Property, State and Geopolitics:
Re-interpreting the Turkish Road to Modernity

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Abstract

This dissertation re-interprets and re-historicizes the origin and development of capitalism in the late Ottoman Empire and Turkey, and by doing so, it explores in a new light the question of ‘multiple modernities’. Contrary to the conventional wisdom in Historical Sociology and International Relations, I argue that the formation of ‘market societies’ should not be considered the outcome of ‘economic’ processes, but rather of systematic political and cultural interventions into existing ways of life that ensure the commodification of the means of subsistence, especially of land and labour. Departing from the ‘evolutionary’ understanding of the transition of capitalism, I show that the (early) modern world did not witness a concentric extension of largely similar market-making projects following the rise of British capitalism. Instead, historically specific social and geopolitical struggles generated qualitatively different modernities within and outside Europe. In particular, the modernization associated with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, i.e. the Jacobin model, not only proved (at least for a while) the viability of an alternative path to modernization that did not require the commodification of the means of life, but also became a model itself to be emulated and selectively adapted by others in and beyond Europe.

In this context, my argument is that from 1840 to 1950 Ottoman/Turkish modernization efforts did not follow a single project of ‘westernization’; but rather, that Ottoman/Turkish elites appropriated, oscillated between and recombined with local resources two inherently contradictory development strategies originally advanced by Britain and France. Overtime, however, the reactions from ‘below’ and interventions from ‘outside’ increasingly forced the Ottoman/Turkish state to consolidate the Jacobin model at the expense of market society. The state, unable/unwilling to commodify land and labour, increasingly substituted the relations of market society with the Jacobin model, while repeatedly recombining the latter with domestic
social and ideological resources. The cumulative result of this century-long Turkish experiment with modernity, therefore, was a historically specific Jacobinism that bypassed capitalism (and socialism) based on an alternative form of property and sociality. Relatedly, although capitalist property relations began to penetrate the social fabric from the 1950s onwards, this Jacobin legacy had a profound impact on the manner in which capitalism was instituted in Turkey. Seen from this angle, I contend that postwar modernization in Turkey cannot be understood merely as another form of capitalism, nor can Turkey’s current transformation signify a mere transition to another form of modernity.

Overall, then, the dissertation contributes to a deeper understanding of the social content, tempo and multi-linearity of world historical development. By departing from the evolutionary conceptions of capitalist development, it undermines the unilinear understanding of the ‘Western’ path to modernity, which in turn has paradigmatic implications for the quality and manner of the arrival of modernity in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey.
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Introduction

‘Modernity’ has been one of the main preoccupations of most post-18th century social theory. Whatever is meant by ‘modernity’ and whether one chooses to emphasize the ‘bright’ or ‘dark’ side of it, it is usually used as a blanket concept to refer to a mixed bundle of innovations and transformations that originated in ‘Western Europe’ and is emblematic of the transition to the ‘modern’ world, such as state formation, secularism, individualism, citizenship, nationalism, private property and industrialization. One of the questions central to this dissertation is to what extent a history of modernity can be grounded in a history of capitalism. There have, indeed, been many explanations for this basic issue, yet the general tendency in historical sociology and international relations scholarship is to subsume capitalism under modernity, or vice versa. While some approaches assume that capitalism, in the course of ‘economic’ development, laid the groundwork for the political and cultural modernization that generated modernity, others see the political and cultural ‘rationalization’, driven by geopolitical competition, as responsible for the ‘economic’ rationalization associated with capitalism. In short, capitalism is either conflated with or understood simply as the ‘economic’ aspect of modernity.

Regardless of these differences, what unites competing narratives of modernity is a common conception of capitalism as the ‘economic structure’. The dissertation begins by problematizing this widely-held assumption. Following a distinct version of historical materialism known as ‘political Marxism’, I argue that capitalism is not an ‘economic’ phenomenon that predates or externally interacts with the political and the cultural. Rather, it materializes in and through specific social relations, particular political/cultural forms and inter-subjectivities (Wood 1995: 24). In other words, capitalism is not defined as some
‘economic’ structure which ‘social and cultural phenomena … trail after … at some remote remove’ (Thompson 1965: 84). Capitalism itself is based on the reorganization of social and cultural relations and political power in such ways that the ‘economic’ in the end becomes conceivable as a sphere functioning, presumably, according to its own rules.

What is signalled here is a dissatisfaction with historical materialist approaches underlined by the base/superstructure model and an effort to preempt the associated charge of economic reductionism. In its crudest form, the base/superstructure model relegates productive forces and relations to the ‘base’, which in turn ‘determines’ or ‘shapes’ the so-called superstructural relations and institutions, including the state. Of course, many attempts have been made to reinterpret this mode of explanation of social structures away from economic determinism. The widespread appeal of Althusserian Marxism, for example, rested precisely in its allowing of political and ideological superstructures to be ‘dominant’ in a given ‘conjuncture’, and its postponement of the ‘determination by the economic’ ‘to the last instance’. However, this shift from crude to ‘remote economism’ is hardly a cure for the problem itself (Lacher 2006: 30). The search for a non-reductionist and workable basis for a historical materialist sociology is undermined, in the first place, by the transhistorical separation of the so-called ‘economic’ base and the ‘non-economic’ superstructure. True, the ‘economy’ or ‘production’ may gain primacy and a self-expanding momentum in modern capitalist society, but it is quite another matter to take the primacy of ‘production’ for granted and project it backwards. Such retrospective formulations collapse consequences into causes, as they presume capitalism from the outset (Wood 1984: 103). The historically specific logic of capitalist accumulation, i.e. its systematic potential to improve productive forces, turns into a universal and timeless drive propelling historical development forward to a pre-designated capitalist future. Furthermore, when this inexorable economistic straitjacket becomes too rigid and attempts are
made to relax it by injecting some degree of ‘autonomy’ to superstructures, this then risks the ‘randomization’ of history and social agency (Wood 1986: 31-5): ‘the base becomes a mere thing which can be safely ignored, while the relatively autonomous superstructures become too complex to analyze systematically and determination becomes “overdetermination” verging on indeterminacy’ (Holstun 2000: 91).

Obviously Marx himself is hardly immune to the kind of critique made above. After all, the base/superstructure metaphor is derived from the 1859 ‘Preface’, and although Marx never embarked on a systematic historical inquiry into the origins of capitalism, especially works such as the German Ideology and the Communist Manifesto are permeated by a mode of explanation that places great weight on the rational ‘division of labor’, the improvement of the means of ‘production’ or a capitalist bourgeois class as the motor of history. As such, while it is true that Marx was primarily concerned with de-naturalizing ‘bourgeois’ categories by exposing their socially- and politically-constructed character, he tended to explain the origin of those categories by trans-historicizing the social reproductive logic specific to capitalism. Perhaps this is not too surprising a consequence considering especially that the early Marx seems to have relied on and uncritically appropriated the taxonomies of 19th century liberal historiography, including a ‘stagist’ history driven by the inevitable and unilinear conceptions of ‘progress’ (Godelier 1986: 99; Comninel 1987: 86).

All that said, however, one can also recognize that in Marx’s own work, especially in his mature historical accounts, the influence of liberal conceptions of history and the resultant economic determinism is countered by a consistent emphasis on the historical specificity of class societies and of capitalist society in particular, which together cast doubt on any simple unilinear and teleological view of history as progress. In the Grundrisse, Capital and the
Ethnographic Notebooks, Marx’s categories become increasingly ‘historical’, as he frees socioeconomic forms from the presuppositions of contemporary social life. In the Grundrisse, rather than relying on some transhistorical ‘economic’ element such as commerce or technology, he focuses on the organization of pre-capitalist human communities to explain the logic of their social reproductive strategies. In this sense, Marx understands production not simply as the production of ‘things’, but of relations and subjectivities vital to the internal and external reproduction of a given human community. In other words, production is not ‘governed by eternal natural laws independent of history’, but by the conditions of reproduction of historically specific ‘modes of life’ underlined by distinct relations of kinship, political status, religion, forms of state, warfare, gender and so on (Marx 1993: 87). Furthermore, Marx observes that all pre-capitalist human aggregates, whether hierarchically or communally organized, functioned in a way to secure the continued access of its members to some form of property, particularly on land. Property was thus a direct derivation of the relations of dependence constitutive of the community. Property could be acquired only in and through the community. Relatedly, Marx adds that property would be unburdened of its communal function and turned into a value in itself, only when the process of the ‘separation of labor from the objective conditions of its realization’ was completed, i.e. only when capitalism completely undermined the ‘natural unity of labor with its material presuppositions’ (Marx 1993: 471). Viewed in this light, Marx later made a definitive departure from his earlier conception of capitalism. Capitalism no longer appears as something natural slowly germinating in the interstices of pre-capitalist societies, ready to burst forth as the division of labor or the forces of production advance, but as an unnatural rupture in human history founded upon an unprecedented reorganization of the political-cultural rules governing access to the means of reproduction, especially to land (e.g. Marx 1990: part 8). And it is indeed this recognition of the epochal difference of capitalism, which
allowed him in the Ethnographic Notebooks to explicitly deny that he had created a unilinear trajectory of historical development and the view that non-Western societies such as Russia or India were mere deviations from a natural and preordained path to capitalism (Anderson 2010: 228).

In short, given his insistence on the historical specificity of capitalism, his refusal to generalize the logic of capitalism, and his quest to explain the specificity of the rules of reproduction in non-capitalist societies, Marx, in his later writings, ‘is offering precisely the antithesis of teleology’ (Wood 2008b: 90; Godelier 1986: 246-7). Clearly, this is not to gloss over the contradictions and empirical errors within Marx’s own work, but a reminder that historical materialism does not rest on the acceptance of any ‘article of faith’ (Comminel 2013: 49). Just like Marx’s own ‘willingness to modify and even abandon the supposed general theory of history conventionally ascribed to him, in the light of fresh empirical evidence’ (Sayer 1987: 12), we have to accept that theoretical premises long considered essential to historical materialism ‘must be supported by history, or else discarded’ (Comminel 2013: 49; Lacher 2006: 30).

Above all, therefore, what is being offered here is a materialist method that thinks ‘historically’ (Wood 2011). Making this leap requires us to take at least three theoretical steps. First, this method completely dispenses with the base/superstructure aphorism and the view that the ‘economic’ is a separate sphere driven by a transhistorical capitalist rationality. Instead, it turns to real historical time in order to understand a society’s particular ‘logic of process’, its own rules of reproduction, and ultimately its own conditions of the transition to capitalism. Class relations are thus freed from the presuppositions of contemporary social life and explained with reference to the internal and external conditions of social reproduction.
Put differently, class interests are not pre-given but can be understood only through an analysis of geopolitically-mediated and historically-specific ‘property relations’, i.e. an ensemble of institutions, relations and inter-subjectivities through which ‘unpaid labor is pumped out of the direct producers’ (Marx 1991: 791). Here the ‘mode of production’ or class structure is not a mere theoretical construct, but an outcome of past social and geopolitical struggles built into the prevailing property relations. As determination is pulled to the level of human relations, history gains an open-ended, processual and contextually-bound character.

Second, the historical materialism offered here tries to overcome the theoretical compartmentalization of social life, hence insisting on the ‘unity of life experience’ and the need to study ‘social process in its totality’ (McNally 1997: 39; Thompson 1995: 95). Therefore, it does not offer merely another ‘sectoral history’ - as ‘economic’, ‘religious’, ‘political’ or ‘international’ history- but ‘a total history of society in which all other sectoral histories are convened...to show in what determinate ways each activity was related to the other, the logic of this process and the rationality of causation’ at work in the formation of property relations (Thompson 1995: 95). Third, it argues for an epochal conception of capitalism, i.e. a capitalism that arises not out of extra-historical necessity, not from the mere sale of commodities, not as a result of commerce, not wage-labor per se, not due to the more-or-less natural extension of preceding social patterns, but as a result of a systematic intervention into social relations, institutions and values that leads to increasing commodification of the means of reproduction in society at large.

Once we recover the specificity of the capitalist market, one important historical implication follows: the conception of a unitary ‘Western modernity’ collapses. For, having departed from teleological conceptions of the transition to capitalism, we discover that modernity and capitalism were born not simply as different aspects of a single process of Western
‘rationalization’. Rather, there were qualitatively distinct, if not rival, modernities in Western Europe derived from fundamentally different social processes and geographical contexts. More precisely, we find out that while capitalist modernity initially developed in England in the post-medieval period, continental European states were not following their Albion counterpart with some time lag as often presumed. Although the rise of capitalist agriculture and later industry in England generated unprecedented geopolitical and fiscal pressures on the continent for emulation, this did not lead to an immediate convergence of socioeconomic forms. At least until the early 19th century, mainland Europe and above all modernity’s archetypical home, France, was marked by fundamentally different forms of social organization from which capitalist property-relationships were absent. Much of what is conventionally associated with modernity, from the Enlightenment to the French Revolution, therefore, either had nothing to do with or, at best, developed in geopolitical contestation with capitalism.

Obviously, these historical insights are hardly new. They have been developed over the years by generations of political Marxists, who consistently argued for the non-capitalist nature of French absolutism and revolutionary France. Missing in this literature, however, beyond the recognition that the French Revolution was not triggered by and did not lead to capitalism, is a systematic inquiry into the question as to what the process of post-revolutionary French ‘modernization’ was actually about. This represents a considerable lacuna, especially considering the fact that revolutionary and Napoleonic France, alone or alongside capitalist England, became the model for subsequent modernization projects within and outside Western Europe. In this sense, specifying the forms of rationalization, mobilization and appropriation entailed in revolutionary France and absent in Britain can provide us with important insights into the socioeconomic character of alternative modernities. In other words,
a closer analysis of the rules and institutions governing social and geopolitical reproduction in revolutionary France and their importation elsewhere shows us that modernization projects must not be classified merely as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ copies of a singular 19th century ‘market project’, but that they hint at attempts at fostering qualitatively different modernities in ‘substitution’ for capitalism.

As Robbie Shilliam (2009) has shown, the ‘substitution’ characteristic of revolutionary and Napoleonic France led to nothing short of a military and social revolution, i.e. the subjection of the peasantry to ‘universal conscription’ and the concomitant birth of the ‘citizen-soldier’ endowed with land and equality. In addition to the invention of the citizen-army, the dissertation identifies and elaborates ‘public schooling’ as another extra-market mechanism systematically implemented in revolutionary France to discipline and appropriate peasant bodies. The French elite, unable or unwilling to expropriate the peasants’ right to subsistence, attempted to centralize and universalize education as an alternative mechanism to tap peasant labor and energies. The implication is that while the politico-cultural mobilization of the lower classes through universal education led, in principle, to the generalization of access to the state, which was the main source of social reproduction unlike in Britain, it also brought about a continuous onslaught against the non-state sources of politico-religious power. As a result, in the making of French citizens, secularism and nationalism, in a way unheard of in Britain, acquired entirely new meanings, turning into developmental ideologies and practices. New discourses of ‘nation’, ‘religion’ and ‘science’ were employed to simultaneously universalize and restrict the lower classes’ access to the state and property. Universal conscription and education, combined with a nationalist-secular ideology, were the essence of, what I will call, Jacobinism. By establishing a citizen-army and citizen-bureaucracy, the Jacobin project engineered non-market means to the acquisition of the right to equality and
subsistence. As such, it not only proved (at least for a while) the viability of an alternative path to modernization that did not require the commodification of the means of life, but also became a model itself to be emulated and selectively adapted by others, including the late Ottoman Empire and early Republican Turkey.

The dissertation suggests that in the course of the 19th century the Ottoman Empire embarked on not one only but two modernization projects: the Empire introduced the principles of market society and those of the *model français* concurrently. The reactions from below and interventions from outside forced the Ottoman elite and intellectuals to continuously negotiate the rights of the propertied individual with the rights of the citizen-soldier. Thus both in political practice and imagination, the reconciliation of the inherent tensions between the right to property and the right to subsistence emerged as a task of pivotal importance and constituted the underlying logic of the late-Ottoman and early-Republican experience of modernity. The Ottoman reformers, from the Tanzimat elites to the Young Turks, never repudiated the right to property, but conditioned this right to the realization of sociopolitical and military duties towards the state. The rules of owning property and accessing the state were increasingly ‘nationalized’ and ‘secularized’ in the face of new geopolitical and domestic challenges. And by conditioning social reproduction to military and educational mobilization (rather than market competition), the Ottoman reformers generalized a set of non-market means to accessing the sources of subsistence.

I argue that the cumulative result of this century-long Ottoman/Turkish experiment with modernity, i.e. the original Kemalist project, is best understood as a historically specific form of Jacobinism. Kemalism attempted to equalize, secularize and militarize the Republican subjects while considerably limiting the commodification of land and labor. In doing so, it
repeatedly recombined the revolutionary French model of modernization with the social and intellectual resources of a Turkish-Islamic milieu. Kemalism, as such, generated a political economy and subjectivity that were consciously designed to achieve a non-capitalist (and non-socialist) form of late-development. Though ultimately unsuccessful, it would be amiss to read the period from 1840 to 1950 as but a period of transition to capitalism in Turkey; instead, it was the site of far-reaching efforts to develop alternative forms of modernity.

In many ways the 1950s signified the end of Jacobinism and the rise of the capitalist project in Turkey. After more than a hundred years of modernization, the Turkish elite finally found the breathing space in which capitalist property relations could be established without the imminent danger of domestic rebellion and foreign invasion. That said, however, one should not presume capitalism’s coming into dominance as a relatively smooth process. Capitalism was born in a Jacobin womb; hence the property relations that characterized the original Kemalist project were often invoked by different classes to limit and contest as well as to produce capitalism. From the 1970s onwards, however, the dissertation contends that there was also another form of capitalism growing in provincial Anatolian towns. Completely detached from the social and intellectual resources of the original Republican project, the Islamic ‘National View’ movement provided the blueprint for a novel capitalist development strategy, heralding the end of capitalism’s complicated coexistence with Jacobinism in Turkey. By deducing modernity from an imagined Ottoman-Islamic past rather than revolutionary France, the National View movement unburdened capitalist development from the legacies of Jacobinism, thereby imagining a totally fresh foundation for what they considered a ‘productive’ and ‘uncorrupted’ ‘free enterprise’ system. As the classes associated with and mobilized by the National View mustered power throughout the 1980s and 1990s, ‘secularism’ turned into the main Republican bulwark against capitalism. And
since this secular bulwark was taken down in 2002, an increasingly anti-modern yet fully capitalist future has been in the making. In this light, the dissertation concludes that while post-1950 ‘modernization’ in Turkey cannot be understood merely as another form of capitalism, Turkey’s current transformation signifies more the consolidation of a relatively novel capitalist project than a mere transition to another form of modernity.

Overall, then, the dissertation argues that much of the history of the last two centuries would be fundamentally obscured if we presume a universality of capitalist dynamics in many European societies as well as in non-Western societies. The dissertation challenges the evolutionary understanding of the origins of capitalism as a specifically ‘Western’ path and by doing so, it claims to better explain and provide an alternative reading of the dynamics and multi-linearity of world historical development. As such, I believe that my doctoral project opens up the possibility of critically reconsidering and reconstructing the foundational concepts and assumptions of historical sociology, comparative political economy and International Relations (all which, as I will show, are crippled by a tendency to equate modernity to capitalist modernity).

The argument proceeds in five chapters. The first two chapters are essentially preparatory. Chapter 1 discusses the capitalism - modernity relation. Chapter 2 documents the domestic and international context in which capitalism and absolutism/Jacobinism arose as two competing and qualitatively different developmental models. Each chapter on the Ottoman Empire and Turkey (chp. 3 - 5) introduces a different historical period, while at the same time taking issue with different manifestations of the same problem, i.e. the problem of extrapolating capitalist forms and dynamics into the past. In each chapter I will question the
explanatory efficacy of concepts and paradigms such as ‘Bourgeois Revolution’, ‘Uneven and Combined Development’ and the ‘Sonderweg’ paradigm.
Chapter 1

Early Modernity and ‘The Rise of the West’: Questioning the ‘Pristine’ Conditions of Capitalism

The ambiguity of the concept of modernity is an open secret (Sayer 1990). As one of the main ‘code words’ of the social sciences, modernity is used to refer to diverse yet interconnected processes of economic, political and cultural change, such as capitalism, industrialization, the nation-state, secularism and the enlightenment (Prendergast 2003). The debate on the actual content of modernity and the timing of its unraveling still continues; however, its historical specificity is widely recognized. Modernity, argues Antony Giddens, stands for a ‘particular discontinuity’ in human history, a break from our previously-existing perceptions of time and space marked by fundamental changes in the ‘pace’, ‘scope’ and the ‘nature’ of socioeconomic development (Giddens 1990: 4-6). Karl Polanyi tends to concur with this view stating that capitalism corresponds more to ‘the metamorphosis of the caterpillar’ than ‘any alteration that can be expressed in terms of continuous growth and development’ (Polanyi 1957a: 44). Clearly, modern change has never been a ‘quantum jump’; i.e. the transition to modernity occurred rapidly but processually, bearing the traces of the previous political, economic and cultural forms (Goody 2004: 11). Similarly, Michael Mann writes that modernity brought about ‘structural’ changes, ‘often occurring within single lifetimes’ yet it rarely ‘swept all away but were molded into older forms’ (Mann 1993: 14-7). Thus, the protractedness of modernity aside, the concept of the ‘early modern’ presupposes the beginning of a specific composite transition towards modern capitalism, the modern state and the modern subject.
Remarkably enough, despite all the historical specificity attributed to modernity and all the different causes said to have impacted its emergence, the transition to the modern age is explained in largely ahistorical terms. Consider Max Weber’s historical sociology for a moment. In a sense, the question of the transition to modernity would seem to Weber almost an irrelevant one, as he sees capitalism, to varying degrees, present at all times and all places. The key to capitalist economic activity in Weber’s terms is ‘rational capital accounting’, which is the systematic calculation of expected profits ‘from the utilization of opportunities for exchange’ (Weber 1978: 334; 1961: 275). As such, ‘capitalism and capitalist undertakings...have existed in all the civilized countries of the world for centuries’ (ibid 1978: 335). And yet in another sense, what Weber is particularly interested in explaining is the ‘purely market capitalism’ of the West: a kind of capitalism based on ‘rational economic enterprise’ and driven by ‘opportunities’ in the marketplace, in contradistinction to the ‘purely formal variations’ of capitalism such as the one in China that, he argues, continued to be organized around the opportunities presented by political power and subjected to various spiritual constraints (ibid 1978: 315, 330). Weber emphasizes the specificity of Western capitalism, which he thinks is rooted, among other things, in ‘the rational capitalist organization of (formally) free labour’ (ibid 1978: 336). However, nowhere does he explain how such a transition to a regime of ‘free labour’ came about. Instead, he draws attention to the emergence of the Western bourgeoisie equipped with a particular capitalist rationality, which is a phenomenon, he thinks, embedded in the structure of European medieval towns, commercial laws and its Judaea-Christian culture (ibid 1978:338). Furthermore, the rise of the burgher classes largely shaped the rationalization of bureaucracy and legal codes, since it was in the interests of the patrimonial and feudal lords to ally with and grant autonomy to theburghers in order to pay forever increasing military expenditures. Unlike their weaker non-Western counterparts, the burgher classes thus began to impose their rationality not only in
the economic sphere but also in the political, hence accelerating the rationalization-impersonalization of the institutions of rule and domination.

In Weber’s narrative, then, capitalism is understood as the progressive removal of obstacles to the bourgeoisie’s autonomy and rationality. From the medieval city-states to the early modern period, multiple processes of rationalization (economic, political, legal and aesthetic) occur in mutually reinforcing ways such that the bourgeois classes are eventually set free from political restraints and given ethical support. Capitalism is freed from its politico-cultural impediments, as the state and culture acquire more ‘rational’ forms. On the whole, Weber takes for granted precisely what requires the most explanation: the transition to capitalism is reduced to ‘a natural consequence of the liberation and political elevation of burgher classes’ (Wood 2012:82). Capitalism becomes ‘more of the old same thing’, i.e. ‘nothing more than an elaboration of the age-old principles of profitable exchange’ (Wood 1995: 171). Weber’s account ultimately turns into ‘a teleological story that knows no real historical ruptures’ but only the gradual unfettering of modern capitalist rationality (Lacher 2006: 23). Once set free, capitalist rationality ‘becomes an autonomous guiding parameter of history. In this way, ‘the state becomes the “modern state” and capitalism becomes “modern capitalism”’ (Gerstenberger 2007: 27-8).

Weber’s model has been modified and has become more complicated over time in the hands of his adherents. And yet it is not clear how far the proposed modifications lead to a divergence from the teleological presuppositions underlying Weber’s argument. That is, the mode of argumentation that views capitalism and the modern state as the natural outcomes of the ‘unimpeded’ growth of towns, trade and bourgeois classes has remained largely in place.
Michael Mann is a specific example. Mann argues that one can discern ‘movement toward [Europe’s] leap forward gathering force through the whole medieval and early modern period’ (Mann 1986: 373). According to Mann, the European ‘miracle’ was primarily a result of the absence of a ‘unitary state’ in and the Roman-Christian legacy of medieval Europe. The fall of the Roman Empire caused a considerable weakening of centralized political power, hence a decrease in the political demands for the mobilization of labour and taxation. In the absence of a centralized authority, ‘social relationships were extremely localized’ yet not chaotic. For, by providing common social norms and a common social identity, Christianity made possible ‘a basic level of normative pacification’, ‘obedience’ and ‘solidarity’ within and between the emerging medieval polities (ibid: 377-8). The outcome was that Christianity unburdened economic classes from the high costs of political regulation, thereby indirectly leading to the confirmation establishment of property rights and market relations in medieval Europe. This launched a process during which states largely lost their regulative/redistributive functions. They became ‘overwhelmingly, narrowly political. The separation between economic and political functions/organizations was clear and symmetrical - states were political, classes were economic.’ (ibid: 17). Thus the path to Europe’s ‘embryonic transition to capitalism’ was cleared; despite occasional setbacks, people, once endowed with property rights, gained ‘autonomy and privacy sufficient to keep to themselves the fruits of their own enterprise and thus to calculate likely costs and benefits to themselves of alternative strategies. Thus with supply, demand, and incentives for innovation well established, neoclassical economics can take up the explanation’ (ibid: 409).¹

If the economy flourished in a relatively non-political, i.e. Christian shell at this early stage, its further development, however, was promoted by the holders of political power, as military

¹ For a comprehensive critique of Mann, see Brenner 2006.
competition from the 1200s began to force political units to expand and centralize. And the resultant fiscal/administrative pressures were ameliorated only when the holders of economic power supported the political classes. The implication is that while capitalism funded and facilitated war-making and state-building, states, in turn, fulfilled ‘new pacification requirements’ of a rapidly commercializing economy (Mann 1986:500-517). In sum, ‘[a]s the original dynamism of feudal Europe became more extensive, capitalism and the national state formed a loose but coordinated and concentrated alliance, which was shortly to intensify and to conquer both heaven and earth’ (ibid: 446). And ‘why did the miracle not occur’ elsewhere, say in the realm of Islam? Mann finds his answer in Ibn Khaldun: ‘endless cyclical struggles’ within and between different power networks rendered impossible the modern re-organization of power (ibid: 502).

Despite his modifications, the fact remains that the model proposed by Mann, stripped of its inessentials, reproduces the teleological logic of Weber’s argument; whenever the holders of political/ideological power secure private property and maintain order without encumbering the economy, economic actors, by definition, adopt a capitalist logic of action. The explanation of the transition to capitalism then boils down to the removal of growth-repressing factors on an otherwise naturally-developing capitalism. The existence of capitalism is assumed ‘in order to account for its appearance’ (Brenner 1989:36). By implication the composite transition to modernity is, at least partly, conceived as buttressed and conditioned by this pre-given process of capitalist rationalization. Modernity, in other words, becomes part of the teleology underlying the rise of capitalism.

‘Eurocentric anti-Eurocentrism’: Universalizing and Naturalizing Capitalism

These conventional narratives, formulating the rise of capitalism in terms of the ‘abilities/advantages’ Europe possessed and ‘blockages’ that existed in the non-Western
world, have been criticized by a number of scholars for their Eurocentrism. The common charge is that the portrayal of capitalism and modernity as exclusively European processes is permeated with the assumption of a stagnant, despotic, irrational non-West. As a result, the Eurocentric accounts not only fail to square with empirical facts, but also severely obscure the international dimension of social transformation, i.e. the economic, political and cultural exchanges between the West and the Non-West, without which the ‘rise’ of capitalism and modernity in the West would have been impossible.

James Blaut’s ‘The Colonizer’s Model of the World’ well exemplifies this position. Blaut suggests ‘Europeans had no superiority over non-Europeans’ before 1492. Europeans and non-Europeans alike were mere variations of ‘a single feudal landscape’ marked by inter-regional connectivity and roughly similar developmental patterns. Many regions in Asia, Africa and Europe, in this regard, ‘bored…the same potential towards evolution to capitalism’. Different expressions of ‘proto-capitalism’, such as commercial agriculture, monetized rent, long-distance trade, existed almost everywhere in the hemisphere ‘on a spatially and socially small scale’ (Blaut 1993: 160-5). There was therefore nothing ‘unique’ about Europe since the rest of the world was equally ready for further advancement. What permitted Europe to develop a more elaborate form of capitalism was colonialism. Had Europe not gained access to extra-European resources thanks to its proximity to the Americas and favourable Atlantic ‘trade winds’, Western capitalism would have never taken off (ibid: 180-2).

Another prominent example in this framework of analysis is John Hobson’s work. Hobson challenges the assumptions of a ‘pristine West’ by drawing attention to the comparative superiority of some of the leading Asian powers between 500 and 1800. From Hobson’s
perspective, most of the abilities and institutions associated with capitalism and modernity were, in fact, present in the East, and absent in the West. ‘Long-distance trade’, ‘rationalist capitalist investors’, a set of virtues conducive to capital accumulation, technological inventiveness, and states that successfully pacified ‘internal’ rivals and actively promoted the ‘background conditions necessary for capitalism’ existed across China, India, and in the realm of Islam, whereas ‘Europe remained mired in a backward agrarianism and a relatively weak commercialism’ at least until the 1500s (Hobson 2004:296-7). Likewise, until the 19th century, major European powers were not as liberal, democratic, centrally-organized and industrialized as often presumed; hence the myth of dramatic deviation by the West from the East. Furthermore, even when the West finally eclipsed the major Asian powers in the 19th century, this was made possible not based on its indigenous capabilities and resources, but initially by ‘diffusion’ and then forceful appropriation of Eastern ideas, technologies and institutions. Therefore, the final rise of Europe had nothing to do with an intrinsic European rationality, argues Hobson; instead the ‘racist’ features of European collective identity made Europe uniquely expansionist and imperialist. This inexorable drive to geographical expansion, aided by a number of historical contingencies such as the fortuitous conquest of the Americas, thus marked the ‘rise’ of the West.

Kenneth Pomeranz follows a similar line of argumentation. Pomeranz argues that ‘well-developed markets and other capitalist institutions’ were equally present throughout the early modern period in the core areas of Asia (primarily China) as well as in the core areas of Western Europe (primarily England). The resultant ‘market-driven growth’ in both milieus led to ‘very similar processes of commercialization and proto-industrial growth’ before 1800. The implication is that market dynamics and market rationality alone fall short in explaining the ‘great divergence’ that would emerge in the nineteenth century (Pomeranz 2000:16, 24).
The question of divergence, thus, has to be re-formulated with a new focus on ‘absences, accidents and obstacles’ that subsequently led to the differentiation of developmental paths in Britain and China (ibid:8). England was able to circumvent the ecological and demographic constraints of further industrialization thanks partly to the proximity of coal resources and partly because of its efficient ‘military fiscalism’ that led to the colonization of foreign resources (ibid: 9). Without these extra-economic advantages of coal and colonies, which China did not have, Pomeranz reasons, the path to industrial growth in England would have never been cleared (ibid: 437-445).

The ‘anti-Eurocentric’ scholars surveyed above have come some way in overturning the sense of the inevitability of capitalism in the West by emphasizing the relative backwardness of Europe and the importance, if not superiority, of the commercial networks, technologies and institutions of some of the non-European regions throughout most of human history. They also stress the significance of inter-regional connectivity, geopolitics, historical contingency and imperialism in contributing to the final ‘rise’ of capitalism in the West.

And yet it is debatable how far these anti-Eurocentric histories differ from the assumptions underlying Eurocentric accounts. For, in spite of a variety of disagreements over the timing and the means of arrival of European capitalist hegemony, the revisionist literature as a whole reproduces the same method of argumentation to which the Eurocentric model resorts to explain capitalism and capitalism’s origins. They hope to overcome the worst faults of the old model by breaking with its overemphasis on Europe, and yet they do so through the same a posteriori reasoning: the purported antecedents of capitalism, which culminate in ‘modern’ capitalism under the right political, cultural, ecological and international circumstances, is no longer seen as exclusively Western, but is extended in time and space and made almost
universal. Anti-Eurocentrism thereby nurtures ‘the expectation of convergence everywhere, so long as politico-institutional arrangements do not prevent the rational self-interested response to economic opportunities from bringing about specialization, accumulation and innovation’ (Brenner 2011:205). As such, the argument that the non-European civilizations had no inherent impediment to capitalism simply inverts the assumption that Western Europe was modern and capitalist by its nature. What remains firmly in place is the ahistorical core of the argument: an essentialist view of historical agency and a teleological view of historical change that together postulate a necessary connection between commerce, wealth, technology on the one hand, and capitalism on the other (Wood 2001).

Also worth considering in this conjunction is a different ‘non-Eurocentric’ account that has been recently offered by a number of Marxian International Relations scholars (e.g. Anievas and Nisancioglu 2013; Matin 2012). What sets these scholars somewhat apart from the rest of the non-Eurocentric approaches is that they (partly) move beyond the trade-centred accounts of the rise of capitalism, and put additional emphasis on the role played by ‘geopolitical’ factors in the transition to and consolidation of capitalist social relations in Western Europe. More specifically, they argue that identifying the ‘geopolitical determinations of the outcomes of internal class struggles’ can overcome the ‘Anglocentrism’ of Brennerian narratives and lead to a more ‘horizontally integrative approach’ to the formation of capitalist social relations in England. From this angle, for example, the historically unprecedented unity of the English ruling classes, which is one of the most important factors setting the stage for England’s capitalist transformation, was a by-product of the 11th century Norman invasion (Matin 2012:45). Therefore, the transition to capitalism in England should not be seen as singularly ‘English’ but as an ‘externally-determined’ phenomenon (Anievas and Nisancioglu 2013: 91).
This critique of ‘Anglocentrism’ aptly brings back the wider international context in which capitalist social relations developed in England. Yet, emphasizing the ‘geopolitical-mediation’ of social change is one thing, assigning geopolitics ‘primacy’ or ‘determinacy’ is another. For ‘geopolitical’ or ‘inter-societal’ factors per se explain nothing, or hardly anything, about the historically specific content of social interaction. For example, even if the charge of Anglo-centrism is admitted, the way out of it does not rest on the mere addition of the Norman invasion as a ‘geopolitical’ phenomenon to our narrative. Instead, what requires elaboration is the socio-spatial context of the Norman-Anglo-Saxon interaction. And this requires in the first place a deeper historical inquiry into the ‘internal’ social reproductive organization of the conquering and conquered communities, i.e. the solidity of their kinship structures, levels of social stratification, forms of tributary arrangements and so on. Thus a simple recognition of the Norman invasion as a geopolitical phenomenon hardly accounts for the historically specific development of modes of property and rule associated with the English ruling class. That said, a generic insistence on ‘geopolitics’ easily assimilates into ‘international determinism’, thereby blocking socio-historical inquiry, after having stimulated it.

All that said, a much more serious problem runs through all of the above-mentioned non-Eurocentric approaches, which forces them to eventually relapse into Eurocentrism. No matter how they explain the origins and final rise of capitalism, either as the result of the

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2 In fact, the ‘non-Anglocentric’ scholars themselves acknowledge that the scholars whom they consider Anglocentric either implicitly or explicitly provide a great deal of the role played by geopolitical factors in the transition to capitalism in England (Matin 2012:45; i.e. Robert Brenner 1985b: 255). And they curiously neglect that ‘social-property relations’ encompasses not only the ‘vertical’ relations of exploitation between the direct producer and the appropriator but also the ‘horizontal’ social relations within and between the competing ruling classes (some of whom are organized in and as the state). Therefore, political Marxism, by definition, involves inter-societal and inter-state interaction and systematically analyzes the influence of that interaction on social relations in the domestic sphere. Indeed, this aspect of political Marxism has been powerfully shown by such scholars as Benno Teschke (2003) and Hannes Lacher (2006) whose works are at pains to show the wider geopolitical milieu in which the transition to capitalism took place.

3 The argument presented in this and the following paragraph was originally developed by Hannes Lacher in his ‘Comparative Politics’ graduate seminars at York University in 2008.
‘global confluence’ of technologies, commercial exchange and institutions or in terms of capitalism’s ‘geopolitical determinations’, the explanatory strategies employed by these non-Eurocentric accounts inevitably produce ‘deviant’ historical cases. Let us shelve for the moment empirical debates about whether China, the most prominent Asian power, can be considered to have been on a capitalist developmental path through the early modern period. Can all human aggregates around the world conform to the anti-Eurocentric criteria, i.e. be considered to have undergone similar developmental patterns and to have equally ‘contributed’ to the rise of modern capitalism? Blaut answers in the affirmative. He proposes a ‘uniformitarian’ model based on a belief of the ‘equal capability of human beings…in all cultures and regions’, which, he eventually admits, causes him to ‘theorize well beyond available evidence’ especially in parts of his argument concerning pre-1492 Africa (Blaut 1993: 42, 153). Besides Europe and China, Pomeranz (2000: 27) notes only Japan and, ‘to a lesser extent’, north India having shared the same capitalist dynamics. In like fashion, Jack Goody (2004: 159-60) privileges only a number of societies in Eurasia which, he argues, developed similar levels of economic and cultural activity since the Bronze Age. Accordingly, he defines modernity as a ‘moving target’ located only between these inter-linked regions, with Europe enjoying a ‘temporary advantage’ since the Industrial Revolution. In contrast, the Ottoman Empire is Anievas and Nisancioglu’s favourite. By waging almost constant warfare against the Habsburgs during the 16th and 17th centuries, they argue that the Ottomans prevented the unification of Europe under Habsburg rule, thereby ‘unwittingly’ contributing to the ‘geopolitical breathing space’ opened to England in advancing towards capitalism (Anievas and Nisancioglu 2013: 94).

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4 Pace Pomeranz, Brenner and Isset (2006) argue that Chinese economic growth followed an involutionary path, i.e. it was marked by increased output but not by growth in labour productivity.
Radical as it may seem, anti-Eurocentrism ultimately turns into a self-defeating exercise. For anti-Eurocentric accounts cannot but either envisage a world entirely ‘flattened of determinant social differences’ based on empirically unsupported ‘imagined commonalities’ (Bryant 2006: 418) or to hierarchically provincialise the world according to the degree of development of capitalist networks/institutions or build new spatial hierarchies in terms of geopolitical contributions to the rise of capitalism. As such, anti-Eurocentric accounts increase the number of regions/areas which they consider as capitalist as or contributed to the rise of capitalism in Western Europe. Yet they do so without overcoming hierarchical readings of world history. They offer a non-Eurocentric history only by creating new spatial hierarchies. Relatedly, by trying to narrate an all-inclusive history of the transition to capitalism, i.e. a narrative purporting that everyone ‘contributed’ or 'could have contributed’ to the rise of capitalism, non-Eurocentric accounts reproduce perhaps the most Eurocentric assumption that capitalism represents a superior and better mode of organizing human relations, so that everyone must have contributed to its rise (Wood 2001: 32).

The way out of this intellectual dead-end rests on challenging the view that capitalism naturally emerges once certain English, European or universal human resources/technologies accumulate (Duzgun, forthcoming). What needs to be asserted, instead, is the historical specificity of the ‘rupture’ that produced capitalism (Wood 2001). At stake here is a departure from a ‘continuist’ (evolutionary) interpretation to a ‘discontinuist’ one, i.e. from a transhistorically cumulating capitalism towards a conception of capitalism as a qualitative break in human history founded upon a previously inexperienced mode of organizing human relations and social power (Lacher 2006).
Capitalism, Modernity and International Relations

Clearly, the argument that capitalism, as a type of society, is radically different from pre-existent societies is not a novel one. Karl Polanyi, for instance, argues in favour of such a discontinuist interpretation by historically distinguishing the capitalist market from other types of economies that were based on ‘reciprocity’ and ‘redistribution’. Trade and exchange, he contends, existed at all times and served different integrative functions in different markets. To exemplify, the presence of ‘symmetrically arranged groupings’ presupposed ‘reciprocity’ as the integrating principle of the economy, just as ‘redistribution’ can integrate the economy in the presence of an ‘allocative center’. But for exchange per se to produce integration required ‘a system of price-making markets’, which arose only when ‘land and food were mobilized and labor was turned into a commodity free to be purchased in the market’. It is these social relations and institutional arrangements that make relevant the ‘view of the economy as the locus of allocating, saving up, marketing surpluses’ and ‘compel[ling] economizing actions’. Furthermore, Polanyi promptly adds, all this is ‘nowhere created by mere random acts of exchange’, but is an ‘institutional setup’ (Polanyi 1957c: 240; 1957d: 250-1, 255).

What flows most readily from Polanyi’s analysis is an analytical distinction between wealth and capital. The connection between the two is not necessary but historical. That is, wealth does not turn into capital in the absence of the social relations and institutions of a market economy. Only when people become dependent on the market for their means of subsistence and their existence is systematically subjected to competitive reproduction, wealth begins to invade the productive process and is compelled to alter the conditions of production. All in all, the rise of market society in Europe is not be understood as a consequence of wealth-seeking actions or commercial activity per se, but an outcome of political processes that
create, make rational and generalize a certain pattern of sociality and economic behaviour (Polanyi 1957b: 68-9).

Polanyi’s departure from evolutionism ultimately remains mired, however, by his somewhat technologically-determinist explanation of the emergence of market society. ‘The idea of a self-regulating market system was bound to take shape’, Polanyi asserts, ‘once elaborate machines and plants were used for production’. For ‘they [machines] can be worked without a loss only if…all factors [of production] are on sale, that is, they must be available in the needed quantities to anybody who is prepared to pay for them’. Eventually, despite his conviction that ‘no single cause deserves…to be the cause of that sudden and unexpected event’, Polanyi views the emergence of market society by and large as a function of technological changes associated with the Industrial Revolution (Polanyi 1957a: 42-3).

Polanyi’s rather abrupt lapse into technological-determinism, however, should not overshadow the importance of his recognition that capitalism is a qualitative break in human history. Anthony Giddens (1981: 77) concurs with this view by arguing that capitalism ‘stands out in relief from other types of society, as more radically distinct from them than they are from one another’. Giddens too, as Polanyi, stresses the significance of the commodification of labour and land and the consequent emergence of the ‘capitalist labor contract’ as the sine qua non of the modern epoch. The advent of capitalism separates labour for the first time in human history from the rights and obligations that attached it to the wider political community. What is intrinsic, therefore, to the capitalist labour contract is the ‘insulation of polity from economy’, in other words, ‘the extrusion of control of the means of violence from the principal axis of class exploitation’ (ibid: 11).
Central to the transition to modernity, then, is the commodification of labour. Giddens, however, goes further to argue that the transition to the system of wage-labour ‘can not be interpreted as simply the working out of some sort of endogenous’, hence evolutionist, ‘logic of capitalist development but has to be independently explained’. For the impact of inter-state relations was equally important for the consolidation and generalization of modernity. Put differently, what accounts for the transition to modernity were not only the ‘circumstances…directly involved in the expansion of economic enterprise itself’ (i.e. ‘allocative’ struggles) but also the ‘factors directly bound up with the nation-state and its involvement with other states’ (i.e. ‘authoritative’ struggles) (Giddens 1987:159). Proceeding from these theoretical premises, Giddens analyzes the relation between capitalism and the modern state in two historical phases. During the first phase, the development of the absolutist state converged with the ‘early diffusion of capitalist enterprise’ (ibid: 100, 148). From the 16th to the late 18th century the absolutist state, largely in response to the requirements of war-financing, gradually eroded the power and privileges of the land-owning aristocracy. The resultant centralization of administration, combined with the development of new systems of fiscal, legal and monetary management, unintentionally ‘helped to open up the space for the intrusion of commerce and capitalistic endeavours’ (ibid: 102, 158). ‘The commodification of products’ in turn ‘provided one of the causal conditions leading to the freeing of a mass wage-labour force from the residual bonds of feudalism’ (ibid: 158-9). Yet the systematic and large-scale extension of wage-labour took place only during the second phase, when the absolutist state, compelled by geopolitical pressures, developed new modes of ‘surveillance’ and ‘internal pacification’ that eventually underlay not only its transition to the nation-state but also the emergence of ‘industrial capitalism’ (Giddens 1981: 179).
Giddens’ emphasis on the role of inter-state relations in affecting the unfolding of capitalist social relations remains an important and yet underdeveloped insight. For the way he explains the transition, in many respects, still remains wedded to the conventional model. Although to the transition to capitalism is added a geopolitical dimension, hence partly departing from the evolutionary conceptions of social change, in Giddens’ model capitalism already exists in the ‘interstices’ of feudal society. Once producers are liberated from the relations of political servitude and more centralized fiscal and monetary policies are put in place, capitalism automatically begins to develop according to its own internal logic. Geopolitical factors facilitate and accelerate this process; and yet the emergence of capitalism still presupposes the prior existence of capitalist social relations. In his historical account, Giddens consequently reproduces a framework of analysis akin to the one he criticizes for assuming evolutionism. Absent in Giddens’ account is that the transition to capitalism has much less to do with the gradual unfettering of ‘the economy’, and has more to do with a particular way of organizing socio-political relations. And relatedly, capitalism presupposes a historically specific form of state; therefore, modern state-formation per se may not necessarily stem from and lead to capitalist transformation.

The latter critique equally applies to Justin Rosenberg’s conceptualization of the modernity-capitalism relation. Rosenberg writes that capitalism cannot be captured as an ‘economic’ phenomenon only, but must be perceived as a historically-specific form of ‘society’. For ‘generalized commodification of labor-power’ under capitalism makes the relations of exploitation appear as relations of ‘exchange’ between legal equals. This, in turn, enables the process of surplus extraction to be reconstituted as ‘private’ activity and the state to be abstracted from relations of exploitation. Underlying ‘the structural uniqueness of capitalism’, therefore, are ‘the distinctive institutional forms of modernity’: a ‘purely political’
‘impersonal’ state and a ‘public space’ that continuously insulate and are insulated from the economic and private relations of the market (Rosenberg 1994: 123-5).

Rosenberg, as such, well describes what capitalism is and what capitalist modernity theoretically looks like. Yet, his historical account remains ambiguous on the timing and manner of arrival of capitalism and modernity. Rosenberg seems to acknowledge that there was a temporal hiatus between the formation of the territorial-bureaucratic state and the rise of capitalism in Western Europe. Differently from Giddens, therefore, Rosenberg tends to suggest that capitalism did not develop simultaneously with state-building (ibid: 42, 130). And yet this does not prevent him from repeatedly arguing that the ‘modern sovereign state needs to be understood historically as a form of political rule peculiar to capitalism’ (ibid: 123, 172 emphasis added).

Rosenberg ultimately overlooks the fact that the impersonal character of modern rule in continental Europe well predated, hence did not result exclusively from, its abstraction from economic power (Gerstenberger 2007:14-5). In France, for example, especially from the mid-18th century, a ‘public’ sphere was under construction, yet without being rooted in capitalist social relations. The ‘public’ was increasingly underlined, not by the impersonality of market society, but by the impersonality of new conceptions of political community and subjectivity (Baker 1990:186). One implication of this historical oversight is that in Rosenberg’s account modernity arrives to the continent historically too late and capitalism too fast. The former partly relates to his failure to see the ‘modernizing’ aspects (however limited) of absolutism (Gerstenberger 2007: 483-95). And the latter pertains to his too easy projection of capitalism into the modern era, which, especially in his later works, he justifies by emphasizing the role of geopolitical competition as the catalyzer of capitalist transformation. This, for example,
causes Rosenberg to view arguably one of the most radical phases in world history, i.e. ‘the Jacobin phase of the French Revolution’, as ‘proto-capitalist’ (Rosenberg 2007: 478). No matter how much ‘international’ is injected into Rosenberg’s theoretical framework, therefore, his extra-historical association of modernity with capitalism remains in place.

In a similar vein, Benno Teschke (2003:41) argues that the assumed ‘co-genesis’ of modernity and capitalism is applicable only to early modern England, where the rise of capitalism and the formation of a modern-state contingently coincided and developed in mutual dependence. On the continent, by contrast, and especially in France, the territorial absolutist state developed in the absence of capitalist social relations. This implies that the so-called early modern period witnessed nothing but ‘non-transitions to modernity’ and ‘eo ipso the absence of the modern state’ (ibid: 145). By the same token, the transition to modernity in France, contends Teschke, cannot be explained by reference to social dynamics internal to French society; instead, modernity was an externally-driven and protracted process that began with 1789 and did not fully materialize until the late 19th century, i.e. until one can finally speak of the separation of private/economic and public/political powers (ibid: 192).

Much of the analyses that will be presented in this thesis are in agreement with Teschke’s work. Yet an important point of divergence remains. Like Rosenberg, Teschke continues to adhere to an unqualified association of the transition to capitalism with the transition to modernity. True, certain aspects of modernity, e.g. abstract individuality, civil liberties and ‘impersonal’ laws, may kick in when economic and political processes are sufficiently differentiated from each other. Yet, Teschke’s focus is exclusively on the conditions of the emergence of capitalist modernity, which causes him to view non-capitalist modes of politico-legal rationalization, ‘public’ order and subject-formation as ‘non-modern’. Ultimately
Teschke leaves us to wonder how to make sense of a whole gamut of 18\textsuperscript{th} and early 19\textsuperscript{th} century developments, such as religious-political centralization, standardization of knowledge, emergence of a ‘public sphere’, new conceptions of political community, universal citizenship, and above all the Enlightenment, most of which originated in continental Europe, especially in non-capitalist France, rather than in capitalist England (Wood 1991:24). As such, Teschke risks viewing ‘the process that brought us the best of Enlightenment principles - resistance to all arbitrary power, a commitment to universal human emancipation, and a critical stance towards all kinds of authority…[as] the same process that brought us the capitalist organization of production’ (Wood 2012b: 222).

Teschke’s dismissal of the relevance of ‘modernity’ for the non-capitalist; hence non-English world is, therefore, hardly convincing. A more fruitful solution to this problem, as Lacher (2006:102-3) suggests, can be found in Ellen Meiksins Wood’s distinction between England’s capitalist modernity and the continental forms of non-capitalist modernity (Wood 2002: 182-9). These modernities did not represent merely quantitative variants of the same process of ‘rationalization’. Rather, they were geopolitically related yet historically distinct projects that originated under entirely different social relations. There is no doubt that England was a peculiar modernity. After all, England was the initial home of liberalism and industrialization, and its principles of rule of law, preservation of civil liberties, and legislation through (propertied) representation, constituted an important part of what is usually considered ‘modern’. Yet, it is equally true that the historically contingent development of capitalism in England testifies to the relative absence of ‘modernity’. As I will discuss in chapter 2 in greater detail, in England, with social reproduction increasingly confined to a distinct ‘economic’ sphere, the ruling classes had no compelling need to ‘modernize’ (at least until the 18\textsuperscript{th} century and in some respects even beyond), i.e. they did not need to theorize novel
political solutions to issues they essentially perceived to be ‘purely economic’. Concomitantly, for example, although monarchical rule was by and large depersonalized by the end of the 18th century, the emerging ‘public space’ was hardly ‘emancipated’ from monarchical ‘tradition’ and religion. For the monarchy had already lost its political power and been reduced to only one of the many ‘economic’ interests; so that it could continue to appear as the political foundation of the new order. The propertied classes, much less dependent on politico-jurisdictional privileges than their continental counterparts, had no immediate interest in invoking an anti-monarchical and anti-clerical public space, nor did they need to envision a broader ‘political community’ to challenge an inexorable monarchy/church complex. The public space could continue to be reproduced in the religious and aristocratic self-image of the ruling estates. Similarly, the state was no longer a major source of surplus appropriation; therefore economic conflicts tended to lead to the ‘rationalization’ of property, rather than the bureaucratization of the state. Hence the reason for the relative unwillingness and laggardness of English ruling classes in imagining certain socio-political forms conventionally associated with the ‘project of modernity’, such as the bureaucratic state, Enlightenment and the ‘nation’.

France, in contrast, was marked by the complete absence of capitalist social relations. The absolutist state was the main source of ruling class reproduction; therefore, economic conflicts were at once and the same time political issues. Intensification of class conflicts continuously invoked the principles of ‘equality’ and ‘universality’ of access to the state, generated a persistent concern for the ‘rationality of the state’ and a tendency to overstaff it, and led to imagining relatively universalistic identities that went beyond class and status differences. In like fashion, conflicts of a religious kind were rapidly absorbed by class and status cleavages, which not only made the unity of religious practice an immediate imperative for the reproduction of the ruling class until the revolution, but also opened up more space for anti-
clerical and philosophical critiques of the existing order thereafter. Combined with the heightening geopolitical pressures generated by capitalist England, France consequently became the breeding ground in the 18th and early 19th centuries for imagining and selectively realizing the forms of socio-political mobilization, subjectivity and community directly linked to the project of modernity. By implication, the subsequent transition to capitalist modernity in France from the second half of the 19th century neither presupposed the earlier presence of non-capitalist forms of modernity nor led to a merely quantitative extension of its ‘economy’. The transition was geopolitically driven and required a comprehensive transformation of existing social relations, institutions and moral codes.

To recap, capitalist modernity and absolutist modernity developed, by and large, as two historically-distinct and competing projects. Thus perceived, Wood’s conceptualization provides an important theoretical and historical opening for a non-teleological account of modernity: it allows us enough room to historicize the question of modernity without presuming the necessary arrival of capitalism. Inter-societal factors are brought back into theory, yet in ways that do not naturalize capitalism in Western Europe.

This, in turn, I suggest, has important implications for a non-Eurocentric account of modernity too. With the temporal-geographical pairing of capitalism and absolutism no longer holding, there remains no inherent reason for analyzing the geography of modernity through a pre-given West vs. non-West binary. For neither the West nor the non-West simply reproduced the image of capitalist modernity in England. Instead, through their geopolitical interaction with England and with each other, they developed new ‘projects of modernity’ that either totally substituted or selectively imported capitalist forms of sociality into their own socio-historical milieu. Capitalism, therefore, was neither a universal point of departure nor a
necessary destination point for modernity. And once modernity is freed from self-referential and self-generating conceptions of capitalism, the non-Western world no longer appears as an ‘imitation’ of or an ‘aberration’ from a generically-defined ‘European’ path to modernity, but creative agents who formulate novel ‘modern’ orders and subjectivities, thereby actively shifting the conditions of global modernity. And again, Robert Brenner and Ellen Meiksins Wood, in their discussion of medieval and early modern Europe, not only expose the limitations of teleological narratives of the origin of capitalism, but also offer the preliminary methodological outlines of an alternative non-Eurocentric historical account. It is to this issue that the next two sections turn.

**The Mode of Production: Rent or Tax?**

Most Marxian scholars have grappled with the question of geo-economic differentiation by elaborating the concept of ‘mode of production’ (e.g. Byres and Mukhia 1985). A large group of Marxian Ottomanists, for example, construed state ownership of land, the ‘independence’ of peasants from lordly extraction and the ‘weakness of merchant capital’ as indicators for the ‘dominance’ of the ‘Asian Mode of Production’ in the Ottoman Empire, which they contrasted to the presence of private property and labor rent in feudal Europe (*inter alia* Keyder and Islamoglu 1977; Divitcioglu 1981). In a similar vein, it has been argued that in most Asian societies tributary ‘tax’ relations and feudal ‘rent’ relations coexisted in an ‘articulated’ fashion, with the Ottoman Empire being considered the most ‘uncompromising’ state regarding the privatization of land; hence a clear example of the ‘dominance’ of the ‘tributary mode’ over the feudal mode of production (Wickham 1985: 182).

In applying to historical scholarship the theoretical model of the ‘articulation of different modes of production…only the description of historical development is possible, not explanation’ (Comninel 1987: 85). For ‘tax’ and ‘rent’ are ‘far too undifferentiated and
explain very little’: neither tax nor rent is able to account for the specificity of agrarian relations both in the East and in the West (Wood 2008: 169ff). One way out of the present riddle is to trivialize the difference between the East and the West by relativizing the terms of the debate. Berktay (1987), Haldon (1994) and Amin (2009) do so by contending that ‘tax’ relations in the East and ‘rent’ relations in the West did not signify the existence of a ‘modal’ difference. But rather, in both contexts, the producer is not separated from the means of production, thus the extraction of the surplus product has to be obtained by non-economic means. That in all pre-capitalist class societies surplus is extracted by extra-economic means is surely an important insight (which is originally derived from Marx). Yet still, Berktay, Haldon and Amin provide us no guidance as to how to distinguish one pre-capitalist situation from another.

Perry Anderson’s solution to this problem is particularly fruitful. Given that producers have direct access to land, Anderson maintains that pre-capitalist societies cannot be distinguished by any ‘economic’ criteria, but only according to their differing politico-legal patterns of exploitation (Anderson 1974: 402-5). Eric Wolf concurs with this view, but with an important qualification: if variation among pre-capitalist modes ‘depends on the organization of power in particular states, the operation of the mode is at least in part determined by whether that state is weak or strong in relation to other polities’. In other words, ‘successful surplus extraction cannot be understood in terms of an isolated society alone; rather, it is a function of the changing organization of the wider field of power within which the particularly tribute constellation is located’ (Wolf 1997: 82). Sociopolitical struggles and geopolitical processes, in summary, have to be combined in a coherent theoretical framework in order to better understand the divergent origins and transformation of pre-capitalist class and state-formation.
Class, State and Geopolitics: Historicizing Transitions and Transformations

Properly appreciated, the emphasis on the extra-economic nature and geopolitical context of surplus extraction furnishes us with a common key to distinguish the origins and terms of transformation of pre-capitalist class societies. This also hints that the task of the ‘historicization’ of different social forms cannot be adequately undertaken with a generic focus on ‘production’ or the ‘economy’. For it is only under capitalism, i.e. when people lose their unmediated access to the means of subsistence that human existence becomes thinkable in ‘economic’ terms and that the ‘economy’ has a practical significance (Sayer 1987: 20-21). In non-capitalist class societies, by contrast, the ‘economy’ or the ‘market’ is instituted as networks of patronage, hence organized through the hierarchical allocation of political rights and privileges (Polanyi 1977). It is one’s position in the political and geopolitical structure, rather than exchange and production per se, that gives access to the means of life. Kinship, custom and political/jurisdictional and territorial arrangements thus constitute class relations themselves (Godelier 1986). ‘Accumulation’ in non-capitalist societies, thus, immediately and necessarily takes political and geopolitical forms (Brenner 1985a; Teschke 2003).

The implication is that the transition to capitalism cannot be understood as a natural consequence of the quantitative development of commercial classes. In other words, capitalism does not emerge out of ‘economic’ exchange on the shoulders of commercial classes; nor does it automatically develop whenever the holders of political power secure property rights in exchange for the commercial classes’ support for war efforts (cf. Mann 1986; Tilly 1990). Indeed, what marks Brenner’s departure from the conventional stories of the ‘Rise of the West’ is precisely that he does not take for granted the existence of capitalist social relations or capitalist rationality in order to explain capitalism’s origins. Accordingly, in Brenner’s analysis, changes in trade and population do not of themselves lead to capitalism.
Capitalism emerges only in societies wherein a certain set of social relations and institutions is put in place, which systematically imposes the market as the main access to the means of reproduction. It thereby generalizes the economic drive to cut costs through specialization, innovation and re-investment in the means of production. Put differently, although all capitalisms are spatially and temporally differentiated, the transition to capitalism, in principle, presupposes the generalization of a form of property that is subsumed to the operation of the ‘law of value’. Capitalism then assumes the transition to a socio-legal order that systematically enables and compels producers to increase the ‘ratio of unpaid labor to paid’ and decrease ‘the socially necessary labor time involved in appropriating surplus value’.

This is in stark contrast to non-capitalist societies in which the holders of political authority, merchants and peasants are necessarily dependent on non-economic means to socially reproduce themselves. In feudal Europe, for instance, the reproduction of rule relied on a lord’s ability to extract peasant surpluses by means of extra-economic compulsion and his successful military competition against other lords. Likewise, merchants made profit by exploiting politically-constituted price differentials, while the peasantry had non-market access to their means of subsistence (Brenner 1985b: 214). In this context of social reproduction, then, the ruling class is much more likely to invest in the means of coercion, rather than the means of production, in order to secure and strengthen the politico-military basis of its existence. Likewise, peasants, a large portion of whose surplus is already channeled to ruling classes as rent or tax, strive to guarantee subsistence in the face of the unpredictability of the harvest. To maintain economic security, therefore, peasants have to consistently avoid specialization. Merchants, even if some of them are motivated by pure

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5 This is not to say that capitalism necessarily improves prosperity and productivity. Quite the contrary, the compulsions of capitalism can also produce waste, deprivation, and de-industrialization. The point is simply that the space and scale of production, ‘to the extent they answer to the imperatives of capital, will be determined not by human needs, social responsibility or the requirements of the state’, but by considerations of successful economic competition and profitability (Wood 1991: 164-5).
‘greed’ and profit, are not able by themselves to force non-capitalist producers to produce competitively, to specialize and to allocate resources to competitive production. Therefore, they strive to better integrate themselves in the system of political reproduction, rather than act as pre-given agents of capitalism.

Non-capitalist social relations, thus, generate no widespread tendency towards the development of a capitalist economy. The transition to capitalism, then, requires a systematic political intervention into human relations in ways that eliminates the non-market access of direct producers to the means of subsistence, hence ultimately the dissolution of the immediate unity of political and economic power. This is not to imply the uncoupling of the market from political power; to the contrary, in a sense, economic and political powers are more strongly integrated in capitalism than they ever were previously. For the decisions concerning the allocation of labour and resources have never been more thoroughly subjected to the dictates of profitability and the production process has never been more closely regulated and ‘managed’. Yet in another sense, all this presupposes the ‘privatization of political power’ at the level of surplus extraction (Wood 1981:92). Under capitalism, then, social relations and political power are transformed in such ways that result in the emergence of an insulated ‘private’ and ‘economic’ sphere of appropriation. Obviously, the state, no longer directly involved in the process of appropriation, still complements or promotes the functioning of the capitalist economy, but it does so by merely ‘intervening’ from ‘outside’. What is at issue here is, therefore, not the extent of state intervention, but the constitution of a qualitatively different relation between political and economic power that produces and reproduces the ‘fiction’ of self-regulating markets.
Indeed, it is precisely this relative differentiation of political power from economic processes that *may* lend the capitalist state its ‘public’ character and *may* make thinkable a political arena in which subjects are formally equal despite their socioeconomic inequalities. Clearly, the point here is not that capitalism requires equality or that capitalism is necessarily less authoritarian than other modes of socioeconomic organization. Capitalism can and has been compatible with different forms of labor control, including unfree labor and coerced wage labor (Post 2013). Yet, the opposite is also true: as capitalism effectively denies any rights of participation in decisions related to the organization of production, thereby shielding itself from any kind of democratic accountability at the workplace, it *may* also create a political space consisting of formally equal subjects. While other modes of production are *structurally* antithetical to political equality due to the fusion of political and economic powers, capitalism is not. Hence capitalism’s possible, yet not necessary, congruity with the requirements of liberal democracy (Wood 1991:174-6; 1995: 237).

What remains to be answered, therefore, is why the holders of political authority sought to commodify land and labor and why they wanted to establish a new order that shifts the basis of social power from the ‘political’ to the ‘economic’. Because of the disparities in

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6 Capitalist property relations can exist in a multiplicity of forms as long as three interrelated conditions are present in a given context. First, the social reproduction of both the producers and appropriators must depend on successful commodity production, i.e. there must be no socio-legal contraints on producing at or below the socially average necessary labor-time and increasing the ratio of unpaid labor to paid. For, ‘in situations where exploiters and producers have access to means of production and consumption independently of successful commodity production – as did lords and peasants in feudalism and other pre-capitalist forms of social labour – neither are under any systemic compulsion to specialize output, introduce labour-saving tools and methods or accumulate in order to acquire, maintain or expand means of consumption and production’. Second, ‘the most efficient exploiters must be able to gain access to the means of production (land, tools, etc.) of their less efficient competitors. In other words, less efficient producers must be displaceable’. Third, ‘producers must be potentially expellable from production in order to allow the easy adaptation of labour-saving tools and methods. Put another way, labour-power must be relatively mobile – unattached to means of production and consumption – so that they are easily made redundant in response to changing market conditions and through the introduction of labour-saving technology’ (Post 2013: 80-1).

7 This is in stark contrast with earlier forms of popular power and democracy. In ancient Athens, for instance, political and economic power were so inextricably fused that when the common people obtained political rights, they were liberated from the most common forms of economic exploitation as well (Wood 2012).
commercial opportunities and profits, says Wallerstein, lords and merchants transformed the ‘mode of labor control’ into wage-labor in the ‘core’ of the capitalist world-economy, whereas peasants became serfs and were coerced into cash crop production in the ‘periphery’ (Wallerstein 1974: 87-116). The transformation of property relations is therefore perceived by Wallerstein as a function of different levels of profitability and the commerce-based division of labor. Brenner strongly dismisses this view. Lords, according to Brenner, cannot be expected to respond to market opportunities as if they were capitalist actors, ‘for they simply did not have to produce competitively in order to survive’. Furthermore, depending on the pre-existing patterns of class relations, profits accrued from commercial activity may also empower peasants, hence not necessarily leading to their dispossession or enserfment.

The focus, suggests Brenner, has to shift from the pre-conceived notions of socioeconomic change (such as market opportunities, cities and technologies) towards an analysis of the ‘historically specific patterns of development of the contending agrarian classes and their relative strength’, i.e. historically specific struggles within and between the appropriating and appropriated classes that generated specific possibilities for and imposed constraints on the long-term development in different parts of Europe (Brenner 1985a: 52). Read in this light, Brenner conceives the origins of capitalism not as the maturation of some superior human qualities linked to favourable commercial or environmental factors, but as the unintended consequence of class struggles that emerged only in England during the early modern period (Brenner 2007:89). Elsewhere in Europe no similar contingent development occurred; in its stead, capitalist social relations began to spread to the states of continental Europe only from the 19th century onward and as a protracted process compelled by the geopolitical and military pressures engendered by the success of England’s capitalist economy (Wood 1991: 159-60). In this regard, in continental Europe during the early modern period different paths out of
feudalism crystallized, such as absolutism in France, from which capitalist social relations were entirely absent. English capitalism and French absolutism were thus not mere regional variations of a more or less unified Western European transition to modernity, but represented two inter-related, yet historically distinct paths out of feudalism rooted in entirely different sets of social reproductive relations (Teschke 2003: 257).  

With capitalism redefined and re-historicized, two important implications follow. First, hierarchical readings of world history collapse. For such an approach does not assume capitalism as always present in pre-capitalist history; therefore it does not construct spatial hierarchies according to the degree of development of commercial abilities, inventiveness and so on. Put differently, an appreciation of the historical specificity and contingent emergence of capitalism in England and its non-existence in France refutes the image of capitalism as a universal and necessary category of socioeconomic development both in the West and the non-West. This thereby allows us enough space to historicize divergent paths to class and state-formation without utilizing categories and assumptions borrowed from a distant capitalist future and without constructing spatial hierarchies according to the degree of development of capitalist actors and institutions.

Second, once the spatial-temporal distinctiveness of capitalism and absolutism is recognized, the 19th century consolidation of the modern state in different localities and the emergence of multiple modernities will also appear in a new light. Modernity in Europe, from this perspective, will not be explained by reference to absolutism or capitalism alone but understood as a response to the three-centuries-long co-existence and clash of these two

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8 ‘Contingency’ in no way means mere ‘accident’ of a purely external nature. Rather, it is a social phenomenon which is related to the open-ended character of intra- and inter-class struggles and can be explained by analyzing the variations in the degree of self-organization of ruling and producing classes (Brenner 1985:36).
historically distinct forms of development (Lacher 2006: 93). More to the point, the modern state on the continent resulted from geopolitically-induced ‘projects’ that modernized non-capitalist social relations by either completely ‘substituting’ or selectively incorporating certain elements of capitalism (Shilliam 2009). In particular, the project of ‘substitution’ associated with the French Revolution and Napoleonic era resulted in one of the most violent and radical alternative ways of competing with capitalist modernity, which, in turn, set the precedent for other modernization projects in and beyond Europe (Wood 1991: 26; 2012b: 134), including the Ottoman Empire. In the next chapter, I will begin to flesh out the narrative informed by these theoretical and historical insights.
Chapter 2

Capitalism, Absolutism and Jacobinism: The International Relations of Modernity

In this chapter I challenge the unilinear conceptions of Western European development by exploring the historical specificity of and inter-societal connections between capitalist Britain and absolutist/revolutionary France. The ultimate purpose of this historical-sociological survey is to set out the international context in which capitalism and Jacobinism arose as two competing and qualitatively different developmental models. All this is critical in order to construct the historical backbone of the argument I will make in the subsequent chapters, namely, that Ottoman/Turkish modernization efforts did not follow a single project of ‘westernization’; but rather, that Ottoman/ Turkish elites appropriated, oscillated between and recombined with local resources two inherently contradictory development strategies originally advanced by Britain and France.

The chapter begins by substantiating the argument that under different social and geopolitical circumstances two radically divergent trajectories of class and state-formation took place within early modern Western Europe: capitalism in England and absolutism in France. The geopolitical tensions between capitalism and absolutism escalated particularly during the 18th century, repeatedly exposing the vulnerabilities of French fiscal and military power vis-à-vis England. This geopolitical backwardness led the French ruling elite and intellectuals to continuously debate how an English-like polity could be created on absolutist soil. Rather than a unilinear extension of the market project from England to France, however, the Anglo-French contestation, and the concomitant process of inter-societal comparison and learning,
sharpened and restructured existing socio-historical differences, ultimately leading to the formulation of a qualitatively different project in France.

The fundamental problem that confronted French reformers was the policy of ‘enclosures’ that empowered England geopolitically. By subjecting social reproduction to market competition, enclosures in England had produced a novel system of rule and appropriation by the end of the 17th century. When the market became the primary institution responsible for social reproduction, property relations in England were no longer necessarily implicated in the relations of political inequality. Social reproduction and political equality could eventually be viewed as two theoretically distinct problems; and the abstract ‘individual’, unburdened by political and communal duties, could be presented as the basis of English productivity and freedoms. By contrast, in France differential access to sources of income was immediately derived from one’s position in the system of political hierarchy and privilege. Therefore, creating the ‘abstract individual’ required a fundamental overhaul of the relations of authority and property constitutive of the absolutist regime. Indeed, this proved to be an impossible task in the 18th century, jeopardizing the position of reformers themselves. Without enclosure the only way to theoretically justify the ‘abstract individual’ was to condition the individual’s right and equality to his service to alternative conceptions of an ‘abstract collectivity’. I will argue that the impossibility of emulating English enclosures on the one hand and the increasing geopolitical pressures on the other was (at least partly) responsible in making France the breeding ground for the ideas associated with the enlightenment project such as the ‘general will’ of the ‘nation’ and populist and secular conceptions of the ‘public’.

If the core Enlightenment ideas were partly developed as substitutes for capitalism, the French Revolution, and especially its Jacobin phase, radicalized and materialized these ideas by
innovating new methods of empowering and containing the abstract individual. The revolutionary state ‘equalized’ the new subjects, while subjecting them to ‘universal conscription’ and ‘universal education’. The ‘citizen-soldier’, endowed with land and granted merit-based access to the state, thus became the main agent responsible for the reproduction of the new regime. The implication is that participating in the citizen-army and bureaucracy (rather than the market) became the ultimate means to the acquisition of the right to equality and subsistence in France. By equalizing, militarizing and educating the new subjects, France revealed the feasibility of a modernization strategy (at least until 1815) that did not presuppose the commodification of land and labor. As indicated above, following Robbie Shilliam, I will call this alternative project of modernization ‘Jacobinism’.

Combined and Uneven Development in Post-Feudal Europe: England vs. France

Following the ‘barbaric’ invasions of the 9th and 10th centuries, the Frankish lands became the scene of massive increases in lordly power at the expense of what was left of the Carolingian Empire. Individual lords completely appropriated royal juridical and military powers, subjugating the peasantry to a distinct manorial regime unhindered by regal authority, namely, ‘banal lordship’ (Bloch 1961: 251-7; Duby 1968: 187; Poly and Bournazel 1991: 38). As the peasantry was usurped of their early medieval autonomy (i.e. enserfment), medieval space was also territorialized among the members of the nobility (i.e. encastellation) (Poly and Bournazel 1991: 25, 33, 352). A ‘fief’, thus, was no longer a unit of production only, but a territorially designated military-juridical unit linked to and shaped by other like units within the wider web of competing jurisdictions, i.e. feudal geopolitics. In this regard, the rise of territorial castellans from 1000 upwards increased lordly pressure on the peasantry and

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9 Some scholars prefer the term ‘revolution’ in order to emphasize the unprecedented changes brought about by banal lordship in the social fabric of early medieval society, see Bisson 1994. This is both an affirmation and a departure from Bloch’s conception of feudalism. Bloch sees the rupture brought about by feudalism as a ‘great metamorphosis’ (Bloch 1966:93) and yet he thinks that the two centuries before 1000 represented the ‘first period’ of feudalism and the following two centuries the second. In light of the contemporary evidence, it seems safe to conclude that Bloch was right in his characterization but mistaken in his periodization of feudalism: ‘Bloch’s “second period” was certainly a feudal age: it is indeed the only one’ (Poly &Bournazel 1991:354-5).
extended the geography of war much beyond its early medieval boundaries. Thus began a historically unique process of geopolitical accumulation and expansion, driven by feudal class relations, which resulted in the adaptation of feudal institutions to new eco-social circumstances outside the old imperial heartlands. New ‘geopolitically combined’ forms of lordship consequently emerged, paving the way for ‘spatially and temporally uneven’ processes of state-formation across Europe (Teschke 2003: 95-112).

‘Under the brutal compulsion of foreign [Norman] masters’ a historically distinct mode of lordship and manorial regime was formed in England (Bloch 1961: 244). Unlike in other Frankish lands, in Normandy ‘royal power had never so completely crumbled away’, i.e. banal lordship had never developed on any comparable scale (Bloch 1966: 90; Duby 1968: 190). The lordly classes had remained relatively united during the early feudal age, which impacted the manner in which they extended their rule to England. Also, after the conquest the monarchy had reinforced its position by keeping alive certain pre-conquest customs, most importantly the ‘tradition of local assemblies’. Assemblies were the royal spaces of communication where men who were subjected only to royal authority periodically gathered to ‘receive judgement in the king’s name’. After the conquest, ‘the king did nothing to weaken this custom’, thereby contributing to the formation of a stratum of ‘free’ peasants (freeholders) who were neither tied to land nor subject to lordly power. Nevertheless, one has to note that the king also recognized ‘the personal authority of lords of manors’ over the rest of the peasantry (around sixty per cent of the labouring population) (Duby 1968:194-5;

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10 Equally important, the pre-conquest rulers of England had achieved the ‘generalization of royal rule’ since the 8th century ‘to a degree quite unusual for the Christian West at this time’ (Gerstenberger 2007:44-5). Taken together, these explain the manner in which the Norman conquerors extended their rule to England in the 11th century. First, they completely eliminated the pre-conquest ruling class without having to assimilate them into their own ranks. Second, they seized all the power Anglo-Saxon kings had appropriated during the 10th and 11th centuries. And relatedly, the political integrity of the Norman nobility resulted in and was further ‘cemented’ by the successful military campaigns it led abroad, especially in France (Brenner 1985b: 272; Anderson 1974:118; Teschke 2003:107).
Bonfield 1989:518). Therefore, while the monarchy weakened the autonomous powers of the lords through its alliance with free peasants, it also recognized their exclusive ‘customary’ authority over land and ‘unfree’ peasants.\(^\text{11}\) Given the pre-conquest customs governing social reproduction, and the pattern of ruling class solidarity prevalent in Normandy, the lordly exploitation of the peasantry in Norman England developed more as a product of intra-lordly cooperation supported by royal authority. This was in stark contrast to France where competing claims to jurisdiction and political control over the peasantry could be neutralized only through ‘unstable bonds of vassalage’ (Teschke 2003: 107-8; Duby 1968: 187). Intra-elite class cohesion characteristic of Norman England, thus, did not exist in Capetian France, hence its ‘failure to develop anything which resembled a national parliament of the English type’ (Parker 1983: 14).\(^\text{12}\)

These initial socio-legal differences also partly explain the divergent socioeconomic trajectories that crystallized in the face of the generalized crisis caused by the Black Death in the 1340s. For, while the plague cost the lives of millions of peasants both in England and France, it also produced two distinct relational contexts marked by the prior differentiation of the patterns of lordly solidarity and peasant control (Bloch 1966: 115; Duby 1968: 328-9).

