small holder agriculture, particularly in the core highland regions, for reasons of livelihood security, while also opening space, through the identification of “unused” lands primarily found in the peripheral Southern lowlands of the country, for the initiation of large-scale agricultural production that could provision the food surplus necessary for underwriting industrialization (Lavers, 2012, 112; Rahmato, 2013). Large-scale agriculture would facilitate the transition by providing cheap food for an emergent industrial proletariat, and by generating foreign exchange, through the export of
surplus food, that could then be used to finance the import of the technology and machinery necessary for industrialization (Makki, 2014, 86).

While the EPRDF began to transition to such a dual track strategy at the turn of the century, the lack of domestic capital and expertise suitable for large-scale agriculture led the regime to emphasize the importance of attracting foreign capital to undertake such initiatives (Rahmato, 2013, 96). Thus, when the political fallout of the global food crisis of 2008 manifested itself, and impressed upon global development and governance organizations, such as the World Bank and the UN Food and Agricultural Organization, the pressing need to identify and close the remaining yield gaps for the sake of global food security (Geisler and Makki, 2011; McMichael 2014), and revealed to transnational capital the enormous profits that could be potentially realized through agricultural investment, the Ethiopian state identified, and acted upon, such opportunities to operationalize its strategy for foreign capital led large scale agricultural production (Kebede, 2011).

Embracing the so-called Rise of the South, the Ethiopian state has sought to promote such a development strategy through the channel of South-South solidarity and cooperation. This geopolitical orientation is premised upon the belief that Ethiopia has much to gain by engaging with states and capital from the South who, in contrast to Northern actors, could best apply, owing to the similarity in transition and development challenges across the South, the appropriate practices and technology for enhancing agricultural productivity within Ethiopia (Cheru, Modi, & Naidu, 2013, 24-33). Within the South-South strategy, India has emerged as a particularly prominent partner in the field of agricultural investment and co-operation, as Ethiopia’s desire to attract foreign investment in agriculture has converged with India’s growing recognition of the need to secure offshore resources for food production (Rowden, 2013, 111).
Such convergence has been furthered through India-Africa forums which, along with bilateral trade initiatives signed between India and Ethiopia, have helped facilitate an enabling trade and investment framework through which Indian capital seeking to expand into transnational agricultural production could align with the Ethiopian state’s aim of seeking foreign investment to transform “unused” arable land into highly productive units of agricultural production. The Ethiopian state, for its part, has sought to attract Indian agricultural investors with the promise of extremely cheap and abundant fertile land, along with cheap labour, in peripheral lowland provinces such as Gambella. In return, the Ethiopian state expects Indian companies to either enhance national food availability or contribute to the state’s foreign exchange reserves through commodity exports. For Indian capital, the motivation of expansion has been less the systemic need for capital in general to re-constitute, in the face of ecological exhaustion, the condition of possibility for accumulation, through the forging of the ecological surplus, and more the profits to be gained through accessing cheap, fertile land that could facilitate low-cost (in so much as it requires less capitalization than the lower quality soils in India), high-productivity agriculture, that offers secure and high returns through the increasing global and national demand for cheap food (ibid). Expansion to Africa, which Indian capital has imagined as a frontier of cheap land and labour (Mitra and Bhuvaa, 2011), would also enable Indian agribusiness capital to overcome its own profitability constraints that increasing costs of production – primarily land and labour – has imposed within India.

While the conducive post-crisis investment context has facilitated the expansion of numerous Indian firms into agricultural production in Ethiopia, with several operating in
Gambella province alone,\textsuperscript{11} the Bangalore based Karuturi Global has been identified as a pioneer in Indo-African agricultural investment, both for leading the way, in 2008, as the first major investor in Gambella, and for the large scale at which it has sought to undertake its project (Dubey, 2012; Bose and Mehra, 2012). Initially a floricultural firm, specializing in export oriented rose production in India, Karuturi expanded its operations to Ethiopia and Kenya in the mid-2000s in order to take advantage of cheaper land and labour costs, more productive soils, and the lower tariff rates that the primary export market for roses, the European Union, offers to exporters based in African countries (Dubey, 2012). After consolidating itself as the largest rose producer in the world by 2007, Karuturi’s ambitions turned to achieving supremacy in global food production, as it looked to capitalize on the convergence of the systemic drive to close the global yield gap, the desire of African states to leverage such an imperative to attract foreign investment that could facilitate the achievement of the agrarian surplus necessary for industrialization, and the push by the Indian state to secure a longer run source of cheap food and biofuel sources necessary for the continuation of its development trajectory (Dubey, 2012; Bose and Mehra, 2012). For the company’s chairman and managing director, Ramakrishna Karuturi, the rising land acquisition difficulties and labour costs associated with MNREGA meant that the “overall cost competitiveness of India for this kind of activity was not what it used to be” (quoted in Ahuja, 2014). In light of such domestic constraints, the huge 300 000 ha concession of prime fertile land in Gambella the company acquired from the Ethiopian state at a rate of one dollar per hectare per year constituted the necessary ground from which such ambitions of global food supremacy could be secured. Furthermore, in contrast to the rising capitalization costs associated with maintaining yield growth on deteriorating soils in India, the company noted that

\textsuperscript{11} Please see OI (2011) for further details on specific Indian firms operating in Gambella and elsewhere in Ethiopia
what it was granted in Gambella was “very good land. It’s quite cheap. In fact it is very cheap. We have no land like this in India. There you are lucky to get 1% of organic matter in the soil. Here it is more than 5%. We don’t need fertiliser or herbicides. There is absolutely nothing that will not grow on it” (quoted in Vidal, 2011). Taking into further account the abundant water resources of the Baro-Akobo river basin in which the land was located, Karuturi’s management expressed full confidence that with the proper application of modern industrial farming technology the company would be able to extract from the land its full productive potential.

While it is evident that the principal actors of the Gambella land rush are motivated by varying factors, it is my contention that the project as a whole is fundamentally constituted as the penetration of a new untapped frontier, with the aim of constructing an ecological surplus that can provision the cheap food necessary for underwriting a new round of global capitalist accumulation and the development trajectories of the Indian and Ethiopian states. In the process, the principal actor responsible for operationalizing the large-scale agricultural production, Karuturi, envisions that it will be rewarded for its role in such ecological surplus making with sustained and high rates of profit. As this dissertation argues, the historical drive to forge an ecological surplus, whether in order to overcome ecological exhaustion or to initiate agrarian transition and industrialization, calls forth processes of global primitive accumulation that are informed by, and further re-affirm, the racialized society/nature distinction in which the knowing and acting being, the rational human, acts upon the irrational, passive, and “un-thinking” non-being of nature in order to maximize efficiency through the extractive transfer of resources from low-value nature to higher value industry. In this particular case, the Ethiopian State’s claim that “this land is not used by anybody” and thus “it should be developed” (Rowden, 2011, 14), alongside the World Bank’s emphasis on the “yield gap,” and Karuturi’s assertion that this is
“virgin land, which has never been plowed for hundreds of years” (Maritz, 2012), suggests that the indigenous pastoralists and subsistence farmers of Gambella are incapable of generating and deploying the knowledge necessary for most effectively utilizing the “free gift” of nature found in Gambella’s rich soils and abundant water resources.

