PUNCHING ABOVE ITS WEIGHT:
THE CARIBBEAN AS AN 'IDEATIONAL' ACTOR IN GLOBAL POLITICS
IN THE ERA OF NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE

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ABSTRACT

Are some of the world's smallest state regions, like the Caribbean, able to *punch above their weight* in international affairs, thus overcoming limitations of acutely small size? This is the first of two questions that the dissertation addresses, by investigating *how* and *under what conditions* the Caribbean Region—an extremely small, marginal (ostensibly island) world region, on a global comparative scale—routinely dons and deploys an *international image qua posture* in the pursuit of strategic international policy. Through empirical cases the dissertation demonstrates that this strategy is principally geared at and mediated by *technocratic norm generation* and *political projection* in the international system, with a view to expanding very small states' scope for recourse to statecraft and agency. Explanations of this kind have, generally, not been offered. The first of two principal findings of the dissertation is that a constellation of 'norm entrepreneurs' or epistemic communities—what is referred to as an *elite technocracy*—influence, champion and marshal how the Caribbean state is socialized *inter- and intra*-regionally, per moral imperatives. This study determines that this dual 'socializing' engagement is profoundly informed by elite technocrats operating in regional and national bureaucracies who draw attention to and seek accommodation as regards the treatment of clusters of states, in the light of the relative mismatch of size and associated material disparities. The dissertation showcases *how* collective norms and common regional identity or like-mindedness (expressed through *regionness*) are reified in Caribbean-pivoted interregionalism (as relates to the negotiation and implementation of trade agreements, specifically), whilst they are seemingly disrupted in aspects of Caribbean regional integration. The fact is, systematic scholarly study of small state Global South regions' constitutive role in norm generation and, importantly, in the use of norms to 'level the playing field' has been elusive. The dissertation contributes to filling this gap, building on standard neorealist accounts—which fall flat—but rather on social constructivism, Social Identity Theory (SIT), the discourse-theoretic approach of poststructuralism and, to some extent, Habermas' social theory. Taken together, these theoretical referents are compelling in analyzing the priority accorded regional identity in very small states' diplomacy.

The Caribbean has been pivoted as an 'ideational' actor at a time when many larger states/regions—often with competing geopolitical interests—have seemingly placed considerable stock in soft power, with a view to maneuvering to claim increased space and thus boost their standing in global politics as *normative powers*. In this context, focusing in on the European Union (EU), the second dimension of the two-tiered puzzle the dissertation unravels is whether through the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the Caribbean, the EU seeks to promote *its vision* of the identity-*cum*-regionalization orientation of the 'official' Caribbean region-building project. The dissertation argues that the EU has seen fit to advance a particular notion of the identity-based boundedness of the Caribbean as a *regional configuration*, inclusive of the Dominican Republic. In the process the study also examines how the EU leverages its normative power, gauging how this reinforces the EU as a global actor and elucidating policy implications therein for the Caribbean Region as delimited for the purpose of the EPA.

The dissertation determines that theorizing small, marginal world regions like the Caribbean as 'social constructs' provides conceptual purchase, and serves as an analytical device that more accurately captures and contributes to an understanding of the soupçon of negotiating savvy in regionalist engagements in which such states are involved than do materialist, rationalist approaches and attendant parsimonious explanations. It is shown that the Caribbean has a growing, purposeful reliance on (inter)regionalism-*cum*-norms in the exercise of strategic international policy—i.e. regional *interactions and representations*, with a view to extracting gains. For its part, as an emergent normative power the EU is increasingly relying on the norm-based exercise of *actorness* to achieve its own ends, which are deemed to be not altogether unproblematic.
Acknowledgements

Having arrived at the finish line of my PhD 'marathon', I am in debt to many people absent whose support and encouragement my completion of this journey would have been in doubt.

First and foremost, I owe a special debt of gratitude to my dissertation Committee Chair David Leyton-Brown—supervisor extraordinaire—for his intellectual support and commitment to the dissertation project. David played an invaluable role in shepherding the dissertation to completion.

The other committee members were Heather MacRae and Daniel Drache. They provided incisive and detailed critiques. I am grateful for the intellectual exchange I had with them both, as my arguments were sharpened. A special word of thanks is extended to Daniel for lending his support to the dissertation project by coming onboard as a committee member at the 'eleventh hour', replacing Ricardo Grinspun. While Ricardo stepped down from the committee, it would be remiss of me not to acknowledge his important role in shaping ideas in the dissertation in the early stages of writing.

My special thanks go to Professor Lana Wylie of the Department of Political Science at McMaster University for serving as my dissertation's external examiner. The insights she provided were most useful, as were those of two other panelists at my doctoral defence, York University professors Willem Maas and Fahimul Quadir.

At York University, I had the honour and privilege of being taught by some of the most learned scholars in Canadian academia, among them: Gregory Chin, Stephen R. Gill, Stephen M. Hellman and Hannes Lacher. Their course offerings grounded me in comparative regionalism studies, international political economy, critical international relations (IR) theory, comparative politics, European politics, and the sociology of the international system. I am indebted to them for impacting on my intellectual development, as I am to Godfrey Baldacchino of the University of Prince Edward Island's Island Studies Program, too.

My interest in IR was piqued during my undergraduate studies in Political Science at Memorial University of Newfoundland. David Close's teachings on the politics of Latin America and other developing areas were instructive, in this regard. My foray into graduate studies at Saint Mary's University and Dalhousie University further exposed me to the field, albeit through the lens of international development and public policy studies, respectively. I am indebted to several scholars who taught me at the time, among them: Henry Veltmeyer and M. Paul Brown. They have been mentors at various points in the lead up to my doctoral studies.

As a trade policy practitioner, I had the singular honour of being mentored by the late Ambassador Henry S. Gill, a world-renowned international relations/trade expert. I am indebted to Henry for the many lessons he imparted. My former boss at the then Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) and dear friend, Henry played a pivotal role with respect to the regional strategy pursued by the Caribbean Forum of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (CARIFORUM) in its negotiations with the European Union (EU) for the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). He not only encouraged me to pursue doctoral studies, but took an active interest in and shared his thoughts with respect to my research.

I am grateful, too, for the friendships I made while based at the Graduate Program in Political Science. Alyssa Brierley, Timothy Clark, Simon Granovsky-Larsen and Kole Kilibirada come to mind. I have fond memories of our study group sessions for Qualifying Exams for courses in IR and comparative politics, respectively.
My studies were assisted by financial support that came my way via teaching assistantships I held while based at the Graduate Program in Political Science, and my field research was aided considerably by the financial security that came from my taking up a position as a trade official at the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat in June 2010. In the months leading up to this assignment, I benefitted from a sojourn at the University of Prince Edward Island as a sessional lecturer in the Island Studies Program there. I am grateful for all these opportunities, but also for my earlier stints at the CRNM, the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) Secretariat and in the United Nations system which have variously informed the insights that are brought to bear in this dissertation. My experiences as a CARICOM national also loom large, in this regard.

I wish to take this opportunity to register my sincere thanks to my many interviewees, who gave so generously of their time and insights.

Special thanks are also extended to the Graduate Program Assistant, Marlene Quesenberry. Marlene made herself available to answer my many questions about the 'maze' of administrative steps I had to take as a PhD candidate, and she expertly guided me through and facilitated regarding the final procedural steps that would bring my PhD journey to a close.

My greatest debt is to my family. As with any marathon, there have been highs and lows associated with my PhD journey. Through it all, my wife unselfishly lent her support. She endured my being 'married' to the dissertation project, too, and the sacrifices that had to be made as a result. Thank you, Samantha. My sister, Pepukaye (Pep), was a source of inspiration in her own right. Even though Pep is younger than me, I have always looked up to her and marveled at her thirst for knowledge, dedication to cause and pursuit of perfection. I am grateful to Pep, not just for her advice—having been through doctoral studies of her own—but for not letting me lose sight of the 'bigger picture'. To Nicholas, I say, 'aim for the stars!'

I close off with a tribute to my parents. Although my father—the late Dr James Victor Bardouille—passed away when I was still a child, his life story and accomplishments have been a source of inspiration for me. I had him in my thoughts throughout my PhD journey. My greatest debt of gratitude is owed to mother, Dr Raj Bardouille. My mother first sparked and then nurtured my intellectual curiosity, and as I looked on at her intellectual pursuits from an early age I came to understand the sacrifice associated with 'toiling in the vineyards of academia', but also the important contribution that academics can make to humanity.

I dedicate this dissertation to my mother, without whose unwavering support I could not have finished my PhD journey and whose life and academic lessons—as my first teacher—anchor much of what follows.

Although many people have contributed to this dissertation, I alone bear the responsibility for any errors or omissions. The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, the CARICOM Secretariat, or to CARIFORUM States.

Nand C. Bardouille

Toronto, Canada
April 2013
For my mother, my 'guiding light'
Contents

PUNCHING ABOVE ITS WEIGHT:
THE CARIBBEAN AS AN 'IDEATIONAL' ACTOR IN GLOBAL POLITICS IN
THE ERA OF NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE

Abstract
Acknowledgements
Dedication
Contents
List of Tables
List of Figures
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

Introduction: Toward an Explanation of the 'Puzzle' and a New Research
Agenda for the Study of Caribbean Regionalism.............................................1-62

I. Purpose and Importance of the Study ...................................................... 1-5
II. Quo Vadis, Caribbean Integration?: A Brief Account .............................. 5-23
   A. 'Bureaucratic-driven Integration': The Promethean Construct and its Set-pieces 5-13
   B. "Crucial Moments" on the Path Toward Integration and Milestones in the History of Integration: A Snapshot 13-16
   C. Integration Peregrinations: Common Purpose, if not Common Strategic Approach 17-18
   D. The Tale of Woe or the Tower of Babel: Sovereignty and the Elusive Promised Land of Supranationalism 18-23

III. Definitions, Concepts and Analytical Scope ....................................... 23-37
   A. The Basics ........................................................................................................ 23-25
   B. Strands of 'Actors', in Light of the Levels of Analysis as an Analytical Device: 'Choosing between the Trees or the Forest' 25-31
   C. Analytical Scope .................................................................................................. 32-37

IV. The Context for a Constructivist Research Program on Caribbean Regionalism: Toward a 'We-ness' in States' Self-understandings and Socialization Practices ............................. 37-55
   A. Background ............................................................................................................ 37-50
      A.(i) Caribbean Political Identity ........................................................................... 37-38
      A.(ii) Caribbean Ethnographic, Linguistic and Cultural Identity .................................. 38-40
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.(iii)</td>
<td>Caribbean Economic Identity</td>
<td>40-42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.(iv)</td>
<td>Caribbean Geographic and Historical Identity</td>
<td>42-46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Elite Technocracy: Astute Purveyors of Episteme regarding Caribbean Regionalism</td>
<td>50-52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>State-Society Relations and the Study's Approach to Caribbean (Inter)regionalism</td>
<td>53-55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>Toward a Constructivist Approach to Framing Caribbean Regionalism: Central Questions, Thesis</td>
<td>55-56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>56-59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII.</td>
<td>Summary Findings and Scholarly Intervention</td>
<td>59-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII.</td>
<td>Dissertation Roadmap</td>
<td>60-62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PART I  Traversing Boundaries: Interregionalism, Regionalism and Island Studies in Comparative Perspective**

1. **Interregionalism: A Survey of the Literature/Theory and Treatment of Caribbean (Inter)regionalism Therein** .................................64-76

   1.1 Introduction 64-66
   1.2 Conceptualizing Interregionalism: Towards a Definition and Tracing Key Scholarship 66-69
   1.3 Interregionalism: Theory in Perspective 69-73
   1.4 'Lilliput' Regions in Interregionalism Literature, Against the Backdrop of More Studied Regions 73-75
      I. The Dominance of Europe in the Interregionalism Literature 73-74
      II. Small State Regions in the Interregionalism Literature 74-75
   1.5 Conclusion 75-76

2. **Regionalism: A Survey of the Literature/Theory and Treatment of Caribbean (Inter)regionalism Therein** .................................77-120

   2.1 Introduction 77-79
   2.2 (European) Integration Theory at a Glance 79-93
   2.3 Haasian Neofunctionalism beyond Europe 94-96
   2.4 Regionalism Studies in Perspective 97-103
   2.5 Constructivism in International Theory 103-109
   2.6 Constructivist Applications in the Study of European Integration 109-112
2.7 Regional Identities: A Constructivist Approach to the Study of Regionalism 112-114
2.8 Small State Regions in the Regionalism Literature 114-119
2.9 Conclusion 119-120

3. Island Studies: A Survey of the Literature/Theory and Treatment of Caribbean (Inter)regionalism Therein.................121-143

3.1 Introduction 121-122
3.2 Island Studies in Perspective 122-131
  I. The Context 122-124
  II. Islandness: What is it? 124-125
  III. Island Studies: Its Emergence as a Field of Academic Study 125-129
  IV. The Small States Literature in IR against an Island Studies Backdrop 129-131
3.3 Island Imaginaries 132-137
3.4 Vulnerability (and Resilience) of Small State Actors: A Review 137-141
3.5 (Inter)regionalism in Island Scholarship 141-142
3.6 Conclusion 142-143

PART II Caribbean (Inter)regionalism: Toward a Model, in Light of some Theoretical Considerations

4. International Theory and the 'Region Leveraging Nexus' (RLN): Toward a Model of Caribbean (Inter)regionalism......................145-170

4.1 Introduction 145-146
4.2 International Theory: The Traditional Agenda, the place of Small States in it; Recasting Caribbean Regionness 146-163
4.3 The 'Region Leveraging Nexus' (RLN) 163-168
4.4 Conclusion 169-170

PART III Elite Technocracy, Caribbean Inter/Intra-regionalism: Institutional Dynamics, Ideational Structures, Processes and Norms

5. Elite Technocracy: Interregionalism, Intra-regionalism and the Role of Caribbean Regional Institutions and Caribbean States in Identity/Norm Agenda-Setting & Cooperation..........................172-240

5.1 Introduction 172-174
5.2 Anthropomorphising the Caribbean Regional Order: Towards an (Auto)biographical Narrative 174-177
5.3 Socialization Processes: Elite Technocrats and Caribbean Interregionalism 177-219

viii
5.3.1 The CARIFORUM-EU EPA: A Review, with attention to the EU's Protective Banana and Sugar Regimes
5.3.2 The CRNM: A Bureaucratic Actor-Leader in Caribbean Trade Diplomacy
5.3.3 The 'Caribbean Regional Platform': A Sociological Analysis of the Interregionalist Institutional Trade Governance Environment
   I. The Role/Identity Narrative Setting
   II. The Role/Identity Narrative
   III. The Role/Identity Narrative Practice
5.3.4 The Praxis of the RLN: Caribbean Interregionalism
      5.3.4.1 Case Example 1 - 'Leveling the Playing Field': Leveraging Development Finance
      5.3.4.2 Case Example 2 - 'Leveling the Playing Field': Leveraging Trade Liberalization
5.3.5 Norms Generated as a Result of Caribbean Interregionalism, in Connection with Issue Areas under Study: 'Cui Bono'?
5.4 Socialization Processes: Elite Technocrats and Caribbean Intra-Regionalism
   5.4.1 The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas
   5.4.2 The CDF in Perspective, against the Backdrop of the OECS
   5.4.3 The Praxis of the RLN: Caribbean Intra-regionalism
   5.4.4 Norms Generated as a Result of Caribbean Intra-regionalism, in Connection with Issue Areas under Study: 'Cui Bono'?
5.5 The Functional Application of Regionness: Effects, Dynamics and Demonstrating Causal Relationships
5.6 Conclusion

PART IV The Rise of European Normative Power: Comparative Regionalism, Global Governance and the CARIFORUM-EU EPA


   6.1 Introduction
   6.2 Global Governance and Europe
   6.3 NPE and the Study of the EU in World Politics
   6.4 The EU Approach to Global Governance: EU Interregionalism, EU Actorness and the CARIFORUM-EU EPA
      6.4.1 EU Global Governance: A Sui Generis Approach?
      6.4.2 EU Global Governance: The Role of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA
         I. The Export of the Regionalization Norm:
            The EPA in Form
         II. The Export of the Regionalization Norm:
            The EPA in Function
   6.5 The Joint Caribbean-EU Partnership Strategy: The Link to the CARIFORUM-EU EPA and NPE
6.6  The Functional Application of *Actorness*: Effects, Dynamics and Demonstrating Causal Relationships 280-281
6.7  Conclusion 281-283

**PART V**  Conclusion

7.  Concluding Remarks and Possible Future Directions for Research...........285-292

List of Interviewees........................................................................................302-304

Bibliography and References............................................................................305-332
### List of Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1</td>
<td>Conceptions of the Contemporary Practice of the Socialization of Caribbean Regionalism</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>Interregionalism Involving the Caribbean</td>
<td>293-299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3</td>
<td>10th EDF Programme of Support to CARIFORUM in the Implementation of the CARIFORUM–EU EPA - Key Milestones in 2012</td>
<td>209-210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4</td>
<td>Value of Imports, Exports and Balance of Trade: Jamaica vs. Trinidad and Tobago, 2000-2010</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5</td>
<td>Value of Jamaica's Imports from, Exports to, and Balance of Trade with CARICOM by Country: 2000-2010</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6</td>
<td>Value of Trinidad and Tobago's Imports from, Exports to, and Balance of Trade with CARICOM by Country: 2000-2010</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# List of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chronology of Relevant Events Impacted by Socialization</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practices regarding Contemporary Caribbean Regionalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region Leveraging Nexus <em>(Macro-level Rendering)</em></td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regionness-Leveraging Quotient(s)-Norm Nexus <em>(RLN Meso-level Rendering)</em></td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Integrative Nature of NPI-NPA-NPAS <em>(RLN Micro-level Rendering)</em></td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 'Caribbean Regional Platform': Influence and Embeddedness of the Elite Technocracy</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation regarding Caribbean External Trade Negotiations: Governance Structure, Socialization Dynamics</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Intra-regionalist Socialization Dynamics</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSME Trade Hub-cum-CARIFORUM-centric Trade Schema</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABA</td>
<td>Ancillary Bureaucratic Actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCP</td>
<td>Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians</td>
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<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States</td>
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<td>ACS</td>
<td>Association of Caribbean States</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIMS</td>
<td>Africa, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean and South China Sea</td>
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<td>AIT</td>
<td>Aid for Trade</td>
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<td>ALBA</td>
<td>Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAM</td>
<td>Banana Accompanying Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAHFS</td>
<td>Caribbean Agricultural Health and Food Safety Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALC</td>
<td>Community of Latin American and Caribbean States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARDI</td>
<td>Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development Institute</td>
</tr>
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<td>CAREC</td>
<td>Caribbean Epidemiology Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAREC</td>
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<td>CARICAD</td>
<td>Caribbean Centre for Development Administration</td>
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<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
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<td>CARIFORUM</td>
<td>Caribbean Forum of African, Caribbean and Pacific States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARPHA</td>
<td>Caribbean Public Health Agency</td>
</tr>
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<td>CARTAC</td>
<td>Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Centre</td>
</tr>
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<td>CARTFund</td>
<td>Caribbean Aid for Trade and Regional Integration Trust Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASSOS</td>
<td>Caribbean Aviation Safety and Securing Oversight System</td>
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<td>CCC</td>
<td>CARICOM Competition Commission</td>
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<td>CCCCC</td>
<td>Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre</td>
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<td>CCJ</td>
<td>Caribbean Court of Justice</td>
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<td>CCM</td>
<td>CARIFORUM Council of Ministers</td>
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<td>CDB</td>
<td>Caribbean Development Bank</td>
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<td>Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<td>CDF</td>
<td>CARICOM Development Fund</td>
</tr>
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<td>Caribbean Environmental Health Institute</td>
</tr>
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<td>CELAC</td>
<td>Community of Latin American and the Caribbean States</td>
</tr>
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<td>CFC</td>
<td>Caribbean Food Corporation</td>
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<td>CFNI</td>
<td>Caribbean Food and Nutrition Institute</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
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<td>CHRC</td>
<td>Caribbean Health Research Council</td>
</tr>
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<td>CIMIH</td>
<td>Caribbean Institute for Metrology and Hydrology</td>
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<td>CKLN</td>
<td>Caribbean Knowledge Learning Network Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLE</td>
<td>Council of Legal Education</td>
</tr>
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<td>CLI/CLIC</td>
<td>Caribbean Law Institute/Caribbean Law Institute Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COFAP</td>
<td>Council for Finance and Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>COFCOR</td>
<td>Council for Foreign and Community Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COHSOD</td>
<td>Council for Human and Social Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSLE</td>
<td>Council for Security and Law Enforcement</td>
</tr>
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<td>Caribbean Organisation of Tax Administrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>CARICOM Council for Trade and Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>College of Negotiators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Cotonou Partnership Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Caribbean Regional Drug Testing Laboratory</td>
</tr>
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<td>CRFM</td>
<td>Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRIP</td>
<td>CARIFORUM Regional Indicative Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRITI</td>
<td>Caribbean Regional Information and Translation Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRNM</td>
<td>Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CROSQ</td>
<td>CARICOM Regional Organisation for Standards and Quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSME</td>
<td>CARICOM Single Market and Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTO</td>
<td>Caribbean Tourism Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTU</td>
<td>Caribbean Telecommunications Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF/QF</td>
<td>Duty Free/Quota Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Communities</td>
</tr>
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<td>Eastern Caribbean Currency Union</td>
</tr>
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<td>ECS</td>
<td>Embassies of the Eastern Caribbean States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FAC</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Council</td>
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<td>FCR</td>
<td>Foreign and Community Relations</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Free Mobility</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTAA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area of the Americas</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Highly Indebted Poor Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>HoG</td>
<td>Heads of Government</td>
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<td>HSD</td>
<td>Human and Social Development</td>
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<td>HT</td>
<td>Hermeneutic Tradition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IICA</td>
<td>Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIR</td>
<td>Institute of International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILA</td>
<td>Individual Level of Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IMPACS</td>
<td>CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Inter)regionalism</td>
<td>Interregionalism and regionalism</td>
</tr>
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<td>IPE</td>
<td>International Political Economy</td>
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<td>International Small Island Studies Association</td>
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<td>ISLA</td>
<td>International System Level of Analysis</td>
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<td>LAC</td>
<td>Legal Affairs Committee</td>
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<td>LDCs</td>
<td>Less Developed Countries</td>
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<td>LP</td>
<td>Legal Persons</td>
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<td>MDCs</td>
<td>More Developed Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mercosur</td>
<td>Common Market of the South</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIRAB</td>
<td>migration, remittances, aid and public sector bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Moral Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>NAO</td>
<td>National Authorizing Officer</td>
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<td>National Consultations</td>
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<td>NE</td>
<td>Norm Evolution</td>
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<td>National Indicative Programmes</td>
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<td>Norm Process Assets</td>
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<td>NPAS</td>
<td>Norm Process Agenda Setting</td>
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<td>NPE</td>
<td>Normative Power Europe</td>
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<td>NPI</td>
<td>Norm Process Inputs</td>
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<td>NRA</td>
<td>New Regionalism Approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECS</td>
<td>Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTN</td>
<td>Office of Trade Negotiations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBA</td>
<td>Principal Bureaucratic Actors</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCCA</td>
<td>Permanent Committee of CARICOM Ambassadors</td>
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<td>PCS</td>
<td>Persuader Caribbean States</td>
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<td>PEM</td>
<td>Plantation Economy Model</td>
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<td>PMSC-EN</td>
<td>Prime Ministerial Sub-Committee on External Negotiations</td>
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<td>PP</td>
<td>Psychological Persons</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Phased Socialization Outputs</td>
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<td>PTB</td>
<td>Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt</td>
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<tr>
<td>QBA</td>
<td>Quasi Bureaucratic Actors</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAO</td>
<td>Regional Authorizing Officer</td>
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<td>RLN</td>
<td>Region Leveraging Nexus</td>
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<td>RPSDP</td>
<td>Regional Private Sector Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPTF</td>
<td>Regional Preparatory Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTAs</td>
<td>Regional Trade Agreements</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALISES</td>
<td>Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAT</td>
<td>Substantially All Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
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<td>SGS</td>
<td>School of Global Studies</td>
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<td>SIDS</td>
<td>Small Island Developing States</td>
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<td>SIT</td>
<td>Social Identity Theory</td>
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<td>SPS</td>
<td>Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary</td>
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<td>S/TIOILA</td>
<td>State Level of Analysis-cum-Transnational Intergovernmental Organization Interactions</td>
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<tr>
<td>SVEs</td>
<td>Small, Vulnerable Economies</td>
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<tr>
<td>S&amp;DT</td>
<td>Special and Differential Treatment</td>
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<tr>
<td>TBA</td>
<td>Technical Bureaucratic Actors</td>
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<tr>
<td>TBT</td>
<td>Technical Barriers to Trade</td>
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<td>TEI</td>
<td>Trade and Economic Integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRI</td>
<td>Trade-related Issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>TWGs</td>
<td>Technical Working Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNU-CRIS</td>
<td>United Nations University-Comparative Regional Integration Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNU-WIDER</td>
<td>United Nations University-World Institute for Development Economics Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPEI</td>
<td>University of Prince Edward Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UG</td>
<td>University of Guyana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWI</td>
<td>University of the West Indies</td>
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<tr>
<td>WIRSPA</td>
<td>West Indies Rum and Spirits Producers' Association, Inc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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If there is one undeniable truth deriving from the total West Indian historical experience, it is that, whatever the task, we do it better if we do it together.

- TIME FOR ACTION, Report of the West Indian Commission (1992, 90)
Introduction
Toward an Explanation of the 'Puzzle' and a New Research Agenda for the Study of Caribbean Regionalism

I. Purpose and Importance of the Study

Established rationalist, materialist explanations in International Relations (IR)\(^1\) have tended to ignore the world's smallest state regions. When the latter are given passing mention by realist and other conventional IR perspectives, they are thought to be poorly placed to independently/meaningfully achieve foreign policy ends. Indeed any possible dint of a winning negotiating strategy with respect to so-called 'under-dog' states, especially when they are up against larger states, tends to be written off.

In addition to paying scant attention to these kinds of states, structural realism is 'hard-wired' to overemphasize materialist explanations of the foreign policy behaviour of states. Stemming from this default position, the international system is showcased as the 'independent variable' with respect to state-derived foreign policy outcomes. More profoundly, the ideational backdrop of or, crudely put, the role of ideas and the intersubjectivity of identity with respect to international interactions involving the world's smallest state regions is not taken into account by realist-oriented explanations of that ilk. Yet, the foreign policy behaviour of states cannot be properly or accurately understood apart from ideas-driven behavior.

Owing to the fact that neo-realism continues to be extraordinarily influential and the paradigm of choice—in the mainstream current, no less—of (North American) IR scholarship, the strategic (ideas-driven) behavior of some of the world's smallest states is generally hidden from view. Where systematic scholarly attention in this vein is absent, hyperbolic depictions of the foreign policy behaviour of small states tend to run rife in mainstream explanations, which

\(^{1}\)The abbreviation 'IR' denotes the academic discipline.
present an unflattering vision of these states' lot in global politics.

Simply put, in the overall scheme of things, these groupings of states are deemed as 'inconsequential' in the so-called hierarchical international system by perspectives that miss the mark. In fairness, such theories are not well equipped to analyze these types of world regions in the first place.

What such approaches lack in explanatory value with respect to especially small world regions, like the Caribbean, some of recent vintage more than make up for. Socialization perspectives, which have mushroomed since the early 1990s and stand in sharp contrast to materialist perspectives, suggest small states should not be underestimated. Instructively, the ascension of social constructivism in IR has opened new pathways for the study of interstate relations. Of note, it has profoundly impacted: (i) how international politics is understood and explained; and, (ii) the study of certain kinds of actors in the international system, otherwise marginalized in mainstream international studies. In point of fact, constructivism has expanded the horizons for theoretically guided inquiry of small states in the international system.

That small state studies in IR has been reprised over the last two or so decades owes much, then, to the fact that constructivism's footprint has grown ever larger in the discipline (Neumann and Gstohl 2006, 14-15). Structural realism's explanatory appeal, on the other hand, has been abraded in that period. Put plainly constructivist approaches have had a strong bearing and salutary effect on the advance of small state-related IR scholarship (which came into its own in the 1960s), albeit taken up largely with sets of countries of the Global North (see Ingebritsen

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2 In taking identity, ideas and international norms seriously, social constructivism holds open the possibility that small states can be theorized as also being able to bring influence to bear in international affairs (Neumann and Gstohl 2006, 14). In point of fact, if it is that “not only relative power and/or international institutions matter, but also ideational factors, small states may gain new room to maneuver in their foreign policy” (Ibid., 14).

3 Hereinafter, social constructivism will be referred to as constructivism.
et al 2006).

Constructivist-informed empirical research on the Global South and by academics from that part of the world has historically placed a distant second in comparison, and even then there is geographical bias. For instance, Southeast Asia has attracted a disproportionate amount of scholarly attention (see, for instance, the work of Acharya (2001)). Smaller Global South regions, like the Caribbean, have not attracted research attention with respect to international affairs themed issues along these lines, even though the theory and policy-relevant 'fruits' of such a focus stand to be bountiful.

A notable exception is Lana Wylie's recent volume Perceptions of Cuba: Canadian and American Policies in Comparative Perspective (2010), which adopts a constructivist approach to analyze the markedly different state and non-state 'perceptions' that Canada and the United States have of a country in the 'Wider Caribbean', Cuba, following the 1959 Cuban revolution. She traces these different perceptions to divergent national identities, and in this vein argues that the Canadian approach to Cuba has been to constructively engage the island, while the United States has historically adopted the opposite approach, to "other" Cuba.

Instead, research on the Caribbean has over the last decade tended to utilize postcolonial/reflectivist perspectives to understand the political economy of the Region's development and international interactions (see Barrow-Giles and Marshall 2003). This comes on the heels of a period from the 1960s when dependency theory-related accounts of the Caribbean in the international system cast a long shadow over how the Region came to be theorized, in contradistinction to conventional, long-dominant Modernization theory-inspired accounts that have also commanded the research spotlight. The dissertation departs from such accounts, with a view to contributing to filling the gap in scholarship with respect to studying
Caribbean regionalism from the vantage point of constructivism.

Very little is known about Caribbean diplomacy set against a constructivist scholarly backdrop. Even less is known, in this regard, as relates to the social typification of the Caribbean along interregionalist lines. Yet it has been acknowledged that “foreign policy is constructed by our perceptions which in turn have their origins in our identities” (Wylie 2010, 19).

Instructively, the Caribbean is pursuing foreign policy ends as an 'ideational' actor at a time when many larger states/regions—often with competing geopolitical interests—have set upon to enhance their normative power. They wish to claim increased space and thus boost their standing in global politics as normative powers. The European Union (EU) is seemingly at the forefront of this effort, and it is a region to which the dissertation turns attention, analyzing its intent in this regard by undertaking an ideational and normative reading of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) interregional engagement that interlocks the EU and the Caribbean.

The seminal 2002 article by Ian Manners in the Journal of Common Market Studies laid the ground for important work on Normative Power Europe (NPE) over the last decade, though that work has had rather limited geographic and conceptual reach. Of note, the EU’s interregional engagement with the Caribbean has not been framed in these terms, and for that matter the EPA has not systematically come under scrutiny in NPE terms. The dissertation makes inroads into plugging these gaps.

In sum, this study utilizes a constructivist framework to understand the role of Caribbean regional bureaucratic actors (with a view to challenging myths and misconceptions about small state regions as passive, reactive actors) and extra-regional actors (with a view to bringing to light certain global governance agendas) with respect to the construction of 'a' Caribbean
The study is primarily concerned with systematically analyzing and explaining ideational diplomatic postures adopted by the Caribbean Region set against recent EPA negotiations and the interrelated flexing of 'normative muscle' by the EU in the context of those negotiations, and the implications thereto. The argument is developed drawing on constructivist insights and using empirical evidence, sourced mainly from interviews, to provide a more compelling, first of its kind account of Caribbean regionalism/interregionalism. The study breaks new ground regarding a constructivist research program, in this regard, providing a theoretical and empirical focus which, on the one hand, recasts the limits of the possible for Caribbean agency and, on the other, uncovers new insight into European Commission external actions in the Caribbean leveraging the normative strength of the EU.

The dissertation is a contribution to IR, but admittedly it does not neatly fit there. It is at the intersection of interregionalism, regionalism and island studies, traversing the boundaries of critical geopolitics and NPE, too. Thus the study's contribution is not limited to IR, or the small states literature therein. Its contribution can be framed against the following backdrop:

The work of the Commonwealth Secretariat and some other authors have gone a long way in opening up scholarly focus on very small developing states in the global system, albeit not strictly from the lens of IR, rather island studies (broadly conceived). Interregionalism, critical geopolitics and NPE literature have all fallen short in engaging with these types of states seriously, though the track record of regionalism studies fares better. This dissertation contributes to patching these gaps, from an IR vantage point.

II. Quo Vadis, Caribbean Integration?: A Brief Account

A. 'Bureaucratic-driven Integration': The Promethean Construct and its Set-pieces

Before proceeding any further, we need to turn our attention first and foremost to the region which my doctoral research investigates—the Caribbean. The region, as understood in the
present work, is comprised of the independent states of the Commonwealth Caribbean that are full members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), inclusive of Haiti and Suriname. The Dominican Republic is also associated with the study's notion of the Caribbean, albeit in a limited manner—to be described shortly. These are, for the most part, littoral states. They will be enumerated in short order.

As a regional movement CARICOM is something of a novelty in the Global South, establishing “itself as a beacon of cooperation among small states” (Stuart 2012, 16-17). A high level of institutionalization characterizes Caribbean integration, evidence of which is the range of formalistic institutions and associated bureaucratization in cooperation procedures and practices. In point of fact, regional organizations form the cornerstone of cooperation in CARICOM, spanning a variety of subject areas. These organizations abound. There are close to thirty regional organizations falling into four relational categories with respect to the Guyana-based CARICOM Secretariat—the administrative arm of the Community—and the Organs of the Community. Taken together these organizations make up the mainstay of the regional

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4 The present Secretary-General of CARICOM is Ambassador Irwin LaRocque, a national of the Commonwealth of Dominica. Ambassador LaRocque is also Secretary-General of CARIFORUM, and Regional Authorizing Officer (RAO) in the context of CARIFORUM for the European Development Fund (EDF) pertaining to the CARIFORUM Regional Indicative Programme (CRIP). The EDF is the primary instrument utilized in the provision of EU aid for development cooperation regarding the ACP States. The Fund is also used in connection with Overseas Countries and Territories, which depend constitutionally on four EU Member States: Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

5 Category 1 of Regional Organizations ('Institutions within the Community'): Caribbean Agricultural Health and Food Safety Agency (CAHFSA), Caribbean Aviation Safety and Security Oversight System (CASSOS), Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCC), Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), Caribbean Examinations Council (CXC), CARICOM Competition Commission (CCC), CARICOM Development Fund (CDF), CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), Caribbean Food Corporation (CFC), Caribbean Knowledge Learning Network (CKLN) Agency, Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) (it is the most recently established of the regional organizations (now a legally established entity, with the signing of the Inter-Governmental Agreement in July 2012), and is expected to commence formal operations in January 2013. It is a consolidation of five regional health institutions—Caribbean Epidemiology Centre (CAREC), Caribbean Health Research Council (CHRC), Caribbean Environmental Health Institute (CEHI), Caribbean Regional Drug Testing Laboratory (CRDTL) and Caribbean Food and Nutrition Institute (CFNI)—into one agency; Caribbean Organisation of Tax Administrators (COTA), Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism (CRFM), Caribbean Regional Information and Translation Institute (CRITI), CARICOM Regional Organisation for Standards and Quality (CROSQ), Caribbean Telecommunications Union (CTU) and Council of Legal Education (CLE); Category
bureaucracy, the staffing complement of which numbers in the hundreds. In the case of the CARICOM Secretariat, the Caribbean's foremost regional organization, there is a total staffing complement of some 320, of which around 140 are professional staff. These numbers also account for staff of the Secretariat's Barbados-based CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) Unit and Jamaica-based Office of Trade Negotiations (OTN), which has a sub-office in Barbados, too.

As outlined in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the Caribbean Community including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, there are two Principal Organs in the CARICOM construct: the Conference of Heads of Government (and its Bureau) and the Community Council of Ministers (The Community Council). Assistance is provided to the Principal Organs by four subsidiary Organs (which meet at Ministerial level), three 'bodies', as well as the CARICOM Secretariat. The Organs are: the Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP), the Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED), the Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR), the Council for Human and Social Development

2 of Regional Organizations (established by or under the auspices of the Community, and hence dubbed 'Institutions of the Community'): Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians (ACCP) (the Assembly is now defunct), Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development Institute (CARDI), Caribbean Centre for Development Administration (CARICAD), Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) and the Caribbean Institute for Metrology and Hydrology (CIMH); Category 3 of Regional Organizations ('Associate Institutions'): the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), Caribbean Law Institute/Caribbean Law Institute Centre (CLI/CLIC), Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), University of Guyana (UG) and University of the West Indies (UWI); Category 4 of Regional Organizations ('Limited Association'): Caribbean Export Development Agency (Caribbean Export) and Caribbean Tourism Organisation (CTO), which periodically request observer status to certain Community Organs. The Association of Caribbean States (ACS) can also be placed in this category. The organizational categorization enumerated above (does not necessarily find expression in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing CARICOM including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy and) is drawn, in part, from: http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/institutions.jsp?menu=community Regional organizations within the Community enjoy a closer relationship with relevant Organs of the Community than do those organizations that are of the Community, in so far as it is not stipulated that the latter should necessarily report to any of the Organs.

6 Calculation, by author, drawing on internal Secretariat staff database: 5 September 2012.

7 Expressed as the Revised Treaty, in shorthand.

8 The Community Council comprises Ministers responsible for Community Affairs, and acting on policy directions set out by the Conference it focuses to a great extent on what Article 13 of the Revised Treaty describes as "the development of Community strategic planning and co-ordination in the areas of economic integration, functional co-operation and external relations."
(COHSOD) and the Council of Ministers responsible for National Security and Law Enforcement (CONSLE). The bodies are: the Legal Affairs Committee (LAC), the Budget Committee and the Committee of Central Bank Governors.

For illustrative purposes (and I deploy this comparative referent advisedly) the aforementioned Organs and bodies can be compared to the Council of the European Union, but only in so far as the respective Council configurations provide platforms for Member State ministers to engage one another on a cross-section of policy areas and help steer the respective bloc's positioning in this regard. The resemblance between the CARICOM Organs/bodies and the Council of the European Union does not extend beyond this superficial comparison, not least because the legislative body-styled Council of the European Union has considerable ability to make EU laws working in concert with the European Parliament. The Council system within CARICOM has no such authority, nor is it formulated to work in such a manner.

These CARICOM Organs and bodies comprise the institutional structure of the Community, and they find expression in the Revised Treaty. In essence, along with regional organizations and national bureaucracies in Member States these Organs and bodies are the constitutive parts of what can be termed 'bureaucratic-driven integration' in the Region. Importantly the Organs and bodies are at the forefront of the architecture of 'bureaucratic-driven integration', in that they provide mandates that set the direction of institutional work plans/programmes nationally and regionally in the service of regional integration and development. These mandates are guided by strategic visioning for regional integration and development emanating from CARICOM Heads of Government (HoG) that routinely finds expression through a variety of leadership fora, principally the Conference of HoG.\(^9\) In this

\(^9\) As previously alluded to, provision has also been made for the Bureau of the Conference of HoG of CARICOM, or
regard, there is an established arrangement where a Chairperson of the 'Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM'—the Conference being the "supreme" Organ of the Community—is in place, the turnaround for which is six months. The Chairperson is him/herself an HoG, and the convention is that during the given HoG's tenure the annual HoG summit (typically held in early July, starting from around 4 July, the anniversary date of the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas which established CARICOM) is convened in his/her country, and it typically comes to a close on 6 July. A mid-term summit dubbed the Intersessional Meeting of regional leaders is also held, either in February or March of each year. It is less formal than the Regular summit Meeting in July, and shorter in duration.

The Conference of HoG is, then, at the helm of 'bureaucratic-driven integration'; the full extent of this leadership role captured in Article 12 of the Revised Treaty: "The Conference shall determine and provide policy direction for the Community". Instructively, the HoG is directly inserted into the integration milieu by virtue of a Quasi-cabinet of the CARICOM Conference of HoG, wherein individual HoG are responsible for regional portfolios. These portfolios consist of sectors that have been deemed critical to the Region's contemporary integration and development, and as such HoG with assigned portfolio responsibilities serve essentially as 'champions' for integration in the sectors concerned and, by extension, initiatives intended to catalyze the sector's advancement in the context of integration and development. Presently, the

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CARICOM Bureau in shorthand. This is a platform that comprises the current Chairman of CARICOM and the immediately outgoing and incoming Chairmen of the Conference, as well as the CARICOM Secretary General, respectively. Meetings of the Bureau generally take place twice a year, to coincide with the assumption of the new Chairperson of the Conference, or, at the very least, be convened during the term of the sitting Chairperson. Meetings of the Bureau also take place against the backdrop of certain emergencies, and so the convening of this body is, essentially, on an as needs basis above and beyond the twice yearly convening. Please note, reference to the Bureau here should not be confused with another 'Bureau', the Bureau of COFCOR. The Bureau in the latter case advances issues germane to COFCOR, in between regular meetings of this Ministerial Council. In the years following the establishment of the Bureau of the Conference of HoG, regional Foreign Ministers determined that they needed a Bureau pertaining to COFCOR.

10 For the rotation schedule for the Chairmanship for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2014, refer to http://caricom.org/isp/community/chairmanship_rotation_schedule.jsp
regional portfolios are: Agriculture, Agricultural Diversification and Food Security (including the Regional Transformation Programme and Bananas); Community Development and Cultural Cooperation (including Culture, Gender, Youth and Sport); Energy; External Trade Negotiations; Human Resource Development, Health and HIV/AIDS; Justice and Governance; Labour (Including intra-Community Movement of Skills); Security (Drugs and Illicit Arms); Services; Science and Technology (including Information and Communications); Single Market and Economy (including Monetary Union); Sustainable Development (including Environment and Disaster Management and Water); Tourism (including Land, Cruise, African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP)/EU Partnership Agreement provisions etc); and Transport (Maritime and Aviation).

The Quasi-cabinet is not altogether unique. Although there are important differences, for illustrative reasons it can be likened to the European Council in so far as both are constituted of Heads of State or Government of Member States of the respective blocs. What is more, as far as function is concerned like the European Council, the Quasi-cabinet sets out the general political direction and priorities for the bloc. Any comparisons beyond this are not practical, not least because the European Council is an institution (further to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009) at the helm of a supranational project that is the EU. The European Council is headed by a President, presently Mr Herman Van Rompuy. Also within the fold of the European Council is the President of the Commission, presently Mr José Manuel Barroso. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is also inserted into the European Council. Indeed, the Quasi-cabinet has more in common with the pre-Lisbon European Council that took form in the years following the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), wherein the European Council assumed a more robust and defined role with respect to setting down the
political direction and priorities for the bloc. The Quasi-cabinet plays a central role in handing down political directives and setting down related priorities for, importantly, the flagship policy area of the bloc—the CSME.

The signing by regional HoG, over a decade ago, of the Revised Treaty laid the ground for the regional bloc's policy agenda in its present form. That agenda hinges, for the most part, on advancement of the CSME—effectively, the notion of a Common Market has given way to the CSME. Notwithstanding, the contemporary CARICOM bloc is taken up, too, with integration and functional cooperation imperatives in a cross-section of policy areas, namely trade integration and the promotion of economic development, the advancement of human and social development, as well as the coordination of foreign policy. The Secretariat Directorates of Trade and Economic Integration (TEI), the Caribbean Forum of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (CARIFORUM), Human and Social Development (HSD) and Foreign and Community Relations (FCR), respectively, are indicative of the institutional focus lent to the aforementioned thematic areas.

With respect to the CSME, the main objectives are: “full use of labour (full employment) and full exploitation of the other factors of production (natural resources and capital); competitive production leading to greater variety and quantity of products and services to trade with other countries. It is expected that these objectives will in turn provide improved standards of living and work and sustained economic development”. Therefore, the CSME encapsulates the steps and process for base building with respect to the contemporary regional bloc.

In decoupling the SM from the SE in the CSME, the following facets can be flagged: (i) with respect to the “Caribbean Single Market, [it] rest[s] on five pillars:…..the free movement of

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11 Refer to http://www.caricom.org/jsp/single_market/single_market_index.jsp?menu=csme
goods, free movement of services, free movement of capital, free movement of skilled labour and the free movement of enterprises”,12 (ii) the Single Economy dimension is much more ambitious (delving, for instance, into harmonisation of fiscal and monetary policies) and is farther off, with respect to being given effect in the agenda of the integration movement.

Concrete and positive steps toward the consolidation of the regional integration project—though far from achieving the ambitions of some—have been taken. At a Special Retreat of the Region’s political directorate on the priorities for the Community held in Guyana on 21-22 May 2011, HoG “affirmed the importance of the CSME in advancing the development of the Region…..and [t]hey reiterated the importance of ensuring a fully effective and efficient Single Market which is critical to making the Region more competitive and better equipped to compete in the global market place” (CARICOM 2011a).

In assessing the status of implementation of the CSME at the Thirty-Third Regular Meeting of the Conference of HoG in July 2012, HoG underscored the following elements, among others, for “strategic focus” regarding an effective CSME:

- The expansion of the categories of skilled Community nationals, including the introduction of additional categories;
- Adherence by all Member States to the decisions that make CARICOM nationals welcome in other Member States. The decisions include the automatic grant of a period of six months upon entering a Member State, subject to security exceptions;
- Creating the environment for competitive production;
- Making key institutions more effective;
- Acceptance of the principle that Member States able to proceed with integration at a faster rate should be allowed to do so, provided that the door is always left open for other Member States to join when they are able.

(CARICOM 2012)

12 Refer to http://www.caricom.org/jsp/single_market/single_market_index.jsp?menu=csme
However, the regionalism project has pushed up against some challenges in recent years with respect to the pace and depth of integration. Of note, concerted action with respect to integration has, at times, been in short supply. In a Summit Communiqué issued in July 2011 HoG also signaled “their intention to review the schedule towards full implementation of the Single Economy, putting a pause on specific elements, such as the creation of a Single Currency” (CARICOM 2011a, 2). In fairness, HoG “highlighted the critical importance of advancing implementation of those elements of the Single Economy which would create an environment more conducive to investment and job creation” (Ibid., 2).

B. “Crucial Moments” on the Path Toward Integration and Milestones in the History of Integration: A Snapshot

The contemporary Caribbean integration movement owes a debt to the early visionaries of Caribbean regional integration in the first half of the twentieth century, among them Dr Eric Williams—the first Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago. In 1942, he proposed “an economic federation of all the Caribbean areas”—understood as the insular (or ethno-historic) Caribbean (Moore and Wilmot 1998, cited in Gaztambide-Geigel 2004, 140). As a matter of fact, today's independent Caribbean States have had longstanding experience with integration initiatives/arrangements of one form or another that predate the present one. The West Indies Federation is one of the more high profile ones.

The idea of a West Indies Federation can be traced back to the 1940s. Indeed, the initiative took root on the heels of the end of World War II. British policy in respect of the future of what were then its West Indian colonies was to link their independence with their integration into a federal political system (Will 1991, 5-10). The British Caribbean Federation Act of 1956 put in place the groundwork for the Federation which was comprised of Antigua and Barbuda,
Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, the then St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Saint Lucia, St Vincent and Trinidad and Tobago.

The Federation was short-lived, lasting from 1958 to 1962. Its failure and the circumstances that heralded the beginning of the end of the Federation loom large with respect to its notoriety, and in a nutshell reflect a resistance on the part of respective territories at the time to cede policy making authority in key areas to the Federal Government, an administrative structure established at the behest of Britain. That the West Indies Federation project came to such an unceremonious end not only affected the prospects for integration in the immediate aftermath, but dealt a severe blow to hopes for and attempts at far-reaching, decisive steps toward integration in the decades since, in so far as the Federation's 'curtain call' and the disagreements that led up to same have served to temper overly ambitious attempts at integration.

Following the demise of the Federation (precipitated by the exit of two of its largest members, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, and its dissolution not too long thereafter) the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) was founded in 1965, with the signing of the Dickenson Bay Agreement. Effectively, regional integration was re-envisioned. For one regional states sought to exert 'home-grown' notions of and control over integration, thus determining the limits of the possible regarding integration peregrinations. Arguably, the vision for integration was scaled back when regional states took ownership of the integration movement. The bloc, however, did evolve—guided in its formative years by a cohort of scholar-politicians who strongly associated their political legacies with achievements just as much in the national space as the regional space.

CARIFTA would almost a decade later become CARICOM, with the signing of the
original Treaty of Chaguaramas by founding members\textsuperscript{13} Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago on 4 July 1973. At this time some of the states had already secured independence, while many others were on the verge of doing so. The effect of the signing of the original Treaty of Chaguaramas was the establishment of CARICOM, including the Common Market. CARICOM came into effect on 1 August 1973, and has since formed the basis upon which modern Caribbean integration has unfolded in the years since. Instructively, the decision taken by regional leaders in Grande Anse, Grenada in 1989 to establish the CSME was the trigger for the modern regional integration movement to be further deepened (Stuart 2012, 23). Over a decade later, another seminal event took place. In 2001, the original Treaty establishing CARICOM was revised. In effect over a half-dozen protocols were combined, forming the 'Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas'.

This Revised Treaty is the constituent document for CARICOM. With the advent of the Revised Treaty, there is an agreed plan for the modern-day integration movement. As to the future, there is a bourgeoning debate on the need to revisit the Revised Treaty in light of emergent opportunities and challenges. The change management process currently underway under the aegis of the CARICOM Secretariat and geared at the transformation of CARICOM will no doubt also spur this debate, given that the process (expected to span two-plus years) is intended to advance the vision of a renewed CARICOM and, by extension, identify ways in which the Secretariat will have to adjust. It is instructive, in this regard, that the agenda for change has two primary expected outcomes: i) A five-year strategic plan for the Community; and ii) A transformed Secretariat with clear goals and purpose, as well as the capacity and will to play a lead role in implementing the Community Strategic Plan.

\textsuperscript{13} These states are the so-called 'Big Four' that, as such, are often looked up to by the other states to provide leadership to the integration movement.
Owing to its historical backdrop, which has been traced above, CARICOM is widely regarded as “the longest surviving integration movement among developing countries and is only surpassed by the European Union in longevity” (Housty 2005, 137). Like the experience of European integration, Caribbean integration has deep roots that go even further back among some countries—predating the twentieth century. Consider that as far back as the seventeenth century, confederation was attempted on Caribbean colonies (across both the Greater and Lesser Antilles, including Guyana and what was then known as British Honduras) by the English (Taglioni 2000, 213). Indeed, a string of political union-inspired integration efforts were pursued that involved territories in the Caribbean, through the course of the 1700s and 1800s (Ibid., 213). Dating to “the nineteenth century there were many proposals for federation of the British West Indies” (Braithwaite 1957, 133). Some saw the light of day. For example, “[i]n 1871 the federation of the Leeward Islands was actually achieved,” though it was subsequently “defederated” (Ibid., 133-135). Similarly, there were calls in the nineteenth century for an Antillean Federation, to comprise the Spanish-speaking Caribbean States of Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico; a Greater Antilles Federation was also contemplated, to which Haiti and Jamaica would be added—in the late 1800s, the inclusion of the British West Indies was also in the cards (Garcia 2008, 58). The US's 'gunboat diplomacy' and more assertive imperial designs in the Greater Antilles in the late 1800s and early 1900s would, ultimately, weigh heavily in scuttling efforts to get the Antillean Federation off the ground (Ibid., 59).

All told, with respect to the Caribbean 'regionalism story' it is one that surely is marked by actors oscillating between revival and retreat in respect of regional integration and leveraging it to create strategic advantage, especially when confronted by the 'guava season’ (a term used in the Caribbean to denote hard economic times).
C. Integration Peregrinations: Common Purpose, if not Common Strategic Approach

What is perhaps most apparent in integration efforts which pre-date CARIFTA is the 'hand of Empire'. It comes as no surprise, then, that Caribbean peoples have been unapologetic in their quest to have command over *their own destiny* and seek to leave their imprint on integration initiatives. This latter narrative continues to find expression today, in so far as policy makers and ordinary citizens alike are seized of the existential threats facing their relatively tiny countries 'going it alone', so to speak, in the international system as opposed to banding together and thus seeking strength in numbers. West Indians are quick to invoke the adage "*We must Integrate or Perish*", which was made famous by the late Forbes Burnham (former President of Guyana) forty-five years ago. In a much-cited speech, the title of which the aforementioned adage stems from, Burnham underscored:

> [T]he Caribbean can no longer, like the proverbial ostrich, hide its head in our beautiful sandy beaches and ignore the trends and impelling forces of change in the world economic order. Either we weld ourselves into a regional grouping serving primarily Caribbean needs, or lacking a common positive policy, have our various territories and nations drawn hither and thither into, and by, other large groupings where the peculiar problems of the Caribbean are lost and where we become the objects of neo-colonialist exploitation, and achieve the pitiable status of international mendicants.

(Burnham 1967, 1-2)

European integration (the most mature form of integration, as compared to any other regional bloc) and Caribbean integration have a common narrative of sorts, then, in so far as integration has been pursued in the light of *existential threats*—albeit very different ones. For Europe, the experience with back-to-back world wars in the first half of the last century cast a long shadow over policymaking that set the course toward and provided impetus for integration and the associated 'ideational story' of a rule of law-based Europe, as envisioned by 'big thinkers' like
Schuman and Monnet. For the Caribbean, economic imperatives have loomed large with respect to the *steps* and *process* for base building, in so far as what compelled integration was an interest in coming together to better guard against and surmount the vagaries of an unforgiving global system. Caribbean States generally are committed to staying the course in their integration peregrinations and embracing the promise of a shared future.

The parallels between European and Caribbean integration, however, end here. The respective blocs each took radically different paths, with respect to how 'high the bar was set' for integration. From the very outset, the architects of the European integration project had their sights set on supranationalism. For the most part the trajectory of modern Caribbean integration has been considerably less ambitious, in recent years seemingly stuck in mid-gear as the grouping's states try to see a way forward in respect of weaning themselves from the 'gravitational pull' of state sovereignty.

**D. The Tale of Woe or the Tower of Babel: Sovereignty and the Elusive Promised Land of Supranationalism**

As two scholars astutely point out in a recent work, "[t]he esteem in which Caribbean states and their leaders seem to hold their sovereignty cannot be underestimated" (Bishop and Payne 2010, 4). This foregrounding of state sovereignty has had a zero-sum effect, of sorts, on regional integration. H. E. Ralph Gonsalves, the Prime Minister of St Vincent & the Grenadines, is on

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14 There are some exceptions in respect of the level of integration ambition amongst sub-groupings of CARICOM countries, notably among the Windward Islands in the late 1980s when political union was under serious consideration. More recently, in the early part of the last decade, Trinidad and Tobago and a sub-grouping of Eastern Caribbean islands pursued an initiative for regional integration among themselves. That initiative has been absent from the spotlight since the former Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago and one of the initiatives' leading architects, Patrick Manning, was voted out of office. In point of fact, the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)—which has an architecture all its own that is steering sub-regional 'bureaucratic-driven integration'—has embarked on a level of integration that has long outpaced the CARICOM bloc at large. The operationalization of the OECS Economic Union in 2011 has served to provide a fillip to the sub-regional grouping's integration peregrinations.
record as saying “[t]he course we have taken to view CARICOM as a community of independent sovereign states, that is, if we proceed without a supranational authority to which some measure of sovereignty is transferred to direct the operation we can still succeed but it will take much longer and there will be greater pain and frustration. We have chosen to proceed in the most difficult way to a single market and economy” (Stoneman, Pollard and Inniss 2012, 10-11).

At issue are setbacks over the last two-plus decades in the advancement of regional governance. The nub of the issue is, to use a term deployed by a regional statesman, an “authoritative machinery”15 (what has been termed as the Caribbean Commission) to implement the decisions of HoG with respect to facets of the integration project—such that the overarching project may unfold relatively seamlessly—has proven elusive. Regional policy makers at the very highest levels remain supine on such an executive body, critics charge. Implementation has, as a consequence, fallen behind. The fact is in as much as action regionally across a range of policy areas is contingent on decisive implementation, the lack thereof is the Region's Achilles heel.

For some the pace of integration has slowed considerably, as a result of the impasse on the establishment of the Caribbean Commission. Hence, some integration watchers contend “CARICOM has yet to live up to its economic integration goals” (Bravo 2005/2006, 148). Others are more critical. Bishop and Payne call into question the emphasis placed by individual Caribbean States on sovereignty, considering that they have to contend with an unforgiving “global political order” (2010, 5). Such a stubborn allegiance to sovereignty is doing more harm than good with respect to the regional integration project, they note.

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15 Edward Seaga, an elder regional statesmen and the former Jamaican Prime Minister, has said “[a]t the present level, CARICOM functions in pieces and patches without any overriding authoritative machinery” (Seaga 2006).
In point of fact the West Indian Commission's landmark report—entitled *Time for Action*, published in 1992—"[a]cknowledging....that CARICOM had lost much of the dynamism displayed at the time of its launch as a regional movement in the early 1970s and had by common consent retreated into little more than ritual by the early 1990s,...proposed a radical step to reinvigorate the whole integration process, namely, the establishment of a permanent Caribbean Commission of three former political leaders designed to drive forward the development of the region" (Payne and Sutton 2007, 2).

In effect this Caribbean Commission would put the bloc on track to an integration arrangement transcending simple intergovernmentalism. At its core, though, CARICOM remains "a Community of sovereign states." Hence the proposal for such an executive agency has proven contentious, given that sovereignty would increasingly have to give way to a supranational regional agenda. The proposal for a Caribbean Commission was, therefore, rejected by HoG who met shortly following the West Indian Commission issuing its Final Report (*Time for Action*) to consider that Report. Since that time, the Caribbean Commission has failed to take root as there has not been a paradigm shift at the very highest levels of the Community wherein supranationalism would be the preferred developmental path over sovereignty.

All the while integration has suffered from the so-called 'implementation deficit', given that the implementation of decisions taken with respect to the integration project has in key

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16 The Report has been described as "essentially [laying] out a comprehensive programme of economic and social development for the region and then specify[ing] the institutional and other machinery required to deliver it" (Stoneman, Pollard and Inniss 2012, 26).

17 The deep-seated attachment in the Region to sovereignty of states is reflected in a much-cited Declaration issued in 2003, the so-called *Rose Hall Declaration on Regional Governance and Integrated Development*. While it spoke to "improving governance," with a view to "deepening the integration process," there was a reaffirmation of CARICOM as a "Community of Sovereign States, and of Territories" (CARICOM 2003, 2). The Declaration made clear "that the deepening of regional integration will proceed in this political and juridical context" (Ibid., 2).
instances not come about because the Secretariat has no enforcement powers, due to its status as an intergovernmental body.\textsuperscript{18} That decisions are effected at all depends on whether HoG are seized of the need to do so and that they are willing to expend the necessary political capital to do so. It is often the case that the allegiance of the political directorate is to sovereignty (driven by \textit{domestic considerations}) over supranationalism (driven by \textit{regional considerations}), such that in the realm of reality there is often a gap at the very highest levels of the architecture of 'bureaucratic-driven integration' between the \textit{stated desire} to advance on the integration project and the \textit{actual steps} being taken to that end.

Ironically, HoG themselves have repeatedly expressed frustration in this regard. Recently, at the Opening of the Thirty-Second Meeting of the Conference of HoG in July 2011 the Prime Minister of St Vincent and the Grenadines, H.E. Ralph Gonsalves said that the Region “had to appreciate the combined and uneven development of the integration movement, which could be attributed to domestic considerations taking priority over optimal regional activity, and stressed the importance of leadership by the four [founding] Member States” (CARICOM 2011b).

It is fair to say that the experience of the West Indies Federation, more precisely the factors that led to its demise, has had a lasting effect on the collective psyche of the political directorate, in particular its outlook on integration in the direction of supranationalism. Instructively, \textit{Time for Action} concluded that political integration was a goal “out of reach.” What is more, it rejected the notion of a “return to federalism.” Rather, the Report called attention to “instrumental integration,” where integration would be pursued at “practical levels affecting everyday lives” (West Indian Commission 1992, 22-25). That approach to integration proved less

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\textsuperscript{18} The CARICOM Secretariat is no substitute for the much vaunted Caribbean Commission. It is an intergovernmental organization, and as such has limited authority in respect of \textit{driving} integration.
bothersome for HoG, as the ‘red line’ for them was going the route of the Caribbean Commission. They favoured the creation of a CARICOM Bureau, instead.

The Bureau was operationalized shortly following the issuance of the *Time for Action* Report, i.e. in December 1992. The Bureau's functions are set out in Article 12 of the *Revised Treaty*, and they encapsulate the following: (i) initiating proposals, for advancement typically in the context of the Ministerial Councils; (ii) updating consensus of Member States, usually on issues that are to be determined at the level of the Conference; (iii) in an “expeditious” and “informed” manner, work to facilitate *implementation* of Community decisions; and (iv) provide the Secretariat with guidance on policy issues.

The decision by regional leaders to put the Bureau in place was taken at a Special Meeting of CARICOM HoG in October 1992, and that decision heralded a mechanism ostensibly charged with a crucial remit that in theory should have smoothed out an otherwise uneven record of implementation in respect of any number of areas of import to the Community. However because the Bureau was created as a compromise mechanism that lacks the powers that the *Time for Action* Report envisioned for the mooted Caribbean Commission, whether it has in fact provided the necessary impetus for implementation two decades since its establishment is an open question.

Recognizing that a lot more had to be done to build confidence with respect to efforts to facilitate an enabling environment in the Community that could plug the ‘implementation deficit’, HoG proposed the establishment of the Permanent Committee of CARICOM Ambassadors (PCCA). The Committee would complement the Bureau mechanism; in effect, reinforcing it by facilitating in streamlining follow-through at the level of state institutions. The PCCA proposal received a tepid response in the Region, and was eventually unable to take flight. That the PCCA
initiative was essentially stillborn did not do much to assuage concerns that not enough was meaningfully being done to close the gap between initiative-setting and implementation of same.

At its very highest levels, 'bureaucratic-driven integration' in the Region is in the midst of feeling a way forward to secure a 'stop-gap', at the very least, to patch the divide between competing narratives of integration that at one extreme pivot on the perceptual and at the other seek to forthrightly put into practice what is preached.

III. Definitions, Concepts and Analytical Scope

A. The Basics

Having examined key dynamics and features of the Caribbean Region, I now turn attention to other concepts and analytical underpinnings of the study. Some terminology is first explored.

Constructivism\(^\text{19}\) and the so-called Wittgensteinian constructivists\(^\text{20}\) can provide great explanatory power for the study of Caribbean (inter)regionalism.\(^\text{21}\) Constructivism's attempt to distill "how....states know what they want [and show, in this regard, that they turn to structures] not of power, but of meaning and social value" (Finnemore 1996, 2) is especially instructive for our purposes. So too is drawing on insights from Social Identity Theory (SIT), the discourse-theoretic approach of poststructuralism and Habermas' social theory, all of which are used in conjunction with and in order to support the study's constructivist approach.