That is, given the legacy of banal lordship, in France the rebellious and shrinking peasantry was able to exploit the heightening intra-lordly class conflicts. Village communities to some extent improved their ability to exploit common lands and to retain near-hereditary rights over

\(^{11}\) Even Magna Carta (1215), one of the historic moments of opposition between the monarchy and English lords during the feudal age, granted the lords the right of being tried by their peers, but not the rights of exercising jurisdiction over ‘freeholders’ (around 40 per cent of the laboring population) (Wood 2012:12; Bonfield 1989:518). This is another reminder of the fact that the English ruling classes were relatively united (but not unified); hence competition between alternative loci of political-juridical powers was relatively limited in comparison to continental Europe (Aylmer 1990:101; Gerstenberger 2007:59-60, 596).

\(^{12}\) In light of the English case, one must note that the whole discussion on ‘Western feudalism’ and especially its association with ‘parcelized sovereignty’ is pitched at an unacceptable level of over-generality, cf. Anderson 1974. For, as Gerstenberger notes: ‘If we take feudal relations as a measure, England was the most thoroughly feudalised kingdom of the late Middle Ages, but, if the concept of feudalism is seen as involving a parcelisation of generalised power competences…then England does not fit this picture, since the competences of lordship were both guaranteed and restricted by royal power’ (2007:593).
land, which they had come to occupy on customary basis (censives) (Beik 2009: 25). In England, however, in the absence of banal lordship, intra-elite class conflict was more successfully checked in the face of peasant rebellions. English customary tenures transformed in a way similar to French censives, i.e. the ‘unfree’ peasantry changed their condition of servitude, gaining better status and decreasing rents (at least for a while). Yet, except freeholding peasantry, who were under monarchical protection, customary tenants did not acquire hereditary guarantees to land. Lands they came to possess on customary basis were freed from lordly jurisdiction, but eventually remained as “lords’ land” (Comninel 2000: 28-31; Hilton 1985: 127-132; Brenner 1985a: 46-9).

Increasingly devoid of autonomous powers of surplus appropriation, English lords at the onset of the 15th century had no option but to turn to King’s law (common law) in order to maintain their sources of income. The result was that while the monarchy further extinguished the autonomous juridical/military power held by lords, it also amplified the exclusiveness of their power with respect to the land occupied by customary peasants (Comninel 2000: 29-30; Duby 1968: 194-6). What was at stake therefore was the deepening of existing ‘division of labor between the monarchy and landlords’. In developing their appropriative powers through the common law, English lords, thus, from the 14th century onward were inclined to raise their revenues through their possession of and investment in land, rather than mere extension of their juridical/territorial privileges. This was also facilitated by the existence of freeholders, some of whom were wealthy enough to lease, work and invest in the lords’ land. In this context these landlords and freehold tenants began to restructure agrarian production through

13 This does not mean that there were no more disputes among lords and the monarchy. Yet the issues arose less among the alternative holders of political-military authority, and were more centered on the struggles over the control of a centralized political authority. For ‘what English lords lacked in the form of feudal jurisdiction, they possessed as participants in royal justice and in the legislative role of the parliament’ (Brenner 1993: 658-9; Wood 1991: 48).
the enactment of ‘common law’ against the law of manor, i.e. the ‘custom’ (Comminel 2000: 46).

Underlying the reorganization of ‘custom’ were enclosures. Enclosures were neither a mere quantitative engrossment, nor a technical process of fencing of land. In fact, early enclosures transformed neither the form of tenure nor led to concentration of land, i.e. customary tenants remained in place for a long period of time, yet without the customary rights that used to bind them to land (Comminel 2000: 31-2; Thompson 1991b: 238-9). Enclosures enforced that only those who could pay increasing rents could retain the land, and those who could not were to leave it. Land tenure, thus, was no longer custom-determined but made conditional on the tenant’s ability to transform production. Consequently, from the 1450s, lords began to ‘enclose’ the land by subjecting peasant tenants to competition for leases (Brenner 1989b: 49). As land began to be systematically and often violently divorced from its former political-legal embellishments, a new society governed by a distinct mode of property and rule began to crystallize in early modern England, heralding the contingent arrival of capitalism.

In France, just as in England, lordly juridical/military powers proved ineffective for the extraction of peasant surpluses, i.e. lords were unable to increase their incomes by increasing labor services. Yet, French lords, unlike their English counterparts, remained divided on

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14 This is not to say that the ‘market’ unfolded on its own once ‘custom’ was reorganized. In fact, the monarchical state was heavily involved in and actively promoted the construction and consolidation of capitalist social relations. This became especially pronounced after the Civil War as parliament took a decisive pro-enclosure stance: ‘no government after 1640 seriously tried either to prevent enclosures, or even to make money by fining enclosers’ (Hill 1992: 69-70). And perhaps the clearest example of parliamentary enactment of capitalist property relations was the Black Act (1724) that passed fifty new capital offences governing the access to property. ‘The Act registered the long decline in the effectiveness of old methods of class control and discipline and their replacement by one standard course to authority: the example of terror. In place of the…manorial and corporate controls and the physical harrying of vagabonds, economists advocated the discipline of low wages and starvation, and lawyers the sanction of death. Both indicated an increasing impersonality in the mediation of class relations, and a change, not so much in the “facts” of crime as in the category- “crime”- itself…What was now to be punished was not an offence between men…but an offence against property’ (Thompson 1990:206-7).
questions of property and rule. Combined with the absence of freehold tenure, it was neither possible nor necessary to transform the customary conditions of land tenure (Wolf 1997: 121). In consequence, French lords had no option of changing the conditions of access to land. Instead, they were to reorganize ruling-class power based on a new mode of ‘political’ appropriation. They were to turn to the monarchy to reinforce their hold on the peasantry. Lords and the monarchy were to strike a new balance in a relatively centralized regime of appropriation, i.e. the ‘tax/office’ structure of the absolutist state (Brenner 1985b: 263).

What underpinned the absolutist economy was a massive network of patronage and privilege built upon a market for venal offices. Many official posts could be bought and sold in an ‘open market’, i.e. a market not exclusive to the nobility. Like nobles, therefore, large numbers of the bourgeoisie, heavily involved in commercial and financial activity, competed to purchase a share of state power (Beik 1985: 335-6). For, given the persistence of peasant customary rights over land, only political leverage within the state, rather than production per se, could secure and advance commercial and financial interests (Parker 1996: 53; Beik 2009: 65). As a result, ‘engrossment’ of land, rather than its ‘enclosure’, became the main ruling-class strategy in the countryside. Landlords, both of commercial and aristocratic origin, pushed back the extent of peasant holdings, consolidating big commercial farms by ‘squeezing’ the land directly held by peasants (Beik 2009: 41, 63). However, this ‘urban colonization of the countryside’ did not initiate a capitalist growth dynamic (Parker 1996: 53; Beik 2009: 65). For the expropriation of land did not translate into the systematic expropriation of customary rights (Gerstenberger 2007: 456). Agrarian production and prices continued to be bound by the subsistence requirements of peasant holdings (Brenner 1985b:
Impoverished by the rent and tax demands of the ruling-classes, a massive class of land-hungry peasants emerged, which severely restricted the expansion of the home market beyond the consumption of luxury items. Consequently, the overall dynamic of agrarian relations further reinforced the politically-constituted character of bourgeois and noble fortunes, thereby perpetuating the widely recognized ‘structural’ problems of the French economy, i.e. its peasant-based character, relative lack of specialization, inter-regional transportation problems, and institutional inefficiencies, and so on (Skocpol 1979: 54-64).

In the absence of an organized and system-wide political intervention into the prevailing property relations, mercantilist policies, which involved protectionist, regulatory and colonial measures, did not generate the kind of investments that could have otherwise unified and deepened the internal market. Monopoly trading and manufacturing companies boosted profits only by securing politically maintained price differentials, hence systematically excluding economic competition both abroad and at home. Better put, commercial competition was much less a matter of transforming the conditions of production and underpricing rivals, than of direct political/military control of markets. Tariffs and subsidies eventually degenerated into mere fiscal, provisionist and redistributive devices (Parker 1996: 44-5; De Vries 1976: 250-1). Private property and accumulation of wealth were certainly historical preconditions for the development of capitalism, but neither of them in pre-

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15 As a result, despite the rise of larger units of property and production, agricultural productivity (not output) remained almost stagnant (De Vries 1976: 67).

16 By contrast, in early modern England, the dissolution of hereditary peasant tenancy developed simultaneously with the rise of consumer demand for the myriad small goods. Thus, ‘[p]urchasing power and productive capacity were…mutually sustaining’ (Thirsk 1978: 174-5).

17 Mercantilist policies and colonialism certainly contributed to the rise of capitalism in Britain. Yet this was mainly because they coincided with the development of capitalist property relations (Wood 2001; Parker 1996: 32-4). That said, unless these socio-spatial differences are taken into account, ‘mercantilism’, as a category which embraces the economic thought and practices of several nations across Europe, loses most of its explanatory value (McNally 1988: 23).
revolutionary France presupposed capitalist property and capitalist accumulation within itself as a developmental tendency.\textsuperscript{18} Quite the contrary, for capitalist property to develop, the dominant forms of private property, either in the form of commercial/manufacturing monopolies or venal office, would have to cease to be the main source of private appropriation (Gerstenberger 2007: 27; Brenner 1985a). Absolutism was thus not a continental variant of capitalism. It was a historically distinct path out of feudalism that neither involved nor necessarily led to the development of capitalist social relations.

The Politics and Culture of Capitalism: England’s Capitalist Modernity

In parallel to their differential developmental trajectories, conceptions of property, law and culture radically diverged in early modern England and France. As argued above, In England politically-constituted and collectively-regulated leases began to fade away from 1450 onwards, as lords began to lease their demesnes based on prices determined by market competition. This, in turn, brought about a qualitative transformation in the dominant conception of ‘property’. Before 1450, no conception of ‘ownership’ existed; each parcel of land was hierarchically distributed among different individuals, i.e. interlocking forms of ‘possession’ was in place, which allocated differential access to different actors in the feudal hierarchy (Berman 1983:454-5). Since ‘land sustained multiple overlapping claims…the primary relation of an individual to land…could be maintained without physically excluding others (Seipp 1994:86-7). Land was an organic extension of such a community, in which individuated, impersonalized and strictly demarcated forms of property had no place or meaning (McNally 2011:42-3). At stake in the transformation of property relations, therefore,

\textsuperscript{18} The conventional view holds that absolutism represented an interregnum before the final collapse of feudalism and the full-fledged unfolding of capitalism, hence combining elements of both types of society (Anderson 1974: 113; Giddens 1985: 100, also see Keyder 1983: 31-47). In consequence, the approximately three centuries long existence of absolutism is read as some sort of “proto-capitalism”, i.e. in terms of the “arrested” development of bourgeois society, the “aristocratization” of bourgeois classes and the “inefficient” institutions that created a “court capitalism”, thereby failing to further advance a bourgeois economy and so on. Obviously, grafting capitalism on to absolutism does not explain, but teleologically reposes the question of the social character of absolutism. And behind the teleology inherent in this mode of argumentation lies the unqualified equation of the bourgeois and private property to capitalism. For a critique, see Teschke 2003: 151-165.
was the destruction of feudal rights and obligations embedded in the customary possession of land. From the 1490s onward, consequently, English lawyers began to perceive land less in terms of feudal mutual obligations, and more in ‘universal’, ‘abstract’ and ‘individualist’ terms (Seipp 1994:34). By 1640, ‘land…was much more clearly becoming capital, a profit yielding investment, rather than primarily a source of service, or followers, or royalty’ (Corrigan and Sayer 1985:73). And finally by 1750, as Thompson notes, property was already taken for granted by law as a ‘thing’ in itself, totally alienable and with no consideration for mutual obligation or general good (Thompson 1991a: 135).

Underlying the transformation of property relations was the re-invention of custom and religion (Thompson 1991a: 6). Through the 16th and 17th centuries, village communities and town crafts/guilds that were organized around customary rights and religious confraternities began to dissolve. In this regard, post-Reformation England witnessed not only the formation of a state-controlled and unified Church under geopolitical dictates, but also an assertive parliament ‘urged on by a religious movement that was determined to narrow religion to its

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19 What seems somewhat contradictory to this argument is the fact that England was the only country in early modern Europe that had a government-run system of poor relief. And indeed the English poor law was essential to the completion of the transition to capitalism without any major agrarian revolts after 1600. Yet the point that needs to be emphasized is that the poor relief in England did not seek to resurrect old common rights and direct access to land. It partially recompensed for the disappearance of copyholds yet was not a substitute for capitalist property rights (Patriquin 2007:115). Conceived this way, the infamous Speenhamland Law (1795) was far from generating the ‘pre-capitalist’ impact to which Karl Polanyi attributes. For a discussion, see Patriquin 2007:124-7.

20 As in the countryside, in towns production was designed to reproduce existing socio-political ties. ‘Under the guild system’ writes Polanyi (1957a: 70-1), ‘the motives and circumstances of productive activities were embedded in the general organization of society’. Therefore, attributing a proto-capitalist character to guild members and independent artisans would be a misreading of the conditions of their ‘organized existence’. And indeed, in early modern England, even after the guilds were no longer able to regulate markets, the artisans ‘would ever more forcefully assert their customary rights...in order to shield themselves from being “hurled” amidst the growing ranks of the fully market-dependent poor’ (Zmolek 2013:801).

21 The English had been driven out of the continent in the 15th century, and the subsequent diplomatic attempts at securing an equal status with France, Spain and the Holy Roman Empire had repeatedly failed. Thus, the English Reformation of the 16th century must be seen partly within this framework of ‘initial defeat and isolation, and the consequent refusal to submit to dictation from outside’ (Hill 1992:25,36). Yet the issue was neither geopolitical nor religious only. As the capitalist classes grew stronger in the 16th and 17th centuries, construction of a Protestant state became indispensable to the internal reproduction and external protection of capitalist interests. The parliament’s rivals included not only the Papacy and Spain, but also the potential adversaries at home, including magnate rebels, peasant resisters and even the monarchy itself under Mary who defined themselves as Catholic and/or anti-Protestant (Brenner 1993:659).
essentials’ a process at the end of which people like John Locke could assert that ‘society was bound together by agreement on things like property, rather than on god’ (Sommerville 1992:143). For this, the ‘god of work’ had to cease to be conceived as the ‘devil’, and ‘work’ had to become an end itself (Hill 1961:294). All customary entitlements, e.g. access to common lands and alms from neighbours, had to become markers of laxity, corruption and immorality (McNally 2011:47-8). Rights and obligations over social reproduction had to be transformed and assimilated into the impersonal mechanism of the supply and demand of ‘things’. Presupposed was ‘an atomic society of individuals fighting for their own salvation’, hence ‘no longer a community working out its salvation as it cultivated its fields in common’ (Hill 1992:40; Corrigan and Sayer 1985:81). Thus, an ‘impersonalized individual’, abstracted from wider political and social duties, had to be created alongside a merely ‘political’ state (Shilliam 2009: 34). The ‘free men’, unencumbered from custom and religion as previously understood, had to be re-disciplined on grounds conducive to the ‘improvement’ of capitalist property, the advancement of liberty and the protection of Protestant religion (Hill 1961:105-7, 171). The customary, the religious and the political had to be connected in novel ways so as to match the changing rules of reproduction and contestation in the emerging capitalist society (Wood 2012b: 136).

One testimony to the gradual disappearance of ‘common purpose’ from the process of production was the increasing popularity of ‘mechanical analogies’ in discussions of property, society and the state (Hill 1992: 207-8). English intellectuals and scientists of the early modern era worked out an image of society as a ‘multitude of free men’ collected together by a sovereign power and increasingly governed by an ‘invisible hand’; a machine-like market that functions according to its own rules. This was a radical departure from the personalized image of the body politic based on the divine harmony of naturally unequal men united to
each other by mutual obligations. Entailed in this re-imagination of social reproductive relations was the bourgeoning ‘culture of improvement’. Featuring most powerfully in Locke’s political theory and the new ‘science of political economy’, a novel conception of ‘property’ and ‘right’ pervaded the intellectual scene in early modern England. ‘Improvement’ of property eventually became an ethical right and responsibility. One’s right to productive use of property could now overrule another’s right to subsistence. In fact, ‘improvement of property’ and the ‘ethic of profit’ were to be the straitjackets in which the Enlightenment conceptions of ‘freedom’, ‘progress’ and ‘reason’ would be placed in England (Wood 2012b: 306-7).22

Despite differences in their sources of income and wealth, the members of the English ruling class were becoming ‘species of the same genus’, i.e. ‘a single economic class’ whose power increasingly stemmed from ‘the possession of capital they employed for the end of profit and further accumulation’ (Stone 1965: 52; Hill 1992: 19; Moore 1966: 19). Indeed, their power and unity was further consolidated after the Revolution, when the independent politico-juridical power of the Crown was effectively subjected to parliamentary control, so much so that the king began to be perceived merely as another member of the propertied class and the parliament (Corrigan and Sayer 1985: 79-80). The apparent ‘idiosyncrasy’ of the early modern centralization of the English state, that is, its ‘small bureaucracy’, ‘limited fiscality’, with ‘no permanent army’ (Anderson 1974: 127) was rooted precisely in the power of the private holders of property and their relatively united struggle to protect private rights of appropriation from royal interference. The state was defined in opposition to property,

22 Of course the continental Enlightenment found much inspiration in the works of Bacon, Locke and Newton. Yet the ‘improvement of property’ and the ‘ethic of profit’ never took root on the continent, for there was no individualized and impersonalized property. Rather, the continental Enlightenment substituted the improvement of property for the improvement of the ‘state’, of ‘humanity’, the ‘people’ or the ‘nation’ (Wood 2002: 188-9). See more on this below.
precisely because it could be: surplus was extracted within a capitalist ‘landlord shell’, i.e.
lords had no immediate need to use the state and state office for appropriation (Brenner 1989:
304; 1985b: 298; 1993: 652). Although the use of state-office for private gain continued, the
state-office was no longer of itself the direct and major instrument of surplus appropriation,
here there was no tendency to establish a large bureaucracy (Brewer 1989: 64-87). Given
also its relative insulation from continental war-making especially during the Tudor period,
state-formation in England was neither indispensable to the internal reproduction of the lordly
classes nor rendered necessary by external factors. Tax levels ultimately remained quite low
at almost one-fourth of those in France in the early 17th century, hence England’s relative
‘inability’ to man a centralized fiscal system (Hill 1961: 51).

Emerging thus was much less a bureaucratic state than a capitalist economy and a distinctly
‘political’ state that could not tolerate the emergence of a sizable fiscal-military machine. Put
differently, judged by the Weberian yardstick, the early modern state in England was much
more ‘impersonal’ and ‘united’ and yet much less ‘bureaucratized’ as compared to the forms
of state-formation in continental Europe (Gerstenberger 2007: 277). For the state was by and
large responsive to the interests of capitalist civil society, thus the monarchy’s ability to
structure the latter remained relatively limited (Brenner 1989a: 274).

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23 The historical specificity of ‘corruption’ in early modern England is best understood when it is compared to
the nature of public-private power in early modern France. As I shall discuss below, in France ‘taxation was a
direct instrument of appropriation from primary producers, the peasantry. State office was a form of private
property…a centralized form of ‘extra-economic’ exploitation, competing with other claims to the surplus labour
of peasant-producers. In this sense, private appropriation was a “primary” function of the state, not an alien
growth, not merely a corruption, not just a parasitism, but the thing itself’ (Wood 1992:27).

24 Even the English state’s absence from the great wars of Europe should not be taken as a
geopolitical/geographic given, but should be, at least partly, regarded as a result of the successful resistance of
capitalist classes to the crown’s strengthening of its political-military muscle. Parliamentary classes, deriving
their incomes primarily through the economic appropriation of surplus, became increasingly reluctant to give
support to an army over which they would not have full control. That said, parliament would tend to support the
establishment and reform of a standing army only after the Revolution when it acquired full control over
military/foreign affairs, see Brewer 1989: 7-14; 140 cf. Anieavas and Nisancioglu 2013: 95.
The assumed co-development of a modern state and capitalism, however, became more of a reality from the end of the 17th century onward. Compelled by geopolitical pressures emanating from the rise of absolutist powers on the continent, the state in England developed a competitive military-fiscal apparatus and political ideology.\textsuperscript{25} And still the generic pressures of geopolitical competition are far from explaining the specificity of the institutional-ideological transformation in England (Teschke 2005: 14-8). For modernity in England remained invariably coloured by the capitalist social relations to which it was subordinated. Given the ‘economic’ sources of ruling class incomes, the state in Britain was able to extract higher taxes and attract larger loans from the ruling class with less resentment than anywhere on the continent, especially in France. Better put, the ruling classes were able to tax and more willing to loan themselves in England, for their incomes did not derive from venal office and fiscal privileges as their counterparts across the Channel (Parker 1996: 218-20). Relatedly, the relative expansion of administrative and military posts did not lead to the (often violent) struggles for entry into the state service, as they did in France, but merely caused concerns about ‘administrative efficiency’, ‘economical reform’ and ‘credit worthiness’ (Daunton 2012: 117; Gerstenberger 2007: 280).\textsuperscript{26}

The re-imagining of political unity, collective identity and public space under geopolitical pressures took a peculiarly English form too. The class of property owners were ‘the sovereign nation in Parliament’, hence they were able to give a ‘national form to their social

\textsuperscript{25} The number of state employees increased from 1200 in the 1650s to about 16,000 by the 1760s (Brewer 1989: 65). There was also a phenomenal growth in total and per capita state revenues at this time, so that the English were now paying more in taxes than the French. By 1760, government expenditures were absorbing 20 percent of GNP. The outcome was a strong central government, with an expanded civil service (Brewer, 1989: 91).

\textsuperscript{26} What is more, that the state modernized its tax base and institutions in the context of capitalist social relations explains not only the initial rise of Britain as a geopolitical and geoeconomic power (unmatched by the continental states at least until the 1870s) but also its relative decline thereafter. For the British state, historically all too well adapted to market competition, was to prove increasingly unable and unwilling in the long run to handle the geostrategic management of economic development, thereby falling behind especially the state-assisted projects of military-industrial modernization on the continent (Wood 1991: 19).
interests’, unlike continental European states where relatively fractured form of intra-ruling class politics could potentially force them to imagine and try to materialize more inclusive and popular notions of sovereignty and nation (Dufour 2007: 594). For this reason, the English ruling elite, by and large, substituted monarchical tradition and the Anglican Church for continental notions of ‘state’ and ‘nation’. The monarchy and the Church in England could be re-endowed with ideological support and value (in ways unimaginable in continental Europe, and especially in stark contrast to France) for they posed no serious challenge to the propertied classes and their dominant modes of appropriation (especially after the Glorious Revolution). Indeed, the cohesion of the body politic, organized based on ‘economic relations’, was well assured by the re-invoking of the most readily available forms of unity and inequality inherited from monarchical rule. With a ruling class no longer immediately dependent on political forms of appropriation, socioeconomic inequalities were no longer a major obstacle to the formation of political unity. In this context, reproducing monarchical/clerical tradition did not mean a return to the ‘ancien regime’; instead, it could secure stability at home and worked as a geopolitical substitute for more populist continental notions of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ (Wood 1991: 31-41; 2012b: 179; Gerstenberger 2007: 318-9).27

27 The position adopted here bears similarities to the thesis presented by Arno Mayer (1981) and Sandra Halperin (1997). Mayer and Halperin contend that the constitution of the modern order in Western Europe was not fully completed until the early 20th century due to the persistence of old aristocratic classes. The ‘old regime’, so the argument runs, was firmly entrenched in the economic, political, and cultural establishment throughout all the European states. They suggest that the widely acknowledged ‘aberration’ of Germany from the ‘original’ path to modern ‘bourgeois order’ applies to Europe as a whole. This position also echoes the Nairn-Anderson thesis that the ‘non-modern’ and ‘archaic’ features of English modernity were rooted in the aristocratic/agrarian origins of its capitalism. Because the aristocracy persisted, according to Nairn and Anderson, political and cultural institutions in England could not flourish to their fullest extent. There are two major problems with this mode of argumentation. First, neither the presence of an aristocracy nor the absence of a bourgeoisie necessarily indicates the absence or incompleteness of capitalism. A closer examination of the reproductive pattern of the ‘old’ forces in England easily overturns the hasty conclusions derived from the mere persistence of aristocratic titles. Capitalism developed ‘within the framework of – and not in contradiction to – aristocratic landlordism’ (Gerstenberger 2007: 776; Brenner 1989:274; Mooers 1991: 171-6; Teschke 2003: 269; Lacher 2006: 100). Second, underlying such an ahistorical notion of social class is an equally problematic understanding of modernity and capitalism. Modernity is assumed to develop whenever capitalism is freed from adverse politico-cultural factors. As such, any lack of advance towards modernity is perceived to stem from ‘not any inherent logic to capitalism but by the inertia pull of backward social values, political institutions and cultural norms. Political, social and cultural progress then means catching up with capitalism’ (Wood 1991: 162-3).
In consequence, under geopolitical imperatives the aristocratic/clerical order was resuscitated in England, yet ‘in a new shape, for money more than birth was now its basis’ (Moore 1966: 19).

Likewise, the emergence of a ‘public sphere’ was more a result of the participation of the aristocracy and the Anglican establishment in the generalisation of their rule, than in their continuous confrontation with the monarchy. This enabled the structural transformation of the public sphere ‘to appear as the expansion of something already existing’ (Gerstenberger 2007: 619-21). Therefore, on the one hand, it is true that a ‘public reason’ began to emancipate itself from the personalized rule during the early modern period, which manifested itself in various institutional innovations such as relative freedom of the press, reform of suffrage and change in party structures. On the other hand, however, it is equally true that the dominant content of generalised public debates remained deeply rooted in significantly altered, yet equally religious discourses (Gerstenberger 2007: 619-21; cf. Clark 1986:110-1). Novel interpretations of religion (for example underlying the work of most Whig theorists such as John Locke) usually held in common that there was nothing in (Protestant) religion that was incompatible with ‘reason’. Individual reason, rooted in the ethic of productivity, did not have to take a secular form, exactly because it could be formulated in union with religion. Reason was not opposed to religion; to the contrary, it was invested in the individual by nature, thereby by god (Zaret 2000: 270-5).

Read in this light, if any transition to modernity took place in England during the early modern period, it was the transition towards ‘capitalist modernity’. This involved the emergence of a state increasingly rooted in and differentiated from civil society, an ethic of ‘productivity’ and a ‘public space’ reproduced as part and parcel of the image of capitalist
aristocracy. The propertied classes had no immediate interest in invoking an anti-monarchical and anti-clerical public space, nor did they need to envision a broader ‘political community’ to challenge an inexorable monarchy/church complex. By contrast, as I shall discuss below, most of the ideas, collective identities and institutions associated with French absolutism, the quintessential home of modernity, had their origins not in capitalist social relations, but in their complete absence (Wood 1991: 18; Parker 1996: 203).

The Politics and Culture of Absolutism: France’s Absolutist Modernity

In France, there were two main and interrelated features of the absolutist class structure that come to the fore: The persistence of peasant property and the concentration of ruling classes within the state. The latter was made possible by the sale of state offices and the granting of fiscal immunities to the higher nobility. Construing absolutism as merely lending weight to the monarchy, therefore, would be misleading, for the extension of the absolutist office did not bring to an end but transformed noble privileges. While the Crown to a certain extent undermined the political/juridical autonomy of the nobility, this was made possible only by granting them patrimonial rights over state office (Parker 1983: 26-7; Briggs 1998: 199). State office itself, therefore, became ‘at one and the same time both an instrument for the extension of royal authority and a superb mechanism for the preservation of noble interests’ (Beik 1985: 30-1).  

Office was as much the key to the reproduction of the bourgeoisie as to that of the nobility. The bourgeoisie did not differentiate itself from the nobility by seeking to establish an autonomous space of accumulation governed by an ‘improvement’ ethic. Instead, their differences stemmed mainly from their differential access to state office. Competition for

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28 At the time of Louis XIV, who is said to have coined the infamous phrase ‘L’Etat c’est moi!’, the state involved merely 300 full-time commissioners and non-venal officials as opposed to 45,000 venal office holders (Collins 1995: 93).
fiscal and commercial privilege and a share of royal taxes persisted as the main means to the reproduction of the bourgeoisie and nobility alike (Taylor 1964: 491; Skocpol 1979: 59). Therefore, it would be no misuse of words to say that the bourgeoisie and nobility were not two fundamentally opposing classes that represented two different modes of life, capitalism and absolutism respectively. Instead, the bourgeoisie and nobility in early modern France made up the opposing factions of the same non-capitalist ruling class (Comninel 1987: 194-6).

Of course the reproductive pattern of the French ruling classes was also a reflection of their relation to the countryside. Since the appropriative classes acquired tax exemptions, the absolutist state had a direct interest in securing the hereditary character and taxability of peasant holdings. The concentration of ruling class power within the absolutist state, therefore, had gone hand in hand with the consolidation of peasant possession of land (Mooers 1991: 49). Similar to tax-office, ‘rent’ too was no longer intrinsically tied to noble status only. And precisely in this context the revival of the complex categories of Roman law gained momentum, as more definite answers were demanded by royal justice for questions rarely raised before: ‘who was the owner of a tenure’, the noble, the peasant tenant or the bourgeois? And yet again, no matter who owned the land, by the 18th century it had become commonplace among French lawyers that the peasants were the ‘true proprietors’ (Bloch 1966: 128-9; Beik 2009: 26). Rent, therefore, could be extracted through various forms of

It is, therefore, not without reason that by 1790 France was to become a country with the largest number of taxpayers and ‘the largest number and highest proportion of fiscal exemptions’ in Western Europe (Bonney 2012: 93).

According to one estimate, the peasantry in France in the early 17th century possessed about half the land and worked most of the rest; the nobility owned about 20 percent, the bourgeoisie 15, the clergy 10 (Parker 1996: 52). And on the eve of the Revolution, peasants still constituted 85 percent of the population. And the land, whether possessed by the peasantry or rented out by landlords, remained extremely fragmented and scattered in comparison to England (Skocpol 1979: 55; Mooers 1991: 53).
private property arrangements ranging from ‘money-lease’ to ‘sharecropping’ and yet without transforming the peasant possession of land (Cominich 1987: 194).

Given that property was politically-constituted, the relation of propertied classes to the state was never unambiguous. While in England propertied classes were almost exclusively concerned with limiting state power over property, in France they confronted the state both as a ‘competitor for and as a means to’ accessing sources of income. What was more certain, therefore, is that the struggle was much less about limiting state power than acquiring a privileged position in it or preventing others from doing so (Wood 2012: 151).

Against this background we begin to make sense of the ‘culture’ and conceptual foundations of early modern France. The fragmentation of the state among the holders of political/jurisdictional privilege made necessary an image of royal authority as the carrier of a ‘general’ interest, i.e. the interest of a ‘broader’ political community (Jones 1995: 108, 138). And not so paradoxically, those in opposition could resist state demands only by reasserting their equality of access to it and by invoking a more ‘general interest’ in the name of a ‘higher’ political community. What is at stake, therefore, was not so much the protection of the ‘private’ sphere from the state’s encroachment but ‘transforming the “private” state into a truly public thing’ (Wood 2012: 170-1). The spiral effects of intra-ruling class struggles included a recurrent tension in French political discourse between ‘privilege’ and ‘equality’ and a continuous tendency to re-define the ‘general will’ and ‘political community’, a phenomenon that, combined with new geopolitical pressures in the 18th century, would lend the French Enlightenment its most radical texture.
Another feature of the culture of absolutism was this: given that state office, tax exemptions and political privileges remained the main area of contestation among various particular interests, religious debates were quickly assimilated into political/military disputes. For example, in the 16th and 17th centuries the protestant theories of resistance, in the form of Huguenot tracts, were directly implicated within the struggles of lesser notables against the rising absolutist monarchy. Alternative religious doctrines, as long as they served some variety of constitutionalism, were immediately absorbed into the forms of political/military resistance to absolutism. The Jansenist (non-conformist Catholics) quarrels in the 17th and 18th centuries would both conform to and, in an important respect, diverge from this historical pattern. The Jansenists opposition arose in the wake of the almost complete elimination of Protestantism and religious heterodoxy in France, therefore in the context of increasing politico-religious centralization. Jansenism found its first supporters among the lower clergy, and then in the educated strata of bourgeois intellectuals/parlementaire constitutionalists (Van Kley 1987: 170-1,194-7). And what united these two groups was not so much their support for an alternative politico-religious authority as their attack on the state and church as means of private extortion and the struggle to open them to ‘talent’. Furthermore, unlike England, in the context of the increasing centralization of the ecclesiastical and political establishment, the political/moral critique of the established order could no longer be easily assimilated into another religious discourse, but inevitably developed secular and philosophical undertones.³¹ Public space *a la franca* was thus born (Beik 2009: 309; Briggs 1998: 155-7,176-84).

³¹ Zaret notes: ‘[t]he “invention” of public opinion in England occurred at the level of communicative practice. Its inventors did not acknowledge the innovation, [nor] did they invest it with a principled foundation’. Thus ‘innovative communicative practices arose for which new words, like *public opinion*, were not coined’. By contrast, in France ‘public opinion was a political and linguistic innovation, a conceptual transformation that concealed continuities with older traditions of political authority’ (2000: 21).
The Geo(politics) of Enlightenment: The Invention of ‘Reason’ and the ‘Improvement’ of the ‘Public’

That the French Enlightenment developed as a reaction to the tightened ideological domination of the absolutist state is widely recognized. Especially from the 1660s, the monarchy steadily extended its intervention into the minutiae of daily life, initiating new processes of socialization and acculturation based on regenerated agencies of social control and discipline. In this respect, the elevation of the ‘public’, of ‘reason’ and ‘progress’ over ‘tyranny’, ‘ignorance’ and ‘superstition’ was central to the discursive struggles against an increasingly oppressive state-church complex that sought to centralize political rule and impose a ‘purified’ Christianity. Yet what is equally important to recognize is that constitutional and geopolitical issues became ever more closely interrelated as the 18th century wore on. Both state-centralization and the political/religious reactions to it unfolded in a context of cutthroat geopolitical competition. During the 18th century Russia, Prussia and Great Britain rose as formidable geopolitical enemies, forcing French ruling classes to seek ways in which to rationalize the administrative apparatus and reorganize the system of taxation. Of these enemies, however, it was only Great Britain to which France would turn as a model.

The British state, with its fiscal base rooted in a dynamic capitalist economy and home market, continually outspent and outcompeted France during what some historians call the “Second Hundred Years’ War” (1689/1714-1815). Great Britain, especially after its involvement in the War of the Spanish Succession, almost completely disengaged from

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32 Due caution must be exercised in evaluating the overall success of absolutist centralization. On the one hand, it should be kept in mind that the successive French governments could only partially harvest the fruits of their reform attempts. From the 1650s on, most of the reforms, aiming to better regulate the poor, penetrate peasant culture and discipline the provincial elites, never fully succeeded in ‘getting the state machinery working properly’ (Briggs 1998: 152; 1989: 381-413). This should not lead one, however, to overlook that the Bourbon state, in its late 18th century form, ‘displayed unmistakable characteristics of modernity’; ‘Sovereignty over territory was no longer a matter of serious dispute, despite a residue of geographical and administrative untidiness, and the native population no longer challenged the taxing prerogative of the crown’ (Jones 1995: 45-6).
territorial claims on the continent (apart from the acquisition of certain strategic posts on trading routes such as Gibraltar and Minorca). It concentrated its geopolitical focus on naval power in order to ensure unimpeded access for British commercial interests overseas. This was combined by selective involvement in continental affairs in ways to ensure that continental powers continuously fought one another, thereby diverting their resources away from colonial operations (Brewer 1989: 178). Given the narrowness of the tax-base, colonial markets were much more important to absolutist France than they were to capitalist England. In the course of the 18th century, therefore, France fiercely reacted against British mercantilism overseas while at the same time finding it increasingly difficult to sustain its military superiority on the continent. Of the seven Anglo-French wars, France lost six. Its only victory in the War of the American Revolution provided nothing, but further added to the problem of war financing. Despite widespread recognition of the need for fiscal reform, the fear that changes could threaten fiscal/mercantile exemptions and privileges left the elite ‘in a state of paralysis’ (Parker 1996: 219).

The implication was that the French elite was becoming increasingly aware in the course of the 18th century of the ‘comparative backwardness’ of their state vis-à-vis Britain (Shilliam 2009: 37-43). By persistently defeating a wealthier and more populous state like France, the British state exposed the presence of a qualitatively different society across the Channel. Britain became a constant reference for comparison for the French elite, representing an order that is geopolitically more efficient yet which proved almost impossible to emulate, hence ultimately ‘undesirable’. While the increasing recognition of socioeconomic unevenness

33 Behind this new foreign policy orientation (blue water strategy) lurked three interlinked objectives: First, the parliamentary classes, less dependent on political means of appropriation, wanted to spare themselves from costly and militarily risky ventures on the continent. This had the additional advantage of avoiding substantial increases in the size of the army, thereby preventing the creation of a military force that could have otherwise threatened individual liberties. Related to this is also the suspicion that major military interventions into European inter-dynastic struggles, if not successful, could have revived dynastism at home (Brewer 1989: 168-9).
further irritated existing tensions within the French ruling strata, it also gave new momentum to debates on how to reconcile ‘general will’ with private interest, thereby generating and promoting new conceptions of ‘reason’, ‘science’ and the ‘public’ (Acomb 1980: 121-3). As they were selectively re-interpreted by French policy makers, Enlightenment ideas would turn into geopolitical substitutes for English capitalism.

In approaching the issue of geopolitical rejuvenation the major problem confronting the French ruling elite was how to reform the economy and the system of taxation. In this context, from the 1740s, the French view of English economic success had begun to shift from trade-based explanations towards the ‘real economy’ of England (Crouzet 1990: 137). The productivity increases achieved in English agriculture drew the attention of a group of French agronomes and economists (Physiocrats), leading them to study and theorize the ways in which conditions of capitalist agriculture could be created in France (Bourde 2013). Especially after the humiliating defeat of the Seven Years’ War, the government also became more responsive to proposals for agrarian and fiscal reform, ready to take bold steps towards materializing Physiocratic promises (Jones 1995: 128). However, it took only a decade or so for the French reformers to fully realize that any prospect of economic revitalization was conditional on the transformation of the entire social edifice of absolutism. Neither the customary rights of peasant possessors could be extinguished, nor the fiscal exemptions of the ruling elite be abolished. And indeed every attempt to adopt the social reproductive relations underlying the fiscal power of the British state would tend to threaten the political position of the reformers themselves (Bloch 1966: 222-3; Jones 2012: 112).

Transplanting the English constitution to France, therefore, could bring about profoundly dangerous implications for the reformers. By implication, ‘in an ill-ordered society’, the
Physiocrats concluded, ‘self-interested economic activity could rupture the social fabric’ (McNally 1988: 123-9). Like the économistes, most philosophes of the French Enlightenment, despite their evident admiration for it, also found ‘something unnervingly extreme about the English political experience’ (Baker 1990:178). Even the most ‘Anglophile’ philosophers of the Enlightenment, such as Montesquieu, referred to England as ‘a nation that could mobilize against its enemies immense fictional riches, which the confidence and the nature of its government would render real’. Yet this also was a nation in which liberty by itself became the main object of political life, therefore the nation was ‘more easily led by its passions than its reason’ (ibid: 176). The problem thus was to imagine and make possible a political space that would reform the old regime and boost its geopolitical competitiveness without the English-like contestation of interests.

Despite the failure of attempts to create a society on the English model (a society of self-interested and politically equal individuals who work for the public good simultaneously as they work for themselves), the debates on British rights and liberties continued. These debates stemmed from a growing sense of inter-societal unevenness; hence underlain by the problem of external reproduction. Relatedly, domestic actors also mobilized the idea of reform to raise their material stakes in the moral economy of absolutism. Considered in this context, it is no surprise that the concepts ‘public’, ‘state’ and ‘nation’ were discussed in mid-18th century France as never before (Baker 1990: 21-2). Competing conceptions of ‘public’ and ‘nation’ advanced contesting definitions of rights and duties, underlying different appropriative strategies. The rights of the propertied individual secured by British common law, for example, inspired a multiplicity of elements in the French body politic (such as the lower clergy and certain segments of the parlementaire) to justify their demands for the equality of access to state office and tax revenues. In like manner, a constitution similar to that of the
British was increasingly perceived by the ruling elite as the key to national regeneration (Comninel 1987: 107). For reformers like Turgot and Necker, the doctrine of the rights of man was the only norm on which the ‘nation’ could be reconstituted; yet to the ‘nation’ they attached an important qualification: the hallmark of the nation could not be individual will, but ‘reason’ (Baker 1990: 127).

In short, although the 18th century constitutional conflicts in France had real domestic roots, they can be also understood partly as a series of struggles rooted in the internalization of ideas imported from capitalist England. In England the conditions of political inequality were not directly given in the relations of appropriation. Therefore, the ‘individual’ with unhindered rights to property and unencumbered by wider social duties could become the expression of public power. Mere ownership of property could underlie the logic of social representation. By contrast, in France property was directly sustained by the relations of political inequality. As such, invoking British concepts of right and equality in the land of absolutism would mean the collapse of the entire structure of appropriation and rule. The impossibility of basing public power on abstract individuals led in the course of the 18th century to the further radicalization and containment of abstract notions of ‘nation’ and ‘reason’. ‘Reason’ mediated the substitution of ‘nation’ for the individualistic conception of the ‘public’ influenced by the British constitution. In the hands of the reformers, reason transformed the sociological referent of the public from the ‘individual’ to the ‘nation’ and sought to prevent the

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34 Controller-General Jacques Necker says: ‘[t]he influence of the nation on the government, the guarantee of civil liberty to the individual, the patriotic support which the people always give to their government in times of crisis all contribute to making the English constitution unique in the world’ (quoted in Stone 2002:36-7) The escalating ‘geopolitically engendered debt’, argues Bailey Stone, forced Necker to ‘find ways- short of British parliamentarism- to bolster the confidence of taxpayers and boldholders’ at home (ibid).

35 Without doubt, ‘nation’ was an amorphous concept. It initially emerged as the contraposition to ‘privilege’, but whose privilege was implied depended on the context. It could be used in support of provincial sovereignty and corporate orders as easily as of France as a whole (Fitzsimmons 1993: 30). Nation would acquire its most abstract meaning when the revolutionary deputies, in the face of urban resistance and rural revolts, merged the nation with the Third Estate as a whole, thus giving the nation its most heterogeneous and hence most universal character (Hampson 1991: 13-5).
redefinition of the ‘nation’ along more popular and radical lines (e.g. the radicalism most prominently propounded by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, more on this below).

As such, modernity in pre-revolutionary France was not marked by the impersonality of the capitalist individual, but by the impersonality of the nation mediated by reason. Reason attempted to ‘fix’ the meaning of the ‘nation’ in ways to maintain stability at home and increase competitiveness abroad. It dictated that the state should actively create the conditions under which civic equality served the general welfare of the nation. Fundamental to reform, therefore, was first and foremost the constitution of a state untroubled by the individualistic claims of civil society. Guided by ‘reason’, the state had to educate ‘the public generally and the court specifically as to the true principles of economic and political administration’ (McNally 1988: 123-9). Subjects had to be ‘improved’ not only to learn their place in the newly empowered public space, but also had to actively contribute to the progress of the nation without succumbing to their individual ‘passions’. The logic of social representation propounded by reforming elites, thus, sought to monopolize popular sovereignty in an enlightened public space. This presented both a geopolitical alternative to the British system of representation and a political response to popular claims to represent the nation in opposition to the crown (Baker 1990: 240-1).

In short, 18th century French Enlightenment can be read as an attempt to restrain and bolster the absolutist state by way of an enlightened sovereign power and enlightened citizenship.

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36 In fact, Adam Smith agreed with the physiocratic opposition to the intrusion of selfish interests into the political sphere. However, while Smith held that certain classes such as the landed gentry had interests consistent with the general interest, the Physiocrats argued for the constitution of an autonomous state against and above particular interests. This is another telling example of the socioeconomic differences between England and France in the early modern period. Adam Smith is not concerned about the capitalist transition. He can take for granted that the market functions as an integrative force and attributes to the state only a ‘corrective’ role. Physiocrats, by contrast, had to assign the state a ‘generative’ role, for their main concern was not the disciplining of an already existing market but its very ‘creation’ (McNally 1988: 263).
Among Enlightenment philosophers, however, Rousseau occupies a special place, not only because he was arguably the most important figure in radicalizing the constitutionalist debates in France, but also because his writings had a deep impact on (though not universally embraced by) the Jacobins, especially Robespierre. Rousseau represented both a continuity within and a rupture from the constitutionalist tradition. He shared the constitutionalist concern for transforming the state into a ‘truly public’ thing. Yet, unlike the mainstream of French constitutionalism, he refused to locate the public will in intermediate institutions. Rousseau identifies private property as the principal cause of inequality, adversarial relations and ultimately ‘unfreedom’. Therefore, while he attacks the proprietary character of the absolutist state as do other constitutionalists, he departs from them by locating the ‘general will’ not in the ‘public council’ or ‘assemblies of estates’, but in the ‘people’ as a broadly conceived social category (Wood 2012a: 200).

That said, in Rousseau’s thought the prospect of popular sovereignty and self-government also presupposes the cultivation of certain civic and martial practices that would instill ‘reason’ within individuals, inducing them to work for the ‘general will’. Participation in the civic militia and education figures prominently in Rousseau’s writings as two Republican means whereby citizens learn how to resist the inequality and oppression caused by private property and power. In this sense, Rousseau considers the army and the school as alternative Republican spaces to the old regime and the market, which foster forms of association in substitution of absolutism and capitalism.

Clearly, there was little embrace of the radical Enlightenment before the Revolution. Nevertheless, this early modern legacy, especially that of Rousseau, largely shaped the way in which the revolutionary actors would make sense of and try to solve the underlying problem
of comparative backwardness. For, unwilling/unable to differentiate political and economic processes, the agents of the revolution would have to confront the same dilemma that haunted the reformers of absolutism: How could they rejuvenate France without expropriating the traditional rights of the peasantry? How could they match the British fiscal-military power without replicating the British route to modernity? This required the creation of a new ‘public’ with a historically-specific combination of rights and duties. They had to find new ways in which the individual could be linked to the reproduction of a new political community. The logic of British participation in the public sphere—the propertied citizenship—would be ultimately substituted by conditioning property and representation to compulsory military service and education. In other words, the condition of entrance to British civil society would be universalized and militarized: it would be extended to an army of peasant proprietors with the condition of protecting the patrie. The revolutionary and Napoleonic state would materialize the 18th century substitution project by militarizing it.

The Process of Substituting Capitalism: The ‘Citizen-Soldier’ and ‘Public School’ as keys to Understanding Alternate Routes to Modernity

Geopolitically exacerbated fiscal and constitutional crises gradually caused the collapse of the absolutist regime. In June 1789 the Third Estate unilaterally transformed the Estates General into a ‘National Assembly’, laying the institutional foundations of a new mode of representation and collectivity. The conquest of national sovereignty, however, was initially carried out in a somewhat reformist fashion. The Third Estate, whose members were drawn mainly from bourgeois landowners and professional office holders, represented the less advantageous segment of the ruling class (Lucas 1973: 118). That is to say, their interests, as with the interests of the First and Second Estates, lay in the continuity of political modes of surplus appropriation, though they were relatively disadvantaged in accessing the sources of income. Therefore, the conflict in June 1789 erupted mainly as an intra-ruling class issue, as a

37 My arguments in this section have benefited significantly from Shilliam (2009).
manifestation of the heightening competition for politically-constituted property, and of bourgeois demands for equal access to it (Comninel 1987: 200). Demanded was a more equitable distribution of the tax burden, a doubling of the Third Estate and voting by head. The Third Estate wanted a more significant role in regenerating the realm; yet it did not seek to challenge ‘privilege’ as an institution (Fitzsimmons 1987: 294; Jones 1995: 178). What forced the Revolution to shift from mere intra-ruling class negotiations and to embrace a more universally-understood sovereignty was ‘the combination of the counter-offensive of the Ancien Regime and anti-privilege pressure from below’ (Lucas 1973: 125). Over the summer of 1789 urban populations mobilized against worsening socioeconomic conditions, which led to a decisive defeat of royal attempts at reconstituting the absolutist order. Meanwhile the peasantry also began to attack everything that threatened their existence in the countryside. They burned chateaux and the archives containing seigniorial dues, occupied their lost commons and invaded forests (Lefebvre 1961: 129-32).

Faced with pressures from below, the Third Estate had two options. It could either support the royal repression of the common people, thereby potentially contributing to the undermining of its own position vis-à-vis the monarchy. Or alternatively it could lead the people to undermine the regime as a whole. August 4 witnessed the realization of the latter option. The National Assembly conditionally proclaimed the destruction of ‘feudalism’ (sic): noble/clerical dues and rights became conditional to an ‘exorbitant’ form of redemption by peasants, while venality of office and fiscal/regional/corporate privileges were all categorically dismissed as remnants of the old order. And the proclamation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen on August 26 carried the Revolution to its logical conclusion: it affirmed individual liberties, representative government, elections and the separation of powers as the principles of the new regime (Woloch 1994a: 24-5).
In principle, then, elimination of privilege and corporatism made imaginable a united public space based on individual liberty and civic equality, hence constituting an important step towards a British-style constitution and national regeneration. And yet, unlike Britain, the free and equal individual in France was created merely by ‘political decree’, i.e. in the absence of a capitalist transformation (Shilliam 2009: 43). For, despite the formal denunciation of the ‘feudal’ system, the new regime could neither destroy peasant usufruct (censives), which was a form of property within the hierarchy of privilege, nor sought to suppress seigniorial dues without compensation. The interests of the bourgeois landowners, as well as the fear of external and internal reactions to the Revolution, rendered impossible the unconditional elimination of seigniorial dues and forced the National Assembly to make concessions to peasant demands for subsistence (Jones 2012: 113-4, 135). Consequently, although office venality and fiscal privilege were dissolved, state-appropriation and redistribution of peasant surpluses continued to be the main locus of class struggle. While the state was opened to talent, it greatly expanded and remained the main source of ruling class incomes.38

The Assembly embraced the constitutional rights and liberties of the impersonalized individual in a non-capitalist society. And in such a context political and economic rights were fused, i.e. one’s right to political equality was in immediate contradiction to another’s right to enjoy his property. That said, the free and equal individual could become the basis of a new public space in France only if his constitutional rights and liberties were balanced by constitutional duties. In the absence of a society wherein self-interested ‘free’ individuals may produce beneficial social and geopolitical effects, the rights of the impersonalized individual

38 From 1792 to 1795 the bureaucracy expanded five times and doubled from 1795 to 1799 (Mooers 1991: 73).
had to be reformulated in such ways as to involve obligations for the welfare of an ‘impersonalized collective’, i.e. the ‘nation’ (Shilliam 2009).

And it is scarcely surprising that every major legal/constitutional text written after 1789 reproduced the inherent tension between the rights and duties of the individual. While unleashing the rights of citizens, the Declaration of 1789 also set forth obligations to contain them.\(^\text{39}\) The Constitution of 1791, likewise, in theory, ‘brought into being one of the most participatory and democratic national communities in the world’ by basing the electorate on taxes rather than on property (Fitzsimmons 1993: 37). Keeping the liability to direct taxation at low levels, the National Assembly extended liberty and equality far down the social order, creating a reservoir of citizens that included many on the ‘poverty line’ (ibid). And yet the same constitution could not help but halt the empowerment of new citizenry by dividing them into two groups: a minority of ‘active’ citizens who were qualified to exercise rights and liberties; and a majority of ‘passive’ citizens ‘endowed’ with duties only (Sewell 1988). At this early stage of revolution, then, liberal rights could prevail only when based on a seemingly contradictory, yet ultimately necessary mode of subjecthood, i.e. based on a hierarchical allocation of duties among ‘equal’ citizens.

The initial fissure opened between rights and duties, however, began to deepen as the old socioeconomic problems resurfaced. For, contrary to the expectation that the new citizens would be willing to tax themselves, the members of the National Assembly consistently

\(^{39}\) For example, Article 1 reads: Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions may be founded only upon the general good. Article 2: The source of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. No body nor individual can exercise authority that does not explicitly proceed from it. Article 4: …the exercise of the natural rights of each man has no limits except those which assure to the other members of the society the enjoyment of the same rights. These limits can only be determined by law. Article 6: The law is the expression of the general will. All citizens, being equal in the eyes of the law, are equally eligible to all dignities and to all public positions and occupations, according to their abilities, and without distinction except that of their virtues and talents (italics are mine).
‘confused tax reform with tax cuts’ (Daunton 2012: 128). Consequently, ‘[t]he new regime of consent to taxation’ turned into ‘a regime of lighter, rather than heavier, taxes’ (Bonney 2012: 104). To restore public finances, the National Assembly issued paper money (assignats) based on the expected revenues from the sale of confiscated ecclesiastical lands. With the fiscal power significantly constrained, however, assignats rapidly depreciated, falling to ‘less than 1 per cent of their face value by 1796’ (Daunton 2012: 129). The resultant inflation and food scarcities began to afflict rural and urban citizens from the start of 1792. Price-fixing riots erupted in cities in early 1792, while peasant insurrections posed a serious challenge to the regime in the countryside.

Meanwhile, deteriorating domestic conditions were also breeding the fear of counter-revolutionary strife backed by foreign powers. Already by 1791 the radical factions in the National Assembly had become agitated by rumours of foreign invasion. The assumed linkages between the Revolution’s internal and external ‘enemies’ were increasingly confirmed by the Habsburg and Prussian hosting of French émigré nobles and their open declaration of support for the embattled royal family. However, the geopolitical fault lines completely cracked only during early 1792 when Vienna, hard pressed by the Russians in the East, demanded the disbanding of the French army on the frontier of the Habsburg Empire and the almost complete restoration of the old order in France (Stone 2002: 164-6). The irony is that the Austrians, soon joined by Prussia and England, would actually succeed in ‘undermining’ the revolution by unwittingly radicalizing it.

In these dire social and geopolitical circumstances, the Girondins could hardly afford to neglect popular interests. From 1792 to 1793 they grew increasingly lenient towards rural and urban popular demands, while at the same time implementing harsh measures in order to
protect property rights. The deputies declared the *unconditional* abrogation of all seigniorial dues and services in August 1792. During early 1793, likewise, in the face of increasing ‘lawlessness’ in the countryside (violent acts of land clearance and price-fixing), the Convention took measures to implement progressive taxation (Jones 1991: 105). Both measures were designed to lower the fiscal burden on the poor while trying to mobilize them for the war endeavour. Despite this, the Girondins also remained determined that stability should not come at the expense of property rights. They rejected proposals for systematic price controls and grain redistribution as ‘an intolerable infringement of individual liberty’ and decreed the death penalty against whoever proposes ‘an agrarian law or any other law which subverts territorial, commercial or industrial property’ (Gross 1997: 71, 122-36).

The Montagnard rule, thus, began when property was still ‘triumphant’. And it would end with a radical redefinition of property. From the summer of 1793 it was becoming increasingly evident that no mere ‘combination of free markets and bayonets’ was able to feed the troops, deliver supplies and pacify the people (Hirsch 1994: 214). It was especially the British entry into the anti-revolutionary coalition in the spring of 1793 that rendered even more doubtful the viability of the military and political basis of the revolutionary state. The British had not only seized Toulon, the gateway to south-eastern France, but were in preparation for landing and inciting anti-revolutionary fervour in the rebellious western provinces as well (Stone 2002: 177). Meanwhile, new popular clubs proliferated in Paris and the provinces. Unlike the restricted membership of academic and masonic societies, popular clubs reached far down the social scale, providing lower classes unprecedented opportunities for political engagement. Through the clubs, the common people familiarized themselves with a new mode of socialization (involving debates, committees, voting and, above all, the
rhetoric of equality and fraternity) and acquired an important avenue for raising popular demands and local subsistence issues (Woloch 1994b: 314-5).

The Montagnards could seize power in the summer of 1793 only by incorporating into their political and military agenda the sans-culotte demands for subsistence. Hence their endorsement of the radical measures that the Girondins had outright rejected, such as the enactment of a general price ceiling, imposition of the death penalty on hoarders and the compelled acceptance of the assignats at face value. Food shortages were no longer perceived to be the result of temporary market imperfections but as treason and counter-revolutionary plots (Sewell 1994: 266). Agrarian policy also merged with some of the peasant demands. It allowed for the partition of émigré lands into smaller plots and the dismantling of the castles in order to provide land and shelter to the rural poor. Without doubt, the redistributive impact of these policies remained limited and most of them were reversed with the fall of Montagnards. Yet the more decisive and world-historical impact of ‘social Jacobinism’ perhaps lay elsewhere: in its formulation of the ‘ownership of food’ as the most basic property right for those who serve the nation (Gross 1997: 12).

Tellingly, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in June 1793 reacknowledged the ‘sacred’ right to property, but only with an addendum: it introduced ‘poor relief’ and ‘public assistance’ as a ‘sacred debt’. It recognized new rights: the right to subsistence, the right to work, the right to education, all of which were considered vital for the advancement of social

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40 For example, the Montagnards outlawed coalitions of peasant buyers from buying confiscated lands and rejected demands to impose price controls over peasants’ rental obligations. Regardless whether the revolutionary land sales benefited the peasantry as much as the landed bourgeoisie, ‘there can [however] be little doubt that [land sales] hugely reinforced the small-scale character of landholding in France’. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the peasantry was also ‘busily engaged upon property acquisition by other means’, such as colonizing commons, wastelands and forests (Jones 2012: 113).
Implied here is a historically-specific conception of property, through which the Montagnards sought to overcome the recurrent tension between economic liberty and political duty. They attempted to ensure the triumph of property by making it directly pertinent to one’s subsistence. That is, property was no longer for the wealthy only, but turned into a precondition to one’s ‘right to existence’. And the question of ‘whose right to existence’ was further clarified during early 1794 after the failure of price controls. Through the Ventose decrees, the Montagnards made clear that property did not necessarily belong to those who ‘improve’ it, but was universalized as a political right for all men who were ‘patriots’. As such, property was all the more sacred because it was both the safeguard of individual existence and a means to securing political unity and defending the nation (Hirsch 1994: 220).

All this was not a simple conciliation of property rights with citizen welfare. The Montagnard ‘Terror’ neither expropriated nor slavishly accepted the rights of the propertied individual, but redefined them in ways conducive to French political unity and geopolitical competitiveness. As a result, while social Jacobinism transformed subsistence from simply a moral duty into a constitutional right, it also drastically departed from the English poor law because ‘it did not act merely as an appendix to the rights of property’ (Shilliam 2009: 46). Instead, by linking social reproduction to patriotism, the Montagnards instituted a form of property with totally new sociopolitical embellishments. Property was no longer understood as an economic right exercised by self-interested individuals only. But it was freed from those who ‘abuse’ it and

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The Declaration of 1793 reads: Article 1: The aim of society is the common welfare. Government is instituted in order to guarantee to man the enjoyment of his natural and imprescriptible rights. Article 2: These rights are equality, liberty, security, and property. Article 21: Poor relief/Public assistance is a sacred debt. Society owes subsistence to unfortunate citizens in adversity, either by procuring them work or by ensuring the means of existence to those who are unable to work. Article 22: Education is needed by all. Society ought to favour with all its power the advancement of the public reason and to put education at the door of every citizen. Article 23. The social guarantee consists in the action of all to secure to each the enjoyment and the maintenance of his rights: this guarantee rests upon the national sovereignty.
turned into a political entitlement for those who are socially and geopolitically useful to the nation. As such, the ‘nation’ was not a derivation of property but vice versa. Envisioned was not a market economy, but a moral economy underlined by a new sense of social reciprocity and unity: an economy in which service to the nation (rather than market competition) gave access to the means of social reproduction and provided ‘the ultimate form of civic participation’ (Woloch 1994b: 317).

The most immediate result of conditioning welfare to patriotism was levée en masse, i.e. mass conscription. In the ancien regime of France the social basis of the armed forces was a direct expression of the structure of the wider society. One’s participation in the army was necessarily mediated by his membership in corporate bodies and investment in political privileges (Kestnbaum 2002: 122). The Montagnards’ elimination of privileges and the universalization of military service thus combined military and political practice in an hitherto unprecedented way: ‘for the first time in French history men of rural origin predominated in the army in the same proportions as they did in civil society’ (Woloch 1994a: 387). And ‘[e]ven the lowliest of those previously excluded from politics now had an unimpeachable claim to be included as an equal citizen solely by virtue of the military service he performed’ (Kestnbaum 2002: 131). The army thus became the most unmediated point of access to the nation. Citizens became soldiers and soldiers citizens. The citizen-soldier was thus born.

42 Translated literally as ‘mass rising’, levée en masse originally implied much more than just universal conscription. It connoted to ‘a general rising of the people for any purpose, with or without the assistance of official persons who did not command much public confidence. It could be a swarming of citizens to defy the regular armies of Prussia and Austria. It could be a rising of the sections of Paris against the Convention…It could be the wandering of a band of sans-culottes from one part of France to another, self-organized as an armée révolutionnaire, in pursuit of aristocrats or in search of food’ (Palmer 2014: 451; also see Cobb 1987). This spirit of general popular mobilization was, in fact, echoed in the decree concerning levée en masse: ‘young men will go off to fight, married men will forgo weapons and transport food supplies; women will make tents and clothing and will provide service in hospitals; children will shred old linen; old men will be taken to the public squares to offer encouragement to the warriors and to preach the hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic’ (Forrest 1993: 162).
The fall of the Montagnards in July 1794 heralded a sea change in many respects, but the citizen-soldier remained firmly in place. For, while the Thermidorian reaction quickly reversed many of the Jacobin ‘excesses’ by, above all, bringing back the propertied franchise (Wolloch 1994a: 98-9), it even more strongly reaffirmed the place of military service at the heart of the new body politic. Under the Directory, participation in the nation was now conditioned on participation in the armed forces regardless of property qualifications. That is to say, military service became the precondition to gaining citizenship for the propertied and the propertyless alike, the former as the elected and the latter as the elector (ibid: 390). Two broader and interrelated implications ensued with the consolidation of the citizen-soldier as the new subject. First, given the peasant origin of the new armed forces, military mobilization rendered almost impossible the expropriation of the peasantry, hence it could not be used to facilitate the opening of an intensive path of economic growth. Consequently, the Directory and, then Napoleon, had to channel popular energies outward. They systematically linked the reproduction of the new body politic to an increasingly aggressive regime of external, i.e. geopolitical accumulation.43

Second, if the citizen-soldier marked a fundamental transformation in the contours of political life, its collective expression, the ‘citizen-army’, heralded a revolution in war-making and state-building (Mjose and Van Holde 2002: 33). Despite widespread draft evasion, after the first levy in 1793 the French army reached 750 000 men, a number the combined coalition armies could hardly match. Born as a one-time emergency measure in 1793, the levée turned

43 The Directory was thus locked in a situation of permanent war: ‘the penniless Directory could not feed its soldiers, but it could not disband them [either], because they were needed to keep the ruling clique in power, and because it was feared that they would enter the pay of the government’s political opponents unless work were found for them…The only solution was to continue the war, and order the troops to “live off” the invaded lands’ (Stone 2002: 219, quoting Biro). During 1797-99, as a result, 25 percent of the Directory’s revenues came from conquered territories (ibid: 232).
into a systematic annual exercise in 1798, incorporating around 3 and 3.5 million men in the armed forces until 1813. Of the young men born between 1790 and 1795, almost half of them served in the armies of Napoleon (Forrest 1989: 20). This implies that peasant resistance to conscription was by and large broken by 1810 and Napoleon fully routinized and bureaucratized the recruitment process, finally engraining ‘the habit of conscription…in the psychology of the young and the communities to which they belong’ (Forrest 2002: 104-5; Wolloch 1994a: 432-3).

Perhaps more important than its quantitative enormity, however, the creation of a ‘national army’ mobilized social forces that the ancien regimes of Europe could not dare to unleash. For conscription offered the popular classes ‘a newly authorized place in the regime as citizens: political recognition if not democracy, a way to participate in at least one of the state's chief endeavors, and a way…to [however limitedly] appropriate the state as their own’ (Kestnbaum 2002: 133). The novelty of this shift in state-society relations can hardly be overstated. And indeed it was this qualitative transformation that not only made possible the triumph of French armies (virtually unstoppable until 1814) but also rendered their success, at least for a while, irreproducible by others. Britain, for example, with its capitalist economy and dispossessed ‘surplus’ population, could match the threat of French invasion by simply hiring more foreign mercenaries, recruiting volunteers and reinforcing its naval power. ‘More fundamental reforms were neither necessary nor desirable’ (Mjoset and Van Holde 2002: 34). Britain could ‘rely on the incentives of the marketplace to meet its manpower needs’ (ibid:36). In other words, it could afford to buy soldiers without creating citizens. Prussia, on the other hand, traumatized by its defeat at Jena (1806), had no option, but was forced to (selectively) imitate Napoleonic conscription, which would cost her nothing less than a ‘revolution from above’ (ibid: 35).
Mass conscription was the most successful expression of modern state-building and an important hallmark of the new civic order. Yet it was not the only one. Despite periodic retreats from and popular reactions to it, the mobilizing vision of the Revolution was also pursued in the field of education. Free public schooling was considered central to inculcating the civic values conducive to the Republican cause. The Convention, and then the Directorate, regarded public schooling as a means to creating the new citizen and regenerating the nation. True, they were never able to adequately fund universal public education since the requirements of war-financing quickly depleted the financial and human resources of the French peasant-based economy, leaving no sustainable financial basis for establishing a national system of education. Napoleon, likewise, focusing all his energy on conscription, could show only little interest in keeping up with the Republican insistence on public schools. The Bourbon Restoration could only modestly revive the Republican belief in universal primary education while dropping altogether its Republican content (Wolloch 1994a: 232-6).

All that said, what is perhaps more important than the limited and protracted development of public schooling was the specific vision underlying the educational reform attempts: a (geo)political pedagogy that links the education of all citizens to the reproduction of the state. In this sense, ‘the Revolution produced a permanent change of perspective among the governing elites of most political persuasions. Officials in every successive regime denounced the deficiencies of community driven, tuition-supported traditional popular education…and clung to some notion of instruction publique as a potential antidote’ (Wolloch 1993: 148-9).

The point is that while seeking to boost political unity and geopolitical competitiveness, the ruling elite attempted to integrate the common people with the state through a centralized system of education. And when education became accessible to all subjects, it, at least in
principle, brought to an end the systematic exclusion of the lower classes from the state and state-generated income. The need to mobilize popular classes for the state, in other words, brought in its train the generalization of access to it. Education was thus a right and a duty at the same time. The ‘school’ as a result gained an unprecedented importance in the formation of the successive regimes in France. The novelty of instruction publique should not be overlooked. In Britain, for example, educational attainment remained entirely voluntary, locally-based and privately-funded well into the second half of the 19th century. The political/cultural mobilization of the lower classes was not necessary for the reproduction of the ruling class. The market could well discipline the poor and deliver geopolitical objectives; therefore there was no need to ‘educate’ the lower classes beyond voluntary and localized forms of vocational/industrial training (Vaughan and Archer 1971: 202-30).

It was precisely from this market-school dichotomy that another important implication ensued. Underlying the critique of traditional schooling in France was an attempt at shaping the existing religious establishment and values according to new political and strategic objectives. The Church’s role, in this regard, as the main provider of education, had to be repeatedly restructured to meet the state’s changing strategic goals, which inevitably generated a constant tension between and within the clergy and the political elite. This by no means implies that the state necessarily pursued an anti-clerical and anti-religious policy; after all, Napoleon was quick enough to liquidate Republican anti-clericalism by ‘cementing anew Church-state relations, in the process trying to enlist the parish clergy as his moral prefects’ (Wolloch 1994a: 431). Yet the point simply is that in France the state had to control and systematically intervene into the processes of politico-religious socialization. Religion and politics had to be merged in novel ways to unite and defend the nation. And whenever the existing cadres failed to deliver these objectives, as they would at Sedan (1870-1), anti-
clerical and anti-religious tendencies could resurface. Thus, the modernizing vision could potentially turn into a secular one. In England, by contrast, a new mode of political/cultural mobilization was not necessary. Demands for secular schooling therefore could be formulated not against, but in addition to the Church. The state could accommodate demands for secular schooling without turning secularism into a developmental ideology (Vaughan and Archer 1971: 202-30).

Conclusions: Rethinking the French Model

In summary, enclosures had created a historically-specific society and a novel mode of existence in England; property was separated from the wider networks of sociopolitical relations on which human existence came to depend. One’s enjoyment of property could now, in principal, be perceived as an ‘accident’, hence not a mere result of one’s genetically located position in society. Thus social space could be built in the image of the ‘impersonalized individual’; an abstractly-defined individuality, equipped with natural and unimpeded rights to property, could become the expression of both the private and public powers. Property per se, rather than a politically given communal duty, could become the basis of social existence and political equality.

Geopolitical pressures generated by capitalist England had already made the ‘abstract individual’ the reference point for attempts at reform in pre-revolutionary France. However, it was not enclosure but the Revolution through which France could institutionalize the rights of the abstract individual. This, in turn, led to the contradictory assertion of capitalist property rights in a society where capitalist social relations were absent. The Jacobin ‘Terror’, not less radical than the English enclosures, provided a historically-specific solution to this uneasy modus vivendi. It recognized the abstract individual by conditioning his rights to his duties towards an abstract and idealized community, i.e. the nation. The nation, freed from the
particularisms of the pre-revolutionary period, thus turned into a substitute for the British mode of social relatedness. In this respect, the French invention of the ‘citizen-army’ and ‘public school’ developed as geo-institutional responses to and ideological/political substitutes for the ‘market’ in Britain. They were born of an attempt to engineer an alternative form of sociality in the course of substituting the ‘nation’ for British civil society.

France developed a specifically modern conception of community and rule as it sought to overcome its conditions of geopolitical backwardness. From this angle, ‘modernity’ was born neither as a derivation of capitalism nor a mere continuation of absolutism. The geopolitical coexistence and contestation between English capitalism and French absolutism throughout the early modern period eventually produced in France a historically novel combination of the two. The adaptation of the British impersonalized individual into France brought about the end of absolutism without leading to capitalism. The result was a novel yet still non-capitalist conception of property, rule and subjectivity that together lent Jacobin modernity its particular texture. The constitutions of the revolutionary period and then the Napoleonic Code continued to reflect this uncomfortable balance. While they repeatedly endorsed the inalienable character of propriété, such assurances never amounted to the subordination of public law to private law. In the common law world, it was indeed a rejection of the autonomy of public law that ‘has enabled control over the legality of executive action…to be maintained by the same institutions that administer the ordinary law of the land, and on the same basic principles of justice’ (Schwartz 1956: 252-3). The strict separation of public and private law in the Code Napoléon, by contrast, re-exposes the sharp dichotomy drawn between the rights of the propertied individual and his duties towards the nation.44 The Code, unsurprisingly, formulated the right to property in such a way that would benefit the ones who serve the

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44 Lewy goes as far as to argue that given various limitations on the right to property, the French propriété was ‘perhaps no ownership at all’ (Lewy 1956: 165).
nation. As a result, while ‘property owners all over the country drew comfort from [legal] assurances… smallholders practicing “Republican farming” drew more comfort than most’ (Jones 2012: 133).

Unable and unwilling to expropriate the peasantry, the French ruling class attempted to construct an alternative form of impersonal order and subjecthood to the British path to modernity. The results of the French adaptation of British civil society- citizen-army and public school- provided a blueprint for other modernization projects also. They demonstrated to the ancien regimes in Europe and beyond the geopolitical viability of an alternative mode of rationalization that ‘did not invoke the idiosyncrasies of British history as a prerequisite’ (Shilliam 2009: 54). By bypassing Britain’s capitalist transformation, France, however contradictorily, proved that dissolving particularistic corporate interests into an impersonalized collective could improve political unity and geopolitical competitiveness. By revolutionizing the social basis of the army and school, the French model of modernization ‘informed a new comparative standard against which other political authorities would be judged, and judge themselves, as “backward”’ (ibid:55). And it is a historical irony that the *model français* would not only substitute the British path but also ‘introduce the majority of the rest of the world to the modern life of impersonalized social relations’ (ibid:56).

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45 Consequently, the legal system ‘for much of the nineteenth century served actually to discourage remedial adjustments to property structures’ (Jones 2012: 133). In 1820, for example, of the nearly 80 percent of the population that lived in the countryside, almost 90 percent subsisted on five acres of land or less. Between 1826 and 1858 the number of small holders increased by 27 percent, and the level of subsistence farming increased by 50 percent during the century as a whole (Mooers 1991: 72).
Chapter 3

Modernity as Substitution: Disputing the Ottoman Path to Modernity

Having documented the differentiated developmental trajectories of Britain and France, in this chapter I will explore the significance of a non-capitalist Jacobin path to modernity for our understanding of the rise of multiple modernities. As argued above, the main tenets of Jacobinism emerged in competition with capitalist forms of rule, appropriation and mobilization. And in fact, it was the demonstration effect of this competition between, and the direct geopolitical threat generated by Britain and France, that compelled most European states to pursue a combined ‘capitalist-Jacobin project’. For example, as Robbie Shilliam has shown, Prussian elites set in train both projects concurrently: they took steps towards commodifying labor and land while invoking popular sovereignty by introducing the citizen-soldier as the new engine of the military machine (Shilliam 2009). The long-term result of this mutually conditioning course of development in the Prussian context was the gradual subordination of the Jacobin forms to the emerging capitalist market. Radical manifestations of popular rule, in the course of the 19th century, were by and large repressed and gradually incorporated into a constitutional framework of mass politics. By confining popular conceptions of nationhood and citizenship to a distinct ‘political’ sphere abstracted from the relations of exploitation and economic power, Prussian/German capitalism not only significantly watered down the Jacobin appeal of these concepts but also profoundly transformed them into antidotes for working class radicalism and internationalism (Eley 2002).

The chapter documents the rise, trajectory and eventual fall of a similar ‘combined’ capitalist-Jacobin project in the Ottoman Empire. It begins by examining a range of theoretical debates
on the transition to modernity and their linkages to the concepts of ‘bourgeois revolution’ and ‘uneven and combined development’. The two sections devoted to this theoretical discussion prepare the ground and set a framework for the historical narrative outlined thereafter. Sections three and four elaborate the social and geopolitical contexts behind the transformation of European absolutism, within which I situate the specific problem of the early modern Ottoman Empire. I explore the reasons for the Ottomans’ comparative ‘backwardness’ and their reform attempts in the face of rival projects of modernization. In the remainder of this chapter, I turn to discuss the Ottoman path to modernity, a brief summary of which is as follows.