The use here of “global primitive accumulation” to describe the Karuturi land concession in Gambella is distinct from the concept of primitive accumulation that has been widely deployed, and critiqued (Levien, 2015; Martin and Palat, 2014), in the land grabbing literature. As mentioned earlier, primitive accumulation has been conceptually deployed to suggest that processes of land grabbing today are informed by the same logic of capital-labour formation first initiated in the English enclosures. By contrast, my argument here is that the land grab in Gambella is better understood as a moment of “global primitive accumulation,” which I have argued throughout the dissertation consists of the production and mobilization, via racialized enclosure involving the appropriation and erasure of indigenous knowledge and practice, of frontiers of unused nature that can be exhaustively appropriated in service of the imperatives of development and accumulation in the core zones. In this case, however, the Cortesian premise through which Gambella’s reproductive conditions were denied, in order to recast its soils and waters as a “free gift” of nature, would rapidly shift the frontier from a condition of “surplus” to “exhaustion” as the “third movement” of indigenous resistance and extra-human natures converged to sink the project.

*Socio-Ecological Formation in Gambella*

It is mistaken to assume, as the principal actors in the Gambella agricultural project do, that its rich soils and abundant waters are constitutive of dormant virgin lands whose
reproduction is not dependent upon the “primitive” inhabitants. An examination of the socio-ecology of the lands leased by Karuturi, which are located in the Jikaw district of Gambella province, reveals instead that the rich soils and abundant waters coveted by modernizing agents are constituted through a complex diversity of socio-ecological interactions in which the livelihood practices of the Anywaa people play a crucial role. While the Anywaa, depending upon the particular ecological region of Gambella within which they live (forests, grasslands, or riverbanks), practice a diverse array of livelihood strategies, those residing within or adjacent to Karuturi’s land concession cultivate land along the banks of the Baro River, where annual floods are determinative in shaping the socio-ecological context. During the rainy season, which generally occurs between May and September, the Baro River rises and eventually inundates the lands in its floodplain. Much of this land is normally covered in dense forests, which perform the crucial function of absorbing much of the floodwaters (Woube, 1999, 247). The effects on the land vary depending upon the speed and volume with which the floodwaters cover the plains. On the outer curve of the river, where the water moves rapidly and in high volume, it sweeps away much of the nutrients of the land, leading to soil erosion. On the inner curve of the river, by contrast, the floodwaters move slowly over the land, allowing for the gentle depositing of nutrient rich organic matter (Kurimoto, 1992, 45; Woube 1999, 246).

As Eisei Kurimoto’s ethnographic research has shown, the “Anywaa riverbank cultivation is an adaptation to this ecological condition” (Kurimoto, 1992, 44). Specifically, the Anywaa, utilizing a “folk knowledge of the environment,” distinguish between the eroded and fertile soils by identifying “two different weeds as indicators of the two parts,” and they cultivate exclusively on the fertile soils using a hoe to prepare the land for planting (Kurimoto, 1992, 44). During the rainy season, when the land is submerged under water for several weeks, Anywaa
farmers plant local flood resistant varieties of maize and sorghum which, over many generations, have “adapted to the wet ecological condition.” During the dry season, the post-flood re-fertilized soil retains enough moisture to allow for a second planting, a process known as “flood-retreat cultivation” (Feyissa, 2011, 81; Kurimoto, 1992, 45). The flood’s annual renewal of the soil’s organic content removes the “problem of exhausting soil fertility,” allowing for the field to be “continuously cultivated forever unless the river changes its course” (Kurimoto, 1992, 44).

The relatively stable and sufficient production levels have provisioned the subsistence needs of the Anywaa, without, however, producing any significant surplus.

Beyond simply responding to non-human ecological forces, the cultivation practices of Anywaa farmers have, in turn, played an important role in reproducing the soil and hydrological properties of the riverbanks on which they live. In an investigation of “sustainable land-water management in the lower Baro-Akobo river basin,” Mengistu Woube concluded that “floodwater farming systems have been an indispensable component of this humid tropical zone since the early Anuak [Anywaa] settlement” (Woube, 1999, 242). Specifically, Woube argues that the Anywaa’s hoe-based cultivation, protection of surrounding forests, and management of wetlands, have ensured the proper balance between flooding and land infiltration capacity to allow for annual re-fertilization, rather than erosion, of the soil.

These particular practices are informed by what we might consider a non-human centered, embedded and relational, epistemology. The Anywaa scholar, Ojut Ojulu (2013), in a recent study on the effects of large-scale land acquisitions on indigenous people in Gambella, has argued that “for the Anywaa indigenous people in Gambella land is something more than a productive economic resource” (286) and their concept of territory is “not that of the human being controlling and commanding the way in which the territory and its environment has to be
governed and exploited” (289). Rather than celebrating a separation from, and mastery over, nature, for the Anywaa “the human being is only part of the bigger community of the living beings taking care of and benefiting from the territory and its environment.” Informed by such an epistemological premise, in which other “living beings” steward, and therefore have a claim over, the territory, Anywaa socio-ecological practices do not accord the “right to destroy the forest, because it does not belong to them alone but also to the rest of the living beings dwelling in these forests” and they further maintain that the “water resources have to be used in a way that does not disrupt the survival of the fish and other living beings in it” (Ojulu, 2013, 288).

The inter-constitutive relations between Anywaa socio-ecological practices, epistemology, soil fertility, and water flows, were, however, occluded from the Karuturi project’s field of vision, which was restricted by what James Scott (1998) has referred to as the “cyclopean shortsightedness of high-modernist agriculture” (264). The narrow focus of high modernist agriculture on production and profit “casts into relative obscurity all the outcomes lying outside the immediate relationship between farm inputs and yields” such as the long term effects of agricultural practice on “soil structure, water quality, [and] land tenure relations”. Reflective of what Scott has called the “imperialism of high-modernist ideology”, which seeks to establish the “mastery of nature” through a process of “radical simplification” of socio-ecological landscapes, Karuturi and the Ethiopian state isolated, and privileged, the ecological inputs of soil fertility and abundant water which were particularly valuable for short term productionist aims, and discounted those factors deemed of less immediate value.

