TIME, TECHNOLOGY AND TROUBLEMAKERS: ‘FAST ACTIVISM’ AND THE ALTER-GLOBALIZATION MOVEMENT IN CANADA

KAMILA PIETRZYK

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE YORK UNIVERSITY TORONTO, ONTARIO

JUNE 2013

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Abstract

This study documents and critically evaluates the history of the alter-globalization movement in Canada. It makes a contribution to existing scholarship by providing the most comprehensive historical account available of the movement's major mobilizations during the past fifteen years. The study also deploys an interdisciplinary theoretical framework to examine the largely overlooked temporal dimensions of contemporary activism in the age of instant communication. While recent years have seen a proliferation of scholarship lauding the advantages of "new media activism," of which the alter-globalization movement is an example *par excellence*, most of this literature neglects what are arguably more pressing questions regarding the ways in which contemporary social actors conceptualize and organize time, and the implications of these hegemonic temporal norms for patterns of collective action. To redress this gap, this study evaluates the social, cultural and political implications for activism of the process of time-space compression, driven by the basic dynamics of capitalism and facilitated by digital communication technologies. Using evidence collected from semi-structured interviews, it therefore not only offers the first systematic and in-depth account of the history (and pre-history) of the Canadian alter-globalization movement, it also demonstrates that the social acceleration of time facilitated by new media technologies encourages a tendency toward "fast activism" by diminishing three activist time-related practices in particular: building sustained movement infrastructure, learning from the past, that is, collective memory, and thinking reflexively about the future, that is, long-term strategic planning. The study's conclusion offers some tentative suggestions for improving the political capacities and potentials of today's anti-status quo troublemakers.
For my parents
Acknowledgements

I want to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Dr. Leo Panitch for his peerless intellectual guidance and consistently going the extra mile to support my academic ambitions. Special thanks are due to Dr. Lesley Wood and Dr. Stephanie Ross, for their valuable (and speedy) comments and suggestions concerning this project. I also wish to acknowledge Dr. Edward Comor, who first inspired me to pursue this rewarding research path. Many thanks also to the members of my defense committee.

In addition, I wish to sincerely thank my generous respondents, without whom this project would not have been possible, as well as all of my friends and family, whose unwavering support in good times and bad continues to be deeply appreciated.

Finally, I would also like to thank the wonderful staff in the Department of Political Science, as well as the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Provost of York University for their support.
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Introduction

In June 2010, thousands of people took to the streets of Toronto in protest as the leaders of the world's most powerful states – the Group of Twenty (G20) – met inside the heavily fortified Metro Toronto Convention Centre amidst the twenty-first century's first major economic crisis. The meeting agenda focused above all on reaching agreement regarding spending cuts designed to socialize the cost of huge government bailouts handed out to banks and financial corporations in the previous two years. The themes, targets and tactics of the protests against the G20's agenda as well as the drastic level of police repression resulting in the largest ever mass arrests in Canada inspired many to reflect upon the recent history of resistance to neoliberal austerity in this country – yet no comprehensive account of similar protests in the Canadian context has been produced. The aim of this dissertation is precisely to redress this gap by providing the most comprehensive historical account available of the so-called anti-, or better yet, alter-globalization movement (AGM) in Canada. ¹

Commonly considered to have emerged following a mass protest in Seattle against the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1999, the international alter-globalization movement has been an important site of political contestation over the past fifteen years. During this time, a large body of literature has emerged to document the movement's primary manifestation in the form of spectacular, large-scale protests against organizations of

¹ Many movement scholars and activists alike eschew the term “anti-globalization” as unduly negative, given that the movement was never opposed to globalization per se; rather, protesters object to the capitalist vested interests that have shaped globalization's trajectory. Alternative names used to refer to the movement include the global justice movement, globalization from below, and the alter-globalization movement (AGM). Though a scholarly consensus has yet to emerge concerning the choice of a single name, according to Alain Touraine (2011), the use of the French-derived term “alter-globalization” is becoming increasingly widespread; what is more, the acronym AGM is more wieldy than the comparatively awkward “GJM” (global justice movement). Since it, too, denotes participants' interest not merely in opposing neoliberal globalization but in inventing alternatives, the term “alter-globalization movement” will be used throughout this study.
global governance such as the Group of Seven (G7), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as specific free trade and investment treaties. If most of this scholarship examines the main protest-events and campaigns of the AGM across borders, in recent years the unique trajectory of the AGM in the United States, France, Germany, and other European democracies has been documented by leading social movement scholars (see della Porta 2009). However, so far the unique history of the alter-globalization movement in the Canadian context has attracted attention primarily from popular writers (e.g. Klein 2000b; Barlow and Clarke 2001), and a handful of Québécois scholars who have written on the history of the alter­mondialisme in La Belle Province (e.g. Canet et al. 2010, Dufour 2006). By supplementing these scant existing accounts with extensive original empirical research, this study offers the first in-depth history of the Canadian alter-globalization movement, making a major contribution to the literature on (Canadian) social movements in the contemporary era.

Beyond the need to fill a lacuna in the history of Canadian extra-parliamentary, left-wing activism, the AGM is an important and worthwhile object of study also because it was the first major social movement to emerge in the age of digital communication. As examined in more depth in the ensuing chapter, the AGM activists' pioneering and continually expanding use of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) has been extensively interpreted as one of its key advantages and distinguishing features, ushering in a new approach to civic engagement known as “new media activism.” As activists began to deploy the global internet to network across borders, movement and media scholars alike began to extol the unprecedented “means, speed, and intensity of communication” among the various groups involved as key to explaining the novelty of global justice struggles (Routledge 2000: 25).

However, while it is important to recognize the instrumental value of new media for
contemporary activism, celebratory accounts of “new media activism” tend to overlook what are arguably more profound and pressing questions regarding the ways in which social actors, including activists, conceptualize and organize time, and the implications of these hegemonic temporal norms for patterns of collective action.

Recent decades have seen an increase in scholarly as well as popular interest in the question of time and temporality, a welcome recognition of the dialectic between time and space that had been forgotten, if temporarily, in the midst of the globalization debate. Thanks to Manuel Castells’ theorization of “timeless time” (2001), David Harvey’s “time-space compression” (1989), Anthony Giddens’ “time-space distanciation” (1991), as well as popular titles such as Faster: The Acceleration of Just About Everything (Gleick 2000) and In Praise of Slowness (Honore 2004), the central role of new ICTs in facilitating the speed-up of daily life in the context of capitalism has been established. However, as Judy Wajcman has observed, although temporality “has become a central issue in the social sciences and much has been written about the increasing lack of control over time experienced in postmodern societies,” there remains “a dearth of empirical research informing these debates” (2008: 73). Certainly, no existing account examines the temporal norms, values and practices of contemporary anti-status quo movements: the few extant critiques of the implications of time-space compression for collective action are limited, primarily anecdotal and/or speculative (e.g. Hassan 2009, Scheuerman 2009). Thus, while this study’s primary contribution to knowledge is to fill a gap in the collective memory of Canadian activism, it also highlights overlooked temporal dimensions of collective action, in particular the alter-globalization activists’ values and practices related to building sustained movement infrastructure, thinking reflexively about the future, that is long-term strategic planning – and learning from the history of past struggles, that is collective memory.
Chapter Outline

The aim of the first chapter is to establish the dissertation’s theoretical framework by bringing together insights from social movement, media, time, and collective memory studies. The chapter begins with an overview of the central features of the alter-globalization movement, and in particular, its internet-mediated, networked, fluid and flexible structure. Though I acknowledge the main advantages of “new media activism,” I argue, using the insights of “time studies,” that activists in high-speed, highly networked, “advanced” capitalist societies like Canada, are subject to unprecedented temporal pressures linked to the proliferation of ubiquitous, time-annihilating technologies in the context of capitalism. Drawing upon Canadian communication theory, elaborated in the ensuing section, I argue that this shift has powerful implications for the predominant habits of thought and orientations to (collective) action by promoting a cultural neglect of the past and the future in favour of a preoccupation with the present and with short-term concerns.

To provide some substance to this claim, and to establish the theoretical framework for chapter 5, in the ensuing substantive section I delineate the historical evolution of the dominant conceptions of time in Western culture, beginning with the dominant future orientation. Next, I turn to the changing temporal norms related to the past, specifically in connection to collective memory. In what follows, I discuss the other temporal concepts that inform my analysis of the AGM’s history, namely the question of the value and practice of building sustained movement infrastructure – not just organizations but also lasting coalitions – and the concept of protest cycles. Informed by this theoretical framework, in the final section of this chapter I elaborate with more precision the research questions animating this study. I also explain its methodology.

The study’s ensuing, substantive chapters utilize the above framework to document and
analyse the history of the AGM in Canada. The second chapter begins by delineating the pre-history of the movement, in particular the anti-free trade campaigns of the 1980s and 1990s, as well as the three “counter-summit” protests organized in Canada in that period. The second half of the chapter looks at the AGM’s immediate precursors, namely the 1997-98 campaign against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), which signalled the growing importance of internet-based cross-border networking, and the 1997 protest in Vancouver against the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC), which demonstrated a growing and powerful interest among the new generation of activists in disrupting the summits of global governance organizations using direct action.

The third chapter demonstrates that the peak of the Canadian cycle of alter-globalization protest transpired at the turn of the millennium. It began with the mobilization against the IMF and the World Bank in Washington, D.C. and against the Organization of American States (OAS) in Windsor, Ontario, in the spring of 2000: two mobilizations, two months apart, that helped to build the momentum leading up to the Canadian movement’s climactic “moment of convergence” a year later in Québec City. The middle part of this chapter explores the protests against the Summit of the Americas in April 2001 in some depth. Upon subsequently analysing the impact upon the (North American) movement of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, I confirm that the changed political climate effectively halted the cycle's forward momentum, and that it altered the political landscape of the AGM’s major mobilization: the summer 2002 protests against the G8 summit in Kananaskis, Alberta. The conclusion of the chapter discusses the “spillover” from alter-globalization to anti-war mobilizing which climaxed in the winter of 2003 in the form of spectacular but short-lived Global Days of Action against the US invasion of Iraq.

Given the ensuing period of demobilization and disorientation, the fourth chapter skips forward several years to examine the next major moment in the history of the movement,
this time directed against the North American “three amigos summit” in Montebello, Québec, and more specifically, against the proposed Security and Prosperity Partnership, designed to extend NAFTA with new security measures. Suggesting a possible return of alter-globalization movement in Canada, the timing of the summit coincided with the beginning of the financial crisis that would balloon into a full-blown economic crisis two years later, and provoke anti-austerity protests in Toronto in 2010. As examined at length in the final part of the chapter, the Toronto G20 mobilization manifested both continuity and ruptures vis-à-vis the AGM.

The fifth and final chapter of the study deploys the theoretical insights elucidates in the first chapter to focus on two of the Canadian AGM activists’ time-related practices in particular: learning from the past, that is collective memory, and thinking reflexively about the future, that is long-term strategic planning. I show how the pervasive sense of time scarcity and the collapse of the hegemonic time horizons exacerbated by the proliferation of instantaneous ICTs influence the activists’ value and enactment of these practices.

Finally, the study’s conclusion offers a review of its main findings as well as some programmatic recommendations for ameliorating the capacities and potentials of contemporary anti-status quo movements.
Chapter 1: Time, Media, and Movements

To begin, let us review the key features of the movement in question. Given the alter-globalization movement's heterogeneity, perhaps its core characteristic, it has been frequently referred to as a "movement of movements" — a moniker that aptly conveys the wide variety of groups united in opposition to the inequalities and irrationalities of neoliberal capitalism. Amory Starr, who wrote one of the definitive books on the AGM, noted that the "basic idea" animating the movement was that "people all over the world are commonly threatened by environmental degradation, abuse of human rights and unenforcement of labour standards, and that powerful global alliances can be formed to make corporations and governments accountable to people instead of elites" (2000: 83).

Alter-globalization activists also commonly share a concern that democracy is threatened by globalization. They argue that the power possessed by transnational capital undermines the capacity of local and national communities to make their own decisions concerning their social, economic, and political priorities (Ross 2003). This concern manifests in the AGM's "trademark" tactic, namely spectacular, large-scale demonstrations against institutions of global governance, which reflects many activists' belief in need to confront and disrupt the agents of globalization by "closely shadowing the periodic landing of global flows of wealth and power in their meeting places" (Castells 2001: 142). These elite governance bodies include the Group of Seven (G7), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the international financial institutions (IFIs): the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Since their meetings take place "behind closed doors" with little or no civil society consultation, they are perceived by critics as profoundly undemocratic and illegitimate.

During the past fifteen years, a considerable body of research has emerged to document the role of the new information and communication technologies (ICTs) in facilitating
contemporary social movements' pioneering use of fast, flexible, and decentralized forms of organization (e.g. Meikle 2002, Rheingold 2002, Juris 2005, Drache 2008). According to these scholars, thanks to the new, instantaneous ICTs, globally networked social movements – of which the alter-globalization movement is the example par excellence – have become powerful political forces. As Nick Dyer-Witheford (1999) argues persuasively in his book Cyber-Marx, the internet has permitted previously dispersed and isolated points of resistance to “rhizomatically” connect and combine with each other with unprecedented speed and ease, without ever gathering in one physical location.

Digital ICTs are also commonly lauded for introducing novel tactics to the toolkit of the alter-globalization movement, or, to use Charles Tilly's apt term, its “repertoire of contention” (2006). These include online petitions and virtual sit-ins, as well as “hactivism” in the form of denial-of-service attacks, mail-bombings, and website defacement or cloning (for instance, the Yes Men's famous cloning of the World Trade Organization website). Furthermore, the internet performs a “cognitive function” by disseminating information not covered by the corporate media, thus helping to raise public awareness about critical social justice issues (della Porta and Mosca 2005: 167). Using self-produced websites and extensive email networks, activists are now able to bypass corporate media filters and agendas in order to “get the message out.” In the context of the alter-globalization movement, many scholars have celebrated the activist-run, open-source Indymedia activist news network as participatory and thus inherently more democratic than corporate media (e.g. Pickard 2006).

The flexibility afforded by the new ICTs constitutes another major theme informing most celebratory accounts of new media activism. Conducive to what some have likened to “guerrilla” warfare, this flexibility has been heralded as one of the AGM's greatest sources of strength. As noted in a widely cited report produced by the RAND Corporation, for instance, since the alter-globalization movement has no central command
structure, it is "multtheaded" and "impossible to decapitate" (Arguilla and Ronfeldt 1996). A related concept is that of "swarm intelligence" or simply "swarming." According to activist scholar Rodrigo Nunes, this designates what happens when "the dispersed units of a network of small (or perhaps some large) forces converge on a target from multiple directions...then disperse and recombine, immediately ready to recombine for a new pulse" (Nunes 2006). The intent animating the use of the concept of swarming in connection with activism is to stress that no formalized decision-making mechanisms are necessary in "rhizomatic" resistance (Deleuze and Guattari 1986). Scholars influenced by post-structuralism in particular have deployed the concept of swarm intelligence to suggest that the decentralized, autonomous activity of "the multitude" will compound to generate a new social order spontaneously and, crucially, "from below" (e.g. Hardt and Negri 2004, Chesters and Welsh 2005, Escobar 2004).

The emphasis placed on decentralized, non-hierarchical decision-making constitutes a particularly significant feature of the alter-globalization movement. The movement's basic concern with democracy has manifested not only in the activists' opposition to the secretive decision-making processes shaping globalization, but also to hierarchy and exclusion in their own internal organizing processes. A rejection of leadership, the espousal of decentralized structures such as affinity groups and spokescouncils, and respect for diversity (particularly in the realm of tactics) have all been widely adopted within the movement as a reflection of this deeper commitment. The foregrounding of internal process has been particularly salient within a significant sector of the movement associated with an anti-capitalist variant of anarchism, which places the emphasis on how

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2 Associated with the anarchist tradition and grounded in its commitment to the principles of decentralization and autonomy, affinity groups emerged a key feature of the AGM. An affinity group consists of about five to twenty people, who decide to work together as an autonomous unit on direct action or other projects. In the context of AGM anti-summit organizing, each affinity group would send a representative, or a "spoke," to larger decision-making meetings called spokescouncils, where decisions concerning mass actions would be made by consensus.
social inequality reproduces hierarchy and domination (Ross 2003).³

Significantly, according to Rodrigo Nunes (2006), while social and political groups have practiced horizontal ways of organizing in the past, they were always precluded from doing so on a large scale due to the lack of material means through which to proceed. The “large scale massification” of digital media, in particular the “many-to-many” medium of the internet, facilitated a widespread shift toward decentralized, horizontal, networked forms of organization; thus, Nunes identifies the development of new ICTs as the “chief material cause behind the 'renaissance' of openness and horizontality” (ibid). While leading movement scholars agree that all social movements are essentially networks, rendered relatively coherent by virtue of having shared goals and a collective identity (e.g. Diani 2000), they also admit that “[b]y comparison with past movements...the 'movement of movements' is marked by still more pronounced network features” (della Porta et al. 2006: 28). In short, the proliferation of digital communication technologies has elevated decentralized “logic of networking” (Juris 2005) to a new level, placing it at the core not only of the AGM but also of much if not most contemporary activism in general.

While much contemporary scholarship lauds the advantages of decentralized, networked forms of activism, this mode of engagement has its limits and weaknesses that have not gone entirely unnoticed. Chief among them is the emergence of informal leadership

³ While Stephanie Ross (2003) notes the increased appeal of an anti-capitalist variant of anarchism among AGM activists, Barbara Epstein (2001) sees “a certain intellectual fuzziness” that allows them to simultaneously uphold elements of anarchism, Marxism, and liberalism, leading to “a habit of holding various positions simultaneously which, if more rigorously examined, would prove incompatible.” She argues that the anarchist mindset of today's young anarchists is relatively removed from anarchism's theoretical underpinnings, and of the great debates between anarchists and Marxists, most of which took place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Instead, this neo-anarchism is more correctly identified as an anarchist sensibility, with its “egalitarian and anti-authoritarian perspective” and emphasis on a decentralized organizational structure.
structures and challenges related to decision-making (e.g. Ross 2003, Klein 2002). These challenges will be elaborated as they become manifest at various points during the ensuing historical narrative.

It is also important to acknowledge that, over the past decade, the celebratory rhetoric regarding the emancipatory potential of the new ICTs, evident in much existing scholarship on new media and social movements, has been tempered to some extent by several significant lines of critique. Canadian media scholar Vincent Mosco, for one, cautions against what he has famously termed “the digital sublime” and connected to humanity's tendency to place blind faith in the revolutionary capabilities of every new major wave of technological innovation – the so-called “technological sublime” (2004).

Many scholars have also pointed out that despite claims about the “global village” facilitated by new media, access to the new ICTs is heavily influenced by class, gender and other indicators of social status, producing persistent “digital divides” (e.g. Norris 2001). Furthermore, when it comes to the content of activist-produced media, the frequent lack of strict (or any) editorial standards diminishes the quality and credibility of activist-produced media content – a problem commonly raised in relation to the Indymedia network, the most widely cited example of horizontally organized, alternative media source of the AGM (and now largely defunct).

Finally, while activist websites, videos and other online materials have certainly proliferated over the past decade, they remain largely marginalized within “mainstream” cyberspace dominated by corporate channels of trivial entertainment and mindless diversion. In pointing this out, critics have sought to challenge the celebratory accounts of the internet as a “virtual public sphere,” that is a space wherein web users can be informed and mobilized by being exposed to new and critical ideas (see Papacharissi 2002). As argued by Cass Sustein (2001), the ongoing “balkanization” of cyberspace,
involving filtering and ease of customizing online content, makes it less likely that web surfers will stumble across critical content that challenges or contradicts their established point of view.

While all of the above lines of critique usefully problematize the laudatory accounts of new media's emancipatory power, a major gap persists in this literature: up to this point, very little academic attention has been devoted to the ways in which evolving communication media shape habits of thought and patterns of action by (re)structuring hegemonic time-space relations. In order to better understand the dynamics of these relations, it is helpful to consult the insights of an approach to communication studies known as medium theory.

**Medium Theory and the Political Economy of Time**

The renowned media scholar Raymond Williams once described the influence of the material conditions of any system with the expression "the setting of limits and exertion of pressures" (1973: 4). From the perspective of this study, this expression conveys admirably the dialectical relationship between a medium of communication, time, and the character, cognition and the cultural capacities of the society in which it operates.

In Canada, this type of understanding had already been developed by Harold Innis, an economic historian-cum-communications scholar, who argued that how human beings conceptualize themselves, their world and their interests is shaped by various media which influence, and are in turn influenced by prevailing political-economic relations. Depending on its structural characteristics, each medium militates in favour of the formation of some mental structures and habits – and consequently, certain orientations to action against others (Innis 1950, 1951).
Innis was particularly interested in the influence of communication media in relation to how different civilizations apprehend and organize themselves in terms of time and space – the two fundamental indices of the human experience. According to Innis, most civilizations tend to have a cultural orientation towards either space or time, one closely connected to the predominant communication media. He held that modern Western history started with a “time-biased” tendency and moved toward being dangerously “space-biased” given the general trend in innovation, i.e. towards ever “lighter” and more ephemeral communications technologies which are highly efficient over distances but of short duration. In order to trace this connection across civilizations, Innis developed the concept of media “bias,” arguably the most significant heuristic device found in his later writings (Comor 2001a: 275).

To elaborate, Innis believed that, given their structural capacities, media tend to privilege, or be biased towards, either time or space. Media that are easy to use and transport, and that have an abundant capacity to store information but are not durable (e.g. paper) were space-biased to the extent that they tended to give rise to, and support, space-biased cultures, which Innis characterized as “secular, present-minded, and intent on territorial expansion and administration of vast territories.” These technologies facilitate the transmission and control of information over an ever-expanding space. Paper, for instance, lent itself to the creation and administration of the Roman empire – its lightness enabled an army of officials to coordinate their activities over vast expanses of space, simultaneously reducing the amount of time for decision-making. By contrast, media that are relatively intractable (e.g. stone carvings), difficult to transport, durable, and that are limited in their capacity to store information were deemed by Innis to be time-biased because they support and induce time-biased cultures, characterized as traditional, hierarchical, and geographically confined (see Babe 2004: 384).

Innis saw a tension or balance between time and space biases as key to cultural
efflorescence and the preservation of knowledge for perpetuity. To the predominance of space-biased media in the context of commercial impulses (especially vis-à-vis Canada's imperial neighbour), Innis attributed a cultural lack of interest in problems of duration – what he deemed the "obsession with present-mindedness" characteristic of modern Western culture (Innis 1951: 76). Innis made this assessment in the 1950s, prior to the proliferation of television and digital media, yet an application of Innisian medium theory to these technologies would highlight their role in permitting the expansion of (capitalist) control over space through shrinking time-frames. From this perspective, the Internet and related media can be considered relatively space-biased.4

It is crucial to emphasize that a key strength of medium theory is its holism: it recognizes that media function in a relationship of reciprocal (dialectic) influence with the structure of power relations in a given society. Trained as a economic historian, Innis recognized that the development and use of a new means of communication into a specific society will shape, and be shaped in turn by, the political economic conditions prevailing in that society at the time. In other words, one cannot evaluate the impact of new technologies, including new media, without also examining the material foundations of society involving its means of production, distribution and consumption, and the structured relationships related to them. These conditions continue to modify how a medium functions even as they themselves undergo transformation due to how people use the medium in question. For example, Innis was initially enthusiastic about the radio's potential to foster a temporal counter-balance to the spatial bias of the commercial press;

4 While the concept of media "bias" shaping societies may bring to mind technological determinism (and some have accused Innis of just that), this interpretation represents a common misreading of his work. This is because Innis understood space and time biases as "as shorthand designates for the supports and constraints presented by different communication media for prevailing mentalities and institutions throughout history... [T]o say that Sumerians were time-biased is not to reduce it to the medium of communication; it is to reveal the way the material context and available technologies of the time constrained or supported existing institutions, social groups and mentalities" (Deibert 1999: 286).
however, with radio’s rapid commercialization, it started to be used primarily to maintain rather than engage its audience, contributing to a volatile and consumerist outlook. As with all media, the bias of radio “both affects and is affected by the intellectual and material capacities of vested interests – including listeners” (Comor 2001a: 115).

In the context of the contemporary world order, capitalism expands because it has to, as a system organized around competitive market relations, which manifest themselves “in the continuous threat that each capital poses to every other, a threat that can only be effectively countered in each enterprise itself adopts an aggressive, expansive strategy. Thus, the sheer necessity for self-preservation also forces capitalist to expand” (Heilbroner 1980: 118). Marx could already see that the spread of railways, telegraph and steam navigation would tend to accelerate the means of communication and transport, leading to periodic bouts of “annihilation of space by time” (Rosenberg 2005: 21-22). Famously commenting on the capitalist impulse to revolutionize the means of transportation (themselves media of communication, broadly defined), Marx noted how capital must “strive to tear down every spatial barrier to...exchange, and conquer the whole earth for its market” and “annihilate this space with time, to turn over capital in the ‘twinkling of an eye’” through the spread of railways and the telegraph (Marx 1973: 538-9). In a system where “expand or die” is the fundamental condition of existence, there are two basic dynamics: the drive “towards the reduction if not elimination of spatial barriers, coupled with equally incessant impulses towards acceleration in the turnover of capital” (Harvey 2000: 98). In brief, the faster capital is turned over, the faster it can realize profit – the faster that profit can be reinvested, the faster it can expand in its turn. To put it simply, as Benjamin Franklin did over two centuries ago, time is money.

In the contemporary era, the emergence of instantaneous, time-and-space annihilating digital technologies constituted one of the ways in which capitalism responded to the collapse of Fordism in the mid-1970s, and the subsequent need to develop greater
flexibility with respect to labor processes and markets, products, and patterns of consumption. The ensuing shift to the post-Fordist "regime of flexible accumulation" was partially achieved through the rapid deployment of new organizational forms and new technologies of production that brought to the fore entirely new sectors of production, new ways of providing financial services, new markets, and above all, greatly intensified rates of organizational innovation (Harvey 1989: 147).

These and other organizational shifts constitutive of post-Fordist restructuring benefited enormously from the development and implementation of new, time-and-space annihilating ICTs, which enabled capitalists to improve efficiencies and extend their control of various markets across geographical space. By using ICTs to obtain "time leads" over competitors, corporations can obtain potential "extra-profits" before the competition catches up. For instance, the ability to "beat the competition" in accessing the latest trend, product, or scientific discovery implies the possibility of an important competitive advantage and thus constitutes a vital aspect of successful profit-making (ibid: 159).

Moreover, instantaneous, global communication systems have also played a key role in neoliberal globalization by facilitating what some scholars refer to as "the new international division of labour." Thanks to the new technologies, transnational corporations can seek to maximize competitive advantage by arranging, for instance, to locate their headquarters in New York City, design facilities in Virginia, and manufacture in the East Asia, with sales campaigns co-ordinated from a London office.

Finally, instantaneous ICTs have played a key role in the transnationalization and liberalization of finance. Informational facilities are now in place for the continuous and real-time flow of monetary information, the round-the-clock trading in stocks, bonds, and currencies, which bounce from exchange to exchange in response to slight shifts in the
market, as computers handle the transactions automatically for traders through complex algorithms (Webster 1995). This unprecedented volatility makes the capitalist system ever more susceptible to crisis.

To reiterate, the way in which media are developed and deployed depends upon pre-existing political-economic conditions obtaining within the society in question as well as the material and intellectual capacities of their users. This point is critical to understanding that Innisian medium theory is not an exercise in technological determinism: rather than causing people to think or act in specific ways, people using the Internet perpetuate or modify biases that already exist. In our political-economic and historical context, the Internet enables and exacerbates rather than creates or determines the short-term, ahistorical and unreflexive cultural perspectives that are now so pervasive. As this study seeks to demonstrate, these are troubling insofar as they inhibit practices involving relatively non-urgent and time-consuming practices related to reflection as well as immanent critiques concerning social movements' weaknesses and political potentials.

**Social Acceleration**

As stated in the introduction, thanks to the writings of leading social scientists, including those of David Harvey on "time-space compression" that proceeds from the capitalist application of new technologies to usher in a more flexible regime of accumulation, the question of evolving time-space relations has been gaining in currency in recent years. Virtually all scholars interested in the topic agree that the process of “time-space compression” or, as I will refer to it, following Rosa (2003), as the general process of “social acceleration,” goes back at least to the mid-eighteenth century (e.g. Koselleck 1985, Kern 1983) and the spread of time-annihilating communication and transportation technologies such as the telegraph and the railroad in the service of capitalism. However, these scholars also agree that in recent years, the proliferation of instant, digital, mobile
media technologies has resulted in a qualitative shift in the hegemonic temporality of Western society – away from the linear and relatively predictable “clock time” of the industrial age (e.g. Thompson 1967, Mumford 1964) to what Robert Hassan has termed “network time,” a “new and powerful temporality” predicated upon the unprecedented penetration of daily life by networkable devices (2003: 134). I contend that this shift has powerful implications for patterns of collective action. But first, what exactly is social acceleration?

According to an influential account by the German scholar Harmut Rosa (2003), while social scientists exploring theories of modernity have analysed extensively the processes of individualization, rationalization, differentiation and domestication of nature, they have overlooked the processes of social acceleration that run across these four dimensions of society. Most usefully, Rosa examines what it means to say that Western societies are “acceleration societies” by separating social acceleration into three analytically and empirically distinct categories. The first and most easily measurable category is that of technological acceleration, which echoes Innisian medium theory in that it refers to the speed-up of transportation and transmission, as historically it became easier to communicate more quickly over large geographic spaces. The second category pertains to the acceleration of social change, which means that the rate of societal change itself is changing, involving a reduction in the stability of institutional (including work and family) life as well as accelerating shifts in fashions, lifestyles, social relations, and forms of practice. The final category is the acceleration of the pace of life itself, defined as “the number of an individual’s episodes of action and/or experience per units of time” (Rosa 2006: 448). Speed-up in this third category of experience can be measured using both a subjective and objective approach. On the “subjective” side, recent studies indicate that more and more people are feeling perpetually rushed and under pressure; on the objective side, scholars have conducted studies to measure the social tendency to compress actions and experience, for instance, by “multitasking.” As Rosa reports, both approaches
demonstrate that a profound sense of time scarcity has become pervasive in recent years. As confirmed by Judy Wajcman, “time pressure and time poverty” have become “major preoccupations of contemporary sociology and of social science more generally” (2008: 61).\footnote{While cross-cultural studies of temporality such as that carried out by the social psychologist Robert Levine (1997) show that different places in the world retain elements of a slow-paced culture, these are arguably increasingly marginalized as the speed imperatives of capitalism continue to extend to all parts of the globe.}

However, while social movement scholars routinely acknowledge time as a vital resource of collective action, so far, the question has failed to generate more than passing remarks. Even scholars working in the tradition of Resource Mobilization Theory have so far failed to take seriously the implications of time scarcity on movement capacities and potentials.\footnote{Resource mobilization theory (RMT) was developed by American social scientists in the 1970s, in response to the social-psychological tradition of the Chicago school, which regarded collective action as an irrational reaction to rapid social change (Cohen 1985). Against this view, the RMT approach insisted that activists are rational actors whose choice to become engaged in collective action is motivated by individual interests and guided by a proper evaluation of the costs and benefits of participation. The other innovation of RMT was to supplement the study of tensions and structural conflicts with a focus on the conditions which facilitate the transformation of discontent into mobilization. At its core, RMT focuses on analyzing the processes through which the resources required for collective action are mobilized; this includes material resources such as money and services and non-material resources such as faith and friendship available to a group (della Porta and Diani 1999: 7-9).}

Yet, as will become abundantly clear in the ensuing chapters, “time poverty” shapes in significant ways the priorities of movement activists, their habits and patterns of action.

In contemporary “high-speed” society, it is not only the availability of time as a resource of collective action that is at stake: the shift to “network time” also implies changes to the hegemonic “temporal orientations,” namely the relative value placed upon the past, the present, or the future. According to some scholars, these differ based on individual personality, religious background, climate, and nationality (e.g. Levine 1997; Zimbardo 2008). Rather than delve into individual-level differences among my respondents, I
follow Innis in considering changing concepts of time on the broad level of civilizational culture, specifically his argument concerning the historical shift away from tradition, ritual, community, and custom and toward spatial control and expansion, commercialism, and present-mindedness – and the key role of the predominant communication media (broadly defined) in informing this shift. This should help to clarify that while contemporary generations of movement actors make increasingly heavy use of ICTs (see Stalker and Wood 2013), variation in the amount of time individual activists devote to using digital media is therefore not directly determinative of their specific patterns of civic engagement. Rather, I argue that since social movements and their actors do not develop or function in a vacuum, they are bound to reflect, while also trying to resist, the cultural biases of the societies in which they operate – including the hegemonic norms and values regarding time. As noted by Roth, social movements emerge, and remain tied to their specific “historical terrain”: as a result, they “never act outside of the imagined logic of the system” and can therefore be taken as indicators of society’s condition (Roth 1994 cited in Blühdorn 2006: 27).

In what follows, the insights of “time studies” are used to nuance and supplement the Innisian hypothesis concerning the present-mindedness of contemporary “space-biased society” by shedding light on the evolution of the dominant time perspective in modern Western culture, starting with the future.

Modernity and The Future Time Perspective

As should by now be clear, the ways in which human beings conceptualize and organize time and space are not static; rather, the dominant temporality within a given society evolves in response to changes in the broader socio-economic context, and particularly in the dominant systems of communication. This necessarily extends to the dominant conceptions or valorizations of the future, with implications for the ability of individuals
and collectivities to make long-term plans (as explored in relation to the AGM in chapter 5).

As declared by Yogi Berra, "the future ain't what it used to be." It is certainly true that the popular conceptualization of the future has changed dramatically over the past several hundred years. In ancient and medieval societies, the future was widely understood as controlled and pre-articulated by the weight of the past and tradition, or governed by the influence of Christian eschatology – or both simultaneously (Carvounas 2002). This dominant cosmology explained the apparent uncertainties of the future with reference to magical or divine forces; it promoted a worldview in which the future was shaped by transcendental rather than human intervention. Every earthly event and the fate of every individual was therefore understood as predetermined according to divine providence, thus even the most trivial events happened for a reason, as part of the divine plan. An individual's position within the social hierarchy was likewise predetermined by this grand design. As Reith (2004: 387) explains, this position was "established by God, continued by heredity, and backed by tradition," thus "utterly inflexible." In pre- and early modern Western society – which Innis characterized as "time-biased" due to its emphasis on continuity and tradition – religious dogma played a major part indeed in shaping the predominant notions of the future, particularly the Christian imperative to bear one's earthly cross humbly in life, and to always turn the other cheek in exchange for eternal reward in the afterlife. An attempt to utilize earthly time to improve one's condition or the well-being of society would have been regarded as heresy, a sin of pride offensive to God's perfect plan. This "otherworldly image of the future" was formalized by the Church by "praising all heavenly pursuits and denigrating any purely secular endeavors, especially those that threatened to alter the economic, social, and cultural landscape" (Rifkin 1987: 157). This is what Boyd and Zombardo (1997) called the "transcendental future orientation," one which Marx derided as the "opiate of the masses" (1970) and blamed for stonewalling the working-class revolution.
In the late seventeenth century, the future determinism of the Middle Ages started to give way to a new dominant temporal orientation – a gradual shift from “time-biased” to “space-biased” civilization that Innis connected to the development of ever-lighter and more portable communication technologies enabling improved control over space through shrinking time frames (Innis 1950). Though Innis did not examine the impact of this shift on the dominant concepts of the future, other scholars have analysed the vested interests that structured the development and use of increasingly space-biased media, paving the way for what Hagerstrand (1985) called the “colonization of the future” (cited in Reith 2004: 388). Notably, in economics, the rise of the new merchant class encouraged a new, more active engagement with the future’s uncertainties. The idea that divine providence would oversee the unfolding of events was no longer satisfactory to those whose goods might be at stake; as argued by Reith, the “creation of profits depended on foresight and planning, which in turn demanded consideration of a future that was neither fixed nor beyond human control” (ibid). Time was no longer seen as the domain of the Almighty; it became “merchants' time,” a commodity to be used, saved or sold to make profit. The future became a mental category to which a rational cost calculus could be applied.

On the social and cultural plane, the advent of the Enlightenment also helped to advance the radical reorientation in the dominant future time perspective. First, the “grand narrative” of progress and the perfectibility of humankind which emerged with the Enlightenment replaced the idea of nature’s cycles or Christian salvation in the afterlife. Instead, it promised better things to come on earth, as encapsulated by the Enlightenment’s idea of the progressive movement of history. As elaborated by Carvounas (2002), the Enlightenment ensured that the past came to be seen as largely supercedeable and no longer continuous with the present or constraining of the future. Furthermore, the Enlightenment introduced a scientific epistemology based on a Newtonian model of the universe as a machine functioning according to fixed laws of cause and effect. In this
model, future events were seen as being caused by occurrences in the past, from which they proceeded in a linear fashion (Reith 2004: 389).

The cultural sense of human control over the future increased in line with the Industrial Revolution. On the one hand, the accelerated technological progress of the nineteenth century, involving the spread of railways, the first instantaneous media of communication (the telegraph and telephone), and the bicycle and the automobile, gave rise to widespread concern about the quickening pace of life; on the other hand, humanity continued to hold onto a strong sense of control of the future (Kern 1983). Eloquent and impassioned evidence of this confidence in what Reinhart Koselleck (1985) famously called the specifically modern concept of an “open future,” can be found in the cultural texts of the era, such as the ebullient odes to speed and machinery penned by the Italian Futurists or the writings of philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, the Enlightenment thinker par excellence.

Strong faith in a better tomorrow is also clearly evident in the writings of Karl Marx. As elucidated brilliantly by Marshall Berman (1988), Marx was a modern philosopher through and through. Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, which insists that the point of philosophy is not just to interpret the world but to change it, offers only one hint of the philosopher’s radical future orientation. Faith in the revisability of the future led Marx to insist that the exploitative present would inevitably collapse amid the pervasive social volatility wherein “all that is solid melts into air.” The transient present was therefore but the “pre-history” of human exploitation coming to an end, ushering in a new and emancipated future spurred on by class struggle as the true motive force of historical development (Carvounas 2002: 85).

The thought of Marx was likewise inspired by the Enlightenment’s teleological view of history, or telos, namely the idea that the future is unfolding inevitably in a progressive
direction, to result eventually in a what Marx hoped would be classless society. The activism at the heart of Marx's future vision, however, means that he believed this teleological view of history would only come to fruition thanks to human effort – as Carvounas (2002) points out, while Marx believed that the past continues to cast a shadow and that people do not make history under the circumstances of their own choosing, he maintained that humans are nonetheless capable of creation and innovation through conscious action and our potential for free activity – what he called the human "species being."

In the final years of the nineteenth century, the Enlightenment's faith in progress was institutionalized in the form of socialist parliamentarism, as the modern mass party emerged as the main model of achieving an ideal social order. But not all the elements on the Left were of like mind: anarchists, who had participated in the divisive debates of the First and Second Internationals, continued to view the state and its institutions as fundamentally corrupt and hierarchical structures. From the classical anarchist perspective, the state cannot be reformed; rather it must be abolished in widespread spontaneous uprisings of the oppressed classes. The fastest and most efficient way of achieving the goal of insurrection was by way of "propaganda of the deed," which, in the eyes of some anarchists at the time, would be most easily achieved by political assassination. Consequently, the turn of the twentieth century saw a number of European royals and members of the ruling class perish at the hands of anarchists. While the ensuing trials and executions of anarchists were often clearly unfair and secured them some sympathy from other leftists, the currents of anarchism based on propaganda of the deed diminished significantly in influence and appeal (Lerner 1982). Though anarchism continued to attract adherents in the years to come, as a political tendency it remained marginalized, as working with and within the state structures rather than against them became the primary vehicle of achieving social transformation. It would take several decades for this to change, when it became increasingly clear, starting in the mid-
twentieth century, that capitalism excelled at co-opting progressive political parties, and that socialist parliamentarism was accordingly incapable of radically transforming society. This realization went hand in hand with a new way of thinking and experiencing time.

The Politics of Here and Now

Just as the centre of temporal gravity, so to speak, started to shift from the past to the future over two centuries ago, in the second half of the twentieth century it began to shift yet again. A number of significant developments helped to bring about this development. First, the idea of progress that had permeated Western culture since the Enlightenment diminished significantly in the wake of famine, genocide, and two devastating world wars. Then, starting in the 1970s and 1980s, the advent of postmodernism and the associated “linguistic turn” in literature and philosophy dealt a further blow to the twinned “grand narratives” of telos and progress. From the post-structuralist perspective, words do not represent the external world; instead, they refer primarily to themselves (the “self-referentiality” of language). This disconnect between “the real” and discourse animates the post-structuralist aversion to claims of objective knowledge, which posits that “where is no ‘truth’ there can only be versions of ‘truth.’” Since any given “sign” holds an infinite multiplicity of meanings, none more or less valid than the next, post-structuralists uphold and celebrate differences in interpretation, in ways of life and in values (Webster 1995: 173-75).

It is precisely this preoccupation with differences, grounded in the post-structuralist critique of “totalizing” or “grand” narratives, that provided the philosophical underpinning for the so-called “New Social Movements” (NSM). Widely understood as expressing “identity” over “interest,” the NSMs emerged at least in part due to the growing disappointment with actually existing socialism that erupted in the French events
of 1968 (Nunes 2006). The Stalinist experience and other failures of state socialism also played a part in leading movements – of women, indigenous peoples, and sexual minorities, among others – away from Marxism's all-important structural fault line between the proletariat and capitalist classes and towards an emphasis on identities and lifestyles as the progressive force of societal innovation (Blühdorn 2006).

Significantly from our temporal perspective, the NSM also rejected the progressivist telos of the “Old Left” – the ontological position that history unfolds inevitably toward greater human freedom and emancipation via ongoing class struggle – in favour of a “prefigurative” ethos of living and seeking change in the here and now. In insisting upon change in the here and now, the NSM were also reacting against orthodox socialism's insistence upon the superiority of one struggle over another and the associated need to wait until “after the revolution” to achieve their particular aims.

To be sure, if they demanded change in the here and now, it is also true that many New Social Movement retained elements of formal organization and looked to the state to produce the social changes they demanded. In Canada, the women's movement in particular continued to make strong demands of the state – and the mid-twentieth century anomaly that was the welfare state obliged. However, this openness to cooperating with civil society actors was itself short-lived: as the ideology of neoliberalism became increasingly dominant beginning in the late 1970s, the state cut short its support of social groups and movements, and placed them on the defensive where they remain today. The generations that came of political age in the ensuing decades – notably, members of the generation of so-called Millennials whose energies powered the AGM – would no longer experience a state willing to address their social justice concerns. The significance of this point will become clearer in relation to the growing importance of anarchism to the AGM and contemporary activism in general beginning in the late 1990s, as examined in more detail in the next chapter.
The Collapse of the Future

If the political developments of the mid-twentieth century prompted social movements to reject the socialist telos and the associated faith in progress in favour of a politics focused on the present, in recent years, the cultural focus on the present has arguably become pathological. Though he lamented the "obsessive present-mindedness" related to the rising dominance of time-annihilating technologies, Innis's concern was not with the future. As noted by Wernick, in Innis's day, "the foreclosing of the future in the social imaginary was still partially covered up by progress myths" (1999: 279). In our own time, the temporal horizons have contracted, leading a number of scholars to assert the existence of a "crisis of the future" (Pomian cited in Leccardi 1999: 6). While eastern philosophy has long advocated living in "the now," ours is a fraught, problematic kind of present, one governed by precarious time, that is a "time without possibilities," in which it seems impracticable to engage in rational planning or anticipation because there is no way to get a solid grip on the world (Leccardi 2003: 36).

As both Stephen Kern (1983) and Marshall Berman (1988) have explained so well, this sense of volatility has been a feature of modernity for well over a century. Again, what is qualitatively new today is the unprecedented proliferation of instant mobile media technologies driven by the capitalist imperative toward speed, which, as we saw in a preceding section of this paper, has transformed how human beings conceptualize and organize their relations in time, including the future time dimension. Movements do not operate in a vacuum; they reflect the dominant values and norms of a given society. In the context of capitalism, the imperative to accelerate the speed of daily life shapes the sense of the long term vision and future in the activist imaginary. Following John Turpey (2001), one is accordingly wont to wonder: whatever happened to those early twentieth-century expressions of optimism in the socialist future trumpeted in the Italian socialists'
Avanti! or the German Social Democrats’ Vorwärts – and where do we find their analogues today?

For some scholars (e.g. Leccardi 2003), the answer lies with the alter-globalization movement. Is this really the case? I pose this question with more precision in the penultimate section of this chapter, wherein I elaborate the central research questions related to the future and the practice of long-term strategic planning explored in chapter 5 of this study. For the time being, I focus on the other dimension of time relevant to my evaluation of contemporary activism’s capacities and tendencies, namely the past and, by extension, the practices related to collective memory.

Media, Memory and Movements

As I have been arguing, conceptions of the past and the future are socially constructed – what is more, they are inter-related. As Stephen Kern observed in his influential book The Culture of Time and Space: 1880-1918, “the future is dependent on the past for its content of images reassembled and projected ahead” (1983: 90). Likewise, effective strategic planning depends on the cultural value placed on knowing history and the interest and ability to learn from one’s mistakes, to evaluate successes and failures, and to ascertain what was learned about allies, opponents, and the movement actors themselves (and then, hopefully, to transmit that knowledge onto others). From the perspective espoused in this study, the “obsession with present-mindedness” that Innis linked to the growing predominance of space-biased media in Western culture suggests that practices related to the past, in particular those of collective memory, are also neglected within contemporary activism. As aforementioned, this hypothesis is evaluated empirically in chapter 5 of this study; in what follows, my aim is to lay down the theoretical groundwork for that discussion by delineating the connections between time, culture, memory, and historically contingent media of communication.
In illuminating the role of media in the structuring of hegemonic temporal norms and, by extension, the value and practice of the past, that is history and memory, among contemporary movement actors, this study serves to fill a gap within the growing field of collective memory studies as well as that of "media memory" (see Neiger, Meyers and Zandberg 2010). As revealed by even a cursory review, the writings comprising this growing literature have hitherto focused mainly on applying the discursive approach to the study of specific media texts. By contrast, this study's ensuing empirical examination of collective memory among contemporary movement actors is grounded in the "medium theory" approach associated with the Toronto School and Innisian medium theory in particular.

As noted by leading social movement scholars Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani, historical memory plays an important role in successful activist organizing (1999: 184-85). However, scholarly discussion on this topic within social movement studies has been largely limited to analyses of movements for national self-determination, and on the nation as a mnemonic community, as evidenced, for example, in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger's (1992) famous conceptualization of the role of "invented traditions" in securing the legitimacy of European states following the demise of absolutism. Yet, the importance of collective memory to social movement studies extends beyond this role. Within social movements, the practice of collective memory, comprising both remembering and commemoration, influences interpretation, which in turn mediates the opportunities that arise and the actions that are taken. Moreover, not only do activists inherit movement structures and models from their predecessors; at the same time, they hopefully learn from the errors of movements that came before them and seek to go beyond them. In other words, the capacity to consult the past and apply lessons can significantly influence the trajectory and outcomes of collective action.
To be sure, technology is not the sole mediating factor when it comes to collective memory. Accordingly, any account of the cultural value and practices related to history and memory must take note of factors such as the philosophical discrediting of progressivist 'grand' narratives, including the aforementioned rejection of the socialist telos, and the rise of the ethos of prefigurative politics, which entails a commitment to implementing changes in the here and now rather than awaiting the fruits of a far-off revolution. Moreover, the conditions of life in what Zygmunt Bauman (2000) called "liquid modernity" make for additional problems with the long-term retention of activists, as they adapt to the exigencies of the post-Fordist, flexible regime of accumulation and move from place to place in the perpetual pursuit of new opportunities. Finally, collective memory transmission is impeded by generational conflict, manifest in the paternalism of the older generation and the knee-jerk anti-authoritarianism of many of today's youthful radicals. These factors exacerbate the ideological divide between the labour movement and the often anarchist(ic) and youth-based, grassroots activism, and impede the transmission of first-hand experience between generations of movement activists. Yet, acknowledging the complexity of social, economic, and cultural conditions that shape activists' collective memory practices need not prevent us from examining the role that media play in process of consolidating and transmitting collective memory – as I demonstrate below, historically, this role has been significant indeed.

To begin, it is imperative to clarify what is meant by the concept of collective memory, alternatively termed social or cultural memory (see Olick and Robbins 1998). Most available definitions of the concept reflect the influence of the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, widely acknowledged as the founder of collective memory research. A disciple of Emile Durkheim, Halbwachs sought to move beyond the view of memory as a faculty of the individual mind, dominant among the leading thinkers of his time; instead, he insisted that individual memory cannot be formed outside of the broader socio-cultural contexts, or frameworks. In his seminal 1925 work Les Cadres Sociaux de la Memoire
(The Social Frameworks of Memory, partially translated in 1992 in *On Collective Memory*), Halbwachs argued that collective memories are tools used by social groups to establish their centrality in individuals' lives.\(^7\) By creating a common vision of history and of the world, groups strive to stabilize collective identity and promote a sense of solidarity among their members. The role of collective memory in establishing a sense of collective identity illustrates Halbwachs' roots in the Durkheimein school – it also highlights its importance to the study of social movements, given that collective identity has been theorized as playing a key role in movement's emergence, trajectories, and outcomes (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 284). Re-member-ing is therefore a key process in fomenting continued collective action.

A leading contributor to this growing field, German scholar Astrid Erll (2010) has usefully delineated the different yet intersecting dimensions of memory. Based on an understanding of culture as a three-fold framework involving the social (people, social relations, institutions), material (artifacts and media), and mental aspects (ways of thinking, mentalities), she proposed that "the idea of 'cultural' or collective memory can serve as an umbrella term comprising 'social' memory (the starting point for memory research in the social sciences), 'material or medial memory' (the focus of interest in literary and media studies), and 'mental or cognitive memory' (the field of expertise in psychology and the neurosciences)" (Erll 2010: 4; original emphasis). The latter kind of memory operates on the micro level of the individual, while the former are located on the level of the social and medial. As she correctly identifies, these distinctions are merely

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\(^7\) Research on collective memory initiated by Halbwachs waned after World War II, but was reinvigorated beginning in the 1980s with the emergence of so-called "new memory studies" (Erll, 2010: , pp. 8-9). This body of scholarship has served to advance the theoretical and empirical study of collective memory, notably through the work of German cultural scientists Jan and Aleida Assmann, and the French historian Pierre Nora, among others. Even more recently, the establishment of an academic journal devoted to memory studies as well as a Palgrave Macmillan book series on the subject has solidified the study of collective memory as an exciting area for interdisciplinary research.
heuristic, since in actuality, “all three dimensions are involved in the making of cultural memories” and “the cognitive and social memory continuously interact” (ibid: 5).

Erll’s comments above are relevant for our purposes for two main reasons. First, she calls attention to the inextricable connection between organic and collective memory: a key premise in an ensuing section of this chapter which examines the influence of digital ICTs on the individual ability to remember. Secondly, and relatedly, Erll points out that existing approaches to the study of collective memory have tended to be segregated by disciplinary boundaries. It is the strength of the medium theory approach that it allows for a holistic approach to the study of all three levels. Before elaborating, it will be useful to provide a brief sketch of the intimate link between media of communication and memory.

As virtually all scholars interested in the topic recognize, collective memory depends on communication media, which constitute its means of external expression, storage and circulation. The first medium used to transmit historical knowledge across generations, of course, was oral speech. Unable to set down their thoughts in writing, members of pre-literate societies depended upon a variety of mental tools, or “mnemotechnics,” such as rhyme, rhythm, cadence and meter, to aid them in the effort of retaining vital cultural information. Consequently, by our standards, the mnemonic capacities of individuals living in pre-literature cultures were superlative indeed, and the cultural value placed on memorization correspondingly very high. The main task of education was to train, cultivate and improve the memory, and those who developed outstanding memories were esteemed as living libraries and the carriers of sacred traditions (Gandz cited in Watson 2006: 355). In light of this, it comes as little surprise that the ancient Greeks worshipped Mnemosyne, the goddess of memory, as the mother of all the Muses.

Given the high cultural premium placed on memory and memorization, the invention of writing prompted concerns about the effects of outsourcing memory to external media. In
a famous passage from *Phaedrus*, for example, Plato rails against the Greeks' growing dependence on the technology of writing, warning that it would reduce their mental capacities. Despite Plato's reservations, however, memory and memorization continued to be valued for centuries to come, and the mnemotechnics described by Frances Yates (1966) in her influential book *The Art of Memory*, were widely employed through the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and Enlightenment. As printed works proliferated following the invention of the printing press in the sixteenth century, they were seen not as a replacement but rather as a supplement to the oral model (Esposito 2010: 187). So-called "commonplace books," for instance, were commonly used to enable memorization. As Carr (2011) explains, these were used as portable notebooks, in which their owners would transcribe quotations in longhand, and rehearse them regularly, to ensure that the information remained fixed in their mind. The passages were like "kinds of flowers" to be plucked from the pages of books, and preserved in the pages of memory (cited in ibid: 178). In fact, the "classical view" of memory as key to the transmission of cultural heritage inherited from the Greeks persisted until the close of the nineteenth century. Thus, when the philosopher William James gave a lecture to a group of teachers in 1892 stating that "the art of thinking is the art of remembering," he was "stating the obvious" (ibid: 181).