Compelled by a series of geopolitical failures outside and faced by the threat of partition inside, the Ottoman ruling classes, from the 1840s onward, began to selectively import socio-legal forms connected to capitalism and Jacobinism. Both projects presupposed the dissolution of politico-cultural privileges and obligations that came to constitute the Ottoman moral economy. By implication, capitalism and Jacobinism equally inflicted on the Ottoman ruling classes the fear of violent reaction and foreign intervention. Both projects also strongly conditioned one another, repeatedly producing sociopolitical tensions in the first phase of the reform period known as the Tanzimat (1839-76). Forced to emulate simultaneously the fiscal base of capitalism and the geopolitical base of the Jacobin project, the Ottoman ruling classes had to continuously negotiate the rights of the propertied individual and the rights of the peasant-soldier. Reconciling the inherent tensions between property and subsistence emerged as a task of pivotal importance and constituted the underlying logic of the first period of Ottoman reforms.
The project of reinforcing Ottoman political unity and strengthening its fiscal base by way of introducing capitalist social relations reached a deadlock towards the 1870s. Propertied classes were reluctant to pay tax, and their ‘inviolable’ right to property became socially and geopolitically too risky for the state elite to press any further. As the first period of Ottoman experimentation with the relations of market society came to an end, the Ottoman central elite increasingly turned to the Jacobin project to foster political unity and geopolitical mobilization. ‘Military service’ and ‘public education’, not the market, were instituted as the ultimate means to acquire political and economic rights. Social reproduction, in other words, was increasingly detached from the market and linked to individuals’ contribution to the welfare and survival of the ‘nation’. Political and geopolitical utility for the state and the ‘nation’, instead of market competition, provided the subject with access to property, means of subsistence and civic status. As such, the ‘nation’ emerged as an alternative frame of reference according to which surplus appropriation and redistribution was organized. The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 consolidated this trend, leading to the progressive popularization, militarization and Turkification of the rules of reproduction and the institutionalization of a form of private property with new communitarian embellishments.

My overall argument is that the cumulative result of the 80-years-long Ottoman experience with modern social forms and values resulted in the emergence of a novel project of modernity: a modernity that not only substituted the relations of market society with the Jacobin model, but also repeatedly recombined the latter with the resources of an Ottoman-Islamic milieu. In other words, the Ottoman reformulation of modernity resulted in a historically specific Jacobinism that combined and bypassed capitalism based on an alternative form of property and sociality.
Clearly, the interpretation offered here counters some of the most common assumptions of the Marxian approaches to Ottoman/Turkish modernisation. In these accounts, capitalism is almost unanimously presumed to be there starting from the nineteenth century, based on the intensification of commercial relations with capitalist Europe. Capitalism, albeit in a ‘peripheral’ or ‘underdeveloped’ form, is assumed to develop merely by virtue of the commercial ties linking the Empire to the capitalist ‘world-system’.\(^{46}\) What is overlooked by these Braudelian/Wallerstenian interpretations is that integration into and production for the world market does not of itself necessarily lead to capitalism. Based on the relative strength of contending classes and broader geo-territorial configuration of power relations, commercial expansion may engender outcomes other than capitalism. Furthermore, the bourgeoisie cannot be taken for granted as the pioneer of capitalism; which would otherwise read capitalism back in history. To reiterate, the conception of capitalism advanced here has much less to do with commerce and commercial actors per se and much more with the political constitution of a specific type of class society, i.e. a society in which direct producers are systematically deprived of non-market access to the means of reproduction, especially land. Without socio-legal changes inducing and forcing the market as the main source of subsistence, one can not assume the rise of capitalist rationality. Thus, while providing an alternative explanation of the Ottoman road to modernity, this chapter will also discuss and try to overcome the limitations of the Marxian approaches to Ottoman history.

\(^{46}\) A large group of scholars who have written extensively on Turkey from world-systems theory (WST) and dependency-theory perspectives have especially employed this conception. See İslamoğlu and Keyder 1977; Kasaba 1988; Berberoglu 1982. For more nuanced approaches operating within the general parameters of world-systems and dependency theories, see Keyder 1987; Pamuk 1987.
From ‘Bourgeois Revolution’ to ‘Uneven and Combined Development’: Transitions to Modernity and Varieties of the Bourgeois Paradigm

A long way has been travelled since ‘revisionist’ historiography rendered utterly indefensible the old Marxist interpretations of bourgeois revolution. As such, after the revisionist turn, even the most paradigmatic case of bourgeois revolution –France– seems to have lost its paradigmatic status (e.g. Furet 1981; Lucas 1973). That is, the weight of historical evidence not only effectively rules out the image of an ascendant and conscious capitalist bourgeoisie in pre-revolutionary France, but also postpones its arrival until well into the 19th century. Viewed in this light, the most ‘classical’ case of transition to modernity seems to have massively deviated from what was previously held to be the ‘norm’. That said, however, in de-emphasizing the capitalist character of bourgeois revolutions, revisionist readings have tended to negate the material basis of revolutionary quarrels all together in favor of purely ‘political’ or ‘cultural’ interpretations (e.g. Sewell 1985). Marxism has responded to the revisionist challenge by developing its own brand of revisionism that criticizes earlier historical materialist models of bourgeois revolution for uncritically appropriating the taxonomies of 19th century liberal historiography (Comninell 1987: 86; Wood 1991: 3-4).

Either way, given that the French Revolution has long served as a template by which other paths to modernity are compared, rethinking the French ‘path’ may have paradigmatic implications for and lead to a deeper understanding of the social content, tempo and multi-linearity of world historical development. In other words, rethinking the French Revolution’s relation to the transition to capitalism and modernity makes an imperative to critically reconsider the foundational concepts and assumptions of all (comparative) social theory.

47 As Furet notes: ‘[t]he unbridled capitalism whose force the Revolution is supposed to have freed’ appears to have taken ‘quite a while to “take off”’. In the rural areas, ‘it was checked, even more effectively than before, by the growth of very small-scale ownership’. Nor in the urban areas ‘are there any signs that the Revolution brought a rapid development of capitalism’. Nor ‘the decision to send French peasants on a vast military spree all over Europe…seems to have been dictated by a bourgeois calculation of economic rationality’ (Furet 1981:119-20).
debate on the social nature of ‘bourgeois revolutions’, therefore, is not merely a ‘historiographical’ one, but concerns social theory as a whole. Let me examine this more closely.

Consider for a moment Perry Anderson’s initial formulation and subsequent amendment of the concept of ‘bourgeois revolution’. In the Lineages of the Absolutist State, Anderson associates the variegated routes to modernity across Europe with the level of development of bourgeois classes, which he, in turn, links to variations in timing and the socio-spatial antecedents of capitalist development. In this explanatory framework, it is no surprise that France, the home of the most revolutionary bourgeoisie, witnesses the full transition to modernity, thereby becoming the paradigm according to which other ‘transitions’ are judged. In the French mirror, for example, England represents the ‘least pure’ transition. For, English capitalism, contends Anderson, first arose in the countryside and under the sponsorship of a landed aristocracy. The antagonism between the nobility and the bourgeoisie therefore remained relatively less pronounced; hence the ‘incompleteness’ of the English revolution and the bourgeoisie’s unwillingness to fully modernize the monarchic state and its aristocratic culture. Worse still, no bourgeois revolutionary route to modernity took place in Eastern Europe, for the Romano-Germanic legacy that gave birth to feudalism, absolutism and then capitalism in the West, had never fully taken root in the East. Given the relative absence of endogenous sources of capitalist development and the weakness of bourgeois classes, modern social forms could develop in the East only under ‘an accelerating military pressure from the more advanced West’, hence their externally-induced and retarded transitions to modernity (Anderson 1974: 428-31).
Most notably, Anderson’s initial formulation of the concept of bourgeois revolution is pregnant with two immediate problems: the problematic use of the French Revolution as an idealized model; and the depiction of the rise of capitalism in Western Europe as essentially an internally-rooted and endogenous process. In his later work, Anderson attempts to repair these misconceptions by deflating the significance of the French case and pronouncing all bourgeois revolutions as ‘bastard births’:

‘none of the great turbulences of the transition to modernity has ever conformed to the simple schema of [bourgeois revolution]…The porous pattern of feudalism above, the unpredictable presence of exploited classes below, the mixed disposition of the bourgeoisie within, the competitive pressure of rival states without, were bound to defeat this expectation. In that sense one could say that it was in the nature of bourgeois revolutions to be denatured: these transformations could never have been the linear product of a single class subject’ (Anderson 1992:112-3).

Anderson therefore concedes the existence of factors that complicated the bourgeoisie’s rise to power, such as geopolitics, lower-class reactions and so on. What he previously regarded as ‘deviations’ thus turn out to be the rule. Yet, no matter how ‘bastardized’ the transitions to modernity are, another implicit and perhaps more serious problem lurks behind Anderson’s narrative of modern transitions. While acknowledging myriad spatial and temporal factors complicating the ‘rise’ of bourgeois classes, Anderson still pre-imputes the bourgeoisie as the transhistorical carrier of capitalism. Anderson uncritically equates the rise of the bourgeoisie to the rise of capitalist social relations, and then uses this ahistorical categorization to typify
diverging paths to modernization. As such, Anderson perceives any lack of advance towards modernity as stemming from the ‘bastardization’ of bourgeois classes and the resultant weakness of capitalist development. Consequently, Anderson’s narrative remains hamstrung by problems associated with what Ellen Meiksins Wood calls the ‘bourgeois paradigm’. He lumps capitalism and modernity together under the same transhistorical process of rationalization of bourgeois agency, the former simply being its economic component while the latter constituting its political/cultural aspect. The unqualified association of bourgeoisie with capitalism results in a form of social amnesia that fails to recognize that geopolitical rivalries and the reactions from below might compel/induce the bourgeoisie to generate modern, yet still non-capitalist forms of property and sociality. The likelihood of the rise of modern social forms as an alternative to, and in substitution of capitalism is thus obscured by a pre-given process of capitalist development.

If Anderson paralyzes modernity by an overdose of a priori logic of capitalist development, so too does the theory of ‘uneven and combined development’ (UCD). Notwithstanding the debate on whether or not the theory is applicable to the pre-capitalist period, several scholars have utilized UCD in relation to the transition to modernity and in order to foster an alternative reading to the old Marxist interpretations of bourgeois revolution. Neil Davidson, for example, like Anderson, acknowledges that depending on a variety of conditioning factors (e.g. the timing of and the stage in the transition to capitalism, the geopolitical context, the weakness/strength of the political apparatus and the outcome of class struggles), transitions to modernity took different forms. More specifically, spatially ‘uneven’ development of capitalist social relations generated geopolitical pressures on ‘backward’ ruling classes, forcing them to ‘combine’ old social forms with novel capitalist ones. These internally-contradictory and internationally-conditioned ‘combined’ forms, in turn, mark the historical
specificity of modernity at home and change the conditions of transition to modernity elsewhere (Davidson 2012: 508-9). From this perspective, then, it was natural that in France what produced and what was produced by the bourgeois revolution was not a clear-cut ascendant capitalism, but a ‘combined’ form. The Revolution marked and was marked by the subterraneous and contradictory development of capitalist social relations inside and propelled by geopolitical struggles from outside, which explains the relative weakness of capitalist agency during the Revolution and the protracted unleashing of capitalist social relations in the post-revolutionary period (Davidson 2012: 529). Moreover, the ‘combined’ nature of capitalist development was much more strongly pronounced in ‘peripheral’ areas such as Italy, Japan, Mexico and Turkey; for their delayed and geopolitically more precarious transitions to modernity had to be carried out as ‘bourgeois revolutions from above’ or ‘the passive revolution of capital’, i.e. in the relative absence of bourgeois classes, state elites themselves had to constitute political forms that suited the organization of capitalism without the revolutionary overthrow of existing social forms (Allinson and Anievas 2010: 473; Morton 2007: 610).

Despite all the factors that are said to have contributed to the diversity of ‘combined’ paths to bourgeois modernity, UCD continues to reproduce the bourgeois paradigm with a mere temporal and geopolitical twist. For, in the framework of UCD, bourgeois revolutions, however imperfectly and belatedly, from above and otherwise, are still construed as necessarily leading to the consolidation of an ‘autonomous centre of capitalist accumulation’ and the reorganization of social relations within new forms of capitalist order (Callinicos 1982: 110; Davidson 2012: 479; Morton 2011: 46). What bourgeois revolutions facilitated, then, was nothing but ‘capital insert[ing] itself into…an uneven developmental process, gradually gaining mastery over it’ or ‘assimilations to modernity’ through ‘processes of
primitive accumulation’. To put it differently, based on the social amalgamations produced by bourgeois revolutions, capitalism ‘united the world into a single causally-integrated, but internally-differentiated, ontological whole’ (Allinson and Anievas 2010: 473; Morton 2007: 607).

The result is that UCD surrenders to a form of historical hypermetropia that conflates the immediate agents, intentions and outcomes of ‘bourgeois’ revolutions with their long-term, indirect and and initially unforeseeable consequences. What prevails is a ‘consequentialist’ mode of explanation that allows social agents to act only in the shadow of a distant capitalist future (Teschke 2005: 5-6). Despite duly emphasizing the significance of inter-societal relations in bringing about social change, UCD leaves the ahistorical association of bourgeoisie, capitalism and modernity totally unscratched. This, in turn, causes perhaps one of the most innovative periods in French history, i.e. ‘the Jacobin phase of the French Revolution’, to be labelled as ‘proto-capitalist’ (Rosenberg 2007: 478). The Jacobin construction of modern social forms in contestation, but not as derivations of capitalism, such as the nation, the nation-state and secularism, pales in this ‘grand narrative’ of the rise of capitalism (cf. Shilliam 2009). The instrumentalization of revolutionary agency eventually leads UCD to obscure the heterogeneity of world historical development. Contrary to their self-proclaimed anti-unilinear conception of world history, the proponents of UCD concede heterogeneity only within an overarching and all-absorbing conception of capitalism.

The bourgeois paradigm inevitably narrates a history in which capital unfolds as a supra-sociological entity, which fundamentally obscures the processual, contested and spatially interactive experience of modernity. The possibility of substituting historically novel ‘modern’ social forms for capitalism is ruled out from the very beginning. The multiplicity of
geopolitically induced and socially mediated responses to the rise of capitalist social relations, i.e. the emergence of ‘multiple modernities’, is thus forcefully assimilated into a simplistic account of the varieties of capitalism.

**Capitalism as ‘Market-Dependence’ and Modernity as ‘Substitution’**

In sum, the conceptions of bourgeois revolution surveyed above share a teleological view of social change. Capitalism is considered to be a natural trait of the bourgeoisie, which, however imperfectly and belatedly, assumes its transhistorical role whenever ‘conditions’ are ripe. Of course, the ‘conditions’ vary: for trade-oriented explanations of capitalist development (the commercialization model), the question as to how capitalism arose is explained through the circular logic of the bourgeoisie and commerce. The expansion of commerce becomes the cause of the rise of the bourgeoisie and capitalism, and *vice versa*. In most historical materialist explanations, however, emphasis shifts from trade to commodity production and wage-labour as the pre-condition to the rise of the bourgeoisie and capitalism *proper*, i.e. capitalism-in-production. It is rightly contended that commerce by itself cannot explain the emergence of capitalist social relations; therefore the dispossession of the peasantry and the emergence of wage-labour have to be taken as the starting point of capitalism (e.g. Davidson 2012: 418; Morton 2011: 43-4).

Obviously the struggle-ridden emergence of ‘wage-labour’ appears to be a crucial fix to the circularity of the commercialization model, yet one burning question still remains: What guarantees that the bourgeoisie employs wage-labour, invests in production and generalizes commodity production? More accurately, what makes sure that appropriating classes produce ‘capital’, i.e. what enables and forces them to increase ‘the ratio of unpaid labor to paid’ and to shape the space and scale of production according to nothing else, but the requirements of profitability and competitiveness? While others remain silent on this point, Davidson
explicitly links it to ‘human nature’: People ‘can develop such a propensity under certain conditions and without compulsion’ (2012: 423). There is a grain of truth in this formulation. Human beings may indeed choose to specialize and improve the means of production, re-orienting their material existence according the dictates of competitive production. It would be rational for them to do so especially when the opportunity cost of staying outside the market is repeatedly higher than becoming dependent on the market. In other words, a structured opportunity space, partly rooted in the producers’ increasing inability to meet the historically and socially acceptable levels of subsistence, can indeed enable and force the producer to generalize and systematize commodity production. That said, however, Davidson’s formulation of market participation, by and large, rests on opportunity per se. He tends to suggest that in a pre-capitalist agricultural setting a small stratum of peasants, following the market signals, can rise as capitalist farmers and transform the countryside along capitalist lines (ibid:523-529) and considers sufficient the mere existence of a dispossessed population to encourage bourgeois classes to seek for ‘opportunities’ for investment (ibid: 416).

In the presence of peasant possession of land and in the absence of stable sources of food and credit supply, most units of production would prioritize production for subsistence over production for the market. Considering the peasants’ non-market access to land, the so-called proto-capitalist peasants, even if they obtain ‘a greater share of the market at the expense of their less-well-off counterparts’, would not be able to change the peasants’

48 For a critique of Davidson, see Dimmock 2014: chp.8.
49 ‘Given the low level of agricultural productivity…. food constituted so large a part of total consumption [and] the uncertainty of the food market brought with it highly uncertain markets for other commercial crops…It was therefore sensible for the peasants to avoid dependence upon the market - above all dependence upon purchases of subsistence goods, but also to avoid dependence upon sales of commercial crops…This does not mean that they failed to use the market, but simply that they tended to market only physical surpluses….therefore] under pre-capitalist conditions, peasants would likely have sought to avoid specialization and dependence on exchange not only to avoid the specific risk of market failure in necessities, but more generally, in order to avoid becoming entirely subjected…to the dictates of the market and the whole transformation of life that transformation would have entailed’ (Brenner 1989: 289).
subsistence-first strategy, nor would they be able to ‘put them out of business, appropriating their assets, and reducing them to the ranks of the proletariat’ (Brenner 2007: 87). Furthermore, even when there is a pool of dispossessed population, there are myriad risks associated with market competition that historically deterred big land owners and merchants from supervising and organizing the labor process, introducing labor-saving technology and so on. Increasing involvement in the production process is likely to lock appropriating classes into economic competition, thereby rendering them vulnerable to the ups and downs of the market. To remain free from competitive constraints is perfectly rational especially in the absence of ‘institutionalized markets’, i.e. institutions that induce and govern market competition by mobilizing land, labour, credit and other elements of the productive process (Polanyi 1957c: 240; Friedmann 1980:160). But even in the presence of relatively developed market institutions, more often than not propertied classes themselves have jeopardized the further development of market relations that would have subjected them to the pressures of international economic competition (Lacher and Germann 2012:117; Chaudry 1993: 264; Chibber 2005). With that said, Davidson eventually overlooks that producing ‘capital’ would fulfil social reproductive needs of propertied classes only in particular social and geopolitical settings, i.e. only when specific social and geopolitical circumstances make necessary and possible the institutions that systematically generalize commodity production as the rule of reproduction for propertied classes.

In short, to take ‘dispossession’ and ‘wage-labour’ as necessarily synonymous with capitalism can be sustained only by presuming the existence of a transhistorical capitalist agency.50 Furthermore, besides these theoretical pitfalls, the uncritical equation of capitalism to wage-

50 And unsurprisingly, construed in this way, the question of the transition to capitalism boils down to a ‘non-question’: Capitalism, it is argued, existed as a developmental tendency in ‘transitional’ forms all over the world that keeps unfolding or gets obstructed, depending on the relative availability of ‘free’ labor, strength of the state, etc. (Davidson 2012: 416-8).
labour leads to an inaccurate account of historical development. In England, for example, as I explained in chapter 1, dispossession of the peasantry had little to do with the origin of capitalism. Enclosures before the 1640s transformed the conditions of access to land, yet did not lead to an outright dispossession of the peasantry. Tenants remained in place for a long period of time yet without the customary rights that used to bind them to land. Therefore, peasants, dependent on market competition for their survival, progressively became capitalist farmers ‘before the widespread proletarianization of the workforce and as a precondition to it’ (Wood 1999: 176-7). Likewise, in what was to become the capitalist core of the United States, the closing off of access to free or inexpensive land, the imposition of heavy taxes and the enforcement of debt payment gradually subordinated Northern peasants to market competition on their own land. Although the conditions of access to land drastically changed, however, there was no immediate and insurmountable political pressure on peasant possession of land. For the labour-power requirements of capitalist industries, which grew over time partly as a response to the market demand generated by market-dependent farmers, were largely met by the liberalization of immigration laws, thereby it did not presuppose the immediate and forceful dispossession of farmers and sharecroppers (Post 2011; Friedmann 1978). In absolutist France, in contrast to England and the USA, despite some level of peasant dispossession, no systematic abolition of customary rights occurred. The French ruling classes remained divided on questions of property and rule; hence they were neither able nor willing to generate the relations of ‘market society’, which the Physiocrats so meticulously theorized (Comninel 1987; McNally 1989).

All this, however, is not to deny that capitalism leads to dispossession and wage-labour. Rather, the point simply is that neither is the possession of the means of production necessarily an immediate obstacle to the development, nor does the existence of wage labour
automatically mean the existence of capitalism. Indeed, Robert Brenner and Ellen Wood depart from such rather deterministic views of capitalist development by refusing to equate capitalism to wage-labour and to the existence of a ‘proto-capitalist’ bourgeoisie. In their conception, there can be no ‘transhistorical laws’ governing the path to capitalism, not only because of variations in social reactions, but also due to the changing inter-societal context of capitalist transformation. For ‘once breakthroughs to ongoing capitalist economic development took place in various regions’, as Brenner notes, ‘these irrevocably transformed the conditions and the character of the analogous processes, which were to occur subsequently elsewhere’ (Brenner 1985b: 322). With this proviso in mind, capitalism is better understood in terms of socially- and temporally-varying ways of organizing human relations and institutions that produce the historically specific impact of ‘market dependence’. Put differently, the transitions to capitalism did not follow a universal pattern, but all transitions, in principle, presuppose the elimination of non-market survival strategies, thereby the restructuring of human relations and social power in ways that ensure the systematic generalization of commodity production and imposition of the market as the main access to the means of self-reproduction (Wood 2002).

What underlies the emergence of the capitalist market, then, can not be market participation per se, but growing market dependence based on systemic, regular and continuous commodification of production and subsistence (Brenner 2007: 59). This implies that it is by and large the wider political and geopolitical context that makes necessary and possible the systemic penetration of commodity relations to the cycle of reproduction (Friedmann 1980: 160). For capitalist property relations to rise, then, certain socio-legal measures must ensure that both the surplus-extracted and surplus-receiving groups lose the ability to reproduce themselves outside commodity production and become dependent on the market (Post 2013:
The implication is that understanding capitalism as market dependence not only prevents the ‘bourgeois paradigm’ from obscuring the multiplicity of ways of establishing capitalist markets, but also allows enough room for historicizing different paths to modernity without presuming the existence and necessary development of capitalist social relations. In other words, once capitalism is defined as market dependence, we are able to recover the heterogeneity of world historical development and more clearly specify the interconnections and differences among multiple modernization projects. From this angle, the constitution of the ‘modern’ required the institutionalization of an ‘impersonalized’ political/public sphere, based on a reworking of the previously existing conceptions of the political, domestic and the religious. However, this reorganization did not necessarily bring about a loss of non-market access to the means of subsistence. Although the constitution of the modern state, territoriality and subjectivity had profound implications on subjects’ social reproduction, modernity did not necessarily involve the systematic commodification of land and labour. Rather, based on the balance of power among contending classes and states, alternative projects of

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51 A variety and combination of dissuasive and stimulating conditions and policies that secure the continuity, irreversibility and expansion of commodity production must therefore be in place for the generalization of commodity relations, for example the institutionalization of private property, monetization of taxation, closure of access to free land, relative mobility/disposability of labor power, extension of credit for the introduction of cash crops, provision of fertilizer and machinery, strategic compensation of risks related to market competition, stabilization of the conditions of food supply and so on. By inference, in a society which is becoming capitalist, survival of the unit of production increasingly depends on the unit’s ability to respond to changes in commodity prices/relative profits, which may, in principle, lead to specialization and the development of the productive forces. Institutionalization of commoditized reproduction, however, in no way suggests a blue print for capitalist ‘development’ and capitalist industrialization. Depending on past socio-institutional legacies and the timing and geopolitical context of capitalist transition, market dependence may or may not lead to ‘development’. For example, while it is possible to argue that in all pre-20th century transitions to capitalism, capitalist development was, at least partly, determined and fostered by states’ strategic promotion of market dependence in agriculture, in the post-World War II period, and especially since the 1970s, the development of capitalism in agriculture, thereby the resolution of the so-called ‘agrarian question’, seems to have lost some of its significance for the late-late experiments with capitalist industrialization (Bernstein 2011: 250-1). Today, in a world economy dominated by large multinational corporations with super intensive technological skills, the cost of new entry to the market and alleviation of capital shortages can hardly be handled by raising productivity in agriculture and transferring farmers’ surpluses to the industrial sector. While market dependence therefore continues to signify the minimum socio-legal prerequisites to the existence of capitalist social relations, its developmental promises barely hold today. In other words, today market imperatives regulate social reproduction almost worldwide, yet with no prospect of capitalist development (however limited, ecologically disastrous and socially inhumane that development may be) for an overwhelming majority of the world population (see Akram-Lodhi and Kay et al. 2008).
modernization were developed in order to match the economic and geopolitical impact of capitalist markets.

More concretely, the rise of industrial capitalism in Britain imposed hitherto unexperienced pressures on the continent for emulation, and yet at the same time led to the emergence of alternative models of rationalization. Classes, organized in and as the state, could develop novel political and intellectual responses to their conditions of backwardness without undermining the existing political hierarchies and social alliances that secured their sources of income and power. These projects comprised either the emulation or total substitution or selective importation of capitalist forms of sociality. And even in the latter case, i.e. when state elites selectively combined forms of capitalist sociality with pre-existent social relations and institutions, they might not simply generate peculiar capitalisms, as the proponents of UCD would have us believe. As already shown in the case of Jacobin and Napoleonic France, the result of attempting to generate British social forms was not necessarily the relations and institutions of ‘market society’, but alternative forms of rationalization, mobilization and appropriation. ‘Combined’ forms, in other words, were developed in competition with, but not necessarily as derivations of capitalism. And indeed, by innovating social forms that were originally absent in the British path to (capitalist) modernity, such as the nation, secularism and the citizen-soldier, the ‘combined’ projects not only successfully checked the expansion of capitalism (at least for a while), but also became models themselves to be emulated or selectively adapted by others.

By this reasoning, ‘the movement of modernity’ can neither be derived from any logic intrinsic to capitalism nor be reduced to the interaction of ‘multiple capitalisms’. Instead, it has to be thought of in the context of ‘the relationship between the advance of the challenge of
capitalist social relations and the substitution projects to escape backwardness’ (Shilliam 2009: 201). Modernity, in other words, cannot be equated to capitalism, but must be understood as the totality of attempts at emulating, selectively adapting or completely substituting capitalism (Lacher and Germann 2011: 114; Lacher forthcoming). All this implies that UCD, sterilized from teleological-functionalist assumptions, can still serve to reveal the geopolitically driven and ‘combined’ nature of the transitions to modernity. UCD may well illuminate the diachronic, mutually conditioning and ‘combined’ processes of modern state-formation if the consequentialism of its proponents is checked and rehabilitated. As such, UCD ceases to see multiple modernities as differentiated moments of subterraneously developing capitalisms, but as qualitatively different outcomes of competitive processes of class- and state-formation. In the remainder of this chapter, UCD will be used in this spirit.

**Uneven and Combined Development in Early Modern Europe**

If the developmental logic in post-feudal continental Europe was *not* characterized by the uneven and combined development of capitalism, it definitely signalled the uneven and combined development of new tributary/redistributive forms of rule and appropriation; most notably of absolutism (Lacher, forthcoming). The centuries-long assimilation and appropriation of extra-European resources, technologies and ideas, combined with the intensification of intra-European class and geopolitical struggles, set in motion from the 16th century onwards a set of competitive and mutually-conditioning processes of military innovation and political accumulation across continental Europe. Absolutism, in general, was a strategy to boost geopolitical competitiveness and to overcome peasant resistance based on ‘a qualitative advance in the…self-organization of the aristocracy’ (Brenner 1985b: 283). Therefore, it was both a response to the crisis and represented an advancement of existing patterns of ruling class reproduction across Europe.
Absolutist state-building took its ‘classical’ form in France, with the tax/office structure of the
monarchical state being turned into a relatively stable bulwark against the peasantry and the
unruly/rival lordly classes. And in contexts marked by different social-property and
geopolitical relations, absolutism took different forms in the West as well as in the East.\textsuperscript{52} For
example, in most of medieval Spain (except Catalonia), serfdom and banal lordship had never
developed to the level achieved by French lords. Spanish absolutism, therefore, signified less
a response to a peasantry rebelling against serfdom and more to the formation of an
aristocratic ‘partnership’ organized around colonial military objectives. Given the tapping of
unparalleled colonial wealth that endowed the state with unprecedented geopolitical power,
the Spanish ruling classes did not need to establish a firmly knitted intra-lordly collaboration.
Spanish state-building, as a result, tended to remain as a ‘looser’ aristocratic alliance
especially in comparison to France and England, which in the long run led to the erosion of
Spain’s imperial status and geopolitical competitiveness (Bush 1996: 221; Ruiz 1998: 60-1;

And if absolutism was highly variegated in the West, it became a quite different beast in
Eastern Europe. For one thing, the social fabric of most of medieval Eastern Europe, despite
needing to be nuanced in several contexts, was characterized by fairly different class
structures than the West. Indeed, no comparable institutionalization of peasants’ class power
had developed in village communities, as much of the colonization of agricultural land during
the late medieval period had taken place as a ‘landlord-led’ process, hence without the deeply-
rooted ‘traditions of peasant solidarity’ and ‘collaborative agricultural practice’ characteristic

\textsuperscript{52} Or absolutism did not take hold at all. In the Netherlands, Switzerland and Poland, for example, socio-spatial
relations were reconfigured along lines entirely different than absolutism.
1996: 205). Furthermore, the ‘frontier character’ of Eastern Europe, i.e. its geo-historical susceptibility to nomadic warriors and armed settlers, had rendered it relatively difficult to establish control over potential power holders. Taken together, at least until the early modern period, there was neither an implacable need to improve the lordly control over peasant communities, nor would the spatial setting permit the Eastern ruling classes to develop the kind of relatively more cohesive and vertically-integrated pattern of ruling class organization of their Western counterparts. Thus, no ‘secular adaptation into a relatively disciplined feudal hierarchy’ had occurred in medieval Eastern Europe, which was to lead the lordly classes to reorganize in historically-distinct absolutisms, especially once they encountered ‘the historical dangers of foreign conquest or peasant desertions’ (Anderson 1974: 223-4).

The latter point indicates that different forms of absolutism were not merely marked by distinct social lineages, but were also directly shaped by the temporal sequence and resultantly changing geopolitical context of absolutist state-making. Phrased differently, the socio-spatial specificities of absolutist state forms were, at least partly, constituted by the temporal order of their emergence (Anderson 1974: 10). Spain was the earliest absolutism that, largely empowered by its colonial possessions, stepped up the form of political accumulation (however imperfectly) from relatively decentralized to centralized tributary forms. Spanish military incursion into Europe, in turn, both conditioned and gradually petered out in the face of state-making elsewhere, especially with the rise of tax-office state in France (and the rise of capitalism in England). Likewise, absolutism in Eastern Europe was largely an attempt to absorb the pressures of competitive state-building, which was already being generalized in the West. Differently put, the prior development of absolutism in the West forced the emergence and shaped the manner of arrival of absolutism in Eastern Europe. For the Eastern European lords not only exploited the Western advances made in absolutist class
organization, but they also did so in historically-distinct social and inter-societal contexts (Brenner 1996: 274), i.e. without having to face strong peasant communities; without having to confront already present monarchical states that might have backed the peasantry; and under the geopolitical impact of their Eastern neighbours, most notably the Ottoman Empire.

The most significant outcome of these combined processes in Eastern Europe was the rise of ‘centralized systems of serfdom’ (Brenner 1996: 276). From the late 15\textsuperscript{th} century, Eastern lordly classes began to elevate the dynamic of political accumulation by organizing themselves in and as absolutist states. And at the heart of this newly acquired lordly unity was the systematic enserfment of the peasantry. Poland (1496), Prussia (1526-8), Austria (1539-64), Hungary (1608) and Russia (1649) enacted several orders and exercised draconian measures to break peasant resistance and prevent peasant flight, which eventually culminated in the imposition of servile status on the peasantry (Bush 1996: 205). Like serfdom in the medieval West, Eastern serfdom was based on tying the peasant to the lord, with no right to leave and subjection to various labour services. Yet, the difference between the ‘first’ and the ‘second’ serfdom lay in the degree of centralization of the latter: Serfs in Eastern Europe were defined as unfree not only ‘with respect to an individual lord and by virtue of their subjection to that particular lord, but \textit{per se}’. That peasants became serfs by definition, in turn, ‘cut off the ability of lords to compete with one another by using the grant of freedom’, thereby greatly facilitating lordly collaboration (Brenner 1996: 275). In Eastern Europe, therefore, out of the combined impact of social and geopolitical struggles emerged the particular social reproductive logic of \textit{late absolutism}: a historically specific mode of aristocratic collaboration based on the systematic and centralized enserfment of the peasantry.
The point is that just as the *prior* development of Western absolutism forced and conditioned the rise of *late* absolutism in the East by stabilizing and improving the conditions of aristocratic class power, the enserfment of the peasantry in the East dramatically advanced the geopolitical power of Eastern absolutisms, thereby indirectly forcing and conditioning the transformation of the Ottoman Empire in the early modern age. The Ottoman attempts at political centralization were thus characterized by a distinct temporality and a cumulatively hardening geopolitical space as well as a specific set of property relations. The particularity of Ottoman attempts at state-making, in other words, was both conditioned by and a response to the uneven and combined development of continental absolutism. The result was the formation of a *late-late* absolutism: a new mode of ruling class unity that sought to improve the conditions of revenue collection, thereby largely conforming to the rationale and tributary character of European absolutisms, yet still lagging behind them due to its distinct class lineage and spatio-temporal setting. Let me elaborate this.

**Explaining Ottoman Geopolitical Backwardness**

In many respects, the Ottoman expansion into Anatolia and the Balkans from the 14th to the 16th century had taken place as a ‘conservative’ process that sought to reconcile local conditions and classes with Ottoman institutions (İnalçık 1954: 103). Domestic ruling classes, if not eliminated during the conquest, were assimilated into the state and promised financial gain and stability. Deported from their original lands and continuously rotated in the empire, lesser nobilities were absorbed into the *dirlik* system, a system of non-hereditary fiscal-grants that systematized the transfer of imperial revenue to individuals in exchange for administrative/military service. Most upper nobilities, likewise, turned into imperial bureaucrats, in exchange for lucrative *dirlik* holdings and even private property. Two implications followed from this upward displacement of ruling class power. First, peasant populations, whose modes of life were historically marked by age-old customs of village
solidarity, self-rule and semi-nomadism, were restored hereditary usufruct rights and were no longer subject to direct lordly power. No matter the source of their entitlement to surplus (tax or rent), surplus-receiving groups were not able to determine the level and conditions of appropriation. Second, given that property holders lost their direct political/juridical power over the peasantry, the question of who owned the land became increasingly irrelevant over time. Successful intra-elite competition depended on neither institutionalization of nor investment in landed property. ‘The most important issue was who controlled the land and its revenues’ (Imber 2012: 53).

Hereditary usufruct rights and relatively non-institutionalized forms of property thus constituted the main pillars of the classical Ottoman property regime. This, in turn, decisively marked the way in which the Ottoman Empire responded to the geopolitical challenges of the early modern period. The property relations organized as the Dirlik system came under increasing stress by the rise of absolutist regimes in Eastern Europe during the 17th and 18th centuries. It was especially the wars with Austria and Russia that revealed the growing military ineffectiveness of the timar-holding cavalry force, thus confronting the government with the problem of financing a centralized army of salaried soldiers. The central elite responded by farming out the taxes formerly absorbed by timar holders. The result was widespread sipahi rebellion and banditry in rural areas, which caused massive peasant flight and re-nomadization (Adanir 1989: 142-3). Given this social context, resettlement of the countryside and the establishment of tax-farming practices could hardly be achieved without conceding the independent status of the peasantry. Relatedly, the non-institutionalized forms of property rendered difficult the formation of stable ruling-class alliances, which could have united against the peasantry. Consequently, none of the new tax-farming methods
implemented during the 17th and the 18th centuries such as ciftlik and malikane could amount to the systematic expropriation of peasants’ customary rights (Keyder 1991: 10).

The persistence of hereditary usufruct rights, combined with the prevalence of relatively non-institutionalized forms of property, locked landholding classes back into a mode of competition that was conducive neither to the ‘improvement’ of property, nor to its institutionalization. Parallel to the network of patronage headed by the Sultan, the landholding classes established their own networks (households) to increase their leverage over the allocation of sources of revenue such as offices and tax-farms (Abou Al Haj 1991). In this new property-regime, then, controlling the sources of revenue by investing in political ties, rather than institutionalizing and investing in property, continued to be the most immediate precondition to the reproduction of landholding classes. Organized into households, tax-farmers developed a systematic interest in obtaining and accumulating distributive privileges in but not against the state. Resultantly, wealth and power did not translate into clearly defined and long-lasting rights. Competitive confiscation prevailed, rendering private wealth and power relatively precarious.

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53 Gocek describes this situation as follows: In the Ottoman Empire, ‘the loss of economic resources was less significant than the loss of social resources in terms of the long-range consequences…Once the post was lost, the official’s position became very precarious: he could not cut his expenses since he needed to retain a large household to keep his chances of attaining a post, and he also had to buy off favors and invest in social ties through gift exchange to maintain his candidacy for a post…This precariousness enhanced the competition for appointments and led office-households to invest more and more in developing their own social ties’ (1996: 59).

54 I don’t mean that there were no rebellions against the state. Indeed between 1600 and 1800, 7 out of 14 Sultans were deposed in consequence of ruling-class factionalism. But the point is that even when rebellions led to the execution of individual sultans, rebels did not much question the centrality of the state in appropriating peasant surpluses. Lacking political-legal autonomy, rebels did not seek to parcelize the state but to be re-integrated into it (Kafadar 1997: 40; Keyder 1991: 9-10; Darling 2006: 123; Barkey 2008: 212)

55 Yet this oft-cited rentier mentality of the land-holding elite, i.e. their unwillingness to invest in land, was not a peculiarly Ottoman phenomenon (Barkey 2008: 258; Adanir 1998: 258). Given the continuity of peasants’ customary rights, the rentier mentality had a good economic basis in France also (e.g. Parker 1996: 111; Brenner 1985b: 314), but with an important difference. In France the landholding classes had retained most of their medieval autonomy when they were integrated into the absolutist state structure. The intra-ruling class competition, therefore, continued to manifest itself as territorial/juridical struggles. Elite reproduction, as a result, depended on successful competition both in and against the state. Relatedly, the reproduction of landholders in France was much more linked to the ownership of property than in the Ottoman Empire. While
The relatively non-institutionalized nature of the property structure was firmly linked to the relative instability of cross-empire class alliances also. Particularly after the treaty of Karlowitz (1699), which decisively marked the Ottoman Empire’s passage from expanding to shrinking borders, new spatial arrangements were introduced in order to encourage investment in land and to better exploit the fiscal resources of the empire. This involved the systematic empowering and reliance on provincial notables as second tax-farmers. Better phrased, tax-farmers, most of whom were high-ranking military-religious bureaucrats and business elites based in Istanbul began to subcontract tax-farms to provincial notables (ayans) (Salzmann 2004). Ayans exercised substantial autonomy, assumed important administrative/military functions and were involved in commercial agriculture. And yet, as both ciftliks and malikanes continued to operate based on small family farms, ayans eventually faced chronic shortages of labour, which cut short their interest in agricultural production (Inalcik 1991: 27; Gerber 1987: 56-7). Moreover, without tax-farming privileges authorized by the central elite, they could exercise little power over the peasantry (Islamoglu-Inan 1991: 75-6; Pamuk 2004: 246). Therefore, ‘it was not from the control of the land, or more directly, of the peasantry, that the ayans derived their power’ (Keyder 1987:16). In other words, the ayans’ power did not stem from their ownership of land or their control of and investment in the production processes. They sought to reproduce themselves without changing the customary conditions of surplus appropriation and inter-ruling class competition. The ayan, just as the primary tax-farmers, chose to establish households in order to control a greater portion of the state-extracted peasant surpluses and to prevent others from doing so. Thus the household logic of ruling-class competition was, by and large, exported from the centre to the periphery (Veinstein 1991: 52; Adanir 2006: 167; Khoury 2006: 154-5). The

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intra-elite struggles in France thus proved conducive to the institutionalization of property rights, in the Ottoman Empire they did not.
increasing householdization of intra-ruling class competition, in turn, further reinforced the relatively non-institutionalized character of property relations.

Two interrelated consequences ensued. First, already existing barriers to surplus appropriation, which emanated from the independent status of the peasantry, were further reinforced in the Ottoman Empire by the presence of a landholding class whose social reproduction was not directly linked to the ownership of property. Second, the non-institutionalized forms of property rendered difficult the formation of stable ruling-class alliances that could have more successfully squeezed and more strategically utilized peasant surpluses. Without clearly defined and long-lasting rights over land, no enduring compromise could be reached between the central elite and provincial notables, which could have united them against the peasantry. And without a relatively stable ruling-class pact that could massively boost the appropriation of peasant surpluses (either by super-squeezing the peasantry as in France or by enserfing them as in Russia), the central elite could hardly augment their extractive powers and reintegrate notables into a single regulative framework of appropriation. As a result, Ottoman geopolitical competitiveness gradually declined during the early modern period, which rendered progressively more difficult and necessary the ‘reform’ of existing forms of rule and property.

‘Reform’ was a dangerous affair for several reasons. For one thing, central elites and provincial notables had formed their own military retinues and planted their own agents in the administrative structure, which forced the sultan to ‘moderate between households and tamper with his absolute authority’ (Barkey 2008: 208). Perhaps more importantly, successful household competition had increasingly become dependent on the ability to form alliances

56 For a comparative evaluation of Ottoman fiscal power, see Karaman and Pamuk 2010.
with groups that occupied lower positions in the Ottoman moral economy. Among these the most formidable, well organized and populous were the Janissaries. Given the fiscal strains of the late 16\textsuperscript{th} century, Janissaries, originally servile soldiers, had acquired the right to enrol their sons in the corps and engage in extra-military occupations such as crafts and trades. Meanwhile, the increasing manpower needs of the central government had been met by the recruitment of migrants, who had escaped taxation and banditry in the countryside and had become petty artisans (\textit{esnaf}) in urban centers (Kafadar 1981: 91; Gocek 1996: 90-1). In search of a steady government income, petty artisans entered the janissary regiments in large numbers, thereby opening wide the doors of the ruling-class establishment to ‘commoners’ (Tezcan 2010: 10; Mardin 1962: 139).\textsuperscript{57} The \textit{esnafization} of janissaries and the \textit{janissarization} of artisans, yoked together, created a large group of \textit{artisan-soldiers}, who played a key role in the struggle among household factions and in voicing discontent against the sultan (Mardin 2006: 33; Berkes 1964: 60-1).

To alleviate the insecurities stemming from the relatively non-institutionalized nature of ruling-class competition, households thus had to bring janissaries and the urban poor to the centre of Ottoman political life. This further pre-empted the possibility of a stable and long-term ruling-class alliance from being formed under new geopolitical exigencies. Artisan-soldiers became the bulwark and perpetuated the household logic of the Ottoman ancien regime. They successfully frustrated the efforts to reform the fiscal and military system and often removed ‘too reformist’ Sultans and their allies from power. Altogether, nine major revolts broke out in Istanbul from 1622 to 1730, preventing the vertical reorganization of the polity by way of an Ottoman absolutism. After each revolt, the extra taxes imposed on artisans and the allied households were withdrawn, janissaries were granted concessions and

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{57} Typical janissary occupations in civil life were bath-attendant (tellak), itinerant buyer of junk (eskici), fruit seller (manav) and coffee shop keeper (kahveci).}
coronation bonuses and thousands of new artisans and household members were placed into military and administrative positions (Barkey 2008: 216).

All this came with predictable damage to the state treasury. Although the new tax-farming methods had led to an economic upturn in the first half of the 18th century, enabling the Ottomans to recapture some of the areas that had been lost in 1699, ruling-class factionalism and the rise of janissaries in the capital rendered fiscal and military reforms practically impossible. Consequently, according to one estimate, central elites and provincial notables engaged in tax-farming, diverted from the state more than two-thirds of net tax revenue (Darling 2006: 129). Furthermore, they sheltered private wealth from taxation and confiscation by establishing family endowments (vakifs). Originally pious foundations customarily spared from confiscation and exempted from certain state taxes in exchange for the provision of educational and social services, vakifs turned into the main avenue for privatizing tax revenues (Findley 2006: 75). At the end of the 18th century, vakifs, controlled by military officers, religious office holders and dervish brotherhoods, amounted to a third of the Ottoman state’s total revenue and took up between two-thirds and three-quarters of state land (Kuran 2001: 849; Barnes 1986: 83). In urban areas, especially in Istanbul, janissaries became the armed defenders of the urban poor and the connected elite households, which made the provisioning of the populace a major concern. For any interruption in the supply of goods, especially food, either due to lack of imports or stocking up by merchants, was likely to lead to government-changing riots (Kafadar 1986: 155-6; Salzmann 2004: 69). In this context, the ability to borrow was of utmost importance, which the Sultan could afford only by offering interest rates significantly higher than the rates in the European markets and by using, among other sources of revenue, the janissary pay certificates (esame) as collateral (Karaman and Pamuk 2010: 603ff; Kafadar 1981: 111; Aksan 2006: 98). Consequently, the
Sultan unintentionally provided further financial incentive for and broadened the social base of an anti-reformist party, which benefited from the continuity of the status quo.\textsuperscript{58}

In spite of the introduction of new socio-fiscal practices that indeed lent some degree of unity to the surplus receiving groups, Ottoman fiscal power was thus considerably limited by the rise of elite households and janissaries. From the 17\textsuperscript{th} to the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, as a result, the Ottomans neither fragmented into a ‘nobiliary anarchy’ (like Poland) nor could turn into a ‘centralized’ absolutism (like France, Russia and to a lesser extent Austria). The centrality of the state in surplus appropriation and redistribution was retained (however imperfectly), yet without major improvements in the self-organization of the surplus receiving groups. Tellingly, at a time when most of Europe underwent fiscal reforms characterized by major changes in agrarian relations, Ottoman central revenues remained almost unchanged (Karaman and Pamuk 2010: 594). Therefore, having missed out on the first round of fiscal and military reform, the Ottoman attempts at centralization from the 1760s would be not only compelled, but also strongly conditioned by the prior development of absolutism in Europe.

Clearly, the most immediate external factor conditioning imperial reform attempts was war. The southward contraction of Ottoman territories and the related war indemnity payments substantially reduced sources of revenue otherwise available for reform (Aksan 2006: 90; Hanioglu 2008: 22). Perhaps more enduringly, however, military defeats and diplomatic negotiations resulted in the yielding of extra-territorial privileges to European states, which led to the ‘internationalization of the empire’s inner tensions and confessional lines’ (Kafadar 1997: 46). That is, since the 16\textsuperscript{th} century the Ottomans had granted temporary trade privileges (known as capitulations) to some Western states in order to increase customs revenue, to form

\textsuperscript{58} According to one estimate 400 000 esames circulated by the end of the century, of which no more than 10 percent belonged to the janissaries.
political alliances and to exploit Western inter-dynastic cleavages. With the gradual loss of Ottoman geopolitical power, however, especially from the 1740s on, capitulations became a regular aspect of treaty negotiations, turning into permanent and far more comprehensive political liabilities (Eldem 2006: 319). One implication is that non-Muslim Ottoman merchants, hard-hit by the loss of Ottoman political leverage and excluded from *malikane* contracts, turned to the European powers to obtain privileges enjoyed by their European counterparts. By participating in Ottoman-European trade under foreign flags, minority merchants gained access to significantly lower trade dues, accumulated wealth in the space secured by foreign powers and were exempted from the tax that traditionally paid for the protection provided to the non-Muslim population (*cizye*). Eventually, the Ottoman reform attempts were debilitated not only due to large tax losses, but also became further complicated by the fact that the interests of Ottoman minorities became increasingly tied to the ability of foreign powers to claim representation and jurisdiction within the Ottoman state (Gocek 1996: 93-7).

In summary, obstacles to the absolutist reorganization of the Ottoman ruling-classes, stemming from the Ottomans’ distinct social lineage, were further amplified by the prior rise of absolutism in Europe. While janissarization of Ottoman political life made difficult the vertical reorganization of ruling-class households, the prior rise of absolutism in Europe led to the alienation of non-Muslim minorities, thereby putting further limitations on the feasibility of Ottoman reforms. This unsustainability of the existing order and the destructiveness of household competition were becoming increasingly clear to the Ottoman ruling elite from the 1770s onward. In particular, the two disastrous wars against Russia (1768-74, 1788-92) had revealed that geopolitical challenges could no longer be contained by traditional patterns of intra-elite negotiation and bargaining. Russians had deeply penetrated into Ottoman territories
south of the Danube, gained control over Crimea and Russian naval guns could now be heard from Istanbul. Defeat could no longer be confined to a distant battlefield, but began to threaten the whole body politic. Towards the end of the 18th century, thus, higher echelons of the ruling elite were becoming increasingly cognizant that even the mere importation of military tools and techniques required a radical overhaul of the traditional Ottoman system of governance (Aksan 2007: 167-70; Berkes 1964: 81). As centralization became progressively harder to attain, the Ottomans were compelled to resort to untraditional ways of rejuvenating the empire. It was at this juncture that the French Revolution erupted, the consequences of which were to frighten and inspire the generations of Ottoman reformers on how to transform the empire.

**French Revolution and Ottoman Late-Late Absolutism**

*My God! What kind of situation is this? Two of the barbers who shave me say that they are members of the artillery corps! If we call for soldiers, we are told 'What can we do? There are no salaried soldiers to go on campaign.' Let others be enrolled, we say, and we are told 'There is no money in the treasury.' If we say, there must be a remedy, we are told 'Now is not the time to interfere with the regiments'.*

Thus expressed Selim III (1789-1807) the need for and the difficulty of Ottoman military reform the year he was enthroned (quoted in Aksan 2007: 184). This frustration with the sorry state of the Ottoman military was often characterized by a sense of backwardness felt in the Sultan’s reformist circle in relation to their most formidable enemy: by ‘borrowing Frankish devices’, the reformers noted, ‘the Muscovite nation of inconsiderable animals has in thirty years reached the point of posing a danger to states five hundred or a thousand years old’ (quoted in Hanioglu 2008: 42). And yet, despite their admiration for the Russian army, the Sultan and his entourage were equally aware that the same Frankish ways led to unbearable socio-fiscal burdens in France, ultimately causing what they called the ‘rising of the rabble’, the Revolution. After the Revolution, France, according to pro-reform imperial bureaucrats, was ‘like the rumblings and crepitations of a queasy stomach’, poisoned by principles
consisting of ‘the abandonment of religion and the equality of rich and poor’. ‘In a manner without precedent’, Jacobins ‘have removed…the regard for retribution from the common people, made lawful all kinds of abominable deeds…and thus prepared the way for the reduction of the people of France to the state of cattle’ (Yesil 2007: 290; Lewis 1975: 66-71).

The fear and admiration felt towards Frankish methods was further aggravated in 1798 when a Napoleonic army of less than 30 000 soldiers swiftly invaded and ruled for three years the Ottoman territories of Egypt and the Ionian Islands. And indeed, after this brief period of direct geopolitical confrontation and hostility, ‘the voice of France, no longer shouting in Greek or Arabic, became more audible in Istanbul’ (Lewis 1975: 68-9).

The line between reform and revolution was thus frighteningly thin. But given the reform-or-perish circumstances and the fact that the violent overthrow of governments was already too familiar a feature of Ottoman political life, Selim III did not hesitate to re-initiate reform with greater determination than his predecessors. The first logical step in Selim’s reform program was establishing a new army alongside and as an alternative to the janissary regiments. He employed (mostly) French advisors and instructors to serve in military and naval colleges, which were established along the lines of French academies and where the medium of instruction was French (Hanioglu 2008: 44-6). Even this strictly ‘military’ experiment with reform, however, was to remain short-lived; its fate was sealed by the same limitations and reactions that had confronted earlier generations of reformers. With no restructuring of the janissary corps, no stable alliance with provincial notables and with no power to properly tax commercial activity, the new army remained underfunded, under-equipped and undertrained. And unsurprisingly, when Selim attempted to expropriate big tax-farms and abolish janissary paychecks to create extra revenue, the new army could not prevent the interests entrenched in
the janissary barracks, the court and the mosque from taking Selim’s life. Selim was dead, so was reform (Aksan 2007: 185, 262; Salzmann 2004: 183-5).

Despite being unsuccessful, however, the reform-party was gaining further support in the provinces. The latter half of the 18th century had witnessed the central elites’ growing dependence on the local notables as tax-farmers and suppliers of soldiers and food. Mobilization of fiscal resources and manpower desperately needed for war-making had created a stratum of semi-autonomous provincial power holders. The state was not always able to harness the allegiance and support of its provincial notables. Indeed some notables turned rebellious, posing severe challenges to the fiscal base and reform effort of the Ottoman state. And yet, with no strong legacy of politico-legal autonomy and with their tax-farming contracts threatened by unruly notables and the rise of Russian influence over the non-Muslim peasantries, the local elite in most Asian provinces and some European provinces remained loyal to the state (Khoury 2006: 135; Barkey 2008: 219; Shaw and Shaw 1977: 2). It is to this group of notables that the new Sultan, Mahmud II, turned to renegotiate existing forms of intra-elit solidarity and to obtain support against janissaries and unruly notables.

The harbinger of such ruling class collaboration was the Sened-i Ittifak, a charter of alliance signed between the Grand Vizier (himself a powerful ayan) and a group of provincial power holders that saved Mahmud from the janissaries and brought him to the throne. The agreement indicated an attempt to recover and regularize the intra-ruling class consensus achieved in the 16th century and lost thereafter. The mutuality of interests was recognized: local notables pledged to support the Sultan’s authority and treasury in times of war and rebellion. Ayans agreed not to interfere in each other’s zone of influence. The Sultan recognized the inheritability of ayans’ tax-farms and promised not to tax arbitrarily. Worth noting in this
context is that although the alliance was initiated and by and large imposed by provincial forces on the central elite, there was nothing in the alliance that might have signalled their unification against the peasantry. Quite the contrary, although they won generational security of tax-farming privileges and took an important step towards diminishing inter-ayan feuding, provincial notables also agreed to rule ‘justly’ and not to ‘oppress’ the peasantry. The reason for not stepping up peasant exploitation must be sought in the internationalization of class conflict. In particular, given the ongoing Ottoman-Russian War (1806-1812), notables exercised due caution not to instigate peasant revolt, which could have provoked further Russian aggression in the name of protecting the Ottomans’ Christian subjects (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 2; 14). In any event, the Sened-i Ittifak was bound to remain a defunct document. Two months after it was signed, janissaries revolted once again, killing the Grande Vizier and reinstalling the power of anti-reformist party.

Yet, the social and geopolitical considerations that gave the Sened-i Ittifak its specific texture remained in place, forecasting the character of absolutist restoration that was to take place between 1812 and 1839. The Ottoman-Russian war came to a sudden end in 1812: Bonaparte’s march towards Russia forced the czar to come to terms with Ottoman demands despite the weakness and initial defeat of the Sultanic armies. This gave Mahmud II breathing space and an opportunity to reverse the internal balance of power to his advantage. He was still very cautious towards the janissaries, but the new troops and weapons secured for the war with Russia could now be used to restructure the imperial periphery and strike a new centre-periphery alliance on the terms determined by the Sultan. The period of ‘Ottoman civil wars’ thus opened (Salzmann 2004: 187).
The reduction of provincial notables did not necessarily follow a violent pattern. In exchange for their subordination to stricter central control, many notables and their sons were granted official salaried positions or tax-farms and continued to exercise considerable regional power. When rewards fell short in convincing notables, as they often did, punishment followed. In consequence, many lesser notables in Anatolia and the Lower Balkans were, if not executed, integrated into a relatively centralized structure of rule and appropriation by 1820. And indeed, it was this remaking of state power in the provinces that enabled Mahmud to muster resources to finally abolish the Janissary corps in 1826. Despite these successes, however, suppression of notables in other parts of the empire, especially in Serbia, Greece and Egypt, proved impossible. In both Serbia and Greece, the struggle between the centralizing state and provincial notables turned into a mutually destructive process that caused massive peasant flight, brigandage and discontent. The result was the wide opening of both regions to Russian interventionism, which not only led to the (formal or informal) secession of Serbia and Greece from the empire, but also brought the Ottomans to the verge of virtual collapse. By 1829, Russian troops advanced into Northern Anatolia and the Southern Balkans, ultimately reaching the outskirts of Istanbul. The Sultan was to save Istanbul from invasion only when the British forced the Russians to sign a peace treaty and retreat to their fortresses on the Danube.

The lesson to be drawn from this two-decade long experiment with absolutism was clear: the threat of internal disorder strongly correlated with the threat of partition from outside (Hanioglu 2008: 69). The process of centralization was thus strongly mediated by geopolitical struggles and could be achieved only by maintaining a delicate balance of class forces. Having bitterly tested the limits of his absolutist rule, the Sultan had no option but to set in motion a pattern of vertical reorganization that regularized and backed the appropriative
privileges of the landholding elite, yet at the same time prevented their exploitation of the peasantry from destabilizing imperial rule. In other words, the constitution of Ottoman absolutism was strongly dependent on stepping up and stabilizing the conditions of peasant exploitation, while simultaneously checking the geopolitically risky consequences of this new framework of ruling-class cooperation. Peasant surpluses had to be extracted without leading to peasant revolts that could undermine the empire’s geopolitical position.

These considerations would be further compounded in the face of Egypt’s rebellious governor, Muhammed Ali. During her brief invasion, France had considerably weakened Egypt’s ruling and military elite. Thanks to this legacy, Muhammed Ali, the new Ottoman governor of post-French Egypt, was able to completely eliminate traditional notables and tax-farmers. This, in turn, opened the way for a series of radical reforms, ‘many of which built on the Napoleonic precedent, while others were aided directly by France, the governor’s only European ally’ (Keddie 1994: 142-3). Freed from traditional notables, Muhammed Ali launched an ambitious project of military and fiscal centralization almost twenty years before Mahmud II dared to destroy the janissaries. Besides programs of education, commercial agriculture, and industrialization, among Muhammed Ali’s French-inspired reforms the most ambitious one, which would generate grave consequences for his overlord in Istanbul, was universal conscription. Based on brutal measures aimed at breaking peasant resistance and preventing peasant flight, mass conscription in Egypt produced an army of well over 100 000 men during much of the 1820s-30s (Dunn 2009: 183; Fahmy 1998: 163). Emboldened by the successes of the new army in the Sudan, Hijaz and Greece in the 1820s, Muhammed Ali was confident enough in the 1830s to chase the Sultanic armies to within a few days march of Istanbul; such that only diplomatic struggles among the major European powers over the future of the Middle East was to stop Egyptian armies from invading the Ottoman capital.
Cairo thus set a new standard of geopolitical competition for the Ottomans, almost three decades before the Russians began to ‘free’ and ‘modernize’ their serf-based army. Muhammed Ali’s French-trained peasant soldiers became a source of inspiration and envy for the Ottoman elite, which hinted at the complication of agrarian relations in the Ottoman empire (Zurcher 1998: 80-1). For the state’s acute lack of manpower further entangled its reliance on and check of landholding class power over the peasantry. The state’s external reproduction was already highly dependent on its ability to mediate the relation between the peasantry and landholding classes, which, in the face of Egypt’s universal conscription, became even more crucial. With the burden of defense likely to fall on the peasantry as a whole, the peasants’ geopolitical role as soldiers became as equally important as their fiscal role as taxpayers. The implication being that the increasing geopolitical exploitation of peasant bodies would force the state to further mediate their economic and fiscal exploitation. The geopolitical reproduction of Ottoman late-late absolutism was therefore becoming increasingly dependent on the constitution of historically specific agrarian class relations. It was this geopolitical and class context that compelled the sultan and the central elite to selectively import the conceptual arsenal of the French Revolution into the Ottoman empire, which led to the emergence of novel conceptions of property, state and subjectivity (Berkes 1964: 84; Hanioglu 2008: 73).

The *Tanzimat, 1839-1876: Between Capitalism and Jacobinism*

*Civilization depends on the attainment of complete security for the life, property and honor...of each nation and people, that is to say, on the proper application of the necessary rights of liberty...[By contrast] tyrannical rule sows the seeds of enmity and reaps the harvest of revolution and anarchy...The reason for all the turmoil and revolution that have happened so far is uncontrolled inequality (mustakili adem-i musavat), i.e. the holders of wealth and power did not act with moderation or those in need were extremely stranded... in this regard a state can guard itself against the evil wrought by agitators only through just conduct.*
The introduction of liberal principles into the Ottoman Empire and the challenges that lay ahead were thus encapsulated by Sadik Rifat Pasha, one of the key figures in shaping state policies in the early reform era known as the Tanzimat (Lewis 1975: 132; Mardin 1962: 186-7; 2012: 160; Berkes 1964: 130-1). At first sight, Sadik Rifat’s ‘civilization’ seems to be premised on the image of a world order informed by fairly liberal assumptions: civilization, asserts the Pasha, is a ‘system’ in which the states maintain peaceful relations and respect equality between each other, and at the same time they provide their subjects ‘with the opportunity to reap to the fullest extent the fruit of their daily labor’ and ‘freely engage in the productive activities’. Only in such circumstances the subjects would promote the accumulation of wealth, which, he considers, is a precondition to the strengthening of the state (quoted in Mardin 1962: 180-1). Civilization is, then, predicated on the liberal assumption that all people, if freed from political and geopolitical constraints, would lead to the flourishing of the state as they pursue their selfish interests. Behind this liberal façade, however, also stands a vague conception of ‘justice’ through which Sadik Rifat seeks to contain the ‘uncontrolled inequalities’ entailed by ‘freedom’. For ‘excessive freedoms’ as well as ‘tyranny’ cause revolutions and turmoil, undermining the source of ‘the power and life’ of all states, i.e. ‘justice’ (ibid: 179, 188). Therefore, ‘[i]t is impossible for a country...[acting] contrary to law and reason and equity and justice to be settled and enduring’ (quoted in Darling 2013: 161). In Sadik Rifat’s understanding, then, ‘justice’ marked the anticipation that class and geopolitical balances would require the Ottoman political elite to pursue a highly ‘mediated’ route to modernity. Indeed ‘justice’ would guide the Ottomans in their quest for a non-revolutionary path to geopolitical rejuvenation, and in doing so it repeatedly conditioned the realization of liberal values to the fulfillment of communitarian duties.
The harbingers of such mediation were already in place towards the end of the 1830s. In the midst of the Egyptian crisis, the Ottomans signed a series of free trade agreements with Britain (1838-41) in order to secure the geopolitical and legal preconditions of their liberal project. By completely lifting state monopolies in foreign trade and reducing custom duties on exports, the central elite aimed to gain British support against Muhammed Ali, increase its control over contraband trade, and induce productive activity in the countryside (Pamuk 1987: 20; Ortayli 1998: 99,106-8). The Imperial Edict of 1839, likewise, sought to lay the geopolitical and legal foundations of a capitalist order. By promising to introduce laws guaranteeing life, equality and the property of all subjects, the Edict aimed to both pre-empt Russian claims over Ottoman minorities and to institutionalize the ‘free’ and ‘productive’ individuals of a liberal order. And yet, the Edict also took the critical Jacobin step towards linking the enjoyment of property to the fulfilment of duties towards an impersonalized collective: ‘A state certainly needs armies and other necessary services in order to preserve its land…[therefore] it is the inescapable duty of all the people to provide soldiers for the defense of the fatherland (vatan)’.

The Tanzimat attempted to emulate simultaneously the fiscal base of British capitalism and the geopolitical base of the Jacobin project. Both projects aimed to create a universal political subject with equal rights and obligations, thereby requiring the dissolution of hitherto existing politico-cultural privileges and obligations that constituted the Ottoman moral economy. Yet this entailed the dilemma that the proposed reforms could also undermine the status of the reformers themselves by giving rise to the ‘rabble’. The rights of the prospective individual, especially the tax-farmer, i.e. future propertied-class, therefore had to be defined in ways that were purified from ‘egoistic’ tendencies. A substitute route to modernity had to be invented,
in which property would be ‘freely’ enjoyed yet without causing ‘oppression’. As encoded in the Imperial Edict of 1839:

Every one shall possess his property of every kind and may dispose of it freely, without let or hindrance from any person whatsoever…This should not however amount to handing over the financial and political affairs of a country to the whim of an ordinary man and perhaps to the grasp of force and oppression, for if the tax-farmer is not of good character he will be interested only in his profit and will behave oppressively.

That said, it is not surprising that the Sultan had no problem with seeing the Tanzimat as ‘guaranteeing…the good order of the land’ and at the same time bringing ‘equal justice for all’ and ‘protecting the weak’ (Darling 2013: 162). At this juncture, it is important to note that Tanzimat was not a mere reformulation of the traditional conception of ‘justice’ that dictated a passive mutuality between the ruler and the ruled. By injecting into the Ottoman socioeconomic fabric the social reproductive logic of capitalism and Jacobinism concurrently, Tanzimat attempted to make both property owners and peasants active participants of and directly responsible for the reproduction of the body politic as a whole. Tanzimat ‘justice’, then, did not seek to resurrect old patterns of reciprocity, but justified and reacted to, and ultimately tried to reconcile these new forms of sociality within the context of pre-existent social relations.

The seemingly contradictory character of the Imperial Charter was reflected in the manner in which its promises were legislated and implemented. The first decade of Tanzimat, by and large, unfolded as political experimentation, which led to unexpected twists and turns in the
reform programme. Initially, the central elite introduced a centralized salary system for state officials and the members of the dynasty. Accordingly, they attempted to abolish tax-farms and to establish a fixed cultivation tax as the only tax on the produce of the land (Hanioglu 2008: 90; Shaw and Shaw 1977: 96). With their tax collecting privileges threatened, many provincial notables claimed to own the villages that fell under the areas in which they had been authorized to collect taxes. In other words, tax-farmers attempted to subsume peasant lands into their private estates by using the Tanzimat principles that secured private ownership. Likewise, the tax-farmers’ utilization of the Tanzimat for their own benefit was countered by peasants, who rebelled in many parts of the Empire by radicalizing the Tanzimat principles concerning equality (Aytekin 2012: 196; 2013: 315-8; Mardin 2006: 119). Peasants construed the Tanzimat as giving them land, relaxing tax demands (especially the poll-tax for non-Muslim peasants), saving them from tax-farmers’ ‘oppression’ and so on (Ortayli 1998: 120).

The question of who owned the land became even more complicated as the central state began to take concrete steps towards institutionalizing universal conscription. Especially with the enactment of the conscription law in 1846, military manpower ceased to be provided by provincial notables; and military service was now defined as an ‘individual’ duty. True, there were many exemptions from ‘universal’ levy, including non-Muslims and the members of the central elite and ulema. Yet what is remarkable is that for the first time in Ottoman history peasants, despite much draft evasion, began to enter the Ottoman body politic in an unmediated fashion, i.e. without the mediating role of semi-corporate bodies such as the sipahi or the ayan (Heinzelmann 2009: 108, 263-4; Yildiz 2009: 150). The mobilization of the lowest stratum was no longer based on the relations of a localized and personalized political community, but began to be understood within the framework of the universal rights and
duties of a new political subject (Besikci 2012: 95). Geopolitical reproduction of the ruling elite was therefore becoming dependent on the creation of a new political subject from the ranks of the rural poor, which would, in turn, qualitatively redefine the space of bargaining between the ruler and the ruled.

Conscription and the competing claims to land ownership eventually caused widespread, large scale and long-lasting peasant unrest in many parts of the empire, most notably in Bulgaria (1841-50, 1875-6), Northern Anatolia (1840s-1860s), Lebanon (1858-61), Palestine and Syria (1852-1864) and Bosnia (1850, 1874-5) (Aksan 2007: 416-31; Aytekin 2012, Qutaert 1994:877). Moreover, without the support and assistance of the provincial notables, tax collection utterly collapsed in the countryside, forcing the central elite to reinstitute tax-farming three years following its abolishment (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 96). The core danger anticipated by the Ottoman reformers, then, proved to be very real. Attempts at simultaneously creating the propertied-individual and the Jacobin-like political subject, both defined with universal freedom and equality, ended up corrupting the developmental and geopolitical promises of modern subjecthood. The process of formulating the Ottoman equivalent of the citizen-soldier and the propertied-individual, in other words, caused further popular disengagement from the reform project. The state could neither afford to alienate tax-farmers’ right to property, nor could it give them full support against the peasants’ demands for equality.

This uneasy modus vivendi could only be stabilized by the pursuit of a middle course between agrarian capitalism and social Jacobinism. Reformers were usually unwilling to restrain tax-farmers’ demand for land. For they were well aware that agricultural productivity, investment and increases in imperial revenues depended on individualizing property and lifting restraints
on the inheritability, size, sale and the use of private landholdings. Yet, in the meantime they were also ‘engaged in a continuous balancing act between the exigencies of a rule of justice (read absence of social strife) and a rule of property’ (Islamoglu 2000: 33-4). During the first half of the 19th century, such a balancing act included a number of protective measures\(^{59}\), and above all, the importation of Napoleonic inheritance laws, which prescribed partible inheritance regardless of the gender of heirs (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 96; Ortayli 1998: 216). Besides stipulating individual title to land in order to increase agricultural productivity, the Tanzimat thus simultaneously moved in the opposite direction by trying to secure the minimal subsistence for cultivators. For the requirements of geopolitical reproduction forced the state to take measures to maintain the generational security of the peasant holding as a unit of conscription. Furthermore, especially in regions where the struggle over land occurred between Christian cultivators and Muslim tax-farmers, any disruption of order could make the empire vulnerable to European intervention, which aggravated the reformers’ rather ‘dispassionate view of individual property rights’. In sum, during the first half of the 19th century, the Ottoman reformers’ utmost concern was to introduce private property without ‘allow[ing] disputes over property to be translated into political conflicts’ (Islamoglu 2000: 33-4).

Keeping ‘property’ politically sterile did not necessarily deliver a balanced fiscal sheet, however. Imperial revenues, albeit improved, were far from meeting the costs of military and administrative centralization. This situation further worsened in the face of the Crimean War. The war represented the next phase in the Eastern Question, which had been dormant since the end of the dispute over Egypt (1841). A conflict between France and Russia over the primacy of Catholic or Orthodox communities in Jerusalem escalated into a major inter-

\(^{59}\) According to Davison (1963: 501), there was also some Greek and Armenian emigration from independent Greece and Russia into the Ottoman dominions, ‘where they had found the demands of government less oppressive’.
European scramble for the Ottoman Empire (1853-6). The Ottomans eventually faced a tremendous fiscal burden: whereas the cost of Ottoman participation and maintenance of allied troops on Ottoman territory far exceeded Ottoman revenues, the allied victory against Russia brought no substantial benefits in return (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 97).

In response to these fiscal and geopolitical challenges, the Ottomans initiated another bold attempt with the declaration of a renewed Imperial Reform Edict in 1856. The Edict of 1856 expressed commitment to the realization and expanded the scope of the Ottoman combined project, i.e. it pledged to carry out reforms aiming to realize both the fiscal and military potentials, which British enclosure and French Jacobinism had unleashed, respectively. In contrast to the Edict of 1839, however, it reaffirmed the rights and duties of the free and equal individual, yet it did not express much concern for the ‘oppression’ of the peasantry:

The guarantees promised [by the Edict of 1839] to all the subjects of my Empire…for the security of their persons and property…are today confirmed and consolidated, and efficacious measures shall be taken in order that they may have their full and entire effect…Everything that can impede commerce or agriculture shall be abolished… Non-Muslim subjects shall, as well as Muslims, be subject to the obligations of the Law of Recruitment…it shall be lawful for foreigners to possess landed property in my dominions, conforming themselves to the laws as the native inhabitants.

The clearest manifestation of this promise of ‘property’ came with the Land Code of 1858. The Code, first and foremost, ruled out traditional revenue claims on and collective/village rights to land, thereby taking an important step towards privatizing and individualizing property (Mundy and Smith 2007: 46). Put differently, it ‘signified the separation of the
ownership claims from the former revenue and use claims, thus establishing [individual ownership] as the singular and absolute claim over land, only to be restrained by the taxation claims of the state’ (Islamoglu 2000: 29). This determination to institute property rights, however, went one step further than the laws issued in the 1840s, for the Code and two subsequent decrees issued in 1860 and 1869 allowed mortgage of land for payment of taxes and payment of debt to individuals. The Code, therefore, officially lifted restraints on dispossession of the peasantry by permitting the alienation of land in case of indebtedness (Güran 1998: 141-2). In addition, concomitantly with the Land Code, the Provincial Law of 1864 introduced the principle of representation for the propertied-classes: wealthy provincial notables gained some degree of legitimate voice in local affairs as the central state allowed them to send their representatives to newly-established provincial administrative councils. While the provincial law thus sought to reintegrate propertied-classes into a legal framework of appropriation and taxation, it also provided them with some political leverage over their peasant tenants (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 90-1, Kayali 1995: 266).

The new Ottoman Land Code did not amount to enclosure, nevertheless. Ongoing peasant unrest in the provinces and the threat of European intervention rendered impossible the full implementation of the Code (Quataert 1992: 214-5). What is more is that Russia, traumatized by its failure in Crimea, had embarked on a complete overhaul of its military-agrarian system from 1861 onwards based on the elimination of serfdom and the introduction of universal conscription (Aksan 2007: 437). The success of Prussia’s popular conscription against Austrian armies in 1866 also impacted the Ottoman perception of military reform (Cadirci 2008: 52; Aksan 2007: 478). Taken together, these forced the Ottomans to reconsider the social basis of their geopolitical reproduction, which ultimately led to two new initiatives: the Conscription Law and the Nationality Law, both promulgated in 1869. The Nationality Law...
aimed to connect all Ottoman subjects in a way unmediated by special community privileges, and to avoid interference from European states on the pretext of protecting Ottoman non-Muslim subjects (Üstel 2005: 26-7). And while the Law was a milestone in de-corporating Ottoman political life based on a common and equal Ottoman citizenship, the military reform reaffirmed the duty of all equal citizens to serve in the army. Although the conscription law continued to allow the obligation to be transmuted into cash, and the Non-Muslim reaction to it eventually remained insuperable due to the threat of foreign intervention, the military reform of 1869 marked a decisive expansion of popular conscription, especially among Anatolian Muslim peasants (Moreau 2010: 17).

All combined, towards the end of the 1860s the Ottoman ruling-classes seemed to have agreed that they would not be able to implement the Land Code without protecting from forced sale ‘the roof over the cultivator’s head and a basic amount of land required for survival’. They eventually sought to institute private property in many parts of the Empire without overriding peasants’ right to subsistence. The alienability and disposability of land was codified without allowing the seizure of the house and land of the cultivator against debt (Mundy and Smith 2007: 47; Islamoglu 2000: 33-39). Likewise, laws and decrees concerning conscription consistently specified that those who chose to buy their way out of military service had to pay the exemption tax without selling their plots of land (Heinzelmann 2009: 156; Shaw and Shaw 1977: 100; Zurcher 1998: 87). By preventing conscription from causing dispossession, the state therefore directly linked its external reproduction to the maintenance of peasant subsistence. Moreover, from 1869, all these socio-legal tendencies began to echo in the first Ottoman civil code, Mecelle. After having seriously considered the option of translating and directly adopting the Code Napoleon, the Ottomans eventually decided not to. Instead, they selectively borrowed French civil code and selectively codified Islamic law (Rubin 2011: 30-
1, 154-5). With regards to property rights, the result of this ‘combined’ civil code, just as the Napoleonic code, was the encoding of property law and the law of contracts within the terrain of and as only complementary to administrative law (Islamoglu 2000: 10).