Amongst those factors discounted were the local knowledge and agricultural practices of the Anywaa. During meetings convened in order to inform local communities of the state’s intention to lease land to foreign companies for the purpose of large-scale agricultural
production, state officials made it clear that the deals were premised upon the Anywaa’s incapacity to productively employ the rich resources of Gambella. In one such meeting, the regional governor informed those present that the “lands you are using are not utilized. We have investors coming who will use more efficiently. Those who resist we will take all possible action” (quoted in HRW, 2012, 31). On another occasion, officials made clear that “we will invite investors who will grow cash crops. You do not use the land well. It is lying idle” (quoted in HRW, 2012, 54). Within the Cortesian epistemic order driving the Ethiopian development project, then, Anywaa land use is necessarily understood as expressive of an irrational, and hence dangerous, misuse of bountiful resources of fertile soils and abundant waters.

In order, then, for the land to be put to rational use, it is necessary for the productive potential of the capital relation to be deepened in Gambella through processes of primitive accumulation that separate indigenous producers from critical means of subsistence, releasing in the process both land and labour from the “irrational” grip of non-commodified socio-ecological regimes. For those living on Karuturi’s land concession, this has involved the company’s enclosure, and subsequent clearance, of thousands of hectares of forest that are vital to their socio-ecological reproduction. The forests, besides protecting against erosion, windstorms, and severe floods, provide local Anywaa communities with key resources for home building, medicine, and supplemental food gathering.\textsuperscript{12} Karuturi’s clearance of the forests, in order to make way for large-scale agricultural production, was undertaken without any consultation with, or approval from, the communities on whose territory the forests were located. As a farmer from

\textsuperscript{12} Fieldwork Interviews, April 2014. This is further confirmed in a new report released by the Oakland Institute (2015)
an affected village pointed out, “the local community was not consulted…we simply see them [Karuturi] cutting down the trees but we don’t know who allow them.”

Rather than meaningfully consult with local communities, Karuturi’s project necessarily called forth the “civilizing mission” which has been integral to the construction and penetration of the colonial-capitalist frontier. In line with the premise that the Anywaa are mired in “backwards” or “primitive” agricultural practice, the promoters of this large-scale land deal, including the World Bank, the Ethiopian state, and Karuturi, suggested that such a project of agrarian transformation could enhance the livelihood prospects of local communities by facilitating a transition from the poverty trap of subsistence agriculture into better paying jobs on large scale farms (HRW 2012, 100, 114-115;). In addition, the agricultural project promised, through practices of corporate social responsibility, to connect hitherto isolated Anywaa villages to modern health, education, transportation, and communication networks.

In rendering the Anywaa people and their lands as passive “irrational” natures awaiting modernization by the superior human rationality embodied in state and capital, both the Ethiopian state and Karuturi reveal an epistemic blindness to the complex diversity of mutually constituting human and extra-human ecological actors in Gambella. Such “cyclopean shortsightedness” then allows for rich resources, such as fertile soils and abundant water, to be conceived in isolation from less valuable actors, such as the forests and local knowledge systems. Reconfiguring the socio-ecological order, Karuturi sought instead to bring its land to productive life through the introduction of universal industrial farming methods (heavy machinery, chemical pesticides, artificial fertilizers) that they argued had proven their worth in a variety of large scale

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13 Fieldwork Interview, April 26, 2014
farming contexts (Bose and Mehra, 2012; Dubey, 2012). In order to rationally manage such a massive and rapid injection of capital, Karuturi, citing again the lack of local expertise, employed experts in the form of agronomists and farm managers who had experience with industrial farming in India, and those with experience with large-scale agriculture from Uruguay (Bose and Mehra, 2012; Dubey, 2012). Armed with the necessary capital and expertise, Karuturi cleared its lands of tens of thousands of hectares of forests, built the necessary dykes to properly harness and restrain the abundant water resources of the Baro River, and declared its intention of having 45 000 hectares under cultivation by 2012 (ICRA, 2012a).

_Can the River Speak? The Rise of the Baro and the Fall of Karuturi_

The potentiality of producing cheap food in Gambella is thus premised upon both the appropriation of Anywaa socio-ecological knowledge and practice, integral as it is to the sustenance of the fertile soils and abundant waters that Karuturi seeks to act upon, and its erasure, as material recognition of the creative socio-ecological agency of local Anywaa communities would compromise the low cost of the land lease. Further, denying Anywaa practice and knowledge, as well as the agency of less important “extra-human” natures such as the forests of Gambella, is necessary to the initiation of the productive powers of the capital relation, as it enables soil fertility to be intensively and exhaustively acted upon without having to account for its reproductive conditions. This denial of the frontier’s reproductive conditions, while potentiating capital’s productive powers, simultaneously forecloses, however, the possibility of recognizing, and responding to, signals of ecological distress and exhaustion.

Scholars of political ecology are increasingly noting the agency of extra-human natures in escaping projects of mastery and shaping the formation and collapse of socio-ecological regimes.
Timothy Mitchell (2002), in his groundbreaking article, “Can the Mosquito Speak?”, revealed how massive attempts to master and control nature, such as large-scale irrigation development in mid twentieth century Egypt, have been profoundly undone and re-shaped by non-human natures such as malaria spreading mosquitos. Mitchell’s point is that the success of development projects is not achieved by the application of an exterior human expertise upon passive non-human nature, but rather involves the formation and deployment of knowledge through a relational ontology in which human and extra-human nature remake one another (2002, 37).

While modernizing development projects have been premised upon the epistemic subjugation of the non-human, Mitchell argues that it is nonetheless the case that extra-human nature has “never quite accepted this secondary role,” and, as was the case with the mosquito in Egypt, the non-human often exceeds “human intention” and profoundly re-shapes the trajectories of the projects within which human expertise has sought to act upon passive nature (2002, 37).