\(^{19}\) This is taken up with the study of the effect of norms on actors' identities, but also interests and behaviour (Christiansen et al 1999b, 535).

\(^{20}\) They understand speech acts to ascribe meaning (Ibid., 535). Christiansen et al say of Wittgensteinian constructivists that they are seized of the need to understand the ways in which the world is constructed. Hence the importance of speech acts, from which social meaning is derived. This type of constructivist is contrasted with what Christiansen et al refer to as the other side of the dichotomy, sociological constructivists. They are described as being more seized of the importance of positivist-styled empiricism as a means of exploring the effect of no norms on actors, though they acknowledge the 'social constructedness' of reality.

\(^{21}\) I use (inter)regionalism in this study to refer, in shorthand, to interregionalism and regionalism.
Before we engage with these themes any further, some definitions and concepts need to be established from the outset. They are enumerated below:

**Caribbean Region:** The Caribbean Region is often loosely defined, so for purposes of this study unless otherwise specified, the Caribbean is understood as comprising the independent states of the Commonwealth Caribbean that are full members of CARICOM, inclusive of Haiti and Suriname. They are enumerated here, as follows: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, St Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago. The Caribbean is, ostensibly, an island region (with the exception of Belize, Guyana and Suriname, which are continental states). While a West Indian regional space has been outlined here, the intention is not to exaggerate its geographic terms. Rather, I am interested in the social processes, as relates to shared state identities and interests, sloshing around notions of the Caribbean that help to 'construct' it as a region and assign it meaning. (As an informational note, when the independent CARICOM states are paired with the Dominican Republic—typically in the context of the EPA and Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA)—the regional entity is referred to as CARIFORUM. This regional configuration will also be examined in the study).

**Regional Identity (Formation):** This term refers to economic (namely developmental), social, political and cultural idiosyncratic referents that together are used by agents to (re)produce, anchor and project the historical and contemporary ideational and experiential collective meanings of elements/institutions of a transnational space and its peoples, in time. That spatial consciousness takes form by binary relations being emphasized by one region, such that the distinctive meaning ascribed to that regional place emanates just as much from perceived discontinuity narratives applied in establishing another and in determining what is expected of that other region in relation to itself.

**Norm:** A norm is defined as "a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891). Norms can have a "regulative" effect (i.e. setting out expectations or standards of proper actor behaviour, according to a given identity narrative) and a "constitutive" effect (i.e. norms that act not unlike rules that actually define an actor's identity; and that actor's actions are specified in such a way that a given identity is recognizable to others) (Katzenstein 1996, 5). As an intersubjective belief, a norm is animated through social practice.

**Regionness:** This is a term attributed to Hettne et al, and refers to "the degree to which a particular region in various respects constitutes a coherent unit" (1999, xv). It has also been noted that regionness effectively transforms a geographical area; formerly a "passive object" it becomes an "active subject" voicing transnational interests (Hettne and Soderbaum 2002, 38). While I am seized of both of these characterizations of regionness, the second one is especially pertinent to this study and how it invokes the Caribbean. Regionness is applied in this study exclusively in relation to the Caribbean.
**Actorness**: This term is defined by Soderbaum and Stalgren “as conscious efforts to shape the external world in accordance with the values, interests, and identity of the actor” (2010, 1). The EU is deemed to exhibit actorness, and the term is applied in this study exclusively in relation to the EU.

**Normative Power Europe (NPE)**: Normative power is understood in the present study not in terms of neorealist notions of material power, but rather as the wherewithal (which is understood to rest with and is framed in the context of the EU) to project onto others, with authority and impact, ideas of a foundational and normative nature. Instructively, those on the receiving end are often compelled to institutionally embed projected values.

**The EU**: For our purposes, the EU is not a political community, per se. In deploying the term, I am interested in ontologically conceptualizing and representing the EU as the ‘bureaucratic’ actor of note, set against the governance milieu in that regional space; and so, I am most interested in its institutionalized form, the European Commission. The Commission is seen in this study as being emblematic of the EU, perceived as an administrative and a normative (and not so much a geographic) space/construct. The ‘ideas’ of this space/construct are projected by the Commission, and solidified by norms. I wish, at this juncture, to further nuance why the study is taken up with the Commission in the way that it is. The study focuses on bureaucratic elite actors, and on the EU side the bureaucratic actors that the Caribbean side was most regularly in contact with as counterparts during EPA negotiations were those from the Commission. This remains the case, to a large extent, in the implementation period. It is against this backdrop that the European Commission has the prominence that it does in the study, and that focus should not be taken to mean that the ‘jigsaw puzzle’ of institutions like the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice are somehow not also institutions of consequence which make up the broader composition of the EU (which includes states) and the range of European identity(ies). One final caveat: The EU which is the subject of analysis in the present work is also temporally specified—i.e. the EU of the post-Maastricht period (1993 onwards).

**B. Strands of 'Actors', in Light of the Levels of Analysis as an Analytical Device: 'Choosing between the Trees or the Forest'**

With the aforementioned terms/explanations in mind, I want now to make an initial foray into pairing them with key analytical referents of the study. The work of David Singer (1960) is pivotal in setting the stage.

His review of Kenneth Waltz’s seminal work *Man, the State, and War* let loose an instructive quip that drew attention to the significance of “the level of social organization” deployed as a “point of entry into any study of the subject” (*Ibid.*, 453). Singer would later
publish an influential article on the levels of analysis pertinent to the study of IR (1961), which was inspired by and owes an intellectual debt to Waltz's analysis of the causes of war framed against three 'images', i.e. the first image (the individual); the second image (the state) and the third image (the international system). Indeed, Singer's concept of 'levels of analysis' and Waltz's 'images' concept are, in many respects, synonymous.

The opening salvo in Singer's 1961 piece is especially instructive. He notes, "[i]n any area of scholarly inquiry, there are always several ways in which the phenomena under study may be sorted and arranged for purposes of systemic analysis" (Singer 1961, 77). Singer's use of metaphor, in this vein, aids significantly in making his point; of note, he alludes to the investigator "choos[ing] between....the trees or the forest" (Ibid., 77).

It is useful to pause here to acknowledge one of the terms in the title of Singer's 1961 work: 'Problem'. He, no doubt, was alluding to several things in referencing this term, not the least of which is a "propensity" for students of IR "for vertical drift" spanning a plane of micro to macro levels, and vice versa, in the conduct of analysis. Of this, I am no less guilty. I will be oscillating between the 'trees' or the 'forest', so to speak, at various points in the study. For this, I make no apologies. The complexity of the international transactions under investigation has necessitated such an approach; it would be quite arbitrary to come down solely on and deploy one level of analysis at the expense of the other.

Indeed Singer, no less, stopped short of favouring one level of analysis over another. Perhaps this was also part of the 'Problem' to which he alluded: depending on the level of abstraction, one level of analysis may be more fitting to deploy (in an explanatory sense) relative to another, at anyone given point. That the level of abstraction in any comprehensive analysis is fluid means that the "resting place" (to use Singer's terminology) in terms of the level of analysis

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cannot be static.

It should also be kept in mind that for Singer the level of analysis problem is intimately tied to the examination and/or explanation of state behavior, namely how it is to be done. For our purposes, this notion can be extended/applied to the Region. Namely, the level of analysis approach can be used to study Caribbean regionalism.

In borrowing from Singer's insights, I want to nuance the levels of analysis concept once more to suit my purpose. With the aforementioned in mind, for purpose of analysis of Caribbean regionalism we can turn to the lens of 'Individual' Level of Analysis, i.e. ILA (seized of individual protagonists, elite technocrats as I call them in the Caribbean context, otherwise referred to as 'norm entrepreneurs' or epistemic communities). European Commission functionaries (namely, Commissioners and technocrats of the Directorate Generals Trade and Development, as well as officials from the Delegation offices of the EU spread across the Caribbean, namely Delegation offices to Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, respectively) also fall in this category. There is also the 'State' Level of Analysis, to which I tack on 'Transnational' Intergovernmental Organization Interactions, i.e. S/TIOILA (seized of unit-styled perceptions of respective protagonists, i.e. states or intergovernmental organizations as having characteristics/identities). Finally, there is the 'International System' Level of Analysis, i.e. ISLA (seized of certain global agendas, which play out at the behest of certain global players, e.g. the EU). As the study unfolds, I oscillate between all three to convey insight with respect to in-group/out-group socialization practices and the end result in respect of same, which I elaborate on in empirical chapters of this study.

ILA is the point of reference for analysis at the level of the 'trees'. At this level of
analysis, the study takes its cue from Peter Haas' (1992) rendering of epistemic communities, though it expressly draws on constructivist insights. In this regard, the study is most interested in setting its gaze on elite technocrats operating in the Caribbean 'bureaucratic' space by way of intergovernmental institutions (informed by regional policy frameworks) and public institutions (informed by national policy frameworks), and determining how they influence, champion and marshal the Caribbean state's socialization (i.e. the dynamics and practices) in relation to certain inter- and intra-regional engagements, respectively. The themes of regional identity (formation) and norms are interrogated, against the backdrop of regionness, with a view to addressing some basic questions: Who are those agents? Do some, such as top-tier policy makers and high-level technical experts/officials in regional and national bureaucracies, play a more prominent role than other actors in devising and normalizing in-group/out-group regionalism-based socialization practices, in the service of negotiating ends/policy outcomes, such as norms and accords that help 'level the playing field' for Caribbean States? If this is the case, can they be ranked in order of influence and embeddedness (or insertion) in the so-called Caribbean Regional Platform, a term that is a catchall for a universe of actors involved in interregional and/or intra-regional policy engagements with respect to the Caribbean? How can such a framing help to better understand the praxis of regionalism and, stemming from this, the construction of the Caribbean Region at the hands of administrative structures of that region, or, for that matter, an extra-regional administrative and normative space?

My analytical gaze also shifts up the 'totem pole of abstraction', if you will, referring not just to states in the first person but ascribing agency to regions. In terms of this S/TIOILA approach, I engage in a level of abstraction that envisions blocs of states as the protagonists. In looking at the experience with the CARIFORUM-EU EPA—the study's analytical referent when
it comes to interregionalism—the Caribbean Region is said to have a regionness, and along the
lines of the sociological/constructivist turn in IR theory is assigned an identity; a set of
characteristics that influence its foreign policy behaviour. In references to the 'Caribbean
Region', more often than not I seek to frame *that region* as 'actor'. It is not an actor in the
*semantic abstract*, though. Rather, it was institutionally anchored by way of the then Caribbean
Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM). By the same token, in references to the EU it is also
implied that it has an institutional form upon which its agency is anchored, i.e. the European
Commission. In turning to an analysis of the CARICOM Development Fund (CDF)—the
impetus for understanding intra-regional Caribbean state relations in this study—the notion of a
cohesive regional identity in respect of the Caribbean is destabilized/problematized and the
prominence of groups of states brought to light as *the* protagonists rather than the 'region' and an
institution (i.e. the CRNM), *per se*. Thus the strands of 'actors' identified with respect to
S/TIOILA are: the Caribbean Region à la CARICOM, CARIFORUM, clusters of states within
the Caribbean (such as the OECS) and the EU.

In these parts of the study, I move more concertedly to cloak and infuse my analysis in
constructivist terms in a bid to decipher, showcase and instantiate *socialization dynamics and
practices* as relates to instances of Caribbean interregional and intra-regional engagements dealt
with in the relevant empirical chapter of this study, Chapter 5. Some terms that I use in these
parts of the analysis are *small state-brokered social learning, normative persuasion*, and *norms*. I
invoke the duality of *socializers* and *socializees*, for instance framing the Caribbean as socializer
during EPA negotiations while the EU is understood as coming to occupy the role of socializee.

The study's levels of analysis gaze shifts higher still, aiming for the 'forest over the trees',
when the focus moves to global agendas, namely the EU's global governance agenda. Leaning
analytically on the ISLA approach, this agenda is described in very specific terms: NPE. Indeed the EU is framed as a normative power in Chapter 6, with a view to drawing attention to a particular view of the Union's role in the world. NPE is found to loom large in respect of the concept of actorness. The primary protagonist, in respect of NPE agenda-setting, is understood to be the European Commission, in so far as the exercise of EU actorness occurs at the hands of its functionaries, it is argued. Rather than viewing the Commission as a 'black box', as set out in the Treaty of the European Union it can be conceived of as having two tiers. One constitutes a political arm, namely the over two-dozen commissioners. The second is a bureaucratic arm, which is comprised of technocrats. The two work in concert in effecting the EU's actorness. They represent an epistemic community all their own. During the negotiation of the EPA, CARIFORUM came in contact most with the bureaucracy at political and technical levels from the Directorate Generals Trade and Development, respectively.

In terms of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA, the forthcoming analysis focuses to a significant degree on how that interregionalist engagement is implicated in NPE and the connection thereto in respect of the EU promoting its vision of the identity-cum-regionalization orientation of the 'official' Caribbean region-building project. Deciphering the regional integration challenges for CARIFORUM that stem from this delimitation is also of particular interest. The EU's interregional engagement with the Caribbean has not been framed in NPE terms, and for that matter the EPA has not systematically come under scrutiny in NPE terms; and so I determine whether there is a link to be made in both these cases, and establishing that there is I explore the implications, by way of an ideational and normative reading of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA.

Against this backdrop, simply put the constructivist approach applied to Caribbean regionalism in this study frames the Caribbean at once as the product of ideational frameworks

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22 The work of Ian Manners is especially instructive in this regard.
and, not un-controversially, as the target for the transposition of global governance imperatives. As a 'product', the Caribbean Region takes form through discourse and negotiated understandings (or norms) of ideas around a 'sense of community', and out of this springs regionness. The influence of identity-based institutional preferences looms large, in this regard. As a 'target' for norm-based transposition, the Caribbean Region can be subjected to norm projection from third countries via interregional relationships. The study examines the EU in this regard, pointing to its actorness through the European Commission in deploying the EPA to achieve NPE ends.

In sum, rather than being monolithic, there are a number of indispensable, yet different ways that the contemporary practice of the socialization of Caribbean regionalism can be conceptualized/understand and will find expression in this study. These conceptions are illustrated below.

Table 1
Conceptions of the Contemporary Practice of the Socialization of Caribbean Regionalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regionness</th>
<th>ILA</th>
<th>S/TIOILA</th>
<th>ISLA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean elite technocrats (namely, top-tier policy makers and high-level technical experts/officials)</td>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- As region: CARICOM, CARIFORUM grouping of states</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- As institution: CRNM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actorness</th>
<th>ILA</th>
<th>S/TIOILA</th>
<th>ISLA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Commission functionaries (namely, Commissioners and Technocrats of the Directorate Generals Trade and Development), as well as officials of Delegation offices of the EU spread across the Caribbean</td>
<td>EU, as a region and in its institutionalized form, the European Commission</td>
<td>NPE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author.
C. Analytical Scope

The present study should be seen as providing a basis for analytically unshackling small states, all too often portrayed by the theoretical orthodoxy in IR as incapable of exhibiting agency. A discourse analytic reading of representational issues around the construction of a community of Caribbean States could advance this type of analysis. How so? Consider that reality, as it is understood in the material sense, is derived from the speech act—language has a performative effect. For instance, elements of the material world (e.g. sovereignty) have no meaning apart from the “framework of shared meaning” that animates and validates them; on the basis of “collective intentionality” (Ruggie 1998, 870). Indeed, many constructivists have noted that the 'structure' of shared knowledge gives the material world meaning for social agents.

Discourse analysis, then, can be a valuable tool for providing insight into the diplomatic and policy tack narrative of the Caribbean Region. Consider that, like other world regions, the Caribbean has had a dominant, organizing representation built on enduring narrative themes, which policy-making elites\(^{23}\) have a hand in weaving together and an influential say in projecting. A constructivist framework can shed light on the ends sought and strategies/practices deployed in this regard, with respect to foreign policy hanging so deliberately on sketched social realities (as will be showcased, overwhelmingly labeled as adversity-driven ones) by way of official texts and rhetoric.

For the Caribbean, in the first instance, this representational self-image reflects a certain socially constructed reality, a commonality (but also divergence) of experience. In perpetuating

\(^{23}\) There are many actors who contribute to the social construction of the Caribbean. I am, however, interested—as I have already alluded—in a particular set of actors: so-called 'norm entrepreneurs'; their characterization is slightly different elsewhere (see Ingebritsen 2002). As administrative elites and functionaries, they, in fact, form epistemic communities (Haas 1992). They are part of an institutional fabric that has a central role in framing the regional narrative.
an anthropomorphist narrative, as a result, the Region would consciously/purposively be *normalizing* a subjectivized discourse that informs diplomatic and policy tacks. In this vein, *extreme smallness and vulnerability looms large as the currency of difference*. The fact is, this community of Caribbean States is politically, financially, economically and developmentally heavily invested in an adversity-driven narrative, and continues to ply that narrative as it affords them and is an important precondition for:

(i) Vital access to the *largesse* of and *differentiated treatment* by the international community, in such policy areas as trade and development. We need look no further than the CARIFORUM-EU EPA and the role of *regional institution-based* norm entrepreneurs; and

(ii) Norm entrepreneurs (primarily *state actor-based*) to play a dominant role in devising the norms that shape and/or define state identities and interests underpinning regional integration (e.g. under the CSME). The case of the recently established CDF is especially instructive, in this regard.

The sort of treatment that obtains for Caribbean States through *inter*-regional and *intra*-regional relations, respectively, is secured by the establishment of norms, which are principally *identity* and *interest-centered*. The constructivist approach could avail deep insight into the Caribbean region's constitutive role in the generation of norms and, importantly, in the negotiation/use of norms as influence-bearing instruments of statecraft. Chapter 4 sets down a conceptual framework that is pivotal to undergirding the constructivist analysis of Caribbean regionalism which unfolds in later chapters.
The fact is guidelines and frameworks for treatment in respect of norms—which have “practical implications” (Simon and Martini 2004-05, 132)—are established in treaties like the CARIFORUM-EU EPA and that governing the CDF; principal amongst them differentiated treatment. This differentiation in treatment stems from ideas of smallness and vulnerability, and thereby disadvantaged status, articulated by Caribbean States which resonated with others, such that the structure for the interaction between the respective sides is comprised of shared ideas.24 The literature on role theory/analysis, as applied to foreign policy analysis, provides a useful theoretical framework and cognitive construct (Aggestam 2006), in this regard (see Holsti 1970). So, too, does social psychology and identification theory.

Building on constructivism, therefore, rather than viewing Caribbean States as norm-takers, they (as will be shown) can be thought of as norm-makers.25 A strength of the constructivist approach is that it provides the conceptual 'tool-kit' to frame social learning and normative persuasion, which underpin regionalist-informed statecraft in this vein.

In going forward with this sort of analysis, then, we must take a cue from critical geopolitics; which is also pivotal in bridging strands of constructivist insight with the present study as a whole. In this vein, if we are to think of the Caribbean as a place, we must distill what makes it a place in its own right.

Massey's approach to 'place' is a useful one (1993, 66). For her, it is socially-constructed. As Brenner argues, “spatial scales can no longer be conceived as pregiven or natural areas of social interaction, but are increasingly viewed as historical products – at once socially constructed and politically contested” (1998, 460). In terms of the framing for the present study

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24 This is in keeping with Wendt’s assertion that “the central thesis is that the meaning of power and the content of interest are largely a function of ideas” (1999, 96).
25 These themes will be taken up in detail in Chapters 4; 5 and 6.
we can understand this to mean that, the Caribbean Region and/or regionalism is a social reality constructed by (often non-neutral) discourse that is typically bent on relational distinction, and is ultimately identity-driven. Identity, in this sense, is constituted of ideational-cum-normative factors, such as shared historical narratives and contemporary circumstances, values and culture.

This is not unlike Deutsch's articulation of 'we-feelings' and common 'role-identity' (Deutsch 1957, 5-7), with respect to gemeinschaft. It is also fair to say that the construction of an identity for identities' sake (or some sort of altruism) is not what obtains in the Caribbean, or any other world region for that matter. Ultimately, Caribbean regionalism serves a strategic purpose; that is: the production of regional awareness/consciousness in identitive terms and through social-communicative practices/processes, so as to establish the Region as a relational act/device.27 Its strategic purpose is to preserve and reinforce—as it will be argued—the adversity-driven narrative, in the service of continued access for this community of states to the largesse of and differentiated treatment by others.

However, what a constructivist framework can also reveal is that this identity affinity is destabilized at the level of the intra-regional ideational structure, which is more deeply tangled up in state-mediated and anchored interests. As with interregional interactions, Caribbean States

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26 In invoking Deutsch, it is perhaps fitting to recall that he devised concepts like 'we-feelings' in the context of security communities. Deutsch and his collaborators defined a security community as "a group of people” that are bound up by a "sense of community,” i.e. “a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of ‘peaceful change’" (Deutsch et al, 1957, 5). Against this backdrop, peaceful change is seen as “the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force" (Ibid., 5). Two types of security communities were distinguished: the amalgamated security variation (which is uncommon, e.g. the United States) refers to states that have banded together and forfeit their full sovereignty in favour of a union (a design which makes for the most institutionalized structure of cooperation). This is distinct from more widespread pluralistic security communities, wherein state sovereignty is retained but common institutions are advanced as is a sense of “we-ness” and “we-feeling”. The pluralistic security community variant when applied to the real world should, practically, be seen as subject to varying degrees of cooperation/integration, the EU being the most tightly-knit of them all. Following a five decade-long dry spell in research on that subject matter, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998) would reprise the security communities concept, but with a constructivist twist.

27 In that, not unlike self-other depictions, states in a regional grouping may also define their commonality, their 'we-feelings' in juxtaposition to an external 'other' (Hurrell 1995, 335).
also leverage difference amongst themselves to extract gains (I previously intimated as much). Where Caribbean States do so collectively with third parties, among themselves, the notion of 'speaking with one voice' is not always workable. In treaty-making, therefore, at the Community level it is not uncommon for states to be pitted against states, or sub-region (namely, the OECS) against a state or states.

A constructivist approach, then, can serve as a springboard for framing how different states strategically position themselves in an integrative milieu (e.g. through cooperative bargaining), with a view to seeking concessions in treatment and access to resources.

With respect to the assertion that areas of the Global North, like the EU, have placed considerable stock in soft power (loosely conceived) with a view to maneuvering to claim increased space and thus boost their standing in global politics, invoking the NPE thesis is especially fitting. Manners has characterized NPE as the "ability to shape conceptions of 'normal' in international relations" (2002, 239). This study will seek to examine this very important insight, and relate it back to the EU's EPA-centered interaction with CARIFORUM. The fact is, while the seminal article by Ian Manners in the Journal of Common Market Studies a decade ago laid the ground for important work on NPE since then, the relevant scholarship has had rather limited geographic and conceptual reach.

The fact is, the manner in which the EU has utilized its policies to project norms has featured prominently in the scholarly agenda of the fields of European and international studies, which—instructively—has also advanced insight with respect to the emergence of the EU as a global actor. However, relatively little is known about NPE and in the Caribbean. Thus there is scope for an empirical study of how the EU has sought to leverage the CARIFORUM-EU EPA, against the backdrop of NPE. This approach is a significant departure from run-of-the-mill
accounts of the EPA that are more often than not taken up with tariff and non-tariff issues (see, for instance, Stevens et al 2009).

IV. The Context for a Constructivist Research Program on Caribbean Regionalism: Toward a 'We-ness' in States' Self-understandings and Socialization Practices

A. Background

The foregoing has set the stage for the analysis in the balance of the study. However, as part of its first steps, this study must establish substantially more context—political, ethnographic-cum-linguistic, economic, geographic and historical—vis-à-vis Caribbean identity. Such a review is useful, considering that the Caribbean is often seen as a former site of colonialism, and thus comprised of heterogenous socio-political, cultural, racial, linguistic and geo-economic/political backgrounds (Hillman and D'Agostino 2003).

A.(i) Caribbean Political Identity

I have already indicated the 'boundedness' of the Caribbean, for purposes of this study. It is comprised of some of the smallest states in the world, and the smallest in the Western hemisphere. With the exception of Haiti, Suriname and the Dominican Republic (with French, Dutch and Spanish governance systems, respectively), the Caribbean States that are the subject of this study have relatively stable Westminster-styled democratic parliamentary systems of government inherited from their former British colonial master. For the most part, in the states that once came under British rule the British Monarch is the Head of State, represented in-country by an appointed Governor General. Similarly, they have common jurisprudential/legal traditions, including shared understandings of the rule of law and human rights.

The relative political stability of the Commonwealth Caribbean has, in identity terms,
been showcased as a significant achievement, indicative of political and societal maturity. That experience is held up for others to take notice, against the backdrop of experiences of most other developing countries in respect of their move toward and embrace of democracy which has generally been fraught with difficulties. The gains that regional states have achieved with respect to sovereignty tend to be juxtaposed, by political and civic leaders, on the 'long march' to independence and the associated struggle. The 'sacred cows' of British imperialism are also taken to task in that narrative.

A.(ii) Caribbean Ethnographic, Linguistic and Cultural Identity

The Caribbean has historically been a cultural crossroads, and as such is a product of its unique history. Several different racial groups have coalesced in this part of the world, dating back to its insertion into the global economy some 500 years ago. As the Atlantic slave trade took root, the Caribbean became one of several focal points on the Atlantic shores of the Americas for the transfer of African slaves. As such, ethnographically the peoples of the Caribbean are for the most part descendants of slaves; in some instances, descendants of European slave masters. There is considerable racial mixing dating back several hundred years, and the Region's indigenous peoples—whilst they form distinctive groups—have also mixed, to some extent, with other races. The arrival in the 1800s of indentured labourers from the Indian sub-continent, to some territories, and in the 1900s of other ethnic groups, for example from the Middle and Far East, have also added to the rich, diverse ethnic composition and, typically, led to even more racial mixing. Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago, in particular, have traditionally been settlement countries for persons from the Far East. In more recent times, economic migrants from Asia/the Far East have settled in their numbers in these two countries and Guyana, and to a lesser extent some of the other territories.
As Lloyd Best put it, in reference to the Caribbean, “the people come from many different places at many different times (2001, 6). This is not unproblematic for Best, neither has it been for some very influential West Indian scholars writing in the first half of the twentieth century. Indeed Best recalls the writings of C.L.R. James, in this regard, noting that he “wrote that we were brought from Africa and thrown into modern industry and organization, and we either had to adapt or die” (Ibid., 6).

Suffice to say, the contemporary Caribbean is home to some of the most diverse racial groups in the world and, as such, is a 'melting-pot'. This has impacted on language. For example, recent migrants, typically from Asia/the Far East, to the Caribbean have brought their linguistic traditions. Notwithstanding, there is a long tradition of 'creolized' language systems in some territories, and where there are indigenous peoples so too are there language systems practiced by these groups. The official languages are English, French, Dutch and Spanish for the Commonwealth Caribbean, Haiti, Suriname and the Dominican Republic, respectively.

The diversity of cultural heritage that has come to define the Caribbean is a source of great pride, narrated as strength, in identity terms, in these territories at large through a rich, vibrant cultural sector. The Caribbean's historical experiences are explored as are the constitutive countries' experiences as post-colonial societies, recounted through the works of artists, poets, writers, calypsonians (and other musical traditions), carnival mas-makers/performers/revelers and other cultural forms that often invoke political and economic nationalism, even West Indian nationalism. The concept of unity in diversity and the multiculturalism that has become a hallmark of these societies is often showcased on the world stage as a best practice of sorts, set against a world where in some countries diversity has not been met with tolerance, instead having led to societal and political fracture, discord and, in some instances, war. The societal
focus, in many territories, on cultural and religious events and festivals, with the active support of government, is seen as a conscious effort to showcase diversity as an integral building block of identity.

A.(iii) Caribbean Economic Identity

As a legacy of colonialism, the economic base of virtually all these states has been centered on the provision of commodities to the metropole and tied, in trade-terms, to such global hubs. In some instances, these states remain heavily agrarian. What is more, going back in history the economics of these countries have, for scholars like Best, wrong-headedly informed social structures. As he notes, “while in all other situations that I know in the global order, the society founded the economy, in the Caribbean it is the economy that founds the society. You have the economy first, and then you bring in society as labour power” (Ibid., 7).

Historically these territories served as plantation economies for such cash crops as bananas, rice and sugar, though this is steadily changing due to contemporary challenges that have visited these states from within and without. The traditional mono-crop economies that came to define the economic bases of many of these countries in the heyday of colonialism and even, to some extent, in post-colonial times have been overhauled in recent years, sometimes through no choice of their own. The woes experienced by such economies in recent years have been made worse not just by economic shocks, but weather-related events. As such, the economic fortunes of many of these states are intimately related to climactic events, and climate change has increasingly come to define the identity-related narrative of the economic fortunes, or otherwise, of these states. The narrative of vulnerability of these countries springs most conspicuously from this economic-climactic reality; what can be termed the 'economic-climactic complex'.
Further, sub-sets of these countries rely on extractive sectors, namely gold, bauxite, alumina, oil and natural gas. Many are experiencing windfalls from such sectors, given the increasing demand for these commodities in the world market. However, even amidst this boon vulnerability looms large; given the fluctuating fortunes of commodities in the global market.

The twin-island republic of Trinidad and Tobago is a notable exception to the mono-economy narrative, in so far as it (namely Trinidad) has a highly industrialized, diversified manufacturing-centered economic base. It is oil-rich, and the natural gas industry plays a crucial role in its economic fortunes.

For the most part, these states have made forays into tourism, and some have made the leap successfully to offshore banking, albeit mostly at the lower end of the value chain. In most cases Services have come to occupy a significant percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), though significantly skewed towards tourism. Notwithstanding, their economies are extremely vulnerable to exogenous shocks, be they brought on by the vagaries of the global economic system or—as previously noted—natural disasters, namely hurricanes and other climactic events associated with hurricanes or broadly climate change.

In terms of trading relations between CARIFORUM and the EU, the latter is a trading partner of consequence for CARIFORUM, accounting for some 12% of trade flows from the Region. According to 2011 data, Caribbean exports to the EU stood at €3.7 billion, and are primarily commodity-centered.²⁸ Alumina, bananas, bauxite, fuels, rum and sugar loom large, in this regard. However, given that Services rank high as a percentage of GDP in regional states, Services also have an important place regarding trade with the EU, albeit skewed towards tourism and travel-related services.

On the other hand, for 2011, the Region's imports from the EU amounted to €3.4 billion.

²⁸ Gleaned from email correspondence between the author and European Commission officials: 15 to 20 June 2012.
Higher value-added goods loom large, in this regard.

The Region's trade with the EU is dominated by the Dominican Republic. Amongst regional states, The Bahamas, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago also have strong trading stakes in the EU. Many enterprises from the smaller Caribbean territories are not yet sufficiently primed to effectively contest the EU market. An important identity narrative, in that regard, is the absence of scale economies and acute supply side constraints, amongst other constraints, that inhibit breaking through the EU market.

A.(iv) Caribbean Geographic and Historical Identity

I want, now, to engage in an account of the Caribbean's geographic and historical referent(s) in a less than conventional manner. The standard refrain would be to point, rather arbitrarily, to a map and situate the Caribbean, musing that the 'West Indies' has a history that is intimately tied into standard textbook accounts of discovery by Christopher Columbus. My interest, however, is in delving into a geographic-cum-historical account of 'the' Caribbean by calling attention to intersubjective images/understandings of what and where it is, and how it has been situated through history. Such an account serves as an instructive preface to my own efforts to describe the major actors involved in contemporary Caribbean regionalism and a constructivist research program that can be brought to bear to understand how actors within that region interact among themselves and third parties, and to what end.

The scholars whose work I engage with below make scholarly incursions into the study of 'the' Caribbean. Perhaps the best place to start this discussion is with a work that is widely seen as a triumph both for Caribbean studies and Latin American literary studies, more generally—Antonio Benitez-Rojo's (1996 [1992]) The Repeating Island: The Caribbean and the Postmodern Perspective. It is one of many works that have grappled with the vexing issue of
what 'the' Caribbean 'space' is. *The Repeating Island* stands out as a profoundly innovative, provocative and fascinating intellectual journey, in this regard, on the mantle especially of polyrhythm: Benitez-Rojo leans on Chaos Theory.

As the subtitle of his book suggests, his work also plays on postmodernism; and, as a result, eschews the notion that there is a single truth to defining the Caribbean. Ultimately, his work sheds greater light on the poignant, central place of the plantation and related legacies in the 'Caribbean story'. They have permeated the Caribbean experience; repeated in this space.

If repetition/rhythm is to be pinpointed in respect of regularities or patterns beholden to what the Caribbean is, a common refrain is the plantation-*qua*-plantation grounded 'social system'. The plantation is at once a referential devise, but a metaphorical one too—with respect to the dialectic of colonialism and creole cultures. But in this discourse, as with his eclectic exploration of the cultural edifice emblematic of the Caribbean, Benitez-Rojo destabilizes traditionally accepted delimitations of what/where the Caribbean is geographically. As he suggests, “the Caribbean is not a common archipelago, but a meta-archipelago...[thus] it has the virtue of having neither a boundary nor a center” (Benitez-Rojo 1996 [1992], 4).

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29 Understood not necessarily in a purely geographic sense; rather, in geo-/socio-cultural terms: i.e. namely, as a confluence of historical processes, cultures, peoples, from 'here' and 'there'. Benitez-Rojo's usage of the term 'Caribbean' does not conform with the geographical parameters set out for it in the present study.

30 There are at least four "legacies of the postcolonial state: slavery, dependence, commodity production for export and the plantation regime" (Salmon 2005, 164).

31 I borrow the term *social system*, in reference to 'the plantation', from Eric Wolf's usage of it, regarding field research into the 'plantation' in the Antilles around the mid-1950s. Wolf and Mintz described the plantation not only as a social system, but as "webs of social relationships" (1957, 380-381).

32 Benitez-Rojo is careful, though, not to essentialize the Caribbean as a postcolonial society, its narrative perennially hinged, as it were, to a metropolitan hub. In this sense, the Caribbean is not singularly derived from or a byproduct of its colonial roots. He makes this point through metaphor. Citing Deleuze and Guattari's concept of machine, he defines—thus *re-reads*—the Caribbean as standing apart from (in that it is not a function of) metropolitan players: "[w]hich is to say that every machine is a conjunction of machines coupled together, and each one of these interrupts the flow of the previous one; it will be said rightly that one can picture any machine alternatively in terms of flow and interruption" (Benitez-Rojo 1996 [1992], 6).

33 He also, by extension, disrupts the traditional geographical referents of American/African American and Latino studies.
For his part, Gaztambide-Geigel (2004, 127-128) outlines what for him are the various meanings of the Caribbean; a term which he describes as having relatively recent usage: a function of the passing of the 'hegemonic baton', in the Region, from Europe to the United States. Regarding its use over the last fifty or so years, the Caribbean has come to refer to what he terms different American sub-regions; namely: "the insular (or ethno-historic) Caribbean; the geopolitical Caribbean[;] the Greater Caribbean Basin[;] Central Afro-America" (Ibid., 127).

For the most part, these 'Caribbeans', as Gaztambide-Geigel refers to them, began to be defined in 1898 (Ibid., 137). The insular or ethno-historic Caribbean is slightly restrictive in its geographic scope, "coincid[ing] with....internally-driven regional identities [; the shared (post)colonial experience looming large, in this regard]" (Ibid., 138). The geopolitical Caribbean is periodized by Gaztambide-Geigel (Ibid., 141), viz-à-viz pre- and post-1945. After that date, it comprises the insular Caribbean, Central America and Panama. In the lead up to 1945, the configuration was the Antillean republics, Central America and Panama. In this conception, the Caribbean is seen as those lands that have been heavily caught up in US military interventions (Ibid., 141). The Greater Caribbean Basin approach envisions the Region as building on the previous Caribbeans, in geographic terms incorporating large continental Meso/South American countries; namely: Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela (Ibid., 143). The

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34 According to Gaztambide-Geigel, there has not been consistent use of the term Caribbean "to name a geographic region until the twentieth century" (2004, 127). Prior to this, there were permutations of the term (Ibid., 131-132). Aspects of Gaztambide-Geigel's usage of the term 'Caribbean' does not conform with the geographical parameters set out for it in the present study.

35 In the late nineteenth and into the early twentieth centuries, the United States' began to leave a more discernable geopolitical footprint in Central America and the Caribbean Basin—these regions taking shape as 'America's backyard': "[t]his is the context in which the Caribbean was invented as a region starting in 1898" (Ibid., 136-137).

36 These countries are associated, ostensibly, with CARICOM.

37 This narrative is brilliantly captured in Eric Williams' From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean, 1492-1969 (1970).

38 All three of these countries have islands in the Caribbean sea.

39 The Association of Caribbean States (ACS) is a grouping emblematic of this conceptualization of the Caribbean. It comprises states which lie on the Caribbean Sea, in addition to El Salvador.
Caribbean Basin Initiative, unveiled in the 1980s, popularized this conceptualization; though it does not include some of the countries in this conceptual schema. The Central Afro-America conceptualization is by far the most expansive, at the very least in geographic terms. The conceptual pivot is the plantation. The plantation and the social order it engenders provide a prism through which we can discern shared experiences, linked to slavery and its legacies in a territory spanning the American South (namely, Afro- or Plantation America) and extending to parts of Meso-America, the Greater and Lesser (comprising the Leeward and Windward Islands) Antilles, and parts of northern South America (Ibid., 146). This schema is also cognitively expansive, including the Caribbean diaspora and migrant communities (Ibid., 148).

Benitez-Rojo's (1996 [1992]) and Gaztambide-Geigel's (2004) respective works are important for our purposes, in so far as they underscore that the Caribbean is not easily defined or located, cognitively or otherwise. What is more, where, at first blush, the Caribbean may appear monolithic, it is not.40

The just-reviewed works are also important as they represent theoretically-oriented research on Caribbean regional identities. The work of Gaztambide-Geigel is especially instructive for our purposes, as in reference to the insular or ethno-historic Caribbean he is of the view that its geographic scope “coincides with....internally-driven regional identities” (2004, 138; my emphasis). In general, these scholars' respective works lend themselves to constructivist-inspired analysis. Some earlier work on Caribbean 'identities' holds a lot of promise, in this regard, too.

Consider a dated, but important, article by Braithwaite (1957). In discussing the juncture

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40 As Garcia argues, "the concepts of Caribbean and "caribenidad" (Caribbeanness) are problematic" (2008, 56). Multiple identities obtain in the case of the Caribbean, per the varying terms used to refer to it as a region and the peoples who inhabit it (and the different meanings encapsulated therein); namely, “Antilles, West Indies, Caribbean, Antilleans, West Indians and Caribbean (caribenos)” (Ibid., 56).
between World Wars I & II, he notes that the 'federal idea' grew in the West Indies; contending that there was "the development of West Indian sentiment"⁴¹ (Ibid., 137; my emphasis). Patsy Lewis (2002) provides a more recent scholarly engagement with this theme. In examining regional integration amongst the countries of the OECS, she maintains that a "West Indian identity" (framed by common historical and cultural experiences emanating, for instance, from slavery) is an important basis for the pursuit of such an initiative. Also informing integration, she argues, for microstates such as these is that they all face more or less the same predicament, because of size and other shared resource difficulties; and as such banding together in the face of a global political economy increasingly unsympathetic to their plight is also an overarching integration narrative.


In this sub-section, I have explored different identity referents associated with the Caribbean. What should immediately be apparent is that the Region has an 'ideational' backdrop, one that has been reproduced over time in that regional space.

The long history of citizen-to-citizen, intra-regional movement and the everyday, lived experiences associated with co-mingling across national jurisdictions in that space has been instrumental in fashioning, even synthesizing, Caribbean identity. Whether this movement of people has reached its full potential in laying the foundations for a 'transnational Caribbean citizenship', however, is an open question. There is greater surety, though, that a 'transnational Caribbean citizenship' has taken form amongst bureaucratic elite actors. In what follows, I

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⁴¹ This is reminiscent of what Deutsch noted as one of the indicators of "social community...[and]...the defining characteristics of integration...[:] elite and mass attitudes" (Scheingold 1970, 979; my emphasis).
consider these two points in turn.

With respect to 'the man on the street', consider that while the movement of people within the Community is recognized as “an essential factor in an ever closer union among the people of CARICOM Member States,” the regime in place to facilitate this has faced set-backs. On 'paper', under the CSME, free movement of Community nationals within the Region has been provided for, albeit only for certain categories of persons, who in moving freely to another Member State are entitled to the same benefits and rights in relation to the condition of work and employment relative to those given to national workers. In 'practice', there have been 'teething problems'. Formal mechanisms—like the CARICOM Certificate of Recognition of Skills Qualification (CARICOM Skills Certificate)—that are meant to support this mobility regime have, for instance, not worked as seamlessly as first envisioned. Moreover, there continue to be reported cases of instances where CARICOM nationals face entry difficulties at some ports of entry in the Region.

The regional integration policy environment also looms large in the 'free movement' debate. As intimated earlier, the advance of the CSME 'project' has slowed in recent times. Some contend that it is in drift. The effect of such a trend is that forward movement of the agenda with respect to high-profile matters, like the free movement of Community nationals, is in fact not being robustly effectuated. Ironically movement, conceived in these terms, is amongst the most tangible way that 'the man on the street' gets to experience integration.

The fact of the matter is, Caribbean peoples have historically traveled from one territory to the other, be it for familial reasons, employment reasons, touristic travel-related (to partake in, for instance, sporting events like cricket and in the process common societal conventions, which

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42 Refer to: http://www.csmeonline.org/en/movement-of-people
lend themselves to the shared Caribbean experience), business-related or any other cultural exchanges, etc. 'Regional identity' is further established and woven together, as a result; thereby shoring up a collective psyche relating to a 'West Indian-ness' or Caribbeaness.

However, to return to the point I made earlier, the creation of a shared sense of 'community' could be moving further along and growing from strength-to-strength, if only the agenda on the free movement of Community nationals and the formal integration agenda, at large, got a boost. While scholars of European integration, like Willem Maas (2007), observe in the European context that free movement is key to establishing the idea of commonality, it is an observation which is just as applicable in the Caribbean context.

The reality is that Caribbean peoples, even though—in most cases—they are separated by sea and are conscious and protective of national identities, are less prone to propagate nationalism in contradistinction to a regional identity, but rather as a constitutive part of the spatial 'jigsaw puzzle' that is the wider community of people à la the Caribbean. Their historical referent, in this context, is typically commonality of narrative that animates this region, related—for instance—to imperial domination and struggle. Guilleen, in this regard, says of the Caribbean archipelago that it is a “communal yard” (1976, cited in Hillman 2003, 8).

On the matter of the commonality of narrative, recently the Prime Minister of Barbados, the Hon. Freundel J. Stuart (whose country has lead responsibility for the Single Market and Economy in the CARICOM Quasi-Cabinet of HoG) recalled part of an address by the late Right Honourable Errol Walton Barrow at an HoG Conference in Georgetown, Guyana in 1986. That address reads in part, “'[f]or many of our people the regional integration movement has come to mean matters which relate exclusively to trade....[this is not] the exclusive justification for our being together. *We have a cultural history, a common experience of feeling* which goes deeper
and is much older than CARICOM and the negotiations about trade”” (Stuart 2012, 21; my emphasis). This sentiment is consistent with what Vayrynen refers to as “[i]dentity regions exist[ing] in the consciousness of people” (2003, 37).

What is more, as a number of West Indians who move between the regional territories do so as economic migrants, their concern is with the future. The implication is that in as much as West Indians would be hard pressed to reach back—figuratively, at least—in history in search of one focal point in respect of their origins, in co-mingling with each other as they do they are together pragmatically fashioning a common future, of sorts, laden with ideas of identity to match.

With the preceding in mind, I make one final point at this juncture which constitutes an underlying reason for the study's focus on bureaucratic elite actors:

West Indians are, for the most part, seized of a sense of 'transnational Caribbean citizenship', and depending on their individual circumstances they are personally and even professionally invested in this construct. Given that the free movement of Community nationals' agenda has faced some challenges, the contemporary identity nexus that transcends sub-regional borders with respect to 'the man on the street' may not be dense. This is not the case for bureaucratic elite actors. They regularly operate unimpeded across the Region. As identity node agents, they are at the forefront of simultaneously being recipients/shapers of foremost knowledge of the regional project's identity narrative and integrating that knowledge/insight into collaborative bureaucratic and decision-making nodes, which are vital for the formulation/execution of agendas.

To elaborate, generally networks of Caribbean functionnaires/experts and policy-makers have internalized a regional identity affinity in an unparalleled fashion, and this is a determining factor with respect to the convergence (or otherwise) of preferences regarding how the regionalist
project should be put together and steered. The outlines of 'transnational Caribbean citizenship' are especially defined at the level of these actors, at the very least not only because of the frequency with which they come into contact with one another in the lead up to, at and following meetings/summits (and other initiatives) that are effectuated across the Region, but also because they are exposed to each other's thinking on any number of policy issues and strategic matters.

B. Elite Technocracy: Astute Purveyors of Episteme regarding Caribbean Regionalism

Suffice to say, the prominence of identity/image narratives in the Caribbean—at times built around a seemingly common\(^{43}\) commitment to a regional identity-cum-community (and sometimes not)—begs for theoretical explanation from a constructivist point of view. Such an approach has, hitherto, been elusive in scholarly work, and constitutes the organizing theme of this study.

From such a vantage point, we can bring into focus the constitutive effect of ideas, as it relates to outlook on 'self' and worldviews as well as resultant, matching policy orientations/outcomes. This study represents a call, then, for an extensive constructivist research program on Caribbean regionalism, in its own right advancing this type of research by borrowing from close to two decades of constructivist insights applied to international studies to examine elements of the socialization of the Caribbean Region.

Against the backdrop of the preceding discussion, the balance of this sub-section will engage with the beginnings of a discussion that the study at large will set out. I want to do so in response to two related questions. First, how can the Caribbean be defined? Caught up in this question is the notion of circumscribing the Caribbean. So the second question is, to what end is

\(^{43}\) Statesmen, like former Jamaican Prime Minister the Most Honourable P.J. Patterson, have used the term 'Caribbean oneness', in this regard (Patterson 2003).
the Caribbean framed in a particular way? On this score, the following explanation is useful: Where the Caribbean's boundaries end, so too do shared understandings/meanings of what the Caribbean is. Furthermore in cognitively inscribing the outlines of the Caribbean and attaching a narrative to same, in that act protagonists wish to advance a certain agenda. This explanation cannot, however, be divorced from establishing who decides or pronounces on the outlines of the Caribbean and the associated narration of the Caribbean problematique. Some actors are more prominent in defining a 'we-ness' in states' self-understandings of self and socialization practices that emanate in bureaucratic environments, so as to achieve certain ends.

In this regard, the study identifies bureaucratic elites or the elite technocracy—policy makers and officials in regional and state institutions in the Caribbean—as playing a significant role. In official settings, they have emerged as the most visible faces in the narration of Caribbean regionalism (and, importantly, are imbued with a keen sense of regional identity).

This finding is consistent with that of other scholars who study the Caribbean. Payne and Sutton (2007, 3) observe that in relation to policy issues at the heart of the political economy of the Region's development, "[w]hat is immediately striking...[is that the debate] has been led by what one might call the tecnicos of the Commonwealth Caribbean, principally either professional policy-makers working for national governments or regional organisations."

These actors are generally committed regionalists. In the case of some contemporary HoG (as with those who came before them), like H.E. Kenny Anthony of Saint Lucia and H.E. Ralph Gonsalves of St Vincent and the Grenadines—both leaders of Labour Parties in their respective jurisdictions and with many years experience in leading regional affairs—they have similar ideological stripes, and are scholars in their own right. Prime Minister Anthony has a doctorate in law and Prime Minister Gonsalves a doctorate in Government, and both have

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44 It is one that I borrow from Adler and Barnett (1998), adapted for my purposes.
infused regional integration processes with their visions for same. They are especially active in the Quasi-cabinet of HoG. In point of fact, both politicians are from an era where the view of integration is that of a 'project' vital in supporting the sustainable development of small states and in providing strength in numbers for territories recently emerged from the yolk of colonialism.

For their part, many of the officials who grace the halls of Ministries of Trade or Caribbean intergovernmental organizations, like the then CRNM, see in the Caribbean integration construct a *shared destiny* for Caribbean peoples. Their work as so-called *tecnicos* is heavily influenced by this world view, not just their considerable subject-area expertise. That they come from territories which, for the most part, have a shared regional identity makes for strong camaraderie. Indeed the epistemic community involved in trade negotiations/policy is relatively small in the Region, and as a tight-knit, nimble group\(^\text{45}\) there are interpersonal dynamics that are conducive to building up trust relations and intersubjective or background knowledge. Many of those officials are friends, too. Thus, there are pronounced quotidian official network ties. As a result, these officials are aware of each other's motivations regarding the integration project.

It is also important to acknowledge that the 'we-ness' in Caribbean States' self-understandings and socialization practices has not just been pursued by Caribbean agents, but foreign actors too. The earlier NPE discussion points to this. Although the United States has a strong *influencing* imprint on this Region, so too does the EU. More conspicuous is the influence that some EU States brought to bear in a by-gone era, colonialism. Less visible have been contemporary moves on the EU's part, leveraging the European Commission, to project influence relating to how the Region is defined and norms applied thereto, through accords like the EPA.

\(^{45}\) It is not uncommon for Ministries of Trade in the OECS territories, in particular, to have a staffing complement of six or less technical staff. As a regional institution, the then CRNM had within its ranks technical staff numbering just over a dozen.
C. State-Society Relations and the Study's Approach to Caribbean (Inter)regionalism

As I close out this section, I want to touch briefly on state-society relations and make the connection with the present study. Let me start by acknowledging that there is a long tradition of theorizing the state in Western social science, and a spectrum of social science theories have been brought to bear in that regard. That debate, while important, is not going to be engaged with here. The acknowledgement of this fact will suffice, as it opens the way for the following statement: "For purposes of this study, Caribbean regionalism and the associated interregionalist engagement with the EU is best explained as a formal intergovernmental/state-led, top-down process."

Although the subsequent discussion in Chapter 5 will provide greater insight into this approach, it is important from the outset to address any misconceptions that may possibly arise from the emphasis placed on the state and inter-state institutional backdrop in the aforementioned statement. One quite significant misconception that may arise is that state-society relations are somehow eschewed and, more to the point, top-level bureaucratic actors and their principals are autonomous from the societal part of the state-society complex. This could not be further from the truth. In the balance of this sub-section, I briefly explain why.

Invoking Massey's approach to 'place', like her I take the view that place is socially-constructed; further, according to Massey, "what gives a place its specificity...is the fact that it is constructed out of a particular constellation of relations, articulated together as a particular locus" (1993, 66; my emphasis).

With this in mind, I begin by establishing that the state can be particularized as the administrative structure of governance, on which basis public authority is exercised in a multiplicity of ways. Yet the state is not an 'island on to itself'. It has a relationship with domestic
society, to the extent that there is interdependence between the two.

In the Caribbean, there is a tradition of interaction between the institutions of the state and societal groups regarding any number of policy sectors. The state-society complex is typically bridged by 'tripartite platforms' that regularly bring together Government, the private sector and civil society (e.g. labour/trade union groups), albeit to examine and advance consensus on policy matters at the sectoral level. Barbados is a much-cited example of a Caribbean country with a strong tradition of a 'tripartite framework'. At the level of regional institutions, too, there are also platforms in place to facilitate such interface. An important example, for our purposes, was the establishment of a first of its kind Memorandum of Understanding in 2009 between the Caribbean Congress of Labour and the then CRNM. The stated intention was to deepen the relationship between the two entities, and as such it outlines a framework for the engagement.

The trade policy-themed issues under study in this dissertation have been the focus of consultations between institutions of the state (as well as intergovernmental institutions) and societal groups. I contend that this sort of interaction lends itself not just to transposition, in a two-way manner, of positions on policy matters _per se_, but on state/regional identity and the implications for policy.

On the matter of state-society relations, generally speaking, scholars have noted that such interaction can be given impetus as a result of corporatist interests, and societal actors' attempts to lend their voice on a range of public policy matters. In some extremes, scholars have noted that clientelism is a motivating factor. This sort of scholarship has shone the spotlight on developed and developing countries, alike.

I am most interested in the Caribbean, as I am in discerning the 'official' attempt at
pivoting the region-building project so as to assert the Region in contemporary international relations. In that regard, generally, it is the state and inter-state institutions that play a lead role in effectuating and agreeing accords with other states. Indeed 'bureaucratic' institutions and practices, legal and otherwise, are in place to facilitate this sort of interaction. Caribbean regionalism and the associated interregionalist engagement with the EU, with which this study is taken up, are therefore examined in these terms.

V. Toward a Constructivist Approach to Framing Caribbean Regionalism: Central Questions, Thesis

The dissertation unravels a two-tiered puzzle:

A. Are some of the world's smallest state regions, like the Caribbean, able to punch above their weight in international affairs, thus overcoming limitations of acutely small size?

B. Is the CARIFORUM-EU EPA part of a larger global governance project spearheaded by the European Commission and geared at devising, embedding and projecting perceived values/model of modernity, as reflected in EU standards/norms and associated agendas? To the extent that this approach has a bearing on the Caribbean as a spoke region, what are the implications for the identity-cum-regionalization orientation of the 'official' Caribbean region-building project and regional integration policy thereto?

The dissertation posits that:

**Thesis I:** The social typification/signification of 'the actor' in Caribbean interregionalist and intra-regionalist engagements is a key strategy employed by Caribbean bureaucratic elites to engender ideas/norms, which have a power all their own in respect of enabling the world's smallest state regions, like the Caribbean, to punch above their weight in respect of the nature/extent of the gains they secure in international affairs. [An intellectual undercurrent that simultaneously buoys this claim and serves as a response to dissatisfaction in the ability of conventional structural IR theory to provide a compelling explanation of the enduring agency of these types of states, let alone its capacity to do so in normative terms, is constructivism and allied approaches.]

**Thesis II:** The CARIFORUM-EU EPA was negotiated and is being implemented at a time when the EU is asserting itself, as never before, as a normative power on the world stage. In this regard, the EU's wider normative agenda is not unrelated to how it has sought to negotiate the EPA and its interests with respect to the implementation of that Agreement. At
a minimum, the EPA simultaneously feeds into and flows out of complex NPE narratives that are not unproblematic for CARIFORUM.

Does the evidence support these assertions? The dissertation examines these propositions. According to research findings, they are found to have merit.

VI. Methodology

It is to Caribbean and European bureaucratic/elite actors that the study's empirical research has been directed. It is with a sampling of them that interviews were conducted, with research questions structured in such a way as to draw out their negotiating experiences, knowledge and perspectives with respect to the negotiating theatres and the strategies therein under study in this work. Participant observation and archival research were also conducted, with a view to gaining deeper insight into their roles in socializing the Caribbean, how they did so and to what end.

In examining how the 'we-ness' in Caribbean States' self-understandings and socialization practices thereto took form, be it at the hands of Caribbean or EU agents, the study is informed by the following timeframe: 2004 to 2012.

While setting down 2004 is useful, in so far as this date neatly sets the floor for the period under study, the circumscribed window cannot be viewed in isolation from developments that came before and that would have unfolded over an extended stretch of time from which the period under review in the study proceeds.

The following timeline of key events (which the study will come back to as it unfolds) is, therefore, useful to keep in mind:
This dissertation's methodology incorporates a qualitative empirical study that comprises the following data sources, inter alia:

A. **Field Work**: The formal field research period spanned just over two years, from January to April 2010 (based in Saint Lucia) and from July 2010 to July 2012 (based in Guyana). During this extended period in the field, 51 semi-structured, in-depth interviews (which, having been transcribed, were subjected to systematic qualitative content analysis) were conducted. Interview findings were triangulated against each other and, where possible, against primary documentation. The majority of the interviews took place up until the end of the field research period, which coincided with the implementation of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA.

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46 A handful of interviews were conducted in 2009.
place across the length and breadth of the Caribbean, with others conducted in Brussels and the Czech Republic as a result of brief visits there. The interviews targeted officials of intergovernmental institutions and other agencies, including former staffers. Officials of Caribbean States—including diplomats posted overseas—were also interviewed, as were policy makers and non-state actors, including from the private sector (ostensibly, business support organizations) and the civil society community, namely academics and some from non-governmental organizations. Some interviewees opted not to go on the record. They were candid, as a result. The field work period was not only taken up with data gathering, but intense periods of drafting the dissertation.

B. Participant Observation: The researcher was attached to the CARICOM Secretariat-based EPA Implementation Unit as an official, through much of the fieldwork. The researcher engaged in participant observation of meetings germane to the EPA and in interactional processes which form the centerpiece of intergovernmentalism. This experience, drawing on several years of prior experience as a regional trade official, provided deep insight into the praxis of the Region's trade/development diplomacy.

C. Development of Model/Conceptual Tools: A theoretically supported model qua conceptual tool—the 'Region Leveraging Nexus' (RLN)\(^{47}\)—was developed and utilized in order to highlight the interactive relationship between and offer a potentially strong explanation of Caribbean-pivoted interregionalism (as relates to the negotiation of trade agreements, specifically) and intra-regionalism (as relates to regional integration). A methodological innovation was also developed with respect to understanding the NPE in the Caribbean context, dubbed the *normative-role approach.*

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\(^{47}\) The RLN constitutes a theoretical contribution to the ideational study of Caribbean (inter)regionalism.
D. *Study of Official Documents/Official Speeches and other Literature*: Archival research was conducted, as was analysis of primary documents and secondary literature, including an extensive literature review. This approach was critical, in so far as it forms the intellectual backdrop for the empirical analysis of written discourses.

The upshot of this multi-tiered methodological approach is that it serves to hold up this dissertation's two principal findings.

On a final note, given my prior work experience in the Region, and the contacts I had established then with members of the epistemic community under study for the present work, and the fact that I worked in the CARICOM Secretariat during most of the field work period, I had fairly good access to officials/policy makers.

VII. *Summary Findings and Scholarly Intervention*

As a formal intergovernmental/state-led, top-down process, Caribbean States' interregionalist and intra-regionalist trade-*qua*-development diplomacy, respectively, is best understood as being informed by two related considerations: (i) the psychosocial abstraction and evocation of registers of signification/imagery in respect of the relational construction of the *selthood* of states *on* and *through* what I term the 'Caribbean Regional Platform'; and (ii) the crucial and marked role of certain bureaucratic elites therein, located in regional and state institutions, respectively, who successfully controlled (i.e. 'kept on message') the regionalism narrative during EPA negotiations and worked to 'level the playing field'. The effect was that, EU counterparts were sufficiently seized of that narrative such that they were supportive of concretizing/entrenching certain concessions and associated norms into the Agreement itself. Further, the strength of Caribbean elite technocrats' arguments was that they nurtured a negotiating environment where
the 'logic of appropriateness' shone through in respect of elements of the EU's logic of (negotiating) action, such that the EU was influenced by the need to do what is right (i.e. moral imperatives). The locus classicus and point of departure for framing these empirical cases is the RLN. It is the intellectual device (which draws on constructivist insights from critical geopolitics which have traveled, in varying degrees, to scholarship germane to the present study) developed in the dissertation to anchor the first of two scholarly interventions.

The second finding stems from a deeper reading of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA, which determines that the interregionalist negotiating engagement was utilized by the European Commission to put the conditions in place for exercise of NPE with respect to the Caribbean. The EPA is, thus, deemed to be part of a global governance agenda that lends support to the development of the EU as a normative power in its own right. In this regard, the EU's normative agenda is found to be problematic both in terms of how it delimits the Caribbean and amplifies regional integration challenges thereto. This particular finding is a contribution to the NPE literature.

VIII. Dissertation Roadmap

This introductory chapter is wide-ranging, forming a cursory, prefatory attempt to engage and showcase key themes which permeate my doctoral research and the resultant dissertation. Chapter One is the premier chapter of a total of three that comprise Part I of this study, and they are comparatively linked: each is geared at determining whether there is systematic theoretical treatment of the Caribbean—a small state Global South region—in the literature of interregionalism and regionalism studies as well as island studies, as regards an (inter)regionalism narrative. In aid of this primary objective of these respective chapters, a
comprehensive survey of relevant scholarship is undertaken. Each chapter engages underlying concepts, while also outlining and critically engaging debates in the respective scholarly areas of study. In so doing, Part I of the present study reflects the beginnings of a possible interdisciplinary conversation among scholarship that forms, in large measure, the intellectual site of the scholarly contribution of the dissertation.

Chapter Four introduces the RLN, the model qua conceptual tool which serves to hold up the identity-based framework developed in the present study regarding Caribbean (inter)regionalism. The RLN is developed against the backdrop of an analysis of conventional international theory's portrayal of small states, with a view to transcending it so as to reveal how the interplay of identity and agent/institution can in turn impact on diplomatic outcomes, with respect to securing norms in relation to determining what is expected of the EU in relation to CARIFORUM. Importantly and in part drawing on the RLN, I later explain why this matters.

Chapter Five makes the case that the Caribbean's elite technocracy has been actively involved in inter- and intra-regionalism, of note in the negotiation and implementation of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA and the operationalization of the CDF, respectively. It frames the process against which negotiations unfolded and implementation unfolds today for both these institutional environments as having a social and normative context, which on the one hand lays out the identity of the institution shepherding respective processes and on the other engenders the development of favourable norms stemming from interactions with respective third parties.

Chapter Six examines the emergence of the EU as a global actor and normative power, in the first instance making passing reference to the growing literature on this theme. As part of its contribution to the debate on NPE, the chapter highlights a hybrid framework that I develop called the normative-role approach. The chapter also brings into relief the role of
interregionalism in consolidating the EU's rise in the contemporary world order, juxtaposed on NPE. That the EU has sought to leverage the EPA with CARIFORUM, in this vein, commands the chapter's attention, in so far as it analyzes how the EU has utilized the EPA to promote its vision of the identity-cum-regionalization orientation of the 'official' Caribbean region-building project, whilst also examining associated regional integration policy implications. Thus the chapter pushes the boundaries of conventional analysis that has come to engender the CARIFORUM-EU EPA. The analysis provided in this chapter has to date been elusive in the NPE literature, too, and so in advancing it several lacunae are filled in respect of understanding CARIFORUM-EU relations against the backdrop of the rise of the EU's normative power.

The concluding chapter follows, and serves to recap the main themes and insights of the dissertation, outlining the overarching research findings. It also reflects on possible future directions for research, in this vein. The expectation is that the research undertaken and the prospective discussion of possible research pathways for a future scholarly agenda will be relevant for both the academic and policy communities.
PART I

TRAVERSING BOUNDARIES:
INTERREGIONALISM, REGIONALISM AND ISLAND STUDIES IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
1.1 Introduction

The present chapter surveys the scholarship which forms the intellectual backbone of interregionalism studies. In first showcasing definitional issues, the key literature and pertinent theoretical approaches, the chapter sets out to assess whether there is systematic theoretical treatment of the Caribbean as a small state Global South region in this corpus of work, as regards an (inter)regionalism narrative. A determination is made that such a focus has largely been overlooked, but also that its metatheoretical 'throw-weight' is diminutive. That attention has not been placed on this type of region takes away from the no less important, insightful experiences that its interregional interactions and theorizing in this regard can lend to the scholarship.