Today, thanks to digital technologies, there is little perceived need to commit anything to personal memory since information can be quickly located online. To give just one example, thanks to cell phone technology, hardly anyone today can be expected to know the phone numbers of friends and family “by heart.” In contrast to the technology of writing or printing, the Internet is now widely perceived “as a replacement for, rather than just a supplement to, personal memory,” culminating a century-long trend in thinking about the human mind as a machine (ibid: 180).

In considering further the connection between media and memory and their historical co-
evolution, it is yet again instructive to consult the insights of medium theory. As we have already seen, this approach is interested less in the content of media than in their broader social, political-economic, and psychological implications. This perspective effectively examines the “inside of history” – it looks at how people's ways of thinking and acting are related to the material conditions set by historically contingent social structures, including the systems of communication technology.

In this light, Carr's insights above concerning the devaluation of memory and memorization corresponding to the improvements to communication technology can be seen as mirroring those articulated by Innis over half a century ago. Influenced by the wave of neo-Hellenism that swept through North American academia in the inter-war period, Innis held in high esteem the oral tradition of the ancient Greek culture, whose wide deployment of mnemotechnics facilitated the transmission of cultural heritage and ensured its efflorescence. He viewed the oral tradition as “both fecund and sterile in a fashion exactly contrary to the written tradition... [I]t had the ability to disseminate ideas but was obliged to depend on oral sources for creativity in thought” (Watson 2006: 353).

The disintegration of the oral tradition in modern society was, for Innis, accelerated by mechanical mass communication – the reading of books, newspapers and magazines, listening to radio, watching films. “The quantitative pressure of modern knowledge,” he wrote, “has been responsible for the decay of oral dialectic and conversation” (1995a: 351). The process of systematizing and amplifying the reproduction of contemporary (mostly commercial) sources of information – what Innis (1995a) called “the mechanization of knowledge” – involves significant implications for intellectual and cultural capacities insofar as it fosters a “dispossession of time and the resources of memory” and renders marginal “nonrational” forms of knowledge, including history, myth, and the oral tradition (Berland 1999: 305).
Today, over half a century after his death, Innis's insights concerning the impact of information technologies on the human psyche are being borne out by a growing body of scientific research. While some observers continue to wax enthusiastic about the superior ability of the generation of “digital natives” to process information quickly and to “multitask,” neuroscience has put a serious challenge to these claims by demonstrating the deleterious implications of the daily application of immersive, ubiquitous, and instantaneous communication technologies for their human users’ intellectual and reflexive capacities.

Echoing Innis, scientists say that this is because these ICTs tend to promote and develop certain mental skills and habits at the expense of others — including memory. For instance, after reviewing fifty studies on the effects of different types of media on people's intelligence and learning ability, developmental psychologist Patricia Greenfield concluded that while we are generally becoming better at visually rotating objects in our minds, there is a price to be paid for our sharper spatial-visual intelligence, namely a decrease in attention spans and the ability to concentrate (cited in Carr 2011: 141).

A permanent state of distraction, facilitated the proliferation of mobile media, makes it more difficult to absorb and retain information. Drawing on scientific literature, Carr explained that it takes about an hour for working memory to become consolidated into long-term memory in the “deep storage” of our brains, as new protein strings are formed via a phenomenon known as “neuroplasticity.” “The key to memory consolidation is attentiveness,” he argued. “However, the unstoppable flow of images and information bombarding us via our various digital media overwhelm our working memory, and inhibit the formation of long-term memory.” In light of the above, Carr concluded that “the Web is a technology of forgetfulness” (ibid: 193).

Another study done by neuroscientists in Tokyo in 2001 linked severe memory loss
experienced by increasing numbers of young people to a growing dependence on computer technology. A preliminary study of one hundred people between the age of twenty and thirty-five revealed that serious problems with their memory afflict more than one in ten. Those afflicted report an inability to recall names, written words or appointments; the severity of their memory problem has even forced some to leave their jobs. The researchers argue that devices like electronic organizers “lead to diminished use of the brain to work out problems and inflict ‘information overload’ that makes it difficult to distinguish between important and unimportant facts.” “It’s a type of brain dysfunction,” said Toshiyuki Sawaguchi, the university’s professor of neurobiology. “Young people today are becoming stupid” (Norton 2001: A1).

The changes to mental habits related to memory wrought by revolutions in communication can be better understood by foregrounding the key role that media play in the structuring of hegemonic temporal norms and relations. As I have already discussed, it has become a commonplace in debates about contemporary society that core social and economic processes are undergoing profound temporal changes, with the general rates of social change and the pace of life intensifying dramatically. These shifts carry profound implications for the capacity of social movement actors to enact collective memory. This is because consulting the past, whether by looking to previous meeting minutes or tracking down former activists, etc., requires time and effort – in other words, things that activists, perpetually preoccupied with responding to the most urgent tasks and issues, feel that they simply cannot spare. When faced with growing and competing demands on their time, the tendency among contemporary activists is to relegate to the permanent backburner activities that are considered relatively slow, time-consuming, and above all, non-urgent, such as collective debriefing and reflection. Instead they tend to attend first and foremost to the most pressing and immediate logistical demands of organizing the next action du jour. There is rarely time or energy left over to engage in deeper, critical, reflexive or historical thought, especially since, as the ensuing chapters will show, the
major effort of organizing mass street protests typical of the alter-globalization movement tends to leave activists exhausted and "burned out."

Yet, according to folk wisdom, those who do not learn from history are bound to repeat it. Susan Ellis (2003) laments the lack of institutional memory in the "volunteer sector," arguing that "[n]ew ways of doing things seem to spring up without any consciousness of what happened in the past, and newcomers often initiate change simply because of their own preferences or the wish to establish a 'new administration.' Many fail to ask an important question first: Why and how did we end up where we are now?" (2003). While she acknowledges the importance of avoiding getting bogged down in past failures, she insists that "we are all too busy to reinvent the square wheel or duplicate the hard efforts of predecessors."

Likewise, in a post on the activist online forum *infoshop*, activists Cobarrubias and Casas (2007) confirm a lack of collective memory and historical awareness among activists. They identify an "unhealthy lack of trying to reflect on what has been done (actions, campaigns, movements, etc.), learn lessons, share those lessons and tools with others, and in a more long-term way recuperate genealogies of movements' struggles." They further observe that

Activists do not know how to learn from their history - how to keep it alive - or even how to produce and share or own history with others... Often, even simple things like keeping track of a collective's activities, being able to share its history with others, are left by the wayside in the grind of daily activist work or organizing response actions. Groups that are fighting against the same exact targets don't know what people three or four years ago did, what worked and what didn't... [T]he question of a lack of historical memory - not only of what movements did 100 or 70 years ago but of what they did 10 & 20 years ago (Cobarrubias and Casas 2007).

The preceding comments raise a number of questions concerning the practices
related to collective memory within contemporary activism. As with the preceding section on the future and planning, these questions are specified at the end of this chapter.

But first, the ensuing section takes up some of the themes discussed at the beginning of this chapter in order to consider another temporal dimension that informs this study's historical account of the AGM, namely durability, in particular vis-à-vis the AGM's definitive organizing structure, namely the network.

**Durability and Networks**

As discussed above, the proliferation of digital communication technologies over the past fifteen years has placed the logic of decentralized networking at the heart of the AGM – and arguably, much if not most contemporary activism in general. The leading theorist of "network society," Manuel Castells, observed that:

> the "anti-globalization movement" does not have a permanent, professional organization, does not have a center, a command structure, or a common program. There are hundreds, thousands of organizations and individuals, around the world, converging in some symbolic protests, then dispersing to focus on their own specific issues – or just vanishing, to be replaced by new contingents of newly born activists (2001: 142).

Given the growing number of activists incorporating the internet into their everyday routines through e-mail, websites and social media platforms, for Castells, the AGM "is not simply a network, it is an electronic network, it is an internet-based movement" (ibid: 141).

To stress the fact that networks "emphasize the shifting and temporary nature of many connections," Cumbers et al. (2008) argue against the use of the term "movement" in
relation to the AGM, and propose replacing it with their own concept of “Global Justice Networks” (GJN). Compared to more traditional social movements, which have been “based around a more permanent sense of collective and shared identities associated with ongoing struggles,” GJNs “are non-permanent and unstable assemblages, where there are no clear beginnings and end points. They can be conceptualized as systems of multiple temporalities with chaotic and multiple branching points, so that people, actions, ideas spill from one network to another” (ibid). The ephemerality of activist networks deserves closer attention; indeed, sustainability, for some, is the very thing upon which typologies of collective action hinge.

In particular, Sidney Tarrow’s widely cited definition of a social movement entails an often-repeated but rarely fleshed out temporal dimension. To Tarrow’s mind, true social movements are sustained interactions, “both rooted in domestic social networks and connected to one another more than episodically through common ways of seeing the world, or through informal or organizational ties” (1998: 184). The question of durability thus fundamentally informs Tarrow’s classification of various forms of transnational contention. In his classic book Power in Movement, Tarrow insists on the need to distinguish between temporary and sustained forms of cross-border activism; according to his schema, the former category includes transnational diffusion and exchange while sustained forms encompass transnational issue networks as well as what he would consider true social movements (see Tarrow 1998: 184-189). Given the high cost of air travel and the fact that communication media such as email lists conduce to impersonal, weak ties only, Tarrow concludes that the “conditions necessary to produce a sustained [transnational] social movement...are hard to fulfill” (ibid: 185).

Significantly from our temporal perspective, in his subsequent writing, wherein he commented upon the activities of contemporary transnational activists, Tarrow noted that “[t]heir variform and shifting organizations, their tendency to produce rapid and rapidly-
liquidated coalitions, their focus on short- and medium-term issues rather than fully fledged ideologies do not produce standing activist commitments or deeply held loyalties” (cited in Bennett 2004: 128). As I will show in the ensuing chapters, this assessment also applies to the Canadian alter-globalization movement: although the organizations (unions, NGOs) involved in the movement have persisted, as have some interpersonal connections among individual activists who have remained engaged, the networks and coalitions constitutive of the movement have dissolved in almost every instance. This argument is supported by a number of social movement scholars who argue that new media offer new opportunities for international collective action but are not equally conducive to the development of stable, long-lasting movement infrastructure (e.g. Diani 2000, Clark and Themudo 2003).

Any attempt to provide a nuanced account of the value of building durable movement organizations (as well as maintaining individual commitment to one organization or issue over the long term) needs also to take into the postmodern fragmentation or multiplication of identity. While in the modern and pre-modern era, one's place in the world and life trajectory was largely fixed by the past and tradition, today, the “self-reflexive” individual is free to remake herself many times over in the course of a single lifetime (see Giddens 1990). The recent proliferation of digital communication technologies has permitted a further multiplication of identities, which some scholars have lauded as potentially emancipatory “identity play” (e.g. Turkle 1997). This multiplication has profound implications for collective action; it means that there is less emphasis on developing an identity as a member of a single movement or organization, effectively lessening the value placed upon creating sustained movement organizations over the long term.

Indeed, for some observers, a major part of the attraction of networked activism – of which the AGM is a prime example – is precisely that it allows for a “more personalized and hybrid sense of self-identity,” compared to more traditional class or party politics that
involved “submerging one's identity within a larger mass and developing a collective consciousness” (Cumbers et al 2008: 186). Kevin McDonald's (2002) suggestion of a shift from class solidarity to what he calls “fluidarity” captures the essence of this development. As suggested above, a generational tendency is emerging whereby activists increasingly eschew long-term commitment to one organization or issue in favour of lending temporary support to the “Next Big Thing” in activism.

In his analysis of how “communication regimes affect civic engagement,” Lance Bennett et al. (2011: 835) confirm that a generational shift has occurred in recent years, away from what he calls the hitherto dominant “dutiful civic style” – of joining organizations, taking cues from older people and officials, and acting out of a sense of responsibility and duty – to an “actualizing” style of engagement. Embraced by the “online generation,” the self-actualizing mode of activism does not require long-term commitment; instead it relies on peer networks that organize civic action using new media that maximize individual self-expression.

Relatedly, one of the central preoccupations of much of contemporary activism (at least in advanced capitalist, postmodern societies) is a hedonistic focus on instant gratification and personal experience. As noted by the Canadian cultural critic Hal Niedzviecki, “How many of the mostly middle-class Westerners who protested at the anti-globalization rallies of the early millennial period were in attendance at least as much to be there as to 'work for change?'” (2004: 218; original emphasis). It would be unfair to say that that activists at such protests are mainly interested in having a good time; as the ensuing chapters demonstrate, much heart-felt effort and genuine idealism undoubtedly factors into the work of today's activists. But for many activists and youth in particular, activism arguably serves as a vehicle to “reinvent themselves and affirm their specialness” (Niedzviecki 2004: 221).
This development is understandable to the extent that the identity of human beings in postmodern consumer society is being defined in largely neoliberal economic terms vis-à-vis unique consumer profiles. The centre of social movement activity is therefore no longer the political alternative, but *alterity*, the desire of individuals to be different from the system and to demonstrate, perform and experience autonomy and agency (Bluhdorn 2007). The dominant pattern among the current generation of activists (at least in advanced capitalist countries) seems to be to enthusiastically embrace the *cause du jour* (determined in most cases by a volatile commercial news agenda) and spend some time vigorously organizing a “day of action”: a demonstration, a festival, or a film screening. Once the action is done, participants tend to feel a little better about themselves and, more often than not, subsequently turn to a new and different social justice issue, choosing from the plethora of more or less titillating causes available in what one commentator called “the theme park of radical action” (ibid). In light of the above, it becomes clearer why the new generations of activists appear less inclined to dedicate themselves to the slow and painstaking process of building sustained organizations and lasting movements. This argument will be explored throughout the ensuing three historical chapters of this study, as part of my analysis of the durability of AGM’s constitutive formations.

**AGM as a cycle of protest**

The final temporal concept informing my reading of the history of the AGM is that of “cycles of contention.” This notion is grounded in what is variously referred to as “political process” or “political opportunity structure” (POS) approach.\(^8\) According to

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8 Though it derives many of its basic tenets from resource mobilization theory, the POS model was developed as a corrective to the strong tendency of scholars working in the RMT tradition to consider the context in which social movement mobilization took place as a constant, or to factor it out altogether (Meyer 2004). By comparison, the POS paradigm pays more systematic attention to the political and institutional environment in which social movements operate. Sidney Tarrow (1989), for example, considers such factors as the presence of elite allies, and the given nation-state’s capacity for repression, to be very important.
Sidney Tarrow's influential conceptualization, a cycle can be understood as "a phase of heightened conflict across the social system" characterized by "a rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilized to less mobilized sectors; a rapid pace of innovation in the forms of contention; the creation of new or transformed collective action frames; a combination of organized and unorganized participation, and sequences of intensified information flow and interaction between challengers and authorities" (1998: 142). The discussion in this chapter has already addressed some of these elements – the ensuing chapters will flesh them out by focusing in more depth on the trajectory of the AGM cycle in Canada, specifically the location of its major "moments of convergence" along this trajectory, as well as the external and internal factors that have determined its rise and fall. As noted by Tarrow, a cycle "begins when political opportunities are opened for well-placed 'early risers,' when their claims resonate with those of significant others, and when these give rise to objective or explicit coalitions among disparate actors and create or reinforce instability in the elite" (ibid: 144). The ensuing chapter, the first of the three historical chapters of this study, will examine the element that spurred the cycle's emergence in Canada. Furthermore, Tarrow argues that cycles tend to end in either exhaustion and factionalization, institutionalization and violence, or repression and facilitation (ibid: 147). The matter of the AGM's decline or end as well as contributing factors is likewise taken up as part of the historical narrative that follows.

**Research Questions and Methodology**

In light of the preceding theoretical discussion, my historical account of the Canadian alter-globalization movement, presented in the ensuing chapters, is guided by a number of inter-related research questions. As stated in the introduction, my aim, first of all, is to
make a contribution to (Canadian) social movement studies by documenting the origins and key mobilizations in the history of the movement. Event-based research is a long-standing tradition among movement researchers, who use it to create a "time-series" reconstruction of movement trajectories (McAdam and Sewell 2001). Since the significance of these events must not be assumed a priori (see ibid: 123), my research examines their impact and significance as evaluated by the activists themselves. In addition, given the emancipatory intent animating this study, my investigation of each major mobilization also probes the reflections and lessons drawn in each instance.

Furthermore, this study asks a number of questions related to the temporal aspects of collective action. Starting from the Innisian hypothesis concerning obsessive present-mindedness of contemporary society, supported by interdisciplinary research concerning social acceleration and the collapse of the hegemonic time horizons, I am interested in evaluating empirically three areas of activist practice related to time: building sustained movement infrastructure, learning from the past, that is collective memory, and thinking reflexively about the future, that is long-term strategic planning. These are examined on the meso level of the AGM's constitutive organizations as well as on the broader level of the AGM itself. More specifically, this study asks:

1. What is the perceived value and practice among AGM activists of building durable movement infrastructure? By this term I mean something analogous to physical infrastructure, elements of which (pipes and power lines) need to be connected together in order to work properly and achieve their goals. In the sense employed in this study, infrastructure includes stable social movement organizations, but also extends to long-lasting coalitions, spaces, and networks that transcend activist "silos" to bring together in permanent shared projects existing groups of activists from different movement sectors. By being relatively formal and institutionalized, sustained infrastructure is also distinct from informal networks of activists or "political circuits" (Tilly and Wood 2008) which
can become insular and are not always open to those not already in the movement. Moreover, as I will elaborate later on, compared to relatively informal even if long-lasting informal networks, relatively formal sustained movement infrastructure is more conducive to the preservation and transmission of collective memory; relatedly, it also demands greater political accountability.

In investigating the question of organizational duration over time in relation to the summit-based mobilizations discussed in this study, I wanted not only to determine how long different movement formations lasted over time, but also to examine the activists' valorization of organizational sustainability and their associated intentions: in cases where a given piece of movement infrastructure, whether a network, coalition or organization, proved short-lived, how do the activists themselves interpret this outcome— is it but a manifestation of the current generations' willful preference for fluid and ad hoc style of engagement?

2. Concerning collective memory: how valuable is it? In practical terms, how are newcomers familiarized with the given group's own history and with the history of past AGM organizing? What are some of the challenges and obstacles to collective memory transmission?

3. Concerning strategic planning, is it seen as important and valuable among the activists? How far into the future is it and should it be done? How is it practiced within the anti-globalization movement and within the activists' "home" organization or group? What are the obstacles to strategic planning that the AGM activists encounter? What mechanisms and tools of strategic planning, if any, do they use?

In an effort to examine these questions empirically, this study relies on a qualitative research approach involving primary and secondary sources. The first step of the research
process involved content analysis of reports on the major protests of Canada's AGM found in major Canadian newspapers, and accessible either on the internet or, for the most part, using the Lexis-Nexis newspaper database. (The preliminary list of the key mobilizations was established in advance, informed by my background knowledge of the movement's history.) While mainstream newspaper coverage has long been critiqued for misrepresenting social movements, discourse analysis of the coverage consulted falls outside the scope of this study; instead the reports were mined primarily for basic information concerning the relevant protests' location, time and date, the names of some of the key groups and individuals, and the main messaging or "framing" -- including any direct quotations or "soundbites" that the activists were successful in communicating.

In addition to newspaper accounts, I consulted many different movement sources. This includes print materials such as newspapers, posters, and print programs given to me by my interview respondents, or otherwise obtained over the course of my own movement involvement. I also searched for the main websites of every mobilization, counter-summit, and major group or coalition that participated in the Canadian AGM; however, while the websites of those organizations still in existence today likewise remain live, the websites created for the purposes of protest events, counter-summits, networks and coalitions, have been almost universally taken offline or taken over by spam. It was possible to recover some of the missing content with the aid of the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine, which contains "snapshots" of websites generated sporadically by automated "bots" and hosted on the Archive's servers. Although a systematic investigation into the numbers of extant versus extinct websites falls outside the scope of this study, this apparent ephemerality provides preliminary evidence supporting this study's key hypothesis animating the pervasive cultural neglect of time among contemporary activists.

Apart from the aforementioned sources, the ensuing empirical investigation of the history
of the Canadian AGM is based primarily upon evidence collected from semi-structured interviews with its key organizers. Open-ended and exploratory, such interviews can be particularly helpful for understanding little-studied aspects of social movement dynamics (such as temporality) (Blee and Taylor 2003: 94). Compared to formal, structured interviews, they also permit the respondents to clarify, extend, or elaborate upon the assumptions contained in the questions (for instance, following the first handful of interviews, I added two items to my original list of the AGM’s major mobilizations). Over the summer and fall of 2011, and subsequently in March 2013, I conducted a total of sixty-nine face-to-face and phone interviews with activists who have participated, almost in every case in a leadership capacity, in the major mobilizations of the alter-globalization movement in Canada. My existing contacts in Canadian movements helped me to secure the initial interviews, after which I was provided with additional contacts in keeping with the “snowball” method.

Once collected and transcribed, the interviews were coded on themes related both to the specific episodes of contention in the history of the movement as well as the key time-related themes specified above. The coding for the specified themes was carried out using Nvivo 9 qualitative research analysis software.

Given the highly semi-structured nature of the interviews, not every interview yielded information on all these major themes. Moreover, given the differential background, age, memory, and experience of the respondents as well as time limitations placed on interviews in a number of instances, it became necessary at times to prioritize some lines of questioning and skip over others. Accordingly, when citing interviews, I have sought to ensure that the position expressed does not represent an isolated point of view among my respondents, and that in an instance of conflicting accounts I have presented both sides. A further and related limitation of the interview method in the context of this study is that since the interviews were carried out post-hoc, the respondents’ answers reflect their own
version of collective memory.

Moreover, given that much if not most of the AGM's energies were centered on summit protests, the interviews were likewise focused on the movement's most spectacular mobilizations. This means that this study does not elaborate upon the less visible globalization-oriented organizing and educational work carried out by some of the relevant actors outside the context of summit protest organizing.

Finally, while my study does not delve into differences among my respondents based on demographic traits, it may be useful to get a general sense of the sample's basic demographic attributes. As mentioned, almost all the respondents remain active organizers living in the major Canadian cities, especially in Toronto (not only Canada's biggest city with a large activist community, but also the site of the most recent protest examined in this study, which explains why a significant number of interviews cited in the ensuing chapters were conducted with Toronto-based organizers). The gender distribution is almost perfectly balanced; on the other hand, most of the respondents are younger than forty, and almost all of them are white. Almost half hold advanced degrees. Based on my background knowledge of the respondents' primary political ideology, identity and organizational affiliation (or lack thereof), the biggest group represented are perhaps anarchists, but the category of labour and socialist activists is a close second, followed, in no particular order, by environmentalists, anti-war activists, feminists, and others.

Having established the study's theoretical framework, its main research questions, and methodology, the ensuing three chapters of this study examine the history of the alter-globalization movement in Canada, beginning with its deep roots in the 1980s.
CHAPTER 2:
The Canadian Alter-Globalization Movement in Historical Perspective

Although the “Battle of Seattle” is most commonly cited as the beginning of the alter-globalization movement, the national manifestations of this movement can claim their own unique origins and precursors. The aim of this chapter is to shed light on the pre-history of the alter-globalization movement in Canada, including the campaign against the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the transnational networking against the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in which Canadian organizations played a leading part. I also discuss the three, now largely forgotten G7 “counter-summits” organized by Canadian activists in 1981, 1988, and 1995. Over the course of this discussion, I introduce the key institutional players of the Canadian Left, by which I mean formal organizations such as activist-oriented unions, as well as non-governmental organizations and advocacy groups, in contradistinction to the anti-authoritarian, anarchist(ic), and primarily youth-based wing of the AGM movement that I will refer to rather reductively as the “grassroots.”

The coming together of these two movement wings under the alter-globalization umbrella meant temporarily papering over the ideological and other differences in order to emphasize international coordination and solidarity against shared targets. The beginnings of this coalescing of generations against corporate-led, neoliberal globalization begins in earnest in Canada in 1997, with the start of the campaign against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, and the APEC protests in November in Vancouver. In the second section of this chapter, I discuss them both in turn as transitional moments ushering in a cycle of AGM activism in Canada, characterized by unprecedented reliance on fast, digital communication with which to organize short-lived summit-based protests.
To begin, it may be useful to establish the context in which resistance to neoliberal globalization in Canada first emerged. In the mid-1970s, capitalism was caught in the first serious postwar economic crisis. Suffering from a number of difficulties, including the oil shocks that began in 1973, increased competition from foreign capitalists (especially those based in Japan), and “stagflation” (a condition of slow economic growth and relatively high unemployment accompanied by high rates of inflation), capitalism needed to overcome the rigidities of the Fordist mode of capital accumulation, particularly with respect to labour markets and the allocation of long-term and large-scale capital investments (Harvey 1989). As discussed in the previous chapter, ICTs played a key role in facilitating the liberalization of finance, international division of labour, and the emergence of new services and areas of production typical of the fast and flexible “post-Fordist” regime of accumulation.

Since the crisis, the process of economic globalization, though not in itself new, has been shaped by the principles of neoliberalism expressed by John Williamson (1990) in a list of ten policy recommendations summed up as the “Washington Consensus.” These include fiscal discipline, liberalization of trade and capital flows, privatization of state enterprises, and ever-stronger security of private property rights. Thanks in large measure to the powerful influence of American financial institutions, in the last few decades of the twentieth century the tenets of the Washington Consensus have been written into international trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreements (NAFTA), which grant new rights to transnational capital and corporations. The creation of these accords has been accomplished with the active participation of states: contrary to accounts that specify neoliberal restructuring to be the inevitable outcome of the process of economic globalization, states have been actively promoting neoliberal reforms by undergoing internal restructuring and actively re-regulating markets – measures that can best be understood as a political response to the gains made by the working classes in the
previous decades (Panitch and Gindin 2012).

In addition to new trade and investment agreements, the process of extending capitalism globally was further facilitated by the creation of new international governing bodies. Seeking to establish solidarity in the face of economic crisis, in 1976, the leaders of the world's six most powerful economies met at the invitation of the French President for an informal fire-chat at the hunting chateau in the forest of Rambouillet. The group met again the following year in Puerto Rico to continue the conversation, this time with Canada's participation, as the Group of Seven (G7). Though not an official policy-making body, the G7 is nonetheless more than a mere photo opportunity; as noted by Leo Panitch, an important function of its annual summits has been to ensure the stability of the world capitalist system by establishing a common way of defining and addressing problems, solidifying consensus concerning market discipline and structural adjustment, and protecting member state leaders against domestic democratic pressures from their own parties and parliaments (Panitch forthcoming).

As we will see in the next chapters, at the turn of the millennium, little over two decades following the Group of Seven's creation, the summits of the G7 and other institutions of global governance such as the IMF and the WTO would become the target of an international cycle of protest. Yet AGM's turn-of-the-century protests against agents of neoliberal globalization were not new in Canadian history. In the 1980s, the onset of neoliberal reforms was very much on the minds of Canadian left-wing activists, who were organizing in unions, parties, Maoist and Trotskyite groupuscules and NGOs. They began to realize the need to come together to analyze the conjuncture and find ways of holding onto the gains secured in the past decades. In 1981, when the G7 leaders were to meet in

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9 The initial "G6" consisted of the US, UK, Italy, Germany, France, and Japan. The foundation for the G6 and G7 had been established in the early 1960s, in what became known as the "G10," charged with the management of international capitalism (Panitch, forthcoming).
Canada for the first time, the opportunity to protest an agent of globalization provided the basis of Canada’s first ever “counter-summit.”

“Popular Summit”: Ottawa, 1981

The first Canadian G7 summit was hosted by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in Montebello, Québec. To raise awareness about the economic and foreign policies of the G7 countries and the US in particular, an ad hoc activist coalition consisting of students, NGOs, churches and unions organized Canada’s first ever “Popular Summit,” on the weekend of June 18-19, at the University of Ottawa.

One of the activists at the core of this coalition was David Langille, then a graduate student, now a politics teacher at York University. The Popular Summit was the first such event of its kind in North America, he explained during our interview, “so we had no models to go on.” As would be the case with the ensuing counter-summits against the G7, G8, and later G20 organized by AGM activists, the Popular Summit was endorsed by many, in fact almost a hundred different organizations and movements, and there was no single issue or message motivating the work of the organizing committee. A print copy of the counter-summit program (courtesy of Leo Panitch, the Popular Summit’s first keynote speaker) reveals a Saturday schedule filled with an impressive selection of workshops on the Summit’s central themes: economic crisis, militarism and disarmament, solidarity with El Salvador (whose military junta was receiving aid from the United States to fight left-wing guerrillas), and with Namibia (where Canadian companies like Hudson’s Bay and Falconbridge were exploiting natural resources and people). The next day there was a day-long teach-in, in Major Hill Park, followed by a rally and a peaceful march of some six thousand protesters (see Hanna 1981: 55).

As intimated by David Langille, the city’s administration, in particular the left-leaning
mayor, was supportive of the counter-summit and "opened a lot of doors," such as granting the activists the right to use a city park. Such cooperation between activists and officials would be far less forthcoming in the ensuing years. As we will see, upon the G7's subsequent return to Canada in 1988, the host city of Toronto reacted very differently, and it had much to do with the escalation of anti-G7 militancy in the streets. Before proceeding with that discussion, however, the ensuing section of this chapter examines the fight against free trade that unified the institutional Left in Canada in the late 1980s and created a common way of understanding and deconstructing free trade, and in these and other respects laid down some of the infrastructure and analysis for the alterglobalization movement that arose a decade later.

"No, Eh?" The Struggle against the FTA

One year after the G7's first Canadian summit, the nascent neoliberal agenda in Canada received a major boost when the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau established the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, chaired by the former Finance Minister Donald Macdonald. The final report of the Macdonald Commission, as it was commonly called, was issued four years later, in 1985. In it, the Commission called for dramatic cuts to state spending in order to foster business competition and to forge closer economic links with the United States – a recommendation perfectly aligned with the ambitions of the Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney, elected in a landslide the previous year. As indicated by Maude Barlow, that same week, the government along with a group of corporations published a nine-page supplement in the New York Times declaring that "Canada is under new management, a marriage of government and business" (quoted in Barlow 1998: 98). To facilitate the elimination of trade barriers and liberalization of investment with the United States, at the beginning of 1985, the Mulroney government confirmed its intention to negotiate and ratify the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA).
One month later, a distinguished group of Canadian social movement leaders came together in Toronto to “share information and to plan what was to become a national movement to protect Canadian economic and cultural sovereignty” (Barlow 1988: 93). As detailed in her autobiography, present at the meeting was Maude Barlow (who had recently quit her job as a women’s issues advisor to the Liberal party), Mel Hurtig, the Canadian publisher, Bob White, then with the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW), Grace Hartman of Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE), Gerry Caplan, then principal secretary to NDP leader Ed Broadbent, the environmentalist David Suzuki, writer and cultural nationalist Pierre Berton, feminist Doris Anderson, and distinguished others. 10

Inspired by the discussions that took place during that meeting, three of the participants – Hurtig, Barlow, and Berton – founded a new, non-profit, membership-based organization later that year, called the Council of Canadians – in its own words, a “pre-eminent public watchdog organization” created to be independent from the government, corporations or any political party (“Join the Council”). The Council’s raison d’etre was to defeat the free trade deal – its mission to “maximize” Canadian economic, political, social and cultural sovereignty (Barlow 1988). The CoC subsequently became one of the key organizations in the Canadian campaign to defeat the FTA and, as will become evident over the course of this study, it would be present at virtually every turn of the alter-globalization movement in the years to come.

The event that helped to launch the official anti-FTA campaign took place in early April 1987. It was then that the CoC organized an event in Ottawa called the Maple Leaf Summit, meant to contrast with the “Shamrock Summit” organized around the same time.

10 Some of these actors, including Mel Hurtig, had been involved in the effort to maintain Canadian distinctiveness vis-à-vis the neighbour to the south since the 1970s through the Committee for an Independent Canada, demonstrating that Canadians have long been concerned about forging closer ties with the United States.
between US President Ronald Reagan and Brian Mulroney. At the end of the day, participants in the Maple Leaf Summit decided to form a new coalition called the Pro-Canada Network (PCN). To demonstrate their unity of purpose, together they marched to Parliament Hill and attached a statement of principles called the “Canada Declaration” to the doors of the Centre Block (Barlow 1998: 108). For its chair, the PCN chose Tony Clarke, who had worked with the social justice committee of the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops and the Toronto Committee Against Free Trade (created shortly prior to the PCN), and who later co-chaired the CoC together with Maude Barlow. Over the next months, the PCN emerged as a powerful national coalition driving the anti-FTA campaign, bringing together over twenty national organizations and provincial coalitions, claiming to represent over ten million Canadians (Ayers 2001: 59). In the ensuing months, the primary objective of the coalition became to defeat the free trade agreement by defeating the Progressive Conservatives in the federal election of 1988.

Virtually all the major elements of the Canadian institutional left got involved in the PCN. Among them was the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC), which realized early on that the FTA would impact disproportionately on women through the loss of jobs and attacks on social programs (Sparke 1996). Though NAC's organizational capacity diminished due to funding cuts, the dynamic leadership of Judy Rebick (who led NAC from 1990 to 1993) and Marjorie Cohen (who served for many years on the organization's executive board) ensured that neoliberalism's gendered effects were front and centre during the campaign.

Church groups – Anglican, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Roman Catholic and United – were also involved substantively in the PCN. According to Tony Clarke, their participation was channelled mostly via an ecumenical umbrella organization called GATT-Fly (a play on words referencing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and the Ecumenical Coalition for Economic Justice. Both groups were concerned about neoliberal
Among other key institutional actors to play a big role in the PCN were the activist-oriented unions: the CAW, CUPE, Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW), United Steelworkers, Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC) and the National Farmers Union. Also involved were Native as well as Québécois groups, such as La Coalition Québécoise d’Opposition au Libre-échange. In fact, according to Tony Clarke, it was the involvement of Québécois comrades that led to a change in the network’s name in 1990, from Pro-Canada Network to Action Canada Network (ACN).

Without the internet at its disposal to publicize critical analysis on the proposed agreement, the ACN’s propaganda efforts relied on the standard communication repertoire of the pre-internet age: mail, fax and telephone. The ACN also organized a national

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In the 1970s and 1980 Canadian church groups took on a key role in campaigns to support the struggles in Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua) and South Africa. Insofar as they were movements of international solidarity, they can be considered similar to the AGM, but as several of my respondents noted, these movements were primarily the purview of church groups and were seen as organized on the basis of a charity model, not necessarily in the spirit of solidarity and autonomy. Nonetheless, these movements were marked in the 1980s, and though it is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine the history of each of them (South Africa, El Salvador, Nicaragua), here I will mention two of the most notable groups among them: Canadian Action for Nicaragua and Tools for Peace both lobbied the Canadian government to provide direct bilateral aid to Nicaragua and to officially protest U.S. policy in the region. Starting in 1981, Tools for Peace shipped vast quantities of fishing equipment, carpentry tools, saws, hammers, agricultural tools, day care supplies and other basic equipment to Nicaragua. It became a major activist operation coordinated through a National Office in Vancouver, one that dissolved after the defeat of the Sandinistas in the 1990 elections (“Tools for Peace”). Activism in solidarity with South Africa was channeled primarily through the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC, pronounced as “tickle-sac”), which engaged in education, lobbying of the Canadian government, and material aid projects. It also published a regular newsletter called The TCLSAC Report (which became The Southern Africa Report in 1985) in addition to organizing events, speaking tours, and a regular film night, in addition to “tiny demonstrations and a plethora of political campaigns to unmask the complicity of corporate and official Canada” in South African apartheid (Swift 1993, n.p).
petition drive, and, given the election-centric focus of the campaign, lobbied Liberal and NDP federal election candidates to oppose the agreement. In this effort, it utilized standard movement communication tools like buttons (bearing the caption “No, eh?”) as well as election kits, lawn signs, and public demonstrations (Ayers 2001: 59).

The most ambitious and successful of the ACN’s communication activities was the creation of a cartoon booklet called “What’s the Big Deal?” explaining the trade agreement in an accessible and attractive way. The twenty-four page booklet, written by Rick Salutin and illustrated by Terry Mosher (“Aislin”) of the Montreal Gazette, appeared as an insert in major newspapers in Canada, for the not inconsiderable cost of $650,000. “Working out a strategy whereby you place this in twenty-two newspapers across the country on the same day, and so it’s delivered to like two and a half million homes, and therefore read by three or four people in those homes – this was quite a coup in those days, and was considered quite a communications achievement,” noted Tony Clarke. “We noticed a difference in the polls immediately following the circulation of that cartoon booklet.”

Interestingly, despite its demonstrated success in swaying public opinion on-side, to the best of my knowledge, this outreach tactic has not been replicated by any social movement in Canada. Two immediate reasons come to mind: first, the considerable cost of the endeavour, and second, the emergence of the global internet, which, as we saw in the last chapter, allows activists to focus their outreach online, even if the probability that someone who is “unconverted” will seek out, stumble upon, or be convinced by this information is relatively low.

Despite the strength of the campaign and Canadians’ demonstrably growing anti-free trade sentiment, in November 1988 the Progressive Conservatives under Brian Mulroney managed to secure a second governing majority. Shortly afterward, the federal
government proceeded to ratify the free trade agreement. Asked to comment on this outcome, Tony Clarke and Murray Dobbin both pointed out that the Conservatives’ victory was due to Canada’s deeply flawed first-past-the-post electoral system, and that the outcome of the popular vote confirmed that most Canadians opposed the deal. As Murray Dobbin put it, the ACN had effectively won “the battle for hearts and minds.”

The ACN’s success in the battle over the FTA is key to understanding its role as an early precursor to the AGM. As Sidney Tarrow argues, “movements do not simply fade away...they have indirect and long-term effects” (1998: 164), including the political socialization of the participants, the effects of their struggles on institutions and practices, and their contributions to changes in political culture. Although subtle, indirect and therefore difficult to trace empirically, the ACN’s lasting legacy was its contribution to Canadian political culture. As indicated by several among my respondents already active at the time, the anti-FTA struggle had the effect of creating a common interpretation and analysis of free trade (what Snow and Benford [1992] famously termed a “master frame”) and of opening up political space in which to articulate critiques of neoliberalism.

In the aftermath of the Conservatives’ electoral victory, a hundred people gathered for the ACN’s first post-election assembly in late 1988 to perform a “post-mortem” on the election and decide collectively whether to disband or keep going. “I honestly didn’t know which way it was going to go,” recalled Tony Clarke. “The overwhelming response was, we had to stay together, we had to move forward.” In the ensuing months and years, two different tendencies emerged and co-existed within the ACN: one part of the coalition turned inward to pursue a defensive domestic agenda, while a growing sector within the ACN decided to extend its focus beyond Canada’s borders and address the power of transnational capital and corporations more broadly. The latter wing subsequently participated in the creation of a new, Toronto-based NGO called Common Frontiers (CF). The CF would go on to play a leading role in the fight against the extension of the FTA.
continent-wide via the North American Free Trade Agreement. But first, the same year that the Mulroney government was elected, another important and now largely forgotten event in the pre-history of the Canadian AGM took place, namely the 1988 G7 summit in Toronto. For the first time in the short history of Canadian “global summitry,” the ensuing protests involved direct action tactics in the form of non-violent civil disobedience.

The G7 in Toronto, 1988

In June 1988, the G7 returned to Canada for its fourteenth summit. This time, the resistance occurred on multiple fronts. First, a coalition of institutional actors consisting of NGOs, churches and the critical unions came together to organize the “Citizens' Summit.” David Langille was once again centrally involved, as was, for the first time in Canada, the newly created American “wing” of a British NGO called The Other Economic Summit (TOES). As had been the case in Ottawa seven years earlier, the Citizens' Summit was primarily educational: it consisted of a series of panels and workshops featuring speakers from Canada and abroad. The conference took place for five consecutive nights, just prior to the start of the official G7 summit, in the Metropolitan United Church downtown Toronto. According to Langille, each panel focused on a different theme such as international development, peace, and the environment, and every night, some six hundred people turned out to participate. On the weekend, the coalition also held a series of teach-ins and workshops at Ryerson University, which attracted approximately three thousand participants.

While the 1988 “Citizens' Summit” mirrored closely the 1981 Popular Summit in Ottawa, there was one marked difference: in 1988, some activists were intent on organizing

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12 TOES formed in 1984 to organize a counter-summit against the G7 meeting in London. Its US wing was established a few years later, just in time to help co-organize the Toronto 1988 G7 “Citizens' Summit” (“Welcome to TOES”).
something beyond an educational conference about the G7 and its policies — they wanted to take direct action to oppose them. This camp consisted of a group called the Alliance for Non-Violent Action (ANVA), which had emerged out of the Canadian anti-nuclear, women's, and other movements in the early 1980s. According to one of its core members, Matthew Behrens, ANVA played a leading role in organizing two related protest actions against the G7 in 1988. The first, held a week in advance of the summit, was called “the Tribunal” and took the form of a mock trial of the G7 leaders, whom the activists charged with crimes against humanity under the auspices of the then newly passed Canada War Crimes Act. As Behrens recalled, when ANVA's lawyer went to court to ask for an injunction against the summit on the basis of the Act, the activists found out that an order had been passed two months earlier declaring the leaders immune from prosecution for the duration of the summit. The Tribunal proceeded nevertheless. After testimonies were heard from 140 witnesses, including survivors of nuclear blasts in the South Pacific, peace movement veterans, and others, the Tribunal found the G7 leaders guilty of the alleged crimes, and a (mock) warrant was issued for their arrest.

As Behrens noted, ANVA's Tribunal and plan to arrest the G7 leaders were driven by the desire to move past and beyond what was seen as stale and ritualized protest tactics dominant on the left at the time. “If you look at history of civil disobedience in Canada in the 1980s, it was very much marginalized by the organized left,” he explained, adding that the actors involved in planning the educational “Citizens’ Summit” did not denounce, but distanced themselves from the protests planned by the ANVA camp — which in 1988 were called (somewhat confusingly in light of the Ottawa precursor) the “Popular

13 As explained in its newsletter, Subject to Change, kindly mailed to me by Matthew Behrens, “ANVA groups played an integral role in the development of the peace movement in Canada in this decade. Member groups of ANVA were the original organizers of the 5-year direct action campaign against the construction of the guidance system for the cruise missile at Litton in Toronto.” ANVA also led a 5-year campaign against NATO weapons over the Innu land Nitassinan, a campaign against Bata shoes over their exploitation of South African workers, among others.
As affirmed by David Langille, the support offered to the Citizens' Summit organizing coalition by churches and unions (phones, offices, printers, photocopiers) was not extended to ANVA and other direct action groups planning the Popular Summit.

In keeping with the tradition of non-violent civil disobedience, the intention to arrest the G7 leaders during the summit was advertised publicly several months in advance. In preparation, ANVA trained a couple of hundred people in the tactics of non-violent civil disobedience, in particular ways to peacefully resist arrest, as per the anticipated outcome of the action. Thus, the three thousand people who attended a rally at Queen's Park on Sunday, including Langille, were aware that the plan was to later march down University Avenue to the Metro Toronto Convention Centre in order to arrest the leaders – an illegal march, since the city refused to issue a permit. Only a small handful of people chose to remain in the park on principle, refusing to partake in an unsanctioned march, recalled Behrens with a laugh: the vast majority proceeded to march, to the sound of warnings blasting from nearby police vans.

As they approached their destination, just south of the intersection of Dundas Street and University Avenue, the protesters came face to face with several hundred police blocking their path. There were snipers on roofs and helicopters buzzing overhead, Behrens said, noting the parallels with the extensive securitization of Toronto twelve years later in preparation for the summit of the G20. Some protesters chose to leave the march then, but a group of about a hundred and seventy people proceeded to scale the police barricades erected across the intersection. At this point the police moved in and arrested them all. The majority were released after several hours on the charge of breach of peace.

“Everyone was really disappointed about that,” said Behrens, since they had hoped to be charged with at least mischief or obstruction of police so that they could fight the charges in court and expose to public scrutiny the massive dossier compiled for the Tribunal.
The hundreds who remained at the intersection continued to rally and chant a while longer. As they eventually began to disperse, a group of young anarchists not connected to ANVA overturned some newsboxes and set them on fire. As Behrens explained, there was some tension between ANVA and related groups of the Popular Summit and this group of young anarchists:

ANVA was very much an anarchist organization but it was an older organization, so these were people in their late twenties to early forties, and there was another anarchist grouping of people in their late teens and early twenties who felt that what we were doing wasn't radical enough. We got shit from them after the large direct action took place because they were saying what we were going was legitimizing the state by using non-violent civil disobedience – that it was disempowering, that we should be fighting the state.

Asked to compare this to the black bloc tactic of the AGM (which I discuss in more detail below), he answered that his sense is that there has always been that sentiment, similar to what happened in Toronto, of “people who self-identify as anarchists who were burning things and saying this non-violent shit, it's not gonna get you anywhere, so we have to push the envelope. So the black bloc is not perfectly new...” While he admitted to being sympathetic to the younger anarchists' critique of what was becoming a “ritualization and fetishization” of non-violence, Behrens insisted that there are different ways of going about non-violent civil disobedience, and that ANVA's particular goal was to challenge rather than smash the state by demanding that it respect the integrity of the rules that it had itself established, i.e. the War Crimes Act.

Though in this regard the Popular Summit did not succeed, to Behrens' mind the resistance at the G7 was a high-water mark for social movement organizing in the 1980s and jump-started direct action organizing in central Canada, notably with respect to anti-war and indigenous solidarity action, in the years to come (see Wilson 2010). On the
other hand, reflecting back on the events, David Langille was less enthused; he noted that although the organizers of the Citizens’ Summit had done a lot of media outreach, ANVA’s direct action “stole the headlines.” He concluded that the CS participants “went back to communities around Canada better informed, but we weren’t capturing the mainstream media, and the message that came out after those arrests didn’t help the movement very much.” Their comments attest to the multiple ways of measuring success, the challenges of mainstream media appeal, and the tensions already visible between the direct action-oriented militants and lobbying and education-oriented institutional left mobilizing in parallel against a central agency of global capitalism. In 1988, these tensions were also visible along generational lines among anarchists, between non-violent and confrontation-bent groups.

The North American Free Trade Agreement

As mentioned above, one of the first steps taken by the ACN as it regrouped in the aftermath of Canada-US FTA’s ratification was to establish a new Toronto-based NGO called Common Frontiers. The CF served as the ACN’s “international networking arm” (Huyer 2002: 301); it was also the Canadian representative of the Hemispheric Social Alliance.14 According to Ayers (1998), the important role played by the CF in the continental struggle against NAFTA signalled the increasingly transnational orientation of Canadian anti-free trade campaigners. Starting in 1990, the organization began reaching

14 The creation of the Hemispheric Social Alliance was first proposed at the “Our Americas” forum in Belo Horizonte, Brazil in May of 1997, a counter-forum to the meeting of the Americas Trade Ministers and the Americas Business Forum. It attracted 700 civil society activists, who agreed to build a broad-based movement throughout the hemisphere to oppose corporate-led globalization. The HSA was composed of regional coalitions like the Convergence of People’s Movements of the Americas (COMPA), Grito de los Excluidos, and Friends of the Earth Latin America. Starting with the First People’s Summit held in 1998, parallel to the Second Summit of the Americas in Santiago, Chile, it would go on to play an active role in the campaign against the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), an agreement that became a key target of the Canadian AGM in 2000-2001, as discussed in the next chapter.
out to activists in Mexico. As Huyer explains, "because there was little hope of influencing the political process in Canada (other than a national election) Common Frontiers considered that strengthening the opposition in the other countries would be more conducive to achieving its goal to halt the NAFTA negotiations" (ibid: 302). Later that year, an ACN delegation composed of thirty-three activists travelled to Mexico City to network with independent trade unions during a five-day meeting organized by Common Frontiers. According to Tony Clarke, that meeting was "absolutely pivotal" — it allowed ACN members to build ties with their Mexican comrades "sector by sector." Out of that meeting emerged, in April 1991, the Red Mexicana de Accion Frente al Libre Comercio (Mexican Action Network on Free Trade, or RMALC), a major coalition of labour, women's, and environmental groups modelled on the ACN. Six months later, once the NAFTA talks had started, the CF organized a follow-up meeting in Zacatecas, Mexico, this time also involving American activists. In the meantime, the CF was also producing and disseminating research on free trade, often in partnership with the left-wing think-tank Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (CCPA), also an ACN member.

In campaigning transnationally against NAFTA in the early 1990s, the CF used many of the same communication tactics that its parent organization, the ACN, had used in the fight against the FTA during the late 1980s: the phone, fax, mail, newsletters — the pre-existing media repertoire. Emerging electronic media of communication central to enabling high-speed, highly networked mode of activism inaugurated by the AGM were, however, beginning to attract some attention. For instance, during a CF meeting held in 1991, a member noted that:

the way we organize...needs changing. We need to use technology differently. Coalition information sharing is key. Electronic mail and conferencing can be a useful way to network a number of people's movements. Electronic mail is a quantum leap over fax and it is extremely cost-effective...social change movements need to utilize this potential
The comment above suggests that the Canadian institutional left was starting to recognize the instrumental advantages of the new ICTs before they became widespread several years later. Nonetheless, in her examination of the use of communication networks by Canadian activists in the 1990s, Huyer notes that during the anti-NAFTA campaign Canadian groups used the internet and email much less than their US and even Mexican counterparts: “There existed enough alternate communications media – fax, comparatively affordable long-distance rates and fairly dependable surface mail – that the Canadian groups could communicate effectively without having to invest the time, equipment, and training to do online,” she explains (2002: 306).

Though she does not elaborate, it may be said that Huyer’s assessment no longer holds in the digital media age, where social movement organizations’ use of the internet and related technologies can be assumed to be heavy and universal. Though their uses of these technologies are certainly not homogenous, unions, NGOs, and movement organizations of all kinds can now be expected to have a website, an email address at minimum, and likely a Facebook page and Twitter account as well. To opt out of electronic communication is hardly an option, since not “keeping up,” not being “plugged in,” means potentially missing out on valuable opportunities.

While Canadian activists were able to utilize the pre-existing media repertoire to share their experience, analysis and strategy with allies across borders, the anti-NAFTA campaign did not reach its objective. The agreement was signed into existence late in 1993, and officially came into effect on the first day of the new year, 1994. Two important events occurred in response. The first was an uprising against neoliberalism by a previously unknown group of Mexican peasants calling themselves the Zapatista National Liberation Army, to which I will return shortly. Second, and more importantly for the time
being, in January 1994, Canadian anti-free trade activists regrouped yet again to debrief and discuss how to move forward. As recalled by Maude Barlow in her autobiography, shortly after NAFTA's implementation, sixty-five of North America's leading activists met in San Francisco, including herself and Tony Clarke as well their international allies from the NAFTA fight, representing the Sierra Club, Greenpeace, and the Third World Network, among others (Barlow 1998). By the end of that first meeting, the participants agreed to create a new organization called the International Forum on Globalization (IFG), complete with staff and a board of directors (on which Maude Barlow and Tony Clarke have served since). The aim of the IFG, according to Tony Clarke, was to fight "global corporate rule." Toward this end, beginning in 1995, the organization started to hold a series of teach-ins on neoliberal globalization in various American cities.

Two years later, the first of the IFG teach-ins was organized in Canada, when in early November 1997, the IFG committee on corporations, chaired by Tony Clarke, brought ninety researchers and campaign activists to the First International Symposium on Global Corporate Rule in the CAW educational centre in Port Elgin, Ontario. Shortly after, the first International Teach-In on Global Corporate Rule was organized by the same group at the University of Toronto, attracting between 1,500 and 2,000 people—mostly youth, which in her autobiography Maude Barlow (1998) recalls with excitement (in confirmation of the importance of new generations in starting new protest cycles), noting that the teach-in "had the feel of a rock concert with thousands of young people, for whom this issue clearly speaks, trying to get in... There was such energy in that hall that night" (Barlow 1998: 200-01). Likewise, Tony Clarke noted that the two teach-ins can be considered among the precursors to the AGM in Canada to the extent that they helped to increase awareness and build desire to fight corporate globalization, inspiring many to join the campaign against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment which was coalescing around the same time, as discussed below.
As the second teach-in came to an end, another significant event in the pre-history of the Canadian AGM was about to take place. With the summit of the Asia Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) about to take place in Vancouver at the end of the month, activists, including a group of students at the University of British Columbia, were getting ready to confront and disrupt the APEC leaders' meeting. According to Tony Clarke, a number of people involved with the University of Toronto teach-in, including some speakers from abroad and himself, travelled to Vancouver to participate in the “counter-summit” and the accompanying street protests against APE, which I also examine below.

