Outside the Multicultural: Solidarity and the Silencing of Palestinian Narratives

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Abstract

This dissertation examines a series of efforts by the Canadian state to silence and censor the Palestine Solidarity Movement (PSM), particularly activism engaged in the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign, in the years following the second Palestinian uprising (Intifada) of 2000. Following a delineation of the broad contours of Canada’s official multicultural policy, the dissertation seeks to interrogate multicultural policy’s inability to accommodate Palestinian narratives relating to the struggle for Palestinian self-determination. The analysis explores the central contradiction between the multicultural state’s self-construction as accommodating and even celebrating cultural difference, and Canada’s adoption and deployment of the discourse of clash of civilizations and the War on Terror.

Rooted in a critique of liberal theories of the state and an understanding of Canada as a racial state embedded in neoliberal global hierarchies as a second tier imperialist state, this study reveals the ways in which notions of “tolerance” may be used to establish boundaries and markers of belonging. Moments of erasure and silencing are analyzed as racializing moments, whereby the state reveals its class and racial character in both domestic and international spheres. Specifically, the manifestations of anti-Arab, anti-Muslim racism in Canada are interrogated.

The silencing campaign against the Palestine Solidarity Movement demonstrates the role official multicultural policy has played in obfuscating this racism. Multicultural rhetoric is used to enact the erasure and silencing of the Palestinian narrative; under the guise of “respecting diversity,” the Palestinian narrative is cast out as it makes some feel
“uncomfortable.”

Relying on a textual analysis of state records, parliament proceedings, public speeches, media reports, journalistic reports, op-eds, and documents obtained through freedom of information requests, three specific case studies are examined: the attack against Israeli Apartheid Week; the defunding of Arab/Palestinian ethnocultural organizations, as well as development organizations and research bodies deemed pro-Palestinian; and the campaign to ban Queers Against Israeli Apartheid from marching in Pride Toronto. Close attention is given to three interrelated silencing discourses that rely on historical forms of anti-Arab and anti-Muslim racism: the accusation of anti-Semitism, calls for balance and dialogue, and the distinction between extremists and moderates.
Acknowledgements

"I don't decide to represent anything except myself. But that self is full of collective memory."

– Mahmoud Darwish

The silencing and censorship we faced as Palestinian and Palestine solidarity activists in Canada, a country that prides itself on its tolerance and multiculturalism, prompted me to pursue the questions in this dissertation. This work is an attempt to record some of the collective memory of a young movement: its key moments, its inspiration, the campaigns to silence it, and the resistance to this silencing. This movement, however, would not exist in Canada if it were not for the courage of the Palestinian people in its entirety—who have not surrendered their existence to the Israeli state despite decades of military aggression. I can only hope this work sheds some light on the Palestinian struggle for freedom and justice.

I would like to thank my dissertation supervisor, Ananya Mukherjee-Reed, for her support during my PhD studies and her wholehearted belief in this project, Professor David McNally for encouraging me to pursue a topic many would shy away from, and for taking the time to introduce me to the complicated debates within Canadian political economy, and finally Professor Karren Murray, for her invaluable help in strengthening the text and highlighting key ideas. A special thanks to Angela Pietrobon for her editorial assistance, professionalism, and immaculate attention to detail.

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grounded when the world of academia becomes disconnected from our history as refugees in exile. Thanks especially to my parents for knowing how to enjoy life despite its “50/50 chances.” Above all, I would like to acknowledge the tremendous support that my partner Adam Hanieh gave me during this process. It is to him that I dedicate this dissertation, as without his love and calmness this work would not have seen the light of day. My dear friend Andrew Hugill was a pillar of support throughout this work and one of the most committed activists I have had the pleasure of working with, and Issam Al-Yamani supported me as a father would at all stages of my studies. Finally, I want to thank Alan Sears and Mary-Joe Nadeau for all the dissertation-writing survival tips, guidance, and support.

Inspiration for this project has come from many individual activists (too many to name here) and grassroots collectives. I continue to learn from and be inspired by colleagues active across movements for social and economic justice and hope this dissertation can be a useful resource for them.
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"The ideologies that gain currency in society reflect and reproduce the interest of the dominant classes" (Loomba, 1998, p. 2).

"The story of Canada's tolerant nationhood has often been framed in terms of its policy and mythology of 'multiculturalism', a policy defined in official government ideology as 'a fundamental characteristic of Canadian heritage and identity'" (Mackey 2002, p. 2).

This dissertation examines the Canadian state's attempt to silence and censor the Palestine Solidarity Movement (PSM) in the years following the Palestinian uprising of 2000 (the second Intifada). The PSM is a global grassroots movement which advocates for Palestinian rights and has regionally specific demands and dynamics. It brings together a wide range of both Palestinian and non-Palestinian activists. In Canada, as elaborated upon more fully below, this movement has largely cohered around the adoption of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign, launched in 2005 by 170 Palestinian civil society organizations active among Palestinian communities in the Palestinian Occupied Territories (OPT), as well as Palestinian refugee networks outside the OPT, and among Palestinian citizens of Israel.

1. For a sociological analysis of the PSM, see the first chapter of David Landy, Jewish Identity and Palestinian Rights: Diaspora Jewish Opposition to Israel (2011, p. 20-39).
2. In 1948, the ethnic cleansing of Palestine by the Zionist military forces turned ca. 750,000 Palestinians into refugees. The establishment of Israel divided Palestine along the armistice line.
My central argument is that Canada’s official multicultural policy, established in the seventies of the twentieth century and persisting in modified forms into the twenty-first, has played a key role in this silencing and censorship. This study therefore unsettles the common way of understanding official multicultural policy as being a neutral and progressive—some even say anti-racist—tool for managing “diversity.” The silencing of the Palestine Solidarity Movement provides a clear illustration of the ways in which official multicultural discourses serve to maintain social relations of domination embedded in Anglo-normativity and structured around a “white multiculturalism” (Hage, 2000). ³

More specifically, in the case of the PSM, official multicultural policy was at times used as a tool to exclude and silence voices that did not fit within the dominant narratives. These practices of exclusion and silencing are not only illiberal in the sense that they erode the liberal tenet of freedom of expression, but also inherently violent as

Ca. 160,000 Palestinians left within the borders of the new state were granted citizenship and put under a military regime that lasted until 1966; thereafter, they have continued to suffer various forms of repression and discrimination. The remaining Palestinian territories, the West Bank and Gaza, were under respective Jordanian and Egyptian sovereignty until 1967, when Israel occupied these areas, placing the population under a regime of military occupation that is still in force today. This is the historical origin of the division of Palestinians between refugees, those living under occupation, and those holding Israeli citizenship. For a general history, see Khalidi (1992), Masalha (2003), and Pappe (2006). The BDS call and the list of its signatories has been published on the website of the BDS National Committee that was formed to implement it (see http://www.bdsmovement.net/call).

³ In the case of Australia, Hage (2000, p. 84) maintains that, despite policies of multiculturalism, social relations have “remained marked by intolerance, prejudice and racism.” In Canada, a “white multiculturalism” helps to obscure power relations. Henry and Tator sum up the current state of the Canadian body politic succinctly when they state: “Canada suffers from historical amnesia. Its citizens and institutions function in a state of collective denial. Canadians have obliterated from their collective memory the racist laws, policies, and practices that have shaped their major social, cultural, political, and economic institutions for three hundred years” (2009, p. 2).
they support and extend myriad forms of oppression and domination against the Palestinian people. I situate my analysis within the larger context of domestic and foreign policy orientations of the Canadian state marked by the so-called War on Terror. Within this context, Arabs and Muslims have been subjected to a heightened, racialized visibility. This racialized visibility and its effects are ignored within dominant liberal articulations of the problem of racism. Anti-Arab and anti-Muslim racism is at times acknowledged, but this tends to be limited to moments of overt discrimination, which are presented as aberrations. As Nadine Naber noted:

within liberal discourses on tolerance and diversity, the privileging of individual hate crimes over the institutionalization of state violence facilitated official US narratives that sought to reduce the post 9/11 backlash against persons perceived to be Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslims, or South Asian to the acts of a “few bad apples” and to cover up the systematic institutionalized nature of the violence. (2008, p. 3)

This dissertation aims to go beyond the moments of overt discrimination that mark the “excesses” of the War on Terror to more subtle moments of erasure, silencing, and censorship of the Palestinian narrative and to consider the broader ramifications of these processes. Sociologists Mary-Joe Nadeau and Alan Sears (2011) describe the goal of the silencing campaign against the Palestine Solidarity Movement as the attempt, quite simply to shut down political activism and scholarly exchange that explores Palestinian experiences and/or criticizes the Israeli state. This silencing project echoes that of the Israeli state itself, which has systematically clamped down on
all aspects of Palestinian life while trying to eliminate signs and memories of Palestinian existence. (2001, p. 1)

The silencing campaign targeting pro-Palestinian advocacy efforts provides, in short, an emblematic illustration of the ways common sense racism operates within a context of official multicultural policy. Such silencing works to exclude and marginalize specific voices and cast them out of the multicultural altogether—delegitimizing them before they are even heard. I argue that these moments of silencing constitute an essential part of the structuring and perpetuating of a racialization that articulates the official multicultural policy’s limits of tolerance for oppositional narratives. Such racialized silencing discourses act to set the parameters of tolerable diversity acceptable within the multicultural logic.

With the aforementioned themes in mind, I seek to address several interrelated questions. First, what are the broad contours of Canada’s official multicultural policy and why is it unable to accommodate Palestinian narratives relating to the struggle for Palestinian self-determination? Second, how does the Canadian state maintain/construct itself as accommodating and even accepting of cultural difference, while being fully enmeshed in the discourse of clash of civilizations and the War on Terror? And finally, what are the racialized discourses and mechanisms that are deployed by the Canadian state to silence dissent within the multicultural framework and what are the implications of these processes?

**Research Focus: Why the Palestine Solidarity Movement**

During the years of the so-called Oslo peace process (beginning in 1993), the
greater part of solidarity organizing that emphasized the historical injustice against the Palestinian people fell dormant. The Oslo Accords, officially called the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, reconfigured the political struggle for Palestinian rights from a collective struggle for self-determination against a colonial settler state (Rodinson, 1973) to a struggle within a framework that equalized two sides in a “conflict zone.” Demand for Palestinian self-determination morphed into a “state-building” project on ever-shrinking slivers of land managed by a narrow coterie of Palestinian officials in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (see Said, 2000, and Usher, 1999). Palestinians were thus stripped of their collective voice while decisions were made at secret negotiating tables. But even with the Palestinian people agreeing to give up 78% of historic Palestine, Israel remained invested in holding ultimate power over the area.

The years immediately following the signing of the Oslo Accords were marked by heavy funding of projects promoting reconciliation, dialogue, and peace-building. This contributed to what some authors have termed the peace industry (Bishara, 2001, p. 142). These initiatives often emphasized the need for Palestinians and Israelis to “co-exist,” while ignoring power relations and deemphasizing history.

The failure of the negotiations at Camp David and the beginning of the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000 was a clear challenge to the formulations of the Oslo process. The violent military reinvasion of the West Bank reinserted “power” as a concept, emphasizing that Israel—even during the “Oslo years”—continued to hold power over Palestinian lives by retaining structural power in the region (Hanieh, 2003). Critically, Israel also retained ideological power within Western circles that quickly laid the blame.
for the failed negotiations on the Palestinian side, claiming it was the Palestinian leadership that refused to accept a “generous” final offer.  

The second Intifada, a mass uprising that began in the West Bank and Gaza, spread to Palestinian citizens of Israel and led to mass demonstrations across the Arab world. Within two years of the second Palestinian Intifada, political economist Sara Roy argued:

Palestinians unquestionably face the deterioration of their economy, a humanitarian crisis that is characterized in large part by levels of impoverishment and social decline that have no parallel during Israel’s 36-year occupation of WB/G, and the destruction of ordinary life. Not since 1948, perhaps, have Palestinians faced such conditions of loss and dispossession. (2004, p. 366)

She emphasized, however, that the “present state of Palestinian life - be it economic, social, or political - derives fundamentally from dynamics institutionalized during and by

4. See, for example, The Missing Peace (2005) by Dennis Ross, the U.S. Middle East Envoy at the time of the negotiations. Historian Norman G. Finkelstein wrote a rebuttal to Ross’s book arguing that “Israeli needs, in Ross’s calculus, systematically trump Palestinian rights” (2007). While dominant perceptions laying the blame on the Palestinian leadership remain largely unchallenged, glimpses of the actual story did appear in the media. In 2001, Deborah Sontag reported in the New York Times on the disconnect between the wide-ranging disagreements between the parties about the negotiations and the simplistic narrative that came from the very top of U.S. power: “at the end, Mr. Clinton praised Mr. Barak’s courage and vision and said Mr. Arafat had not made an equivalent effort.” A month later, an even more critical account of the negotiations came from two participants, who wrote that, “in accounts of what happened at the July 2000 Camp David summit . . . we often hear about Ehud Barak’s unprecedented offer and Yasser Arafat’s uncompromising no. . . . For a process of such complexity, the diagnosis is remarkably shallow. It ignores history, the dynamics of the negotiations, and the relationships among the three parties. In so doing, it fails to capture why what so many viewed as a generous Israeli offer, the Palestinians viewed as neither generous, nor Israeli, nor, indeed, as an offer” (Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, 2001).

5. For an analysis of the situation within the Palestinian Occupied Territories post the second Intifada, see Saree Makdisi, Palestine Inside Out: An Everyday Occupation, (2008).
the Oslo peace process” (2004, p. 366).

The second Intifada breathed life into the solidarity movement internationally. As Israeli human rights abuses against the Palestinian people intensified, the solidarity movement began to orient itself towards mass education, teach-ins, and public meetings. Demonstrations were organized and, importantly, contingents focused on Palestine took place within the broader anti-war movement that emerged over the invasion of Iraq.

The 2005 call from all sectors of Palestinian society for Boycotts, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) provided a strategic impetus to the growth of the Palestine Solidarity Movement in Canada. The BDS call made an explicit connection between South African Apartheid and Israel, emphasizing a direction for action similar to that taken by people around the world to end South African racism (Barghouti, 2011, p. 63–84). The Unified BDS Call gave the needed push for a reorientation of the Palestine Solidarity Movement, away from educational events that left attendants unclear about what to do next to a very specific call for action—and an analysis that included all demands that pertained to the entire Palestinian people, not just those living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The three demands of 1) ending the occupation, 2) equality for Palestinian citizens of Israel, and 3) right of return, were a reclaiming of the Palestinian collective narrative, against erasure and segmentation (Palestinian Civil Society, 2005).

The main difference between the BDS movement and earlier forms of solidarity was that it directly questioned and challenged the corporate and state relations that sustain Israeli actions. It appealed directly to people to act in their own capacity, in their workplaces, universities, etc., to challenge specifically the role of corporations and the
state in sustaining Israel’s policies against the Palestinian people. The BDS call did away with the Oslo paradigm of equalizing both sides and looked directly at the root causes of the conflict in the region—not seeing Palestinians and Israelis as two peoples that have some intractable disagreement, but rather viewing the conflict as a colonial conflict between a native population and settlers.

Once the solidarity movement began to articulate demands around concepts of achieving justice for the Palestinian population, ending systemic discrimination, and challenging the conception of Israel as a democratic state, the silencing campaigns began to emerge. The new movement was not merely contesting Israeli state actions; it was tackling the underlying international diplomatic, economic, and corporate support that normalizes Israel’s actions and positions it as a state above the law, while at the same time holding up standards of international law as a whip by which to discipline other regimes. The BDS Call was not appealing to the benevolence of states that have acted to support Israel; rather, it put the onus on ordinary people to hold governments accountable. In a state like Canada, this entailed a serious challenge to the mainstream image of Canada as a peace-loving nation state that only intervenes to protect people in failed states. The concept of state neutrality is stripped away when various prime ministers (whether liberal or conservative) continue to insist that Israel’s values are Canada’s values.

From 2005 to 2009, the BDS movement took hold on university campuses, within

6. For specifics on the various ways European states and corporations support Israel, see David Cronin, *Europe’s Alliance with Israel: Aiding the Occupation* (2010).
some trade-unions, and among Arab community organizations in Canada. However, during this time, the movement began to face a severe curtailment of freedom of expression and the ability to engage in normal political and cultural practice. Examples of this included cuts to funding to the Canadian Arab Federation (CAF) and Palestine House, threats to Pride funding if Queers Against Israeli Apartheid were to march in the yearly parade, bans against Israeli Apartheid Week posters on university campuses, and condemnations by local government of the terminology of Israeli apartheid.

In addition to these state-backed forms of repression, organizers within the PSM, among other obstacles put in their way, had to contend with cancellations of room bookings and impositions of security fees on events, as well as respond to condemnations over the use of the term “Israeli apartheid.” In short, “[T]hose who speak about Palestinian rights agree that they are excluded, silenced, censored, and/or erased from nearly every progressive political sphere by the systematic, institutionalized attempts to exclude and de-legitimize all critiques of Israel” (Naber, Desouky, & Baroudi, 2001, p. 6).

**Tracing Canada’s Official Multicultural Policy**

Canada’s official multicultural narrative comprises a set of policies and discourses that espouse a shift away from exclusivist nationalism by recognizing Indigenous rights, substate groups, and ethnic communities. As the Citizenship and Immigration Canada website notes on its page titled “Canadian Multiculturalism: An Inclusive Citizenship,” Canadian multiculturalism is based upon the affirmation of “the value and dignity of all Canadian citizens regardless of their racial or ethnic origins, their language, or their religious affiliation” (2013). As part of this process, Canada’s 1971 Multiculturalism
Policy explicitly referred to the rights of Aboriginal peoples and the status of English and French as the two official languages. Successive governments have viewed multiculturalism through this positing of an alleged equality of all citizens, in which everyone “can keep their identities, can take pride in their ancestry and have a sense of belonging” (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2013). Through this narrative, the Canadian government claims that Canadians will gain “a feeling of security and self-confidence, making them more open to, and accepting of, diverse cultures. The Canadian experience has shown that multiculturalism encourages racial and ethnic harmony and cross-cultural understanding” (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2013).

An historical approach offers a lens for disrupting this dominant narrative. My particular historical approach draws upon critical political economy, which focuses on social relations of the production of power and politics. This perspective seeks to reveal the very real inequalities of power and wealth that necessarily underlie the formal equality claimed for all citizens within the liberal framework of the official multicultural narrative. As Ellen Meiksins Wood noted, liberal assertions of equality act to conceptualize away the problem of capitalism, by disaggregating society into fragments, with no overarching power structure, no totalizing unity, no systemic coercions—in other words, no capitalist system, with its expansionary drive and its capacity to penetrate every aspect of social life. (1995, p. 245)

In contrast, a critical political economy perspective aims to explore the structural inequalities that characterize all capitalist societies—including class, race, gender, and the position of states within the capitalist world market—and the differential access to
political power that results from these hierarchies (Bannerji, 2000; Clarke, 1991; Harvey, 1999). This study places emphasis on the analysis of multicultural policy, as other authors in the political economy tradition have done, on the historical dynamics of immigration, settlement policies, labour inclusion/exclusion policies, and class relations (which are both gendered and racialized), as well as on the role of the state (Bolaria & Li, 1988; Castles & Kosack, 1973; Collins, 1991; Miles, 1982; Satzewich, 1990). Bringing history back into the conversation begins to disrupt the Canadian imaginary that official multicultural policy helped garner. As anthropologist Evelyn Kallen (2003) noted, techniques of domination and social control have existed since the origin of the idea of Canada.

Since a political economy approach is concerned with the social relations of production, property, and power, the starting point for a discussion of official multicultural policy must be rooted in Canada’s colonial history, and principally in the subjugation of Indigenous peoples from first contact onward. Aligning with the political economic lens, I am particularly interested in delineating the relationship between processes of class formation, racialization, and the subordination of Indigenous peoples. On the importance of rooting any analysis of Canada’s history in its colonial past, noted Marxist historian Bryan Palmer argued that,

whatever the points of difference separating out the experience of Indian removal or marginalization, 19th-century Canada is connected, across time and space, by the ultimate resolution of class formation’s initial act of subordination: native people’s displacement made proletarianization of other subordinate groups
possible. (1996, p. 22)

The Canadian state's transition from an indigenous mode of production to a capitalist one ushered in the formation of a new class structure that was embedded in racial hierarchies. Similar to other settler colonies, Canada's political and economic development depended on replacing the indigenous population with a new population of workers needed to sustain the new society. Bonita Lawrence explains this process of settlement as one that included policies which caused "diseases and alcoholism" to be "deliberately introduced" in addition to the following outcomes:

- wholesale land appropriated, resource plundering practices, the deliberate use of starvation tactics, settler violence and organized military violence to subjugate communities and suppress resistance, centuries of widespread and concerted attacks on Indigenous spiritual and ceremonial life, and finally the theft of Native children, first into residential schools and then into the foster care system. (2004, p. 17)

The development of a modern capitalist liberal democracy was dependent on the dispossession of Indigenous lands, commodification of the land, and the reliance on migrant labour for extraction of resources. This reliance on migrant labour was negotiated in a context of keeping Canada a white-settler colony connected to the British Empire (Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). The Canadian state has thus always had to grapple with the issue of articulating a Canadian identity while relying on immigration to sustain economic expansion. In an article comparing Australia and Canada, historians Franca Iacovetta, Michael Quinlan, and Ian Radforth argued that both countries "shared, too, a
history of paradox—receiving societies with strong anti-immigration traditions, especially regarding non-Anglo-Celtic immigrants” (1996, p. 90). For these reasons, non-Euro-Anglophone migrants in Canada have had to contend with a racial hierarchy since the inception of the Canadian nation state. Yet this racial hierarchy was not static; it developed and morphed over time. Thousands of Irish, for example, as opposed to English and French settlers, were sent to North America in the late eighteenth century as indentured servants and were not considered white; in fact, there was a long process of subjugation before they were accepted into “whiteness” (Ignatiev, 1995). In his study on the origins of slavery, Eric Williams argued that the forms of indentured labour the Irish endured “was the historic base upon which Negro slavery was constructed” (1964, p. 7). In *The Invention of the White Race*, Theodore Allen (1994) traced the transition that Williams alludes to, explaining the ways in which racial categories emerged in the Anglo-American colonies in relation to resistance by European indentured servants and Indigenous peoples. Divisions along racial lines were promoted and used by ruling classes in a manner that stratified the labour force and assured that no alliances emerged that could be disruptive of the status quo. Policies of racial ordering affected all groups coming into Canada. Some Blacks entering Canada, for example, were given access to land on the basis of a “license of occupation but not ownership” (Bolaria & Li, 1988, p. 168).

This process of imposed and managed racial hierarchies was refined over time and used against various groups. As Stasiulis and Jhappan argued, “Non-European would-be immigrants would be excluded unless their cheap labour was needed” (1995, p.
East Asian and South Asian immigrants, for example, began to arrive in Canada in larger numbers in the late 1800s, entering the economy mainly through low-paid, unskilled jobs. Many worked laying the tracks for the railroad in the West, while others found work in mining. The increase in immigrants led to the implementation of exclusionary immigration policies. For example, while Chinese immigrants were welcome to work on the building of the railway between 1881 and 1885, the Chinese Immigration Act established the “head tax” (a fixed fee charged to every Chinese person entering Canada), with the purpose of excluding Chinese workers from the labour market. South Asians faced similar restrictions, and were required to pay two hundred dollars in entry fees (Bolaria & Li, 1988; Jakubowski, 1997). The 1908 Continuous Passage Act required that immigrants make non-stop journeys from India to Canada, refusing East Indians right of entry if their ship either stopped at a port en route to Canada or if the tickets were not issued in India (Buchignani & Indra, 1985). Similarly, in an agreement with the Japanese government, the Canadian state agreed not to discriminate against Japanese immigrants already in Canada, in return for Japan’s restriction of migration from its territories to Canada (Ujimoto, 1985, p. 352).

Restrictions on entry were further institutionalized in the 1910 Immigration Act, which imposed severe restrictions on immigration based on standards of education and even matters like the ability to adapt to the Canadian climate. Immigration policies were based on a list of preferred nations and white settlement was, of course, encouraged (Bolaria & Li, 1988; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). Under such restrictive immigration policies, Canada’s doors were closed to European Jews fleeing Nazi persecution (Abella...
In short, Canada’s immigration policies operated on a principle that meant, as Abu-Laban and Gabriel described, “historically, people were welcomed who best conformed to the ‘ideal citizen’ of a white settler society whose very identity was underwritten by a shared order of being. This commonality was premised on imperialist racial hierarchies, British values, and British institutions” (2002, p. 42). This White Canada policy continued, more or less intact, until the period following the end of the Second World War.

White Anglo-Eurocentricity began to transform in the wake of the economic boom that followed the war. Seeking to widen its immigration base, the Canadian government began to embrace greater ethnic diversity in immigration practices. Beginning in the 1950s, family and village-based migration from Italy and Greece was an important source of new immigrants. This was later extended to southern Europe, Turkey, and the Baltic countries. In the 1960s, immigrants began to come from the Caribbean, India, and Africa. However, even during the period of Canadian postwar welfare state expansion, an explicitly racist immigration policy was maintained (Bolaria & Li, 1988; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). In urban areas such as Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal, Asian immigrants began to arrive in increasingly large numbers from the late 1970s onwards.

Canada’s multicultural policy developed in and through a specific set of social relations of power both domestically and internationally. Up until the 1950s, Canadian identity was structured around a White Anglo/British normativity. This configuration,
however, was challenged and undermined during the 1960s in the wake of the massive wave of postwar European immigration, the growing militancy of Canada’s indigenous population, the rise of Quebecois nationalism, decolonization in the third world, and the civil rights movement in the United States. These developments all worked to challenge hegemonic power relations. The following section traces the emergence and development of Canada’s official multicultural policy, its closer realignment with neoliberal policies, and finally its reconfiguration into an integrative multiculturalism under the conservative government of Stephen Harper with an emphasis on shared Western values.7

The emergence of an official multiculturalism policy dates back to 1963 when, in response to rising French-Canadian nationalism (Quebec’s Quiet Revolution), Liberal Prime Minister Lester Pearson established the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Bannerji, 2002; Hawkins, 1989; Mackey, 2002; Palmer, 1975). The Commission’s initial focus was on two languages and two cultures, but it nevertheless created an opening for migrants from non-French and non-English backgrounds to begin to contest the established racial hierarchies and argue for their own contributions to be recognized. These early struggles were known as the so-called “third force” (Breton, 1986, p. 44). Ukrainian migrants especially took the lead in fighting for the recognition of other groups within Canada. In response to this, the Commission released Book IV, The Cultural Contribution of Other Ethnic Groups in 1970.

The election of Pierre Elliott Trudeau in 1968 set the stage for the adoption of an

7. See Saad-Filho and Johnston, Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader (2004), and Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2005) for further discussion of neoliberal ideology.
official multicultural policy that gave recognition at the federal level to Canadians whose origins were not British, French, or indigenous. Thus, it served to shift Canadian identity and concepts of nationhood to include what were termed “minority cultures.” Trudeau argued for and secured a policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework. He explained the policy of multiculturalism as involving four main aspects: 1. the allocation of state funding to ethnocultural groups for cultural maintenance; 2. the removal of cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society; 3. the promotion of cultural interchange; and finally, 4. the provision of official language training for migrants to Canada (Gabriel & Abu-Laban, 1999, p. 107). As Gabriel and Abu Laban pointed out, “multiculturalism joined other areas (and groups) which received funding from the Canadian state as part of the post-war, Keynesian-inspired idea of what it meant to be a citizen of Canada” (2002, p. 108). Funding was given through the Multiculturalism Directorate within the Department of the Secretary of State. From its inception and until 1981, this funding meant support for folklore activities and heritage languages (Abu-Laban, 1999, p. 468–472).

By the 1980s, multiculturalism’s focus on folklore and language, as promoted by Trudeau, came under pressure, particularly from migrant groups facing racism and institutionalized discrimination (Abu-Laban & Stasiulis, 1992). The number of migrants who were non-French and non-English had grown significantly because of the post-1967 shift towards third world immigration. In response to this pressure, the Multiculturalism Directorate established a race relations unit in 1981 (Stasiulis, 1988, p. 90). In 1982, when the constitution was “patriated” from Britain, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
officially recognized multiculturalism. A few years later in 1988, under the Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney, the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* was passed. The *Act* set multiculturalism as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society and a policy of the Canadian state, making Canada the first country to adopt multiculturalism as state policy codified in law. The *Act* committed the state to “recognize and promote the understanding that multiculturalism reflects the cultural and racial diversity of Canadian society and acknowledges the freedom of all members of Canadian society to preserve, enhance, and share their cultural heritage” (Government of Canada, 1988). Going even further, in 1991 the Mulroney Conservatives advanced legislation that created a separate Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship within the federal bureaucracy (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002). Whereas earlier multicultural programs emphasized cultural preservation through the promotion of arts festivals and foods, the 1991 legislation that created the new department emphasized integration into federal institutions, anti-discrimination, and affirmative action. This new focus was due to pressure from below, including anti-racist organizing.

Interestingly, it was also in the 1980s, as ethnic communities demanded that multiculturalism deal with issues of racism, that the policy also began to be tied more closely to business interests: “starting with the Liberal minister James Fleming in 1981, the federal liberals began to try to make multiculturalism attractive to business associations and also to strengthen the entrepreneurial segments of ethnocultural minorities” (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002, p. 110). This pattern “continued during the time of Prime Minster Mulroney (1884–1993) and was symbolized by the
The institutionalization of multiculturalism did not fit neatly into the federal structure; responsibility for it therefore moved between ministries and its priorities were changed several times. For instance, the Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship did not last long; in the fall of 1993, it was dismantled and the programs integrated into the new Department of Canadian Heritage. The Liberal government announced that Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada would be split along its two main components: the multiculturalism programs would be merged within the Department of Canadian Heritage, and citizenship programs would be amalgamated with the newly established Department of Citizenship and Immigration.

Following much criticism of the multicultural programming in place, the Department of Canadian Heritage launched a review of its activities in 1995. In 1997, a renewed program was announced with a focus on three objectives: social justice in building a fair and equitable society, civic participation, and identity. This shift meant that multiculturalism was no longer about promoting cultural heritage—rather, it was to “inculcate an attachment to Canada (as opposed to cultural maintenance) and to create what is referred to as active citizens” (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002, p. 114).

In October of 2008, the responsibility for implementing the multiculturalism Act was fully transferred from the Department of Canadian Heritage to Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Program grant priorities placed focus on “promoting integration, youth-at-risk” and importantly on “promoting inter-cultural understanding and Canadian
values (democracy, freedom, human rights and rule of law) through community initiatives, with the objective of addressing issues of cultural social exclusion (parallel communities) and radicalization" (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2009). This shift consolidated another major change in the orientation of Canadian multicultural policy, linking it to the policy concerns that emerged in the context of the War on Terror.

Official multicultural policy thus completed a trajectory that began in preserving minority cultures and ended—for the moment—in an emphasis on creating a new identity commensurate with “Canadian values” as defined by the state. Noting the importance of the War on Terror context, Arnn Kundnani argues that a similar process of fortifying a national identity through a discourse of shared core values took place in Britain as well:

[the] new conventional wisdom is that a national story of Britishness must be promoted in order to bind the nation together around a set of core values, to which minorities must assimilate. This integrationism draws on a wider anti-Muslim political culture associated with the ‘war on terror’, in which the focus is on ‘self-segregation’, alien values and forced assimilation, rather than on institutional racism. (2007a, p. 25)

In Canada, changes to the federal government’s citizenship guide, the citizenship test, and language requirements, as well as changes to the priorities of the Multiculturalism Program, emphasized integration and reorganized citizenship even further in the direction of requiring immigrants and people of colour to seek acceptance and adopt a set of core values. The Conservative government of Prime Minister Harper (first elected in 2006) has gone the furthest in redefining official multicultural policy itself as “integration” into
a core culture rather than as the preservation/recognition of various cultures. In a speech
titled “Good Citizenship: The Duty to Integrate,” Minister of Citizenship, Immigration
and Multiculturalism Jason Kenney explained,

our immigration program, our citizenship program, our multiculturalism program
must increasingly focus on integration, on the successful and rapid integration of
newcomers to Canadian society, and on a deepening understanding of the values,
symbols and institutions that are rooted in our history, not just for newcomers but
for all Canadians. (2009c)

Canada’s official multicultural policy is consistent with the ideas of liberal
multiculturalism put forward by Western theorists, and is intertwined with liberal
conceptions of individual freedom and political equality, as well as with a specifically
liberal view of the state and pluralism (Kymlicka, 1995; Raz, 1994; Spinner, 1994;
Tamir, 1993; Taylor, 1994). Theorists have argued the case for multiculturalism on many
different grounds, including “egalitarianism,” “impartiality,” and “rectifying historical
Tully, 1995, p. 3).

In the Canadian context, Charles Taylor advanced a key defence of
multiculturalism, arguing that “recognizing” and valuing subaltern groups is a necessary
and critical element of liberal democracy. Recognition of a person’s culture is an
important constituent in valuing all people with equal respect. Taylor described this belief
in “the equal status of cultures and of genders” as the “politics of recognition” (1994, p.
27). He posited that this type of world outlook is a relatively new phenomenon, and that it
needs to be distinguished from the earlier patterns of individual and group identity that characterized pre-modern societies.

Older societies were stratified by hierarchies and held associated notions of honour that were based on exclusion rather than universalist or egalitarian beliefs. In contrast, the liberal, modern notion of dignity is something that applies to all people equally. From the end of the eighteenth century onward, this politics of equal recognition was reinforced with a sense of individual identity, through which “we become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves” (Taylor, 1994, p. 33). Taylor argued that this identity is something that develops in a “dialogic” manner—i.e., in a continued interaction with the “other.” He wrote,

[m]y discovering my own identity does not mean that I work it out in isolation, but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt internal, with others. That is why the development of an ideal of inwardly generated identity gives a new importance to recognition. My own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others. (1994, p. 34).

Will Kymlicka developed Taylor’s ideas and connected them to liberalism in a systematic way. Kymlicka stressed that multiculturalism is not a question of symbolic recognition only, but that at its most basic the “multicultural state is to be seen as belonging equally to all citizens” (2007, p. 65). Proponents of liberal multiculturalism such as Kymlicka view it in opposition to and as a rejection of “earlier models of the unitary, homogenous nation-state” (Kymlicka, 2007, p. 61). In other words, multiculturalism is where the state is “no longer the possession of a dominant national
group” pursuing policies “to centralize all political and legal power in forums dominated by the majority group” (Kymlicka, 2007, p. 63). Likewise, theorists of liberal multiculturalism do not posit any dichotomy between building a national identity and accepting multiculturalism as policy. Thus, Kymlicka asserted that

[i]n reality . . . the sort of multiculturalism that has emerged within the west has transformed nation-building, not replaced it . . . Where multicultural polices have been adopted they operate to supplement and transform these nation–building policies so that the latter are less likely to marginalize or stigmatize minorities.

(2007, p. 84)

Kymlicka further stipulated that, regardless of the original intention state officials had in recognizing symbolic minority rights, “non-dominant groups used multicultural reforms as a springboard for negotiating significantly enhanced access to public resources, powers and officers” (2007, p. 83).

The theoretical underpinnings of official multicultural policy have been critiqued from various perspectives, three of which I discuss in this section: 1. liberal multiculturalism’s conceptualization of the state as neutral relative to racial divisions and other power relations in society; 2. its elision of the connection between racial policies of managing domestic groups and imperialism; and 3. its obfuscation of whiteness and culturalization of race. Throughout this dissertation, each of these points is interwoven within the analysis of the specific ways racialized discourses and disciplining measures have been used to silence and censor speech critical of Israel.

Major Critiques of Multicultural Policies and Practices

23
Assuming the neutrality of the liberal state.

The first major critique of the theoretical underpinnings of multicultural policy challenges its understanding of the role of the state as a neutral arbiter that guarantees a pluralist society. Pluralist approaches to multicultural policy emphasize the state as a neutral arbiter of competing interest groups lobbying for power. This view postulates that the political system is characterized by openness and that power is widely dispersed among interest groups, rather than being controlled by just one group (see for example, *Pluralist Democracy in the United States* by Dahl, 1967). Liberal multicultural theory expands pluralism to include recognition of cultural communities, articulating a cultural pluralism based on the basic premises of liberal plural democratic theory. According to this theory, a liberal-multicultural state “accepts that individuals should be able to access state institutions, and to act as full and equal citizens in political life, without having to hide or deny their ethnocultural identity” (Kymlicka, 2007, p. 64). Moreover, supporters of official multicultural policy assert that it presents a “dramatic transformation in the relationship between states and ethnic groups,” a transformation that involves a “significant redistribution of economic resources and political power – something close to a genuine sharing of power – as well as giving non-dominant groups enhanced access to state institutions” (Kymlicka, 2007, p. 81).

Many scholars have however noted that, within a society stratified by different relations of power, the state cannot be seen as simply the neutral arbiter between various communities acting as equal groupings vying for recognition. The state is instead embedded in capitalist social relations and international financial hierarchies. Far from
being a neutral entity that migrants can relate to, participate in, and contest, the capitalist
state plays a specific role in constructing racialized identities and
marginalizing/excluding narratives that are outside its interests. Critical accounts thus see
pluralist notions as obfuscating the reality of how capitalist states function as well as the
social relations within society. Arguments that liberal multiculturalism leads to a more
dispersed distribution of power in society and to cultural groups gaining greater access to
state institutions, and therefore greater equality, can be refuted by looking at the
structures of Canadian political economy. These display a telling story of the
concentration of wealth and decision making in the hands of the few. As Political
Scientist Jerome Klassen argued, “at an institutional level, the Canadian capitalist class
thus forms an East-West network of corporate power, which is formed around an
industrial financial axis” (2009, 183). Therefore, this class holds disproportionate power
in Canadian politics. An article by scholars from the department of economics at the
University of British Columbia, titled “Canadian Inequality: Recent Developments and
Policy Options,” concluded that “in 1980 the top 20 percent of income earners received
45 percent of total income earnings, while by 2007 they received 52 percent” (Fotin,
Green, Lemieux, Milligan, & Riddell, 2012, p. 123). Looking at individual income, the
article noted that:

in the late 1970s, about 8 percent of total income in Canada was concentrated in
the hands of only 1 percent of the population. Things have changed dramatically
since then. The top income share almost doubled to reach 14 percent in recent
years. Such an uneven distribution of income has not been seen since the dark
days of the Great Depression. (p. 127)

In *Canada’s Economic Apartheid*, Grace-Edward Galibuzi (2001) described the growing racialization of the gap between the rich and poor. Using statistical data, he pointed to the persistent overrepresentation of racialized groups in low-paying occupations and low-income sectors, their higher unemployment, and their poverty and social marginalization. In the report that preceded the book, Galibuzi noted: “While Canada embraces globalisation and romanticizes cultural diversity, there are persistent expressions of xenophobia and racial marginalisation that suggest a continuing political and cultural attachment to the concept of a white settler society (2001, p. 3).

In a report titled *Canada’s Colour Coded Labour Market*, drafted by Galibuzi and Block, the findings show a continuation of these patterns of exclusion:

- even in the best of economic times, the pay gap between racialized and non-racialized Canadians is large: Racialized Canadians earn only 81.4 cents for every dollar paid to non-racialized Canadians. Poverty rates for racialized families are three times higher than non-racialized families. In 2005, 19.8% of racialized families lived in poverty, compared to 6.4% of non-racialized families. (2011, p. 3–4)

The report also noted that racialized workers find themselves in the lowest paying, unsecure jobs. As Lance Roberts and Rodney Clifton observed, official multicultural policy advances a “symbolic ethnicity” that you can opt in or out of, but that does not, however, constitute different, equal cultures living side by side (1982, p. 91).

The above indicates that cultural pluralism makes assertions about equality
without a serious interrogation of the persistent racialization of poverty. Howard Brotz explained that no matter how much multicultural Canada claims to be equal, the society still stands for a bourgeois way of life (1980, p. 42). Thus, cultural pluralism enables capitalist states to perpetuate inequalities while simultaneously inculcating an acceptance of these inequalities as “natural” under a guise of state neutrality and equality of interest groups. Wood has particularly emphasized this characteristic of capitalism, arguing that the division of the political and economic allows the state to promote political “equality” while eschewing an analysis of economic, racial, and gender inequalities (1995).

Canada’s multicultural policy plays a similar role—advancing the “equality of cultures” while simultaneously denying political and economic status to the marginalized (Peter, 1981, p. 65).

Official multicultural policy and discourse is thus a powerful mechanism in maintaining the status quo, particularly in the face of challenges from mass oppositional movements. Bannerji makes this point forcefully, arguing that there is an “insider/outsider relation” to power within multiculturalism: those in the core of power get to both define and manage the surrounding outsider cultures and their relations with the mainstream, while all the time appearing as equals (2000). Another critical aspect is the role of multiculturalism in developing the state’s capacity for engineering society. According to Day, multiculturalism is a “bureaucratic project”—organized and carried out by the state—that acts to recognize and discipline officially constructed identity categories in order to manage the problematic Other (2000). Moreover, using liberal discourses of equality and tolerance enables the state to exclude and racially order
This dissertation challenges the pluralist view by focusing on integrating the insights of critical race theory with anti-racist Marxist theories of the state, arguing that each set of literatures can complement one another and help to reveal the linkages between state formation, class formation, and racialization. One starting point for this approach is the critical race theorist Theo Goldberg’s conception of “racial states.” Goldberg noted that “the theoretical literature on race and racism, given the culturalist turn of the past two decades, until very recently has largely avoided in a comprehensive fashion the implication of the state in racial formation and racist exclusion” (2002, p. 2). In addressing this occlusion, Goldberg suggested that all modern nation states are racial states. State power, manifested in various ways, allows modern states to exclude and include in racially-ordered terms.

In his book, Racist Culture, Goldberg argued that “race is one of the central conceptual inventions of modernity” and that “we have come, if often only silently, to conceive of social subjects foremost in racial terms” (1993, p. 3). Western philosophy, in Goldberg’s account, is complicit in this, with both empiricism and rationalism facilitating racism from the seventeenth century onward. Goldberg further stresses the specific ways that liberalism perpetuated these notions by promising liberty and equality while at the same time rationalizing racial inequality. In his work on the racial state, he takes this theme further and focuses on the role of the state in creating racial categories. The modern state, according to Goldberg, is a homogenizing state that excludes to construct homogeneity, while at the same time appropriating difference through the discourse of
In addition to Goldberg's insightful analysis of the racial state, anti-racist Marxist theories of the state help to explain the connections between capitalism, class formation, and racialization. Unfortunately, there is a serious weakness in classical Marxist theories of the relationship between the state, racism, and racialization. The state theory debate produced a range of competing theories including instrumentalism (Miliband), structuralism (Poulantzas), derivationism (Altvater), systems analysis (Offe), and organizational realism (Skocpol), all of which treated race as external to class formation and the functioning of the state. In general, these theories ignored the ways in which state formation and state rule take place alongside processes of racialization (Gordon, 2007). In doing so, race is kept out of the description of ruling class strategies and treated as an external or separate sphere of social relations.

More recently, however, there have been other powerful contributions to the theorization of the state and racialization by anti-racist Marxist theorists who look at class as a social relation (see Bannerji, 2000; Kelley, 1994, 1997; McNally, 2002; Roediger, 1994). These authors helped pave the way for an understanding of racial states that is rooted in class formation and political economy rather than in notions of modernity. The state, according to these theorists, cannot be abstracted from its role in constituting racialized/classed and gendered identities, managing them, and structuring the ideologies that preserve them. Thus, racism in the context of official liberal multiculturalism should not be thought of in abstraction from broader power relations in society, and without considering the role of the state. This goes against the typical way in which racism is
thought of in the discourses of official multiculturalism, where it is turned into an
individualized problem or tension between communities that needs to be resolved
through “recognition” and “tolerance.” As Thobani noted, “most public discussions of
racism focus only on its individualized and interpersonal aspects and do not include the
concept of power, institutional and state practices, and the centrality of these practices to
(2000) focus on how the state produces racial and cultural difference, and how present­
day multicultural policy is linked to the history of colonialism and the management of
populations in Canada.

This study focuses on the level of the state and its disciplining actions and
discourses towards the Palestine Solidarity Movement, highlighting the state’s role as an
active agent in racialization and silencing. It aims to reinsert the concept of power into
the discussion of racism, imperialism, and the state, stressing that anti-Arab, anti-Muslim
racism is not simply an individual problem, but a form of systemic racism that takes place
at the level of the state and society. As Harvey noted: “One of the principal tasks of the
capitalist state is to locate power in the spaces which the bourgeoisie controls, and
disempower those spaces which the oppositional movements have the greatest potential
to command” (1989, p. 237). The Canadian state’s role in disempowering the spaces
where the Palestine Solidarity Movement has, as Harvey described, the “greatest
potential to command” will be analyzed throughout this work.

The elision of the connection between the racial management of domestic
groups and imperialism.
A second critique of official multiculturalism extends the critique of state neutrality. In this view, it is not only necessary to understand Canada's domestic relations of power as undermining any claim to the neutrality of the Canadian state, but also to link the role of the state in maintaining internal relations of domination to Canada's foreign policy and the state's location within the world market. Since Canada is an imperialist state, its domestic policies need to be seen in relation to, and as extending into, the international sphere. The interaction between internal social divisions and international relations bears directly on how we understand multiculturalism. As Moallem and Boal argued, multiculturalism "consistently evades engagement with three pressing issues: the enduring heritage of Eurocentrism, the question of justice, and the connections between national and global domains." Multiculturalism, they pointed out, "contrives to efface all historicity in its consumption of the present" (1999, p. 244).

When the idea of multiculturalism is discussed within Canadian official discourse, it is divorced from the ways in which the Canadian state acts in the rest of the world, creating an artificial internal/external sphere. In this way, the state presents itself as tolerant of domestic "outsiders" while at the same time acting in the international sphere to support and reinforce relations of domination that contribute to the dispossession, displacement, and subjugation of these communities in their countries of origin.

The discourse of inclusivity is rooted in and partly came as a response to the changing role of newly decolonized states and the struggles of peoples around the world to gain self-determination. As Hawkins explained, multiculturalism—as a reversal of the "white Canada policy"—was not a result of
parliamentary or popular demand, but was instead motivated by a growing recognition among bureaucrats that Canada could not operate effectively within the United Nation, or in a multiracial commonwealth, with the millstone of a racially discriminatory policy around her [sic] neck. (1989, p. 258)

The internal/external connection in policies is thus evident from the beginning of the notion of multiculturalism; it was both a solution to an internal problem of labour, and also a response to the external pressure of decolonization.

Since the 1970s, a rich theoretical debate about Canada’s political economy has developed around tracing the evolution of Canada’s imperialist position and its relationship with the United States (see Carroll, 1985; Laxer, 1973; Levitt, 1970; McNally, 1981; Panitch, 1981; Teeple, 1972). As Canadian imperialism developed in the postwar period, Canada took an increasingly interventionist role militarily around the world at the same time that its role in international financial markets grew in prominence. The Canadian state today plays a major role on all fronts of the “new imperialism” (Harvey, 2003). Its role in Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq, and Somalia reveals the militarization of Canadian foreign policy and a close alignment with the United States under the guise of the War on Terror. However, as recent literature indicates, while Canada is highly integrated economically with the United States, it is not a dependent of the U.S. (Klassen, 2009); rather, there is in Canada an independent corporate elite with effective control over the national economy (Carroll, 2004; Carroll & Klassen, 2010). Given Canada’s prominent role in financial hierarchies, Canada is best viewed as a secondary imperialist power (Gordon, 2010). For the purposes of this work, a critical point of departure is the
interconnection between Canada’s role in the world market and the racialization and discipline of migrant communities within the borders of the nation state.

