

**On Counterinsurgency:
Firepower, Biopower, and the Collateralization of Military Violence**

Neil Balan

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Abstract

This dissertation investigates the most recent cycle of North Atlantic expeditionary warfare by addressing the resuscitation of counterinsurgency warfare with a specific focus on the war in Afghanistan from 2006 to 2014. The project interrogates the lasting aesthetic, epistemological, philosophical, and territorial implications of counterinsurgency, which should be understood as part of wider transformations in military affairs in relation to discourses of adaptation, complexity, and systemic design, and to the repertoire of global contingency and stability operations. Afghanistan served as a counterinsurgency laboratory, and the experiments will shape the conduct of future wars, domestic security practices, and the increasingly indistinct boundary between them. Using work from Michel Foucault and liberal war studies, the project undertakes a genealogy of contemporary population-centred counterinsurgency and interrogates how its conduct is constituted by and as a mixture of firepower and biopower. Insofar as this mix employs force with different speeds, doses, and intensities, the dissertation argues that counterinsurgency unrestricts and collateralizes violence, which is emblematic of liberal war that kills selectively to secure and make life live in ways amenable to local and global imperatives of liberal rule. Contemporary military counterinsurgents, in conducting operations on the edges of liberal rule's jurisdiction and in recursively influencing the domestic spaces of North Atlantic states, fashion biopower—as custodial power to conduct the conduct of life—to shape different interventions into the everyday lives of target populations. The 'lesser evil' logic of counterinsurgency is used to frame counterinsurgency as a type of warfare that is comparatively low-intensity and less harmful, and this justification actually lowers the threshold for violence by making increasingly indiscriminate the ways in which its employment damages and envelops populations and communities, thereby allowing counterinsurgents to speculate on the practice of expeditionary warfare and efforts to sustain occupations. Thus, the dissertation argues that counterinsurgency is a communicative process, better understood as mobile military media with an atmospheric-environmental register blending acute and ambient measures that are always-already kinetic. The counterinsurgent gaze enframes a world picture where everything can be a force amplifier and everywhere is a possible theatre of operations.

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The entailments of this project migrate and drift into many different spaces, times, and environments. Suffice it say, the interactions, engagements, and collaborations necessary to complete this work exceed the reasonably distilled form it currently takes. Thus, I must begin by acknowledging the many invisible and imperceptible things—the unknown quantities and dangerous supplements—that were fleeting but which no less colonized and pollinated the process. Put another way, this project is of me but it is not really mine at all. In discerning a set of influences, I want to acknowledge more than a few people.

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List of Abbreviations

Works of Michel Foucault

BB	<i>Birth of Biopolitics</i>
D&P	<i>Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison</i>
HoSV1	<i>History of Sexuality, vol. 1: Introduction</i>
OOT	<i>The Order of Things</i>
SMBD	<i>'Society Must Be Defended'</i>
STP	<i>Security Territory Population</i>
S&P	"The Subject and Power"

Military & Martial Terminology

3BW	Three Block War
4GW	Fourth-Generation War
ADO	Adaptive Dispersed Operations
ALP	Afghan Local Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
ANP	Afghan National Police
ASCOPE	Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organization, People, Events
AUP	Afghan Uniformed Police
AW	Asymmetric Warfare
CAAT	Counterinsurgency Advisory & Assistance Team
CAO	Comprehensive Approach to Operations
CCF	Commander's Contingency Fund
CDC	Community Development Council
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CF	Canadian Forces
CHB	Clear-Hold-Build
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CJOSTF-A	Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan
COA	Course of Action
COE	Comprehensive Operating Environment
COO	Continuum of Operations
COP	Combat Outpost
CSEC	Communications Security Establishment Canada
CSIS	Canadian Security Intelligence Services
CST	Cultural Support Teams
CTC-A	Counterinsurgency Training Centre – Afghanistan
DESNEX	Development-Environment-Security Nexus
DND	Department of National Defence (Canada)
DST	District Stabilization Team
EBAO	Effects-Based Approach to Operations
EBO	Effects-Based Operations
ETT	Embedded Training Team
FEBA	Forward Edge of Battle
FET	Female Engagement Team
FID	Foreign Internal Defence
FOB	Forward Operating Base

GoIRA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GOC	Government of Canada
GW	Generation of War
HN	Host-Nation
HTS	Human Terrain System
HTT	Human Terrain Team
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IA	Influence Activities
IO	Information/Influence Operations
IW	Irregular Warfare
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KPRT	Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team
KVA	Key Village Approach
LOO	Lines of Operation
MAAT	Marjah Accelerated Agricultural Transition Program
MISFA	Microfinance Investment and Support Facility for Afghanistan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Network-Centered Operations
NCW	Network-Centered Warfare
NROLFSM	NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission – Afghanistan
NSP	National Solidarity Program
OCO	Overseas Contingency Operations
ODA	Operations Detachment – Alpha
OIL	Observations, Insights, and Lessons
OMLT	Operations Mentoring Liaising Team
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
PB	Patrol Base
PDO	Private Development Organization
PMESSI-PT	Political/Governance, Military/Security, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, information, Physical Environment, Time
POL	Pattern of Life
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSO	Peace Support Operations
QIP	Quick Impact Project
RDO	Rapid Domination Operations
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RW	Regional Command
SF	Special Forces
SFA	Security Force Assistance
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (US)
SOD	Systemic Operational Design
SOIC	Stability Operations Information Centre
SSR	Security, Stability, and Reconstruction
SWEAT-MSO	Sewer, Water, Electricity, Academic, Trash, Medical, Security, Other Sub-categories
TIC	Team in Contact
TFK	Task Force Kandahar
TTP	Training, Tactics, and Procedures
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency of International Development

USMC	United States Marine Corps
VSO	Village Stability Operations
WOG	Whole-of-government

1 Counterinsurgency Did (Not) Take Place

The surge of combat power [in Afghanistan], along with the Marjah and Kandahar offensives, will suppress the Taliban infection in the near term, but it is only a temporary reprieve. The current high level for U.S. and NATO combat power cannot be maintained forever. Therefore, without a rejuvenated immune system, the infection will come back.

- W.B. Caldwell & Mark Hagerott, "Curing Afghanistan" (2010: ¶8)

What is specific to our era, as we claimed earlier, is that war has passed from the finale element of the sequence of power—lethal force as a last resort—to the first and primary element, the foundation of politics itself....In order for war to occupy this fundamental social or political role, it must be able to accomplish a constitutive or regulative function: war must be both a procedural activity and an ordering regulative activity that creates and maintains social hierarchies, a form of biopower aimed at the promotion and regulation of social life.

- Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, *Multitude* (2004: 21)

A counterinsurgency campaign is conducted using the same means as any other campaign: through the application of a military force's fighting power. It is set within the continuum of operations and is executed through a combination of tactical-level activities and tasks. However, it is a distinct campaign with its own philosophy and set of principles that provide guidance for the application of fighting power and the conduct of activities.

- Canadian Forces, *Counterinsurgency Operations* (BGL-323-004 2008: 1/101-2)

The marriage of medicalized perception and population-centered counterinsurgency operations described by American military officers intent on 'curing' Afghanistan should not be surprising. As the work of Michel Foucault makes clear, conceptions of immunity, infection, and disease are inherent in the imagination of population as an object and knowledge-effect specific to ways of rule. Therapeutics and treatment offer ways to design protocols and procedures for making life live, distributing and producing reality through dividing and separating practices aimed to isolate and quarantine dangerous pathologies while simultaneously promoting and conducting the life coded as and deemed acceptable. When military agents invoke epidemiology to describe violence and make it legible, it becomes easy to connect contemporary innovations in state military warfighting and the genealogy of biopower and biopolitics proposed by Foucault, a genealogy initiated by way of Foucault's investigation of the displacement of war into the emerging field of government in 18th century liberal modern societies. The logistics of medical perception specific to the clinic, which invents a field of population through the optics of health and disease, becomes also the logistics of military perception in today's expeditionary environments.

This dissertation considers and extends these connections by undertaking an interrogation of contemporary military counterinsurgency, the method deemed appropriate to pacify the "aggressive infection" of insurgency. In particular, I focus on the quasi-colonial war prosecuted in Afghanistan by American and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces for almost fifteen years, a war still waged by Afghan state security forces after the withdrawal of most components of NATO International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in late 2014. More than Iraq, Afghanistan served as the place where old military theories and technologies became new again, reinvented equipment for contemporary operators. Beyond the Afghan war itself, this dissertation describes and maps the rise, the subsequent decline, and the residues of counterinsurgency—its indivisible remainders—even as its status as 'the answer' fades from public-popular view. Further, it considers the biopolitical implications and "boomerang effects" of this war (Foucault 1976 [2003]; Graham 2013) by looking to how the logics and the movement what I call more generally the spirit of counterinsurgency¹ return from today's frontier zones beyond neoliberal edges and the remit of liberal government. My inquiry into the implications of this spirit, its structures of feeling, its aesthetics and methods, and its drifting ideological presumptions and procedures, both within and beyond the continuum of expeditionary military operations, compose the heart of this investigation.

As a minor literature and counter-discourse within military affairs, counterinsurgency doctrine and practice served as the regime of truth for what started in 2001 as the so-called War on Terror and mutated into ongoing expeditionary campaigns and occupations in both Iraq and Afghanistan by American-led military coalitions comprised by core capitalist states on the North Atlantic basin. Given that this coterie of militaries are still active—a scaled-back NATO advising mission in Afghanistan, Operation Resolute Support; a mix of airpower and special forces advising in Iraq and Syria, which has continued from 2014 into 2015 and 2016; a series of interventions in different theatres of operation from the Central African Republic and Mali to the Philippines—it is crucial to keep counterinsurgency in

¹ For example: the common invocation of *Zeitgeist* ("spirit of the times"); *Weltgeist* ("world spirit") from Hegel's phenomenology; Weber's "spirit of capitalism" (1905); Boltanski and Chiapello on the new spirit of capitalism (2005); Baudrillard's "spirit of terrorism" (2001) and the spirit of "integral reality" (2006); Turner's spiritualization of violence (2003).

focus. Certainly, many critical scholars continue to focus on the emergence of new ontologies and geographies of military violence developed over the last expeditionary cycle: remote war waged with the rise of drones and unmanned aerial vehicles (Gregory 2014, 2011; Shaw & Akhter 2014; Ross et al 2014; Chamayou 2011 [2014]); war prosecuted with covert special forces and clandestine direct action, (Rogers 2014, 2012); and war as a blend or aggregate of different military-police technologies that function as 'assemblages of intervention' (Bachman, Bell, and Holmqvist 2014; Holmqvist 2014; Neocleous 2012, 2013; Weizman 2007, 2012; Evans 2011, Dillon & Reid 2009; c.f. Hardt & Negri 2004: 19, 39-40). I argue that counterinsurgency, insofar as it has enabled broad discussions about military violence and state war and even as it is vanishing from wider public discourses and debates, is best understood as an ongoing experiment in theory and practice, which has in turn generated not only new forms of military conduct but a whole new type of epistemological and aesthetic equipment necessary for contemporary and future military operations.

My analysis of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan explains military violence as a mixture of firepower and biopower, revealing the continuum of different dividing and separating technologies that territorialize the war at the village level. In locating firepower and biopower as military methods constituted *as* media with variable velocities and rates of closure, I map the different ambient, acute, and always-systemic effects of counterinsurgency by focusing on how military agents operating on the ground in Afghanistan speculated on the mixture of different methods. This allows me to describe military violence today as environmental and atmospheric (Anderson 2010; c.f. Sloterdijk 2002 [2009]), and I argue that contemporary counterinsurgency, in targeting the vital space of life to make life live (Dillon & Reid 2009: 125), has realized a type of war that is collateralized, unrestricted, and increasingly *indiscriminate*—perhaps less lethal but more thoroughly damaging and insidious in its insemination and continual breaching of limits. To borrow humbly from Eyal Weizman, what is at stake here is war below the threshold of discourse but also below the threshold of detectability in physical and biopolitical terms (Weizman 2015). While this may sound counterintuitive and paradoxical—collateralizing and spreading war to stop the spread of war and so pacify populations to compel them to live—I will argue

this claim throughout. Counterinsurgency allows for the collateralization of war and a *widening* of its field of action; it is emblematic of a deeply speculative and integrative approach that operationalizes life itself, enveloping both spaces and populations (Trinquier 1961; c.f., Mégret 2012; Weizman 2012). This collateralization, in mobilizing and globalizing loud and quiet forms of military violence, invites a critical reconsideration of the domain and ontology of war in relation to biopolitics and security. I feign no impartiality or disinterest; I am interested in challenging the apparatus and edifice of counterinsurgency warfare, its material and rhetorical violence, and its string of dense abstractions and ambiguous equivocations. My aim is to identify a diagram—an architecture or an order—of coordinated military practices exercising and mobilizing differential concentrations of violence in wars that are less about conquest and more about achieving influence, isolation, insulation, and integration. "Diagram" is invoked precisely: "The diagram or abstract machine is the map of relations between forces, a map of destiny, or intensity...that is co-extensive with the whole social field" (Deleuze 1988 [2011]: 33). The diagram, or abstract machine, is a logic informing an interpretation from which to motivate and produce concrete outcomes.

Taking Your Medicine: The Epidemiologic of Counterinsurgency

While counterinsurgency necessarily requires insurgency in semiotic and performative terms, it also calls-forth the population as an anchoring third term, a concept tied not simply to a nation or a people but, as outlined by Foucault in his works on the emergence of medical-clinical enclosures, to demographic conceptions of security, circulation, and public health (Foucault 1978 [2007]). To produce a healthy population in biopolitical terms—that is, to normalize and protect a population while also leaving it space to develop its power of life—is to secure it on an ongoing basis.² Colleen Bell's recent work makes this abundantly clear in relation to military operations: in assessing the widespread use of biomedical and illness-related metaphors (contagion, virulence, illness, triage, quarantine) in today's

² As I discuss in chapter three and four, Foucault's work around early-18th century formalizations of *Polizeiwissenschaft* (police science)—as police power—describes the emergence of a whole range of governing technologies aiming to assure and enhance populations to basis infrastructures for life, which resemble the many of the biopolitical promises made by counterinsurgency doctrine.

military counterinsurgency doctrine, Bell follows the work of both Foucault and Roberto Esposito on the coupling of contagion-immunity to offer a persuasive assessment of what she calls "hybrid warfare" (Bell 2012: 226). While this medical-military convergence is not new, Bell focuses on the contemporary intersections of health and security in military affairs, tracing the merging of contagion-controlling efforts on a continuum from lethal violence to non-lethal civil-social measures. In this respect, war and the clinical imagination of health come together as one in acts of killing, maiming, and protecting.

Population, simultaneously a field of perception and an object to administer and manage, is made visible by the discursive gaze of epidemiology, a collection of medical disciplines dealing primarily with "the incidence, distribution, and possible control of diseases and other factors relating to health" (OED). The study of *epidemia*—"the prevalence of the disease," from Greek—generates an epistemology and aesthetic, an *epidemiologic* focusing on complex population-level patterns and causal factors that create conditions for epidemics, outbreaks, exposure, and widespread contamination by virulence and pathologies. As a practice, epidemiology informs prediction and preemption by merging "microbiological" and "macrosocial" strata (Porta 2008: vi); as a medical cartography of risk, it is premised on generating data and complex analytics to create legible metrics so as to justify a more vigilant and interdictory approach to managing the health of populations. From medicine to war to economy to digital life, population is both the necessary aggregation of constituting differences and the field shaped by the abstract and arbitrary signatures captured and made legible to predict, pre-empt, prohibit, or prototype behaviours, acts, and ways of living and being. Population must provide the grounds and materials for sorting even as it is invented through the very act of sorting. When Foucault considered in his 1978-1979 lectures *Security Territory Population* (2007 [1978]) the problems of circulation, uncertainty and randomness (the aleatory, *la aléatoire*), and *milieu* within the context of normalizing ways of life, his point was not that the emerging biopower he was sketching and describing was restrictive. Rather, it was a modality of power that required the productivity and performance of proliferation and differentiation; it needed the productive power life and the deviating drift of heterogeneity in order to organize and conduct the conduct of species-life itself around a normalizing

pole. If determining how a population should live and be made to live remain the basis for ways of rule, it has also today become part of the logic for the ways of war encapsulated in counterinsurgency. More than a trope, this *epidemiologic* is the foundation upon which military agents imagine and constitute the collection of different streams and speeds of political violence specific to counterinsurgency warfare, *violence that is actually becoming warfare without limits*.

Counterinsurgency is defined as a distinct subset of warfare (FM 3-24 2006: 1-1), as "all political, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological, and civic actions that can be taken by a government to defeat an insurgency" (FM 3-24.2 2009: 1-4). It encompasses "comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes" but not a "substitute for strategy" (FM 3-24 2014: 1-3/4). While it has its direct and indirect variants and can be waged with a strict enemy-centered focus, counterinsurgency from 2006 to 2014 is unique because it operated not simply in conventional binary terms—as a duel or confrontation between adversaries as per Clausewitz—but as a triangular military reality (*realmilitaire*) comprised of insurgent, counterinsurgent, and population. Imagined in these terms, the coercive political violence of counterinsurgency's 'fighting power' unfolds as a rivalry played out in an economy of mimetic desire where insurgent and counterinsurgent compete in pursuit of the 'prize' of population, positioned precariously in-between. The military principle of discrimination is challenged in counterinsurgency: boundaries between civilian and insurgent are placed into question with problematic and productive implications for military agents. Further, who and what is a counterinsurgent is not entirely uniform. Military forces, the host government, non-governmental organizations, international aid organizations, multinational private military contractors, and local or regional actors populate the battlespace environment. Suffice it to say, with the rise of military humanism (Weizman 2012; Fassin 2011; Zolo 2002; Chomsky 1999), the bleed between security and development—or neoliberal development and 'market authority' as a means to institute securitization and control (Cowen 2014; Klein 2009; Duffield 2007)—and the 'civilianization' of military affairs coincident with the militarization of aid (Christie 2012; Amar 2012), warfare is a turbulent mix of different interests, desires, and causal flows. Yet, the efforts

arrayed under the sign of counterinsurgency's legitimacy-making efforts to drive social, economic, and human development consistently route through military actors and the persuasive power of military violence. 'Population' is an object constantly stabilized, its content continually re-invented by the needs and desires—psychic and operational—of counterinsurgents.

That counterinsurgency is wed to aiding and abetting the legitimacy and jurisdiction of a so-called "sovereign host-nation" is a self-fulfilling and sometimes schizophrenic claim given the vagaries of foreign governments served by North Atlantic forces. On one hand, neoliberalism and the financialized face of today's global capital have succeeded in undermining state sovereignty and reducing it to a willing participatory relay, a 'post-sovereign' link in a 'structurally adjusted' economic network architecture characterized by jurisdiction-altering and boundary-dissolving trade agreements and partnerships dictated by interests of multinational corporations.³ According to Saskia Sassen's arguments regarding capitalism, globalization, and denationalization, multilateral and comprehensive economic partnerships tend to wash out and erode traditional sovereign claims where states become sorting devices for larger macro-economic and –social ideologies (Sassen 2006). On the other, we are expected to accept the inviolable premise of a sovereign host, whose fragility requires support and propping-up but which acts as a functionary for the expression of geo-economic and geopolitical interests from outside. Further, in a place like Afghanistan, any population indexed to the national institutions of government is questionable as the state remains a rather artificial and arbitrarily-created polity of agrarian opium and grape farmers, ethnic and religious divisions, influential tribal systems, and rural/urban divides all bounded by a porous border in a place now subject to its second foreign invasion and occupation in 40 years.

³ For precedents, consider here the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, 1994), the hemispheric Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP, 2005), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP, 2010-present), the current Canada-China Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPPA, 2013), and even the recent Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA). All of these agreements promise reciprocity and free trade but tend to create anti-markets and enforce a specific type of structured competition that rewards large economic enterprises and global corporations to mobilize capital flows across state boundaries. While often articulated as meeting bi-, tri-, or multilateral interests and creating mutually-beneficial outcomes, these agreements tend to route through supra-state organizations like the IMF, the WTO, and the World Bank—regulatory bodies defending the global capitalist economy.

Diagram One: Firepower, Biopower, and Collateral War

Counterinsurgency is a curious object, totem and fetish, valorized but never vindicated. Its rise to prominence followed efforts initiated largely by the American military establishment to reboot and unify existing doctrine and create a winning formula for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan waged in the wake of 9/11. Their mutations continue to serve—in 2001 and in 2015—as necessary structural features in an American-centered political economic system that requires ongoing military operations as part of a wider permanent war economy (Retort 2005; Schwartz 2011; c.f. Melman 1974). Military agents seized this period as an opportunity to experiment with counterinsurgency and irregular warfare to the extent that the intellectual output over the last fifteen years represents a pulse or wave in the cycle of revolutions in military affairs (RMAs). However, having failed to deliver military and political results—an adequate 'end state' which, on its own terms, tended toward the unrealistic and untenable—sought by American and NATO forces across the Iraq-Afghan wars, counterinsurgency has fallen out of favour with many within the military establishment, sparking a predictable cycle of forensic assessment. The doctrine, once *panacea*, has faded from view in military circles and for increasingly indifferent (and indebted, war-fatigued, and austerity-saddled) North Atlantic publics vaguely aware of the legacy of these still-ongoing but increasingly distant and now-opaque wars. Yet, despite this 'failure' of counterinsurgency to satisfy the nebulous determinations and metrics for winning, and given the debate about the ongoing role of and the current crisis in counterinsurgency in relation to contemporary military thinking and practice (c.f. Ucko 2014; Ucko & Engell 2013; Porch 2013), the residues of the doctrine remain to shape doctrinal and philosophical discussions among military agents about the organization and delivery of political-military violence. So, even as counterinsurgency appears to be over, it still haunts the contemporary apparatus of military affairs and continues to influence military designers tasked with driving the ongoing process of military enlightenment.

As a body of thought—an *episteme*—counterinsurgency unified thinking about counterterrorism, unconventional and irregular warfare doctrine, and small war theory. Further, its formalization, following from the Global War on Terror generated the emergence of new doctrinal concepts like

overseas contingency operations,⁴ stability/support /transition/reconstruction operations, foreign internal defense (FID), security force assistance (SFA), and the blend of conventional and irregular capacities in hybrid warfare. If the foreign wars waged by North Atlantic states have become more like ongoing colonial-police operations prosecuted in the name of liberal order intent on securing global cosmopolitan consensus by correcting illiberal disorder (Holmqvist 2014; Neocleous 2011, 2013; Evans 2011; c.f. Bachmann, Bell, and Holmqvist 2014); if their collective temporality is permanent (Retort 2005), perpetual (Shapiro 2003), forever (Filkins 2009), unending (Joxe 2010), or endless (Bacevich 2013); if their geographic register has become non-linear and non-contiguous, territorialized anywhere and everywhere a target signature is induced from calculations derived from aggregate packets and bundles of data (Gregory 2014 & 2011), or unfolds within the asymmetric spatial coordinates of the tracking trajectories of a predator-prey hunt—a cynegetic engagement—rather than the traditional adversarial face-off between equals (Chamayou 2014 & 2011); and if they reveal a wider cycle of global civil war within the context of empire (Tiqun 2011; Hardt & Negri 2004), then much needs to be said about the remains and residues of the spirit of counterinsurgency within and beyond military organs.

Even though counterinsurgency is disappearing from view, it still functions in epochal terms and remains an important symbolic referent and master signifier, serving as an affective heuristic, shorthand for recent cycle of expeditionary wars. It is useful here to recall Jean Baudrillard's prescriptive injunction written in the political haze following the first Gulf War in 1991 and the alleged arrival of the end of history:

It is not a question of being for or against the war. It is a question of being for or against the reality of the war. Analysis must not be sacrificed to the expression of anger. It must be entirely directed against reality, against the evidence; here, against the evidence of this war. (Baudrillard 1994: 95)

The reality of the recent Iraq and Afghan wars and the reality created by military actors should remain front and centre as North Atlantic states claim to have satisfied the criteria for achieving adequate 'end states' while either disavowing the outcomes or actively obscuring the wider implications of 'these' wars,

⁴ Michael Skinner notes this semantic shift in American military doctrinal language, suggesting that even as the name changes the practices do not. See Skinner, (2012), "The Empire of Capital and the Latest Inning of the Great Game," p. 107 and p. 131 (note 1).

which have mutated into ongoing internecine conflicts that a killing and damaging communities, people, and populations. In short, we should refuse to accept the disappearance of counterinsurgency and foreground its legacy and spirit, which fertilizes the future violence to come. As Michael Dillon and Julian Reid (2009) argue, revolutions in military affairs (RMA) and military force transformation today certainly result from technical, technoscientific, and network-centric advances in information management; however, they also follow from biological-ecological conceptions of species-life and the general biopoliticization of war coincident with the rise of the life sciences, the informationalization of life itself, and the crisis in speculative and financialized neoliberal capitalism.⁵ Biopolitics has drifted more fully into and fertilized the military conduct of warfare, constituting what I call the biopoliticization of military battlespace and a new type of military intelligence actualized as the collateralization of warfare and the spirit of counterinsurgency.

The aggression and force of contemporary counterinsurgency varies greatly because its logic aims to both make lives die and make lives live, creating kill sacks and life preservation zones in close proximity. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri were accurate in this respect while writing during the initial years of the expeditionary cycle: "More important than the negative technologies of annihilation and torture, then, is the constructive character of biopower. Global war must not only bring death but also produce and regulate life" (Hardt & Negri 2004: 19). Their conception of a "military-vital complex" and their emphasis on biopolitical innovations in warfare as the object of current revolutions in military affairs (41) anticipated the work of liberal war studies and this very project. Punitive and grievous bodily harm and targeted operations to kill occur alongside the active preservation of life, with counterinsurgency war exposing indigenous populations to the violence of killing and the violence of sustaining, securing, and making life live. Put another way, counterinsurgency, as an exercise in extended war and occupation, has at its core economies of both life and death: a positive side that harnesses and conveys the productive power of life to live in predictable ways; and a negative side based

⁵ Notably, the roll-out of counterinsurgency was coincident with the cresting of the global financial crisis in 2007 and 2008, where the fear of a failed capitalist political economy was mobilized to counter the insurgency of vulnerable financial populations who, while exposed to bearing the burden of financial risks, called for structural and in some cases radical changes.

on what Achille Mbembe calls "necropolitics" (2003) or Eyal Weizman calls the "thanatopolitical" (2011), where protection ceases and population are either left exposed or explicitly subjected to precarity, harm, and killing. This negative side is fundamentally different than 'people just getting killed' in war, whether they are agents of the state (soldiers; legal military actors), enemy non-combatants, or civilians who are intentionally or unintentionally made to suffer (on one hand, targeted by tactics of total warfare; on the other, 'accidental' deaths and unintended collateral damage). The difference is that this 'making die' is a screening or sorting device tied to compelling populations to live, which becomes the primary principle of the war effort in counterinsurgency. Again, Hardt and Negri are important in this respect:

Counterinsurgency strategies can no longer rely only on negative techniques...but must also create positive techniques. Counterinsurgency, in other words, must not destroy the environment of insurgency but rather create and control the environment. (Hardt & Negri 2004: 58)

Following what Gregorie Chamayou calls "philanthropic executions" (in Lambert 2013: 39)—culling and killing for the generalized betterment of some common good—the logic here is that killing occurs in the interests of coercively ensuring the protection of a pacified, pliable, and productive population. Killing is a way of coding life as unredeemable and unworthy, a life that otherwise would be left alive and compelled to live, which is patently different than, in traditional terms, killing a reciprocal adversary who opposes one on a discrete field of battle. The coercive military efforts to make live and make die are simultaneously rhetorical, affective, and material; they have different rhythms and speeds, different registers and intensities, assigning and distributing specific ways of knowing and being known. Killing requires acute lines of force communicated in direct terms whereas making live requires more ambient and indirect approaches that mediate the life world in military operating environments in diffuse ways.

In alluding to Baudrillard's *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place* (1994) both above and in the title of this chapter, my point is that indeed *a war did take place but it was different than the one expected*. Grabbing low-hanging fruit in Iraq to satisfy American-centered geopolitical and geoeconomic interests was not supposed to morph into almost fifteen years war still brutally unfolding in Syria and Iraq;

retribution and retaliation, the spectacular symbolic redress for September 11th was not anticipated to escalate into a thirteen-year war in Central Asia and the current post-2014 Operation Resolute Support. For Baudrillard, the war in 1991 was nothing resembling the concept "War"; as a spectacle, it was not war but it was *not* not-war either. Its value as a media event was important to announce the initiation of a 'new world order' yet its collectively organized violence, overwhelming and asymmetric but tempered in deployment, was not of the order of war as traditionally imagined as an engagement between equally-matched belligerents.⁶ As his title refers Jean Giraudoux's 1935 French play *The Trojan War Will Not Take Place*, Baudrillard's critique rests firmly on the first Gulf War's function as a legal and humanitarian fiction—a simulation—to justify a punitive political and economically-motivated intervention. The legend of Cassandra and her prediction early in the original play that the war cannot be avoided (it *will* take place) forces us, as it forced Baudrillard, to query the logics of these most recent expeditionary wars in the same ways. In Afghanistan, war would, did, and is taking place. Yet it *may not be taking place* as a discrete war if we acknowledge what Markus Kienscherf describes as a historical mission of "global pacification" indexed to new liberal ways of rule sustained by ongoing and perpetual military operations (Kienscherf 2011). In this regard, the object 'Afghan war' exists less as a war and more as one part of an ongoing planetary process, a war for the global enforcement of a global neoliberal economy and the enforcement of new interfaces enabled by war (Dal Lago 2010: 32). Contrary to critics who dismissed Baudrillard's book as irresponsible, we must deal with the multiple realities of today's wars.

In inquiring about counterinsurgency, we can pose a number of important questions. What becomes of war when life is both the basis and object of politics? How can we distinguish the state of war and the conduct of warfare and account for the production of military violence as an ordering and organizing practice? What is violence today, especially violence that damages without being lethal and that is ambient and difficult to detect, sapping energy and damaging populations in ways that defy

⁶ Though it lead to the chain of causal events required for America's invasion in 2003 after twelve years of punishing sanctions, no-fly zones, and induced insecurity topped with the worst argumentative *non sequiturs* regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

conventional assessments or measurements? At what point did the current round of expeditionary wars become a problem at the level of conduct, of statements, or of general intelligibility, especially for military agents prosecuting and framing them? What actions and events in these wars are made visible and utterable, and what remains inexplicable, unintelligible, and invisible? Why do military actors conducting counterinsurgency not explicitly speak the language of biopolitics? How do military agents produce and maintain some monopoly on the war effort and through what procedures is this authority secured, especially given the multiplicity of actors and agents in today's expeditionary deployments? What types of ontological or epistemological subjects and objects emerge in the conduct of population-centred counterinsurgency warfare? How has the military conduct of warfare—fighting—in expeditionary deployments changed in our current biopolitical context after over ten years of neocolonial-neoliberal adventurism dressed up as human rights and humanitarianism, in which security, and economic stabilization are what Mimi Thi Nguyen refers to as "the gifts of freedom" (2012) and ruling through damage control (2014)? How is contemporary state military violence communicated and territorialized, especially when the violence of counterinsurgency is often legitimized after the fact with a forensic justification based on its productive effects to disorder and reorder environments and populations (c.f. Hardt & Negri 2004: 30)? How does counterinsurgency sort and order whether bodies will be a made to live or made to die, thus deciding not simply who shall have the bodies (*habeas corpus*) but how they shall be had? Which bodies, following the 'guidance' offered by American counterinsurgency architect General (ret'd) David Petraeus in 2009, will be targeted and deemed 'reconcilable' and 'irreconcilable'—liberal and illiberal—and based on what measure? And what martial practices return, like a 'boomerang' (Graham 2013), to pollinate the domestic enclosures of North Atlantic states in a convergence and exchange of internal and external military-security regimes? Given the scope of these questions, I undertake a synthesis of shifting material, semiotic, and discursive registers to make sense of a long and complex chain of martial events.

In describing counterinsurgency as a joint doctrine of firepower and biopower, I explain how this emblematic warfighting produces a unique kind of military environmentalism. By collateralizing

and unrestricting violence, it creates a nexus of security and war that increasingly disturbs the boundaries and categories of core/periphery, domestic/foreign, and inside/outside. While I am no military expert, I can fuse together and deploy a number of concepts and approaches to make intelligible and legible some of these military processes; the assessment and fate of counterinsurgency should not be left to the operational specialists. Generally, my method is theoretical; that is, the dissertation builds a theory through an approach resembling what Foucault describes as genealogy.⁷ As all wars and types of warfare have collateral damage and collateral effects, this dissertation accounts for counterinsurgency and anticipates its drift and collateral circulation as a complex expression of force and violence. Thus, we are concerned not only with counterinsurgency warfare or with the continuation of the spirit of counterinsurgency beyond its application in today's wars but also its 'extension' (*forzetsung*) into conceptions of life generally. As a networked constellation of techniques that blur ways of rule and ways of war, the military recourse to counterinsurgency over the last ten years is an important object of inquiry for creating a critical ontology of the present. I consider geopolitical and geoeconomic factors along and account for American exceptionalism in the North Atlantic orbit, though this is not the primary focus of my genealogy. I am more interested in reading counterinsurgency as a communicative, environmental, and speculative way of ordering, organizing, and producing military operations, and in how this type of warfare expresses a generalized biopolitical logic. In assessing the firepower and biopower of counterinsurgency, my aim is to place our broader biopolitical culture and society—not military logics *per se*—on the hook. This is not to endorse military undertakings but to understand the culture of biopolitics and liberal government that launches these wars and manifests the spirit of counterinsurgency.⁸ Pacification, domestication, making docile: these are military *and* biopolitical endeavours.

⁷ Recourse to method tends to obscure and efface evaluative hierarchies and the self-referential nature of evidence. See Theses 55-67 in Anne Norton's (2004) *95 Theses on Politics, Culture, and Method*.

⁸ Conservative American military historians Victor David Hanson and Max Boot (among others) have attempted to assess so-called "Western ways of war" as reflective expressions of what amount to, in their view, superior civilizational qualities of Eurocentric (or especially Anglocentric) Western ways of rule (liberal democratic capitalist states). In less chauvinistic terms, a whole field in international relations and strategic studies focuses on relationship between national culture, strategic cultures, and ways of war. Lawrence Sondhaus' *Strategic Culture and Ways of War* (2006) and Benjamin Buley's *The New American Way of War: Military Culture and the Political*

Given the range of military methods, this study is situated within a large interdisciplinary body of critical, radical, and polemical work that has been generated and directed to challenge the justifications and results of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As argued across the essays in recent Canadian-centred collections like *Empire's Ally: Canada and the War in Afghanistan* (Klassen & Albo [eds.] 2012) and *Globalizing Afghanistan: Terrorism, War, and the Rhetoric of Nation-Building* (Jalalzai & Jefferess [eds.] 2011), the consequences of these wars are still unfolding and therefore require ongoing analysis, contextualization, and explication. The field of liberal war studies, which builds on the canon of Foucault's work on biopower and biopolitics, provides a way of framing and assessing the ecology of counterinsurgency practices. This largely Anglo-American field, comprised of work by Bell, Mark Evans, Dillon, Reid, Mark Duffield, Randy Martin, and Andrew Neal among others, is attuned to explaining and de-naturalizing today's spectrum of political violence in its military-civil or domestic-foreign jurisdictions. Critical geographers Ben Anderson, Stephen Graham, Deb Cowen, and Derek Gregory, among others, add to this growing field. The field develops Foucault's arguments from his first biopower-themed Collège de France lectures in 1975-76, '*Society Must Be Defended*', which addressed the displacement of war and located war as an "analyzer of power relations" (Foucault 2003: 45-46). Today it registers these displacements to account for and explain the increasing indistinction—spatially and temporally—between liberal war and liberal peace. In particular, Evans' 2011 essay "The Liberal War Thesis: Introducing the Ten Key Principles of Twenty-First-Century Biopolitical Warfare" offers a paradigmatic foundation for my considerations. Additionally, this inquiry relies on the seminal war-related work of Paul Virilio, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Rey Chow, Achille Mbembe, Alain Joxe, Mark Neocleous, Brian Massumi, Eyal Weizman, and Judith Butler, all of whom have been immensely important to current theoretical and critical accounts of war and military affairs.

Although the redevelopment of counterinsurgency doctrine and warfare has been subject to scrutiny and even though the contemporary critical work on liberal war has offered significant insight in

Utility of Force are emblematic of contemporary offerings in this field. Considerations around strategic culture verge into and draw from sociological studies of armed forces and societies as well as historical accounts of revolutions and transformation in military affairs. This inquiry poses and traces some of these considerations but through a perspective identifying biopolitics and biopower as the core referents and following from a Foucauldian-inspired approach.

relation to the global logics of securitization, neoliberalism, and threat in the post-9/11 era, few works have closely investigated the biopolitical production of counterinsurgency in forward operating environments and considered the mix of firepower-biopower in military battlespace specific to the latest cycle of expeditionary wars. That said, several noteworthy works deserve mention here at the outset, which I assess in more depth over the next two chapters. Counterinsurgency's focus on local knowledge, cultural intelligence, and 'human terrain' provoked substantial responses from the fields of critical geography and postcolonial anthropology.⁹ Following from the escalation of both wars, a number of book-length pamphlets addressed the militarization of anthropology and the military will to 'going native' in both contemporary and historical contexts: the Network of Concerned Anthropologists' *The Counter-Counterinsurgency Manual* (2009), Roberto Gonzalez's *American Counterinsurgency: Human Science and the Human Terrain* (2009), David Price's *The Weaponization of Anthropology* (2010), and Neil Whitehead and Sverker Finnström's edited collection *Virtual War and Magical Death: Technologies and Imaginaries of Terror and Killing* (2014) all challenge the rise of military-celebrated 'culture-centric warfare' (Scales 2004) formalized through counterinsurgency doctrine. These offerings show how the generation of human and cultural intelligence induce deep social divides and exacerbate existing sectarian, ethnic, or cultural differences that quicken political violence and select winners and losers in the battlespace. *Human Terrain: War Becomes Academic* (2010), a documentary film directed by James Der Derian and David and Michael Udris, traces similar concerns, focusing on an anthropologist killed while deployed as part of a U.S. Army Human Terrain Team (HTT) in Iraq. Markus Kienscherf's essay, "Plugging Cultural Knowledge into the US Military Machine: The Neo-Orientalist Logic of Counterinsurgency," (2010), further details counterinsurgency's reliance on cultural knowledge; Kienscherf invokes biopolitics and reads counterinsurgency as a sorting device used to identify and mark liberal and illiberal forms of life and to mete out different practices of engagement and pacification.

⁹ The Canadian manual makes recourse to culture on numerous occasions. "Moreover, one must understand the culture in which the insurgency is occurring. This is vital, for the overall goal of the COIN campaign is to solve root causes and to convince the vast majority of the populace to support a legitimate process and to reject the insurgency" (CF 2007 *B-GL-323-004: 2-22*). *FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency* (2009) dedicates a whole section (Section 5) in Chapter 1 to "cultural competence and situational awareness" that includes subsections on culture, cultural capability, cultural proficiency levels, and culturally-influenced situation awareness (*FM 3-24.2* 2009: 1-18 - 1-26).

His other important essay, "A Programme of Global Pacification: US Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Biopolitics of Human (In)Security" (2011; see above), attempts to scale up the analysis of liberal/illiberal life in relation to a globalized regime of counterinsurgency that organizes who and what is safe and who and what is dangerous. In a Canadian context, Jon Elmer and Anthony Fenton's essay "Building an Expeditionary Force for Democracy Promotion" (2012) and Justin Podur's "Incompatible Objectives: Counterinsurgency and Development in Afghanistan" (2012) examine the contradictions in doctrine and practice and expose military-prosecuted counterinsurgency as one component of a wider set of neoliberal logics of empire and the new global imperialism.

The field of critical human and Marxist geography has been especially attuned to the spatial and territorial configurations of counterinsurgency. Critical geographer Derek Gregory's contributions are important in foregrounding the spatial and territorial production of counterinsurgency warfare as biopolitics. "The Biopolitics of Baghdad: Counterinsurgency and the Counter-City" (2008) offers an important assessment of the spatial implications of counterinsurgency as it unfolded in Iraq; "'The Rush to the Intimate': Counterinsurgency and the Cultural Turn" (2008) identifies a cultural turn—or what we could call human turn—in military affairs. His 2011 essay "The Everywhere War" argues for the possibility of a radically dispersed type of war instantly emerging anywhere depending on the targeting determinations produced from complex surveillance and data capture practices, where targets become signatures that literally can be everywhere (Gregory 2011; c.f. Gregory 2014). In "Population and Affective Perception: Biopolitics and Anticipatory Action in US Counterinsurgency Doctrine" (2010), Ben Anderson takes up the geographical and spatial implications of Foucault's theorization of biopower-biopolitics and develops a unique analysis of counterinsurgency through the perspective of 'affective perception,' focusing on anticipatory action where counterinsurgency is the production of a "violent environmentality" (Anderson 2010: 224) situated between ways of rule (governmentality), war, and life. In citing environment, Anderson is describing and responding to the expansion of military methods and means to fight and conduct warfare across all spectra, many which do not conform to traditional definitions of combat or fighting; *environmentality* implies a integrationist view of operations and

activities, defined by the recourse by military intellectuals to understanding campaigns and engagements in terms of ecology, complexity, and continua. Anderson's more recent "Facing the Future Enemy: U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Pre-insurgent" (2011) extends the idea of a military environmentalism with war-peace and friend-enemy distinctions in relation to psychological warfare operations (PSYOPS) and influence operations (IO) specific to American paradigms of counterinsurgency.

All these works critique the violence of counterinsurgency while also considering, in explicit and implicit ways, the ontology of war in more philosophical terms that counter offerings from more conventional approaches to war and military affairs. They respond to entrenched scholarly traditions of war studies, which are often problem-solving engines servicing state military needs. In "The Powers of War: Fighting, Knowledge, and Critique" (2011), Tarak Barkawi and Shane Brighton diagnose the inability of conventional war and military studies to offer a nuanced account of the ontology of war—what war is and what it is becoming. Though they do well to criticize the conceptual lack at the core of such studies, Barkawi and Brighton seem unable to connect to existing alternative and polemical accounts of war that I have outlined above, which consider this ontology in broader social, cultural, and existential-epistemological terms. Despite these shortcomings, the authors make a good point when they write:

For those who focus on war as fighting, its reality as an actual and potential presence compels an instrumental relation to it, such that knowledge about war is never fully exterior to *an order war itself creates*. War studies as the study of warfighting surely apprehends that most definitive of war, but rarely escapes from the limits of historical particularity and thereby constrains its own potential utility for a wider analysis of war. (Barkawi & Brighton 2011: 135)

I cite this because it bears on the 'utility' of or justification for my own inquiry. In opting to study counterinsurgency as warfighting, I maintain that this epidemiological and collateral type of warfare is coincident with combat and fighting—what militaries typically call "kinetic force" or "kinetic operations." However, what constitutes warfighting today is *not* simply combat, and *what combat is today is also changing*. Besides lethal or kinetic force, counterinsurgency's warfighting is *conducted and constituted* through engagements that are typically categorized as non-kinetic or non-combat. Put

another way, I argue that in counterinsurgency the non-kinetic *is kinetic* and is combat, is fighting, and is violence. Even if it does not kill, this violence is never 'unalloyed'; following Benjamin's critique of violence (1921), it still preserves and creates the 'mythic' context for rule and for the government of life, which is premised on regulating violence itself whether for a fledgling host government, for a supportive and 'muscular' advanced military coalition, or indirectly through a global logic of biopolitical and neoliberal recognition and integration that imagines a unified human species. Further, according to political theorist Uday Mehta, approaching violence in phenomenological terms may prove useful in a testimonial sense with respect to claims of virtue or to its normative status, but this method is politically (and biopolitically) inadequate. Such an analytic cannot account for the ubiquitous and disproportionate ways in which violence—here, state military violence that is less than lethal force—"designates a condition out of measure" (Mehta 2013: ¶1-2). When this condition is normalized to disorder and reorder, the violence exercised requires a context of significance, and the project here attends precisely to building an "evolving grammar" (¶5) to make the meaning and force of this violence intelligible.

For instance, consider the general "shape-clear-hold-build" approach of American and Canadian counterinsurgency doctrine. Holding and building are the phases in which reconstruction, stabilization, and economic-governmental development initiatives commence, often in conjunction with a myriad of non-military actors to 'secure' the local community, return it to normalcy, and undermine support for insurgents. While not combat, the measures themselves still have a target and a velocity; they are mobile and aim to persuade and coerce; they communicate and demand a response, which in turn registers a local community as either amenable or recalcitrant. They are kinetic and violent in that they territorialize the environment of daily life itself as the space for war. Rather than regard biopower-specific measures as 'force multipliers' or 'force amplifiers' augmenting the ballistic and the kinetic, biopower and biopolitical lines of operation are—at least from the perspective of counterinsurgents—crucially important in and of themselves. Some military actors—combat-centered warfighters—acknowledge but disdain this approach, citing it as too weak and not compelling enough; others advocate for its implementation, suggesting they are less-than-war and efficacious because they are

decidedly neither kinetic nor combat. Both positions misrecognize the 'objective-symbolic' violence¹⁰ of military-directed biopower, objective because force and coercion (invasion, occupation, and ongoing vigilance) founds and preserves the legitimacy of the method; symbolic because the master signifiers like 'build' or 'stability' imply an exemption from the constituting power of military violence. What I propose here is a better description and explication of the different weapons and munitions, which can be fast and slow, acute and ambient, and hard and soft, along with an account of the accumulation of their systemic effects. The current dichotomy articulated in counterinsurgency doctrine and practice is wholly false—combat on one side and benevolent population-centred methods on the other. This orthodoxy requires a corrective on its own terms, namely in the terms given by military actors who define these problems and expect to enjoy continued authority to do so.

Three important and interlocking implications emerge from this dissertation. The first is that rather than limiting military violence, counterinsurgency actually unrestricts, 'unlimits', and *collateralizes* the flow and production of military violence by routing it through the life environment—'hearts and minds', 'human terrain', 'patterns of life' (POL)—of local populations via more ambient types of coercive measures. In this sense, counterinsurgency *becomes indiscriminate*. Second, this indiscriminate collateralization unfolds under the sign of 'lesser evils' and the humanitarian and ethical application of force; that is, it is expressed in the terms of necessity, moderation, and proportionality. Weizman's work on the conceptual and material architectures of contemporary state military violence (2012), which build on his investigation of the differential territorializations of Israeli state violence in the Occupied Territories and Palestine (2011, 2009, and 2007), attends to this problematic by addressing how military operational designers calculate proportionality and justify specific types of non-lethal violence in ways that are ultimately *more* debilitating and oppressive. According to Weizman, because lesser evils are validated as such, they are more likely to be employed and with increased frequency, fading into the background but nevertheless continuing to shape the operating environment. They are validated because they amount to a slower type of violent engagement, which results in incremental damage that

¹⁰ See Slavoj Žižek's first chapter, "SOS Violence," in *Violence: Six Sideways Reflections* (Picador: 2009).

is dangerous because it becomes normalized, quietly passing under the radar as the objective *status quo* (Weizman 2012: 23). This is more the slow accumulation of systemic effects than the sharp and incisive injection of discrete action. The venerated content of counterinsurgency—if not a 'gentler' approach to security, stability, development, and economic opportunity than at least a more proportionate and considerate—is camouflaged force often justified as humanitarian action.¹¹ Third, this inquiry draws on and continues to develop a vocabulary and lexicon to discuss the conduct and outcomes of counterinsurgency in ways that are external to the semiotics of military operators and campaign designers. Though they are equipped with increasingly complex and nuanced concepts and doctrine, operational designers and military agents do not imagine their actions biopolitically in a Foucauldian sense. Even as some prominent operational planners and theorists around the American-based and military-centered *Small Wars Journal* have demonstrated a notable interest in Foucault's conceptions of epistemology and power-knowledge in relation to (as they call it) 'problematizing knowledge', the register is rather minimal (for instance, c.f. Zweibelson 2013: 96 & Zweibelson 2010: ¶9 & note 15). Given Foucault's impact on the social and human sciences, this *lacuna* is curious given the will by military intellectuals to integrate scholarly work from outside military affairs as so academically validate and qualify their work.¹²

¹¹ Additionally, counterinsurgency 'screens' other more aggressive and direct types of warfare that have emerged in the last decade—namely the recourse to a not-so-secret but still clandestine global program of targeted killing, capture, and interdiction by drones and footloose special operations forces. This could make counterinsurgency what Frederic Jameson calls a vanishing mediator, "a catalytic agent which permits an exchange between two otherwise mutually exclusive terms" (Jameson 1973: 78): having 'negated' the initial phase of expeditionary invasions and occupations, counterinsurgency is the middle bridging term subsequently 'negated'—forced to disappear—by the refinement of newer methods of epidemiological and unrestricted warfare.

¹² To be sure, and as I will later outline, state militaries have engaged with, encountered, and integrated oppositional academic or scholarly work, a process made apparent because of the very public life of counterinsurgency's re-conception and re-use. Beyond the criticisms of the military pursuit of cultural intelligence to better understand the human terrain (Price 2011; Gonzalez 2010; Network for Concerned Anthropologists 2009), efforts to 'academize' the counterinsurgency manuals' collective military positivism (Price 2009: 74) is quite clear. An academic stamp was used to grant ethical licence to counterinsurgency's version of warfighting after the 2007 edition of American manual included an introduction from Sara Sewall of the Carr Centre for Human Rights at Harvard University. Militaries today flirt with from the philosophical, theoretical, and discursive thresholds of poststructuralism to animate their conceptualization of violence and operations. The Israeli Defence Forces' Operational Theory Research Institute's short but now well-known doctrine-shaping engagement with rhizomes, the war machine, and *A Thousand Plateaus*. (Deleuze & Guattari 1980 [1986]) was documented by Eyal Weizman (2007: 186-204) and the institute's ex-director Shimon Naveh (Weizman 2006). See chapter three for the lack of explicit military engagement with Foucault and biopower.

Overall, my approach accommodates a wider set of concerns about counterinsurgency that are not simply indexed or reducible to the wars in Afghanistan (or anywhere) or to military arts, philosophy, and science. Continuing to study and develop a generalized spirit of counterinsurgency makes apparent the confluence of ways of rule, ways of war, and ways of life and allows me to track and interpret the drift of biopolitical technologies with their attendant procedures and epistemologies. I think this coincides with what Barkawi and Brighton mean when they ask:

There is little exterior to the orders war creates. But in writing war back into the polity—in engaging war in society—we make a potentially democratizing move, wresting knowledge of war from the sphere of political authority and the knowledge complex around it. We have written war out of the architecture of our reality; what will it mean to write it back in? (Barkawi & Brighton 2011: 142)

Il n'y a pas hors-guerre... mais nous devons pousser notre analyse à l'extérieur. Yes, there may be nothing outside the war but we should push our analysis outside. To put it plainly, Barkawi and Brighton echo Foucault's suggestion in *SMBD* about turning our attention from the peripheral roar of "the distant guns of battle" as the privileged object of war to considering how war has been displaced as a practice and analytic. Liberal war studies has arguably managed to achieve this goal over the last ten years, both tracking the intensification of internal civil wars in the domestic enclosures of North Atlantic states under the rubrics of homeland defense and terrorism, and assessing how the latest cycle of ongoing external wars has affected patterns of securitization, militarization, and neoliberalization. I propose to return to military battle precisely because the fighting 'on the ground' continues but the violence, definitely still deadly and lethal, is also becoming quiet, ambient, slower, and indirect. The munitions delivered and the targets selected are changing and their increasing imperceptibility is troubling. In a deeply disconcerting way, the outcomes or ends—economic development, security, stability— that justify the conduct of counterinsurgency in expeditionary military terms are weaponized, becoming the 'civilizing' and 'liberalizing' weapons themselves.

Diagram Two: Regarding Matters of Special Concern

The first diagram requires a second explanatory diagram. Biopower and biopolitics, race, and collateralization are all concepts that emerge repeatedly throughout the dissertation. I have already alluded to them, and though I address and interrogate these concepts in chapters two and three and deploy them further in chapters four and five, what follows here is a brief explication of each in order to clarify the wider arc of my argument about counterinsurgency. In addition to these terms, I also consider the role of—and my recourse to—military terminology throughout the dissertation, where assuming, translating, and demystifying the operational language of counterinsurgency forces one to confront the implications of being *too* obedient to military semiotics to the point of indulging in the same linguistic and discursive fantasies that create one reality at the expense of many others.

Regarding Biopower & Biopolitics

Often invoked together or close proximity, biopower and biopolitics are core concepts for this project. While chapter three provides a more detailed analysis of Foucault's conception and genealogy of these terms, this shorter summary qualifies how I use and distinguish between the terms. Suffice it to say, this summary refers generally to Foucault's work in the mid to late 1970s and is based on his discussions of biopower and biopolitics in *The History of Sexuality. Volume One* and the lectures *Society Must Be Defended*, *Security Territory Population*, and *Birth of Biopolitics*.

Generally, biopower refers to a modality of power that emerged in the late 17th and early 18th centuries CE in European states, and which was directed at populations order to make life live. Life becomes the object to secure, stabilize, and control. According to Foucault, the concept of population is made legible and intelligible by biopower; as such, the concept of population emerges (and is enframed) as a self-referential knowledge-effect of technologies of government aiming primarily to proliferate productive forms of life. Biopower, as an aggregate technology of order and administration, discovers population as an 'organism' with intrinsic 'natural' elements coincident with the natural scientific realization of human life as species-life and 'biological being' (*l'espèce humaine; être biologique*). The

biological discovery of human life as a species includes the coincident infrastructures and living environments that are re-naturalized as habitat—as an ecology and *milieu* for life. Population is not an original or primary datum but *a derivative invented by the act of government itself*, an index and knowledge-effect that is recursively produced, thereby calling forth and making intelligible the affiliated 'natural' features and rhythms of life (Foucault 1978 [2007]: 70-71). Thus, the population makes the *milieu* legible, and the *milieu* becomes what we understand today as a society, "a new reality" (Foucault 1984: 242). The collection of modern *epistemes* capable of infinitesimal calculations and taxonomic categorizations about the content of human life—biology, demography, ecology, population geography, and statistics—create the analytic conditions for optimizing and regulating life through government (75-6; c.f. Dillon & Reid 2009: 20). For instance, basic epidemiological information and metrics like mortality rates, the distribution of illness, and the relationship between wages and housing allowed government undertaken with and by biopower to shape reality in regards to whose lives were optimized with the allocation of resources and who were left to carve life out themselves.

As I mentioned above, biopower is not merely repressive but equally creative and productive, compelling life to live in specific ways and aiming to normalize the population within an acceptable range of behaviour. Biopower implicitly proposes a paradoxical equivalence: all life is valuable and defensible *and* all life is suspect, and it is not that we are all refugees or all suspects or enemies *but that we are all alive*. If life is contingent and emergent, and if the emergence of life can always be an emergency, technologies of rule must aim to mimic this capacity. The normalization of the emergency has a transformative effect in that preventative and mitigating responses gradually morph into precautionary and pre-emptive measures, which shape the field of possibility. Life must be shaped and conducted to unfold "naturally" but in balance with the contingencies of circulation, dispersion, and distribution, which can be productive and beneficial but also dangerous and damaging (Foucault 1978 [2007]: 64); the circulation of different desires, which are shaped culturally and socially, are regularized and managed but still left dynamically open (73-74). Biopower must find the adequate level of regulation to create a field not of the permissible but of the tolerable; it will manage the 'bandwidth' across what is

acceptable and optimal to what is unacceptable and intolerable based on the ends of making a population live productively. Homogeneity is problematic from this perspective, and Foucault describes how differences are produced and tolerated so long as they fall within this acceptable range so that the power of life is left to unfold (6).

Government and rule—what Foucault refers to as the art of government—coincides with the state and with state power but government is neither reducible to nor synonymous with the state; institutions—health care, public infrastructure, housing, agricultural subsidies—are effects of biopower, stabilizing and fixing relationships and serving as measures of *veridiction*, 'telling the truth' about the needs and requirements of population while simultaneously producing populations to depend on and desire the very provisions provided. The state serves as a condition (a state) or as staging area from which to direct different technologies of biopower to the extent that Foucault refers to the ongoing governmentalization of the s/State (Foucault 1976 [2003]: 242-248). Further, as Foucault argues in *Birth of Biopolitics* (1979 [2008]), liberal and neoliberal conceptions of market economies begin to penetrate the imagination of social relations and government, and the autonomy of capital and the market allows for an analysis of—and for the actual instantiation of—government through economy, which Foucault aims to explain ways that do not follow conventional or orthodox Marxist approaches.

As a collection of different technologies directed at the object of population, biopower operates to secure the population and its *milieu* or environment to 'act on the actions' and 'conduct the conduct' of life. As an aggregation and synthesis of different historical conceptions of power—epidemiological *noso-*power; Christian-based pastoral power; and the custodial imperative of welfare-providing police power—biopower 'treats' the population, selecting some forms of life for care, support, and protection; indifferently exposing others to risk, harm, and vulnerability, rendering them as expendable and unworthy; and killing some in order to nullify threats and risks to lives made to live. As with Bell's description above about counterinsurgency and disease (Bell 2012: 232-4; c.f. Gregory 2008: 40-41), biomedical semiotics and therapeutic technologies of order and organization are not merely metaphors; rather, the imagination of population is coincident with the emergence of material concerns around

contagion, contamination, and disease in relation to the health of a population. Given Foucault's emphasis on separating and dividing practices—cordoning and quarantining—Esposito has persuasively argued that immunity¹³ is the "missing interpretive key" for Foucault's biopower (Esposito 2004 [2008]: 45; c.f. Esposito 2002 [2011]); c.f. Thacker 2006).

If not care and protection, immunity implies at least a condition to secure and sustain, where life rendered as immune is contained and administered. In parallel with this biomedical referent, Foucault identifies the Christian pastorate—pastor and pasture—of the late sixteenth century as a "prelude" to institutionalized biopower (Foucault 1978 [2007]: 184). This pastoral power is a "power of care" (127), a custodial power that must apprehend its 'flock.' The eschatological implication of salvation for the flock translates to salvation and wellbeing for the population in a social and governmental context. Spiritual guidance provides the model for social control through social security and health. The STP lectures describe a "network of servitude" and obedience where the flock is a population of equals who must be cared for and whose lives must be conducted through faith to salvation (Foucault 1978 [2007]: 195). Both the flock and the individual must be managed as a mobile "multiplicity in movement" (125) by the shepherd who does not dominate individuals but governs the flock's circulation under the sign of care: "So, in contrast with the power exercised over the unity of territory, pastoral power is exercised over a *multiplicity on the move*" (126; emphasis added). If counterinsurgents will dream of Foucauldian sheep—directly and indirectly moving the population towards the provision care of a host-nation government—they will also have to reconcile the register of mobility within the coordinates of a pasture. A pasture is not a fenced-in area. It is open and flat, emerging during a pause in the flock's

¹³ Immunity as protection is always incomplete because the immunizations themselves produce ever more resilient risks that adapt in response to treatment. This feedback loop creates a fundamental ontological crux:

If life—which in all its forms is the object of immunization—cannot be preserved except by placing something inside it that subtly contradicts it, we must infer that the preservation of life corresponds with a form of restriction that somehow separates it from itself. Its [life's] salvation thus depends on a wound that cannot heal, because the wound is created by life itself. (Esposito 2002 [2011]: 8)

Esposito's point: when immunizing life becomes the object of government and the basis for entry into a community, the very life of the community—in the virtual and actual enclosures secured and protected so as to be immune—is always wounded and is constituted by the perpetual risk of this wound. The logic of immunity, as the logic of biopower and biopolitics, identifies life itself as a dangerous pathogen and threat. Protection and immunization are thus also exercises in self-harm and damage.

migration and movement; however, the shepherd or guide is required to conduct and provide care and custody precisely when the *milieu* of the pasture is not delimited as such. A pasture invites more risks but these risks are necessary to feed the sheep, allow them to grow, and let their lives unfold in their natural setting of the open range outside the enclosure of the pen. The pastorate is then a non-enclosed enclosure, a bounded territory without a border, and the so-called ungoverned spaces in relation to populations—as is often the case made to justify village-level counterinsurgency—speaks less about the lack of local procedures for rule in the *milieu* and more about the anxiety of counterinsurgents installing the necessary parameters for control in an environment beyond *their* rule.¹⁴

In conjunction with pastoral power, Foucault identifies "police science," which converts pastoral power further towards a biopolitical art of government (Foucault 1978 [2007]: 312). Police power is the primary technology for administering and managing the equilibrium of the population inside the boundaries of the territorial state enclosure. Developing police in relation to the conventional understanding of *polis*—as a "community or association governed by a public authority; a sort of human society when something like political power or public authority is exercised over it" (312)—the conception of police changes in the late 17th and early 18th century, when it becomes "the good use of the state's forces" to sustain the health and vitality of a population whose energies and wellness become the object of government (314; and especially in German, French, and Italian juridical texts discussed in STP), "inserted to command" the problem of the government of living (326-7; c.f. 334-5; 340; 346).

Beyond the lectures, Foucault writes:

[P]olice is the ensemble of mechanisms serving to ensure order, the properly channelled growth of wealth, and the conditions of preservation of health 'in general'...police activities can be readily distinguished in terms of three main sets of aims: economic regulation [...], measures of public order [...], and general rules of hygiene...The sudden importance assumed by medicine in the eighteenth century originates at the point of intersection of a new, 'analytical'

¹⁴ In his lecture on drones, political violence, and the FATA in Pakistan, Derek Gregory critiques the repeated claim by American military and political agents of having to intervene in an ungovernable and lawless space (Gregory 2015). As alibis for asymmetric violence as biopolitical treatment, these claims reproduce the logic of liberal war: ordering and correcting that which is disorderly and dangerous. Gregory argues that these kinds of claims ignore what are alternate protocols for living in these areas (and in Afghanistan; e.g., the Pashtunwali), which may be traditional and customary but which create procedures and laws for everyday life.

economy of assistance with the emergence of the general 'police' of health (Foucault 1976 [1980]: 170-1).¹⁵

Police will 'penetrate' society but will also encounter a density of sociality and social networks that, because they must proliferate and circulate to be productive, outstrip the capacity of police. We have a fine balance: the fantasy of docile bodies and domesticated individuals who govern themselves in and come to expect a system of support and control; and the fantasy of a population threaten to undermine this police power by way of ever-changing social relations and impenetrable formations

The emergence of a biopolitical technology of police admits to the reductive premise of the contract between the state and plural political subjects that become the population, who in turn have their own internal antagonisms; the contract is not annulled but it requires police action to extend the power of government to conduct life and modulate, dampen, or amplify these antagonisms. Implicit in this scenario is a fundamental asymmetry between the way of rule and the ways of life of a population: the way of rule is, in fact, always overmatched by the power of life, and as such must catch-up to conduct the conduct of life and act on the actions. To deal with this in terms of securing and protecting life, the police power described by Foucault attempts to enable the migration of control from government to the self, idealizing a diminution of explicit instruments by letting self-regulation and self-control unfold across the population. As a regime of security, police is outsourced to the self through processes of subjection, which both individualizes and locates individuals as part of a wider population, and which in turn produces and directs the energy of the population as a society towards generating overall health, happiness, and well-being (329-30).

Historically, police power is concerned with strengthening and increasing its powers in relation to the capacities and energies of population (327).¹⁶ Its objects are clear: the number of citizens; the

¹⁵ Adam Smith's "Of Police," the second part of his *Lectures on Jurisprudence* (1763), is notable in relation to Foucault. Aside from the fact that the lectures form the basis of *The Wealth of Nations* (1775), Smith's lectures regarding police are divided into two smaller parts: "Division I: Cleanliness and Security" and "Division II: Cheapness or Plenty". The former addresses similar types of population-level concerns specific to Foucault's elucidation of police power; the latter refers more so to matters of commerce and economic law—to liberal subjects as liberal economic subjects.

¹⁶ German treatises outline a *Polizeiwissenschaft* ("police science") and *Polizeistaat* ("police state") (Foucault 1978 [2007]: 318; c.f. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* 1833 ¶236, in Tiquun 2010: 103-4). In addition, Foucault

necessities of life; general health; occupations and labour-power; and the coexistence and circulation of men and material (322-328). These objects indicate the desire to harness and mobilize the population so as to ensure a coherent kind of sociality and the necessary infrastructure and services for the administration of life, which relates to the maintenance of the essential services and basic necessary infrastructures to sustain a population. These are central concerns for counterinsurgency in doctrine and practice. Police power, then, does not refer to police in pejorative sense as the enforcement arm of the law, or as the agency tasked with distributing the law, though this conception of police as such is a more refined version that follows from the genealogy offered by Foucault. According to the sociologist of police Egon Bittner, police historically function as an intervention arm of government to correct any kind of disorder (i.e., Benjamin's law-preserving violence), whether in strict legal terms or in relation to or in terms of sustaining the health of the population: "Police are empowered and required to impose or, as the case may be, coerce a provisional solution upon emerging problems...their competence to intervene extends to any kind of emergency without any exceptions" (Bittner in Greif 2015: 17).

Counterinsurgents in Afghanistan operate as both types of police: as an enforcement arm for the rule of law re-presented by and as the sovereign power of the host-nation government (i.e., the central government in Kabul); and as military agents delivering services to stabilize, sustain, and support the life of local populations.¹⁷

spends time discussing Nicolas de La Mare's *Traité de la Police* (1704), a government treatise emblematic of police power in France.

¹⁷ Counterinsurgency, especially in the British tradition, is closely associated with colonial constabulary and policing operations, which imply law enforcement and arrest if with more lethal proclivities. Yet the criminal referent of police and the pursuit of individual suspects suggest a blurring between inside-domestic and outside-foreign jurisdiction. Colonial and/or expeditionary environments become liminal spaces that fall under the internal (i.e., traditional police) jurisdiction of colonizing forces. Police implies a lower intensity engagement and lower threshold of violence: for liberal rule, better a police action than a full blown war; better a revolution in police affairs to selectively mediate populations and mitigate global disorder (Palidda 2010: 118). What was a matter of war becomes a matter subject to police power endowed with a legal context related to crime even if it occurs beyond domestic or internal borders, which in turn blurs, on one hand, the language of war and international humanitarian law and, on the other, the language of crime and domestic law. Expeditionary forces acting at the behest of client or host-nation fight wars increasingly defined in criminal rather than martial terms under the aegis of extending the civilizing forces of liberal rule (c.f. Neocleous 2011). In his essay on air power, vertical sovereignty, and no-fly zones, when Neocleous outlines militarism as the universalization of police power, he is referring directly to this process of interventionist warfare becoming a civilizing global police (Neocleous 2013). Caroline Holmqvist, in her book on "policing wars," argues that the North Atlantic military interventions of the early 21st century are "rationalized not as war proper but as a necessary corrective to disorder—a fantasy that proved extraordinarily lasting in the liberal imagination" (Holmqvist 2014: 16). The implication is that

I understand biopolitics, in distinction from biopower, as referring more so the aggregation and durable functioning of technologies of biopower, and its use by Foucault is linked to an assessment of neoliberalism and the eclipse of social relations by economic logics regarding new modes of subjectivity and the dismantling of the Keynesian capitalist social welfare state in the post-WW2 period. The 'birth' of biopolitics is something Foucault assesses recursively, identifying how the collection and historical production of technologies of biopower as a form of governmentality developed over four hundred years of liberal rule come into sharper relief when examining the neoliberal present of the late 1970s with human capital, entrepreneurial subjectivity, and the 'equally unequal' basis of the enterprise society tied to a new and 'not so new' liberalism. If biopower identifies problems of population through the optics of health and police and war, government after the birth of biopolitics perceives its own administration of life as an economic process reliant on larger political economic transformations to dictate how to rule. Given biopower unfolded by way mixing intervention with the logic of *laissez-faire*—letting reality unfold by leaving it alone—biopolitics indicates a historical moment where the art of government responds to the call of *laissez-nous-faire*—"leave us alone" (Foucault 1979 [2008]: 20). In effect, while this biopolitical shift seems like an affirmative response to a population demanding to be left to its own devices and suggests a way of ruling that is in tune with the general will, Foucault argues that government actively engineers this situation so that it appears as a natural outcome. Economy will 'tell the truth' about how to rule by offering an appropriate apparatus of security to ensure good government and productive populations:

[I]t will be state intervention with the essential function of ensuring the security of the natural phenomena of *economic processes* intrinsic to population. This explains, finally, the insertion of freedom within governmentality, not only as the right of individuals legitimately opposed to the power, usurpations, and abuses of the sovereign or the government, but as an element that has become indispensable to governmentality itself. (1978[2007]: 353)

Economic freedom will become the way through which art of government will organize populations in a way that guards against the excesses of "overly-regulatory police" (353). The historical transformation

foreign wars, at least from the perspective of the North Atlantic, are civil wars always-already as they are *internal* to the global order of liberal rule and its presumed jurisdiction. North Atlantic military intervention becomes police enforcement that is, on one hand, aggressive and repressive and, on the other, expressed through custodial life-sustaining measures specific to biopower.

to a generalized condition of biopolitics is realized when economic thinking not simply quickens techniques of biopower but also organizes in full the surplus value of populations not bound-up in the capital-labour relationship described and explained by the tradition of Marx-Weber (Lazzarato 2002: ¶8; c.f. Dean 2012). As Lazzarato puts it, Foucault—along with Deleuze and Guattari—tells a different story and advances a "non-economistic" conception of the economy, which involves considering how economic production invents subjectivities and shapes forms of life in relation to the production of desire and of power relations (Lazzarato 2012: 42). The quilting point of neoliberal-biopolitical rationality is the intersection of the macroeconomic competition-based enterprise society¹⁸ and microeconomic entrepreneurial subjectivity, which together aim to understand social (i.e., non-economic) behaviour economically and thereby move to gain "complete knowledge" of the economy (Foucault 1979 [2008]: 226, 243)

Regarding Positive & Negative Biopower

As Dillon and Reid (2009) and Mbembe (2003) make clear, Foucault does not evacuate the question of death and killing from the field of biopower; rather, death and killing are indexed to making lives—and some life as opposed to other types of life—live. Thus, biopower refers to administering life *and death*, where what is made to live and die becomes the basis for differentiation, revealing population-level biopower as a process fundamentally about dividing, separating, and segregating different segments of the population (Butler 2009 & 2004). Within the wider field of work around biopower, many have distinguished between positive and negative forms of biopower: the former being technologies of power directed at populations that make life live; the latter being technologies that make life die or expose life to harm, risk, and indifference. According to this schematic, some techniques foster and prioritize life while others restrict or disqualify life to the point of death (Balibar, in Aradau 2012: ¶2). In this context, lethal military firepower typically associated with military fighting and combat can be understood as negative biopower, part of the "necessary killing" that is distributed to make life live

¹⁸ Enterprise society follows from already-economized conceptions of civil society. See Foucault's lengthy discussions of Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson in the latter half of *BoB*, especially lecture 12 (4 April 1979).

(Dillon & Reid 2009: 104). For instance, the increasing individuation of targeted killing achieved by drones, which is described in detail by Derek Gregory and by the cynegetic manhunt doctrine described by Chamayou, takes negative biopower to its logical end on a global scale (Gregory 2014: 11; Chamayou 2011). Watson writes, "This strain of biopolitics thus addresses the conundrum posed by modern liberalism: the preservation of life tends to take the form of allowing, threatening, or imposing death" (Watson 2012: ¶3). So, the productive power of life as the object addressed by biopolitical governmentality still demands a negative component: what, again, Weizman calls "thanato-tactics" (Weizman 2011); what Mbembe calls the necropolitical impulse (Mbembe 2003); and what Agamben has referred to as the *a priori* threat of death directed at bare life before the custodial protection of government (Agamben 1998)—even if this killing power is obscured, obfuscated, or made 'indirect' as described by Foucault. Further, more advanced engagements with the concept of biopower, specifically in anti-capitalist Italian political economy and critiques of neoliberalism, invoke biopolitics in more affirmative ways in order to relocate questions of biopower as a creative program to consider how a population may in fact realize itself as a people and so determine how to govern itself with different protocols or procedures according to a different but as yet undiscovered biopolitics to come (i.e., like a Deleuzian people and way of life to come).

The use of biopower and biopolitics to describe, explain, and interrogate military population-centered counterinsurgency is viable and novel insofar as these concepts are not used in the military literature or lexicon. As with the concepts of war, capital, or violence, one runs the risk of recognizing biopolitics and biopower in everything, leaving no middle-range ways of understanding things and imposing the same kinds of totalizing methods against which Foucault warned in his outline of genealogy (see below). Sometimes, during this project, this slip or drift occurs; however, by working to avoid the overdetermination of everything and *every thing* as biopolitical, Foucault's concepts remain valuable in making military violence intelligible in novel ways, which also then mark out new ways of naming and framing military affairs independent of military actors who assume the prerogative and monopoly to conduct and discursively frame war and violence. Military violence—lethal, kinetic, and

high-speed—that kills people, and military violence—non-lethal, 'non-kinetic', and slower— that makes people live can be coded as negative (killing) biopower and positive (making live) biopower. The making-live and making-die functions of biopower can be said to conform to a wider kind of military biopolitics. However, while this wider sense of biopolitics holds to explain the range of military activities I identify and explain, I make distinctions throughout between firepower and biopower, or between ballistics and biopolitics, for heuristic and analytic purposes.

Regarding Race & Racism

Foucault discusses race and racism at length at the end of *Society Must Be Defended* (Foucault 2003), though the discussion is tied to his question early in the lectures regarding the displacement of war and regarding whether or not war can be deployed or used as an analyzer of power relations (i.e., can government 'use' war to imagine a way of ruling populations; Foucault 1976 [2003]: 45-6). Though his explication of race is often linked to his problematic and underdeveloped analysis of European imperialism and the civilizational violence of colonialism, racism is a core feature of his genealogy of biopower. In fact, he points to the discernable emergence of 'race thinking' (Foucault 1976 [2003]: 60). In that it relates directly to the separating and dividing practices of biopower for conducting the conduct of the life of the population, race is a crucial concept as a sorting device, and racism is the form of power-knowledge and discourse on which biopower is built. In the lectures, Foucault states:

What in fact is racism? It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power's control: the break between what must live and what must die. (Foucault 1976 [2003]: 254)

The first function of racism [is] to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum. (295)

Racism is how the population will be divided as a species into what is valuable and what is not, into what will enjoy the custodial resources of government and what will not, and each distinction is necessary to the wider project of biopolitics. Race will be the way by which to determine how and what life will and will not exist, and how the resources of government—the state, sovereign violence, institutions, the market, public infrastructure— will be allocated and distributed to sustain such a

divide. Thus, Foucault develops a theory of racism that is generalizable to the genealogy and conceptualization of biopower. Insofar as we agree that biopower is generalizable to explain the technologies of order, ways of rule, and the government of life, we are all constituted by and through race, first as expressions of human life that are made to live, exposed and left to die, or killed to make other life live, and subsequently as raced bodies (e.g. whiteness, blackness, Other). Foucault's explication of race and racism has less to do with more contemporary or pejorative accounts of racism (i.e., the logics of white privilege and white supremacy; whiteness as a discursive position; for instance, what Rinaldo Walcott calls zones of black death) or to specific approaches in postcolonial approaches and critical race theory (e.g., Said, Spivak, Chow), though it is not disconnected from these terms despite charges regarding the poverty of Foucault's analysis of race in contemporary terms (c.f. Puar 2007 for an extension of Foucault's conception of biopower and race in relation to terror and state violence). Analyses that expose racialized systems of social relations (e.g., settler colonialism), and the subordination of communities based on explicit forms of racial segregation, are arguably more specific than the racial logic described and analyzed by Foucault. His offering is a non-racialized theory of racism.

Certainly, we can discuss how North Atlantic counterinsurgents racialize local Afghan communities, coding them as effeminate and inferior Oriental others who are backward, primitive, or non-modern, and I address this in chapter two and four. Yet, in a way more in line with Foucault's sense of race, population-centered counterinsurgency relies on racism in the discursive and semiotic construction of insurgency, where the bodies and environments coded as insurgent serve not only as targets for military operations but also as exceptional aberrations marked out and excised from the rest of a population. In describing today's liberal wars waged by North Atlantic states on behalf of life itself, Michael Dillon describes how this negative biopower or necropolitics relies on race determine what is "promotable" and what is deemed "antipathetic" in terms of the population:

While the project of making of making life live requires a letting die, [it is] often also an actively promoted killing, necropolitics is the other face of biopolitics. This is precisely where race comes in for Foucault. Race is one of those mechanisms by which biopolitics adjudicates life for the purposes not only of saying how life is to be promoted but also which life has to be

disempowered and disenfranchised in that cause. Race is a governmental technology as much as it is a biologized cultural and political ideology. (Dillon 2008: 195)

When race is repurposed for culturally-attuned counterinsurgents to help them kill correctly, 'insurgent' actually becomes a racial category. As Alesandro Dal Lago puts this in relation to what he calls an asymmetric war against persons who count *only* because they possess *no* value: "the treatment of the enemy is racist to a new extreme because it does not assume its inferiority, but rather its *a priori* exclusion from humankind" (Dal Lago 2010: 31). That said, given counterinsurgent thinking understands insurgency through the optic of grievance and resentment, its logic also holds that a population can be redeemed in environmental terms by identifying "unfortunate locally regressive conditions that can be manipulated to resuscitate the vitality of local life systems" (Evans 2011: 750). Even if a population enframed by counterinsurgency is a volatile field always "*tensed* on the verge of becoming dangerous" (Anderson 2011: 225), the logic renders friends and enemies in fluid ways: "Counterinsurgency becomes anticipatory. The emphasis is on whether a friend could become an enemy in the future or vice versa. This means that any actual enemy is not simply an evil to be destroyed and extinguished" (Anderson 2010: 213). As a generalized technology of biopolitics, race, like insurgency, becomes contextual and contingent, normalized but never normal.

Regarding Collateralization

Throughout the project, I refer to collateralization and to the collateralization of military violence. As I discuss in more detail at the end of chapter two, I draw on this concept of collateral in a number of registers: financially, where one collateralizes debts to guarantee repayment, where debt becomes a disciplinary relation of power; in circulatory terms, where collateral flows can open if a blockage in a route or pathway emerges to stem the flow of a material or arrest as process; in terms of horizontal or lateral violence, where victims of structural violence and systemic oppression displace violence into their own communities rather than at the wider system that sustains this violence; and in military terms, where collateral damage refers to incidental and unintended destruction or death as a result of missions and operations, where targeting was not discriminate enough.

Collateralization is how I describe the unrestriction and increasingly indiscriminate expression of violence specific to counterinsurgency. Violence moves sideways, collateral to the traditional space of fighting that is combat undertaken with firepower, ballistics, and munitions. The biopolitical component of counterinsurgency, insofar as it is not necessarily lethal but still invasive, unsettling, and coercive, is slower violence targeting the life of a population, what Weizman describes in his analysis of the normalization of military and humanitarian lesser evils (Weizman 2012). These lesser evils, given the way they are framed as proportional and appropriate to create acceptable end states for operational success, are in counterinsurgency used with increasing frequency, which counterintuitively but actually *removes restrictions* on the biopower-end of the warfighting continuum. Given the way counterinsurgency intervenes into the space of life itself, it is less discrete and increasingly indiscriminate as the way of waging the war—with biopower as reconstruction, as infrastructure development, as local village stability through economic enfranchisement— collapses with the outcomes or ends themselves. Instead of indiscriminate violence being area-directed munitions, it is constituted more so by area-directed biopower underwritten by firepower. In this sense, the collateralization of military violence as the indiscriminate unrestriction of force has an environmental and atmospheric register, what Anderson describes as military environmentalism (Anderson 2011). This atmospheric and environmental register realizes, if somewhat differently, the military concept of *enfilade*, or envelopment. With the contemporary predilection to operationalize 'non-military' means and measures by intervening into different ecologies in a battlesphere, collateralization relates to dispersing and distributing war into spaces not typically deemed the space of fighting, and it implies speculating on this distribution to derive different returns and generate different systemic effects.

Regarding Military Terminology & (Dis)Obedience

At a number of different points, this project engages with the production of military knowledge in order to interrogate what I call the aesthetic equipment of counterinsurgency. As such, how the project negotiates military knowledge and the raft of military terminology is a core concern with

respect to the analysis. How words enact realities to sustain a whole architecture of violence is crucial, and recognizing the ways in which military language serves as media—as mediating the in-between space of thought and action to the point of obfuscating this gap—is of considerable importance. The archive that is military language commands and commences reality, working like a fetish endowed with magical powers, incantation-like. From the biological and medical metaphors of treatment inherent in counterinsurgency to the thermodynamic imagination of a military environmentalism that 'injects heat' into a system to generate effects, the possibility of military violence relies on the possibilities of language to see and say things and so distribute sense itself. The dense neologisms and acronyms make for a discourse of camouflage and secrecy that occurs in plain sight, impenetrable to the non-initiated.

Different works by Ranajit Guha (1983), Jacques Derrida (1984), Christopher Coker (2008), Jan Mieszkowski (2009), Anderson (2011), and Weizman (2012) among others provide very specific ways of criticizing the linguistic and rhetorical production of insurgency, focusing on how doctrine documents, field manuals, and operational assessments represent and so imagine and produce a very specific type of military reality and peculiar discourse of war. As argued in chapter two, doctrine is many things, but it is above all a dreamworld for deciding on and deriving military desires. Carol Cohn's well-known feminist critique of the phallic and patriarchal newspeak of defence intellectuals in the American nuclear discourse of the 1980s addresses this problematic (Cohn 1987). Further, a parodic research proposal submitted to American defence contractor Lockheed Martin (via Princeton University) by Jeff Dolven and Graham Burnett entitled "Irony in the National Defense" (Dolven & Burnett 2009) focuses playfully on the semiotic infrastructure necessary for war (linguistic *jouissance*) along with the self-reflexive feedback that comes with using language as such. Language itself, then, is a source of what Clausewitz called fog and friction, where representation, whether with words in a report or in the real-time networked processing of sensors and signals, becomes a source both of intelligence and of dangerous volatility

Meta-level considerations of doctrine as semiotic systems are well-established *within* military organs, refining how North Atlantic agents of war order and organize objects, spaces, and targets.

Words produce and sustain these things. Therefore, investigating military violence and counterinsurgency warfare, with its corollaries of ongoing contingency and stability operations, necessarily requires a consideration of how the arbitrary and mutable ontology of language is the *first stability and contingency operation* required from military actors, who seize on a consistent vocabulary to create the physical and metaphysical theatre of operations itself. Language induces different effects, a shaping and smoothing asset to clear, hold, and build reality. As such, the project struggles with the question of obedience to military language, acknowledging the ways in which "clean language" (Cohn 1987: 690) is employed to sanitize violence, not so much camouflaging reality with anti-septic, sterile, or instrumental language but rather staging violence according to a semiotic map of reality that precedes the environment or territory in advance.

Military language thus territorializes a place for violence. Most evident in this respect is the rampant use of acronyms, abbreviations, and initialized short forms (e.g., NATO 2010, *AJP-01(D) Allied Joint Doctrine*), which imply a reductionist power to efficiently and ergonomically enframe a specific operating picture while obfuscating the messy material events that derive from their use. The articulation of different acronym-abbreviation assemblies, as equipment, is the articulation of—and the expression of anxiety about—*control*; master the language and master the world. This form of terminology and the density of the vernacular serve as a kind of collective event horizon, asymmetrically delimiting complexity and regulating the boundaries of possibility. PMESSI-PT, one of the longest initialized short forms and acronyms (it is invoked and spoken as a word) in the counterinsurgent lexicon, refers to an operational assessment guide that identifies Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time, which is a meaningless and reified bloc for the uninitiated and a code for which one needs the necessary key. DIME can refer to Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economics *or* to Dense Inert Metal Explosives, and the ambiguity of the acronym here cuts against the promise of thinking military problems through military shorthand. TIC, "team in contact" during combat/kinetic operations, lends itself to different affects and signifieds, like the normalization of battlespace tempo and rhythm as in the 'tic-toc' of a clock; or like a

tic that is a sudden but repetitive irruption or spasm, predictable in a person or population, a tendency that must be governed and managed; or a tick that is a small parasitic insect that nags, burrows, and infects a host, a persistent and nagging feature of an ecosystem. Even as a simple example, the TIC-tic-tick chain indicates slippage and semiotic drift, and it implies how counterinsurgents may come to understand the employment and application of violence whether in terms of firepower or biopower. Suffice it to say, appreciating this wider linguistic operation is important, as is self-monitoring how thoroughly one indulges in and uses it in imitation.

Opting to negotiate and navigate these epistemological blocks of power-knowledge and subsequently problematizing them requires both a kind of semiotic acumen and a willingness to remain removed, modulating how to deeply to take on military language and its symbolic referents and how to escape and so undermine the powerful function of the same language. Fundamentally, this is a question of obedience and intelligibility: on one hand, ensuring comprehension to expose and translate ideas from the military source; and, on the other, retaining agency and not relying on or affirming the same militarized imagination of the world. Throughout, the project oscillates between indulging in and refusing military language, which is a constituting antagonism of the work, a contradiction in relation to what Foucault described as totalizing procedures. Certainly, one must learn to speak in the operational language to demonstrate fluency and currency so as to pass, especially when engaging with military agents working within military organs; one must assert knowledge, currency, and legitimacy in the face of the authoritative military paternalism directed to interlopers and outsiders. Yet, throughout, one must also realize an inevitable recursive creep, where the vehicular language subject to criticism suffuses and bleeds into the critical account, nearly overwhelming it, reterritorializing the violence it sought to dismantle, and disturbing the relation and flow between what is deemed the major and minor literature (i.e., Deleuze & Guattari's use of Henri Gobard's tetralinguistic typology). The minor literature—the critical account of counterinsurgency—is sometimes overwhelmed by the operational literature it seeks to disturb. This happens at moments throughout this project, knowingly and unknowingly, even as I proceed with deconstructivist vigilance.

Diagram Three: Genealogy, Method, and Making-Curious Counterinsurgency

Without wanting to sound too static or reductive, Foucault 'extracted' biopower with the method of genealogy, and I use both the product and the method to read counterinsurgency. Indeed, his work on security, war, and biopolitics and their connections to questions of territory, circulation, and political economy follow from what were genealogical investigations. Without wanting to overdetermine this dichotomy or render method and content in binary terms, we should recognize that the former—the body of work on biopower and biopolitics—is possible only through the latter in that genealogy offers a different type of equipment to distribute what is sensible and intelligible in conceptual and historical terms. So, what follows here is a series of considerations relating to the general genealogical method of this dissertation, which consequently engages with a number of ideas central to Foucault's wider intellectual project.

Few are invoked as frequently in cultural theory and the humanities as Foucault. Just as the focus of Foucault's work varied and transformed over the course of his own intellectual trajectory, scholars invoking and importing Foucault often emphasize different Foucauldian iterations and personas, whether as archivist and cartographer (Deleuze 2011 [1988]), historian of systems of thought, philosopher of freedom and the subject, or theorist of violence and war. Writing about the best way to situate Foucault's thinking on security, war, and politics, Michael Dillon and Andrew Neal argue that Foucault's establishment and subsequent abandonment of trajectories of investigation—for example, his initial consideration of security falls by the wayside for a more pronounced exploration of pastoral power and biopower in *Security Territory Population*—indicate impasses and contradictions in his thought (2009: 1-2). This is to say, there is nothing 'complete' or self-evident about Foucault even as his work is reified, applied, and put to work as if it were purely distilled and free from any conjecture. According to Mark G.E. Kelly, the biopolitics lectures, which were composed and delivered out of obligations as a professor at France's premier academic institution, were "summaries of research on primary texts, with some preliminary interpretive gloss" that Foucault was hesitant to see published on their own terms (Kelly 2015: ¶6). Kelly's essay, which acknowledges the shortcomings of Foucault's

work but primarily responds to recent arguments that Foucault's study of neoliberalism was somehow an affirmation of neoliberal government,¹⁹ registers the range of academic, intellectual, and (bio)political uses of Foucault's work. On what scholars do with Foucault, Kelly writes:

Should we then similarly attribute the tame banality of Foucault scholarship today as simply reflecting the political temperature of our times and hope that when things are ripe the political resources of Foucault's thought will activate again? [...] Much academic writing that invokes Foucault is politically demobilising, even when it invokes his theory of power directly. Tepid scholarship not only reflects but contributes to the tepidity of the times. Foucault scholarship is an ideological battlefield, by which I mean not that it is a *Kampfplatz* where social forces meet in a sublimated form, but rather something more complicated: a *Kampfplatz* which has the possibility of generating new resources and perspectives that can change the wider war. In this, it is in fact no different from any literal battle, because wars, like everything else, are much more complicated than our binary imagination allows. (¶20)

Kampfplatz is a battlefield or battleground, and this martial metaphor is fitting given both this project and the way in which Kelly advocates for making judicious use of the conceptual resources available in Foucault's body of work.

While referred to generally as the theorist of power relations, subjectivization, and force, I am inclined to emphasize the way in which Foucault's thinking is unified around the concern of order and organization. Regardless of theme or approach, his work consistently considers how processes of sovereign power, disciplinary power, and biopower are imposed on individual bodies and across populations to control spaces, induce self-regulation, and enable predictable and normalized outcomes. If his earlier method of archaeology sought to uncover or excavate *epistemes* (bodies of knowledge or discursive formations) to comprehend and challenge their discursive and thus social and political function as regimes of Truth (i.e., power-knowledge; not simply knowledge as truth but the power to nominate knowledge as Truth), genealogy responds to ruptures, counter-movements, and reversals within embedded social and political formations at given moments as they constitute a regime of Truth.

¹⁹ Kelly's essay is a response to a series of discussions around the work of Daniel Zamora published in *Jacobin Magazine*, who argues that Foucault's research and work along with his "curious sympathy for neoliberalism" were irresponsible in the context of sustaining the left during the 1970s somehow led to the hardening of neoliberal government. Besides Zamora, Kelly outlines and rebukes a number of detractors and accusations that make Foucault into a figure of "wild contradictions"—a rebuke with which I agree entirely. Kelly goes on to explain the relation between orthodox Marxist theory and Foucault's work before ultimately asserting the importance of Foucault for any Left politics and denouncing radicals who slavishly seek full-formed answers about what is to be done. For Zamora's work, see References. Zamora's edited collection, *Critiquer Foucault: Les Années 1980 et La Tentation Néolibérale* (2014), is slated for publication in English in fall 2015.

Certainly, his genealogy 'sees' rationalizations that undergird and buttress the production of knowledges and practices; however, genealogy is devised to detect and flesh out a messier account of contingencies and discrepancies—that is, how at any given time smaller, situated 'micro-discursivities' struggle against one another.

Calling it a tactic rather than a discernible method, Foucault maintained that genealogy operates on two levels: one, it reveals the contingencies and fractures within social and political "totalization procedures"; and two, it remains self-reflexive and vigilant about the totalizing procedures of critique and analysis themselves (Foucault 1982: 213). Foucault's conception of genealogy is based largely on Nietzsche's anti-positivist, anti-*telos* *Genealogy of Morals*. Foucault writes:

In short, genealogy demands relentless erudition. Genealogy does not oppose itself to history as the lofty and profound gaze of the philosopher might compare to the mole-like perspective of the scholar; on the contrary it rejects the metahistorical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself to the search for "origins." (Foucault 1984: 77)

There is no 'dazzling emergence' of a knowledge formation or strategy of power, no clear-cut cause or founding moment; in the language of today's complexity theory, Foucault aimed to account for and map the turbulence of emergent causality. Warning against unitary and transcendental explanations, Foucauldian genealogy attempts to resist theoretical constructs pressed down from above in favour of a historical analysis of local phenomena— a materialist history 'from below.' Put another way, if the genealogy of contemporary counterinsurgency is an investigation and critique of political violence, the method would require "discard[ing] all monolithic analyses of violence" and affirm Walter Benjamin's critique of the constituting power of violence as a world-making force (1921; c.f. Hanssen 2000: 29). Topographic approaches and the containment of phenomena with explanatory axes are rejected in favour of a topological analysis of local relations between modes or points within a given system or scenario in order to make apparent the visible and articulable aspects of "strata or historical formations" (Deleuze 2011 [1988]: 44). Inherent in Foucault's work is the recognition that the strategies, techniques, and practices of power and order were and are in no way complete or consolidated so as to be external from the processes in which they unfolded. They are neither self-evident nor unassailable.

Foucault writes: "What is found at the historical beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of other things. It is disparity" (Foucault 1984: 79).

In the simplest and most general terms, genealogy apprehends the emergence of ongoing problems and identifies how modalities of power respond to and reconfigure those problems with alternative techniques and practices.²⁰ While this is abstract, it means that the strategies of power produced by social institutions and political formations are not static but mobile, constantly 'probing' and experimenting to invent the possibility of order, which is *always* a problem. Rather than fixed arrivals, the outcomes are better understood as interactions between the knowledge-effects created by the empirical methods themselves, a process of adjustment and adaptation in a non-finalized process continuously instituting and staging the necessary procedures. Genealogy 'reads' the disciplines and the technologies of biopower not as inert but productive and responsive, indexed to targeted bodies and populations that actively negotiate this power. For instance—and in a way relevant to our inquiry—the emergence and operation of what Foucault calls "apparatuses of security" (Foucault 2007 [1978]: 29-30) do not wholly repress and restrain action but responsively employ a logic of recognition and integration so as to enable the productivity of life itself without clamping down too hard, all the while converting and 'securitizing' (bio)political questions to remove them from the discursive and practical field of contestation (Cowen 2010: 610). The rationality here is based on regularizing action predictably via the disciplinary "normation" of bodies and the normalization of populations (Foucault 2007 [1978]: 56-67).²¹ The power to order and regularize is thus always-already an inquiry and investigation of what is possible and *how* it is possible. In *The Birth of Biopolitics*, Foucault identifies a more sophisticated method than simply denouncing power or thinking of power in terms of oppression and repression. His critique proposes determining, "under what conditions and with what effects a *veridiction* is exercised...a type of formulation under particular rules of verification and falsification" (Foucault 2008 [1979]: 36, emphasis mine). Veridiction amounts to a 'truth-telling' function inherent to a discourse and its affiliated

²⁰ In addition to Foucault's own description, Maija Holmer Nadesan offers a schematic outline of possible points of investigation specific to genealogy. In her discussion of Foucault (and Foucault-inspired social theorist Nikolas Rose), genealogy comprises problematizations, explanations, technologies, authorities, subjectivities, and strategies (Nadesan 2008: 12).

²¹ This is what Deleuze will later refer to as modulation in the context of control societies.

material practices that validate it on its own terms as the Truth. Genealogy thus intends to make visible or utterable the formations and practices of power *and* how these practices verify and validate their own practices in self-fulfilling and self-referential terms.

What does a method of genealogy offer to a study of counterinsurgency? An answer: it gives us the vocabulary and also the approach to talk about the re-appearance of counterinsurgency, its residues and remnants, and its drift into other domains that, initially at least, seem non-military. Divorced from the search for origins (*Ursprung*), genealogy almost dismisses the very existence of the phenomena it apprehends or assesses in order to reconstitute both its descent (*Herkunft*) and emergence or arising (*Entstehung*) to establish what Foucault calls "the entry of forces" (Foucault 1984: 85). To borrow from the arboreal/rhizome distinction developed by Deleuze and Guattari, genealogy—as a way of explanation and analysis—refuses pre-formed objects arranged in progressive or tree-like forms of descent, instead foregrounding intensive and contingent kinds of relationships emerging across different fields at a given moment.²² In our case, a genealogy of counterinsurgency does not deny the tangible practice of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it confirms that North Atlantic state militaries have prosecuted counterinsurgency warfare by making life die and making life live but 'acknowledges' counterinsurgency warfare as a multiplicity of physical, epistemological, and territorializing forces, which in combination induce a consistent phenomenon called 'counterinsurgency', which in turn validates or disqualifies itself. In abstract terms, genealogy stabilizes an aggregation of different elements and material flows to make an object or process stable so as to become legible. The method is geological and ecological. One should not mistake the power and functioning of the apparatus (*dispositif*) with "ancient continuity" but understand it in terms of the play of forces in a process of "systemic dissociation" that gives and takes elements (ibid., 97). Though premised against the deployment of explanatory frameworks that guarantee a desired reading and against narratives confirming the inevitability of phenomena, genealogy still proceeds with a deliberate motive or *a priori* inference. This

²² Manuel De Landa, in his assemblage theory, has refined this approach to create the non-anthropocentric neomaterialist approach to Western history by emphasizing singularities, phase transitions, 'machinic phyla' and phase spaces, bifurcation points, nested hierarchies, and abstract degrees of freedom. His Fernand Braudel/Deleuze-inspired history of warfare, (1989) *War in the Age of Intelligent Machines*, offers a compelling account of Western-Northern revolutions in military affairs.

has caused many to remark on the tension in Foucault's own work between a closely-read materialist history and the tempering influence of his prevailing philosophical *and* political priorities. Yet, Foucault was clear: one must make deliberate and intentional choices in "rationalizing the aims of analysis" (Foucault 2003 [1976]: 8); analysis must proceed from a situated context and cannot be "a spontaneous process coming from anywhere" (Foucault 2007 [1978]:172). As such, a genealogy of counterinsurgency and its remains and residues identifies the entry of biopolitical forces into contemporary military thinking and their effects on the conduct and territorialization of collateral war.

To avoid getting bogged down in Foucault's multiple statements about genealogy, I draw on the succinct definition given in *STP* and relate them to how this method works for a study of counterinsurgency. He outlines the "three displacements" or "de-centerings" offered by a genealogical approach: "extra-institutional, non-functional, and non-objective" (2007 [1978]: 116-119). Extra-institutional refers to an analysis of counterinsurgency warfare that moves analysis "outside the institution." Most simply, this means framing the conceptualization of battlespace and warfighting in counterinsurgency in ways that are outside of the conventional explanations following from the traditional monopoly and jurisdiction given to state militaries to prosecute specialized types of political violence. This also means attending especially to minor knowledges within the military knowledge-production system, which spiral from the ongoing experimental probing undertaken by doctrine and conduct. A non-functional approach outlines population-centred counterinsurgency in a practical sense (i.e., what it does, where, how) but also considers how, beyond this primary function, the prosecution of counterinsurgency integrates other practices in unanticipated or unintended ways. An emphasis on the non-objective dimension of counterinsurgency acknowledges the object "counterinsurgency" but refuses to endow it with a unitary, self-evident, and ready-made status in favour of discerning a more fluid or syncretic and synthetic collection of practices and partial techniques that recombine over time.

The Lines of Operation to De-Center Counterinsurgency

A number of the counterinsurgency manuals propose creating dedicated and well-defined 'lines of operation' to manage and deploy kinetic and non-kinetic resources. I propose five subsequent lines of operation to de-center counterinsurgency and interrogate the firepower and biopower used to collateralize war and insert it in ambient into the atmospheres and environments of life itself. To undertake a genealogy and theorize the collateralization and unrestriction of warfare, and to make sense of the wider spirit of counterinsurgency, each of the following five chapters develops a specific focus, standing on its own while building toward an overall interrogation of the concerns of this project. Given the confluence of diverse academic and military literatures outlined in this introduction, each chapter attempts to bring clarity to the aesthetic, epistemological, and material production of counterinsurgency by creating a more contained assessment related to particular themes.

Chapter two, "Counterinsurgency, or the Aesthetic Equipment of Military Enlightenment," focuses on counterinsurgency within the context of military affairs and interrogates its key features and aesthetic equipment. Framing the chapter through the context of enlightenment as myth (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947 [1969]: 6) and through the idea of enlightenment as a modern "limit-attitude" (Foucault 1984: 45), I consider the military "lessons learned" apparatus and theories of military adaptation and innovation in order to interrogate contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine as both reality and dreamworld—a military positivism with a necessary aesthetic dimension to assign and distribute what and how violence, force, and coercion are possible. Among others, I consider Clausewitz's *On War* (1837 [1976]), Derrida's essay on nuclear war and language (1984), Negri's conception of insurgency (1999), and Guha's essay on the prose of counterinsurgency (1983) to interrogate the semiotic and linguistic production of military reality. This leads into an interrogation of counterinsurgency as a historical discourse and as a practice of irregular war, which is increasingly 'regularized.' Further, the doctrine produced in late-colonial counterinsurgency suggested both a significant RMA and the arrival of "modern warfare," which actually indicates a postmodern sensibility amongst counterinsurgents who no longer regard the conventional war metanarrative as legitimate.

The chapter turns to the concepts of battlespace and battlesphere, operational art, and Systemic Operation Design (SOD) and Effects-Based Operations (EBO), which constitute and sustain counterinsurgency's aesthetic equipment and counterinsurgent's capacities to operationalize of firepower and biopower. The counterinsurgency-related doctrinal architectures of contingency operations and adaptive dispersed operations are emblematic of these processes; they reveal the increasingly *atmospheric and environmental* ontology of military violence that is both abstract and tangible as a production of affects, communications, and forces. The chapter concludes by relying on work from Weizman regarding the principles of proportionality, necessity, and restraint as lesser evils (2007, 2011, and 2012). I link these elements to the epidemiological basis of counterinsurgency as unrestricted and indiscriminate warfare, which actively speculates on and collateralizes military violence through new methods of *enfilade*—envelopment—territorialized by a mixture of ballistic and biopolitical measures traveling with different rates, speeds, and intensities.

Chapter three, "Counterinsurgency, or the Continuation of Foucault by Other Means," serves as a bridge, drawing on first on Foucault's work and work liberal war studies before turning to the military narrative and conduct of counterinsurgency from 2006 to 2010. In his recent book *Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction* (2012), Thomas Lemke writes, "[B]iopolitics constitutes a theoretical and empirical field that crosses conventional disciplinary boundaries and undermines the traditional academic and intellectual division of labour" (Lemke 2012: 2). This goes as much for the field of liberal war studies as it does for the implicit theorization and implication of biopolitical strategies, practices, and techniques in population-centred counterinsurgency. The chapter explores the missed encounter between Foucault and counterinsurgents in what are two parallel population-centered theories of life and power that emerge in the same historical moment. It provides an overview of Foucault's work on biopower and considers biopolitics as the missing 'interpretive key' for counterinsurgents who 'do' Foucault without knowing it, if in an inverted way and for violent ends. The chapter moves through Foucault's biopolitical paradigm, focusing on his engagement with Clausewitz and outlining a number of shortcomings with respect to the genealogy of biopower/biopolitics—namely, the lack of any

substantive engagement with the 'epistemological ruptures' of settler colonialism and imperialism. I then consider how, in the 1960s, the increasingly population-centered theorist of power and order and the emerging postcolonial population-centered conception of modern warfare 'miss' one another. After flirting with the fantasy of an advance seminar on Foucault for lesson-learning counterinsurgents, the chapter offers an overview on the messianic return of counterinsurgency to military affairs, whereby counterinsurgency became the route to victory, the exit strategy, and the answer to the expeditionary wars spawned by the War on Terror.

Chapter four, "Counterinsurgency, or Envelopment, Environment, and Firepower-Biopower," focuses on the mixture of violence specific to the life-taking and life-making efforts in the Afghan counterinsurgency campaign from 2009 to 2012. This chapter engages directly with the ISAF operations in Afghanistan, extending the assessments of the prior two chapters and explaining how counterinsurgency was produced as an atmospheric, communicative, and environmental process. Working chronologically, the chapter considers the emergence of comprehensive 'ground-up' 'precision' counterinsurgency in 2009, which targeted village *milieu* and their populations by territorializing counterinsurgency inside remote and rural Afghan communities. The chapter begins with a rumination on local Afghan—specifically, Pashtun—social and cultural norms (i.e., existing non-Western governmentalities, with protocols and procedures for life) before considering the now well-known debates around the re-militarized discourse of anthropological intelligence and human terrain. After considering village-level approaches conducted in Kandahar and Helmand provinces—the Canadian Forces' efforts in Dand and Panjwayi districts in 2009; American-led operations in Helmand in 2010—in conjunction with the rise of a country-wide biometric data capture initiative to capture signatures and monitor 'illiberal' and 'illicit' populations, the chapter devotes significant attention to ISAF special forces' village stability operations (VSO) and the standing up of the Afghan Local Police (ALP). The chapter also addresses the formation and employment of Female Engagement Teams (FETs) and Cultural Support Teams (CSTs), all-women units operating under the sign of monolithic and reductive liberal feminist virtues but aiming to penetrate the off-limits gendered core of Afghan domestic spaces

in order to access women and leverage and influence them, their families' male members, and their villages generally. Further, I examine VSO as a speculative act undertaken by special forces functioning as *de facto* venture capitalists, using ballistics, biopower, and capital to leverage local communities with an eye to returns on investment especially in relation to local development and humanitarian projects. The chapter ends with a focus on question of metrics and measures of operational success, which reveals the impossible and ultimately violent expectations placed on local communities who are both compelled to live 'securely and forced to labour as signals of success to counterinsurgents embedded directly in their life environments who seek indicators of acceptable end states.

Chapter five, " Stability, or the Spirit of Counterinsurgency as Society Made Durable," makes sense of "Foucault's boomerangs" (Graham 2013) by mapping how the architecture and conduct of military counterinsurgency 'return' from the new colonies to domestic enclaves on the North Atlantic basin. Wars waged abroad by North Atlantic states, even as they seemingly wind down, should direct us to the return and cross-fertilization of counterinsurgency's 'lesser evils' and its application for domestic, 'homeland', and hemispheric contexts. In making sense of these residues and remains as boomerang effects, I identify the entailments of more generalized spirit of counterinsurgency with an emphasis on the biopolitical "sacrifice series" (Elmer & Renzi 2011) and on ruling through damage control (Thi Nguyen 2012.). The connections I make are not necessarily causal, though I indicate their historical coincidence with almost fifteen years of counterinsurgency and comprehensive contingency operations. Focusing largely on Canada, the chapter considers the fall-out of the war in Afghanistan before assessing a number of contested sites—military veterans, the body of Omar Khadr, village-centered gentrification in urban environments, and the visual grammar and iconography of beards, among others. Engaging with the ideas of resiliency, sacrifice, and damage, the chapter moves on to interrogate the spirit of counterinsurgency in relation to the militarization of policing, to neoliberal Toronto as a racialized and divided city, to Canada's speculative immigration policy, to Canadian 'terror' legislation in the form of Bill C-51, and to the resurgence of indigenous sovereignty in Canada with particular reference to the 'energopolitics' of the Canadian capitalist extraction apparatus in the tar sands. These

all lead toward re-engagement with the contexts of global civil war and liberal war and to a repurposing of biopolitics in affirmative and emancipatory ways with respect to countering counterinsurgency, neoliberal capital, and enmeshing of life as/and security.

After assessing how counterinsurgency comes home—or, perhaps, has always been 'home'—a shorter concluding chapter, "**The** Prospects for Future Force, or Notes on Camouflage," considers how and why to continue thinking about the constellation of ways of rule, life, and war in relation to biopolitics and military counterinsurgency. In closing but not concluding, I argue the need to keep our thinking about war and life front and center and suggest that the theories and war offered by military agents are, though powerful, always partial—that is, wed to specific interests and always incomplete and unfinished despite the presumed military monopoly on martial discourse.

2 Counterinsurgency, or the Aesthetic Equipment of Military Enlightenment

...[T]he ambition of *conducting* a war begins with the planning of its theatre, or the creation of *artificial environmental conditions* which will form the infrastructure, the stage on which the scenario should be played out—a scenario prepared in advance by whichever adversary claims to dominate the other.

- Paul Virilio, *Popular Defense and Ecological Struggles* (1978: 14; emphasis in original)

I'll tell you this much. War creates a closed world not only for those in combat but for the plotters, the strategists. Except their war is acronyms, projections, contingencies, methodologies. [...] They become paralyzed by the systems at their disposal. The war is abstract...There were times when no map existed to match the reality we were trying to create.

- "Elster," *Point Omega* (Delilo 2010: 28)

Every method has an aesthetic.

- Anne Norton, *95 Theses on Politics, Culture, and Method* (2004: 99)

If counterinsurgency is synthesized as a practice pulling together different desires, how can we describe it as an aesthetic system relying on different epistemological, perceptual, and material resources? How do its acronyms, metrics, and methods imagine and produce the firepower and biopower of an increasingly epidemiological type of war? How is it coded and made functional in language, in conduct, and in the service of sustaining a longer if uneven tradition of military violence as a 'regime of Truth' that objectifies the world? These questions anchor the thematic considerations of this chapter. Chapter one offered a summary overview of counterinsurgency and biopolitics along with the stakes of my project. Before moving to position counterinsurgency doctrine and practice as an inversion and continuation of Foucault by other means and linking it to an account of the messianic return of counterinsurgency from 2006 onward, this chapter interrogates the historical conditions and trajectories in military affairs that make contemporary counterinsurgency possible. Understanding the doctrine narrowly as a direct response to military problems faced by North Atlantic states in the post-9/11 era is important. Yet, the revision and return of the doctrine must be contextualized more broadly in relation to the nebulous history of counterinsurgency itself, which is part of a broader pattern of military violence based on lessons learned, limit-thinking, and ongoing enlightenment as an

epistemological order-making process. As such, this means contextualizing counterinsurgency in relation to revolutions in military affairs (RMAs), generations of war (GW),¹ and force transformation, which operate as standard analytical frameworks to interpret changes both in state military affairs and in broader conceptions of war's ontology (Gat 2013). As we shall see, it was arguably through counterinsurgency doctrine that North Atlantic military actors realized the horizon of "modern warfare" after the failure to suppress and defeat decolonization and national liberation struggles in the Global South during the 1950s and 1960s. Doctrine on modern warfare, as distinct from traditional or conventional warfare, paradoxically indicates a postmodern fissure with respect to military aesthetics and enlightenment: on one hand, existing military grand narratives failed to account for the risks and uncertainties of fighting a counterinsurgency war; on the other, faith in the military knowledge production apparatus (as a structuring metanarrative itself) presumed the capacity to generate new models and systems.