Before proceeding, however, it is important to make two observations. First, it should be noted that not all of my respondents saw the early anti-free trade struggles in Canada, and the anti-FTA campaign in particular, as a precursor to the AGM. For instance, Matthew Behrens and Jaggi Singh, both of whom have organized protests against global summits (though using different tactics), felt that the anti-free trade campaign was nationalist in tone and generally uninterested in challenging the capitalist system itself – a challenge that Singh, one of the AGM’s best-known public figures, believes to have been at the heart of the alter-globalization movement.

Yet, as mentioned above, movements do not operate in a vacuum: much of the counter-hegemonic discourse and critical analysis of so-called free trade and neoliberalism adopted in the late 1990s had already been established a decade earlier. Continuity was further ensured by virtue of the fact that many of the organizations that had participated in these precursor coalitions and produced this analysis went on to partake in the struggle against NAFTA and the MAI, signalling a new perceived commonality of interest with transnational allies that flowed into the subsequent emergence of the AGM. In this light, the inclusion of these early struggles in the preceding discussion of AGM pre-history appears justified.
Second, when it comes to the pre-history of the AGM, it is important to note that the struggle against NAFTA inspired the AGM (in Canada and beyond) in yet a different way. It began on January 1, 1994, the day the agreement went into effect, when the previously unknown Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN), with the mysterious Subcommandante Marcos as its poetic spokesperson, declared war on neoliberalism. Thanks to their technological savvy, the list of the Zapatistas' demands, the so-called Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle, appeared online within hours, and went viral, so to speak, among Tarrow's “well-placed early risers,” namely activists in North America and Europe who were already networking online using digital hubs such as the Well.

To be sure, the Zapatistas' influence on the nascent AGM proceeded not only from their skilled and imaginative use of the emergent digital ICTs, but also in large part from their refusal of a charity-based model of international solidarity characteristic of the 1980s church-led campaigns, in favour of transnational solidarity based on decentralization, autonomy, and consensus decision-making. As summarized by the anarchist scholar David Graeber, the EZLN laid down the foundation for the emerging alter-globalization movement by “promulgating a politics of direct action, democratic experimentation, and a new approach to revolution that converges with the anarchist tradition in its refusal of traditional attempts to transform through the seizure of state power” (2009: xiii). 15

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15 While I did not explore this topic systematically in my interviews, preliminary evidence indicates that most Canadian on-the-ground organizing in solidarity with the Zapatistas occurred in Montreal. Among the members of le Réseau de solidarité avec le Mexique was Sarita Ahooja, then a university student in Montreal, and later a co-founder of Québec’s leading AGM group, the CLAC (Convergence des Luttes Anti-Capitalistes (CLAC)). The network consisted of unions, churches, members of the Mexican diaspora, NGOs including then newly formed Montreal-based organization called Alternatives, and students like herself, she explained. Over the next couple of years it engaged in fundraising, raising awareness about the Zapatista cause, periodically picketing the Mexican embassy, and sending activist observers to Chiapas. In late 1995, the network organized an encuentro in Montreal which attracted over two thousand people. Out of the gathering emerged another network called le Réseau Contre le Neoliberalisme; however, most of its members were interested mainly in lobbying, according to Ahooja, and not long after its founding, militant members split off to form or join more direct-action oriented groups, including the CLAC, which I discuss in the next chapter.
Zapatista *encuentros* (held first in Chiapas in 1997, then in Spain) also gave rise to the world’s first internet-based, anti-capitalist, direct-action oriented network called People’s Global Action (PGA). As noted by Lesley Wood, one of the network’s participants, the PGA’s creation exemplified the two major developments in collective action occurring in the late 1990s: a shift to an internet-based mode of organizing, and a new understanding of a shared interest among single-issue networks working on labour, the environment, and poverty in targeting international financial institutions and other global targets (Wood 2012: 30). In Canada, this type of activism was happening outside the context of a movement cycle, such as the forgotten People’s Summit in Halifax in 1995, which brought together activists for a peaceful concert and workshop series in the Commons park.

### The People’s Summit, Halifax, 1995

In June 1995, the G7 came back to Canada for its twenty-first summit, held in Halifax. At the time, Joy Woolfry was the executive director of the International Education Centre at St. Mary’s University. She recalled holding the first PS organizing meeting in her living room, which brought together a group of “senior people” from women’s, peace, and environmental movements.

The second meeting of the organizing coalition featured a special guest speaker: David Langille was flown in to talk about his previous summit organizing experience and offer his advice. After that, the meetings were moved to the public library, and for the next year, a committee of forty to fifty people met regularly to organize the first “People’s Summit” modelled after the two previous educational counter-summits. The People’s Summit was held from June 11 to 18, 1995, in the Halifax park called the Commons. Akin to a week long teach-in and festival, it featured outdoor workshops, NGO displays in large tents, and open-air stages for rallies and music. It was organized to start before
the G7 to attract the attention of journalists who arrived to cover national public figures such as Ovide Mercredi, Grand Chief of the Assembly of First Nations, who led a street march with full drums onto the PS stage and made headlines when he called on the G7 leaders to live up to their obligations to First Nations. His demands were echoed in the People's Summit collective communiqué issued on June 16 (and available online), which consisted of a list of wide-ranging demands, including nuclear disarmament, an end to structural adjustment and third world debt, greater democracy, the implementation of the Tobin tax, and "acknowledgement that transnational corporations have acquired colossal power to determine the fate of the earth" ("Communique from the People's Summit")

Organized by traditional NGOs, the Halifax People's Summit was festive and educational, and in this respect resembled the Ottawa Popular Summit and the Toronto Citizens' Summit. On the other hand, the civil disobedience and ensuing confrontation with the police that we observed in Toronto did not transpire in Halifax. As noted by Joy Woolfry and Benoit Renaud, an AGM activist who arrived in Halifax in 1999, this was because direct action tactics did not diffuse to Halifax until preparations for the Summit of the Americas in Québec City.

While the ad-hoc counter-summit organizing coalition dissolved in Halifax after the event, it helped to strengthen and build the membership of one fledgling organization. Bringing together representatives of development, environment, faith-based, human rights and labour groups, the Halifax Initiative was initially formed in December 1994 to "ensure that demands for fundamental reform of the international financial institutions (IFIs), namely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, were high on the agenda" of the G7 ("About HI"). As demonstrated by its website, the organization continues to this day, in a primarily educational capacity. 16

16 Though its focus was perfectly aligned with that of the AGM, Benoit Renaud affirmed that the NGO was primarily involved in research rather than activism, and so there was no continuity between HI and Halifax's MobGlob, the city's main alter-globalization coalition formed in the lead-up to the
A Shift in Tactics

The year 1995 was also significant from the point of view of activists in Ontario. Though not related directly to free trade, the Ontario Days of Action were an important moment in history of activism in the province, and did lay down some groundwork for the provincial AGM by bringing together the institutional left with the more militant direct action groups. Briefly, the Days of Action were a series of eleven one-day general strikes held in cities across Ontario, from the fall of 1995 until the fall of 1998. The actions were organized in response to the spending cuts implemented as part of the neoliberal “Common Sense Revolution” by the newly elected Conservative government of Mike Harris. The organizing coalition consisted of unions, community and anti-poverty groups, notably the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP). Founded in 1989 by the activist John Clarke, OCAP had emerged as perhaps the most militant activist organization on the Toronto left, consistently using direct action tactics to empower poor, homeless and marginalized people to “fight back” (“History of OCAP”). As we will see in the ensuing chapter, given both its direct action orientation and emphasis on locally-based activism, OCAP would play a key if uneasy role in the anti-global summit protests of the AGM.

In addition to bringing together unions and NGOs with groups like OCAP, the Ontario Days of Action prefigured the AGM in one other notable way. In 1996, the coalition behind the Days of Action orchestrated a successful, full-day strike in Toronto that shut

Québec City protests a few years later.

A demonstration of between five and ten thousand people at Queen’s Park in the fall of 1995 was followed by the first city strike that shut down London when 40,000 of the city’s 60,000 unionized workers stayed off the job. Then in February 1996, 100,000 workers took to the streets in Hamilton. As a final high point, on October 25, 1996, one million people in Toronto stayed away from work – the following next day, 350,000 marched through the city streets against the cuts (Kellogg 2011).
down much of the city. As the anti-Harris protesters marched through the streets on that day, a curious and previously unseen phenomenon appeared among them – a group of young activists dressed in black and wearing masks.

As recalled by Carol Phillips, then the CAW's International Department director, “it was the first time that I could remember that the black bloc or their precursor of just young men essentially joining us and trying to hide in our ranks so that they could break windows.” She added that the labour movement “very quickly put together a self-policing system to make sure that we spotted them early and that they couldn't take away from the message that we were trying to bring, which is we can do this if we want, but we choose not to because it's destruction for no good purpose.” She clarified further that the march marshalls would chase after these protesters and physically pull them back before they could destroy any property. Yet she insisted that the Days of Action (which wound down in 1998) were an important precursor to the AGM “from the labour perspective” because the protests against Harris established an early working relationship between the labour movement and what she called “the less traditional groups.” (As I discuss in the next chapter, Phillips herself would play a key role in getting the Canadian Auto Workers in Ontario involved in the alter-globalization movement beginning in 2000).

In keeping with anarchism's aforementioned emphasis on “propaganda of the deed,” black blocs tend to eschew non-violent civil disobedience – as noted by anarchist organizer Alex Hundert, “the Black Bloc doesn't do peaceful arrests” (Hundert 2010). Instead, the black bloc tactic tends to pursue the disruption of capitalist “business as usual,” which often takes the form of destroying private property. The black bloc tactic originated in German anti-fascist and autonomous movements of the 1980s and spread to North America through the anarchist Anti-Racist Action network, making its first appearance in the United States during the 1991 protests against the Gulf War and Columbus Day in San Francisco (Wood 2012: 34-5). Growing interest in anarchism and direct action is also
related to the influence of radical environmentalist and animal rights movements, as well as the Native American scholar Ward Churchill's book *Pacificism as Pathology*, in which he situates non-violence as a sign of privilege and limited thinking (ibid: 93-4). In North America, groups like Anti-Racist Action, Food Not Bombs, anarchist infoshops, and Anarchist Black Cross prisoner collectives networked further following anarchist conferences called Active Resistance held in Chicago in 1996 and in Toronto in 1998 (Graeber 2009; Wood 2012). Significantly from our perspective, David Graeber confirmed that it was thanks to the new ICTs that direct action tactics began to diffuse in the late 1990s with unprecedented “range and speed” (2009: 236).

Before proceeding onto the discussion of the AGM's precursor campaign against the MAI, it bears observing that the seeds of the AGM were also seen in Québec in the mid-1990s. Two organizations were at the forefront of *alter-mondialisme* in *La Belle Province*. The first group to play a major role in sensitizing the population to the issues of globalization was the Québec Women's Federation, or la Federation de Femmes de Québec (FFQ). In 1995, the FFQ organized a powerful, ten thousand-strong March of Bread and Roses (la Marche du Pain et des Roses) to protest poverty. The success of the march, in a context of rising interest in global justice, motivated the federation to join forces with other groups and build over the next few years a major international feminist organization called la Marche Mondiale des Femmes (the World March of Women), which continues to this day. As elucidated by one of my Québécois respondents, the veteran feminist and alter-mondialisation organizer Elsa Beaulieu, the MMF has proved profoundly influential in Québec politics (though its influence in English Canada has been much more limited).

Another precursor to the *alter-mondialisation* movement in Québec was an organization called CANEVAS (Collectif d'actions non violentes autonomes), founded by Philippe Duhamel. CANEVAS first coalesced in 1996; that same year, it carried out its first major
action involving an attempted citizens' arrest of Henry Kissinger, who was in Montréal to deliver the keynote address at the Second Montréal Conference on Globalized Economies. The following year, CANEVAS organized Québec's first significant act of civil disobedience against neoliberalism called "Plan G," after the government building (Complexe G), which the activists blockaded to protest the reduction of the Québec civil service in particular and neoliberalism more generally. As discussed in the section below, after the "Plan G" action, CANEVAS focused its attention on fighting a new global investment treaty with particularly abhorrent implications for Québec and its culture, namely the Multilateral Agreement on Investment.

The anti-MAI campaign

If the 1997-98 campaign against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment is frequently cited in the literature on the AGM, it is above all on account of being "the first successful internet campaign to defeat a global government-corporate project" (Barlow and Clarke 2001: 22). The Financial Times compared the bewilderment experienced by officials in the wake of the MAI's eventual collapse in 1998 to a scene from the film Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid: "Politicians and diplomats looked behind them at the 'horde of vigilantes' in close pursuit, 'whose motives and methods are only dimly understood in most capitals,' and they asked despairingly, 'Who are these guys?'" The hordes, according to the paper, were 'an international movement of grass-roots pressure groups" who claimed their first success in this fight and 'drew blood'" (cited in Barlow and Clarke 2001: 25). Though it still relied on oral communication and lobbying the state, the MAI campaign signalled a transition to new media activism in Canada.

The MAI negotiations were officially launched in February 1995. It was then that financial experts from Canada and the other twenty-eight member states of the Organization for Economic Development and Co-operation (OECD) agreed that by May
1997, they would congeal into one policy the pre-existing 1,600 bilateral, regional and limited multinational investment agreements. According to Katia Tieleman's 1999 report for the UN Vision Project on Global Public Policy Networks, the task was not seen as controversial but rather as "a mainly technical codification of existing rules and practices," best left to investment specialists (1999: 3). Tieleman argues further that this was the reason why no effort was made to inform the public about the proposed agreement, despite the profound influence she admits it would have had on national, provincial and even local legislation worldwide.

The aim of the proposed MAI was essentially to extend the scope of NAFTA by granting new powers to transnational corporations and loosening controls on transnational capital.\(^\text{18}\) The MAI would have removed governments' ability to set conditions (so-called performance requirements) on foreign investment (Barlow 1998: 210); it would also have established a dispute settlement mechanism allowing corporations to sue governments directly, effectively empowering them to challenge state policies, from taxes and environmental issues to labour rules, cultural policies and consumer protection that potentially threatened profits (Johnston and Laxer 2003: 50). As noted on the (still live) CoC website: "[h]ad it been adopted, the MAI would have been a 'charter of rights and freedoms' for global corporations - setting the stage for a two-tier health system in Canada, the erosion of our culture and the endangerment of our environment"

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\(^{18}\) After a period of widespread mistrust towards Foreign Direct Investment in the developing world in the 1970s, the following decade saw the US starting to lobby more aggressively for a new round of multilateral negotiations extending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade with new issues such as intellectual property rights, trade in services and investment (Drake and Nicolaidis cited in Tieleman 1999: 4, ff). The ensuing "Uruguay Round" negotiations did not produce substantial results, since developing states continued to oppose an investment treaty in the newly created World Trade Organization. However, the policy shift in favour of investment liberalization had already taken effect (Ostry cited in ibid). Hoping that a new setting would aid in pushing through a new agreement, the US proposed to move the negotiations towards the OECD where business lobbies, and the U.S. Council for International Business in particular, were keen to push what they termed a "high standard, liberal investment regime" (Tieleman 1999: 4; Walter 2001: 57).
In light of these concerns, critics of the MAI charged that the lack of information about the proposed treaty was evidence of a deliberate attempt to preempt democratic discussion about its detrimental effects.

Civil society groups first learned about the MAI in 1996, when Martin Khor, the executive director of the Malaysia-based Third World Network (a member organization of the IFG), attended the very first ministerial meeting of the newly formed World Trade Organization, where a global investment treaty modelled on NAFTA was proposed by the United States (Barlow 1998: 210). When he subsequently came across documents from an OECD Ministerial meeting, he realized that multilateral investment negotiations that the Third World Network had opposed at the WTO might be underway at the OECD (Tieleman 1999). However, he had no document to use as proof. He asked for help from the other member organizations of the IFG, who in turn asked their governments for more information about the accord. The responses they received, however, were either fudged or denied the existence of the treaty altogether (Barlow and Clarke 2001: 22).

Finally, in early March 1997, Tony Clarke, co-chair of the Council of Canadians and director of the Polaris Institute managed to obtain a leaked copy of the proposed agreement. When asked how he managed to accomplish this feat, Clarke politely limited his answer to saying that he had initiated a search process whose “end result was that a certain person attending a certain meeting in Europe returned with a copy of the document.” Leaked text in hand, Clarke produced an interpretive accompanying piece to be sent out together with the original text through the online networks of the IFG. “The idea was that simply circulating this text would do little to stir up people’s imagination.”

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19 The Polaris Institute was founded in 1997 with a mandate to aid social movements “in developing the kinds of strategies and tactics required to unmask and challenge the corporate power that is the driving force behind governments concerning public policy making on economic, social and environmental issues” (“About Us”).
Both documents were sent to the US-based NGO Public Citizen, led by the lawyer Lori Wallach, whose significant contribution was to frame the work of the campaign in terms of a “Dracula Strategy” – an evocative way to suggest that in order to kill the MAI, one needed only to expose it to public scrutiny. With this objective in mind, Public Citizen and its Multinational Monitor branch circulated the two documents through their virtual networks. From there the documents were circulated further to other civil society organizations in the OECD countries, and an international campaign was born. When it comes to the speed of information dissemination, the internet is certainly superlative to previous modes of communication.

In October 1997, the OECD negotiators decided to mitigate the growing public backlash by inviting representatives of civil society groups to Paris, home of the OECD headquarters. Maude Barlow and the environmentalists Elizabeth May and Michelle Swenarchuk travelled to the French capital as the Canadian delegation. “On the first day, over seventy major citizen, environmental, and labour groups (many of them already coalitions of other groups) from thirty countries as far away as India, Hong Kong, Japan, and New Zealand, came together in the cramped offices of a Paris-based environmental group...to forge a common position and a joint statement,” wrote Maude Barlow in her autobiography (1998: 213). Reaching agreement was hard work given the more conservative stance of some of the groups involved; nonetheless, the delegates did manage to arrive at a common objective of asking for a one-year moratorium on the MAI negotiations, which would allow them to meet with their governments and hold public consultations in their respective countries.

The following day, the activists met with the OECD MAI negotiators. The meeting was hosted by the OECD Secretary General Donald Johnson. As noted by Barlow, Johnson was “clearly annoyed at having to deal with this outbreak of democracy...[he] scolded us
for the 'disinformation you – especially the Canadians! – have been putting out on the MAI'" (cited in ibid: 214). After hours of heated debate, the delegates failed to reach a resolution. Angered by the dismissive treatment they received from the OECD officials, the NGOs dispersed to wage an “all-out campaign against the MAI” in their home countries (ibid: 215). The day that Barlow returned from Paris, the Council of Canadians held a press conference announcing the formation of a global as well as national citizens' coalition.

According to Ayers (2001), Canadian groups were well positioned to lead the fight against the MAI. First of all, the Canadian population was apprehensive about yet another neoliberal trade agreement, especially one negotiated behind closed doors. Second, as we have seen, Canadian activists were seasoned anti-free trade campaigners, and they could draw upon this extensive experience in leading the fight against the MAI. “Because Canada had created a campaign first, we had an important role to play in getting the word out to our colleagues in other OECD countries where the MAI was almost unknown,” wrote Barlow (1998: 218-19). Thus, in addition to travelling the country, Barlow and Clarke travelled to Europe to liaise and strategize with allies, particularly with those in France, such as the NGO Ecoropa as well as the Dutch NGO Transnational Institute. Both were under the directorship of Susan George, a Franco-American political scientist and one of the best known activists affiliated with the alter-globalization movement, who was also one of the commissioners of the MAI Inquiry in Canada.

French activism against the MAI was also strongly rooted in the desire – shared by many Canadians – to protect the distinctiveness of their national culture, especially vis-à-vis the powerful cultural industry of the United States. In a document called "Operation Monkey Wrench," which was circulated through online networks, Tony Clarke outlined a strategy designed to allow citizens' groups to get informed about their government's negotiating positions and then use the information to create friction between different government
delegations. Clarke correctly predicted that as soon as politicians and bureaucrats outside
the trade area, notably those in MIA-sensitive areas such as culture, found out about the
agreement, they would mobilize against it. Indeed, in Europe, it was the French cultural
ministry and arts community that took the lead in opposing the MAI. As recalled by
Clarke, the co-chair of the Césars, France's equivalent of the Academy Awards, was
“well-versed and well-briefed on the MAI” and made an impassioned statement against
the agreement during the 1997 awards ceremony, which created significant support for the
campaign.

On the domestic front, the coalition was co-chaired by the Council of Canadians and the
Canadian Labour Congress, and brought together over forty national groups from every
sector affected by the proposed agreement. The crucial first step was to educate
Canadians about the existence of the agreement. To get the attention of mainstream press,
Clarke and Barlow handed the documents pertinent to the MAI to Laura Eggertson, a
friendly journalist then of The Globe and Mail, who in turn managed to place a story on
the MAI on the newspaper's front page on April 3, 1997 – the same day that the
government put up its own website on the MAI. In the words of Maude Barlow, “the war
was on” (1998: 212). Apart from reaching out to the mainstream media, Clarke and
Barlow also wrote letters to the federal government about the agreement, and lobbied
elements of the government, in particular the departments responsible for culture, given
the cultural threat that the MAI represented.

Maude Barlow was also dispatched on what she described as “the most gruelling national
speaking tour I have ever had, visiting sixty communities right across the country. I spoke
in churches, libraries, union halls, and high school auditoriums. Almost every event was
packed – seven hundred in Guelph, more than five hundred in St. John's, twelve hundred
people in Victoria – and filled with young people, a very important development” (ibid:
216). Her comment echoes that concerning the IFG teach-in Toronto, and further
confirms that fighting corporate rule was increasingly resonating with a new generation of Canadian activists and ushering in a new cycle of protest. Many young activists started their own “MAI-Free zones” on campuses, while others were set up in homes, offices, and even some municipalities.\textsuperscript{20}

The CoC’s “MAI Inquiry,” subtitled “A Citizens’ Search for Alternatives,” attracted other well-known and respected Canadian public figures to serve as the Inquiry’s volunteer Commissioners. Among them were Judy Rebick, Elizabeth May, Carol Shields, Ovide Mercredi, Buzz Hargrove, and David Suzuki.\textsuperscript{21} With their help, the Inquiry organized public hearings about the MAI in eight major cities across Canada: Vancouver, Edmonton, Saskatoon, Winnipeg, Toronto, Montreal, Halifax, and St. John’s. A Citizens’ Handbook on the MAI was also published and distributed to assist people in preparing for the hearings. In addition to attending the hearings, hundreds of individual Canadians participated by filling out the “Citizens’ Report Card” contained in the Handbook.

The campaign to defeat the MAI also helped to galvanize the nascent “altermondialisation” movement in Québec. By 1998, CANEVAS, which had opposed the Plan G as part of its struggle against neoliberal public service cuts, shifted its focus to opposing the MAI. On May 1 at midnight, L’opération SalAMI was launched officially with a street party outside the Montréal Stock Exchange (in conjunction with a similar party in Paris), according to \textit{Long Arc}, the newsletter produced by a group called Toronto Action for Social Change, of which Matthew Behrens (who kindly mailed me this literature) was member.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{20} Toronto, Montreal, Victoria, Kamloops, Saskatoon, Red Deer, Hamilton, and Sydney adopted resolutions expressing concern or outright opposition to the MAI.

\textsuperscript{21} For a full list of the national and regional commissioners as well as principal organizers, see Clarke (n.d.)

\textsuperscript{22} SalAMI is a play on words. The acronym MAI translates as AMI in French, while SalAMI means “dirty friend.” As for TASC, it is a part of the bigger Homes not Bombs coalition of Ontario activists
According to the group’s founder, Philippe Duhamel, the biggest SalAMI group was based in Montréal, but smaller collectives could also be found in Québec City and Saguenay. According to former SalAMI activist Anna Kruzynski (2004), for many Québécois activists, participation in these groups was their first experience with decentralized decision-making that became a “trademark” feature of the altermondialisation movement.

Following a weekend conference on globalization and the last in an ongoing series of non-violence trainings, on May 25, 1998, the Fourth Montréal Conference on Globalized Economies, featuring OECD chief Donald Johnston as keynote speaker, was targeted by CANEVAS-turned-L’opération SalAMI! Five hundred activists, including some from Ontario, surrounded the Queen Elizabeth Hotel – where John Lennon and Yoko One staged their bed-in for peace in 1969 – and sealed off the exits, blocking access for about six hours in what the TASC newsletter called “likely the largest such non-violent resistance staged to date against the MAI.” Ninety-nine people were arrested and criminally charged. They had demanded that Canada and Québec withdraw from the MAI negotiations and oppose all accords that subordinate human, social, cultural, or environmental rights to those of investors and multinational corporations (cited in Kruzynski 2004: 238).

According to Tony Clarke, the anti-MAI activists in English Canada were aware of the efforts of their Québec counterparts and some minimal communication between them did take place. However, since the events around the MAI were “moving very quickly,” there

23 According to the newsletter, six Southern Ontario residents, including three members of TASC, were among those arrested.
had been no time to develop a more meaningful connection, thus Québécois campaigners were operating largely on their own rather than as part of the CoC-led domestic campaign. This point is significant from our temporal perspective because it brings to light the limitations of high-speed, internet-mediated communications, a point I return to momentarily.

Following an intensive year-long campaign, the MAI's demise was finally ensured on October 14, 1998, when, less than a week before the MAI talks were scheduled to resume at the OECD, France announced that it was pulling out from the negotiations indefinitely, citing widespread domestic and international opposition. To be sure, the OECD governments' inability to bridge differences concerning certain elements of the agreement also factored into its collapse (Ayers 2001: 65; Walter 2001: 61). According to Walter, English and especially French Canada's desire to protect its cultural industries were also perceived as unacceptable by US negotiators. The NGOs' success in inserting a number of clauses protecting national autonomy on labour and the environment further reduced the American business lobby's interest in the agreement (Walter 2001: 57-8). Ultimately, however, it was France's withdrawal that ensured the death of the proposed agreement — to the credit of French activists and also, one might add, the Council of Canadians, which supported them along the way.

The campaign against what many NGOs called “the corporate rule treaty” (see Tieleman 1999: 11) can be considered a major victory for social movements in Canada and beyond. According to Johnston and Laxer, the MAI's demise signalled “the first major reversal for globalism in the North” (2003: 49). Commenting upon this success, many media and movement scholars point to the activists' use of the internet in the transnational networks that helped to defeat the agreement. Ayers, for one, noted that the internet “sped up and eased the exchange of information across boundaries ... it provided activists with a tool for creating opportunities for the rapid diffusion of anti-MAI protest” (Ayers 2001: 64)
while *The Globe and Mail* published a front-page story titled “How the Net Killed the MAI: Grassroots Groups Used Their Own Globalization to Derail the Deal” (Drohan 1998). According to the Globe’s report, “by pooling their information, they [the activists] have broken through the wall of secrecy that traditionally surrounds international negotiations, forcing governments to deal with their complaints” (Drohan 1998). The internet effectively made it impossible for all the governments to sign on to the MAI without facing serious domestic democratic pressures.

On the other hand, campaign members were careful not to reduce their success to the new technology. According to a number of activists, “the roots of the MAI campaign lie in the previous FTA and NAFTA organizing, which built a series of personal and inter-organizational relationships, thereby laying the groundwork for the substantive critique of the agreement that made the MAI campaign such a success” (cited in Huyer 2002: 307). My own interviews with the activists confirmed this argument: according to Tony Clarke, while the campaigners made use of “an archaic version of the internet” to circulate the leaked text of the MAI and Clarke’s accompanying analytical piece, “then the follow-up campaign work in the meetings that took place went back to the old style which meant travelling.” As he reiterated, Maude Barlow in particular “made numerous trips” to Europe to connect face-to-face with OECD allies, especially in those based in France, Belgium and Switzerland.

Likewise, in reflecting on his organizing experience with ICTs, ACN activist Ken Traynor (cited in Huyer 2002: 307) noted that while the internet allows activists to get the message out to the public quickly, online communication does not require coalition members “to invest the time and resources to coalesce around and hammer out a more complex and profound platform of resistance.” Based on her interviews with Traynor and other ACN activists, Huyer concluded that “information technologies such as fax and Internet can frustrate one-time policy initiatives, but it is not clear that they can generate a
long term societal challenge (...) Internet networks are not necessarily the appropriate vehicles for developing long-term, substantive and profound critiques and relationships" (2002: 307, 308).

Nonetheless, in 1998, the speedy success of the MAI campaign signalled an early victory for the alternative globalization movement, and a moment of transition to internet-based transnational networking against globalization as a standard part of the tactical repertoire. There is also a more direct connection between the MAI campaign and the global movement's "coming out party" in 1999 in Seattle: worried that international business lobbies would simply transfer the investment liberalization agenda from the OECD to another multilateral body, the NGOs involved in the campaign turned their attention to the Millennium Round of international trade talks to be held by the World Trade Organization (Walter 2001: 52). As noted by Lori Wallach of Public Citizen, when the WTO officials met in Seattle, "they no longer could just get together and give away all of our domestic interests, and it was [as a result of] that work through the MAI campaign which we then in 1998 turned directly into a 'WTO: No New Round' campaign" ("Commanding Heights").

Yet, two full years before the protests known as the "Battle in Seattle" attracted between fifty and one hundred thousand protesters and much mainstream media attention, a protest against another transnational trade institution in Vancouver helped to give a further boost to an emergent protest cycle in Canada.

"No to APEC!" Vancouver 1997

Just as the MAI campaign was taking off, the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) summit was set to take place in Vancouver in late November 1997. 24 According

24 Founded in Canberra in 1989, APEC is currently a 21-member organization of countries whose
to my respondents already active at the time, the APEC protests can be considered the
inaugural protest event of the Canadian AGM. Once widely known as “Peppergate” or
“sprAyPEC,” the Vancouver protests resulted in a high-profile public inquiry into the
RCMP’s misconduct, which further galvanized the fledgling AGM. Today, the APEC
protests have been largely forgotten. In what follows, I recuperate this history from
oblivion to show that while the APEC protest was not yet framed as about globalization
and did not yet have the AGM’s signature tactics, it did demonstrate a marked shift in that
direction on behalf of the new movement generation.

_Preparation_

The APEC protest organizing in Vancouver took place on two fronts. First, as early as a
year in advance of the summit, community organizations from Vancouver’s downtown
east side, one of Canada’s poorest neighbourhoods, came together in a group called the
NO! to APEC Coalition. The Coalition organized educational seminars on globalization in the
ensuing months and also led a peaceful demonstration through the streets of Vancouver
during the days of the summit. Among the coalition’s member organizations were Filipino
community and women’s groups, which were acutely aware of APEC’s poor track record
on human and economic rights in their home country and were energized by the protests
against the APEC summit in Manila a year earlier (which had been attended by activists
from the IFG, including Maude Barlow and Tony Clarke). In 1997, the CoC, the CLC, as
well as church, women’s, student and environmental groups organized a counter-summit

mission is centered on “championing free and open trade and investment, promoting and accelerating
regional economic integration, encouraging economic and technical cooperation, enhancing human
security, and facilitating a favorable and sustainable business environment” (“Mission Statement”).
APEC member states include Canada as well as China and Indonesia – in 1997, the latter two countries
were ruled by the repressive regimes of Jiang Zemin and General Suharto, respectively. Though APEC’s
mission statement illustrates plainly its goal of liberalizing trade, it was primarily the presence in
Vancouver of these two authoritarian leaders that rallied the nascent alter-globalization movement in
Canada around the issue of human rights.
conference, with Barlow delivering the keynote address (Barlow 1998: 206). Conceived as “a place where voices that would not be heard at APEC will be heard,” according to the director of the Vancouver-based Institute for Media Policy and Civil Society (Sylvester cited in Dunphy 1997), the counter-summit brought together about a thousand delegates, and, in a way reminiscent of the G7 summit in Toronto in 1988, it featured a mock tribunal about oppressive workplace conditions involving testimony from Chinese, Mexican and Indonesian workers.

Protest preparations also began in earnest at the University of British Columbia in January of 1997, when outgoing university president David Strangway invited the APEC leaders to converge at UBC’s Museum of Anthropology on the final day of the summit. In response, a second group composed mostly of students, including then undergraduate linguistics student Jaggi Singh, formed a group called APEC Alert. Many of them were also participating in the meetings and activities of the NO! to APEC coalition; however, while the Coalition was committed to non-violence, when it came time to confront the summit on campus, members of APEC Alert were intent on using direct action tactics.

On both city and campus fronts, networking with a view toward the summit lasted almost a year: not only did the activists know far enough in advance that the summit was coming to their city, but – in line with my suggestion that the APEC protest helped to usher in the AGM cycle in Canada – it also seems that the policies of a transnational economic organization were capable of generating enough interest to sustain activist energies over what was, as we will see, a comparatively extended organizing timeframe. This was confirmed during our interview by Jaggi Singh, who recalled that in contrast to many other demos that are organized “a few weeks before, at least if you’re lucky,” the APEC mobilization was “a year long campaign of popular education, workshops, posters on campus and in the city, of trainings and the rest of it. So that tide was definitely
influencing Seattle, because it wasn't about starting just a month before, but a year before.”

To be sure, as revealed during my review of the APEC protest coverage in major Canadian newspapers, and confirmed by my interviews with Garth Mullins and Jaggi Singh, the anti-corporate analysis that animated the alter-globalization movement was only beginning to emerge at the time. The protest “frame,” as movement scholars call it, constructed by anti-APEC activists was centred on human rights. According to Singh, it was easy for the media to adopt the story about idealistic students opposing Canada’s dirty trade dealings with documented tyrants: “that was the frame that we were trying ourselves to get out and contribute to, one way or another.” Indonesian leader General Suharto’s genocidal policy in East Timor emerged as a particularly powerful point of contention. Mullins, who was a member of the NO! To APEC coalition and who still lives and organizes on Canada’s West coast, confirmed that the contents of the anti-APEC message were not fully worked out: it combined an economic nationalist perspective that had propelled the anti-free trade struggle and a nascent focus on international capitalism and corporate globalization. To be sure, mixed messaging would prove fairly standard during subsequent AGM anti-summit protests, apart from cases where a specific piece of legislation was being discussed at the summit. Likewise connecting the APEC protest to subsequent anti-summit protests of the AGM, the activists argued that the APEC meetings

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25 According to Scott Harris, the Edmonton-based Prairies regional organizer for the CoC, Canadian working groups of the (initially U.S.-based) East Timor Alert Network were founded by Elaine Briar, a Canadian photographer who had witnessed massacres carried out by Suharto’s army and came back determined to take action. When she subsequently delivered an address at Edmonton’s annual Global Visions Festival, Briar helped to spark the creation of an ETAN chapter in Edmonton. It consisted mainly of young people, Quakers concerned about Canadian military exports to Indonesia, and labour groups supporting anti-sweatshop efforts. As noted by Scott Harris, the Edmonton-based Prairies regional organizer for the CoC, the anti-sweatshop activism took the form of a boycott of Bata shoes and other items made in Indonesia. “Around here, for me and my circle, the trade piece, through doing that work on human rights and anti-sweatshop stuff...that’s the trajectory of how we arrived at Seattle.” Prior to joining the CoC, Scott Harris himself had gone on long tours of Central America in the late 1990s, and a poster promoting solidarity with Nicaragua still adorns a wall in his home.
were taking place behind closed doors without public consultation, and were therefore illegitimate and undemocratic. As these arguments became more common among activists, the language of alter-globalization in movement communications was strong enough to get picked up by The New York Times, which reported that the protesters were “decrying President Jiang Zemin of China, President Suharto of Indonesia and 'corporate greed’” (“Indonesians Arrested”).

The student activists also took issue with the repression of dissent on campus in the lead-up to the summit. To reclaim their space after a security fence had been hastily erected around the Museum of Anthropology, members of APEC Alert proceeded to stake out an APEC-Free Zone on campus: starting at the statue of the Goddess of Democracy by the Student Union Building, they drew concentric circles on the ground every day until the zone finally reached the museum itself. The action was inspired by the Situationists, recalled Garth Mullins; it was conceived to “counterpose the slow occupation of campus by the police with the liberation of campus by the forces of democracy.” Likely inspired by the MAI-Free Zones being established around the same time, the action gestures toward the playful creativity that became a trademark feature of the AGM.

When it came to outreach communication tactics, the APEC Alert activists used posters and flyers, recalled Elise Thorburn, then a first-year student at Vancouver's Simon Fraser University. In 1997, the Internet was just beginning to spread; it did not play a large role in facilitating the organizing of the APEC demonstrations. As we saw, the following year would bring some changes as anti-MAI activists started to use the Internet to network transnationally with fellow campaigners, and the medium's importance to organizing increased dramatically shortly thereafter (to the point where today it is the definitive tool of “new media activism”).
As the date of the summit approached, the authorities became increasingly troubled by the growing level of militancy on campus. They decided to move ahead with more drastic and preemptive measures. Less than two weeks before the summit, RCMP Staff Sergeant Lloyd Plante wrote the following email to four Lower Mainland detachments:

An anti-APEC group, APEC ALERT, have several planned demonstrations which may involve civil disobedience from now until the conclusion of APEC on 97/11/25. It is hoped that we can obtain support from Crown which may result in a charge of assault against the obvious leader of the group, JAGGY SINGH. It is our intention if we can obtain a 'no-go UBC with respect to SINGH, we may basically 'break the back' of this group” (cited in Dembicki 2009).

On November 24, the day before the scheduled protests, Jaggi Singh was crossing the university campus when he was suddenly tackled and thrown to the ground by several plainclothes police officers. He was placed in the back of an unmarked car with tinted glass windows and whisked off to jail for allegedly assaulting a campus guard by yelling into his ear with a megaphone two weeks earlier – a spurious charge that was later dropped by the Crown in February 1999, two weeks before it was scheduled to go to trial. But it was enough to keep Jaggi Singh behind bars for the duration of the summit. His arrest, carried out publicly and in a dramatic fashion, had an electrifying effect on the student population – the stage was set for a high-octane confrontation (Dembicki 1999).

The Protests

The following morning, as the motorcade carrying the leaders entered the campus, visible from the route were signs with simple messages written on them: “Democracy,” “Free Speech,” and “Human rights.” The signs had been put up on portable coat racks by UBC law student Craig Jones. When asked to remove them by the RCMP, Jones refused, and
was promptly arrested on the lawn of his residence.26

As the news of his arrest spread across campus, up to a thousand protesters gathered outside the Student Union Building for a rally called by APEC Alert. Defiant of the RCMP’s orders, the demonstrators then marched toward the Museum where the APEC meeting was underway.

Elise Thorburn was part of the crowd. She recalled that as the protesters approached the fence, a team of volunteer “peacekeepers” warned that anyone proceeding past that point was risking arrest, but for a period there seemed to be no police and none could be seen guarding the fence, for they had aligned along the route instead. Thus as the marchers approached the Museum, “people just ran at the fence.” At this point a few protesters started to climb on top of the fence. It collapsed almost instantaneously.

The collapse of the fence was not part of anyone’s plan. “I was right at the front, I saw what happened,” said Garth Mullins.

There weren’t thirty people all ripping at the fence and finally it came down – there were a couple of people who just started climbing and it just looped down as if it was held together by a couple of twist ties. And later we found out at the inquiry, it really WAS held up by a couple of twist ties! I don’t know what the motivations of those people were, but everyone seemed really surprised because the fence went over on top of a bunch of people.

26 Jones had put up the same signs the night before; they were removed during the night by the police. Following his arrest (he was held for fourteen hours without charges), Jones, formerly a soldier and supporter of the Liberal Party, went on to file a suit against the RCMP and the federal government, arguing that the PMO interfered with the democratic rights of protesters. As UBC president Martha Piper later confirmed during the official inquiry, the Prime Minister’s Office overruled an agreement between the RCMP and the University of British Columbia that would have permitted protesters near the motorcade of APEC leaders without compromising security (Pue 2000b; Dembicki 2009).
As soon as the fence came down, the police moved immediately to form a human security wall two or three officers deep, recalled Thorburn. Once the perimeter was secured, the RCMP decided to push back the protesters with pepper spray. Unprepared and ill equipped to handle the attack, the protesters retreated to a safe area some fifty metres from the security zone, sat on the ground, and tried to figure out what to do. Among the proposals made, the one that was finally adopted involved forming small groups and walking up to the police to get arrested as a symbolic gesture of non-violent civil disobedience. “So that’s how I got arrested. To be honest, I had no idea what I was getting myself into,” said Elise Thorburn.

Having steadied their resolve to face arrest, she and another person volunteered to go first. Arms linked, they walked up slowly to the police line protecting the fence, with camera crews following closely behind them, blocking off their path of retreat and propelling them on. When they finally arrived before the line of police, “things got pretty shovy,” said Thorburn. An officer reached out and grabbed her by the coat, and with his free hand, held up a large canister of pepper spray. Instinctively she tried to protect her face by hiding it inside her elbow, but the officer pulled down her arm, pushed back her head, aimed, and fired. Thorburn remembers getting dragged violently forward through the line of police and falling to the ground on the other side, her pants partly pulled down, blinded and screaming in pain – an image that was captured by the CBC and helped to rally public outcry against the RCMP in the aftermath of the protest; it also had the side effect of rendering Elise Thorburn an instant media celebrity of sorts. Once in handcuffs, Thorburn was transported to jail where, though never actually charged, she and other women protesters were targeted for strip searches – a shameful act of gender-based oppression that became one of the key points of contention during the ensuing inquiry.

Though a number of their comrades had been arrested, those who escaped remained committed to the idea of disrupting the APEC meeting, which was still in progress at the
Museum of Anthropology. With this goal in mind, several hundred activists regrouped a few hours later to hold an impromptu sit-in in front of campus Gate 6, the chosen exit of the APEC motorcade. Determined to clear the blockade before the motorcade approached, the RCMP once again resorted to copious amounts of pepper spray. It was then that RCMP Staff Sgt. Hugh Stewart distinguished himself and earned the nickname “Sergeant Pepper” for blasting protesters at close range with a ferocious determination (“Oh, if only the internet was around back then, he would have been a meme!” Thorburn noted with a laugh. “He was really lucky that it was 1997!”). One of Sergeant Pepper’s victims was a CBC cameraman, which was captured on video and became an iconic image associated with the protests. Stewart’s frenzied use of the noxious substance also helped to give rise to the terms “Peppergate” and “sprAyPEC,” as the protests became known in the aftermath.

**The Aftermath**

Forty-eight protesters were arrested during the protests at the fence and the road blockade (Pecho 2008). Once released, Elise Thorburn and some of the other women who had been targeted for strip searches coalesced into a small, short-lived group called Women Opposed to Police Intimidation Group, which carried out a couple of street theatre actions. “Our acronym was WOPIG and our slogan was whoa pig, whoa pig, we say no, pig,” recalled Thorburn. Newly radicalized, Thorburn was also among the twenty-seven anti-APEC activists who formed a longer lasting group called Democracy Street, intent on using legal means as a platform for continued struggle against APEC and the repression of democratic dissent.

Along with a number of others, members of Democracy Street, including high-profile plaintiffs and APEC Alert organizers Jaggi Singh, Jonathan Oppenheim and Rob West, filed a complaint against the RCMP. This in turn precipitated the launch of what would be
a four year long formal investigation by the Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP, which sat for more than 160 days and heard 150 witnesses (Bronskill 2001). The Commission heard that General Suharto had threatened not to come to the conference for fear of being embarrassed by protesters. As the media covering the inquiry reported at the time, this concern was expressed directly to Jean Chrétien at a meeting with Indonesian ambassador Benjamin Parwoto in September 1997 (Skelton 1999).

When Chrétien returned to Vancouver in 1998 to deliver a keynote address at the $400-a-plate Liberal fundraiser at the Vancouver Hyatt Hotel, the activists of Democracy Street held a protest in front of the hotel that attracted about 1,200 participants. According to a report in The Globe and Mail, several people were injured and at least one person arrested after some demonstrators attempted to push through a police cordon at the hotel's entrance, resulting in media reports about so-called "Riot at the Hyatt" (Armstrong and Mickleburgh 1999).

At least in part due to the sustained efforts of Democracy Street and public outrage concerning “SprAyPEC” and what was then a unique episode of police brutality against mostly white, middle-class students, the media stayed on the story of the APEC inquiry in the months to come, as it unfolded amid a string of bizarre controversies (see Pue 2000a: xvii-xxi; Giese 2000). In 1999 the original Inquiry Commissioner was fired, and former Saskatchewan Judge Ted Hughes took over the proceedings. A few months later, upon concluding that he could not legally compel him to do so, Hughes politely invited Jean Chrétien to testify before the commission. But even though the Prime Minister had earned some flak for infamously dismissing media's questions about the pepper-spraying of protesters by saying “For me, pepper, I put it on my plate,” he opted to reject the judge's request (Armstrong 2000).

Chrétien's refusal to testify led to the immediate and public withdrawal from the inquiry
of Jonathan Oppenheim, the most high-profile of the fifty-two complainants, followed promptly by the withdrawal of Jaggi Singh and Rob West (Girard 2000). As they explained to the newspapers, without the prospect of Chrétien's testimony, the hearing lost its authority and crucial political context (ibid). In an opinion piece penned for *The Globe and Mail*, Oppenheim (2000) produced a passionate rationale that attests to what had by then turned into a widespread rejection within the AGM of seeking change through established state channels:

A bunch of hyperactive Mounties ripping away protest banners is not nearly as serious a threat to our freedom as the apathy induced by channelling debate into inquiries such as this. Pepper spray is not nearly as brutal as the distant chatter of our politicians. I can in no way continue to be complicit in a hypocrisy of this magnitude. I cannot help legitimize this process even in the most token manner.

By then, the Canadian AGM cycle was starting to peak, with the preparations to protest the FTAA in Québec City already underway. It was just at the peak of the cycle, in the summer of 2001, four years after "Peppergate," that the Commission's 453-page final report was finally released, revealing what was widely known from the start: that the federal government intervened in the security arrangements for the 1997 APEC summit, that the RCMP displayed "inappropriate police conduct" by engaging in "unwarranted 'influence and intrusion'" and that Jean Carle, Director of Operations in the Prime Minister's Office, "tossed his weight around" with police to influence how protesters were treated (cited in Bronskill 2001). 27 Jaggi Singh pithily summed up the protesters' sentiment about the inquiry pithily by calling it "one of the most expensive doorstops ever" (see "RCMP slammed").

27 Despite the rebuke in the final report of the Commission, Carle's career was not affected; likewise, Sergeant Pepper, the officer who came to symbolize the RCMP performance at the summit, got off lightly thanks to Judge Hughes' decision that he had been given an unreasonable assignment by poorly organized superiors. Adding to the activists' anger and disappointment, Hughes' findings and recommendations were not binding on the RCMP commissioner (Bryden 2001)
Asked to reflect critically on the APEC mobilization, both Garth Mullins and Jaggi Singh regretted the fact that the turnout to the campus action had been underestimated. According to Garth Mullins, the organizers had to “scramble” to organize the larger than anticipated crowd: “They could have figured there’d be five hundred rather than a dozen people willing to get arrested. But since non-violent civil disobedience hadn’t been practiced in Vancouver for some time, people were conservative in estimates of the number of people wanting to get arrested.” He explained that as a result, there were not enough medics, legal observers, people to help with civil disobedience, communication of plan, and so on. Along similar lines, Jaggi Singh noted that one disappointment about the APEC mobilization was that “there wasn’t a more organized civil disobedience plan. It was a bit scattered. I mean it was there, it was definitely at the heart of what we were doing, but it wasn’t as large scale as it ended up being in Québec [City, in 2001] or definitely how it was in Seattle. But that’s because it was a precursor, right?” In affirming that the attendance at the protests exceeded the organizers’ expectations, their comments attest to the presence of a rising tide of contention.

As we will see, the predominant focus on police brutality in the aftermath of the APEC mobilization would become commonplace within the AGM. Yet in 1997, the aftermath had a strong nationalist tone that did not sit well with anarchists such as Jaggi Singh. In reporting hearing multiple testimonies about protesters singing the national anthem as the police attacked them, Jaggi Singh noted that, to his mind, “this represents a sort of a false consciousness in the streets, when police start attacking you and you start signing ‘Oh Canada.’ So I think a lot of people there were just offended at having police attack them.” The anti-capitalist globalization perspective was only starting to take hold at the time, he added, confirming the fault line drawn by himself and other anarchists between direct action-based anti-capitalism and “anti-corporate” pacifist types of old (Graeber 2009: 5-7).
Significantly for our purposes, Jaggi Singh reflected further that what gets lost in the history of the APEC mobilization is the story about the year-long coalition work against APEC that brought together students and Vancouver's various community organizations. On the other hand, it seems that despite extensive media coverage, even the memory of the pepper spray has largely dissipated now, since among my respondents, it was almost exclusively those already active at the time who referenced the APEC protests when asked to comment on the origins of the Canadian alter-globalization movement. Thus it appears that despite the high-profile inquiry into an outrageous act of state repression that shocked the nation, the story of APEC has been forgotten by contemporary activists. This brings up the question of collective memory in relation to collective action, one I return to in more depth in chapter 5.

In the weeks and months following the protests, the activists' spirits stayed high. The winds of change were blowing and, in Garth Mullins' recollection, "there was a funny feeling after the demonstrations were over. It felt like the beginning of something, not the end of something." Maude Barlow likewise recalls feeling "a change in the political wind... it was clear our position was gaining respect" (1998: 206). For many people, it was their first demonstration, and they were looking to stir up more trouble for the agents of neoliberal globalization: a new cycle of protest was clearly on the rise.

Some of the anti-APEC demonstrators would get make trouble for the status quo during the event that remains the most readily identifiable protest of the alternative globalization movement, namely the demonstrations against the WTO in Seattle in November 1999. In fact, a number of continuities can be observed between the APEC protests and the "Battle in Seattle" almost exactly two years later. Not only was the anti-corporate, anti-capitalist frame increasingly resonating increasingly with a new generation of activists, a number of the organizers of the APEC demonstration, including Jaggi Singh, were actively involved
in the coalition behind the Seattle protests, the Direct Action Network.\footnote{The Direct Action Network (DAN), which coalesced to organize against the 1999 WTO meeting, was one among several key networks organizing in parallel for the Seattle protests. Others included the global anti-capitalist network People's Global Action, Jubilee 2000, which emerged in 1996 from religious groups to seek cancellation of debt for poorest countries by 2000, ATTAC (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions), and the ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions) (Wood 2012: 27-28).} According to Lichbach (2003), Canadians participated in the Seattle protests in “disproportionate” numbers, comprising almost ten percent of the approximately forty to fifty thousand demonstrators (cited in Wood 2013: 30). Seattle's proximity to Vancouver where the APEC protest took place two years earlier helped to further stir up Canadians' interest in protesting the WTO summit.

Significantly, Lesley Wood connected Canadians' strong showing in Seattle to the “infrastructural support and public education provided by more activist-oriented trade unions...[which] were experienced in showing the links between trade issues, jobs, and social spending” (Wood 2012: 30). More specifically, the CAW, CUPW, and CUPE joined forced with the Council of Canadians and the Sierra Youth Coalition to organize a cross-country speaking tour called the Canadian Caravan to Oppose the WTO. Carrying a small group of representatives from the participating organizations, the Caravan left Toronto on November 4, 1999 and made stops in twenty-one cities before arriving in Seattle in time for the protests (“Caravan”). The Seattle protests were also attended by members of the Council of Canadians, Oxfam Canada, the International Socialists, and Canadian Pensioners Concerned, who mobilized together for Seattle by creating a new coalition in Toronto in the summer of 1999 called Mobilization for Global Justice (Wood 2012: 70).

Much has already been written about the “Battle in Seattle,” and given the Canadian focus of this study, it seems unnecessary to discuss it at length here. Suffice it to say that it was in the streets of Seattle that most North Americans observed a spectacular
appearance of the black bloc, which captured international media attention by breaking windows and effectively provoking — or rather, renewing — a debate among activists concerning violence as a tactic that would become a mainstay of the movement for the duration. In the ensuing weeks and months, the “Seattle tactics,” notably the black bloc (but also the use of giant puppets, blockades, and jail solidarity – see Wood 2012), started to diffuse to activists in other cities and countries. Those who attended the Seattle protests reported back to their communities when they got home, and screenings of documentaries from Seattle, such as “The Showdown in Seattle” on campuses and elsewhere, helped to mobilize a new generation of activists to join the fight against neoliberal globalization.

In the aftermath of Seattle, the organizations that had sponsored the WTO Caravan also joined the new coalition; and not long afterwards, so did other leading institutional actors on the Canadian left, including the Canadian Federation of Students (CFS), the largest and left-leaning national student union, Ontario Public Interest Research Group (OPIRG), a campus-based network of research groups advocating social justice, as well as OCAP and Greenpeace Canada. Toronto Mob4Glob subsequently became “the largest and most well-known organization in Toronto explicitly affiliated with the antiglobalization movement” (Wood 2012: 47), with a chapter downtown as well as at York University.