The progressive veneer of official multicultural policy allows the state to portray itself to both domestic and international audiences as a tolerant society, while at the same time continuing and advancing imperialist policies internationally. More specifically, Canada’s imperial policies in the Middle East can be traced to the continued interest of Western powers in the control and financialization of the resources of the Arab World.8 This interest manifests itself in direct military interventions (in the case of Iraq), in a sustained effort to shape the internal ruling classes of states in the region in support of Israel. This interest in the Middle East, as with other imperialist projects, has reused and updated racial constructions of Arabs and Muslims as uncivilized, backward, violent, and lacking in democratic virtues.9 This racial gaze is not confined to the “outsider/other”; it

8. The exact theorization of the role of the Middle East in global imperialism, including the very application of the term imperialism, has long been a topic of debate and discussion, even as the actual significance of the Middle East to imperial foreign policy has always been unquestionably clear. Ellen Meiksins Wood read the so-called “Bush Doctrine” as a straight enunciation of the principle that control of oil is primarily about dominating allies and competitors (2003, p. 159). Both these interests had already been cited as paramount earlier, for example, by Noam Chomsky in his The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians (1999; see p. 17). Simon Bromley’s work outlines the relationship between oil and U.S. hegemony in the post second world war period: American Hegemony and World Oil (1991); “The United States and the Control of World Oil” (2005, p. 225–255); American Power and the Prospects for International Order (2008). Also see Adam Hanieh, Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States (2011, Chapter 2).

9. The history of the racialization of Arabs, of course, far precedes the War on Terror. It emerged in the nineteenth century with the rise of colonial interest in the region as the “Road to India” and the underbelly of the Ottoman Empire (see Edward Said’s Orientalism, 1979), with all the themes of wilderness, irrationality, violence, polygamy, and exoticism already present (see, for example, Montesquieu’s Persian Letters). This oriental racial imagery has been ubiquitous in popular culture throughout the twentieth century as well, as demonstrated by the study of almost a century of Arab stereotypes in Hollywood films (see Jack Shaheen, Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People, 2009).
continues organically within the boundaries of the liberal state. Citizens who are Arab or Muslim do not escape the racial formation simply by virtue of citizenship. The “other” is then constructed as the Arab outsider, not allowing “Canadians” to enjoy their diversity, “politicizing Canadian universities,” and “bringing their troubles to Canada from back home.” Sherene Razack made a powerful contribution to this debate, studying the categories of “Muslim” and “Arab” as racially marked outside of whiteness and showing how racialization is used to exclude the internal outsider from legal rights and civil liberties (2002; 2008). As Jasmine Zine wrote, “increasingly positioned as anti-liberal, anti-democratic and unnameable to the requirements of modernity, Muslims represent the ‘anti-citizen’” (2009, p. 148). This importantly calls for an expansion of how we study imperialism. Too often, imperialism is referred to as simply “wars and occupation”; however, imperial ambitions are dialectically linked to internal racial projects. They are reflected back to the core through repression of civil liberties, through silencing dissent against the imperial project, and through the construction of various “emergencies” that legitimate foreign policies and increases in state power. The rushing through of anti-terror legislation, mainly aimed at Arabs and Muslims, and the curtailment of civil liberties post the World Trade Center bombing in 2001, illustrated the connections between internal “tolerance” and external imperial ambitions. Discourses that justify imperialist intervention also justify internal disciplining of migrant communities and anti-racist, anti-war movements.10

10. For the impact of the War on Terror on immigration and civil rights in the U.S., see Tanya Golash-Boza, Immigration Nation: Raids, Detentions, and Deportations in Post-9/11 America
In short, the relationship between Canada and the Middle East and North Africa puts citizens of Arab and/or Muslim origin right at the intersection of imperialist foreign policies. Imperialist intervention (both military and economic) is intimately connected to disciplined migrant communities unwilling to challenge the state’s foreign policies. This is the context in which a critique of multiculturalism must be advanced—it is not simply a question of how Canada treats its “minorities” domestically—but, perhaps even more centrally, it is inextricably linked to the ways in which Canada acts within the world.

**The obfuscation of race: Naturalizing whiteness and culturalizing race.**

A third, highly important critique of multiculturalism involves the various ways it works to obfuscate both institutionalized and common sense racism, rather than alleviating them. It does this in two ways: 1. by sustaining the dominant racial hierarchies through a process of naturalizing “whiteness” as tolerant; 2. by culturalizing race under ossified labels that make anti-racist solidarities difficult to construct.

This dissertation considers race, following the work of Omi and Winant, as a fluid social construct that underpins a hierarchy of power “organized and enforced by the continuity and reciprocity between [the] micro-level and macro-level of social relations” (1986, p. 67). “Micro-level” social relations refers to “the ways in which we understand ourselves and interact with others, [and to] the structuring of our practical activity in work and family, as citizens and as thinkers” while the macro-level refers to social structures and common ideologies, including media, public institutions, and the state (Omi & Winant, 1986, p. 66–67). Importantly, this study takes seriously Omi and (2012).
Winant’s point that “race is an unstable and ‘de-centred’ complex of social meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle” (1986, p. 68).

If race is unstable and transformable, then it is critical to understand the role of official multicultural policy, practices, and discourse in the history of the racial projects in Canada. Racial projects are not only about the construction of “otherness”; they are also very much about solidifying whiteness. Official multiculturalism helps to accomplish this by articulating whiteness as tolerant in a way that makes speaking of institutionalized racism at the state level difficult. As Day has illustrated, in the most celebrated works on Canadian multiculturalism, both Kymlicka and Taylor adhere to a normative “we” that does the tolerating and accepting (2000, p. 219–220). Kymlicka, Day argued, reproduced the notion of a “silent, Invisible Self group that chooses to give, or not to give, gifts of recognition and self-government to noisy, Visible Others” (2000, p. 216). Taylor produced implicitly a distinction between “we” and “they,” while at the same time reducing “demands for justice, autonomy, and the reform of existing social structures to a call for recognition” (Day, 2000, p. 221). Official multicultural policy thus acts to sustain a common sense racism through which “everybody learns some combination, some version, of the rules of racial classification, and of their own racial identity, often without obvious teaching or conscious inculcations” (Omi & Winant, 1986, p. 60). It also sets the limits for what anti-racists can demand: recognition and tolerance, but not necessarily justice.

Artist and author Coco Fusco wrote that “racial identities are not only black, Latino, Asian, and Native American and so on; they are also white. To ignore white
ethnicity is to redouble its hegemony by naturalizing it” (cited in Hooks, 1989, p. 39).

White hegemony is constructed in relation to the Other. Official multicultural policy has a key role to play here because it solidifies whiteness as tolerant, while explaining other societies as intolerant. As Thobani noted:

multiculturalism was to prove critical to the rescuing of Euro/white cultural supremacy: white subjects were constituted as tolerant and respectful of difference and diversity, while non-white people were instead constructed as perpetually and irremediably monocultural, in need of being taught the virtues of tolerance and cosmopolitanism under white supervision. (2007, p. 148)

She continued on to state that, “[a]s in Australia and Britain, the embrace of multiculturalism allowed Canadians to resolve the crisis of whiteness through its reorganization as tolerant, pluralist, and racially innocent, uncontaminated by its previous racist history” (2007, p. 154). Throughout the cases of silencing and censorship analyzed in this dissertation, tolerance is seen to be used as a virtue and held up as an ideal of multicultural societies, even as it is being utilized to repress a specific politics of solidarity. Beverly Skeggs pointed out that the upper and middle classes have been able to utilize their support for a multicultural politics as cultural capital in the age of globalization (2004, p. 90–95). This added cultural capital solidifies a unique nationalism that can use formulations like tolerance for its own benefit. Ghassan Hage, in discussing Australian multiculturalism, argued that those Australian nationals who conceived of themselves as tolerant and cosmopolitan were able to gain ground over nationals who were overtly racist (1998).
Along with solidifying whiteness by claiming its tolerance, official multicultural policy helps to obfuscate racism by inserting culture as the organizing unit of migrants along ethnic/culturalist lines. Himani Bannerji explained that multiculturalism constitutes differences in cultural terms and seeks to govern through policy. Multiculturalism thus sought to constitute people of colour as politically identifiable by their cultural backgrounds (as summarized in Thobani, 2007, p. 145). Bannerji contended that such “invented ethnicities” mirror “those employed by racist/colonial discourses of modern Western nations” (2002, p. 3). It is useful here to note the work done by Sherene Razack in pointing to the culturalization of race. Modern racism, she explained, is:

- distinguished from its nineteenth-century counterpart by the vigour with which it consistently denied. In its modern form, overt racism, which rests on the notions of biologically based inferiority, coexists with a more covert practice of domination encoded in the assumption of cultural or acquired interiority. This “culturalization of racism”, whereby black inferiority is attributed to “cultural deficiency, social inadequacy, and technological underdevelopment”, thrives in a social climate that is officially pluralist. (1998, p. 60)

Culture, taken as a static concept, is ossified and made to be both the identifier of communities and the way by which the state organizes services to them. Newcomers seek out their community organizations to receive services, and veteran migrants have to identify with their community along traditionalist ethnic lines—rather than identifying with other migrants of the same class or race, for example. The establishment of “cultural communities” as the identity by which people view themselves has drastic implications
on how anti-racist organizing can take shape in society and on what forms of solidarities/alliances can be built.

Culturalizing migrants also allows for a specific class within these migrant communities to become the spokespeople and managers of communications with the state. They gain privilege from becoming the go-betweens, are then invested in maintaining migrant community acquiescence, and thus acquire an investment in reproducing multicultural policies and selling them to their respective constituencies. Das Gupta has argued that multicultural policy empowered “middle-class people of colour to appropriate anti-racist activism from their working-class counterparts, smoothing out its critical edge in the process” (1999, p. 187). Defining individuals by a pre-conceived and static notion of culture works to obscure class difference and cross-community racial alliances along non-communal lines. As Karl Peter stressed, multiculturalism has worked to deny both political and economic status (1981, p. 65). Thobani took this argument further, arguing that “[m]ulticulturalism co-opted and derailed the explicitly anti-racist activism of people of colour, splitting their cross-racial alliances as it worked to contain the demands for racial equality that sought to ransom the very basis of economic, social, and political power” (2007, p. 160). This derailment of genuine anti-racist activism was largely organized through the state arranging its relations with migrant communities through communal leaderships, thus retaining the power to discipline recalcitrant “community leaders” through the vehicle of funding.

The ghettoization and segregation of migrants into cultural communities minimizes the ability of migrants themselves to point out how racialization works
because they are constantly retold the story of Canadian tolerance. Bruno Ramirez and Sylvie Taschereau suggested that multicultural policy serves the function of defining class issues in ethnic terms (1988, p. 400). For example, employment problems are outsourced from the state to community organizations. This in turn increases the dependence on those communal structures and assures that migrants identify along ethnic/communal lines (rather than building coalitions of the unemployed across migrant communities, for example). Any problems that racialized migrants may be having in finding jobs, for example, are explained away as personal incompetence or migrant community weakness in providing opportunities of employment, rather than being addressed as class issues to do with the structure of the Canadian economy and the significant obstacles new migrants face entering the job market.

Taking its cues from this analysis of the role of official multiculturalism in producing Anglo-normativity and culturalizing race, this work looks specifically at the manifestations of anti-Arab, anti-Muslim racism in Canada and the way the silencing campaign against the Palestine Solidarity Movement demonstrates the role official multicultural policy played in obfuscating this racism. At times, it is multicultural rhetoric itself that is used to enact the erasure and silencing of the Palestinian narrative; under the guise of “respecting diversity,” the Palestinian narrative is cast out as making some feel “uncomfortable.” “Tolerance” is circumscribed to those “cultural” practices that do not disrupt the status quo, whereas political speech that challenges the dominant perspective (as does the apartheid analysis of Israel, for example) is questioned, disciplined, and censored; at the same time, the virtues of multicultural pluralism and
respect for freedom of expression are celebrated. The Palestine Solidarity Movement (PSM) and the silencing campaign waged against it provides an excellent case study through which to test the claims of multicultural policy and the critiques outlined above. Moments of erasure and silencing are analyzed as racializing moments, whereby the Canadian state reveals its class and racial character within both the domestic and international spheres.

**Discourses of Erasure and Silencing**

Processes of racialization, because they are often organized around the erasure, silencing, and demonization of specific narratives, require an analytical centering of silencing moments as a critical part of determining how racism is reproduced in the context of official multicultural policy.

There are four clear discourses that are highlighted through this dissertation as being central to the way in which the Canadian state operates in relation to the PSM. Each of these discourses acts to exclude and silence the Palestinian voice. An analysis of these discourses shows how multicultural discourse may itself be utilized to enable silencing and erasure, acting to discipline certain voices and uphold power relations.

The first of these discourses is the attempt to cast pro-Palestine advocacy as racist by claiming it is antisemitic. This strategy is part of a long process of instrumentalization of the concept. After a century of devastating virulence, antisemitism, because of the shock of the Nazi genocide and the association with the defeated political enemies of Western liberal democracies, had been the earliest racist discourse to be vehemently repudiated by Western elites. This process took place simultaneously with the emergence
of the so-called “special alliance” between the U.S. and Israel (for the emergence of the alliance, see Abraham Ben-Zvi, Decade of Transition, 1998). According to Norman Finkelstein, it is in this context that the thesis of the “new antisemitism” appeared in the seventies, at once arguing that U.S. society was rife with antisemitism and attacking leftists, critics of U.S. imperialism, anti-racists (particularly African-American activists), and, most importantly, critics of Israel, as the promoters of a new kind of hatred of Jews (2008, p. 21–31). Furthermore, spurious and overblown accusations of antisemitism have been used by many states, including the U.S., to justify ignoring or undermining institutions and fora that threaten imperialist domination, or that demand domestic reparation against racism.\(^\text{11}\) The boycotting of the Durban process provides a prime example of that strategy. As Richard Kuper argued, this deployment of the “new anti-Semitism [represents] an attempt to reframe the debate, not so much to exclude certain voices as to render them suspect before they even speak” (2008, p. 106). The ability to label Palestinian solidarity activism as racist ensures the silencing and exclusion of Palestinian narratives. In other words, at its core, the state retains the power to shape what is and what is not deemed racism.

The second discourse uses essentializing and racialized constructions to present Arabs and Muslims as anti-democratic, as supporters of terrorism, and as opposed to “civility.” As Sunera Thobani noted, “the Bush Administration has described Western societies as gravely threatened by the murderous violence of the Islamists, and in effect,\(^\text{11}\) See Naomi Klein, “Minority death match; Jews, blacks, and the ‘post-racial’ presidency” (2009, p. 53–67), and Gabriel Ash, “Honest anti-racists lose out to Zionist lobby” (2009).
whiteness has been recast as vulnerable, endangered, innocent and the subject of irrational hatred of this fanatic non-Western Other” (2007, 169–170). The roots of this discourse can be traced to the images of the Orient that permeated modern Europe, and in particular European political theory. Another component of this discourse is the notion of modernization that undergirds the self-representation of settler colonial societies. Zionism is no exception, and the idea that the Jewish settlers brought with them modernity to both the land and to the indigenous peoples has been fundamental to it since inception (Sa’di, 1997, p. 25–48.) This construction thus relies heavily upon specific understandings of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, in which Israel is cast as the eternal victim in a war fuelled by an atavistic hatred of modernity. This narrative completely dehistoricizes the conflict, erasing its real origins in the late nineteenth century, while producing an image of Palestinians as quintessential anti-modern terrorists. This discourse also emphasizes an interconnection between Canada and Israel, both in terms of the two countries’ core liberal values, and in terms of their narrative of colonization, while at the same time acting to cast Palestinians as the uncivilized enemies outside of such core values.

The third discourse revolves around the division of communities within the multicultural logic of communal segmentation, between “moderates” and “extremists” and the constant search for the “good,” namely moderate, Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims. For a recent example, Joshua Roose “explores the concept of moderate Islam and the proposition that strong government support for multiculturalism encourages its development . . . lead[ing] to improved cultural and political participation and loyalty to the state amongst wider Muslim communities” (2010). This discourse has certain specific
effects when it intersects with projects of racialization. As Nickels, Thomas, Hickman, and Silvestri (2012) have demonstrated, one of the primary functions of this discourse is to demand ethnic communities actively display their loyalty to the state by taking on their “own extremists.” This places the communities simultaneously inside and outside the national collective, and constructs their belonging as a problem to be solved by particular forms of community compliance. In this manner, the division of the community contributes to and is part of its racialization.

Closely linked to the search for “moderate” Palestinians, the fourth discourse articulated by the state towards Palestine solidarity activism rests on the demand for “dialogue and balance.” This discourse promotes dialogue, civility, and tolerance while criticizing any social justice activism that “takes sides.” This theme echoes the logic of Canadian liberalism, which suggests that all viewpoints must be given equal space and overly critical ones designated as “offensive” and “illegitimate.” In reality, what such arguments tend to assert is that non-mainstream political arguments are not legitimate unless they are balanced by the dominant perspective. This argument is particularly common on Canadian university campuses and finds an echo in mainstream media. For example, in Michael Ignatieff’s (2009) public condemnation of Israeli Apartheid Week, a week-long series of activities on campuses promoting the BDS campaign, he claimed that the week “betrays the values of mutual respect that Canada has always promoted.”

In an important article, Palestine solidarity activist Ben Saifer has analyzed “dialogue” initiatives established by Canadian universities and Israel advocacy groups on campuses. He explains that:
The language of dialogue and the implementation of “dialogue initiatives” have become central pillars of Israel advocacy on university campuses and must be addressed strategically. The language of dialogue appeals to proponents of liberal multiculturalism; it avoids confrontation, eschews anger and emotion in favour of “civil discourse,” and addresses personal narratives rather than systemic relations of power. (2009)

Demand for “dialogue” and “civility” in this context can be understood as an official strategy of depoliticization of political antagonisms. This specific usage and reliance upon an idea of “common Canadian values” underlies the ways in which “civility,” “tolerance,” and “mutual respect” are applied selectively to fit within a specific ideal Canadian nationalism. Thus, multicultural language of “tolerance” and “respect for diversity,” which at face value seems neutral, cannot be understood in isolation outside of existing social relations and power structures.

Methodological Considerations

Methodologically, my approach focuses on official multicultural policies and practices from the perspective of those marginalized and cast out, a viewpoint that is generally absent in the scholarly literature. This analytical stance has been systematically marginalized in academic discussions in part because, as Political Scientists Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Abigail Bakan assert, “Israel’s close association with Zionist ideology has created an informal atmosphere of surveillance in the Western academy” whereby critical voices “can face intense scrutiny of their motivations” (2011, p. 279).

In order to fill this lacuna, I limit my temporal scope to particular silencing and
censorship campaigns against Palestine solidarity activism that took place in Canada from 2003 to 2011 under the banner of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign. In analyzing the discourses used to marginalize pro-Palestine advocacy in Canada, I rely on: 1. media reports, including op-ed and editorials; 2. official correspondence between organizations and government departments; 3. statements from party leaderships and key government figures; and 4. freedom of information requests.

In examining these materials, I look at the ways in which government spokespersons, pro-Israel lobby organizations, university administrators, and the media have discursively justified silencing and repression. I particularly focus upon the analogies they use, the ways in which they characterize and describe Palestinian activists and movements, and, most importantly, their references to multiculturalist tropes and so-called Canadian ‘values’ as a means used to buttress repressive measures. In addition, I look at how these ideological justifications intersect with ‘harder’ institutional mechanisms aimed at disciplining solidarity activities (such as restrictions on government funding or use of space). Throughout this analysis, I attempt to assess the interplay of these measures with Palestinian activism, in order to draw some tentative conclusions about the possibilities and challenges of overcoming these dominant narratives.

The analysis of such a wide range of data sources is one of the first, if not the first, of its kind in studies on the BDS campaign in Canada. I do not purport to record every instance of silencing and censorship of the Palestine Solidarity Movement across Canada. Rather, I focus on a number of case studies, including the intimidation campaign against a week of activities on university campuses titled Israeli Apartheid Week, cuts to
funding to ethnocultural and development organizations, as well as the campaign to ban
the group Queers Against Israeli Apartheid (QuAIA) from participating in the yearly
Pride Toronto march. These particular case studies were chosen because they highlight
the severity and durability of the silencing campaign, as well as a variety of mechanisms
that have been deployed in different circumstances to both silence and oppose the
silencing campaign. My objective is to draw conclusions about the types of racialized
discourses and disciplinary tools deployed to silence the Palestine BDS campaign.

This analysis takes a multi-disciplinary approach, which, as discussed above,
focuses on four essential sets of literatures in political science specifically, and in the
social sciences more generally: critical studies of Canada’s official multicultural policy
(such as Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002; Bannerji, 2000; Day, 2000; Mackey, 2002;
Thobani, 2007); situating the critique within the new political economy of Canadian
imperialism and foreign policy (Gordon, 2010; Klassen, 2009); and a growing body of
work on anti-Arab, anti-Muslim racism in North America (Cainkar, 2009; Gualtieri,
2009; Naber, 2006, 2008; Razack, 2008; Salaita, 2006; Zine, 2012); as well as literature
on Palestinian racialization (Lentin, 2008) and the global Boycott, Divestment and
Sanctions movement (Barghouti, 2011; Nadeau & Sears, 2010; Wiles, 2013). These four
sets of literature capture both the external and internal dynamics and the political-
economic and ideological factors that shape Canadian state responses to the Palestine
Solidarity Movement. By combining the insights of these key literatures to focus on the
specifics of erasure and silencing against the Palestine Solidarity Movement in Canada,
this dissertation breaks new empirical ground while also contributing to critical research
in the above three scholarly fields.

Analyzing racialized discourses and disciplinary mechanisms against the Palestine Solidarity Movement from this subaltern stance allows me to move beyond simplistic notions of multicultural inclusivity to restart conversations about (re)building anti-racist solidarities. My aim is to open a space for a counter-narration so that racialized groups can organize to gain meaningful recognition that disavows official practices based upon mere tolerance.

Chapter Outline

This dissertation focuses on the enactment and discourses of silencing and exclusion at the level of state institutions relating to the PSM. As explained above, liberal multiculturalism constructs the state as a “neutral arbiter” between communities. This dissertation provides a critique of this approach, adding to the critical literature on the nature of the Canadian state. As such, much of the research for the various cases of the silencing campaign relies on textual analysis of state records, parliament proceedings, public speeches, and legal proceedings pertaining to the ways in which public officials intervened in the case of the PSM. This is not to say that other institutions do not also play an important role in the silencing campaign. The case studies reveal that university administrations and the media play a key role as well, and that all these various roles have to be considered together as they reinforce a dominant narrative that allows for the silencing of pro-Palestinian voices. However, for the purposes of this dissertation, the focus is on highlighting the role of state institutions in the hope that further research can be carried out on the interactions and intersections between the various institutions.
With this methodological framing, Chapter 2 sets the overall theoretical approach to understanding Canadian state policy towards Palestinians, and the relationship between state ideologies, racial formation, political economy, and imperialism. The chapter looks closely at the ideological underpinnings and geopolitical interests that underlie the relationship between Canada and Israel, tracing how these reflect back on local activists that undertake Palestine solidarity work. The chapter begins by contextualizing Canadian imperialism as part of the “new imperialism,” and then maps the development of the relationship between the Canadian and Israeli states. The chapter concludes with an analysis of racial formation in the Canadian context, with a specific analysis of anti-Arab, Anti-Muslim racism and its connection to the broader imperialist project.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 examine specific case studies of state involvement in the silencing campaign, and the different intersections of racialized/racializing discourses that take place in the context of each case study. Chapter 3 focuses on the example of Israeli Apartheid Week. The chapter describes the roots to the analysis of Israel as an apartheid state and gives a history of Israeli Apartheid Week in the context of repression against student Palestine solidarity activism more generally on Canadian campuses. Exploring the specific state actions and government discourses used to “cast out” the week from “Canadian civility,” the chapter outlines how anti-Arab and anti-Muslim racism is ever present in the denunciation of the week.

Chapter 4 deals with how the Canadian government intervened to cut funding or grants to organizations deemed pro-Palestinian. The chapter focuses on the politicization of state funding and its use to influence the direction of non-governmental organizations.
The final case study in Chapter 5 outlines the attempts to exclude Queers Against Israeli Apartheid (QuAIA) from marching in Pride Toronto in solidarity with Palestinians. This chapter follows the story of the various attempts to ban QuAIA from marching in Pride, analyzing both the racialized discourses used around the “intolerance” of Arabs and Muslims and the threats to cut funding to Pride, as well as the intervention of state officials and the organized fight back against this silencing.

The final chapter analyzes how the contradictions that beset the official multicultural discourse of inclusivity are contested by the Palestine Solidarity Movement. Inevitably, the concepts of tolerance and recognition are tested against oppositional movements challenging state policies. The increasing support of labour unions, student movements, and religious organizations for the Palestinian people is a powerful confirmation that the legitimacy of Canadian state ties with Israeli policies does face challenges from the Palestine Solidarity Movement. The interplay between state repression and the grassroots responses to it reshape concepts of anti-racism and multiculturalism daily.

The campaign to discredit, censor, and silence the BDS campaign in Canada shows the workings of a society ordered by a racial project and a state that is anything but neutral. Official multicultural policy posits that the state will deal with all “communities” equally, that freedom of expression is a cornerstone of liberal democracies, and that such freedom functions through a serious respect of diversity. However, in the case of Palestinian rights, the Canadian state is not a neutral actor, and nor are its policies in the Middle East region.
At an ideological level, the alliance between Canada and Israel is strengthened by the similarities between Canada and Israel’s founding myths. Both states were brought into being as Europeanized settler nation-states through the violence, eviction, and erasure of the indigenous population. The Canadian state identifies historically with Israel as a settler colony, and accepts the dominant imperial claim that Israel is an ally of the West. Israel is also accepted as a democracy, and described repeatedly as the “only democracy in the Middle East” to emphasize its belonging to an imagined civilizational geography of the West. Both the material and the ideological relationships between the Canadian and Israeli states collude to narrow the space for Palestine solidarity organizing in Canada—especially the type of solidarity organizing that would challenge this very relationship.

Studying both the material underpinnings of Canada’s relationship to Israel and its ideological constructions allows for an understanding of the relations between the internal racial project in Canada around the suppression of Palestinian narratives and the broader imperial one. This method dismisses completely the idea that multicultural policies can be seen in isolation simply by looking within a state, without bringing attention to that state’s role in global dominance patterns. This work thus seeks to root the silencing of Palestinian narratives and activism in the everyday and unquestioned racism that pervades Canadian society, explaining its relationship to the macro-processes of global accumulation and the specificity of the imperialist project in the Middle East, and

12. For more on this see Patrick Wolfe, “Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native” (2006).
situating the discourses in the persistent material interests of Western powers in the region.
Chapter 2. Canadian Imperialism and the “Special Relationship” with Israel: A Framework for Silencing and Erasure

“As I said on the 60th anniversary of its founding, the State of Israel appeared as a light, in a world emerging from deep darkness. Against all odds, that light has not been extinguished. It burns bright, upheld by the universal principles of all civilized nations—freedom, democracy, justice” (Prime Minister of Canada Stephen Harper’s 2010 conference speech on combating anti-Semitism).

“As someone who lived in apartheid South Africa and who has visited Palestine I say with confidence that Israel is an apartheid state. In fact, I believe that some of the atrocities committed by the erstwhile apartheid regime in South Africa pale in comparison to those committed against the Palestinians” (Willie Madisha, President of Congress of South African Trade Unions, quoted in Bodoni, 2006).

The Canadian state projects an image for domestic and international consumption as a benign, honest broker that prioritizes international law and human rights. This image helps to solidify a uniquely Canadian nationalism positioned against the aggressive image of the United States. Canadian official multiculturalism—with its emphasis on the respect of different cultures and valuing of diversity—plays a key role in differentiating Canada from the U.S. melting-pot model. Yet much of this narrative is founded upon an assumption that Canada’s role in the world is aimed at “peace making” and building stronger institutions of global civil society. This chapter presents a counter-narrative to
this official discourse, situating Canadian approaches to race and multiculturalism within Canada’s positioning in a neoliberal world market and its partnership in a U.S.-led global imperialism. As Klassen noted, “the last two decades have witnessed an important transformation in Canada’s economic and political standing in the world. During this period, there has been an internationalization of Canadian capital and a militarization of Canadian foreign policy” (2009, p. 163). Building upon this insight, this chapter begins by highlighting the role of the Canadian state in the “new imperialism” (Harvey, 2003), especially across the Middle East region. The first section is focused on Canada’s position in the world market and its advancement of neoliberalism internationally, as well as its role in increasing international militarism. The second part turns towards the important role Israel plays in securing Western hegemony over the Middle East region and traces the specifics of Canada’s increasingly close diplomatic, military, and trade relationship with Israel. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the way racialized discourses and disciplinary silencing tools are connected to Canada’s positioning in the world market and its relationship with Israel. In this manner, the chapter forms an overarching framework in which to situate an analysis of the Canadian state’s approach to the Palestine Solidarity Movement.

**Canadian Capitalism and the Neoliberal World Market**

The advent of the neoliberal era has seen a significant shift in the nature of the world market. With its origins in the global downturn of the 1970s, neoliberalism became the dominant policy framework for most governments across the world from the mid-1980s onwards (Saad Filho & Johnson, 2004). Advocating measures such as
privatization, cutbacks to social spending, the reduction of barriers to capital flows, and the commodification of many social goods previously outside the sphere of the market, neoliberalism was an attempt to address falling profit rates through reconstituting the power of dominant classes (Harvey, 2005). One of the major effects of these policies was the deepening internationalization of capital, with virtually all corners of the globe linked into global circuits of accumulation dominated by firms located in the advanced capitalist countries. The process of restructuring economies in the South was facilitated through the debt crises of the 1980s—which saw the rise of international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) as the key arbiters of national economic policy. Through the 1990s and 2000s, the internationalization of capital took a further qualitative deepening with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening up of markets in China and the former Soviet bloc to foreign investment flows.

The global expansion of capital that typified the neoliberal era also marked a re-articulation of forms of imperialism. Ellen Meiksins Wood has described this as an “Empire of Capital,” which would be sustained by political and military hegemony over a complex state system, consisting of enemies who had to be contained, friends who had to be kept under control, and a ‘third world’ that had to be made available to western capital.

(2003, p. 130)

This was not an arbitrary policy choice based on a more aggressive right wing agenda (such as the Bush Doctrine, or Harper’s conservatism), but was rather embedded in the nature of capitalism itself, which sought expansion of capitalist social relations for the
sake of accumulation on a global scale (Hanich, 2012). The growing interdependencies of capital accumulation that marked this system did not bring about the decline of nation states, but rather brought the development of a “unique mode of economic domination managed by a system of multiple states” (Meiksins Wood, 2003, p. 52). Atop these global hierarchies stood the United States as the predominant global power—but the U.S. was not the exclusive guarantor of accumulation. Each individual nation state had a responsibility “for managing its domestic capitalist order in a way that contributes to the managing of the international capitalist order” (Panitch & Gindin, 2004, p. 17).

The nature of Canadian capitalism was profoundly affected by these trends. Canada has long been one of the wealthiest states in the world market—a status confirmed by its 1976 entry to the G7, an institutional gathering of the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Japan, Italy, and France in the G8). But with the deepening of neoliberalism and the new forms of imperialism, Canadian capital has also expanded globally, particularly in the sectors of mining, banking, and finance. This expansion was given a decisive push by the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, which tied Canadian foreign policy interests very closely to U.S. imperialism. By the 2000s, many Canadian firms were to be ranked among the largest in the global economy, dominating foreign investment flows across key regions such as Latin America and the Caribbean.

Jerome Klassen and William Carroll (extending the work of R.J. Richardson, 1982, 1988, and William Carroll, 1986, 2004) have tracked the subsequent changes in Canadian capitalism as a result of these processes, demonstrating that through the
neoliberal era, the Canadian capitalist class has come to be dominated by a tightly-linked network of Canadian-owned finance capital, bringing together industrial and financial firms, which operate “independent of US imperialism and expand autonomously into world markets” (Klassen & Carroll, 2011, p. 381). Klassen and Carroll mapped the weight of this class and its relative strength at the global scale, noting that, since the 1990s, Canada has become a net exporter of capital overseas. Their detailed study of corporate director interlocks led them to conclude that “the corporate network in Canada is largely dominated by nationally owned firms, in particular, by leading TNCs under Canadian ownership” while simultaneously, there has been “a growing set of directorship interlocks between Canadian-owned TNCs and the largest foreign-based firms in the world . . . as they expand operations beyond the US into Europe and other regions of the world economy” (2011, p. 398).

Elsewhere, Klassen has noted that Canadian capitalism is characterized by one of the most pronounced levels of concentration of any advanced capitalist state—with the top 19 Canadian firms making up 36.3% of the total assets in the Canadian economy (2009, p. 181). These firms range across banking, finance, manufacturing, mining, and energy, with these sectors being the major focus of the internationalization of Canadian capital. While Canadian investments abroad typically focus on the U.S. and Europe—two geographical zones that were the target of 70% of all Canadian Direct Investment Abroad (CDIA) in 2007 (Klassen, 2009, p. 178)—Canadian corporations play an important role in many peripheral regions as well. Klassen documented that Canadian firms were among the top three nationalities of corporate activity in Barbados, Chile, Guyana, Costa Rica,
Trinidad & Tobago, Ecuador, Uruguay, Mexico, Panama, Honduras, Bolivia, and Surinam, and operate among the top ten in Argentina, Venezuela, and Peru (2009, p. 178). Of particular significance is the banking and finance sector, where Canadian firms dominate many markets in the Global South. Todd Gordon, for example, noted that Canadian firms were the fourth largest financial sector investors in the Latin America region from 1990 to 2003, acquiring banks in Peru, Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay, and the Cayman Islands (2013, p. 217). In the English-speaking Caribbean region, Canadian banks controlled the three largest banks by 2011, with assets more than four times that of the forty locally owned banks in the region (Gordon, 2013, p. 217).

Alongside this growing internationalization of Canadian capital, the Canadian state has come to play an increasingly important role in ensuring the conditions of capital accumulation globally. Canada is now “a secondary power among the top tier of states,” not simply a dependency of the U.S. (Klassen, 2009, p. 163–190). As Adam Hanieh

13. The debate on whether Canada is an imperialist power or a dependency of the U.S. is a longstanding one in Canadian political economy (Kellogg, 1989). From an elites theory perspective, in The Vertical Mosaic, Porter argued that Canada was an unequal society with elites at the top of a vertical mosaic (1965). In two other collections on Canadian political dependency, theorists argued that Canada was a dependency of the U.S. (Teeple, 1972; Laxer, 1973). Another version of this argument is the Staples School (associated with Harold Innis), which explained the Canadian political economy by exploring the role of staple exports on capitalist development. Dependency school theorists argued that Canada was a “colonial economy” (Levitt, 1970). And Clement explained that there was a division whereby Canadian elites provided financial services to U.S. manufacturing firms that dominated the Canadian economy (Clement, 1975). The Canadian state was thus understood as a sub-imperial power incorporated into the U.S. empire (Laxer, 1973, p. 127). Critiques of dependency theory were captured in a special edition of Studies in Political Economy (Special Issue: Rethinking Canadian Political Economy, 1981), which contained articles by Leo Panitch, David McNally, and Ray Schmidt. This edition highlighted the Marxist critique of Canadian political economy and a lengthier discussion of the classical theories of imperialism. According to Panitch, for example, dependency theorists took “the absence of indigenous entrepreneurial innovation as the guidepost to Canadian dependency
explained, "Canadian capitalism . . . pursued its overseas expansion, however, as a junior partner with the US – often using the rhetoric of 'humanitarian intervention' to enter markets that were closed to its neighbor" (2012, 179). In line with this expansion, the Canadian state would play an important role among the institutions of the World Bank and IMF, promoting structural adjustment programs and supporting the neoliberal paradigm within these institutions (Gordon, 2010). Concurrently, Canadian foreign policy interests would become very closely tied to those of U.S. imperialism, with international institutions providing a framework that sustained "Canada as a subordinate ally of U.S. imperialism, but with Canada's own imperial interests also being advanced within them" (Albo, 2006).

**Canadian Militarism**

Despite Canada’s growing economic and political weight in the world market, the country’s involvement in the Global South is typically portrayed as benign and analytically distinct from the more overt forms of imperial intervention that characterize the U.S. and European states. The country’s official image of itself draws upon notions of rather than the form and rate of exploitation" (1981, p. 13). Moore and Wells critiqued dependency theorists for focusing on internal and continental relations rather than framing Canada within the broader world market (1975, p. 33). McNally argued that the relationship between Canadian and U.S. capital and the shift in ownership of Canadian manufacturing to the U.S. should be analyzed in terms of the concentration and centralization of capital, rather than dependency (1981, p. 38). Building from this perspective, Carroll’s study of the circuit of capital traced Canadian finance capital. He found that “above all, modern imperialism is the historical culmination of the tendencies of capitalist concentration, centralization and internationalization” (1985, p. 32). His work emphasized the combination between industrial and banking interests into finance capital in the Canadian context, explaining that: “At the apex of this finance capital stood the dominant fraction of the Canadian bourgeoisie, small elite of monopoly capitalists whose interlocking investments and corporate positions effectively fused big industry with high finance” (1985, p. 35).
liberal internationalism, in which Canada contributes to the construction of “good international citizenship” through initiatives such as development assistance programs, involvement in peacemaking missions, and lobbying for UN resolutions on issues such as landmines and the small-arms trade, and so forth (Nossal, 1998/1999, p. 99). Described by one set of scholars as an academic concept of “near mythical proportions,” internationalism has been seen to guide the making of Canadian foreign policy since the era of Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent (1948–1957) and his successor, Lester Pearson (Munton & Keating, 2001, p. 519). Although academic debate has questioned to what extent internationalism continues to guide Canadian foreign policy, particularly in an era of austerity and cutbacks to foreign spending, the notion of internationalism remains the normative pivot around which all government policy is measured and assessed (see Black & Smith, 1993; Carroll, 2004; Melakopides, 1998; Molot, 1990; Stein, 1994).

This perspective of liberal internationalism is at odds, however, with the increasingly pronounced projection of Canadian military power abroad—a trend, which, as Michael Skinner has observed, is “insufficiently studied and . . . virtually ignored by political-economists” (2008, p. 10). Canada’s military-industrial complex is a highly significant component of the Canadian economy—employing over 70,000 workers in over 177 federal ridings and making Canada the sixth largest military exporter in the world (with most exports going to the U.S.) (Skinner, 2008, p. 10). A report by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives noted that, in 2011, at nearly $23 billion, Canadian military spending had reached its highest ever level since the end of the Second World War—18% more than the peak year of spending during the Cold War (1952–53)
(Robinson, 2011, p. 1). This large increase in military spending began in the late 1990s and expanded rapidly through the early 2000s—with the Canadian mission in Afghanistan contributing around half of the extra $30.1 billion in military spending since 9/11 (Robinson, 2011, p. 1).14

This increase in Canadian military spending parallels a growing trend of militarism globally, which was initially codified in the second Bush administration’s ‘War on Terror,’ announced by George W. Bush on 20 September 2001. As part of this militarist trope, Canada has played a major role in expanding and legitimating the notion of military intervention. Indeed, Canada was the lead government in establishing the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), a commission set up in 2001 that developed the doctrine of “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P)—a liberal notion that provides an international legal justification for military intervention in the case of potential “mass atrocities.” Skinner noted that both the War on Terror and R2P provide a means of widening the scope of what is seen as legitimate intervention—a feature confirmed in the Canadian case through the country’s involvement in military campaigns in Haiti, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and the Balkans (2008, p. 4), and, more recently, in Libya and Mali. This expansion of Canada’s military role at the global scale is “also matched by a shift in Canadian military doctrines toward ‘networked joint capabilities’ and ‘inter-operability’ for ‘multi-force, multi-country’ operations. This essentially means improved capacity to support U.S. military operations in pursuit of its -

14. This figure is calculated by taking into account what spending would have been if it had remained at the 2000/2001 level (figures in 2010 dollars).
and Canadian - imperial ambitions" (Albo, 2006).

For all of these reasons it is necessary to challenge the standard picture of Canada as simply a “middle power” that acts to mediate and moderate the actions of larger global states. Instead, Canada needs to be seen as an imperialist power in its own right, with its own set of interests and a conscious projection of power that sits in a relationship of both rivalry and continuity of interests with those of other larger powers. The expansion of Canadian capital and corporate interests abroad is connected to the concomitant projection of Canadian militarism. Both of these aspects of Canada’s position at the top ranks of global hierarchies are critical to understanding Canada’s role in the Middle East, its relationship with Israel/Palestine, and the construction of an internal order that fits these external relations.

Imperialism and the Middle East

The Middle East has been a particularly significant geographical zone within these broader global changes. The region produces around one quarter of the world’s oil and is the major location for cheap, relatively easy to extract reserves (Hanieh, 2011). Since the end of the Second World War, and the transition from coal to oil as the world’s key energy source, the region’s hydrocarbon supplies have made it a central pivot of global power (Bromley, 1991; Chomsky, 2003). According to Hanieh, oil “supplied the necessary energy for industrial production and also formed the basic feedstock for new industries such as petrochemicals and transport. This shift in the global energy regime brought the importance of the Middle East into sharp focus” (2012, 180). Hanieh noted, however, that the 1970s saw yet another transition that reinforced the importance of the
Middle East to the world market—the increased significance of financial flows to global capitalism. This meant that the “petro-dollar” revenues accruing to oil-producing states, specifically the Gulf Arab States, took an important role within global financial markets (Hanieh, 2011). Crucially, the interests of imperialism in the Middle East region focus on “securing a stable environment for the supply of oil, U.S. investment in the wider region, and surplus capital from states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (Khalidi & Samour, 2011, p. 11). In Resurrecting Empire, author Rashid Khalidi described both the Western drive to control the Middle East region and its resources, as well as the resistance by peoples of the region to such domination (2004).

The geo-political strategic significance of the region has meant that the peoples of the area have had to live under and resist imperial dominance and interests from the times of British and French colonialism. With the shift from British and French dominance to the United States’ dominance in the postwar period, the strategy came to rest upon three key pillars of support that would guarantee guardianship of U.S. interests: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and, since the late 1960s, Israel. First, in Iran, the U.S. dominated through the Shah after a CIA-orchestrated coup against Mossadegh in 1953 (Abrahamian, 2001). The Iranian revolution of 1979, however, came as a blow to U.S. dominance in the region, making it more heavily reliant on the other two pillars. The Saudi ruling family was, and continues to be, heavily dependent upon the U.S. and developed a close relationship through its oil companies; however, the rise of nationalist movements in the region at the time also highlighted the extent to which Saudi Arabia could be affected by nationalist sentiments in the region, and to which the population could not be relied upon for
complete adherence to U.S. interests (Ashcar, 2002; Halliday, 1974).

The importance of Israel to Western powers should be assessed within this changing regional backdrop. The U.S. relies on the acquiescence of Arab dictators that owe their hold on power to the United States because they have little popular support from their own people (as evidenced in the wave of uprisings in 2011 across the region). But, much more centrally, Israel, as a settler-colonial entity owing its existence to outside aid and military armament, provides a perfect outpost for imperial dominance over the land, resources, and peoples of the region. Chomsky described how Israel has been moving since 1967 towards

international isolation apart from pariah states, dependence on the U.S. with the concomitant pressure to serve U.S. interests, militarization of society, the rise of religious-chauvinist fanaticism, the internal ‘feed-back’ from the policies of oppression and domination, an increasing sense of the inevitability of permanent conflict and with it, the perceived need to disrupt the region and establish a form of Israeli hegemony under the U.S. aegis. (1999, p. 462)

Bashir Abu-Manneh has described the relationship of U.S. Empire and Israeli colonialism as

circular: U.S. support reinforces Israeli colonialism and occupation, which bolsters Israeli militarization of state and society, which generates new ideological and political justifications and breeds new religious fanaticisms, leading to further indigenous resistance and to more U.S. interventions in the region. A cycle of violence if ever there was one, ultimately determined by U.S.
imperialism. (2007)

Israel’s role in supporting imperialism was confirmed in 1967 when its army defeated the Arab militaries from Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. This devastated the pan-Arab and other progressive movements that sought to bring the region’s resources under greater popular control. Understanding the important role that Israel could play, the U.S. built this relationship by fortifying the country with U.S. made military hardware. For this reason, the basis of Israel’s “special relationship” with Western powers has to do with Israel’s central role in guaranteeing Western interests—not a supposed Israel lobby that guarantees Western support for Israel (although the Israel lobby plays a very specific role when it comes to attacking Palestine Solidarity Movement activities through intimidation and organized campaigns to discredit individuals). Thus, the lobby may influence particular configurations of Middle East policy, but not its overall trajectory.

Canada and Imperialism in the Middle East

In this overall context of the Middle East’s importance to the configurations of Western power, the policies and discourses of the Canadian state have been very much in tune with the interests of U.S. imperialism in the region. Canada’s role in the Middle East is manifested through the military support and training it offers towards the implementation of the overall imperial policy in the region, as well as its support for the advancement of neoliberal market economics. Although its role may not be as prominent or well publicized as that of the U.S. or Britain, the Canadian state does, nonetheless, participate in easing the process of direct military occupations and in bolstering support for Israel as a key Western ally in the region. This role stems from the analysis provided
above—beginning from the needs of Canadian capital to expand geographically, and the significance of the Middle East region to a wider extension of Western power. While there have been differences of emphasis between successive Liberal and Conservative governments, these should not obscure the larger continuities in the evolution of Canadian foreign policy in the age of neoliberal globalization.

The attacks of 9/11 saw a substantial reorientation of Canadian foreign policies to being in line with those of the U.S., most significantly towards the Middle East region. As Albo noted at the time, this included:

- a new Cabinet National Security Committee; budgetary increases for all the agencies involved in policing, anti-terrorism and security work; extension of funds and powers for policing borders and airports, linked to a new Smart Borders Act; new legislative powers in the form of an Anti-Terrorism Act, which widened the definition of terrorism and scope for investigation, allowed for preventive detentions and issuing of security certificates, and extended the range of the Official Secrets Act; and an immediate increase in the military budget, particularly for the JTF2 special forces for rapid deployment and to deploy troops to the Gulf and Afghanistan as a direct contribution to the U.S. War on Terror.

(2006)

Through the 2000s, Canada’s Middle East policy was to include the deployment of Canadian troops in Afghanistan, where the country took the lead role in the occupation of the Afghani province of Kandahar. By 2011, Canadian troops were widely reported to have been implicated in “civilian casualties, the torture of prisoners by Afghan
authorities, aggressive military tactics and failures of aid delivery” (Klassen, 2013, p. 9). Approximately 150 Canadian soldiers were to have been killed and 2000 wounded by 2011 (Klassen & Albo, 2013, p. vii). Despite an initial public perception of Canadian involvement in Afghanistan as contributing to a “good war,” by the late 2000s, there was widespread disquiet over the nature of the Canadian military presence.

Canada’s role in the Middle East was not limited to Afghanistan during this period. Despite an official announcement that Canada would not join the U.S. invasion of Iraq, in 2003, Canada played a significant behind-the-scenes role in supporting the U.S.-led military action. Indeed, a 2011 Wikileaks document has revealed that, on the same day that then Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien announced that Canada would not join the “Coalition of the Willing,” a Canadian Foreign Affairs official, James Wright—now the Canadian High Commissioner in London, England—told U.S. diplomats that Canada would nevertheless support U.S. efforts regardless of the government’s public stance. According to the U.S. briefing note, Wright emphasized that, despite public statements that the Canadian assets in the Straits of Hormuz would remain in the region exclusively to support Enduring Freedom, they would also be available to provide escort services in the Straits and otherwise be discreetly useful to the military effort.