Interregionalism research is of recent vintage, comparatively speaking. It has only recently come into its own, popularized over a decade ago by the work of scholars like Hanggi (2000) and generally riding the wave of scholarly research around the so-called 'new' regionalism—literature that took shape through the 1980s and '90s. Interregionalism has been characterized as “an emerging international phenomenon” (Hettne 2007, 107), the onset of which only began in earnest in the light of the dissolution of the bipolar world order, with the end of the Cold War, and in conjunction with an intensified form of globalization—crystallizing in the 1980s.

In sum, interregionalism features as one crucial component of the multi-faceted dynamics
of global change; in effect contributing to the structural transformation of aspects of global governance\(^{49}\) and leaving its mark on (and creating new) macro-structures of world politics. More specifically, interregionalism is a means by which states can geo-strategically position themselves with respect to competition, cooperation and conflict in a hyper-globalizing era and at a moment when the international order is in flux.

However, in conceiving of interregionalism we must not lose sight of the ‘region’(alism) in interregionalism, and how they are implicated in animating each other. Consider that some scholars have pointed to what they describe as “[r]egionalism and interregionalism [being] impacted by one another”, even “relat[ing] to... each other. In this respect, regionalism and interregionalism are effectively joined at the hip” (Doidge 2007, 229, 244).

That regions are manifest on the international stage is not, however, a novelty. From a geopolitical standpoint, for example, they have had a large and long-standing footprint through history, dating from classical antiquity or the Greco-Roman world. Over the course of the last century, though, world regions—ostensibly the EU—have become considerably more important players in world politics and the architecture of the world order (especially so over the last two decades, in the wake of the bipolar world order collapsing into itself), and can usefully be contextualized in at least two respects, global governance (a discussion of which I will return to at the outset of Chapter Six) and IR.

The chapter proceeds in four steps. It first surveys definitional issues and key literature.

\(^{49}\)According to Finkelstein (1995, 369), global governance can be thought of as governing relationships that reach across national boundaries. An important caveat obtains in this context: governing is exercised without any claims to sovereign authority (Ibid., 369). In conceiving of global governance this way, it is process-driven. Such a framing provides for a more nuanced understanding of global governance. Indeed, Rosenau takes the view that “global governance refers to more than the formal institutions and organizations through which the management of international affairs is or is not sustained” (1995, 13). In terms of providing a nuanced understanding, governance as being process-driven can be seen in one important respect: “[the] formulation and promulgation of principles and promotion of consensual knowledge affecting the general international order, regional orders, particular issues on the international agenda, and efforts to influence the domestic rules and behaviour of states” (Finkelstein 1995, 370).
Secondly, it provides 'snapshots' of some theoretical approaches that can be applied to the study of interregionalism, also drawing attention to the development of the scholarship. Cotermiously, it determines whether there is systematic theoretical treatment of small state Global South regions like the Caribbean in this corpus of work, as regards an (inter)regionalism narrative. It finds that the literature has tended to neglect the constellation of small regional actors in international society (the Caribbean is no exception), oriented instead toward much larger regions. This gaping hole in coverage means that important analytical devices and insights which such regions and their study can provide are lost on the scholarship, which ultimately takes away from the theoretical and policy strength of this body of knowledge. This latter point is explored in the chapter's conclusion.

1.2 Conceptualizing Interregionalism: Towards a Definition and Tracing Key Scholarship

Interregionalism scholarship can be characterized as attempting to take account of a relatively nascent feature of global governance: formalized, increasingly routinized interaction involving world regions. However, Hettne acknowledges that as an emergent “phenomenon in international relations [t]here is no consensus as far as definitions [of interregionalism] are concerned” (2007, 107). A streamlined definition of the phenomenon, thus, proves difficult.

To bear this point out, consider that in some cases such relations are region-to-region in nature, and in others they involve state-based interaction with regional entities; with variations on these forms. Perhaps in recognition of these permutations, for Rossler, “[i]nterregionalism can be explained as different forms of bi- or multilateral relations between one or more regional organisations, or between regional organisations and states, under the condition that the regional grouping is acting as an entity in the international system” (2009, 317).
A useful definition of interregionalism and one that resonates with the present study is provided by Doctor: “institutionalized closer relations between two regional blocs” (2007, 281; my emphasis).\(^{50}\) This is described as the deepest—indeed pure—form of interregionalism (Soderbaum and Stalgren 2010, 5). As regards the more wide-ranging understandings of interregional arrangements transcending the bi-regional form, scholars like Ruland (2001, 5) emphasize two types of interregionalism, of which the bilateral form—the origins of which he locates in the 1970s\(^{51}\)—is one and the second, newer form (emblematic of the so-called ‘new’ interregionalism) is transregionalism. This latter arrangement is characterized by “member states [engagement] from more than two regions” (Ibid., 6); what Wagner similarly describes as an “arrangement which encompasses countries with different affiliations to other regional organizations” (2006, 285).\(^{52}\) Ruland’s characterization of interregionalism and its

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\(^{50}\) For a similar definition, see Soderbaum and Langenhove (2005, 257-258). Hettne (2004) is careful to highlight the role of institutions in mediating interregional interaction. The institutionalized nature of these relations, however, is not universally accepted as a defining feature of interregionalism. Reiterer characterizes interregionalism as an arrangement between two “regionalisms”, but underscores that it can be “either contractual or de facto” (2005, 1). It is perhaps fitting, at this juncture, to also define and distinguish between regionalism, regionalization and region. Regionalism can be seen as top-down, state-brokered and state-driven transnational projects, built around integration and/or functional cooperation processes; whereas regionalization is a bottom-up process, animated by non-state actors that leverage transnational territorial groupings toward achieving primarily commercial/trade ends. Region (understood in the present work as a supra-state unit) is a more contested term that definitionally is subject to various understandings, due in large measure to its application across a number of academic disciplines from political science to geography, economics and more. In the field of IR, the definition of ‘region’ tends to be informed, to a great extent, by theoretical perspectives. Neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches tend to stress materialist definitions, typically anchored in static geographic/geo-strategic and economic narratives. Constructivist approaches, on the other hand, tend to conceive of regions in a more theoretically and analytically useful manner as conceptually produced socio-spatial categories. In this vein, Boas et al underscore that the constructed nature of regions stems from “social practice and discourse” (2005, 1). A more detailed discussion of these approaches will be undertaken later.

\(^{51}\) Other scholars suggest as much, too. Referencing EU-Common Market of the South (Mercosur) relations, Santander contends that they are based on “group-to-group dialogue” (of which the EU was the hub); this sort of interregionalist initiative traceable to the 1970s (2005, 290). In noting the connection between this initiative and the so-called old regionalism, he cites ‘old’ interregionalism, for instance in the context of a dialogue established in the 1980s between the EC and the countries of the Central American Common Market. Pilgaard maintains that extra-European regional conflicts/tensions, as was the case in Central America in the 1980s, were catalysts for interregional cooperation spearheaded by the EU (1993, 108-110). Instructively, Santander acknowledges that such interregionalism was “sporadic […] rather limited by the bipolar international context” of the time (2005, 290). A group-to-group interregional dialogue that is also typically cited in the literature for its long lineage—dating back to the 1970s—is the EU-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) engagement.

\(^{52}\) In this respect, Wagner cites the case of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation; which does
manifestations, though, is but one among many divergent understandings. Hettne, for instance, distinguishes “between interregionalism as a formalized relation between regional organizations, and relations among regions in a more general sense: transregionalism [envisioned as involving disparate actors, running the gamut of state, non-state, even regional organization actors]” (2007, 107). Thus, in this context, transregionalism encompasses relationships that extend beyond intergovernmental engagement and cooperation, to include transnationally networked non-state actors under the ambit of interregionalism, namely: private sector and civil society actors.

Ruland's typology is, however, limiting, in so far as its treatment of permutations in the interregional format goes. To a lesser extent, so too is Hettne's template. Hanggi (2006) provides a typological advance on both, in the process sketching the growing frequency of and reliance on interregional permutations over the last four decades, spanning a cross-section of the Global North, and, increasingly, cutting across the Global North and Global South, and more recently re-formating some historical pan-Global South alliances.

Excluding his account of triad-based interregionalism and triad-cum-non-triad interregionalism, Hanggi's (2006) classification scheme sets out five types of interregional relations, which by his own admission may not adequately reflect “real world” complexities. Hitherto, this classification attempt stands out as an especially expansive stock-taking of arrangements traditionally viewed as interregional in nature, in addition to outlier cases. His

not fit with conventional understandings of group-to-group interregionalism. Rather, he likens it to a megaregion, given that the countries—fourteen in all—constitutive of this arrangement are members of five respective regional groupings: the Southern African Development Community, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

53 Hanggi tracks the emergence of the various types of interregional relations, including what he terms “quasi-interregional relations”, “relations between two regional organizations”, “relations between a regional organization and a regional grouping”, “relations between two regional groups”, “megaregional relationships”, “interregional relations within the triad”, “interregional relations between triad and non-triad regions” (2006, 44-45, 47, 48, 49, 50-51, 53, 55).
analysis expands on a three-pronged categorization of interregionalism, which he developed in an earlier paper: "(a) relations between regional groupings; (b) biregional and transregional arrangements; (c) hybrids such as relations between regional groupings and single powers" (Hanggi 2000, 1).

1.3 **Interregionalism: Theory in Perspective**

Some scholars have determined that there are five broad functions of interregionalism: "balancing [i.e. Triad-centric actors attempting to balance each other (and similarly position themselves with respect to non-Triad groupings), as regards power], institution building [in the context of global governance], rationalizing [decision-making in global forums], agenda setting and collective identity formation" (Doidge 2007, 232). From the vantage point of IR theory, interregional relations' balancing role pertains to realism (Ibid., 232). Collectively, institution building, rationalizing and agenda setting are liberal institutionalist in orientation (Ibid., 232). Collective identity formation is especially germane with respect to constructivism (Ibid., 232).

Regarding the second point and with respect to its IR context, the increasingly discernible trend of the actor status of certain regions has further disrupted the long-established, sweeping grip (already the target of critical, generally post-positivist theoretical IR approaches, for some three decades) that the so-called idealized Westphalian interstate narrative—with respect to the evolution of the modern states system—has had on the discipline. States as sovereign, spatial political units—perpetuated as such by political fiat—appear to be operating more and more alongside world regions.

Consider that "[f]or the last two decades at least, the emerging global order increasingly seems to be characterised by a relocation of political authority to spheres beyond the nation-
state” (Albert and Reuber 2007, 549). That interregional relations are a potentially lasting feature of global governance is of special consequence in terms of the place of these relations, coupled with the manifest (quasi-)unitary strength of purpose and action of certain regions, in challenging the disciplinary resonance and currency of interstate paradigms that present the state as the basic or elemental unit of social analysis.

On this score, interregionalism research has not deliberately engaged with how the phenomenon represents, in theoretical terms, a challenge to the state-centric orthodoxy of IR (though some scholars aligned with the ‘new’ regionalism research have (see Boas et al 2005)). This despite the fact that the group of scholars who have been central in reprising and advancing academic inquiry into this phenomenon over the last decade, have sought to situate interregionalism squarely in IR (see Hanggi et al 2006).

What is more, while some interregionalism researchers may have sought to couch their scholarly contributions in IR-based theoretical frameworks—realist and liberal-institutionalist (or a combination of the two (see Hanggi 2000)), including other variants like constructivism (see Gilson 2002)—such engagements have, generally, been thin. But conspicuous by its absence has been explicit engagement with the metatheoretical debates that animate concepts such as ontology and epistemology (Hollis and Smith 1991a/1991b), and that have riven the field of IR.

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Both ontology and epistemology are central to how the analyst generally approaches social inquiry, and the discipline of IR specifically; in terms of his take on the nature, purposes, methods, scope of inquiry and criteria of the discipline. Ontology relates to the social world and the nature of being, which we can view as units of social analysis (and their relationships), deployed in the study of world politics. Epistemology has to do with how the analyst comes to know and relate his knowledge to the world, leveraging methodology in the pursuit of knowledge. Specifically, the analyst can have an objectivist (essentially materialist) or subjectivist (essentially idealist) position. The objectivist position is based on the 'fact-value dichotomy' (Fischer 1998, 130); the subjectivist position obtains where the line is blurred regarding what is under study and how the analyst's views are inserted in the process, as he is implicated in the reality being studied. Following from this, the analyst can obtain knowledge about the world either scientifically—i.e. using positivism. Referred to as neopositivism by Fischer, he describes it as having forged a social science occupied with the "pursuit of quantitatively replicable causal generalizations [or relationships, emphasizing] empirical research designs, the use of sampling techniques and data-gathering procedures, the measurement of outcomes, and the development of causal models with predictive power....The only reliable
and the level of analysis problem (Singer 1961)—which, arguably, form core facets of paradigm-based outlooks on the world and certainly shape perceptions of the disciplinary nature and purpose of IR. In important respects, this is reflective of just how neoteric second generation attempts to articulate an interregionalism research agenda are.

This reference to second generation interregionalism research, though fleeting, is significant, in that as much as Hanggi’s (2000) now decade-plus old paper is a landmark contribution to the academic engagement with interregionalism, it is not the first such attempt to examine the phenomenon. Rather, it represents a scholarly spark that re-kindled the research agenda; what I term—and have already alluded to as—a second generation undertaking. There were much earlier (albeit exiguous) first generation attempts—through the 1960s (see Russett 1967), ’70s (see Cantori and Spiegel 1973) and ’80s (see Kaiser 1981)—to examine interregional interactions (Hanggi 2000, 2).

However, interregionalism did not appear to resonate in regionalism literature thirty years ago. Prevailing geopolitical (i.e. the systemic break with the Cold War) and geoeconomic (i.e. even more concerted globalization-driven integration) realities unfolding over the last two decades have, ostensibly, changed this; necessitating that scholars treat with interregionalism approach to knowledge accumulation, according to this epistemology, is empirical falsification through objective hypothesis testing of rigorously formulated causal generalizations” (1998, 130). Inspired by the work of Karl Popper, positivism seeks, in the social science context, to emulate approaches to research in the natural sciences—by explaining the world. This, as Cox (1981) describes it, is a 'problem-solving' approach. Alternatively, the analyst can obtain knowledge about the world by understanding it; essentially interpreting it (i.e. post-positivism), given the indeterminacy that animates it. Post-positivism lets go of positivism’s empirical shackles. The Frankfurt School-inspired critical theory of IR, articulated by Robert Cox (1981), generally falls into this latter category, having an emancipatory intent and making the case for systemic change in respect of the status quo in the international system. As such, given ontological and epistemological cleavages, positivist and post-positivist theoretical perspectives in IR do not command a consensus on the nature, purposes, methods, scope of inquiry and criteria of the discipline. [This analysis draws on discussions with professors and classmates, in the context of the York University Department of Political Science doctoral seminar 'Advanced Study in International Relations'.]

55 Exceptions are scholars like Hettne (see Hettne et al 1999), who have sought to situate the study of regionalism on epistemological grounds, making the case for a 'normative-critical IR' as relates to regionalism; pushing the envelope, too, with respect to looking beyond the ontological centrality of the state.
more deliberately. The prevailing narrative of the EU taking shape as a global actor in world politics—in the light of a more internationally present European Commission and, more recently, the Lisbon Treaty (which has brought to the fore such institutional innovations as the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and the European External Action Service (EEAS) (see Article 13a(3) of the Lisbon Treaty))—has also been a catalyst for scholarly interest.\textsuperscript{56}

While scholarly interest in interregionalism has intensified over the last ten-plus years, such literature is far from robust. This is indicative of such research “still [being] in its infancy” (Hanggi \textit{et al} 2006, 6). Typically, the literature has tended to appear as chapter contributions in edited volumes, and in academic journals (ibid). In the case of the latter, a set of articles were published in 2005 in a landmark special issue of the \textit{Journal of European Integration}, on the theme of the EU as a global actor in the context of interregionalism.

To date, Hanggi, Roloff and Ruland’s 2006 edited volume, \textit{Interregionalism and International Relations}, is the first book-length attempt to deal in a dedicated fashion with this subject matter (Hanggi \textit{et al} 2006c, xiii). Their book is the culmination of a research initiative launched in the early 2000s that brought together a group of scholars from around the world interested in advancing research on interregionalism (\textit{Ibid.}, xiii). The volume is described as a first attempt to engage with the state of the art in this research field (Hanggi \textit{et al} 2006). That it was only published in 2006 signifies just how recently established the dedicated research agenda on interregionalism actually is.

\textsuperscript{56} Though institutional reforms that cut to the core of expanding the EU’s ability to act in concert in international affairs have only taken shape in recent years, dating back at least to the early 1990s there has been a long-standing perception of the grouping’s members “as one actor on the world scene, and at the EC summit in Maastricht in December 1991 they committed themselves to a political union, including closer cooperation on foreign policy” (Pilgaard 1993, 101).
Hanggi and Ruland have been at the forefront of the second generation undertaking to develop a research agenda around interregionalism. As previously acknowledged, Hanggi’s 2000 paper is, in many respects, groundbreaking. Ruland has also advanced an understanding of emerging forms of interregionalism; in the 1990s and 2000s publishing work on EU and Asian interregional cooperation and the EU as an interregional actor (Ruland 1999 & 2001).

1.4 'Lilliput' Regions in Interregionalism Literature, Against the Backdrop of More Studied Regions

I. The Dominance of Europe in the Interregionalism Literature

Europe attracts considerable scholarly attention as a so-called apex region, against the backdrop of the theme of interregionalism and global governance; so, too, do the other two so-called Triad regions: North America and East Asia. Collectively, they are generally examined with a view to making sense of the changing world order, notably around the narrative of hegemonic world order, but also growing, complex interdependence.

At the risk of overly simplifying the extent of the geographic spread of scholars engaged in interregionalism research, a case can be made that concerted research efforts appear especially to be clustered within the context of European institutions. This is not surprising, considering that—as previously noted—regional actoriness, as an overarching theme, looms large in the still developing interregionalism research: Europe figuring prominently in this narrative. As such, research institutions, especially those in continental Europe that are occupied with the study of comparative regionalism and Europe in international affairs, have developed research programs

57 See Katzenstein (2005); who contends that regions, particularly Asian and European regionalism—leveraged by the territorial and non-territorial powers of the postwar American imperium—have assumed a critically important place in world politics, especially in the post-Cold War global order. “The United States plays the central role in a world of regions”, he argues (Ibid., 43).
that either touch (directly or indirectly) on interregionalism. Notable examples are the Belgium-based United Nations University-Comparative Regional Integration Studies, the Center for European Integration Studies a research institute at the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms University—in Germany, and the Kolleg-Forschergruppe "The Transformative Power of Europe" initiative of the Freie Universitat-Berlin, to name but a few. The School of Global Studies (SGS) and the affiliated, recently-established Gothenburg Centre of Globalization and Development at the University of Gothenburg are also notable in this regard. The SGS is of particular importance, as it is the academic home to a doyen of (inter)regionalism scholarship, Bjorn Hettne and his protege, Fredrik Soderbaum.

II. Small State Regions in the Interregionalism Literature

Given the above context, it is not surprising why interregionalism research has come to be regarded as ostensibly taken up with so-called Triad-based relations; only in recent years having gradually broadened its scholarly research to consider the interregional narrative of non-Triad (ostensibly Global South) regions. While regions in Asia and Latin America, for instance, have been of interest to scholars, as have regions with respect to the African continent—more recently—there has, at best, been an indifference toward small state world regions; at worst, a disregard.

Either way, there has been an absence of systematic consideration of small, marginal Global South regions, like the Caribbean. This region tends to be subsumed into or has generally been relegated to a secondary status in analyses concerned with certain interregional configurations. A case in point is Holland's (2006) examination of how interregionalism has played out between Europe and the ACP.
The Caribbean's interregional experiences are no less instructive than those of other regions, regardless of it being an extremely small region, on the periphery of the global political economy. These experiences need to be taken stock of. Table 2 in the Annex does exactly that.

As is evident from Table 2, the Caribbean's interregional encounters run the spectrum of permutations. That the region has had a long-standing (colonial/post-colonial) interregional relationship with Europe, decidedly bi-regional in nature, spanning wide-ranging ties around development aid, political cooperation, trade and other themes, makes for an empirical case deserving of deliberative constructivist analysis. The EPA negotiated between a group of Caribbean States and the EU, especially, lends itself to this sort of study.

1.5 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to engage with the interregionalism literature, which is one of the scholarly referent points for the present study. In as much as it is an important scholarly anchor, it has shortcomings. These shortcomings have been explored, among them the literature's lack of engagement with regions like the Caribbean.

Small state Global South regions like the Caribbean are not inconsequential, not least because the particular and unique features of their interregionalist engagements can lead to a better understanding of the nature of interregionalism, in general, in theory and practice. Also important to keep in mind in the general scheme of things is that, there has been a trend (traditionally associated with decolonization and in more recent times where states have frayed and unraveled altogether, e.g. the former Soviet Union) where states are becoming smaller. What is more, smaller state regions are taking shape and are increasingly being engaged by larger ones and vice versa. A cautionary note is, therefore, perhaps apt here: in favouring more conventional
research agendas, interregionalism scholarship runs the risk of compromising its ability to offer well-informed assessment of emerging trends in interregionalist engagements, thus undermining the potency of its explanatory power.

At this juncture, however, we need to take stock of the regionalism literature, couched by an account of integration approaches. This analysis is especially germane, in the light of the link established earlier between regionalism and interregionalism, and considering that "[r]esearch on interregionalism is...part of regional integration theory" (Roloff 2006, 21).
Chapter II
Regionalism: A Survey of the Literature/Theory and Treatment of Caribbean (Inter)regionalism Therein

2.1 Introduction

This chapter turns attention to regionalism studies. I parse the extant literature and some theoretical approaches, surveying them, though not with a view to giving an account of the current state of the field, *per se*. While I discuss the nature and contribution of several scholarly undertakings, my primary concern is to set the stage to determine whether there is systematic theoretical treatment of the Caribbean regarding an (inter)regionalism narrative. Some segments of the regionalism literature, it is determined, do take account of this narrative. However, it is surmised that while elements of regionalism scholarship do treat with the Caribbean seriously, there is scope for the study of Caribbean regionalism to utilize research trajectories increasingly prevalent in contemporary scholarship of IR scholars and comparativists that apply constructivist insights to study Global North regions.

Burgeoning interregionalism has focused attention on regions/regionalism. Indeed, there has been a resurgence of international regionalism through the 1980s and '90s (Hurrell 1995, 331; Hanggi *et al* 2006, 3). The comingling of world politics and regions/regionalism is perhaps presently at one of its tightest moments in history, given that contemporary “[g]lobal governance seems to bring with it a new and strengthened role of regions and regional organisations” (Albert and Reuber 2007, 550).

Hettne and his collaborators cite aspects of the structural transformation of the world that

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58 International regionalism is understood as “the formation of interstate associations or groupings on the basis of regions” (Nye 1968, vii); but, importantly, as “the ideas, identities and ideologies related to a regional project...[R]egionalism is clearly a political project” (Marchand *et al* 1999, 900; my emphasis).
must inform the contextualization but also understanding of recent trends in regionalism, namely: (i) the decline of American hegemony, in relative terms (for more detailed perspective on this view, refer to (neo-)realist approaches to regionalism, which stem from a foregrounding of power relations and hegemony—with a view to understanding both regional agenda-setting and the role of intra- and extra-regional hegemons in this regard (see Gilpin 1975, 1987; Krasner 1976)); and (ii) shifting attitudes, especially among developing countries as regards neoliberalism in its economic and political incarnations (Hettne 2007; Hettne and Söderbaum 2000). With respect to this latter point, emerging trends in regionalism need to be conceived of, too, in keeping with a project to cement neoliberalism—i.e. globalization (Dierckxsens and Aguilar 2007, 27). This is especially the case when globalization is propped up by open regionalism which buttresses trade and investment liberalization agreements. 59

The task at hand is to navigate through and draw from the literature on regionalism studies, with a view to showcasing various theoretical currents. Given the voluminous research therein, for practical purposes a cross-cutting chapter such as this has to be an illustrative, selective engagement.

The chapter is divided into seven parts, followed by concluding remarks. The first section engages with the regionalism literature from the vantage point of the grand theories of European integration. The second section sketches the study of regionalism, building on Haasan neofunctionalism 'beyond Europe'. The section that follows examines further attempts in the literature to extend the theoretical and conceptual insights from European integration studies,

59 Though it has no commonly agreed definition, open regionalism is generally understood to refer to the advancement of both regional (trading) arrangements and the global trading system; and thus is an attempt to reconcile the two. The view is that the two can be compatible, and that regionalism can serve as a "building block" for global liberalization, giving it impetus (Bergsten 1997).
with consideration being given to strands of regional integration theory in its broader sense.\textsuperscript{60} The intellectual terrain of regionalism studies is sketched, with particular focus on the New Regionalism Approach (NRA). Section four turns the attention of the chapter to the theoretical bedrock of the present study, constructivism in international theory. It draws on the notion that integration is anchored in social interaction (Deutsch 1953). Section five looks at the application of constructivism to the study of European Integration. Section six frames regional identities against the backdrop of a constructivist approach to the study of regionalism, which sets the stage for the final section which situates the place of small state Global South regions like the Caribbean in the regionalism literature. The conclusion maintains that the record of scholarship, in this regard, fares better in regionalism studies; especially finding voice through the work of West Indian scholars.

2.2 \textit{(European) Integration Theory at a Glance}

A useful starting point for a review of the extant literature on international regionalism is to consider European integration theory, reviewing the theoretical pluralism that has come to characterize it. The field of European/(regional) integration theory and international regionalism are decidedly distinct, yet have much in common: noteworthy, in this regard, is that the scholarly space of each has been heavily trafficked by IR scholars, as is the case with interregionalism literature. Thus, at the very least, this scholarship is heavily influenced by IR paradigms.

European integration studies is interwoven with the idea of a \textit{united} Europe. It is an idea

\textsuperscript{60} 'European' integration theory and integration theory are utilized interchangeably by some scholars (Rosamond 1995, 391), to refer to \textit{European integration studies}. A somewhat nuanced view of the two is taken. While, arguably, integration theory, \textit{per se}, is taken up with the study of the European integration and governance narrative, regional integration theory attempts to more deliberatively (although not always systematically) grapple with the integration experiences of other world regions.
that has resonated within academic and policy circles, extending far beyond the disciplinary shores associated with the study of Europe as well as Europe's geographical shores, to other regions. Hence the interest of some IR scholars in the EU; especially in delineating and juxtaposing what has been achieved in integration today against a historical backdrop.

Although Jean Monnet and French statesman Robert Schuman\textsuperscript{61} are treated with reverence as regards advancement of the idea of a united Europe, they were not the first to conceive of it. Other noted historical figures articulated a similar vision, years prior to the historically significant Schuman Declaration and Schuman Plan. In a much-cited speech delivered in 1945, Winston Churchill, for example, called for a "United States of Europe"\textsuperscript{62}; to be tasked with pushing for cooperation and harmonious relations (Mauter 1998, 67).\textsuperscript{63} As a result, Churchill is "regarded as the father of European unity" (Ibid., 67). In addition to intellectual efforts in the 1940s that made the case for a postwar European federation, "a major movement of public opinion, with [the establishment of the] Federal Union...in 1939 [, tasked with promoting] the idea [, also took off]..., gaining 10,000 members by the spring of 1940" (Pinder 1986, 41).

But in looking to history to conceptually situate the push for European integration, there is one overarching factor that must be considered. The fact is, the continent's centuries old experience with empires that sought to (and those that did) consolidate territories (in some cases

\textsuperscript{61}The integration initiatives, at the time, were spearheaded by France, with the support of West Germany and the Benelux countries.

\textsuperscript{62}Predating Churchill's call for a "United States of Europe", there were impassioned pleas for unification: coming against the backdrop of the end of World War I, when in the early 1920s Count Kalergi of Austria made the case for a United States of Europe (Basdeo 1990, 104). Foreshadowing what would emerge some fifty years later, the French delegation attached to the Assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva proposed that a European Union be established, and that it "operate" in the context of the League of Nations (Ibid., 104-105). These initiatives were absent traction, at the time (Ibid., 104-105).

\textsuperscript{63}"Churchill's interest in European unity [is said to date] to 1930"; though he would later abandon the idea (Mauter 1998, 67).
by force—the Napoleonic Wars comes to mind—and through diplomacy, e.g. the Congress of Vienna) meant that the idea of a united Europe had had an extraordinarily long time to germinate in a collective European psyche, of sorts.

If some form of union has been a long-standing theme in European history, informing it, to a large extent, has been the quest for peace; which, although emerging as an important driver of the postwar European integration movement, has been a recurring and central preoccupation in the European narrative. This latter point is evidenced in the work of Immanuel Kant—the foundation for democratic peace theory—and others. In its modern history, Europe has the unenviable distinction of having been at the center of two world wars, which, without question, make the impetus for and starting conditions of postwar European integration sui generis; as does the Euro-polity's ambitious 1957 founding treaty (and associated vision), which set the bar high for integration at the very outset. Moreover that fairly ambitious integration was steadily pursued on the heels of an especially dark period for Europe in the lead up to, shortly after and during two world wars is all the more remarkable, accomplishing one of the rarest of feats: peace over the last sixty-plus years of European history. European integration, namely in the postwar

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64 Professor Andre Sapir (Université Libre de Bruxelles) and Dr Luk Van Langenhove (UNU-CRIS): Interview by author, Prague, Czech Republic, 16th and 17th January, 2010, respectively (on the margins of the Eleventh Annual Global Development Conference—Regional and Global Integration: Quo Vadis?). Sapir expounded on the nature and implication of the Euro-polity's ambitious founding treaty: for him, it is imbued with a political vision; as is exemplified by the following passage—“Determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”. According to Sapir, this vision has kept the regionalist project on a forward looking path, as compared with the European Free Trade Agreement—which had a purely economic vision, and has remained a free trade agreement. Thus, as he describes it, the European regionalist project has steadily evolved up the integration ladder—facilitated along the way by common institutions/policies having been set in place—from free trade area, to customs union, to common market, to economic union; with full integration perhaps not yet on the horizon, but “in the cards”. He did stress, however, that he wanted to avoid painting an overly rosy picture of EU integration; citing the uneven extent of integration, for example in the: “goods markets (very high, free mobility (FM)), services markets (medium, partial FM), labour markets (relatively low, but FM) and capital mobility (very high, FM)”. Sapir emphasized three challenges of EU integration: “1. How to manage partial integration?; 2. How to manage global integration?” [Elements of this discussion appear in Sapir's presentation (entitled 'Regional Integration: The European Experience') to Plenary 2—i.e. Lessons for Regional Integration from the EU—is the EU Sui Generis?—of the aforementioned conference].

65 For much of its history, Europe has been all too familiar with war.
years, and the *idea of Europe* both acquired common purpose through the quest for peace. This narrative was evident among the 'big thinkers' in the early days of integration, such as Schuman and Monnet. Part and parcel of that ideational story was to reduce the large asymmetries between the founding partners.

At the very least, there have been two intellectual currents motivating the study of the EU. The first relates to the latter point: to study European integration has meant gaining a better appreciation for its transformative role with respect to sustaining peace in the international system. It is no wonder, therefore, why European integration studies has traditionally been trafficked by IR scholars, having a close, longstanding association—as a result—with IR.

Secondly, European integration studies has been informed by scholarly attention on the raft of European institutions and related policy fields, political parties (party systems) and elections and other issue areas more closely associated with comparative politics and public policy studies. Such issue areas have been studied not as a means of attaining greater insights into broader questions of war and peace, *per se*. Rather, they are studied *in their own right*.

The intellectual currents I have flagged above represent one interpretation of the trajectory of the study of European integration. Another instructive interpretation, provided by Verdun (2005), is intellectually not that far removed. She differentiates between two approaches that have apparently developed in the European integration studies literature: an American and European one.

The "more theory-oriented" scholarship of the American approaches, Verdun suggests, couch the EU in "general phenomena", with a view to "produc[ing] general theories" (2005, 11). In contrast, Verdun understands EU approaches as "focus[ed] exclusively on the EU", the scholarship more "case study-oriented" (*Ibid.*, 11).
The gap between the two approaches can be traced to differing points of view in a number of areas. Whether European integration is a *sui generis* case features prominently, in this regard. As Verdun argues, European scholars tend to take the position that it is, or acknowledge this but invoke a middle ground between it being *sui generis* and it being “a case like many others” ([Ibid.], 12). American scholars, she contends, frame European integration as a process geared at “institution building and policy making” that is comparable to what obtains in the rest of the world ([Ibid.], 12).

With the above background, we cast our gaze now to integration theory. But we do so selectively, taking account of and contrasting major schools of thought that have traditionally (and particularly) been employed in the study of postwar European integration, around: (i) *why* the community emerged; and (ii) *why* and *how* it has evolved in the way that it has. In what follows, the main, contending historical contributions to theorizing European integration are outlined; namely: federalism, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. Flanking the review of these classical integration theories (and integrated into a later subsection) is an outline of a more recent contribution to the study of European integration, constructivism.

Under the entry *federal*, the Oxford Dictionary online resource AskOxford.com cites the term as “referring to a system of government in which several states form a unity but remain

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66 Börzel notes that scholars have sought to advance various concepts—such as the *new, post-Hobbesian order* and a *post-modern state*, even a *network of pooling and sharing sovereignty*—to “capture the *sui generis* nature of the EU” (2010, 192).

67 Scholarship in this vein tends to contribute less to the Political Science literature, broadly conceived—according to Verdun (2005, 12-13).

68 This includes the formative contributions to the literature on functionalism.

69 As classical integration theories, these three have resonated beyond academia, finding broad appeal with practitioners and policy makers alike. In the review that follows, I highlight competing explanations of European integration as driven either by suprastate relations, leveraged by supraterritorial institutions, or the state (including state-based constituents and inter-state processes). As relates to classical integration theories, we can see the core dialectic as not being too far removed from the longstanding liberal and realist debate in IR. Like the latter debate and the so-called 'neo-neo' divide that came to characterize it in the late 1980s, the debates animating classical integration theories appear to have run their course.
independent in internal affairs”. But it also notes that federalism is a derivative of federal; especially noteworthy is the Latin derivation of federal—foedus, meaning “league, covenant, or treaty”.

In integration studies, federalism is especially minded of war and peace and how the pursuit and achievement of the latter is best assured by states typically operating as unitary actors forfeiting sovereignty, and instead uniting as one supranational entity. What would emerge by way of shared institutions and the division of powers between federal, national and local authorities occupies scholarly attention in the federalist approach.

In the context of federalism proper, a common constitution or founding document is the glue that binds together what, in effect, would have been units that previously exercised sovereignty; subsequently forfeited in its outright sense. Although applied in many different contexts, federalism (“highly normative” in nature (Rosamond 1995, 395)) in the context of European integration—with respect to different layers of political authority, i.e. central/sub-central70—probably evokes two landmark documents, the 1957 Treaty of Rome and the 1950 Schuman Declaration.71 The Treaty of Rome—signed by what at the time were six founder-members of the Community, France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries—put signatory countries on the path to economic and political integration, that, arguably, came to represent an approach to governing Europe that had as one of its core objectives the preservation of peace (as already mentioned), in the wake of two devastating world wars—with Europe at

70 In this type of federalism, the sanctity of political boundaries are preserved, and the (new) relationship between sub-central units better defined, as is the relationship between those units and the center. Institutions are also important in giving life to the federal system.

71 Other key events include the Treaty of Paris of 1951, the Single European Act-SEA of 1986, the Treaty on European Union of 1991, the Treaty of Maastricht—especially the creation of the single market—of 1993 [The EU was established by Article A of the Treaty of the EU, or the Maastricht Treaty], the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (that came to a head in 2004, though its ratification failed in 2005), the Treaty of Lisbon (signed in 2007, and entering into force in 2009). The SEA ranks as a key turning point in the integration process, as it formed the basis for the crystallization of the single market in the early 1990s.
their center. One of the Treaty's core pillars was the European Economic Community (EEC), coming on the heels of the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)\textsuperscript{72}, as regards the Treaty of Paris in 1951 (which expired in 2002).

There were two objectives to the creation of the EEC and the Common Market: the transformation of the conditions of trade, but also manufacture in the Community; and secondly, a more political objective that envisioned the EEC as contributing to the "functional construction of a political Europe"—constituting a step towards closer unification in respect of Europe, no less (EEC Treaty 2007). In the preamble of the Treaty, the signatories declare that they were "determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe" (\textit{Ibid.}, 395; emphasis added).

The ECSC, proposed in the Schuman Declaration, envisioned the Franco-German production of coal and steel as being "placed under a common High Authority"...."The pooling of coal and steel production [thought to hold the potential to] immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe" (Schuman Declaration 1950). The economic dimension of European integration was thus seen as an important first step to a political union. Consider that "Monnet's approach to the building of Europe—a federal Europe—lay in the belief that by forging specific functional economic links between states in a way that did not directly challenge national sovereignty, the door to federation would be opened gradually" (Burgess 1996, 3). What is more having been involved in the post-war reconstruction of France, Monnet viewed the European nation state that standing and acting alone as not being a fit with the world that was taking shape. Rather, he embraced the notion of a European common market on a continental scale (Monnet 1962). With a devastating

\textsuperscript{72} This was a precursor to what has come to be known as the EU, which far exceeds the ECSC in membership and policy area reach/remit.
war fresh on the minds of technocrats like Monnet, he also saw the integration of Germany into the western European economy as a means of counteracting any possible tendency on that country's part to unleash war on the continent once more.

The Treaty of Rome and the Schuman Declaration are invoked above as they can be construed as reflecting a push toward a federalist vision for the Euro-polity, by the architects of European integration (other initiatives, namely the ill-fated European Defence Community and the European Political Community, also embracing this federalist goal). “[F]ederal ideas...have contributed both to the legal, political, and constitutional evolution of the European Community and to the creation of the European Union at Maastricht” [; but by the same token,] “the EU has not yet become the federation intended by both Monnet and Schuman” (Ibid., 1, 3).

Europe as having been at the center of two world wars (as previously indicated) was another recurring theme in the Schuman Declaration and the proposal therein for the establishment of an ECSC. That member states would collectively have a stake in coal and steel production was viewed as crucial to mitigating the possibility of war and promoting peace and prosperity on the European continent. Indeed, as stated in the Schuman Declaration, “[b]y pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, this proposal will lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace” (Ibid., 3).

This narrative became an important driving force behind the study of European integration. The federalism literature associated with Davis (1978), Pinder (1986) and Burgess (1996) is perhaps most instructive, in this regard. Authored some seventy years ago by Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi, The Ventotene Manifesto—which made the case for a federation of
European states and served as an important template for the European Federalist Movement (Movimento Federalista Europeo)—can probably be intellectually located as a very important inspiration for the European integration literature on federalism.

While "the European Union [admittedly] is not a federation in the classical sense, [for some] it has a number of federal-like attributes and dynamics" (Burgess 1996, 3), including a commitment to federal principles/values around partnership, equality, recognition (and accommodation) of difference, etc.—sketched out in their "covenant". Federalism, thus, seeks to explain sovereign European states pursuit of an association, otherwise referred to as integration. The need for common institutions feature in this approach, as a way of staving off war between states. How a balance is struck between diverse, sovereign nation-states' interests (including interstate cooperation) and the wider, declared commitment of these units to the union resonates in this theoretical framework. If a balance indeed existed at various points in the history of European integration, it is an open question as to whether or to what degree it may have been taken off kilter, in the light of what some have recently suggested is an EU superstate is in the making (Milward 2005). The Lisbon Treaty has fanned the fears of Eurosceptics, who are concerned about a supposedly emerging superstate.

What of neofunctionalism? Ernst B. Haas was an intellectual giant of this approach (Haas 1958; 1964; 1975). Arguably, he has left an indelible imprint on neofunctionalism, but on integration studies too. Indeed, the emergence of integration studies is thought to coincide with the publication of Haas's *The Uniting of Europe* and the establishment of the EEC in Western Europe in 1958 (Moravcsik 2005, 350).\footnote{Leon N. Lindberg's *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration*, published in 1963, also ranks among the classic contributions to neofunctionalism.}
As the first grand theory of European integration (and its dynamics), neofunctionalism has attempted to explain *how* and *why* states forgo elements of sovereignty, to instead come together as a political community pursuing economic and political integration. With respect to the latter, integration has been characterized by Haas as a process unfolding over a period of time “between the establishment of common economic rules and the possible emergence of a political entity” (Haas and Schmitter 1966, 266); integration styled in this vein ultimately being seen as leading to a blurring of political boundaries.

Haas deemed as indicative of successful integration “the growth of a pluralist political arena in the context of effective community institutions” (Scheingold 1970, 979). Accounting for the supposed near-automaticity of a deepening, sector-by-sector linear integration trajectory also occupies much attention in Haas's framework.

A cornerstone of the early incarnation of this framework is the concept of “spillover”, which represents a prediction-based account of integration—rendering it a *fait accompli*. By way of background, Haasian neofunctionalism sought to illustrate (in a non-normative, empirically-centered fashion) how cooperation, per “Monnet's approach to the building of Europe”, around fairly technical but relatively non-contentious areas/sectors (e.g. coal and steel, to some extent)

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74 While ontologically problematizing the state, Haasian neofunctionalism is epistemologically rationalistic and actor-centered.
75 For Haas, “political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities to a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end result is a new political community, superimposed over the existing ones” (Haas 1958, 16). Rosamond contends that in the neofunctionalist approach “integration amounts to the transposition of the pluralist polity from the national to the regional level” (2005, 395).
76 Years later, Haas would question the soundness of this claim (Haas 1975).
77 Albeit, in “low politics”, in the first instance.
78 Another related concept is “unintended consequences”: integration creates situations where bottlenecks, for example, that may arise are configured in such a way that solutions are only possible in terms of deeper integration efforts.
79 This was perhaps inspired by the social scientific or positivist methods of the behaviouralist revolution in the social sciences, at the time. Haas has been described as conceiving of neofunctionalism “as a variety of rationalist theory” (Rosamond 2005, 241).
political institutions, is an important neofunctional proposition.\textsuperscript{84} Shifting loyalties, as a transmission mechanism, of sorts, solidify supranational\textsuperscript{85} entities as foci of new-found loyalties, at the expense of national institutions.\textsuperscript{86} 

*Cultivated* spillover constitutes the third variant in the spillover narrative; one that highlights the role of the central supranational institution in addressing conflicts, and doing so under the premise that it represents the common interest. Effectively, this would strengthen the case for supranationalism, and integration more broadly, as deepening integration would bolster such an organization.

Though enthusiastically received when it first emerged, neofunctionalism came up for criticism.\textsuperscript{87} That criticism seemed increasingly justified by the late 1960s and 1970s; a period when the pace of European integration had slowed considerably, integration having become increasingly dysfunctional—as exemplified by the “empty chair” tactics of President Charles de Gaulle, from the late 1950s to late 1960s. Some of the fiercest opposition came from intergovernmentalism (Hoffman 1966; 1982), sharply critical of what its key protagonist—Stanley Hoffman—argued was neofunctionalism’s penchant to downplay the significance of the

\textsuperscript{84} This feeds into the notion that new authority points emerge, concomitant to a weakening of authority at the level of sub-central units. This is in contrast to federalism, where in the name of preserving and accommodating the diversity of sub-central units, the authority of those units is not lost to a central (supranational) authority, through the process of integration.

\textsuperscript{85} The notion of a supraterritorial authority was also envisioned by the precursor of neofunctionalism, functionalism. The contention is that integration galvanized around functional/technical areas spawns an internal dynamic, rendering integration self-reinforcing (Mitrany 1933; 1948; 1966).

\textsuperscript{86} “At times neo-functionalists gave the impression that spill-over was inevitable; and they thought that a supranational agency (such as the Commission of the EC) would lead the process, coopting national civil servants and representatives of interest groups for the purpose” (Pinder 1986, 43, some themes attributed to Lindberg 1963). National elites would, thus, become champions of integration.

\textsuperscript{87} The salience of neofunctionalism has been questioned, in recent years. Some scholars, including Haas, have reflected on whether neofunctionalism had in fact outlived its usefulness (Haas 1975; 2001). Some thirty years ago, Haas famously declared neofunctionalism obsolete; after having attempted to rework some of his core claims, in response to critics. Arguably, neofunctionalism was moribund for a time. Yet some scholars, like Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991), have attempted to reprise neofunctionalism, in the light of the “new dynamism” in what is now the EU, since the mid-1980s. Indeed, in one of his last works before his death, Haas would assert that neofunctionalism “is no longer obsolescent” (Haas 2004, liii).

\textsuperscript{88} This is seen as being of the realist kind; as distinct from Moravcsik’s (1991) liberal intergovernmentalism.
nation-state in the integration narrative, characterizing it more as a bystander than active, leading participant.

Amongst Hoffmanian intergovernmentalism's core claims is that the power to press ahead (or not), through a process of "interstate bargaining", with integration rests with member governments; thus placing intergovernmentalism squarely in opposition to neofunctionalism. If supraterritorial institutions exhibit power, it is only because governments wish them to, was the contention. What is more, national governments do not stand in the shadow of what are supposedly all-powerful supranational institutions: if power is indeed wielded by one over the other, the reverse is apparently the case. Importantly, for Hoffman, integration is not seen as formulaic, nor automatic. Thus, to the extent that neofunctionalism marginalizes states, intergovernmentalism brings the state back in.

Integration theory—i.e. neofunctionalism—geared at framing the European integration narrative in terms of member states being engaged in forging a supranational political entity that ultimately overshadows them is roundly rejected by Hoffman (Kjær 2004, 103). Rather, some contend that the EEC should be seen as an international regime, "[i]ncreasing cooperation and the pooling of sovereignty in some economic areas...not necessarily lead[ing] to the overall decline of national sovereignty. On the contrary, participation in a regime can enable states to adapt to a changing world economy. Hence, the EEC has helped preserve the nation-state as a basic unit in Europe, according to Hoffman" (Ibid., 21). For Hoffman, "relations between the

89 Like neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism would later go through a period of reflection. As with efforts to reprise neofunctionalism in the early 1990s, in the wake of the bolstering of European integration in the mid-1980s, though, intergovernmentalism would similarly have new life breathed into it; but with a twist. In the early '90s, Moravcsik (1991) sketched the liberal intergovernmental approach, combining rationalist institutionalism (bargaining theory) and neofunctionalist insight; in calling attention to domestic processes, he places special emphasis on economic interests. As such, there are two theoretical traditions that are evident in intergovernmentalism: a realist orientation, associated with Hoffman, and a liberal orientation, associated with Moravcsik.

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[European] Community and its members are not a zero sum game; the Community helps preserve the nation-states far more than it forces them to whither away” (1982, 21).

In Hoffman's work, there is a conscious effort to dismiss the triumphalism that appears to reverberate in neofunctionalism over a seemingly over-enthusiastic outlook on cooperation and a spillover effect. Intergovernmentalism brings into relief national (domestic) interests, against the backdrop of the so-called anarchical international system and the touted self-interest that stems from this amongst state actors, and the bearing that this has on any sustained drive toward integration.

As a result, “intergovernmentalist analyses of European integration have tended to focus on the bargaining among national governments” (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996, 269). In important respects, “intergovernmentalism is essentially an application of the realist image of international relations to the analysis of the European [Union]” (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991, 8); where neofunctionalism is focused, instead, on non-state actors, such as supranational institutions (e.g. regional secretariats).

In addition to underscoring the primacy of the nation state, Hoffman also held up the external environment—the geopolitics of the Cold War, for example—in the context of the integration narrative. “High politics”, he contended, made for a “logic of diversity” (as regards sparking divisions), rather than the “logic of integration” (1982, 21). This was borne out with

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90 As previously alluded to, this is reminiscent, to a certain degree, of the realist and liberal dialectic in IR proper. What is more, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism stood in opposition to one another for a host of reasons associated with their approach to and the dynamics of the integration process, but fundamentally because of core ontological differences. Neofunctionalism was held up as a challenge to the dominant realist IR state-centric narrative and power-centred logic, to which Hoffmannian intergovernmentalism subscribes. But Haas was wary, too, of liberal idealism’s claim that a Kantian international legal order would effectively enable conflict to be transcended (Rosamond 2005, 239). (This Haasian IR perspective is noteworthy, as Haas was deemed an IR scholar first, as opposed to an area studies specialist. Ruggie et al ask, “if neither realist nor idealist, who was Haas, intellectually speaking?” (2005, 274). Their answer: “Haas's most enduring premises and approaches are essentially Weberian” (Ibid., 239)).
respect to Gaullist France's opposition, from 1958 to 1969, to Britain joining the then EEC (Moravcsik 2000, 4, 7). De Gaulle had long been suspicious of Britain acting as the handmaiden of US geopolitical designs in Europe, against the backdrop of his own aspirations for France's "politico-military dominance in Europe" (Ibid., 7, 8).

Moravcsik makes clear, however, that, in the final analysis, the factors most influencing de Gaulle's reticence to British membership were "enduring French agricultural and industrial interests" (Ibid., 54). Notwithstanding the preponderance of factors at play in Gaullist France's policy toward British membership in the EEC, the point is, with respect to intergovernmentalism, national interests cannot simply be discounted in the integration narrative.

The approaches set out above constitute a first wave of path-breaking integration research, intellectually aligned more to an IR approach to EU studies than a comparative politics one. They have provided sophisticated insight into economic and political integration.

A slate of other, insightful approaches have emerged in their wake, including social constructivist applications to the study of European integration (Adler 1998; Jorgensen 1997; Christiansen et al 1999). Over the next few sub-sections, I consider social constructivism's application to the study of the EU integration narrative but also the study of regionalism more generally; before which it is put in context. First, however, I consider whether the preeminent integration framework (i.e. neofunctionalism) associated with EU studies resonate with the study of other, non-European regions, after which elements of regionalism studies, in general, are sketched.

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91 This thesis goes to the core of Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalist approach, privileging economic imperatives in European integration (Moravcsik 1993; 1998). For his part, Hoffman "advocates...a geopolitical interpretation of de Gaulle's European policy" (Moravcsik 2000, 56). This is a view shared by countless other scholars. Moravcsik goes against the grain with his thesis privileging 'low' over 'high' politics, with respect to de Gaulle, as argued by scholars like Vanke (2000) who responded to Moravcsik's 2000 article. 

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2.3 **Haasian Neofunctionalism beyond Europe**

It is an open question as to what extent Haasian neofunctionalism can be applied expansively, beyond certain regional-types as the EU: as some scholars assert in the context of neofunctionalism, “settings [on which generalizations are to be made] must... be limited to groups of countries with open industrial economies, pluralist societies, and democratic political systems” (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991, 3). By the same token, Haas did consider other regional integration templates; such as Latin America, for example (Haas 1967, Barrera and Haas 1969).

In short, although the intention may have been to pivot neofunctionalism as a general theory of integration, in practical terms Europe was the focal point of research. What can be said on this score is that in its broadest disciplinary sense, Haasian neofunctionalism is situated in IR. But it has been dedicated to accounting for a *particular* form of and experience with international cooperation/organization, as has emerged in and that is relevant to Western Europe and its industrialized societies. As such, while “the study of European integration has long been synonymous with Haas and his intellectual legacy [h]is name... does not figure prominently in recent contributions to the rapidly growing field of comparative regional integration” (Mattli 2005, 327).

This raises a broader question: do integration theories traditionally associated with EU studies travel well as regards the study of other, non-European regions? The short answer is no;\(^92\) but with two caveats: (i) European integration theories have provided an important intellectual bedrock for and as such are genealogically related to certain theoretical templates that have come

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\(^{92}\) As Laursen notes, “[t]heories of integration have mainly been developed to explain European integration” (2008, 3).
in their wake—many whose geographical reach (and referent) extends well beyond Europe, and, (ii) Some can provide important theoretical insights, with regard to studies of non-European regions. Neofunctionalism is especially promising, in this regard; notwithstanding that it was originally devised in the 1950s to explain how and why a political community was developing in Western Europe.

To his credit, in a self-critique that came over a decade after The Uniting of Europe, Haas argued "[t]heories that ignore the need for focused general theories, and instead treat regional integration as a sui generis phenomenon...., breed theoretical insularity and are little more than 'pre-theories' " (cited in Moravcsik 2005, 356-357).

In a stinging indictment of sui generis theory, Moravcsik argues "[m]uch scholarship on European integration over the past two decades remains blissfully uninformed by the self-criticism of neofunctionalists – and by advances in international relations theory over the past thirty years" (Ibid., 357). A quarter century ago, Puchala expressed a more extreme view of integration theory: that going forward it will be held up as "a rather long but not very prominent footnote in the intellectual history of twentieth century social science" (1984, 198).

However, there is a contrarian view. Tranholm-Mikkelsen's view is more forgiving (revealing his neofunctionalist stripes), maintaining that neofunctionalists' "object of study was 'regional integration' in general and European integration in particular" (1991, 3). Rosamond does underscore "that a considerable amount of contemporary writing on the EU is intent on locating its analysis of integration in a global context" (1995, 399). Rosamond goes further, still,

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93 Some scholars are not willing to concede ground even on this point; for them it seems as if the European integration/regionalism experience and legacy has singularly been touted in scholarship in this vein, at the expense of other regionalist experiences—so-called comparative regionalism questioning just how meaningful this narrative is to the study of other regional communities that have surfaced (Postel-Vinay 2007, 555-556).
suggesting that Haasian neofunctionalism was not intended to develop a theory of European integration, “but to arrive at a more generic portfolio of propositions about the dynamics of integration in any context” (Ibid., 243).

But these views are out of step with what, on balance, has over the years been a trend of scholars separating out literature on international regionalism from EU integration studies (Postel-Vinay 2007). Consider the view that “[t]here has been an on-going debate about the heuristic status of the European Union (EU) within regional studies, underscoring a widening divide between a somewhat self-introspecting field of EU studies and an international regionalism studies one which provides little insight, other than tautological, on the European experience’s singularity” (Ibid., 555).

This intellectual bifurcation—as relates to international regionalism—dates to the emergence of European cartographic (i.e. geo-historical/civilizational and continental) worldviews, but also the American tradition of area studies, that took shape as a result of the scale of the United States’ geostrategic, “intelligence gathering and war planning efforts” during World War II that necessitated systematic, data compilation oriented study of the regional geography of the globe (Ibid., 559-560; Farish 2005, 663-664). Indeed according to Katzenstein, “[t]he political and intellectual impetus for area studies came in the aftermath of World War II” (Katzenstein 2005, x). Area studies would come into its own during and be closely associated with the Cold War (Postel-Vinay 2007, 559-560), its narrative having made a lasting contribution to the field of regionalism studies.

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94 Scholars had varied disciplinary backgrounds, across a continuum inclusive of area specialists, Western geographers, etc.
2.4 Regionalism Studies in Perspective

Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (1989) (see also Nye 1971) can be thought of as scholars who attempted to extend the theoretical and conceptual insights from European integration studies,\(^{95}\) to what was in the 1970s a new field, international political economy (IPE).\(^{96}\) The focus was initially on transnationalism and non-state actors (see Keohane and Nye 1972), though later overshadowed—at least in the 'American school'\(^{97}\) of IPE—by a state-centric narrative.

The study of regionalism in this vein relied on neoliberal institutionalist framings.\(^{98}\) Cooperation amongst state actors looms large in this approach—this narrative easily carrying over to the role that regions (but also interregional interactions) play in the international system, in this regard.

Whereas for hegemonic stability theory regionalist cooperation is framed in concert with and as serving the self-interest of a self-regarding, rational acting, rule-setting hegemonic state/leadership (i.e. the United States' preponderance, or a US-led world order)—akin to

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\(^{95}\) Indeed, Keohane and Nye are described as interdependence theorists, said to have acknowledged an intellectual debt to neofunctionalism, despite core differences (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991, 21, 8, 9). In point of fact, Keohane and Nye's 'complex interdependence' can be traced to neofunctionalism; neofunctionalism having far-reaching effects in the field of IR, laying the intellectual groundwork for neoliberal institutionalism and the strength of its intellectual challenge to neorealism, in the so-called 'neo-neo' debate.

\(^{96}\) In so far as the often mutually constitutive worlds of international relations and international economics collide, the field of IPE can be leveraged in the study of that interaction.

\(^{97}\) I attribute this term to Benjamin Cohen (2007), who differentiates two distinct schools in IPE; the other being the 'British school'—which also figuratively extends to the European continent (Canadian neo-Gramscian, critical theory scholars can be tacked on, too). The American school is the "dominant [or] hegemonic version" (Cohen 2007, 198). It is decidedly in the intellectual straight-jacket of positivism and empiricism; in stark contrast to the normative and interpretive agenda of the British school, according to Cohen (2007, 198-200)—that, at the very least, has resulted in an ontological and epistemological "transatlantic divide" in the IPE tradition. The British/American school dichotomy goes beyond the traditional descriptions of the divisions that have characterized IPE: Liberalism, Mercantilism and Marxism; IPE approaches having more recently been subdivided into: "neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, social constructivism and the critical approaches" (Verdun 2005, 17). In some respects, the dichotomy can be thought of as an intellectual convenience, streamlining IPE approaches that have been variously compartmentalized.

\(^{98}\) Methodological individualism is steeped in this ostensibly rational choice-oriented institutionalism, as compared with sociological and historical institutionalist versions.
bandwagoning, in grand strategy— for neoliberal institutionalists the prospects for cooperation (i.e. states calibrating their behaviour to suit the preferences of others) amongst states after hegemony is the object of analysis in the context of regimes and institutions (Keohane 1984). Neoliberal institutionalists do not necessarily discount power-seeking or even self-interested, rational acting states in their narrative, though amongst the major points of difference compared to neorealists is their embrace of absolute gains; as opposed to neorealist's animating state behaviour in the context of relative gains.

A centerpiece of the difference between the two is neoliberal institutionalism's unabashed faith in cooperation (because the power-seeking/self-interested nature of states is curtailed or constrained by norms, it is argued), and the ease with which it can crystallize and be sustained between states. In this context, regions provide a cooperation template for member states to pursue common interests, and similarly for gains to be divided evenly. Cooperation among states is that much more likely, argue Keohane and Nye in their important work of the 1970s—the volume *Transnational Relations and World Politics*—given the rise of economic (but also other forms) of interdependence, against the backdrop of the declining use of military/coercive power, in the global political economy.

This thesis stood in opposition to realist propositions, which traditionally have had a large intellectual footprint in the study of IR, especially in the American academy (Cohen 2007, 202). In this institutionalist thinking the global political economy is animated, then, by complex interdependence. Regionalism figures prominently in this regard; the transnational inter-

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99 For neorealists, regional undertakings also make sense for balancing purposes; the primary interest of less powerful states in getting together in such groupings typically represented as motivated by an external threat.

100 Regimes are “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 1983, 2).

101 Institutions generate norms around state behaviour.

102 In this context, states have a vested interest in preserving the system established under the banner of the hegemon—that system perpetuating itself even after the hegemon has fallen to the wayside.
relationships, governmental and otherwise, that figure prominently in the complex interdependence approach resonating with interregionalism, too.

Threat perceptions and balance of power, by contrast, are logics typically applied by neorealism to contextualize states coming together (in an anarchic international system), in the first place, and then utilizing that regionalist platform as a springboard into interregional cooperation. Neorealists argue that cooperation amongst states (framed as self-interested, rational-egoist in their narrative\textsuperscript{103}) is a possibility, as a means for some of them to gain or restore power. In other words, it is anchored in self-help. In the final analysis, cooperation is held up by hegemonic leadership; this according to hegemonic stability theory (Gilpin 1987). For neorealists, regionalism develops “more fully in those areas of the world in which there is a local hegemon able to create and maintain regional economic institutions”; while the reverse is also the case: “regionalism is at a less pronounced pace in those areas where local hegemonic leadership is less visible” (Grieco 1997, 173). An important dimension of this neorealist narrative is the security-related dimension of a given regionalist project.

In both the neoliberal institutionalist and neorealist approaches outlined above, transatlantic regional states feature. A trend that shifted the focus, in terms of the geographical referent (to seriously consider non-North American-cum-European regional groupings), of regionalism studies was the end of colonial rule in vast tracks of the Global South in the 1960s and '70s. For instance, many African leaders—like Ghana's first president, Kwame Nkrumah—sought to anchor the development vision of his newly-independent country in forms of pan-Africanism. The New International Economic Order and Third Worldism (exemplified by the Bandung Conference era, and Afro-Asian solidarity built around this) in the 1970s also hastened

\textsuperscript{103} For realists, regional cooperation is driven by national interests; so in the final analysis, realists treat with skepticism the “viability of regionalism” (Jayasuriya 2003, 200).
the pace of diversifying the geographic focus in the literature. At the time, developing
countries—many of them newly-independent—were more forcefully voicing their
concerns/interests over their economic lot in the international economic system. Also providing
impetus for scholars to shift their gaze to other regions were trends, with respect to
globalization,104 animating the global political economy over the preceding three-plus decades
that were not being adequately addressed in integration theory. Growing pressures for a
traditionally Eurocentric integration theory to breach its narrow focus on Western Europe also
compelled scholars to branch out (Nye 1971; Holsti 1995, 320).

Suffice to say, regionalism research has proliferated over the last two decades.105
Globalization has informed the more recent generation106 of regionalism studies, christened new
regionalism107 (Hettne 2005, 543; Ruland 2001, 5).108 According to Paasi, “[p]olitical
geographers and political scientists developed the label ‘new regionalism’ just to remind that
while old approaches on regionalism were often based on economically focused integration
theory, new approaches had to go beyond them and to emphasise social, political and cultural
dimensions as well” (2009, 128). What is more while old regionalism literature has generally
confined its analytical currents to geographically bounded notions of units, new regionalism
informed literature transcends these currents. This is the case largely because the literature
grapples with issues not constrained by borders and draws from analytical constructs for which

104 There has been a “virtual absence of discussion about globalization in the literature on integration theory”
(Rosamond 1995, 392).
106 See, for example, Breslin et al (2002).
107 Hurrell (1995, 332) outlines four characteristics of new regionalism: (i) the crystallization of North-South
regionalism; (ii) the institution-dense EU regionalist model is being eschewed by some regional groupings that
favour the institution-lite approach; (iii) a blurring of the dividing line between economic and political regionalism,
thus reflecting a multidimensional character to regionalism in response to geopolitical realities and realities relating
to an ever changing global political economy; and, (iv) a marked increase in regional awareness, on the part of
regions.
108 Scholars like Postel-Vinay are critical of the new regionalism approach for framing regionalist projects in the
context of globalisation, “rather than....a specific global order” (2007, 564).
borders have limited significance.

Hettne and Soderbaum argue that new regionalism manifested itself in the mid-1980s, marking a turning-point in the study of regionalism (2000, 457). This at a time when the global system was going through a sweeping overhaul (Ibid., 457), and when the passing of the Single European Act brought new life into the European integration project—indeed, it constituted one of the key reasons why the academic pendulum swung back in favour of the study of regions.