Insofar as contemporary counterinsurgency and the shift toward more nuanced theories of 'countering insurgency' (FM 3-24 2014) are new in that they respond to specific historical and material conditions, they represent hybrid and syncretic theories of warfare. Thus, plotting what is new, what has changed, and what has not is an important task for this chapter as is accounting for both rhetorical and conceptual-philosophical shifts in military thinking. Language figures prominently in this regard, as does tracking the obedience by military actors to a dense terminological ecology of concepts and keywords (the 'linguistic morass' of counterinsurgency). In considering how language, lessons, and limits come together to stabilize the necessary aesthetic for counterinsurgency, the chapter itself becomes an index for having to take on and mirror the ordering power of military signs that inscribe

¹ The generations of warfare are generally accepted as massed manpower (1GW), firepower (2GW), maneuver and mobility (3GW), and network-based insurgency (4GW) (Echevarria 2005: 1). In an interesting divergence, 4GW suggests a type of enemy or threat without really proclaiming the normative asset of the given era; it fixates on the enemy or adversary rather than the organizing logic of military power. Echevarria argues the model is heuristic at best, with 4GW a fallacy: "The notion of 4GW first appeared in the late 1980s as vague 'out of the box' thinking. The idea was itself an open box of sorts into which every conjecture about future warfare was thrown. As its inaugural essay shows, it was nothing more than a series of it was nothing more than a series of "what-ifs," albeit severely limited by a ground-oriented bias. In its earliest stages, 4GW amounted to an accumulation of speculative rhapsodies that blended a maneuver-theorist's misunderstanding of the nature of terrorism with a futurist's infatuation with "high technology" (Echevarria 2005: 2).

and encrypt violence. As I remarked last chapter, standardizing military acronyms and abbreviated short forms indicates adherence to and fetishistic faith in an operational language that would make transparent the complexities of battlespace environments, where words labour to enframe and territorialize concepts and so produce both physical and metaphysical reality.

This chapter relies on three different but connected frames: Horkheimer and Adorno's concept of the dialectic of enlightenment; Foucault's rebuke of the dialectic and his characterization of modernity's epistemological ethos as a limit-attitude; and Lyotard's arguments about postmodernity and the failure of metanarratives. Together, they allow us to identify not only the material conduct but the desires and, to allude to Judith Butler's work on power (1998), the *psychic life* of counterinsurgency. On one hand, military actors have had to think 'the limit' in ever more complex ways in order to innovate and adapt, managing risks and knowing that what they make legible and intelligible is an always partial and incomplete synthesis. On the other, these efforts give way to the same trap of enlightenment as myth, a belief in the recurring cycle of ever-mutating forms of cunning that progressively promise to be more effective and useful than the last in creating the necessary military intelligence to wage war. Pushing the limit to developed more enlightened practices and reconciling the failures that follow from subscribing to the metanarrative of thinking the limit together represent the constituting contradiction inherent in how counterinsurgents conduct warfare.

In using these interpretive frames to understand the conditions for military violence today, we gain better idea of the aesthetic 'equipment' necessary for the 'occupation' called counterinsurgency. To borrow from Jacques Rancière, this means considering not only the supply or logistics of perception (Virilio 1989) or the enframing of a military world picture (Chow 2006) but more so the military "distribution of the sensible":

This is what distribution of the sensible means: *a relation between occupations and equipment*, between being in a specific space and time, performing specific activities and being endowed with capacities of seeing, saying, and doing that "fit" those activities. *A distribution of the sensible is a matrix that defines a set of relations between sense and sense*; that is, between a form of sensory experience and an interpretation which makes sense of it. It ties an occupation to a presupposition. (Rancière 2009: 275; emphasis added)

'Sensible' here is both sensing and making things sensible, fusing together communicative inputs and outputs. In relying on Rancière's use of equipment, it is worth noting that Heidegger refers in his metaphysical lexicon to *das Zeug* (equipment or gear) and that Foucault also uses equipment in a few of his lesser known collaborative projects (see chapter three). Put in terms more amenable to military-centered scholarship as enlightenment, Christopher Coker writes about the feedback loop between the discourse and reality of war:

A military culture as a conceptual medium may be deeply embedded, yet as a cognitive enterprise engaged in deep understanding, predicting, and controlling the military environment, it always encounters the resistance imposed by a reality that is independent of its own cultural construction. (Coker 2008b: 31)

Coker is describing the self-referential collapse between subjectivity and objectivity. 'Objectivity' is generative, shot full with this constant anxiety, where the military act of perceiving and making things, objects, targets, populations, and environments intelligible to sense has to continually *induce* the terms of possibility for those very same elements. Objectivity must be synthesized and stabilized, and counterinsurgents require a recurring dialectical cycle, a drive to push limits and boundaries, which ultimately governs their desires.

The attendant problems of counterinsurgency (essentially: how do you occupy a place, pacify it, and make people live using less lethal violence?) have given cause to generate new methods for military operational thinking and what is now called systemic operational design (SOD), which are understood in relation to the wider framework of operational art. The art referent is important. 'Art' is traditionally invoked in military affairs—the art of war—to describe the ability to deal with subtle material processes that emerge out of the fog and friction of war, whether from logistics to communications to tactics in contained engagements. Further, the historical development of the concept of operational art in relation campaign planning and command/control contexts implies orchestration, following from the task of combining different elements and joining capabilities to conduct war. To think war *as* art is to think war as the coordination of different affects and corollary effects. In their last collaborative book together, Deleuze and Guattari's *What is Philosophy* outlines the idea that art, science, and philosophy are different domains with different aims and different ontological limits (1994: 216), and this heuristic is useful to

consider the 'art' of counterinsurgency. Stephen Zagala's essay on this issue goes a bit further and proposes that Deleuze and Guattari locate each domain as a different way of thinking predicated on different objects of concern. Philosophy thinks with concepts, science thinks with function and the correlation of different sets, and *art thinks with sensations* (Zagala 2003: 21). When stripped of its armature as Art, art is about generating affects and sensations, which are subsequently circulated, sensed, and made sense of. Blending firepower and biopower by way of systemic operational design in the service of countering insurgency is a way of thinking by doing art.

Thinking war through the systemic imagination of operational affects, sensations, and effects is not necessarily confined to the contemporary moment. As I mentioned above, eschewing models of conventional war and opting for so-called irregular and unconventional tactics, late-colonial counterinsurgents (primarily France and the United Kingdom) recognized the necessity of realizing and waging 'modern war,' which amounted to decentralizing and dispersing warfare and so anticipating the desires espoused by North Atlantic militaries today. The horizon of modern warfare in the late 1950s and early 1960s—not nuclear deadlock but irregular warfare and small war theory in the 'hot' decolonization wars in the Global South—suggests a bifurcation point well in advance of any 'new war' or 'postmodern/post-industrial war' paradigm articulated by military intellectuals or critical humanities scholars in the last twenty years. Military history for North Atlantic states did not end in the late 1980s and restart post-9/11; rather, it was quickened substantially in the 1950s and onward through ongoing wars and interventions, with American military power and the coterie of North Atlantic allies struggling to revalidate their collective doctrine on fighting then and today (Echevarria 2012). To wage modern war post-1960 meant taking a limit-attitude, revoking existing grand narratives of warfare, and 'operationalizing' different domains (civil affairs, life processes, and critical infrastructures) to reconcile and coordinate logistical, territorial, and communicative actions on a continuum.

It is a conceit then to suggest that "modern war" is a new phenomenon even though it is historicized as such. As I address further below, what constitutes fighting has *always* exceeded the tidy confines of binary reciprocal exchange and the geography of a circumscribed battlefield. War is always

continued and extended into its Others (i.e., peace, the civil, politics, etc.), and irregular and unconventional methods are not the aberrations they imply when used to modify 'war.' Obscuring this extension is precisely the basis for contemporary narrative, discursive, and legal efforts by North Atlantic states to justify contemporary wars they undertake to 'tame' violence and disorder. In the counterinsurgencies of the 1950s and 1960s, conventional conceptions of 'combat' or 'kinetic operations' directed against an opponent no longer represented the actual material conditions of war. Counterinsurgency clearly still is fighting, and fighting in war remains, as Clausewitz suggested, a way of imposing ones will on an adversary or opponent by persuading and compelling her with different lines of force (Clausewitz 1976: 75). Fighting is an immutable part of war, but war is never an isolated act (77). In modern war, fighting can take many forms which continue warfare by other means. Adversaries are difficult to target, and the object of modern war understood as counterinsurgency becomes the population comprised of what geographer Ben Anderson calls 'pre-insurgents' who can become either friends or enemies (Anderson 2011). What is called fighting is more properly a series of actions predicated on the work of making such distinctions, which have deeper biopolitical implications given the theological and pastoral basis of Foucault's paradigm. Fighting remains a constant feature but is recast in different environmental and operational imaginaries.

To untangle these conceptual knots and make sense of military sense, there is no straightforward chronological way to organize the elements. Instead, over seven sections, I take a recursive approach, starting in the present and working back in time before returning to the current moment of collateralized and unrestricted war of which counterinsurgency is emblematic. To establish the interpretive context, the first section approaches the question of military enlightenment in terms of the Foucault's limit-attitude and Lyotard's postmodern condition. Using this foundation, the next few sections detail the generation of military intelligence, where intelligence refers broadly to the acumen, knowledge, and aesthetic equipment necessary for counterinsurgency. I use aesthetic equipment as shorthand to refer to the constellation of knowledge production, intelligence generation, and sense perception that assigns and distributes the necessary military reality for counterinsurgency's theatre of

operations. The second section details some of the enduring lessons specific to contemporary counterinsurgency as documented within the circle of military experts. The third section attends to what I call the 'dreamworld of doctrine', reading the function of doctrine as the production of military fantasy with words and language. Among others, the section considers the work of Jacques Derrida, Carl von Clausewitz, Antonio Negri, Carl Schmitt, and Ranajit Guha in relation to the concept of insurgency. In particular, it addresses the semiotic and philosophical production of "insurgency" as articulated by military and (racist) administrative narratives of war and security. The fourth section identifies counterinsurgency as part of a longer history of irregular warfare (IW), a 'minor literature' within military affairs before the realization of modern warfare by late-colonial counterinsurgency.

Moving closer to the present, the last three sections detail how this military aesthetic equipment is inscribed on the world. The fifth section addresses how counterinsurgents set about rethinking space and territory following pronouncements in the 1990s regarding network-centered RMAs. The battlefield gives way to networked battlespace and an ecological battlesphere of persistent conflict, real constructs with actual and virtual architectures for creating the conditions for a theater of war. The sixth section details the contemporary conception operational art and operational thinking, which is understood in military terms as the 'level' between strategy (ends) and tactics (means) and which derives from traditional notions of military logistics. In effect, operational thinking refers to 'programming' the battlespace by way of targeting: identifying and acquiring targets and selecting the proper assets to engage and affect them, joining means with ends. This section also considers the emergence and increased use of systemic operational design, a new paradigm for conducting operations in what military actors agree to be a dynamic, non-linear, and complex battlesphere environment. The final seventh section concludes the chapter by laying out how, given these aesthetic and conceptual developments in relation to the design and territorialization of counterinsurgency operations, military violence today is collateralized through 'beyond-limits' warfare whereby its employment realizes the 'modern' imperative to break boundaries between different domains to create a military environmentalism or environmentality of war (Anderson 2010 & 2011). In relation to counterinsurgency and the mix of

firepower and biopower that kills life and makes life live, this means rethinking the traditional notion of *enfilade*, or envelopment, in acute and ambient ways and within atmospheric and volumetric terms.

Military Enlightenment, Metanarratives, and the Limit-Attitude

Contemporary counterinsurgency is interesting because its repurposing represents military innovation on the fly, "compelled adaptation" occurring in full view of most of the actors, agents, and belligerents involved (Serena 2011). Its 'revolutionary' status, however, is questionable. Iraq and Afghanistan have functioned as tribunals for North Atlantic coalition-based warfare and for the adequacy of existing military knowledge and know-how. According to Theo Farrell's recent essay on military adaptation and Afghanistan, transformational pronouncements about RMA are difficult to verify during times of war because expeditionary deployments always generate unanticipated changes (Farrell 2013: 4). Wars are immensely productive disruptions, creating small tears in the fabric of military reality that must be sutured and repaired. Small improvisations may lead to innovations in operational approaches and new doctrine. The operational level—between strategy and tactics—is where responses are expressed with more immediate remedial or corrective actions but also where organizational and bureaucratic cultures, norms, and routines shape and intervene on the practical outcomes of improvisation (Farrell 2013: 7-8). We have to remember the basis of American-led actions over the last decade and a half: retaliation-revenge adventurism in Central Asia and the "shock and awe" of opportunistic regime change in the Fertile Crescent revealed infantile faith in the program of rapid dominance operations (RDO) followed by the desire for speedy transitional military exits from both wars. According to counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen, comprehensive counterinsurgency was the adjustment, "an adaptation we made under fire, to fix a problem we should have never gotten ourselves into" (Kilcullen & Ricks 2014: ¶13). Yet, as much as "getting into" a situation that becomes a problem suggests a failure to anticipate risks and consequences, the licence that motivates involvement stems from faith in being able to roll with the problems as they emerge.

The works of Horkheimer and Adorno, Foucault, and Lyotard help ground and explain the different ways actors—as subjects with an occupation and different types of conceptual and epistemological equipment; here, counterinsurgents—negotiate this irreconcilable self-referential problem. Horkheimer and Adorno's well-known work on the dialectic of enlightenment is best known as a critique of instrumental reason as a method not of freedom but domination (1947 [1967]). The Frankfurt School critics argued that faith—governmental, social, and cultural—in ever more complex methods to rationalize action and to administer everyday life disavows the violence of making people into docile subjects serving as instruments for ruling class values and capitalist accumulation. Certainly, as an historical occurrence, *the Enlightenment* is no neat and tidy event, inventing the liberties and the disciplines simultaneously, emancipation and order at once (Foucault 1977 [1984]: 222). Yet, the German authors get at the ontological—and, thus, deeply aesthetic—base of modern forms of being and becoming through the rise of reason and rationality. Their dialectic is an immanent critique of the irresolvable development of enlightenment as the mythology it sought to displace. Enlightenment, with all of its intellectual and technical virtuosity, remains one more type of superstition, not negating the pre-modern or pre-Enlightenment epistemology it claimed to replace but simply replays mythology with a different set of contents.

Horkheimer and Adorno dwell at length on the relation between language and enlightenment, which is worth remarking on here given the linguistic production of military doctrine. Following an extended analysis of *The Odyssey* as an archetype of the myth of enlightenment, they argue that the linguistic production of life and the fact of living in language becomes a type of cunning.² The authors argue cunning is an exercise in both self-preservation and self-mystification, a process premised on creating a ruse—stratagem and subterfuge—to outwit and undermine the actions of supernatural or super-sensible forces (Horkheimer & Adorno 2020 [1947]: 39-40). The systematic recourse to rationality as the civilizing and teleological basis of modernity *is* cunning and deception in denying

² Clausewitz, the military touchstone, devotes a whole chapter in *On War* to deception and cunning (Book 3, Chapter 10; 1976: 198). Militaries are nothing if not cunning: generating intelligence, concealing activities, and undertaking covert and clandestine operations.

alternate ways of being, living, and ordering (40). Cunning relies on the formalism of language to denature the natural world in order to pacify it, occupy it, and mitigate its risks.³ Remark on language as the explication and codification of reason through nominalism—the vehicular and instrumental role of words to stick to and order things—Adorno and Horkheimer write:

Within the sphere of ideas in which mythical figures executed the unalterable edicts of fate, the distinction between word and object was unknown. The word was thought to have direct power over the thing, expression merged with intention. Cunning, however, consists in exploiting the difference. In this way, consciousness arises out of intention... Unchangeable words remain formulae for the implacable continuities of nature. In magic their fixity was intended to challenge that of fate, which it reflected. The opposition between the word and what it imitated was already implicit in this challenge... Self-preserving guile relies on the argument between word and thing. (47)

Horkheimer and Adorno are not positing some pre-linguistic origin with a telluric connection to the world *a priori* language; as well, they are not arguing against language as such. Rather, their critique is directed at the extensive capacity of language in modernity to continually categorize and divide things, rendering the world as a technical sum of parts that can be controlled, paradoxically, by an arbitrary and abstract system to which we submit but which is not at all self-evident. Language is anthropocentric defiance of the world made rational, pacifying and submitting nature to words, and an imperative that perennially refuses to be constrained by the non-human and non-linguistic world (45-46). As such, language is the perfect technology with which to manage and circumscribe human possibility, and the myth of enlightenment is premised not on the power of thought but more the power of language as a domesticating code to fabricate myth, or the myth internal to the deliberate, reasoned, and enlightened management of the world. The language and discourse of counterinsurgency, constituting its aesthetic equipment, is thus predicated formally on this same myth of enlightenment.

Of course, the relationship between words and things is a concern central in Foucault's thinking. *The Order of Things* (1966) deals specifically with the emergence of the human sciences and their expression as taxonomic hierarchies and classificatory imperatives to invent and organize the modern world. *The Archaeology of Knowledge* continues the interrogation of language by theorizing the formation of objects and the fields or 'archives' that shape and determine the how enunciations and utterances are

³ This is an argument similar to Heidegger's idea of technology as 'enframing' the world as a standing-reserve.

known and knowable within a "system of function"—the contextual limits, material relations, and discursive frames that make them legible and intelligible (1969 [2002]).⁴ Yet, beyond his early interest in semiotics and language, Foucault's unpublished essay "What is Enlightenment" (1984) offers a rejoinder to Horkheimer and Adorno's indictment of E/enlightenment, which according to Foucault is untenable because its very possibility follows from the historical context it seeks to undermine. Foucault finds this analysis too convenient and instead offers a reading that is productively ambivalent.⁵

Of importance here is how Foucault develops the idea of the limit-attitude, which he valorizes. Responding to Kant's brief 1784 essay answering the same question ("*Was ist Aufklärung?*"), Foucault claims Kant's original essay is a critical reflection on Kant's own historical understanding of intellectual and political developments and on the trajectory of Kant's philosophical enterprise in relation to those contexts. Warning against reducing the implications of enlightenment to a contained and bracketed epoch (*the Enlightenment*), Foucault explains that Kant's axiomatic of *Sapere Aude*—"dare to know," or have the courage or audacity to know—is positioned by Kant as an *Ausgang* (an "exit" or "way out") that releases people from 'immaturity' by use of their faculty of reason. Enlightenment, then, is an exit from immaturity but is also, according to Foucault's reading of Kant, the moment when humanity will put its reason to use freely without "subjecting itself to any authority" (Foucault 1984: 35-36). Foucault stresses that given Kant's three critiques (of pure reason, practical reason, and judgement) the Kantian rendition of *Aufklärung* is in fact *a description of the conditions in which reason should be* freely put to use. Freedom has constraints, and it must be constrained. That is, Kant's "dare to know" is tempered by the "private use of reason," which is the 'legitimate' context where one must do one's duty *and obey*. As Foucault argues, Kant establishes specific limitations on enlightenment as freedom. The Kantian version of freedom effectively sustains a contract where the sovereign power of enlightened despotism remains

⁴ As I discuss below, the military production of the subject called "insurgent" depends on these operations.

⁵ The German authors eventually route their critique toward bourgeois capitalist society and locate Nazism and the Holocaust as the logical consequence of the dialectic of enlightenment. Foucault's assessment differs: the fascist violence of the Nazis and the regime's willingness to kill and expose its own population to killing is not the *sine qua non* of the Enlightenment even as the race politics of the Nazi state realize a version of what Foucault will call in *SMBD* the generalized race war, a formation at the centre of medicalized conceptions of security in biopolitics (Foucault 1976 [2003]: 60-62, 257-8). For Foucault, Nazism is a regression to older sanguine forms of government based on land, blood, and risk.

intact. The private use of reason exhorts *obedience* to government because the public use of reason, universally available to all, will recognize this as the ideal mature decision *that ought to be freely made* (37). Kant's *Aufklärung* "was that of knowing what limits knowledge had to *renounce* transgressing" (46; emphasis added).⁶ One is free to choose one's own intellectual and political limits and abide by them, but this relation to freedom is not necessarily emancipatory or an exercise in autonomy. One has to know when to *stop* breaking limits; freedom must be delimited. Kant's emphasis on thinking freely but doing one's duty leaves the possibility of any radical break an undesirable exercise. Free thinking to exit immaturity is good insofar as one's exit does not challenge the wider *status quo* of the social and political environment. One has to think about limits and freely choose to not break them. In terms of military innovations, this means flirting with conceptual and operational ruptures but ensuring their recuperation lest they drastically disturb tested methods or they destabilize hierarchies of order.

Despite his critique of Kant's position, Foucault recuperates the idea of enlightenment as *the attitude* of modernity that can become a productive political problem at the level of the subject:

I have been seeking, on the one hand, to emphasize the extent to which a type of philosophical interrogation—one that simultaneously problematizes man's [sic] relation to the present, man's historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as an autonomous subject—is rooted in the Enlightenment. On the other hand, I have been seeking to stress that the thread that may connect us with the Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements, but rather the permanent reactivation of an attitude—that is, of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a *permanent critique* of our historical era. (Foucault 1984: 42, emphasis added)⁷

Anticipating criticisms for not revoking e/Enlightenment *tout court* because of its nexus of gendered-racialized-classist privileges, Foucault describes the inevitable "blackmail" of anti-Enlightenment critiques that leave room for little other than totalizing responses that reject outright the "tradition of rationalism" and "principles of rationality" (43). He suggests rejecting these "simplistic and authoritarian alternatives"; *pace* Horkheimer and Adorno and in a clear rebuke, "We do not break free of this blackmail by introducing 'dialectical' nuances while seeking to determine what good and bad

⁶ Kant's conception leaves one enmeshed as a subject subordinate to a sovereign and also a subject subordinate to the class, gender, and racial orders of the time and their wider social and political determinations. We could also reflect on how this prioritizes who is afforded the luxury of enlightenment during the Enlightenment, and who can freely use their public and private reason. That Kant had this privilege is without question, yet this does not annul his insights.

⁷ Not unaware of invoking 'man', Foucault likely made recourse to the hegemonic gendered pronoun in order to sign the entrenched and embedded 'objective' subject of the Enlightenment.

elements there may have been in the Enlightenment" (43). In his own work, Foucault was clearly interested in identifying these good and bad elements, if sometimes unsuccessfully or in ways that circumscribed the fall-out of the Enlightenment beyond the 'European province' and the implied universalization of the subject as a Western modern subject.⁸ That said, his criticism here is directed to those who would disavow the intellectual and epistemological effects of the Enlightenment as a historical event, which created opportunities for the same (for him) hypocritical anti-Enlightenment critiques. In closing the essay, Foucault writes:

This philosophical attitude has to be translated into the labour of diverse inquiries. These inquiries have their methodological coherence in the at once archaeological and genealogical study of practices envisaged simultaneously as the technological type of rationality and as strategic games of liberties; they have their theoretical coherence in the definition of the historically unique forms in which the generalities of our relations to things, to others, to ourselves, have been problematized. (50)

Fidelity to the event of the Enlightenment, for all its shortcomings, means *maintaining a limit-attitude as enlightenment* that then remains a *permanent critique* of the present. The limit-attitude is not on one side or the other: activists, intellectuals, militants, insurgents, and counterinsurgents embrace this ethos. While Foucault affirms the limit-attitude that breaks boundaries and exits formations of knowledge that discipline and normalize action, he acknowledges the limit-attitude will also break boundaries to harvest, capture, and integrate—to pull in, centrifugal, so as to stabilize, bound, regulate, and control. Thinking at the limit in a permanent state of critique cuts both ways.

If Foucault explains the arrival of a decidedly modern epistemological attitude, Lyotard's work on the postmodern condition identifies a historical moment when this attitude, represented by the increasing proliferation of knowledge, seems to break any and all boundaries. His "report" on knowledge is in many respects a critique of political economic transformations specific to capitalism and the rise of neoliberalism in what he calls "computerized societies" of the late 1970s, which has implications for not only the monetization and networking of knowledge but also government and ways

⁸ Chapter three directly deals with Foucault's shortcomings in relation to the Enlightenment, European imperialism, and 'epistemic ruptures' inherent in settler colonialism.

of rule (Lyotard 1979 [1984]).⁹ The condition of postmodernity implies a general change in the status of knowledge production, which in turn alters social and biopolitical reality. Structurally, Lyotard describes a scenario in which the circulation of knowledge and information begin to slowly undermine the social and political architecture provided by 'big stories'. Existing dominant grand narratives can no longer sustain their own legitimacy, and can no longer legitimize actions and decisions, provide guidance, or mitigate risks associated with the narrative (1979 [1984]: 27-28). He refers to this as a "slackening," where the 'tautness' of metanarratives declines and diminishes (Lyotard 1984 [1979]: 71). It is not simply 'those' substantive metanarratives with specific content that fail; rather, the operating ranges of metanarratives in general no longer remain able to sustain themselves in broad terms due to the accelerated circulation and mobility of information and knowledge. Of course, the narratives have no agency themselves; what fails is faith in the institutional narratives of modernity to routinize and structure life and living. This is not to say that societies have some uncontested, monolithic, or passive enchainment to narratives of modernity; however, it is to say that their words and hegemonic common sense could no longer stick to the things to which they affixed to order and contain. Anticipating the network society and the attention economy of contemporary communicative capitalism, Lyotard connects the notion of slackening to "anything goes" but only insofar as the 'anything' is indexed to capital; that is, the 'anything' is a speculative instrument to yield profits and productivity (76).

Towards the end of the report, a small section set in the fashion of Foucault's and Kant's question asks, "What is Postmodernism?" According to Lyotard, the postmodern condition does not necessarily mean the end of the modern, and postmodernism as an aesthetic and epistemological approach is different than the postmodern condition as such. He affirms a postmodern attitude that exists *within* the modern to make what is unrepresentable presentable. This affirmative postmodern refers to art: not to fine art or Art but to material effects and expressions. At one point, Lyotard writes about 'operators' (which is interesting given our concern here with the operational art of counterinsurgency) who create material effects that cannot be rendered correctly or legibly but still can still create an event

⁹ For similar historical arguments, see Alvin Toffler's *The Third Wave* (1980) and Manuel Castells' *The Rise of the Network Society* (1999).

or encounter, whether with knowledge, styles, grammar, images, or spaces (80-81). This coincides with Deleuze and Guattari's idea of art as 'thinking' with affects and sensations, sensible if not wholly perceptible or even immediately knowable. What is unrepresentable exists as such because it does not conform to epistemological habits of thought and to social rules or categories; it denies itself the "solace of good forms, the consensus of taste" (81), refusing to be domesticated or pacified as 'civil.'. In the spirit of emancipatory aesthetics, he suggests the necessity of taking a renewed *avant-guard* approach to knowledge production, suggesting that only something that is first postmodern can be modern—a future past, or "future (*post*) anterior (*modo*)" (79). The modern is invoked to mark a new leading edge, yet it also is the name for capture or for recuperation after the rupture. The end of Lyotard's report calls on interested interlocutors to "wage a war on totality" and against the fantasy of a totalizing narrative in order to "seize reality" (83). This may seem contradictory given the diagnosis of the postmodern condition implies a fragmentation of totality through the slackening of metanarratives. However, his argument exists within the context of the monetized and speculative "anything goes" of neoliberalism and late capital where 'anything' is almost always-already presentable. In other words, the task is to make something meaningful by making it perceptible and sensible without making it intelligible to the point of becoming "anything goes." While this sounds abstract, and Lyotard relies on a number of artistic and literary references to make his case. Yet, the important part for considering counterinsurgency and its aesthetic equipment revolves around the failure of legitimizing narratives to sustain themselves due to the increasing circulation of knowledge and the *avant-guard* response to this new system of knowledge production and circulation, which has to be postmodern before it is modern in order to seize reality. As I describe below, the realization of modern war, which is an indication of a military *postmodern* condition, allows counterinsurgents to begin to 'present the unrepresentable' by displacing warfare from its conventional frameworks.

In recalling Foucault's injunction above to translate the limit-attitude "into the labour of diverse inquiries," military affairs are not exempt. The three constellations I have outlined point toward three interconnected theories of epistemological change that we can use to explain the intellectual

development of counterinsurgency: one is dialectical, a recurring processes of always seeking a better solution but remaining enmeshed within the myth of progressive improvements; one is based on a subjective self-aware approach toward limits and permanently refusing to be constrained by them; and one is based on apprehending and acting when the bounded knowledge associated with these limits (as narratives, as Truth) begin to buckle and fail. In relation to 'distributing sense' in order to enable the waging of counterinsurgency , these frameworks all provide a way to understand the implications of what French counterinsurgent Roger Trinquier meant when he described the need to conceptualize and conduct war across an unrestricted "vast field of action" (Trinquier 1961 [1964]: 6) that exceeded the conventional space of combat. To continue my interrogation of this conceptualization, the next three sections interrogate how counterinsurgency is produced by considering the military lessons learned process, the 'dreamworld' of doctrine, and the rise of modern war articulated within the context of irregular warfare.

Lessons: Pedagogy of the Suppressor & the Return of the Repressed

"An effective counterinsurgent force is a learning organization." (FM 3-24 2006: 1-26)

"Learning organizations beat insurgencies; bureaucratic hierarchies do not." (FM 3-24 2006: x)

"Your operation must be a learning operation." (Smith, in JP 3-24 2013: 4-24)

The intellectual production of counterinsurgency over the last ten years has required the concerted creation of a teaching and learning apparatus in military organs to discern and formulate the lessons of war. This section situates this apparatus in relation to producing the institutional and operational intelligence necessary to undertake counterinsurgency and to stabilize the very concept of counterinsurgency itself.

Anthony Cordesman's 2002 audit *The Lessons of Afghanistan: War Fighting, Intelligence, and Force Transformation* is one of the first comprehensive military-centered assessments of the contemporary expeditionary era. In his earnestness, he likely did not anticipate a nearly fifteen-year cycle of extended expeditionary warfare and intellectual output. Cordesman's work is emblematic of the military 'lessons

learned' apparatus. Self-aware and deliberate, the process has been firmly institutionalized in response to the wars while reflecting the increasing 'academicization' of military affairs, where, according to contemporary military literature, intellectual combat power serves a force multiplier. If war is networked then learning, as knowledge mobilization, must also be networked, too. Following from similar corporate-capitalist formations in postsecondary and university environments in relation to the discourse of excellence (c.f. Readings 1996), the military 'centers of excellence' and 'lessons learned' apparatus codifies and disseminates observations and insights for operational guidance and for future use in doctrine development. Even as its reboot was intended to serve the military needs of the American-led occupation in Iraq and the ISAF coalition mired in Afghanistan, the resurgence of counterinsurgency doctrine did not spring forth *ex nihilo* but represents an uncanny re-encounter with centuries of existing North Atlantic military knowledge. The literature inside and outside state militaries connect the historically recurring incidence of counterinsurgency campaigns to their expression today (Long 2008), whether identifying similarities with the civilizing violence of "enlightened "pacification" campaigns conducted in imperial colonial occupations in the middle and late 19th century (Tripoldi 2010) or the imperial counterrevolutionary precedents from late-colonial wars that blended policing and military force with nascent biopolitically-inspired initiatives such as population-centered efforts to embed units in village settings, understanding indigenous cultures, and dividing local communities by making entreaties to 'protect' women (Feichtinger et al 2012).

Despite efforts to synthesize the 'correct' version of counterinsurgency and lend integrity to its methods, it remains a contested object. According to strategic theorist Colin Gray:

Counterinsurgency is not a subject that has integrity in and of itself... There is and can be no "right way" to do COIN, though there are several ways most probably that might be right enough for a particular case in an imperfect world. (Gray 2012: 25)

Within the doctrinal and military literature, commentators like Gray make recourse to both "COIN" and "counterinsurgency." The former is typically taken as the contemporary population-centered effort that is held to be low-intensity, non-kinetic, and focused on protecting and securing the legitimacy of a regime or bloc of government. The latter refers to any and all methods for interdicting insurgents and

persuading them to desist, including 'crunchier' kinetic, lethal, and combat operations to fix, find, close with and destroy enemy fighters (Maloney 2012: 233-234; c.f. Rid, Riley, and Farrell 2012). The former dreams of securing consent by cultivating the licence to govern within the population; the latter is premised on imposing rule with law-preserving violence and installing the prerogative of sovereignty. Population-centered methods require restrictive rules of engagement, better local intelligence about routines and patterns of life, and a full-spectrum capacity to consider all actions through the context of legitimacy whereas heavier-handed enemy-centered methods imply using all means available to eliminate and eradicate insurrection and insurgency (Springer 2011). By this measure, COIN is actually a subset of counterinsurgency (i.e., any method to counter insurgency).¹⁰

After waves of doctrine development and real-time experimentation, population-centered counterinsurgency focuses on increasingly diffuse methods for "countering insurgency." At its core, the philosophy is premised on the following features, which are generally consistent across the doctrine laid out by North Atlantic militaries over the past ten years:

- **Target:** seize control of, shape, and influence the population; ensure all actions centre around gaining the legitimacy of local populations and bringing the population closer to the Host-nation (HN) government
- **Secondary target:** kill, contain, or manage insurgents; find, fix, and destroy where possible
- **End-state:** stand-up local and state security and military apparatus; delegitimize non-state violence; embed the authority of the host-nation government
- **Secure:** clear and hold local environments
- **Stabilize:** enable redevelopment, reconstruction, and commercial activities; repair the social and economic infrastructures for local life
- **Cultural and social awareness:** generate intelligence with specific emphasis on local anthropological, cultural, and ethnographic patterns of life
- **Comprehensive:** operate holistically across a continuum of domains; merge the actions of traditional military and non-military (civil) actors, facilitated largely through military channels
- **Joint approach:** enable interoperability and unity of effort/action by developing a unified approach common to coalition partners and to other agencies and actors

¹⁰ I retain the use of counterinsurgency because I challenge the normative premise that 'COIN' is low-intensity, non-kinetic, and 'less' violent. Firepower and biopower directed at populations are merely different methods mixed and employed to counter insurgency.

- **Decentralize:** conduct operations specific to and in alignment with local environments; avoid a template-based approach
- **Restraint:** operate with restrictive rules of engagement; minimize 'kinetic' lethal operations and maximize 'non-kinetic' and non-lethal techniques (information operations, influence operations, psychological operations, etc.)

It is truism to say that counterinsurgency is demanding, multidisciplinary, and hard to conduct and prosecute; Clausewitz, the military touchstone, refers to the "chasm" between conception or planning and the reality execution (Clausewitz 1837 [1976]: 118). Two recent Canadian military publications characterize counterinsurgency (and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan) as a 'difficult war' and as 'no easy task' (Spencer 2009; Horn & Spencer 2012), where self-determined military difficulties stem largely from "isolating " and discriminating between insurgents and the population and forging unity among "friendlies" (Hennessey 2012: 26). Yet, the same claims could be made of almost any military expeditionary deployment undertaken by North Atlantic militaries,¹¹ which means that overinvesting in the extraordinary demands of counterinsurgency is somewhat of a self-aggrandizing and self-serving military fable. Still, the rhetoric of difficulty alludes to the ways in which military organs are slowly integrating what are diagnostic accounts in the effort to normalize 'lessons learned.'

According to a study commissioned by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations* (2012), the inadequacy of conventional warfare paradigms and the need to generate 'environmental understanding' and build adaptive, joint-enabled, and coalition-based and partnering approaches will remain essential for future strategic American and North Atlantic military transformations (JCOA 2012: 2). NATO runs a Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) and recently published an interoperable doctrine manual, *NATO Lessons Learned Handbook* (2nd ed., 2011), for optimizing the 'lessons learned' process and embedding the learning process as a capability itself. This work is buttressed by *thousands* of people in military organizations analyzing the coordinated and joint delivery of different military capacities, from munitions to terminology to concepts.¹² Crisis

¹¹ In "Friction in War," Clausewitz writes, "Everything *in war* is *very* simple, but the *simplest thing* is *difficult*" (Clausewitz 1837 [1976]: 119).

¹² For instance, Robert Beljan, a civilian analyst who served with Danish Battle Group – Task Force Helmand in Afghanistan as an instructor at the Peace Support Operations Training Centre in Sarajevo, recently compiled a

operations in 'semi-permissive' complex environments—doing more than killing and traditional combat in population-centric counterinsurgency premised on stabilization and reconstruction—require and result in a "train as you fight" scenario, meaning that operations generate and demand new types of military intelligence and knowledge depending on the different joint ventures, interoperable capacities, and plural *unities* of civil-military effort required (Rietjens, van Fenema, and Essens 2013: 17, 27). So-called small wars—coincident with other modifiers like irregular, unconventional, asymmetric, and low-intensity—offer significant learning opportunities in that they are, as I discuss below, less the exception and more the rule. Such "learning is not for the timid," (Hoffman 2014: ¶6) because it can deeply destabilizing, and "anodyne 'lessons learned' on tactics and procedures" is not a historically-aware "culture of critical inquiry" for military organizations prone to reverting uncritically to existing protocols (¶11). State militaries, like many large vertical-vertebrate organizations with embedded bureaucratic structures, are often ambivalent about engaging with assessments and conclusions that destabilize *status quo* procedures or undermine existing historical narratives and mythologies around which existing doctrine is designed and developed. Yet, the intellectual armature of North Atlantic state militaries over the last fifteen years continues to be organized densely around learning and with the increasing 'academicization' of military affairs and more than a decade of expeditionary operations.

The Canadian Forces relies on a labyrinthine learning apparatus, which is referred to and represented in military-speak by acronyms. One has to wonder if the military will to acronyms and abbreviated short forms, as ways of taming the world into a manageable operating reality, does not simply enable more semiotic and epistemological uncertainty by creating what amounts to conceptual caricatures. For instance, the CF Centre for Lessons Learned (CLL) is housed in the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre (CADTC; formerly the Land Force Doctrine and Training System [LFDTS]), a larger housing tasked with the intellectual development and training for the CF. The CADTC also oversees the Combat Training Centre (CTC), the Combat Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC), and the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC), thereby connecting different but interrelated

lengthy essay published in Small Wars Journal outlining lessons learned in Afghanistan from an ISAF perspective. See Beljan, (2013), " Afghanistan: Lessons Learned from an ISAF Perspective," <<http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/afghanistan-lessons-learned-from-an-isaf-perspective>>.

streams of knowledge creation. In a land-based context, the Canadian Army Advanced Warfare Centre (CAAWC) with its dedicated Warfare Centre Collaboration Team (WCCT) "establishes a single organization with the overall lead responsibility for the development of the army's overarching concepts and capability definition" (Dickson 2013: 34).¹³ In large part, the warfare centre "preserves the integrity of the army's foundation" and "its war-tested land capability" by developing future force employment concepts (*Force 2016 Army Interim Operating Concept, Land Operations 2021, and Army 2040*; c.f. Gizewski, Reshke, and Chapman 2013) based on experiences in Afghanistan and the 2011 Report on Force Transformation (see below). To formalize and *implement* force-wide doctrine development, the Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre (CFEC) was established in 2001 and later developed a Joint Doctrine Branch, which is the norm for North Atlantic militaries with respect to harmonizing doctrine across different branches. All four American military branches have lesson-learned networks as do most NATO allies.

This model was duplicated in Afghanistan. Given that Canada's post-2011 role in the official NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) was a teaching-intensive process, Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) and Operations Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLTs) working with Afghan *kandaks* (battalions)¹⁴ were complemented by an archipelago of formal academies and training centres.¹⁵ The Kabul Military Training Centre (KMTC) provided basic training functions for recruits into the ANA, and the Afghan National Security University commissioned in 2013 houses the degree-granting National Military Academy along with officer and non-commissioned officer academies. The establishment of these facilities stand as part of the knowledge-transfer and dissemination apparatus that satisfied part of the 'benchmark' criteria for NATO's withdrawal from the war.

¹³ At the time of Dickson's essay, the centre was still the Canadian Forces Land Advanced Warfare Centre (CFLAWC) but was renamed in the summer of 2013.

¹⁴ For recent compelling and visceral accounts of the training mission in the shadow of NATO's drawdown and withdrawal, see Ben Anderson's *This is What Winning Looks Like* (VICE News, 2013) and Gelareh Kiazand's *Inside the Afghan National Army* (VICE News, 2014).

¹⁵ Afghan forces get their own counterinsurgency manual, *Kandak COIN Checklist ANA 3-24.4* (2009), in both English and Dari. As a distilled and condensed version, the manual renders basic principles in clear vehicular language, aiming to ensure ease of translation for ISAF forces teaching in a cross-cultural context. The tacit function of the manual is to reinforce for Afghan officers their role in creating a reliable and professional military force. Throughout, a number of recurring didactic messages are deployed, though in ways that infantilize if not orientalize Afghan users of the manual.

A more culturally-intelligent force was prescribed by the initial American manual in 2006, and this is reemphasized in different "lessons learned" iterations ever since. While I cannot recount the debate over the (re)militarization of anthropology and ethnography, which played out extensively from 2008 to 2010 within American anthropological circles (c.f. McFate 2005 & 2008; Price 2010; Whitehead & Finnström 2013), it is worth revisiting in brief. Learning and exploiting the human terrain—one more layer to operationalize—and generating ethnographic and cultural since 2006 remain part of doctrine development in relation to counterinsurgency and beyond. By 2009, scholars within the CF were calling for the creation of a "centre of excellence for cultural studies" to build the capacities of units for complex operations in foreign environments so as to mitigate the 'cultural awareness gap' (Spencer & Bascilivius 2009: 45). These calls were linked to the uptake of lessons from T.E. Lawrence, whose "pioneering" *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* was a touchstone for 'culturally intelligent' warfare (41). Integrating insights from Lawrence would allow Canada and its ISAF allies to decode cultural signals and shape local areas of operation.¹⁶ Indeed, as I discuss below and in chapter four, the recourse to culture is one part of a wider atmospheric and environmental approach to population-centered counterinsurgency and to acting on and influencing patterns of life. Officers with experience in Afghanistan were advocating linguistic and cultural competencies that would provide innovations indispensable to CF future deployments especially in relation to land-based operations (Bond 2010). Such prescriptions were received within military organs as ways of using the cultural sphere "from-the-ground-up" as a force amplifier and of achieving information superiority along with addressing what are clearly cultural gaps and disjunctions in relation to the military and civilian actors in the operating environment (c.f. Bertolotti 2012 for typical accounts of cultural competence as an appropriate "micro-strategy"; Lamb et al 2013).

Yet, the integrationist logic of military efforts to harvest and capture external approaches becomes apparent: the invocation of cultural studies to double for 'cultural intelligence' was rather facile and indicated a misunderstanding (or a wilful omission) of cultural studies' anti-colonial and anti-racist

¹⁶ Lawrence's book has been invoked *ad infinitum* within the military literature. Lawrence's separate "27 Articles" (1917) provides the impetus for Kilcullen's 2006 "28 Articles," which were included as an appendix in most counterinsurgency manuals (both are included in *FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency* [2009]).

methodologies as a ways of challenging hegemonic power relations.¹⁷ According to cultural anthropologist Greg Feldman writing in *The Counter-Counterinsurgency Manual*, the American creation of human terrain teams (HTT) to undertake social network and cultural analysis was reductionist and "unrealistic" (90). Further, as an epistemological method, its ability to undertake anthropological or cultural analysis was compromised and flawed:

The superficial invocation of analytical concepts attuned to agency, creativity, and relativism cannot conceal the political ends at which COIN is aimed: the twin goals of *co-opting* the local population and *identifying* insurgents on the basis of social behaviour and cultural practice. (Feldman 2009: 86)

For Feldman, the social network analysis academically conducted by these teams ultimately "enables the kill chain" (88). If Feldman's focus is on how cultural intelligence was used to kill and make die, Roberto Gonzalez critiques more directly the making-live capacity of counterinsurgency and its exploitation of the human terrain. Writing in the same collection, Gonzalez argues that all of the academic and historical qualifications of cultural intelligence mask the real intent of a classic colonial 'divide-and-conquer' approach to countering insurgency based on leveraging cultural and ethnographic intelligence (Gonzalez 2009c: 111; c.f. Gonzalez 2009b), which actively foments sectarian antagonisms and naturalizes 'ruly' or unruly elements in indigenous populations.

Some lessons cannot be learned because they remain taboo objects, and they are prevented from 'speaking' even as their silence says much. The strategic blowback in Afghanistan is hard to miss even as it is often avoided in popular or public accounts, and the events of the late 1970s and 1980s have clearly contributed to creating a "low-pressure" system and a 40-year war in South Central Asia (Hanieh 2013). The not-so-clandestine American military effort to support anti-Soviet forces in the 1980s created the architecture for the rise of heavily armed factions led by local and regional warlords, whose reach and rule—and impunity—was opposed directly by ethnically Pashtun and religiously motivated *Talibs* ("students") from Kandahar Province in the mid-1990s, which in turn fostered a destructive civil war

¹⁷ During my interviews with CF members in 2009 and 2010, a number of them admitted to disliking the term cultural intelligence, preferring to use information or influence operations to describe how they understood the field of culture as an operational space. Collectively, they felt the use of terms like anthropological and cultural intelligence or even cultural studies obscured their own conceptualization and imagination of their goals and tasks. They were more comfortable 'dwelling' in the language of information and influence despite the explicit promise in counterinsurgency doctrine regarding the fruits of cultivating cultural awareness.

raging into 2001. With the ongoing involvement of armed groups based in Afghanistan and from the border tribal areas directed from Quetta in Pakistan (the Pakistan Taliban, Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Taiba, etc.), American and North Atlantic forces continued to work with and against the sub- or trans-state cellular entities they helped create, reaping what was callously sown and producing the so-called 'failed state' supposedly averted by the North Atlantic occupation (Johnson 2010:13-15; Warnock 2007).

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is a curious object for counterinsurgents allegedly keen to learn. A significant gap within the current 'lesson learned' discourse exists in relation to the Soviet war, which is a taboo subject largely because of the *failure* of Soviet efforts and the presumed superiority of the moral, social, and strategic approach taken by the North Atlantic coalition. The logic goes: "we will not regard the Soviet experience because it is so patently different from our aims and intentions." When studies have excavated insights from the Soviet war they tend to be attributed to defects of the faulty Soviet Union as opposed to an indication of recurring obstacles facing counterinsurgents. One would think the Soviet experience would have been more widely viewed as an important learning opportunity after regime change and revenge in 2001 morphed into an open war conducted under the auspices of stability and liberal humanitarianism. While experts equivocated about North Atlantic intellectual resources and military *materiel* alongside the piety of nation-building and civilizational rhetoric, it was difficult to not detect a wider disavowal of common obstacles especially given that the Soviet leadership articulated similar types of justifications to sustain its own ten-year occupation from 1979 to 1988.

To suggest that imperial states have been making the same mistakes in Afghanistan for centuries (as in Tomsen 2011) implies a 'correct' way to win and fight and exert influence, which naturalizes foreign colonial interventions and implies a better way of designing liberal war to extend the beneficent provisions of liberal rule. It is difficult to know if and what ISAF leaders and American military planners *wanted* to learn in 2005 while commencing the counterinsurgency revision. The 2006 American manual mentions the Cold War and the Soviet Union in brief, mostly to suggest that insurgencies fomented during the Cold War proxy wars continue to fester. American joint doctrine on foreign internal defense (2010) and on counterinsurgency (2013; c.f. FM 3-24 2014) makes no mention

of Soviet-era lessons; the French and Canadian manuals are also silent on this matter.¹⁸ The one exception is the UK counterinsurgency doctrine manual (2009), which dedicates an explicit page-sized text box listing lessons from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as assessed by the Soviet Studies Research Centre of the UK Royal Military Academy. The British legacy in Afghanistan may explain uncanny imperial memories coming to consciousness after two 19th century invasions of the then-emirate of Afghanistan from British India (1839-42 and 1878-1880). The British lessons outlined are clear: failure to promote and support legitimate and respected government inclusive of different groups interests and needs; failure to develop comprehensive and 'whole-of-government' approaches; overreliance on punitive and often indifferent kinetic operations; failure to undermine the 'extensive external support' (then, the United States; now, Pakistan) provided to *mujahedeen*; the failure to connect traditional military operations with civil, social, and political initiatives; the failure to exploit intelligence and weaknesses among insurgent alliances; and an inadequate force contingent on the ground in terms of numbers and capacities (FM 1-10: 3-21).

More recent assessments of lessons from 2013 onward regarding the Soviet war revealed American and ISAF coalition forces openly looking to Russia for logistical guidance on how to withdraw during and after 2014 (Gartenstein-Ross 2013; Faith 2014). According to a string of Russian news stories prior to a NATO-Russia conference in April 2013, NATO officials secretly requested information and joint reports regarding the logistics of the Soviet withdrawal (RT News, "NATO seeks Russia's advice on Afghanistan withdrawal," 2013).¹⁹ Commentators suggested that both the Soviet and

¹⁸ Prior to the finalization of the CF's counterinsurgency manual, a 2007 report commissioned by the DRDC's Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA) used the Soviet experience as object of inquiry for plotting the Canadian transition from the high-intensity combat operations of 2006 to counterinsurgency (Smolyneec & Minkov 2007). The presentation version of the report took a comparative approach by assessing the then-Canadian 3D model of defence, diplomacy, and development in relation to Soviet efforts, which were more decidedly enemy-centered as opposed to population-centered. The Canadian context is important as the 3D approach slowly gave way to the "Whole-of-government" approach coincident with joint doctrine developments around the "continuum of operations" (CF JP-01 2011) and comprehensive Joint, Interagency, Multinational, and Public (JIMP) capabilities, both of which figure in the manual and in later iterations of CF-wide doctrine shaped by ten years of deployments and rotations.

¹⁹ According to reports at *Russia Today* in NATO-Russian cooperation, discussions in 2013 centered on Russia maintaining small military bases to service and maintain weapons and hardware for Afghan army and police forces (<http://rt.com/politics/bases-official-afghanistan-return-985/>). Further, discussions continue about transportation options for NATO forces routing through Russia in 2014 and 2015 (<http://rt.com/politics/>

North Atlantic/American efforts were ultimately unsustainable and unaffordable (as of 2014, the Afghan war cost Americans close to \$700 billion),²⁰ whether in terms of financial support and direct aid affected by corruption and mismanagement or in relation to the demands of clearing and controlling large remote areas with relatively modest military capacities in relation to the population (RT News, "Lessons Learned?" 2014). An American \$300 million emergency aid package and investment was intended to "wean Afghanistan off of its war economy" in late 2014 yet this was grossly ineffectual; the influx of capital was siphoned by corrupt patronage networks and increased wealth gaps in an already impoverished country (RT News, "US to pump \$300mn into Afghanistan to end war economy," 2014: ¶2). A 'strong central government' failed to materialize, and the fuzzy agreements on the number of foreign forces to remain in Afghanistan after 2014 left many regional actors—Russia, Iran, India, and Pakistan—wary and uneasy (Escobar 2014; RT News, "Russia wary of permanent US military bases in Afghanistan," 2014).

One final lesson bears mention. A 1988 letter published by the Soviet Central Committee to all members of Communist Party of the Soviet Union speaks to "honest and noble goals" but admits to having had an insufficient understanding of Afghanistan and the war that broke the Soviet system. The intervention to back a regional communist government added more violence to an already tenuous internal conflict. The letter is remarkable, its resigned tone revealing the truth of matter:

Our approach did not take into account the country's multiple forms of economic life and other characteristics, such as tribal and religious customs...One has to admit that we essentially put our bets on the military solution, on suppressing the counterrevolution with force. We did not even make full use of the existing opportunities to neutralize the hostile attitudes of the local population toward us. *Often our people, acting out of their best intentions, tried to transplant the approach to which we are accustomed onto Afghan soil, and encouraged the Afghans to copy our ways.* All this did not help our cause; it bred feelings of dependency on the part of the Afghan leaders in regard to the Soviet Union, both in the sphere of military operations and in the economic sphere. (Savranskaya, reprinted in *Harper's Magazine* 2006: 24, emphasis added)

transport-hub-nato-russian-150/; <http://rt.com/politics/nato-transit-russia-afghanistan-059/>). Given the ongoing tension between the U.S. and Russia in relation to Ukraine, the resolution of this issue should continue as a significant issue for the withdrawal of American forces and the sustainment of any remaining foreign troops.

²⁰ This figure is reported in the RT News Story; the figure given in a US Congressional Research Service report is \$686 billion. See Anne Belasco (8 December 2014), "The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11," p. 2 <<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf>>.

Published in *Harper's Magazine* under the title "Known Knowns," the implication is clear. By the summer of 2009 and almost eight years into the occupation of Afghanistan, North Atlantic counterinsurgents were already enacting their own "first as tragedy, then as farce" scenario.

Doctrine & Military Dreamworlds: Words/Cunning/Fantasy

Thus, when there is no unity of the thing, there is at last unity and identity of the word. It will be noted that names are taken in their *extensive* usage, in other words, function as common nouns ensuring the unification of the aggregate they subsume. The proper names can be nothing more than an extreme case of the common noun, containing its already domesticated multiplicity within itself and linking it to a being or object posited as unique. This jeopardizes, on the side of words and things both, the relation of the proper name as *intensity* to the multiplicity it instantaneously apprehends. (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 27-28)

In the dreamworld of counterinsurgency doctrine, words labour to unify the aggregate things they must necessarily subordinate and subsume whether in pacifying intense material phenomena—influencing, targeting, killing—or condensing complex combinations of actions—reconstruction, stabilization, security—into distilled instrumental forms. Recalling Clausewitz's discernment of the chasm between concept and action, the decade-long effort to stabilize an appropriate language for counterinsurgency must be understood as the foundation for its aesthetic equipment and its basic infrastructure for the territorialization of its theater of operations. As the last section reflected on the lessons learned apparatus that was formalized around counterinsurgency, this section attends to the semiotic and discursive production of counterinsurgency as an exercise in both cunning and fantasy.

Harper's titling the Soviet communique "Known Knowns" is an allusion to the now-infamous exposition of military intelligence as understood by Donald Rumsfeld during his tenure as American Secretary of Defense. Speaking in 2003 about unverified (and later shown to be non-existent) Iraqi chemical weapons of mass destruction, Rumsfeld invoked the Johari Window²¹ of 'known knowns' (knowing what one knows), 'known unknowns' (knowing what one needs to know), and 'unknown unknowns' (not knowing what one does not know). Yet, as Slavoj Žižek is fond of pointing out, there is a missing term in Rumsfeld's epistemology: the *unknown knowns*, the naturalized things that are known

²¹ The Johari Window is a heuristic cognitive psychology model developed by Joseph Luft and Harrington Ingham in the 1950s to explain decision making behaviour within the context of organizational management.

unconsciously but of which one is unaware, imperceptible to conscious considerations but imparting drives to orient and mediate one's actions (Žižek 2004: 9-10; 2008a: 457). Unknown knowns are subject to disavowal or repression when they break through to the surface. The system of lessons learned, as a deliberate way to manage and synthesize knowledge, aims to mitigate this epistemological uncertainty, to apprehend and deal with situated but tacit knowledge. Yet, the lessons are always subject to feedback, structured by unknown knowns that shape the relative comfort offered by conclusions. Rumsfeld did not have to be a Lacanian to consider the drives and desires of subjectivity in relation to knowledge. A refresher on the Kantian critiques would have revealed even in Enlightenment texts an awareness of the limitation of pure reason and the play between the noumenal and phenomenal world, where reality is not strictly phenomenal but rather the parallax or perceptual and existential gap between what is knowable and unknowable (Žižek 2006: 4-5).

The contemporary debate around counterinsurgency is not simply about method but about the discourse of doctrine and military language. According to military experts, doctrine—especially contemporary joint doctrine—should not be an exercise in fantasy nor a template or "rigid set of prescriptions" but should provide space to sustain experimentation and stimulate thought (Cohen, in Gurney 2009: 59). Thus, it must normalize potential action without constraining action too much, offering the best of its theoretical capacity to guide and shape conduct. Doctrine will not always be deterministic or adhered to with dogmatic zeal, though it is where words commence the work of transforming thought into things, actions, and events. or of containing and making complex processes legible and intelligible. According to Harald Høiback, a military theorist and lieutenant-colonel in the Norwegian Defence Forces, contemporary doctrine, as a multidisciplinary body of knowledge, can be used as a tool for command, for change, and for teaching (Høiback 2013: 4). It should have a prescriptive function as a "recipe" for action (4) and should be formal but not too restrictive as an exercise in teasing out the "art of the possible" (139). The language of doctrine should be consistent and 'streamlined' enough to provide a "professional discourse within military matters" (96) and anchor a military community of practice; yet, as Høiback suggests, the slippage between meta-level terms like doctrine,

theory, and ethos indicate the difficulty in grounding the necessary language at the outset (23, 160).

Doctrine should not and does not have to be gibberish or sloganeering either and can be the basis for a "common vocabulary that helps to clarify the nature of disagreement [or problem]" (154).

There is thus a transversal relation between doctrine, action, and language insofar as there is no proper sequencing between them. Doctrine will use language to impart and prescribe actions but only as a response to lessons and the feedback generated from actions themselves, which indicate the shortcomings of theories and operating concepts. This architecture of language and knowledge remains crucial to territorializing the artificial environmental conditions for conducting and staging a war. The grammar of war will need actual grammar, whether to clarify procedures or to abstract the implications of force and violence. In his essay on the paradox of nuclear war and its revelation (*apocalypse*), Jacques Derrida suggests that the unknown quantity of a nuclear war that has *not* taken place is supplemented in advance by a "fabulously textual" known quantity of endlessly circulating discourse and knowledge on which the absent but virtual threat of nuclear weaponry depends (Derrida 1984: 23). Weapons and war have always depended on what he calls a "sophistry of belief," which is extraordinarily sophisticated while also being crude and vulgar "psycho-rhetoric" (24).²² Similarly, through his detailed study of financial violence and the rise of communicative-cognitive capitalism, Christian Marazzi argues that the disruptive and increasingly sophisticated financial innovations of the 1990s and 2000s required a whole field of disruptive linguistic innovations to codify and justify the function and to obscure the effects of these developments (2002 [2008] & 2011). Military actors require sophisticated semiotic operators, too, because to wage war is to battle with the nominations made about the war and to make intelligible the innovations generated by the war itself.

Many commentators have remarked on the literary quagmire of counterinsurgency, and how the mix of acronyms and terms undermines the ability of military actors to create a shared

²² In relation to Derrida's theoretical emphasis always on the inscription in grammatology, this gap between word and thing is exactly where we can locate the 'dangerous supplement' or the unknown quantity of something that has barely come into 'being there', which is regarded as almost without any existence because of its fleeting appearance. In Derrida's philosophy, we have a zero-ground of absolutely minimal appearance, the existence through a moment that is non-existent and absent the moment it is pinned down: "The movement of its inscription is the very possibility of its effacement." (27). For further explanation of the appearance of the non-existent, see Badiou's chapter (pp. 125-144) on Derrida in *Pocket Pantheon: Figures of Postwar Philosophy* (2009).

understanding of operations and missions (Zweibelson 2013a; Grice 2012). Part of the dilemma facing military actors is translating their interpretations, measurements, and actions into standardized protocols that are reliable, reflecting an agreed upon idea of war's ontology while prescribing how to deal with specific situations. With the 'intellectualization' of military affairs and more complex doctrinal offerings, we can detect a kind of anti-intellectual *revanchism* against doctrine and theory, a defensive move against 'overindulgent' doctrine for doctrine's sake, which is expressed by gendering and feminizing doctrinal exercises as less manly or as elitist (snobby, intellectual) and not conforming to the warrior ethos or the practical needs of contemporary warfighters 'down range' (Kahn 2012).²³ In *On War*, Clausewitz is cognizant of the use and abuse of doctrine, suggesting a doctrinal "idiom" accompanies action in war but that its "retinue of jargon, technicalities, and metaphors... [is] sometimes nothing more than ornamental flourishes of the critical narrative," which lose meaning "once they are torn from their context and used as general axioms" (Clausewitz 1976: 168-9). Clausewitz is writing about the symbolic value of doctrinal markers that divide interpretive communities and communities of practice. To paraphrase the 2004 comments of former United States Marine Commandant General James Mattis, doctrine is the last refuge for the unimaginative. According to this line of reasoning, 'real' military actors respond to reality, not to fancy words in manuals. While Mattis may have issues with the academicization of military affairs, his comments impart a rather base form of anti-intellectualism premised on the implicit feminization of theory and doctrine whereby 'action' is gendered in heteronormative terms as masculine. Yet, from an institutional perspective, doctrine cannot be dismissed given the energy dedicated to its creation. Ever the 'old boy,' Mattis' overdrawn division fails to realize that whether for or against exercises in doctrine development, a common language and

²³ Of course, to feminize is to rely on stale but powerful hegemonic technologies of gender performance that subjugate women in the context of patriarchal societies. In her essay on war and masculinity, Kim Hutchings interrogates different articulations of masculinity that accompany new and contemporary ways of conceptualizing postmodern/post-industrial war. Her central thesis is that any theory about the nature of war, even when they break from the reductive atavistic masculinity of the warrior ethos coinciding with conventional/classical conceptions of war, still requires an analogical and co-constitutive link to a hegemonic masculine trope to ground and triangulate the representation of war so as to make it intelligible. Kaldor's new wars thesis and its promotion of a global military capacity to enforce global civil society imparts a cosmopolitan Enlightenment policeman; Der Derian's account of technologically-mediated 'virtuous war' requires and naturalized a techno-centric masculine user; and Coker's theory of posthuman humane war posits a humane warrior. See Hutchings (2008), "Making Sense of Masculinity & War," *Men & Masculinities* 10(4).

aesthetic remain necessary to imagine and harmonize the war and induce reality. For Clausewitz, friction always exists between Hypothetical (theoretical) or Absolute ('pure' and untainted) ideas of war and the actual occurrence that unfolds with probabilities and unknown quantities.²⁴ So, if language is where the imagination of war finds its grammar, literally and existentially, then language is also where friction and fog manifest, shaping the contours of any war's possibility.

Clausewitz is interesting given his role as an enduring doctrinal anchor for North Atlantic militaries, serving metonymically for debates about fighting and how war 'works.'²⁵ His vocabulary remains important for military actors.²⁶ Essential elements from his work have become codified as principles, inserted and slowly translated into formal doctrine.²⁷ Additionally, considering Clausewitz's *On War* means recognizing its posthumous publication and his own admission to it being an incomplete "mass of conceptions not brought into form" (in Eikmeir 2013: ¶5). While some suggest that Clausewitz cannot offer any prescriptive advice on how to conduct 'new' expeditionary wars or to bridge the qualitative difference between industrial-age war and information-age war (c.f. van Creveld 1991 as the canonical example),²⁸ this assessment fails to appreciate his lasting insight on war as a system of

²⁴ To clarify, Absolute war has nothing to do with total war or total mobilization for state war but rather with the phase space of possibility in relation to the space-time or territorialization of war. In their esoteric language, Deleuze and Guattari suggest the idea of Absolute war is a force specific to the war machine, an assemblage does not have war as its primary referent. It is a space of possibility prior to the uptake and organization of the war machine by state agents for State war.

²⁵ J.F.C. Fuller's 1925 *Principles of War* is in fact a formalization of Clausewitz's axioms in relation to conducting fighting in battle, which were nine principles organized into different permutations of 'cosmic, mental, moral, and physical spheres' or categories of 'control, resistance and pressure' but which were governed overall by what Fuller referred to as "the law of the economy of force." The nine principles are direction, offensive action, surprise, concentration (mass), distribution, security, mobility (maneuver), endurance, and determination.

²⁶ The debate around Clausewitz often returns to the importance of "centre of gravity" as a doctrinal focus, a term attributed to Clausewitz in an 1874 translation but which never appears in his work. Clausewitz used *schwerpunkt* ("weight or focus," "point of effort," "decisive point"), which is understood as the target or point of focus of one's efforts but which over time became understood as a hub or source of power. Discussions in doctrinal circles still argue over the relevance of the term, whether it is meaningless, and whether its application is useful. For instance, see Vincent Curtis's "The Most Important Thing: Clausewitz's Centre of Gravity" (2013) and Eikmeir's "Give Carl von Clausewitz and the Center of Gravity a Divorce" (2013).

²⁷ For instance, *CF JP-01 Canadian Military Doctrine* (CF/DND CFEC 2011) lists 10 Clausewitzian principles of war (or fighting) as a foundation to explain the generation and application of military power (2-5/2-6), which in the estimations of CF joint doctrine developers remain pertinent and enduringly relevant to contemporary deployments and campaigns.

²⁸ Colin Gray connects Clausewitz's principles to Robert Leonhard's *Principles of War for the Information Age* (1998), an American doctrine which extends Clausewitz but in new and "original" ways for an era when North Atlantic ways of war are increasingly dependent on information management that exacerbate Clausewitzian friction. Leonhard outlines four key principles: speed, knowledge, jointness, and precision (in Gray 2005: 62-64).

complex relations still *internal* to any ‘reimagining’ of war in the 21st century (Guha 2010).²⁹ In its own context, Clausewitz's writing moved beyond the mechanistic military models of his time³⁰ and sketched a thermodynamic concept of war as an assemblage based in complexity, material processes, and social interactions (Guha 2010; c.f. Bousquet 2009; De Landa 1991; Gat 1989). Further, overdrawn readings of Clausewitz—suggesting he states unequivocally that *war is A* or *war is B*—do little dialogic justice to the account of war offered in *On War*.

Much of the dispute over the relevancy of Clausewitz is a matter of attributing analogical or representational logic to his collection of axioms and propositions in *On War*. Interrogating Clausewitz and language, Jan Mieszkowski identifies "the power peculiar to war, which is always a campaign to do things with words" (24).³¹ In order to manage the messy aggregate of war—and to sanitize and semiotically subdue it—words will have to suffice in making its reality intelligible. Mieszkowski writes:

This is why Clausewitz's more astute readers invariably come to the conclusion that war is defined by its lack of clear boundaries—spatial, temporal, or logical—even as they vehemently insist that military theory is not to be hijacked by some program that wantonly labels anything under the sun "war." The more precise war's specificity as a model of discourse becomes, the vaguer its conceptual parameters become. (Mieszkowski 2009: 25)

This gets at a fundamental tension between war as a general ontological premise—or generalizable condition—and war as a specific undertaking, a tension notably identified and negotiated by Foucault in *SMDB* and *STP* in relation to the genealogy of biopolitics and the continuation and displacement of war into its Others (i.e., peace, politics, not-war). The paradoxical effect—more specificity about war resulting in the *un-limiting* of war—is certainly applicable to doctrine today and to the practices or scenarios it aims to imagine and enable.

²⁹ For contemporary scholarly debates about Clausewitz, see Strachan & Herberg-Rothe's (2007) *Clausewitz and the Twenty-First Century*, a collection of essays by military and Clausewitz scholars. I cite several essays from the collection below. Further, see Lonsdale's (2004) *The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future*; Herberg-Rothe's (2007) *Clausewitz's Puzzle: The Political Theory of War*; Hauser's (2002) *Reading Clausewitz*; Echevarria's (2007) *Clausewitz & Contemporary War*; and Guha's (2010) *Reimagining War in the 21st Century: From Clausewitz to Network-Centric Warfare*.

³⁰ Clausewitz is often compared to the conservative military thinker Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, the Comte de Guibert, and to Antoine-Henri Jomini, who shared Clausewitz's view that war is an art and not an exact science.

³¹ Mieszkowski opens his essay with a small passage from Derrida's essay, "Violence & Metaphysics" (1966): "There is war only after the opening of discourse, and war dies out only at the end of discourse" (Derrida, in Mieszkowski 2009: 18).

According to American military intellectual Antulio Echevarria, Clausewitz's statement that war is a "true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics" (Clausewitz 1976: 89) should be taken very specifically. War can change in degree at the level of its expression (intensity, frequency), which can eventually force a change in kind (scale, scope), extending the effects of the war into policy or strategic concerns (Echevarria 2007: 61). Such changes are anchored to three *intrinsic* if composite forces—the 'wonderful' or 'remarkable' trinity (Clausewitz 1976: 89)—of enmity, chance, and purpose (passion-hostility-belligerence, uncertainty- probability, and aims-ends), which feed into each other in dynamic and complex ways. Further, Clausewitz identifies a second trinity of the people, the military, and the government, to which he indexes the first: enmity aligns with popular sentiment; uncertainty is linked to the fog and friction of military operations; and ends are a function of governmental reason and policy (89). Linking a state's justification of war to the 'general will' of the population was an idea already well-established in Clausewitz's era, as was the link between belonging to a people and being mobilized as a resource for war (i.e., the link between security, citizenship, and military obligations). There is a nascent biopolitical quality in Clausewitz's trinities: they imply how specific wars and the perpetual threat of war provide government with a way to organize the life and activities of populations, which anticipates Foucault's engagement with Clausewitz through the lens of biopower.

When the relations between these intrinsic forces cause fighting to escalate and 'rise to extremes,' war outstrips the ability to control or direct its course (what Clausewitz calls "the edge of the faculty of reason"). This marks the moment where, in the terms of Clausewitz's continuation thesis, it becomes unclear whether war continues politics or politics continues war. This is exacerbated all the more by attempts to grasp war as an object for scientific management and by efforts that fail to acknowledge the subjective conduct and perception of war and the essence of fighting. For Clausewitz, war *cannot be autonomous* given its connectivity with other domains. It is not reducible to combat but it should ideally remain an instrument subordinate to policy as much as possible (i.e., war is policy or politics by other means, the normative understanding of the continuation thesis).³² While Clausewitz

³² I consider the continuation thesis next chapter through Foucault's use of Clausewitz in *SMBD* (1976 [2003]).

suggests that fighting forces must be destroyed and the enemy—here, again, the trinity of the government, the military, and the people—must be disarmed or lose the will to carry on fighting (Clausewitz 1976: 77, 90-91), different means exist to achieve this end. Only using the 'total means' at one's disposal will result in achieving a decisive conclusion (77). The risk is always that the primary military means and goals (*Zeil*) in war—combat, fighting, kinetic or lethal violence in battle—will render strategic or political goals and justification (*Zweck*) moot; the logic of war will give way to its 'grammar' in unforeseen and unintended ways so that *the means will justify the ends*. Whether these inverted 'ends' are expressed as permanent war economies or as militarized societies with a perpetual war footing is left unremarked.

Regardless, as Clausewitz suggests, it is a fallacy to think that wars will not escalate and threaten to exceed the limit of a given purpose or established aim. Rationalized "war by algebra" is not possible; if war is an act of force, "there is no logical limit to the application of that force" (76-77). Modifications in practice are inevitable as the military conduct of war, flexible as it may be, reacts to the contingency and uncertainty at play in specific wars, which are "uncharted sea[s], full of reefs" (Clausewitz 1976: 120). When understood as multiple lines of fighting, war is exceedingly dangerous: as more contemporary critics have noted, its very ontology can be quickened by the 'pulsations' of violence that intensify acts of war, pushing war from down to something deemed 'less than war' or upward to an unlimited and totalizing undertaking or condition (Echevarria 2007: 62). It can subsume all other things and yet it can subside, becoming political violence that does not conform to the traditional model of reciprocal state-state war (Hutchings 2008). This is the crux of counterinsurgency, where war and fighting exceeds the tidy conventional confines of reciprocal engagements with shared risks and common fields of perception, and where the pulsations of fighting and violence exceed the limits of firepower and target the biopolitical production of populations.

To claim that Clausewitzian ideas are universal means to acknowledge that universality is not homogeneity. There is no fixed substance. Rather, what is universal can be disjunctive, striated, uneven,

and plural even, a recurring process of repetition and variation in relation to the same set of problems encountered. Toward the end of his study, Clausewitz writes:

We wanted to show how every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions. Each period, therefore, would have held to its own theory of war, even if the urge had always and universally existed to work things out on scientific principles. (Clausewitz 1976: 593).

A scientific method will not suffice. For instance, counterinsurgency manuals suggest that while insurgencies have common features, the methods for countering insurgencies are undeniably local and will vary. In assessing the state of the art of counterinsurgency warfare over a short blog post for *War on the Rocks*, military academic David Ucko takes a balanced approach to these questions. Extending Clausewitz's proposition, Ucko argues, "Counterinsurgency theory underlines the uniqueness of each insurgency, yet also advances an approach that is to apply across time and space" (Ucko 2013a: ¶1). He outlines the difficulties of practically achieving the sequencing necessary to build a counterinsurgency campaign around the axiomatic "new normal" process of shape-clear-hold-build, which sounds linear and logical but is beset with what Ucko refers to as a "unique web of competing interests" that shape the success or failure of stabilizing local areas. As Ucko warns elsewhere, a generic cookie-cutter approach to counterinsurgency will fail because it cannot accommodate the range of informal interests and the complexity in local and community-based environments (Ucko 2013c: 529, 547). In a rejoinder to those declaring counterinsurgency doctrine dead or irrelevant, Ucko recently argued that doctrine, taken as theory, is not a guarantee or template for victory; rather, the complexity of counterinsurgency campaigns are here to stay and so to must the doctrine (Ucko 2014). Back in 2011, he admitted that counterinsurgency in the post-Afghanistan era could not be a strategy but rather served as a necessary exercise—an experiment, a phase space—for discerning what would become always-applicable requirements for North Atlantic liberal war in the near future:

In general terms, [counterinsurgency's] main contribution lies in its various principles, which touch on the importance of achieving a nuanced political understanding of the campaign, operating under unified command, using intelligence to guide operations, isolating insurgents from the population, using the minimum amount of force necessary to achieve set objectives, and assuring and maintaining the perceived legitimacy of the counterinsurgency effort in the eyes of the populace. (Ucko 2011: 13)

These mutable but essential features for the success of liberal war applied on the edges of liberal rule's influence. Eschewing a 'monochrome universal,' Ucko's advice repeatedly suggests finding the universal and defining features of counterinsurgency in the particular, eternally recurring elements that express themselves in different ways.

In reconciling the universal and the particular, Ucko's advice for military actors is not simply philosophical but also historical insofar as both the language and the doctrine of counterinsurgency should make both perception and practice intelligible while remaining pliable enough to reflect recurring scenarios. Yet, in terms of discovering material problems with and through the available semantic and linguistic field, history itself plays a part in how and what is made available as aesthetic equipment. In Iraq, from the summer of 2004 and well into pre-Surge 2006, using the word "insurgency" in the upper echelons of the American command structure was taboo because it called forth the failures of American efforts in Vietnam along with attendant failures to accurately understand the anti-colonial motivations of Vietnamese forces in the war. Following the 2003 invasion and into 2004, an increasingly hardened armed resistance to the occupation, along with intensifying battles between Sunni and Shia militias, meant that claims of decisive victories failed to materialize, something clear to military units tasked with conducting the war on the ground. Wishing for a quick conventional campaign with an aggressive kill/capture program and a transfer of government power to compliant host-nation leadership was misguided. The constant semantic recourse by American military and civil authorities to 'dead-enders' or 'jihadists' was negligent because it obfuscated the growing opposition to the occupation and the intensification of sectarian violence between different armed groups, a situation exacerbated by the American-driven Coalition Provisional Authority's decision to disband Iraqi security forces and purge the civil service³³ thereby pushing upwards of a million disenfranchised and aggrieved Iraqi 'fighting age' men into the streets. Further, while negligence may be coupled with a defensible shred of ignorance, the naming-framing-blaming language game indicated a deeper kind of disavowal.

³³ With the appointment of Paul Bremer as the top civilian administrator in the provisional authority and the exceptional powers afforded to him to rule by decree beginning in May 2003, his first two orders purged all Ba'ath Party members from the civil service and state bureaucracy and dismantled the upper echelon and command structure of Iraq's security forces.

Instead of insurgents, the American-led forces were battling "enemies of the legitimate Iraqi government" (Packer 2006: ¶13). A cursory review of the 2010 Wikileaks war logs in both Iraq and Afghanistan reveals this kind of rhetorical exercise. Entries detailing engagements with insurgents use AAF (anti-Afghan forces), AIF (anti-Iraq forces), or ACF (anti-coalition forces)—the first two being *non sequiturs* given that many were fighting *for* Afghanistan or Iraq albeit conceived in different terms. The *de facto* proscription against the use of 'insurgent' prevented military agents from considering or implementing alternative doctrinal programs and so address problems in more 'appropriate' terms (Sepp/PBS Frontline 2007: ¶4-5, transcript). For example, an oft-cited success story in relation to pacifying 'restive' areas in Iraq details American armoured cavalry units in Tal Afar during 2005 and 2006—prior to the operational arrival of counterinsurgency in 2007—conducting clear-hold-build operations but only because local unit commanders decided to use the "I word" (Packer 2006: ¶15). Naming the problem "insurgency" allowed them conceptual access to the existing thirty year-old doctrine on counterinsurgency, and it allowed them to reconceive their relationship to local populations, whose hearts and minds became the prize in an emerging competition. Petraeus, who with the academic 'doctors without orders' circle of advisers around him drafted the 2006 manual, discovered counterinsurgency in during his command of airborne units occupying Mosul in 2004. Heralded as "Iraq's repairman" deployed to fix the 'problem' with a heavy dose of the warrior-philosopher approach, Petraeus brought the 'good news' of classical counterinsurgency and applied it on the fly (Ricks 2006: 228-232; c.f. Russell 2014). While different American units did different things, these two smaller campaigns were comprehensive in scope and aimed for local intelligence generation and non-lethal engagements where possible. Tal Afar in particular became a prophetic model of the population-centered approach to establishing and stabilizing 'white space' for government, basic infrastructure, and reconstruction, a model for the theatre-wide lay down of the doctrine.

For all the complex explication of insurgent methods and motives in the military literature, the etymology of insurgency is never addressed by counterinsurgents themselves. The Latin insurgent or *isurgens* denotes "arising," which implies something relational to which the rising responds. The root is

surgere, from the Latin and French "to rise," and the prefix "in-" translates as "into, towards" (OED). Some sources render the prefix as "against." It takes on its political and military connotations in the 1530s—"to rise in opposition or insurrection"—and in 1765 as "one who rises in revolt." What is clear is that far from being automatically posited from the environment, insurgency rises against or into some existing thing or force that has already precedes it. It is willful reaction or response. Insurgency already counters a surge. Suffice it to say, revolutionary politics and their respective theories of war imagine and advocate insurgency. In fact, as Beatrice Heuser points out, Clausewitz was well-aware of partisan war and a shift toward what he called 'people's war' driven (in his theory) by passion, enmity, and ideological zeal, a topic on which lectured after the Napoleonic wars (Heuser 2010). My point about language here is simply that the military literature fails to substantively deal with the semiotic and conceptual basis of insurgency, creating complex analyses of insurgencies as such but opting always to externalize the motivations.

While not dealing expressly with language, a number of studies beyond military affairs offer some insight into the semiotic production of insurgency's sign value. Antonio Negri's *Insurgencies* gives an account of constituent power and the potentialities of a swarming multitude collectively organized around opposition to neoliberal rule and empire. Negri's use of insurgency lays bare a linguistic but also philosophical, ontological, and political imperative, which he argues is an affirmative, justified, and legitimate expression of opposition to illegitimate ways of rule (Negri 1999: 312-3).³⁴ Similarly, in her study of occupation and resistance as traditions of war within the Eurocentric canon, Karma Nabulsi argues that the European republican tradition represented in Rousseau's *Fragments of War* and *The Social Contract*—the latter an emblematic text of the Enlightenment—does not limit the legitimacy of belligerency to soldiers or state militaries (Nabulsi 1999: 240). If government or sovereign power creates abuse, tyranny, and inequality in the administration of land and people, then insurrection, insurgency, and civilian resistance are justified. Nabulsi suggests earlier in her study that the Grotian or 'just war' (*jus ad bellum*) tradition—based on Hugo Grotius' *On the Law of War and Peace* (1631), the

³⁴ Given the intellectual cherry-picking and decontextualized allusions to anti-colonial and anti-military thinker in the counterinsurgency manuals (Price 2009: 74-75), it is surprising Negri was not misconstrued and cited.

basis of contemporary international law—is problematic. It concedes all rights of belligerency to sovereign power (i.e., monopoly) and frames war as the prerogative of the state (and also supra-state alliances and coalitions)(78; Nabulsi 2006: 44-60). The pious recourse to humanitarianism or to the more recent 'doctrine to protect' (D2P) in international law opts for Grotian and not republican virtues because it gives agency and a monopoly on action to sovereign state actors who use organized violence to sustain or create the basis for ruling (c.f. Benjamin 1921). Ironically, the conception to 'legitimate government' in counterinsurgency doctrine occludes the republican tradition as a justifiable basis for insurgency even as the tradition is held up by just war intellectuals as the highest and most defensible democratic form of post-war rule. Uwe Steinhoff's essay in defence of *guerrillas* argues that insurgents are *unfairly prevented* from using indefinite utopian ends to justify fighting and violent measures even as the legitimacy of a host-nation state (or its international allies, deployed internally) does precisely this in assuming a narrative and moral claim of representing 'the people' (Steinhoff 2010: 101-2). The justice in 'just war' cannot be impartial. Its normative foundation rests on justifying the just warrior's basis for action above all else and depriving opponents access to the same rhetorical and juridical-legal resources.

In a fascinating essay on postcolonial politics and the prose of counterinsurgency (1983), Ranajit Guha provides a close reading of writing on peasant rebellions³⁵ in colonial India before and after the establishment of the British Raj and direct imperial rule. The essay interrogates different historical accounts of revolts and insurrections, and his assessment of the historical record ranges from official administrative-type military-colonial communications (what he calls the primary discourse) to well-intentioned accounts by former colonial administrators (secondary) to quasi-anthropological and non-official accounts reflecting on events after well after the fact (tertiary). His work traces how a vehicular military and colonial-administrative language emerged to establish insurgents not as irrational but a-rational and non-reasonable. For Guha, these accounts represent the paradoxical limit of a colonial power's ability or proclivity to gain enlightenment about its adversary, whom it must know about in order to target but not know too much lest it legitimize resistance. The ethnographically enabled and

³⁵ Guha's essay relies on the Barasat uprising of 1831 and the Santal rebellion of 1855 as core examples while also connecting to the rebellions in Bengal (1860) and the Deccan (1875-76).

culturally intelligent counterinsurgency today opts for the same. As Marcelle Maneri argues in his essay on bellicose metaphors, the conduct of contemporary warfare relies on deep narrative structures where descriptions of enemies are explicitly opaque but threatening and rely on partitions between "us-them" to remove agency from enemies and link just action with state actors (Maneri 2010: 160-163, 166).

Guha identifies the hegemonic colonial narrativization of insurgency as a fable that permanently renders insurrection as pathological. The accounts he studies are paradigmatic in externalizing peasant consciousness and revolts as mindless reactions, inevitable outbursts, or 'instinctive actions,' which are characterizations that rely on the racialization of indigenous peoples as irrational lesser forms and that explain away the *internal* social beliefs and motivations to mobilize against the intolerable violence of colonial-economic conditions (Guha 1983: 2-3). So, the insurgent's motivations are externalized and opaque yet her presence is telluric and 'naturally' infernal. Guha's analysis of imperial semiotics echoes Carl Schmitt's characterization of insurgency in *Theory of the Partisan*, where the partisan may be mobile but her enmity ultimately remains endemic to the local environment and is defensive in nature (Schmitt 1964 [2007]: 92). Her value is that of functioning paradoxically as a totalizing figure and a cipher simultaneously, what Deleuze and Guattari describe as the unspecified enemy, a historical and narrative necessity for the state war machine (Deleuze & Guattari 1986: 119-120).³⁶ She is an object of history but not a subject, her motivations and intentions "desubjectivized" to naturalize the legitimacy of those who oppose her (Butler 2009: 51). From the perspective of a state military's aesthetic equipment, the insurgent or partisan is a 'naturally' embedded ecological feature though one that no longer fits according to new regimes of order ,and, as such must be razed (Bertrand-Monk 2007). As Schmitt's theory suggests in his work regarding the concept of the political (i.e., friend/enemy distinctions), this

³⁶ According to G.L. Ulmen, Schmitt anticipated the merging and conflation of partisan and terrorist enabled by contemporary state military discourses, which brand any kind of adversarial sentiment or opposition as terrorism. For Schmitt, terrorism had an "absolute enemy," who must be annihilated with offensive and indiscriminate means whereas the partisan remains a political concept tied to territory (Ulmen, in Schmitt 1964 [2007]: xxvi). Terrorism as deployed to described and invoked to explain implies a totalizing procedure. Certainly, today's characterization of terrorism by state authorities conforms to this as do many acts and explanations by some self-proclaimed global *jihadi* groups who have a decidedly deterritorialized agenda. Yet, the return to the discourse of insurgency in armature of liberal war suggests a separating of what have become overlapping figurations. See my comments on Brad Evans below regarding liberal war, population, and the possible redemption of insurgents.

notion of the partisan or insurgent inherently depoliticizes and evacuates the insurgent's case for legitimate action even as the same notion is required to ensure the state military's licence to use the insurgent as the target in a larger political—or, biopolitical—sorting exercise undertaken with technologies of life and death.

Guha approaches his collection of prose as colonialist knowledge production, which functioned as the 'objective' foundation for justifying the harsh and lethal mass violence of early and mid-19th century counterinsurgency efforts in India (Guha 1983: 26). While some accounts offer a compensatory supplement to the outright racism of the colonial regime—they sympathetically abhor the genocidal operations, and they admire the courage of the rebels—their historiographical imaginaries fail to shift away from language and grammar that naturalizes the prerogative of imperial "custodians of law and order" clearly articulated in the primary discourse (27). History is the continuation of violence by other means, and the prose offers "nothing to illuminate that consciousness which is called insurgency... [T]he rebel has no place in this history as [the subject of rebellion]" (27).³⁷ Insurgents and the population become figures that wander into the prose of a military fantasy like literary and material *deus ex machinas*. While the more recent tertiary accounts of earlier rebellions validate armed struggle in a language closer to revolutionary Marxist-centered analyses, the base kernel of colonial historiography remains in place, appropriating and assimilating the figure of the peasant to silence and hive off her "historical personality" (33).³⁸ Again, this reveals an internal contradiction within military knowledge production, where counterinsurgents require better cultural intelligence about a population but fail to legitimize insurgency even as they set about diagnosing the grievances and root causes for resistance.

Given the account offered in this section, we can say that military language is the primary 'force multiplier,' the universal coding process designed to focus the imagination of action in order to shape

³⁷ For a similar analysis of the figure of the terrorist, see Dina Georgis (2011), "Masculinities and the Aesthetics of Love: Reading Terrorism in *De Niro's Game* and *Paradise Now*," *Studies in Gender & Sexuality* 12 (1), 134-148.

³⁸ Guha develops a critique of Marxist accounts of peasant rebellions, which he argues flatten and misrecognize the contradictions of context of the revolts even as they attempt to assess them in more radical terms. Guha's criticisms of history done "in the name of Marxism" connect to wider arguments over the universality and generalization of Marxist critique to explain the hegemony, domination, and the bourgeoisie in colonial and postcolonial India. The debate around this constellation has been revived in relation to Vivek Chibber's recent book *Postcolonial Theory and the Spectre of Capital* (2013).

and territorialize 'in advance' the necessary theatre of operations. What I have done here is point toward the self-referential semiotic and discursive labour necessary to controlling any wartime engagement whether in relation to insurgency or to military doctrine generally. Targeting the proper words narrows the gap between saying and doing war—between tidy words and messy violent things—is one part of how military actors think the limit, organize their efforts, and conduct a war. As I discuss below, this semiotic labour is apparent in the realization of modern war and the recognition of irregular warfare as first philosophy.

A Brief History of Irregular Warfare as First Philosophy

Debates around the semiotic production and application of counterinsurgency doctrine have also led to debates about the standing of irregular war in the wider historical context of military affairs. While often relegated to minor status—a minor literature—in relation to conventional narratives of war, the tradition of irregular and unconventional war is less an aberration and more a constant 'indigestible kernel' in regards to theories and philosophies of war. As discussed below, the discourse and practice of irregular war is foundational to the realization of what late-colonial counterinsurgents come to refer to as "modern war," a proto-networked and nascent 'beyond-limits' type of war exceeding the confines of combat. In this respect, counterinsurgency has a definite footprint within military warfighting philosophy though its status has been secondary, emerging at moments while remaining mostly undercover or as the domain of special applications. Independent of its results, the wider military application and embrace of counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan created a space for experimentation and driving the limit-attitude in a process of permanent critique.

In his work on insurgency, the former British officer and now military scholar John MacKinlay argues that the twentieth century's two world wars are exceptions; while described as discrete 'wars' they were actually composite aggregations of existing conflicts unfolding in different geographies and scales. In contrast, the "terrific continuity" is the consistent use of Northern and Western military force in small wars or asymmetric low-intensity contexts against the "bottom 10% of the Global South"

(MacKinlay in Betz, Rid, and MacKinlay 2012; c.f. MacKinlay 2009). The Correlates of War database indicates that state-state war system is also a pathology, with non-state, sub-state, and extra-state warfare the norm, causing counterinsurgency scholars Sebastian Gorka and David Kilcullen to argue that, "Classic COIN is simply the current lens we use to try and comprehend an ageless form of conflict that is in fact *more prevalent* than conventional war" (Gorka & Kilcullen 2011: 17, emphasis added). Influential scholars within military affairs are thus entertaining not simply an alternative narrative but a different core of state military violence altogether.

Given that theories of irregular and unconventional war (of which counterinsurgency is a part) have historically been regarded as a specialized subsets, they have garnered less attention but that does not render them entirely invisible. Historically, formal counterinsurgency doctrine dates back to the French colonial wars in North America during the late 1750s. Military literature of the time on rural *petite guerres* advocated exploiting local indigenous knowledge, practices, and allegiances and using irregular formations to bring firepower to bear in difficult North American physical terrain (Lacroix-Leclair & Ouellet 2011). Building on this base, the French revolutionary armies of General Lazare Hoche in 1792-3 created formal directives outlining counterinsurgency tactics for use against counterrevolutionary insurrections in the Vendée and Brittany (North 2003). The etymological casting of *guerrilla* was created twenty years later in the Napoleonic Peninsular War beginning in 1808, which mixed popular insurrection and partisan engagements with state-state military confrontations.

Coincident with Clausewitz, Prussian General Karl von Decker published an 1822 treatise on "little wars" entitled *The Small War in the Spirit of the New Conduct of Warfare* (Becket 2001: 4). Imperialist wars and colonial occupations by European powers in the latter half of the 19th century and into the pre-Second World War era, along with dedicated American force projection into its self-appointed spheres of influence in the late 19th and early 20th century established a paradigm that mixed police-style constabulary approaches and military methods—hard and soft violence. Callwell's *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practices* (1906), Gwynn's *Imperial Policing* (1939), and the United States' Marine Corps' *Small War Manual* (1940) represent Anglo-American offerings that codified non-traditional or

unconventional practices to pacify populations—"benevolent pacification," as the American government described its operations in the Philippines in from 1899 to 1902 (Gates 1967; c.f. Boot 2002)³⁹—and sustain conditions of emergency rule through foreign military occupation at the behest of a host-nation government (i.e., client state).

The hot proxy wars and the decolonization and national liberation struggles of the Cold War were saturated with military and paramilitary counterinsurgency and with covert unconventional operations to promote insurgency, with American, British, and French forces conducting both depending on the context. According to Feichtinger, Malinowski, and Richards, clear "structural parallels exist between late-colonial wars and current Western interventions" (Feichtinger et al 2012: 36). On this continuum, the authors impart a qualification:

In claiming a continuity between late-colonial wars and the current "humanitarian" wars, we should hasten to add that the contemporary belligerent democracies *do not think of themselves as colonial powers, nor do they think of their wars as colonial wars*. Still, the overall aim of the Western powers is to increase control over economic, strategic, and political spheres and to bring non-Westerners closer to the West. (Feichtinger et al 2012: 38; emphasis added)

In other words, 'contemporary belligerent democracies' invoke humanitarian motivations to create conditions for indirect rule according to the globalization of liberal rule dressed up as an exercise in participatory 'global civil society' and correcting disorder. The methods and rhetorics of contemporary counterinsurgency—the academicization of warfare; the anthropological fetishization of 'native culture'; the exploitation of liberal feminist narratives; the collapse of police and military action; and the bleed between the foreign and domestic fronts—all find their historical roots in the early and late-colonial wars of the 19th and 20th centuries (45-53). Yet, in claiming continuity we should also discern a contradiction in relation to how counterinsurgency is coded in military affairs. The increased formalization of irregular and unconventional methods specific to counterinsurgency occurs in conjunction with the disappearance of the doctrine because of the explicit military *failures* of North Atlantic states in the late-colonial period. Notably, a small 1962 "symposium on counterinsurgency" hosted in Washington by the RAND Corporation (Hosmer & Crane 1963 [2006]) confirmed this,

³⁹ American military intervention has its own history of 'splendid little wars.' While written in defence of U.S. exceptionalism, the neoconservative historian Max Boot's book *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and The Rise of American Power* provides an account of the globalization of American small wars.

assembling military theorists and commanders with direct experience fighting insurgencies to create and preserve a 'best practices' summary of the doctrine for American interests in Vietnam.

Current doctrine reflects the historical and conceptual drift of different state-specific programs for countering insurgency, a discursive convex unifying doctrine on unconventional and irregular warfare, low-intensity warfare, foreign internal defence, security force assistance, stability and contingency operations, and counterterrorism. Yet, while today's doctrine becomes a hybrid form, the philosophical foundations and more expressly biopolitical practices of contemporary counterinsurgency stem from the realization of "modern war", the epistemic rupture specific to late-colonial French military thinking of the 1950s and early 1960s. Exploring this realization allows me to explain how countering insurgency pushed military thinking toward new ideas of warfare emblematic of military enlightenment, an emerging military limit-attitude, and a revocation of old metanarratives about war. While British efforts against popular insurrections in then-Malaya and Kenya in the 1950s shaped the operational imagination of contemporary population-centered counterinsurgents (i.e., through figures like Kitson; see below) and are cited frequently, I argue that the French 'school' is more influential because it explicitly foregrounds the question of limits, an environmental attitude toward operations, and the push to 'unrestrict' the flow of war beyond ballistics, combat, and firepower.

The British and French traditions are similar but retain notable differences, which are visible in their respective approaches today. The British principles laid out in Callwell's *Small Wars* formalized a "subtly different tradition of pacification of 'uncivilized peoples'" (Betz, in Manea 2010: ¶6). Historically, the British blend of constabulary and military force in the Mau Mau Rebellion in Kenya (1952-1960) and the so-called 'Malayan Emergency' (1948-1960) are cited as sources and models for contemporary counterinsurgency campaigns in relation to developing a comprehensive "whole-of-government" (WOG) approach (Alderson & Manea 2012; c.f. Thompson's *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences in Malaya and Vietnam* [1966]). Both of these counterinsurgencies saw the British eventually withdrawing and dismantling imperial-colonial rule rather than attempting to defend and maintain it; these campaigns identified military action as one part of a larger competition for 'hearts and minds'

between different forms of government (Durand & Manea: 2012: ¶14-17). Kitson's *Low-Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping* (1971) serves as a conceptual and doctrinal bridge in the British tradition from the late-colonial period to today, which addresses British constabulary and counterinsurgency operations in Northern Ireland. His assessment of "subversion and insurgency" is that they are nothing new but that regardless of what and how they are defined, they will succeed in challenging how Western militaries use force (Kitson 1971: 15). Kitson seems to acknowledge outright that what is at stake in low-intensity operation is the *perception* of force and how it is negotiated by all sides in the triangular reality of insurgents, counterinsurgents, and the population. Kitson's manual-like book goes on to detail the "non-violent" ideal of low-intensity operations, which will require kinetic operations—that is, will have to kill—but which can ensure legitimacy by "handling the population" (143) through robust intelligence generation, civil-military measures, and local civil defence.

Though the British apprehended the changing conception of force and violence in terms of relative intensities, the French line of development is more self-aware of a wider philosophical and ontological change of war beyond the pragmatic or technical questions of its conduct. The French approach is grounded in a counter-revolutionary (*doctrine de guerre révolutionnaire*) context⁴⁰ because French campaigns were conducted in actual French territories in defense of French governmental and administrative power that had yet to devolve administrative and governing power (i.e., Algeria as a department of France proper; some of French Indochina was annexed directly to France; c.f. Galula 1964: xii). On its own conceptual terms, French doctrine was responding to rebellions against French rule by French subjects rather than unruly and 'uncivilized native' insurrections directed against foreign governments. French military thinkers in French Indochina and Algeria understood insurgency as a

⁴⁰ The French use of "counterrevolutionary war" in the current counterinsurgency manual (2010) is contextualized early on in a translation note: what the British and the Americans call counterinsurgency is for French doctrine "stabilization," which is a different phase of conflict operations. French doctrine locates counterinsurgency as a direct response to insurrection and insecurity in the battlespace; it argues for the expansion of operations across kinetic and non-kinetic measures but does not seem to encapsulate the scope or scale of the American-British conception of counterinsurgency. The French doctrine, as a continuation of military thinking developed across *Belle Époque* colonial wars and late-colonial decolonization struggles, offers somewhat of a rejoinder to and critique of the Anglo model, with the implicit suggestion being the counterinsurgency paradigm imagined by its NATO allies is too ambitious and too large. Explicitly, the French doctrine emphasizes that operators and actors must address and remain focused on restoring security and control in local environments.

component of Maoist revolutionary struggle and saw insurgency escalating from low intensity-agitation in a rural agrarian-based areas to irregular guerrilla war to open regular warfare mobilizing the whole population (Marshall in in Manea 2010: ¶ 12). This 'internalized' what were foreign and external operations conducted well beyond the metropolitan homeland, suggesting something close to scaled-up police operations as per British tendencies. Yet, making insurgency intelligible as a revolutionary undertaking took on special significance in the French tradition, rendering insurrection even more threatening and urgent as something always-already internal—and thus something that must be put down in decisive terms given the aim of revolutionary forces to seize the authority to govern and rule (Galula 1964: 3). The late-colonial doctrine of the 1950s and 1960s was built on late 19th and early 20th century practices of Marshals Joseph-Simon Gallieni and Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey, whose pacification doctrine developed in Sudan, Madagascar, and Morocco, and which used the *tache d'huile* ("oil spot") or "Bugeaud" method which imagined localized cadres and detachments of soldiers as small drops of oil adhering to the land and slowly spreading, indissoluble, across the environment (Boisfeury 2010). Some military intellectuals have called this method an important colonial-generated RMA (c.f. Rid 2010; Griffin 2009). These methods later grew into localized and mobile units embedded in smaller communities, coming to be known in Algeria as *tourbillon* ("whirlwind technique") and *nomadisation* (Durand & Manea 2012: ¶ 11).

In general, French doctrine tends to better register the escalation of an insurgency in large part due to its reliance on a revolutionary referent and its wider understanding of revolutionary war according to Maoist terms. In other words, French theory appreciated the evolution of insurgents (i.e. revolutionaries), whose undertaking of small localized engagements (i.e., *guerrilla* operations in isolated areas beyond military influence) using clandestine and unconventional tactics (subversion, sabotage, ambushes, etc.) eventually grows into a consolidated, protracted, and popularly-supported people's war that unfolds into a more conventional and reciprocal encounter between relatively symmetric forces. As I detail below, French doctrine was based on interdicting any insurgency early by controlling the population and mitigating the collusion of local inhabitants with insurgents (Trinquier 1961 [1964]):

29) where counterinsurgents worked to create an advantage in terms of "tangible assets" be they weapons or reconstruction and development (Galula 1964: 4). The French perspective recognized the necessity of weaponizing what I have been calling biopolitical measures by way of administrative, social, economic, and psychological means (*action psychologique, guerre psychologique*) (Durand & Manea 2012: ¶7); further it acknowledged its enemy's aim to employ a "systematic strategy that relies upon the *total* mobilization of the population across all lines of operations" (¶8). As such, French military theory was keenly aware of how fighting would be displaced and reconceived: high-intensity engagements with firepower would be necessary, but the war would have to be reterritorialized within the living environment of population.

Despite these traits, the French approach was not entirely uniform. Theorists and practitioners realized the necessity of controlling both the physical and mental domains of populations within the context of counterrevolutionary warfare, but two different 'schools' of thought existed.⁴¹ The first, represented retroactively by David Galula's *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (1964) identified the core problem as a population-centered 'hearts and minds' competition between modes of government in relation to addressing local grievances. His writing makes repeated references terms to 'insurgents' and 'counterinsurgents', and he is invoked at large across the intellectual production of counterinsurgency in the last decade even as he was less influential in his own time. Galula argued for a population-centered method premised on consenting participation around wider social, political, and governmental initiatives (Manea & Durand 2012: ¶13-14). Galula's advocacy of active information and psychological operations was an important contribution even if his approach underplayed the ability of insurgent groups to effectively mobilize media in a networked competition for hearts and minds (Betz, in Manea 2010: ¶7-9). The 'second' school is associated with Roger Trinquier and Charles Lacheroy and tends to be more dialectical. Like Galula, Trinquier and Lacheroy advocated the migration of war into local everyday environments, yet they were more pointed in attempting to replicate and emulate

⁴¹ A recent commentary piece by counterinsurgency historian Terrence Peterson argues that a closer analysis of 'French counterinsurgency' reveals the lack of any definitive or singular vision of counterinsurgency. See Peterson (3 December 2015), "Myth-busting French Counterinsurgency," *War on the Rocks*, <<http://warontherocks.com/2015/12/myth-busting-french-counterinsurgency/>>.

the methods and structures of Maoist insurgency especially in their deployment of small cadres of counterinsurgents within local settings (Durand & Manea 2012: ¶13). As a practitioner, Trinquier's counterinsurgency methods in Algeria were characterized as a more punitive version of 'less carrot, more stick': "If you have them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow" (Trinquier, in Maneau & Durand 2012: ¶13). While Galula's influence is more explicitly noticeable in contemporary doctrine, it is Trinquier's *Modern Warfare* (1961) that thinks war towards a new limit in its own time. In part, the treatise is a criticism of the French government's failure to appreciate the 'rules of the game' in Algeria—or to let the military dictate the rules of the game, a 'stab in the back'—in denying them the necessary moral and material resources to win.⁴² Notably, Trinquier's advocacy (and support, during the Battle of Algiers) of torture and 'enhanced interrogation techniques'⁴³ make him taboo for counterinsurgents mindful of political correctness and perhaps explains the lack of explicit references to him in the contemporary military manuals. Yet, after serving in and commanding the French elite airborne and special forces units, his philosophy of modern war is more faithful to normalizing and regularizing—enlightening, bring into the light—the necessary capacities which had been historically deemed irregular (i.e., anything not related to reciprocal exchanges in terms of conventional combat). While Galula's career as an intelligence officer may explain his emphasis on indirect approaches, favouring psychological, information, and influence operations, Trinquier's experiences leading operations on the ground shaped his willingness to go beyond conventional limits.

⁴² Following the defeat in South Asia and into the war in Algeria, a influential group of dissidents within the French military command felt the French government failed to allow units to operate with the necessary licence 'required' to defeat the Algerian insurgency and the National Liberation Front. Upset with the newly formed government of Pierre Pflimlin and its unstable cabinet, some senior members later attempted a *coup d'état* (the May 1958 Crisis) with the aim of bringing Charles de Gaulle back to power (he assumed office to mitigate the crisis). In 1961, the same core group of senior officers created the irregular *Organisation de l'Armée Secrète* (OAS) responsible for terror-style attacks against FLN leaders and perceived supporters in Algeria and France. Some senior members later attempted a second failed *coup d'état* (the "Algiers putsch") against President Charles de Gaulle in 1961 (who was also the target of an assassination attempt by remaining OAS members after the Evian agreements of 1962). For his part, Trinquier was involved in the 1958 crisis but renounced the OAS and the 1961 putsch.

⁴³ Arguing for 'human measures' though clearly interested in assuring interrogators have access to 'terrorists,' Trinquier writes: "The interrogators must always *strive not to injure the physical and moral integrity of individuals*. Science can easily place at the army's disposition the means for obtaining what is sought... *But we must not trifle with our responsibilities*. It is *deceitful* to permit artillery or aviation to bomb villages and slaughter women and children, while the real enemy usually escapes, and *to refuse interrogation specialists the right to seize* the truly guilty terrorist and spare the innocent" (1964: 23, emphasis added).

In unambiguous terms, Trinquier claims, "The battlefield today is no longer restricted" (Trinquier 1961 [1964]: 29). The book's short first chapter, "The Need to Adapt Our Military Apparatus to Modern Warfare," is followed by a second defining modern warfare:

Warfare is now an *interlocking system of actions*—political, economic, psychological, military—that aims at the overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime. To achieve this end, the aggressor tries to exploit the internal tensions of the country attacked—ideological, social, religious, economic—any conflict liable to have a profound influence on the population to be conquered. (6; emphasis added).

"Traditional armed forces" no longer enjoy "their accustomed decisive role" in a type of war that expanded across a "vast field of action" (6). Even as Trinquier ascribes it to the figure of the insurgent bent on dominating the population, 'conquer' would be unpalatable to today's counterinsurgents operating at the edge of liberal rule and making their actions legible through humanitarian overtures indexed to assisting host-nation government. As per today's familiar narrative frames, extended occupations become exercises in 'democracy promotion' and stabilization aimed at 'curing' local environments through institution-building rendered in the biomedical imaginary of dosage, treatment, health, and immunity (Caldwell & Hagerott 2010). In identifying terrorism as an offensive weapon of warfare directed at the inhabitants of a population by insurgents (16, 52), Trinquier's advocacy for diffusing the war into interlocking domains purports to act directly on enemies and armed adversaries (by eliminating them) and on the population (by cordoning them; by controlling and organizing inhabitants [74]) across different affective, communicative, and visceral fields (40). The population is *already divided* in terms of its allegiances, and modern warfare must recast the "line[s] of demarcation between friend and foe" passing through the social body (26). Though the treatise argues that modern warfare will end *like* "classical wars"—when one side is destroyed, or when one side capitulates (53)—Trinquier is overzealous or naïve given the difficulty of securing a decisive ending in his vision of war that is a 'vast field of action' demanding comprehensive operations. Yet, in acknowledging that such an outcome requires "a sum total of perfectly coordinated, complex measures" (65), the book foregrounds a military resigned to the challenges of modern war.

We should remember that *Modern Warfare* is a forensic exercise, an autopsy of the dying French colonial apparatus and its military body. Yet, in arguing for a shift in paradigm and practice, Trinquier seems an *avant-garde* military actor, a postmodern future-past *before* the horizon of the modern appears. When commentators identify the horizon of postmodern war⁴⁴, 'postmodern' often functions as a periodization (a simplistic sequential 'after modernity') to mark the end of the Cold War. However, insofar as we understand normative ways in which war is framed as a state prerogative, the treatise marks an attendant crisis regarding war as a concept, as an organizing technology, and as an activity or conduct without a remit to larger (i.e., metanarrative) project. More than Galula, Trinquier registers the insights of Lyotard well in advance in relation to a narrativization of war that has failed, or at least failed him and some of his cohorts as a regime of military Truth. Certainly, accounts of postmodern war identify the increasing indistinction between war and non-war and the dissolution of boundaries between the trinity of government, military, and population (c.f. Duffield 2011: 757 for this in terms of Foucault's biopolitics). Yet, many accounts of some recently-arrived postmodern war conflate 'modern warfare' with what Trinquier referred to as conventional or traditional warfare. Though theories of postmodern war allude to the fragmentation of the same narrative deemed obsolete by Trinquier (i.e., the 'old war' thesis) and aim to explain how technological and capitalist globalization has affected war and those who wage it, the shift happens decades *after* Trinquier's treatise and his espousal of mixing elements and pushing past limits. In arguing this point, I am neither mystifying nor endorsing Trinquier's methods but rather am attempting to understand them in their own contexts.

Trinquier also seems the military biopolitician in advance by discussing the management of territory, population, and ways of life:

Inhabitants from the rural areas who wish to join the strategic hamlets will be permitted to do so. With our assistance, they will carry with them all their means of subsistence. In this manner, we can continue to add to the number of persons controlled and protected. The difference in their manner of life, especially with respect to the degree of security accorded to the inhabitants in the protected perimeters, will constitute a powerful attraction throughout the intermediate area. Whenever and wherever we have enough troops and the necessary means, we must create

⁴⁴ For example, consider Chris Hables Gray's *Postmodern War: The New Politics of Conflict* (1998), Stanley Fish's "Postmodern Warfare: The Ignorance of our Warrior Intellectuals" (in *Harper's Magazine*, July 2002), and Philip Hammond's *Media, War, and Postmodernity* (2007), among many others.

new strategic hamlets. *Only if we approach the problem methodically can we continue to establish a strict control over all the population and its means of subsistence.* (79; emphasis added)

From a counterinsurgency perspective, modern warfare would have to blend into spheres that were traditionally understood as non-military or non-war. Trinquier describes with biomedical reference a "populace infected by clandestine organisms that penetrate like a cancer into its midst and terrorize it" (50), a telling antecedent to the commonly-used epidemiological and therapeutic metaphors of contemporary counterinsurgency.⁴⁵ Further, given ongoing discussions regarding the difficulty in counterinsurgency to properly discriminate between friend and foe—fighter and civilian—Trinquier argues that it is neither a matter of targeting the population as a sanctuary and provider of both active and passive support, nor of failing to target or discriminate 'correctly' to deliver munitions successfully. Instead, everything slowly becomes a correlate to the 'vast field' of action and is thus in need of some type of specific engagement. This coincides with Brad Evans' remark on discrimination in today's liberal wars:

Unlike the problem of terrorism that is a problem of (dis)order, *insurgents are a problem of population* whose violence is the product of causal resentment. Their resistance pertains from unfortunate locally regressive conditions that can be manipulated *to resuscitate the vitality of local life systems*. Since insurgencies then are open to remedy and demand engagement, like the savages of the colonial encounter, *they are otherwise redeemable.* (Evans 2011: 750, emphasis added)

Counterinsurgency thus admits to a fundamental ambiguity about converting risky would-be enemies and resuscitating their relational 'friendliness.' In this sense, the war must be mobilized *in total terms* so it saturates the environment to better aid decisions around who and what can be redeemed and who and what cannot—who will be killed and who will be made to live.

Yet, as is clear in Fanon's essay "Concerning Violence" in *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963[2004]), the mobilization for war in these total terms is by no means only a state military prerogative. Fanon's well-known essay is a reflection on the Algerian anti-colonial struggle and decolonization war where people were willing to undertake "decisive struggle", which registers in Trinquier's essay as something that undermines the assumed monopoly of war enjoyed by French

⁴⁵ In chapter three, I discuss the military conception of population in the early 1960s in relation to Foucault's emerging interest in the same object for his genealogy of biopower commencing at the same time.

counterinsurgents, further challenging the military's presumed ability to dictate the material conditions and to territorialize the space of war. The spatial confines of the theatre of operations was also fundamentally challenged by an enemy that, according to counterinsurgents, was well-concealed by hiding 'amongst the population' and savvy in exploiting asymmetries in rural and urban environments (Trinquier 1961: 26). The enemy was increasingly understood as a system that required a different war system; conceived as such, this adversary rendered traditional and conventional notions of massed force, conventional maneuver warfare, and territory anachronistic and unsuitable to deal with new threats. Even with these nuanced conceptions of who and what an enemy is, Trinquier's text is notable in *misrecognizing* a fundamental shift in the Algerian war, which was the basis for his treatise. While counterinsurgency repeatedly cites the difficulty in discriminating between enemy fighters (insurgents) and the population that must be secured and controlled, the recourse to describing enemy behaviours as 'exploiting the local environment' is also another way of describing the increase in popular support for those opposed to French rule. Indeed, local Algerians' own life environments willingly become 'sanctuary' for insurgents—Algerians waging national liberation struggle against the French. The 'enemy' in question is not so much a function of wilful and savvy exploitation as it is an index of an environment and atmosphere changing not in degree but in type to actually support armed struggle, a conclusion that Trinquier's text fails to register.