The note continued:

The two ships in the Straits now are being augmented by two more en route, and there are patrol and supply aircraft in the U.A.E. (United Arab Emirates) which are also prepared to be ‘useful’. . . . This message tracks with others we have
heard. While for domestic reasons . . . the GOC (Government of Canada) has decided not to join in a U.S. coalition of the willing . . . they are also prepared to be as helpful as possible in the military margins. (Weston, 2011)

This promise was largely fulfilled, with Canadian forces taking on logistical support (transportation of provisions and heavy machinery, securing of supply lines), training Iraqi police in Jordan, and even taking on leadership positions within the U.S. military (Canadian General Walt Natynczyk commanded 35,000 U.S. and other troops in Iraq). As reported in the National Post, the U.S. ambassador to Canada, Paul Celluci, confirmed this in 2003 when he noted: “ironically, Canadian naval vessels, aircraft and personnel . . . will supply more support to this war in Iraq indirectly . . . than most of those 46 countries that are fully supporting our efforts there.” This military support was accompanied by the entry of Canadian companies into Iraq following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein—at least 15 Canadian-based companies signed some form of exploration, production, or production-sharing contract for Iraqi oil between 2004 and 2009 (Fenton, 2009).

In summary, as a junior partner to U.S. imperialism, the Canadian state fully works to uphold, support, and perpetuate U.S. goals in the region, not least through the increasing projection of its own military power. Most significantly for the purposes of this dissertation, however, Canada’s role in the Middle East has been increasingly marked by its support of Israeli state policy. This has involved turning a blind eye to Israel’s human rights violations, as well as suppressing any internal dissent that would question Western imperialism’s special relationship with Israel.
Canada’s Special Relationship with Israel

Close relations with Israel are central to Canada’s overall imperial strategy. These ties with Israel manifest on the diplomatic, military, economic, and discursive levels. On the one hand, there is the oft-repeated mantra by Canadian politicians regarding Canada’s “special relationship” with Israel. On the other hand, there is the Canadian state’s relationship with the Palestinian Authority (PA), structured around assuring PA acquiescence to Israel as well as PA dependence on security training and aid from the Canadian state, among other Western states.

Canada’s relationship with Israel began in 1947, when Canada was represented on the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). Canada was one of the 33 countries that voted in favour of the 1947 UN partition resolution, which led to the establishment of the State of Israel. Despite this, the Canadian state was able to maintain an image of neutrality for decades by voting with the majority of states at the United Nations when regular motions regarding Israel and Palestine were presented. In the 1980s, the Canadian state did not support Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, and at the outset of the first Palestinian Intifada (an uprising that began in 1987–1988) they did not uncritically support Israel in all its actions—especially as world public opinion was shifting when media reports began showing the brutal manner and “break the bones” policy of the Israeli army in dealing with the unarmed popular uprising. This did not take Canada outside the general sphere of promoting Israel’s overall interests, but—in these earlier decades—criticism of Israeli state policies was permissible in political debate.

It was the sharper realignment with U.S. policies through the 1990s that saw
Canadian prime ministers, starting with the Liberal Party’s Paul Martin, overtly supporting Israel in international fora, and increasing security and military ties under the guise of the War on Terror. Speaking at the opening of the United Jewish Communities 2005 General Assembly, where Israel’s then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was slated to speak, Martin professed: “Israel’s values are Canada’s values -- shared values -- democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights” (United Jewish Communities (UJC), 2005). This trend of uncritical and overt identification with the Israeli state only increased under Stephen Harper’s Conservative administration:

An article in Israel’s Jerusalem Post described how, under Stephen Harper, Canada went from being a middle-of-the-road friend of Israel – somewhere between the US and the European Union – to setting the gold standard for support of the Jewish state. There is not a government on the planet today more supportive of Israel than Harper’s Canada. (Keinon, 2012b)

The relationship today between Canada and Israel is perhaps best described on the website of the Israeli embassy in Canada, in the Israel-Canada Relations section:

Israel and Canada have long stood side-by-side as partners on the world stage. Economic, cultural, political, and security ties reflect our mutual interests in peace and prosperity. Our friendship is rooted in the shared values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

This description encapsulates the discursive view of the relationship between Israel and Canada as being based in notions of a joint civilizational camp of liberal states with shared values. It also points to the extensive connections between the two states on both
economic and political fronts, and importantly, in terms of security coordination.

On the diplomatic level, there has been a change in voting patterns in support of Israel, including a vote against the Palestinian Authority bid for recognition as an observer member state at the United Nations at the end of 2012. Not only did Canada vote against the bid, it actively campaigned for a no vote and called its heads of mission to Israel and the West Bank, along with its United Nations representatives in New York and Geneva, to protest when the statehood bid was successful. Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erekat commented, “I believe this government is more Israeli than the Israelis, more settler than the settlers, I think they have disqualified themselves from playing any role in the Middle East peace process” (Clark, 2012).

This was not a sudden policy shift of the Canadian state only on the issue of the statehood bid; there had been ample signs of uncritical support for Israel long before. For example, Canada uncritically supported Israel’s wars on Gaza in 2008 and 2012, and the assault on Lebanon in 2006. Moreover, Canada was the only country at a United Nations human rights council to vote against a motion calling for an investigation into human rights violations by the Israeli army during the 2008 bombing of Gaza. Much of this trajectory, however, was determined before Harper’s time. Canada and Israel began negotiating trade agreements in the 1990s, resulting in the Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement (CIFTA) and increased collaboration through the Canada-Israel Industrial Research and Development Fund (CIIRDF).

The “War on Terror” saw a further deepening of this relationship, as Israel placed itself as a key Western ally and as a leader in anti-terror innovation (practiced on the
populations of the West Bank and Gaza Strip for decades). Since the World Trade Center attacks, Israel has pounced on the identification of Islam with terrorism and worked hard to foster an image of Palestinians as Islamic fundamentalists, with the rise and growing popularity of Hamas (an openly Islamic movement) within the Palestinian Occupied Territories providing the discursive justification of this process. When asked by a *New York Times* journalist in 2001 about the effect of the attack on the World Trade Center on U.S./Israel relations, Benjamin Netanyahu replied: “it will generate immediate sympathy” (Bennett, 2001). This sympathy, Netanyahu appeared to believe, would be a good result because it would translate to an identification with Israel as a partner in the so-called War on Terror. Abu-Laban and Bakan explained that, in the post 9/11 context,

the US, and by association other liberal democracies in the global North, have come to identify the need for uniquely repressive measures in the face of a perceived ‘terrorist’ threat similar to that faced by Israel since its inception as a state. (2011, p. 277)

In other words, cementing the idea that there is a single war on terror that Israel is crucially a part of, because it historically understands and has dealt with “terrorist threats,” allows for a justification of Israeli policies towards Palestinians. More importantly, this justification allows other states to enforce measures similar to those practiced by Israel’s occupation forces against the Palestinian people for decades. The Canadian state is no exception in this regard.

Kilibarda, for example, outlined some of the most significant connections between Canada and Israel in a study titled “Canadian and Israeli Defense -- Industrial
and Homeland Security Ties: An Analysis” (2008). This study traced the increasing trade links with the signing of free trade agreements between Canada and Israel, but, most importantly, concentrated on the links in the security sector. Kilibarda noted that, in March 2005, a delegation comprised of 13 Canadian Space Agency (CSA) and Canadian aerospace industry representatives visited Israel. The CSA signed a “Technology and Science Cooperative Agreement” with its Israeli counterpart, the Israel Space Agency (ISA), while Canadian aerospace firms met with representatives of important potential Israeli partners in this sector, including Rafael, Elta, Israeli Aerospace Industry’s Mabat division, and Elbit’s Aluf (Kilibarda, 2008, p. 9). According to Kilibarda’s report,

The CSA visit also coincided with a separate trip by 32 Canadian police-chiefs to Israel that was hosted by the Israeli Police and the Israeli Ministry of Internal Security . . . followed in the fall by another visit by 39 Ontario police chiefs. (2008, p. 9)

Kilibarda has asserted that the “strongest expression of this relationship to date has been the semi-formal institutionalization of direct Canada-Israel security cooperation through the ‘Declaration of Intent’ on ‘public safety.’” (2008, p. 10). More recently, Peter MacKay, Canada’s Minister of National Defence, visited Israel in January 2011 to sign a Memorandum of Understanding regarding defense relations with his Israeli counterpart (Government of Canada, 2011). This close coordination at the security level between the two states illustrates the ways in which the Canadian state continues its tacit support of Israeli policies, while disregarding all of its human rights violations against Palestinians. The message this sends, especially to Muslim/Arab and Palestinian communities living in
Canada, is that the Canadian state is in support of Israel’s policies and will not attempt to hold Israel to account. There is also fear that military equipment and surveillance technologies used on Palestinians in Israel are being imported to Canada to be used on domestic minorities that the War on Terror targets, under the guise of “public safety” initiatives.

Canada and Israel’s close relationship in regard to military technologies extends to the private sector as well. In light of Israel’s assault on Gaza in 2008, the Canadian Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade (COAT) published a report on the Canadian complicity in the production of major U.S. weapons systems used by Israel. The report included 10 detailed tables filled with data detailing about 200 Canadian military companies that have direct or indirect export links to Israel (Sanders, n.d.). The Canadian Association of Defense and Security Industries (CADSI), the arms industry business association, works to lobby the government for increased arms industry collaboration between Canada and Israel. In 2004, CADSI organized a “Canada / Israel Industry Partnering Mission” to “advance industrial partnerships between Canadian and Israeli companies.” Speakers at the event included Canada’s Minister of National Defence, Israel’s Ambassador to Canada, a representative from Israel’s Ministry of Defense, and top bureaucrats from Canadian government departments. Canadian military companies heard presentations from Israel’s top weapons industries, and then held 20-minute, face-to-face “Company One-on-Ones” with key Israeli military and security companies (Sanders, n.d.).

This collaboration between Israel and Canada, especially in the homeland security
sector, was emphasized by Abu-Laban and Bakan, who have asserted that “in the heightened climate of anti-terrorism surveillance following 9/11, the Israeli state has increased its international profile as an ‘expert’ in ‘resisting’ the threat of the constructed ‘Muslim terrorist’” (2011, p. 288). Abu-Laban and Bakan thus make the link between foreign policies, the securitization of the state, and the racialization of Arabs and Muslims. Author Naomi Klein’s explanation that the Israeli expertise in anti-terrorism training has been materially beneficial to Israel (2007, p. 528) adds to this argument; in fact, the Palestinian territories have been and continue to be transformed into testing labs for the War on Terror. Furthermore, as Gordon maintained, “the use of the occupied Palestinian territories, Lebanon and Israel itself as laboratories and showcases for the produces that are developed is crucial for Israel’s marketing efforts” (2011, p. 154).

On the economic level, the relationship between Canada and Israel “has been strengthened in recent years as evidenced by increased cooperation in several areas, including public security, defense, trade and investment, and the increased frequency of ministerial visits” (Government of Canada, 2011). In 2010, Peter Van Loan, former Canadian Minister of International Trade, and his Israeli counterpart Binyamin Ben Eliezer, Israel’s then Minister of Industry, Trade and Labour, announced that Canada and Israel were to undertake steps toward modernizing the existing Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement (CIFTA). Canada-Israel bilateral goods trade has more than doubled since the inception of CIFTA, from $507 million in 1996 to $1.4 billion in 2010—a trend directly linked to Harper’s free trade agenda. Minister Van Loan explained that:

Expanding the Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement is part of the Harper
government’s broad and ambitious free trade agenda. In just four years, our government has negotiated new trade agreements with eight countries, is in negotiation with close to 50 others, and is now expanding the three first-generation agreements signed by the former government. (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 2010)

At the provincial level, the premiers of Manitoba, Prince Edward Island, Ontario, and Alberta, along with cabinet ministers from other provinces, have led commercial delegations to Israel. Thus, extending economic relations with Israel happens at all levels of the state, as does repression against the Palestine Solidarity Movement, as the following chapters will illustrate.

These deepening diplomatic, military, and economic relations fall within Canada’s overall goals to advance free trade and neoliberalism and secure the resources of the Middle East and North Africa under Western hegemony, with Israel playing a key role in an endless War on Terror. In October 2010, when Canada was not elected to a seat on the UN Security Council, Harper himself attributed this to Canada’s policies on Israel, but he insisted this trajectory would continue, and explained:

There are, after all, a lot more votes — a lot more — in being anti-Israeli than in taking a stand. But, as long as I am prime minister, whether it is at the UN or the Francophonie or anywhere else, Canada will take that stand, whatever the cost. (CBC, 2012)

Canada’s relationship with the Palestinian Authority falls in line with its strong support for Israel. The relationship is managed through the provision of aid to the Fatah-
led Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and importantly, through the development of a security service that they hope can pacify the Palestinian population. The security relationship between the Palestinian Authority and Canada has taken shape "particularly through Canadian Forces Operation Proteus, which aims to build a Palestinian security force, and through our contribution to the mission of the U.S. Security Coordinator, and to the European Union Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support" (Government of Canada, 2013).

In 2010, Canada’s deputy foreign minister explained that Operation PROTEUS (the deployment of a Canadian Forces team to Jerusalem to support the work of the Office of the United States Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority) was Canada’s “second largest deployment after Afghanistan” (Evyatar, 2010). Former head of the U.S. Security Coordinator mission for building the PA security force, Lieutenant-General Keith Dayton, emphasized that “the Canadian contribution is invaluable,” in a 2009 speech to the Washington Institute of Near East Policy. Dayton went on to explain:

What we have created are new men . . . [men who] believe that their mission is to build a Palestinian state . . . Upon the return of these new men of Palestine, they have shown motivation, discipline and professionalism, and they have made such a difference – and I am not making this up – that senior IDF commanders ask me frequently: ‘how many more of these new Palestinians can you generate, and how quickly, because they are our way to leave the West Bank.’

The training of Palestinian security forces is coordinated with Israel, Dayton also publicly
stated: “We don’t provide anything to the Palestinians unless it has been thoroughly coordinated with the State of Israel and they agree to it” (2009). This includes the vetting of security services personnel.

Nonetheless, for many Palestinians, a U.S.-trained, Israel-vetted security force is not seen in a good light, but rather as a mechanism to keep the West Bank under control and aid the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority against its rival Hamas. These security services have been involved in quelling a number of nonviolent protests across the West Bank. The so-called *Palestine Papers*, documents leaked to Aljazeera news network, included extensive correspondence between General Dayton and Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erekat detailing collaboration between Israeli and Palestinian security services, as well as Dayton’s knowledge of torture of Hamas members in the West Bank (Perry, 2011). In the *London Review of Books*, Adam Shatz aptly wrote: “It is an extraordinary arrangement: the security forces of a country under occupation are being subcontracted by third parties outside the region to prevent resistance to the occupying power, even as that power continues to grab more land” (2011).

Financial resources for these security forces come in the form of “aid” packages to the Palestinian Authority. The reality is that under the rubric of development aid the Canadian state has found a key mechanism for managing its relationship with the Palestinian Authority: exerting pressure when necessary by withholding aid and giving aid in key areas, such as to the security forces described above. In 2006, Canada was the first country, after Israel, to cut aid from the PA when Hamas was elected, only to restore it later when the split between Fatah and Hamas occurred. Canadian officials have not
hidden the fact that aid to the Palestinian Authority is provided for the benefit of Israel. In January 2008, Maxime Bernier, Canada’s then foreign minister, declared: “We are doing that because we want Israel to be able to live in peace and security with its neighbors” (Zohar, 2008).

The stated reason for the provision of aid to the West Bank PA is that it is specifically meant for the development of Palestinian state institutions. The Canadian International Development Agency’s (CIDA) program is aligned with the requirements identified in the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP). According to the Canadian government,

Canada is a leading contributor to the development of Palestinian institutions, and is in the midst of implementing a $300 million commitment over five years in support of the peace process and of Palestinian reform and development in the priority areas of security, governance and prosperity. (Government of Canada, 2013)

The main thrust of the PRDP is to build state institutions in accordance with a crude neoliberal plan for the Palestinian economy. Authors Khalidi and Samour have noted that the plan “faithfully reflect[s] the economic policy agenda set forth in the so-called ‘Post-Washington Consensus’ (PWC) orthodoxy advanced by the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI), the World Bank Group, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), since the late 1990s” (2011, p. 9). In adherence with basic neoliberal dictates, the Canadian state focuses its aid on support for “private sector development as a major driver of sustainable economic growth, employment and stability. In doing so, Canada focuses on helping to
develop a more investment-favourable business environment in the West Bank” (Government of Canada, 2013).

In line with this trajectory, trade relations between the PA and Canada fall within the Joint Canadian-Palestinian Framework on Economic Cooperation and Trade, signed with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) on behalf of the Palestinian Authority. This framework confirms PA “approval of the application of preferential tariffs and any future concessions under CIFTA to goods produced in the West Bank and Gaza Strip” (Government of Canada, 2013). In this manner, Canadian relations with the PA are mediated through its wider relationship with the Israeli economy—this not only ties the Palestinian Authority into neoliberal trade agreements, but further consolidates Israeli control over future Palestinian economic development.

As part of this shift in funding priorities to the PA, the Canadian government announced in January 2010 that it would transfer its financial support for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA, the UN agency responsible for Palestinian refugees) to the Palestinian Authority. This decision showed weakening Canadian government concern for the plight of Palestinian refugees, and a commitment to strengthening the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority against Hamas. While officially, the Canadian state claims to support a two-state solution, the reality is that on the diplomatic, military, and economic levels, it supports Israel’s actions uncritically and further manages its relationship with the Palestinians in accordance with Israel’s interests. The aid given for the development of security services, and the support for neoliberal development within the Palestinian Occupied Territories, only function to cement Israel’s
illegal military occupation.

**Empire, Racism, and the War on Terror**

The foregoing discussion has focused on Canada’s position as a second-level power within the top tier of the world market, and the implications of this for Canada’s role in the Middle East and its relationship to Israel. It is necessary to turn now to the ways in which this position is articulated within Canada’s domestic policies towards racialized groups such as Palestinians. One of the key features of neoliberalism is—as David McNally has noted—its dual feature of both advancing an ideological and programmatic defence of the free market, whilst simultaneously ensuring that oppositional voices are silenced or marginalized. Extra economic coercion is a necessary corollary of neoliberalism, designed to discipline behaviours that contradict market-oriented reform (McNally, 2010, p. 113–120). This argument can be extended to include the ways in which a neoliberal state such as Canada systematically employs discursive, ideological, and other forms of silencing against elements of its population who appear to challenge the wider imperialist orientation traced in the discussion above. The Palestinian case provides a particularly salient example of this “discipline through silencing,” which has consistently worked to sustain the project of Canadian imperialism in the Middle East.

On the discursive level, the Canadian state’s support for Israel has echoed notions advanced by authors such as Samuel Huntington—who posited an eternal Clash of Civilizations (1996), and a view of Arabs and Muslims as static, irrational beings who are culturally inferior—as well as Francis Fukuyama’s End of History (1992) thesis, which
argued that capitalist liberal democracy is the way forward for the rest of the world. These two themes combine to mark Arabs and Muslims as civilizationally inferior, while at the same time as being unable to enter the new democratic world order based on capitalist social relations (Ali, 2003; Mahajan, 2002). Drawing upon these discursive tropes, the Canadian government has promoted Israel as a democracy with shared Western values and a common civilizational agenda, struggling to survive against overwhelming odds. In this manner, racialized discourses of Arab/Muslim backwardness, which underpin the War on Terror, were utilized to promote Israel as a key ally in that war. This process took place in the context of post 9/11 restructuring of racial relations, which sets the world in terms of opposing binaries of civilized vs. uncivilized, and good vs. evil.

This view is consistent with the way empire building has historically relied on racist constructions to advance and justify its expansion. As Razack explained: "empire is a structure of feeling, a deeply held belief in the need to and the right to dominate others for their own good, others who are expected to be grateful" (2004, p. 10). McNally also rightly emphasized that, "to invoke the defense of civilization is simultaneously to paint the enemy as uncivilized, savage, barbaric – all the standard motifs of racism" (2002, 148). These racial binaries of civilized vs. uncivilized, however, do not only affect the world outside the borders of a given state, they reflect on domestic ‘Others’ in a variety of ways—from overt state-sanctioned racial profiling to more subtle forms of common sense racism.

One of the most important features of this new form of racism is a particular
projection of “Muslim.” Sherene Razack noted that:

three allegorical figures have come to dominate the social landscape of the “war on terror” and its ideological underpinnings of a clash of civilizations: the dangerous Muslim man, the imperiled Muslim woman, and the civilized European, the latter a figure who is seldom explicitly named but who nevertheless anchors the first two figures. (2008, 5)

Not only is there a projection of specific “allegorical figures,” there is an insistence regarding how these figures should behave to redeem themselves in order to re-enter the mainstream. As Mahmoud Mamdani also explained, within mainstream discourse after September 11, 2001, “‘Bad Muslims’ were clearly responsible for terrorism . . . ‘good Muslims’ were anxious to clear their names of consciences of these horrible crimes . . . and unless proven to be ‘good’, every Muslim was presumed to be ‘bad’” (2004, p. 15).

Importantly, the racialization of Arabs and Muslims has occurred both inside and outside the borders of the nation state. The so-called War on Terror, as a “global war” on an “existential threat,” according to its advocates, is a war that transcends borders and definitions of combatants; it also turns on domestic minorities with increased surveillance and policing. As Thobani noted, “the racialization of the category ‘Muslim’ made it inevitable that racialized Others inside the country would come to be linked directly with the enemy outside the borders of the nation-state” (2007, p. 238). Even strong advocates of official multiculturalism, like Kymlicka, noted the changes in relations after the fall of the twin towers in New York on September 11, 2001. According to Kymlicka, “The 9/11 attacks, and the subsequent Madrid and London bombings, have led to the
'resecuritization' of state-Muslim relations, as fears have arisen that locally settled Muslims might collaborate with external enemies of the West, serving as a fifth column" (2007, p. 125). Kymlicka also made the connection between multiculturalism in the West and geo-political security:

Given that the public acceptance of multiculturalism in the West has depended on the perception that it is consistent with both the geopolitical security of the state and the personal security of individual citizens, support for a liberal multiculturalist approach to the integration of Muslim migrants faces an uphill battle in Western Europe. (2007, p. 125)

Therefore, official multiculturalism, which helps to foster domestic social stability because it is designed to create optics of “inclusion” for historically racialized groups, is tested to its limits when internal “inclusion” interferes with foreign policies. This has meant, in the case of Canada, a “re-whitening of Canadian identity” and a redefinition of it along “civilizational lines” (Arat-Koc, 2005, p. 32).

Too often, however, racism against Arabs and Muslims is not analyzed as a structural feature of Western societies; rather, it is only referred to and studied during overt moments of discrimination such as deportation to torture prisons (as was the case with Canadian citizen Maher Arrar who was deported to a prison in Syria) or security certificates (which have affected Arabs disproportionately). These instances are often seen as aberrations that might be corrected, or explained as the work of “a few bad apples” (as was the case with the Abu Ghraib torture scandal), or even viewed as temporary “necessary evils” to help the West in a battle for survival. In contrast to this
“exceptionalist” approach, an understanding of the systemic, common sense racialization of Arabs and Muslims—beyond simply its most overt moments—allows us to situate the racialization process within the actual lived histories of migrant communities. Naming and analyzing this racism through moments of erasure, silencing, and censorship allows us to study how it is constructed and perpetuated in a multicultural context that claims tolerance and diversity.

**Palestinian Racialization: Erasure and Silencing**

Anti-Arab and Anti-Muslim racism is most acute in form when it comes to Palestinians and the Palestinian narrative. Goldberg described racial Palestinianization as “among the most repressive, the most subjugating and degrading, the most deadly forms of racial targeting, branding and rationalization not least in the name of racelessness” (2009, p. 130). The racialization of Palestinians and the silencing campaign against solidarity with them, however, does not begin with the War on Terror; it is rooted in the erasure of the Palestinian narrative of dispossession. The following section begins by rooting this racialization historically in the first act of erasure and silencing, the 1948 ethnic cleansing of Palestine, or the *Nakba* (the Arabic word for catastrophe). Next, the specific racialized discourses utilized in the Canadian context to silence the Palestine Solidarity Movement are discussed, including the utilization of multicultural language itself, accusations of anti-Semitism, legislative measures, and harsh disciplinary actions.

It is important to note, first and foremost, that this racialization is solidified on the longstanding settler-colonial solidarity between Israel and Canada—one that, importantly, denies the experience of indigenous communities in both countries. Harper
himself has noted publicly that Canada has “no history of colonialism” (Ljunggren, 2009). This depoliticization of Canadian history is the starting point of obscuring the colonial past, along with the persistence of racial, class, and gender inequalities in modern Canada. In speaking of this, Thobani rightly argued that Canadian identity “has been deeply racialized since its inception in colonial violence, and that it remains inextricably infused with the colonial tropes of white racial supremacy and western civilizational superiority” (2007, p. 249). It is no coincidence that a state based in this type of erasure would tolerate the erasure, silencing, and censorship of the Palestinian narrative of dispossession.

This type of settler solidarity begins with an erasure of indigenous history and colonial conquest. As Nadeau and Sears have argued,

the silencing of Palestine solidarity has a very long history, and is ultimately grounded in the particular character of Palestinian unfreedom. One of the fundamental characteristics of Palestinian unfreedom has been the attempted erasure of the Palestinian people, their history and their presence. (2010, 7)

These authors have traced Palestinian unfreedom to the 1947/48 Nakba (catastrophe), the initial ethnic cleansing that saw the expulsion of the majority of the Palestinian population and the destruction of more than 500 villages (2010, 7).15 Importantly, Palestinian history following the 1947/48 Nakba has been marked with consistent resistance to the erasure and silencing of Palestinian history and culture. The history of

15. For more information and scholarship on the Nakba, see Abu-Lughood & Sa’di, 2007; Khalidi, 1992; Masalha, 1997; Pappe, 2007.
“Palestinian oppression is defined here as resulting in not only the collective mass
displacement and transfer of the population in 1948 and 1967 but also the incessant and
invisible effort of muting (silencing) the Palestinian narrative” (Habashi, 2005, p. 711).

As with all colonial projects, this “muting of Palestinian narrative” is anchored on
racializing Palestinians as inferior. As a people facing, surviving, and challenging a
colonial project embodied in the Zionist movement, the Palestinians are accorded the
status of being non-existent in the Zionist narrative—or at best, are perceived to be
“backward natives,” violent and uncivilized. Since Israel was portrayed by the Zionist
movement as the “bulwark of civilization against Asiatic barbarism” (Herzl, 1896, 18),
then the people it was displacing, the indigenous population, were to be constructed as
the “bulwark” of backwardness and barbarism. These are the ideological underpinnings
used to justify the colonization of Palestine and the silencing of anyone who challenges
this colonization. Israel was conceived by the Zionist movement and understood in the
West as a hub of civilization that shares similar values with Western democracies. This
conception has only been fortified further with every Israeli military victory; Israel is
referred to as the only democracy in the Middle East, despite ample and well documented
evidence to the contrary (Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel,
2011). Israel, in mainstream discourse and politics, becomes the signifier of Western
values and Palestinians the signifier of the anti-Western.

A key feature of Palestine solidarity, and more specifically the BDS movement, is
to challenge this racialization, while at the same time problematizing the “normal” view
of Israel in the West. A principal aim of the BDS movement is to place the Palestinian
narrative and the ethnic cleansing of Palestine as a starting point for discussions of any solution to the conflict, as, rather than analyzing the situation as one between two equal conflicting sides, the Palestine movement understands it as an anti-colonial struggle. This perspective challenges the core principles of Western hegemony in the Middle East, and strategically implicates Western governments and corporations in Israel’s ongoing violations of Palestinian human rights. For this reason, the Palestine Solidarity Movement has faced systematic silencing, curtailment of freedom of expression, and an attempt to restrict its access to public space.

Conclusion

This chapter has situated the Canadian state’s relationship to the Palestine Solidarity Movement in the broader context of Canada’s position in the world market, its role in upholding the imperial order, and the racial hierarchies that stem from it. There is a powerful case to be made, based in the literature of critical political economy, for seeing the Canadian state not as a neutral, rights-abiding force within global politics, but as an imperialist state that has long played an aggressive role within the world market.

Within the Middle East region, Canada operates within the framework of a U.S.-led imperialism aimed at securing the resources of the region and bringing it under Western control, guaranteeing the flow of petro-dollars and opening the markets of the region to foreign investment. Within this framework, a close relationship with and support for Israel has become a key pillar. The Canadian state, although it has historically supported Israel since the debate on its creation, has increasingly and very openly allied itself diplomatically, militarily, and economically, with Israeli state policies. Silencing of
the Palestinian narrative constitutes an essential part of structuring and perpetuating a racial project in Canada that deems Palestinians uncivilized, while positing all traits of liberal democracy on the Israeli state.

As various examples of the silencing campaign throughout this work will illustrate, the racialized discourses and mechanisms for silencing Palestine activism do vary between softer discursive approaches and harder disciplinary ones (such as cuts to funding). All of these discourses and mechanisms of coercion stem from the specific nature of the neoliberal Canadian state, despite the liberal multicultural rhetoric on diversity and tolerance. Indeed, one of the key mechanisms of silencing is the use of official multicultural language itself, especially concepts of “civility” and “dialogue.” Tolerance and civility are used to claim that views critical of Israel cause discomfort and harm diversity and thus should not be tolerated. This language of civility fits neatly with the wider discourses of a clash of civilizations. Notions of diversity and civility act to mark Palestine solidarity activism as outside of tolerated, acceptable speech in multicultural Canada. These constitute the softer side of the silencing campaign, in which freedom of speech is limited in the name of protecting diversity and civility. These discursive silencing tools go hand in hand with more disruptive disciplining mechanisms like defunding organizations, outlawing specific speech through legislative measures, introducing bureaucratic and security hurdles in booking spaces for activities, and so forth. The defunding of ethno cultural organizations (such as the Canadian Arab Federation and Palestine House) is designed to have a serious chilling effect on communities that goes beyond the immediate programs that are defunded. The remainder
of this dissertation will examine case studies of silencing, including the silencing of Israeli Apartheid Week on campuses, the defunding campaign against groups perceived to be pro-Palestinian, and finally, the attempts to ban Queers Against Israeli Apartheid from marching in Pride Toronto. In all of the cases studied, the focus will be on the role of the state in the silencing campaign, with an understanding that other institutions also play key roles in racializing and silencing Palestine advocacy.
Chapter 3. Silencing Dissent on Campus: the Case of Israeli Apartheid Week

“One has to keep telling the [Palestinian] story in as many ways as possible, as insistently as possible, and in as compelling a way as possible, to keep attention to it, because there is always the fear that it might just disappear” (Said, 2003, p. 187).

“The organizers of Israeli Apartheid Week use the cover of academic freedom to demonize and delegitimize the State of Israel. In reality, this week is nothing more than an unbalanced attempt to paint Israel and her supporters as racist. This week runs contrary to Canadian values of tolerance, mutual respect, and understanding” (Kenney, 2012).

University campuses have long been regarded as a space for critical debate and the building of solidarity with international struggles, although certainly a space embedded within a broader set of ruling relations (Smith, 1999). Despite the fact that the production of knowledge in North American universities is increasingly linked to the interests of the corporate sector, campuses provide an important space to organize in support of marginalized and oppressed groups (Sears, 2003). The gains made by social movements of the 1960s and 1970s around academic freedom and access to campus space, although increasingly under attack at the dawn of the twenty-first century, allow for a degree of freedom for political activism. That the university continues to be a contested political space is perhaps nowhere more evident than with respect to the Palestine Solidarity Movement. This is most sharply felt in the attacks on campus-based
Palestine solidarity organizations, such as Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP), Students Against Israeli Apartheid (SAIA), and Students for Palestinian Human Rights (SPHR).

This chapter focuses on the silencing campaign mounted during Israeli Apartheid Week against the flagship organizations of the Palestine Solidarity Movement in Canada: Students Against Israeli Apartheid (SAIA) and Students for Palestinian Human Rights (SPHR). Israeli Apartheid Week runs for seven days in late February or early March depending on the academic schedule and comprises educational lectures, film screenings, and social events organized on university campuses across Canada. It started at the University of Toronto in 2005, under the banner of the Arab Students’ Collective, and broadened to include a cross-Canada coalition of student activists known as Students Against Israeli Apartheid before spreading internationally. In the year 2012, 216 IAW events were held around the world. The stated aim of IAW is “to educate people about the nature of Israel as an apartheid system and to build Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) campaigns as part of a growing global BDS movement” (Israeli Apartheid Week, 2012). IAW seeks to insert a Palestinian-centred narrative and acts as a “counter history” against what authors Abu Loughod and Sa’di have described as “the thundering story of Zionism” (2007, p. 6).

The silencing campaign against IAW, a permanent fixture of the academic calendar in Canada, can be understood as a prototype of the silencing campaign against Palestine solidarity activism more generally. Efforts to de-legitimize Israeli Apartheid
Week come predominantly from the organized Israel lobby, but the emphasis of this chapter is on how the Canadian state aligns with this lobby group through use of techniques of ostracism and marginalization of IAW. A central premise underpinning these processes is the unsubstantiated claim that IAW, and the use of the term “apartheid” in particular, is a form of anti-Semitism against Jewish people.

Canadian officials have argued that IAW shuts the door on civil debate and goes against mutual respect—ostensible pillars of Canadian diversity. As Eva Mackey, author of The House of Difference: Cultural Politics and National Identify in Canada, noted, “pluralism and tolerance have a key place, and an institutionalized place, in the cultural politics of national identity in Canada.” She further added that “the story of Canada’s tolerant nationhood has often been framed in terms of its policy and mythology or ‘multiculturalism’” (2002, p. 2–3). As this suggests, the definitions of tolerance and diversity are regarded as the legitimate purview of elected officials, rather than as a site of free debate and political contestation. What we see, then, is how attempts to delegitimize IAW are part of wider efforts to harness “multiculturalism” as “a key process by which the state manages difference by maintaining control over the power to name and annex ‘the other’” (Walton-Roberts, 2011, p. 106). By categorizing IAW as racist and outside the bounds of civility, the state automatically engages in both naming and silencing.

16. It is important to note that the Israel/Zionist lobby is itself a diverse grouping with the main aim of garnering support for Israeli state policies in Canada. It includes individuals and non-governmental organizations, some of whom claim to speak on behalf of the Jewish community, but also others who are ideological Zionists and Christian Zionists. See for example, Freeman-Maloy’s analysis of some transitions within sections of this lobby (Freeman-Maloy, 2006).
In developing these arguments, this chapter begins by situating official campaigns against IAW within a broader context of silencing on North American campuses. It then moves on to a brief historical overview of student organizing in the Palestine Solidarity Movement (focusing on Toronto) and the history of Israeli Apartheid Week in Canada. After briefly discussing the responses of the Israel lobby and university administrations to IAW, the chapter deals in detail with authoritative declarations against IAW in parliament and among elected officials.

**Silencing Palestine on Campus**

In the broader North American context, enormous resources have been marshalled in an attempt to silence criticism of Israel in the academy, usually taking the form of harassing professors seen to be pro-Palestinian (Benin, 2004). Although such harassment campaigns have always existed, they vastly intensified in the rubric of the War on Terror as pundits played on the new nationalist fervor inflected with anti-Arab and anti-Muslim racism. As Pappano noted, in an article titled "Academic Freedom Threatened in Ontario Universities," "in North America, students and faculty raising critical viewpoints about Israel find themselves muffled, accused of anti-Semitism, threatened with disciplinary action, or, in the case of former Depaul University professor, Norman Finkelstein, out of a job entirely" (2009).

With the beginning of the second Palestinian Intifada, campus activism began to challenge the founding myths of Zionism and their hegemonic narrative of Israel as a perpetual victim state. In response, supporters of Israel quickly coined the term "the new-anti-Semitism"—defined effectively as any criticism of Israeli policies (Chesler, 2003;
Dershowitz, 2003; Iganski & Kosmin, 2003). Through employing new accusations of anti-Semitism, it was hoped that those critical of Israeli policies would either be silenced or too caught up with defending themselves against allegations to organize. Importantly, this was a strategy aimed at stigmatizing Palestine solidarity as racist. Officials in Canada that target pro-Palestinian advocacy usually employ the terminology of the “new anti-Semitism” as a silencing tool. For example, in his 2009 speech to the Inter-parliamentary London Conference on Combating Anti-Semitism (ICCA), Jason Kenny, Minister of Citizenship and Multiculturalism, stated “we do see the growth of a new anti-Semitism, the anti-Semitism predicated on the notion that the Jews alone have no right to a homeland, the anti-Zionist version of anti-Semitism” (CBC News, 2009). The irony here is that it is Palestinians who are denied a homeland and left stateless. This conflation of anti-Zionism, referring to a state ideology, with anti-Semitism (racism against Jews) works to conflate all Jews with the actions of the Israeli state, while simultaneously attempting to cast all Palestine advocacy as racist.

In the U.S., organizations like the David Project and Campus Watch were established in an attempt to silence university professors who were challenging the Zionist narrative. Scholars working on the Middle East were pronounced “un-American” for producing work that did not support U.S. interests in the Middle East. As the Campus-

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17. ICCA is a grouping of parliamentarians, established in 2000, that initially came out of the Global Forum for Combating Anti-Semitism, organized by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 1999 London Declaration called on parliamentarians “to expose, challenge and isolate political actors who engage in hate against Jews and target the State of Israel as a Jewish collectivity” (ICCA, 2009). The Canadian Coalition Against Anti-Semitism, initiated by Canadian Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Jason Kenny along with Erwin Cotler, came out of the ICCA process.
Watch website put it, “U.S. scholars of the Middle East lack any appreciation of their country’s national interests and often use their positions of authority to disparage these interests” (2005). As Makdisi and Goldberg noted:

It is an extraordinary fact that no fewer than thirty-three distinct organizations—including AIPAC, the Zionist Organization of America, the American Jewish Congress, and the Jewish National Fund—are gathered together today as members or affiliates of the Israel on Campus Coalition . . . to generate [in their organizations’ words] a pro-active, pro-Israel agenda on campus.” (2009)

In Canada, the attack was more pronounced when it came to student organizing. For example, even before the issue of the academic boycott of Israel had been discussed on any university campus in Canada, in the summer of 2007, 19 university presidents signed a statement that opposed academic boycotts. This step was executed without any consultation with university bodies or students and was seen as a direct measure taken to foreclose any discussion on academic boycotts.18

As with most social movements, students provide a core of organizers within the Palestine Solidarity Movement in Canada. This explains the centrality of the debate over use of campus space, the use of specific terminology (such as Israeli apartheid), and the notion of academic freedom to the movement. In Canada, a very organized silencing/censorship campaign has been going on, not only against students active within the Palestine Solidarity Movement, but also the faculty who support them (Nadeau &

18. All statements are collated under a document titled “Statements by Canadian University Presidents on the Issue of Academic Boycotts” (Canadian Academics for Peace in the Middle East, 2010).
Sears, 2010). Student activists have noted discrimination in terms of access to space and increased bureaucratic hurdles to Palestine-related events, as well as direct administrative coordination with Zionist organizations to cancel events related to the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign. In one instance, Freedom of Information Requests demonstrate that the cancellation of a student conference titled “Standing Against Apartheid” in October of 2008 was discussed prior to the room booking request even being handed in (Schofield, 2009).

The use of space management policies and student codes of conduct to restrict PSM activities has been increasingly pursued. For example, the Temporary Use of University Space Policy and Procedures (TUUSP), revised in 2004 by the York University administration, requires assessments of “High Profile, Controversial or High Risk External Speakers.” It also includes restrictions on use of campus space by declaring the University’s lands and properties as private (Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT), 2008). In 2008, the University of Toronto introduced a similar “Space Booking Policy.” Student Codes of Conduct were revamped or introduced on a number of campuses as a way to manage non-classroom student behaviour. The Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) noted, in speaking of York’s Student Code of Conduct and Temporary Use of Space policy, that:

The dispassionate language of policy and procedures is utilized to camouflage mechanisms that have the potential to infringe in a significant manner on academic freedom and freedom of speech . . . in the hands of administrators, policies and procedures may be called into use as forceful disciplinary tools to
suppress legitimate debate and dissent. (2008)

A 2006 report by CAUT, set up to investigate cases of infringement on freedom of expression at York University, concluded: “For many faculty members and students the explanation for the contentious events that [have] unfolded on the York campus is found in what they see as decisions by the university’s senior administration to support pro-Israel initiatives and marginalize pro-Palestinian efforts.” 19 The introduction of student codes of conduct and stricter procedures regarding use of campus space were the main mechanisms pursued by university administrations to curb political activism under the guise of neutral procedures.

For example, although charging security fees may seem like a standard procedure that applies equally to all groups, it clearly disadvantages groups without access to resources and outside financing. Beyond security fees, criteria and procedures for “risk assessments” are not public, leaving it up to administrators to decide who poses a risk. These decisions on who poses a risk are not neutral procedural matters. In one example, York University Security Services charged Students for Palestinian Human Rights (SPRH) the costs needed to pay for ten external police officers for a talk given by Norman Finkelstein on York’s campus. Students at the University of Toronto refused to pay such a security fee when they invited acclaimed author Tariq Ali to speak on their

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19. One such case at York was the suspension of student Daniel Freeman-Maloy for the use of a megaphone on campus at a rally for Palestine. A court eventually decided that the university president at the time, Lorna Marsden, had “maliciously misused her statutory power to harm York honours student Daniel Freeman-Maloy by summarily suspending him for three years for his participation in two campus demonstrations.” A CAUT bulletin titled “Supreme Court Refuses to Hear York Appeal” reported on this specific case (2006).
campus. Such silencing campaigns also involve increased scrutiny of critical academic events/papers that relate to Palestine/Israel.  

Restricting campus space and imposing codes of conduct resonates with a view of students as customers paying for a service in the context of a neoliberal university, rather than as active participants in the politics that shape the world around them. As Nadeau and Sears have argued,

the goal of neoliberalism in post-secondary education is to make the universities serve exclusively economic goals, preparing students for the corporate workplace and creating know-how that can be commercialized. This requires a serious culture shift on campuses. One of the core political projects of neoliberalism on campus has been to roll back the spaces for campus activism and freedom of expression originally won by student militancy in the 1960s and 1970s. (2010) Although the intended effect of the various access to space policies and student codes of student conduct is to depoliticize campus space and monitor student activism under the veneer of neural procedures, they have not passed without contestation from the student body. While students continue to face restrictions, room cancellations, and requests for detailed information on invited speakers, IAW has nonetheless continued and the student sector of the Palestine Solidarity Movement in Canada continues to anchor its activities internationally to a large extent. The following section traces the origins of Israeli

20. The “Israel/Palestine: Mapping Models of Statehood and Paths to Peace” conference at York University was one such case where the university administration, as well as government officials, intervened in the event requesting changes and extra scrutiny due to the topic at hand. See “No Debate: The Israel Lobby and Free Speech at Canadian Universities” by Jon Thompson (2011) for a full account of the campaign against the “Mapping Models” conference.
Apartheid Week in Toronto placing it in the broader historical context in which it emerged during the second Palestinian uprising.

**Origins and History of Israeli Apartheid Week**

At the onset of the second Palestinian Intifada (uprising) in 2000, international solidarity efforts with the Palestinian people were in disarray after years of the so-called Oslo peace process. The Oslo Accords, signed in 1993 between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the umbrella body of the Palestinian liberation movement, and the Israeli government, transferred limited powers to the newly established Palestinian Authority. They were heralded as a new period of peace negotiations between the Israeli state and the PLO, meant to result in two states living side by side. In reality, the Accords build on a long standing Israeli policy drive to establish limited Palestinian “self-rule,” while allowing the Israeli military to maintain remote control over the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza and their respective populations without deploying its soldiers in Palestinian urban centres (Hanieh 2003).

Under the auspices of the Oslo’s Accords, discussions on borders, illegal Israeli settlements in Palestinian Occupied Territories, further annexation of Jerusalem, and the right of return for Palestinian refugees were postponed to “final status” negotiations allowing Israel ample time to create “facts on the ground” that prejudiced any final outcome. For example, while illegal settlements were designated a “final status” issue, under a labour government Israel launched massive settlement expansion. The number of Israeli settlers living in settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip doubled from 1994 to the beginning of the year 2000 (Foundation for Middle East Peace, 2002). The Oslo
Accords divided the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C. The Palestinian Authority was given authority over Area A and shared authority with Israel over Area B, while Israel retained control of Area C, which constituted more than 70% of the territory (Usher, 1995). Travel in and out of Areas A and B was under strict Israeli control. Israel retained control over major water aquifers as well (Gvirtzman, 1997, 7). In Israel, a network of so-called bypass roads, or restricted access highways, was established to connect the illegal settlements to each other and to cities inside Israel. These bypass roads also acted to segment Palestinian cities from each other and restrict Palestinian movement (Shah, 1997, 221; B’Tselem, 2004).

In short, the Oslo Accords allowed the Israeli state to give Palestinians limited autonomy, yet retain final control over the land and economy. This period also saw the move of Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) institutions from exile in Tunis and surrounding states like Lebanon and Syria to the West Bank and Gaza.

In July 2000, under the sponsorship of U.S. President Bill Clinton, Israel’s then Prime Minister Ehud Barak and the late Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat were meant to sign off on final status issues for the Oslo Accords. The negotiations collapsed as the Israeli side insisted there would be no return to 1967 borders, but that East Jerusalem would remain under Israeli control and large settlement blocks in the West Bank would be annexed to Israel; most importantly, there would be no right of return for Palestinian refugees, only a limited number of reunification of families (Said, 2000, 9–14). The second Intifada effectively erupted after these negotiations failed, following a visit by Israeli military commander Ariel Sharon on September 28, 2000 to
Haram Al Sharif in Jerusalem. The Palestinian population, seeing further land confiscation for Israel’s network of bypass roads and increasing settlement construction in recent years, took to the streets in protest, understanding that the Oslo Accords were more about institutionalizing Israel’s control rather than granting sovereignty. The Israeli military responded to protests with militant collective punishment, including enforcing curfews and restrictions on movement, and making mass arrests and military incursions.

In November 2000, under the pretext that it wanted to protect its citizens from Palestinian violence, Israel announced plans to build a large Wall that would cut across the West Bank, sealing what some have called Israel’s Bantustan solution (Bishara, 2002; Hilal, 2007).

With the collapse of the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian population—from inside the Occupied Territories, those in exile, and those inside Israel—were forced to respond to ongoing Israeli military campaigns. Unfortunately, the shift in Palestinian politics during this period—between the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the eruption of the second Palestinian uprising in 2000—meant that structures of the Palestinian

21. Beginning in 1913, the white South African government started promoting a scheme of concentrating blacks inside a dozen allegedly self-governing geographical areas. These areas were initially called “native reserves,” then referred to as “homelands,” and finally named “Bantustans.” The areas, which reserved 13% of the land for only 75% of the population, which was black, were mostly non-contiguous. Blacks living outside Bantustans were often forcefully and violently relocated to the Bantustans. In 1970, blacks living in the Bantustans were stripped of their South African citizenship and declared citizens of their Bantustans. Thus, the use of the term “Bantustan” to designate self-governing Palestinian territories within an intended “two state solution” relies on a series of structural and functional similarities with the Bantustan system during apartheid in South Africa: 1. The vast inequality in the distribution of land. 2. The lack of contiguity, which makes territorial independence impossible. 3. The economic and military dependence on Israel. 4. The facade of independence, statehood, and international recognition of a structure that is fully under the control of another state.