Mitchell’s emphasis on non-human agency has been re-affirmed in recent years by critical political ecology perspectives which foreground the “limitations of mastery,” in so much as they uncover how the subordination of nature is not equivalent to control (Schneider and McMichael, 2010, 465), and that a “forgotten nature…which could be said to be taking its revenge…is in fact reminding us of its existence” (Serres, cited in Wittman, 2009, 807). Moore (2010) highlights the constitutive socio-ecological dialectic of capitalism as world-ecology, in which extra-human nature, while epistemologically discounted, continues to shape, and be shaped by, the emergence and reproduction of capitalist accumulation. The moment of neoliberal ecological exhaustion has, in particular, been defined by the “creative responses of extra-human natures to the disciplines of capitalism” (406).
We can identify such a creative response as central to the stark failure of Karuturi’s efforts at large-scale agriculture in Gambella where, despite having invested upwards of 150 million US dollars in heavy machinery, sprays, fertilizers, clearing operations, dyke construction, and so on, the operations were “sunk” as the Baro River repeatedly rose up, breached the flood-control dykes, decimated the company’s cultivated area and paralyzed much of the company’s heavy machinery that was not designed to act upon waterlogged land (Sethi, 2013; Davison, 2013). In early 2011, prior to attempting to cultivate its first harvest, Karuturi was attracting global interest in its shares, which were trading at the time at nearly 40 rupees per share, largely due to its successful rose operations in Kenya and the potential that investors recognized in the low-cost high fertile land that Karuturi had secured in Gambella (ICRA, 2012a). Having cultivated 12,000 hectares of corn that year, Karuturi expected to employ the returns on its initial harvest to expand the cultivated area to 45,000 hectares by May 2012 (ICRA 2012a). However, in the fall of 2011, as Karuturi prepared to harvest its initial crop of corn, its entire cultivated area of 12,000 hectares was inundated with flash floods as the Baro River overflowed and breached the dikes that Karuturi had constructed (Davison, 2011). The CEO of the company, Ramakrishna Karuturi, expressed shock at the power and scale of the flooding, claiming that the floods could not have been predicted, particularly since they were stronger than any flood in recent memory (Bose and Mehra, 2012; Davison, 2011). Karuturi, whose epistemological premise rendered him incapable of accounting for such ecological agency or feedback, expressed the limits of his company’s expertise in the face of an “irrational” nature, as he claimed that “this kind of flooding we haven’t seen before...this is a crazy amount of water” (quoted in Davison, 2011).
The financial consequences of the flash floods for Karuturi included an immediate 15 million dollar loss, in the form of expected revenue and damaged machinery, and a rapid 85 percent collapse in its share price, reflecting investor concerns over the future viability of the project, despite the low cost, high fertile lands on which it was located (Bose and Mehra, 2012; ICRA, 2012; Sethi, 2013). Karuturi’s response was not to consult with indigenous farmers who had deep local knowledge of flood patterns and management, but rather to hire expert flood control and drainage firms from India and Holland to assess how best to control any future flooding that might impact its operations (Dubey, 2012). Based upon such expert advice, the company moved to fortify its system of dykes, with the intention of completely altering the dynamics of the floodplain by preventing the flow of any floodwater near their land allotment (Bose and Mehra, 2012; Sethi, 2013). However, the following year, in August 2012, the fortified dykes only aggravated the overflowing waters, first pushing the water back towards the riverbank and causing serious damage to Anywaa villages and farmland, and then eventually, due to the intensification of the force of the water caused by the dykes themselves, the overflowing waters once again breached the dykes and caused substantial damage to the cultivated areas of Karuturi’s farm operations (Sethi, 2013).

The company could only make sense of the flooding through the same epistemic frames with which they had approached the investment, and which had foreclosed the agency of extra-human nature and indigenous people, as they argued that the floods were only further evidence that the land, while fertile and cheap, had hitherto been unused due to the antagonistic nature of the floodplain, and thus there was no question of any sort of land grabbing. Responding to the land grab narrative in light of the flooding, Karuturi argued that “we have been trying to convince people who’ve been making these allegations that these are floodplains where nobody
stays, where nobody can reside or graze their cattle because most of the time they are under four or five feet of water” (Davison, 2013). At the same time, Karuturi excused its own apparent incompetence in managing the floods by claiming that it had no prior knowledge of the extent of the flooding, due to a supposed lack of data on past flooding and rainfall in Gambella (Sethi, 2013).

In making the floods intelligible in this way, however, Karuturi only further reinforces the epistemic foreclosure of modernist epistemology, as it presents the floods as a natural force that must be subdued by modern human expertise, while at the same time denying the presence of indigenous people as thinking and acting beings who have long co-existed with the abundant waters of the Baro River. Contrary to Karuturi’s assertions, there have been studies carried out on flood patterns in the Baro Akobo river basin that covers much of Gambella, including one of particular relevance that involved a fifteen year study of what were termed “abnormal” flooding patterns between 1985 and 1999 (Woube, 1999). The author of the study drew a distinction between normal and abnormal flooding in Gambella, and argued that the latter, in the form of severe water overflow that negatively affected the livelihoods of indigenous farmers, could be primarily attributed to the ecological change induced by the Derg regime’s attempts to introduce large scale mechanized agriculture into Gambella. In particular, the study found that the deforestation necessary to make space for large-scale agriculture was a key factor in triggering the abnormal flooding in so much as it reduced the water absorption capacity of the land (Woube, 1999).

While the scientific data is not readily available to confirm any link between Karuturi’s massive forest clearance and the reduction of water infiltration capacity, affected Anywaa cultivators argue that the floods were intensified by the agricultural practices of the company
(Sethi, 2013). Besides the effects of forest clearance, the role of the dykes were identified as central to aggravating and intensifying the floodwaters of the Baro. The dykes, they argued, had blocked the natural flow of the waters, and consequently effected a reverse flow back to the river.\(^{14}\) In the absence of alternative infiltration areas, the floodwaters then gathered in even greater force and overwhelmed the dykes. Thus, far from signifying an “irrational” force of nature, the aggressive floodwaters were co-constitutive forces in an emergent socio-ecology of large-scale industrial agriculture.

From the perspective of the local Anywaa cultivators, the failure of the Karuturi project could be attributed to the epistemic rift that underpinned its efforts to institute a socio-ecological regime organized around the imperatives of profit oriented production. As a resident of a village located in the heart of the Karuturi land concession made clear,

It’s because he [Karuturi] never consulted the local people about the seasons of planting, this is why he was victim of flood. There is no problem of Baro River for farming. He doesn’t listen to any local people – they listened to the highlander experts, but naturally we know the nature of the land.\(^{15}\)

This discounting of local knowledge left Karuturi unaware of the mutual constitution of a diversity of human and nonhuman ecological actors. Besides drowning Karuturi’s project, the aggravated floods wrought by forest clearance and dyke construction risk undermining the fertile soils that had mobilized the project in the first place, as the increase in velocity and volume of the floodwaters threaten to carry away, rather than gently deposit, the rich organic nutrients responsible for the annual re-fertilization of the soils.