Given how American doctrine sets the North Atlantic military tone, it is worth asking how deeply this French experience registered in the American military both in the 1960s and today. According to Ucko, the American legacy of small interventionist wars precipitated a nascent approach to 'modern war' but it was not institutionalized. Writing after the surges in Iraq and Afghanistan but before the texts of his discussed above, Ucko's *The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars* (Ucko 2010) argues that whatever its shortfalls, the current turn to counterinsurgency must be exploited as an opportunity to equip American military power for future operations. Ucko also argues that the failure to learn the lessons of the French prevented a transformation for the modern war footing required for Vietnam. As with the inability to consider the

Soviet experience in Afghanistan, the American military seemed to overinvest in its own self-perceived superiority and ability to impose a different reality than the French. The 'old' counterinsurgency era was relegated to fringe status, an outlier, whereas its necessity today is significant, and American forces should not fail to meet the challenge of modern war fifty years later. American efforts in South Vietnam did build on French efforts if in limited ways. Outside the conventional 'search and destroy' or 'sweep and clear' (*rattisage*) operations characteristic of larger American operations, local-level counterinsurgency routed through special forces units in sustained hamlet- and village-centered efforts under the banner of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) (Beckett 2001: 201-203). Following from French efforts in rural areas both in Vietnam and Algeria, CORDS deployed small cadres of counterinsurgents in local environments to raise self-defence forces consisting of local inhabitants and to assist in agriculture-based development programs. In addition, American Marines developed their own combined action program (CAP), where autonomous squad-sized Marine units embedded with communities and raised local militias ('Popular Forces') to decentralize the war with village-level counterinsurgency capacity specific to different local environments (Gortzak 2014: 138). This legacy remains in place today: contemporary doctrine identifies it as village stabilization and village stability operations (VSO), which attempt to reduce the shape- clear-hold-build sequencing to the smallest possible aggregate unit by working from-the-ground-up. American doctrine in Vietnam outlined a complex pacification evaluation system (PACES) and hamlet evaluation system (HES), which lead toward the Strategic Hamlet Program (SHP), closely following from Trinquier's conception (Trinquier 1961: 74-82). As with the French, the American effort opted sometimes for a population-based 'scorched earth' policy. If pacification efforts and local reforms were unsuccessful, whole villages were forcibly evacuated and razed, with the community resettled elsewhere in pacified areas.⁴⁶ In effect, this tactic was environmental management writ large, transferring the population and its life environment elsewhere, removing the theatre of war from the war itself.

⁴⁶ Counterinsurgency in Vietnam was complemented by the Phoenix Program, which through local provincial reconnaissance units (PRUs) comprised of Vietnamese security personnel and led by American handlers undertook 'neutralization' operations in the form of targeted assassinations and kill/capture raids against 'infiltrators' and 'operatives.'

Where else did irregular war—as counterinsurgency, as foreign internal defense, as stability operations—become more visible in application and practice? Greg Grandin's *Empire's Workshop* (2007) offers an assessment of American (and quiet Canadian; c.f. Engler 2009) policy and practice in Latin America, where the delivery of military advisory capacities, arms, and direct assistance enabled brutal paramilitarization, coups, and 'dirty wars' undermined democratically-elected governments and actively destabilized political agreements. In connection, William Avilés' *Global Capitalism, Democracy, and Civil-Military Relations in Colombia* (2006) offers an examination of American-backed counterinsurgency efforts in Colombia, which targeted grassroots communist organizations, social movements, and global narco-syndicates. He documents the violence of protracted paramilitarization in relation to what he refers to as "low-intensity democracy," the condition necessary for structural adjustment and the neoliberalization of Colombia's economy. Additionally, Lesley Gill's work on the U.S. Army's Western Institute for Security Cooperation—known as the School of the Americas, founded in 1961—exposes what is effectively an official hub for military training in clandestine counterinsurgency violence framed as foreign internal defense and counterterrorism (2004), with the a school a source for the type of liaising and training undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan with local police, state police, and national military forces.⁴⁷

The increasing proliferation in the 1980s and 1990s of low-intensity warfare, asymmetric warfare (AW), and operations other than war (OOTW) doctrine all revealed military organs beginning to reorganize for future operations beyond state-state war. One genre of doctrine around foreign peace support operations (PSO) followed from the coalition-based deployments of small force structures in 'peacekeeping' contexts, usually mandated by the United Nations for humanitarian interventions into intrastate sectarian conflicts or civil wars in so-called 'failed states' during the late 1980s and 1990s. However, invocations of humanitarianism no doubt further the reach of North Atlantic states in what Chomsky calls, following from Habermas, a 'new military humanism' (Chomsky 1999; c.f. Zolo 2002;

⁴⁷ Keeping Latin America and the Caribbean in view, we should extend counterinsurgency to the geographically-proximate and ongoing occupation of Haiti, with international stabilization by global actors disguising political and economic force projection coincident with Naomi Klein's 'shock doctrine' theory of disaster capitalism (Klein 2007) and resulting in what Peter Hallward, in his book on the neoliberal/military occupation of Haiti, describes as the new politics of containment (Hallward 2010).

Bricmont 2006). Military actors will support peace by providing security and impartially mediating between local host-nation forces and non-state actors like NGOs, contractors, and smaller cellular militias and armed groups.⁴⁸ As many have argued, beyond the geoeconomic and geopolitical interests of states opting or not to get involved in support of 'peace,' interventions are primed and pumped by a liberal "global rescue industry" driven by influential blocs of private investment into the merging of development and security (supra-state organizations, global NGOs, private military companies and security firms, etc.) (Weizman 2012; Amar 2012; Foley 2010; Duffield 2007 & 2001). Peace support is increasingly supported stability operations and contemporary overseas contingency operations (OCO), both corollaries to counterinsurgency. A similar doctrinal stream coincident with stabilization and low-intensity operations emerged out developments within the U.S. Marines Corps. With the "Three Block War" (3BW) concept, forwarded in 1999 by then-commandant General Charles Krulak, military forces would undertake three different capacities in close proximity: humanitarian support, stabilization and peacekeeping, and 'muscular' combat operations (Dorn & Varey 2009: 38). It envisioned a nimble and agile force able to operate across the continuum of operations and achieve full spectrum dominance from the kinetic to the non-kinetic—firepower and biopower. While 3BW is vague in relation to how the three elements fit together, and while some have argued the doctrine is unsustainable in placing pressure on frontline units to be "humanitarian workers, peacekeepers, and warfighters at the same time, and within a small area" (44),⁴⁹ its late-1990s formulation anticipates the wider turn to comprehensive whole-of-government or joint military-civil approaches realized during the recent counterinsurgency cycle.

According to current North Atlantic "future force employment" architectures and concepts, regularizing irregular capacities is idealized as the future norm. In the military literature, static and

⁴⁸ "NATO's longstanding Peace Support Operations (PSO) doctrine provides a useful contrast to the Three Block War. PSOs are of six clear types: conflict prevention (action before a conflict has erupted in violence), peacemaking (discussions and negotiations for peace agreements), peacebuilding (developing infrastructure for peace), humanitarian assistance (keeping people alive), peacekeeping (preventing a reoccurrence of fighting), and peace enforcement (using force to apply the rules" (Dorn & Varey 2009: 42).

⁴⁹ Dorn and Varey (2009) are critical of the CF's uptake of 3BW during the early leadership of General Rick Hillier as Chief of Defense Staff. Its prominence diminished with the Canadian Army's deployments to Kandahar in late 2005 and the refurbishing of the counterinsurgency doctrine.

sedentary has given way to adaptive, resilient, and dispersed forces capable of operating at high and low-intensities simultaneously—and efficiently in terms of cost, materiel, and logistics. The opportunity to conduct expeditionary war was greeted by militaries as an opportunity for operations and for renewed budget allocations. For example, in Canada, the Canada First Defence Strategy was rolled out in 2008 and outlined twenty years of dedicated funding to the CF/DND and to the private defence sector in Canada and elsewhere. Yet, even the CF—a symbolic object mobilized repeatedly by the then-Conservative federal government to remilitarize notions of Canadian citizenship—took a hit once the logic of austerity was firmly installed into 2009 and 2010, going from a darling to a loser on the budgetary exercises and omnibus budget bills. Neoliberalism, at least in its current iteration, annulled the promises of military Keynesianism; given its lucrative political economic power, there must a supply of war, but not too much. The market for war must be structurally adjusted but in a way that ensures the creation of capacities through procurement and contracting processes that are wealth-generating engines.⁵⁰ Hybrid expeditionary wars with large line items for reconstruction and development thus become increasingly attractive political economic necessities (i.e. opportunities for primitive accumulation by private interests) regardless of how they mitigate or further local immiseration (Schwartz 2011). Regularizing irregularity is thus a flexible political economic strategy, too, for managing the supply of war.

When Canadian combat operations in Afghanistan ended in 2011 before the turn toward embedded mentoring and training, the CF Office of Force Transformation issued a report authored by then Lt-General Andrew Leslie, a co-creator of the Joint Interagency Multinational and Public (JIMP) approach and Chief of the Land Staff from 2006 to 2010. According to the report:

[T]he explicit goal of the transformation team was to identify areas where we could reduce overhead and improve efficiency and effectiveness, to allow reinvestment from within for future operational capability despite *constrained resources*. (Leslie/CF 2011: vi)⁵¹

⁵⁰ Even as the U.S. Army is slated to drawdown its forces to pre-WW2 levels, the American permanent war economy is a truism; arms, defense, security, and cybersecurity all play a significant role. That said, the procurement scandals in Canada over the last four years have been highly visible, with the F-35 fighter plane, new helicopters and armoured fighting vehicles, and training budgets all playing out before the Canadian public.

⁵¹ Not only had the "operational tempo" of successive Afghan deployments taken its toll; the Canada First Defense Strategy rolled out by the Harper Conservative federal government in 2008, a vehicle for the resuscitation and renewal of Canada's military apparatus in terms of material, infrastructure, and public influence, was already in

Future force concepts are then political economy by other means. Following from its 'transforming defence' program and the most recent Strategic Defence and Security review (SDSR), the UK Ministry of Defence in 2013 outlined its main policy priority as the provision of "versatile, agile and battle-winning armed forces and a smaller, more professional Ministry of Defence" enabled by "curbing defence costs while providing battle-winning forces"; the purpose is to economize in developing more efficient and ergonomic methods of military force projection and operational reach.⁵² Future force employment concepts such as the Canadian Army's "adaptive dispersed operations" (CF DLCD 2011 & 2007; see below) and the UK Army's "reactive and adaptive force" (2012) anticipate hybrid security environments where threats are contingent and dynamic. In a recent address about the future of the British Army in a volatile world of "persistent engagement," the Chief of the General Staff, General Nicholas Carter, foregrounded a new doctrinal model of 'Integrated Action,' which places emphasis on information and persuasion where targets—"actors, allies, or adversaries"—are conceived as audiences for whose attention military organizations must compete (Carter & de Waal 2015: 3-4).⁵³ In this model, warfare becomes an environment with an attention economy to be managed and administered, and different kinds of political violence are different types of information to be conveyed and communicated. Thus, information is not simply an instrument for facilitating operations but the operation itself; sending information means making the environment legible as a space for mediation. The new U.S. Army operating concept, Unified Land Operations, based on the principle "Win in a Complex World" (US Army 2014a), promotes decentralized and adaptive capabilities in an era of persistent conflict and outlines "tailorable and scalable combinations of special operations and conventional forces, regionally

2011 being significantly curtailed despite the Conservative's analogical recourse to link Canadian militarism and Canadian populist nationalism. Beyond targeting recurring institutional problems like duplication, expenses related to private military contractors and security firms, and the lack of a dedicated capital purchasing program, Leslie's report cited both administrative incoherence and administrative/headquarters growth as significant obstacles, identifying the most expensive part of the infrastructure: people. Leslie's solution revolved around "even thrusts", which focused largely on redeploying human resources and consolidating a new command and control system through a "blended organizational model" (Leslie/CF 2011: 74)—targeting bloat by optimizing network-centered organizational capacities.

⁵² See the UK MOD policy page, < <https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/providing-versatile-agile-and-battle-winning-armed-forces-and-a-smaller-more-professional-ministry-of-defence>>.

⁵³ See also RT News (18 February 2015), "Military 'mask': British Army gets 'information warfare' focus, says top general," <<http://rt.com/uk/233367-british-army-information-warfare/>>.

aligned and globally responsive combined arms teams, and foundational theater capabilities to enable joint operations" (in US Army 2014a: i & 17-24; c.f. Odierno, in Tan 2014). Similarly, the U.S. Marine Corps, using its amphibian imaginary, has returned to the notion of littoral access ("Assuring Littoral Access") to think literally about the intertidal zone linking water and land, and conceptually about conjoining different operational domains to win small wars (USMC 2010; c.f.,). UK Royal Marines espouse the value of lean and adaptive force for versatile, modular, and multi-purpose applications (UK Navy 2011: 6). These doctrinal frameworks account for amplifying force and unifying effort via auxiliaries, contractors, and paramilitaries. Adaptive implies responsive, but it also evokes an evolutionary connotation, where adaptation is fitness for 'natural selection' at a time when force transformation means thinking violence "biostrategically" *as* pulsations of information in networks and as swarms in ecologies (Dillon & Reid 2009: 118-9). The language of dispersion denotes distribution, decentralization, and spreading; it also implies an atmospheric context, as in a dispersant that diffuses into the air. From the Canadian Army:

[The adaptive dispersed operating] concept envisages an operating environment characterized by complex, multi-dimensional conflict, a non-contiguous dispersed operational framework, and an approach to operating within that environment based on adaptive dispersed land forces conducting simultaneous full spectrum engagement. (CF DLCDC 2007: 16)

The goal is to create and exploit opportunities, control the tempo of operations, and overwhelm the adversary's understanding. The essence of adaptive dispersed operations is the ability to conduct coordinated, interdependent, full-spectrum actions by widely dispersed teams across the psychological, physical, and informational planes of the operating space, ordered and connected within an operational design created to achieve a desired end-state. (CF DLCDC 2011: 31)

We have two things here: an anticipatory diagnosis of an adversary's environment and behaviour, and an account of how to perceive future operating environments. If this imperative of adaptation and dispersion—as Trinquier's modern war, as the regularization of irregularity—is today's first philosophy, military agents will have to reconcile their own always-lacking grasp on the total field in which they have to operate. In other words, they will have to think the limit to occupy different fields of action while harnessing and integrating irregular activities, letting slip not only the proverbial dogs but altogether different species of war.

Supply Unrestricted: From Battlefield to Battlesphere and Beyond

Deploying force in adaptive and dispersed ways requires two things: a territorial referent—where to do things—and an operational referent—how to do things. These referents, as part of counterinsurgents' aesthetic equipment, respond to changes in war as much as they reinforce and induce them. They follow from the increasing internalization of irregular war into general military doctrine especially for land operations. In this section, I trace how the conceptual and philosophical insights specific to the narrative of modern warfare translate to territorial incarnations of battlespace and battlesphere environments before turning in the next section to operational art and operational thinking before ending the chapter by framing contemporary military violence as a collateralizing and indiscriminate limit-breaking production of environmental effects.

The inception of modern war realized through counterinsurgency stands as a significant driver for territorializing war as first an environmental and then atmospheric undertaking with volumetric parameters (c.f. Elden 2013 on political space as volume). Insofar as the doctrine on irregular war has allowed for this approach, it is worth noting the role played by the field of logistics, which also generated philosophical and practical changes to the movement and management of military materials but also to the conception of space and the enactment of operations. As Deb Cowen remarks, the 1960s amounted to a 'revolution in logistics' and "was a time of tremendous experimentation" (Cowen 2010: 16; c.f. Cowen 2014), with the American military logistical infrastructure shaping and being shaped by increasingly dense global commercial and transport flows. In this sense, the revolution in logistics required an attendant transformation of military aesthetics and of how to consider spatial and temporal problems specific to supply and demand in what was becoming—in today's military vernacular—a comprehensive operating *environment*. Historically, the physical distribution and allocation of goods and materials required for war had been the most significant constraint on the war machine (historically, even incubating nascent technologies of discipline and biopower within military institutions). Logistics has always been a mediator between strategic aims and tactical means (De Landa 1991: 108-9; Van Creveld 1977), and the increasing complexity of American military flows in the postwar era generated

approaches that began to decentralize control-command (C₂) systems so as to diffuse and minimize friction, avoiding the 'stovepipes' and 'silos' of rigid centralized hierarchical structures (De Landa 1991: 116-7). The development of concurrent and parallel processes in military affairs—in other words, the basis of network-centered thinking, aided by computerization and the design of self-organizing event-driven interfaces of aggregations of algorithmic software "demons" (agents) collaborating to coordinate packages of information—is tied genealogically to logistics (De Landa 1991: 107, 114, 122-3).

According to Cowen, while logistics emerged as an epistemological and material field specific to war, its contemporary life has outstripped war-making. The security of global supply chains driven by transnational capital and "market authority" ultimately transforms the primary target of security, supplanting the geopolitics and populations with the geoeconomics of sovereign border zones and commodity flows becoming 'vital systems' and critical infrastructure with an global remit enabled by but not reducible to states (611). Security in this context becomes a matter of managing the risk flows inherent in supply change and mitigating friction and disruption—"the neoliberalization of space" (615). The process of "securitization" is indexed to the biopolitical field, a method used by government to invoke security concerns to remove issues from the realm of political contestation (Stasiulis & Ross, in Cowen 2010: 335). According to Manuel De Landa, the 1960s saw capitalist innovations in logistics effectively consolidating the feedback loop between commercial enterprise and war-making (i.e., as the military-industrial complex, as military Keynesianism) premised on procurement and speculation (De Landa 1991: 105). As such, "Logistics becomes a matter of network management" (107) based on the military development of cybernetics, systems analysis, and operations research during WW2, which led to non-military management science and the wider dissemination of systems and complexity theory (111; Cowen 2010: 16; c.f. Lawson 2014 & Bousquet 2009 on "chaosplexic warfare" and the 'scientific way of war').

As both Cowen and De Landa indicate, the vocabulary of operations, systems, and networks began in earnest in military logistics, and these drifted into an increasingly indistinguishable 'civilian sector' (Cowen 2010: 613-4; De Landa 1991: 111; c.f. Cowen 2014), revealing an ongoing exchange

across civil, political economic, and military affairs where the "network management of wartime logics" affects wider non-military processes such as auditing, bookkeeping, accounting, and the Internet (De Landa 1991: 111). These developments also re-pollinate military affairs in novel ways, especially in relation to managing knowledge and conducting warfighting so that the logistical revolution is understood at both macro- and micro-levels. The resulting benefits of networking—real-time synchronization and non-linear and non-hierarchical coordination—are substantial, and they directly bear on a military distribution of sense increasingly able to 'think' different processes in parallel. Logistics effectively systematized the need to 'think' adaptation, contingency, and flexibility in relation to the risks associated with the global circulation of materials. In other words, logistics required a limit-attitude to manage risks and uncertainties in complex chains of events. Spatially, this has implications, too. Following from Cowen but put in different terms, we can say that the convergence of liberal trade, liberal rule, and liberal war demands an aesthetic: the idea of "seam space" with suprastate and sometimes extralegal jurisdictions (2010: 604) is linked analogically to the 'phase space' of a population as a space for government and to the battlespace as a place to manipulate different forces and flow to conduct a war.

Logistical transformations may not have directly induced the collateralization of war I develop; however, they are part of a wider nexus of causal factors shaping the recombinant form of military fighting power as it is conceived of today and inducing the imagination of battlespace and battlesphere. Indeed, logistics and modern warfighting are both 'systems of interlocking actions' occurring across a 'vast field of action.' Beyond the literal requirement to deploy adequate resources and supplies to a real physical place, waging modern war is a logistical problem in a deeper sense: one must enframe a space and then decide how to distribute, diffuse, and deliver the appropriate materials and goods whether they be ballistic or biopolitical, physical or metaphysical. When De Landa describes the problem of establishing a nimble but optimal "critical path," we should extend this to the work of

counterinsurgents.⁵⁴ If logistics 'sees' space differently, agents of contemporary military violence will need to 'see' the theatre of operations differently in order to control its flows and shape its form.

Insofar as North Atlantic militaries understand it, modern war has annulled the 'traditional' or conventional battlefield. Battlespace and the battlesphere are now the standard spatial referents comprised of actual and virtual components to create a synthetic reality. Network-centered communications technologies have allowed for ever-more accurate and quasi-omniscient representations of the space and time of battle via diverse streams of signals and information. One can render and share a picture of the battlespace and one can act in the battlespace as well. Its *diegesis* is fluid and responsive.⁵⁵ While digitized and projected onto screens, these environments must be enacted through operations. This is cartography at its most mythic and precise as a world picture where everything can become an object of sense and thus a target with which to engage. We are close to the fantasy of Borges' story of the 1:1 simulacrum: the map will merge in confluence with the events and encounters of the world it must represent, promising to provide perfect but ultimately impossible (and ridiculous) monitoring and congruence.

This new battlespace emerged from developments in the 1980s and early 1990s around the intensification of networked communications and the techno-centered dream of providing commanders with a comprehensive view of the operating environment—enhanced situational awareness—where the supply of a 'common operating picture' could be shared. This concept links decision-making and perception to promise military enlightenment and intelligence. Replacing outdated approaches like the

⁵⁴ Virilio's notion of "the logistics of perception" is apparent here (1989). Further, we could analogically scale the idea of logistics up and down or across the continuum of operations to explain how different perceptual, material, and discursive materials are supplied to conduct war.

⁵⁵ As a literary concept, *diegesis* is best known as a means of truth-telling, a narrative or report opposed to mimesis, or imitation. Cinematically, *diegesis* refers to the elements and events within the narrative space of a film itself. Elements can be diegetic or non-diegetic: dialogue between characters is diegetic in that it belongs to the narrative logic and space of the film; musical accompaniment that is added to the film to enable affective and emotional responses from the audience but not heard by the characters is extra- or non-diegetic—an element in the film as such but not of the filmic space of the narrative. Of course, these conventional descriptions breakdown and are placed into question in documentary or experimental non-linear non-narrative cinema; creators may orchestrate elements so as to undermine the boundaries between diegetic and non-diegetic elements to provoke different responses in audiences; some filmic elements, in grammatical and semiotic terms, are ambiguous, further leading to uncertainty about where a given element 'belongs' within the production of the film or the narrative. As a concept, the idea of *diegesis* is a question of boundaries and framing: where does narrative space end and the filmic space begin, and where does the meta-cinematic space continue to past the single film itself?

linear Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop, battlespace is closer to an enterprise management system. Aiming to break open hived-off bodies of knowledge and information and eschewing stovepipes and silos, the early American purveyors of network-centered architectures idealized and implemented an integrative approach based on mobilizing knowledge, generating metrics and real-time data analytics, and 'informationalizing' operations (Arquilla & Rondfeldt 2001; Cebrowski & Garstka 1998; c.f. Dillon & Reid 2009: 114-119). Command and control (C2) has expanded to C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) or C5ISR (command, control, communications, computers, combat systems, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) or even C4ISTAR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance). Battlespace is integrative and intended to internalize different disruptions and material feeds, if not harmonizing them then at least making them intelligible and recognizable for acting in and sensing with battlespace. As Samuel Weber suggests with simplicity, the promise of the infrastructure is that the nets literally will work, catching with a mesh or web stretched far and wide across space and time (Weber 2006: 93-5).

While action occurs 'in' the battlespace, its visualization and virtual elements are based on the flow of different informatic streams. The networking of military information to coordinate and synchronize activities with a shared operating picture relies on a military "Pandemonium," a self-organizing system of 'order out of chaos' still concrete enough to allow for channeling central control of data inputs and outputs that becomes planetary in scope (De Landa 1991: 229-230). Yet, this system of informatic plenitude is not without peril. According to Ian Roderick, military faith in the epistemology generated by technical realism and promise of autonomous technology is idealized as a source of innovation ('force amplifier', 'force multiplier', 'force unifier') rather than as a point of anxiety largely due to the political and cultural coding of military operations as an ecosystem with 'natural laws'—a view coincident with neoliberal discourses on technology and economic globalization (Roderick 2007: ¶1). In this military dialectic of digital enlightenment, more risk—more friction—comes with the promise of more information in the system, something which is disavowed. The alleged accuracy and transparency

of military targeting systems and their real-time sensorial architectures divide the visual field in order to conquer it but in doing so also selectively obscure the field. The ongoing mediation becomes opaque even as it promises immediacy (*im-mediacy*), where the prosthetic promise of tightening the gap between the object seized and subordinated and the perception of the intervening subject requires ever more effort to prevent a slackening of the same closure made with the remote object (Bishop & Phillips 2002: 158; c.f. Crary 1990). The world picture provided via the battlespace perspective is 'objective' because it is continuously being stabilized as a holistic and total object that is ultimately impossible to complete.

James Der Derian refers to this battlespace production as one part of contemporary "virtuous war" (2001 [2009]): war that is virtual but still real; that possesses virtue, as in enabling excellence; and that demonstrates virtuosity, with technical acumen. The boundaries of a battlefield are rendered moot. On one hand, the integrationist logic at work demands that there be no forward edge of battle (FEBA); everything is pulled in and becomes the space for battle, whether figuratively or ontologically. On the other, FEBA does not exist because risks, threats, and enemies—all objects to engage and manage—come from anywhere, inherent to the system. And of course, they are not inert or static but mobile and turbulent. According to Blackmore, "Battlespace...is intended to be deep, high, wide, and simultaneous; there is no front or rear" (Blackmore 2005: 5). It is expansive, edging out, while pulling in features to create an integral reality and the necessary military intelligence for operations:

Nothing is outside of it, temporarily or geographically... The concept of battlespace thus permeates everything, from the molecular scales of genetic engineering and nanotechnology through the everyday sites, spaces and experiences of city life, to the planetary spheres of space and the Internet's globe-straddling cyberspace. (Graham 2010: 30)

Even though the conception of battlespace is integrationist in problematizing limits and edges, it still requires a topographic imaginary (Croser 2007). It needs a set of Euclidean axes to project a box onto space in order to make things perceptible and intelligible and so house "the 'mess' of the materiality of contemporary battlespaces" (Croser 2011: 2). The dream of perfect information belies the fact that the 'mess' may actually increase relative to the sophistication of an observer's techniques and the decisions that must follow from constantly adjusting to new inputs. For Mary Sterpka King, the network-centered conception of battlespace is coincident with and emblematic of post-industrial conceptions of

flexible production and post-Fordist 'just in time' logistics, amounting to what she calls the ability to manufacture and produce integrated massed effects—and *massed aggregates of perception*—almost instantaneously (Sterpka-King 2010: 305). In this sense, the promise of battlespace, especially as a network-centred creation, is based on the ongoing ability to extrapolate from and speculate on enriched and ever-thickening streams of information (Sterpka-King 2010: 315)—anything that can be put 'into form' for military use. For instance, the U.S. Army's Command Post of the Future (CPOF) promised "topsight" access for commanders to perceive—to see and say, to make visible and utterable—events and encounters unfolding in an operating environment (Croser 2011: 69-72). Individual platforms—for sensing, surveying, targeting, or kinetic operations; soldiers as optimized 'sensor-shooters'—give way to the abundance of aggregate capacities marshalled and joined together for synchronizing different actions on a continuum. The ideal outcome is the layering, integrating, and correlating different domains (maritime, land, air, space, information, electromagnetic, time) that "encompasses all aspects of a joint operations area (JOA) within which military actions take place" (UK JDP 3-70 2008: 1-2/3). When in his work on drone geographies and military violence Derek Gregory describes "remote splits" and "multiple and compound geographies," he is arguably describing an integrative apparatus that is radically asymmetric and non-reciprocal but which can bisect environments transversally and make distant and non-contiguous elements coincident and connected (Gregory 2014: 7, 9).

Counterinsurgency's focus on local and human terrain adds another layer of signs and signals to be apprehended and managed through the battlespace architecture. Writing from within the CF, Roy van den Berg warns against battlespace techno-centrism. While drone-based surveillance and targeted assassinations have since reinserted high-tech imaginaries of war into popular consciousness, the ideas of post-heroic warfare (Luttwak 1995) and the re-enchantment of 'risk-transfer' war (Coker 2004)—waging wars with automated and stand-off technologies or remote and distant measures—have been challenged by the messy contingencies of land-based population-centered operations. In other words, the latest expeditionary cycle placed North Atlantic soldiers' bodies back into the breach. For the contingencies of counterinsurgency and stability operations, van den Berg argues that contemporary

deployments have made it necessary to integrate the 'human factor'—that is, the lived realities of people and populations in the battlespace (van den Berg 2010: 11, 14). Situational awareness is generated through social and human intelligence realized in the human terrain through ground-level interactions between military actors and local populations (15). Intelligence generation cannot be antiseptic and military knowledge production must find ways to integrate different feeds into the battlespace picture that transcends high-tech by optimizing and "nurturing the soldiers' key human traits" as important force multipliers (16).

In documenting how "the current reality of war has outstripped the ability to describe it" in deployments where a civilian population is "entwined" in the conflict, Roger Denton argues is a similar way that techno-centered conceptions of battlespace fail to describe contemporary warfare that is characterized by community engagement, influence patrols, and embedding in local communities (Denton 2012: 26-27). He proposes the idea of 'battlesphere', which connects to what he describes as the "ecosphere" and "ethnosphere" (28). For Denton, the challenge in representing and conceptualizing where fighting occurs and war happens is that one runs the risk of indefinitely expanding the concept of battlespace, integrating and incorporating everything into one's picture of military reality until the model or representation matches the observations (31). The three spheres better integrate and represent the "non-combat" dimensions of contemporary warfare (28). Battlesphere designates fighting, whereas ecosphere designates the flows and spaces for life, and ethnosphere defines cultural and social "filters" interacting with one another and the environment (31). What is unique about Denton's observations is his reliance on the concept of sustainability and how sustainability as a measurement of acceptable political violence can avert 'fighting' (i.e., traditional conceptions of combat) by resolving disputes and struggles through the other two spheres (33). I read this as the affirmation of different speeds and intensities of military force designed to persuade and coerce. What is interesting from a biopolitical perspective is how violence and power and fighting, inasmuch as Denton wants a complexity-based theory of multi-sphere warfare, are externalized as forces that are somewhere outside; the battlesphere is generated only when "one initiates a fight" (33). According to Denton, violence

begins only when measures employed in relations in ethno-social and ecological spheres fail, which are not violent. The military actors who subscribe to this kind of martial grammar, despite their semantic and theoretical equivocations, *fail to follow modern warfare to its logical conclusions*. They misrecognize 'non-combat' as non-fighting and non-battle, and the biopolitical imperative we have been tracking clearly indicates otherwise. The mix of different speeds and doses of violence that animate counterinsurgency cannot be contained by combat as the privileged space for fighting, especially given the limit-attitude to work across a 'vast field of action.'

North Atlantic militaries are not the only organs thinking modern warfare and the space of battle in new ways. Core Chinese military doctrine of the late 1990s offers a set of blunt but prescient propositions on how to rethink the battlesphere or battlespace environment to exploit and weaponize its different features. In *Unrestricted Warfare* (1999), Qiao Liang & Wang Xiangsui, both colonels in the People's Liberation Army, argue that conventional jurisdictions are ineffectual and that contemporary warfare and the conception fighting must route through traditionally non-military or non-martial spaces. In both diagnosing and mimicking the American military apparatus' ability to create and sustain technologically- and logistically-enabled conditions for full spectrum dominance, the Chinese doctrine aims to counter American global military and economic power. Additionally, while it responds to the American discourse of networked-centered operations and the idea of interoperability and spectrum-wide operations, the doctrine also builds on the former Soviet "correlation of forces" model (c.f. Raska 2010: 3), which follows from Soviet conceptions of operational art subsequently taken up in North Atlantic military affairs within the American orbit (see below).

In arguing for large- and small-scale actions, the Chinese unrestricted warfare doctrine promotes the idea of "beyond limits combined war" (Liang & Xiangsui 1999: 205-6) achieved by conjoining different battlefields in "supra-domain combinations" (190). What shall be combined? Military and non-military domains that serve as spaces for direct and indirect competition between adversaries. Certainly, a number of the principles for beyond-limits combined war are familiar and found in North Atlantic doctrine: taking an omnidirectional perspective; recognizing and exploiting

asymmetries; networking actions across different domains and dimensions (206). Yet, the most remarkable idea regarding 'unrestriction' is the relationship between objectives and measures, where "unlimited measures to accomplish limited objectives is the ultimate boundary... *the limited must be pursued by way of the unlimited*" (210; emphasis added). Objectives must be limited in the sense of being specific to a space and time, but they can and must be achieved through the mixture of different measures. The treatise warns against setting objectives that are greater than means or measures (209); the objective must still 'rule' over the means (210), an important assertion for the authors who seem to vaguely register Clausewitz's concern about war rising to extremes and outstripping the political ability to control it. They seem to discern what is military moral hazard in an era when "technical civilization" looks blindly to technoscience to develop a "valve" to control war (221). So, according to this formulation, everything is on the table as a means to a limited end. One should not "fight the fight that fits one's weapons" but instead create the weapons to "fit the fight" (19).⁵⁶ The authors do not argue for a moral equivalence between sets of unlimited means; rather, they suggest that while all means should not be restricted, it is important to find the appropriate means to satisfy the objective and *blend or mix* accordingly. While the Chinese doctrine says little about ethics or moral considerations, or about the *just ad bellum* ('just war') and *just in bello* ('justice in war') traditions of North Atlantic warfare, Liang and Xiangsui attempt to legitimize the idea that the ends justify the means inasmuch as the ends are precisely determined. On one hand, this is a naïve and dangerous proposition in that ends will gradually creep, moving in a perpetual conveyor belt of ever-widening spheres of action. On the other, and in terms of the semiotics and aesthetics of military equipment I have been explaining, the authors provide a way of imagining violence that not only colonizes and programs different spaces but becomes increasingly imperceptible in comparison to conventional ideas of war and warfare. It is not that fighting migrates into other domains; rather, with the correct means, one can literally fight anywhere.

⁵⁶ In other words, weapons should follow from the desires of belligerents: "Weapons relate to the free action effectuates a free action model is not the weapons in themselves and in their physical aspect, but the 'war machine' assemblage as the formal cause of the weapons... Speed is in itself a 'weapons system'... Weapons and tools are consequences, nothing but is always the assemblage that constitutes the weapons system' (Deleuze & Guattari 1986: 80-82).

Operational Art as Military Play: Endowing Effects & Blending Streams

In regularizing irregular capacities, the return of counterinsurgency has also pollinated a renewed focus on operational art and operational design. As part of the 'levels of war' heuristic, operational thinking is a hinge midway between strategy and tactics—about "ways," between ends and means. Extending from logistics and supply and from operations research, operational thinking today is predicated on the act of targeting and allocating the commensurate munitions or measures to complete the task of closing with the target (tactics) to ultimately achieve the outcome (strategy). Thus, targeting is the hinge between the ends and the means. Though models like the comprehensive approach and the continuum of operations have rendered the strategy-operations-tactics heuristic rather elastic, operational thinking is gaining increasing prominence with some arguing that state militaries are in fact the midst of an operational revolution (Naveh, Challans, and Schneider 2009). Traditionally, operations refer to a specific mission (a series of planned tactical engagements) or it implies 'operators,' the military agents doing the actual work of closing with a target (i.e., an adversary or enemy to kill; a structure to destroy; an area to seize and occupation to territorialize).⁵⁷ Yet, if operations are as much about making life live as about killing, and if they entail activities like disruption, degradation interdiction, neutralization, security, or holding and building, the operational perspective has come to encompass a hinge-like process of designing comprehensive measures available to achieve objectives through targeting (c.f. Bishop & Phillips 2010: 19 for distinctions between targeting for operations and for intelligence). The emergence of the systemic operational design (SOD) paradigm and its corollary, the effects-based approach to operations (EBO), have been the subject of significant debate especially within American, British, and Canadian circles. For us, this debate is important as it reveals how military actors conceive of programing environments with different speeds and intensities of violence to achieve or approximate ideal end-states.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ The term operator, or "tier one" operator, is used pejoratively to describe members of American, Canadian, and other North Atlantic special forces. Its strict usage in American joint special operations refers to members Delta force, an elite special forces detachment in the U.S. Army, and to the U.S. Marine Corps special operations, where all members are "critical skills operators."

⁵⁸ A precursor of operational thinking is the esoteric field of polemology. Bordering on the arcane, it is (or was) an actual method of inquiry imagined by French sociologist Gaston Bouthol (Pick 1993: 276), who is credited with

In his video essay on war, images, and the military gaze, Harun Farocki argues that operational thinking is the process of inscribing war on the world (Farocki 1989). Military targeting requires an operational image, which simultaneously illuminates the events at hand while also inscribing them on the environment, creating a self-referential feedback loop between *what is perceptible and intelligible, what is known, and what must be perceptible to validate what is known*. He also foregrounds the historical and semiotic implications of *Aufklärung*, which in German means both "enlightenment" and "reconnaissance." On one hand, *Aufklärung* is a metonymic catch-all reference for the Enlightenment. In its martial variant, *Aufklärung* refers to the gathering information to create 'situational awareness' and generate intelligence. In French, *connaissance* means "knowledge" and refers to knowledge in general; it is different from *savoir*, which implies how to know and is in turn related to *pouvoir*, which is the power or ability (or order by which) to know something and do something (Foucault's *pouvoir-savoir*, "power-knowledge"). *Re-connaissance* literally denotes a re-knowing or a desire to know again or to know again but know better. Thus, to enlighten or illuminate is to ensure one can both know and *re-know how to know things* to further the fantasy and the myth, a process that Farocki argues is necessary to operationalize the world for war and warfare anywhere (c.f. Chow 2006: 33-34).⁵⁹

According to former Israeli Defence Force officer Shimon Naveh, Western militaries historically have been reluctant to embrace operational theory, which has a more durable history in the context of the Soviet doctrine (mentioned above) of deep battle and deep operations that emerged in

conceiving and formalizing the quasi-discipline in 1945, the contents of which are summarized in his (1976) *Essai de Polémologie: Guerre ou Paix?*, Defined as the study or science of *polemos*—literally, “struggle,” and taken as the semantic root or umbrella for “war”—Bouthol’s paradigm stands as an excessive (and perhaps ecstatic) attempt at defining and studying war ‘scientifically’ by way of multiple correlations and relays, aspiring to social science with an interdisciplinary combination of taxonomies, tabulations, typologies, and periodizations. Bouthol’s intent to derive and fix transhistorical universal laws about war is less noteworthy than the attempt to consider the sheer multiplicity of processes and phenomena crystallized as ‘war.’ His analytic and interpretive efforts recall also the formulation in 1915 of *strategosophy* by the British ecologically-minded biologist and urban planning theorist Patrick Geddes. Billed as a kind of ‘total natural science’ of warfare early in World War One, Geddes’ paradigm merged the art and science of war with a sociology of strategy to develop an all-encompassing material theory of war with a natural scientific orientation drawing on vulcanology and seismology (Pick 1993: 266). The fluid movements of molten lava and tectonic friction provided Geddes with the impetus for imagining both the process of conduct and ontology of war as an environmental and geological process.

⁵⁹ "War would exist from now on as an agenda that is infinitely self-referential: war represents not only other types of struggles and conflicts...but war itself. From its previous conventional, negative signification as a blockade, an inevitable but regrettable interruption of the continuity that is [peaceful] "normal life," war shifts to a new level of force. It has not become the cessation of normality but rather the very definition of normality itself" (Chow 2005: 33-34).

the 1920s and 1930s (Naveh 2004: 3, 183). As is well known, Naveh's expertise regarding operational thinking is evident in his past role in the IDF as head of the Operational Research Institute (ORTI), which effectively transformed occupied Palestine in Gaza and the West Bank into experimental zones for military violence. Spatially, deep battle and deep operations 'think' military action beyond discrete tactical movements or engagements, looking to create 'operational shocks' and literally strike deep behind an enemy's forward line of defense (i.e., a non-linear battlespace, not a static battlefield of front lines). Temporally, to strike deeply means ongoing and simultaneous interlocking maneuvers generating wider systemic effects through synchronized actions. Contemporary joint doctrine, comprehensive operations, and full-spectrum or continuum-based models all follow from innovative Soviet operational theory, which placed emphasis on operational synergy and on synchronized and coordinated action that combined different facets of military force (Naveh 2004: 221-3). Here, we can understand the importance of communications networks and increased coordination across all networking elements in the battlespace environment; maneuver warfare and massed effects are important but it is the ability to act as mobile media capable of striking anywhere that becomes decisive (c.f. Kittler 1986 [1999]; Virilio 1989). Deep operations and operational thinking together offered a holistic and fluid philosophy of war that proposes to accommodate feedback between different levels of war and between different coordinated actions in the battlefield/space/sphere environment. While always important, speed becomes crucial, not simply as the rate of closure or as velocity but as a rhythm or tempo with a pace that mixes different capacities to generate affects and induce effects in dispersed and adaptive ways. Thinking military action at the operational level forced planners and actors to consider their own and their adversaries actions in more complex and dynamic ways (Naveh 2004: 15), which required new thinking about systemic and indirect n^{th} order effects and of non-linear processes in a broader environmental context (c.f. Lawson 2014).

Notably, Naveh's time in the IDF revealed his intellectual taste for poststructural philosophy. His assimilation of Deleuze and Guattari is well-documented, as are his attempts to integrate and synthesize rhizomatic conceptions of fractal maneuvers, singularities, swarming, and smooth space—

"smooth the intrinsic striation of the enclave"—for usage in warfighting doctrine for IDF urban operations (Naveh 2006: ¶29; c.f. Weizman 2007: 187-9, 198-200). As operational thinking derives from 'deep' operations, the 'smoothing' function described by Naveh may seem counterintuitive. While the small quote above alludes to his description of planning for aggressive 2003 incursions in Nablus, the idea of smoothing space to undermine 'striations' is (as per Deleuze-Guattari) a way of thinking *a-*hierarchically and 'horizontally' to consider the different streams of desires, energies, and materials that aggregate together as an assemblage. One can access and develop 'depth' by removing barriers, thinking problems as flat so as to better discern or apprehend the available processes to control and modulate within the different spaces of any military or martial system. In such a framework, to think operationally is to also think about *attaching* and *detaching* the necessary elements or resources to complete a task. Remarkably on what they call "the curious logic of the hinge," Bishop and Phillips describe the nature of the military body and its attendant techniques as not a conglomeration of atomized *milēs* ("soldier") but as *tache*, a collection of hinge-like attachments and detachments (Bishop & Phillips 2003: 69-70). To function, a military is thus simultaneously a union and a divided body set to deploy and expedite, and military mobility and capacity proceeds from this logic of the hinge-joint-*tache* (70). Together, in their own ways, Naveh and Bishop and Phillips describe how operational thinking is conceptualized as an in-between but mobile process that must employ different assets and integrate different measures, modulating the force employed.

Clearly, there is something compositional or even symphonic regarding this operational approach. The UK Army doctrine publication *Operations* (2010) dedicates a whole chapter to "orchestrating operations" in land-based environments (2010: 7-2). In this way, sequencing and synchronizing forces and actions that achieve mission objectives came to be increasingly understood as the practice of operational *art*. Traditionally, references to military art, science, and philosophy abound in military affairs, with science pejoratively connoting a rigorous or technical undertaking and with art implying something more fleeting or superfluous. As I explain, the reference to 'art' represented the desire to frame the nature of designing and executing operations with attention to different interlocking

and 'beyond-limit' elements as a creative composition. While operational thinking slowly penetrated North Atlantic military doctrine in the late 1970s, the idea of operational art emerged later, showing up in mid-1980s doctrine manuals and through the 1990s (Piatt 1999: 17). In Canada, earlier operations publications addressed the concerns for a CF-based conception of operational art (English et al 2005). The CF-wide doctrine manual (*CF JP-01* 2011) makes repeated reference to concept. The current Canadian joint doctrine manual on conducting operations (*CF JP-03 Operations* [2011]) oddly refrains from using operational art whereas the operational planning manual (*CF JP-05 Operations Planning* [2008]) dedicates a section to operational art that emphasizes the non-linear effects of war as a human activity (Section 107, 1-3) and a large section to operational concepts in campaign design, with "end-state" being the first consideration (Section 201, 2-1/5). The U.S. *JP 3-0 Joint Operations* (2011) foregrounds operational art which it describes as the creative process of employing and organizing military force that encompasses operational design, "the conception and construction of the intellectual framework that underpins joint operation plans and their subsequent execution" by answering the "ends-ways-means-risk questions" (U.S. JP 3-0 2011: xxii-xiii/sec. 2.3-5). In thinking about the desired end-state and the "decisive conditions" regarding a given problem, operational design will require different "lines of effort" that "describe the routes through decisive conditions," where lines may be "functional, thematic, or environmental" (UK 2010: 7-7)—or material, rhetorical, discursive, and systemic—so as to create either a tipping point that sustains or disrupts an equilibrium (7-8). The 2014 American manual for countering insurgencies proposes that the most important operational consideration is to "attack the network" with lethal and non-lethal targeting to support friendly networks, influence neutral networks, and neutralize threat networks (FM 3.24 2014: 7-13/ secs. 7.49 & 7.54-5). Targeting must be able to isolate and address specifics but must also anticipate effects to the wider network of systems and non-linear relations given that, in the doctrinal imaginary, insurgencies are not hierarchical and linear but composed of nodes and dyads with horizontal connections and varying densities (4-17-8/secs. 4.88-91). Notably, the 2009 American manual, which focused less on targeting networks and more on the linear "decide-detect-deliver assess" framework, makes the same

distinction between lethal and non-lethal targeting, almost acknowledging in passing that *both* operational imperatives are kinetic whether they are ballistic or biopolitical (FM 3-24.2 2009: 4-26-7/secs. 4.138-141). The 2009 manual also emphasizes the distinction between area and personality targets, which in turn dictates whether acute or ambient methods are used to territorialize counterinsurgency. In Weizman's essay on "thanato-tactics" and operational planning, IDF officers describe how they employ lethal bombing attacks and targeted assassinations within networks to achieve cascading effects through the environment. According to Weizman, planning consists of mechanical, systemic, and political levels (Weizman 2011: 181). The systemic level is where both the specific killing of a single person or the wider application of less discrete violence to a whole area (i.e., checkpoints, codons, and curfews) creates ripple effects within the local population.⁶⁰

As the counterinsurgency and general doctrine suggests, to think operationally is to 'think' with art. The counterinsurgency manuals—American, British, Canadian—share the same vocabularies, idioms, and concepts with the general operations manuals espousing operational art. What does this mean? Would operational *science* not be more appropriate in describing how military actors enframe and draw on the standing-reserve of unlimited means and ways to achieve the limited objective or end-state within the battlesphere?⁶¹ Recalling the allusion to Deleuze and Guattari's *What is Philosophy?* at the start of the chapter, we could say military philosophy *thinks with concepts*, military science *thinks with function and with correlating sets*, and military art *thinks with sensations*. In this schema, tactics—fixing and closing with targets to affect them; generating sensations to be sensed, registered, and felt—coincides more so with art. Operations and operational thinking—in marrying munitions, measures, and resources with targets; in synthesizing relations and correlating different capacities to create a program

⁶⁰ Weizman is incisive here on how systemic and networked effects affect a population to create operational shocks: "Unlike the infrastructure of state militaries, much of whose power is grounded in buildings and equipment, the infrastructure of the Palestinian resistance is the people themselves" (Weizman 2011: 182).

⁶¹ In their book on modernist art and military aesthetics, Bishop and Phillips follow the route laid out by Heidegger. They point to the fact that in the Aristotelian context *techné*, which referred more so to "knowing how to make things" at the scale of both skills and systems, was a category of *poiesis*—of "making, fabrication, production." Further, *praxis*, or action, was another category of *poiesis* (Bishop and Phillips 2010: 7). They then trace in brief how *techné* supplants *poiesis* as a higher order category and how *techné*, as technological determinism or domination, and how *poiesis*, as art or aesthetics, is relegated as superfluous and how *praxis*, as action, becomes a mere function of industrial "motorized functionality."

of actions to enable tactics—coincides with a correlating function and thus science (i.e., a 500 lb bomb with a compound, a reconstruction program in a key village during a holding operation). Strategy, as the domain of objectives and end-states, would then coincide with philosophy, with inventing and deploying concepts to make operations legible and intelligible in larger systematic terms. Yet, aside from creatively conjoining Deleuze-Guattari's conceptions of art, science, and philosophy with tactics, operations, and strategy, military actors do not discuss operational science. They venerate operational art, which is about joining capacities and affecting targets and environments in specific contexts.

Additionally, art has a more durable if sometimes parochial semiotic life within the military discourse. Sun Tzu's 2500 year-old compendium of aphorisms *The Art of War* invokes art as the appropriate way to conceive of the practice of war. In *On War*, Clausewitz writes at the start of Book Two:

Essentially the art of war is the art of using the given means in combat; there is not better for it than the conduct of war. To be sure in its widest sense, the art of war includes all activities that exist for the sake of war. (Clausewitz 1976: 127)

Whether at the level of tactics and engagement or at the level of strategy that links and coordinates the sequence of engagements, art remains the referent (128). For Clausewitz and many of his contemporaries,⁶² science presumes too much certainty and matters of war are radically contingent and never certain. Art refers to fine art or the mechanical arts (or craft-based practices) whereas science refers more so to a verifiable technical system or method of knowing how to do things, which seems to be closer to the idea of technology as a durable system. Even as Clausewitz—and military doctrine generally—seeks to describe the ontology of war by using concepts from the natural and applied sciences (i.e., complexity theory, systems theory, cybernetics, chaos theory; Bousquet 2009: 4; c.f. Fuller

⁶² While Jomini, Clausewitz's contemporary, may be regarded as providing a more mechanistic model of war, is very clear in writes in his treatise on the art of war: "War, however, in its ensemble, is not a science, but an art. If strategy, especially, can be subjected to dogmatic maxims which approach the axioms of positive sciences, it is not the same as a whole with the operations of a war, and combats among others will often escape all scientific combinations, to offer us acts essentially dramatic, in which personal qualities, moral inspirations, and a thousand other causes, will play at times the first part" (Jomini 1805 [2008]: 259, emphasis added).

1929)⁶³, conducting war must be and remain art.⁶⁴ Art functions as a code for dealing with friction, contingency, and the circulation of risk; it is how one conducts war at the limit. While he later introduces some ambiguity by arguing that war's materiality can be neither art nor science, Clausewitz suggests, "art is creative ability" and "creation and production lie in the realm of art" whereas science's "object is pure knowledge" and "science will dominate where the object is inquiry and knowledge" (148-149; c.f. van Creveld 2000 & Lawson 2014). In the same passage he argues it is difficult to separate perception (or sense) from judgement and art from knowledge; that is to say, while feeling and thinking are not reducible to deciding and knowing, the power of intuition is no less important to imparting action.⁶⁵ In the end, war will be waged as art and as an act of orchestrating an ensemble of elements. Clausewitz's emphasis on linking engagements together and sequencing them appropriately to create effects anticipates the operational art of contemporary doctrine, which views battlespace environment not as static and inert but as pulsing and mobile.

In the current discourse, art refers to the ability to remain responsive to the creative process of warfare. It requires artifice and finesse, improvisation to deal with the *fluxus* of the creative process one steers an. Operational thinkers will want to be artists and imagine their practice as art because they are designing and developing; they have a particular style, which connects to the idea of command and control as shaping the direction of events and subsequently to the idea of artistic authorship. It is understood and practiced as a creative activity (Coombs & Gauthier 2012: 102). Art provides a coherent narrative—a different story—for the enaction and conduct of warfare, especially in relation to counterinsurgency. The operational artist is more of a resourceful *bricoleur*, able to envision and deliver different assets to achieve effects. Counterinsurgency has provided the impetus to better hone and

⁶³ Fuller, a key figure in the philosophy of mobile mechanized warfare, invokes science to describe his materialist account of war, which is distilled into nine principles (derived from Clausewitz) and organized around the principles of control, pressure, and resistance.

⁶⁴ Regarding the conception of war as art in Clausewitz, and the connections to Kantian notions of epistemology and judgment, see José Fernandez Vega's (2007) "War as 'Art': Aesthetics and Politics in Clausewitz's Social Thinking."

⁶⁵ While Clausewitz suggests 'art of war' may be more appropriate, he argues the conduct of war can neither be an art nor a science because it is above all human intercourse and is constituted by the forces of human existence (i.e., the political or biopolitical, the social, cultural, etc.), which are never inanimate and never reducible to easy predictions. War is wild because humans are prone to breaking the boundaries imposed on them, however reliable they seem in confining action and normalizing conduct.

develop this approach. Yet, while operational thinking and operational art are widely accepted and internalized within North Atlantic militaries, systemic operational design (SOD) and its corollary, effects-based approaches to operations (EBO), have not enjoyed the same reception, or at least not yet.⁶⁶ Aiming to unify insights from innovations in operational art/thinking, both these design approaches identify ideal end-states and recursively develop ways of programming battlespace/sphere through operations to achieve them. In doing so, they also challenge the existing planning and decision-making metanarratives within military organs.

Writing in an American military context, Ketti Davison (a U.S. Army officer and former ISAF campaign planner in Afghanistan) argues that while SOD and EBO have been embraced as replacements for more conventional joint military decision-making processes (the MDMP), the former do not prove to be as effective or suitable in relation to aiding units in completing specific tactical tasks or objectives (Davison 2006: 51). Yet, the focus on more linear planning processes tends to focus too greatly on one 'centre of gravity' as opposed to understanding the environment in systems-level terms (Eikmeier 2012). Effects-based approaches involve a larger systemic operational approach; in other words, one designs operations in a systemic framework by designing for effects. Systemic design subsumes effects (Davison 2006: 54). SOD is defined as "a process of inquiry that produces both a framework rationalizing strategic complexity and a framework for planning action in accordance with the logic of that complexity...[and which] recognizes that uncertainty is an attribute of complex adaptive systems and addresses it through continuous reframing" (Davison 2006: 31). EBO uses "a holistic understanding of the operational environment in order to influence the behavior of the threat system... It translates strategic objectives into desired effects based on the threat's Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure (PMESII) systems" (Davison 2006: 17).⁶⁷ SOD "focuses on

⁶⁶ Written in early 2001, Paul Davis' RAND monograph *Effects-Based Operations: A Grand Challenge for the Analytical Community* outlines the difficult but necessary transition to EBO in relation to further developing American military capabilities.

⁶⁷ Current U.S. Army doctrine uses PMESSI-PT: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure Physical Environment, and Time. See Celestino Perez's 2013-2014 U.S. Army series "Arguing the Operating Environment" < <http://www.youtube.com/channel/UCOr83GopOU1nITl6WQzgQ2g>>. Other military heuristic tools include ASCOPE (Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organisations, People and Events) and DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic).

transforming the relationships and interactions between entities within a system"; EBO involves specific ways of "disrupting nodes and relationships" within a more contained part of the system (31).

Echoing the Chinese doctrine on unrestricted warfare and 'beyond-limits war', contemporary Canadian doctrine suggests that desired effects should dictate the capabilities required, and not *vice versa*. In emphasizing the necessity of agile "manoeuvrist"(mobile) warfare" for "shattering the enemies overall cohesion," the CF Army's adaptive dispersed operations doctrine (discussed above) advocates designing and acting across different systems or spheres. Action should be:

...conducted simultaneously on the physical and psychological planes in a complementary fashion...Mission command supports a manoeuvrist approach to operations as applied to activities on both the physical and psychological planes. An objective may be reached through either fires or influence activities, or through a combination of both. While the term objective has commonly been used to refer to a physical object against which action is taken, an objective is often something far more abstract, particularly if it is on the psychological plane or if it relates to a set of circumstances or conditions to be created. Potential second and third order effects are important considerations. (CF/DND 2011c: 30)

The proposition of combining ballistics ('fires') and biopolitics ('influence activities') reveals a realization of employing different types of persuasive and coercive measures. Killing one fighter may affect the 'psychological plane' of other fighters or of locals who supported insurgent cells whereas a local initiative to enable economic development inside a security bubble may dissuade locals from aiding the resistance altogether. The lethal and non-lethal act creates multiple effects in systemic terms by inserting and dispersing the war effort in different ways. SOD proceeding with an effects-based imperative will juxtapose and mix different types of direct and indirect address, linking all actions and "plac[ing] increasing importance on establishing influence over the mind of an adversary while keeping collateral damage to a minimum" (Grossman-Vermaas 2008: 66). For counterinsurgency, this imperative implies unifying effects on physical, cognitive, affective, and moral planes. Further:

EBO may be considered a process for obtaining a desired outcome or effect from an adversary, friend or neutral through the synergistic and *cumulative* application of military and non-military capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. (67; emphasis added)

Again, we notice here different targets, different capacities employed to affect those targets, and a set of outcomes that are transversal in that they create a tear across the operating environment.

As an example, the CF's operational approach is currently in flux, perhaps subject to the operational revolution in military thinking described above. Though it relies on 'operational art' discourse, the CF operations planning manual (2008b) is based on a linear and highly-structured operational planning process (OPP) to generate Courses of Action (COAs). However, many operations officers (as of 2009) were interested in moving to an SOD approach (Lauder 2009). While the OPP tends to deductively "decompose" problems into rigid and isolated "discrete components" before reassembling a Course of Action (42), the SOD process is viewed as "highly flexible and iterative," able to induce outcomes by understanding systems in their holistic, non-linear, and multi-causal contexts (44). From an aesthetic perspective, the SOD model *simultaneously senses and distributes its sensing because 'it' recognizes everything as something to read, address, interpret, influence, or shape*. This is an admission of lack: a complete picture of battlespace is *entirely impossible*, a perpetual lost object structuring the desire of operational artists. In this scenario, situational awareness is always incomplete, and perception proceeds in a state of almost permanent emergency to generate better intelligence and situational awareness.

Systemic operational design and effects-based approaches have their critics. In 2008, then-U.S. Marine Commandant General James Mattis authored a force-wide memorandum regarding effects-based approaches and stating that regardless of nomenclature, traditional practices like clear Commander's Intent and deliberate orders unambiguously stating tasks and responsibilities should remain the norm. While Mattis acknowledged the dynamic environment of counterinsurgency operations, his criticism derided EBO as new-speak that obscured clear tactical goals during missions and operations. In 2008, a senior CF operational planner's suggestion about SOD was clear: "don't drink the Kool-Aid" (Magee 2008). A special section in a 2009 issue of *Joint Force Quarterly* (an American military publication) ruminated on the doctrine-conduct gap but was more conciliatory, claiming that SOD and EBO were useful in some contexts but not necessarily the norm across all joint doctrine (Joint Staff 2009: 60). Others suggested they enabled important insights by reframing problems and revealing alternative ways and means to achieve ends, especially when the design process integrates different feedback into the design process, which in turn creates a more egalitarian approach to establishing the

"imaginative patterns of actions" (Swain 2009: 68) necessary for the deployment of force and violence (63). In the same section, American military intellectual and operational theorist Milan Vego argued against "so-called systemic operational design," pegging a large share of the blame on the inappropriate invocation of systems theory and—go figure—the integration of "French postmodern philosophers" (he cites Deleuze, Guattari, Lyotard, and Baudrillard), whose writing he claims is collectively "unintelligible and pseudo-academic" (71). His criticism of the IDF's use of such philosophy for operational thinking (see the discussion about Naveh above) argues that practitioners fail to clearly identify what each stream of thinking does: effects-based measures imagine a closed system focusing on the disruption of nodes; systemic operational design attempts to transform the nodes and entities within the system itself (72). In dismissing them as "pseudo-scientific" and as lacking in empirical evidence of success (73; c.f. Vego 2012), Vego is more inclined toward 'certitude' of straight lines.

In opposition to Vego, Ben Zweibelson, an outspoken military advocate of systemic operational design, has written extensively about his experience as an American joint campaign planner and operations officer with substantial experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. His basic argument is that "fusing design theory with military planning efforts" is the best way avoid "set procedures and sequences" in approaching "ill-structured problems," which will characterize the contemporary and future continuum of operations whether in counterinsurgency, persistent engagement, or ongoing contingency operations (2012a: 80-1). Zweibelson invokes Foucault's conception of problematization to position those practicing SOD as progressive 'problematizers' within conservative military organs (84; cf. 2013a: 97). In other words, he associates SOD with the appropriate limit-attitude and with making the *unpresentable presentable*. Distinguishing between operational design that *thinks* in non-linear terms and how operational art should translate design into linear action, he argues operations should anticipate multiple future states and be able to improvise accordingly. Somewhat predictably, Zweibelson deploys his own musical analogy, where the orchestration in question is less a conducted symphony and more an improvisational jazz band (85) that can respond to crowds, adjust compositions, and sustain cohesion even as lines of musical flight diverge. In addressing his own work in Afghanistan,

which revolved around 'standing up' Afghan national security forces, he outlines how operational design must navigate doctrine and root metaphors while still working to perceive things abstractly and contextually in relation to the battlespace environment (Zweibelson 2012b: 2). Further, he also explains how the integration and of Deleuze and Guattari's assemblage theory proved productive in forcing him and his team to rethink relations of interiority and exteriority to revise reductionist approaches to design inherent in traditional linear models (4; c.f. 2013a: 95).⁶⁸

In conjunction with systemic operational design, "narrative-led operations" is emerging as a smaller sub-stream to anchor the design process within joint and coalition-based operations (Nissen 2012). This means using narratives to build a shared awareness of the systemic operational design process between different actors, beyond the trajectory of orders and commander's intent statements and outside the strategic messaging specific to influence and information operations. If "words and deeds must match at all levels," narrative-led operations would ensure that narratives are not phrased to fit operations after the fact but would instead create a comprehensible pre-existing narrative to drive the design of operations (69) in order to "inform the planning of kinetic and non-kinetic activities...to support the strategic intent with employment of military force" (72). On their own terms, the counterinsurgency manuals recognize the need for a shared metanarrative across actors at the strategic and operational level. According to the American joint manual:

If done correctly, operations nested with a strategic narrative are strengthened through sense of purpose, unity of effort, and the ability to gain and maintain initiative against insurgents. The strategic narrative is most effective when incorporated across the joint force and embedded in all that counterinsurgents say and do. (JP 3-24 2013: 7-1/sec. 1)

Furthermore, the manuals call for sustaining and extending the operational initiative and momentum by way of disseminating narratives to shape, influence, and affect local populations (JP 3-24 2013: 3-9/sec. 3b; c.f. BGL-323-004 2008: 1-16/sec. 2-10), which is possible only after fully understanding the operational environment with better sociocultural knowledge and understanding of host-nation partners

⁶⁸ Beyond different camps for and against systemic operational design, it is hard to know how the use of figures like Deleuze and Guattari affect the uptake of the theory. This raises the question of whether or not operational thinkers like Zweibelson can cite and use non-military sources and be understood. Work like Zweibelson's is written for a smaller community of military intellectuals who slowly translate and distill their insights to eventually create doctrine.

(JP 3-24 2013: 3-8/sec. 3a). They identify how a "compelling narrative" is "spun" to assign blame for grievances, alleged to be the most important root cause of insurgency (2-4/sec. 3b.1 c.f. FM 1-10: 1-7/sec. 2.3). A "counterinsurgent mindset" must be able to "understand the insurgent strategy and narrative in order to counter their operations" (JP 3-24 2013: 3-4/ sec. 2a-c). So, ensuring consistency across external narratives is crucial (FM 3-24 2014: 1-21/sec. 1-87) alongside functional internal narratives for understanding the operational planning contexts and the environment (7-19/sec. 7-90). In addition to his work on design concepts, assemblage theory, and operational art, Zweibelson proposes the use of design narratives (2013a: 88). His point differs from Nissen's somewhat in that he advocates not the development of a narrative to which design must conform but rather the development of a narrative that encompasses or at least represents an awareness of the elements influencing the design process itself, and addresses how design can unfold according to different stories military actors tell themselves about the design process. In the end, he is advocating for operational designers and artists to reflect on and document their own movement through the design process so as to reveal and explicate opportunities for knowledge creation that remain tacit or hiding in plain sight. Design becomes a vigilant and self-reflexive auto-ethnographic process and also becomes a node or point internal to the continuum of warfighting, one step in the comprehensive approach.⁶⁹

So, 'employing' the operational art with the equipment of systemic operational design means first appreciating the different groups or actors in an environment *as* systems in themselves, which are interdependent and continuously interacting in unpredictable ways—different local populations, police, different coalition partners, Afghan leaders, insurgents, contractors, etc. (Conover 2011: 26-27). In a method similar to Latour's actor-network theory (ANT), counterinsurgents employing operational art must think then in 'actor-centric' terms (Gorka & Kilcullen 2011) while developing a holistic operational assessment practice that recognize the systems in which actors embed their activities, and which give rise to the networks themselves in a mutually constituting process (Upshur, Roginski, and Kilcullen

⁶⁹ If taken to an absurd end, the design narrative process would have to consult with insurgents themselves prior to the drafting of a systemic operational design session intended to address or mitigate them. While integrating this knowledge is usually called intelligence, I make the point only to emphasize the 'desire' built into these models in relation to integrating and representing anything and everything.

2012). Subsequently, this means thinking operations from the ground-up while still trying to recursively engineer outcomes to reach the end-state; this results in campaign plan that may lack detail so it can be tuned for local relevance (Conover 2011: 36).⁷⁰ Decentralized and flexible, counterinsurgency in this context would be waged as a series of local, vitalized undertakings in compliance with a recurring or universal logic, a 'mosaic war' (see Sepp 2006; JP 3-24 2013: 3-26) waged from the operational level and below toward junior commands specific to local circumstances. Overall, according to the leading edge of operational avant guardists, systemic design is about thinking complexity and assemblages to think beyond limits, and it is also literally based on telling stories to compensate for the uncertainty that comes with complex operations, creating fantasies to which action and the employment of violence will conform, whether firepower or biopower.

Collateralization as Operational Imperative: Unrestricted & Indiscriminate Envelopment

Having considered counterinsurgency's aesthetic equipment, and given the reconceptualization of linguistic, territorial, and operational parameters for military thinking, I now turn finally to arguing, based on the operational frames I have interrogated, that counterinsurgency's approach is radically *indiscriminate* and premised on *collateralization*.

Collateralization denotes a few different things. Collateral in speculative and financial terms denotes a guarantee, "an asset pledged by an agent who owns a debt" (Marazzi 2010: 127); one offers or overleverages collateral to borrow or rent money or capital. Collateral is a placeholder and surrogate for debt. In circulatory terms, something is collateral if it is situated in parallel or proximate to something, as in collateral circulation to avoid a blockage, or as (col)lateral violence where structural violence is internalized and then directed elsewhere to those more vulnerable or exposed. In military terms, collateral damage—inadvertent or unintended damage, death, and destruction, especially of civilians and civilian infrastructures—refers to the failure of properly discriminating a target for address. All of these relate to what I mean. Given the contemporary predilection to operationalize 'non-military' means and

⁷⁰ Conover describes counterinsurgency as unified efforts "to gain an appropriate level of stability to facilitate political maneuver and eventual military withdrawal on favorable terms" (Conover 2011: 37). Clearly, an exit strategy is the narrative of choice for operational design.

measures by intervening into different ecologies in a battlesphere that is open even as it must be contained so as to become sensible, the reality imagined and induced in expeditionary environments sends the flows of war sideways, collaterally, at different speeds and with different dosages and intensities. Collateralization will disperse and distribute the war into different places, becoming increasingly *indiscriminate*—and presenting the unrepresentable.

While the military logic of discrimination and of necessity are typically understood in relation to kinetic operations, the contemporary military recourse to restraint and to proportionality to justify military action actually normalizes what becomes lauded as 'lesser evils.' Technologies of war that do less than killing are viewed favourably, which is to say that one gains more licence to use the biopolitical end of the warfighting spectrum in order to think the limit and design systemic operations. Against what he calls the "liberal canards" of just war, Weizman argues that the minimization of violence, occurring within an "economy of calculation," is the basic logic of violence (Weizman 2012: 3, 12). The naturalization of violence is possible only through this moderation and differentiation. As a grouping, necessity, proportionality, and restraint remain categories that guide the operational art and the practice of targeting, joining the chain of ends, ways, and means (Weizman 2012: 13, 19-20; Challans 2007: 155).⁷¹ This new trinity serves as ways of measuring what is suitable (ends), feasible (ways), and acceptable (means), determining the calculus of how to design and program environments with military violence. However, these concepts, inasmuch as they structure action, have less to do with preventing or prohibiting actions and more to do with continuously "calculating and determining balances and degrees" where balance, as equivalence and symmetry, gives way *to ensuring no excessive imbalance* in the violence or force of a given response or exchange (Weizman 2012: 11).⁷² On the internalization of this regime within international human rights law (IHL) and customary war law, Weizman writes:

IHL does not seek to end wars but rather to 'regulate' and 'shape' the ways militaries wage them; and that western militaries, increasingly bogged down by a raft of urban insurgencies in various global arenas, are also keen to change the way they fight wars and to minimize civilian

⁷¹ "Proportionality is a complex logic with many variables—but how do you compare these? There is no choice but to ask the question, compare, and calculate. Proportionality does not tell us what to include in the calculation, what the equation is and what is the exchange rate" (Reisner, in Weizman 2012: 13).

⁷² Weizman alludes to Protocol 1 of the Geneva Conventions, which in 1997 formally codified proportionality regarding the use of force.

casualties. Western militaries tend to believe that by moderating the violence they perpetuate, they might be able to govern populations more efficiently and finally win over the hearts and minds that have continuously eluded them since the Malayan counterinsurgency and the Vietnam War. (11)

Similarly, as Timothy Challans contends, this approach, in making explicit the decisions to legitimize military violence, not only assumes a dangerous type of moral ascendancy but also reinforces psychological ascendancy—"Our version of military reality is technically virtuous, ethical, smart, and savvy"—which then self-referentially validates the undertaking itself (Challans 2007: 118). Following the same line of criticism, Tracey Dowdeswell (2013) argues that the current war system—coincident with the normalization of population-centered warfare whether as counterinsurgency or stability operations or 'remote war' by drone-based killing—actually normalizes atrocities in the context of international law and the customary laws of armed conflict. Studying the infamous 2007 "Collateral Murder" video released by Wikileaks and the surrounding debate about the legality of the strike on civilians and journalists in Baghdad, Dowdeswell concludes that contemporary military operations do not preclude civilian deaths but must function within what are acceptable legal thresholds to govern what is appropriate. That is to say, civilian deaths are acceptable and normalized; they can be and are calculated and measured as proportional or necessary, and are in turn imbued with the rule and force of law (Dowdeswell 2013: 46; c.f. Lamb 2013: 37-55; Weizman 2010 on lawfare). Not targeting civilians and not killing them are two entirely different things.

If atrocity has become law and if lesser evils are increasingly normalized in relation to 'measured' kinetic military responses, what of the so-called non-kinetic and non-military ways and means? Alongside acute strikes and extended operations that are vetted by the string of legal advisors in command centres and embedded with units in the theatre of operations,⁷³ the recourse to more ambient types of coercion that are slower and less perceptible *actually collateralize and unrestrict warfare*,

⁷³ Ben Anderson's *The Battle for Helmand* (2010) depicts an embedded legal affairs officer, who was often the first person consulted by the Marine commander at the centre of the documentary. The film does not clarify whether the officer is third-party contractor or a member of the Marines. Given the hazy legal foundations of counterinsurgency and contingency operations and the recourse to justifying different lines of force, the American now military relies on a *JP 1-04 Legal Support to Military Operations* (2011). The U.S. Army recently published its own updated *FM 1-04 Legal Support to the Operational Army* (2013). The Marine Corps is working on updating its operational war law doctrine as indicated in *MCP 3300.4A Marine Corps Law of War Program* (2014).

setting it loose in local environments of life, especially for war waged as a mixture of biopower and firepower. This is a curious situation, one that is almost counterintuitive. If population-centered counterinsurgencies are less lethal, they are more damaging and violent precisely because they sublimate coercive and persuasive force and saturate the whole environment in an atmospheric type of *envelopment*. I read envelopment as an extension of the military concept of *enfilade* though in a way that displaces it. As a way of compromising an adversary's cover (*defilade*), *enfilade* is the ability to flank or envelope a target so as to deliver fire in way that exposes an adversary across her 'longest axis'. Maneuvering so as to get an enemy 'into' *enfilade* typically enables a tactical advantage engineered and designed in advance (i.e., an ambush). *Enfilade* thus creates a kill sack or kill zone. When understood in relation to the mixture of firepower and biopower, *enfilade* will also create zones for life and living.

Envelopment as the collateralization of war, inasmuch as it moves warfare sideways and optimizes biopower, is also speculative, hedging on derivatives—on deriving and projecting attractive and profitable rates of change over time—within an environment so as to capitalize on the effort, expenditure, and investment. This economic imperative is not new: according to Dillon and Reid, Clausewitz had intuited an analogical relation between the material flows of warfare and the material flows of capital (Dillon & Reid 2009: 118). If we opt to understand counterinsurgency as envelopment and collateralization, we then have a model of military violence as arbitrage, an actuarial undertaking in assigning and finding value in things so as to expropriate or exploit them, whether in war, society, or finance (Coker 2007; Rasmussen 2006). Just as collateralized debt obligations in financial markets bundle massive toxic debts and sends them sideways to transfer risks and exploit the amalgamated surplus value aggregated by savings and investments of ordinary people comprising a population, collateralized war unrestricts how and where investments in military violence can flow and how they can be leveraged (Martin 2011).

Of course, this collateralization will generate cascading effects as per the intention of concepts like systemic operational design. Weizman outlines how operations officers, in developing strike packages or designing information operations, develop appropriate metrics to enable 'measured'

responses. He explains how, with the vernacular of the operational art, officers describe injecting 'heat,' friction, or uncertainty into a system by designing or developing the appropriate way and mean (Weizman 2011). Richard Swain describes this injection in relation to the complex and dynamic properties of the operating environment:

[C]omplex systems are characterized not just by multiple actors (complicated systems), but by the frequency of interactions between autonomous actors—interactions that make system behavior nonlinear in magnitude and unpredictable in direction. *Small infusions of energy into complex systems can produce entirely disproportional effects.* Unintended and unanticipated responses to actions are the norm. (Swain 2009: 62).

As Swain implies, managing fall-outs and risks is crucial to operational continuing and reaching the desired end-state. Yet, in considering these infusions of energy in terms of biopower and biopolitics, what is the outcome when they are ambient and with a different velocity and rate of closure? To opt for a biochemical analogy, we can say that the referent here is *endocrinal* and not toxicological.⁷⁴

Toxicologically, responses to exposure are measured in linear terms; if toxicity increases and acute exposure increases, so does harm. In endocrinal terms, small dosage or minimal exposure can produce significant systemic effects or can produce nothing at all. Such non-linear measures may require less energy, less output, and less sustained effort while generating a significant systemic effect that realizes the military exploitation of asymmetry. The endocrinal register makes ambient effects intelligible; it presents the seemingly unrepresentable. Population-centered counterinsurgency is constituted by these ambient but pervasive smaller doses that may not kill but which coerce through less measurable and less discriminate types of damage. While protocols like restrictive rules of engagement, intent-based orders, positive identification (PID), and 'courageous restraint'—limiting the use of 'kinetic' (i.e., ballistic) force to the point of exposing oneself to risk⁷⁵—appear to provide checks on the deployment of aggressive and lethal violence, they have little to say regarding the non-lethal but still coercive kinetics of biopower and biopolitical measures, whether they be "pattern of life" patrols and psychological operations, infrastructure development initiatives, or the raft of techniques under the umbrella of village stability

⁷⁴ My use of this schema comes out of discussions with Dr. Jody Berland in 2008 and 2009.

⁷⁵ NATO ISAF issued a new release in its COIN News section in January 2010, "Honoring Courageous Restraint" (ISAF 2010), which detailed the "extraordinary courage and self-control" of US Marines in not firing on demonstrators in Garmsir, Helmand Province (¶ 12).

operations. The celebration of restraint and moderation indicates what Weizman and Adi Ophir describe as a perverse reverse logic, where the "necroeconomy of lesser evils" does not refer to less violence but rather violence that is unpredictable because of the way it festers and pollinates other events (Weizman 2011: 195). What is perhaps most significant here—and what is at stake in the aesthetic equipment and its operational capacities—is that local populations (as targets) become indices for success and are consigned to signal whether or not the operations have achieved the ideal end-state. Populations, as systems—and as subalterns on the peripheries of liberal rule—are not inert and they do 'speak'; however, the language of counterinsurgency asks them to participate in their own pacification by demanding they signal in a specific way. Designing violence to generate systemic effects implies the environment is not static; it pulsates outward, always signalling. Targeted by a system that endows any utterance with value, the population, as a feature of the environment, speaks in spite of itself.

The design of envelopment and collateralization promises to reprogram territory, unfolding and explicating it while extrapolating the force employed in order to continually remake the theatre of operations. Weizman has described the geography of military occupations and military power where non-contiguous spaces are linked together, and where verticality extends the prerogative of vertical sovereignty (Weizman 2007: 253-4), creating an environment of containment of hollowed out land, cross-sectional occupations, and extra-territorial enclaves (258).⁷⁶ Envelopment demands an environmentality closer to what Stuart Elden refers to as "volumetric space" beyond the bounded constraints of mere notions of area (Elden 2013b: 1). As Elden argues in his book *The Birth of Territory*, territory is a political (and biopolitical) technology produced to capture bodies in space; territory is always-already premised on custody, confinement, and control (Elden 2013a; c.f. Brighenti 2010). Insofar as counterinsurgency must be territorialized and produced in an environment, it will take custody of different sectors of the population in different ways depending on how different types of violence are used to de- and re-territorialize the theatre of operations. Peter Sloterdijk, in his work on

⁷⁶ In his essay about aerial sovereignty, Mark Neocleous has recently argued about the actualization of global no-fly zones rationalized by the dream of "police power all the way to heaven" now realized in a global context of liberal rule and liberal security to maintain order in a disorderly world (2013; c.f. Holmqvist 2014). Neocleous' critique registers the same kind of atmospheric (or volumetric; c.f. Elden 2013) context I have been developing

'atmo-terrorism' and the literal and biopolitical colonization of the air environment has remarked on the explication-based imperatives of modern liberal power and the atmospheric turn in military and civil violence (2002 [2009]). What can be more agile and dispersed than biopower as military violence becoming ether, diffusing and drifting into a volumetric space? T.E. Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, a touchstone for today's 'culturally intelligent' counterinsurgency, suggested that armies were sedentary plants whereas irregular war—modern war—imagined and ought to produce force conceived gas that could disperse into a whole environment (Lawrence 1926 [1981]: 198). We could even say that this kind of envelopment is also camouflaged; that is, its designers, programmers, and conductors tacitly understand it as a series of actions that ideally and imperceptibly blend into the background as low-dose measures with asymmetric and non-reciprocal returns. This atmospheric referent reads as a metaphor but I am arguing we understand it in very explicit and literal terms.

Thus, envelopment as collateralization and unrestriction reveals a logic of military enlightenment that constantly seeks to both delimit and un-limit, to assess the limited operating range of its own forces and targets while also probing for ways to unrestrict how and where violence can circulate to enable cascading effects on which counterinsurgents can speculate. Following from Sloterdijk, Elden, and Foucault, Mark Duffield suggests that this requires rethinking what total war means in the post-industrial context of liberal rule:

It is a *modus operandi* of violence that, in the broadest sense of the term, demands the destruction of an enemy's environmental lifeworld. The targets of this war include the climate regimes, vital urban infrastructures, ecological systems, and social networks, together with the neurological and cellular processes that collectively support life and make it possible. Since the essence of such warfare is surprise and uncertainty, especially the dread of not knowing when or where the blow will fall, total war operates through terror. More specifically, it works as environmental terror. The targets of this war include the climate regimes, vital urban infrastructures, ecological systems, and social networks, together with the neurological and cellular processes that collectively support life and make it possible. (Duffield 2011: 757)

This is asymmetric not because of the disparity between the capacities of the different actors engaged in fighting or resisting *but because of the intent* behind the dosage administered in environmental and terms at the level of a population's of ways of life. Slow and ambient military ways and means, as political violence, are artfully designed and programmed, directed at local targets with the aim of achieving

larger systemic effects so as to make them live. While backed by the promises of liberal freedom and self-determination, the goal is *not* to enable the hopes, dreams, and aspirations of a people whose desires are channeled by and through the zero-institution of the nation and constituted in the host-nation governing apparatus. In practice, the counterinsurgency program fosters the goal of securing the population but only so as to make it *ruilier*, more liberal and less illiberal (Kienscherf 2010), more amenable to rule and a rationality of government favouring biopolitical conceptions of security and control. The goal, straight from the manuals and the doctrine, is to bring populations closer to their respective governments whatever its composition—to impose government on a subordinate population (Gonzales, Gusterson, and Price 2009: 12).

We have been mapping the aesthetic equipment of contemporary military enlightenment, interrogating how contemporary North Atlantic militaries use the limit-attitude by producing and optimizing an environmentality of envelopment. The next two chapters continue to interrogate this conduct and equipment by focusing more closely on the idea of envelopment as a mixture of firepower and biopower. The next chapter considers the relationship between counterinsurgents and Foucault; I contend that counterinsurgents, with their own coincident and parallel theory of population, 'do' Foucault without knowing it by inverting his analysis of biopower and extending it into their own affairs. Building on this chapter's assessment, it then considers the messianic arrival of counterinsurgency in 2006. This leads into chapter four, which assesses the firepower and biopower of contemporary counterinsurgency through the practice of village stability operations (VSO), an ever-growing sub-discipline of population-centered counterinsurgency and stability operations specific to foreign internal defense missions. Examining VSO and the concerted turn toward village-level 'from-the-ground-up' initiatives in Afghanistan from 2008 offers a better sense of the way biopower and firepower are deployed to conduct war 'from below' by collateralizing flows into the life environments of populations.

3 Counterinsurgency, or the Continuation of Foucault by Other Means

The population is pertinent and the object, and individuals, the series of individuals, are no longer pertinent as the object, but simply as the instrument, relay, or condition for obtaining something at the level of population.

- Michel Foucault, 18 January 1978 (2007: 42)

In fact, the population is not a primary datum; it is dependent on a series of variables.

A constant interplay between techniques of power and their object gradually carves out in reality, as a field of reality, population and its specific phenomena.

- Foucault, 25 January 1978 (2007: 70, 79)

By interrogating the aesthetic equipment and operational art of contemporary military methods in the last chapter, I argued that counterinsurgency is an experiment in envelopment, a condition achieved by the actual *unrestriction* of military violence and its *collateralization* into environments and infrastructures of life and living. Though framed as more proportional, as non-kinetic, and as less lethal, counterinsurgency violence is still aimed at targets if administered with a different speed, intensity, and dosage. In this chapter, I create a bridge between Foucault and counterinsurgency. The first half of the chapter examines in more detail Foucault's work on biopolitics, violence, and war and assesses its relationship to contemporary counterinsurgency. Foucault's analysis indicts what the philosophers and agents of counterinsurgency desire. In effect, as I argue, Foucault's military contemporaries, in their discovery of modern war, seem to invert and 'do' Foucault without knowing it, having arrived at some of the same conclusions if for different ends, which implies a missed encounter between population-centered military actors and the population-centered theorist of power and order. The second half of the chapter engages with the revision and relaunch of American counterinsurgency doctrine in 2006 and its reception as "the answer" to the escalating expeditionary wars waged by North Atlantic states. Building on my interrogation of doctrine and language from chapter two, I consider how military actors and would-be counterinsurgents argued over the conduct and the narrative of counterinsurgency. This leads into the fourth chapter, which examines the biopower and firepower of village-level counterinsurgency and village stability operations.

The military discourse after the release of *FM3-24 Counterinsurgency* in 2006 reveals no Foucauldian footprint, nor do the development of doctrine and the practice of precision and from-the-ground up counterinsurgency post-2009. More broadly, while other European cultural theorists and poststructural thinkers are invoked in the recent cycle of military literature and counterinsurgency doctrine, Foucault is almost entirely absent.¹ Given his prominence and influence in the humanities and social sciences, this non-existent register is remarkable especially when considering the ongoing academicization of military affairs, the integrationist approach to military intelligence, and the concept of 'intellectual combat power.' Save for smaller forays—cognitive reconnaissance—into Foucault's work related to power-knowledge and 'problematization' (Zweibelson 2013: 96; 2012: 83; c.f. 2103b) and to the method of genealogy to rethink the 'generations of war' heuristic in relation to historical discontinuities (Verschoor-Kirss 2012), there appears to be almost no footprint of biopower or biopolitics. Part of what I uncover in this chapter is two parallel tracks of population-centered thinking that never seem to connect: on one side, Foucault's development of biopower starting in the late 1960s and 1970s and furthered in the during the lectures of the late-1970s; on the other, doctrinal writing on the methods specific to modern warfare and the regularization of irregular war, which increasingly aim to wage war 'amongst the people' and in the environment of life itself. While these two tracks are politically—or rather, biopolitically—opposed, they address a similar set of concerns at a common historical moment: Foucault develops a genealogical understanding of the history of population-centered power, government, and rule to advance a theory of biopolitics in a contemporary context; the military avant-gardists of the 1960s and counterinsurgents today increasingly understand populations as objects to secure and, as I claim in my interpretations, serve as spaces in which to unrestrict and collateralize war. Military counterinsurgency does not 'need' Foucault in any strict sense; the doctrine has at its core a parallel theory of how to administer and pacify populations as the conduct of war. Yet, this complementarity is important given the common set of concerns around power, violence, and population and given the lack any real record of each theory encountering the other.

¹ Thinkers like Pierre Bourdieu, Clifford Geertz, Victor Turner, and even Antonio Gramsci were pulled in to buttress the literary and intellectual credibility of the manuals (Price 2009; Gusterson 2009).

With his focus on governmentality and the engagement with Clausewitz and war in *'Society Must Be Defended'*, Foucault 'missed' the military thinking of Lacheroy, Trinquier, and Galula and French military thought in general. Given the way he describes the displacement of war in order to conceptualize biopower, the displacement of Foucault is ironic. In a formally similar way, the late colonial counterinsurgents and their military descendants fail to engage with the intellectual resources available through Foucault. His work is their 'unknown known,' and they have managed to approximate his insights independent of any dedicated attempt to incorporate biopower, whether in concepts or vocabulary. Given that Foucault's conclusions have been realized by counterinsurgents in their own efforts to unrestrict war, I am interested in pointing to how counterinsurgents think 'war-beyond-limits' but fail to recognize the limit of Foucault, whose work is unintelligible and literally invisible to them in the existing doctrinal record.

Following this introduction and building on the overview of biopolitics in chapter one, I review the concepts of biopower, biopolitics, and race and then pull back to consider Foucault as a thinker and philosopher not of power but of order, a core concern common across his varied work. I then devote a larger section to Foucault's engagement with Clausewitz and the philosophy of war, about which counterinsurgents should likely *but do not* have much to say. After considering criticisms of Foucault's work on populations and biopower-biopolitics—notably, his inadequate engagement with the epistemological ruptures of colonial-imperial race thinking alongside a rather abstract conception of violence in colonial-imperial environments—I give some consideration to the gap between his theory of population and the philosophy advanced by French counterinsurgents who 'discovered' modern war in the 1960s before offering an analysis of the discursive, epistemological, and practical uptake of counterinsurgency after the roll-out of the repurposed doctrine in 2006.

Order & the Trajectory of Biopower-Biopolitics

Foucault's unifying concern across his historical and philosophical work is the extended interrogation of technologies of order. Prior to the wider translation and republication of the *Collège de*

France lectures, Anglo-centric readers typically understood Foucault's work according to a customary periodization of conceptual method: archaeology, genealogy, and the ethical turn back to the subject (c.f. Rainbow & Rose 2003 for an account of this reductive reading). Sovereign power, juridico-legal power, disciplinary power, biopower, and power-knowledge: all blend promiscuously to produce the conditions for organizing living, where order comes from everywhere and no one single place. Like his allies Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault's approach is topological rather than topographic: the analysis wants to establish an object and logic, but does so in way that does not fixate on a macro-level perfect system; the genealogy aims to make intelligible a composite whole that is constituted by local relations and micro-level processes. Accordingly and consistent with the axioms of genealogy, Foucault advocated approaching order—as the organization of people, spaces, resources, and words—as if it did not exist, favouring discontinuities and non-linearity, and encompassing the formation of order from below in order to trouble the assumed 'hardness' of order as something unilaterally imposed. The diffuse sources of order contribute to the seeming naturalness of order (Foucault 1979 [2008]: 3).² *The Order of Things* (1963 [1966]) identifies the invention of not only contemporary human subjectivity (“man,” a technology with all of its gendered reductions) but also the turn of the social and human sciences to explain and understand the cumulative material effects of the “hidden networks” of “discrete orders” that have tangible effects but are far from self-evident (Foucault 1963 [1966]: xx). From this perspective, it is no surprise that his considerations of order will lead him past the philosophy of language, natural philosophy, and political economy and toward investigations of the meshwork of force, power relations, strategy, violence, and war as ways of ordering the world.

While Foucault's work is often categorized in North American and Anglo-centric environments as French poststructuralist theory, his investigations are shaped by a French anti-liberal and

² In his review of Paul Rainbow and Nikolas Roses' anthology, *The Essential Foucault* (2003), Stephen D'Arcy writes, “[T]he picture that emerges from the pages of *The Essential Foucault* – taken on its own – is that of a historico-philosophical research program, underdetermined (so to speak) by actual research” (D'Arcy 2004: 116). In other words, Foucault, for all his contributions, put the cart before the evidentiary material horse, imposing his analyses. Yet, if taken as another common criticism of Foucault, this position sustains a nod to dispassionate objective history while implying the work of Foucault as a speculator and proselytizer, which is ridiculous. Foucault's project all along was an active inquiry into the silenced, marginalized, and minor, which is to say I think his method justified his epistemological and philosophical but also political tendencies.

materialist-historical tradition. By anti-liberal, I mean that the philosophy of economic liberalism and the liberal subject becomes the target of his critique. Engaging with Foucault's work means acknowledging how his thinking unfolds in an explicitly French national context situated within the trajectory of modern French republicanism, within the vicissitudes of the French academy leading up to and after the events of May 1968, and in the post-war and postcolonial context of waning French state power abroad. While these may have created conditions for poststructuralism, they certainly influenced and shaped—ordered—Foucault's work. It is tempting to take Foucault's analysis and approach it as is, which is to say apply his work in a purely positivistic way. Yet, the work is not hermetically sealed and by no means complete. Part of the challenge is to read Foucault's work on biopolitics as an opportunity to continue his paradigm by other means—which military counterinsurgents seem to do inadvertently, and which I do in my assessment of them. Deleuze, in his book on Foucault (Deleuze 1988 [2011]), refers to him as an archivist and cartographer revealing the 'strata' and 'folds' constituting liberal modernity. In effect, Foucault's work stabilizes and renders sensible and knowable the emergent forms of order produced historically and specific to the contemporary era, which he explains via the concepts of biopower and biopolitics.

Though Foucault's genealogy of biopolitics tends to be understood as a coherent paradigm, it is actually punctuated by a number of conceptual inconsistencies and by different aims that changed over the course his investigations. While his early work tends to make totalizing claims about the production of knowledge, the Collège de France lectures provide a "more supple analysis of the configurations in which forms of power take shape and function" (Collier 2009: 80). In turning his attention to how the state will be 'governmentalized' and how the population will be pacified 'through peace,' Foucault develops a historical account of rule that operates through the normalization of permanent wartime measures, through pastoral-police power, and through the political economy of liberalism and new liberalism. From 1975 to 1979, this work unfolded in a series of connected if uneven stages. Generally, the genealogy and theorization of biopower and biopolitics identifies the emergence of life and living as both the object and problem of polyvalent "governmentality" (1978 [2007]: 108): "Biopolitics deals with

the population, with the population as a political problem" (Foucault 1976 [2003]: 245); "By [biopower] I mean...the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power" (Foucault 1978 [2007]: 1). Foucault describes an emerging 'art of government' beyond the purview of sovereign rule (79), which develops from late 17th and early 18th century European liberal political thought and which operates across different modalities and expressions of power, positing a continuum of ordering practices that "act on the actions" and "conduct the conduct" of populations (1978 [2007]: 99, 121). Like my discussion of military conceptions of operational art, Foucault's conception of 'art of government' implies a similar quality of being able to adjust, affect, and adapt, where "caught up, intertwined, and tangled together" forms of governing require "upward continuity" (93-94) and where art refers to "manipulating, maintaining, distributing, and re-establishing relations of force" with population as the object (312). Beyond the lectures, the most cogent descriptions of biopower remain the final chapter, "Right of Death and Power Over Life" in HOSV1 (Foucault 1978 [1990]:138-150) and the essay, "The Subject & Power" (1982). The Collège de France lectures served as opportunities to develop and invent the concepts; yet, while detailed and comprehensive, they remain incomplete sketches and full of conjectures, asides, and tangents as new concerns revealed themselves over four years of work (Dillon & Neal 2008: 1-2; Lemke 2007). According to Nikolas Rose's assessment of Foucault's cycle, biopower and biopolitics are together "more a perspective than a concept" that brings questions of life, control, and authority into focus (Rose, in Debrix & Barder 2013: 8). Additionally, Foucault repeatedly warns against any simplistic or teleological assessment regarding the 'evolution' of power. Rather, three co-existing and overlapping modalities or domains of power relations—juridico-legal power by law, disciplinary power by individual bodies, and biopolitical power by population—operate in different scales and at different rates and mixtures. As such, it is better to speak of a "multiplicity of force relations" (Foucault 1990: 92-94; 1978 [2007]: 6-7; 1976 [2003]: 249).

'Society Must Be Defended' (SMBD) begins as an investigation into the displacement and role of war as an "analyzer of power relations" vis-à-vis how governments exercise ruling power. Foucault

inverts Clausewitz's continuation thesis, "War is a continuation [extension] of policy [politics] by other means" (Foucault 1976 [2003]: 15; c.f. Clausewitz 1976, Book 1, Chapter 1.24-24: 87 & Book 8, Chapter 6.B, 605-610) and argues that war becomes a grid of intelligibility for emerging techniques of government aiming to make life live at the level of population (Foucault 1976 [2003]: 46-50). The lectures identify the emergence of 'race thinking' (Foucault 1976 [2003]: 60) and the medicalized and biologically-inflected conception of security that 'uses' war as a scheme of intelligibility to make the problems of government legible and intelligible especially during the 18th century in Europe (239). The idea of race is important, functioning as a sorting mechanism, a technology of order. Foucault spends time distinguishing between what he refers to as racist discourse (racism) and a history of race war. In locating the latter within the discourse of history emerging in European modernity, he sets up the history of race war as performing a counterhistorical function in its undermining more typical histories of sovereign power. The discourse of race war makes intelligible accounts of population and struggles between populations, which anticipate the realization of population as the object of biopower (66-71; Pugliese 2014: 32-33). History is no longer a history of nobles, kings, and privilege but a history of populations, and the 'entry' of populations into historical consciousness.

For Foucault, the changing historical discourse of government is an index for the transition toward a modality of power that identifies the problem of population as the primary object of government. Race does not have a stable biological meaning but is rather discursively coded to indicate "historical-political divides[s]" between groups and people (i.e., a construction to exacerbate difference) (77), and Foucault argues that race is later grafted onto workers and the social underclasses in relation to revolutionary practices and struggles in the 18th and 19th centuries (i.e., 'the people' as a race) (79; 261-3). While we can today speak of a common 'ordinary racism' that animates relationships between different cultural communities and social demographics and sustains structural and systemic discrimination in local and global contexts, the deeper biopolitical form of racism described by Foucault is 'born' when sovereign power converts race struggle into "a biological racism"—a knowledge-effect produced through the power-knowledge of natural science of the time—and a "grand antirevolutionary

project" (81) to preserve the sovereignty of State power by using race to code risky sectors of the population. In these passages, Foucault refers to a shift from legal and disciplinary power to "medico-normalizing techniques"—biopower (81)—and describes how this racism can and does grow into a state racism oriented, in the Nazi German case, to the "biological protection of race" and, in the Soviet case, "the hygiene of an orderly society" where class enemies become racial enemies (82-83). Race and state racism had "become the administrative prose of a State that defends itself in the name of a social heritage that has to be kept pure" (83). The prose of biopolitics and population is a racist prose, and race will be an epistemological and semiotic operator from the "political arithmetic" of statistics to the inception of demographics to sort and administer what does and does not count (Dillon 2008: 184).

By the final lecture of *SMBD*, Foucault identifies population as the field for the intervention and application of biopower, which grows out of the 'governmentalization' of statistics, demography, population geography, and public medicine oriented to study the population's life and make it live (Foucault 1976 [2003]: 242-248). Biopower will act on "a new body, a multiple body, a body with so many heads that...cannot necessarily be counted" (245), and it will administer "serial phenomena" unfolding with uncertainty over time while aiming to regularize and reach an equilibrium or homeostasis (246-47). By the end of the final lecture, Foucault explains that killing does not go away; it is rather reconciled in new ways—hence, the positive and negative biopower already outlines in chapter one. Killing in the "biopower system" is acceptable only if it results in "the elimination of a biological threat and to the improvement of the species or race" (256). Thus, the killing undertaken as war is paradoxically framed in non-warlike ways, rationalized not as reciprocal confrontations between equals in a united act but as an exercise guaranteeing the health and life of the population as a species so it can proliferate (255). While biopower will make life live, it will also have to expose "deviant" or "abnormal" individuals or communities to increased risk, subjecting them to informal political exclusion and social expulsion, and to death through "indirect murder" (Foucault 1976 (2003): 256-257). Victory over a political adversary is no longer the question; protecting the population's integrity and its habits and

routines from internal and external threats is crucial. Already, we can see here the linkages to the logics of counterinsurgency.

In the '*Society*' lectures, Foucault spoke of how security mechanisms had to be "installed around the random element in a population of living beings so as to optimize a *state of life*" (246, emphasis mine). In other words, populations will have to be *enveloped*, though not too tightly. *Security Territory Population* begins with Foucault identifying "apparatuses of security," formations constituted by and through territorial enclosures and social spaces of human habitat (what Foucault calls *milieu*; 1978[2007]: 20-21). These *milieu* imply modern problems of circulation, risk, and uncertainty (*aléatoire*, "aleatory") (64). The focus on territory and space is important. To describe the material infrastructure of biopower, Foucault relies on geographic and territorial concepts from his earlier archaeologies of the prison, the asylum, and the clinic. Panoptical discipline requires the careful environmental design and organization of space to ensure examination and visibility, whether in terms of austere cell designs, medical amphitheatres, military barracks, or, say, the battlespace rendered by military network-centric communications systems and the surveilling gaze of loitering drones. In his posthumously published "Of Other Spaces" (1966 [1984]), Foucault develops his idea of heterotopia as a non-hegemonic space, which he opposes to the concept of utopia in the original preface to *The Order of Things* (1963 [1966]). A telling 1976 interview with *Hérodote* reveals Foucault's sometimes 'obsessive' recognition of spatial and geographic questions (he cites his own use of territory, *milieu*, field, domain, region, horizon, and archipelago; Foucault 1976 [1980]: 68), which he links to the historical interface of the military-strategic apparatus and administrative-biopolitical concerns around conduct:

Once knowledge can be analyzed in terms of region, domain, implantation, displacement, transposition, one is able to capture the process by which knowledge functions as a form of power and disseminates the effects of power. There is an administration of knowledge, a politics of knowledge, a relation of power which pass via knowledge and which, if one tries to transcribe them, lead one to consider forms of domination designated by such notions as field, region, and territory. (69)

Space is the stage for the effects of power-knowledge—the theatre of operations— and the testing ground for the utility of the knowledge in question to administer, manage, and order. Order is not inscribed on an empty space but produced and structured through circulation and practice, which in

their normalized and probabilistic unfolding require certain territorialized constraints. Total containment—of the population or the enemy-as-contagion—is impossible; life must be left to unfold so as to circulate and remain mobile and, thus, productive. Foucault outlines what he calls problems regarding the links between government and the territorialization of biopower requiring new 'technics' of space—urban design, transportation, energy, communications, and electricity (Foucault 1982 [1984]: 243)—which will definitively shape the conduct of population:

It is true that for me, architecture, in the very vague analyses of it that I have been able to conduct, is only taken as an element of support, to ensure a certain allocation of people in space, a *canalization* of their circulation, as well as coding of their reciprocal relations. So it is not only considered an element in space, but is especially thought of as a plunge into a field of social relations in which it brings about some specific effects. (Foucault 1982 [1984]: 253, emphasis in original)

To canalize is to create a canal, a directed link engineered to convey things through routes, passages, speeds, and vectors of movement.³ Conducting conduct is difficult to undertake in the open, and security practices will create boundaries and boxes to restrict movement and life where necessary but also to smooth obstacles for conveying the productive energies of a population.

Prior to his current work on volume and territory, Stuart Elden considered the spatial-environmental bent of several of Foucault's collaborative but undeveloped and non-translated (to English) research projects. *Les équipements du pouvoir* ("The Equipment of Power") emphasizes urban morphologies and normalizing 'equipment'—the facilities, architectures, and infrastructures for the government of life—and broadly engages with the assemblage of power relations, territory, and production (Elden 2009: 28). *Politiques de l'habitat (1800-1850)* ("The Politics of Habitat"), to which Foucault contributed little, emphasizes the ways in which government works on and through urban populations "to provide satisfactory environments for their habitation, in order to constitute security" (36). What is most important beyond the biological discourse of habitat is the *coding* of built space as a

³ Geography and space, at least as they are territorialized socially but species-life to create and produce specific *milieu*, are clearly not self-evident. We could talk about programming spaces and the rise of what Foucault's refers to as insurrectionist knowledge and counter-conducts that hack and re-purpose space, from the Levellers against English enclosure movement to the Situationist *derive* and drift to the extreme private-property-fetish of American-style "don't tread on me" libertarianism.

human habitat and the desire to program space—to territorialize it—as a secure zone for living and life-preservation. According to Andrea Brighenti in his essay on "territoriology":

In order to work properly, government needs to territorialize a given population within its own framework of sovereignty. In Foucault's account, this is precisely the aim that disciplines help to achieve. What counts is not space per se, but the relationships among people that are built through space and inscribed in it in the effort to sustain the triangle sovereignty–discipline–government. (Brighenti 2010: 55)

The difficulty in conceptualizing the interplay between physical space and the organization of relations and functions that comes along with it, within and throughout a territory, is in the first place an epistemological difficulty. (59)

In the second passage, Brighenti could be describing how counterinsurgents inscribe the war on the environment.

According to Collier, Foucault's contention in *Security Territory Population* is that the problems specific to population emerging in the modern era become too complex and demanding to be managed by "the frames of sovereign power" and a rigid approach to social and economic controls (Collier 2009: 91). This gives way to an elucidation of biopower as a population-level way of rule derived from the Christian pastorate (pastoral power) and defined by health and security practices according to early modern discourses of population-centred 'police science.' This modern pastoral-police biopower inductively 'discovers' population through statistical measures that calculate and determine population-wide patterns and probabilities; in other words, population is a correlate of other things, a knowledge-effect and relay that registers what a population does, how it moves, and what energies it requires in order to apprehend what it is. By taking custody of a biological field with 'natural' intrinsic features and a "thickness" of different internal formations and strata, the object of population becomes the site where life can be governed and organized according to the same 'natural' determinations of health, security, and wealth (Foucault 1978 [2008]: 70-75). This naturalization coincides ideologically with the concept of *laissez-faire*,⁴ which "means acting so that reality develops, goes its way, and follows its own course according to the laws, principles, and mechanisms of reality itself" (Foucault 1978 [2008]: 48).

⁴ Foucault's use of *laissez-faire* in *Security Territory Population* is different than its typical association with liberal economics doctrine, where it is usually rendered as *laissez-faire*. The usage here implies more of a way to confirm the effectiveness of techniques of biopower on the grounds of non-interference; that is, the art of government will interfere and shape outcomes but only in respect of the 'natural' probabilities and properties inherent to population as a form of order.

Allowing reality to develop means waiting for patterns to emerge and intervening to shape and guide those patterns to achieve an equilibrium (Collier 2009: 91.) Such governmentality claims to be paradoxically non-interventionist in that it allows things to unfold as they should but only insofar as what 'should unfold' is acceptable to the needs of government indexed to state, social, and increasingly commercial interests. It is not repressive logic as much as it is regulatory and premised on making life productive and reasonably predictable. In effect, this is a self-referential loop: the art of government reliant on population-level biopower has to induce and supply an aesthetic of government—the naturalization of populations as such—and then extract, explicate, and project the population's 'free' unfolding in relation to the 'natural' variances particular to them in order to confirm this distribution and assignment of reality. This art of government is inscribed onto the world and subsequently creates an image of its own efficacy, which then self-referentially confirms the validity and coherence of the approach itself. In other words, this is the process of *veridiction*, the never-total and always incomplete process of letting reality "tell the truth"—and confirming the truth in operation.

STP emphasizes the process of normalizing populations (1978 [2007]: 56-57). Normalization is not homogenization but rather a matter of *ensuring predictability*; it does not preclude heterogeneity and expects probable divergences in relation to the activities of different demographics, the proliferation of which can be productive economically and socially. Things can verge toward the edge of the norm in order to create a spectrum or continuum of acceptable practices, yet they cannot be allowed to become too risky or dangerous so as to be 'ungovernable.' The population must be a generative force itself and it is not simply an inert or passive field (Foucault 1978 [2008]: 56-8). Early in STP, Foucault suggests that "one establishes an average considered as optimal on the one hand, and, on the other, a bandwidth of the acceptable that must not be exceeded" (6). Indeed, in his understanding of allowing reality to unfold, Foucault is clear in his assertion that this governmentality enables the power of species-life to vary, diversify, and improvise; *its productivity and inherent power must be made to live*, and there cannot be too many constraints exercised on or over life lest it fail to generate and reproduce the social and economic coordinates of this reality. The end of STP turns from the pastoral-police assemblage of *les*

politiques to the *économistes* and the influential rise of economic liberalism and its attendant modifications to the field of government (Foucault 1978 [2008]: 353).

Birth of Biopolitics maps the re-entry of economic forces into the diagram of rule, and the lecture represents Foucault's effort to bring his genealogy to the contemporary moment (Foucault 1979 [2008]). He traces the post-WW2 emergence of ordoliberalism and neoliberalism, related political economic systems which confirm the arrival of a durable biopolitical system beyond technologies of biopower. This biopolitics works at different scales, relying on a macro-economic paradigm premised on population-level conceptions of an enterprise society, on micro-economic entrepreneurial subjectivity, and on the deep insemination of a theory of human capital into the social field, where 'the market' limits governmental reason and acts as the arbiter truth from the mid-1960s onward (Foucault 1979 [2008]: 10-11; 33-34). Foucault explains how the post-war German and American liberalisms were developed and launched, and how the architects regard the projects as a collective "critique of the irrationality peculiar to excessive government" (329), in particular to the postwar version of Keynesian capitalism and the so-called "welfare state." In his rejoinder to orthodox Marxism (though not Marx),⁵ which he argues promulgates a positivistic "literal and simple economic reality of capitalism" (164), Foucault states that "economics is a science lateral to the art of governing" (286). In other words, economics cannot be government's principle object, and economic calculations cannot alone supply the proper rationality for government that must be closer to art, able to adjust and augment population in different ways. That said, while biopolitical government will govern "alongside economics," it will seek to govern economic processes through and in 'civil society,' which for Foucault is the liberal reality that emerges when government and rule are legitimized on the grounds of its own "self-limitation...pegged to the specificity of economic processes" (297). Economy is not governed; potentially excessive government is governed within an eye to allowing economic processes to guide reality and let it unfold.

⁵ Commenting in STP on the inability to register the new population centered art of government through Machiavelli and the discourse of the Prince, Foucault suggests Marx is an appropriate figure through which to realize the emergence of these concerns (1978 [2007]: 243).

The 1982 essay, "The Subject and Power," offers a cogent summary of the biopower-biopolitics lectures. In arguing that there is no "primary or fundamental principle of power which dominates society down to the smallest detail" (Foucault 1982: 224), Foucault offers a five-part outline:

1. Creating a complex system of differentiations, which in turn create protocols, procedures, and permissions for actions
2. Producing different types of objectives for different segments or sectors of individuals within a population
3. Activating power relations by way of different measures
4. Institutionalizing and regularizing habits, routines, and practice
5. Rationalizing and elaborating different power relations in different fields simultaneously so that their expressions are incoherent and discontinuous (i.e., "power is not a naked fact")

(223-224; my summary)

While often criticized for theorizing power relations and force without identifying a central source (i.e., the s/State),⁶ Foucault repeatedly argued that there is no single source or orientation of power relations, which come from multiple encounters and exist as an "incessant exchange" (Foucault 1979 [2008]: 77). As I explain below, Foucault does not discount the function of the state or its importance; rather, his account renders "state" as both a proper noun (the State) and a condition (the state) to be maintained. Government rationalized and undertaken through technologies of biopower cannot nor should be reduced to the purview of the s/State; security, normalization, and police require a wider field of action across the system of social networks not necessarily related to sovereign or State power (Foucault 1984: 224). Each separate encounter, as site of permanent confrontation, "dreams of becoming a relationship of power relations" between government and governed, a measure of submitting or refusing the subordination and custody of government (225-6); hence, Foucault's belief that freedom (which is neither autonomy nor self-determination) is intransitive and possible only insofar as it is a relation. Freedom is an index of power, whether power is pressure exerted, pressure defied and blocked, or output produced in living life.