In the months to come, the cycle continued to pick up momentum, and the emerging movement set its sights on its next target: the summit of the IMF and World Bank scheduled to take place in Washington, D.C in April, 2000. Just a couple of months later, alter-globalization activists in Ontario got an opportunity to flex their organizing muscle against the 2000 summit of the Organization of American States, marking the beginning of the peak of what I call “cycle 2.0” in the history of the Canadian AGM, and to which I now turn.
Chapter 3
“Cycle 2.0” : The AGM at the Turn of the Millennium

In the previous chapter, we saw that a new cycle of protest began to surface in Canada beginning in 1997, a couple of years prior to the Battle of Seattle. In the first half of this chapter, I examine the major “moments of convergence” that marked the ascent and peak of the Canadian AGM cycle during the ensuing two years. To demarcate this period (2000-2001) from the previous (and following) waves of contention against free trade and neoliberal globalization, I will refer to it as “Cycle 2.0.” This phrase captures not only the peak’s turn-of-the-20th-century timing, but also the central role of the global internet and participatory media — the so-called “Web 2.0” — in helping the cycle to diffuse and reach this peak — and quickly.

As I will show, the cycle continued to climb in the year 2000, with the spring protests in Washington, D.C. against the IMF and World Bank and, just a couple months later, in Windsor, Ontario, against the Organization of American States (OAS). Though not successful in shutting down the official summits, for reasons discussed below, these two mobilizations continued to feed the growing wave of opposition. In the year that followed, a swelling Canadian movement coalesced around a new shared target: the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which loomed as the main agenda item during the “Summit of the Americas” in Québec City. With tens of thousands of people defying clouds of tear gas to take over the streets of the picturesque Vieille Ville, the Québec City protests became the “coming out party” of the Canadian movement — to this day, having been there grants one a certain movement “cachet.”

Yet, if the cycle’s momentum seemed unstoppable in the first months of 2001, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center effectively stopped the North American AGM in its tracks. As discussed in the chapter’s third section, amidst the US-led “war on terror” and
the resulting clampdown on political dissent, the next major mobilization in the history of the Canadian AGM, namely the summer 2002 protest against the G8 summit in Kananaskis, Alberta, was much smaller and more subdued compared to the preceding AGM demonstrations. In discussing the ensuing cycle's end, the chapter concludes by revealing the uneasy location of the AGM's direct action activists in the spectacular though short-lived anti-Iraq war protests of winter 2003.

From Washington to Windsor

With a new wave of protest on the rise, those who had missed the “Battle of Seattle” were keen to find their way to Washington, D.C. in the spring of 2000 to protest the meeting of the IMF and the World Bank. The successful shutdown of the WTO Millennial Round trade talks in Seattle emboldened the alter-globalists to continue in the same tactical direction. The goal of the “A16” demonstration was therefore not to reform the two international financial institutions, but rather to shut them down too, with the help of the direct action blockading tactics used by DAN in Seattle.

On April 16, up to fifteen thousand demonstrators took to the streets of the American capital. Protest organizers had intended for affinity groups to self-organize to block intersections in a downtown area, in order to prevent the delegates from leaving. They found, however, that different affinity groups had different ideas on how to proceed. A major weakness of decentralized decision-making became evident at this point, when the organizers finally announced that since each affinity group had complete autonomy, each one was free to participate in the blockade – or not. While this was “impeccably fair and democratic,” noted Naomi Klein, “there was just one problem – it made absolutely no sense. Sealing off the access points had been a co-ordinated action. If some intersections now opened up and other rebel-camp intersections stayed occupied, delegates on their way out of the meeting would could simply hang a right instead of a left, and be home
free. Which, of course, is precisely what happened” (Klein 2002: 23). Yet while the Washington protests demonstrated a significant shortcoming of the AGM’s trademark decentralization, a new protest cycle predicated upon this method of decision-making was just beginning, and its first major tactical failure neither changed the approach nor dampened the spirits of the activists.

Likewise impressed by the Washington demo was a delegation from the Canadian Auto Workers. Carol Phillips, who had served since 1995 as the director of the union’s international department, explained that the labour leadership was increasingly aware of the importance of joining forces with the young people driving the new movement. She took with her to Washington two respected rank-and-file CAW organizers, “and we went down to Washington to find out first hand, face-to-face what this movement was about,” she said, “and we came back absolutely blown away...and said, ‘you know what? We had better be part of their movements or we’re going to miss a huge opportunity here to affect change.”

Jerry Logan and Rick Kitchen had been key organizers during the Ontario Days of Action: they were worried about the direct action tactics used by the new movement, and whether the labour movement would be able to work alongside the young radicals. But in Washington, Phillips added, they were all very impressed by consensus decision-making in the streets, blockading efforts, and bicycle couriers. When they came back and shared their positive experience with other rank-and-file union members, it had a hugely galvanizing effect, she recalled, inspiring union members to get involved in preparations of the next mobilization, which was coming up shortly thereafter on their own turf, in Windsor Ontario, against the summit of the Organization of American States. During those two months, labour and grassroots elements worked together in the spirit of a new cycle rising against a shared enemy, the free trade agenda of the Organization of American States.
Preparation

Given the lack of extant radical activist community in Windsor, much of the on-the-ground organizing was done by activists from Toronto and other neighbouring cities. The preparations began late, given that Washington had been the central focus of the North American movement for the first months of 2000. Thus, just a couple of months ahead of the summit, several members of a Toronto-based affinity group called Resist! with ties to OCAP and OPIRG decided to rent a house in Windsor and dedicate themselves full-time to outreach and protest preparations. According to veteran AGM activist and independent journalist Justin Saunders, other members of Resist! visited regularly to assist their efforts.

Together with direct action activists from Detroit, Guelph, Kitchener-Waterloo, Kingston, Montréal and Québec City, members of Resist! created a group called The OAS Shutdown Coalition. As suggested by its very name, the singular goal of the group was to disrupt the OAS official summit, as had been done seven months earlier in Seattle and attempted again, albeit unsuccessfully, in Washington. During the three days immediately preceding the official summit, the Coalition hosted daily workshops on direct action and civil disobedience, in preparation for the ensuing “Days of Action.” In an interview with The Globe and Mail, Jaggi Singh, a member of the Coalition, insisted that “these meetings can no longer continue as they once did” (cited in Scoffield and Knox 2000). Likewise, an online callout from the group made it clear that the central goal was a shutdown and “an open show of defiance to the powers of global capitalism” (“Anti-FTAA”).

As recalled by Carol Phillips, when activists began to make their direct action plans, the union leadership in Windsor was nonplussed; in fact, its members started liaising with the
police to talk about ways of controlling what was perceived as “a possible invasion of crazy young activists from Toronto.” But then Phillips, who had been attending meetings of the Mob4Glob in Toronto, invited some of the key figures in the Toronto AGM to Windsor to talk to the leadership, “and eventually they became quite supportive locally.” This included support from Ken Lewenza, then president of the influential CAW Local 444. “In talking face to face with these young folks not just listening to what the local police were saying...they started to trust each other and started to agree that what we had to have was cooperation.” It is significant that it was face-to-face communication that proved capable of overcoming distrust on the part of the CAW leaders – it confirms the argument raised previously concerning the limitations of the internet in this regard.

No longer as fearful of the purported hooligans, the labour movement in Ontario, and the CAW in particular, went on to play a significant role in the Windsor protests. Over the course of the three days leading up to the summit, the CAW organized workshops for union members about the OAS and globalization; it also joined forces with People's Global Action to host similar workshops for the public in the hall of its Local 195. Moreover, on June 3, the day before the start of the official summit, the Windsor District Labour Council and the Canadian Labour Congress organized a “Teach-In with Labour and Social Activists,” featuring Maude Barlow, Tony Clarke, and Naomi Klein, author of the newly released No Logo (2000b), a book that played a significant role in inspiring anti-sweatshop activism and “culture jamming” within the international movement.

Labour groups also played a part in sponsoring media activism in Windsor. According to Justin Saunders, the OAS protest in Windsor saw the creation of the first Indymedia Centre (IMC) in Canada. First created in 1999 in Seattle, the Indymedia network pioneered within the movement the use of open source publishing systems to provide independent, grassroots coverage of protests and globalization-related issues. By 2000,
the Indymedia network was growing rapidly, and inspiring much laudatory scholarship in social movement and communication journals alike. The creation of an IMC in Windsor for the purpose of the OAS mobilization originated with a pre-existing group called the Toronto Video Activist Collective, of which Saunders was part, and whose key objective in Windsor was to record any confrontation between the police and the protesters.

The police had been preparing for such a confrontation in earnest for weeks. "We saw what happened in Seattle," Greg Bowens, a spokesman for the mayor's office, told the media. "In Seattle, the police were caught off guard. We don't intend for that to happen here" (cited in Christian 2000). In addition to carrying out preemptive arrests of key activists immediately before the protests (Klein 2000a), local police on both sides of the Canadian-US border joined forces with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States Border Patrol, the Ontario Provincial Police and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in joint strategic preparations, including riot training for the officers. Security measures at the border were also increased, and several hundred American activists deemed "likely to engage in violent activity" were barred from entering Canada from Detroit (Laidlaw 2000). Preemptive security measures also included covering a brick road in tarmac to prevent bricks from being used as projectiles, and putting snowploughs on standby in case "obstacles" needed to be cleared away.

The house rented by Toronto organizers was also placed under surveillance. Mandy Hiscocks, an anarchist from Guelph who had gone to Seattle in 1999 and subsequently took part in the OAS Shutdown Coalition, recalled that the activists staying in the house were startled one time when a police helicopter appeared outside and swept its searchlights through the windows.

largely fallen into oblivion. Justin Saunders attributed this to the proliferation of open publishing software and technology, and in particular social media, which have changed the way in which people search for and access alternative and movement-oriented media content.
According to Hiscocks, it became clear early on that the plan to shut down the meeting was not going to succeed. Blocking the delegates from entering the summit site was out of the question: as detailed by Canadian newspapers, a 10-foot fence had been constructed around a six-block area in downtown Windsor, including the Cleary Convention Centre where the delegates were meeting, as well the two hotels adjacent to it where they were escorted to for the night. Riot police on the ground guarded the area on three sides, while police in speedboats patrolled the side facing the Detroit river. The typically quiet streets of downtown Windsor were bustling with activity, with police officers donning sunglasses and bulletproof vests stationed at practically every corner. During a spokescouncil meeting on Saturday, June 3, just before the first scheduled “Day of Action,” the Coalition finally decided to abandon the plan to blockade the convention centre the following morning. As the discussion moved heatedly to other options, Carol Phillips suggested that the group join the labour rally scheduled for the following day. “Come and blend in with us to protect yourselves,” she told them. “And while our march goes on you can do your actions and our members who support you will come and witness” (cited in Kirzner 2000). She explained during our interview that she was not acting out on a limb:

the Canadian Labour Congress at the national level may not have been in favour of the actions on the streets, of trying to shut down the OAS, because they had representatives on the inside...[but] the union people who were closer to the ground and in the local unions, and in this case at the national level of some of the unions, had no problem with shutting the OAS down and preventing the meeting from happening.

Her comment confirms that the cycle was gaining momentum, as the tactics and objectives of the young militants were influencing and diffusing to the institutional left, whose protest repertoire in the preceding few decades did include street demonstrations but, as we saw in the past chapter, of the peaceable (some would say predictable) kind,
and not involving direct action.

**The Protests**

After three days of teach-ins, speakers, and direct action training, Sunday June 4 marked the big day of street protests, including the first of the three Days of Action planned by the OAS Shutdown Coalition. The day began with a morning event featuring Noam Chomsky (with opening remarks delivered by the Liberal Party’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy), organized by the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development. Around noon, a couple thousand activists began to gather at City Hall Square for a rally and march organized by the Canadian Labour Congress and the Windsor District Labour Council under the banner “For Democracy, Social Justice, and Fair Trade in the Americas” (“O.A.S.”). At the same time, another group called by the Windsor chapter of the CoC was gathering at the Capitol Theatre to rally and march with the UN Declaration of Human Rights, intending to later converge with the labour march and proceed together toward the Cleary International Centre. A solidarity rally was meanwhile held at the Hart Plaza in Detroit by the Detroit OAS Shutdown Coalition, an expression of international solidarity and protest coordination that can be considered another trademark of the AGM.

Once the crowd of protesters arrived at the security perimeter, the trust and cooperation established prior between labour and direct action groups “didn’t hold...entirely,” as Carol Phillips recalled, noting that when some members of the latter camp tried to scale or bring down the part of the fence between the protesters and the main hotel, they were pulled back by some union activists. “We still had some of our folks go into their traditional mode. At that point it had become less about acting as auxiliary police and more of a condescending protection that they were trying to afford them in the same way that they might afford young strikers on the picket line who were pushing things further than they
thought was safe."

But if attempts to scale the fence were unsuccessful, for those willing and trained in direct action, a more meaningful opportunity for non-violent civil disobedience presented itself at last around 4 p.m., when a bus carrying a handful of OAS delegates was spotted attempting to enter the secure area. Before it could make its way past the security gate, the bus was surrounded by about two hundred activists, who proceeded to stage a peaceful sit-in in front of the vehicle (while others wrote “Smash FTAA” on its sides and reportedly slashed its tires). A tense standoff ensued. After about thirty minutes, the security gate suddenly opened, and several dozen RCMP officers in riot gear rushed out. Using batons, smoke bombs, and doling out generous doses of pepper spray, they managed to disperse the sit-in. “They had fire hydrants of pepper spray that they were literally dumping on us for twenty minutes, so everything we had the next day was riddled in pepper spray,” recalled Mostafa Henaway, a member of York Mob4Glob. Henaway was among the thirty-five sit-in participants who got dragged past the line of police into the cordoned-off area, and subsequently transported to an empty Canadian Tire store that had been turned into a temporary makeshift prison. There he would remain for the next twenty-four hours until he was released without charges.

A handful of protesters were less lucky, and would remain in jail for another week, on charges of mischief and in the case of one seventeen year-old woman, of assaulting police (“News Digest”). Though Sunday marked the high point of the protests, Monday and Tuesday saw a number of local high school students walk out of class in protest of the OAS meetings. Approximately twenty of them were subsequently arrested, along with a handful of out-of-town activists who had remained in Windsor to provide legal support for the walkout action.
The Aftermath

Was the OAS protest in Windsor successful? It depends on what metrics are used to assess success. The interpretation offered by Jaggi Singh to the media was that the action was a success: “The spectre of a shutdown was even more effective than a shutdown” (cited in Scoffield and Knox 2000b). The OAS Shutdown Coalition' spokesperson Anna Dashtgard likewise put a positive spin on the event: “We have put the OAS on the map. We have exposed it as another piece in this global corporate puzzle that people are increasingly feeling disempowered by, and it’s not going to end here in Windsor” (cited in Scoffield 2000).

Confirming that a new cycle was ascending, a number of respondents attested that despite the small turnout, the Windsor mobilization did give a boost to the nascent Canadian AGM – if mostly in Ontario – by establishing relationships among labour, students, environmentalists and anarchists, in tum encouraging the critical unions to mobilize in much greater numbers for the FTAA protests in Québec City the following spring. Given that the OAS agenda included preliminary, informal discussion about the FTAA, Windsor was where activists first began talking about organizing a protest against the proposed agreement; Mostafa Henaway, for one, recalled that it was while sitting in his Canadian Tire makeshift prison cell that he was asked by a fellow inmate whether he was going to Québec City next year.

But if it did inspire many to prepare for the ensuing mobilization, the success of the Windsor demo was in other ways limited. First of all, akin to what had happened in Washington, the OAS Shutdown Coalition failed to achieve its raison d’être – the state had learned its lesson, and overwhelming security measures were put in place to prevent another Battle of Seattle. Moreover, the turnout was smaller than all sides had anticipated. According to Mandy Hiscocks, the OAS protest largely failed to register outside Ontario:
"It was very disappointing after Seattle, 'cause I was in Seattle, and I was like, oh yeah, round two! Actually it was after Washington as well, so Windsor was a bit of a letdown. But it's Canada, and it's Windsor, so it's kind of expected."

According to Mostafa Henaway, the small turnout could be attributed to the short organizing timeframe (as we saw, activists did not begin mobilizing for Windsor until just a few months in advance). "So one lesson was, we do have to spent a year to actually mobilize for Québec City," he explained. His comment is interesting insofar as the APEC protests were organized almost a year ahead of time, as were the protests in Seattle -- the fact that the preparations for Windsor were abbreviated can arguably be attributed above all to the tendency of the AGM activists to focus on the Next Big Thing to the neglect of what comes after -- as we saw previously, in the early part of the year 2000, the cause du jour was the planned shutdown of the IMF and the World Bank in Washington.

The groups that came together for the purposes of the protest were also short-lived. According to Justin Saunders, though members of the Resist! affinity group did not necessarily envision that it would outlast the mobilization, massive burnout due to the intensity of the last-minute organizing process was a major reason why the Resist! affinity group fell apart shortly after the event. Likewise, the OAS Shutdown Coalition shut itself down the moment the protest was over, having lived out its singular, short-term mandate. With no police inquiry, as in Vancouver, to keep the activists working together, the Windsor mobilization did establish better relationships between the anarchist grassroots and the institutional left, but it largely failed to create lasting movement infrastructure bridging their differences and bringing them together in a more permanent fashion.

Commenting on the protests in the immediate aftermath, one journalist noted that the relatively small turnout in Windsor showed that the numbers at “anti-globalization” protests were already “dropping like a stone” (Drohan 2000). However, this was not
really the case. Indeed, just a few days later, fifteen hundred young people clashed with police at an alter-globalization protest in Bologna, Italy, while later in June, about two thousand people marched against the Sixteenth World Petroleum Congress in Calgary. Then, in September, 2000, the annual Asia Pacific Summit of the World Economic Forum, the Davos, Switzerland-based think-tank promoting neoliberal globalization, provoked a protest of at least ten thousand activists, followed shortly by a massive protest in Prague against the IMF and the World Bank involving approximately fifteen thousand demonstrators in Prague (Barlow and Clarke 2001: 37-40). What is more, when the finance ministers of the Group of Twenty (G20), comprising the G7 plus thirteen major developing states, met in Montreal in October 2000, their gathering was protested by a group that The Globe and Mail estimated at 500 people (Drohan 2000). A number of people were arrested, including Jaggi Singh, who was held for 48 hours for handing out leaflets and giving a speech, tactics interpreted by the police as attempts to “incite a riot.” The charges were ultimately dropped (Klein 2000c).

Another significant event in the history of the movement took place in January 2001, when the very first World Social Forum (WSF) took place in Porto Alegre, Brazil. First proposed by Brazilian social movements, notably the Workers Party (PT), as well as several international organizations affiliated with the journal Le Monde Diplomatique and Bernard Cassen, founder of the French alter-mondialiste group ATTAC,30 the World Social Forum was organized to contrast with the World Economic Forum held annually in Davos, Switzerland. The WSF’s slogan “Another World is Possible” reflects its fundamental goal: to serve as a meeting space where activists from around the world can learn about each other and discuss developing alternatives to neoliberalism (although, to be sure, the WSF’s mandate to serve as an arena for discussion rather than a political actor has led some to question its usefulness in generating alternatives). Much has been written

30 The Association pour la taxation des transactions financières et pour l’action citoyenne (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions and for Citizens’ Action).
already about the WSF and it seems unnecessary to review this literature here – yet, for the purposes of this study, it is pertinent to note that among my respondents, it was the primarily the Québécois who most (pro)actively referenced the WSF during our interviews. According to Thomas Chiasson-Lebel, this was partly a function of the large influence exercised by Alternatives, an internationally federated development NGO headquartered in Montréal, which has been involved in the WSF process from the start as part of its international council.\(^\text{31}\)  Alternatives was founded in 1994; seven years later, it grew in importance as it took part in organizing the counter-summit in Québec City. I turn my attention to this major protest now.

Québec City 2001: “Stop the FTAA!”

The pressure to implement a new and ambitious trade agreement had been accumulating since the defeat of the MAI and the shutdown of the “Millennium Round” meeting of the WTO in Seattle (Barlow 2001). But the FTAA negotiation process got started even earlier, that is in 1994, when thirty-four heads of state of the Americas and the Caribbean, with the exception of Fidel Castro, met in Miami to begin discussing the terms of the proposed FTAA, with a view to implementing the agreement by 2005. The Second Summit of the Americas in Santiago in 1998 saw the vice ministers of trade from each country form the Trade Negotiations Committee, with Canada serving as chair during the initial eighteen-month phase of the process. Santiago is also where the decision was made that when it came Canada’s turn to organize the subsequent SOA, the Department of Foreign Affairs

\(^\text{31}\) Founded in 1994 in Montréal to assist in the struggle against the FTAA, Alternatives Canada belongs to the 8-member Alternatives International federation. According to its website, the NGO implements sustainable development projects in collaboration with local partners in more than 30 countries including Canada, trains interns, and educates Québecker s on international solidarity, climate justice, and participatory democracy (“FAQ”). Its unique appeal is based on an approach to development based on the kind of solidarity model promoted by the Zapatistas, which Thomas Chiasson-LeBel, one of Alternatives’ former board members, summarized as “international solidarity in the sense that...you don’t consider people who are working with as needing help, you consider them as equals.”
and International Trade (DFAIT), with Minister Pierre Pettigrew at the helm, would host the summit in Québec City. Even though Québec's capital is not a major hub of activism in Canada, at least compared to Toronto and nearby Montréal, it still seems safe to assume that a year later, after the Battle of Seattle, the Canadian government's choice of summit location would have been quite different.

As noted by Drainville (2002), the FTAA summit was the most significant trade meeting to take place since the collapsed WTO Round in Seattle in 1999. If implemented, the FTAA would have been the largest trade agreement in history, affecting more than 800 million people. Critics were particularly concerned that the provisions of the proposed agreement mirrored those of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)\(^{32}\), as well as the controversial "investor-state" provisions found in NAFTA's infamous Chapter 11, which granted corporations "private legal standing" and the ability to sue governments directly for alleged property rights violations (Barlow 2001).\(^{33}\) Although International Trade Minister Pierre Pettigrew publicly opposed the inclusion of Chapter 11-like provisions in the FTAA, critics insisted that the draft text leaked at the end of 2000 proved that the investment chapter in the FTAA document duplicated the controversial provisions (cited in Dougherty 2001: A15). Some critics also raised alarm about the lack of "social clauses" in the FTAA that would protect workers, the environment, health care and other social programs. More radical critics, notably the anti-

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\(^{32}\) The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was created in 1994, at the conclusion of the "Uruguay Round" of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that became the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. The aim of the GATS was to liberalize the global trade in services, including public services, and eliminate government "barriers" to international competition in services (Barlow 2001).

\(^{33}\) Two famous cases of corporations using the NAFTA provision include an ultimately unsuccessful lawsuit filed by the American courier company UPS against the Canadian government for unfairly subsidizing Canada Post. Three years earlier, in 1997, Virginia-based Ethyl Corp. challenged Canadian regulations that banned its gasoline additive on account of environmental and health hazards. The company was awarded $13 million in damages, and Ottawa was forced to reverse the ban (Brautigam 2007; "Ethyl Corp sues Canada over NAFTA").
capitalists and anarchists, rejected the agreement altogether, insisting on doing more than merely “replacing capitalism with something nicer.” In keeping with the Seattle tradition, and empowered by the mounting momentum driving the movement, many activists were set on confronting and directly disrupting the FTAA negotiations, rather than contributing to them.

Equally if not more mindful of the lessons of Seattle (which, as we have seen, had already been applied in Windsor the summer before), the Canadian and Québec governments joined forces to ensure that the militants did not succeed in disrupting the summit. Toward this end, a three metre high, 3.8 kilometre long chain-link fence was built around the summit site, the Centre des Congrès on René Lévesque Boulevard in downtown Québec City. This fence, nicknamed le mur de la honte (the wall of shame), required residents to show a pass going in and out. It thus conveyed clearly the anti-democratic character of the negotiations while also causing a major local inconvenience — it effectively became a shared target of anger and opposition among local residents and activists alike.

In addition to erecting an imposing security perimeter around the summit site, the Summit of the Americas security operation involved a tremendous amount of personnel: more than 6,000 police, including officers from Québec City municipal forces, the Sûreté du Québec, the RCMP, as well as 1,200 soldiers and student volunteers from local police colleges (Drainville 2001: 19). With thousands of security personnel on hand to ensure that the FTAA negotiations proceeded apace, the third SOA marked the largest police deployment in Canadian history up to that point, with an estimated cost of $100 million — an impressive record that would be shattered repeatedly in the years to come.

**Preparation**

As we learned from Mostafa Henaway, discussions about the upcoming protest in Québec
City were already occurring in the summer of 2000 during the protest (and later, in-jail downtime) in Windsor, Ontario. Indeed, the campaign against the FTAA occupied many Canadian activists' energies for a year in advance of the FTAA summit. In this respect, it resembled the APEC demonstration in Vancouver in 1997, when activists began organizing for almost a year ahead of the official summit. By the same token, the length of the organizing process ahead of the SOA contrasts with the OAS demo, which, as we saw, was organized over a period of only a couple of months. After Windsor, activists in Québec and Ontario redirected their energies immediately to the coming Summit of the Americas. Across the country, activists were doing the same, and AGM groups such as Mobilization for Global Justice (both the Toronto group and the newly established one in Halifax) began attracting many new members.

As aforementioned, in the aftermath of the OAS protests in Windsor, Ontario's critical unions were eager to join the direct action-oriented youth in opposing the FTAA. Carol Phillips explained that in the lead-up to the protests, the CAW organized workshops on what she called "hot and cold" zones entailing different levels of risk, on how to protect oneself against tear gas, on non-violent civil disobedience, and on practical legal matters such as writing down the phone number for legal support on one's body in case of arrest: "all of that with the intention of going to the fence," she remarked.

Another contribution of unions and NGOs to the FTAA convergence was, once again, a "People's Summit," which took place over the course of three days prior to the start of the official SOA. The various speakers' panels, workshops, and forums attracted over three thousand delegates (though not very many youth, who were more interested in protesting in the streets, as intimated by one of my respondents, who referred to the PS as the "People's snooze fest"). On the final day of the People's Summit, the delegates endorsed Alternatives for the Americas, a 78-page counterproposal to the FTAA that was significant, according to David McNally (2001), in that it did not take the anticipated
“FTAA Plus” position demanding the inclusion of social clauses, but instead proclaimed the people’s opposition to the proposed agreement. The oppositional tone of the communiqué confirms that the confrontational orientation of the AGM as a protest-driven movement had an influence on the outlook of the institutional actors involved in the struggle.

The two key groups behind the 2001 People’s Summit in Québec City were Réseau Québécois sur l’Intégration continentale (RQIC) and the Toronto-based Common Frontiers, which as discussed in the previous chapter grew out of the ACN and the opposition to NAFTA. In 2001, the two organizations were both serving as Canadian representatives to the Hemispheric Social Alliance, which was formed by various trade unions, social movements and NGOs from the Americas in 1997 in order to oppose the FTAA (Saguier 2007). In the lead-up to the FTAA summit, RQIC joined forces with SalAMI members to organize anti-FTAA workshops around the province; they also collaborated on producing a sleek, professionally designed twelve-page brochure titled “Understanding globalization to change the world” (my translation) as a workshop aid. 34

In addition to SalAMI, RQIC, and the Hemispheric Alliance, all of which pre-dated the organizing of the People’s Summit in Québec City, four grassroots coalitions emerged to organize the protests against the FTAA. Two of them were based in Montréal: a large coalition of student and community organizations called la Groupe Opposé a La Mondialisation des Marchés (the Group Against the Globalization of Markets) or GOMM, and a more anarchist, militant formation called CLAC, la Convergence des luttes Anti-Capitalistes, or the Anti-Capitalist Convergence, which consisted of some former members of SalAMI who were no longer in agreement with SalAMI’s “dogmatic” stance on non-violent tactics (see Conway 2003). In Québec City, the equivalents of GOMM and

34 Many thanks to Sébastien Bouchard for kindly mailing me this movement literature.
CLAC took the form of L'Opération Québec Printemps 2001 (OQP2001), which comprised representatives of over thirty local groups and NGOs, and the explicitly anti-capitalist CASA, le Comité d'Accueil du Sommet des Ameriques, or the Summit of the Americas Welcoming Committee, a militant direct action group and a close collaborator of CLAC.

Preparation for the SOA protests also spurred into existence a cross-Canada, internet-mediated network of resistance to the FTAA. The formation of such a network was referenced by several respondents active at the time; it was also confirmed by online communication from 2001, specifically an action "callout" containing a list of email contacts for the groups in various cities taking action on the issue (in addition to the four already mentioned): FTAA-Alert at McGill and Concordia, Mob4Glob in Toronto, and anti-FTAA working groups set up at the University of Ottawa, Guelph, Queen's and Carleton. In Winnipeg, the organizing was "bottom-lined" by activists associated with the Mondragon Bookstore & Coffee House35, while in Edmonton, that role was played by a group called People's Action Network (PAN) ("Cross-Canada").

The activities of these groups consisted of coordinating protest logistics (food, travel, accommodations, etc.) as well as popular education about the FTAA. In Québec City, organizers collaborated with Food Not Bombs and the People's Potato to organize food for an anticipated ten thousand activists, and with various student associations to secure accommodations (at the gym at the Université Laval and at the local colleges, churches, or private homes). The logistical challenge was considerable but the activists rose up to it, which many would consider a success in and of itself.

35 The Mondragon is a political bookstore and vegan restaurant organized as a workers' collective; it is also, in its own words, "a focal point of friendly anarchism in the city since 1996" ("About Us").
As discussed previously, activists in Canada spent much longer preparing for the FTAA protests than they did for Windsor. The comparatively extended length of the organizing process meant that there was more time to engage in outreach – equally if not more important, there was a willingness to do so, given that the movement cycle was on the rise and the FTAA protests were the key focus of Canadian activists at the time. According to OQP organizer Sébastien Bouchard, CASA and OQP 2001 managed to distribute over twenty-nine thousand anti-FTAA brochures in going door-to-door and talking with residents (2001: 11). Furthermore, according to Drainville, between June 2000 and the start of the official Summit, approximately fifty training workshops, or formations, were organized across Québec, in addition to various globalization-themed conferences and two CLAC/CASA consultas in Québec City (2002: 29). As well, from January to March, 2001, members of SalAMI joined forces with the International Socialists to tour the northern United States and Canada in order to build a base of support for a protest plan involving non-violent civil disobedience. As detailed by David Graeber in his book Direct Action (2009), which describes in detail the participation of New York City anarchists in the Québec City protests, the SalAMI delegates were viewed by young direct action activists with suspicion, and referred to derisively as “pacifists” and “anti-corporate types,” not anti-capitalists (Graeber 2009: 5, 27). The Canadian “chapter” of the international network was founded in Toronto in 1975 as an outgrowth of a left-wing caucus of the NDP called the Waffle, and had involved itself in many struggles over the ensuing decades (Bakan and Murton 2006). Described by Graeber (ibid: 27-28) as “the anarchist nemesis,” the IS stands accused in his book of being “explicitly vanguardist,” and for “always trying to talk everyone into ratcheting things down, turning a plan for militant direct action into an act of strictly nonviolent civil disobedience; turning a plan for non-violent civil disobedience into a unpermitted march, turning a unpermitted march into a permitted one.” This negative assessment of the organization by the leading anarchist scholar and AGM commentator leads us to consider the debate about tactics that was starting to peak in the movement at the time.
Debate: Diversity of Tactics

The debate concerning the so-called "diversity of tactics" (DoT) has been a key and recurring feature of the alter-globalization movement (the other one being the summit-hopping debate, discussed later on in this chapter). Though tensions over tactics have long plagued the left, this debate took specific contours in the aftermath of the black bloc's spectacular appearance in the streets of Seattle, where it generated much media attention - and flak from the authorities as well as the more traditional activist groups - for breaking windows and otherwise damaging private property. In Canada, this debate reached its peak when the Canadian movement did, in preparation for Québec City. From the perspective of this study, this debate is important to consider insofar as it speaks to the tension between short-term tactics and efforts to fit such tactics into a longer term strategy.

According to one activist, the diversity of tactics framework emerged around the time of the Battle of Seattle as an attempt to avert within the nascent AGM the divisions that had plagued movements in the past, in particular tensions stemming from the use of a rigid, dogmatic commitment to non-violence to justify activists directing the police to arrest other activists and condemning them in the press, to the delight of the media and the authorities. In keeping with the principles of horizontality, decentralization and anti-authoritarianism (and arguably, postmodern cultural relativism), the decisive feature of this position is respect and acceptance of whatever protest tactics others choose, including illegal/extra-legal ones such as property defacement and destruction (Conway 2003: 511). For many supporters of this framework, real violence is structural - that violence inflicted upon people by structural adjustment programs, for instance, is infinitely greater than the "violent" acts against private property, such as breaking windows (see Kovitch 2011).
Though the framework was devised initially to foster solidarity across movement sectors, it became a source of tension within the movement as it came to be largely conflated with endorsement of the black bloc tactic and property destruction more specifically. For many critics of the “diversity of tactics” position, the morality of property destruction is not what is at issue – indeed, most of my respondents who spoke out against it insisted that they are not pacifists. Rather, their critique is directed against an interpretation of this position equivalent to “anything goes,” which means that an honest discussion about the strategic value of different tactics in specific contexts is precluded from taking place – and since the black blocs are temporary ad-hoc alliances that only come together during protests, their “members” have not been known to attend coalition meetings to defend their approach, and are therefore largely unaccountable for their tactical choices to the rest of the movement. In the absence of a sustained and common forum where the long-term strategic usefulness of different tactics can be discussed openly, the position of respect for a diversity of tactics framework therefore arguably serves to subvert true respect for diversity, since it frustrates some groups’ right to engage in family-friendly protest without the risk of being subjected to blanket police repression.

A valuable insight concerning the intensity of the debate in the North American context specifically was offered by OCAP organizer and AGM veteran Mac Scott, who had participated in the Direct Action Network in New York. According to Scott, North American activists in particular seem to self-define on the basis of a tactic, as exemplified by the existence of a group like the Direct Action Network. The associated “fetishization of tactics” makes it harder to have “a rational respectful debate,” he added. His comment suggests that the problems and challenges associated with the diversity of tactics framework can be better understood from a temporal perspective: like the previously dominant commitment to non-violence, the diversity of tactics framework has turned into a relatively rigid position, one preoccupied with a short-term tactic (and the associated identity performance and radical self-experience in the here and now) rather than an
attempt to build long term strategy and movement infrastructure by minimizing internecine disagreements about tactics. I return to the question of strategy and long term strategic planning in chapter 5.

Tensions around tactics were very much visible in the weeks leading up to the Québec City protest. The pre-existing conflict between non-violent direct action groups and those insisting upon respect for a diversity of tactics became exacerbated following the publication of Operation SalAMI's "rules of conduct" for the SOA protests, in which the group called for non-violence and advised against the wearing of masks or spray-painting of slogans. Such an attempt to curtail autonomy was anathema to the anarchists and anti-authoritarians, particularly those of CLAC and CASA, and tensions during spokescouncil meetings were consequently running high. According to one activist I interviewed, during one meeting, two young, masked men ran into the room and threw a pie at Philippe Duhamel before equally quickly making their exit.

Despite the tensions caused by the debate, in the spring of 2001, Canadian grassroots as well as institutional groups were getting ready to confront the Summit of the Americas in one way or another. All across the country, groups were mobilizing to send activists to Québec City, while local solidarity rallies were being planned in various cities, including Vancouver, Halifax, Edmonton, and Toronto. According to Scott Harris, who went to Québec City from Edmonton as a member of People's Action Network, and works currently as the Prairies Regional Organizer for the Council of Canadians, a dozen affinity groups had come together to travel to Québec City – and "there were still enough people organizing around the issue in Edmonton to have a couple hundred people at the solidarity event." The organization of solidarity events in other Canadian cities suggests the kind of energy and high spirits characteristic of the peak of a protest cycle, as well as a high level of inter-city coordination, which began in the AGM with the Global Days of Action but which did not manifest in Canada until the start of the new century.
As the date of the summit approached, one of the key complaints voiced by the activists was the fact that the text of the proposed FTAA remained a mystery, despite Pierre Pettigrew's earlier promises to release it. In early April, a coalition of activists from Ontario and Québec, including l'Operation SalAMI, decided to take the matter into their own hands by reusing the "Dracula strategy" that had proven so successful against the MAI. After holding a "People's Parliament" on the FTAA in the Parliament Buildings in Ottawa, about five hundred people gathered in front of the Pearson Building, home to DFAIT. After reading out a "citizens' search warrant," several dozen activists trained in non-violent civil disobedience started to climb the steel fence around the building. According to a newspaper report, at this point the police intervened and arrested 87 activists. Pierre Pettigrew offered only scorn in response, calling the action "a lamentable failure" (cited in MacKinnon 2001b: A5).

April 19, the day before the summit, saw another significant mobilization take place in the form of the anti-FTAA border caravan. Bringing together activists from Ya Basta! groups in the state of New York with Ontario-based organizers, including members of CAW and OCAP, the caravan was designed as "a regionally organized direct action, diversifying the anti-globalization struggle to more than anti-conference demos" ("The Anti-FTAA Border Caravan"). Twenty vans plus a rented bus travelled from NY to Québec City along the "NAFTA Free Trade Corridor" Highway 401, intending to meet

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36 At the beginning of April, trade ministers from the 34 countries met in Buenos Aires, where they agreed to Pierre Pettigrew's proposal to release the 250-page draft to the public. Pettigrew himself described this as a historic move, one that an editorial in The Globe and Mail credited to "the international protest movement" (2001: A14). Despite this agreement, the text of the FTAA remained a mystery as of the start of the summit, due to alleged delays with Portuguese and Spanish translation. The text would not be made public until July 3, 2001.

37 Initiated in Italy and named after the slogan "enough is enough!" adopted in 1997 by the Zapatistas, Ya Basta! continues in some places today as an anti-capitalist, pro-immigrant network, though like most of AGM's decentralized anarchist networks, it is much diminished.
with Canadian allies and Mohawk Nation supporters. The plan was to proceed through the border patrol at the Akwesasne Border Crossing – and if anyone was refused entry, to turn back as a group. In confirmation of the challenges of horizontal decision-making that lasted well into the night before, caravan participant David Graeber noted that the plan was controversial and few had faith it would work, yet it was “the best that we could come up with” (2006: 126, 131). Almost immediately upon the activists’ arrival at the border it became clear that it would be impossible to overwhelm customs with sheer numbers, as the authorities were clearly in the know about the activists’ plans (ibid: 133). To their own surprise, a few caravan members were allowed to cross the bridge to the Canadian side, but many more got detained. Those who passed through, including Graeber, decided to proceed toward Québec City, putting behind them what Graeber called “a border action manqué” (ibid: 139-140).

**The Protests**

Meanwhile the organizers in Québec City were welcoming the first influx of fellow FTAA protesters. As DAN had done in Seattle, they decided to divide the city into three colour-coded zones, corresponding to different levels of risk: the green zone was dedicated to creative and peaceful protest, the yellow zone provided a space for non-violent civil disobedience, and the red zone involved high risk due to “possible attacks” on the “totally illegitimate” security fence, as one organizer explicated (see “View from the Summit”). She added that the decision to divide the city into three zones was driven by a desire to “facilitate a respect for a diversity of tactics among protesters, and to distinguish between the state-sanctioned legal and the illegal forms of protest.”

The FTAA protests got underway in Québec City on the evening of April 19, with a torchlight march led by the CLAC. The march proceeded from Université Laval to an area called Îlot Fleurie found in lower Québec City beneath a highway overpass. Covered
in political graffiti, the spot became an outdoor "convergence space" for the rest of the weekend. That Thursday night, it became the scene of a drum circle and a dance party, complete with a stereo sound system, courtesy of CASA's cultural committee.

Around noon on Friday, the following day, two large groups started to gather on the campus of Université Laval university. One was called by the GOMM, the other by the CLAC. The two groups left Laval and proceeded downtown along distinct though parallel routes, occasionally catching a glimpse of each other. Once downtown, those who wished to remain "green" made their way either to Îlot Fleurie or to the Faubourg Saint-Jean Baptiste neighbourhood uptown, where a local group had organized a peaceful occupation of the neighbourhood (L'Info-bourg cited in Drainville 2001: 18). Others decided to head to the fence, including a group of about two thousand trade unionists from Ontario, who had arrived in Québec City hours earlier, and joined an impromptu march to the fence spearheaded by Carol Phillips of the CAW and Winnie Ng of the CLC. It was a "very exciting moment," in Carol Phillips' recollection.

As a crowd of demonstrators continued to gather all along the security perimeter, some among them managed to pull down sections of the fence. It was showtime for a creative action group from Edmonton called the Deconstructionist Institute for Surreal Topology, or DIST, which moved into the formerly fenced-off area with a home-made wooden catapult. One "arrestable" volunteer among them pushed the catapult up to the line of riot police protecting the zone, and fired a teddy bear in their direction. Scott Harris, one of the members of the group standing nearby, recalled that the toy "did not go that far...[but] the cops went nuts and started tear-gassing everything." In the chaos that ensued, the police confiscated the catapult, and Jaggi Singh was arrested and dragged away to jail for using a weapon, among other bogus and downright false charges (given he had nothing to do with the project).
The story of the catapult is an interesting one worthy of recounting in a bit more detail. As intimated by Scott Harris, the idea was to create a “Medieval Bloc” in Québec City: since the state was building a fortress to hold the FTAA talks, the protesters were going to lay a siege to it. Judy Rebick connected the group with a person who liked the sound of the project and decided to sponsor DIST with a $5,000 donation. The group then connected with Middle Age re-enactors living on an acreage outside Ottawa, who had participated in an annual catapult-building contest and consequently possessed some expertise in this regard. On Thursday night, DIST members drove the catapult in three pieces from Ottawa to Québec City, where they assembled it the following morning, just in time for the CLAC march. After Jaggi Singh was arrested in connection with the catapult, the DIST members felt “really responsible,” said Scott Harris. They issued a press release and one Edmonton activist tried to turn himself in; thankfully, Singh’s charges were later dropped. 38 Scott Harris mentioned that Jaggi Singh informed him afterward about the existence of videos showing police doing teddy bear ballistics tests with the catapult. What ultimately became of the catapult remains a mystery, though in Scott Harris’s estimation, “it’s probably in a warehouse somewhere, or the cops just threw it out...”

After the police released the tear gas in response to the teddy bear attack, many demonstrators chose to retreat for the night. While they made their way back to their billets or the convergence area in the Îlot Fleurie, the authorities were busy rebuilding the fallen “wall of shame.”

On Saturday, all minds were on the big march, with tens of thousands of trade unionists expected to arrive by bus and overnight trains. The unions did not disappoint in this regard: the Saturday People’s March attracted an estimated sixty thousand protesters, by far the largest protest in the history of the Canadian alter-globalization movement.

38 The statement from DIST exonerating Jaggi Singh, titled “We Made the Catapult, Judy Rebick Got the $$$,” can be accessed on the Rabble website (2001).
The creativity characteristic of the alter-globalization movement was on full display during the People’s March. San-Francisco-based writer, witch and veteran activist Miriam Simon, better known as Starhawk, led an action called “The Living River,” drumming and leading a chant, as women intent on “speaking for water” walked while waving blue banners of cloth all the way to the fence, where they presented the summit with the Cochabamba Declaration. In a display of what Lesley Wood (2012) situates as one of the “Seattle tactics,” giant puppets, including the goddess “Nemesis” and a genetically modified “capitalist octopus” wearing a suit and staring with one evil eye, walked with the crowd as well. Also marching with the crowd were Funk Fighting Unaccountable Naughty Korporations, a street theatre group and the musical militants of Les amères Noëlle, the Radical Cheerleaders, and the Raging Grannies. Radical cheerleaders chanted, to the tune of the alphabet song, the names of the movement’s transnational targets: “OECD, MAI, GATS, NAFTA, OAS, WTO, WB, and IMF. Now I know my enemy. Won’t you smash the state with me?”

As they arrived at the corner of the Charest Boulevard and Rue de la Couronne, the marchers had to make a choice: radical cheerleaders were urging everyone “to the left, to the left, not to the right, to the left!” This meant going up the wooden staircases to upper

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39 A declaration written in 2000 by the residents of the Bolivian city of Cochabamba, who organized to successfully reverse the government’s decision to hand over public waterworks to the American multi-national corporation Bechtel.

40 Given the Canadian focus of this study, it may be interesting to note that the Raging Grannies are a home-grown protest phenomenon. Self-described as “caring older women who use song to protest, and to raise awareness of issues of peace, the environment and social justice,” the Raging Grannies’ origins go back to Victoria, British Columbia, and the year 1987 (“The Raging Grannies”). Their first target was the pollution caused by U.S. Navy warships in the waters around Victoria – ships that were suspected to be powered by nuclear reactors and/or equipped with nuclear arms. They also united in opposition to the sexism and ageism inside a peace group they were involved with, which had relegated women largely to menial “support” roles (Roy, n.d., para. 2). They have been a regular presence at anti-war and alter-globalization protests.
town, towards the perimeter. Meanwhile, marshals from the Québec Federation of Labour and the Canadian Labour Congress steered their members in an “aggressive” manner (Conway 2003: 522), along the pre-determined path toward the final destination: the Colisée, the city's hockey arena, located about five kilometers west of the summit site. Most unionists were directed by marshals away from the fence, and despite the strong showing from unionists at the fence the previous evening, one key story to subsequently emerge from Québec City was that the labour movement walked away from the fence in what was derisively called as “the march to nowhere.”

Many unions members did not agree with the decision. According to Carol Phillips:

if the meetings that happened in Québec City had happened in Toronto and not Québec City, we would have shut it down and we wouldn't have marched away from the fence. The problem was that the Québec labour movement had not been through Windsor and...had not developed through a common struggle the kind of relationships that happened in Ontario because of the Windsor demonstration...but they had not, and were determined to be the ones who called the shots in Québec City on their own turf, and that is what essentially made it difficult for the rest of us, because we were torn between respecting that we were in Québec City and that the Québec trade unions were taking the lead on this demonstration, and being part of a broader demonstration. It was a very, very difficult situation to put activists in...

Those who did decide to go to the fence, including a number of unionists as well as the Council of Canadians, were greeted by clouds of tear gas and a police confrontation already in progress. Sections of the fence had once again been torn down, and water cannons mounted on white police vans were brought out to disperse the demonstrators. As the police advanced down Côte d'Abraham, shooting tear gas canisters as well as rubber bullets that injured several dozen protesters (including one person who was struck in the throat and required emergency tracheotomy), the protesters fired back with rocks, sticks and hockey pucks, slingshots, and a handful of Molotov cocktails. Some hurled the tear
gas canisters back at police, eliciting cheers from the gathered crowd. Residents of Québec City, many of whom sided with the protesters, called medics, offered cloths against the gas, and provided running water from buckets and hoses to wash out burning eyes.

Saturday night marked the finale of the mobilization. As noted by activist scholar Harriet Friedmann in her personal account of the protests published in *Studies in Political Economy*, by the evening, the police pushed back the protesters toward the Îlot Fleurie.

In the final hours of the confrontation, police drove protestors down the stairs into the free space, stood on the expressway ramps above, and fired volley after volley of tear gas into the crowds below. Jubilation and pleasure turned to rage. Rhythmic drumming morphed into the loudest possible din, to challenge the chilling beat the police made on their shields. A giant fire was lit as a barricade on the stairs. Beauty withered like leaves with herbicide. Yet anyone who experienced that possibility is changed (2001: 101).

With a strong smell of tear gas still lingering in the air, the next day activists began to make their home, many nursing their wounds, feeling enraged and empowered at the same time.

**The Aftermath**

In the final tally, 463 people were arrested on charges ranging from assault against a police officer, unlawful assembly, and causing a disturbance or riot (most of them were released the next day). Over five thousand gas grenades and almost a thousand plastic bullets were fired by the police against the protesters, injuring several dozen (Bouchard 2001: 16-17). Deemed “the new standard” by the Québec Minister of Public Security Serge Menard, these brutal measures became the target of post-A20 anti-police brutality.
activism (cited in ibid: 17). An independent inquiry into police violence was called for by a coalition of labour groups and NGOs, including Common Frontiers, Amnesty International, and the Québec Legal Collective, as well as by the federal New Democrat Leader Alexa McDonough.

Concerning the official decisions made at the summit, some human rights groups saw as a modest success the fact that the text of the FTAA was altered subsequently to include a much touted "Democracy clause," specifying that dictator regimes would not be privy to the benefits of the agreement (effectively excluding Cuba but including Colombia, despite its history of state-sanctioned violence against labour leaders). However, the foreign ministers from the Organization of American States refused to approve the clause at a meeting in Costa Rica in June 2001.

The FTAA negotiations eventually faltered several years later. Already in 2003, a big disappointment for Jean Chrétien was that despite his personal appeal to U.S. President George W. Bush, there was no immediate breakthrough on two high-profile disputes, namely the looming trade war over Canadian lumber exports and the American ban on Prince Edward Island potatoes (Whittington 2001). These and other internal divisions among the thirty-four countries played a big part in securing the demise of the proposed trade accord in 2005, when the deadline came and went and no agreement could be reached (Drainville 2002; Saguier 2007). An article from that time found on the website of the international human rights group Global Exchange states that "January 1, 2005 should be remembered in history as the day the social movements of the hemisphere achieved one of our greatest triumphs. The derailment of the FTAA will have greater impact on the future of the hemisphere – as the free trade area that never was."\footnote{41 Though the FTAA is no longer on the negotiating table, the Summits of the Americas continue to take place. The fourth one took place in 2005 in Argentina, the fifth in Trinidad and Tobago, and the sixth in April 2012 in Cartagena, Colombia ("Summits").}
However, to the best of my knowledge, there were no signs of celebration of the FTAA's demise. From the perspective adopted in this study, this may be at least in part attributed to the temporally limited focus of the AGM's activity as a protest movement based on "global summitry."

On the question of durability, the organizations involved in the FTAA protests persisted, perhaps unsurprisingly, including the unions, but also the HSA, RQIC, Alternatives, and the Council of Canadians. By contrast, all four grassroots networks created to organize against the FTAA at the turn of the 21st century dissolved at various points over the ensuing months and years. We saw that in Windsor, the OAS shutdown coalition dissolved almost instantly – yet the organizers in both CLAC and OQP 2001 (both of which were founded for the purpose of the anti-SOA protest) decided to continue organizing in the aftermath. OQP 2001 continued to hold meetings of various committees and to publish a newspaper for another year. CLAC proved the most durable of the networks. After a series of long meetings in June, it decided to persist as three comités de lutte, or working groups: the first focused on immigration issues and fighting imperialism locally – this committee evolved into the Montreal chapter of No One Is Illegal; a second on focused on the environmental issues, and the third one on anti-poverty struggles, centered in particular on housing issues in Montreal. According to CLAC founding member Sarita Ahooja, "those were the three axes...the three lines in which we would take action and implement our entire message, our global message around Summit of the Americas, that's where we would concentrate our energies in terms of public direct action and education." Over the next three years, the committees worked largely independently of each other. Due to "the dispersion of activists," according to Sarita Ahooja, CLAC dissolved officially in 2006 (though as we will see, it was resurrected a few years later, largely by a new generation of agitators, as "CLAC 2010" in preparation for the G20 summit in Toronto examined in the next chapter ("About CLAC").
The Mob4Glob working groups also did not last very much longer. Garth Mullins noted that “after the actual FTAA conference, it [MobGlob] had a lot of different goals so the unity of purpose wasn’t there.” Though its membership swelled substantially in the months preceding the FTAA protests, Toronto Mob4Glob ceased to meet in 2002 (Wood 2012). This decline, sealed by the events of that September as discussed below, came despite the assessment offered in his a 2001 report by Sébastien Bouchard, who wrote that OQP 2001, Toronto Mob4Glob and Halifax MobGlob working groups seemed “the most solid” or stable (2001: 22; my translation).

Significantly from our perspective, one of the intentions guiding Sébastien Bouchard’s debrief report was to promote the unification of the coalitions that coalesced in the lead-up to Québec City into a more permanent group, “and not return to ephemeral coalitions” (ibid: 21). OQP and CASA continued to organize together after the summit for a little while longer as the Comité d'adieu au Sommet des Ameriques, providing support to protesters who were still in jail, including high-profile prisoner Jaggi Singh. This work then gave way to continuing to educate and organize against other transnational targets: OQP continued to operate via committees and to publish a newspaper. But it dissolved in the months following 9/11, whose effects on the broader movement I examine momentarily.

Likewise, L’Operation SalAMI “operationally folded right after” the protests in Québec City. According to the group’s founder Philippe Duhamel, this was in part to his personal withdrawal due to burn-out and personal matters. Moreover, as intimated by Anna Kruzynski, once an activist in L’Operation SalAMI, tensions were running high within the group concerning internal democracy and in particular its “dogmatic” commitment to non-violent tactics, which is what prompted many activists, including Kruzynski, to move to more militant grassroots formations, such as the CLAC (see Conway 2003).
As the preceding comments make clear, as in Windsor, the various ad-hoc groups and coalitions of the AGM involved in the FTAA protests proved largely ephemeral – but not always in line with their participants' intentions, effectively problematizing the argument that such groups are generally not meant to last in the first place. Though it is clear that a number of factors entered into their demise, from the perspective of this study, the lack of interest among many young anarchists in particular in erecting permanent movement structures, combined with the constantly shifting focus in search of the Next Big Thing in activism, are also significant in this regard.