Sharecroppers, Peasants and ‘Merchant Capital’: The Persistence of Non-Capitalist Forms of Social Labor

The overall implication is that in most Ottoman provinces the right to property could not triumph over the right to subsistence. Peasant smallholdings continued to be the dominant institution in agriculture while sharecropping arrangements prevailed on commercial estates (Güran 1992: 229-30; Pamuk 1987: 106,135; Ortayli 1998: 226-7). Considering the expansion of agricultural output from the 1840s onwards, the dominant view of Ottoman agrarian change tends to interpret the vast majority of agricultural producers as ‘petty commodity producers’. The criterion used for this categorization, in many ways, boils down to ‘production for the market’. Pamuk, for example, writes that the unequal relations between peasant and merchant that involve market processes are capitalist in form (Pamuk 1987: 86). From this angle, the intensive commercialization of Ottoman agriculture on the one hand and the central state’s endeavor to preserve peasant holdings on the other led to the expansion of smallholding peasants as petty commodity producers (Pamuk 1987: 185). Similarly, Keyder identifies ‘petty commodity production’ as one of the ways in which ‘merchant capital’ ‘introduces world market determinations into the pre-capitalist economy’ (Keyder 1981: 1).

The character of petty commodity production in the Ottoman context was shaped both by merchant capital that preferred to ‘expand its area of operation within existing social relations’ and ‘the redistributive pre-capitalist concerns of the Porte’, which together ‘conditioned and influenced the pattern of installation of commodity production’ in the form

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60 From 1840-60 to 1913 total agricultural production and exports increased in current prices approximately by 2 fold and 5 fold, respectively (Pamuk 1987: 83).
of peasant households (ibid: 1, 3; see also Keyder 1987: 43-4). In short, capitalism based on ‘petty commodity production’ seems to have taken root in the 19th century Ottoman Empire. Clearly, depending on the larger context of social reproduction the existence of small producers and sharecroppers may not necessarily signify the absence of capitalist social relations (e.g. Friedman 1980; Post 2011). For this, however, two conditions must be present. 

First, the reproduction of productive units organized as small family farms must increasingly depend upon commodity production. This requires the increasing elimination of non-market access to the means of subsistence, provision of credit, stabilization of food supply, building of irrigation networks, transport facilities and so on. Second, in a context of labor immobility, peasant production in sharecropping arrangements provides landowners with a low-cost option for securing harvest labor. And indeed, when the sharecropping unit is relatively big and the land/labor ratio is relatively high, one can expect fairly continuous involvement in commodity production. Despite extensive participation in the market, however, for sharecropping to be considered a capitalist form of social labor, the landlord and sharecropper, in principle, must be able and willing to organize the labor process according to the dictates of market competition. This, in turn, requires available land in a given area to be held under the monopoly of the landlord class. For, it is ultimately the landlord class’ monopoly on land and the resultant closure of access to free or inexpensive land that would force the sharecropper to be more willing to cooperate with the landlord, to increasingly specialize and fully engage in commodity production. Unless these conditions apply, and especially if land clearance is a viable option for the sharecropper, higher yields that could be produced by increased utilization of labor-saving tools and techniques would not only benefit the sharecropping landlord but would also help sharecroppers pay off their debts and become ‘independent’ peasants again. With no monopoly over land and no access to an alternative labor market, the sharecropping landlord would be more likely to choose not to invest in the
means of production that could otherwise cause him to lose his only source of labor (Bhaduri 1973). As such, sharecropping put definite limits on the transformation of the labor process, deterring the introduction of labor-saving techniques and the capitalist reorganization of production.

The problem to be solved is then twofold: how successful was the Ottoman state at reorienting the peasant strategy of production for subsistence toward that of production of commodities? How successful were the Ottoman merchants, usurers and landlords at changing the balance of power to the disadvantage of sharecropping peasants so that they would be able and willing to transform the labor process? Obviously, the character of sharecropping arrangements varied highly according to the sharecroppers’ relative position vis-à-vis the landowner and the state (Issawi 1980: 207-8). But from the 1870s onwards it was becoming increasingly clear to the Ottoman central elite that sharecropping provoked revolt, which, in fact, provided the social base for the nationalist movements that ended Ottoman control over many Balkan provinces (where ciftliks, hence sharecropping, were the most common) (Quataert 1994: 878-9). Combined with the increasing importance of the peasantry as soldiers, it does not require great foresight to predict that the Ottoman elites perceived their geopolitical reproduction as closely tied to the stability of smallholdings and the prevention of sharecropping’s destabilizing impact. It is thus not surprising to observe that regardless of the size of the landholding, throughout the empire the organization of production was left to peasant households (Keyder 1991: 12; Pamuk 2008: 389) and therefore ‘free cultivators accounted for most agricultural production and exports, even on the largest estates’ (Quataert 1994: 864).

Undoubtedly, the ‘freedom’ of the sharecropper should be approached with caution. While sharecropping ‘most often was based on a 50-50 division, with the sharecroppers usually
paying the taxes before dividing the produce’ (Quataert 1994: 863; Pamuk 1987: 93), the sharecroppers’ position depended highly on the socio-legal patterns of appropriation historically prevalent in a given region as well as the state’s willingness and ability to extend protection to the producer. For instance, in some parts of Kurdistan and Macedonia and in some Arab provinces, where the old timar pattern had never developed and where the Ottomans had never exercised effective rule, sharecropping often led to forms of social labor verging on serfdom (Quataert 1994: 866, 871). In either case, however, the productive role of the sharecropping merchant or landlord (sometimes the same person) was usually limited to the provision of land, credit and agricultural supplies and the dictation of crop-mix. Although overburdened by taxes, rents, debt and even labor services, the sharecropper began and completed the production cycle himself.

More importantly, ‘sharecropping result[ed] from a difficulty in continuing with independent farming, rather than from land unavailability’ (Keyder 1983: 132). That is to say, sharecropping was the result of a bad harvest, a drought, a disease, a wedding, the death of an oxen or a decrease in market prices, rather than the absence of available land. Eviction in case of default was rare, but even when a landlord evicted a sharecropper (which would definitely be a prize for some sharecroppers) the latter always had the option of accessing marginal lands owned by the state in exchange for taxes (ibid). No landlord/merchant monopoly on land therefore developed, which otherwise might have facilitated the subsumption of sharecropping peasants to capital. Consequently, the engrossment of commercial landholdings, which occurred partly as a response to rising world market prices (especially of cotton) and often to the detriment of small peasant holdings, did not lead to a qualitative transformation in the prevalent forms of exploitation. Landlords responded to market competition by increasing exploitation on the old basis. As such, sharecropping in the
Ottoman Empire remained inherently inimical to the development of productive forces, thereby representing a non-capitalist form of social labor.\textsuperscript{61}

All that said, however, it was not large estates, but tax-farming that ‘probably brought most Ottoman produce onto the domestic and foreign market’ (Qutaert 1994: 871).\textsuperscript{62} After all, peasant smallholdings prevailed in most areas as the basic unit of taxation and seem to have remained remarkably stable during the commercial boom and bust of the latter 19\textsuperscript{th} century. Indeed, of all cultivable land in 1859, 82 percent entailed smallholdings, with the average farm size somewhere between 6 and 8 hectares and roughly the same proportions applied in 1900 (Pamuk 1987: 91). In Anatolia the ‘majority of private plots were less than 5 hectares’ and ‘even such small plots were likely to be fragmented into tiny parcels of land in a number of different places around the village’ (Owen 1981: 208). In Western Anatolia, which was one of the most commercially oriented areas of the empire, the average size of a peasant landholding varied from 1.2 to 8 hectares (Issawi 1980: 203; Pamuk 1987: 100). Given the size of their land and the low levels of productivity, most peasants were extremely vulnerable to unfavorable weather conditions and taxation, which also rendered usury and peasant indebtedness a widespread and chronic phenomenon. Whatever was left after the tax collector and the usurer had taken their shares was hardly enough for subsistence. ‘The small producers

\textsuperscript{61} Only exception to the persistence of non-capitalist property relations seems to be the region of Cukurova. As elsewhere, in Cukurova, commercialization and the formation of large landholdings did not result from or result in dispossession of peasant producers and was largely based on sharecropping arrangements. Unlike other commercial regions, however, sharecropping seems to be accompanied by successful mobilization of labor-power. By the 1890s onward the Ottoman government accomplished a relative constancy and regularity in seasonal labor supply in Cukurova thanks to the forced settlement of nomadic tribes with no agricultural skills. This, in turn, must have encouraged sharecropping landlords (who were mainly non-Muslims with limited eligibility to acquire state office) to introduce labor-saving techniques and machinery into the labor process (Toksöz 2010:144, 173), thereby enabling them to break away from the technologically inhibitory nature of sharecropping arrangements. Given the increasing mobility of labor power and if everything had remained the same, sharecropping in the Cukurova region, therefore, could have been seen as a ‘transitional’ form, i.e. a form which permitted ‘a more or less direct transition to formally capitalist class relations and co-operative labour under the pressures of competition on the market’ (Brenner 1977:52ff). All that said, however, the trajectory of class and geopolitical struggles, and the consequent expulsion of non-Muslim landlord class after 1909, would enable sharecropping relations to prevail once again in the region until the 1950s (Keyder 1987: 138).

\textsuperscript{62} Despite several efforts to eliminate it throughout the century, tax-farming continued to account for ‘more than 95 \% of all tithe revenues collected even in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century’ (Quataert 1994: 855).
frequently had to struggle to survive from one year to the next’, with no prospect of ‘capital improvements in land and implements’ (Pamuk 1987: 89).

If access to land had been mediated through the market and had cheap credit been sufficiently provided, the combined pressure of taxes and debt might have generated a capitalist growth dynamic in the Ottoman countryside by compelling and enabling a richer stratum of the peasantry to break the cycle of indebtedness, improve productivity, market ever larger portions of their subsistence and to eventually oust the less competitive producers from the land. And in fact, especially during 1850-1873 (and then 1896-1908), a high world market demand for agricultural goods, together with the relative improvement of rural security and the establishment of modern means of transport, encouraged peasants to extend production and participate in the market. Population growth, the sedentarization of tribes, the settlement of immigrants and the availability of cultivable land also contributed to the expansion of agricultural output, especially for grains, tobacco, raisins and cotton (Issawi 1980: 6; Quataert 1994: 844, 847). However, it is important to remember that grains, primarily wheat and barley, far outstripped the production of other cash crops; even in regions where non-food crop agriculture was relatively developed, grains accounted for roughly 75-80 percent of cultivated lands (Quataert 1994: 844-6). How much of these grains were marketed? Despite the relative absence of reliable data especially for the period before 1900, Issawi estimates that in the Ottoman Empire ‘even during the 1863 cotton boom, by far the greater part of the land was planted to wheat, barley and other grains, which were mostly consumed on the farm’ (Issawi 1980: 200). Quataert similarly notes that although ‘enormous changes over time

63 Vedat Eldem estimates that from 1889 to 1914 population growth accounted for 50 percent of the increase in agricultural production (quoted in Issawi 1980: 6ff). Given that agricultural productivity changed little, the remaining half of agricultural output growth can be attributed to the extension of cultivated land, increases in the average size of peasant holdings and the betterment of transport facilities, see also Toprak 1988: 20.
64 In Western Anatolia, for example, the share of non-grain crops did not exceed 12 percent of total cultivated land at the beginning of the 20th century (Pamuk 1987: 96).
occurred in the agrarian sector’, in 1900 most cultivators still ‘possessed small landholdings, engaging in a host of tasks, with their crops and animal products mainly dedicated to self-consumption’ (Quataert 2005: 130-1). One rough indicator of this is that while the marketed grain output shipped from major railway districts and ports during 1901-1905 amounted to about 500 000 tons, in 1913 the total grain production within Turkey’s present borders was more than 7.3 million tons (Issawi 1980: 213).65

Implied here is the persistence of the peasants’ ‘subsistence logic’. Perhaps more importantly, however, we need to be aware that in a given year and place ‘peasants may have any proportion of subsistence to cash crop production, including complete specialization’ and still this may not indicate the existence of ‘petty commodity production’. That is to say, the transition from ‘peasant production’ to ‘petty commodity production’ can not be grasped in quantitative terms only, but depends on qualitative changes in the rules of accessing the factors of production, especially land (Friedman 1980: 167). After all, it is not commodity production per se, but the socio-legal mobilization of land, labor and credit that forces, enables and permits peasant family units to produce competitively, reorganize production and accumulate land in the face of their less competitive neighbors. With this qualification in mind, we need to recall that even in the most market-oriented areas, such as Western Anatolia, ‘uncultivated marginal lands were always available for purchase from the state at nominal prices or in return for regular payments of tithe for ten years’ (ibid: 90). Furthermore, although some significant attempts were made by the state to extend low-interest credit to

65 The ratio of total grain output destined for both domestic and foreign markets then was around 7 percent. According to one estimate, combined with non-grain agricultural goods, around 25 percent of total agricultural production in 1914 went to export markets (Pamuk 1987: 97). Given that between 1840 and 1913, 75 percent of the agricultural surplus was induced by world market demand (ibid: 85), it would not be an exaggeration to conclude that agricultural expansion in the Ottoman Empire had little, if any, impact on the creation of a home market for consumer and investment goods; which, in turn, considerably inhibited the release of surplus food and labor so vital for capitalist development at home.
induce market production, these were far from satisfactory, as most of the agricultural support targeting the land-hungry and technologically-backward peasantry, was siphoned off by bureaucrats, local notables and big landlords (Quataert 1994: 871-2; Owen 1981: 202ff). Considering their relatively uninhibited access to marginal lands and lack of credit, peasants were neither under compulsion nor willing to devote the majority of their labor-time to commodity production and reorganizing their labor process according to the dictates of market competition. Despite their participation in the market, ‘basic subsistence considerations [remained] paramount and accordingly most decisions betray[ed] risk-avoiding behaviour’ (Keyder 1983: 136). In other words, small family farmers, already distressed by their subsistence, chose not to subject their generational security to the uncertainties of the market. Instead they were ‘ready to exert and be content with very low levels of consumption which made it easier for them to retain their holdings’ in the face of the tax collector and the usurer (Pamuk 1987: 101; Ortayli 1998: 226-7). Even when peasants were encouraged by high cash-crop prices, their involvement in the market was sporadic. Tobacco production, for example, which became especially popular among small producers during the last quarter of the 19th century, was carried out by peasants who were ‘only marginally’ involved in and ‘were able to withdraw from the market’ (Koç 1988: 65-71). In short, no continuous, systematic and regular commodification of subsistence took place in the Ottoman countryside. Agricultural households using family labor were consolidated, but without households becoming an enterprise ‘whose relations to outsiders progressively take the forms of buying, selling and competition’ (Friedman 1980: 163; cf. Post 2010). A richer stratum of peasants perhaps might still ‘rise’ in this context, but they would not be able to initiate a process of capitalist accumulation given their inability to change the socio-legal basis of the ‘safety-first’ agriculture. In this regard, Caglar Keyder’s argument that in the Ottoman Empire ‘[a]n autonomously functioning economy where the law of value reigned had begun to grow in
importance ever since external trade became significant’ seems mistaken (Keyder 1981: 128). Instead, it would be better to conclude that no ‘petty commodity production’ developed, and in fact, as Charles Post notes in a different context (2013: 88), the so-called dominance of ‘merchant capital’ depended on the dominance of non-capitalist property relations.

Given peasants’ control over the labor process and ability to obtain and maintain land without having to systematically increase commodity production, productive forces remained primitive and domestic investment scarce. Relatedly, almost all foreign investment funds went into infrastructure projects, which gave ‘quick, high or at least secure returns’, rather than flowing to production (Hershlag 1968: 33). The route to improved agricultural productivity via system-wide transformation of peasants’ customary rights therefore remained blocked. An ‘extensive’ economic development based on peasant-squeezing, land-clearance and settlement of semi-nomadic groups set in during the Tanzimat period with few prospects for ‘intensive’ development based on (re)investment and productivity increases in land (Güran 1992: 233; Quataert 1994: 843). Similar compromises and uncertainties marked Ottoman attempts at industrialization also. Even after the abolition of the janissary corps, who had been the armed defenders of guild privilege, ‘the Tanzimat state compromised endlessly on the issue of guilds’ position in the Ottoman economy’ (Quataert 1992: 215-6) Although general price ceilings were lifted (except on important subsistence goods such as bread and meat), which was an important step towards undermining artisan solidarity, the state, afraid of social unrest, continued to recognize the monopolistic privileges of many artisan guilds throughout the 19th century (Ortayli 1998: 208-9; 1978:25). Given the persistence of peasants’ customary

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Let alone chemical fertilizers, which were the basic agricultural supplement widely used by Western European farmers, In Anatolia and Arab lands most cultivators ‘used animal and human waste for fuel and its use as fertilizer remained exceptional’ (Quataert 1994:853).

Indeed there were massive inflows of foreign direct investment into land in Western Anatolia following the Land Code of 1867 – one-third of cultivable land belonged to the British in 1868 – and yet foreign investment totally retreated in the subsequent decades because of labour-power shortages, low effective demand, high wages and, above all, the reluctance of the Ottoman state to transform agrarian relations (Pamuk 1987: 39, 68).
rights on land, Ottoman factories, despite considerable efforts to fund and sustain them, faced chronic labour shortages and extremely high turnover rates, which eventually frustrated the appetite for public and private investment in manufacturing (Clark 2012: 769). Combined with the absence of custom walls that could have protected infant industries against foreign competition, the Ottoman industrialization remained as a still-born attempt.68

In consequence, approaching the 1880s, the Ottoman state was at the brink of financial collapse. Three decade-long attempts at reconciling the rights of the propertied individual and the rights of the citizen-soldier ended by producing a form of property that allowed neither a rate of productivity nor a system of taxation characteristic of market society. Propertied classes remained unwilling to invest and resistant to pay tax, which largely explains the state’s failure to collect estimated revenues, its increasing turn to foreign borrowing in the aftermath of the Crimean War and its ultimate default on international debt in 1875 (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 155-6).

Coming full circle, the changing nature of geopolitical competition in the post-Napoleonic era forced the Ottomans to reform their system of taxation and military mobilization. Both objectives required the institution of a common political subject endowed with universal rights and duties, hence characterized by a qualitative restructuring of extant relations of appropriation. The project of reinforcing ruling-class unity and strengthening the Ottoman fiscal/geopolitical base by way of an Ottoman capitalism reached a deadlock towards the

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68 Of course, the fact that the Ottoman state was unable to implement protectionist tariff policies was an important cause of Ottoman economic ‘underdevelopment’. Yet this should not lead us to an uncritical equation of protectionism to capitalist development. No late developing country industrialized merely thanks to protectionist tariff policies. Protectionism in France and Germany was implemented not to completely shelter industrial producers from, but to selectively and strategically subject them to the imperatives of international competition (Lacher and Germann 2012:116-7). Equally telling is that Japan, whose modernization began as late as that of Ottomans, did not have full political control over its tariff policy until 1911, long after it successfully established an industrial power base (Tezel 1982:70ff).
1870s. Thereafter the Ottoman ruling-class was to increasingly turn to the Jacobin project as an alternative model of elite and popular mobilization.

**The Ottoman Constitution of 1876: The Rise of Jacobinism**

*Property of lawful title is guaranteed. There can be no dispossession...*  
*Article 21, The Ottoman constitution of 1876*

The central elite had to maintain a sustainable class balance in order to cope with the fiscal and geopolitical challenges facing the empire. The first Ottoman constitutional experiment of 1876-8 materialized precisely in this context (Karpat 1972: 267-8). The constitution asserted the indivisibility of the empire (art. 1), while equalizing all subjects before the law. It called all citizens ‘Ottomans’ who have the same rights and owe the same duties towards their country without prejudice to religion (art. 8 and art. 17). Furthermore, the constitution built and expanded on the earlier experience of provincial councils, which, during the 1860s, had provided an advisory role and political representation to wealthy provincial notables. While the provincial committees set up during the constitutional period continued to consist of propertied groups of diverse occupational, religious and ethnic backgrounds, they also gained electoral capacity by sending their representatives to the newly established House of Deputies. And the power of the House of Deputies, despite being circumscribed in many ways by the Sultanate and the Executive (the Porte), was significant in one important respect: the constitution asserted the freedom of property once again, while granting the House of Deputies the right to supervise, audit and, if necessary, dismiss government decisions on fiscal matters (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 176-7). The constitution thus provided provincial elites with room for participation in central politics and gave them considerable leverage concerning matters on property and taxation.
All that said, however, the constitution did not confine political representation to the propertied-classes. Based on the French election law of 1789, it expanded the scope of popular representation to ‘primary’ voters, i.e. all males above the age of twenty-five who fulfilled a ‘vague’ taxation requirement were allowed to vote for electors who then chose the actual deputies. Therefore, notwithstanding several problems involved in the actual elections, the constitution, in principle, created a system of ‘popular elections with relatively few suffrage restrictions’, which compared favourably even with contemporary Western European countries (Kayali 1995: 268-70).

The implication is that the era of constitutionalism unfolded not with the recognition of the rights of the propertied-individual only, but also with the introduction of the logic of Jacobin representation into the Ottoman body politic. As such, it comes as no surprise that the constitution sought to deliver the promise of political unity and geopolitical regeneration by conditioning the freedom of the propertied-individual to the maintenance of citizen subsistence. For the establishment of a universalized political space, based on the impersonalized relations of constitutional politics, was possible only through a form of property that lubricated the inherent friction between liberty and equality. The above-mentioned article 21 served precisely this end by concurrently institutionalizing one’s right to property and one’s right to subsistence. And as the local custom governing peasant subsistence entered the constitution, the Ottoman experiment with impersonalized politics was bound to radically depart from the relations of market society. Thereafter, political equality would cease to be understood as the basis for universalizing the relations of the capitalist contract, but increasingly construed as the means to implementing Jacobin methods of appropriation and mobilization.
The constitution took two critical Jacobin steps. First, it foresaw the universalization of conscription regardless of ethno-religious and income differences. Second, it introduced free education as a constitutional right and obligation (art. 15 and art. 114). Both steps instituted spaces as alternatives to the market, in an attempt to reconnect the modern subject to the geopolitical reproduction of the central elite. Reforming education and conscription would not only generate new spaces for political integration and mobilization, but also presupposes the formulation of new rules of access to property. For the individual’s participation in this new moral economy became directly linked to his contribution to the geopolitical survival and his sharing of the geopolitical pedagogy of the state. The Ottoman constitution thus established new rules of reproduction by conditioning the individual’s ‘inviolable’ rights to his contribution to the survival of the ‘nation’. From the Tanzimat to the Constitution, then, the ‘impersonality of the capitalist subject’, that is, his absolute right to use private property unfettered by wider social and political duties, was cumulatively substituted by novel political subjects whose rights and equality were constantly redefined in line with the changing requirements of an impersonalized political community. The constitution, in this respect, captured the logic of and reset the conditions for Ottoman entry into modernity. It suspended the option of organized enclosure, while providing the blueprint for a substitute route to modernity based on reform of the system of education and conscription.

The constitution’s attempt to regulate agrarian conflict would ultimately shift the main locus of ruling-class competition from the site of production to the site of bureaucracy. In the post-constitutional context, the growing bureaucracy would absorb the cadres generated by the spread of conscription and free education. And struggles within the Ottoman bureaucracy (rooted in educational differences that provided differential access to state-provided income and shaped by struggles in the wider geopolitical milieu) would considerably impact the
character of the public sphere during Sultan Abdulhamid’s autocratic rule. For the lower bureaucracy, in their quest for merit-based access to state office, could challenge the Sultan and the higher bureaucracy only by incorporating commercial, peasant and working-class demands into their essentially elitist-conservative vision of imperial rule and regeneration. It was precisely the rise of this new political space that would make possible the Revolution in 1908 and that would radicalize constitutional politics thereafter. The revolutionary expansion of the public sphere, combined with severe geopolitical challenges, would lead to the cumulative redefinition of the requirements of participation in the Ottoman moral economy. A form of Jacobin ‘Terror’ would consequently prevail in the Ottoman lands, giving rise to a regime of property that entailed new politico-cultural rules of reproduction.

Abdulhamid II (1876-1908): Educating the ‘Nation’

‘Learned nations can defeat us even if we build walls around us like China’.

Ali Pasha

The constitution and the parliament would not survive even the first geopolitical challenge. When the Russian armies appeared once again at the gates of Istanbul, Sultan Abdulhamid II, heavily criticized by the deputies for the way he conducted the war, dissolved the parliament and shelved the constitution in 1878. The result of war was utterly disastrous for the empire. In spite of the ultimate Western diplomatic intervention in favour of the Ottomans at the Congress of Berlin, the empire was forced to pay a huge war indemnity and to surrender two-fifths of its entire territory and one-fifth of its population, of which half were Muslims. In addition to the loss of vital sources of taxation and manpower, the war accelerated the influx of Muslim refugees into the remaining Ottoman territories, which caused a massive strain on Ottoman finances (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 191-5; Karpat 1972: 271-2).
To add insult to injury, after the war the Balkans turned into a geopolitical ‘tinderbox’. Greece, Rumania, Serbia, Montenegro and most notably Bulgaria emerged as rival states, whose geopolitical aspirations far exceeded the petty territories they gained at Berlin. The result was that the Balkan states put constant pressure on the remaining Ottoman lands in Europe (Macedonia, Thrace, Thessaly and Albania); further complicating the difficult balance of power the Ottomans tried to maintain both within and without (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 191-5). Furthermore, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 had reduced the significance of the Ottoman Straits for British foreign policy, thereby mitigating the British fear of Russian control over the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, it was this growing British reluctance to preserve the status quo that first left the Ottomans wide open to Russian aggression during 1877-8 and then would lead to the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 (Hanioglu 2008: 131-2). While the Congress of Berlin, therefore, was part of this sea change in the British perception of the Eastern Question, it also marked the deprivation for the Ottoman state of a relatively reliable supporter in the international arena and the beginning of its rapprochement with a late capitalist-Jacobin progeny, Germany.

The irony is that under these dire fiscal and geopolitical challenges, Abdulhamid II, having killed the constitution, also had to revive the constitution’s very spirit of reform, especially in terms of its two main objectives: education and conscription. With regard to the latter, Germany showed the Ottomans the future. Through their overwhelming victory against France in 1870, Prussia’s conscript armies had not only sent grave geopolitical reverberations racing across Europe, but also forcefully reminded the European ruling-classes of the virtues of universal conscription (Mjoset and Van Holde 2002: 46-7). With the ghost of the citizen-soldier resuscitated once again in post-Napoleonic Europe, resulting in the competitive formation of conscript armies of unprecedented sizes, the Ottomans turned to Germany in the
post-constitutional period for military expertise and help. The result was the new conscription law of 1886. In many ways the new law still fell well short of universal conscription. The fear of revolt and foreign intervention, as well as fiscal concerns, prevented the suspension of military exemption fees, from which mainly non-Muslim subjects were eligible to benefit (Moreau 2010: 26-7). In addition, the traditional exemptions given to the inhabitants of Istanbul were retained, as well as those for students who continued their studies in religious or secular schools. Despite the persistence of non-Muslim and Muslim immunities, however, the law took an important step towards generalizing conscription among the Anatolian Muslim population: it conditioned the payment of exemption tax to the prior execution of three months of military service in the reserve army (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 100, 245-6). The significance of this rather overlooked legal detail lies in the fact that the law of 1886 put in practice, for the first time, the principle of equality between the propertied and the property-less. The rich and the poor were equalized not through enclosure, not through the relations of the capitalist contract, but in terms of their responsibility for the geopolitical reproduction of the Ottoman polity (albeit still limited due to the continuity of exemption fees that would be dissolved in 1909). Regardless of income differentials, therefore, military duty tended to become the indirect precondition for accessing property and to acquiring the status of modern subjecthood among the Anatolian Muslim populations (with the notable exception of Kurdistan).

The intertwining of equality and property with conscription became even more pronounced among the lower-classes, especially the refugees. The immigration of Muslim refugees from the lost Ottoman provinces, while initially disruptive, offered some relief to the problem of the scarcity of military manpower. In the wake of the Crimean War the Ottomans had already issued relatively favourable refugee laws that gave plots of state land to immigrant families
‘with only a minimum amount of capital’ (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 115; Pamuk 1987: 105). Yet a condition was set that newly arrived populations had to ‘fulfill the requirements of the Ottoman conscription system to acquire full Ottoman citizenship status’. Thus at a time when the state encountered several difficulties in tapping manpower from native populations, a growing pool of a de-rooted and revanchist reserve army emerged, whose right to new lands was conditioned to fighting those who caused their displacement. Indeed, from the 1860s, and especially under the reign of Abdulhamid II, Muslim immigrants began to substantially contribute to the Ottoman military power as ‘volunteers’, as ‘volunteerism would confirm their rights to be granted land and status…and further establish their legitimate residency in the Ottoman Empire’ (Besikci 2012: 172-5; Shaw and Shaw 1977: 246).  

Understandably, linking geopolitical survival to peasant subsistence forced the Hamidian state to continue to be attentive to the precarious structures of social reproduction in the Ottoman countryside. Provincial propertied-classes continued to successfully resist taxation, which shifted the fiscal burden onto the bulk of smallholding peasantry. And indeed, heavy taxation combined with the low productivity of peasant-based agriculture, rendered peasant indebtedness a chronic and widespread phenomenon, leaving many cultivators in a state of permanent struggle for subsistence. Yet, it is remarkable that when the very subsistence of the peasantry was in jeopardy, neither the state was ready to accept, nor did the propertied-classes seem to be willing to initiate an organized process of dispossession. Evictions were rare. ‘Complaints that the defaulting peasants were not being arrested’, though ‘not unheard of’, were ‘infrequent’ (Pamuk 1987: 90). The social conditions of geopolitical reproduction,

69 After five decades of enforcing conscription, the number of military troops increased from 24,000 regular soldiers in 1837 to 120,000 in 1849 and up to 206,000 in 1877, with a reserve army of 500,000 soldiers (Quartert 1992: 218; Karpat 1972: 278). The non-Muslim and at least one-fourth of the Muslim population remained exempt in the second half of the 19th century, leaving some estimated 12 million Muslims available for conscription. And while in Bosnia, Albania, Syria and Iraq conscription attempts foundered due to rebellious populations, the heaviest burden of conscription fell on the population of Turkic Anatolia, which grew by more than 2 million refugees from 1850 to 1900 (Aksan 2007: 479).
heightening international economic competition, as well as the fear of revolt and the possibility of peasant flight, forced them to keep the peasantry in place (Ahmad 2009: 69-70).

As a consequence, state revenues, already exacerbated by the worldwide depression of agricultural prices, consistently lagged behind military expenditures in the last quarter of the 19th century. Also, despite significant improvements in infrastructure and tax-collection, efforts to apply an income tax to the earnings of foreign and non-Muslim Ottoman merchants largely failed due to the opposition of the European ambassadors (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 225).

In sum, conscription was not comprehensive, nor was agriculture productive enough to create the human and fiscal resources needed for geopolitical regeneration. In this context, Abdulhamid turned to strengthen the second pillar of the Jacobin Project charted by the constitution: he substituted free public education for the free market.

In the pre-Tanzimat Ottoman Empire, education for common people came to be provided by semi-independent religious orders and funded by pious foundations. Quran schools and medreses established in provincial centers educated provincial youth to be employed as the lower ulema, while the higher ulema, especially from the 18th century on, originated exclusively from powerful religious households. In addition, ‘the lower ulema officiating in mosques and schools were part and parcel of the lives of the masses’, while ‘the higher ulema were directly involved in political decisions’. Education therefore was neither centralized nor had any significant impact on the circulation of authority and wealth from below to above (Mardin 2006: 87-8). Quite the contrary, the purpose of education, in the Ottoman ancien regime, was to maintain the persistence of political inequality, which was the key to securing hierarchical access to sources of income. With the Tanzimat’s injection of equality into the Ottoman body politic, the perception of education went through a qualitative change. For the
Tanzimat not only introduced, in principle, the equality of access to the state, but also conditioned social mobility and social reproduction on the new subjects’ successful socialization and disciplining in a new and centralized system of education.

The Tanzimat statesmen, from the 1840s, thus began to envision public education as the means to securing the loyalty, fostering the unity and increasing the geopolitical usefulness of the new politically equal subjects. Especially after the Crimean War, the severity of educational reform began to be felt in Ottoman ruling class circles. For the state’s acute need to raise official cadres and loyal citizens was not only marked by the insufficiency of Quran schools but further compounded in the wake of the Crimean War by the proliferation of autonomous missionary and non-Muslim schools, which enjoyed considerable foreign backing (Somel 2001: 42, 98; Fortna 2002: 117). The first decisive response to this came in 1869, when Ali Pasha and Fuat Pasha, the two top bureaucrats of the Tanzimat era, accepted the educational reform plan prepared under the supervision of their foreign advisor, the French Minister of Education Jean Victor Duruy. The reform stipulated the establishment of a centralized educational fund, the expansion of secondary schools in the provinces, the foundation of public primary schools (ibtidais) in parallel to Quran schools and the improving of the quality of instruction in both primary and secondary schools by adding more practical and natural science courses to their curriculum (Somel 2001: 88-9).

Despite its earlier enactment, however, fiscal difficulties did not allow for an expansion of the public school network until Abdulhamid II. What made possible the Hamidian state’s relative success in overcoming financial shortages was its incorporation of provincial propertied-classes into local educational councils. This must have worked out well as an integrative strategy, for the provincial notables, apart from their contribution via taxes, even took the
initiative themselves to establish and finance public schools at the provincial level (ibid: 94, 273). From this angle, it can be argued that the centralization and expansion of public schooling during the Hamidian period points to a sort of compromise reached between the centre and the provincial elite (ibid: 116). On the one hand, Abdulhamid II, having liquidated constitutional politics, attempted to introduce public education as an alternative way of integrating propertied-classes into the Ottoman regime of rule and appropriation. And on the other hand, by sending their sons to public schools, local notables, wealthy agrarian families and Muslim merchants sought to regain access to the state as a source of income and power (Karpat 1972: 276).

Given the growing mutuality of interest between the state and provincial notables, the Hamidian success in expanding the secondary school network all over the empire comes as no surprise. The number of secondary school students increased from 3000 in 1856 to roughly 40 000 in 1895 (both rusdiye and idadi schools), while the number of those attending military, technical, medical and law schools amounted to nearly 18 000 (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 107, 112-3). On the failure side, however, reforming primary education remained a limited venture due to fiscal restrictions as well as the fear that the lower ulema, the local imams and semi-independent brotherhoods might react to the diminishing of their chances for employment and promotion (Somel 2001: 61, 272; Mardin 1962: 128). Taken together, while the efforts to extend the state’s geopolitical message to the bulk of the peasantry proved to be rather unsuccessful, the state opened a new avenue of appropriation for the provincial propertied-classes. As such, the reproduction of property was further displaced from the site of production and became directly connected to one’s political loyalty to and geopolitical utility for the Hamidian state. The irony is that the generations educated by the Hamidian schools

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70 It must be noted that for all primary and secondary school students, tuition was free and room and board were provided. However, higher-level schools charged tuition, so that ‘only the wealthier families could afford to send their children, except the very best poor students, who could attend without charge’ (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 108).
were to remain loyal to the state, but not to Abdulhamid. The era of rebellious officers was about to open.

From Abdulhamid II to the Young Turks: Redefining Islam and Reinventing the Public Sphere

‘The bases of contemporary civilization are nothing but the actions and traditions of Muhammad’.

\textit{Abdulhamid II}

‘Il y a promesse de mariage entre la civilisation musulmane et la civilisation scientifique’.

\textit{Ahmed Riza}

The Ottomans’ engagement with public education costed them dearly. By injecting into the Ottoman body politic the Jacobin logic of public education and meritocracy, Ottoman reformers tacitly conceded the principle of equality within the state. By this reasoning, it can be argued that the ‘citizen-officer’, rather than the ‘citizen-soldier’, became the most immediate by-product of the Ottoman engagement with Jacobinism. Students, who were educated in provincial public schools and came from relatively modest families, began to enter the ranks of the military and civil bureaucracy in the 1880s. In terms of civil-military service posts, for example, there were a half-million officers in 1900 that had not existed in 1800 (Quataert 1992: 218). The fiscal cost of this bureaucratic-military expansion is noteworthy: in the 1890s around 70 per cent of government revenues was used to pay civil servant salaries and pensions, while government funds allocated for public investment remained as low as 3 per cent (Tezel 1986: 85). Beside the expansion of state apparatus as the main source of authority and income, Abdulhamid II continued to wield personal authority through an empire-wide network of spies and informers and established a cadre of loyal technocrats at the apex of the state. As the Sultan centralized and personalized the appointment and promotion of the higher bureaucracy, however, the lower-ranked officers were bound by the law and their advancement was subjected to strict standards of merit, age
and experience (Hanioglu 2008: 125). Also, given the fiscal instability of the empire, the lower echelon of the administrative hierarchy ‘was often left to fend for themselves on inadequate salaries paid in arrears’. The point is that the lower-ranked officers would become one of the main agents of societal change as they struggled to open state careers to talent. In fact, it is this struggle to which the main wing of the Young Turk movement, the Committee of Progress and Union (CUP), would appeal in order to summon vital support for reinstalling the Ottoman constitution (Mardin 2006: 121-2).

At this juncture a few observations are in order, which illuminate the politico-cultural colouring of the Ottoman public space from the Tanzimat to Abdulhamid II. Most noticeably, the Ottoman reformers attempted to create a modern public space not insulated from, but imbued by Islam. Despite some clerical resistance to the state’s arrogation of the prerogatives of the religious establishment, for example, they had little problem with Islamic education being provided side-by-side with Western education. Indeed, both the Tanzimat reformers and the Hamidian state tried to establish modern subjecthood by increasing the visibility of Islam both in school and in society at large (Somel 2001: 3-4, Fortna 2002: 13). Abdulhamid went even further by explicitly linking modernization to religion by ‘recharg[ing] and redefin[ing] basic Islamic institutions, namely the Seriat and the caliphate, as the basis of the quest for a new national identity’. He ‘rationalized’ and standardized Islam (based on Sunni-Hanefi interpretation) both in school and court in ways that served the state’s political and geopolitical objectives (Deringil 1998: 48-50). In like fashion, he consolidated the Ottoman civil code (Mecelle) and the new judicial system (Nizamiye) by fusing Seriat and positive French law and without totally alienating the religious establishment (Rubin 2011: 58-9).
In this sense, Ottoman modernization led to the creation of a public space that was both a
derivation of and a departure from the Jacobin model. In France, just as in the Ottoman
Empire, ruling-classes tended to develop religion-based responses to their conditions of
geopolitical backwardness. Yet, given that the theological authority in France continued to
preserve some degree of autonomy even through the 19th century, the Church’s failure to
deliver geopolitical objectives could generate an anti-clerical and anti-religious dynamic. In
the Ottoman Empire, by contrast, the higher ulema were by and large dependent on worldly
authority for their own reproduction, i.e. for their access to vakıf lands and state offices. In the
absence of a relatively autonomous power specifically devoted to policing theology, the
higher ulema especially found it harder to oppose the bureaucratic and geopolitical
redefinition of Islam. The state cadres were able to reinterpret religion in conformity with
their own political and geopolitical interests, as the higher ulema either had little material
basis to oppose this or simply found it easier and more beneficial to accord with its
bureaucratic repositioning.

The implication is that the importation of French social, educational and legal forms into the
Ottoman Empire did not inherit the Jacobin potential of creating an anti-religious modernity,
but resulted in the standardization of Islam. In other words, the combination of Jacobin and
Ottoman forms of sociality generated a historically specific modernity that repeatedly
substituted the anti-religious potential of Jacobinism for the bureaucratization of Islam. While
transforming the agent of modernity from the individual to the nation, the Ottoman political
imagination therefore did not have to operate within the framework of a politics/religion
binary. Islam, bureaucratized and standardized, could be well used as a proto-nationalist
ideology. A public space engraained in an Islamic vocabulary could mediate the tension
between the rights and duties of the modern individual.
Indeed, in the 1860s the ‘Young Ottomans’, representing the first wave of dissident bureaucrats and intellectuals, had already articulated relatively inclusive, liberal and Islamic conceptions of the ‘nation’ in opposition to what they considered the ‘westernist dictatorship’ of the Tanzimat pashas. The Young Ottomans, most of who came from the wealthy families of Istanbul and were educated abroad, found their opportunities for advancement shrinking within the Tanzimat bureaucracy. In their quest for an alliance with the lower ulema, they formulated a form of Islamic liberalism as the precondition to the Ottoman entrance to civilization and as the basis of imperial regeneration (Mardin 1962: 105-122). They espoused the ‘individual’ and ‘constitutionalism’ as the basis of civilization, yet at the same time charged the Islamic establishment with the task of creating an ‘ethical individual’ who works for the common good. As such, the Young Ottomans, while asserting their own class interests, claimed the existence of a wider ‘nation’ and an Islamic moral base that could guide the introduction of the impersonalized individual. And in doing so, they pointed to the possibility and desirability of a non-revolutionary transition to ‘civilization’.

Competitive reframing of the ‘nation’ continued through the Hamidian period also. What distinguished the Young Turk theory of opposition and reform from that of the Young Ottomans, however, was their disbelief in the presence of a public morality that could be readily provided by the existing religious establishment. In the eyes of the Young Turks, Abdulhamid’s efforts to standardize and elevate existing Islam as the new public morality had delivered nothing but inequality, tyranny and imperial decline. The inequalities of Ottoman bureaucracy, therefore, led many educated elites to disassociate themselves from the Hamidian regime and to consider the ulema as the major obstacle on the road to civilization. Educated in public schools and royal academies, where they learned Western languages and
sciences and became acquainted with Western political thought, the Young Turks would increasingly invoke universalist and secular concepts such as humanity, liberty and progress in order to politicize and mobilize the lower-classes against Hamidian ‘despotism’ (Mardin 2006: 121).

Nevertheless, they were also well aware that fighting the Hamidian regime by mobilizing the lower-classes might also lead to the full activation of a Jacobin political subject whose rights and duties could undermine the position of the bureaucracy and the Sultan alike. Despite being persistently crushed by the Hamidian state, the Young Turks maintained their elitist and scientific vision of society for a long time and remained consistently suspicious of revolutionary change. For them, it was only ‘scientific thinking’, not popular action, that could lead to personal freedom and a constitution. Referring to Robespierre as an example, they contended, ‘one should not show blood to the masses and should not get them used it. Otherwise no end and limit may be found for the awakened human brutality’. Their ultimate objective was therefore to revolutionize ‘minds, schools, industry and knowledge, but not...the streets’. Moreover, they believed mass action could easily backfire in the Ottoman context, for ‘any appearance of chaos [in the past] had served as an excuse for [foreign] intervention, the return of despotism, or both’. Accordingly, in the Young Turk journals ‘educating the people’ and ‘a military takeover from the top’ came to the fore as the most loudly proclaimed strategy to overthrow the Hamidian regime. Indeed, they admired and viewed another late-developer as the archetype of such ‘scientific’ methods of transforming the state and society. Japan, in the eyes of the Young Turks, affirmed the possibility of national regeneration without invoking the ‘Terror’ of the ‘bloodthirsty masses’. As in the case of the Meiji restoration, they argued a ‘swift and bloodless’ military coup and mass education could well
substitute for ‘the violent methods of the French Revolution and the horrors of mass participation’ (Sohrabi 2011: 62, 72-5, 77, 80-1).

In the Young Turk circles, then, what was deemed paramount was the problem of how to find a substitute route to ‘civilization’, i.e. ‘the problem of how to change the regime without a revolution’ (Hanioglu 1995: 207). They had to revive the constitutional rights and duties of the modern subject in ways conducive to the overthrow of the regime, but without lifting the lid of the revolutionary Jacobin subject. Therefore, the Young Turks considered the formation of a new ‘ethical’ public space as the prerequisite to returning to constitutional rule and halting imperial decline. They imagined a new ‘nation’ led by a group of intellectual elites whose primary mission was to ‘educate’ the masses based on ‘scientific’ principles.

Tellingly, ‘science’ did not engender an anti-Islamic discourse. The common thread running through all Young Turk writings, including the writings of the most anti-clerical members like Ahmed Riza and Abdullah Cevdet, was not the rejection, but the invention of an ‘enlightened’ Islam. In opposing Abdulhamid, the Young Turks, especially the early members of the CUP, theorized a ‘nation’, in which a ‘true’ and ‘scientific’ Islam, compatible with the impersonalized procedures of positivist sciences, governed and made politically useful the impersonalized individual. By replacing ‘Islamic obscurantism’ with ‘scientific Islam’, so ran the Young Turk argument, a moral and universal base for orderly progress could be established under the guidance of the intellectual elite (Hanioglu 1995: 200-216). The Young Turks, as such, perceived modern science and education as necessary preconditions to the admission of the impersonalized individual into the modern public space. Distrustful of ‘ignorant’ classes, the Young Turks conditioned the equality and property of the individual to his internalization of the political morality and pedagogy of the intellectual elite. They thereby
envisioned an ideal order, in which cultural-educational boundaries became and legitimized class boundaries (Mardin 2006: 123). As time wore on, however, education, secular morality and intellectual elitism were to prove insufficient to mobilize and tame the common people. New geopolitical threats and revolutionary fervour were already in the air at the onset of the new century and would not disappear unless the Young Turks became revolutionaries themselves. And once the Young Turks unleashed the people’s revolutionary energies and seized the state, they would have to water down their scientific/elitist vision of society based on a new moral and popular economy.

The Geo(politics) of Revolution: Reimagining the ‘People’

‘Up to now, no nation has been able to acquire liberty, their natural right, by means of publications. In reality, ideas are a preparatory means for evolution. However, arms speed up this evolution’.

From a Young Turk Publication, 1907

The Young Turks, organized in the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), was largely composed of émigré bureaucrats. Headquartered in Paris, the CUP published and disseminated journals propagating a ‘scientific’ transition to constitutionalism and strived to organize an empire-wide underground network of constitutional resistance (Hanioglu 2008: 144-5). From 1905, however, under the impact of domestic uprisings, new geopolitical exigencies and world-historical events, the Young Turk vision of social change began to drastically alter. The constitutional revolutions in neighbouring Russia (1905-6) and Iran (1906), the revolts in Anatolia (1906-7) and the imminent threat of foreign partition of Macedonia (1903-8), all combined, forced and enabled the Young Turks to develop a new repertoire of social mobilization. The revolution in Russia was particularly decisive in shifting

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71 As indicated earlier, the Young Turks were not a monolithic movement. All Young Turk groups held grudges against Abdulhamid’s autocratic rule, yet they had no vision of a united front and no common strategy to be pursued against the sultan. The CUP was the main organization within the Young Turks, which also played a decisive role during the revolution. Therefore, hereafter, unless otherwise stated, I will use the ‘Young Turks’ and the CUP interchangeably.
the Young Turks’ ‘evolutionary positivism towards revolutionary activism’ (Sohrabi 2011: 90). For one thing, the Russian upheavals made the Young Turks realize that a group of ‘enlightened’ intellectual elites could well use and tame the revolutionary potential of the peasantry and urban poor for transformative action. The Young Turk journals extensively and affirmingly reported on the ‘hungry Russians coming from villages and cities [who] are like mines and torpedoes ready to ignite with a little contact’. Also, the initial constitutional success of the Russian uprising, which the Russian army was reluctant to suppress, seemed to the Young Turks as confirmation of the revolutionary potential of conscripted peasants. They concluded that a people’s army ‘can not fight against their own sons, fathers and brothers for long’ and ‘it is only a few times that the Tzar might be able to use this force against the people’ (Yaşar 2014: 119-20). Along with the discovery of the ‘peasant’ in the Young Turk imaginary of social change, the intellectual also gained a new role. The Young Turks reasoned that if ‘ignorant’ masses were one reason for the persistence of Hamidian despotism, the lack of ‘enlightened’ intellectuals was the other. Intellectuals should not just wait for the people to awaken to their rights, but, as in contemporary Russia, intellectuals ‘were to ignite the masses against tyranny and injustice, as electricity and heat did for chemical reasons’. In fact, without the intellectuals’ guidance, uprisings in Russia would ‘express the masses’ hatred of despotism and injustice but fail to achieve anything of value’ (Sohrabi 2011: 80-1).

This intellectual vanguardism and peasant-based populism found further support and gained a new expression in the wake of the Iranian revolution. Tehran proved to the Young Turks the possibility of a relatively bloodless and popular revolution even in a more ‘backward’ setting than Russia. Equally important, the fact that the ulema led the revolution in Iran not only reinforced the Young Turk belief that a ‘real’ Islam could underpin the discourse of revolutionary leadership, but also demonstrated the existence of a local moral source that can
guide and control the revolutionary subject. The Young Turks thus construed the revolution in Iran as proof that ‘the religion of Islam, from its inception, declared liberty, justice and equality’. Indeed, precisely because Islam was originally ‘built upon freedom and justice, today in the government of Iran...freedom is granted without any bloodshed’ unlike Europe and Russia where attaining freedom costed people much more dearly (Sohrabi 2011: 82-4).

While the wave of international revolutions gave the Young Turks an idea about ‘what must be done’, the social ferment developing in Anatolia provided them with the first testing ground to adapt freshly acquired ideas and practices to new ends. Between 1906 and 1907, several provinces in the empire and especially in Central and Eastern Anatolia were shaken by popular revolts. Rising taxation demands on propertied-classes, artisans and the urban poor, increasing peasant indebtedness, conscription, food scarcities and the non-payment of salaries to military officers produced a series of reactions ranging from tax-revolts, bread riots, occupation of government buildings to mutinies (Kansu 2009: 37-41; Aytekin 2013: 324-7; Hanioglu 2001: 123-4). Although most of these reactions were voiced through a constitutionalist discourse, they hardly produced a coherent bundle of demands, however. For, while wealthy merchants organized mainly to oppose tax increases, the lower-classes and artisans seem to have directed their rage not only against the government, but also against the rich whom they accused of tax-evasion, hoarding and usury. For example, in Erzurum and Kastamonu, where resistance was the fiercest and lasted the longest, the rebels lynched the ‘profiteers’ who caused food shortages and forced the wealthiest merchants to flee the town, seized government buildings and killed government representatives (Aytekin 2013: 325; Özbek 2010: 76; Hanioglu 2001: 114).
The situation in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolian countryside was even more unbearable and reactionary for socio-historical reasons. Following the first attempts to introduce property rights in the region, the Hamidian regime had supported Kurdish tribal chiefs’ claims on property and even authorized them as a police force and tax collectors. This had, in turn, led to the reduction of most peasants (predominantly of Armenian and Kurdish origin) in the region to sharecropper status. Subjected to excessive taxation and rent and various depredations, the Armenian peasantry, from the 1880s, became a breeding ground for the spread of popular ideas and practices and the establishment of nationalist and revolutionary organizations. In particular, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) was active in organizing armed resistance in villages and towns. During the Eastern Anatolian revolts, the ARF thus effectively put ‘re-possession of the peasantry’ onto the list of emerging constitutional demands (Astourian 2011: 63-7; Klein 2002: 304-5; Kansu 2009: 50).

The CUP in particular and the Young Turk movement in general actively engaged in attempts to strengthen and spread resistance in Anatolia through underground propaganda activities (Kansu 2009: 35-97). The Anatolian revolts ‘solidified the CUP resolve to move toward a more wide-ranging uprising’, and in doing so, they pushed the CUP to widen the scope of their public appeal. They recognized that more peaceful means such as tax-holding by the propertied-classes was not sufficient to overthrow the Hamidian regime; indeed they congratulated the people of Erzurum and Kastamonu ‘for selecting the best method of ridding

72 As elsewhere, extending the political and fiscal power of the central state into Kurdish provinces could not be achieved without incorporating local notables into the administrative apparatus of the state. This proved to be a more complicated task in Kurdistan, however, for settling and securing the loyalty of Kurdish tribal lords, who often led large pastoral, mobile and warrior populations in border zones, required the state to be much more attentive to the interests of Kurdish tribal chiefs. Also, the peasantry in the region were predominantly of Armenian and Kurdish origin, who were exempted from conscription. Read together, in Kurdistan and the Armenian plateau the central state was much more unwilling/unable to provide the peasantry with the minimum protection that maintained the integrity of the peasant household elsewhere in Anatolia. This tendency became more pronounced after the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The rising fear that Eastern Anatolia would be lost, as were most European provinces, increasingly led the Sultan to ‘cow the Armenian population and to secure the loyalty of the Kurds…the Armenians were to be the bait for Kurdish obedience and loyalty’ (Deringil 2009: 350, Özbek 2012: 791-2).
themselves of thirty years of Hamidian injustice and tyranny’ (Sohrabi 2011: 84-5). In Anatolia lower-class demands and methods thus began to enter the CUP’s political agenda and repertoire of action. However, it would be in Macedonia where the organization would take stronger root and where the revolts turned into revolutionary uprisings.

The Ottomans had granted semi-autonomous status to Macedonia after a major revolt that shook the European provinces of the empire in 1903. This left a power vacuum in the region that was filled by various rebellious groups fighting for land and independence and supported by neighboring Balkan states. Rebels organized into armed village bands and committees, initiating a competitive process of land and tax-grabbing in the region. Popularly supported and trained in guerrilla tactics, they gave a hard time to the Ottoman army and put pressure on Muslim villages (Hanioglu 2001: 221-6). In response, the junior Ottoman officers, most of whom had become CUP members since 1907, began to penetrate Muslim villages and began to organize Muslim bands modelled after their Christian adversaries. Recruitment into village bands was assured by the backing of village notables/landowners and by providing the villagers with concrete incentives, which included the end of unjust taxes and insecurity of life and property. The process of arming peasants and creating village militias sped up especially after June 1908 when Russia and Britain met at Reval, (purportedly) to discuss the possible partition of Macedonia. The Ottoman officers took to the mountains, roamed the villages and spread the word of justice and liberty, which the revolution promised to bring. Peasants and town inhabitants in Macedonia joined the CUP in increasing numbers. The Third Army, the main Ottoman military force in the region, under the leadership of CUP-related officers and with the involvement of Muslim notables and villagers, thus evolved into both a source of popular uprising and elite rebellion (Karpat 1972: 280-1). Popular demands and elite grievances were absorbed into the army that was increasingly addressed by the CUP as
‘the vanguard of the freedom movement and the public guide to the true path’ (Sohrabi 2011: 96). An extensive military mutiny, combined with a broad popular uprising, consequently forced the Sultan to grant the constitution in July 1908 and turned the Young Turk Revolution into a ‘Jacobin revolution’. This is what I will unpack in the next section.

**The Young Turk Revolution, 1908-1918: A Capitalist Revolution?**

*Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and Justice!*

_A Young Turk slogan, 1908_

*Property of lawful title is guaranteed. There can be no dispossession...*

_Article 21, The Ottoman constitution of 1908_

*Everyone is a soldier now.*

_Enver Pasha, 1914_

*Private property is legitimate insofar as it serves social solidarity.*

_Ziya Gokalp, 1918_

Massive public celebrations, often with a strong emphasis on the fraternity of all Ottomans, took place in the first days of the revolution. *Hürriyet* (liberty) was now declared everywhere. So was *adalet* (justice). The coupling of liberty with justice had been a usual discursive act since the beginning of the Tanzimat era. Yet, supplementing the French revolutionary trio with ‘justice’ in 1908 was no longer an expression of the reforming elite’s fear of social strife only, but also the result of the active incorporation of lower-class demands into the emerging constitutional agenda. The meaning of ‘liberty’ was thus no longer the monopoly of the Young Turk elite and their propertied-allies. In the new era, the Young Turks would strive to control and direct lower-class reactions and demands into channels conducive to fighting new ‘internal’ and external enemies. The question of what kind of liberty and property would eventually prevail would thus be determined by a complex set of internal struggles and the
contingent unfolding of new geopolitical challenges. ‘National economics’ would arise in this vexed context as the ultimate Young Turk substitute for the relations of the market economy.

It is notable that the CUP, initially, did not seek a complete seizure of the state even if it had the power to do so. They allowed a government of old pashas to dominate the executive as long as they did not directly challenge CUP interests and policy priorities. A government that supported the opening of the state to merit, a more equitable distribution of the fiscal burden and protection of private property was sufficient to advance the Young Turks’ immediate interests. That said, however, the trajectory of revolutionary experience in both Russia and Iran, once again, forced the Young Turks to reconsider their own methods and means of sustaining the constitutional regime. Left without extra-legal backing, they reasoned, the Ottoman constitution could turn into a monarchical parody as in Russia (June 1907) or be completely abolished by the counter-revolutionary forces as in Iran (June 1908). The CUP, thus, must be ‘at once an open political party and a clandestine network’. It must act as ‘a government within the government’ that not only exercises power through well-placed members in the state but also penetrates and widens the public space through an extensive network of CUP branches, clubs and societies (Sohrabi 2011: 136). The latter organizational strategy would both facilitate and complicate the objectives of the Young Turk Revolution in the face of new geopolitical and social challenges.

The CUP was quite ambiguous in articulating the economic objectives of the revolution, by and large reproducing the tension between capitalism and Jacobinism that had haunted the reformers of the pre-1908 period. On the one hand, ‘free enterprise’ (teşebbüş-i şahiş) became one of the main code words of the Revolution, which, according to many influential Unionists, could flourish only in a society wherein the rules of free contract (serbest-i
mübadelat) and free competition (serbest-i rekabet) were instituted. ‘Capital’ was the key to bringing ‘civilization’ to the country, which, first and foremost, required that the ‘individual’ be allowed to pursue his selfish interest (Toprak 1982: 23-4). In this regard, the Revolution promised to create a de-corporated political space composed of free individuals endowed with equal rights. Despite recognizing the potentially integrative and mobilizing function of the capitalist market, however, the CUP’s economic proposals and the reform programme announced by the government at its first convention were just as much concerned with the continuity of Jacobin methods of creating the ‘free’ and ‘equal’ individual. Individuals were equal not only based on their equal rights to enjoy property but also their common duties towards the fatherland: military service and education, as well as property, were imagined as common denominators securing the equality of citizens and as preconditions to participation in the new modern economy (Ahmad 2009: 31; Kansu 2009: 201-3).

The euphoria for capitalism remained rather brief though, due to the combination of lower-class reactions, the counter-revolutionary threat and the acute crisis of geopolitical reproduction. During the heyday of the revolution, lower-classes consistently ‘misinterpreted’ liberty in ways conducive to their own interests: ‘liberty of property’ in their hands turned into liberty from tax, liberty from debt, liberty from conscription, liberty from fares and liberty from penalties. Especially in the first six months following the Revolution, government business came to a standstill in many places as guilds reclaimed their deteriorating rights, peasants refused to pay taxes and obey government representatives (Sohrabi 2011: 175-88; Kayali 1997: 59). The irony is that many CUP branches and clubs, established independently of the CUP headquarters, became the center of opposition to taxation. Given its leadership during the revolution, the CUP was seen by the masses as the guarantor of ‘justice’, hence organizing themselves as and through the CUP branches and clubs provided them with the
legitimate means of resisting what they considered injustice (Hanioglu 2001: 282; Emiroglu 1999: 50-1).

The first external shock to the new order came in October 1908 when Austria annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria declared its full independence. Perhaps much more unpleasant and unexpected than the loss of these two provinces, over which Istanbul had exercised no control since 1878, however, was that the loss instigated a reactionary popular wave in Istanbul and the provinces. Reminiscent of the revolutionary days, massive and spontaneous popular demonstrations took place, eventually forcing the government and the CUP to find and institute a new form of legitimate protest: the boycott. As for the government, boycotting Austrian and Bulgarian goods not only fell short of declaring war, thereby not ‘risk[ing] the newly acquired freedom for lands that had been lost long ago’, but could also be effective in keeping mass reactions and protests ‘away from a possible anti-constitutional political current’ (Çetinkaya 2014: 40-1). They thus thought of and popularized the boycott as a form of orderly and peaceful protest based on consumers’ refusal to buy certain products. Just as with ‘liberty’, however, the boycott went much beyond what was originally advocated by the CUP and the government. For the lower-classes tied their interests to the boycott movement and used it to increase their demands and widen their participation in the post-revolutionary public space (Sohrabi 2011: 187; Çetinkaya 2014: 63). As such, the boycott often far exceeded mere consumer action, escalating to violent forms of reaction to property: protestors picketed stores, assaulted merchants and threatened their employees and customers whenever their demands went unfulfilled. For example, the port workers, the most active element in the boycott movement until 1912, boycotted the companies that threatened their guild privileges on the grounds that they imported goods from foreign ‘enemies’. Especially after the government banned labour strikes (1909) and abolished guilds (1910), the
boycott remained an indispensable strategy for the port workers across the empire to maintain and advance their interests. Likewise, when prices of basic consumer goods imported from Austria increased as a result of the boycott, the urban poor who organized themselves in the boycott movement assaulted merchants for stockpiling goods and raising prices, hence for not being ‘patriotic’ (Çetinkaya 2014: 73).

While the ‘sanctity’ of property was endangered by the agitated masses and ‘liberty’ had no stable meaning, the CUP took another initiative, which would further complicate the post-revolutionary situation. In order to overcome fiscal problems and to smooth the upward mobility of educated officers loyal to the CUP, they pressed the government to dismiss large numbers of officials who were allegedly uneducated and related to the old-regime (Sohrabi 2011: 190, 223). In addition to the lower-ranking soldiers and bureaucrats, those especially targeted were the medrese students, the lower ulema cadres and populist religious organizations, whose inflated numbers and exemption from conscription was found hardly justifiable by the CUP. From the end of 1908, this motley crowd of disfavoured officials, who enjoyed popular support from the masses disappointed by the Revolution, began to organize and unite; this then culminated in a major empire-wide revolt in April 1909. Three main and interrelated demands came to the fore during the revolt. First, they wanted ‘justice’ for all those whose livelihoods were threatened by the ‘indiscriminate’ official purges. Next they demanded the recruitment of medrese students into the religious establishment and the continuity of their exemption from conscription. And finally, they took issue with the principle of ‘equality’. For equality forced them to give up their privileged access to state-based income, while reinforcing economic advantages already enjoyed by the propertied classes, most of whom were Greeks and Armenians. They argued that by equalizing the Muslim and the non-Muslim, the CUP actually countered the national interest and took sides
with the ‘infidels’, who were already supported by the European powers for the continuity of their trade privileges. That said, it is scarcely surprising that in some provincial towns with a high inter-ethnic composition, such as Adana, Ankara, Sivas and Aleppo, the revolt produced violent reactions against property and newly introduced technologies such as tractors, reaping machines, etc. This resulted in inter-religious conflicts and large-scale massacres of non-Muslim imperial subjects (Astourian 2011: 77-8).

The revolt was eventually extinguished by the military, but most of the pre-revolutionary nightmares of the CUP had already came true by May 1909. Mass uprisings, combined with the boycott movement, proved to be not only frightening but also an awakening of sorts. Through the boycott and the 1909 uprising the lower-classes acquired strong leverage in defining the ‘national’ interest, which forced the CUP to find new ways in which the dangerous masses could be prevented from completely derailing the reproduction of the new political community. More specifically, while the lower-classes reinvented and raised the traditional stakes in the newly emerging ‘national’ space, the CUP and its propertied-allies would not only partially concede to the lower-class reframing of the nation, but would also make use of the lower-class clubs and organizations to outcompete their own political and economic rivals. All this eventually set a pattern of elite manoeuvre and popular action that would repeatedly surface in different forms until 1914. Entailed by this entanglement of interests was the progressive radicalization/nationalization of the rules of reproduction in Ottoman civil society. The result would be the creation of an ‘ethical’ and ‘patriotic’, hence ‘truly Ottoman’ propertied-class and the construction of forms of ‘private’ property with new communitarian embellishments.
If the suppression of the 1909 revolt muted (at least for a while) the forces of the old regime, it also inaugurated a new period of constitutional politics and struggles. The latter half of 1908 witnessed the reintroduction of the constitution and the electoral law of 1876 with minor amendments. The electoral law, in principle, allowed a greater proportion of the population to enter the new political space as either primary or secondary voters (Kayali 1995: 268-71; Kansu 2009: 274). In the Chamber, the CUP-nominated candidates had won around 200 seats out of 281, yet the number of the ‘core’ CUP deputies had not been more than 54 (Kansu 2009: 351-4). The CUP’s parliamentary power was thus already fragile in 1908, which became even more alarming after 1909, for the Chamber, in the wake of the counter-revolutionary attempt, gained significant leverage over the Porte and the Palace. The Chamber now had the power to depose the Sultan and dissolve the cabinet if it wished to do so (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 284). Party politics consequently gained critical importance after the restoration of the constitutional regime, which, in turn, led within the Chamber to the surfacing of many of the fault lines that came to divide Ottoman civil society.

The organized challenge to the CUP in the parliament came primarily from old-regime bureaucrats and notables and the non-Turkish propertied-classes. The main bone of contention was the CUP’s adamant position on ‘equality’. Equality was the guiding principle in achieving the CUP’s vision of political centralization, opening the state to talent and reorganizing social relations along capitalist lines; all of which presupposed dissolution of the corporate privileges that came to determine one’s position in the Ottoman moral economy. Understandably, those who benefited from old-regime privileges, i.e. bureaucrats/notables of the old-regime and large segments of the propertied-classes, were not in favour of a radical application of the principle of equality. Among deputies, Greek merchants, Albanian and Arab notables, as well as old-regime grandees, were particularly suspicious of the CUP’s
equalizing and centralizing drive, which often led them to form anti-CUP alliances. The CUP drew its support mainly from the lesser Muslim officialdom, the Turkish propertied-classes who opposed the trading privileges enjoyed by non-Muslim merchants, and the ARF-related deputies who demanded the restoration of Armenian lands that had been usurped by Kurdish tribal chiefs (Ahmad 2009: 24).

The parliamentary struggles over ‘equality’, especially under worsening geopolitical circumstances, would generate extensive ramifications for the various parties involved, producing significant implications for empire-wide politico-economic struggles. The increasing threat of annexation of Crete by Greece (1909-11), Albanian rebellion (1910), Italian invasion of Tripoli (1911), British-Russian partition of Iran (1911) and finally the Balkan Wars (1912-3), would mark both the dire geopolitical-fiscal crisis confronting the Ottoman state and the escalation of intra-elite struggles for power and legitimacy within the chamber. The CUP was able to counter the growing parliamentary opposition only by appealing to and deepening its reach among the lower-classes, i.e. the masses that had already learned how to raise their own demands by playing the nationalism card (Ahmad 1988: 268). From 1909 the ‘patriotic’ clubs previously established in the provincial centers emerged as official CUP centers, while the CUP members and their propertied-allies infiltrated clubs and societies established by the lower-classes, most notably the ones related and contributing to the boycott movement (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 282; Çetinkaya 2014: 111-2).  

The second wave of boycotts began with the outbreak of the Cretan crisis and the arrival of Cretan Muslim immigrants to Asia Minor. In practice, the island had been semi-autonomous

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73 In early 1910, according to a prominent CUP member, the CUP had ‘more than 360 centers and 850 000 members, the chamber’s majority and a good number of cabinet members’, therefore it ‘constituted the Ottoman public opinion’ (Sohrabi 2011: 174).
since 1896, therefore, the declaration of Cretan allegiance to Greece in 1909 did not come as a shock. Yet, what was extraordinary was the level of mass mobilization caused by the Cretan crisis. Spontaneous mass meetings, volunteer enlistment initiatives, printed forms of agitation and the establishment of new patriotic clubs reinvigorated the popular-nationalistic setting of 1908. Boycotting, picketing and economic blockades consequently re-entered the lower-class agenda, yet this time targeting a new external and internal enemy: Greece and Ottoman Greek merchants (Kerimoglu 2006: 92). Aside from port workers who considered the boycott a means to protect their interests against the shipping agents and the lighter owners, the ‘street force’ of the boycott also consisted of newly arrived Cretan immigrants who, having been dispossessed, were probably the most eager to claim that ‘the boycott should harm the interest of the Hellenes [in general], so that they would be forced to migrate first by their own will’ (Çetinkaya 2014: 119).

The CUP was directly involved in organizing some of these actions, yet was never able to exercise full control over the movement. Indeed, in several towns, ‘the level of mobilization instilled fear in the elites, the members of the CUP, and particularly the Ottoman government’, prompting them to take (rather unsuccessful) measures to prevent the masses from beating Greek merchants, damaging their property and threatening the people not to work in and to buy from Greek stores (Çetinkaya 2014: 92, 100-1). Through the 1910-11 boycotts, therefore, the CUP and its propertied-allies, rather hesitantly, embraced the opportunity to counter their own parliamentary enemies, and in doing so, they legitimized and presented at least some of the lower-class demands as the interest of the nation. The amalgamation of different class demands as the national interest led, for example, the newly-established Cemiyet-i Mutesebbise (Society of Entrepreneurs) to claim that ‘it was a national responsibility for the wealthy to invest, and that the poor and the workers had rights to their
wealth’. Likewise, while seeing non-Muslim trade privileges as one of the ultimate reasons for Ottoman backwardness, CUP publications and pamphlets, appealing to the interests of land-hungry immigrants, could also state that ‘nobody forced [Greeks] to live in the Ottoman Empire, and it would be better if they left the “Turkish land”’ (ibid: 136-7).

No other war in Ottoman history, with the exception of the World War I, stirred up as much existential anxiety as the Balkan Wars. The war possessed a ‘total’ character, i.e. ‘the home front became an integral part of warfare’, and the Ottomans eventually lost virtually all their possessions in Europe as well as much of their revenues. Masses of Muslim immigrants streamed into the Ottoman Empire from the lost territories. The state was unable to pay salaries and overcome food shortages and the emergence of black markets, which not only caused a series of violent reactions and demonstrations across the empire, but also paved the way for the ultimate and most aggressive wave of boycotts (Besikci 2012: 3; Shaw and Shaw 1977: 294). This time, the CUP played a much more dynamic role in the boycott movement, actively propagating the unification of rich and poor Muslims in counteracting the Greek ‘traitors’. The boycotters accused Greek Ottomans of evading conscription and of financing and joining the Greek army during the Balkan Wars (Kerimoglu 2006: 94; Toprak 1995b: 109-10). The CUP asserted that the movement was not even a boycott anymore, but ‘a duty and revival of Muslims’ and ‘a call to reconquer the country’. The national interest now demanded that consumers give up their ‘silly preferences’ for non-Muslim goods and buy from Muslim stores only, and in turn, that Muslim merchants reinvest in the economy and hire Muslim workers. Otherwise, the CUP claimed ‘every penny given to non-Muslims’ would become ‘a bullet aimed at Muslims’ (Çetinkaya 2014: 168-9). Meanwhile, Muslim refugees, once again, emerged as the catalyst of the movement, extending the boycott from towns to the countryside. The earlier forms of boycott, such as picketing and physical intimidation,
consequently, were replaced by banditry and gang-formation in the countryside, causing thousands of Ottoman Greek subjects to leave their land and estates.

The post-revolutionary experimentation with capitalism thus collapsed in 1913. In the face of lower-class reactions and geopolitical challenges, the attempt to ‘free’ property from wider sociopolitical responsibilities brought the propertied-classes to the verge of destruction. And the new propertied-classes could seize and maintain wealth only by inventing a new form of economy organized around new communitarian objectives. Private property could survive only if it was re-decorated with responsibilities towards the general welfare of the ‘nation’. The ultimate locus of social reproduction, therefore, shifted from the market towards the nation. Put differently, individuals’ contribution to the welfare and survival of the nation, rather than market competition, would be the ultimate basis of their social reproduction. As such, unable to equalize ‘modern’ subjects on the basis of the relations of the capitalist contract, the CUP would eventually set the equality of service and sacrifice for the nation as the new standard of civilization.

Signalled here is the CUP’s ever more ambitious turn to the Jacobin methods of creating equality, securing political unity and increasing geopolitical competitiveness. The first Jacobin step had been already taken in 1908 by the reintroduction of the 1876 constitution with the infamous article 21. Private property was accepted, so was one’s right to subsistence. Subsistence and property concurrently became constitutional rights, the exercise of which was linked to military duty in July 1909. Conscription was made compulsory for all Ottoman subjects, regardless of income and ethno-religious differences. All fees for exemption from military service were abolished. ‘Comradeship in arms’, rather than comradeship in the marketplace, had thus begun to be perceived as ‘the most effective means for amalgamating
peoples of different races, religions and sects’ (Besikci 2012: 97). That said, however, the problem of conscription of non-Turkish elements could not be overcome until 1913 (and only partially thereafter). The Greek and Armenian communities conceded to conscription with the condition that their members would ‘serve in separate, ethnically uniform units officered by Christians’. This was rejected outright by the Young Turks ‘who saw it as just another way to boost the centrifugal forces of nationalism in the empire’. That being the case, many non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire continued to successfully resist conscription by either leaving the country or obtaining a foreign passport, thereby disabling the state’s resolve to universalize conscription (Zurcher 1999: 89; Aksakal 2014: 469). Even during the Balkan Wars, when conscription efforts took off relatively well (except in Kurdistan and Arabia), with non-Muslim recruits, who according to one estimate now made up one-fourth of the whole army, resistance to conscription continued within the army. Many Greek and Bulgarian recruits were reported to have changed sides, deserted, destroyed railway tracks and telegraph lines, which then made them the scapegoat for the ultimate defeat of the Ottoman armies (Adanir 2011: 120-3). The result is that while the implementation of Jacobin forms of property, equality and modern subjecthood facilitated the establishment of new bonds between the state and the Anatolian Muslim population, it also led to the further marginalization of non-Muslim groups in the newly emerging public space. With their property and existence already endangered between 1908 and 1912, non-Muslims would be subjected to another period of ‘Terror’ for not fitting the new standards of civilization characterized by the Jacobin model.75

74 Kurdish tribal units continued to function ‘as an alternative to the failure of conscription system in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia’ (Besikci 2012: 29).
75 Estimates for the number of Greeks who were forced to leave the Aegean Region from 1913 to 1918 run between 200 000 to 1 million. Indeed, the ‘success’ of this initial deportation encouraged the CUP to implement the same policy on the Armenian community during World War I. CUP-Armenian relations had become increasingly hostile after the Balkan Wars due to the CUP’s failure to ameliorate the conditions of Armenian sharecroppers vis-à-vis the Kurdish tribal lords and the CUP’s suspicion that Armenians, impressed by the Ottoman collapse in the Balkans, would cooperate with the Russians for a definitive solution to the
The state therefore grew increasingly suspicious of and reluctant to conscript non-Muslim subjects. Meanwhile in 1914 it enacted a series of new legal measures that intended to entirely abolish the exemption fee practice among the Turkish population, attempting, once again, to condition social reproduction to participation in the armed forces. It was declared that the new laws and decrees would enable ‘the most refined and the wealthiest’ to enjoy the ‘honour’ of actively ‘defending their motherland in the same way as the poor peasant little Mehmeds’, while the property-less, i.e. immigrants and refugees, would ‘accept conscription into the Ottoman army in return for their right to be…settled on Ottoman lands’. Ultimately, everyone, ‘the rich and the poor, the educated and the illiterate’ were brought ‘under the same banner’ for the protection of the nation (millet) and the fatherland (vatan) (Besikci 2012: 139-41, 172-3). The right to subsistence and the right to property were therefore simultaneously recognized; and both rights were conditioned to the realization of military duty. Military duty, not the capitalist contract, united and mobilized the propertied and the property-less. Vatan and millet then heralded the emergence of a novel political space and political community built upon historically specific property relations. ‘National economics’ of the Young Turks emerged precisely in this context to institutionalize the property relations necessary for and conducive to the reproduction of this new political community and political space.

**Substituting Capitalism via ‘National Economics’**

‘National economics’ attempted to solve the tension between subsistence and property, i.e. between equality and liberty, by reorganizing social classes along solidaristic lines. The agrarian/national question. The fear of partition further escalated in the course of World War I, resulting in massive expulsions and the almost complete annihilation of the Armenian presence in Anatolia (Akcam 2004: 141-50). In Ottoman Syria, the Young Turks were able to implement a ruthless conscription policy during World War I. In contrast to Anatolia, however, the CUP in Syria was unable to prevent food shortages, the emergence of black-markets and rising inflation in basic necessities during the war. Conscription, combined with widespread famine (as a result of which one out of seven people died by war’s end), caused various riots and rebellions, culminating in the infamous Arab Revolt of 1916. The Young Turk ‘Terror’ eventually descended on Arab lands, causing numerous deportations and executions (Aksakal 2014: 462; Kayali 1997: 194).
creation of a ‘national’ bourgeois class was the bedrock of national economics. This was a bourgeoisie that would not seek its selfish interest only, but serve the ‘nation’ by funding the state in its war endeavour and providing an ‘ethical’ space of accumulation, i.e. accumulation without dispossession, or better put, accumulation without infringing on the minimum subsistence reserved for patriotic, hence equal citizens.\textsuperscript{76} The Great War forced the systematic formulation and provided the first testing ground for the realization of ‘national economics’. During the war, almost half of the adult male population outside the civil service was conscripted for military service, in addition to the ‘hundred of thousands, both men and women, conscripted into labour battalions’.