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liberation movement, as well as structures of international solidarity established through the 1970s and 1980s, had become dormant, often as a result of disillusionment brought on by the results of the Oslo process (Hanieh & Ziadah, 2010, 87). The Palestinian anti-colonial liberation project, which had relied upon international solidarity in earlier decades, had morphed into a state-building project limited to the West Bank and Gaza. Although Arafat had not signed off on the final status negotiations that would foreclose Palestinian right of return, Palestinians in exile had been largely cut off from the decision-making process. Younger generations of Palestinians living in the West a decade earlier had belonged to the General Union of Palestinian Students, a historically active union within the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). At the beginning of the second Intifada, however, there was no comparable organizational formation to participate in. As institutions of the PLO shifted into the West Bank and Gaza Strip, emphasis on organizational structures in the Palestinian diaspora had diminished. New ways and organizational forms of engaging with the situation on the ground in Palestine had to be created.

Palestinian youth in the diaspora had been absorbed into the rhetoric of the Oslo peace process, and thus, to a large extent, joined organizations that promoted “dialogue” between Palestinian and Israeli youth. Such “dialogue” was embedded in a discourse of post-conflict resolution that equated the Israeli State and the newly formed Palestinian Authority, positing them as equal partners in peace negotiations. The second Intifada, however, came as a major challenge to such concepts of the Oslo period and forced Palestinian youth in exile to question their relationship to Palestine and their right to
return—put on the back burner during the long years of negotiations and considered a “final status” issue. As such, Palestinian youth in the diaspora were now challenged to reinsert themselves into Palestinian politics.

At the same time, an increasing number of Jewish students did not relate to Israeli policies, especially in the context of the continuation of the Intifada, and began identifying with anti-Zionism. They insisted that Israel did not speak in their name. Larger groups within the anti-globalization and anti-war movements also had to grapple with integrating Palestine as a central pillar of their campaigns against militarism and the corporatization of war in the Middle East region more broadly. Among these various networks, new organizational forms were beginning to emerge, along with stronger communication channels between Palestine and outside organizers.

The analysis of Israel as a settler colony practicing colonialism, occupation, and apartheid brought cohesion to what had previously been disparate political groups. The continuation of the Intifada forced activists to tackle fundamental questions about the root causes of the conflict and go beyond the framework set out by the Oslo Accords. This shifted attention to broader political processes beyond the day-to-day human rights violations that had long been a concern since the beginning of the second Intifada. The launch of IAW was part of this process of rediscovering the anti-colonial history of the Palestinian struggle for self-determination beyond narrow state building imperatives. As IAW expanded, more scholars and public figures were analyzing the similarities between Israel’s apartheid policies and those of apartheid-era South Africa (for examples, see Abu-Laban & Bakan, 2008; Bishara, 2001; former-U.S. President Jimmy Carter, 2006;
Broadly speaking, as IAW was launched, student activism in the Palestine Solidarity Movement coalesced around two main objectives: 1. to advance the analysis of Israel as an apartheid state, and 2. to advance the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign by building toward an academic boycott of Israeli institutions and calling for divestment from Israeli companies. The two objectives are of course interrelated, with the first being the educational component towards achieving a critical mass of students campaigning on their campuses for divestment from companies complicit in Israel’s military occupation and apartheid policies.

Israeli Apartheid Week emerged in this context with a focus on both promoting an analytical framework and an activist orientation. The week would tackle various aspects of Israel’s apartheid policies towards the entirety of the Palestinian people and act as an intensive educational course (Israeli Apartheid Week, 2005). The first IAW was held in 2005 at the University of Toronto campus and was organized by the Arab Students Collective. In following years, IAW took for its guiding principles the United Palestinian Call for Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions, issued in 2005 by over 170 Palestinian civil society and political organizations (Palestinian Civil Society, 2005).

A byproduct of IAW, beyond the educational aspect, was the immense training and skillset gained by student activists working to put on an intensive week of events. Organizers developed internal training courses in relating to the media, fundraising, choosing topics and speakers, coalition building, and establishing a promotional plan. Such skills are crucial to sustaining campus-based movements with a high turnover rate.
of students.

The first IAW was very much a reflection of the state of the student Palestine Solidarity Movement in Toronto at the time. It brought together speakers from the various existing Palestine solidarity organizations, as well as from allied movements. In its first year, IAW consisted of five days of lectures from January 31 to February 4, 2005. The first lecture was about Al-Nabka (catastrophe in Arabic), referring to the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians that took place in 1948. The following lectures focused on Palestinian political prisoners, the Wall, labour rights in Palestine, along with poverty in Toronto, in an effort to make connections with local struggles. The final Friday lectures were titled “Resisting Apartheid” and presented Ilan Pappe as the keynote speaker (at the time a professor at Haifa University), elaborating on Israel as an apartheid state and the necessity of a global BDS campaign.

In the following year, IAW began to grow internationally. One of the main advances in 2006 was the first IAW taking place at the University of Oxford in the United Kingdom, organized by the Oxford Arab Society. Discussions then focused on ways IAW could adapt to local contexts and continue to expand. This laid the framework that IAW continues to organize by to this day: local groups decide how best to organize in their context, while keeping with the general principles of IAW. In various locations, IAW weeks took different forms, with some emphasizing academic lectures, and others film screenings and cultural events.

It also happened that 2006 was the thirtieth anniversary of the Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. This gave IAW its theme for that
year and highlighted the more analytical and legal definition of the term apartheid. Importantly, in Toronto at this point, the various Palestine solidarity organizations started working together under the auspices of the Coalition Against Israeli Apartheid, and IAW was organized under the banner of Students Against Israeli Apartheid.

In 2007, IAW was becoming a more dominant feature of the Palestine solidarity calendar internationally. The Universities of London (SOAS) and Cambridge joined Oxford in the United Kingdom; Ottawa and Hamilton joined Toronto and Montreal in Canada; and New York joined all the others as the site of the first IAW in the United States.

As the year 2008 was the 60th anniversary of the Palestinian Nakba, IAW was held under the banner “60 Years of Ethnic Cleansing and Dispossession, Palestinian Refugees Will Return.” In 2008, IAW took place in 25 cities across the world, and in South Africa for the first time, with the important symbolism of Dr. Azmi Bishara (then member of Israel’s parliament) giving the key address in Soweto. His talk was taped and transmitted on Al-Jazeera’s channel and broadcast at IAW events in different cities. This was a watershed moment for the global coordination of IAW. It had moved from being a single event on one university campus, to one taking place in cities around the world. To call Israel an apartheid state and organize a full week of events around that analysis was no longer seen as an insignificant act by a few local students.

The threat of the spread of this analysis was not lost on pro-Israel organizations and their supporters. At this point, the McMaster University administration in Canada attempted to ban the use of the term “Israeli apartheid.” This decision was rescinded after
major mobilizations and a rally at McMaster by student organizations from across Ontario, including official student union locals who did not necessarily agree with the use of the term apartheid or know much about the situation in Palestine, but who wanted to assure that freedom of expression was upheld for their own future campaigning on campuses (Rebick & Sears, 2009).

In 2009, IAW happened in the wake of Israel’s war on Gaza. Once again, there was an exponential growth in the number of locations that participated, with over 55 IAWs taking place. Part of the strength of IAW and the reason for its rapid growth is the decentralized way in which it is organized. Events are listed on a simple website and no large bureaucratic structures are needed for the week to run.

Pro-Israel Lobby Approaches to IAW

As IAW spread internationally, the Israeli state felt the imperative to respond. In 2012, for example, the Public Diplomacy Ministry of Israel created the “Faces of Israel” program, training 100 Israelis to travel on a mission to “represent and defend the state during Israel Apartheid Week” (Harkov, 2012). IAW has been scrutinized right from its inception. At the level of the Zionist lobby in Canada, there is a constant effort to have the week banned and equate it with hate speech. University administrations have also played an underhanded role in attempting to stall IAW activities. Before moving to the specific discourses and mechanisms used by the state, the following section will explain the general atmosphere and arguments against IAW.

Predictably, the organized Zionist groups were in an uproar over Israeli Apartheid Week from its inception. In the first few years, attacks were confined to Zionist
organizations lobbying campus administrations to ban the week and/or organizing counter events. Yet as IAW spread to other campuses over the years, its condemnation became more widespread. The approaches to dealing with IAW varied from one Zionist organization to the other. This discussion offers a brief summary of some highlights within the Zionist response to IAW. It is not meant to be an exhaustive list of every single Zionist effort against the week, but a general summary of the main approaches used.

One can divide the strategies deployed by varying Zionist organizations into soft and hard strategies. It is important to note, however, that those two approaches are not in opposition to each other, but act to reinforce one another very organically; their end goal is the same. The soft approach involves claims that IAW does not support debate that fosters peace in the region, but rather demonizes one side. This approach advocates dialogue groups and joint events. The hard approach works more directly to ban the week and organize counter events.

The soft approach camp argues that ignoring IAW is the best method for depriving its organizers of any legitimacy. Instead they opt for organizing counter events that highlight the positive aspects of Israel. This softer approach also emphasizes targeting any support IAW might garner from other organizations in the form of endorsements or sponsorship. While mobilizing energies to detract from the week, the soft approach employs the constant refrain of how marginal it is. Tilly Shames, Hillel of Greater Toronto’s associate director in 2008, argued in an article in *The Canadian Jewish News*:

What we found is that the organizers of this event are very marginalized on
campus . . . and we feel that it is more effective to focus on the 90 per cent of students who are not interested in politicized events and want to come together to find a common ground for dialogue. (Shefa, 2008)

Under the logic of this softer approach, a computer game was created called “Peacemaker” and was displayed throughout campuses in Toronto. The “game” encouraged students to decide what each side, Palestinian and Israeli, would have to give up for peace to be achieved (Shefa, 2008). The concept of dialogue features heavily in this approach with an emphasis on “positive Israel programming” that includes promoting Israel Appreciation Days to “take back the space on our campus” (Hillel of Greater Toronto - Anti-Hate Video, 2007).

The soft approach also works to deemphasize Israel’s militarism and human rights violations. In 2008, Hillel ran a series of ads titled “This is Israel” to promote Israel in Excalibur, The Ryersonian, and The Varsity, three campus newspapers at York, Ryerson University, and the University of Toronto, respectively. In 2010, the soft approach created its highest budget campaign yet, titled “Size doesn’t matter,” in an attempt to put emphasis on Israel as a thriving tourist destination despite its small size. A centerpiece of the campaign was a video that showed a Canadian woman telling her Israeli boyfriend, who appears to be naked, that “it’s small” confusing the audience in terms of what she is referring to, until the camera pans to a map of Israel (Size Doesn't matter, 2010).

Presumably, the title of this video was meant to impart to audiences that, just as the boyfriend’s penis size “doesn’t matter” in terms of performance, Israel’s size also doesn’t affect its ability to please as a tourist destination. This campaign was in line with the soft-
approach method being used to distract from politics and Israel's record in the Palestinian occupied territories.

On the other hand, the hard approach is much more direct, with advocates making calls to ban Israeli Apartheid Week and organizing confrontational counter events. For example, in 2008, the Simon Wiesenthal Center, in partnership with Betar Tagar, organized a series of lectures called Know Radical-Islam Week (Shefa, 2008). In 2008, pro-Israel activists countered IAW with "Islamic State Apartheid Week." According to an article in the Jewish Tribune:

The three-day event – sponsored by Betar Tagar, Hasbara Fellowships, B'nai Brith Canada and standwithus.com – was held during the fourth annual Israeli Apartheid Week (IAW) specifically to counter the extensive negative propaganda and misinformation concerning the Jewish state. The literature on Islamic apartheid was divided into four categories: Gender, sexual, political and religious. (Beck, 2008)

Clarifying the purpose of this counter week in an article, Ben Feferman, Hasbara Fellowships campus coordinator for that year, said:

As much as it is important to talk about the fact that Israel is a democracy, we really believe that we need to talk about the... atrocities that go on [in Islamic states]. People don't talk about them because they are afraid to upset Muslims... and it is because of our obsessiveness with being politically correct that these countries are suffering because of it. (quoted in Shefa, 2008)

Unfortunately for the organizers of such counter weeks, their events did very little
to harm Israeli Apartheid Week—IAW continued to take place with packed lectures. If anything, the overt anti-Muslim racism of those events managed to upset many students on campuses and turn them into supporters of IAW. Such counter weeks did not happen again after 2008, but condemnations of the week intensified at the official Canadian state level.

**Israeli Apartheid Week and University Administrations**

University administrations have also played their own role in silencing Israeli Apartheid Week; while allowing the event to happen, they have put up immense bureaucratic obstacles. Delaying room bookings, charging security fees, and scrutinizing speakers’ bios have become standard practices. Most university presidents had, as noted earlier, already declared their rejection of the academic boycott in 2007, and many have travelled to Israel to deepen academic linkages. Perhaps the feelings of university presidents about IAW were best summarized by David Naylor, the president of the University of Toronto, in an article titled “Free Speech has to be for Everyone” written by Margaret Wente in February 2008, in which he was quoted as stating, “it is the consistently worst week of a president’s life.” Naylor’s comment powerfully confirms the significance of IAW to university administrations. It is remarkable to consider that he believes that a week of student activity poses more difficulties than any other time in the academic year. Such a recognition is indicative of the scale of the resources and energy invested by university administrations in obstructing IAW’s activities.

During this period, a long played out war of advertising in mainstream papers also occurred, with Zionist organizations placing ads urging university presidents to ban the
week. In the February 5, 2008 issue of the *National Post*, in an open letter to David Naylor, the Friends of Simon Wiesenthal Center for Holocaust Studies wrote: “Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination by claiming that the existence of Israel is a racist endeavor is anti-Semitic. Applying a double standard by requiring of Israel behavior not demanded of any of its neighbors is anti-Semitic.” Two days later, the University of Toronto responded in the *National Post* with a counter-advertisement explaining that:

Cancelling events because of anticipated controversy rapidly changes the nature of the debate. Instead of public attention focusing on the actual positions of the speaker or sponsoring group (sometimes extreme and therefore lacking broad appeal), the focus shifts to the abrogated free speech rights of the affected groups and can create publicity and even sympathy for an extreme view. Here, the university is not necessarily promoting free speech—rather the administration is explaining that to ignore the week would deprive it of extra publicity. Constantly using the word “extreme” in a loose reference to IAW twice in this short paragraph also implies negative judgment on the week and its content. It is important also to consider that President Naylor has not once attended an IAW event at the University of Toronto campus.

The general treatment of IAW by university administrations has involved a balancing act between espousing commitment to freedom of expression, while constantly maintaining that they are watching these spaces very carefully for hate speech. David Farrar, Deputy Provost and Vice Provost, Students, issued a statement on January 19,
2005 on behalf of the University of Toronto explaining that the university would not cancel Israeli Apartheid Week because to do so would “violate the university’s fundamental commitment to freedom of speech.” In that same statement he added, however, that any “behavior or speech that constitutes hatred or incitement to hatred against any group will be dealt with quickly and appropriately” (Scott, 2005). The statement continued on to say that the University of Toronto administration had “assured Hillel that any hateful or anti-Semitic statements expressed by the organizers of ‘Israeli Apartheid Week’ or their guests [would] be dealt with according to the university code of conduct.”

Along the same lines, John Danakas, the director of public affairs at the University of Manitoba, told the Winnipeg Jewish Review, in an email referring to the first IAW at the University of Manitoba to be held in March 2010, that the university would “respond promptly to behaviours that constitute discrimination, harassment or represent a violation to Canada’s laws.” He added: “We will continue to monitor [IAW] closely, and please be assured that maintaining a safe and respectful environment for our students, faculty and staff remains a priority for the University of Manitoba” (Spivak, 2010).

The implication that hate speech might occur because there is a Palestine solidarity event is illustrative of the common sense racism pervasive in the university setting. There are numerous pro-Israeli events that take place every year on many campuses; at times, Israeli soldiers involved in recent military attacks are invited to give their positions. Statements that any hate speech will be monitored are not given when
Israeli state representatives or soldiers come to speak—indeed, the idea that Israeli incitement against Palestinians would be considered hate speech is not uttered in the public realm. However, negative stereotyping of Palestinians and pro-Palestine events is so common that public statements that Palestine advocacy events are being monitored are uttered freely.

The most overt direct attack against IAW came from Carleton University and the University of Ottawa when they banned one particular Israeli Apartheid Week poster from their campuses. Carlton University's Equity Services staff are reported to have judged that the poster included an image that may “incite others to infringe rights protected in the Ontario Human Rights Code” adding that the poster was “insensitive to the norms of civil discourse in a free and democratic society” (Canadian Civil Liberties Association, 2009). The University of Ottawa added that the poster “was inflammatory and capable of inciting confrontation” (Canadian Civil Liberties Association, 2009). In the days following the announcement of the ban, Carleton’s Provost and Vice-President Academic Feridun Hamdullahpur sent a letter to the entire university community calling the posters “hurtful and discriminatory” and threatening students, stating that they could “be withdrawn from their studies indefinitely” (Students Against Israeli Apartheid at Carlton University, 2009).

The poster in question was for the IAW that came directly after the 2008/9 Israeli military assault on Gaza. It depicted a young child holding a teddy bear standing in between concrete walls with an apache helicopter launching a missile at him with the word “Israel” on the helicopter. The image was meant to invoke the destruction caused
by the Israeli assault and to point to the number of Palestinian children that were killed in the bombing. Thus, in the name of “civil discourse and democracy” this poster, a cartoon that is much less harsh than the reality for children in Gaza, was banned. No explanation as to how the decision was reached was given and there was no provision of any recourse to appeal. Here, the language of civil discourse and democracy was used to shroud censorship in a veneer of progressiveness, using the rhetoric of equity to silence by marking a specific perspective as being outside the bounds of normalized discourse. Students at the University of Carleton subsequently filed a complaint with the Ontario Human Rights commission against the banning of the poster. The case is ongoing with the university adjudicator, and has been stalled over the question of whether Students Against Israeli Apartheid can be described as a group or not.

Many of the silencing campaign’s tactics on campuses have relied heavily on claims of equity and adherence to human rights codes while suppressing freedom of expression. One of the oft-repeated attacks on IAW has been the “discomfort” it causes on campuses. Interestingly, however, in 2009, when the time came to report to the Canadian Parliamentary Coalition for Combating Anti-Semitism (an extra-parliamentary group, that itself is part of the silencing campaign strategy to equate Palestine activism with anti-Semitism), no university administrators reported a rise in anti-Semitism on their campuses. On November 24, 2009, Ryerson University President Sheldon Levy, York University’s Vice-President Academic and Provost Patrick Monahan, Concordia University’s President Emeritus Fred Lowy, the University of Ottawa’s Centre for Equity and Human Rights Director Francine Page, and the University of Toronto’s Assistant
Vice-President Robert Steiner all testified at a hearing organized by the CPCCA.

Mamdouh Shoukri, President and Vice-Chancellor of York University, explained in a statement read on his behalf that “for the most part, and for most of the time, the students, faculty members and staff go about their business with great respect for differing backgrounds and positions and without disruption or incident” (CPCCA - Hearing 3, November 23, 2009a, p. 3). Jack Lightstone, President and Vice-Chancellor of Brock University, importantly noted “criticism of any government’s policy by anyone must be acceptable, and in universities it is to be encouraged” (CPCCA - Evidence Hearing 9, January 25, 2010, p. 4).

The address given by Fred Lowy, Concordia University’s President Emeritus, is very telling of the way university administrators characterize activism relating to Palestine on campuses. First, he stated that Canadian campuses “are not hotbeds of anti-Semitism or racism of any kind, although, of course, these conditions do occur, as they do in society generally” (CPCCA - Hearing 4, November 24, 2009b, p. 3). However, he went on to offer two reasons why anti-Semitism might be more prominent on campuses than in general society, stating:

students generally tend to be drawn to anti-establishment policies, anti-establishment events . . . Israel now and possibly Jews generally are seen as establishment rather than anything else. Israel is seen as powerful and relatively affluent in the Middle East. Palestinians are seen as victims and the oppressed.

(CPCCA - Hearing 4, November 24, 2009b, p. 4)

The conflation here between anti-Semitism and criticism of the Israeli state is clear.
Importantly though, Lowy’s second reason to explain tensions on campuses is, as he stated, that there exists “organized Islamic anti-Israeli propaganda and activism. I said Islamic because I’m not talking about Muslims generally or Arabs generally.” He explained that criticism of Israel is “entirely appropriate,” but that criticism of Israel tends to cross the line into anti-Zionism, and Israel is thus singled out for criticism and boycotts, which is “out of proportion to its contributions to unrest in the world” (CPCCA - Hearing 4, November 24, 2009b). The term “Islamic propaganda” expresses the framing of this issue in racialized terms. The conflation of pro-Palestinian activism with what Lowy terms “Islamic” is very telling, particularly with the added note that he doesn’t mean all Muslims, which has become a common caveat.

All in all, the racialization of pro-Palestinian activism and its silencing on Canadian campuses is evident. Significant, however, is the use of multicultural language of diversity, equity, and tolerance to brand such activism as being outside the bounds of “multicultural” respectability.

State Officials and Discourses of Silencing

It was in 2009 that political figures and parties stepped into the repression campaign against IAW, echoing the arguments of Zionist organizations to a large extent. Public statements from politicians started to appear regularly in newspapers, and there were even debates on resolutions to condemn the week discussed in federal parliament, and in the Ontario and Manitoba legislatures. Condemning IAW became part of the 2010
mayoral debate in Toronto as well.\textsuperscript{22}

Some would argue that these attacks on IAW have stemmed solely from the Conservative Party, and that surely the Liberal Party would not attempt to condemn a week of activities on a campus—after all, freedom of expression is meant to be a liberal value. However, as the following section illustrates, support for Israel and condemnation of the Palestine Solidarity Movement cuts across the not so wide political divide in Canadian politics. Officials from both the Conservative and Liberal parties, and at times the New Democratic Party, took great pains to issue statements distancing themselves from and condemning Israeli Apartheid Week, some even putting forward motions to specifically condemn the use of the term apartheid in relation to Israel. The following section discusses the specific discursive strategies used by state officials to marginalize IAW, as well as the cross-party consensus on such silencing.

\textbf{Accusations of anti-Semitism.}

The most vocal Conservative opponent of IAW is Jason Kenney, federal Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism. Speaking in the 40th House of Commons session on March 3, 2009, he gave lip service to the principle that “Canadians are free to express different views about the policies of foreign government.” But, he continued on to say that “Israel Apartheid Week is not about that... We condemn these

\textsuperscript{22} Denunciations of IAW became common political practice during Toronto’s 2010 mayoral debate, when candidates were asked their views on the week. In its coverage of the prospective candidates’ positions on Israeli Apartheid Week, the \textit{Canadian Jewish News} reported that Ford, the candidate that eventually won, explained his attitude towards IAW thusly: “When I’m mayor, I assure you there won’t be any of this nonsense.” Two other candidates felt the future mayor would have to be involved, with Rossi explaining: “The mayor should champion this issue and create discussions with universities and with police to ensure [Jewish] students feel safe on campus” (Levy-Ajzenkopf & Poliakov, 2010).
efforts to single out and attack the Jewish people and their homeland” (Kenney, 2009b).

In this short sentence, the Minister of Multiculturalism did two things simultaneously: on one hand, he was conflating the actions and policies of the Israeli state with Jews around the world, and on the other, he marked IAW as being outside the realm of free speech. In doing so, he clearly demarcated the space of acceptable speech and cast out voices he disagrees with.

This conflation between the apartheid analysis and anti-Semitism is often repeated as a measure to condemn IAW. However, as noted by Rebick and Sears in response to accusations of anti-Semitism:

The deployment of anti-Semitism as an accusation to silence criticism of Israel is also a serious setback in genuine struggles against anti-Semitism and other forms of discrimination. It is based on a claim that the State of Israel is the single outcome of the history of the Jewish people, the final end of generations of diasporic existence. It attempts to make the Zionist project of a Jewish nation the only legitimate project for all Jews. (2009)

It is important to note that, in Canadian politics, Zionism and thus Israel has asserted itself as a progressive reaction to anti-Semitism because the state was conceived as a homeland for the Jews, in their attempt at self-determination. What follows from this assertion is that Palestinian narratives are then deemed anti-Semitic for their mere existence in the path of this Zionist project. As Bakan and Abu Laban have explained:

The unique role of Zionism as an ideology that lays claim to anti-racist ideological space as a response to anti-Semitism in the history of Europe, the US
and Canada, while at the same time advancing racialised interests of colonial expansion in the Middle East, renders the ideological terrain of the BDS movement in the West complex. (2009, p. 33)

In line with this two-fold character of Zionism, the silencing campaign against the BDS movement has focused on broadening the term “anti-Semitism” to encompass the activities of Palestine Solidarity activists, while simultaneously applauding the foreign policy goals of the Canadian government in the Middle East.

“Singling out” Israel.

A common theme across the silencing campaign is “singling out”—the implication being that critics of Israeli state policy attack Israel because of its claim to being a Jewish state, while ignoring gross human rights violations by other states. Wherever Israel’s record towards the Palestinian people is scrutinized, the list of questions about other states quickly follows: “What about Syria? Iran? North Korea?”

This notion brings about two results: first, that no criticism of Israel is possible because the state is conflated with the entirety of Jews around the world, and second, that any criticism of Israel must be coupled with criticism of all other human rights violations around the world. Proponents of this argument, sadly, misunderstand that advocates of Palestinian human rights do consistently condemn human rights violations internationally—they simply want Israel to be held accountable as well. Indeed, it is actually the Canadian state that is singling out Israel for preferential treatment and uncritical support. As Goldberg and Makdisi noted, those who wish to silence criticism of Israel “seek to de-exceptionalize Israel by insisting that critics do not equally condemn
Sudan or China or North Korea for violations of human rights. And yet they exceptionalize the Israeli state by seeking to shield it from any criticism whatsoever” (2009).

In 2009, the National Post printed a statement by Liberal Party leader Michael Ignatieff denouncing the week, and specifically, the use of the term apartheid. Embarrassingly, when a similar statement by Ignatieff was issued again in 2010, it was pointed out by independent journalist Jon Elmer in this talk during Israeli Apartheid Week that, in 2002, in reference to Israel, Ignatieff himself used the term apartheid in the following passage in The Guardian:

When I looked down at the West Bank, at the settlements like Crusader forts occupying the high ground, at the Israeli security cordon along the Jordan river closing off the Palestinian lands from Jordan, I knew I was not looking down at a state or the beginnings of one, but at a Bantustan, one of those pseudo-states created in the dying years of apartheid to keep the African population under control. (Ignatieff, 2002)

Clearly, Ignatieff had had a change of heart, now being leader of the federal opposition party. In his short statement to the National Post on March 5, 2009, not only did he decide to come out against the use of the term apartheid, he also explained that Apartheid Week “goes beyond reasonable criticism” because it “singles out one state, its citizens and its supporters for condemnation and exclusion.” By this logic, any campaign against specific state policies or human rights violations must equally condemn and engage with all human rights violations around the world. More importantly, the insinuation that Israel
is being “singled out” is used to deflect focus from serious and well-argued criticisms of Israeli state policies to the intentions of those posing the criticism. In short, the “singling out” argument is used to stifle criticism, without ever engaging with it.

**Diversity, civility, and respectful dialogue.**

In his statement condemning IAW, Michael Ignatieff emphasized that, “throughout our history, Canadians have strived to understand each other across the solitudes that have broken other countries to pieces. Our common national purpose has been built on our diversity” (2009). It is very interesting that this is Ignattief’s point of departure for his condemnation of IAW: diversity. Taken to imply a simplistic celebration of cultural customs, “diversity” is abstracted from concrete social relations of power and divorced from issues of anti-racism. As Bannerji explained, multiculturalism as a state apparatus rearranged questions of social justice, of unemployment and racism, into issues of cultural diversity and focused on symbols of religion, and so-called tradition. Thus immigrants were ethicized, culturalized and mapped into traditional/ethnic communities. Gradually, a political and administrative framework came into being where structural inequalities could be less and less seen or spoken about. (2000, p. 44-45)

Along the lines of respect for diversity, another thrust of the silencing campaign argues that IAW runs against known norms of “civil and respectful” debate. This is intended to isolate the week as an aberration to the “respectful dialogue” of multicultural Canadian politics. The discourse of “civility” mirrors the racialization of Palestinians
embedded in the Zionist narrative of civilizing mission, with its "picture of a handful of European Jews hewing a civilization of sweetness and light out of the Black Islamic sea" (Said, 1992, 25). Narratives that situate Palestinian dispossession at their core, as does Israeli Apartheid Week, do not conform to the myth of Zionism as a progressive force in the Middle East region—and thus are deemed as lacking in civility. It is therefore through the language of "civility" that racist claims that Palestinians and Palestine solidarity activists are an uncivil aberration on Canadian campuses are validated.

Ignattief, for example, stated: "Israel Apartheid Week and CUPE Ontario's anti-Israel posturing exploit academic freedom, and they should be condemned by all who value civil and respectful debate about the tragic conflict in the Middle East" (2009). Anita Neville, Co-Chair of Liberal Parliamentarians for Israel, has stated the same ideas in different words. In a March 9, 2009 press release by Liberal Parliamentarians for Israel, in calling on "Canadians to help prevent the politicization of Canadian campuses," she stated:

the atmosphere of fear and intimidation fostered by IAW is sure proof that our campuses are becoming less tolerant and respectful of free speech . . . It is a day when our values as Canadians are being threatened in institutions that are built on the tenets of free speech, multiculturalism, diversity, respect and openness.

(Liberal Parliamentarians for Israel, 2009)

There are serious assertions in the statement about "our values as Canadians being threatened" that cast those who organize IAW outside of such values. This discourse of common values and civility is intended to create a clear binary between those who are
accepted within Canadian multiculturalism and those whose freedom of expression may be curtailed.

**Setting the limits on criticism of Israel.**

In his public statements, Ignattief also takes it upon himself to define the boundaries of what is and is not acceptable criticism of Israel. For example, in 2010, he claimed:

> International law defines “apartheid” as a crime against humanity. Labeling Israel as an “apartheid” state is a deliberate attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the Jewish state itself. Criticism of Israel is legitimate. Attempting to describe its very existence as a crime against humanity is not.

However, there has been extensive scholarly and legal research on the similarities and differences between policies in apartheid-era South Africa and in Israel. As a matter of fact, the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (General Assembly resolution 3068, entered into force on 18 July 1976) sets forth that the definition of the crime of apartheid is not limited to the borders of South Africa. Thus, if Israel is not an apartheid state, then it should be easy to factually prove that it does not practice apartheid. It does not follow that the allegation itself is not legitimate. Opponents of Israeli Apartheid Week, instead of engaging with the analysis, find it easier to claim that the analysis itself is not legitimate. As the Palestinian Boycott National Committee put it, in a statement on repression of the BDS movement in Canada:

> It is not surprising that government officials and some university administrations in Canada have chosen to hone in on the use of the term “Israeli apartheid”. They
would prefer to outlaw the term rather than engaging the facts, perhaps because doing so would lead them to the same conclusions of international law experts, scores of civil society organizations and Archbishop Desmond Tutu who argue that the label is an accurate one, in accordance with the UN Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. The apartheid framing of the Israeli regime is long standing; in 2009, a 302-page legal study overseen by Prof. John Dugard, a former UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in the occupied Palestinian territory, concluded that ‘the State of Israel exercises control over the Occupied Palestinian Territories with the purpose of maintaining a system of domination by Jews over Palestinians and that this system constitutes a breach of the [UN] prohibition of apartheid.’ (The Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions National Committee (BNC), 2010)

Although assurances that some criticism of Israel is acceptable are repeated, limits are set on criticism that pertains to changing the status quo by recognizing the power differential between Palestinians and the Israeli state—or between Palestine solidarity organizers and the Canadian state for that matter.

**Finding the balance between occupier and occupied.**

Another track used by state officials to demonize IAW has been to label it “unbalanced.” Along these lines, Jason Kenney recently stated: “In reality, this week is nothing more than an unbalanced attempt to paint Israel and her supporters as racist” (2012). The notion of balance is a very interesting silencing tool because it is essentially an attempt to cast doubt on the Palestinian narrative wherever it appears. While pro-Israel
advocacy is normalized—the yearly Walk for Israel, for example, is attended by various state officials—Palestine advocacy is deemed unbalanced. Notions like balance, when abstracted from power relations, serve to maintain the status quo because they marginalize counter-hegemonic perspectives. The idea that any time a Palestinian perspective is put forward it must be countered by a Zionist one, while the reverse is certainly not asserted, illustrates the pervasiveness of invisibilizing Palestinians through the use of benign terms such as balance.

Safety, inclusivity, and comfort.

Both Kenney and Ignatieff claim that IAW victimizes Jewish students, who are therefore “feeling increasingly vulnerable” (Kenney), and “wary of expressing their opinions, for fear of intimidation” (Ignatieff). Freedom is thus being invoked to silence IAW organizers while claims are made presenting an ultimate victimhood for the Zionist narrative, which in reality has no trouble being expressed openly on university campuses and supported by administrations and the state. Government officials, as a matter of fact, profess uncritical support for Israel regularly. The idea that Jewish students are intimidated—besides racializing all Jewish students as supporters of Israel—plays on the racialization of Arabs/Muslims as security threats out to intimidate the proper working order of universities.

Motions and Statements Condemning IAW

The discursive silencing strategies listed above were coupled with attempts at disciplinary action at the state level in the forms of motions to condemn IAW. A motion put before the federal parliament clarifies the role the state plays in condemning IAW.
The 2010 motion, put forth by Conservative Tim Uppal, MP for Edmonton Strathcona Park, stated:

this House condemns Israeli Apartheid Week for seeking to delegitimize the State of Israel by equating it with the racist South African apartheid regime, and his House continues to support a peaceful resolution through a negotiated two-state solution that respects Israel’s right to exist.

This motion needed full consent to pass; there was only one voice in all of parliament that opposed it, that of Libby Davies (New Democratic Party Member of Parliament), and thus it failed. In a 2010 letter thanking those who supported her decision, Davies wrote:

whatever one thinks about the term “apartheid” in reference to Israel, I don’t believe that Members of Parliament should have any role or influence in stifling open discussion and education on this issue. As someone who has visited the West Bank and Gaza twice (most recently in August of 2009), I know first-hand the impact and destruction caused by Israeli policies towards Palestinians.

A week after the motion was defeated, MP’s were literally reading, in parliament, from the paper that the Canada Israel Committee issued condemning Libby Davies. MP Sweet, for example, said:

Last week the New Democratic Party blocked a Conservative motion condemning Israel Apartheid Week. I fully agree with the Canada-Israel Committee, which said that the NDP’s position demonstrates, “An utter disregard for the plight of students who are bullied and intimidated on campuses in Canada is staggering and unacceptable.” Why will the New Democratic Party not condemn the so-called
“activists” on university campuses who use Israel Apartheid Week as a pretext to harass, intimidate and bully Jewish students? (2010)

There, again, is the oft-repeated claim that IAW intimidates Jewish students—a view that assumes that every Jewish student is supportive of the actions of the Israeli state (and thereby homogenizes all Jewish students, ignoring those who help organize IAW). In reality, the weaker side in the equation is that of the student activists, who have nothing more than the strength of their argument to put forward.

**Provincial motions to condemn IAW: Mixed results.**

The first successful attempt to bring a parliamentary resolution condemning IAW took place in the Ontario Legislature on February 25, 2010. The resolution, though symbolic, is important because it was later used by the Toronto District School Board (TDSB) to disallow IAW from happening in Ontario high schools (although there were no IAW events planned for high schools). Though the motion was not binding or action oriented, it continues to be referenced for condemnation of the week. 23

The private member’s bill, put forth by MPP Peter Shurman, stated:

the term ‘Israeli Apartheid Week’ is condemned as it serves to incite hatred

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23. In March 2010, the Director of Education, Chris Spence, released a statement in response to Israeli Apartheid Week after the Ontario legislature vote. The statement was circulated to all schools and posted on the TDSB website, and read: “The event called ‘Israeli Apartheid Week’ has the effect of fostering ill-will and disharmony among groups and individuals. The Government of Ontario and the opposition parties have unanimously adopted a resolution condemning ‘Israeli Apartheid Week’. The Toronto District School Board therefore affirms that ‘Israeli Apartheid Week’ and its activities are not permitted to take place on school or Board property, or as part of any activity under the jurisdiction of the TDSB. All TDSB staff in schools and workplaces are reminded of the attached Guidelines on Controversial Issues, issued in May 2009.” In June 2010, the motion was used as reference in attempts to ban the Queers Against Israeli Apartheid group from marching in Pride (discussed in detail in Chapter 5).
against Israel, a democratic state that respects the rule of law and human rights, and the use of the word 'apartheid' in this context diminishes the suffering of those who were victims of a true apartheid regime in South Africa. (Shurman, Resolution 93 condemning Israeli Apartheid Week, 2010)

It is very instructive to analyze the speeches made in the legislature in support of this motion as they are telling of the racialized discourses that permeate the silencing campaign.

**Canada and Israel’s “common values” paradigm: “democracy and women’s rights.”**

One of the main tools of the silencing campaign is to focus on the “common values” between Israel and Canada, presenting both as democracies imbued with a set of uniquely Western values that include women’s rights. The reliance on the racialized rhetoric of “common values” between Canada and Israel fosters an atmosphere where silencing dissent is acceptable. Peter Shurman, in his speech supporting his motion against IAW, explained:

> It’s about an annual event in our province on our campuses, and most significantly it’s about our values, because our values are the same as the values of the state of Israel: democracy, education, individual freedom, human rights and the right to defend oneself from aggressors. In fact, the values of Judaism and of Israel were bedrock values for the foundation of Canada, and those values from Judaism and from Israel date back over 3,000 years, all to say that if you’re going to label Israel as apartheid, then you are also calling Canada apartheid and you are
attacking Canadian values. The use of the phrase ‘Israeli Apartheid Week’ is about as close to hate speech as one can get without being arrested, and I’m not certain it doesn’t actually cross over that line. (2010)

Setting aside what core values Canada and Israel do have in common for the moment (as do most settler colonies), the idea of common values being a marker of civilization and modernity that connects Canada and Israel is very telling of the racialized demarcation of belonging to either state. Abu-Laban and Bakan have noted the use of the language of values in the post 9/11 climate as a “moment of redefining hegemony in the international racial contract” whereby a common values discourse marks a unity between the West and Israel while casting out an “enemy” as belonging to the racialized categories of “Arab and Muslim ‘and identified with terrorism’” (2011, p. 286).

Further, presenting the entire struggle for Palestinian rights as a religious issue helps to cement this “common values” paradigm. For example, Shurman’s motion was supported by the New Democratic Party member of the Ontario Legislature, Cheri DiNovo who did not mention the word Palestinian once in her speech, while she referred mainly to Muslims, Jews, and Christians. This simple fact illustrates that the perception of the issue is rooted in a religious standpoint, rather than the struggle being understood as a modern conflict over land and basic questions of human rights within the territories that Israel controls. Speaking only in religious terms, as if this is an intractable conflict based on ancient religious hatred, helps Canadian politicians to distance themselves from answering any specific questions on the Canadian government’s strong support of Israel. Thus, Canada is created as a spectator in a complex age-old struggle, rather than an active
participant in supporting one side over the other.

In the same speech, DiNovo argued: “We want peace. We don’t need inflammatory language on either side of this issue. We don’t want it. We don’t need it. We reject it. And is ‘apartheid’ an inflammatory term? Absolutely” (2010). In this manner, she takes on the role of defining what is inflammatory and condemning it, without any appropriate process or regard for the specific arguments about Israeli policies.

Interestingly, DiNovo then turned to recounting a conversation she had with a “well-respected Muslim” stating:

It was interesting that one of the Muslims, a well-respected one, and I won’t drag his name out, said that, really, just like you heard from the member from Thornhill, Israel is one of the few if not the only real democracy in the Middle East. He said, having been a struggler for rights in Iran, “Certainly I’d rather live as a Muslim in Israel than in Iran at the moment.” And I think he speaks for many Muslims and certainly many of us—certainly as a woman. (2010)

This rendition of a conversation, seemingly irrelevant to the topic at hand regarding condemning a single week of activities on university campuses in Canada, presents Israel’s supposed democratic virtues while ignoring any facts about the state’s treatment of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories or even Palestinians who hold Israeli citizenship. This is an example of the use of a particular and constant thread in the silencing campaign: to refer to Israel as a democracy that may not be termed an apartheid state, simply by repeating the mantra that it’s a democracy. This view also ignores that
even apartheid South Africa was considered a democracy for some of its citizens.

Importantly, DiNovo adds the reference to herself as a woman who would prefer to live in Israel, rather than in any other part of the region. Palestinian women are erased in this discourse of Israel’s record in terms of women’s rights. It is in this way that the alleged superiority of Israel in terms of women’s rights preempts any need for engagement and effectively silences all grievances against Israel.

Razack summarized this use of women’s rights succinctly, explaining that the smallest reference to cultural differences between the European majority and Third World peoples (Muslims in particular) triggers an instant chain of associations (the veil, female genital mutilation, arranged marriages) that ends with the declared superiority of European culture, imagined as a homogeneous composite of values including a unique commitment to democracy and human rights, and to the human rights of women in particular. (2008, p. 88)

By utilizing the idea that Israel is a democracy and referencing women’s rights, DiNovo is invoking the “instant chain of associations” that remain unsaid, but act to trigger a cultural allegiance to Israel under the rubric of “common values,” while at the same time casting Palestinians/Arabs and those who support them outside those same common values. Thus, according to DiNovo’s argument, in the name of Israel’s democracy and record on women’s rights, specific rights to freedom of expression may be curtailed and specific forms of organizing deemed too “inflammatory.”

**The A-word and hate speech.**

In his speech presenting the motion, Shurman also argued that the phrase IAW is
“as close to hate speech as you can get without getting arrested.” To label an event “close to hate speech” without due process, without an attempt at giving a hearing to those who study, analyze, and understand Israel as an apartheid state, is an attempt to silence the use of the term completely. However, all policies and ideologies underpinning any regime, whether Canadian or Israeli, may be challenged and some may indeed call them apartheid.

To claim that an analysis of Israeli state policies is a form of hate speech is to set Israel apart from all other states and illustrates how limited the parameters of debate around Palestinian human rights may be. Shurman went on to quote from a website he found called ziofascism.net. He did not quote from the IA W website, for example, which has a long section on the history and goals of the week. Rather, he chose some obscure website with no relation to IA W whatsoever. In fact, none of the arguments used by those who supported the motion to condemn IA W were based on serious argumentation or even references to “what is actually being said” by any IA W speaker. As Goldberg and Makdisi argued:

> the rhetoric of response is predictable, and it takes the shape of the familiar litany of exhausted assertions that are inevitably recited en bloc, without any reference to what is actually being said; what evidence is being offered; what reasons, arguments, facts, figures, and citations are being assembled. (2009)

In the face of a growing effective Palestine Solidarity Movement on Canadian campuses, centred around an analysis of Israel as a state practicing apartheid policies against the Palestinian people, officials of the Ontario legislature sought to shut down the
discussion altogether. In doing so, they were both silencing the Palestinian narrative as well as attacking freedom of expression more broadly.

**Other Provincial Legislatures Try to Follow Suit**

Following the Ontario legislature resolution, a private member’s resolution denouncing Israeli Apartheid Week was tabled on April 15, 2010 in the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba. The resolution, introduced by Heather Stefanson, the Conservative member for the Winnipeg riding of Tuxedo, called for the denunciation of IAW as “divisive, promoting intolerance and undermining a balanced debate of the Israeli-Palestinian question.” It added that IAW “may promote anti-Semitic opinions leading to the harassment and intimidation of Jewish students and staff” and that “the use of the word ‘apartheid’ is offensive to victims of apartheid in South Africa and ignores that Israel is a strong democracy . . .” (2010, p. 809–810). This resolution, unlike the Ontario Legislature resolution, did not pass.

One member, Dave Chomiak, Minister of Innovation, Energy and Mines, simply rejected the resolution, noting that it would give the week more publicity. Gord Mackintosh, Minister of Family Services and Consumer Affairs, on the other hand, while agreeing with the thrust of the motion, that the term apartheid is “profoundly unhelpful” and “unwelcome speech,” noted that it was speech “likely protected” by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. He added: “The resolution is speaking outside, then, of the existing civil and criminal laws and the Human Rights Code of Manitoba.” MacKintosh rejected the notion, stating that it is the “new function for provincial governments of the day in Canada to formally denounce and chill unwelcome speech”
(2010, p. 814). This view was noticeably absent at the Ontario legislature.

Conclusion

Israeli Apartheid Week has grown from a single campus in Toronto to reach more than 216 campuses worldwide by 2013. It continues to be an important vehicle through which students learn about and join the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. It is also a key space for spreading the analysis of Israel as an apartheid state.

The week’s student organizers have been persistent on two accounts: first, at assuring that Apartheid Week events provide a sophisticated analysis of Israel as a settler-colonial state, and second, by insisting on building alliances and coalitions aimed at protecting students’ rights to organize on campuses and debate issues that university administrations and the Canadian government deem controversial. Thus, the Palestinian anti-apartheid movement on campuses in Canada has become intertwined with questions of academic freedom, access to campus space, and ability to debate and question mainstream assumptions about the Israeli state.

This chapter has sketched the various silencing discourses employed against this week of activities, including accusations of anti-Semitism, of a lack of balance regarding the conflict, and of a singling out of Israel. Importantly, the chapter has traced the ways in which the silencing attempts are couched in anti-racist language and shrouded with the multicultural terminology of diversity and civility. Legislative attempts to silence IAW analyzed in this chapter illustrate the use of multicultural language to cast IAW outside Canadian norms of “balanced dialogue” for example.

It is important to note, however, that the silencing of this particular week of
events is rooted in the silencing of the Palestinian narrative more generally. As Said noted, “so much of our [Palestinian] history has been occluded. We are invisible people” (2003, p. 20). Israeli Apartheid Week is thus an attempt to narrate Palestine in a context where, “Power is not only exercised over the land and its people, it also controls the story, its point of view, and the meta-narrative of truth and memory (Bresheeth, 2007, p. 165). The silencing and erasure of the Palestinian narrative does not remain confined to the territories controlled by Israel; it is generalized, as Western states, including Canada, have a vested material interest in Israel, in addition to an ideological connection based on settler-colonial logic that manifests itself in the assertion of “common values.”

The constant attempts to discipline and demonize Palestine advocacy on campuses have put a spotlight on the student movement’s struggle for freedom of expression and access to space. This, in turn, has ushered a broader debate that involves faculty and unions on campuses. By 2011, Faculty for Palestine, a grouping of university professors which formed in 2008, had issued an open letter signed by 400 academics, related specifically to “increasing efforts to limit advocacy of Palestinian rights on Canadian universities, amounting to a pattern of the suppression of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly” (Pappano, 2009). This alliance between students and faculty has been key in slowing down the drive to ban Israeli Apartheid Week on Canadian campuses.

In writing about the various disciplinary measures undertaken against Palestine advocacy groups in Canada, the Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions National Committee (BNC) has explained clearly how such measures are “not only repulsive per
se; they are forms of complicity with Israeli violations of international law and
Palestinian rights and have far reaching adverse consequences for civil liberties” (BNC
Secretariat, 2010). The silencing campaign against Israeli Apartheid Week is thus not
only an issue of concern for the Palestine Solidarity Movement in Canada, it is crucially
an issue of civil liberties and anti-racism that cuts across many social movements.

The following chapters illustrate how discourses utilized against Israeli Apartheid
Week are common across the silencing campaign, and simply differ in emphasis from
one case of silencing to the next.
Chapter 4. Mechanisms of Disciplining Dissent: Funding Cuts and the Silencing Campaign

“We know, of course, there is really no such thing as the ‘voiceless.’ There are only the deliberately silenced, or the preferably unheard” (Roy, 2004, p. 1).

“The Palestinian Boycott National Committee (BNC) is deeply troubled by the politically suspect and professionally unjustifiable defunding of organisations that advocate Palestinian rights and organise humanitarian efforts on behalf of Palestinians” (BNC, 2010).