New regionalism has special resonance in the context of interregionalism, as the exigencies of interregionalism are such that they favour new regionalism. As a result, interregionalism has been characterized as a corollary of new regionalism (Santander 2005, 290, 302). As a second “wave”, the latter is distinct from 'old' regionalism, temporally and in terms of the scholarship it has generated (Soderbaum and Langenhove 2005, 254-255). Shaw describes the subject matter of 'old' regional studies as “formal, interstate economic and strategic relations, from European Community/European Union to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)” (2000, 401). He contrasts this with the focus of new regionalism, which extends to less (non-) formal, non-state relations—not just in the Global North but the Global South, too—involving national and global levels, in an environment informed by the “hegemony of neoliberal values” (Shaw 2000, 401-402).

The NRA, developed by Bjorn Hettne and Fredrik Soderbaum (2000), emphasizes the

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109 Emblematic of the new regionalism scholarship that is closely associated with Hettne and his collaborators is the five-volume New Regionalism Series published over a decade ago by the United Nations University-World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) project on new regionalism.

110 Thus the European integration literature, leading up to the late 1960s/early 1970s, formed part of the old regionalism research. Old regionalism was also informed by bipolar Cold War geopolitics. Other factors, too, spurred this research, including de-colonization and resultant regionalist projects, intended to shore up respective chunks of the Global South.

111 Soderbaum describes the NRA—which came about in the mid-1990s—as: “an eclectic and explorative effort to understand the regional phenomenon in the context of economic globalization...[its focus in the 1990s]...was on systemic factors (especially globalization and end of the Cold War) rather than the intra-regional factors and
dichotomy between old and new regionalism; the research project(s) that framed old regionalism having famously been written-off by Haas in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{112}

That new regionalism is linked to processes of neoliberal globalization is particularly significant from an analytical point of view, in that it demands a multi-dimensional framing of regionalism and the region itself. For Hettne and Soderbaum, contemporary trends in regionalism à la new regionalism need to be understood more so from the vantage point of social processes and the "ideology of regionalism"; rather than being informed solely by notions of geographic contiguity (2000, 457). As Katzenstein argues, "regional designations are no more 'real' in terms of geography than they are 'natural' in terms of culture" (1996, 125). In essence and drawing from constructivism, from Hettne and Soderbaum's standpoint regionalism is first and foremost a social construct building on shared identities; the notion of discrete regions premised on distinct identities.

Although the view of Hettne and Soderbaum appears far more convincing, the established literature—notably an important contribution to it (see Mansfield and Milner 1997b, 3)—tends to be weighted towards a definition of a 'region' on the basis of geographic proximity (\textit{Ibid.}, 3). To frame a 'region' simply as a specified geographical area and 'regionalism' as forming, for instance, the locus of concentrated economic interactions but also coordination of aspects of statecraft amongst a group of states (\textit{Ibid.}, 3) has limited analytical resonance.\textsuperscript{113} Katzenstein suggests as much, arguing that the geographic designations of regions are neither "natural" nor interdependencies that characterized many of the so-called old approaches, especially the neofunctionalism approach by Ernst Haas and others" (Schouten 2008, 2). Regional agency and the construction of regions/regionness also proved an important narrative in the NRA (\textit{Ibid.}, 2). Instructively, the NRA views "state-led regional organizations...as a second order phenomenon compared to the processes of regionalization" (\textit{Ibid.}, 2).

\textsuperscript{112} See Haas (1975; 1976).

\textsuperscript{113} In point of fact, "[o]ur regional images are often based on unexamined and outdated metageographical conceptions of the world—a perspective dubbed the "jigsaw-puzzle view" that assumes discrete, sharply bounded, static continental units fit together in an unambiguous way. Yet, the world is not structured in such a neat manner" (Vayrynen 2003, 25).
are they "essential" (1997, 7).

In the final analysis, a core question that surfaces is: does one study the region as an object or as a social process? The latter approach is, perhaps, a more promising one; in that it enables an examination of how regions are (re)produced as constructions of reality. What is more, it takes account of regions' mutability; how they are (de-)constructed through social practice and discourse (Hettne and Soderbaum 2002, 36-37).

We need to better appreciate what the study of regions as social processes can reveal. To do so, we turn now to an exploration of constructivism, the intellectual bedrock of this type of analysis.

2.5 Constructivism in International Theory

Constructivism has had a long association with social theory-cum-the philosophy of the social sciences (Onuf 1989). In recent years, it has permeated the social sciences, including IR. It is, therefore, not indigenous to IR (Hollis and Smith 1991a, 393). Neither is it a theory of IR, per se.

Rather, constructivism is an approach that is applied to the study of IR and international politics, generally at odds not just with purely materially-conceived notions of actor-based

114 Although Onuf is frequently cited as an intellectual doyen in this regard, a much earlier work is also deserving of mention; in important respects laying the groundwork for constructivism. That work is Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. The central theme is the exploration of how the roles of actors in social systems are habituated in the course of everyday existence; over time institutionalized. Following from this, reality—in the sense of the material world—is assigned meaning (e.g. linguistically) as an outgrowth of human consciousness; rather than a priori being possessed of it. The material world, then, hinges on intersubjective awareness. As a work informed by a phenomenological approach to the sociology of knowledge, the end result is the revelation that reality, in a social system/world, is socially constructed. However, constructivism's intellectual roots run deeper still. Berger and Luckmann's landmark work notwithstanding, amongst the earliest constructivist scholarship—forming the basis of contemporary constructivist analyses—is that of eighteenth-century Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico. 115 The migration of constructivism and the (vexing) issues that command the attention of such scholars (e.g. the structure-agent problem) have not gone over well with some IR scholars. Hollis and Smith caution others in the field to be wary of the "'wonder drug' character" of what are ultimately "nuanced" constructivist ideas, "simplified in the course of translating them...from elsewhere in the social sciences" [to IR] (1991b, 393).
environments, but also the default position of methodological individualism that typically animates agency-derived or structure-centered rationalist approaches. It came to IR (in earnest) in the 1980s, a time when the discipline was in the throes of the early stages of a fourth wave of intellectual ferment.

Constructivism was framed as a challenger to dominant, rationalist approaches in IR theory—namely, structural realism or neorealism (Wendt 1987, 1992, 1999; Onuf and Klink 1989; Dessler 1989; Ruggie 1998a/1998b; Patomaki and Wight 2000; Lebow 2001). In a presidential address to the International Studies Association in 1988, Robert Keohane argued that rationalistic perspectives (to which he assigns “neorealist theories”), long-leveraged in the study of international politics, have been facing a challenge to their “intellectual predominance”, by what he referred to as a “reflective” approach (a catch-all for a broad set of reflectivist theories intellectually opposed to rationalist, positivist dominant IR approaches) that since then have

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116 Although a constructivist pedigree in IR dates back further, to early work in the English School (which theoretically is grounded in the study of the global society in social terms (Cohen 2007, 212)). However, Lebow has made the “radical assertion [that] Thucydides [, an icon in IR,] is a founding father of constructivism”; not withstanding that [r]ealists claim Thucydides as their “forebear” (2001, 547). In terms of other perspectives on its antecedents, constructivism in IR is also traced by Ruggie to neofunctionalism; which he argues “embodied elements that we now recognize to be social constructivist in character, but it did so largely unconsciously” (1998b, 862). Indeed, in one of his final works, Haas (2001) flirted with the idea of neofunctionalism's constructivist proclivities. Ruggie goes on to say, “Giddens' work [in the late 1970s and early 1980s, especially] profoundly affected the emerging constructivist project” (1998b, 862).

117 IR has been the object of four 'great debates', starting from the early part of the last century. The first was between idealism and political realism; otherwise referred to as the 'inter-war debate'. The second pitted traditionalists against positivists (i.e. those advancing the scientific ambitions of behaviouralism). It was not so much a theoretical as it was a methodological debate, unfolding over the 1950s and '60s. The third showcased the divide between interdependence-styled liberals and realism. The fourth is witness to various strands of post-positivism (one branch of constructivists aligned to this approach) juxtaposed against positivists, of which neorealism is emblematic. The core narrative in this latter debate is that there are two stories to tell, with respect to explaining and understanding (Hollis and Smith 1991a, 1 (in citing Hollis and Smith's quip two stories to tell in this context, I am aware that they also employ it in a different context: the agent-structure problem and IR's “failure to resolve it” (Doty 1997, 367)). In this vein, Wendt maintains that “there are significant analytical and methodological differences between causal and constitutive theorising, which reflects the different kinds of questions that they answer” (1999, 85-6).

118 Along with neoliberal institutionalism, though increasingly problematized, neorealism was especially prominent in the 1980s, converging “around neo-utilitarian precepts and premises” (Ruggie 1998b, 855).
come to be termed constructivism (Keohane 1988, 379, 381).\footnote{This dichotomy is not watertight, and indeed is awkward, in so far as one category of constructivists (self-identify as and) are 'positivist' (certainly in their epistemological orientation, e.g. Wendt), whilst another category is 'interpretive', more focused on discourse/linguistic method (Reus-Smit 2002, 495-496).} For Keohane, then, there appeared to be a binary debate.\footnote{A decade later, Keohane contended that "constructivism and rationalism [would] provide the major points of contestation shaping the field in years to come" (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 391-392).}

But the fact of the matter is, constructivism is also seen as a middle-range approach\footnote{This is a view that is especially held by those constructivists who are epistemologically positivist.} (a \textit{middle-ground}, of sorts), that can be wedged (and even construed—for scholars such as Alexander Wendt—as a bridge) between rationalism and reflectivism,\footnote{Namely, postmodernist/post-structuralist—also referred to as 'relativist' approaches by scholars such as Adler (1997)—and critical theories, amongst others.} as it draws on elements of both.\footnote{The constructivist attempt at \textit{bridge building} has not occurred in a vacuum; as at the level of social science methodology, some scholars have attempted to overcome epistemological divisions, too.} This is an overly simplistic (if not misleading) but nonetheless necessary portrayal, considering the epistemological,\footnote{Constructivism, in some circles, does apply 'scientific' methods. Wendt makes the case, for instance, for publicity of evidence and falsifiability (Chernoff 2005, 60). Wendt, therefore, "endorses a positivist epistemology \textit{and} post-positivist ontology" \textit{(Ibid., 61; my emphasis). Notwithstanding, other constructivists reject the positivism that has come to personify mainstream theoretical currents in IR.} \footnote{See, for instance, the discussion that follows on \textit{constructivisms}: various forms look to but also dismiss rationalism and reflectivism. The latter two can be seen as intellectual parents to different constructivist strands. For example, Alexander Wendt (a preeminent constructivist) takes issue with rationalist approaches not on epistemological grounds. Rather, the differences come through ontologically. More reflectivist minded constructivists are ontologically \textit{and} epistemologically opposed to rationalism; and, by extension, they are epistemologically at variance with their more conventional constructivist cousins. The result is a deep intellectual chasm/dissonance—often resulting in a "dialogue of the deaf" (I borrow this phrase from Der Derian (1995), who utilizes it in a different context). In certain respects, it is difficult to see how these constructivist strands can 'sing from the same hymn sheet' epistemologically. Elements of \textit{how} and \textit{why} they are riven, given their respective rationalist and reflectivist lineages, are a microcosm of the vexing debate involving rationalist and reflectivist schools, in general, on the nature, purposes, methods, scope of inquiry and criteria of IR. Notwithstanding, some constructivists have not shied away from calling for a shared epistemological approach; convinced that this will advance the lot of constructivism in IR. Adler, for instance, calls on constructivists to work toward “a coherent constructivist methodological base that suggests a practical alternative to imitating the physical sciences” (2002, 109).} ontological and methodological differences at play.

Moreover, although labels—i.e. rationalism, reflectivism and constructivism—risk simplifying what are sophisticated, even eclectic, intellectual currents;\footnote{The constructivist attempt at \textit{bridge building} has not occurred in a vacuum; as at the level of social science methodology, some scholars have attempted to overcome epistemological divisions, too.} they are useful, particularly in this context, where reflectivist (e.g. postmodernist) and constructivist approaches...
are sometimes conflated.

In terms of constructivism being framed as a challenger to neorealism, it was one particular framing of constructivism—constructivism associated with Wendt (i.e. 'systemic' oriented (Price and Reus-Smit 1998))—that was especially visible in the formative period of its challenge. Thus, it is a misnomer to refer to constructivism, in the singular (although for ease of reference, I do). Given that “there are many constructivists, [it is perhaps more accurate to refer to]...constructivisms” (Price and Reus-Smit 2000, 181; my emphasis).

Indeed, Adler (2002, 96-98) points to a spectrum of constructivist strands; namely: modernist (e.g. Finnemore 1996), modernist linguistic (e.g., Onuf 1989, Kratochwil 1989), radical/critical (e.g., Ashley 1986, Walker 1993—both of whom are postpositivists). Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner identify three forms: conventional, critical and postmodern (1998, 675-678). For his part, in discussing the variants of constructivism, Ruggie differentiates between three: (i) neo-classical constructivism (i.e. “an epistemological affinity with pragmatism...and analytical tools [e.g. speech act theory] necessary to make sense of intersubjective meanings”126); (ii) postmodernist constructivism (“[h]ere the linguistic construction of subjects is stressed, as a result of which discursive practices constitute the ontological primitives, or the foundational units of reality and analysis”127); (iii) naturalistic constructivism (“[i]t combines aspects” of the first two. It is informed by scientific realism; especially Roy Bhaskar's work. Wendt and Dessler also loom large in this variant) (1998, 880-881).

126 Onuf, Kratochwil, Ruggie, Katzenstein and Finnemore fall into this category.

127 Foucault and Derrida can be assigned to this category, as central figures. Richard Ashley, R.B.J. Walker, Campbell and Der Derian also loom large, in this regard.
Given that there is an epistemological pluralism characterizing constructivism, there is no methodological uniformity across the board (ontologically, however, constructivist strands are not necessarily dissimilar). This makes for a rather unfortunate situation: because there is no epistemological 'meeting of minds', there tends to be a reticence amongst certain constructivist strands to meaningfully engage one another.

Constructivists are also taken up with the agent-structure debate in social theory and IR alike. “[C]onstructivist research generally stresses the importance of the mutually constitutive relation between agent (state) and structure (international system), in which neither unit of analysis is "ontologically" [prior]” (Curley 2009, 653). Instead, they are characterized by a duality. Thus, constructivism is informed by the interpenetration of the two.

At its most basic, constructivism can be understood as “draw[ing] heavily from sociology and social psychology” (Thies 2002, 149), so as to deliberatively theorize the place of ideas/ideational factors, intersubjective meanings, norms, values, socialization and identities in world politics—all of these constituting constructivism's social ontology. In this framework, reality (e.g. the international system) is not exogenous to or divorced from human consciousness. To the contrary, the material world is anchored by intersubjectivity. As a result, in international affairs ideas trump material forces, and—as such—the study of international affairs must be taken up with the shared understandings of actors. This rationale certainly requires a degree of

128 This also reflects a transatlantic divide in constructivist theorizing, the more conventional approaches reflected in the US tradition (such as constructivism tending, methodologically, to be liberal-idealists in this tradition (Barkin 2003, 336)), while the more critical variants are especially apparent in Europe (Checkel 2004). What is more, so-called ‘thin’ constructivists technically are not so much even at variance with rationalist approaches on epistemological grounds as they are theoretically and ontologically differentiated.

129 In their work, constructivists apply varying approaches—namely: process tracing (common amongst more conventional constructivist work, which is epistemologically positivist) and discourse analysis (common amongst more critical constructivist work, which is epistemologically post-positivist). More radical constructivists, like their critical constructivist counterparts, make use of textual methods, but play on power-centric narratives in discourse (it is not an exaggeration to suggest that they have a postmodernist flare).

130 Giddens' (1984) structuration theory has an important bearing, in this respect.
abstraction, but the conceptual and analytical pay-off is great; considering the rationale has powerful implications: not least, constructivism is positioned to take to task a core assertion of neorealism that, systemic change in the international system is unlikely.

For constructivists, generally, far-reaching change is not outside the realm of possibility, as actors make of the international system what they will. In point of fact, ideas are malleable. Following from this, because the international system is underwritten by ideas, it is far from static. As Wendt puts it: “anarchy is what states make of it” (1992).

Thus, a key proposition of constructivism is that the material world is subject to interpretation, in so far as meaning is assigned to its various facets. Therefore, reality is socially constructed; the material world is given meaning as a result of cognitive structures (Wendt 1995). But there is a dual meaning to this notion of socially constructed. Applied to gain an understanding of the world, the notion suggests that the world is a work in progress. The world and the 'system' that animates it, therefore, are not static. This leaves open the possibility for change. Thus, on the face of it, constructivism lends itself to: (a) contingency; and, (b) an emancipatory narrative; especially given more critical strands' commitment to interpretation over explanation.

Further, constructivism is in opposition to the core meta-theoretical claims of neoutilitarian perspectives. Ultimately, constructivism “results from the combination of objective hermeneutics with a "conservative" cognitive interest in understanding and explaining social reality” (Adler 2002, 97-8).

As applied to the study of IR, at least one pillar of constructivism is taken up with “emphasiz[ing] the importance of identity in understanding international politics” (Thies 2002). Thus, “[i]n contrast to neo-utilitarianism, constructivists contend that not only are identities and
interests of actors socially constructed, but also that they must share the stage with a whole host
of other ideational factors that emanate from human capacity” (Ruggie 1998b, 856). As such,
constructivism can be leveraged to better understand state behaviour through the lens of
identities and norms, and the effect that the two have on interests.

2.6 Constructivist Applications in the Study of European Integration

Constructivism has only recently been applied to the study of European integration, and in this
regard owes an intellectual debt to Karl Deutsch's (1957) work on 'transactionalism'
(communication theory) in the 1950s. Transactionalism primarily has been focused on “how
peace could be established through post-national community building...[; and, in this regard] the
applicability of transactionalism to regionalism lies in Deutsch's assertion that the states system
could be stabilised through building a sense of community across a region, as a function of
communication, or transaction” (Thomas 2004, 39).

Indeed, Katzenstein et al contend that Deutsch's “research program...foreshadowed what
later came to be labeled constructivism. It highlighted the importance of identity formation
measured by social transactions and communications” (1998, 654). Especially germane is how
Deutsch's work has proved to be a touchstone for theorizing the role of social
interconnectedness/interdependence (and how this is animated by shared/common goals) in
spurring integration.

The first “systematic and focused” (Christiansen et al 1999, 527) application of
constructivism to the study of European integration came in 1999, in the form of a special issue
of the Journal of European Public Policy.131 Particularly interesting, in this regard, have been the

131 However, in the lead up to this special issue, Risse-Kappen found fault with some of the standard-bearer theories
attempts to examine how the EU is constructed on the shoulders of language: discourse analysis (relating to communicative practices or speech-acts, for example) in the study of European integration, then, figures prominently (see Diez 1999).

Schmitter (1996) is another notable scholar who has considered the effect of language in the context of European integration; specifically exploring the impact of so-called “Euro-speak”. Similarly, interesting constructivist work in the area of European integration, as a contribution to institutionalist research, has been undertaken by Checkel (2001)—a constructivist known for work on social learning.

An equally instructive constructivist approach to the study of European integration is sketched by Christiansen et al (1999). They consider the “transformative” effects of the European integration process, European governance and the *Europeanization* of policies and politics on the European states system, from the vantage point of agent-specific “identity formation” and/or endogenously generated interests (*Ibid.*, 529).

In a similar vein, Cowles, Caporaso and Risse-Kappen’s now decade-plus old edited volume examines how Europeanization—i.e. “the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance”—affects (to the point of changing) the formal domestic structures-*cum*-associated political cultures, and how the EU impacts on informal structures (e.g. nation-state identities, etc) at the level of EU member states (2001, 1).

Thus, the notion of “EU identity”, writ large, and European states and how the two—in the ontological context of structure and agency—constitute each other, represents an important of the study of the EU; and at the time was one of a handful of scholars making the case, instead, for constructivism “to be taken more seriously” in this regard—taking a que from the “constructivist turn” in IR theory (1996, 54). In addition, amongst the earlier, and sometimes linguistic, attempts to look at identity as relates to the institutional aspects of the EU was undertaken by Chilton and Illyin (1993), Bulmer (1994) and others.
current in constructivist work on European integration. EU enlargement—especially in light of the 2004 expansion of the membership from fifteen to twenty-five states—is also attracting more scholarly attention, constructivist-informed analysis seeking to explain the decision to enlarge.

All told, the advance of constructivism in the study of European integration has received an intellectual fillip from the aforementioned special issue of *Journal of European Public Policy*. Four points are particularly noteworthy at this juncture: (i) European integration studies is amongst the latest scholarly battleground for rationalists and constructivists (Checkel and Moravcsik 2001, 219); (ii) Some (i.e. more conventional) constructivist work carries forward the tradition of constructivist scholarship in IR with respect to *bridge building*, but obviously targeting rationalist (materialist) work in EU studies: a prime example is recent scholarship on institutional theory and the EU (see Caporaso *et al.* 2003); (iii) Whereas the integration theories previously discussed were developed, primarily, as theories of European integration, constructivism was not. Just like it was imported into IR, thus is not indigenous to it,

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132 The largest single expansion of the EU in any one accession cycle, in terms of member states, came in 2004; entrants comprising eight states in Central and Eastern Europe, in addition to two Mediterranean islands. Two more former eastern bloc countries acceded in 2007. This brought the total count, to date, to twenty-seven EU countries; this latest tranche of entrants representing the sixth successive enlargement. Accession negotiations are under way for other hopefuls (like Turkey), which have achieved candidate status. Countries that are in the pipeline for accession are in the Western Balkans, amongst them Croatia. Other countries in this sub-region have also applied for membership, in the last two years.

133 See Sjursen (2002); who makes the case that eastern enlargement has been motivated by "kinship-based duty" to Eastern Europe, by Western Europe.

134 Other journals have followed suit. Noteworthy is a recent Special Issue of *Comparative European Politics* (Vol.8, Iss.1), entitled ‘Mainstreaming Sociology in EU Studies’.

135 Important parallels can be drawn between the rise of constructivism in European integration studies and IR. Specifically, some constructivist strands problematize certain grand theories of European integration, on ontological, epistemological and methodological grounds; not unlike what first happened in IR in the early-1980s—in terms of it being the intellectual space for a fourth wave of debate—with the rise not only of constructivism but also reflectivist/post-positivist perspectives.

136 However, as with constructivists in IR, constructivists taken up with the study of Europe are grappling with vexing epistemological differences of their own. These differences typically play out (but are not restricted) with respect to discourse and process tracing methodologies, that militate against *intra-constructivist* bridge building, with respect to study of Europe.
constructivism has similarly been applied to the study of European integration—i.e. as an approach rather than a theory; (iv) Constructivism is thought to impact studies of European integration in three respects: “development of theories, construction of frameworks of analysis, meta-theorizing” (Ibid., 538).

2.7  **Regional Identities: A Constructivist Approach to the Study of Regionalism**

There has been a long-standing scholarly tradition—in Western literary, geographic and other disciplinary works—of formulating world regions as cognitive sites with which to frame narratives, civilizational and otherwise. That regions are socially constructed or conceptually produced as socio-spatial categories has emerged as an important thread in recent studies of regionalism (see Neumann 1994; Paasi 2002; Browning 2003). As Vayrynen states, “[t]he study of regionalism is....undergoing a methodological renewal that is manifested in the new divide between rationalist and constructivist research agendas regarding the processes of region formation” (2003, 26).

The study of the regional dimensions of the social identity construction of actors—i.e. regions as social institutions—provides a rich analytical framing. In such research, a singular emphasis on crude territorial-cum-geographic determinants of regions (along the lines of Mansfield and Milner 1997a and Nye 1968, for example) is eschewed.

Methodologically, neo-utilitarian approaches (for instance their materialist orientations) are analytically unable to engage with more ethereal, but no less important, logics engendering

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137 In other words, “regions are shaped by the collective perception of identities and meanings with blurred and ever shifting boundaries” (Vayrynen 2003, 27). Regions seen as forged around common identities/shared values (e.g. liberal values) tend to be conceptualized this way by those articulating the security communities concept, per the constructivist research program (Ibid., 37).

138 Nye defines international region “as a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence” (1968, vii).
region-building projects: namely, socially patterned regional cohesion-cum-shared regional identity. These, too, are important explanatory factors in accounting for regional integration (and how common regional spaces are forged and sustained), but also the dynamics and motivations of interregionalism.

Thus (material) physical boundaries take an analytical back-seat to cognitive ones, when regions are understood for what they truly are: cognitively compartmentalized territorial referents emphasizing identity narratives.

The work of critical geographers like Anssi Paasi (1986; 1991—namely on the “institutionalization of regions”139) in the 1980s were pathbreaking, in this regard. Scholars like Iver Neumann (1994—namely the “region-building” approach to regional formation), working from an IR disciplinary vantage point, would bring the ontological status of regions into relief a decade later (Browning 2003, 46).

“[T]hat regions are imagined, much like the nation [per Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1991)], underscores the relevance of constructivism in analysis of regionalism” (Fawn 2009, 31). For Fawn, “at least some of the cohesion of regions must derive from the trust and the ‘cognitive interdependence’ that Hurrell finds in ‘cognitive regionalism’” (Ibid., 31). Such constructivist forays into the study of regions are closely associated with, inspired and foreshadowed by the work of geographers: i.e., the literature on regions per the ‘new’ regional geography (see Pudup 1988; Gregory 1989; Johnston et al 1990) and what has been referred to as behavioral theories of geography. These behavioral theories put the geographical study of

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139 Paasi reinterprets the region as a concept, advancing it “as a sociocultural and historical category” (Paasi 1991, 239). In this vein, the region is understood as a process that is historically contingent, “whose institutionalisation consists of four stages: the development of territorial, symbolic, and institutional shape and its establishment as an entity in the regional system and social consciousness of the society” (Ibid., 239). Instructively, as a region is institutionalized, as an entity it assumes “a specific regional identity” that has wide resonance, continuously “reproduced in individual and institutional practices” (Ibid., 239).
regions on a different footing, "focus[ing] on how regions are shaped and reshaped by political practice" (Katzenstein 1997, 11). In this regard, Katzenstein makes a key point: "[s]pace has behavioral properties" (Ibid., 11).

It has been suggested that "critical ideas" are one of "three ideas of region that geographers perpetually lean back on": the other two being the "pre-scientific" [i.e. a "spatial unit, statistical area"] and "discipline-centred" [regions are seen as objects "(e.g., traditional Landschaft geography)"] (Paasi 2002, 804). The critical ideas approach stresses social practice, identities and discourse, in addition to cultural, political and economic processes of a region: taken together, this narrative resonates with "work labelled as 'new regional geography' " (Ibid., 804). In sum, "[c]ritical approaches suggest that regions are 'social constructs' " (Ibid., 804). This approach resonates with constructivism, extending the imagined communities concept to the mosaic of world regions, with a view to showcasing how they can be anchored by and thus normatively differentiated on the basis of social practices and discourses: i.e. regional identities, against the backdrop of social meaning.

For our purposes, of immediate interest is whether the Caribbean as a small state Global South region has been studied in this vein. The next and final component of this subsection is taken up with this discussion.

2.8 Small State Regions in the Regionalism Literature

An important 1999 special issue of the journal Third World Quarterly, entitled 'New Regionalisms in the New Millenium', is purportedly "dedicated to new regionalisms in the [Global] South" (Marchand et al 1999, 904). In glancing at the titles of the articles in the special issue, one is struck by the fact that they are dedicated to case analyses of larger state regions in
the Global South, namely the Middle East, Southern Africa, NAFTA (with a focus on Mexico), APEC, and ASEAN; along with comparative reviews of the EU and Mercosur, in addition to Europe and North America. Only one article, on Central America, engages with a region that is comprised of small states. Island regions do not feature at all.

A similar state of affairs obtains in the landmark five-volume New Regionalism Series, coming out of the UNU/WIDER project on new regionalism just over a decade ago. Volume 3 of this series, entitled *National Perspectives on the New Regionalism in the Third World* (2000), focuses on country studies from the Global South; ostensibly the large (e.g. China, India) to mid-sized countries in East and Southeast Asia, in addition to Brazil and other countries in Southern Africa. Only two articles deal with small states—one on Uruguay and the other on the Caribbean Basin. Volume 5 of the same series, entitled *Comparing Regionalisms: Implications for Global Development* (2001), takes stock of the UNU/WIDER new regionalism research project and pronounces on the prospects for the comparative approach to the study of world regions; but like Volume 3 is selective in the regions under study, i.e.: Africa, Asia, Southeast (East) Asia, Central Europe, EU, NAFTA and the Middle East.

Generally, regionalism studies literature in the vein of the two examples flagged above only engage small, marginal Global South regions—like the Caribbean—modestly, if at all. This is not surprising. Given what some deem as its peripheral status in the global political economy, the Caribbean's analytical merit does not resonate. Consider that Volume 5 of the research project mentioned above is described as 'covering all important regions of the world'.

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140 A third article considers Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Entity; which may be geographically small, but with respect to other indicators are not implicated in the small state narrative.

141 In this regard, the Spanish-speaking Caribbean (namely Cuba and the Dominican Republic) and Haiti have traditionally attracted considerably more scholarly and institutional attention, as compared to the *Caribbean* under study in the present work.
However, the Caribbean regionalism narrative does find voice in a broad regionalism, or at least regionalism-informed,\textsuperscript{142} literature. But it does so to varying degrees. In scholarly platforms indigenous to the Region,\textsuperscript{143} like the interdisciplinary Caribbean Studies Association, Caribbeanists regularly engage with this issue. Similarly, journals that spring from the Region take this narrative seriously. Flagship journals of the University of the West Indies (UWI), namely \textit{Social and Economic Studies} and the \textit{Journal of Eastern Caribbean Studies}, are a case in point.

In addition, regional initiatives like the 'UWI-CARICOM Project'—which weave together the Region's primary tertiary institution and the CARICOM Secretariat, in collaboration with a prominent regional publishing house, Ian Randle Publishers—under the ambit of \textit{The Integrationist} series (launched in 2001 and recently ended)—have published a number of influential volumes on Caribbean regionalism. Those volumes and other like-minded works form part of a veritable 'cottage industry' of scholarship. This work emanates from eminent Caribbean intellectuals and academics, statesmen and leaders, policy makers and technocrats, over the last decade. Said scholarship has been taken up with the study of regional institutions and regional integration (and related policies), in addition to the Caribbean in the international system and Caribbean development, more broadly (see, for example, Hall and Chuck-A-Sang 2010, Hall and Chuck-A-Sang 2007a/2007b, Hall and Chuck-A-Sang 2006).

Some of the scholars who have contributed to the volumes cited above are associated with the UWI-based Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies (SALISES),

\textsuperscript{142} For example, works such as Demas's \textit{The Economics of Development in Small Countries with Special Reference to the Caribbean} (1965).

\textsuperscript{143} A useful web-based platform that features a variety of academic and journalistic work on Caribbean regionalism is http://www.normangirvan.info/; overseen by Dr Norman Girvan, Professorial Research Fellow at the Trinidad-based UWI Institute of International Relations (IIR).
which is represented across the three campuses in Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago, respectively. The Institute is renowned for its long-standing work on Caribbean regionalism, its name-sake amongst a distinguished group of pioneering Caribbean scholars who have engaged the issue and who rose to prominence in the mid-twentieth century.

Within the UWI system, the IIR and departments such as the Department of Government (at the Jamaica campus) have made notable contributions in teaching and research in this vein, as has the more recently established Barbados-based Shridath Ramphal Centre for International Trade Law, Policy & Services. Of particular note, in this regard, UWI-Barbados offers a MSc in Integration Studies. This campus has, of late, emerged as an important hub for CARICOM-related research, with the establishment of a CARICOM Research Park; which houses research initiatives like SALISES and the Shridath Ramphal Centre. The Centre for Caribbean Thought, which is located in UWI-Jamaica's Department of Government, has also engaged with Caribbean regionalism research, albeit indirectly and from an inter-disciplinary approach; its overall mandate being the 'examination of Caribbean intellectual thought' and its promotion as a field of study.

Admittedly, there has been a long history of pluridisciplinary engagement by regional scholars on themes that have a bearing on Caribbean regionalism. Works on Caribbean historiography feature prominently, in this regard. The scholarship is plentiful, but the rich intellectual tradition that informs it cannot be fully engaged with here.

In short, the study of West Indian history from the vantage point of colonialism-cum-imperialism/postcolonial society and what has been described as “social complexities, class, race, and the extraordinary economic relationships that conjoined the diverse human components of the islands” (Green 1977, 509), has provided an incredibly rich source of understanding of the
Caribbean region. Some of the notable work that exemplifies the breadth of scholarly interest in the Caribbean regional space/studies includes that of Dr Eric Williams (1944), Gordon K. Lewis (1968; 1983), Elsa Goveia (1956 [1980]), Lloyd Best, George Beckford and the Plantation School144 (what became known as the New World Group; see Meeks and Girvan (2010)), among others.

In addition to work on Caribbean regionalism being taken up by West Indians, the subject has also increasingly attracted scholarly attention from a small (but growing) community of non-West Indian academics; notably longtime and noted contributor to scholarship on the Region Professor Tony Payne, a University of Sheffield-based Political Science scholar and a cluster of junior and senior scholars who collaborate with him. These academics are attached mainly to European (particularly British) universities, but also North American institutions. Regarding the latter, affiliations are typically with Centres and Institutes for Latin American and Caribbean Studies (many of which are Latin American focused).

The North American academy notwithstanding, many British universities (e.g., the University of London's Institute of Commonwealth Studies) and think-tanks (e.g. the Overseas Development Institute) have a long track record of Caribbean regionalism research. Amongst North American think-tanks, the Canadian-based Centre for International Governance Innovation has carved a niche for itself in the study of the Caribbean region and related thematic areas through its Caribbean Papers series which examines policy issues germane to the Caribbean's

144 Dependency theory, especially in the 1960s and '70s, emerged as a highly influential explanation of Latin American underdevelopment (see Frank 1966)—problematicizing, for example, metropolitan powers imposing agrarian structures-cum-patterns of dependent agricultural production and trade in the periphery as laying the groundwork for dependent capitalist development. The Plantation Economy Model (PEM), on the other hand, can be thought of as having been devised to explain underdevelopment in the Caribbean context; specifically, it “explain[s] the origins and persistence of the structures and processes of underdevelopment in the [Region; problematicizing] the establishment there of plantation economies by western European colonial power since the sixteenth century” (Dupuy 1983, 237). Like dependency theory, the PEM is a critical alternative to traditional theories of development; i.e. Modernization theory (ibid., 240).
'economic future'. In terms of the handful of Caribbean-based think-tanks, the Caribbean Policy Research Policy Institute stands out for its broad-ranging research, which has included work on regionalism.

While relatively robust in the contexts reviewed above, little attention has been paid to Caribbean regionalism research in a range of international journals, some of which—in name, at least—are associated with the study of the Caribbean. In regards to the latter, the record of representation has been far from stellar in the *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, the *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, *Latin American Politics and Society* (formerly *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*), among others.

### 2.9 Conclusion

The foregoing has charted a cross-section of scholarly waters pertaining to regionalism studies. While regionalism scholarship has come a long way both in respect of its geographic breadth and the depth of theoretical innovations applied to its study, on both counts significant strides could yet be made in the study of the Caribbean.

The study of Caribbean regionalism stands to benefit significantly from the research trajectories of more contemporary scholarship on regionalism reviewed above, notably in the vein of the track record of IR scholars and comparativists applying constructivist insights to the study of regions. It is a pertinent theoretical framing for the cooperation narrative of Caribbean (inter)regionalism, one that could make available an explanatory construct with the potential to provide significant insight into the determinants of the behavioral interactions of small state actor types—like the Caribbean—on the international stage.
We now transition into a discussion of island studies. What becomes apparent is that studies of islands in a material sense take a back seat to what are serious efforts to abstract islands, at least in certain disciplinary strands of the social science arm of the field. This sort of intellectual pivot is a useful one, for our purposes.
Chapter III
Island Studies:
A Survey of the Literature/Theory and Treatment of Caribbean
(Inter)regionalism Therein

3.1 Introduction

This final chapter in the series that constitutes Part I of this study is taken up with an engagement of island studies scholarship. As with the first two chapters, this one seeks to interrogate pertinent literature and theory from the vantage point of gauging the treatment the Caribbean, set against an (inter)regionalism narrative. While replete with micro-state and island references pivoted against disparate policy areas, it is found that the literature has a paucity of an (inter)regionalism narrative. This is unfortunate, as such an approach could prove useful when viewed through a constructivist lens. It is determined that such a framework is a promising approach for furthering an understanding and reappraisal of the role of regional identities in how small states conduct aspects of their international affairs, at a time when these actors are increasingly being taken more seriously in international studies.

It should be noted from the outset that island studies is seen as "the global, comparative and inter-disciplinary study of islands on their own terms". It is, therefore, a dispersive scholarly space; a richness of inter-disciplinary engagement characterizing the study of islands. This is a strength of the field, for some. For Baldacchino and like-minded scholars, for example, "[t]he adoption of 'island studies' as a focus of inquiry, straddling as well as going beyond conventional disciplines, can be a powerful force towards a better understanding of the

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145 This definition appears on a clearinghouse-styled website for island studies, http://vre2.upei.ca/islandstudies.ca/. Managed by Dr Godfrey Baldacchino, Canada Research Chair in Island Studies at the University of Prince Edward Island, the site is described as a depository of research supporting the study of islands.  
146 Indeed, courses in the field tend to be taught in an inter-disciplinary fashion (see the following weblink, for an Introduction to Island Studies course syllabus designed by and taught at the University of Prince Edward Island by the author: http://www.upei.ca/islandstudies/files/islandstudies/IS201-CompleteCourseOutline.pdf)
world and the furtherance of knowledge” (2006, 6).

For others, this interdisciplinarity—and the difficulty this brings in delimiting the field—is a source of apprehension about island studies' “legitimacy” (Baldacchino 2004, 327). In fact, Selwyn questions the merits of treating as “distinct” small islands from small countries (1980, 945). He was among the first to dismiss the usefulness of islands as a social category, “in analytical, predictive or policy terms” (Ibid., 945).

With the foregoing in mind, this chapter proceeds in the following manner. The first section contextualizes island studies, drawing particular attention to islandness and its emergence as a field of academic study. The respective analyses are segmented into sub-sections. A discussion of the small states literature in IR is showcased as a fourth standalone sub-section. Section two traces how islands have loomed large in the mythical geographies of Western cultures, underscoring the applicability of the islands as metaphor approach to IR not being underestimated. The third section explores the vulnerability and resilience narratives of small state island actors, which forms the basis for the final substantive section that seeks to account for an (inter)regionalism narrative in island scholarship. Some concluding remarks, which sum up findings, round off the chapter.

3.2 Island Studies in Perspective

I. The Context

While island studies' disciplinary eclecticism has made for challenge from without the field, this does not mean that the field itself is a cohesive one. Island scholars\textsuperscript{147} generally put up a

\textsuperscript{147} It must be borne in mind that these scholars are of varied disciplinary affiliations, some of whom shy away from being labeled island studies scholars, \textit{per se}.
common front in defence of the field, but in their own 'house', so to speak, there are fissures.\textsuperscript{148} What is immediately apparent is that the field's heterogeneous disciplinary makeup is, at the very least, a source of methodological and epistemological difference.\textsuperscript{149} Hay (2006) draws out other faultlines, in an important article in which he delves into whether a coherent theory of nissology is possible: he holds up place theory as a theoretical framing with great potential for island studies. For Hay, three (potentially divisive) faultlines obtain regarding nissology: (i) the nature of the island 'edge'; (ii) the import for questions of island memory and identity, as relates to the movement of people to and from islands; and (iii) the metaphoric use of islands (which he wrongheadedly discounts, arguing it be jettisoned from island studies.\textsuperscript{150} This is not a surprising move on his part, considering his juxtaposition of place theory).

For scholars taken up with the study of islands, islands have traditionally been depicted and studied in opposing ways: physical attributes\textsuperscript{151} vs. perception\textsuperscript{152}. On the one hand, they occupy a geographical/physical \textit{place} in the world (and, thus, are the objects of a host of disciplinary questions arising from their circumstances/attributes relative to the rest of the world). On the other, they are also \textit{cognitive} sites (thus, subject to abstraction, per understandings

\textsuperscript{148} Indeed, there is some question as to whether there is sufficient dialogue amongst the subfields—some more than others. This sort of collaboration is not outside the realm of possibility, as nissology remains at the core of the field—its common purpose. What is more, this is the intent; given the field's interdisciplinarity: the fact is, “[i]nterdisciplinarity refers to the integration of discrete bodies of knowledge with each other to create new knowledge syntheses” (Griffin \textit{et al} 2006, 11). Such collaboration, though, is not immediately visible. The research specializations seem to grudgingly lend themselves to dialogue; raising questions about how tightly knit island studies is as a field.

\textsuperscript{149} Rather than something to be frowned upon, this is generally accepted as an inescapable reality of the field's interdisciplinarity. As Baldacchino notes, “[i]t need not have a distinctive methodology” (2006, 9).

\textsuperscript{150} As we will see in the 'Island Imaginaries' sub-section, some of the most insightful analyses of islands utilize this approach. Indeed, today there is wide acceptance of the need to critically evaluate the literal and metaphorical meanings that permeate islands (Dodds and Royle 2003, 492).

\textsuperscript{151} This \textit{objective} approach tends to be subscribed to by scholars in the hard sciences, or some scholars in the social sciences who share an epistemological affinity with the modalities of research in the hard sciences.

\textsuperscript{152} This \textit{subjective} approach tends to be subscribed to by scholars in the social sciences, namely those with post-positivist research approaches, goals and outlooks on the world.
or perceptions of their meanings/potentialities as islands).\textsuperscript{153} With respect to the latter, the lived experience associated with islands has a deep and complex meaning, typically anchored in the term \textit{islandness}.

II. Islandness: What is it?

Islandness, in the words of Gillis and Lowenthal, “is not easily defined” (2007, iii). It is, however, thought of as the \textit{qualities} and \textit{characteristics} of islands that distinguish them from continents. An obvious difference is one of scale (Downes 1988). Dommen notes differences in the size of islands, relative to continents; but also such physical characteristics as geology and climate (1980a, 929), but also the environment and fragilities as relates to bio-diversity, etc. The economic size and vulnerability of island economies have also been used to distinguish an island narrative; amongst these, trade dependence and the bottlenecks that obtain as a result of geographic remoteness, limitations regarding economies of scale and natural resources, overly narrow export and sectoral base, limited ability to leverage diverse developmental policies, capacity constraints regarding public administration, etc (see Briguglio 1995; Streeten 1993).

For his part, Dommen explores islands' distinct character, transcending a purely economic narrative to engage with a range of policy issues (1980b; 1985). But there is something to be said, too, about what bearing these physical aspects and, importantly, the palpable boundedness of islands have on the \textit{lived experience} of islanders themselves; in terms of their outlook on themselves, their place in the world (from the vantage point of self and their community) and the world in general. But while the deployment of an overarching understanding of islandness in the service of a discernable pattern of a shared island narrative may make sense in certain respects, it

\textsuperscript{153} For Skinner, there is increasingly a recognition that “[t]he island [is]...a legitimate subject for social scrutiny, whether as conceptual device, as metaphor, or as...distinctive location” (2006, cited in Baldacchino 2006, 6).
may be too simplistic to guide how we study all aspects of the kaleidoscope of the world's islands, in general.

So it may be better to think of islandness on a case-by-case basis, tempering how we deploy its constitutive meanings with cognizance of the uniqueness of each of the world's islands, or, at the very least, island groupings (Hay 2006, 20). Here, perhaps, is where some of the complexity of the concept of islandness comes through. As Weale describes it, “[i]slandness becomes a part of your being—a part as deep as marrow, and as natural and unselfconscious as breathing” (1991, 81). He refers, in this context, not to an “island way of life”, the meaning of which is not as deep; but rather islandness going to the core of islanders' identity, “nature and essence”—at the level of the individual and community (Ibid., 81-82). As Conkling says of Weale's definition of islandness, it speaks to “a quality of being that is deeply internalized and ultimately cannot be separated from an islander's identity without risking "soul-destroying" failure” (2007, 198; emphasis added). For Conkling, “there is self-consciousness about islandness amongst islanders” (Ibid., 193). Perhaps a most poignant characterization of islandness is that in addition to islanders being more in touch with (and respecting) their natural environment than mainlanders, islandness “lives in one's mind and imagination and therefore can be carried within one no matter where one might be” (Ibid., 199).

III. Island Studies: Its Emergence as a Field of Academic Study

Out of the two conceptions of islands—i.e. as place and cognitive site—have flowed a range of scholarship: a common thread with regards to the study of islands in these respects being an experiential discourse. For example, building on the place of islands in the world, biogeographers typically seek to draw on evolutionary and climactic lessons that the study of islands
may have for the wider world. Literary studies scholars, on the other hand, have typically sought to underline the polysemic nature of the island narrative, juxtaposed against time and space.

That is to say, islands and the island experience acquire certain meanings, compared to continents. Thus they lend themselves to differential representations. This approach to the study of islands has important parallels with constructivism, which hitherto have not been interrogated. I will draw parallels between them shortly. The immediate concern is, however, to outline the field of island studies.

Scholars have suggested that it is difficult to pin down the earliest work featuring islands (see Baldacchino 2007, 7). The fact is, islands have been the subject of literary and other works dating back thousands of years. There is a sense, however, that engagement with islands in a scholarly fashion has a more recent lineage; one that can probably be traced to the work of evolutionary biologists, bio-geographers, human geographers and social anthropologists some two hundred years ago (Ibid., 7). Certainly, the work on evolution of the naturalist Charles Darwin—especially his *On the Origin of Species* (1968), which drew from his voyages to far-flung parts of the world, including islands like the Galapagos Islands—is an important marker. These pioneering scientists treated with islands as if they were laboratories; their small, discrete nature holding the potential to uncover scientific narratives about the wider world.

In terms of other, particularly social science, disciplines, islands have garnered attention relatively recently. Economics (especially development economics), development studies, public administration, political science and environmental and tourism studies come to mind. Even more recently, island studies has emerged as a field of academic study. Island studies programs have been established in a modest number of tertiary institutions, notably the University of Malta and the University of Prince Edward Island (UPEI). Related to the latter, a number of initiatives
have taken root in the last five years that have served to raise the profile of island studies as a field. Especially noteworthy is the launch of *Island Studies Journal*, one of only a handful dedicated to the field, amongst a small cluster of journals more loosely taken up with the island narrative from different disciplinary vantage points.

Also, a Canada Research Chair in Island Studies—the first of its kind—was awarded to Dr Godfrey Baldacchino. A number of research projects have emerged, as a result. Indeed, Dr Baldacchino has been at the forefront of and is widely recognized as an authority amongst a small but active community of self-identified island scholars, who dot universities spanning the globe.

Nissology has also become a more organized scholarly undertaking over the last two decades, in the light of the formation of the International Small Island Studies Association (ISISA). It was established in 1992, at the *Islands of the World III* conference, in The Bahamas. Conferences of ISISA are convened biennially.

But the profile of work on islands in academia has also benefited from international initiatives in policy circles over the last two-plus decades, especially as relates to the United

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154 The others are *INSULA: The International Journal of Island Affairs* and *Shima: The International Journal of Research into Island Cultures*. The *International Journal of Small Economies* focuses on a range of matters relating to public policy in small economies, but stands apart from the latter two journals which are specifically taken up with advancing the island studies field. Although the emergence of such journals is an important step on the road to island studies coming into its own as a field, Baldacchino laments that a "suitable branded journal of island studies has yet to come to light" (2006, 8). There is a risk, he contends, that in the absence of such a journal island studies research published across a swath of journals is "much more likely to remain a loose and uncoordinated collection of research initiatives in search of a home" (ibid). Baldacchino is, however, spearheading an initiative to establish a new journal around the theme of small states [Interview by author of Dr Baldacchino, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, 16th October, 2009].


156 The most recent one, *Islands of the World XI*, took place in 2010.
Nations. The Barbados Programme of Action is an important one, in this regard. One such initiative, in particular, that has drawn on the expertise of island scholars is the Commonwealth Secretariat's support to so-called small states, as relates to their special circumstances arising from the constraints of size and vulnerability. This effort is, in many respects, a continuation of the groundbreaking work on island developing states first undertaken by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in the 1970s. Since then, other, important, United Nations programming on islands has been put in place: notably, under the ambit of the United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and the Small Island Developing States.

Other notable initiatives, more so on the academic front, that have fed back into the policy community have been pursued by institutions such as the University of Malta's Islands and Small States Institute; but also more recently the Helsinki-based UNU-WIDER. On this score, there has traditionally been vibrant interaction across scholarly and policy spaces.

The potentiality of island 'studies' was perhaps brought into full view, in a big way, by a series of articles appearing in a special issue of World Development, three decades ago. According to Baldacchino, it is perhaps the first academic journal to have come out with an issue dedicated to islands (2004, 327). Since this 1980 special issue, there have been others in the pages of this journal.

Other journals—virtually all of which are listed above—cutting across a spectrum of disciplines, have followed suit. In terms of book length studies, a number have been authored. One is of particular significance: the volume A World of Islands: An Island Studies Reader. It is

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described as the first global reader—and a pluridisciplinary one, at that—on the study of islands; and is edited by Dr Baldacchino (2007). It has done for island studies what Hanggi, Roloff and Ruland's 2006 *Interregionalism and International Relations* did for interregionalism studies: trace the outlines of a relatively recent scholarly undertaking.

While not generally acknowledged, the emergence of island studies as a field and the research strand within it that focuses on international political economy and political economy of development issues around islands has been given impetus by the small states literature in IR.

IV. The Small States Literature in IR against an Island Studies Backdrop

The intellectual space for small states in the IR literature was carved by the foundational work of Baker-Fox (1959) and Vital (1967), and later by the work of scholars such as Katzenstein (1985). Many scholarly contributions have been made, since these early works (see Kassimeris (2009), for a good overview). This literature—distinct from scholarship (with which the present study can be aligned) that has also made use of the small states nomenclature, but in reference to smaller developing countries (see, for example, Persaud (1986); and the work of the Commonwealth Secretariat (see Sutton 2001))—paved the way for the systematic study of an often neglected group of states in the scholarship on international affairs. To a certain degree, elements of the island studies scholarship and small states literature in IR are not all that dissimilar, in so far as their 'emancipatory' research current is concerned.

Generally although cognizant of the vulnerability of small states, common to both is an effort to defy the stereotyped expectations of the *limits of the possible* for small states and affirm their lot in international affairs (see Baldacchino and Bertram 2009 and Ingebritsen *et al* 2006, respectively). Both sets of scholarship have had to contend with those who would dismiss the
scope and objects of their study, and they have come up against an academic mainstream that has challenged their relevance (see Selwyn 1980).

Indeed, far from being impervious, the research ramparts between the two are, on occasion, not that distinguishable; analyses as of late spilling in to each others' analytical purview (see, for example, Cooper and Shaw 2009). This interlinking appears increasingly more likely, as some small states scholars continue to branch into the study of states other than small western European ones. There are, however, important differences. For one, the small states literature is flush with IR scholars and the disciplinary conventions therein; for example, the term 'small' in small states is understood in the context of 'power', not 'size per se' (Elman 1995, 171). Not so for island studies.

Also, island studies' interdisciplinarity has given its scholarship license to roam a larger research range—case studies often being of a diverse nature—across a spectrum of smaller countries. This has not necessarily been the experience of the small states literature, its pedigree being its focus more so on the statecraft and/or political economy of small advanced industrial (European) states (see Keohane 1971, Goetschel 1998, Thorhallsson 2000, Schwartz 1994 and Schmidt 2003). Specifically, it is said that three strands of literature obtain regarding “the study of small states: a first tradition is concerned with issues of self-determination, a second strand deals with the foreign policy options of neutrality or alliance, and a third thread comprises the comparative literature on politics and policy formation in small states” (Neumann and Gstohl 2006, 15).

All this notwithstanding, small states is a contested category in world politics. As Crowards notes, “[n]o widely accepted definition of small states has yet emerged” (2002, 143). Part of the problem is the term is bandied about in different literatures. In the small states in IR
literature, the category of small states has evolved through history (Neumann and Gstohl 2006, 5). With the dismemberment of European empires in the first part of the twentieth century, smaller states emerged (Ibid., 5). They came to assume the title of small states given that they were not great powers, nor did they lay claim to the title of middle powers; as was the case with countries like Canada (Ibid., 5). Instructively, associated with the category of small states is the notion of 'inconsequentiality', in the context of realpolitik (Ibid., 5). In scholarship in the vein of island studies, it typically has been utilized in the context of Global South (island) states. It is to this latter literature's reference to small states that I refer. In this latter literature, generally, indicators like population and territorial/geographical size have been used in this regard; but others have been identified (see Streeten 1993, 197).

However, their use is not that straightforward. Consider that in the case of population, for example, some have benchmarked the cut-off for small states as 1.5 million (Commonwealth Secretariat 1997). But using this indicator alone is misleading. Jamaica's population, for instance, stands at well over 2 million. By this measure, alone, it would not fall into this category. But surely it is a small state. Regarding size, Botswana is also considered a small state; but it towers over the likes of tiny Montserrat. Judging smallness, then, is a matter of perspective. Arguably, it is not a static position (Streeten 1993). Importantly, it has an intangible quality about it. In the words of Streeten, “we know a small country when we see it” (Ibid., 197). What smallness evokes, then, is vulnerability. My meaning, by way of the latter, is simply that any undertaking by such states is more challenging than it would otherwise be for larger counterparts.

An important current in the study of islands, however, is their theoretical abstraction. This is an approach that is common to and one that redounds to the benefit of the array of disciplinary engagements of islands within the field. This approach is taken up in the following section.
3.3 Island Imaginaries

Islands loom large in the mythical geographies of Western cultures, etched in what have been termed "mental maps" (Gillis 2007, 274); what I understand to be islands as cognitive sites. Gillis offers an instructive point, which helps crystallize this understanding: "[i]slands are among the features of the landscape that have always been indispensable to Western thought processes. Along with mountains, seas, and rivers, islands provide metaphors that allow us to give shape to the world" (2007, 276). Thus, islands have been described as "symbolic: the material and experiential significance of islands [captured] in artistic imagination". As Thomas explains, "[i]slands [have] lent themselves well to the imagination [having] engendered notions of the fantastic and the inversion of values....[literary works and voyages of intrepid explorers centuries ago having] created a psychological space in the Western mind, offering the promise of safety, destiny, travel and adventure in an environment without the trappings of regimented industrial civilisation" (2004, 79).

There is a long history of islands being looked upon metaphorically; imaginings of islands playing off and into every conceivable human emotion, but also cultural and behavioural practice. For example, since time immemorial, idyllic, utopian island narratives have been commonplace. The allure of islands is weaved into romanticized perceptions of innocence and paradise (in Edenic terms); islands seen as harmonious, pristine alternatives to bastions of modernity (and all its dysfunctions) that are metropolitan powers (Schulenburg 2003, 536;

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158 But Gillis's understanding of the place of islands in our psyche cuts deeper. We are inclined, as human beings, to find order in chaos. We compartmentalize, to distill order (Gillis 2007, 276). This bounded approach in respect of self compared to others, community to nation, nation to region, region to world, exemplifies a proclivity for what Gillis refers to as islanding; in the West, Gillis argues, we think archipelagically (Ibid., 276).

159 I attribute this statement to Kathy Stewart; an island scholar affiliated with the Institute of Island Studies, UPEI.

160 We need only look to Greek antiquity. Plato, for instance, viewed islands coterminously as concepts and metaphors; in and of themselves a basis to engage with utopian possibilities (Connell 2003, 556).
For the most part, then, islands have come to be associated with an 'idealised image'. In fact, islands have a hallowed place in some of the earliest and most important literary works in Western culture, especially those of Greek antiquity. Of note is Homer's *Odyssey*, centered around Odysseus's mythical voyage home, after the Trojan War. Islands, like the Ionian Islands, feature prominently. Thomas More's *Utopia* is another excellent example, published in the Renaissance era. It contrasted a near-idyllic, fictionalized island's political and societal system with the society in which More lived, which he perceived as dysfunctional on a number of levels.

As previously noted, Dodds and Royle contend that today there is wide acceptance of the need to critically evaluate the literal and metaphorical meanings that permeate islands (2003, 492). An example of scholarship in this vein is work which has sought to explore how the naming of islands as well as the narratives built around them and their associated oceanic regions simultaneously reflects and reinforces geopolitical-cum-civilizational imaginings, forged around their storied past and prospects going forward.

Smith's (2009) article is a good example of this. She focuses on Australasia—not an unproblematic reference. At first glance, it may be seen as referring to Australia and New Zealand. She is more interested, however, in how it came to pass as a name.

The naming of a place is not a neutral exercise, politically or culturally (*Ibid.*, 1117). Rather, it is an assertion of “power, proprietorship and propinquity, and bestowing names on the earth's larger geographical forms such as oceans, continents and archipelagos is often a perquisite of regional or global power” (*Ibid.*, 1099).

Today, the connotation of and term Australasia is a shadow of what it once was; the
political legitimacy of this arbitrary label having long since lost its luster (*Ibid.*, 1099). Ultimately, the geopolitical narrative of place naming is often tied up with shared civilizational/historical narratives: i.e. Australasia (weighed down by a British perspective), as distinct from Oceania (caught up in French and US perspectives), in the context of cartographic representations and perceptions of the Pacific (*Ibid.*, 1101, 1117).

As Jolly maintains, imagining a world region is generally aided by a map: “[y]et the maps we draw are never reflections of the world as it is, but always partial representations of it—representations powerfully shaped by who we are, where and when we are, and what motivates our interests in that place” (2007, 508).

In discussing Micronesia, Hanlon notes that the term was devised in the early 1800s (2009, 93). He outlines the ethnographic criteria employed by the academics who met some two hundred years ago, to divide Oceania into five regions; of which Micronesia was one. What, perhaps, is most striking about his account is that the geographers labeling distant parts of the world were French-European, convening their meeting in Paris (*Ibid.*, 93). What is more, some of these academics had limited or no contact with those distant lands.

This case of a foreign (more precisely, Western) hand in the naming of lands and characterizing associated narratives—rife with cultural misrepresentations—is not an isolated one. Ultimately, discursive practices have come to colonize cultural, ethnographic, sociological and cartographic narratives, in places like the Pacific.\(^\text{161}\) As Jolly notes—in the specific context of Oceania—in considering foreign representations of place (and its peoples), we need also to

\(^{161}\) Thomas notes, “[t]he age of European exploration in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries...produce[d] the long-held subdivisions of the Pacific islands into the *artificially constructed zones of Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia*, laden with Western assumptions and stereotypes” (2004, 76; my emphasis). The end result of the naming and subsequent academic study of the Pacific by Europeans is that a series of pseudo-identities for Pacific islanders has been created (*Ibid.*, 80). Such European practices have fostered a “salvationist message” (Fry 1997, 305); linked to the notion of a *white man’s burden*, no less.
Consider indigenous representations (2007, 509). Taken together, they are not separate visions, per se; rather "double visions" (Ibid., 509). No surprise, then, that there has been a long tradition amongst most Pacific writers to unshackle Oceania narratives from their colonial-cum-metaphorical chains/legacies, in keeping with "a growing regional consciousness linked to an Oceanic literary and cultural formation opposed to colonial impositions....The important work of dismantling orientalism had begun in the region some time before Edward Said named the phenomenon" (Subramani 2001, 150-151). Indeed, Thaman calls for Pacific studies to be decolonized: "[i]f we are to apply Said's suggestions about the Orient to the Pacific, we might conclude that what we delineate as "the Pacific" had been produced politically, socially, ideologically, and militarily by westerners" (2003, 3-4; emphasis added).

Not unrelated to this theme is a point made on 'island imaginaries' by Steinberg (2005, 255). He is of the view that it has been invoked to idealize metropolitan powers, such as Britain. By the same token, it has been important in the 'othering' process, as relates to (former) colonies. The term 'island' took on a deeper meaning, in this framing. As Steinberg explains:

In Britain's colonial ordering framework, the label 'island' (along with all of the imagery associated with colonies that bore that label) was used to characterize places that were viewed as isolated, backwards, controllable, and valuable primarily as sites for plantation production, for extraction of raw materials, or for military outposts in Britain's ongoing geostrategic competition with other European powers. The fact that British Guiana could not be circumnavigated by ship was simply ignored by British colonists who sought to construct this colony within the colonial 'island' category (2005, 255).

Conceiving of islands metaphorically is not just an academic exercise. It has resonance in policy circles, too. As Peckham (2003, 499-500) points out, around the time of the Falklands War, Thatcher played on and evoked a metaphorical narrative about these islands in the Southwest Atlantic. This tack fit with and sought to mask or, in part, redirect attention away from Britain's
geopolitical aims in retaining a foothold in that part of the world. To naturalize Britain's claim over this long-disputed territory, Thatcher's political rhetoric was on the islands' "quintessentially English' identity"; under threat—per that narrative—most recently from Argentinean aggression, as it had been in the past "from the Spanish Armada, to Napoleon, and Nazi Germany" (Ibid., 499-500). For its part, the Argentinean government played up a geographical narrative, in respect of its claim of sovereignty over what it calls Islas Malvinas. Argentina's claim rests, in part, on a geological rationale: the islands are deemed to be "part of the same continental shelf" (Ibid., 499-500).

The case of the Falklands/Malvinas is a very good example of how pivoting islands on metaphor analysis has wide appeal not just in an academic sense, but resonates especially in international affairs policy circles. The applicability, then, of the islands as metaphor approach to IR should not be underestimated. Indeed, there are important parallels in conceiving of islands in this manner and the constructivist framework, outlined earlier. Consider that for constructivism, ours is a social world. Material objects are meaningless, save for the intersubjective understandings assigned them. The textualization of islands, building on imagery therein, adopts analytical devises that resonate with constructivism, in general.

As outlined earlier, islands have an allegorical quality; a normative value so often ascribed to them by island scholars (Schulenburg 2003, 535). For its part, "constructivism concerns the issue of human consciousness in international life" (Ruggie 1998, 878). As articulated by Adler, "[c]onstructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world" (Adler 1997, 322; emphasis in original). In sum, its contention is that the material world is socially constructed, as are identities and interests; in
large measure because of intersubjective exchange and social learning.

What is more, while metaphor is commonly used in the study of islands, the term *social construction* has also been deployed. Steinberg suggests that notwithstanding the simplistic definition of an island as land surrounded by water, there is ambiguity regarding what an island is (2005, 54). This, for him, is indicative of “the island” being a social construction, based on the narrative of an island as a distinct category (*Ibid.*, 54). As Steinberg describes it, “social properties [are] typically....associated with island essences”; e.g. being “frozen in time, isolated, homogenous and pristine” (*Ibid.*, 54). He argues that if the difference between islands and mainlands are seen as arbitrary, the handy-work of humans as opposed to nature, then island essences can be seen for what they truly are: “social constructions, rooted in specific historic contexts” (*Ibid.*, 54).

Indeed, *metaphor* also features as a type of scholarship in IR: “[m]etaphors are [seen as] invitations to reason by analogy. An imaginary construct is used to accentuate certain aspects of reality....The power of metaphors [in this context] lies in their ability to orient, evoke, and even provoke and mobilize” (Chan 2002, 747-748).