As above, for Foucault, the s/State and sovereign power are neither the same nor reducible to each other. The state is a condition, and the State is an assemblage of "diverse forces which eventually

⁶ Edward Said famously wrote regarding Foucault that if there is a web then there must be a spider.

coagulate and form an effect" (Foucault 1978 [2007]: 248). Biopower conceives of "institutions as technologies... Instead of taking institutions as the point of departure, it focuses on technologies that are materialized and stabilized in institutional settings" (Lemke 2007: 50). Institutions are *effects* willed into being to achieve conditions for rule: they formalize and organize complex processes, at once differentiating, classifying, and unifying them by making them predictable. The institutionalization of 'police science'—with institutions that care for and enable the health of the population, from public works to social services to law enforcement—is emblematic of this wider process. Institutions are by definition the attempt to stabilize and produce reliably consistent outcomes (Lazzarato 2002: part 5, ¶6). Government is not an instrument of the s/State; it is rather the opposite, government is articulated through the state and the State to engineer conditions and effects. Foucault writes:

In referring here to the restricted sense of the word *government*, one could say that power relations have been progressively *governmentalized*, that is to say elaborated, rationalized, and decentralized in the form of, or under the auspices of, State institutions. (Foucault 1984: 224)

The State will serve as a focal instrument for government. Government will dwell in it, but it will shrink in coincidence with the maximization of its abilities to stage measures, standardize ruling initiatives, and institutionalize methods for managing populations (Foucault 1978 [2007]: 109). Thus, one can be governed by something that is not of the State's institutions but still part of the existing state (the condition) as such. The authority of the 'free' market is an example, where the market is conditioned (but not controlled) by the State to establish the state for all. The State is not a "cold monster"⁷ but rather an "episode of governmentality" (Foucault 1978 [2007]: 248); it is a fiction, a condition where, "the state only exists in states, in the plural" (1979 [2008]: 5) and it "has no heart in the sense that it has no interior... The state is nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities" (1979 [2008]: 77). While the s/State is not a random entity—the State Foucault describes is a liberal and then neoliberal state animated by capitalism—the modern s/State effectively becomes infrastructure, a launching platform for government. To borrow from the military jargon,

⁷ In his summary of the *STP* lectures, Foucault refers to "the circular ontology of the state asserting itself and growing like a huge monster or an automatic machine" (Foucault 1978 [2007]: 354). While this seems to contradict his earlier statement from the lecture (quoted above), he is describing the *economisté* view of the state as the launching point for the freedom-curtailling outcomes of invasive pastoral-police power.

biopolitical government is an effects-based operation where the s/State becomes part of the environment. As with Rupert Smith's 2005 comments about modern warfare as the process of establishing conditions in which outcomes can be decided (Smith 2005: 271), Foucault's conclusion about biopolitical government is much the same.

Clausewitzian Inversions & Reversals: Power, Force, and War

Given Foucault's running engagement in SMBD and STP with Clausewitz, it is surprising no military thinkers have found a way to Foucault through this martial touchstone. Foucault makes use of Clausewitz's war-politics continuation thesis and inverts it, both to shape his own analytic perspective and to make visible the imperative inherent in his primary object—an emerging government of life. In this section, I trace this encounter with Clausewitz and the displacement—the collateralization—of war as core imperative in Foucault's development of biopower as a concept and historically-situated technology of order.

Considerations of military forms of order emerge in *Discipline and Punish* (D&P) (1975), which culminates with Foucault's work on disciplinary power, panopticism, and 'austere institutions'. The SMBD lectures, commenced the same year, mark a movement toward a set of concerns regarding war and eventually biopower, security, and governmentality. Yet this break is not a clean one: in terms of continuity with his studies of the clinic, the asylum, the prison, and sexuality, Foucault's lectures trouble and undermine the "universal objects" of government and order, whose targets and technologies are multiple (Donzelot 2008: 115). If understood as universal objects in themselves, war and military institutions seem logical choices to extend the study of order. Specifically, D&P traces how the travel of military techniques particular to the military camp and the barracks—incubating disciplinary types of order through means of hierarchizing judgement, the examination, and full visibility (1975 [1979]: 171; c.f. all of part 2, chapter 2, "The Means of Correct Training")—enabled the rise of panoptical power and new management technologies in prisons. This panoptical architecture was undertaken in the interests of creating docile self-policing bodies and the making-humane of carceral conditions. Discipline is self-

imposed and internalized and what happens in the prison will occur at large, with disciplinary measures drifting into wider social environments whereby all are 'permanently registered' (1975 [1979]: 293-5). The implication is that what happens in military institutions and within military bodies happens within the population and society as well.

The invocation in *SMBD* of Clausewitz's continuation thesis along with its subsequent inversion indicates Foucault's interest in the constituting power of specialized military organs and of war generally within the context of modern liberal ways of rule and ways of life. As well, in *STP*, Foucault speaks repeatedly of a military-diplomatic 'ensemble' that historically operates at the periphery of the State to ensure equilibrium with other states in the European 'balance of power' in the late 17th century but which subsequently turns inward to produce the state-as-condition for the emergence of the pastoral-police assemblage specific to techniques of biopower (1978 [2008]: 297-8; 1979 [2008]: 5; c.f. below in Lesson 6). In other words, the apparatus for war waged beyond the borders of the State, with all of its logistical and material innovations, returns from the periphery to the core, exerting influence on the domestic civilian formations of order. As Cowen argues in her own work on logistics, geopolitics—"a science of national territoriality"—and biopolitics are "deeply entwined" (Cowen 2010: 611). The spatialization of a contained enclosure requires an outside, and the geopolitical imaginary of a space outside is what allows for conceptualizing the integrity of territory and population for a sovereign state and the biopolitical art of government. In considering and rejecting both the 'primal' Hobbesian contract with Leviathan⁸ and the commodity-form (capital) as models for population-based power, Foucault opts for war as an 'analyzer of power relations.' Instead of framing modern ways of rule as seeking to stop the war of all against all,⁹ modern government will 'wage peace' by way of administering

⁸ Foucault devotes a few paragraphs early in *SMBD* to Hobbes and the conception of sovereignty as the "soul" of Leviathan (1976 [2003]: 28-29) in relation to what he calls the "material agency of subjugation" (1976 [2003]: 28). After this passage, Foucault passes over Hobbes rather quickly in *SMBD*. Understandably, Foucault attempts to sidestep Hobbes; he suggests getting bogged down in Hobbes is not where he hopes to devote his energies. The characterization of political subjectivity in Hobbes, according to Foucault, is too static and premised on the economic contractual/transactional exchange of submission and loyalty for protection and security. In *Empire of Disorder* (2001), Alain Joxe criticizes this passing deflection. While he generally agrees with Foucault's genealogy of war, he advances a critique of Foucault's avoidance of Hobbes and instead connects Foucault and Hobbes.

⁹ "During the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that conditions called war; and such a war, as if of every man, against every man" (Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Chp. XIII).

and exploiting the quiet but endemic social and civil wars between different sectors of a population in accordance with the logic of race thinking. If halting the war of all against all imagines an exchange between the sovereign rule of the State and its relatively equivalent subjects across the social field—loyalty and submission for peace and protection—the latter goes beyond this static sovereign relation in order to discern how governing life necessarily requires prioritizing some while abandoning others. As is well known, the focus on war in SMBD gives way to security in STP, but the main point still holds: emerging apparatuses of security, in bringing about order, will exploit the feature of war within the social field, subsequently creating insecurities—for example, through discourses race, epidemiology, and risk—within populations, across communities, and internal to *bodies politic*.¹⁰ While he later suggests in SMBD that using war as a grid of intelligibility for power relations cannot provide a "valid" analysis, his point is that war makes legible "point[s] of maximum tension" and "force relations laid bare" (Foucault 1976 [2003]: 46). The proposition of war as an analyzer of power relations provides a way toward making biopower and the problems of population intelligible, both analytically for Foucault and historically for the form of government he intends to describe.

In effect, Foucault contends that emerging biopolitical governmentalities 'saw' problems of population as they were inclined to 'see' war. With reference to military counterinsurgents looking at enveloping the life environments of local populations and collateralizing the war through the routines of everyday life, Foucault's premise seems prescient if not indispensable. On Clausewitz, Foucault writes:

Power is war, the continuation of war by other means. At this point we can invert Clausewitz's proposition and say that politics is the continuation of war by other means. This would imply three things. First, that power relations as they function in a society like ours are essentially anchored in a certain relationship of force that was established in and through war at a given historical moment that can be historically specified. And while it is true that political power puts an end to war and establishes or attempts to establish the reign of peace in civil society, it certainly does not do so in order to suspend the effects of power to neutralize the disequilibrium revealed by the last battle of the war. According to this hypothesis, the role of political power is perpetually to use a sort of silent war to reinscribe that relationship of force, and to reinscribe it... This is the initial meaning or our inversion of Clausewitz's aphorism... Politics, in other words, *sanctions and reproduces the disequilibrium of forces manifest in war*. Inverting this proposition also means something else, namely that within this "civil peace," these political struggles, these clashes over or within power, the modifications of relations of force... all these

¹⁰ "There is no discourse of security that is not simultaneously a discourse of insecurity; no discourse of security that is not also a discourse of fears, anxieties and dangers. Nowhere is this truer than in the fear and anxiety that animates liberalism" (Neocleous 2008: 28).

things must be interpreted as a continuation of war. Inverting Clausewitz's aphorism also has a third meaning: the final decision can come only from war, or in other words a trial by strength in which weapons are the final judges. It means that the last battle would put an end to politics, or in other words that the last battle would at last—and I mean “at last”—suspend the exercise of power as continuous warfare. (1976 [2003]: 15-16; emphasis added)

While leaving open the messianic violence of the 'last battle,'¹¹ this passage is important in identifying the role of war within liberal societies in creating order and organizing populations by *fomenting order through disequilibrium* as way to produce stability and security. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and elsewhere will do this; however, instead of displacing war into the government of life by way of biopower, it will displace biopower into the conduct of war.

For Foucault, the domestic ramifications of war are clear: “We are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the history of peace and its institutions” (1976 [2003]: 16).

Furthermore:

We could, and must, also ask ourselves if military institutions and the practices that surround them—and in more general the techniques that are used to fight a war—are, whichever way we look at them, directly or indirectly, the nucleus of political institutions... When, how, and why did someone come up with the idea that the civil order is a sort of uninterrupted battle that shapes peace, and that the civil order, its basis, its essence, its essential mechanisms—is basically an order of battle. (1976 [2003]: 47)

The law is born of real battles, victories, massacres, and conquests... This does not mean, however that society, the law, and the State are like armistices, that are an end to wars, or that they are the products of definitive victories. Law is not pacification, for beneath the law, war continues to rage in all the mechanisms of power, even in the most regular [sic]. War is the motor behind institutions and order. In its smallest cogs, *peace is waging a secret war*. To put it another way, we have to interpret the war that is going on beneath the peace; *peace itself is coded war*. We are therefore at war with one another, a battlefield runs through the whole of society, continuously and permanently, and this is the battlefield that puts all on one side or another. There is no such thing as a neutral subject. *We are all inevitably someone's adversary*. (50-51; emphasis added)

War can be about many things, but Foucault's interest lies in understanding how biopolitical government, to discover of population as its object, required the perspective of war. Foucault is describing a modern problem where a translation occurs, from the “noise and confusion of war” to a way

¹¹ This recalls Walter Benjamin's notion of divine violence at the end of "Critique of Violence" (1921). Foucault implies at points towards the end of SMBD that there may in fact be a productive political and emancipatory potential resulting from a people or population as a general race at war against government. While this may sound like a description of class war, Foucault's distance from Marxism would present this turn; however, given his comments at the end of SMBD about racism, biopower, and socialism, Foucault appears to thinking more so about the population in terms of events as substantive political openings.

“to understand order, the State, its institutions, and its histories” as a form of acceptable equilibrium (47). The power relations of civil peace with its liberal conception of politics—ruling through peace, war's alleged Other—are always-already antagonism, what Mark Neocleous efficiently sums up as "war as peace, peace as pacification" (Neocleous 2010). This argument has both discursive and material implications. The politics of peace posited as a condition of equilibrium unmarred by hostility is actually achieved by quiet war waged by other means, which is how government will approach the problem of population. Government can 'see' its enforcement of peaceable or non-wartime activities as a way of war, as a *constant campaign* to order and organize those it must rule and so make live. In material terms, the implications are clear: an analysis of social and political power *as* war does not merely impose or induce war as a grid of intelligibility but reveals war as a universal and intrinsic feature of social life. If sustaining this reading of war as a baseline seems somewhat totalizing, perhaps this is why Foucault moves away from war to focus on security and police-pastoral power, and then on political economy. What is unresolved is whether war is no longer tenable for Foucault's analysis or if the historical record assessed in the biopolitics lectures reveals something otherwise.

While Foucault's reading of Clausewitz is productive in terms of alerting us to the quiet constituting power of war,¹² his reading is arguably *opportunistic in its overdetermination* of Clausewitz's continuation thesis. Foucault understands Clausewitz's continuation thesis in a surprisingly reductive way: war is an expression of the strategic interests of a State and its policy ambitions outside its own borders, where it can achieve the goals specific to the State's place within the imperial-colonial network of emerging global frontiers collaboratively developed but competitively partitioned by European nation-states. While Clausewitz's conception of politics is rendered in normative terms in relation to Western legal traditions—the government or State enjoys a special monopoly on violence—he is clear that this integrity is always subject to compromise. Throughout *On War*, Clausewitz warns that war is never an isolated act or event (Clausewitz 1976: 78) and that it threatens a reciprocal rising "to

¹² In "Marxism & War" (2010), Balibar argues that Marx and Engels' notion of class struggle realizes the "irreconcilable antagonisms"—"war" in a generalized sense—of capitalist society as ongoing civil war. This is significant for Balibar because this realization effectively invents a new historical concept of the political. In noting Foucault's interested but reductive engagement with Clausewitz, Balibar argues appears Foucault was interested in the notion of irreconcilable antagonism but fail to appreciate its centrality for Marx (10).

extremes" (76-77) exceeding the institutional capacity to control its logic. In other words, and as I addressed in chapter two, Clausewitz is well aware of the inability to subordinate the institution of war to other institutional processes even as he formulated the relation as such. According to Etienne Balibar, Clausewitz's relation of war and politics is a unity (and an "extension," according to the original German, *fortsetzung*) rather than a continuation. This unity is dialectical and irresolvable:

Clausewitz's problem is: how is it possible for violence to reach the extreme and to remain institutional, within the limits of an institution? What happens or would happen if this unity of opposites proved unsustainable? (Balibar 2006 [2008]: ¶ 14)

In his description of the war-politics unity, Clausewitz identifies war's political aim (*Zweck*) and the military aim (*Zeit*). The danger of the latter outstripping or over-determining the former was apparent to him. It indicates not only the inefficacy or total collapse of the *Zweck* but the compromised relation between the institutions of government (routed through the State) and the military organ (c.f. Joxe 2008: ¶ 3; 2002: 170). Clausewitz warns violence should not *but can* eclipse policy or politics (Clausewitz 1976: 88). This eclipse can become the norm and erode the ideal hierarchical relation between *Zweck* and *Zeit* to the extent that the *Zeit*—not just 'the war' but the war machine, the generals, the military industrial complex—supplants the aims of the state, fusing itself onto the very constitution of State interests, many of which relate to securing and administering the life of domestic populations.

Notably, this is the commonplace orthodoxy of the militarization thesis prevalent in the critical humanities, which quite rightly identifies and maps the ongoing 'military normal' amplified during the latest war cycle (Lutz 2009; Marzec 2009; Turse 2008; Buchanan 2006), where the ontology of war is unconditional and always on 'low boil' (Massumi 2010; c.f. Massumi 2015). Yet, the militarization of society is not a recent phenomenon even if the imprint of military affairs on civilian life is not explicit. Militarization refers to more than simply military service, and my point is that the kernel of this analysis is already theorized and anticipated in Clausewitz's work. In holding out for some kind of zero-ground or space with its own integrity and cleanly demarcated jurisdiction, these accounts tend to underplay the fact that war and military institutions are constitutive of the history, imagination, and social ecology of biopolitical modern liberal states (Cowen 2008: 16; Neocleous 2010). It is not that war

and military organs are or have become sovereign but that thinking through these issues requires an acknowledgment of the cross-fertilization between war and its Others. Further, when Clausewitz writes, “[W]ar has its own grammar, but not its own logic” (Clausewitz 1976: 607), he seems expressly aware of the ability of the grammar to overrun the logic itself. The punctuation provided by warfare and fighting will affect the composition of a war, which will subsequently affect the political logic that is supposed to guide its undertaking. So, though Clausewitz suggests warfare and fighting are “in no sense autonomous” and should be subordinate to and subsumed by the logic of politics (605), he anticipates the difficulty in dampening the grammar and preventing it from sliding into the logic. He thus indicates a multidirectional exchange between the binary domains of *Politik* and *Krieg*—that is, a biopolitical unity between them.

The inclination to invert Clausewitz and the continuation thesis in the interests of posing the war-as-condition argument thus seems to miss his message, which is to say that Foucault's reading of Clausewitz is already available on Clausewitz's own terms. While the continuation thesis is foregrounded by Foucault, it is one small aspect of Clausewitz's larger philosophy of war, which in fact recognizes war as an institutional force to organize populations. His concept of the trinity (88–89) proposes a formative and co-constituting relationship between government, the people, and military armed forces, which are in constant confluence within a war system.¹³ The people comprising the population offer not simply the requisite passion or enmity or support but the material base—the caloric, physical, and psychic recourses—necessary for government and a state military to undertake a war. For modern States, the population's life becomes a core concern because it will supply labour to the economy and labour to war. The problem of maintaining the standing army for the nation-state translates into the problem of maintaining a productive population within the state. The strategy of war

¹³ In fact, the government-military-people trinity is for Clausewitz a secondary trinity, a kind of shorthand. This trinity is actually a molar rendering superimposed on a primary trinity of the dominant tendencies, the vitalist forces animating war: “...primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as blind natural force; the play of chance and probability, within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and [war's] element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone” (Clausewitz 1976: 89). This second triangle of relations, which coincides with the primary trinity specified by Clausewitz, is typically rendered as passion (extremes), uncertainty (fog/friction), and purpose (the ends/logic).

is always linked to the strategy of government—and the technologies of governmentality—to organize and order the population.

Yet, insofar as Foucault fails to identify an incipient kernel of his own analysis already in Clausewitz, there is another interpretive wrinkle. According to Foucault's argument, Clausewitz's continuation thesis actually inverts the *pre-existing* proposition, affirmed by Machiavelli and Hobbes, that politics is nothing other than war continued by other means (Foucault 1976 [2003]: 48).¹⁴ Machiavelli's prince will manipulate this bellicose hostility; Hobbes' Leviathan will nullify it by means of pacts. According to Foucault, 'politics' in both accounts are always-already shaped by war and by the preparation for and potential undertaking of war. Clausewitz's continuation thesis is simply an innovation attempting to control war according to the limit-attitude of liberal modernity by subordinating it to the promise of perpetual peace or politics. War must become the jurisdiction of the State so that government can control it, monopolize it, and shield (in relative terms) the population from it while also using the population as an engine to fight the wars it opts to fight. In schematic terms, small 'nomadic war machines' independent of the State (but part of the state, as the conditions) are integrated into the wider mix of populations, becoming the material base for labour, productivity, and making war (Guareschi 2010: 78; c.f. Deleuze & Guattari 1986). Government must prevent the explicit outbreak of war internally but be sure the population can be mobilized in the interests of defence and security. As such, Clausewitz recognizes the pretext of war as providing an important social ordering function, though Foucault seems to miss this; his own reading confirms this while wanting to distance it from Clausewitz.

This forced disagreement plays a schematic function, however. Within Foucault's genealogy, the Machiavelli-Hobbes politics-as-war thesis coincides with a historical reading of sovereign power oriented to making life die, to repression, and to an everyday environment of private warfare, which together serve as indicators of an old regime prior to the "threshold of the modern era," before anything

¹⁴ The historical frame here is murky. While the pre-Clausewitz 'politics is war by other means' thesis tends to mark the period of sovereign power and making die, Foucault's suggestion that it was in circulation in the 17th and 18th century seems contradictory given this is the period where police and pastoral power emerge. I am not suggesting there ought to be any clean breaks; rather, we can acknowledge here the coexistence of different governmental rationalities and the problems encountered by Foucault in determining their respective 'births'.

resembling biopower or biopolitical governmentality (1976 [2003]: 48). Clausewitz's thesis (the first inversion) is coincident with the emerging state monopoly on war and the consolidation of political violence by the state—"the entire social body was cleansed of bellicose relations" (*ibid.*; c.f. Tiqqun 2009 [2010])—whereby the state and its "great units" consolidated the practices and institutions of war. The same consolidation contributes to the relative pacification of internal conflicts and removes war to the periphery of the State ("outer limits"; geopolitical encounters; capitalist expansion and colonization), becoming a "technical and professional prerogative of a carefully controlled military apparatus" (Foucault 1976 [2003]: 48-49). In Foucault's account—the inversion of Clausewitz's inversion—this apparatus returns from the edges and is inserted into domestic environments where the distinctions between civil/military and war/peace begin to break down. Just as De Landa's work on logistics indicates how civilian supply, procurement, and accounting practices were reconceived and enhanced in domestic environments through an encounter with the externally-oriented military apparatus, Foucault asserts a 'boomerang effect' occurs with respect to the domestic art of government and the administration of populations (Foucault 1976 [2003]: 103, see discussion below).

One final point is worth mentioning. Late in the 22 March 1978 lecture in STP, Foucault returns to Clausewitz's continuation thesis, not to invert but to almost *reverse his own reading* of it. Clausewitz's suggestion that war continues policy or politics by other means is recognized as correct inasmuch as the practice of war unifies domestic and foreign policy on a continuum, extending matters of war into domestic policy and decision-making (Foucault 1978 [2007]: 306). The phenomenon of war must become less war-like so it can reside in domestic environments, which are peaceable and cleansed of bellicose relations (see above). It must become implicit and indirect so that it is "a struggle in purely civilian terms." From the end of SMBD:

This will therefore be an essentially civilian struggle to the extent that domination is neither its goal nor its expression, and to the extent that the State is both its object and its space. It will take place essentially in and around the economy, institutions, production, and the administration. We will have a civil struggle, and the military struggle or bloody struggle will become no more than an exceptional moment, a crisis or episode within it. Far from being the real content of every struggle, the civil war will in fact been no more than an episode, a critical phase in a struggle that has to be seen not in terms of war or domination, *but in non-military or civilian terms.* (1976 [2003]: 225)

In effect, violence will have to become something different, something more ambient and displaced but no less kinetic and mobile. The episodic punctuation produced by explicit external wars and high-intensity civil wars will not culminate with some decisive perpetual peace. Instead, government will allow the quiet perpetual civil wars¹⁵ already underway to unfold, their 'reality' administered according to the logic of risk and indexed to the notion of race in order to ensure the stability and security of populations. War becomes imperceptible and indistinct from social life itself; it becomes a correlate of population screened by the government of peace. It is both a distant foreign undertaking occurring at the limit of civilian jurisdictions and a social process internal to the lives of domestic populations.

**Paradoxes & Criticisms:
War Everywhere, Colonial-Imperial Violence, and Postcolonial French Militarism**

Foucault's discussion across the lectures troubles the integrity of war and politics and asserts how ways of war, rule, and life coalesce around and through biopolitics and biopower. Given my argument about the non-encounter between Foucault and counterinsurgency, three problems are worth exploring regarding Foucault's explication of war. They are important to address given their relevance to counterinsurgency, and they are all the more important given the lessons of Foucault that have seemingly been learned by counterinsurgents in advance.

The first shortcoming concerns the implications of rendering war as the norm and the de facto condition. Can we sustain the argument not of comprehensive militarization but of war as the general condition *tout court*? In her book on Benjamin, Hannah Arendt, and Foucault, Beatrice Hanssen incisively argues—notably, before widespread academic engagement with Foucault's lectures after their dissemination in print—that Foucault's work on war is subject to slippage (Hanssen 2000: 136). In mapping a continuum of order that exists between war and peace and tracing the process by which the

¹⁵ For a wonderfully clear elaboration of this critical point taken to its logical and—I believe—accurate end, see Tiqqun, (2009 [2010]) *Introduction to Civil War*, 32-36. What resonates most is the critique of the monopoly of violence assumed by the state, or by the art of government premised on contemporary forms of biopower, which the authors rail against. The logic: if this is civil war, it is asymmetric because the State enjoys the fiction of its own legitimacy; the monopolization, capture, and specialization of violence is one of the crucial innovations in the context of biopower and biopolitical governance. This meshes with the arguments of Pierre Clastres's *The Archeology of Violence* and with Deleuze and Guattari's idea of the war machine

concept of war is put to use by government to discover biopower in terms of race, biology, health, and security (c.f., course summary, Foucault 1976 [2003]: 266-7), Foucault runs the risk of eliding any distinction regarding war's ontology. Drifting from his assessment of war as a discursive filter that makes legible the problems and procedures for governing and preserving life, Foucault's analysis slides toward an argument about bellicose social relations constituting an indefinite condition of war, to the point where war and politics become indistinguishable. In doing so, he leaves this problem by the wayside, moving to questions of security, pastoral power, and police later in the lectures; however, the issue is never resolved.

For Alesandro Dal Lago, part of Foucault's aim rests in freeing people "from the common sense opinion whereby war is supposed to be an anomaly" (Dal Lago 2010: 24). Further, Foucault's inversion of Clausewitz has global implications, where global politics has a continuous dimension of global war regardless of its rhetorical and discursive framing by liberal states (24). Yet, is 'all war all the time' too crude an assumption? According to Massimiliano Guareschi, Foucault's analysis is important but borders on the unsustainable:

While connecting every kind of power relationship with war was surely suggestive as a theoretical gesture, this was evidently exposed to the risk of simplification, which was unable to fully comprehend the multiple ways in which power relations are manifested; subsequently compressing violent coercion and government, intersubjectivity and institutional relations, politics and war onto a single register. (Guareschi 2010: 74)

For Mieszkowski, Foucault's project blurs the boundaries between rhetorical and non-rhetorical forms of war and battle in ways that are immensely productive *and* deeply problematic (Mieszkowski 2009: 22). Mieszkowski asks whether war in Foucault's cosmology is (and can possibly sustain, in semiotic terms) *something less* than inflicting grievous damage and death on people (22); that is, can the violence of both battle and non-battle, both abroad and domestically, be equivalent *as* war? Force, power, and civil war are used interchangeably at times, and question of violence—its ontology—is never really addressed. While the lectures and *SMBD* in particular are clearly concerned with these questions, the implications are never really spelled out by Foucault. Derek Gregory's more recent work argues that we seem to be in the midst not of permanent or perpetual war but an emerging 'everywhere war' (Gregory

2011), which sidesteps and reframes this issue. In a documentary on CBC Radio One about drone warfare and targeted assassinations, Gregory expounds on the idea of everywhere war, but he retains the concept of war as something Other, or at least something that is not *the* condition. His spatial rather than temporal categorization of war indicates a desire to leave space for something outside war even as the war system of North Atlantic states is increasingly footloose.¹⁶

The second criticism relates to Foucault's failure to address what Spivak (among others) famously referred to as the "epistemological rupture" of settler colonialism and imperialism, a shortcoming taken up at length by postcolonial theory, subaltern studies, critical race theory, and indigenous studies. Foucault's theory of biopower is quiet—almost silent—on the administrative, civilizational, military, and social violence of imperialism and colonization, processes that Foucault argues return to the domestic core. The periodization of Foucault's genealogical arc specific to the emergence of biopower in France and England, from the late 17th to the early-to-mid 19th century, coincides with aggressive globalizing capital flows under the aegis of territorial ambition, resource extraction, and material wealth coincident with protracted colonial wars, ongoing occupations, and exploitative and asymmetrical repressive violence. Given Foucault's claims in *SMBD* and *STP* about the migration of war from the geopolitical periphery into the internal domestic spaces of populations, colonial-imperial environments ought to demand some attention. Writing about Foucault and postcolonialism, Stephen Legg suggests that given the territorial, epistemic, and historiographical violence and domination of colonization, Foucauldian power-knowledge and biopower should offer much in challenging formal and informal colonial categories (race and racialized taxonomies of population), their discursive mutation, and their global circulation (Legg 2007: 265). However, the colonial and postcolonial remain an absent presence for Foucault and haunts the work on biopower. According to Couze Venn, with whom I agree, Foucault's analysis of liberal modernity and neoliberalism through the genealogy of biopower is immensely relevant but retains a significant blind spot in failing to detail the reliance of global capitalism on colonial expansion and the constituting role

¹⁶ See "How We Kill In War," (1. October 2013) <<http://www.cbc.ca/ideas/episodes/2013/10/01/how-we-kill-in-war/>>. For an earlier position on the inadequacy of war as a concept to describe often informal contemporary state military violence, see Saskia Sassen, "Anti-War" (2007) <<http://dictionaryofwar.org/concepts/Anti-War>>.

of colonialism to structure radically unequal levels of accumulation still playing out today in the globalization of liberal rule (Venn 2009: 208-9; c.f. Jabri 2007).

Though Foucault spends time discussing the insertion of military-colonial organs into European domestic enclosures, he glances over techniques of government developed during extended colonial occupations. Foucault points toward an exchange—what he terms a "boomerang effect"—between these geographies in relation to the advancement and refinement of population-centered ways of rule.¹⁷ The territorialization of the environments of biopower across the core and periphery are non-contiguous but deeply linked, with domestic spaces also experimental sites for innovations in practice after techniques return from the laboratory abroad. After discussing different iterations of the prerogative for sovereign rule that appear in late 16th century political tracts that compare the Norman invasion of Britain with the British colonization of the Americas, Foucault states:

At the end of the sixteenth century we have, then, if not the first, at least an early example of the sort of boomerang effect colonial practice can have on juridical-political structures of the West. It should never be forgotten that while colonization, with its techniques and its political and juridical weapons, obviously transported European models to other continents, it also had a considerable boomerang effect on the mechanisms of power in the West, and the apparatuses, institutions, and techniques of power. A whole series of colonial models was brought back to the West, and the result was that West could practice something resembling colonization, or an *internal colonialism* on itself. (Foucault 1976 [2003]: 103)

Foucault argues that racism first develops in colonial contexts, becoming a sorting device that is realized through the violence of colonial genocide (237). He also devotes a small portion of STP to linking the economic and commercial operations of colonial ventures (resource extraction, slavery, arms trade, etc.) with the capitalist power of Europe after 1648 (Foucault 1978 [2007]: 299-306, from Venn 2009: 209). Though these passages acknowledge a connection between race, capital, colonialism, and biopolitical modernity, they stand as minimal gestures.

While imperialism and the colonies were not his targets as such, to undermine their role as a constituting feature of European modernity and biopolitical governmentality is a significant shortcoming. In her interrogation of Foucault's work on sexuality and biopower, Ann Laura Stoler

¹⁷ Continuing from his book, *Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism* (2010), Stephen Graham has productively examined and extended Foucault's conception of boomerang effects in the context of contemporary military affairs, apparatuses of security, and spatial technologies. I address Graham more directly in chapter five.

argues that the discourse of race, as imperial-colonial power-knowledge with a new schema of racialized taxonomies and racializing practices of separation and segregation, most certainly had a return effect on European domestic environments in relation to intersecting technologies of gender, class, and sexuality (Stoler 1995). While writing from a Eurocentric context, Foucault's was not entirely 'blind' to the imperial and colonial contexts of race and the implications for biopower (Stoler 2002: 412, in Legg 2007). Further, the nuanced discussion at the end of *SMBD* regarding 'ordinary racism' and 'race war' (see above) indicate a willingness to engage with the question. For Stoler, the colonies were "laboratories of modernity," geographically distant but closely linked to domestic environments to the extent of problematizing "what constitutes metropolitan versus colonial inventions" (Stoler 1995: 15). Colonial developments around the technology and discourse of race allow them to merge with and shape domestic population-scale practices; they 'tell the truth' about what is possible. Stoler points toward understanding and mapping these mobile practices as existing on a continuum. Orientalist and racist conceptions of colonial populations and environments, based on imagination and actualized in practice, played a large role in emerging European modern consciousness with respect to the discourse of race in expert biological and governmental contexts. At points, Stoler affirms Foucault's assessment of how colonial-racialized codings merged with medicalized conceptions of authenticity to produce a complex biopolitical epistemology of authenticity and difference related to "permanent social war" within populations (69). Yet, she is critical throughout of the relative poverty of Foucault's consideration of colonial and imperial—and thus, biopolitical— environments beyond the North Atlantic basin.

Many scholars have attempted to engage with and extend Foucault beyond European geographies to the environments of the postcolony in the Global South.¹⁸ In a Canadian context, Daniel Clayton (2000), Bruce Braun (2000), and Cole Harris (2004) have all worked to map Foucauldian concepts onto the continuum of colonial violence and population-centric biopower in Canada in relation to the conduct of settler populations and the development of racialized biopolitical technologies to

¹⁸ Consider Achille Mbembe, Jean & John Comaroff, Gayatri Spivak, Dipesh Chakrabaty, Partha Chatterjee, and Rey Chow.

destroy or pacify and enforce the assimilation of indigenous peoples.¹⁹ In an erudite and timely offering, Scott Lauria Morgenson's recent work on the biopolitics of settler colonialism argues that biopolitics and biopower have deep colonial roots in that they produce *by default* settler societies that simultaneously seek to eliminate and assimilate—to destroy and produce life (Morgenson 2011: 53). Building on the work of Patrick Wolfe,²⁰ Morgenson's essay explicitly engages with Agamben and Foucault and offers a thorough analysis of the violence of waging peace and 'civilization' through settler biopolitics and its fall-out for indigenous peoples in North America, whether by way of open war in the forests and on the plains, in asymmetric treaty agreements, or the slow eradication of the 'Indian problem' through repressive/disciplinary technologies like residential schools. This settler colonial context resonates in the assessment of contemporary war offered by Alesandro Dal Lago and Salvatore Palidda, who use the expression the "civilization of war" to characterize the ambiguous conditions assumed by political violence in a context where the Western-North Atlantic-Global North bloc continues to promote its "material, political, and economic culture" on the rest of the world, often backed with arms to code war as democracy promotion, exporting democracy, and humanitarian nation-building (Dal Lago & Palidda 2010: 5). A more civilized form of war, premised on recognizing life and making it live, becomes simultaneously the means and the end.

Much of the work around Foucault and colonialism considers the applicability and political consequences of relying on, deducing from, and translating 'universal' Eurocentric models for non-European contexts (Chakrabaty 2000 [2007]; c.f. Chow 2006 on the perils of post-structuralism and comparative work).²¹ For instance, Foucault's 'non-account' account of the often-brutal colonial

¹⁹ 18th and 19th century Canada is certainly not the West but the Far West. Today, within the context of indigenous resurgence and sovereignty and indigenous nationhood movement, one could say that Canada has always-already had the Global South existing in the Global North.

²⁰ See Wolfe (1998), *Settler Colonialism* (London: Bloomsbury Academic).

²¹ Vivek Chibber's recent book, *Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital* (2013), has become a focal point for debates about the universalization and travel of Eurocentric concepts, whether such cross-cultural or interdisciplinary flows are benign or pernicious, and the implications for strategic essentialisms articulated within postcolonial theory and subaltern studies. In a related way, Rey Chow's book *The Age of the World Target* (2006), maps the migration of poststructural approaches in area studies and comparative literature with attention to the implications for postcolonial theory. While Chibber argues that postcolonial studies ignores and refuses more radical offerings in the European post-Enlightenment trajectory at its own peril, Chow qualifies the political and interpretive power of continental theory by warning against the cultural capital that comes with using

environments maintained by European states tends to reduce the diverse multi-scalar complexities of colonial experiences and realities—and alternate modernities—as a uniform and 'monochrome' generalization about extra-European colonial violence, relations which are idealized and "merely deduced" by Foucault (Hanssen 2000: 142). According to Peter Jackson, Foucault's work on population and governmentality theorizes the complexity of difference *within* a society rather than the multiplicity of differences *across* societies (Jackson, in Legg 2007: 266). While acknowledging his role in developing an important analytical architecture to consider intersectional technologies of power and force, Spivak claims Foucault's own work actually *produces* a "miniature version of colonialism" at the level of its epistemological and intellectual tools (Spivak 1988 [2000]: 1449, in Legg 2007: 267). Similarly, Mitchell Dean considers Foucault's work as radical and important; however, he argues that Foucault's spatialization of modernity specific to 18th and 19th century domestic European environments is subsequently imposed on (and as such circumscribes) discussions and interrogations of colonial space (Dean 1994: 16, in Legg 2007: 268).

Writing on the role of Foucault's work in critical postcolonial geography, Legg considers Edward Said's well-known embrace and then later rejection of Foucault's work on the grounds of his alleged "political quietism" (Legg 2007: 269-270) and his falling prey to what Said calls imaginative geographies, which cleave and divide along reductive Occidental/Oriental lines. Yet, Legg also demonstrates how Foucault has been put to use to consider colonial and postcolonial spaces of biopower (278-80) and subaltern negotiations of governmentalized spaces from the perspective of racialized and subjugated knowledges (280-2; c.f. Chakrabaty's *Habitations of Modernity* [2002]).²² For our own

poststructural theory and ways in which such theory may enforce disempowering equivalences in terms of drawing comparisons between different territorial and semiotic-discursive conditions. Chow's book starts with a dedicated explication of Foucaultian genealogy and her description of the academic field as a space of antagonism between major and minor—or dominant and subjugated—knowledges is an indication of her careful blending of Foucauldian and postcolonial approaches.

²² In citing the reservations of figures like Spivak and Said in the early 1980s, Legg also indicates how Partha Chatterjee worked early on within the context of the Subaltern Studies Group (SSG) to avow and align Foucault's work with postcolonial theory and his own considerations on power, peasant classes, and colonial Bengal (Legg 2007: 276). Notably, the uptake of Foucault in the 1980s and early 1990s was based largely on his own monographs and the edited collections available, like Paul Rainbow's *The Foucault Reader* (1984) and Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller's *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (1991). Prior to the edited publication of the lectures, Mitchel Dean's book *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society* (1999) is also

purposes, it is worth noting Legg's reference to Gregory's 2004 examination of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine as 'colonial presents.' Gregory makes use of Foucauldian historiography and Foucauldian-inflected cultural geography (Legg 2007: 274), starting with *The Order of Things* as a point of departure for reading contemporary state war as a technology for the fabrication of a new imperial order early in the arc of the post-9/11 expeditionary war cycle (Gregory 2004: 1-5). Overall, Legg's essay registers dissatisfaction with Foucault's discursive and rhetorical level of analysis, which failed to connect to real struggles against epistemic and material formations of power, violence, and force. However, as his conclusion suggests, these readings are waiting to be productively undertaken.

For all of its importance as an analytic architecture, Foucault's work is possibly *another* of Guha's examples of the prose of counterinsurgency: even in its close explication of governmental rationalities premised on making the life of populations live, it leaves little for the motivations and responses of those targeted by techniques of biopower in the colonies and in terms of "internal colonialism." Foucault's framework limits the exploration of multiple modernities and curtails any investigation of colonial counter-conducts or colonial insurrections themselves. Important as Foucault's work remains, it has limits despite its own best leanings towards genealogy and the limit-attitude seeking to displace and trouble conceptions of modern technologies of order. Appreciating how colonial techniques of biopower graft on to domestic governmentalities is important for understanding how contemporary ways of liberal rule and liberal ways of war boomerang into each other, of which counterinsurgency is emblematic. Expeditionary war waged as counterinsurgency continues biopolitics and liberal governmentalities by other means, extended to the edges of liberal rule. Therefore, the return of counterinsurgency from the contemporary colonies inserts itself as part of a renewed internal colonialism, where today's biopolitics becomes counterinsurgency by other mean. This is what I mean when suggesting the need to consider the spirit of counterinsurgency.

The third criticism and paradox is the missed encounter between Foucault and the military architects of modern warfare, which I have referred to a number of times. Each body of knowledge has

remarkably prescient as is the writing of Lemke, who stands as an important Foucaultian interlocutor in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

remained in its respective 'silo', hived off from the other. While contemporary counterinsurgency has yet to grasp Foucault even as biopower stands as the prominent and idealized feature of population-centered warfare, the late colonial French proponents of modern war developed their own military theories of population. Given the decolonization wars in Algeria and Indochina, French military thinking had developed a relevant theory of population-centered power in its 1950s counterrevolutionary war doctrine and in 1960s-era accounts of modern war. Yet, the colonial and military register of this work eluded Foucault. Why Foucault was not attuned more so to these events in and through his work is remarkable though perhaps not surprising given his overall lack of engagement with the colonial-imperial technologies of population-centered biopower. Though Foucault's work on biopower and population emerges in the 1970s and after the turn to modern warfare by French military organs, there seems no indication (at least, based on his published work) of any broader awareness. Certainly, the historical orientation of his work played a part in shaping his scope of concern; archival documents and older tracts on government represent the primary fond of materials for his genealogical studies. Yet, given the connection between the wave of insurrections and rebellions in what could become former French territories and their connection to the domestic uprisings in France in the late 1960s, this absence is striking.

As outlined in chapter two, French military doctrine on counterinsurgency warfare was undergoing a fundamental transformation in the early 1960s. The created philosophical and conceptual continuities run from Algeria to Afghanistan to new expeditionary deployments to Mali and the Central African Republic. The output of French military thought in the early 1960s was substantial. Trinquier, Lacheroy, and Galula, all influential thinkers on matters of modern war and counterinsurgency (see last chapter), generated work that coalesced as a wave in the revolution in military affairs caused by the response to armed decolonization. They championed collateralizing warfare and waging irregular war with more comprehensive measures that mixed lethal and non-lethal methods, arrayed across the interlocking domains described by Trinquier. French military intellectuals were discovering their own population-based 'new war' thesis and had already reached an event horizon where planning for

conventional land warfare was inadequate and obsolete. French military thought instigated the rise of an alternate regime of truth, a better formation (at least, for its needs) of power-knowledge to deal with a different set of military concerns.²³ Having dedicated much of his intellectual energy to considering military matters, the military affairs of Foucault's day failed to register.

Foucault's account of war describes how it becomes less warlike—civilized, civilianized—so as to allow for its insertion into domestic environments in aid of the government of life, an analysis oriented to the past but indexed to his historical moment. The modern warriors of the late colonial period, responding in kind to the operational world around them, alter war to colonize 'vast field of action,' collateralizing flows and making its conduct less about killing and more about managing the life and perceptions of the population. Their descendants draw on biopower to make their own fighting power less warlike in order to insert it into the environments of foreign populations. Perhaps it is only a matter of time before the next wave of counterinsurgency doctrine discovers Foucault's parallel paradigm of population. In realizing they have to paradoxically restrain their lethal actions in order to unrestrict warfare and envelope environments of life, North Atlantic counterinsurgents know they must artfully create conditions to make life live while thinking with the limit-attitude. If they decide to embark on, say, an advanced seminar to learn lessons from the critical biopolitician, counterinsurgents would read Foucault as an enemy. Yet, to speculate on the prospects of a military Foucault reading group, even if it did not hone their abilities as operational artists, perhaps it would offer a momentary shift in their own conceptual and philosophical perspectives. Further, they would likely conclude that expeditionary wars and military occupations have always had their biopolitical contexts, even if they have not been named as such. It is unlikely Foucault will become the new master signifier for population-centered military affairs; however, his work may make counterinsurgency legible to the

²³ Some counterinsurgents became insurgents. With the French government willing to grant Algeria independence (enabled by the 1962 Évian Accords referendum), a number high-level French commanders—Lacheroy among them—organized the militant *Organisation de l'armée secrète* (OAS) in 1961 to oppose the ceding of Algeria. Based in Algeria, the OAS conducted clandestine and unconventional 'counter-terrorist' operations outside the remit of the French military. The group staged a number of bombings and assassinations in Algiers and Oran in 1962, targeting French military units and French and Algerian-French civilians and attempting a *coup d'état* and assassination of De Gaulle in August 1962. The group was eliminated in 1963, though some of its leaders went on to lead anti-Marxist and anti-Communist groups in counterinsurgency wars, namely in South America.

point where Foucault's work *tells the truth* for about the violence generated and deployed in counterinsurgency warfare. That is, Foucault will become an instrument of veridiction for counterinsurgents. The biopolitical correlates of nosopolitics, police power, and pastoral power act as epidemiological sorting devices for military actors whether they know it or not. Further, these biopolitical traces align with existing military theories of population, and they will continue to shape the design, development, and deployment of military violence as doctrinal and operational innovations search out methods to achieve more adaptive and dispersed approaches.²⁴

Messianic Passion, or The Resurrection of Counterinsurgency

In effect, contemporary counterinsurgents have inserted Foucault into warfare whether they know it or not. Yet, this influence is less important in that, as I have argued, the paradigm of modern war was well on its way to develop a population-centered approach to waging war in collateralized terms. What is important, though, is the way in which counterinsurgency has evolved from 2006 onward. As I indicated in chapter two, it did not emerge fully formed in 2006 but was articulated as aggregation or blend of new and old epistemes and methods. As such, I now turn to some of the discussions in academic, policy, and military institutional circles about the discursive life of counterinsurgency from 2006 onward, which reveals sentiments ranging from the credible to the tenable to the bombastic. The internal military debate over counterinsurgency's successes and failures distributed (and still distributes) winners and losers within the military-political establishment: attentive primary definers (experts, academics, and journalists) are attuned to the flow of the conversation; some readings are overdetermined or overdrawn, resuscitating or recuperating arguments on the stage of career-making public and professional opinion. Yet, in genealogical terms, the debate is predicated on the idea of veridiction—the process of validating the Truth as such. Furthermore, understanding the concept of counterinsurgency mean recognizing the 'realist' constraints of the

²⁴ If I am ultimately evasive about the actual possibilities of this advanced military seminar—about the real prospects of counterinsurgents reading Foucault to enhance their capacities—it is because I harbour some fear that it may actually, two or three years out, come to be. Given the propensity of military affairs to integrate non-military thinking, this work could be weaponized to amplify the intellectual combat power of counterinsurgency.

discussion: that is, though military intellectuals and leaders seem receptive to ever more complex and idiosyncratic analyses to create 'better solutions' in the achievement of satisfactory outcomes, the debate over military counterinsurgency remains an exercise in military positivism indexed to the instrumental imagination of military action by military agents.

Flexible War for Flexible Life

Some certainly foresee global population-centred counterinsurgency as the norm in future operations (Burlingame 2013a) coincident with increased attention to 'cellular' non-state actors, force disparities, asymmetries, and the regularization of irregular warfare (c.f. Kaldor 2006 on "new wars"). The discovery of so-called "human domain warfare" (Sauer et al 2015) follows from the latest refurbishment of the American military doctrine manual, *FM 3-24 Insurgencies & Countering Insurgency* (2014), itself a response to the counterinsurgency cycle. NATO's recent joint doctrine publication, *AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine*, is clear regarding the confluence of population-centered operations, irregular and unconventional war, and force disparity in relation to the future of North Atlantic military thinking:

Discrete operational themes actually overlap and merge. Conflict can now be seen as a blurring of the distinctions between adversaries and the way they use force to achieve political goals. Future conflict will blend the lethality traditionally associated with state-on-state conflict and the protracted nature of irregular warfare. (NATO AJP-01 2013: 0219, 2-9)

Conducting operations where "the people in the streets and houses and fields – all the people anywhere – are the battlefield," the so-called war amongst the people, has significant implications for NATO forces. Positive identification and engagement of opponents, particularly in urban areas, will become more difficult and heighten the risk of collateral damage. Furthermore, in complex political and social contexts where the will of the indigenous population becomes the metaphorical vital ground (i.e. it must be retained or controlled for success), there is a requirement to influence and shape perceptions through the judicious fusion of both physical and psychological means. (NATO AJP-01 2013: 0221, 2-10)

The NATO documents conjugate ISAF's experience in Afghanistan but also allude to a body of work predating and buttressing the return of counterinsurgency in 2006-7. Writing in 2005 and reflecting on both the cycle of 'small' or 'low-intensity' state-waged expeditionary wars and his own deployments during the 1990s, former British Army General Rupert Smith argued that the "defining future operational trend" for Western state militaries was to develop a flexible, malleable, and fluid

interventionist paradigm of "war amongst the people" (Smith 2005: 269). The space of life itself would provide the very infrastructure for what would become the new architecture of war. This does not nullify or negate the traditional anchoring function of other vertebrate state militaries to serve as adversaries in 'regular warfare'; however, such architecture places more emphasis on protracted irregular engagements with cellular non/sub-state actors that require indirect methods indexed all the while to influencing "relevant populations."²⁵ In such wars, "hard objectives that decide a political outcome" would have less prominence than measures dedicated to "establishing conditions in which the outcomes may be decided" (271)—politically, socially, and psychologically. Taking Smith's argument to its logical end, military violence deployed within the *milieu* of populations is a speculative investment whose outcome is contingent on the changing conception of what is possible in a given engagement or environment depending on the ongoing management of the population's disposition and response.

Amid this normalization of irregular and unconventional capabilities, the 'regular' contexts of imperialism, militarism, and capitalism remain important macro-referents for this shift in military thinking. Without question, interrogating counterinsurgency requires a consideration of the diffuse "empire of capital" (Skinner 2012), an acknowledgement of neoliberal state-building imperatives in places like Afghanistan (Klassen 2012; Hanieh 2012), and an understanding of war in Afghanistan as a process *not* of American-centric conquer or force projection necessarily but of 'harmonizing' capture by the neoliberal logics of global civil society articulated *through and as* expeditionary wars (Jalalzai & Jefferes 2011)—globalization by empire via "expeditionary democracy promotion" by force (Elmer & Fenton 2012). Indeed, in the era of debt, austerity, drones, pre-emption, data harvesting, and the permanent emergent threat of terror, counterinsurgency should be understood in a way that acknowledges these tendencies and pressures. They co-constitute today's environment of war. Explicit juridico-legal developments in the post-9/11 era such as the legalization of indefinite detention and

²⁵ According to U.S. DOD JP 1-02 *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, irregular warfare (IW) is, "A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode and adversary's power, influence, and will" (2010: 148). The U.S. Army Irregular Warfare Centre (USAIWC) is currently revising its "IW narrative" coincident with wider American and NATO policy-doctrine reviews. See USAIWC "Irregular Warfare: A Clear Picture of a Fuzzy Objective" (22 October 2013) < http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/irregular-warfare-a-clear-picture-of-a-fuzzy-objective#_edn6>.

extraordinary rendition also inform counterinsurgency, amplifying and continually normalizing the state of exception through innovative regimes of security that remake territorial boundaries and political-social categories (i.e., citizenship, immigration reform) so they function in increasingly arbitrary and mobile ways (c.f. Sassen 2012 & 2006).²⁶

This is not to say these boundaries and categories no longer matter; rather, they matter because they are arbitrary and interdictory, becoming impassable as quickly as they become porous, producing new risks, vulnerabilities, and points of exposure. Hard edges are smoothed to allow integration or assimilation while the once-interior spaces of the centre and inhabitants who belong become potentially dangerous by default. So, it is not simply that we are all refugees or always-already bare lives prior to our inclusion in the safety of the enclosure (Agamben 1993 & 1998). Rather, following Sassen in her conception of political life and new assemblages of sovereignty in the era of "transversal bordered space" (2012), the location of the enclosure itself is increasingly contingent and informal whether in relation to built urban environments or to the 'normal' legal expectation of liberal rights and entitlements. Her point: these conventional political categories are breaking down in increasingly securitized and neoliberal conceptions of cosmopolitan global civil society. As foundational promises, they have been 'extraordinarily rendered' with an expansion of exceptional measures like pre-emptive and indefinite detention, security certificates, and wildly expanding passive and active surveillance powers, where *questioning this creep has been effectively securitized* and removed from field of contestation and deliberation (c.f. Evans 2013). We *start* as suspects, enemies, and insurgents, and subsequently are obligated to prove otherwise. In the context of warfare, this renders the traditional notion of civilian immunity moot if everything in the environment is an endemic threat. Civilian non-combatants become essential feature of the population anchoring the wider war campaign.

²⁶ In chapter two, I dedicate more attention to the bracketing function of the attacks of September 11, 2001 in relation to military affairs and the ontology of war. I consider the events both creating a generative rupture for security, defence, and military policy and continuing it in an amplified way ongoing transformations.

Messianic Counterinsurgency

As much as counterinsurgency has been harmonized and reissued in specific military contexts, it is by no means uniform, always drawing on more formalized parts of small war theory, doctrine on 'operations other than war', stability operations, foreign internal defence, security force assistance, and low-intensity, limited, and unconventional warfare doctrine. As different variations of counterinsurgency theory and practice reflect different contexts and constraints—and different imaginaries of "insurgent" or insurgency—the two predominant types are enemy-centred or population-centred counterinsurgency (Manea & Durand 2012; Springer 2011; c.f. Galula 1964).²⁷ As the environment for operations, we know that 'the population' is an object and a fantasy, a knowledge-effect that is not simply natural or given. It must be continually imagined and invented by those who require a population to justify its administering and protecting. Following its paradigmatic re-packaging in 2006 with the American publication of *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency* first within US military circles and later by the University of Chicago Press, population-centered counterinsurgency doctrine became a core repertoire and a consistent narrative frame to understand and prosecute the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, both of which had outstripped early American-centered strategic assessments. Even on their own terms, military planners had failed to recognize 'objective' nature of the wars and their own forces' 'subjective' role in exacerbating the escalation of violence. The 2006 field manual was intended for use by both the US Army and US Marine Corps (USMC).²⁸ As a result of the initial conduct of counterinsurgency, the manual was followed by *FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency* (2009), which aimed to refine counterinsurgency and respond to critics who suggested that the paradigm curtailed the use of lethal and kinetic force at the expense of American and ISAF soldiers. Notably, *FM 3-24.2* superseded *FM 90-8 Counterinsurgency Operations* (1986) and *FM 7-98 Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict*

²⁷ As framed and discussed within the institutional military literature, these distinctions are subject to infinite qualification and refinement. In short conversation piece for *Small Wars Journal*, Octavian Manea and Etienne du Durand (2012) clarify the enemy- and population-centred theories of counterinsurgency as articulated in the tradition of French counter-rebellion and counter-revolutionary theory. David Galula, whose work has been heavily integrated in the current iteration of counterinsurgency, stands as a proponent of the "classic" population-centered (i.e., less lethal) approach with Charles Lacheroy and Roger Trinquier acknowledged as advocating an enemy-centered (i.e., more lethal) approach.

²⁸ USMC refers to *FM 3-24* as *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5*.

(1992), indicating the semantic and practical confluence of what were once deemed different doctrinal areas of concern. The new counterinsurgency supplement acted as a unifying device for diverse military conversations. In October 2009, both manuals were re-consolidated as *JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations*, the authoritative joint publication issued by the U.S. Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to guide the application of US military force. Again, we see an aggregation: the preface to *JP 3-24* actively links and connects counterinsurgency with irregular warfare, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense (*JP 3-24 2009*: i). So, separate from its use for war in Iraq and Afghanistan, counterinsurgency served as a node through which to connect and assemble different doctrinal and warfighting trajectories for future use. The most recent American doctrine—represented by the 2013 version of the joint doctrine manual and the 2014 *Insurgencies & Countering Insurgencies*—is increasingly interdisciplinary in terms of pulling together different arms of warfighting measures from the ballistic to the biopolitical.

The 2006 American manual's reception verged on public spectacle. Its primary author, General David Petraeus, garnered high praise. Counterinsurgency would bring messianic stability and strategic opportunities to Iraq and Afghanistan, and it would also "lift the stain" of Vietnam where land forces failed to consolidate victory in an "irregular war thousands of miles from home" (Russell 2014a: 72). This was a chance for redemption. Within the military-defense-security community, formal doctrine documents and manuals clearly maintain counterinsurgency *as* warfare. Writing for the RAND Institute in 2008, David Gompert and John Gordon authored a lengthy 500-plus page 'addendum' to build "complete and balanced capabilities for counterinsurgency" clearly understood as "war by other means." In another 2009 RAND study, Seth Jones assessed already-ongoing counterinsurgency tactics in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2001-2008 and formalized a number of lessons for military actors fighting both wars (2009). One overarching thematic focus, especially in North Atlantic militaries, is the development of joint doctrine,²⁹ which follows from network-centred transformations in systems and information-knowledge management and aims to create a common and shared approach to operations. Joint doctrine

²⁹ According to the Canadian Forces Warfare Centre, joint doctrine "is focused at the operational level, providing processes which are integrated with those of our major allies, in order to maximize interoperability not only within the CF but also internationally." See "Welcome to Joint Doctrine," <<http://www.cfd-cdf.forces.gc.ca/sites/page-eng.asp?page=1714>>.

intends to enable unity of effort, force, and purpose and aims to achieve a few things: seamlessly integrating the capabilities of different service branches and different state military capacities (and even other 'multi-agency' actors); developing shared information architectures to further coordination, synchronization, and interoperability ('plug and play'); and decentralizing information to allow smaller units to generate and exploit operational initiative and momentum. The American revamping of counterinsurgency doctrine spurred other NATO partner states—Canada, the UK, France, Australia, and Italy—to redevelop their own manuals, creating a wider renaissance in cross-branch and cross-state doctrine.

After extensive time in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence consolidated *British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Countering Insurgency* (2009). The French military's Forces Employment Doctrine Centre published *Doctrine for Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level* (2010). The ongoing French military intervention in Mali and the Central African Republic initiated in 2013 certainly follows from and builds on the 2010 manual. While sharing common doctrinal conceptions related to continuous expeditionary missions focusing on contingency and stabilization operations while reflecting different colonial-imperial traditions (see chapter two), the British and French manuals still reflect the core principles of the American manual (namely, population, security, and government). Canadian Forces (CF) doctrine outlined in *B-GL-323-004 Canada Land Force Counter-insurgency Operations* (2008) is built largely on the 2006 American manual, diverging in places to reflect Canadian military needs while in others mimicking word-for-word the language of *FM 3-24*. The Canadian manual's public life is noteworthy: a 2005 draft version was available in 2007 but was subsequently pulled from public circulation and made secret again by CF and Department of National Defence (DND) officials. David Pugliese, a defence affairs columnist at the *Ottawa Citizen*, wrote:

Since the Defence Department already released its manual on several occasions in the last year to the public, the move to stop its distribution has puzzled some observers,” leaving some Canadian parliamentarians to suggest the move was merely “secrecy for secrecy’s sake” (Pugliese 2008: ¶10 & 13).

In the same article, Pugliese refers to sections of the manual draft making comparisons between sovereign indigenous nations in Canada and foreign ‘terrorist’ groups, which resulted in opposition from indigenous leaders suggesting that indigenous autonomy and self-determination was being criminalized and targeted as a domestic threat. This analysis has arguably been confirmed in two contemporary examples. After omnibus budget bills (Bill C-38 [Spring 2012], Bill C-45 [Fall 2012], and Bill C-4 [Fall 2013]) tabled by the federal government changed legislation and undermined constitutional Treaty rights, the Harper Conservatives took a largely paternalistic and oppositional response to the resurgence of grassroots indigenous political organization through the Idle No More movement in 2012 and 2013. The government also targeted anti-mining and –pipeline organizing, attempting to shame, pathologize, and criminalize dissent.³⁰ Further, the conflation of dissent—in relation to indigenous sovereignty or title; in relation to opposing the critical infrastructure of the Canadian petrostate and extreme energy—with ‘terror’ following from the Canadian federal government’s 2015 ‘anti-terror’ bill C-51 purposefully erodes the conceptual and territorial integrity of domestic and foreign environments. Notably, the 2008 manual, which has yet to be publicly updated, also suggests that, alongside operations in Afghanistan, CF units were conducting counterinsurgency operations “against the criminally-based insurgency in Haiti since early 2004” under the rubric of stability operations after the coup against (and subsequent kidnapping by U.S. Marines, of) democratically-elected Jean Bertrand Aristide in 2004—but only so as to stabilize the post-coup regime (Engler 2009: 22-24).³¹ The manual was finally declassified and made public in 2009 after Wikileaks made a copy available online. In another belated and bizarre turn in April 2012, a DND intellectual property advisor demanded its removal by Wikileaks on the

³⁰ What Pugliese fails to recognize in 2008 is that indigenous communities in Canada were, in fact, subject to surveillance and police/military attention in relation to the context of community-based resurgence. See Diabo and Pasternak (13 Jul 2011), “First Nations Under Surveillance: Harper government prepares for Native ‘unrest,’” <<http://www.dominionpaper.ca/articles /4066>>. The speculative fiction of former Canadian military officer Doug Bland, entitled *Uprising* (2010), tells the story of widespread indigenous insurrection and reads like a book-based exercise for domestic counterinsurgents. I discuss Bland’s fantasy in chapter five.

³¹ Notably, the Chretien government hosted the Ottawa Initiative on Haiti in 2003, a conference regarding the future of the state’s government. Aristide and Haitian officials were not invited.

grounds that its availability, while declassified, "may be exempt from disclosure to the public under the Access to Information Act" and infringes on Crown copyright.³²

If anything, the counterinsurgency doctrine of 2006 offered a consistent referent. If its content verged from the inchoate to idiosyncratic to the incoherent between different North Atlantic states, it nonetheless provided a stable grammar and discourse for the expeditionary wars. Those charged with its application and conduct have oscillated between faith and disavowal—or perhaps an ideology of faith precisely because of the quiet disavowal about the efficacy of the method, the resources required, and the possible outcomes of the 'unwinnable' wars for which it was redeveloped. Military actors fell into factions that cut across theory-practice or doctrine-conduct lines, their internecine relations rife with the unfolding sectarian drama between 'COINdinistas' and 'COINtras' (on the two camps, c.f. Ricks 2009 & Russell 2012).³³ Defenders of the new faith were buoyed by the events of 2006 to 2010. On advice from the American bipartisan Iraq Study Group, the 2007-8 so-called 'Surge' in Iraq saw the deployment of upwards of 20 000 soldiers and Marines to Baghdad and Anbar Province to escalate the war. During this period, Petraeus became commander of the most American Multinational Force – Iraq. Following the US-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement and the refusal of the Al-Maliki government to allow both the maintenance of American bases in Iraq and the exemption of American forces from Iraqi legal jurisdiction, the bulk of American military units withdrew in 2011 though leaving behind a sizable contingent of special forces units and American military advisory teams. While the Surge paramilitarized Shia and Sunni groups and intensified already brutal sectarian civil wars added by the fall-outs of the American invasion and occupation (Cockburn 2008 & 2007), Petraeus was selected by

³² For a copy of the directive, see Public Intelligence, "Canadian Military Demands Removal of Counterinsurgency Manual," (21 April 2012), <<http://publicintelligence.net/canadian-military-demands-removal-of-counterinsurgency-manual/#demand>>. Notably, I waited 8 months to receive an official copy of the manual, with an ATI request in May 2009 finally answered in January 2010.

³³ Perhaps indications of the veracity of the truism 'policy wonk', COIN'dinistas and COIN'tras have together become fashionable shorthand to refer to the coteries of supporters and detractors of counterinsurgency. The terms intertextually allude to the Latin American dirty wars, in part populated by Nicaraguan Sandinistas and Honduran contras. According to dominant if simplistic Cold War narratives promulgated within the American orbit, we could create two equations: <Sandinistas = Marxist-inspired revolutionaries = insurgents against American interests = bad> whereas <Contras = clandestine American-funded paramilitary response to undermine the Honduran government = good>. Analogically, this designation would suggest counterinsurgency (supported by the 'bad' COIN'dinista camp) is fundamentally problematic whereas its opponents are merely restoring balance and certainty to the situation, fighting the good fight from below.

Prospect Magazine (an arm of *Foreign Policy*) as the 2008 Public Intellectual of the Year for creating in philosopher-general style an "intellectual surge" and a doctrine of "actively-humane warfighting" (Crabtree 2009: ¶3). As commander in Iraq, Petraeus was able to aggressively foreground counterinsurgency and shift the frame from killing nominally identified insurgents and terrorists to providing security, to building local 'host-nation' capacity, and to civil-military efforts to stabilize the economic and social life of local populations through vaunted "clear, hold, and build" operations. On the public register at least, body counts were out and human development was in, despite the fact that *more* Iraqi civilians died in 2008 than in the pre-surge period in 2007 (IBC 2008: 5).

In 2008, when Petraeus was appointed to command United States Central Military Command, he selected former Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) General Stanley McChrystal as head of NATO ISAF in Afghanistan. Assuming command in June 2009, McChrystal was tasked with developing a population-centred counterinsurgency approach that became known as the 2009–2010 Afghan Surge. It resulted in an escalation of the war effort with the arrival of over 30 000 new American soldiers and Marines deployed mostly to Kandahar and Helmand Provinces.³⁴ In fact, McChrystal and Petraeus, in responding to critics of counterinsurgency's 'restrictive rules of engagement', actually foregrounded the kinetic/firepower-based end of the warfighting spectrum in Afghanistan. Early briefings during McChrystal's tenure, in which McChrystal was often accompanied by Petraeus, returned to emphasizing enemy body counts and lethal operations, marking the explicit integration of American special forces into the increasingly unconventional and irregular war effort, where special forces both focused on 'high-value targets' (i.e., kill-capture raids to disrupt and interdict insurgent networks) and slowly began to develop ground-up village stability operations (VSO), which I document in depth in chapter four.³⁵ As the shape-clear-hold-build paradigm took hold, the targeting list—the so-called 'disposition matrix'—widened to encompass anyone peripherally associated with designated

³⁴ The second American manual, FM 3-24.2 *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, was completed after the Iraq Surge and prior to the Afghanistan escalation in the summer of 2009. The American military brain trust intended to place emphasis back on the necessity of kinetic and lethal operations to shape the environment and so facilitate the clear-hold-build phase of counterinsurgency.

³⁵ Regarding village stability operations: "By fall of 2011, a program that had started with the nine villages in 2010 had expanded to include 1000 US Special Forces from the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF-A) in over 103 locations covering 23,300 square kilometers" (Russell 2014: 81).

insurgent cells, a process coincident with what Gregory describes in his work on drones as the production of nexus, personality, and signature targets induced by data analytics and intelligence production (Gregory 2014; c.f. Rich 2014: 26). Given the marked increase in American and NATO casualties from May 2009—peaking in the summer of 2010—to late 2011, the rhetorical strategy of returning to the referent of enemy body counts was likely intended to signify the operational effectiveness of counterinsurgency in tactical and strategic terms. Further, the recourse to dead insurgents served to counter the semiotic and affective fall-out associated with coalition fatalities, an actuarial turn in the narrativization of the war by senior commanders dealing with the "impossible trilemma" of force protection, distinguishing combatants from civilians, and the "physical destruction" (i.e., killing) of insurgents (Zambernardi 2010: 22). McChrystal resigned his command in June 2010, following the publication of a candid *Rolling Stone* article—"The Runaway General" by Michael Hastings—in which McChrystal and his aides were recorded deriding the Obama administration and criticizing the war policy they were charged with implementing. Not long after, Petraeus assumed command of NATO ISAF in Afghanistan. After being confirmed as the Director of Central Intelligence Agency in 2011, Petraeus himself resigned from his position in November 2012, scandalized after an extramarital affair with his biographer became public.³⁶

With the personification of counterinsurgency through figures like McChrystal and Petraeus, we notice the attribution of an author-function to the doctrine and the war itself, validating the orchestrators who compose new military arts and science (Russell 2014b). This extended beyond the upper echelons of American military command. For a number of experts within the circle of military academics inside and proximate to American military organs, the counterinsurgency transition meant public exposure and even notoriety. New primary definers vied for an opportunity to contribute to discussions on the shape and state of American-led expeditionary wars. Counterinsurgency experts John Nagl and David Kilcullen became, like Petraeus, *de facto* public intellectuals, high visibility agents

³⁶ Paula Broadwell, a West Point graduate, academic, and former U.S. Army officer, was the co-author *All In: The Education of General David Petraeus*. (2011). Petraeus was the basis for Broadwell's doctoral dissertation. The details of the exposure are quite interesting, with the FBI harvesting and using data to track Petraeus and Broadwell's emails and with questions about the integrity of American national security and the CIA's own 'media management' (propaganda) strategies.

espousing the virtues of the reissued doctrine. Nagl, a retired American operations officer and then commander of an armoured regiment in the 1st Infantry Division, had fighting experience in Iraq and developed Military Transition Teams (MTT) to work and train the then nascent and reconstituted Iraqi military.³⁷ Holding a doctorate, Nagl had already written *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (2002 [2005]) and was tapped to write the foreword to the University of Chicago 2007 edition of the American field manual. In 2008, he became a fellow of the Centre for New American Security (CNAS), an American policy think-tank close to the Bush and Obama governments. He also composed the foreword for *The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars* (Ucko 2010) and has continued his commentary in relation to the latest American manual (Nagl 2014). Kilcullen, a retired Australian Army officer to whom I have referred in chapter two, participated in a number of 'peace support' operations (notably, East Timor) and worked extensively with the American government and defense community. A co-author of the 2006 American manual, he previously authored *Complex Warfighting* (2004), which became the Australian Army's "future land operating concept" for guiding the force transformation and force design (the Canadian Army's, described as a 'future force employment concept', is 'adaptive dispersed operations' [CF DLC 2007 & 2011]). His essays "Counterinsurgency Redux" (2006) and "Twenty-Eight Articles" (2006)—based on T.E. Lawrence's "Twenty-Seven Articles" (1917), which outlined Lawrence's conclusions after supporting the British-backed Arab-Bedouin insurgency against Turkish forces during the First World War³⁸—and his report to the American Congressional Committee on Armed Service about counterinsurgency "lessons learned" laid the groundwork for his 2010 book *Counterinsurgency*. Nagl and Kilcullen were two of the key players in the new military and expeditionary narrative.

³⁷ Currently in Afghanistan, where training and mentoring is one of the core foci for NATO-ISAF forces, Operations Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) perform the same function. Large parts of Canada's deployment to Afghan National Army training facilities in Kabul serve as trainers, who accompany Afghan forces on operations, guiding while encouraging ANA forces to plan missions and develop their own command and control capacities.

³⁸ Kilcullen's twenty-eight and Lawrence's twenty-seven articles are listed in full as appendices (C & D) in *FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency* (U.S. Army 2009).

Afghanistan Singularities: Combined Arms & Coalition Warfare

From the perspective of military operations in Afghanistan, counterinsurgency offered a way to unify force and effort across ISAF in what had been a fragmented approach. As the village-level began to take shape into 2009, the challenges of waging a coherent effort that still allowed for a localized and mosaic approach remained difficult. The NATO campaign in Afghanistan was and is still significantly shaped by the influence of American military infrastructure—physical and metaphysical—though this influence was tempered somewhat by NATO ISAF oversight for the Afghan war beginning in 2005. Practically, American forces contributed the bulk of the logistical and material support but cooperatively shared command with other larger NATO partners (Germany, the UK, Canada, France, etc.). Also notable is the postcolonial confluence of Anglo-centric militaries—an interoperable coterie within the coalition—with the Australian, New Zealand, British, Canadian, and American armies cooperating explicitly through the auspices of ABCA Armies Agreement dating back to the post-Second World War period (c.f. Vucetic 2011). Known as 'the Five Eyes community,' these collation members share signals and human intelligence.³⁹ Outside of the promise of interoperability and synchronization, the success and failure of counterinsurgency both before and after 2009 depended on local conditions and the capabilities of ISAF forces in particular areas. Afghanistan provides unique demographic and geographic challenges to counterinsurgents—the physical, built, and human terrain. Iraq is a highly urbanized country whereas Afghanistan, while having large urban centres (Kabul, Kandahar City, Herat, and Jalabad), is a bigger country with a massive and geographically-segregating mountain system and a large rural population base, meaning that the war effort on the ground would have to spread out. Further, the histories of government and sovereignty along with expectations around constituting local communities are significantly different from the 'success' in Iraq. After the Bonn Agreement of 2001 and

³⁹ The same five states also compose the Tripartite Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP), initiated in 1957. Given global scale of passive metadata mining and the comprehensive mass electronic surveillance undertaken—often illegally—by agencies like the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) through the notorious and now-exposed Prism program, this partnership program has implications across the domestic-foreign continuum. That NSA surveillance and intelligence has been connected to CIA and US Air Force drone attacks and targeted killings in Pakistan indicates a both a blurring of jurisdictions and an intensification of intelligence generated from big data and analytics to counter anything arbitrarily deemed insurgent.. I discuss the implications of data, the informationalization of life, and population thinking in chapter 5.

prior to 2006, the Afghan occupation was comprised of three different military campaigns with different remits: the main American Operation Enduring Freedom; a shadowy American-driven special forces contingent operating through U.S. Joint Special Operations Command with virtual *carte-blanche* to kill or capture Al-Qaeda or Taliban leaders; and the multinational ISAF, framed as credibility-establishing presence.

Established in 2001 via the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386⁴⁰, ISAF was envisaged as a 'stabilization' force, initially having a small footprint; however, as the American invasion mutated into an occupation, ISAF jurisdiction gradually expanded from Kabul, becoming responsible for the all military operations in Afghanistan in 2006 and unifying command for all foreign military forces over six regional commands (RCs Capital [Kabul], North, West, South, Southwest, and East). ISAF's three main foci were security, reconstruction and development, and governance to "sustain stability" and "[create] conditions whereby the government of Afghanistan is able to exercise its authority throughout the country, including the development of the professional and capable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)" (ISAF Place Mat 2013: 1, ¶1).⁴¹ Of course, American commanders and political advisors exerted significant influence on ISAF, especially during the intensification of 'kinetic' shaping and clearing operations against a growing insurgency in 2006-7 and onward to the Surge and beyond. After 2012, ISAF forces ceased taking the lead in combat operations and continued providing combat support until the end of 2014 with the mission focused on training and advising—in dedicated training centres; through police and military operational mentoring and liaising teams—as host-nation forces assumed control of counterinsurgency and security responsibilities in 2015.

⁴⁰ Resolution 1386 and succession of UN resolutions granting ISAF space to operate gave cause to defenders of the war and its expansion and escalation to argue the war was legal and justified under international law. While the resolutions provide cosmetic *de facto* legitimacy to ISAF operations, the war's legality—a war still undeclared—has always been questioned within the context of international law. For a discussion of the war's legality and the discursive limits of UN resolutions see Echele Guerre's "Canada's Role in the Occupation of Afghanistan" and Ligue De Droites et Libertés' "Is the War in Afghanistan Legal?" together in *Afghanistan & Canada* (Kowaluk & Staples, eds.; Black Rose Books: 2009)

⁴¹ As of August 2013, ISAF's total military strength was 87 207 from 49 troop contributing states (ISAF Place Mat 2013: 1, ¶4) alongside approximately 187 000 ANSF. For some perspective, American troop levels alone from July 2009 to November 2011 consistently hovered between 90 000 to 100 000 (Livingstone & O'Hanlon 2013: 4). The current NATO troop levels for Resolution Support Mission is 13 195 from 42 contributing nations according to NATO's most recent place mat of 27 February 2015.

Although counterinsurgency became the cornerstone for the American war policy in Afghanistan with the arrival of McChrystal, it was implemented informally prior to 2009 by different ISAF military units. The logic of population-centred counterinsurgency's shaping, clearing, holding, and building used NATO and then Afghan forces to create islands or bubbles of security followed by reconstruction and development efforts. Depending on the disposition of regional commands, state militaries took different approaches depending on the security climate in different places, resulting in an uneven and sometimes inconsistent approach depending on local conditions and unit- or area-specific capacities and capabilities. Many of these efforts were routed through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) operating to provide the impetus for focused development efforts, which unfolded along with a web of initiatives seeing local Afghan players and large international NGOs in the mix. North and west of the Hindu Kush in RCs West and North, communities were less hostile to ISAF and Afghan government presence (roughly, the western and northwestern provinces of Nimruz, Farah, Herat, Badghis, Faryab, Sar-e-Pol, and Samangan) due in part to cultural and social divides—non-Pashtun and non-Taliban—and basic geography that left communities insulated from infiltration by anti-regime fighters from Pakistan (see below). In these places, local civil-military cooperation initiatives and ongoing influence operations (IO) aimed to shift the counterinsurgency campaign from the 'muscular' kinetic end of the warfighting spectrum to the non-kinetic stabilization/reconstruction side. Incoming American forces in 2009 and 2010 were deployed primarily in the 'restive' provinces of Helmand and Kandahar in RCs South and Southwest in order to consolidate the clearing component of the counterinsurgency campaign and create a more comprehensive and integrated approach. In an interview with the BBC's Mark Urban regarding the situation in Helmand Province in 2011, Petraeus referred to "cleaning up the battlefield geometry" and "bringing down the level of violence" while allowing for smaller areas of operation for units to subsequently exert a larger area of control (Urban/BBC 2012).

Independent of the costs of the military campaign and its attendant logistics and material requirements, the American financial footprint for stabilization and reconstruction was sizeable. According to a 2014 quarterly report by John Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghan

Reconstruction (SIGAR), the Afghan government has received close to \$97 billion in reconstruction aid in just over a decade from 2002 to the end of 2013 (SIGAR 2014: 77). The most recent report lists the overall contribution at \$110 billion (SIGAR 2015). In Canada, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) (folded into DFAIT in March 2013) actively obscure overall funding and aid amounts. According to its Afghanistan summary, DFAIT reports \$100 million/year commitments from 2002 to 2007, largely filtered through the World Bank. The post-2007 aid package coincided with "new priorities" and three signature infrastructure projects in Kandahar Province coincident with the CF role in the Dand, Argandab, and Panjwayi districts. As the post-2011 aid context was connected to the military role changing from counterinsurgency to mentoring and training, funding turned to longer-term development monies in relation to children and youth, human rights, and humanitarian assistance. The 2011-2012 figures amount to \$127 million.⁴² According to unreleased internal CIDA audits in December 2012 obtained through Access to Information requests, overall aid amounted to \$1.5 billion (Blackwell 2012: ¶1).

Not all states contributing troops to ISAF were NATO states (or are operating under the mandate of the post-2014 Resolute Support mission), and non-NATO states *not* contributing military forces also play a significant role outside of the NATO pre- and post-2014 missions. Rival regional powers Pakistan and India are the most prominent non-NATO players. Pakistan, an official American ally and the recipient of billions of dollars annually in U.S. military aid, was a key staging ground for the American-funded Afghan insurgency against the Soviet occupation from 1979 to 1989. As is well known, the Pakistani military, in service to both American and Pakistani interests (which do not necessarily converge), has been waging its own aerial bombing and counterinsurgency campaign in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), a Pashtun-dominated collection of autonomous regions in Western Pakistan on the border with Afghanistan. In addition to Pakistani air force strikes that began well before the 2007 formation of Pakistani Taliban, the tribal areas have been also been subject to the loitering aerial threat that is the extra-legal and not-so-clandestine American joint CIA-Air Force

⁴² All from CIDA, "Afghanistan," <<http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/afghanistan-e>>. Accessed 30 July 2013.

drone campaign, which commenced covertly in 2004 and has prosecuted targeted killings and assassinations that have escalated significantly during the presidency of Barack Obama, killing *thousands* since 2009.⁴³ The FATA has become a custodial territory that is cordoned and engineered to envelop the bodies and communities within the zone. Excised as an exceptional space of violence sanctioned *within* the context of the law (Gregory 2015), the areas are subject to ballistic and biopolitical force deployed through aerial violence and land-based operations aiming to insert new ways of rule into existing local ways of life shaped by customary, traditional, and religious protocols and everyday procedures.⁴⁴ Not surprisingly, this has created resentment among locals due to vertical and horizontal occupation along with thousands of civilian deaths in the region⁴⁵, creating a veritable 'recruiting tool' for anti-government fighters. *Body Count*, a joint-authored report by different affiliates of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, estimated that close to 49 000 Pakistani civilians have been killed from 2004 to 2013 as a result of the 'War on Terror,' with large numbers coming from the 'AfPak' area (i.e., FATA) and possibly up to 1000 killed incidentally by drone strikes (IPPNW 2015: 82-83). According to a 2013 estimate compiled by the U.S. Congressional Research Service, direct American military/security-related aid to Pakistan in 2014 (independent of direct economic support and ongoing funding for international development) was anticipated to be close to \$370 million (Epstein & Kronstadt 2013: 28-29), a lucrative line item for the American arms and

⁴³ A study by the New America Foundation (8 July 2013) estimates that anywhere from 2044 to 3377 people have been killed in 360 drone strikes in Pakistan since 2004 of which 312 were launched during the Obama presidency. The same report estimates that anywhere to 1590 to 2740 'militants' have been killed. See "The Drone War in Pakistan," <<http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis>>. I address more recent statistics in chapter four on village stability operations.

⁴⁴ In his excellent lecture, "Dirty Dancing: Drones and Death in the Borderlands" (2015), Derek Gregory argued that one cannot understand the American targeted killing drone campaign and its own biopolitical entanglements without understanding how the FATA has been prioritized for exceptional political violence in military legal, and social terms. Citing Lisa Park's idea of a disenfranchised class of targeted people, Gregory contextualizes FATA and drones within a larger global matrix of military and political violence.

⁴⁵ The same New American Foundation study reports that anywhere from 258 to 307 civilians have been killed. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, which reports a slightly higher number of drone strikes in the same period, places civilian deaths from 407 to 928, with anywhere from 164 to 195 children killed. See <<http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/08/01/bureau-investigation-finds-fresh-evidence-of-cia-drone-strikes-on-rescuers/>>. A 2012 joint Stanford/NYU study "Living Under Drones" was based on interviews and field work in the FATA. It concluded, among other things, that the difficulty for outsiders to access the region and the American underreporting of civilian deaths creates a false narrative about the efficacy of drone-based targeted killings. See <<http://livingunderdrones.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Stanford-NYU-LIVING-UNDER-DRONES.pdf>>

security/defence companies. Strategically, the situation verges on the quixotic. Ongoing Afghan government and American accusations against Pakistan's fragmented security and intelligence forces—in particular the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), alleged to be using Taliban fighters and other anti-government groups as proxies against the Afghan state—suggest that foreign military aid is actively funneled to groups in Afghanistan fighting against the American- and ISAF-backed government.⁴⁶

One outspoken and highly visible critic of Pakistan's said/unsaid policies is Amrullah Saleh, a former anti-Taliban fighter, Afghan intelligence directorate chief from 2004 to 2010, and now prominent opposition leader of the Afghanistan Green Trend party. Saleh has been a proponent of continued NATO and American military presence post-2014 to avoid the anticipated military vacuum and mitigate the ongoing "strategic deadlock" (Saleh 2012: ¶5). While the American-backed war is creating what he called much-needed democratic "white space" for Afghanistan's political renewal, he was explicitly critical of Pakistan's role in the Afghan war. He has called for:

...a U-turn in Pakistan's policy, closure of Taliban sanctuaries, and a reformed Afghan government. It doesn't sound realistic...to expect Pakistan to change now, when memories of 9/11 seem so distant and NATO prepares for a massive reduction in troops...Most indicators show Pakistan as a declining state. Yet in one area, Afghanistan, Pakistan has outsmarted and outmanoeuvred everyone. Pakistan has kept the Taliban alive and deadly, and continues to keep the US as an ally with deep pockets under any circumstances. (¶7-8)

Saleh's assessment translates to what have been more practical concerns for ISAF counterinsurgents regarding Afghanistan's mountainous north eastern provinces of Kunar, Nangahar, Paktia, Khost, and Paktika, which share an arbitrary and fuzzy border—the Durand Line—with the FATA. As I discuss in chapter four, these remote provinces became crucial areas for American special forces conducting village stability operations, which push the mix of firepower and biopower into lives of local Afghans in remote environments. To counter the fluid movement of fighters and militants from the tribal areas into

⁴⁶ Capital flows dictated by military operations are complex and sometimes counterintuitive. In an even more bizarre development in Afghanistan, a Reuters story reported that the U.S. Army has inadvertently awarded \$150 million in reconstruction and development contracts to groups or individuals who support the insurgency, whether the Taliban, Al Qaeda, or the Haqqani Network. Despite calls from SIGAR to bar these contractors, the Army argued the evidence was inconclusive. See Susan Cornwell, (30 Jul 2013), "U.S. Army won't bar contractors linked to Afghan insurgents: watchdog," <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/30/us-usa-afghanistan-aid-idUSBRE96T04K20130730>>. Of course, the irony here is that these funds as directed by these contractors do in fact assist and help local communities though not in ways favourable to the perceived legitimacy of NATO's counterinsurgency effort or the central Afghan government.

Afghanistan and to undermine the use of the tribal areas as sanctuary for fighters outside its jurisdiction, American military and political leader continue to encourage the Pakistani government to escalate its police and military efforts in the border regions. A number of major Pakistani military offensives—the 2010 Operation *Khawakh Ba De Sham* ("I will teach you a lesson") in Orakzai and Kurram Agencies, operations in the Tirah Valley in 2013, and ongoing operations across North and South Waziristan—resulted in heavy fighting, displaced communities, and civilian casualties. These operations hardened armed resistance to Pakistan state authority and resulted in increased suicide bombings and attacks within Pakistan. In fact, in December 2014, the Pakistan-based Tehrik-i-Taliban infiltrated and attacked the Army Public School in Peshawar, a school for children of Pakistan military officers, killing 145 people, most of them elementary and secondary schoolchildren. Reports in 2015 of ISIS-aligned groups emerging in Pakistan indicate a widening range of actors in the war. While not playing an active role in explicit military operations, India is also active in Afghanistan to counter Pakistani influence and to exert its own through support for reconstruction and developmental assistance. Because of the ongoing Indian military occupation of the contested Jammu and Kashmir regions on the border with Pakistan⁴⁷ and India's own counterinsurgency operations in the regions against a mix of secular, Maoist, and Islamist militant groups (including Lashkar-e-Taiba [LeT], responsible for the 2008 attacks in Mumbai), India's state and civilian installations in Afghanistan have been targeted by attacks and suicide bombings—some allegedly with the support of the Pakistani security establishment. High-profile deadly attacks were launched against the Indian embassy in Kabul in 2008 and 2009. An August 2013 attack on the Indian Consulate in Jalalabad killed nine Afghan civilians. So, overall, India's and Pakistan's influence remains complex and ongoing. In summary: three states, three overlapping counterinsurgencies, and a dynamic situation across Southern Asia

⁴⁷ Recently, five Indian soldiers were killed along the Line of Control, allegedly by "20 heavily-armed terrorists, along with persons in Pakistani army uniforms." The Pakistani army denied the allegations. See "Five Indian soldiers killed in Kashmir attack" (6 August 2013), *Al Jazeera English*, <<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2013/08/20138652538183730.html>>.

Questioning Counterinsurgency: American Developments

The counterinsurgency turn has come full circle in terms of theory, commentary, and doctrine. The new 2014 American manual implied the continuation of debates and discussions, but nowhere near the exhibitionism and shrill pitch of debates in 2006 and 2007, which saw counterinsurgency shift from its small "c" status as a paradigm based on small cadres of military advisors working with host-nation states to big "c" with wider liberal nation building imperatives (Rich 2014)—from quiet wars waged for geopolitical and geoeconomic reasons to loud liberal wars waged as biopolitical exercises. Framing the debate in 2014, Ucko warned that those wishing to bury counterinsurgency capacity do so at the peril of American and North Atlantic strategic interests given the need for hybrid capabilities and the increasingly adaptive and dispersed 'employment' of military force (Ucko 2014b). While Ucko does not say it in these terms, he is effectively talking about the necessity of developing a jointure of ballistic and biopolitical capabilities, which can be administered as needed. According to his rebuke of a number of overdeterminations made by its detractors, Ucko argues that counterinsurgency is neither a formula for victory, nor a strategy, nor a kinder type of war. One should not be against it in principle, and counterinsurgency capabilities do not predispose North Atlantic states to intervention—though we may realize the implicit privilege assumed by North Atlantic states developing their expeditionary instruments and the way this capacity predisposes states to deploy adaptive and pliable military assets precisely because they are designed as such. This becomes a self-referential loop at the centre of what is a new military positivism and intelligence. One of Ucko's detractors, the American military scholar Douglas Porch, argues against the mythology of counterinsurgency as an enterprising 'start-up':

[T]he collapse of COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan has revealed some of the endemic problems of democracies and their armed in the thrall of irregular warfare in which they invariably get sucked into difficult strategic circumstances and see counterinsurgency, conveniently packaged by a coterie of so-called "experts" as the only solution for success. (Porch 2014: 182)

Porch's invective, wrapped in conspiratorial accusations, is worth considering for two reasons: first, as a counterpoint to Ucko (c.f. Porch 2013); and second—and despite his invocation civil-military relations and of democracies subordinate to the state war machine—as a *shared* implicit affirmation of American military and neoliberal privilege. For his part, Ucko's rejoinder to Porch in a more recent essay counters

Porch's skepticism but assumes the same American privilege. Ucko argues for the necessity of developing a better indirect approach to counterinsurgency that does not require a substantial lay-down of American or North Atlantic troops—in other words, opting for a smaller expeditionary footprint and avoiding large-scale occupations. Counterinsurgents would be best to pursue the 'good' instead of the 'perfect' and remain mindful of the doctrine's historical inability to ensure "public security during war-to-peace transition" (Ucko 2014a: 3; c.f. 2013b).

Early in the turn to counterinsurgency, American conservative security intellectual Edward Luttwak criticized the fanfare around the doctrine prior to its wholesale application in Iraq. Luttwak called it military malpractice because the doctrine's supporters failed to outline in honest terms the ongoing necessity of killing; they also failed to deploy an adequate number of troops ("boots on the ground") to contain and defeat an insurgency (Luttwak 2007).⁴⁸ Andrew Bacevich was another member of the military-security establishment who was outspoken in his criticism. A retired American Army officer already opposed to the interventionist preventive/preemptive wars of the so-called 'Bush Doctrine' and warning against the seductive power of the 'new American militarism' (2005) while anticipating the end of American exceptionalism (2008b; c.f. Engelhardt 2007 on the end of 'victory culture'), Bacevich inveighed against the counterinsurgency doctrine and campaign, arguing it justified the lengthening of already long and ill-advised American expeditionary adventures. As a proponent of the 'prudent' use of American military power, his legitimacy within the foreign policy and strategic studies sector amplified his criticisms. In "The Petraeus Doctrine" (2008a), Bacevich expressed some support for the way in which counterinsurgency doctrine affected the US Army in particular, having allowed for intellectual regeneration and renewal sparked by dissent from-the-ground-up—a institutional battle between "crusaders and conservatives" (Bacevich 2008: ¶7). Yet, he questioned the certainty with which counterinsurgency (and by extension the group around Petraeus) consolidated its influence as the new military organizing principle favouring stability and contingency operations at the expense of "conventional warfare capabilities" (¶24-25).

⁴⁸ According to David Galula in his seminal *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (1964), a ratio of ten or twenty counterinsurgents to every insurgent is not uncommon to protect and control the population especially when "the insurgency develops into a guerilla war" (Galula 1964: 21).

In his denunciation of counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, Bacevich argued with only *some* irony that American interests would in fact be better served by attending to secure and undertake nation-building efforts in Mexico especially "if one believes that moral considerations rather than self-interest should form foreign policy" (Bacevich 2009: ¶13). Given hemispheric-scale initiatives like the Security & Prosperity Partnership (SPP) aiming to harmonize economic, transport, and security policy for NAFTA signatories Canada, the U.S., and Mexico, Bacevich's sideways proposals call this policy architecture into consideration. Alongside decades of the Mexican state's military counterinsurgency efforts against popular anti-neoliberal and indigenous movements in Oaxaca and in the autonomous Chiapas region, the last decade has seen an escalation in the public-private civil wars waged in the context of an illegal but lucrative global drug trade. The actors—violent, corrupt, self-interested—range from global narcotics syndicates to local self-defence popular units to the paramilitary arms of private interests to corrupt public officials aided by state military and police forces. The wars themselves generate significant social and political instability and spillover. Huge numbers of displaced Mexicans, as economic and political refugees, flee the violence and illegal passage into the U.S., which drives a violent human trafficking racket in the borderlands of *la frontera*.⁴⁹ The increased securitization of the US-Mexico border, along with American immigration policy changes that intersect with the exceptional and extra-judicial measures of post-9/11 emergency 'homeland-security' measures against terrorism foment revanchist-racialized conceptions of self-defence and feed security and defense sector companies with a quasi-domestic space to monetize and develop (Miller 2014; Paley 2014; c.f. Miller 2013).⁵⁰ In arguing there is 'terror' to counter south of the American border, Bacevich suggests

⁴⁹ Gloria Anzaludúa's well-known conceptualization of the liminal and violent territoriality of *la frontera*—the borderlands between the U.S. and Mexico—identifies 'just-off-shore' neoliberal exploitation and *maquiladora* factories, narco-gangs and cartels embedded in the social and cultural fabric, and desperation induced by a permanent and racialized state of exception in the border zone. With the relatively rapid intensification of border controls and the ongoing construction of a Israeli-style permanent separation barrier, migrants and refugees find themselves even more contained in this interstitial zone. See *Borderlands/ La Frontera: The New Mestiza* (Aunt Lute Books: 1987).

⁵⁰ In an opinion piece for *Al Jazeera English*, Todd Miller writes persuasively about a military-industrial-immigration complex and the speculative and profit-driven incentives for private security firms and defense contractors to militarize the Mexican-U.S. border. Given the potential returns for companies and corporations with their political lobbies, a U.S.-Mexican border as a war zone is a lucrative proposition not unlike the capitalist

any such proposal would be greeted with accusations of lunacy whereas those proposing the same imperatives in the context of the Afghan war "are treated like sages" (Bacevich 2009: ¶13).

What Bacevich does not really develop in his Afghan-Mexican discussion (and what bears some mention given the biopolitical intersection of counterinsurgency, agriculture, and the Afghan poppy trade, which I address in chapter four) is Mexico's connection to the so-called global war on drugs. The auspices of drug eradication, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, and counterinsurgency have allowed the American state to militarize a number of countries fighting against criminal insurgencies hostile to host-nation forces and wider neoliberal trade policies whether in Colombia, Panama, or Mexico. According to Greg Grandin, the George H. Bush government actively militarized the war on drugs while the George W. Bush government "collapsed all public policy problems into the war on terror to bypass oversight that may hinder its actions" (Grandin 2007: 217). In effect, the 'global war on terror' frame created exceptional licence for U.S. military, intelligence, and police agencies to pursue whomever wherever. America's adversaries in the 'war on drugs' became subject to the same legal and military-police innovations as insurgents, enemy fighters, terrorists, and unlawful combatants; local subsistence farmers concerned about drug eradication are coded as sympathizers with 'terrorists' and agents of insecurity. Further, this collapse offers security forces aligned with the American state (e.g., Colombia) the ability to escalate its drug wars, receive additional American military aid in relation to foreign internal defense and stability operations, and foment already-existing divisions on class, social, and urban/rural lines. These partners get to equivocate as members of another Coalition of the Willing.

As I mentioned above, this linkage is apparent in Afghanistan, where narcotics and insurgency-counterinsurgency go hand in hand. As I document in chapter four, village-level efforts to reprogram agricultural practices aim to nullify the biopolitical function of opium farming. According to Nigel Gibson, the Afghan opium industry is already-globalized, dwarfs the formal economy, and "has been a major driver of Afghanistan's economy since 2001" (Gibson 2011: 32; c.f. Martin 2014), funding

opportunities offered by the increasing privatization of prisons and the detainment-incarceration sector across the US (Miler 2013).

different warlords and gangs aligned on tribal and ethnic lines. Initial efforts in 2006-2007 by British and American forces to destroy the poppy crop in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces through dedicated drug eradication teams were unsuccessful (Evans 2012). The opium trade has always been a key economic resource and lever; any campaign to undermine the drug trade runs the risk of ecological disruption and alienating Afghan farmers, the people comprising the population (Gibson 2011: 44). While some of the harvest was periodically confiscated by ISAF forces, eradication efforts enjoyed far less prominence after the arrival of counterinsurgency given the link between tenant farming, the opium crop, and local ways of life. According to a study by the United Nations Office on Drug Control released in October 2013, opium production reached an all-time high in terms of hectares farmed and crop produced, projections actually exceeding the global demand (UNODC in BBC 2013: ¶5; c.f. Obaid 2013; see chapter four for more recent figures). The report advocates an "integrated, comprehensive response to the problem," warning about both production and addiction with "the virus of opium" affecting local communities with "low immune levels due to fragmentation, conflict, patronage, corruption and impunity" (¶8-9). Given that since the global price of opium has been rising since 2010 (¶13), local farmers cultivate and speculate on a crop that, while illegal, offers a modicum of income and economic security with the withdrawal of ISAF forces. More recently, the American special inspector general in Afghanistan found that the \$7 billion (UD) spent from 2001 onward on drug eradication failed to stop opium poppy growth (BBC 2014a).

In 2008—with Iraq increasingly volatile—Afghanistan became 'the good war', and the same mirage is now morally and strategically deployed to frame the re-engagement of the US and its allies, Canada included, in the ongoing air and military assistance campaign in Iraq and Syria to 'degrade ISIS.' In 2008, Tariq Ali assessed the arguments about renewed efforts to prosecute the good war in Afghanistan (Ali 2008). Remarking on what he calls the "liberal imperialist perspective," Ali writes:

[E]ven in the estimate of the West's own specialists and institutions, 'nation-building' in Afghanistan has been flawed in its very conception. It has so far produced a puppet president dependent for his survival on foreign mercenaries, a corrupt and abusive police force, a 'non-functioning' judiciary, a thriving criminal layer and a deepening social and economic crisis. It beggars belief to argue that 'more of this' will be the answer to Afghanistan's problems. (14)

Any troop surge to prosecute 'the good war' would merely exacerbate these problems. Killing and/or containing insurgents (Taliban forces, Al-Qaeda, etc.) to secure islands of stability fails to deal with the fundamentally flawed premises of the overall architecture of the war, namely manufacturing a legitimate Afghan government and sustaining stability through security and reconstruction efforts in a large country with a massive rural population. Yet, if Iraq was the test, Afghanistan would confirm a new norm and new round of experiments. Addressing the American Department of Defense initiative 3000.7 issued at the beginning of the first Obama administration in 2009, Anthony Fenton pointed to the directive's identification of the increasing importance of regularizing irregular warfare capabilities and "whole-of-government" (WOG) approaches to war. His essay details how the wave of policy reviews and responses within the American defence sector (as determined by think tanks and policy institutes like the Center for New American Security (CNAS) and The Project for National Security Reform) reveal the wider recognition of a generalized global "counterinsurgency era" (Fenton 2009b: ¶28-33). Among other things, Fenton's piece warns against the militarization of aid and the inculcation of non-military resources and methods into a larger American-centered counterinsurgency apparatus.

Debates about the ability to actually conduct counterinsurgency operations continued despite the fanfare it enjoyed. To put it another way, the public and political hype effaced the challenges faced by units on the ground. After embedding with American soldiers and marines in Afghanistan in 2007 and 2008 prior to the 2009 counterinsurgency push, journalist John McHugh produced a series of short investigative documentaries for *The Guardian*. McHugh's essay-video "Nation Builders and Warriors" (2008) addressed the implications of counterinsurgency for troops on the ground as they attempted to follow "the often contradictory instructions" laid out in the doctrine, usually at their own peril. McHugh's videos suggested that for combat troops trained for direct action and kinetic operations, the force posture required to minimize civilian harm, operate according to strict rules of engagement, and 'secure the population' was difficult to adopt. Conversely, American military commanders interviewed for a PBS *Frontline* episode, "Rules of Engagement" (2009), which documented the killing of 24 civilians by American Marines in Haditha, Iraq, argued the opposite: U.S. soldiers and marines were

professionals, well-trained, and able to operate appropriately in what was becoming a 'complex' counterinsurgency environment, i.e., they advocated the normalization of unconventional and irregular war. Responding in late August 2009 to criticisms from within American military circles about the need for dismounted patrols and the resulting increase in "catastrophic" injuries and deaths because of improvised explosive device (IED), then-commander McChrystal stated, "ISAF cannot succeed if it is unwilling to share risk at least equally with the people...the best way to defeat IEDs is to defeat the Taliban's hold on the people" (McChrystal, in Porter 2012a: ¶9). Getting out of what McChrystal called the "garrison posture and mentality" (¶10) became the new sanguine pact of counterinsurgency. While McChrystal's comments suggest the need for a change in attitude and practice to enable a more nimble approach to the war, his remarks registered the ambivalence within ISAF about the overall shift to counterinsurgency and the risks involved.⁵¹

Journalist and author Ann Jones argued in 2010 that counterinsurgency was *already* "down for the count in Afghanistan" after her experiences embedded with American Army units. Writing in the summer of 2010 following the ISAF push into Helmand and Kandahar Provinces and at the start of what became village stability operations, Jones argued:

Counterinsurgency doctrine, *originally designed by empires intending to squat on their colonies forever*, calls for elevating the principle of "protecting the population" above pursuing the bad guys at all cost. Implementing such a strategy quickly becomes a tricky, even schizophrenic, balancing act, as I recently was reminded...I just spent some time embedded with the US Army at a forward operating base near the Pakistan border where, despite daily "sig acts" -- significant activity of a hostile nature -- virtually every "lethal" American soldier is matched by a "nonlethal" counterpart whose job it is, in one way or another, to soften up those civilians for "protection." (Jones 2010: ¶3-4; emphasis added)

For Jones, the elaborate edifice and apparatus of counterinsurgency as official war policy tended to mask an increase in 'creeping Talibanization' because of civilian casualties and disenchantment at the local community level with the illegitimate and corrupt Afghan government under Hamid Karzai (¶26-27).

Even on the terms established by ISAF forces, the effort was failing. A "fraudulent war" and "fraudulent

⁵¹ While I do not have space to document it here, a whole sub-genre of commentary emerged in 2009 about the constraints of population-centered counterinsurgency as a betrayal of military forces. Following from critics like Luttwak, the arguments tended toward the familiar military trope of 'our hands are tied' or 'the politicians stabbed us in the back' as a response to the strategic and tactical difficulties of counterinsurgency. The fall-out after Vietnam saw the development of similar arguments in military affairs.

aid program" (¶31) amplified an alternate logic closer to what Charles Tilly meant when war quickly becomes an organized protection racket akin to crime. According to Jones:

And so it goes round and round, this ill-oiled war machine, generating ever more incentives for almost everyone involved—except ordinary Afghans, of course—to keep on keeping on. There's a little something for quite a few: government officials in the US, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, for-profit contractors, defense intellectuals, generals, spies, soldiers behind the lines, international aid workers and their Afghan employees, diplomats, members of the Afghan National Army, and the police, and the Taliban, and their various pals, and the whole array of camp followers that service warfare everywhere. (¶33)

Jones' polemic: the revered population disappears in favour of defending a war effort in the service of serving wider economic interests, an incentivized perpetual war with positive externalities for those with the means to capitalize on the war. For 'true believers' following the Afghan Surge, a war of narratives—crucial to persuade local Afghan populations and domestic audiences at home, according to counterinsurgency doctrine—was being waged to control the narrative of the war itself in order to obscure the inefficacy of its saving power (c.f. Porter 2012b).

In mid-2012—and following the American-Afghan Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement of May 2012, almost six years along since the mobilization of the doctrine and three years into ground-up counterinsurgency in Afghanistan—Elizabeth Bumiller of *The New York Times* reported that West Point, the U.S. Army's military academy, was deeply divided on counterinsurgency whether in Afghanistan or in relation to the role of the U.S. Army in future (Bumiller 2012). According to King's College war studies scholar Thomas Rid speaking at a roundtable on counterinsurgency, what was unfolding in 2012 was a rather 'shrill and sharp debate' (Rid, Betz, and Mackinlay 2012). During the same discussion, military historian David Betz referred to the "counterinsurgency publishing industry" driven by shallow punditry. In a similar vein, freelance reporter Kelley Beaucar Vlahos describes the situation after "the shimmery dawn of the groupthink experiment we now call the mass COIN (counterinsurgency) delusion" (Vlahos 2012: ¶2) as follows:

The FM 3-24 bible is now being rewritten because everyone feels free to acknowledge how lame it is. Even the most die-hard optimists now say the war is lost. How much the Afghans lost, and how much our Army lost as an institution from this painful diversion from reality, we'll never know. (¶12)

According to American conservative security commentator Fred Kaplan, counterinsurgency doctrine is tantamount to intellectual insurgency, with the once revered but now scandalized Petraeus playing insurrection and undermining the apparently self-evident 'American way of war' with a massive plot to overthrow the wider military establishment (Kaplan 2013). In *Wrong Turn: America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency* (2013), US Army Colonel Gian Gentile, a notable COIN'tra, provocatively locates counterinsurgency as an indication of 'liberal conventional wisdom'⁵² that makes it easier to engage in foreign expeditionary adventures, predicating tactics over a clear strategy of objectives, goals, and outcomes (Gentile 2013). Allusions to the past successes for counterinsurgency tend to mythologize European imperial-colonial legacies (Porch 2011). Further, the margin for success in counterinsurgency is nearly impossible given the perils ranging from "the limits of military intervention's transformative impact on regional and in-country dynamics" to "the high risk of human rights violations in a racialized, frequently sectarian combat environment" to "the high potential for damage to diplomatic credibility and national reputation" (Porch 2013: 177).

While these accounts internal to military affairs fail to address how the firepower and biopower counterinsurgency damages across the different communities in Afghanistan and focus more so on problem of recuperating American military capacity and global hegemony after fifteen years of war, they do suggest a waning of counterinsurgency doctrine and its diminished influence. Yet, as the residual and cascading effects of counterinsurgency warfare continue to radiate, we shall see that the reading of counterinsurgency in decline is overdrawn and premature.

Opportunism & Overdetermination: Counterinsurgency and the Canadian Forces

Beyond its public release, the coming of counterinsurgency to the Canadian Forces has its own narrative wrinkles. Recall the celebratory tone ten years ago: upon steering the CF's transition from a

⁵² 'Liberal' here is invoked in opposition to Gentile's own military realism. It functions as a pejorative insult referring generally to impudence and to a naïve belief in nation-building efforts and the reach of global civil society without much thought for the necessity of military expenditures. Gentile is realistic of about the generation and delivery of violence as well as its implications; however, his rather conservative view of American prerogative makes, as with many military agents, for an ambivalent, problematic figure versus, say, Bacevich. In the critical theory and the radical humanities, liberal is a bad word.

more static role in Kabul to 'muscular' warfighting in Kandahar Province in late 2005, then-Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier relished the opportunity to demonstrate the poise and prowess of Canadian land forces now finally able to get to the business of killing in the interests of the Canada's contribution to ISAF: "We are the Canadian Forces, and our job is to be able to kill people" (Hillier, in Podur & Kolhaktar 2005: ¶3). Hillier, wrapping his comments with no shortage of demonizing and racist tropes, suggested that those killed would be "detestable murderers and scumbags" who "detested" 'our' freedom, society, and liberties (¶2). Following the CF's intense combat operations in the Panjwayi and Dand regions of Kandahar Province in 2006, which resulted in in dozens of Canadians killed and wounded, counterinsurgency provided a new narrative frame for domestic audiences aware of and even wary of the war. According to Jon Elmer, the Canadian military and political establishment was fundamentally deceptive in lauding the swelling counterinsurgency effort, where the recourse to the virtuous and humane approach to a war of necessity in fact masked a shrewd opportunity for the ongoing renewal and reinvention of Canadian militarism keen to shed its peacekeeping and nation-building narratives in favour of warfighting capabilities (Elmer 2006). In his book *Creating a Failed State: The U.S. and Canada in Afghanistan* (2007), Canadian political economist John Warnock detailed the transformation of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan and asserted that the ongoing push to counterinsurgency, hollow and ineffective overall because of the unsustainable militarization of aid (Warnock 2008: 169), was crass opportunism for a Canadian military establishment intent on reasserting its importance in Canada via a new narrative (160-2).⁵³ Counterinsurgency did not simply re-invent the war narrative for Canadians; it breathed new life into an institution in decline.

In 2013, with Canadian units in a training/mentoring role, counterinsurgency's legacy was being assessed and debated. Writing in *Canadian Military Journal*, Bob Martyn argued that counterinsurgency was important in generating institutional changes but that the CF would do well to "unlearn counterinsurgency" (Martyn 2013: 5) lest the paradigm and concept undermine the wider conventional capacities of the CF. Martyn warned about 'creep' of counterinsurgency through the CF by

⁵³ For a timely collection of critical account of Canada's role in Afghanistan up to 2008, see the already-mentioned collection *Afghanistan & Canada* (2008).

tracing the debate on counterinsurgency, considering its effects in the context of a Canadian Forces undergoing another phase of "force transformation" after the CF's 2011 report on transformation (CF Office of Transformation/Leslie 2011) that outlined the implementation of integrated operating concepts and doctrine for comprehensive approaches to future operating environments⁵⁴ during a time of austere financial and economic conditions.⁵⁵ The institutional benefits of counterinsurgency doctrine and operations created pliable and nimble North Atlantic military forces able to deploy for global contingency and stability operations and undertake "social engineering" in "ungoverned spaces" (Martyn 2013: 4).⁵⁶ Canada's extensive if varied Afghan deployment from 2002 onward generated significant changes: the CF and DND created paradigms and operating concepts like whole-of-government approach (WOG) and "diplomacy, defence, and development" (3D) (10); these lead into the concept of a "joint, interagency, multinational, and public" (JIMP)-capable military force (Leslie, Gizewski, and Rostek 2008) and enabled continued developments in the Canadian Army in relation to the Force 2021 operating concept based on "Adaptive and Dispersed Operations" (CF DLCD 2011b & 2007).

For Martyn, all these concepts and paradigms together represent the military response to the challenge of expeditionary warfare, indicating the necessity of 'plug-and-play' capabilities merging different military capacities (i.e., firepower and biopower) for the vaunted comprehensive approach to operating across a continuum of operations. Yet, while the Afghan war and counterinsurgency warfare

⁵⁴ The Chief of Force Development (DND) produced *Integrated Capstone Concept* (2010), which was intended to serve as unifying document the CF in the context of realizing comprehensive, integrated, and adaptive and networked operations. The document coincides with the development of CFJP-01 *Canadian Military Doctrine*, an updated CF-wide doctrine document produced by the Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre from the official Canadian Forces Joint Publication series.

⁵⁵ The irony here is hard to miss, especially following the debacle of the F-35 fighter jet fiasco, which revealed expedient but unjustified and poorly conceived decision making on the part of civilian and military officials in DND. The Afghan deployment and counterinsurgency raised the profile of the CF. Its symbolic reinvention during the initial phases of the Harper government in 2006-7 resulted in the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) in 2008 that triumphantly outlined \$490 billion in funding for the CF to 2028. Yet, in 2012, a 'reset' was ordered; with calls for federal budget cuts to military spending and reports from within the CF and DND that the procurement and funding plan was unaffordable, the strategy's "level of ambition" was being reviewed. See David Pugliese, (16 Nov 2012) "Will the CFDS Become Victim of Government Cutbacks," *Ottawa Citizen*, <<http://blogs.ottawacitizen.com/2012/11/16/will-the-canada-first-defence-strategy-become-a-victim-of-government-cutbacks/>>.