As a “new approach to nation-building” (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002, p. 105), multiculturalism has been conducive to the construction of the Canadian state as ostensibly tolerant and accepting of cultural difference, allowing it to both manage and limit what has come to be known as Canadian diversity. This chapter shows how development aid and multicultural policies are linked together in the Canadian government’s effort to present itself as a benign and neutral actor in relation to global hierarchies of race and imperial domination. The production of this image is facilitated, in part, through the suppression of internal dissent concerning the Palestine Solidarity Movement in Canada. The chapter examines how this suppression is affected through two key mechanisms: funding priorities and appointments to federal governance bodies. In the period under consideration, a key context that emerges for these processes is the so-called War on Terror, and in particular the federal government’s unprecedented diplomatic support for Israel. This unwavering backing of the Israeli government reflects
back domestically on “internal Others,” and specifically on those supportive of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign. Supporters of BDS not only directly challenge the Canadian government’s official support of Israel, but also unsettle the premises of this support by calling attention to Israel’s authoritarian character, thus undermining its constructed image as a liberal state respectful of democratic liberties.

This chapter describes in detail several cases of funding cuts to or efforts to undermine the financial stability of organizations supportive of the BDS campaign or those loosely associated with a pro-Palestinian stance—namely, the Canadian Arab Federation and Palestine House, each of which saw their funds rolled back by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), as well as KAIROS and Alternatives, each of which had their funds cut by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Additionally, the chapter looks at cases of interference with grant decisions at Rights and Democracy and the International Development Research Centre, both federally funded non-governmental organizations ostensibly operating at arms-length from the state.

This chapter begins the examination of these funding interventions by identifying the official rationales invoked by those who enacted them. It shows that invocations of “anti-Semitism” were key claims made by federal bodies in their funding decisions. These claims of anti-Semitism were often twinned with accusations of “links to or support for terrorism.” Together, these rationales relied on racialized discourses and a generalized atmosphere of common sense racism against Arabs and Muslims. Arabs and Muslims were depicted as presumed anti-Semites and as the figure of the enemy in the War on Terror. At the same time, the violence against the Palestinian people and latter’s
resistance to this violence was rendered invisible and unimportant. State funding cuts represent one form of pressure that enabled this erasure. The BDS campaign was thus implicitly treated as an internal threat to the Canadian state. This was because it undermined the dominant narrative of Canada as a “tolerant, peacekeeping nation” by foregrounding Canada’s complicity in state violence against the Palestinian people and human rights violations more generally.

**Questioning the State Funding Paradigm**

Before discussing the specifics of the case studies below, it is important to contextualize the types of funding addressed in this chapter and place them within the broader evolution of multicultural policy funding. This context begins to explain the ways in which ongoing changes to state funding for ethnocultural organizations have evolved to increase the reliance of ethnocultural groups on state funds in an economic context increasingly marked by neoliberalism, turning them into “service provision” organizations rather than advocacy groups. Importantly, it also reveals that the state’s official rhetoric of commitment to multiculturalism and diversity has not been backed with equivalent funding prioritization. As noted by Abu-Laban and Gabriel, by the new millennium, multiculturalism was an area of “relatively little state spending” (2002, p. 110). Canadian development funding, on the other hand, as appears from the case studies below, was increasingly tied more closely to neoliberal methods and foreign policy objectives; although, as noted by some, this aid, even when channeled through independent NGOs, has never been completely neutral or benign in its aims (Barry-Shaw & Oja Jay, 2012).
Multiculturalism as state policy began in 1971, and was further codified with the 1988 passage of the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* (CMA). With the adoption of this act, Canada became the first country in the world to legally define multiculturalism.

Canada’s multicultural policy has been marked by a high degree of fluidity. In the 1970s, it was framed as “ethnic multiculturalism,” and focused on the maintenance of identities, folklore, and language training. In the 1980s, after coming under criticism for the failure to deal with issues of institutional racism, multicultural policy objectives shifted to integrate issues of equity in Canadian society. In the 1990s, multicultural programs were once again reframed, and an emphasis on integration and civic participation was introduced. By 2009, three new objectives for the Multiculturalism Program were approved and came into effect on April 1, 2010: to build an integrated, socially cohesive society; to improve the responsiveness of institutions to meet the needs of a diverse population; and to actively engage in discussions on multiculturalism and diversity at an international level. Fleras and Kunz (2001) describe this evolution as a transition from Ethnic Multiculturalism in the 1970s, Equity Multiculturalism in the 1980s, Civil Multiculturalism in the 1990s, to Integrative Multiculturalism in the 2000s (Fleras & Kunz, 2001; Kunz & Sykes, 2007).

The primary governmental unit for dealing with multicultural policy also changed over the years. Originally entrusted to the Multicultural Directorate created for this purpose within the Department of the Secretary of State, the implementation of the policy was moved to the new Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship in 1991. The new Department was in turn dismantled in 1993 and the multiculturalism programs were
transferred to a new Canadian Heritage Department. Finally, in 2008, responsibility for administering the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* moved from the Department of Canadian Heritage to Citizenship and Immigration Canada. For easy orientation, Table 1 provides a chronology of the main events in the history of Canada’s multicultural policy. Table 2 lists the changing objectives of federal multicultural programming.
Table 1

Multiculturalism Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Liberal Prime Minister Lester Pearson established the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (B and B Commission).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism released Book Four, on the contribution of other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Multiculturalism Policy established multiculturalism within a bilingual framework.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Multiculturalism Directorate was created within the department of the Secretary of State. The new department supported folklore activities and language education (in languages other than English/French).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>The Multiculturalism Directorate created a race relations unit.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Multiculturalism was referred to in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 27 of the Charter states: “this Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Multiculturalism Act was passed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>New Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship was officially established.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Progressive Conservatives Pre-election Cabinet disbanded Multiculturalism and Citizenship as a separate department.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Incoming Liberal government created the Department of Canadian Heritage, which included the Department of Multiculturalism, the Secretary of State, the Department of Fitness and Amateur Sport, the parks component of Environment Canada, and the cultural broadcasting component of the Department of Communications. Multiculturalism was overseen by the Secretary of State, who was responsible for Multiculturalism and Status of Women. Citizenship programs would be amalgamated into the newly established Department of Citizenship and Immigration.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>The government commissioned Brighton Research to perform an evaluation and review the multiculturalism program.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>The Brighton Report was released, with key recommendations that multiculturalism should be about “identity, participations and justice.” The Brighton Report also said direct funding to ethnocultural organizations was problematic.</td>
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### Multiculturalism Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Milestone</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997–98</td>
<td>The multiculturalism program was redesigned. The program focused on three goals: identity, civic participation, and social justice. Funding to ethno cultural organizations would only be given to &quot;projects which address the priorities of the Multiculturalism program.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>The government conducted a policy review of the program. The review concluded that there was a need to adjust multiculturalism programming to focus more on integration and link the program to broader notions of citizenship and Canadian identity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Responsibility for administering the <em>Canadian Multiculturalism Act</em> moved from the Department of Canadian Heritage to Citizenship and Immigration Canada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>The three new objectives for the Multiculturalism Program were approved</td>
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Table 2

Shifts in the Stated Objectives of Multicultural Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Policy Objective</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971–1981</td>
<td>Multicultural policy was established:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To assist cultural groups to retain and foster their identity;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To assist cultural groups to overcome barriers to their full participation in Canadian society (Thus, the multiculturalism policy advocated the full involvement and equal participation of ethnic minorities in mainstream institutions, without denying them the right to identify with select elements of their cultural past if they so chose.);</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• To promote creative exchanges among all Canadian cultural groups;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• To assist immigrants in acquiring at least one of the official languages.</td>
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<td>1981–1991</td>
<td>Multiculturalism was given a legal basis through the passing of two pieces of legislation in this period:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• 1982: the <em>Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms</em>. Section 27 of the Charter states &quot;This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1988 <em>Canadian Multiculturalism Act</em> which ensures “that all individuals receive equal treatment and equal protection under the law, while respecting and valuing their diversity.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship established to promote</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Race Relations and Cross-Cultural Understanding “to promote among Canadian and in Canadian institutions appreciation, acceptance and implementation of the principles of racial equality and multiculturalism”;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Heritage Cultures and Languages “to assist Canadians to preserve, enhance and share their cultures, languages and ethnocultural group identities”;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Community Support and Participation “to support the full and equitable participation in Canadian life of individuals and communities from Canada’s racial and ethnocultural minorities.”</td>
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</table>

(continued)
### Shifts in the Stated Objectives of Multicultural Policy

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<th>Period</th>
<th>Policy Objective</th>
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| 1997/1998 | Federal Liberals announced new priorities for Multicultural Program (now transferred to new amalgamated Department of Canadian Heritage). The new goals were:  
  - Fostering a society that recognizes, respects, and reflects a diversity of cultures such that people of all backgrounds feel a sense of belonging and attachment to Canada.  
  - Developing, among Canada’s diverse people, active citizens with both the opportunity and capacity to participate in shaping the future of their communities and their country.  
  - Building a society that ensures fair and equitable treatment and that respects the dignity of and accommodates people of all origins. (Canada, 1998) |
| 2008     | The aims of the Multiculturalism Program were summarized as  
  - ethnocultural/racial minorities to participate in public decision-making (civic participation);  
  - communities and the broad public engage informed dialogue and sustained action to combat racism (anti-racism/anti-hate/cross-cultural understanding);  
  - public institutions eliminate systemic barriers (institutional change); and  
  - federal polices, programs and services respond to diversity (federal institutional change). (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012) |
| 2009     | Responsibility for administering the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* moved from the Department of Canadian Heritage to Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Three new objectives for the Multiculturalism Program were approved and came into effect on April 1, 2010:  
  - to build an integrated, socially cohesive society;  
  - to improve the responsiveness of institutions to meet the needs of a diverse population; and  
  - to actively engage in discussions on multiculturalism and diversity at an international level. (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012) |

Multicultural Policy and State Funding

Before proceeding to examine the development of the linkage of funding with recipient organizations’ stance on the Palestinian cause, it is necessary to review the historical context of the change in funding practices, marked by both a decrease in the general level of funding and an increase in the various strings that came to be attached to it.

Representing a culmination of over a decade of growing dominance of neoliberal ideas of governance, a key moment of transition in the practices of funding multiculturalism took place in 1995, when the federal Liberals commissioned Brighton Research, a private company, to evaluate the multiculturalism program. One of the pivotal recommendations of the report was on the issue of funding, noting that “past funding practices have reinforced the impression that multiculturalism is a program of special interests” (Department of Canadian Heritage, 1996, p. 76). In the subsequent three years, the program was redesigned in line with the report’s recommendations, so that funding would be provided on a project by project basis. Less money was therefore available to fund the general and autonomous operations of ethnocultural organizations. Ethnocultural communities were still eligible for funding, but they had to address the new program objectives and compete with private entities in applying for funding. Organizations applying for funds had to craft each project to meet funding criteria, thus losing a measure of autonomy and forced to focus on “servicing clients.”

By 1998, the program’s objectives focused less on preserving cultural identity and working with ethnocultural groups dedicated to single communities; instead, the goal was
to “inculcate an attachment to Canada (as opposed to cultural maintenance) and to create active citizens” (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002, p. 114). Ethnocultural organizations did not support this shift at the time. In fact, the Canadian Ethnocultural Council criticized the shift, arguing that community groups were not consulted, and that the Brighton Report failed to address the issue of ongoing funding cuts to multicultural programming to begin with (Kordan, 1997).

Two shifts occurred simultaneously to the multiculturalism program. First, the program suffered decreased funding and was opened up to the market to create competition over grants, and was thus made both more vulnerable to and more dependent on governmental arbitrariness. Second, the purpose of the program itself was “increasingly emphasized as a way to deal with global markets and global competitiveness” (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002, p. 116). Thus, the objectives of the multiculturalism program, as well as its funding, were transformed in line with neoliberal percepts of restructuring state/community relations, emphasizing efficiency in “service delivery.” At the same time, the purpose of the entire multiculturalism program was subordinated to the discourses of neoliberal globalization. The reforms following the Brighton Research report followed over a decade of neoliberal transformation of the role and functioning of the state. In the area under consideration, this process of transformation and the increased ideological centrality of the market had been epitomized a year earlier by the “Multiculturalism Means Business” slogan, the title of the conference that Progressive Conservatives organized in Toronto in 1986, which sought to recast multiculturalism by engaging the business elites of ethnocultural communities, and
by harvesting connections with countries of origin for trade benefits (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002).

Following the electoral victory of the Conservative Party, a new policy review of the program was conducted in 2007. The review recommended adjusting multiculturalism programming to focus more on integration and linking the program to broader notions of citizenship and Canadian identity. In 2008, the responsibility for implementing the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* was transferred to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). The minister responsible for the portfolio, Jason Kenney, explained that this “allow[ed] for greater coordination between the government’s settlement programs for newcomers and its programs to promote further inclusion, participation and shared citizenship for all Canadians” (2009a). The objectives of the program were updated in 2009 even further, with a focus in the direction of inculcating a Canadian identity based on, among other things “promoting intercultural understanding, fostering citizenship, civic memory and pride, and respect for core democratic values, and promoting equal opportunity for individuals of all origins” (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012d).

Under CIC auspices, three major funding programs involving newcomers and multiculturalism were funded: Settlement, Resettlement, and Inter-Act. Outcomes for the Settlement program are Orientation to Newcomers, Language/Skills, Labour Market Access, welcoming communities, and finally, Policy and Program Development (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012d). Both the Canadian Arab Federation and Palestine House were funded through this stream to deliver services to newcomers of all
origins (not only Arabs). The Inter-Action stream was conceived as “Canada’s Multiculturalism Grants and Contribution Program” with the objectives of intercultural/interfaith understanding, civic memory and pride, and respect for core democratic values (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012c). This constituted an ever clearer connection between fostering a unified Canadian identity based on the idea of “core values” that belonging to the nation necessitated.

This process thus subordinated the funding of multiculturalism to a construction of the Canadian nation built around increasingly more exclusionary notions such as civic memory, pride, and core values. These core values were in actuality those attributed to a specifically Western tradition. The shifts in multiculturalism coincided with other reorientations of Canadian policy, including a shift of foreign policy towards greater alignment with the U.S. The idea of “common values” between Canada and Israel, which increased in popularity among Canadian politicians, was fundamental to the new ideological reconstruction of the nature of the relation between the the two states. Thus, the reorientation of citizenship and belonging around “values” had significance in transforming international alliances and the repositioning of Canada within the “civilizational” camps within a new articulation of global divisions.

Beyond the changes in the program’s official objectives, it is instructive to compare concretely the actual level of funding of multicultural programming to the prevalence of multiculturalism in mainstream discourse. Funding for the Inter-Action program in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 was $13.2 million and $15.3 million, for a total of $28.5 million in two years (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012c). As for
Settlement programing, Minister Jason Kenney announced that “Integration Services Are About Nation Building” (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012b), tripling allocations from $200 million for 2005–2006 to almost $600 million for 2012–2013 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2011). While this increase in settlement services may seem significant, it must be understood in the context of the Conservative push for “nation building,” rather than as a commitment to multiculturalism. Indeed, it can be contrasted to the $20 billion in funding provided for the military budget in 2011.24 This gives a very different picture about the priorities and positioning of the Canadian state in relation to both its domestic and international affairs. While much time is spent in mainstream discourse on the success of Canada as a multicultural state and the importance of diversity, the shifts in the priorities of the multiculturalism program and its small budget, especially when contrasted to other budget items such as the military, highlights a change to an exclusionary—not only white, but also neoliberal—multiculturalism. This reorientation allows the state to manage and discipline ethnocultural groups through tight budgets that run on a project-by-project basis, while shifting their role to providing services that introduce a set of “core values.”

Funding cuts from the Canadian International Development Agency, the second category discussed in this chapter, must be situated in the broader terms of funding aid within a neoliberal framework as well. While CIDA support for specific projects does certainly have an impact on people’s lives in the global south, such aid has also been

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24. CBS commentator Brian Stewart noted: “Between Afghanistan and military modernization, Canada has spent perhaps $30 billion more on defense than the norm in the past decade” (2011).
crucial to advancing and securing spaces of accumulation for Canadian capital. As Gordon notes,

by the late 80s structural adjustment was strongly endorsed and advocated by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the departments of finance and external (now foreign) affairs as part of an effort to facilitate the expansion of Canadian economic interests in the wake of the profitability squeeze of the 1970s and 80s. (2010, p. 142)

Critical literature about the connection between official state funding and NGOs stresses the role of such funding in promoting “a new type of cultural and economic colonialism” (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2001, p. 132). Others note that, “as northern NGOs increasingly rely on official donor funding and goodwill, and as the conditionalities attached to that aid increase, they are inevitably drawn into supporting and even spreading many aspects of the dominant global agenda” (Wallace, 2003, 203). As a specific example of the connection between Canadian state funding prioritization and foreign policy objectives, writing in 2010 for The Globe and Mail on the shifts to CIDA priorities under new Minister Beverley Oda, Smilie explained:

the minister spoke about how CIDA was deprioritizing Canadian aid to several of the poorest African countries, along with Cambodia and Sri Lanka. This was supposedly all about geographic “focus,” but it conveniently loosened up money for new programs in two upper-middle-income countries, Peru and Colombia, where, coincidentally, the government wants to improve trade.

The switching of funding priorities has created a form of self-censorship for many
NGOs wishing to maintain funding. As noted in an article in The Globe and Mail: “Some [NGOs] have had veiled warnings about positions that clash with Ottawa’s on issues such as climate change, free trade with Colombia, or the Middle East, said Gerry Barr, president of the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, an umbrella group” (Clark, 2010).

Here too, it is necessary to look concretely at how much funding actually goes to development aid. After a spending freeze at $5.16 billion since 2010, the 2012 federal budget decreased Overseas Development Aid (ODA) by “more than 7 per cent by 2014-15 — a $377 million slice from Canada’s current $5.16 billion aid budget . . . CIDA’s budget will be cut by $319.2 million by 2014-15” (Scallan, 2012). To put this in perspective, the development aid budget for 2010 (even before the cuts to the 2012 budget) stood at only 0.34% of the Gross National Income (GNI) (OECD, 2012). Of the many countries affected by these cuts, “eight are in Africa and rank at the bottom of the UN’s 2011 Human Development Program,” while countries with which Canada has “either ongoing trade agreements or is carrying out significant business activity, will see no change in their relationships with Ottawa” explained Chantal Havard, the government relations and communications officer at the Canadian Council for International Co-operation (CCIC) (Sheikh, 2012).

Again, the ideological use of development aid in establishing an image of the Canadian state as a source of support for developing countries is not matched in reality in funding prioritization. Thus, in the following discussion on funding cuts, it is fundamental to look critically at the general notion of “independent” NGOs, given that so
many of the protagonists rely so heavily on state money to continue to operate. Importantly, CIDA priorities themselves must be understood in the context of Canada’s place and relationship to neoliberal globalization and its foreign policy objectives.

**Funding Cuts to Canadian Arab Federation and Palestine House**

Funding shifts and cuts have been a central feature of the way the Canadian state has managed its relationship with and exercised discipline over the Palestinian Authority, and the same tools were used in the case of Canada-based Arab/Palestinian community organizations and international aid NGOs involved in Palestine. For example, in 2006, the Canadian state was the first to follow Israel in cutting funding to the Palestinian Authority after the Hamas government was democratically elected, only restoring aid after a division between Hamas and Fatah put Fatah at the head of the Palestinian Authority again (CBC News, 2007). According to the Canadian International Development Agency,

in 2009, as part of Canada’s new aid effectiveness agenda, the West Bank and Gaza was selected by CIDA as a country of focus. ... CIDA’s program in the West Bank and Gaza is aligned with the requirements identified in the Palestinian Reform and Development (PRDP) for 2008–2011. (Canadian International Development Agency, 2013)

Hanieh described this PRDP program:

Developed in close collaboration with institutions such as the World Bank and the British Department for International Development (DFID), the PRDP is currently being implemented in the West Bank where the Abu Mazen-led PA has effective...
control. It embraces the fundamental precepts of neoliberalism: a private sector-driven economic strategy in which the aim is to attract foreign investment and reduce public spending to a minimum. (2008)

A significant portion of the Canadian aid to the Palestinian Authority is diverted towards enhancing the policing, judicial, and security apparatus of the PA. Through such aid, through an operation named PROTEUS, Canadian officials support the U.S. Security Coordinator office in Jerusalem. The Canadian state also “redirected” its funding for international organizations that support Palestinians, such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (Zerbisias, 2010), to the PA. Furthermore, UNESCO funding was threatened as punishment for the vote in favour of the Palestinian statehood bid. It is clear that Canadian aid to the Palestinian Authority goes well beyond humanitarian assistance, instead promoting a neoliberal security paradigm.25

Between 2008 and 2012, there was a wave of funding cuts to Canadian-based NGOs and community organizations that spoke out for Palestinian human rights by both the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) (see Table 4.3). KAIROS Canada, a church-based development NGO, for example, lost CDN$7.1 million in funding from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The official stated reason was that KAIROS did not fit CIDA development priorities. However, it soon emerged that the real reason was its perceived support for the BDS campaign (this case will be detailed below). In

25. For a critical view of the Western aid to the Palestinian Authority, see Taghdisi-Rad (2010) and Tartir (2011).
December 2009, Alternatives, another NGO critical of Israel’s occupation of Palestine, lost CDN$2.1 million in CIDA funding. The Canadian Arab Federation and Palestine House, both community organizations, lost their funding from the Canadian Immigration and Citizenship (CIC) for their English language and newcomer settlement programs. Table 3 gives a breakdown of six organizations’ mandates and loss of funding.
### Table 3

**Organizational Loss of Funding**

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<th>Organization</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Cuts/Impact</th>
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| Alternatives          | “Alternatives’ mission is to create a world where international solidarity, environmental rights, democratic rights and human dignity are universally respected. ... We will thus continue to work for a world in which:  
  - Women, men and children live in dignity and respect, and equitably share the power and resources they need to live and thrive.  
  - The diversity of peoples and individuals is respected, as well as their human, civil, economic, social, and cultural rights.  
  - Solidarity, cooperation, respect for the environment, participatory democracy and peace are truly valued.  
  - Sustainable, just and democratic social and economic development takes place at local, national and global levels.” | Lost $2.1 million in CIDA program funding in December 2009.                                      |
| Canadian Arab Federation | “CAF is made up of over 40 member organizations. Through an elected Executive Committee, CAF’s team implements the organization’s vision.  
CAF’s Values  
CAF is committed to:  
1. The protection of civil liberties and the equality of human rights;  
2. Combating racism and hate in all of its forms;  
3. Working with all politicians and all levels of government on issues of importance to Canadian Arabs to promote community empowerment through civic participation;  
4. Assuring the accurate representation of Arabs in the media, and in all areas of civil society;  
5. A strong, vibrant multicultural Canada.” | $2.1 million CIC contract for immigrant language instruction not renewed in March 2009 and a $473,873 contract for immigrant job search assistance threatened. |
Table 3 (continued)

Organizational Loss of Funding

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<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Cuts/Impact</th>
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| International Development Research Centre | “Who: We are a Canadian Crown corporation established in 1970.  
What: We help developing countries use science and technology to find solutions to local problems.  
Why: Our efforts lead to healthier people, higher incomes, cleaner environments, and responsible governments.” | In March 2010, two grants worth almost $800,000 from IDRC to Mada al-Carmel, were terminated.  
Mada al-Carmel is a Haifa based research institute focused on studies on Palestinian citizens inside Israel. |
| KAIROS                                | “The current agenda and mandate of KAIROS reflect dedication to action in the following priority areas:  
• International human rights  
• Global economic justice (including corporate social responsibility and global trade and debt issues)  
• Ecological justice  
• Canadian social development (including anti-poverty advocacy and funding and refugees and migrants)  
• Aboriginal and indigenous rights  
• Global partnerships  
• Education and animation  
The Board, program committees, and staff of KAIROS carry forward these priorities, working with key partners and a network of people from across the country.” | KAIROS program proposal for 2009-13, involving $7million in CIDA funding, rejected by CIDA in November 2009. |
## Organizational Loss of Funding

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<th>Organization</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
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<tr>
<td>Palestine House</td>
<td>&quot;The Palestine House Educational and Cultural Centre is a not-for-profit organization that was established in June 1992 by the joint efforts of various Palestinian Associations in Canada. It serves as the educational, cultural, and social centre for the Palestinian community in the Greater Toronto Area (in particular) and in Canada (in general). Our Membership is open to all Palestinians and Arabs in Canada, and our services are available to the Canadian community at large.&quot;</td>
<td>Contract worth nearly $1 million annually to provide language and settlement services for new immigrants not renewed in January 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights and Democracy (R&amp;D)</td>
<td>&quot;Rights &amp; Democracy (International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development), is a non-partisan organization with an international mandate. It was created by Canada’s Parliament in 1988 to encourage and support the universal values of human rights and the promotion of democratic institutions and practices around the world.”</td>
<td>Effective March 2009, no further funding given to three human rights organizations operating in Israel (Al Haq, Al Mezan, and B’Tselem). R&amp;D shut down by the Harper Government in April 2012.</td>
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*Note. Organizational mandates drawn from official agency websites.*
Arab community organizations were historically organized through the Canadian Arab Federation (CAF), and the Palestinian community was specifically involved with the Palestine House Educational and Cultural Center (which is a member group of CAF). Both organizations lost their funding for Settlement and English training programs from the Canadian Immigration and Citizenship (CIC) ministry. The stated reason for the funding cuts to CAF was the perception that the organization’s leadership was anti-Semitic and supported “extremism.” As for Palestine House, the organization received a letter explaining that they were losing funding because of actions “that could arguably be seen as extreme” (Kenney 2011). The following section traces the history and reasoning for those funding cuts, addressing the way both were stigmatized and disciplined by the state for their opposition to its uncritical support for Israel, and for addressing the increased racial profiling and targeting of Arab-Canadians.

The Canadian Arab Federation was formed in 1967 as a direct response to the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It was decided by members of the Arab community that there was an urgent need to mobilize, no matter where their place of residence, and present a united voice to advocate for Arab-Canadians. Thus, from its inception, CAF was not divorced from the political realities in the Middle East and was established to play a leading role in representing the interests of the Arab community to the Canadian government. CAF was envisaged as a vehicle for Arab-Canadians to voice their opinions on the politics of the region they came from and to influence policies in the new state they lived in, challenging the negative stereotypes of Arabs in Canada. At the time, Arab nationalism was strong among the newcomer
community and the number of Arab-Canadians was small, so it made sense politically and logistically to unite under the banner of one organization.

As early as 1982, CAF commissioned a study about racial stereotypes of Arabs in political cartoons published in Canadian newspapers. The study determined that Arabs were repeatedly portrayed as terrorists. The researcher pointed to the danger of such pervasive negative imagery, recalling the role played by German caricaturists in their similar depictions of Jews as laying the groundwork for the Holocaust (Henry & Tator, 2002, p. 42). During the first war against Iraq, after the invasion of Kuwait, CAF documented over 100 violent anti-Arab incidents across Canada (Antliff, 2004, p. 132).

With the continuing migration of Arabs to Canada, with many fleeing wars or repressive regimes, and with the weakening of Arab nationalist sentiment in the Middle East, Arab newcomers began to retreat into national or sectarian-based organizations, and CAF became an umbrella for those smaller groups. By 2010, CAF stated that its membership consisted of 40 Arab-Canadian community groups. CAF’s aims include influencing Canadian public policy in matters related to the Middle East, and raising issues of civil liberties, racial profiling, and racism affecting Arab-Canadians (Canadian Arab Federation website, Position Papers section, n.d.).

With the restriction of multicultural funding, CAF began to also run government-funded programs, such as Job Search Workshops aimed at assisting new immigrants in learning skills like resume and cover letter writing. CAF also ran a LINC Program (Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada) for eleven years with funding provided by Citizenship & Immigration Canada (CIC); in 2008, CIC approved the continuation of
the program's contract for 2009–2010.

After the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, when racial profiling of Arab-Canadians and Muslims increased, CAF was heavily involved in organizing a response to new legislation that enhanced the targeting of Canadians of Arab origin, such as the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* of June 2002, and the *Anti-Terrorism Act*, introduced in October 2001. In a position paper to Citizenship and Immigration Canada, published in April 2003, CAF warned of the sweeping new anti-terror regulations, explaining that such measures after “September the 11th and its aftermath have left Arab and Muslim Canadians reeling with sentiments of anxiety, fear, alienation, marginalization, betrayal, and disillusionment” (Canadian Arab Federation, 2003). However, the language used by CAF sought to strike a balance between civil liberties and the “legitimate” security concerns of the state. For example, in 2005, CAF president Omar Alghabra (later to become a Member of Parliament for the Liberal Party of Canada) stated in the CAF Annual Report that CAF was “working hard to advance a Canada that is inclusive of diversity and respectful of the balance required to protect both security and civil liberties” (2005, 1). Earlier in April 2003, CAF’s position statement on multiculturalism and civil rights argued that:

given that multiculturalism is premised on the equal treatment and respect of all citizens, Canada needs to consider how the security agenda and multiculturalism can co-exist. To date, the former has come at the expense of the latter . . . we need to determine, as a society, how to combine our desire to respect human rights and multiculturalism with our need to protect our security and trade interests.
With security becoming the dominant theme of Canadian politics, and with the rightward shift in Canadian foreign policy towards overt support for U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East, CAF’s straddling strategy became increasingly untenable. Under the new presidency of Khaled Mouammar, CAF’s discourse shifted to a more active condemnation of Canadian foreign policy and toward explicit support for Palestinian and anti-war solidarity actions and groups, such as the Coalition against Israeli Apartheid and the Toronto Coalition to Stop the War. On the one hand, the newly elected Conservative government leadership was not meeting with CAF and was aligning its policies closely with Israel; on the other hand, CAF itself, largely in response to events in the Middle East, was becoming increasingly alienated from the government and taking public positions condemning the shift in both foreign and domestic policies related to Arabs and Palestinians. This coincided with the emergence of a stronger grassroots movement in support of Palestinian human rights across campuses in Canada, a development that emboldened CAF and led it to take a more active role at the grassroots level—versus the lobbying model which no longer seemed to yield results on the political front. This shift alienated some of CAF’s traditional base organizations invested in keeping open lines of communication with the political parties, and in securing funding for their member organizations from multicultural granting institutions.

The disjuncture between the Canadian government and the Canadian Arab Federation became particularly sharp in the summer of 2006, when Israel attacked Lebanon. While CAF helped to organize demonstrations against the war and mobilized
the Arab-Canadian community, the Harper government’s response was one of overt support for Israel. In an action alert CAF issued in July of 2006, in response to the Israeli bombing raids, CAF President Khaled Mouammar wrote:

The Canadian government has been a major supporter of the Israeli Apartheid Regime, both economically (Canada has a Free Trade Agreement with Israel that grosses over 1 billion dollars) and diplomatically (Canada voted against the Palestinian Refugees Right of Return at the UN in March of this year, Canada was also the first country to declare sanctions against the Democratically elected Hamas government).

Then, in a press release from August 10, 2006, Mouammar was quoted as saying: “we are marching together, beyond Palestine and Lebanon – against war in Iraq and Afghanistan, against poverty and police brutality, and against the erosion of social services and civil rights” (Canadian Arab Federation, 2006). By 2006, then, the leadership of CAF was explicitly making the connections between ongoing wars in the Middle East and domestic policies affecting Arab Canadians under the rubric of the War on Terror.

As the war in Lebanon revolved around Hezbollah (an organization officially listed as a terrorist group in Canada), it was inevitable that CAF would address the issue of Hezbollah and its perception in Canada as well. After three MPs visiting Lebanon on a mission organized by the National Council on Canada-Arab Relations suggested that the Canadian government should communicate with Hezbollah, they were attacked by Minister Jason Kenney and Minister Peter MacKay, with Kenney comparing Hezbollah to the Nazis. In response, the president of CAF, in an article in The Star, stated:
By refusing to deal with Hezbollah, a political party represented in the Lebanese government whose resistance to Israel's aggression is supported by 87 per cent of Lebanese citizens, Peter MacKay is parroting the Bush administration's stand and is emboldening Israel to launch further wars against its neighbours. (Fraser, 2006) Later on, in a policy paper released in November 2006, CAF put forth its position on both Hezbollah and Hamas:

Both of these groups are legitimate political parties, with grassroots support, and are represented in the legislature and the cabinets of Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority respectively. Both groups are resisting the illegal Israeli occupation of Lebanon and Palestine respectively which right is guaranteed under international law.

The paper went on to call on the Canadian Government to “remove Hezbollah and Hamas from the list of banned organizations” (Canadian Arab Federation, 2006). This policy paper and CAF's remarks about the two groups were then used as a justification for portraying CAF as a supporter of terrorism, rather than simply as an advocate of a perspective different than that of the party in government. These policy suggestions, despite having the support of thousands of Arab-Canadians, were thus construed as outside the realm of legitimate debate in a Canadian context dominated by the anti-terrorism discourse, coupled with the perception of the Arab community as the “fifth column within,” trying to undermine the Canadian state and the safety of its citizens from within. These policy positions therefore alienated CAF from the political establishment even further. Significantly, CAF’s behaviour has never been termed illegal. In fact,
Minister Kenny, in speaking of CAF’s positions, stated: “When I say beyond the pale, I don’t mean illegal. But these are the kinds of organizations that should receive no formal support from the organs of the Canadian state” (Talaga, 2009). However, if CAF’s actions are not illegal, this calls into question the rules that apply to Arab Canadians’ organizations. As argued by Razack in a different context, “Muslims have been evicted from law and politics” where, in a state of exception, “paradoxically, the law has determined that the rule of law does not apply” (2008, p. 6).26

It was in February 2009 that Minister Jason Kenney announced that he would review the federal funding to the Canadian Arab Federation for its settlement services. While present at a conference against the “new anti-Semitism” in London, England on February 18, 2009, Minister Kenney said:

These [Canadian Islamic Congress (CIC) and CAF] and other organizations are free within the confines of our law and consistent with our traditions of freedom of expression, to speak their mind, but they should not expect to receive resources from the state, support from taxpayers or any other form of official respect from the government or the organs of our State [emphasis added]. And I would encourage all other governments to take a similar approach to organizations that either excuse violence against Jews or express essentially anti-Semitic sentiments.

26. In the case of the banning of George Galloway, prominent anti-war activist and Respect Party MP to the British Parliament, from entering Canada based on accusations of “support for terrorist groups” issued from the Citizenship and Immigration Ministry office, in September 27, 2010, Federal Court judge Richard Mosley found that Minister Kenney’s office had acted inappropriately, using “a flawed and overreaching interpretation of the standards under Canadian law for labeling someone as engaging in terrorism or being a member of a terrorist organizations” (CBC News, 2010b). The ban was revoked, but the incident is a clear indication of the “overarching” ways in which legislation is interpreted to suit ideological goals.
This happened soon after Khaled Mouammar, during a rally against the bombing of Gaza, had called Kenney (and other Canadian politicians) “professional whores” for their support of Israel. Here, Kenney was articulating the view that governmental funding could be made contingent on recipients’ political views and the political implications of their legal activities, and used to punish or promote various groups holding different political views. Crucially, he also identifies anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism, altering the definition of anti-Semitism itself, stating: “The argument is with those whose premise is that Israel itself is an abomination, and that the Jews alone have no right to a homeland. And in that sense, anti-Zionism is anti-Semitism (CBC News, 2009).

The back and forth between CAF and the Minister continued. On March 13, 2009, Kenney gave an interview with the Canwest News Service and Global National, saying:

I can tell you, at my ministry, I have no intention of funding that organization [CAF] as long as it has the current leadership that apologizes for groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, [that] says they [Hezbollah and Hamas] should be able to operate legally, [and] that promotes hateful and extreme views, particularly the most pernicious and durable form of hatred, which is anti-Semitism. (O’Neill, 2009a)

At the time, CAF’s member organizations issued a statement supporting CAF President Khaled Mouammar, but did add that Mouammar’s use of the term “professional whore” was “unfortunate.” The groups were attempting damage control at this point, but that did not help.
On March 18, 2009, Rick Stewart, then Associate Assistant Deputy Minister, Operations, wrote to CAF that the government would not renew a two-year, $2.1 million contract, which expired that month, for immigrant language instruction that CAF provided. A second $473,873 contract for immigrant job search assistance was also threatened. Stewart’s letter included a statement from Minister Kenney justifying the decision to halt funding:

Serious concerns have arisen with respect to certain public statements that have been made by yourself or other officials of the CAF. These statements have included the promotion of hatred, anti-Semitism and support for the banned terrorist organizations Hamas and Hezbollah. The objectionable nature of these public statements in that they appear to reflect the CAF’s evident support for terrorist organizations and positions on its part which are arguably anti-Semitic raises serious questions about the integrity of your organization and has undermined the government’s confidence in the CAF as an appropriate partner for the delivery of settlement services to newcomers. (National Post, 2009)

Interestingly, the letter uses terms such as “they appear to reflect” and “arguably anti-Semitic”—vague terms that avoid any legal terminology, reference to hate-crimes, or reference to anti-terror legislation. In other words, the statement is based on the perceptions and biases of the minister in charge, not on an investigation. While hate-crime legislation and anti-terror legislation might be biased as well, the important point is that the use of terms such as terrorism and anti-Semitism provided a context in which notions of due process and impartiality could simply be ignored.
Although in mainstream media the suspension of funding was quickly explained as a result of “name-calling,” Minister Kenney explained subsequently several times that cutting CAF’s funding had been on his agenda since he entered office, stating:

When I first became Minister over 2 years ago, one of the very first things I said to my bureaucrats on the very first day in my Department of Multiculturalism was that we would not be funding groups that promote extremism, defend or apologize for terrorism or terrorist organizations and promote hatred, and as I mentioned specifically two groups: the Canadian Arab Federation and the Canadian Islamic Congress. (Canadian Arab Federation, 2009)

In the legal proceedings that followed CAF’s application for an interim injunction to the Federal Court, which sought to stop the funding cuts until a full judicial review of that decision could be undertaken, the Minister’s side argued that it was “not the insult to the Minister per se but rather the ‘anti-Semitism’ and ‘sympathy with terrorists’ that caused Mr. Kenney to cancel the funding” (Canadian Arab Federation (CAF) v. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2009, para. 8). The court did not grant an interim injunction, on the grounds that the cuts did not constitute irreparable harm to the organization. The court did find, however, that Minister Kenney may have breached his legal duty to act fairly towards CAF. Justice Kelen, who presided over the case, made it clear that it would be inappropriate for the Minister to cut CAF’s funding because its President had called the Minister a name, stating:

Being a target of public criticism is part of holding public office. If the Minister decided to cancel the English as a Second Language funding contract for the
Canadian Arab community simply because he was called a name . . . his decision should not stand. It was not unexpected that the Arab community would be repulsed by Israel’s invasion of Gaza . . . the Arab community was upset that the Canadian government did not strongly protest this attack. Many reputable Canadian Jews were similarly opposed to [the] attack. (Canadian Arab Federation (CAF) v. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2009, para. 31)

In its decision, the court stated that the Minister was legally obligated to advise CAF of his reasons for intending to cancel the contract, to provide CAF with a full opportunity to respond, and to fairly take into account this response before making his final decision (Canadian Arab Federation (CAF) v. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2009). Minister Kenney took only the procedural lesson to heart; as will be explained below, for later funding cuts to Palestine House, he sent a letter warning that he was investigating the organization, requested a response, and later proceeded to cut the funding.

In response to the cuts to CAF’s funding, Jim Karygiannis, a Liberal Party Toronto Member of Parliament in whose riding the CAF program operated, requested parliamentary ethics commissioner Mary Dawson investigate the issue. Karygiannis’ complaint explained:

I believe for the Minister to use his position and exert undue influence and or in this case instruct his officials to hold funding from such an NGO; this sets a bad precedent which clearly should not be allowed to stand. With this move the Minister sends out a signal to community-based NGOs to toe the line or risk
losing their funding. (Thompson, 2009a)

However, news reports quoted Alykhan Velshi, spokesman for Kenney, who called the complaint “ridiculous” and “said it was ‘disturbing’ to see a Liberal MP standing up for a group that has made anti-Semitic comments” (Thompson, 2009a). As noted earlier, discourses of silencing include casting positions in support of Palestinians as being anti-Semitic, as well as the use of anti-terror discourses to racialize and stigmatize Arabs. In the case of the funding cuts to CAF, both discourses were utilized by the state. Using ideological biases rather than due process, the Minister was able to cast CAF as extremist for its political opposition to both Canada’s support for Israel and its internal policies of racial profiling. Moreover, the attempt of the state to replace the leadership of CAF altogether was very telling of the shift in the management of the relationship between the state and ethnocultural organizations. As O’Neill reported, Kenney explained that a change in leadership would restore the funding:

Immigration Minister Jason Kenney says the Canadian Arab Federation will have to change its leadership and adopt a more moderate stance or risk losing federal funding . . . Mr. Kenney said taxpayers should not be footing the bill for an organization whose leader “promotes hateful and extremist views.” Mr. Kenney said there are many moderate organizations that could do the job . . . He suggested the decision could be reversed if more moderate leaders were in place. (2009b) In an interview with The Canadian Jewish News, Kenney again criticized CAF President Mouammar, stating:

The more Mr. Mouammar . . . speaks, the more clear it is that he doesn’t speak for
the vast majority of Canadians of Arab origin, who are honest, decent, thoughtful, democratic, moderate people; most of whom came to this country seeking life in a stable, liberal democracy, not this kind of shrill, cartoonish voice of extremism that he too often represents. (Levy-Ajzenkopf, 2009)

In this case, the Minister was clearly using funding as a political tool to change community leadership to one of his liking. The Canadian political establishment is devoutly pro-Israel (and makes no effort to hide this), and the Arab-Canadian community happens to bear the brunt of Israel’s military aggressions when they occur in their region of origin. So this community is specifically told to be quiet and to elect a “moderate” leadership. The acquiescence of the Arab-Canadian community leadership is necessary for Canadian foreign policy imperatives. The main contradiction, however, lies between, on the one hand, the strong support for Israel and the internal security agenda, and on the other hand, the rhetoric of multiculturalism and diversity. The bounds of multicultural diversity are clearly demarcated within a specific politics; when actual disagreement with the state on policy occurs, then the community in question needs to put their “diverse” view aside or suffer the consequences of losing funding. Funding is used here as a tool for control and discipline.

The Palestine House Educational and Cultural Centre suffered a similar fate to the Canadian Arab Federation in 2012. Palestine House is a not-for-profit organization that was established in June 1992 through the joint efforts of various Palestinian Associations in Canada. It serves as the educational, cultural, and social centre for the Palestinian community in the Greater Toronto Area (in particular), and in Canada (in general)
On December 16, 2011, in response to an application to renew their CIC funding, the organization received a letter signed by Minister Jason Kenney, notifying them of a review. The letter noted that the settlement program is not only for language training, “it also facilitates the settlement and social, cultural, economic and civic integration of sometimes vulnerable and impressionable immigrants and refugees into Canadian Society.” The letter also stated, “we expect that a service provider will conduct itself in a manner that could not be perceived as extreme or endorsing violence against any person or group,” adding that the review will take into account actions, statements, and positions that “may be incompatible with CIC’s interest in providing services to new Canadians, free of any association with extreme political activity or views” (Palestine House letter, viewed by author, March 15, 2012). The letter did not specify how the review would be conducted, or importantly, what constitutes “extreme” activity and political views.

The letter went on to stress three actions that the Ministry found objectionable, explaining that “Palestine House has a history of taking positions that could be interpreted as extreme or supportive of terrorists and terrorism and viewed as offensive to newcomers and to many Canadians.” The incidents cited in the letter as objectionable included: “the presence on your [Palestine House] website of a map showing a Palestinian state encompassing all of Israel.” A Palestine House event held on Oct 8, 2011, marking the release by Israel of about 1,000 prisoners in an exchange deal with Hamas for the abducted Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, was also cited, with the letter stating that the freed prisoners were “convicted terrorists and at least one individual who...
murdered two Canadian citizens.” Lastly, a March 2010 event was cited, for which the Palestine House hosted Abdul Bari Atwan, a journalist based in London, for Palestinian Land Day commemorations, which the centre hosts yearly. The letter specifically quoted Atwan’s comment from a televised interview on a Lebanese channel, where he said: “If the Iranian missiles strike Israel, by Allah, I will go to Trafalgar Square and dance with delight.”

Palestine House responded to the letter, explaining that the map on their website was merely an outline of historical Palestine, a geography that many Palestinian-Canadians continue to be connected to, adding that it could be easily removed. On the subject of the event to mark the release of Palestinian prisoners, Palestine House explained that the event was in support of the prisoners and all their families, not one particular prisoner, adding that the majority of Palestinians are tried under Israeli military courts for political activities of any kind (not necessarily political violence). On the final issue of hosting Abdul Bari Atwan, the organization made clear in their response that he was hosted as a prominent London-based Palestinian journalist with a long career, and that they were not aware of the particular statement quoted and in any case did not agree with it (Siddiqui, 2012).

The explanation did not convince the Ministry, and in January 2012, the Palestine House was informed that the CIC would not enter into a new agreement with them. Twenty staff members lost their jobs due to these cuts, the majority of them both women and non-Palestinian. Most individuals receiving services at the centre were of Chinese and South Asian background, and were neither Arab nor Palestinian.
In both of the above cases, CAF and Palestine House were not assessed on their program delivery—rather, the judgment was on their positions, actions, and events regarding Canadian foreign policies in the Middle East, and specifically their criticism of Israeli state policies. Those in favour of funding cuts continue to stress that state funding should not go towards advocacy. However, it is important to note that funds given by the state through CIC for settlement programs are monitored very closely through monthly reports that program managers must submit to CIC; these reports are detailed to the point of recording exact spending on photocopying, office supplies, and so on. Both CAF and Palestine House insisted that none of their activities that were Palestine related were ever supported with CIC funds. This indicates that the issue for the government was not the manner in which the funding was used, as the monthly reports they received easily proved the effective organizational operations in using the resources—rather, this is a case of specifically disciplining groups for their activities unrelated to “service delivery.” It is unclear, however, what positions on Palestine CIC would not deem “extreme” or if there is even an acceptable Palestine solidarity position that would satisfy the Ministry.

Interestingly, the first letter to Palestine House notifying the organization of the review, dated Dec. 16, 2011, included a reference to the new Citizenship and Immigration Canada citizenship guide issued in March 2011, titled *Discover Canada: The Rights and Responsibilities of Citizenship.* The letter noted: “as stated in CIC’s guide to new Canadians ‘some Canadians immigrate from places where they have experienced warfare or conflict. Such experiences do not justify bringing to Canada violent, extreme or hateful prejudice.’” The use of the guide is significant: it was utilized for managing
what discourses and experiences Canadian immigrants can and cannot “bring” with them. According to a CIC report evaluating the multiculturalism program, the updated guide “strengthens the content on common Canadian values such as freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the equality of men and women” (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012a). Moreover, right after the guide was reissued, “an advertisement campaign on citizenship was launched which emphasized the meaning of being Canadian and the importance of Canada’s values, symbols, institutions and history” (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012a). The use of the guide in the context of a letter issued to review an organization highlights its use in the disciplining of communities that are determined to, potentially, “bring in prejudice” and “extremism”—as such terms are defined by the state officials. Citizenship itself is reordered in this way, not only into a set of common values that include freedom and democracy as inherently Canadian values (and not universal), but the guide itself is also quoted to curtail what discourses and experiences are to be admissible into Canada.