What of vulnerability? If not at the center it has long been a bedfellow of research in the field of island studies; though, as of late, this research current has been somewhat muzzled by those who deem its narrative to be dis-empowering for islands and its original meaning distorted. Instead, resilience has become a popular refrain.

### 3.4 Vulnerability (and Resilience) of Small State Actors: A Review

Within island studies, there is an extensive literature on vulnerability; one that has traditionally cast a long shadow over the field. For a time, at least, it perhaps was seen by some as the field's
signature issue. But in recent years, aspects of the vulnerability literature have become unfashionable. In considering this literature, we must first elaborate on the theme. Let us begin by turning to a United Nations' definition of vulnerability.

In looking at least developed countries, the United Nations defines vulnerability “as the risk of being negatively affected by unforeseen events” (1999, 29; emphasis in original). This definition lacks specificity. The report does, however, go on to dissect the concept, outlining economic vulnerability (namely, structural and conjunctural) and ecological fragility; recognizing that the two are linked (Ibid., 29).

Regarding economic vulnerability, there has been a long-standing policy discussion around island developing states and the challenges that emanate as a result, which pose a serious challenge to their development. The link between the two garnered the international spotlight in a big way in the early 1970s, at UNCTAD III (Briguglio 1995, 1615).

The special challenges of these states were under discussion at the conference, opening the way for other fora like it over the following three-plus decades. But, it was “thanks to diplomatic processes” in some of a series of high-profile international conferences, especially in the 1980s, on the theme of sustainable development and the environment that an internationally recognized category for what are ostensibly island developing states “took root”.163

At one of those gatherings, the 'Rio Summit', in 1992, the category of Small Island Developing States (SIDS)164 was recognized for the first time. Along with Agenda 21 and other platforms, a distinct narrative was weaved for these countries on the basis of vulnerability

164 This is a United Nations classification. In addition to island nations, the category includes low lying ones. They are generally categorized regionally, as follows: the AIMS (Africa, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean and South China Sea), the Caribbean and the Pacific (see http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/dsd_aofw_sids/sids_members.shtml). For a list of SIDS, see http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/sid/list.htm
stemming from environmental considerations, like global warming.

Coming out of conferences, like those of UNCTAD, that were taken up with elaborating on the vulnerability problematique, in the early 1990s experts in the academe and the policy community pressed for “a composite index to serve as a yardstick that could measure the degree of overall vulnerability of these countries” (Briguglio 1995).165 This was seen as vitally important, considering that traditional economic measures were “deemed inappropriate and unable to capture the nuances and minutia of the SIDS' problematique”.166

As regards the body of literature on vulnerability, it is a prime example of an intellectual space where academics, experts in the policy community and scholar-analysts have shared in its development. What has been especially apparent is the great strides that have been made to cross-fertilize debate and threads of concept/theory-building emanating from the academe to practitioners, and vice versa. Amongst some of the notable work is Benedict (1967), Commonwealth Secretariat (1985), Downes (1988), UNCTAD (1988), Briguglio (1995), Commonwealth Secretariat (1997), Armstrong et al (1998), Commonwealth Secretariat and World Bank (2000), Easterly and Kraay (2000), Briguglio et al (2004), UNCTAD (2004), Fairbairn (2007), and McGillivray et al (2008).167

In terms of their sustainable development challenges, broadly conceived, SIDS are viewed in such work as having common physical and structural challenges.168 By far, size

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165 Briguglio (1995), who has worked closely with the policy community on a composite index and SIDS issues more generally, put together an index of economic vulnerability. Others that have been constructed include the Commonwealth Vulnerability Index, coming out of the Report of the Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank Joint Task Force on Small States (see Atkins et al 2000).


167 The articles on islands that featured in the aforementioned, landmark 1980 special issue of World Development can also be included as influential ones, in this regard.

168 See http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/dsd_aofw_sids/sids_members.shtml where they are succinctly sketched. Also see Briguglio (1995).
features prominently. These idiosyncratic size-cum-development challenges have been reinforced over the last three decades by influential explanatory frameworks, such as the MIRAB economy approach. For the most part, such scholarship is replete with the notion that the effect of those idiosyncrasies is that SIDS' economies are made “very vulnerable to forces outside of their control—a condition which sometimes threatens their very economic viability” (Briguglio 1995; my emphasis). The emphasis, very clearly, is on economic vulnerabilities (Carment et al 2004, Santos-Paulino et al 2010).

Though some raise the issue of viability, more so than others, this line of argumentation has touched a nerve in certain quarters. These scholars have deep misgivings about and push back on the case that has traditionally been made regarding vulnerability, and would, no doubt, have a preference for a resilience narrative to attenuate if not upstage the vulnerability one (see, for example, Baldacchino and Bertram 2009, Armstrong and Read 2002). For Baldacchino and Bertram, to infer weakness because of smallness and that smallness is the cause of a host dysfunctions “is a version of structural determinism” (2009, 141). They argue, “many small states not only survive but thrive in the modern global order”—the mere fact that they have survived, Baldacchino and Bertram argue, speaks not to weakness; rather strength (Ibid., 142). They take to task the empirical work that says otherwise, albeit with the proviso that their position is not that challenges do not obtain in respect of small states. Rather, it is their contention that we should not underestimate, in an evolutionary sense, the coping abilities and

169 The small states literature in the context of IR has also recently waded into analyzing the effects of size; notably in the context of member states of the EU. A 2006 Special Issue of the Journal of European Integration, entitled 'The European Union's Member States: The Importance of Size' (Vol. 28, Iss. 1), was dedicated to this theme. Pace characterizes the literature on small states and the EU as falling into two categories: (i) examining “the behaviour[influence] of small states in the Union's institutions”; and, (ii) from the vantage point of comparative politics, “the process of European integration from a particular small state's perspective” is explored (2006, 34).

170 An acronym that captures a problematique especially associated with these countries: migration, remittances, aid and public sector bureaucracy (Bertram and Watters 1985).

171 Some have even argued that small size is an advantage (see Baldacchino 2005).

172 To be fair, not all in the 'vulnerability camp' make this link.
responses to challenges that (most of) these states are able to bring to bear (Ibid., 142).

The vulnerability and resilience approaches to small state actors' problematique, then, are two, (often) opposing views. As Hay notes, "[p]erhaps the most contested faultline within island studies is whether islands are characterised by vulnerability or resilience" (2006, 21).

There is not likely to be scholarly consensus anytime soon. The upshot is, both sides of the debate have merits, but also shortcomings. Realistically speaking, though, it is difficult to be situated squarely in either one or the other. The fact of the matter is, especially since the 1990s, Global South island states have had to face new and mounting security, political economy (broadly conceived) and environmental challenges, associated with the post-Cold War era. The literature, however, has had mixed success in explaining the tacks/strategies these states have adopted, in this regard. It has, for instance, engaged well with regionalism. This is not so for interregionalism.

3.5 (Inter)regionalism in Island Scholarship

Conspicuous by its absence in island studies is research on interregionalism. The fact is, interregionalism is deserving of attention in island studies at a time when one of the most striking developments in the international affairs of small/island states today is that they have come to rely on interregionalism in the pursuit of strategic international policy; as is the case in the Caribbean, for instance through the CARIFORUM-EU EPA.

Short of the many commentaries and some scholarly work that has appeared on the Agreement in other disciplinary folds, the CARIFORUM-EU EPA has apparently not resonated in the field of island studies, standing on its own or couched in interregionalism. To the extent that academic analyses are influenced by events in the world, this is surprising. A theoretical
framework and associated analysis of some of the most pressing issues in this emergent Global North and Global South region arrangement is long overdue in the field of island studies.

### 3.6 Conclusion

With respect to its approach, the chapter takes stock of island studies. This review, in the chapter's first part, is flanked by consideration of the substantial body of empirical work on the 'vulnerability' (and 'resilience') of small state actors, but also engagement of some of the literature in which islands are abstracted as cognitive sites. Finally, referring to research on the Caribbean, a determination is made that interregionalism, curiously, has largely escaped the attention of scholars in this field; though regionalism has not.

The foregoing has taken stock of island studies—a large and diverse literature—and, tangentially, the small states literature in IR. Instructively, I underscore that while this latter literature has contributed to the establishment of island studies, unlike the small states literature in IR which has gravitated toward constructivist frameworks work in the genre of island studies—for the most part—has not. An embrace of such an approach by these latter scholars may provide the grounds for a deeper engagement with one another on the part of these two sets of scholars, who generally are disengaged from each other. Calls for such interface have been elusive, especially because the bridge-building role of constructivism has not garnered attention.

The survey and theoretical engagement that constitute this chapter are instructive for our purposes, in so far as they point to much being gained from drawing on sociological or constructivist approaches with respect to the study of Caribbean (inter)regionalism. This does not mean to suggest that constructivism fully explains the diplomatic and policy tacks of such states. Rather, as we will see, a constructivist framework may prove invaluable, against the backdrop of
environments where small state-brokered social learning and normative persuasion abound, and where power maximization in the realist sense takes a back seat to identity-centric, 'appropriate' state behaviour. We first need to frame this sort of analysis with a theoretically supported model \textit{qua} conceptual tool.
PART II

CARIBBEAN (INTER)REGIONALISM:
TOWARD A MODEL, IN LIGHT OF SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Chapter IV
International Theory and the 'Region Leveraging Nexus' (RLN):
Toward a Model of Caribbean (Inter)regionalism

4.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the RLN, the theoretically supported model qua conceptual tool which serves to depict and provide a frame for identity informed diplomacy of which an account is given in the present study. The RLN serves to lend insight into the pragmatism and dynamism of agency-laden Caribbean-pivoted interregionalism (as relates to the negotiation of trade agreements, specifically) and intra-regionalism (as relates to regional integration), and the nexus between. The analysis of the RLN is juxtaposed on a review of conventional international theory and the place of small states in it. This is done with a view to sharply contrasting stale, unsatisfactory mainstream accounts of the inability of small states to be stewards of their own destiny with an innovative approach to framing their agency—which draws on progressive scholarly currents—that suggests otherwise.

The theoretical literature on (inter)regionalism regarding small state Global South regions like the Caribbean remains uneven and fragmented, certainly absent dedicated study of how such states leverage notions of socially constructed regions to the advantage of their various diplomatic and policy tacks. The present chapter, and the study at large, is an effort to make scholarly headway into filling some of the gaps, with a view to making the case that such states are by no means 'powerless' as conventional international theory contends.

The chapter is divided into two parts, the first of which is constituted of two sections. The first section conceptually situates how small states are portrayed in conventional international theory. It questions what remains a relatively narrow focus on generalizing these states' supposed inability to affect change for themselves, and to do so on their own terms. The second section
discusses SIT, post-structuralism and, briefly, Habermas' normative social theory—namely his theory of communicative action. The balance of that section explicates how these approaches can lend conceptual and analytical weight to the constructivist framework that underpins my case for theorizing Caribbean (inter)regionalism in ideational terms, where agency\textsuperscript{173} is frontloaded.

The chapter's second part sets forth and examines the RLN. The RLN turns its sights on: (i) the interactive relationship between and offers a potentially strong explanation of Caribbean-pivoted interregionalism (as relates to the negotiation of trade agreements, i.e. the EPA, specifically) and intra-regionalism (as relates to regional integration); and (ii) how regional social identities at times work against the production of norm cohesion-type discourses in regional cooperation and regional governance.

In its concluding section, the chapter showcases a point that forms a centerpiece of this study: state agency is better animated by \textit{the best argument}, set against the backdrop of state identity construction, than by established explanations in IR which assign misleading conceptions (even presumptions) relating to state agency.

4.2 International Theory: The Traditional Agenda, the place of Small States in it; Recasting Caribbean Regionness

The study of the behaviour of states in world politics is one of the central concerns of predominant, rationalist IR theory.\textsuperscript{174} Realists and neoliberal institutionalists, alike, hold that outside physical forces affect the behaviour of actors (Adler 1997, 322). Neorealists, for instance, conceive of self-help styled international anarchy as a structure that conditions state behaviour (Wendt 1992, 391; Waltz 1979), and states as "try[ing] to maximize their interests based on fixed

\textsuperscript{173} I understand agency to simultaneously refer to \textit{purposiveness} and \textit{choice}, rooted in extant social engagement.

\textsuperscript{174} In addition to being rationalistic, realism and institutionalist theory are utilitarian (Keohane and Martin 1995, 39); neo-utilitarian, for Ruggie (1998, 855).
ex ante preferences” (Verdun 2005, 17).

In this dominant IR perspective, a structural theory of international politics, there are highly restrictive notions of agency; which come at the expense of some of the smallest states in world politics: agency is assumed out of existence for them. Consider that small states have been described as “not hav[ing] a foreign policy; they merely have a policy of existence” (Fauriol 1984, cited in Thorburn 2007, 244). Not only are foreign policies elusive, but purportedly these states are beholden to larger states (Hey 2003, cited in Thorburn 2007, 244). Small states are thought to exhibit vulnerability with respect to what has been described as “patterns of power and alignment” that obtain in the international system, said to “leave them exposed to predation and ambition by states” (Sutton and Payne 1993, 591-592). Small islands have also been characterized in similarly unflattering terms; described as “helpless pawns in the game of international relations” (Shibuya 2003, cited in Thorburn 2007, 244).

The lived experiences of especially small states in world politics tend to be overly simplified by such descriptors, which, at the very least, embody a neorealist orientation. At best, this theoretical orthodoxy provides only fragmentary insights into the statecraft of 'Lilliputian' states; at worst, it reinforces stereotypes. Simply put, on offer are materialist explanations; the main axis of theorizing. The impetus behind such unspecific, tenuous characterizations is easily understood, though: it suits the austere parsimony of neorealism (an exemplar of scientific, systems-based IR theory), which in the service of social scientific or positivist methods truncates the repertoire of state behaviour.

Neorealism's preoccupation, after all, is with the security-oriented behaviour of states, in the context of what, at its root, is a rather 'linear' understanding—inspired by the scientific
ambitions of behaviouralism\textsuperscript{175} (in the vein of David Easton's scholarly work)—of the logic of international anarchy: described as law-like, systems-based 'regularities' modeled on cause and effect.\textsuperscript{176} Mainstream (typically American) IR scholarship has, thus, traditionally been pregnant with a program of rational choice analysis (i.e. game theory), dedicated to determining/predicting state behaviour based on conceptions of the material capabilities of states that are likened to 'billiard balls'. Indeed, "neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are drawn directly from microeconomics" (Ruggie 1998, 862); the centerpiece being individuals as elemental units of social analysis—i.e. methodological individualism.

Such an approach exogenizes the underpinnings of state behaviour (Wendt 1994, 384), and cannot begin (nor does it have the methodological scope) to fully grasp the significance of state identities and interests in what, in effect, is a socially interactive international system. For neorealism (and neoliberal institutionalism), state identities and interests are the result of their material positions, exogenous and given (Ruggie 1998, 862); essentially, bracketed. In this framing, the material is essentialized, at the expense of the ideational. As such, constructivists' "critique of neorealists and neoliberals concerns not what these scholars do and say but what they ignore: the content and sources of state interests and the social fabric of world politics" (Checkel 1998, 324; emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{175} Dating back to the 1950s, "behaviouralists argued that the field [of IR] would be improved by shedding many of its traditional methods of enquiry to emulate more closely the natural sciences" (Chernoff 2009, 161-162).

\textsuperscript{176} The ahistorical nature of this project—which essentially has impoverished realism in the tradition of Morgenthau and Carr—and its unflinching commitment to the application of "images taken from Newtonian mechanics or Darwinian biology...[and]...the logic of scientific explanation [associated with] the sciences of inert matter to encompass patterns of probability in historical processes" (Walker 1993, 97-98), have been the centerpiece of important critiques of neorealism (Ashley 1984, Walker 1993, Gill 1993). This latter critique is reminiscent of one of three broad criticisms of positivism in the context of the philosophy of science: "the application of positivism [in the context of a naturalist perspective] to the social sciences" (Chernoff 2005, 39). The others are: "the inadequacies of positivism as an account of science. The third set is by authors who reject causal theory altogether and defend constitutive theory in the social sciences, notably interpretivists and supporters of the hermeneutic tradition (HT)" (Ibid., 39).
That state identities and interests are, in effect, sidelined, any understanding of state behaviour is incomplete; indeed, it is overly simplistic. The result, in the case of (very) small states, is that their statecraft, and agency therein, is narrowly, arbitrarily and naively conceived of.

To be sure, small states are challenged by their idiosyncratic size; and there is a determinacy to their agency on the international stage. It is not my intention to downplay this. However, smaller size cannot simply (or arbitrarily) be equated with or seen as predetermining/engendering diminishing returns on agency. This is a reductionist approach. It flies in the face of the complexity (even contingency) that characterizes international affairs and the reflexive nature of actors therein; in effect, *trading complex social reality for explanatory expediency*. With this prescriptive, predictive approach, the considerable complexity and nuance of action of social institutions—state-based or otherwise—at the heart of statecraft risks being lost.

However, they can be successfully uncovered by analytically engaging with state identities and interests. Analysis of *plasticity*, with respect to how state identities and interests are leveraged, holds the promise of providing a more complete picture of agency, especially in the context of 'Lilliputian' state actors. 177

Privileging state identities and interests in the study of world politics, though, requires a shift away from the theoretical mainstream, typically toward constructivist but also socialization theories, more broadly. Instructively, constructivism has come to be seen as the main challenger to the theoretical orthodoxy in IR (Hopf 1998, 171), over the past two decades. Indeed, constructivism is at variance with perspectives such as neorealism, on meta-theoretical

\[177\] I borrow the term *plasticity* from Legro (2009).
grounds. If state identities and interests are considered salient in locating agency, and in this regard understanding how states are socialized in a norm-animated international system, adopting a constructivist approach is imperative.

Constructivism emphasizes the constructed nature of and the intersubjective framework behind the identity-driven image(s) and normative role of actors in world politics. In effect, culture, norms, identities, ideas, ideology and socialization have a bearing on state interests and policy preferences.

In recent years, analysts have assigned greater importance to ideas and ideational structures, against the backdrop of the study of international affairs where for a long time material forces and capabilities occupied center stage. This has led the way to analyses of actor or agent identities and the complex interplay with an ideational structure. In this regard, students of IR have been able to better appreciate the role of interstate socialization—per social learning and normative persuasion or the 'logic of appropriateness' (see March and Olsen 1998)—in the diffusion of norms.

Some constructivist scholars have pointed to how states' identities are formed and built by state-to-state interaction (Marcussen et al 1999; Wendt 1999). Others flag the role of ideational and normative factors (Checkel 1997; Finnemore 1996). Both these threads of research are of interest, and are relevant for our purposes.

However, while constructivism usefully provides a theory of identitive socialization, strictly speaking it "lacks a theory of the agent" (Flockhart 2006, 93). For Curley, "[i]nstead, constructivist research generally stresses the importance of the mutually constitutive relation

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178 In fairness, because of the many strands of constructivism, when compared with the theoretical mainstream on ontological and epistemological grounds some branches of constructivism vary to a greater degree than others.
179 The constructivist position, of course, is that norms constitute state identity, by extension state interests.
180 In important respects, this conventional approach is still the predominant one, as reflected by mainstream scholarship.
between agent (state) and structure (international system), in which neither unit of analysis is "ontologically" [prior]" (2009, 653). Thus, in this framework, ontology is grounded on the relationship between agents and structures. In effect, constructivism is informed by the interpenetration of the two.

As a result, an agent-level theory is needed, which can be paired with the socialization narrative of constructivism. Indeed, it is vital, given the state-as-agent approach adopted in the present study.

Like Flockhart, I turn to “Social Identity Theory (SIT) [an agent-level theory from social psychology] as social constructivism's theory of the agent” (2006, 92). SIT is taken up with the study of identity (especially identity formation), in the context of social group settings—seen as collective social constructs, principally forged on criteria of differentiation/ distinctiveness. It looks at intergroup behaviour, underscoring how social groups play a role in defining the social identity of its members. What SIT is especially helpful in doing is distilling the in-group/out-group comparative dynamic, at play in social contexts (see Tajfel 1978).

In the context of world politics, group membership forms part of and is critical to identity formation regarding state actors. At this level of social reality or social structure, regionalism is a common manifestation of group settings; group identity looming large in such interactional spaces, such that regions may also serve as agents. In point of fact, states derive a sense of self, or social identity, in large part from membership in a regional grouping. This is not unlike people, who also attach a value but also are emotionally invested in a social grouping (Ibid., 63).

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181 Social psychology is one of “two different fields of decision analysis” (Reiter 2006, 232).
182 Regions as agents or actors should be conceptualized from a constructivist vantage point. Furthermore, they can be thought of in a similar way as the 'English School' of IR conceives of international society: “A society of states (or 'international society') exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions” (Bull 1977, 13). Indeed, the 'English School', having gained prominence in the 1960s/70s, has influenced constructivist work in IR.
By way of SIT, then, state identity construction can be conceptualized. In this regard, in conceiving of states as actors in world politics, they can be assigned “person-hood” (Jackson 2004, 255). Indeed, they are thought of as having “anthropomorphic qualities” (Wendt 1999, cited in ibid, 256). Following from this formulation, properties that are ascribed to human beings also hold with respect to states; amongst them identities (Wendt 2004, 289).

In this context, identity can be understand to refer to “relatively stable, role specific understandings and expectations about self....[indeed], [i]dentities are the basis of interests” (Wendt 1992, 397-398; emphasis added). In point of fact, “[c]onstructivists claim that interests are only given meaning in the social context in which an actor interprets these interests”; in stark contrast to the economistic, neorealist assumption that actors are utility maximizers (Curley 2009, 653). Both identities and interests are, thus, socially constructed—in the constructivist framing, at least. Taken together, identities, interests and the structure(s) in which they are contained are “mutually constitutive” (Wendt 1995, 137).183 In the context of state identity, Katzenstein notes “[c]ultural-institutional contexts do not merely constrain actors by changing the incentives that shape their behaviour. They do not simply regulate behaviour. They also help to constitute the very actors whose conduct they seek to regulate” (2005, 22). Identities, then, are internalized by states. As a result, as “purposive actors”, states have “a sense of Self” (Wendt 1999, cited in Neumann 2004, 259; emphasis added).

My theoretical framework also incorporates the discourse-theoretic approach of poststructuralism, on account of the view that actor-centred perspectives make sense with respect

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183 To be fair, Wendt also reveals his proclivity for causal effects, in considering social structures (Chernoff 2005, 49, 60). So, on balance, he envisions constitutive relations in the context of social structures, but points to the causal effects of those structures too (Ibid., 60). This would not sit well with pure constructivists, focused on constitutive relations (Ibid., 61); and so this speaks to the diversity of approaches within constructivism itself.
to the study of norms when conjoined with discourse-centred perspectives.\textsuperscript{184}

Poststructuralism in IR goes by different labels. Poststructuralism is used by some. For others, their referent is postmodernism, and also intertextuality, even re/de-constructivism (Østerud 1996, 385). The labeling is used interchangeably by some; a practice frowned on by those for whom the varying labels are not just cosmetic, but speak to “crucial distinctions” (\textit{Ibid.}, 385).\textsuperscript{185}

Amongst the more widely known scholars writing in this vein are Richard K. Ashley, David Campbell, James Der Derian, Michael J. Shapiro and R.B.J. Walker. My interest here is not in carrying out an in-depth discussion of this kind of work. Nor is it with this work's methodological and epistemological quarrel with scientism, \textit{à la} the social science (even IR) mainstream, or its long-recognized attempts to strike at certain understandings of modernity \textit{qua} the Enlightenment, knowledge, etc (\textit{Ibid.}, 386). Rather, of interest are its socio-linguistic insights, for which research in this vein has come to be known. In this regard, its discourse\textsuperscript{186} analytical approach to the study of foreign policy is of special interest, namely: “discourses as systems of signification” (Milliken 1999, 229). Instructively, discourses can be seen as “\textit{structures} that are actualized in their regular use by people of discursively ordered relationships in 'ready-at-hand language practices' or other modes of signification” (\textit{Ibid.}, 231). Discourse understood in this way would imply “that discursive studies must empirically analyse language practices (or their equivalents) in order to draw out a more general structure of relational

\textsuperscript{184} I attribute this insight to Hülssse and Spencer, though their's is not so much a call for balance in respect of the two as it is for “a shift of perspective...from an actor-centred to a discourse-centred perspective” (2008, 571); albeit in their discussion of terrorism studies.

\textsuperscript{185} Subaltern (postcolonial) scholarship and feminist writings, regarding gendering the study of international politics/international political economy, are amongst some other perspectives that are thought, by some, to be classified as poststructuralist theories

\textsuperscript{186} Like Achard, I understand the term discourse to refer to “any language use in a social context, whether in spoken or in written form” (1993, 75).
distinctions and hierarchies that orders persons' knowledge about the things defined by the discourse" (Ibid., 231).

The approach has a lot to offer how we think about and can theorize states bringing their respective identities to life; not unlike the interpretive or more critical variant of constructivism—that the present study subscribes to—does. Importantly, the significance of 'speech acts' and official rhetoric in norm formulation can be uncovered. In this sense, discourse analysis opens the way for a better understanding of social reality, in so far as language gives it meaning.

There is no one way of undertaking discourse analysis (Fairclough 1992). However, a method that is commonly utilized, and for our purposes is sufficient, is to analyze a set of policy-type documents, including speeches and statements. Referred to as “predicate analysis”, this method allows for language practices that are utilized in texts to be studied (Milliken 1999, 231).187

By so doing, the meanings that are generated by and assigned to social actors can be distilled, at least in part, through looking at language. Discursive practices, the use of text, rhetoric, etc., all form an important element of how states are represented, portrayed and otherwise animated as actors on the international stage.

In in-built normative practices, therefore, is language-based state identity positioning. To what end? In the socialization process that is entailed, meanings are derived. They are brought about through processes of negotiation, the end result of which are normative regimes. As Kratochwil notes, “[a]ctors are not only programmed by rules and norms, but they reproduce and

187 In regards to language practices, consideration can be given to “the language practices of predication — the verbs, adverbs and adjectives that attach to nouns” (Milliken 1999, 232). The effect of predication, with respect to a noun, is that the noun becomes a thing(s) (Ibid., 232). Subjects take on this meaning, in this kind of analysis (Ibid., 232). Subjects, then, become “defined through being assigned capacities for and modes of acting and interacting” (Ibid., 232).
change by their practice the normative structures by which they are able to act, share meanings, communicate intentions, criticize claims, and justify choices” (1989, 61).

Per the latter point, constructivism is useful in framing state socialization as norm-driven, subjected—in how norms are negotiated—to the 'logic of appropriateness' (see March and Olsen 1998, 949-954). The latter is one of two logics of action studied by March and Olsen (Ibid., 949-954), with respect to international orders. The 'logic of consequentialism' is the other.

Where rationalist perspectives adopt methodological individualism, so as to portray actors as utility-maximizers, constructivism generally transcends the implied logic of consequentialism therein. Rather, the logic of action in constructivism can be characterized by the logic of appropriateness, in that the forging of preferences by actors is not done solely instrumentally. As March and Olsen contend, “[I]linking action exclusively to a logic of consequences seems to ignore the substantial role of identities, rules and institutions in shaping human behaviour....Human actors are imagined to follow rules188 that associate particular identities to particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing similarities between current identities and choice dilemmas and more general concepts of self and situations. Action involves evoking an identity or role and matching the obligations of that identity or role to a specific situation” (Ibid., 951).

My point is that, rather than construing actors as taken up solely with dispassionate cost-benefit-styled analysis of utility and preference maximization, per the logic of consequentialism, the logic of appropriateness affords an opportunity to view actors' logic of action as influenced ostensibly by doing what is right.189 Ultimately, theirs' is social action,

188 These rules are socially constructed; both identities (around “senses of belonging”) and rules forged by “social interaction” (March and Olsen 1998, 952).
189 Appropriateness can be conceived of in respect of several dimensions, including a cognitive dimension: appropriate action, in this regard, “is essential to a particular conception of self” (Ibid., 952).
where preferences need not be fixed; a radical departure from how rationalist perspectives would have us conceive of actor behaviour.

Like the understanding of action sketched above, social psychology, communications theory and also sociology-oriented scholarship have, for instance, made important contributions. But one type of analysis that has increasingly commanded the spotlight in IR, proving incredibly useful in understanding how action is undertaken, builds on Habermasian propositions; namely, the theory of communicative action.

Communicative action refers to multiple actors establishing a relationship, with which they "seek to reach an understanding about the action situation and their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by way of agreement" (Habermas 1984, 86). In essence, Habermas' communicative action approach contends that given societal actors pursue common understanding, and what is more they seek to 'coordinate actions' based on reasoned argument but also consensus and cooperation (Ibid., 86). Communicative action, then, stands opposed to so-called teleological action, which perhaps would go over well with rationalist IR perspectives. In the former, action is interpretively hinged. This is not so, per the teleological variant.190

When viewed in concert, the above theoretical pathways form an important basis for understanding how norms come about in world politics, especially from the vantage point of small states in the Global South, like those of the Caribbean.

To make this case, I conceptualize Caribbean States in the context of their interregional relationships and intra-regional relationships, and begin to address the effects of institutions (themselves vessels for norms and intersubjective understandings) and processes therein.

Regarding their interregional relationships, for our purposes, these states can wholly be

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190 This schema of communicative vs. teleological action has parallels at the macro-level with the dichotomy of constructivist and rationalist approaches. But it also resonates with the earlier discussion of March and Olsen's (1998) scholarly work.
conceived of as what Wendt refers to as *psychological persons*, “possess[ed] [of] certain mental or cognitive attributes” (2004, 294)—amongst them, negotiating savvy. For their part, the larger negotiating counterparts of the Caribbean can be thought of as Wendtian-styled *moral persons*, “accountable for actions under a moral code” (*Ibid.*, 294). Following from the 'logic of appropriateness', it is reasonable to surmise that *some* of the time, these *moral persons* can be 'persuaded' to *do what is right*, regarding their norm-based responsibilities. In the context of the interregional relationships raised here, I am particularly interested in socializing agents, including the related institutions (specifically, their role in crafting preferences) and processes that obtain, in the context of *regions*.

What of Caribbean States intra-regional relationships? In this case, Caribbean States can be seen not exclusively as psychological persons. They are only *partly* so. They can also be conceptualized as one part *moral persons*; in addition, operating under the status of what Wendt terms *legal persons*. The latter have “rights and obligations in a community of law” (*Ibid*). Following from the logic of appropriateness, it is reasonable to surmise that *most* of the time, the *moral persons* in this schema can be 'persuaded' to *do what is right*, regarding their norm-based responsibilities to *legal persons*. In the context of the intra-regional relationships raised here, I am particularly interested in socializing agents, including the related institutions (specifically, their role in crafting preferences) and processes that obtain, in the context of *states*.

Regarding an elaboration of the above inter- and intra-regional relationships, generally, and what I see as their persuasion-centered approach, it is my considered view that Caribbean States are more likely to resort to “arguing and reason-giving”. As regards the latter point, I draw on insights from Ulbert and Risse’s (2005, 352) work on 'argumentative talk' (which is

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191 Arguing is understood as “a reflexive process....characterized by an exchange of arguments that is based on a common frame of reference that is adjusted in the course of communication” (Ulbert and Risse 2005, 352).
informed by the theory of communicative action), with respect to multilateral diplomatic negotiations.

Through a series of empirical studies on deliberation and arguing, they determine that arguing and reason-giving are prevalent, for the cases studied, throughout the life-cycle of the reviewed international negotiations (*Ibid.*, 352). This finding appears especially germane for Caribbean States, typically engaged in negotiations as 'under-dogs'. To secure gains, in certain contexts, evidence\(^{192}\) suggests that they fall back on arguing and reason-giving, in hopes that the pay off for such efforts, if successful, are counterpart agents' preferences being changed (Grobe 2010, 6). By extension and in keeping with the Habermasian communicative action-informed argumentative talk approach, I surmise that “[a]gents....do not [necessarily] try to maximize their own utility functions, as rationalists would assume. Instead, they are ready to succumb to the better argument, even if such behaviour required reformulating their preferences throughout the interaction” (*Ibid.*, 6). This leaves room for altruism, the resulting negotiated outcome(s) tending to redound to the benefit of persuader Caribbean States (PCS).

I shall re-visit the Wendtian-styled state typology as well as the argumentative talk approach to multilateral negotiations, discussed above, in the final section of the chapter. Three points should, however, be immediately apparent, at this juncture. First, small states, like those of the Caribbean, can be viewed as taking on different personas, to suit inter- or intra-regional relationships. Second, be they inter- or intra-regional relationships, it is reasonable to infer that they are founded on and eventually mediated by norms. Third, the establishment and operationalization of norms can be seen as dependent on the state socialization process; that process, in turn, contingent on social learning. It is fair to say, Caribbean small state-driven persuasion would loom large, in this regard; argumentation around and appeals to, ostensibly,
moral standards or moral imperatives directed at bringing about attitudinal adjustments in counterparts, “without [the] use of either material or mental coercion” (Flockhart 2006, 97). If successful, the following outcomes are expected: (i) the interests of socializing agents are advanced; (ii) counterpart agents' outlook on what they stand to gain by signing onto the norm(s) (but also lose, by not) is altered, as are their preferences, such that they are amenable to adjusting their bargaining positions. At the core of this interaction is actor-based, interest-driven representational self-imaging.

With the preceding in mind, one caveat is in order, at this stage. What I have done thus far is to sketch a framework for state socialization, especially applicable to the regionalist project of the Caribbean. The intention is not, however, to suggest that the regional diplomatic and policy tacks possibly engendered by this framework are always successful. This is a separate matter, which will be taken up later.

Let us now take stock of where we have come from in this sub-section, but also where we are headed in terms of an alternative theorization of the Caribbean in international affairs. In what follows, I am interested in setting out issues related to theory, especially agency.

First and foremost, the handful of alternative perspectives flagged above open theoretical space for recast narrative framings of small states—like those of the Caribbean—in the international system, and in explaining diplomatic outcomes in their favour. This narrative is vastly different from and indeed is at odds with that of the prevailing approach to the study of the Caribbean in world politics, which upon classifying them as small states would singularly view such states as “inarguably constrained by their external environment and...."system level phenomena"....[their] foreign policy and international relations....largely defined by larger, more powerful actors and situations” (Thorburn 2007, 244; emphasis added). In their study of the
security strategies of microstates, Wivel and Oest contend “[m]ost microstates have had, therefore, little or no independent foreign policy, and even fewer have implemented any independent security policy” (2010, 430). This prevailing approach tends to be rationalist (Atkins 2001, 33). Neorealism fits this mold. As Cox (1981) contends, neorealism is ‘problem solving’ in nature.

The alternative perspectives I have discussed cut against the (mainstream) grain, not unlike the political economy analyses of the Region offered up by some prominent West Indian scholars three-plus decades ago. This literature exhibits a critical hue, much like the scholarship of the dependencias of the same era, occupied with problematizing the political economy of Latin American development. This period witnessed the emergence of the PEM, associated with the so-called New World Group. This tradition of critical theorizing has continued apace, some contemporary Caribbeanists having brought a new spin to the critical geoeconomic study of the Caribbean, engaging seriously with postcolonial/reflectivist perspectives. The recent edited volume of Barrow-Giles and Marshall (2003), entitled Living on the Borderlines: Issues in Caribbean Sovereignty and Development, is an important example of scholarship in this vein. But as Atkins (2001) notes, post-positivist approaches to the study of the Caribbean are relegated to scholarly margins. It is fair to say, then, that while theoretical pluralism has visited Caribbean IR, just how expansive these forays have been is an open question.

Clearly, the study of Caribbean international affairs is unfamiliar terrain for constructivist and SIT-informed analyses. This is surprising. As will be shown in the final two sections, themes such as Caribbean (inter)regionalism can nicely be viewed through the prism of these theoretical perspectives. It becomes apparent that the ideational study of the international affairs of this Region possesses considerable potential for and is appropriate to deepening an understanding not
only of why diplomatic and policy tacks around regional identity are positioned the way they are, but also the agency upon which such socialization tacks have come to rest.

The fact remains, such states leveraging social learning, through their persuasion-based engagement with each other and collectively as a region with third parties, to deliberatively affect social change is under-examined; indeed, to date, it has been undertheorized. The advancement of this sort of research, along the lines discussed above and building on the insights of critical geopolitics\(^{193}\) vie the socially constructed nature of regions, can go a long way in striking up an inter-disciplinary conversation around interregionalism, regionalism and island studies.

What is more, what SIT, post-structuralism and Habermas' normative social theory can theoretically hold up, when paired with constructivism, is the contention that it is in processes of and institutional cooperation that mediates state socialization that agency can be re/uncovered, with respect to the smallest of states—like those of the Caribbean. My core point is that in relationships, Caribbean institutions, as it turns out, are norm-makers,\(^{194}\) not norm-takers, as is so commonly assumed.

This chapter seeks to advance this sort of understanding of small states, which has escaped neorealists, who by default proscribe power politics and material balance of power explanations—given their mantra of self-help and relative gains. For their part, neoliberal institutionalists would accord greater weight to cooperation (partly through the lens and wholly by way of an instrumental approach to norms), spurred by international regimes/organizations.

\(^{193}\) See Neumann (1994); Paasi (2002); Massey (1993).

\(^{194}\) Indeed, practitioners of Caribbean regionalism suggest as much, in reference to the diplomacy of such states. The former acting Secretary-General of CARICOM, Ambassador Lolita Applewhaite, has said “[i]t is the force of ideas and creativity that are our strengths as we grapple with the issues and attempt to make a difference in the international arena. It is the use of these strengths that give our small states a voice on equal terms with the most powerful states to advance those issues which are of particular concern to us” (CARICOM 2011; my emphasis).
However, that cooperation and the preferences that channel it would be theorized against the backdrop of incentivization—with respect to material rewards, or, conversely, punishment. This rationalist bargaining theory (which has so captivated the thinking of academics and practitioners, alike) would, thus, gloss over other negotiating tacks particularly utilized by small states—touched on in the earlier discussion on socialization—that tend to be born of argumentative rather than instrumental rationality.

Ultimately in both the neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches, small size predetermines the degree of influence. After all the central tenet of realists, in particular, is power, which is synonymous with exacting influence.\textsuperscript{195} Power is a relative term, in this construct. The differentials therein are typically associated with the size of the state concerned and the material resources (e.g. military, economic, etc.) at its disposal, though strictly speaking structural realists, whose focus rests more so on sovereign states occupying and operating in an anarchical (i.e. supra-authority lacking) international system, would ascribe that system as being the locus of power. All things considered the larger the size of the state and the resources available to it, the state in question has an increased ability to secure its interests because it is said to have greater recourse to the exercise of power \textit{à la} realpolitik. An inverse relationship holds in this realist framework, the smaller the state. Thucydides’s much-cited dictum that the strong do want they want and the weak endure the consequences is apt, in this context.

However neither one of the aforementioned neo-utilitarian approaches is as nuanced as explanations of small regional states in international politics—in the Deutschian but also ‘imagined community’ sense—based on identity, intersubjective meanings and the development of socially-oriented norms. In this constructivist or cultural theoretical framing, states are far

\textsuperscript{195} I stop short of providing an outright definition of power in the context of IR, as it has long been a contested term. It has come up for scrutiny definitionally, but also in respect of its measurement and usage.
more accurately portrayed in the international system as doing “what they think most appropriate”; in sharp contrast to the realist line, especially, that “[s]tates do what they have the power to do” (Farrell 2002, 52; emphasis added). The realist explanatory range, especially, is not sufficient in understanding and precludes an appreciation of the nuances of these states’ foreign policy. Not so for ideational explanations.

The subsequent description of the RLN seeks to reinforce the theoretical case set out above and showcase under what conditions Caribbean States’ norm-driven persuasion strategies can be successful.

4.3 The 'Region Leveraging Nexus' (RLN)

With a better appreciation now of the social identities of states at play in the Caribbean region and the ideational and normative perspectives that can be brought to bear in their study, I want to concretize how Caribbean (inter)regionalism can be conceptualized. To this end, I outline the RLN model qua conceptual tool, below.

As indicated earlier, I have a very specific understanding of Caribbean-pivoted interregionalism. It relates to the Region's negotiation of the EPA. As I also indicated, the CRNM has loomed large at least regarding the negotiation dimension. For its part, the intra-regional narrative is taken up with regional integration, relating to the CSME. In this regard, CARICOM states loom large, particularly so in such institutional set ups as the CDF. These two institutional cases make for important heuristic examples of the practical relevance of my approach to Caribbean-pivoted interregionalism.

Let us consider the Wendtian-styled state typology again, in the present context. For ease of reference, I will refer to psychological persons as PP; moral persons as MP; legal persons as LP.
In interregionalism, \( PP \) would loom large, juxtaposed against what is hoped are \( MP \) negotiating partners. There is a propensity for personas to be changed up in the regional integration context, however; because dissonance-based narratives take hold intra-regionally, as Member States jockey for differential treatment amongst themselves. What obtains in this scenario is \( PP, MP \) and \( LP \).

Thus, the RLN model \textit{qua} conceptual tool—at the heart of what I call \textit{strategic inventiveness}, which holds out the promise for agency with respect to these 'Lilliputian' states—can be developed, which takes account of two distinct regional identity-centric narratives:

I. \textit{Interregionally}—in the context of world politics—where efforts are made to give impetus to regional coherence and cohesion (the narrative, in this regard, built on commonality—i.e. \textit{policy-based convergence}), and by extension primarily \textit{intergovernmental-bolstered} attempts at pan-regional, (though) state-derived 'identity socialization'. Informing this approach is the Region's negotiation/implementation of international trade agreements, as a single entity. Thus, they must not only establish a common position in engaging a third party, but must "sing from the same hymn sheet".\textsuperscript{196} \textit{The norm entrepreneurs in this context are overwhelmingly intergovernmental institutions}; and,

II. \textit{Intra-regionally}—in the context of the regional configuration—where propelling regional integration features prominently, as do primarily \textit{state-bolstered} attempts (typically constitutive of divergent, sometimes conflicting, sub-regional/state agendas) geared at ensuring tailored accommodation in terms of intraregional treatment, based on distinctive features of size and levels of development of states that set respective state problematiques apart from each other. A narrative of difference (i.e. \textit{policy-based dissonance}), the advocacy and diffusion of which is largely the province of states, informs a push for accommodation, which tangibly is played out regarding how much of the 'integration adjustment pie' is divvied up to Member States. \textit{The norm entrepreneurs in this context are overwhelmingly state institutions}.

\textsuperscript{196} Senior Caribbean policy maker: Interview by author, 30th November, 2009.
The following three hypotheses are developed for this model/conceptual tool, at large:

A. Most of the time, these small states will generally be able to extract the most gains for and norms regarding their special treatment during periods that are seen as marked by great challenge for them, with deep structural implications for their political economies.

B. The 'argumentative talk' approach is likely most effective during times alluded to in the above point. The persuadee will probably be more empathetic to their cause, buying into or internalizing, as it were, associated norms. Moreover, against this backdrop, Caribbean States' case will tend to appear more credible. Ulbert and Risse make the point that, "as far as the persuasiveness of...reasoning is concerned", credibility plays a "crucial role" (2005, 359).

C. Finally, if these states 'stay on message', in terms of how they frame norms, once they have secured one norm—thus establishing a precedent—other related norms should be easier to secure. As Ulbert and Risse note, actors “speak[ing] and act[ing] consistently” is deemed as a gauge for credibility (Ibid., 360). As constructivists underscore, “arguments have to 'resonate' with prior knowledge, agreed-upon principles and norms, or commonly held worldviews in order to become persuasive” (Ibid., 361; emphasis added).

The RLN is illustrated below. It incorporates the hypotheses set out above.
On the face of it, the actors and processes that inform interregionalism and intra-regionalism appear to work against and are at odds with one another. However, this is an overly simplistic reading of the
relationship, which exaggerates the dialectic at play. Upon closer inspection, these roles also suggest that external trade negotiations provide a framework against and conditions under which the ideas and practices encompassing regional integration can be reproduced, politicized and legitimized. Regional integration, for its part, also buttresses trade negotiation undertakings with third parties. Thus, there is a nexus between the inter- or intra-regional narrative. Ultimately, the actors and processes do leverage the Region differently (the degree to which this is done is given expression through leveraging quotients), such that distinct normative foundations can be propped up and states, too, can be constituted differently in identity-centric narratives; à la the inter- or intra-regional nature of the negotiating undertaking.

The relationship between plying regionness and the leveraging quotient(s) that stem thereto and the respective norm which results and is subscribed to is illustrated below.

Regionness-Leveraging Quotient(s)-Norm Nexus

(RLN Meso-level Rendering)

Source: Author & drawing on Interviews with Officials/policy makers.
Norm Process Inputs (NPI) are the interrelated actions pursued by the region in question in pursuit of the norm(s). Norm Process Assets (NPA) is the process value generated as a result of NPI, which is in turn utilized to provide guidelines and criteria for Norm Process Agenda Setting (NPAS), which literally forms the basis for the norm(s). NPI, NPA and NPAS correlate with the leveraging quotient, but ultimately are integrative in the service of the norm(s). NPI, NPA and NPAS each ebb and flow as the norm(s) evolve(s). What is more, NPI, NPA and NPAS interact at various points on a continuum—what can be called a *stream*—in norm evolution. The end product is the norm. The integrative nature of the NPI, NPA and NPAS is illustrated below.

**The Integrative Nature of NPI-NPA-NPAS**

*(RLN Micro-level Rendering)*

Source: Author & drawing on Interviews with Officials/policy makers.
4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to develop a framework for conceiving of Caribbean (inter)regionalism, using constructivism, SIT, post-structuralism and Habermas' normative social theory. Its theoretical agenda has been to draw insights from all four perspectives, which together form the theoretical basis for what I call the RLN model; from which can be gleaned incisive insights into the international affairs tack of this Region. Of note, by way of the RLN, this chapter proposes that how some of the smallest states in the world conduct their regional/international affairs is best understood from the vantage point of them assertively attempting to gain a foothold over their destiny, than by established explanations that would have us believe that they are ineffective and incapable of steering their own course in today's international system.

Moreover, power can be derived from the 'better' (convincing) argument. As Risse contends in reference to 'arguing', "actors try to challenge the validity claims inherent in any causal and normative statement and to seek a communicative consensus about their understanding of a situation as well as justifications for the principles and norms guiding their action" (2000, 7). Little, if any, attention is paid to this sort of emancipatory narrative in established scholarship.

In summary this chapter has taken the dominant IR perspective to task, in respect of its pathologies and by extension how it severely circumscribes and frames the 'limits of possible' for states like those of the Caribbean in world politics. A complementary framework to such states laying claim to more agency than they are often given credit is the RLN, which can theoretically hold up the praxis of persuasion and norm formation as discussed in the foregoing. The RLN showcases under what conditions Caribbean States' norm-driven persuasion strategies can be successful.
The crux of what should be understood in terms of the operation of the RLN—drawing on insights from Risse's (2000) application of Habermasian communicative action to the concept of 'arguing'—is this: the realist notion of the power of the state(s) involved in negotiations is a secondary consideration, in respect of the negotiated outcome or agreement. There need not be a correlation—as conventional theory would have us believe—between the outcome of interstate negotiations and so-called 'powerful' (invariably large) actors, such that the latter's size and self interest would be the determining or overriding factors in the negotiated result being in that state's favour over a much smaller state. The notion of diminutive small states, with all the negative connotations that go along with them, thus does not hold.

Instead, what looms large is the best argument. Such an 'argument' has the potential to lay the ground for third party negotiators of big states—who ultimately are seized of securing the best collective outcome/reasoned consensus—to revise their beliefs and existing preferences in 'real time'; in other words at the negotiating table. As such, what matters is the ability of small states to strategically and pragmatically persuade other parties to change their thinking/negotiating positions reflexively, and that this is at all possible suggests that predictive notions of static, rational state behavior attuned to rational utility maximizing/bargaining actors are overly simplistic. Instructively, small state actors can play a role geared at the generation of norms, especially those that emerge in response to 'identities' of the norm-maker and social learning informed by the 'logic of appropriateness'. The empirical cases set out in the following chapter explore these themes in considerable detail.
PART III

ELITE TECHNOCRACY, CARIBBEAN INTER/INTRA-REGIONALISM: INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS, IDEATIONAL STRUCTURES, PROCESSES AND NORMS
Chapter V
Elite Technocracy:
Interregionalism, Intra-regionalism and the Role of Caribbean Regional Institutions and Caribbean States in Identity/Norm Agenda-Setting & Cooperation

5.1 Introduction

Are there socialization processes amongst Caribbean States that frame the Region's collective *interregionalist* and *intra-regionalist* engagements, respectively? The present chapter draws on two empirical cases—(i) the negotiation and implementation of trade agreements, namely the CARIFORUM-EU EPA; and (ii) the operationalization of the CDF—to argue in the affirmative. The empirical evidence reveals that there is an important precursor step to the *internalization* and *projection* of norms with respect to Caribbean interregionalism and intra-regionalism. On the face of it while this is a novel finding deserving of attention the chapter proceeds to explore why this matters and instances of norm formulation *à la* special and differential treatment (S&DT) in the EPA and the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, all the while showcasing the role of 'elite technocrats' therein. In the process, the central proposition of the present study is substantiated in respect of *regionness* and the Caribbean: i.e. the Caribbean was able to *Punch Above its Weight* in negotiations with a significantly larger actor in the EU by making considerable tangible end-result gains on the shoulders of an ideational narrative about itself, which like-minded elites did a masterful job of controlling.

The exercise and interplay of *inter-* and *intra-*regionalism have long been central to diplomacy by and within the Caribbean, respectively. While the *institutional* environments that animate them have been studied (Grant 2000; Byron 2005), to some extent, albeit in instrumental terms their social and normative contexts have been a 'blind spot'. Similarly, while the negotiation and implementation of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA and the operationalization of the
CDF, respectively, have elicited some research, the persuasion-centered process against which negotiations unfolded and implementation unfolds today in both regards has not been on the scholarly radar.

The implications of this intellectual neglect are stark, in so far as insights that otherwise are ripe for the picking (indeed are 'low hanging fruit') are not gleaned. On balance, the research agenda along these lines is for the Caribbean relatively untapped and in need of much more systematic and comparative analysis. It falls behind research in this vein that targets other regions, principally Europe. Ideational scholarship, in this regard, has long been robust and continues to grow because of its insights. Such insights are no less important with respect to the Caribbean.

In the sections that follow, I examine the exercise and interplay of identity and agent/institution on the Caribbean regional plane, with a view to advancing an understanding of the impact of the praxis of region leveraging on diplomatic outcomes, as it relates to securing norms. Importantly and drawing on the RLN, I explain why this matters and showcase the role of elite technocrats therein.

This chapter is organized into and proceeds along three substantive sections, and is brought to a close by some concluding reflections. Firstly, the elite technocracy—which I am especially interested in showcasing as socializing agents, with respect to oppositional self/other-centric discourse motifs and norm generation—is introduced. Secondly, the EPA is reviewed (with attention paid to the link with the EU's protective Banana and Sugar regimes), as is the institution—i.e. the CRNM\textsuperscript{197}—which led the charge during the negotiations (with brief consideration of the architecture that undergirds EPA implementation), and a sociological

\textsuperscript{197} Now referred to as the OTN of the CARICOM Secretariat.
analysis of the institutional environments that shore up the core policy negotiating/making end of the Caribbean Regional Platform *viz-a-viz* interregionalism is provided. Un/recovering the dynamics of the generation, internationalization and projection of a 'regional narrative' occupies significant attention, with particular attention being afforded to instances of norm formulation with respect to S&DT in the EPA. The constituent parts of this second section culminate in two sub-sections that turn attention to the praxis of the RLN, with respect to Caribbean interregionalism, as well the norms generated as a result of Caribbean interregionalism, respectively. The intention here is to draw out how the Region sought to 'level the playing field'.

Following from this, attention is turned in section three to socialization processes and Caribbean intra-regionalism, with a view to highlighting how elite technocrats are implicated in this regard through the operationalization of the CDF. The interregional dynamics of the generation, internationalization and projection of a 'regional narrative' are revisited and tweaked to suit the intra-regional institutional environment under consideration (where the extreme reluctance of elite technocrats to bend to and make the case for a 'regional narrative' is highlighted), which is also subjected to an analysis regarding norm formulation and S&DT this time with respect to the *Revised Treaty*. The section culminates in an analysis of the praxis of the RLN regarding Caribbean intra-regionalism, as well as a look at the norms generated as a result of Caribbean intra-regionalism, respectively. A capstone section follows, serving to instantiate the kernel of the chapter's argument and demonstrate causal relationships. The chapter ends with a concluding section, which serves to highlight key findings.

5.2 Anthropomorphising the Caribbean Regional Order: Towards an (Auto)biographical Narrative

Drawing on constructivist and SIT insights, consider that like people, through regular interaction
with one another, states weave a story about themselves and what can be expected regarding their behaviour. According to Legro, "states adopt labels and positions" (2009, 38; emphasis added).

These interactions secure relationships, guided by certain negotiated but agreed social identity-centric norms. The states of the Caribbean are no different, in this regard. They have what I call an identity repertoire, and on this basis are anthropomorphised to achieve certain ends.

An elite technocracy—what can be thought of as epistemic communities or norm entrepreneurs—make up the core policy negotiating/making end of the 'Caribbean Regional Platform', and are nested or embedded, ostensibly, in intergovernmental and state-related institutions as bureaucratic actors.

This technocracy comprises a mix of top-tier policy makers and high-level technical experts/officials who are inserted into interregionalist and intra-regionalist engagements across the full spectrum of processes: negotiations/implementation to leading the charge in steering policy and related decision-making. In respect of the latter, their exercise of communicative

198 Peter Haas notes epistemic communities are “networks of knowledge-based experts” (1992, 2). I share the view of Haas that it need not apply strictly to scientific communities; rather epistemic communities as characterizing professionals with shared beliefs of particular knowledge and a “recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” suffices (ibid, 3). Instructively, referencing the 1992 special issue of International Organization, entitled 'Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination', Adler and Haas (1992) assert that this set of articles - which represent the so-called epistemic communities approach - responds to Keohane's 1988 call for a 'reflective' research program. Although Haas popularized epistemic communities, Ruggie (1975) was the first of such scholars to engage with the concept. Of note, studies of Caribbean epistemic communities are rare. Notably in a 2002 article, Clegg highlighted policy communities with respect to Jamaican, Windward Island and Belizean banana exports, particularly to the UK. He described this network as a historically "tightly knit relationship between the main actors involved in exporting Caribbean bananas to the UK, including the bananas producers, the private corporate interests, and the relevant UK government departments...The close relationship developed into a 'policy community' ” (2002, 65).

199 I borrow this term from Ingebritsen (2002).

200 March and Olsen understand institutions, as do I, to be “relatively stable collection[s] of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations. Such practices and rules are embedded in structures of meaning and schemes of interpretation that explain and legitimize particular identities and the practices and rules associated with them” (1998, 948).
practice vis-à-vis identity and interest-driven normative regimes is of particular interest.

I consider in this chapter four discrete—albeit networked—categories of elite technocrats, each of which is subject to a hierarchy all their own in respect of their influence over bureaucratic action-based policy outcomes and their embeddedness in attendant pluralistic processes (e.g. bargaining):

(i) Principal Bureaucratic Actors (PBA), i.e., Heads of Government, Foreign and Trade Ministers, amongst others in the political directorate. This category would also comprise some PBAs who are no longer in office, but very influential;

(ii) Technical Bureaucratic Actors (TBA), i.e., Foreign Affairs and Trade functionaries at the highest levels (and mid-level Officials) of regional institutions (namely regional Secretariats), including at the level of states. This category would also comprise some former staffers, who are called on to provide advice to Officials;

(iii) Quasi Bureaucratic Actors (QBA), i.e., representatives of key Business Support Organizations (BSOs) and enterprises; and

(iv) Ancillary Bureaucratic Actors (ABA), i.e., key social partners, like labour unions, employers federations and some other segments of civil society.

This bureaucratic actor-based scenario as it pertains to the core policy negotiating/making end of what I term the 'Caribbean Regional Platform' (comprised of a constellation of actors involved in interregional and/or intra-regional policy engagements) is illustrated in the grid below. In the sub-section that follows these bureaucratic actors are juxtaposed in Caribbean interregionalism, à la the negotiation of the EPA.
The 'Caribbean Regional Platform':
Influence and Embeddedness of the Elite Technocracy

5.3 Socialization Processes: Elite Technocrats and Caribbean Interregionalism

5.3.1 The CARIFORUM-EU EPA: A Review, with attention to the EU’s Protective Banana and Sugar Regimes

The EPA, in general, has come to rest on a quadrangle of immutable first principles: partnership, regional integration, development, and link to the World Trade Organization (WTO). It was signed in October 2008\textsuperscript{201} by the EU and its Member States\textsuperscript{202} and fourteen CARIFORUM

\textsuperscript{201} EPA negotiations between CARIFORUM and the then European Communities (EC) were launched in Kingston, Jamaica on 16th April, 2004. At the time, both sides agreed on a four-stage plan and schedule that would unfold over some three years (the Agreement was initialed by all fifteen CARIFORUM States on 16th December 2007).

\textsuperscript{202} As at the time of writing, the EU members of the EPA are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
The fifteenth CARIFORUM State, Haiti, signed the EPA in December 2009. The EU and its Member States and fourteen CARIFORUM States (the exception being Haiti) have been provisionally applying the EPA from 29 December 2008. At the time of writing, seven CARIFORUM States have ratified the Agreement, i.e.: the Dominican Republic – 29 October 2008; Antigua and Barbuda – 19 December 2008; Dominica – 30 October 2009; Belize – 31 May 2011; Guyana – 14 June 2012; Saint Lucia – 25 September 2012; and St Vincent and the Grenadines – 22 November 2012. Twelve EU States have ratified the Agreement, to date.

The EPA is a reciprocal trade agreement between CARIFORUM States and the EU. It replaces the trade component of the CPA that was based on non-reciprocity. Instructively, the EPA places new responsibilities on the CARIFORUM States to undertake market opening and rules-related commitments. These commitments are wide-ranging, covering inter alia: trade in goods, trade in services and investments, as well as in trade-related subjects such as intellectual property, competition and government procurement. However, the EPA also commits development support for CARIFORUM States to meet national and regional integration obligations and adjustments that the EPA requires.

The EPA ranks as a landmark trade and development Agreement, both in novelty and scope; “it constitutes the state of the art as a trade agreement with a development orientation.” On the one hand as a trading instrument with development components, upon signing it became

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203 The CARIFORUM members of the EPA are: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.
204 Articles 36 and 37 of Chapter 2 of 'Cotonou' refer to the negotiation of EPAs.
205 Caribbean trade official: Interview by author, 29th February, 2011.
206 Mr Remco Vahl, Deputy Head of Unit, Economic Partnership Agreements Unit, Directorate General for Trade, European Commission: Interview by author, Brussels, 22nd January, 2010.
the first such agreement of its kind. It is a trade partnership (geared at liberalizing and enhancing trade between the two sides) that is intended to give a fillip to sustainable development and poverty reduction in CARIFORUM states, whilst promoting regional integration and the gradual integration of those states into the world economy. On the other hand, the EPA spans a broad set of themes. It is divided into six parts and contains annexes and protocols. Part I is titled 'Trade Partnership for Sustainable Development', whilst Part II focuses on 'Trade and Trade-related Matters' (namely Trade in Goods, Investment, Trade in Services and Trade-related Issues or TRI (i.e. Competition, Innovation and Intellectual Property, Public Procurement, Environment, Social Aspects, and Personal Data Protection)). The other parts are as follows: Part III—Dispute Avoidance and Settlement; Part IV—General Exceptions; Part V—Institutional Provisions; Part VI—General and Final Provisions. There are seven Annexes (including Appendix I to Annex III - Schedule of Tariff Liberalisation of CARIFORUM States). Three Protocols and a Final Act also make up the Agreement.

The Agreement heralds the dawn of a new era of relations between CARIFORUM and the EU. Consider—as previously indicated—that one significant difference between the CARIFORUM-EU EPA and the trade relationship between the EEC and the ACP is the introduction of the reciprocal grant of preferences by the two sides, instead of the non-reciprocal preferential (duty free) market access in favour of ACP States, which provided terms more

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207 The CARIFORUM-EU EPA is the first such Agreement to be concluded between the EU and one of six ACP regional negotiating configurations. In a related move, the EU has recently completed Association Agreements in respect of groupings of Latin American countries.

208 Ambassador Irwin LaRocque, Assistant Secretary-General Trade and Economic Integration Directorate (presently Secretary-General), CARICOM Secretariat: Interview by author, Georgetown, Guyana, 15th March, 2011.

209 The themes covered in this and the following paragraph draw extensively from an Interview by the author of Mr Branford Isaacs, Adviser to the Secretary-General in the Implementation of the EPA at the CARICOM Secretariat. He also serves as Head of the EPA Implementation Unit and Trade in Goods Specialist in said Unit: Georgetown, Guyana, 16th September, 2011. Mr Isaacs was also the lead negotiator on Market Access, during EPA negotiations.
favourable than those extended to the goods of other countries.\textsuperscript{210} In other words, under the terms of the Trade in Goods provisions of the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the ACP Group of States, WTO-compatible EPAs were to be negotiated between the EU and ACP States to replace the trade arrangements set down in the Cotonou Agreement.\textsuperscript{211}

A case in point, the provisions of the EPA dealing with Trade in Goods represent fundamental changes in the relationship between the CARIFORUM States and the EU and its Member States. While ACP States (including CARIFORUM States), from the establishment of the Lomé I Convention in 1975, enjoyed duty free/quota free (DF/QF) access for the large majority of their exports to EU Member States without the obligation to grant tariff preferences to imports from EU Member States, the commitment in the Cotonou Agreement to establish WTO-compatible Free Trade Agreements required the setting up of a free trade area between CARIFORUM and the EU. This free trade area called for tariff liberalization by both the EU and CARIFORUM on substantially all trade in a reasonable period of time. To this end while the EU agreed to maintain its DF/QF access in favour of CARIFORUM States, CARIFORUM States agreed to apply a package of measures.

The CARIFORUM-EU EPA, therefore, lays bare a fundamental break with the past, for the two sides (Arthur 2009 & 2010). In fact, the European Commission \textit{Green Paper} published in 1996 that examined/assessed “relations between the European Union and the ACP countries on the eve of the twenty-first century....[came to the determination that]....the status quo would not do, change was needed” (Vahl 2011, 2-3). Indeed, the EPA cannot be considered in isolation

\textsuperscript{210} Another difference in formalized trading relations today between Europe and the Caribbean is the new areas that make up the EPA, which hitherto were not considered. Trade in Services is certainly relevant in this regard, but so too are the areas falling under the TRI component of the Agreement.

\textsuperscript{211} As Lodge (2008, 6) puts it, the EPA “is a GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] Article XXIV-consistent Free Trade Agreement and thereby represents a radical departure from the Lomé/Cotonou paradigm of non-reciprocal market access.”
from certain processes that provided important impetus for the negotiation of the Agreement in the first place. Of note, in this regard, are the so-called 'Banana Wars', an account of which is provided below.\textsuperscript{212}

The EU is amongst the world's largest importer of bananas. Until recently, banana exporting ACP states enjoyed a decades-old relationship in respect of the EU market for bananas, one where they supplied that market while enjoying market protection. Essentially, preferential treatment was extended to banana exporting ACP states over the so-called 'dollar' banana exporting' countries ostensibly of Central and South America.