\(^{14}\) Fieldwork Interviews, April 30, 2014

\(^{15}\) Fieldwork Interview, April 26, 2014
Beyond aggravating the flooding of the Baro, the failure to involve Anywaa communities as knowledge producing actors fundamentally exposed the “development,” or “civilizing mission” pretence of the Karuturi investment in Gambella. Fieldwork observation and interviews in Anywaa villages along the riverbank directly adjacent to Karuturi’s cultivated acreage revealed that, though the project disrupted Anywaa livelihoods, it offered little in the way of secure alternatives pointing to a more prosperous future.\textsuperscript{16} Significant among the disruptions, in addition to the adverse social impacts of the flooding mentioned earlier, were the extra distance, due to Karuturi’s forest clearance, that villagers had to travel to hunt, collect firewood, and gather medicinal plants. The loss of food supplies and materials, whether due to flooding or forest clearance, was not, as promoters of the project had promised, made up for by food provisioned by Karuturi’s more productive farming methods. Much of the acreage was dedicated to cash flex crops, destined for extra-local national, regional, and global markets, rather than the variants of maize and sorghum preferred for local consumption. Locals had little to show, by way of concrete evidence, that could affirm the promises of enhancing village level infrastructure for the health and education sectors. The limited employment generated was described by locals as offering insufficient compensation, particularly in comparison to the wages offered for similar work to highlander employees. Quite often, in fact, wages were simply not paid to Anywaa employees who had worked on the farm. This was reflective, many believed, of the inferiority ascribed to Anywaa labour, as evident most disturbingly in their characterization by Karuturi’s farm managers as “non-people” (Oakland Institute, 2015, 10).

Local Anywaa communities, it must be emphasized, have responded with various forms of resistance and opposition to the forms of alienation, exploitation, and exclusion visited upon

\textsuperscript{16} Fieldwork Interviews, April 26-30, 2014. A recent report released by the Oakland Institute (2015) presents similar findings.
them by large-scale agricultural schemes. Regarding Karuturi specifically, Anywaa workers collectively filed a lawsuit for unpaid wages in the provincial courts of Gambella, exposing in the process Karuturi’s impending financial collapse. More broadly, Anywaa alienation from large-scale agricultural projects has elsewhere been expressed in armed attacks on investors in the heart of “Anywaaland” (Johnson 2012), as well as in the central role played in anti-land grabbing global shaming campaigns by diasporic Anywaa communities, in collaboration with international NGOs, sharing the stories of those marginalized in Gambella who are unable to speak out directly themselves for fear of state repression (Dubey 2012; Oakland Institute 2013; 2015). As part of such efforts towards building international solidarity, Anywaa diasporic organizations have developed links with anti-land grabbing peasant organizations in India, gesturing perhaps towards more de-colonial South-South relationships (Mittal, 2013).

The Anywaa resistance, in exposing the social consequences of the exclusionary premise of Karuturi’s venture, works alongside the Baro’s floods to caution states and investors against supporting such projects. As a result, Karuturi has been unable to secure financing from creditors increasingly wary of being associated with such a publicized case of land grabbing which, combined with the losses suffered from the persistent flooding detailed above, has significantly hindered the company’s ability to continue with operations in Gambella and beyond (Davison, 2013a; ICRA, 2012b; Balasubramanyam, 2013). Forced, by creditors seeking returns on outstanding debts, to relinquish control of its major rose farm in Kenya in 2014 (Wahome, 2014), Karuturi, though quite inactive in Gambella since 2013, formally closed down operations and declared bankruptcy there in early 2015 (Fekade, 2015).

17 Fieldwork Interview, April 27, 2014
Conclusion

The attempt to resolve, then, the contradictions of primitive accumulation in India through the initiation of a project of global primitive accumulation in Gambella failed on account of its very constituting conditions. Specifically, the distinctive “double movement” compromise of India’s “new political economy” generated, in the necessarily extra-national space of Gambella, the construction of a frontier of unused nature capable of resolving the food price crisis aggravated by ecological exhaustion and the “reversal of primitive accumulation” in the core national space. Here, however, the denial of the reproductive conditions of the Gambella frontier generated, in turn, the rising resistance of the Baro River and the local Anywaa indigenous communities. In this sense, the “double movement” in India today is completed by the missing “third movements” in Gambella. This signifies a potential re-emergence of the decolonial “South-South” option, a possibility which we will further probe in the conclusion to the dissertation.

For now, I will conclude this chapter by noting two significant implications of the failure of the Karuturi investment in Gambella for wider debates on land grabbing, agrarian change, and development. The first concerns the limitations posed by concepts such as the “yield gap” in determining directives for agricultural investment and development. In assuming a “lack” in local capacity, the yield gap epistemic frame ignores how the space between current and potential production levels is actively produced, rather than passively wasted, in order to sustain a given landbase’s socio-ecological conditions of possibility.
The second, and related, implication draws primarily from my fieldwork in Gambella, where an overwhelming majority of those I spoke with\(^\text{18}\) in Anywaa communities expressed an eagerness to engage projects of agrarian change which would foster local agricultural innovation and further diversify their livelihood sources. Rather than express a resistance to any sort of change, they emphasized that what they were opposed to was their exclusion from efforts to enhance productivity or further regional and national development. If their participation was made more central Anywaa cultivators insisted that they could facilitate, based upon their own long-standing knowledge systems rooted in the local landbase, more ecologically sensitive and socially inclusive forms of agricultural development that would be less prone to failure than the Karuturi project. Such an approach to agrarian change would, however, require viewing Gambella, not as a frontier of virgin lands and primitive inhabitants, but rather as a dynamic socio-ecology of mutually constituting, and sustaining, human and extra-human life forces.

\(^{18}\) I spoke with approximately twenty five residents of four different Anywaa villages in April and May of 2015
Conclusion