It is critical to assess the described cuts to the funding of two of the most important Arab community organizations in Canada in light of Canada’s foreign policies, as well as the redefinition of Canadian citizenship into a white-neoliberal multiculturalism in a context of neoliberal globalization and the War on Terror. As Gary Younge noted in relation to Islamophobia in Britain:

Somewhere out there is the Muslim that the British government seeks. Like all religious people he (the government is more likely to talk about Muslim women than to them) supports gay rights, racial equality, women’s rights, tolerance and
parliamentary democracy. He abhors the murder of innocent civilians without qualifications – unless they are in Palestine, Afghanistan or Iraq. He wants to be treated as a regular British citizen – but not by the police, immigration or airport security.

He raises his daughters to be assertive: they can wear whatever they want so long as it’s not a headscarf. He believes in free speech and the right to cause offence but understands that he has neither the right to be offended nor to speak out. Whatever an extremist is, on any given day, he is not it. (2009)

In the case of Palestinian-Canadians, the Canadian state is looking for something similar: a Palestinian-Arab who will not speak about Canadian support for the Israeli state, will not engage in conversations about the ethnic cleansing of Palestine or remember his/her original villages on a map, and who will not even celebrate the release of Palestinian political prisoners.27 The government explains that if organizations are to engage in such acts, they will not receive government funding for newcomer services. Multiculturalism for Arab-Canadians, then, is relegated to expressions of dress, food, and dance, but does not include expressions of political positions—especially those that do not conform to the expressed foreign policies of the state.

Funding Cuts to Development NGO

27. It is important to consider that the use of funding to silence and discipline community groups happens also in other Western states allied to Israel. For just one example, in Britain, the week preceding a government launch of an anti-terror strategy named Contest 2, MP Hazel Blear threatened to deny funding to the Muslim Council of Britain “because of comments its deputy secretary, Daud Abdullah, made about supporting Palestinians. It shows how these domestic tensions are intertwined with foreign policy” (Younge, 2009).
The funding cuts went well beyond Arab community organizations to reach aid and development non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that the state considered to be at odds with its foreign policy. The following section will discuss the funding cuts to two development aid NGOs: KAIROS and Alternatives.

KAIROS is an organization composed of eleven churches and religious groups. Its main work consists of promoting human rights, sustainable development, and women’s rights with its partners in Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America, and the Middle East.

In March 2009, KAIROS submitted a program proposal for 2009–2013 which focused on human rights and ecological justice. As is common practice, KAIROS submitted the proposal in consultation with CIDA staff and made all adjustments to the program requested by the program officer (KAIROS, n.d.). By July 2009, the proposal was received by Beverly Oda, Minister of International Cooperation, after approval from various levels of CIDA. On November 30, however, KAIROS received a phone call that they would not receive their requested funding. After some pressure following media reports and questions in the House of Commons, CIDA faxed a letter to KAIROS stating that CIDA was focusing its resources on three themes—food security, children and youth, and economic growth—and that the KAIROS proposal did not fit these priorities. But,

according to KAIROS, the proposal was framed within two CIDA priority areas: promoting good governance (human rights), and advancing ecological sustainability (reducing the impact of climate change and addressing land degradation) (KAIROS, n.d.). The KAIROS proposal, the organization argued, “was deemed by CIDA staff to be within CIDA criteria and priorities throughout the approval process,” a fact that completely undermined the official explanation for the cuts. At that stage, however, no coherent alternative explanation for the cuts existed besides the official one regarding KAIROS falling outside the revised CIDA priorities.

However, boasting about the decision a few weeks later in a speech to the Global Forum for Combating Anti-Semitism in Jerusalem, Citizenship and Immigration Minister Jason Kenney explained:

We have articulated and implemented a zero tolerance approach to anti-Semitism. What does this mean? It means that we eliminated the government funding relationship with organizations like for example, the Canadian Arab Federation, whose leadership apologized for terrorism or extremism, or who promote hatred, in particular anti-Semitism. We have ended government contact with like-minded organizations like the Canadian Islamic Congress, whose President notoriously said that all Israelis over the age of 18 are legitimate targets for assassination. We have defunded organizations, most recently like KAIROS, who are taking a leadership role in the boycott. (2009e)

The following day, Jason Kenney’s office defended the assertion that KAIROS was involved in the BDS campaign by referencing NGO Monitor (NGOM), a pro-Israeli
source. As reported by Elizabeth Thompson on December 17, 2009 for the *Toronto Sun*, Kenney's office pointed to critical comments made by an Israel-based group. The NGO Monitor said KAIROS is a main supporter of the anti-Israel divestment movement in Canada and gave a $25,000 grant in 2007 to Sabeel, a Palestinian NGO whose leader "employs anti-Semitic themes and imagery." . . . Kenney's office also pointed to a 2006 press release from B'nai Brith and Canadian Christian College president Charles McVety calling on CIDA to stop funding KAIROS.

The use of NGO Monitor information as a source is itself very revealing. 29 According to its own website, "NGO Monitor’s objective is to end the practice used by certain self-declared ‘humanitarian NGOs’ of exploiting the label ‘universal human rights values’ to promote politically and ideologically motivated agendas" (NGO Monitor, n.d.). As Réghaï explained:

Although using language that would appear neutral, NGOM is a highly partisan organization that weakens universal human rights by its fixation on shielding Israel from accountability and charging some of the most respected international human rights organizations with bias against Israel. According to NGOM, these include Christian Aid, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Oxfam, the Center for Constitutional Rights and Médecins Sans Frontiers. (2010)

29. NGO Monitor produced briefings on KAIROS and Alternatives, prior to the funding cuts, that can be found on the organization’s website, dated 2007 and 2009, respectively. When the funding was cut for the two organizations, NGOM updated their website with a section titled “Canadian Gov’t to Halt Funding for NGOs Promoting Conflict” (2009b).
In 2008, NGO Monitor wrote regarding CIDA that, “funding continues for a number of NGOs engaged in anti-Israel campaigning [and] [t]his group includes Al Haq, Alternatives, Medecins Du Monde, Oxfam and the Mennonite Central Committee,” clearly casting a wide net on what they deem anti-Israel campaigning (NGO Monitor, 2008).

In a response to Kenney’s allegations, KAIROS explained in a press release:

Minister Kenney’s charge against KAIROS is false. KAIROS did not lead this campaign. In 2007, KAIROS took a public position opposing sanctions and a boycott of Israel. A recently released document, KAIROS Palestine, 2009: A Moment of Truth, is not a document of KAIROS: Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives. (2009)

It was assumed that Minister Kenney had mistaken the KAIROS Palestine document for a KAIROS Canada position. In fact, the KAIROS Palestine document supportive of BDS was indeed issued in Bethlehem on December 11, 2009, but had nothing to do with KAIROS Canada. KAIROS’ response went on to say,

Minister Kenney’s statement, in a highly charged environment, raises very disturbing questions about the integrity of Canadian development aid decisions. If aid decisions are based on political rumor rather than on due diligence, development criteria and CIDA’s own evaluation process then this is a matter of grave concern for the entire international development sector – and for the Canadian people who pay for this aid. (2009)

It is worth noting that KAIROS’ actual position on Palestine-Israel included
“three strategies: educate church membership on the conflict in Palestine and Israel; promote fair trade olive oil and other products from the Occupied Palestinian Territories; and highlight Canadian economic relationships with illegal Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories” (KAIROS, 2008). KAIROS argued that their position was consistent with Canada’s foreign policy on Israel-Palestine, stating that according to the Government’s own Canadian Policy on Key Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, it was specified under the heading “Occupied Territories,” that Canada adheres to “UN Security Council Resolution 446 and 465 [both of which] refer to Israeli settlements in occupied territories as a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The settlements also constitute a serious obstacle to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace” (KAIROS, 2008).

Minister Kenney was forced to retract his comments, especially as they contradicted the public statements by other officials from CIDA regarding the cuts and CIDA funding priorities. In a response to an article on the issue in the Toronto Star, Kenney explained:

While I disagree with the nature of KAIROS’s militant stance toward the Jewish homeland that is not the reason their request for taxpayer funding was denied. International Cooperation Minister Bev Oda – not me – is responsible for the Canada International Development Agency. And she has been clear that a cost-sharing program with KAIROS was not approved because it did not meet CIDA’s current priorities, such as increased food aid. (2009d)

The government continued to insist that the cuts were merely the result of missed
criteria. Jim Abbott, former Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of International Cooperation, told Parliament on March 15, 2010 that CIDA recommended cutting funding to KAIROS: “CIDA thoroughly analyzed KAIROS’ program proposal and determined, with regret, that it did not meet the agency’s current priorities” (Abbott, 2010). In the House of Commons, Minister Oda claimed that KAIROS had lost its funding because their work no longer fit CIDA’s objectives stating:

Mr. Speaker, our government has been very clear. We have an international aid effectiveness strategy and we are acting on it . . . all projects by CIDA are assessed against our effectiveness standards. After due diligence, it was determined that KAIROS’ proposal did not meet government standards. (2010)

Unfortunately for Beverly Oda, the story of the funding cuts did not end there. Documents obtained through an Access to Information request showed that KAIROS’ 2009–2013 funding proposal had been approved at every level of CIDA. Thus, it was not a decision made by the staff of CIDA in response to an evaluation of the proposal based on stated criteria; rather, it was a political decision. The documents contained the signatures of top CIDA officials recommending that funding to KAIROS continue, including the signature of CIDA President Margaret Biggs. However, a handwritten “not” was added to the final document.

As a result, both Margaret Biggs and Minister Oda were questioned in the Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs and International Development in December 2010. Margaret Biggs testified that the inserted word “not” was not on the final document that the Minister received. Minister Oda also testified that she did not know who had
doctored the document.

In February 2011, the Minister finally explained that it was her personal decision not to recommend funding, and that it was up to ministers to make such decisions: “Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to set the record straight regarding the funding application for KAIROS... The ‘not’ was inserted at my direction” (Oda, 2011). She insisted, however, that she had not misled Parliament about the doctored document. After examining the case, then Speaker of the House of Commons, Peter Milliken, ruled that “the government withheld information from a parliamentary committee, and that International Cooperation Minister Bev Oda may have misled the House” (Ibbitson, 2011).

As reported by Clark in The Globe and Mail (2011), the Prime Minister nonetheless continued to support Minister Bev Oda. The decision to stop funding was not rescinded, forcing KAIROS to cut some of their programming. What became evident as this case unfolded was that the notion of “fitting priorities” was effectively used to deny funding to an organization, while government ministers publicly, and on flimsy grounds, accused it of anti-Semitism.

Another NGO that suffered a similar fate to KAIROS and lost its funding from CIDA under similar circumstances was Alternatives, a left-leaning, Montreal-based NGO established in 1994. Its stated mission is to “create a world where international solidarity, environmental rights, democratic rights and human dignity are universally respected (Alternatives, n.d.). In December 2009, after 17 years of receiving funding from CIDA for projects in over 30 countries, Alternatives learned through an article in a national
newspaper that CIDA funding for their programs would be cut (Voices-Voix, n.d.). The organization could not get a confirmation from Minister of International Cooperation Beverely Oda, or from CIDA President Margaret Briggs. Michel Lambert, Alternatives’ Executive director said at the time: “From our point of view we have no news, and we have asked many times for the [minister’s office] and CIDA to clarify that and we don’t even get an answer, so we don’t know.” Mr. Lambert said further that: “The people we discuss with on a daily basis say it’s still in process, but the higher-level people, like the president [Margaret Biggs], are not responding” (Payton, 2010a). It was widely reported however that “an independent evaluator, working for CIDA, gave Alternatives a positive recommendation. The evaluator even suggested a five-year funding renewal. CIDA staff suggested Mr. Lambert amend it to a three-year proposal” (Payton, 2010b).

The government never explained officially what had taken place; it was just implied in media reports that Alternatives’ position on Palestine was the issue. Alternatives’ executive director, however, publicly stated: “What we hear from various people in Ottawa, including a member of Parliament, is that we are going to be cut (off) based on point of view . . . mainly on the issue of Israel-Palestine” (Brennan, 2010). Alternatives was forced to dismiss many members of its staff and to cancel various projects following the cuts to its funding.

**Federally Funded “Arm’s-Length” Institutions?**

The cases of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (better known as Rights and Democracy) and the International Development Research Centre showcase a different aspect of the interference in funding
because both organizations were created by the Canadian parliament. However, they were meant to be independent and at arm’s length from the state. The cases below outline funding cuts to grants that were made by both organizations to NGOs critical of Israeli policies. Through a series of board appointments from the Conservative government, Rights and Democracy was embroiled in a controversy and eventually shut down, with the debate largely surrounding three grants approved by the president for three NGO’s that operate in Palestine: Al-Haq, Al-Mezan, and B’tselem, three human rights organizations critical of Israeli policies. The International Development Research Centre also revoked a grant to Mada al-Carmel, a research institute active around issues of Palestinian minority rights within Israeli society.

In 2008, the Harper conservative government appointed four new Rights and Democracy Board members: Jacques Gauthier, Jean Builbeault, Payam Akhavan, and Ellio Tepper. Then, in early 2009, Aurel Braun was appointed as Chair of the Board. According to Sima Samar, an international board member who later resigned, some of the new appointees had a “narrow political agenda” (Siddiqui, 2010). Warren Allmand, a former president of the agency and former Liberal cabinet member, commented on the changes and controversy at the organization, noting, “It’s pretty clear to me that the government recently has been packing the board with people who have the biases of the Prime Minister’s Office” (CBC, 2010a).

In testimony to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development on the issue, board member Payam Akhavan insisted that problems between board members first began when a minority led by Braun and Gauthier pursued
a "hostile takeover" (Akhavan, 2010). In February of 2009, Rights and Democracy provided grants of $10,000 each to B’Tselem, Al Haq, and Al Mezan, three human rights organizations critical of Israeli policies. These grants were one of the key points of contention between some new board members and the president of the organization, Remi Beauregard, who had approved the grants.

Mr. Braun, the Chair, was quoted in the media stating his objections to the grants: "Al Haq and Al Mezan — have links to terrorism. The third group, B’Tselem, which is Israeli, is biased and undeserving of funding” (CBC, 2010). There was no evidence provided for the allegations. 30 Together with his allies on the Board, Braun accused President of Rights and Democracy Remi Beauregard of a lack of accountability and communication with the Board. A Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development investigating what went on at Rights and Democracy stated:

It is abundantly clear to the Committee that a significant factor underlying the dispute between certain members of the Board and Mr. Beauregard and the organization were differing views on the current dispute in the Middle East. From the perspective of Professor Braun and his supporters, their clear view was that support for certain organizations, in the words of Mr. Braun, followed a pattern of "delegitimating and dehumanizing a fellow democracy.” From the perspective of President Beauregard, it is clear that Rights and Democracy felt it important to

30. It is worth noting that Al-Haq and Al Mezan are funded by many governments and European foundations, including Norway, Sweden, Ireland, Christian Aid, Diakonia, the Ford Foundation, and the Open Society Institute.
support the cause of civil rights in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank, even if this meant supporting organizations critical of the state of Israel. It is clearly impossible to understand the depth of emotion underlying the dispute between members of the Board and between the Board and senior officials at Rights and Democracy without comprehending the deep differences of opinion on this important subject. (Standing Committee on FAAE, 2010)

As early as March 26, 2009, at the Board of Director’s first meeting chaired by Braun, after strong opposition to the grants was voiced by board members Braun and Gautheir, a compromise was struck that no further funding would be given to Al Haq, Al Mezan, or B’Tselem. Prior to these events, Beauregard had received a positive performance review, and the 2009 audit of R&D by the Auditor General of Canada was also positive. However, three members of the board (Gautheir, Tepper, and Braun) initiated an assessment of the president’s performance and sent their negative evaluation to the office of the Chairman to the Privy Council Office (PCO) without any discussion with the Board. Beauregard had not seen the evaluation either, and later only accessed it through a Freedom of Information request. According to the testimony of board member Akhavan, the evaluation included “baseless accusations, half-truths, and distortions that disregarded or minimized his successful leadership” and amounted to “a character assassination” (Akhavan, 2010).

The review included a reference to the three grants as well as to Beauregard’s participation in a conference in Cairo. According to Akhavan’s testimony to the parliamentary committee, Beauregard was accused by Gauthier (another of the four
Harper appointees on the Board), of having met with representatives of Hamas and Hezbollah as part of this conference. Gauthier also implied that Beauregard broke the law by attending these meetings, referring to the “section 83.18 of the Criminal Code of Canada [which] provides that contributing directly or indirectly to the activity of a terrorist group is punishable by ten years of imprisonment.” Akhavan stressed that Gauthier’s serious accusations were not backed by facts, and bemoaned how “[s]o without a shred of evidence—without a shred of evidence—a distinguished bureaucrat with a spotless record was accused of being a criminal” (Akhavan, 2010).

In a June 18, 2009 board meeting, President Beauregard responded to his evaluation report and requested that it be rectified; the majority of the Board also requested that it be revised, and rejected the evaluation. This never took place, however, as the following board meeting was cancelled hastily, and the next one only took place after the Braun faction had placed a decisive majority on the Board through new appointments. New appointees included Marco Navarro-Génie and Bradley Farquhar (appointed November 2009), as well as David Matas and Michael Van Pelt (appointed November 2009). Regardless of their political affiliation (Matas, for example, belonged to the Liberal party and was senior counsel to B’nai Brith), they voted to support the Braun faction. It was Matas in his first board meeting who brought in the motion to repudiate the grants to Al-Mezan, Al-Haq, and B’Tselem.

After securing a majority on the Board, the conflict between Beauregard and certain members of the board erupted at a key meeting on January 7, 2010. The new Board had voted to deny a second term of office to Guido Riveros Franck of Bolivia, one
of three international Directors. Sima Samar resigned and walked out of the meeting, as did international human rights expert Payam Akhavan. The board members voted at this meeting to repudiate the three grants, with Beauregard voting in favour of this change. The final vote was nine for and one abstention. Beauregard died of a heart attack the following day, Jan. 8, 2010. His widow has stated publicly that he experienced considerable stress and bullying in the months before his death (CBC Radio, 2011). Of the 47 staff employed at R&D at the time, 45 members signed a letter demanding that Directors Braun, Gauthier, and Tepper be dismissed from the Board, due to behaviour that constituted harassment (Cheadle, 2010).

This only resulted in the Board appointing Jacques Gauthier as interim President of Rights and Democracy. He proceeded to suspend three directors, later dismissing them (they filed a legal case for wrongful dismissal) (Standing Committee on FAAE, 2010). Gauthier also “authorized several contracts to hire external firms during his short tenure, which included two law firms, a communications firms, an accounting firm, and a private investigation firm” to perform an external audit (Standing Committee on FAAE, 2010). The hiring of these private firms was not done through a tender process. Importantly, the audit did not reach any damning conclusions regarding the agency’s financial management. The biggest issues identified by Deloitte & Touche related to matters of governance, pointing to “several conflicts between certain members of the Board of Directors and certain management personnel.” As a result, auditors called on the Board to clearly define “restrictions concerning the activities, projects and/or partnerships, or geographic areas with which Rights & Democracy should not be associated or to which it
should not provide financial assistance” (LeBlanc, 2010).

In its recommendations, the parliamentary committee investigating the situation at Rights and Democracy concluded that “the Privy Council Office remove the Board’s evaluation (and all documents related to the evaluation) of Rémy Beauregard from all files” and recommended that “the Government of Canada reconstitute the Board, with a new Chair.” The Committee also concluded that the new Board “should be appointed in consultation with the opposition parties to ensure an arms-length, non-partisan Board.” However, the Conservative government did not agree to all recommendations and remained supportive of the Board (Standing Committee on FAAE, 2010). The Conservative Party of Canada produced a “dissenting opinion” to the parliamentary report, writing in response:

We want to express our confidence in the Board of Directors and thank them for their perseverance during these difficult incidents. These are essentially volunteer positions and their labour is one of service to their country. While we worked diligently with opposition members to agree on the body of this report, we cannot support ALL the recommendations pushed through by the opposition majority on the Committee. (Standing Committee on FAAE, 2010)

In March 2012, the Canadian government announced that it would close down R&D, and transfer the organization’s functions to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Mills, 2012). Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird said: “For some time, the many challenges of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, also known as Rights & Democracy, have been well publicized. It is time
to put these past challenges behind us and move forward” (2012b). Even though it was clear that there was no organizational mismanagement, nor any financial issues, the organization was folded and the report evaluating the late president was never changed.

In the same vein, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), another development research institution funded by the federal government and meant to be at arm’s length from the state, ended its contract for two grants to Mada al-Carmel, a Haifa-based research institute focused on studies on Palestinian citizens inside Israel. The IDRC was taken to court by Mada al-Carmel, with allegations that the institute lost its IDRC funding without an explanation relating to the institute’s conduct. In its application to the federal court, Mada noted that they had been criticized in written submissions to Canadian Parliamentarians by an aggressive Israeli organization, NGO Monitor. The Respondents are aware of NGO Monitor’s submissions, which are inflammatory and incorrect in accusing Mada Al-Carmel of advancing “a one-sided agenda of demonizing and delegitimizing Israel.” (Federal Court, 2010)31

Mada was in the second year of two three-year grants from the IDRC to study the marginalization of women in Arab-Israeli society and the low level of political participation by Arab Israelis, when the IDRC terminated the grants, worth almost $800,000. This was not related to the performance of the organization. As a matter of fact, an IDRC statement said: “We wish to emphasize that this termination is . . . by no

31. This was in reference to NGO Monitor’s “Submission to Canadian Parliamentary Coalition to Combat Anti-Semitism” dated August 31, 2009.
means a reflection on the quality of the work being done by your institution” (Martin, 2012).

The official reasoning given for the revocation of the grants by IDRC president David Malone was that the IDRC’s “mandate is to fund research in developing nations and that Israel, as a high-income country, is not considered a developing state” (Martin, 2010). However, he acknowledged that the Mada grants were “first brought to [his] attention as the result of an inquiry by NGO Monitor, an Israeli advocacy group,” in late January. Shortly afterward, IDRC management received a communication from the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lawrence Cannon, also inquiring about Mada. However, Malone insisted that “[i]t was a management decision . . . strictly internal” (Martin, 2012). Following an initial IDRC investigation, Malone wrote to Cannon that he planned to continue Mada’s grants, as noted in a letter by Palestinian NGOs inside Israel to the Canadian ambassador to Israel: “From Mr. Malone’s cross examination under oath, we know that your office did conduct its own inquiry about Mada al-Carmel and that you reported back that Mada is a credible research center serving the Palestinian community in Israel” (Johal, 2010). But one month later, Malone changed his mind about the IDRC’s own investigation, and just two weeks before the grants were cut he met with the Israeli ambassador at the Israeli embassy in Ottawa.

When asked by Mada’s lawyer if that meeting had anything to do with his decision to end the grants to Mada, Mr. Malone was prevented from answering by a lawyer for the Attorney General of Canada, who warned he must not reveal the contents of any such embassy meeting as they relate to Canada’s national security and
international relations (Martin, 2012). The idea that such a decision was “strictly internal” was highly suspect since, by Malone’s own admission, the grants came to the IDRC’s attention through NGO Monitor. Abruptly, in September of 2010, as the court case was ongoing, both organizations announced that they had “reached a mutually agreed settlement of all legal disputes” and Mada dropped the legal case (Mada al-Carmel, 2010).

As both the cases of Rights and Democracy and the IDRC illustrate, even supposed arm’s-length non-partisan organizations have to be disciplined and brought in line with the Canadian state’s support for Israeli policies. Interference through board appointments and pressure on staff can lead to defunding and ending relations, not on the basis of any relevant criteria, but because of this sort of one-sided inference. Thus, disciplining mechanisms cut across the board, from community organizations to development NGO’s and all the way to federally supported institutions. Discipline is exercised though direct funding cuts from CIC or CIDA, or by assuring board appointments that will put pressure on funding institutions. In all these cases, “imbalance” and criticism of Israel was cited as a reason for cutting funding. Meanwhile, it is the Canadian government that is imbalanced in its support and one-sided orientation towards Israel.

**Conclusion**

The cases of funding cuts to the Canadian Arab Federation, Palestine House, KAIROS, and Alternatives, as well as the interference in the grants given by Rights and Democracy and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), reveal a clear
pattern of targeting and disciplining organizations that do not agree with the uncritical support for Israel adopted by Prime Minister Martin’s Liberal government, and advancing more vigorously under Harper’s Conservative government. This chapter has sought to contextualize funding cuts within the broader process of subordination of official Canadian multiculturalism to the goal of advancing a more exclusionary Canadian identity based on “core values”—values that demarcate a “civilizational” border that leaves Arabs, Muslims, and by extension Palestine solidarity, outside. Further, the analysis is rooted in an understanding of the changing relationship between state funding and ethnocultural organizations in a neoliberal paradigm, whereby ethnocultural organizations become more dependent on the state for their survival and transform into “service providers,” thus becoming more vulnerable and susceptible to the exercise of discipline by the state. Importantly, this chapter has highlighted the use of development aid as a tool for silencing NGOs, arguing that the state retains the power to silence dissent through funding, even as the term “independent” continues to be associated with the NGO sector.

Clearly, the War on Terror “jettisoned those of Arab and Muslim background from their place in Western nations and ‘Western civilization’ and made precarious the national belonging and political citizenship of many other Canadians of color” (Arat-Koc, 2005, p. 36). Arabs and Muslims have come to understand that the state operates by dividing their communities into fundamentalists and moderates, and that the main role of a citizen in such a circumstance is to prove at all times that s/he belongs to the latter. Mahmood Mamdani’s (2004) work, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, convincingly explains
how, under the guise of the War on Terror, every Muslim is a perceived as a threat and must act to clear his/her name to fit the “good Muslim” category. As Thobani notes, however, “unfortunately for the good Muslims, no matter how deep their gratitude to the nation, no matter how ardent their embrace of western civilizational norms, the new anti-terrorism measures continue to make them as equally suspect as the bad Muslims” (2007, p. 238). Both the Canadian Arab Federation and Palestine House were doomed to fit the category of “bad Muslim” despite all attempts to escape from this label. Unfortunately, this category does not apply only to Muslims; it applies to any individual/group that is perceived to take up a position critical of the imagined camp belonging to “Western civilizational values.”

The securitization of state/community relations increases levels of state censorship against groups that oppose unconditional support for Israel. This censorship relies, as discussed in Chapter One, on discourses and mechanisms of silencing that encompass labeling Palestine solidarity organizing as anti-Semitic (with a broad enough definition of anti-Semitism to encompass criticism of Israel), and the racialization of Arabs and Muslims as civilizationally inferior and extreme. The neoliberal ploy of subjecting the funding of organizations to “market” incentives further increases the vulnerability of organizations such as community groups and NGOs and paradoxically strengthens the state’s power to discipline them. In an atmosphere of decreasing funding, with the language of “homegrown terrorism and domestic threats,” commonplace, self-imposed censorship becomes a key method of survival within the multicultural mosaic. However, such censorship rarely stops at the boundaries of single communities, but
gradually begins to affect any organization that would speak for Palestinian human rights or contradict the government on foreign or domestic policies. Eventually, dynamics of racialization and inferiorization spill out to encompass all dissent against state policies.

Both CAF and Palestine House continue to operate without government funding; they have had to relearn skills of community fundraising to sustain themselves. If anything, they can now be even more outspoken about policies in the Middle East because the threat of funding loss has been acted upon. The court case for CAF is still pending, with state lawyers delaying proceedings at every opportunity. As for NGOs, there has been a serious chill placed over any activities related to Palestine, but this must also give them pause—to consider their level of “independence” when there is such heavy reliance on state funding.
Chapter 5. Queers Against Israeli Apartheid: Organizing Against the Silencing Campaign

"The narrative of Palestine in the cultural arena carved by Zionism is first and foremost a story of erasure, denial, and active silencing by historians and intellectuals”
(Bresheeth, 2007, p. 179).

“Canada and Israel bolster each other’s colonial occupations through political, military and economic support. To us, the links are clear. As queers our role in the struggle is obvious” (QuAIA, 2009).

As the Palestine Solidarity Movement (PSM) gained momentum, especially after Israel’s assault on Gaza in 2008, the silencing campaign against a variety of Palestine advocacy organizations intensified. There was a turning point after the war on Gaza, when pro-Palestinian advocacy was clearly moving beyond campus activism, reaching into the trade union movement, and making connections with other human rights organizations. It was in this context that Queers Against Israeli Apartheid (QuAIA) was formed and began to face severe attempts at silencing and censorship.

Discussions about forming Queers Against Israeli Apartheid followed a public forum at Toronto’s Israeli Apartheid Week in 2008. At that particular IAW event, queer human rights activists spoke from the audience about the ways in which Israel uses LGBTQ rights to portray itself as a tolerant and multicultural state. This attempt to appropriate the language of LGBTQ rights to market Israel in a positive light
internationally was dubbed “pinkwashing” by advocates of Palestinian human rights. In a November 22, 2011 article in the New York Times titled “Israel and ‘Pinkwashing,’” Sarah Schulman defined it as a “deliberate strategy to conceal the continuing violations of Palestinians’ human rights behind an image of modernity signified by Israeli gay life.” The naming of this strategy as pinkwashing facilitated the coalescence of a new pro-Palestinian organizing focus in response to Israel’s attempt to appropriate LGBTQ liberation in defense of its policies versus Palestinians.

In the “Who We Are” section of their website, Queers Against Israeli Apartheid activists explained that:

Today, in response to increasing criticism of its occupation of Palestine, Israel is cultivating an image of itself as an oasis of gay tolerance in the Middle East. As queers, we recognize that homophobia exists in Israel, Palestine, and across all borders. But queer Palestinians face the additional challenge of living under occupation, subject to Israeli state violence and control. Israel’s apartheid system extends gay rights only to some, based on race. (QuAIA, n.d.)

Initially, QuAIA’s main focus was to open discussions and offer education about apartheid in Israel and the role of pinkwashing, as well as to support Palestinian queer groups. QuAIA also adopted the Palestinian call for BDS, and thus began to actively campaign on the basis of an analysis of Israel as an apartheid state and to advocate BDS as a tactic. One method used towards achieving this goal was to march with anti-apartheid slogans during the annual Pride Week activities in Toronto. According to the official website, Pride Week “exists to celebrate the history, courage, diversity, and future
of Toronto’s LGBTTIQQ2SA (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual, Transgender, Intersex, Queer, Questioning, 2-Spirited, and Allies)” (Pride Toronto, 2011). The Pride festival is run by Pride Toronto (PT) a not-for-profit organization that hosts and organizes the week.

Backlash against these new forms of advocacy emerged swiftly in the form of a campaign to silence QuAIA. The silencing campaign mainly focused on censoring QuAIA’s messaging and banning the group from marching in the main Pride parade. This chapter will take an in-depth look at the attempts to censor the group, by following the actions and discourses of pro-Israel lobbyists, the responses of the Pride Toronto executive committee, and the involvement of City of Toronto staff and elected officials. It begins by contextualizing the attack on QuAIA within the broader politics of the tolerant/intolerant binary within official multiculturalism, a binary used to mark “others” as inferior. Overall, the chapter frames these moments of silencing and erasure not merely as the work of over-zealous lobbyists and city officials who pushed for defunding Pride, but rather as the structuring and perpetuating of a racial imperial project aided by discourses of official multicultural policies that help to marginalize through the very

32. Terminologies of sexual orientation and gender non-conformity are contested, and various competing and sometimes hotly debated acronyms are in usage, including LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender), and LGBTQ (which adds Queer, or in some versions Questioning). Groups arguing for the named inclusion of more specific identities have put forward longer acronyms, such as Pride Toronto’s LGBTTIQQ2SA (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual, Transgender, Intersex, Queer, Questioning, 2-Spirited, and Allies). In this work, the terms Queer and LGBTQ will be used throughout, except in quotes or references to specific usage. For definitions and examples of some of the pitfalls of acronyms, see Morya Lang’s article, Library Rhetoric: the Canadian Library Association Statement of Diversity and Inclusion and LGBTQ Advocacy, *Progressive Librarian: A Journal for Critical Studies & Progressive Politics in Librarianship*, 32 Winter/Spring 2009, 36–54, at http://www.progressivelibrariansguild.org/PL_Inl/pdf/PL32_winterspring2009.pdf#page=38
language of inclusivity.

The resistance to the silencing campaign is also a central focus of this discussion as it is a significant part of QuAIA’s narrative. When state officials and Zionist lobbyists tried to ban QuAIA from Pride Toronto (or, as some put it, ban the term Israeli apartheid), they faced what proved to be the strongest and most organized opposition yet to an attempt at censorship in the context of the Palestine Solidarity Movement. In the case of QuAIA, the silencing campaign was not contending with frightened Arab community groups dependent on funding or young student activists, it was dealing with long-term activists in a movement that had faced its own silencing battles and won them in the past.

While the methods and discourses of silencing discussed so far in this dissertation were also employed against QuAIA, there is an important specificity to this case that must be examined because it brings questions of the racialization and corporatization of queer identity to the forefront. The arguments used to oust QuAIA from Pride Toronto are extremely helpful in understanding the various ways racialization and exclusion occurs in an official multicultural setting. Increasingly, LGBTQ identities are being integrated into a cultural mainstream based on a white multiculturalism that does not challenge the status quo, but looks to manage it within the confines of existing power relations.

As Eva Mackey explained, “the recurring paradox of multiculturalism and core culture in Canada is that the proliferation and plurality of other cultures should add up to the bounded and indefinable core culture of the nation” (2002, p. 151). In tackling the
issue of Israeli apartheid and standing against it, Queers Against Israeli Apartheid stepped outside the bounds of this core culture, which accepts LGBTQ liberal rights so long as they are separated out from a wider oppositional politics that focuses on the role of the Canadian state within conflicts and wars internationally. Those trying to silence QuAIA relied on using the official multicultural language of “keeping space inclusive and safe” in order to mark QuAIA as being outside of that space of inclusivity. Thus, the treatment of QuAIA is consistent with Puar’s observation that “the terrorist figure is not merely racialized and sexualized; the body must appear improperly racialized (outside the norms of multiculturalism) and perversely sexualized in order to materialize as the terrorist in the first place” (2007, p. 38). Language that is meant to build towards “tolerance” is as easily used to foster intolerance of specific narratives. One cannot abstract notions of inclusivity and tolerance from social relationships of power and the material conditions which produce them. Official multicultural policies, as the case study of QuAIA reveals, may be deployed to set not only the parameters for what is acceptable diversity and tolerance, but also our understanding of identity in general, as well as queer identity in particular and its relationship to power.

A Note on Pinkwashing, Silencing, and Erasure

The state of Israel relies on the silencing and erasure of Palestinian history to perpetuate the status quo in its conflict with the Palestinian people. It also relies heavily on transmitting an image of itself as a multicultural liberal democracy attuned to and working in sync with the “values of Western culture.” As a key imperial proxy in the Middle East, Israel asserts and is accorded with civilizational superiority—already in the
vision of the founder of political Zionism it stood as a “rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism” (Herzl, 1896, p. 29). One of the strategies the state uses to mark its belonging to “Western civilization” is the marketing of the “tolerant” aspects of Israeli society, and specifically for the case being examined here, its tolerance of LGBTQ rights. Benjamin Netanyanhu summed up this racialized construction of the Middle East succinctly in a speech in May 2011 to U.S. Congress, stating that “in a region where women are stoned, gays are hanged, Christians are persecuted, Israel stands out. It is different” (Netanyahu, 2011).

However, as Cnaan Liphshiz bluntly explained in a 2009 Haaretz article, “Tel Aviv’s burgeoning gay scene may be the single most effective Israel-advocacy instrument in the Zionist toolbox, according to participants of a new program which uses Israel’s vibrant gay culture to improve the country’s image abroad.” It is no coincidence that the Israeli state adopted a campaign of branding itself as a gay haven within a region of intolerance. Focusing solely on the celebration of LGBTQ identity while all other Israeli state actions are ignored, the branding campaign expands significant sums and much effort on portraying Israel as a modern, multicultural, and tolerant state that stands out in a region plagued by widespread homophobia, thus reinforcing “the ‘cultural difference’ of Palestinian homophobia rather than recogniz[ing] the constraining, suffocating spatial and economic effects of Israeli occupation” (Puar, 2012).

The silencing of queer voices in support of Palestinian human rights on the streets of Toronto is an extension of the racialization of Palestinians as inferior and the wholesale erasure of the Palestinian narrative. It requires turning a blind eye to the acts of
the Israeli state and setting limits on what queer liberation can mean, specifically excluding from it any affinity with broader struggles for social and economic justice. In a dual movement, then, this silencing involves the racialization of Palestinians as inferior and the demarcation of queer space as a white multicultural space that celebrates one identity while ignoring other forms of oppression. Therefore, by their mere presence and registration to march in the Pride Parade in Toronto, Queers Against Israeli Apartheid not only challenged Israel’s pinkwashing agenda, but also reclaimed the Pride Parade as a political space from this white multiculturalism and the forces that sought to impose it.

For pinkwashing to be effective, the Palestinian narrative must be silenced and erased wherever it emerges, even if it is on the streets of Toronto. This is because any rupture in the pristine image of Israel as a queer-friendly liberal democracy is a rupture in the imperial narrative as a whole, a narrative in which the imperial adoption of the language of LGBTQ rights is seen as progressive and positive—so long as it comes at no expense to its foreign policy interests.

Therefore, pinkwashing, silencing, and erasure must take place at the scale of the whole empire, and not just within Israel. As Puar explained, “pinkwashing only makes sense through an erasure of the spatial logics of occupational control as an intricate, even intimate system of apartheid emerges” (2012). Therefore, at the heart of the silencing campaigns are multiple forms of erasure and racialization that have the effect of silencing the Palestinian narrative in general, erasing Palestinian queers from any narrative, and importantly also from accounts of homophobia in Israel. To maintain an image of Israel as a haven of tolerance in a sea of intolerance, the sanitizing of queer space
internationally from any oppositional discourse becomes a necessity.

Canada's Official Multicultural Policies and Homonationalist Inclusiveness

As noted by Thobani, official multicultural policy allows the state to “live with the difference of others, while claiming this difference to enhance its own cultural superiority” (2007, p. 145). This cultural superiority is articulated through a language of tolerance and inclusivity that works on two axes: first, by solidifying a specific kind of acceptance onto a liberal white multiculturalism that maintains racial, class, and sexual hierarchies; and second, by casting out Others, framing them as intolerant and outside the bounds of multicultural inclusiveness. In the context of queer politics specifically, the state expresses its tolerance of LGBTQ liberal rights to enhance its own image locally and globally in opposition to an intolerant “Other.”

At the same time, this tolerance and promotion of queer rights marks the acceptance of LGBTQ subjects into a core culture, so long as there is no direct challenge to the state’s neoliberal project and/or external imperial project. In short, LGBTQ liberal civil rights are brought into the space of tolerance in a managed way that supports and enhances a core culture. In the same way that, within official multicultural discourses, race is “reconfigured as culture and cultural identity became crystallized as political identity, with the core of the nation continuing to be defined as bilingual and bicultural (that is, white)” (Thobani, 2007, p. 145), sexual politics is reconfigured in communal terms and integrated into an acceptable and accepting core culture.

Within the framework of the War on Terror, a binary between a multicultural, superior West and the Rest articulates an imperial politics of core, and periphery, and
maps, onto the Middle East region by casting Arabs and Muslims specifically as intolerant and barbaric. This can be seen as an additional moment in a continuum of imperial racism that deploys human rights language and minority rights to present its superiority, erase its own colonial history in relation to other regions, and significantly, justify intervening to "save those in need." It is important to note that this racialized discourse is expressed in many ways, some of which are embedded in the language of civilization, human rights, and tolerance, but all serve to support patterns of domination, exclusion, and marginalization (Henry, Totor, Mattis, & Rees, 2000).

The growing degree of acceptance that is afforded in the West today to sexualities traditionally marked as deviant must be understood in the context of this imperial mechanism. Puar noted that: "The politics of recognition and incorporation entail that certain – but certainly not most – homosexual, gay and queer bodies may be the temporary recipients of the 'measures of benevolence' that are afforded by liberal discourses of multicultural tolerance and diversity" (2007, p. xii). Therefore, a core culture, in this case a Canadian core culture, can be constructed as accepting of LGBTQ liberal rights—and be given credit for its tolerance—while this same tolerance is used to both manage queer communities within specific state-set hierarchies and mark the intolerance of "Others," legitimizing the state's imposition of its domination on them—including through wars—on the ground of its perceived superiority. Thus, LGBTQ liberal rights are themselves reconfigured to support a dominant nationalism. The concept of homonationalism explains this contradiction of incorporating queerness into white multiculturalism and liberal rights in a way that subordinates and excludes many others.
Importantly, this binary creation of a tolerant state in opposition to an intolerant other is not only organized to inferiorize the Other outside the borders of the state, but also to solidify internal identities that can be depoliticized and managed in a context of “diversity management.” It is not only that Arabs/Muslims must be constructed as homophobic and intolerant, queer identity must also be managed to fit inside an apolitical, celebratory notion of diversity that looks at queer rights in liberal terms that are fragmented from a broader emancipatory politics. In other words, homonormativity is, as explained by Duggan: “A politics that does not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions, but upholds and sustains them, while promising the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption” (2003, p. 179).

Thus, spaces for the celebration of queer identity are supported and encouraged so long as those involved remain within a prescribed role that disconnects oppressions and fragments social/political fight back. When it came to Queers Against Israeli Apartheid marching in Pride Toronto, their presence was acting against various layers of silencing: the silencing of the Palestinian narrative, the racialization of Palestinians, and the silencing of an oppositional politics within Pride events.

**Commodified Queer Identity**

In addition to the fragmentation of identities, there is also a corporatization or commodification of those identities within a neoliberal framework that thrives on “selling-diversity” (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002). As Duggan noted, “neoliberalism in fact has a sexual politics” (2002, p. 177). Scholars of neoliberalism, such as Harvey, have
explained that neoliberalism “proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey, 2005, p. 2). Official multicultural policies set within a neoliberal framework “as a basis for national identity mobilises the idea that the ‘multi-cultures’ are made up of identifiable and commodifiable fragments of culture, a defined range of traditional practices, cultural possessions or lifestyle choices” (Mackey, 2002, p. 151).

A cursory look at the Pride Toronto website is enough to show the extent to which neoliberal consumption has become integrated and central to the functioning of this festival meant to celebrate “history, courage, and diversity.” Pride Toronto boasts of having been named “Best Festival in Canada” by the Canadian Special Events Industry in 2004, 2005, and 2009, and having been recognized as one of only eight Signature Events in the City of Toronto (Pride Toronto, 2010). Seen from a different angle, the financial annual report for 2010 reveals that sponsorships for the festival amounted to $1,469,027, which made up 42% of the total festival revenue for that year (Pride Toronto, 2010, p. 4).

It is no coincidence that in making her case for the banning of the term Israel apartheid, Tracey Sandilands, executive director of Pride Toronto at the time, explained in an email reproduced in Xtra! newspaper that “both current and potential sponsors have made it clear that their reasons for supporting Pride is to support LGBT issues and the queer community, rather than an event that could become an ‘omnibus of unrelated political issues’” (2010). In responding to this type of reasoning for censorship, Tim McCaskell, speaking for QuAIA, said that “Pride Toronto has become more of a creature
belonging to a city that wants to sell tourism and corporations that want to sell to gay people. They’ve lost any connection to the community or diversity” (2010).

The multicultural discourse divides society into ontologically and politically disconnected cultures and communities such that they can be then reconnected through the market and the state as a set of segmented bodies/communities that celebrate specific aspects of identity (in the most corporatized and commodified fashion possible). In protesting the banning of the term Israeli apartheid from Pride Toronto in 2010, the founding members of Pride insisted in a statement published on the QuAIA website:

Solidarity with all struggles against oppression has been a crucial part of the history of Pride. To break this solidarity as the Pride Committee has now done not only refuses to recognize how queer people always live our lives in relation to race, class, gender, ability and other forms of oppression but also breaks our connections with the struggles of important allies who have assisted us in making the important gains that we have won. (Arnup et al., 2010)

This segmentation and corporatization of identity, along with the celebration of some voices and the silencing of others, reveals the failure of official multicultural policies to meet oppositional politics and demands of recognition by marginalized groups within an integrated discourse of equality and anti-racism. As Bannerji observed, through the concept of multiculturalism:

The concept of race lost its hard edges of criticality, class disappeared entirely, and colour gave a feeling of brightness, brilliance or vividness, of a celebration of difference which was disconnected from social relations of power, but instead
perceived as diversity, as existing socio-cultural ontologies or facts. (2000, p. 32) Thus, celebration can occur, as long as it’s a celebration in the form of corporate events that can be linked to tourism and emptied of a politics that challenges Canada’s foreign policy. The Palestinian narrative specifically is racialized as being outside of the issues acceptable within Pride—it is outside the core culture. This form of diversity management relies on a complicit homonationalist construction of diversity that prescribes limits to what queer political subjects can care about and say. In official multicultural logic, queer subjects are meant to speak only of LGBTQ liberal rights not human rights in general, and if they venture into human rights more broadly it has to be about those rights that reside within the realm of acceptable imperial politics. Identities are re-constructed in isolation and are to a large extent ghettoized, their internal and constitutive relations of power and connections denied, and their potential for solidarity and joint struggle undermined.

In August 2009, in a statement titled “Call to queers in Ottawa, Gatineau: March to Show there is ‘No Pride in Apartheid,’” QuAIA activists rejected such notions of an apolitical corporate Pride, explaining that:

We reject the corporatization and depoliticization of queer identity that is being “celebrated” today. Instead, we celebrate the long history of queers being at the forefront of social justice movements (from the Civil Rights movement in the U.S. to the Anti-Apartheid movement in South Africa).

Pride A-Political?

One aspect of sanitizing queer space involves the acceptance of a commodified
queer identity immersed in the language of celebrating diversity. This commodification entails a limited politics of liberal civil rights. In this context, it makes sense to claim, as some did in their campaign to push QuAIA out of Pride Toronto, that this “celebration” is meant to be apolitical. For example, Bernie Farber, CEO of the Canadian Jewish Congress, was quoted by Ian Roberston, in a *Toronto Sun* article dated 12 June 2009, as saying:

> This parade ought not to be politicized . . . we’re disappointed . . . It’s a pretty sad story that the Pride Parade, a highlight of the summer which invites people to come out and show pride in their identity, includes heavy-duty, very intense political debate.

Along the same lines, in a *Toronto Star* article, Martin Gladstone, a leading character in the silencing campaign against QuAIA, argued, after Pride Toronto reversed its ban on the term Israeli apartheid: “we don’t want Pride to turn into a battleground of regional conflicts all over the world. It’s on a slippery slope from being a parade about gay celebration to becoming a parade about non-gay issues” (2010).

A statement was issued by the Pride Toronto executive on May 27, 2009 to make their position on Pride and politics clearer. The statement explained:

> Pride Toronto wishes to state publicly that it is a nonpartisan organization created to serve the LGBTTIQQ2S* community of Toronto in all its cultural, religious, ethnic and sexual diversity. The organization does not have any affiliations whatsoever to political entities or causes. It exists for the purpose of delivering the annual Pride festival, which is an informational, educational and cultural festival.
However, at the same time, and contradicting the Pride Toronto statement, Pride Toronto executive director Tracey Sandilands explained that:

No one will be banned because of their messaging unless they contravene the hate crimes laws or antidiscrimination policies. But if they simply have a political position, whether it’s prevent global warming, save the whales or down with Israeli apartheid, that is not our decision to make [to stop them from participating] [sic]. Pride has always been a political platform. (Kuhr & Garro, 2009)

At this stage, the crisis in the identity of Pride Toronto itself was emerging. On one hand, Pride organizers were pressured to declare that the organization exists only for the “delivery of the annual festival.” But on the other hand, participating groups were insisting that the festival ought to remain true to its origins in the LGBTQ struggle and remain a political event.