Levels of production considerably diminished, which, combined with escalating war expenditures, put an enormous strain on public finances (Aksakal 2014: 468; Hanoğlu 2008: 189-90). Inflation, food shortages, price speculation, hoarding and black-marketeering developed to an unprecedented extent, rendering extremely difficult the provisioning of the army and the towns (Ahmad 1988: 274-5). Repeated attempts to stabilize the currency and prevent shortages by fiscal and punitive means did not bear fruit.

Big banks and businesses, often co-owned by foreigners and non-Muslim merchants, had no confidence in newly issued paper notes nor did they show any interest in funding government debt. In the countryside, while peasants were heavily indebted and barely able to maintain subsistence, Muslim landowners could not benefit from increasing demand due to commercial oligopolies dictating low prices on agricultural goods (Toprak 1995a: chp.2). And with no funds to create and improve infrastructure and an industrial base\textsuperscript{77}, the Ottoman state could

\textsuperscript{76} The reconciliation of liberty and equality by way of solidarism was best crystallized in the words of Ziya Gokalp, central committee member of the CUP and the founder of Turkish sociology: ‘Turks love freedom and independence…they can not be socialists. But they love equality; they cannot be liberals either. The system best suited to Turkish culture is solidarism. Private property is legitimate insofar as it serves social solidarity’ (quoted in Barlas 1998: 46).

\textsuperscript{77} In 1913 in what was to become the Turkish Republic there were about 600 manufacturing firms employing ten or more workers. The total number of workers employed in these establishments was around 35 000 or about 0.2 percent of the population (Pamuk 2005: 113).
hardly maintain, utilize and ‘cope with the mass army they had so diligently created’ (Zurcher 1999: 91).

It is this context in which the CUP initiated its major ‘solidaristic’ drive. First of all, the CUP unilaterally abrogated the non-Muslim trade privileges and increased custom tariffs in an effort to encourage domestic production and create more favourable conditions for Muslim guilds, merchants and peasants. All ‘infant’ industries and agricultural production were ‘completely’ protected from international competition (Toprak 1995b: 39). This was followed by a ‘language reform’, which encouraged the employment of Turks by making an imperative for the use of the Turkish language in all business correspondence and transactions. Seeking to gain further leverage over the market, the CUP also gathered and organized former artisan and worker guilds as ‘national societies’. This not only lent former guilds a ‘national’ and ‘solidaristic’ base for their activities, but also enabled the CUP to obtain the support of the lower-classes in establishing and enforcing commercial monopolies in basic necessities. Consequently, while a system of allocation was put in place in towns to fight price speculation and food shortages, which enabled the urban poor to survive under dire war-time circumstances, the CUP also reaped huge profits, which were then transferred to a stratum of the ‘enlightened bourgeoisie’ and ‘enlightened farmers’ (Toprak 1999: 184-5; Ahmad 1988: 271-2). During the war, clubs linked to the CUP emerged as political and intellectual centers of a ‘national commercial awakening’. The CUP led and provided several economic and extra-economic incentives to the Muslim propertied-classes to establish ‘national banks’, ‘national credit cooperatives’, ‘national joint-stock companies’ and ‘national farmer cooperatives’. CUP-related credit and banking institutions as well as CUP monopolies were vital to ‘reconciling individual interest with national interest’ (Toprak 1995a: 66). These monopolies and banking institutions freed the Muslim merchant and landowner from low
prices and unfavourable loan conditions dictated by non-Muslim monopolies and foreign banks. The Muslim bourgeoisie, in turn, ‘paid back’ the nation by establishing and investing in national joint-stock companies and by buying government debt. Furthermore, with higher agricultural prices and the credit opportunities specially designed for small producers, the state (however imperfectly) attempted to protect the peasantry from the relations of usury and provided incentives to increase peasant production for urban and military consumption (Toprak 1995a: 73, 139-42; Ahmad 2009: 68). Similarly, CUP members and propertied elites, mainly organized in semi-voluntary societies, developed a system of poor relief, which they preferred to call ‘public assistance’ rather than charitable activity. ‘Public assistance’ especially targeted peasant-soldiers, i.e. needy veterans and their families, aiming to contribute to their subsistence and generational security, thereby connecting once again the social reproduction of the poor to their geopolitical usefulness (Özbek 1999: 22-3).

Undoubtedly, the redistributive impact of ‘national economics’ remained very lop-sided. The CUP unleashed propertied interests as much as it could. It allowed Muslim merchants to massively profit from skyrocketing prices without imposing extra taxes on them, permitted landowners to accumulate land to the detriment of the peasantry and even subjected peasants to forced-labour in big commercial farms (Ahmad 2009: 78-80). Yet, despite all this, by leaving article 21 intact, it also recognized minimum subsistence as a constitutional right and tried to uphold it as a public duty.78 Furthermore, balancing subsistence and property, equality and liberty, order and progress became an even more alarming duty in the wake of the October Revolution. The proponents of ‘national economics’ and solidarism construed the

78 Tekin Alp, one of the major theoreticians of ‘national economics’, expressed this ambivalence as such: ‘we believe that the real substratum of the Turkish existence is the peasant class…Still, while our nationalism demands that we give the primary place to the peasantry, it equally demands that we support the growth of the Turkish bourgeoisie…[For] if the Turks fail to produce among themselves a bourgeois class…the chances of survival of a Turkish society, under the onslaught of European capitalism and big industry, will be very slim’ (quoted in Berkes 1964:426).
Bolshevik revolution as the mirror image of the ‘Social Darwinistic’ policies implemented in Russia. Untramelled liberalism, they argued, ended with the revolutionary annihilation of property and liberty in Russia, which reinforced the Young Turks’ self-professed determination ‘to reconcile liberty and justice’ on Turkish soil (Toprak 2013: 301-3).

What to make of ‘national economics’ then? Did it aim to establish merely a form of ‘social liberalism’ or ‘national capitalism’, as often assumed? Did ‘solidarism’ simply seek to ease the Ottoman transition to capitalism by neutralizing the social costs of capitalist competition and accumulation? Or did it substitute capitalism for a novel mode of social relatedness? National economics never repudiated the rights of the individual, but conditioned these rights to the realization of sociopolitical duties towards the Turkish nation. By conditioning social reproduction to serving the ‘nation’, the Young Turks not only vindicated the propertied individual in the eyes of the have-nots, but also formulated and generalized a set of non-market means to accessing sources of subsistence. ‘Property’ was much less an ‘economic’ right enjoyed by those who successfully competed in the marketplace and much more a political privilege for those who served the nation. As such, solidarism reinvented the ‘Turkish nation’ as a new impersonalized socioeconomic unit, a substitute abstraction between the market and the state, an alternative frame of reference according to which social reproduction would be organized.

79 It is commonplace to argue that the Young Turks imported ‘solidarist’ ideology mainly from Third Republic France, with Gustave LeBon and Emile Durkheim being their main source of inspiration. This view is correct insofar as it shows from where Turkish solidarism takes its cue. Yet, it is completely misplaced to equate the relations and objectives underlying French solidarism to those of its Turkish counterpart (e.g. Hanioglu 2000; Toprak 1982). The former’s negation of class conflict, advocacy of social reform and emphasis on social solidarity was produced by and responded to the challenges of the transition to capitalism in France. During the Third Republic, although producers were not yet completely deprived of their customary trade and local rights, economic inequalities were ‘no longer as clearly and as immediately related to patent juridico-political inequalities as [they] used to be. Class was less and less mingled with extra-economic status relations and was increasingly mediated by property relations and market exchanges between formally equal individuals belonging to a broadening community of citizens’ (LaFrance 2013: 294). While French solidarism therefore aimed to ease the social cost of destabilization generated by the advance of capitalism, the CUP asserted solidarism in an utterly non-capitalist context.
‘National economics’ aimed to build a new form of individuality, an individual equipped not with market rationality, but with ‘national culture’ (millî kültür) and ‘national morality’ (millî ahlak). In fact, it is in relation to this challenge that the intellectual stratum of the CUP, especially after the Balkan Wars, began to give up productivist assumptions about economic development and formulate culture-based prescriptions for Ottoman backwardness. Ziya Gokalp, for example, was increasingly convinced that social life could not be ‘oriented by rational or utilitarian standards. The orientation toward which a society bent its course was determined by values and ideals’ (quoted in Berkes 1964: 364). In this respect, continues Gokalp, ‘English political economy…did not suit the [Turkish] national spirit [and] misled [Turks]’ from the onset of the Tanzimat (quoted in Barlas 1998: 45). What was to be done instead was first ‘to analyze the self or the consciousness of the society’ and then ‘to turn the unconscious gropings into conscious, cultivated, systematized and coordinated ideals’. Indeed, ‘without the cultivation of Turkish culture, there could be no genuine reform and modernization’. Needed therefore was what Gokalp called a ‘New Life’ founded on a ‘modern national culture’, i.e. a life whose modernness was to be defined and measured not according to some market criteria, but its level of Turkish-ness (quoted in Berkes 1964: 364-5).

If the essential task for economic development and political mobilization was to define and systematize cultural codes associated with Turkish-ness, institutions that could not fulfil this function had to be reformed: the mosque, the school, the court and the family had to be reorganized in order to inculcate a new socioeconomic morality. Accordingly, the ulema were once again accused of not being able to ‘adjust’ and of failing to provide a cultural-moral base for stirring the Turkish national ‘spirit’. From 1913 ‘a frantic push toward secularization’ was
thus launched aiming at increasing state leverage over pious foundations, breaking the control of semi-autonomous religious sects on primary schools, educating the *ulema* cadres, making access to religious posts ‘merit-based’, modernizing the school curricula, increasing the power of lay courts and so on. Through the Family Law of 1917, likewise, the state assumed power to ‘modernize’ matters related to all family relationships, such as marriage, polygamy, adultery, divorce and inheritance (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 306-7). That said, for reasons I explained earlier, the exhaustion of traditional sociocultural resources did not lead to the increase of anti-religious sentiment in the vision of Ottoman modernization. Quite the contrary, the Young Turks thought of increasing state control over religion as an attempt to revive Islam as well as the state. Just as the pre-revolutionary radicals who saw nothing incongruent between Islam and science, the later Young Turks maintained a ‘Turkified’ Islam as the repository of ethics conducive to ‘civilization’. Islam, cleansed from ‘Arabic’ traditions and rescued from old-ulema interpretations, could ‘provide the Turks with a stable base for participation in contemporary Western civilization’ (ibid: 302). The Young Turks therefore could substitute ‘turkification’ of Islam for a radical secularization of the French type. ‘Turkification, Islamization and Contemporization’, the famous trio formulated by Gokalp, set the terms of and guide Turkish entry into modernity.

**Conclusions: 1908 as a Substitute Jacobin Revolution**

The bourgeoisie is the paradigmatic agent of modernity. The conventional view holds that without the bourgeoisie’s appeal to universality, its passion for liberal democracy and its drive for capitalist development, modernization is either incomplete or has to take a ‘defensive’ path. In this respect, the history of modernity is assumed to be the history of the rise of bourgeoisie. Most comparative-sociological analysis of the Young Turk Revolution subscribe

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80 Although still not explicitly articulated, underlying the family law was an intention to reform traditional forms of womanhood. The Young Turks sought to ally with women to make the (peasant) family unit politically more reliable and geopolitically more useful. Women were envisaged as active participants in the ‘national economy’ as ‘responsible’ mothers and producers, see Toprak 1991
to this paradigmatic view notwithstanding their disagreements on the reasons for the ‘deviation’ of the Turkish case from the ‘classical’ bourgeois path to modernity. Caglar Keyder, for example, argues that the ‘peripheral’ status of the Ottoman Empire in the world economy culminated in the formation of a bourgeois class whose interests rested primarily in capital accumulation in the core countries, rather than in the Ottoman market. Consequently, instead of ‘replac[ing] the bureaucracy of the old regime with state functionaries more or less given to serving capitalist interests’, as (presumably) was the case in revolutionary France, the Young Turks largely remained as a bureaucratic movement, failing to fully address bourgeois interests (Keyder 1987: 76). In a similar vein, Feroz Ahmad contends that given the weakness of bourgeois classes, the Young Turks had to ally with big landlords during and after the Revolution, which considerably compromised the revolutionary character of the Young Turk era. This ‘incompleteness’ of the Turkish revolution, so continues the argument, contrasts the bourgeois revolutionaries in France, who, in cooperation with the peasantry, established the ‘classical path of the bourgeois revolution’ (Ahmad 200x). Sukru Hanioglu, in like fashion, argues for the ‘failure of a vital bourgeois class to emerge in the late Ottoman Empire’, which he thinks also explains the CUP leaders’ conservative reformation rather than ‘destruction’ of the Ottoman old regime, ‘unlike the French revolutionaries of 1789’ (Hanioglu 2008: 209, 148).

Of course, the model of ‘classical’ bourgeois revolution used by Keyder, Ahmad and Hanioglu as the basis of comparison for analyzing the late Ottoman and Young Turk era has lost most of its persuasiveness since the revisionist turn. The historical narrative associated with Western European transformation- a capitalist bourgeois class ousting from power a class of feudal aristocrats- has long been revised, with ‘bourgeois revolution’ is now considered, at best, a protracted process, undertaken from above or below and largely
propelled or mediated by geopolitical factors. Despite all the revisions made in this classical formulation, however, this chapter has contended that most historical materialist accounts have continued to perceive bourgeois revolutions as necessarily related to the development of capitalism. I have argued that this stems from their transhistorical equation of the bourgeoisie with capitalism. Such a view of social agency ignores that the conditions of reproduction of the bourgeois class and its relation to the state, production and other classes are historically variable and do not approximate any deductive generalization. Correlatively, the uncritical equation of the bourgeoisie to capitalism theoretically precludes the possibility that the bourgeois revolutions may generate historically novel ‘modern’ social forms in substitution for capitalism.

Indeed, once we depart from essentialist interpretations of social class and historical change in the West, which lays the foundation for the ‘difference’ of the Young Turk Revolution in several conventional accounts, we are able to reveal with more precision the spatially and temporally interactive character of world historical development and the multiplicity of modernities generated therein. In this light, this chapter has argued that the late Ottoman and Young Turk attempts at modernization were built on two historically-distinct yet mutually-restructuring projects: capitalism and Jacobinism. However, the social character of the pre-existent relations of appropriation, together with the lateness of absolutist restoration, rendered the realization of Ottoman ‘combined’ project much more than its Western European counterparts. The social and geopolitical risks associated with the capitalist transformation of the Ottoman fiscal base proved particularly formidable, which compelled the Ottoman elite, from the 1870s on, to implement more vigorously the Jacobin project. Significant steps were taken to define human existence away from the market, with participation in mass citizen army and bureaucracy, rather than competition in the market place, began to be understood as
the basis of the social reproduction of imperial subjects. Given the persistence of non-capitalist social relations and the continuity of the centrality of the state in surplus appropriation, even the limited introduction of different manifestations of popular sovereignty, such as political equality and merit-based access to the state, bore grave consequences for the reproduction of the ruling elite. This became especially serious in the wake of the Russian and Iranian revolutions, when the Ottoman lower bureaucracy, aiming to have better access to the state, increasingly appealed to the lower class interests, which, in turn, set in train a cumulatively radicalizing process of redefining the nation and the citizen.

The 1908 Revolution broke out as much a revolution from above as a revolution from below. On the one hand, the lower bureaucracy conquered the state and was determined to ‘rationalize’ the society based on the rules of free contract and free competition. Yet, the fact that the new state elites were able to put liberal demands into the revolutionary agenda thanks to the mobilization of lower classes put definitive limits to the regeneration of the capitalist project. The lower class reactions and the severity of geopolitical challenges eventually convinced the elites to envision and seek to establish a historically-distinct regime of property in substitution of capitalism. In this regard, the 1908 Revolution did not result in a mere conservative reformism (pace Hanioglu) nor did it entail an incomplete/peripheral capitalism (pace Ahmad and Keyder). The revolution opened and widened new non-market channels of reproduction and accumulation. A ‘modern’ economy and society underlined by a new conception of private property and an impersonalized political collectivity consequently emerged, the participation in which was by and large conditioned to serving the ‘nation’ and the ‘state’. The Jacobin forms of reproduction did not merely ‘shape’ the relations of the market society, as was the case in Western Europe, but completely substituted them. A
historically specific Jacobinism prevailed on Turkish lands, whose contradictory legacy was to continue to guide and trouble the early Republican elite.
Chapter 4

Beyond the Turkish Sonderweg: Kemalism as the Ultimate Turkish Substitution for Capitalism

Much of the last two hundred years has shown that war, industrialization and agrarian change are deeply interwoven processes. Agrarian and industrial transformation deeply impacted the rules of military competition, forcing ruling elites around the world to ‘modernize’. A multiplicity of ‘modernization’ projects eventually arose, producing historically distinct agrarian-industrial compounds. Every modernization project required a degree of adaptation of foreign institutions, relations and subjectivities to local circumstances, hence entailing the generation of ‘novel’ social forms conducive to industrial and agrarian development. However, it is commonplace to argue that partly due to the legacy of past social relations and partly due to the economic/military constraints posed by early developers, the processes of adaptation often took more authoritarian, defensive and statist forms in late modernizing countries. The problem of societal reorganization associated with industrialization was thus magnified in late-developing countries, which forced them to pursue ‘peculiar’ by-roads to modernity facilitating rapid geopolitical catch-up.

Undoubtedly, for most agrarian and historical sociology scholarship, such a by-road in Western Europe is best epitomized by Germany’s ‘special’ route to modernity (Sonderweg). Terence Byres, for example, argues that a feudal agrarian-military ruling class, the Junkers, remained inexorable throughout the early modern period in Prussia; therefore no capitalist farmers were allowed to emerge from the ranks of the peasantry, which could have otherwise initiated an ‘agrarian capitalism from below’. In its stead, at the onset of the 19th century partly as response to the growing profit opportunities and partly due to worsening geopolitical
conditions, the Junkers themselves initiated an agrarian capitalism from above. As the Junkers themselves became capitalist, they significantly retarded mechanization in agriculture and thereby industrialization in towns (at least until the 1860s), while leaving an enduring conservative imprint on the processes of modernization in Germany (Byres 1996). In similar fashion to Byres, Barrington Moore contends that in 17th and 18th century Prussia the prevalence of labor-intensive and labor-repressive agriculture made the development of a ‘militarized fusion of royal bureaucracy and landed aristocracy’ necessary. As the geopolitical pressure to industrialize escalated during the 19th century, the bourgeoisie entered the ruling class coalition, but only as a junior partner: It was ‘too weak and dependent to take power and rule in its own right’; therefore it ‘exchanged the right to rule for the right to make money’. Consequently, the weight of the aristocracy in the ruling class alliance persisted, which resulted in a process of industrial development led by the state and a conservative modernization project built upon the aristocracy’s political and cultural preferences (Moore 1967: 435-40).

The relative lack or weakness of an ‘enterprising stratum peasantry’ in the countryside and of ‘strong bourgeois agency’ in the towns therefore marks the historical distinctiveness of German modernization. In this regard, the Sonderweg theory rests on the general standard of capitalist development against which the ‘modernness’ of late development projects is measured. In other words, the method and assumptions that underlie the Sonderweg theory presuppose an ‘original’ pattern of capitalist development according to which late development projects are typified. As such, it comes as no surprise that some of the alleged peculiarities of the ‘German path’, i.e. the transition to ‘capitalism from above’, the ‘persistence’ of bureaucratic interests, the ‘weakness’ of the industrial bourgeoisie and the resultant ‘conservative modernity’, directly echo the framework of analysis used to explain
the sociological-comparative character of early Republican Turkey also. According to Çağlar Keyder, for example, the specificity of Turkish modernization lies partly in the ‘peripheral’ integration of the Ottoman Empire into the world economy and partly in ‘the peculiar status of the bureaucracy as a ruling class’. While the empire’s peripheral status in the world economy considerably limited the prospects for the development of an industrial bourgeoisie, the power of the bureaucratic class curtailed the development of a landowning oligarchy in 19th century Anatolia. During the early Republican period the bureaucratic class restructured the social pillars of the modernization project from above by creating an industrial bourgeoisie and a middle stratum of market-oriented peasantry. The result was two fold: First, ‘the bourgeoisie exchanged the right to establish…a civil society for…the privilege to make money’. Second, while the political support given to the middle peasantry generalized the relations of ‘petty commodity production’ in agriculture, it also checked the rapid development of capitalist social relations in the countryside, thereby sanctioning a highly mediated articulation with capitalism. A form of ‘state capitalism’ and an authoritarian/statist modernization project eventually prevailed under the rubric of Kemalism.

In short, when the classes associated with the ‘original’ advance of capitalism, i.e. bourgeois classes and middle farmers, are relatively weak and state-dependent, the modernization process takes a statist, conservative and politically and culturally reactionary form. Therefore it is the degree of development of bourgeois classes and ‘middle farmers’ that serves as a yardstick by which different modernization projects are classified. In this chapter, I develop a theoretical and historical critique of this analytical and comparative framework. I raise and substantiate two main and interrelated points of contention. First, the Sonderweg mode of explanation rests on a deductive understanding of class agency. Class roles are theorized not through social agents’ relations to one another in historically specific contexts of social
reproduction, but primarily deduced from *a priori* abstractions derived from the capitalist mode of production. That is, the (industrial) bourgeoisie and middling farmers are trans-historically equated to and read back in time as universal carriers of capitalism. The whole discussion on late development then boils down to finding reasons for the ‘absence’ or ‘weakness’ of industrial and agrarian middle classes. This view of social class reinforces the essentialist assumption that the process of capitalist transformation is primarily one of a quantitative expansion of capabilities and productive techniques, rather than a qualitative and systematic shift in the organization of political power and human relations that compel and induce the commodification of the means of subsistence, especially of land and labour. 

Second, by judging the quality of modernization by the level of development of capitalism and bourgeois classes, the Sonderweg paradigm uncritically dissolves modernity into capitalism. Modernity is assumed to (fully) develop whenever the bourgeoisie and capitalism are freed from adverse politico-cultural and international factors. Thus understood, the phenomena conventionally associated with modernity such as the centralization and rationalization of the state, the systematization of cultural codes, nation-building and secularism, simply mean facilitating the politico-cultural ‘superstructure’ of and catching up with capitalism. With the unqualified equation of modernity to capitalism, the Sonderweg paradigm consequently builds a historical narrative in which all modernization projects with a ‘bourgeois’ component are reduced to different instances of a single ‘transitional’ social type, all moving at different speeds and by different paths towards capitalist modernity. Taken as a whole, the Sonderweg theory is characterized by a method of explanation that rules out from the very beginning the possibility of alternative non-capitalist modernities.

This chapter begins by introducing the Sonderweg paradigm and its critiques. I will pay particular attention to Terence Byres’ method of explanation of the differing forms of
capitalist transition and David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley’s critique of the Sonderweg paradigm. I will then propose that a departure from the deductive understanding of social class underlying the Sonderweg theory, in fact, enables us to differentiate among qualitatively distinct, geopolitically competing and mutually re-transforming projects of modernity. Building on theoretical and historical insights developed in previous chapters, I will then situate within the broader Sonderweg debate the specific problem of early Republican modernization in Turkey.

**Agrarian Change, Industrialization and the Economistic Fallacy: Reconceptualizing Late Modernization**

The critique of ‘economistic fallacy’ constitutes one of the main methodological pillars of Karl Polanyi’s analysis of the development of market society. According to Polanyi, reading back into history the dynamics and motives underlying market society naturalizes and universalizes capitalist economic action, thereby turning capitalism into a self-referential and self-birthing phenomenon. Economistic fallacy narrates a world history in which past economies appear to be mere ‘miniatures or early specimens of our own’ and markets seem to have ‘come into being unless something was to prevent it’ (Polanyi 1957a: xviii; 1977: 14). Immediately lost in this narrative, Polanyi argues, is the fact that non-market economies do not have ‘institutionalized markets’ to compel and induce economic action driven by a distinctive market rationality. As such, Polanyi departs from the idea that capitalism is a natural trait of a single class agency and he hints that class interests, far from being explainable *sui generis*, are comprehensible only by focusing on the historically specific circumstances of social reproduction.

From this angle, the terms ‘capitalism from below’ and ‘capitalism from above’ become susceptible to serious ambiguities, especially in relation to their utilization as conceptual keys to understanding diverging paths to modernity. No doubt, one of the most sophisticated
scholarly works employing these theoretical pointers is that of Terence Byres. For Byres, the manner in which the ‘agrarian question’ is resolved, i.e. the question of how to reorganize rural social structures in ways conducive to the development of capitalism in agriculture and industry, has profound implications for explaining varying trajectories of modern state-formation (Byres 1996: 419-20). Depending on which class is central to agrarian transformation and how this centrality is checked and supported by other classes and the state, the transformation of rural societies has taken very different forms, generating ‘progressive’ or ‘reactionary’ modernities (Byres 2009: 34). ‘Capitalism from below’, in principle, speaks to a situation wherein the process of agrarian transformation derives its main impetus from within the peasantry: A richer stratum of farmers, exploiting growing market opportunities, rises from an ocean of small peasant holders, improving the forces of production, deepening the process of social differentiation, thereby providing a large home market for industrial and consumption goods as ‘petty commodity producers’. In this regard, Byres sees prior peasant differentiation, hence the existence of a proto-capitalist group of peasants, as central to a relatively rapid and ‘progressive’ transition to capitalism.

Of the ‘transformations from below’ perhaps the most typical is the transformation of the Northern United States. According to Byres, the roots of overall capitalist accumulation in the Northern US lay in the prior existence of a commercially oriented peasantry (which he labels ‘early petty commodity producers) and the subsequent transformation of these peasants into ‘advanced petty commodity producers’ under new political constraints. In Byres’ conception, both ‘early’ and ‘advanced’ petty commodity producers generated ‘exchange values as well as use-values, although to very differing degrees...in the former case marginally and in the latter totally and systematically’ (Byres 1996: 387). The agrarian transition thus began first as a result of the commercializing impulses from within the peasantry and then due
to the strict imposition of debt and tax payment and the enforcement of a new land system that closed off cheap and easy access to the bulk of public lands. Eventually, rural households had to increasingly specialize in commodity production. They became progressively dependent on the market for their social reproduction, thereby expanding both marketable agricultural output and the home market for manufactured goods. A similar scenario also applies to England. In Byres’ narrative a ‘proto-capitalist’ peasant elite emerged in England after the Black Death, eager to produce for the market and to accumulate land. Byres acknowledges that the ‘rise’ of wealthy peasants was checked by serious socio-legal limits within the village community until the late 15th century when English lords finally began to transform village ‘custom’ by leasing their demesnes on competitive market prices. And yet he contends that without the prior peasant differentiation which ‘had yielded a strong class of rich peasants, with the desire, the means and the capacity to accumulate and expand’ English lords would have not been able to lease their demesnes at competitive rates, thereby being incapable of taking the critical step towards capitalism (Byres 2009: 37-8).

The assumption guiding Byres’ idea of ‘capitalism from below’ is that prior to the transformation of the rules of accessing land, accumulation through product specialization, improvements in labour productivity and cost-cutting was rational. Hence commodity producing rural households with larger lands were, in fact, ‘capitalist farmers in embryo’ who were subjected to ‘the law of value, to the market’ (Byres 2009: 37; 1996: 387). True, the prior existence of a strong middling peasantry producing commodities was an important variable in facilitating the transition to capitalism both in England and the Northern US (Brenner 1985b: 300; Post 2011: 180; Dimmock 2014: 182-3). Yet, it is not quite clear how commodity producing rural households in a context characterized by non-capitalist social relations can be seen as subject to the dictates of market competition, thereby being perceived
as the initial trigger of the transition to capitalism (Post 2006). Indeed, in both pre-enclosure England and the pre-1840 Northern US, Byres concedes that rich peasants were only ‘marginally’ involved in commodity production and still ‘able to retreat fully into subsistence production’ (Byres 2006: 57-8). That said, Byres overlooks that for peasant households to turn into ‘petty/simple commodity producers’ a qualitative change in the rules of accessing land had to happen, which would compel and empower rural households to initiate and generalize the dynamics of capitalist accumulation (Friedman 1980). Without broader socio-legal changes, rural households, whatever the degree of prior economic differentiation, would remain as ‘peasants’, i.e. producers who prioritize production for subsistence, who do not have to compete in the market to survive, are thereby not subjected to the ‘law of value’, and are not empowered to accumulate land at the expense of less competitive peasant producers.\(^1\) As such, depicting rich peasants as ‘proto-capitalist’ simply falls back into the ‘economistic fallacy’: Byres presumes and extrapolates back in time the logic and imperatives of capitalist accumulation in order to make the case for a ‘farmer-led’ capitalism.

By contesting the argument that agrarian capitalism ‘rose’ from ‘below’ in early industrializing states, we challenged the first comparative criterion (a rising middling peasantry) according to which the ‘modernness’ of late modernization projects is conventionally typified. What about the (industrial) bourgeoisie? After all, was it not also the ‘weakness’ or ‘absence’ of an industrial bourgeoisie that led ‘astray’ the projects of late modernization? As mentioned earlier, Germany’s Sonderweg has been conventionally understood as a ‘compromise between iron and rye’, an aphorism used by many scholars to

\(^1\) This point is further clarified when one considers that both in 15\(^{th}\) century England and France ‘a middle peasantry on relatively quite large holdings’ occupied a strong position and yet the developmental patterns under similar commercial and demographic conditions radically diverged thereafter. While in England the lordly imposition of new rules of reproduction led to the rise of a class of capitalist tenants from the ranks of the peasantry, in France in the absence of ‘leaseholds’ the result of demographic and economic growth was the morcellization of land, the perpetuation of peasant ways of life and the rise of the ‘tax-office’ structure of absolutism (Brenner 1985b: 300-2).
explain Germany’s statist/protectionist economic policies and the bourgeoisie’s assimilation into the Junkers’ conservative political/cultural outlook (e.g. Gerschenkron 1943; Moore 1966). In short, the later the industrialization and the weaker/more compliant the industrial bourgeoisie, the more the likelihood of landlord/bureaucratic intervention into the economy, hence the continuity of non-liberal notions of modernity.\(^82\)

Perhaps one of the most powerful critiques of this position is provided by Geoff Eley and David Blackbourn (1984). Eley and Blackbourn confront the Sonderweg schema of world development by challenging ‘assumptions about the role played by a buoyant bourgeoisie in the forging of bourgeois society’ (ibid:16). They criticize ‘the habitual conflation’ of bourgeoisie and democracy, which, they rightly contend, is rooted in highly contested histories of the alleged ‘early’ modernizers such as England and France (ibid: 58-9, 168-174). Departing from narratives of a ‘rising’ or ‘failing’ bourgeois class dedicated to carrying out its ‘historic mission’ of transforming society, Eley suggests that the notion of bourgeois revolution ‘should be dissociated from the necessary introduction of specific constitutional and liberal-democratic forms of rule’ and ‘redefined more flexibly to mean the inauguration of the bourgeois epoch—i.e. the successful installation of a legal and political framework for the unfettered development of industrial capitalism’ (ibid: 83). Likewise, Blackbourn argues that ‘the independent and assertive bourgeoisie lurking behind so many assumptions…has

\(^82\) Despite several theoretical nuances, this interpretative framework is widely reproduced in the analyses of late-late development also. In the Middle East, for example, it is often argued that the ‘patrimonial’ or the ‘rentier’ character of the state, buttressed by sacred law and an Islamic understanding of justice, has frustrated the potential to generate an independent space where bourgeois classes could flourish (Gellner 1981; Turner 1984). In Dependency Theory perspective, the emphasis shifts from the non-capitalist obstacles to the bourgeoisie’s rationality to the hierarchies in the world economy. Unlike its counterparts in the ‘core’ of the capitalist world economy, the bourgeoisie in the ‘periphery’ does not seek to transform its own society. It either forms alliances with pre-capitalist social forces for the continuity of the relations of dependence between the core and the periphery or it leaves the leadership of the developmental project to a ‘state bourgeoisie’ (Alavi 1972; Amin 1976; Evans 1989). The argument then runs that given the relative weakness or the peripheral character of the bourgeois classes, late and late-late modernization projects remain as ‘limited’ or ‘unfinished’ modernities imposed from ‘above’. State-led capitalisms consequently prevail in late modernizing countries, which inhibit the full development of liberal political and cultural institutions (Trimberger).
been a historically elusive class’, thus ‘the idea of a bourgeoisie as the *deux ex machina* of the transition to capitalism’ hardly corresponds to any actually existing pattern of historical development (ibid: 168). In this light, Blackbourn suggests we either give up the concept of bourgeois revolution all together (ibid: 174) or if we choose to retain it, we stop looking for ‘an overt transfer of political power’ to a ‘revolutionary’ bourgeoisie and instead focus on long-term and ‘silent’ processes during which the relations and culture of market society are injected into the framework of European ancien regimes (ibid: 175-90).

To recap, Blackbourn and Eley argue that across Western Europe ‘the bourgeoisie was unable (reasonably enough) to act as midwife at its own birth’ (ibid:169) nor was it the ardent supporter of the development of liberal democratic institutions. Bourgeois leadership is thus a ‘myth’, so is the ‘spontaneous liberalism of a rising bourgeoisie’. A diversity of political regimes, state forms and ruling class alliances were perfectly compatible with securing bourgeois predominance and the consolidation of capitalist social relations (ibid: 10; 84-5). As such, Blackbourn and Eley undermine the second yardstick against which late modernization projects are conventionally measured and found wanting. They strike a powerful blow to ‘capitalism from below’, further exposing the illusion of a ‘Western norm’ of capitalist development and modernization. All that said, however, a serious theoretical lacuna still exists in their analyses, which eventually pries it open to economistic fallacy. Although Blackbourn and Eley significantly undermine the assumption of a ‘bourgeois-led’ capitalism, they continue to equate the bourgeois class to capitalism and the ‘inauguration of the bourgeois epoch’ to the ‘victory’ of capitalist property relations (ibid: 84). Thus the clear inference is that even if capitalism was not borne by the bourgeoisie, it was for and supported by the bourgeoisie.
Obviously the legal, institutional and cultural acts that compel and induce the reordering of human relations based on productivist principles creates a group of beneficiaries whose interests rest on the deepening and generalization of commodity relations. And, depending on their level of competitiveness in the marketplace, commercial and industrial interests may well support the establishment of institutionalized markets. Yet it is one thing to recognize possible bourgeois involvement in the constitution of market society and it is quite another to ascribe a pre-given capitalist rationality to the (industrial) bourgeoisie as a whole. ‘Economic’ actors, while heavily involved in trading and manufacturing, may not support their own subjection to the uncertainties of market competition, thereby (directly or indirectly) jeopardizing the development of commodity markets in land, labor and other means of production. Especially in the absence of relative factor mobility and market competition, the bourgeoisie, no matter how industrious, would be under no compulsion nor be able to systematically increase specialization, improve labor productivity, reorganize labor processes, reinvest in production and accumulate at the expense of less efficient producers. Therefore, they would be neither allowed nor compelled to transform ‘labor power’ into ‘labor’, systematically increase the ‘organic composition of capital’ and reduce the ‘socially necessary labor time’ involved in appropriating ‘surplus value’.

In such conditions, no surplus value, absolute or relative\textsuperscript{83}, can be realized and no industrialist could transform into a ‘capitalist’, that is a ‘supervisor and director of the [labor] process, as a mere function, as it were endowed\textsuperscript{84}.

\textsuperscript{83} On the capitalist labor process, see Braverman 1974.

\textsuperscript{84} Extraction of ‘absolute surplus value’ requires the ‘formal subordination’ of labor to capitalist discipline, i.e. the discipline secured without transforming the technological content of the labor process. ‘Relative surplus value’ requires the ‘real subsumption’ of labor to capital based on the systematic application of techniques and technologies improving labor productivity. For Marx, relative surplus value represents ‘a specifically capitalist form of production’ or ‘capitalist production proper’ while absolute surplus value is a prerequisite to the rise of relative surplus value (Marx 1990: 1019-38). However, ‘formal subordination’, if understood merely as employment and extension of wage-labor, may not necessarily encompass ‘real subordination’ within itself as a developmental tendency. Put differently, for one to assume the existence of capitalism in a wage-labor relationship, formal subsumption must be shown to be increasingly subjected to the competitive and productivist pressures peculiar to the capitalist mode of production. Only thereafter, can one assume a ‘necessary’ relation between formal subordination and real subsumption, i.e. only thereafter can formal subordination be conceptualized as conducive to the real subsumption of labor to capital and to the rise of capitalism, see Sayer 1987: 36.
with consciousness and will, of the capital engaged in the process of valorizing itself” (Marx 1990: 1022).

In fact, examining the way in which capitalist industrialization unfolded in 19th century continental Europe highlights that the so-called industrial bourgeoisie had, at best, an ambiguous relation to capitalism (Lacher & Germann 2011: 116-7). They sometimes supported the competitive re-ordering of industries and sometimes took a totally opposite stance against regulations designed to create competition and enforce competitive pricing mechanisms. A case in point is 19th century French industrialization. In France, the pattern of industrial development in the first half of the 19th century, albeit quantitatively impressive, was shaped by the continuing legacy of revolutionary politics in towns as well as in the countryside (Horn 2006: 251). In the countryside, it is widely recognized that the post-revolutionary settlement of agrarian relations led to the consolidation of the peasants’ customary rights on land. A subsistence-oriented peasantry, coupled by a rentier landlord class, put definitive limits on labor productivity and the expansion and deepening of internal markets (Jones 1988: 254; Brenner 1985b: 312). Perhaps less recognized than the lingering legacy of the revolution in rural France is the fact that the revolutionary threat from below continued to ‘loom large’ in towns also and ‘the repression of worker militancy met only with uneven success’ in the post-revolutionary period (Horn 2006: 15). As a result, factory workers, at least until the mid-19th century, worked based on a contractual system (marchandage) that allowed them substantial autonomy at the workplace. They were ‘not paid…according to their productivity. Their income derived from the sale of goods that they produced autonomously, using tools and spaces that they rented, under their own individual or collective supervision’ (LaFrance 2013: 165). The so-called industrial bourgeoisie did make some investment in industrial technology, yet without exercising control over the labor
process and only behind a blanket economic protectionism. This explains why ‘the prospect of [domestic and international] economic competition made many French industrialists uneasy’, why circumscribing and circumventing the market by a variety of illicit means usually proved much more rational than producing according to market imperatives (Horn 2006: ch 8) and why even in the largest industrial sectors such as steel and textile industries the owners of the means of production, by and large, retained a ‘merchant and speculative vision of profit’ (Lefebvre, quoted in Lafrance 2013: 168).

Given that their social reproduction did not depend on successful market competition, large segments of the industrial bourgeoisie, in fact, fiercely opposed the critical tariff reform of 1860 that was to selectively and decisively expose French industry to international competition. Aside from a few ‘enlightened’ businessmen who supported the formulation of the new tariff policy, the driving force was the French state elite. Desperate for scarce foreign currencies in order to build up railways and military power, the state elite imposed a capitalist industrialization project from above as part of the efforts made to improve their conditions of fiscal and geopolitical reproduction. And, contrary to what Blackbourn and Eley would have us believe, the ruling elite did so, not for, but in spite of and to the detriment of existing industrial bourgeois interests (Lacher and Germann 2012: 116-7).

In short, although Blackbourn and Eley partly overcome the ‘economistic fallacy’ by departing from the conception of ‘bourgeois-led’ capitalism, they fall back into it by uncritically equating the industrial bourgeoisie to capitalism. The price paid for this conceptual conflation is high: As capitalism becomes an ever-present trait of the (industrial) bourgeoisie, all modernization projects with an industrial bourgeois component simply correspond to temporally and spatially differentiated attempts to develop capitalism.
‘Modernity’ is depleted of its social content, solely used to emphasize the diversity of political-cultural arrangements conducive to the rise of an ever-present capitalism. As such, qualitatively different modernities, i.e. impersonalized political-cultural orders that allow for the development of commercial and manufacturing groups, yet do not necessarily commodify the means of subsistence, are forcefully assimilated into the concept of capitalism. The economistic fallacy ultimately results in a conceptual bulldozing that loses the diversity of modernities in the ‘non-history of capitalism’ (Wood 1997).

**The Turkish Sonderweg: Kemalism as State Capitalism?**

*We will try to create millionaires and billionaires in our country.*

*Mustafa Kemal, 1923*

*Who is the owner and master of Turkey? The peasant!...it is this exalted master whose blood we have spilt for centuries...the fruits of whose toil we have expropriated and squandered...whose kindness and sacrifices we have repaid with ingratitude, insolence, oppression and the desire to degrade him into a bondsman.*

*Mustafa Kemal, 1922*

Paradoxical as it may seem, the objective of creating a class of millionaires while declaring millions of peasants to be the masters of the country reveals two vivid expressions of the contradictions faced by the Kemalist elite in their ascendance to power. Most students of Turkish modernization try to capture the ambiguities entailed in this specific ‘path’ through the concept of ‘state capitalism’. As indicated earlier, the main argument is rooted in the Sonderweg paradigm: in such a predominantly peasant-based agrarian economy and in the absence of a strong bourgeois class, capitalism had to be initiated by the state, which is then used to explain why the process of capitalist development unfolded only limitedly and protractedly; why it lacked ‘ideological coherence’, why it took an authoritarian form and why it was largely confined to ‘superstructural reforms’. For example, Zurcher argues that although the Republican regime led to a process of capitalist development in which the state functioned as the agent for private accumulation, the regime also, rather incoherently,
‘rejected [in theory] any kind of change in property relationships’ (Zurcher 2010: 149-50). Parla and Davison (2004: 30) claim that the Kemalist elite was committed to maintaining the existing social order through a ‘corporatist capitalism’, which ‘seeks to replace liberalism as the superseding rationale of modern capitalism, but not to replace capitalism itself’. Taner Timur writes that given the weakness of bourgeois classes the scope of superstructural reforms initiated by the Kemalist elite far outsprinted the level of transformation of production relations (Timur 2001: 106).

Capitalism is the only mode of production that does not presuppose direct political involvement in the immediate processes of production. That is to say that in certain historical conjunctures the mere economic threat of losing employment and property may well secure the reproduction of the relations of capitalist accumulation (Wood 1981). Nevertheless, ‘state capitalisms’ are possible and in fact have been historically very common. That is, states have often intervened in economic life, taking extremely authoritarian, and protectionist/populist measures in order to stabilize market society and overcome its crisis. Indeed, this is precisely what Kemalism’s Western European counterparts carried out during the interwar period. Nazi and Fascist restoration in Germany and Italy, for example, was not a ‘political freeze of or simple reaction’ to capitalism, but was underlined by the aim of ‘rationalizing’ capitalism. Against what they conceived to be a ‘wasteful’, ‘egoistic’ and ‘rentier’ capitalism, devoid of social harmony and subject to cycles of boom and bust, Fascism and Nazism aimed to reorient economic life based on totalitarian ‘productivist’ ideologies (Maier 1988: 12-5). Enhancing technical efficiency and economic productivity, through scientific management of the labor process or repression/corporatist regulation of industrial conflict, was the key to the ability to reallocate the economic rewards of capitalism without a radical redistribution of political power. In the face of inflationary pressures, militant trade unions and geopolitical challenges,
‘the civic ideas of 1789’ were thus totally discarded in favor of a new social order based on authority, discipline and economic renovation. In order to achieve this, the state ‘distorted’ market prices, regulated the movement of labor, invested in massive public works, brutally repressed working classes, allocated raw materials, and even implemented a few (temporary) socially-protectionist measures for workers and peasants (Maier 1987: 77). Clearly there were winners and losers within the business community; nonetheless the fact that businessmen had already won an unprecedented degree of authoritarian control over labor, combined with gains accrued from increased productivity, well compensated for the occasional injuries that might be caused by tariff changes or the loss of a state licence to invest in new plant (ibid: 85).

Therefore, the important point to establish here is that notwithstanding substantial national differences, state capitalism in both Germany and Italy was characterized by a specific combination of public and private powers that aimed to deepen the commodification of labor according to the requirements of an ‘organized capitalism’. Likewise, tariffs, production quotas and monopolies did not annihilate market competition, but ‘rationalized’ it: extra-economic measures were used in ways to compel and induce producers to ‘improve’ the technological and organizational set-up of the production process (Jessop 2013: 103). All combined, both fascism and Nazism, though disastrous failures, attempted to stabilize and improve capitalism, and by doing so, they largely subordinated the Jacobin aspects of modernity to the capitalist project.

The question to be answered is whether Kemalist modernization can be subsumed under the same rubric of state capitalism. How successful and willing was the early Republican regime in initiating and sustaining a capitalist restructuring of social relations and institutions? How willing and successful were the so-called proto-capitalist middle farmers and bourgeoisie in
initiating a capitalist growth dynamic? How successful was the state in subordinating the Jacobin project to the capitalist project? In the remainder of this chapter, I will provide an alternative historical narrative to those informed by the Sonderweg paradigm.

**After the Deluge: Nationalists, Bolsheviks and the Question of ‘People-ism’**

*I believe the essential nature of our existence today, which has been proved by the nation’s common inclination, is people-ism and people’s government. This means government passing into the hands of the people. We will work to submit the administration to the people. I am convinced that all our difficulties will thereby be solved.*

*Mustafa Kemal, 1920*

*We are a working people, a poor people, striving to save our lives and independence… We have to work to live and to achieve our freedom. Therefore, all of us have rights... But we acquire such rights only through working. In our society there is no place or rights for a person who wants to lie down and does not want to work... To protect this right and to keep our independence secure, all of us pursue a populist doctrine which justifies nationwide struggle against imperialism that wants to destroy us and against capitalism that wants to devour us.*

*Mustafa Kemal, 1921*

The official end of the World War One came with a considerable delay on the Ottoman Front. After the armistice treaty in 1918, it took almost two years for the Entente Powers to reach an agreement among themselves on how to partition the Ottoman Empire. The resultant treaty (the Treaty of Sevr) effectively marked the end of the empire as well as the liquidation of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the ruling party in which the bureaucratic elite and the Turkish propertied classes were thus far organized. As shown in the last chapter, before and during the war, the interests represented by the CUP had initiated and partially achieved a process of turkification of the economy by expelling or exterminating the non-Muslim Ottoman minorities, most notably Armenians and Greeks. The treaties that ceased and ended the war contained clauses that declared the partitioning of a considerable part of Anatolia among former non-Turkish subjects of the empire, thereby implying the immediate reversal of most of the wartime wealth and property accumulated by Turkish landlords and merchants. It
was in this context in which the bureaucrats and Turkish propertied classes established a network of resistance organizations and a new Ankara-based assembly, contesting the Sultan’s acceptance of the annexation of western Anatolia by Greece and the creation of Armenian and Kurdish states in the east (Ahmad 2002: 70).

From 1919 to 1922 the assembly, led by Mustafa Kemal, waged a series of wars against the Greek invasion of Asia Minor, suppressed twenty-three ‘domestic’ rebellions and tried to sideline the Istanbul government in its quest for international support and recognition. Even under these dire conditions, however, the assembly exercised unprecedented control over the executive, hence representing a fairly ‘heterogeneous’ and ‘unruly’ body (Zurcher 2003: 159; Koçak 2005: 3, 26). Parliamentary members largely diverged in terms of their diagnosis of the present circumstances and their political vision for the future. Yet, one particular external condition greatly influenced the political and ideological colouring of the parliamentary cleavages, forcing different groups in the parliament to frame their own interests in terms of a variety of ‘people-ist programs’ (Tekeli and Şaylan 1978: 67-8). Let me briefly elaborate.

Undoubtedly, the principal beneficiary of the Treaty of Sevr was Britain. In addition to granting effective control over Arab lands and Cyprus, the treaty provided Britain with free access to the Straits and the Black Sea, thereby putting the Soviets in a geopolitically insecure position (Barlas 1998: 118). Given the existence of a common enemy and thanks to the success of the Bolshevik struggle against the White Army and Western powers, the Soviets stood out as the only foreign power the Ankara government could possibly rely on for military and financial support. However, the resultant rapprochement with the Soviets generated both enthusiasm and fear in Ankara. Besides ongoing border disputes, the Bolsheviks were involved in propaganda activities in Anatolia from the very outset of the resistance movement
and had significant impact over the socialist-leftist group within the assembly (Tunçay 1991: 90). This group (the People’s Group) was the parliamentary extension of a semi-military resistance organization called the Green Army. On the one hand the existence of the People’s Group within the parliament was the key for the Kemalist elite to maintaining Soviet support. Yet, on the other, the People’s Group repeatedly radicalized the nationalist agenda, providing what they called ‘people-ist’ answers to the burning questions of what was to be done and how. For example, they advocated the principle of ‘occupational representation’ and ‘women’s suffrage’ in order to open the parliament to interests other than the bureaucratic/commercial/religious elite and proposed the establishment of popular assemblies/popular courts to mobilize the countryside (Tunçay 1991: 90-1; Shaw and Shaw 1979: 351). 

None of these demands were accepted in the assembly, however. And indeed, the nationalists organized around Kemal either killed or marginalized the members of the socialist group immediately after the war of independence (1922). Yet, the point remained that the Kemalist elite, under the immense pressures of external reproduction and intense political rivalry, had to develop a competitive ‘people-ist’ program in order to rapproche the Soviets themselves and to limit the socialist and sultanic influence in the assembly. In other words, although most members of the Kemalist elite originally perceived people-ism as a form of ‘political barbarism’ or ‘luddite political activity’ invented to prevent ‘progress’ (Ahmad 2009: 164), the threat (real or perceived) of domestic and external socialism and the need to appeal to and remobilize local/commercial interests as well as a war-weary and impoverished peasantry

85 The Assembly included ‘125 civil servants, 13 municipal officials, 53 soldiers (10 of them pashas), 53 men of religion (including 14 muftis), and 5 tribal chiefs’. Of the remaining 120 members ‘40 were merchants, 32 farmers, 20 lawyers, 1 journalist, 2 engineers, and a single artisan—a master gunsmith. No less than 92 of its members had belonged to the last [Ottoman] Chamber of Deputies’ (Lewis 1975: 366).

86 From this angle, it can be argued that ‘the basic importance of the War of Liberation lies in the fact that it also became a popular movement training Anatolian masses in the struggle (Karpat 2004: 181).
compelled them to create their own brand of people-ism (Tekeli and Şaylan 1978: 66; Kazancigil 1981: 51). The first version of a Kemalist populist programme, which became the first post-Ottoman constitution in 1921, was born in this context with strong anti-capitalist and anti-bureaucratic undertones. Indeed ‘their rhetoric was so radical that European observers initially denounced the Kemalists as Bolsheviks’ (Ahmad 1995: 85). To be sure, the revolutionary character of Kemalist populism would be significantly watered down after the war (Göker 1990: 130, 145; Tekeli and Şaylan 1978). But one critical lesson learned during the war was to continue to guide Kemalist populism throughout the early Republican period. Although the Kemalist elite would keep claiming that Turkey was not suitable for socialism because it was a ‘classless’ society with no bourgeois or working classes, they would remain well aware that their cunning historical stagism was already proved wrong during the war by socialists both at home and abroad. The social and geopolitical challenges of the postwar years, therefore, would be filtered through this war-time trauma of imminent socialism. In order to remedy this, the early Republic was to formulate a historically specific populist ideology, which would facilitate and complicate the unfolding of the new bourgeois order.

Viewed from this angle, populism should be seen neither as only rhetoric nor mere elite ‘manipulation’ of the lower classes to preserve bureaucratic and propertied interests. Rather, 87

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87 Article 6 of the 1921 constitution reads as follows: ‘sovereignty belongs without reservation and condition to the nation; the system of administration rests on the principle that the people personally and effectively direct its own destinies’ (quoted in Kazancigil 1981: 52).

88 In an otherwise superb analysis of Kemalist populism, Karaomerlioglu (2008; 2002) argues that since there was no unified peasant movement in early Republican Turkey, Kemalist populism should be seen mainly as a conservative act, i.e. a tactical manoeuvre aiming to safeguard Kemalist interests. Such an interpretation is largely true. Yet it also rests on the idealized assumption that elsewhere, presumably in Europe, populism could develop merely from ‘below’ and as mere reaction to the ‘internal’ expansion of peasant movements and mass politics (cf. Blackbourn 1985: 290). What is lost in comparison is the fact that the crisis of geopolitical reproduction was, at least partly, responsible for compelling the ruling elites throughout Europe to introduce new citizenship rights and duties in ways conducive to the reproduction of state power. And, however hierarchically defined, these new rights and duties opened hitherto unimaginable avenues for popular mobilization and negotiation between the ruled and the ruler, which could, in turn, force the state elite to keep promises implicit in their modernist/nationalist/populist rhetoric. For examples of such a situation in early Republican Turkey, see Akin 2007; Lamprou 2015.
I suggest, given such dire circumstances of internal and external reproduction, as well as the revolutionary atmosphere of the previous decade, populism emerged as an attempt to reconcile (however unevenly) lower class interests with the interests of the bureaucratic, commercial and landed elite. Essential to this project was the empowering of as well as the limitation of lower class agents in ways conducive to the reproduction of the body politic as a whole. This is precisely why the Kemalist elite, at the onset of the Republican regime (1923), tended to perceive the ‘people’ in ways reminiscent of the ‘Third Estate’, i.e. a multitude led by but not confined to the propertied and bureaucratic classes (Ahmad 2009: 164-5). In the postwar years the heterogeneity of class interests subsumed under the ‘people’ would force the Kemalist elite to develop contradictory yet complementary policies governing access to political community and property.

The Geo(politics) of Sharecropping: Class, State and the Nation

*There is no basis for Bolshevism in Turkey, as we have neither big capitalists, nor artisans, nor millions of workers, nor a land question in our country.*

*Mustafa Kemal, 1921*

Negating ‘class struggle’ and the ‘land question’ in Turkey was typical of early Republican populism. Yet, far from an expression of actual conditions, the Kemalist denial of class struggle, in fact, testified ‘either to apprehension that conditions generating class struggle existed in the society, or to the fact that the anticipated future economic development might lead to such a struggle’ (Karpat 1959: 53). The denial of class differences, in other words, had much more to do with preempting class conflict than an actual disbelief in the existence of class differences (Aydemir 1999: 427). There was ample justification for such a preemptive strategy. According to one estimate, in 1913, land ownership was so concentrated in the Anatolian countryside that 87 per cent of the rural population occupied only 35 per cent of the cultivable land, and 8 per cent were totally landless (Ahmad 2002: 43). There is every reason
to assume that after almost a decade of continuous war the land question was even more alarming in the wake of the establishment of the Republic. Most of the land and property left by the departing non-Muslim Ottoman subjects was appropriated by Muslim landlords, which caused several land disputes between the landlord class and the incoming immigrant population (Keyder 1981: 23; Tezel 1986: 332-3). Tenancy was rare; the overwhelming majority of the land-hungry and landless population was involved in sharecropping to be able to meet their subsistence needs (Silier 1981: 15). ‘Middle farmers’, who were able to produce for their subsistence as well as for the market, were a ‘very thin’ strata of the rural population (ibid: 14). Peasant indebtedness and (near) landlessness was the major source of labor supply for sharecropping land owners, who, for reasons I explained in the last chapter, remained as ‘absentee’ landlords, i.e. landowners disinterested in production and investing in land (Silier 1981: 15-16; Tezel 1986: 338-9).

Perhaps more disturbing than its economic consequences, however, sharecropping was seen by the bureaucratic elite as an acute political and geopolitical problem. This was not only because ‘[t]he role of land-hungry peasants in the Bolshevik Revolution’ was still ‘a fresh memory in the minds of many Turkish elites’ (Karaömerlioğlu 2008: 124), but also because the geopolitical situation made sharecropping look much more unstable and threatening than it actually was. The end of the war in 1922 had hardly brought to an end the international disputes over the new Turkish state. Among others, there were two important issues in which the new Turkish state and the Allied Powers could not come to an agreement: the status of the oil-rich Mosul region in Southern Kurdistan and the status of the Turkish Straits (Barlas 1998: 121). Britain refused to give in to Turkish demands over Mosul, while all the Allied Powers refused to recognize full Turkish sovereignty over the Straits, demanding the Straits be demilitarized, open to international ships and governed by an international commission. The
official disputes over the Straits and Mosul were (temporarily) concluded during the 1920s in favor of Britain and the Allies, thereby leaving Turkey unsatisfied with the status quo. In addition, Mussolini’s rise to power in 1922 marked an overt return of Italian ambitions over Aegean and Mediterranean Turkey, further aggravating the fear of foreign military intervention (ibid: 132-3). Read together, the fledgling republic, unable to consolidate its borders and under threat by foreign irredentism, remained hard-pressed on the international front. Most of these territorial claims and disagreements were to last up to the mid 1930s, only to be magnified later by the massive insecurities caused by World War II (ibid: 123).

The implication is that geopolitical complications following the birth of the Republic (1923) largely shaped the elite’s perception of the land question and of internal threats. Sharecropping seemed to the Republican elite not only to be the harbinger of a revolutionary proletariat, but also the catalyst of domestic rebellion and foreign intervention. Landlessness and sharecropping were most prevalent in Kurdistan, a phenomenon the Kemalist elite was already preoccupied with in the early 20s (Kuruç 1987: 158; Tezel 1986: 344). The Republican cadres came to perceive the relations of personal dependence underlying sharecropping arrangements as the ultimate hothouse for the development of alternate forms of sociality and loyalty to the ones formulated by the state. Put differently, sharecropping stood out as the repository of politico-cultural forms and identities potentially endangering the social and geopolitical reproduction of the state elite. Yet, what rendered Kurdistan particularly threatening in the eyes of the Republican elite was that the land question was already ‘internationalized’. During the war the Allied powers had given support to some Kurdish chiefs for autonomy and after the war Southern Kurdistan was partitioned among colonial powers. Combined with the lingering dispute over Mosul, neutralization and stabilization of Turkish Kurdistan was of utmost importance to the Kemalist elite (Kirişçi and
Winrow 1997: 84-85). In contrast to other regions, therefore, sharecropping in Kurdistan was a concurrent socioeconomic and geopolitical problem. And it is these circumstances under which the emergent property relations in Turkey would get their particular politico-cultural texture. That is, precisely because of this perception of imminent threat, the state would present its attempt at transforming the relations of sharecropping as an act of turkification and secularization. In Kemalist discourse, sharecropping, albeit not limited to Kurdistan, would tend to be exclusively identified with Kurdish-ness, while the peasantry in possession of ‘sufficient’ land would be seen as the guarantor of the regime, hence of Turkish-ness (Karaömerlioğlu 2008: 128-9). Directly implicated in the consolidation of the Republican regime and the making of Republican subjects was thus the transformation of sharecropping into what I would call ‘Republican farming’, a form of production insulated from the socially and geopolitically risky consequences of sharecropping and ‘petty commodity production’. However, before turning to explain what Republican farming and the Republican regime really entailed I first have to make clear what they did not. This is what I will discuss in the next two sections.

**Ten ‘Bourgeois’ Years, 1923-1932: Capitalism Unbounded?**

Throughout the early Republican period two main concerns marked the trajectory of Kemalist agrarian policy. On the one hand, the sharecropping landlord constituted one of the main pillars of the political alliance on which the ruling Republican People’s Party (RPP) rested. On the other, the fear of revolution, geopolitical challenges and concerns for economic efficiency forced the ruling elite (however limitedly) to implement policies aiming to keep the peasantry in the countryside and to prevent the expansion of sharecropping arrangements (Tezel 1986: 343).
Reconciling these two contradictory interests was the underlying motive behind the Kemalist vision of agrarian property relations. Tellingly, by enhancing the status of private property, the first Republican constitution (1924) facilitated the legal consolidation of large estates. Landlords who had possessed large estates on a *de facto* basis therefore obtained full legal title over their lands. Yet, neither the constitution nor the new civil code (1926) took any measures to prevent the morcellement of land. Ottoman laws (imported from Napoleonic France) prescribing partible inheritance remained in full force and effect (ibid: 340-1). More importantly, ‘the greatest difficulties were encountered in applying the rules relating to land’; consequently, arable land continued to be created and transferred without official registration (Versan 1984: 250). This means that there was no political attempt to establish landlord/merchant monopoly over land. Just like during Ottoman times, marginal lands of little or no cost remained readily available (Keyder 1981: 24). This, in turn, allowed for considerable demographic growth without the peasantry further swelling the ranks of sharecroppers and proletarians. Likewise, tax-farming, which had accounted for more than 20 per cent of all government revenues in the early 20s, was finally and definitively abolished by the Republic in 1925, which led to ‘a significant decrease in the tax-burden of the rural population’, hence an important attempt at pulling the peasantry out of sharecropping, facilitating the establishment of an internal market (Pamuk and Owen 1999: 15). Viewed together, the Kemalist gambit in agriculture seems to have opened with two opposing moves. The regime attempted to protect the minimum basis of peasant subsistence by permitting the expansion and division of small landholdings and at the same time officially recognized large sharecropping units, thereby forestalling land reform.

Such were the initial steps towards institutionalizing Republican agrarian policy. At this juncture, the question to be solved is this: how conducive to capitalism was the emerging
agrarian structure? According to Çağlar Keyder, it definitely was. Keyder argues that given the relative openness of and favorable agricultural prices in the world market, the Turkish state during the 1920s remained responsive to the demands of the merchants and commercially-oriented landlords (Keyder 1981: 128). In addition to the encouraging world market conditions, the state’s abolition of tax-farming, railroad policy and support for tractor purchases provided extra impetus for the expansion of commodity production not only for big landlords but also for an emergent stratum of middle peasants. The combined impact of this transformation was ‘qualitative’ on the would-be middle peasant by bringing him to the market, and ‘quantitative’ on the large farmer through increasing the size of his surplus product’ (ibid: 33, my emphasis). Indeed, according to Keyder, it was this ‘qualitative’ transformation of the middle peasantry in the 1920s that would facilitate the expansion of commodity relations in the 1930s. For, while the Great Depression arrested the development of export-oriented merchants/landlords, thereby significantly diluting the merchants’ influence on the formulation of agrarian policy, from the mid 1930s the state would actively promote the further enrichment of the middle peasantry. Through extensive support policies, Keyder contends, the state turned middle peasants into ‘petty commodity producers’, and by doing so, it not only fostered the production of crops necessary to industrialization, but also created a stable base for the deepening of the internal market (ibid: 129). In summary, Keyder’s argument is that world market conditions in the 1920s and state support programmes in the 1930s increased the level of ‘marketization’ on both large and middle holdings, ultimately leading to the consolidation of ‘an autonomously functioning economy’ ruled by the ‘law of value’ (ibid: 128).

Keyder’s analysis of early Republican agriculture is problematic in one important methodological respect. Keyder categorizes agricultural units and classes according to their
size and level of ‘marketization’, rather than their historically specific patterns of social reproduction. From this angle, ‘the genesis of the new structure is determined by the transformatory impact of markets’ (ibid: 5). Markets are the cause of capitalism, and *vice versa*. In other words, the qualitative transformation of social relations and institutions are not seen as the basis of the transition to a capitalist market, but as its result. The ‘economic fallacy’ built into this mode of explanation, in turn, causes several problems for Keyder’s historical narrative. To begin with, in this framework of analysis large landholdings, by virtue of their level of commercial activity, are capitalist by definition. While agricultural units employing wage labor, an ‘extremely rare’ phenomenon in Anatolia, are seen by Keyder as ‘proper’ capitalist farms, sharecropping landlords and market-oriented peasants are simply impending capitalists and petty commodity producers (ibid: 13, 16). Keyder, as such, tends to overlook that in a socio-legal context that deliberately prevents the commodification of labor, draining the peasantry of most of their surpluses through usury and allowing the almost unrestricted division and expansion of land, neither the peasantry nor the sharecropping landlord would be compelled to increasingly depend on the market and able to reorganize/improve production according to the dictates of market competition. What is neglected in Keyder’s account, therefore, is that the ‘transformative potential of markets’ can begin to unfold only when there are no *inherent* socio-legal limits to them. Unless a systematic political-cultural intervention to existing ways of life takes place, which increasingly transforms land and labor into commodities, peasants and sharecroppers can produce for the market and be impacted by market prices, yet will reproduce forms of social labor inherently antagonistic to the development of capitalism.  

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89 Indeed, elsewhere in a passing note, Keyder (with Birtek) recognizes this, but insists on seeing middle peasants and sharecropping landlords as impending capitalists. He argues that even in a slightly ‘open’ village economy, for example in a village where the economy is ‘to a large extent self-sufficient with the exception of a wheat crop that is taken to the market in “good years”, sharecropping, governed by kinship obligations, survives, but the decisions with respect to the production itself, and not the process of production, are governed by the economic factors external to this social context’. Likewise, once the peasant begins ‘specializing within a market
In fact, all the historical indicators appear to justify this view. From 1923 to 1929 (except during a period of drought in 1927-8), Turkish agriculture experienced exponential growth under conditions of an open economy, with agricultural output in constant prices having increased by 115 per cent (Keyder 1981: 37). The state agricultural bank injected substantial loans to the agricultural sector with the hope that the small landholdings, based on collateral guarantees, would obtain access to official credit channels, thereby making them able to increase production for the market and mitigating their extreme dependence on the big landlords and usurers (Hershlag 1968: 49). Furthermore, from 1923 to 1934, the state distributed about 5 per cent of the gross cultivatable area to immigrans and landless peasants, which somewhat increased the portion of lands under the control of small holdings (Hershlag 1975: 172). Under these circumstances, thus, it seems safe to assume that the peasantry, unburdened by the tithe and to some extent supported by the state, responded to favorable world market prices by increasing their level of production and surplus taken to the market. Yet, it is mistaken to interpret the peasants’ increased production for the market as necessarily leading to a ‘qualitative’ transformation of their relation to land and production. For one thing, the state’s attempts at breaking the relations of usury bore no fruit in the countryside: land distribution was too limited to generate a qualitative impact on the peasantry as a whole (Tezel 1986: 345) and the plots distributed to a limited number of cultivators were ‘far less than was required to maintain a family’ (Hershlag 1975: 172). Likewise, most of the state-provided credit was used up by landholders with large holdings (Silier 1981: 44-5), and even when the peasantry obtained some access to these funds, most of them had to use these relationship and increasingly depends on the market for his basic needs; it is this precariousness of his livelihood in lean years that reinforces the [capitalist] economic rationality’ (Keyder and Birtek 1975: 448ff). What Keyder and Birtek disregard is that for the transition from occasional sale of surplus product to systematic commodity production and market dependence, i.e. from peasants to petty/simple and capitalist commodity production, the social and institutional context for the maintenance and expansion of landholdings must change.
monies ‘to pay off their debts, instead of investing the money in equipment, fertilizer and irrigation’ (Hershlag 1968: 113). Clearly, as Keyder assumes, there must be a segment of the peasantry able to produce commodities relatively independently of the relations of debt and usury. Yet, a closer look at this so-called ‘middle peasantry’, who were engaged especially in wheat, tobacco and hazelnut production, shows that they were barely able to accumulate any surpluses (Tezel 1986: 436). This was the case because foreign and domestic merchants, organized in monopolies and trade associations, were able to collectively dictate prices to the peasantry much lower than the world average (Silier 1981: 30-1; Tezel 1986: 358-9; Toprak 1988: 22). Over time this must have substantially depleted the middle peasantry’s appetite for commodity production. And indeed it was this frustration that enabled the peasantry to reduce their relation with the market to a minimum after the plummeting of world agricultural prices in 1929 (Keyder 1988: 165). All in all, throughout the 1920s the continuing relations of usury and monopoly, combined with the relative availability and divisibility of land, eventually led to a pattern of agricultural development which was not conducive to the consolidation of petty commodity production. Partly driven by increases in population\(^90\) and partly thanks to the improvements in security and transportation, peasants extended and divided the area under cultivation, yet remained unable or unwilling to develop a capitalist logic of social reproduction. In other words, increases in commodity production was generated not by an intensive growth underlined by a qualitative transformation of the peasants’ labor process and increasing dependence on the market, but by an extensive growth based on the expansion of the peasants’ traditional survival strategies alongside their limited and occasional engagement with the market (Tezel 1986: 340-1, 434-5).\(^91\)

\(^90\) While the total cropped area constituted only 4.86 per cent of the total area in 1927, and then rose to 10.20 per cent in 1934 and 12.25 per cent in 1940, ‘the relative rise in area and in crops was almost identical’ (Hershlag 1968: 112).

\(^91\) Consequently, between 1926 and 1950 labor productivity in agriculture increased only 15 per cent (Tezel 1986: 378).
Given that there was no alternative source of labor supply and that the land was expandable and divisible by the peasantry, sharecropping landlords did not develop any systematic interest in supervising and improving the labor process on large estates. On average 90-95 percent of the land within big estates was left uncultivated (Silier 1981: 16). Relatedly, sharecropping arrangements on big estates were governed by the same logic of reproduction that prevailed on small peasant holdings (Tekeli and Ilkin 1988: 40, 89). That is, following Friedmann’s model (1980: 177-8), sharecropping peasants either maintained the safety-first logic of subsistence agriculture, or if they were under conditions of extreme indebtedness, sharecropping peasants got ‘locked in’ ‘chronic overproduction’ despite falling prices and deteriorating terms of trade, while the entire surplus product accrued only to the absentee landlord/creditor. Hence in the absence of a transformation of property relations that would set free alternate sources of credit and food supply, sharecroppers were inherently unwilling or unable to respond to fluctuating market conditions and incapable of reinvesting in land. Either way, sharecropping arrangements continued to forestall the operation of market principles on big estates.

If the Republic of the 1920s was not able to initiate a capitalist growth dynamic in the countryside, it was even less able to do so in the towns. For the inability/unwillingness of the state to transform agrarian property relations, together with the wartime exhaustion and

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92 All this does not mean that big estates remained technologically backward. Indeed, the number of tractors in Turkey increased from 220 in 1924 to 2000 in 1930. Yet, this increase hardly signified the rise of a capitalist landlord class. For one thing, most of these tractors were not bought according to some cost-price calculation, but obtained through state subsidies, which ‘amounted to close to the full price of the tractor’ (Keyder 1981: 25). Also, the tractors had no practical use on large estates run by sharecroppers: in the absence of an alternate and stable labor supply, landlords ‘were reluctant to adopt the newly available technology, which could not be put to direct use without altering the mode of exploitation. Under conditions of sharecropping, where the grip of the landlord on the small tenant is through a perpetual indebtedness, any technology raising the productivity of the share-cropper threatens to break the cycle of usury. Thus the landlords have to control the level of technology for the perpetuation of their political and economic domination over sharecropping peasants’ (ibid). In any event, most landlords would find the use of tractors increasingly ‘non-economical’ especially after the Great Depression (Tekeli and Ilkin 1988: 84-5) and the government would cease supporting the mechanisation in agriculture to pre-empt the danger of rural unemployment (Hershlag 1968: 111). It should thus occasion no surprise that the number of tractors would drop from 2000 in 1930 to 1,756 in 1948 and ‘the number of operating tractors barely exceeded one thousand’ in 1946 (Keyder 1987: 130).
exodus of local populations, rendered precarious the already feeble supply of industrial workers.\textsuperscript{93} Most industrial production\textsuperscript{94} could be carried out only through temporary and seasonal peasant-workers, who came to industrial sites for a month or two at the end of the harvest season in order to supplement their household income (Makal 2007: 121; Koç 2013: 193, 213-4). Inevitably, extremely high turnover rates prevailed, undermining the prospects for the capitalist reorganization of industrial production.\textsuperscript{95} That is, given the lack of a skilled and permanent workforce, industrialists had little incentive to invest in labor saving technology, organize and manage the production process ‘efficiently’ and to increase extremely low wages, which could have otherwise helped to stabilize the supply of labor power (Hershlag 1968: 119). From the 1920s, therefore, ‘efforts at reviving industrial production were largely hampered by difficulties securing workers and labor scarcity discouraged investments in new industrial enterprises’ (Arnold 2012: 371).

However, despite all these organizational and productive inefficiencies and the unwillingness to invest, easy profits could still be made by the nascent bourgeoisie. As pointed out in the last chapter, in the last ten years of the empire, state subsidies and contracts, wartime profiteering,

\textsuperscript{93} The emigration of Ottoman minorities alone ‘removed those responsible for 70 per cent of the capital and 75 per cent of the labour in Turkish industrial enterprises’ (Arnold 2012: 371).

\textsuperscript{94} The term ‘industrial’ needs to be further elaborated. In early Republican Turkey among enterprises considered ‘industrial’, ‘the overwhelming was small workshops’. According to one estimate, the number of industrial workers, apart from handicraft, was around 27,000 in 1927. Of all enterprises, establishments with an average of more than 5 workers constituted less than 9 per cent; 0.23 per cent employed more than 100 workers and merely 4.3 per cent utilized motor power (Hershlag 1968: 54-5).

\textsuperscript{95} Indeed, a high turnover rate was a problem in the capitalist West as well. Yet the difference is that while in the contemporary West a high turnover rate was more likely to be caused by a relatively well-established working class that was unhappy with existing wages and working conditions, in Turkey high turnover rates were much less about low wages and more about ‘structural’ circumstances that deliberately inhibited the formation of a permanent commodifiable workforce (Makal 2007: 53). There are several surveys and reports from the 1920s and 30s pointing to this aspect of the problem. For example, in the coal-rich areas of the Black Sea the average yearly number of working days for an unskilled miner was from 16 to 22. In a textile factory in Kayseri 3000 employees, including women and children, had to be employed in order to maintain a permanent workforce of 2000. Across the country annual turnover rates fluctuated between 35 and 75 per cent (Hershlag 1968: 118-9, see also Koc 2013: 219). Even in the relatively well-connected commercial and manufacturing centres of Anatolia, such as Izmir, the situation seems not to have drastically differed: ‘as late as 1948, a textile factory in Izmir hired 2,424 workers for its 3,000-strong workforce, to replace the 2,132 labourers who left that year’ (Arnold 2012: 372).
combined with the expulsion and extermination of Ottoman minorities, had enriched a new Muslim-Turkish bourgeois class. During the 1920s, besides continuing to seize properties that belonged to emigrating minorities\(^96\), the bourgeoisie, domestic and foreign, received further support from the new state eager to create a domestic market and promote industrialization. For example, in order to make up for the loss of revenue caused by the abolition of the old agricultural tax, the new state established monopoly rights over major consumption goods such as sugar, tobacco, oil, alcohol, matches and in major sectors of commerce such as harbors and docks (Lewis 1975: 468). Instead of directly exercising these monopoly rights, however, the state granted them to Turkish and foreign firms under favorable conditions (Boratav 1981: 169). Also vital to industrial development was the establishment of a ‘national’ bank, i.e. a bank that would generate and allocate investment funds according to ‘national’ criteria which foreign banks considered economically risky or non-profitable. In 1924, a group of prominent politicians and merchants thus established the Turkish Business Bank (Is Bankasi), equipping it with several official privileges designed to foster private actors’ appetite for industrial investment (Keyder 1981: 106-7; Hershlag 1968: 56). Furthermore, the Law for the Encouragement of Industry (1927) provided a variety of subventions and incentives to new industrial ventures in a manner ‘without parallel in the history of republican Turkey’ (Boratav 1981: 169). Enterprises ‘with a minimum scale and level of technology’ were entitled to land grants, custom exemptions, ‘reduction of taxes and transport charges, granting of premiums and obliging the authorities to use the local products’ (Keyder 1987: 103; Weinryb 1947: 474).