This dissertation has been motivated by the imperative of clarifying the theoretical and historical significance of the motive forces and consequences of the global land grab, particularly as they have manifested in the “South-South” case of the Indian agribusiness firm Karuturi’s attempted institution of a large scale industrial farm in the Gambella province of Ethiopia. It has sought to do so by articulating a theoretical and historical framework of decolonial world-ecological agrarian question which situates the global land grab within the longue durée of a colonial-capitalist modernity marked by accumulation cycles that rise and fall in association with the constitution, and ultimate exhaustion, of global ecological surpluses provisioned through racialized society/nature regimes. Placed within such an historical framework, the global land grab reveals the global and ecological premises and consequences of capitalist agrarian transition and development which have otherwise remained obscured within conventional approaches to the agrarian question and primitive accumulation. This challenges, in particular, the notion that capitalist development’s founding condition of agrarian surplus is achieved on an endogenous national basis through the “self-sustaining” productivity advances of the market dependent capital-labour relation. Contesting the anthropocentric conceit implied in such a claim that the rational human can, in fact, perform the magical act of producing more outputs from less inputs, this thesis has argued, instead, that the global land grab elucidates how capital’s constituting agrarian surplus remains dependent upon the appropriation of the unseen/unpaid work of extra-human natures. Key to this act of appropriation, I have further argued, is the colonial appropriation and erasure, through the racialized technology of “misanthropic skepticism,” of indigenous peoples whose socio-ecological knowledges and practices have been fundamental to the co-constitution of the “natural” abundance of the surplus provisioning frontier zone.
Not only, then, does this dissertation mark an important entry point of the co-production of race and nature into the literature on land grabbing, it does so by further clarifying the qualitative import of race and racialization, as a distinctive “human over nature” logic of power, to the emergence and reproduction of capitalist accumulation and development. In this sense, this work stands as an important deepening of the understanding of the significance of race to core concerns of critical political economy. In particular, it has undertaken a decolonial reconstruction of primitive accumulation, a key transformative mechanism identified by agrarian political economy in the successful resolution of the agrarian question. For conventional Marxian approaches to the agrarian question, as detailed in chapter one, primitive accumulation involves the private enclosure of agrarian resources, within a contained national space, that give rise to the foundational productive antagonism between capital and dispossessed labour (Brenner, 1976; Byres, 1986). While this is certainly part of the story of “agrarian transition,” only going this far occludes the necessary “extra-national” reproductive premise of the capital-labour antagonism. For market-dependent labour to reproduce itself, be subject to the wage repression necessary for capitalist profits and accumulation to proceed, and offer, through its absorption of consumer goods, a home market for industrial outputs, it is necessary that the costs of the key wage-good, food, be repressed to the greatest possible extent. Here, I have followed world-historical approaches to the agrarian question in foregrounding the key role played by the constitution of cheap land and labour in politically subjugated colonies in provisioning the transitioning core with the surplus of cheap food necessary for the hegemonic resolution of the capital-labour antagonism (Wallerstein, 1974; Friedmann and McMichael, 1989). In order to capture such an expansive “extra-national” frame of transition, world-historical approaches have forwarded the concept of “global primitive accumulation” (Araghi, 2009; Moyo, Jha, and Yeros,
2012) wherein enclosures in the periphery give rise to forms of labour and labour control
differentiated from those given by enclosures in the core zone. Specifically, conceived on a
world-scale, and thus effected by mechanisms of global primitive accumulation, the resolution of
the agrarian question involves the institution of “free” labour in the transitioning core, whose
simultaneous “double movement” subjection to market based exploitation and claim to non-
market state protection stands upon the pedestal of absolutely exhaustible racialized labour
supplies ontologically excluded from such claim making capacity.

In so much, however, that the world-historical approach to the agrarian question and
global primitive accumulation did not go beyond the quantitative focus on “unfree” labour and
cheap land, it remains unaware of the key qualitative relations set in motion by enclosures in the
extra-national colonial space. This dissertation has addressed this limitation by applying the
decolonial concept of coloniality to the emergent theory of “capitalism as world-ecology” in
order to argue that differentiated processes of global primitive accumulation institute distinctive,
yet co-productive, zones of commodification, centered upon the qualitative capital-labour
relation, and zones of appropriation, centered upon the qualitative racialized society-nature
distinction. In this rendering, the co-constitution of racialization and global primitive
accumulation stands for more than an ideological justification for the theft of land and labour.
Rather, race signifies the necessary symbolic-material technology through which enclosure in the
colonies effects the human/nature separation that enables a rational humanity to put to productive
use the “free gifts” – soil fertility, mineral wealth, forest cover, water abundance – bestowed
upon, but not realized by, an irrationally unused nature. This society/nature distinction, I have
argued, emerges through the racialized collapse of indigenous people into the sphere of irrational
passive nature, thereby making possible the effective disarticulation of the active co-production
of indigenous knowledge, practice, and extra-human natures. It is, moreover, such a denial of the socio-ecological reproductive conditions of extra-human nature that enables the latter to be recategorized as virgin, or pristine, resources which can, therefore, be freely appropriated in service of the transitioning core’s cost reducing imperatives.

A further dimension of the decolonial world-ecological agrarian question advanced in this dissertation consists of the fundamental contradiction through which the very relations – the racialized denial of the reproductive conditions of “unused” nature – enabling “ecological surplus” come, inevitably, to switch the frontier to a condition of ecological exhaustion wherein the increasing inability, or perhaps, refusal of extra-human nature to provision “unpaid” work, as evidenced in collapsing soil fertility, sets in motion a secular increase in input costs that, in turn, induces a systemic crisis of accumulation. Besides ecological signals of distress/refusal, exhaustion, I argued in chapter three, can, as was particularly the case in the collapse of the British-led accumulation cycle, be effected by the “hidden third movement” of anti-colonial contestation launched by indigenous peoples in opposition to their subjection to racialized technologies of misanthropic skepticism. The clarification, here, of the inevitable exhaustion of the surplus, signifies a further challenge to the conventional Marxist approach which holds that the agrarian question is resolved in a linear temporal register. In other words, ecological exhaustion of the surplus, a phenomenon of which classical marxism has been remarkably unaware (Bernstein, 2010), suggests that the agrarian question, rather than being resolved once and for all, is posed anew, even for “leading” capitalist states, in the racialized pursuit of fresh frontiers of unused nature capable of underwriting, via surpluses of cheap food, a successive accumulation cycle.
The global land grab, I have argued, assumes historical significance precisely as a potential ecological surplus regenerating response to the neoliberal accumulation crisis that has taken hold since 2007/8, and which has been significantly marked by a food price inflation crisis. The South-South dimensions of land grabbing express a simultaneous challenge to the traditional “North-South” world-ecological order of surplus extraction and transfer, and the necessary reinstatiation, though now along “South-South” lines, of the racialized society/nature premise of capitalist development. In this sense, this dissertation has argued that the radical decolonial potential of the South’s original challenge to Northern world-ecological hegemony has been abandoned in favour of a “dewestern” orientation wherein Southern states seek to catch up to the North through a program of rapid national industrial development which remains dependent upon the racialized production of terra nullius in extra-national space.

I have specified, in chapter four, such South-South dimensions of the global land grab by linking India’s attempted transnationalization of agricultural production into Gambella with the food price inflation crisis that India has confronted since the mid-2000s, on account of both its own shrinking “internal” frontier capacity, and the unfavourable global market context of the Northern dominated foodgrain trade. The shrinking “internal” frontier reflects both the straightforward ecological exhaustion of the long green revolution, which had proven so essential to the cheap food surplus underwriting capitalist development across both statist and neoliberal eras, and the constraints imposed on further internal frontier expansion by social movements of peasants and tribals forcing protective non-market reproductive concessions from the Indian state. The key thesis of the dissertation emerges here: Indian state and capital sought to overcome the crisis of food price inflation, and, hence, the underlying frontier constraint by mobilizing, through the racialized appropriation and erasure of indigenous knowledge and
practice, the fertile lands of Gambella as a site of “virgin” nature which can, on account of its lack of value-producing human presence, be freely, or very cheaply, appropriated.