When I asked my respondents whether the Québec City mobilization was a success, they were, for the most part, ambivalent. The general feeling was summed up aptly by Judy Rebick: “Yes and no. It was a success in that it had a huge impact and radicalized a lot of people, but it wasn't because it created a lot of divisions.”

Highlighting the bright side of the mobilization, a number of my respondents noted that they gained experience and made new connections. Building relationships with other activists emerged as a particularly significant metric of success. Edmonton catapult assembler Scott Harris said that he still talks to Jaggi Singh and other folks that he “connected with on cross-Canada networking calls.” He added that the connections established with the labour movement around the FTAA were also helpful when the time came to organize against the G8 summit in Alberta the following year. Similarly, Benoit Renaud, formerly of MobGlob Halifax, explained that some of the Haligonians who organized against the FTAA were still in touch when the time came to organize a demonstration against the G7 finance ministers' meeting in Halifax in June 2002, just ahead of the G8 leaders' meeting. Their comments confirm that anti-FTAA organizers maintained personal relationships, at least in part thanks to new media technologies with which to preserve latent ties. On the other hand, the three organizers mentioned above
were all key figures in the movement and well-connected – their continuing rapport was unlikely to extend to the more casual supporters, including those newly politicized following their participation in the protests.

To be sure, a number of respondents noted that while the protesters failed to shut down the FTAA summit, “Québec City” had a radicalizing effect on a generation of young people in Canada. A grassroots anthology titled Resist! published a few months after the protest, includes many stories about witnessing, in most cases for the very first time, the repressive power of the state apparatus: getting tear-gassed, beaten, and/or thrown in jail simply for exercising one’s democratic right to protest. “I’d just spent the most radicalizing week of my life,” wrote Angela Bischoff, one of the contributors to the collection. “Truly, I’d never felt so alive” (2001: 109).

Yet, while the importance of mass mobilizations and the radicalizing effect of confronting state oppression cannot and should not be discounted, the comment above also attests to the pervasive emphasis on “radical self-experience” prevalent among contemporary activists, as discussed in this study’s theoretical chapter. In confirmation of this point, a contributor to the same anthology described her Québec City experience as “the best vacation of my life” (Bennett 2001: 48), while “Tear Gas Holiday” became the title of a documentary about the protests produced by the Toronto Activist Video Collective. In reflecting on the Resist! anthology, the Canadian cultural critic Hal Niedzviecki (2002) noted in The Globe and Mail, that “[t]his kind of writing, unfortunately, plays into the hands of cynics like Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, who told Le Devoir before Québec City: ‘They say to themselves: ‘Let’s go spend the weekend in Québec City, we’ll have fun, we’ll protest and blah, blah, blah.’”

Indeed, in Québec City, confrontation, “putting the body on the line” and potentially getting tear-gassed seemed to be the main metric of true commitment to the cause. This
view was communicated in one of the few critical, self-reflexive pieces in the Resist! anthology. In it, Sarah Lamble, at the time a Trent University student and member of the Peterborough PIRG, critiqued the hierarchy implicit in the valuation of different forms of participation she observed in the anti-FTAA organizing process. “Sucking back tear gas seemed to be primary criterion for a legitimate day of protest,” she reflected (Lamble 2001: 180). Menial organizing tasks such as organizing buses, answering phones, doing legal work or providing food and childcare were seen as “support” roles, she stated – ones which, one wishes to add, are often organized along gender, generational, and ideological lines, with women and older activists, particularly unionists, providing the resources and infrastructural support while those looking to smash the state by smashing property and confronting police tend to be young men. This predicament has not escaped the attention of some activists, and has been aptly summarized in the expression “everybody wants a revolution, nobody wants to do the dishes.”

“Québec, Je Me Souviens”

Similarly, another contributor to said anthology, Québécois journalist Francois Pelletier, waxed woeful about what was then still coalescing into the collective memory of the protests:

It is unfortunate that almost everybody here in Québec forgot the real reason for the coming of such a plethora of people to our fair city: the much-disputed FTAA! [...] The issue of police brutality quickly became the only reason they were here in Québec City. Maybe we need to reflect. In fact, let’s ask ourselves why groups of protesters forgot the “Fuck you, go away, FTAA” and replaced it with “Break down the wall, break down the wall!” (2002: 125).

Likewise, in reflecting on what people remember about the FTAA protests, Denise Hammond (Toronto Mob4Glob organizer and now president of CUPE Local 1281),
observed that

the only thing you hear of, in Québec City there were thousands of people and there were mass demonstrations and they used tear gas and pepper spray and rubber bullets. That's the kind of stuff you hear. You don't hear about the organizing that went it, the mascots movement, the popular education. In Québec City, we went a couple of weeks before and knocked on doors and talked to people, and did mass leaflet drops. You don't hear any of that!

My research revealed that the Québec City protests remain the most memorable mobilization of the AGM, among Canadian activists across generations; it is also the Canadian mobilization most frequently mentioned in international literature on the movement. The size of the mobilization and the extended length of advance campaigning surely entered into it, but it is not insignificant that, as revealed by the preceding discussion, the confrontation at the fence appears to comprise the bulk of that collective memory. From the perspective of this study, activists' collective memory thus seems to reflect the mainstream media's preoccupation with violence and spectacle.

It is also worthwhile to note that a year later after the protests, a three-day event commemoration of the protest was organized by OQP 2001 and RQIC, including a march called "Marche des Peuples + 1: "Non a la ZLEA! Un autre monde est possible!" ("Le Sommet"). Significantly, a rally commemorating the tenth anniversary of the protests was also organized by Sébastien Bouchard and his OQP comrades, demonstrating a level of concern with history that is arguably a uniquely Québécois phenomenon. Though my research did not include a comprehensive comparative investigation of the practice of collective memory among activists in French and English Canada, a greater emphasis placed on collective memory aligns with common understandings of the behaviour of cultures who perceive themselves to be under threat and are consequently preoccupied with their own long-term preservation (see Bell 2003, Zerubavel 1995).
Just as the movement's momentum seemed unstoppable, about five months following the FTAA protests, the twin towers of the World Trade Center were reduced to rubble by hijacked jetliners, and in North America, the AGM cycle was stopped short, then began its decline.

The response of the US government was largely to blame. In the aftermath of the attacks, the US government reacted swiftly and aggressively by expediting the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act and other measures to significantly increase the state's coercive and repressive powers. Washington also placed pressure on other countries to follow suit, citing the need to coordinate anti-terrorism efforts on the international plane. When George W. Bush declared “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists,” other countries promptly fell in line. The European Union passed a Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism in December 2001, a document whose definition of terrorism encompassed such vaguely defined terms as “urban violence,” with grave implications for the European alter-globalization movement (Panitch 2002: 41).

In Canada, while mainstream media pumped up the rhetoric of “war of civilizations,” legislators rushed to pass Bill C-36, the “anti-terrorism” bill. The new legislation significantly extended police powers of search and seizure and to detain people for 72 rather than 24 hours, on suspicion alone; it also effectively restricted the movement of individuals across borders, clamped down on immigration and refugee approval processes, and increased racial profiling (Conway 2003: 534-5). The passage of Bill C-36 and the USA PATRIOT Act resulted from, and in turn exacerbated, a state of “permanent exceptionalism” which normalizes a temporary suspension of the rule of law (Panitch 2002: 42).
In the political climate marked by fear and hysterical patriotism, Washington protests against the IMF and World Bank meeting planned to take place at the end of September 2001 were cancelled by the local chapter of Mobilization for Global Justice. In Canada, CAW president Buzz Hargrove, considered to be among the more radical labour leaders, issued a statement calling off a day of protest planned to coincide with the November WTO meeting in Qatar, a Global Day of Action, despite the fact that the organizing process was well underway. In a letter to Ken Georgetti, president of the Canadian Labour Congress, Hargrove explained that it would be “a symbolic act to signify our movement's outrage and our condemnation of terrorist acts as well as all senseless acts of violence” (cited in Walkom 2002). As noted by the journalist Thomas Walkom, the demonstration went ahead anyway, but was “little-noticed and peaceful.”

To be sure, the repercussions of September 11 did not affect the various alter­
globalization movements around the world in the same way. The second World Social Forum in Porto Alegre in January 2002 drew around sixty thousand participants, and the massive turnout at the first European Social Forum (ESF), held in November 2002 in Florence, demonstrated the Europeans' relative immunity from the chill on dissent felt widely in North America in the aftermath of the attacks. Likewise, approximately 120 thousand people responded to the call to demonstrate against the G8 in Evian, France, in June 2003, and there were decentralized actions against the WTO Cancun ministerial later that year.

In Canada, however, the climate of political repression created by the US had a profoundly marginalizing effect on dissent, as Canadian politicians and media pundits rushed to proclaim their unequivocal support of the country's closest economic ally, further exacerbating the difficulties experienced by the protest-based movement with maintaining its post-Québec City momentum. The subsequent mobilization, effectively
the last in the Canadian movement's "Cycle 2.0," would proceed against not insignificant odds.42

**Kananaskis 2002: "Wanted: the G8, for crimes against humanity and the environment!"**

In 2002, it was Canada's turn to host the summit of the Group of Eight (G8). The national capital was the obvious and original choice of summit location; however, the violence that transpired at the G8 summit in July, 2001 in Genoa, where 100,000 people took to the streets and a carabinieri fatally shot a 23-year-old protester named Carlo Giuliani, changed the mind of the Canadian Prime Minister. At the closing of the Genoa summit, Jean Chrétien declared that "[i]t's getting out of control somewhat," and announced that the June 2002 meeting of the G8 would be held in a resort in the remote Kananaskis Village, hidden deep in the Rocky Mountains, about 85 kilometres west of Calgary. "We are democratically elected people and it's important for the world – for us – to meet," he said. "If the anarchists want to destroy democracy, we will not let them succeed" (cited in Walkom 2002b: 3).

The 2002 G8 summit was the first to be held after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Though the meeting agenda was officially focused on Africa and more specifically, a proposed agreement called the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), a major point of discussion was George W. Bush's attempt to generate support for preemptive action against potential terrorist threats in Iraq (Cornwell 2002). The "war on terror" thus loomed large the minds of Canadian state officials as they prepared to play host to the G8 summit. Despite logistical difficulties, the prevailing climate of fear of

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42 Though not targeting a summit of a global governance body or free trade agreement and thus beyond the scope of this study, a relatively large protest did occur in Toronto in the aftermath of 9/11, specifically on October 16, 2001, when approximately a thousand activists took part in a disruptive snake march organized by a coalition of activists called the Ontario Common Front (and spearheaded by OCAP) in order to protest the economic policies of the provincial government.
enemies both foreign and domestic justified the Prime Minister's choice of a remote location hidden in the mountains. "They specifically picked Kananaskis to marginalize the protests and hide the G8," Scott Harris observed. "Kananaskis is the Qatar of Canada" (cited in Kraus 2002).

On high alert against terrorism in all its various guises, the police elevated summit security measures to a new level. About 1,500 RCMP officers and 5,000 soldiers guarded access to the Kananaskis Village within a 6.5-kilometre radius. An 80-nautical-mile no-fly zone was also established, and surveilled by CF-18 fighter jets and ground-to-air missiles. According to most estimates, the cost of this security, according to most estimates, was between $300 million to $500 million for what would be a 30-hour event (Harper 2002).

*Preparation*

Scott Harris, whom we know from the previous section as the Edmonton-based, catapult-wielding veteran of the alter-globalization movement, recalled that the announcement about the summit coming to Kananaskis was made on the night that Edmonton activists held a candlelight vigil in honour of Carlo Giuliani— that same night also heard the first conversations about mobilizing a convergence in opposition to the coming summit.

The escalating repression of dissent at previous summits was a key point of contention for the activists. The killing of Carlo Giuliani in Genoa, who was shot twice in the head after throwing a fire extinguisher at the police, pushed police brutality, human rights, and civil liberties to the forefront of the movement agenda, in keeping with the AGM's pro-democracy orientation. According to Garth Mullins, "in Kananaskis, you really saw the death knell of that turn-of-the-millennium upsurge of the anti-globalization movement ... Just trying to have a rally with speakers, which is most of what Kananaskis was, was really difficult." The Mayor may have given out cowboy hats to all the leaders in a
friendly gesture, but he also made all but one public demonstrations illegal in Calgary, "so just fighting for the right to gather in the streets is what was going on there."43 Of course, in addition to the criminalization of dissent, a host of other issues informed the anti-G8 convergence, in keeping with the AGM's diverse constitution; as noted by the activist Erin George, relevant issues connected to the G8 ranged from its "refusal to sign the Kyoto protocol on climate change, to the G8's recycled colonialism for Africa, from privatization of health care, education, water and electricity to the G8's so-called 'war on terrorism'... And so much more" (George 2002).

The need to place these issues on the G8 leaders' meeting agenda was a key objective of the NGO-led counter summit, which in 2002 was called the summit of the Group of Six Billion (G6B). It was organized by a national steering committee spearheaded by the International Society for Peace and Human Rights, with support from the Canadian Labour Congress, Amnesty International, Partnership Africa Canada, and Rights & Democracy. The coalition secured the University of Calgary as the site of the G6B summit, and coordinated the traditional mix of workshops, performances, keynote speeches, and panel discussions. According to the almost 100-page long debrief report put together afterward by three G6B organizers – and to their credit, still available online – the "G6B was a rousing success by all standards. We had planned for 800 attendees, but there were 1400. There were over 100 speakers from 26 countries" (Foster, Azer and Howrish 2002). As in the past, at the closing plenary, the delegates agreed on a broad set of recommendations to present to the G8 leaders.44 The need to place these issues on the

43 The Calgary Mayor Dave Bronconnier defied the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by stating that public spaces were not to be used for political purposes, and refusing to sanction more than one mass march (Paraskevas 2002: C8).

44 Given the G8's agenda, the G6B participants (including Oxfam members) were particularly concerned with the proposed New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). Critics considered the document as yet another set of empty promises, as well as an attempt to "blame the victims" of neoliberal, neo-colonial policies of global governance bodies such as the G8 ("The G8 must stop").
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By 2002, many young Albertan activists were already experienced in organizing against neoliberal globalization. Scott Harris explained that in the aftermath of Seattle, a group called People's Action Network (PAN) was formed in Edmonton. Modelled on the Direct Action Network, PAN consisted mostly of University of Alberta students and other young activists who were involved in anti-globalization and anti-sweatshop activism, but were not necessarily connected to any organization; like DAN, the group was quite amorphous, in keeping with the AGM's organizing culture favouring ad hoc, decentralized networking over more permanent formations requiring sustained commitment — as Scott Harris put it, “it was a name put on posters more so than anything else.” People who formed PAN had previously organized direct action trainings and transportation logistics for Seattle, as well as debriefs and workshops afterwards. As mentioned above, PAN was the key AGM

45 Given the G8's agenda, the G6B participants (including Oxfam members) were particularly concerned with the proposed New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). Critics considered the document as yet another set of empty promises, as well as an attempt to “blame the victims” of neoliberal, neo-colonial policies of global governance bodies such as the G8 (“The G8 must stop”).
coalition group in Edmonton organizing logistics and transportation for activists going to Québec City to oppose the FTAA. As was the case for the Canadian movement in general, Scott Harris confirmed that the FTAA protests were the peak moment of mobilization for PAN; the same year, PAN members were also able to organize a protest in Calgary against the World Petroleum Congress, in order to call attention to the links between oil companies and corporate lobbying.

As noted above, Jean Chretien announced that Kananaskis would host the June 2002 G8 summit a year in advance; however, according to Leah Henderson, an Edmonton radical, unlike in Vancouver or Québec City, protest planning against the G8 summit did not begin in earnest until just a few months before, in the spring of 2002. The political climate in the aftermath of 9/11 and the beginning of the Cycle 2.0's decline meant that there was little enthusiasm for organizing a counter-summit protest and dealing with the likely state repression – especially given the Albertan activist community's already low organizing capacity. According to Leah Henderson, no one in Alberta's small activist community had felt "ownership" over the event. A seasoned organizer now living in Toronto (where she would get arrested as a "ringleader" of the G20 protests eight years later), Leah Henderson was still in high school and about to write her final exams when she got involved in organizing the anti-G8 convergence as part of a grassroots group called Anti-Capitalist Edmonton (ACE).

In Alberta, there is not much "radical community" on the ground, she explained:

We were really small and not particularly organized, we didn't have the grassroots presence the way that OCAP or NOII [No One Is Illegal] has in Toronto ... It was all very last minute, none of us particularly had a lot of time to put into Kananaskis ... There is no local activist community there, so then who organizes it? Calgary or Edmonton? I mean that's like saying Toronto or Ottawa, they're really different cities, they've got really different cultures, and they're really far apart from each other. It's not like, 'Oh, just
organize it together,' you know? One city had to take hold and say we're gonna do this...and no one wanted to.

Despite this inter-city "game of chicken," as Leah Henderson called it, a coalition of Calgary and Edmonton activists did finally come together. In March of 2002, members of ACE and its equivalent, the Calgary Anti-Capitalist Collective, were joined by union and NGO representatives, and started to hold monthly spokescouncil meetings in Red Deer, Alberta – the halfway point between the two cities, and an hour-and-a-half drive in both directions. Though the split over diversity of tactics in Québec City was still a sore point for many within the movement, unions played a big role in the broader organizing coalition, noted Leah Henderson. "It's one of those things where in Ontario, it's big enough that you can dislike each other on the left, and in Alberta it's kind of not," she said. "Though factions exist, we all have to pull together 'cause there's only thirty of us."46

Despite the internecine fallout of the FTAA protest, in keeping with the alter-globalization movement's past practice, respect for diversity of tactics was yet again adopted as the coalition's organizing framework.47 According to Janet Conway (2003), this was unnecessary, given that even the militant groups were planning non-violent action (in light of this, we may surmise that in addition to the small size of the Albertan activist community, the unstated agreement [acquiescence?] to a non-violent approach was part of the reason why the Calgary convergence saw unions, NGO, and anarchists working

46 According to an online info sheet about Solidarity Village, the organizations who issued the call-out to come to Kananaskis and were involved in organizing the Village included the Communication Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Alberta Federation of Labour, Co-Motion Collective, EcoCity Environmental Educational Society, Edmonton Council of Canadians, Edmonton G8 Planning Collective, Calgary G8 Pplanning Collective, Council for Global Cooperation, and the Calgary District Labour Council ("Kananaskis Info"). The CLC and the Alberta Federation of Labour contributed $100,000 to the organizing effort (Schreck 2002).

47 The Basis of Unity adopted through the G8 Spokescouncil process in Alberta centered on six points, which emphasized direct participation, horizontality, diversity, and "bold and creative actions that respect the natural environment and human safety" ("Solidarity village")
together again after 9/11, as noted by both Conway and Leah Henderson).

In the few short months leading up to the summit, the coalition dreamed up “Solidarity Village,” a week-long campsite convergence to be located just north of the summit site in Kananaskis, on Stoney Nakoda Nation lands. According to the now-defunct convergence website (g8.activist.ca), in addition to welcoming up to 20,000 campers, Solidarity Village was also going to feature fifteen large tents for specific purposes: an emergency kitchen, first aid, a protest art tent, a women’s tent and a music tent. In this fashion, the Village would serve as “a microcosm of the possible - a place where we can strategize, tell stories, share regional issues; build long-term coalitions; demonstrate living alternatives to capitalism and teach each other new ways to manifest dissent” (“Kananaskis Info”). However, as the date of the summit neared, the organizers, including Council of Canadian’s’ trade campaigner David Robbins, were still negotiating the Solidarity Village plan with indigenous leaders. Finally, in May, and just one week ahead of the summit, the Stoney band council turned down the idea: there would be no Solidarity Village in Kananaskis after all.48

Exasperated, the coalition turned to the Calgary City Council to ask for last-minute permission to use a city skatepark to host the convergence. Given the global political

48 An agreement to rent land from the Stoney First Nation was signed, but at the last minute the band council stymied the $7,000 deal between the activists and Harold Simeon, a Stoney member who has previously rented family land to film western movies. The council insisted that the land belongs to the band, and that the activists needed a band council resolution. Though Simeon insisted it was his right to rent what he claimed was family land, the activists did not wish to proceed with the Solidarity Village without consent from the tribal council (Harrington 2002: A6). According to Walkom, the band’s decision to turn down the deal at the last minute was connected to Ottawa’s offer to cover the indigenous community’s “security costs” such as border fortifications and courses in first aid (Walkom 2002a: 3). In its June 2002 media release, the Council of Canadians noted that the Stoney Nation received $300,000 from the federal government to pay for the reserve’s “security costs” (“$300,000”). The same media release also insisted that the Solidarity Village organizers “have no issues with the Nakoda Sioux ... However, we suspected there was interference when our discussions about a venue for Solidarity Village broke down for no apparent reason. Now we know that the federal government paid to prevent G8 dissenters from being able to organize a peaceful response to the Summit” (ibid).
climate and the Conservative provincial government under Ralph Klein, plus the $34 million in federal funds channeled to the city for its summit assistance, the activists could not have been very surprised when their request was brusquely turned down. To their minds, the obstacles encountered at each turn were evidence of federal interference. Ottawa, of course, denied the allegations (Walkom 2002). Ultimately, the convergence website announced regretfully the cancellation of Solidarity Village, and encouraged activists to come to Calgary instead.\footnote{Newly radicalized thanks to my involvement in the increasingly popular Oxfam students association at Western University, I was presented with an opportunity to fly to Calgary as a youth delegate to Oxfam Canada's annual general meeting, scheduled to overlap with the "Group of 6 Billion" summit. I was welcome to stay in Calgary on my own for the protests. I happily took up the offer, but instead of flying to Calgary, I petitioned Oxfam to pay for two Greyhound tickets instead, and took along with me for a radical adventure (and one very long bus ride) a school friend of mine. It was a fifty hour journey one-way with many layovers, but it was worth it...}

Not every activist willing to cover the distance could also cover the cost of a trip halfway across the country. Citing the activist Erin George, Walkom noted that a “planned charter flight to take 250 easterners to Calgary attracted only 86 takers,” partly due to $643 cost for a seat. But there was another reason which was perhaps more important, namely the growing doubts about the usefulness of this form of political action (Walkom 2002a: 3). In reply, Erin George specified that a “delegation of 140 easterners” was reportedly set to travel by bus, car caravan, and “AIR 6Billion planes” co-sponsored by Toronto Mob4Glob and the Canadian Labour Congress. She noted that people were coming to Kananaskis from all over the country, including Toronto and Windsor, London, St. Catharines, Hamilton, Burlington, Mississauga, Oshawa, Brockville, Montreal, Rimouski and even London, UK (George 2002).

But despite George's reply to Walkom, in which she stressed that activists from the eastern half of Canada were making their way to Kananaskis undeterred by the state's
machinations and the cancellation of Solidarity Village, it is true that many Canadian activists were questioning the value of going to Alberta for the convergence. Though it had been a key force in organizing against the SOA in Québec City, CLAC was among the groups adamantly opposed to sending activists across the country for the G8 protests. Instead, CLAC members and many other activists in the eastern part of Canada decided to hold their own regional convergence to protest the G8 summit.

Toward this end, a protest involving two Days of Action against the G8 was organized in Ottawa under the banner “Take the Capital!” (with smaller rallies also planned in Toronto, Halifax, and Vancouver). Three thousand people showed up on the first Day of Action against the G8, to participate in the expressly anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist march organized by the CLAC in accordance with a diversity of tactics framework. According to a report on Indymedia UK, as they marched that day, there was some minor property damage, as some activists hurled paint-bombs at banks and spray-painted anti-capitalist slogans on walls. The window of a police car was smashed, a Global TV van was damaged, and a rally in front of the American Embassy saw the burning of an American flag and an effigy of George W. Bush. The snake marchers eventually rallied at the grounds at the Parliament buildings. Another march and a squatting action took place later in the day (“Cross-Canada”).

The following day, June 27, a non-violent march called “1000 Flags of Resistance” organized by No One Is Illegal, proceeded from the American Embassy to Parliament Hill, about 2,000 strong. Uniquely in the history of Canadian alter-globalization marches of the millennial cycle, this one saw no arrests, no police violence, and no acts of property destruction. Commenting on the event shortly afterwards in The Globe and Mail, Judy Rebick (2002) commended the Ottawa organizers “for their ability to successfully mobilize and broaden the movement to immigrant communities and people of colour.” She noted that as a result, “in Ottawa, for the first time in Canada, the movement's
demonstrations were visibly multicultural and entirely non-violent” (2002: A15).

Yet, while a certain degree of unity was visible in the streets of Ottawa (on that second day in particular), the very fact that protests against the Kananaskis G8 summit were organized in Ottawa illustrated a deep running tension concerning so-called “summit hopping” that was peaking within the Canadian movement at the time.

**Debate: Summit-Hopping**

By 2002, the critique of “summit-hopping” was becoming increasingly widespread and contentious within many movement spaces. CLAC and OCAP in particular began calling for a return to fighting globalization by focusing on its local manifestations. This shift was informed in large part by the influence of Betita Martinez’s (2000) criticism of the AGM as a movement constituted by a relatively privileged (i.e. white, young, and middle class) demographic. What is more, the costs of organizing counter-summits were also starting to sink in – especially given the remoteness of Alberta to the hubs of Canadian activism in Ontario and Québec. In light of the above, many activists counselled others against going to Kananaskis. In a piece titled “Doing things differently this time: Kananaskis G8 meeting and movement building,” activist Yutaka Dirks, for one, argued that “[t]his time we should encourage people NOT to come at all, unless they are from the region. As organizers from the Ontario and Québec region have suggested, we should encourage convergences based in regions across the continent that have a common focus or demands” (Dirks 2002).

On the other hand, in a letter in the *Toronto Star*, Ontario organizer Erin George insisted upon the need and benefits of going to Alberta. She explained that those travelling to the site of the summit had fundraised for months to pay their way, with every dollar signifying “support from our communities in the fight for global justice. We will be their
eyes and ears in Alberta. And we are planning to report back to our communities when we return – to energize our struggles against the G8 agenda at home” (George, 2002: para. 6-7). George's comment addresses the most commonly recognized benefit of organizing a counter-summit, namely the sense of empowerment that proceeds from mass presence in the streets, and also from the “radical self-experience” that is closely tied to confrontation with the authorities.

One activist involved in the Canadian Federation of Students felt that the debate was mired in a mean and negative attitude, manifested by “some people who would position themselves very righteously as real activists, and accused those going to summits as tourist organizers [...] The best was when OCAP suggested that anyone who wanted to go to Calgary would have to fundraise an equal amount for their ticket as for local organizing, presumably to OCAP. So a number of us started to call it the OCAP tax.” As we will see, OCAP members were equally wary of organizing a counter-summit against the G20 when it came to Toronto eight years later, and would again invoke the Martinez critique in arguing against it (though its members went on to play a leading part in the eventual 2010 mobilization).

Denise Hammond likewise noted the divisive effect that the debate was having not only on the existing groups like Mob4Glob in Toronto, of which she was part, but also on those who heard about the movement for the first time when the FTAA protests happened in Québec City and became involved afterward: “for younger people who were beginning to get involved, there wasn’t that same sort of inspiration that you were part of a collective movement because there was so much toxicity around having the debate on whether we organize here or send people to organize there...and the young people who weren't part of Québec City, many of them never lasted because of the internal tensions and turmoil.”

In 2002, the summit-hopping debate was at its peak, and was stirring up contention in
organizing meetings across Canada, fracturing the movement but simultaneously boosting
the profile of the mobilization – as noted by Leah Henderson, although it proved
relatively small, smaller even than Windsor perhaps, “everyone knew that Kananaskis
was happening because everyone was arguing whether to go or not to go.”

The Protests

The protests officially kicked off on June 25, the eve of the official summit, with a
Solidarity March through the skyscraper-dominated streets of downtown Calgary. In the
evening, activists made their way to the “Showdown at the Hoedown,” a street party
organized to disrupt (only with noise, it turned out) the $300,000 dinner held for the
lower-level G8 delegates at the Stampede complex in downtown Calgary. A few members
of a black bloc started to climb the fence around the complex, but they were quickly
surrounded by police and sent on their way without arrest or a major confrontation
(“Cross-Canada”; Stewart 2010).

The G6B Summit had concluded the day before the G8 summit began, allowing protesters
to attend the main day of protests on Saturday, June 26, or “J26” in activist parlance of the
day. At 6 a.m., the protesters coalesced in the east end of Calgary to partake in a snake
march organized by the Calgary Anti-Capitalist Collective (CACC) and Anti-Capitalist
Edmonton (ACE). The crowd remained peaceful for the duration of the march. The police
chose to forgo riot gear in favour of plain garb, and body shields in favour of bicycles,
and this helped to maintain the peaceful nature of the march.50 As Maude Barlow put it,
“They didn’t have that Robocop look” (cited in Brethour and Walton 2002: A1). The San

50 As part of that crowd, I was excited and slightly nervous – this was my first big alter-globalization
demonstration. In my backpack was an old, musty smelling second-hand gas mask, which I bought in an
army surplus store. I was hoping I would not have to use it, although I will admit that a small part of me
did hope it would come to that.
Francisco activist Starhawk, who had led the Living River in Québec City, likewise noted publicly that the police in Calgary behaved like no other security force she had seen.

The indomitable Maude Barlow and CoC activists were part of the 2,000 people who participated in the four and a half-hour long snake march through the financial district of downtown Calgary, disrupting traffic and business as usual. Illegal due to organizers' inability to secure a permit from the city, the march nonetheless attracted several hundred unionists, and flags from the CAW, CUPW, CEP, CUPE, United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) and Steelworkers were flying high.

The route of the march led the protesters past several corporate targets in need of naming and shaming: "Talisman Energy for complicity in supporting Sudan's genocidal civil war against its southern inhabitants, Shell Oil for its role in the Nigerian military's oppression of the Ogani peoples to open up oil fields, Telus's plans for mass layoffs and contracting out of unionized work, and countless energy companies for their objection to the Kyoto protocol" (Schreck 2002, np). No windows were smashed, however. According to Indymedia UK, a black bloc attempted an occupation of Macdonald's restaurant, but left shortly after the police evacuated those trapped inside by a back door ("Cross Canada"). The mainstream media were surely yet again disappointed by the lack of spectacle.

After the march, protesters staged a "die-in" to commemorate and honour the deaths of people with lack of access to essential medicine. A large group continued to a local part for a People's Picnic. The event featured Bruce Cockburn and free French fries cooked by Greenpeace using solar power. Well fed and inspired, many of the protesters left the picnic to participate in a caravan to the barricades at Kananaskis. After a hundred people organized, semi-spontaneously, into a caravan spearheaded by the CUPW and comprising several dozen cars, we headed west to Kananaskis to deliver a social justice petition to the G8. Members of DIST (Deconstructionist Institute for Surreal Topology), whom we know
from our discussion of the FTAA protests, were also part of the caravan as representatives of DICK, or the DIST Intelligence Committee of Kananaskis. For the purpose of disrupting the summit in Kananaskis, in a luxury resort deep in the forest, they had formed the Ewok Rebel Alliance, whose basis of unity was centered on “Maximum disruption combined with maximum cuddliness” (“Ewok Council”). As Ewoks engaged in guerrilla warfare, they had hoped to blockade the lone highway that runs through Kananaskis. But finally, the Ewoks ended up hitching a ride with the bigger caravan (“Ewoks in Kananaskis”).

Once the caravan entered the Rockies, we made it as far as the second police checkpoint, to our own surprise, until we were told we could go no further. At that point everyone got out of the cars and tried to figure out what to do. No one was in charge, and there was no prepared plan of action or civil disobedience. Some discussion of organizing a blockade ensued; however, with no decision-making mechanism already in place, the group of a few hundred listened politely to all the comments and suggestions made – and nothing happened. The caravan participants milled about uncertainly, taking in the absurd contrast between the majestic beauty of Canadian wilderness around us and the massive police presence on the road before us. After a couple of hours we grew weary of indecision and the sound of helicopters buzzing overhead. Everyone finally, reluctantly, got back in their cars and headed back to Calgary.51

The second memorable action was the “mud ritual,” organized by the Pagan Cluster. This was a favourite moment for Leah Henderson, who recalled that the witches stripped down to their underwear, got completely covered in mud, then symbolically came to life and, in an act of “magickal-political-resistance,” set forth through downtown Calgary in the

51 That was the end of my Kananaskis adventure. Compared to the tales I had heard previously about tearing down the fence, it felt anti-climactic. Nonetheless, the next day, it was time to get on the Greyhound bus, and make the 50-hour trip back home to Ontario.
company of “plant” and “winged” associates, singing, drumming, and pressing their muddy bodies up against the shiny glass facades of the city’s financial district buildings (“Gaia Resistance”). When he saw what was happening, a business type who emerged from one of the buildings proceeded to strip off his own clothes, and joined in the dirty ritual fun. “He kept saying that he missed his flight, but that he didn’t care because this was the best thing ever!” recalled Leah Henderson with a laugh.

Was the Kananaskis mobilization successful? Again, it depends. According to one account:

From an insurrectionary viewpoint, and contrary to media reports, the G8 demonstrations across Canada displayed a growing level of militancy, given the huge distance between Canadian cities and the difficulty of mobilizing and transporting people to Calgary and Kananaskis, the lockdown at the Canadian / American border, and simultaneous Black Block and anti-capitalist actions in several major Canadian cities. The G8 demonstrations showed an increase in localized agitation, economic disruption, and cross-country coordination of efforts. The momentum gained in Seattle, Québec City and Genoa has not been lost! While the G8 retreats, the people move forward! (“Cross-Country”)

Written in the customary propagandist style, the above passage, penned by an anonymous contributor to the Indymedia UK website, highlights the positive aspects of the mobilization. It also illustrates the tendency among activists to always look on the bright side of life (so to speak). This was also reflected in Judy Rebick's commentary piece in The Globe and Mail published a few days after the protests, wherein she asserted optimistically that the protests “mark[ed] a critical turning point in the Canadian movement against corporate globalization (...) Because the threat of violence at demonstrations has been at the root of divisions in the movement, the peaceful nature of both Calgary and Ottawa actions should provide a basis for movement reconvergence” (Rebick 2002).
At the same time, Rebick acknowledged in the same piece that the G8 protests were quite modest, at least compared to the massive mobilization of 40 to 50 thousand people in Québec City the preceding year (plus 100,000 people in the streets of Genoa for the 2001 G8 summit). The small scale of the protests can be attributed to several factors. As we have seen, the US-led “war on terror” and the violence at the Genoa summit prompted Jean Chrétien to move the summit to the remote Kananaskis Village.

Furthermore, we saw that the decision to cancel the tentative land deal between the Alberta farmer and Solidarity Village organizers came at the last minute, as the federal government extended funds to support this decision. The details of how decisions were made in this case remain unclear, but it can be presumed with some confidence that the strategy sessions taking place at the federal level concerning summit preparations included directives to disrupt the planning protest of the opposition in the most effective way, leaving the opposition with no time to come up with an alternative plan.

In addition, one thing that was missing in Calgary/Kananaskis was also organized civil disobedience, as demonstrated by my anecdote about the “highway action manqué”. The American activist Starhawk, who attended the Calgary protests, made a point to that effect afterwards in her reflective piece titled “Getting Our Tactics Right: Lessons from the Calgary G8 Mobilization” (2002). In it, she argues that a number of civil disobedience possibilities were open in Calgary, including blocking the road in Kananaskis until the postal workers were allowed through, blocking delegates from leaving until they heard the activists' perspectives, or ending the snake march with mass blockades at oil companies, to draw the parallels between oil, global corporate capitalism, and the "war on terror" (2002).

In an argument refuting the position of respect for a diversity of tactics, Starhawk went on
to assert that “to take any of those or other truly disruptive actions, we would have needed to organize in ways that are possible only in the political space opened up by an explicit commitment to nonviolence” (ibid). As noted earlier, however, the organizing coalition in Calgary operated under the diversity of tactics framework. According to Starhawk, this was unnecessary, given that even the militants eschewed property destruction this time around:

Calgary just wasn’t the place or time for high confrontation tactics or property destruction, no matter how principled. Calgary is called “the Texas of Canada” for both its oil wealth and right wing politics. It has no tradition of street protests, and its radical culture, though vibrant, is very small. Street fighting and window smashing would have basically undercut any future efforts at radical organizing in Calgary and possibly throughout Alberta (ibid).

Interestingly, the passage above suggests that in Starhawk’s view, considerations such as the possibility of undermining future organizing efforts is part of the black blocs’ tactical calculus. Yet arguably, the efforts of the black bloc were largely absent in Calgary because those activists intent on confrontation found their way to Ottawa for the CLAC march instead.

When I asked Leah Henderson whether the Kananaskis convergence was a success, she was ambivalent. The snake march of two thousand people was significant, she noted, since “Alberta doesn’t have that kind of numbers, that kinda life. That’s a moment for Alberta leftist history for sure.” Upon further reflection, she added that

The fact that it happened was more than enough work! (laughs) Which I’m kind of joking about, but kind of not. What I would have liked to see Kananaskis do more...is this sort of longer-term work. As an activist who worked in Edmonton for years after the Kananaskis mobilization, I didn’t feel the energy. We didn’t have tonnes more recruits, we didn’t have new organizations or new sources of funding. It didn’t feed the city. It felt like it drained it.
Her sentiment was closely echoed by Scott Harris, who recalled that “organizing around Kananaskis was so draining. Like, it was really draining.” Scott Harris referenced the failed negotiations about Solidarity Village and “weird personality politics” among Edmonton activists as elements contributing to the widespread burnout. “It was a hard year of organizing. I remember by the time I got to Calgary, I just wanted it to be over. Not to say things weren’t good, but I just remember being absolutely exhausted. Activists in Alberta didn’t have the capacity to do that scale and that magnitude... It was a bit of a burnout machine.” We saw this also in the reluctance on behalf of Calgary and Edmonton activist communities to organize the protests, given capacity issues and the political climate, and to some extent, the summit-hopping debate. As we will see in the next chapter, similar conditions obtained in Toronto in 2010 when the G8 and G20 returned to Canada.

As suggested by the above comments, the Calgary mobilization also failed to produce lasting movement infrastructure. Though the unions and NGOs who took part predictably persisted in the aftermath of the protests, neither the umbrella organizing coalition, nor Anti-Capitalist Edmonton, nor the Calgary Anti-Capitalist Convergence withstood the test of time. On the other hand, equally grassroots CLAC, No One Is Illegal, and OCAP, namely the three groups centrally involved in organizing Take the Capital,

As for relationships among activists, a number of new ones were certainly forged and others strengthened in the aftermath, but as noted above, not in the long run. “There was no long-lasting effect for the movement,” concluded Leah Henderson. “It happened, it was a pretty quiet mobilization in terms of the history of mobilizations in North America in this context ... that was kind of it.” Noting that the Canadian labour movement leadership had “completely shut down” after September 11, Carol Phillips observed that the decline of the AGM cycle was clear in Calgary: “We had a presence there, but it was much more traditional than it had been, and if you remember, the crowd wasn’t very big
and as I said it was much more traditional...Windsor and Québec were a whole other world compared to Kananaskis.”

In short, it appears that Kananaskis is remembered primarily as the pinnacle of the summit-hopping debate within the Canadian alter-globalization movement (and also, perhaps, for the Gap strip-down protest or the mud ritual, which made mainstream news). But to the minds of several of my respondents, the Calgary convergence against the G8 stood out on account of one more thing: the meeting that initiated a new wave of networking among Canadian anti-war activists, culminating in the “blip,” to use Carol Philips' term, that were the mass mobilizations of February and March, 2003. The “master frame” employed by the activists to make meaning of the main issues at stake shifted to emphasize the military-industrial complex and American imperialism, and it drew out the AGM’s final burst of energy as it ambivalently supported traditional peace groups in organizing family-friendly anti-war protests.

“No Blood For Oil!”

On the last day of the G8 summit in Kananaskis, a group of about seventy people gathered on the lawn outside the Calgary anti-G8 convergence centre. Most of them were active in the campaign to stop the sanctions against Iraq, according to veteran Toronto anti-war organizer James Clark. James Clark, an AGM veteran and today a board member of the Canadian Peace Alliance, was one of the participants in that informal meeting; he recalled that the goal was to discuss what was widely understood as a looming US invasion of Iraq. There was no pan-Canadian anti-war network already in place: though the Canadian Peace Alliance had done a lot of good work around disarmament during the 1980s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it became a disoriented shell of the former organization. In the new millennium, it also found itself quite removed from the alter-globalization movement, in part due to the generational gap.
The national coalition (or network, given the internet's central role) that emerged from that meeting, organized its first coordinated protest in a dozen cities on Hiroshima Day in August 2002. This in turn precipitated the creation of new local anti-war coalitions (Clark 2013). As the US government made its clear its intention to invade Iraq, the attention of AGM activists in North America turned to the anti-war movement. Over the next few months, local rallies were organized, and local organizers answered the online callout to participate in a Global Day of Action against the invasion. The callout was issued by the 2002 European Social Forum that took place in Florence – it resulted in the largest protests in recorded history, with over thirty million people in 800 cities taking to the streets to say "No to War! No blood for oil!"

Canadian anti-war activists mobilized (in) large numbers, too. According to James Clark:

At least 80 anti-war events took place in Canada on February 15, ranging from city-wide marches of tens of thousands, to more modest actions such as candle-light vigils, banner drops and local pickets of MPs' offices. The biggest demonstration by far was in Montreal, where over 250,000 people completely shut down the downtown streets. Next was Toronto with 80,000 and then Vancouver with 40,000. Over 18,000 marched in Edmonton, 8,000 in Victoria, 6,000 in Ottawa and 4,000 in Halifax. Almost every urban centre – Calgary, Winnipeg, Québec City and St. John’s, among others – hosted some kind of protest (Clark 2013).

As the single biggest day of protest worldwide in history (with Rome setting the record at three million demonstrators), the February 15th mobilization prompted a writer for The New York Times to declare the world's public opinion its "second superpower" (Tyler 2003). The movement regrouped quickly for another massive coordinated protest on March 20th: the day that bombs started dropping on Baghdad. Yet, when that tragedy came to pass, the protests stopped virtually instantaneously. Given the record-breaking numbers of protesters in the streets on two separate occasions during the previous month,
the sudden demobilization seemed all the more anti-climactic.

In the ensuing months, the anti-war movement in Canada underwent a significant reorientation. By January 2004, it regrouped around a new priority campaign in support of American war resisters – a “small echo of Vietnam era,” as James Clark put it. The movement also began to shift its focus from Iraq back to Afghanistan: since the Canadian state did not formally participate in the Iraq invasion, there was more pressure on the movement to engage with the Canadian military presence in Afghanistan, and to dismantle the deeply lodged myth about Canada’s military as a peacekeeping and humanitarian force. The persistence of this myth has always obstructed the work of the Canadian anti-war movement, noted Leah Henderson. Given that the Canadian government and mainstream media routinely frame Canadian military action as peacekeeping, mobilizing against Canada’s involvement in the war in Afghanistan was “a really uphill battle,” she recalled. Though James Clark would likely disagree, in Henderson’s estimation, the Canadian anti-war movement is currently “almost non-existent.”

By way of concluding this chapter, although the “Cycle 2.0” of the alter-globalization movement in Canada was cut short and began to decline after September 11, 2001, this was not the end of anti-summit, AGM-style organizing in this country. Over the next few years, activists continued to engage with the question of free trade, neoliberalism, and the international institutions charged with the task of promoting them – but this work was carried out in a “one-off” fashion, no longer propelled by a swelling, worldwide tide of contention. The next alter-globalization mobilization to take place in Canada, the 2003 Montreal protest against the WTO mini-ministerial, evidenced this shift insofar as it made virtually no mark on the history of Canadian activism (as confirmed by my respondents, only one of whom, a Québécois, mentioned it in passing). As activists turned to other issues and, often, more locally based organizing – indigenous solidarity, migrant justice,
anti-poverty – the interest in (and time spent) organizing solidarity rallies against transnational targets diminished. The next major “moment of convergence” against corporate-led globalization would not take place in Canada until 2007, raising questions about a possible resurgence of the AGM. The third and final part of this historical narrative, presented in the ensuing chapter, thus begins with the protest against the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) in Montebello, Québec.
Chapter 4
Crisis, Resistance, Change: The Canadian AGM 2007-2010

As we saw in the previous chapter, though the alter-globalization movement did not follow the same path everywhere following the events of 9/11, in the aftermath, the climate of political repression in its aftermath reduced the interest among Canadian activists in summit-based protests against neoliberal globalization. Demobilized further by the turmoil of the summit-hopping critique, the "Cycle 2.0" dissipated as the AGM generation of activists turned to other movements and issues. While the ensuing years were thus not devoid of contentious action, the period was not distinguished by any identifiable cycle of protest in the same way that the turn of the century had been.

In 2007, it seemed as though this situation was about to change. In the context of the Bush Administration's continuing "war on terror" as well as the US mortgage meltdown whose grave implications for global capitalism were starting to become clear, the leaders of the world's leading capitalist countries were anxious to reinforce consensus concerning the ongoing progress of neoliberal globalization with the implementation of new policy and security measures. Toward this end, in the summer of 2007, the three North American heads of state met in Montebello, Québec to discuss the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP), a new accord summed up aptly by critics as "NAFTA on steroids." The protests that took place in Montebello against the SPP are discussed in the first part of this chapter. As we will see, there were a number of important continuities with the AGM's "Cycle 2.0" both in terms of the actors involved and the themes invoked. The Montebello protests thus suggested that a new cycle of AGM protest was about to begin in Canada: as noted by one of my respondents, ideological and political space was opening up once again, and there was a sense that it was going to be possible to mobilize again on a scale that was not possible in the years immediately after 9/11.
Indeed, the SPP protests did play a part in precipitating what became known as the “No 2010 campaign” involving a triple target: the subsequent SPP summit, the Vancouver Winter Olympics, and the G8/G20 summit, which this chapter discusses in turn. However, as we will see, though significant in the history of Canadian extra-parliamentary activism, these protests did not cohere into a new cycle of globalization-centred collective action in Canada.

**Montebello 2007: “Stop the War, Stop the SPP!”**

On August 20 and 21, 2007, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, US President George Bush, and Mexico's President Felipe Calderon met to discuss the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) and build an informal understanding that would have nevertheless harmonized policy, reformed regulation, and extended the provisions of NAFTA with new security measures between the three North American countries. The 2007 “Three Amigos Summit,” as the media called it, took place inside the heavily fortified Château Montebello, a luxury resort in the picturesque tourist town of Montebello hugging the Ottawa river in the Outaouais region of Québec.

The Montebello summit was the third of its kind. The SPP process was launched by George W. Bush, Vicente Fox, and Prime Minister Paul Martin in Waco, Texas in March 2005, with the goal of creating “NAFTA Plus” by integrating North American policy in more than 300 areas: from environmental protection, to food safety, water exports, and energy and electricity markets. Significantly, the SPP also meant implementing new and enhanced joint security measures against terrorism and other threats. Thomas Shannon, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for western hemisphere affairs, revealed the SPP's purpose with remarkable candour: “To a certain extent, we're armoring NAFTA” (cited in Carlsen 2008). After Bush ordered the border temporarily closed after 9/11, business
leaders in Canada wanted to make sure that this never happened again; consequently, the Canadian business community and successive Canadian governments were eager to provide the US with what it wanted (Webb cited in Troster 2007: 5).

According to Laura Carlsen, director of the Mexico City-based Americas Program of the Center for International Policy, although not much visible progress was made at the initial Waco meeting, it did “set in motion an underground process that spawned 20 different working groups as well as rules, recommendations, and agreements – all below the radar of the legislatures and the public in the three nations” (Carlsen 2007). Follow-up meetings included a March 2006 gathering of heads of state in Cancun, a secret meeting of high-level government, military, and business leaders in Banff in September of 2006 that was outed by Canadian civil society watchdogs, and a ministerial meeting in Canada in February of 2007 (ibid).

**Preparation**

As with the MAI, the SPP was shrouded in obscurity and received little media attention. The most vocal civil society watchdog seeking to expose the SPP’s existence and detrimental implications was the national stalwart in the fight against neoliberalism, the Council of Canadians. The CoC followed the developments concerning the SPP since the agreement’s informal inception in 2005, and was among the first to shed light on the profound influence over the SPP negotiations exercised by a corporate lobby group called the North American Competitiveness Council (NACC).\(^\text{52}\) NACC’s lobbyist did not seek to

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\(^{52}\) NACC was created in 2006 at the second SPP summit in Cancun and consisted of thirty CEOs, ten appointed by each country (Barlow 2007). NACC representatives regularly informed the SPP negotiations in an “advisory” capacity; they were the only civil society group allowed to do so. In their February 2007 Report to Ministers, the NACC issued 51 recommendations for “enhancing North America’s competitive position in the world economy.” They sought, first of all, to improve “the secure flow of goods and people within North America;” secondly, they wanted governments to “cut red tape;” and thirdly, they sought to protect the prosperity of the United States by ensuring a “secure supply of imported energy” (“North American”).
shape a formal process aimed at establishing a new treaty or agreement: the corporate and state actors involved agreed that it would be wiser to frame it as “dialogue” rather than seek to pass legislation. As Ron Covais, president of Lockheed Martin, one of the US companies belonging to the NACC, admitted to Maclean’s magazine in 2006: “We’ve decided not to recommend any things that would require legislative changes ... because we won’t get anywhere” (cited in Barlow 2007). Likewise, during a meeting in April, 2007 between representatives of the CoC and an American Embassy, US officials clarified with uncanny candour that there was little interest in going through another “bruising NAFTA battle,” which is why the three leaders were not taking the SPP to their legislatures (ibid).53

The group that took on the lead on the SPP as it had with the MAI, the Council of Canadians had to yet again begin with the basics, by exposing the very existence of the SPP. Toward this end, the CoC again undertook a months-long campaign of popular education. First of all, it became, through its website, a clearinghouse of information, offering backgrounders and propaganda material on the SPP, in a specially designated part of its website called “Integrate This!” As elucidated there, the top reasons for opposing the SPP were, first of all, the anti-democratic nature of the negotiations that were informed solely by a corporate lobby group; second, the SPP would privilege energy exports to the US; third, it would lead to bulk water exports from Canada to the US; and

53 International opposition to the SPP came from an ultra-conservative US group called the Coalition to Block the North American Union, composed of over one hundred politicians and public policy advocates (plus the singer Pat Boone). Members of this group, led by chairman Howard Phillips, held a press conferences and travelled to Montebello to protest the SPP in person side by side with left-wing activists (Smyth 2007: A4). The Coalition was worried about secret attempts to destroy America’s sovereignty via the creation of a North American Union (NAU). It also shared many left wing critics’ concerns about a rumoured “NAFTA superhighway,” a freeway reportedly to be sponsored by the North American Super Corridor Coalition (NASCO), and stretch four football fields wide, starting in Mexico, cutting a wide swath through the middle of Texas and up through Kansas City, and winding up near Churchill in northern Manitoba (though both NASCO and George Bush denied it in the media).
fourth, that it would make Canadians “less secure” by tying Canada to the American “war on terror.”

Outside the CoC’s focus on protecting Canadian democracy and Canadian values, a part of opposition to the SPP in 2007 was centered on the last reason in that list, and came from the anti-war movement. As discussed previously, the “war on terror” orchestrated by the George W. Bush Administration sparked huge protests four years earlier; in 2007, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were still going on despite Bush’s assurances to the contrary. In activist discourse, Bush himself was widely regarded as a terrorist (the world’s number one terrorist, in fact, according to a well-known placard from the anti-war movement visible at the SPP rally, in the photos found on the “Integrate This!” website). As noted in 2009 by CoC trade campaigner Stuart Trew (2009), “[f]ormer U.S. President Bush provided a convenient target to embody all the evils of NAFTA expansion through the SPP.” Likewise, Pat Cadorette, who organized against the SPP from his home base in Montreal, recalled that Bush loomed as a “big boogeyman” in the minds of activists and was conducive to rousing anti-SPP mobilization. Thus, while the Council of Canadians did much if not most of the educational and organizing work, protest promotion and travel logistics involving buses to bring people from Toronto to Montebello were organized with the help of the Toronto Coalition to Stop the War. Created in 2002 as the local chapter of the Canadian Peace Alliance, TCSW had by then become the largest peace organization in the Greater Toronto Area, representing over 60 labour, student, faith and community groups (“About TCSW”). As specified by an online callout, titled “Stop the War! Stop SPP,” in order to reserve a spot, one needed only send an email to “bushbus2007@gmail.com.”