The 'Banana Wars'\textsuperscript{213}, as they came to be known, resulted from a challenge in the 1990s of the EU banana regime in the WTO by Central and South America countries with an established interest in the supply of bananas to the EU market. Although a drawn out battle ensued that pitted the 'dollar' banana countries, backed by the United States, against the EU, backed by the ACP, the EU would eventually lose the challenge in the WTO on more than one occasion in the years that followed.

The fact is ACP states' access to the EU market, more specifically the value of these countries' access to the EU market, depended on the protective regime that EU had in place. The latter was based on a combination of quotas and high tariffs, which were at the center of the dispute. As a result of WTO rulings the regime would be modified at least once, from the 2000s onwards, which made ACP access to the EU market less certain.

The regime the EU had in place had quotas for basically each of the banana exporting

\textsuperscript{212} The themes covered in the balance of this sub-section draw extensively from an Interview by the author of Mr Nigel Durrant, Agricultural Trade Specialist, Office of Trade Negotiations (OTN) of the CARICOM Secretariat: Georgetown, Guyana, 2nd March, 2012.

\textsuperscript{213} The 'Banana Wars', widely recognized as one of the longest international trade disputes, officially ended in November 2012 following an agreement reached between the EU and eleven Latin American countries at the WTO.
ACP states, in addition to the restrictive quotas that the EU had in place for the 'dollar banana' countries. The EU eventually put in place a single quota for banana exporting ACP states and limited the total amount that those countries could export to the EU, further to WTO rulings. This was an attempt by the EU to try and comply with those rulings. But this action did not go far enough for the 'dollar' banana country challengers, in the main because the EU still had very high tariffs on Central and South American bananas or what was also referred to as 'out of quota bananas'. In point of fact, the EU would allow a certain quantity of bananas from Central and South American countries, and anything over that threshold would be charged a prohibitive tariff. For Central and South American countries, the objective was to get the EU to sharply reduce the tariff.

From the ACP's vantage point, as the 'Banana Wars' were being waged these countries were also mindful of the imminent expiration of the trade aspect of the CPA set for 2007. In other words, the 'Banana Wars' were not unfolding in isolation from 'other moving parts' in the machinery of the relationship between the ACP and the EU. The crux of the concern with respect to the expiration of the trade aspect of the CPA was that if the ACP did not have a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in place with the EU by 2007, ACP bananas would no longer have duty free access to the EU market in any quantity at all. What is more, the EU would as a consequence of a pivotal WTO ruling against it set the overall quantity for ACP banana supplying states at approximately 776,000 tonnes.

As a result, the EPA became necessary as a vehicle to ensure non-least developed ACP banana supplying states continued preferential access to the EU market (this is because least developed countries would be able to get full duty free and quota free access to the EU for their bananas regardless, in light of the EU's 'Everything but Arms' initiative). If the EPA was not
negotiated and signed by such ACP regions as CARIFORUM, the implication would be that bananas from these high cost-producing countries would be charged the same duties as the 'dollar bananas'; which would have put banana producers from such ACP countries out of business. In CARIFORUM, the banana exporting states are: Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines and Suriname.

As it turns out, the EPA would be negotiated and eventually signed by CARIFORUM. The initialing of the Agreement coincided with the deadline for expiration of the trade component of the CPA, i.e. 2007. By virtue of having 'inked the EPA', duty free and quota free access for CARIFORUM banana exporting states was secured in respect of the EU market. However, with respect to the saga of the 'Banana Wars', as a final settlement with 'dollar' banana countries the EU agreed in 2009 to a very steep reduction of the tariff from 176 EUR per tonne to 114 EUR over seven years. With this agreement in place, the longstanding legal disputes at the WTO over bananas were ended; but the cut in the EU's banana tariff for Latin American countries—its so-called Most Favoured Nation or MFN tariff—would result in a marked fall in the preferential margin which ACP countries enjoy (European Commission 2010). Due to the tariff cut action and the difficulties that it was widely seen ACP banana exporting states like those in CARIFORUM would face as a result, the EU put in place Banana Accompanying Measures (BAM). The ACP banana exporting states to benefit from the BAM were "pre-identified" by the European Commission, "on the basis of their volume of exports to the EU"; i.e. "[t]en countries [which] exported more than 10,000 tonnes on average over the past decade" (Ibid., 5).

The BAM, which has a total allocation of 190 million EUR for the ten countries over four years, got underway from early 2011 (Ibid., 5). The BAM essentially comprises funding to
support those ACP states concerned to transition out of the banana industry through
diversification, in light of competitiveness pressures stemming from the new banana tariff
environment. Alternatively, the funds can be used by those countries that see fit to keep their
banana industry going and, as a result, require the funding to facilitate this.

The Caribbean's elite technocrats were aware of the significant role of the 'Banana Wars'
in providing impetus for the EPA's negotiation and, importantly, the negotiation's timeline for
completion. On both counts, given the importance of bananas to the economic and social fabric
of the CARIFORUM States concerned, the Region's elite technocrats had reason to press the
case for the on-time launch of the EPA's and the efficacious conduct of negotiations 'with a clear
finish line in sight'.

However, bananas are not the only commodity to have had a bearing on EPA
negotiations. Sugar is the other, though it was pivoted very differently in those negotiations.

Sugar, like bananas, has had a storied role in EU-ACP relations. The relationship in the
specific context of sugar was managed by the Sugar Protocol, an arrangement where each year
the EU contracted a fixed quota of sugar from the Protocol signatory states of the ACP, and those
amounts were allowed in to the EU market duty free. The EU, however, as part of the process of
reforming its sugar regime took the decision in recent years to scrap the Sugar Protocol. That
decision came during EPA negotiations, about a year before the CARIFORUM and the EU were
to actually conclude their EPA.

The Sugar Protocol itself was based on contractual arrangements, wherein a competitive
system prevailed. There were fixed rules, in that if a given ACP sugar supplying state was unable
to supply the set amount it risked losing its quota through reallocation of the amount that was not
supplied to another ACP sugar supplying state. That system did not always work to the advantage
of CARIFORUM sugar supplying states', which for years had been on the losing end in terms of ability to meet quotas. Instructively, when the Sugar Protocol was jettisoned sugar industry insiders in the Region lamented this development. However, the view of sugar supplying CARIFORUM States was far from uniform on the Protocol's demise, as some went on record as saying they could no longer support a system in which their ability to supply the EU market was being eroded year after year because of some states' inability to meet their quota. Some states advocated for a free and open system for supplying sugar (i.e. no more restrictions on how much sugar could be exported to the EU from a given state, and by the same token there would not be a pricing guarantee linked to how much can be supplied), as opposed to a managed one.

In terms of the difference in how the Sugar Protocol was pivoted during the EPA negotiations, consider that its removal did not represent an existential threat for those CARIFORUM States concerned, in large measure because sugar supplying states in the configuration Barbados, Belize, Guyana and Jamaica—were divided on the relevance of the Protocol to them, notwithstanding public statements to contrary. Secondly, the EU's move to terminate the Sugar Protocol came as EPA negotiations were already underway, and it would be written into the EPA that the Protocol would expire in 2010. The EU put in place—as an interim measure, with respect to the transition from the end of the sugar protocol—a market management mechanism which is meant to prevent a precipitous fall in prices.

The change to the EU-ACP relationship highlighted above is especially striking when viewed against the background of the historical relationship between Europe and what came to be known as the ACP. It must be borne in mind that, "as a result of the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, some ACP states benefitted from structured cooperation with Europe. Two

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214 The Dominican Republic, which did not previously have access to the Sugar Protocol, is exporting sugar to the EU now.
Yaoundé Conventions (1963-1974), centered on trade and development cooperation, grew from that early relationship. There was an evolution once again in the relationship between the two sides not too long thereafter. The Lomé Conventions (1975-1999) are a case in point. The successively renegotiated Lomé Conventions had long been the centerpiece of Caribbean and EU relations”.

Dating back to the 1970s, the Lomé Conventions were ultimately replaced by the CPA, which was signed in 2000 and which hinges on trade, development and political pillars. The CPA exemplifies an evolution in the cooperation framework anchoring ACP-EU relations. Based on three broad areas of partnership (i.e. Development Cooperation, Trade, and Political Dialogue), the CPA comprises a number of new elements in the re-tooled ACP-EU relationship. Simply put, “while being separate instruments, the EPA and CPA need to be read alongside each other. In other words, the EPA should be contextualized in the CPA”.

Though presently being implemented by another entity, the negotiation of the EPA was led on behalf of the CARIFORUM region by an institution that has a storied history, the then CRNM. The following sub-section delves into this important institution.

5.3.2 The CRNM: A Bureaucratic Actor-Leader in Caribbean Trade Diplomacy

By the 1980s, an intensified form of globalization had taken hold of the world economy, a development not lost on Caribbean leaders. Whilst Caribbean States have had a longstanding relationship with the world economy, their experience with what became an increasingly prominent dimension of the emergent form of globalization—trade negotiations/agreements—was quite limited. In its bid to adjust to and thus better mediate its insertion into the global economic system, the region was faced with the challenge of navigating international trade negotiations. The CRNM, as the lead institution for the CARIFORUM region, played a crucial role in this process.

215 Dr Anthony Peter Gonzales, Interim Director, IIR-UWI and former Senior Coordinator-WTO at the CRNM: Interview by author, Barbados, 22nd September, 2011.
trading system so as to capitalize on development opportunities in the changing world order, the Region had to build its capacity 'from the ground up' to better engage in and manage external trade negotiations.

As they were taking shape, Caribbean policy makers were mindful that the trade negotiations were unprecedented both in scope and complexity, hence likely to test the Region's negotiation capacity as never before. In the face of severe capacity constraints, the Region sought to advance a *coordinated* approach to the use of human and financial resources, which required the establishment of an organization dedicated to managing the negotiation process at the behest of Regional Governments. It is against this backdrop that the CRNM was born.217

The Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM established the CRNM in 1997,218 having already organized themselves to grapple in a more systematized fashion—notably *via* the Prime Ministerial Sub-Committee (PMSC) on External Negotiations219—with pressures visited on the Region by a more frenetic agenda of trade negotiations. The CRNM220 was billed as the principal regional intergovernmental organization tasked with managing the Region's external trade negotiations (regional states negotiate *as one*, though there are provisions

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217 The deployment of a 'team approach' that foregrounded coordination in external negotiations in the context of the CRNM was not the first time this approach had been used by the Region. Albeit more formalized in the context of the CRNM, the 'team approach' had been attempted in developing positions for negotiations with respect to the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development in 1992, for example (Grant 2000). The experience of pooling regional expertise at such fora provided valuable lessons for the Region and in general was instructive, as policy makers began to conceive of the CRNM. Grant goes further, to suggest that the CRNM structure embraced some elements of supranationalism that have so alluded the Region, and otherwise been met with resistance, in the advance of regional integration.

218 While the independent CARICOM Member States were in the forefront of efforts to establish the CRNM and comprise its membership, Cuba and the Dominican Republic were also invited to join. They formed part of the CRNM's membership, but the CRNM only represented their trade interests in certain negotiating theatres.

219 This platform is an offshoot of an Interlocutory Group formed in the early 1990s, which was overseen by the Prime Minister of Jamaica; an operating dispensation which continues today with respect to the PMSC on External Negotiations. A Working Group of Experts, its ranks of Officials drawn from member governments, played an integral role in backstopping the high-level process of advancing both a strategy and organizational basis for the Region's external trade negotiations (Grant 2000).

220 The CRNM was headquartered in Jamaica, as its Prime Minister holds Prime Ministerial responsibility within CARICOM for External Negotiations. A CRNM sub-office was established in Barbados, whilst a presence was maintained in some other states.
for individual states to negotiate partial scope agreements with third countries). It was assigned the primary responsibility for developing and coordinating a cohesive, coherent regional trade policy, and by extension managing the Region's external trade negotiations-related resources and expertise.\textsuperscript{221}

As a testament to the stock placed by regional leaders in the Caribbean's trade negotiations undertaking under the aegis of the CRNM, they selected a prominent Caribbean statesman to be its founding leader, Sir Shridath Ramphal. Most notably he had served as Secretary General of the Commonwealth from 1975 to 1990. Another celebrated Caribbean statesman served as his deputy, Sir Alister McIntyre. He served as Chief Technical Advisor. Amongst his career highlights previous to this appointment were as Secretary General of CARICOM and Deputy Secretary General of UNCTAD. An eminent Jamaican diplomat, Ambassador Richard Bernal, would later replace Sir Alister and in December 2001 assume the top post of Director-General until his departure in June 2008.

The CRNM's mandate has centered on the following: "[p]roviding sound advice; [f]acilitating the generation of national positions; [c]oordinating the formulation of a cohesive negotiating strategy; leading negotiations where possible."\textsuperscript{222} The CRNM engaged in negotiations spanning the following theatres: multilateral (WTO); plurilateral (EPA); hemispheric (the now defunct Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)); and bilateral (i.e. “the negotiation of agreements between CARICOM and [third] countries like Canada, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic”).\textsuperscript{223} It was very stream-lined, with a staffing complement of technocrats that numbered, at its peak, just over a dozen; though it drew on expertise on an as-

\textsuperscript{221} Caribbean trade official: Interview by author, 12th July, 2010.
\textsuperscript{222} Extract from http://crnm.org (About OTN_General Information).
\textsuperscript{223} Ibid.
needs basis from throughout the Region, by way of a pool of experts from states and regional organizations.

The CRNM became a world renowned brand. It has been recognized as having within its ranks a cadre of top-notch, dedicated, highly trained, experienced and hard working professionals whose subject-area expertise (e.g. Intellectual Property, Trade in Services, Government Procurement and Competition Policy, and Agricultural Trade) had been sought after within and outside of the Region. Senior regional technocrats have underscored that the "impressive level of resources" invested in the CRNM over the years, both in respect of personnel and financially, by the Region (directly, or indirectly via donor agencies) was "indicative of the importance that its political directorate placed in retaining and exercising superior, world-class negotiating power".  

Indeed the CRNM, and by extension the Region, had built up negotiating prowess, which was on display during EPA negotiations, which on the European side was led by the European Commission (principally, the Directorate General Trade with backstopping from other directorates, like the one responsible for development). This was the case principally because of the negotiating structure that CARIFORUM Ministers had agreed to for the grouping ahead of the launch of CARIFORUM-EU EPA negotiations in Kingston, Jamaica in April 2004, following an all-ACP phase. A three tiered negotiating structure took shape as follows: Ministerial, Principal Negotiator and subject-specific technical experts. At the Ministerial level, CARIFORUM's Lead Ministerial Spokesperson was Dame Billie Miller, Barbados' Minister of

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224 Ambassador Henry Gill, former Director General, CRNM: Interview by author, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 18th May, 2012.

225 On the occasion of the launch, both sides agreed on a plan and schedule that would guide the negotiations over the next three and a half years. The negotiations unfolded over four phases, with the last two by far being the most intense. Four negotiating groups were put in place: (i) Market Access (Goods); (ii) Services and Investment; (iii) Trade-related Issues (TRI); and (iv) Legal and Institutional Issues.
Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade. The Ministerial Spokesperson was supported by a troika, comprised of Ministers from Belize, the Dominican Republic and Saint Lucia. The Director-General of the CRNM served as Principal Negotiator, while also serving as Dean of the EPA College of Negotiators (which I will discuss later). This structure assured a significant level of organization and preparedness in the lead up to and during the negotiations, such that the CARIFORUM grouping was in a position to extract “negotiating/norm-based gains” from the EU side on a technical and political level.\textsuperscript{226} In all of this, the CRNM played a central role—with the backing of CARIFORUM States (namely, Ministries of Trade and diplomatic missions in Brussels) and regional integration secretariats—in the generation of technical analysis and negotiating positions, all the while working assiduously to effect the mandate given it to do precisely that by a governance structure and attendant socialization dynamics that I will take stock of shortly.

Indeed, representatives of the EU side no less have credited the CRNM with playing an “instrumental” role in negotiating agreements like the EPA (see Vahl 2011, 2). In point of fact, the 'CRNM model' has been studied in other regions, with some developing country regions having expressed the desire to emulate it.\textsuperscript{227}

From its inception, until 2009, the CRNM stood at arm's-length from the CARICOM Secretariat.\textsuperscript{228} Stemming from a decision taken at the Thirtieth Meeting of the Conference of HoG of CARICOM, convened in July 2009, and as previously indicated, the CRNM is now referred to as the OTN. This Heads decision came in the wake of their earlier decision in March 2009 at the Twentieth Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Conference of the Heads to “incorporate the

\textsuperscript{226} Ambassador Henry Gill, former Director General, CRNM: Interview by author, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 18th May, 2012.
\textsuperscript{227} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{228} This paragraph draws heavily on the description of the CRNM set out on http://crnm.org
Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) into the CARICOM Secretariat as a Specialised Department recognizing and providing for the special nature of its role and functions.” The OTN “now has extended responsibility for the coordination, development, and execution of negotiating strategies for all Community external trade negotiations.”

However, save for the EPA’s built-in agenda, the OTN is not responsible for EPA implementation. This task falls directly to CARIFORUM States which individually signed the Agreement; they have established national EPA Implementation Units or like entities to coordinate their respective implementation efforts. EPA National Coordinators are also in place, to aid in the aforementioned effort. The CARICOM Secretariat-based EPA Implementation Unit—which has also been referred to as the Regional EPA Implementation Unit, as it is housed in the CARIFORUM Directorate—also plays a supportive role. It facilitates in respect of the implementation of the Agreement.

The Unit was set up by the Secretary General of CARICOM/CARIFORUM on 16 February 2009, to facilitate the implementation of the EPA namely by assisting CARIFORUM States to honour their initial commitments relating to the implementation of EPA provisions. The Unit is a response to capacity constraints that exist regionally and nationally to effect EPA implementation (both at the level of meeting commitments made under the EPA and taking advantage of opportunities for the regional private sector), a fact that was acknowledged during the negotiations, as evidenced in Article 8:1 of the Agreement. The Unit delivers assistance, including in-country, to all signatory CARIFORUM States. In addition it executes some regional

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229 Ibid.
230 From 15th June 2011, the Director General of the CARIFORUM Directorate assumed supervisory responsibility for the Unit, which previously fell under the day-to-day management of the Trade and Economic Integration Directorate. The Unit is one of two in the CARIFORUM Directorate; the other being the Development Cooperation and Programming Unit. The EPA Implementation Unit’s operation is supported, in part, by funds provided under a Grant Agreement between the CDB, as Administrator of the United Kingdom Government’s Caribbean Aid for Trade and Regional Integration Trust Fund (CARTFund), and CARICOM.
functions as required by the EPA, such as partnering in the establishment of the Joint CARIFORUM-EU Institutions.

To date, the following Joint Institutions—which oversee the implementation of the EPA—have already been established, and have begun to address operational aspects and issues arising out of implementation of the Agreement; those institutions are: the Joint CARIFORUM-EU Council and the CARIFORUM-EU Trade and Development Committee. The CARIFORUM-EU Parliamentary Committee is also in place, as is the Special Committee on Customs Cooperation and Trade Facilitation. The CARIFORUM-EU Consultative Committee—which is intended to formally include civil society actors in the implementation process—has not been established or convened as yet, due to unresolved differences between the two sides.

The work of the Regional EPA Implementation Unit is guided by the Draft EPA Implementation Road Map. This document encapsulates the legislative and policy actions required, at the national and regional levels, and the timelines for accomplishment of each action in chronological order in which they are to be undertaken. The document also informs CARIFORUM States' implementation efforts.

I want now to turn to a sociological analysis of the interregionalist institutional environment with respect to the Caribbean, so as to gain an appreciation of how associated processes engender the development of favourable norms stemming from interactions with third parties.

5.3.3 The 'Caribbean Regional Platform': A Sociological Analysis of the Interregionalist Institutional Trade Governance Environment

I. The Role/Identity Narrative Setting

I begin by stating, institutions are generally social settings. They have social contexts, because
they are animated by socialization processes. To what end? Put simply, cooperation looms large in this regard mediated by persuasion. The CRNM, as noted previously now OTN, has had a social context vis-à-vis trade governance that has gone unexamined with respect to explanations of cooperation in Caribbean trade diplomacy. In the balance of this sub-section, I advance just such an analysis.

As indicated earlier, the CRNM was tasked with managing the external trade negotiation process at the behest of Regional Governments. Over the years, it did precisely that. In so doing, it has played a critical role in the Region's interregionalist engagement. Its role has been informed by the governance structure (and attendant processes/consultations) established for it by the HoG, which has provided for reporting to such bodies as the CARICOM COTED; the COTED has provided the CRNM with guidance and its negotiating mandate. Mechanisms like the College of Negotiators have also played a critical role, in so far as it facilitated the CRNM's provision of technical advice, as well as its coordination of negotiations. The CRNM's Director General has been responsible to Caribbean HoG, principally by way of the PMSC on External Negotiations.

There are other relationships, too. These relationships exist in and are bounded by a governance structure. In the model developed here different types of elite technocrats inhabit this

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231 The CARIFORUM Council of Ministers has played this role, where the Dominican Republic has had to be catered for—ostensibly in the context of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA negotiations. A corresponding CARIFORUM dispensation at the level of Heads of Government was also devised, given that the Dominican Republic is not a CARICOM Member State and thus cannot participate in relevant Community organs.

232 The CRNM's financial governance fell to a Finance Committee. It was comprised of representatives from some Member States, a CARICOM Secretariat representative and the CRNM Director General and Directors.

233 As regards the CARIFORUM-EU EPA, the respective College provided a structured environment in and through which to advance technocratic/thematic synchronization of several trade issues that made up the Agreement that was, at the time, under negotiation. The EPA College comprised Lead and Alternate Lead Negotiators, and was led by the Dean of the College, i.e. the EPA Principal Negotiator, Ambassador Dr Richard Bernal. It was comprised of individuals with expertise in the various negotiating subjects and trade-related disciplines. Mandates approved by the CARIFORUM Heads of Government directed the College, which was supervised by Trade Ministers.
governance space, or structure. The illustration below sets out the governance structure. It should be seen as building on the 'Caribbean Regional Platform' grid (above), in that it further showcases the ability of categories of elite technocrats to effect and otherwise impact on the governance structure and attendant socialization dynamics buttressing the Caribbean's external trade negotiations.

**Consultation regarding Caribbean External Trade Negotiations:**

**Governance Structure, Socialization Dynamics**

**COMPOSITE SOCIALIZATION OUTPUTS**

- **Purpose:** COTED recommendations are reviewed. Further guidance on external negotiation positions is also provided. At this stage, recommendations are submitted to Caribbean Heads for approval.
  - Bureaucratic Actors involved: PBA (at the level of Heads of Government)

- **Purpose:** Review and approval of recommendations of the College and TWGs.
  - Bureaucratic Actors involved: PBA (at Ministerial level)

- **Purpose:** Facilitated the CRNM's provision of technical advice, as well as its coordination of negotiations.
  - Bureaucratic Actors involved: TBA (in the execution of the College's technical responsibilities), PBA (oversight responsibility)

- **Purpose:** Convened by CRNM to deliberate on each negotiating subject, so as to develop proposals and build consensus.
  - Bureaucratic Actors involved: TBA, QBA

- **Purpose:** Convened to arrive at national positions on negotiation issues.
  - Bureaucratic Actors involved: TBA, QBA, ABA

**Source:** Adapted from CRNM documents & drawing on Interviews with Officials/policymakers

The Composite Socialization Inputs are central to the systematic formulation of and agreement amongst elite technocrats as to what identity problematique is most appropriate for a given
interregional scenario, and in turn form the basis for efforts to package and in turn project as Composite Socialization Outputs to the extra-regional third party that problematique in narrative form, to ultimately generate a socializing effect or interactionism: inducting the third party into the persuader’s view of the problematique and the importance of establishing the norms that serve to accommodate the idiosyncratic lot of such states in the international system. In the case of the EU as the party being socialized, for instance, its internalization of a given problematique that is narrated on behalf of the Caribbean is likely to take hold due to the long association that Western European countries have had with (and therefore their insight into the Region), dating back to colonialism.

The governance structure set out above, particularly through meeting/summit diplomacy, as relates to the formulation and sanction of regional negotiating positions in institutional settings is especially instructive in terms of the social interaction that it has generated with respect to PBA and TBA. Research findings reveal that these two elite technocrat groups play an especially prominent role in the previously identified institutional settings.

What is more, through years of collaboration as members of common networks, they share the same ideological and world views. They have even maintained personal contacts, reinforcing camaraderie and shared perspectives on the lot of their respective states (in the case of elite technocrats hailing from states) and Member States (in the case of elite technocrats hailing from regional institutions) in international society. Many PBA and TBA, for instance, would have matriculated together. This is especially common amongst the 'baby boomer' generation, who upon graduating university would have operated in the same political and bureaucratic circles for decades. For their part, PBA and TBA in their 30's, 40's and 50's have for the most part come up the ranks of the public service together, influencing each others' views on
the trade-cum-development problematique of Caribbean States. In the process, these elite technocrats would have birthed a 'we-feeling' about these states (Deutsch 1957). In effect, what has emerged is a common role identity for these states.

Like other states in the international system, Caribbean States took/take on a socialized role, a 'national image' of sorts (Holsti 1962). They play(ed) on, as some of these states also do in their intra-regional interactions, their underdog status. The literature on role theory/analysis, as applied to foreign policy analysis, provides a useful theoretical framework and cognitive construct, in this regard.

It highlights role conceptions (i.e. actor-based perceptions about their position relative to others, which can also be thought of as the belief system which “organiz[es] perceptions into a meaningful guide for behavior” (Ibid., 245) in the international system, as well as role expectations (Holsti 1970). These are derived from state socialization in international society, and not in the manner structural theories of international politics would have us think of state roles.

Roles, then, can be applied to view state actors in social categories, in that in the enactment of a role there is a claim to identity (Aggestam 2006). This type of theory also brings into view role impact, which, counter-intuitively, can be thought of and will be shown to be generally large for Caribbean States—in certain diplomatic scenarios—because of the negotiating savvy exercised in their regionalist engagements.

II. The Role/Identity Narrative

There is a tradition of Caribbean States being socialized as 'small and vulnerable', with a view to

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234 Holsti discusses policymakers' positions on certain "decisions" and "suitable actions" for their state and its function in the international system, in the context of role conceptions (1970/1987).
extracting gains from that narrative. Consider that the CARICOM Secretariat characterizes its Member States as being amongst “the smallest and most vulnerable countries in the world” (CARICOM Secretariat 2002; emphasis added). Caribbean leaders have repeatedly said as much, at a range of fora. For example, these oft-used terms routinely crop up in statements delivered by representatives of Caribbean States in such high-level fora as the General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly. Indeed, narratives around size and levels of development of states are well-worn, having long-informed these states’ conceptions of shared identity, featuring as main themes in statements and documents.

As previously indicated save for Belize, Guyana and Suriname, all Caribbean States are islands. They comprise one segment of the SIDS category. By any measure, SIDS are small. Arguably, they are the smallest of the world’s small states; historically a catchall category. Suffice to say, Caribbean States represent one extreme in an international hierarchy of states, on the basis of population and land mass alone.

Caribbean States, respectively, fall well below the 'high water mark' with respect to a key statistical indicator for a 'small state', a population of 1.5 million people. The exception is Jamaica, with a population of just over 2.6 million. According to the CARICOM Secretariat, “ten CARICOM States would fit into any definition of 'micro states' with [respective] population[s] of under 300,000” (ibid). Stunted geographic area is another consideration. In addition to the combined populations of the full members of the OECS—by far the smallest of

235 Notwithstanding, these three continental states exhibit vulnerability and characteristics most commonly associated with island states; indeed they are represented along with their fellow CARICOM island states in many international coalitions and fora where islands have a major presence. This is the case with the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), for example; a grouping comprised of like-minded “small island and low-lying coastal countries that share similar development challenges and concerns about the environment, especially their vulnerability to the adverse effects of global climate change” (see AOSIS site: http://www.sidsnet.org/aosis/about.html). AOSIS has forty-two member states, not including observers.

236 Thus, “smallness is [itself] a comparative concept” (Neumann and GstöhI 2006, 6; my emphasis).

the CARICOM states—"total[ing] less than 600,000,\textsuperscript{238}....most have land areas only two or three times the size of Washington, D.C." (Erikson and Minson 2005, 166).

In terms of the Caribbean States’ narrative, theirs is an *adversity-driven* one—developmental “challenges aris[ing] from factors beyond [their] control[,] including:

- Remoteness and isolation;
- Openness;
- Susceptibility to natural disasters and environmental change;
- Limited resource, production and export diversification;
- Limited capacity; and,
- Limited access to global capital markets” (ibid).

A similar, but expanded, version of the above list has been drawn up, in which Caribbean States are said to be “challenged to overcome critical constraints relating to:

- An undiversified range of economic resources;
- Openness with a heavy reliance on external trade, foreign investment, technology, and overseas development assistance;
- A narrow export base, mainly sugar, rice, bauxite, petroleum products, tourism and financial services and in some economies such as Trinidad and Tobago, a growing light manufacturing sector;
- High dependency on trade taxes;\textsuperscript{239}
- High dependency on preferential trading arrangements in the US, European and Canadian markets;

\textsuperscript{238} This figure excludes the grouping's two associate members.

\textsuperscript{239} Bernal notes the disproportionately high dependence on “trade taxes as a percent of government revenue [in this regard] [t]rade taxes account for more than one-half of government revenue in St Lucia, Belize and the Bahamas” (2001, 3).
· Limited administrative and managerial resources;
· Costly provision of socio-economic infrastructure and services;
· High per unit transport costs; and,
· Extreme vulnerability to natural disasters” (Housty 2005, 137-138)

The CARICOM Secretariat underscores the vulnerability of its Member States in the particular context of the deleterious effects of trade openness, but also high export dependence (CARICOM Secretariat 2002). A testament to CARICOM states’ highly open economies is “[t]he average ratio of trade to GDP of about 80 percent in 2000” (Egoumé-Bossogo and Mendis 2000, 6). A number of these countries are reliant on primary product exports, which face adverse terms of trade (CARICOM Secretariat 2002). Some are outright monoeconomies, as regards commodity exports; “in extreme cases, one primary product export accounts for nearly all of exports, e.g., in 1991, bananas accounted for 92 percent of total exports in [the Commonwealth of] Dominica and 87 percent in St Lucia” (Bernal 2001, 3). In point of fact, “most CARICOM countries lack a diversified economic base, with the majority of countries dependent on primary products, tourism, and increasingly, financial services. Merchandise exports consist of primary products, such as sugar, bananas, and petroleum and natural gas in the case of Trinidad and Tobago. The narrow export base has been supported in the past by preferential trade agreements with North America and the EU” (Egoumé-Bossogo and Mendis 2000, 6).

What is more, these countries have over the last several years had to contend with the erosion of trade preferences, a mainstay of their economic and trading relationship with

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240 Similarly, such states face “high import content of production and consumption” (Bernal 2001, 6).
241 Indeed, “[e]xport concentration is compounded by the dependence on one or two export markets, e.g. Britain absorbs 80 percent of [the Commonwealth of] Dominica’s bananas and 90 percent of St Lucia’s exports” (Bernal 2001, 3).
respective metropoles. The potential losses, but also adjustment costs, for what are extremely small, vulnerable economies are daunting, in the light of the erosion of preference margins per Global North preferential tariffs\(^{242}\) (Milner et al 2009, 4). This is especially the case for those states that grapple with export concentration resulting from a narrow base of commodities, such as sugar and bananas (Ibid., 4).

Historically these commodities have enjoyed high preference margins, but no more. Milner et al note that, “[g]iven the concentration of the current benefits of preferences, the actual erosion of preference margins due to national reforms (for example, reform of EU policies towards sugar and bananas) or prospective erosion associated with the multilateral tariff reductions proposed under the Doha Round of WTO negotiations will be concentrated on a relatively small number of developing and least developed countries. The developing countries experiencing or facing high losses are typically island economies, mostly in the Caribbean....especially those dependent on sugar or banana exports to the EU” (Ibid., 4).

What is incontestable is that as some of the smallest developing economies, Caribbean States “have structural and institutional characteristics, which affect the process of economic growth, constrain their ability to compete, increase their vulnerability to external events and limit their capacity for adjustment. These characteristics are sufficient to identify small economies as a distinct type of economy” (Bernal 2001, 1).

Actually, Caribbean States comprise special cases within the small states category;
notably because they are, for the most part, extremely small island states. As Dommen suggested three decades ago, "islands have a distinct character" (1980, 931): thus their problematique, conceivably, is even more acute. Even amongst the SIDS themselves, countries are tiered: "some of these are extremely small, and...face as a result severe constraints in this regard" (Briguglio 1995).

III. The Role/Identity Narrative Practice

Research findings reveal that during EPA negotiations TBA, especially, consistently narrated the Caribbean in the terms set out above to EU negotiator counterparts. In a word, vulnerability exemplified that narrative or portrayal; this one particular representation having come to dominate these states' sense of person-hood.243 This discursive construction, it would appear, has become naturalized; integrally a part of who they are.244

In extra-regional trade negotiations, PBA and TBA have had a long record of securing differentiated treatment and norms for Caribbean States on account of the role/identity narratives of smallness and vulnerability. The EPA was no different. Indeed, S&DT is a central pillar of the Agreement, and it draws from Article 35.3 of the CPA which states that:

[E]conomic and trade cooperation shall take account of the different needs and levels of development of the ACP countries and regions. In this context, the Parties reaffirm their attachment to ensuring special and differential treatment for all ACP countries and to maintaining special treatment for ACP LDCs and to taking due account of the vulnerability of small, landlocked and island countries.

(European Commission 2005)

244 As Hill and Wallace note, "[e]ffective foreign policy rests upon a shared sense of national identity, of a nation-state's 'place in the world', its friends and enemies, its interests and aspirations. These underlying assumptions are embedded in national history and myth, changing slowly over time as political leaders reinterpret them and external and internal developments reshape them" (1996, 8).
From the outset of the four phase EPA negotiation, regional PBA and TBA made known to their EU counterparts the centrality of S&DT to CARIFORUM's approach to the negotiation and the EPA itself. They were adamant that the principle of S&DT be given expression in the Agreement. On principle, the CARIFORUM side was concerned with disparities in the economic/developmental situations and capacities of the two parties.245

Thus S&DT was a priority issue in CARIFORUM's negotiating brief. It built on and was informed by gains made with respect to S&DT from the very earliest days of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), with respect to Article XVIII treatment of developing country members. It also built on various milestones in the decades since then to strengthen S&DT, most recently through the Small, Vulnerable Economies (SVEs) Work Programme/Working Group in the WTO's Doha Round of negotiations, in which Caribbean countries have been especially active.246 As contained in Paragraph 35 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, the objective of the Work Programme is to frame responses to reduce the trade-related sources of vulnerability of small economies. Previous to that experience, the FTAA negotiations were important 'testing grounds' for Caribbean States in respect of this S&DT strategy, given that the forum made provision for the Consultative Group on Smaller Economies. To some extent, the bilateral FTAs pursued by the CARICOM bloc in the years leading up to EPA negotiations had also proved useful experiences in fashioning S&DT-related negotiating tacks.

S&DT is a broad ranging issue, one which has assumed many forms. In this regard, a

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245 Ambassador Henry Gill, former Director General, CRNM: Interview by author, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 18th May, 2012.
246 S&DT has been an integral part of the GATT/WTO framework, exempting developing countries from certain trade rules/disciplines that otherwise developed members have to subscribe to. Building on this, developing countries such as those of the Caribbean have advocated transposition of like treatment in Agreements like the EPA which they have engaged developed countries in outside of the WTO framework.
CRNM brief on the issue notes that “the WTO Secretariat has identified 145 provisions spread across the various Multilateral Agreements. These have been classified according to the following six-fold typology:

(i) provisions aimed at increasing the trade opportunities of developing country Members;
(ii) provisions under which the interests of developing country would be safeguarded;
(iii) flexibility of commitments, of action, and use of policy instruments;
(iv) transitional time periods;
(v) technical assistance; and
(vi) provisions relating to least-developed country Members” (CRNM 2008, 1-2).

The CRNM brief further notes that in relation to the identification of S&DT provisions, the aforementioned classification was applied to the CARIFORUM-EU EPA. The end result is that S&DT is enshrined in the EPA.

It is worth identifying, at this juncture, two important ways in which S&DT is reflected in the Agreement. The first is Article 1(f) of the EPA, which states:

Strengthening the existing relations between the Parties on the basis of solidarity and mutual interest. To this end, taking into account their respective levels of development and consistent with WTO obligations, the Agreement shall enhance commercial and economic relations, support a new trading dynamic between the Parties by means of the progressive, asymmetrical liberalisation of trade between them and reinforce, broaden and deepen cooperation in all areas relevant to trade and investment.

(European Commission 2008, 7)

Secondly and as previously intimated, S&DT provisions “infuse” the Agreement.²⁴⁷ Of note, there is in place an overarching S&DT narrative as relates to development cooperation. The

²⁴⁷ This paragraph draws heavily on the CRNM EPA Brief on the CARIFORUM-EU EPA and Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in the EPA (2008).
chapter on development cooperation sets the scope and priorities for such cooperation, in addition to which every substantive chapter of the EPA has embedded in it subject-specific cooperation provisions. Broadly, these provisions “aim at facilitating implementation of commitments, improving CARIFORUM’s ability to take advantage of the opportunities contained in the Agreement through increased competitiveness, improved export capabilities, fostering closer integration, building human, legal and institutional capacity and enhancing technological and research capabilities” (CRNM 2008, 2).

What of the intra-regionalist dimension of the 'Caribbean Regional Platform'? As is revealed, it has actually problematized the cohesiveness of the Caribbean state narrative. Before examining how and why, the RLN is now examined with respect to the praxis of Caribbean interregionalism and a look at norms, in this regard.

5.3.4 The Praxis of the RLN: Caribbean Interregionalism

As set out earlier in the RLN framework, I contend that in Caribbean interregionalism PP looms large as, generally, do regional coherence and cohesion with respect to negotiations stemming from this sort of engagement. This contention is borne out upon closer inspection of the Region's approach to EPA negotiations.

Consider that while, admittedly, some of the smaller so-called lesser developed countries in the CARICOM grouping were provided relatively more flexibility in respect of liberalization obligations, for instance, regional states in general were afforded flexibilities on account of the case of the narrative of shared vulnerability and differential treatment pitched by the then CRNM and others resonating with what turned out to be MP negotiating partners. In what follows, I delve into this latter point.
It is important, first, to set the stage by acknowledging the instrumental role that the elite technocrats at the level of TBA, essentially in intergovernmental institutions, ostensibly the CRNM, played in laying out how regional states ought to strategically position themselves in EPA negotiations. At various stages of regional consultation spanning NC, TWGs, CN, COTED/CCM, PMSC-EN and CARICOM/CARIFORUM HoGs, what was repeatedly emphasized was that it was incumbent upon states to 'sing from the same hymn sheet'.\textsuperscript{248} As one senior Caribbean policy maker put it, "[t]he Region had more to gain than lose in foregrounding pan-regional, albeit state-derived 'identity socialization'".\textsuperscript{249} This reoccurring theme and the efforts of elite technocrats within the regional configuration to advance its cause can be deemed as a tactic to maximize the leveraging quotient to such a degree that it significantly added to rather than took away from regional coherence and cohesion, such that the norms that did take shape shored up negotiated outcomes that were in the interests of the group \textit{at large}.

But how, in practice, did the size and levels of development narrative articulated by the Caribbean during EPA negotiations work to its advantage? Simply put, that narrative helped 'level the playing field'. This point is examined below.

\subsection*{5.3.4.1 Case Example 1 – 'Leveling the Playing Field': Leveraging Development Finance}

The fruits of this narrative can be seen in respect of EPA implementation itself, for which significant funding has been secured by the CARIFORUM side. The case for this support was strenuously made by CARIFORUM negotiators during EPA negotiations.\textsuperscript{250} The merits of the

\textsuperscript{248} Ambassador Henry Gill, former Director General, CRNM: Interview by author, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 18th May, 2012.
\textsuperscript{249} Ambassador Henry Gill, former Director General, CRNM: Interview by author, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 18th May, 2012.
\textsuperscript{250} Ambassador Henry Gill, former Director General, CRNM: Interview by author, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 18th May, 2012.
case were accepted by the EU side, so much so that language to that end appears in the Agreement. What follows is an excerpt from the preamble, which captures the understanding shared by both sides on the matter of support:

AWARE that building capacities and addressing supply constraints in CARIFORUM States is required to take full advantage of increased trading opportunities and maximise the benefits of trade reforms and REAFFIRMING the essential role that development assistance, including trade-related assistance, can play in supporting CARIFORUM States to implement and take advantage of this Agreement.

European Commission (2008)

While no financial commitments regarding EPA implementation were made by European Commission counterparts in a manner that tied such support to the EPA per se, it was generally accepted by both sides that at the very least the 10th EDF—which spans 2008-2013, the period immediately following the signing of the EPA—would have to be relied upon for such support.

It was also accepted that bilateral Aid for Trade (AfT) from EU Member States would also have to feature, to complement EDF resources. The following excerpt from the Agreement attests to this:

RECALLING that the European Union (EU) is committed to scaling up development aid, including aid for trade and to ensuring that a substantial share of the European Community's and EU Member States' commitments is devoted to ACP countries.

European Commission (2008)

Support for EPA implementation, then, primarily emanates from the EU-funded EDF viz-a-viz the CRIP and National Indicative Programmes (NIPs), in addition to AfT contributions of EU Member States (CRNM/Caribbean Export 2009, 9). In point of fact, the 10th EDF makes €143
million available for Caribbean economic integration (supporting CARICOM's CSME, the OECS and the relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic), EPA implementation and the private sector. Some 9th EDF resources were also utilized to support aspects of EPA implementation. These funding envelopes to CARIFORUM are additional to EU funding arrangements in place for aiding in the adjustment of such Caribbean industries as sugar, banana, rum and rice (Ibid., 9).

In point of fact building on recognition in the EPA itself that CARIFORUM States have capacity and supply constraints that must be addressed if they are to effectively “take full advantage of increased trading opportunities and maximize the benefits of trade reforms” with respect to the Agreement, a suite of initiatives financed under the 10th EDF are currently being put in place with the aim of lending support to CARIFORUM in the implementation of commitments under the EPA in several areas. These include: (i) Fiscal Reform and Adjustment; (ii) Statistics in the Dominican Republic; (iii) Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) Programme; (iv) Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT); (v) Services Sector; (vi) Rum Sector; and (vii) Institutional and Implementation Capacity.

A three year (December 2012 to December 2015) €3.5 million EPA Standby Facility—a fund to be administered by the CDB, with support from National Authoring Officers (NAOs) in respective States—is also being established. It is intended to assist CARIFORUM States by helping to build institutional and productive capacity.

The Regional Private Sector Development Programme (RPSDP), which the Caribbean Export Development Agency (Caribbean Export) manages, was the first initiative to be approved under the 10th EDF EU-CARIFORUM CRIP. The RPSDP officially began in March 2011 and has a five year implementation period with €28.3 million of the total amount provided under the
EDF. This is a several fold, unprecedented increase in EDF funds made available to Caribbean Export, so that it can lend much-needed, multi-faceted support (in the areas of competitiveness, market intelligence, trade promotion and export development) to the regional private sector in its bid to breakthrough key external markets. This RPSDP represents perhaps the single largest EU contribution of its kind to an ACP region, in the context of an EDF cycle.

Through the aforementioned programming initiatives, the Region’s public and private sectors—both of which have a stake in EPA implementation—are supported.

The '10th EDF Programme of Support to CARIFORUM in the Implementation of the CARIFORUM–EU EPA', briefly outlined above, is valued at €46.5 million. A Financing Agreement for that support was signed between the European Commission and CARIFORUM on 28 March 2012. The key milestones—including financial allocations and description of the respective sub-components—of this Programme of Support, at present, are presented in Table 3 (on the following page).

In keeping with the stated commitment to AfT in the Agreement, EU Member States were to have made additional resources available with respect to advancing the cause of EPA implementation. To date, however, only the United Kingdom and Germany have done so. The United Kingdom's programme of support through the CARTFund supported the EPA Implementation Unit within the CARIFORUM Directorate of the CARICOM Secretariat through its first phase of operations, up to December 2012. Launched as a £5 million Trust Fund, the UK Government-financed (and CDB-administered) CARTFund has also supported counterpart Units in a handful of CARIFORUM States. German AfT resources, more modest than the CARTFund, has been utilized for a variety of capacity building efforts directed at CARIFORUM states, to assist in advancing EPA implementation.
### Table 3
10th EDF Programme of Support to CARIFORUM in the Implementation of the CARIFORUM–EU EPA

**Key Milestones in 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Allocation (€)</th>
<th>Milestones</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Fiscal Reform and Adjustment | 4,000,000 | • Conclusion of a Contribution Agreement between CARIFORUM and EU | 24 March 2012 | The overall objective of the Programme is to support the beneficial integration of CARIFORUM into the world economy. More specifically it seeks to support CARIFORUM in its implementation of the EPA.

| Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) Programme | 3,700,000 | • Conclusion of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA) and CARIFORUM | 22 November 2012 | This component seeks to enhance revenue mobilization efforts in CARIFORUM and to strengthen public finance management. The Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Centre (CARTAC) will have specific responsibilities under this project.

| Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) | 3,800,000 | • Conclusion of a MoU between Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB - Germany) and CARIFORUM | 15 May 2012 | This component seeks to increase the use of services of internationally recognized Regional Quality Infrastructure institutions in CARIFORUM States. PTB has been identified as the implementing agency, working with partner organization CEN/ITS and its counterpart in the Dominican Republic. The MoU serves to establish the formal relationship between CARIFORUM and PTB and makes provisions for PTB to implement the Action on behalf of CARIFORUM and in collaboration with other implementing partners, both of which have established their respective MoUs with PTB.

| Rum Sector | 7,300,000 | • Launching of tender for the International Service Contract for the Authentic Caribbean Rum Marque Communications Campaign | 16 June 2012 | This component seeks to promote increased awareness and evaluation of Authentic Caribbean Rum Marque and the use of the marque by participating companies in export markets. The Service Contract makes provisions for the management and implementation of the project by WIRSBA.

| Institutional and Implementation Capacity | 29,800,000 | • Signing of Programme Estimates | 12 December 2012 | |

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209
In taking stock of the development finance arrangements discussed above, which were secured in keeping with EPA negotiations, two points are worth noting. First, while the resources secured represent a serious response on the part of the EU to the call from the CARIFORUM side to address supply side and other constraints they would face in penetrating the EU market, once market access was secured via the EPA, the adequacy of the quantum of resources has been openly questioned by the CARIFORUM side. Second, a 'bone of contention' during the negotiations for the EPA was the line taken by the EU, and ultimately settled upon, not to directly tie such support to the trade pact itself. So the EPA does not itself provide resources. Development assistance is provided under Cotonou. As such, the EDF is drawn on.
Be that as it may, the broader issue as the EPA was taking shape was how the so-called 'development dimension' of the EPA was finding expression. More precisely, as the negotiations unfolded, that 'dimension' met with criticism on the CARIFORUM side for not going far enough. The EU side seemed content in its own interpretation, which in the early part of negotiations was seen as less ambitious. A term that itself was the subject of some criticism, the 'development dimension' refers in general to development finance but also to how CARIFORUM would be accommodated in the various facets of the Agreement, on account of its size and levels of development.

That the CARIFORUM side was of one mind on the matter and the EU side another represented a defining divergence between the two sides, one that rested on whether the rhetoric of 'development' was being matched in negotiations with the practice of ingraining development in the Agreement. The backdrop was one of expectations as to the concerted 'marriage' of trade and development, and whether or not those expectations were being met in the view of the CARIFORUM side. Certainly, the EPA had been sold in these terms by the EU. In point of fact, at the outset of negotiations in Jamaica in April 2004, Commissioners Nielson and Lamy, who were at the time EC Commissioners for Development and Trade, respectively, underscored that the EPA is a "developmental mechanism, not simply a trade agreement" (Carrington 2006, 1).

Speaking at a forum held during the period of Phase III of the EPA negotiations, the then Secretary General of CARIFORUM/CARICOM H.E. Edwin W. Carrington reminded EU representatives on hand "of one matter in these EPA negotiations which remains of outstanding concern to CARIFORUM.....the Development Dimension" (Ibid., 2). In his address to the 5th Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) Meeting forum held in September 2006—which had

251 The RPTF came into being further to Paragraph 9 of the so-called CARIFORUM/EC Plan and Schedule for the
in attendance Ministers of CARIFORUM, Heads of European Commission Delegations in the Caribbean, NAOs of CARIFORUM and Members of the RPTF—Secretary General Carrington lamented that neither supply side constraints faced by the Region or the costs of adjustments with respect to the EPA were being addressed seriously in the negotiations (Ibid., 2).

There would subsequently be a turnaround in negotiations, such that as the two sides moved into an advanced stage of talks supply side constraints and other costs of adjustments were dealt with seriously and meaningfully, on the insistence of the CARIFORUM side. The outline of 10th EDF Programming reviewed above attests to this. That programming and costing snapshot does not, in its entirety, necessarily reflect a 'meeting of minds'.

A key takeaway, however, is that those development finance gains put to the test whether the rhetoric of development with respect to the EPA was just that, rhetoric; or whether there was tangible expression in reality. Where the CARIFORUM side may not have gotten all that it wanted with respect to the development finance component, and the interview data indicates that the CARIFORUM side wanted more, it secured important gains that are presently helping to advance the Region's ability to put the EPA to work in a manner consistent with its interests.

What is not in dispute is that this development finance gain was a hard-fought one. The development finance secured reflects the determination and persistence of the CARIFORUM side. Moreover, empirical indicators show that these gains were an outcome of CARIFORUM's negotiating strategy that gave expression to its identity narrative. That this narrative had a bearing on how the Region was accommodated in the EPA and thus came to 'infuse' it is also

EPA negotiations, and it served to bridge EPA negotiations and development cooperation (including the 'design of development strategies' and associated 'development finance cooperation' stemming there from). The mandate of the RPTF is set out as: "[T]ranslate needs for support, identified in the course of the negotiations, into operational ideas for trade-related and other development assistance, and to work out these ideas up to the level of pre-identification of fundable actions" (see Carrington 2006, 1).

212
evident in respect of trade liberalization gains, the theme of the next Case Example.

5.3.4.2 Case Example 2 – 'Leveling the Playing Field': Leveraging Trade Liberalization

In terms of the new responsibilities that the EPA places on the CARIFORUM States to undertake market opening and rules-related commitments, these commitments span a cross-section of areas and are to be met over various periods (in respect of market liberalization by CARIFORUM States, it is to be phased in over 25 years (i.e. phased reductions over 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 years)—with an outermost limit of 25 years in the case of the phased reduction of some tariffs. The process of liberalization started three years after the signature of the Agreement. The scheduling of CARIFORUM liberalization, then, spans from 2009 until 2033.

The total amount of trade flows (imports and exports) which will be liberalized between the CARIFORUM and EU by the end of the transition period (2033) will be 92%. The actual value of 92% is significant, as—for the EU, at least—anything greater than 90% of trade flows is deemed to be the value required in order to satisfy the substantially all trade (SAT) criterion under the WTO’s Article XXIV of GATT 1994. On this basis, a FTA is considered to be in compliance with the relevant WTO Article on Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs).

By all accounts, the 25 year liberalization period is “unheard of in trade agreements.” 252 That this degree of treatment was secured for the Region “exceeded regional negotiators’ expectations.” 253 This concession represents an important victory for the CARIFORUM side. Indeed, CARIFORUM tariff reductions are far less onerous than those of the EU. In Part II of the EPA, entitled Trade and Trade-related Matters, for example, the sub-section on Trade in Goods

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252 Mr Branford Isaacs, Trade in Goods Specialist, CARICOM Secretariat-based EPA Implementation Unit: Interview by author, Georgetown, Guyana, 16th September, 2011.
253 Mr Branford Isaacs, Trade in Goods Specialist, CARICOM Secretariat-based EPA Implementation Unit: Interview by author, Georgetown, Guyana, 16th September, 2011.
takes account of the concept of S&DT. Enshrined in this aspect of the Agreement is a gradual opening of CARIFORUM states' domestic markets to EU goods. In addition, extensive safeguards are in place to protect CARIFORUM's sensitive sectors. Moreover, immediate DF/QF access to EU markets has been granted for CARIFORUM exports, with the exception of rice and sugar (rice was liberalized fully in 2010 and sugar in 2009).

In respect of the final annexed schedules for CARIFORUM, then, they represent a liberalization schedule whereby "82.7% of the...[groupings']...imports would be liberalized within the first 15 years, and 92% of total CARIFORUM-EU trade would be liberalized within a 25 year period."254 What is more, "1 in 10 tariff lines were excluded from liberalization, including more than half the tariff universe dealing with agriculture and fisheries."255

For CARIFORUM, a number of items (representing 13.1% of CARIFORUM imports from the EU) have been excluded from tariff liberalization altogether. What is more, CARIFORUM enjoyed a three year moratorium across the board from the point of signing the Agreement, with the exception of vehicles and some other goods. Instructively, "[n]early every significant revenue source was either placed in exclusions or given a phased reduction period of 15 years or longer, allowing for these states to carry out their own internally agreed tax reforms, to replace potential revenue loss from the EPA."256

Significant market access gains were also made by CARIFORUM, in respect of the EU market. Of note, in relation to exports by CARIFORUM under the Agreement, for a number of items, relaxed rules of origin qualifying conditions have been agreed, including those applicable to flour, biscuits and other bakery products, jams and jellies, chocolate confectionery, juices and

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255 Senior Caribbean policy maker: Interview by author, 30th November, 2009.
256 Senior Caribbean policy maker: Interview by author, 30th November, 2009.
drinks, garments, of both knit and non-knit fabric, and air conditioning units, hence significantly enhancing market access into the EU.

Negotiations, on the part of CARIFORUM, and the gains that the Region came by as a result were not easily won by any measure. Up until Phase III of those negotiations, the then CRNM is on record as reporting to the 83rd ACP Council of Ministers' Meeting in May 2006 that while the negotiations were on track, "seen from the perspective of the treatment of issues, in particular, those germane to Caribbean economic interests, the chasm in positions between CARIFORUM and the EC has never been wider. The following issues constitute areas where the current stage of the negotiations reflect major difficulties, namely, (a) approaches to tariff liberalization; (b) articulation of the regional integration dimension; (c) scope and ambit of commitments in the fields of sustainable development and good governance; and (d) funding the costs of EPA implementation and adjustment" (CRNM 2006).

As far apart as the two sides were, with respect to a variety of issues, at various points in the negotiations the gulf between them narrowed towards the end, in certain areas. Aiding in this process was, ultimately, "the bridging of differences in respect of commercial/trade and developmental trade-offs, but in a manner that was sensitive to 'leveling the playing field' for the CARIFORUM side, on account of its trade and development problematique". 257

Further, as a safeguard, the CARIFORUM side took the approach at the 'eleventh hour' that a review clause be included in the EPA. This position was adopted by the CARIFORUM side principally at the insistence of Guyana. The EU side agreed to incorporate the clause, which provides for a five-yearly review of the EPA. This was another important concession extended to

257 Ambassador Henry Gill, former Director General, CRNM: Interview by author, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 18th May, 2012.
the CARIFORUM side, and a rare one at that relative to other trade accords.

Considered in their entirety and viewed through the lens of the *leveraging quotient*, then, these negotiating and representational experiences of the CARIFORUM side outlined above tell an instructive story of the bargaining tactics utilized by a smaller region seated at the negotiating table with a much larger one. Importantly, the account highlights gains for the CARIFORUM side; gains which go a long way in 'leveling the playing field' in respect of this precedent-setting partnership.

The Region's elite technocrats recognized that with respect to the negotiated outcome or agreement, what is critical is *the best argument* as it has the potential to "put the pieces in place" for third party negotiators to reconsider their beliefs and preferences at the negotiating table.\(^{258}\) As such, what matters is the ability to persuade other parties to change their thinking and internalize regional norms. What is of help, in terms of the ability of the third party to *soak up the norm*, is the *frequency* and *intensity* of the negotiation-based interactions. This is where the Region's power rests and how it is able to mitigate, to a large extent, traditional notions of the power of large states. Thus the three hypothesis articulated earlier in the context of the RLN framework remain intact, against the backdrop of the empirical case.

The discussion below highlights important norms secured in the context of the EPA. It serves to round off the preceding analysis of gains for the CARIFORUM side. I then transition into a discussion of intra-regionalism.

5.3.5 *Norms Generated as a Result of Caribbean Interregionalism, in Connection with Issue Areas under Study: 'Cui Bono'?*

Recalling the discussion of norms in the introduction to this study, I had made the point that there

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\(^{258}\) Ambassador Henry Gill, former Director General, CRNM: Interview by author, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 18th May, 2012.
are two types of norms. Norms can have a “regulative” effect. They also have a “constitutive” effect.

Both norm types permeate the CARIFORUM-EU interregional relationship à la the EPA, pertaining to notions of the different developmental circumstances and regional identity of the Caribbean as compared to the EU. With respect to the “regulative” kind, I highlight here one norm of particular consequence that the EPA encapsulates:

[Reaffirm] the essential role that development assistance, including trade-related assistance, can play in supporting CARIFORUM States to implement and take advantage of this Agreement.

(European Commission 2008, 6)

**Norm I: 'IMPORTANCE' OF AID FOR TRADE: Adoption of the notion that the CARIFORUM grouping’s implementation, including it moving to secure market penetration with respect to the EU market, is for all intents and purposes contingent—to a large extent—on the EU extending the relevant/necessary resources (financial and otherwise, such as technical assistance).**

This norm sets out expectations or standards of proper actor behaviour, with reference to a particular identity narrative, in this case that of the EU partner. However, norms with a “constitutive” effect are also present. Consider the following:

[Recall] that the European Union (EU) is committed to scaling up development aid, including aid for trade and to ensuring that a substantial share of the European Community's and EU Member States' commitments is devoted to ACP countries.

(European Commission 2008, 6)

**Norm II: 'RESPONSIBILITY' FOR PROVISION OF AID FOR TRADE: Adoption of the notion that the responsibility falls squarely on the EU and its states to provide the relevant/necessary resources to the CARIFORUM grouping.**

Aware that building capacities and addressing supply constraints in CARIFORUM States is required to take full advantage of increased trading opportunities and maximise the benefits of trade reforms.

(European Commission 2008, 6)
Norm III: 'RECOGNITION' OF AND 'COMMITMENT' TO ADDRESSING DEVELOPMENTAL ENCUMBRANCES: Adoption of the notion that there are certain developmental idiosyncrasies with respect to CARIFORUM States that need to be addressed, in particular by drawing on EU resources, in order for that configuration to maximize the extent to which it leverages the EPA in the implementation phase.

Both of the aforementioned norms have rule-like qualities. The first references the EU and the second the Caribbean in defining respective actor's identity, but also actor's actions are specified in such a way that a given identity is recognizable to all concerned.

Norms of this nature did not appear by accident. Caribbean elite technocrats confirmed that these norms found expression because of how they framed/narrated the Region during negotiations. Empirical findings reveal that the Caribbean's elite technocrats engaged their European counterparts in EPA negotiations with a view to generating not only intersubjective knowledge on the Caribbean, but that they did so in order to make the best argument. Thus social learning was not an end in itself. Rather, it was a means to an end, i.e.: arriving at a shared understanding (or norms) in respect of differential treatment to be extended by the EU to CARIFORUM, based on the latter's strength in making the best argument.

Importantly, the best argument emanated from intense preparatory meetings and other consultative processes amongst the Caribbean's elite technocrats in the lead up to actual negotiations. These processes allowed for negotiating positions to be tested and vetted before they were taken forth to the negotiating table. Taken together and recalling the RLN—NPI, NPA and NPAS are reflected in these various steps.

Data gathered reveals that the EU long held the view that although the Caribbean for the most part constitutes small, vulnerable islands with a unique development problematique, with the exception of Haiti, they do not fit United Nations standards of being LDCs. The EU held
firm, at the outset of negotiations, to the view that the type and volume of support and differential treatment to be provided to CARIFORUM to assist the Region in effecting and adjusting to the EPA should be commensurate with their middle income status. This would mean reduced types of support, lower levels of support as well as more modest differential treatment. CARIFORUM negotiators aggressively made the case that it was unfair to apply standard measures of development, such as GDP indicators, to the CARIFORUM States, as their vulnerability manifests itself in other ways; for example: susceptibility to climactic events (such as hurricanes and climate change more generally), or being more prone to the effects of exogenous economic shocks, given the trade dependency of these economies on the global economy. These events and phenomena were framed as being exigent, with respect to Caribbean States. Moreover, these arguments won the day, as reflected in the fact that norms like those featured above were secured, and as such this empirical case serves to hold up the three hypotheses set out earlier with regard to the RLN framework.

Recalling the RLN, in this context, it turns out PP did in fact loom large with respect to the Caribbean side of the negotiating table, set against MP negotiating partners. The *leveraging quotient* is pivoted, then, toward policy-based convergence in plying regionness. In this regard, elite technocrats at the level of regional institutions, the evidence reveals, exercised an especially pronounced role.

5.4 Socialization Processes: Elite Technocrats and Caribbean Intra-regionalism

5.4.1 The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas

In contrast to the Caribbean's interregionalist narrative, regional states *leverage difference amongst themselves* in respect of the intra-regional dimension of their relationship, so as to extract gains in that setting. Nowhere is this differentiation more sanctified than in the Revised
Treaty (CARICOM Secretariat 2001). In Article 4 of the Revised Treaty, Less Developed Countries (LDCs) and More Developed Countries (MDCs) are specified.

In the Preamble to the Revised Treaty, it is acknowledged that “some Member States, particularly the LDCs, are entering the CSME at a disadvantage by reason of the size, structure and vulnerability of their economies.” The LDCs are characterized, in the first instance, in Article 1 as “disadvantaged countries” and are seen as perhaps requiring “special support measures of a transitional or temporary nature.” Regarding the latter, several reasons are enumerated in Article 1 which also sets out “disadvantaged regions” and “disadvantaged sectors.” The case of “disadvantaged countries”, “disadvantaged regions” and “disadvantaged sectors” is laid out in great detail in Part Two of Chapter Seven, whilst Part Three of the same chapter sets out the “Special Regime for Less Developed Countries.” It is further recognized in the Revised Treaty that the persistence of disadvantage, however it may arise, may have an adverse impact on economic and social cohesion in the Community. Against this backdrop, the Community commits to establishing measures, programmes and mechanisms to respond accordingly to this economic imbalance. Instructively, Article 158, which appears in Part Two of Chapter Seven, references the establishment of the Development Fund, which the balance of this sub-section focuses attention on.

5.4.2 The CDF in Perspective, against the backdrop of the OECS

Article 158 notes that the establishment of “a Development Fund [is linked to] the purpose of providing financial or technical assistance to disadvantaged countries, regions and sectors.” First off, this Treaty language explicitly acknowledges that social and economic disparities exist among CARICOM Member States. Importantly, the “received wisdom in the Community is that
unless disparities emanating from physical size, economic structure and the like are mitigated the full participation of disadvantaged countries in the CSME will be hamstrung, if not forfeited outright. Indeed, regional economic development could be severely compromised.”