⁵⁶ The recourse to so-called ungovernable spaces—and the normalization of such a term—beg a number of questions regarding perceived dominance, an implicit neocolonial-imperial perspective, and the primacy of ways of rule specific to liberal capitalist enclosures.

generated significant epistemological and operational change in the CF, Martyn argued that preparing for counterinsurgency as a chronic condition ultimately undermines the overall military capacities of North Atlantic states. The risk relates to so-called "conventional capabilities":

[R]etooling of the military as a constabulary force would merely bog [North Atlantic states] down in generations of unwinnable wars, to the detriment of preparing to face continued conventional threats such as those coming potentially from North Korea, Iraq, or China. (5-6)

Martyn's critique is emblematic of detractors of counterinsurgency doctrine. Getting caught up in too many "unwinnable [and undeclared] wars"—a common idiom issued from military circles following indecisive or complex deployments or missions with no "solid, attainable political objectives" (10)—is not an attractive position for military forces returning from ten-plus years of ongoing deployments and operating within the neoliberal context of state-directed austerity. Yet, even as it recovers from a continually high 'operational tempo' specific to the Afghan deployment, the CF will likely be inclined to undertake coalition-based expeditionary operations in stability or contingency contexts, meaning that while counterinsurgency may slowly slip away from view both publicly and even in military circles, its 'lessons' will fertilize new ways of conducting operations. The current deployment of Canadian special forces and Canadian air power to Syria-Iraq war is consistent with this stability-contingency focus that blends into security force assistance and foreign internal defence. Similarly, recent decision by the then-Harper government in early 2015 to send CF units to Ukraine to train Ukrainian state forces in what has been an ongoing war with Russian-backed separatists in the eastern border regions also conforms to this disposition in the post-Afghanistan period. Thus, whether counterinsurgency is spoken as such or remains unsaid, its disappearance is unlikely to be an unlearning; claims otherwise, while perhaps wishful within some circles of military intellectuals, amounts to disavowal. The doctrine and the conduct will undoubtedly re-emerge in novel and unanticipated ways.

* * *

So, given the discussion of Foucault and war, of the glancing non-encounter encounter with military affairs and the limit-attitude of counterinsurgents, and having mapped the narrativization and conduct of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan from 2006 onward, we can now turn to interrogate specific operational and campaign-based examples of epidemiological warfare and the collateralization of war that constitutes contemporary military reality. The next chapter does this by assessing the firepower and biopower of village stability operations (VSO), a growing subdomain specific to population-centered counterinsurgency and contingency operations in foreign internal defense missions. By examining several specific VSO-based campaigns and initiatives in Afghanistan, we get a better sense of the intricacies of how the war was territorialized, collateralized, and conducted in biopolitical terms.

4 Counterinsurgency, or Envelopment, Environment, and Firepower-Biopower

Military violence, then, endeavours not only to bring death and destruction to its intended targets but also to communicate with its survivors...The communicative dimension of military threats can function only if gaps are maintained between the possible destruction that an army is able to inflict and the actual destruction it does inflict. It is through the constant demonstration of existence and the size of this gap that the military communicates with the people it fights and occupies.

-Eyal Weizman, *The Least of All Possible Evils* (2012: 19)

There is no such thing as a single concept of 'village', but there are a multitude of local notions concerning spatial and settlement belonging. While an uninformed outsider would try to approach 'the local' with the village notion in mind, such an encounter is most likely to face difficulties and cause confusion since the scope of what local encompasses is very wide and not fixed. The locals' insider perception is much more differentiated than the outsiders' perception and it is strongly contextualized at the same time.

- Katja Mielke & Conrad Schetter, "Where is the Village?" (2007: 80)

From the perspective of both insurgent groups and governments combating insurrections, community development may not be a politically inert poverty reduction technology but an intervention that supports the reach of the state, particularly in contexts where the state and insurgents are competing at the grassroots by providing governance and public services.

- Robert Oppenheim, "Community and Counterinsurgency" (2012: 249-50)

...You must approach every village as its own campaign.

- "Applying Influence Within the Campaign," *UK JDP 3-40* (2009: 37)

In this chapter, I interrogate village stability operations (VSO) undertaken in Afghanistan's Helmand and Kandahar Provinces from 2009 onward, a three-year push that is emblematic of counterinsurgency's collateralization and unrestriction of military violence. Taking a chronological approach, I examine how village stabilization evolved from ever-localizing forms of intervention into Afghanistan's lifeworld. By using first-hand accounts from military counterinsurgents who designed and implemented village stability operations and drawing on critical analyses by local Afghan advocacy groups, along with an emerging body of military doctrine and 'lessons learned' reports, the chapter exposes the blend of firepower and biopower employed to compel and coopt local populations. As I argue, the conduct and discourse of village stability represents another phase of North Atlantic military

enlightenment and is emblematic of the military limit-attitude realized during the last decade of expeditionary war.

Across much of Afghanistan, the village serves as the biopolitical *milieu* where counterinsurgents divide communities, territorializing the war by distributing lethal and non-lethal effects. To desire the village is to interrogate its built environment and its visible and invisible infrastructures. Villages are conduits to extend the reach of the Afghan government by 'pushing' local populations 'up and out' toward national and regional initiatives flowing downward. Counterinsurgents seek the correct balance of life-taking and life-making initiatives to shape life in the village, which becomes a place of both protection and exposure for Afghans subject to North Atlantic military methods of 'war amongst the people.' Village-centered approaches have been an anchor for different iterations of counterinsurgency, whether from the idealization of small French military cadres undertaking *nomadisation* and spreading via the 'oil-spot' method in colonial and late-colonial counterinsurgency wars, to the American strategic hamlet pacification system of Vietnam, to Soviet-era village-level methods in Afghanistan. Yet, what is new in Afghanistan is the more intensive employment of biopower into the environment of life itself to bring the population into the acceptable biopolitical bandwidth. VSO rely on a number of comprehensive and interlocking methods, producing different speeds and relative intensities of violence to take custody of populations. By testing the 'atmospherics' of local spaces and inserting the war into villages based on patterns of life (POL), village stabilization implies something unstable at the outset and in need of modification. Stability, as equilibrium (or, as fomenting and managing *disequilibrium* as per Foucault), arrives via biopolitical development efforts like ISAF's Afghanistan-wide Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) delivering infrastructure projects like agricultural reforms, access to water, economic and entrepreneurial enfranchisement, and the delivery of basic medical services (c.f. U.S FM 3-07 2008: Appendix F on PRTs). Biopower is then one stream in a wider repertoire of measures, coincident with more conventional shaping and clearing operations or with clandestine but *not* secret kill/capture raids across 'restive' areas in Afghanistan—not secret

because they must remain legible so as to communicate the persuasive appeal of alternative types of non-lethal pacification.

I demonstrate that village-level counterinsurgency promises to improve security for populations, but the biopolitical technologies deployed as military means exploit the vulnerabilities and precarity they claim to mitigate in that the measures themselves collateralize and distribute the war through the built environment and critical infrastructure for life. First, I consider the discourse around Afghan village ecology in order to frame it as critical biopolitical infrastructure, emphasizing the ways in which military knowledge production and culturally-aware counterinsurgency comprehends customary, traditional, and religious protocols and procedures for life and living in the Afghan human terrain. The section dedicates some consideration to the discursive importance and neocolonial shortcomings of "village" as a semiotic and epistemological operator in relation to the veneration of anthropological-cultural-ethnographic intelligence and to the function of the village as the target for economic reforms. I also devote some space to considering the role of gender as a technology of biopower in Afghanistan and how counterinsurgents navigate and exploit the performance of gender as a means of preparing the village for stabilization through development and reconstruction initiatives. This connects to another section in the chapter regarding female counterinsurgents. Second, and working chronologically, I address the CF's Key Village Approach and stabilization efforts in central Kandahar Province in 2009 and 2010, which stand as precursors to formalized VSO doctrine and practice. This is followed by the third section, which examines the use of biopower by American forces in Marjah, Afghanistan, following Operation *Mosharak* in 2010. Across these two sections, I consider how counterinsurgents use agricultural and infrastructure development projects to collateralize the war into local environments and solicit the support of local populations for counterinsurgents. Fourth, I devote a small section to addressing the village-level employment of biometrics and the pursuit of "identity dominance" (US Army CALL 2011s), a comprehensive program aiming to informationalize Afghanistan's populations which developed in conjunction with the push into the villages. As an initiative launched and refined by NATO forces from 2009 onward, this military biometrics program

aims to render Afghans and Afghan communities into their most basic epidemiological constituents, and dreams of *re-membling* them according the imperatives of risk and social network analysis specific to counterinsurgency. The scale of use is significant: while classical or late-colonial counterinsurgency has always relied on census figures, identity passes and controls, and more rudimentary social network analysis to make risky populations intelligible, these new methods offer ways of cross-referencing and tracking movements in a targeting system based on complex data analytics, which has implications for controlling and monitoring whole populations and single individuals in Afghanistan and beyond.

These sections build toward the fifth and sixth sections, where I address the arrival and refinement of village stability operations as conducted by North Atlantic special forces. After considering a number of historical precedents for village stability as a form of irregular warfare, I examine the formal integration of VSO into the ISAF military campaign in Afghanistan, assessing how some conceptions of village stability invoke the language of neoliberalism to frame missions as speculative exercises in venture capital and entrepreneurial enterprise activities. I also consider the emphasis placed on raising informal local self-defence forces—namely the informal Afghan Local Police (ALP)—to augment counterinsurgency efforts. The push for local Afghan self-defence pulls populations in two directions at once: it naturalizes what counterinsurgents affirm as their incipient propensity for violence, pathologizing communities for being 'war machines' prone to endemic tribal or village-to-village conflict, while simultaneously pressuring communities to fight, thereby exploiting the same capacity to counter insurgency and ensure stability. Sixth, I address the biopolitical implications of female engagement teams (FET) and cultural support teams (CST), adaptive military innovations realized during the conduct of VSO. These teams represent new 'corrective' assets for counterinsurgency to, in the word of an FET commander, "use female influence for information and messaging capacity" (Cobiesky 2013; Preen 2011). I argue that the teams augment local village stability efforts by exploiting conservative gender roles in rural Afghan environments and serve primarily to generate intelligence by accessing the female core of the Pashtun *oikos nomos* hidden from view, the domestic interior of local hearts and minds. In other words, female counterinsurgents become

technologies of biopolitical envelopment, penetrating the village and collateralizing the war effort by exploiting gender norms—in Pashtun customary culture and in the context of North Atlantic military organs themselves. These teams' deployments relied on and rearticulated the same liberal-imperial feminist arguments used to justify liberal war in 2001 and today under the sign of benevolent intervention, women's liberation, and human rights. This discussion forces a consideration of more radical transnational feminisms, which seek to avoid reductions to some composite 'oppressed Afghan woman' while registering no less the contradictions inherent in the customs and traditions of rural Afghan communities regarding gender roles, patriarchy, and women.

Last, I offer a few observations about how local communities and populations within village environments are compelled to live precariously *as* the environment for war, and how they subsequently serve as indices and relays for military success. This means considering how military actors ultimately produce population as a field of sensors always emitting signals or data, which must be put 'in form' to make sense of operations. In considering how these village-level operations are made legible and deemed successful or not, I revisit some of the methods used in counterinsurgency to measure effectiveness by way of metrics and indicators that actively "embrace the fog of war" (Connable 2012). I conclude by suggesting that, alongside traditional military concepts like *enfilade* (envelopment), we can consider the biopower and firepower of counterinsurgency as an exercise in *sapping*, which in military jargon refers to engineering efforts to undermine and breach fortifications, to literally sap defences. Here, of course, the fortification to breach has become population.

The Village Ecology as Biopolitical Infrastructure

The population is a set of non-friends whilst remaining potential friends, non-enemies whilst remaining potential enemies. The logic of categorical opposition is suspended as enemies appear and disappear unpredictably... [C]onsequently, the population is not only considered in terms of what it currently is. Counterinsurgency becomes *anticipatory*. The emphasis is on whether a friend could become an enemy in the future or vice versa. *This means that any actual enemy is not simply an evil to be destroyed and extinguished. There is always the possibility of becoming a friend.* (Anderson 2010: 213, emphasis added)

Village-level operations speculate on whether enemies will become friends, and vice versa, and it is in this way that the village is a fetish for counterinsurgents, but only insofar as the fetish is, as Žižek argues, a symptom in reverse, a magical object on which obsessive attachments congeal.¹ The village is a symptom of counterinsurgents' desires not because they repress their desires for it in their competition with an insurgency, but because it always functions as a 'detail' or trigger indicating the inevitable 'loss' of rural Afghanistan no matter the war effort. In reversing this symptom, the village is a fetish because it indicates the space where the life of insurgency always magically remains; in their version of military reality, counterinsurgents are haunted by the spectre of something they understand as internal to the environment, which will never go away despite their best obsessive efforts. As Žižek goes on to remark, if one is forced to consider why and how to 'enjoy' one's own symptoms—to cease disavowing them—and if one is forced to renounce possession of the fetish, the rationalized and enlightened world one inhabits inevitably collapses (Žižek 2001: ¶3).

Ironically, the intellectual currents of counterinsurgency were beginning to change direction even as VSO commenced—as if military thinkers were already looking further afield. Ironically, the 2009 village stability push in Afghanistan occurred in parallel with wider doctrinal claims that the city would be the site for future counterinsurgency operations. Patterns and flows of migration along with the fallouts of capitalism and climate change suggested that Global South coastal megacities and their dense reconfigured spaces (edge cities; gentrified conurbations; ghettos, slums, shantytowns, and favelas) and subjectivities (ecological, economic, and political refugees; non-status, *de facto*, and irregular citizens) appear to be the likely locations for urban contingency operations of which counterinsurgency is a part (Kilcullen 2014; Graham 2010; Coaffee 2009; Sassen 2008). In the medical imagination of counterinsurgency, the concentration of people and the density of social networks in cities are rich breeding grounds for viral insurgencies; biopolitically, cities territorialize segregated populations along economic, social, and cultural lines, a collection of frontier spaces requiring stabilization and

¹ Žižek: "The fetish is effectively a kind of symptom in reverse. That is to say, the symptom is the exception which disturbs the surface of the false appearance, the point at which the repressed Other Scene erupts, while the fetish is the embodiment of the Lie which enables us to sustain the unbearable truth" (2001).

pacification. Certainly, Afghanistan has its large cities. Kandahar and Kabul are urban centres constituted by heterogeneous demographics and enclaves, each having its own 'mobile multiplicities' composing the population. Yet, across the Afghanistan, village-level life is the norm, and the village had to become the laboratory for new methods. With over 75% of people living in Afghanistan's rural areas, local populations orient their collective lives around subsistence agriculture and small commercial activities, and poverty is a durable feature in the village environment (World Bank, "Afghanistan Priorities," 2012). As villages provide the venue for decentralized local governmentalities and for local economic activities built around farming, irrigation, and small-scale commercial activities, counterinsurgents were faced with stretching their efforts and binding rural spaces together.

By 2011, coalition and host-nation forces were consumed with exploiting the village *milieu*, linking island chains of secure and cleared areas, archipelagos of villages and towns bolstered by forward operating bases and combat outposts constructed from modular HESCO 'Concertainer' barriers. These fortified installations mimic the mud-wall and brick-mortar bunker-like compounds—*qalats*, in Pashto—that are rural Afghan homes in a country that is allegedly "the land of a million Alamos" (Yon 2009). If we believe the anthropological intelligence about tribal cultures and local social networks, we likely think of these homes from the outside as war machines, dwellings and stop-over points from which a family and community can subsist and defend, a defensive fighting position to supply the means for life and living. As per Paul Virilio's well-known argument (1979), a house, a village, a town, and a city are always-already fortified fighting positions, part of the architecture of war and military (sub)urbanism, a continuation of war by other means. In Afghanistan, the clusters and nodes of compounds within the larger distribution of villages are designed to enclose land arrayed around irrigation ditches and canals (*karez*); while sometimes labyrinthine with pathways between walls, buildings, drying huts, and different plots of agricultural land, they have their approaches and their 'fields of fire,' their *glacis* and *esplanade*² designed to expose interlopers. Sometimes, these approaches are

² These are classical French military engineering concepts. A *glacis* is an artificially sloped area outside a fortress' walls to prevent cover and expose attackers to direct fire. An *esplanade* is the large open area outside a fortress' or city's walls, effectively a kill zone. In urban design vernacular, esplanades (known also as promenades) today are open, level walkways or median areas that divide boulevards or roads.

ringed with IEDs emplaced by fighters intending to forestall the advance of ISAF units. They may remain undetected by counterinsurgents or villagers may warn foreign troops depending on the disposition of the village, who it favours, who it is compelled to collaborate with, and how it is targeted within the economy of mimetic desires borne by insurgents and counterinsurgents.

Securing villages and villagers in an expeditionary context means reconciling strategic goals with already-stretched logistical demands of constant campaigning far from the domestic spaces of the North Atlantic basin. As with any extended campaign, the 'tail-to-teeth' problem of military logistics—the fighting 'teeth' at one end, the supply of military *matériel* at the tail—plays a substantial determining role in Afghanistan (Gregory 2012: ¶20), generating friction as a material constraint on how and where to stage the war (De Landa 1991: 113). Dispersed village-level operations and the networking of different supply lines are determined practically by logistics and, thus, by the financial and capital flows internal to any military deployment. Counterinsurgency then must literally speculate and hedge on its assets, calculating its tolerance for risk financially and geographically while considering how to engineer effects and systematically design operations in sustainable and proportionate ways, knowing all the while that insurgency is strongest where its own resources are weakest.³ This calculation determines the ways counterinsurgents seek to exploit opportunities—arbitrage-like, with fewer risks during their transactions—across the continuum from ballistics to biopower.

The village with its population thus acts as a large sentinel device, both a guard against and an indicator of disease. It will relay a picture of the war for counterinsurgents that reveals viral contamination by insurgency, which circulates perpetually through and is nested within the pathways of village ecologies. Military quarantine achieved with firepower and biopower, as hybrid therapeutics, relies on the village to provide a zero-ground on which to base and orchestrate missions and operations. The village will confirm the difficulties encountered by counterinsurgents with respect to discrimination and targeting, where a population is never beyond reproach and always susceptible to the risk of being compromised by the illiberal insurgent cause. This is ironic given the resigned, quiet, but equally

³ Faysal Itani, a fellow at the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, suggests: "That's the logic of insurgency. You don't confront the regime where it's the strongest and employs its best tools; you confront it where it has diverted [military and economic] resources away."

difficult compromises local communities must make when interfacing and interacting with counterinsurgents. According to the logic of counterinsurgency, the germ of insurgency exists always-already in the village, and for counterinsurgents channeling their best Heideggerian readings of Hölderlin, the village is where danger lies alongside the possible growth of saving power, the place of redemption for friends or at least not-enemies. Viewed in advanced—foreseen—as a reservoir of risky, resentful, and illicit elements, the village may resist but is still potentially amenable to comply if not collaborate with its own occupation undertaken by ISAF forces serving as agents of the Afghan government deemed the legitimate authority.⁴ Yet if not amenable to these efforts, the village and its population can always be made to assume the ambivalent role of *Pharmakon*, performing biopolitically as a site of the therapeutic "remedy" while serving as an available "scapegoat" or *pharmakos* sacralized and sacrificed if efforts fail to immunize the population.⁵ Counterinsurgents can always blame Afghans for not wanting to be saved.

As Guha's analysis of the prose of counterinsurgency demonstrates, the insurgent is often stripped of any internal motivation or desire, becoming *deus ex machina*. Despite the complex analyses of her expressions and activities, she is rendered as if motivations are external to her; she must be biopolitically renaturalized and emplaced in the ecosystem of the local environment, autotelic and telluric, indigenized as a species with an infernal predilection to vigilance, resistance, and violence independent of the force directed at her, which communicates its own message of convert or be killed. By this calculus, warfare is an endemic feature originating in *her* environment and terrain (Gregory 2008: 18), and this offers counterinsurgents the moral and ethical high ground. However, the extended engagement by counterinsurgents admits to liberal faith in transformation and redemption by acting on what, according to liberal rule, are "locally regressive conditions" to "resuscitate the vitality of local life systems" (Evans 2011: 750). Yet, the rhetorical and semiotic cover offered to operations described as driving 'wedges' between Afghans and insurgents disavows the basic fact that insurgents *are* often

⁴ While the power of the State is arbitrary and exceptional but enforced no less through violence, village life in Afghanistan reveals alternative and competing systems of government and authority.

⁵ I am loosely drawing on both Derrida's and Girard's complex interpretation of Plato's use of *Pharmakon*. See Derrida, (1981) "Plato's Pharmakon," *Disseminations*, 99-127; and see Girard, (1977) *Violence and the Sacred*.

Afghans and *are* one part of a population segregated and divided as such—by their own efforts, by counterinsurgents—whether in imaginary or material terms. By bringing war to the village in order to support and stabilize it, counterinsurgents unrestricted and actually enlarge their conception of whom and what is a target. They may not use acute ballistics and the killing power but the life-making measures they deploy have different dosages and employ a different intensity of fighting. They are ambient and mediate and affect environments in different non-linear ways. The quote from Weizman at the start of the chapter refers to survivors as the remaining bodies with which military violence will communicate after the initial point of contact and killing. As communications, the operational art of counterinsurgency will coerce people to live, forcing them to signal in their very acts of living—in their engagements and exchanges, in the data they generate as living creatures—the success, or at minimum the defensibility, of the war effort.

In the rugged mountainous regions of the northern and eastern frontier provinces and in the dry deserts and *wadis* of the south, the valleys and their green zones are the only places available to sustain and supply any density of population, meaning that counterinsurgents attempt to seize these spaces and collateralize the flow of war into them. To use military force as a custodial technology for conducting the conduct of populations, the flow of war must necessarily circumscribe environments in which populations themselves are determined by their caloric, metabolic, and agrarian limitations. The war will follow the valleys because the people are in the valleys. The Korengal Valley and the Pech River Valley, both in Kunar Province, are two ecosystems depicted in the film *Restrepo* (2010; c.f. *Korengal* [2014]), which documents the 15-month deployment of an American airborne platoon to a remote combat outpost in 2008. The unit was tasked with clearing the area and facilitating the construction of a reliable commercial road route linking different villages and settlements in challenging terrain.⁶ Post-2009, the evangelical call of counterinsurgency unfolded with operations into the green

⁶ American airborne and Marine units were more expansively deployed in isolated combat outposts in Nuristan and Kunar Provinces from 2005 onward. The physical terrain of the Hindu Kush significantly constrained ISAF operations and limited mobility. Notably, the Battle of Wanat (July 2008) and the Battle of Kamdesh (October 2009), both in Nuristan, saw large insurgent forces make massed conventional attacks on American outposts, temporarily overrunning the bases and resulting in some of the heaviest losses for ISAF forces to that point in the war.

zones of the Arghandab River in Kandahar—across Zhari, Dand, Panjwayi, and Maiwand Districts—and of the Helmand and Musa Qala Rivers of Helmand Province, creating different theatres of operations amongst the people in the riparian spaces for life. After the initial influx of American troops in late 2009, larger coordinated operations followed: the American-led offensive, Operations *Khanjar* ("Strike for the Sword") and *Panchai Palang* ("Panther's Claw") was launched across central Helmand Province in 2009; Operation *Moshtarak* ("Together")⁷ targeted Marjah, Helmand, and its surrounding area in late summer 2010; and Operation Dragon Strike directed new ISAF efforts into the Arghandab River valley northwest of Kandahar City in late 2010. Significant in scale, these operations unfolded as coordinated assemblies of different local village level-actions tied to green zones.

Insofar as the village focus aimed to bring government and security to rural areas, rural Afghanistan was neither unruly nor ungovernable. As argued by Derek Gregory in a recent lecture, the recourse to lawlessness to justify military intervention functions obscures what are law-bound spaces with different ways of rule and with protocols and procedures for life (Gregory 2015; c.f. Pugliese 2014: 127-8). In their own research about NGO aid and development in post-2001 Afghanistan after the initial occupation and during the war, Mielke and Schetter (2007)⁸ do not describe a vacuum or absence of government but rather altogether different orientations regarding ways of rule and ways of life.⁹ In conjunction with culturally-aware civilian researchers and NGOs, more receptive counterinsurgents would learn how the Afghan "village" itself is a reductive colonial remnant tied to racialized discourses and technologies of civilization and modernization. Villages and villagers were always-already lesser forms, impediments to modern development trapped in the past and devalued relative to colonized

⁷ These are all translations from Dari, which is the main Persian (Farsi) dialect spoken in Afghanistan. Dari is the vehicular language of the Afghan National Army.

⁸ While the authors' international development field work is well-intentioned and not conducted under the sign of counterinsurgency or military knowledge needs, it follows from the refocusing of the global humanitarian rescue industry's attention—whether military, paramilitary, or non-military—towards Afghanistan. Schetter's more recent edited collection, *Local Politics in Afghanistan: A Century of Intervention in the Social Order* (Hurst: 2013), offers a longer historical view of the uneven and destabilizing interactions between foreigners and local communities.

⁹ Mielke and Schetter's research follows from their own extended and intensive field work in northeastern Kunduz Province, an area comprised of Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara communities, with the Pashtun in the majority. While Kunduz province has not seen the same operational level of activity from NATO ISAF since 2009 as the eastern and southern provinces, German units and American special forces have conducted similar pushes into village-level environments.

indigenous communities living in colonial urban centres, the primary targets of administration, commerce, and bureaucracy. That said, contemporary counterinsurgents would appreciate how a village territorializes a centralized and consolidated location as a place to implant the jurisdiction necessary to govern local affairs (Mielke & Schetter 2007: 73). They would affirm that a village, as a node and confluence of different flows, is an administrative target, remaining mindful all the while that the conceptualization of any village is dependent on how local Afghan communities imagine themselves and their respective social and physical geographies (72). That is to say, the village is enclosed spatially and inhabited in common but is a networked site of religious loyalties, family and kinship allegiances, and commercial relationships. Solidarities will vary. Further, according to the culturally-aware military knowledge apparatus, any counterinsurgency effort must realize that "the basic unit for democracy is clearly the tribe and the tribal system," which is especially so in rural villages and remote settlements (Grant, in Dennys 2012: 2). Yet, inasmuch as "tribe" functions as a key symbolic referent for non-Afghans to discern common descent and local bonds, the recourse to "tribe" as a unit of analysis is arguably an orientalist residue wherein associating communities with tribes in strict terms tends to simplify complex social relations and make generalizations about local interests, which is common in military-colonial pacification strategies (Gonzalez 2009b).

Given the durability of local forms of government and rule, attempts to push centralized government into rural Afghanistan are not unique to the North Atlantic war. After the 1964 establishment of a constitutional monarchy in Afghanistan, administrative reforms allocated resources to organizing and ordering rural areas, attempting to develop reliable institutions in a 'country without a state' Yet, the administrative penetration of local village-level environments has remained difficult from the Soviet invasion through the intractable civil wars between warlords, drug cartels, and the Taliban government, and into the North Atlantic expeditionary war:

[A]dministrative units beyond the district level have not been recognised legally to this day. Officially, Afghanistan has a two-tier government system consisting of national and provincial administrations. Lower-level government bodies are specified in by-laws and include the district level (*wuluswāli*) as a third administrative tier. The *wuluswāli* usually, but not necessarily, comprises one district municipality called *shahrwāli wuluswāli*, where a main bazaar and government buildings are located. *Shahrwāli wuluswāli* as well as *shahrwāli velāyat*, e.g. the city

of Kunduz, display legally acknowledged elements in the formal administrative system as rural and provincial municipalities, while any other kind of rural settlements does not. This tends to be overlooked, but is still crucial, given the fact that most rural development projects target 'local' communities. As a result rural areas are approached with the Western assumption of the existence of 'villages' without actually understanding what the concept of 'village' entails in a particular environment. (Mielke & Schetter 2007: 74).

An array of different terms for "loci of rural community life" in Pashto and Dari include *qalas*, *qarya*, *deh*, *qishaq*, *manteqa* and *keley* (*kelay*).¹⁰ While all are typically translated into English as "village," this translation fails to convey the deeper cultural and territorial contexts of these terms. The imagined and physical coordinates of settlements tend to describe social rather than strict territorial units; given the structuring role played by irrigation canals and other agricultural infrastructures—the ecological green zones—the village morphology is shaped and understood by local communities through these types of spatial formations tied to sustaining life (75-76). If *qalas* describe the coincidence of water and social management, the interchangeability of *qarya*, *qishlaq*, and *manteqa*, which designate either a bounded territorial unit or a space in which solidarity is shared, introduces semiotic friction and ambiguity into the lexicon of outsiders. As a point of reference, these latter three terms usually refer to communities organized around mosques. Given the reliance on livestock and animal husbandry, many rural settlements acted as stop-over points with good pasture, a break from the nomadic summer grazing season. For instance, *qishlaq* means "winter quarters" but can designate compact rural settlements characterized by ten families and one to two mosques (77). Some settlements are named after important elders (*arbab*) or local religious leaders (*mullah*) specific to local Afghan pastoral-based biopower, but cease to be named as such when an influential leader dies depending on how local biopolitical and governing power is transferred generationally (78).

So, on their own terms and independent of how counterinsurgents understand their nuances, villages in Afghanistan are important loci of power. Biopolitical development programs during the North Atlantic war have re-discovered the village as an important administrative tier for two reasons: first, for anchoring the logistical capacity to deliver aid initiatives and development-related services; and

¹⁰ Aside: based on my own anodyne interpretations while viewing war-related media and digital video, American, British, and Canadian forces tend to use *kelay* frequently. Google Earth also relies heavily on *kelay* in its rendering of Helmand and Kandahar Provinces's villages and towns.

second, for interpellating local communities with concepts of participatory development and discourses of 'thick' accountability as they seize and are seized by external funding flows for development and reconstruction projects (Mielke & Schetter 2007: 81). For instance, the federal National Solidarity Program, run out of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, commenced in 2003 with plans to continue through 2015. At its height, the program ran only in what ISAF deemed 'cleared' areas and in conjunction with provincial PRTs. Funded largely through monies disbursed by the World Bank's International Development Association (which manages the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund) and through bilateral payments from states within the North Atlantic orbit (GoIRA 2013: ¶6),¹¹ the program is built on the basis of micro-institutional Community Development Councils (CDCs) modeled on traditional *shuras* (local decision-making councils), but set up on the basis of families rather than on villages *per se* (Mielke & Schetter 2007: 81-82; c.f. GoIRA 2013: ¶1). According to official data, the program has financed 77 000 subprojects valued at \$1.3 billion (US) routed through over 31 000 CDCs across Afghanistan (GoIRA 2013: tables 1 & 2). As conduits for grassroots funding, the CDCs are conceived of as extensions of the Afghan traditions of *Ashar* ("community members working together on a volunteer basis to improve community infrastructure") and *jirga* ("councils comprised of respected members of the community"), and as following from "Islamic values of unity, justice, and equity" (¶2-3).

While wrapping the project in a local cultural and social frame may have convinced donors of its efficacy, many of the NSP-funded initiatives contribute to quick-impact projects (QIPs). Though mitigating immediate infrastructural gaps, they do not sustain longer-term transformations with respect to levels of community trust or changes to economic activity or significantly high levels of poverty (Beath et al 2010, in Klassen 2013: 159-60). While CDCs are held up as proof of local engagement and the efficacy of community-based decision-making attuned to local conditions, the

¹¹ "The NSP receives funding from four primary sources: the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA), the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), the Japanese Social Development Fund (JSDF) and bilateral donors. Contributors to the NSP via the ARTF include Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, EC/EU, Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, UK/ DFID, and the United States. Bilateral donors include the Governments/Embassies/International Aid Agencies from Cyprus, Denmark, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland. The proportion of the funding received to-date is as follows: US\$ 437.84 Million (22.06 - %) IDA, US\$ 1369.48 Million (69.0%) ARTF, US\$ 41.81 Million (2.11 %) JSDF, US\$ 7.92 Million (0.40%) FPCRTF and US\$ 127.63 Million (6.43%) bilateral funds. Funding from some donors are [sic] preferred' by geographic area or core components." 'Preference' here suggests tied aid.

projects are based on often-incompatible North Atlantic neoliberal economic assumptions, which compound problems regarding the project duration and effect (Podur 2013; Sedra 2012). As argued by Alex Marshall, the localized development apparatus in contemporary counterinsurgency "ignores the broader neoliberal economic context which robs states of many of the tools that they had in the past" (Marshall, in Manea 2010: ¶ 13) and renews the project of creating and managing a compliant population of neocolonial subjects indexed to wider global imperatives of liberal rule (Marshall 2010: 250). Certainly, the aid agenda successfully completed school and education projects, road reconstruction, irrigation infrastructure improvements, and basic immunizations but it failed to address "systematic weaknesses" in Afghanistan's social and economic systems (Klassen 2013: 161). Additionally, given the externally-driven aid apparatus in Afghanistan, many of the macro-level political economic processes tied to the NSP remain part of a wider neoliberal framework premised on structural adjustments, massive debt-bound relations through loans,¹² the privatization of state assets, a number of legal agreements on export-driven mining and extractive sector to exploit a mining 'treasure trove'¹³ and foreign investor rights (Klassen 2013: 160).¹⁴ From this perspective, North Atlantic military intervention is a globalizing vector to establish Afghanistan as an "economic bridgehead" for foreign (esp. American, Canadian, Indian, and Chinese) investment (Skinner 2011: ¶ 3) and as a way to embed more durable capitalist social relations in South Asia generally (Skinner 2013b: 110). Of course, speculative opportunities are framed as the long-term and sustainable way forward to economic security and prosperity for Afghans, but it seems to be nothing other than another cycle of exploitative neocolonial underdevelopment dressed up as humanitarianism.¹⁵ The language of corporate social responsibility and corporate social integration regarding 'shared value creation,' 'building local capacity,'

¹² Loans route through the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank's Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC).

¹³ See Nicolas Johnson, (7 March 2012), "Canadian firms guide Afghan efforts to unlock mining 'treasure trove'," *The Globe and Mail*, <<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/canadian-firms-guide-afghan-efforts-to-unlock-mining-treasure-trove/article4092530/>>.

¹⁴ Klassen cites the Hydrocarbons Law, the Mining Law and the Law on Foreign Investment.

¹⁵ From Josue De Castro: "Underdevelopment is not the lack of development. It is the result of an ill-guided kind of universal development. It is the abusive concentration of income—especially during this historic period dominated by capitalist neo-colonialism, which is responsible for much of the underdevelopment in the world today: the regions that are direct political or economic colonies." See <<http://www.josuedecastro.com.br/eng/development.html>>.

and addressing 'social dimensions of competitive contexts' are together really a way of transferring risks to an already unsteady Afghan economy in order to exploit a 'new Silk Road' (Skinner 2013b: ¶46).

The administrative recourse to the village understood in biopolitical terms—to act on actions and conduct the conduct of life—links populations to territory in order to normalize and consolidate them while simultaneously decentralizing the government of economic and social life by allowing for an acceptable 'bandwidth' of heterogeneity and divergence from the coming 'government from above.' Beyond the rhetorical force of law, the federal Afghan government has demonstrated a substantive lack of ruling authority; it is no *Leviathan*, but it serves as a state, a focal point and 'mobile effect' to launch different governmentalities entering Afghanistan from global and local nodes. Engineering liberal democracy from the 'Kabul bubble' outward by bringing government institutions to rural areas is presumptuous: it naturalizes the intuitions of liberal government and normalizes government as a launching point for neoliberal political economy, which actually seems to fly in the face of the cultural and social intelligence indicating huge divides between Kabul and the rest of the country.¹⁶ According to Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín and Antonio Giustozzi, "Afghanistan's is a society very weakly integrated in a national framework, if at all...Hence the importance of social networks, local leaders, and 'men of influence'" (Sanín & Giustozzi 2010: 839). Leveraging these leaders, their charismatic power, and their patronage networks both in 2001 and 2009 remained a cornerstone for counterinsurgents to achieve an adequate end state; at the local level, special forces conducting village stability operations focused on key leader engagements to gain legitimacy and leverage influence. In his study of the anti-Taliban warlords of the 1990s United Front (i.e., the Northern Alliance) — Ahmad Shah Massoud, Ismail Khan, and Abdul Rashid Dostum—Giustozzi traces how local populations assemble around the protection and order created by these leaders (Giustozzi 2009b). Put biopolitically, they offer local communities the necessary pastoral and police power to create space for life and living. While sometimes harsh and

¹⁶ Writing from this perspective as a U.S. Marine training Afghan forces, Evan Munsing argues that "current counterinsurgency doctrine presumes a national solution to local problems" (Munsing 2014: ¶2). The centralized solution proposed as is failing because it is forcing 'Afghans'—who have nothing resembling a coherent and reliable central government—to adopt the American "reductionist approach" in terms of doctrine, in terms of reifying some catch-all "Taliban" as a coherent organization, and in relation to how Afghan military and police forces organize, supply, and deploy their assets (¶3).

repressive, their leadership enabled regional governmentalities, developing into an incipient kind of class consciousness and party-like awareness of localized and a-national constituent power. Although the syncretic cultural composition of the North Alliance (Uzbek, Tajik, and Hazara) stood in contrast to the largely Pashtun-centered communities of the Taliban heartland in the 1990s and into 2001 and beyond, these leaders all depended on grassroots support from below in exchange for stability and protection, which in turn produced vertebrate-like subnational formations with Dostum, Khan, and Massoud responsible for large populations to administer.

Writing before the 2009 military escalation, Jennifer Brick argues that the overinvestment in disruptive and distorting nation-building efforts from above, particularly in relation to the NSP program and through the formal creation of CDCs, undermines local forms of effective customary government in Afghanistan (Brick 2008: 1-2). These forms enjoy remarkable continuity in relation to rural political economies in the face of the last 40 years of acute and ambient violence whether during encounters with foreign militaries, with insurgent *jihadis* and *mujahedeen* leaders, or with local warlords. Traditional and customary local organizations and figures in rural Afghanistan like *shuras* or *jirgas* (village councils; see above), *maliks* (village executives), and *mullahs* (village lawgivers; see above) enjoy ongoing local support because of their egalitarian "ability to deliver public goods" ("local safety and security" [24]) and distribute common public wealth alongside the resolution of private property issues (i.e., land disputes). While they rely on conservative social scripts and oppressive gender roles and "are far from perfect," Brick suggests these organizations retain their legitimacy because they remain more accountable than government interventions from outside, which negatively impact local life in rural areas and dangerously destabilize the 'micro-foundations' of order in local rural settlements (36). In blunt terms, local communities are suspicious of outside initiatives especially when routed through a foreign counterinsurgency campaign promoting a weak central government. Seth Jones, a RAND intellectual and early advocate of village stability operations and local defense initiatives, echoed Brick in relation to Pashtun communities and the community-binding function of the *Pashtunwali*:

[P]ower tends to remain local in Pashtun areas, which is where the insurgency is largely being fought. Pashtuns may identify with their tribe, subtribe, clan, *qawm* [kinship-based ties], family,

or village based on where they are at the time, who they are interacting with, and the specific event. *Pashtunwali*, the Pashtun code of behavior, shapes daily life through obligations of honor, hospitality, revenge, and providing sanctuary. *Jirgas* and *shuras*—which are decision-making councils—remain instrumental at the local level, where state legal institutions are virtually nonexistent. (Jones 2010: ¶ 14)

The sophisticated operation of the *Pashtunwali* code is clearly something with which to be reckoned, and the military knowledge apparatus is quite accurate in identifying its practical importance for locals and for counterinsurgents seeking a way into local communities (c.f. Jones & Muñoz 2010: 21-2).

However, in venerating the code as emblematic of local protocols and procedures for ways of war, rule, and life, counterinsurgents do two things. First, interpret action and behaviour according to these local codes but do so reductively, indigenizing but re-mystifying and freezing local village life. Second, tension exists between the desire to change or alter these local patterns of life and the desire to respect them and adjust the approach accordingly. In the biopolitical imaginary of the Afghan war, the former is tantamount to a neocolonial civilizing mission, a process which military counterinsurgents are hesitant to embrace (i.e., 'We are not colonizers civilizing primitives'); the latter offers to recognize and work with differences, however regressive they may seem to counterinsurgents, which is the calling card of liberal ways of rule. This tension leads to my point: the *Pashtunwali* becomes a productive problem for counterinsurgents in that they can rely on it to do the work for them, resting on the fact that they will respect it, but that its 'timeless' and durable nature will also "tell the truth" about the mix of ballistic and biopolitical methods they decide to employ in their operations. In other words, they can explain away their successes and failures in relation to the code.

Further, trouble comes from relying too much on traditional bodies of local knowledge as *panacea*, interpreting local situations in simplistic or static ways. From Brick:

State builders often treat [informal, customary organizations] as embodiments of a “conservative political culture” that disenfranchises women or exploits peasants. In most cases, state builders do not consider them at all or they are just assumed to have been wiped out by decades of war. Emphasis on their “traditional” features conceals their “modern” capacities to govern. (Brick 2008: 3)

In recognizing these formations and practices as given and as characteristic of the *milieu*, counterinsurgents play to them to garner legitimacy but simultaneously alienate other parts of the

community. For instance, in focusing on key leader engagements and dealing with powerbrokers to "identify the local major players and rivalries and untangle any interpersonal intrigues" (Etoile 2011: 12), VSO and village-level counterinsurgency do not purport to fix or solve these problems. Rather, they provide information gathering opportunities within the larger social network, which enhances situational awareness at the cost of reinscribing existing social hierarchies that are ironically often disempowering (and dangerous) for some people within villages or communities. ISAF interventions do not transform so much as exploit existing divides in local communities by playing to some villagers and not others, and causing further vulnerability for those not aligned with the village leadership. For instance, a case study on American Naval Special Warfare Development Group units conducting VSO in 2011 admits to how local development efforts "were determined to a large extent by the local village elders during Key Leader engagements" (Briggs 2014: 131). An earlier assessment from the Centre for Irregular Warfare at the U.S. Naval War College implores counterinsurgents to "identify layers of leadership" as a means to undermine "Taliban incubation" and "infestation" by "marginalizing the first layer of leadership" and prop-up or address another source of legitimacy (Nigh 2012: 36; c.f. Briggs 2014: 130). Analyst Phillip Münch with the NGO Afghanistan Analysts Network reported how German provincial reconstruction teams working with German special forces to penetrate local village-level environments made overtures to local leaders and subsequently alienated underprivileged families and sub-tribal groups not aligned with local key leaders, causing many locals to see ISAF forces as "accomplices of the ruling class" (Münch 2013: ¶7). While cultural and social analysis is regarded as an important extrapolation machine capable of rendering visible and negotiable the human terrain of the village, the assessments remain rather one dimensional in only establishing an 'objective' background—the theatre of operations—on which to figure, project, and inscribe the war. The pillars of military social science research and network analysis—discerning social identities, understanding community power structures, and assessing local hierarchies of needs (Nigh 2012: 29)—are concerned mostly with identifying how and where to *breach* local solidarities. Most assessments apprehend local 'differences'

from the perspective of counterinsurgents and their conceptions of how life should be made to live and ruled, which is then followed by questions of how to leverage these differences.

Given the accidental discovery of class in rural Afghan that I described above, critical conceptions of gender do not register much in the initial cycle of military literature on village stabilization and ground-up counterinsurgency. Questions of gender performance, division of labour, women's rights, and emancipatory feminist politics as social justice are left largely unaddressed.¹⁷ I want to pause briefly to consider several contradictory threads around questions of gender particularly because they relate to the village *milieu* and bear on my eventual analysis of Female Engagement Teams and Cultural Support Teams. Following the invocation of hollow liberal feminism advanced under humanitarian auspices to justify war since 2001, many scholars have criticized the blank and flat conceptualization and the self-serving political mobilization of Afghan women as a monolithic collection of backward, disempowered, and infantile figures in need of rescue from predatory forms of conservative religious fundamentalism. Yet, this alone does not explain how paternalistic neoliberalism, poverty, and authoritarianism prioritize women globally for vulnerability and violence (among many sources, c.f. Razack 2009 & 2008, Jiwani 2009, Jefferess 2011, and Abu-Lughod 2013). Here, we see the logic of liberal war clearly: waging war to stop the war on women in a society characterized as noble and bound to timeless virtues while simultaneously demonized as violent, repressive, and patriarchal. In her recent account what she calls "B-52 bomber feminism," Rafia Zakaria argues that the invasion of Afghanistan and the "Afghan-women savior complex" did little to liberate or empower women (Zakaria 2015:¶12). Citing a quarterly report from John Sopko, the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Zakaria indicates that American military-borne aid agencies did not track or assess the effectiveness of programs implemented for Afghan women (¶3; c.f. SIGAR 2014b). She also refers to a report from the Afghan Human Rights Commission, which documented 25% increase in violence against women in Afghanistan from 2012 to 2013. Zakaria indicts the SIGAR report

¹⁷ The same can be said for Foucault's genealogy of biopower, which pays scant attention to gender performances and performativity as a biopolitical technology and dividing practice specific to population. Productive feminist critiques of Foucault have addressed this gap, and my biopolitical assessment of Female Engagement Teams attempts to address this problem as well.

for equivocating and "locating the problem always and forever in Afghan traditions or cultures" (¶ 11) and not in the war itself or the creation of a war economy that pumps "hundreds of millions of dollars money into a country with almost no independent GDP" (¶ 12).

Borrowing from Proudhon, Danilo Zolo argued that whoever invoked humanity in war was trying to cheat (2002). We can go a step further: whoever invokes *women* is trying to cheat and occlude their motivations, mobilizing precariously positioned subjects and exploiting their symbolic effects to justify a wider biopolitical project of rule and of war (Butler 2009 & 2004; Puar 2007). Beyond the post-political pale of liberal women's rights, which casts the category 'women' as one more interest group to be integrated, postcolonial feminist scholars have gone to great lengths to problematize feminist discourses around Afghanistan, assessing radical transnational feminist currents alongside the often contradictory material realities of women across Afghanistan (c.f. Deb 2014; Taylor & Zine 2014; Chisti & Farhoumand-Sims 2011).¹⁸ Such discussions aim to escape the simplistic opposition between the liberal feminist 'saviour' and the spectre of an oppressive and conservative women-hating Islam. These binaries cannot consider how many Afghan women accept and negotiate the customary use of Sharia law as a worthy source of rights and guarantees now forwarded through regimes like the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). While the 'transnational feminist apparatus' acknowledges emancipatory political struggles by women in Afghanistan—like those of the Revolutionary Afghan Women's Association (RAWA)¹⁹—to oppose insecurity and gendered violence exacerbated by war and occupation and to refuse to be stigmatized for demanding social justice, the challenge for global actors is to justly and accurately represent the situation facing Afghan women (Chisti & Farhoumand-Sims 2011:128-129). For instance, in her account of the failure of the Afghan parliament to pass the Elimination of Violence Against Women Law, member of parliament and activist Fawzia Koofi cites conservative male and female MPs, a weak speaker, the government desire to appease militants, and also discrepancies between progressive women's rights activists (Koofi

¹⁸ Kim Riegel and Krista Hunt's 2008 edited collection (*Engendering the War on Terror: War Stories and Camouflaged Politics*) (Aldershot: Ashgate) is a good resource for analysing the operationalization and discourse of gender in relation to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the War on Terror.

¹⁹ The title from RAWA's 2008 statement on the seventh anniversary of the American invasion: "Neither the U.S. nor *Jihadis* and Taliban: Long Live the Struggle of Independent and Democratic Forces of Afghanistan!"

2015). While she characterizes the legislative landscape as complex and contested, she also registers disappointment in what she calls the international community's disengagement from Afghanistan (¶20), implying a failure of the foreign military-government-security-aid apparatus to influence and enable basic legal guarantees for women. Oversimplifying issues or refusing to engage with women who do not share (or conveniently validate) intervening outsider perspectives continue to be shortcomings (Azerbaijani-Moghaddam 2004: 103, in Chisti & Farhoumand-Sims 2011: 125). Such concerns around solidarity and responsible allyship must themselves be decolonized of the moralized saving imperative, which is another if more complex type of global race thinking (Jefferess 2011: 78). Responsibility must be reframed and rethought as a complex *responsibility to and not for* distant others—here, Afghan women.

As Spivak famously remarked, feminist theory and politics are not reducible to but often depend on a "strategic essentialism" (a sometimes necessary but "false ontology," according to Butler)²⁰ in order to make visible the *universally available* field of struggle around gender and emancipation. Yet, it remains necessary to refuse the presumed ascendancy of North Atlantic iterations of feminist thought in relation to Afghanistan. In terms of understanding the biopolitical infrastructure for life, it is important to consider how conceptions of Afghan gender practices are not necessarily reducible to the spectre of religious fundamentalism but also pertain to issues of regional influence, social relations, and class (Bergner 2011: 113; Puar 2007: 6). Additionally, subtle and more explicit types of blowback result from Western generalizations regarding how and where to engage women in Afghanistan, whether based on militarized aid and donor-driven agendas on the biopower-side of counterinsurgency or in terms of building networks of transnational solidarity (Chisti & Farhoumand-Sims 2011: 123, 130). With counterinsurgency coming to the villages, the unintended effects and the sideways flows of the war—displaced lateral violence—disproportionately affect women. With the often strict policing of gender roles and punishment for the failure to perform them, rural women are subject to "conditions similar to those imposed by the Taliban" but continued and enforced by husbands, families, and village leaders in

²⁰ This is, of course, an allusion to Spivak's suggestion to "take the risk of essence" in relation to the subaltern subject and undertake a "strategic use of positivist essentialism" in order to create a pragmatic—if theoretically unviable—category for action. See Spivak, "Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography," *Selected Subaltern Studies*, eds. Guha & Spivak (Oxford: 1988), 3-32.

"strongly militarized" environments (Nojumi, Mazurana, and Stites 2009: 37). Consider this in relation to village stability operations: Taliban are terrible and male family members not much better, though it will be male members in the village, whether key leaders or just men generally, to whom counterinsurgents will direct their missives for support and stability. Though women-only *shuras* and *jirgas* provide venues to share and discuss common problems, these traditional fora compartmentalize political participation and fail to provide a role for them in choosing leaders (83). Further, restrictions on women's mobility exacerbate the lack of formal political participation; movement beyond the private space of village compounds or family influence is limited, with access to public life nearly non-existent (87). Given that communities rely significantly on women's gendered labour to stabilize the life in the village, the actual economy (the law of the house, the *oikos nomos*) to sustain life depends on the energies of women (162). As special forces operators defer to customs and comply with local cultural codes in the village to bring onside local players and keep the biopolitical infrastructures for 'good security' in place, we will see how Female Engagement Teams and Cultural Support Teams target and penetrate Afghan dwellings to exploit and stabilize hegemonic gender roles as well.

Having framed the village as a biopolitical *milieu* and a unit of analysis targeted by the counterinsurgency knowledge apparatus, the next three sections consider different precursors to the formalization of village stability operations. I begin with the CF's Key Village Approach initiated in 2009 in Kandahar Province before addressing the highly-visible 2010 American push into Marjah (Helmand Province). I then consider the implications of militarized biometrics in Afghanistan, an intelligence-centered data collection innovation with significant biopolitical implications.

Precursor One: Canada, the Key Village Approach, and Stabilization

The net result is a population that feels squeezed, targeted by insurgents while their security is as much at risk because of official complicity or neglect: "It is very clear who is opposing the government and who is in the Taliban. The government knows where the Taliban are operating and the Taliban know where the government and the Americans are patrolling but they never fight each other. Instead they are attacking our villages. We are not with the Taliban but we have always paid the price. We have been victims caught between the two sides." (International Crisis Group 2011: 28)

By 2009, having realized they had "fought this war all wrong" by way of the 'whack-a-mole' mentality that alienated local communities and populations in the southern part of the country, the North Atlantic coalition developed a comprehensive approach to reverse "the Taliban's momentum" (Galloway 2009). The new surplus of troops in 2009 and 2010 pushed the war into rural areas and villages in Helmand and Kandahar provinces in particular to secure the population. Canadian Forces units collaborated to create a "ring of stability" around Kandahar to forestall the advance of insurgency. The CF's efforts in Kandahar Province transitioned from the combat operations of 2006 and 2007 toward the counterinsurgency program espoused by the coterie of military commanders steering the American-led ISAF war campaign. Rationalizations about villages-level operations in Afghanistan followed from a palimpsest of historical operational knowledge and contemporary practice—lessons upon lessons. Leading into 2008 and 2009, the creation of ISAF's Kabul-based Counterinsurgency Training Centre – Afghanistan (CTC-A) was intended to serve as a hub for coalition and Afghan forces, and different Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Teams began to emerge across the different Regional Commands to facilitate population-centric counterinsurgency as the "operational priority" (CTC-A 2010: ¶1). This meant pushing again into the green zones of Helmand and Kandahar, with clear-hold-build sequencing sweeping across the south. When asked for their opinions on the war and the ISAF campaign, local Kandaharis were generally ambivalent. One farmer said, "For eight years we have been hearing so many promises of stability and security" (Muhammad, in White 2009: ¶18), while a landowner remarked on the lack of basic infrastructure, stating that troop surges will not solve the problems: "I need electricity in my house and roads I can drive. That will be a start" (Hakim, in White 2009: ¶19).

CF operations in 2009 and 2010 followed an ISAF-wide precedent by mixing military and civilian development surges (Coombs & Gauthier 2012: 120). After the focus on high-intensity warfighting in the Panjwayi, Zhari, and Dand districts, the effort in late 2008 began to shift from ballistics to biopower, which saw an increased role for the Canadian-led Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team and the formalization of the Key Village Approach. According to a 2007 report

from the CF Chief of Review Services (CRS), the reconstruction team was effectively engaged in high-visibility reconstruction and development operations in a joint, comprehensive, and whole-of-government approach. However, the report also identified shortcomings in relation to a few things: the CF's existing counterinsurgency doctrine; integrated planning with other government departments; and to exploiting the reconstruction team as a significant element in influencing and shaping the perceptions of local populations, among others (CF CRS 2007: iv-vi). Parliamentary reports argued Canada's whole-of-government approach was showing good progress in June 2009, already expanding a biopolitical footprint through its signature Arghandab Irrigation Rehabilitation (Dahla Dam) project to create reliable water and irrigation infrastructure, through public education initiatives, through an ongoing polio eradication plan, and through education initiatives to refurbish local schools (GOC 2009; c.f. CIDA/DFAIT 2013).²¹ Further, after gaining favour with American architects of the war for its willingness to wage aggressive combat operations, the CF was engaged in close collaboration with the new American push, with CF units serving as smaller scale experiments for what was to come (Fenton 2009: ¶7). The new premise in 2009: disperse and spread the CF task force's contingent—the fifth and sixth rotations of the CF's Operation Athena in Kandahar—across different combat outposts and forward operating bases and, where possible, embed them in villages. Out was the enemy-centered direct action to eliminate fighters in the Taliban heartland, and in was a collection of population-centered efforts to bring the war more intensively into the everyday *milieu* and living space of Kandaharis—counterinsurgency as grassroots community development.

Indeed, since its re-conception, the new version of counterinsurgency was sometimes fawned over as armed social work (Kilcullen 2006a), a "sweetened" type of warfare relying on biopolitical technologies (Price 2013). Yet counterinsurgency as social work and as community development is more than just an interesting analogy, especially within the context of international development discourse and the global rescue industries. Bottom-up community-directed development is increasingly the norm

²¹ CIDA's project browser lists completed and ongoing develop projects in Afghanistan. See "Afghanistan – International Development Projects," < <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/cpo.nsf/fWebCSAZEN?ReadForm&idx=00&CC=AF#countryonly>>. Project partners include Oxfam, Care Canada, the International Red Cross, and the UN's World Food Programme.

for nation-building and for allocating the downward flow of resources linked to an increase in popular participation that "mobilize[s] the poor," which "can closely parallel civil counterinsurgency" (Oppenheim 2012: 249). In principle, development theories premised on empowering local communities shared much in common with ISAF's idealized practice of flexible and adaptive village-level counterinsurgency. If self-organized grassroots community development is supposed to address the inability of top-down government to deal with social and economic issues and to adequately reach its population (253),²² then we can understand village-level counterinsurgency in the same way, working from below but nudging the village ever closer toward the reach of regional and state government. In this sense, if we wanted to force the comparison of counterinsurgency with the social work and community-based development, the push into villages is an exercise in *harm reduction*, at least from the perspective of those waging counterinsurgency against the risk of an ever-spreading and virulent insurgency. Centralized security and social policies—the larger initiatives of the national Kabul-based regime—were failing to stem the insurgency because local communities did not view the government as a legitimate and interested custodian, so a punch from below was required.

Taken broadly in a social justice context, harm reduction approaches to delivering support and social services engage with at-risk and vulnerable communities without the disempowering paternalism or moralizing interventionist rhetoric endemic in the conventional social work and community-building apparatus. Harm reduction is premised on an egalitarian approach opposed to behavioural modification, stigma, and criminalizing those living in the intersectional fall-out zones of systemic discrimination and structural violence. Harm reduction aims to manage the harm done to those placed at risk by hegemonic social systems while also mitigating the harm done by cookie-cutter approaches to social work. As a philosophy and practice, it aims to minimize harm and risk by radically breaking down the hierarchy of power between giver/worker and receiver/client, opting for peer-to-peer service delivery and peer-directed approaches based on local community members' awareness of the lived material realities of

²² Oppenheim cites Colombia's *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC), *Hizb'allah* in Lebanon, and the Liberation Tigers of *Tamil Eelam* (LTTE) as examples of "armed movements" that deliver robust social services—and biopolitical government—in relation bottom-up, population-centered development (2012: 52).

poverty, racism, sexism, ablism, etc.²³ Village-based counterinsurgency would seem to be an exercise in harm reduction: it imagines minimizing the intersectional harm done to villages by wider forces (i.e., Taliban, insurgents, religious fundamentalisms, etc. and also cookie-cutter development approaches) and by the community trapped in a cycle of self-harm (i.e., "they are too scared or unable to change"); and it will minimize—restrain, and in proportional ways—its own interventions, recognizing the inefficacy of meaningless killing and instead opting to make life live. According to the premise of reducing harm, the munitions will change, deployed in specific sites but in less direct terms. Ando Arike provides further insight into this logic of harm reduction. In his essay on "soft-kill solutions," Arike documents the latest round of non-lethal weapons used to suppress demonstrators at protests in North Atlantic domestic environments (Arike 2010). Mapping "new frontiers in pain compliance" in relation to marches, rallies, uprisings, and public insurrections, the essay is a genealogy of police kinetic measures that do not kill, and that are premised on proportionality—blunting trauma, dispersing irritants into the atmosphere, and dampening violence into an inconspicuous middle range that seems less repressive (Arike 2010: 39). Arike is clearly calling attention to the obfuscation of harsh measures and their recoding as lesser evil refinements in the production of police violence. However, his interpretations resonate when extended to the edges of liberal rule in expeditionary environments: village-level counterinsurgency, as a harm-reductionist, softer-kill solution, is lauded as a restrained and proportional way to wage war to preserve life and compel it to live even as it distributes war by unrestricting and collateralizing its flow.

All this came together through the CF's Key Village Approach (KVA), which was premised on clearing areas to create and extend a security bubble—a life preservation zone—for local villages and communities. Notably, the effort occurred coincident with a sharp increase in ISAF embedded training teams and operational mentor and liaising teams working with ANA and ANP forces, with the idea that host-nations forces could begin to play a larger role in delivering and providing security, crucial

²³ Certainly, there exist a range of progressive egalitarian interpretations and material expressions of harm reduction, which are mobilized in North Atlantic domestic environments against not conventional social work paradigms and the ongoing neoliberal and biopolitical production of austerity and precarity for all populations. Additionally, and paradoxically, the visibility of harm reduction, its ability to make its own practice intelligible to itself, coincides with neoliberal approaches to risk, which seek to manage and mitigate risk by establishing risk tolerance and an admission to the inability to eradicate or eliminate a phenomenon or trend.

"connective tissue" for a post-ISAF Afghanistan (Maloney 2012: 244). According to a CF summary, KVA did not change strategic or operational aims but rather pushed down to the tactical level the core components of population-centered counterinsurgency by composing and employing stabilization teams (Braün 2009: ¶2-3).²⁴ The village-level push was an opportunity to eschew the garrison mentality and instead develop a persistent presence by "deploying into the human environment to think Afghan solutions" (Turenne, personal communication, 2009).

Yet, going native and working with locals to solve security and development problems revealed a number of implicit 'objective' beliefs. Resembling the rhetoric of victim-blaming and subtle accusations of belatedness, a 2009 CF media summary suggests that pastoral deliverance from (or reduction of) harm and the salvation of stabilization will occur only when people are ready to open their hearts and minds to the good news of counterinsurgency:

[Stabilization] teams comprise elements from an alphabet soup of civilian and military organizations. Most of the work in the villages is done by the military members of the team, but we maintain close co-ordination with our civilian partners. Site-selection is crucial if these operations are to succeed... The people of the village must be ready and willing to move out of the morass of war and insurgency. (Braün 2009: ¶3-4)

It is important to "keep an Afghan face", so all project personnel are Afghans, from the labourers to the human resources manager on up to the project manager, with mentoring by a team from the Construction Management Office at the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team. The emphasis here is to get every segment of the population involved in rebuilding and developing their community, and keep them engaged. (¶5)

Without question, many Afghans would wish to see the cessation of war across their fields and compounds, but the description above imagines an immature population unwilling to take the opportunities so generously offered. Site-selection is crucial because operations are speculative, based on intelligence and premised on generating more intelligence, and are feasible only if the atmospheric are acceptable. This means actually *avoiding* well-known anti-ISAF or anti-government nodes and working around the edges to slowly disperse the war as much as possible, "oil-spotting" to consolidate success.

²⁴ At the peak of operations in 2010 and 2011, ISAF employed 27 different PRTs across Afghanistan with different provincial foci. The 330-strong Kandahar PRT was Canadian-commanded and was comprised of 250 CF members—force protection, engineers, civil-military cooperation, headquarters and logistics—with the remainder filled out by non-military officials from DFAIT, CIDA, the RCMP, the U.S. State Department, and USAID (DND 2009a BG-09:3-4). Interactions with private contractors, whether commercial or security-military, tend to remain under- or unreported.

The liturgy of the population-centered effort was not always greeted with open arms by those tasked with conducting it. Following the summer of 2006 in the Panjwayi, Zhari, and Maiwand districts, many CF members were skeptical about closer engagement with local communities after heavy fighting, most notably through Operation Medusa in August and September 2006. A 2007 PBS *Frontline/World* documentary, "Afghanistan: The Other War," traces the exploits of a Canadian unit at FOB Martello, an outpost in the remote Shah Wali Kot district located in the Arghandab river valley north of Kandahar City and the Dahla Dam. The film depicts the clear antagonism between the combat-centered infantry soldiers and Capt. Nicola Mascon, a civil-military cooperation officer assigned to the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team. The soldiers deride Mascon's mission, suggesting she is naïve in distinguishing between insurgents and local villagers. Mascon's mission to refurbish water pumps and deliver basic medical supplies in the village of El Bek goes awry when her equipment does not arrive through the logistics chain. Her credibility with the village on the line, she commandeers a platoon of soldiers and their armoured fighting vehicles to provision sparkplugs at a local village bazaar. However, the vehicles get stuck on the muddy roads and the soldiers get angry and anxious as they are exposed to the risk of attack kilometers away from the fire support of their operating base. Many blame Mascon. The documentary captures and certainly amplifies the soldiers' resentment of the Mascon and the mission. Later, the documentary reveals that Mascon was able to provide partial fixes to some of the local problems by inviting villagers to the forward operating base for medical treatment. By early 2009, the official military fable had changed: Mascon's mission became ISAF's writ large, an evangelism of pastoral power enmeshed in counterinsurgency warfare.

Notably, and in connection to my discussion below about Female Engagement Teams, Mascon's mission reveals how gender intersects with the stabilization efforts of comprehensive counterinsurgency operations. The documentary conveys an explicit sense within the unit regarding the masculinization of combat and the feminization of anything otherwise, a cleavage multiplied by Mascon's status as a woman. She is doubly-coded as an outlier—reinscribed as a woman and as a humanitarian actively humanizing warfare. Her status is at odds with what Ryerson Christie refers to as "nominal hegemonic

military masculinities" reconstituted during the latest expeditionary cycle, which saw a significant level of combat operations and lethal warfighting for professional North Atlantic militaries with their respective warrior ethos (Christie 2010: 2; c.f. Duffield 2001 & Coker 2000). Mascon's presence and mission challenge and contradict the traditional gendered construction of soldiering subjectivities (Christie 2013: 54).²⁵ Outside the unit, those not targeted with acute lethal violence but still targeted for operations, namely those deemed in need of militarized care and comfort to make their lives live, are feminized as imperiled, helpless, infantile, and weak, requiring "muscular humanitarianism" (Orford 1999) and racialized as requiring neocolonial protection from paternalistic contingents of white men (Razack 2004; c.f. 2009). For atavistic military warfighters lamenting the waning days of the Western warrior, their encounter with Afghan men in particular is disturbing because it arguably indicates *both* danger and desire—danger because Afghan men are regarded as pre-insurgents, and desire because 'they' represent what Western warriors believe they themselves are losing, i.e., the capacity to fight. Mascon is feminized because she fights with biopower and this threat feminizes anxious male counterinsurgents, who admire the Afghan male as a warrior—members of a volatile 'martial race' (Highgate 2013) but need no less to feminize him in order to dominate his environment. This chain of codings render Afghans as ecological creatures re-naturalized in a biopolitical niche (or re-orientalized as strange and mythic Others) so that Afghan masculinities have to then redouble their efforts and 'man-up' to defend themselves but only according to the wishes of counterinsurgents. 'Man' and 'race' remain objects of fascination for the warrior ethos, nostalgic reminders (according to an atavistic masculine imagination rampant in the military)²⁶ of some halcyon time on the North Atlantic basin

²⁵ Though Mascon's status—engaged in the counterinsurgency fight, directing operations—should be cause for celebration in a CF seeking to address gender, diversity, equity issues, the documentary indicates resistance in operating environments 'down range' in Afghanistan. For a good pre-Afghanistan internal assessment of CF organizational culture and the revolution in social affairs regarding military recruitment and retention, see Tasseron (2001). For an internal perspective on gender, equity groups, and diversity within the CF, see Pinch, Macintyre, Browne, and Okros (2004). Cowen's work on military workfare (2008) offers a cogent summary and critical assessment of CF efforts to reinvent itself as an 'employer of choice' in relation to the mobilization of gender and equity and implications for re-militarized notions of obligations-based citizenship.

²⁶ If recent events regarding the CF are any indication, a conservative and patriarchal masculine culture remains the norm. The Deschamps Report, authored by former Supreme Court justice Marie Deschamps in May 2015, found that CF culture was misogynistic and characterized by rampant gendered and sexual harassment, abuse, and misconduct. According to different news sources, top military brass tried to hinder the circulation of the report. In

when 'men mattered' before the era of liberal domestication and feminization. Furthermore, a crucial contradiction remains: with the predilection for complexity, systems, networks, and ecology for future force employment in a contingency operations context, the traditional military body—the mythic solid, stable, and unmarked masculine body—must be porous and open, willing to detach and disperse itself, more a transversal or queer (from Sedgwick, *queer* [German] as "crosswise" or "across") military body in spite of itself.

In 2009 and 2010, while stabilization teams and later district stabilization teams (DSTs) operated throughout the battlespace environment of Task Force Kandahar, most media and military accounts centred on Deh-e-Bagh, Nakhonay, and Najiban.²⁷ The former lies in Dand District about ten kilometres southwest of Kandahar City; the latter two lay farther west, in Panjwayi District. The three settlements are separated by barely fifteen kilometres but that distance is non-contiguous, with local villages and tribal affiliations constituting different biopolitical *milieu*. Deh-e-Bagh is the administrative district centre in Dand. Housing the basic functions of district government and the size of a town, it was the target of a suicide bombing in March 2009, and the reconstruction of the Dand District Centre in June 2009 was a priority for practical and symbolic reasons (CF/DND, "The Dand District Centre," 2009). Its unveiling was attended by then-incoming ISAF commander Gen. McChrystal, who praised the "model village" as a successful example of the shift to population-centered operations (CBC 2009a) and called it a "thinking man's effort" (in Brown 2010: ¶1) and a weapon "more powerful than any round we can shoot" (in Fenton 2009: ¶3). Accounts of Dah-e-Bagh suggest that the effort spread like (and had to spread like) "prairie fire" and pulled interest in from other villages. CF reports argue that people were happy to work with coalition forces and to share information with ISAF forces about Taliban

connection, sex assault prevention educator Julie Lalonde revealed she was verbally abused and derided by cadets at Royal Military College, the CF's university for officer education, where she had been invited to speak in the fall of 2014 about rape culture and sexual consent. Lalonde continues to receive abusive and nasty emails as a backlash. See James Cudmore (13 May 2015), "Military's response to sexual misconduct report curtailed by general's orders," <<http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/military-s-response-to-sexual-misconduct-report-curtailed-by-general-s-orders-1.3071386?cmp=rss>>, and 22 May 2013), "Royal Military College cadets struggled with questions of sexual consent: Educator," <<http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/royal-military-college-cadets-struggled-with-questions-of-sexual-consent-educator-1.3083831>>.

²⁷ Najiban, also known as Balandi, is near COP Belamby, which was established in 2010. The base and the town is now known in relation to events in March 2012 when U.S. Army Staff Sergeant Bales, allegedly acting alone, left the base as murdered sixteen Afghan civilians in the area.

fighters and "strangers," meaning other armed insurgent or criminal groups deemed as such (Brain 2009: ¶8-9). The result: villages can be quarantined to effect changes in the operating environment, filtering insurgents elsewhere. The initial move into Deh-e-Bagh during May 2009 was known as Operation *Kalay* 1, which aimed at placating and engaging local elders and creating "large, low-tech, labour-intensive jobs" led by the Specialist Engineering Team (Meyerle et al 2010: 152; c.f., CF/DND 2009a). It subsequently employed 340 local people by July 2009 indexed to the market rate for local labour (400 Afghans/day, or \$ 7.76 CDN) (153). This included paving roads in the town and beyond, and beginning work on irrigation projects. To implement the approach, unit commanders had access to a Commander's Contingency Fund for discretionary spending and investment for quick-impact projects alongside Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team initiatives. This activity continued into 2010 when almost \$3 000 000 (Can.) in funding from CIDA's dedicated Kandahar Village Stabilization project was dispersed through civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) channels to rehabilitate irrigation canals and sanitation systems alongside school vocational training and local business development (DFAIT/CIDA 2014; c.f. Coombs 2012: 22-23 for a detailed breakdown of projects).

In many respects, reconstruction and development is code for injecting money into local environments. Allocating financial support equals using money to buy results. Prior to the full-scale realization of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, monetary compensation was actively, if asymmetrically, used for *solatia* (customary condolence) payments from 2005 onward to communities when they were harmed in operations. Money—used to standardize and create equivalences between different outcomes of military violence—was offered to when compounds were destroyed, when crops and livestock were compromised, or when civilians and family members were killed.²⁸ According to a report from *The Intercept* based on American military data, almost 6 000 claims were filed in Afghanistan

²⁸ The 2006 American counterinsurgency manual included a section on compensation and condolence payments, the joint 2013 manual mentions nothing about *solatia* and little on compensation, and the 2014 manual has a small section on protocols (2014: 13-13, secs 13-58/60). The U.S. Army doctrine manual FM 1-04 *Legal Support to the Operational Army* outlines claims procedures regarding host-nation populations (2013: 5-8, section 5-45) and mentions *solatia* in the chapter on stability operations (2013: 9-3, section 9-13). The 2008 CF counterinsurgency manual mentions adequate compensation and the lack thereof in relation to effects-based conceptions of building credibility and legitimacy in local villages (2008: 8-7, section 809.2). ISAF public affairs officers issued regular press releases on compensation protocols.

by civilians from February 2003 to August 2011 through a claims system that was shoddy (Currier 2015).²⁹ Of course, anticipating that actions required *solatia* was based on the assumption that the local environment would be subject occupation and pacification and to levels of violence and insecurity calculated *as acceptable and proportionate* with the mission objectives but not necessarily with how Afghans were continuously compelled to deal with counterinsurgents. Afghans would simply have to accept these realities. Suffice it to say, counterinsurgents had a lot of money and could disburse relatively small amounts in impoverished rural areas in exchange for wider symbolic benefits or to effect systemic changes. The stabilization push into villages relied on "Cash to Work" programs, which was based on the baldly-termed American concept of "Money as a Weapons System" in relation to monies allocated to the Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP) (USFOR-A Pub 1-06 2009; Coombs 2012: 22), to "Supporting Economic Generation and Enterprise Creation" (FM 3-24 2009 7-22, sec. 7-80), and to "Integrated Monetary Shaping Operations" outlined in American doctrine manuals (FM 3-24 2014 10-11/14, secs. 10-56/70).³⁰ While money has always been used to coerce and persuade in wars (Giustozzi 2010), the use of money in counterinsurgency is unique in its use as a core fighting tactic, a flexible asset "used to attack sources of instability, build partnerships, and provide for economic stabilization and security" (FM 3-24 2014: 10-11, sec. 10-56).

In Kandahar Province, this became military harm reduction by way of creating a supplementary economy alongside the predominant sharecropping in the area, which saw most people earn wages as tenant farmers paying rents. By throwing money at communities, counterinsurgents were able to create short-term jobs:

The idea was to give gainful employment to landless laborers with few marketable skills—those who had joined the Taliban for money and laid most of the IEDs—and tie them into the Canadian effort. By employing large numbers of fighting-age males, Canadian forces drained much of the Taliban's potential recruiting pool. (Coombs 2012: 15)

²⁹ "Through the Freedom of Information Act, *The Intercept* received Foreign Claims Act data from the Army, which handles Afghanistan for the entire U.S. military. As with the condolence payments, the database doesn't include the documentation behind each claim. Rather, it shows a quick synopsis, date and amount for each claim filed. In all, the Army released 5,766 claims marked for Afghanistan, filed between Feb. 2003 and Aug. 2011, of which 1,671 were paid, for a total of about \$3.1 million. Of those claims, 753 were denied completely, and the rest are in various kinds of accounting limbo" (Currier 2015: 27-28). See chapter five for more on this report.

³⁰ British doctrine refers to "Using Money on the Battlefield" and "The Tactical Use of Money for Security Effect" (FM 1-10 2009: 6-12, sec. 6-20; 8-3/4, secs. 8-7/15).

According to this logic, temporary labour as a poverty reduction strategy for risky young men would pacify the villages, and the KPRT element in the operation actively sought to distribute labour and work across all households while avoiding contractors from outside the community.³¹ For example, restorative work on the village's two mosques seemed to quiet anti-ISAF sentiment from local *mullahs* and *maliks*, who could subsequently influence their communities. Operation *Kalay 2* saw the CF set-up new patrol bases south and west of Deh-e-Bagh toward Panjwayi District, implementing projects with local contractors (Meyerle et al 2010: 156) and employing close to 1 000 people in seven villages and towns (157). Pashtun-dominated, the area was split between Barakzai clans around Deh-e-Bagh and Noorzai communities towards Panjwayi, with the Noorzai opposed to the ISAF presence. Noorzai elders did not explicitly support local Taliban or trafficking cartels, though these differences provided engagement challenges for CF units. According to American military reports on the role of human terrain teams' abilities to assist the Canadians, local village leaders were often largely sympathetic to Taliban influence in the area (especially Nakohonay), and often tried to buffer relations between counterinsurgents and the population to blunt whatever biopolitical benefits coalition forces could generate (Nigh 2012: 18-19). Assessments of projects in Dand and Panjwayi indicate better operational success in Dand than in Panjwayi, where progress was slow but "mov[ed] in a positive direction" in relation to supporting the initiatives and the provincial government (Coombs 2012: 22). ANP forces operating in the area were non-Pashtun, comprised largely of Tajik and Uzbeks from the north. They were not trusted by local communities and could not speak Pashto, which compounded challenges around deploying police at checkpoints and standing-up a reliable operational host-nation security force.

³¹ The logistical reality of the war—access to potable drinking water in remote areas and the waste generated from bottled water—becomes an artificial supply chain for local commercial development vis-à-vis the wartime economy. A 2009 KPRT greenwashing media release celebrates how CF units, in good waste management form, sent their used water bottles to a Kandahar City recycling facility (Godin 2009). This "little thing" had a "positive impact on the local population" in enfranchising a local business that employed 100-150 city residents. The press release explains that the company, Moshkan Plastic, won first prize in a USAID-funded reality show to promote small and medium-sized enterprises. I am not sure about which is more fascinating and disturbing: reality television as a technology of freedom (i.e., liberal rule) or celebrating expeditionary war as a local driver for the global green economy.

Inasmuch as counterinsurgents sought to collateralize the war into villages, the willingness of local leaders to allow the coalition to colonize their own biopolitical infrastructures with the promise of stability was crucial. Canada and its ISAF allies spend time participating in *shuras* and *jirgas* and collaborating with a new network of concentrated local relationships with dense collective histories (Meyerle et al 2010: 160; Seguin 2009). American lessons learned supplements emphasize the role in Pashtun communities of *nikat* ("pedigree," or status) within *khel* (sub-tribal kinship groups), warning that "not everyone with a white beard is an important elder" (US CAC 2011: 12, 15). Outsourced military knowledge producers expound on the role of indirection or *taqiya* ("protective dissimulation") practiced in Pashtun contexts, suggesting that counterinsurgents be wary of making immediate concessions lest they be viewed as weak or unable to negotiate according to local patterns and habits (Tribal Analysis Center 2010: 4). Yet, the question of time is important, too. The village push commenced in 2009 and 2010 was viewed by the coalition leadership as a critical window to stabilize the environment and create conditions amenable to the eventual withdrawal of foreign troops. In having to "get it done now," more time in the villages revealed the necessity of having to slow down and pause according to the rhythms and customs of local life, meaning immediate successes were fleeting and that village stability would take more time. Add to this the logistical challenges of pushing influence farther into rural areas and from-the-ground-up counterinsurgency becomes a generational effort—too long for most nations providing counterinsurgency capacities in the ISAF coalition.

In this respect, effectiveness was difficult to measure. In a 2010 essay by Matt Aikins about the CF effort in Kandahar, CF General Johnathan Vance—now Canada's Chief of the Defence Staff—was circumspect about success:

We didn't lose, but we didn't win either...How long does it take to end an insurgency? Anyone care to guess? Five years? Fifteen years. That's how long it takes on average. We don't have fifteen years. We're in hurry-up mode. (Vance, in Aikins 2010: 5-7).

Vance's comments reveal his and other commander's ambivalence about the task of village-level counterinsurgency, registering the pressure placed in units to achieve objectives in unrealistic time

frames while also under sourced.³² Further, the drift between fighting, security and government did not escape those charged with undertaking this type of blended warfare. According to Ben Rowsell, a key civilian representative of the KPRT in 2010:

We've gone from seeing it primarily as a security challenge to seeing it principally as a governance challenge...It has been the story of our evolution since I've been here. One of the principal obstacles here is the relationship between the government and the people. (Roswell, in Aikins 2010: ¶21-22)³³

Once the development money dried up—once the funds allocated to provision counterinsurgents' pockets to fund jobs and quick-impact projects were no longer available because village stability was no longer feasible—counterinsurgents presumed villagers would regress and 'revert to their old ways' and work for the Taliban, their role in securing their own lives no longer monetized and their willingness to work with ISAF forces tempered by the knowledge that withdrawal and lack of clear-cut victory means eventually engaging with whomever fills the local government vacuum—Taliban, prominent tribal leaders, Kabul, or otherwise (Galloway 2009: ¶20). In addition, using money for leverage can backfire: while QIPs allowed for the rapid development of infrastructure-related projects to serve as methods of containment and interdiction, local economic flows in rural Afghanistan are unsteady and seasonal. Further, in soaking the war zone with liquidity, a formalized informal economy emerged along with a commercial private war, where local and regional contractors—core employers seeking the enfranchising opportunity of reconstruction funding—opted to fight one another or follow the money to other more lucrative jobs (Maloney 2012: 250). Though convinced of the local benefits of better infrastructure borne from the projects, military and reconstruction team commanders in Kandahar were also

³² According to defence studies scholar Warren Chin's essay on British military operations in Helmand from 2006 to 2010, the optimum ratio of counterinsurgents to residents is 20-25 per 1 000 meaning Afghanistan, with a population of 31 million, would need 775 000 counterinsurgents, a number which was never achieved even when taking the less-than-operational capacity of Afghan security forces into account (Chin 2010: 234). Chin cites the 2006 American manual as well as Adam Roberts' essay, (2009) "Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan," *Survival* 51 (1). 2011 saw the highest number, with 132 5000 ISAF Forces and just under 421 000 with Afghan army and police factored in.

³³ Reflecting on his time in Vietnam as a counterinsurgency-trained American Army officer, David Donovan writes: "The main enemy to development was a corrupt bureaucracy...The host government has to be interested and active in winning that basic loyalty [of its people]...The Afghan government remains famously corrupt and appears either unwilling or unable to make changes. Some allied officials have tried to dismiss corruption as a cultural matter and in that way deflect calls for action. That is a mistake. Ignoring corruption now only means the Afghan government will suffer for it later. Its people will remain disaffected while its enemy operates with two strong motivations—religious fervour and ethnic xenophobia" (2012: ¶11, ¶17, and ¶31).

continuously skeptical about how effectively profits would be redistributed within the community and region (Meyerle et al 2010: 159).

By late 2009, with the early influx of American troops and additional Afghan forces, Task force Kandahar was beginning to focus its operational attention on the agriculturally-intensive Arghandab District north of Kandahar in the Arghandab river valley, which had seen successive summers of heavy combat (CBC 2009b). For Canadian counterinsurgents, the Key Village Approach forced different elements of the comprehensive whole-of-government apparatus to collaborate: it allowed CF units to amend clear-hold-build sequencing to a more extensive chain of "define-shape-clear-hold-build-enable-transition" and forced them to reconcile the "paradoxical trinity" of security-development-government (Coombs 2012: 19, 23; c.f. Leprince 2013). In other words, this meant the CF experimented with optimizing the biopolitical end of the warfighting spectrum to influence local village infrastructures and village life, sustaining the war by slowly transferring the effort and the risk of the war—the risk borne by working with ISAF forces—to ordinary Afghans themselves under the rubric of stabilization.

Precursor Two: Marjah, *Moshtarak*, and Biopolitics of Local Agriculture

Village-level operations in Kandahar continued into 2010, and ISAF leaders turned their attention in February 2010 to staging the well-publicized Operation *Moshtarak* (Dari, "joint, together") in central Helmand Province. *Moshtarak* was a sizable operation, with ISAF-ANA force of 15 000 comprised mainly of American Marines, Afghan army *kandaks*, several British army battle groups, and a small CF contingent of mentors for Afghan troops. Though considered a Taliban stronghold prior to 2006 and characterized by "fluctuating insecurity" (Van Ess 2010: 3), the province of Helmand was relatively quiet with a light ISAF footprint and coalition operations focused on the Afghan-Pakistan border during the first five years of the war. The extension of ISAF operations into Helmand distributed a new tempo of war into the environment (Urban 2011). Heavy fighting occurred around isolated British FOBs and COPs (especially in Sangin, Garmsir, Lashkar Gah, Musa Qala, and Now Zad) in 2006 and 2007, and the severity of the fighting—seeing British forces regularly use close air

support right outside their bases—destroyed infrastructure and ultimately alienated local populations (c.f. Chin 2010). July 2009's Operation Khanjar (Dari, "Strike of Sword") was the first surge into Helmand to establish the new American footprint. According to ISAF leaders, it bolstered ISAF forces, 'cleaning up the battlefield geometry' with the establishment of American areas of responsibility and allowing British forces a more focused approach in a smaller area of operations.

Though Pashtun-dominated and ordered around customary organizations and elder-based networks for government, the province was not necessarily pro-Taliban especially after Taliban militias forced the conscription of many Helmandis in the late 1990s for fighting in the civil war (Coghlan 2009: 125, 151). Further, ethnic and blood relations did not guarantee support for the Taliban in 2010 either; rather, despite tribal associations, many Helmandis felt marginalized and ignored by the Karzai government in Kabul after repeated promises of local development (Tarzi, in Chin 2010: 226). Still, while support was not always self-evident, Taliban presence was strong, and different regional cells established parallel administrative and government hierarchies to stabilize and secure villages in their own right to conduct the life of the population (Mahendrarajah 2014: 96, 106; Chin 2010: 225). According to Shivan Mahendrarajah, the village-level counterinsurgency push in Afghanistan failed to fully apprehend the Taliban methodology: Maoist-inspired revolutionary war in a peasant-based agrarian context. Different regional groups were networked and had access to ongoing knowledge-sharing around tactical discourse and general military knowledge production, which served to build horizontal and adaptive organizational solidarity (Mahendrarajah 2014: 105). Further, the Taliban in Helmand and Kandahar were able to politically (biopolitically) mobilize (conduct) the population and "provide *comprehensive* judicial and *basic* administrative services" in a "system of governance, security, and justice [that] is polycentric and flexible" (107)—a mosaic approach from-the-ground-up as well. Though the Taliban was augmented by committed *jihadis* and religiously-motivated foreign fighters directed from Quetta, Pakistan ('bad Taliban'; Sedra & Gopal 2010, in Van Ess 2010: 4; Chin 2010: 224), many local groups deemed to be 'insurgents' or Taliban were instead groups motivated by local grievances or social and economic self-interest (Coghlan 2009: 133)—what one British commander in Helmand called

"playground weaklings" who were "local boys" whose willingness to fight melted away when more ideologically committed foreign and "out of area" fighters left the environment (FM 1-10 2009: 3-10, sec. 3-22, text box). These local armed cells simply operated beyond the reach of the newly created Afghan state. Further, monochrome conceptions of the Taliban as fervent fundamentalists were often overdrawn and inaccurate: during interviews, Kandahari men serving in Taliban *mahaz* ("fronts"), while embarrassed to admit it, alluded to needing a wage to augment their farming income derived largely from poppy production (Smith 2009: 200; c.f. ICG 2011: 26-28). While some Helmandi Talibs were outraged at ISAF commanders referring to "\$10 Taliban" or guns for hire, many openly acknowledged the range of motivations for opposing ISAF and Afghan forces, speaking to how they augmented their forces with local volunteers looking for temporary income (Coghlan 2009: 144). While many in Helmand did not explicitly support Taliban operations, open defiance was uncommon (141) and many nonetheless opposed the presence of foreigners, the puppet federal government, and the imposition of Western-style law and order (131). Notably, international NGOs were allowed to operate in Taliban-controlled areas from 2006 onward because they provided benefits for local communities in the form of medical assistance and access to basic health care (140).

The coalition narrative on Operation *Moshtarak* was that it *was* the new war model (Filkins 2010). Ostensibly 'Afghan-led,' it centered on the town of Marjah and the surrounding towns and villages (including Nad-e-Ali, 20 km northwest) all west of the Helmand River, where small villages are organized around irrigation and agricultural infrastructure. After using preemptive special forces operations to target and kill suspected local insurgent leaders (shaping), the focus of the mission was initially centered on finding and killing anti-government forces (clearing) in what was held to be a Taliban stronghold and an opium trafficking hub beyond the reach of the Kabul government. Disrupting a major opium centre would also disturb the financial and logistical networks for insurgents, who relied on local agriculture for poppy production in order to monetize the war campaign. Most importantly, the operation served as a test for the new population-centered approach, where ISAF and ANA forces would hold and build to ensure consolidation. Military leaders—ISAF commander General Stanley

McChrystal—promised the arrival of "government in a box" (Filkins 2010: ¶6; Wingrove 2010b). After the initial stages of the operation, ISAF and Afghans would 'unpack' and install a functional governing apparatus. Acute combat operations would punctuate the environment temporarily after which local communities not aligned with Taliban insurgents or opium traders could restart their normal lives.

The initial clearing phase of the battle lasted approximately two weeks, but the "government-in-a box" never manifested itself. Local Taliban cells and other armed groups maintained consistent coordinated attacks on ISAF and ANA forces for months afterward, adapting to launch direct engagements on bases and patrols with small arms, IEDS, and suicide bombers (Chivers 2010a). The density of IEDs in villages, fields, and roadways was unprecedented, greatly limiting the movement of ISAF patrols and inhibiting their access to the local population, which had to be carefully enclosed and partitioned (Chivers 2010bc; Van Ness 2010: 12). The biopolitical end of the continuum of operations was slow to materialize. On one hand, the humanitarian apparatus comprised of UN-led NGOs failed to respond to thousands of families fleeing the area after ISAF's messaging to local communities about the coming operation—"we're coming to kill the Taliban, you better get out"—and displaced civilians faced difficulties accessing emergency services due to restrictions on travel and movement (Afghan Rights Monitor 2010: ¶5-9). On the other, locals felt increasingly insecure and were reluctant to trust the arrival of instant government animated by administrative officials with no local allies and no real local standing or legitimacy (Van Ess 2010: 27). With key administrators opting to remain in Lashkar Gah and avoiding Marjah, a "very skeptical population" remained unconvinced about the central Afghan government's commitment to support the community (29). Afghan forces, supposedly entry points into the local population, proved to be not up to the task, with units disbanded and officers dismissed for drug use and 'unprofessional behaviour'— in other words, incompetence, corruption, bribes, and exploitation (Nissenbaum/RAWA 2010; Van Ness 2010: 22).

Though ISAF firepower was supposed to pave the way for biopower, locals felt even more vulnerable and exposed, whether from ISAF tactics to persuade people to cooperate and 'root out the Taliban' or from intimidation and threats from fighters (Van Ess 2010: 20). Ben Anderson's video essay

The Battle of Marjah (2010) depicts the combat operations from the Marines' perspective, but several encounters with local villagers and farmers are emblematic of the sentiments of ordinary people in rural Afghanistan: "We're stuck in the middle," and, "All we want is to feel safe." Another film told the same story about events a year before *Moshtarak*: Danfung Dennis' documentary *Hell and Back Again* (2011) depicted the late 2009 Operation *Khanjar* from the perspective of an American Marine sergeant who was later severely injured in an IED blast. During interactions with locals, the Marines' frustration is palpable. Though not expecting to be greeted as liberators, the Americans hear firsthand the resentment from Afghans. One man says, "We can't resist against you or the Taliban. Give us an option"; another angrily bypasses a group on a small path between compounds, telling the Marines, "I am dealing with my own issues. I don't care about you or any Talib." An independent study surveying people in Marjah in late 2010 saw over 60% of those interviewed feeling more negative about ISAF forces, 78% often or always angry, and 97% living with the disruptive effects of the operation due to the internal displacement of their families, friends, and colleagues (ICOS 2010: 2).

Before focusing on some of the specific ways biopower was employed and operationalized by ISAF forces in Marjah, it is important to understand Operation *Moshtarak* the wider context of ISAF's southern campaign. With the attack on Marjah, ISAF commanders asserted that the coordinated assault in central Helmand was a rehearsal for future operations in Kandahar Province, which would lead to the eventual "dissolving" of the insurgency (Vance, in Brautigam 2010: ¶4).³⁴ Maiwand, Zhari, Panjwayi, and Arghandab Districts—areas in Kandahar Province already shaped and influenced by the village-level approaches undertaken by the CF and other ISAF contingents in 2009 and early 2010—were all targeted through the summer of 2010 with Operation *Hakmari* (Lee/ANSO 2010: 2) and by Operation Dragon Strike in the fall of 2010. Together, these operations aimed to enhance the so-called 'ring of stability' around Kandahar City, its population, and its urbanized biopolitical infrastructures, with the

³⁴ In good counterinsurgent form, Vance was clear in stating operations in the summer of 2010 *would not* deliver cataclysmic effects but would create conditions and effects where the insurgency would continue to operate in parallel with ISAF and HN forces, though it would wither and cease to be a prominent actor. According to John Duncan, a professor from University of Toronto writing in *The Globe and Mail*, "[T]his counterinsurgency will be no game-changer...In all likelihood, these surges will be little more than massive counterstrikes in an indefinite series of offensives that have produced temporary victories" (Duncan 2010: ¶9-10).

outer edges subject to what CF Gen. Daniel Menard called a "deep fight" zone (Trofimov 2010: ¶12). Local residents, however, expressed ambivalence at bearing the brunt of the fighting and at the inefficacy of ISAF efforts to interdict Taliban who, accordingly to local residents, "did not come here from the outside"(¶13). Anti-coalition and anti-government forces were largely local. As well, existing informal Taliban networks and more formal top-down 'shadow' technologies of government directed from Quetta were more robust, influential, and respected in Kandahar than in Helmand (Gopal 2010: 26), offering a more discrete target for counterinsurgents amidst the overlapping interests specific to drug cartels, corruption rackets, and family or tribal rivalries (38). Local Afghan human rights organizations continued to call for "humanitarian vigilance" in relation to counterinsurgency operations that would as in Helmand, displace larger numbers of local communities (ARM 2010).

Even as these Kandahar operations unfolded, ISAF Commander General Stanley McChrystal referred to Marjah as a "bleeding ulcer" (Nissenbaum, in Hastings 2010: ¶2). Anonymous sources suggested upper-level commanders "oversold its importance" and knew expectations were too high especially in terms of installing top-down government (¶4-5), but moved forward at the behest of a weak Afghan government and the clique of American advisors around Barrack Obama hoping to score a symbolic 'win.'³⁵ Despite these criticisms, ISAF press releases regarding Marjah in 2011 unsurprisingly depicted a thriving local community of 80 000 no longer 'held hostage' by bomb-makers and opium-trading narco-gangs (ISAF 2011: ¶2); the formation of Interim Security of Critical Infrastructure (ISCI) units, all-volunteer groups of civilians, in 52 of Marjah's 56 blocks indicated local people standing up for their own security (Stence/ISAF 2011: ¶15). According to ISAF, killing insurgents is not necessary to win: contrary to the "ruthless brand of order," holistic efforts to invest in community growth proved more compelling (¶12-14). Employment through QIPs—restoring local bazaars, paving roads, refurbishing district centres—and agricultural reforms alter the critical infrastructure to divest capital

³⁵ This was friction in the information domain of the battlesphere. ISAF Command was not happy with Nissenbaum's or Hastings' characterization of McChrystal's comments, which lead ISAF to suggest McChrystal's comments referred to addressing perceptions of a bleeding ulcer in Marjah. Whatever the equivocations and qualifications, Hastings' June 2010 *Rolling Stone* article, "The Runaway General," published controversial comments made by the general about the inefficacy of the war effort and the Obama Administration. Ordered back to Washington following the article's publication, McChrystal tendered his resignation.

from the opium trade, starve groups controlling the flow, and compel farmers—armed or not—to enter the counterinsurgent pastorate. By 2013 as reported in the *Miami Herald*, Helmand was becoming increasingly "dull" and "not sexy" for American Marines, who after reducing their footprint from over 200 bases to half a dozen larger FOBs were taking a mentoring role with Afghan forces alongside the logistical task of withdrawing (Price 2013). However, ISAF's narrative of success obscured the causalities taken by Afghan forces and failed to address ongoing issues around desertion and graft within the army and police ranks.

The Marjah operation certainly foregrounded the biopolitical end of the warfighting spectrum, but the benefits failed to materialize as anticipated and in the timeframe anticipated. While it dispersed American Marines through the green zones of Southern Helmand, it did not instigate the changes it prescribed or intended. Given this arc of events, I turn now to focus on how agriculture was operationalized for counterinsurgency in the form of agricultural transition programs. Agriculture is crucial in Helmand for local tenant farmers and drug cartels alike. During his testimony to a US senate committee in January 2014, John Sopko, the American special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, warned that "things are bad" and that the social and economic—biopolitical—reengineering is giving way to a "looming narco-state" with no real substantive transformation in agricultural flows, which was anticipated to undermine and counter both narcotics and corruption (in Brown 2014; c.f. Ali 2013). Sopko's third quarter report in October 2014 indicated that poppy eradication measures across the country had fallen off by 63% from 2013 to 2014 (Sopko/SIGAR 2014b: 113-114). While this analysis assumes the opium trade is always-already a source of insecurity—in other words, Sopko's analysis fails to measure the biopolitical *security* assured by reliable access to a global if illicit, illegal, and informal market with local power structures; Sopko's analysis fails to acknowledge that opium may provide some stability and prosperity—the point is that agricultural transition programs in Helmand that are part of the renewed counternarcotics focus within counterinsurgency have not succeeded in making poppy cultivation less appealing (Brown 2014: ¶12). In fact, a recent BBC report based on United Nations figures and Sopko's reports argued that the \$7

billion (US) in dedicated counter-narcotics funding through the war had failed, with opium cultivation at an all-time high (BBC News 2014a; c.f. Sopko/SIGAR 2014b: 113). As discussed briefly in chapter three, forty years of war in Afghanistan has globalized opium exports and exacerbated the shift from diverse agriculture to opium mono-crop (Gibson 2011: 41). Though the Helmandi agricultural sector produces crops like wheat, barley, corn, sugarcane, and rice along with pomegranates, melons, and grapes (ubiquitous grape drying huts populate accounts of the war in the green zones), opium requires the least financial overhead with respect to inputs and is a reliable winter crop planted in the fall and harvested in the spring. While a 'war on drugs' ethos followed from enemy-centered conceptions of counterinsurgency, Helmand's poppy eradication campaign in particular was a serious failure in making mostly landless sharecropping peasant farmers even more exposed to economic precarity and in driving farmers to armed groups fighting ISAF, be they Taliban or otherwise (Evans 2012: ¶6, ¶10).³⁶

In Helmand as in the rest of Afghanistan, agricultural productivity and commercial activity in the biopolitical *milieu* revolve around variances in weather along with the atmospheric and climatological effects of war. According to ISAF assessments, agricultural development was a "crucial yet volatile" sector for inclusive and self-sustainable growth—in other words, a way through which to extend rule into ways of life. Agriculture makes up to a third of GDP and "absorbs" 60% of Afghanistan's working population, but productivity is 50% below pre-war levels (Lane/NATO CIMIC 2013: 10-11). As American Marines pushed into rural areas around Marjah, they were influential drivers for agricultural reforms tied to the lives of Helmandis. By prioritizing alternatives to poppy production or other cash crops, Marines could control local settlements through commercial flows diverted to ISAF controlled-bazaars and markets. In coincidence with the agricultural transition initiatives, local village environments had to *look* transitional and ready for new opportunities; they had to be cosmetically shaped. Like many urban revitalization schemes in North America premised on beautification and coincident with market-based gentrification, Marines funded the refurbishing of

³⁶ The *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012*, co-authored by the UN office on Drugs and Crime and the Afghan Ministry of Counternarcotics, find Helmand to be the largest producer of opium by far in the country. The report also finds no discernable increase in Helmand production in 2012. Evans finds issue with these findings and with the UN claims regarding the effectiveness of eradication-centered counternarcotics efforts.

signage awnings and steel shutter doors, creating the appearance of a model, functional town (Shah 2011: ¶23). A Marine captain stated, "This is the centre of Marjah. It should look nice. It will serve as an example" (¶26). The point here is not that local residents are or are not entitled to aesthetically pleasing built environments; rather, the focus on creating exemplars indicates the different ways in which the population is seized and forced to respond to being 'bettered' by the uplift of local changes delivered and enforced by counterinsurgents. This is an exercise in simulation, in creating simulacrum.

Beyond the aesthetics of store frontage, a report on the Marjah campaign by the NGO International Council on Security & Development (cited above) called for real reforms based on land allowances—private property and 'liberal' property rights—for landless peasant farmers. Yet, redistributing land ownership, insofar as it conferred power on farmers to choose their crops, was problematic for counterinsurgents because it impeded their ability to control what farmers would grow. In Marjah and beyond, any scenario offering too many options and too much autonomy to local villages would trouble the pipeline of crops, seeds, and inputs provided and controlled by counterinsurgents and other civilian agencies, which is to say it would trouble the link between controlling agriculture and controlling the population. Put another way, counterinsurgents sought to create not simply trust but dependency. For their part, American Marine units intervened into the biopolitical *milieu* exactly this way.³⁷ As they eventually recognized the negative effects of poppy eradication in population-centered counterinsurgency—simply destroying poppy crops with no alternative for tenant farmers fueled anger and resentment—embedded units created the Marjah Accelerated Agricultural Transition Program (MAAT) to incentivize a switch to 'licit' legal agriculture (Clark 2010a: ¶2). By signing up and registering, farmers were partnered with military-vetted NGOs to access seeds and fertilizer along with a cash payment, new tools, and a water pump (¶6-7). Given recurring and rolling bans on fertilizers like ammonium nitrate because of its frequent use for bomb-making (Verma 2010), counterinsurgents limited the type and circulation of inputs and often opted for local alternatives (like urea-based

³⁷ Subsistence and small-holding agriculture has always an optimal point of entry for counterinsurgents to act on the actions of life and living, now and historically. For instance, during the Algerian liberation war, French civil-military efforts developed upward of 800 rural development projects to secure the support of the population through agricultural reforms (Beckett 2001: 164).

fertilizers) in order to regulate farming according to the transition initiative. Further, farmers had to destroy their poppy crops, which then had to be verified by Marines to meet the required program criteria (Clark 2010b: ¶3-5). Because the winter of 2010 was particularly harsh in Helmand and affected the poppy crop (¶6), the physical climate and the weather became inadvertent force multipliers in that they altered the biopolitical climate, driving Afghans toward the program after a difficult harvest. Stabilizing villages meant stabilizing local agricultural infrastructure by stabilizing the relation between who provides and governs such provisions and who receives.

On the matter of agricultural reform as counterinsurgency, Foucault's discussion early in *STP* of grain scarcity (*la disette*) in mid-18th century France is instructive (Foucault 1978 [2007]: 30-34). Instead of working to stop scarcity outright, the emerging biopolitical art of government was increasingly disposed to dealing with scarcity to the extent of making it normal and manageable, one situation to administer—a 'mini-shock doctrine' through which rule can quietly be extended. Instead of being considered a negative outcome or a situation to be averted at all costs, crisis and emergency become immensely productive ways to organize a population. While a population's basic biological needs remain central concerns for government, the 'nature' of the population must be shaped without too much overt intervention into the field of agricultural production to allow what Foucault calls the "the reality of grain" to unfold in all of its climatic, economic, and social contexts (36). Foucault describes a system of government that, aware of the threat of insurrection and revolt in relation to food shortages, artificially kept prices low to prohibit hoarding and refused more profitable export opportunities to keep the grain in local circulation. According to his assessment, the biopolitical innovation came with setting *high* prices during a shortage to incentivize cultivation for growers and raise profits for peasants. This measure would see more grain on the market the following year, and if domestic production did not meet projections, high prices would attract exports from other markets, which would be permitted. As such, "the very rise in prices would precipitate a set of processes that would eventually result in the lowering of prices" (Hoffman 2013: 103).³⁸ Matters of grain would be

³⁸ I have relied heavily on Hoffman's interpretations of Foucault's discussion about grain.

managed but not tightly controlled; slight modifications to the market infrastructure would allow for the re-engineering of "natural" rhythms to unfold by way of modifications that intervened away from the "immediate behaviour" of the population itself (Foucault 1978 [2007]: 72). As such, the security of the population is premised on regularizing irregularities without bearing too closely on living life; order must seem natural, spontaneous, and self-sustaining, allowing communities to self-regulate themselves (43-4).

Counterinsurgency espouses a belief in securing populations and converting risky communities by restoring 'natural' rhythms and fading into the background is the utopian end state. To re-engineer local agricultural infrastructure and other commercial practices, the clear-hold-build sequencing (shape-secure-develop, in the British manual) proposes a slow relinquishment of overt control to allow the 'normal' flows of population, commerce, and production, where the security bubble artificially induced through extended operations eventually seems less invasive, camouflaged and blending into the background. The ISAF guidebook renders this ideal outcome in its future-perfect description of the transition phase after successful counterinsurgency operations:

Life will have returned mostly to normal and a viable, legitimate HN government will have been established, to include competent leaders and capable local security forces. Essential services and a sustainable economy will be in place. Ultimately the population will have been completely and irreversibly separated from the insurgency, root causes will have been addressed, and prerequisites removed. (CTC-A 2011: 41)

The 2006 American manual reflects repeatedly on the paradox of risk: counterinsurgent efforts to mitigate risks to themselves—by using 'muscular' force, by escalating kinetic and lethal measures, by taking more aggressive dispositions—is often riskier because of the escalation of violence has the potential to convert would-be friends into enemies (FM 3-24 2006: 1-27, sec. 1-149/53). The better option: "Genuine compassion and empathy for the populace provide an effective weapon against insurgents" (7-2, sec. 7-4). Given its direct bearing on the 'natural rhythms' of everyday life, addressing Afghan agriculture was crucial.

Programs like the MAAT program were framed in relation to food security, where a valuable one-time intervention enabled a 'year-zero' opportunity to reset and recalibrate local agricultural

practice *and* local life. For instance, a related report from American special forces on agriculture and village stability argued for "supporting year-round farmer-to-buyer connections" by linking growers and urban buyers with locked-in pre-harvest prices (i.e. futures), which would maximize producer outputs (Hanlin 2011: 4). Diversifying crops and increasing overall yields offered local farmers the chance to make longer-term decisions; access to inputs like seed and fertilizer along with better water and land conservation techniques arguably would enhance already-existing local ecological knowledge and adaptive crop rotation practices; storage capacity through silo/storage building could allow for better long-term planning with respect to selling to markets, something further enhanced by sustaining communications and transport capacities to improve timing and get crops to local bazaars , markets, and, further afield, to district and urban hubs (5; c.f. World Bank 2012). Together, these critical infrastructures amount to small 'shocks'—not for the arrival necessarily of disaster capital (yet)—which slowly restructured agricultural flows and local rhythms to bring people and populations closer to government and to global market requirements. Sometimes the external interests driving the agricultural agendas were laid bare. Based on a quarterly review from the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction in 2014, a report from the Centre for Public Integrity revealed the failure of the Soybeans for Agricultural Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative, which cost almost \$35 million (US). Backed by the US Department of Agriculture and the American commercial soy lobby headed by the American Soybean Association, the project was framed as a transition program and was implemented in 2010 despite explicit studies indicating a lack of feasibility, no real value-chain infrastructure, and totally inadequate conditions for farming soybeans in Afghanistan (Khan 2014: ¶1, ¶9). Despite efforts to position soy as a protein-rich dietary staple and cash crop, the program was a flop. While offshoot soy lobby groups espoused the value of soy for animal feed and suggested the initial SIGAR review did not tell the whole story, the Centre for Public Integrity report indicated a range of problems: small and unscientific studies were used to substantiate the initiative; the soybean lobby skirted regulations by creating non-profit bodies subject to different legal requirements required by for-profit entities; and the plan to 'Afghanize' the whole operation was woefully lacking (Cohen 2014).

While \$35 million is miniscule in comparison to the global soybean trade, this renewal initiative was one small (if unsuccessful) attempt at inserting new market authorities to shape local Afghan life and repurpose it as a space for primitive accumulation.

In this sense, food security is rhetorical camouflage, where agriculture becomes the insertion point to stage one more interlocking action specific to the wider counterinsurgency effort. It has less to do with securing a local food source for local consumption and production than with incentivizing one set of farming practices over another in order to control population by monetizing their actions in different ways. Further, the 'security' sustained depends on the creeping insecurity about the time remaining during the war for the injection of external resources and finances into local economies. If viewed in the context of food sovereignty, where communities can sustainably produce and maintain access to agricultural goods and to adequate nutrition in a fair and equitable manner, the transition initiatives appear more so as invasive and enforced technologies of control.

Incentivizing agriculture requires lasting investments and the measures specific to village-level capacity, while generating positive outcomes and attractive returns in the short term remain coercive methods to not simply counter insurgency but reorder populations. While no one is forced to operate in and through new systems, communities unwilling or unable to collaborate and reconcile with these biopolitical measures find themselves losers in a game that allocates resources based on a 'nuanced' understanding of the human terrain but ultimately distributes them in a zero-sum way for anticipating and calculating the effects on such investments. Further, after measuring the experiments in village-level agricultural reforms in terms of nutrition, the U.N. World Food Program and several Afghan ministries recently reported that 55% of Afghan children are actually stunted in terms of growth, development, and cognitive function, with most children facing chronic malnutrition exacerbated by poverty, low wages, and massive wealth gaps (Graham-Harrison 2014b: ¶4-5). Far from the beneficent and benevolent deliverance promised by counterinsurgents,³⁹ statistics like these raise serious issues

³⁹ While NGO and agriculture actors outside the military tent see these problems for what they are, initiatives and measures had routed for the most part through the counterinsurgency apparatus, meaning ISAF had significant oversight in relation to what was and was not allowed in forward operating areas.

about the impact of the war and the actual benefits of agricultural measures beyond their role to disrupt insurgents and operate as a biopolitical dividing technology.

In Marjah, using emergency Marine-deployed aid as micro-grants—short-term contingency funds allocated as if it were long-term financial support— may have turned opium bazaars into new commercial ventures like tailors shops and provided solar-powered streetlamps, but the monetary shock gave way to Marines slowly weaning the area off the funds and encouraging people to start their own businesses (Shah 2011).⁴⁰ While local narcotics syndicates and cartels make a similar pitch by setting up their own micro-credit systems for farmers in order to counter poppy eradication or transition initiatives (Ali 2013: ¶7), the renewed entrepreneurial push from counterinsurgents was accompanied by increased calls to maximize the formal (burgeoning) micro-finance sector in Afghanistan routed largely through the Microfinance Investment and Support Facility (MISFA), a World Bank entity 'invited' to operate in Afghanistan by the Afghan government in 2003 to facilitate reconstruction and development by coordinating donor funding. Registered in 2006 as a limited-liability non-profit company, which means that liability (risk) cannot be distributed to the leverage offered by donors and investors of MISFA (i.e., donors and investors are not on the hook), the facility's sole shareholder is the Afghan Ministry of Finance. By 2011, the credit and loan apparatus and its smaller microfinance institution had disbursed over \$1 billion USD in 1.7 million loans to more than 420 00 clients. As of November 2014, MISFA had close to 167 400 clients and 106 300 active Afghan borrowers. Further, its gross loan portfolio—the principal amount, not including interest, on loans outstanding—stands (as of November 2014) at \$93.7 million. According to the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, "market-based arrangement for social protection are dominated by microfinance development schemes," which have been deployed over the Global South with increasing regularity as a way to allow impoverished communities with no collateral or access to commercial lenders to access credit and financial backing.

⁴⁰ In a public relations piece "The Military as a Provider of Microgrants in Conflict Areas," two program specialists with the Center for Financial Inclusion recount being sought out by American officers interested in learning about microfinance in relation to allocating funds from their Commander's Emergency Response Program (Piskadlo & Riecke 2014: ¶2). I discuss this further below. Notably, the Center is an arm of ACCION international, a global NGO in the microfinance sector.

In terms of rural agricultural development, companies like Development Alternative (DAI) are solicited to partner with North Atlantic funding organs (USAID, DFAIT/CIDA, etc.) and to implement the necessary infrastructures to facilitate loans for seed, fertilizer, equipment, grain handing, or milling (DAI/*Guardian* 2013). However, the microfinance system also restructures local economics through extra-state channels but from-below, eventually achieving "the destructive rise of local neoliberalism" (Bateman 2010). Though cited by supporters as a means of financial inclusion for low-income and impoverished communities (i.e., rural Afghansitan), microfinance creates debt-bound subjects stuck in debtor-debt relationships and is often prone to 'mission drift' whereby so-called 'progressive lending' slowly seeks out wealthier clients with higher relative income to eventually commercialize the finance apparatus.⁴¹ While the scale of loans funded in Afghanistan may not be large enough to argue as the basis of military-enabled and predatory capitalist creative destruction, the credit-loan-debt apparatus promulgated from outside is a subtle way through which foreign investments and global financial flows neoliberalize and 'open' up new spaces to transfer and disperse risks.⁴² Global contractors—whether in security, development, or infrastructure—prioritize Afghanistan for primitive accumulation opportunities; the microfinance sector, "standing up" the entrepreneurial actor from below, is arguably a slower and less perceptible method of achieving the same ends.