As with the campaign to expose the MAI, the key focus of activism around the SPP in the months leading up to Montebello was popular education. A three-day public teach-in called “Integrate This! Challenging the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North
America” was organized in late March in Ottawa by the CoC, the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, and the Canadian Labour Congress. It attracted over 1,500 people, and featured twenty different workshops. As usual, there were also several panels, featuring women role models such as Maude Barlow, Judy Rebick, as well as Bertha Lujan, has been played an important role in the struggle against the FTA and NAFTA as the co-founder and national coordinator of the Mexican Action Network on Free Trade (RMALC). Lujan drew parallels between the SPP and the earlier NAFTA agreement: “Now, as was the case then, we find ourselves facing a process that is very secretive and that we need to shed light on,” she said. “From the point of view of Mexicans, the participation of Canadians [in the struggle against NAFTA] was key ... we learned from Canadians about what it meant to organize around this kind of agreement” (cited in ibid: 12).

In Montreal, organizing around the SPP did not begin until May, at the time of the anarchist book fair, recalled Pat Cadorette. He explained that this was because the activists did not know about the summit until then. Once the activists found out about the impending summit, the organizing got started right away, recalled Pat Cadorette, and involved “all the usual suspects of radical Montreal,” who came together as People's Global Action (PGA) Bloc Montreal. Another, smaller PGA Bloc was also created in Ottawa. As discussed previously, the PGA was designed as a network, not a membership organization, and becoming a PGA Bloc meant simply accepting a basis of unity composed of the PGA Hallmarks, including direct action and a confrontational anti-capitalist attitude. Montreal PGA Bloc included groups such as Block the Empire, No One Is Illegal-Montreal, le Comite de sans-emploi, Solidarity Across Borders, Les Sorcières, Projet Accompagnement Solidarite Colombie (PASC), Tadamon Montreal, La Otra Campana, QPIRG-Concordia, the Immigrant Worker's Center (IWC), DIRA Anarchist Library, the Collective Opposed to Police Brutality (COBP) (“Canada, Montreal”).
In the lead-up to the summit, the PGA Bloc organized a series of consultas. As part of a National Week of Action Against the Security and Prosperity Partnership called by the CoC from August 13 to 17, Bloc members also organized two demonstrations: against CN rail and the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), exposing the connections between both targets and the proposed SPP. In addition, a series of Community Assemblies, a benefit show, and “Brigades Festives” in Montreal’s local neighbourhoods were organized by the PGA’s info/popular education committee as part of a popular education effort ("Harper, Bush & Calderon").

Having engaged in consciousness-raising during the early summer months, by mid-August radicals were preparing to board a dozen chartered buses, and travel to Montebello to partake in a summit “shitshow,” to use Pat Cadorette’s word, used to describe the spectacular quality of both the official meeting and the inevitable confrontation.

Thanks to the efforts of Québécois activists, those protesters who wished to travel to Montebello for the SPP summit could stay at one of two so-called autonomous camps in the area. According to Pat Cadorette, who was a core camp organizer, the camps were an annual happening, designed to allow people “to drop out of capitalism, to try and survive for a couple of weeks without financial support or institutional support....the main idea of that was to relearn solidarity by living together.” Active since 2003, in 2007, Pat influenced the organizing process so that the camp would be in Montebello, “so that it would serve as a base for mobilizing.”

The Protests

On Sunday, August 19 a rally was organized in Ottawa on Parliament Hill, about 60
kilometres from where the leaders were starting their meeting. Sponsored by the Outaouais-Ottawa Stop the SPP Committee, the rally attracted between one and three thousand protesters (depending on the source), who gathered for a “loud but peaceful” protest, in the words of one reporter, then marched onto the US and Mexican embassies before returning to the Hill. The crowd remained peaceful, respectful of the organizers' public plea to respect their decision to hold a family-friendly event (Thomson 2007: A4). Later that day, a public forum on the SPP was held by the CoC at the University of Ottawa, and included a political panel with politicians from all parties but the Tories (who reportedly repeatedly declined invitations to speak during SPP public meetings, according to the event poster found online). The CoC forum effectively substituted for a People's Summit, which did not take place in Montebello itself, after the CoC's earlier attempts to organize one were stonewalled by officials.

A bike caravan left Ottawa for Montebello that same day, and travelled 70 kilometres in hopes of raising awareness about the SPP's intention to lower environmental protection and increase oil and bulk water exports to the USA (“SPP protest”).

Meanwhile in Montebello, the site of the summit was once again heavily fortified against dissenters. The Québec police erected a 2.1 kilometre security zone around a reinforced fence that the RCMP constructed near the permanent barrier that already surrounds the resort (Smyth 2007). Boaters were allowed to continue travelling on the Ottawa River

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54 The same reporter detailed online accounts posted by anarchists concerning direct actions taken against corporate targets associated with the NACC, which allegedly involved breaking a window of a Bell Canada building; in addition, the door locks at two Scotiabank locations were glued and their entrance walls were spray-painted and paint-bombed (Thomson 2007b).

55 Once again, the CoC is to be commended for preserving the history of the SPP opposition by posting video, audio and photographic documentation from its public forums and other events on the Integrate This! website. In so doing, the organization helps to preserve movement history, and has made the task of writing this dissertation much easier.
during the summit, albeit under escort as they got near the Château; but truckers had to 
make a detour through Ontario (LeBlanc 2007: A1). RCMP officers on golf carts were 
also patrolling the inside of the perimeter while their colleagues patrolled the adjacent 
Ottawa River by boat. Hundreds more officers lined the road into the resort (Thompson 
2007: B3).

Several media reports noted that the security forces were heeding lessons from the APEC 
inquiry by ensuring that the demonstrators could be seen by decision-makers. This was to 
be accomplished via a video feed streaming into the summit, as had also been done five 
years prior in Kananaskis. Whether any of the officials inside the resort would or did 
actually watch any of the video stream was neither questioned nor specified.

One video that the media played was of Stephen Harper speaking at a press conference. 
He belittled the SPP summit protests by insisting that the decisions made at the summit 
were simply removing red tape. Here Harper articulated a key talking point subsequently 
widely repeated by the media: he explained that Ganong Chocolates, a small Canadian 
confectionary company involved in the SPP process, was having problems standardizing 
its nutrition labelling across Canada and the US. “Is the sovereignty of Canada going to 
fall apart if we standardize the jelly bean? I don’t think so,” Harper told the press with a 
smile (see “You, Me and the SPP”).

The following day, Monday, August 20, 2007, had been declared a National Day of 
Action Against the SPP by the Council of Canadians. Appropriately, it marked the biggest 
day of protest. On that day, CoC chapters across Canada spearheaded various anti-SPP 
activities, ranging from press releases, to flyerings, to movie screenings in twenty-eight 
locations from Vancouver to Saint John – including a few rallies scheduled in cities 
including Toronto for those who could not make it to Montebello (see “Stop the SPP 
Events”).
On that same day, beginning at noon, a crowd began to gather in Montebello for a rally co-sponsored by the CoC and the Outaouais-Ottawa Stop the SPP Committee. The protesters congregated outside the walls of the Château, in what Jaggi Singh referred to scornfully as “holding pens.” Singh, who was in Montebello with PGA Bloc Montreal, was making reference to two areas, to the east and west of hotel grounds, which the police had designated as protests zones. “We refuse to be caged,” he told The National Post, adding that rather than seeking to be (hypothetically at least) observed by the dignitaries on monitors inside the Château, the protesters were going to disrupt their meeting by marching to the entrance of the hotel, located on Highway 148 running through Montebello. “We believe we should be able to directly confront these three leaders, and not virtually,” he told the Post reporter, who noted in turn that the RCMP had promised such attempts would result in arrests (see Smyth 2007).

Easily the loudest voice against the SPP in Montebello that day was that of the CoCc and in particular its chairperson, Maude Barlow, who was joined by the CoC’s trade campaigner Stuart Trew and their compatriots in attempting to deliver an anti-SPP petition containing the signatures of 10,000 Canadians. The feature-length documentary “You, Me and the SPP,” produced by an independent filmmaker (and CoC member) Paul Manly and available on YouTube, shows the group marching with three large bins filled with the pages of the petition, as Maude Barlow explains that just one hour earlier, the CoC’s prior arrangement with the RCMP permitting the delivery was unilaterally overruled by the Department of Foreign Affairs. “This is a political decision. This means that we’re getting the word out on the SPP and they don’t like it, and so they are blocking us here from telling our story in there,” Maude Barlow affirms in the video with her customary verve.

Faced with police resistance, most front-line protesters opted for an impromptu sit-in,
amidst drumming, dancing, and chanting the classic slogan of the AGM: “this is what democracy looks like.” Others were dousing bandannas with vinegar, just in case. This turned out to be a smart decision: according to Alex Hundert, at one point, a number of chartered buses arrived in the protest zone, and a large number of Montreal anarchists spilled out. What happened then, as he put it, was that they “attacked the cops and then disappeared.”

Alex Hundert was new to AGM activism: he was in Montebello as a member of a newly formed, research-oriented activist group from Kitchener-Waterloo called AW@L (Anti-War at Laurier), as well as part of a non-violent affinity group. He remembered his sense of surprise when that happened.

We didn’t know five hundred people were planning to charge the fence all at once, and I was right at the fence when that happened. We instinctively rushed in to help push the police and then we looked at each other: “wait a minute, didn’t we make a commitment not to do this?”

Alex Hundert explained that AW@L members fell back at this point and helped to pick up those who were getting shot by the police with rubber bullets – which proved to be just one weapon in the arsenal unleashed at the moment of the Montreal anarchists’ attack on the fence. The police also used both pepper spray and tear gas to push back the protesters, who obliged by retreating to nurse their wounded – but did not leave.

Just past three 3 p.m., three men dressed like protesters, wearing bananas and black clothing, approached the gathered group of NGO and union members. “This is our line! This is for grandmothers and grandfathers! Bugger off to your line!” Dave Coles, president of the Communication, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada (CEP), protested loudly, and pointed to a group of young militants a short distance away, many also in black and milling about. One of those youth, wearing black clothes and a bandanna, came up to Coles and said in the Québécois accent, “these are cops!” “I know,”
Coles replied. He then walked up to one of the men and asked him to take off his mask. By that point the man had picked up a large rock and was holding it in his hand. “Put the rock down, cop!” Coles shouted. The man responded by swearing and pushing him, as French Black Bloc activists pointed and chanted “Policier! Policier!”

Faced with a crowd of hostile protesters, the three undercover officers huddled against the wall in front of the riot police. After a few minutes, they were pulled through the line and (pretend) arrested on the other side, to the sound of derisive laughter from the activists. Shortly afterwards, the video shows Dave Coles and Maude Barlow giving interviews in which they explain that the three men were les agents provocateurs. “They were trying to create a riot to suck us all in and get beat up,” says Dave Coles. “We got pictures, they’re provocateurs. We got a peaceful group of young brothers down there, and we’re gonna ensure that these guys don’t beat them up. That’s our job! This is our line and we’re going to protect them. We’re not letting some goon with a rock come in and start a riot!” (see “Police provocateurs”).

As recounted by movement journalist Tim Groves (2011), in the late afternoon the excitement subsided, and the number of protesters began to dwindle. At this point, the riot police decided to move in and disperse those remaining. As the police line advanced, two women sat on the ground and refused to move back, and were subsequently arrested for obstruction of police in line of duty. Theirs would be the only arrests during the SPP demonstration.56

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56 One of the women, Leila Martin, fought back in court using a charter challenge, and had her charge dismissed by a judge in the January 2011 ruling. The video showing the police provocateurs entered into the judge’s rebuke of the RCMP’s approach against the two women arrested, and of their inexplicable decision to break up a peaceful protest (Groves 2011).
The Aftermath

In the days that followed, the media stayed on the story of the SPP protest a while longer. At first the RCMP and SQ denied the allegations; however, just three days after the protest, on August 23, 2007, the SQ released a statement admitting that the men were indeed undercover officers, but insisting that they had not committed any illegal acts (Groves 2011). As it turned out, the three officers were part of an undercover team code-named “flagrant delit,” which roughly translates to “caught red-handed;” their role, according to a report by the Québec Police Ethics Committee, was to “melt into the crowd to identify the perpetrators of crime and stop them” (cited in Groves 2011).57

In April of 2008, the SPP talks continued at the fourth “three amigos” summit, this time held in New Orleans. According to Stuart Trew, for six months prior, the CoC had liaised with Mexican and American civil society groups, including Washington’s Institute for Policy Studies, to establish a common front against the SPP. CoC leaders, including Trew and Maude Barlow, were also in New Orleans for the duration of the summit and participated in the “People’s Summit” organized by local activists.

Another group to take part in the New Orleans anti-SPP activities was a group of young Ottawa activists bussed to New Orleans by the Student Federation of the University of Ottawa. Alex Hundert was part of this contingent, as were other anarchists who had attended the Montebello protest, he noted. On the last day of the summit, members of this group organized what Hundert called “a DYI black bloc march” through the French Quarter, but their activities involved playing homemade instruments and handing out

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57 In January 2011, a Québec court ruled that the police had acted illegally in attempting to shut down the Montebello protest, and in arresting two women on a downtown street. The Committee’s final report released in March, 2011, found that the key undercover officer had breached the police code of conduct by swearing at and pushing Coles, but dismissed charges of inciting violence and abusing his authority. The charges against the other two officers were all dismissed.
flyers. Based on this description, it seems that the black bloc's signature activity of confronting police and destroying property was eschewed in New Orleans — conceivably due to the small size of the protesting crowd and the inescapable impropriety of smashing property in the Katrina-ravaged city.

Equally subdued was the New Orleans SPP summit itself — so much so that Maclean’s reporter Luiza Savage referred to it as the “siesta summit” (2008). The SPP plan was formally abandoned next year, during a NACC meeting at the summit in Guadalajara, Mexico.58 Although the North American Competitiveness Council was institutionalized in June 2006 “so that the work will continue through changes in administrations,” in the words of former U.S. Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez, neither SPP nor NACC survived the change in the US administration when Barrack Obama was elected; both became effectively defunct (Trew 2009).

When the SPP talks finally faltered, there was no sign of celebration. As noted at the time on Rabble by CoC's Stuart Trew, who stayed active on the SPP file, activists should have assumed much of the credit for the SPP's demise, and “should [have been] singing it from the rooftops.” Yet there was a puzzling lack of excitement about the SPP and the NACC's dual demise following the 2009 summit, which Trew attributed to the fact that the corporate agenda that informed the SPP negotiating process continued to live on in different guises. He also speculated that the lack of media attention could have been at fault. From the perspective of this study, the latter argument seems more persuasive, given that both mainstream and social media attention tends to both reflect and inspire waves of protest.

58 Over a thousand people took the streets of Guadalajara to protest the SPP, including members of Red Mexicana de Acción Frente al Libre Comercio (RMALC), part of the Hemispheric Social Alliance and major player in the struggle against NAFTA. Also involved were members of the Council of Canadians and Common Frontiers, who likewise participated in a tri-national panel discussion during a public forum (Trew 2009a).
While the CoC persisted on the SPP file, PGA Blocs in Montreal and Ottawa responded to a callout from Coast Salish Territories (Vancouver) to disrupt the Olympic torch relay as it passed through Canada: both blocs seem to have dissolved shortly afterward. The action against the torch relay was organized as part of the “No 2010” campaign. In 2007, activists in Canada already knew that the Group of Eight was set to return in 2010. The SPP summit initially planned for 2010 also appeared on the activist radar – before the SPP negotiations faltered in 2009 and the 2010 Canadian SPP summit got cancelled – as did the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver. What was seen as a triple target prompted Ontario and Québec activists to come together in Ottawa in the fall of 2009 for a consulta designed to set in motion the No2010 or “Resistance to 2010” coalition. However, once the SPP talks faltered following the election of Barack Obama, and the news dropped that the G20 summit was being relocated to Canada’s largest city, the focus of Toronto activists shifted accordingly, and the cohesiveness of the coalition subsequently diminished, as elaborated below.

Forum Social Québecois

Before proceeding, it would not do to move beyond Québec and the year 2007 without acknowledging a major happening in the history of the altermondialisation movement, namely the first Québecois Ssocial Fforum, which took place in Montreal just a few weeks after the protests in Montebello. While local social forums have been organized in other Canadian cities, including but not limited other places in Québec, we saw in the

59 In London, Ontario, three “Regional Social Forums” were organized in the first five years of the century (with the help of yours truly). They were significantly smaller than the québécois one, and, from my perspective as one of the organizers, brought together activists who, like in Alberta, formed part of a small and therefore already well connected and relatively tight-knit progressive community. But I leave it up to other researchers to document more thoroughly the history of the social forums in Canada.
previous chapter that the WSF had a much bigger influence on the AGM in Québec than in English Canada. By the mid-2000s, young activists across Québec were increasingly focusing on local forum organizing. It started in 2004, when a group called Alter-UQAM was formed by students at l'Université du Québec à Montréal, specifically for the purpose of organizing a local edition of the WSF. One of its key members, Gabrielle Gérin, explained that when the World Social Forum first started in 2001, the NGOs in Québec considered themselves sufficiently networked and so not in need of a local or regional social forum to bring them closer together. The grassroots activists thought otherwise; but without the support of the institutional left, it took them a long time to organize the event. “We had no money for three years,” said GérinGab, adding that all the food at the event was dumpster-dived. Ultimately, the long, slow organizing process was not in vain, she noted: the time she and others spent travelling to other parts of the province to host movie nights and discussions helped to create the basis for a grassroots social forum movement in Québec.

When it finally took place, from 23 to 26 of August, 2007, the Forum Social Québécois attracted 150 organizations and 5000 activists, exceeding all expectations, and by numbers alone (still the main metric of assessment among activists), rendering the event an instant success. Afterward the organizers stepped back from the organizing process, and a new group of activists stepped up to organize the second forum in 2009. However, there was not the same kind of extended grassroots outreach effort. Combined with the professionalization of the organizing committee, it meant that second summit accordingly proved much smaller.

From the temporal perspective, it is also significant that while the Québécois organizers had spent approximately three years preparing and building support for a local social forum, they themselves burned out in the process, and went their separate ways afterward. This was communicated by Gabrielle Gérin when I asked her to reflect on what could
have been done better. She replied that

maybe one thing would have been to be more proactive after the forum in keeping these links together, to be really proactive. We did a few things but everyone was so tired at the end that we took a three month vacation and came back and said, “OK, the paperwork is fine and the finances are clear, so see ya.” It’s the continuity, and for most for grassroots movement building you need to be present in the everyday or else you leave a big gap open after the event.

Her comment confirms that one of the central difficulties of activism – and, I have been arguing, contemporary activism in particular – is durability and continuity, and the problems of maintaining momentum after big events. Instead, debilitating burnout seems endemic and little that is tangible seems to remain in place.

“No Olympics on Stolen Native Land!”

Before proceeding to the G20 protests, the anti-Olympic campaign organized under the banner “No Olympics on Stolen Native Land!” deserves some consideration in these pages: while it did not focus directly on issues related to globalization, it did create cross-Canada networking among direct action activists, and – the fallout of the campaign also had a direct impact on some of the protest preparations in Toronto in 2010.

In the fall of 2008, a group of Indigenous solidarity activists in Vancouver formed the Olympics Resistance Network “to coordinate Olympic resistance efforts [and]...act in solidarity with other communities across 'British Columbia' - particularly indigenous communities who have been defending their land against the onslaught of the Olympics and similar agents of colonialism long before Vancouver won the bid to host the games.” According to the Olympic Resistance Network (2009): “While Olympic corporate sponsors are getting bailed out, Indigenous lands are being stolen, people are becoming
homeless, thousands are losing their jobs and access to public services, the environment is being destroyed, and civil liberties are being eroded with almost a billion dollars sunk into surveillance. The negative Olympic legacy is turning into an anti-Olympic legacy of resistance across the country.” Responding to the online callout for solidarity action, in October of 2008, organizers from Kitchener-Waterloo (notably AW@L), Toronto, Guelph and London and Six Nations joined forces to blockade the Canadian Pacific Spirit Train that had departed from British Columbia in September as part of a cross-country trip designed to boost enthusiasm for the games.

Following the blockade, which took place just outside of Vaughan, Ontario, the activists regrouped in Waterloo, Ontario to form the Olympics Resistance Network – Ontario (ORN). They organized speaker panels and banners drops at locations of the Royal Bank of Canada, which has been linked to exploitation of Native people and resources. The focus of their energies, however, was a series of “torch actions” aimed at disrupting the 106-day, 45 thousand kilometre national Olympic Relay leading up to the Games. Groups of up to several hundred protesters sought to block intersections and disrupt the torch's passing in cities including St. John’s, Halifax, Montreal, Quebec City, Ottawa, Kingston, Toronto, Kitchener-Waterloo/Grand River Territory, and Victoria (see “Olympics Resistance Network” 2009), generating some media coverage (most of it decidedly negative, to be sure).

Unsurprisingly, the biggest protests took place during the Olympics in Vancouver. On February 12, a family-friendly march led by indigenous women called “Take Back Our City” saw two thousand people march within metres of the Games’ Opening Ceremonies. But the media’s attention was yet again focused on the big direct action the following day. On the morning of February 13th, several hundred activists took to the streets for an action called “Heart Attack 2010: Clog the Arteries of Capitalism,” which had been promoted by ORN as a “diversity of tactics” demonstration, indicating that it would likely
involve property destruction and police confrontation. Sure enough, as the marchers made their way through Vancouver streets aiming to block key transportation routes, some newspaper boxes, private vehicles and store windows were destroyed (including the windows of the Hudson’s Bay Company and TD Bank in particular). The action ended less than a couple of hours later, when a wall of riot police blocked the marchers’ path, then moved in to make a small number of arrests.

Though comparatively small, “Heart Attack 2010” predictably captured the attention of both mainstream and alternative media, with equally predictably polarizing effects on the movement, as the debate about the black bloc tactic and the meaning of “diversity of tactics” resurfaced with renewed vigour. In a blog post on Rabble titled “Breaking Windows Is Not a Revolutionary Act,” Judy Rebick (2010) accused the participating black bloc for being unaccountable to the rest of the movement. Her sharp critique prompted Alex Hundert, a “Heart Attack” participant, to publish a blog post riposte, also on Rabble, in which he insisted that all the action participants knew about the bloc’s plan to damage property, and that “it is not unity under a commitment to a ‘diversity of tactics’ that stifles debate within our movement—that is what we call solidarity. It is a zealous adherence to dogmatic “non-violence” that shuts down any meaningful dialogue” (Hundert 2010). Their exchange served to harden the positions on both sides, further decreasing the possibility of open and democratic deliberation about the long term strategic value of different short-term tactics during preparations for the Toronto G20 protests, which were starting to get underway.

Toronto 2010: “Defend Turtle Island: Abolish the G8/G20!”

In December 2009, the Harper government made a surprise announcement that while the 2010 meeting of the G8 would still take place in Huntsville, the ensuing summit of the
G20 would be relocated to Toronto. With only a few months left before the event, Toronto's activists did not fail to mobilize in opposition—according to some, this was precisely what Stephen Harper had counted on, and the G20 protests played out precisely as previsaged. Before I introduce the groups and actors involved in this mobilization, discuss its temporal dimensions and aftermath, as well as the organizers' own reflections, the following account of the “Toronto G20” begins with a closer look at the political economic conditions shaping the 2010 summit agenda.

The 2010 “Austerity Summit”

In 2010, the G20 leaders met for the fourth time, having first convened in Washington in 2008 at the invitation of George W. Bush. Their principal goal was to ensure the continued prosperity of global capitalism in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007. By the end of the meeting, the leaders would agree to Harper’s proposal to halve their national deficits by 2013. In Canada, this would translate into spending cuts of $4 billion, aimed at, among others, at federal health transfers, environmental and social assessment, and public service employment. The proposed “austerity measures” would also have the effect of replacing good jobs with low-paid part-time employment, deepening a state of

60 City officials in Toronto at first assumed the summit would take place at the Exhibition Place, a fairground in the west end of the city enclosed by train tracks and one side and the Lake Ontario on the other, and thus easily protected. But the federal government ignored the municipal government's pleas and pushed ahead with the choice of the Toronto Metro Convention Centre in the heart of the financial district (Renzi and Elmer 2012: 74). Smith and Cowen (2011) suggest that it was the PM's revenge for not winning a single seat in the Toronto metropolitan area.

61 A brainchild of the former Prime Minister Paul Martin, the G20 was first created in 1999 to bring together the finance ministers and central bank governors of the world’s major economies; the leaders of the member states did not start meeting until 2008. The G20 members are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States of America — plus the European Union, which is represented by the President of the European Council and by Head of the European Central Bank.
precariousness and vulnerability for growing segments of the population.

Between 2009 and 2010, the looming austerity measures had failed to provoke very much mobilization on the left; yet in Toronto that summer, the level of police mobilization surpassed spectacularly all the previous summit security operations discussed so far. Shattering previous expenditure records, the Toronto G20 summit cost the taxypayers an estimated $1.2 billion. Among the purchases was a $1.9-million tourism pavilion at the G8/G20 summit media centre in Toronto that included a fake lake meant to impress the foreign press corps. But by far the biggest expense was military, with almost a full billion of taxpayers’ money (to use the Tories’ own “bottom-line” rhetoric) directed at what Smith and Cowen call “the securitization of the city” (2011).

To make sure that the protesters did not disrupt the summit, a security zone involving a three-kilometre fence was set up around the Metro Toronto Convention Centre in downtown Toronto. Approximately 19,000 Canadian police and security officers, including 5,100 from the RCMP, were deployed to patrol the city. The entire operation was supervised by a new security umbrella group called the Integrated Security Unit (ISU), first created to coordinate anti-terrorist security for the Vancouver Olympics (Smith and Cowen 2011: 143). Restrictions were also placed on access to the city, including intensification of security at airports, rail and car crossings, in airspace and on Lake Ontario. Numerous newspaper and post boxes, bike racks, bus shelters, parking metres, and trees were removed from the cityscape to ensure they were not broken or used as projectiles. In addition to these “preemptive” security measures, the security preparations for the G20 summit in Toronto were used to increase military spending,

62 A veritable mise-en-scene was created at the Direct Energy Centre at Exhibition Place, complete with a cedar deck, wooden Muskoka chairs and canoes sitting in front a giant screen flashing images of Ontario lakes. The pool was meant to give the journalists of taste of Ontario’s Muskoka region, its premiere cottage country, where Huntsville is located (Elliott 2010).
including the purchase of the American Technology Corporation's Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD), commonly known as the sound cannon or the "ear-splitter." Along with water cannons, the LRAD was on standby during the G20 protests. Security measures were also fully in place around the Deerhurst Resort near Huntsville, Ontario, 215 kilometres north of Toronto, where the G8 summit was scheduled to take place, though the police correctly anticipated that the main thrust of protest would transpire in the streets of Canada's biggest city.

The provincial government under Dalton McGuinty also played its part in the securitization of the city. Toward this end, it quietly passed invoked an obscure piece of legislation from 1939 called the Public Works Protection Act, originally designed originally to bar Nazis from entering public buildings. This act temporarily granted the police temporarily enhanced and sweeping powers of search, seizure and arrest. The Toronto Chief of Police Bill Blair used the act to effectively empower his officers to detain anyone deemed suspicious and found within (and in some cases, without) a five-metre zone adjacent to the security perimeter.

These drastic measures became easier to justify after May 18, when a small group of anarchists called FFFC-Ottawa firebombed a branch of the Royal Bank of Canada. In a video posted on Youtube, the activists explain in a written message that the firebombing was meant to highlight RBC's sponsorship of the Vancouver Olympics on stolen Native land, as well as its involvement in the Alberta tar sands project. “The Games in Vancouver are now over, but resistance continues. An RBC branch can be found in every corner of Kanada,” the video statement continued before concluding with a promise that the group would attend the G20 protests the following month (“RBC fire”). Three men responsible for the firebombing were subsequently arrested, but only one, Roger Clement, a retired federal bureaucrat, was convicted for of arson and mischief, and sentenced to over three years in jail (“Royal Bank”). According to independent journalist Krystalline Kraus
(2010), a month after the firebombing, the Ottawa Movement Defence held a support rally for the three men, attracting about fifty supporters to their court appearance.

As I discuss below, the reaction of the indigenous organizers involved in planning a Day of Action as part of the Toronto G20 protests was less supportive.

**Preparation**

As we have seen, in 2010, protests against the G8 (and G20) were not new in Canada. As in the past, the mobilization involved a People's Summit organized by the institutional left, as well as street demonstrations, which in 2010 took place over the course of a full week, and were organized by various groups within the framework established by a grassroots activist formation named the Toronto Community Mobilization Network (TCMN). In what follows, we take a closer look at “Toronto G20,” as the protests are commonly called, the actors involved, and the relationships among them.

**The People's Summit**

The 2010 People's Summit (PS) in Toronto, titled “Building a Movement for a Just World,” was organized by a formal steering committee consisting of representatives of NGOs and labour organizations. Among them were three professional activists with major organizational clout and resources behind them: the CoC Ontario regional organizer Mark Calzavara, Oxfam Canada's Ontario outreach officer Victoria Harnett, and a senior officer with the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC). I had the opportunity to speak with all three.

Exemplifying the NGO imperative to cooperate with global governance institutions – which differs fundamentally from the radical “anti-summit” position – Victoria Harnett explained that her participation in the PS planning process by noting that Oxfam Canada
“recognized early on that G8 wasn't going to deal with the full spectrum of issues that we felt deserved a voice.”

Significantly, she recalled that the PS planning process got started “very late” because an initial meeting in November had not attracted much interest (as we will see, this was also the case with the TCMN). Given the initial lack of enthusiasm – which confirms the absence of a protest cycle – a second callout was sent out after Christmas, prompting a few dozen people representing NGOs, church and labour groups to attend the subsequent meeting. At the end of that meeting, they reached an agreement to create an organizing committee. This committee went on to organize a large and, if on this basis alone, successful People's Summit on the weekend ahead of the G8 summit, featuring speeches by Maude Barlow and other notable activists including Victor Baez, Lorena Aquilar, and Jessica Yee.63

Though the PS was deemed a success based on the turnout, the planning process was criticized by a number of the activists involved. According to Shawn Khan, who sat on the committee as a representative of a local environmental group, the steering committee was lacking in internal democracy and openness. After a group of some 15 to 20 individuals were invited to form the committee at the January meeting, the list was closed; anyone who wished to join at a later date was told the committee was full. Very few TCMN members ended up serving on the Committee, he recalled, adding that he was regularly approached by outside activists with requests to add items to the Steering Committee agenda, which did not always come to pass.

Also involved in the process, at least initially, was Judy Rebick, whose connections had

63 I was also among the speakers at the People's Summit, making the case for free public transit on a Sunday panel titled "Understanding and Resisting the G20" organized by a local anti-capitalist organization called the Greater Toronto Workers' Assembly.
helped to secure Ryerson University as the site of the event. Though more research is necessary in order to ascertain the extent to which her critique was shared by other activists participating in the broader PS meetings, Rebick was likewise critical of the People’s Summit organizing process, specifically of the fact that the organizing committee, including the CLC rep, agreed to adopt a position of respect for a diversity of tactics, extending to the labour-led march on Saturday, June 26. “It’s very rare that I walk away from something, but I couldn’t participate in this,” said Judy. “I didn’t pull Ryerson but I stopped going to meetings.”

According to one PS steering committee member, the decision to adopt the diversity of tactics framework was to avoid recreating old divisions within the organizing network – for the same reason, a decision was reached to eschew talking to the police when they made inquiries concerning the nature of the event. Likewise, the CLC officer specified that his agreement to adopt a diversity of tactics position was motivated by a desire to avoid repeating what had happened in Québec City, i.e. the poor optics and the schism that ensued when most trade unionists marched away from the fence. The CLC agreed to start the labour march at the same time as the “Get off the fence” confrontation: as he told me, he was not interested in telling other G20 protesters what to do. The problem, according to Judy Rebick, was that he did not have the authority to make that promise, given the established decision-making hierarchy within the labour movement. With her trademark verve, she remarked: “I said to them, ‘you think that if the Black Bloc attacks cops – I didn’t even say break windows – that Ken Georgetti [president of the CLC] isn’t going to criticize them?’... Well, you’re dreaming in Technicolor because it’s not going to happen, I don’t care what this guy is saying here.’” As we will see, her prediction turned out to be true, when Georgetti issued a damning statement during the summit in which he condemned “vandalism” and declared the labour movement’s full willingness to cooperate with the police.
In the lead-up to the protests, the tension concerning diversity of tactics stemmed primarily from the decision to organize a militant march as a break-off from the main labour march, made by an ad hoc group called the Southern Ontario Anarchist Resistance (SOAR), which coalesced specifically for the purpose of opposing the G20 in Toronto (many SOAR members also participated in the TCMN, effectively contravening the St. Paul principle of tactical compartmentalization, as specified below). The main activity planned by SOAR was called Get Off the Fence: a “militant march to the summit” designed to “tear it down” and initially scheduled to take place “immediately following the Labour Union rally” (“G8-G20 Anarchist Resistance”). This plan was the centre of the controversy involving the People’s Summit organizing committee comprising the institutional left, as discussed above. Though SOAR was intent on confronting the G20 rather than “marching in a circle,” as some of my respondents derisively referred to the labour parade, as the city securitization continued, it became clear that this would be difficult if not downright impossible. Nonetheless, as we will see, attempts to come up with a feasible plan for the break-off march continued into the night before the action was supposed to take place.

As mentioned above, another significant point of contention centered on tactics that emerged in connection with the planned Indigenous Day of Action on June 24th. According to Corvin Russell, a long-time indigenous solidarity activist, the contention first surfaced when a group of indigenous anarchists (who, he clarified, would not call themselves that but who fit the bill ideologically) wanted to issue a statement supporting the RBC firebombing in Ottawa carried out the previous month. According to Russell, it was clear that most of the indigenous organizers present at the meeting were upset about what had happened and wished to make sure that any statement issued would make this sentiment clear. Corvin Russell was among the handful of individuals who agreed to produce an early draft of the statement. When it was sent out on an internal listserv for feedback, one of the organizers on the list forwarded the draft to other contacts, and the
document circulated widely from there. At this point a number of direct action-minded activists involved in broader G20 planning process attempted to discredit the statement, despite the fact that the views expressed therein reflected those of the majority of the indigenous organizers present at the initial decision-making meeting. Some activists within the TCMN, which had embraced the diversity of tactics position, and which endorsed the June 24th Day of Action as one of its themed “Days of Resistance,” threatened to de-endorse the action, according to Russell. In the end, this did not happen, as elaborated below. In this instance, it is possible to see the anti-democratic character of an unwavering commitment to the “diversity of tactics” position. Encapsulated by the “Solidarity and Respect” Declaration modelled closely on the “St. Paul Principles” initially developed by G20 protesters in Pittsburgh in 2008, the diversity of tactics position was adopted by the TCMN and, as we saw, weakly assented to by the labour representatives. Yet as we will see, only some of these principles were adhered to in Toronto: the compartmentalization of actions and tactics recommended by the second principle and key to movement democracy became sidelined.

Toronto Community Mobilization Network

As was the case with the People’s Summit, the initial meeting held in the fall of 2009 by the Toronto grassroots left with the intention of organizing street protests against the G20 went nowhere. One OCAP organizer explained that some of the activists in OCAP and NOII aborted the organizing for strategic reasons, because the meeting was attended by young, mostly white people who seemed primarily interested in disruptive direct action, and had little connection to grassroots movements in Toronto. OCAP’s Mac Scott likewise

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64 The St. Paul Principles are as follows: “(1) Our solidarity will be based on respect for a diversity of tactics and the plans of other groups (2) The actions and tactics used will be organized to maintain a separation of time or space (3) Any debates or criticisms will stay internal to the movement, avoiding any public or media denunciations of fellow activists and events. (4). We oppose any state repression of dissent, including surveillance, infiltration, disruption and violence. We agree not to assist law enforcement actions against activists and others” (“St Paul Principles”).
noted that the organizing should have started earlier, but “unfortunately, there were some debates mainly on the actual local versus summit organizing early on that sort of blew things apart.” As we have seen, the summit-hopping critique was well established within OCAP since the AGM’s Cycle 2.0, as evidenced by the discussion concerning the G8 protests in Kananaskis. Yet despite some activists’ qualms and reservations, when the Harper government suddenly changed the location of the G20 summit to Toronto’s downtown core, a group of Toronto organizers from the city’s leading activist groups, including OCAP, decided that they could not let the G20 leaders meet unopposed, and began planning an anti-G20 convergence. By then, only a few months remained until the G20 descended on Toronto, and the organizing consequently proved a scramble, not unlike the organizing process for the G8 summit in Kananaskis eight years prior.

In the lead-up to the G20, a group of community organizations, influenced by the summit-hopping critique, confirmed that they did not want to neglect ongoing campaigns in favour of organizing the protests. According to one OCAP member, to take advantage of the event of the G20 summit to build connections among pre-existing organizations, members of OCAP and NOII, Basics, Tamil Youth, Justicia, and Jane and Finch Action Against Poverty, who are bound by strong personal ties, decided to form a network that would allow local communities – of poor, racialized, and otherwise marginalized people – to plug in by organizing their own autonomous actions. Subsequently, the participants in the newly formed TCMN made extensive of multiple media to pursue various outreach tactics (see Stalker and Wood 2013). The goal, however, was not to inspire activists from other cities to come, but to highlight and connect existing local struggles, and discourage “activist tourism.” In its own words, the TCMN came together as “a loose grouping of Toronto-based grassroots activists” intent on using “the fleeting moment of the G8/G20 meetings in Toronto in June 2010 in Ontario to come together and share the work that we do every other day of the year” (g20.torontomobilize.org). Given that, at that point, the summit was only five months away, the structure adopted was meant to facilitate
logistical organizing, not broad discussions about the structure of the framework itself, explained Mac Scott.

In the eyes of some, democratic decision-making during the organizing process suffered as a result. According to Toronto activist scholar David McNally, the TCMN meetings suffered from a “lack of democratic assembly-style spaces where the movement could thrash out tactics ... Somebody somewhere had to be doing the strategizing, but it wasn’t done openly and democratically.” As veterans of the alter-globalization movement, both David McNally and Denise Hammond contrasted a lack of open decision-making within the TCMN with the consultas that happened in the period leading up to the Québec City protests a decade earlier. According to Denise Hammond, given the huge emphasis that was placed on establishing a basis of unity, those consultas had allowed people to feel invested in the organizing process. “Democratic consensus decision-making was painful, but it allowed people to feel like they participated in the process. And I never once felt that like in any of the TCMN meetings that I went to,” she noted.

Another activist I spoke with who was new to Toronto at the time and joined the TCMN when the organizing began in earnest in January, was likewise sensitive to the largely hidden interpersonal dynamics informing the group’s decision-making process:

Partly it had to do with its emphasis on local organizing to bring already existing organizing together. It seemed like things had been decided in the past before I was there, like there was some a long history of cooperative organizing that I wasn't privy to... It was an endless source of frustration for me that it seemed like things were not up for debate... I'm not going to say names but I think it has to do a lot with culture of organizing in Toronto and who the stars of that are.

The comments cited above highlight a source of frustration among several of my Toronto respondents who were involved in the TCMN but were not part of the core organizing
group that called the initial meetings. The comments also suggest that the TCMN, as a leaderless, grassroots network rather than a top-down institution, was not immune from to a tendency that feminist activist Jo Freeman (1970) identified already in the 1970s as the "tyranny of structurelessness" and that Stephanie Ross linked to the AGM already in 2003.

This critique was also articulated and recognized also by TCMN organizers themselves, according to one of them, Eryn Wheatley, who noted that

> there's a certain group of folks, myself included, that were involved with more organizing and were either friends before or became really close friends through organizing. So an increasing amount of discussion was not happening in committees, and people were able to talk about directions in which they think things are going, and were able to bring that in committee meetings and were able to have this really well thought out proposal, which in some way is good but in some way made it less inclusive...

Eryn Wheatley went on to explain that, in recognition of this problem, TCMN core organizers "were calling each other out on it," and in turn moved to devolve the decision-making from a network-level to committee-level (for a depiction of this structure, see Malleson 2011). Nonetheless, by then many people had become discouraged and did not return to TCMN meetings.

Though for many, it proved too little, too late, Wheatley's comment suggests that the TCMN was a little more self-reflexive regarding its internal process (in line with the AGM's focus on horizontality) than its capacity to mobilize the poor and marginalized communities whom it ostensibly set out to highlight and empower. The official narrative of the TCMN was that it was providing vital infrastructure for local (if vaguely defined) "communities" organizing their own autonomous actions (see O'Conner 2011). But as the
weeks and months of organizing went on, it became clear that this was not happening — and yet still the narrative persisted (see Wood 2010).

From the perspective adopted in this study, the lack of reflexivity concerning the persistence of this narrative can be explicated at least in part with reference to the effects of temporal pressures on the dynamics of collective action. The sense of urgency, in the case of the G20 exacerbated by the late start to the organizing, also meant that TCMN organizers assigned low priority to reflection — as the literature on social acceleration, reviewed in this study's first chapter, suggests, reflection and critical thinking are usually among the first victims of time scarcity. Relatedly, as members of the network prioritized urgent logistical tasks, they did not properly reflect on the faltering of the outreach committee, formed to educate the public and liaise with the local activist communities to bring them into the TCMN's fold. The failure of this committee was also related to temporal pressures: as they plunged into organizing urgent protest logistics, the handful of experienced AGM organizers did not take the time to properly train the neophytes comprising the committee — and as the committee subsequently faltered, it was too late, and there was no time left, for other TCMN organizers to step in and fill in the void. In effect, unlike in with the FTA, MAI, and FTAA, comparatively less popular education concerning austerity politics was carried out by G20 organizers in the months leading up to the protest.

The desire to highlight local struggles, motivated by the persistence of the summit-hopping critique, as well as the ultimate faltering of outreach meant that there was the TCMN activists did not seek to coordinate protests beyond the city — for instance, very limited communication was taking place between Toronto and Montreal, where, as aforementioned, CLAC 2010 was formed specifically for the purpose of mobilizing activists to travel to Toronto for the G20 protests. According to Pat Cadorette, it involved “all the usual suspects from the last four or five years,” that is going back to the PGA
Bloc Montreal and its anti-SPP organizing.

The same sense of urgency that informed the planning of the People's Summit and the TCMN's activities influenced the organizing process of the Environmental Justice Day, part of the “Themed Days of Resistance” leading up to the G20 summit. According to one of the organizers with Environmental Justice Toronto, Dave Vasey, the decision to organize a demonstration on that day was made only in January; after that, the organizing process became “a scramble.” He explained that “most of the folks that were involved in the environmental justice day were either involved heavily in the TCMN or organizing for other days or or the people's assemblies, so we were all really busy. Most of the core organizers were going to four or five meetings a day, so we were right in the pace of most folks at that time, which was crazy.” From the temporal perspective of this study, Vasey's comment confirms the extra temporal pressures faced by the G20 protest organizers. It also raises a strong parallel with the protests preparations ahead of the G8 in Kananaskis: little capacity, intense work load, and a limited time frame in which to accomplish everything.

The Protests

The biggest protests against the G20 in Toronto were scheduled to coincide with the G20's official meeting itself on the weekend of June 26-27. While the events of that weekend did predictably attract most of the media attention, they were preceded by a week of rallies, marches and other events organized by various groups that, though smaller, also deserve recognition.

The first protest occurred on Thursday, June 17, and was organized by a coalition of NGOs, including Oxfam and Climate Action Network Canada. Demonstrators covered in oil gathered in downtown Toronto to demand that Canada stop subsidizing fossil fuels,
and act against world poverty. The group marched through Toronto's financial district with a giant papier-mache head of Stephen Harper, handing out fake $1 billion bills that spoofed the price tag of summit security (French and Jordan 2010). Many of the same NGOs were involved in organizing the People's Summit, which began the following day and lasted the full weekend. On Sunday, the closing day of the People's Summit, a march for reproductive rights and gender justice was organized by trade unions, and led by women of colour.

Monday June 21 marked the beginning of five themed “Days of Resistance” coordinated by the TCMN. The first rally on Monday was organized by anti-poverty activists under the banner “All out in the defense of right for all!” Though it attracted a relatively small crowd of a few hundred people and remained peaceful, the police carried out a number of targeted arrests, including a well-known Indigenous activist, who was detained for holding a unity flag (Malleson and Wachsmuth 2011: 7). Also on Monday (though not coordinated through the TCMN), the Ontario Coalition for Abortion Clinics (OCAC) held a panel at the Steelworkers Hall in Toronto to strategize ways of defending abortion rights, with women from various backgrounds coming together to speak from their experiences and to denounce Harper's proposed G20 Maternal and Child Health Policy that purposefully excluded the provision of abortion (Roblin-Ghanie 2010). The busy Monday movement schedule also included a one-day conference called “Building Solidarity with the Democratic Labour Movement in Mexico,” which brought leaders of independent Mexican unions to Toronto so that they could “share their stories of repression and struggle with labour leaders from other parts of the world.” The conference was sponsored by three of Canada's largest private sector unions and three international workers' federations, the CEP, USW, CAW, the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' Unions (ICEM), UNI and the International Metalworkers' Federation (IMF) (“Historic meeting”).

65 This was the conference where an IMF representative gave a keynote address, a couple of non-
Tuesday June 22, 2010, marked the second Themed Day of Resistance, and was centred on gender justice and queer rights. Creative action was the order of the day, with statues of famous military men getting a makeover involving pink feather boas. “We're queer, we're fabulous, we're against the G20,” the protesters chanted before engaging in a public “kiss-in” in the streets of downtown Toronto (Malleson and Wachsmuth 2011: 7).

Wednesday was a Day of Resistance dedicated to the environment and climate justice. The main event was a “Toxic Tour of Toronto,” which involved passing by a number of offending targets, notably the Royal Bank of Canada and the Munk School of Global Affairs. The latter has been criticized for being funded and thereby unduly influenced by Peter Munk, founder and acting chairman of Barrick Gold, a gold mining corporation accused of human rights abuses and environmental violations. In the words of Dave Vasey, one of the tour organizers and member of the now-defunct network called Environmental Justice Toronto, the tour was a “a carnivalesque participatory march. We intended to go really over the top.” In a manner reminiscent of the festive creativity characteristic of the heyday of the AGM, some activists dressed as clowns, while others navigated “monstrous” floats depicting the Alberta tar sands, the BP oil spill, and the XL Keystone pipeline. The colourful crowd marched through the streets of Toronto to irresistible beats produced by the Rhythms of Resistance, Toronto's well-loved radical samba band. About five hundred people participated in the demo, in Dave Vasey’s estimation. Later that day, a smaller number of activists attended an environmentally-themed “People's Assembly.”

The following day, Thursday, June 24, was the aforementioned Indigenous Day of Action. The main event was a march for Indigenous sovereignty, led by Indigenous organizers union organizers told me scornfully. When I asked a CLC officer about this, he was anxious to clarify that the keynote speaker was in fact speaking on behalf of the International Metalworkers’ Federation, NOT the International Monetary Fund.
and called by the cross-country Indigenous network called Defenders of the Land. Held under the banner “Canada Can't Hide Genocide,” it was the biggest Day of Resistance up to that point. In keeping with the organizers' expressed intention, and despite the prior controversy, the tone of the demonstration was solemn and dignified: no acts of property damage or other violence transpired, and the police kept their distance (Malleson and Wachsmuth 2011: 7). The marchers passed out mock report cards, giving Canada failing grades in several categories, including the failure to adopt the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and a failure to protect lands and resources (Edwards 2010). The media estimated the attendance at around one thousand (e.g. Edwards 2010), though participant Lisa Currier observed that three thousand Native rights activists took part, making it the largest Indigenous rights protest in Canadian history (Currier 2011: 43). After the march ended in Allan Gardens, the Defenders of the Land hosted a packed public meeting that attracted hundreds of new people, mostly native people from Ontario's rural communities.

Friday, June 25 marked the opening day of the G8 summit in Huntsville; meanwhile in Toronto, the protesters kicked off the first scheduled Day of Action against the G8/G20. On Friday evening, the Council of Canadians hosted a sold-out public forum at Massey Hall called “Shout out for global justice!” featuring such AGM stars as Maude Barlow, Naomi Klein, Amy Goodman, and Vandana Shiva.

In the eyes of many activists, perhaps the more exciting event of the day was the march that had taken place earlier that afternoon. Organized under the banner “Justice for Our Communities!” the march set out to foreground local issues, and was organized by a coalition consisting of members of OCAP, the migrant justice organization No One Is Illegal, and the direct action group DAMN 2025 (Disability Action Movement Now), as well as the community advocacy group called Jane and Finch Coalition against Poverty and a broad-based anti-capitalist organization formed in 2009 called the Greater Toronto
Workers Assembly. The protest attracted several thousand people, who marched for citizenship rights for migrants, increased welfare rates (including the restoration of the Special Diet supplement), disability rights, Indigenous sovereignty, and more. The plan was to end the march with a tent city in Allan Gardens, a park in east end Toronto of historical significance to local poor people's movements.

The other two of the groups involved in the organizing had also planned their own activities during the march. As part of their campaign at the time, members of the direct action group DAMN 2025 [Disability Action Movement Now] flyered Toronto transit vehicles and stations with stickers demanding “Free and Accessible Transit for all!” Meanwhile, the ambition of NOII (and a number of members from the other organizations), marching under the banner “No Fences, No Borders,” was to veer south at some point during the march, with the aim of getting as close as possible to the Metro Toronto Convention Centre, and confronting the G20 summit. But there was a complication: at the marshalls' meeting held the previous night, it was decided that the priority would be to have a family-friendly march and avoid confrontation, in order to ensure that the tent city would be permitted to proceed as planned.

According to several respondents, disagreement concerning this decision emerged between organizers during a critical point of the march, when scouts on bikes were able to determine points of unobstructed passage southward at the intersection of Church and Sherbourne streets, and communicated this intelligence to the rest. While a number of activists from the participating organizations were eager to move in that direction, the marshalls urged everyone to continue along the predetermined route toward the park. People were exhausted, and the priority was to go ahead with the tent city, explained Mac Scott. This point of contention demonstrates that disagreements concerning the strategic usefulness of police confrontation from a long term perspective occur not only along widely recognized labour-grassroots lines, as had happened in Québec City in 2001, but
also among strongly interconnected organizations, including the two close allies of Toronto's radical left.

That evening, a group of affinity group spokespeople including SOAR and TCMN members met at an anarchist spokescouncil to finalize the plan for the “Get Off the Fence!” action, planned to take place the next day, Saturday, June 26, as a break-off from the labour-led march set to depart Queen's Park at 1 p.m. Reminiscent of what had happened in Windsor a decade earlier, the inability to reach consensus on how to execute the break-off in face of overwhelming police presence became evident as the summit approached. It was the main topic of conversation during that Friday night meeting, just hours before the big day. Finally, the impasse resulted in a collective decision that a coordinated break-off march was not feasible. The last words recorded at that meeting by an undercover police officer were facilitator Joanna Adamiak's, who summarized the consensus as follows: “so the plan is, there is no plan.” With no formal plan in place, SOAR members decided that the next day, they would distribute leaflets regretfully announcing that their plans were thwarted by the state, and that others were encouraged to organize their own autonomous break-off marches to get to (and “off”) the fence.

If the activists had hoped to get some much needed rest following that frustrating meeting, their repose was short-lived: in the early morning hours on Saturday, June 26, police broke into the homes of several core activists and arrested them at gunpoint. Arrest warrants were issued for a number of others. Sixteen people, including my generous respondents Leah Henderson, Mandy Hiscocks, Joanna Adamiak, Terrence Luscombe, Alex Hundert, Julia Kerr and Pat Cadorette, were charged with three counts of conspiracy: to commit mischief over $5,000, to assault police, and to obstruct justice. Some of Toronto's best organizers were thus effectively and preemptively removed from

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66 A long time friend and comrade of mine from our days as Oxfam activists at Western, Joanna laughs about it now, telling me that this was the part of the recording that never got played by the Crown during the subsequent pre-trial hearings she later faced along with sixteen other G20 “ringleaders.”
the protest scene for the duration of the weekend—and indeed, as it turned out, for many months to come.

Even as the bad news began to spread, protesters were dismayed but not deterred. Indeed, despite the news as well as the rainy weather, an estimated forty to fifty thousand people took to the streets to participate in the CLC-led march under the banner “People First!” Once the march arrived at the intersection of Queen Street and Spadina Avenue, unionists went north to Queen’s Park, which had been designated by the authorities as a safe “free speech zone.” Rather than follow them, a large crowd chose instead to occupy the intersection. After a while, three separate break-off marches comprising several hundred activists altogether broke the standoff and began to push south toward the convention centre. Some time later, a group of a few dozen break-off marchers entered Toronto’s financial district unhindered. Four police vehicles, inexplicably left unattended in the middle of the street, were promptly vandalized and set on fire, providing mainstream media with a dramatic image of that was replayed endlessly in the mainstream media, and likely became the single most powerful memory of the protests burned in the public’s collective memory.