How successful was the state at encouraging private actors to invest, improve productive forces and earn foreign currencies? Of the firms that took advantage of the investment/export

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\(^96\) With the exception of those living in Istanbul, the vast majority of the Christian-Orthodox population left Turkey by 1925 as a result of a population exchange agreement between Turkey and Greece.
incentives, ‘those capable of competing against imports remained few’ (Keyder 1987: 103). For example, Turkish-foreign joint ventures, which accounted for one-third of the corporations and 67 per cent of the investment in manufacturing between 1920 and 1930 (Boratav 1981: 168; Keyder 1994:137) benefited tremendously from government support yet invested mainly in industries in which there was virtually no or little competition from imports despite low tariffs, such as public utilities and monopolies, mining, cement and food processing (Boratav 1981: 168-9; Hale 1984: 157). Furthermore, political measures aiming to strategically utilize subsidies largely failed as local manufacturers circumvented regulations, using imported materials and subsidies for the purposes of profiteering: ‘companies of paper acquired subsidized goods and sold them to other companies at a profit and then never began production’ (Arnold 2006: 87). With easy access to political rents and no compulsion to compete, manufacturers’ social reproduction hardly depended on successful commodity production and extending/deepening their hold over scarce reserves of labor power. Unsurprisingly, between 1925 and 1929, the share of the population employed in manufacturing and manufacturing’s share of GDP remained roughly the same, 9 and 10.5 per cent respectively (Tezel 1986: 112; Keyder 1987: 103).

Given the structure of property relations in agriculture and manufacturing, chronic trade deficits and currency devaluations, very high inflation rates inevitably became the norm during the 1920s (Silier 1981: 46). With the crash of international markets in 1929, the situation further worsened, driving down agricultural prices97 while doubling the trade deficit. In addition, the Republican government was still burdened by Ottoman debt, the first installment of which had to be paid to the Allied Powers in 1929 (Boratav 1981: 170). The bureaucratic elite, as elsewhere, planned to respond to the crisis by erecting high tariff walls.

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97 Between 1928-9 and 1932-3, the price of Turkey’s primary exports, such as wheat, tobacco, hazelnuts and cotton decreased 50 to 60 percent on average (Arnold 2012: 367)
However, the initial impact of attempting economic protectionism was disastrous: prior to the tariff increases, local businessmen engaged in ‘speculative inventory-building through excessive imports’, i.e. they ‘imported and hoarded foreign goods before the tariffs went up’. Businessmen eventually made huge profits, while the state was forced to suspend payments to the Allied Powers and foreign creditors in 1930 (Boratav 1981: 170; Ahmad 2002: 96).

Yet still, from 1930 to 1932 Turkey experienced an industrial ‘boom’ based on massive import suppression and bureaucratic consumption. Yet, none of this led to a qualitative change in the character of industrial activity: ‘the primitive character of private industry and the uncontrolled appropriation of the rent of protection’ continued. A blanket economic protectionism, coupled with various import exemptions and investment incentives, produced ‘a vast area of short-term profiteering’. ‘Industrial’ in appearance, most manufacturing activity, in fact, was limited to ‘minimal transformations of imported materials’ and their sale ‘at monopoly prices in the internal market’ (Boratav 1981: 172). Custom exemptions, together with monopoly practices in the domestic market, led to mere ‘pilfering of foreign exchange’: ‘factories were established overnight, producing import substitutes with minimal local value added’ (Keyder 1987: 103). The Turkish bourgeoisie was able to obtain easy profits with no investment in production and little consideration for labor supply. Therefore, ‘[t]he rent of protection…appropriated by the local industrial bourgeoisie…constitute[d] the basic source of accumulation’, which was ‘reinforced by the low prices of agricultural inputs to industry and the depression of money wages’ (Boratav 1981: 176). Indeed there were attempts from the ranks of the bureaucracy to ‘discipline’ the bourgeois class based on productivist principles,

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98 The average industrial growth, in constant prices, was 14.8 per cent, while imports dropped roughly 60 per cent (Boratav 1981: 172). ‘In 1930, 34 per cent of the budget went for salaries paid to civil servants, whose number was constantly increasing in the 20s without any consideration for the financial capacity of the state’ (Hershlag 1968: 68). Furthermore, given that peasants were destitute and working class employment and incomes were in decline, the incomes of around 105 000 civil servants either remained constant or increased in real terms between 1929 and 1934, which made them the primary consumer of the nascent industrialization drive (Makal 2001: 1, 15).
yet to no avail. The industrial bourgeoisie reacted in 1931 to policies that aimed to condition the protection of the internal market to the bourgeoisie’s ability to sell in the international market (Kuruç 1987: 88–89). This policy backfired in the face of bourgeois resistance organized in and through the Turkish Business Bank, which forced the resignation of the minister of economics of the era and the overhaul of the economic policy in conformity with bourgeois interests (Tekeli and Ilkin 2004: 217–218).

In summary, from 1923 to 1932, neither in agriculture nor in industry was a capitalist growth dynamic initiated. The state was neither able to generalize ‘petty commodity production’ at the expense of sharecropping, nor willing to initiate a socio-legal transformation that would release labor for permanent absorption in industrial activity. Relatedly and ironically, the state’s ability to induce the reorganization of industrial activity based on productivist principles was by and large undermined by a non-capitalist bourgeois class whose relation to production was handicapped by chronic shortages of labor and the contraction of international markets. Because the ‘nascent’ bourgeoisie did not invest and comply with developmental regulations, and due to the emergence of new external challenges and opportunities, the state was increasingly forced to directly engage in production from 1932 onwards.

The ‘Etatist’ Thirties: Industrialization, Monopolization, Peasantization

Those who are antagonistic to etatism demand that liberalism be equally tolerated... To adopt the liberal system would mean abandoning all those avenues to success which dazzle us now

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99 For the original parliamentary debates concerning Şeref’s economic program, see Kuruç, 1988: 216–227. See also Boratav, 1980: 140-150.
100 The distributional struggles between the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie did not merely signify the existence of a ‘corrupted’ capitalism. The term ‘corruption’, in the sense of illicit relations between ‘economic’ and ‘political’ actors, makes sense only when the so-called economic actors, at least partly, depend on the market for their social reproduction, which requires them to organize the labor process according to the dictates of market competition. The early Republican state remained unwilling and unable to remove structural obstacles to the unfolding of capitalism. The state was neither willing to solve the agrarian question in a manner that would condition the obtaining and maintaining of landholdings to successful commodity production, nor able to overcome monopoly practices and overhaul blanket economic protectionism. Therefore it is hard to speak of a more-or-less identifiable distinction between ‘economic’ and ‘political’ processes in early Republican Turkey, which is the minimum precondition for a ‘corrupted capitalism’ to exist.
in the life of the nation...we must consider this point not as a mere formula but as a matter of life and death for our generation.

Recep Peker, RPP party secretary, 1935

It has been clearly shown to everybody that there can be found a way of not giving way to the formation of classes and occurrence of class struggle although the principle of individual property is preserved.

From a RPP document, 1943

During the Great Depression, the peasantry became worse off both in absolute and relative terms. Agricultural prices decreased much faster than the prices of manufactured goods, while agricultural taxes, which either remained constant or increased, continued to burden the rural masses (Emrence 2000: 33). Anatolian peasants pursued ‘typical’ survival strategies during the depression. They reverted to subsistence farming; they fell into further debt and increasingly became sharecroppers; they gave up product specialization and diversified crops as much as possible; and lastly, they (temporarily) migrated to the closest towns and usually found no employment (Akçetin 2000: 93-8). Surely, in the eyes of the Republican elite the prevailing destitution in the countryside once again resuscitated the ghost of Revolution. Also, the rise of peasant movements during the 1920s in the Balkan countries, especially in Bulgaria, had further aggravated the fear of violent unrest in Turkey, forcing the ruling elite to consider new strategies to restore stability and order after the Great Depression (Karaömerlioğlu 2001: 79). Worse still, the world economic crisis revived geopolitical tensions in the Balkans. Italian and Bulgarian revisionism’s return to the region with full force after 1929 heightened the perception of geopolitical threat, the fear of internal instability and the need for industrialization that had haunted the Turkish ruling elite since the 1920s (Barlas

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101 Industrial wages decreased much faster than industrial prices between 1929 and 1932, 16 per cent and 49 per cent, respectively. ‘No doubt that this constituted a real shock for the manufacturing firms’, which in turn (partly) explains the very high unemployment rates in towns, and the migrant peasants’ quick return to their villages (Gursel 2005: 23).
While forcing industrialization, the escalating inter-imperialist rivalry also enlarged the pool of external funds available for industrialization. The Soviets, British and German states, attempting to expand their zones of influence in the Balkans and Middle East, competitively extended low-interest credit and technical help to Turkey during the 1930s and early 40s (Tezel 1985: 430; Hale 1981: 74).

Turkish ‘etatism’ was born in this social and international context. What was meant by etatism was never fully clear. The ruling party insisted that etatism was neither ‘socialism’ nor ‘liberalism’; because it left room for private enterprise while making the state responsible for economic activities considered vital to rapid industrialization and the maintenance of order.

Essential to etatism was the development of heavy industries necessary for the expansion of railways. By the end of the decade, the state emerged as an important, if not the leading, investor and producer in iron, steel, cement, utilities and mining. It nationalized all the previously built railroads, established state banks and investment agencies and took back most of the state monopolies which had been run by private actors since the 1920s. State ownership of key enterprises in transport, banking and finance enabled the bureaucratic elite to exercise greater control over markets and prices, which in turn, at least partly centralized the appropriation and distribution of surpluses in line with the regime’s strategic concerns.

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102 The perception of instability must have been so imminent for the ruling elite that Mustafa Kemal had to order the creation of an opposition party (Free Party) in 1930 in order to steam off the rising discontent among the rural and urban poor. And much to the chagrin of the ruling elite, even this muppet opposition party gained so much power in the first municipal elections that Kemal would have to order the party’s dissolution only three months after its establishment (Emrence 2000).

103 The Soviets were the only creditor of Turkish industrialization until 1938, followed thereafter by Britain, France and Germany.

104 In Mustafa Kemal’s words: ‘Turkish etatism is not a system which borrows ideas that have constantly been harped on by socialist theoreticians…It is a system peculiar to Turkey, which has evolved from the principle of the private activity of the individual, but places on the state responsibility for the needs of a great nation…The state wanted to do quickly things which had not been done throughout the centuries by individual or private activity…This road we have followed is…a system different from liberalism’. The rejection of ‘liberalism’ by the Kemalist cadre was partly an expression of the ‘extremely risky’ political, social and distributional consequences associated with the earlier economic model (Boratav 1981: 176) and partly rooted in the rise of what they perceived to be ‘non-liberal’ measures implemented across the world to counteract the world economic depression, such as the US New Deal and the USSR’s First Five-Year Plan (Hershlag 1984: 175).
All this, however, hardly means that ‘the private sector was hurt by the expansion of the state sector’ (Pamuk and Owen 1999: 19). Although some distributional tensions inevitably existed between the two sides, protection of and incentives for private investment became even more generous than in the previous period. This was not solely because the state stimulated the growth of private manufacturing enterprise by establishing capital-goods industries and infrastructure (which the bourgeoisie was reluctant to undertake regardless), providing the bourgeoisie with subsidized inputs and granting them greater exemptions from customs (ibid). Much more importantly, the state simultaneously gave in to business demands for internal monopolies and external protection (Ilkin and Tekeli 2009: 219-20). Ever since the Law for the Encouragement of Industry of 1927, industrialists attempted to ‘organize in cartels in order to prevent overproduction or in order to safeguard the high profit rates they enjoyed’ (Keyder 1987: 103). What changed with etatism is that the state, previously unable to prevent business circumvention of productivist policies, began to deliberately encourage monopoly business practices. Etatism ‘responded positively to [business] demands and permitted the formation of sector-based associations which openly sought to fix prices and avoid competition’ (ibid). The decisive legal step was taken in 1933 with the enactment of the Law of Regulation of Overproduction (Sürproduksiyon Nizamnamesi). Although the law merely stipulated that the ‘over-production’ of goods for which local supply was sufficient had to be prevented, it resulted in the consolidation of monopolist practices as the private sector used it to avoid competition all together. The state therefore encouraged monopolization of large industrial enterprises. Yet at the same time, almost contradictorily, it put extra taxes on mechanization as well. The Turnover Tax (Muamele Vergisi) discouraged investment in machinery, thereby limiting competition and preventing the dissolution of primitive manufacturing enterprises (Aydemir 1979: 454; Tekeli and Ilkin 1987: 5). The overall
expectation from this seemingly contradictory bundle of economic policies was that if the stability of industrial accumulation could be secured by keeping capitalist competition at bay, this would also promote growth and stabilization in the countryside by creating an internal market for raw materials and food, for which demand and prices had fallen since the international crisis.

As pointed out earlier, distorting market prices and signals through a variety of political measures and incentives has always been the key to capitalist development (e.g. Amsden 2001). From this perspective, one may argue that reducing competition and granting privileges to the industrial sector in Etatist Turkey was hardly an extraordinary measure. What is striking, however, is that as the Turkish state froze competition and secured profits for industrialists, it did nothing to ‘intensify’ industrialists’ control over the labor process by trying to increase the permanent labor supply. It took virtually no measure to close the land frontier and overturn laws of partible inheritance. Peasants could still clear the land at little or no cost and indeed ‘the government aided this trend by actually distributing the land in small plots’ (Birtek and Keyder 1975: 454). Furthermore, pace Keyder, instead of promoting the rise of a middle stratum of petty commodity producers, which would have increased productivity and gradually released labour from agriculture, state support of agriculture seems to have aimed at the consolidation of the ‘peasantry’. For one thing, price support programs addressing especially wheat-producing peasants, which Keyder sees as the pioneer of the so-called petty commodity producers, in fact remained ‘limited, not exceeding 3 per cent of the wheat crop in any given year’ (Pamuk and Owen 1999: 22). In other words, ‘the adverse terms of trade for wheat in the early 1930s were kept more or less constant until the war’ (Boratav 1981: 184). By contrast to wheat, tobacco was indeed a major crop, for which the

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105 Between 1934 and 1938 approximately 3 per cent of the landless and near-landless peasants benefited from the distribution of state-owned lands (Silier 1981: 75).
state, through its tobacco monopoly, provided relatively generous price support programs and credit (ibid: 185). Yet, the state monopoly of tobacco did not attempt to replace powerful commercial agents that were able to dictate much lower prices on the peasantry. Private actors, buying cheap from the peasantry and selling dear to the state, therefore became the primary beneficiary of state encouragement of tobacco production (Silier 1981: 86-8). With peasant surpluses largely accrued to commercial agents and sharecropping landlords, ‘villagers did not become significant consumers of urban manufacturers’ and ‘the national market (outside the urban areas)…[remained] both narrow and thin’ (Keyder 1994: 152).

Viewed in this light, it is implausible to contend that the leitmotiv of the state support of agriculture was the creation of a rural capitalist class or the qualitative transformation of agrarian property relations. Instead, the safer argument would be that the state aimed to restore the minimum conditions for the reproduction of peasant households by preventing seasonal price fluctuations and price speculations (Tekeli and Ilkin 1988: 41; Toprak 1988: 22-3), and by doing so, it tried to promote political stability and production for the market without changing the essentially peasant character of social reproduction. To create and sustain a peasantry that cultivates a minimum amount of land and is able to produce some surplus was the ultimate goal of the etatist agrarian policy. The peasantry was seen as the ultimate antidote to working class and religious internationalism (Karaömerlioğlu 2000: 125).\footnote{At the time Ankara was fearful of all potentially ‘international’ currents. For example, according to the General Secretary of the RPP, Recep Peker, ‘[t]he peasants are nationalists; they see their interests connected to the interests of the nation. For this reason, the peasants have refused the workers’ invitation in the name of proletarian unity’ (quoted in Karaömerlioğlu 2000: 125ff).}

The model countryside for the Kemalist elite was one characterized by \textit{Republican farming}, which idealized a mode of life far away from the tumultuous world of sharecropping relations and that certainly did not resemble the world of restless petty commodity producers,
whose relation to land and production are determined by the market. The ‘agrarian question’ in early Republican Turkey, thus, had nothing to do with establishing a capitalist market and everything to do with finding the ways in which the peasant mode of life could be consolidated.

Tellingly, attempting to resolve the agrarian question by establishing Republican farming generated, once again, an ‘extensive’ growth dynamic (Tekeli and Ilkin 1988: 40-1). Industrial growth stimulated substantial increases in agricultural output and the strategic goal of food self-sufficiency was attained in the course of the 1930s. All this, however, was achieved mainly thanks to demographic growth, the expansion of railroads and the increase of cultivated land (Pamuk 2005: 390; Hershlag 1968: 112). In the face of unfavorable market prices and powerful merchants, peasant households worked harder, cultivated more land, yet remained unable to accumulate savings and investment funds (Tezel 1986: 436). With little support from the state, peasants were unable to invest in land: ‘irrigation and the use of commercial inputs such as fertilizers remained very limited’ (Pamuk and Owen 1999: 23) and unsurprisingly, there was no productivity growth even in major commercial crops produced by the peasantry, such as wheat and tobacco (Tekeli and Ilkin 1988: 56-64; Koc 1988: 86). Also, beneath the surface of agricultural growth, sharecropping remained rampant. The state hardly provided relief to the peasantry from sharecropping. In fact, the sharecropping landlord, producing mainly cotton and beet, made huge profits thanks to state credit and price support programs (Silier 1981: 88), which were in turn spent on luxury consumption, rather than invested in production (Tezel 1986: 439).

In the words of a prominent Republican intellectual and bureaucrat: ‘if a land reform is accomplished in our country, its end result will again be a social polarization under the impact of social differentiation and diversification, which are the tendencies and laws of the system of market economy. Lands given to the peasants will be centralized again in the hands of some farmers and city dwellers because of factors such as debt and price setbacks. For this reason, land reforms are, in fact, far from being an absolute measure to solve land issues’ (Ismail Husrev Tokin, 1934, quoted in Karaömerlioğlu 2000: 122f).
In short, the development of an agrarian capitalism in the Turkish countryside seemed neither feasible nor desirable. The flipside of this is that the overall occupational structure remained roughly the same till the end of the 1940s\textsuperscript{108}, which indicates the persistence of chronic labor shortages in industrial towns. Monopolization and protection of business on the one hand and the unavailability of a permanent work force on the other ultimately created an industrial structure in which ‘several enterprises continued to exist only thanks to government support and an artifical price structure’ (Hershlag 1975: 190). Despite the enactment of highly authoritarian labor regulations and penal laws, industrialists were neither able nor willing to intensify their control over the labor supply and the labor process. As a consequence, in industries approved for state support, ‘investments incurred created additional jobs, but no real progress was made in the level of productivity’: ‘the relative increase of output and labor was almost equal’ (Hershlag 1968: 106). Productivity being stagnant, there were no grounds to offer higher wages to workers. Even in state factories, where better wages could be offered, wages were not high enough to retain workers. ‘Extremely high’ turnover rates consequently prevailed in both state and private factories: workers often quit their jobs simply because they could easily return if they chose, which rendered totally ineffective employers’ control over labor which could have been otherwise exercised through recruitment practices. Relatively, in a context where workers could easily exit and re-enter the labor market, the deskilling of labor and the scientific management of the labor process were most likely to backfire, hence countering the interests of factory management. There was, therefore, no willingness or compulsion to supervise the labor process. ‘Workers were not fired even after they were fined

\textsuperscript{108} About 80 per cent of the economically active population continued to be employed in agriculture, while the proportion of industrial employees did not exceed 8 per cent of the total (Hershlag 1968: 119). The number of industrial workers in state-supported private industries rose from 27,000 in 1927 to 90,000 in 1939 (Hershlag 1968: 119). Although, of all industrial enterprises the number of state economic enterprises did not exceed 20 per cent (Pamuk and Owen 1999: 18); ‘state workers constituted the majority in large-scale enterprises where labour was concentrated and production was mechanized’ (Akgöz 2012: 65).
for absenteeism at various times’, and as indicated by several foreign expert reports, in many industrial plants there was no well-defined wage policy in place, no clear and accessible system of remuneration that would reward more productive workers and in some factories not even proper bookkeeping (Akgöz 2012: 93-111).

It must be clear by now that early Republican etatism did not entail the development of ‘state capitalism’. Neither land nor factory were organized based on principles of productivity. The fear of revolution and foreign intervention forced the ruling bloc to deliberately pre-empt the development of capitalist social relations. The state encouraged peasantization and monopolization as the foundation of a new industrialization strategy. The bureaucratic elite and industrial bourgeoisie thus allied to form a redistributive non-capitalist economy in which they themselves became the primary beneficiaries. Likewise, in this redistributive economy the regime’s relation to sharecropping landlords was unambiguously supportive, provided that sharecropping relations were kept politically and geopolitically sterile. Rural and urban masses lived in destitution, yet the state, unable to initiate an organized and systematic process of ‘enclosure’, attempted to maintain their minimum basis of subsistence, and by doing so it defined social reproduction away from the market. The construction of a ‘market society’ was not central to the early republican modernization project. Instead, as I will show in the next section, the Turkish ruling elite, from the very inception of the republic, would turn to consolidate an alternative project of rationalization. By linking subjects’ social reproduction to their ‘schooling’ and ‘conscription’, the ruling bloc tried to inculcate a series of ‘national’ traits, habits and behavior adequate for the reproduction of Jacobin forms of exploitation and mobilization. Republican reforms would produce new inclusions to and

109 A further indicator of this rather unusual coupling of monopolization and peasantization is that the Five-Year Plans of the 1930s were characterized by a lack of coordination between agricultural and industrial sectors and did not have a clearly stated aim of integrating all sectors of the economy (Hershlag 1968: 76; 1988:22).
exclusions from the ‘nation’, which in turn would not ‘rationalize’ capitalism as was the case in contemporary Western Europe, but substitute the market, becoming the ultimate criteria according to which the economy would be organized.

**From the Agrarian Question to the National Question: Redefining Property and the Citizen-Turk**

As pointed out earlier, private property was institutionalized by the first Republican constitution in 1924, as were conscription, public education and universal male suffrage (in a two-tier election system). And if the state’s guaranteeing of private property tied the peasantry to the land and consolidated sharecropping relations, hence solidifying non-capitalist social relations in the countryside, the introduction of compulsory education, conscription and general suffrage provided the contours of an alternative model of social and ideological modernization. Improving the state without ‘enclosure’ arose as the most urgent task, which the Republican regime tried to deliver by linking the peasants’ access to land to their acquisition of skills and allegiance conducive to the social and geopolitical reproduction of the ruling elite. Conscription and public education would consequently be set as the most legitimate criteria to determine one’s eligibility to participate in the political community and to have access to the means of subsistence and property.

Significant steps had been taken to universalize conscription and compulsory public education before the Republic. Yet, ‘draft evasion and army desertion remained widespread and socially acceptable’ until the 1920s (Peker-Dogra 2007: 58) and public education never penetrated the primary school level and the lower ulema, while semi-independent Islamic brotherhoods (tarikats) continued to hold considerable sway over the education of the masses (Winter 1981: 184). Traditionally, primary education, funded by land and property that belonged to charitable foundations (vakifs), provided students with access to minor positions in the political and religious establishments. The heads of religious brotherhoods (sheikhs), together
with non-religious notables (*aghas*), exercised considerable power over the rural populace and made up the local power structure in the Ottoman provinces (Mardin 2006: 202). Since the Tanzimat, the Ottoman ruling elite had to some extent undermined the independent power of sheikhs by exercising greater control over *vakif* revenues (Barnes 1974: 37) and by subjugating and co-opting non-religious notables to the central administration (Mardin 2006: 202). Deprived of independent sources of revenue and powerful non-religious allies, most dervish orders were already weakened by 1923. All that said, however, Kurdistan stood out as an exception all along the way. As a result of political and geopolitical arithmetic that was entrenched centuries ago, Kurdish lands remained relatively free from Sultanic decree, so did medreses, tarikats, sheyks and tribal chiefs. Political and religious power holders (sometimes the same person), with relatively independent sources of income, remained in power, and accordingly landlessness and sharecropping relations were more common in Kurdistan than in any other region (Keyder 1981: 13, 19). While the relations of personal dependence prevailed and persisted in the region, centralist measures like public education and conscription consequently never took root before the Republic. And indeed, as mentioned earlier, after World War I the politico-religious autonomy and sharecropping relations in Kurdistan were combined with new geopolitical fears related to the British and French presence in the Middle East. All this ultimately fed on each other through the inter-war years, turning the region into the Republican powder keg.

The implication is that religion was deeply submerged in relations of rule and property that had serious political and geopolitical implications for the Republican elite. Across Turkey and especially in Kurdistan the Republican attempt at transforming religious institutions would thus simultaneously mean transforming property relations, and *vice versa*. It is no wonder, then, the Republican elite framed the ‘agrarian question’ as an ethno-religious one:
sharecropping was increasingly associated with religious reaction and Kurdishness, while Turkishness meant peasantization, stabilization and secularization. As one prominent Republican bureaucrat put it,

‘Wherever small land ownership emerged, the people [in the East] wanted to rely on the government, and in such places settled administration and schooling, and therefore [the] Turkish [language], took root. Wherever the aghas and sheikhs predominated, the land and villages there passed to the control of the aghas, and administration and schooling were withdrawn from those places and in those regions Kurdish turned out to be the native language of the people.’ (Sevket Sureyya Aydemir, quoted in Karaömerlioğlu 2008: 129).

It was indeed this intertwining character of religion, ethnicity and the agrarian question that made many scholars perceive secularization and nationalism the foundation stone of Turkish modernization (e.g. Berkes 1964; Gellner 1997; Akural 1981). In this respect, nationalism and secularization should not be seen as ‘superstructural’ attempts at transformation, but as a development and mobilization strategy peculiar to Jacobinism. Republican secularism and nationalism were born of an effort to turn land and property into a right for the conscripted and educated subjects of the Republic. Secularization and nationalization were essentially class acts aiming to peasantize the countryside, thereby improving the transmittability of the state’s educative and geopolitical message to the agrarian masses.

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110 The fact that the so-called religious ‘superstructure’ was central to those activities necessary to the reproduction of social life undermines the widely-held assumption that the Kemalist vision of modernization was merely a modernization of ‘culture’ or ‘values’, rather than of social structure (e.g. Anderson 2008). Mardin tends to concur with this view by stressing the centrality of the alleged superstructural institutions and relations: ‘[a]ll of the attempts to change the “superstructure” of Turkish society have...to be understood in the light of...the real importance of the superstructure for Ottoman society’, i.e. ‘the centrality and thickness of cultural elements in the workings of the ancien regime that obliged [the reformers] to selectively direct their energies to the destruction of social norms’ (Mardin 2006: 203). Likewise, Trimberger argues that the ‘cultural reforms transformed the class base of the political regime, for they destroyed the institutional foundation for the power, wealth, and status of the traditional elite, and were a necessary prerequisite for recruiting a new industrial, managerial, and commercial elite’ (Trimberger 1972: 200).
The first powerful secular strike was delivered in 1924 with the unification and centralization of the school system (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat*). While the legislation abolished all religious schools, it also set Turkish as the only medium of instruction, thereby undermining the use of Arabic and Kurdish. In 1925, the state outlawed all dervish orders, lodges and ceremonies and criminalized religious titles apart from the ones endowed by the state. Likewise, beginning from 1925, a series of new legislation outlawed clothing and headgear associated with hierarchies of the old religious and political establishment. The Turkish Civil Code of 1926 completed the unification of the legal system under state control, secularizing the last residues of religious regulation, especially with regards to marital and family law. In 1928, the state introduced and enforced for all public communications the use of the new Turkish alphabet based on Latin script, replacing the previously used Persian-Arabic script. The same year the constitutional clause that declared Islam as the state religion was removed.

Clearly, such a rapid and extensive reform movement generated both cooptation and resistance. By recognizing their ownership of land and granting them political status in parliament, the state integrated the majority of provincial elites into the central administration in exchange for their support for secular reforms (Özbudun 1970: 389). Indeed, that the tarikat as an independent power base and a source of employment and promotion were already undermined forced many dervishes to accept the reforms and seek employment in the official religious establishment (Küçük 2007: 126; Brockett 1998: 58). Resistance was fierce however, especially in Kurdistan. Of 18 major revolts that broke out between 1924 and 1938, 17 took place in the Kurdish regions. Taxation, conscription and administrative/educational centralization were the root causes of these rebellions, although the government strongly (yet largely unfoundedly) believed that they were provoked by Britain (e.g. Olson and Tucker
1978: 197). This created a continuous perception of imminent geopolitical threat and a ‘civil war-like’ situation during the interwar years, whose impact on the Republican psyche would, in many ways, be comparable to that of the war of independence (Tunçay 2010: 134-5).  

Suppression and cooptation followed each rebellion. The threat of extinction forced many rebellious notables to submit to the reforms. Indeed, if they were able to prove their allegiance to the central administration, notables could still maintain their lands and acquire an upper hand to defeat local rivals; therefore cooptation was more likely than sheer suppression (McDowall 2004: 399). When cooptation did not work out, however, rebellions were met by the worst forms of suppression ranging from the issuance of country-wide emergency laws to mass killings and forced deportations. The Kemalist ‘Terror’ never ushered in an extensive land reform, however. Three laws, enacted by the Kemalist regime in 1930, 1934 and 1937, either expropriated the lands of only the most rebellious politico-religious notables or they were limited to redistributing minimum amounts of state-owned lands to the peasantry (Barkan 1980). Either way, the ultimate point of land redistribution was to punish rebelliousness and restore the minimum conditions of subsistence so that the link between the state’s geo-political pedagogy and peasant reproduction could be established.

Conscripting and educating the masses, rather than subjecting them to the market, thus constituted the core of the Kemalist vision of modernization. Military service and public education, rather than market competition, provided the basic means of social reproduction and constituted the ultimate source of equality and civility for the Republican subjects. In this context, the army and the school inevitably emerged as the major sites responsible for the

\[111\] This perception of imminent geopolitical threat on its Eastern borders forced Turkey to seek inter-regional alliances, which eventually led to the signing of the Sadabad Pact in 1937. The stated objective of the pact was to ensure non-aggression and non-intervention among Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan in case of irredentist uprisings and border disputes.
making of Republican subjects. Yet given the fiscal constraints caused by the peasant-based character of the economy and the Great Depression, it became almost impossible to reach the bulk of the population by conventional means of education. The state, unable or unwilling to reform the prevailing land regime, had to try new ways of ideological and moral mobilization that would stabilize, if not mitigate, sharecropping relations, preempt peasant migration to the cities, and keep the peasantry away from ethno-religious and revolutionary currents.

The Village Institutes (VIs) were a case in point. The VIs, established in 1937, aimed to create a stratum of peasant-teachers who would act as a ‘peasant intelligentsia’ as well as teach the peasantry in village schools. The peasant-teachers were not allowed to leave the countryside, therefore they were expected to stay within their own class and ‘never give up advocating the interests of the class from which [they] came’ (Karaomerlioglu 1998: 71). The VI graduates were planned to be one of the main agents of the Republican campaign for rural stabilization, turkification and increasing productivity. Unsurprisingly, in order to achieve these objectives, the architects of VIs emphasized the importance of learning how to struggle ‘against the hardships of nature’ and to overcome ‘ignorance’ rather than transforming agrarian property relations (ibid: 60). The ‘problem of low productivity’ and ‘poverty’ was thought to be rooted in the mere lack of ‘human will, voluntarism, and work with enthusiasm, devotion, diligence and passion’, rather than the structure of property relations (ibid). The flipside of this was that overcoming economic backwardness and political reactionism through education was not based on the teaching of values informed by productivist market principles, but the selective inculcation of radical citizenship practices. As one of the founders of VIs put it, the institutes and public schools should neither create ‘bookish intellectuals’ nor merely teach techniques of production, which by themselves would be a ‘disaster’ for the country. Rather they should teach peasants how to gain and exercise their rights so that ‘nobody could insult and “exploit”
them’ (Ismail Hakkı Tonguç, quoted in Aytemur 2007: 102, 105). The spread of values such as ‘freedom of thought, freedom of expression, and equal rights which had been the well-known slogans of the French Revolution’ was essential to the elimination of differences which would otherwise undermine the social order (Ismail Hakkı Tonguç, quoted in Aytemur 2007: 105-6). The insistence on hard-work, human will and voluntarism as transformative principles therefore did not hint at the rise of a ‘capitalist work ethic’ (cf. Karaömerlioğlu 1998: 60), but the creation of ‘enlightened peasants’. Despite their essentially conservative agenda, the village institutes, in the absence of a productivist space, had to engineer and contain a radical citizenship ethic so that peasant labour and bodies could be expanded and tapped in ways to reproduce the Republican order.

Using education and conscription as a way to facilitate modernity was a double-edge sword, however. On the one hand, both measures had to revive the people-ist and egalitarian understanding of political community in order to broaden the mass base and increase the geopolitical competitiveness of the Kemalist regime. Yet, the potential radicalization of people-ism had to be restrained by hierarchically requalifying the rules of participation in the Republican moral economy. This became an acute problem especially in the face of the absorption of greater numbers of commoners into public education and the resultant glut in bureaucratic cadres.\textsuperscript{112} The rules of accessing the state, which was by far the main source and generator of income, had to be repeatedly conditioned to credentials other than citizenship and merit.

In this regard, it is significant that Turkishness was defined by the Republican regime as a ‘legal’, ‘civic’ and ‘voluntarist’ citizenship category. Theoretically, every citizen, who was

\textsuperscript{112} ‘In 1930, 34 percent of the budget went for salaries paid to civil servants, whose number was constantly increasing in the 1920s without any consideration for the financial capacity of the state’ (Hershlag 1968: 68).
educated, thereby able to speak and write Turkish and who proved his political allegiance by doing military service, was entitled to become an equal participant in the political and economic establishment. However, in the absence of a ‘self-valorizing’ ‘economic’ sphere of accumulation, a potential increase in the number of politically equal citizens necessarily meant a more equal sharing of the state-generated rents and income. The Republican elite thus had to hierarchically redefine equality and civility by continuously reasserting ‘ethnic’ differences among equals. Precisely for this reason, in practice Turkishness consequently became a dual category which simultaneously encompassed ‘real citizens’ and ‘half citizens’; while the former represented the ethnic Turks (whatever that might mean), the latter referred to the ‘untrustworthy’ non-Muslims and Kurds (Ince 2012: 45-6). Needless to say, only ‘real Turks’ were able to obtain bureaucratic positions, while non-Muslims and Kurds were tacitly yet systematically excluded from the state service. Likewise, in the private sector most companies were required to replace non-Muslim Turkish workers with ‘Turks’ and non-Muslim Turkish businessmen were subjected to crushingly discriminatory taxation practices (Bayir 2013: 122-3).

Not the ‘weakness’ of the middle classes, but the conditions of geopolitical reproduction as well as the internal structure of surplus appropriation thus lent the Republican regime its ethno-cultural baggage and determined the quality of its impersonalized politics. This explanation also applies to Kemalism’s oft cited ‘paradoxical’ and ‘eclectic’ character: its ‘ad-hoc absolutism’ and ‘futurist democratism’ (Dumont 1981: 28); its heavy-handed single party

113 It is also in this respect in which the Republican elite was able to present Turkishness as a unifying and liberating force, while identifying other ethno-religious groups with a sort of false consciousness, i.e. people who forgot their Turkishness as a result of centuries of ‘oppression’ caused by the local and imperial power holders. For example, according to Recep Peker, the party secretary of the RPP ‘we consider as ours all those of our citizens who live among us, who belong socially and politically to the Turkish nation, and among whom ideas and feelings such as Kurdism, Circassianism etc. have been implanted. We deem it our duty to banish, by sincere efforts, those false conceptions, which are the legacy of an absolutist regime and the product of long-standing historical oppression’ (quoted in Dumont 1981: 29).
rule and relentless referencing to parliamentary sovereignty as the sole legal basis for popular legitimacy (Koçak 2005: 43); its ‘elitism’ and ‘peasantism’ (Karaömerlioğlu 2008: 116); and its promotion of ‘totalitarianism’ and ‘individualism’ (Mardin 1981: 212-3). Kemalism could not afford to be a merely elitist and authoritarian regime that guarantees only the interests of and solely relying on the owners of private property. The regime was preceded by a revolution in 1908 and born thanks to and in competition with Bolshevism. Combined with the continuing precariousness of the geopolitical situation and the persistence of non-capitalist social relations into the 1920s and 30s, the Turkish ruling elite had no other option but to try to secure the minimum conditions of subsistence in order to create and appeal to politically loyal and geopolitically useful Republican subjects.

Therefore, the right to property continuously clashed with, but did not crush, the right to subsistence during the early Republican era. Comparatively speaking, then, unlike Nazism and fascism that attempted to annihilate the man-the-citizen in favor of the man-the-producer, Kemalism, in the absence of a productivist space, still had to find new ways in which citizens could be empowered as well as contained. This is precisely why Kemalism had to claim the sharing of the universal values of modernity while continuously reinterpreting the manner of their implementation in hierarchical ways. One implication is that despite tacitly and persistently postponing their realization, Kemalism’s official embracement of equality and democracy could still be used by the lower classes to radicalize these concepts from within the official ideology. This was in stark contrast to Nazi political theory, for example, which completely banished parliament, the rights of the individual and duties towards the social whole in favor of a ‘spiritually-driven’ Volk and Führer (Shilliam 2009: 175). Thus, while in Nazi Germany the room for popular negotiation, mobilization and sovereignty was completely obliterated in favor of hierarchy and productivity, Kemalism’s bureaucratic elitism
could still potentially turn into populist radicalism. For, in an economy driven by political redistribution of the sources of income, the lower classes could raise their stake by reinterpretating the Kemalist negation of class differences as a blueprint for a politically more equal, if not classless, society. Kemalist populism, an essentially conservative and bureaucratic venture, could potentially be led astray by the lower classes, and turn into a breeding ground for radical forms of political equality and citizenship.\footnote{For example, the Kemalist attempt to create a peasant intelligentsia through village institutes more often than not ‘created a type of student who happened to be too disobedient and self-confident despite the mainstream norms of the Single Party regime’. This also partly explains why many graduates of the VIs...took part in progressive organizations and trade unions in the late 1960s and 70s’ (Karaömerlioğlu 1998: 70). For a detailed survey of how the populism of the VIs became a challenge to Kemalist populism see also Aytemur 2007: chp. 5.}

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have argued that ahistorical conceptions of class underlying the Sonderweg paradigm lead to a fundamental mischaracterization of Kemalism as ‘state capitalism’. Neither in the countryside nor in towns, I have contended, was the early Republican regime able or willing to legislate capitalist property relations. During the 1920s and 30s, the state elite were unable to impose market discipline on the bourgeois classes and were fearful of the divorce of the peasantry from the land. Via a series of ‘populist’ measures, such as fiscal incentives and limited land redistribution, the state elite preempted peasant dispossession and labor mobility, which they perceived as the ultimate danger to the existing sociopolitical order. In the absence of a stable supply of labor power, industrialists, foreign and domestic, invested only to reap easy profits in an economy completely sheltered from international competition. Organized in monopolies, they prevented competition and ‘overproduction’ and even sabotaged state plans to improve industrial productivity. Combined with the crisis of the world economy and the escalating threat of war during the 1930s, the state responded to its inability to establish ‘institutionalized markets’ by formulating alternative rules governing social and geopolitical reproduction. Through an alliance with a non-capitalist industrial
bourgeoisie, the state elite, once again, turned to consolidate Jacobin forms as the basis of its modernization strategy. Education, turkification and the militarization of Republican subjects became the ultimate basis of their social reproduction. The main principles of Turkish republicanism, ‘etatism’, ‘populism’, ‘nationalism’ and ‘secularism’ were consolidated in this context, leading to the emergence of an alternative regime of accumulation and an alternative modernity.

Kemalist modernism then did not derive from market society. It aspired to cultivate modern forms and values while deliberately bypassing the institutionalization of capitalist social relations (whereas the totalitarian-corporatist regimes in Western Europe, to which Kemalism is often compared, aspired to eradicate the most progressive aspects of modernity in order to deepen and rationalize capitalism). Instead of capitalism, Kemalism carried the Ottoman-Jacobin project to its logical conclusion by recombining it with new domestic resources. After almost a hundred years of engagement with the impersonalization of the relations of rule and property, Kemalism consolidated the modernist project as a late Jacobin progeny. In theory, this undertaking never relinquished its claim for the role of the individual and popular sovereignty in the making of ‘civilization’, yet given the non-capitalist character of prevailing property relations and in the face of geopolitical uncertainties (old and new), it endlessly racialized, militarized and secularised the politico-cultural conditions of being civic, equal and modern. As such, the manner in which the Republican regime tried to solve the ‘agrarian question’ inevitably took the form of an ethno-religious recolonization.
Chapter 5

Reinterpreting Capitalist Modernity a la turca

A central argument of this dissertation has been that the transition to modernity cannot be equated with the transition to capitalism, and vice versa. Capitalism is not simply the ‘economic’ compartment of modernity, nor is modernity the politico-cultural component of capitalism. Instead, capitalism represents a peculiar modernity governed by a distinct logic of reproduction. Only when we recognize the historical distinctiveness of capitalism, are we able to adequately comprehend its penetration into pre-existent forms of modernity and the concomitant rise of ‘capitalist modernities’ (Lacher 2006:149).

What is at stake here is not a complementary combination of modernity and capitalism, however. Clearly, preexistent forms of modernity may facilitate capitalism’s development. What is often overlooked, however, is that for capitalism to be born modernity has to also be undone in many respects. For capitalism eviscerates modern conceptions of rule, nationhood and citizenship by confining these to a distinct ‘political’ and ‘cultural’ sphere with no significant implication for the distribution of social and economic power. Clearly this is not to deny that struggles over ‘politics’ and ‘culture’ under capitalism may still complicate and even reverse the insulation of the ‘economic’ sphere, provided that political and cultural rights are reinterpreted in ways to transform the rules of access to the means of reproduction. Yet, the point that remains is that the establishment and generalization of a capitalist form of appropriation brings about a qualitative shift in, and often contradictory results for, modern forms of rule and subjectivity. As such, once the relations of the capitalist market are consolidated, modernity, as it previously existed, becomes almost unrecognizable (Bromley 1994: 100-103). The implication is that capitalist modernity does not refer to the ‘interpenetration of equals’, but refers to a protracted and open-ended process during which
capitalism gradually permeates modern orders and values, subordinating the historical legacies to its commodifying logic (Lacher 2006: 103). At the end, modernity is restructured to reinforce an order entirely different from what it was originally meant to underlie. Capitalist modernity, then, signals as much the destruction of modernity by capitalism as their complicated coexistence.

In preceding chapters, I have shown the non-capitalist origins of Ottoman/Turkish modernization. What awaits resolution in this chapter is the conceptualization and historicization of the rise and consolidation of capitalist modernity in Turkey. The chapter will open by introducing the recent historical-sociological debates on the transformation of Turkish modernity. I then move on to locate the origin and protracted development of capitalism in Turkey in the post-WWII period. I will show how capitalist social relations began to penetrate the social fabric, and how the initial Kemalist project and ‘traditional’ forms of sociality and subjectivity are reinvented by different actors to contest and produce capitalism. In so doing, I do not presume the dominance of the capitalist mode of production and capitalist rationality from the very beginning. Instead, I take capitalist development as a ‘process’ and outline the social, ideological and geopolitical struggles central to the making of capitalism. Seen from this angle, it will become clear that postwar modernization in Turkey cannot be understood merely as another form of capitalism, nor can Turkey’s current transformation signify a mere transition to another form of modernity (Duzgun 2012; 2013).

State, Capitalism and Class: The Fall and Ascendance of the Liberal Project in Turkey?
Turkey has been undergoing a radical social transformation since the 1980s, which has yielded significant implications for the hitherto prevailing notions of secularism, democracy and citizenship (Keyman 2010). The Kemalist encapsulation of the political and religious imaginary seems to have vanished during this time, with the previously excluded social
classes moving into the public sphere and hence redefining the political, the secular and the religious. In particular, the bourgeois classes associated with Political Islam are deemed to be the prime movers behind ‘a state-making project from below’, reversing the bureaucratically informed hierarchies of the Republican period (Atasoy 2009: 51). Taking advantage of ‘opportunity spaces’ created by global economic processes, Islamist business groups have succeeded in breaking the supremacy of the military bureaucracy (Tugal 2009; Eligur 2010; Yavuz 2003). They have successfully challenged the political and cultural preferences of the state elite, thereby leading to an overhaul of Kemalist modernity (Gulalp 2001; Keyman and Koyuncu 2005; Keyder 2004; Gumuscu and Sert 2009). Indeed, at least until the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011 and recent authoritarian turn in Turkish politics, they seemed ready to export their liberal-conservative project to the Middle East, finally laying the foundations of, what its enthusiastic proponents call, an ‘Ottoman commonwealth’; a dream that Ottoman and Turkish reformers long strived for, yet could not materialize (Colak 2006).

Explaining the unfolding of the liberal project in Turkey with the eventual rise of a bourgeois class hints at the final resolution of the conceptual dichotomy used by many scholars to define the relation between the Turkish state and the bourgeoisie. For example, Serif Mardin (2006c: 62-63) describes the postwar Turkish socioeconomic system as ‘late neo-patrimonialism’, a patrimonial system with ‘an increasing number of characteristics of capitalism’. The political ‘center’, according to Mardin, fostered the growth of a new class of entrepreneurs during the postwar years, yet the penetration of these new social elements into the ‘center’ was not strong enough to change the balance of forces at the apex of the state. As a consequence, ‘power’, rather than ‘economic production’, remained the defining feature of Turkish political and economic life, hence the underdevelopment of modern conceptions of rule. In like fashion, Heper (1992) and Kazancigil (1994) emphasize the ‘timidity’ of the bourgeois classes
vis-à-vis the strength of state cadres, which made impossible the development of an ‘independent’ civil society based on market relationships and economic rationality. Bugra (1994) and Onis (1992) formulate a milder version of the ‘weak’ bourgeoisie argument. Well aware of the role the state played in the industrialization of the East Asian ‘tigers’, they highlight the lack of a long-term industrial strategy on the part of the state cadres, which in turn led the bourgeois classes to engage in ‘rent-seeking activity’. Eventually, they contend that what characterized Turkish society and its non-liberal modernity was not the ‘strength’ of the state per se, but a market-repressing state, instead of a ‘market-augmenting’ one, limiting the ‘self-confidence’ of the Turkish bourgeoisie. Keyder (1987) seems to agree with this view, as he sees bourgeois domination only in the economic sphere, with political and cultural life still shaped by the rather authoritarian practices of the state cadres. This pertains to the ‘disinterestedness’ of the bourgeois classes in enlarging the politico-cultural sphere in Turkey, a consequence of their peripheral integration into the capitalist world economy.

Either way, be it the peripheral character of capitalism or the lack of indigenous sources of ‘proper’ capitalist development, the bourgeoisie/state dichotomy constitutes the conceptual backbone of the debate on postwar Turkish modernity. The main theoretical issue, which I diagnosed in earlier chapters, thus equally applies to the analyses of the postwar period. That is, in searching for an explanation for the fall and rise of the liberal project in Turkey, existing analyses reproduce the economistic fallacy or the bourgeois paradigm. The presence of non-liberal forms of modernity is linked to the nature of capitalism, which is in turn associated with the ‘weakness’ or ‘ peripheral’ character of bourgeois classes. As capitalism becomes a natural trait of the bourgeoisie, changes in modern conceptions of rule and subjectivity are explained by the ‘liberation’ or ‘repression’ of bourgeois classes. Consequently, this ahistorical understanding of the bourgeois class causes capitalism and modernity to be
imprinted over each other. For this reason, the issue to unravel is the transhistorical association between the bourgeoisie, capitalism and modernity and to specify the socio-historical and international context in which classes articulate their historically specific interests. Once we stop pre-imputing capitalist logic to any single class, we will be able to provide a series of new explanations as to why Turkish modernity in the postwar period assumed the character that it did and clearly identify the conditions for the interpenetration of capitalism and modernity. In what follows, I will try to tackle this formidable task.

**Land and Democracy: World War II and the Prelude to Multiparty Politics**

*If the farmers are not given enough land, ...the unexpected poisonous effects of the ideologies, which would spread everywhere after the war like a fierce flood, would inflame the entire society and damage the social fabric and national unity.*

*Recep Peker, RPP secretary*

*[Regarding the governance of the Turkish Straits] it is impossible to accept a situation in which Turkey has a hand on Russia's throat.*

*Joseph Stalin, 1945*

*If we did not bring the democratic regime in 1945-46, then there could have been a bloody revolution.*

*Ismet Inonu, RPP leader*

I have argued in the last chapter that the Kemalist elite viewed sharecropping relations as the harbinger of ethno-religious separatism, proletarianization and foreign intervention. These concerns would reach their peak once the long-expected war finally broke out. During most of WWII, Turkey pursued a meticulous neutrality policy. The war had to be avoided at all costs not only because of the looming threat of German invasion, but also due to the fact the political elites were convinced that in case of war, no matter whose side Turkey was on, the Soviets would eventually occupy Turkey either as enemies or ‘liberators’ (Aydin 2000: 105). Throughout the war Turkey tended to favor a limited Allied victory; a victory that would not completely annihilate Nazi Germany so that the ‘nightmare’ of ‘a Bolshevized Slav Bloc at
Turkey’s door’ would not come to pass (VanDerLippe 2005: 88). In order to remain autonomous, obtain military aid and secure international trade deals, the Republican elite continuously appeased and tried to exploit both sides in the great power rivalry, the Axis Powers who rapidly expanded in the Balkans and Mediterranean, and the Allied Powers who pressed Turkey to join the war.

Staying out of the war did not spare Turkey from the socioeconomic costs of preparation for war, however. Military expenditures increased from 30 percent of the budget in 1938 to 54 percent in 1942, while the number of conscripts increased 10 fold, amounting to 1 million men in 1942 out of a total population of 17.8 million (ibid: 69). This, in turn, resulted in sharp decreases in production levels, skyrocketing inflation, and hoarding and black marketeering.115 The state tried several measures in order to provision the army, prevent food shortages and restrain inflation, such as strict price-wage controls, forced government purchases, obligatory work practices, prolonged working hours and the introduction of a series of devastatingly high taxes.

Wartime military mobilization and economic measures led to widespread grievances in the countryside and towns. Peasants were conscripted; they were subjected to extra taxes; their draft animals were confiscated; their produce was forcefully sold at below-market prices to the state; they were forced to work on road construction and in coal mines (Karaomerlioglu 2006: 94; Pamuk 1988:100-107). Large landowners, in principle, were not spared from wartime agricultural taxes, but they were able to evade government demands and bribe government officials more successfully than the peasantry and could still benefit from rising prices and black markets (Pamuk and Owen 1999: 25). This points to the further

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115 Between 1940-5, industrial production decreased by 33%, agricultural production by 42% (Boratav 2003: 85). Inflation rose roughly 5 times between 1938 and 1945, which is an extraordinary increase ‘given the fact that even in countries actually in war prices increased 20 to 35 per cent only’ (Karaomerlioglu 2006:98).
strengthening of large landowners’ relative position vis-à-vis the peasantry, and their increasing capacity to perpetuate the sharecropping debt-cycle and relations of dependency in the countryside (VanDerLippe 2005: 86). In towns, urban dwellers deeply resented the government’s freezing of wages and salaries, corruption, deteriorating living standards, the rationing of basic necessities, and the rise of a new group of rich merchants benefiting from wartime inflation and black markets. Parallel to dramatic decreases in real wages, absenteeism in the workplace also reached unprecedented levels, as did unemployment, beggary and petty crime (Karaomerlioglu 2006: 101, 98).

Social discontent and fiscal difficulties became particularly alarming after 1941, which forced the government to issue Varlik Vergisi, a one-time emergency wealth levy on leading merchants, industrialists and large landowners. The levy’s declared aim was to ‘renew the faith of the people in the government’ by ‘compelling those who amassed inflated [wartime] profits…to participate in the sacrifices demanded by the extraordinary circumstances…to an extent commensurate with their profits and capacity’ (VanDerLippe 2005: 82). Despite being formulated in a non-discriminatory language, however, the levy was applied mainly to the non-Muslim minorities, which was often justified by a typically Jacobin argument reminiscent of the Young Turk times: ‘for centuries Turks had fought to protect the land and the people while the minorities, who were exempt from service in the army, had time to enter business and accumulate wealth’. Thus, the wealth tax, ‘because of their previous exemptions,
should demand more from the minorities’ (ibid: 83). In short, faced by military threats from outside and political pressures from below, the Turkish state elite, once again, sacrificed the non-Muslim propertied classes on the altar of the citizen-soldier.

*Varlik Vergisi* provided (temporary) populist relief to the regime of accumulation in place, and while doing so it reinforced the economic position of a group of favored Turkish Muslim merchants. Yet, it is important to bear in mind that *Varlik Vergisi* ‘seriously damaged business confidence’ in general, raising widespread suspicion among the Turkish propertied classes, who feared that such an arbitrary and heavy-handed taxation practice could one day also target themselves (Keyder 1987: 113). The fear was further magnified in 1945 when the RPP, forced by geopolitical circumstances, attempted to legislate land reform. At two major international conferences held by the Allied Powers in 1945, Soviet demands for territorial concessions in eastern Turkey and the need for Allied supervision of the Turkish Straits were acknowledged (VanDerLippe 2005: 127-132). Faced with Soviet hostility and let down by Britain and the US, the RPP was forced to design a new land reform bill to preempt peasant reaction caused by continuing military mobilization and the spread of revolutionary ideas (Karaomerlioglu 2000: 131).

What differentiated the reform bill of 1945 from previous land reform experiments was that for the first time in Republican history the bureaucratic elite was going beyond the mere distribution of state-owned lands and was risking alienating the landowning class by proposing to nationalize all landed property in excess of 500 *donums* (125 acres) and distributing to sharecroppers and land-hungry peasants the land they tilled. The reform also stipulated that peasants would be provided with twenty-year interest-free loans for development, and that the new holdings acquired by the peasantry must not be partitioned
among heirs (Lewis 1968: 475, Tezel 1985: 351-7). If successfully implemented, the bill could have ended sharecropping relations and paved the way for the rise and generalization of petty commodity production in the Turkish countryside. In the face of fierce landlord reaction within the RPP, the full promises of the land reform bill never came to fruition; its implementation was halted until 1947 and the bill was significantly altered in 1950, consequently losing much of its teeth against the wealth and status of the propertied classes. Although ultimately unsuccessful, however, the reform bill was to become the last straw to break the ruling class coalition\textsuperscript{118}: the ruling bloc was irreversibly shattered after the bill, with merchants and landowners beginning to loudly challenge the dominance of the ‘radicals’ within the RPP (Ahmad 1977: 11).

If the peasantry could not be granted land, they could, however, be endowed with democracy. Put differently, the RPP, unsuccessful at improving the conditions of peasant subsistence through land reform, could still try to regain popular support and secure the regime’s geopolitical reproduction by devising a controlled transition to multiparty politics. The RPP leaders announced the opening of the era of direct elections in order to preempt ‘any kind of radical solutions that might [otherwise] come from below’ (Karaomerlioglu 2006: 102). Squeezed by military pressures from without and social discontent from within, the RPP eventually split in 1946 to give birth to the Democrat Party (DP) both as a shock absorber and competitor.

The DP was founded by a group of nouveau riche businessmen and big landlords. This fact made the Republicans believe that the DP would not be able to obtain popular support and

\textsuperscript{118} Among the 453 deputies elected to the Assembly in 1943, 127 were public servants of various kinds, 67 members of the armed forces, 89 lawyers, 59 teachers…49 were merchants, 45 farmers, 15 bankers, and 3 industrialists’ (Ahmad 1977:31, quoting from Lewis). ‘Although 89 representatives identified themselves as lawyers this only means that they had all been to law school, not necessarily that law was their profession. In many cases there were probably wealthy landowners’ (Ahmad 1977: 31).
would be easily marginalized given the RPP’s strong organization in the countryside and control of the state apparatus (Karpat 1964: 51). Also, in order to strengthen their hand in electoral competition and gain access to US aid, the RPP leaders from 1946 onwards were ready to reinterpret etatism and secularism in ways appealing to business and popular demands. In 1947, the more radical interlocutors of Kemalist etatism and secularism within the RPP were defeated, so were the attempts at radicalizing the village institute experiment, people’s houses and the redistributive land reform (Boratav 2003: 98). In 1950, the year of the first truly competitive and direct elections, there was barely any difference between the programs of the Republicans and Democrats (Ahmad 1977: 30, 124-5). Both parties pledged to reverse ‘extreme’ state intervention into the economy and society, emphasizing the need to expand economic and religious freedoms as well as prevent communist propaganda and infiltration (Ahmad 2003: 108). Despite these similarities, however, the DP won a decisive victory in the 1950 elections. Given its provincial roots and the fact that the Republican Party was held responsible for the poverty and authoritarianism of the last two decades, the DP proved much more successful at ‘mobilizing large segments of the rural and lower urban groups and set them against the Republicans’ (Karpat 1964: 50).

The multiparty politics, begun in 1950, would bring about two important implications for the decades to follow. First, the rise of electoral politics would eventually lead to a process resulting in the competitive undoing of the original modernist project, transforming the alternative political economy and subjectivity which Kemalists sought to establish during the interwar years. Second, inter-party competition would operate under such intense pressures for upward social mobility that the terms of the transition to capitalism would be greatly

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119 The rate of participation in the elections was roughly 90 per cent. The Democrats won 53 per cent of the vote and 408 seats in the Assembly, while the RPP won 38 per cent of the vote but only 39 seats. The vast disproportion between votes and seats was caused by the ‘winner takes all principle’ of the electoral system, which was ‘the creation of a Republican government which had so far used it to its own advantage’ (Ahmad 2003:109).
shaped and complicated by the demands of the peasantry and urban poor. This is the argument to which I turn in the following section.

**New World Order, Petty Commodity Production and the Transition to Capitalism**

There are many countries that have suffered from the dominance of large landownership and the landlessness and proletarianization of the peasantry. [Yet] the situation is different in Turkey. It should never be forgotten that in our country it has always been possible to obtain an acre of land for the price of the cheapest pair of shoes.\(^\text{120}\)

*Adnan Menderes, the DP leader, 1945*

Greece and Turkey, without financial and other aid from either the United States or Great Britain, may become Soviet puppets in the near future. Their loss to the western world would undoubtedly be followed by further Soviet territorial and other gains in Europe and the Near and Middle East. The resulting chaos would be accompanied by an immediate weakening of the strategic and economic position of the whole western world ... and the very security of the United States would be threatened.

*Foreign Relations of the United States Report, 1947*

The Land Law the former administration passed was harmful and provided no benefits. Since former times the system of tenant farming or sharecropping [ortakçılık] has been in practice. Under this system the wealthy landowner provided the small farmer with credit in kind and in cash. The Land Law ended that and created conflict over land between the landlord and the tenant. Now we shall encourage tenant farming and also try to give land to the landless as soon as possible. [In short] the big landlord will be protected and the Land Law will be brought to life.

*Nihat Iyriboz, the Minister of Agriculture, 1950*

The leaders of the Democrat Party fiercely opposed a radical redistribution of land, ultimately succeeding in overturning the original land reform bill. Yet they did not want agrarian relations to remain unchanged (Tezel 1985: 354). In fact, DP cadres, and above all, Adnan Menderes, the DP leader and a rich landlord from the Aegean region, came to favor an agrarian transformation that would not violate the sanctity of private property (i.e. the sanctity of large landholdings) but would nevertheless tackle the politically dangerous and economically unsatisfactory state of agrarian relations. To revise the land law in ways mutually compatible with the interests of landlords and peasants was indeed a difficult

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\(^{120}\)“Büyük toprak mülkiyetinin hüküm olmasından ve çiftçinin büyük kısmının topraksız veya tamamen proletaryalılaşmış bulunmaktadır ıstraplar çekmiş ülkeler çok görülmüşdür. (Ama) Türkiye’de manzara bu değildir. Hiçbir zaman hatırlan çıkarılmamak gerekir ki, ülkede en adi bir çift ayakkabı pahasına bir dönüm toprak edinmek imkanları daima mevcut olagelmiştir”
undertaking (Ahmad 1977: 133-4). This was a burning task especially because the DP’s electoral success was achieved thanks to its appeal to the peasantry, and its recurring promise that the DP was not a ‘class’ party but ‘represented all those who wanted to put an end to one-party rule’ (ibid: 16-7). In this context, it is no wonder that capitalist social relations were to be created and embedded within the shell of sharecropping.

As argued earlier, the existence of sharecropping and a small-landholding peasantry, in the absence of relatively developed credit, labor and land markets, are structurally antithetical to the development of capitalist relations. During the early Republican period, political and geopolitical concerns pushed the state to forestall the development of ‘petty commodity production’ in the countryside (which presupposes the commodification of the conditions of subsistence without the separation of landholder from land). Peasants were largely excluded from credit channels; they endured below-market prices imposed by monopoly merchants and were not able to take advantage of the price-support policies. Furthermore, land was divisible and the peasantry had relatively easy access to free or inexpensive state-lands. Under these circumstances, peasants were neither enabled nor forced to accumulate funds beyond those required for rent and subsistence, which could have been otherwise used to improve agricultural tools and implements. Likewise, the sharecropping landlord, who had no alternative supply of labor and no monopoly over land, systematically impeded the development of productive forces, which could have otherwise enabled sharecropping peasants to brake the debt-sharecropping cycle. Furthermore, these productive and investment patterns inherently inimical to capitalism were further solidified during the Second World War under the impact of military mobilization and the forced levy on agricultural produce (Keyder 1983: 140). The issue now confronting us then is to account for the transition to capitalist agriculture after the Second World War.
The most commonplace explanation posits the increasing availability of foreign aid funds from 1950 onwards that facilitated the import of agricultural machinery and the introduction of capital-intensive techniques in agriculture, which in turn initiated the first large scale out-migration from the countryside to the urban centers, thereby paving the way for the consolidation of commodity relations both in agriculture and industry. What is problematic with this ‘tractor ate men’ hypothesis is two-fold: first, as long as the old political and geopolitical concerns prevailed, i.e. the threat of revolution and Soviet aggression, the state would not be as willing to support a process of mechanization in agriculture leading to proletarianization. Second, as long as peasants, including sharecroppers, continued to have access to free or cheap state-owned lands, the pull and attraction of towns would remain weak; mass migration would be less likely to occur and the landlord class would be less willing to introduce machinery and to impose capitalist property relations. The question as to why the state and sharecropping landlords were more willing than previously in the postwar period to initiate a capitalist growth dynamic thus has to go beyond rather techno-determinist explanations, and take into account the transformation of the (geo)political determinants of the capitalist transition in Turkey.

After all, what worried the Americans most in relation to postwar Turkey was not Turkey’s capitalist transformation per se, but its stability. As the Turkish army remained mobilized due to the perception of imminent Soviet attack, the state continued to devote 60 per cent of its budget to defense expenditures after the war. Coupled with the Greek Civil War (1946-9), the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Soviets (1946), and the increasing importance of Middle Eastern oil fields, the US (albeit initially reluctant to extend protection) was increasingly convinced that maintaining such a large army would cause fiscal and social
destabilization in Turkey, which could eventually lead to the installation of a pro-Soviet government, thereby severely endangering US interests in the region (VanderLippe 2005: 168-9). While this growing US recognition of Turkey’s geopolitical importance\textsuperscript{121} assured Turkey against Soviet military pressure, it also allowed considerable leeway for the Democrat Party to initiate structural transformation in agriculture without being much concerned about the masses that would be dislocated as a result of this transformation (cf. Karpat 1972: 353). After more than a hundred years of modernization, then, Turkey finally found the geopolitical breathing space in which capitalist property relations could be established without the imminent threat of foreign intervention.\textsuperscript{122} With outside pressure alleviated and foreign military assistance extended, the ruling elite could more easily control and suppress domestic reactionary movements, and without having to further invoke radical citizenship practices to defend and unite the ‘nation’.

If the emergence of a bipolar world order laid the (geo)political foundations for capitalist development in Turkey, foreign economic assistance, high world market prices and favorable state policies \textit{indirectly} galvanized the process of transition during the 1950s by undermining sharecropping relations and encouraging petty commodity production as the new norm in agriculture. The bulk of foreign funds were used to import agricultural machinery\textsuperscript{123}; and as a result the portion of arable area cultivated by tractors increased from 8.6 percent in 1950 to 14 percent in the latter 1950s (Hale 1981: 95). Despite their still limited use for cultivation,

\textsuperscript{121} While the military aid from the United States began in 1947, the economic aid began the following year with Turkey’s admission to the Marshall Plan. By 1968 Turkey received ‘a total of about five billion dollars …, a third of which was economic and the rest military aid’ (Karpat 1972: 353).

\textsuperscript{122} The disappearance of imminent geopolitical threat after Turkey joined NATO does not mean that geopolitics ceased to be important. Even after the Soviets (following Stalin’s death in 1953) renounced their direct territorial claims over Turkey, Turkey remained hostile to the USSR during most of the 1950s, deeply suspicious of Soviet efforts/interventions to increase or reinforce their zone of influence in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Hungary (Aydin 2000: 112-3).

\textsuperscript{123} The number of tractors increased from 1750 in 1948 to 16585 in 1950, 31415 in 1952, 41896 in 1959 (Ahmad 1977: 135).
tractors were rented or collectively purchased by the peasantry to reclaim marginal lands owned by the state (e.g. grazing lands, meadows and forests)\textsuperscript{124}, which led to an exponential increase of the area under cultivation especially between 1950 and 1956 (Hale 1981: 95; Hansen 1991: 360).\textsuperscript{125} The mechanization and expansion of the area sown was made possible by state distribution of land and credit. Throughout the 1950s the peasantry was freed from most wartime taxes and gained access to state-provided cheap and long-term agricultural credits,\textsuperscript{126} which gave peasants the opportunity to buy/rent agricultural machinery and draft animals\textsuperscript{127} without incurring too much debt. In this respect, the intensification of credit relations between the state and the peasantry not only increased peasant production and relative living standards, but also protected them against relations of debt and usury.\textsuperscript{128}

Combined with the state provision of floor prices\textsuperscript{129}, distribution of state-owned land\textsuperscript{130} and infrastructural investment,\textsuperscript{131} most landless peasants ultimately broke the cycle of debt-sharecropping: the number of owner-occupied farms increased by 30 percent between 1952

\textsuperscript{124} Only about 20 per cent of tractors were bought by small landholding peasantry (Singer 1977: 206). And yet, although large landowners were the main beneficiaries of cheap credit and tractor policy, large tracts of lands, were also distributed among large numbers of peasants (Marguiles and Yildizoglu 1983:34; Keyder 1983:142).

\textsuperscript{125} The area under cultivation increased by 67 per cent over the decade as a whole: from 13,900,000 hectares in 1948 to 22, 453,000 hectares in 1956 and 22, 940,000 hectares in 1959 (Ahmad 1977: 135).

\textsuperscript{126} The Agricultural Bank’s credits to agriculture increased almost 10-fold between 1948 and 1958 (Varli and Oktar 2010: 12). Meanwhile, direct taxes on agricultural income were significantly reduced: ‘[t]he rich landowners and substantial farmers who together earned more than a fifth of the GDP, paid only 2 per cent of the total tax revenue’ (Zurcher 1993: 228).

\textsuperscript{127} The number of draft animals used on small family farms increased 40 per cent during the 1950s (Atasoy 2005: 92).

\textsuperscript{128} 88 per cent of the loans, which equalled to 42 per cent of total credit distributed by the Agricultural Bank were received by small producers. Large loans, equal to 15 per cent of total credits, were benefited by 0.48 per cent of farmers (Atasoy 2005: 91).

\textsuperscript{129} The state price policy became particularly important after the collapse of world grain prices following end of the Korean War. The overall index of grain prices paid by the state rose from 100 in 1950, to 120 in 1954 and 196 in 1959. Although these rises were more-or-less in line with increases in inflation, state purchase prices exceeded export prices by 50 per cent in 1954 and 90 per cent in 1959 (Hale 1981: 95).

\textsuperscript{130} In accordance with the modified land reform act of 1946, the state distributed from 1945 to 1959 a total of about 3 million hectares (land and communal pasture land) to about 400.000 families who were the least propertied (Hershlag 1968: 158; Keyder 1983: 142).

\textsuperscript{131} In 1950, there 47.000 km of roads, of which only 1600 km were hard-surfaces. Thanks to American technical and economic aid, by 1960 ‘the length of hard-surfaced highways increased to over 7000 km, together with just under 35.000 km of loose-surfaced primary roads, out of a total of 61.500 km. Hundreds of previously isolated towns and villages were now integrated into the national economy’ (Hale 1981: 90). Also the improvements in road networks must have been conducive to the breaking down of territorial commercial monopolies, thereby contributing to the relative homogenization of country-wide commodity prices (e.g. Keyder xx).
and 1963, while landlessness declined from 16 percent to 10 percent of the rural population between 1950 and 1960 (Keyder 1987: 131).

All this indicates an extensive expansion of agricultural production in the first half of the 1950s. Mechanization, good weather conditions, price and credit support and population increase enabled the rapid opening up of previously uncultivated lands.\(^\text{132}\) However, the extensive limits of profitable cultivation began to be tested from 1956 onwards. With little pressure to produce competitively, producers expanded agricultural frontier land as much as possible while yields remained almost stagnant (Owen and Pamuk 1999: 107-8).\(^\text{133}\) Continuing to produce on lands of poorer quality or inferior location lowered yields and depleted investment funds, which further limited competitiveness in world markets, causing unsustainable deficits in the country’s trade balance.\(^\text{134}\) The result was repeated foreign exchange crises in the latter half of the 1950s which foreshadowed the increasing inability to import tractors and the end of the expansion of the agricultural frontier (Hansen 1991: 344).

This decade-long expansion and eventual closure of cultivable land, however, had three important and interrelated implications on the structure of agrarian relations, all of which made the 1950s a prelude to the intensive capitalist development that was to take place in the following decades. *First*, as small holdings reached an economically feasible size and peasants were provided credit and price support, they became consumers as well as suppliers of the domestic market for the first time in Republican history (Keyder 1988: 164). This

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\(^\text{132}\) During the years of most rapid agricultural expansion (1951-4), improved practices accounted for only 7 per cent of the increase in agricultural production, while the extension of land frontier accounted for 36, the weather 43, mechanization 10 and transportation per cent (Ahmad 1977: 133).

\(^\text{133}\) ‘From 1948-50 to 1951-53 yields measured as GDP per hectare of cultivated land increased by 0.4 percent annually. From 1951-53 to 1961-63 yields increased by 0.7 percent annually. This was poor performance’ (Hansen 1991: 344). Furthermore, according to one estimate, labor productivity in Turkish agriculture between 1890 and 1960 did not increase by more than 60 per cent in seventy years (Pamuk 2008a, p. 392).

\(^\text{134}\) The trade deficit reached 22.7 per cent of the volume of foreign trade in 1955 from 4 per cent in 1950 (Marguiles and Yildizoglu 1983:20ff).
increasing market orientation was further supported by US food aid, which contributed to the peasants gradually losing their ability to revert to subsistence production and their increasing specialization in cash crop production. Second, the closure of the land frontier and the implementation of a stricter land registration system put upward pressure on land prices, which considerably limited the extensive reproduction of peasant households. Read together with improvements in transportation and the expansion of the domestic market, permanent migration to urban centers for the first time became both a necessity and viable strategy of reproduction. In other words, while state support for agriculture ‘gave even relatively inefficient farms a chance to survive’ (Zurcher 1993: 226), the closure of the land frontier made them increasingly market-dependent, indirectly leading to the process of mass migration from the countryside to the towns. Chronic labor shortages, which haunted the earlier attempts at industrialization, thus began to be overcome with the continuous flow of a permanent labor force. Third, the emergence of a stronger consumer and labor market significantly contributed to the smooth transformation of sharecropping landlords into capitalist entrepreneurs. With the structural makeover of labor markets and alluring prospects for productive activity (both in agriculture and manufacturing), the sharecropping landlords

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135 I have derived this point from Robert Brenner’s following remark: ‘naturally the pressure on peasants to diversify and produce for subsistence would decrease to the extent that the growth of food production elsewhere and the improvement of transportation allowed for increasingly secure food imports and thereby decreased the riskiness of specialization. Once capitalism had developed in some places, what constituted the rational self-interest and thus the rules of reproduction of the pre-capitalist economic actors was subject to change’ (Brenner 1986: 29)

136 After the end of the Marshall Aid in 1952, the main source of US economic aid to Turkey was food aid, which amounted to US$ 351 million between 1954 and 1962 (Atasoy 2005:95). The volume of production increased both for cereals and industrial crops from 1950 to 1960, and yet the increases in industrial crops were more rapid: while the volume of cereal cultivation roughly doubled, industrial crop production increased by more than 350 per cent (Marguiles and Yildizoglu 1983: 21).

137 As a result, while the increase in the agricultural labor force was merely 9 per cent between 1950 and 1960, the number of non-agricultural laborers increased by 86 per cent (Hansen 1991: 342), which means that ‘one out of every ten villagers migrated to an urban area during the 1950s (Keyder 1987: 137).
finally began to find it feasible and profitable to reorganize the labor process by driving off sharecroppers and improving their holdings.\footnote{According to a survey cited by Caglar Keyder, during the 1950s ‘only 4 per cent of the village populations was driven off and less than one-fifth of those actually left their village (most of those remaining in the village found land to reclaim)’. In more commercially oriented areas such as in cotton-rich Cukurova, however, at least 12.4 per cent of the population were driven off. In Cukurova, therefore, some of the previously sharecropping landlords turned to capitalist entrepreneurs who invested not only in agricultural machinery, but also ‘made the jump from cotton to ginnery, yarn and textiles’ (Keyder 1987: 138, also see Zurcher 1993:227-8). Correlatively, another study finds that 20 per cent all industrialists in 1960 were ex-farmers (Alexander 1960). Only region where sharecropping relations seem to have persisted in post-war Turkey was Kurdistan, i.e. Eastern and Southeastern Turkey (Keyder 1988: 168), more on this below.}

The 1950s thus witnessed the beginning of structural transformation in the Turkish countryside with peasants slowly turning into petty commodity producers, i.e. farmers whose relation to the means of subsistence was increasingly determined by their capability to maintain landholdings with recourse to commodity production. The peasantry’s political neutralization and incorporation into the capitalist project, however, brought about not too unexpected outcomes for government finances. The peasantry’s integration into markets could be sustained only by expansionary fiscal policies and price support programs, which were at least partly responsible for growing public indebtedness and inflationary pressures, especially during the second half of the 1950s.\footnote{Money supply increased 6 fold, while the price index, 100 in 1949, rose to 222 by 1959. The internal debt increased 2.4 times and the external debt 6.5 times. The latter was largely caused by a 10 fold increase in trade and current account deficits (Hershlag 1988: 19).} What was more costly than the support given to the peasantry, however, was ‘the credit extended from deposit banks to the private sector’. In other words, the bourgeoisie, one of the leading forces behind the DP government, was the ‘main culprit’ for the monetary expansion and the resultant macroeconomic problems (Hansen 1991: 344). Let me briefly explain.