Further, in a country like Afghanistan where customary village-level formations and Islamic precepts inflect government and local ways of rule, specific vehicles for microcredit and microloans chafe against existing protocols regarding the social and symbolic value of money and the existing networks of lending and borrowing (Cantor 2009: xi), which bind together social networks and settlements in less visible but important ways. Access to credit and removing barriers are not enough, even though providing access through debt to private property (i.e., money) is framed as a way to

⁴¹ See Beatriz Armendariz and Ariane Szafarz (2011), "On Mission Drift in Microfinance Institutions," *MPRA Paper No. 31041*, Munich Personal RePEc Archive, <<http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31041/>>.

⁴² After a discussion with my colleague, Ali Karimi, an Afghan academic doing doctoral work on Kabul and urban geography at McGill University, I was made aware of BRAC, a Bangladesh-based development organization that provides alternative microfinance opportunities outside the Afghan state/MISFA apparatus. Focusing on "South-South collaboration," BRAC established the BRAC Bank Afghanistan in 2006, focusing on small and medium-sized enterprises and having made \$35 million (US) in loans to 6 000 customers. See "BRAC in Afghanistan: Quietly Making Large Impact," <<http://www.brac.net/node/637#.VKokgHvLraJ>>.

alleviate poverty and allow more vulnerable people—in Afghanistan, women especially—access to funds. Informal credit systems, where credit may be offered freely or conversely with punitive terms, already abound and new systems deployed may undermine local biopolitical dynamics in the village and district level where informal and locally-negotiated lending agreements create different ties and divides between communities (xii). Additionally, as is well known, lending procedures for Sharia-informed Islamic finance are co-operative and prohibit (*haram*) interest (*riba*) in favour of *murabaha* (a flat mark-up rather than a compound interest and time-based accumulation) and a system of *takaful* where risks are often insured collectively and mutually (Parto/APPRO 2011: 7-8). In this system debts may not be fungible in that they cannot be reduced arbitrarily to some *fiat* or monetary value, meaning foreign lenders entering the market require innovations to develop Sharia-compliant financial vehicles and instruments (DAI/*Guardian* 2013: ¶12-14; Parto/APPRO 2011: 15). In this case, financialized capital flows must adjust to the human terrain, too.

Overall, the biopolitical legacy of Marjah and operations in Helmand is one of intervention, insecurity, and increased instability. The development and reconstruction push, characterized by a number of quick-impact projects along with programs promoting agricultural alternatives, indicates a tension between existing population security in Afghanistan and the neoliberal-coloured measures converted for war by counterinsurgents. ISAF-borne biopower, then, was unable to use pastoral protocols in Helmand's rural environments, where existing technologies of biopower blunted military force. While powerful and mobile, counterinsurgents become one more coercive actor injecting friction into an environment already saturated with competing interests and affiliations. In reflecting on his deployment to Sangin, a town in northern Helmand and site of fierce fighting in 2006-7 and 2010, an American Marine wrote about his encounter with a local man in 2010:

He still wanted to know if we planned to stay. “We will be happy if the Marines make their patrol bases near here. That will keep the *munafiqeen* away,” he said, using the term meaning “hypocrites” to describe the Taliban...“But if you plan to leave after only a short while, my family will be in greater danger than before you came. Everybody knows about 2014.” (Kadon 2014: ¶16-17)⁴³

⁴³ On Sangin, see the micro-documentary *Make Peace or Die* (2011), an account of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Division during their time in Sangin. See also Ben Anderson's *Battle for Bomb Alley* (2010), which documents the

In 2013, during an interview on National Public Radio (NPR), Wais Ahmad Barmak, the director of the National Solidarity Program and minister of rural rehabilitation and development, said:

The greatest fear is that once the military drawdown happens, and then the prospects of international aid decline—that's also looming ahead of us—then the gains we have made in the past 10 years, in terms of social development, in terms of economic development, and the democracy project that we created in Afghanistan to turn the country into a stable and prosperous and democratic society, we see a kind of, you know, a bleak future ahead of us. If all these cuts, you know, happen then the programs I have—which have touched, you know, 80 percent of the Afghan population—and then in this way, I have connected the people of Afghanistan to the central government. It has created the legitimacy of the government, the state and the parliament, everything we've created in Afghanistan—at risk. And so, that's the greatest fear. (NPR 2013: ¶19-20, transcript)

According to journalist Emma Graham-Harrison, British efforts in Helmand stretching from 2006 through the American surge in 2009 and 2010 and onward to 2014 had ultimately failed:

Unemployment is rampant, electricity is scarce and malnutrition is common. "People are worried," said Ghulam Sarwar Ghafari, 65, a school teacher in Lashkar Gah who said security was getting worse. "People had jobs working for the British. They were building roads, clinics and bridges, but a lot of things are unfinished." (Graham-Harrison 2014a: ¶7)

On the agricultural end:

[The Helmand PRT is] leaving behind a province that last year harvested a record opium crop and where violence in northern Sangin got so bad that government forces reportedly struck a deal with the Taliban. (¶6)

A "green zone" policy replaced opium farms in the most fertile land along the Helmand river valley with food crops, but enterprising farmers ploughed up and irrigated desert land to create new poppy fields. (¶14)

In using cultivation and agriculture to pollinate and fertilize *ruvier* populations amenable to friendly relations with counterinsurgents and the Afghan government, counterinsurgency weaponized biopower. Though always underwritten by ballistics, these collateral methods are slower in terms of their speed—less decisive, less discrete, and less discriminate. Despite the apparent benefits of intervening literally into the food supply chain to affect the state of the life chain, the outcomes and results, as outlined above, arguably cause more damage over the longer term.

efforts of Marines in clearing IEDs on Sangin's infamous Pharmacy Road. The Marines in Anderson's film repeatedly tell locals, "It's your choice," regarding whether or not to divulge the location of IEDs before clearing homes and demolishing compounds—often arbitrarily—to create clear sight lines and fields of fire.

Precursor Three: "Identity Dominance" & Biometrics in Afghan Village Life

Large operations aiming to push into local village environments revealed the need for counterinsurgents to not just map the human terrain, measure the atmospheric, and track patterns of life but to personalize and individualize surveillance and monitoring. Coincident with the surges into Helmand and Kandahar, counterinsurgents aggressively employed biometric technologies, aiming to envelop the population in new ways. According to Dillon and Reid, biometric data renders a population as a sensor system writ large (Dillon & Reid 2009: 143), which in turn creates a common operating picture from which to discern deviations from normal habits and routines. The militarization of biometrics for Afghanistan was "recognized as a key component of the counterinsurgency fight at the highest levels of command in ISAF" (Buhrow 2010: 48). Using portable digital iris and fingerprinting scanners along with digital photography and facial recognition software,⁴⁴ American forces in particular established "identity dominance" and aggressively informationalized the Afghan population. Taken from the American doctrinal idiom of full-spectrum dominance and rapid dominance, identity dominance refers to using the constituent parts of people's identities—individual biometrics—to win the counterinsurgency fight. Measureable anatomical and physiological features were used in conjunction with other "modalities" like voice patterns, DNA, and gait analysis (Public Intelligence 2014: ¶4). The promise: using technoscientific equipment to dismember a population into a collection of species-level signatures, recombined and cross-referenced in future for surveying and tracking but also predicting and pre-empting emergent insurgent events by extrapolating the expanding reservoir and 'making sense' of the data through movement, mobility, and pattern analysis (c.f. Boone 2011).

For counterinsurgents, deploying biometrics was an opportunity to inscribe and territorialize biopolitics with what is idealized as a sorting device for identifying different segments of the population. Travelers who passed through Afghanistan's American-controlled border crossings from 2010 onward were selected at random to 'give' data; most of those passing through Kabul International Airport are

⁴⁴ "The U.S. military currently uses three devices for collecting the bulk of the biometric data harvested in Afghanistan: the Biometrics Automated Toolset (BAT), Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE) and Secure Electronic Enrollment Kit (SEEK)" (Public Intelligence 2014: ¶5). These devices have become ubiquitous features in visual representations of the war.

scanned by default.⁴⁵ With ability to track individuals, ISAF forces could prioritize or prohibit the mobility of people, of families, of village residents, or of members of different tribes. They could measure the frequency of travel or movement. Initially, the biometric surge occurred from the ground-up, tracking Afghans who worked with ISAF forces as interpreters or on bases, who were part of units mentored by ISAF trainers, and who were put to work through local Cash-for-Work and quick impact project jobs. In 2011 alone, upwards of 2 million Afghans had been added to the American military database (Nordland 2011: ¶4); the number today is certainly much higher. While the Afghan government plans to harvest data from the whole population coincident with demographic, statistical, census, and identity-card (i.e. biopolitical, population management) efforts (¶15), widespread opposition to American biometric efforts in Kandahar in 2009 spurred the Karzai government to speak out about the practice (¶23; Schachtman 2010: ¶13). Yet, Afghan biometric employment is not confined only to Afghanistan. The data collected by American forces flows laterally—and continues to flow today—beyond Afghanistan's interior and national security ministries and remaining coalition forces, and to the US Office of Homeland Defence and Department of Justice—and likely, the CIA—for consideration in creating surveillance imperatives and kill/capture lists for global operations (Nordland 2011: ¶9 & 19).

Even with a biometrics task force established in 2010 and the 2011 formation of the NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission (NROLFSM) to offer advice on such matters, there was little oversight for biometric data collection in Afghanistan in relation to privacy issues or human rights (Boone 2010). The US Army's 2011 guide to biometrics in Afghanistan admits that there is no formal doctrine or institutionalized set of guidelines for the practice (US Army CALL 2011a: ii). Yet, changes were spurred after a report in 2012 compiled by the US Government Accountability Office recommended expanding biometric use in combat operations for both conventional and special operations forces (GOA 2012: 30) as the new apogee of "smart" precision war. While documentation

⁴⁵ In Canada, the Harper government proposed to expand the abilities of Canadian security and immigration regimes to collect biometric data from non-European and non-American travelers and immigration applicants. These proposals, which changes legislation included in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, were inserted into the government's 2015 omnibus budget bill. This is a boomerang effect I discuss further in chapter 5. See Susana Mas (3 June 2015), "Biometric data collection change in budget bill raises privacy concerns," *CBC News*, <<http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/biometric-data-collection-change-in-budget-bill-raises-privacy-concerns-1.3095488>>.

from Canada and the UK is not publicly available, we can reasonably anticipate similar military guidelines along with the convergence of doctrine regarding biometrics and future contingency operations. According to the American guide:

Afghanistan presents an extraordinarily complicated environment for the broad employment of biometrics. However, the payoff to US and coalition forces is so great in terms of securing the population and identification of *bad actors* in the country, that commanders must be creative and persistent in their efforts to enroll as many Afghans as possible. (US Army CALL 2011a: 12)

The guide describes the merging of different biometric "products" with human terrain mapping and influence/information operations to create "hot spots" of "latent value" to target within areas of operation and driving future operations (20-21) based on knowing "friend, foe, or unknown" (27). Short of the impossible, the guide prescribes utopian secondary measures: "Locate and identify every resident (visit and record every house and business). At a minimum, fully biometrically enroll all military-age males" (31). Given the faith expressed in the beneficial use of ever-expanding reams of biometric data, the employment of biometrics is literally a probing exercise in veridiction. It is only as good as what it reveals or makes intelligible, but the premise of integrating every possible biometric measure implicitly promises the ability to extrapolate intelligence. The practice will tell the truth about its own efficacy, learning lessons as it goes, with Afghanistan as the experimental environment.

Counterinsurgency certainly generated a ripple effect for producers in biometric technology sectors. The post-9/11 era and the war in Afghanistan enabled substantial economic growth in the sector because of ongoing governmental investment (Dillon & Reid 2009: 144), a new wrinkle in a military-industrial-biopolitical-data complex. Responding to the employment of military biometrics, one tech start-up blog-post advocates deploying biometrics into all conventional market-based fields before celebrating the American military as a productive incubator with spin-off benefits for commercial consumer markets (Breedon 2013: ¶1). Florida-based Cross Match self-identifies as the worldwide leader in "biometric identity solutions" and provides much of the software and hardware for units used in Afghanistan. In 2013, the company was producing second and third generation devices based on its procurement contracts with American and ISAF forces (Vrakulj 2013). As with the spectre of cybersecurity and risks in the information domain, so goes the spectre of biometric insecurity in the

context of population control. Military biometrics emerged in part to minimize the risk of so-called 'blue on green' insider attacks by Afghan troops on coalition trainers or mentors (Buhrow 2010: 46; c.f. Schachtman 2010). One account traces the use of biometrics back to American forces in Iraq, where units were compelled to monitor and track access by Iraq security forces into American camps and FOBs following the infiltration and subsequent suicide attack on base in Mosul in 2005 (Breedon 2013: ¶7). Yet, while the genealogy of contemporary biometrics in counterinsurgency is tied to limit-environments and conflict zones, the source is not the military proper but the humanitarian NGO sector. In his book on biometrics and biopolitics, Joseph Pugliese describes the usage of biometrics by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and other NGOs in Afghanistan as a way to securitize the distribution of aid among already impoverished refugees displaced by the early stages of the war. According to Pugliese, the "seemingly neutral exercise" of biometrics is "underpinned by racialized presuppositions" that facilitate aid while simultaneously derogating and disempowering recipients in a paternalistic neocolonial relation of dependency and welfare provision (Pugliese 2012: 104; c.f. Browne 2009). According to Pugliese, the UNHCR was managing the problem of "delinquent aid recyclers" who allegedly double-dipped aid disbursements, though the incidence was negligible. He argues that while the biometric initiative harvested data, its symbolic function was far more important: it added another layer of security that effectively criminalized poverty and re-staged the vulnerability of aid recipients (Schwartz-Dupree 2007, in Pugliese 2012: 104). In employing biometrics to administer the needs of precarious populations, the population was automatically coded and marked as risky and dangerous, a situation wholly ironic given the UN's self-identification as a noble and righteous actor in distinction to whichever military actors operate in the area.

In relation to adding insurgents to watch lists in Afghanistan and imagining the social distribution of insurgency like epidemiological pandemic modelling, coalition and Afghan forces found that biometrics allowed them to augment their own "be-on-the-lookout" directives as the counterinsurgency campaign became increasingly localized and dispersed. People could randomly encounter biometric scanners, which in term resulted in legible patterns of local population movement.

Finger swabs were consistently used on detained Afghan villagers to detect cordite or other explosive materials residues, which in turn invents a chain of evidence linking and connecting different people and communities, with a centrifugal surveiling apparatus pulling together and manufacturing consequential relations out of disparate ties. Much like the now-normal and expected use of forensic evidence in North Atlantic domestic legal proceedings, the lack of biometric evidence is increasingly greeted as an obstacle to war-related criminal convictions in Afghanistan (Pendall & Seig 2014: 72) in a judiciary environment interested in actively integrating biometric data as evidence (US Army CALL 2011a: 13 & 44; c.f. *ISAF Evidence Collection Guide 2010*). As I mentioned above, critics in and outside Afghanistan have argued that this practice compromises privacy and basic civil freedoms. Yet, the biometric initiative is underwritten by more aggressive measures and by the threat of ballistic force for those unwilling to comply. What does one do at a check point when presented with a biometric scanner? Noncompliance likely equals being coded as a recalcitrant local and then being immediately detained, or worse.

Interestingly, in concert with detractors and opponents, the military literature itself questions data quality alongside the skills of technicians and their respective interpretive dispositions specific to social and institutional settings. As Gregory notes in his work on drones and "everywhere war," remote pilots and sensor operators, as technicians, are 'in the fight' even as it is physically continents away. Ordinary activity perceived by drone sensor operators becomes a threat in waiting; intimacy is conditional, where those in at a distant remove become immersed in battlespace, sharing the world of their comrades on the ground in what are "contrapuntal geographies" and "remote splits" (Gregory 2011ab & 2014) where the distance is not hundreds or thousands of kilometres but "eighteen inches away: the distance from eye to screen" (Gregory 2014: 9). The clinical and anti-septic 'objective' perspective offered by drone aesthetics gives way to a mediated technical realism of operators and analysts infused with biases, and perception is anything but neutral. While biometric analysts and forensic technicians may not have the same killing capacity as drone pilots and operators in what appears comparatively as mundane labour related to aggregating data, running algorithms, and overseeing computerized cross-referencing, they are subject to the same kind of perceptual drift,

assembling and *inducing* patterns of life to individualize targeting and track threats in what Gregory calls "mobile zones of exceptions" (14). There is no "objective" handling of data when the purpose of the data is to synthesize actionable intelligence and detect incipient objects from multiple signatures and fragments for recreating an environment for counter insurgency. As with all of the biopolitical measures that collateralize the war into the life environment of populations—with drones, their physical movements; with biometrics, their DNA, their irises, their skin—these technologies are fundamentally asymmetric. There is no reciprocity between the biometric enrollee targeted and the biometric agent targeting and capturing data; the shared "unity of the act" specific to conventional models of war and combat does not exist (9), whether by drones or biometrics, or by drone-generated intelligence interfacing *with* biometrics and vice versa. That identity dominance is positioned as a proportional and necessary lesser evil is disconcerting and dangerous.

Close Life Support: Special Forces, Biopower, and Village Stability

Having outlined different precursors to village stability operations (VSO) in Afghanistan, this section accounts for the historical practice of village-level counterinsurgency as conducted by special forces. Further, I outline how these operations rely on popular mobilization and the establishment of local ad hoc defence forces and how North Atlantic counterinsurgents attempted to draw on and modify tactics from Iraq, where American forces exploited sectarian divides to generate seeming 'spontaneous' support from local communities.

As conventional forces were learning how to do large-scale grassroots counterinsurgency in southern Afghanistan by way of regularizing irregular capabilities, special forces teams were undertaking a similar push, targeting more remote areas in an attempt to take custody of rural village populations. While village-level stability efforts were confined to special forces before 2009, the emergence of Stability Operations Information Centres (SOICs) in 2010 across the ISAF regional commands in Afghanistan testified to a new normal for conventional units as well. In VSO, small units embedded with local communities, recalling Galula's prescription for cadres of French modern warriors

in Algeria going native in "whirlybird" patterns of *nomadisation*. While ballistics and close air support would be directed at insurgents, VSO aimed to provide close life support to conduct the conduct of village populations. The special forces push stood as an additive and a corrective, a way to refine counterinsurgency from the bottom-up and distribute the war into areas where the Afghan government had even less influence and where even the most adept conventional forces could not sustain the campaign. Eschewing "firebase diplomacy" that keeps conventional units inside the wire more than outside, and freed from the logistical demands necessary to sustain larger contingents, special forces teams were able to insert themselves and employ firepower and biopower where required.

In his book regarding state formation and small wars, Giustozzi argues that no state arrives at the precipice of liberal rule after neat and tidy settlements with some social contract between governed and government. Instead, these liberal historicizations obscure the role of "naked coercion" in creating a S/state and in the sophisticated and long-term process of taming and domesticating violence (Giustozzi 2010). If VSO tells the biopolitical truth about how to interdict and administer the lives of local communities, the truth actually admits to the failure of Afghan government institutions to coerce or penetrate rural environments—and perhaps to the actual lack of interest or inclination to do so beyond the imperatives of North Atlantic states. In many cases, attuned special forces operators realized the lack of legitimacy enjoyed by the Afghan central government in rural areas; they aimed to support tribes, villages, and key leaders who were not aligned with Taliban forces rather than engineer some alignment with Kabul (Briggs 2014: 130). Accordingly, the core focus of village stability was linked to addressing and exploiting local grievances and to appealing to established systems of local government through meetings with village and tribal elders in order to 'build capacity' at the village level (Dennys 2012: 12). As with the Canadian Key Village Approach, VSO prescribes shaping (clearing), holding, and building followed by an 'expansion and transition' stage based on integrated popular mobilization in which people both defend themselves and reinsert themselves into their own local communities:

Success in VSO requires a mindset of presence, patience, persistence, and partnering. The goal of VSO is to permanently shape an area to support local governance and create an environment where Afghans can live prosperous lives. This process normally requires months, and not weeks, to achieve. (Ashley 2012: 18)

The answer, the Truth, is not simply mosaic warfare. It will be intimate, occurring and unfolding on the micro-level largely because Afghans—especially rural Afghans—turn to local community leaders to address and fix problems (Jones 2010: ¶15). As such, counterinsurgents would then take Giustozzi's advice and avoid dreams of liberal rule dreams and instead "inject a fair dose of Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Ibn Khaldun into the mix" (Giustozzi 2009 in Jones 2010: ¶10), where counterinsurgency's biopower and firepower is the continuation of war by means of local pacts with a temporary shelf-life. According to counterinsurgent narratives, internecine conflict always-already animates the dense social ecologies and networks of rural Afghanistan, and finding the appropriate centre of gravity—the singularities or attractors that bind together built spaces and populations— amounts to determining the opportune or 'supreme' moment (*kairos*) to press and seize villages and their residents.

The employment of VSO served as a way to determine and apply an appropriate mix between what a recent RAND study called the "iron fist" and the "motive-focused" paths of counterinsurgency (Paul *et al*/RAND 2013: 180). VSO requires "vertical and horizontal vision" (NSWC 2012: 53) to make use of the different material flows and infrastructures— affective, emotional, material, metaphysical— that in a population-centered operating environment. In essence, VSO is:

[A] bottom-up counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy [establishes] security and stability bubbles (or "white space") around rural villages with an eye toward permanently shaping an area to support local governance and development. This is an important distinction from past efforts that seemed to concentrate mostly on short-term security gains rather than addressing deeper political, ethnic, tribal, and socioeconomic issues necessary to sustain these gains in the long run...At the heart of VSO is a 12-man SF team that embeds in or adjacent to a local village. The team engages with the surrounding community and relies on Village Stability Platforms (VSPs) that provide a range of enablers for additional support. (Saum-Manning 2012: 7-8)

In systemic terms, platform is anything that can be seized, synthesized, and operationalized as an element for staging and sustaining the war—medical support, reconstruction, coercion through capital and monetary compensation, civilian affairs support, or female engagement and cultural support teams. With the amount of institutional literature and doctrinal commentary on VSO has increased significantly since 2010, North Atlantic forces are clearly refining what will remain a core competency for ongoing contingency operations in the future.

American special forces efforts from Vietnam provide the basis for contemporary village stability operation, although the conceptual foundation also draws from British and French late colonial efforts in Algeria, Malaya, or Kenya. For the French, failures in then-Indochina led to a re-doubled village-level approach in Algeria, where 660 small cadres of Special Administrative Sections (SAS) and Special Administrative Sections-Urban (SAU) were deployed across Algeria to bolster military and civil development in local settings and persuade Algerians as to the long-term benefits of French rule (Beckett 2001: 164-166). Besides creating resettlement programs involving close to 3 million people and creating almost 2 000 *auto-défense* villages, the localized initiatives unfolded in relation to larger efforts to establish rigorous controls on rural populations based on cordoning 'pacified' villages and creating forbidden and free-fire zones. The American effort in Vietnam mixed development and military action—biopower and firepower in complex combined operations—to secure local environments. From 1954 to 1971, this 'visionary' effort—embracing modern war—was associated with the Civilian Irregular Defence Group (CIDG) and later, after 1967, was supplemented by Civil Operations and Revolutionary/Rural Development Support (CORDS), a "civil military hybrid" that anticipated contemporary comprehensive approaches to operations by developing "unity of effort" similar to whole-of-government approaches promoted today (Sauvé 2008: 4, 12-15). CORDS relied on a Hamlet Evaluation System to track over 12 70 hamlets and 200 villages, and the program generated reams of metrics and statistics through a Pacification Evaluation System (PACES) (Beckett 2001: 201; see chapter 2). In Vietnam, large search-and-destroy operations (in Afghanistan, clearing operations) based largely on denying sanctuary and support to insurgents tended to alienate rural populations and amounted, as in Afghanistan, to simply "mowing the grass," where units "advanced into ambush" in order to kill insurgents while achieving more destruction than development or reconstruction (Urban, "Afghanistan: the Battle for Helmand," 2011). According to his essay on VSO in *Small Wars Journal*, Mark Brown, a major in US Army special forces with VSO experience in Afghanistan, argues that it took the American military leadership in Vietnam almost fifteen years of advisory and special forces operations before and during the build-up of conventional forces to realize the crucial importance of

village-level operations as the key to pacification (Brown 2013: ¶13). In other words, while small in size, special forces units offered an economy of force and a set of skills—lethal and non-lethal—that were necessary for sustained village-level operations (¶3; c.f. Gortzak 2014). This capacity was at the core of VSO in Afghanistan from 2010 onward.

Civic action in Vietnam also meant *paramilitarizing* local communities to sustain American and government influence in local areas and hamlets and interdict Vietnam People's Army and National Liberation Front forces.⁴⁶ Developing an indigenous auxiliary force with defensive and strike capacities was essential to the CORDS/CIDG initiative in Vietnam.⁴⁷ U.S. Army special forces in the form of Operational Detachment - A (ODA) teams embedded in villages and organized military-age men into quick reaction teams (Brown 2013: ¶6-7).⁴⁸ In his treatise on modern warfare, Trinquier advocated the same paramilitarization, describing the need to create small contact teams comprised of local men to defend villages (Trinquier 1961: 106). In Vietnam, American units initially exploited existing territorial and social antagonisms between indigenous mountain tribes—whom the French called *Montagnards*, or "mountain people"—and rural Vietnamese communities to use these tribes as leading edges in Civilian Irregular Defence Group formations and as guides, fixers, and translators. However, with the largely rural constitution of CIDG forces and the eventual reduction of American logistical and infrastructure support for remote areas during the process of "Vietnamization" (returning the war effort to the South Vietnamese government and military as an exit strategy), many remote Montagnard and Vietnamese communities were targeted for retaliation and retribution after 1971 (¶12). As is well-known and documented, North Vietnamese forces in conjunction with Viet Cong cells captured and killed local leaders who worked with Americans.

Notably, on its own terms, Brown's analysis gives the American operators the moral high ground, celebrating the rapport-building and loyalty as the beneficent entailments of the diffusion of

⁴⁶ The VPA was known in American circles as the North Vietnam Army (NVA), conforming to the American narrative and imaginary geography of a dangerous Communist north toppling domino-style into the south. The NLF was known as *Viet Cong* (*Việt Nam Cộng-sản*, or "Vietnamese communist") or VC.

⁴⁷ See Francis Kelly's (1973) *Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971* (U.S. Army).

⁴⁸ ODA, or Operational Detachment-A, is the basic unit specific to U.S. Army's special forces, the Green Berets. ODAs are also known as A-Teams.

American warfare into the hamlets, and demonizes the American forces' adversaries as bloodthirsty monsters. Yet his assessment tends to ignore how the very insertion of American special operations into the life environment of rural villages effectively escalated and collateralized the war through alternate pathways; rather than a bulwark against infiltration and enemy sanctuary, it was an amplifier of violence. Further, Brown's account is quiet on the Phoenix Program (*Chiến dịch Phụng Hoàng*), a joint CIA, American special forces, and local security forces operation, which from 1965 to 1972 systemically hunted and 'neutralized' Viet Cong/NLF infrastructure, eliminating over 80 000 enemies through torture, extra-legal detention, and targeted assassinations, killing anywhere from 26 000 to 40 000 people.⁴⁹ Although Brown positions VSO as a necessary American innovation to counter insurgent influence from Vietnam to Afghanistan, his analysis obfuscates the economy of violence that was cooperatively continued in rural operations designed to pursue the prize of population.

In Afghanistan, village stability operations represented a significant change in direction for special forces. From 2001 to 2005, American and other ISAF special forces units aggressively prosecuted quasi-legal or extra-judicial kill/capture missions, one part of "cynegetic war" based on the logic of the predatory animal hunt (Chamayou 2011). Special forces focused on "high value targets," with an intelligence-generation apparatus and social network analysis that created ever expanding kill/capture lists (Scahill 2013: 140-141).⁵⁰ By 2005, with troop increases, an escalation of the war effort, and the transfer of command (at least in name) to NATO ISAF, the special forces focus on direct action continued albeit with a gradual shift towards a more active role in population-centered counterinsurgency. For instance, a CIA doctrine document made available by Wikileaks, *Making High-Value Targeting Operations as an Effective Counterinsurgency Tool* (2009), emphasises the importance of high-value targeting as internal to counterinsurgency, and the document is part of a small CIA series

⁴⁹ From Alfred McCoy's *A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror* (2006; Henry Holt/Macmillan). See pages 64-69.

⁵⁰ Jeremy Scahill's book *Dirty Wars: The World is a Battlefield* was adapted into a film (directed by Rick Rowley). Scahill documents the global growth of American SF operations post-2001 in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere. During an interview, former SF member Andrew Exum comments on his experience in Iraq: "You start out with a target list. And maybe you got 50 guys on it. Maybe you got 200 guys on it. But you can work your way through those 50 to 200 guys. And then suddenly at the end of that target list, you now got a new target list of 3,000 people on it. And how did this grow?"

Best Practices in Counterinsurgency.⁵¹ The document suggests how focused operations against high-value targets, if considered appropriately within the context of insurgent life cycle and "bench strength" and of ensuring minimal collateral damage, can shape the operational environment as desired for staging for chain of clearing, holding, and building (CIA 2009: 6). In other words, select acts of killing would enable the non-ballistic biopolitical end of the warfighting spectrum. While their kill/capture repertoire remained intact, the discourse within special forces circles around "Afghanization" as the way to exit the war was common during country-wide conduct of village stability. Furthermore, Afghanistan was not the only place this shift occurred. Instead of alluding to precedents in Vietnam, many special forces commanders referred to concurrent if less visible American-backed counterinsurgency campaigns in Colombia and the Philippines, each with their own blend of foreign internal defence, security force assistance, and population-centered stabilization (Robinson 2013: 128).⁵²

Brown identifies the Afghan prototype for VSO as being implemented in July 2009 in Daykundi Province, with ODA teams receiving support in a largely ethnic Hazara area already favourable to "pro-Western leadership," which allowed teams to live outside heavily-fortified combat outposts or patrol bases and in the local village environment (Brown 2013: ¶ 17-19). As the military literature repeatedly states, effective VSO ideally divides communities and their living environments, introducing enough friction in enemy systems to create a cascading anti-Taliban tipping point (Mann 2012: ¶ 1; Jones and Muñoz 2010: ix). As the efforts to secure local villages proceeded from 2009 onward, smaller ISAF village stability coordination centres and a national village stability coordination center aimed to harmonize approaches while leaving enough space for local units to act autonomously to develop the biopolitical requirements necessary for conducting the war as an exercise in custodial and pastoral power. The desire to *distribute* the war and spread it, like the avowed 'oil spot' or like a swarming

⁵¹ The document outlines the choice of high value targeting methods: 'Governments can use variables such as culture and the likelihood of collateral damage to assess whether desired effects produced by HVT methods are best achieved by capturing insurgent leaders, using psychological operations to marginalize them, or conducting kinetic strikes. Captures help to demythologize insurgent leaders in cultures with a strong warrior ethos, according to an academic expert on counterinsurgency, and may be preferable because of insurgent leaders' interrogation value" (CIA 2009: 5).

⁵² The same passage mentions the massive expansion of American special forces operations in Africa under the auspices of AFRICOM, the U.S. African Command. For American counterinsurgency and AFRICOM, see Catherine Besteman's essay, "Countering AFRICOM," in (2009) *The Counter Counterinsurgency Manual*.

counter-contamination, meant 'speaking' the language of violence first and stability second (Robinson 2013: 78-79)—showing first the lethal ability and proclivity to kill so as to make some die and then make others live. Killing power and the propensity to use violence expressively and to let it communicate legitimacy remained significant, though its use was carefully curtailed in shaping the environment and the population.

The village stabilization narrative in Afghanistan placed emphasis on local self-sufficiency and on the idea of emancipatory-sounding popular mobilization, which, with some nudging and prodding, was supposed to emerge from ground-upwards against anti-government forces, whether the Taliban, cartels, or otherwise.⁵³ Precision-guided war, according to the calculus of restraint, discrimination, and proportionality, was not happening only from the wings of drone-launched aerial strikes but via "precision counterinsurgency" aiming to mobilize local communities as auxiliary units, which came to be called the Afghan Local Police (ALP) (Madden 2011). From the ISAF perspective, local auxiliary units build on already existing extra-legal local defense initiatives based on traditional tribal structures like the Pashtun *akbari*. Raising irregular local defence forces—or actively militarizing civilians as a viable exit strategy (E'toile 2011)—is a core tenet of unconventional or irregular warfare doctrine during extended counterinsurgencies or foreign internal defense mission. As a number of rights-based NGOs have pointed out in comprehensive reports, these militias cut both ways (AIHRC 2012; HWR 2011; Oxfam 2011). While they may provide auxiliary security services and act as a bulwark for ISAF forces to protect critical infrastructure through local presence and their own local cultural and social knowledge, they reinscribe hegemonic village-specific types of masculinity and conservative gendered norms, offering an instrumental solution for ISAF that conflicts with claims about women's rights and empowering women, especially in rural Afghanistan. Prior to VSO and the plan to rely on informal local police and coincident initial training of Afghan military and police forces, the Afghan National Auxiliary

⁵³ Arming rebels and raising local or for-hire mercenary forces to fight proxy wars against host-nation governments works the same way. Consider American-backed popular mobilizations in 1980s Afghanistan and Central America, in Libya in 2011, or in post-2011 Syria and Iraq. For instance, in northeastern Syria, the current American-led coalition fighting against the *Daesh* (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS]) backs the Kurdish YPG (*Yekîneyên Parastîna Gel*), or local people's defence units. In Iraq, the central government uses Shia-based *al-Hashd al-Shabi*, or Popular Mobilization Forces. Consider also Pakistan's support for different armed groups in Afghanistan's border regions.

Police (ANAP) was created but subsequently dismantled due to its lack of integration into the local communities in which they operated (Saum-Manning 2010: 4). Further, the Afghan Public Protection Program, the Local Defence Initiative, and the Critical Infrastructure Police Program (CIP) were all developed through 2008 and 2009 to temporarily relieve security gaps in different provinces and unfolded with different results. Yet, each was hampered by corruption and extortion, lack of oversight, and "negative perceptions of ...legitimacy" (7). Notably, the CIP in Kunduz Province was disbanded in 2011 after charges from ISAF and the Afghan government of illegal taxation and active give-and-take with insurgents to share the financial benefits of NATO monetary flows and quasi-legal jurisdiction.

By 2010, many ALP members were often former anti-regime or 'anti-Afghan' fighters persuaded to participate by prominent local men of influence or with a small if comparatively more lucrative salary than that offered by leaders of local insurgent cells. Local police units in Afghanistan were contingent on the direction and flow of ISAF operations. Paying people to 'fight for the good guys'—and paying to control, tame, and monopolize violence—by enfranchising small cells in villages indicates that 'choosing sides' often has less to do with religious zeal or militant fervor or noble aims and everything to do with the provision of a living wage (c.f. Giustozzi 2010). In a sense, the same motivation likely inspires the supply of labour to contemporary domestic police forces in North Atlantic states: stable income, benefits, and job security. Further, and as I discuss below, local police forces exacerbated informal economic networks based on graft, extortion, and corruption, where units act with impunity against rivals, exploiting ties with ISAF forces to target and harass adversaries, fomenting insecurity in the same environments they were tasked with policing and protecting.

The emphasis on local police also followed from the American experience in Iraq, where counterinsurgents exploited sectarian divides to bring different communities into the fighting. The so-called and "Sunni Awakening" in Anbar Province during 2005-6 and the "Sons of Iraq" movement in 2007-8 coordinated with American forces to neutralize and interdict more committed Sunni-based *jihadi* elements and insurgent groups. American military commanders hailed this as an indication that Sunni communities—favoured under the government of Saddam Hussein, targeted by Shia-majority security

forces reengineered after the occupation of Iraq—were finally deciding to collaborate with the new Shia-centered government.⁵⁴ While this move by Sunni communities to undertake their own self-defence in Iraq appeared spontaneous, it was shaped by American military Reconciliation and Engagement Cells, which conducted information, psychological, and influence operations directed at the Sunni community in Iraq's 'Sunni triangle.' Further, the awakenings were based on payments to local Iraqis participating in the security and redevelopment program (Quinn & Fumerton 2010: 13). In other words, economic enfranchisement was a crucial lever in a process that essentially created small private armies for hire, emerging from the human terrain with the adequate indigenous acumen.

Village Stability Operations as the Biopolitical Limit-Attitude

The biopolitical turn toward the villages—as with the cultural turn in military affairs—is a 'rush to the intimate' because it is based on knowing and exploiting more intimate details about people, populations, and their lived environments (Gregory 2008). Embedded in villages after being 'invited' to establish a presence, units doing VSO sought intimate awareness by emplacing themselves, weaponized with biopower and firepower, within the *milieu* of everyday life. Further, stability operations across the villages tell the truth not only about war measures also but about the theatre of the war: they will reveal 'what is really going on' at ground level and in the grassroots across rural Afghan spaces; and they will then tell the truth about the operational approach itself, affirming VSO as the way forward.

As mentioned above, VSO marked a transition for ISAF special forces units, and they had to reinvent themselves given that they were often greeted (rightly so) with suspicion and fear by Afghans. The direct action "hunting and killing" role over the first eight years of the war in Afghanistan alienated many rural village populations (Robinson 2013: 67). Communities did not sympathize with insurgent groups or anti-ISAF forces so much as resent the methods of what Afghans refer to as 'American Taliban' who act with their own fair share of impunity (c.f. Scahill 2013: 26 & 344). In one documented case, US Army special forces detachments operating in the Nerkh district in Wardak

⁵⁴ Today, many argue that this set of events also contributed to the rudimentary beginnings of the command element of *Daesh* (ISIS).

Province during 2012 were accused of atrocities—war crimes—against local tenant farmers after villagers discovered the remains of ten local villagers. Locals believe they were abused and killed because of their unwillingness to provide information and work with the American unit around the ALP initiative (Aikins 2013c). In March 2012, Robert Bales, a sergeant in the 3rd Stryker Brigade, left Combat Outpost Belambi in the Panjwayi District southwest of Kandahar City and murdered sixteen local people in two different villages nearby (Alkozai and Najiban; near the CF KVA villages). Notably, witnesses allege Bales did not act alone and local residents were outraged with how the event was framed and explained by ISAF military officials (Lendman 2012). The fall-out of this event 'derailed' VSO 'momentum' and caused significant anger and outrage in the Pashtun communities around the base (Robinson 2013: 145-8). Bales' brigade, a rapid-reaction conventional unit, had been performing base security tasks and offering support for special forces conducting VSO in the area. In an earlier well-known incident from 2010, a small contingent of soldiers from the US Army's 5th Stryker Brigade formed a secret kill team in Maiwand District, in western Kandahar, and killed local civilians (Boal 2011). In this incident, the brigade was also deployed to provide back-up and support for the VSO push into the Maiwand area. While the two latter examples are explained away by VSO adherents as aberrations—as criminal actions; as the unfortunate expression of psychic distress—that have nothing to do with the environmental conditions of the war, all three follow from the ongoing push to close the distance with local communities and bring the war to rural settlements—off the radar, out of sight. While much of the human rights discourse around civilian atrocities and collateral damage in Afghanistan has focused on the intensive use of close air support and air strikes (Garlasco/HWR 2008; c.f. VCNV 2014)⁵⁵, it is ultimately difficult to estimate how many Afghans have been killed and maimed by special forces, whether in kill/capture raids or in the conduct of village stabilization.

With the continuation of the village stability focus, the more intimately engaged counterinsurgents conducting operations in remote and rural areas realized the fundamental ambiguity of the dominant but simplistic war narratives, whether in terms of 'good' North Atlantic virtues versus

⁵⁵ The Voices for Creative Non-Violence (VCNV) report catalogues reports of civilian deaths resulting from military operations. The Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) maintains an ongoing list of civilian deaths.

backward religious fanatics or in relation to the triangular narrative of counterinsurgency as battle between groups for the population's hearts and minds. These fables were elements of a larger frame for the war, grafted onto ongoing local antagonisms and struggles that existed prior to North Atlantic operations. In other words, ISAF forces were one more collection of antagonists and belligerents operating in local environments. Former British Army officer Mike Martin's recent work on British and American efforts in Helmand Province (in Sangin and Garmsir; in Marjah, Kajaki, Now Sad, and Musa Qala) reveals the naiveté and disavowal internal to ISAF's narratives, which diverge significantly from the perceptions of people living in the province (Martin 2014). After conducting extensive interviews with Helmand's largely Pashtun population, Martin's findings reveal a geography of ongoing and sophisticated 'intimate wars' between families, clans, and villages. Small conflicts and struggles between different communities and villages where resources are scarce constitute a local biopolitics and art of government. Antagonisms over land disputes, access to water, and poppy smuggling along with ongoing feuds based on *badal* (retaliation for violating one's honour) often dictate how communities engage and cooperate in contexts in which deputized local police and Taliban fighters know each other. The North Atlantic war effort merely superimposed a new bellicose layer of violence and coercion onto existing rivalries that are multidirectional and multigenerational.⁵⁶ ISAF is then one more auxiliary actor adding to the operational friction for local communities who are always dealing on their own terms with the circulation of uncertainty, the currency of trust, the function of patrimony and patronage, the tension between state interference and village-level ways of rule, and the changing continuum of firepower and biopower.

⁵⁶ Martin's interview with Public Radio International (PRI) offers a good summary of his book and its findings. See "No one in the West understood what the war in Afghanistan was really about" (10 April 2014), <<http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-04-10/no-one-west-understood-what-war-afghanistan-was-really-about>> Notably, Martin is a former British Army officer and served in Helmand for two years. When asked about the use of dominant 'good guy/bad guy' frames to explain the war within North Atlantic military circles—the interviewer suggests this simplistic narrative was intended for public consumption—Martin responds that many leaders up and down the military chain were largely invested in the fable. Martin's work was the result of his work as a doctoral dissertation, which was funded by the UK Ministry of Defence as part of the lessons learned process. His subsequent effort to publish the book outside the UK MOD was met with opposition, which according to Martin indicates the embarrassment of UK military officials regarding their legacy in Helmand. While insightful in telling the truth about Helmand, the implication of Martin's work is that, given better intelligence and knowledge, ISAF could have waged a 'better' war—and this is the myth of military enlightenment intact.

With this epiphany coming by pushing the internal limits of counterinsurgency to the ground, we can see how the war becomes, literally, a method of inquiry. Enlightened because they take a limit-attitude, special forces operators devise alternate methods for affecting and influencing local environments based on exploiting community-based fissures to assign who is good and bad, designations which follow from the aims of pacifying the 'restive countryside.' In venerating and designing a comprehensive but precision approach, VSO creates the reality of "21st century combat as a politics" where fighting *is* communication and cultural engagement (Simpson 2012). Here counterinsurgents implicitly reaffirm Clausewitz-Foucault: if war and politics, or war and biopolitics, extend into and continue into each other, the Clausewitzian trinity of the people, government, and the military (or war machine) remains firmly in place. Put another way, the continuum between ways of life, ways of rule, and ways of war remains intact. Local Afghans, especially in rural areas, are ordered and organized by the different conflicts that constitute and normalize their everyday lives, which connect to the local ways of rule to which they submit, which 'conduct the conduct' of their lives. Village-level counterinsurgents ostensibly acting at the behest of the Afghan state intervene into this trinity already in place. Using military speak, the local environment of VSO is a network of nodes with different centres of gravity: a host-nation whose authority is conferred by Afghan state forces trying to monopolize and dictate the direction of the war; counterinsurgents comprised of special forces units, who realize their role vis-à-vis extending the reach of the state but discover the failure of the Afghan state to penetrate remote settings; and then local populations themselves, who may or may not align themselves with counterinsurgents, and who may be deemed insurgent or unfriendly simply because they attempt to occupy and carve out a third space between the insurgency, North Atlantic incursions, and the missives of the central government.

In countering insurgency, special forces units had significant latitude to determine their operational priorities. Like marauding free radicals, the units were permitted to wage something closer to 'indie war' to complete campaign goals in relation to stabilization. They could smooth out space and spread the war, adapt locally with small footprints in a "conditions-based approach" (Connet & Cassidy

2012: 24), and then "vertically integrate" (Green 2014: 31) to influence local social networks and hierarchies of key leaders at different nodes or locations in order to add 'depth' to the overall effort. Each village-level campaign, precise and situated, one part of a larger mosaic, is like a separate exercise in enterprise management. As in the CF Key Village Approach and in the Marine occupation of Marjah, small units driving VSO operations direct the allocation of aid monies and reconstruction efforts based on the needs of local communities but always in alignment with a unit's *own* perception of the security needs and required security infrastructure for given areas or environments. For instance, and following from the weaponization of money, American teams enjoyed access to a Commander's Emergency Relief Program, which allows teams to allocate funds for small projects to selectively prioritize the restoration or sustainment of local essential services (Connet & Cassidy 2012: 26; Rust 2011: 31; FM 3-24 2009: 4-9/sec.4-390; c.f. USFOR-A Pub 1-06 2009). Towards the end of the ISAF mission from 2012 onward, American officers planning for deployments were actively consulting with NGOs for advice on how to manage and administer these funds in local contexts (Piskadlo & Riecke 2014). Further, units interfaced with US Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) to determine priorities for projects, which the OTI funded through grants no greater than \$50 000 U.S. (Robinson 2013: 84-85; c.f. Beeton 2014 on the legacy of USAID in American proxy wars in Central America). While these programs have tangible benefits in basic material terms, they reflect the needs of counterinsurgents' own assessment, amounting to a type of coercive military-inflected tied aid. Using District Development Plans designed by the different ISAF stabilization operation information centres, U.S. Army Civil Affairs Teams working with special forces produced their own developmental agendas and goals throughout the battlesphere. Fundable development remained contingent on local support for special forces teams, enchaining communities to the dictates of stabilization. Any NGOs or contractors had to route through counterinsurgents, and non-aligned aid organizations not vetted by or of no value to the aims of the campaign—even if they had experience in the area—were shut out.

Critics argued that the dispersion of village stability operations, along with the reliance of Afghan Local Police units in rural areas, indicated failures in the state-building agenda and represented

shortcuts to satisfy criteria for an adequate end-state friendly to an American/ISAF exit from the war (ICG 2010: 7). According to the Afghan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), the initial phases of village-stability programs, rather than control the tempo and severity of violence, introduced "a new variety of armed actors into the field" by actively stoking existing antagonisms in operations that were remote, making them opaque and not subject to any real oversight (Lee/ANSO 2010: 4). Further, this diffusion of violence resulted, in 2010, in an increase of attacks on private development organizations (3), essentially private for-profit entities on which counterinsurgents rely to implement projects enchainned to local stabilization. In addition, ANSO reported that instead of things getting worse before getting better, things were simply getting worse with a trend toward an escalation in attacks by armed opposition groups against NGOs aligned or not with counterinsurgency campaign. The village stability focus became more "schizophrenic posture" that made access to basic aid conditional, standing as an example of the "extreme pragmatism" with little long-term focus (Battison 2011: ¶4-5). We have to suppose local village communities were aware of these antagonisms, making who they interacted with and how even more perilous, whether they be special forces, vetted contractors, or non-aligned if well-intentioned grassroots aid organizations trying to gain access. Further, just as VSO admits to the inadequacy of top-down state-building in Afghanistan, it also indicates a foreign aid apparatus and an Afghan state unable to unify action, demonstrating a willful lack of interest in acting on the espoused humanitarian ideals at stake in Afghanistan (Battison 2011: ¶12).⁵⁷

Speculative Warfare & Village Stability as Entrepreneurial Action

When approaching individual village or district-level campaigns as enterprises in themselves, special forces operators speculate on their investments in order to create 'healthy' villages ready for the pastoral custody of formal government flowing from the State. A collection of essays in *Small Wars Journal* by E.M. Burlinghame, a former member of U.S. Army special forces with VSO experience in Afghanistan, makes explicit the connection between irregular warfare, village stability, and venture

⁵⁷ Battison cites reports from the Afghan Rights Monitor, the Afghan Centre for Research and Policy Studies, the Afghan Analysts Network, the Sanayee Development Corporation, and the NGO Cooperation for Peace and Unity.

capitalism. Burlingame affirmatively suggests that roaming operations undertaken by Navy SEALs and Green Berets *should* be informed by an entrepreneurial attitude, whether in terms of mobilizing financial and economic programs for village stability or in terms of the required mindset for counterinsurgency (Burlingame 2012abc). Coding military violence as an entrepreneurial enterprise indicates the insemination of neoliberalism into the war effort at the tactical level, and represents a novel biopolitical conception of envelopment for counterinsurgency. While Burlingame's work represents a subset of VSO doctrine, his argument about the idea of comprehensive population-centered counterinsurgency as a fundamentally speculative undertaking is *accurate and widely-applicable*, if for different reasons than he proposes. He argues the 'trickle-down' approach to economic development in Afghanistan has failed, and that, as VSO doctrine asserts, grassroots development in local settlements is crucial. In rendering the entrepreneurial ethos as a from-the-ground-up economic self-starter—"powered by the endlessly creative and entrepreneurial spirit of humanity, and provides access to a near limitless supply of ideas and future business leaders" (Burlingame 2012c: ¶6)—Burlingame celebrates venture capitalists as disruptive innovators who disrupt local systems (Burlingame 2012c: ¶7). They are sorting devices for where to invest so as to ensure wealth returns on investment (ROI) for all—a tax base, job-creation, and long-term growth, where the proprietary and private management of wealth eventually generates wider benefits. Further, he venerates the process of creative destruction (he calls it "constructive destruction" but he means Schumpeter) that "cannibalizes" inefficient organizations and redirects investments for success (2012a: ¶9).

Financializing and monetizing village stability operations are remarkable, and Foucault's analysis of crime and criminality after neoliberalism actually reveals much about the enterprise approach imagined and employed by Burlingame. Clear analogies exist between Foucault's discussion of the neoliberal management of crime and the expeditionary management of insurgency proposed by Burlingame's entrepreneurial operations. Foucault explains how the theory of human capital would contribute to the disappearance of criminality, where capital is coded as a natural property inherent in the capacities and expenditures of species-life (Foucault 1979 [2008]: 226-32, 243-5; c.f. Becker 1964 &

1976). According to the neoliberal schema, criminality-crime is neither deviance nor pathology but rather a productive force, merely one type of transaction chosen based on the available assets and opportunities on which one can speculate and accumulate value (Lemke 2001: 199). Insofar as it is a social practice, crime has a supply-demand curve with agents who rationalize its undertaking and with law enforcement (contemporary police) as the instrument tasked with making legal prohibitions a social and political reality (Foucault 1979 [2008]: 254). In fact, enforcement often has less to do with "catching criminals" and making high-profile arrests and more to do with what Mark Greif calls the mundane "distribution of crime" based on targeting minor infractions and violations, which are often assigned disproportionately to poor and marginal people and in turn criminalize whole communities so that the prediction of criminality is largely self-referential but powerfully prophetic for the police who normalize this targeting (Greif 2015: 12). As such, the neoliberal conception of crime is fundamentally different than the panoptical-penal policy aimed at "reforming mind," and it has "absolutely renounced the complete suppression and exhaustive nullification of crime" and its negative outcomes (Foucault 1979 [2008]: 256). In a generalized way, law enforcement in neoliberalism is calculated based on intervening to adjust the market supply of crime; in other words, the matter is one of relative compliance and tolerance based on a hovering threshold as to the level of acceptable illegality. A population is *more* secure so long as the expenditure of crime is in *balance* with the capacities to enforce it. Some deviance is natural, which in turn ensures some sectors of a population will be prioritized for more enforcement. Race, poverty, and class will dictate *and segregate* how and where crime is distributed and policed most comprehensively. It is rather an economic calculation at the outset, and one which serves as a dividing practice to allocate who is more and less likely to be criminalized.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ When understood from the neoliberal perspective, contemporary American and Canadian governmental agendas on crime legislation, which actually seek to artificially create more crime, should alert us to the surplus capacity of available law enforcement that provides significant opportunities for wealth generation and accumulation—and which legislation seeks to mobilize. The privatization of the carceral apparatus and different security sectors is a hugely profitable. With a decline in crime rates, recent federal policy in the U.S. to opt for parole and early release of convicted felons suggests the social unsustainability of this practice even in the core are of neoliberal economics. The question of public safety is interesting, with advocates for release arguing that long term incarceration simply ruins whole sectors of the population and makes inmates even more dangerous when released.

Crime rendered through Foucault's account of neoliberalism can be extended to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: insurgency will be managed and *the war will be administered as an enterprise* and in flexible terms among the people to dictate the conditions—the state, the time, the territory—for future operations. Simply put, the absolute is subsumed by the management of risks, investments, and outcomes. Pathology—crime, insurgency—is not eradicated; friends become enemies and vice versa depending on the flow of firepower and biopower, and on the circulation of capital investments. In fact, as North Atlantic states rarely fight state and non-state adversaries directly, and opt instead to intervene under the sign of necessity, humanitarianism, and killing to end wars, the unfolding of insurgencies, contingencies, and emergencies are structural neoliberal necessities in a macro-level or geoeconomic context. Given the political economic capacity to service them, they are good problems to have from the perspective of capital. Thus, the reality of insurgency and countering insurgency is allowed to unfold so long as it does so in balance with the capacities to administer and govern its aggregate effects. There will be no elimination of insurgency; certainly, counterinsurgents will target the 'root causes' and 'prerequisites' for insurgency but they will aim for manageable and tolerable levels of fighting and engagement to satisfy an acceptable end-state. If the threshold is exceeded, various military measures are deployed to bring things into the correct range, which means realizing what is effectively a flexible neoliberal approach to targeting and operational design (as in the logic of targeted assassinations that by drones or special forces, which individualize the war effort). The insurgent and counterinsurgent both become entrepreneurs and neo-subjects:⁵⁹ the insurgent using all the capital at her disposal and undertaking decentralized local operations; the counterinsurgent conducting one small 'from-the-ground-up' campaign in a local village *milieu* as part of a larger mosaic of military enterprises. What unfolds is “a policy of law enforcement [and warfare] according to the economic rationality of the market” that produces the “anthropological erasure of the criminal” (Foucault 1979 [2008]: 258) and perhaps even (paradoxically, despite the anthropological imagination

⁵⁹ "For the neo-subject, the target of the new power is the desire to realize oneself, the project one wishes to pursue, the motivation that inspires the 'collaborator' of the enterprise, and, ultimately, desire by whatever name one chooses to call it. The desiring being is not only the point of application of this power; it is the relay of apparatuses for steering conduct" (Dardot & Laval 2014: 4).

of counterinsurgency) the insurgent herself. According to this rationalization, political and ideological motivations for insurgency simply mask a labouring body with no alternative economic opportunity, and the local tactical employment of cash testifies to this belief

Burlinghame's essays collectively do more than imagine and operationalize the economic components of biopower in military terms. Thinking with risk management to mitigate the flows of uncertainty, his avant-guard military *bricoleur* becomes an *arbitrageur* and derivative warrior, where one venture in a village is simply one transferable or fungible asset on which to speculate and seed with more attention. The special forces investor must locate financial returns as central to her battlesphere metrics, wholly embracing the persuasive power of "cash as a weapons system" and so-called "integrated monetary shaping operations." Returns beget more investment. Burlinghame creates a market but it is, like contemporary neoliberal markets, unabashedly structured to prioritize competition for specific actors; 'the market' is vigilantly enforced and regulated as such, constantly instituted through formal and informal regimes but obscured (and disavowed) by a rhetoric of free and open exchange. This competition is superimposed onto the existing competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents seeking optimal "returns" on investments in population. As with the traditional potlatch, we have an economy of gifts, where investments—exchanged as gifts given to stabilize communities—bring obligations of debt based not necessarily in repayment but on a longer-term (temporal) affiliation that creates social solidarity or a bond which lasts, linking actors (whether passive or active) through "bonds of debt" (Žižek 2011: 41; c.f. Thi Nguyen 2012). According to Burlinghame, these should be the grounds for systemic operational design. Special forces operators should think like venture capitalists and trade in a debt-based economy, renting or loaning stability with the knowledge of creating a credit-bound debtor community locked into a biopolitical relationship with monetary, resource-based, and military economies.

For Burlinghame, the VSO environment in Afghanistan—rural and remote, ruled by customary laws and different biopolitical governmentalities—is "walled or partially walled off from globalization" (¶17). Taken to its logical if parochial end, his celebration of an entrepreneurial-enterprise subject—

part of the necessary aesthetic equipment he believes necessary for stabilization efforts to successfully counter insurgency—requires not victims to be saved but potential consumers to be serviced. War will be the perfect way to drive new investment into these 'ungovernable' spaces, some of which will succeed and some of which will fail. Burlinghame does not directly conceptualize the conduct of counterinsurgency as speculation but this is implicit throughout. Yet, for all his economic acumen, he fails to explicitly discern the always-already presence of global venture capital circulating through communities via the informal economies exacerbated by the war. His argument fails to contextualize the different imperial wars that have transformed Afghanistan into a repository for global financial risk transfer, whether in the Great Game of the late 19th century or through the 1980s to today whereby the subaltern contraflow that is the seasonal opium harvest is eventually pushed up and out into the global economy on the backs of impoverished farmers. The allocation of monetary and financial resources from-above—from a network of global state and supra-state donors—is caught in a meshwork of corruption, graft, and patronage, diffusing to influence the country. These local economic flows route through commercial settings in bazaars or local cash-cropping, whether 'licit' or 'illicit', and are tied to how and which tribes or clans enjoy influence and esteem.

Regardless of my criticisms of this quasi-paradigm, the way Burlinghame stretches VSO to the limit represents a counter-discourse within the normative boundaries of the doctrine itself:

The *sole purpose* of VSO is to establish the environment in which business assets are identified, valued and improved. Whether we recognize it or not, at the heart of all human endeavors is Wealth creation and every action and decision increases or reduces Wealth. In the world of globalization, it is the Angel & Seed Investors who are responsible for establishing the conditions for new Wealth creation. If VSO is to go on and ultimately be successful the mind and Wealth creation skills and practices of these investors must become an integral skillset of the Green Beret... With VSO, the members of a SFODA collectively organize their Wealth enabling efforts along three integrated Lines of Operation. A VC trained and enabled ODA would greatly enhance and ensure success along these same Lines of Operation. (2012c: ¶32-33, emphasis added)

Burlinghame's Green Beret as an entrepreneurial subject inverts Foucault's analysis without knowing it, operationalizing biopolitics and literally inserting the market into the field of social life to render all as entrepreneurs. Villagers simply need assistance from angel investors to tap into what is a blocked reservoir of human capital. Green Berets as wealth creators mirror, structurally and semiotically, the

neoliberal discourse of wealthy "job creators" under attack from the 'evil' egalitarian promise of wealth redistribution—"our enterprise can build value in your community." VSO will not simply bring a better life; it will increase the probabilities for the eventual circulation of global capital through local Afghan environments:

The desired end-state of VSO and Venture Capital investment are the same, to develop a stable asset out of next to nothing, which can sustain and improve its position in the marketplace and increase in value...The mission and purpose of the Green Beret and the Venture Capitalist is the same. Their common mission is to bring stability to the now global economic engine, to bring down the walls which prevent the free flow of ideas, people, Capital and Wealth. (Burlinghame 2012: ¶51)

Micro-war and macro-economic development converge. In contextualizing his work within the midst of a revolution in special forces affairs with a shift from kinetic warfare to a global new normal of "population-centric human domain warfare," Burlinghame avows the power of "economic influencers" to sustain and drive operations (Burlinghame 2013a: ¶2). While Burlinghame is quiet on the cannibalized villages picked up and left behind or those deemed disposable bases for the accumulation and generation of more ventured-driven wealth directed elsewhere, his view naturalizes and renders 'objective' the neoliberal political economy at the center of his assessment. While rural populations, the human resources who consume investment and produce value, will be divided and partitioned by the venture capitalist/special operator based on returns, one wonders—to extend the analogy—how long before the assets identified in the analysis are rendered toxic and transferred elsewhere after being subject to overleveraged injections of speculative (and bankrupt) credit.

Local Police & the Derivatives of Local Violence

Though Burlinghame says nothing about local popular defence and paramilitary mobilization, the Afghan Local Police would seem to be the ideal target for his venture-style investments. While many village stability proponents suggest its employment in Afghanistan is "more than village self-defence" in relation to security, governance, and development (Connet & Cassidy 2012: 24), they typically devote much praise for the formalization of the informal Afghan Local Police (ALP), the armed auxiliary forces raised by special forces and established by Afghan presidential decree in August 2010.

This date is interesting in that it coincides with the Karzai government's prohibition against many private military contractors or companies (PMCs)—corporate warriors—due to ongoing reports of abuses, killing, and charges of PMCs funneling money to local influential 'strongmen' (HWR 2011:51). Having lost one asset, counterinsurgents require another. Accounts of ALP in the military literature argue that enlisting local people to counter insurgency is sustainable because it empowers local communities to take charge of their security and protect themselves (Green 2013: ¶8; Kagan in Connet & Cassidy 2012: 25). By this logic, villagers and farmers must mature and become active participants in generating security as opposed to meekly and subserviently receiving it, which becomes a chance to achieve an "enduring solution" (Green 2014: 28). Further, the same proponents suggest that not actively exploiting the 'endemic' violence in rural Afghan life *is a missed opportunity* where rural populations are already divided along tribal and clan lines (Hanlin 2011: ¶4). Beyond allocating economic opportunities to create winners and losers, counterinsurgents anoint certain groups with the capacity, as allies, to use 'legitimate' violence in defense of stability.

The ALP process serves the narrative of self-organized Afghan communities empowering themselves and 'taking a stand': "The notion of 'Afghans standing up' within the villages is a very strong narrative component that has significant untapped potential" (Mann 2011: 4; c.f. FM 3-24 2014: 7-3/sec 7-11). This rhetorical frame performs across different affective and logical registers. Addressing fear and insecurity by 'taking responsibility' is constructed in binary gendered terms, consistent with the reductive if durable coding of violence as masculine. This is accompanied by the implicit assertion that local communities and villages that do not defend themselves are weak and timid—that is, they are feminized. Espousing the virtues of affirming and exploiting this sentiment for popular mobilization, Joe L'Etoile writes that in the honour-based ecology of Pashtun social relations:

[I]t is shameful for a man to be denied a role in protecting his own family, clan, or tribe. All of the good works of governance and development will come to naught if population-centric COIN strategies do not take this simple fact into account. (L'Etoile 2011: 7)

In effect: this is how these men are, and we must entreat them to be men on their terms but also in aid of counterinsurgency goals. No doubt, these codings multiply the assertions made in both religious and

tribal terms regarding conservative gender roles and the production of gendered identities in rural village environments. Special forces teams embedded in villages and pushing the self-defence narrative had to find ways of persuading elders to “accept the risks and responsibilities of organized violence” by pushing a masculinized pastoral-custodial rhetoric of the ALP as guardians (Deep 2014: 7). Scott Mann, a former special forces member and a primary architect of VSO in Afghanistan,⁶⁰ advocates that units conducting VSO actively mobilize the semiotic field by transforming the insurgent discourse into a criminal discourse, thereby aligning ALP actions with law, order, and honour versus the illegitimate and illegal thief or bandit⁶¹ who undermines the protocols and procedures of local ways of life (Mann 2011: 4-5). Thus, caricatures and criminalization, as ways of influencing and shaping local audiences, coincide to facilitate who is a target to protect, sustain, and make live and who is a target to harass, interdict, and make die.

As mentioned above, the recourse to forming local defence groups follows from past practices by special forces but also builds especially on existing traditions—“the demonstrated propensity”(Connet & Cassidy 2012: 27)—of Afghan and especially Pashtun-produced community-level forces like *arbaki*, *chaga* (spontaneous defence group), *lashkar* (*qarwm*, or kin-based, offensive strike force), or *maahdi satoonky* (local defenders) (Jones & Muñoz 2010: 27-28.). ALP units are intended to serve as defensive forces tied to providing security for villages and key transport networks. While paid a small but regular salary, the forces acted as deterrents. Additionally, their knowledge of the local operating environment was a significant benefit to ISAF units, yet the ALP's explicit function is arguably less important than its symbolic and biopolitical function to partner with coalition forces and a grassroots desire to police their own communities (c.f. NSWC 2009: 15, 17; Jones & Muñoz 2010: 55). Following the village-level trend of converting risks by monetizing labour, operationalizing precariously-employed men via the ALP stood as a practical way to manage 'surplus masculinities' (Cowen & Siciliano 2010) by enlisting "the population in its own defense [and] robbing the insurgency of a ready-made recruiting pool of

⁶⁰ Mann also authored what is known as "VSO 101," a methodology for village stability published in the American special forces publication *The Donovan Review*. Now retired, he is the CEO for The Stability Institute, a private contracting firm offering guidance and training on "complex stability issues around the globe."

⁶¹ Insurgents, as partisans, guerrillas, or armed opposition groups, are frequently decried as bandits—an opportunistic, base, and disorganized rabble.

poor and unemployed military-age males" (Green 2014: 31). Though I located Burlingame's account of venture-capitalist village stability as an *avant-garde* type of operational art increasingly realized in practice, discussions of profit-motives do not dominate the coalition's public accounts of successful VSO/ALP efforts in Afghanistan, which celebrate proud and noble Afghan men obliged to defend their local villages, roads, and bazaars in pursuit of better and safer quality of life. Paying ALP members is perhaps less a matter of economic enfranchisement and arguably more often compelled *precarious labour* in the full sense of the term where ISAF intervention creates a market for war. I am not suggesting some communities do not openly greet the opportunity to partner with coalition forces to achieve civil-military benefits; rather, I am pointing to the way in which communities are monetized and become objects of speculation, whether literally or figuratively, in creating a grassroots, homegrown counterinsurgency element. The creation of security bubbles is predicated on financing local people as instruments for war, where the financial obligations to prime the supply of community-vetted and basically-trained ALP is a risky bubble itself.

Regardless, special forces teams and stability coordinators were confident in growing the Afghan Local Police capacity as a core element of village-level counterinsurgency.⁶² Though the program was conceived of as a temporary fix in 2011 with a lifespan of two years (to extend into the ISAF draw down, the Status of Force Agreement for foreign troops in 2014, and the transition to Afghan security forces) (Radin 2011: ¶11), reality changed:

An Afghan war strategy for the future should drastically expand the Afghan Local Police program as part of a light, lean, and long-term military presence in the central Asian country. Sustainability issues and force resiliency will persist as enduring factors, especially as the US military drawdown continues and the Taliban attempt to reassert their control over Afghanistan. (Green 2014: 31)

The American-led VSO narrative, though, tends to efface the kind of ineptitude catalogued in the journalist Ben Anderson's documentary, *This is What Winning Looks Like* (Anderson: 2013). While the Afghan National Police is represented in a more favourable light, Anderson's vignettes of the ALP

⁶² "Currently, there are 70 districts identified for ALP participation, with each district authorized about 300 ALP members. At present, 27 ALP units have been validated for full operations, and the other 43 units are in various stages of being established. General Petraeus has speculated that the ALP might be expanded to 50,000 with 40 additional districts (110 districts in total)" (Radin 2011: ¶18).

border on humiliating and deflating.⁶³ Further, the documentary reveals the pressure tactics used to mobilize local communities to fight. In one scene, the film depicts local farmers being reproached by Afghan security forces and American advisers for not 'manning-up' according to the local economy of masculinity. The film also documents the sometimes wanton manner in which local defence is constituted, much to the chagrin of several American special forces mentors and ISAF trainers charged with its implementation, who are deeply concerned about the prospects for success after the 2014 transition. In the context of village stability, engaging key leaders means building relationships with esteemed village elders but it also often means empowering local strongmen who secure areas as much by protection as by fear and exploitation (Aikins 2014, 2011, and 2009).⁶⁴ On one hand, an informal force operating in its own indigenous *milieu* inflects 'security' differently (or more causally) than in the domestic spaces of North Atlantic states with a formal security and emergency apparatus and the monopoly of violence assumed by state or military forces. However, on the other, one has to question the efficacy of the VSO push when local ALP commanders, when asked how they will fight after ISAF departs, state they will not have to because they will opt to simply negotiate with whatever forces are present in their areas.

With VSO/ALP employed in their names, many rural Afghans registered concerns about the approach. Interviews with ALP members indicated some were weary of being deemed 'police' due to the negative connotation it has with local communities due in part to the perception of the national police, which enjoyed little respect or legitimacy due to "high levels of corruption and a culture of impunity," which eroded public support (Perito, in Quinn & Fumerton 2010: 7). Abuses—bribes, illegal taxes, and violations of human right—against farmers, peasants, and ordinary Afghans are not uncommon. The

⁶³ Alongside Anderson's film, Gelareh Kiazand's *Inside the Afghan Army* (2014) documents Afghan security forces in Kandahar as they face the first fighting season as 'sole owners of the battlespace' where they are responsible for developing and mounting operations independent from ISAF forces.

⁶⁴ In his work on corruption and local patronage networks, Matt Aikins essays on Abdul Raziq demonstrate the willingness of ISAF forces to work with unscrupulous local actors. Raziq, a former Kandahar-based drug trafficker turned local police commander, is profiled in "Our Main in Kandahar" (2011) and "The Master of Spin Boldak" (2009). Aikins recent web-essay self-published on Twitter (May 2014) makes serious allegations against Raziq regarding human rights abuses, harsh interrogation, torture, and 'disappearing' locals following the deaths of several Kandaharis in police custody. Conversely, Linda Robinson's book on Afghanistan and American special forces praises Raziq (2013). Aikins most recent work documents ALP corruption in the Pashtun-dominated district of Ander in Ghazni Province.

ALP has been criticized for many of the same practices and behaviours, which undermines the practice and narrativization of noble popular defence (Quinn & Fumerton 2010: 7). A Human Rights Watch report in 2011 indicted the reliance on ALP as a destabilizing and dangerous turn in the war, documenting frequent human rights abuses and criminal acts including abductions, forced land grabs, tribal vendettas, targeted killings, smuggling, extortion and sexual assault (HRW 2011: 1, 5-7). In arguing that ALP units have little oversight or accountability and operate according to *deliberately* vague legal powers, the report goes on to outline how ALP units are often predatory and rival 'anti-government elements' in exposing Afghanistan's most vulnerable demographics—children and women in rural village-level environments—to insecurity and uncertainty. In 2011, an Oxfam report on accountability and Afghan security forces argues for suspending the expansion of the ALP until independent monitoring has been established due to inadequate vetting and poor training. The report also argues for terminating local defence initiatives that fall outside the jurisdiction of the formal security apparatus, which should be the object of focus and institutional reform (Barber/Oxfam 2011: 29-30). Vetting is crucial: the cycle of disarming, reconciling and re-integrating militias, warlords, former *arbaki*, or Taliban as ALP under the auspices of reconciliation—converting enemies into friends—has "re-empowered" old networks of power and influence effectively arming whoever is willing to serve as a proxy-cum-self-defender (HWR 2011: 15; c.f. Radin 2011: ¶13). Further, ALP units were frequently operating outside their own districts despite restrictions to the contrary (HWR 2011: 55) while also abusing their investigative powers to force their way into commercial or social affairs. A 2010 HWR report warned that lasting peace in Afghanistan is impossible without justice for women, who suffered most from the reconciliation and reintegration of fighters back into community life or into ALP recruitment, whether they were former warlords, criminals, or anti-ISAF Taliban (HWR 2010). While women were attacked and threatened outside the home in Taliban areas—for attending schools and accessing whatever modest provision of top-down government services—because of interpretations of Sharia law and the normalization of systemic discrimination,⁶⁵ the continuum of gendered violence and

⁶⁵ The same report argued though that fighters had numerous motivations and that many Taliban do not fight to

repression continued under the auspices ALP cells comprised of 'honourable' men defending local villages (HWR 2011: 24). In other words, women were threatened by both insurgent Taliban units and ALP units, too.

In an expected response, ISAF leaders and the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan—responsible for village stability and local police development—suggest organizations like Human Rights Watch were and remain short on facts. According to joint special operations task force commanders in 2012, criticisms are 'misunderstandings' due to strategic communications failures to correctly and accurately disseminate persuasive accounts to media outlets and NGOs, also significant stakeholders and audiences—targets—in the battle sphere's information environment (Robinson 2013: 130). Further, in relation to allowing un-vetted and provisionally untrained ALP to roam and operate with impunity, the task force deflected criticism and argued that it was actually other conventional American and ISAF units that unwisely used and relied on *ad hoc* local forces to provide a quick-fix security component. These forces were "graver threats" to and "caused great angst" for the special operations command, who maintained that the ALP was a carefully planned effort routed through the Interior Ministry (131). That said, evidence from 2011 suggests American commanders having grown uneasy with cleavages between different ALP detachments and with how district and provincial officials leveraged ALP units to develop patronage networks for their own political, social, and economic benefit (133; c.f. HRW 2011b: ¶8). In its report on *arbaki* and local police, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission raised serious concerns about a lack of ethnic inclusion and the lack of respect for ethnic and tribal balances in ALP units; the interference of ISAF special forces in the recruitment process; extortion and smuggling; and human rights violations and a lack of discipline (AIHRC 2012)

By late 2012, the Afghan interior ministry and the government generally seemed more interested in allocating military energy and expenditures to the ANP, ANA, and Afghan special forces rather than the ALP even as local government and district leaders were aware of how existing ALP forces increasingly bore the brunt of attacks in defending cleared areas (Robinson 2013: 250). Yet,

oppress women, coding insurgents as 'local people or as 'non-ideological moderates' ignores the biopolitical situation of women who are disproportionately exposed to risk, a situation naturalized—and left unaddressed (HWR 2010: 38; c.f. Zakaria 2015).

American and ISAF special forces commanders repeatedly made the case for VSO and ALP effectiveness, citing reductions in 'kinetic' activity around ALP forces, reduced civilian casualties and improved security, and an increase in local economic activity (RAND 2011 report & UNAMA 2013 annual report, in Robinson 2013: 250-251). In response, an Afghan Analysts Network report in 2013 suggests that for all the talk of special forces units remaining attuned to village elders, ALP forces in many areas were undermining the role of elders and were themselves downloading responsibilities onto other villagers to undertake dangerous tasks like IED detection, acting more as "predators not guardians" (Ceccinel/AAN 2013: 4). Human Rights Watch's 2013 annual report on Afghanistan was critical of the civilian casualties caused by ALP operations, whether in relation to disproportionate and indiscriminate lethal action or in terms of coercion and impunity. Additionally, while ALP 'reform' was underway, the report suggests was largely a response to the increased incidence of deadly "green on blue" insider attacks by infiltrators or disgruntled Afghans who target their foreign military mentors, which have increased significantly since 2011 (HWR 2013: 1, 3). While reporting from Afghanistan in June 2015, Ben Anderson draws on a recent study by the International Crisis Group, which documents widespread extortion, physical abuse, illegal taxation, and theft undertaken by ALP units. The report finds that the situation has gotten worse since the departure of most American special forces mentors; Anderson quotes a tribal elder, who says, "The ALP are like snakes in the water...Spring is coming, and they are waking up" (Anderson 2015: ¶9).

Overall, military-centered assessments favour the proliferation and ongoing North Atlantic development of VSO and local police capacities in Afghanistan and beyond, a necessary component for future contingency and stability operations. Early U.S. Naval Special Warfare assessments located VSO as "an enduring presence for Afghanistan" with deliberately decentralized operations needing to be a long-term competency for special forces units post-Afghanistan (NSWC 2009: 45). Other community members opined: "while not without flaws" and difficult for conventional forces to conduct due to the operational tempo and the lack of a "clear-cut template," the VSO/local police coupling is crucial in Afghanistan and elsewhere to reduce the load on coalition special forces while making use of local

defence to eliminate "insurgent safe havens" in rural areas (Schreckengast 2012: 9-10). Besides, "it's the only game in town" (10). The approach requires time and space to develop, and deviating from a proven method established in Afghanistan, which unites embedded special forces units, villagers and farmers, NGOs and PDOs, and other non-military actors, for the sake of expediency would result in failure (Long 2013: ¶15). Beyond Afghanistan, this means growing the number *and* the licence of special forces to augment 'small footprint' local defence initiatives under the auspices of counterinsurgency, security force assistance, or foreign internal defence (Robinson 2013: 262-4; c.f. Long, Pezard, Loidolta, and Helmus 2012). The course has been charted: as the new normal for regularized irregular operations, VSO will achieve a satisfactory end-state and will become the containment-quarantine method of choice the future expeditionary deployments where population-centric stabilization demands local mobilization (Ashley 2012: 18-19). In other words, VSO will be employed across the contemporary global operating environment by the American military and its North Atlantic allies:

Working with and through a friendly government to build a security force capable of providing local officials the operational whitespace to expand basic services, rule of law, and development initiatives is an inherently unconventional task for SOF teams to execute in semi-permissive and denied areas alike. The ability of SOF [special operations forces] elements to approach FID tasks with an unconventional mindset including an understanding of local customs and traditions, tribal/ethnic distributions of local populations, relationships with traditional sources of power at the community level, and the concept of acting through district officials and security leaders, will dictate the relevance of SOF teams in COIN operations. A SOF team that understands these means by which to accomplish the goal of defeating an insurgency will increase its likelihood of success, whereas a team that focuses on kinetic targeting of insurgents at the expense of building capacity will likely fail to make a lasting impact on the security and governance frameworks in a target area. (Deep 2014: 19)

Too much firepower will see this containment method fail, whereas more action on the biopower end of the continuum is the way forward for precision intervention into local *milieu* indexed to extending global liberal rule and pacifying those on its edges (c.f. Kienscherff 2011).

Village-Level Cunning: Gendering Stability Operations

FET [Female Engagement Team] is a program that was started by the US Marines Corps and has been around for nearly a decade. It is comprised of volunteer female members of appropriate rank, experience and maturity to develop trust-based and enduring relationships with the Afghan women they encounter on patrols. Having such a team at its disposal has given American forces an added tool in reaching out to the Afghan population in advance of the scheduled troop reduction in 2014. (McCullough 2010: ¶2)

They travel from village to village in Afghanistan, dressed in Muslim head scarves and Type II Navy Working Uniforms. These female Sailors are armed with weapons, Afghan cultural knowledge and a desire to help Naval Special Warfare win the war in Afghanistan one rural community at a time. The women of NSW's Cultural Support Teams are building rapport and trust amongst the country's women and children and improving counterinsurgency objectives in the process. (Cannales 2012: 22)

Stabilizing villages required counterinsurgents to exploit the production *and* performance of gender. To fully breach the inner walls and interior spaces of the rural Afghan *oikos*, operations turned to technologies of gender as part of the biopolitical armament. While I introduced concerns around gender and the aid apparatus early in the chapter and addressed the way gendered conceptions of war affect the conduct of counterinsurgency, village stability methods actively operationalize gender to prosecute the war. Foucault's work on biopower does not engage with how gender functions as a dividing technology, and what I focus on here is how counterinsurgency uses gender to target Afghan women. Both conventional and special forces units faced limitations in re-engineering the lives of Afghan women with biopower, and accessing the closeted space for women in traditional social settings represented an obstacle for interdicting insurgency and collateralizing the war more deeply into a zone beyond the reach of stabilization efforts. Starting in Helmand in 2010 and continuing into village stability operations, newly created Female Engagement Teams (FETs) and later Cultural Support Teams (CSTs)⁶⁶ became the adaptation to target women. While their usage was curtailed in 2013 as the Afghan Army and National Police slowly assumed operational and battlespace ownership (Lamothe 2013), the military literature locates the equipment as a necessary supplement for future contingency operations.

The logic of making women's lives live according to liberal tenets is lofty, presumptuous, and pretentious. As discussed earlier, 'Afghan women' are not a monolithic group with uniform desires. Yet, as in the late-colonial counterinsurgencies of the 1950s and early 1960s, the symbolic operation of women's emancipation in Afghanistan was a crucial discourse for liberal war:

⁶⁶ Notably, the 2015 NBC-produced series *American Odyssey* features as its central character a female member of an American special forces unit. The character, Sgt. Odelle Ballard, is billed as a member of a Female Engagement Team. The series is built around Ballard's efforts to make it out of Mali after her unit is ambushed (during a mission against an Islamic militant group) by private military contractors working to conceal a conspiracy that reaches into the American government. Ballard, using her acumen as a culturally-aware operator, cooperates with locals in her own Homeric odyssey to make it home.

[T]argeted attention to women did not simply promise to heighten the effect of political and social reforms; on the propagandistic home front, protecting colonial women from their own society served as an illustration of the humanitarian aims of colonial war. (Feichtinger et al 2012: 40)

One rhetorical figure borrowed directly from the wars of decolonization has been the pretension to improve, through military force, the lot of women in the affected societies...reportage and media discussion of the goals of the war in Afghanistan repeat formulas of the struggle for the emancipation of the Muslim woman that were pioneered during the Algerian War. (50)

Ultimately, FETs and CSTs in Afghanistan had less to do with the tenets of liberal feminism and more to do with what one special forces commander called making use of "female influence" as the "correct asset to leverage information and messaging capability" with local populations (Odom, in US CALL Handbook 12-20 2012: 2-3). Team members may have acknowledged first-hand the ways in which Afghan women precariously perform gender according to conservative protocols, which restrict their mobility and greatly hinder their access to independent life without the influence of men. They registered the ways in which women are vulnerable but crucial players in local domestic flows, quiet but critical infrastructure in patriarchal villages. Yet, the teams remained military means for counterinsurgency, exploiting women to manipulate the village system (c.f. Khalili 2011).

Outfitted as all-women units, the teams employed a militarized version of 'strategic essentialism' by differentiating themselves as counterinsurgents *qua* woman, which in turn re-segregated and re-partitioned Afghan women not as only oriental and mysterious but as secretive enablers of an interior intelligence that must be revealed—enlightened and made visible to the light of counterinsurgency. Male counterinsurgents addressed men in village communities but typically did not engage with women. For local women, outsider males were off limits. According to one account of female engagement teams:

[I]n most households, only a woman's close relative, a father, brother, or husband, may see her face or speak to her, [and] this puts male service members at a disadvantage when trying to discuss serious issues with the local population. (Cobiesky 2013: ¶2)

As one element in the hold phase of counterinsurgency—where FETs are best used (Pottinger, in Harding 2012: 11)—the employment of women-centered teams was a different way to generate effects and penetrate local circles of power:

[W]omen in a village, though not often seen by outsiders, have considerable influence on their husbands, children and their community as a whole...[B]y sitting down and talking with these women that they will be able to encourage the wives to influence their husbands to stay clear of insurgent affairs and focus instead on bettering their families and their villages. (McCullough 2012: ¶6)

Teams in the past have found women possess a significant influence over their husbands, brothers and children...By earning the trust of female Afghans, the [teams] can increase their chances of winning the trust of the local population. Developing a working relationship within the female population also helps. (Cobiesky 2013: ¶10)

Not simply seeing behind the curtain or the veil, the teams territorialized an alternate theatre of operations by targeting women's lives:

The infantry doesn't see what we see...They don't get to go inside the houses; they don't get to see how a family interacts with us. It's something you could take for granted...but then you go and visit with the family and you're like 'this is why I'm doing this, to learn and to help them in any way we can. (Buschman, in McCullough 2012: ¶13)

Though they will be shielded from the gaze of counterinsurgents by men in their communities, women are less risky in that are biopolitical subordinates in villages, secondary points of access. Their lives will be made to live, but they will be conducted and held in custody only insofar as they serve as targets for intended operational effects that cascade toward influencing men.

Operational success is not the only argument for the use of FETs and CSTs. Their legitimization was furthered given the secondary discourse regarding combat exclusion for women in most North Atlantic militaries.⁶⁷ As advocates frame the teams as practical and necessary future assets (Harding 2012), they are also lauded as a vehicle for female military service members to achieve some measure of equality within the hegemonic masculine matrix of North Atlantic military organs. Scholarly work inside and outside military institutions identify how military performances of masculinity typically rely on deeper systemic technologies of gendered (and sexualized) violence to enforce cultural norms and practices within military populations vigilant against the threat of gendered contamination by dangerous destabilizing insiders (c.f. Hutchings 2008; Cowen 2008: 180-185; Cockburn 2004; Enloe

⁶⁷ The IDF's Caracal battalion is an operational "co-ed" combat unit, but 70% of which are women, which must also voluntarily join the unit after their third year of military service. Of course, as I will touch on below, the selection and training of Afghan women for service in the Afghan security forces—indigenous women with the best 'cultural intelligence' about their own social lives—is subject to many of the same gendered biopolitical issues regarding North Atlantic women in the military.

2000).⁶⁸ Women in CSTs and FETs are doubly bound to their militarized subjectivities: they have to perform and labour as unmarked and universal (i.e., male) soldierly subjects to gain credibility while being coding otherwise as compensatory exceptions (i.e., women playing men) that are the collective beginning of a transformation in 'military social affairs' (Tasserson 2001; c.f. Khalili 2011 & Cowen 2008). Even in furnishing the premise of military work as an acceptable social measure for egalitarian and non-hegemonic gender performance,⁶⁹ the teams labour nonetheless as "difference" for local Afghan populations and for their male counterinsurgent comrades.

The formation of FETs and CSTs was celebrated as an expeditionary adjustment from the bottom-up, which retrofitted the available biopolitical equipment to meet operational needs in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Some commentators within American military circles liken them to human terrain teams tasked with generating cultural intelligence (Lamb et al 2013: 28). Given customary and Islamic proscriptions on men touching or searching women, and given the aggressive searches and night raids in Iraq that intervened into private domestic environments, American Marine units in Anbar Province created Team Lioness in 2004 (RCSW ISAF 2012). While the Team Lioness initiative was conceived of in narrow terms—securing and searching Iraqi women—the role evolved in Afghanistan into a broader range of "enabling" stability activities (Lamothe 2012: ¶6). Acting in a support role attached to combat units, Marine engagement teams were first deployed to Helmand in 2009 and were relied on significantly in Marjah during *Moshtarak* to engage local women through civil initiatives following from quick impact projects and influence operations (RCSW ISAF 2012: ¶8; Cobiesky 2012: ¶7). By 2011, Marine commanders were beginning to plan operations more comprehensively by employing FETs (Bedell 2011: 6). In conjunction, US Army units also began to integrate FETs (Cobiesky 2012) as did

⁶⁸ Regardless equity policies or gender equality in state militaries, gendered and sexualized violence within military organs leave women more vulnerable and exposed to risk. In an American context, *The Invisible War* (Dick, Ziering, and Barlow 2012) documents the epidemic of rape and sexual assault in across all branches of the American military. Despite record-high allegation of sexual violence in the U.S. military, punitive action is disproportionately, which suggests the normalization of such violence and a culture of victim-blaming. In 2015, the Canadian Forces leadership was reeling from an external audit and report that exposed it military culture as hostile to women and premised on sexual harassment, misogyny, and sexual violence.

⁶⁹ Many anti-liberal feminist intellectuals and commentators have serious trouble affirming the instrumental uptake of women into combat roles especially where they serve as military means to neo-imperial ends. Notably, in January 2013 American defense secretary Leon Panetta lifted the formal ban on women serving in combat roles.

British Army battlegroups, which were augmented by female civilian "stabilization advisors" to advance community engagement and influence operations (UK Stab Unit 2012: ¶1-2).⁷⁰ According to American commanders, Afghanistan society was more restrictive for women than Iraq:

Unlike Iraq, where Iraqi women had many more social liberties and greater opportunities in education, work, and their government, most Afghan women are isolated from or forbidden to have contact with US service members... I feel the US Military FETs will remain to be a vital instrument allowing us to learn from this undisclosed component of the Afghan society...its women. (Prairie, in Cobiesky 2013: ¶6)

Male counterinsurgents had access to half of the Afghan population (McCullough 2012: ¶1). The idea is predicated on leveraging the 'invisible' half to shape and influence communities by exploiting "female networking operations" (Russo & Spann 2011).

With penetration into rural settlements through village stability operations, Cultural Support Teams grew out of FETs. The US Naval Special Warfare Command worked with Navy SEALs to develop and train CSTs for proficiency in physical fitness, basic combat and soldiering skills, and irregular warfare and theatre-specific operational theory. Yet:

The intent is not to make a shooter; it *isn't* to make a female SEAL. The intent is to produce an *enabler* who can stand next to a SEAL in the environment, in the population, who won't be a hindrance, who won't get in the way and who can take care of themselves in an extreme situation. (Booher, in Canales 2012: 23, emphasis added)

Similarly, the US Army draws on female members with specializations in civil affairs and psychological operations from within its airborne units to fill out CSTs for deployment with special operators in Afghanistan (Ball 2013: ¶2). A female SEAL may not be the goal, but an adequately capable—read: both a woman *and* appropriately gendered as militarily masculine enough—enabler is essential. The teams' status as all-women units allowed for a holistic approach to precision counterinsurgency and village stability. Afghan women's hearts and minds were addressed by female counterinsurgents able to bypass existing customary blockages and so collateralize the war. A curious interplay of subjectivities unfolds for CST and FET members: they are soldiers, women, and outsiders often in native drag wearing headscarves. Further, while the emerging military literature warns of inadequate cultural and

⁷⁰ By 2011, the U.S. Army Centre for Lessons Learned (CALL) had formalized its *Commanders Guide to Female Engagement Teams*. By 2012, the Army was in the process of formalizing doctrine and calling for standardizing training and employment standards for FETs as key assets for future contingency operations (c.f. Holiday 2012).

ethnographic knowledge of the operational environment (i.e., counterinsurgents should know Pashtun tribal histories), the presumed positive operation of female essence that taps into a 'global sisterhood' assumes shared experiences and commonalities where huge gaps and divergences persist (Henry, in Amar 2012: 6; c.f. Henry 2013). Passive information collection and female-led influence or psychological operations are framed in the literature and in accounts of the teams as incidental benefits but seem nonetheless to be the primary foci.

Participating in women's *shuras* allows access to women in the village *milieu*. Some teams use cosmetic products and 'make-up parties' to connect with local women, eschewing traditional kohl for lipstick and eye shadow to bond over the gendered labour of appropriately marking female bodies. In addition, many teams undertake small education initiatives and 'women's governance' messaging around access to micro-grants, development, and women's centres, and all these measures operate as ways of engaging with women as the critical village infrastructures for making life live (c.f. Bedell 5, 8, and 15).⁷¹ Village medical outreach (VMO) was also a way to access women, where teams engaged in hygiene, health, and sanitary training. This is especially interesting given the humanitarian context by which medical outreach is inserted into the battlesphere. The universal necessity and right to access health care is deployed as a war tactic and dividing technology to engage and target specific demographics and populations (c.f. Pfingst & Rosengarten 2012). Public health, hygiene, and medicine are basic elements of pastoral-police power in Foucault's analysis; here, they are militarized to seize the village. On one hand, the material benefits of access to basic medical care, treatment, and supplies are uncontested; something like the Canadian-funded polio eradication campaign⁷² in Kandahar Province impacts the lives of people facing significant structural and environmental challenges to meeting their

⁷¹ A quick view of the CIDA's Project Browser for Afghanistan indicates a number of women's-centered projects. Consider "Capacity Building and Access to Medicines," "Afghan Women's Community Support," and "Through the Garden Gate: Integrating Women into Markets (Afghanistan Challenge Component)."

⁷² Following the global rebound of polio worldwide—especially in conflict zones like rural Afghanistan and in Syria—the CIA was forced to admit in April 2014 that it has used polio vaccinations as a fake cover to surveil, spy, and collect information for intelligence. Notably, a fake polio eradication initiative in Abbottabad, Pakistan, was used to access the local community and collect biometrics and DNA around Osama Bin Laden prior to his targeted assassination by American SF.

basic needs well before any war campaign.⁷³ Yet, on the other, claiming village medical outreach simply removes obstacles for locals to access to basic health care ignores how the imperative installs a compelling and quietly coercive orientation between who gives, who should take, and who receives.

Furthermore, as women and not men, female counterinsurgents compel different responses from men in the village, whose performances coincide with more traditional and conservative conceptions of masculinity, and who are automatically placed into question when confronted by male counterinsurgents. While honoured by counterinsurgents to enable engagement and interactions, hegemonic village masculinities and their authoritative role are displaced and subordinated to secondary status with the arrival counterinsurgents stabilizing the settlement⁷⁴ Regardless of their support for insurgents or counterinsurgents, village men may experience their own masculine performances in intersectional ways depending on the atmosphere and environment, coded by counterinsurgents as both Other and as queer or perverse. The men may feel disempowered, compromised, and feminized—reluctant to elaborate and inclined to maintain the *status quo* for fear of showing weakness—which then exacerbates the role of female counterinsurgents in the context of the gendered economy of the village. According to some accounts, rural Afghan men tend to maintain a front of normalcy and control:

Developing a working relationship within the female population also helps provide a more holistic understanding of the community's needs. The men, often driven by pride, will give the "official" version of things; however, by engaging the women the teams get the unofficial version of the truth... (Cobiesky 2013:¶15)

Further, for Afghan men, female counterinsurgents are neither Afghan women nor non-Afghan men, which make for different encounters. Several accounts in short ISAF media pieces and American Marine public relations releases on the teams suggest local men are inclined to talk to women in ways they may not speak with ISAF or Afghan male soldiers, deferring their exposure to other men while subsequently

⁷³ In *The Least of All Possible Evils*, Weizman describes the 'Red Line' reports, which were detailed IDF and Israeli state ministry calculations of basic electrical, medical, and nutritional needs and subsequent minimal provisions for those living in the Gaza Strip (2012: 83-86). The Israel state used these calculations to modulate, leverage, and control the Palestinian population through the movement of resources into Gaza. Discussing the ways in which deaths in Gaza do not provide an accurate evaluation of this biopolitical violence, Weizman writes: "[I]t needs a slower, more cumulative process in which that might have been averted were actively not prevented... This form of killing—Malthusian in its conception—deliberately sought to control the living conditions of, and is part of the current Israeli policy in relation to Gaza" (86).

⁷⁴ Throughout this section, I am relying loosely on R.W. Connell's conception of hegemonic masculinity. Connell's schema outlines hegemonic, complicit, subordinate and marginal masculinities.

offering information and local knowledge to women. In relation to her encounters with men, one FET member said: "Men will talk to women... This is a crucial intel enabling piece to exploit in the future."⁷⁵ Instead of feminine wile, female counterinsurgents perform female masculinity in this instance, legitimate enough to 'pass' and engage with men but mild enough to not alienate or induce too much anxiety.

Across the same public relations videos, team members offer a range of reflections on their role in counterinsurgency and village stability operations, and these indicate the contradictions inherent in the mobilization and weaponization of gender. One Marine speaks of her role as a Marine first and foremost—equivalent to male Marines—but one whose main capability is her military operationalization *as a woman*, which creates unique tasks and purposes for her in the battlesphere. Another suggests that FETs and CSTs, as compensatory supplements, function expressively as a way of respecting local culture ("their culture"), and she goes on to say that the teams' collective orientation is "not aggressive," which then leaves them better equipped to penetrate the village's different biopolitical systems. An FET commander says, "We must go get them," and addresses basic domestic tasks performed by women as the way of achieving the task. Another Marine in Marjah remarks that it is "difficult to be a girl out here" in terms of serving in a combat unit, and that being a foreign female in the field is alien to locals. While she embraces the ability to "build bridges," she is aware of the danger that comes with working or interacting with counterinsurgents as many local women are nervous and afraid of engaging with ISAF forces for fear of reprisals, framed either as collaborators or as refusing to remain subordinate (Preen 2011). Beyond an information gathering role, others speak of how the teams, by gaining and integrating information from engagements, work as "connectors for women to the outside" and have "really given women a voice"(Cooper, in Cobiesky 2013: ¶ 3 & ¶ 12).

The conception of CSTs and FETs as emancipatory conduits for warfighters and Afghan women connects to the recruitment of women and the creation of all-women units in the Afghan security forces taking over after 2014. With the militarization of Afghan women, equality, respect for

⁷⁵ See "A Look Inside the FET (US Marines - Female Engagement Team)," <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQLH-FUc1rA>>. See also "Female US Marine in Afghanistan - Female Engagement Team 13 (2012)," <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S0y8xTNKSaw>>.

customs, and security are three birds killed with one stone (Overson 2013; c.f. Giustozzi & Isaqzadeh 2012). The inclusion of women in the security apparatus is a normative liberal measure (like numbers of forward-deployed women in ISAF forces) of the advancement of human and women's rights (Wyatt 2014)—and another justification to exit the war. Yet, the 'standing up' of Afghan women as militarized labourers and as those who will participate in their own 'rescue' by actively producing a new regime of security is by no means a solution to biopolitical technologies of a binary gender order—namely, the systemic and structural discrimination and gendered violence against women alongside rifts and cleavages of 'Afghan women' on class, cultural, and urban/rural axes of difference (Henry 2013: 16-17). An 'inclusive' Afghan military and the imagination of a just war waged by a 'civilized' Afghan government do not annul these issues any more than the formation of CSTs and FETs address the systemic issues around gender in North Atlantic militaries or their respective domestic civilian populations.

"Embracing the Fog of War": Sapping as Stability

It should be axiomatic that fusing all forms and sources of information as early as possible is far more effective and efficient than attempting to reconcile separate and often calcified views, views that more often than not are formed without the benefit of comprehensive and integrated information. (Stability Operations Information Centre 2010c: 8)

Due to the decentralized nature of COIN campaigns, few activities are generalizable or consistently implemented across a COIN theater of operations. This situation is exacerbated by the complexity and uncertainty inherent in the environment. It would be difficult (if not impossible) to develop a practical, centralized model for COIN assessment because complex COIN environments cannot be clearly interpreted through a centralized process that removes data from their salient local context. (Connable 2012: xv)

How to measure, then, the stabilization success of precision counterinsurgency and village stability? As Foucault argued, population is not an original datum but rather a synthetic knowledge-effect, a field in which to intervene with different means and measures. The biopolitical diversification of the war campaign in Afghanistan—collateralized, unrestricted, and indiscriminate measures targeting and enveloping populations to act on the actions—required metrics and indicators to gauge the cascading effects of operations. One surge begets another, and the growth of stability-related statistics coincident

with the 'from-the-ground-up' village-level focus served as another way of making the war intelligible in an environmental context where everything 'speaks' or signals. Counterinsurgency, in enveloping local lives to make them live, becomes an 'empire of signs' in which populations made to live are then also read as signals and sensors acting as relays for the success or failure of comprehensive operations.

Most of the counterinsurgency manuals—the newest American version (2014), American joint doctrine publication (2013), the joint NATO publication (2011), the original Canadian document (2008)—contain sections on measuring effectiveness and assessing operations. One trend is certainly consistent: the more recent the publication date, the more lengthy and rigorous the chapter or section. The dilemma for counterinsurgents is context: how to measure success or assess effectiveness given the "mosaic" conception of stabilization efforts and operations from the village-level upward, where centralized quantitative methods fail to represent the reality of war from below? According to more recent approaches, the will to metrics and number crunching is being displaced in favour of rhetorical and narrative methods. According to a critique of complex operational assessments in Afghanistan, quantitative assessments cannot "measure the universe, attempting to aggregate all the disparate information in the battlespace" (Upshar, Roginski, and Kilcullen 2012: 89). Numerical rigour to organize reams of data often obscures more precise insights about specific lines of effort and operations (90-91). Further, "Afghanistan is an information-rich but data-poor environment" (92), and assessments require holistic but more simplified indicators to measure success. The issue for military agents is as much a matter of representing reality for precision counterinsurgency and stabilization operations (e.g., dense prose versus data sets versus graphics, diagrams, and heat maps) as it is a wider question of military epistemology and information design (101-102)—developing the necessary aesthetic equipment to realize and inscribe reality and so alter it accordingly.

In a massive study on counterinsurgency assessment published by RAND, Ben Connable argues that centralized top-down assessments based on quantitative methods to establish statistical trend-and-pattern analyses actually obfuscate the reality of the war and are incongruent with the principles of evolving counterinsurgency doctrine that values dispersed operations. There is no correct metric

(Connable 2012: xx-xxi). The numerical positivism of core metrics cannot be equated with specific operational objectives, and metric-centered operations will skew decision-making (213). Further, he argues large data repositories—and especially the ways they are visualized for heuristic use—actually inhibit the assessment of counterinsurgency because they simply cannot rectify inconsistencies (xxii). "Objective-focused assessment" is the way forward in order to create better decision-making in comprehensive counterinsurgency operations (xxii), a way to make sense of operations practically from the bottom-up (220) by using "contextual assessment" and "mission-type metrics" (228) in a process that builds "layered assessment" from the tactical to the theatre-wide level (230).

Invoking Clausewitz, Connable suggests assessments must embrace the fog of war, the atmosphere of uncertainty that pervades all military and martial endeavours. Caught paradoxically between trying to enframe a stable picture and realizing the impossibility of certainty, Connable discerns how assessments themselves generate friction in war by inserting another line of 'force' into an already dynamic environment, one part of the "wicked problems" amplified in counterinsurgency (34-36). And while Connable is no poststructuralist, he is quite attuned to the ways in which analysis induces effects on the material or objects assessed; self-referentiality becomes a crucial determining factor in what one can see and say about something. His study admits to the problem of imprecision and to *not* 'getting it'; the data do not tell the truth. In a small section right titled "Deflation, Inflation, and Inherent Subjectivity," Connable remarks on how expectations play out during "relief-in-place transfer-of-authority" (224). New commanders take responsibility for the battlesphere and begin with a "negative bias" but inevitably follow the same cycle of assessment, where low expectations slowly give way to signs of success as a local situation moves from worse to relatively better—an epistemological trap for ordering the world. The imposition of subjectivity into the assessment process, which is advocated by Connable contra centralized 'objective' assessments, makes for not simply a noisy theatre of operations but also pandemonium of singular accounts that must be reconciled or at least stabilized as a series of layered accounts. In effect, Connable's assessment of assessments concludes that one unitary metanarrative—numerical data and core metrics—was out in favour of a new if ironic metanarrative: the

proliferation of different 'phrases in dispute' composed of narrative threads that cannot be easily integrated or resolved.⁷⁶ The end point of this layering—or rather, the parsing of different singular elements into an assemblage—is what one of the study's diagrams labels a "contextual impressionistic decision" synthesized from layered summaries (231). On this matter, special forces commanders analysing village stability operations were *avant-guardists* in this respect, where the different regional Stability Operations Information Centres opted for narrative analyses to provide local and contextual intelligence and assessment for counterinsurgents.

As the military saving power, village stability operations sought to reduce and minimize the harm—done by insurgents *and* counterinsurgents on the population—by opting for more biopower and less firepower, a lesser evil that could always be worse. One major implication here is that the effort (the means) and the intended effect (the ends) collapse. In their return to the village, counterinsurgents discovered that collateralized and unrestricted warfare waged in an epidemiological context from the ground-up is increasingly indistinguishable from the desired end-state anticipated in advance. On one hand, the population is prized, a sacred object to save, produce, and conduct. On the other, the population is ultimately always susceptible to being compromised; it becomes a scapegoat for the lack of counterinsurgents' success, revealing an ecological defect in its own indigenous ways. Countering insurgency and stabilizing communities are thus ongoing interventions to manage and administer a risk that never really disappears; biopolitical interdiction and employing biopower in reconstruction and development is risk management by another name. As goes the truism, some of the best counterinsurgency weapons do not shoot: elders and tribal leaders take time in appraising special forces operators conducting VSO; the biopolitical density of the rural village slows down the velocity of operations as does the geography of compounds, *karez*, and farming fields; FET members recount the time taken to drink tea while meeting, a polychronic and symbolic ritual serving to filter and weed out unscrupulous parties. The velocity of these biopolitical measures may be slower but they are still kinetic.

⁷⁶ I am referring here to Lyotard's notion of *le differend*—"phrases in dispute." This is ironic because Lyotard positions *le differend* as something outside or beyond the ordering power of metanarratives. In realizing their own faith in a series of fragmented differends to counter the metanarrative of core metrics, military actors endow these "phrases in dispute" as the new metanarrative.

They allow for war waged as an exercise in life support that is an undertaking in *perpetual damage control*—apply too much and no will be left to live, but adjust the level of force and blur the violence appropriately to manage the damage done (Thi Nguyen 2014). The ambient effects of such a campaign are together like a constant but slow practice of *sapping*, draining strength and gradually weakening the foundation of a body or a formation. Sapping, after all, has its own military genealogy: sappers are better known as military engineers, and saps are small trenches or subterranean tunnels used to undermine the foundations of fortifications.⁷⁷ Sapping deforms matter, slowly reducing the integrity of materials, compelling structures to compromise themselves after successive efforts to introduce friction and slowly exacerbate damage. During sieges, sapping was crucial to undermine the strength of a strongpoint and ultimately render its defenses ineffective. By avoiding any direct engagement with ever thicker and higher walls or the evolving "defense in depth" of the 18th century European garrison towns and fortresses, it was an indirect way—a lateral or collateral way—of fighting. Incidentally, sapping also shares its Latin root, *sap-*, with *sapere* (wisdom, knowledge, to know) and with *Aufklärung*—reconnaissance or Enlightenment. This notion of sapping returns us back to the dialectic of military enlightenment and the military limit-attitude at the centre of contemporary warfare, the biopower of counterinsurgency, and the village stability focus. Populations—village communities to be stabilized—are sapped; their everyday lives are the targets of biopolitical breaching methods.

Most American units spent much of 2014 demobilizing and withdrawing—a long process that was fraught with significant logistical issues given the massive military footprint, semi- and non-permissive neighbouring governments (Russia and Iran), and a land-locked country (Faith 2014; Jeong 2014). The American-led coalition's mandate to conduct combat operations ceased in 2012 but coalition units have drove the campaign and operational design process into 2014 and after. While the ISAF mission officially ended in mid-December 2014, the Status of Forces Agreement signed between NATO and the Afghan government by President Ashraf Ghani along with the Bilateral Security Agreement

⁷⁷ Sapper itself comes from the word sap, which is a "tunnel or trench to conceal an assailant's approach to a fortified place" (OED). The word is etymologically linked to military engineering (OED: from French *saper*, from Italian *zappare*, from *zappa* 'spade, spadework', probably from Arabic *sarab*, 'underground passage', or *sabora* 'probe a wound, explore').

and Enduring Strategic Partnership between the United States and Afghanistan guarantee that approximately 13 000 foreign troops will remain in the country from 2015 through to 2024 (NATO 2015; Ackerman 2014ab). ISAF has been reincarnated under another NATO auspice, the support mission known as Resolute Support. Most of the contingent is American and many are special forces conducting stability and contingency operations, both in conjunction with Afghan forces and independently. Several other NATO members—like Germany and the UK—pledged troops to support Afghan security forces with a "train-advise-assist" mission through 2018 and beyond (c.f. Hirsh 2013).⁷⁸ In the lead up to the agreements, which were delayed given the controversial run-off to Afghan federal election in late summer 2014, Barrack Obama announced a global counterterrorism slush fund of \$5 billion (US), which allows allies to "train, build capacity, and facilitate partner countries on the front line" (BBC News 2014b), leaving open the door for biopolitical and ballistic quick impact projects as ongoing contingency operations. Notably, as of early 2015, the United States alone had disbursed almost \$49 billion for Afghan security force development. Yet, concerns about the promise of ongoing military assistance, aid, and training begs the question given the 2014 failures of the Iraqi military—trained by American mentors—in fighting against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a transnational Sunni *jihadi* group that emerged in Iraq during the American occupation and that have been establishing control over large areas in wake of the bloody Syrian civil war. With American-led airstrikes in Iraq and Syria to bolster Kurdish groups, rebel factions, and Iraqi forces, and with a large North Atlantic contingent of advisors on the ground in Iraq and Syria, ISIS has been 'degraded' but controls large swaths of Syria and of Iraq north of Baghdad. Its forces were defeated in Tikrit by Shia popular mobilization forces (militias) and Iranian special forces, but they have controlled Mosul since the fall of 2014 and pushed Iraqi forces out of Ramadi in May 2015. Despite the fact that 2014 was the deadliest year for civilians in Afghanistan as North Atlantic forces withdrew (Glasse 2014),⁷⁹ something

⁷⁸ See NATO's Resolute Support Mission Placemat (31 May 2015), <<http://www.rs.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php>>.

⁷⁹ In the micro-documentary *What We're Leaving Behind* (2014), Ben Anderson tracks the huge increase in mass civilian casualties and trauma patients in Afghanistan along with an average of 25 Afghan security force casualties per day. Conversations with overworked doctors in underfunded medical centres about the frequency of ballistic

which should have given global actors pause, we have to wonder how the employment of firepower and biopower will unfold going forward, and if the Afghan war itself will fade from view as it competes for attention with Syria, with counterinsurgencies in central and sub-Saharan Africa, and with attacks in North Atlantic domestic environments.

While Canada's military mission in Afghanistan formally ended in March 2014, its ongoing financial and military commitments remain largely hidden from public view. A CBC story about the departure ceremony at NATO headquarters in Kabul following the end of the CF's role in the Afghan training mission was telling: journalists were explicitly forbidden from reporting about the heavily-guarded ceremony in advance because of security concerns—in other words, the fear of insider attacks or suicide bombings at a high-profile media event (CBC/CP 2014: ¶2). According to journalist Kaj Larsen, Kabul's core areas, which house the Afghan government ministries, foreign embassies, and a series of American and NATO military installations, have been more intensively securitized, a bunker-like mix of blast walls, HESCOs, and permanently-manned checkpoints dividing the city, greatly reducing the freedom of movement for foreigners (armed or not) and reducing contact between Afghans and foreign workers within and outside the NATO apparatus (Larsen 2014). Building on the *VICE News* story "Afghan Money Pit" about ongoing and post-2014 American expenditures in Afghanistan, American journalist Alice Speri writes:

But if you thought that getting out of Afghanistan would save us some cash, you're wrong. The troops might withdraw, if things go as planned, by the end of the year, but US dollars are going to have to keep flowing into the country for years to come to keep it afloat. If things go bad, the US might feel compelled to start the war all over again. (Speri 2014: ¶3)

Citing John Sopko, the special inspector general on Afghan reconstruction, from a mid-2014 report, Speri adds that only 21% of the country may be accessible to civilian employees by the end of 2014, meaning that evaluating and monitoring the fruits of a \$6 trillion military budget along with a \$102 billion reconstruction and development bill are next to impossible. While telecommunications, GPS, aerial reconnaissance, and a 'multi-tiered approach' to oversight provide some shred of American funds

and 'high energy' injuries to civilians reveal that inexperienced and firepower-prone Afghan forces are often indiscriminate in engaging anti-government forces.

disbursed and dissipated, there is no real substitute for going to sites and locations (¶16). This says nothing about the investments and expenditures of other contributing NATO and non-NATO coalition members.