The militants continued to march through the downtown core, some smashing store and bank windows, before disbanding (Malleson and Wachsmuth 2011: 7-8). The area was placed on lockdown, as the police swept the area to push protesters east along Queen

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67 My research on the history of G7/G8 summits revealed that the coverage of the 2001 G8 summit in Genoa was likewise “hijacked,” according to an irrate Jean Chretien, by the image of a burning police car set on fire by Italian anarchists. As Chretien told the reporters at the closing of the Genoa summit: “I watch TV. Ninety-five per cent is on that car that is burning. I’ve seen the same car burning 50 times in all the papers in Italy. We (the leaders) spend hours together. We’re discussing poverty, AIDS, the environment. This is important. It’s more important than this damn car” (cited in Martin 2001). By contrast, it is hard to escape the impression that in 2010, Harper took a page from the Genoa events precisely to ensure that the media coverage was focused on a burning police car, helping to justify his military expenditures on display in Toronto. A number of critics have also suggested that the police left the vehicles unattended on purpose, hoping that the black bloc would vandalize them. Whether an activist or an agent provocateur was responsible for setting the police car on fire has not been conclusively established (see Groves 2011).
Street. Meanwhile, trade unions wrapped up the rally in Queen's Park. Once they left the park, several hundred police, many on horseback, pushed back, and harassed, and eventually arrested the protesters who remained in the so-called “Free Speech Zone.” Later that day, 263 protesters who had gathered several kilometres from Queen's Park in front of the Novotel Hotel on the Esplanade were also kettled and arrested. The same night saw a police raid on the University of Toronto’s Graduate Students Union, which resulted in the arrest of approximately seventy activists, mainly Québécois. Among the arrested were members of CLAC 2010, including Jaggi Singh (who would get arrested, yet again, for his alleged role as a “ringleader” of the G20 protests).

Given the terrors of the preceding twenty-four hours, the SOAR-organized “Saturday night fever” roaming street party also did not proceed quite as planned: it took place instead outside the former film studio-turned-detention centre on Eastern Avenue where hundreds of people were being held in metal cages. As a gesture of solidarity and defiance, a crowd of about 150 danced for hours with determination to music blasting from a stereo system mounted in the back of a rented cargo van. Around 2 a.m. the police ordered the crowd to disperse or face arrest. As the activists grudgingly began to oblige, their exits on all sides were cut off, and the police started to close in, kettling and arresting everyone, and seriously injuring at least one person in the process (see Kellar 2001; Wachsmuth 2011). As noted by one activist, the “ill-fated” street party basically delivered activists to prison.

On Sunday, the police continued with the kettling tactic. In the afternoon, about five hundred people, protesters and “innocent bystanders” alike, were trapped at the intersection of Queen Street and Spadina Avenue for several hours in the pouring rain before they, too, were finally kettled and transported to the temporary jail inside the former film studio on Eastern Avenue, where the growing crowd of detainees was being treated with neglect and abuse. The authorities were turning down even urgent requests
for food, water, clothing, medicine, and other necessities. Many activists also reported being beaten, subjected to racist, sexist and homophobic slurs and threats, and being strip-searched. This became a focal point of civil liberties activism in the G20 summit’s aftermath.

**The Aftermath**

In total, 1,105 people were arrested, the vast majority during the main weekend of protest and, marking the largest mass arrests in Canadian history, and 317 were charged. Despite or rather because of the magnitude of police repression, the protests in Toronto streets continued into the work week: on Monday, June 28, a spirited crowd gathered downtown Toronto for an emergency jail support rally, and listened to a fiery Judy Rebick and Naomi Klein denounce state violence and demand an inquiry into police actions.

In the weeks and months that followed, three more civil liberties rallies would be organized by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) and the Canadian Federation of Students (CFS). Meanwhile, both Toronto’s mayor David Miller and Prime Minister Stephen Harper upheld the right to free speech while condemning the “thugs” who engaged in violent acts of property destruction (“G20 protest violence”). But the public opinion was not so easily appeased, as disturbing revelations came to light regarding the abuse of police power. First, a few days following the summit, the Ministry of Community Safety clarified that the provisions of the *Public Works Protection Act* applied only to the area inside the security fence. When he was asked to clarify whether he believed that a regulation permitting search and detention within five metres of the fence ever existed, Toronto Police Chief Bill Blair responded with a smile: “No, but I was trying to keep the criminals out” (“Chief admits”).

A few cases of police brutality likewise became big news, including the case of Adam
Nobody, who was brutally beaten by the police and became the target of Bill Blair's wrathful lies and machinations as he organized a lawsuit against the police. The other high-profile case was that of Tommy Taylor, whose story “How I Got Arrested and Abused at the G20 in Toronto, Canada” went viral on social media, attracting the attention of mainstream media (it was also turned into a play for the Toronto Fringe festival). A lawsuit was also brought against Toronto police by a number of arrestees, including a group of young women from Hamilton, who argued they were unfairly targeted for arrest due to displaying hairy legs (as confirmed by the comments in the arresting officer's own report).

As for the seventeen activists arrested as G20 protest “ringleaders” for conspiracy and counselling mischief, they were facing their own personal hell. Released on very restrictive bail conditions, they were forced to remain under house arrest and the supervision of their sureties at all times. As alleged co-conspirators, they were also prohibited from communicating with each other in any way (in some cases, also from using the telephone and the internet). They were likewise barred from political activity, which, as it turned out, applied also to academic events, as Alex Hundert found out the hard way, when he was arrested a day after he spoke at a panel at Ryerson University. In

68 Through all of this, Toronto police chief Bill Blair remained arrogant and unrepentant, and with good reason, since most politicians were on his side. In fact, just a month after the protest, Blair was commended for his “outstanding” work by the outgoing Toronto city council (Rider 2010).

69 One of the “ringleaders,” or “co-accused,” to use their preferred term, was Julia Kerr, my good friend and comrade of a dozen years. Julia’s life was likewise dramatically unprooted by her conspiracy charges and the ensuing punitive legal battle. Her parents agreed to post bail and act as her sureties, so she had to quit her job as an OPIRG staffer in St. Catharines and move into their basement in Orillia, far away from her friends. As her “jailers in the community,” her parents were required to supervise Julia’s activities at all times, including trips to the grocery store and even hangouts in the backyard. As months passed, the bail conditions were loosened thanks to the efforts of the lawyers working for the co-accused. By 2011, friends were permitted to “sign Julia out” for outings that were first restricted by curfew but with time became longer – I just had to have a written authorization from her parents or later, her partner, designating me as a temporary surety. Had she elected to abscond during one of my visits, her parents would have forfeited thousands of dollars they had posted as bail; if caught, Julia herself would have spent the rest of her pre-trial period behind bars.
brief, in the months following the G20, the lives of some of Ontario's finest social justice organizers were made miserable by state-sanctioned collective punishment, meted out before their pre-trial period even began.\footnote{Arrested for counselling mischief over $5000 for allegedly encouraging people to tear down the security fence, Jaggi Singh was initially part of the group of co-accused; however, he got his own prominent lawyer and pleaded guilty in late April. He was subsequently placed on a 12-month probation, assigned 75 hours of community service, and prohibited from participating in unlawful protests or demonstrations — in exchange, the Crown withdrew the more serious charge of criminal conspiracy (Teotonio 2011).}

The only time the co-accused could communicate was while in court, when their preliminary hearing began in September 2011. It is also there that they were forced to face the undercover police officers who had infiltrated the TCMN and SOAR as part of so-called Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) operation, which the RCMP declared in its internal post-summit review as “likely the largest JIG ever assembled in Canada” (cited in Groves and Dubinsky 2011). The two informants were OPP officers Brenda Carey, who was Mandy Hiscocks' roommate for months before the protests, and Bindo Showan, an older Muslim man who aroused some suspicion but benefitted from the fact that the other, mostly young and white activists did not feel comfortable questioning his identity (Wachsmuth and Malleson 2011) (on the bright side, Dave Vasey noted with a smile that Showan did have a truck which the organizers “exploited quite a bit”).

Following his performance on the witness stand, Showan unwittingly became the butt of the co-accused's jokes, as several of them informed me at the time (while this information was still under a publication ban). First, he demonstrated with dead solemnity the defendants' bizzarre hand gesture he identified (incorrectly) as “twinkie fingers.”\footnote{To clarify, the gesture of “twinkling” or wiggling one's fingers is used by the deaf to signal applause; in many activist circles, it is used during meetings to quickly and silently indicate agreement with a view being expressed.} He also referred to one meeting where the activists were discussing ways of supporting the
First Nations march. One of the people present at the meeting, G20 defendant Adam Lewis, interjected at one point by yelling jokingly “kill whitey!” Showan elicited a good chuckle from the co-accused, who were watching him testify from their seats, when he clarified in all seriousness, in response to the Crown lawyer’s question, that he understood the interjection to mean “kill white people.” He later confirmed, without blinking an eye, that yes, Mister Lewis and all but one of the other sixteen defendants were themselves white.

The preliminary hearing of the “Toronto seventeen” began in September; by mid-November, the court case against them was dismissed before it went to trial, when the co-accused agreed to a plea deal which stipulated that if six of them pleaded guilty, the charges against the others would be dropped.\(^7\) In the end, Adam Lewis, Alex Hundert, Leah Henderson, Amanda Hiscocks, Peter Hopperton, and Eric Lankin pleaded guilty, and were given jail sentences ranging from several to almost eighteen months (including time served prior to the preliminary hearing, both in jail and under house arrest). Charges were dropped against Julia Kerr, Patrick Cadorette, Monica Peters, Paul Sauder, Meghan Lankin, William Van Driel, Joanna Adamiak, David Prychitka, Sterling Stutz, Syed Hussan, and Terrance Luscombe.

In the months leading up to the preliminary hearing, the co-accused were supported in various ways by the broader movement. The TCMN was transformed into the Community Solidarity Network (CSN) to fundraise and help cover the costs of legal defense. Meanwhile, groups including the CCLA, the National Union of Public and General Employees (NUPGE), the federal New Democratic Party and Amnesty International, continued to call for a public inquiry into police actions at the G20 (Groves 2011). A

\(^7\) My friend Julia Kerr was in the latter category. By summer 2011 her bail conditions had been loosened, and she was able to move to Toronto and live with her partner, who was now acting as her surety. We would get together for tea and she would tell me sad tales about the tense meetings in the courthouse, as the co-accused sat in a conference room and negotiated the terms of the plea deal, trying to come to consensus about who would go to jail and for how long, and who would get to walk free.
broad-based debrief session was held by the Greater Toronto Workers Assembly, which was created for the purpose of bringing together activists across movement sectors in a new anti-capitalist project. As aforementioned, G20 inquiry rallies were also organized by the CCLA and the CFS on July 3 and July 10, 2010 and June 25, 2011 (the one year anniversary of the protests, the so-called “G20 redux.”) According to Judy Rebick, the way in which activists across sectors came together to provide jail and legal support for the people who got arrested – labour reluctantly, the student movement enthusiastically – was commendable. Unlike what happened after Québec City, she noted, “we basically put aside differences in order to defend them against the state.”

However, repeated and urgent calls for a public inquiry fell on deaf ears: neither the federal government nor the RCMP convened one, and the Ontario Legislature voted against it, in marked contrast to the APEC summit thirteen years earlier. As noted by Naomi Klein, “[i]n 1998 there was an RCMP inquiry called over the use of pepper spray on peaceful protesters outside an APEC summit. It was known as Peppergate. How quaint by G20 standards” (2011: xi).

In light of the unprecedented police crackdown, was the G20 convergence in Toronto a success? The TCMN thought so. Two weeks after the protests, the TCMN website declared the G20 mobilization a victory:

Nearly 40,000 people took to the streets, gathered in discussion, watched movies, set up a tent city, danced and fought... For the first time, an economic summit saw a march of thousands against colonization and for Indigenous sovereignty... Instead of simplifying our diverse struggles in to one issue, we supported actions for queer and trans rights, environmental justice, income equity and community control over resources, gender justice and disability rights, migrant justice, and an end to war and occupation. We created the conditions for 1000 grassroots organizations to come together, to build relations, to grow stronger together... We saw communities in ongoing resistance, people of color, poor people, indigenous people, women, disabled flk, queer folk, and others leading the days of action. This in itself
is a victory (cited in Wood 2010: 97).

Similarly, in an online post dated June 27, 2010, NOII-Montreal and CLAC 2010 members Robyn Maynard and Jaggi Singh stated that “[t]he fence did not come down today, but the interests that the G20 protects on Bay Street were attacked. We organize, daily, in our communities. But those community-based struggles also came together today, for a few hours, to courageously defy Stephen Harper’s billion-dollar Fortress Toronto and the G20 agenda.” However, despite the unambiguously celebratory tone of these assessments (which can be attributed at least in part to the widespread tendency among activists to focus on the positive in every instance), almost all of my interviews with activists who either organized or participated in the G20 protests disclosed a much higher degree of ambivalence.

To begin on a bright note, the classic argument regarding the politicizing effect of state repression, especially on the casual or first-time protesters, was articulated by a number of activists. For instance, Scott Harris, who travelled from Edmonton to Toronto for the protests, drew parallels with A20: “the reaction of the police radicalized people in a really significant way, kind of like Québec City had done. People who got teargassed in Québec City became really serious activists after that, and I think for a lot of people, Toronto was the same thing.” Many of the people thus radicalized went on to join existing local groups, primarily OCAP or NOII (and, as noted by John Clarke, in the longer term, maybe two out of every ten people who joined, stayed).

In reflecting on the protests, John Clarke also stated that he was pleased with the large turnout at the Friday “Justice for Our Communities” march that OCAP co-organized, and the fact that it “wasn’t choreographed with the cops the way labour march was.” He noted that the latter “politically demanded nothing more that they [G20] be kinder, gentler in the implementation of their agenda” in “a sick parody of social resistance.” Nevertheless, he
was impressed and inspired to see that, despite the crackdown, the mobilization continued throughout the weekend. Masses of people in Toronto had not experienced that level of repression, with the largest ever arrests and terrible incarceration conditions, a lot of violence and intimidation: “but people were still mobilizing...so it is encouraging for the future.”

Another positive outcome noted by several respondents is that the media stayed on the story of police misconduct, helping to sustain the public outcry and maintain pressure for an inquiry. *The Toronto Star* in particular seemed set on exposing and condemning police abuses and civil liberties violations under the leadership of Bill Blair. “The Star is basically running our anti-police campaign for us,” said one activist with a smile.

Asked to reflect on areas that could have been improved, a number of respondents referenced the failure to do proper outreach, discussed above. For instance, Leah Henderson wished that the TCMN had done “more old school organizing, more door to door knocking. More person to person to contact and outreach.” She explained that the unions and the NGOs did not step up to organize the protest infrastructure, apart from organizing the Saturday march. The radical grassroots left did not want the responsibility, she added. In a statement reminiscent of her assessment of the situation in Alberta prior to the G8 summit, she noted: “We didn't have capacity. We never wanted to do this. Any of it!” She explained that in the heyday of the AGM, in Québec and in Kananaskis too, the CLC would hire a few contract people to do this job, but in Toronto? “Nothing! They were going to do one rally on one day. So it all fell to us, and we just couldn't do that grassroots, leaflet dropping, door knocking work.”

As we saw, in the case of the Kananaskis protest, the lack of capacity on the ground was exacerbated by the last minute cancellation of Solidarity Village, which threw off the activists’ one and only plan. Similar pressures were at play in Toronto in 2010. TCMN
member Eryn Wheatley reflected that the biggest challenge experienced by members of the TCMN was “the amount of time that we had to do everything. Generally speaking, for all the other summits there is at least a year to plan, in some cases multiple years, it didn't have to be the G8 or G20... We had six months to figure it out.” Though we have seen that in the history of the Canadian AGM, one-year preparatory processes has been the exception rather than the rule, Eryn Wheatley and Leah Henderson’s comments attest to the strong parallels between the protests against the G8 summit in Kananaskis and the G20 in 2010 in Toronto. They also underscore the fact that when the organizing timeframe is contracted and the logistical tasks urgent, the activities that tend to fall by the wayside are popular education and outreach.

As we have seen, similar temporal pressures resulting from a contracted organizing timeframe (partly the outcome of government strategy and the activists’ own priorities and choices) applies in this case to the institutional left. The NGOs, for instance, were feeling stretched, as well. Even with all the organizational resources at her disposal, once she “plunged” into organizing the People’s Summit in February, Oxfam’s Victoria Hamett “did not stop” until the G20 week was over and did not attend “even one minute” of the counter-summit, she admitted. Recall that the PS organizing process got started in January, that is “really late” from Hamett’s perspective, due to low interest. She added that, after the G20, she had never been at such a level of burnout in her life. For the same reason, Mark Calzavara of the CoC, who also sat on the PS organizing committee, noted that he would not put himself in the same role in the future: “I don't think it was worth the time and effort involved... It was really overwhelming and I think I could have used that time far better.”

Victoria Hamett further blamed severe burnout for the steering committee’s failure to debrief, as she, Mark Calzavara, and the CLC officer had talked about doing. “The movement came, went, and everyone went into hibernation, no debrief, no report, no
nothing... We were all really burned out, I was for sure never been at that level of burnout at any point in my life. And when there wasn't interest from people in doing it, we were like, that's the point? But in retrospect I wish we had a chance to do that,” especially since she herself made extensive use of the debrief report created by G6B organizers in 2002. While Mark Calzavara, Victoria Harnett and the CLC officer all wrote internal debriefs reports for their organizations' internal boards, they did not produce anything collaborative or publicly available; consequently, one of Victoria Harnett's expressed concerns was that “there is no real documentation of what happened that G20.”73 Her concern about memory is explored further in chapter 5 of this study.

Furthermore, and as aforementioned, another significant shortcoming related to temporal pressures was the failure to adequately train new activists. As tends to be the case, the mobilization attracted the participation of a new generation of activists; as Jean Broughton confirmed, “for a lot of people in the TCMN, this was their first summit.” In retrospect, Mac Scott identified the fact that the veterans within the TCMN did not make time to train the neophytes as his biggest regret:

If we started earlier, we could have done more training and brought a new layer in to do more of the organizing... and then I don't think there would have been burnout issues as much. Instead I think, like with the outreach committee, we had a bunch of people who were new and didn't know what they were doing – we didn't give them training and support, they didn't know how to do things, people would yell at them when they didn't do it right, but that was about it, and so they fell apart...

Mac Scott's comment aptly conveys one of the deleterious consequences of movement organizing taken up relatively late and carried out under ensuing, extra time pressures: in Toronto, it was therefore both a cultural neglect of time linked to social acceleration as well as the contracted organizational timeframe that marginalized important but relatively

73 I reckon this is partly why she graciously gave me a two hour interview.
non-urgent work such as training new activists or doing outreach.

Another line of critique articulated by some of my respondents pertained to the TCMN's failure to achieve its expressed goal of strengthening local communities. As several activists pointed out, this goal was achieved in a limited sense at best. David McNally noted that the G20 convergence "really only managed to strengthen the organizations that already had a pretty viable organizing basis." As confirmed by Stalker and Wood's analysis of the TCMN's outreach tactics, the group largely failed to go beyond its own "political circuit," indicating that "developing communication modes that connect with people of colour is a great challenge for organizers in the global justice movement" (2013: 193). Indeed, while groups like OCAP and NOII held large new members' meetings in the immediate aftermath of the protests, activists I interviewed agreed for the most part that Toronto was not mobilized in any way that it was not before. Nor were the relations between the grassroots and the institutional left improved: Mark Calzavara, for one, noted that his involvement on the PS committee and liaising work with the TCMN did not create the kind of relationship that the CoC once had with activist youth. Referring to the current generation of Canadian youthful radicals, he noted: "I think some of them maybe understand who we are more, but when you form relationships with other groups, it's a 'you scratch my back I'll scratch yours, I come to your events you come to mine,' and I don't see that happening."

Old tensions between much of the labour movement and radicals was were not mended, either. Jean Broughton, a TCMN activist who played a key role in coordinating the G20 convergence space, said that she was happy about the connections she established with fellow TCMN members; however, apart from a few student members of CUPE Local 3903 at York University who were active on the logistics committee, "certainly that experience is not shared with say labour, or the NGOs, or any of the people who were coordinating the People First march." When Ken Georgetti issued a blanket condemnation
of the black bloc, the schism was widened, given that the letter flew in the face of the CLC officer's earlier assurances. In short, it seems that the activist left in Toronto is more divided than it was before the G20 came to town.

As far as the groups and networks that organized the G20 convergence in Toronto, they proved as ephemeral as the AGM's organizing formations in the past. With the People Summit over, the Steering Committee that organized it disbanded (and the People's Summit website was taken down). It was less clear whether the activists who formed the TCMN had intended to maintain the network. According to a couple of respondents, it seems that they had not thought that far ahead: the end point of the TCMN's organizing timeframe was cleaning out the convergence space (a theme pursued further in an ensuing the next chapter where we explore the activists' capacity for long-term planning). The future direction of the group came up for discussion at the meetings of what was turning into the Community Support Network. At that point, a groundswell of interest on the left attracted new activists, who wanted to organize within existing network infrastructure against police brutality and for civil liberties. Their interest soon fizzled out, however, partly because TCMN activists who escaped arrest were not prepared to permit newcomers to make decisions about the group's future direction while most of its core members were in jail. The slowing of momentum that follows when mass mobilizations end in police repression and divert scarce resources (including time) into legal defense also took its toll on the potential of the CSN to organize against the G20's austerity agenda.

At the present moment, the TCMN-cum-CSN website "g20toronto.mobilize.org" continues to urge visitors to join the mailing list, organize a fundraiser, or check out the events listing or community calendar; yet, most of the links leading to the relevant pages are broken, and the news menu contains mostly items related to the personal struggles of
the co-accused. The memory of the G20 also lives through the widely read letters from
prison, posted in blog form by Mandy Hiscocks and Alex Hundert.

On the subject of continuity, a number of organizers noted that the coalition that
coaalesced around the “Justice for Our Communities” Friday march lasted past the G20 by
becoming the basis of the Toronto Stop The Cuts (STC) network. In its own words, the
STC operates on the basis of “neighbourhood committees” building “local anti-austerity
campaigns” (“Toronto”). First established in the summer of 2011 in opposition to
municipal budget cuts championed by Toronto’s conservative mayor Rob Ford, the
network organized rallies, participated in night-long deputations at city council, and did
other creative actions. Moreover, according to Corvin Russell, some of the links
established in preparation for and during the Indigenous Day of Action were sustained
over the months to come, and helped to prepare the groundwork for the subsequent
emergence of the Idle No More movement in Ontario.

In Montreal, despite (or because of) the arrests, there was lots of energy to keep the
CLAC 2010 initiative going as a permanent coalition. In November, a consulta brought
together several dozen people where this decision was made, but the follow-up meeting to

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74 This includes Mandy Hiscocks' recent Human Rights complaint against the Vanier Centre for
Women, which she filed shortly prior to her recent release. Having served over a year-long jail sentence,
Mandy was released in early December 2012, and was feted by a large crowd of Southern Ontario
activists at the house of co-accused Joanna Adamiak and Terrance Luscombe, who live near me in west
end Toronto and in whose company, at the Bloor/Gladstone Toronto Public Library, I wrote this chapter.
Alex Hundert was released in March 2013, while I was editing it.

75 See Mandy Hiscocks' blog, “Bored but not broken” at boredbutnotbroken.tao.ca and Alex
Hundert's ongoing blog, “Narrative Resistance” at http://alexhundert.wordpress.com

76 When the cuts went through following the city budget vote in January 2012, a rally at City Hall
drew hundreds of protesters, and resulted in several arrests. The STC website's latest update, dated July
21, 2012, is a call for donations to help cover the arrestees' legal bills. After a long period of inactivity,
on January 15, 2013, the STC network held a “Stop the Cuts Breakfast” as the City Ccouncil began the
three-day voting process on the proposed 2013 municipal budget. Whether this event, which is the first
action organized by the STC in months, can rejuvenate the various neighbourhoods working committees
remains to be seen.
figure out how to do this attracted far fewer people, said Pat Cadorette: “So in terms of carrying it, carrying the work itself, it’s very hard to have people show up at the follow up meetings ... the interest is there for sure but people got into the habit of doing their thing, working on their own projects, and coalition building is sort of secondary to that. And that’s one thing we’re trying to work on, is for those things not to be mutually exclusive.” Despite the diminished momentum, CLAC 2010 continues still as CLAC Montreal; just recently, on May Day 2013, it organized a demonstration where almost five hundred people were arrested.

As for the durability of the interpersonal relationships forged within the TCMN that continued into the STC network, several activists interviewed in summer and autumn of 2011 noted that these were already beginning to “fracture” and “fizzle out.” Their comments attest to the difficulties of maintaining meaningful rather than latent, internet-based ties over the long term, when persistent coalition work becomes daunting, especially vis-à-vis the tendency of “fast activism” to shift organizing energies in support of the cause du jour determined by the volatile media agenda. Accordingly, while some of the anticipated cuts were prevented, most of them went through and more could be expected given the conservative administration under Mayor Rob Ford, yet the STC network's activity declined; it appears that it now operates primarily as an information email listserv. The organizations that played a key role in the Friday march and initiated the STC network, primarily OCAP and NOII, have since then deployed the listserv mainly to promote their own battles, such as the fight to prevent the closure of the School House men's homeless shelter in the Downtown East neighbourhood (the only “wet” shelter in the city).

In a final analysis, despite the TCMN's best intentions, the G20 protest played out quite similarly to earlier cycles, radicalizing some, but also leading to massive burnout, even more massive arrests, and connections that apparently proved ephemeral in the long run.
Many among my respondents felt that although summits represent great opportunities for activists to increase awareness of issues of critical importance, the G20 mobilization diverted scarce time, energy, and resources away from other, longer-term kind of organizing in Toronto, despite some activists’ intentions to avoid precisely that.

Perhaps the main lesson from the G20 is that organizing “shit shows” against meetings of the G7, the WTO, WB and IMF is exhausted as a protest tactic. “I think a lot of people felt, at least this time around, more defeated than anything else,” said Joanna Adamiak, who has now returned to her doctoral studies at York University. “It might have helped people to know each other, but I don't know that it made them feel powerful or mobilized. At least in Toronto, it had a feeling of trauma, of collective trauma…” She felt that the way in which Toronto mobilized for the G20 summit was not very different at all from previous mobilizations dating back to the Battle of Seattle, “except no one saw Seattle coming, and so the difference is that the police already know and so does the state, and so it's like they try to get you earlier and earlier in the process.” Her comment indicates that the cost of organizing counter-summit protests – a moment when the state’s repressive apparatus is at its most powerful – outweights the benefits: a critique that seems applicable to this protest model in general, but caused particular damage in Toronto, given the unprecedented extent of repression.

Along similar lines, when asked whether summit protests are still a good idea – all things considered, that is, especially the “shit show” that inevitably ensues – Judy Rebick replied that “these protests became counter-productive. It’s like a Kabuki dance, the same thing happened every time. You have big demonstrations, everyone’s pissed off at the black bloc – what's the fucking point? It never gets resolved, and it has no impact.” In response to the same question, CUPE researcher Archana Rampure, who was on the People’s Summit organizing committee, recalled a friend's advice that when the G20 comes to Toronto everyone should stay home “to make the billion dollar mobilization of the police
and militarized forces look ridiculous. I look back and sometimes think that would have been better response...a different way of sending a message out. And perhaps then media message wouldn't have been burning cop cars.”

Likewise, Matthew Behrens, whom we know to have engaged in non-violent civil disobedience against the G7 in Toronto in 1988, explained why he chose to keep away from the G20 protests in 2010: “This sounds arrogant but it was so predictable, the minute they started talking about diversity of tactics, you knew what was going to happen ... How many times does it take before we learn that that image of the burning car and the smashed window and the bandanna over your face, that becomes the discussion, not what the policies of G20 represent?”

Finally, reflecting on his own experience during the protests, Pat Cadorette noted that one lesson that he wants to focus on in his own popular education efforts is be smarter and more strategic in the future – and to compartmentalize direct action and mass protest. “One lesson that people need to pass on, and it's certainly something that I'm going to try to focus on in my popular education...that one thing I can pass onto younger people or just newer people, is to be conscious of the state that is watching and is ready to do pretty much everything, including criminal activity, to sabotage dissent.” He then added: “I think that if movements are to be sustainable, that also ties in with diversity of tactics debate, is that people need to be strategic. It's not just a matter of, 'fucking do whatever you want, all tactics are good, and by whatever means neccesary.' Yeah, I agree, but you have to be strategic if you want to be successful.” Will this lesson be transmitted on the younger or new generation of activists intent on organizing the next symbolic protest against the G7 or G20 in Canada? In pondering this question, it is to the matter of collective memory and strategic planning in collective action that I now turn.
Chapter 5: Learning from the Past, Looking to the Future:

collective memory and long-term planning in AGM activists' practice

"The art of remembering is the art of thinking"
-William James

In the preceding three chapters, my aim has been to fill a gap in the Canadian social movement literature by delineating the rise and fall of the AGM in Canada, from its pre-history in the form of early free trade struggles, through the movement's peak at the turn of the millennium, to the recent protest period unfolding amidst a major economic crisis. From the temporal perspective, I have also not only analysed the location of each major mobilization in relation to the movement's trajectory; I also explored the durability of the various networks and coalitions constitutive of the AGM's characteristic, summit-based, "one-off" approach to fighting neoliberal globalization. In what follows, I zero in with more precision on two of the movement's time-related practices that have thus far been broached only in passing, namely collective memory and long-term strategic planning.

In the first chapter of this study, I discussed the connection between communication media and collective memory and their historical co-evolution; I also referred to recent neuroscientific research to show the deleterious impact of the proliferation and daily application of mobile media on organic memory, one among the sources of collective memory. In what follows, I will examine the practices of collective memory among AGM activists on the level of the movement or the network, and within their own organizations. We will also see that while there is some benefit to forgiving and forgetting, among the inimical consequences of ignoring the past is the tendency to perpetually reinvent the proverbial wheel, a decrease in accountability for individual and collective actions, and the persistence of corporate rather than counter-memory.
In the second half of the chapter, I shift tenses to examine the impact of social acceleration on "futurity," and specifically AGM activists' ways of conceptualizing and exerting control over the future by way of strategic planning. Beginning with the recognition of the fundamental link between the past and the future – and by extension, between collective memory and the capacity for strategic planning – my examination of long-term strategic planning among Canadian "fast activists" is grounded in chapter I's discussion of the changes to the future time perspective wrought by the shift from the modern "age of progress" ruled by "clock time," to a global "network society" characterized by speed, risk, and uncertainty. My analysis of the AGM activists' practices concerning collective memory and strategic planning is carried out both on the broad level of the AGM itself and on the meso level of the AGM's constituent groups and organizations.

**Collective Memory**

As discussed in this study's first chapter, both natural and social scientists are becoming increasingly concerned about the impact and implications of the proliferation of mobile, digital communication technology on individual and, by extension, collective memory. When asked to comment on collective memory within contemporary activism, a couple of my respondents identified this connection. Notably, Justin Saunders, a Toronto-based veteran of the alter-globalization movement and member of the TAO alternative technology collective, felt strongly that collective as well as institutional (i.e. intra-organizational) memory are sorely lacking within contemporary activism. He explained that "the reason for low familiarity with cultural memory has to do with technology and its impact on our level of knowledge." Echoing the insights of Harold Innis and Nicholas Carr concerning the effect of the internet on the predominant patterns of thought, Saunders observed that:
In the last ten years in North America we have seen a real dumbing down in the way we understand our world. There's much less focus on collecting knowledge, having a body of knowledge about something, we're much more focused on developing this sort of fluid intelligence where you can navigate using these particular tools ... It's very surface, people don't know the information contained in wikipedia articles but know how to go to wikipedia articles and skim ... There's a general trend in culture away from retaining information, so there's a tendency among activists to not know a lot of their history or history of people in the same room as them who actually did that organizing. So if we sat down and did activist story time I'm sure people would be blown away by what people had done, we know so little about each other.

Saunders' insight, borne out by the scientific studies reviewed above, confirms the observations made by Harold Innis, namely that the accelerating speed and volume of information transmitted by modern communication media do not automatically lead to greater understanding. Indeed, shortening attention spans and a perpetual sense of distractedness and restlessness are also directly related to the daily application of what MIT psychologist Sherry Turkle (2011) calls “always on, always on you technologies.” These technologies shape in profound and disturbing ways the intellectual habits and capacities of their users, including activists; combined with broader cultural forces and dynamics, the daily application of these technologies serves to alter the predominant social values and norms concerning memory. As a result, the capacity of movement actors to utilize history and collective memory in their regular, ongoing interactions becomes diminished.

Along similar lines, Matthew Behrens lamented the lack of collective memory and historical awareness among today's movements. In his view, this can be attributed to “a more distracted and fragmented culture and a less oral culture and a less literate culture as well.” He elaborated:
If you interviewed my parents, they'd tell you the history of Ukraine from fifty years ago because they thought it was important to know that and to learn from mistakes. Now we are very capitalist and very reactive and we're living for instant gratification. We seek the moment: “ooh there's something cool going on,” so the culture of activism has certainly changed.

Behrens's comment confirms the tendency to support the “sexy” issues or, to use a different term, the *causes du jour*, first noted in the first chapter. This tendency, I argue, is further exacerbated by the widespread sense of time scarcity, which reduces even further the likelihood that one will devote whatever little time is available for activism to activities that promise few possibilities for radical self-experience and what Bennett et al. (2011) called “self-actualization.” Indeed, the scarcity of time emerged as a leading explanation provided by activists interviewed in this study in order to account for what most of them confirmed as a pervasive neglect of memory and history-related practices among activists on the left. In one of the most memorable statements garnered during the interviews, one organizer explained that if there is not enough collective memory being created and transmitted among activists, it is because of the pervasive “addiction to urgency.” Asked to comment on this observation in subsequent interviews, other respondents confirmed that it is a fair and accurate depiction. In the words of Toronto anti-war activist James Clark, “we feel so pressured by day-to-day demands, getting this many posters distributed, or booking this space, or getting buses to demo, day-to-day things. You become immersed in a blizzard of details and you don't take enough time to step back and look at what we did.”

For Vancouver migrant justice activist Harsha Walia, this lack of time “can't be underestimated.” This is because most activists are organizing on top of their “9 to 5” lives; hence, even though “everyone” believes in the importance of institutional memory, “there's the reality that we're operating on very little time ... it's the most important thing, because there are so many things ... we wish we could do.” My interviews with several
dozen other organizers confirmed that Canadian social justice activists almost universally uphold the importance of collective and institutional memory (with the exception of one young, male anarchist, who expressed a distinct distaste for history and all that “dead shit”). On the other hand, most of them also stated that there is a widespread neglect of the processes of creating and transmitting memory among activists.

**Media, Memory and Movement Infrastructure**

The “addiction to urgency” resultant from the widespread sense of time scarcity and pervasive among contemporary activists, including but not limited to those combatting neoliberal globalization, has additional implications that deserve our attention. When it comes to collective memory, the tendency to “run around from one thing to the next,” in the words of yet another organizer, translates into a tendency to eschew institution-building in favour of quick, one-off actions and events. This strategic proclivity carries additional challenges for the processes of creating and transmitting collective memory, insofar as sustained movement infrastructure in the form of lasting institutions and organizations is generally more conducive to these processes than ephemeral, event-oriented networks and coalitions.

In examining the question of institution-building and organizational continuity and their importance for collective memory, we are once again directed to consider the role of digital media. This is because in addition to impacting on organic memory and reducing the time available for historical thought and reflection, digital ICTs play a key role in facilitating a characteristically loose, amorphous and ad hoc organizational model associated with the AGM, and with the “networked” approach to activism more generally, which entails additional challenges to the processes of collective memory by reducing organizational continuity.
Many Canadian AGM activists themselves have come to recognize the limits of this organizing model, including those pertaining to the processes of collective memory. One of the ways the ad hoc, decentralized approach to organizing interferes with these processes is by rendering more difficult the practice of collective debriefing, namely a meeting where the activists involved reflect on what went well and what would have gone better. This activity not only serves to consolidate a shared memory of what happened, but also allows organizers to draw lessons for future actions.

A regular practice within stable and well-defined organizations, debriefing becomes tricky in coalition or network settings. In the words of Archana Rampure, a one-time activist in the Toronto chapter of Mobilization For Global Justice (Mob4Glob):

> once a mobilization is over everyone sort of just disperses, you come back in different combinations. We laugh about the fact that Toronto is a small town – you go to enough demos, you start recognizing people. But very rarely you go back in same formation and try to figure out what worked and didn't work. And I wonder whether it's partly because we don't have a really sustained model or really sustained space in which to come together.

In other words, the lack of movement infrastructure and more permanent movement organization precludes the creation or consolidation of collective memory on the network/coalition level. For Vancouver-based veteran AGM activist Garth Mullins, the fact that within the alter-globalization movement, there is “no one place, one source, or one venue where one movement comes together and can see something, that's a strength and weakness of the movement. It means there's no centralism and no hierarchy, but it also means there's not always common points of reference.” Along the same lines, Benoit Renaud remarked upon the challenges resultant from the absence of a central entity or organization that would bring activists together after an event to carry out a cross-coalition debrief: “different groups may reach very different conclusions and may not
even know what conclusions other groups drew from their experience, so it's not common to reach some kind of common conclusion ... People can only hope that people have drawn similar lessons from previous experiences but there is no way to actually know that.” As a result, with each new mobilization, “activists were always in some sense starting from scratch in terms of what should be done.”

The lack of stable and sustained movement infrastructure linked above to reduced ability to consolidate and transfer experience from one mobilization to the next also means that there is less accountability within movements. Mac Scott, a long-term organizer with the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP), explained with reference to his own experiences:

I've been in plenty of groups when I started out where we fought on the same issues, but what we would do is we'd form a group, we'd be together for a year, and then we'd sort of fall apart. And then we'd reform the same group a year or two later, but under a different name. And what that means, there's less accountability, people can't show up on your doorstep and say, well, you know four years ago you did this really racist thing, or four years ago your group was really male-dominated, or four years ago you tried to build alliances in Parkdale and you screwed people over, because you're a new group, they don't know, right? Whereas when OCAP makes a mistake, one of the classics would be like we've been critiqued historically as being a very white organization, it means we're held accountable for it. Right now people can still come to us with that critique, and say what have you done over the last five years to deal with the fact that you're a mainly a white group? And I feel we would have a good answer to that, but we still have to deal with that question. If we had broken up and reformed as a different anti-poverty group, we'd be able to duck that bomb.

Renaud and Scott's comments not only illuminate the consequences of a mnemonic deficit within contemporary “fast activism,” they also highlight the structural and organizational differences among the various groups from different sectors that constitute the AGM. The
The following section of this chapter examines the mnemonic practices employed by some of these groups.

**The Practices of Memory**

The tendency to perpetually reinvent the proverbial wheel was confirmed by Mark Calzavara, CoC Ontario regional organizer who worked previously as an action coordinator at Greenpeace. My interview with him disclosed that collective memory practices are lacking in both Greenpeace and the CoC on account of high turnover and time scarcity. While at work for Greenpeace, Calzavara participated in a global network of hundreds of full-time action coordinators, who were charged with organizing and training people for direct action. “You’d think they want to talk to each other, ‘how did you do this, how did you do this?’ Anyone know how to do this part, climb a rope etcetera. There is some training and get together once a year but for most part we are not interested in how other people do it. We want to do it our way, use our own ideas, and do it better.” He also recalled an internal debate about the ideal frequency of the staff meetings. At issue was whether it should be a longer yearly meeting, or a shorter bi-annual meeting. Since new volunteers were not familiar with the arguments exchanged over this very question in previous years, they unwittingly rehashed the same debate over and over. “It's the exact same argument!” he said. “It's cyclical, and it stunned me, because I was there long enough to notice it.”

Calzavara also noted that the sense of busyness was affecting the collective memory practice of debriefing within the CoC. “One thing I would definitely say is that we seem to be so busy at the Council that I don't really have time to look back, to study how effective we were. We didn't get a committee report on the G20 People's assembly but I also didn't write any report about my own work to the Council around G20 stuff.” Asked to comment on where he thinks this sense of busyness comes from, he explained that “the
pace of change makes it less likely that we pay attention to the way things were done before.” Noting that in the late 1970s, when things seemed to be moving more slowly,

I think we had more time to consider it and evaluate it (...) I do remember in the past after an action or protest or event or whatever that we used to actually debrief it. And I’m not sure we’ve ever done that in the two years that I’ve been with the Council. Now part of that is a certain management style but mainly even those managers who are leading that debriefing, they would say ‘I would love to do that but I’m just too busy.’ And I’ve been doing this a long time and generally we’ve done a good job and we’ll try to do a better job next time but there are no specifics that I’m at least aware of.

The Ontario Coalition Against Poverty has a long track record of participating in alter-globalization mobilizations. Two of its permanent organizers, John Clarke and Liisa Schofield, were asked to comment on OCAP’s practices related to institutional memory. How do they go about acquainting newcomers with the organization’s history? As it turns out, OCAP employs a combination of both formal and informal mechanisms. First, it hosts designated “new member” meetings, which are usually held following major mobilizations as a way of harnessing the momentum. During those meetings, Clarke, a founding member, typically offers a quick presentation of the history of the organization and its current campaigns. Afterward, an intake session connects a senior OCAP member in a one-on-one meeting with a newcomer, partly to answer their questions – and partly to ascertain if the person is an undercover police officer. According to Schofield, in the last three years, OCAP’s new membership development committee has also worked on developing a book for new members that includes the organization’s history, in addition to devising workshops on various topics for newer members. She added that senior OCAP member Gaetan Heroux, who researched the history of local struggles of the unemployed people’s movement, occasionally leads walking tours of Toronto’s downtown east side that are “very popular.” However, “there is not much beyond that in terms of a concerted effort at discovering history.”
As a relatively resource-poor organization, OCAP's institutional memory practices are notable, but its reliance on the oral history communicated by its long-term members and founders is problematic. The interpersonal dynamics within the organization, with relatively little turnover, means that many things are done informally. One of the significant and surprising consequences is the eschewal of minute-keeping. "We keep some level of minutes," professed John Clarke, "but we haven't done it well. And that's a reflection of wooliness and people being busy and not focusing on something that should happen. I don't think there's enough in our organization -- I think in most organizations -- of that sort of thing." Liisa Schofield clarified that there are files and notes from OCAP's history in its Toronto east side office; however, since the records are not kept in a coherent fashion, "it really doesn't give people a sense of the debates, unfortunately."

No One Is Illegal (NOII), a migrant justice organization, established the practice of prefacing its general meetings with a half hour devoted to organizational history, according to Montreal member Sarita Ahooja. As elaborated by Syed Hussan, the Toronto NOII chapter has rotating, open and closed bi-weekly meetings. New members orientation takes place at the open meeting, where newcomers are offered the option of joining a new subcommittee, and as in OCAP, they are assigned to a veteran organizer from that group. Transmission of institutional knowledge is also encouraged via the informal practice of having senior organizers hold back from volunteering for tasks until a new person steps up; only at that point a senior person will join in.

Both OCAP and NOII are community organizations with relatively limited resources; their collective and institutional memory practices reflect this, at least in contrast with labour unions and large non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Given their organizational durability and the resources at their disposal, the latter may be reasonably expected to exercise a fair degree of diligence when it comes to collective memory, which
can be linked up with their members' living memory of the past decision and debates, since compared to smaller, grassroots activist groups, unions and NGOs experience relatively less membership turnover.

Denise Hammond noted that unions experience less turnover because of the personal stakes: “oftentimes people get involved because it’s about their job, their wage, their benefit, their harassment in the workplace. People are really invested...it is also very, very personal in terms of livelihood and you can develop some strong relations because you see the same people year after year at conventions or that kind of thing as opposed to more grassroots [where] there’s more turnover. There may be some permanent people but it's not the same.”

Similar factors help to reduce turnover in the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty. Asked why OCAP is able to keep its members for a long time, Liisa Schofield explained that it has to do with “their class and their social need,” in relation to the social support network that OCAP membership provides. OCAP is further protected from the impacts of turnover by virtue of having an actual office and several staff, one of whom is a founder of the organization, the indefatigable veteran rabble rouser John Clarke. Student activists in OCAP tend to come and go on a regular basis, said Schofield, “but we also have some people who have sustained over time ... we do have the elders that we call upon to give that sense of history, and when we have an action they say, oh yeah, we tried that, here's what worked and here's what sucked ... So I think it would become a problem if John wasn’t there, if Gaetan wasn’t there, if Wendy wasn’t there; we would start to lose some of that memory. If we lost those members then certainly it would suck quite a lot, and it would be a completely different organization.”

As for the student movement itself, “we're always hemorrhaging our talent because it's always graduating out,” said Joel Duff, who spent many years working as a national
organizer for the CFS before joining the staff at the Ontario Federation of Labour (OFL). Familiarizing a new crop of students each September was like being in the Bill Murray film *Groundhog Day*, “having the same discussions every day and doing the same presentations every day and people have the same Aha! moments.” The aptness of the analogy was confirmed by Denise Hammond, who worked for the Ryerson Student Union in Toronto prior to becoming president of a CUPE local. “Every year you have the same discussions suggestions and ideas, and sometimes you feel like it’s groundhog day, oh it’s this time of the year, we’re talking about this again,” she noted.

In addition to experiencing comparatively less membership turnover, established bureaucratic protocols mean that unions and other large organizations perform relatively well at documenting their activities. “If unions have better institutional memory,” observed Archana Rampure, a researcher for the Canadian Union for Public Employees (and co-organizer of the Toronto G20 People’s Summit), “it’s because we’re fairly diligent about record keeping and we have to write reports, and action plans, and campaigns plans, and report to members.” She was unsure, however, “of how much that actually means anything, in terms of how much use that is in coming up with new and creative ways of doing things.” The same warning was conveyed by Ruckus-society affiliated activist trainer Jessica Bell, who put it this way: “it doesn’t mean much if it’s not living.”

As Rampure and Bell’s words attest, it is one thing to have archives full of decades’ worth of reports, and another thing altogether for activists, including union members, to be familiar with this memory in a way that informs their day-to-day activities. Unions and NGOs, by virtue of their structure, do well at “archival memory,” but this does not automatically equip their members with “living” memory (Assmann 2006). President of the Toronto Area Council of the United Steelworkers Carolyn Egan noted that that while unions do undertake efforts to educate the rank and file about the history of working-class struggle, the problem is that there is “no incentive to share that history by bureaucratic
leadership that wants to dampen militancy rather than inflame it.” Asked whether there is a lot of institutional memory among the rank and file, she replied “probably not. Not unless they become an activist.”

A similar discrepancy between archival and living memory can be observed in the NGO world. Oxfam’s Victoria Barnett works on setting out plans for monitoring and evaluating the NGO’s activities. “The challenge of actually getting people to participate in that, even as part of their jobs, is a big one for sure,” she remarked. In her estimation, institutional memory, defined by her as “monitoring and evaluation,” is something that activists “don't do well – at all, actually ... maintaining that memory in a way that's easily accessible to people and having it pulled together from the outset in a way that's really useful is often a challenge.” At the time of our conversation, Oxfam was undertaking a review of its public campaigning over the past decade, a process which yielded a “surprising” volume of internal evaluation, according to Barnett.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, members of the G20 People’s Summit steering committee, including Barnett, had planned to compile a communal debrief report that could be used by activists planning a similar event in the future – but in the end, the administrative staffperson hired to help with organizing the People’s Summit was too traumatized by the outcome of the G20 protests to produce a report in the aftermath, and other central organizers did not take on the task themselves. As Victoria recalls, there was not a whole lot of interest. She mentioned that the CLC officer, Mark Calzavara of Oxfam and she herself “were quite concerned that organizations had given financial contributions that we should probably be accountable to. We would have been more diligent if we heard from them. But we didn’t.” She was consequently concerned about the lack of collective memory about the People’s Summit and the G20 – a concern that this study seeks to address.
Counter-Memory or Corporate Media Memory?

In addition to leading to a perpetual reinvention of the wheel and permitting groups to evade accountability for their past, the lack of strong collective memory among contemporary networked activists means that the dominant collective memory of the AGM largely mirrors the focus of corporate media coverage, i.e. the spectacle of violence and confrontation between the protesters and police. The issue of police brutality is no longer, if it was ever was, only the mainstream media's obsession.

While the experience (and memory) of confronting the repressive power of the state can profoundly politicize a casual or first-time protester and thereby help revitalize movements, it also tends to obscure the memory of the objective of the protest, the lessons learned, and the groundwork established for future organizing work. One may expect alternative media coverage to offset this bias; however, even a cursory review of activist anthologies like *Under the Lens of the People or Resist!* reveals that the focus of most first-hand accounts from protests like that against the Free Trade of the Americas in 2001 in Québec City is on the experience of police brutality.

In the minds of the majority of activists who had heard about Canada's inaugural alter-globalization protest, which addressed the Asia-Pacific Economic Summit and took place in Vancouver in 1997, what stood out the most was the liberal use of pepper spray by the police against the protesters, then justified by the obnoxious "pepper on my plate" comment by the then Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. As we saw in the second chapter of this study, while the pepper spray remains burned in many activists' memory, Jaggi Singh, one of the organizers of the APEC protest, observed that what gets lost in the history of the demonstration is the less dramatic but by no means less important story of the coalition building between university students and the community groups in one of Canada's poorest urban neighbourhoods, Vancouver's downtown east side. A similar
critique was extended by Denise Hammond of the memory of the FTAA protests in Québec City, which, she noted, consists of mass demonstrations and tear gas but does not comprise the organizing that happened in the lead-up for weeks and months ahead.

**Forgive and Forget?**

Of course, powerful collective memory can be a mixed blessing, hindering rather than enhancing movement potential. While "a common interpretation of the past creates cohesion," the obverse can also be true, since collective identity is "not only produced by remembering, but also by forgetting" (Buckley-Zistel 2012: 74). The collective identity of nations, for instance, aptly exemplifies the ideological benefits of "chosen amnesia," as it depends to a significant extent on the willful act of forgetting the inglorious aspects of its shared past (ibid: 76).

The deleterious aspects of collective memory manifest most strongly in settings where this memory tends to be the strongest, such as the long-standing institutions of the labour movement. As noted by Denise Hammond, unions tend to experience relatively less turnover than grassroots movement formations; however, there is a dark side, namely the unproductive persistence of grudges. "Personal tensions and strife doesn't really go away," explained Denise. "In coalitions of grassroots organizers, sometimes when people leave, it changes the entire dynamic — for good, sometimes for bad, but you can let go of some those differences and that tension because of political dynamics or whatever person [is] no longer there." Meantime in a union setting: "there's lots of 'this person did this ten years ago and got to the microphone and spoke on this resolution.' It's like, oh my gosh, let it go, let's move on, right?"

Strong collective memory obtains not only within particular movement organizations such as unions, but also between movement sectors and organizations, serving to
potentially exacerbate the problem of left-wing sectarianism. While knowing one's enemies from one's allies is certainly important from a strategic point of view, innocence has a potentially bright side: if new generations could enter social movements unburdened by the nightmare of history weighing on their brains, they might build broad-based solidarity with other groups without excessive, internecine “baggage.” But, in recalling her experience joining the New Socialist Group, a young activist remarked that the NSG deployed historical memory to define itself “by what it is not: that historically it wasn't Stalinist and it wasn't communist and it also wasn't the IS [International Socialists]. So there was a real mobilization of historical lessons in terms of who we should invite to speak, who we should be organizing with, these kinds of questions.” She added that during her first meetings she was happy to receive this information, but that this positive sentiment faded over time: “more and more I became cynical: shouldn't I have the opportunity to learn these lessons? Who I should and shouldn't be organizing with, and not just take it at face value?”

Institutional memory also becomes stifling when groups of activists within organizations get stuck in stagnant routines, re-enacting old patterns of behaviour with little effort aimed at innovation. For Mac Scott from OCAP, this is why “you also have to balance it [collective memory] out with the idea of validating new ideas, even sometimes when they seem crazy, because obviously we haven't won yet. And so though it's good to know what've done in the past, it's also good to innovate, which is also something we're not always good at.”

In thinking through the potentially harmful aspects of collective memory, leading memory scholar Aleida Assmann (2012: 57) pointed out that both forgetting and remembering “can exert both damaging and healing effects.” The presence of collective memory alone does not guarantee that it will be used for constructive purposes, as a way of helping activists to avoid repeating the mistakes made by their predecessors. If what gets
remembered is used as a means of perpetuating sectarianism and keeping alive ancient
grudges, it may indeed be better to forgive and forget. As Assmann argues, in my view
correctly, the decision whether to forgive or to remember “depends on the historical
class and above all on the cultural values and general circumstances prevailing in each
instance” (ibid).

In the preceding section of this chapter, I discussed the impact of the social acceleration
of time on the value and practice of collective memory among Canadian “fast activists.”
We saw that while some scholars extol the potential of the internet and related
technologies to serve as an easily accessible and virtually unlimited archive of “digital
memories,” the same media paradoxically serve to reduce collective memory among
contemporary social actors by shaping the predominant patterns of consciousness
including organic memory, by limiting the time available for historical reflection, and by
prioritizing short-term networking at the expense of building durable movement
infrastructure. We also saw that while there is some benefit to forgiving and forgetting,
among the inimical consequences of low or lacking collective memory is the tendency to
perpetually reinvent the proverbial wheel, a decrease in accountability for individual and
collective actions, and the persistence of corporate rather than counter-memory.