During the 1950s, ‘the private sector demonstrated an unprecedented flurry of activity’ yet without delivering the expected developmental outcomes (Barkey 1990a: 53). The Democrat Party had committed to reversing the etatism of the early Republican years under the
‘illusion’ that the creation of a market economy was ‘only a matter of legislation’. Once the economy was de-etatized, the party assumed, ‘businessmen and industrialists would then do the rest and in no time a [strong] private sector would come into being’ (Ahmad 1977: 128). Until 1954, the rising income and consumption levels in agriculture, combined with government encouragement and relaxation of import restrictions, indeed provided a strong stimulus for private investment. Yet, the appetite for investment continued only insofar as the Turkish Lira preserved its overvalued international position. Importing goods was an extremely profitable venture; hence some private actors ‘greatly prospered while the Turkish lira was kept overvalued at 2.8 to the US dollar though its market value was between 10 and 12 liras’ (Ahmad 1993: 116). Under these circumstances, it is no wonder that the private sector showed little interest in government plans to privatize the state economic enterprises (SEEs) of the etatist period. Nor is it hard to predict why foreign companies (albeit quite few in number) were merely interested in gaining internal distribution rights, rather than engaging in productive activity (Hale 1981: 88-9). Additionally, it is not so unexpected that actors involved in construction and trade received the lion’s share from the distribution of bank credits, while earlier industrialists increasingly diverted to lucrative non-industrial activities.140

After the agricultural sector lost steam in external markets, however, it became increasingly difficult for the DP government to continue to afford agricultural machinery and spare parts. ‘Farm machinery could no longer be serviced properly and much of it went out of commission, while run-down factories were reduced to operating at half their capacity’ (Ahmad 1993: 116-7). Furthermore, foreign economic assistance had been declining or had

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140 ‘Industry garnered only 2.73 per cent of these credits in 1955 while agriculture and services (basically trade and construction) scored 30.78 and 66.49 per cent respectively’ (Milor 1989: 141).
been conditioned on economic restructuring since 1954.\textsuperscript{141} Electoral pressures and considerations, as well as powerful interests entrenched within the party, rendered the taxation of agriculture, the cutting back of agricultural subsidies and currency devaluation politically too risky even to try at least until 1958, and only unsuccessfully thereafter. Inflation soared, as did black markets, unemployment and indebtedness. The escalating foreign exchange debt crisis and political pressures eventually forced the DP to relapse to the kind of policies reminiscent of those of the etatist 1930s: the government increased import limitations, imposed credit restrictions and price controls while rediscovering the usefulness of state economic enterprises as ‘instruments for relieving some of the bottlenecks and for capital formation’ (Owen and Pamuk 1999: 108; Hershlag 1988: 18).

Two implications ensued from the quasi-etatist turn of the mid-1950s. First, the SEE investments outweighed private investment from 1954 onward; the state, once again, became the main investor in the economy.\textsuperscript{142} Instead of being part of a long-term industrialization plan, however, public sector investments became, by and large, a means to artificially maintaining economic expansion and ‘halting any erosion in the DP’s domestic support base’ (Barkey 1990a: 54). Most SEEs (especially in cement and sugar industries) were governed by ‘a system of pricing which bore little attention to costs’, i.e. the ‘prices of many SEE products were arbitrarily established… frequently below production costs’. There was also ‘a tendency to establish new plants for purely political [and electoral] reasons with little regard to

\begin{footnote}{Two months before the 1954 elections, the Prime Minister Menderes went to the US and pleaded for increased aid. However, he returned to the country with a piece of advice only. It had become more difficult to persuade Americans of the continuing geopolitical significance of Turkey, especially after Stalin’s death in 1953 that led to the revision of Soviet policy towards Turkey, renouncing the territorial claims of the earlier period. Consequently, the US not only refused to provide supplementary aid but also called for the reduction of agricultural subsidies, devaluation of the Turkish lira and the reversal of inflationary policies.  
\textsuperscript{142} The average annual industrial growth during the 1950s was about 6 per cent (Hershlag 1988: 20). Private sector’s contribution to fixed capital formation increased from about 45 per cent in 1950 to 53 per cent in 1952. After 1954, the state once again became the dominant investor in the economy, with the private sector’s share in capital formation decreased to 40.1 per cent in 1954, 38.9 per cent in 1956 and 43 per cent in 1958 (Hale 1981: 90-1).}
locational advantages or the needs of the market’ (Hale 1981: 92). As a result, the bureaucracy in charge of the state sector grew exponentially: the proportion of public employees and public workers to the total number of non-agricultural wage earners increased from 21 percent in 1950 to 34 percent in 1955 and then stood at 28 percent in 1960 (Makal 2001: 2-3). Second, restrictions on the import of consumer products and the growth of the state sector providing cheap capital goods provided a new stimulus for manufacturing investment, thereby giving rise to a new group of industrialists. The share of manufacturing increased from 11.8 percent of GDP in 1952 to 16.3 in 1957 while, according to one estimate, 43 percent of rich merchants and 20 percent of rich farmers began to invest in industrial activity (Alexander 1960).

What is implied here is the growth of two potentially dissident classes, industrialists and bureaucrats, whose stakes were endangered by the property relations established by the DP government. As for the former, the rise of a class of would-be industrialists signaled the division of the DP constituency into two potentially conflicting camps. On the one hand, there were merchants who obtained the largest portion of bank credits, farmers who were not taxed and agricultural petty commodity producers who were subsidized. On the other hand, there were would-be industrialists who expressed discontent over the ‘misallocation’ of scarce foreign currencies and fiscal resources that could have been used to foster industrial growth (Milor 1989: 146-7). The state employees were hurt by the DP policies in two important respects. First, the burden of inflationary policies weighed most heavily on the salaried masses, especially in the public sector. While the salaries of functionaries and workers increased in 20 years only fourfold and twofold respectively, wholesale commodity prices increased 11 times during the same period (Karpat 2004: 191-2).
In addition to the erosion of their real and relative economic standing in society, the Kemalist bureaucracy and intelligentsia, including most notably the junior military officers, university professors and university students, also reacted to the liberalization of the ethno-religious contours of the Republican property regime. The DP, under electoral pressures, made an attempt to reincorporate previously excluded actors into the political system, most notably the religious groups and Kurds. Throughout the 1950s the DP carried indigenous Kurdish notables (rather than merely state-approved Kurdish elites) into parliament, even including those associated with the Kurdish rebellion of 1925. Kurds, for the first time in Republican history, thus became part of the ‘nation’ and (at least vaguely) were in a position to expect the state to serve their interests and to speak, publish and educate in Kurdish (Akturk 2013: 140-2; McDowald 2004: 398). The DP also continued to reverse and relax some of the (rare) radical and anti-clerical manifestations of Kemalist reformism; for example the Village Institutes and People’s Houses were closed for breeding radicalism; religious courses were included in formal secular education; the ban on the recitation of the call to prayer in Arabic was lifted, and the number of preacher schools (imam-hatip) and public funds earmarked for the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA) were increased (Atasoy 2005: 73). In effect, it is hard to argue that the changes undertaken by the DP amounted to a serious challenge to secularism, but under the weight of socioeconomic problems, ‘the intelligentsia reacted hysterically to the [supposed] Islamic resurgence’, beginning to agitate the masses for the defense of Kemalist reforms, for the guarantee of their material and symbolic existence (Ahmad 1977: 373; Taspinar 2005: 126-7).

In 1958 the DP government was, therefore, not only financially insolvent, but also ‘totally isolated from virtually all the institutions of the state’. The DP had retained the majority of votes after the 1957 elections, but the RPP had increased its parliamentary seats sixfold, and
the press, the judiciary, the civil bureaucracy, the junior army officers and the universities began to increasingly and outspokenly denounce the government (ibid: 59). Although the arrival of US funds in 1958 temporarily stabilized the government’s financial position143, the structural adjustment measures promised in return by Menderes proved too risky to be systematically implemented in the face of growing domestic opposition, hence by 1959 the economy was once again in the doldrums and in dire need of an external bailout (Sonmez 1968: 38).

Equally important, two international developments further complicated the internal deadlock by bringing back the fear of revolution into Turkish politics. The military coup in Iraq in July 1958 ‘made a deep impression on the DP leaders who now came to see military intervention backed by popular support as a potential threat to their power’. This ‘revolution phobia’ pushed the DP towards implementing increasingly authoritarian measures (Ahmad 1977: 60, 158). Restriction of the freedom of the press and assembly in 1959-60, combined with an oppressive martial law, further escalated political polarization in the country, leading to violent clashes between the opposition and government (Karpat 2004: 173) This intense political climate took another revolutionary turn in April 1960, when the press, banned from reporting on the domestic clashes, began to write about the popular uprising that forced the fall of the Syngman Rhee government in South Korea. The lesson to be drawn was clear and the Turkish intelligentsia was even further encouraged when it was learned that the US did not try to prevent Rhee’s overthrow (Ahmad 1977: 65). The writing was on the wall.

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143 The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 could not have arrived at a more timely fashion. The greater Soviet influence in the Middle East as well as the success of the Soviet space technology that put the United States inside the range of Soviet nuclear missiles had once again turned Turkey into an important ally in the region. The new US strategy encoded in the Eisenhower Doctrine, tailored a more significant role to the US military bases in Turkey, which was the main reason for releasing the desperately-needed US funds to the country.
A Failed Jacobin Revolution and its Legacy: The 1961 Constitution and ‘Social Republic’

It is not right to regard the situation in which we found ourselves today as an ordinary political coup d’état. The political power which should represent the conception of state, law, justice...and should protect public interests had for months, even years...become a material force representing personal power, ambition and class interests... Political power lost all its moral ties with its army...with its courts and the bar... with its universities, with its press...and fell into a position hostile to the State’s genuine and main institutions and to Atatürk’s reforms, which are of extraordinary value and importance if Turkey is to occupy a worthy place among the nations of the world as a civilized state...The legality of a government...lies only in its [cooperation] with institutions such as the public opinion of the nation, the army, and scientific and judicial institutions.

The Constitutional Commission, May 28, 1960

The Turkish Republic is a nationalistic, democratic, secular and social state...Economic and social life shall be regulated in a manner consistent with justice, and the principle of full employment, with the objective of assuring for everyone a standard of living befitting human dignity...it is the right and duty of every individual to be engaged in some occupation, trade or business.

Article 2, 41 and 42, The Turkish constitution of 1961

A key point that has guided me throughout this dissertation has been the notion that capitalism is not just the ‘economy’ but a particular way of organizing human relations. Due to spatial and temporal differences, all market-building projects take different forms, but they all undercut and ultimately eliminate non-market means of social reproduction. As such I have departed from transhistorically defined prerequisites of capitalism (e.g. dispossession, bourgeois classes etc) according to which different paths to market society are conventionally classified. As far as Turkey of the 1950s is concerned, the significance of this argument lies in its ability to reveal three things: First, the apparent persistence of non-capitalist forms, i.e. peasant production and sharecropping relations, was deceptive. For peasants and sharecroppers were becoming market-dependent throughout the 1950s even if they were not dispossessed. Second, while capitalism developed protractedly in and through older social relations in the countryside, the urban commercial and industrial classes, enriched under the auspices of the Democrat Party, impeded the development of capitalism as much as they owed their existence to it. Third, the protractedness, incompleteness and instability of capitalist
development hint at the high potential of past Jacobin forms to bounce back and continue to shape the development of capitalism. In this sense, if the 1950s heralded the beginning and crisis of the transition to capitalism, 1960 was to be the year of an attempt at restoring and radicalizing the original Kemalist project, which, albeit unsuccessful and short-lived, would substantially mark the subsequent trajectory of capitalist modernity in Turkey.

The 10-year long experiment with capitalism and multiparty politics collapsed with a military coup on May 27, 1960. The coup was planned and carried out predominantly by junior and mid-ranking officers. Growing inflation and political instability in the 1950s had led to the same kind of inequalities and grievances within the military forces as in the salaried masses writ large. The DP had continuously appeased and created a loyal stratum of senior officers at the apex of the military hierarchy, while younger officers’ economic and social status had gradually eroded; their channels for upward mobility had been blocked and became highly politicized. In a sense, then, the military intervention of 1960 was ‘in the tradition of the Young Turk revolution of 1908’ (Ahmad 1993: 11). As in 1908, young officers revolted against the high military command and existing ruling class coalition. And just as in 1908, the coup of 1960 would have hardly had any chance of success had it not incorporated other class demands into the emerging revolutionary agenda (Karpat 1970: 1672-3). However, in contrast to 1908, the 1960 coup was carried out against a democratically elected government that was still fairly popular among and generous to the peasantry. Under DP rule, the days of social discontent caused by taxation, war-making and war preparation had become something of the past (yet definitely not forgotten). Compared to the first half of the 20th century, the 1950s were thus, in many ways, the golden age of the Turkish peasantry. In this context, junior officers, who were educated and socialized at the heart of the Kemalist establishment and marginalized during the rising capitalist order, would have to reinterpret and remobilize the
social and intellectual resources of the original Kemalist project in new ways to justify the military intervention, secure their leadership of the 27 May movement and appeal to larger segments of society. And by doing so, they would set new standards for the Kemalist project, which would, in turn, initiate a new process of competitive redefinition of the social, popular and national character of the Republic.

The military committee that took power following the coup, the National Unity Committee (NUC), was far from a monolithic body. For one thing, the young officers who orchestrated the coup did not represent all segments of the armed forces, they therefore still needed the presence of senior officers (and of those who were recommended by them) in the committee to be able to justify the intervention and enforce the chain of command within the military forces (Karpat 1970: 1666). As a result, five generals joined the NUC, alongside seven colonels (albay), five lieutenant colonels (yarbay), thirteen majors (binbasi), and eight captains (yuzbasi). The inclusion of senior officers and their entourages created a group of ‘moderates’ within the NUC, whose sole aim was to restore power to the civilians (read the RPP) as soon as the ‘corrupt’ elements were purged from the political system. That said, however, regardless of their ranks, all members were equal in the committee (Ahmad 1977: 164-5), which enabled the relatively junior officers to exercise considerable ‘power both over those armed forces and over the political system which the armed forces as a whole had just set out to reform’ (Weiker 1963: 127). The number of junior officers who were directly involved in the coup was 14. Just as the committee itself, ‘the Fourteen’ (as they came to be called) was not a homogenous group either (Karpat 1970: 1680ff; Hale 1993: 131). They were roughly divided into two subgroups, one ultra-nationalist and the other populist/socialist (given the Janus-faced character of Kemalism, most notably its constant oscillation between elitism and populism, and nationalism and universalism, it is perhaps not too surprising that it
gave birth to two polar opposite currents of movement). Despite obvious ideological cleavages, however, ‘the Fourteen’ were ‘united in supporting the extension of a strong military role in the form of a new political organization’ (Karpat 1970: 1677). They, *en bloc*, espoused ‘reforms which would alter the political structure of the country before party politics were once more permitted’ (Ahmad 1977: 165). According to these ‘radical’ officers, the junta’s task was not simply handing back power to the civilians as the ‘moderates’ would have, but ‘eliminat[ing] underdevelopment’ by ‘completing’ the Kemalist revolution that was ‘interrupted’ by ‘corrupt’ politicians, ‘opportunistic’ businessmen and landowners and religious conservatives (Karpat 2004: 195). Fighting ‘poverty’, ‘inflation’, ‘class conflict’, ‘backwardness’, ‘laziness’ and ‘ignorance’ would be the primary goal of military rule; all of which could be attained by expanding and transforming the education system, socializing the health services, undertaking fiscal modernization and implementing economic planning (Weiker 1963: 120, 133; Ahmad 1993: 128; Hale 1993: 131). In this regard, the state should work towards uniting the intelligentsia with the peasantry; spreading Kemalist principles throughout the country; establishing linguistic and cultural unity; reorienting and encouraging fine arts to promote the expansion of national culture; spreading values promoting hard-work and sacrifice and saving people from ‘fake sheiks’ and self-interested ‘deviants’ (*sapkin*) (Turkes 1977: 69-71). What was at stake was the creation of a new political system and populist culture, and indeed until this goal was accomplished, according to the Fourteen, multiparty politics must be either postponed or allowed only with the condition that educational qualifications were introduced for voters (Ahmad 1977: 159; Weiker 1963: 126ff).

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144 It is interesting that for some members of the Fourteen the source of inspiration for this new culture was Nasser’s Egypt (Ahmad 1993: 128).
In short, ‘the fourteen radicals favored more firmly controlled and centralized implementation of the Ataturk reforms and a longer period of military tutelage of the nation than was favored by the remainder of the NUC’ (Weiker 1963: 132). No wonder the central project envisaged for this reinvigorated Kemalism was an ‘education mobilization programme’ (Ahmad 1977: 271). The program aimed to form cultural associations as a substitute for the People’s Houses (closed by the DP in 1951), revive the Village Institutes which were turned into simple teacher training schools by the Democrats and expand the public school system in Turkish Kurdistan (Weiker 1963: 133; McDowall 2004: xx). More ambitiously, it also intended to establish a comprehensive ‘cultural regeneration’ plan, namely the Turkish Union of Ideal and Culture (Turkiye Ulku ve Kultur Birligi, TUIC). The TUIC aimed to ‘mobilize the nation's intelligentsia to work with its entire energies on recognized problems in order to strengthen the...Turkish nation in the national consciousness’ (Weiker 1963: 133; Karpat 1970: 1676). The Union would replace and unite ‘the Ministry of Education, and the Directorates of Physical Education, Pious Foundations, Religious Affairs, and Press and Radio’ and its director would be a cabinet member, but would not be responsible to the prime ministry (Weiker 1963: 133; Hale 1993: 135). The director would establish “continuing liaison” in villages, cities, schools, universities, factories and the army to bring to light basic problems and to submit plans prepared for the solution of these problems’, all of which were planned to ‘diffuse and re-instill’ Kemalist secularism, nationalism and populism in the citizens (Weiker 1963: 133).

The overall aim of the project did not yet seem clear in 1960, and given that the Fourteen would lose their control over the NUC right after they proposed the TUIC, perhaps they did not even have the opportunity to clearly state what the political and economic implications of the project would be. Notwithstanding the ambiguity, however, the coup, already in 1960, was
explained, above all, by reference to the original populist project, which meant, according to
the Fourteen, everything must be done ‘for, with and towards the people’. Colonel Alparslan Turkes, who, for many people, was the TUIC’s main planner and the leader of the Fourteen, wrote that ‘people would be taught that they are all equal, and no one is another’s slave’. In this regard, ‘chains of slavery and tyranny, no matter what they are made of, be it platinum or gold, are chains. Revolting against such chains is the noblest thing people can do’ (Turkes 1977 [1963]: 83, 73). In this regard, reviving Kemalist principles was of utmost importance in order to launch a ‘Turkish Renaissance’ (ibid: 87). Turkes writes that all this requires rethinking the ideals and principles that created Western civilization, some of which are identified as follows: rationalism and scientific thinking; the principle that human dignity is above everything; humans are born, live and die free; the principle that humans must trust themselves, cherish their own existence and live based on their own power and labor; the use of natural resources for the interest of ‘humanity’; the principle that people, if necessary, must defy injustices and counter them with force (ibid).

The Jacobin character of the project would be further clarified in 1965 by Turkes. Turkes formulated a political ideology (Dokuz Isik or Ulkuculuk) that in many ways built on the model of societal and moral reorganization anticipated in the TUIC and claimed to be a nationalist-developmental path as an alternative to socialism and capitalism (including what he considered to be the ‘degenerated’ variants of capitalism such as ‘fascism’) (Turkes 1965). This political doctrine would recognize private property, thereby forestalling the citizens’ ‘enslavement by bureaucracy’ (i.e. socialism), but was also opposed to capitalism, which is

145 ‘Halkcilik demek: Her sey halk icin, halkla beraber, halka dogrudur’ (Turkes 1977 [1960]: 75). This affinity with the radical populism of 1920 and 1921 becomes even clearer when Alpaslan Turkes makes reference to the following quote by Mustafa Kemal: ‘Our is a ‘a people’s government...we are people who struggle to save our lives and our independence...Each one of us has a right and authority. We earn this right through work. Those who lie on their backs and while their time away without doing any work can have no place in our social structure’ (ibid).
not more than ‘people’s enslavement by things’ (Turkes 1976: 266). Unlike capitalism which is based on ‘class property’ (sinif mulkiyeti) and promotes, at best, ‘political democracy’, Turkes proposed an ultra-nationalist industrial order peculiar to ‘Turks’, in which workers and capital-owners would jointly manage factories and share profits (ibid: 264-6). Indeed, since this would provide every Turk a voice in economic decision-making, it would form the basis of ‘real’, i.e. ‘economic’ democracy (Turkes 1979: 60-2).

Regardless of the initial ambiguity of the TUIC, however, such an ambitious ‘educational’ and nationalist drive signaled a tremendous expansion of state control over society and a major restructuring of state finances (Ahmad 1977: 271). Indeed, shortly after seizing power, the junta initiated a series of reforms aiming to reverse policies enacted by the DP government, which allegedly undermined the sense of purpose and unity in the country. What needed to be done, first and foremost, was to stem inflation and eliminate taxation ‘injustices’. This effectively meant the end of the expansionary economic policies of the previous decade. The banks were shut, bank accounts of prominent politicians and businessmen frozen, loans suspended and large construction projects stopped. The military government also removed businessmen connected with the Democrats from administrative boards of the chambers of commerce and industry. Meanwhile, ‘building taxes were increased two to six-fold, and the income tax was doubled’ (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 415; Weiker 1963: 151-2). It was also rumored that the junta ‘intended to examine the accounts of business houses and to make the declaration of wealth obligatory’, which caused ‘many to fear a new capital levy’ or Varlik Vergisi (Ahmad 1977: 271). The measures taken to transform taxation in agriculture proved even more threatening than those targeting the urban propertied classes: the junta not only increased land taxes tenfold, but also intended to lay down ceilings on landholding size, hence paving the way for an expropriative land reform (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 415). Moreover, in
Turkish Kurdistan more than 200 tribal and religious leaders associated with the DP were imprisoned and 55 were relocated to Western Turkey due to the (largely unfounded) fear that they would revolt against the military government, just as the Southern Kurds engaged in military resistance in the wake of the 1958 military coup in Iraq (Taspinar 2005: 88).

Aspiring to secure the leadership of the junta and muster societal legitimacy following the overthrow of a democratically elected government, the Fourteen had no choice other than radicalizing the original populist Jacobin project. Kemalist populism had emerged during the War of Independence as a geopolitically-induced redistributive ideology. By including the peasantry into democratic processes and endowing them with land and equal access to the state, populism attempted to control and empower peasant bodies in ways conducive to the geo(political) reproduction of the Kemalist elite. Given the peasant-based character of the early Republican economy, the absorption capacity of the original populist project was very limited; therefore the rules of inclusion into this supposedly universalist project were repeatedly conditioned to the subjects’ acceptance of and education in a secular and nationalist ideology. It is indeed true that the populism of the 1960 revolution attempted to revive the Jacobin spirit of its early Republican counterpart, yet it is equally important to remark that it did so in a context entirely different from the 1920s and 30s. The peasantry was no longer desperate for land, nor was it excluded from electoral politics. Therefore, as the young officers abolished democracy, they had to justify their intervention by reinterpreting populism as a radical framework of redistribution. For the first time they threatened the Turkish-Muslim propertied classes with punitive and expropriative action, while continuing to condition the social reproduction and dignity of the poor to their espousal of an ultra-nationalist and secular order (instead of market competition).
No doubt the bourgeoisie was deeply disturbed by the junior officers’ ‘collectivist radicalism’ (Ahmad 1993: 128). Business leaders, including those who were initially sympathetic to the 27 May movement, fiercely opposed the blocking of banking operations as well as investigations into their wealth and transactions, and demanded the military government ‘put an end to the insecurity on private property’ (Karpat 2004: 196). The immediate result of this precarious economic atmosphere was an investment strike and economic stagnation: ‘there was scarcely any new investment, stocks of goods remained unsold, production was reduced, and without doubt the only thing that rose was unemployment’ (Ahmad 1977: 271).

Discontent was brewing in the streets, and even those who had initially supported the coup were now skeptical of the junta’s ‘real’ intentions. The Fourteen responded to the growing opposition by threatening to reform the press and purging ‘suspicious’ university professors and military officers (ibid: 167). The conflict within the NUC became even more intense in this context. Since the outset of the intervention both moderates and radicals had been living ‘in fear of a coup by the other’, but now the tide was beginning to turn against the latter (ibid: 166). And indeed, it was this loss of societal support that finally encouraged the moderates to overthrow the radicals in November 1960. The new coup led to the purge of the Fourteen from the NUC and their appointment to missions abroad. The removal of the radicals certainly proved to be a big relief to the propertied classes, yet at the same it pushed the junior officers’ radicalism underground, leading to ‘the re-establishment of conspiratorial groups within the armed forces’ (ibid: 168). After the November coup, therefore, ‘several of the “old revolutionaries”...drifted back to their conspiratorial habits of the late 1950s’ in an effort to ‘revive the spirit of 27 May’ (Hale 1993: 139-40).

Following the counter-coup in November 1960 the army thus turned, once again, into a den of intrigue. ‘[T]he idea of a second takeover continued to tempt the radicals’, and indeed on
several occasions they challenged the high command, succeeding to shape their decisions on military appointments, economic reforms and elections (ibid: 149). Moreover, the conflict within the army escalated ‘in parallel’ and ‘in reaction’ to the appearance of various neo-Democrat parties on the political scene. The purge of the Fourteen opened the way for competitive elections and multiparty politics; and despite the military’s huge propaganda campaign, the new parties proclaiming to be the heirs of the Democrats were showing remarkable success in reenlisting the old DP constituency. From November 1960 until the first elections held in October 1961, therefore, there were many rumors that the radicals were again preparing to intervene to check the growth of ‘reactionary’ forces organized in the successor parties of the old DP (Ahmad 1977: 170-1).

The response in the high command and among the generals was one of appeasement and conciliation. Squeezed between the bourgeoisie's investment strike and the junior officers’ radicalism, the high command had to both retain the program of political democratization and appease radical demands by making concessions. Ironically, then, the generals had to act both as ‘democrats’ who would bring back civilian rule and as ‘reformers’ who would implement radical changes, which the civilians would not be willing to carry out under normal circumstances. In due course the bourgeoisie would get their rule accepted by the military forces in general, but along the way they also had to concede to the trial and execution of their political figureheads and a constitution they fought hard to get rejected in the constitutional referendum. Menderes and two of his ministers were sent to the scaffold just before the elections in order to appease the hawks in the military and to deter the neo-Democrats from reversing the constitution after the elections. Likewise, the new constitution, accepted in July 1961, confirmed the sanctity of private property and incorporated some of the populist measures demanded by the radicals. It also appealed to new potential allies and expanded the
scope of freedoms in order to forestall the danger of a Jacobin or neo-Democrat dictatorship. As a result, ‘economic and social planning’, socialized healthcare, a right to land, a right to work, and a full employment policy entered the constitution, as did wider civil rights, greater university autonomy, a proportional electoral system, the freedom to organize and assemble, and the right to strike.

In summary, the generals attempted to preempt both the junior officers’ Jacobinism and neo-Democrat revanchism, and in doing so, they paved the way for a constitution that reset the Kemalist rules of reproduction. In addition to being ‘secular’ and ‘nationalist’, the new constitution redefined the Kemalist Republic as a ‘social’ and ‘democratic’ state. Adding these two principles to the traditional Kemalist couplet would have enormous implications for the way capitalism would develop in the following two decades. The Jacobin legacy would complicate the development of capitalism, while at the same time providing (at least partly) the socio-institutional framework into which capitalism would be further imposed. It was this interpenetration of the old and the new, Jacobin and capitalist, which would lend the 1960s and the 1970s their explosive and unstable character. This is the subject to which I turn in the next two sections.

**Planners, Oligopolists and Workers: Contradictions of a Capitalist-Jacobin Compound**

*Should not private business be helped in case they incur a loss given that we live in a democracy?*

*An eminent Turkish industrialist, October 1960*

Now that the Republic was a ‘social’ and ‘democratic’ state, economic planning became ever more important. The balance of payment difficulties and foreign exchange crisis of the last decade had already shown the necessity for the strategic utilization of foreign assistance and the rational coordination of public investment. Yet it was political considerations, arising
from competitive coups and competitive elections, which made it an imperative to embark on a comprehensive planning effort in the post-revolutionary period (Barkey 1990a: 59-65). In this respect, planning was not only about economic development but also about implementing policies that would facilitate the formation of a power bloc as a bulwark to the revival of Jacobins and neo-Democrats. This task proved to be especially important after the first elections held in October 1961, which simply led to the resuscitation of old votes for new parties (Weiker 1963: chp.5). Despite the military’s clear preference for the RPP, the Republicans barely prevailed in the elections: while the RPP received 36 percent of the votes and 173 seats in the parliament, the heirs of the Democrat party, most notably the Justice Party and the New Turkey Party, received 34 and 13 percent of the votes, and 158 and 65 seats respectively. ‘In such a political climate it was improbable that the army would return to barracks and watch events take their course’ (Ahmad 1977: 172). Indeed, two more coup attempts were made by junior officers in 1962 and 1963, which, albeit unsuccessful, kept the country within ‘the extraordinary atmosphere of an impending coup’ throughout the 1960s (ibid: 184).

Planning, therefore, was vital to nurturing a broad social coalition that would prevent the radicals and neo-Democrats from exploiting the country’s precarious socioeconomic balances. The State Planning Organization (SPO) was established in this context. The industrial bourgeoisie readily embraced the SPO since planning, in principle, contained some assurance that domestic industrial production would be protected and supported in order to ease foreign exchange difficulties. Industrialization through import substitution would also potentially broaden the internal market; hence it was an attempt to recruit salaried employees, including
civil servants, military officers and the unionized working classes\textsuperscript{146}, to the emergent power bloc (Milor 1988: 152-3).

If planning itself was not a matter of dispute, ‘planning the plan’ proved to be a highly divisive issue. Initially, the planners, who were highly educated technocrats, drafted a plan that would enable the SPO bureaucrats to exercise absolute authority over the allocation of budgetary sources for public investment and incentives for the private sector (ibid: 156). By envisaging the SPO as an institution above politics, technocrats aimed to curtail the freedom of political power holders to implement economically unsound policies, and force private actors to invest in line with planning priorities, both of which they considered tantamount with the development of the country’s productive and competitive power (Barkey 1990a: 64-5; Milor 1988: 156-7). In this respect, enterprises, public and private, ‘should...try to rationalize their production by minimizing their costs and increasing the productivity of labor’. Protectionism, likewise, was acceptable only insofar as it fostered ‘the expanded reproduction of capital and the extraction of relative surplus value (respectively called “investments” and innovations”)’. Hence technocrats designed a plan that would not only rationalize state intervention into the economy but also potentially ‘oppose private capitalist interests in name of a collective notion of “capital”’ (Milor 1988: 158-9).

The plan was accepted by the NUC only with certain reservations and modifications. In particular, the planners’ preoccupation with maximizing labor productivity was not welcomed by military bureaucrats who, given the existing political tumult, were extremely reluctant to accept policies that would cause (at least in the short-run) further sociopolitical costs such as unemployment, class conflict and ethnic tensions (Milor 1988: 159). As a result, the generals

\textsuperscript{146} There were around 78,000 unionized workers in 1950 and 283,000 in 1960 (Hale 1976: 65). Although not negligible, unionized workers, thus, did not weigh much in electoral politics, nor were they able to exploit intra-ruling class tensions throughout the 1950s.
accepted the plan bill only with an administrative twist. They did not change ‘labor productivity’ as a goal, but watered down the technocrats’ authority over investment decisions by decreasing the number of experts on the main decision body of the SPO (Milor 1988: 157). After the elections, this expanded space for non-expert control over the SPO translated into increased political leverage over the determination and implementation of developmental goals. Particularly important, as politicians struggled with each other to obtain the support of business groups, they transmitted (directly or otherwise) different business interests into the planning process (Milor 1988: 160; Hale 1981:141-2).

Planning, therefore, was doomed to failure from the outset and ended with the planners’ collective resignation in October 1962. Yet, the technocrats did not go down without a fight. For example, they proposed a maximum limit to land holdings and progressive taxation\textsuperscript{147}, which was expected to exert pressure on landowners to mechanize and prevent the underutilization of land, thereby leading to increased labor productivity, cheaper food, a larger domestic market and greater funds for agricultural and industrial investment (Milor 1988: 162-3, 165; Bulutoglu 1967: 191-2; Ahmad 1977: 274). Likewise, they took steps to institutionalize ‘a new conception of state economic intervention’, which refused to protect, support and subsidize inefficient public enterprises and private companies whose production does not promote innovation, competitiveness and ‘rational’ management practices (Milor 1988: 163-4). Yet, parliamentary control over the SPO eventually frustrated the attempt to expand and deepen capitalist social relations both in agriculture and manufacturing. The plan to restructure existing land, tax, credit, subsidy and investment regimes with a view to the expanded reproduction of capital was criticized and eventually rejected by politicians for violating ‘freedom of property’ and ‘democratic rights’ (Hammas 1967: 140). Ultimately the

\textsuperscript{147} ‘Progressive’ in the sense that farmers would not pay taxes for the products produced above a net ‘average’ determined by the SPO according to each type and size of land.
SPO turned into an organization whose purpose was ‘to achieve certain quantitative targets without altering the status quo in any drastic way’ (Ahmad 1977: 275). As such, structural transformation, begun in the 1950s, would be extended but not intensified throughout the so-called import substitution period.

As planning was reduced to mere support of the private sector, manufacturers became the staunchest supporters of import substitution policies (Barkey 1990a: 60). Unsurprisingly, the country underwent a spectacular industrial expansion (roughly 9 percent a year) during the so-called import substitution years (1962-1979) and manufacturing for the first time surpassed agriculture in terms of its contribution to total growth (Hansen 1991: 357; Barkey 1990a: 80). The private sector received generous support and protection from the state. Behind high tariff walls, the state provided tax rebates, scarce foreign currencies and various subsidy schemes to the manufacturing bourgeoisie so that they could import capital and intermediate goods to produce consumer products. However, since the SPO had no power to sanction cooperation and no control over the allocation of public funds, the state support could not be conditioned to manufacturers’ ability to compete in international markets and earn foreign exchange. As such, state promotion of industrialization, by and large, boiled down to mere distribution of fiscal privileges and favors with almost no gain that could have been accrued from increases in productivity and competition. Tariffs and quotas led to ‘overprotection’ and the ‘building of excess capacity’ in many industries. ‘Allocations of foreign exchange...were based solely on considerations of capacity’ and ‘any firm by receiving a percentage of the total exchange

148 With the exception of textiles sector that consistently increased its share of exports, consumer good exports increased from 8.8 per cent of production in 1967 to 9.3 per cent in 1972, but declined to 6.1 per cent in 1977. Investment good exports remained below one per cent, while intermediate good exports hovered around 2 per cent throughout the import substitution period. Overall, ‘the Turkish manufacturing sector did not achieve any significant gains in exports’ (Barkey 1990a: 83-6, also see Owen and Pamuk 1998: 113).

149 The result was that the easy subsidy regime of the 1950s was re-established in the so-called import substitution years: only 17.9 per cent of the total subsidies received by firms between 1968 and 1980 was invested in accordance with developmental directives (Milor 1988: 255-256).
allocation was automatically guaranteed a share of the domestic market’ (Barkey 1990a: 91-2; Hale 1981: 202). Oligopolistic manufacturers, formed in the domestic market thanks to state support and protection, were thus inherently inimical to further capitalist development, for ‘it was perfectly rational for the industrialists to use their economic power to choke off further industrialization, rather than promoting the deepening of industrial capital’ (Milor 1988: 233).

One implication was that state economic enterprises in particular and public investment in general were geared to serve functions incongruent with any market or productivity criteria. That is, they either supplied low-price inputs to the private sector or became centers of ‘social’ redistribution by creating public employment in cities or providing support to agricultural producers. If there had been a large pool of taxable income, perhaps the SEEs serving private and populist ends would not have hurt fiscal balances. However, although ‘attempts were made to introduce taxation of agricultural income...and [indeed] taxation was established by law in 1964…, exemptions were considerable and evasion massive. The same was the case for the taxation of business’ (Hansen 1991: 382). Tax revenues thus repeatedly lagged behind progressively increasing public expenditures. Inflationary spending and external borrowing consequently became the only means to servicing debt payments and providing the agricultural and manufacturing subsidies necessary to keep the SEEs afloat.

In many ways, what was vital to the maintenance of this property regime was the exchange rate policy that overvalued the Turkish lira (Tekin 2006: 135-6). With the exception of the immediate aftermath of devaluations, the lira was constantly maintained above its

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150 Who were taxed then? Mainly fixed income groups such as salary and wage earners whose share in the total direct tax income amounted to 60 per cent by 1977, while farmers whose share in the GDP was 22. 7 per cent in 1980 remained by and large untaxed (Milor 1988: 235ff).

151 The gap increased from 2.3 per cent of GNP to an average of 5.5 per cent between 1963 and 1972 (Milor 1988: 236ff).
international market value. While this facilitated the import of investment goods, thereby
directly benefitting import-substituting manufacturers in general, the exchange rate regime was
particularly instrumental to the development of industries that assemble prefabricated goods,
i.e. assembly industries (Barkey 1990a: 73). The assembly industries were established with
very high foreign content, in the sense that, while local firms provide capital, foreign investors
‘bring in the patent, most of the parts to be assembled, and some managerial and engineering
skill’. The joint enterprise, then, ‘comes under state protection...by important restrictions
which make the product almost a monopoly item enjoying benefits of non-competitive prices
and low wages’ (Soysal 1970 quoted in Ahmad 1977: 280). This inward-looking investment
pattern was indeed reproduced by local-foreign partnerships in other sectors as well. The
industries to whose development foreign capital substantially contributed such as chemicals,
rubber and electrical industries, produced ‘goods which would cater for local customer
demand’ and were ‘in no way designed to produce goods for an export market’ (ibid: 279).

If economically unsound, however, this oligopolistic structure served to consolidate the
emerging alliance between industrialists, the military bureaucracy and farmers. For, much as
the bourgeoisie lived on benefits derived from a politically protected market and politically
provided subsidies, farmers too took advantage of being in the electoral majority to obtain
politically constituted prices and state support for their products. For example, over 25 percent
of the total value of agricultural production was procured by the state throughout the ISI years
(Kasnakoglu 1986: 132). Meanwhile government purchase prices steadily increased, as did
government credits to agriculture (from 10.74 percent in 1963 to 62.16 percent in 1975) and
also subsidies for artificial fertilizers (from 60 to 80 per cent of product cost in 1979) (Atasoy
2005: 108). As a result, the domestic terms of trade increased in favor of agriculture by 41
percent from 1960-1 to 1975-6 (Boratav 2004: 136; also see Kazgan 1999: 31). This hints that
following the closure of the land frontier in the 1950s, state support of agriculture paved the way for the development of an intensive growth path in the 1960s and 70s. Agricultural productivity and yields consequently increased, in line with increases in the use of industrial tools and products in agriculture.\(^{152}\) Combined with low agricultural taxes, rural settlements rose as important centers of consumption for domestic industries such as agricultural machinery, textiles, processed food, consumer durables and cars (Aydin 2005: 154-5). It is important to remember that post-revolutionary governments did not or could not legislate a land reform that could have prevented the underutilization of large landholdings and the fragmentation of smaller lands (Hale 1981: 185-6). Yet, the state, as in the 1950s, still supported the peasants-cum-farmers through purchases at floor prices, input subsidies and subsidized credits, which eventually made them more market-dependent for their production and consumption. Although protracted, the transition to petty commodity production in agriculture was by and large secured and maintained through an alliance with oligopolistic industries.

Oligopolies were not to the benefit of industrialists and middle and large farmers only, but the military officers also carved for themselves a special niche in this emerging economic structure. After the transition to multiparty politics in 1961, senior military officers charged themselves with an ‘advisory’ role in the newly established ‘National Security Council’ (NSC) whose stated function was ‘to assist the cabinet in the making of decisions related to national security and co-ordination’. ‘National security’, however, was understood in such a ‘broad and all-embracing [way] that the pashas had a say in virtually every problem before the cabinet’ (Ahmad 1993: 130). No doubt, this increasing political power translated into increased economic benefits, which, in turn, helped to neutralize the political dissent within

\(^{152}\) By 1976 about 88 per cent of the crop land was tractor-cultivated, while 85 per cent of farmers used a combination of industrial inputs (Hale 1981: 178; Atasoy 2005: 109)
the army, thereby forestalling another intervention from ‘below’, and facilitated the integration of military forces (both high command and junior officers) into the new socioeconomic order. The benefits included but were not limited to increased pay scales, pensions and subsidized accommodation, consumer goods and also professional opportunities for retired officers both in the upper levels of the bureaucracy or private sector (ibid: 11, 130).

Another important factor contributing to the consolidation of military forces as a status quo power was the creation of the Army Mutual Assistance Association (OYAK). OYAK was exempted from taxes and duties and rapidly went beyond a mere mutual assistance fund to ‘grown into one of the largest and most profitable conglomerates in the country, providing high dividends to its investors’ (Ahmad 1993: 12; Bianchi 1984: 71). In the two decades after the revolution, it was heavily invested in several industrial and financial ventures (sometimes even in partnership with foreign investors), ranging from the production of assembled cars and tractors to cement and construction (Ahmad 1977: 281).

The Turkish military forces thus eventually lost their Jacobin potential. As junior officers were firmly integrated into the existing political economic structure, and there was no imminent geopolitical threat under NATO’s protective shield, the military’s long-standing need to mobilize and appeal to the lower classes by radicalizing the original Kemalist project became obsolete. Content with their place in the political economic establishment, there was no longer any need for military officers to invoke Jacobin forms of property, appropriation and mobilization. The citizen-soldier was dead, as the citizen-officer consolidated his place as the guardian of and a partner in the new socioeconomic order. Military interventions that were to take place after 1960 would no longer seek to establish a new order, but to stabilize or ‘rationalize’ capitalism. Yet, the legacy of the failed Jacobin revolution was still there, encoded in the constitution of 1961. Clearly, the ‘social’ character of the constitution, which
was both influenced by and a response to young officers’ radicalism, could be assimilated into a form of ‘social democracy’, and as such, it would pose no serious challenge to the capitalist order. After all, a fine balance between social rights and capitalism was established in the Western European countries of the time, which Turkey could emulate by ‘regulating’ its own capitalism. Or could it?

Generous wage and social security measures, and wider democratic rights were indeed consolidated in Western Europe in the postwar period, yet, at the heart of this ‘marriage’ between ‘social democracy’ and capitalism rested the internationalization of American methods of production (Konings and Panitch 2009: 31, 241). That is, under American auspices, the depoliticized essence of Henry Ford’s ‘productivity-profit sharing equation’ was imported to the class-conflict ridden countries of Western Europe.153 The US had already discovered during the turmoil years of the Great Depression that by enhancing productivity, whether through scientific management or regulation of industrial conflict, ‘American society could transcend the class conflicts... without a radical redistribution of economic power’ (Maier 1977: 613–14). The implication was that the demands for higher wages, benefits and democratic rights in Europe were conditioned to subordination to capitalist authority and productivity increases, and were effectively separated from the demands for political autonomy within the institutionalized mechanisms of wage bargaining. As such, the ‘limitations placed on the economy through the extension of citizenship rights and social policy were accompanied by an increasing subordination of all aspects of social life under the exigencies of the “market”’ (Lacher 2006: 144-5). It was therefore stabilization and the deepening of market society that allowed social democracy to emerge as a political possibility (not a necessity though) in postwar Western Europe.

153 For an extensive analysis of Fordism as it was practised in the Ford Motor Company, see Rupert 1995.
In Turkey, however, market society was far from being consolidated. As I argued above, industrialists represented an ‘infant’ capitalist class whose very presence became an impediment to the further development of capitalism in Turkey. Their privileged access to public resources resulted in oligopolistic/monopolistic practices\(^{154}\), which remained the ultimate basis of their social reproduction, thereby halting the further differentiation of political processes from economic ones. In this context, secularism and nationalism (although with minor modifications) continued to be deployed to provide a sense of unity and an ethos of conduct among the business and bureaucratic elite, while being used to keep the gates of the state and economy closed to potential contenders. Given the continuing centrality of the state in the social reproduction of the dominant power bloc, any attempt at widening the ‘nation’ beyond its previously designated boundaries would endanger the foundations of this partially capitalist modernity.

Two cases in point were the left-turn of the RPP after the mid-1960s and the emergence of the Workers Party of Turkey (WPT). The oligopolistic economic structure had two immediate consequences for the radicalization of political life. First, facing no imperative for economic competition behind high tariff walls and an easy subsidy regime, oligopolistic structures caused a chronic need for and an ever-intensifying political competition among different business groups over the scarce foreign currencies.\(^{155}\) Business interests were organized in

\(^{154}\) It must be clear by now that what I argue here is not that the cases of successful late development were achieved without state intervention or under conditions of perfect competition. However, the state provision of oligopolistic rights and subsidies in the internal market in such countries as South Korea and Taiwan worked to ensure that capitalists became subjected to the rules of reproduction in the international market. Likewise, the provision of subsidies to peasants to enhance productivity was compensated for by charging the peasantry above-market prices for their access to fertilizers and consumption goods, see Amsden 2003; 1985, pp. 86-87, also see Chibber 2003.

\(^{155}\) The economy was characterized by a surge of investment with very weak backward and forward linkages to the rest of the economy. The resultant lack of ‘vertical’ investments kept the overall domestic content of the allegedly import-substituting industries as low as 23 per cent (Barkey 1990a: 115), hence the never-ending foreign exchange crisis and competition for import licences throughout the import substitution period.
and through different associations and political parties, yet the majority of big businesses were members of and represented by the Justice Party, the main descendant of the Democrat Party (Ahmad 1977: 244). The Justice Party won the elections in 1965 and 1969, and was able to form majority governments thanks to its appeal to the bulk of businessmen, big landlords and middle farmers. The JP’s main rival was the Republican People’s Party. Unsuccessful at recruiting larger segments of the business world as well as farmers (most likely due to its association to the 27 May movement and the earlier Kemalist project in the popular psyche), the RPP had no choice but to turn ‘left’ by reinventing Kemalist populism. The RPP became the conduit through which the underprivileged, who were forcing the gates of the state in the 1970s, radicalized and turned Kemalism’s solidaristic and non-class vision of ‘populism’ into an outcry for equality (Sencer 1974: 281). Obviously, the RPP’s turn to the left had its limits, as it remained attentive of dominant bureaucratic and bourgeois interests. Yet, to some degree, it succeeded in including the previously marginalized segments of society, such as the radical working class, the landless peasantry, leftist university youth as well as Alevis, into the RPP constituency. By doing so, the RPP transformed existing conceptions of secularism and nationalism as understood thus far by the political and economic elite.

Second, given the oligopolistic character of and the lack of ‘deepening’ in manufacturing markets, most of the newly established industries were capital-intensive, which dramatically limited the absorption capacity of the rural masses by urban centers (Hale 1981: 215). The state tried to respond to the rising urban unemployment by siphoning off the otherwise

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According to one estimate rents from import licences constituted 10 to 15 per cent of GNP in 1968, and there were not any policy changes that could lower this ratio until 1980 (Ilkin 1991: 89). Despite the reluctance of international financial institutions to extend further loans and the draining of worker remittances especially after the second half of the 1970s, the private sector hardly succumbed to the political and international demands to restructure the state-provided economic incentives and to devaluate the overvalued lira (Evrensel 2004).

156 Manufacturing’s share in GNP between 1962 and 1980 increased by more than 64 per cent, while its share in total employment rose by only 2.8 per cent, see Barkey 1990a: 80-81; Senses 1994: 53.
Schools and institutions of higher education doubled their enrolment in the 1960s (Ahmad 1993: 145). The state was the employer of one-third of the working population and 36 per cent of the manufacturing workforce throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Guran 2011:30).

According to one estimate, the number of unionized workers increased from 283,000 in 1960 to 1.5 million in 1970, which equaled to 38.6 per cent of the wage earners. This was a degree of unionization comparable to most advanced Western European countries such as Germany and Britain (Hale 1976: 65). DISK’s membership was over 300,000 workers in 1976 and 500,000 in 1980, rising from 100,000 in 1970. Given its militancy and open defiance of capitalism, the impact of DISK far outweighed its membership number (Bianchi 1984: 224, 229; Mello 2006: 158).

The radicalization of university campuses during the 1960s, of course, took place under the demonstration effect of worldwide events such as the war in Vietnam, student movements around the world and Soviet invasion.
importantly, the WPT provided the platform through which one of the usual suspects/scapegoats of the Kemalist regime, the Kurds, forcefully asserted their politico-cultural rights (Akturk 2012: 150-1). The integration of Kurds into the radical left was particularly threatening for the Kemalist political and economic elite, not only because Kurdish politico-cultural demands, tinged with socialism, would amount to an overhaul of the Kemalist property regime, but also because the prospect of a radicalized Kurdish population heightened Ankara’s never-ending geopolitical anxieties about Kurdistan, especially in the wake of 1970 Baath-Barzani Accord in Iraq (McDowall 2004: 411; Taspinar 2005: 93).

The implication is that business and political elites were not only concerned about rising real wages, but alarmed by the rise of a militant Left even in such establishment parties like the RPP. Given the constitutional freedoms, however, the only thing that they could do (at least for a while) was to exert pressure on governments and tolerate, if not unwillingly support, the formation of a Kemalist ultra-nationalism. Informed by a virulent anti-communism and ultra-nationalism, the Nationalist Action Party (established by one of the Fourteen, ex-colonel of Czechoslovakia. Perhaps more important than these external factors, however, was the fact that ‘[t]he universities had played an important part in toppling Menderes and in formulating the constitution of the second republic. It was only logical therefore that students and teachers began to see themselves as the moving force of society’ and as ‘an enlightened elite’ (Zurcher 2003: 254-5). Unsurprisingly, student demands were hardly strictly ‘economic’, varying from the reform of the ‘archaic’ system of education and of ‘unjust’ land ownership to the end of an alliance with the West (Ahmad 1977: 199).

Kurdish youth and intellectuals were another example of the potentially universalist and explosive character of Kemalist populism and education. Until the end of the 1950s, the rate of extension of public school system in Kurdistan remained relatively low as compared to other regions. The NUC, in an attempt to Turkify the region, began to establish area boarding schools in the region after 1960, which provided young Kurdish peasants not only an opportunity to obtain state-based income, but also (indirectly) a greater room of engagement in national (radical) politics. And indeed, given the strong legacy and relative prevalence of sharecropping relations and the state-landowner alliance in the region, Kurdish students and intellectuals substantially contributed to the formulation of WPT demands on land reform, end of ‘internal colonialism’ etc. (McDowall 2004: 409-10). After the closure of WPT in 1971, Kurds were largely pushed to underground organizations, a process further accelerated by the subsequent incorporation of the Turkish left into the RPP (Bishku 2007: 82-84).

The significance of the geopolitical factor becomes clearer when one considers that despite the proliferation of various leftist journals in the Turkish language, severe restrictions on Kurdish political and cultural expression remained in place throughout the 60s and 70s (Taspinar 2005: 91).

For example, despite significantly lower levels of productivity, manufacturing wages in Turkey were three times the level of South Korean wages in 1974, double in 1977 and still 50 per cent higher than Korean wages in 1979 (Keyder 1987: 159-161). Also, the number of workdays lost due to industrial dispute increased three-fold from 1973 to 1980 (ibid: 191-2).
Alparslan Turkes) and its militant youth organization (‘commandos’ as they came to be known) stirred up political violence to an unprecedented level. When the commandos proved unsatisfactory and perhaps too unruly, the military intervened once again through a ‘coup by memorandum’, asking for the resignation of the Justice Party government and the formation of a ‘strong’ government ‘inspired by Ataturk’s principles’ that would end ‘anarchy’ and ‘social and economic unrest’ (Ahmad 1993: 147-8). A technocratic government ruled the country from 1971 to 1973, but achieved almost no success in economically ‘disciplining’ the bourgeoisie (Tekin 2006), nor was it able to alter the course of political developments despite utilizing considerable brutality (Zurcher 2003: 5). The WPT was dissolved by the military junta, which contributed only to the further radicalization of former WPT supporters. In addition to mass demonstrations, university occupations and general strikes, the militant left began to engage in guerilla activities after 1973, killing US officers, kidnapping prominent businessmen and robbing banks. Ultimately, militant trade unionism and escalating political violence on the one hand, and the OPEC crisis, the exhaustion of workers’ remittances, investment strikes and unemployment on the other reinforced one another, causing a strong stagflationary spiral and political polarization throughout the 1970s.\footnote{Inflation rise from 10.1 per cent in 1975 to 85 per cent in 1979. The debt-service ratio increased from 7 per cent in 1975 to 26.7 per cent in 1978, with short-term borrowing, non-existent in 1970, amounted to 60 per cent of the total borrowing in 1977 (Atasoy 2005: 113). From 1970 to 1980 twelve governments were formed, and no single party was able to form a majority government (Arat 1991: 143).} This further deteriorated the political atmosphere, only to pave the way for another military intervention in 1980. It would fall onto the new junta to change the constitution and initiate a radical economic restructuring by decisively reformulating the dominant conception of sovereignty and political economy.

In summary, the widening of political space alongside the tightening of the ‘economic’ sphere through the 1960s and 70s forced and allowed social forces from below to radicalize
prevailing discourses on popular sovereignty and the nation. Partly due to the legacy of Jacobinism encoded in the 1961 constitution and partly due to the incompleteness of capitalist transformation, struggles over otherwise strictly ‘economic’ issues were easily and almost immediately translated into struggles over political rule and political rights. And this was further complicated by the fact that critiques of the existing order could be raised through the reinventing of the ruling ideology, Kemalism. That is, given Kemalism’s dual character, the lower classes used Kemalism, the most easily justifiable ideology, to counter Kemalism’s own elitism. They invoked the populism and universalism of Kemalist principles, and while doing so, Kemalism became the catalyst for the expansion and radicalization of the ‘nation’.

The elite response to the lower class reinterpretation of political society was a tacit approval, if not purposeful, organization of an ultra-nationalist Kemalist right and two military interventions that checked and ultimately crushed the popular conceptions of the ‘nation’.

In this Jacobin-capitalist compound, it was perhaps not too unexpected that Kemalism was used either to defend an oligopolistic capitalism or to smash capitalism altogether. In this sense, Kemalism was either oligopolist or socialist (RPP, trying to be both, perhaps ended up being neither). What is more interesting, however, is that the blueprint for a capitalism ‘proper’, based on ‘the expanded reproduction of capital and the extraction of relative surplus value’, was being cooked elsewhere in an entirely non-Kemalist socio-intellectual milieu. Completely breaking away from Kemalism, a new bourgeois class was in the making in Anatolian towns, which would use local Islamic values to create a capitalism of the ‘little men’. A ‘just’, ‘productive’, ‘competitive’ and ‘national’ order was being imagined against the existing ‘Masonic’ and ‘imitator’ capitalism, and against ‘socialist’ and ‘atheist’ populism. A discussion of the rise of ‘Islamic capitalism’ is in order.
Capitalism of the Oppressed: Reimagining the State, Secularism and Islam

There is no real planning in Turkey. For 25 years we have not established institutions conducive to real industrialization. The state has supported only those who seek to reap easy profits from the market. [in this sense] the motor of Turkish industrialization is not the state, but a small happy minority. None of the factories they built are real factories, because none of them can compete with world market prices. We have to resolve this issue at the root... All of the existing laws related to industrialization are obsolete.\footnote{25 senedir asıl sanayileşme mede faydali kuruluşlar maalesef yapılmamıştır. Bir takım daha ziyade kâr getirecek, hemen el çabukluğu ile piyasadan kâr getirecek tesislere bu iş kayımsıtı. Biliyorsunuz, çok mühim bir hususu arz edeyim size: Efendim, plan yapıyoruz, şu nu yapıyoruz, bunu yapıyoruz diyorlar ya, aslında plan yok lıa, Türkiye de hakkı manâda hiç bir plan yok Niye, bakınız tatbikat nasıl yürüyor: Kim krymetli proje getirirse ona kolaylık vereceğim diyor. Bunun manâsi ne demektir? Türkiye nin sanayileşmesinde, lokomotif olan devlet değil üç buçuk mutlu azınıltır. Asında böyle. Bizim bugün büyük bir sanayi memleketi olmamız şöyle dursun, bir fabrikayı bile ciddi olarak kuramamz mümkün değil. Niye efendim, bu kadar fabrika kuruluyor—Onlar kuruluuyor ama, onların hiç birbirine fabrika diyemezsiniz. Çünkü hiç biri dünyaya fiyatlarıyla rekabet edemez. Bu iş kökünden halledilmeye mecburdur. Butun sanayi kanunları mülgdir.}

Necmettin Erbakan, 1973

Since the Tanzimat...the European, by making us copy him blindly and without any understanding, trapped us in this monkey's cage and, as a result, forced us to abandon our personality and nobility...He was successful in this because he used agents recruited from within, who felt [inferior and] disgusted with themselves, bringing to his knees the Turk who for centuries could not be defeated by the crusades and external blows.

Necmettin Erbakan, 1970

Undoubtedly, one of the most important leitmotifs throughout the Ottoman/Turkish modernization has been the issue of finding and solidifying a feasible political-cultural base for ‘national regeneration’. As I have argued above, from the Tanzimat to Kemalism, reformers, intellectuals and dissidents elaborated the domestic conditions for emulating two different modernization projects, capitalism and Jacobinism, each of which was rooted in distinct systems of appropriation and subjectivity. Every time the capitalist project failed to materialize, either due to the threat of foreign intervention and/or domestic revolution, the Jacobin project was called forth, which cumulatively led to the birth of a late Jacobin progeny on Turkish soil during the interwar years, Kemalism. Kemalism equalized Republican subjects while turning the state into the main medium of reproduction and accumulation. In theory, the state was officially open to each and every citizen. Yet behind this universalist and
civic facade, partly due to the structure of property relations and partly due to geopolitical pressures, Kemalism had to invent new principles governing access to the state, i.e. secularism and nationalism. Kemalist secularism centralized and created its own brand of Islam, and while doing so it caused an onslaught on the relations of rule and appropriation embedded in preexistent politico-religious institutions and norms.

After World War II, with the holding of multiparty elections and as the market began to be instituted as a new locus of reproduction alternative to the state, nationalism and secularism of the original Kemalist project began to be relaxed, yet without any substantive change in the Kemalist interpretation of secularism and nationalism. In the 1960s, Kurds, and other Muslim and non-Muslim minorities continued in practice to be regarded as second-class citizens. Public education sought to cultivate ‘active citizens’ who, through ‘participatory education’ and ‘critical thinking’, were ‘to question issues both at home and abroad’, ‘seek solutions to the benefit of homeland and nation’, and to ‘accept responsibility’, while tacitly renouncing alternative ethno-religious values and demands threatening the integrity of the Kemalist state (Ince 2012: 135). Meanwhile, political parties, most notably the Justice Party (like its predecessor DP), addressed religious sentiments and established relations with Islamic brotherhoods to cultivate electoral support. Also, the successive governments increased the budget allocated for the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA), opened more Imam Hatip Schools and even allowed Imam Hatip graduates, who were previously eligible to study at theology faculties only, to enter all university departments (except military academies). All this, however, took place under state supervision with even the armed forces seeming to have accepted Islam’s increasing visibility in political life; seeing it as a temporary solution to the looming threat of socialism (Ahmad 1977: 378-9; Taspinar 2005: 129-31).
Although partly permitted by this strategy of tolerance, there was also another Islam growing outside and against the Kemalist establishment throughout the 1970s. As a consequence of its distinct international ties and relationship to the state, a new bourgeois class, mainly based in Anatolian towns, comprised of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and in close connection with certain Sufi sects, began to formulate a new conception of Islam and state as the foundation of a new industrialization strategy. After more than 100 years of modernization, the political and intellectual outlines of a capitalist development strategy would be finally laid out without combining it with Jacobinism. Capitalism would no longer be substituted for, nor would it be instituted in addition to Kemalism. Indeed, a purely capitalist future, unfettered by the legacies of the Jacobin past, was being imagined. Herein lay the origins of the present times.

Let me begin by contesting an all-too-common conception about this new bourgeois class and its political demands organized in the so-called ‘National View’ movement. The conventional interpretation holds that the Anatolian bourgeoisie of the 1970s was essentially a protectionist, inward-looking and non-competitive group of entrepreneurs in favor of a pseudo-etatist, industrialization strategy. The National View’s conception of development ‘combined a shopkeeper ideology with demands for state interventionism in large industry, thus guaranteeing that the transition to monopoly capitalism should occur without the destruction of small business’ (Keyder 1979: 35). They were disturbed by the expansion of modern capitalist industries concentrated in big cities in Western Turkey, and threatened by the looming threat of international competition due to the state’s plans to form a customs union with the European Economic Community (EEC) (Ahmad 1977: 382). In this respect, so the argument goes, the new bourgeois class was the mirror image of TUSIAD, the business association formed by big, mainly Istanbul-based secular capitalists that supported an
outward-looking industrial strategy, including Turkey’s integration with the EEC (Atasoy 2005: 119; 2008: 53). To be able to preserve their small-sized and technologically backward enterprises in the face of domestic and international competition, they translated ‘the discontent of the small town traditional petty bourgeoisie into a platform of Islamic revivalism...[in lieu of] the nostalgic image of community lost through uncontrolled capitalism’ (Keyder 1979: 35; Gulalp 2001: 435). They needed and demanded greater state protection and larger shares of bank credits, hence their constant emphasis on Islamic ‘justice’, conservative values, rejection of the West, the dislike of Kemalism and so on.

Clearly there is a kernel of truth in the conventional interpretation: the Anatolian bourgeoisie reacted against the Istanbul-based industrial monopolies and the state’s ‘unjust’ credit policies favoring big business. They also fiercely rejected ‘Western’ values and showed great dismay towards Kemalism, while remaining fearful of the possibility of abolition of quotas and tariffs between Turkey and the EEC. What is fundamentally misleading, however, is the assumption that the Anatolian bourgeoisie was merely an inward-looking class of entrepreneurs trying to defend ‘petty bourgeois’ interests against competition from big domestic and foreign industrialists.

The size of an industrial firm is far from being a clear indicator of its investment and productive patterns, nor does its owners’ demand for economic openness necessarily equate with support for structural economic reform. By way of example, the TUSIAD, the presumably most free-trade oriented interest association of large industrialists, actually had a completely ambivalent stance towards economic reform throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. As noted above, import restrictions on consumer goods produced a class of oligopolists who were completely protected from foreign competition and made no vertical
investments that would have deepened the internal market. They generated almost no foreign exchange, while benefiting from ‘substantial access to foreign markets for their investment and raw material needs’ (Tekin 2006: 139). Most industrial profits were made by ‘manipulating’ state intervention (Tekin 2006: 133). Different interest groups, in competition with one another, attempted to maximize shares in this system of redistribution, while the lion’s share of politico-economic rents was received by large industrialists. In 1969, according to one estimate, more than half of the total production belonged to three enterprises in 236 of the 251 mass consumption goods (Ozturk 2015: 123). Big industrialists were the main beneficiaries of import quotas and subsidies (Barkey 1990a: 118), while enjoying highly privileged access to bank credits\textsuperscript{165}, first as a result of state policies encouraging banks to offer low-interest funds for industrial investment, and then due to the establishment of ‘holding corporations’ which included one or more banks. That industrial enterprises could now borrow unlimited sums from banks that belong to their own holding corporations further added to the oligopolistic controls over the economy (Barkey 1990a: 123-5).\textsuperscript{166} Additionally, large industrialists supported Turkey’s integration with the EEC (after a transitional period of 22 years), mainly because of the prospect of cheaper imports and additional foreign funds, while remaining adamant that the integration should not bring about the lira’s devaluation (Tekin 2006: 140, 145-6). It is little wonder that at least until the late 1970s industrialists ‘across-the-board’ fiercely opposed and systematically undermined government initiatives to devalue the lira, selectively expose the private sector to international competition and so on (Barkey 1990a: 119; Tekin 2006).

\textsuperscript{165} The government credits allocated to large industrialists in 1973 was equal to 44 per cent of their total capital, although only 3 per cent of their production stemmed from exports (Atasoy 2005: 117).

\textsuperscript{166} Of the existing 24 private banks in 1980 19 were part of holding corporations. In 1982, the top 10 banks accounted for 90 per cent of saving deposits (Barkey 1990a: 124).
Still, it is true that things began to change especially after 1978 when the foreign exchange and debt crisis reached its tipping point. At this point the loss of profit caused by the lack of foreign exchange and underutilized capacity was even greater than the increased cost of imported inputs (Tekin 1997: 219). Cleavages in the existing power bloc eventually deepened, and TUSIAD became increasingly and vocally critical of ISI policies, charging the government, trade unions and other industrialists (mainly organized in the Istanbul Chamber of Industry) with sacrificing the country’s future for their short-term gains (Arat 1991: 140; Barkey 1990a: 117; Tekin 1997: 239). For all this change in discourse, however, TUSIAD’s ‘long-term commitment to the outward oriented measures was doubtful’ (Tekin 1997: 220-21; Barkey 1990a: 178, 184). TUSIAD conceded some limited reform measures as long as ‘they resulted in infusion of foreign exchange (thus imports of their inputs) into the economy’, yet once foreign exchange became easily accessible after the military coup, they reverted to their old stance of criticizing the government for continuing with reform measures at their expense. During the 1980s, TUSIAD would by and large (though not entirely) remain as the association of non-competitive, protectionist and inward-looking industrialists, opposing (yet no longer able to completely derail) the economic restructuring begun in 1980 (Tekin 1997: 249-50).

The ‘National View’, and the two political parties established as its offspring, the National Order Party (NOP, 1969-71) and the National Salvation Party (NSP, 1973-80), developed as a reaction to the dominance of big industrialists (Landau 1976: 21). Small firms were almost completely excluded from state-generated credit and subsidy circles, although they produced 25 percent of total industrial production and 88.3 percent of the total manufacture of footwear, apparel and textiles (which were three of the few industrial sectors showing strong export potential) (Atasoy 2005: 119; Tekin 2006: 153). Furthermore, although Anatolian
industrialists were much less dependent on foreign imports for their production and consumption, their share of public (manufacturing) investment remained much lower than their counterparts based in Istanbul and Izmir (Barkey 1990a: 132-3). Despite being subjected to various politico-economic exclusions, however, the Anatolian bourgeoisie largely operated outside centrally supervised industrial relations, thereby having access to a non-unionized (hence cheaper) workforce. Also, their willingness to export to the relatively less competitive markets in the Middle East was improving especially after the rise in oil prices. Given these constraints and opportunities, it was perhaps a fairly foreseeable phenomenon that the Anatolian industrialists were calling for a fairer distribution of state support and an end to inter-regional discrepancies. What needs to be emphasized, however, is that this disgruntled ‘petty bourgeoisie’ believed that the answer to these ills lied not in less, but more capitalism.

Necmettin Erbakan, a mechanical engineer trained in West Germany, was the intellectual father of the National View, and the leader of the NOP and NSP. Erbakan argued that industrialization was much less a matter of ‘planning’ and ‘engineering’ than of transforming the obstructive ‘structure’ and ‘climate’ of the general order (Erbakan 2013b [1971]: 404). The key to this transformation was neither ‘statism’ per se nor ‘liberalism’ (Erbakan 2013e [1973]: 63). Statism and liberalism have both been tried in Turkey, yet they benefited either only bureaucrats or a small minority of businessmen. These two groups, together with their foreign partners, squandered the scarce resources of a poor country by establishing low productivity and non-competitive industries (Erbakan 2013e [1973]: 50). Moreover, both statism and liberalism came to promote a ‘materialistic’ lifestyle and education by slavishly mimicking the West (taklîcîlîk), which resulted in ‘interest-based exploitation’ of the masses (somurucu faizcilîk) and their drift towards anarchism and communism (Erbakan 2013b [1971]: 403; 2013e [1973]: 68). In this view, the economic system is thus led by a ‘Masonic’,
‘Zionist’ and ‘Comprador’ minority that heavily taxed and borrowed from the people, but did not offer any payback by creating jobs and ‘real’ investment. As such, Turkish industrialization was marked by a ‘vegetative growth’ (*nebati inxisaf*), which structurally inhibited an overwhelming majority of the people from participating as manufacturers, and even when people became workers, their wages were not based on ‘strong money’, thereby rapidly eroding under inflation (Erbakan 2013e [1973]: 51, 62; 2013a [1975]: 105).

Thus, without a wholesale transformation of existing political organization (*teskilat*), rules and legislation (*mevzuat*), and mentality (*zihniyet*), no plan could deliver expected economic outcomes in Turkey (Erbakan 2013e [1973]: 53-5). ‘Real industrialization’ was then not only about ‘economic’ planning, but required the transition to a ‘horizontal statism’ (*ufki devletcilik*) and moralism (*maveviyetcilik*) that together would promote the development of an ‘intensive’ (*yogun*) private sector. To accomplish this goal Erbakan proposed a number of politico-cultural measures, some of which are as follows: the presidency and prime ministry will be combined in a presidential system and the president will be directly elected by the people (instead of by parliament) (Erbakan 2013a [1975]: 59). The number of members of parliament will be decreased, and the electoral system that prevents parliament from working in harmony, and decreases its productivity will be remedied (ibid). The Senate, hence the two chamber system, will be abolished (ibid). Ministries dealing with economic issues will be combined and reorganized in line with the requirements of rapid industrialization and export growth (Erbakan 2013a [1975]: 60; 2013b [1971]: 402). ‘Communists’ and ‘freemasons’ will be removed from state service (Erbakan 2013b [1971]: 402). The profitability of state institutions will be increased by shifting redundant state employees to more productive enterprises (ibid). Public investments are vital to encouraging productive investment in the private sector, therefore public funds should not be directed to unproductive venues such as
the building of theatres and stadiums (Landau 1976: 16-7). The SEEs, unless they have a ‘leading’ function in the economy, will operate in the same way private enterprises do, and those with ‘leading’ functions will be privatized once they complete their tasks (Erbakan 2013c [1976]: 127). The credit system will be overhauled in such ways that the allocation of credit will be commensurate with the level of productivity of industrial undertakings (Erbakan 2013b [1971]: 403). The interest rate system will be abolished. Taxes will be imposed on wealth, not on profits. Banks will be directly involved in production and share profits with industrialists by establishing joint productive ventures. With interest rates replaced by ‘profit-sharing’, bank operations will not only facilitate production, but also decrease the cost of borrowing and inflation, thereby increasing export competitiveness (Erbakan 2013a [1975]: 105-6). The state will lead and induce the deepening and spread of private industrial investment with the condition that production will be made contingent on ‘satisfactory profit’ and ‘world market prices’ (Erbakan 2013e [1973]: 63). However, this does not mean that Turkey should completely give up economic protectionism. Rather, protection has to be selective: for example ‘as opposed to struggling with the EEC to be able to sell some parsley...we should sell our agricultural and manufactured goods to Muslim states [and] build their industries [and] their roads’ (Erbakan 1975 quoted in Atasoy 2005:128). Instead of being Europe’s ‘servant’, we should lower tariffs with our neighbors in the Middle East and Africa. ‘We should be men and...sell our products to the markets that we can control’ (Erbakan 2013e [1973]: 70-1). And indeed, if Turkey insists on integrating with Europe, ‘in 22 years I am afraid –Allah forbid– instead of joining the EEC, we will become just another province of Russia (Erbakan 2013e [1973]: 57).

Erbakan’s conception of ‘social justice’ (ictimaı adalet) is more or less a natural outcome of the order prescribed above, i.e. social justice is seen by and large as a derivation of the
political transformation that would spread the fruits of increased competition, productivity, currency stability and an improved investment climate. Social justice thus can not be maintained through minor social fixes to existing ‘masonic’ ‘liberal’ capitalism (Erbakan 2013e [1973]: 52), and in fact, any attempt to do so is doomed to failure, for they would lead in the long run to nothing, but higher inflation, higher unemployment, higher taxes on the poor, and thereby, communism (Erbakan 2013a [1975]: 102). Social justice, therefore, requires a radical departure from the existing economic order towards the establishment of a productivity-based system that would create jobs for the unemployed, cut waste, increase opportunities of enrichment for hardworking people while enabling workers to earn better pay and even get a share of profits (kardan hisse) (ibid: 105). Needless to say, all this depends on disciplining not only the rich, but also the workers and small farmers. Small farmers ‘should be able to sell their produce at its real value’ (Landau 1976: 17), unions will operate independently of ‘political’ influences, and workers and employers will treat each other like brothers who cooperate and work for the common goal (Erbakan 2013a [1975]: 104-6).

Indeed, the brotherly love and mutual help, ingrained in the nation’s consciousness by God, will be the primary guarantor of social justice, while the state’s role in redistribution will be ‘secondary’ and ‘complementary’ (NSP 1975: art 5).

It is in this context that the meaning of Erbakan’s call for ‘moral’ transformation also begins to become clear. Against the ‘moral invasion’ of Western values that brought nothing but ‘exploitation’ and ‘anarchy’ to the country (Erbakan 2013b [1971]: 400), Erbakan proposes a ‘radical re-interpretation’ of secularism. He argues that secularism turned into a means of ‘oppressing the believers’ and protecting the ‘usurer’ (Erbakan 2013a [1975]: 62). Secularism also promotes anarchy, as it removed from people’s minds and hearts the love for their traditions, customs and national character. As a consequence, the education system is totally
corrupted. Especially disturbing are sociology courses and curricula, most of which are based on the ideas of ‘a man called Durkheim (a man who had the very same ideas as a French rabbi)’ (Erbakan 2013b [1971]: 405). Sociology in particular, and the education system in general, foster ‘materialism’ among the youth in the name of ‘reason’ and ‘intelligence’. Apes have been shown to be our ancestors, and the Kaaba to be only a late imitation of the Greek Acropolis. As such, generations have been brought up with no respect for existing moral and cultural values. Corrupted here is not only religion itself but also ‘science’. For, ‘real science’ must be done not for science’s sake, but people’s use. In this context, Erbakan makes an interesting reference to Henry IV of England (sic), who purportedly said in 1569 to the Royal Society of Science not to do science ‘over the clouds’, but produce science that has practical utility for national development (Erbakan 2013e [1973]: 71). The solution to all these problems, according to Erbakan, lies in reinterpreting secularism to signify the state’s tolerance for religious differences, rather than religion’s exclusion from the state. This is indeed what democracy and human rights, two principles encoded in the 1961 constitution, would also presuppose as a logical conclusion (Erbakan 2013e [1975]: 61-2).

This new conception of social justice and secularism conducive to productivity increasingly hints at the undoing of property relations and subjectivities that Kemalism came to support. For they imply the beginning of state restructuring according to the requirements of a ‘non-usurious’ and ‘productive’ order and the combining of science and education with religion in ways to create politically loyal, scientifically ‘useful’ and economically ‘productive’ subjects. In this respect, Erbakan’s semantic move from Durkheim to Henry IV is very meaningful. Durkheim was perhaps the most important intellectual source that inspired the ‘solidarism’ or ‘populism’ of the original Kemalist project, whereas the Royal Society of Science, which the English King was allegedly addressing, was the champion and orator of the culture of
‘improvement’. Moreover, Erbakan’s proposal to shift power from parliament towards the top of the state and the executive, and the strategic reordering of state support and credit in ways to subordinate production to the dictates of market competition, while short of a comprehensive economic plan, definitely provided the outlines of a novel project of capitalist development.

From this angle, the National View movement, taken as a whole, offered a totally fresh foundation for capitalist development in Turkey. It sought to unburden ‘modernization’ from its Jacobin yoke, which it saw responsible for causing ‘anarchy’ and creating a corrupted capitalism. Erbakan’s contempt for the ‘West’ and his blatant anti-Semitism were thus rooted in his effort to destroy the remnants of Jacobinism and enthrone fully capitalist property relations. Part and parcel of the destruction of Jacobinism was a new legal, scientific and moral order that, by linking social and economic rights to productivity increases, aimed to subordinate the poor ever more powerfully to the dictates of capitalist competition. The moral improvement and material welfare of the poor was thus imagined as a direct derivation of their subordination to the discipline of capitalist accumulation. Erbakan’s attack on ‘interest-based exploitation’, and his drawing of new boundaries between the moral and the immoral was just the flipside of his attempt to deepen capitalist property relations.

Regardless of its intentions, however, the National View did not muster enough power to materialize its societal vision during the 1970s. The NSP, although not negligible for a nascent political movement, won only 11.8 percent in the 1973 elections and 8.5 percent of the votes in 1977 and acted as a minor partner in coalition governments under either Republican or Justice Party leadership. Yet, it has to be noted that in addition to certain Sufi orders, the NSP’s support for a ‘productive’ and ‘just’ order, embellished in a religious
discourse, found a strong resonance among the urban poor (especially the non-unionized workers and unemployed) and Kurds, two major groups who were excluded from the power bloc during the 1960s and 70s (Taspinar 2005: 136-7; Akturk 2012: 161). This was mainly because the NSP’s call to end the ‘moral invasion’ and transform secularism was the harbinger of a new conception of the ‘nation’. Departing from Kemalism’s ‘nation’ that systematically oscillated between equality and hierarchy, the NSP promised an ‘equal’ and ‘just’ world to all; a nation driven by a distinctive market rationality, organized around the presumably ‘colorless’ relations of capitalist contract and encapsulated in a language of Islamic multiculturalism. How much of this capitalist- Islamic dream could be realized is the subject of next two sections.