Further, for all the discussion about possible political reconciliation and settlement following the lengthy intervention into Afghanistan and its life environment, the decrease of international spending and the diminishment of military-routed disbursements to rural and urban areas alike will have significant destabilizing effects. According to Matthieu Aikins, Afghanistan's politics have become more or less about money, and the future of the country is inevitably tied to how elites, strongmen, armed insurgents, or narcotics syndicates—and the web of patronage inherent in these relations—are affected by the drawdown of surplus capital acting as economic stimulus by martial means (Aikins 2013c: ¶5). Left between a form of government likely oscillating between "consolidated oligarchy" or "durable disorder...in which vicious cycles of insecurity continue at a low hum," Aikins implies speculative financial action will be the most important, coercive, and persuasive measure of government (¶5). The venture capitalist Green Beret may have a longer life span. The decade-long "aid-boom" in Kabul has driven "wild and haphazard growth" without providing any infrastructure needed for it to last. With total aid in 2010 equivalent to the Afghan GDP and with two-thirds of government payroll funded by international donors, a significant and severe recession is inevitable (Akins 2013b: 46). If 2001 was Afghanistan Year Zero 1.0 and 2009's counterinsurgency roll-out became Year Zero 2.0 then 2015 is Afghanistan Year Zero 3.0, which begins to look increasing more like the disaster capitalism unleashed in Iraq with 'free market' shocks used to structure, regulate, and enforce a competitive environment that siphons revenues and profits to offshore zones abroad (53). Village stability and the distributed and dispersed envelopment of counterinsurgency suddenly seem insignificant in this context, with rural villages and short and longer-term impact projects ultimately *nth* order concerns. This is not to suggest, as most liberal accounts tend to, that a 'better' prosecution of the war would have made a more satisfying, democratic, or sustainable outcome. Rather, it is to say that the conduct of the war relies on an overdetermined political economic apparatus routed through global and local populations to

indifferently reach *some* condition or state determined as conclusive by those prosecuting the war and orchestrating its conduct. When it began to circulate in 2012, the idea of "Afghan good enough" (Cordesman 2012) was nothing other than a continuation of harm reduction, sapping, and damage control. The inefficacy of the effort—and the enormity of a massive economic and social engineering experiment facilitated by the insurgency of global economic and monetary flows into an in-between territorial enclosure in South Asia—finds its relay in another telling event that is quite rightly an affective heuristic for the war. In mid-April 2014, a massive landslide in remote Badakhshan Province near the town of Ab-e-Barek killed over 2 500 people, and area residents and security forces were left with hand tools to rescue and recover survivors, with the distribution of emergency relief efforts plagued by poor transport infrastructure and chronic mismanagement. This was one more ordinary disaster, an event driven by heavy rains and spatial traps dictated by the biopolitical constraints specific to a population of impoverished tenant farmers whose lives, in a place that barely registered in the wider war effort, were left to die rather than being made to live.

Whatever the material legacy of military operations in Afghanistan, the affiliated knowledge production apparatus continues to generate the requisite epistemological and aesthetic equipment for the future. To update the most current American joint doctrine document *JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, the US Army and Marine Corps published an updated version of Field Manual 3-24 in late 2014 now titled *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, which I have already mentioned throughout. The manual is both a collection of lessons learned and a forensic account of the war efforts over the last fifteen years, its refurbished imperatives expressing the desires specific to the military limit-attitude. New sections on the principles and paradoxes of counterinsurgency act as registers for this forensic operation. With heuristic teaching vignettes based on Iraq, Afghanistan, Mali, and the Central African Republic, the manual also includes an updated set of source notes reflecting academic and military work on the latest expeditionary cycle. Indeed, as a concept and a form of conduct itself, counterinsurgency has been modified by no shortage of adjectives in the last ten years: enemy-centered, population, centered,

motivation-centered, actor-centered, precision, mosaic, bottom-up, and now with the latest addition, direct and indirect. According to John Nagl, who penned the foreword to the 2006 manual:

The single biggest change in the new manual is the addition of Chapter 10, “Indirect Methods for Countering Insurgencies”, a tacit admission that the “Clear, Hold, and Build” method recommended in the 2006 edition may be too expensive in lives, time, and treasure for an America chastened by a hard decade and more of counterinsurgency campaigns... The new one advocates earlier interventions with smaller footprints, as often as possible using host-nation forces to carry most of the burden, whenever that option is available. This is enormously valuable as a guide to policymakers but perhaps less so to the conventional Army and Marine Corps, as most often it will be Special Operating Forces that will implement future small footprint COIN campaigns. (Nagl 2014: ¶5)

Indirect is another way of saying collateralizing, dispersing, distributing, and unrestricting war by opting for methods that stabilize with less firepower and more biopower.

While the narrative of counterinsurgency falls away as the war in Afghanistan fades from public view, the spirit of counterinsurgency continues, its remnants pollinating future contingency operations. Yet its spirit also returns home after its repurposing abroad. What follows from these wars, and how do they fertilize the domestic environments of North Atlantic states whose militaries are recovering from years of deployments? How do North Atlantic populations resign themselves or make compromises to deal with this spirit that biopolitically binds living environment together? The next and final chapter gives some consideration to these questions by addressing the "boomerang effects" of contemporary counterinsurgency with particular attention to the biopolitical and neoliberal contexts of Canada and the Canadian state. I consider how counterinsurgency is an important interpretive key for theories of biopolitics and biopower after Foucault—and after criticisms of Foucault's own failure to do more than gesture toward the genesis of biopower in settler colonial environments. The idea of boomerangs should alert us to a wider biopolitical environmentalism directed to making life live, which, while far from uniform, makes demands of many different populations across the world to serve as a critical reservoir and resilient ecological infrastructure to *empower* liberal ways of rule. In the idiom of lessons learned, we can elaborate on the pedagogy of counterinsurgency and the lessons of expeditionary experiments in stabilization for biopolitics making life live around the North Atlantic basin in core liberal capitalist S/states. In other words, considerations about the status of forces in Afghanistan should connect to the

status of forces in the far northwestern edge that is Canada. In doing so, we can give some thought to the continuum of counterinsurgency as an environmental phenomenon, which also demands some resolution or at least engagement with ontology of war not as a totalizing process but as something totally mobilized because of its distribution in epidemiological terms and its ongoing adaptive dispersion into the capillaries of life.

If in realizing that counterinsurgents' aesthetic equipment derives from a common set of historical concerns shared by Foucault if in an inverted form—they desire what he indicts—we have an interesting reversal we can also pursue. Perhaps, in realizing and challenging our own biopolitical coordinates, we can draw insights from the martial acumen generated by counterinsurgents through their biopolitical measures and invert them, *doing it while knowing it* and affirming alternate protocols and procedures for living and ruling ourselves.

5 Stability, or the Spirit of Counterinsurgency as Society Made Durable?

It's no longer exo-colonization (the age of extending world conquest), but the age of intensiveness and endocolonization. One now colonizes only one's own populations. One underdevelops one's own civilian economy.

- Paul Virilio, *Pure War* (1983: 95)

Civil war is the free play of forms-of-life; it is the principle of their coexistence. War, because in each singular play between forms-of-life, the possibility of a fierce confrontation—the possibility of violence—can never be discounted. Civil, because the confrontation of forms of life is not like that between States—a coincidence between population and territory—but like the confrontation between parties in the sense this word had before the advent of the modern State. And because we must be precise from now on, we should say that forms of life confront one another as *partisan war machines*.

- Tiqqun, *Introduction to Civil War* (2009 [2010]: 32-33)

Material proportionality gives a new meaning to the concept of security...Through the idea of proportionality, differences and disagreements conflicts and contradiction become 'productive.' In processes concerning proportionality in which questions of normative moderation arise, the contradictory aims of different actors [...] add to a diffuse security system that shapes the physical reality.

- Eyal Weizman, *The Least of All Possible Evils* (2012: 78)

Instead of asking about how the war in Afghanistan ended, we ought to describe how it continues both in Afghanistan and on the North Atlantic basin. How do affluent North Atlantic states—core liberal capitalist democracies—import liberal war, the very thing they export? How do the wars that aimed to speculate on democracy promotion and seed liberal rule drift back to their sources-or constitute their sources? How does this ongoing return amplify already-existing civil wars and the legacy of internal colonization within these state enclosures? Weizman's comment on proportionality and security turns our collective attention not to one environment or other—domestic space and its external other—but rather to the continuum between them. Stabilization, understood biopolitically, only has meaning, like security, in a proportional context. This means reconciling the fact that edges and frontiers, where warfare is animated by biopower, can be anywhere in asymmetric and disproportionate ways. Writing from the northwestern edge of the Atlantic basin, this means considering the war both 'down range' and in the domestic enclosures of liberal states—for my purposes, the domestic enclosure of Canada. We ought to ask how counterinsurgency remains an important referent not just in the military conduct of warfare but as the interpretive key to understand

how life is made to live according to today's biopolitical governmentality espoused as democratic liberal rule. To ask this is to apprehend the 'boomerang effects' of almost fifteen years of expeditionary warfare rationalized with a collateral and epidemiological logic that is global in scale.

Foucault's failure to fully engage with what Spivak referred to as the 'epistemic rupture of colonialism' should remind us to take a wider view of how counterinsurgency re-enters—or is permanently *in situ* within—the domestic spaces of North Atlantic states without totalizing or overdetermining this process. As per Foucault's glancing remarks, the insertion and development of biopolitical technologies of rule in Europe were augmented by the settler biopolitics refined in the colonies of South Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Canada's settler colonial history and exploitative resource extraction and speculation—capitalist-driven dispossession, racism, segregation, and genocidal violence—are always-already *internal* to Foucault's account, and tracking the return of the Afghan war is to ask about the derivatives of this boomerang two or three times removed and so to interrogate the biopolitics of the present in and around Canada. Canada has always been part of a colonial present, whether in 1613, in 1763, in 1850, in 1867, in 1871, in 1885, in 1912, in 1931, in 1969, or in 2013 and 2015,¹ and in ways historically unique to the biopolitical reality of its position in the imaginary of liberal modernity. To recall the comments of Dipesh Chakrabarty regarding the local striations of capitalism in an Indian context, globalization and universalization is not the same thing (Chakrabarty 2000 [2007]: 73). The same goes for the return effects of counterinsurgency, which do not manifest themselves in exactly the same way. In Canada, they begin to blend into historical foundations of biopolitical government based on settler colonialism and on neoliberalism that together enframe and conduct the flow of resources and populations, engines for 'force transformation' across the spectrum of civilian affairs.

¹ In order: the Two Row Wampum of 1613, a proto-globalization agreement between settlers and the Haudenosaunee; the creation and incorporation of the Hudson Bay Company by royal charter in 1870; the Royal Proclamation of 1763; the Robinson-Huron and Robinson-Superior treaties of 1850; the British North America Act of 1867; the Dominion Land Survey and the signing of Treaty One in 1871; the Northwest Rebellion of 1885; the immigration of 400 000 settlers in 1913; the operation of over 30 Indian residential schools in 1931; the Indian Policy White paper and the commencement of Syncrude's tar sands operations in Fort McMurray, both in 1969; the omnibus budget bills C-38 and C-45 in 2013; the summary Call to Action for reparative justice in 2015 following the findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on Residential Schools.

To ask about the derivatives of these boomerang effects is to also wonder if 'boomerang' is perhaps too slow an analogy, where the looping return lacks the speed or velocity to accurately represent the ripples and waves across the continua linking here and there, inside and outside, war and peace, and firepower and biopower. Is counterinsurgency really society made durable? Are we always-already speaking of counterinsurgency when we describe the intelligence of ordering and the organizing powers of liberal rule? What if counterinsurgency is the limit-attitude specific to the imaginaries of pastorate, police, and population power? This line of questioning takes the claims made by contemporary military philosophy to their logical end and exposes a series of contradictions about contemporary biopolitics that no aesthetic or epistemological edifice can contain. Taking up the task of sharpening Foucault's thinking about foreign wars, biopolitics, and return effects, Stephen Graham has written extensively about the territorial, discursive, and material boomerangs intensified by the last round of North Atlantic expeditionary warfare (Graham 2013 & 2012a). A critical urban geographer, Graham's interest lies in considering how this continuum between traditional conceptions of inside and outside produce new forms of military urbanism and material architectures for war waged as peace and order secured through technologies of biopower, which bear greatly on the organization and ordering of populations (2012b & 2010). Extending Graham's analysis, I argue that the war's effects, no matter how faded or hived-off they seem, always come back as unknown knowns.

Boomerang effects also direct us to consider questions of damage. In her essay on imperial debris and the notion of ruin, Laura Ann Stoler takes up Benjamin's concepts of shock and wreckage along with Raymond Williams' idea of 'formation' in conceptualizing what she calls imperial formations:

[T]hey are processes of becoming, not fixed things. Not least they are states of deferral that mete out promissory notes that are not exceptions to their operation but constitutive of them: imperial guardianship, trusteeships, delayed autonomy, temporary intervention, conditional tutelage, military takeover in the name of humanitarian works, violent intervention in the name of human rights and security measures in the name of peace. (Stoler 2008: 193)

Like Foucault's idea of institutions in relation to government and veridiction, formations are the cumulative effects of tendencies that are habitually realized in practice. Stoler diagrams a condition between destruction and decay with the intent of "broach[ing] the protracted quality of decimation in

people's lives, to track the production of new exposures and enduring damage" (196). A population made to live is also a population perpetually sapped of its energies, where rule, as Mimi Thi Nguyen reminds us, is a practice of damage control (Nguyen 2014). Put in the terms of the continuum of operations, environments of debris and damage are not confined to the off-shored spaces of expeditionary war; the epidemiological implications always come back to domestic enclosures and such returns are always-already constitutive in that they cannot be quarantined largely because the biopolitical basis of liberal government, when scaled up to a global context with a global population, prioritizes interactions between outside and inside. This is not to say that the continuum of damage is the same in Canada and other North Atlantic states as it is in Afghanistan; there is no equivalence. Nor is it to say that the distribution of damage and vulnerability within Canada is at all uniform. The segregating and dividing practices of biopolitical government already prioritize some communities for damage and actively expose them to intersectional violence. For some, these boomerangs are not at all new; rather, they are constitutive always-already of everyday life. Clearly, and as I address further below, the enduring settler biopolitics of the neoliberal Canadian state and its systemic racist, gendered, and classist effects target different communities for different levels of risk all under the sign of 'allowing reality to unfold.' It is to say, though, that even if the damage or injury is comparatively weaker and or the intensity ambient and lower, the experience of this pressure and stress is not experienced passively or inertly. It changes and transforms populations, stabilizing them in new ways. In this sense, domestic populations become the site for collateral damage as the counterinsurgency warfare is displaced and unrestricted in a different way.

Certainly, a biopolitical approach to damage and ruin benefits greatly from critiques of capitalism, which help to understand and consider similar processes: creative destruction, build-and-destroy cycles, permanent economic crisis, and the idea of shock doctrine (Retort 2007; Grandin 2014; Klein 2007; Harvey 2009). Stoler's incisive remarks connect to a darker biopolitical context through the German architect and Nazi minister of armaments and war production, Albert Speer, who asserted that the debris of ruins—as deformed matter and material—is the foundation to create new environments.

Speer's paradigm—the theory of ruin value—was conceived of as a way to realize the future built infrastructures necessary to the administrative and functional needs of Nazi Germany. Damage is necessary, and in the context of the Nazi race war it took on a quasi-evolutionary bent, perverting the concept of natural selection to augment a necropolitics—a negative biopower—that annihilated whole peoples. A biopolitical conception of damage and stress as acting on and affecting matter implies intersecting biological, metabolic, and social registers. Rheology, the study of how the material flows of solids and fluid deform when subjected to force, is also a useful reference here. In trying to conceptualize the weakening, the sapping, and the slow damage done to populations, a rheological perspective acknowledges the ongoing environmental and atmospheric conditions—pressure and stress—to which we are subjected and subordinated even if we no longer wish to recognize the continuation of the war and read its evidence, inscriptions, and marks drifting homeward from expeditionary spaces. The question then becomes a matter of assessment, of biopolitical battle damage assessment across domestic and foreign boundaries in relation to the spirit of counterinsurgency's methods of direct and indirect treatment.

In previous chapters, I showed that counterinsurgency was fashioned in ever more specific and micro-level ways in Afghanistan to stabilize environments and populations. Unrestricting and collateralizing the war required counterinsurgents to make some lives live, make some lives die, and ultimately make all life suspect. Some lives were actively developed and secured while others were intentionally underdeveloped, exposed to danger and risk to make other lives live. If counterinsurgency implies we are all pre-insurgents because of the relative productive capacities of our own lives and the danger of exceeding the bandwidth of what is tolerable and acceptable—what is deemed stable—with respect to liberal rule, what does the curtailing of our own inherent insurgency entail? How are we cascading effects in the systemic operational design of liberal rule and its own stability operations? As I have shown earlier in chapter three, and as military doctrine developers and critics of liberal war have indicated, countering insurgency is a fluid process of *conversion and redemption*; its basis is *ontotheological* (Evans 2011: 753), where ways of war and rule are sustained by the pastoral and liturgical narratives of

salvation that inform the promotion of cultural and social life according to the spirit of counterinsurgency. Interventionist wars exported and waged by affluent liberal states under the auspices of democracy, security, humanitarianism, and economic development are rationalized by a pious² and providential conversion narrative animated by environmental treatment, where planetary frontiers and the perimeter of liberal rule are less boundaries and more thresholds where confrontations between forms of life play out and unfold in different theatres of operations. As biopower and biopolitics have been more aggressively militarized for full-spectrum warfighting in the name of securing and stabilizing population security and stability, it is crucial to interrogate the atmospheric and environmentality of biopower inside Canada's domestic enclosure, which I argue have been pollinated by counterinsurgency. Among other things, this means considering the idiom of insurgency, whether in terms discourses and practices around critical infrastructure, or whether in relation to liberal rule and technologies of government that force a reconsideration of notions of damage, resiliency, and redemption.

I argue that Canada's colonial present is affected by the return of another foreign war grafted onto existing quiet civil wars, though my aim is not propose a strict causal link between different territorial regimes of military-biopolitical treatment. Rather, the aim here is to indicate the historical coincidence of biopolitical practices that constitute counterinsurgency abroad and domestically in order to demonstrate how liberal war requires liberal rule and vice versa. As with Graham and Stoler, Evans is clear about this connection:

Throughout modern history, liberalism has proved to be resilient when faced with its own crises of legitimacy and authority. Its claims to violence in particular seem to enjoy a remarkable ability to regenerate as the memory of indigenous subjugation and depoliticization fades with time. One could be more cynical and suggest that given the only things that liberal regimes in Western zones of affluence can materially export today are war and violence, rather than write of its demise, the liberal war thesis is only beginning to enter a new retrenching chapter, which will resonate for a considerable time. (Evans 2011: 754-5)

² "The discourse of democracy is sustained by faith...in recent years the omnipotent position of democracy has come to be sustained by the increasingly pious behaviour of its advocates. This democratic piety abhors complexification of political analysis and renounces attempt=pts to clarify and highlight the relationship between democracy and violence. It supports the position of democracy as the political concept par eminence, even if what is done in the name of democracy appears increasingly distant from its theoretical inheritance" (Little 2008: 164).

My concern is both how counterinsurgency fades with time to become the natural background, and how the retrenching abroad occurs also at home. The fifteen year chronology of post-2000¹ expeditionary wars coincide with biopolitical changes in domestic environments, which do not always align in clear ways but which must be understood in a shared historical context. What occurs in Afghanistan does not occur in Canada, and the domestic space of Canada is not domestic space of the United States; however, I argue there is a biopolitical correspondence between them, which is evident if read through the counterinsurgent gaze. In what follows, I expand on Graham's theorization of and work on Foucauldian boomerangs alongside work by Saskia Sassen before picking up on comments from the end of chapter four and offering an assessment of the intractable biopolitical dilemmas of Afghanistan. I then work through a number of different constellations, which exemplify how and where counterinsurgency is society made durable, with a concerted focus on Canada and the continuation of the war—the biopolitical displacement of the war—by other means in a domestic context. I dedicate attention to veterans and the physic and physical damage done to soldiers' bodies, which become disposable biopolitical waste products, before focusing on Omar Khadr, the indefinitely detained and recently freed Afghan-Canadian. I then consider the cultural register of the Afghan war in relation to popular cinematic representations before interrogating the visual and symbolic economy of beards from local Afghan men to special forces operators to fashionable gentrifying hipsters, which indicates a convergence of different biopolitical imperatives. This leads towards a discussion about counterinsurgency in North America. I focus on domestic Canada's largest built environment, Toronto, with an emphasis on the distribution and territorialization of wealth, policing, and security. Approaching these sites in relation to narratives of resiliency and critical infrastructure, I work to bridge the biopolitical stabilization efforts abroad with those in Canada, and indicate the implicit and explicit ways the spirit of counterinsurgency makes—or has, for some time, made—society durable. This allows me to understand the convergence between liberal war and liberal rule by connecting to domestic discourses and practices of racialization and criminalization, to austerity and neoliberal social policy, and to a governmental agenda of uneven development. Last, I consider the biopolitical fantasies

of Canada's energy extraction apparatus and assess the securitization of fossil fuels as a means of engaging with the constellation indigenous sovereignty, resistance, and civil war in Canada, where groups like Idle No More and anti-extraction activists are targeted and coded by the Canadian state and security apparatus as insurgents and as threats to the integrity of the Canada, a frame that continues war by other means.

Boomerangs as a Persistent Feature of Liberal Rule

Damage and ruin, as boomerang effects, link foreign and domestic spaces and serve as a persistent feature of liberal rule. Liberal wars waged abroad serves as a form of treatment in the service of extending the contact and reach of liberal rule; they are view by the liberal states who conduct them as correctives and not as colonization or acts of conquer. The counterinsurgencies of the early 21st century undertaken by North Atlantic states are corrective methods by way of both inquiry and recognition: inquiry because they are wars about generate new possibilities for the installment of government; recognition because they acknowledge and compel a new known quantity of lives and life to live liberally (Appadurai 2006: 24). In this sense, structural adjustment is not just a political economic technology of neoliberal capital but also an operation deciding how and why lives must be adjusted to live in productive and fulfilling ways. Warfare in this context is important insofar as it is an avenue to convert and convey life, rendering aberrant or pathological modalities of living amenable to becoming enframed by liberal intelligence and enveloped by liberal rule, literally attempting to in-form life itself. Global war prosecuted as contingency operations is a more affordable method of managing delinquency than the financial and biopolitical costs (and impossibility) of total suppression. Waging global peace becomes the logic informing operational design. When inverted within the domestic enclosures of liberal states, the process works in reverse to identify what life and which lives should be protected and secured and which should be quarantined and excised.

While another round of commentary warns of a 'new' militarism creeping into the civil institutions of liberal states (Sangster 2014; Albo 2014), we should be clear that this is an ongoing

constituting process for liberal states already historically influenced and shaped by military organs and military service. What is different right now is the glow of a long expeditionary war cycle of the post-9/11 period that has renewed the explicit role of state military action; however, the current amplification of this creep simply reasserts the basic Foucaultian premise about the displacement of war into the social and political field. If we consider boomerangs in this context, we quickly realize we are also considering collateralization and unrestriction in relation to what Foucault described as 'internal colonialism' within the environments and territories of liberal states. With its aesthetic equipment and its limit-attitude, the forensic gaze of counterinsurgency comes back—or is perpetually coming back—to conjugate domestic affairs though paradoxically undermining the imagination and integrity of the enclosure even as its logics are purported to save and protect it. Stephen Graham has been important in mapping the different Foucauldian boomerangs in relation to the fifteen years of war. In alignment with liberal war studies' basic proposition that life itself and the space of civil society are coterminous with war (c.f. Dillon & Reid 2009: 128), Graham tracks how war and military action escape from where state militaries are 'normally' deployed (Graham 2012b: 140). Put in the terms I have been using, Graham is really assessing the collateralization of war that flows inward from outside.

Following Foucault's assertion about boomerangs, Graham argues that the conduit between core and periphery has always been multidirectional and cross-fertilizing (2012a: 38). Practices and influences travel in different directions according to a "local-to-local" logic (42). Describing Great Britain, Graham writes:

Historically, within Western Europe, the importing of colonial tropes into metropolitan cores has tended to centre on the construction of *internal* colonies within domestic cities for the putting down of revolutions and insurgencies, as well as management of criminals, the insane, or racialized minorities. As colonial migration to the increasingly postcolonial centres of empire has grown since the Second World War, so racialized depictions of immigrant districts as 'backward' zones threatening the body-politic of the (post)imperial city and nation helped Orientalist discourses, and imperial practices of urban subjugation, to telescope back to infuse domestic urban geographies. (Graham 2012a: 39)

Biopolitical and military technologies boomeranged back, indexed to communities from the Global South who were designated as riskier parts of the larger population of the British Empire, subject to containment and cordoning like ghettoization, concentration, and 'inner city Orientalism' in urban and

social *milieu* of the postcolonial metropole with respect to settlement and access to resources (Graham 2013: 6; 2012: 95). In Canada, as a Commonwealth constitutional monarchy and former colonial dominion of the Crown, these same flows resulted in sizable Canadian-based Caribbean and south Asian diasporas. As I discuss below, the Temporary Foreign Workers Program rearticulates this historical infusion in a contemporary context. This kind of migration occurs in coincidence with the rise of what Graham calls a "new security economy" and "pacification industry" beyond the military proper, generating a political economic bonanza for the players in the sector who rely on contingent foreign workers. For Graham, urban design plans to 'resuscitate' city life through 'walkable' and 'livable' neighbourhoods are programmed into the environment via 'predatory planning' that develops subtle but hostile architecture deigned to sanitize neighbourhoods and generate productive 'positive externalities' for private property (Graham 2010: 95). Proponents of gentrification in practice if not in name— unfolding historically as 'white infill', as speculative class-driven infill, and as slum-clearance under the sign of revitalization along ubiquitous urban frontiers (Graham 2010: 89; c.f. Harvey 2011; Smith 1996)—tend to favour the rhetoric of local decentralized planning and encourage a mosaic-like approach to urban design, which employs the language of adaptation, dispersion, and local sustainability to recuperate and build defensible neighbourhoods in a different set of stability operations.

Graham's focus on cities and on the urbanization of military and security doctrine shares much in common with the work of Sassen, who also locates cities as new frontier zones that no longer "triage conflict through commerce and civic activity" but become the focal points for what she calls an intensified "urbanizing of war" (Sassen 2010: 33), where new global forces are layered onto older pre-existing and antagonisms conflicts. For Sassen, the urbanization of war and the "unsettling of urban order" is part of "a larger disassembling of existing territorial logics" (34). The biopolitical treatment for urban populations is one of exposure to global pressures as in Toronto, where the discourse around being a 'global city' is as much aspirational and rhetorical as it is a result of no effective policies to develop transit, housing, or other basic infrastructure. The global city described by Sassen is emblematic of new "emergent transversal borderings" that create all kinds of novel and informal

jurisdictions, de facto spaces of sovereign exception and privilege that parallel but differ from the prerogative of national bordered territory in a system based largely the organizing engine of neoliberalism and the political economy of global capital (Sassen 2013: 68). Similarly, in her development of imperial formations and ruins, Stoler refers to the proliferation of these types of assemblages as "graduated forms of sovereignty" (Stoler 2014: 8). In other words, just as war neither exists solely on the periphery of states nor unfolds according to clearly demarcated frontlines, the borderlands of liberal rule occur everywhere and anywhere while being amplified and exacerbated in the uneven encounters and ecologies specific to large urban conurbations. As Graham makes clear, these contexts—ruling through anxieties and insecurities—thrive because we live in a world of increasing inequality and the uneven accumulation of wealth.

From the perspective of counterinsurgency, this means emergent alliances and organized insurrection can come from anywhere too, implying an ongoing 'state of emergency' gaze for contemporary police-pastoral power indexed to the city, where old and new types of dividing and separating practices are realized and put to work. Repurposed after time abroad, counterinsurgency's logics make internal risks ineligible with more urgency. From this perspective, the theatre of operations is less about demarcating inside and outside and more about managing a relative spectrum of volatility territorialized in global terms, an imaginary which relies on conventional state borders to sort and funnel different populations but enframes a more holistic and planetary view of government and administration. In this sense, massive metropolitan centres that are already understood as nodes in a global economy and global civil society are deemed to be insecure and ungovernable, requiring ongoing interventions to stabilize and pacify them. According to Graham, the securitization and militarization of urban space—with "ubiquitous borders" (Graham 2010: 89)—coincide with market processes of urban neoliberalization revolving around "punitive criminology," predictive profiling and anticipatory data-driven tracking, and revanchist urban policy expressed through speculative gentrification, 'revitalization and renewal' campaigns, and the targeting and slow razing of low-income or systemically vulnerable communities and populations (Graham 2012b: 140). To borrow from the lexicon of Dillon and Reid,

'biohumanity's rogues' are simultaneously outside and within; the gaze of liberal rule requires 'seeing' nothing less. The development-environment-security nexus (c.f. Duffield 2007) routed through the spirit of counterinsurgency can explain paving roads in Kandahar to convey the economic activities of populations as much as it can explain the bankruptcy of Detroit and the cessation of basic public services like water in 2014, where residents in the context of austerity are threats because they actually demand responsible government and provision of basic services as common wealth. They demand that local authorities take custody of their lives and provide for them as opposed to expelling and exposing them to neoliberal market authority as biopolitical government.

While the emerging military literature regarding future counterinsurgency, contingency, and stability operations in dense urban environments coincides with Graham and Sassen's analyses, both assessments interrogate what are always-already displacements of war in city infrastructures and populations. Given this focus on urbanization, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) focus on village stability in Afghanistan may seem anathema to the coming set of military and biopolitical concerns. In other words, the village-level focus may not seem easily transferable back into North Atlantic domestic environments. Yet, in a Canadian context informed by settler colonialism, indigenous resurgence, temporary foreign workers, and the rampant resource-intensive capitalism of an extractive sector given freedom to speculate at will in enframing rural areas for development, the idiom of 'village' can be retrofitted for use whether in the increasingly underserved low-income suburban rings of instability around Toronto or in the halfway industry towns of the Northern Alberta tar sands. After considering Afghanistan post-2014 in the next section, I then turn to consider how the village remains and becomes biopolitical grammar anew with its own disjunctures and entanglements, offering finer grain ways of imagining and desiring control and order.

Continuing the Continuum of Operations: Afghanistan Undone

The war in Afghanistan certainly continues, and the arrival of 'adequate end-state' and 'Afghanistan good enough' remain paltry and risible slogans deployed to sustain the larger strategic

narrative espoused by counterinsurgents. If the counterinsurgency campaign promised to be the method for stabilizing Afghanistan, it failed. As Ben Anderson argues in a recent op-ed piece, "Any withdrawal was supposed to be 'conditions based' on achieving that goal" (Anderson 2015: ¶7), and those conditions—the fantasy end state—have not been met. With Taliban offensives in Kunduz and Helmand Provinces unfolding in the fall of 2015, it was clear that insecurity was in the fact the condition securitized (c.f. Morrissey 2015). The withdrawal of ISAF and the post-2014 NATO mission have created a vacuum, which has been exacerbated by an unstable national government. The audit, recount, and impasse over the 2014 Afghan federal election results followed by an American-brokered power-sharing agreement and unity government between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah has been slow to consolidate its own powers, limited as they are to Kabul (Matta 2014; Salehi 2014). John Sopko, the American special inspector general for Afghan reconstruction (SIGAR), pointed to a "legacy of mixed results" that following from over \$100 billion in American funding alone. Infant mortality rates are down and schools, roads, and clinics have built, but opium production continues to increase despite the \$8.4 billion in counter-narcotics, poppy eradication, and the local agricultural transition programs of counterinsurgency while \$65 billion in funding for Afghan national defence and security forces since 2002 has failed to create a reliable, legitimate, and professional set of institutions (Sopko/SIGAR 2015: ¶14-17). Troubling increases in civilian casualties—with 2014 being the deadliest year for Afghan civilians since the 2001 invasion, and with 2015 on track to equal or exceed these numbers³—indicate an escalation of the war in relation to the diminished presence of the ISAF and to the instability following from the unresolved election (Clark 2015 & 2014; Latifi 2015). Indeed, one of the largest suicide bomb attacks occurred in mid July 2014 in the Urgun district of Paktika Province, killing 89 people in response to the proposed deal to resolve the presidential election (Latifi 2014). The so-called 'insider attack' at Camp Qargha in August 2014 in western Kabul, which houses the Afghan National Defence University, killed a visiting American general and wounded fifteen ISAF mentors and trainers, including a German and two Afghan generals (Ackerman & Jeong 2014). Attacks against ANSF and

³ See the report, (5 August 2015) "Afghanistan: Civilian Casualties Remain at Record High Levels in First Half of 2015," from the UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, < <http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16289&LangID=E>>.

coalition forces in Helmand and Kandahar Province rose sharply in the late summer of 2014 at the end of Ramadan (Al Jazeera America 2014), with anti-government forces exploiting the relative weakness and disorganization of Afghan forces. A suicide bomb attack (blamed by ISAF and Afghan security officials on the Haqqani network, an ally of the Afghan Taliban) at a district-level volleyball tournament in eastern Paktika Province killed 57 people in November 2014. Three separate Taliban suicide bomber attacks killed ten policemen in one day on 10 November (Al Jazeera America 2014a). In late November, an insurgent cell attacked Camp Shorabak in Helmand Province, killing nine Afghan soldiers. Shorabak was formerly Camp Bastion, one of the largest ISAF bases in the country. The same day, a suicide bomber attacked a small base in Sangin (also in Helmand), killing five soldiers.

As discussed last chapter, metrics do not tell the whole story, though a recent project by *The Intercept* to document American condolence and compensation payments to ordinary Afghans over the course of the war indicates a speculative approach that used money as a weapons system and waged a derivative war from-the-ground-up. Revealing a logic similar to the mathematics of Israeli operational planners whose targeting selection is based on formulae to determine the proportionality of different effects to compare seeming disparate things, the report on compensation is explicit:

An armored vehicle ran over a six-year-old boy's legs: \$11,000. A jingle truck was "blown up by mistake": \$15,000. A controlled detonation broke eight windows in a mosque: \$106. A boy drowned in an anti-tank ditch: \$1,916. A 10-ton truck ran over a cucumber crop: \$180. A helicopter "shot bullets hitting and killing seven cows": \$2,253. Destruction of 200 grape vines, 30 mulberry trees and one well: \$1,317. A wheelbarrow full of broken mirrors: \$4,057. A child who died in a combat operation: \$2,414. (Currier 2015: ¶ 1-2)

These data and metrics quantify value and indicate the function of money to ground and make intelligible the fall-out of operations in a war conducted as a mosaic of smaller enterprises. The human elements of trauma and suffering, and the actual damage to communities, are evacuated from the equation where money functions to make arbitrary equivalences between different things. The 'actively-humane warfare' that is counterinsurgency obscures the damage it causes, where mirrors are worth more than a child killed in combat. These equations mute and practically negate the suffering borne by Afghans, whose lives are the theatre of operations for population-centred war.

Beyond suicide bombs and firefights, drone strikes and targeted assassinations continue in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well,⁴ less visible and occurring in an information vacuum due to the slow erosion of mainstream global media coverage as Western forces withdraw (Ross, Serle, and Willis 2014). According to Rachel Reid of the Open Society Foundation:

As the U.S. withdraws from Afghanistan, [and] the networks of informants that provide human intelligence on potential targets is dismantled, the quality of intelligence that informs the strikes will degrade, making misidentifications and civilian casualties more likely. (Reid, in Ross 2014b: ¶28).

Further, a 2014 audit conducted by SIGAR found an alarming lack of accountability—on the Afghan and American side—in relation to the American oversupply of arms and equipment for ANSF from 2010 to 2013 (Sopko, in Taraby 2014). The numbers of small arms in circulation have not been tracked,⁵ with many now in the hands of people outside the Afghan National Army and National Police, which poses risks for the Afghan government and its security forces. Arms are not the only thing drifting from the confines of control. As discussed last chapter, the killing, abuse, and intimidation suffered by local villagers at the hands of ad hoc local police operating with no substantive formal oversight continues (Aikins 2014), part of the normative moderation of violence proportional to the ever lowering bar for 'Afghan good enough.' Further, the tone of the American counterinsurgents advising local police commanders is one of indifference, with operational mentors deferring to 'self-sufficient' decision-making and claiming to have little jurisdiction in dictating matters internal to the creation of Afghans solutions to Afghan problems. In his article regarding "Afghan-Centric Counterinsurgency's Three Stooges"—Uzbek-Afghan warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, Pashtun and Kandahar-based General Abdul Raziq, and Afghan 'Taliban-hunter' Commander Azizullah—American foreign policy commentator

⁴ Not long after the November suicide bombing in Paktia province, an attack by the Pakistan-based Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan) gunmen on a military-aligned high school in Peshawar, Pakistan, killed 145 people (132 children) in mid-December. While not in Afghanistan, the TTP claimed they were responding to the Pakistan military offensive in the tribal border regions of North Waziristan, an offensive supported by American military commanders, and one augmented by U.S. air power and drone strikes. The perpetual threat and the near-permanent loitering of drones over the border region no doubt plays a part in generating resentment and fear within local populations beyond the ongoing campaign between Pakistani military forces and anti-government groups. Pakistani state forces have since escalated the ground and air campaign. See "Pakistan steps up campaign against Taliban" (21 December 2014), <<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2014/12/pakistan-says-fighters-killed-bombardment-2014122053421810392.html>>.

⁵ Notably, American military policy post-2014 is marked by a refusal to equip Afghan forces with heavy weapons largely due to a fear they would be sold on black markets or funneled toward anti-government forces.

Gary Owen argues that, as with the Afghan Local Police program I discussed in chapter four, "The US has pinned Afghanistan's security hopes on a motley group of bad actors and dangerous thugs who've been welcomed with open arms by American forces" (Owen 2014: ¶3).

Life in Afghanistan less secure and the vaunted population has borne the brunt of the war more than insurgents or counterinsurgents. A report from the Afghanistan Analysts Network, based on case studies and interviews in local environments, concluded that the lack of any substantive legal reforms has exacerbated systemic violence against women, protecting perpetrators and shaming victims in a context where incidents are actually becoming *more* brutal (Samandary 2014). This renders bankrupt the liberal feminist rescue narrative about 'saving Afghan women' and it indicates the difficulty of transnational feminist networks to intervene into the war and stop asymmetric gendered violence. The March 2015 murder of Farkhunda, a 27 year-old Afghan woman and religious studies student killed by a mob of 'ordinary' and 'urbanite' Afghan men after accusations she burned a Quran, indicates that egregious gender violence remains a core feature of Afghan society, and the attack points to a wider culture of violence produced by the influence of an atavistic religious establishment and an arbitrary rule of law in a country in survival mode after forty years of war (Malikyar 2015: ¶14-15). In a July 2014 report also for the Network, Julius Cavendish tracked ongoing military violence Helmand Province after successive iterations of counterinsurgency from above and below between 2005 to 2013. Echoing the findings of Mike Martin's book about 'intimate war' in Helmand where Martin described ISAF forces as simply one more set of violence-prone actors in the region adding to ongoing civil wars (2010; see chapter 4), Cavendish suggests that the failure to follow through on reconstruction team development and essential services projects, the friction between British and American legacies in the region, and the combination of American and ISAF lethal operations coupled with special forces kill/capture raids all added more martial heat into places where customary ways of rule labour to keep affairs in order. With delicate and informal agreements between ISAF forces, village elders divided along tribal lines, and Quetta-directed Taliban forces in and around Sangin and Kajaki, Cavendish argues that the compromises made for peaceful solutions did not satisfy the American Marine units' calculus for victory.

This means the Marines were vindictive, mean-spirited, and aggressive even as 'volatile Helmand' appeared quiet in 2013 (Cavendish 2014: 7; see chapter 4). In a similar analysis of a different region, Bill Roggio concluded that following fierce fighting in northern Faryab Province between Afghan security forces and large Taliban units in 2013, many areas in the north, often quiet in relation to Helmand, Kandahar, and the eastern border provinces, were increasingly becoming "no go zones." While Roggio points to Taliban leaders regaining control, developments in the north are significant given the lack of Pashtun communities—traditional pipelines for Taliban—and the relative lack of violence during the occupation and war (Roggio 2014: ¶6). In other words, these are *new* developments.

A recent Amnesty International (AI) report comprised of case studies focusing on ISAF and Afghan military operations since 2011 argued that coalition forces have fundamentally failed to account for civilian casualties during the prosecution of the war (AI 2014). Whether through targeted assassinations, night raids, or the escalation of force, civilians are left in the dark with respect to compensation and justice. Further, their efforts to speak out and respond reveal a basic asymmetry when faced with a military information operations apparatus keen to keep events and encounters out of the light. The report suggests that no formal process to adjudicate, investigate, prosecute, and act on allegations of abuse or misconduct exists, with an opaque, partial, and deliberately piecemeal process leaving little in the way of accountability (12; c.f. Currier's report for *The Intercept*). The Amnesty report also implies that dampening stories about civilian casualties seems more pressing for ISAF during its drawdown and post-2014 force disposition than openly addressing the resentment that comes with being unjustly treated. While the contents of 'enduring strategic partnership' and the bilateral security and status of forces agreements between North Atlantic militaries and the Afghan remain obscure, the desire of foreign forces to remain immune from legal prosecution is well known as they operate as 'combat enablers'. In addition, Barrack Obama signed a secret order to authorize American special forces and conventional troops to participate in targeted operations (Lazare 2014: ¶6). Regardless of the role, it seems likely Afghans will find themselves exposed to and required to endure a variable economy of military violence.

The new Afghan government's difficulty in forming a cabinet—or at least one not populated by the same networks of cronies, corruption, and graft—and making basic decisions created security and economic problems that compounded one another, often at the expense of ordinary Afghans (Sarwary 2014). For instance, a recent report from The Killid Group, an independent Afghan media collective, estimated that anywhere from 30 to 80 per cent of customs-related tariffs, duty, and excise in Afghanistan's western provinces is being embezzled and siphoned away from federal coffers in a "deliberately complex" system of informal regulations designed to mask the corruption. The report estimates that upwards of 40 million AFs (\$700 000 USD) change hands under the table *daily* (Shukran & Kohistani 2014: ¶2). In a related vein, residents and tribal elders in Maroof District in southern Kandahar Province described how newly-established bureaucracies plundered monies for education initiatives and base budget funding for local schools in the name of "salaries", with district officials fabricating reports based on fictitious outcomes and non-existent capacities (Nadam 2014). Old fiefdoms are replaced by new fiefdoms in a context where even the most base and typical measures of liberal rule—the rule of law and state monopoly on violence—remain absent. The war, as a military-enabled process of biopolitical engineering, contributed to increasing levels of inflation, extortion, corruption, and drug addiction in a fragile situation characterized new threats of violence entangled with ongoing feuds along regional and tribal lines (Smith 2013: 21). Given counterinsurgency's focus on local engagement and embedding in the life environment of Afghans, one of the more disconcerting situations is revealed in Anderson's recent documentary short, *The Interpreters* (2014). The film outlines the plight of Afghans who embedded—and often fought—with American and ISAF units as translators and interpreters and who now face intimidation, violence, and targeted assassinations from Taliban cells, from local communities, and sometimes even from their own families. As former human intelligence assets, the translators are now viewed by many as collaborators and traitors, and Anderson documents the administrative apathy from the American government, which have stalled immigration proceedings for these military labourers and virtually abandoned them as disposable human resources. Though the Obama administration moved to sign a special immigrant visa bill for Afghan nationals in August 2014,

it remains to be seen whether the response is simply a face-saving gesture or a wilful change of policy. If the seeds of democracy have been planted, one must follow the analogy to its end, realizing the seeds as such are probably genetically-modified terminator seeds, good for one season in conjunction with the application of pesticides, herbicides, and other types of treatment to ensure a one-time harvestable crop.

Commentators like Borham Osman argue that Afghanistan will not be the next Iraq. For Osman, such comparisons are inaccurate in both geopolitical and local regional grounds along with different constituting social—biopolitical—antagonisms within the population. In other words, the "rampant chauvinism" of an American-installed post-occupation central government is not enough to drive segments of the population toward militant groups spiralling out of an open war in a neighbouring state (Osman 2014b: ¶11). In Iraq, fighting has made strange allies, at least for North Atlantic states: Iraq's Shia-based state military and police, Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, Iranian special forces and Iranian-backed Shia militias, and American-led coalition assets—airpower⁶ and special forces advisor, including Canadian CF-18s and CF's Special Operations Regiment—all fighting against the Islamic State and Sunni militant groups in order to reduce the threat on Baghdad. If Ward Churchill described chickens coming home to roost after September 11, 2001—America getting its due for fomenting large and small wars across the world—this latest phase of the Iraq war is blowback after an extended war against Sunni armed groups, after American civilian and military leaders backed a sectarian and repressive Shia president, and after the divide/conquer tactics of the Surge that actively segregated and enforced de facto partition between different communities. With the Syrian civil war connected to Iraq after the Islamic State dismantled parts of Sykes-Picot in July 2014—the Iraq-Syria border—with the establishment of its so-called caliphate, the flow of enmity and the cascading internecine battles between different groups on religious, sectarian, and social—biopolitical— grounds in the region continues. Displaced Syrians now eclipse Afghans in terms of largest refugee populations worldwide (aside from

⁶ According to American military figures available in two recent Reuters reports, the American-led coalition airstrikes have carried out roughly 1 700 airstrikes against Daesh targets, with over 700 occurring in Syria. The strikes have hit 3 222 targets according to the Pentagon. See David Alexander (6 January 2015), "U.S. investigating civilian casualty claims in Iraq, Syria," <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/07/us-mideast-crisis-syria-usa-idUSKBN0KF20K20150107>> and (7 January 2015) "U.S.-led air strikes have hit 3,222 Islamic State targets: Pentagon" <<http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCAKBN0KG1ZM20150107?sp=true>>.

Palestinians) (Nebehay 2015), and the focus on ISIS obscures the wider context of damage and destruction of civil war in Syria where a regime wages war indiscriminately on civilians and rebels. In a report for the Afghan Analysts Network in late 2014, Osman also argued that there is no solid evidence for claims about Islamic State presence in Afghanistan (Osman 2014a), the rumours of which followed from suggestions that Hezb-e-Islami, an anti-government militant group in Baghlan Province, was considering aligning with IS (Simpson 2014). Conversely, a report by Alice Speri in January 2015 suggested 'disgruntled ex-Taliban members' are recruiting for IS in Helmand Province, though it remains unclear if there is any connection to IS beyond pledges and a show of faith (Speri 2015: ¶3). While a suicide bombing in the eastern Afghan city of Jalalabad that killed 33 people in April 2015 was claimed to have been undertaken by groups affiliated with IS after Taliban leaders denied responsibility, it is too early to propose a durable IS influence in Afghanistan (Blomqvist 2015), though it remains to be seen what kind of transnational links will emerge.

Pronouncements and reassurances about the Islamic State not being in Afghanistan seem to be the best of the worst lesser evils, a testament to the inability of over a decade of engagement by North Atlantic militaries to bend popular support toward the government in Kabul. Suffice it to say, many Afghans want basic security and a reliable way of rule, and will no doubt work toward developing their own—or returning to existing—technologies of biopower to organize their communities after a counterinsurgency campaign that promised a lot but sustained very little. As concerns from government ineptitude slide toward more pragmatic anxieties about the 2015 summer fighting season, issues of endemic corruption and reduced international funding remain significant (Mir 2015). Firepower will not win the day in Afghanistan, and what remains is the drama of a negotiated settlement between all parties involved in the war, which is to say an agreement forged on biopolitical terms regarding the future of the country that will outline how liberal ruling technologies blend together with customary religious traditions and other culturally-specific features of Afghanistan.

Kinetic Effects in Canada: Damage and Counter/Insurgent Bodies

On the far western edges of the North Atlantic basin, the register of the war is increasingly minimal. News on Afghanistan remains available to the Canadians but the prominence once enjoyed by the war is no more, a function less of compassion fatigue than of indifference and the mediated haze of an attention economy saturated with a stream of competing signals. With the federal government's emphasis on its contributions to Iraq and Syria as part of the American-led coalition, the lack of government messaging on Afghanistan demonstrates a desire to avoid any connection to Canada's longest war. Factor in the contradictions of Canada's petro-capitalist and energy-extraction driven economy are increasingly apparent for Canadians, with coverage of failing oil process in late 2014 and a permanent austerity environment dominating public discourse, and Afghanistan moves even farther away. Even as the discourse of terror and threat have been excited and quickened again by a 'lone wolf' attack by a so-called homegrown 'terrorist' on the Canadian parliamentary buildings in Ottawa in October 2014,⁷ the context is the Islamic State and not the Taliban or Al-Qaeda. The public safety arm of the Canadian government, in developing an exceptional security agenda, uses Syria and the spectre of ISIS to increase data collection and surveillance of domestic Canadians as forwarded in Bill C-51, an 'anti-terror' bill tabled in 2014 and voted into law in May 2015. For most Canadians, the Afghan war is over and the cascading effects are of little concern. Yet, I argue the war returns in more unrestricted, collateral, and indiscriminate ways, enveloping Canada's populations in more subtle terms.

Given the deployment of Canadian special forces advisers and fighter jets to Iraq in August 2014, public discourse periodically cycled back to the Canadian Forces and the Canadian military. After the killing of reservist Nathan Cirillo at the National War Memorial in the lead up to the attack on Parliament Hill in October 2014, populist rhetoric and public sentiment were mobilized by media

⁷ The register in Canada remains something to track given recent high profile attacks in Paris. On 7 January 2015, two gunmen—Paris-born brothers with well-established links to Sunni militant groups in Iraq and aligned with Al Qaeda in Yemen—attacked the head offices of *Charlie Hebdo*, a French satirical magazine that had repeatedly lampooned the Prophet Mohammed and had already been the target of reprisals. A simultaneous attack saw another gunman take over a Paris kosher grocery store. Overall, 17 people were killed including 5 cartoonists at *Charlie Hebdo*, and all three attackers were killed by French security forces. Another coordinated attack by a pro-ISIS cell on restaurants and music venues in Paris on 13 November 2015 killed 135 people, which has amplified North Atlantic efforts to target ISIS forces in Iraq and Syria.

outlets and the federal government in a momentary demonstration of support for Canada's military service personnel and veterans. Further, in March 2015 after CF reports of special forces advisors exchanging fire with IS units in Iraq, Sgt. Andrew Joseph Doiron of the Special Operations Regiment was killed in a friendly-fire incident near Mosul after a meeting with Kurdish forces at a checkpoint went awry, which led to the same government and military missives about noble sacrifice. In both cases, the so-called Highway of Heroes was reactivated when Cirillo's and Doiron's bodies were transported home. The highway, a stretch of Highway 401 from CFB Trenton to Toronto, was named as such because dead soldiers returning from Afghanistan were transported to Toronto for official autopsies. However, 2015 is not 2007, and soldiers' bodies are not spectacularized as frequently or explicitly. Throughout the Afghan war and especially during the 2007 to 2010 period, the Conservative government under Stephen Harper opportunistically linked Canadian militarism with Canadian identity in an analogically coded relation. Successive federal governments have opportunistically stapled their policies to the symbolic power associated with the Canadian Forces as figures of service and sacrifice (Kozolanka 2015). As Greg Albo recently argued, a resuscitated triangle of state, military, and nation has emerged over the last fifteen years to create a new Canadian militarism in both neoliberal policy and cultural contexts (Albo 2014). Yet, while Albo is accurate in pointing to how much of Canada's foreign policy has collapsed into military contributions and security policy—consider Canadian foreign aid cuts have been the biggest of any country in 2013 (Porter 2014)—the Harper government took a disposable approach to the soldiers it was once keen to mobilize and venerate for symbolic purposes. It remains to be seen whether the election of a new Liberal federal government under Justin Trudeau in October 2015 will change course.

This militarism is missing human bodies, which become biopolitical by-products, waste to be disposed. For instance, after 'public communications' efforts specific to the Yellow Ribbon 'Support Our Troops' campaign that was engineered to do less for soldiers and more to generate support for the 'good war' in Afghanistan (McCready 2010), the semiotic and affective utility of soldiering bodies is now a threat because soldiers' bodies are sites that signify debris and ruin. The Conservative Harper

government repeatedly silenced Afghan veterans and closed down discussions around the epidemic of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) cases and suicides (Stewart 2014), which indicates a callous and dishonourable approach to dealing with the material and physic resources put to work in the form of military labour. Damaged military bodies are no longer useful, a reminder of a long and unresolved war that continues. Disposable bodies are clearly not confined to the Canadian Forces. In the US, the register is quite different because of sustained American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and the way in which military organs are deeply embedded in the social and biopolitical imaginary. Fifteen years of war has resulted in an epidemic of PTSD, depression and anxiety disorders, amputations and rehabilitation, drug addiction, criminal convictions, and suicides.⁸ PTSD is not a new phenomenon and its clinical existence as a legitimate disorder and pathology is now medically accepted, which was not the case even twenty years ago. Yet, vets today are trapped between a medical and military apparatus affirming the disorder while denying how widespread it is given the sheer scale of the Iraq and Afghan deployments. Further, advances in life-saving battlefield medicine mean soldiers who are grievously wounded actually live through injuries and recover, having to learn how to live with permanent ability-centered issues. Given their own militarized conceptions of soldiering subjectivity and the cultures of military organs—disciplined professional agents of political violence—many veterans feel guilt and face stigma when asking or requiring help and support. To paraphrase the comments of a Roberto Alvarez, a veterans' psychotherapist for the National Organization on Disability's Wounded Warrior Program, the stigma and the traumatic fall-out are ordinary and predictable responses to extraordinary experiences (Alvarez in Edge/PBS 2010).⁹

⁸ For instance, see (2009) "PTSD: A Growing Epidemic," *National Institutes of Health Medline Plus Magazine* <<http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/magazine/issues/winter09/articles/winter09pg10-14.html>>; Jaeah Lee (2013), "Suicide, PTSD and the Psychological Toll on America's Vets," *Mother Jones*, <<http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/01/charts-us-veterans-ptsd-war-iraq-afghanistan>>; and Caroline Alexander (2015), "Behind the Mask: Revealing the Trauma of War," and "Blast Force: The Invisible War on the Brain," *National Geographic* (February).

⁹ Even in strict medical terms, the wars have become literal laboratories for transformations in practices and research initiatives—a 'revolution in battlefield medicine'—to refine emergency services for those injured and damaged during fighting. BBC Two's *Frontline Medicine* and National Geographic's *Inside Combat Rescue* manufacture reality television out of the medical end of the warfighting spectrum, with both series offering viewers access to emergency trauma procedures in the battlespace environment. Increased exposure to IEDs meant an increase in the incidence of concussions, amputations, and injuries to extremities, which required

Veterans' traumatic experiences are normalized, something that comes with being a human resource pool prioritized as an infrastructure for military violence. As one of the soldiers in *Restrepo* comments regarding the effects of their deployment to the Korangal Valley in 2007 and the number of soldiers in his unit suffering from PTSD, "They don't know what to do with us." Dan Fung Dennis' *Hell and Back Again* (2011) documents the experiences of U.S. Marine Sgt. Nathan Harris, which I referred to in chapter four. After following Harris during his 2009 rotation to Helmand, the film's focus turns to the debilitating difficulties faced by Harris and his family as he returns and reintegrates after being severely wounded. His physical and cognitive injuries, the psychic trauma, and the narcotic addiction to 'manage' lasting and ongoing pain are together emblematic of the different forces acting on soldiers' bodies as they remain indices and fall-out zones for the war. The damage abroad creeps back with the return of repressed physical and metaphysical injuries and geographical dislocations, which are neither equivalent nor expressed the same ways but remain as wounds. Of course, if North Atlantic military agents tasked with fighting liberal wars are suffering from serious and debilitating mental illness, what of the populations and people living through the colonization of their life environments by counterinsurgency's firepower and biopower, subject to the treatment and triage undertaken by liberal states?

Under the banner of austerity, Canadian federal funding for veterans services and benefits was significantly cut since 2011, with the largest reductions coming from compensation and financial support for ex-soldiers to the amount of almost \$230 million (CBC/CP 2011). This has occurred in coincidence with government efforts to claw back military pensions and fight veterans' pension claims in court with public funds.¹⁰ Further, soldiers suffering from PTSD are being deemed unfit for duty (i.e., they cannot deploy at a moment's notice under the universality of service rule) and discharged from the

different approaches to treating wounded soldiers from changes in body armour and ballistic vests to requiring all soldiers to carry tourniquets. Given innovations in treatment for wounded soldiers like the use of ketamine as a replacement for morphine and the ability to evacuate soldiers by air to nearby field hospitals, many injuries that would have been fatalities ten years ago now result in soldiers surviving. Dedicated research initiatives like MIT's Institute for Solider Survivability developed preventative macro- and microphysical technologies to sustain soldiers, sometimes at the cellular, nano-, and molecular level.

¹⁰ According to a *Canadian Press* story, the federal government spent more than \$750 000 in 2012 fighting vets' pension claims. See <<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/feds-spent-more-than-750k-fighting-veterans-pension-claim-1.1163925>>. Trudeau's Liberal government have promised to reverse this practice and trend.

CF before their ten year service mark—rendering them ineligible for their public pension (Brewster 2013: ¶9). The government's effort to delegitimize, shame, and push out veterans is symptomatic of a wider systemic failure to consider and anticipate, in the normative military vernacular, the scope and scale of third and fourth-order effects that spiral off the design and protracted prosecution of the war. After draping itself in pro-military rhetoric and relying on the 'muscular' and 'robust' efforts of Canada's professional warfighters to galvanize a rather narrowly constituted set of 'real' narratives of Canada, nation, and citizenship, publically funded services for veterans failed to conform to the budgetary and ideological dictates of austerity attached to the neoliberalization of the Canada. Once sacred and consecrated, military bodies become threatening aberrations especially given the war's continuation and the increasing needs of veterans. A 2014 encounter between vets and then-Veterans Affairs Minister Julian Fantino was telling in this regard. After arriving late for a symbolic meeting with the group, vets said Fantino's actions were "unacceptable and shameful" (Do 2014: ¶22), further intensifying the confrontation between those who fought and the institution tasked with caring for them after the fact.

The Harper government declared and celebrated a National Day of Honour in May 2014¹¹ to commemorate the service of current military members and veterans, to bestow battle hours on CF units, and to mark the end of Canada's explicit military commitment to Afghanistan. The event was subdued—not quite spectacle but theatre no less. The effort to memorialize Canada's actions and commitments punctuated the public field though in an intentionally shallow way, tapping into faint collective memories regarding Canada's role in the war but doing little more, with the government enjoying an engineered opportunity to resituate and steer its cosmetic narratives regarding Canadian military and civil contributions to the war campaign as successful foreign policy. In other words, the event was a pedagogical opportunity to teach the population about the legacy of Canada 'engagement' in Afghanistan at a time when bonds of solidarity between the military, the government, and the Canadian public (Clausewitz's trinity) are minimal. While ostensibly a tribute for soldiers, the rhetorical gratitude

¹¹ See the DND's page, National Day of Honour <<http://www.app.forces.gc.ca/ndoh-jndc/national-day-of-honour.html>> along with the PMO's statement from Stephen Harper regarding the event's announcement <<http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2014/04/28/national-day-honour-commemorating-end-canadas-military-commitment-afghanistan>>.

inveighed during the event stood in stark contrast to the material resources and support available to Canada's human resources sent to fight a war largely beyond—then and now—the everyday purview of the Canadian public. In the lead up to the event that honoured over 40 000 veterans including 158 killed in the war, the Royal Canadian Legion was left out of the loop, leaving the veterans-centered organization scrambling with little time to prepare. Some military and veterans' families were told they would have to cover their costs to attend the ceremony only to have corporate sponsors pick up the tab (MacKinnon 2014).¹² Given the failure of the Canadian government to address issues of veterans' services and support, the event seemed to be deliberately planned with little collaboration in order to forestall criticisms of the government's ongoing dealings with vets. Notably, in late May 2014 after the commemorative spectacle, Fantino ran from a parliamentary committee meeting to avoid reporters and veterans' advocates, brushing off questions from the spouse of a vet suffering from PTSD and refusing to address further questions about the \$4 million advertising budget for Veterans' Affairs (Berthiaume 2014: ¶2-4). In a strange reversal, vets themselves become insurgents and targets for military and government influence operations on a broader continuum of operations. As critics of the CF, their symbolic power and practical experience—which, in the narrative of obligations-based citizenship, grants them right to speak openly and speak out after their military service—are threats to the legitimacy of the government narrative on the war and Canadian security.¹³

Other bodies continue to speak. Soldiering bodies are complemented by the body of Omar Khadr as a domestic register of the war. Khadr, a Canadian citizen, was highly visible as Canada's first 'homegrown terrorist.' After his capture in Afghanistan in 2002 at the age of fifteen, he was subject to extraordinary rendition, which left him buried as an 'enemy combatant' in the extra-legal American detention facility at Guantanamo Bay. Badly wounded and near death during his 'capture,' he was

¹² One vet pointed to the \$30 million budget for commemorating the bicentenary of the War of 1812, monies that could have made a significant impact for veterans' affairs and services. The War of 1812 spending represents another attempt by the Conservative government to ramp up the rhetoric around Canadian nationalism, constituting violence, and war.

¹³ Veterans are often the most staunch critics of the wars in which they fight. For instance, the renewal of the Winter Soldier movement during the latest expeditionary cycle of wars has seen new chapters emerge in Canada and the U.S. In a presentation at the 2014 Canadian Communications Association Annual meeting, Tanner Mirless described how many Canadian soldiers are coerced to sign non-disclosure clauses when accessing services in order to curtail and contain criticism of government policy.

exposed to the impunity of American military legal power. Lest the Canadian government be judged as 'soft on terror' in the post-9/11 'homeland' security regime, his symbolic and affective value was beneficial for a Canadian state intent on biopolitically exploiting the body of a boy following the passage of American-style Canadian anti-terror laws and the ongoing prosecution of the Afghan war (c.f. Williamson 2012). His extended detention in the illegal American military prison at Guantanamo was prolonged by the Canadian government's unwillingness to repatriate him to Canada after his dubious conviction in an American military commission, a literal space of exception from the rule of law that saw facts bent and stretched to criminalize and demonize Khadr after he was alleged to have killed an American special forces medic during a raid on a village in Afghanistan. The biopolitical technology of citizenship no longer covered the actions of Khadr, his status repudiated in a situation where citizenship is revealed as conditional, something revocable and qualified by government. Outside the care of Canadian custodial power, Khadr was finally transferred to a Canadian federal corrections facility in May 2012 after signing a guilty plea in late 2010, and a 2014 Alberta provincial court decision granted him the opportunity to serve the remainder of his sentence in a provincial facility (CBC 2014). The court's logic: while affirming his guilt and far from exonerating him or questioning the American military decision regarding his conviction, the judge found that the American military court should have handled Khadr as a youth given his age at the time of his capture. The federal government's neglect of Khadr and its ongoing exposure of Khadr to harm flew in the face of consular protocols and legal responsibilities, yet it served to mark and sign a dangerous threat to domestic populations by repeatedly foregrounding a military show trial. After Khadr sought bail in January 2015 pending his disposition to appeal war crimes convictions in the US, the April 2015 Alberta court decision to grant Khadr bail was challenged by the federal government, the challenge was overturned by an Alberta court of Appeal judge in May 2015, and Khadr was released from custody for the first time in thirteen years.

In the context of Agamben's *homo sacer* and bare life, the Canadian state did not want Khadr's body, even to subject it to its own punishments. It totally disqualified Khadr's Charter guarantees and exposed him to risk, allowing him to 'die' or be killed, becoming close to what Foucault described as the

negative biopower. The indifference of the Canadian state was tantamount to incidental or indirect murder, a refusal to take custodial care of a body. Someone else had Khadr's body, and in doing more damage to it, the logics of government in the context of post-9/11 security discourse justified these actions by framing Khadr as a having an infinite and irreconcilable propensity to damage Canada. The ruined boy's—and now, grown man's—body, while intended to function as a relay for dangers to Canada during its expeditionary war lest it not pursue its agenda vigilantly, actually functions as a register for damage and immunity as described by Esposito (c.f. chapter three). The governmental logic is clear: remove Khadr and contain him lest his riskiness, and the supposed risk posed by those 'like' him, ruin Canada. Khadr was targeted as a body that exceeds the acceptable bandwidth of normalcy with respect to Canada's population, and for that he was no longer, as Butler puts it, grievable. While his body is assumed to function as the symbol of contagion (a contaminant from which the domestic population must be protected), the return of his body (as a body eventually incarcerated in Canada at the acquiescence of the Canadian government) serves to expose Canada and its population to virulence, where the dosage of exposure is small and manageable. Yet, paradoxically, the harm and risk done to Khadr's body is an indication of the possible harm done to any living Canadian bodies, which are part of an inherently risky population called-forth by liberal rule, which incrementally saps populations by slowly seizing and enveloping them in the name of conducting the conduct of life. If the population can tolerate the risks levied by its own technologies of government and continue to accept the damage, it will become biopolitically immune because it mimics Khadr's suffering and continues to weather the injuries of liberal rule.

In the exercise of examining the different expenditures and speculative investments in the war—moral, military, biopolitical— a number of Canadian commentators have reflected recently on how and if Afghanistan was worth it. Given the war's assemblage of actors, interests, imaginaries, and desires, and its technologies and resources and ruins, converting the pronoun "it" into a more tangible set of objects tended to be the approach taken by most commentators. Writing in *Canadian Military Journal*, the military historian Sean Maloney plays his metadiscursive cards and considers the meaning

of "it" for different primary definers and communities of interest (Maloney 2013). In arguing Canada "has done what can be done to set up the Afghans for success" over the complex realities of a thirteen year "Afghanistan project" that defies easy measures of effectiveness, Maloney concludes with a predictable answer. Only time will tell, and any answer—or anyone answering—the question is "tentative, premature, and politically motivated" (Maloney 2013: 30-31). Christine Blatchford echoes Maloney's sentiments in her *National Post* column: there's still no easy answer (Blatchford 2014). For his part, journalist Graeme Smith's conclusion in his memoir *The Dogs Are Eating Us Now* is that the redemptive narratives of war and reconstruction were idealistic and difficult but worthy, yet they slowly began to rot from Kabul outward, producing a regrettably infectious mix of disillusion and discontent and causing many Afghans undue hardship and suffering (Smith 2013). While already over three years old, Murray Brewster's 2011 book on the Canada and Afghanistan characterizes the Canadian 'whole-of-government approach' as an extended exercise that was flawed from the outset (Brewster 2011: 271). Writing before the above mentioned Day of Commemoration, Thomas Walkom indicts the Conservative government response to the end of Canada's mission in March 2013 as "so low-key as to be almost invisible" (Walkom 2014: ¶5). For Walkom, the war was and remained "misguided enterprise" that exploited soldiers and the sentiments of Canadians, functioning more to "burnish" Canada's political credibility within NATO and the G20 as an influential state that mattered—which is, then, an admission also of anxiety and lack. Writing for *Rabble*, Greg Shupak derides the mainstream media focus on noble soldiers, 'difference making,' and the fuzzy arithmetic of success (Shupak 2014). Canada did nothing other than enforce an imperial occupation by rich countries of the North Atlantic basin on people of the Global South, resulting in instability, displacement, and a low quality of life (Shupak 2014: ¶10-11). I agree with Shupak and with his emphasis on the effects of the war on Afghans, but I contend that his pronouncements miss the deeper biopolitical question especially in relation how the "it" was made worthy. Beyond retaliatory vengeance and the pious exercise of expeditionary democracy promotion in Afghanistan (and regime change in Iraq), the war *was undoubtedly worth it* for liberal regimes because explicit and open foreign war was needed to continue the

recurring motor of crisis, risk, and recrimination both outside and within liberal states. Afghanistan was a 'market correction' war that spawned new productive problems for order-making inclined to discern edges and peripheries in both the most proximate and most distant places. Wars to liberalize foreign populations are worthy speculative exercises especially for the 'health' of domestic populations.

With the focus turning toward open multi-actor wars in Syria, Iraq, and Ukraine—not liberal wars *per se*, but each with their respective biopolitical contexts—Khadri's experience fades out and the Afghan war becomes a black site for many Canadians. Debates about problematic transformations regarding the securitization of citizenship in Canada—of which Bill C-51, the Anti-Terrorism Act, is emblematic—have been dampened by a government suggesting that 'we' should be happy about the relative peace and stability in the Canadian enclosure. The alibi: better what 'we' have in Canada than an extremist Islamic militant group bent on establishing a 21st century caliphate or a queer-hating evil Russian dictator. Yet, these equivocations expound a logic of lesser evils according to what Eyal Weizman calls the *politique due pire*—it could always be worse, be happy with what you have, don't worry about these minor things. It is precisely the incremental pace of these changes that slowly saps and damages the population subject to stability and security.

Cultural Registers of Counterinsurgency: Movies, Beards, Hipster Pioneers

Despite the quietude of government, the Afghan war inevitably boomerangs back into popular culture. Graham identifies what he calls a militarized visual culture characterized by convergences between military and civilian practices of visualization and representation specifically in relation to tracking, targeting, and surveillance (Graham 2012b: 143; c.f. 2010, Chapter 5). As in the work of James Der Derian, Rey Chow, Jordan Crandall, Ryan Phillips, and Paul Virilio, Graham discerns deeper links and multidirectional flows between the logistics of military perception and ubiquitous everyday aesthetics, whether in relation to the aerial gaze of satellites and drone platforms, the play between transparency and opacity, and or the visualization of feedback between actor, sensor, and action for network-centered military, commercial, or social-civilian operations. Night vision aesthetics and

thermal optics for targeting and tracking have been culturally internalized and co-opted for commercial ends, realized in advertisements, console-based games, and music videos. So-called 'war porn' and POV-style fighter- or soldier-generated content is available for anyone wanting visual access to different theatres of operation from the confines of their screens and devices, martial mobile privatization and a perspective redoubled by immersive gaming interfaces and first-person shooters. These connections crystallize Graham's wider arguments about how popular culture serves as a site for housing and representing the return of the war. For my purposes, a few things bear mentioning in relation to the cultural economy of the war, where a couple of examples demonstrate the register of the Afghan war and its boomerangs. The first example is the space of cinema and film production specific to the recent expeditionary cycle. The second refers to the affect, style, and ubiquity of beards.

The Afghan war remained relatively undertreated in North America, especially in terms of mainstream popular film. Even a cursory review of the content and timing of the films indicates a lack of popular appeal and an unwillingness to address both Afghanistan and Iraq. Certainly, both wars served as a basis for a number of well-known documentaries: for Afghanistan, *Restrepo* (2010), *The Battle for Marjah* (2010), *The Tillman Story* (2010), *Hell and Back Again* (2011), *This is What Winning Looks Like* (2013), *The Hornet's Nest* (2014), and *Korengal* (2014);¹⁴ for Iraq, *Occupation Dreamland* (2004), *Gunner Palace* (2004), *The War Tapes* (2006), *The Ground Truth* (2006), *No End in Sight* (2007), and *Standard Operating Procedure* (2008). Beyond the documentary genre, the Iraq war was the basis for a cycle of American films: *Redacted* (2007), *Battle For Haditha* (2007), *In the Valley of Elah* (2007), *The Hurt Locker* (2008), *Stop Loss* (2008), *Home of the Brave* (2008), *Grace is Gone* (2007), *Body of Lies* (2008), and *Green Zone* (2010). A new addition, *American Sniper* (2014), was nominated for Best Picture for the 2015 Academy Awards. The film, directed by Clint Eastwood, is a jingoistic biopic about American Navy SEAL Chris Kyle, the most 'prolific' sniper of the expeditionary era and credited with killing 160 'fighting-aged' men in Iraq. While gritty and opting for verisimilitude, the film decontextualizes the

¹⁴ While not American-made, the Danish documentary *Armadillo* (2010) follows Danish ISAF units in Helmand and centres on a controversy around the execution of wounded Taliban fighters. *Korengal* (2014) is a follow-up to the 2010 film, *Restrepo*.

war, racializes Iraqi communities, and devolves into self-aggrandizing justifications for the necessity of what was a 'difficult' war. Many of these films are action-based or dramatic vehicles with a stable of well-known Hollywood actors starring in key roles: Tommy Lee Jones, Jessica Biel, Leonardo DiCaprio, Russell Crowe, Ryan Phillippe, Channing Tatum, Joseph Gordon-Levitt, Matt Damon, John Cusack, Samuel Jackson, Jeremy Renner, Guy Pierce, and Bradley Cooper. Some focus on PTSD and problems faced by veterans coming back to the 'homeland'; others centre on the challenges facing families living with deaths of family members killed during operations or dealing with family members reintegrating after their tours of duty; still others attempt to depict the Iraq war with realism to place emphasis on the 'moral ambiguity' and difficulty of population-centered warfare. Notably, films explicitly critical of the wars saw almost no uptake. Despite his stature as an American *auteur*, Brian De Palma's *Redacted* received next to no mainstream media coverage because of its blunt and critical reconstruction of the rape of a local Iraqi teenage girl in Samarra, a crime covered up and denied by American military officials. The same went for *Battle for Haditha*, in which Nick Broomfield represents the extra-judicial killing of unarmed Iraqi civilians in 2005 by American Marines and the subsequent scapegoating of individual Marines. The film is notable for the development of Iraqi characters, which move beyond being native placeholders in the narrative arc, and the representation of local communities around Samarra. Kathryn Bigelow's *The Hurt Locker* won an academy Award for Best Picture, which she followed up with the 'war on terror' offering *Zero Dark Thirty* depicting the American torture-intelligence apparatus and the special forces operation to kill Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan.

Compared to Iraq, Afghanistan's place in popular cinema is more muted. *Charlie Wilson's War* (2007), directed by Mike Nichols and starring Tom Hanks, Julia Roberts, and Phillip Seymour Hoffman, is a comedy-drama recounting the story of an U.S. congressman working to fund and arm Afghan *mujahidin* during the 1980s in their insurgency against the Soviet occupation. The film ends on a rather didactic note, with Hoffman's CIA field officer outlining what the American intelligence apparatus created in the region in the late 1980s and anticipating the future blow-back and consequences in what is clearly a dedicated commentary on Afghanistan in 2007. *Lions for Lambs* (2007), with Robert Redford,

Tom Cruise, and Meryl Streep, is a melodramatic story about a shrewd American senator looking to exploit the war for political gain, which is juxtaposed alongside the sacrifices made by soldiers fighting and dying because of his nefarious scheming. Natalie Portman, Jake Gyllenhaal, and Tobey McGuire starred in *Brothers* (2009), based on the Danish film *Brode*, which follows the familial fall-out after an American Marine captain goes missing in Afghanistan only to be rescued and returned home. While representing the war, these latter two films emphasize, if in rather heavy-handed ways, the domestic damage done to an American society dealing with extended expeditionary wars. For the most part, the cinematic offerings tend to address events prior to the official commencement of counterinsurgency, and it is as if there is an almost structural unwillingness to deal with or address the complexities of either war post-2008. *Afghan Luke* (2011), a Canadian film, is an exception to this timeline. The film follows a journalist and his efforts to track down a Canadian sniper in Kandahar Province alleged to have mutilated the bodies of dead Afghans. While aiming toward satire, the film is flat, falling into buddy-film tropes and reductive representations of Taliban fighters and unsavoury, predatory Afghan merchants. Perhaps because of the ubiquity of soldiers' combat footage posted on platforms like YouTube, no films have really attempted to simulate kinetic operations and combat in the manner of the WW2 spectacle *Saving Private Ryan* or the recent *Fury* (2014), which stars Brad Pitt as an American tank commander in the late stages of WW2. Given that the strategic shift in attention to Afghanistan coincident with the withdraw of American ground troops from Iraq in 2011, the Afghan war remained a taboo subject and object, with few filmmakers willing or able to take up the cinematic task of representing its complexities to a North American enclosure increasingly indifferent after a decade-plus of wartime. *Hyena Road* (2015), celebrated as a "marvel of quiet authenticity," is another Canadian-produced film about a CF intelligence officer operating in the complex cultural and human terrain of Kandahar Province. *Lone Survivor* punctuated the cultural field in 2013 as a revisionist effort to recuperate the events and sacrifices of Operation Redwing, a botched 2005 kill/capture raid in the Korangal Valley in which 19 Navy SEALs were killed. The film was directed by Peter Berg, whose *The Kingdom* (2007) celebrated American FBI agents killing terrorists in Saudi Arabia and whose big-budget

Battleship (2012) was a veritable propaganda piece for American military hardware pitting the eponymous American naval vessel against an alien invasion.¹⁵

Cinema provides one visual cultural index for the war. In an entirely different register, beards stand as a curious war-related representation, with the beard becoming an *nth* order effect stretching across space and time. Devout Muslim men tend to grow and maintain beards, with Sunni men growing longer beards and Shia men keeping closely cropped beards. While reports suggest militant groups like ISIS forbid clean-shaven faces (*haram*) and issue *fatwas* to ensure long beards and trimmed mustaches in accordance with *Sharia* law, some Islamic scholars argue that beards are not obligatory but recommended, honoured in relation to ideal type of hegemonic masculinity in some Muslim contexts. The *Hadith*, the compilation of sayings attributed to the Prophet Mohammed, makes reference to beards and facial hair but the *Quran* has little to say on such matters. According to Abduljalil Sajid, a British Islamic scholar, "In my opinion, this is a bit like the issue of women wearing headscarves. It is not one of the compulsory pillars of Islam, like prayer or fasting...going without a beard became a sign of modernity" (Sajid, in BBC News 2010: ¶ 13-16). The elaborate maintenance of facial hair thus becomes a technology of gender performance—masculinity and maturity—and also a symbolic turn away from a cleanly shaven 'modernity' indexed to North Atlantic states and their interventionist wars. If events in China are any indication, this performance holds affective and biopolitical weight: Chinese authorities, facing insurrections and uprisings in the mainly-Muslim autonomous region of Xinjiang, recently banned beards for all men in the Uighur city of Karamay (AFP/The Guardian 2014). Given the wars and representations of swarthy and 'dangerous men' from the Global South, the global visual field is saturated images of Muslim men with untrimmed beards.

¹⁵ This short interrogation says nothing about war films that indirectly refer to Iraq and Afghanistan. *Battle: Los Angeles* (2011), an alien invasion vehicle based on the alleged 1942 attack on L.A. by a Japanese strike force, pits American Marines in urban operations defending the homeland against a vastly superior force. The film fixates on the rhetoric of freedom and homeland defence and sacralises the arsenal of military equipment, gear, and weapons. The 2012 remake of *Red Dawn*, originally made in 1984 during the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet occupation, pits a group of American teens in Spokane led by a Marine at home on leave against invading Chinese-backed North Korean. The 1984 film, which was the highest-grossing box office film of the year, follows a group of high school students in Colorado who wage a *guerrilla* insurgency against Cuban and Soviet troops occupying the central U.S.

Simultaneously, the rise of so-called 'hipster beards' in North America and Europe has seen the re-entry of full facial hair into the cultural field and the visual consciousness of North American and North Atlantic societies. The turn toward hirsute accoutrements can in part be attributed to trendsetters styling themselves via a pastiche of non-conformist facial hair sources of the 1960s and the rustic look of rural Ned-Kelly-like bearded frontiersman, trappers, and settlers. With the contradictory expression of seemingly out-of-control whiskers, which are actually coifed and preened as wearers aspire to a new version of dandyism, the full beards of urbane *beau* men in liberal societies do not connect directly with Muslim men; however, the coincidence is noteworthy, with beards perhaps an element of visual grammar returning from the new colonies to amplify domestic trends. While stubble and short beards have enjoyed a renaissance, the return of the fully-filled out beard is a remarkable deviation from the clean look of hegemonic masculine ideals and marking men who are not quite marginal but certainly self-styled outliers in relation to both beard and non-beard wearers. Full beards serve in some urban areas as fashionable markers indicating the pioneering edges of not-quite-gentrified neighbourhoods with the spectre of the beard-wearing hipster becoming a figure both adored and reviled in popular cultural contexts. Yet, as beards become increasingly widespread, the big beard as a subversive mark of exceptional status and symbolic power has waned. Already an overdetermined cultural invention, the bearded hipster becomes an impossible masculine object, idealized but subject no less to derision, a stylistic and social enemy in common for all to repudiate. Certainly, it is a cliché today to hate the hipster. However, as Peter Frase argues in his essay, "Resenting Hipsters" (Frase 2011),¹⁶ hating beards along with flannel, full sleeve tattoos, craft beer, partial employment, and fair trade coffee (where hipster may also be camouflage for a trust-fund 'low rent' boy) says less about hipsters and more about a petty and mean-spirited cultural attitude informed by disavowal and the failure of left politics to provide alternatives to an era of austerity, precarity, and postemployment. Contempt for the carefree hipster is auto-critique, an indictment of an inequitable society that enjoys vast wealth distributed in concentrated and consolidated ways. Perhaps the resentment and anxiety directed to dangerous bearded Muslim men

¹⁶ See further *Adbusters* columnist Douglas Haddow's (29 July 2008) "Hipster: the Dead End of Western Civilization" < <https://www.adbusters.org/magazine/79/hipster.html> > and the small collection *What Was the Hipster?* (2010) by Mark Greif and the editors of *n+1 Magazine*.

stems from the same place: in some small and repressed but constituting way, we admire the resistance of those 'small numbers' our neoliberal societies war against.

With beards, another wrinkle unfolds. While most would not identify 'hipster' with the military occupation 'critical skills operator' (i.e., the basic designation for American special forces soldiers), the two are united through the visual sign that is the beard. Big beards mark special forces, who enjoy the latitude to buck the protocols of regular military forces, who must conform to stricter disciplinary directives regarding facial hair. As is well known, many special forces operators in Afghanistan wore beards, 'going native' to conform to local customs, cultivate legitimacy and respect, blending into the human terrain and become the environments like good *camoufleurs*. The facial economy of the beard is mimetic, where operators reflect both the population and their adversaries not in mockery of local ways of life but in affirmation, one more force amplifier based on authenticity. Indeed, given their visual profile and their predilection to coerce local communities to bend toward village stability efforts, Afghans referred to bearded special forces as 'American' or 'White' Taliban:

Ask most rural Afghans what they know about the American Special Ops guys, and they will talk about beards. Unlike the usually clean-shaven and uniformed conventional forces, the American commandos grow their beards out... They are so good at blending in that the locals have taken to calling them "Spin Taliban"—Pashto for White Taliban – because of their resemblance to the actual Afghan Taliban. (Zahori 2013: ¶6-8).

In a cultural boomerang, the wilds of Afghanistan become the wilds of contemporary urban frontiers and allude to the wilds of the American West or the deep wilderness of the New World penetrated by itinerant fur trading *coeur de bois*. Cool kids with regularized irregular beards acting as domestic agents of urban colonization find a visual convergence with clandestine military agents whose irregular capacities are regularized for engineering village stability with firepower and biopower. While fashion commentators have predicted 'peak beard' and that the trend will fade (Milman 2014),¹⁷ another notable demographic seems to have taken up the cause: professional baseball players. Following the 2013 bombing attacks at the Boston Marathon, most of the Boston Red Sox, in a show of solidarity, grew beards. While sports-related superstitions around baseball and hockey playoff beards are well-known,

¹⁷ See also Scott Christian's *GQ* article, "Beards are Officially Uncool Because *The New York Times* Has Called Them a Trend" (9 January 2014), and Hannah Marriott's article in *The Guardian*, "Beard Trend Goes a Whisker Too Far" (16 April 2014).

the connection between fashion, homeland security, and foreign war seemed more of a motivator. The Boston Red Sox, purveyors of the American national pastime, dressed up like 'White Taliban,' playing baseball for a city subject to an attack by two un-bearded Chechen-Americans who were symbolically associated with dangerous bearded Islamic terrorist-insurgents.

Militarization & Displaced Contingency Operations

In an introductory essay to frame the special on cultures of militarization for *Topia: Canadian Journal of Cultural Studies*, published incidentally when ISAF special forces were commencing village stability operations in Afghanistan, Jody Berland and Blake Fitzpatrick write:

The collection is not a move to summarize militarism into a finite set of conceptual terms, but rather an attempt to offer evidence of the tangential, broad, insidious, and revealed process of militarization throughout culture. As Catherine Lutz, argues, militarization is "simultaneously a discursive process, involving a shift in general societal beliefs and values in ways necessary to legitimate the use of force, the organization of large standing armies and their leaders, and higher taxes or tributes to pay for them"...Militarization is not just something that happens in war zones; when our government invests millions of dollars in war planes, prisons, and the "digital economy" while starving resources in social justice, education, the environment and culture, we are living the consequences of global militarization. To talk about cultures of militarization is to talk about the terms in which collective identity is militarized and restive forms of agency allowed and disallowed. (Berland & Fitzpatrick 2010: 9)

Certainly, the authors are not writing about village stability, but they are interrogating the production of stability in a wider cultural and social—and thus biopolitical—context that short-circuits internal domestic and external foreign space. Berland and Fitzpatrick emphasize militarization as something that is acute but also ambient, collateral to the military conduct of war itself, occurring in diffuse places simultaneously, blending into policing and security but also life itself.

In this sense, the visual field offers a bridge for considering the connection between counterinsurgency abroad and domestic police militarization. Police militarization refers to police forces becoming more like military organizations. The militarization of police also implies police becoming something other than the police power described by Foucault, which was a technology of government historically concerned with the baseline welfare assuring the life of a population (which, as we know, incubated within early modern military organizations aiming to care for their soldiers). Today, armour-

clad riot police, camouflage-wearing emergency task forces and tactical units, and the not-so-subtle upgrading of general police apparel to mimic the uniform and equipment of soldiers is hard to miss. Recent mainstream media representations of police in action reveal police detachments in military drag desiring direct action through high-intensity interventions: paramilitary RCMP officers in Moncton following the murder of 3 RCMP officers in 2014; RCMP attempting to breaking an anti-fracking blockade in 2013 maintained by Mikm'aq community members in Elsipotog, New Brunswick on traditional lands; St. Louis County police in Ferguson, Missouri detaining and arresting citizens demonstrating and justifiably outraged after police shot and killed Mike Brown, an unarmed black man; and the more recent crackdowns on uprisings in Baltimore following the death of Freddie Gray, a young black man who died while in police custody (c.f. Gude 2015; Hildebrandt 2014; Walshe 2014; Lorinc 2014). Images of tactical squads with sniffer dogs in the fields around Elsipotog could easily be inserted into a photostream of ISAF soldiers entering a compound from a poppy field in Helmand's green zone. From the uniforms to body armour to the subsidized (and sometimes free) military hardware from weapons to armoured vehicles sold back to North American police forces to save on the logistical costs of shipping the American and ISAF equipment from Afghanistan (Johnson & Shank 2014; c.f. Jeong 2014),¹⁸ domestic environments resemble expeditionary war zones. As Graham argues, high-intensity policing merges with low-intensity warfare in increasingly neoliberal low-intensity democracies (Graham 2010: 96) where local, urban, and international police-military organs, both public and private, converge and collaborate (98). The blurring between police and military jurisdictions is visually and materially produced, with overzealous police detachments ready to turn on those people, environments, and objects that become instant enemies when unwilling to comply with their directives. And it is worth noting that while police militarization appears more visible today, the function of police as an internal

¹⁸ Hank Johnson and Michael Shank (2014) outline towns and counties in the U.S. where police forces have unnecessarily and unjustifiably purchased and acquired 22-tonne Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs), with over 27 000 designed and built for expeditionary use to counter IEDs at approximately \$1 million US per unit (c.f. Parsons 2014). With costs of shipping equipment home, American forces in Afghanistan have sought to sell off hardware to willing buyers. In connection, May Jeong's short 2014 dispatch from Kandahar ("Military Surplus") documents CF logistics units packing up or selling off essential operational equipment. Many of the Canadian MRAPs (RG-31 Nyalas) have been dismantled and sold as scrap to local Afghan companies, one of the Afghan war's many economic bubbles.

military force is *not new* given the historical use of police to 'stabilize' what are often low-income and racialized communities—black, Hispanic, brown, and indigenous—in the ongoing internal colonialism of North Atlantic states.

Aggressive high-intensity policing is more than 'simply' police brutality and excessive use of force under the guise of law-preserving violence of the state. A recent American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) report *War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing* (2014) condemns the institutional conditions and the political economic incentives driving the indistinction between domestic policing and military action. The report identifies an indisputable mission creep (ACLU 2014: 25), with counterinsurgency, contingency and stability operations, and the shape-clear-hold-build sequence unfolding on domestic 'pre-insurgents.' As police forces continue to adopt a warrior mentality, the environments and populations they police are increasingly conceptualized and imagined as threats and enemies (3, 25, and 43). The intersection is complex but not unpredictable: post-9/11 homeland security terror-laws and a "federal funding bonanza" (Greenwald 2014: ¶3) have amplified already-existing justifications for raids in relation to anti-gang and 'war on drugs' initiatives in domestic and foreign settings. Fifteen years of foreign war driving a burgeoning arms and military hardware sector have together resulted in the escalation and regularization of irregular tactics (i.e., the use of emergency police special tactics teams), an increase in forced entries, an increase on the use of military equipment and training,¹⁹ and a lack of government and judicial accountability and oversight. Writing in 2007, Peter Kraska defines police militarization as "the process whereby civilian police increasingly draw from, and pattern themselves around, the tenets of militarism and the military model," and he tracks different material, cultural, organizational, and operational practices as tangible indicators of the process (Kraska 2007: 503). Kraska, an academic expert on the collapse between police and military affairs,

¹⁹ Writing about the ACLU report, Jordan Larson the U.S. DoD's Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO), which was created in 1997 to assist civilian police with counter-drug and counter terror operations. His article cites a communication from the Defense Logistics Agency, which manages the LESO program: "The intent of the congressionally-mandated LESO program is to assist state and local departments in crime fighting and protecting their citizens...Excess DoD equipment is being put to good use by law enforcement agencies by not only protecting their citizens, but by keeping their officers safe during dangerous situations" (Larson 2014: ¶14). LESO is slated to distribute and sell 13 000 MRAPs 780 American domestic law enforcement agencies. Larson also describes the American Department of Homeland Security's grant system, which facilitates "national preparedness" by assisting government agencies and private sector actors (i.e., PMCs and security firms) (¶15).

argues that police—as a repressive apparatus with a monopoly on violence—have *always* been organized on military lines and the task now is discerning where paramilitary police action falls on the continuum of military force (508). In other words, Kraska argues that police militarization is not new so much as historically nuanced. Similarly, in his book on "warrior cops" and police militarization, Radley Balko outlines the history of direct and indirect militarization, the former being the use of standing military units for domestic operations against internal 'threats'—advocates of indigenous sovereignty, organized workers, revolutionary anti-racist organizations— and the latter occurring when police incorporate military tactics and doctrine (Balko 2013; c.f. Lorinc 2014). Thus, we see long-term trends but also intensification coincident with expeditionary warfare and the resuscitation of counterinsurgency.

As pointed out recently by Anna Feigenbaum, the American 'war on drugs' in the 1990s saw explicit agreements between the U.S. Departments of Defense and Justice in relation to technology transfer, procurement, research, and development—in other words, networking practices and concepts across the continuum of external and internal jurisdictions (Feigenbaum 2014: ¶4-5). While framed as cost-effective at a time when military procurement practices were changing to repurpose civilian-pedigree hardware for military purposes, shared solutions indicate an acceptance of shared problems and tasks. In a sense, police forces are not being militarized so much as they are becoming joint partners with state militaries. In the U.S., with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the burgeoning commercial market for security, the public (i.e., universities) and private sectors aim at developing mid-intensity products for asymmetric engagements across police and military applications, whether they are non-lethal chemical dispersants and long-range acoustic devices to control civilian crowds or targeted operations against cartels or enemies in the 'war on terror' (¶9). Traditional police jurisdiction is civil and criminal, and what is fascinating is the inversion and collapse of traditional internal and external technologies of order: foreign counterinsurgents increasingly diminish the legal legitimacy of those they fight with categorizations like enemy combatants and terrorists, and opt for a more criminal-centered conception of targeting and apprehending individuals; internal domestic categories like suspect, accused, and perpetrator, though still used, fail to contain the creep of operations

and tactics towards the military end of the internal security spectrum conceived of by police. As police forces militarize themselves to conform with images and practices of contingency and stability operations as per counterinsurgency (c.f. Harwood 2014), the increasing biopoliticization of warfare according to the collateralization of 'lesser evil' violence seems to be moving in the opposite direction with respect to intensity, speed, and dosage. The internal and external lines of force appear to be meeting somewhere in the middle, zeroing out. So, we are not simply talking about the criminalization of dissent or the criminalization of using public spaces for organizing and assembling (Madar 2013); we are talking about *a new limit-attitude of policing subsumed by counterinsurgency*.

Policing and police tactics are developed in increasing interoperable ways. While a recent CBC story reported a Canadian psychologist bringing a "Canadian perspective" to training American officers in Los Angeles about use, necessity, and escalation of force (Brunhuber 2015)—implying Canada and Canadian-trained police are more restrained and proportionate, not as prone to high-intensity violence—American and Canadian police forces already regularly train together. Both CF and RCMP members embedded as mentors and trainers with the Afghan national army and police. Consolidated joint operations and planning between the CF, the RCMP, provincial police forces, and local police forces is evident in the 'public safety' apparatus created for the 2010 Vancouver Olympics to control dissent and preemptively target local settler and indigenous activists protesting the games. The same year also saw the notorious police violence at the G20 meetings in Toronto, where large formations of unidentifiable security forces illegally and mainly with impunity intimidated, attacked, and indefinitely detained thousands of people, where police actions underwritten by the usage of arcane municipal bylaws to suspend Charter rights and access to public spaces deemed critical infrastructure (Halais 2014; Renzi & Elmer 2012; Crosby 2010b; see below). In effect, Toronto was besieged not by radicals and rogues who undermined 'Toronto the Good' but by repressive security forces intent on fomenting confrontation and dispensing law-preserving mythic violence to discipline dissent at the direction of government (Smith & Cowen 2010). Both events enabled the creation of octopus-like Integrated Threat Assessment Centres and relied on a Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) comprised of police, military, and

government intelligence and response capabilities along with private security companies (c.f. Crosby 2010a).²⁰ Given the CF doctrinal idiom of Joint Interagency Multinational Public (JIMP) capability created in 2009, the premise of 'plug-and-play' capacity refers to domestic environments and forces as much as other coalition allies in an expeditionary setting. Generally, the willingness to use 'less-than-lethal' munitions—wooden and rubber-coated bullets, tear gas, tasers and electroshock weapons, long range acoustic devices (LARDs), bean bag guns, and water cannons—along with spatial "kettling" and "corralling" techniques have together increased, their non-lethal status coded and framed by authorities as justifiable lesser evils to suppress dissent and control contested public environments (Piven 2014; Arike 2010). According to Lesley Wood, Canadian police agencies have been early adopters of 'less-than-lethal' munitions whether at the APEC summit in 1997, the Summit of the Americas in 2001, the G20 Summit in 2010, or the Quebec student mobilizations in 2012 (Wood 2014a: ¶2). Canadian police forces have been 'innovators' with respect to protest policing and non-lethal crowd dispersion, which is to say that while police militarization may not be as highly visible in Canada—or to Canadians—it was an ongoing trend well before 2010 (Wood 2014b). Recent footage of Montréal riot police reacting to student protests and anti-austerity protests in early spring 2015 offers evidence of non-linear policing tactics, with police using infantry-like squad-sized units to interdict and skirmish with demonstrators and so penetrate the line of confrontation, dissolving the 'forward edge of battle' with police emerging within the crowd to create small mobile enclaves of police territory used to then selectively envelope people close to these dispersed nodes.

While the militarization of policing in Canada and US is the subject of wider public coverage, appearing and unfolding in the relative open, the refitting of counterinsurgency tactics and methods for domestic police operations, border controls, and internal or near-proximate use in and around North America remain under cover. A growing number of police and security officials are looking to retrofit counterinsurgency for domestic application. 'Applied' and 'adapted' counterinsurgency has been developed for: "counter-gang strategy" (Bertetto 2013); fighting global drug cartels and narco-

²⁰ See also the 2012 RCMP report *Games Security and Public Safety for the Vancouver 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Games*, <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/aud-ver/reports-rapports/pp-gs-ps-eval-eng.htm#Perf_Ach>.

syndicates (Maier 2013); enabling American National Guard forces for asymmetrical irregular war and "domestic utilization" (Maier 2015); and targeting 'homegrown radicals,' disenfranchised young people, domestic instability, and any "stress on living space" requiring internal peace support operations (Mackinlay 2012).

Deploying the language of terrorism and insurgency, John Maier, a judge advocate in the American National Guard, invokes the spectre of hemispheric insecurity in the face of Mexican drug cartels (Maier 2013: 1) and what he characterizes as large ungovernable spaces across Mexico and the interstitial borderlands of the southern United States (2).²¹ His argument: "[D]ecisive action is needed. The uncoordinated, poorly resourced, limited law-enforcement approach taken to date is useless" (8). Maier routes his analysis through the American counterinsurgency manual, drawing on Trinquier's *Modern War* to the extent that he refers to it as "the Trinquier Method" based on bottom-up approaches that exploit the timely acquisition of intelligence with a mix of direct and indirect action (4). In effect, he advocates for local defense forces and village stability operations across vast tracts of Mexico, which is already populated with cartels, security forces, corrupt public officials, paramilitary groups, and self-organized *autodefensas* defending their own towns and communities (c.f. Hale 2014). Imagining the Mexican drug wars as problems of operational design and effects, Maier makes no reference to the American border security apparatus as a littoral zone full of private military contractors, increased surveillance, and a separation wall that has proven a huge benefit for capitalist interests bound up in the military-security industries hungry for what Harsha Walia has recently described as the new formal and informal apartheid of border imperialism (Walia 2013).²² From a neoliberal policy perspective, counterinsurgency applied to Mexico has positive economic externalities for building "boundary enforcement" to manage the 'right' amount of insecurity, which becomes a *de facto* border war complex indexed to the flow of drugs, immigration, and informal labour all understood through the idiom of infiltration and terror (Miller 2014: 36).

²¹ Recall Andrew Bacevich's ironic call in 2009 for counterinsurgency in Mexico as opposed to Afghanistan.

²² On new apartheid, inclusion and exclusion, and liberal rule, see Žižek (2008a), pp. 422-424.

Maier is also quiet on what activist and scholar Juanita Diaz-Cotto terms the prison-industrial military complex exported and reinserted in Mexico through the global war on drugs, which becomes a collateral campaign of biopolitical violence against migrants and especially women whose lives are already vulnerable and at risk (Diaz-Cotto & Hing 2013: ¶5). He is also quiet on the flow of migrants through the border zone and says nothing regarding the intersection of 1980s 'war on drug' rhetoric and the cycle of coups, counter-rebellions, and dirty wars exacerbated by not so clandestine American (and more quiet but by no means passive Canadian) intervention in Central and South America (Brulin 2014; Grandin 2007), whether in Mexico or the 'low-intensity democracy' of contemporary Colombia (and increasingly, Honduras), which fights drugs and terrorism with American military hardware and resources alongside the neoliberalization of trade as one part of "drug war capitalism" (Paley 2014; c.f. Aviles 2005). In suggesting that what is unfolding is the newest chapter of asymmetric warfare that demands the immediate start of new counterinsurgency campaign in Mexico (8), Maier writes that successful campaigns should serve as operational examples and cites Algeria, British Malaya, and Vietnam, adding "that is not to say we re-create [them]" but that "expectations must be real" and based on a Mexican-determined end-state of 'normal' (8). The curious omission of Iraq or Afghanistan as choice examples to duplicate begs the question as to Maier's own assessment of almost ten years of population-centered counterinsurgency and his selective (or immediately repressed) memory given the conditions of both states and the outcomes of both ongoing wars. Maier's advocacy for a more aggressive response to clear and hold space in Mexico occurs in a context of already-excessive and bloody mass killings, 'disappearings,' and extra-legal assassinations committed by cartels and security forces.²³ A recent Amnesty International report cited a *600 per cent* increase in torture and ill-treatment

²³ The September 2014 detention, disappearance, and killing of 43 students from the Ayotzinapa Normal School in Guerrero indicate the necropolitical context in Mexico. The students, *normalistas* from a socialist-centered school training peasant farmers to become teachers, were ambushed by local police and law enforcement officials along with a group of armed men during their return from a local demonstration in Iguala against neoliberal municipal policies regarding school reforms. The ambush was ordered directed by the mayor of Iguala, who claimed afterward that the teachers often 'provoke the authorities.' Several students were killed and 43 others captured and loaded into police vehicles. They were subsequently given to group of hired killers aligned with a local cartel, who then killed the students and incinerated their bodies at a rural land fill. The events have been at the center of national demonstrations against the state and federal governments' complicity, violence, and impunity. See *Vice News* (9 December 2014), "Ayotzinapa: A Timeline of the Mass Disappearance That Has Shaken Mexico,"

over the last decade by Mexican security forces—many mentored and trained by American PMCs and military advisors—during interrogations and information operations, which target suspected cartel members, people defending their local land base, or migrant workers caught in the political economic drift (AI 2014a: 8). This statistic is startling, and it indicates both the enmity and impunity of actors in the conflict, signalling the currency of grievous violence in a large conflict comprised of smaller civil and private wars. The report also notes an increase in arbitrary detentions and fabrication of evidence, concluding that damage done by the government response to drug war is traumatizing and damaging not just victims but Mexico generally (AI 2014a: 6). In connection with fundamental violations of human rights normalized in the free trade zones of Northern Mexico animated by systemic economic, sexist, and physical violence faced largely by precarious labourers in the *maquiladora* sector and beyond (Gordon 2010: 249-3), we see the supply of drugs, labour, and militarism bound together in a biopolitical mix operant on a global scale. Counterinsurgency becomes one more element of this constellation.

Military intellectual John Mackinlay suggests that a 'new security era' will require an adaptive British military able to operate domestically, a position he characterizes as politically unpopular but necessary if difficult to implement. Mackinlay, a former officer in the British Army, argues for the active blending and integration of military and police powers in domestic environments. Citing rapid urbanization, climate change, migration flows, and the outcomes of (neoliberal) globalization, "invasions of another kind" are not unimaginable (Mackinlay 2012: 52), which state governments and larger regional supra-state organs will have to address, whether they be in Fortress Europe or Fortress North America. Further, Mackinlay warns that public officials obsessed with the sensationalism and political affect specific to the discourse of terrorism fail to 'correctly' characterize insurgency as the proper internal and domestic referent. Agencies and institutions 'hope' for terrorism—high visibility events to justify new security policy—when they should be planning for the siege of protracted insurgency and insurrection pollinated by internal domestic issues and "upheavals" overseas (MacKinlay 2012: 55, 57).

< <https://news.vice.com/article/ayotzinapa-a-timeline-of-the-mass-disappearance-that-has-shaken-mexico>>.

Mackinlay writes of contemporary networked hordes, which he terms the "smart mob" able to operate "as an organism...like a huge flock of starlings in flight":

In respect of the security of our populations, what is far more interesting is that there are now more effective techniques for outraged communities, *whatever their cause*, to assemble and cause irrepressible violence and disorder. This is not about the targets and the causes but rather the "smart mob" techniques that are now being used. (58)

Grievances and good reasons for outrage, while acknowledged insofar as they function as casual mechanisms, seem secondary in relation to suppression where anger 'boiling over' becomes illiberal and illicit 'whatever their cause.' This threat to order and security implies both the multitude as invoked more positively by Hardt and Negri in 2005 and the way of ruling through the perpetual "emergency of emergence" described by Dillon and Reid in their work on the liberal way of war. Mackinlay takes the 2001 "netwar" arguments of Arquilla and Rondfeldt (2001) and the 'new war' thesis of Kaldor's (2007) to their logical conclusions and renders them through the North Atlantic expeditionary experience: swarming 'uncivil' or civil society actors—terrorists, criminals, 'ethnonationalists,' and militants—will continue to be the preeminent threats to stability and security (Arquilla & Rondfeldt 2001: ix) leading to ongoing and indecisive encounters and engagements, which nonetheless must be waged to defend society.

As MacKinlay's essay appears in *Prism*, the American joint military journal for complex operations, he is preaching to readers who, regardless of the expeditionary pitfalls of counterinsurgency and its successes and failures, want to see ongoing force transformation put to good use. In America as in Canada, and given the doctrinal innovations and lessons learned over the expeditionary cycle—comprehensive operations, continuum of operations, the CF's adaptive dispersed operations, JIMP-enabled capabilities—it is little surprise that counterinsurgency inseminates domestic policing. In Afghanistan especially, expeditionary counterinsurgents complained of undermanned forces able only to "mow the grass" before the surges and the transition to the shape-clear-hold-build approach. In a similar if inverted metaphorical register, the police idiom of "weed and seed" has since been redeployed as a key method in the repertoire of community policing and crime prevention measures (Government of Ontario MCYS 2010; U.S. DOJ 2004). Police operations 'weed' crime and criminals and 'seed' stability

and order. Spurred by anti-gang strategies to fight the 'war on drugs' popularized during the 1990s in American jurisdictions to target high crime areas, its shared elements with village stability operations and population-centered counterinsurgency are hard to miss. Both equip authorities with the measures and capacities to counter any insurgent emergence, where the continuum of operations specific to the war on drugs stretches from Afghanistan's insurgencies to global narco-syndicates to neighbourhood dealers. Just as counterinsurgency promised success by infiltrating local communities to embed operations within ways of life, the community policing approach of weeding and seeding 'weeds out' criminal elements by separating them to protect the population and then aims to 'seed' different social and human services through collaboration with community based organizations (Government of Ontario MCYS 2010, "Community Policing in Practice," ¶6). Generally, the philosophy and practice of community policing is positioned as a less aggressive form of police interdiction and enforcement—'reactive policing'—a lesser evil environmentality of 'differentiated social control' through measures like public education, neighbourhood watch programs, consultations and neighbourhood meetings, and the establishment of local street-level ministrations.²⁴ Lower-intensity here translates to persistent presence and local engagement; like counterinsurgents, police attempt to build legitimacy with local communities, where returning to on-the-ground beat patrols mimic village stability operations' pattern-of-life (POL) patrols to make friends, assesses the atmospherics, generate intelligence, and surveil and deter.

Inasmuch the 'boomerang' character of today's foreign wars alert us to the displacement of counterinsurgency, targeted policing operations occur always-already within the biopolitical context of loud and quiet civil wars *required* by government. The 'return' of counterinsurgency from the new

²⁴ In his book *The Year of Dreaming Dangerously*, Žižek's analysis of the 5-season series *The Wire* (HBO 2002-2008) is worth mentioning in this respect. Created and produced by David Simon, the series follows the internecine social and civil wars in Baltimore waged between police bureaucrats, municipal corruption, well-intentioned detectives, local gang syndicates, and community members in ghettoized and impoverished neighbourhoods all revolving around the drug trade and the biopolitical production of urban territory. While Žižek is interested in reading the series ultimately as an interrogation of the naturalization of objective and symbolic violence where "the culprit is the social totality" (Žižek 2012: 101), he describes in detail the population-centered weed/seed strategies taken by police whether in *de facto* legalizing the narcotics trade in certain areas to contain it or programming initiatives in local high schools to work with street involved and at-risk youth by way of working in and through the human terrain to 'understand' the biopolitical production of gang life as a community-focused counter-conduct.

postcolony adds to the history of targeted operations against those whose lives are deemed restive and an inimical to liberal rule. This in turn means realizing the how the spirit of counterinsurgency has always-already distributed violence based on racial segregation and the enforcement of systemic disparities in wealth and resources. Militarized police responses are the norm for minorities who become target populations in North America: black and 'ethnic' communities, refugees and migrants, urban indigenous communities, 'homegrown' Muslim men, new immigrants, and already-precarious temporary foreign workers. Summed up by the American journalist Glen Greenwald:

As is true for most issues of excessive and abusive policing, police militarization is overwhelmingly and disproportionately directed at minorities and poor communities, ensuring that the problem largely festers in the dark. (Greenwald 2014: ¶4).

Consider this in the context of the 2014 and 2015 American uprisings in Ferguson and Baltimore, where urban black communities and their allies justifiably responded angrily to the killing of young black men by police, events which followed from systemic racism and the legacy of slavery alongside decades of poverty, neglect, and dispossession by neoliberal market authority (c.f. Gude 2015 & Walcott 2014). In his essay regarding the April 2015 police killing of Walter Scott, another unarmed black man in a southern U.S. city, columnist Greg Howard describes the normalization of police violence directed against minorities as a structural feature of government. While no Foucauldian, Howard describes the scenario in biopolitical terms, drawing a line from the genocidal violence of slavery to the treatment of 'insurgent' minorities today:

The killings of minorities by police are instructive in this regard, not because all policemen are violent racists or murderers (the vast majority are neither) or because they are personally responsible for killing large numbers of black and brown people (they aren't), but because they are agents of the state, and so their actions, and the consequences they face, serve as a sort of index of the public will. (Howard 2015: ¶8).²⁵

Howard's point: if the police represent the desire for public order 'enjoyed' by the wider population, then the general will of the public is complicit in what are durable systemic practices—and if not culpable then at least responsible to their ongoing occurrence. Police in America (and Canada) "see" colour and

²⁵ "We know things about this sort of killing. Last year, ProPublica published a study concluding that black teenage boys are 21 times more likely to be killed by police than their white peers. (The findings have since been debated, but all agree that the disparity is enormous.) Mapping Police Violence reports that in March, 36 black people—one every 21 hours—were killed by cops. In big towns and small towns and cities across the nation, minorities are being killed by the very men and women sworn to protect and to serve them" (Howard 2015; ¶9).

race and sustain coded ways of looking that distribute crime and state violence asymmetrically by targeting non-white coloured bodies, keeping the peace by enforcing racial terror (Greif 2015: 12, 19). In Baltimore as in Ferguson, grievances were acknowledged and reforms were proposed but the local government, police authorities, and media outlets continued to justify hard measures during the uprisings as responses to the 'violent extremism' of some demonstrators. As I discuss below in relation to Toronto, the controversial practice of 'carding'—effectively urban information operations where patrols stop and frisk people on the street to question or interrogate them and so map the 'human terrain'—is internal to this community-based approach. In theory, the idea is to *ratchet down* the police role as a repressive apparatus and return the control of policing to the community by making local citizens active participants in securing and revitalizing their neighbourhoods (c.f. Freeman 2015: ¶ 14). I am neither affirming this transformation nor suggesting that this is how community policing plays out; rather, I am simply acknowledging how its biopolitical operations are collectively framed as a lesser evil to legitimize its custodial logic and the insertion of police to conduct local stability operations.