Having examined the role of memory, history, and more generally of the past in the eyes
of our group of alter-globalists, I now turn to the future, in order to assess empirically the
Canadian AGM activists' interest in, and their capacity for, long-term strategic planning.

**Strategic Planning in the 'Empire of Speed'**

To begin, it is important to acknowledge that the past and the future as mental categories
are in fact not so easily nor universally separated (see Gurvitch 1964, Levine 1997). As
the cultural historian Stephen Kern observed in his well-known book *The Culture of Time*
and Space: 1880-1918, “the future is dependent on the past for its content of images reassembled and projected ahead” (1983: 90). Likewise, effective strategic planning depends on the cultural value and practice of collective memory, involving the willingness and ability to learn from one's mistakes, to evaluate successes and failures, and to ascertain what was learned about allies, opponents, and the movement actors themselves (and then, hopefully, to transmit that knowledge onto others). Equally important to developing strategic planning capacity is a strong grasp on the nature of the present conjuncture, since without some kind of historical consciousness, the ability to respond effectively and intelligently is inevitably diminished (an insight conveyed among others by John Clarke of OCAP, who noted that “if there is a lack of capacity to plan for the long-term, it's because of the acute lack of understanding of the roots of the present situation, which means that everything you're doing is either ill-informed or highly improvisational work in nature”).

As we have seen, the ephemeral, event-driven character of the alter-globalization movement poses a significant challenge to the consolidation, maintenance, and transmission of collective memory among its activists. As I argue in the remainder of this chapter, the cultural sense of future precariousness shapes organizations' capacity to plan long-term; what is more, the shift away from building lasting movement infrastructure in favour of a loose and amorphous, networked mode of political engagement that I am calling “fast activism” likewise impacts on the capacity for strategic planning evident among AGM activists.

To begin, it is important to acknowledge that social movements are in large measure reactive by their very nature. Without delving into the differences among the main theoretical approaches to the study of social movements that variously emphasize the importance of resources, political opportunities, or collective identity to their emergence, it remains the case that activist campaigns typically are born in response to perceived
grievances.

This intrinsic reaction is arguably more pertinent in relation to some movements than others; thus, while many movements historically have agitated pro-actively to obtain future rights and benefits, the anti-war movement can arguably be considered a reactive movement *par excellence*. Reflecting on his organizing experience, James Clark, a long-time activist with the Canadian Peace Alliance, spoke about the constantly shifting focus of the organization. Though the CPA's 2008 convention had decided to focus its energies on the war in Afghanistan, that goal was "knocked off the agenda" by the escalation of the conflict in Sri Lanka, followed by the invasion of Gaza. When it comes to long-term planning, then,

probably more than one or two years would be difficult for even bigger organizations than the CPA because they often have to respond to issues as they come up ... a lot of the last ten years, at least for me, feels like it's like more of the responding to things, reacting, which some people criticize and feel like we're always reacting, we're always reacting, we're not preemptively doing whatever. But on some level you have to respond. We don't set the terrain, sadly, we don't determine what happens in the outside world, and you have to engage at that moment when there's a big audience paying attention...

As we have seen in previous chapters, the anti-war movement and the alter-globalization movement merged and overlapped with the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. In the present context, the two movements are likewise related in terms of their propinquity for reaction, insofar as the alter-globalisation movement's primary manifestation took the form of "counter-summits," which are by definition organized in reaction to a meeting of transnational political powers. I contend that while some movements are by their nature more reactive than others, in the case of the alter-globalization movement, this propensity can best be understood as a manifestation of a broader cultural shift away from long-term thinking and the painstaking construction of durable movement infrastructure in favour of
quick and crowd-pleasing one-off “events.” This is because the AGM represents the prime instance of what movement scholars have been calling the “new politics” of networked activism which relies upon internet-mediated, short-term coalitions as its main organizing model.

Thus, in the context of AGM organizing, when individuals and groups come together during “moments of convergence” to organize a Day of Action or a People’s Summit, they do not, in most cases, intend to keep organizing together in the same formation after the action is over. The network/coalition is intentionally forged for a limited time, and dissolves as soon as it has served its short-term purpose. Benoit Renaud, for one, observed that “with the global justice movement, the planning was usually: what is the next big mobilization that we’re building and the planning was going all the way there, and that was it. You could go as far as planning some kind of debrief after the mobilization and that was all.”

As noted by several activists interviewed in this study, in the aftermath of large mobilizations, what remains in place, hopefully, are strengthened ties among the various activists who had taken part; however, as we have seen in preceding chapters, how meaningful or durable these ties prove to be over time is questionable. Moreover, while short-lived, one-off actions and events are not intrinsically a bad thing (and can sometimes have powerful and lasting effects), another significant downside to becoming absorbed in the logistics of organizing a large one-off mobilization such as the protests against the G20 is that the sheer extent of the task absorbs all the time and energy of the organizers, leaving little time for reflection and long-term thinking and planning.

To give a concrete example, the chosen end point on the Toronto Community Mobilization Network’s G20 planning timeline was the final day of the protest, and more specifically, the clean-up of the “convergence space.” My interviews with the TCMN
activists a year after the protests revealed some critical reflection on this point. For instance, TCMN member Eryn Wheatley stated that the group “did not have the time to think about the time after.” Consequently, when a number of core organizers were suddenly arrested on charges of conspiracy in the lead-up to the protests (in some cases at night and at gunpoint), jail support had to be organized spontaneously and “on the fly.” This not only presented a severe logistical challenge, but also placed additional strain on the already traumatized activists who managed to escape arrest. This shortcoming can be attributed in part to the bracketing of consequences for risky actions but also in part to the general neglect of long-term thinking prevalent in the “empire of speed”. 77 In addition to being caught largely unprepared for the massive extent of police repression, the group's decision to plan only as far as cleaning out the convergence space also meant that little forethought had been given to figuring out ways of maintaining the momentum that typically follows in the wake of mass street protests. The TCMN “totally failed to foresee...this upsurge of young activists who had nowhere to go,” professed Jean Broughton, one of the group's organizers. “So had we been thinking better, if we were thinking beyond just the campaign, we would have had something waiting.” Likewise, Alex Hundert noted that that “there was not enough done beforehand to carry the momentum from G20 into anything. I think that was a big failure. So, on the one hand we didn't have support for the people arrested pre-figured out well enough, but also, actually, how do we carry on relationships and the momentum? We hadn't done that, and because of the crackdown we lost the space to do it afterwards. So one of the lessons is, you have to do it before.” While more research is necessary to ascertain the extent to which this critical assessment is shared among other TCMN organizers, the above comments by three TCMN organizers do seem to suggest that temporal pressures limited the amount of time, energy and effort dedicated to planning for the long term.

77 In this case, it can also be linked to the fact that the TCMN managed to attract only a few seasoned organizers to its ranks, in large part due to inter-generational dynamics outlined in the previous chapter in connection with collective memory. With most of the TCMN activists just cutting their radical teeth, the collective memory gap affected detrimentally the organizing that was carried out.
Reflecting on the reactive character of much contemporary activism, and in reflecting on her own experiences with activism, TCMN member Joanna Adamiak remarked that "a lot of organizing seems to happen in relation to governmental shifts, in Canada at least. So the plans that you make for protesting, it's kind of like union work, you only really talk about this bargaining round."

This line of critique was echoed in a strategic planning brochure (2012) co-authored by Jessica Bell and other seasoned activists. In it, the authors warn against placing too much emphasis on short-term tactics at the expense of long-term strategy. They argue that many small groups swallow the pill of urgency-addiction and dedicate their time to doing action, action, action. As a consequence, some groups fail to address group health, address power-imbalances within the group, recruit and train new members, and build friendships. Members then burn out and leave. It's useful to occasionally ask if doing an action is the best thing the group could be doing right now (Bell et al. 2012: 6).

This insight was likewise conveyed in a 2007 interview by Dave Bleakney, then national organizer of the Canadian Union of Postal Workers and member of the now-defunct alter-globalization network called People's Global Action (PGA). To Bleakney's mind, the predominant "addiction to urgency" is profoundly inimical to long-term thinking and planning:

there's not a lot of strategic discussions because the urgency, of course, of completing an action and taking it on and doing it can take a lot of energy out of people and often we don't debrief afterwards ... The whole notion of strategy is quite avoided, because we just go through this repetition of action to action and repeating ourselves...

The sense of urgency identified above and in the preceding chapter cannot be separated
from the sense of perpetual crisis taking place in the “extended present.” In the minds of social actors, including activists, this sense of crisis militates against the ability to think long-term, an insight reiterated time and again during the interviews. Insofar as strategy entails forging a long-term plan involving *multiple short-term tactics*, the capacity to craft strategy becomes inevitably reduced.

The lack of capacity for strategic planning has not escaped the attention of the activists; indeed, it was recognized by many of those I interviewed. For instance, when asked for her thoughts on social movement activists' ability to create strategy, movement trainer and co-author of the aforementioned brochure Jessica Bell did not mince words: “they suck at it.” In confirmation of this chapter's main argument, she attributed this shortcoming to the uncertainty and volatility impacting on activists' personal lives. Given unstable life circumstances and the perceived inability to predict even the relatively near future, strategic planning within movements is limited to one year, “because we know we can all commit to a year.” A one-year plan is a short-term one, and as such, it cannot but be considered tactical rather than strategic; nevertheless, it was easily the most commonly identified strategic planning time frame among the organizers interviewed in this study.

A number of activists affirmed strategic planning while also insisting on the need to remain flexible. Paraphrasing an old adage about military campaigns, Rob Fairley and Mike Balkwill (2011) made a related point in their campaign planning handbook authored for the Toronto and York Region District Labour Council, by stating that “[no campaign plan survives first contact with the opponent.”78 Adjustments to the plan should be expected, but if the plan is well-conceived, the overall framework will likely stand the test of conflict, they insist. The adoption of the “plan, act, evaluate” as a continuous practice

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78 Drawing on the work of many people, the handbook was “written for unions, but the principles of campaign planning apply to all social movements,” according to the authors (Fairley and Balkwill 2011: 2). Inside the handbook the reader can find advice on creating, implementing and evaluating campaigns, as well as a number of planning tools, such as Force Field Analysis, Spectrum of Member Support, and Power Mapping.
can help activists to adjust their plans under changing conditions (though, of course, this requires a reconfiguration of activists' priorities, as we saw earlier in this chapter regarding the need to take the time to reflect and evaluate movement's past successes and failures.)

"I'm not a planner. But if you want a plan, just make sure you're flexible," said Judy Rebick when I asked about strategic planning. "Politics is the art of the moment." She explained that the ability to recognize opportunities as they arise and acting on them is a mark of a true leader — "things go pssht! And they're gone!" This is why it's important to distinguish between urgent and important tasks and objectives, she observed.

**Strategic Planning Tools**

While the overall argument advanced in this chapter is that social acceleration and the shrinking of the hegemonic time horizon impacts deleteriously upon the capacity for long-term strategic planning among Canadian "fast activists," in this section I wish to briefly address another factor contributing to this shortcoming, namely the prevalent lack of familiarity with the tools of strategic planning.

Like the overwhelming majority of the respondents, in my own long tenure as an activist I have never come across any strategic planning tools. It was therefore not altogether surprising that, save a very small handful of exceptions, most of the activists I interviewed could not identify any concrete tools used in strategic planning. Those who could were movement trainer Jessica Bell, who has written on this topic, and Philippe Duhamel, leader of the now-defunct group L'Operation SalAMI. As it turns out, there exists a variety of strategic planning tools and workshops aimed specifically at social movements. Most of the organizations offering and promoting them, however, are outside of Canada, many in the United States. In this country, they are far less familiar; even
Jessica Bell admitted that she herself found it "extremely difficult" to locate strategic planning tools.\(^{79}\)

To reiterate, while my directed research revealed perhaps not a plethora but certainly a handful of solid strategic planning tools, the interview component of the project confirmed that these tools are almost entirely unknown among Canadian activists. We have already seen that given the short-term mobilizations characteristic of the alter-globalization movement, this lack presumably has posed few problems. However, what about the movement's more permanent, constituent organizations? Given the general ignorance of the requisite tools, how do they fare in terms of their capacity for strategic planning? Having considered the challenges pertaining to strategic planning on the broad level of the alter-globalization movement and its network-based "moments of convergence," the following section examines strategic planning on the meso level, by tracing the relevant practices and difficulties in relation to the groups and organizations comprising the movement.

**Strategic Planning in Social Movement Organizations**

In the section above, we examined OCAP's collective memory practices — now, what about the organization's capacity to plan strategically? Based on interviews with several long-time OCAP organizers, it appears that there exists significant room for

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\(^{79}\) It is outside the scope of this chapter to provide a comprehensive summary of the multiple strategic planning tools that I was able to discover thanks to the research recommendations provided by Bell and Duhamel. I will limit this discussion to specifying that among the most popular tools are "The Spectrum of Allies," the "Tactics Star" and "The SWOT analysis," the latter an acronym for Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats. For a detailed explanation of these tools, the interested reader is advised to consult the website of the organizations Training for Change, the MidWest Academy, and the Change Agency. Moreover, the Ruckus Society's "Action Guide" co-authored by Jessica Bell offers a useful outline of some of these tools. Finally, Fairley and Balkwill's (2011) aforementioned Campaign Planning Handbook written by provides a detailed, step-by-step guide to strategic planning, focused but not limited to planning within trade unions. Both of the latter publications are can be freely downloaded online (see references).
improvement. According to Liisa Schofield, a strategic planning session takes place at OCAP's annual general meetings in the form of a general discussion guided by a set of recommendations put forward by the elected executive committee, and open to new campaign proposals from the floor. All members are invited to take part, with the aim of reviewing and interrogating ongoing campaigns and time lines, to see if they fit into what the members think is going to be happening down the road — "nothing more formal than that," she said.

Similarly, "kind of ad hoc" is how fellow long-time OCAP organizer Mac Scott characterized the organization's strategic planning practices. While it boasts many experienced organizers who are "good at learning their lessons every year" and who put a lot of thought into the AGMs, OCAP has been struggling with strategic planning for a number of years, he added. This is partly because of the lack of any kind of concrete strategic planning model. More to the point, both OCAP and No One Is Illegal (two of Toronto's most established activist organizations) struggle with strategic planning because they are always responding to the attacks on their constituencies while also trying to promote more revolutionary social change. "We often get caught up in a crisis mentality which plays against the idea of strategic planning," Scott explained. "At the same time, if you don't do a certain amount of strategic thinking about how you deal with crisis, you'll just be caught like everyday dealing with crises because the communities we deal with are dying everyday, there's multiple crises everyday." Scott's insights bear out the by-now familiar argument about the pervasive addiction to urgency; they also help us to understand why strategic planning and evaluation rarely come up during regularly scheduled OCAP meetings — as confirmed by Liisa Schofield, "in theory our meetings are supposed to be spaces for that, but often we're so focused on the immediate task list of getting through the next two weeks that it's hard to think beyond that."

According to the organization's founding member, John Clarke, OCAP's shortcomings
vis-à-vis strategic planning are part and parcel of the challenges imposed by the historical conjuncture of neoliberalism. When asked about the capacity to plan on the left, Clarke found it lacking, like the majority of the activists interviewed in this study. Speaking indirectly to the sense of disorientation associated with social acceleration, he clarified that

it's genuinely difficult to have an assessment of the way forward. If you were organized in the beginnings of the post-war boom, you might make mistakes but there seemed clear ways forward. Today, it's much less clear. Movements that existed have been weakened massively and there's so little to draw from and so few examples. I think in OCAP we have a clearer perspective than many people but who doesn't today have more questions than answers?

In short, while the previous section disclosed that OCAP fares comparatively well with respect to its collective memory practices (mainly by virtue of its longevity and the long-term tenure of its organizers), it is less immune to temporal pressures when it comes to forging long-term strategy. Its strategic planning sessions take place but briefly and only once a year; moreover, they are not subject to regular and systematic revision. Thus it emerges that despite its organizational stability, OCAP is not entirely unlike the ad hoc networks of the AGM insofar as it tends to operate primarily on a reactive, short-term basis.

As far as the strategic planning capacity within the Canadian labour movement, here we are dealing with a relatively well-resourced sector of the Canadian left. Might we expect more planning capacity than observable amongst grassroots movement formations? The answer, in short, is no: the interviews with a number of seasoned labour activists disclosed that, by and large, Canadian unions tend to operate without a strategic plan. “I don't think five years in the future, ever, no. Maybe a year?” said Denise Hammond, president of CUPE Local 1281 and an alter-globalization movement veteran. “I don't think there is a long-term strategy because people in many ways are trying to survive and
get through today. And it takes more time and energy to think about what we'll do for the next year than just focusing on: next June, we're going to build for a rally." Echoing the oft-repeated argument about the general state of social volatility, she further observed that within CUPE, there is an effort to do some strategic planning, but the reality is that at least at this current moment there's so many battles being waged on workers and public services that even at our convention we sort of adopt a plan of action that we're going to work on for the year, and it's constantly changing because there's just so much is happening and you have to be able to respond.

As Hammond's remark attests, the pervasive sense of disorientation linked to social acceleration and the collapse of the future time horizon impacts deleteriously upon the capacity of unions to create long-term plans.

Without belabouring the point, it is likewise important to acknowledge that the ideology of the labour movement has had a negative impact in its own right on its long term vision. According to recently retired CAW national organizer Steve Watson, the paucity of strategic planning within unions has to be understood in relation to the shift in their overall political orientation, namely, away from efforts to create a different kind of society and toward a focus on what he termed "babysitting the membership." He elaborated by explaining that

the day-to-day reality of the union is still more like a business than a social movement. And like a business, it's just thinking about the next quarter, like, what are the next quarter's results going to be? What are we going to report to our shareholders this quarter so they don't dump all their shares? There's that kind of mentality, that's the business way of operating. I think corporations are doing more strategic planning than we do, when we should be doing the strategic planning about how we organize ... Nobody seems to have an industry-wide campaign: OK, here's our plan to unionize all the auto parts plants in Canada, which are only about forty percent unionized at best, lucky if it's thirty percent ... We're
the Canadian Auto Workers! Where's the plan to unionize the auto industry?!

In light of these comments, it becomes clear that the short-termist orientation driven by social acceleration and inimical to long-term thinking is prevalent across the AGM, not only within the ephemeral-by-design counter-summit coalitions but also within the relatively well-resourced and durable organizations of the Canadian labour movement.

Speaking from his extensive experience within the CAW, Watson continued to attest to the inimical consequences of the propensity of unions to prioritize the immediate at the expense of the long term:

I think one of the faults of our union, and it's a real downfall of the union, is that we're great at starting something — do we ever finish it? Look at all the different campaigns we'll initiate, go to our website on any particular day and you'll see: oh, today's campaign is this, we're gonna save the shipyards in Halifax, tomorrow it will be this, something else, we go from one thing to the next, and everything is important that day, but the next day it's something else, so what did we do yesterday? Well, I can't remember, we're doing this today! But where's the strategic plan when you can't remember what you did last week, and you're doing something else this week that you weren't doing last week? I'm not saying reacting to new challenges isn't important, but I'm saying we could do a little bit better than the purely reactive. Think about this: would we have medicare in this country if Tommy Douglas thought it was a three-month campaign?

Similarly, when asked whether uncertainty bears the blame for the lack of long-term strategic planning within unions, labour strategist Rob Fairley shot back: “Is the world constantly shifting and shifting dramatically? Absolutely! Have other people worked under changing circumstances with wars and invasions and economic collapses and all of that? Sure. You still have to have a plan.”
Fairley has extensive experience with strategic planning within the labour movement; as mentioned above, he is co-author of the Toronto and York Region Labour Council's *Campaign Planning Handbook*. From his perspective, the key to successful strategic planning is making it a participatory process; however, this happens very rarely, for reasons for this get to the very heart of union democracy, as well as the need to accept change, he suggested.

Echoing fellow labour activists, he also confirmed a troubling absence of strategic planning within unions. Asked whether there are any exceptions, he was able to identify only one, namely CUPE Local 4400, Toronto Education Workers. This particular local employs a variety of strategic planning practices, he explained, including an out-of-town annual executive board strategic planning session that lasts several days, and involves a comprehensive planning process which yields a final report as well as a "user-friendly" single-sheet report summary. Work planning is subsequently carried out with the help of the local's vice-presidents in order to implement the handful of key strategic priorities identified in the report. Furthermore, an annual "committee day" involves the members of all the various committees in reviewing the strategic plan in order to figure out how the committees can advance that plan. Finally, there is an annual stewards' assembly of about 150 individuals, which also takes place out of town over a weekend out of town, and is focused on the role of stewards in moving forward the strategic plan. "It's a pretty good model," said Rob Fairley, "and I think it's pretty rare within the union movement."

**Strategic Planning in Comparative Perspective**

Despite the critical tone of our assessment so far, in assessing the effects of social acceleration on individual and collective capacities, it is important to keep in mind that this process has not penetrated all parts of the globe to the same extent. The growing "time studies" literature offers a number of cross-cultural analyses of different temporal
orientations (e.g. Hall 1983, Levine 1997). The important point is that the relatively "underdeveloped" or "developing" countries of the global South, as well as a number of localities in the advanced capitalist world, including some regions of Europe, retain a relatively greater emphasis on tradition, history, and the importance of sustained, intimate relations with one's extended family and community members. In such places, the cultural influence of time-annihilating media has been relatively constrained, supporting qualitatively different cultural and intellectual habits and capacities and relationships than those pervasive in the North.

In light of this, it seems reasonable to assume that the capacity for long-term planning might be stronger among activists in those places. Indeed, this hypothesis was confirmed by several activists. For instance, long-time CUPW organizer and former North American PGA convener Dave Bleakney noted that

it'd be interesting to compare some of the Southern movements around this 'cause I find they're a little more "stewed" at long-term strategies and that one action must build towards something else. They're not "one-offs," so if you're doing something in the street, it is tied to something else.

In working alongside some Southern activists within the networks of the alter-globalization movement, Bleakney came to believe that although they may be somewhat bureaucratic, "there's still some sense of – you don't just do actions 'cause you're angry. You do actions because you're trying to build something."

Likewise, Elsa Beaulieu, an organizer with Marche Mondial des Femmes (Women's World March) and veteran of the alter-globalisation movement in Québec, expressed admiration for the strategic orientation evidenced by the Latin American activists within her organization. "Every meeting they have in Latin America there's analysis of coyuntura, context and its evolution, local, national and international," she stated. "They
use it all the time, always thinking about the situation evolving and how we're going to create strategy for ourselves within it ... I find it so inspiring.” Echoing Dave Bleakney, she contrasted the Latin American activists' propensity toward strategic analysis with that of Canadian or North American activists, who, to her mind, tend to focus their energies on event publicity and public relations rather than on seriously thinking through the systemic problems facing them and long-term plans for addressing them.

As Bleakney and Beaulieu's comments illustrate, temporal biases influencing cultural tendencies, habits and intellectual capacities are not an automatic outcome of technology or its use. Rather, they are shaped by the given configuration of pre-existing political-economic and cultural conditions. The predominance of the hegemonic “space bias” of modern capitalist media whose implications for activism we have been examining in this study is not a universal, world-wide condition – it is specific to those parts of the globe that have undergone capitalist technological modernization to an advanced degree. To reiterate, then, rather than creating biases, communication media, structured by vested interests, serve to intensify or deepen pre-existing tendencies.
Conclusion: Time to Resist

In this dissertation I have attempted to make a two-fold contribution to existing knowledge. I have sought, first of all, to offer the most comprehensive historical account available of the alter-globalization movement in Canada, redressing a marked gap in (Canadian) social movement literature. Second, with the aid of an interdisciplinary theoretical framework I have sought to not only illuminate the trajectory of this movement as a summit-based cycle of protest, but also to better understand the tendencies of contemporary activism by shedding light on the hyper-accelerated, media-saturated social context in which today's collective actors have to operate, and the hegemonic temporal norms they consequently reflect in their modes of political thought and practice. In explaining the central role of media technologies in fostering the process of social acceleration and the associated cultural neglect of time, my aim has been to complicate predominant scholarly accounts lauding the advantages of “new media activism,” of which the AGM is the example par excellence. I have done so by focusing on three areas of the movement's time-related activity: building sustained movement infrastructure, learning from the past, that is collective memory, and thinking reflexively about the future, that is long-term strategic planning. In what follows, I review some of my main findings and offer some suggestions for ameliorating the capacities of today’s social justice advocates.

To begin, in this study we saw that the history of the alter-globalization movement in Canada can be conceptualized as consisting of three distinct phases: the pre-history of the movement starting with the anti-free trade struggles in the 1980s; the transition to transnational, internet-based networking which inaugurated the rise of what I have termed “Cycle 2.0” at the close of the century, and finally, the third phase beginning with the 2007 protests against the SPP and the planned “Resistance to 2010” campaign, which unfolded in the midst of a ballooning economic crisis, provoking questions about the rise
of new cycle of opposition to neoliberal austerity in Canada.

In documenting movement activity during these three phases, I have sought to highlight both the continuities and the ruptures between them, in terms of the central actors involved, their tactics, targets as well as key objectives. We saw that the long-standing organizations of the Canadian left, such as unions, NGOs and community organizations, participated more or less easily with a new generation defined by direct action tactics in creating a new cycle of protest. The continuity of these actors and the analysis they developed over many years, including ways to frame the free trade issue, shaped in more or less direct ways the critique of and resistance to neoliberal globalization associated with the ensuing, millennial cycle of AGM protest.

On the other hand, the AGM is unique: it was the first transnational movement to emerge in the digital media age, powered by youth well-versed in using new technologies to their political advantage. As Naomi Klein pointed out early on, these technologies, notably the internet, shaped the movement in its own image: decentralized, diverse and highly networked. But as we saw, the price of flexibility and fluidity is durability and continuity: while most of the institutions and organizations of the institutional Canadian left (many of which predated the AGM) persisted when the Cycle 2.0 declined, most of the coalitions and groups that came together to organize against globalization at the turn of the century – Mobilization for Global Justice, OQP2001, and People's Action Network – fell apart, either in the immediate aftermath of the given mobilization, or in the aftermath of 9/11. Arguably, the AGM did not have enough time to establish roots; on the other hand, the desire to create some institutional heft, so to speak, was largely absent within a youthful movement oriented away from hierarchy and permanence in favour of flexibility, fluidity and speed. Contemporary social movement actors excel at organizing temporally limited campaigns or one-off events, but they have yet to figure out how to create more permanent coalition spaces and institutional formations.
When it comes to the question of durability, we have seen, to be sure, that short-term coalitions and networks are not exclusive to the AGM: for example, the ad hoc committees that coalesced to organize the three counter-summits prior to the AGM's rise also dissolved in the aftermath, having served out their temporally limited mandate. There is nothing inherently problematic with groups that coalesce specifically for short-term purposes, but a lack of organization poses challenges, as we have seen, when it comes to accountability. Furthermore, the decision to create a long-lasting coalition or group that is run democratically, holds formal meetings, and is open to newcomers in a formal way—rather than operating an informal network—what is troubling, however, is the increasing tendency toward “fast activism,” observable in particular among the new generations of networked activists, and expressed as a proclivity for the short-term and instant gratification at the expense of relatively slow, painstaking, and often invisible movement activities, such as reflection, outreach to the unconverted, and building lasting coalitions across movement sectors. Given the tendency toward ephemeral networks rather than formally organized and permanent coalitions and organizations, one avenue of building durable collective action infrastructure could involve the creation of locally based institutions, such as community centres, food co-ops, free schools, cafes, etc. These place-based infrastructures can also foster the kind of meaningful, face-to-face relationships of trust among neighbours—relations that social scientists call “strong ties” or “social capital”—that also conduce to the organic transmission of experience and collective memory (as discussed below). Sustained social movement spaces and structures are necessary in order to provide continuity and support—as well as a sense of a meaningful community that is arguably lacking on the left right now. As a number of my respondents pointed out, activists are often too busy to take care of one another; their personal interactions are therefore often instrumental and focused above all on the (often urgent) task at hand, with little time left over for “relationship building” guided by true care and compassion.
Continuing with the summary of the study's findings, I have been arguing that the penetration of daily life by ubiquitous, instant communication technologies has a deep impact on collective action insofar as it serves to deeply exacerbate the sense of time scarcity among social actors. As discussed in chapter V, while contemporary activists generally uphold the value of collective memory, they feel they do not have time to enact it, given the growing and competing demands on their time. Instead, their energies tend to concentrate on the most pressing and urgent tasks, often with no time or energy left over to ponder the past as a source of lessons, and avoid making the same mistakes as their predecessors.

A similar conclusion emerges concerning the activists' ability and willingness to plan strategically for the long-term. Yet while most activists maintained the value of collective memory, they proved relatively more ambivalent regarding the value of long-term planning: as many of them indicated, attempts to plan beyond one year are essentially pointless since past that point, the future is largely unpredictable. As I have sought to make clear, the tendency revealed by my respondents to limit the planning timeframe to one year must therefore be understood in relation to the profound sense of disorientation pervasive in the highly networked, highly technological, high-speed "risk society" governed by radical future uncertainty. To be sure, understanding the challenges related to long-term planning in a social milieu ruled by a widespread sense of volatility does not mean capitulation; as I make clear below, from the perspective of this study, learning how to think and plan strategically for the long term remains an important imperative for social movements today.

In addition, although this question was not initially a part of my inquiry, it became increasingly clear over the course of my research that the widely perceived scarcity of time as a resource of collective action can become further exacerbated in specific
instances by the added pressures of contracted organizational timeframes. We saw that Canadian activists' singular focus on mobilizing for the protests in Washington left them scrambling when it came time to organize the OAS convergence in Windsor. In Kananaskis and Toronto, the internal factors that contributed to the late start of the organizing process (and the associated shortcomings of the mobilizations) included the influence of the summit-hopping critique and a perceived lack of organizing capacity. Externally, the state's machinations resulting in the last-minute cancellation of Solidarity Village and the last-minute decision to relocate the G20 summit from Huntsville to the Toronto downtown core (rather than the more remote Exhibition place, as Toronto's mayor had urged) were quite conceivably strategic, in that they effectively placed extra pressures on the organizers involved, promoting a preoccupation with the most pressing logistical tasks at the expense of outreach and education. In light of this, future research should pay more attention to the factors that determine the duration of the organizing timeframe and the extent to which it can be seen as determinative of the character and outcome of episodes of contention.

A related conclusion to emerge from my research is that the educational component of the mobilizations appears to vary in accord with their target: the mobilizations against the G7 and especially G20 in Toronto were not motivated by a specific goal, unlike the protests to defeat a concrete piece of legislation: the FTA, MAI, FTAA, and SPP. There was extended popular education on these agreements carried out by the institutional left but also, on the FTAA and SPP in particular, by direct action activists of groups such as the CLAC. This stands in contrast to Kananaskis and Toronto in particular, where the focus was overwhelmingly on organizing Days of Resistance and Action, with little outreach and education taking place apart from the People's Summit.

To return to the question of the AGM as a cycle of protest, it became clear in chapter IV that despite the early promise, the possibility of a new wave of dissent that appeared on
the horizon in 2007 did not become reality. Indeed, most of my respondents identified the alter-globalization movement as having ended after 9/11 in Canada. Though the SPP protest in 2007 seemed to signal a renewed interest among activists in opposing neoliberal globalization, the outcome of the subsequent “No 2010” campaign, specifically the Toronto G20 protests and the TCMN's desire to focus specifically on local issues, attests to this by confirming the loss of a unifying master frame centred on international solidarity in the face of capitalist globalization. Today, sweatshop boycotts, fair trade, and, on the cultural level, culture jamming and “adbusting” that were once at heart of the Canadian AGM have waned in importance, as has the idea of organizing international solidarity rallies – as observed by Scott Harris, the G20 summit protest in Toronto neither encouraged nor inspired solidarity rallies in other cities, “whereas during the period between ‘99 and 2003 it was just a foregone conclusion that every city would send a caravan” to the protest.

Indeed, in recent years, Canadian activists' interest in organizing against neoliberal free trade (especially in solidarity with other countries) seems very much limited. Since May 2009, the Harper government has been quietly negotiating the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with the European Union. Moreover, in April 2013, the Liberals joined the Conservatives in defeating an NDP motion to halt the ratification of the Canada-China Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA), which was signed in September 2012 at the APEC Summit in Vladivostok. On its website, the Council of Canadians calls it “one of Harper's worst corporate rights pacts” (“Action Alert”). Given that it has fought all previous agreements of this sort, it comes as no surprise that the CoC has been trying to raise alarm about FIPA, which, as it argues, will protect China-based corporations against environmental or other legislation seen as interfering with their potential profits. Canada in fact already has 24 FIPAs with countries like Russia, Argentina and Czech Republic, and is negotiating more – these are not free trade agreements, but rather bilateral treaties, and therefore do not generate as much
publicity. Yet the China FIPA is different because of the amount of investment China already has in Canada: like the MAI and other agreements before, this FIPA contains an investor-state mechanism allowing China-based corporations to sue for decisions made by any level of government in Canada, if Chinese companies believed they were not being treated the same as Canadian ones.

Significantly, this time, the mainstream media have not shied away from covering the negotiations. Yet, despite public knowledge, the criticisms of the agreement articulated by the political parties, and the efforts of stalwart opponents like the CoC, the broader Canadian activist left has thus far failed to mobilize against the treaties in any significant way. To the best of my knowledge, a petition circulated on Facebook has been the extent of anti-FIPA activism in Canada, confirming that unlike the effort to get on the map by organizing a symbolic protest against an agent of globalization like the G20, fighting free trade agreements no longer resonates the same way it did before and during the peak of the AGM.

To be sure, and as I noted previously, movements never simply fade away: they have lasting, more or less direct effects on those that follow. Thus, albeit no longer supported by the power of a rising protest cycle, the themes and tactics of the AGM still motivate pockets of resistance today – for instance, a solidarity rally with garment workers in Bangladesh took place in Toronto as part of May Day 2013 march, after a factory collapse that killed over eleven hundred workers. Just days earlier, a group of several dozen protesters, many of whom had organized the G20 protests in Toronto, demonstrated against the Canadian mining company Barrick Gold to oppose the company's unethical and dishonest practices leading to ecological destruction and Aboriginal displacement. Some of the AGM's veteran organizers helped to organize these protests; while they confirm that movements do not simply fade away, and that many of the themes of the AGM, notably anti-corporate, anti-sweatshop activism, continue on, it remains the case
that these protests are not taking place in the context of a new AGM cycle of contentious action.

This is not to say that no new protest cycles have occurred in Canada since the decline of the AGM in the early 2000s. Indeed, a major international wave of protest erupted a year after the G20 protests in Toronto, in October 2011. It was then that activists in New York City (inspired in part by one of the key cultural influences on the AGM, the Vancouver-based *Adbusters* magazine) decided to permanently “Occupy Wall Street” to protest the politics of austerity initiated in the wake of the 2007 financial crisis. Much like the AGM cycle had spread outward from Seattle in 1999, a new cycle initiated in NYC diffused transnationally, including to Canada, as a wave of contention that became known as the Occupy movement.

That same month, in a column titled “Occupy Wall Street: lessons from the anti-globalization movement,” Naomi Klein (2011) waxed enthusiastic about the future prospects of the Occupy movement. She commended the protesters for learning from the mistakes of the AGM, as evidenced, first of all, by Occupy’s commitment to non-violence, and second, by the choice of sustained physical presence as its “fixed target.” Articulating a critique very much along the lines of my own regarding “fast activism,” she noted that since the anti-globalization movement was oriented primarily to organizing protests against transient international summits, it would “regularly appear, grab world headlines, then disappear,” making it easier for the movement to “fall apart” after 9/11. By contrast, she argued, Occupy has “time to put down roots, which makes it a lot harder to sweep them away, even if they get kicked out of one physical space.”

Yet, less than two months after this column was published, a wave of evictions ended most of the Occupy camps. In Toronto at least, efforts to maintain the momentum and continue the General Assemblies in alternative locations grew feeble over the ensuing
months. While pockets of the movement can still be found today, for all intents and purposes, the Occupy movement cycle ended after the evictions. No longer anchored permanently either in space or in the media spotlight, the largely neophyte activists driving the Occupy movement (at least in Toronto) did not manage to maintain momentum and the public (as well as the broader left's) interest and attention.

About a year after the wave of evictions, an activist identified only as Colin O published a piece online called “Occupy is dead. Now what?” In it, he echoes this study’s key line of critique by noting that activists “often display a sort of notoriously short American attention span. We get excited about the exciting portions of movements, but don’t commit ourselves in a massive enough way to the more serious, harder part of building movements – targeted outreach, consciousness raising, analysis development and organization building” (“Occupy is dead”). His comments confirm that the tendency toward “fast activism” and the associated challenges related to durability apply not only to the AGM but to contemporary activism more broadly. It thus emerges that when it comes to building lasting movement infrastructure, the Occupy movement did not learn from the failures of the AGM after all. Given the neglect of collective memory transmission between groups and generations of activists, this is perhaps not surprising. Let us consider more closely the question of collective memory and its amelioration now.

Making Memory Matter

We have seen that while formal organizations are particularly well positioned to produce and preserve historical material, the cultural neglect of living memory applies to them as well as the fluid networks constitutive of much contemporary activism. What then, is the key challenge? Is scarcity of time really the primary obstacle to the transmission of historical experience and lessons among activists? Though it was widely identified as impeding efforts to learn from the past, the way in which activists organize in the
dimension of time is itself a product of the times and as such, is subject to reflection and revision. As Syed Hussan, a TCMN and NOII organizer, put it, “People don't know what happened in Kananaskis, in Akwesasne. I don't believe we don't have enough time – make time!” When the only time one has available for political activity is spent on the futile attempt to stay at least superficially informed about the various current crises happening now, and to respond to them with “emergency” rallies, collective memory and historical thought become inevitably marginalized. From this perspective, the practices related to collective memory are a matter of priorities. In reflecting on their tendencies to assign tactical priority to activities and objectives that are most pressing but not necessarily most important (from a long-term standpoint), activists would be wise to ask themselves the question that inspired the writings of Harold Innis, namely “why do we attend to the things to which we attend?”

In reflecting on how collective memory could be improved in movements, perhaps the most important answer to emerge during my interviews with Canadian activists was the importance of building lasting relationship across generations. A number of organizers stressed the importance of sharing experiences and lessons in a way that is organic and contextual, and a part of the activists' daily interactions – the “living” rather than “archival” kind of memory discussed previously. History is organic and grounded in relationships, noted migrant justice activist Harsha Walia, so “we need to get away from the idea of putting all memories in one place.” Garth Mullins likewise emphasized that it is important for experienced organizers “to plug in and make the lessons relevant then and there so that it's not something that's aside, something different. You don't have to take time out from the current mobilization to go talk to the old folks, but it's part and parcel of what you're doing – you know, make history alive and organic.” In the same spirit, reflecting on his own formation as a young hospital worker in the 1960s, John Clarke recalled looking up to his colleagues who were forty- and fifty-years old, and who were able to mentor him because they remained engaged in struggle. “It wasn't just
people sitting down and telling it,” he recalled. “They were present and engaged in practice, and you learned from it.”

Likewise, recently retired CAW educator Steve Watson reflected on the role of face-to-face communication in shaping his own learning trajectory: “I didn't get it all from a book, right. To be convincing with your colleagues in a union movement, it's better if you can speak from direct experience than writing it all down.” He explained that while the CAW's educational centre in Port Elgin does employ written material to teach rank-and-file members about history, much of the lore is shared after class. “Activists will often say to me that they learned as much from discussing things with each other after class, on the patios behind their rooms and residences, as they do in the class ... in the class we got only so much time to cover the curriculum, twenty minutes of discussion on this and then you gotta move on. Where, you get into a real conversation about how something really happened, it can take a few hours.”

It was in the same spirit that G20 organizer Eryn Wheatley remarked that, when it comes to collective movement memory, “a lot of it is stories, not documents, it's people's experience ... For me, that's the way that information is going to be transferred in the most honest way, for people to be able to hear and ask questions of someone else's experiences, what they did and why and what did they learn about it.”

All of these comments confirm the value of learning about the past through meaningful, face-to-face interaction with other people. Today, however, the oral tradition, including face-to-face communication practices such as storytelling and soapboxing, seems much diminished. The gradual loss of the art of storytelling in particular was lamented eloquently by Walter Benjamin – echoing Innis's worry about the decline of the oral tradition in the age of mechanized communication, Benjamin attributed this decline to the gradual removal of narrative from the realm of living speech. “If the art of storytelling has
become rare, the dissemination of information has had a decisive share in this state of affairs,” he wrote (2011[1969]: 101). While mechanically reproduced, individually consumed media are able to convey great amounts of information, Benjamin viewed oral communication as uniquely capable of conveying those aspects of knowledge which involve wisdom and counsel. “The nature of every real story,” he wrote, is that it “contains, overtly or covertly, something useful. The usefulness may, in one case, consist of a moral; in another, of some practical advice; in a third, in a proverb or maxim. In every case the storyteller is a man who has counsel for his readers” (ibid: 100).

The unique advantage of learning about one's predecessors’ actual lived experience in interpersonal, face-to-face environments is predicated on the uniquely dialogic nature of embodied interaction. “The storyteller takes what he tells from experience – his own or that reported by others,” wrote Benjamin. “And he in turn makes it the experience of those who are listening to his tale” (ibid). The manner in which experience is communicated with others takes on critical importance here. As David Thelen has pointed out, in direct face-to-face communication, “narrators fix their listeners very clearly in mind as they decide which elements to recollect, how to organize and interpret those elements, and how to make the memory public” (Thelen 1989: 1118). This type of communication, more than any other kind, allows the listeners to participate interactively, engage in dialogue, ask questions, and hopefully, to internalize what they have learned.

To be sure, the internet and related media may be (paradoxically) deployed by activists in order to start becoming more familiar with the rich legacy of past anti-status quo struggles; yet it is crucial to understand that information does not equal knowledge: it must first be made meaningful in the context of ongoing activist praxis. Thus, perhaps instead of devoting all their energies to organizing yet another event or emergency action, activists could dedicate some time and effort to the relatively less urgent but no less important task of recuperating the past, sharing and discussing it with comrades, and
incorporating it into their daily interactions in an organic and vital way.

Yet the cultural neglect of time, the central underlying premise of this study, applies not only to the past, but also to the future. In the first chapter of this study, I have delineated how futurity, that is the dominant conception of the future, evolved historically in response to technological, social, and political-economic change, culminating in what scholars have termed “the collapse” or the “crisis of the future” characteristic of contemporary, postmodern, high-speed society. In this scenario, we saw that the ability to fit short-term tactics into a longer-term political strategy diminished – if this is the case, what can be done to remedy this political shortcoming?

**Thinking Strategically for Radicals**

It is noteworthy that the ancient Greeks were not only a source of inspiration for Harold Innis in his quest to restore the vitality of the oral tradition and the transmission of cultural heritage -- when it comes to strategic planning, business writers have also offered up the Greeks' cultural and intellectual capacities as worthy of emulation. In her book *Learning How to Think Strategically*, international business consultant Julia Sloan (2006) explains that in ancient Greek society, a strategos was a helmsman on inshore vessels who had to weave his maps of the territory together with his understanding of the prevailing currents with their ship’s purpose and their own skill with a rudder. Based on this concept, the Greeks likened strategic wisdom to oscillating between different positions and perspectives toward a particular purpose. They understood wisdom not as the ability to represent things with objective certainty for the purpose of bringing predictability and control, but rather as metos, that is the ability to steer a prudent course between a world of order (cosmos), of forms and laws, and the world of chaos, of the multiple, unstable, and unlimited nature of affairs (Sloan 2006: 6). Though the progress of time has advanced science and technology, the Greeks navigated a world that was, in
some respects at least, as mysterious and uncertain in their eyes as our contemporary world of speed appears to us. This is why contemporary social actors, including activists, can benefit from striving for a Greek-style balance or perhaps better yet, *dialectic* between attending to urgent tasks and maintaining in mind a longer term plan is a useful and necessary if admittedly, not easily attained perspective to adopt in the struggle for social justice.

Now, it is important to note that a sense of urgency can be a powerful motivational factor, and it is not my intention to discount or discourage it altogether. Nonetheless, in the contemporary capitalist society reeling from social acceleration, the tendency to attend only to what is on the immediate temporal horizon has resulted in excessive tendency toward short-term reaction on the activist left. Confirming a lack of planning capacity on the left, David McNally noted that “the ruling class thinks long term even though it can get obsessed with the momentary and the short term...but all the time it uses institutions to shape long-term strategic visions and there's no meaningful left organizing without that. You have to be able to do it.”

Thus, though the temporal horizon of the future has been foreshortened, activists can learn to become better strategic thinkers and planners by reflecting upon their unconscious biases and learning new heuristic planning tools. Preliminary evidence from the interviews suggests that there exists percolating awareness of the need to develop strategic planning capacity among Canadian activists. Philippe Duhamel, for one, who works today as a movement trainer and consultant, noted that in recent years, he has observed growing interest in learning “how to do strategic planning” among young activists, as “more and more of 20s generation know that they live in a complex world, one that their elders from 70s or 80s couldn’t fathom...” Along similar lines, after commenting on the failure of the Toronto Community Mobilization Network to plan beyond the last day of the G20 protests, Jean Broughton revealed that “there’s a group that
is just starting up that I'm a part for, which in order be a core member you have to submit a one year work plan, which I think is kind of amazing cause they're actually trying to start doing that, like, thinking beyond the end of the next action." At the time of our interview, the group did not yet have a name, but Broughton's enthusiasm concerning the long-term potential of this project was both infectious and inspiring. However, in order to generate a meaningful impact, more activists need to be able to reflect critically upon their current, short-termist, urgency-driven practices.

**The Need for Reflexivity**

To conclude, I do not mean to argue that in order to recognize and rectify the pervasive short-termist outlook of high-speed society, activists should permanently turn off their computers or dispose of their digital media devices. I am, however, calling for more reflexivity within activist practice. It constitutes a crucial first step in recognizing the temporal biases that set movement priorities and delimit their transformative capabilities. As this study has suggested, the internet and other time-annihilating technologies might be better understood not as a revolutionary tool or solution, but as part of the problem confronting today's activists in the accelerated, digital media age. Future successes of anti-status quo movements may well depend on the ability of its activists to recognize the way in which space-biased media such as the Internet are influencing their political self-articulation, and to re-think and re-evaluate their uses of such media.

Admittedly, reflection is a luxury in our turbo times: we are living in the age of information, which bombards us at every turn with a torrent of sounds and images, inhibiting deep thought and manifesting in a greater sense of distraction and anxiety. Recent years have seen a proliferation of self-help texts concerned with helping individuals cope with the excessive demands placed upon our mental resources in the digital age. With this goal in mind, some writers are lauding the restorative benefits of
“natural therapy.” For instance, in Japan, a version of natural therapy called shirin-yoku, or forest-bathing, has been developed, which requires patients to stroll through the woods for extended periods of time, absorbing the sylvan atmosphere to still their minds (Alter 2013). Moreover, a number of popular works with titles like In Praise of Slowness, The Slow Fix (Honoré 2004, 2013), and Focus: a simplicity manifesto in the age of distraction (Babauta n.d.) offer advice on decelerating one’s life, including additional recommendations for “digital detox,” meditation, and the rejection of multitasking in favour of dedicated “quality” time for deep reflection and interaction with loved ones — again, activities which are now increasingly perceived as luxuries vis-à-vis the pervasive sense of “running out of time.”

Such individual-level solutions can help to alleviate the stress of living in high-speed society and permit some respite from incessant information overload; in this respect, they can be useful in permitting social actors, including activists, to develop their reflexive capacities, hopefully resulting in an increased critical sensitivity of the unconscious hegemonic time biases enacted time and again.

However, while they can provide a useful starting point, the above measures are inherently limited. This is because in targeting the individual, they leave intact larger social structures and systemic imperatives toward acceleration — indeed, these “restorative” practices arguably help to maintain the systemic status-quo by recuperating the individual’s ability to be a “productive member of society.” What is needed, then, is radical structural change that goes above and beyond such micro-level solutions. In striving toward sweeping transformative change, intermediate steps could address how time is distributed as an aspect of power. This could include such mostly Europe-based initiatives as the “slow cities” and “slow food” movements (though the latter in particular is not immune from a class-based critique) as well proposals to implement a thirty-hour work week (see Knox 2005; Pink 2008). Furthermore, as noted by Leo Panitch, these
efforts can include the implementation of radical proposals for a statutory reduction in the working day, which would not only ameliorate the "maldistribution of employment in contemporary capitalism," but also "establish the conditions for the extension and deepening of democracy by providing the time for extensive involvement in community and workplace decision making" (Panitch 1994: 88). The ability of the state to reduce the working day is significant in that it represents a potential to "slow down" the tempo of life in capitalism, and to provide people with more time to develop social capital as well as crucial intellectual capacities. From the radical perspective, the long-term goal in this regard involves the eventual emergence of a post-capitalist society wherein the equation "time is money" will not longer obtain.

As Thomas Allen once observed, "time is defined in relation to the purposes it serves. Hence, we can never say what time is. Instead, we can only ask what kinds of worlds different forms of time make possible, and what interests are served by the creation of such worlds" (2008: 217). As this study has tried to show, the digital age makes it possible for social actors, including activists, to communicate and to organize more rapidly than ever before, yet the attendant temporal pressures limit in profound and troublesome ways contemporary movements' creative and reflexive capacities and by extension, their political potentials. Though slowing done is easier said than done, it is imperative that today's social activists develop critical resistance to the intensification of speed-based social politics – not without some irony, the faster the better.
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APPENDIX: List of Interviews

2011
Joanna Adamiak July 22, Toronto
Dave Vasey July 27, Toronto
Darius Mirshahi July 27, Toronto
Seamus Parker July 27, Toronto
Mark Calzavara July 29, Toronto
Sharmeen Khan Aug 3, Toronto
Steve Watson Aug 4, Toronto
Justin Saunders Aug 5, Toronto
Julia Kerr Aug 7, Toronto
Liisa Schofield Aug 9, Toronto
Carolyn Egan Aug 9, Toronto
Shawn Khan Aug 12, Toronto
M. K. Aug 16, Toronto
M. Jean Broughton Aug 16, Toronto
Archana Rampure Aug 18, Toronto
Terrance Luscombe Aug 19, Toronto
Joel Duff Aug 19, Toronto
Selena Flood Aug 23, Toronto
Adrie Naylor Aug 23, Toronto
Sebastien Bouchard Aug 29, phone interview
Simon Tremblay-Pepin Aug 30, phone interview
Victoria Harnett Aug 31, Toronto
Eryn Wheatley Sept 2, Toronto
Denise Hammond Sept 4, Toronto
Benoit Renaud Sept 7 (part 1) Sept 14 part 2, phone interview
Syed Hussan Sept 8, Toronto
Clare O'Connor Sept 9, Toronto
Leah Henderson Sept 9, Toronto
Mac Scott Sept 13 part 1/Sept 28 part 2, Toronto and phone
David Heap Sept 12, Toronto
Thomas Chiasson-LeBel Sept 14, Toronto
Gabrielle Gerin Sept 16, Toronto
Mandy Hiscocks Sept 20, Toronto
Paul Kellogg Sept 23, Toronto
Jessica Squires Sept 24, phone interview

Harsha Walia Sept 28, phone interview
John Clarke Sept 30, Toronto
Shawn-Patrick Stensil Oct 1, Toronto
Sarita Ahooja Oct 4, phone interview
Amanda Dorter Oct 6, phone interview

Philippe Duhamel Oct 6, phone interview
Natalie Caine Oct 7, Toronto
David McNally Oct 7, Toronto
Judy Rebick Oct 8, Toronto
Jessica Bell Oct 11, Toronto

Sherri Panko Oct 13, Toronto
Jaggi Singh Oct 17, phone interview
Yogi Archaya Oct 18, Toronto
Mostafa Henaway Oct 19/Oct 29, Toronto
Pat Cadorette Oct 19, phone interview

Garth Mullins Oct 20, phone interview
Elise Thomburn Oct 23, Toronto
Abigail Bakan Oct 23, Toronto
Elsa Beaudoin Oct 28, phone interview
Sarah Blackstock Oct 31, Toronto

James Clark Nov 1, Toronto
Matthew Behrens Nov 2, Toronto
Alex Hundert Nov 4, Toronto
Scott Harris Nov 7, phone interview
Frank Showler Nov 16, Toronto

Sam Gindin Nov 29, Toronto

2013
Duncan Cameron Feb 11 (2013), phone interview
Corvin Russell Feb 11, Toronto
Murray Dobbin Feb 12, phone interview
David Langille Feb 12, phone interview
Herman Rosenfeld Feb 13, Toronto
Tony Clarke Feb 25, phone interview
Carol Phillips Feb 25, phone interview
Joy Woolfry March 18, phone interview