Secondly, the CDF is an institutional response to the imperative to address longstanding concerns with respect to intra-regional disparities which may result from the implementation of the CSME, and which certain States in particular have taken up the cause of on the wings of their own case of being less developed. To this end, “the CDF focuses on disbursing concessionary loans and grants, according preference to small to medium size projects of a short implementation period.” Presently, with the exception of The Bahamas and Haiti, the independent Member States of CARICOM are Members of the CDF. Eligibility for financial and technical assistance support from the Fund extends to all Members of the CDF. However, during the period of the first contribution cycle access to resources has been limited to the designated disadvantaged countries - the LDCs (OECS and Belize) and Guyana (as a Highly Indebted Poor Country).

With regards to its history, the CDF began operations in August 2009. Its two primary objectives are: “(i) mitigating polarization and promoting economic convergence; and, (ii) compensating for the negative impact and dislocation resulting from the intra-CARICOM integration process. These objectives are pursued through: (a) addressing defined structural diversification and infrastructural development needs; (b) facilitating regional investment promotion and mobilization; (c) assisting business development and enterprise competitiveness;

260 Ambassador Lorne T. McDonnough, Chief Executive Officer, CDF: Interview by author, Hastings, Barbados 22nd April, 2010 (in the margins of the Conference on the CARIFORUM-EU EPA One Year On: Regional Integration and Sustainable Development).
261 Ambassador Lorne T. McDonnough, Chief Executive Officer, CDF: Interview by author, Hastings, Barbados 22nd April, 2010.
and (d) assisting in the alleviation of the social and economic impacts of natural disasters.  

To this end, in terms of capitalization of the Fund, it is a requirement that all Member States contribute. A formula to facilitate such contributions has been agreed by the CARICOM Heads of Government. At present, the CDF is capitalized at around US$90 million. Originally, the CDF was tasked with raising US$130 million, including through contributions from international development partners.

While all CDF Members are eligible for financial and technical assistance-related support from the Fund, it is the OECS that stands to benefit the most from the CDF (by far making up the bulk of LDCs). Indeed, during the first contribution cycle along with Belize and Guyana the OECS had access to resources from the Fund. Instructively respect to the grouping of states that by far has the largest 'piece of the CDF pie', it is the OECS. Of all the states that stand to benefit from the 'pie', the OECS has been most conspicuous in laying claim.

The OECS's claim to difference from other States in the CARICOM grouping is a strong, fiercely guarded one and is steeped in a tightly knit sub-regional integration process all its own. Lewis (2002) provides a recent scholarly engagement with this theme, the thrust of which was previously reviewed.

The OECS's integration effort is an ambitious one, and though often compared to the EU because the OECS has stopped short of the depths of the EU's own integration maneuvering it is generally considered EU-lite. Lewis (2002) recounts how a proposal tabled in the late 1980s to 'merge' the countries of the OECS (many of which had only just gained independence in the

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262 Ambassador Lorne T. McDonnough, Chief Executive Officer, CDF: Interview by author, Hastings, Barbados 22nd April, 2010.
263 In the Region's external trade negotiations, too, the sub-region has from time-to-time called for and gotten special carve outs or caveats with respect to the degree of liberalization that they grant.
preceding decade) into a 'single state' did not sit well with some in the grouping. Her detailed account of this period notes how countries in the Leeward Islands were the first to reject the initiative, and how subsequently, following a few years of debate, the initiative for political unification would be let go by the Windward Islands.

To be fair, this sub-region has embarked on a depth of integration unparalleled in the rest of the Region, if not the Hemisphere. In addition to many areas of functional cooperation—for instance, in pharmaceutical procurement (via a unit housed in the OECS Secretariat), the Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority and the Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications Authority—the sub-region also pools resources. Some Member states, for example, until recently had a joint High Commission in Ottawa, and have in place a joint technical and diplomatic mission in Geneva and Brussels, respectively.

To date, though, perhaps the single greatest achievement of this grouping of states regarding their integration journey was the establishment in 1983 of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank. It is the Monetary Authority for Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, the Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia, and St Vincent & the Grenadines. In place, therefore, is an Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU). The Central Monetary Authority decides on the Union's monetary policy. In addition to the maintenance of a common pool of foreign exchange reserves, the Bank issues a single common currency, the Eastern Caribbean dollar. Most recently, the sub-region has advanced the cause of integration still further, by way of the Economic Union 'project'.

264 Indeed William Demas, a Caribbean statesman, observed in the mid-1980s that true independence for the countries of the Caribbean Region could only come as a result of a political union involving the former West Indies Federation members and Guyana, and that the impetus for this should be the countries of the OECS (Demas 1986, cited in Lewis 2002, 1-2).

265 The themes covered in this paragraph draw extensively from an Interview by the author of Mr Ricardo James, Chargé d'Affaires, Permanent Delegation of the OECS to the UNOG and other International Organisations in Geneva: Georgetown, Guyana, 15th July, 2012.
The OECS Economic Union commenced operations on 21 January 2011, coming on the heels of the seminal signing on 18 June 2010 of the Revised Treaty of Basseterre. Entering into force on 21 January 2011, the Revised Treaty of Basseterre has the effect of establishing a single economic space amongst the sub-region's independent Member States. Factors of production are to move unfettered in this space, including persons. The free movement of OECS nationals within this economic space took effect from 1 August 2011. However, the record with respect to giving effect to the Economic Union has been mixed.

Given the pace, scale and degree of OECS integration from the very earliest days, following the creation of the grouping in 1981, the sub-region has generally been seen as an exemplar of integration for the rest of the Region. Instructively, the OECS's 'we-feeling' tends to trump that of the wider-Region.

5.4.3 The Praxis of the RLN: Caribbean Intra-regionalism

However, the OECS is but one example of a subset of regional states claiming difference in the narrative of the intra-regional undertaking. Guyana, as a Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC), is also different. Most prominently, it is a continental country. So, too, are Belize and Suriname. Given where and how they are geographically positioned raises a whole host of issues, predominantly around how integrated they can be in the regional project given transportation challenges, etc. There are stark contrasts, too, in relation to natural resource endowments and economic activity. The continental countries tend to be resource rich, though agrarian in orientation. Among the larger of the regional island states Trinidad and Tobago, on the other hand, as previously noted, is a highly industrialized, energy-rich country. Similarly, Barbados—though a smaller island state—is highly services dependent. Other regional states are variously
inserted into the disparate narrative sketched here.

Against this backdrop, a coherent narrative with respect to the *intra-regional dimension* of the 'Caribbean Regional Platform' is elusive. In terms of the identity narrative of Caribbean States, the representation of subjectivized *State-sameness* is disrupted. National interests rise above all other considerations, and this is perhaps where QBA and ABA 'show their hand' most conspicuously in so far as in respective national settings domestic interest groups need to be catered to by the state. Business support organizations and business elites advocate positions which resonate with segments of national private sector constituencies, and they are not always supportive of or conducive to regional coherence or cohesiveness in myriad policy areas that 'strike a chord' in the regionalism narrative.\(^{266}\) The same holds true for such social partners as organized labour.\(^{267}\)

It is worth bearing in mind that the work of liberal inter-governmentalists is especially useful in showcasing how national interests are often tangled up in and, effectively, beholden to domestic interest groups, with the result that certain initiatives to deepen integration become the 'sacrificial lambs' so to speak at the altar of national autonomy.

Regarding state personas that can be brought to bear regarding intra-regionalism in the present context, drawing from the RLN framework set out in Chapter Four, they can be thought of as PP, MP and LP; each of which is maneuvering in a manner that draws attention to difference and that subscribes to policy-based dissonance. In this regard, the principal protagonists are state institution-based elite technocrats: PBA taking the lead in showcasing difference in platforms facilitating regional dialogue/consultation at the level of the political

\(^{266}\) Mr Joel Richards, Trade Consultant, Barbados Private Sector Trade Team: Interview by author, St John's, Antigua and Barbuda, 26th October, 2011; and, Mr Carlos Wharton, Senior Trade Policy Adviser, Caribbean Export Development Agency: Interview by author, Bridgetown, Barbados, 2nd April, 2012.

\(^{267}\) Former senior member Caribbean Congress of Labour: Interview by author, Georgetown, Guyana, 5th July, 2012.
directorate, whilst TBA spearhead efforts at the level of NC, TWGs, CN and COTED/CCM preparatory meetings. These state-based institutions include Ministries of Trade, Finance, Planning, etc.

A centerpiece of this 'destabilized regional state narrative' is the CDF and the amount of resources that can be secured to the extent that the narrative of state vulnerability that is laid claim to is relatively more acute. However, these sorts of tactics should in no way be seen as implying that the material incentives at play somehow make for a 'logic of consequences' prevailing over a 'logic of appropriateness'. Quite the contrary, while a 'we-ness' may be disrupted for state-centric gains in the short-term, regional integration is not sacrificed on the altar of such state tactics. The long term gains to be had from projecting 'we-ness' to third parties is never far from mind, and the pursuit of state-related aims are not pursued with a view to jeopardizing the regional narrative.

That said, negotiating tactics of state actors in the intra-regional dimension of the 'Caribbean Regional Platform' are sophisticated, well prepared and "surgically exercised" by highly trained and seasoned technicians principally based in Ministries of Foreign Trade through regular interaction, in order to highlight "difference" and secure "differential gains". In difference they see this status as working to great effect to extract gains (i.e. financial (stemming from the disbursement of concessionary CDF loans and grants), technical assistance-related, etc.) intra-regionally, be it through CDF-related bodies (of note the CDF Board) or CARICOM organs, like the COTED.

While socialization processes obtain (not unlike those in the interregionalist dimension of the 'Caribbean Regional Platform') in which relevant elite technocrats are implicated, a narrative of difference is more pervasive. State identities and interests are reflexively defined/refined,

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268 Senior trade official: Interview by author, 14th June, 2011.
informed by markedly divergent identity-derived policy preferences.

Contestation, then, plays a key role in shaping the context and outcome of intra-regionalist interaction such that state socialization in the interregionalist institutional environment (set out in the previous sub-section) is essentially 'put on its head' and what is a regional narrative, for that scenario, is supplanted by a state-based one in the present scenario. The influence of push factors looms large, in this regard.

The illustration below sets out the push factors with respect to identity dissonance arising in the interaction of CARICOM States, in the particular context of their intra-regional relations. It should be seen as building on the 'Caribbean Regional Platform' grid (above), in that it further showcases the ability of categories of elite technocrats to effect and otherwise impact on attendant socialization dynamics buttressing the Caribbean's intra-regional relations.

**Caribbean Intra-regionalist Socialization Dynamics**

![Diagram of Caribbean Intra-regionalist Socialization Dynamics]

*Source: Author & drawing on Interviews with Officials/policymakers.*
The approach outlined above can be deemed a tactic to maximize the *leveraging quotient* to such a degree that it significantly adds to tailored state-based socialization and accommodation in terms of intraregional treatment, thus having the opposite effect in terms of regional coherence and cohesion, such that the norms that do take shape shore up negotiated outcomes that are in the interests of the state *in particular*.

Interviews with top state level and intergovernmental bureaucrats suggest, however, that while domestic political economy imperatives loom large in shaping state preferences in intraregional relations such that the *national* narrative trumps the *regional* one this dimension is not the overriding factor in the inter-state bargaining process. After all, the process itself is mainly shaped by PBA and TBA. For them, their interest in the inter-state bargaining process is not of a short-term nature, *per se*, in the sense of allowing any one domestic political economy imperative to stand in the way of regional integration.

This point bears itself out, for example, in the context of an especially thorny issue that presently is commanding the spotlight in intra-regional relations: Jamaica's widening trade deficit with CARICOM, and Trinidad and Tobago in particular. That country has run a trade deficit with the rest of the region for many years, and particularly so with Trinidad and Tobago; but the matter has come to a head as of late, as the gap has widened.

Table 4, below, depicts the trend in the trade deficit relationship between Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago over a decade, up until the most recent year for which data can be sourced.
Tables 5 and 6, in the Annex, provide a more complete picture regarding the regional narrative and the trade deficit as relates to Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, respectively.

It is worth noting that the matter of the trade deficit in relation to Trinidad and Tobago is not unique to Jamaica: the twin-island Republic exports considerably more to other CARICOM Member States than they do to it. Barbados is also on record as registering its concerns, which were recently only inflamed on account of a trade spat widely reported in the regional media: a Barbadian conglomerate—Banks Holdings Limited—disclosed that its well known milk products and juices were barred from the Trinidadian market on account of a long-festering dispute involving labeling.

That there has been rising tension in relations between Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica is especially significant, given their status as two of the founding member countries of

| Source: Regional Statistics Programme, CARICOM Secretariat |

Table 4

Value of Imports, Exports and Balance of Trade: Jamaica vs. Trinidad and Tobago, 2012-2015
CARICOM. Rising tension is on account of the trade deficit and other commercial (namely, energy) issues, with some Jamaican politicians and business leaders contending that Jamaica is not benefiting from membership in CARICOM and should therefore exit the regional integration project. However these views have been dismissed by others; by Jamaica’s Prime Minister, no less, who has repeatedly reaffirmed that country’s commitment to the regional integration project (an affirmation echoed by the current CARICOM Secretary General Irwin LaRocque). Instructively, ahead of a summit of regional HoG held in July 2012 Barbados' ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago is said to have warned against “emotional statements” that could have an adverse effect on resolving disputes among Community partners. Reportedly, he warned against “misplaced hostility” towards Trinidad and Tobago.

What this sentiment is indicative of is that as important as domestic corporate interests are to PBA and TBA and as responsive as they, in turn, must be to them, as a rule policy makers and technocrats are loath to become mired in what at times can become a caustic narrative of national economic interests that overshadows the 'bigger picture' of regional integration. A case in point is that the dispute over the trade deficit did not find expression in the Communique of a summit of regional HoG held in July 2012, at the height of the most recent flare up of tensions over the state of the trade deficit. The regional media, though critical that HoG had remained mum on the matter in the official summit statement, asserted that “[t]he silence of the communique on the contentious trade disputes could be viewed as a plus for political maturity in downplaying areas of disagreement and highlighting, instead, intended structured cooperation to deal with implications for the region of the prevailing global economic crisis” (Singh 2012). It was also reported that in the lead up to the summit, Barbados' Prime Minister expressed the view that he was attending the summit not “to fight with anybody” but that he would make Barbados'
concerns known. This sentiment also suggests that PBA are committed to cooperative (rather than competitive) bargaining, intra-regionally, which also has the effect of trumping the potential of identity cleavages that could end up posing an existential threat to integration taking hold.

In as much as identity dissonance is at play intra-regionally in order to strategically pursue interests and policy preferences, the reflex of PBA is to not let that narrative get out of hand in terms of a zero-sum dynamic (i.e. maximizing respective preferences at any cost) taking hold. There is an unwritten rule, then, as to how far to push identity dissonance in the trading of concessions, even as it relates to shifting of the bottom-line.

The upshot is that while important in the grand scheme of things, domestic political economy imperatives generally tend to inform rather than be deciding factors in inter-state bargaining processes. As such, liberal inter-governmentalism has limited explanatory appeal for our purposes. PBA and TBA are more invested in building up an image of their respective states in the service of how they are socialized intra-regionally in the long-term, such that they continue to benefit from policy, programme and financial assistance measures developed in response to their developmental problematique, in order to enable accommodation on a sustained basis. Thus, while the leveraging quotient is given practical effect by respective bargaining processes exerted to influence given regional consultative processes/machinery, it is informed by the overarching aim of norm formation: the most effective means of enabling accommodation in the long-term.

The Revised Treaty, then, sets out one important norm—differentiated treatment within the Region, for which there is accommodation of 'institutionally' by way of the CDF. S&DT is accorded to LDCs with respect to the Treaty on account of their differences in levels of development and economic structures. S&DT provisions are intended to ensure more equity
prevails in respect of the obligations and commitments among parties to the Treaty, with due consideration to their levels of development. What we have to be cognizant of is that in the lead up to and in terms of advancing the cause of this Treaty-based accommodation, in CARICOM fora LDCs in particular had consistently underscored that because they are disadvantaged countries they had been significantly worse off during periods of great challenge for the Community absent any accommodation.\textsuperscript{269} They presented an even more acute picture of the constraints of, say, each of the OECS micro-states, underscored on a scale that brings into relief the idiosyncrasies of a "micro of a micro-state."\textsuperscript{270} Thus the three hypothesis articulated earlier in the context of the RLN framework remain intact, against the backdrop of the empirical case.

5.4.4 Norms Generated as a Result of Caribbean Intra-regionalism, in Connection with Issue Areas under Study: 'Cui Bono'?

The Revised Treaty has many instances where both norms with a "regulative" and "constitutive" effect are referenced with respect to notions of the different developmental circumstances and identities of sub-sets of Caribbean States and their intraregional relationships. An instructive set of three interrelated norms with "regulative" effect that the Treaty encapsulates are:

Acknowledging further that some Member States, particularly the Less Developed Countries, are entering the CSME at a disadvantage by reason of the size, structure and vulnerability of their economies;
Believing further that the persistence of disadvantage, however arising, may impact adversely on the economic and social cohesion in the Community;
Conscious further that disadvantaged countries, regions and sectors will require a transitional period to facilitate adjustment to competition in the CSME.....

\textsuperscript{269} Sir Edwin W. Carrington, former Secretary General, CARICOM Secretariat: Interview by author, Georgetown, Guyana, 17th November, 2011 and 29th March, 2012.
\textsuperscript{270} Senior trade official: Interview by author, 14th June, 2011.
Norm I: 'RECOGNITION OF DISADVANTAGE OF SOME CSME STATES OVER OTHERS AND THE NEED TO MITIGATE SAME': Adoption of the notion that there is a prevalence of disadvantage amongst segments of CSME states relative to others, the deleterious effects of which affect the parties concerned and threaten the Community at large. Further, carve outs in respect of obligations applicable to one set of states, i.e. the more disadvantaged ones, is an important remedial action.

These norms set the stage for a pivotal norm with a "constitutive" effect, which is reflected in the Treaty as follows:

Committed to establish effective measures, programmes and mechanisms to assist disadvantaged countries, regions and sectors of the Community.

CARICOM Secretariat (2001, 3)

Norm II: 'COMMITMENT TO REMEDIAL ACTION': Adoption of the notion that regarding the disadvantaged CSME states, protocols are to be established and associated policy-based mechanisms pursued in respect of mitigating the disadvantage experienced.

The first three norms elaborate the expectations or standards of proper actor behaviour, invoking sub-set State identity narratives, whilst the fourth norm has a rule-like effect that on the one hand defines an actor's identity and on the other specifies actors' actions in such a way that a given identity is recognizable to others.

Recalling the RLN, the empirical case shows that NPI, NPA and NPAS loom large regarding the establishment of the aforementioned norms. However the tendency is for the leveraging quotient to pivot toward policy-based dissonance, given the manner in which regional states ply regionness.

5.5 The Functional Application of Regionness: Effects, Dynamics and Demonstrating Causal Relationships

The chapter has been taken up with an examination of the Caribbean regionalism socialization
practices which find expression among parties in in-group as well as out-group scenarios, namely social learning and persuasion. Social learning has a very specific meaning in the study, i.e.: socializers (the previously identified Caribbean epistemic communities and/or groups of states) imparting intersubjective or background knowledge on a group of states, i.e. socializees. What is more on the basis of the deployment of social learning, it was determined socializers engage in persuasion, with a view to advancing the 'best argument'. Data gathered revealed that routinized, sustained institutionalized network interactions involving nodes of Caribbean epistemic communities under study—more so at the levels of PBA and TBA social structures, respectively—served a strategic purpose: influencing the institutional preferences of socializees to the benefit of the socializers.

In examining socialization processes that underpin Caribbean interregionalism and intra-regionalism, and the role of elite technocrats as social agents therein, the study finds that identity and its evocation loom large. That it interrogates, in the context of the 'Caribbean Regional Platform', the hand of elite technocrats in socializing states and their 'regional identity (formation)' is a departure from the work of scholars like Wendt (1999) who also reify identity, but in framing the 'corporate identity' of the state they end up doing so as if it were an exogenous construct. Therefore while Wendt's constructivist scholarship informs the insights that find expression in this and the previous chapter, it only does so to a certain degree.

With respect to the Caribbean's elite technocrats, the intention in the case of my analysis of the negotiation and (to some extent) implementation of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA was to lend insight into how PBA and TBA were most responsible for formulating a 'we-ness' (set against the ideational backdrop of region formation), in terms of how the Caribbean region was narrated and assigned a shared identity. Theirs was a pivotal role regarding knowledge
production concerning the Region.

Of note, they drew in part on Commonwealth Secretariat and Commonwealth Secretariat-informed literature on small states (referenced in Chapter 3). Importantly, I wanted to illustrate their role in presenting the Region as comprised of states with a shared developmental problematique, one that warranted—in the specific context of the EPA—differential treatment (as a norm) being extended to these states as a whole with a view to 'leveling the playing field' for them. I illustrated that dependable expectations had to be effected in respect of preferential treatment (norms) afforded CARIFORUM by the EU, in light of developmental idiosyncrasies associated most acutely with size, which the EU became seized of.

By the same token, the CDF case illustrated how difference was sought within the group. Likewise, norms holding up that difference were sought. The emergence of Article 158 that formed the basis for the establishment of the CDF in the first place is a manifestation of the acceptance by all States of norms for differential treatment of the LDCs. However, there are numerous other instances where there were norm-based attempts to account for this 'difference': Measures to promote industrial development under Article 164 of the Revised Treaty is one important instance.

Further, it was found that socialization practices are of consequence in the in-group scenario because they enable interpersonal trust to be established, preserved and form the basis for collective interaction going forward with respect to actors in that group and their ability to successfully achieve collective end-results, in as cohesive a manner as possible, with out-groups.

There is another set of implications associated with epistemic community-based interactions that we must now turn our attention to. As already intimated, what is apparent from the study is that like-minded PBA and TBA play a dominant role in narrating the Region,
assigning meaning to it and *mainstreaming* a certain kind of thinking with respect to Caribbean States and their problematique. Importantly, the Region has been narrated on *their terms* (the same can be said of the norms that are devised to sanctify agreements).

Empirical findings indicated that quotidian official network ties in relation to the regionalism policy making machinery could be pivoted in two ways by practitioners. If the Caribbean region engaged with a third party like the EU ('interregionalism'), the implication would be the production of a *uniform regionalism narrative* type. Wherein States within the Caribbean region engaged one another, instructively over access to a resource base such as the CDF ('intra-regionalism'), they were more prone to deploy a *differentiated regionalism narrative* type.

This narrative type oscillation was first conceptually illustrated by way of the RLN. In either case the elite technocrats concerned felt that there was more to be gained in terms of *negotiated outcomes/desired ends*, by deploying the respective regionalism narrative type in response to a particular type of regional engagement. The effect was that regionness was most apparent with respect to the Caribbean during interregional encounters, though it receded during intra-regional ones. Of note, Caribbean States were keen to cement understandings with respect to treatment afforded them in either the interregional or intra-regional pathway, and therefore they moved to secure norms that have either a "regulative" or "constitutive" effect.

Of note with respect to EPA interregionalism, it was determined that consistent with the compelling image associated with this study's title the Caribbean was able to *Punch Above its Weight*, in so far as during a period of unprecedented trade negotiations under cover of the EPA it was able to control its regionalism narrative. Moreover, PBA and TBA were able to make headway in 'leveling the playing field'.

236
Its regionness, so to speak, was evident in that the Caribbean was firmly in control of and able to make its ideational narrative resonate, for the most part, with as formidable a negotiating power as the EU. This narrative resonated with the EU, as evidenced by the concessions it extended and the norms which were concretized/entrenched in the Agreement.

That the Caribbean epistemic communities under study in this dissertation accomplished this feat has been largely neglected in scholarly work. In point of fact, they ensured the persistence of a particular type of episteme about the Region in the lead up to and during EPA negotiations, utilizing the behaviours I have studied in this dissertation. Admittedly, they drew in part on the ideational referents of small states developed in the work of scholars and practitioners associated with the world renowned Commonwealth Secretariat research agenda on small states (referenced in Chapter 3).

Secondly, in applying the constructivist concept that state socialization is a matter of course and is norm-driven as a framing for the empirical case of the Caribbean's approach to negotiating the EPA, it was determined that the 'logic of appropriateness' punctuated those negotiations such that the EU's logic of (negotiating) action was influenced by the need to do what is right. This finding forms a core element of the story of the best argument leveled by the Caribbean side in its efforts to strategically and pragmatically persuade the other party regarding concessions, such that tangible end-results came its way as a result. In this way, the Caribbean was also able to Punch Above its Weight. This is a key part of the story I tell.

The outcome of EPA negotiations would have been far different, had the Caribbean side not been the protagonist that it was in doggedly narrating the ideational framing of the Region. What the study has accomplished, in part, is to document the role of ideational, non-material factors in shaping what the Caribbean is and the actor-based behaviours that arise to hold up and
diffuse that meaning for tangible benefit.

The Caribbean, therefore, is not simply there. My empirical study shows that it is constructed. Key members of the Caribbean epistemic community studied exerted influence to this end. Importantly, this cognitive regional space is constructed to a significant degree by interactions of its protagonists with counterpart actors.

5.6 Conclusion

Elite technocrats serve as 'gate-keepers', with regard to the formulation and animation (i.e. communicative practice) of identity and interest-driven normative regimes. They have a profound understanding of the ideations of the Caribbean, and have come to recognize that more than ever before imaging and symbolism (precisely put, place branding) have fast become indispensable conceptual tools through which states can better make sense of and manage interactions in an unrelentingly complex world. PBA and TBA wield considerable influence and are embedded to a significant degree in Caribbean interregionalism and intra-regionalism. QBA and ABA also have roles to play, albeit less pronounced.

Arguably these norm entrepreneurs operate within complex policy-making processes, at times seemingly representing contending narratives of the Region; their strategic policy choices/targets shaping perspectives on and practices as regards regional coherence differently. It is my contention that clusters of norm entrepreneurs are compelled, through diplomatic and other channels, to portray states differently from a discourse analytical point of view, depending on whether interregionalism or intra-regionalism objectives are being pursued. The (auto)biographical narrative which anchors state identity springs from state institutions (Steele 2007, 905), but also region-specific intergovernmental organizations. As a region, the Caribbean
thus has an (auto)biographical narrative all its own, which gives meaning to state mandated interaction interregionally and intra-regionally. This circumstance, it can be surmised, influences how they come to view the wider world; and, importantly, how they want the world to view them.

A former trade minister from a regional state perhaps put it best when he said of the Caribbean its “vulnerability is very real, not least in respect of small size” (Savarin 2005). These states are able to secure benefits and exercise agency in a manner that conventional theory is incapable of grasping. This is not so for constructivism, the theoretical backstop for this study. What has been instructive for our purposes is constructivism’s “epistemological claim that meaning, and hence knowledge, is socially constructed”, but also its “ontological claim that the social world is constructed” (Guzzini 2005, 498). Crucial, in all of this, has been the chapter’s homage to constructivism’s overriding tenet: “[the] reflexive relationship between the social construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality (ibid, 499).271 Especially relevant with respect to interregionalism, regionness with respect to the Caribbean took form during EPA negotiations in a manner that redounded to the benefit of the Region.

What we should be seized of and call attention to, then, is the power of ideas/norms (namely, their moral persuasiveness), not the power of states in the realist sense. As a testament to the recognition of the power of the negotiation process, the Caribbean Region organized its best and brightest minds—by way of the CRNM—in its external trade negotiating effort. Enviable negotiating skill has been brought to bear, too, in the Caribbean intra-regional narrative, albeit for different reasons. Importantly, negotiations—regardless of the interregional or intra-regional backdrop—enable an intensity and consistency of interaction, which is crucial to the

271 As Guzzini notes in reference to constructivism’s emphasis on reflexivity, “[it centers] on how the social construction of knowledge can itself affect the construction of social reality and vice versa” (2005, 499).
advance of social learning and the crystallization of norms.

When considered in conjunction with strategic inventiveness—the kernel of the RLN model—the foregoing analysis reveals that 'Lilliputian' states, like those of the Caribbean, exhibit capacity for more agency than they are often given credit. At the very least, it prompts a re-think of how to problematize these states in world politics. Thus the empirical cases in the foregoing reveal that the RLN depicts 'what is', with respect to regional behavior/outcomes.

Upon reflection, it would appear that when faced with adversity, PCS strive to outmaneuver counterparts, not blindly submit to them. The anthropomorphised (auto)biographical narrative (i.e. the construction of a social reality), then, informs behavioural cooperation, facilitating agency built on securing differential treatment for these states in order to accommodate particularity, associated with size and levels of development. This tactic is emblematic of strategic inventiveness (a term coined in the present study). Opportunism, then, is a more apt characterization of their regional/international affairs approach, than is submission. These states look to 'level the playing field'.

However, the Caribbean has flexed its 'ideational' regionness at a juncture when Global North regions like the EU have invested considerably in soft power, such that increased space can be secured and their standing boosted in global politics as normative powers. Instructively, the EU has utilized its EPA with the Caribbean to leverage normative power to achieve its own ends. This approach has important implications for the socially constructed nature of the concept of the Caribbean 'region' and policy implications therein for the Caribbean region delimited for the purpose of the EPA, which the next and final chapter of the study delves into.
PART IV

THE RISE OF EUROPEAN NORMATIVE POWER:
COMPARATIVE REGIONALISM, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE
CARIFORUM-EU EPA
Chapter VI
Global Actor, Normative Power, Region-Constructor: Making Sense of the EU's Global Governance Approach, in relation to its CARIFORUM EPA Engagement

6.1 Introduction

While NPE has hitherto been the subject of much attention in both the academic and policy communities, consideration of how the CARIFORUM-EU EPA forms a part of this strategy has gone virtually unstudied; thus, the Agreement's broad intent, through an EU prism, remains poorly understood. This chapter furthers such an understanding, at its outset reviewing the NPE thesis, then developing a hybrid normative-role approach and on this basis advancing the proposition that EU-centric interregionalism anchors the EU's actorness. That such interregionalism positions NPE at the center of a 'hub-and-spokes' relationship with world regions—especially those in the Global South—is underscored. From the vantage point of the EU's interregionalist EPA engagement with CARIFORUM, I examine how the cause of a distinctive European, normative approach to global governance is advanced. Such region-pivoted North-South relations, I argue, reinforce the EU's understanding of the identity-based delimitation of other world regions. In policy terms, the EU's putative commitment to nurturing a regionalist project in the context of the wider Caribbean is also emblematic of a purposive effort on its part to champion, transpose and solidify its values—through actorness—onto this regional configuration, an effort which I demonstrate can present difficulties for the spoke region.

It should be pointed out from the outset that the NPE thesis is best understood against the backdrop of the civilian power thesis. The civilian power thesis in the study of European/international affairs has cast a long shadow in academic and policy circles, longer still
if one traces its roots not to the work of Francois Duchene but E.H. Carr who proffered analysis to this end in the early part of the last century. In the decades since the 1970s, there have been two developments of note that have contributed to a resurgence of interest in the civilian power thesis (and its intellectual legacy), albeit in new 'wineskins'. One can be located in the academic world, the other in the policy world. In respect of the former, the so-called constructivist turn in the social sciences, notably European/international studies, has led the way in theoretical innovations that have heralded the application of a 'normative lens' to the study of the EU. In respect of the policy world, there have been tectonic shifts in world politics (which have enabled the EU to assert itself as never before) and with respect to the entity that is now known as the EU, which have forced practitioners to pay close attention to the EU's apparent 'normative muscle'.

This chapter considers the EU's normative predilection by examining the nexus between EU-styled global governance, the EU as a global actor-cum-region-constructor and the EU as a norm purveyor of consequence. As its backdrop, the chapter adopts a very narrow episodic focus as relates to the EU—i.e. the post-Maastricht period (1993 onwards) comprising the last twenty years wherein there has been an EU proper (i.e. the Treaty on European Union was signed in 1992), and is cognizant of the period since the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon (2007 onwards), one result of which has been a more coherent foreign policy stance on the part of the bloc. In terms of ontologically situating the nature of the EU, as I have already explained (see Introductory chapter) it is understood in the present study to pivot less on notions of political community than on conceptions of it as finding expression by way of the European Commission. This explanation is an important one, for our purposes, as NPE itself finds expression via the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Moreover, what is European in theory
and practice is less a function of geographic notions of borders, which in and of themselves are problematic, but rather a project spearheaded by a supra-national institution—the European Commission. In recent times, it has been tasked by certain forces with devising, embedding and projecting a particular way of thinking regarding perceived values/model of modernity, as reflected in EU standards/norms and associated agendas, which if adopted by others will ultimately uphold a civilizational discourse in the service of European zone security imperatives.

The structure of the chapter is as follows. As a first step, it frames the EU against a global governance narrative. Secondly, it reviews key themes and literature with respect to NPE, showcasing a hybrid framework called the normative-role approach along the way. The next section first examines the role of EU interregionalism in holding up EU actorness. It then ascertains how a distinctive European approach to global governance is advanced via interregionalism, while discerning how this brand of global governance nurtures a norm-cum-ideational regionalist project in the context of the wider Caribbean. In this regard I draw on empirical analysis with respect to the CARIFORUM-EU EPA, particularly to point to how the Caribbean has been defined in EU terms and how as a spoke region it is has been negatively affected by one important dimension of the Agreement. The final section engages with the Joint Caribbean-EU Partnership Strategy, which along with the EPA is framed as part of the larger puzzle board of the exercise of NPE in the Caribbean. The Joint Strategy is linked to the CARIFORUM-EU EPA, and the implications thereto examined. A capstone section follows, serving to instantiate the kernel of the chapter's argument and demonstrate causal relationships. The chapter is rounded off with a brief concluding section.

6.2 Global Governance and Europe

Regions have brought an added complexity to the global governance landscape. On the one hand,
they have expanded and diversified its ranks. On the other hand, and more importantly, in cases where regions are imbued with actorness given assertive intergovernmental, institutional arms regional actors have more of a voice in policy areas on the global governance plane.

As a result, regions have a bearing on the decision-making dimensions and calculus of global governance policy processes, given that they have been inserted into and increasingly are exercising more of a role in various policy arenas. With respect to this latter point, especially, this stems, in large measure, from some of these configurations increasingly exhibiting actorness in international affairs. In evolutionary terms, this is indicative of state-like qualities adorning regions, at the level of form and function.

Regional actorness, as a theme, has had considerable resonance in interregionalism research. In many respects, it has occupied a central place in the research agenda. Scholarly interest in this thematic referent has been driven primarily by research into the EU experience with integration, which has unfolded in such a way that the regional configuration has become ever more coherent in devising, articulating and projecting policy. As such, much of the contemporary research has had a geographic bias, where the narrative of the EU having assumed the status of an actor in world politics—one that seemingly has received wide acceptance by more conventional actors in international affairs—looms large.

This preoccupation with Europe can perhaps be attributed, in large part, to what Hettne and Soderbaum describe as interregional cooperation over the last decade having “become an

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272 Grinspun, for instance, underscores how NAFTA sanctioned economic integration—a core pillar of North American regionalism—sweeps sweeping transformations with respect to Mexico and Canada’s economic and social structures (1993, 14). He is careful to note that, “the main impact of NAFTA at the nation-state level will be to carve out a stronger role for transnational capital and consolidate this neoconservative agenda of structural reforms by engraving the changes in an international treaty” (Ibid., 17).

273 The narrative of the EU as a global actor likely has wide appeal especially amongst scholars who have recently made the case that a European executive order is emerging (see Trondal 2010). For influential work on Europe as exhibiting 'regional actorness', see Bretherton and Vogler (1999).
increasingly important component of the EU's foreign policy relations [with other world regions]" (2005, 544).

If not directly engaging with the EU, in taking account of interregionalism in select chunks of the world, the scholarship relates those experiences back to Europe and to the European Commission as the formalized, institutional nerve center of the integration process. Europe as region—with the European Commission at its helm—is often presented not only as a global actor in world politics, but as the center of gravity, no less, of a number of interregional arrangements spanning a swath of world regions.

6.3 NPE and the Study of the EU in World Politics

In a seminal article published a decade ago, Manners (2002) argued that Europe has established itself as a key player in world politics because of its ability to exercise power in a manner that influences global opinions, values and norms; a notion that is not altogether new, by Manners' own admission. Put differently and as already noted in Chapter One, Manners has characterized the concept of NPE as the “ability to shape conceptions of 'normal' in international relations” (2002, 239). More precisely, Manners points to the EU's power as resting in an ability to “define” what passes for normal in the context of global politics.

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274 Some scholars are more guarded in their pronouncements in this vein. For instance, Krotz (2009, 556) readily admits that contemporary international and European affairs have served as catalysts for “European high politics actorhood”, as never before. By the same token, as he describes it, impediments to Europe emerging as a high politics actor remain (Ibid., 556). Krotz's assessment of Europe as an actor on the world stage—in such high profile areas as foreign policy, security and defence—in the years ahead, concedes that Europe will come into its own as an actor; but with the caveat that “a fully grown high-politics actor 'Europe' remains a longer-term project rather than something that will emerge in the imminent future......autonomous actorhood [in this vein historically] the weakest and least developed” (Ibid., 556-557).

275 See, for example, a cross-section of chapter contributions in Hanggi et al (2006); also see the 2005 special issue of the Journal of European Integration on the theme of the 'EU as a Global Actor and the Role of Interregionalism', subsequently published as an edited volume—Soderbaum and Langenhove (2007).
In his 2002 article, Manners discusses the EU's normative power against the backdrop of earlier concepts of and debates surrounding military power (which Hedley Bull\(^{276}\) was a leading proponent of) and civilian power\(^{277}\) (which François Duchène was a leading proponent of) which have had significant influence over the study of Europe in international affairs over the last three decades.\(^{278}\) He goes further, contending that recent developments in international affairs warrant a reappraisal of traditional focus on either military power or civilian power (without dismissing that research agenda out of hand), to instead take into consideration the place of normative power in world politics (Manners 2002, 236). While juxtaposing NPE on civilian power and normative power, Manners is wary of what he characterizes as the latter two power references' penchant to treat with Europe like it was a state or to ascribe state-like qualities on it. Manners explicitly points to normative power as shifting traditional analysis on the EU's institutions or policies, \textit{per se}, to cognitive processes—which he refers to as having “both substantive and symbolic components” (\textit{Ibid.}, 239).

Elements of Manners' analysis are not that far removed from and owe an intellectual debt to social constructivist contributions to EU studies (see Chapter Two), where there has been

\(^{276}\) Hedley Bull characterized Duchêne's conceptualization of Europe in normative terms as a “contradiction in terms.” For Bull (1982) that Europe could operate as civilian power was contingent on traditional military power that made this possible in the first place.

\(^{277}\) Civilian power is a reference to Europe's economic prowess (but also its emphasis and reliance on multilateral diplomatic cooperation in the realm of 'low-politics' and the prominence of supranational institutions therein to achieve objectives on the international stage), as compared to its significantly more limited 'armed force'. A civilian power, then, turns to non-military means to achieve certain ends. Duchêne saw the then the European Community as having within its grasp the ability to exercise influence on the world stage through “essentially civilian forms of power” (Duchêne 1973, 19). His concept of ‘idée force’ looms large in this context. The conduit for the exertion of this type of power is a supranational institutional structure. For Duchêne, by projecting itself as a civilian power Europe was projecting its own “model” bent on ensuring “stability and security.” The achievement of both, as indicated earlier, rested on economic as well as political means (1972; 1973). This thesis of Europe's role in international affairs is a very influential one.

\(^{278}\) More recently, the concept of \textit{ethical} power Europe has been devised and studied by some scholars (see Aggestam 2008). The concept is utilized, primarily, to study instances of usage of hard power or force by the EU and the ethical dilemmas that this raises in relation to the EU's stated commitment to a peace project, and by extension its obligation to uphold certain values.
particular emphasis on ideas, values, norms, discourse and interests. He suggests as much, when he refers to normative power as having an “ideational nature” (Ibid., 239). Indeed, there is a link with other literature. Two come to mind.

Role theory is one. Decades ago, Holsti was at the center of theoretical innovations around the study of national images and what he recognized even then as “students of international politics [taking] a growing interest in psycho-attitudinal approaches to the study of the international system” (1962, 244). The study of soft power is the other scholarly area. As a concept, soft power in contemporary international studies is associated with Joseph Nye (see Bound to Lead (1990)). Nye characterizes soft power as “the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment” (2008, 94). Instructively, Nye notes that “[a] country's soft power rests on its resources of culture, values, and policies” (Ibid., 94). Of note, the term soft power has come into use in the context of the EU, which increasingly is being viewed as a global actor that thrives on the exercise of normative prowess.

Strictly speaking, Manners likely would not accept the co-mingling of these concepts/approaches. As already stated, Manners has a very specific view of the EU in world politics. While analyzing the EU in ideational terms, his framing is not actor-centric, per se, though he does see the EU as a post-Westphalian actor of sorts. Rather, the EU’s international identity is conceived of as stemming from common values and ideologies closely associated with the Union and its evolution over the last fifty years. His reference to how the EU is perceived can

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279 In Keohane's (1988) now much-cited reference to an emerging reflective approach in IR some twenty-five years ago, he underscored the importance of cultural practices, norms and values in the articulation of interests by states and in the behavior of states themselves in this approach.

280 However while the 'soft power/hard power' dichotomy was coined by Nye, the study of states' efforts at what has come to be known as public diplomacy or image projection has a long lineage. E.H. Carr, a doyen of IR, noted the importance of 'power over opinion'.

248
be seen as third parties looking in to the EU, rather than the EU looking out. In contrast, contemporary scholars like Elgstrom and Smith (2006), who build on the tradition of role theory à la Holsti, showcase the EU's global actorness.

I propose a middle road, one that combines insights from both the role theory scholarly agenda and NPE scholarly agenda. Admittedly Manners' attempt to de-emphasize the role of European institutions in the projection of normative power has some appeal, in so far as it reflects what he confesses is his not wanting to be straight jacketed by Westphalian conventions. However, on balance his is a problematic stance and at times inconsistent, given that references to "the EU as a normative power [with] an ontological quality to it" (Manners 2002, 252) leads one to believe that the EU-qua-actor is his ontological unit of analysis. Ultimately, it is those very institutions that he wishes to remove from the picture that are the well-spring not only of European norms, but identity narratives. What is more, institutions have 'stabilizing properties'; "[i]nstitutions generate their stabilizing properties once actors consistently adopt a particular role conception and modify their behavior according to each other's role, behaviors and expectations" (Barnett 1993, 275). Importantly and according to constructivist tenets, an actor's identity is influenced by the institutional structures within which the actor is embedded; and by the same token those very same institutions are in place because of the actors who populate them.

Thus normative power, it is the view of the present study, must be framed against institutions and seen through them, as they are formed because of them. The EU's ideational impact, in fact its ideational role-driven identity, does not just magically appear. This ideational narrative can be traced back to EU institutions, which are invested in the projection of power. In the first half of the next section, I provide further insights into this middle road approach, a normative-role approach.
Due to the fact that theorizing must as accurately as possible reflect the real world, this hybrid approach is especially instructive. Consider that in a Speech to the Bucerius/Die Zeit Summer School, Die Zeit Foundation in 2005 entitled 'The European Union as a Global Actor', Member of the European Commission responsible for Enlargement—Mr Olli Rehn—expressed the following view:

I strongly believe that the EU's creation of a rules-based framework that is respected worldwide makes Europe a global actor...The idea at the heart of the European project is a simple one: create institutions and rules within which countries can conduct their business—both political and economic—and other countries will seek to do the same. The EU's most effective method of exerting soft power is by persuading countries to integrate themselves into legal frameworks and economic relationships with the Union.

(Rehn 2005, 2)

By most measures, the EU has defied expectations in emerging as a global actor, challenging conceptions of it as a regional actor with limited policy range. Haas (1961), for instance, had left out foreign and security policy from his middle-range theory of European integration, neo-functionalism.281 This grand model of European integration notwithstanding, Bretherton and Vogler (2005) are amongst a growing tide of scholars who have examined and showcased the emergence of the EU as a global actor in world politics.

The newly-established EEAS282 and debate, associated with this pan-European diplomatic corps, of a coherent EU foreign policy that is taking form has only raised the profile still further of a Union with a global reach spanning a policy range that includes the domain of 'high politics'. That the advance of a CFSP, which first came to light in the Maastricht Treaty as a 'second pillar'

281 Scholars like Deutsch (1957) took a more nuanced stance in the examination of a cooperation/military narrative, developing concept of 'security community': a region spanning many nations, where members' positive identification and interaction would foster an environment supportive of peaceful relations, or at least expectations to that end.

282 The EEAS "was one of the principal foreign policy innovations of the Treaty of Lisbon, intended to bring greater coherence and impact to the EU's international relations" (Hemra et al 2012, vi).
in the common European architecture, is on the cards is all the more remarkable, given that treaties dating back to the 1950s for the EU's predecessor organizations did not treat with these areas.

6.4 The EU Approach to Global Governance: EU Interregionalism, EU Actoriness and the CARIFORUM-EU EPA

6.4.1 EU Global Governance: A Sui Generis Approach?

The European Commission functionary cited above makes a compelling case for how the EU positions itself as a global actor, and importantly how it exerts soft power: "persuading countries to integrate themselves into legal frameworks and economic relationships with the Union." The statement is revealing in respect of the EU's approach to global governance, too, as it goes to the heart of ideas of a European order. A European Commission White Paper on European Governance ((COM(2001) 428 final)) provides insights into the Union's interest in the transposition of EU norms internationally.

However, the aforementioned statement also resonates with the EU's sense of identity, in large measure framed politically—precisely because of its cultural and linguistic heterogeneity. Thus various EU Treaties describe the Union as being founded "on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law." Indeed, at the Copenhagen European Summit in 1973, the Heads of State/Government of the nine Member States of the enlarged European Community at the time affirmed their determination to introduce the concept of European identity\textsuperscript{283} into their common foreign relations (Declaration on

\textsuperscript{283} European identity in this sense has nothing to do with a European cosmopolitan identity, in so far as the latter hinges on a cultural self-transformation; the European identity construct found in the \textit{Declaration on European Identity} is a product of official institutions (Beck and Grande 2007).
European Identity 1973). Instructively, the statement notes:

'The Nine have the political will to succeed in the construction of a united Europe. On the basis of the Treaties of Paris and Rome setting up the European Communities and of subsequent decisions, they have created a common market, based on a customs union, and have established institutions, common policies and machinery for co-operation. All these are an essential part of the European Identity.....The European identity will evolve as a function of the dynamic construction of a United Europe. In their external relations, the Nine propose progressively to undertake the definition of their identity in relation to other countries or groups of countries. They believe that in so doing they will strengthen their own cohesion and contribute to the framing of a genuinely European foreign policy.

(Declaration on European Identity 1973, 2 and 4; my emphasis)

The Davignon Report, though set out fully three years earlier than the Declaration on European Identity, was an effort on the part of Foreign Ministers of the Member States of the then European Communities to usher progress with respect to political unification through cooperation in foreign policy matters. The Report cited instructions by the Heads of State/Government a year earlier “to study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification, within the context of enlargement” of the European Communities. In respect of instructions by the Heads of State/Government, instructively the Report went on to note:

They stated that “the European Communities remain the original nucleus from which European unity has been developed and intensified”. And they expressed their determination to pave “the way for a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate with its traditions and its mission”.

(Davignon Report 1970, 2; my emphasis)
Even more striking was the Report's reference to the following:

The Heads of State or Government affirmed their "common conviction that a Europe composed of States which, in spite of their different national characteristics, are united in their essential interests, assured of its internal cohesion, true to its friendly relations with outside countries, conscious of the role it has to play in promoting the relaxation of international tension and the rapportement among all peoples, and first and foremost among those of the entire European continent, is indispensable if a mainspring of development, progress and culture, world equilibrium and peace is to be preserved....The Ministers therefore felt that foreign policy concertation should be the object of the first practical endeavours to demonstrate to all that Europe has a political vocation."

(Davignon Report 1970, 2 and 3)

That we see ideational referents to Europe and its role that date back several decades in the aforementioned documents would suggest that NPE, per se, is not new. As I had intimated earlier, E.H. Carr and other scholars writing decades ago touched on ideas widely associated with NPE today. Indeed, Professor Andre Sapir has argued that "from a conceptual perspective, NPE is not new. From a descriptive viewpoint, it is; for the reason that the EU is evolving in a trend which suggests that a global Europe is rising. Tremendous strides have been taken in the economic, political, cultural and intellectual realms; this European project can benefit other states not formally part of the Union. The projection of this project is informing the EU's interaction with others, forming critical elements of a distinctly European vision for global governance. What is more, that the European project is reaching a critical mass within the Union, there is tremendous scope for its export beyond the Union. By the same token, in so far as NPE projects the European project it serves a defensive end, a countervail against the United States' designs for a global governance order and for that matter a rising China. There is also an offensive dimension, in this regard. The EU wants to advance the cause of its norms for
commercial and business ends, too. Innovation and competitiveness are now central to civilizational advance.”

The various statements referenced above are telling of a Europe entity's 'foreign policy' intentions, especially the declaration that in respect of the vision for Europe's responsibilities in and contribution to the world they must correspond in degree to its traditions and its mission which includes preserving a sense of progress and culture. In these key documents the EU's global role expectations were garnished with a normative sense of purpose, and as such are in keeping with the normative-role approach. Practitioners, it would appear, have been leading the charge in transforming the narrative on the possibilities of a re-envisioned Europe in international affairs. Theoreticians would soon follow, as the 1970s unfolded, in adopting and extolling this narrative; chief amongst them was Duchene.

In the realm of the CFSP, the EEAS has positioned the EU to 'speak with one voice' as never before. Article 13a Amendments To The Treaty on European Union And To The Treaty Establishing The European Community attest to this. The EU's interregionalist pivot is an integral part of this narrative. However, how the EU has come to deal with enlargement is also instructive; in that it reinforces cohesion around a norm-laden stance/voice projected to third parties. The so-called Copenhagen criteria captures this dimension quite well. It notes that:

Membership criteria require that the candidate country must have achieved

- stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
- the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope

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284 Interview by author, Prague, Czech Republic, 16th January, 2010.
285 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union also lends insight, in this regard, in so far as it sets out core EU values; in the very first chapeau of its Preamble it frames the notion of “ever closer union” on the basis of “common values”. It goes on to set out other values, underscoring the “individual [as being] at the heart of the Union's activities” (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 2000).
286 See http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm

254
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;
• the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the
aims of political, economic & monetary union, and importantly adoption of the
acquis communautaire based on expanded administrative structures to do so.

(European Council 1993)

What of the EU’s dealings with states or groupings of states farther afield? Again, the
Declaration on European Identity is instructive. In reference to the then Member States, as
previously noted, the Declaration said those States “propose progressively to undertake the
definition of their identity in relation to other countries or groups of countries. They believe that
in so doing they will strengthen their own cohesion and contribute to the framing of a genuinely
European foreign policy.” Two themes come into view.

First, allowance was made for engaging “groups of countries”. A more recent
Commission communication is especially notable, in this regard. It records the following:

The EU has a duty, not only towards its citizens and those of the new member
states, but also towards its present and future neighbours to ensure continuing
social cohesion and economic dynamism. The EU must act to promote the
regional and subregional cooperation and integration that are preconditions for
political stability, economic development and the reduction of poverty and social
divisions in our shared environment.

(European Commission 2003, 3; my emphasis)

Second, the act of engaging third parties would 'strengthen their own cohesion and contribute to
the framing of a genuinely European foreign policy.'

Both these propositions resonate as much today as they did thirty-plus years ago. In sum,
interregionalism holds up EU actorness.
I had previously linked interregionalism to EU actorness, suggesting that it props up the latter. I address this contention in detail now.

That this notion pervades practitioners' thinking is becoming increasingly apparent, in light of the trend of a sharp increase in pronouncements to this end. In a European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs Resolution/Report on the 'EU as a Global Actor: Its Role in Multilateral Organisations (2010/2298(INI))' issued 29 April 2011, it was noted that the Lisbon Treaty by “introducing” the EU’s a legal personality:

....entrusts [the EU] with a wider range of competences in its external action, provides, notably by the creation of the post of a Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Union with an opportunity for a clearer and stronger single voice in the world, as well as encouraging all types of mutually beneficial cooperation with relevant international and regional organisations and groups of states, and whereas it enables the Union to organise itself in such a way as to be able to become an effective global player. ....

(European Parliament 2011, 5; my emphasis)

The same document went on to say that the European Parliament (which has a 'strengthened role'/'new powers', as a result of the Treaty of Lisbon or Lisbon Treaty) “[t]akes the view that, as a general rule and in the spirit of the Lisbon Treaty, in cases of exclusive competences the EU should be the pre-eminent actor with full membership of the given multilateral organisation while its Member States may also – but need not necessarily – be present as members, but usually without an independent role” (European Parliament 2011, 5).

The Lisbon Treaty refers to the EU as an actor on the international stage empowered with a voice, and as such is an instantiation of the EU as global actor approach. Instructively in the Treaty, the EU is referred to as having the “competence” to define and implement a common
foreign and security policy, a competence which includes the “progressive framing of a common defence policy.” In respect of external action, “the role of the EU is further enunciated in the Treaty such the EU can be a player on multiple stages and assert itself as never before in international affairs”. 287

I want now to return to a statement by Manners that I have cited before: for him the concept of NPE is the “ability to shape conceptions of 'normal' in international relations” (2002, 239). The statement has a dual meaning. In as much as it references, as I have discussed, norm projection and the role of that exertion of norms in changing up the 'normal' viz-a-viz norms, its second meaning is just as important: the differencia specifica of the EU. Importantly, that the EU is a region operating in an international space conventionally seen as the domain of states in and of itself disrupts notions of what is 'normal' in international relations (Manners 2002). What is more, the EU cannot be neatly folded into the set of actors conventionally labeled international organizations, because both in form (institutions) and goals (vision) the EU stands apart in continually shifting the 'limits of the possible'. Thus at the level international organizations, too, the EU forces a re-think of what is 'normal'.

Further still, in projecting itself and framing itself as a cohesive region, the EU as Dr Luk Van Langenhove argues “wants to interact with others like it; meaning regions that exude regionness. The EU wants to identify with other regions. Where there is a dearth of others like it, the EU wants to create those like entities. This helps establish normalcy for it as an actor. Where the EU finds an environment that is not populated with like entities, it seeks to create them so as hold up a reality consistent with its form; the push towards regional EPAs fits with this agenda. The reverse is also true, in that by projecting itself as a region it wants to change up what is

considered normal in the actor-centric international system.”

At this juncture, I contend that interregionalism is also a key vehicle/medium or platform that not only buttresses but projects NPE or spread/extend EU norms globally, what the EU ultimately aspires toward in the international sphere in order to shape a global governance model with regional overtones. Various European bodies have said as much, with references to the EU being positioned to be “able to assert its interests and values on the international scene” (European Parliament 2011). The EU has “honored its experience, in this regard, in the accession process with respect to EU enlargement.”

The EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007, respectively, brought large chunks of Eastern and Southern Europe into the EU fold. In and of itself, enlargement is a linchpin of ensuring compliance with a common body of norms, constitutionalized as a body of law no less. This acquis communautaire is the ultimate, most ideal way for the EU to shore up its norms and through its interregionalist approach to global governance.

However, it is not practicable for enlargement to continue at the pace it has in recent years. There are several hurdles to this. Two that immediately come to mind is the appetite (or lack thereof) within the European polity for continued enlargement. There is also the question of the boundeness of Europe, in so far as a European zone is concerned.

If it is that the EU is taken up with projecting its norms, surely enlargement cannot be the

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288 Interview by author, Prague, Czech Republic, 17th January, 2010.
290 In May 2004, ten states joined the EU (i.e., Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) in the way of the so-called 'big bang' enlargement. This fifth accession brought in the largest number of states, and it was followed in January 2007 with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania.
291 The acquis communautaire is, in effect, the continual codification of Community/European values, which form an important element in the NPE projection narrative, in so far as the areas being dealt with by the acquis are finding expression in EU external action around the EPA, for instance, but also the CPA: Mr Morgan Githinji, Expert, Market Access, ACP Secretariat: Interview by author, Brussels, 21st January, 2010.
only tool at its disposal, given the limitations therein. It can be surmised that other platforms are required, to continue NPE. EU pivoted interregionalism with third states or non-member states who in the main will likely not become formal members is a hallmark of this strategy.

The EU has a strong interest in continuously engaging a pool of states so that on the basis of that engagement those states are positioned to partake of, have a stake in and in turn reproduce the EU global governance order. The end result is that the EU-influenced international system/order becomes self sustaining, built on self reinforcing agents (i.e. regions) and structure (i.e. the international system) that relate to each other intersubjectively with norms being the bridge: this approach is *sui generis* to the EU.²⁹² Empirical evidence supports this claim. We need look no further than the CARIFORUM-EU EPA, though this influence narrative is more apparent in the European neighbourhood policy (ENP), as is evidenced in European Commission statements as follows:

The objective of the ENP is to share the benefits of the EU’s 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned. It is designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and to offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural co-operation....The method proposed is, together with partner countries, to define a set of priorities, whose fulfilment will bring them closer to the European Union. These priorities will be incorporated in jointly agreed Action Plans, covering a number of key areas for specific action: political dialogue and reform; trade and measures preparing partners for gradually obtaining a stake in the EU’s Internal Market; justice and home affairs; energy, transport, information society, environment and research and innovation; and social policy and people-to-people contacts.....The European Neighbourhood Policy will reinforce existing forms of regional and subregional cooperation and provide a framework for their further development.

(Commission for the European Communities 2004, 3 and 4)

²⁹² This narrative is reminiscent of constructivism, which is widely recognized for bridging structure and agency.
In point of fact, after enlargement the next testing ground for the transposition of EU norms are the EU's immediate neighbours, via the ENP. As some scholars have noted, "[e]arly ENP pronouncements in particular made conscious references to the Copenhagen criteria and the acquis communautaire as appropriate guidelines for the ENP countries" (Magen 2007, 379). As previously intimated, Agreements entered into via the EU's interregionalist pivot, like the EPA (but also Association Agreements with non-ACP states, e.g. in Latin America), are a third tier of the EU strategy of norm projection. It is perhaps opportune to note here that, "in as much as a link can be made between NPE and EPA that link was not always there. When talk of the EPA began, that instrument was framed strictly in terms of facilitating WTO compatibility in EU trading relations with the ACP regions." There is "no doubt, too, that the EPAs were seen, at their 'conceptual outset' as an instrument to surmount the long simmering 'banana battle'-which came to a head in the mid-1990s when banana preferences were deemed indefensible in the WTO context—in which both the CARIFORUM States and by extension the EU were involved in, pitted against other, primarily Latin American, WTO members."

However, "in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War and contemplation of the inclusion of parts of Eastern and Southern Europe into the EU via enlargement prompted strategic thinking on the extension of application of elements of the acquis communautaire beyond the shores of Europe. As the 2000s drew nearer, the conceptualization of the EPAs as being more than just about sorting out WTO compatibility took hold in hallways of the European Commission." This sentiment about the acquis communautaire is shared by legal scholars.

\footnote{Mr Walter Kennes, Head of the Sector for Regional Integration, Directorate-General for Development, European Commission: Interview by author, Brussels, 22nd January, 2010.}
\footnote{Mr San Bilal, Head of Economic Governance Programme, European Centre for Development Policy Management: Interview by author, Brussels, 22nd January, 2010.}
\footnote{Mr Walter Kennes, Head of the Sector for Regional Integration, Directorate-General for Development, European Commission: Interview by author, Brussels, 22nd January, 2010.}
and given practical expression in the Lisbon Treaty. Instructively, the European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso quipped, “it is often said that the EU’s comparative advantage lies in its normative power or the power of its values” (Barroso 2009).

Indeed, these various methods of docking with Europe in a fashion that facilitates the transposition of norms supports (and fits very nicely with) the aforementioned contention of an EU functionary, which bears repeating here: “[t]he EU’s most effective method of exerting soft power is by persuading countries to integrate themselves into legal frameworks and economic relationships with the Union” (Rehn op cit). The framing of the EPA along these lines merits further study, as the EU's engagement in this regard is emblematic of a distinctive interregionalist European, normative approach to global governance. Many in the Caribbean's PBA and TBA have made this observation, as my field research has revealed.

As is revealed in the next section, EU values are transposed through the EPA. This is emblematic of the regionalization norm, and is “a tactic that obtains with regards to the EPAs that the EU has pursued with the other ACP regions, too”. Moreover, the Agreement serves to reinforce the EU's understanding of the identity-based delimitation of the Caribbean. As we shall also see, this 'prevailing' view of the regional configuration has visited complexities that go to

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296 For Magen, “the phrase ‘acquis communautaire’ contains two commonly undifferentiated yet strongly distinct personalities, which in turn serve two very different purposes: an inward-looking, 'internal order' personality that represents the inherited patrimony of the community and acts to preserve the sui generis genetic code of European integration; and a second, 'transformative engagement' (or 'governance export') personality, whose purpose is the outward projection of EU norms and the advancement of its interests abroad” (2007, 361-362).

297 Article 21 of Title V, Chapter I of the Lisbon Treaty reads as follows: “The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world...”.

298 For example, in an interview I conducted with Ambassador Henry Gill, former Director General, CRNM in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago on 18th May, 2012 he argued “given how the EU is positioning itself in the world it is always trying to influence norms, and platforms like the EPA represent important means through which it attempts to exercise that influence.” A similar view was expressed by Ambassador Colin Murdoch, Antigua and Barbuda’s Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Trade (who also serves as an OECS Commissioner on behalf of that country and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Caribbean Export Development Agency) in an interview I conducted with him in Georgetown, Guyana on 25th May, 2012.

the heart of how these states treat with each other.

6.4.2 EU Global Governance: The Role of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA

In respect of the aforementioned research trajectory, my empirical analysis focuses on one EU policy-type norm: regionalization. In so far as for Manners (2002) a norm is not only a commonly accepted standard but a standard that is dubbed normal, my interest lies in exploring what the EU supports as normal in respect of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA's form and function.

I. The Export of the Regionalization Norm: The EPA in Form

At this juncture, let us turn our attention once more to the CARIFORUM-EU EPA. It bears repeating here that the EPA can be traced back to the CPA (see Chapter Five). Indeed, elements of the preamble of the EPA are framed in the context of the CPA. What is even more instructive is that Article 2 of the EPA on Principles says of the Agreement, it “is based on the Fundamental Principles as well as the Essential and Fundamental Elements of the Cotonou Agreement, as set out in Articles 2 and 9, respectively, of the Cotonou Agreement” (European Commission 2008; my emphasis). It goes on to note that the EPA “shall build on the provisions of the Cotonou Agreement and the previous ACP-EC Partnership Agreements in the area of regional cooperation and integration...[and that]...the Parties agree that the Cotonou Agreement and this Agreement shall be implemented in a complementary and mutually reinforcing manner” (ibid; my emphasis).