Retroactively considering the foundations of community policing after the latest expeditionary cycle indicates common tendencies of a police-war assemblage (c.f., Bachmann, Bell, and Holmqvist 2014), whether they are carding practices and racial profiling, social network analysis, or biometrics and more aggressive types of data analytics. John Bertetto, a member of the Chicago Police Department, describes a counter-gang strategy in operational and tactical terms based on population-centered counterinsurgency complete with economic redevelopment capacities, partnerships with trusted community leaders (TCL, or Key Leaders as per village stability operations), and increased use of social network analysis (Bertetto 2013: 4). While Bertetto continually restates the divide between military and law enforcement strategy, his emphasis on proactive and preemptive intelligence-driven operations and on 'whole-of-government' approaches duplicates the doctrinal tropes of counterinsurgency. His description of Counter Criminal Continuum Policing in Massachusetts, a program implemented by former Green Berets who became state troopers, represents the spirit of counterinsurgency. A specialized detachment cordoned—shaping and clearing—an eight-block area and expanded the

operational footprint to thirty blocks—holding—which resulted in decreases in violent crime, property crime, and weapons offenses along with an increase in calls for police service (9). Bertetto reads this latter relay as the key indication of success, where increased calls indicate community trust and "stronger perceptions" of police legitimacy (9). However, the lower-intensity focus greeted with greater local uptake suggest also that local communities, having faced perpetual criminalization and often intersecting racism due to repeated efforts by police to penetrate their environments, are compelled to collaborate with high-visibility police mediating everyday environments.

In Bertetto's model, as in the pastoral and ontotheological imaginary of biopolitical counterinsurgency, the population's conduct is always available to be converted to live in more licit and liberal ways. While advocates of community policing may correctly cite the desire of 'ordinary' residents and citizens for safety and security, and while they argue in favour of measures designed to decrease aggressive policing in favour of working with as opposed to against communities (Beare, in Hildebrandt 2014: ¶34), the stability offered as securitization and soft control may simply be the shaping of the domestic battlespace environment for the slow creep of 'revitalization' and 'renewal' that brings speculation and gentrification while displacing poverty and wealth gaps, the very structural and systemic problems that exacerbate gang activities and informal economic flows. Here, we see connections between policing, political economy, and environmental changes to urban areas. In a short opinion piece, journalist Sarah Kendezior writes of the 'peril of hipster economics' (Kendezior 2014), where the bearded pioneers—in conjunction with the wave, as in Toronto and other large cities, that is the condominium/real estate apparatus—follow closely and exploit the 'auto-segregation'²⁶ and separating-dividing practices enabled by the police and the neoliberal economic pacification of troublesome and decaying neighbourhoods With weed/seed and the pollination of community policing by counterinsurgency, what results is not simply police militarization but the return of effects-based operations biopolitically conjoining market and state forces for the correct therapeutic mix of treatment.

²⁶ This term comes from a comment made in response to a story published by *Al Jazeera America* during the ongoing protests and demonstrations in Ferguson, Missouri following the police shooting of Michael Brown, an unarmed black man. The story See "Ferguson: Gentrification and its Discontents," (15 August 2014) <<http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/8/16/ferguson-and-thepoliticsofzipcodeapartheid.html>>.

Before turning more specifically to Canada, one last consideration of the current American military context is important to mention even if it somewhat unrelated to the biopolitical discussion of military-police assemblages. The boomerang effects of the wars have actually benefited *and* troubled the capitalist interests of defence lobbyists and the military-industrial-congressional apparatus in a context where 'political engineering' has allowed defence corporations like Raytheon and Lockheed-Martin to dictate not simply military procurement policy but also strategy and doctrine in a permanent war economy. Through the expeditionary environments of Iraq and Afghanistan, the defence sector realized huge opportunities with the roll-out of new military hardware and infrastructure. Lumbering Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles, which can survive catastrophic and deadly improvised explosive devices (IEDs), are one example of a capital-intensive and profit-centered opportunity for manufacturers to create massive machines at the expense of public funds and for the benefit of shareholders yet all in the name of protecting the troops (and now the police as municipal and city forces in the U.S. purchase and pay to ship the vehicles for domestic operations). PMCs and the use of contractors arrayed under the umbrella several large multinationals represent another sector for growth. Certainly, austerity budgets have dampened the direct public funding of state militaries, yet the implicit role of the military and defence sector—whether in the U.S., within NATO, or internationally with respect to arms, munitions, and ICTs—demands the allocation of public funds to keep the economic end of the war system turning.

Paradoxically, as a research and development opportunity, the wars have revealed lessons that many of the high-tech-centred firms *do not* learn. Yet, they continue to benefit despite the actual operational knowledge garnered from operations in-theatre. For instance, over two essays, Andrew Cockburn traces the policy preference for new military technologies that actually flies in the face of lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan but seem to be inevitable outcomes given the lobbying and political economic power of the defence sector. Cockburn's essay on human terrain and American bomb disposal units (EOD: explosive ordnance disposal) recounts the battle between local IED bomb makers in Sangin (Helmand Province, Afghanistan) and the small American Marine unit tasked with detecting

and disposing devices while compiling evidence to target, disrupt, and eventually eliminate and kill the cell (Cockburn 2011). He traces the rise of counter-IED doctrine and the eventual outlay of billions of dollars of lucrative funding for what are largely techno-centered solutions like automated drones and robot disposal units. The essay likens the work of EOD teams to forensic investigators who read the human terrain and ballistic evidence to track local bomb making cells. Cockburn's essay confirms the success of local initiatives but concludes that the complex of anti-IED technology manufacturers, who stood to gain \$10.1 billion US in 2012, is difficult to displace despite operational conclusions. Pentagon policy on IEDs has effectively been derailed and reset by the corporate and commercial agenda. One defense commentator quoted at the end of the essay sums it up:

[The environmentally-attuned EODs] are the antithesis of the techno-war that keeps the money flowing. The American military has sold the idea that complex technologies coupled to step-by-step analytical procedures can negate all the uncertainties and surprises of combat to solve any problem in war. A guy who can clear a town with guts and smarts is *much too cheap*. (Cockburn 2011: 77, emphasis added)

Low-tech and knowledge-intensive approaches may actually do a better job but will not generate continued capital growth.

Cockburn also outlines the decline of the A-10 Thunderbolt, a low- and slow-flying ground attack aircraft (Cockburn 2014). Despite its indispensable use to provide close tactical air support for ground units in Iraq and Afghanistan, the plane is quickly being phased out to make way for next-generation aircraft like the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Lightning (both produced by Lockheed-Martin), high-tech and high-cost units marrying policy, procurement, and profits. Cockburn describes how, because of the low-flying maneuverability of the airplane, A-10 crews are able to see and assess features on the ground directly by sight—*qalats*, canals, farmers, vehicles, children, harvested grapes, and cows—and can avoid killing locals caught in and around firefights, ensuring the accuracy of the fire they deliver through visual and electronic communications with forward air controllers. The low-tech A-10 ostensibly provides more accurate and precise fire than the laser-guided 'precision munitions' dispatched from high-altitude, where bombs are dropped by way of pixelated viewfinders, mediated cockpit heads-up displays, and a triangulated targeting process comprised of satellite feeds, drone imagery, and GPS

data. While all this data implies certainty, the synthesis and fabrication of judgment based on these inputs confirms the *desire* to attack a target and rather the necessity or plausibility of such an attack. As with drones and targeted killing, the data-driven focus and the weapons systems themselves, while framed as solutions, indicate an adaptation that is engineered recursively—creating solutions for problems that must be manufactured. Further, the very means—high altitude, highly-mediated, cockpit-bound—confirms an administrative process that directs and employs 'assets,' where technological liberty—as with drones and targeted killings—equals lethal licence (Cockburn 2014: 46). Cockburn describes how, during an engagement resulting in the killing of civilians by bombs dropped from an American B-1 bomber in Paktia Province in 2012, A-10 pilots vehemently argued while on station in the battlespace that the target was non-hostile and the bomber crew was mistaken. The A-10 pilots refused to attack (46). This detail, along with the A-10s' participation in the events that day, were redacted from the final report on the incident (50). Here, the spectrum of winners and losers stretches from local families in a small village to pilots operating a complex command and control system to interested weapons developers with shareholders to service.

Domestic Canada, Resiliency, and Stabilizing Built Environments

What are the atmospherics and environmentalities of counterinsurgency in Canada after the most recent expeditionary era, the legacy of which is disappearing even as population-centered warfare clearly informs how the Canadian state is thinking about risk, threat, and security? Are there specific boomerang effects in Canada? Todd Gordon's *Imperialist Canada* (2010; c.f. Gordon 2013) traces this question, if in ways that emphasize neoliberal globalization and capitalist accumulation. After mapping the ways in which Canadian-based global corporations in the extractive sector target foreign environments through lobbying and leveraging governments to paramilitarizing local environments to choosing winners and losers for 'capacity building,' Gordon ends his book with an account of "empire coming home" and reveals how the same sector colonizes Canada in the interests of private property and at the expense of common public wealth, revealing a continuum of dispossession and the expropriation

of land and resources in from the Global South to the edges of the Global North. The Canadian state facilitates this process as a crucial mediator sustaining the linkage between inside and outside. While the political economy of global capital has disrupted state sovereignty simultaneous with the rise of new informal but powerful actors like regional trading blocks, massive multinational corporations, and extra-state regimes like the World bank and the IMF (Sassen 2006: 2, 415; c.f. 2012), the State still matters in relation to creating and sustaining this condition by acting as a launching pad to legislate and provide the correct state to prioritize private property and wealth accumulation as the basis for domestic government.

In considering how a population has to sustain its own occupation and signal its security to counterinsurgents as it is enveloped during stability operations, the Canadian population as a whole has been compelled to remain resilient in the face of social and financial crises and so communicate its own stability. The discourse of resiliency provides a way to connect inside and outside. Certainly, one unique thing about Canada has been its often-remarked resilient ability to 'ride out' the 2008 financial crisis on the back of austerity measures and the contradictions of intensive energy extraction and petro-capitalism, which in turn shape Canadian neoliberalism and the separating and dividing practices specific to Canadian biopolitics. As discussed in chapters three and four, the imbrication of economic relations into the whole social field marks the arrival of neoliberalism and the transition to a generalizable condition of biopolitics. The biopolitical subject becomes an entrepreneurial neoliberal subject where life itself is understood as a commercial enterprise to labour and mobilize capital, whether communicative, financial, symbolic, or cultural, and where all are equally unequal. This "neo-subject" governs itself from within, where enterprise becomes defining ethos of self-valorization (Dardot & Laval 2014: 5) Neoliberalism understood as biopolitics actively exposes populations to inequality, credit, and debt, which stand as ways organizing and ordering life. Counterinsurgency, as population-centered war that is biopolitical, re-occupies Canada both through explicit social measures and more subtle political economic measures. In this sense, the biopolitics of neoliberalism is counterinsurgency by other means. If Marx's notion of class war predicated on the proletarian struggles structured by relations of

production 'invented' the constituting antagonism of civil war as a permanent feature of the social field within capitalism (Balibar 2010), we should contextualize domestic developments in their proper global terms—that is, in terms of global civil war (Tiqun 2010: 32-33), which "continues even when it is said to be absent or provisionally brought under control" (60) as "an *armed* peace crafted to cover the uncoiling of an imperceptible civil war" (199). Financially, debt as damage becomes a weapon to rule (Lazzarato 2012), whether through the enforcement of financial terms by a military usurer mobilizing money as a weapons system and underwriting security in remote villages or across wide swaths of bank-managed private wealth funds comprised of individual people's debt-bound savings, to which risk is transferred to ensure leverage for speculation and the naturalization of sizeable corporate profits. Of course, there is no equivalence between the coercive mediation of foreign environments by state military actors and the collective sundering of individual wealth by a publicly-traded but firmly private sector endorsed by domestic government. Yet, just as the concepts of foreign and domestic refer less to territorial integrities and more to differentiated locations that coalesce on a larger spectrum, the violence of liberal war as a 'lesser evil' intervention abroad to make life live is always-already connected to financial and neoliberal processes that arguably constitute more quiet and less perceptible technologies of violence labouring to rule through personal dispossession and ongoing uncertainty and insecurity (Marazzi 2011 & 2002[2008]). This violence is indexed to the discourse of resiliency, which has a very specific register with Canadian biopolitics.

Given the austerity era of emergency economic measures, the affirmation of resilient capacities has become biopolitical code for dealing with a *status quo* that will never get better. The financial crises of 2008 revealed not only that global financial flows circulate more freely than human material flows but that the financialization of the economy, as fundamentally insecure and crisis-creating, is precisely the processes to be secured, the critical infrastructure to be protected, the system 'too big to fail.' In the context of neoliberalism and biopolitical government, resilience is code for living according to this logic of damage control. It implies an evolutionary 'just barely living', having a modicum of fitness to sustain oneself in the *milieu* one is forced to live in and territorialize through living. While 'bouncebackability' is

something we all wish to have—that is, there are resiliencies to affirm—the normalization of this capacity as a biopolitical feature of government implies the fundamental ways in which the liberal way of rule exposes its subjects' lives to ever more risk, imploring them to do more with less. As Evans and Reid put it, "Resilience is currently propounded by liberal agencies and institutions as a fundamental property which peoples and individuals worldwide must possess in order to demonstrate their capacities to live with danger" (Evans & Reid 2014: 2). While the idea of resilience is worth appropriating from the semiotic field of liberal rule and biopolitical government (something Evans and Reid aim to do in favour of a more egalitarian and emancipatory reading), their critique identifies the incitement of subjects to the affective, material, and *institutionalized* imperatives to live with the danger of risk and threat of uncertainty. Resilience means dealing with the slow and subtle sapping of life support. Given the government's reliance on the discourse to terror—financial, social, or otherwise—to set the biopolitical agenda, terror becomes the logical conclusion and condition of life ruled according to security in an era of unpredictable flows, which is subsequently used to justify the logic of individualized and enterprising self-making within the acceptable bandwidth of behaviour.

Taking this further, the spirit of counterinsurgency enables an overlap of the financial pyramid scheme and the ecological pyramid. Accepting the ecological basis of resiliency as a systemic feature specific to sustaining a steady state across a complex set of macro- and micro resource-flows through an environment, the conception of population as a biological entity (a holistic aggregate of species-life) further justifies all number of inequities, disparities, and subtle structures of quiet but coercive force because these features 'tell the truth' about the population. In other words, those whose lives form the base of the ecological pyramid are crucial to the health of the whole system, and their niche roles and relative fitness are not deficient as such but rather naturalized as the logical outcome of a flourishing cycling of matter. In their assessment of military methods, Dillon and Reid write, "Biostrategic dominance...logically becomes the objective because it is seen as a 'natural' response to the 'natural' imperatives of the emergency of emergence of life thus understood in its very essence as biostrategically embattled" (Dillon & Reid 2009: 123). To inflect this somewhat differently in the context of critical

domestic infrastructures in the Canadian economy, this is both war *and* neoliberalism in the age of the life sciences, where mass financialization of a global Ponzi scheme vanishes into the ecological resilience of a population.

In Canada, the successive string of omnibus budget bills legislated into law by the federal Conservative government, along with its economic action plans dating back to 2008, all stem from the repeated recourse by the prime minister and other cabinet ministers to promote a resilient Canadian economy.²⁷ Speaking in 2013 about the Economic Action Plan items of that year's fiscal budget, MP Gary Goodyear, the Minister of State for Science and Technology and for Ontario Federal Development, stated:

Today, Canada is universally recognized for its resilience through the global recession and recovery, its low-tax environment, its highly educated and skilled labour force, its natural resource endowments, and a financial sector that is the envy of the world. But we cannot become complacent. In a fast-changing, competitive global economy, Canadians must continually aim higher to avoid falling behind. (Goodyear 2013: ¶69-70)

Resilience here is code for *not getting worse*. Neoliberal-minded *The Economist* celebrated the Canadian economy's recession-proof resiliency but undercuts some of the self-congratulatory claims of the current regime, suggesting that regulations on banks' capacities to overleverage themselves and "sound public finances" together "predate Harper." Further, and despite the 2015 downturn in oil prices, the ongoing successes of the extractive oil and mineral mining apparatus have less to do with Canadian policy and more to do with foreign-based "resurgent appetites" ("The Goldilocks Recovery...", 2010: ¶4).

According to Mark Neocleous, resilience is inherent in the liberal intelligence of biopolitics, which has to find ways to reframe not simply security but also its erosion and conversion to incremental advances in insecurity characterized by trauma and anxiety around environmental and economic instability (Neocleous 2012). Training to be resilient in the face of trauma is a trap that maintains the status quo, recruiting bodies and populations to remain enveloped by its sustainment, where the aim is to find equilibrium within fundamentally unstable and crisis-bound processes (civil war and counterinsurgency interior to the State; government wed to intervening into the social field in the interests of capital and

²⁷ See "Economy resilient amid instability: Harper" (15 September 2008), <<http://www.canada.com/story.html?id=def523ba-f146-4040-bd56-4d616e55d9a1>>. See "Update Highlights Canada's Economic Resilience Amidst Global Uncertainty" (13 November 2012), <<http://www.fin.gc.ca/n12/12-143-eng.asp>>

finance) rather than change them. In other words, resilience is business as usual, or rather the constant condition of dealing with emergencies by normalizing them so as to create a continual loop of countering any insurgency aiming to alter or change the 'resilient' system. Refusing or failing at resiliency in subjective or micro-level contexts is to invite accusations of being illicit, illiberal, and risky. Citing UN and IMF policy documents regarding global systemic risk and resiliency discourse, Neocleous traces the ways in which the world's global technocratic policy elites deploy resilience to describe 'the growing wealth of the poor' who are able to withstand shock, a capacity which requires little biopolitical change or political economic transformation because that resilience, as something that can be nurtured and developed, marks the global poor's ability to find inclusion in a system *that needs them but only to exclude them* (Neocleous 2013: 4). The result here is that we find an updated version of Foucault's initial sense of police power, with financial police the avenue through which the wellness of national and global populations are conducted and conveyed.

In the context of Canada, what does resiliency bring? According to arguments advanced by Stephen McBride and Heather Whiteside, resiliency is another name for public austerity undertaken to stabilize private affluence (McBride & Whiteside 2011). In this sense, austerity is a comprehensive operation in exploiting a population's capacity to sustain the transfer of risks and so continue the informal but sovereign rule of private interests whose benefits follow from a regulatory and legislative process that paradoxically protects private interests *as* critical public infrastructure. Recent reports from the Broadbent Institute (2014ab), the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (McDonald 2014), and the University of Toronto Cities Centre (Walks 2013; Hulchanski 2010)—all using Statistics Canada data—indicate disturbingly deep and persistent wealth concentration and income inequality, which in the resiliency frame means a set of conditions that must be tolerated and normalized. The fortune of the few is being enabled by the resiliency of the many, whose wealth and debt become sites for the collateralization of risk to maintain the consolidation enjoyed by the top 20% of Canadian households (Broadbent 2014b). While Canadian households reported overall growth in wealth, this trend (70%) was largely confined to the top 20% of Canadian families for whom the real estate market provides

opportunities for wealth that are out of reach for many Canadians (Spinks et al 2014: 4). Their wealth is underwritten by an increase in credit and overall household debt, which is increasing across all Canadian households (20) but especially across the vaunted 'middle class' built on a credit-housing bubble (c.f. Hennessey 2014).²⁸ To stabilize and produce resilience requires becoming an enterprise family or an entrepreneurial subject, and this means remaining subordinate and indebted to a financial and biopolitical system that offers the freedom and 'privilege' to be equally unequal, to struggle, and to 'freely make a go of it' by way of constant exposure to forces of neoliberal capital (Lazzarato 2012: 89; c.f. Atwood 2008). Writ large, debt quells insurgency, or at least instantiates the enchainment to relations of production and forms of conduct structured around servicing debt as opposed to any re-imagination of life without debt.

This damage is a process of sacrifice, where the majority of the population must do its part to enable resilience. In their biopolitical analysis of the Toronto G20 Summit, Greg Elmer and Alessandra Renzi interrogate the securitization of critical infrastructure and the production of different "sacrifice series" that both make sacred the critical infrastructure of neoliberal "world class" global cities by sacrificing the public, something deemed necessary for wider resilience and security (Renzi & Elmer 2012: 87, 103-109). Put in the terms of David Harvey's recent arguments about the enigma of capital (2009), this is the 'spatial fix' returning back to the core hubs of a global political economy: with fewer constitutive outsides to outsource financial problems, capital must recolonize the domestic environments of North Atlantic states. Put in Esposito's biopolitical terms of immunity, this economic resiliency occurs with the slow introduction of incremental cuts (i.e., austerity) to consolidate what becomes a body perpetually damaged, where the constant structural injection of risk and exposure becomes an internal shock doctrine to be absorbed and normalized. In this sense, immunity—as a

²⁸ Arguments around 'middle class' and debt-to-income levels abound and are at the heart of debates around neoliberal economic policy in Canada. According to recent remarks from Mark Zelmer, deputy superintendent for the Office of The Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI)—Canada's financial sector watchdog—household debt is at record levels and is "potentially a real problem" (See "Remarks by Deputy Superintendent Mark Zelmer to the C.D. Howe Institute Housing Policy Conference, Toronto, Ontario, June 26, 2014," <<http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/eng/osfi-bsif/med/sp-ds/pages/mz20140626.aspx>>).

function of resiliency—implies the operation of adaptive capacities ("just deal with it") as lesser evils, reducing harm rather than changing the system of relations altogether.

Though counterinsurgents warn of the failure of quantitative metrics to adequately represent the fog of war, the economic numbers in Canada tell a story about the production of resilience and stability. According to the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, the richest 20% of Canadian families control 50% of all income in Canada (Walker 2014: 5). Canada's wealthiest 10% control 32% of all wealth in Canada, whereas the next decile controls 17.5%, which is a huge drop-off that is nothing compared to the bottom 60% controlling only roughly 20% (Broadbent Institute 2014b: 14). These trends are not new, though the increasing disparities have been amplified over the last six years. In 2011, the Conference Board of Canada reported that income inequality has increased consistently from 1991 to 2011, with the richest group of Canadians increasing its share of income from 1993 to 2008; as one headline reads, "Canada is richer, but not everyone shares equally" (Conference Board 2011: ¶ 11). Similarly, reports from Statistics Canada in 2006 and 2002 indicate overall wealth inequality increased in Canada from 1984 to 2005 (Morissette & Zhang 2006; Morissette et al 2002). The Statistics Canada data locate the top 10% as the only group increasing its share of total net worth in 2002 (Morissette et al 2002: 11) and indicate that while median wealth had doubled between 1970 and 2005, the lack of increases of overall real income in relation to inflation nullified any benefit and saw the distribution of wealth become more unequal (Morissette & Zhang 2006: 13-14). Further, the 2006 Statistics Canada report argues that home equity and capital returns from financial markets and mutual funds played a significant role in producing this trend (12-13). Put another way, economic success was ensured by the ability to enter an increasingly risky and prohibitive housing market in 2006, prior to the 2008 financial crisis and the American subprime mortgage meltdown, which was indexed both in the US and Canada to toxic assets that constituted financial instruments like futures, hedge funds, and derivatives. Private property segregates winners and losers and continues to eclipse the pursuit of common public wealth.

More specifically, Canadian cities display increasingly "less equal" and "more polarized" environments across different social scales (Walks 2013: iii), resulting the spatialization of inequality

and a geography of income segregation (44)—conditions ripe for new stabilizing forces to clear, hold, and build and so prioritize new developments. David Hulchanski's "three cities" project that mapped the spatialization of income polarization in Toronto from 1970 to 2005 reports that 53% of Toronto neighbourhoods were considered low-income in 2005, with the average individual income in 'City #3' being \$26 900 (compared to \$88 400 in City #1; Hulchanski 2010: 6). In a recent update with new data from 2012 and projections for 2015, Hulchanski argues that Toronto is a divided city characterized by severe financial polarization and a core island of wealth surrounded by poor pockets of inner suburbs (Hulchanski, in Rider 2015: ¶1-3). The middle second city is disappearing (¶15). These dividing practices also coincide with infrastructure underdevelopment. In Toronto, the divided city inhibits access to critical infrastructure like public transit for low-income communities who need it most to conduct their lines and who find service most lacking outside the political economic redoubt that is the gentrified core of the city. According to political geographer Stefan Kipfer, the discourse of public transit in Toronto often obscures what is an issue of forced mobility dictated by neoliberal transformations of labour and territory where the attendant lack of public transit infrastructure that is tantamount to infrastructure injustice (Kipfer 2012). For theorist and architect Léopold Lambert, this territorial technology is a matter of weaponized architecture that creates an "infrastructural urban canyon" and functions as an "axis of segregation" (Lambert 2015: ¶5). What is more, a recent Toronto Public Health report made clear the links between income inequality and health inequality, where wealth gaps, as social determinants of health, produce substantive health gaps (van Ingen, Khandor, and Fleiszer 2015). The resilience of private property and wealth, as a critical infrastructure in the context of liberal rule, actively damages and *inhibits the health* of large segments of the population. Biopolitically, this is matter of acting on the actions and conducting the conduct of divided demographics in different ways to manage and administer the life, where some lives matter more than others. Further, according to Hulchanski, gentrification is less a cause than an expression of wider historical changes that follow from the political economic and social transformations specific to neoliberalism and government policies we now know as austerity: global free trade agreements; precarious labour and low income in

deregulated labour markets; tax cuts benefitting rich Canadians; cuts to public programs and social spending; and 'offshored' Canadian corporate taxes that are not subject to taxation and wealth redistribution (¶ 16-17). This is the system that is too big to fail, which must remain resilient.²⁹

In the prosperous Toronto Ward 13 neighbourhoods of Bloor West Village, Swansea, and High Park North, these issues all currently meld together in relation to village stability. Already a fortress-like redoubt of wealth and prosperity, the neighbourhoods are populated by small signs imploring residents to "Save our Village" in the face of ongoing condominium development around main transit and subway routes and the speculative practices of a legislative-developer apparatus. The proponents of this community-based campaign advocate "responsible Bloor West development" linked to preserving properties and heritage.³⁰ Saving the village means saving it from condominium development, which would devalue property prices, clog local thoroughfares, overrun local schools, tax local commercial resources, and undermine the cultural capital that comes with living in the affluent area. As with other areas Toronto, the campaign doubles as a 'not-in-my-backyard' (NIMBY) campaign against density creep. According to the City of Toronto 2014 profile for Ward 13 based on the 2011 National Household Survey, the mean average household income in the ward is almost \$106 000 and approximately \$20 000 more than the Toronto average.³¹ Low income households stand at 12% in the ward versus the city's overall figure of 19%. The ward's 2013 health profile also indicates several key trends: lower proportions of low income residents, racialized people, immigrants, vulnerable children, and infectious diseases including tuberculosis and sexually-transmitted infections. While the speculative condo development apparatus is a key driver of gentrification in Toronto, the advocates of "Save Our Village" act for their own collective if disavowed propertied interests, not offering an alternative or a

²⁹ The pressures described by Hulchanski come together in the Toronto neighbourhood of Parkdale, where gentrification is being consolidated by the drift of Queen Street West condo development and also by the arrival of Akelius, a Swedish-based global property management company that is buying up properties and driving up rent across Toronto. After back-to-back rent increases sought by the company (to 'subsidize costs'), local residents organized and challenged the increases in a Landlord and Tenant Board hearing, which the residents won in April 2015. See Manisha Krishnan (22 March 2015), "Parkdale tenants battle back-to-back rent increases," The Toronto Star < <http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2015/03/22/parkdale-tenants-battle-back-to-back-rent-increases.html>>.

³⁰ See Save Our Village, < <http://saveourvillage.ca/>>.

³¹ The median average in Ward 13 is \$72 000, which is only roughly \$14 000 more than the Toronto median average, and which indicates a substantial band of wealth in the upper range of the ward's population.

socially just vision of accessible and affordable housing for all Torontonians. In this context, to save the village means pushing to keep out those who desire the space the saviours already have. In the Hegelian terms favoured by Žižek, the negation of the condos fails to negate the extreme economic privilege and wealth the residents enjoy and defend.³²

Further, Toronto's Priority Neighbourhoods program, while explicitly addressing the significant disparities in wealth by addressing poverty and public housing for communities often subject to acute and ambient forms of racialization and criminalization, tends to address 'problem areas' while normalizing and naturalizing the fortification of wealthy neighbourhoods. After city officials created a new ranking system based on an "equity benchmark score" derived from Toronto area hospitals' demographic research on social and community health outcomes, priority neighbourhoods are to now be deemed "neighbourhood improvement areas," with the number of neighbourhoods in need of improvement expanding from 22 to 31 (Doolittle 2014b: ¶2). From the outside, rendering life in the neighbourhoods as an ongoing 'saga of oppression' with no agency or community-based autonomy is reductive, and certainly one must acknowledge the desires of residents for better conditions and the work undertaken to achieve this outcome. Yet, the disparities are systemic. Geographically, the areas targeted are on the middle to outer edges of the city, which indicates two things. On one hand, the center is unaffordable for many, who migrate to the edges, effectively economic refugees in their own city. On the other, this spatialization obscures existing needs in the core area, where downtown neighbourhoods are deemed ineligible for ongoing funding (Doolittle 2014a: ¶8) and where pockets of low-income communities (Moss Park, South Parkdale, St. Jamestown) continue being slowly carved out by capital flows and development. In other words, archipelagos of wealth begin to aggregate and merge together to fill in gaps and force out those unable to afford living inside the confines of a city where economic privilege buys one the opportunity stay local in an 'liveable' neighbourhood.³³ Saving the

³² The Toronto Star reported on a similar situation, where the Density Creep Neighbourhood Alliance is organizing against the threat of higher density housing, which would adversely affect property values in the already-affluent area of North Toronto. See, (25 May 2015), "Midtowners Battle the Rise of the Midrise," <<http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2015/05/25/midtowners-battle-the-rise-of-the-midrise.html>>.

³³ The recent push—and massive investment by different level of government—lead by Toronto Community housing to redevelop both Regent Park and Alexandra Park should be supported. As two large core public

village and ensuring its resiliency seems to come at the expense of others and Others. In Toronto, as in many other cities with significant new immigrant and settled diasporic communities, these divides are normalized as natural outcomes instead of being recognized as the territorialization of racialized divides.

Resilience in the face of systemic risks is precisely what is required to ensure the continuation of the same outcomes. Rather than the critical infrastructure serving the wellbeing of population, the population becomes a softer and more pliable set of flows that is merely one more component of the infrastructure. It becomes the medium for circulating productivity and conducting value—whether basic caloric output in living life or the cognitive expenditure of the 'creative class' gentrifying neighbourhoods—through built environments. If the biopolitical art of government is premised on the modulation of species-life as a differentiation engine or machine with infinitesimal degrees of freedom normalized around a pole of predictability, then human beings are literally walking batteries and energy-burning aggregations of material capacities and flows, metabolic processes indexed to the same segregating and separating practices linked to urban space and wealth concentration. As an integration and recognition engine, biopolitical government nurtures safe differences—as in formal legal and institutionalized rights and obligations—in the name of resilient critical infrastructure of which population becomes a component part.

Resiliency in Canada is also regulated by an increasingly common set of changes to traditional repressive security measures. Mirroring the American homeland defence and federal emergency management apparatus, Canada's relatively new organ, Public Safety Canada, integrates the action of different agencies—the RCMP, CSIS, Canada Border Services, among others—to "keep Canadians safe from a range of risks" (Public Safety Canada, "About Us," 2014: ¶2). The Conservative federal government under Stephen Harper has made this all too clear in rhetorical and symbolic terms with its

housing projects, their redevelopment as 'vibrant communities' with mix of rental and 'market units' is timely given the dismantling of public budgets by decades of neoliberal cuts to affordable housing and the current crisis mentality of austerity. Yet, given the 15-20 year project trajectory for revitalization, questions remain: will these areas be forced to serve as bulwarks to stem the speculative development apparatus in the city's core, and will they slowly be swallowed up by private development, a process subsidized with public funding on the front end? And can redevelopment be imagined outside bourgeois consumer lifestyle trappings specific to neoliberal logics of cultural life in the city? For details on both policies and planning for both neighbourhoods, see Toronto Public Housing, <http://www.torontohousing.ca/alexandra_park_revitalization> and <<http://www.torontohousing.ca/regentpark>>.

'dangerous world' thesis (Behrens 2015a; c.f. Kozolanka 2015). Following the recent government changes to 'anti-terror' legislation in Canada (Bill C-51, tabled in January 2015 and passed into law in May), which lowers the threshold for preemptive arrests and enhanced surveillance as a way to undermine 'radicalization' and domestic attacks, Public Safety continues to coordinate and implement new security measures. Its nebulous remit is national security, border strategies, countering crime, and emergency management and disaster mitigation. The description of national security responsibilities identifies counter-terrorism, cyber security, and critical infrastructure as core areas of concern, with Public Safety advocating joint approach in conjunction with hemispheric allies, whether they be municipalities, corporations, or American agencies. In "enhancing critical infrastructure resiliency," a comprehensive "all-hazards" approach to operations means "tak[ing] mitigative or protective measures to reduce risks and the potential for disruptions" (Public Safety Canada, "Enhancing Critical Infrastructure Responsibility," 2014: ¶2). These powers are rendered in wider systemic terms: "[g]iven the interdependencies and connectedness among critical infrastructures, a disruption of any one service could have a cascading effect across essential services or systems" (¶8). The broad, vague, and arbitrary scope of Public Safety's jurisdiction imagines a pre-insurgent population and creates a security gaze that requires a constant supply of subversive "unspecified enemies," *saboteur* figures who can be filled with substance and content retroactively but which must function rhetorically in advance as placeholders for internal and external threats (c.f. Deleuze & Guattari 1986: 120). In relation to C-51, Public Safety in conjunction with Canada's police, security, and military agencies enjoy deliberately abstract and ambiguous powers with advanced and extraordinary capacities that are not subject to public oversight (Payton 2015; Behrens 2015b). Failures and disruptions of infrastructure threaten to amplify these *nth* order cascading effects, meaning that continuous security measures must be ever flexible given that the risks—as "increasingly complex and frequent" (CPS 2009: 4); as high-impact, low-frequency "black swans" (CPS 2014: 4)—are entirely virtual and emerge to become actual only when recursively nominated as such or when preemptively foreclosed in advance but confirmed after the fact. This perspective is founded on an almost divine

decision-making capacity. Yet, given the emphasis on recovery and returning to equilibrium, the critical infrastructure space described in these documents is depopulated and fleshless, with no bodies present. This occlusion is interesting in two ways: first, it presumes the subsuming of the population within the wider logics of resilient critical infrastructure; and two, it implies the function of population as a material basis that serves the critical infrastructure and not *vice versa*, whether for business, economic continuity, social stability, or security. Resilient people are required as a critical component to bind together and sustain resilient critical infrastructures, or at least enhance their operating thresholds and tolerances for failures.

This resiliency discourse also connects to the rise of data and its biopolitical function to provide new types of pattern analysis and so create new knowledge-effects in relation to enframing population. The 'mathematical ferocity' of an actuarial-algorithmic-derivative gaze extends into maintaining the resiliency of critical infrastructure, with population quantified and informationalized because of or in spite of itself. While the Harper Conservatives have disavowed Statistics Canada data and muzzled the data-driven research of Canadian scientists, other sectors of government have embraced the gaze. Understood in this context, revelations about the scale and scope of so-called Big Data—whether captured and monetized by corporations or 'passively' captured and securitized by domestic state intelligence organs like Communication Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) or through the NSA's data mining PRISM apparatus—indicate the realization of terrorism and insurgency as anything deemed disruptive to critical infrastructure in environmental, territorial, and affective or physis terms. Data collection by Canada's public safety and security apparatus is increasing and the passing of Bill C-13 in March 2014—ostensibly legislation regarding cyberbullying but arguably a 'Trojan horse'—provided larger *legal* openings for state organs to access data whether from individuals or based on via Canadian ISPs obliged to share information and data (Elghawhaby 2014). When Gregory remarks about a visual and digital chain of custody in relation to drone strikes and targeted assassinations in his conceptualization of everywhere war, the idea of "remote split operations" takes on further importance when the key symbolic and discursive referent ceases to be war or even terror and is replaced with

systemic resilience in terms of the capacity of government as liberal rule. The geography of military violence enabled by drones, with its adjudicative functions to render individuals in calculative rather than corporeal registers (Gregory 2014: 12-13), cannot be understood outside its domestic attachments. The convergence of the domestic mass surveillance of metadata in alignment with the aerial and vertical dimensions of counterinsurgency and contingency operations—what Sassen calls "drones over there, total surveillance over here" (2013)—suggests a desire to recognize and register an infinitesimal number of signals aggregated as acceptable and unacceptable patterns of life necessary to function as critical infrastructure.

The combination of data-driven intelligence and biometrics has been realized in the experimental spaces of Afghanistan, and the boomerang effects are clear with domestic biometric and facial recognition programs undertaken by both Canadian and American security agencies increasing in scale and scope (Lewis 2014). An integration machine, the 'identity dominance' discourse around biometrics pioneered by ISAF forces over the last five years is now indexed to domestically curtailing the insurgency of illiberal and illicit activities that would undermine the population's resiliency of the critical infrastructure, or rather its resiliency to play its part. In the U.S., the FBI recently the completion of its facial recognition system, which has seen its database grow significantly based on the inclusion of 4.3 million pictures "taken for non-criminal purposes" drawn from employment records and criminal record checks (Lewis 2014: ¶7). To function, the database must be populated with enough images to provide a context for the arbitrary comparisons made between available faces in the standing reserve and the 'suspect,' and those whose images are enrolled without a shred of consent unknowingly walk into the fantasy of law, apprehension, and order. In partnership with Canada Border Service Agency and the RCMP, Canada's Ministry of Immigration and Citizenship, after a decade of neoliberal policy to shift the focus from refugee claims to temporary foreign workers, has been leading the push for increased biometric data collection from all manner of visitors, with a list of 29 countries prioritized in particular for biometric requirements (MCIC 2013; RCMP 2013). The RCMP's Canadian Criminal Real Time Identification services, the existing institutional arm for providing biometrics in civil and criminal

court, is also already responsible for the security screening environment for all levels of government and the general public (RCMP 2012: ¶1). In reading the descriptions, it is easy to miss the drift from criminal to general public, a subtle shift that implicitly identifies and networks through the public safety authority all members of said 'general public' as pre-criminal, near-illicit, and pre-insurgent.

Some segments of domestic populations are deemed more dangerously pre-insurgent than others, and their lives are made to live in ways that reproduce their coding as risky and problematic. Segregated communities are important because their exceptional status as targets make requires them to continue as *essential* parts of the critical infrastructure to be stabilized and made resilient. The high-visibility intersection of class and race redouble traditional security and policing measures to conduct the flow and lives of special populations in specific ways. Prior to the wave of police militarization, practices like carding and racial profiling functioned less to mitigate the unfolding of crime or pacify illicit activity—whether gangs, narco-syndicates, or homegrown terrorist threats posed by extremists 'sleeping' in new immigrant communities (i.e., what Razack calls 'dangerous Muslim men').³⁴ These practices operate rather as a giant inscription apparatus to continually mark those who must serve as targets. In their essay on surplus masculinities and security, Cowen and Sicilian contextualize the logic and practice of Toronto's priority neighbourhood approach (see above) within a wider discourse of security and "plural policing" operations that targets racialized men in already underserved and marginal communities deemed "high needs" and "at risk" (Cowen & Siciliano 2011: 1527). Writing about the biopolitical intersection of crime, race, and neoliberal governmentality, they argue:

Criminality is not a constant; prisons and policing expand to absorb populations made redundant by deindustrialization, changing regional and global patterns of uneven development, and the growth of high-tech and professional industries. Poverty and dependency are criminalized, targeted policing proliferates in cities, and prisons are expanded and privatized *en masse*. The prison system has become a means of warehousing a racialized reserve army of predominantly young male labour. (1517)

³⁴ Suffice it to say, the case of the Toronto 18 bears mention here as the culmination of what, if using the military counterinsurgency idiom, would be a JIMP-enabled WOG police and intelligence investigation across municipal to federal jurisdictions and agencies. See CBC News, "Toronto 18: Key Events in the Case," <<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto-18-key-events-in-the-case-1.715266>>. Additionally and in a more current context, another wave of manufactured moral panic is building regarding 'radicalization,' Islam, and young Canadian men in the context of Syria and Iraq, where foreign fighters are serving under the banner Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

While the authors go on to connect urban security and the criminalization of racialized masculinities to military recruiting practices targeting 'captive labour' already prioritized for either poverty or incarceration, they clarify the ways in which exclusive racialized bodies labour and so remain internal exceptions in a system, fulfilling the role as dangerous and risky demographics as they are disciplined by neoliberal markets, militarized policing, and biopoliticized governmentality unfolding as counterinsurgency. From this perspective, surplus masculinities have a right to the city, but not in the affirmative way described by Henri Lefebvre and David Harvey; rather, the right is an injunction to function as a relay for lawlessness and ungovernable space in need of intervention. This should give us pause: with military-age men in rural villages in Afghanistan targeted by 'money as a weapons system' to buy stability and counter insurgency, I wonder how and when such an explicit measure will be deployed in Toronto beyond Keynesian-like social welfare schemes. Given that the surplus of illiberal bodies—illiberal because they are racialized and criminalized as such—is a standing reserve that provides for an "incredibly productive and profitable cycling of redundant men through security industries and institutions" (1533), what remains is a deeply speculative approach that has to constantly administer and speculate on the objects of safety and risk. In other words, racialized and impoverished communities in Toronto *are disposable but indispensable* critical infrastructure as sites for treatment and intervention. They are surplus in the strict capitalist sense in that they represent an accumulation that can still be put to work within the system of security even if that work is to serve as an index of risk (1535), where policing today becomes biopolitical arbitrage.

In Toronto, these surplus masculinities are also often racially profiled and subject to carding, which is essentially the practice of stopping, frisking, and questioning people, a practice justified by police and some civic officials as part of the community policing approach to build local cultural intelligence. Carding gives police *de facto* arrest powers—indefinite detention—which are arbitrary and which undermine legal rights with little in the way of civilian oversight (Winsa 2015: ¶6).³⁵ Carding practices function as acts of veridiction, self-referential exercises to constantly sustain the

³⁵ In April 2015, the Toronto Police Services Board passed a new policy on carding, which did little to alter or change the practice. Since then, a number of prominent community leaders, public intellectuals, and activists have called on Mayor John Tory to compel the police force to stop the practice.

counterinsurgency gaze creeping across domestic spaces, confirming the need to keep the peace in urban 'Indian country'. Intrusive policing becomes stability operations lite, with police disproportionately stopping—and criminalizing—young brown men (counterinsurgency's 'military aged males') or street-involved people, whether in Sangin or Baltimore or Toronto. Further, well aware of and internalizing the demands placed on their habits and routines, people pre-empt these pre-emptive policing measures by performing "respectability politics," learning how to comport and choreograph safety and innocence in advance, learning how to "play white" and so internalizing oppression (St. Félix, in Del Rosario-Bel, Rodrigues, St. Félix, and Tortorici 2015: 26).³⁶ Speaking at a recent solidarity demonstration about police practices in Toronto, activist and community organizer Lena Peters said, "These issues [in Baltimore and Toronto] are connected...Police violence, state violence, and police brutality affect black people and people in Canada all the time" (Peters, in Reddekopp 2015a: ¶3-4).

After renewing its commitment to the Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS) in 2012, Toronto Police Services began sending small units of police into Rexdale, Jane-Finch, Weston-Mt. Denis, and other 'high-crime' neighbourhoods (Kirzner 2012)—Toronto's own *banlieus*, many of which coincide with those included in the priority neighbourhood/neighbourhood improvement area approach. On a spectrum, the strategy outlines three 'levels' of policing: higher intensity direct action, 'maintenance-level enforcement', and 'normalized' policing where communities accept continuous police omnipresence.³⁷ The units' activities are urban 'pattern of life' patrols, undertaking ambient surveillance, and testing the atmospherics while taking acute measures like stopping, carding, and gathering intelligence used to generate Field Information Reports (Kirzner 2012: ¶4). The high-intensity end of the spectrum includes acute measures like raids, serving search warrants, and more muscular displays of force targeting gang members, suspects, and non-status or undocumented immigrants who are threatened with deportation. In many instances, the young men targeted are already victimized by intersectional systemic barriers to accessing social and economic resources (Olawoye, in Kirzner 2012:

³⁶ Consider Frantz Fanon's concept of double consciousness (Fanon 1952 [1967]: 11, 109, and 210-222).

³⁷ See the Toronto Police Services' TAVIS website, <<http://www.torontopolice.on.ca/tavis/>>. Furthermore, see *The Toronto Star's* 2012-2013 investigative project, *Known to Police*, <<http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/knowntopolice2013.html>>, which is based on Access to Information requests and Toronto Police Service reporting.

¶22). This is exacerbated by the performance and currency of masculinity premised on confrontation and a justifiable suspicion of the continuously invasive police presence in a space where being outside and on the street is grounds for targeting (Adjetey, in Kirzner 2012: ¶13). After the TAVIS approach was implemented over a two-month sweep through neighbourhoods in Toronto's eastern core areas because the high concentration of crime, local community organizer Zoe Dodd cited a huge perceptual gap between police approaches and local grassroots approaches. According to Dodd, the policing approach, as nuanced and community-development-friendly as its architects frame it, reduces the issue to crime and fails to address or deal with systemic social and economic processes like poverty, lack of affordable housing, and lack of infrastructure all the while exacerbated by the deterritorialization of the area by speculative development and gentrification (Dodd, in Winsa 2014: ¶4 & ¶13).

Further, as in Afghanistan's village stability operations that mix the threat of firepower with the promise of biopower, coercive agents (i.e., domestic police) shape the community-based response by compelling leaders and organizations to 'plug and play' with police, validating the police response. This compromises the agency of local groups to intervene in their own life environments without explicit repressive influences from outside; they may lose credibility within the community after being compelled to work with police. As argued by Oppenheim in his essay on community development and counterinsurgency:

[C]ommunity development may not function independently from the conflicts into which it is projected...[A]lthough development interventions may have their own internal logic, quite distinct from counterinsurgency, they may fit neatly within local counterinsurgency frameworks and practices. (Oppenheim 2012: 259)

In Toronto, the counterinsurgency creep produced in neoliberal and biopolitical terms has indeed fit neatly into the development imagination. A recent police report found that police carding stops had plummeted following the implementation of a carding receipt system in the creation of contact card data (Rankin & Winsa 2014). As oversight, the receipt system was implemented in 2012 after wider media, academic, and public scrutiny, creating a higher threshold of accountability for police, who enjoyed the licence to arbitrarily stop and momentarily detain people with little to no cause saving for generating information and intelligence. Yet, the same data indicated that stops of black and brown men had

increased, and police officials suggested this was inevitable given the intersection of race and "socioeconomic disparity" (Rankin & Winsa 2014: ¶3). They were unapologetic in saying, "[W]e're not going to take ownership of all of the social ills [like systemic discrimination] that befall us as a 24/7 service provider" (Deputy Chief Sloly, in Rankin & Winsa 2014: ¶5). Even if we take this statement as an apology or an admission of the limits of policing, its biopolitical underside suggest Canada's deep racial divides from the street, impoverished neighbourhoods, and public housing projects right up to national institutions (Rinaldo Walcott, in Reid 2014: ¶23).³⁸ Further, while advocates of 'correct' community policing method suggest police must work with communities rather than against them and use methods that appropriately reflect the 'crime situation' (i.e., no police militarization or aggressive raids; c.f. Freeman 2015 on the Peel policing tradition; c.f., Beare, in Hildebrandt 2014: ¶36), the perspective here still locates police as a misguided responsive enforcement arm rather than as a core biopolitical dividing practice that is actively engaged to map the contours of population. This mapping — as a marking— implies a bleed between contemporary and older conceptions of police, where today's repressive investigative apparatus coincides with the pastoral care function furthering population-level health located by Foucault. Whether targeting black, brown, indigenous, or new immigrant communities, the domestic counterinsurgency apparatus can blend speeds of coercion and violence to determine how bodies shall be had to be detained, debased, and delimited.

The biopolitical profiling and prioritization apparatus that creates frontiers in Canada's core 'world class global city' has its corollary on Canada's edges, where a temporary foreign worker program (TFWP) serves as the filter and sorting device for immigration, one part of Harsha Walia's border imperialism. If we understand expeditionary wars as a globalizing processes that disturb and penetrate local environments within a wider field of what Walia calls global geopolitical violence, the global flow

³⁸ See Rinaldo Walcott's recent lecture at the Association of American Geographers Conference entitled, "Zones of Black Death: Institutions, Knowledges, and States of Being" (April 2014) and available at *Antipode: A Radical Journal of Geography* <<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291467-8330>>. His analysis of the mutually exclusive conceptions of persistence of black life forms and Euroamerican notions of the human follows a biopolitical line insofar as he argues, cogently and with force, that the epistemological and discursive invention of blackness is coincident with the emergence of global systems of Transatlantic slavery and settler colonialism actively ensuring black disposability and violent death and as such a necessary precondition to contemporary life.

of migrants and refugees from foreign theatres of operation to the domestic *milieu* is directly connected to the neoliberal world system, which the Canadian state co-produces with a cartel of advanced capitalist states for its own benefit. This is to say that the context of 'giving' migrants and refugee rights and asylum are not simply domestic issues specific to Canada but follow from a wider global context of displacement, dispossession, and expulsion fueled by economic and military interventions (Walia 2013: 16-17). If neoliberal and neoconservative legislation to transform Canadian citizenship—for instance, Bill C-24, which will actually make citizenship status more exclusive, increasingly fragile, and revocable (Black 2014)—takes care of new immigrants should they make into Canada, the TFWP is a filter creating a ring of stability beyond the borders of the state, *a priori* quarantine and pre-emptive containment. Should foreign bodies enter into the territorial environment of Canada, federal legislation has engineered fewer measures for life support with significant cuts planned for the provision of refugee health care (Elliot 2014) let alone people who with no defined status vis-à-vis Canadian law. Physical and metaphysical capabilities—human resources— will be neither maintained nor actively managed unless there are economic benefits according to the interests of the Canadian state.

The TFWP was envisioned to meet Canadian labour gaps and 'acute skills shortages' but is now revised to do so on a 'temporary basis.' Beginning in mid-2013, reports revealed a number of deeply problematic issues with the program: corrupt commercial immigration service providers, failures of the federal government to monitor compliance with the programs,³⁹ and allegations of companies exploiting workers—from Royal Bank of Canada to rural Tim Horton's coffee franchises to Syncrude tar sand operations. The labour provided by foreign workers was a cheaper option as Canadian citizens would require higher wages. The practice was becoming a "core labour market strategy" in Canada (Stanford 2012: ¶4). Indeed, over the course of the TFWP managed by the Harper Conservatives from 2007 to 2012, the program doubled and grew to almost 350 000 workers (Weir 2013: ¶2); further, rather than target "perceived labour shortages" and far from enabling economic growth, the program undermined wages and worsened wider Canadian unemployment rates due to actual labour glut based on exploiting

³⁹ According to a report by Bill Curry in *The Globe and Mail*: "Before 2010, not a single government worker was responsible for monitoring compliance with the program, even as about 200 federal employees processed employers' applications to bring in foreign workers" (2014: ¶2).

already-vulnerable workers with minimal workplace rights and no guarantee of permanent residency (¶13). While as the then-minister of citizenship and immigration and subsequently as the minister of employment, Jason Kenney (who became minister of defence in 2015) shepherded reforms in 2013 to "remove wage flexibility" and ensure employers who rely on temporary foreign workers "transition to the Canadian work force" (Employment & Social Development Canada 2013), the business sector was not pleased. Commercial lobbies like local and regional Chambers of Commerce greeted the changes with criticism, upset at having to pay out more in terms of wages and benefits to employ citizens who they claim are unwilling anyway to take already low-paying jobs which can be paid out even lower to extract labour from foreign workers. The Conservative government, through having failed to continue to the provision of just-more-than-bare-life for labour exploitation, has been able to scapegoat the program it aggressively grew, pandering to populist anti-immigrant rhetoric about protecting 'real Canadians' with respect to an economic action plan all the while ensuring the flow of new immigrants to Canada was reduced to a trickle. Yet, the biopolitical implications are more problematic, with the program literally identifying biopolitical workers pre-empted from any promise of citizenship. Based on his study of the TFWP, sociologist Greg Bird revealed how the program sorted the vitality of risky outsiders based on a racial hierarchy of who is suited for high- and low-skill jobs in a situation where the isolation of temporary workers insulates the Canadian state from responsibility (Bird 2014). 'Guest workers' are forced to function as speculative objects, their labour and their racialization and foreign status extracted on an ongoing basis. While liberal North Atlantic states fret with Islamophobic anxieties about radicalized and fanatical Muslims spilling over their borders and indulge the fantasy of an ideal enemy (Kundandi 2014: 114), the post-austerity neoliberal immigration apparatus demonstrates a remarkable biopolitical elasticity with which to make precarious labourers into necessary evils as dangerous and illiberal aliens residing within the Canadian enclosure.

The issues around the TFPW animate the one of the most hallowed and sacred objects in Canada: the energy extraction apparatus and the tar sands. While imported to populate both the retail and service sectors in Alberta where the 'oil boom' drives many domestic workers to the network of

infinitely differentiated sites and locations within the production chain, some temporary foreign workers are also plugged into 'frontline' jobs across the extraction–upgrade–export chain. A recent report by the Alberta Federation of Labour argued that the use of foreign workers in on-site high-skills positions was both dangerous and duplicitous. The of lack of cross-cultural communication capacities saw foreign and domestic workers finding it hard to coordinate and collaborate; in addition, the express of use foreign workers continues to undermine the existing Labour Market Opinion process⁴⁰ and fast-tracks 'guest workers' which then allows employers to undercut and down wages across the sector while farming out more work to non-union firms and operators (known as Merit Contractors) (CBC News 2014a; AFL 2012). While unions and organized labour groups have called these issues into question, safety and wage depression serve to generate resentment on the part of 'real Canadians,' which in turn displaces the focus on the exploitative basis of the energy production system and its biopolitical operations. In other words, defending the rights of Canadian workers against sanctioned 'internal outsourcing' amounts to a 'lesser evil' approach. Meanwhile, the federal government consistently messaged in both directions, defending the necessity of foreign workers while championing the populist cause of Canadian workers.

Furthermore, while labour groups may work to defend the earning power of workers operating in the sector, they fail to issue any challenge to the stakes of transnational corporate conglomerates enjoying a radically asymmetric level of control over life and living in Canada. Like intensity-based emissions regimes expounded by the industry to mitigate climate change—reducing per unit carbon emissions despite the trend to significantly increasing overall production—these challenges fail to alter the biopolitical and industrial *status quo*. The damage is less acute but increases in terms of ambient overall effects.

Canadian Counterinsurgency Fantasies: Energopolitics & Indigenous Struggle

The biopolitical entanglement of the TFWP directs us towards the spirit of counterinsurgency's connection to Canada's energy extraction apparatus, where the tar sands and the processing of heavy oil

⁴⁰ Labour Market Opinion refers to the adjudication process through which employers and immigration and employment officials determine if using temporary foreign workers is permitted for staffing jobs and projects.

cannot be understood outside primitive accumulation, settler colonialism, and the expropriation and enclosure of land and traditional indigenous territory. As Morgenson and others have argued, contemporary biopolitical government is historically and materially linked to settler colonial logics, and taking seriously the internal 'endocolonization' of Canada after the recent expeditionary cycle requires us to keep this front and centre. Counterinsurgency, capitalist energy mining and extraction, environmentalism, and population all come together under the sign of what of what Imre Szemen, Hannah Knox, and Domenic Boyer refer to as "energopower" and "energopolitics"—placing energy production and extraction at the centre of contemporary biopolitics.⁴¹ This is a useful anchor for contextualizing the spirit of counterinsurgency and its environmental and atmospheric protocols and procedures, especially in relation to indigenous resurgence and decolonization struggles in what is a Canadian petrostate. The 'energopolitical' analytic does not supplant the politics of indigenous resistance and struggle in Canada; rather, it sharpens the biopolitical terms of my discussion. The conception of energopolitics lends itself to thinking biopolitics in a wider atmospheric context, where the terraforming entailments of energy production—as a pole around which human societies are ordered and organized—in the age of capitalist carbon-based intensification necessitates a reconsideration of government, environment, and population in a different planetary register and scale.

It is well-known that the Canadian extractive sector—mineral mining along with energy, oil, and gas—is responsible for human rights abuses, for collusion with corrupt state governments and neoliberal interest from Central America to sub-Saharan Africa, and for enabling paramilitary violence and local repression often against local indigenous groups on their traditional territory (Lodge 2014; Surr 2014; c.f. Gordon 2010). The so-called 'Canadian Advantage' is built on community conflict,

⁴¹ Boyer, Knox, and Szeman all contributed to a special issue of *Anthropological Quarterly* in 2014 entitled "Energopower and Biopower in Transition." From Boyer: "I would describe energopower as an alternative genealogy of modern power, as an analytic method that looks in the walls to find the wiring and ducts and insulation, that listens to the streets to hear the murmur of pipes and sewage, that regards discourse on energy security today as not simply about the management of population (e.g., "biosecurity") but also about the concern that our precious and invisible conduits of fuel and force stay brimming and humming. Above all, energopower is a genealogy of modern power that rethinks political power through the twin analytics of electricity and fuel" (Boyer 2014: 325).

violence, and a consistent record of environmental destruction (Engler 2012).⁴² What is more, *the same abuses are occurring in Canada*, if in a different register where the Canadian Global North becomes the Global South. Energy and mineral extraction, along with the processing and logistical infrastructure to move and transport the oil-based products, have been at the centre of an indigenous resurgence represented by grassroots social movements like Idle No More (INM) and the Indigenous Nationhood Movement. These movements augment indigenous organizations like Mohawk Warrior societies in the Haudenosaunee confederacy, Marching With Our Sisters (who organize against the continued inaction regarding the epidemic of missing and murdered indigenous women across Canada), and ecologically-centered groups like the Committee for Future Generations and Defenders of the Land. They also complement ongoing long-term actions by band and tribal councils across the country in relation to indigenous title and ecological defence by sovereign nations: the Lubicon Lake First Nation and Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation in Alberta; the Yinka Dene Alliance, the Haisla First Nation, and the Tsilhqot'in First Nation in B.C.; and the Asubpeeschoseewagong First Nation at Grassy Narrows and the Tyedinaga Mohawk Nation in Ontario.

The current situation follows from a number of policies undertaken to enable extraction-based opportunities at the expense of indigenous communities and their territories: successive omnibus budget bills in 2012 and 2013 (C-38 and C-45) removed environmental protection for waterways; provisions lowered thresholds for quorum on votes by status Indians on issues related indigenous title and unceded indigenous territory; the failed duty to consult by the National Energy Board and federal ministries and bodies around existing and new projects like Enbridge's Northern Gateway pipeline alienated many communities; signing massive foreign investment agreements prioritizing resource extraction and the energy trade with little consideration for impacts on indigenous rights and treaties, and in ways that give foreign and large supra-state actors sovereign jurisdiction and legal rights in Canada;⁴³ and the

⁴² The federal government's Office of the Extractive Sector Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Counsellor has been a toothless failure—or a remarkable neoliberal success—with Canadian corporations having to volunteer to participate in any charges brought to the office by local communities harmed, abused, and undermined by large Canadian global mining firms operating with licence and impunity (Biron 2014; Warnica 2014).

⁴³ The Hupacasath First Nation, a Coast Salish community on Vancouver Island, recently lost its legal challenge in the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal regarding the federal government's duty to consult prior to signing the

lack of an honest and substantive discussion about resource ownership. As such, after decades of opposition and resistance, many communities have renewed their commitments and mobilized in defense of traditional territory and sovereign *sui generis* rights predating Canadian laws. Some indigenous and non-indigenous critics of this resurgence claim it is misguided political correctness dressed up as radical action, suggesting it is a detriment to the ability of individual communities to freely dictate their economic futures, or that expresses a self-victimizing grievance culture that ultimately debilitates communities further due to an excessive commitment to traditional ecological knowledge and an ultimately 'inferior' history (c.f. Widdowson & Howard 2008 for work emblematic of this 'scholarly critical' avenue).⁴⁴ The mobilization of communities from-the-ground-up reveals significant solidarity around indigenous autonomy and self-determination and a rejection of neoliberal apologists linking indigenous futures to ongoing if more ambient and less acute forms of subjugation. Recent pushes in 2014 by the federal government to pass paternalistic laws like the First Nations Education Act and the First Nations Financial Transparency Act target communities who have been repeatedly victimized and oppressed by historical continuities of 'care' by the custodial government of Canada. Despite the federal government's effort to pacify opposition by encouraging resource companies in the tar sands to build capacity in Canada's north creating shared value and as a form of resiliency for rural northern communities—and alongside the ambivalence of communities who enjoy attractive monetary benefits after a history of dispossession, expropriation, and genocide—many indigenous communities continue to fight against this apparatus with a variety of tactics from direct action through pipeline blockades to intergenerational marches and demonstrations to protracted court battles. Of course, they are coded as dangerous, illicit, and illiberal threat to stability, a pre-insurgent population.

Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement with China in 2011. The court found that until impacts were 'non-speculative', the Canadian government had no duty to consult prior to ratifying dedicated investment agreement despite existing indigenous title. See the case note from North Rose Fullbright, (January 2015) <<http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/ca/en/knowledge/publications/125419>>. See also Andrea Palframan's article at Rabble, "Hupacasath First Nation vs. Canada-China FIPA Agreement" (12 June 2014), <<http://rabble.ca/news/2014/06/hupacasath-first-nation-vs-canada-china-fipa-agreement>>.

⁴⁴ The book, *Disrobing the Aboriginal Industry: The Deception Behind Indigenous Cultural Preservation*, was welcomed by some as a check on the 'unrealistic' expectations of Canada's indigenous communities while pointing to the failure of band and tribal chiefs to care for their people. For a rebuke of the book and its tendency to re-cast the racializing and civilizing attitudes of settler colonialism in a more duplicitous way—a rebuke with which I agree entirely—see Leanne Simpson's review in *Wicazo Sa Review* (Spring 2010).

Counterinsurgency has many histories in Canada, many of which relate to indigenous sovereignty and the Canadian government's historical desire to usurp and undermine it. It is useful here to recall Foucault's reference the waging of "silent war[s]" to reinscribe that relationship of force" (Foucault 1976 [2003]: 15), where the war by the Canadian state on indigenous peoples is silent only because it occurs out of sight and beyond the everyday life of most Canadians. According to the 388-page executive summary of Canada's Truth and Reconciliation Commission written by Justice Murray Sinclair, which focused specifically on residential schools, the central goals of Canada's Aboriginal policy "can best be described as cultural genocide" (Sinclair 2015: 1).⁴⁵ When settler colonialism driven by land speculation and natural resource extraction—the political economy of fur, hides, agriculture, lumber, and minerals—arrived in Western Canada, treaty agreements and the implementation of the reservation system functioned as segregating and dividing practices aimed at isolating indigenous communities and traditional ecological knowledge. This bears repeating: the assimilationist agenda of the colonial Canadian state targeted populations that produced their own sophisticated governmentalities and ways of life with different methods for organizing the world. This occurred in the context of continuous encounters and engagements between relatively autonomous nations and the state of Canada,⁴⁶ which occurred in a wider historical context of European expansion of imperialism and the deepening penetration of the prairies by capitalism. Indigenous peoples on the prairie, as in the rest of Canada, were not static or telluric features of the environment; rather, they adjusted to the influence of settler biopolitics and were compelled to negotiate and navigate a changing world in a complex frontier environment, adapting to the dispersion of 'civilizing' stability operations of the time. The expulsion of communities from unceded territory and repressive military violence cleared the way for waves of European immigrants (many of 'lesser' racial pedigree than 'white Canadians,' according to colonial

⁴⁵"For over a century, the central goals of Canada's Aboriginal policy were to eliminate Aboriginal governments; ignore Aboriginal rights; terminate the Treaties; and, through a process of assimilation, cause Aboriginal peoples to cease to exist as distinct legal, social, cultural, religious, and racial entities in Canada. The establishment and operation of residential schools were a central element of this policy, which can best be described as 'cultural genocide'" (Sinclair 2015: 1).

⁴⁶ The new Liberal government in Canada, with a newly named Ministry of Indigenous Affairs and North Government, has proclaimed a new era of nation-to-nation engagement based on recognition, rights, respect, co-operation, and partnership.

hierarchies) to occupy the land in exchange for citizenship, pioneers as paramilitary occupation forces using agriculture to convert space. Insofar as Canadian authorities responded to claims of indigenous sovereignty before and after the Northwest Uprising in 1885 by violating the numbered treaties— asymmetric documents empowering the government at the expense of communities on the land—what we see is late-19th century village stability that intervenes by containing and quarantining First Nations on reserves where they had 'access'—as leverage, as underdevelopment, as violence—to education, health care, and basic nutrition. This is a familiar biopolitical technology of counterinsurgency for penetrating local environments, which in late 19th century Canada meant erasing indigenous peoples and 'absorbing' them into the white settler population. Again, this was part of a wider imperial-colonial network of racial violence to correct deficiencies in the emerging global system of biopolitical order.

As James Daschuk outlines in his book *Clearing the Plains* (2013), the federal government was indifferent to lethal infectious diseases that decimated indigenous populations, letting them die. The speculative commodification of bison hides to feed global markets in the 1870s and 1880s acted as weaponized capitalism. Famine and hunger were leveraged to control the population with the government of John A. McDonald pushing the limits to starvation to reduce expenses and induce dependency and destruction (Daschuk 2013: 134), based on statistical calculations to determine where the real caloric and nutritional 'red line' existed. This process flies in the face of the medicine chest clause in Treaty Six (central Saskatchewan and Alberta; 1876-1878), which guaranteed access to health care for indigenous communities on the prairies. While many communities were compelled to transition to farming on reserves, they were limited in terms of where they could get their products to market. Based on government records and statistical evidence, Daschuk concludes that those communities with the least amount of contact with government-backed biopolitical technologies were often the healthiest (166). While the famine-disease cycle was biopolitically produced and engineered, it gave rise to racialized forms of power-knowledge influenced by eugenics, which simply deemed indigenous people as genetically predisposed to disease, which in turn implied a moral defect in relation to non-Western ways of life that then required correction. This produced the civilizing logic of 'killing the Indian in the child'

specific to the disciplinary technology of the residential school system that commenced in the 1870s and continued to its height in the 1930s, which forcibly removed and detained over 150 000 indigenous children from their families. When Chief Theresa Spence began a hunger strike in the fall of 2012 to protest the conditions on reserves and the federal neglect of the Northern Ontario reserve of Attawapiskat,⁴⁷ she was calling to attention the failure of the federal government to meet its treaty obligations and to a biopolitical village stability program that ruled through fomenting insecurity for over a century. Conservative critics attacked Spence and justified government inaction. Arguments oscillated between a number of equivocations: customary indigenous ways of rule through band council structures are based on corruption and nepotism, and only indigenous leaders can be blamed; the event was nothing more than self-indulgent grandstanding, a manufactured spectacle by a rich chief; indigenous ways of life are inadequate for life in a postmodern global world; all reserves are not created equal, and this is a belated community that failed to take its destiny into its own hands—all attitudes that recast the same settler colonial and racist practices of 1880 in 2012.

The CF's 2007 working draft of the counterinsurgency manual openly cited indigenous communities and anti-capitalist social movements as likely sources for domestic insurgencies (Elmer 2007: ¶8-10; Elmer 2010). Doug Bland, a retired CF colonel and former chair of defence management studies at Queen's University, authored *Uprising* (2010), a speculative fiction that flirted with the prospects of a widespread indigenous insurrection in Canada, essentially expanding on the manual's predictions. Published by Dundurn Press, which is the publisher of choice for Canadian military intellectuals aligned with the CF, the book reads like an exercise in doctrine and training literature where the story is a fantasy for some 'lessons learned' module on domestic counterinsurgency. In the book, military and police units are deployed to deal with the uprising but are ultimately undermined by spineless bureaucrats and the ineptitude of the Canadian government. If Canadian counterinsurgents undertook their advanced seminar on Foucault I tarried with in chapter three, Bland's book would be on the reading list. After the emergence of the Idle No More in late 2012, the book gained some notoriety

⁴⁷ As a testament to difficulties of reservation life, more than half (56%) of Canada's indigenous population live in urban environments. See the Aboriginal Affairs and North Development fact sheet, "Urban Aboriginal Peoples" (2014), <<https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100014265/1369225120949>>.

as a guide for anticipating possible outcomes. In her review of the book, conservative columnist Christine Blatchford opines that Canadian political authorities tend to "bungle" responses to indigenous blockades or protests and laments that "some reserves are islands unto themselves" in a situation where all Canadians should be afraid of the "awful status quo" (Blatchford 2013). Yet, she implies more repressive measures may court more success. The disruption of the status quo that comes from actual redress and *reparative justice* seems to be what Blatchford fears. The book's identification of indigenous disenfranchisement by and disenchantment with the Canadian state, and the antagonisms internal to rural indigenous communities now the subject of biopolitical and economic imperatives by corporate entreaties, are accurate. The failure of the Canadian state to recognize the constitutional supremacy of sovereign indigenous nations over formal governmental and legislative measures is also accurate. Yet, for all its predictive verisimilitude, the narrative is more about the anxieties specific to a particular energy-driven Canadian biopolitics and to elites who support and continue it by other means. *National Post* columnist John Iveson, remarking more recently on Bland's research paper *Cooperation or Conflict*, worries about the "grim realities" of Bland's findings regarding the "'feasibility' conditions for a violent native uprising" (Iveson 2013: ¶4). Iveson compares Bland's report to another report outlining the cooperation and collaboration on natural resource development, which would apparently repair a history of cultural, territorial, and ecological displacement. Yet, the neoliberal view returns the question to 'education' and to abstract notions of justice that continue to ignore the material realities of indigenous people in Canada. In other words, Bland, Blatchford, and Iveson are writing the prose of counterinsurgency for 21st century Canada.

Bland's narrative outlines how an indigenous insurgency would seize specific to Canada's critical energy infrastructure, a fearful prospect for an industry with thousands of surface and subsurface installations and almost 250 000 km of pipelines.⁴⁸ While these are obviously sensitive sites for the industry with repercussions for the myriad 'stakeholders', the logic of Bland's fantasy assumes and naturalizes the jurisdiction of the Canadian state and the global corporations its policies serve to ensure

⁴⁸ From the J.T. Ryan's entry for "Pipeline" online in *The Canadian Encyclopedia*, <<http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/pipeline/>>.

primitive accumulation. Due to the often indifferent and unconstitutional measures taken by the Canadian federal government, direct action has followed from long traditions of resistance by indigenous communities land. For instance, the Mi'kmaq blockade of contractors undertaking exploratory drilling and seismic imaging for shale gas hydraulic fracturing (fracking) on the lands of the Elsipotog First Nation in New Brunswick (see above) was the culmination of organized direct actions over 2012 and 2013. When the blockade organizers and protestors were served a court injunction brought by energy companies involved, events in October 2013 saw an aggressive response by RCMP officers and paramilitary tactical units assaulting the blockade and trying to enforce removal. As journalist and indigenous lawyer Chelsea Vowel argues, the mainstream media coverage of the event delved into the same racist and colonial stereotypes about dangerous, belated, and unruly Indians with little context given the history of the protest and the actions of the companies and governments involved (Vowel 2013).

Furthermore, as indicated in heavily redacted internal reports from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service obtained under the Access to Information Act, Canadian military, intelligence, and policing services have been preparing a 'whole-of-government' approach to this 'problem' in collaboration with the federal government and Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development (Ling 2014b). An internal RCMP report from 2013 referred to the Idle No More movement "like bacteria, it has grown a life of its own...this is one issue that is not going to go away...the escalation of violence is ever near" (Barrera 2015: ¶6-7)—an infectious threat. CSIS has a mandate for surveilling and monitoring security threats outside of Canada (which is currently being revised to allow it to focus inward through C-51), and while the domestic remit to monitor Idle No More (INM) is beyond its legal jurisdiction, this is likely changing. The Ministry of National Defence's Counter-Intelligence Unit spent 2013 focused on indigenous communities generally (Ling 2014a). Emails sent in early June 2014 from the joint Government Operations Centre in Ottawa to all federal departments indicated that Canada's security establishment was increasing the scope of surveillance and intelligence generation of INM and other indigenous activists and leaders (Pugliese 2014). Leaked

documents also suggest increased RCMP surveillance of high-visibility indigenous activists and leaders, among them grassroots organizer Clayton Thomas-Mueller and Ryerson University professor Pam Palmater, head of the Centre for Indigenous Government (Barrera 2014; Palmater 2012). According to other Access to Information requests, the federal government was surveiling and spying environmental and social justice advocacy groups actively speaking out about climate change, petroculturalism, and Canada's corporate energy apparatus (Millar 2013). More specifically, documents indicate that the National Energy Board, an alleged independent federal agency, coordinated intelligence gathering efforts for CSIS, the RCMP, the Ministry of Natural Resources, and oil companies like TransCanada and Enbridge during its joint review panel hearings on the proposed Northern Gateway pipeline (¶3).⁴⁹

Egregious as it may be, this is not surprising given the Canadian government's willingness to deride and delegitimize any and all detractors to the 'energy sector' that is at the capitalist core of Canada's critical infrastructure and its government's self-declared 'energy superpower' status. In 2012, then-Minister of Natural Resources Joe Oliver characterized the alliance of environmental, indigenous, and social justice groups opposing the Gateway project as a collection of dangerous radicals, internal enemies backed by shady foreign interests who, "driven by an ideological imperative," seek to undermine the self-evident wealth and security of Canada (Payton 2012: ¶13). Since then, the Canadian Revenue Agency has undertaken a number of audits of the groups targeted by Oliver's comments in what is clearly a punitive response. The language of infiltration and infestation, of exposure to a dangerous contaminant compromising the integrity of the interior social economic spaces of Canada, exploits the codes of terrorism and insurgency by conflating any opposition as a threat against which government must be vigilant. This governmental regime of Truth says nothing about ecological racism or the ways in which rural indigenous communities—whether Cree and Dene bands in Northern

⁴⁹ The Northern Gateway Pipeline, proposed by Enbridge, is a large pipeline running from Fort McMurray in the Alberta tar sands across the Rocky and Coast Mountains to the Pacific coast in Prince Rupert, B.C. The proposed pipeline is intended to ensure the flow of tar sand oil exports to China, with a new port terminal proposed in nearby Kitimat built to handle supertankers in the ecologically-sensitive and narrow Douglas Channel. Millar's report also cites how federal agencies targeted opposition to Kinder Morgan's Trans Mountain Pipeline expansion in Vancouver, to proposed liquefied natural gas facilities, and the Keystone XL pipeline. We should also consider here reversal of Line 9 in Southern Ontario, an outdated pipeline which is being slated to bring heavy tar sand oil to Ontario and Quebec for processing and upgrading, and the proposed Energy East Pipeline slated to connect Western Ontario and the Maritimes.

Alberta or the Aamjiwnaang First Nation in Sarnia—are sentinel devices, populations whose ways of life are knowledge-effects and relays for climate change and the environmental entailments of aggressive resource extraction (c.f. Whartington 2014ab).⁵⁰ It says nothing of how local ecological defence is actually affirmative village stability from an egalitarian and emancipatory perspective. It says nothing either about how the Canadian state subsidizes what are already extraordinary profits for foreign companies. It avoids foregrounding how Canada has become a rogue state itself (Mark Jacquard, in Panetta 2013: ¶5; Elizabeth May, in Payton 2012: ¶29),⁵¹ infiltrated by the global oil/gas apparatus to the detriment of Canada and its land base (Nikiforuk 2014 & 2010) and now enjoying the status of being the worst among OECD and top sixty industrialized nations with respect to climate change initiatives, ecological protection, and environmental performance (Burck, Marten, and Bals 2014: 4; Waldie 2013). Whether this changes with the ouster of successive Conservative governments remains to be seen.

In the debate over C-51, the intersection of counterinsurgency, security, and critical infrastructure—whether financial, economic, or resource-based—indicates the need to discursively and physically arrest opposition to extreme energy and petrocapiatalism. According to documents made available by Greenpeace, RCMP reports from January 2014 name an "anti-petroleum" movement and reveal, first, concern about so-called "militants and violent extremists" and second, an antagonistic

⁵⁰ For almost ten years in Alberta, Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation and the Mikisew Cree First Nations (among others) have published the results of studies arguing that environmental and medical fallout of the Alberta tar sands are affecting communities downstream on the Athabasca River with contaminated water and high loads of carcinogenic heavy metals that wreak havoc on human endocrine systems. While academic critics of the studies often cite problems with methodology and statistical analysis—notably, a 2010 Royal Society of Canada study on tar sands pollution cited a lack of industry monitoring but dismissed claims about downstream effects, a finding which has since been called into question by other environmental scientists—band leaders and other university researchers argue that the critics are often biased themselves given they are usually based in Alberta universities tied closely to energy sector money. For a recent exchange, see CBC News (7 July 2014), "Study Suggests Link Between Oilsands and Fort Chip Illnesses," <<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/Edmonton /study-suggests-link-between-oilsands-and-fort-chip-illnesses-1.2698995>>. The Aamjiwnaang First Nation in Sarnia is surrounded by the notorious 'Chemical Valley' on the St. Clair River, with their unceded reserve land now the proposed site for the Enbridge terminal anchoring the Line 9 reversal. See Toban Black and Sonia Grant (2 January 2015), "On the Front Lines of the Great Lakes," *Briarpatch Magazine*, <<http://briarpatchmagazine.com/articles/view/on-the-front-lines>>.

⁵¹ Jacquard was appointed in 2006 to draft climate policy and head up the federal government's National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, and he has since emerged as staunch critic of the Harper Conservatives and Canada's extraction-centered approach. May is a Minister of Parliament and the leader of the Green Party of Canada.

government hostile to any group or community questioning the sovereignty of resource extraction (McCarthy 2015: ¶2-3). A Press Progress analysis of the same report argues that the federal government's is attempting to nullify environmental concerns about extreme energy by dubbing environmentalism as anti-petroleum; further, the report relies on non-attributed claims from social media, on *Toronto Sun* opinion columnists for intelligence, and on the pro-development *Financial Post* for financial data (Press Progress 2015). This strategy wilfully blurs the line between legitimate lawful dissent and actions defined as terrorism, coding as radical or terroristic anything not conforming to peaceful opposition. According to Greenpeace campaigner Keith Stewart:

This document identifies anyone who is concerned about climate change as a potential, if not actual—the lines are very blurry—‘anti-petroleum extremist’ looking to advance their ‘anti-petroleum ideology’...The parts that are genuinely alarming about this document are how it lays the groundwork for all kinds of state-sanctioned surveillance and dirty tricks should C-51 be passed. (Stewart, in McCarthy 2014: ¶14)

As advocates of environmental defence and opponents to C-51's effects suggest, this legislation insulates the oil and gas industry's operations and obscures any debate about climate change, capitalism, and ecological destruction. It actively designs and operationalizes enemies and insurgents to fit the systemic design of a Canadian biopolitical and neoliberal narrative. On one hand, the unceasing demonization of indigenous rogues and their insurgent allies, whether settlers or environmentalists, indicates an almost *a-liberal* type of rule from the government of Canada premised on repression; on the other, the liberal desire to recognize and integrate indigenous peoples in Canada—within the acceptable bandwidth, making First Nations and Metis peoples equally unequal under the sign of neoliberal inclusion—nullifies the status of indigenous people and the reparative obligations of the Canadian state after the damaging legacy of colonialism.

When the sovereignty of critical energy infrastructures outstrips the sovereignty of indigenous communities, renders questions or doubts as insurgent, and indexes environmental destruction to financial speculation and primitive accumulation, we are talking about an envelopment and atmospherics of a different kind. Pipelines, with subsurface thoroughfares and subterranean conduits that create unique types of 'logistics space', have their own vivisectionist politics of verticality, smoothing barriers

and creating hollowed out land and volumetric space, and they induce a different domain of remote split operations linking different geographies. These pipelines are also deeper than affordances laid out in the treaties, where surface rights to the land extend only to the depth of a plough.⁵² Chokepoints, whether technical, financial, or biopolitical, are dangerous and any means necessary to treat or deal with the blockages are, as Cowen argues, increasingly exempt from political debate. Instead, they are referred to the remit of security to protect these seam spaces, justified by the logic of necessity despite the material, biopolitical, and ecological fall-out. Canada's energy infrastructure is more porous and less stable than the energy sector cares to admit; pipeline leaks and spills are daily occurrences but often occur in remote and rural areas. The high-visibility event that was the Lac Megantic train derailment in July 2013 served as an affective heuristic regarding the implications of oil, logistical failures, and both environmental and human destruction. After the hand brakes on a parked engine failed, the train rolled into the Quebec town with a number of tanker cars derailing and exploding, killing 47 residents. Questions about the transport route and the integrity of the tankers, which were carrying hydraulically fractured oil from the shale-based Bakken oil formation that stretches across Montana and North Dakota and into southern Manitoba and Saskatchewan, in turn pollinated a larger debate about the safety and the volatility of oil infrastructure and its proximity to—and embedding in—urban environments (e.g., the Line 9 reversal in southern Ontario). Yet, the event also gave pipeline advocates in the wider energy sector a chance to tout the environmental and safety-related benefits of increased recourse to pipelines—a lesser evil. In 2015, a leaked unpublished parliamentary report pointed to a lack of industry and regulatory knowledge about the toxicological effects of heavy oil (bitumen) on waterways (Weber 2015). Federal research from an oilsands advisory committee found that tailings were seeping into and contaminating ground water in the Athabasca River despite industry claims to the contrary (CBC 2014d). Further, a new study published in the scientific journal *Nature* concluded that most of Canada's heavy and crude oil should be left underground in order to avoid atmospheric warming

⁵² This refers to one of the three things—pine for houses, grass for animals, and land to the depth of six inches—as requested by the Treaty Commissioner during Treaty Six negotiations in 1876 with Plains and Wood Cree peoples and Assiniboine peoples. See Sharon Venne (2002), "Understanding Treaty Six," in *Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on equity, Law, and Respect for Difference* (ed. Michael Asch; UBC Press), p. 193.

and climate change (Dyer 2015). Stating that unexploited reserves are unusable is a dissenting opinion and an insurgent knowledge formation according to the extraction-government apparatus.

Here, the ecological and biopolitical overlap, and the authority and security given to critical energy infrastructure rather than the population it is alleged to serve indicates a utopian art of government that dreams of having no population to administer. Counterinsurgency, energy, and biopower unite in a common operating picture. The architecture of pipelines and energy, with its systemic operational design to conduct the flow of oil, becomes an architecture of sacrifice, collateralization, and—given the resurgence of popular defense and ecological struggle—confrontation between forms of life. In her essay on biopolitics, the Anthropocene, and climate change, Hannah Knox describes how climate science inadvertently discovers population, a knowledge-effect produced by considering a problem that is global and geological in scope (Knox 2014: 414). While climate science is framed as the way to stop extreme energy extraction, it explains the cause of climate change as a species-level issue, indexed to the generic and monolithic human population causing damage for 40 000 odd years that is effectively an 'empty population' to ground a larger material environmental effect (415). In other words, Knox argues that to ascribe climate change to the Anthropocene is to ignore the different systems created by different sectors of the human population, which is to ignore the way in which capitalism—as a system of social relations; as a system of domination and subordination; as an imperial, colonial, and global system—has produced and accelerated the outcomes. Citing 40 000 years obscures the last 250 and fails to account for how capitalism has and does segregate and divide global populations and prioritize access to fossil fuel infrastructures at the expense of many o/Others, whether they be human, non-human, or atmospheric. Knox is not problematizing the fact of anthropogenic climate change; rather, she argues the population effect (the era named the Anthropocene) generated by climate science fails to generate opportunities for social justice, energy alternatives, and different protocols and procedures for ways of life (423; c.f. Szemen 2014). Put in the terms of anti-capitalist ecologist Andreas Malm, the Anthropocene is an alibi to cover military, state, and political economic violence indexed to capitalism:

The difference in energy consumption between a subsistence pastoralist in the Sahel and an average Canadian may easily be larger than 1,000-fold — and that is an average Canadian, not the owner of five houses, three SUVs, and a private airplane... [A] person's imprint on the atmosphere varies tremendously depending on where she is born. Humanity, as a result, is far too slender an abstraction to carry the burden of culpability... Species-thinking on climate change only induces paralysis. (Malm 2015 ¶31-32, 40)

Dipesh Chakrabarty, writing also about climate change, suggests that this species-level collectivity—an "us"—that is united in potential planetary catastrophe must be universalized but only in ways that refuse to subsume local particularities via what he calls "negative universal history" (Chakrabarty 2009: 222), where realizing the biological and geological constitution of ourselves is an exercise that displaces easy categorical equivocation of who and what "we" are. Ultimately, and in a more hopeful vein, the 'bad' biopolitics of security, counterinsurgency, and extreme petrocultural pursued in Canada also implies the eventual coming of a 'good' biopolitics of deep environmental awareness, decolonization, and different realizations about the basis of a population's powers, in Canada or globally, after long periods of damage and ruin. Yet, realizing the latter arguably means realizing the partisan terms of confrontation entailed by forms of life engaged in civil war, which counterinsurgency prosecutes while collateralizing it to the point of making its damaging effects indiscriminate. It may not look like a war, but making intelligible the slower speeds and the ambient effects of political violence across a "vast field of action" is precisely the challenge of countering the spirit of counterinsurgency.

Conclusion: The Prospects for Future Force, or Notes on Camouflage

Just because it happens out of sight or beyond the register of perception does not mean it ceases to occur—this goes for the war in Afghanistan, for counterinsurgency's boomerang effects, and for the ontology of war in the broadest sense. This dissertation has interrogated and made intelligible a specific type of warfare waged by North Atlantic states, which employs firepower and biopower to collateralize fighting. It has also used counterinsurgency as an analyzer of power relations to identify the displacement of liberal war within liberal states on the North Atlantic basin.

As stated early in the introduction of this project, my aim throughout has been to make intelligible a diagram of coordinated military practices mobilizing differential concentrations of violence in foreign wars that are less about colonization and conquest and more about achieving influence, isolation, insulation, and integration. The expeditionary war in Afghanistan was a smoothing and shaping operation on a global scale. Using the theory and historical account of biopolitics, my method has been to interrogate population-centered counterinsurgency through Foucault to explain its own internal limit-attitude and displace it according to genealogy. Perhaps in a novel way, I have unrestricted Foucault and collateralized his work to make legible some facets of North Atlantic military affairs and a more specific type of military violence indexed to liberal rule and liberal war. Foucault can be used to infiltrate and sabotage the logic, the aesthetic equipment, and the biopolitical conduct of contemporary counterinsurgency and its repertoires of violence. In another register, this could arguably provide intellectual combat power to counterinsurgents that colonize different canons and academic traditions frontier ripe for reconnaissance and occupation. This is a contradictory consequence of the work, a boomerang, where my naming and framing possibly enables, should it be seized, the continuum of operations critiqued throughout.

Further, as with any work on war and violence, I have reservations about the affordances offered to me in relation to the narratives I foreground and develop. This is not to indulge guilt regarding privilege (or the self-referential privilege to obsess about my privilege); rather, it is to

consider in political and historical terms of the analysis I supply and the system within which it may circulate. Marco Roth, in his essay "The Drone Philosopher" (Roth 2013), wonders if the critical interpretations he furnishes about the contemporary cycle of North Atlantic warfare merely follow from the same set of biopolitical asymmetries that enable the wars themselves. Roth writes:

When it comes to actually committing thoughts to paper and attempting to make an existentially responsible job of it, my sense is that no matter what register I choose—polemical, realist, satirical, exoticizing—it all comes out wrong in the end. With so much real suffering occurring for so many stupid reasons, my very civilian efforts to picture the war as it now enters its twelfth year become obscene by their very nature as imaginative acts. (Roth 2013: 27)

While there are no guarantees, this could become part of the new prose of counterinsurgency. It also may or may not become a responsible act of imagination, new equipment for a renewed critical occupation depending on the results of its cascading effects.

Contemporary counterinsurgency was anticipated over fifty years ago. French counterinsurgents thought with the limit-attitude in the 1960s and realized a "vast field of action" for modern warfare—territorializing a theatre of operations and regularizing irregular operations, laying the foundation for the paradigm of systemic operational design to unrestrict the flow of violence employed in acute and ambient ways. They 'missed' but seemed to have mimicked Foucault's eventual population-centered project. Given Foucault's genealogy of biopower is always-already constituted by and through war and security, the link to counterinsurgency is not hard to make, especially if one argues that counterinsurgency is the missing interpretive key for liberal government today. While critical literatures in the interdisciplinary humanities have focused on orthodox arguments about perpetual war and the biopolitics of a permanent war society, this project has extended those terms to consider the biopoliticization of military-induced battlespace in foreign operating environments and tracking its drift back to the domestic environments of core capitalist states, particularly in North America. Certainly, considering the political economy of war reveals specific features of military violence today: a relationship between the state, society, and the military-industrial-cultural complex ('the Trinity'); the need by North Atlantic states especially to assert power and inject friction into global systems as a feature of capitalist accumulation; the enablement of productive military disruptions and

their ongoing exceptional employment as state policy; the justification of interventions potentially everywhere, where aggregations of data generate intelligence based on signatures to create an extralegal fantasy targets walk into; and the conduct of occupations and engagements to securitize the logistical networks of neoliberal financialized capital along with 'democratic' client states and their populations, who become the critical infrastructure for sacrifice and risk transfer. The biopolitical dimensions of North Atlantic military warfighting that I have tracked augment and extend this analysis, continuing it in ways that do not contradict or annul more orthodox accounts of war in the critical humanities but rather indicate how liberal war's means and ends are increasingly indistinguishable. The martial grammar and the military conduct of the war in Afghanistan, understood as ground-up counterinsurgency waged to stabilize a frontier zone in relation to the territorial imaginary of risk and threat specific to states in the American orbit, has not necessarily changed what is possible with respect to the ontology of liberal war so much as made apparent the collapse between what constitutes fighting and what such fighting is supposed to achieve. This is arguably the changing expression of military violence produced by North Atlantic militaries, and this project has worked to present this fact as something that has been unrepresentable, camouflaged so as to remain undetected.

To talk about the spirit of counterinsurgency is to talk about how contemporary practices of liberal war and technologies of biopower function, and how they produce their own knowledge-effects, whether for military operators, for government, or for critics. Further, to talk about the spirit of counterinsurgency in and beyond its military contexts proper is to question in a more circumspect way the validity and the limits of biopolitics as a paradigm to question the loud and quiet forms of violence employed both in foreign and domestic environments. This is a substantial consideration. If Foucault warned against the 'totalizing procedures' of critical paradigms in favour of displacing them, I am left wondering if this project has failed to fulfill this task. Given counterinsurgency is an anxious system with an atmospheric and environmental remit that detects a pandemonium of signals and signs always-already, what of critical system that inevitably and recursively creeps back to rendering all problems as biopolitical? What then of an analysis and interpretation that perceives the operational logic of

counterinsurgency everywhere, coincident with life itself—an argument both furnished and questioned in the dissertation? How can the concept of population be affirmatively reconceived beyond its dis- and re-memberment as series of habits and data signatures, and how does it differ from the idea of a people or a multitude? What are the biopolitical elements of war generally and in more specific terms, and are all wars not in some way fought over biopolitical matters—that is, over different forms and ways of life, and over different procedures and protocols for living? Is politics then always-already eclipsed by the biopolitical? This is a rhetorical question, because to some extent I argue this is the case, though the wider implications of such a condition are not yet clear to me. Further, in describing and exposing counterinsurgency as a complex mixture of different speeds and intensities of violence that territorialize kill sacks and life preservation zones often in close proximity, what equivocations does this analytic framework inadvertently make in if not comparing then at least juxtaposing how different global populations are segregated and divided in decentralized ways, sapped and ruled through damage but in disproportionate ways? How does the limit-attitude and forensic gaze of the dissertation flatten the world and enframe it in a very specific way, imposing a utilitarian hold on material events that, in their own complex ecologies of life and violence and war, defy easy categorization but which become a standing reserve for the fuzzy conclusions outlined here?

Bodies, communities, and forms of life are registers for the environments around them. As Eyal Weizman recently remarked in a lecture on forensic architecture and the political work of making covert military violence perceptible, buildings are force fields always under stress. The same can be said for the biopolitical *milieu* and the bandwidth of behaviour that unfolds in ordinary and extraordinary space. Bodies and their relations to their habitat and equipment are relational force fields for stress and pressure marking the coercive and persuasive power of violence that is war but which is often camouflaged as something else. How this damage and war is inscribed on different bodies varies greatly, and so it is problematic to make sweeping generalizations about the ontology of war and the state of war in contemporary terms. For instance, the difficult and bloody multi-actor war in Syria and Iraq is increasingly closer to conventional conceptions of warfare, with open engagements between belligerents

that are not necessarily equally matched but engaged in more symmetrical and reciprocal terms. The killing and the casualties over four years have been terribly high. The wars are being fought ostensibly over ways of life and ways of rule, and local military organization involved—state militaries, militant groups, popular mobilization units, people's defence groups—all fight with a mix of regular and irregular tactics, designing operations with mix of firepower and some biopower, with an eye to cascading effects and to the narratives that frame their activities. In addition, North Atlantic militaries are involved, yet this is arguably not a liberal war.

Insofar as liberal war is concerned—where war is waged as a corrective to disorder to convert or pacify dangerous forms of life by killing some of them and making others live—the liberal governmentality of North Atlantic states tends to imagine the latest cycle of adaptive and contingent expeditionary wars fought as necessary and proportional in order to counter insurgency and achieve stability as part of a larger unifying act in a planetary context. This logic, as military positivism with its own aesthetic equipment, employs war to unify a theory of the global—to literally enframe a world picture. When the radical collective Tiqqun argues that life itself under liberal rule is coincident with civil war, the North Atlantic version of population-counterinsurgency realizes this well in advance, whether when conceived concretely as a military subset of warfare or as a wider spirit specific to the biopolitical present that envisions a global population. The practice of liberal war presumes custody over the life it envelops and treats, attempting to organize it with and by war, where war is collateralized into the environments and circuits of everyday life, merging with capital, logistics, and discourses of resilience. This continuum of martial operations creates loud and quiet campaigns targeting and mobilizing the war powers on 'low-boil' but inherent in different populations (what Brian Massumi calls *ontopower* [2015]), domesticating some and compelling others to fight, who in doing so expose themselves to an asymmetric response that is justified as coded as proportionate, necessary, and restrained. Asymmetry here is understood as a disparity in military force and the ability to mobilize violence *as well as* the disparity in the control of the few over the sheer scale of a planetary many, reversing Appadurai's question posed a decade ago about which small numbers we should really fear.

In her book on the liberal imagination and the interventionist conduct of "policing wars," Caroline Holmqvist argues that wars like Afghanistan and Iraq were and remain conceptualized as correctives to disorder, whether in local or global scales. Holmqvist directs us to consider how this embedded idea—war as a corrective, as a method of taking custody and conducting and sorting select populations—reveals something about the incidence of liberal war and the operations of liberal government and how this ontology of war, as a concept and idea, "interacts with much broader ideas about society, politics and the self" (Holmqvist 2014: 6). Here, we can recall how Brad Evans argued that liberal war—another name for what Holmqvist describes—is litigious and ontotheological. It has a religiosity to it and a built-in conversion narrative of redemption. If we wish to ask what is being targeted to correct and to pacify, the answer we find is the war power in us all. What Dillon and Reid call the emergency of emergence coincides with the capacity to create alternative forms of order, which in turn may challenge the 'acceptable bandwidth' of what a population is and can or should become—and who or what can be converted into a person, a friend, or member of a population as such. Put another way, life itself is dangerous because it is always empowered in physical and metaphysical terms; to be productive in the context of biopolitical governmentality described by Foucault, life must be able to differentiate and proliferate even wildly sometimes, but not too much. Flexible life requires flexible war. The power and vitality of life must be conducted and channeled, subject to the efficacious and productive modulation of mental, caloric, and biological capacities. This is the dream of liberal rule, and together liberal rule and liberal war perceive this life as inherently belligerent, and the pastoral and police powers internal to the spirit of counterinsurgency and its different practices of violence aim to steer the population to more predictable outcomes amenable to *ruliness*. In this respect, just as military-waged counterinsurgency is predicated on an empire of signs where every signal has potential significance if registered and decoded with the proper relay, the spirit of counterinsurgency inherent in liberal rule perceives and inscribes littoral environments everywhere, contested in-between spaces that require engagements for the adaptation and the dispersion of operations. With concerns similar to Holmqvist, Alessandro Dal Lago writes:

As long as it is assumed that ours is the only (legitimate) culture, the others will always be considered to lack culture or to be bearers of abnormal or monstrous cultures (as in the case of fundamentalism). Therefore, asymmetrical war is not fought against different individuals, but against non-persons. (Dal Lago 2010: 31)

If "we" (the "we" that is the "our") opt to take a more necropolitical approach to this passage, we may realize that, following Butler, Mbembe, and Agamben, this exclusion is something shared in common, where passage into the enclosure of care is determined by the triage or treatment deployed, which in turn segregates and separates, quarantining and immunizing some while exposing, excising, and disappearing others.

This project has covered a lot of ground. Its philosophical and rhetorical battlesphere has produced a cascade of effects just as the methods and processes it has intended to critique. The first chapter laid out the theoretical and biopolitical basis of the project, situating it conceptually in relation to Foucault's analysis of biopower and methodologically alongside Foucault's accounts genealogy so as to undertake a critical ontology of counterinsurgency's present. I argued that we would be wise to continue to consider counterinsurgency even as it fades from public view and as thinking in the radical humanities is moving toward considerations of drones and other types of remote warfare. Counterinsurgency both in practice and as a line of intellectual labour and effort has fertilized another adaptive ripple in the revolution in military affairs, which is otherwise known as the continual semiotic and environmental refinement of employing organized violence.

The second chapter considered the military doctrine and knowledge production apparatus in light of innovations and 'lessons learned' generated by the conduct of counterinsurgency and how it is imagined as a more efficient form of organized violence. Using the dialectic of enlightenment, Foucault's notion of the limit-attitude, and Lyotard's conception of postmodern knowledge, I located counterinsurgency within the narrative framework of the revolution of military affairs, identifying the aesthetic dimension of counterinsurgency, which distributes and makes sensible and intelligible a specific type of warfare that mixes new and old practices and knowledges. In particular, I considered the realization of modern warfare by French military intellectuals following their decline and defeat in the postwar/postcolonial era. Focusing on the military conceptions of battlesphere and battlespace and

following from the history of logistics and networked-centered war, the chapter considered the discourse and practice of operational art and the emerging employment of systemic operational design as expressions of military intelligence. This led to explicating how counterinsurgency, with the mix of firepower and biopower, actually collateralizes war to envelop targets (be they objects or populations) and actively 'unrestricts' warfare by inserting violence into the *milieu* and infrastructure of everyday life to make life live. The counterinsurgency-related doctrinal architectures of contingency operations and adaptive dispersed operations are emblematic of these processes; they reveal the increasingly atmospheric and environmental remit of military violence that is both abstract and tangible as a production of affects, communications, and forces. As an approach that exploits the principles of proportionality, necessity, and restraint—lesser evils—I argued that counterinsurgency (coincident with innovations in military violence like drones and the global footprint of special forces direct action) makes war indiscriminate and allows its conduct to unfold as an effects-based speculative practice.

The third chapter served as a bridge. It explored the missed encounter between Foucault and counterinsurgents and what are two parallel population-centered theories of life and power. It offered an overview of Foucault's work on biopower and biopolitics, locating it as the missing 'interpretive key' for counterinsurgents who 'do' Foucault without knowing it, if in an inverted way and for violent ends. The chapter moved through Foucault's biopolitical paradigm, discussing his engagement with Clausewitz and outlining a number of shortcomings with respect to the genealogy of biopower/biopolitics—namely, the lack of any substantive engagement with the 'epistemological ruptures' of settler colonialism and the biopolitics of European imperialism. The chapter then considered how, in the 1960s, the increasingly population-centered theorist of power and order and the emerging postcolonial population-centered conception of modern warfare 'missed' one another. Given the contemporary predilection to integrate non-military thinking, the chapter addressed the almost non-existent footprint of Foucault in contemporary military doctrine and literature as odd. The chapter then turned to Afghanistan, offering an account of the war according to theories of liberal war and global civil war before addressing the messianic return of the revised counterinsurgency doctrine produced by the American military and,

afterward, its NATO partners. As I argued, the fetishization of the doctrine as an intellectually robust academic work and as 'actively-humane warfighting' obscured the local and global biopolitical implications of the Afghan war.

The fourth chapter directly addressed Afghanistan, extending the assessments of the prior two chapters. Working chronologically, the chapter exposed the emergence of comprehensive 'ground-up' 'precision' counterinsurgency, which targeted the rural village *milieu* and its populations by territorializing counterinsurgency inside remote Afghan communities. The chapter began with a rumination on local Afghan—specifically, Pashtun—social and cultural contexts before considering the now well-known debates around the re-militarized discourse of anthropological intelligence and human terrain. After considering the village-level approaches conducted in Kandahar and Helmand provinces in 2009 onward alongside the rise of a country-wide biometric data capture initiative to capture signatures and monitor 'illiberal' and 'illicit' populations, the chapter devoted significant attention to NATO special forces' village stability operations (VSO) and the standing up of the Afghan Local Police (ALP). I also critiqued the formation and employment of Female Engagement Teams (FETs) and Cultural Support Teams (CSTs), all-women units that operated under the sign of monolithic and reductive liberal feminist virtues. The units aimed to penetrate the off-limits gendered core of Afghan domestic spaces in order to access women and leverage and influence them, their families' male members, and their villages generally. Further, I examined VSO as a speculative act undertaken with an eye to returns on investment especially in relation to local development and humanitarian projects, where special forces agents perform as seed investors and venture capitalists; and I focused on the impossible and ultimately violent expectations placed on local communities who are compelled to live 'securely' and forced to labour as signals of success to counterinsurgents embedded directly in their life environments all the while seeking indicators and metrics of acceptable end states.

The last chapter of the project traced what Foucault called the boomerang effects of biopower, tracking the displacement of counterinsurgency from foreign environments on the edges of liberal rule to the domestic environments of North Atlantic states and, more specifically, the enclosure of Canada.

In establishing connections between the internal biopolitics of government in liberal states and the military practices of counterinsurgents attempting to stabilize and correct global disorder, I considered how this boomerang is continual and continuous—a kind of ongoing churning and drifting of discourses, meanings, and material practices that fertilize a continuum of coercion and violence designed to shape, clear, hold, and build on different territorial and social scales. After addressing the post-2014 continuation of the war in Afghanistan waged by Afghan state forces in conjunction with an American-led contingent of 15 000 NATO troops under the auspices of Operation Resolute Support, the chapter engaged with the entailments of more generalized spirit of counterinsurgency following from the latest expeditionary cycle. The chapter assessed a number of contested sites: military veterans, the body of Omar Khadr, village-centered gentrification in urban environments, and the visual grammar and iconography of beards. This connected to interrogating the spirit of counterinsurgency in relation to the militarization of policing, to neoliberal Toronto as a racialized and divided city, to Canada's speculative immigration policy, to new Canadian 'terror' legislation, and to the resurgence of indigenous sovereignty in Canada with particular reference to the 'energopolitics' of the Canadian capitalist extraction apparatus in the tar sands. Throughout these different considerations, I foregrounded the idea of the population as a critical infrastructure that is, following the work of Greg Elmer and Alessandra Renzi, sacrificed¹ and ruled though what Mimi Thi Ngyuen called damage control. Elmer, Renzi, and Thi Ngyuen attend to how the ability of a community or population to absorb ongoing pressure and stress is affirmed as resilience that actually reinscribes the status quo and inhibits changes or transformations. In other words, this discourse of resilience as a discourse of tolerance is ideological, implying an operating range that is taken as a 'natural equilibrium' of what 'we' as populations can handle which in turn naturalizes and normalizes the production of liberal governmentality, its outcomes, and its causes.² The diffuse sources of these operations—coincident with Saskia Sassen's identification of the increasingly exclusive types of informal sovereignty enjoyed by large extra-state organs that

¹ The irony of liberal rule: it will espouse a population of individuals, but it will carve out and segregate groups, and it will relegate the vaunted individuals to the financial-ecological-social base of the pyramid to feed the rest.

² In this sense, and borrowing from W.B. Sebald's 1999 book title, many would be *living* the slow natural history of their own quiet destruction.

influence global life by private corporations, finance and trade regimes, or security companies operating in congruence with the interests of state actors—make them difficult to counter, implying that what unfolds today is a series of private wars that territorialize select environments and that still, in the end, prioritize life in North Atlantic enclosures far more than others.

In effect, wars waged as foreign counterinsurgencies or internal civil wars always-already connect up and out to planetary frontiers, which could be a few blocks away or 'remote split' into other continents, and are speculative precisely because they intend to derive returns from sapping and damaging ways of life not amenable to liberal rule. In other words, these wars are waged as ways of dictating the conditions of future military—and neoliberal and thus biopolitical—operations, enterprises run as complex hedges to administer violence and distribute it accordingly. Stability—as a contingent condition—is our inheritance on the investments made to which we resign ourselves, and we—academics and intellectuals in the core neoliberal states of the North Atlantic basin—best think about the ongoing martial arbitrage undertaken in our names, a 'too big to fail' endeavour of its own to which we are assumed to have lasting debts. Stability seems to come at the expense of new protocols and procedures of life, and part of shoring up the damage comes with the *repurposing of biopolitics in affirmative and emancipatory ways*.

Waging a campaign to take back words like "austerity" and "security" and "operation" and "logistics" is a good place to begin. Refusing to reduce the world to acronyms, abbreviations, and initialized short forms in order to administer and control it is a worthy line of effort. Decolonization is another way to commence the really-existing work of what Paul Virilio calls popular defence and ecological struggle, which would foreground the quiet civil war of settler societies whether in Canada or anywhere where indigenous sovereignty has been delegitimized, cultures have been destroyed, and land has been violently appropriated and annexed. This is not a call to waging rhetorical insurgency against what Derrida referred to as the "fabulously textual" nature of war³ though it is to foreground how,

³ As Derrida argued in 1984 in his essay on nuclear apocalypse, normal non-expert everyday people share common experiential repertoires with military technocrats and technoscientific expert, and because we are all alive and living as the living dead always-already, we are all experts tout court. This is true today in relation to threat 'we' continually supply as a collection of insurgent lives.

given the pre-insurgent status afforded to us all, we would be well served to enter the fight given the presumption we are all already involved. This does not mean perceiving war as saturating everything, but it does mean refusing to let acts of war remain camouflaged, whether as clandestine operations abroad, or as targeted operations against internal enemies coded as domestic threats, or as slow sapping operations becoming indistinguishable from living. Further, it does mean continuing to connect these seemingly disparate practices in relation to wider processes that favour some populations at the expense and gross disregard of others. It also means recognizing that those who have been historically targeted by the biopolitical violence of counterinsurgency in its direct or indirect form likely possess the acumen and awareness to resist and oppose it. These are the bonds of debt, especially in Canada, to which many of us should arguably be attending, which would help us design the joint operations we should be territorializing and undertaking.

In a recent essay given at a conference, Jasbir Puar argued—rather late in the game with respect to the argumentative arc of conceptualizing war as a collection of unrestricted lesser evils—for the importance of understanding war as a practice not of only of killing but of maiming, disablement, and injury.⁴ Like Mimi Thi Ngyuen, Judith Butler, Laura Ann Stoler before her, Puar identifies how frames of war, and framings of people and populations targeted in wars, are subject to different types of atmospheric and environmental envelopment, which slowly undermine resistance with a collection of lethal and non-lethal but always kinetic methods. Attending to these concerns in Canada and linking them to global military and biopolitical operations beyond would also be a good place to continue the work commenced here by describing and exposing acute and ambient measures. This would require a consideration of how to repair damage done abroad through solidarity articulated not as care for but responsibility to populations subject to the different speeds and types of custody and treatment produced by counterinsurgency as stabilization. It would, following Roth, mean being responsible to the "objects of our attention" beyond their status as anchors for elegant and complex analysis, and finding

⁴ See Puar (2014), "The 'Right' to Maim: Disablement, Palestine, and Disaster Capitalism," *Space, Race, Bodies: Geocorpographies of City, Nation, and Empire* < <http://www.otago.ac.nz/mfco/research/otago071501.html>>.

ways to hear them "speak to us for themselves" (Roth 2013: 27) and in ways that defy the how the spirit of counterinsurgency translates all of our voices as a set of operational signals.

This ends with a list: envelopment, damage, ruin, sacrifice, unrestriction, debt, derivative, sap, ruin, speed, ambient, acute, custody, care, and treatment. All of these words refer to the collateralized type of warfare prosecuted as a mix firepower and biopower. Making these words stick—ordering words to things, organizing things to make them visible and utterable—would be the ongoing line of operation for this project. What is a population? What is the new regime of military violence to come? What is a kill sack? What is a chokepoint? What does stability look like? What is enfilade in environmental and atmospheric terms? What is rebellion? Addressing these considerations would do well to continue moving the concerns of this project forward, both on its own terms and in relation to the study of biopolitics and liberal war.

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Official military documents and doctrine manuals are typically published in-house, and the citations reflect provenance and source by listing the appropriate centre, school, department, or institute within the larger organization. More specifically, the counterinsurgency manuals discussed throughout the work are entered accordingly below. For the sake of clarity, the following list outlines the core manuals to which the project frequently refers:

FM 3-24	<i>Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies</i> (2014) [U.S.]
FM 3-24.2	<i>Tactics in Counterinsurgency</i> (2009) [U.S.]
FM 3-24	<i>Counterinsurgency</i> (2006) [U.S.]
JP 3-24	<i>Counterinsurgency</i> (2013) [U.S. Joint Chiefs]
CTC-A	<i>A Counterinsurgent's Guidebook</i> (2011) [ISAF]
F-DCTL	<i>Doctrine for Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level</i> (2010) [France]
FM 1-10	<i>Countering Insurgency</i> (2009) [UK]
BGL-323-004	<i>Counter-insurgency Operations</i> (2008) [Canada]

In order to minimize confusion, in-text citations refer to the manual number or acronym above and year of publication. Most of the manuals are paginated by chapter and page (e.g. 3-1 is the first page of the third chapter), and in-text citations mimic this system, listing specific section numbers where possible. The American manuals, while authored by the U.S. Army save for JP 3-24, are used jointly by the U.S. Marine Corps.

Small Wars Journal (SWJ) is a peer-reviewed military-centered online journal, and continually publishes essays and commentary. Work is produced by academics and analysts, and the journal regularly posts longer doctrine or policy pieces from military organs. Most of the works are extended analyses or essays but some find the form of smaller commentary pieces. In-text citations are listed by paragraph and page number. Citations below include the exact date of publication where possible but lack any volume or issue numbers given such indicators are not given by SWJ. Similarly, *War on the Rocks* is a web magazine with an editorial staff and a large stable of commentators, columnists, and analysts; citations reflect the date of publication and author. *Kings of War* is the official blog of the King's College Department of War Studies, and content is curated and generated by faculty in the program.

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