Although some organizations tried to say that Pride should not be political, it was in fact the specific politics of Palestinian human rights that they were concerned with. The same was true of the oft-repeated accusation that the presence of QuAIA made some feel uncomfortable and did not allow for an inclusive environment. In this way, keeping spaces safe, apolitical, and inclusive became code for cleansing those spaces of unwanted politics that disrupted the power structure and challenged the funders and pro-Israel lobbyists. What was at stake was a question of what politics rather than politics per se—and significantly, it was a matter of allowing those in positions of power, and in a context of common sense racism against Arabs and Muslims, to decide which politics were
inappropriate, which were properly “inclusive,” and what could be tolerated within tolerant multicultural spaces.

The argument that this was “outside politics” coming in to hijack Pride Toronto had no basis, and only antagonized people into defending freedom of expression. It is critical to note, because it is easily forgotten, that the history of Pride itself is a very political history. Pride evolved out of the mass protests that followed the 1981 Toronto bathhouse raids. In February 1981, the Metropolitan Toronto Police launched raids against four gay bathhouses in Toronto, and more than three hundred men were arrested. In their statement protesting the banning of QuAIA, the founders of Pride made a direct reference to this history, noting:

We remind people of the political roots of Pride in the Stonewall rebellion against police repression in 1969 and that the Pride march in 1981 in Toronto grew out of our community resistance to the massive bath raids of that year. On the Pride march in 1981 about a thousand of us stopped in protest in front of 52 Division Police Station (which played a major part in the raids) and our resistance to the bath raids was rooted in solidarity with other communities (including the Black and South Asian communities) also facing police repression. Two of the initiating groups for Pride in 1981 — Gay Liberation Against the Right Everywhere (GLARE) and Lesbians Against the Right (LAR) — organized Pride as part of more general organizing against the moral conservative right-wing. This included not only its anti-queer but also its anti-feminist, racist and anti-working class agendas. (Arnup et al., 2010)
In a context of official multiculturalism, this political history of Pride can easily be subsumed in a language that defines diversity and tolerance in terms of celebration, not struggles for equality. What is to be celebrated or silenced is carefully prescribed and managed. In one instance, Pride is being stripped of its political past and history of struggle on many international solidarity questions (such as apartheid South Africa). Meanwhile, tolerance in this context excludes political speech around Palestine and also excludes queer Palestinians, as well as anyone willing to speak out for Palestinian human rights. The next section traces the silencing campaign and its discourses chronologically.

The Beginnings of a Silencing Campaign

One of the early public manifestations of a queer movement against Israeli apartheid in Toronto occurred in the Dyke March on June 28, 2008, in which there was at least one banner protesting Israeli apartheid. A video of the Pride Parade that took place on the following day shows a very visible contingent of more than twenty people marching with the Canadian Union of Public Employees Ontario float under banners that read “Queers Against Apartheid” and “End Israeli Apartheid.” The Ontario division of the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) had just passed a BDS motion at its convention, and, as was its custom, invited allies to march with the CUPE float during Pride with banners highlighting the recently developed policy.

Official Zionist reaction to the first appearance of QuAIA was communicated in the Jewish Tribune in an article titled “Remove Hate Messaging from Pride Parade.” The article quoted Frank Dimant, Executive Vice President of B’nai Brith Canada, arguing that the anti-apartheid “signage” was intended to “de-legitimize the Jewish state” and that
it "promotes hatred against its supporters at home and abroad" (2008, p. 1). Dimant strongly urged Pride organizers to pressure CUPE to take down their website photos that allegedly misrepresented the “spirit” of Pride by showing a banner containing “the propaganda slogan [sic] of Israel Apartheid.” In the same article, Martin Goldstone was also quoted to the effect that QuAIA “singles out and marginalizes the Jewish community on a political issue, demonizing the Jewish state with taxpayers’ money.”

This first Zionist reaction already contained the main arguments that would continuously be used against QuAIA in the coming years, by: 1. conflating Israel with the Jewish community, so that criticism of Israel is equated to promoting anti-Semitism; 2. claiming that taxpayers’ money is being used to fund a forum which is supposed to promote diversity, not political messaging; and 3. arguing that the term Israeli apartheid delegitimizes Israel.

The silencing campaign against QuAIA intensified the following year. In 2009, QuAIA began to think strategically about reaching out to other LGBTQ organizations, beyond those already active in the Palestine Solidarity Movement. It held two forums, one at the University of Toronto, the other at Buddies in Bad Times Theatre. The second forum was titled “Exploring Queer Resistance to Apartheid from South Africa to Palestine.” The promotion for the event drew strong parallels between queer involvement in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa and QuAIA’s involvement in the movement against Israeli apartheid. The announcement for the event read:

1986: Queer people in Toronto united in the Simon Nkoli Anti-Apartheid Committee (SNAAC) to fight for justice in South Africa.
2009: Another struggle against apartheid is building throughout the world. Queer people are joining the international call to name Israel’s occupation of Palestine apartheid.

Israel has now begun to frame itself as a tolerant, queer-positive democracy. This can never be reality under Occupation. Join Queers Against Israeli Apartheid on May 23 for an evening to reignite Toronto’s queer community in the fight against apartheid.

One of the speakers in this forum was El-Farouk Khaki, well-known lawyer and queer activist, and founder of Salaam Canada: Queer Muslim Community. Khaki also happened to be the grand marshal for the 2009 Pride Parade (which at the time was an honorary nomination made by an open vote). There was a concerted attack against Khaki for speaking at this forum even before the event took place. As one example, B’nai Brith issued a press release on May 20, 2009, titled “B’nai Brith Canada urges LGBT community not to allow their agenda to be hijacked by anti-Israel agitators.”

Along with the public denunciations of the speakers at the forum, pressure was being brought to bear against Pride Toronto, as reported in an article in B’nai Brith’s Jewish Tribune of May 28, 2009, titled “Pride Parade Microcosm of Anti-Semitism Happening Globally” (Beck, 2009) The article focussed on the de-funding of the parade. This is a clear illustration of how the silencing campaign relied on using both defamation through the accusation of anti-Semitism and threats to funding as key pillars to silence and erase oppositional voices. In the same article, Gladstone was quoted as stating that “the City of Toronto as well as TD Canada Trust, the main corporate sponsor, contacted
the Pride committee, urging them not to tolerate anti-Israel activity during the festivities [sic]" (Beck, 2009).

QuAIA continued to plan for its contingent in Pride Toronto despite the attack on its public event. However, on May 28 of 2009, a National Post article incorrectly reported that Queers Against Israeli Apartheid had been “banned” from Toronto’s annual Pride parade. It read: “Queers Against Israeli Apartheid (QuAIA), an anti-Zionist protest group that made corporate sponsors squirm by flying banners at last year’s Toronto Pride parade, has been banned this year, along with any other group that would advance a political agenda” (National Post, 2009).

In response, Pride Toronto issued a public statement stating that there was no such banning; however, at the same time, the PT executive began to implement various bureaucratic tactics to manage the week. They argued that the trouble with QuAIA marching in 2008 was the lack of registration, and that for the 2009 parade they would have to apply and register if they wished to march. Tracey Sandilands, then Pride executive director, explained: “This is an issue that we are taking very seriously. We have retained legal counsel to investigate and advise us of our rights and responsibilities in the matter and a decision will be taken by our board on May 26 in the evening” (Jewish Tribune, 2009). Even though there was no direct banning of the group, it was clear the pressure against QuAIA was mounting to the point that Pride Toronto had to get legal counsel. To this end, the PT executive introduced new registration rules.

At this time, countering the narrative that some people had just “slipped in” the previous year, Stephen Seaborn, vice president of political action for CUPE Toronto
District Council, explained that the initial QuAIA contingent in 2008 was invited by CUPE Ontario to march with them as it was customary for CUPE to “invite community allies and partners to join us on that day” (Kuhr & Garro, 2009).

Although it was becoming clear that Pride Toronto was being pressured to introduce new rules to regulate the physical space of the Pride Parade, QuAIA chose not to challenge the new registration process. Spokesperson for QuAIA at the time, Corvin Russell, stated: “We decided to register to avoid any ambiguity and get clarity on Pride’s position, and to avoid putting other groups in an awkward position” (Kuhr & Garro, 2009). QuAIA went on to assemble a large anti-apartheid contingent in the 2009 Pride Week—about 180 women and trans people in the Dyke March, and over 200 people in the main Pride Parade on Sunday.

The attempts to silence QuAIA actually managed to garner the group more support. In the lead-up to Pride, QuAIA produced a video and held a workshop titled “Queering Apartheid” intended for people unfamiliar with the politics of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The silencing campaign thus gave QuAIA an opportunity to provide further education. QuAIA used the time before Pride very well, continuing to hold forums and reaching out to various groups. When it came time for QuAIA to march in Pride, the contingent was very strong and vibrant. There were a number of verbal attacks on the QuAIA contingent by supporters of Israel in the main Pride Parade, but otherwise the participation of QuAIA went without incident (Brett, 2009).

The pressure in the lead-up to the 2009 Pride Parade saw Pride Toronto responding to Zionist and corporate pressure, by making the relatively minor concession
of introducing compulsory registration of participants, but not attempting to control the messaging of participants. These concessions did not go far enough, however, for the opponents of QuAIA's participation and the silencing campaign only increased in intensity in 2010.

**Keeping pride under control.**

It was increasingly obvious that the pressure on Pride Toronto was becoming more organized and daring. Changes began to seep into Pride Toronto organizing that were intended to control the messaging of all groups, as well as transfer the power away from participating groups and move it to the Pride executive. For example, one of the early changes introduced in 2010 was a shift in the selection process for grand marshals, honoured dykes, and honoured groups. The selection process was changed to include votes by "a jury of peers, instead of a public voting process." It was also explained in the press release making the announcement that "the nominations will be screened by the Pride Toronto Board and a shortlist will then be sent to a jury of former Pride Award Winners who will make decisions in each category" (Pride Toronto, 2010). This appeared to be a direct response to the selection of Khaki as grand marshal in the previous year.

Another change was introduced on March 10, 2010, when Pride Toronto unveiled revised terms and conditions for groups applying to participate in the 2010 Parade and Dyke March in a press release titled "Pride Toronto focuses on celebrating 30 years in Parade." The new terms and conditions required that "participating groups must agree to avoid any messages that promote violence or hatred and to have their messages and signage approved by the Ethics Committee of Pride Toronto in advance of the event"
(Pride Toronto, 2010). The press release went on to explain that this vetting/censorship policy, in the words of Pride co-chair Jim Cullen, meant that: “We are promoting freedom of expression and diversity in a way that is positive and supportive of our community. We hope to include everybody who wants to participate.”

These new rules amounted to a vetting of every message by every group participating in the Parade. As a response, the “Don’t Sanitize Pride: Free Expression Must Prevail” Facebook group was launched and more than 1,500 people joined it over the next two weeks. After a concerted organizing campaign, Pride Toronto dropped its policy on sign vetting in advance of the Parade in an announcement on March 23, stating, “The Board of Directors of Pride Toronto has listened to feedback from the community, and the proposed plan for an Ethics Committee to review and approve all messaging prior to the Parade, Dyke and Trans March has been withdrawn” (Pride Toronto, 2010).

Significantly, it was revealed in documents obtained through Freedom of Information requests made by QuAIA and shared with the Xtra! newspaper that, at the time these new regulations were imposed, even though the Pride Toronto executive and co-chairs insisted that the motivation for the new policies had been merely the desire to improve the event, city staff had been working with the Pride Toronto executive behind the scenes and discussing QuAIA’s participation in Pride. For example, a letter dated April 14, 2010 from the office of Rita Davies, the City’s executive director of culture, summarized a discussion with PT Executive Director Tracey Sandilands and co-chairs Jim Cullen and Genevieve D’Iorio. The letter, addressed to the City Manager and Councillor Kyle Rae, among others, read:
A review will be made as to whether they can ban a group on the basis of being called “Queers Against Israeli Apartheid.” If that is the registered name of the group this would prove difficult. If not, it is “messaging” and can be covered under the need to abide by the City’s anti-discrimination policies. (Martin, 2010)

Another briefing note addressed to councillors, dating back to November 2009, from Executive Director of Cultural Services Rita Davies, shows that plans were in the works long before the sign vetting policy was announced in March of the following year. It noted: “In response to city staff’s continuing concerns, Pride Toronto has confirmed that it is working with a consultant and has been receiving legal advice on how to curtail the anti-Israel marchers in next year’s Pride parade.”

The collaboration between the PT executive and city staff to work out rules and regulations to ensure that QuAIA did not march is very telling of the pressure funding has on organizations such as Pride Toronto, but also of the ease with which silencing and censorship function in official circles without any due process. Without discussion with QuAIA, the group was judged in advance as inappropriate—and this was not done through a human rights tribunal or by adhering to any criminal code.

The summer events of 2010 amounted to an intense stand-off between activists and Pride Toronto, with Pride Toronto attempting to balance between grassroots activists and the pressure from its corporate sponsors, Zionist lobbyists, and city officials.

**Excluding you to be inclusive.**

In the midst of the back and forth around new rules and regulations for participation in Pride, a homemade film by lawyer Martin Gladstone accusing QuAIA of
having “Nazi memorabilia” during Pride 2009 was circulated. This film was sent to media outlets and city officials. In fact, the t-shirt Goldstone pointed to in the video had a well-known Anti-Racist Action symbol which features a crossed-out swastika. Gladstone, who had already been lobbying to oust QuAIA from Pride, began to use the video to lobby city councillors and Pride sponsors to ban QuAIA.

The group Kulanu Toronto (meaning “All of us” in Hebrew), a Jewish LGBTQ group, publicly supported Gladstone’s video, stating, “We support Martin Gladstone’s fight to educate the public about QuAIA’s mandate and encourage people to watch his poignant 2009 Pride documentary entitled “Reclaiming Our Pride” (Kulanu, n.d.). In a press conference after the ban on the term Israeli apartheid had been rescinded, Kulanu’s executive director explained: “Kulanu promotes inclusivity, diversity, acceptance, tolerance. We feel those values have been removed from the Pride parade and we want to bring them back” (Dagostino, 2010). This example illustrates how tolerance and diversity became catch phrases used to silence QuAIA.

As early as November 2009, Martin Gladstone (lawyer) and Avi Benlolo, Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian branch of the Friends of Simon Wiesenthal Center for Holocaust Studies (FSWC), met with city staffers. A briefing note from that meeting to Ward 27 City Councillor Kyle Rae, obtained through Freedom of Information requests, read:

Gladstone stated that Pride has no mandate to engage in anti-Israel advocacy and that by allowing marchers, some of who wore swastikas and carried signs that read “End Israeli Apartheid” and “We Stand with Queers in Palestine,” is contrary
to the City of Toronto Anti-Racism, Access & Equity Policy. (Davies, 2009)

The meeting minutes were obtained by QuAIA through Freedom of Information requests and posted on their website. The list of arguments put forward against QuAIA included the point that grant money is meant to be given for the “celebration of gay culture, not anti-Israel messaging” (City of Toronto, 2009). Interestingly, anti-racism policy was also invoked, claiming that “just because it [the term Israeli apartheid] does not meet the criminal standard of hate law in the Criminal Code of Canada, does not mean it is acceptable by City of Toronto Standards.” This amounts to a recommendation for city officials to ignore laws and due process in deciding on the exclusion of groups like QuAIA from civic spaces.

Calls for censorship were thus framed as neutral claims to protect inclusivity. As the meeting minutes indicate, grant money for Pride Toronto was justified through the need “to help promote a healthy fabric for a multicultural city”; the implication was that QuAIA’s messaging was incompatible with multicultural celebrations. In an Orwellian twist, the principles underlying this multicultural fabric were listed in point form as: anti-discrimination, inclusion, no racism, no divisiveness, everyone should feel welcome. Everyone, that is, unless they are Queers Against Israeli Apartheid. In the same document, the pro-Israel delegation suggested that defunding the Canadian Arab Federation for its “anti-Israel advocacy had set a precedent that should be applied to Pride” (City of Toronto, 2009).

In response to what was clearly becoming an organized campaign to censor QuAIA, many groups wrote in to support freedom of expression. For example,
the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) wrote a letter to Mayor David Miller on April 20, 2010, objecting to the threat to Pride funding:

in activities such as parades, art exhibitions and theatre performances, points of view on controversial subjects may be expressed that may make individuals from specific communities uncomfortable. Freedom of expression is central to such activities, however, and these considerations alone should not preclude public funding.

Importantly, Queer groups from Palestine also wrote in explaining:

We believe that as queers, one of the most disadvantaged and oppressed minorities in human societies, we should protest against all forms of oppression and struggle together. As Palestinian queers, our struggle relates to social injustices caused by the discrimination that is deeply rooted in Israel’s policies and practices against the Palestinian people, straight and gay alike.

(Aswat & alQaws, n.d.)

**Defunding pride: banning the term Israeli apartheid.**

That Israel lobbyists would try to exclude QuAIA is not surprising, but what is instructive is the role city officials took upon themselves in putting pressure on Pride to censor QuAIA. Correspondence obtained through Freedom of Information requests reveals that Toronto City Councillor Kyle Rae had sent a letter dated February 9, 2010 requesting that the board of Pride Toronto “review the parade entrance requirements to ensure that Pride’s mission vision and values are reflected in the (QuAIA) contingent’s participation” (Xtra Staff, 2010). In his letter to Pride Toronto, Rae explained that he had
seen “the film produced by Martin Gladstone, and found the intervention of Queers Against Israeli Apartheid in last year’s Pride parade completely out of keeping with the spirit and values of Pride Toronto.” Furthermore, the Toronto Star reported (Dale, 2010) that Toronto City’s manager of economic development and culture, Mike Williams, explained that the City’s anti-discrimination policy had likely been violated by QuAIA’s conduct and very presence at the previous summer’s parade. However, he added that the City “didn’t do a formal review and weigh all the evidence.”

Specifically on the use of the term Israeli apartheid, Williams could not produce a legal opinion, but followed Rae’s lead in referring to the Ontario Legislature’s symbolic motion: “We sort of have to take a look at it based on what the province did in their motion, where that phrase was pointed out as being an inappropriate phrase” (Dale, 2010). The resolution on Israeli Apartheid Week was therefore used to designate the limits of acceptable speech, even though the passing of that resolution in itself was very problematic. This is a clear illustration of the ways in which the silencing campaigns have been mutually reinforcing: a condemnation of Israeli Apartheid Week in the Ontario legislature was used to silence the use of the term Israeli apartheid in various contexts, even though the term did “not meet the criminal standard of hate law” and even though there was no due process. The silencing campaign was orchestrated initially by some pro-Israel lobbyists, but was then carried out and sanctioned by the state.

**Silencing Motions in City Council Begin**

The campaign to silence QuAIA took a more legislative turn before the 2010 Pride Parade in the form of motions put forward by City of Toronto Councillors to
defund the parade. The City Council had consistently given Pride Toronto substantial funding and in-kind donations of city services such as clean-up and policing. On April 28, 2010, Toronto City Councillor and mayoral candidate Giorgio Mammoliti issued the following ultimatum to QuAIA and Pride Toronto:

I’m giving them 24 hours, I’ll give ‘em till midnight tonight. If they [QuAIA] don’t withdraw from the parade, I’ll be drafting up a motion at the next city council meeting asking to get rid of the funding this year completely and any resources that are associated with it. If we’ve already given any money to the parade, we’ll be asking for it back. (2010a)

Neither QuAIA nor Pride Toronto responded to Mammoliti and he went on to introduce a motion at the May 11, 2010 council meeting, which recommended that:

1. City Council direct the City Clerk to advise the Pride organizers that the City of Toronto’s 2010 funding and support will be revoked if Pride Toronto does not invoke the City of Toronto’s anti-discrimination policies.

2. City Council direct that if the Pride Committee confirms to the General Manager, Economic Development and Culture, that it has received and rejected an application to march from QuAIA prior to June 14, 2010, there be no further consideration of this matter by the Executive Committee. (Toronto City Council, 2010)

Although the motion invoked the city’s anti-discrimination policy, there was nothing at this stage to back a claim that QuAIA actually contravened any such policies. In the background document accompanying this motion, the only evidence put forward to
support the claim that QuAIA was in breach of anti-discrimination policies was a reference to the Gladstone video. The document stated:

A video, Reclaiming Our Pride, recently created by Lawyer Martin Gladstone shows footage from the 2009 parade where QuAIA marchers carried signs condemning Israel with their members chanting the slogan, “Fist by Fist, Blow by Blow, Apartheid State, Has Got to Go.”

Neither was any effort made to argue in what way the aforementioned slogan was discriminatory, nor was there any opportunity given to QuAIA to defend itself. The anti-discrimination policies were thus invoked against QuAIA based solely on the biases of city councillors and fabricated information from pro-Israel lobbyists. The defunding motion also exemplifies how control can be exercised over communities in a multicultural setting through funding. The corporatization of Pride Toronto and its embeddedness in a neoliberal logic of selling diversity for profit and tourism makes it susceptible to the pressure of actual or even merely threatened funding cuts from both the state and private corporations. As Schulman argued in reference to QuAIA and Pride Toronto:

The queer community being dependent on government funding is a recent phenomenon. If we’ve come to the point where governments are telling us that we have to exclude people to get funding, that means the relationship of dependency has become destructive. We have to ask ourselves what is more important, the integrity of our community or the approval of the government. (Dupuis, 2011)

Within discourses of multicultural and neoliberal policies, events like Pride are
transformed into mere festivals disconnected from struggles for equality. Funding is used as a disciplinary mechanism that enforces the exercise of a very particular form of “diversity”—one that supports the status quo of Canadian foreign policy.

**Pressing Ahead with Motions to Defund Pride Toronto**

Mammalotis’s first motion was referred to the next executive committee meeting, which was to be held on June 14. This was part of a strategy by the council to make it appear that Pride Toronto, and not the council, was making the decision to ban QuAIA. An *Xtra!* article reported that City Councillor Rae explained that he “worked with Mammoliti to turn his immediate vote into a deferred one. Instead of us going into a discussion about what Pride will or will not do or may or may not do.” He continued on to say: “I was trying to get Giorgio to understand that it’s more important, I felt, for Pride to have the ability to make a decision themselves” (Dagostino, 2010).

The response from the board of Pride Toronto was to ban the use of the term “Israeli apartheid” from any messaging in the Pride parade that was to take place on July 4th, effectively banning QuAIA from the parade. In a press release issued on May 25th, Pride Toronto stated: “on May 21st 2010 the Board of Directors voted to disallow the use of the term ‘Israeli Apartheid’, or any combination of this notion, in the Pride Festival.” In the same press release, they explained that, “the City of Toronto has expressed the presence of the term ‘Israeli Apartheid’ in the Parade may contravene its anti-discrimination policy” (Pride Toronto, 2010). Note that the City did not accuse Pride Toronto of contravening guidelines, and only stated that they might have done so. As a direct result of Pride Toronto’s capitulation to the City’s demands, the June 14th meeting
of the Executive Committee withdrew the motion threatening to defund Pride Toronto from the agenda.

In this initial press release banning the term “Israeli apartheid,” the executive director of Pride Toronto stated: “We welcome the space for debates and discussions [and] hope that over time, there will be a way for people to use language that can promote education and knowledge over anger and hatred” (Pride Toronto, 2010). With this statement, Pride Toronto was both censoring and silencing specific political language, while at the same time deeming it hateful and once more outside the norms of civility that govern a multicultural society.

Despite statements of support from various organizations for QuAIA, Pride Toronto moved to censor the term “Israeli apartheid” from all Pride events, including the Parade, Dyke March, and Trans March. Interestingly, QuAIA had not even applied yet to march in Pride. The Pride executive explained that no individuals were banned, just the term. The stated position of the Pride Toronto executive was that without banning the term apartheid Pride Toronto would not happen. D’Iorio, Pride co-chair at the time, explained: “corporate sponsors are threatening to pull funding, and banning the phrase ‘Israeli apartheid’ is the best position PT organizers could take” (Dagostino, 2010). As members of the Pride Toronto executive announced their decision in a press conference outside the Pride Toronto offices, over one hundred QuAIA members and supporters gathered to protest the decision in a loud demonstration chanting “Whose pride? Our Pride!”

**Backlash Against Pride Toronto’s Decision**
After Pride Toronto announced its censorship decision, the founders of the 1981 Toronto Lesbian and Gay Pride Day issued an open letter expressing solidarity with QuAIA. The 2010 grand marshal and honoured dyke both refused their appointments, and 21 former grand marshals, honoured dykes, and Pride Toronto award recipients returned their honours in protest. Pride Toronto had not counted on the backlash from its own supporters over such a decision. The Board was subjected to sustained pressure from the community to reverse its decision to ban the use of the term “Israeli apartheid.” As described by QuAIA organizer Tim McCaskell:

The community response was immediate and dramatic. The Pride Coalition for Free Speech (PCFS) was formed. May 21, a crowd of 100 demonstrated outside the morning press conference where Pride announced the banning. A few days later, 2010 Pride Grand Marshal, Alan Li and Honoured Dyke Jane Farrow refused to accept their positions. The co-chairs of the International Lesbian and Gay Association, invited to be the international grand marshals, likewise refused to take part. Twenty-three former Pride honorees returned their awards and presented the organization with an “Award of Shame.” Blackness Yes, organizers of the perennially popular Blockorama, already furious with the pride board over its high handed treatment of the Black and Caribbean communities, expressed its solidarity. So did trans community members. A number of women organized Take Back the Dyke, an alternative to the official Dyke March, in protest. (McCaskell, 2011)

Dr Alan Li, who was Grand Marshal for the Parade, refused the post, explaining:
Pride’s recent decision to ban the term “Israeli Apartheid” and thus prohibit the participation of the group Queers Against Israeli Apartheid from participating in Pride celebrations this year is a slap in the face to our history of diverse voices. Pride’s choice to take pre-emptive step to censor our own communities’ voices and concerns in response to political and corporate pressure shows a lack of backbone to stand up for principles of inclusiveness and anti-oppression. (2010)

The moment for the Israel lobby, city officials, and funders to declare victory for ousting QuAIA from Pride did not last long. The very strong outcry from various queer organizations and individuals forced Pride Toronto to reverse its decision and not censor the term “Israeli apartheid” from the parade. In a QuAIA press release, Tim McCaskell explained:

This is a victory for the Palestine solidarity movement, which has faced censorship and bullying tactics from the Israel lobby for far too long. . . . The Israel lobby learned a tough lesson today about our community’s proud history of standing up to censorship and human rights abuses. (Queers Against Israeli Apartheid, 2010)

Criticizing the Pride Toronto executive for reversing their decision to ban QuAIA, Gladstone explained to Toronto Star reporter Teotonio: “By reversing the decision (Pride) has gone from a place of inclusion and tolerance to one that supports hateful messaging and intolerance and it’s supposed to be against that.” Teotonio further reported Gladstone’s admonition that “Pride events should be focused on gay issues, rather than being ‘hijacked’ by groups with other agendas” (Teotonio, 2010). Once again, the
language of tolerance was invoked to sanitize space from any messaging around Israeli apartheid, using the claim that such messaging is hateful.

Pride Toronto was thus forced to reverse its censorship policy. In May 2010, the board resolution banning the term “Israeli apartheid” was rescinded. Instead, Pride Toronto required all participants to sign and abide by the City of Toronto’s non-discrimination policy. At the same time, Xtra! reported on May 23, 2010 that a motion had been passed to establish “a representative advisory panel of community leaders that will lead a broad-based community consultation process with diverse queer communities to recommend a set of strategic principles and a decision-making framework that will help shape future festivals.” This consultation process resulted in a Community Advisory Panel (CAP) that finally provided 133 recommendations to Pride Toronto. However, the process was heavily critiqued. As Queer Ontario, a provincially based network committed to liberationist and sex positive principles, put it in their Pride Toronto Evaluation Report:

considering that many targeted individuals never bothered to fill out the survey or to participate in the CAP’s forums – whatever their reason – and considering that the CAP also incorporated the needs and interests of other governmental, lobbying, and corporate stakeholders during its consultations – those who do not necessarily constitute members of Toronto’s LGBTQ “community” – we refused to give the report the credibility and authority the CAP was demanding from us. (Queer Ontario, 2011)

City Continues on Defunding Track
In response to Pride’s reversal, lawyer Martin Gladstone held a press conference together with representatives from the Canadian Jewish Congress, the Canada-Israel Committee, the UJA Federation of Greater Toronto, and the Friends of Simon Wiesenthal Center; Toronto mayoral candidates Rocco Rossi, Giorgio Mammoliti, and Rob Ford were all present as well. At this event, Mammoliti announced “plans to introduce a new motion to city council in a bid to retroactively defund PT. Ford and Rossi said they support that move” (Dagostino, 2010). The campaign to silence and censor QuAIA thus became a campaign issue in the mayoral race, with each candidate vying to be the one who would work harder to ban QuAIA, all using the same logic that applying the epithet apartheid to Israel constituted hate speech and did not promote an atmosphere of tolerance.

True to his word, Councillor Giorgio Mammoliti introduced a new motion during the Toronto City Council meeting that opened on July 6, 2010. The new motion to defund Pride asked that:

1. City Council direct that funding for Pride Toronto be paid after the parade and be conditional upon Pride Toronto requiring all registered participants to comply with the City of Toronto’s Anti-Discrimination Policy.

2. City Council request the City Manager to advise Pride Toronto on what is required of them to meet the Policy.

3. City Council request the City Manager to advise Pride Toronto whether the participation of Queers Against Israeli Apartheid and the signs or banners they carry contravenes the City’s Anti-Discrimination Policy.
Up to this stage there had been no ruling whatsoever that QuAIA had contravened any policies, and, as indicated by the second part of the motion, all the calls to ban QuAIA had been made before the City Manager made any ruling on the issue of the policy and QuAIA’s compliance with it. This motion from Giorgio Mammoliti, seconded by Rob Ford, which passed by 36–1 votes, was thus the first time city officials inquired into the actual question of QuAIA’s compliance with anti-discrimination legislation, by instructing Joseph Pennachetti, the City Manager to produce a report on the question (Toronto City Council, 2010).

However, at this point, the decision to ban the term Israeli apartheid had been reversed and not much could be done to prevent QuAIA from marching in Pride Parade 2010.

The reversal of the ban was a major victory for QuAIA following a long year of collaboration between Israel lobby groups, city councillors, corporate sponsors, and Pride Executive to ban the group from the parade. The mobilizations, coalition building, protests, and creative materials produced by the campaign had all worked to put pressure on the Pride Toronto executive, but also to reassert and take back Pride as a community affair, and not a corporate-run festival.

The City Manager Report: “Israeli Apartheid” does not Contravene Anti-Discrimination Policy

While the debate around QuAIA marching in Pride was ongoing, with politicians making demands that Pride should ensure QuAIA did not march again, the Pride Toronto board followed the CAP consultations mentioned earlier by instituting a new process for
conflict resolution through a disputes committee (Pride Toronto, 2012). On the provincial level, on March 03, 2011, Pride Toronto received $400,000 from the Celebrate Ontario grant, up $100,000 from the previous year (Houston, 2011). Due to this grant, Ontario Progressive Conservative MPP Peter Shurman introduced Bill 171, Prohibition Against Government Funding of the Promotion of Hatred Act, 2011, into the Ontario Legislature on March 28, 2011.

In an interview with Marcus McCann for Xtra! on March 30, 2011, Shurman, the politician behind the resolution condemning Israeli Apartheid Week at the provincial parliament, explained:

I’ve been working on this one for six months, and it flows from my Israeli Apartheid Week resolution of a year ago. To take it to the next step, I thought I would introduce legislation that says, “Hey, if you speak hate, it’s going to be a problem.”

Importantly, he added:

At this point, nobody at a university campus or at the Pride parade has been accused, much less found guilty, of hate speech. But there’s a question in my mind, which is why I pursued this, which is how close to the boundary Israeli Apartheid Week or QuAIA comes to hate speech. (McCann, 2011)

At this point, the Toronto city council had not yet decided on funding for 2011, and the motion of 2010 was still hanging over Pride Toronto. This prompted Pride’s co-chair for 2011, Francisco Alvarez, to explain in a Toronto Star article by Daniel Dale on April 14, 2011, titled “Pride and ‘Israeli apartheid’: A guide to the controversy,” that:
This year’s festival would likely proceed in significantly smaller form if council denied Pride both the grant money and the services. The coming years would be even more challenging . . . because the city provides about a quarter of Pride’s $1.6 million budget, the withdrawal of all support would create a large deficit that would threaten the organization’s long-term existence. The withdrawal of only the grant money would be problematic . . . but less of a mortal threat.

All of these threats to funding were still made on the assumption that QuAIA’s presence contravened city policy (Dale, 2011).

However, following the 2010 city council motion described in the previous section, City Manager Pennachetti issued his report on April 2, 2011, titled “Compliance with the City of Toronto’s Anti-Discrimination Policy.” As the debate about QuAIA’s participation in Pride was raging for the fourth year in a row, with many allegations that its mere participation violated the anti-discrimination policy, the last blow to the silencing campaign came when the report stated clearly that:

City staff have determined that the phrase “Israeli Apartheid” in and of itself does not violate the City’s Anti-discrimination policy as it does not impede the provision of services and employment provided directly by Pride or the City to any group on any grounds provided for in the Policy. The City staff has carefully reviewed the matter of whether the participation of QuAIA violates the City’s Anti-Discrimination Policy. To date, the phrase “Israeli Apartheid” has not been found to violate either the Criminal Code or the Human Rights Code (Ontario). However, a decision on the latter would have to be made by the Human Rights
Tribunal of Ontario. The City Staff has therefore concluded that the participation of QuAIA in the Pride Parade based solely on the phrase “Israeli Apartheid” does not violate the City’s Anti-Discrimination Policy. The City also cannot therefore conclude that the use of term on signs or banners to identify QuAIA constitutes the promotion of hatred or seeks to incite discrimination contrary to the Code.

(City of Toronto, 2011)

Following the City Manager’s report, which vindicated QuAIA, on April 15, 2011, QuAIA removed the pretext for any further action against Pride by announcing that it would not march in the 2011 Pride Parade. The group had obviously been vindicated and it was clear that all attacks against them were sheer censorship tactics using the guise of anti-discrimination. In a news release days later, QuAIA said it had made the decision to hold independent Pride Week events outside of the festival so that Mayor Rob Ford would be denied a convenient pretext for withdrawing funding: “with the City report settling that debate, now is the time for us to move beyond the parade to build our community’s response to Israeli apartheid” (Queers Against Israeli Apartheid, 2011).

In lieu of their participation in the actual Parade, QuAIA dropped a 40 foot banner from above during the Pride Parade on July 3, 2011, in a very visible location for all marchers to see. The banner called for a boycott of LGBTQ tourism in Israel and read “Support Palestinian Queers, Boycott Israeli Tourism.” Also, as part of their outreach and education efforts prior to Pride, QuAIA hosted writer and activist Sarah Schulman for a conversation on the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign (Queers Against Israeli Apartheid, 2011).
Conclusion

The involvement of Toronto’s city officials in the silencing campaign against QuAIA is illustrative of how deeply normalized censorship is at the official level in Canada when it comes to Palestinian human rights and criticism of the Israeli state. At every stage of involvement in meetings, discussions, and even motions to silence QuAIA, there were no expressed concerns by city officials that the city might be trampling on freedom of expression. Rather, in the name of inclusivity, and by means of evidence organized by Israel lobbyists, city officials were willing to promote defunding an entire festival.

This chapter has emphasized that this specific campaign to oust QuAIA from Pride must be contextualized within the broader politics of the silencing and erasure of the Palestinian narrative, the use of pinkwashing by the Israeli state, and most importantly, a white multicultural politics that protects a core culture of fragmented, corporatized identities recruited to a politics of serving and securing the status quo rather than challenging it. The use of the discourses of inclusivity to exclude QuAIA highlights that such liberal notions can never be abstracted from the specific relations of power in which they are embedded.

There are very important lessons to draw out from QuAIA’s organized and creative efforts to challenge censorship against the group. Reaching out to various organizations and building a broad coalition to defend freedom of expression in Pride Toronto, producing video messages, utilizing Freedom of Information requests to uncover details of the silencing campaign, and strategically deciding at every step how
and where to intervene, all contributed to raising important challenges to the silencing campaign. QuAIA succeeded in showing that although such battles against censorship can be draining, with careful coalition building they can be won on the grounds of freedom of expression. Any space that is gained in this context for free expression is also space gained for the Palestine Solidarity Movement and for the Palestinian narrative. As Tim McCaskell aptly put it:

Before the events around Pride, it would be fair to say that many people in Toronto’s network of queer communities knew very little about the notion of Israeli apartheid or, if they did, wouldn’t have considered it to be any kind of a queer issue. Because of the controversy about our right to participate in Pride, however, the term “Israeli apartheid” became a household word in the community. For months the name of our organization featured prominently in both community and mainstream media. The issue was the topic of thousands of conversations. Riding on the wave of support for our right to be in Pride, the notion that Israel could be an apartheid state was no longer a marginal issue.

(2011)

In attacking the depoliticization, commercialization, and fragmentation of hitherto progressive political spaces such as Pride Toronto, QuAIA was able not only to partially safeguard the persistence and visibility of radical liberatory politics and subjectivities on the streets of Toronto, but also to concretely alter public representations such as the image of Israel, representations that are of key importance to the Palestinian struggle for rights.
Chapter 6. Challenging the Silencing Campaign: Counter-Narration and Anti-Racist Politics

“From New York to Athens, from Madrid to Santiago, from Bahrain to Rome, these huge mobilizations provide a much needed reminder of something that Palestinians have always known – that another world, a dignifying one, is possible and ordinary people can create it” Statement by BDS National Committee (BNC Secretariat, 2011).

“You have no better friend in the world than Canada, no stronger ally who will stand up [for you]. We won’t stand behind you; we will stand shoulder to shoulder with Israel” Speech by John Baird, Canadian Foreign Minister (Keinon, 2012a).

This chapter begins by contextualizing current changes in Canada’s official multicultural policy, then moves to addressing the specific racialized silencing discourses utilized against the Palestine Solidarity Movement by focusing on the findings of the Canadian Parliamentary Committee to Combat Anti-Semitism (CPCCA). Finally, this chapter concludes this study by pointing to the need to build an anti-racist politics of solidarity across social movements and communities, because silencing of dissent and state-sanctioned disciplinary mechanisms against specific social movements transcend the boundaries of one group and become a way of organizing society as a whole.

Outside the Multicultural: Limits to “Tolerance”

Although Canada’s multicultural policy has always been debated, today the idea of “being multicultural” and “tolerant” is deeply intertwined with the Canadian national
narrative. As a matter of fact, most political speeches outlined in this dissertation do stress “our Canadian values of tolerance” even as they condemn and aim at silencing particular speech. This is exactly the paradox of Canada’s official multicultural policy: it claims to be securing/promoting “diversity,” while in essence it is increasingly promoting a unified Canadian identity—one that I have argued is not only grounded in white normativity, but that also adheres to a neoliberal logic and understanding of citizenship.

This multicultural identity helps to accomplish two things: 1. construct a Canada that is different from the U.S. melting pot model; and 2. in some ways, more importantly, construct a Canadian nationalism that is imagined as “civilizationaly superior” for the tolerance it offers. In other words, multicultural policy is the terrain upon which national identity is displayed and constructed as cosmopolitan, while simultaneously not disrupting in a fundamental way the racial and/or economic hierarchies of the state nationally or internationally. This is not to say that the effects of multicultural polices are all negative, or that a retreat from multiculturalism back to exclusionary nationalisms need be the response, but simply that a serious anti-racist critique of the way multicultural polices have developed is necessary, and that political space must be opened up for critical and nuanced discussions beyond a “with or against” multiculturalism.

As it stands, “Canadianness” is structured through a “core culture” (Mackey, 2002) for all to aspire to belong to, while tropes of cultural difference may be displayed and celebrated only to enhance and prove the “tolerance” of the core culture. The limits of this “tolerance” are circumscribed by the core culture and maintained by the state;
hence “state multiculturalism is invested with the power to manage a range of differences that might prove potentially troubling in a hegemonic state’s bid to retain its exclusive authorizing powers” (Walcott, 2011, p. 18). Far from being a neutral overseer of relations between various cultures and communities, the state holds the power to define and discipline communities. As Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism Jason Kenney explained in relation to cutting funding to the Canadian Arab Federation,

> We are proud of our long tradition of pluralism, respect for others, diversity and multiculturalism, but it does not mean that there are no limits. There are certain limits and they are defined by our deeper and best political values of respect for human dignity, the equality of men and women and of ordered liberty in our Parliamentary democracy. (Kenney, 2009c)

These “limits” are applied most strictly to oppositional movements and discourses outside the “core culture.” Oppositional movements find themselves marginalized and silenced through an ongoing process that racializes them as “extreme” and “outside the norms of civility,” with “civility” offering “an ideological marker of those contrasting themselves as civil from those they take to deny the condition, or even its possibility” (Goldberg, 2008a, p. 36). This dissertation has focused on one such oppositional movement: the Palestine Solidarity Movement and the Boycotts, Divestments and Sanctions campaign.

Rooted in a critique of liberal theories of the state and illustrating the Canadian state as a racial state embedded in neoliberal global hierarchies, this study has sought, through an analysis of several cases of censorship and silencing of the Palestine
Solidarity Movement, the “emblematic solidarity movement of our times” (Bhattacharyya, 2008, p. 42), to highlight the ways in which Palestinian narratives and solidarity are racialized and cast outside the Canadian multicultural.

Social movement theory “despite being potentially of great relevance to organizing, has become an academic industry over the past thirty years and can tend toward overly theorized and abstract outputs, leading to many questioning its relevancy for movement activists” (Choudry, Hanley, & Shragge, 2012, p. 4). Thus, this study has attempted to fill a void in the literature, while also being relevant to the day-to-day work of oppositional social movements, by first, explaining moments of silencing as racial and racializing moments, and second, by interrogating the mechanisms upon which the silencing campaign of the Palestine Solidarity Movement operates. It thus focuses attention on the various ways that exclusion and censorship occur in a multicultural setting, and how anti-discrimination language associated with multiculturalism itself is appropriated to enact the silencing whereby notions of “tolerance” act to establish boundaries and markers of belonging.

The increased marginalization of Muslim and Arab migrants in the United States and Canada has spawned a field of critical literature addressing Anti-Muslim/Anti-Arab racism (Jamal & Naber, 2008; Razack, 2008; Salaita, 2006; Zine, 2012). Much of this literature has focused on the institutionalization of racism at the state level, and on a critique of the clash of civilizations paradigm that orders the securitization of state/community relations. This study works to expand this critical literature to include silencing and marginalization of Palestine solidarity activism—in particular,
understanding silencing as a key moment in the construction and maintenance of a racial project marking Arab Palestinian narratives and solidarity as outside of Canada’s official multicultural tolerance.

Both the growth of Palestine Solidarity activism in Canada and the ferocity of the silencing campaign against it necessitate a serious interrogation of silencing and erasure as moments embedded in a racial discourse inferiorizing Palestinians, while marking Israel as civilizationally superior for its liberal values. Indeed, as I have shown, to even question the fact that those liberal values apply only to a section of the population under Israel’s control—just as liberal values applied only to whites in apartheid era South Africa (Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, 2011; White, 2012)—is to be labeled “extreme” and anti-Semitic.

Silencing and censorship of solidarity is therefore within the field of anti-racist inquiry, as it is a systematic and state-level approach to dealing with dissent in general and dissent when it comes to relations with Israel in particular. Unfortunately, the very nature of silencing critical inquiry on Palestine/Israel in the academy, exemplified in campaigns targeting specific academics and interfering in their tenure decisions,33 has created an atmosphere whereby a self-imposed censorship keeps many from writing about Palestine. This trend is hopefully beginning to break with the shifting of the discourse outside the academy and thanks to the few courageous voices that persisted in breaking the taboo around discussions of Palestine in academic circles.

33. For more, see Arab Studies Quarterly’s special issue on Academic Freedom, Ideological Boundaries and Teaching of the Middle East, Vol 33, Numbers 3/4, Summer/Fall 2011.
Framing Canada’s Official Multicultural Policy

Looking through the literature on Canadian multiculturalism, it is easy to recognize that the term itself has been contested and its effectiveness as state policy has never been settled. While some hail it as a progressive break from exclusivist forms of identity and nationalism (Kymlicka, 1991, 1998; Taylor, 1992), it has also been criticized as a policy that does not enhance national belonging and that destroys a cohesive national identity (Bissoondath, 1994; Gwyn, 1995). From a critical perspective multiculturalism is analyzed as a nation-building policy (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002; Mackey, 2002), and discussed as an ideological and policy apparatus that obscures power relations and racism (Bannerji, 2000; Li, 1988; Thobani, 2007). This dissertation is situated within the critical literature on official multiculturalism, concurring with Mackay’s argument that “specific forms of Canadian pluralism bolster ‘unmarked whiteness’ and help to affirm a dominant white Anglophone ‘Canadian-Canadian’ culture and nationalist program” (2002, p. 142).

This critique is grounded first and foremost in the history of official multicultural policy within the context of a settler-colonial project initiated through acts of “conquest, genocide, slavery and the exploitation of the labor of people of color” (Razack, 2002, p. 2). Although the official policy acts to obscure these facts and lays the groundwork for a national narrative that imagines a Canada that from its inception was a happy mosaic, as Walcott has explained,

one cannot fully make sense of post 9/11 multiculturalism debates without taking into account the context of Western global expansion over the last five hundred years, a period in which Europe reordered the globe under its own terms or ways
of knowing as the only legitimate way of being. (2011, p. 15)

Thus, the analysis of multicultural policy is not divorced from history, the political economy of the state, or gendered/raced class formation.

There has been an emphasis throughout this dissertation on connecting internal racial projects with imperial projects externally, and understanding that Canada's foreign policies, in support of Israel especially, reflect back onto communities within Canada. It is clear with the shift in the very objectives of the Canadian multicultural program that internal and external polices cannot be easily disentangled, and that Canada's role as a junior partner in a U.S.-led imperialism must be factored into all discussions on Canada as a multicultural state (Gordon, 2010; Klassen & Albo, 2013).

Further, multiculturalism has not been a static policy; rather, it has changed in emphasis several times. As anti-racist movements weakened with the advent of neoliberal economics, multiculturalism itself became a neoliberal asset—rather than its stated aim to be a mechanism for marginalized communities to gain "recognition."34 As Gilbert argued, "multiculturalism became a competitive advantage in the discussion of North American free trade and integration and has been seen as a security risk since the events of September 11, 2001" (2007, p. 13).

"Canadian Core Values" and Civilizational Camps

In responding to a question regarding new regulations requiring women who wear the niqab to show their face at citizenship oath ceremonies, Canada's Minister of

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34. The term "recognition" is used to keep within the language of multiculturalism that promises "recognition" rather than social justice or equality.
Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism Kenney stated, in a 2012 interview with The Globe and Mail:

no one is obliged to take the citizenship oath. If they feel stronger about hiding their faces, they don’t have to take the oath. In our citizenship guide, we talk about Canadian multiculturalism and the fact it doesn’t extend to forced marriage, female genital mutilation, etc. We are sending a signal that certain barbaric practices are not welcome in Canada. There are certain legal limits and cultural norms about women in Canadian society.

The linking of women wearing the niqab with “barbaric practices” illustrates a civilizational discourse and identifies how new documents, such as the citizenship guide, serve a specific purpose of defining belonging within a set of constructed liberal values.