**Turkey’s (Not-So) Great Transformation, 1980-2002: Secularism against Capitalism**

*We have protected industry for too long [and]...excessively....It is not acceptable to produce garbage behind the customs walls and sell your garbage at the price you want. No, we will not let that happen anymore. You should compete, bro!*  
*Turgut Ozal, Prime Minister, 1987*

*[We are] against interest but not profit, against monopoly but not free competition, against central planning but not state regulation.*  
*Necmettin Erbakan, The Welfare Party Leader, 1994*

*If the fight against inflation fails and distributional injustice continues, conservation of the regime will turn into a grave problem.*  
*Mesut Yilmaz, Prime Minister, 1998*

In many ways, the 1980 military takeover represented a watershed in Turkish political economy. Unlike the fragmented character of the 1960 intervention, the 1980 coup was led by a unified chain of command and organized well ahead of time, with a clear action plan to be implemented during and after the intervention (Karpat 1988: 149). The coup decisively suspended the constitution, shut down political parties and unions and brutally repressed the left. A transitional government, consisting of retired military officers and technocrats, was put in place, while overall power was conducted by the National Security Council, which was
composed of the military high command. The new constitution reversed the liberties contained in the constitution of 1960, reasserting Kemalism in ways that criminalized all leftist currents, including radical interpretations of Kemalism itself. It perceived almost everything as a threat to the security of the state and the territorial/cultural integrity of the ‘nation’. The left, in general, suffered serious injuries after the coup. However, the Kurds, who were closely allied with the socialist movements of the 1970s, proved to be better organized and resilient than the rest of the militant left, reacting to political and military repression through increased guerilla insurgency organized by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Also, the emergence of Kurdistan as a ‘common front of communist and nationalist activities’ coincided with the increased perception of a geopolitical threat over the region; first as a result of the outbreak of a rebellion in Iranian Kurdistan following the Islamic Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and then Syria’s hosting and tacit support of the PKK leadership throughout the 1980s and the 1990s (Taspinar 2005: 97, 137-8, 171).

If the left in general and Kurds in particular were the main victims of the coup, the Islamic movement received only a slight blow. As in the 1970s, the military tried to remove ‘radical’ elements from the former NSP constituency, while tolerating, if not reviving, the Islamic movement as a bulwark against the Left (Akturk 2012: 164-5). This trend was further encouraged by the US, which, threatened by the fall of Iran and Afghanistan, had plans to create a moderate Sunni Islamic bloc in the Middle East led by Saudi Arabia and with ties to NATO through Turkey (Atasoy 2005: 150). It is no wonder that typical Kemalist methods of containing and utilizing Islam followed the military intervention. The number of Imam Hatip Schools and Koranic courses sharply rose between 1980 and 1983, as did the DRA’s budget and personnel. Also, compulsory religious lessons were introduced in all primary and middle schools (Taspinar 2005: 138). Likewise, ‘secular-track school curricula recorded a marked
about-face in the national educational system’. While the curricula of the earlier period ‘distanced the republic from the Ottoman ancien regime (which students were taught had been overthrown by a “revolution”), after 1980 it began ‘a gradual reversal on the question of the Ottoman-Islamic heritage which culminated in advocacy for the integration of Islamic values into the nation’s political culture’ (Kandiyyoti 2012: 520). Given that Kemalism, as previously understood, had turned into a breeding ground for leftist radicalism, the junta and successive governments thus increasingly resorted to Islam to create a new type of subjectivity incorruptible by leftist currents.

In a sense, this quest for a new ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’, although pursued in a more authoritarian manner, was not different from previous state attempts at reinterpreting Islam as an element in the making of obedient subjects. That said, however, the transformation of Turkish secularism in the early 1980s was underlined by an additional factor, which would change the momentum of Turkish political economy. For the transformation of secularism did not bring about the repression of the left only, but also signaled the breaking down of the power bloc that ruled Turkey since 1960. Given the fiscal and debt crisis, the military regime had to create a new state-society complex that would create, strengthen and rely on groups and classes with stakes in structural reform, international competition and an outward orientation.

The first step in this direction was taken with the appointment to the transitional cabinet of Turgut Ozal, a pro-reform technocrat and engineer, as minister of state in charge of economics. Ozal had acted as the head of the State Planning Organization between 1969 and 1971 and worked as an economist for the World Bank during the 1970s. He had initially been involved in Erbakan’s NSP, where his brother was a leading figure, and later in 1980 the
Justice Party government put him in charge of preparation for an economic reform package, which failed to materialize due to the political stalemate preceding the coup. Already in the 1970s, Ozal had thus witnessed the politics of economic reform at first hand. One lesson Ozal drew from the failure of stabilization packages in the 1970s and 1980s was that ‘steadfastness [was needed] against demands from all groups, and especially from the private sector, as the cardinal ingredient for his measures’ success’ (Barkey 1990a: 184). Relatedly, Ozal was also aware that previous reforms had failed to take off, because there was no significant private sector group pressing for their full implementation, i.e. once the balance of payments crisis was over, the protectionist pressures from both the private and public sector would resuscitate, resulting in the reversal of reforms (Tekin 1997: 236).

In short, what was at stake was a radical reorganization of public and private powers in the post-coup period, which aimed at selective seclusion of the state from popular pressures and the creation of a coalition whose interests rested on the expansion and deepening of export-oriented production. The first task, i.e. the building of the state’s relative autonomy, was partly achieved through institutional and legal changes designed to overcome potential political clashes within the state and restrict the influence of societal groups over economic policy making. These measures included, albeit were not limited to: empowerment of the presidency, the constitution of a unicameral legislature, strengthening of the executive through the issuance of decree laws (kanun hukmunde kararname), the centralization of economic decision making in a number of state ministries to bypass the control of parliament and the old bureaucratic structure, restrictions of constitutional freedoms, curbing of trade unions’ power, centralization of decision making in higher education, and the establishment of a 10 percent electoral threshold (Barkey 1990a: 187-9; Oguz 2008: 163-4). The sustainability of these legal and institutional changes was also dependent on the realization of
the second task, which indeed proved to be much more formidable than the first. For, already in 1982, there was resistance to Ozal’s market reforms from the largest holding corporations with strong import substitution concerns (most notably the Koc and Sabanci Groups), which in fact, by exerting pressure on the military, led to Ozal’s resignation from the transitional government (Barkey 1990a: 184; Tekin 1997: 247-8, 250). Big business was interested in increasing Turkey’s ‘credit-worthiness’ yet not structural reform, i.e. a reform that would lead to the reproduction of the import-substituting industrial structure by ensuring the continuous availability of external funds for import-dependent industries (Aydin 2005: 112).

Ozal came back with an election victory in 1983, however. While all pre-coup politicians were banned from electoral politics for 10 years, Ozal, as a technocrat highly respected by Western creditors, was (halfheartedly) allowed by the junta to enter the elections with his brand new Motherland Party (MP). The army was confident of the success of two military-sponsored parties, which turned out to be a total underestimation of the unspoken reaction to the military regime (Barkey 1990b: 180-1). The bourgeoisie also supported the MP in the elections, as they believed the military-backed parties could hinder the arrival of foreign funds. As a result, the MP managed to win especially the constituency of the old Justice Party and NSP, gaining over 35 percent the vote, and (given the new electoral system) 60 per cent of the seats in parliament. Ozal’s electoral success assured him the power to reinitiate the economic reform process and the building of a pro-reform coalition of bourgeois interests (Barkey 1990a: 190).
Most TUSIAD members\textsuperscript{167} remained suspicious of Ozal during the first half of the 1980s, criticizing him for frequent devaluations (hence rising prices for their imports), import liberalization (hence increasing foreign competition) and the government’s support for ‘exporters’ over the ‘investing industrialists’ (Tekin 1997: 249; Arat 1991: 136, 145; Ozel 2003: 100-1). Given that they had access to their own banks’ funds, however, most large ISI-oriented industrialists were still able to compensate for some of their losses, they could therefore adopt, at least temporarily, ‘a wait and see attitude’, rather than engaging in a direct confrontation with the new genre of economic policy makers (Barkey 1990: 178). In the meanwhile, funds provided by international financial institutions and foreign governments, which had been relatively scarce throughout the 1970s, became available once again after 1980. This gave Ozal’s team of technocrats some degree of independence from the political constraints imposed by the tax base, thereby permitting them to design new incentives to reinforce and deepen the pro-reform groups within the business community.

Naturally, the primary targets of these incentives were those who were already involved in export activity. In addition to the benefits accrued from the devalued lira, import liberalization, and decreased real wages and declining support for agriculture\textsuperscript{168}, Ozal offered subsidies and credits, foreign exchange allocations and tax exemptions to companies that were above a certain productive capacity. Indeed, this initiated a protracted transformation within the group of big industrialists: some import substitution holding companies (especially Sabanci and Koc Holdings), facing increasing competition for the domestic market and

\textsuperscript{167} The number of TUSIAD members increased from 12 in 1971 to 243 in 1987. In the 1980s, ‘the Association accounted for about half the production and employment of private manufacturing industry’ (Arat 1991: 137). In the first half of the 1980s, according to Tekin, there were only two TUSIAD members (Tarik Sara of ENKA Holding and Atilla Yurtcu of IZDAS) who were heavily involved in export activities, while others either took an ambiguous stance or did not change their anti-export position (Tekin 1997: 249ff, 250ff).

\textsuperscript{168} From 1980 to the end of 1988, the real effective rate of depreciation of the lira was about 55 per cent. Given the highly prohibitive environment for unionized labor and suspension of free collective agreements, real labor costs declined from 100 in 1980 to 65.8 in 1988 (Senses 1994: 56-7). Also, with state support for agriculture was largely withdrawn, the index of agricultural terms of trade declined from 100 in 1977 to 47 by 1986 (Waldner 1999: 214).
encouraged by generous export subsidies and lower wages, began to take an outward orientation from the mid-1980s. Yet, more consistent support for Ozal’s export drive came from the companies that, ‘frequently in conflict with TUSIAD, lobbied for the maintenance and increase of incentives presented to exporters’ (Unay 2006: 74). Among these the most prominent were Turkish construction companies and industrialists (predominantly textile and to a lesser extent iron and steel manufacturers) operating in or producing for the Middle Eastern markets, where ‘a company’s religious affiliation mattered a great deal to potential customers’ (Barkey 1990a: 178).

The Middle Eastern markets and financial institutions, whose growth was based on petrodollars, provided ample opportunities for the expansion of Anatolian SMEs (or Anatolian Tigers as they came to be called) closely linked to Islamic brotherhoods and networks (Hosgor 2011: 345). The Islamic bourgeoisie, previously deprived of credit and state support, strongly responded to these opportunities and the export incentives provided by Ozal’s Motherland Party. It was especially the Nakshibendi group within the party, taking advantage of transnational Islamic ties, as well as the ongoing Iran-Iraq War, which rapidly penetrated Middle Eastern markets (Taspinar 2005: 142).\(^\text{169}\) In addition, the devaluation of the lira and economic deregulation (at least in theory) increased prospects for the involvement of SMEs in the domestic market (Ozel 2012: 14). Thanks to relations of solidarity and mutuality characteristic of religious brotherhoods and groups, Islamic entrepreneurs had distinct competitive advantages (Onis 1997: 761). For one thing, religious networks helped them ‘distribute their products and to capture niche markets’ wherever Islamic forms of piety and consumption patterns overlapped, while providing access to a pool of obedient workers

\(^{169}\) The Middle Eastern economies accounted for roughly 45 per cent of the total growth in Turkey’s manufactured exports between 1980 and 1985 (Atasoy 2005: 151). Relatedly, during the same period, about 50 per cent of export earnings of foreign trade companies came from small and medium sized manufacturers (Tekin 1997: 244).
unaffected by the militant trade unionism of the previous decade. Islamic entrepreneurs could also significantly reduce their ‘transaction and transportation costs’ by undertaking ‘joint investments, obtain[ing] loans from each other and/or establish[ing] mutual assistance networks to purchase inputs’ (Hosgor 2011: 346-7). Another important factor facilitating the rise of the Islamic bourgeoisie was the growth of workers’ remittances and the establishment of Islamic financial institutions. Various religious groups were well organized among Turkish guest workers in Europe and the Gulf countries (Demir et al. 2004: 170). In line with the devaluation of the lira, workers’ foreign exchange holdings were collected by these groups for investment in Turkey. The worker-investor, however, had no legal entitlement to these investments ‘since their shares have no legal basis, yet they receive a share of profit (a fixed return) in relation to investments’ (Hosgor 2011: 347). Likewise, Islamic financial institutions, allowed by Turkish law in 1983 and founded by Middle Eastern capital, provided religious business circles with an alternative milieu for financial and ideological mobilization. Operating on a ‘profit/loss sharing’ basis rather than ‘interest’, the Islamic financial institutions furnished the Islamic bourgeoisie with much needed credit, and perhaps more importantly helped them retain and further cultivate their ‘anti-interest’ and ‘productivist’ political/religious posture.

In short, the 1980s witnessed the emergence of a group of businessmen with high stakes in export-led growth, hence the beginning of a structural change in the Turkish industrial sector and the composition of the power bloc. Nevertheless, two things should be kept in mind. First, given their immense resources and political links, the bulk of export subsidies were received by large holding companies (Biddle and Milor 1995: 6; 1997: 291; Tunay 1994: 23-4). Thus, in spite of the emergence of a number of strongly export-oriented sectors in competitive industries with smaller producers (especially textiles and ready-wear), most
export support policies benefited non-competitive and monopolistic actors, who did not have to export to survive. As a result, ‘various forms of incentives, such as tax rebates, preferential credits and grants, ended up becoming "giveaways," pure and simple’ (Biddle and Milor 1995: 57). In other words, ‘rent-oriented networks’ which appear to have no economic rationale were ‘the norm with respect to the Turkish incentive regime’ (Biddle and Milor 1995: 6). Relatedly, until the end of the 1980s ‘the incentives tended to become more widespread rather than more restricted, primarily because modifications to the system were resisted by the beneficiaries’ and the government could use ‘policy-generated rents’ to reward friends and punish foes (Biddle and Milor 1997: 288). Eventually, the space for structural change, which was widened during the crisis, diminished once again, as the reform-minded bureaucrats lost their newly gained autonomy ‘between the powerful business and political actors’ (Biddle and Milor 1995: 6, 58).

Second, the process of economic decentralization begun in 1980 was slow and fell short in introducing ‘the expected increase in competition in the industrial commodity markets’. In other words, while some large businessmen began to slowly increase the proportion of exports in their total earnings, the domestic markets for manufactured goods were still governed by an oligopolistic pricing structure, ‘abated by arms-length connections with the company-owned/managed banking conglomerates’ (Boratav et al. 2000: 18-19; Yeldan 2001: 1). Indeed, prior to 1994, Turkey did not have any anti-trust legislation that could induce competition against cartelization and monopolization. Yet despite the arrival of anti-trust laws, it is doubtful whether ‘decentralization’ via ‘administrative fiat or legal changes’ alone could eliminate the existing rent-seeking networks. For ‘the effective implementation of the

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170 The Antitrust Act of 1994 filled an important loophole in the Turkish legal system, operationalizing for the first time Article 167 of the Turkish Constitution 1982 that obliged the state to prevent cartelization and monopolization in the economy. The Competition Board, which became functional as an ‘independent’ institution in 1997, was also another step towards strengthening the rule of competition, upholding it as a constitutional responsibility (Sanli and Ardiyok 2011: 76).
incentive regime [would] benefit from decentralization’ only ‘to the extent that such organizations [could] emerge from the bottom up in competitive industries aimed at exports’ (Biddle and Milor 1995: 57-8). Also, that large industrialists had easy access to export and monopoly rents also explains the fact that export growth throughout the 1980s was achieved largely based on increased utilization of existing capacity, rather than new investment (Senses 1994: 64; Waldner 1999: 220).

Still, the private sector’s unwillingness to invest would not have caused a major problem, had export markets and subsidies continued to expand and the social costs of economic liberalization been contained. Yet, the late 1980s signaled the end of Turkey’s ‘export miracle’ and the reemergence of old social forces in new political parties. As the Iran-Iraq War came to an end and oil prices dropped after 1986, export earnings began to decrease (Ilkin 1991: 95). This, in turn, increased the cost of export subsidies and foreign debt due to continued real depreciation of the lira (Boratav et al. 2000: 8). Combined with meager private manufacturing investment, public expenditure and inflation came under serious pressure from 1986 onwards. Furthermore, mass protests erupted against the suppression of real wages and agricultural subsidies, which in turn reinforced the hands of pre-coup political leaders who were allowed to return to electoral politics in 1987 (Ozel 2003: 106). In this context, Ozal had no choice, but to reinitiate the cycle of electoral populism, which would

171 In the period 1980–88, the real value of exports grew 19 per cent annually, which then declined 5 per cent between 1989 and 1993 (Boratav et al. 2000: 30). This seemingly impressive export growth has to be qualified in two respects, which also shows the shaky foundations of Turkish export performance. First, ‘the extent of state intervention through export incentive schemes was so large that it probably led to much time and effort devoted to obtaining export incentives’ (Senses 1994: 58). According to one estimate, for example, ‘the subsidy effect of government incentives equalled roughly 55 per cent of the value of exports’ (Atasoy 2005: 149, also see Yeldan 1994: 82). Second, given the generosity of government support, overstating export earnings to take advantage of the export rebate schemes was a commonplace practice. The so-called fictitious exports are estimated to have reached to almost 13 per cent of total exports to OECD countries during 1981-5 (Senses 1994: 58).

172 Inflation decreased from 108 per cent in 1980 to 28 per cent in 1983, and then increased back to 75 per cent in 1988 (Waldner 1999: 220-1). The national debt between 1980 and 1990 increased from $13.5 billion to $40 billion, while yearly repayment reached to 7 billion, which was approximately 60 percent of export earnings (Taspınar 2005: 142ff).
lead to important wage and subsidy increases until 1994. Thus, towards the end of the 1980s the strategy of ‘restraining incomes of popular classes to encourage capital accumulation and gaining international competitiveness, was increasingly becoming inoperative’ (Turel 1996: 167). The most typical response by the business elite to declining export earnings, increasing wages and inflation was to markup their prices, begin an investment strike and shed labor, which exacerbated the ongoing political and economic crisis. At this juncture the state liberalized the capital account in 1989 to finance its deficits, which would in fact provide big business with a golden opportunity for turning potential losses into profits (Boratav et al. 2000: 6-7).

After the opening of the capital account in 1989, the holding banks became the central benefactors of state borrowing practices. Lured by high interest rates, these banks, almost all of which were parts of holding companies with industrial bases, made profits by purchasing government securities and exploiting the difference between the exchange rate and the interest rate. That is, they first obtained funds on international markets as credit denominated in dollars, converted this into Turkish lira, and then lent to the government at high interest rates. It does not require great foresight to predict that an increasingly high proportion of profits were obtained in the financial activities associated with the holding of government securities (Oguz 2008: 110-2). 173 With holding companies enjoying oligopolistic markets and financial rents, there was eventually only little need for reinvestment, which is an indicator of the degree of stagnation of investment levels throughout the 1990s. 174 Furthermore, the

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173 Private commercial banks’ annual interest income from securities steadily increased from under half a billion in 1987 to over US$9 billion by 1999. On average, this income was about twice as big as the net profits of these banks throughout the 1990s, putting into perspective their structural dependence on and vested interest in Turkey’s perpetual fiscal crisis (Guven 2009: 238-9).

174 While real gross domestic product grew only by 3.4 per cent per annum between 1990 and 2000, the annual real rate of growth of banking sector assets exceeded 13 per cent. This enormous divergence between the performance of the real economy and the financial sector was clearly a result of the short-term foreign capital inflows that were made possible by very high rates of interest offered by the state: 100 per cent in January 1996;
privatization of state economic enterprises took place only very slowly until the 2000s, in part due to the unwillingness of large businesses’ to buy into the privatization process, and their opposition to the sale of SEEls to foreign competitors (Onis 1991: 171, 173).  

The point is that throughout the 1980s and 1990s the social reproduction of the big bourgeoisie remained by and large dependent on the state’s systematic transfer of monopoly and financial rents. This created a vicious rent-debt cycle, which ultimately prevented the completion of the capitalist restructuring process begun in 1980. As the state’s attempt at strategically leading capitalist development degenerated into the mere distribution of tax revenues, the restructuring of productive capacity of the economy via the deepening of capitalist social relations was undermined. This is not to argue that large industrialists did not change at all; indeed, thanks to their vast financial resources they were able to adapt to and benefit from policies promoting export-led growth in the 1980 and 1990s (e.g. Onis and Turem 2002: 444). Yet, given their ability to extract financial rents, and that these rents were higher than their productive sector earnings176, furthering structural reforms was simply detrimental to their own interests. Had it been otherwise it would have been hard to explain the persistence of this rent-debt cycle despite the progressive deterioration of the economic situation throughout the 1990s.

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60 per cent in December 1998; 80 per cent in March 2000, see Cizre and Yeldan 2005: 391-395; Alper and Onis 2005. This brought in its train catastrophic consequences for public finance. The ratio of interest payments to tax revenues rose from 28 per cent in 1992 to 77 per cent in 2000, while the public sector’s real disposable income declined by 39 per cent through the 1990s (Boratav and Yeldan 2006:424).

175 While annual privatization income amounted to 380 million dollars between 1980 and 2003, after 2003 it would reach 6 billion dollars annually. Also, privatization entered the constitution only in 1999, countering for the first time the explicit constitutional references to ‘nationalization’ and ‘use for public good’ (Guran 2011: 23, 38).

176 ‘Between 1985 and 1988, non-activity income of the largest 468 industrial firms constituted 24.5 percent of their profits on average; yet from 1989 to 1999, the share of non-activity income in profits, the bulk of which came from government papers, was a remarkable 64 percent’ quoted from Yeldan 2001 in Guven 2009: 216, also see Guven 2009: 245; Aydin 2005: 118.
When the 1994 crisis is considered, whatever the triggering factor was (premature capital account liberalization, unregulated capital outflows, economic mismanagement etc.), the crisis was rooted in the structural incapacity of productive social forces in enduring the rapidly accumulating debt burden (Oguz 2008: 117). After the crisis in 1994, the government imposed a number of policies including a major devaluation, reductions in real wages, and (temporary) reductions in agricultural subsidies and public spending, in an attempt to reinstall the dynamics of the high export-led growth of the early 1980s. Although the stabilization plan was supported by most social groups (Ozdemir 2013: 56) and solved the balance of payments problem for a while, it fell short in transforming the production and investment patterns of holding companies (Boratav and Yeldan 2001: 5). The efforts to build an export-oriented coalition were seriously curtailed when the holding companies, as the leading faction within the power bloc, were able to condition the responses to prescriptions provided by domestic and international policy makers. Consequently, profitability was restored after the crisis, but without corresponding improvements in international competitiveness and the state’s capacity for affecting the strategic allocation of investment decisions. Throughout the 1990s political attempts to restructure capital failed; ultimately, ‘despite intense interpenetration between finance and industrial capital...financial deepening [and internationalization] did not benefit the real sector’ (Guven 2009: 245).

In spite of their rhetorical support for structural reforms throughout the 1990s, big business thus prevented the transfer of public resources from finance to internationally competitive manufacturing sectors. This would continue until the late 1990s, when a new structured opportunity space emerged, forcing and encouraging the big industrialists to comply with attempts to restructure the economy along more productive lines. On the one hand, a perceived threat to the regime posed by a contending alliance made up of the Islamic
bourgeoisie and the urban poor, and on the other, by the prospect of increased returns via foreign support for new investments seem to have finally made some way in convincing the large industrialists to concede to surgery for the existing system of accumulation.

Mirroring the economic problems of the 1990s was the extreme polarization of political life. Having failed to remedy inflation and sufficiently support small and medium-sized industries, the Motherland Party’s former electoral base rapidly eroded in the 1990s. The cleavages between the large industrialists and the Islamic bourgeoisie, who had temporarily united under MP rule during the 1980s, began to deepen (Taspinar 2005: 144). Especially after Turgut Ozal became the president of Turkey in 1989 (thereby having to keep out of party politics), the party lost most of its appeal among its conservative constituency (Ahmad 1993: 198). The pre-coup leaders had also returned to active politics by the 1991 elections, which led to the reemergence of the old political fault lines. The center-right and center-left were both fragmented among two major parties, which rendered very difficult the formation of a broad based coalition to fix the ailing economy. From 1991 to 1999, nine coalition governments were formed; and indeed the intensity of electoral competition forced the centrist parties of both right and left to engage in a form of ‘double redistribution’ (Guven 2009). While trying to appease the big bourgeoisie through financial rents, they also strived to win rural votes, (still one of the most important segments of electoral politics) by resorting to agricultural populism, especially from 1994 onwards. ‘Rather than neutralize losers by bringing together potential winners under a pro-reform coalition’, double redistribution thus ‘rallied traditional and new style rent seekers behind an odd political alliance dedicated to forestalling reform and the reinforcement of the emergent institutional status quo’ (ibid: 258). Financial and rural transfers enabled volatile coalition governments to survive, yet at the same time ‘exacerbated the fiscal dependence on commercial banks’ and ‘insulated agriculture from world markets.
via an expensive currency’ (ibid: 248, 254). Given that economic reproduction was immediately related to intense political competition, corruption also took devastating forms, further adding to the never ending economic and political crisis of the 1990s (Guven 2009: 193-4; Gulalp 2001: 438).

The urban poor and SMEs were excluded from the channels of double redistribution. Worker activism, which tended to resuscitate at the end of the 1980s, petered out through the second half of the 1990s. The growing inability of both private and public sectors to tolerate wage increases, as well as the repression of the radical left, the informalization of labor markets and imposition of a Turkish-Islamic synthesis in education, rendered labor-based populism politically futile. The urban poor, who used to be the support base of leftist currents in the 1970s, were increasingly impoverished and marginalized, and left with no hope of social mobility and the political representation of their interests. In addition, the expansion of the informal sector paralleled the rise of SMEs ‘both in the metropolitan and Anatolian heartlands, in which wage levels were (and still are) much lower’ (Guven 2009: 192). Thus the SMEs, most of which were ventures associated with so-called Islamic capital, gained access to a larger pool of cheap labor, which helped them improve their ability to ‘establish themselves as significant exporters of manufactures’ despite the fact that they had ‘received little or no subsidy from the state’ (Onis 1997: 759).

Unsurprisingly, the business association representing the interests of Islamic capital, MUSIAD, opposed the ‘uncompetitive environment created by state support of TUSIAD and big business in general’ (Yavuz 1997: 72), while advocating for the free accumulation of profit ‘as long as profit comes from productive activities’ (Hosgor 2011: 349). In their opposition to TUSIAD, they appealed to and sought to discipline the urban poor with a new
understanding of ‘justice’ congruent with the competitive and productive relations of a ‘moral’ capitalism. In this conception, the key to peace and prosperity is the Islamic regulation of the market place, which prevents injustices stemming from industrial monopolies, financial speculation and radical unionism, while promoting productive industrial relations, innovation and hence economic growth for everyone. Workers should avoid conflict and confrontation at the workplace, and instead, should ‘share the risk and responsibility with the employers in quantity and quality of the products produced’. Justice, in this sense, is strongly tied to the attainment of ‘harmony and productivity’, hence the abolishing of all institutions and practices that cause ‘hoarding’, corruption and ‘laziness’. If profit is used productively and not solely for individual consumption, wealth does not cause ‘oppression’ nor do the wealthy constitute a ‘class’. Indeed, there is ‘capital’ in this new order, but there are no capitalists (ibid: 349-50).

Clearly, MUSIAD echoed the ‘National View’ of the 1970s; and it is not by accident that MUSIAD’s call for justice strongly resonated with the National View of the 1990s, which was revamped in Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party (WP). The WP was both a product and a foe of the new Kemalist order established in 1980. While it grew in the space espoused by the Kemalist political and economic elite, it also charged the Kemalist establishment with moral degeneration, which was considered to be the root cause of rentier interests and anarchist currents. According to Erbakan, what needed to be done was to establish a ‘Just Order’, an order underlined by distinct social and moral patterns conducive to productivity and ‘justice’ in the economy. Interest, money printing, the present financial system and monopolies all cause poverty and social injustice (Erbakan 1991: 22-27). In the ‘Just Order’, by contrast, the state prevents monopolization by ensuring that every entrepreneur benefits from state services, while private enterprise is a right available to everyone. The ‘Just Order’ thus
implies a transition from a ‘monopolist’ to a ‘truly pro-private enterprise’ order in which the state plays a tremendous role in assuring productivity and competitiveness. Precisely for this reason, according to Erbakan, ‘Turkey’s entry into the Customs Union without being a member of the European Union, the decision-making body of the trading bloc’ would inevitably lead to the dissolution of productive sectors and the strengthening of a corrupted capitalism in Turkey. Entering the Customs Union without being part of the political union would ‘amount to accepting to live in the servants’ quarters next to the doghouse in the garden of a manor’ (quoted in Cook 2007: 106-7). Instead, stronger economic relations must be forged with the relatively more penetrable markets such as the Middle East, post-Soviet Central Asia and the dynamic economies of Southeast Asia with predominantly Muslim populations, such as Malaysia and Indonesia (Onis 1997: 754).

The Just Order is founded upon a new political structure and new morality. The former pertains to a state that promotes production, investment and competitiveness, maintains a balanced budget, establishes a progressive taxation system, stabilizes the currency by increasing the autonomy of the central bank and implements privatization more effectively. All this, in turn, is conditioned on the cultivation of a national moral consciousness distinct from Western politico-cultural influences. The Just Order rejects westernization as a prerequisite for economic development, seeing that imitating Western models for almost two centuries brought Turkey nothing but exploitation and anarchy. In this respect, transforming secularism is vital to the restructuring of both the state and economy. Production mobilization is possible only if a spiritual transformation can be achieved and the old religious community (umma), uncorrupted by Western influences, can be recovered. The umma replaces Western imposed rights and duties in society with religiously sanctioned yet voluntarily implemented networks of trust and solidarity. This new sociality and morality not only ensures free
competition, productivity and loyalty, but also provides a space wherein Western imposed social differences such as ‘nation’ and ‘race’ are transcended. Transforming secularism therefore is not about asserting a new interpretation of ‘religion’ only, but reconstructing the regime of property and ethnicity based on socio-intellectual resources untroubled by those of Kemalism.

The WP mobilized the urban poor (most of whom were Kurds) and the Islamic bourgeoisie around its ‘Just Order’ program, ultimately succeeding from a mere 7.2 percent of the national vote in 1987 to become the first party with 21.3 percent in 1995.\textsuperscript{177} In a context where winning votes through union-based working class populism was no longer feasible, and redistributive policies were associated with inflation and unemployment, the left was increasingly crippled in delivering anything substantial to the urban poor whose numbers grew tremendously since the 1980s. By contrast, the WP offered a way out of the existing system by invoking a world wherein the secular privileges that sustain the Kemalist politico-economy are destroyed. The popular appeal of replacing the ‘unjust’ and ‘materialist’ system with Islamic equity and brotherhood augmented the WP’s organizational capabilities linked to its close relations with Islamic brotherhoods (Yavuz 1997: 67). As such, the WP was not simply reproducing ‘social democracy’ with an Islamic face as often argued (e.g. Onis 1997), but in its quest for power against the Kemalist political and economic elite, the WP derived from Islam the structure of a fully capitalist society, i.e. one which recognizes no secular privilege for property. Overcoming injustice and poverty was thus intrinsically linked to the deepening of capitalist social relations.

\textsuperscript{177} The population of big cities had rapidly increased in the two decades following the military coup. The rural population decreased from 55 per cent of total population in 1980 to 40 per cent in 1990 and to 35 in 2000. Likewise, Istanbul’s population increased from about 5 million in 1988 to 10-12 million in 1997.
Naturally, the WP’s rise to power in 1995 as the major partner in a coalition government deeply disturbed the Kemalist political and economic elite. The perception of the threat was framed either as the danger of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ or as the looming possibility of a serious ‘social explosion’ caused by adverse socioeconomic circumstances (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan 2000: 482). The military intervened once again on February 28, 1997 with a ‘soft coup’. They did not suspend the constitution or dissolve the parliament; instead, they issued a number of policy ‘recommendations’ to the WP-led government aimed at preventing the rise of Islamic ‘reactionaries’ within the state and economy. This left Erbakan with no room, leading to his resignation and the replacement of his coalition government with a new coalition led by Mesut Yılmaz, the leader of the Motherland Party. February 28 brought about the closure of middle-level Imam Hatip Schools through the extension of obligatory public schooling from five to eight years, closer inspection of religious orders, strict observation of secular dress codes in ‘public spaces’ and supervision of government recruitment practices. The Constitutional Court shut down the WP in January 1998, while Erbakan was banned from politics for five years. Although the remaining WP members of parliament formed the Virtue Party, the military made sure that the VP would be excluded from future governments. On the economic front, the assets of some Islamic holding companies were frozen, while many Islamic firms were excluded from state contracts and their financial operations put under greater scrutiny. Islamic reactionism (irtica) was now considered by the National Security Council as the most important ‘internal’ threat to the Republic, alongside the ‘external’ threat of Kurdish separatism (Taspinar 2005: 156-7). TÜSİAD was either indifferent to or supportive of the February 28 process, an indicator of their perception of the threat from Islamic capital and their prioritization of ‘secularism’ over ‘democracy’ (Ozel 2012: 22-3).
Secularism, however, could not be protected through political and juridical means only. Indeed, following the ‘soft coup’, ‘a new sense of alarm and urgency’ prevailed among the Turkish political elite ‘about the need for discipline in the government’s fiscal management’. For, the existence and sustainability of the regime in the face of Islamic resurgence depended, above all, on the state’s capability to restrain inflation and alleviate economic problems (Cizre-Sakallioglu and Yeldan 2000: 481-2). As argued above, until the late 1990s, the interests of industrialists, bankers and politicians, despite minor disagreements, all converged on the persistence of the existing fiscal and financial regime (Guven 2009: 216-7). There were attempts at structural reform, but to no avail. Despite making suggestions for closer supervision and the reorganization of the banking sector, ‘the directors of the larger banks simply remained indifferent to the numerous bureaucratic initiatives of the late 1990s that sought precisely such improvements’ while allowing ‘profit-aggressive smaller banks [to] fight...against the introduction of new rules as well as the full observation of existing ones’ (ibid: 206). Approaching the 2000s, the situation was no longer sustainable. Inflation and corruption scandals were posing severe systemic challenges to the Republican regime as a whole, thus fixing these problems began to be considered by the secularist establishment as a matter of ‘virtually life and death’ (Cizre-Sakallioglu and Yeldan 2000: 504). Unlike the 1994 crisis, the state’s (potential) inability to make repayments was no longer a matter of a temporary illiquidity of funds, but a matter of survival in the face of a powerful contender with mass support. Therefore, even before the wave of the global crisis, which had begun in Asia (1997) and Russia (1998), reached Turkey in 2000-1, the technocratic space for reform was widened perhaps as never before due to these pressures from ‘below’.

Consequently, in December 1999, for the first time in its postwar history Turkey accepted a reform program in the absence of an explicit crisis (Oguz 2008: 117; Aydin 2005: 119).
Under close supervision by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Turkish government pledged to target hemorrhaging public expenditures in order to reduce inflation to single digits by the end of 2002, which would ultimately require a radical restructuring of the banking sector and thus the reorganization of holding companies (Aydin 2005: 120). Large industrial/financial conglomerates, organized in TUSIAD, seem to have supported the reform process wholeheartedly, as evidenced by numerous reports and press releases from the late 1990s onwards (Oguz 2008: 119). In addition to the Islamic challenge, two external factors contributed to large businesses yielding to structural reform. First, the support coming from the IFIs was conditional on the realization of comprehensive regulatory and institutional reforms, instead of the mere implementation of a set of macroeconomic policies (associated with the so-called Washington Consensus) as was the case in the 1980s (Guven 2009: 266). Second, Turkey had joined a customs union with the European Union in 1995 (despite much initial resistance by most TUSIAD members), and the EU had recognized Turkey’s candidate status in 1999, thus the prospect of foreign (export-oriented) investment must have increased. All combined, the costs of not reforming seem to have begun to outweigh the costs of reform towards the end of the 1990s. And yet, agreeing to reform was one thing, while giving it sustained support was quite another. As I have shown above, throughout the 1990s (and before), the majority of large holding companies, despite their repeated rhetorical espousals, were either not willing or able to support, or simply prevented the realization of structural reform attempts. Could the 1999-2000 reform program change this?

Like previous reform attempts, the measures implemented between December 1999 and November 2000 were followed by increased foreign capital inflows and the appreciation of the domestic currency. Despite relatively low interest rates, however, the increased liquidity in the internal market ‘did not lead to savings and investments in the productive sector as
Although there were ‘some holding companies [which] gradually started to restructure themselves in line with the state regulations’ (Oguz 2008: 119), bank regulation was by and large watered down due to resistance from private banking lobbies and politicians who ‘perceived private and public banks as an important source of financing for the fiscal deficit [and] building up and sustaining electoral support’ (Arpac and Bird 2009: 141). Consequently, the majority of holding companies, which were heavily involved in rentier activities in the financial sector, were ‘neither in a position to shift [their] funds to investments in the crisis-prone economy nor did [they] have any inclination to do so’ (Aydin 2005: 120). From 1999 to 2000 exports remained ‘practically unchanged’, while imports increased 37 percent, ‘more than doubling the trade deficit’ (Yeldan 2001: 6ff). As a result, in November 2000 and February 2001, two major crises erupted, which further shut down the industrial establishment. Capacity utilization decreased from 76.3 percent in October 2000 to 64 percent in June 2001, while 800 000 people lost their jobs in the first half of 2001 alone (Aydin 2005: 124). Meanwhile, however, financial profits were soaring. ‘In the first year of the crisis, interest payments from the Treasury for domestic debt reached to 52 percent of the total budgetary income’, while interest payments shot up to 22 percent of GDP, nine-tenths of it for internal debt (Aydin 2005: 124; Keyder 2004: 76). Needless to say, ‘[t]he bulk of the debt was held by a small group at the top of the concentration of wealth, who owned the high interest deposits in the banks’ (Keyder 2004: 76).

It is not fully clear whether it was the big bourgeoisie that jeopardized the reform, or the failure of reform that caused the big bourgeoisie to stick to the old patterns of accumulation. Regardless, they were the only winner of the crisis. In May 2001, the government launched a more comprehensive reform program supported by the IMF. The new program’s stated aim was to create ‘competitive industry by stopping the struggle for rent’ (Oguz 2008: 121-2).
Initially, the new plan seems to have taken off well. The economy began to show signs of recovery, while a record number of laws and regulations were passed, which granted independence to the Central Bank, restructured the banking system, sought to control public debt and transform agricultural support policy (Arpac and Bird 2009: 142). Yet, however ambitious and comprehensive, there was no reason to presume that the new plan would necessarily succeed either. Indeed, the Motherland Party, the closest party to TUSIAD in the coalition government, was fairly critical of the growing autonomy of the technocrats in economic decision-making, which was a part of the reform program supported by the leading coalition partner, the Democratic Left Party (DSP) (Ozdemir 2013: 56-7). Furthermore, new bank regulations continued to be a source of discontent and cleavage within TUSIAD’s board of directors (Guven 2009: 284-5). Equally important, the other coalition partner, the Nationalist Action Party, whose electoral success was strongly tied to the continuity of rural transfer payments and the upkeep of a nationalist agenda, opposed the transformation of agricultural subsidies and privatization of ‘strategic’ state enterprises. In fact, the reform program was already ailing in the summer of 2002. Kemal Derviş, a World Bank economist who was appointed as the Minister of Economy during the 2001 crisis, resigned from the government in August, ‘sensing increasing strains within the coalition government’ (Arpac and Bird 2009: 143). ‘Even ministers from the leading party DSP were fleeing by July 2002 and early elections were called for November 2002’ (Ozdemir 2013: 57).

Based on this picture, there is no question that the February 2001 crisis largely diminished the ability of different classes to slow down the pace of structural reforms. Nevertheless, it would be mere speculation to argue that the majority of big businesses would continue to give sustained support to the reform process. There were signs of reform fatigue already in the summer of 2002, and we cannot tell whether the big bourgeoisie would have retained its
reformist stance had a government in their favor been elected in November. In any event, the
elections completely crushed the political parties of the 1990s, pushing big business to the
margins of future power arrangements. While none of the center-right parties managed to
enter parliament and the RPP garnered a meager 19 percent of the votes, Islamists with a
brand new party (Justice and Development Party), established only 19 months before the
elections and with a brand new leader (Recep Tayyip Erdogan), secured 34 percent of the
votes and 66 percent of the seats in parliament. Islamists, forced out of the government in
1997, thus reseized it in 2002. In the decade to follow, Islamists would breath new life into
capitalism, as they eliminated the last remnants of Kemalist secularism.

Consolidation of Capitalist Modernity: From Republic to Commonwealth

*Turkey should be administered like an incorporated company. If not, there are shackles tied
to your ankles and you cannot walk further.*

*Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President, 2015*

The Justice and Development Party (JDP) signals the rise of a new capitalist class. In this
regard, the bourgeois paradigm, i.e. the emergence of a new bourgeois class whose social
reproduction is conditioned on the deepening of capitalism, holds true for the period
especially after 2002. A new bourgeois class, previously excluded from the official credit
channels and political privileges enjoyed by the old bourgeois class, has emerged with a
politically/religiously distinct project of capitalist transformation. Its previous exclusion from
state-generated rents forced it to envision (at least initially) a society in which economic
competitiveness, underlined by a specific politico-religious subjectivity, would be the ultimate
basis for the allocation of resources. Once the 2001 crisis subsided, what replaced technocrats,
therefore, was not a fragmented political structure susceptible to reproducing the ‘double
redistribution’ of the 1990s, but a single party government with organic links to a new
capitalist bourgeois class.
The new bourgeois class became the unconditional supporter of structural reforms initiated in December 1999, thereby helping to consolidate the reform process and ensure its irreversibility. In turn, the JDP provided various incentives to the Islamic bourgeoisie, reversing their unfavorable treatment in public contracts and privatization bids, thereby leading to their further enrichment and internationalization. With the JDP and Islamic bourgeoisie converging on an anti-monopolist agenda, the big bourgeoisie was to make strategic compromises to the Islamic bourgeoisie concerning the political and institutional structure of the economy (Hosgor 2011: 355). Forced by the new configuration of political power, and encouraged by prospects for economic expansion under a single party government and European Union membership, the big bourgeoisie seem to have ceded its resistance to reform.

On the whole, such a sociopolitical restructuring signaled the reorganization of holding companies in such a way as to promote ‘productive capital-based accumulation’ through increasing competitiveness in the international market (Oguz 2008: 118). What was underway, in other words, was a departure from the previous pattern of accumulation based on the redistribution of profits through the state towards a mode of accumulation based on production through increasing international competitiveness and labor productivity. The consolidation of a series of reforms and institutions introduced after the 2001 crisis further reinforced the tendency towards subjecting the private sector to the rules of competition in an

178 Akin et al. (2009) note that in the post-crisis period, declining inflation rates, fiscal prudence and the EU’s insistence on compliance with BASEL II requirements forced Turkish banks to assume their intermediation role, transferring the weight in their portfolios from government securities to loans.

179 Consequently, average yearly growth in labor productivity between 2002 and 2010 was 5 per cent, while it was slightly over 1 per cent between 1990 and 2001, see http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=LEVEL. Total exports increased from $23.2 billions in 1996 to $73.4 billions in 2005, and 157.6 billion in 2014, see Oguz 2008: 127 and www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/investmentguide/investorsguide/Pages/InternationalTrade.aspx.
increasingly internationalizing market.\textsuperscript{180} Relatedly, the period under JDP rule witnessed the implementation of measures designed to shield economic decision-making from popular measures, for example the centralization of decision-making power in the executive branch of the state and the creation of ‘independent’ economic institutions such as the Central Bank, the Competition Board and the Privatization Administration.

In short, at the end of a process partly imposed on them, and partly realized by them, the bourgeoisie in Turkey, as a whole, has finally transformed into a fully capitalist class. This is neither to underestimate organic linkages between the JDP and business interests, nor to argue for the existence of a market characterized by ‘perfect competition’ without corruption. Indeed, without corruption and close linkages to certain business groups, the JDP would be hardly able to exercise control over the media and state. Likewise, certain business groups would perhaps not be able to endure world market competition without their favorable treatment in the domestic market (especially through state procurement practices). Yet, the ongoing nepotism should not obscure the qualitative changes the Turkish economy has gone through since 2002. After all, corruption is a serious problem too even in some of the most advanced capitalist countries, such as Italy and South Korea.\textsuperscript{181} Rather than comparing markets according to some abstract corruption criterion, therefore, we have to ask what keeps corruption from overwhelming some markets, whereas it renders utterly dysfunctional some others (cf. Evans 1989). More specifically, once we begin to question what has prevented the state-business relations in Turkey in the 2000s from taking an economically devastating form as they did in the 1990s, we have to go back to the structural transformation the state-business

\textsuperscript{180} My intention here is not to exaggerate the performance of the Turkish economy in the post-2001 period. And the growing current account deficit, continuing reliance on shrinking European and Middle Eastern markets for exports, increasing depletion of global liquidity would not permit optimistic assessments of the Turkish economy at all. However, quantitative challenges facing Turkish economy today must not obscure the qualitative changes it has undergone in the last 15 years, which is my main focus in this dissertation.

\textsuperscript{181} Italy is much worse than and South Korea is almost as equally bad as Turkey, according to the 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index.
relations have gone through since 2002. Emerging is a historically specific political economy, which, despite the extensive use of political power for personal economic advantage, is premised on the ability of public and private powers to achieve material reproduction through the world market and on the capacity to reproduce the fiction of self-regulating markets.

Unsurprisingly, the transformation of state-business relations has been accompanied by corresponding changes in the countryside. Since the 2000s Turkey has witnessed an immensely rapid period of dissolution of petty commodity production driven by neoliberal market reforms. The state ceased to provide support for buying at floor prices, input subsidies and subsidized credits to agricultural producers. It largely withdrew its support from the production of widely cultivated crops such as sugar and tobacco. Instead of buying agricultural products at politically constituted prices, the state provides only temporary income support to peasants, expecting them to produce goods highly demanded in the world market at competitive rates (Aydin 2005: 158-159). In addition to the erosion in the amount of state support,¹⁸² income support now took on a temporary character that increasingly exposed peasants to the imperatives of market competition, thereby precipitating the divorce of peasants from land. As a result, the share of employment in the agrarian sector decreased from 39 percent to 24 percent in the last ten years. Small farmers have exhausted their traditional survival strategies in the face of neoliberal policies since the 2000s and the dissolution of small family farms, which came to constitute the backbone of Turkish rural society, is almost complete (Aydin 2010: 152).

¹⁸² State support for agriculture decreased from 3.2 per cent of GDP in 1999 to 0.45 per cent in 2009, see Gunaydin 2009:183.
Together with the elimination of the political forms of state support, two key institutional and legal changes put in place since 2000 are worth special emphasis. The first one is the law concerning the Unions of Agricultural Sales Cooperatives (UASCs), which provides the legal basis for the privatization of factories and production units belonging to farmers’ organizations. With state support withdrawn and such income-generating institutions privatized, the ability of farmers’ organizations to extend credit, provide facilities and organize their members is substantially diminished. Given the increasing inability of small farmers to organize against neoliberal policies, the Agrarian and Seeds Laws passed in April and October 2006 respectively have further contributed to the commodification of land and labor in the Turkish countryside. Upholding intellectual property rights in agricultural crops and seeds, these two complementary laws have not only deprived small farmers of the traditional seed varieties used for centuries, but also precipitated the dissolution of petty commodity production without farmers losing access to their own land. That is, in the midst of the insecurities created by the impact of liberalization policies, the petty commodity producers turned into ‘contract farmers’, increasingly producing crops demanded by agro-industrial corporations in exchange for information, credits, seeds and other inputs. This ‘contract farming’ has put agribusiness firms in a position to determine the conditions of production and impose the type, quality and quantity of production over the remaining segments of the rural population. All combined, the political support given to small farmers since the 1950s has rapidly faded away, with the consequence that even the remaining farmers have completely lost their autonomy, becoming totally subjected to the imperatives of capital accumulation (Aydin 2010; Keyder and Yenal 2011). With large portions of small farmers dispossessed, the remainder subordinated to full market discipline on their own land, and new
reforms in the pipeline[183], capitalism has permeated the Turkish countryside more than ever before.

The ‘social’ aspect of the Republic has also been significantly altered under the JDP rule. New forms of flexible exploitation such as part-time and temporary work, and subcontracting have been legalized from 2003 onwards to formalize the massive informal sector. Meanwhile, welfare policies, previously considered a public obligation, have been subcontracted to private actors and replaced by ‘means-tested social assistance measures that are commonly regarded as incompatible with social citizenship rights, which ought to entail universal benefits to all citizens regardless of their financial condition’ (Bozkurt 2013: 391). Also, some of the responsibility in this new mode of social provisioning has been delegated to Islamic-oriented charity groups. Indeed, these government-charity partnerships have been relatively successful in reaching those who were previously excluded from formalized channels of public welfare, which is one of the key variables used to explain the JDP’s series of electoral successes from 2002 to the present. Yet, it should be borne in mind that this success is just the other side of the qualitative redefinition of citizenship ‘rights’ under JDP rule, i.e. the increasing ‘exclusion of social security from the rights of citizens’ and the remodeling of political space to suit the marketplace (Cosar and Yegenoglu 2009).

[183] Significant steps have been taken in recent years to consolidate land and prevent its fragmentation through inheritance. According to the Turkish Union of Agricultural Chambers ‘there are roughly 3.1 million agricultural enterprises in Turkey cultivating 30 million parcels of land; the average amount land owned by an agricultural enterprise is 5.9 hectares divided into 10 parcels; the agricultural lands are small, partitioned and dispersed’. However, with recent legislation introduced in April 2014 the state ‘is now be able to expropriate fields that are smaller than a minimum agricultural land unit’. ‘The total land that needs to be consolidated in Turkey is 14 million hectares. So far, 4 million hectares has been combined and by 2023, the Ministry of Agriculture plans to finish the land consolidation. If the government succeeds in combining the plots of land, production costs in the agriculture sector are expected to be reduced dramatically and Turkey’s agricultural exports could increase from $40 billion to $100-150 billion by 2023’. See ‘TZOB president: More progress needed to fulfill agricultural potential’ Today’s Zaman, 19 May 2014.
The result is the consolidation of capitalist property relations for the first time in Turkish history. In this context, as argued earlier, a society which the bourgeoisie can manage through ‘economic’ compulsion emerges as a possibility, though not as a necessity. Indeed, the very trajectory of the JDP rule since 2002 has confirmed how quickly the prospect of capitalist democracy can vanish, to be replaced by capitalist authoritarianism. The 2000s have witnessed perhaps the most revolutionary political and cultural changes ever made in the history of the Turkish Republic. The dominance of the Kemalist bureaucracy in key state institutions has been eliminated, as have the economic privileges enjoyed by OYAK.

Most military spending has been made subject to review by civil auditors. Constitutional amendments have been passed to increase parliamentary control over the system of appointments to the high courts. The decisions taken by the Supreme Military Council, the body with authority over promotions and dismissals in the army, have been opened to judicial and parliamentary review, which had not been possible previously. Likewise, the National Security Council’s ‘monitoring’ function has been significantly curtailed through the appointment of a civilian secretary-general and an increased number of non-military members in the Council. The retirement age has been lowered in some key positions within the security, higher education and scientific establishments in order to replace old cadres with JDP-minded bureaucrats (Cizre 2011; Polat 2013).

Following the thorough subordination of civil-military relations to capitalist discipline, the main parameters of Kemalist modernity have also been opened to public debate. Kemalist

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184 The military-civil bureaucracy did not go without a fight, though. The first serious clash took place in 2007 when the JDP nominated a party member for president. Military attempted to block the presidential election by threatening the government with a coup in April 2007. The JDP defied the pressure by calling early general elections. Elections were held in July; as a result the JDP won 47 per cent of the votes, more than twice the votes of its closest contender. Having won the elections and had its candidate elected president, in 2008 the JDP faced anti-securalism charges and the threat of closure by the Constitutional Court. The JDP not only successfully undermined this threat, but also launched a counteroffensive through anti-coup trials and by increasing its control over the military and judiciary.

secularism has been largely overhauled, as the JDP cadres and Islamic intellectuals have reinterpreted secularism away from the French-inspired Kemalist laïcité towards the Anglo-Saxon model (Turkmen 2009: 394ff), where secularism is understood not as ‘freedom from religion’, but ‘freedom of religion’ (Kaya 2015: 55). Headscarf bans in universities and the civil service have been lifted. The discrimination against Imam Hatip students in the university entrance exam, effective since 1997, has been brought to an end. Additional religion-based courses have been added to secular public school curriculums (Kaya 2015: 57) and the theory of evolution has been almost completely removed even from science and biology textbooks (Sayers and Ozcan 2013). Also, plans have been floated to convert most secular high schools into Imam Hatis, introduce compulsory religious education in primary schools, and extend Imam Hatip schools to the middle school level. In this sense, Islam, reason and science have been brought together to nurture a new subjectivity away from the materialism and positivism of the early Kemalist project.

The initial outcome of such a restructuring of state-society relations was a form of Islamic multiculturalism, inspired by a romanticized Ottoman imperial pluralism and encouraged by the accession process to the European Union. Islamic values and old imperial forms of rule were reformulated to prepare the ground for a form of liberalism, which sought to promote new forms of political community, subjectivity and space. This involved the creation of a new citizenship ethic largely derived from narratives based on the prophet Muhammad's life (the Sunna), especially with regard to his ‘tolerance’ for non-Muslims (Turkmen 2009) and the fact that he was a merchant. Meanwhile, Qur’anic verses were transformed into slogans that provide the moral basis for ‘economic competition’ and fairness of market outcomes (Yavuz 2003: 95). ‘Tolerance’, ‘fairness’ and ‘economic competition’ related to a community where the subjects internalize their rights and duties through an unofficial yet religiously-sanctioned
network of social responsibility and trust (Atasoy 2009), and were thereby no longer in need of political mediation. Entailed in this reorganization of sociality, thus, was the emergence of a religiously represented and politically-empowered individuality based on self-discipline and a distinctive ethos of conduct, totally unencumbered by the Kemalist organization of social reproduction. It was precisely this new ‘individuality’ that made realizable the long imagined, yet never materialized, rejuvenation of the old Ottoman mode of rule and political community. It is this ground on which a shift occurred, at least for a while, from the monolithically understood political space towards a new collective subjectivity based on the peaceful coexistence of different ethno-religious and cultural groups; indeed as some commentators like to call it, an Ottoman commonwealth.\textsuperscript{186} The JDP government, at least initially, adopted a relatively more tolerant approach to cultural freedoms, taking steps towards resolving the most recurrent problems in Turkish political life regarding the rights of ethnic and religious minorities (Akturk 2012: 193-4).

Obviously, this new approach to governing political-cultural difference is predicated on the reproduction of a historically specific political economy and subjectivity. Rights are tolerated only insofar as they do not disrupt the reproduction of this new mode of life, which is itself conditioned on successful competition in the global marketplace. Unlike Kemalism, therefore, this new mode of life is inherently expansionary. That is, while the ‘civilizing’ capacity of

\textsuperscript{186} The term was most explicitly used by Huseyin Celik, the minister of education, who called for the establishment of an Ottoman commonwealth under Turkish leadership: ‘Britain has its commonwealth. So do Russia, France, and Spain. So where is our commonwealth? [...] We are a nation that has created great states. We are not just another state on the earth’s surface. But unfortunately most of us are not even aware of Turkey’s mission. If the Middle East, Africa, and the Balkans are not our hinterland, then our claim to be a great state will remain just words’ (‘Bakan Celik, “commonwealth” istiyor’, Radikal 15 November 2007). The Ottoman commonwealth, thus, was not only a domestic project, but also an attempt at regional re-spatialization with serious implications on Turkey’s foreign policy orientation. That involved the emergence of a ‘trading state’, which sought to unburden itself from the costs of the most chronic issues in Turkey’s international affairs, by promoting economic and cultural integration in the old Ottoman geography while respecting the existing political boundaries (Kirisci 2009), a policy fashionably labeled as ‘Neo-Ottomanism’. For an historical overview, see Colak 2006. Given the social uprisings, civil wars and inter-imperialist rivalry that sweep across the Middle East today, Neo-Ottomanism can be seen as a still-born attempt.
Kemalism was limited by the extent of its ability to absorb non-assimilated masses into the state, the politico-cultural logic of this new mode of life, deduced from fully capitalist social relations, is inevitably bound to suffuse the entire social order. Modes of life, inspired by past and/or alternative experiences, can thus be tolerated only if they are totally subordinated to the politico-cultural logic of capitalism. Behaviors, thoughts and habits rooted elsewhere, say in the early Kemalist project, in the 1960 constitution or in the dream of a socialist Kurdistan, are thus structurally antithetical to the idea of Islamic multiculturalism. And, considering that capitalist social relations are being consolidated in such a globally competitive and geopolitically fragile context, perhaps there has been only little room for even a temporary toleration of these radically different forms of sociality.

Testimony to this are the thousands of political activists, journalists and academics who faced police violence and imprisonment in the last ten years, as well as the brutal repression of the Gezi Park Revolt in 2013, and the recent resumption of war between the Turkish army and the PKK after almost a three-year long ceasefire. The space temporarily opened for the realization of the Islamic-liberal dream is now shuttering. The capitalist project, which initially envisioned a transcultural and transnationally defined space of accumulation unbounded by the hitherto prevailing conceptions of nationhood and public space, is rapidly assimilating into authoritarian nationalism. Partly driven by the rapidly changing geopolitical context, (especially considering the emergence of PKK-affiliated PYD as an increasingly important and legitimate actor in the ongoing civil war in Syria) and partly due to the radicalizing opposition (armed and unarmed) inside, the JDP has had no problem with resorting to extremely authoritarian measures, limiting civil liberties and freedom of expression and invoking monolithic conceptions of the nation in ways reminiscent of Kemalism. This shows
us once more the inherent incompatibility of capitalism with democracy and human emancipation.  

Coming full circle, is all this only another stage of ‘modernity’ marked by the maturation of bourgeois classes? Is this just a shift from Kemalist modernity to Islamist modernity based on new markets, new technologies, new ideologies etc.? Was the Ottoman commonwealth just a natural culmination of the eruption of the Kemalist conceptions of political space and collectivity? Given its increasing authoritarianism, can Islamist modernity not be considered as another form of Kemalism? Or are we talking about two fundamentally distinct societal projects, Kemalist modernity and capitalist modernity, with transition from one to the other requiring nothing less than an epochal transformation? The origin of Kemalism had less to do with capitalism and much more to do with substituting capitalist forms of appropriation with novel conceptions of space and subjectivity. By contrast, the new Turkish commonwealth has less to do with modernity per se and much more to do with the universalization of capitalism, its social relations and its contradictions, and the subjection of all human existence and values to its commodifying logic. After almost a seven-decade-long complicated and complementary coexistence, Kemalism lost its ability to restructure capitalism. An historically distinct space of accumulation looms on the horizon, which not only marks a rupture in the socio-spatial organization of Turkish society, but also makes imaginable a political economy and subjectivity deeply embedded in capitalist social relations. As such, liberalism and fascism become real possibilities for the first time in Turkish history (given the recent unfolding of events the latter seems much more likely than the former). What is approaching is neither an ‘alternative modernity’ per se as some critics of Kemalism argued (e.g. Atasoy 2009), but

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187 For a discussion, see Wood 1995.
what is facing us today is a fully capitalist modernity underlined by the consolidation of capitalist social relations.
Conclusion

The breakthrough to modernity was a highly variegated process. Different socio-historical and geopolitical legacies gave rise to distinct forms of modernity across the world. Speaking of modernity in the plural, emphasizing connectivity and differences among multiple modernization projects, appears to be a fundamental correction to homogeneous, unilinear and Eurocentric conceptions of history. That said, however, ‘diversity’ and ‘interconnectedness’, by themselves, are by no means substitutes for sociological and international theory. Indeed, as I show above, several approaches in Sociology and IR, while emphasizing diversity and equality, tend to reproduce homogenous and hierarchical readings of world history. The challenge is then to construct a truly non-hierarchical historical narrative of multiple modernities without flattening socio-spatial differences. To achieve this, I suggest, we need to defy the methodological compartmentalization of social life, and subject already constituted spheres of modernity (such as ‘economics’ and ‘politics’) to critical scrutiny. Rather than reading back the logic of contemporary economics and politics, and study their inter-relations, we need to radically historicize the categories and assumptions considered central to ‘modernity’, problematizing the genesis of their differentiation from each other.

This dissertation is a humble attempt in that direction. By problematizing the conventional conceptions of capitalism, I rehistoricize ‘modernity’ and reinterpret the question of ‘alternative modernities’. Contrary to the conventional emphasis on ‘economic’ processes, I argue that capitalism is built through systematic political interventions into existing ways of life that ensure the commodification of the means of subsistence, especially of land and labor. In other words, market economies are not mere summations of preexistent commercial trends or a pre-given capitalist rationality (arguing so would mean presuming the existence of
capitalism from the very beginning), but are conscious politico-cultural constructs that systematically undercut the customary conditions of social reproduction, imposing successful commodity production as the ultimate basis for holding and expanding the means of subsistence. Clearly, defining capitalism as a politico-cultural construct requires distancing ourselves from the economistic derivations of Marxism, which reproduce, at least ‘in the last instance’, the base-superstructure model. Put differently, historicizing capitalism is possible only through a methodology that is able to demonstrate that the supposed elements of the superstructural level, in fact, ‘appear at every bloody level and [are] imbricated within the mode of production and productive relations themselves’ (Thompson 1995: 130). Law, moral codes, political institutions and forms of subjectivity are not ‘reflections’ of, but constitutive of and central to the social reproduction of life and its ‘material’ conditions (Wood 1995: 65; Thompson 1991a: 2). Indeed, ‘to seek to expunge these from the concept of property or production relations a priori, for the sake of theoretical coherence or elegance, would seem to be a gross artificiality which does considerable violence to the very facts Marx’s concepts are meant to help us understand: a species of what he himself castigated as “violent abstraction”’ (Sayer 1987: 33).

These methodological and theoretical insights have profound consequences for a new and non-hierarchical reading of multiple modernities. For one thing, once we depart from economistic and teleological conceptions of the transition to capitalism, we stop hierarchically categorizing the world according to the degree of development of entrepreneurial skills or technological inventiveness. Also, we recover the radically heterogeneous character of early modern development even within Western Europe itself. That is, we discover that there was no simple extension of largely similar market-making projects imitating British capitalism, despite the undeniable geopolitical pressures it generated on other societies for emulation.
Instead of a ‘European market civilization’, I argue that historically specific social and geopolitical struggles generated *qualitatively* different modernities both within and outside Europe. Both in the West and in the ‘East’, new modernization projects were attempted. While some modernization projects selectively injected capitalist principles into their own socio-historical milieu, others ‘substituted’ the capitalist modernity of Britain with non-capitalist (and non-socialist) forms of rule and appropriation.

Revolutionary and Napoleonic France was a case in point. The geopolitical challenges (directly or indirectly) posed by Britain were filtered through the new class structure that crystallized during and after the revolution. The French elite had to go beyond the logic of their own system of property relations in order to escape foreign invasion; a risky process in the course of which the elites themselves could be displaced by their own subjects. When geopolitical unevenness rendered problematic the external reproduction of political authority, which was unable to generate the human and fiscal resources needed for a strong military, the need to reconstitute the ‘inside’ became acute. In addition to the social turmoil caused by the Revolution itself, the threat of war, therefore, made it imperative to redefine the demarcations between the inside and the outside, the political and the economic, and the temporal and the divine. The result was the birth of a new political economy and subjectivity in France characterized by the emergence of two novel institutions, which were originally absent in the British path to modernity: the citizen-army and the public school.

The French elite, unable or unwilling to initiate an organized attack on peasants’ customary rights on land, linked the enjoyment of these rights to peasants’ service and socialization in the army and public school. While the state constitutionalized the peasantry’s right to land, equality and citizenship, it also conditioned these rights to the peasants’ protection of the
patrie and their disciplining through a centralized system of education. Through the citizen-army and public education, the Jacobin project instituted a set of new rules of social reproduction embedded in institutions, laws and cultural practices that reinforced the decommodified character of land and labor. Unlike in Britain, therefore, the state in France remained and expanded as the main, if not the direct, source of income and property. The implication in this context is that, wherein access to income and property was, at least in principle, universalized among politically equal citizens, the French elite had to continuously reinterpret the conditions of access to the state. New popular and disciplinary discourses of ‘nation’ and ‘religion’ were mobilized in order to increase the citizens’ contribution to the geo-political survival of the state, as well as restrain their access to it. As a result, nationalism and secularism in France, in a way unheard of in Britain, were used as principles governing property relations.

Overall, the citizen-army and public education, combined with a nationalist-secular ideology, were attempts at institutionalizing and containing the extra-market mechanisms of acquiring income and civic status. Furthermore, the geopolitical success of the Jacobin project (unstoppable until Waterloo) inspired other ancien regimes in and beyond Europe to selectively adopt, alone or alongside the capitalist project, the socio-institutional legacy of Jacobinism. Capitalism and Jacobinism thus posed distinctive alternatives; yet they were also interactive, and entailed forms of substitution as much as mechanisms of emulation. The outcomes they generated, in turn, became critical reference points for subsequent ‘modernizing’ projects (often as counterpoints as much as models).

It is with this new historical-comparative perspective that I reinterpret the Ottoman/Turkish road to modernity. In the course of the 19th century, as more states began to develop military
and fiscal capabilities fostered by Jacobinism and/or capitalism, it became imperative for the
Ottoman elite to ‘reform’ the state in ways that could not be simply tapped from the sphere of
possibilities present in the existing Ottoman socioeconomic order. The Ottomans had to go
beyond the mere importation of military techniques and equipment, and ‘modernize’ the state
and society based on principles structurally antithetical to the politico-cultural privileges and
obligations that came to constitute the Ottoman socioeconomic order.

In this context, my argument is that the Ottomans introduced capitalism and Jacobinism
concurrently. ‘Westernization’ was carried out through these two distinct and potentially
contradictory projects. From 1839 until the constitution of 1876 the state recognized the
property of all subjects as a sacred right, while at the same time identifying military service as
a sacred duty for everyone. ‘Liberty’ rooted in property ownership and ‘equality’ derived
from service to the state were thus simultaneously recognized. During the Tanzimat era
(1839-76), numerous rebellions broke out across the Empire, which were rooted (at least
partly) in the conflicting interpretations of Tanzimat principles. While former tax-farmers
utilized the Tanzimat to assert their ownership rights over land, peasants countered them by
referring to the ‘equality’ of the Tanzimat as a call to end tax-farmer ‘oppression’ in the
countryside. What made the rebellions even more threatening than they actually were was that
they were often provoked by foreign powers, and thus invoked the threat of foreign
intervention and imperial disintegration. As a result, the Ottoman ruling classes continuously
attempted to negotiate and reconcile the rights of the propertied individual and the rights of
the peasant-soldier during the first period of Ottoman reforms. The right to property could not
triumph over the right to subsistence, and vice versa.

In short, despite several attempts to transform Ottoman society along capitalist lines, the
capitalist path did not take root. Contrary to what is usually argued, there was no consolidation of ‘petty commodity production’ in the countryside, and so-called ‘merchant capital’ was not ‘capital’ at all. The threat of revolt and foreign intervention rendered the capitalist project too risky for the Ottoman elite. Also, given the growing importance of the peasant-soldier and the propertied classes’ unwillingness to pay tax, the state became increasingly reluctant over time to commodify land and transform the agrarian structure. From the end of the 1860s, the Ottoman state increasingly turned to the Jacobin project to boost its geopolitical power. While the first Ottoman constitution (1876) openly prohibited ‘dispossession’, Sultan Abdulhamid (1876-1908) further expanded mass conscription and institutionalized universal education. As such, the late Ottoman Empire sought to generalize the Jacobin means of appropriating peasant surpluses and bodies, attempting to consolidate an alternative path to modernization that did not require the commodification of the means of life.

In the absence of the relations of market society, wherein market competition could be expected to deliver socially acceptable and geopolitically beneficial results, the equality and property of the ‘impersonalized individual’ were inevitably coupled with duties towards the state and a repeatedly reimagined ‘impersonalized collective’, the nation. The enjoyment of property was not conditioned on successful commodity production and its productive utilization, but to the fulfillment of duties towards the state and the nation. As the state and the nation were instituted as the ultimate loci of social reproduction, struggles over sources of income predictably launched a competitive and increasingly radicalizing process of reframing the ‘Ottoman nation’ and ‘national interest’. Given the persistence of non-capitalist social relations and the inability to differentiate political and economic processes, as well as the mounting geopolitical challenges, relatively liberal notions of ‘nation’ (formulated by the so-
called Young Ottomans) were doomed to turn illiberal. The cumulative radicalization of the Ottoman modernization project and the growing Jacobin influence on the formation of Ottoman intellectuals and bureaucrats can not be reduced to an ideological preference or mentalité only, but was, at least partly, rooted in the non-capitalist structure of property relations.

The first round of radicalization of the ‘nation’ was carried out by a large group of low-ranking officers and bureaucrats. Having graduated from public schools, trained in the positive sciences and organized in the so-called Young Turk Movement, these rebellious officers strived to open the state to talent. However, challenging the Sultan and the higher bureaucracy depended on the Young Turks’ ability to mobilize the lower-classes and incorporate lower-class demands into their essentially elitist-conservative vision of national rule and regeneration. Determined to overthrow the Sultan, yet fearful of the ‘blood-thirsty’ and ‘ignorant’ masses of the sans-culotte type, the Young Turks originally envisaged an alternate route to ‘civilization’, i.e. a ‘scientific’ and ‘educative’ route that requires no revolution. This politically sterile approach to social transformation continued until the outbreak of revolutionary upheavals in neighboring Russia (1905) and Iran (1906). In the Young Turks’ consciousness, both revolutions put in train a new process for inter-societal comparison and learning. While the Russian revolution showed the Young Turks the possibility of an orderly and popular change under the leadership of an intellectual elite, Iran proved that constitutional and transformative action could take place even in a more ‘backward’ and Islamic setting. It was partly the lessons drawn from the initial success and eventual failure of the Russian and Iranian revolutions that enabled and forced the Young Turks to radicalize their repertoire of social mobilization. Combined with new geopolitical exigencies and internal opportunities, the Young Turks eventually set in motion a
revolutionary process in which contradictory popular interests would be amalgamated as the interest of the nation. The rights of the modern subject therefore entered the new Ottoman constitution (1908) not on the shoulders of bureaucrats and commercial classes only, but through the active involvement of the lower-classes.

That said, initially, it was the rights of the propertied individual encoded in the 1908 Ottoman constitution that the Young Turks most vigorously tried to institute. Like the Tanzimat, however, the period between 1908 and 1913 witnessed a series of mass uprisings caused by the radicalized interpretations of equality and liberty. This resulted in violent reaction against property and propertied-classes (most of whom were non-Muslims), which the Young Turks were barely able to control. Combined with severe geopolitical dangers, the Young Turks, once again, had to find new ways in which the ‘dangerous’ masses and foreign enemies could be prevented from completely derailing the reproduction of the new political community. Consequently, they partially conceded to the lower-class reframing of the nation and national interest, and while doing so, they also learned how to make use of lower-class clubs/organizations to outcompete and exterminate their own political and economic rivals. The ‘national economics’ of the Young Turk era could not annihilate the political basis of subsistence, but attempted to solve the tension between subsistence and property, i.e. between equality and liberty, by reorganizing social classes along ‘solidaristic’ lines. I contend that Young Turk solidarism was not an attempt to heal the social costs of a rising capitalism, as often argued. For, while ‘national economics’ allowed for the enrichment of a ‘turkified’ bourgeoisie at the expense of the non-Muslim propertied classes, it also presupposed the creation of a ‘solidaristic’ space of accumulation, i.e. accumulation without dispossessing, accumulation without changing the rules of accessing land and encroaching upon the minimum subsistence requirements of ‘patriotic’ and ‘equal’ citizens.
In 1923, when the Turkish Republic was established, property was less a right enjoyed by those who used property ‘productively’ and much more a privilege for those who geo(politically) served the ‘nation’. Fulfillment of military and political duties, rather than productive activity, was the basis of social reproduction. Chapter 4 turns to the question of how successful the early Republican regime was in changing the structure of property relations. I discuss ‘state capitalism’ at length with particular reference to Germany and Italy during the interwar years, while questioning whether early Republican Turkey can be subsumed under the same rubric of ‘state capitalism’. I argue that state elites in Turkey were unable to impose market discipline on the bourgeois classes, and given the actual or perceived threat of foreign intervention and domestic rebellion, they were unwilling to initiate a capitalist transformation of agriculture. Unable and/or unwilling to establish ‘institutionalized markets’ in the 1930s, state elites, in alliance with a non-capitalist industrial bourgeoisie, once again, turned to consolidate education, turkification and the militarization of Republican subjects as the ultimate basis of their social reproduction. As such, I suggest that after a hundred years of experimentation with ‘modernity’, Kemalism consolidated Turkish modernity as a late Jacobin progeny. In principle, Kemalism never gave up its claim for the role of private property and popular sovereignty in the making of modern ‘civilization’, yet given the non-capitalist character of prevailing property relations and in the face of geopolitical challenges, it continually racialized, militarized and secularized the conditions of possessing property and being civic, equal and modern.

In many ways, the 1950s signified the beginning of the end for Jacobinism and the rise of capitalism in Turkey. After a century of ‘modernization’, the Turkish elite could finally establish capitalist property relations thanks to the geopolitical protection and monetary
support provided by the United States. Given the lateness of capitalist development, however, the transition inevitably took a peculiar form. Also, the preexistent social relations, institutions and values rooted in the early Republican experience greatly complicated the development of capitalist social relations. The original Kemalist project gave birth to radically different interpretations formulated to contest as well as produce capitalism. While the bureaucratic-industrial elite adhered to Kemalism’s secular and turkified order in an attempt to protect their privileged access to state-based rents and economic protection, the lower-classes turned Kemalism’s denial of class differences into a cry for a more egalitarian, if not classless, order.

In the 1970s there was also another form of capitalism developing in provincial Anatolian towns, however. Disgruntled by their systematic exclusion from the state-generated economic rents, commercial groups of Anatolian towns organized themselves in and through the Islamic ‘National View’ movement. Completely detached from the intellectual resources of the original Republican project, the National View movement appeared to provide an Islamic critique of ‘capitalism’. *Pace* the conventional interpretations of the National View movement, however, I suggest that the Islamic critique of capitalism was not anti-capitalist *per se*, but was levelled against the capitalism of the Kemalist bureaucratic-industrial establishment. The movement, in its various incarnations from the 1970s to the 1990s, did not want an anti-capitalist societal order, but envisioned a fully capitalist future unencumbered by Kemalism’s Jacobin yoke. Against a ‘corrupted’ and ‘anarchic’ order, the movement formulated a novel capitalist development strategy, which was a harbinger of the end of capitalism’s complicated coexistence with Jacobinism in Turkey. With the neoliberal turn in the 1980s, the classes associated with and mobilized by the National View became increasingly important in the political and economic spheres. In the meantime, ‘secularism’
turned into the main ideological safeguard used to protect the political-economic privileges of the Kemalist elite. In 2002, a less-militant heir of the National View movement, the Justice and Development Party, came to power. The JDP has either dispensed with the main contours of Kemalist modernity or transformed them in such ways to serve its own strategic and societal goals. Although such a restructuring seems to have heralded the coming of a liberal/multicultural society for a while, day by day, the limits of this new order are becoming clear. Alternative societal visions, rooted in the early Kemalist project or in the dream of a socialist Kurdistan, are increasingly censored and suppressed by the rulers of ‘New Turkey’ (as they themselves like to call it). A disciplinary and productivist Islam is rapidly replacing and transforming the politico-cultural legacies of the earlier period. What we are witnessing is the consolidation of capitalist modernity a la turca.
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