In foregrounding, through an empirical investigation of the Karuturi investment in Gambella, land grabbing as a racialized appropriation and erasure of indigenous knowledge and practice, this dissertation has offered a more robust rejoinder to the “yield gap” epistemic premise of the global land grab than has hitherto been made by critical land grab scholars. Land grab scholars have questioned the World Bank’s assertion that large-scale investors are targeting unused/underused lands, defined by a significant gap between current and potential rates of production, by emphasizing that such lands are in fact used by indigenous people, though perhaps in ways less visible to a narrow productivist lens, or that they provide important ecosystem services, such as forest cover mitigating against climate change (Borras et al, 2011; McMichael, 2012). I deepen such a critique of the yield gap premise by revealing, empirically, how the indigenous Anywaa people of Gambella do not simply use such lands, a characterization which risks the representation of a passively given landscape, but rather actively co-produce their “natural” abundance through distinctive place-based socio-ecological practices and knowledges. In particular, I have highlighted the Anywaa’s practices of flood-retreat agriculture and forest conservation as vital to the active co-production of the rich “organic” content of Gambella’s soils. The Karuturi investment’s racialized recategorization, via the yield gap episteme, of Gambella as a virgin nature capable of delivering cheap surpluses of food, clarifies, I argue, how a definitive feature of land grabbing consists of the appropriation and erasure of the co-constitutive force of indigenous socio-ecological practice and knowledge. Not only, then, did the Karuturi project adversely impact Anywaa livelihoods through its enclosure of important
ecological resources, it further stood as an appropriation of the Anywaa’s co-production of Gambella’s fertile soils.

The erasure of the socio-ecological reproductive conditions of the Gambella frontier, while necessary for the institution of large-scale industrial agriculture envisioned by the promoters of the Karuturi investment, generated, in relatively short order, a series of oppositional responses, ranging from intensified flooding to indigenous resistance, which proved to be fatal for the project. In empirically documenting such failure, and offering a theoretical framework through which it could be interpreted, this dissertation has further expanded the parameters of land grabbing debates which have generally neglected to take into serious consideration the significance of such implementation challenges. The failed project reveals, I argue, the risks posed to forms of development that are premised upon constructing lands targeted for investment as comprised of virgin soils and primitive inhabitants. While I have made such an argument through a specific empirical examination of the Karuturi investment, it is increasingly evident that the latter’s experience of failure has been shared by most Indian investors in Gambella who have similarly discounted the co-productive presence of indigenous knowledge and practice in the forging of the region’s “natural” abundance (Endeshaw, 2016; Grain, 2016).

Although such failure, along with the sustained resistance and opposition expressed by indigenous peoples (GRAIN, 2016) and global human rights organizations (OI, 2015; Oxfam, 2012), has significantly lowered the enthusiasm surrounding large-scale agricultural investments, this study’s elucidation of the systemic imperatives of capitalist accumulation and development suggests, nonetheless, that the latter will continue to motivate states and corporations to pursue agricultural frontier expansion. Indeed, the international ngo GRAIN (2016), which has since 2008 been at the forefront of land grabbing debates, noted with concern, in a study undertaken in
2016, that the “new research shows that, while some deals have fallen by the wayside, the global farmland grab is far from over. Rather, it is in many ways deepening, expanding to new frontiers and intensifying conflict around the world.” The report further noted that “the food security agenda is still a factor driving farmland deals.” For India, specifically, the ongoing food price inflation crisis constituted a central concern for the Indian Prime Minister during his recent visit, in July 2016, to several African countries. As noted by a senior Indian government official in the lead up to the Africa visit, “the government is working over both short-term and long-term strategies to control the rising prices of food grains, including that of pulses. Exploring the option of contract farming with countries like Mozambique, Tanzania and Malawi is a long-term strategy” (Vikram, 2016). In addition to contract farming, India’s food minister indicated at the time that, in order to “plug the demand-supply gap” the government is looking to directly “cultivate pulses there…for this, we are sending a team to Mozambique” (Karnik, 2016).

In so much as this would involve an expansion of an ecologically exhaustive industrial agriculture, oriented towards long-distance food circulation, and the displacement of sustainable, locally oriented, forms of indigenous agro-ecology, the ongoing land grab remains a significant threat to the global advancement of socio-ecological justice. Expressing even more urgency, Phil McMichael has argued that the

land grab – to the extent that it is incapable of recognizing the salience of low-carbon biodiverse agriculture – is the ultimate death wish as industrial biofuels and value-added agriculture will not resolve the combined problems of climate change and food insecurity. They will only buy time (and space!) in the short run for political and economic elites and consumers with purchasing power. In this scenario the longer run is destined to be catastrophic (2012, 697).

Complimenting McMichael’s food regime articulation of the existential crisis posed by the ongoing land grab, scholars of the “Agrarian South” school, though consistently ignored by
Northern scholarship, have emphasized that such ecological and social consequences, particularly in so much as legacies of decolonization heighten their visibility, render the dewestern approach of “development as catching-up-with-the-West” (Chakrabarty, 2010) as increasingly a “systemic impossibility and an ecological dead end” (Agrarian South editorial, 2012, 10). For Samir Amin, the “catch up” paradigm is premised upon the Eurocentric-anthropocentric myth of agrarian transition that was critiqued in chapter one of this dissertation, and thus ignores how the “classical” European agrarian transitions were sustainable only through the safety valve allowed by the mass emigration to the Americas. It would be absolutely impossible for the countries of the periphery today—who make up 80% of the world’s people, of which almost half are rural—to reproduce this model. They would need five or six Americas to be able to ‘catch up’ in the same way. ‘Catching up’ is therefore an illusion, and any progress in this direction can only result in an impasse. This is why I say that the anti-imperialist struggles are potentially anti-capitalist. If we cannot ‘catch up’, we might as well ‘do something else’. (2014, 15)

Amin is particularly concerned here with the potentially billions of peasant farmers who will be rendered permanently surplus if the expansion of labour-displacing industrial agriculture continues unchecked through ongoing land grabbing. Combined with the ecological consequences of such a model, this means, for Moyo, Jha, and Yeros, that “to grab land and natural resources – is no solution for the large majority of humanity and in the long run it cannot but result in catastrophe for civilization. There is an urgent need to think creatively about alternatives in development and, indeed, rethink the fundamentals of modernity” (2013, 94). In light, then, of the evident colonial (global polarization) and ecologically exhaustive implications of capitalist modernity’s rural/agrarian to urban/industrial evolutionary premise, which fuels the land grab, yet is increasingly a “systemic impossibility” on account of the limited capacity for non-agrarian labour absorption, the food regime political project and the agrarian South intervention converge in articulating a new socio-ecologically emancipatory agrarian question.
The new agrarian question quite explicitly challenges Bernstein’s controversial thesis regarding the death of the agrarian question. Bernstein’s thesis, it is argued, expresses “the conventional wisdom of the last quarter century [which] has been that the agrarian question is a thing of the past, given the many social and technological revolutions of the last two hundred years. ‘We have been liberated from the constraints of agriculture, land and nature’, they proclaim!” (Agrarian South editorial, 2012, 1). Arguing that such a liberation from nature is in fact at the root of intensifying ecological contradictions and global polarizations and exclusions, the new agrarian question is re-defined as the challenge of instituting the land and labour relations through which agro-ecological (Altieri, 2010), rather than industrial-capitalist, forms of food production can “ground” the emergence of more just and diverse socio-ecological futures. This privileges diverse agro-ecological models which are distinctive to the particular socio-ecological context within which they arise, and emphasizes, as such, the replacement of expensive industrial inputs with labour-intensive practices that draw upon local knowledge of ecologically sensitive forms of sowing, fertilizing, crop rotation, harvesting, and weed/pest control.