In response to a follow up question, Kenney added: “we shouldn’t be shy in emphasizing core liberal values. If people choose to wear the niqab, that’s their business. But I hope that little girls who grow up in Canada don’t think it is an obligation.” The new emphasis is on a rootedness in “core liberal values” and by extension a “core culture” set in the tradition of liberal values linked to the British monarchy. In a 2009 speech, Kenney noted that there must be a focus “on the political values that are grounded in our history, the values of liberal democracy rooted in British Parliamentary democracy that precisely have given us the space to accommodate such diversity.” This link to British Parliamentary democracy as the reason for the very existence of diversity helps to erase, first and foremost, the fact that this liberal democracy was built through the destruction (both physical and cultural) of the indigenous peoples of North America, as well as
through waves of migration, from colonies or former colonies of the British empire, being used as cheap labour. In other words, the civilizational link to the British empire itself is rooted in a history of violence that not all celebrate as a positive tradition.

This focus on integration and belonging, organized around a “core values” discourse embedded in liberal modernity, roots Canadian identity in a specific Western civilizational camp under the rubric of the clash of civilizations. It is necessary to remember that the clash of civilizations posited by Samuel Huntington was between the West and an Islamic civilization, with “civilizations” presented in ahistoric terms, as static and monolithic entities. If Canadian identity is constructed in line with this understanding of the world, then those of Muslim background who are citizens of the state are not protected by citizenship documents, nor by how much they attempt to integrate; they are constructed as always outside the confines of Western civilization. In other words, they are civilizationally inferior and suspect no matter what they do.

The ordering of citizenship itself along civilizational lines and values is essentially a racialization process that demarcates the limits of belonging to anyone perceived outside the imagined civilizational borders—the concept of civilizational backwardness used to justify military interventions in the Middle East is in the same manner used to order state relations with internalized Others deemed to belong in the opposing civilization camp. This move to construct Canadian identity in terms of a set of values plays a role in the casting out of many oppositional discourses, with claims that they are outside of those values. One statement that Canadian officials kept repeating throughout the silencing campaign was the claim that events like Israeli Apartheid Week
and organizations such as the Canadian Arab Federation and Palestine House were not respectful of “Canadian values.”

“Crisis of Multiculturalism” Debates

The shift towards an integrative multiculturalism in Canada, constructed around acceptance of a historical link with a British parliamentary tradition, highlights that the Canadian state is a racial state functioning through the structuring/reinforcing of a racial hierarchy and increasingly oppressive immigration practices. Razack has pointed to Canada’s “racialized structure of citizenship in which people of color, suspected of duplicity, must always be policed and kept at the margins of law and community” (2010, p. 89). This change towards an integrative multiculturalism also took place in an international climate where leaders of European states declared that “multiculturalism has failed” (Siebold, 2010) and professed the need for a “muscular liberalism” (Wright & Taylor, 2011). It is important to emphasize this international context as “racisms are no longer domestically driven, but take their impetus from an attempt to legitimize a deeply divided global order” (Kundani, 2007, p. 4).

Debates about the failure or success of multiculturalism mainly revolve around how the West should deal with immigrants from a Muslim background:

in the cacophony of voices that make up this new media-driven “integration debate”, it is Muslims who are routinely singled out: it is their cultural difference that needs limits placed on it; it is they who must subsume their cultural heritage.

(Kundani, 2007, p. 123)

In Europe, for example, such debates take place around the banning of the burka in
France or the banning of minarets in Switzerland. Although there are very important
differences between the European and North American debates on multicultural policy
stemming from the different reasons for and types of migration to both areas, the
discourses of such debates do intersect. In a 2010 report on the state of multiculturalism
in Canada, Kymlicka explained that this crisis of multicultural policy that has “dominated
the debate in Canada in the 2006–2008 period is the specter of backlash and retreat from
multiculturalism,” adding that “it is important to remember that Canada is not an island
unto itself – it is part of an international community that has been struggling with issues
of ethnic and racial diversity” (p. 11).

Such “crisis” debates are set in civilizational terms constructing a Western
civilization grounded in liberal values under an existential threat from migrants bringing
in a value system that does not adhere to liberal democratic conceptions of freedom and
equality. Women’s rights and gay rights play a key role in these debates because they are
utilized to set markers for the superiority of Western civilization, distinguishing it from
the more “backward” traditions coming from the East. This helps to obscure real
socioeconomic questions and issues with foreign policy that immigrants may face or seek
to challenge, while presenting a static civilizational divide. The changes in Canadian
policy echo changes in other Western states and aim to situate Canada as a full-fledged
member in an imperial order that seeks to bring “democracy” to the rest of the world, by
military force if necessary, while making use of its own liberal traditions to silence
dissent.

Debates around multiculturalism—its success, usefulness, and failure—tend to be
the public and legitimate form in which essentialized discourses of Muslim civilizational backwardness are carried forward. Rather than overtly stating that Muslims cannot integrate due to cultural differences, the discussion can be conducted in a more “civilized” manner if it is about a policy failure. Formulating discussions on racism in terms of multicultural policy failure helps to avoid addressing any legitimate grievances that Muslim/Arab immigrants might have with Western states—it is easier to blame culture than to seriously interrogate social and economic policies that marginalize certain communities or imperial policies that justify military occupations. Underneath the rhetoric calling for a different type of multiculturalism (in the Canadian case) and/or making declarations of its failure (in the European case), lies a specific portrayal of an essentialized Muslim/Arab immigrant that must be made to learn a new value system; Palestinian solidarity in particular is imagined not only outside of this value system, but in opposition to it.

Canada, Israel, and a “Shared Liberal Values” Paradigm

The discourse of “values” is not simply used to cement a Canadian identity internally; it helps to set a structure for international alliances as well. For example, the discourse of common values is repeatedly deployed by state officials to mark a connection between Israel and Canada along with the common remark “Canada’s values are Israel’s values,” thus reinforcing “the global immunity Israel receives for its membership in the camp of democratic states. This immunity enables Israel to continue the dispossession of Palestine commenced in the late nineteenth century” (Pappe, 2008, p. 149).
This discourse is clearly played out in the silencing and censorship cases discussed throughout this dissertation. Liberal values are appropriated in the construction of a distinct Western identity, where marking specific voices as being outside of “core values” marks them as outside the multicultural order altogether, unable to integrate or belong. This is not to say that the War on Terror, resonant with the clash-of-civilizations discourse, marks a completely new ideological connection between Canada and Israel. As Abu-Laban and Bakan (2009, p. 32) have argued, there has been an “international racial contract, which, since 1948, has assigned a common interest between the state of Israel and powerful international political allies, while absenting the Palestinians as both ‘nonwhite’ and stateless.”

It is not a new phenomenon that Palestinians are conceived of as “bloodthirsty and warmongering, constantly harassing modern-day Israelites, debauched and lacking in liberal culture” (Goldberg, 2008b, p. 26). However, there has been an intensification of a dual process of racialization: one that casts Palestinian narratives as “extreme,” “terrorist,” and “backward,” while “whitening” Israeli narratives by allying them ever more closely to liberal traditions. The intensification has not occurred in the abstract; it directly ties Western military interventions in the region, under the framework of the War on Terror, to the start of the second Intifada and to Israel (along with its Western allies) needing to answer for ongoing human rights violations in the West Bank and Gaza. Importantly, it also relates to the growth and effectiveness of global solidarity efforts with the Palestinian people.

In other words, in a circular movement, the more Israel abuses Palestinians the
stronger the backlash against its policies becomes, and the more effective Palestine
solidarity becomes in reaching a mass audience. This, in turn, pushes the silencing of
such efforts as fear escalates in Israel that it is losing the diplomatic battle. Organizations
like the Israeli think tank, the Reut Institute, solidify this fear by calling the Boycotts,
Divestments and Sanctions campaign a “strategic threat” to Israel (The Reut Institute,
2010).

Rather than dealing with the root causes of a growing global movement in
solidarity with Palestinian rights—the key questions of land, the right of return, military
occupation, illegal settlement expansion, and water rights—the silencing campaign works
to avoid factual discussions and debates on Israeli policies, insisting on marking Palestine
solidarity itself outside of “Canadian values.” As noted by Abu-Laban and Bakan,
in light of the fact that serious debate about Israel’s violent and illegal practices is
frequently hampered by challenges about the motivations of analysts and the
legitimacy of voice, there are barriers to simply beginning with analytical
assumptions as is standard in a consideration of solidarity movements. (2009, p.
31)

The silencing campaign insinuates that the reason pro-Palestinian activists,
academics, and/or supporters of Palestinian human rights in general are analyzing Israel’s
policies as a form of apartheid, staging demonstrations against the war in Lebanon, and
daring to question Canada’s policy towards Israel is that they themselves are “extreme”
and “anti-Semitic,” and do not understand Canada’s values of tolerance—and, if they
happen to be Jewish, then they are self-hating Jews. Salaita explained:
The notion of Jewishness disseminated by mainstream and rightwing Zionist groups [aims to] place Israel at the center of Jewish consciousness. Jews who decline are called “self-hating”, which implies that they have lost their right to discuss Jewish sensibilities and that their claims to Jewish identity are superficial. Gentiles who criticize Israel are simply dismissed (with moralistic vigor) as incurable anti-Semites. (2006, p. 19)

On the other hand, Palestine solidarity activism, in line with the above-mentioned racialized images of Palestinians, is more generally construed as driven by nothing but unproved hate and anger, incapable of a higher order of values, of deeper causation, of responsibility as a product of free choice. Palestinianization, like the projection of “Palestine” in short, is a state of passion, its only rationality purely instrumental, crudely calculated and cruelly calculating, consequential, awe-full. (Goldberg, 2008b, p. 36)

Israel, for its part, has worked diligently to “teach its allies that the culture of those minorities is itself an attack on multicultural ideals. This is a culture that is absolute, deathly and genocidal. To allow it space and expression is to endanger ‘our’ way of life” (Bhattacharyya, 2008, p. 56).

Interestingly, for racialized communities the contradictions are all too obvious: Canadian identity, we learn in the new citizenship guide, is based on valuing the rule of law, yet Canadian citizens who happen to be Muslim can be “evicted” from the law (Razack, 2008). Freedom of speech is a Western value to be protected, as it is what supposedly sets liberal democracies apart from dictatorships the world over. Yet its limits
are always tested when it comes to using the term “apartheid” in relation to Israel, no matter how factual the arguments for the case that Israel indeed enacts apartheid policies; regardless of who is making them, they are described as “an attack on the mutual respect that holds our society together” (Ignatieff, 2009).

All citizens are meant to be equal in liberal democracies—this is a fundamental rule that immigrants are meant to understand, especially that men and women are equal (as the new citizenship guide highlights); yet, if you are Muslim or Arab, a different set of rules applies to you and anti-terror legislation/racial profiling singles you out. These contradictions are encapsulated in this statement by Kenney regarding the funding cuts to the Canadian Arab Federation:

People are free to express their views on foreign policy, on the Middle East, to differ with, this case, the policies of the Israeli government. They are free to say what they will within the bounds of our laws in Canada. But they shouldn’t expect that, just because they claim to represent a particular ethno-cultural community, any idea, no matter how extreme, is going to be treated, in the framework of moral relativism, as a legitimate contribution to public discourse, and that organizations like that will receive public support. (2009c)

In other words, you are free to say what you like; however, if we deem it to be “extreme” you are to be disciplined, and it will not be considered a “legitimate contribution to public discourse.” Legitimate contributions are determined to be so by the state. This form of cultural racialization is an easy way to silence any criticism of state policies and cast out any group questioning the status quo, silencing dissent by delegitimizing it, rather than
logically arguing the facts (even as we are told logical argumentation by fact is a liberal tradition). The Canadian state can enact discipline and silence communities by casting them outside the core culture, outside Canadian values, and this is how the Canadian state has chosen to manage its relationship with the Palestine Solidarity Movement.

A Focus on Silencing Palestine Solidarity Activism

One of the key reasons a focus on the silencing campaign is important is that it helps in critically analyzing the construction of settler solidarities between Canada and Israel as settler colonies. As Krebs has argued:

While economic and geopolitical ties are certainly important factors, the shared history of Canada and Israel as settler societies is crucial to understanding Canada’s ongoing support for Israel. Simply put, both countries were founded on the forced displacement of Indigenous peoples and the theft of their lands and resources. And in both cases, these colonial processes continue to the present day.

(2012)

Krebs goes on to outline the similar policies of land theft, displacement, and endless negotiations between unequal partners as methods deployed by both Canada and Israel in dealing with the respective indigenous populations. This settler solidarity, however, is cemented even further with Israel’s promotion as an ideal neoliberal economy, grounded largely in the production of new surveillance and urban warfare technologies (Zureik, Lyon, & Abu-Laban, 2010). Settler solidarity is thus grounded in histories of colonialism, as well as in ongoing processes of neoliberal accumulation and racialization at both international and national levels (with the two being interlinked).
A focus on the silencing campaign is crucial to explaining how Western complicity with Israeli policies functions on an internal state level (not only internationally). Israeli policies are maintained by the continuing erasure of Palestinian history and the silencing of pro-Palestinian advocacy wherever it takes place. Western states, far from being neutral in the conflict, act to silence criticism of their complicity. Israel’s inclusion in the Western civilization camp requires the defense of Israel’s policies in international forums as well as the stifling of internal dissent. As Nadeau and Sears explained: “This silencing project echoes that of the Israeli state itself, which has systematically clamped down on all aspects of Palestinian life while trying to eliminate signs and memories of Palestinian existence” (2011, p. 1).

The silencing campaign is thus placed within a specific racial project of the Canadian state as a settler colony, which has historically had a troubled relationship with “inside-outsiders” (Bannerji, 2000). Studying silencing of Palestinian narratives involves unsettling notions of Canadian tolerance and historicizing them in line with the silencing of other indigenous and racialized migrant narratives, while simultaneously highlighting the specificities of silencing in the case of Palestine solidarity. It also involves insisting throughout that understanding internal racial projects necessitates an understanding of settler-colonialism and its impacts on race, class, and gendered relations.

The internal racial hierarchy is also dialectically connected to Canada’s position within a neoliberal globalization that shifts state relations internationally and nationally. Importantly, this has implications beyond one community or group of activists. As Kundnani has argued, in the case of Britain, the “‘war on terror’ and the ‘war on asylum’
are not just destructive of the human rights of Muslim and refugee communities but also serve to camouflage the transition to a globalized neoliberal economic order and a market-state model of politics” (2007a, p. 185).

**Using Multicultural Language as a Silencing Tool**

State control over discursive space does not always take place through overt coercive measures or legal mechanisms (although at times it does), but also through using the language of social justice and tolerant multicultural policy, enacted to delegitimize specific narratives before they even get a hearing. Analyzing the silencing campaign highlights the use of the official multicultural language of tolerance and inclusivity as a silencing tool, whereby the rights of some are protected by inclusion into a white-multiculturalism, at the expense of editing out Palestinians and solidarity with them from the space of tolerance.

In relation to the silencing campaign on campuses, Nadeau and Sears have clarified further how “civility” is used to cast Palestine solidarity outside the norms of respectful debate, asserting that, “at a general level, these principles seem completely worthy. Yet in application, they can be used to derail debate, silence advocacy and depoliticize campuses” (2010, p. 16). In the case of attempts to ban Queers Against Israeli Apartheid from marching in the Toronto Pride Parade, the argument came down to the notion that “we have to exclude you to be inclusive of others.” Tolerance, on one hand, is a privilege offered to some, which brings them into a multicultural space, while lack of tolerance is asserted in order to silence certain others and their narratives. As Cairns and Ferguson noted in their work on the Canadian Parliamentary Coalition to
Combat Anti-Semitism, “notwithstanding their illiberal character, these strategies draw upon the dominant left-liberal language of human rights and social justice in order to assert a pro-Israel politics that denies the legitimacy of the Palestinian struggle” (2011, p. 416).

Legalizing Censorship: Inventing a New Anti-Semitism

Naming the silencing campaign and its discourses is itself a counter-narration—a disruption of the official multicultural space that claims to espouse liberal values such as freedom of expression and tolerance, while casting Palestinian solidarity outside the bounds of such freedom. As the cases outlined throughout this study illustrate, there have been various discourses and mechanisms used to silence the Palestine Solidarity Movement, many of which overlap and reinforce one another. Also, softer methods are displayed in sync with more coercive methods, but all within the same framework and with the aim toward a similar outcome: silencing dissent against Canadian state policies towards Israel.

The most potent and persistent accusation made by the silencing campaign is that the Palestine Solidarity Movement, and specifically the analysis of Israel as an apartheid state, are inherently anti-Semitic. They are so, it is explained, because they “single out” and “delegitimize” Israel and question its existence as a Jewish state. By equating the Israeli state with world-Jewry this accusation essentializes individual Jews as supporters of Israel. Even applying the categories of international law to Israel becomes a new form of anti-Semitism, one that targets, unlike the old anti-Semitism, not Jews as individuals, but rather their homeland.
Proceedings like the Canadian Parliamentary Committee to Combat Anti-Semitism try in this vein to institutionalize such definitions of a new anti-Semitism. According to its final report,

the CPCCA supports and adopts the European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia Working Definition of Anti-Semitism for the purpose of this report and recommends that the Definition be adopted and promoted by the Government of Canada and law enforcement agencies. . . . [with this definition including that] anti-Semitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred towards Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of anti-Semitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities. In addition, such manifestations could also target the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. (2011, p. 5)

The London Declaration of the Inter-parliamentary Coalition for Combating Anti-Semitism, from which the CPCCA stems, pushed for “effective Hate Crime legislation” (ICCA, 2009, resolution 12) to address the “new anti-Semitism” (ICCA, 2009, resolution 13). Unsurprisingly, the final CPCCA report stated that, “the Inquiry Panel has learned that the main and growing problem in Canada is what has been termed the ‘new anti-Semitism’, a form of political prejudice that finds expression in Islamism and certain radical leftist ideologies and discourse” (2011, p. 14).

The CPCCA aimed to legalize the new definition. One of its recommendations, for example, specifically quoting Commissioner Julian Fantino of the Ontario Provincial
Police, was that Canada should establish “national standards for police services across the country so that we have a common understanding of what constitutes an anti-Semitic crime, together with consistent across-the-board mechanisms for data reporting and statistical analysis” (CPCCA, 2011, p. 24). The report also addressed state funding:

recognizing the vulnerability of immigrant communities, we recommend that funding guidelines should be strengthened to withhold any form of government funding or other support for NGOs that preach hatred or anti-Semitism – particularly those involved in integration and settlement of new Canadians where they may influence understanding of the responsibilities and obligations of Canadian citizenship. (CPCCA, 2011, p. 21)

Such recommendations have very real implications; both the Canadian Arab Federation and Palestine House (discussed in Chapter 4) lost their funding for such settlement and English language programs. Therefore, the idea of a “new anti-Semitism” is not simply one that is being discussed in the abstract; in fact, there are moves and specific recommendations to institutionalize and legalize it, curtailing the space for the Palestine Solidarity Movement. Even if such reports do not yield specific results on a legislative level, the fact that they are titled “parliamentary” and have the blessing of elected officials is enough to be used as reference in further silencing the Palestine Solidarity Movement.

Author Judith Butler aptly explained these definitions of anti-Semitism as a silencing tool:

It is untrue, absurd, and painful for anyone to argue that those who formulate a
criticism of the State of Israel is anti-Semitic or, if Jewish, self-hating. Such charges seek to demonize the person who is articulating a critical point of view and so disqualify the viewpoint in advance. It is a silencing tactic: this person is unspeakable, and whatever they speak is to be dismissed in advance or twisted in such a way that it negates the validity of the act of speech. The charge refuses to consider the view, debate its validity, consider its forms of evidence, and derive a sound conclusion on the basis of listening to reason. The charge is not only an attack on persons who hold views that some find objectionable, but it is an attack on reasonable exchange, on the very possibility of listening and speaking in a context where one might actually consider what another has to say. When one set of Jews labels another set of Jews “anti-Semitic”, they are trying to monopolize the right to speak in the name of the Jews. So the allegation of anti-Semitism is actually a cover for an intra-Jewish quarrel. (2012)

The language of a new anti-Semitism has been prominent in official political foreign policy speeches. At the Herzliya conference in 2012, for example, Canada’s Foreign Minister John Baird commented on a “constant barrage of rhetorical demonization, double standards and delegitimization” targeting Israel. These are the 3 Ds identified on the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs website (formerly the Canadian Jewish Congress). The “Understanding Antisemitism” section asserts that a “simple way to distinguish between legitimate criticism of Israel and anti-Semitism is the ‘3-D test’”; this test is defined by the CIJA as “demonization,” “double standards,” and “delegitimization” (CIJA, 2012).
In his Herzliya speech, Baird continued on to say:

harnessing disparate anti-Semitic, anti-American and anti-Western ideologies, it [the new anti-Semitism] targets the Jewish people by targeting the Jewish homeland, Israel, as the source of injustice and conflict in the world, and uses, perversely, the language of human rights to do so. (2012a)

Three important points can be drawn from Baird’s statements: 1) the absolute conflation between the Jewish people and the state of Israel; 2) the seamless combination of anti-Semitism with anti-American and anti-Westernism, as if it is all one and the same; and 3) the stress that it is within the language of human rights that the campaign criticizing Israel is conducted. Rather than an analysis of why the language of international law is appropriate, this allows for a dismissal of any claims to international law altogether.

The idea of “singling out” Israel goes hand in hand with the redefinition of a new anti-Semitism, and with claims that the reason Israel is targeted for criticism is its Jewish character, while other states with worse human rights violations are not equally targeted—leading to the charge that there is a double standard at work. Former federal Liberal leader Michael Ignatieff, for example, argued that Israeli Apartheid Week went, “beyond reasonable criticism into demonization” because it “singles out one state, its citizens and its supporters for condemnation and exclusion, and it targets institutions and individuals because of what and who they are — Israeli and Jewish” (2009). The assumption is that Israel is not being targeted for its policies or actions, but because of who it supposedly represents.

It is important to note that the framework for the BDS movement is an
international solidarity framework that does condemn violations of human rights wherever they occur (for example the Palestinian Boycott National Committee issued statements supporting the uprisings in the Arab World and the Occupy Movement internationally (BNC Secretariat, 2011). However, no single solidarity campaign can address every atrocity in the world, and the fact that violations occur in other places does not negate that Israel is committing them as well. As noted by Cairns and Ferguson on the notion of “singling out”: “not only is it difficult to know how one can criticize Israel, or any state, without singling it out, but making an ‘equal’ case against multiple countries is impracticable. Political critique, mobilization, and change are rendered null and void” (2011, p. 425). To say that Israel is being singled out because it is a Jewish state is to negate the fact that there are legitimate critiques to be made about Israeli policy.

A consideration to keep in mind regarding this “singling out” thesis is that it is the Canadian state that “singles out” Israel for preferential treatment. This makes it even more compelling for citizens of states like Canada to speak out about Israeli human rights violations, since Israel is considered an ally and supported by Canada diplomatically, economically, and militarily. In other words, there is a level of complicity and support of the way Israel conducts itself. It is Canadian officials who are quick to argue that they are not neutral on the question of Israel and will support it and stand “shoulder to shoulder.”

Much of the silencing campaign has sought to characterize any analysis of Israel as an apartheid state within the rubric of the “new anti-Semitism,” claiming that the use of the term “apartheid” questions Israel’s “right to exist” and negates “Jewish self-determination.” However, Bakan has rightly argued that:
The claim that to identify the state of Israel as an apartheid state is anti-Semitic needs to be challenged. Anti-Semitism is a form of racism that targets "Jews" -- an ambiguous category racialized to collectively ascribe common traits to those of Jewish faith, identity or culture. Israel, while a capitalist state in terms of its political economy, is ideologically a "Jewish state", but this is also a constructed claim. Unique in the world system, Israel claims to represent the interest of "Jews" in the region and in the global diaspora. (2011)

While the Palestine Solidarity Movement frames the analysis of Israel as an apartheid state in terms of Israel’s apartheid policies and exclusionary laws, rooting the analysis in international conventions such as the Apartheid Convention, the silencing campaign aims to specifically cement and protect Israel’s existence as an “exclusively” Jewish state, a state that privileges one set of people and defines itself on the basis of one religious or ethnic group. This move to stop any debate over the “character” of the state, however, is framed in progressive notions of Jewish self-determination, while in reality it is designed to undermine the self-determination of another group, the Palestinians, who are the ones outside the protection of a state system. It is this understanding of the “existence of the Israeli state” that the redefinition of anti-Semitism is meant to protect against future debate and discussion.

Generally speaking, however, discussions, debates, or questions about the very existence of a state system is common practice in the academy, considering that states are in themselves a modern political development emerging out of Europe. It would only be natural for discussion to take place regarding a state that wants to define itself along
ethno-racial or religious lines. To shut down the debate completely about the character of Israel is to silence any notions of co-existence that can be set on the basis of equality for all living in the region; debates on a binational or one secular democratic state, for example, as proposed by Ali Abunimah, are foreclosed (2007).

The apartheid analysis indeed does not equate both sides of the conflict; it also explains the roots within the settler colonial project of Israel. But more importantly, it envisions forms of living beyond exclusionary nationalisms that privilege one group with the protection of self-determination, while denying it to the other. To place such analysis outside the bounds of discussion and limit any critique of Israel’s “character as a Jewish state” is an attempt to exceptionalize Israel and normalize its self-definition, thus imposing on the rest of the world a definition that, in reality, excludes millions of Palestinians (one million of whom are citizens of Israel). One has to simply ask: Did South Africa cease to exist when apartheid was dismantled? Can the Israeli state only exist if it practices apartheid against a segment of the population under its control? And, crucially, can we imagine another existence for the state that is inclusive and respectful of Palestinian rights? One does not need to agree that Israel practices apartheid, but to foreclose the discussion altogether and silence such critiques is a clear attack on freedom of expression.

Supporters of the silencing campaign, however, are quick to argue that criticism of Israel is legitimate, and that it is calling into question the very existence of Israel that is not legitimate. But what is being called into question are Israel’s apartheid policies, and its ongoing illegal occupation and displacement of Palestinians. As argued by Goldberg,
to criticize the government of Israel and its policies, even to criticize the partial
grounds on which that state was founded, is not to criticize Jews as such, nor is it
to place Jews anywhere and everywhere at risk, notwithstanding the spike in anti-
Semitic attacks in the likes of France. It is not even to place Jews in Israel at risk.
Quite the contrary; it is to point out the way in which such policies and
governmentality manifest the very insecurity they claim to undo. (2008b, p. 29)

These attempts to redefine anti-Semitism to limit the scope of debate and dissent
have not gone unchallenged; they are mainly challenged through the ongoing organizing
of the Palestine Solidarity Movement. Israeli Apartheid Week, for example, took place on
216 campuses around the world in 2012. However, it is crucial to continually assess and
counter the attempt to legislate and legalize such definitions of anti-Semitism aimed at
narrowing the space (both discursively and physically) for the Palestine Solidarity
Movement. Even if legislation does not follow straight away, reports that purport to be
parliamentary are then quoted and used to legitimize further silencing as the discourse of
a “new anti-Semitism” is normalized at the state level. The Palestine Solidarity
Movement has largely been kept outside discussions of this so-called new anti-Semitism,
while parliamentarians assert its existence; activists in the movement are rarely consulted
or even questioned about their views. It is de facto decided. The CPCCA, for example,
heard from no one involved in organizing Israeli Apartheid Week, yet had an entire
section dedicated to the week in its final report (2011).

Unfortunately, the marking of Palestinians and Palestine solidarity as “extreme,”
along with the chilling environment created by funding cuts and the discourse of anti-
Semitism, has kept other progressive movements from taking a stand against such redefinitions. It is largely seen as an issue involving one or two communities, not as concerning other groups. This is partly the result of the breakdown of anti-racist solidarities and the fragmentation of various communities along ethnic lines all vying for state support. The Palestine Solidarity Movement faces an uphill battle explaining that such a narrowing down of debate on foreign policy does indeed affect all, because it curtails every citizen’s ability to question/challenge foreign policy—not only those active in the Palestine Solidarity Movement. Moreover, such a redefinition has major implications on how the right to dissent itself can be legislated away and silenced as racist by the state.

The Palestine Solidarity Movement continues to organize despite the conclusions of the CPCCA. However, more educational work needs to happen across movements and communities to explain that this reframing of anti-Semitism not only narrows the space for free speech and dissent for a few, but for all. As others have noted, these ideological redefinitions make it difficult to address real anti-Semitism as well. Salaita, for example, has asserted that conflation of Jews with Israel as a
totalizing discourse not only precludes justice in the Near East, but also weakens legitimate claims of anti-Semitism because it amounts to crying wolf – those who have heard decent and intelligent people repeatedly called anti-Semitic for condemning Israel’s ethnic cleaning become programmed into skepticism when the phrase anti-Semitism is uttered. (2006, p. 19)

This push to redefine anti-Semitism clearly illustrates an attempt at containment of a
movement that the state defines as a problem. To try and classify a movement for Palestinian rights as racist is itself an admission that it is easier to legalize censorship against a movement rather than engage in debate. While supporters of the silencing campaign claim that boycotts do not support respectful dialogue, they are the ones shutting down dialogue by legislating censorship.

**Anti-Muslim and Anti-Arab Racism in the Silencing Campaign**

The silencing campaign, while attempting to redefine anti-Semitism as criticism of Israel, also relies upon common sense racist conceptions of Arabs as backward and terroristic. The rhetoric of “extremism” was utilized in every case of silencing examined in this study, and was especially prominent when it came to Arab ethnocultural organizations such as the Canadian Arab Federation and Palestine House.

Looking at the CPCCA report, one can see how anti-Muslim and anti-Arab racism is central to the silencing campaign. The CPCCA final report stated, for example, that the “panel also heard that the twenty-first century has seen the rise of a new and concerning ideology, commonly referred to as Islamism, which is responsible for a substantial component of contemporary anti-Semitism” (2011, p. 18), adding that “witnesses testified that there is a small but prevalent minority in Canada who subscribe to the ideology of Islamism” (p. 19). This “Islamism” was described, according to the report, by Professor Robert S. Wistrich, as “the single, though not the only, major threat to the existence, physical and otherwise, of Jews today, but it is a much broader threat to Western society, to democratic norms, to civic culture” (p. 19). “Islamism” is explained as being “antithetical to Canadian values, advocating not only hatred for Jews, but also
the subjugation of women, and the justification of the killing of gay people” (p. 20). As argued earlier, civilizational markers and the proof of the superiority of liberalism increasingly references women’s rights and gay rights, used to demarcate liberalism from external others whose threat consists in their “backward” attitudes toward these rights. However, the identity of this “small minority” who espouses this ill-defined “Islamism” is never provided. As Cairns and Ferguson have argued, “proponents of the CPCCA also deploy language that plays to Islamophobic sentiments as well as a fear of complexity and intellectual culture that ‘others’ those who criticize Israel as irrational, extreme, and violent” (2011, p. 416).

The CPCCA report references the testimony by Dr. Fred Lowy, President Emeritus of Concordia University, who “argued that a very important reason for anti-Semitism on Canadian campuses, is a group of politically committed Islamist students who essentially mobilize support from within the Muslim student community and then within the general activist community for political purposes” (2011, p. 20). But despite all this talk of a “minority that supports Islamism” and groups of “committed Islamist students” creating havoc and fear on Canadian campuses, the report goes on to admit that we agree with Dr. Lowy and Dr. Levy, that Jewish students on most Canadian campuses are safe and do not experience generalized anti-Semitism in their daily lives on campus. However, we also agree with Dr. Levy, in that administrators have a responsibility to act even if only 1% of their population is affected. (p. 60) It is not a coincidence that the report relies on an “Islamist” threat and appeals to discourses that stigmatize Muslims as extreme and a danger to society, as not only is
there a “minority” out to get Jewish students, they are out to destroy “Western culture” and “Canadian values.” Although, to couch this in non-racist language, there is always that added caveat of, “I don’t mean all Muslims, or the Muslim religion, just the extreme ones.” By relying on such explanations for what it calls “Islamism,” the CPCCA report intends to, first, create fear of the Palestine Solidarity Movement and ostracize it, and second, make it seem like a marginal movement stemming from an “extreme” section of a community that does not adhere to Canadian values, rather than a popular movement combining individuals of all faiths and many atheists.

Therefore, the struggle to maintain a space for free expression of the Palestine Solidarity Movement is centrally an anti-racist struggle against a silencing campaign framed in a clash of civilizations logic. There is much work to be done on the functioning of Anti-Muslim and Anti-Arab racism in the Canadian context, work that is necessary for countering the common sense racism that prevails across the political spectrum. Fear of targeting has made anti-racist alliances across movements difficult to forge; yet it is essential that oppositional movements take seriously the fact that silencing and censorship act to fortify a specific kind of “race thinking” (Razack, 2008) that structures relations across society, not only in relation to Muslims and Arabs.

Balance, Dialogue, and the Constant Quest for Moderates

While casting the Palestine Solidarity Movement as “extreme,” and as outside of “civility” and “respectful norms,” proponents of the silencing campaign propose that a “balanced” approach based on “dialogue” between communities is more appropriate. The dialogue is meant to take place between “moderates” from both sides. Terms such as
balance and dialogue are appealing in an official multicultural atmosphere that promotes an idealized tolerance abstracted from power relations, reconceptualizing anti-racist and anti-colonial struggles in communal terms. The notion of balance, for example, speaks to the common misconception of the Palestinian struggle for self-determination as an endless historic conflict between religions, rather than a modern anti-colonial struggle.

The quest for finding balance, despite the clear power imbalance on the ground between Israel and the Palestinians, is in essence a discursive silencing tool aimed at obfuscating the reality of Western support for the Israeli state. Terms like balance and dialogue have to be interrogated, just as do terms like tolerance and inclusiveness, because, abstracted from power relations and taken at face value, they seem neutral. As noted, however, by Sears and Nadeau, such “invitations to dialogue are grounded in sets of unarticulated assumptions about the character of conflict, particularly that two parties of relatively equal power must reconcile through putting aside emotion and interchanging on a rational basis” (2010, p. 17). Yet the parties involved in the conflict over the colonization of Palestine are not equal. Thus, these are calls for balance and dialogue that leave the power relations where they already essentially are, and that consist of support for the continuation of oppression.

Interestingly, such calls for balance appear in relation to the Palestine Solidarity Movement, while Israel advocacy is normalized. For example, officials do not call for the Walk for Israel, a parade that takes up much of downtown Toronto, to be balanced. In any case, the application of this concept of balance in reality would mean that any time a Palestinian or a Palestinian Solidarity activist made a presentation, an equal number of
Israel supporters must be present to share their view. In relation to requests for balance from members of the York administration in the Mapping Modeless of Statehood and Paths to Peace conference, Masri wrote:

The vagueness of the concept could be easily manipulated by external groups and administrators, who could reduce it to a head count of “who supports what” with complete disregard for the goals of the academic exercise and the context of the discussions. Following the same logic of these critics, at every conference on racism there should be participants who present the point of view of the Ku Klux Klan, and at every conference on political economy supporters of a market economy and supporters of a historical materialism approach should be represented in equal numbers. (2011, p. 17)

In opposition to activism that questions the actions of the Canadian state, it is much more convenient to pose the issue in terms of two communities at odds with each other, with one side in particular even being at odds with Canadian values. In constructing and conceiving politics in communal terms, official multiculturalism helps to depoliticize activist narratives by communalizing them and proposing endless dialogue that does not address the real issues that the BDS movement aims to redress—namely, Israel’s violations of international law and Canadian support for such violations.

Notwithstanding the critique of an abstract notion of “dialogue” that draws false symmetry between Palestinians and Israel and exhibits confusion about the very nature of the conflict by framing it in religious rather than anti-colonial terms, the BDS campaign is not directed towards the Jewish community or Israel’s supporters in Canada and does
not require a dialogue with them. The campaign is engaging with the Canadian state and its institutions, pushing them to not be complicit in Israeli human rights violations. It is not an issue of two equal communities having a dialogue; it is a question of a group of citizens pointing to Canadian state complicity in Israeli violations of Palestinian rights. One could say that dialogue can take place with the state; however, how can such dialogue take place when the state itself has very clearly taken one side of the conflict? The state itself is shutting down dialogue and debate by insisting that one viewpoint is outside of permissible discourse.

As Palestinian activism is excluded, Israeli state policies are vigorously supported. While the state criticizes events like Israeli Apartheid Week for “lacking balance,” it actually tips the balance in favour of Israel by supporting it in international forums and by silencing dissent internally. The language of balance and dialogue is very prominent in the silencing campaign because it works to cast the Palestine Solidarity Movement as “extremist.” Therefore, an analysis of this particular discourse of silencing helps to constructively critique notions of balance and dialogue, replacing them with more nuanced understandings and language that disrupts the way power functions, centering imbalances of power as a starting point. This interrogation of the discourses of balance and dialogue is important across anti-racist movements.

Anti-Racist Alliances vs. Settler Solidarities

The cases outlined in this dissertation—from the attack on Israeli Apartheid Week, to the defunding of ethnocultural organizations and NGOs for their positions on Palestine, and finally, the attempts to ban Queers Against Israeli Apartheid from
marching in Pride Toronto—have serious implications beyond the Palestine Solidarity Movement, especially in a context of ongoing debates framed in a “crisis” of multiculturalism discourse.

Other social movements have begun to feel the brunt of funding cuts and discourses marginalizing their activism. For example, when asked about environmental groups getting government funding, Canada’s Prime Minister Stephen Harper said: “If it’s the case that we’re spending on organizations that are doing things contrary to government policy, I think that is an inappropriate use of taxpayers’ money and we’ll look to eliminate it” (Caplan, 2012). Alex Neve, Secretary General of Amnesty International Canada (English branch), explained that there has been a Campaign Against Advocacy and Dissent across Canada, and argued:

> What was at stake, I suggested, was the freedom and the ability of Canadians to vigorously advocate for the protection of human rights and other fundamental elements to social justice and a sustainable society – of all rights and concerns of all people – both here within Canada and abroad, and to do so without political interference, intimidation or manipulation. (2012).

Anyone imagining that repression of dissent would remain within the boundaries of solidarity relating to Palestine need only look to the streets of Toronto during the G20 protests to witness how the language of “extremism” is played out in the wider context to justify large police budgets and crackdowns on protests. The Office of the Independent Police Review issued a 300-page report about the police conduct during the G20 summit. Its director Gerry McNeilly explained:
What occurred over the course of the weekend resulted in the largest mass arrests in Canadian history. These disturbances had a profound impact not only on the citizens of Toronto and Canada generally, but on public confidence in the police as well. (Seglins, 2012)

However, the government refused to open any formal inquiry into the matter.

Under these circumstances it is crucial to ask, as Kundnani does in the UK case: “is there, then, any basis for overcoming the legacy of communal identity politics through building new alliances, not in the sense of paper coalitions but at the level of genuine solidarities rooted in community-based activism?” (2007a, p. 184). Understanding official multicultural policy as one of the strategies used for racializing communities, driving wedges between them, and weakening social movements that cut across them, opens possibilities for the crucial (re)building of alliances and the much needed assertion of an anti-racist politics.

When official multicultural policy enhances community leaderships that are defined more by their relationship to the state than by their base in the communities they claim to represent, anti-racist alliances must be forged at the grassroots level. The current moment necessitates an integrated solidarity framework whereby struggles for social justice take seriously the protection of liberal values like freedom of speech and civil liberties (which should never be taken for granted as they have themselves come about through struggle), as well as work towards alliance building between movements in a framework that understands the relations between settler-solidarities rooted in free market economics, racism, and military occupations. Such alliances should not replicate the
official multicultural model by seeking token representatives of community groups; rather, they must work to build communication across organizations on multiple levels.

When settler solidarities are grounded in continued colonization, neoliberal economics, increased militarism, and securitized/racialized migration, anti-racist alliances must invert this paradigm and stand for the exact opposite. An understanding of how silencing and censorship operate as mechanisms of state control over discursive space allows oppositional movements to formulate such integrated responses that address issues of war, racism (including racialized poverty), and civil liberties. Moreover, an understanding of how state funding acts to restrict and discipline dissent points to a fundamental need for oppositional movements to discuss sustainability outside state structures.

The key issue to grapple with in building anti-racist alliances and new sustainability models is how to advance this work from small activist circles to organizing wider, genuine alliances at a cross-community grassroots level—without falling into the trap of framing discussions and statements which rigidly adhere to the invocation of certain stock phrases and terms [that] run the risk of becoming ritualized assertions of a kind of stylized militancy that do not work toward building a broader base, and exclude or dismiss those who are not familiar with them, instead of seeking to build a critical social analysis drawing upon, and drawing in more and more people. (Choudry, Hanley, & Shragge, 2012, p. 3)

Such alliances are admittedly difficult to forge when neoliberalism’s insistence on
individualized and commodified social relations has permeated both social relations and culture, and in the context of inter-communal competition for state resources organized through multicultural policy. However, without such alliances it is difficult to conceive of any social justice struggle moving forward. As Krebs and Olwan have noted in relation to indigenous struggles and alliances with the Palestine Solidarity Movement, “failing to inform Palestine solidarity work in Canada with an understanding of native struggles is inherently detrimental, both to amassing effective support for the Palestinian struggle and to advancing liberation struggles within Canada for indigenous and non-indigenous people alike” (2012, p. 151).

As the case of Queers Against Israeli Apartheid illustrates, building alliances between the Palestine Solidarity Movement and queer activists helps to strengthen both movements. As Morgensen recently noted, “increasingly, settler states appeal to gender and sexual diversity to secure their rule, in the era of state multiculturalism absorbing social differences so as to neutralise their capacity to disturb national unity” (2012, p. 171). While “gay liberation” becomes a marker for civilized secular modernity, and highlighting homophobia among Muslim citizens is used as a tool for racializing them as inferior, Israel fosters an instrumental “gay friendly” image intended to “pinkwash” its violations of Palestinian human rights. Alliances across movements aid in deconstructing and countering any such crass instrumentalizations of queer politics that promote a homonationalist identity to aid in legitimizing and normalizing military occupations. As a counter to this, groups like Queers Against Israeli Apartheid have

acted and continue to act in synergy with Defenders of the Land, a Canada-wide
network of non-native allies to indigenous decolonisation struggles. Their collaborations mutually reference links between the Indigenous Americas and Palestine. The forging of such ties is a crucial complement to calls for Indigenous American-Palestinian solidarity; but to form effectively, such ties must be directly responsible to both Palestinians and Indigenous Americans. (Morgensen, 2012, p. 188)

There is, however, no shortcut to forging anti-colonial, anti-racist alliances; these only come about through a process of continuous debate, self-reflection, and active engagement. Unfortunately, oppositional movements are immune from neither conceptions of individualism embedded in a neoliberal ideology, nor ahistorical identity politics elicited by official multicultural policy. This has meant that cross-movement conversations are difficult to hold without descending into divisive versions of identity politics that fetishize differences at the expense of solidarity, rather than discussing them in an ongoing process of learning from one another.

Fundamentally, attempts at alliance building must be grounded in mutual respect and understanding that, by virtue of living in a settler colony that is also an imperialist state, organizers are implicated in different ways and at various levels in settlement and capitalism; but, it is only in acknowledging this and moving to work together in building broader movements beyond small circles of activists that the attack on dissent can be curtailed. All too often, differences on tactical questions and an aim for a “pure,” “radical” politics divorced from the real lives of people tend to hinder movements. Making denunciations across groups tends to be the easier route to take, when compared
to the difficult work of beginning longer-term education and dialogue about tactics and levels of implication in the colonial and racial project that is the Canadian state.

As the state works to fragment society into individuals, political actors into apolitical communal groupings, and oppositional movements into NGOs reliant on state support and funding, movements must develop a counter-strategy. As the Palestinian Boycott National Committee statement issued in the wake of the mass mobilizations across city squares around the world in 2011 stated:

Our aspirations overlap; our struggles converge. Our oppressors, whether greedy corporations or military occupations, are united in profiting from wars, pillage, environmental destruction, repression and impoverishment. We must unite in our common quest for freedoms, equal rights, social and economic justice, environmental sanity, and world peace. We can no longer afford to be splintered and divided; we can no longer ignore our obligations to join hands in the struggle against wars and corporate exploitation and for a human-friendly world community not a profit-maximizing jungle. (BNC Secretariat, 2011)

**Shifting the Paradigm: Palestine Solidarity Anti-Colonial and Anti-Racist**

It takes a significant amount of patience and persistence to do the educational work necessary to foster a wide understanding of the Palestinian people as a nation engaged in an anti-colonial and anti-racist struggle for self-determination, especially when state officials, mainstream media, and university administrations all work diligently to uphold a view that the issues of the Middle East are “complex with a long history.” As Abu-Laban and Bakan argued regarding BDS specifically, the
effectiveness of such a civil society initiative, as a strategy of resistance and cross-border solidarity, can be usefully framed as an anti-racist movement that contests a post-second world war hegemonic construction of state ideology, in which Zionism plays a central role and serves to enforce a racial contract that hides the apartheid-like character of the state of Israel. (2009, p. 31)

Putting forward an anti-colonial framework is in itself a counter-narration. Thus, organizing for action and solidarity in reference to the call for BDS from Palestinians helps give coherence to international efforts and grounds them in an anti-colonial framework. However, success depends also on grounding the organizing work in a broader understanding of struggles for social justice in both the Middle East region and inside Western states.

To challenge the racism against and the silencing of the Palestinian narrative, solidarity efforts must themselves be decolonized as well. For example, all too often solidarity efforts rely on anti-Zionist Jewish speakers and/or academics who study the region as the “more objective” voices and who are more likely to be heard as spokespeople of the movement. For far too long the compass for international solidarity efforts was the soft Zionist or anti-Zionist left in Israel, rather than Palestinians. While anti-Zionist Jewish voices are crucial in the solidarity movement because they reclaim from the Israeli state the power over every individual Jewish voice and reclaim a Jewish history rooted in struggles for social justice, this cannot be done at the expense of silencing Palestinians. Otherwise, it is merely an inversion of the Zionist narrative and not a challenge to it. By the same token, while the mainstream media and political bodies
might find it more palatable to deal with non-Palestinians, this type of common sense racism must be countered across oppositional movements, not normalized by accommodating it. This is not to claim that there is one uniform Palestinian voice or that single individuals can claim to be the one authentic voice of all Palestinians, but simply that solidarity with Palestinians must at least be anti-racist and hold Palestinians as political actors—not victims seeking charity, but a people in struggle calling for solidarity and giving it in return. As Hanieh argued,

Palestinians are not victims but a people in struggle. This struggle goes beyond the borders of the West Bank and Gaza Strip: it is a central component of a broader regional fight. It is impossible to understand events in any country of the Middle East today without situating the national context within the single, coherent and unified offensive that the US and other imperialist states are waging against the peoples of the region. (2008)

With all the changes across the Middle East, it is necessary to shift the paradigm and frame Palestine Solidarity in the tradition of other anti-colonial, anti-racist struggles and understand its significance within broader regional and international politics. This can effectively happen through sincere, decolonized, anti-racist alliances across social movements.

The silencing campaign against the PSM is not a new departure in Canadian history. Indigenous sovereignty struggles, oppositional social movements, and racialized migrant communities have historically faced various forms of censorship put in place to undermine their work. Although the silencing campaign against the Palestine Solidarity
Movement has its own trajectory, understanding this silencing in the context of Canada’s multicultural policy can help all oppositional social movements to begin to go beyond the routinized support for official multicultural policy, and begin to challenge its fragmentation and racialization of communities across ethnic lines, asserting a new anti-colonial discourse based on social and economic justice rather than a “recognition” and “tolerance” that the state can dictate, manipulate, and sanction. To truly extend rights of social and racial justice to those outside the mainstream of Canadian society, it is necessary to resist the state’s attempt to assimilate specific narratives, and its concomitant disciplining and silencing of others. Fundamentally, this must entail tackling the hierarchies of political and economic power that have long characterized Canadian society. Without substantive change to these relations of power, the dominant framing of multiculturalism will continue to act as a veil for the status quo, condemning those outside the mainstream to a position of permanent marginalization justified in the name of equality, justice, and tolerance.
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