The new agrarian question, it is important to note, does not, for either food regime analysts or agrarian South scholars, signify a top-down articulation advanced by academics and activists mystified by romanticist nostalgia for disappearing agrarian worlds. Rather, in the language of agrarian South scholars, a wide spectrum of peasants, along with the growing “semi-proletariat” already rendered surplus by capitalist globalization, have “never abandoned the agrarian question, or the land question…Access to land for the expelled semi-proletariat is now also a question of regaining access to basic citizenship and social rights, in both rural and urban areas – a political motive which is, as before, distinct from the productionist” (Agrarian South
editorial, 2012, 8). In other words, the materiality of resistance waged by peasants, indigenous peoples, and the semi-proletariat to their reduction to surplus/redundant labour, via measures such as ongoing land grabbing, gives rise to an agrarian question which captures the re-emergence of more decolonial socio-ecological options. This recalls the triple movement framework I elaborated in chapter three, with the new agrarian question defined here by the “third movement” calling into question the extra-national socio-ecological cost externalizations underwriting, through the provisioning of cheap food, the double movement compromise in core national zones. McMichael suggests as such, arguing that the “food-land sovereignty movements” at the heart of the new agrarian question,

represent a Polanyian countermovement with a difference—whereas Polanyi’s double movement problematic concerned protection against the market, the twenty-first century countermovement concerns protection against the reduction of life (habitats, food, natural cycles) to “biovalues” to justify land annexation in the interests of fungible commodities (food, feed, and fuel) and conservation emission offsets. Whereas the earlier countermovement was oriented toward public regulation of markets, the recent countermovement is oriented toward a civilizational goal of regulation of social life by ecological principles. This is the ontological difference (2014, 50).

Such a countermovement, problematizing modernity’s racialized “mastery over nature” ontology, potentially stands as the basis of an alternative “decolonial” South-South paradigm. Indeed, the resistance of Anywaa communities, in rendering Indian land grabbing in Gambella visible to Indian social movements, led to a “coming together of Indian and Ethiopian civil society groups…[that marked] a turning point in the struggle for land rights and livelihoods in the two countries and beyond,” particularly in so much as it constituted a rejection, on a transnational scale, of “the idea that ‘some have to be sacrificed’ for the ‘larger national good’” (Mittal, 2013).
Substantively, as suggested above, the new agrarian question moves beyond such rejection in its contemplation of agro-ecological “repeasantization” as an alternative to the “sacrifice zones” instituted, via ongoing land grabbing, in the transition to, or renewal of, capitalist world-ecologies. Repeasantization signifies a strategy of revalourizing peasant forms of agriculture, through which labour-intensive production ensures both livelihood security and ecological sustainability. Beyond defending existing peasant and indigenous communities against land grabbing, repeasantization potentially involves a “counter-enclosure” whereby land, through direct actions such as “land occupation” or state mediated land reform, is redistributed from concentrated landholdings to those hitherto consigned to the alienated fate of surplus labour. As agrarian South scholars have emphasized, repeasantization is already in motion across much of the South. Prominent cases include the occupation of agrarian land by the landless workers movement (MST) in Brazil (McMichael, 2014, 38), the Kudambashree initiative redistributing land to formerly impoverished women in the Indian state of Kerala, wherein social empowerment, poverty reduction, and food security have been advanced through solidaristic and co-operative forms of agricultural production (Mukherjee-Reed, 2013), and, perhaps most notably, the radical redistribution of land from large-scale white settler-colonial farms to smaller scale indigenous farmers in Zimbabwe since the early 2000s (Moyo, 2011).

Repeasantization stands more fundamentally, it is argued, as a conscious reversal of capitalist modernity’s anti-peasant “agro-pessimism” (McMichael, 2014, 50). For the latter, the “good life” is rendered commensurate with the liberation of humanity from the drudgery of

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19 This is not a call for an uncritically romantic reconstruction of peasant and indigenous socio-ecological ways of being. It is, of course, the case that these “modes of existence” often include oppressive and exclusionary relations. The point here is simply to state that deep place-based knowledge and practice, which have been essential to a given socio-ecology’s sustenance, should take evident priority in projects of development and agrarian change. This would not preclude challenging their oppressive and exclusionary tendencies.
agrarian labour and the dependence on an irrational nature. Offering, instead, a more consciously socio-ecological good life, repeasantization involves, in this sense, more than simply the redistribution of land, but rather an explicit recognition of the co-production of both human life and extra-human nature through practices and knowledges informed by the immediate socio-ecological context. Such recognition, in so much as it potentially foregrounds deep place-based indigenous socio-ecological knowledge and practices, thus fundamentally unsettles the Cortesian premise of the colonial-capitalist world-ecology. This revaluation of the indispensable role played by indigenous practice and knowledge in the restoration and sustenance of agrarian landscapes introduces a “land sovereignty” dimension into the new agrarian question which is “protective as well as redistributive, advocating preservation of land access for producers for whom land, forests, and waterways constitute collective lifeworlds” (McMichael, 2014, 49).

Recognizing indigenous socio-ecological lifeworlds as integral to more just and sustainable planetary horizons is not, it bears noting, simply a populist-romanticist return to a pre-capitalist utopia, as sometimes charged by critics (Bernstein, 2014; Jansen, 2015). It simply constitutes what should, in fact, be a rather evident premise of engagement: acknowledging and building from, rather than appropriating and erasing, the deep place-based knowledge and practices of indigenous peoples. It is imperative, I would argue, that scholars attuned to the task of socio-ecological justice increase efforts to take into serious analytical consideration the extent to which such restitution of land rights, along with the broader recognition of place-based indigenous lifeworlds, can ground “alternative” paths of development which can offer more meaningful and sustainable forms of labour and lifeworlds than the alienating and exhaustive forms offered by capitalist agrarian transition.
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