This is not a norm that Manners identifies in his classificatory schema that lists nine EU norms, nor is it one that garners much explicit focus in the literature. He flags five core norms: peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights; four minor norms are also noted: social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance. The regionalization norm can, however, be seen as a supportive norm, in so far as the other norms that are typically identified in the literature find expression in a regionalization backdrop. What is more, regionalization as a concept looms large in “declaratory” language in respect of EU communications on external action (Manners 2002, 248). What is more, regionalization is fundamental to EU identity.
In respect of Article 2 of the second revision of the CPA there are four headings related to fundamental principles, the last of which is germane here. It is partly captioned as “regionalization.” This portion of the Article reads as follows:

[Co]operation arrangements and priorities shall vary according to a partner's level of development, its needs, its performance and its long-term development strategy. Particular emphasis shall be placed on the regional dimension.

(European Commission 2005; my emphasis)

Article 4 of the EPA touches on Regional integration, and it reads in part: “[t]he Parties recognise that regional integration is an integral element of their partnership and a powerful instrument to achieve the objectives of this Agreement” (European Commission 2005). The Agreement further notes, “[t]he Parties recognise and reaffirm the importance of regional integration among the CARIFORUM States as a mechanism for enabling these States to achieve greater economic opportunities, and enhanced political stability and to foster their effective integration into the world economy” (European Commission 2005).

Herein resides the nub of what has turned out to be a bone of contention on multiple levels: The ideal definition/configuration of the Caribbean region, for purposes of the EPA. As I have already pointed out, the signatory states to the EPA are the fifteen CARIFORUM States; i.e. the independent CARICOM Member States and the Dominican Republic. In point of fact the agglomeration of these states into a regional configuration, as one of six ACP regions which the

301 “There are some who hold the view that the regional dimension of the EU's EPA project across the ACP actually split the ACP in a way that the trans-regional grouping is not likely to recover from”: Mr Morgan Githinji, Expert, Market Access, ACP Secretariat: Interview by author, Brussels, 21st January, 2010. Senior technicians maintained “the ACP Group has played and continues to play a critically important role, and while it must evolve to suit the times we cannot contemplate a diminished role for the Group. However, that there is no mention of the ACP in the Lisbon Treaty is a worrying sign. What is more, the budgetization of the EDF and other processes in train, like the Joint EU-Africa Strategy and the Joint Caribbean-EU Strategy, though important, take away from the ACP”: H.E. Shirley Skerritt-Andrew, Ambassador, Embassies of the Eastern Caribbean States (ECS) to the Kingdom of Belgium and Missions to the European Union: Interview by author, Brussels, 21st January, 2010.
EU tasked itself to work with to secure one of six EPAs, has posed a special challenge. To understand why, we must trace CARIFORUM's origins.\textsuperscript{302}

CARIFORUM was created two decades ago. The configuration and the thinking on it have come a long way, in the intervening period. CARIFORUM was formally established in the early 1990s, when its Rules of Procedure were approved by Ministers of CARIFORUM States and signed in November 1992.\textsuperscript{303} This came on the heels of the accession of the Dominican Republic and Haiti to existing ACP-EU Agreements and the need to coordinate the use of funds for regional development cooperation, derived from these agreements, to promote regional integration amongst states involved. In other words, CARIFORUM was originally created as a consultation and coordinating space for the implementation of the resources aimed at promoting regional cooperation under the Lomé IV Convention.

For close to a decade of its existence, CARIFORUM was anchored institutionally by a Secretariat. It existed parallel to the CARICOM Secretariat. The CARIFORUM Secretariat was later merged into the CARICOM Secretariat, following a revision of the CARIFORUM Rules of Procedure, at the outset of the last decade. With a view to continuing in the servicing of the CARIFORUM function, a CARIFORUM Directorate was created within the CARICOM Secretariat. If we are to look to the genesis of CARIFORUM, the Secretary-General of CARICOM has been the Secretary-General of CARIFORUM. That dispensation has remained, following the merger. The CARIFORUM Directorate falls under the Secretary-General of

\textsuperscript{302} The themes covered in the following paragraph draw extensively from an Interview by the author of Mr Iván Ogando Lora, Director-General, CARIFORUM Directorate, Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat, Georgetown, Guyana, 22nd June, 2011.

\textsuperscript{303} While established in the early 1990s, “CARIFORUM was conceived of in the late 1980s, when the Dominican Republic and Haiti joined the Lomé Agreement. In CARIFORUM, the European Commission was able to accommodate the Dominican Republic and Haiti in respect of development cooperation relations. CARIFORUM, as the name indicates, was really more of a forum to facilitate exchange on the EDF CRIP and cooperation issues broadly conceived,” Mr Ben Nupnau, Economic and Trade Affairs Manager, Economic Partnership Agreements Unit, Directorate-General for Trade: Interview by author, Brussels, 22nd January, 2010.
CARIFORUM, though its day-to-day operations are managed by a Director-General who oversees its two Units, one of which is engaged in Development Cooperation/Programming and the other facilitates EPA Implementation. Mandates for the Directorate come from the CARIFORUM Ministerial Council.

In recent times, there has been a discernible change in tenor regarding how the role and responsibilities of CARIFORUM are viewed. There have been calls to strengthen and breathe new life into the role and responsibilities of CARIFORUM. The case for expanding the scope of CARIFORUM has been thrust into the spotlight by the shifting CARIFORUM/EU relational narrative, for so long pivoted by a development cooperation dynamic, to one that is increasingly animated by an implementation narrative regarding the EPA, as well as geo-political considerations.

In sum, CARIFORUM was conceived of and established as a configuration with a very specific purpose in mind.304 With the advent of the preliminary exchange of views between the Caribbean and EU sides with respect to the latter's desire to pursue an EPA with the region, however, it became clear that there was an emerging sense amongst some that the existing CARIFORUM configuration should be utilized as the spatial dimension of the region for purposes of the negotiation of that Agreement.

As one European Commission staffer put it, "the EU wanted to facilitate regional integration by way of the EPA, but CARICOM as an integration grouping was deemed as being too parochial."305 The staffer further noted, "it was always felt that a larger regional configuration would fit the bill, in that it would be big enough to be viable. From the vantage

304 Mr Luis Omar Fernandez Aybar, Ambassador-Executive Secretary of the National Trade Negotiations Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dominican Republic: Interview by author, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 12th June, 2012.
point of states in such a larger configuration likely being able to identify with each other—as they are all part of the Caribbean space—and in terms of the greater economic/trade benefit to be had from a larger grouping collectively utilizing the EPA, it was felt that CARIFORUM would be suitable."

Admittedly, views on the matter were mixed, with the Caribbean side for the most part expressing reservations. A senior Caribbean elite technocrat has said, “my view that the inclusion of the Dominican Republic in a Caribbean configuration to negotiate the EPA was not necessarily wrongheaded goes against the grain.” By the same token, the technocrat noted “the problem is how the Dominican Republic was accommodated in the Caribbean configuration that would come to negotiate the EPA.” I will return to consider this latter point shortly.

Suffice to say, there was some debate early on during efforts to organize the two sides to negotiate the EPA for the Dominican Republic to “go it alone,” and for their part the independent states of CARICOM would sign on to negotiating an EPA. This was generally welcomed in the Caribbean side, considering many on this side were protagonists of this view. There were some in the Dominican Republic who, for various reasons, were not necessarily opposed to this view.

The EU was “not seized of idea of a separate deal for the Dominican Republic, which that country had asked for.” The idea of a separate deal for the Dominican Republic never really took hold as it did not find favour with the EU side, given that this notion went against the EU’s

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307 Ambassador Ellsworth John, St Vincent and the Grenadines' emissary to CARICOM and Head of the Regional Integration and Diaspora Unit in the Office of the Prime Minister: Interview by author, in Georgetown, Guyana on 25th May, 2012.
308 Senior trade official: Interview by author, 14th June, 2011.
309 Senior trade official: Interview by author, 14th June, 2011.
310 Senior trade official: Interview by author, 14th June, 2011.
311 Mr Remco Vahl, Deputy Head of Unit, Economic Partnership Agreements Unit, Directorate General for Trade, European Commission: Interview by author, Brussels, 22nd January, 2010.
regionalization norm; not just in the context of the Caribbean but if it were to have entertained the idea much less pursued it there would have been implications for the other ACP regions, in particular some in Africa that are much less cohesive.\textsuperscript{312}

The EU did not necessarily force the 'Caribbean's hand' with respect to an acceptance, on their part, of the CARIFORUM configuration. However, “it was evident that the EU wanted the Dominican Republic in the CARIFORUM configuration.”\textsuperscript{313} As one regional technocrat put it, “the EU was the match-maker”.\textsuperscript{314} There was “more of a take it or leave it mentality on the EU's part. The Caribbean was not necessarily opposed to the EU's regionalization norm, given its long history of pursuing regional integration. But it was recognized even then that the Dominican Republic's inclusion could pose manifold challenges. That the CARICOM states were at that time pursuing a bilateral trade agreement with the Dominican Republic, and thus on paper this could be interpreted as meaning CARICOM states were committed to integration with that country, it was a stretch to imagine that this sort of initiative gave license for the Dominican Republic to be let into the Caribbean fold to negotiate an EPA.

On the face of it, an outsider not \textit{au fait} with the delicate diplomatic dance between CARICOM states and the Dominican Republic might have thought that a bilateral trade agreement in process between them should have set the stage for a deeper regional interaction courtesy of the EPA. But such an interpretation would have been oblivious to some of the very serious tensions, which have played out over the years at a very high level where three applications of the Dominican Republic for CARICOM membership have at best received tepid

\textsuperscript{312} Mr Remco Vahl, Deputy Head of Unit, Economic Partnership Agreements Unit, Directorate General for Trade, European Commission: Interview by author, Brussels, 22nd January, 2010.
\textsuperscript{313} Sir Edwin W. Carrington, former Secretary General, CARICOM Secretariat: Interview by author, Georgetown, Guyana, 17th November, 2011 and 29th March, 2012.
\textsuperscript{314} Mr Esmond Reid, Minister Counsellor, Jamaican Mission to the European Union and Jamaican Embassy: Interview by author, Brussels, 21st January, 2010.
and at worst no response from CARICOM.”

As an elite technocrat put it, “the inclusion of the Dominican Republic into the Caribbean configuration to negotiate the EPA seemed logical to the EU.” As an EU official said, “with the emergence of the CPA and the recognition that springing from it would be regional EPAs, in terms of the Caribbean EPA it was obvious to the EU side that the Dominican Republic would be part of that configuration. For the EU, the Dominican Republic is a part of one geographic space; its inclusion in the Caribbean configuration to negotiate the EPA made a lot of sense. This is not to say that CARIFORUM was an instrument of convenience; we recognized that regional integration can take many forms, including incipient forms. Considering the Dominican Republic falls outside of CARICOM, we imagined that the EPA would facilitate deepened integration with respect to the Dominican Republic and CARICOM; which at the time was already receiving a boost from the negotiation of the CARICOM-Dominican Republic FTA.” (This rationale would resonate somewhat with technocrats in the Dominican Republic who were originally averse to pairing their country with CARICOM to negotiate the EPA, but it was by no means the deciding factor with respect to their change of heart.)

315 Senior trade official: Interview by author, 14th June, 2011.
316 Ambassador Errol L. Humphrey, Head of the EPA Implementation Unit in the Foreign Trade Division of Barbados’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade and former Vice-Dean of the CARIFORUM EPA College of Lead and Alternate Lead Negotiators (he also served as Ambassador of Barbados to Belgium and the EU): Interview by author, Cave Hill, Barbados, 23rd April, 2010 in the margins of the European Commission-UWI Conference on the CARIFORUM-EU EPA One Year On: Regional Integration and Sustainable Development.
318 The “game changer” regarding Dominican elite technocrats for the most part coming on board with the idea of joining with CARICOM to negotiate the EPA was that country's experience negotiating the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement or DR-CAFTA (Mr Manuel Rodriguez, Economic Studies Coordinator, Directorate of Foreign Trade and Commercial Treaties Administration, Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Dominican Republic: Interview by author, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 12th June, 2012). Originally the Agreement was envisioned to encompass five Central American nations on the one hand and the United States on the other. Negotiations began in early 2003, and the Agreement was signed in 2004. After negotiations had begun with the original grouping of countries, the Dominican Republic was docked on. The announcement that the Dominican Republic would join negotiations came in late 2003. Actual Negotiations between that country and the United States got underway in early 2004, concluding by March of that year. The Agreement entered into force in
Ultimately, the “EU vision is to support regional markets that tend to approximate what it sees as geographical spaces.”319 An elite technocrat makes the point that “the Caribbean is seen as a subsystem and the governments of this Community are desirous to protect the identity of the subsystem as a recognizable collectivity making decisions within an autonomously determined juridical and political framework.”320 (I have touched intermittently on this theme throughout the study) In this vein, taking the similarities of CARICOM Members into consideration, a regional statesman has proclaimed, “these countries [are] more than neighbours. The purpose of the grouping is more than fraternal” (Seaga 2005, 128).

This is a widely held view, across the Region, couched in conceptions of solidarity, derived from a sense of shared heritage (and interests) and belonging/community: i.e. 'cognitive regionalism' (Hurrell 1995, 352) that are not necessarily tangible but nonetheless vital to (and, indeed, can be seen as the lifeblood or connective gel) giving the Caribbean region and regionalism expression.321 Professor Lewis further notes, “as it relates to the EPA, the EU's view of the Caribbean's regional construct won out. The independent CARICOM states, for the most

the Dominican Republic in 2007. However, both during negotiations and following their conclusion the Agreement was controversial in the Dominican Republic, primarily because of the extent of concessions that country had to give and the outcry that resulted from domestic interest groups and society at large. For the Dominican side, the negotiations were “tough” (ibid). The view has been expressed that “with the negotiating experience of the Dominican Republic with respect to the United States fresh in the minds of Dominican technocrats and policy makers, suddenly going it alone in negotiating with another Global North partner—the EU in the case of the EPA—was far from appealing. These players were minded that CARICOM would likely not be ambitious in negotiations for the EPA, an outlook that at the time resonated with some Dominican officials who with the experience of DR-CAFTA negotiations under their belt were inclined to play it safe. What is more, it is fair to say that some Dominican officials derived comfort in the knowledge that in a scenario of a paired negotiation with CARICOM the Dominican Republic would likely improve its odds of negotiating a more favourable Agreement” (ibid).

320 Professor Vaughan Lewis, Emeritus Professor, University of the West Indies and former Prime Minister of Saint Lucia and former Director-General, OECS Secretariat: Interview by author, Castries, Saint Lucia, 5th February, 2010.
321 As Cantori and Spiegel contend, states comprising a region must “have some common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social and historical bonds, and whose sense of identity is sometimes increased by the actions and attitudes of states external to the system” (1970, 6).
part, conceded to the Dominican Republic being grouped with them to negotiate the EPA; this was the price they had to pay, if you will, with respect to taking on board the EU's *regionalization* norm. In CARICOM's estimation, that norm was not an anathema, *per se*, as it was felt could shore up these states' lot in a rapidly changing global market place.  

Thus the EU's normative 'muscle' shone through in respect of the EPA in *form*. Its *regionalization* norm constructed the Caribbean region.

II. The Export of the Regionalization Norm: The EPA in *Function*

What of the deployment of the *regionalization* norm and its *function* in the EPA? By this I mean, do various elements of the EPA impact on *policy space* behind the borders? The short answer is yes, it does. On the face of it, this is not *sui generis* to the EPA. That the EPA touches on behind the border issues is part of a growing trend in trade relations, which has especially been playing out in the multilateral trading system. The trading system at this level "is faced with new and growing demands to extend the liberalization of international commerce and the purview of its rules in new areas hitherto considered only of domestic concern" (Sauve and Zampetti 2000, 83).

One element of the EPA that is unique, though, is Article 238 on the Regional Preference. EU negotiators were the progenitors of the article. It is emblematic of the exercise or the *function* of the *regionalization* norm in the EPA, and it has turned out to be meddlesome and especially contentious. Article 238(1) & (2) reads as follows:

1. Nothing in this Agreement shall oblige a Party to extend to the other Party of this Agreement any more favourable treatment which is applied within each of the Parties as part of its respective regional integration process.

2. Any more favourable treatment and advantage that may be granted under

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this Agreement by any Signatory CARIFORUM State to the EC Party shall also be enjoyed by each Signatory CARIFORUM State.

(European Commission 2008)

To fully appreciate the legal and trade woes that the language contained in these two sub-Articles antagonizes for CARIFORUM states, we need to first take stock of how differently positioned countries in the CARIFORUM configuration are in relation to the touchstone regional integration schema, the CSME.

Of the fifteen signatory CARIFORUM States to the EPA, at least two fall outside of the CSME and one hangs on its fringes. In respect of the two that are clearly not party to the CSME, they are The Bahamas and the Dominican Republic. The Bahamas is a CARICOM Member State, but has decided to opt out of the CSME. The Dominican Republic is not a CARICOM Member State, period. However, a CARICOM-Dominican Republic FTA has been pursued, which has been mired in difficulties and has a built-in agenda in the areas of Intellectual Property Rights and Services that both sides have been slow to effect. For its part, Haiti enjoys a special if at times ambiguous dispensation, in respect of its involvement in the CSME. Suffice to say, it hovers at the margins and for all intents and practical purposes can be considered removed from the integration schema in certain respects.

Herein resides the nub of what has turned out to be a bone of contention on multiple levels: Article 238 says, in a nutshell, that whatever treatment (principally with regards to market access (in Goods and Services), but also investment) one CARIFORUM state extends to an EU state that CARIFORUM state should provide no less favourable treatment to all
CARIFORUM states.\textsuperscript{323} That some CARIFORUM States fall outside of the CSME regional integration schema presents several difficulties/complexities.\textsuperscript{324}

Ultimately, the CARIFORUM-EU EPA was also pursued by the EU “in an effort to develop intra-regional trade and associated rules.”\textsuperscript{325} The fact is, CARIFORUM’s intra-regional dimensions reflect a patchwork of integration scenarios,\textsuperscript{326} which as I have indicated present difficulties/complexities\textsuperscript{327}, principally because CARIFORUM is not a customs union.

Let us now explore the scenarios that present difficulties/complexities, and why they do.

\textit{Scenario 1}

If any one CSME Member State extends certain treatment to an EU state under the aegis of the EPA’s Regional Preference, it must provide no less favourable treatment to all other CARIFORUM States:- Complexity: The benefit may not be one that the CSME Member State concerned would have been willing to concede to the Dominican Republic in the context of the CARICOM-Dominican Republic FTA. What is more, The Bahamas and Haiti are not signatory states to the CARICOM-Dominican Republic FTA. Furthermore, “the Agreement between CARICOM and the Dominican Republic is based on reciprocity with the five CARICOM MDCs and non-reciprocity with the LDCs until the year 2005. It provides for the asymmetrical application of the reciprocity principle as

\textsuperscript{323} The logic of the Regional Preference article does not apply in the case where a CARICOM State extends certain treatment to another CARICOM State, in so far as there is no obligation on the part of the state in question to provide no less favourable treatment to the Dominican Republic or the EU.

\textsuperscript{324} The EPA’s Regional Preference mimics a provision that operates in the EU internal market context.

\textsuperscript{325} Mr Remco Vahl, Deputy Head of Unit, Economic Partnership Agreements Unit, Directorate General for Trade, European Commission: Interview by author, Brussels, 22nd January, 2010.

\textsuperscript{326} Mr Gregory Downes, Brussels Representative, CRNM: Interview by author, Brussels, 22nd January, 2010.

\textsuperscript{327} What is more, deep differences between CARICOM and the Dominican Republic with respect to the EPA were only recently though not completely resolved. The differences had centered on the CARIFORUM governance issue, particularly as it relates to EPA implementation. Challenges experienced in the CARICOM-DR relationship (which extend to the realm of the CARICOM-Dominican Republic FTA, including its built-in agenda) have also been a matter of great concern across CARIFORUM states, and have “resulted in the slow pace of programming of Regional Indicative Programme resources as well as the processing of projects and the disbursement of funds necessary for EPA implementation” (McClean 2011, 23). Of note, after a seven-year hiatus the Fourth Meeting of the Joint Council established under the CARICOM-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement which convened in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago on 31 May 2012, ended much the same way as it did in 2005 – deadlocked. In respect of the EPA implementation dimension of things, the CARIFORUM Council of Ministers met in Belize in April 2011 and took a number of decisions intended bring resolution to a number of the long standing differences with respect to the existing CARIFORUM governance structure, and among those decisions was for “[t]he current position of Assistant Secretary-General of CARIFORUM should be designated as Director-General and the Director-General should also assume the position of CARIFORUM EPA Coordinator, in addition to his/her responsibility for the CARIFORUM Directorate” (\textit{Ibid.}, 23).
CARICOM LDCs are not required to reciprocate treatment.” In the context of the EPA, variable geometry is applied in the treatment of groups of states. Of note, CARICOM LDCs have not undertaken the degree of liberalization that other CARIFORUM States have, namely the Dominican Republic. There is an added wrinkle in the context of Scenario 1: there is a law, as at the time of writing, in the Dominican Republic (Law 173) which has been a longstanding impediment for CARICOM exporters seeking to penetrate the Dominican Republic market. Negative Outcome: for CSME Member State(s).

Scenario 2
If The Bahamas extends certain treatment to an EU state under the aegis of the EPA's Regional Preference, it must provide no less favourable treatment to all other CARIFORUM States: Complexity: for The Bahamas, as this could raise trade uncertainties given that it is not a CSME Member. Positive Outcome: for CSME.

Scenario 3
If any one CSME Member State extends certain treatment to an EU state under the aegis of the EPA's Regional Preference, it must provide no less favourable treatment to all other CARIFORUM States: Complexity: Though The Bahamas is an anomaly with respect to the CSME, because of the EPA's Regional Preference The Bahamas would be conferred benefits in the face of a situation where that country ordinarily would not have enjoyed a benefit given that it falls outside of the CSME construct. Negative Outcome: for CSME and CSME states.

Scenario 4
If Haiti extends certain treatment to an EU state under the aegis of the EPA's Regional Preference, it must provide no less favourable treatment to all CARIFORUM States: Scenario 2 would be repeated, but there is a legal grey area in terms of the degree of replication of the effect, given Haiti's ambiguous association with the CSME.

Scenario 5
If any one CSME Member State extends certain treatment to an EU state under the aegis of the EPA's Regional Preference, it must provide no less favourable treatment to all other CARIFORUM States: Scenario 3 would be repeated, but there is a legal grey area in terms of the degree of replication of the effect, given Haiti's ambiguous association with the CSME.

Against this backdrop, Article 233 on the Definition of the Parties and fulfillment of obligations serves to magnify the complexities in Article 238. Instructively at various points, Article 233

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invokes ambiguous responsibilities in respect of the Party vs. Parties.

The Regional Preference Clause raises a number of fundamental policy issues for CARIFORUM States which are not concentrically positioned in respect of the CSME. These issues arise on account of what I have already pointed to, how the CARIFORUM States are inserted, or not, into the CSME project.

The fact is for the most part the CSME process, pivoted by the Revised Treaty, and the CARICOM-Dominican Republic FTA are the two principal Agreements that structure the trading-cum-integration relationship within CARIFORUM. The illustration below highlights the schema described here.

**CSME Trade Hub-cum-CARIFORUM-centric Trade Schema**

![Diagram showing the trade hub-cum-CARIFORUM-centric trade schema]

*Source: Author.*

The CPA, at Article 35.2, states that “economic and trade cooperation shall build on regional integration initiatives of ACP States, bearing in mind that regional integration is a key instrument
for the integration of ACP States into the world economy” (European Commission 2005). In light of the above analysis of the 'export' of the EU’s regionalization norm to the Caribbean, though, it is an open question as to whether the most appropriate approach was pursued with respect to the EPA’s present form and function.

As to the EU’s expressed desire to apply the CARIFORUM configuration in the EPA context, a refrain from Neumann is instructive: “[R]egions are invented by political actors as a political programme, they are not simply waiting to be discovered” (2001, 58; my emphasis). This latter point is considered further, against the backdrop of the Joint Caribbean-EU Partnership Strategy.

6.5 The Joint Caribbean-EU Partnership Strategy: The Link to the CARIFORUM-EU EPA and NPE

In keeping with the “EU’s focus on regional approaches to political dialogue, joint partnership strategies have been developed or are in the process of being negotiated to take bi-regional partnerships forward.”329 At the Fourth CARIFORUM-EU Summit held in Madrid, Spain in 2010, the proposal for the formulation, adoption and implementation of a Joint Caribbean-EU Partnership Strategy was endorsed. The Caribbean and EU sides subsequently engaged in negotiations for a new Joint Strategy, further to one that crystallized in 2006.

On 19 November 2012, the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) of the EU formally adopted the new Joint Strategy. The Twentieth Meeting of the Council of Ministers of CARIFORUM, convened in the Dominican Republic on 29-30 November 2012, formally endorsed the Joint Strategy. CARIFORUM States had agreed to the final version of the Joint Strategy in October

2012. As at the time of writing, the launch of the Joint Strategy was expected to take place in the first quarter of 2013.

With respect to the previous Caribbean-EU Strategy, "the 2006 Caribbean-EU Strategy, the Caribbean was not a protagonist, *per se.*"\(^{330}\) This time around with the new Joint Strategy, the Caribbean is actively involved. The five agreed areas of action of the Joint Strategy are:

- The promotion of regional integration and cooperation for sustainable development;
- Responses to climate change and natural disasters;
- Support to Haiti;
- Cooperation on crime and security;
- Joint action in bi-regional and multi-lateral fora and on global issues.

Like the EPA, the Joint Strategy does not make specific provision for financial support. Absent no financing provisions, similar to the EPA, financing for the implementation of the Joint Strategy would have to be provided through the Cotonou Mechanisms for Development Cooperation.

The need for a new Joint Strategy has been described by the EU side as having come about because of new "developments and challenges" and a more complex international system—including the Lisbon Treaty which "has amended the way in which the EU and its institutions will interact with third countries and regions"—which have required another basis for interaction outside of the traditional relationship facilitated by the CPA (Council of the European Union 2010, 2).

A senior diplomat has said of a key Joint Strategy document, "a component of the text reflects an important pillar of the relationship envisioned for the Caribbean and the EU, namely '[t]he partnership is facilitated by the fact that for the EU, the Caribbean States are in general

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stable democracies governed by the rule of law and is of strategic geographic importance as the main gateway to the Americas.' "331 This statement is instructive, indeed.

The so-called 'enhanced bi-regional relationship' that is to emanate from the Joint Strategy has been described by the EU side as providing for an articulation of "common interests" (Ibid., 2). What is more, the Joint Strategy forms the basis for political dialogue on the future of CARIFORUM-EU relations.

The Joint Strategy does reveal a "pattern of regionalisation in the EU's external relations, complementing what has already been achieved with respect to regionalisation imperatives relating to the CARIFORUM-EU EPA."332 From the outset of the development of themes for the Joint Strategy, 'regional integration' was identified by the EU side as being one such area. Since then, the EPA has been repeatedly and explicitly referenced in this context. Instructively, one of the findings of a report that emanated from an outreach consultancy commissioned in 2011 to engage relevant stakeholders from the Caribbean side and source their input into the further development of the Joint Strategy stated that in terms of the Regional Co-operation & Integration component of the Joint Strategy stakeholders:

[C]alled for the bi-regional dialogue to emphasise that the Caribbean must drive the integration process - commitments with third parties, particularly agreements with the EU under EPA, should not dictate the pace and speed of integration in the region......numerous participants [interviewees] reflected on the experience with EPA, where targets and timeframes agreed to bi-regionally were “dictating the pace of integration within the region”.

(Houliston 2011, 11 and 30)

Thus, NPE overtones are found in the EPA. Indeed, the processes that the EPA is connected to

331 Brussels-based diplomat: Interview by author, 21st September, 2011.
further implicate it in an NPE narrative: the CPA is top on the list, given that the EPA takes into account the overall principles and objectives of the CPA.\textsuperscript{333} In fact, the EPA explicitly makes this link to the political context of the CPA. Some have said, "there is no denying that the EPA reflects, to some extent, an EU altruism, but that the EU has certain defined economic/commercial ends in mind in having pursued the EPA with CARIFORUM in particular, and in important ways those commercial dimensions are weaved into projecting EU values. The regional approach to the EPAs was, frankly, more manageable for the EU and allowed for some level of tailoring of values to suit certain clusters of states."\textsuperscript{334} Evidently, an EU actoriness is at play.

As the head of the EPA Implementation Unit in the Foreign Trade Division of Barbados' Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade and former Vice-Dean of the CARIFORUM EPA College of Lead and Alternate Lead Negotiators, Ambassador Errol L. Humphrey,\textsuperscript{335} underscores, "the EU has a global vision that it is projecting. It does so through many platforms, and the EPA is one of them. The EPA is, in part, a way for the EU to get the Caribbean to partake in this vision. To see the EPA strictly through the lens of it being a trade and development agreement is to not see the forest for the trees. Consider that the CPA, which is the context for the EPA, has a political dimension, one of three pillars to that Agreement, which the Lomé Agreements that came before did not have."\textsuperscript{336}

\textsuperscript{333} Indeed, Article 2 of the EPA in respect of Principles notes that "[t]his Agreement is based on the Fundamental Principles as well as the Essential and Fundamental Elements of the Cotonou Agreement, as set out in Articles 2 and 9, respectively, of the Cotonou Agreement." Article 2 goes on to state that "[t]he Parties agree that the Cotonou Agreement and this Agreement shall be implemented in a complementary and mutually reinforcing manner."

\textsuperscript{334} Mr Remco Vahl, Deputy Head of Unit, Economic Partnership Agreements Unit, Directorate General for Trade, European Commission: Interview by author, Brussels, 22nd January, 2010.

\textsuperscript{335} He was also a long serving Ambassador of Barbados to Belgium and the EU.

\textsuperscript{336} Interview by author, Cave Hill, Barbados, 23rd April, 2010 in the margins of the European Commission-UWI Conference on the CARIFORUM-EU EPA One Year On: Regional Integration and Sustainable Development.
This is a view shared by other elite technocrats. The Assistant Secretary-General of Foreign and Community Relations at the CARICOM Secretariat, Ambassador Colin Granderson, notes that “the EU’s approach to negotiating agreements with many parts of the developing world, and the Caribbean is no exception, draws on a certain vision of its place in the world and (at times) imposition of its norms—which find ultimate expression in its acquis communautaire—on that part of the world. The transposition of these norms is not unproblematic.”

In how it conveys its motives, though, the EU is careful to build an edifice of rhetoric that lends itself to narratives of legitimacy and altruism, cloaked in notions of partnership. Here we come full circle to the Joint Strategy, as it and its stated political dimension are tied into this narrative. As Barbados’ Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, H.E. Maxine McClean, states, “[a]lthough the scope of the Joint Strategy is broader than that of the EPA, there are some complementarities and even similarities or possible overlap in some areas” (2011, 25).

Indeed for some, “NPE ties into the EU reclaiming influence in the Global South following diminished influence in the wake of decolonization and new possibilities for the EU to insert certain ways of thinking in respect of aspects of post-Cold War global governance in a manner that can uphold and project European civilizational discourse, thereby invoking defensive and offensive imperatives to better mitigate a host of present and prospective security challenges to the European zone.”

The normative-role approach provides a theoretical backdrop for this sort of viewpoint regarding the EPA and the EU’s NPE agenda, and how it pivots itself accordingly.

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337 Interview by author, Georgetown, Guyana, 29th June, 2012.
6.6 The Functional Application of Actorness: Effects, Dynamics and Demonstrating Causal Relationships

As I did with respect to the first dimension of this study, I want now to draw attention to causal relationships in respect of the second dimension which sought to discern the hands of the EU as a would-be region constructor and in the projection of NPE, utilizing what has been described elsewhere rather simplistically as just a trade and development agreement—the CARIFORUM-EU EPA. I want, first, to take up where I left off earlier in the chapter in noting that elements of Manners' (2002) analysis are not that far removed from and owe an intellectual debt to constructivist contributions to EU studies.

Building on this argument, like constructivists, my starting position is that interests must be seen as being mutually constituted by way of interactions amongst actors. Further, the EPA can be viewed as a devise that brought together, for a time at least, the negotiating institutions of the Caribbean and the EU. With this in mind, the chapter developed the following arguments: in the lead up to EPA negotiations, EU agents in the European Commission exerted considerable influence amongst Caribbean States with respect to shaping their interest in the construction of the Caribbean as CARIFORUM. According to empirical findings that the CARIFORUM grouping ultimately became the configuration of choice was not so much a validation of EU region construction designs on the part of Caribbean States as it was a convenience for them, and one which they made work to their advantage during negotiations for the accord. The fact is, the addition of negotiators from the Dominican Republic into the Caribbean side made for a stronger negotiating team on that side. Afterall, the Dominican Republic had gained robust experience negotiating a variety of trade pacts especially with large developed countries, namely the United States in the context of DR-CAFTA.

However, the account of dynamics and implications of some socialization practices by
EU agents directed at the Caribbean region, as I have just described them, speak only to one part of a two part story developed in the chapter. The second argument put forward deals directly with the notion of actorness à la the post-Maastricht EU—by way of the European Commission—and its interregional engagement with the Caribbean. As with interregional interactions involving the European Commission in general, it was found that the EPA (which is caught up in the highly political Joint Caribbean-EU Partnership Strategy) is a mechanism for the EU to transfer elements of the legal and institutional norms à la the acquis communautaire to the Caribbean. This manoeuvre forms part of a wider, persistent global governance strategy targeting a significant chunk of the Global South, as evidenced by the EU's push to engage in EPAs with the other five ACP regions. Consider that together the ACP Group comprises a 79-member bloc.

The significance of this normative manoeuvre by the EU in its interactions with regions like the Caribbean cannot be overstated, since ideas matter in framing global governance agendas that are far from impartial. In this regard, whose ideas find expression as the defining ideas of any number of global governance imperatives can mean the difference in the extent of success and the degree to which groups of states fall short in respect of desired foreign policy ends, set against a zero-sum global governance environment.

In light of this sort of analysis, an important take away is that grafting of EU norms to developing country regions can come with its fair share of problems, in light of a complex set of interdependencies. The case of the one norm analyzed in the latter part of the chapter is evidence of this, in so far as it has visited complexities on a many-tiered integration schema involving the CARIFORUM States that are not easily tackled.

6.7 Conclusion

The chapter is firmly situated as a contribution to the debate on NPE. It serves to extend the
boundaries of this debate, delving as it does into previously unexplored areas. Not typically studied in this manner, the foregoing NPE-styled analysis lends new insight as regards the CARIFORUM-EU EPA. By extension it widens the geographic and conceptual scope of NPE studies in a manner that warrants greater attention from NPE scholars. What is more, it pushes the intellectual envelope in respect of scholarship on the CARIFORUM-EU EPA, which to date has centered on theoretical and policy issues in a rather conventional manner (see, for instance, Stevens et al 2009). Its domaine reserve has been questions that mainstream political economists are content on addressing: tariff issues, non-tariff barriers, new areas that the Agreement is taken up with, such as Services, and the prospects therein for a transformative effect on the productive and developmental potential of the Region.

Of course, this sort of analysis is important in its own right. However, the focus of such analysis is on the Agreement's façade. The Agreement has deeper meaning, both for how the Caribbean Region engaged with itself and with external actors like the EU. In this vein, I have formulated new kinds of empirical, theoretical and normative questions to examine the behavior of actors who attempt to construct the Caribbean for various purposes. That the Caribbean has not attracted the attention of constructivist scholars, small wonder then that this sort of analysis has been hitherto elusive.

Drawing on the work of IR constructivist scholars, Chapter Five sought to frame the EPA as a mirror-like devise that at once allows the Region to construct itself and establish an ideational framework thereto. The concept of regionness captures many of the elements therein, which I sought to explore. In as much as the study has been taken up with socialization processes wherein Caribbean agents are the protagonists, it has also been interested in how the Caribbean as a cognitive space is also the subject of a construction exercise by region constructors like the
EU. In an effort to understand what has motivated the EU in this regard, the study has examined its *actorness* in the particular context of the present chapter. The period under study presented an opportunity to study the EU in post-Maastricht terms, *à la* actorness. However, the negotiation of the EPA drew to a close on the cusp of the advent of the Lisbon Treaty. The era since then and because of that Treaty has seen EU actorness come into its own as never before, given the establishment of the EEAS with responsibility for coordinating European foreign policy and with a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy at its helm.

In sum, this chapter has sought to lend causal support to the arguments set out in the study, against the backdrop of empirical evidence that finds certain epistemic communities across both the Caribbean and Europe seek to socialize the Caribbean. The present chapter, in particular, reveals empirical insights of a global governance agenda at work in respect of the EU’s interregional interaction with CARIFORUM on the shoulders of the EPA. It is neatly captured by the term actorness, the dynamics of which have found expression *via* NPE. Field research which facilitated my interaction with members of both Caribbean and EU epistemic communities under examination revealed that to frame the EPA in purely trade and development terms is, thus, analytically myopic. Something else was at work during EPA negotiations: an effort to transpose NPE.

By the same token NPE tends to be treated with rather uncritically in some scholarship. The EU’s normative agenda is presented and typically accepted at face value as innocuous, a ‘force for good in world politics’. In analyzing elements of the *regionalization* norm, the chapter determined that norm transposition of that nature makes even more slippery a regional integration environment at the level of CARIFORUM which is still trying to find its footing.
PART V

CONCLUSION
Chapter VII
Concluding Remarks
and Possible Future Directions for Research

This dissertation has examined, as its primary topic of study, the social context of Caribbean (inter)regionalism: socialization of regional states by way of role-playing in relation to their identity problematique, in support of persuasion directed at securing norms to accommodate their idiosyncratic identity. The study has sought to locate the role, therein, of what I term elite technocrats in constructing a Caribbean actor and keeping it on-message against the backdrop of international structures and through narrations or the exercise of the 'speech act'/language production (that conjure images, inflect metaphors and frame social and interactional realities of the subject), such that a Caribbeaness is normalized in the international social environment.

Constructivism is an important referent, in this regard, in so far as that framework emphasizes the significance of so-called 'social facts' which are assigned intersubjective meanings (Searle 1995). What is more 'argumentative talk'-informed performative negotiations and related institutional practices, which hold up state identity, I demonstrate, play a crucial role in contouring norm-based social practices and realities.

There has been a paucity of scholarly work on these themes in relation to understanding the diplomatic praxis of Caribbean regionalism, wherein regional bureaucratic actors play a pivotal and too often overlooked role in steering the Region's diplomatic course.

In providing one of the first theoretical and empirical analysis of the social typification/signification of the Caribbean in an (inter)regionalist context, the dissertation makes an original contribution to an understanding of the production of the selfhood of states on and through what I term the 'Caribbean Regional Platform'. Theorizing small, marginal world regions like the
Caribbean as 'social constructs' thus provides conceptual purchase. The study contributes to an understanding of the role of social practices and discourse in generating state-cum-regional meanings as essential elements of norm-hinged Caribbean diplomacy. Thus it contributes to regionalist literature, the latter owing an intellectual debt to critical geopolitics and the NRA of Hettne and Söderbaum that draws attention to regional identity and the (de)construction of regions. Put simply the dissertation attempts to carve out a heuristic space for a better understanding of the role of very small state regions in the international system, one that provides grounds for optimism about their lot in that system. In doing so, it contributes to bridging the disciplinary boundaries of interregionalism, regionalism and island studies.

A core concern of and key take away/insight from the present study is that the size of the state is not so much the determinant of power (in the realist sense, i.e. material power) as is the best argument in a negotiated process: a central aim of the dissertation is to highlight this and, by extension, the power of ideas. Shared ideas, perceptions and norm-produced understandings tend to animate interactions amongst actors, big and small, in the international system.

Instructively the study challenges predominant interpretations of power, and in the process contributes to a cross-section of scholarly fields most especially IR. What we should be seized of and call attention to, it has been argued both theoretically and empirically, is the power of ideas/norms (namely, their moral persuasiveness) and the process of social learning/socialization in this regard, not the material power of states, per se, which makes for a highly problematic theoretical and conceptual framework. With respect to the world's smallest state regions, like the Caribbean, seen in this light they are able to punch above their weight in international affairs; defying expectations and 'leveling the playing field'. Thus, overcoming

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339 As Paasi (2001) contends in the exercise of social practice and discourse, regions 'become'.
limitations of acutely small size is possible in the international system and an appreciation of
how this can be achieved is sharpened by the deployment of a constructivist framework.

The Region's elite technocrats are aware of this from a practitioner's vantage point,
principally because they at the forefront of and have perfected its praxis. There is, however, less
of an appreciation amongst theoreticians of the theoretical applications much less the theoretical
underpinnings therein. Thus an appreciation for insights that can be gained from psychosocial
abstraction of the Caribbean state's diplomatic behavior tend to be lost on them, and most tend,
by default, to frame Caribbean diplomacy in instrumental terms. At best, theoreticians pay lip
service to the application of ideational frameworks to the study of Caribbean diplomacy. At
worse, they ignore them. Where the Region has been studied, parsimonious rationalist theories
find favour, with predictable result.

In addition, there are some other noteworthy findings stemming from the study's first
research dimension that I wish to flag at this juncture. While the states of the Caribbean Region
face ineluctable, manifold challenges regarding negotiating trade agreements by virtue of their
'smallness', there is something to be said about their size and shared identity working to their
advantage in the following respects:

(i) Their regional trade governance architecture is not weighed down by an
overly large epistemic community to consult and agree on matters, and so
negotiating positions/strategies can be regularly ventilated and arrived at
efficaciously based on identifiable trade interests and priorities. Moreover
and in light of the foregoing, strategic agility has come to characterize the
Region's negotiating posture;

(ii) Ideas circulate not only regularly but expansively amongst the tight-knit
pool of elite technocrats, permeating a collective consciousness that
informs first principles and associated ideational framings as well as
norms that the Region is invested in mainstreaming in given negotiations
discourse whenever it ventures to negotiate trade agreements. Importantly,
through its strong trade governance architecture the Region is able to
rigorously and deliberatively formulate/galvanize negotiating
positions/strategies from the ground up at the level of TBA all the way to PBA, for eventual sign-off; and

(iii) Issue-based advocacy is that much easier, especially in situations where first principles and ideas with respect to regional identity-based understandings are widely accepted in the group. Indeed, issue-based advocacy around the Region's identity problematique is a strategy that the Caribbean honed through its experience negotiating the EPA, and is one that it has put to use (drawing on the lessons of and insights from EPA negotiations) in CARICOM-Canada Trade and Development Agreement negotiations which CARICOM HoG and their Canadian counterpart agreed to launch in August 2007. Consider that in these negotiations the Caribbean has been very strong in advocating a Chapter on Development Cooperation and the modalities for the implementation of same. CARICOM has called for a clear commitment on the part of Canada regarding meaningful subject-specific development commitments in the various chapters of the Agreement, which go beyond the traditional notion of S&DT, whilst providing asymmetrical obligations in favour of CARICOM, in addition to specific support linked to a package of resources/development assistance. Failing a Chapter on Development Cooperation, CARICOM has made the case that treatment of development in the Agreement should be secured, for instance, through legally binding Development Cooperation instruments and be informed by and feature appropriate linkages with the provisions of the Agreement.

The second and related claim that the dissertation has examined and which has remained intact after having been subjected to analysis is that the EU is a global actor-cum-normative power that through interregionalist actions like the CARIFORUM-EU EPA has been promoting its vision of the identity-cum-regionalization orientation of the 'official' Caribbean region-building project, with the result that there are ideational and policy-type implications for the Caribbean. These efforts are not unrelated to the NPE agenda. An emergent normative power, the EU is increasingly relying on the norm-based exercise of actomess to achieve its own ends, which are deemed to be not altogether unproblematic. On the face of it, the EPA is billed by the EU as a

340 At the time of writing, the Fourth Round of Negotiations had been held in Barbados from 17-20 July 2012. It provided an opportunity for the two sides to continue textual negotiations which commenced in the Third Round.
trade and development agreement. My findings suggest that the EPA is about much more than its stated trade and development dimensions; and so to narrowly study it and frame it in these terms has limited explanatory value.

That the EPA goes well beyond this purview in intent and result suggests that the EPA cannot be viewed, or for that matter studied, in isolation from questions about the EU's role in the world and links to the NPE project, suggesting further that the other ACP regions that have as yet to sign-off on their respective EPA's should do so advisedly. As for the CARIFORUM Region, it needs to tread carefully as it proceeds to implement its EPA. Moreover, there is cause for research that further draws out the NPE-EPA linkage and the implications thereto.

At this juncture, I want to briefly recall a caveat I had raised at the outset of the study. The case has been made in the study that Caribbean regionalism and associated interregionalist engagement with the EU, along the lines examined, is conceived of as a formal intergovernmental/state-led, top-down process. The fact is such an approach suits the study's purpose, and relatedly it has lent itself, especially, to advancing the first of the two scholarly interventions at the heart of the dissertation. In this regard, the study draws from constructivist research agendas in interregionalism, regionalism and critical geopolitics scholarship, respectively, and the tradition of metaphorical analysis and abstraction of islands in island studies, with reference to the tradition of small state analysis in IR. The study is one (and not the only) way in which to analyze Caribbean (inter)regionalist engagements. I do not purport that the approach herein is 'one-size-fits-all'.

Regional integration could be studied in any number of competing ways, each informed by distinct approaches to and paradigms regarding the inscription of actors, their roles, associated processes (endogenous and exogenous) and outcomes with respect to regional
cooperation/coordination. For instance, the conventional hegemony scholarship could be a useful stepping stone. That it tends, however, to be tethered to rationalist/materialist approaches could be problematic for some. Classical theories like neo-functionalism may not fare better, given such frameworks' predisposition to European regionalism. Liberal inter-governmentalism, a framework that has arrived on the scholarly scene only recently, may also prove useful, though its predilection for domestic political economy imperatives is contestable in certain scenarios. Where informal, non-state regional societal interactions/actors, or for that matter economic/commercial cooperation, are the intended subjects of analysis, accounting in theoretical and analytical terms for inter-state cooperation may not in fact be a suitable approach for the analyst. He may be better served drawing on bottom-up regionalization paradigms, along with applicable metatheoretical approaches. In so far as the present study recognizes the crucial and marked role of PBA and TBA in the Caribbean Regional Platform with respect to socializing states of/in (depending on these elite technocrats' institutional vantage points) the 'Caribbean Region', the examination of (inter)regionalism in the theoretical and empirical terms prominent in the foregoing is deemed most appropriate.

Similarly in identifying the links that it does between the CARIFORUM-EU EPA and the EU's role in the world, the study determines that a juxtaposition of this interregionalist engagement on the NPE agenda is analytically most fitting. The strength of the evidence notwithstanding, some analysts may not be convinced by the findings of such an approach. The fact is, the study presents one (and not the only) way in which to analyze the CARIFORUM-EU EPA, and it does so in so far as it determines that the NPE agenda permeates a spectrum of EU initiatives with third parties.

With this in mind, the dissertation's theoretical engagement (particularly in the context of,
though not limited to, Chapters One, Two, Three and Four) and empirical analysis and the attendant applications thereto (particularly in the context of, though not limited to, Chapters Five and Six) suggest that there is substantial scope for further research of the Caribbean from an ideational vantage point. This extends to its relations with the EU, too, dealt with more frontally in Chapter Six. The dissertation should, therefore, also be seen as a general call for theoretical pluralism in the empirical study of the Caribbean in international studies, wherein it is framed as a relational act/device.341

The recent emergence of ideational social theories and methodologies and their instantiation in IR provide a powerful tool to accurately showcase very small states' realities and their agency, which have typically been hidden from view in conventional theorizing or dismissed outright. By the same token scholarly forays into the study of Europe's interregional, norm-based designs for/in the Caribbean are also not discernable, yet like the ideational study of Caribbean diplomacy its study reveals important insights related to discourse, social interaction, identity and norms and the role of Agreements like the EPA in propagating the EU's norms in another region. This dissertation has attempted to begin to patch these gaping holes in the literature, offering glimpses into scholarly frontiers that beckon.

The dissertation is a long overdue contribution to theorizing and a reappraisal of the Caribbean in world politics, by drawing on influential alternative theoretical framings that have enjoyed wide application in IR and some related sub-fields, but that have remained elusive in the study of the Region. Although reflectivist and postcolonial approaches have recently attempted to establish a beachhead with regard to the critical study of various aspects of the Caribbean

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341 In that, not unlike self-other depictions, states in a regional grouping may also define their commonality, their 'we-feelings' in juxtaposition to an external 'other' (Hurrell 1995, 335). Instructively, as one of Katzenstein's key findings in Small States in World Markets (1985) suggests in the European context, "[p]erceived vulnerability generated an ideology of social partnership that had acted like a glue for the corporatist politics of the small European states" (Katzenstein 2003, 11).
political economy, hitherto social constructivism, SIT and Habermas' social theory have not found their way, in any concerted manner, into the study of Caribbean (inter)regionalism. Their analytical deployment in the present study reveals not only that they can make a substantive contribution to the study of Caribbean (inter)regionalism, but also the place of very small states in the international order which historically have been largely overlooked.

The fact is, where there has been long-standing and sustained engagement with such alternative theoretical framings in IR, comparatively-speaking their application in the study of Caribbean international affairs has barely scratched the surface. Unfortunately, where constructivism and related debates pitting it against a slew of other perspectives, for instance, have generally traveled to sub-field and area studies, its penetration of Caribbean regional studies is not readily apparent. This is an apparently anomalous state of affairs, when viewed against constructivism's wide appeal in such sub-fields as European regional and international/security studies. What is more, a range of global and intra-state developments (notably in security and political economy areas) that have come to pass since the end of the Cold War and that arguably have deeply affected the Caribbean region present no shortage of areas for analyses in this vein; Caribbean (inter)regionalism being one of them.

The framework outlined in the present study provides a more compelling theory-driven and policy-relevant schema with which to conceptualize the Caribbean's (inter)regionalist engagement, compared to the insights of rationalist perspectives on Caribbean international affairs. Such a research vector should appeal to theorists and practitioners alike, and merits further exploration.

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292
### Table 2

**Interregionalism Involving the Caribbean***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interregional Initiative</th>
<th>Year Established/ Frequency and Type of Summits</th>
<th>Areas of Cooperation</th>
<th>Type of Interregional Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)</td>
<td>2008/Meetings of the Joint CARIFORUM-EU Council – the highest institution overseeing the implementation process – are convened at intervals that are not to exceed two years. It meets at Ministerial level, while other Committees that form part of the EPA implementation architecture meet at the level of Officials.</td>
<td>The Agreement, at large.</td>
<td>Bi-regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint CARIFORUM-EU Council (per Article 227)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Of the five* institutions set out in the Agreement and that are tasked with responsibilities meant to ensure that the objectives of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA are met, the Joint Council is the highest such institution. It is described as having the responsibility to supervise implementation, in addition to taking decisions concerning said Agreement.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note: This bi-regional, ostensibly trade relationship has been accounted for here. The same has not been done for other CARICOM bilateral free trade agreements, e.g. between CARICOM and several Latin American countries (and soon Canada), as they are purely trade pacts; not having the same breadth and historical resonance as the CARIFORUM-EU EPA.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARIFORUM-EU Political</td>
<td>2010/biennial, Ministerial</td>
<td>Served as a preparatory meeting for the EU-Latin America and the</td>
<td>Bi-regional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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* As outlined in Part V of the Agreement on 'Institutional Provisions', the other bodies are the: CARIFORUM-EU Trade and Development Committee (Article 230), CARIFORUM-EU Parliamentary Committee (Article 231), CARIFORUM-EU Consultative Committee (Article 232)

For some, the four institutions comprise 'the soul of the Agreement'.

The fifth Committee, tasked with dealing with Customs and Trade Facilitation matters, is the most recently established one.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dialogue* (superseded by CARIFORUM-EU High-Level Meeting held in the margins of the Community of Latin American and the Caribbean States (CELAC)-EU Summit)</th>
<th>level</th>
<th>Caribbean Summit (but also the EU-CARIFORUM Summit, on its margins) that followed, in May 2010.342</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* It is in keeping with the Lima Declaration of 2008, which agreed on the establishment of mechanisms required for a structured, comprehensive political dialogue.</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Dialogue allowed for an exchange of views on a range of Western hemispheric issues, including increasingly closer ties/cooperation between Caribbean and Latin American countries by way of the Rio Group, the Latin American and Caribbean Integration Development Process, the Union of South American Nations (formerly the South American Community of Nations), and the Latin American Bolivarian Alternative (ALBA). The Caribbean side highlighted regional food security, energy and climate change/natural disaster concerns; in addition to security matters affecting the Region, e.g. drug trafficking and small arms trade. In line with the Dialogue's broad aim of promoting partnership and common values of respect for democracy, the rule of law and for human rights, the EU side raised issues related to human rights; namely initiatives underway regarding the moratorium on the death penalty and the International Criminal Court (see European Union 2010). These issues were subsequently taken up within the framework of the EU-CARIFORUM Summit, convened at the margins of the VI EU-Latin America and the Caribbean Summit of Heads of State and Government in 2010.</td>
</tr>
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<td>The Dialogue was intended to strengthen relations between the two regions, which have a long lineage dating back to the colonial past. The intensification of relations was also envisioned by the provisions of Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement. The Dialogue emerged against the backdrop of changing post-Cold War geopolitical realities, including partnerships, not least being increased membership in the EU and deepening integration, e.g. as a result of of the Lisbon Treaty. This Treaty, in particular, has been a catalyst for a strategic re-think on both sides of the Atlantic as to how each region should engage the other; for example, because of the changing face of development cooperation envisioned by the Treaty.</td>
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<td>In concert with Caribbean representatives, the European Commission devised a 'Joint Caribbean-EU Strategy', which feeds into this new Dialogue platform and was discussed at the EU-CARIFORUM Summit. Preparatory meetings for the Joint Strategy were held, including a seminar in Barbados in March 2010. This Joint Strategy follows an earlier strategy, authored ostensibly by the European Commission, in 2006.</td>
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342 Ms Carlene Knight, Trade and Regional Integration Officer, Delegation of the European Union to Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean: Interview by author, Cave Hill, Barbados, 23rd April, 2010.
| **European Union-Latin America and Caribbean Summit**  
(superseded by CARIFORUM-EU High-Level Meeting held in the margins of the CELAC-EU Summit; first meeting to be held in January 2013) | 1999/biennial, Heads of State and Government | Dialogue on political, economic and cultural strategic partnerships across the regions. Typically, mini-summits are organized on the margins, to enable EU representatives to meet bilaterally with Latin American and Caribbean countries and sub-region representatives. | Relations between a regional organization and a regional grouping |
|---|---|---|---|
| **African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP)** | 1975/Officials, Ministerial and Heads of State and Government level  
- Frequency of meetings varies, with officials, ministers meeting fairly regularly; and Heads less so. | Development and political dialogue, with a Secretariat playing a role in coordination on strategic issues. | Transregional |
| **UK/Caribbean Forum** | 1998/biennial, Ministerial level | Development and political dialogue, in addition to topical discussions; e.g., on climate change, security, etc. | Quasi-interregional relations |
| **CARICOM-Mexico Summit** | 2010/ biennial, Heads of State and Government level | Political dialogue and cooperation in a variety of areas, spanning foreign and trade policy. It builds on longstanding ties between the Region and Mexico, with the latter establishing a Joint Commission with CARICOM. | Quasi-interregional relations |
| **CARICOM-Cuba Summit** | 2002/triennial, Heads of State and Government level | CARICOM-Cuba relations and cooperation  
In 1993 an Agreement establishing the CARICOM-Cuba Joint Commission was signed. Under the ambit of the Joint Commission, cooperation is pursued in an array of areas - such as, the economic, social, cultural and technological spheres.  
CARICOM and Cuba concluded a Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement, in July 2000; subsequently signing an Agreement on Cultural Cooperation in 2005. | Quasi-interregional relations |
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<tr>
<th>Country/Region</th>
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<th>Economic and Trade Cooperation</th>
<th>Quasi-interregional relations</th>
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<tr>
<td>China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum</td>
<td>2005/ biennial, Heads of State and Government</td>
<td>Economic and trade dialogue, to facilitate economic and trade cooperation.</td>
<td>Quasi-interregional relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARICOM-Japan Consultations</td>
<td>1993 (the formal establishment of CARICOM-Japan relations)/biennial, Officials level</td>
<td>Wide-ranging cooperation arrangements, inclusive of development/technical assistance (e.g., in tourism, environmental protection, energy, and other areas, per the New Framework for CARICOM-Japan Cooperation for the Twenty-First Century, with technical assistance for projects funded under the Japan-CARICOM Friendship and Cooperation Fund). At the Fourteenth Consultations—the most recent—held in April 2010, dialogue on bilateral cooperation spanned both regional and global issues (e.g., post-earthquake assistance to Haiti, the global financial crisis, the special treatment/position of Small Vulnerable Economies, etc.); in this vein, laying the groundwork for the Second CARICOM-Japan Ministerial Meeting in late 2010. In addition to taking stock of the last decade of the technical cooperation relationship between CARICOM and Japan, since the signing of the New Framework for CARICOM-Japan Cooperation Agreement, a revised Framework was considered (CARICOM Secretariat 2010a).</td>
<td>Quasi-interregional relations</td>
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<td>CARICOM-Brazil Summit</td>
<td>2010/ triennial, Heads of State and Government</td>
<td>Amongst the issues under discussion: trade, integration and climate change. CARICOM-Brazil Technical Cooperation Agreement, which addresses sixteen areas of cooperation, including the key areas of agriculture, health, tourism and transportation (Skerrit 2010). Several bilateral Technical Cooperation Agreements were also signed between respective CARICOM Member States and Brazil.343 Namely, “more than 40 bilateral agreements addressing areas of collaboration including health, education, culture, agricultural development, energy, tourism and civil defense...[were] among the Summit’s outputs” (CARICOM Secretariat 2010b). In addition, regional Secretariats, namely CARICOM and the OECS, also signed separate Memorandum of Understanding with the Rio Branco Institute of the Ministry of External Relations of Brazil, regarding mutual cooperation on the training of diplomats. Both parties cited concerns that “the current international financial relations.</td>
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343 Ms Celia del Bubba, Attache, Embassy of the Federative Republic of Brazil to Saint Lucia: Interview by author, Rodney Bay, Saint Lucia, 30th April, 2010.
2008 (see Declaration of Brasilia 2010)).

structures do not correspond to the unique needs of highly indebted small countries with middle income, like those of CARICOM”; and, in this respect, President Lula da Silva committed to articulate these concerns and related issues at the June 2010 meeting of the Group of 20, i.e. G-20 (see Declaration of Brasilia 2010).

The inaugural Summit was described as having built on several bilateral and multilateral encounters between the two sides, including the Sixteenth Inter­Sessional Meeting of CARICOM Heads of Government in 2005 - at which time President Lula da Silva engaged the gathering (see Declaration of Brasilia 2010).

An important current in the dialogue enabled by this platform is Brazil’s bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, which CARICOM States have generally been supportive of.

| Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CALC) | 2010/Annual, Heads of State and Government | Established at the Rio Group-CARICOM Unity Summit, held in Mexico (on the occasion of the twenty-third Rio Group summit and the second CALC). Instructively, the Unity Summit Declaration highlights, “the necessity of having our own regional space that consolidates and projects the Latin American and Caribbean identity based on shared principles and values; and on the ideals of unity and democracy of our peoples” (see Latin American and Caribbean Unity Summit Declaration 2010).

The CALC was formally launched in 2011, in Venezuela (with Chile being mooted as the country to host the following summit) – its signatory countries including all those in the Western hemisphere, save for the United States and Canada. The mainstay of this sort of summity and diplomatic processes that result will be political dialogue and integration issues, broadly conceived. The host country described as the main objective of the 2010 Summit in Mexico to have been consolidating unity in the region, with the creation of a platform that is different from the Washington-based OAS.

The CALC builds on the inaugural Summit of Latin America and the Caribbean on Integration and Development, held in Brazil in 2008, under the theme 'Cooperation in Integration for Sustainable Development in light of climate change and the global crises in finance, food and energy.' Under discussion were, for example, the financial, energy and food crises and climate change, juxtaposed against integration and development from a Latin American and Caribbean perspective. The objectives of that Summit were described as strengthening regional integration, and instituting a commitment for joint action in the promotion of sustainable development of... |
CARICOM participation in the Inter-Secretariat Co-operation in the Greater Caribbean initiative of the Association of Caribbean States Secretariat

| 2000/Annual, Heads of State and Government | This initiative builds on the spirit of cooperation in the Special Agreement between ACS and CARICOM, signed in 1997. Under the Agreement, CARICOM was recognized as a Founding Observer. Indeed, that Agreement recognized that the ACS could also enter into special arrangements with CARICOM and Latin American and Caribbean Economic System, amongst others in the wider Caribbean, such the Central American Integration System and the Central American Economic Integration System. To advance the Agreement, the ACS and CARICOM Secretariats were charged with holding consultations on a regular basis.

The Secretary Generals of CARICOM, ACS and Latin American and Caribbean Economic System have also met in recent years under a separate dispensation, with a view to advancing cooperation amongst their secretariats.

The Inter-Secretariat Co-operation in the Greater Caribbean initiative convened an inaugural meeting in 2000, in accordance with the mandate handed down from the Second Summit of Heads of State and Government of ACS. These meetings have seen the participation not only of CARICOM and Latin American and Caribbean Economic System, but also Central American Integration System, Central American Economic Integration System, the Andean Community of Nations, OECS, amongst others. Themes have been wide-ranging, concerning issues of shared concern. The ACS is described as a body facilitating consultation, co-operation and concerted action, in the context of its Member States; its areas of focus being trade, transport, sustainable tourism and natural disasters. However, it also oversees an active work programme regarding the Caribbean Sea Initiative. Broadly speaking, the ACS is also envisioned as promoting regionalism amongst the wider Caribbean, conceived as the Caribbean Basin. |

Variation on relations between two regional organizations, in addition to relations between two regional groups |

| Variation on relations between two regional organizations, in addition to relations between two regional groups |

* This is understood to refer to interregional arrangements in which either CARICOM institutionally and/or CARICOM Member States, at large, are engaged. Thus, ALBA and PetroCaribe (which leverages concessionary financing regarding Caribbean countries' purchases of oil, juxtaposed against the broad aim of integration through energy cooperation)—ostensibly underwritten by Venezuelan largesse—cum-geopolitical ambitions—is not included here, as not all CARICOM Member States are involved. Regarding ALBA, only the Commonwealth of Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda and St Vincent and the Grenadines have
joined, in 2008 and 2009 (for both the latter two), respectively. In respect of PetroCaribe, all CARICOM Member States are signatories, save for Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. For similar reasons, also not included are the following sub/cross-regional configurations: (i) the OECS; (ii) the Trinidad and Tobago-Eastern Caribbean states integration initiative (involving Grenada, Saint Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines; (iii) Central American Integration System (by virtue of Belize joining in 2000; although like Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Panama, it is not a part of the deeper integration process being pursued by the Central America Four: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua); and (iv) the Union of South American Nations (formerly the South American Community of Nations), which brings together the countries of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and the Andean Community of Nations and two CARICOM States, Guyana and Suriname.

- The Commonwealth and Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (or the International Organization of the Francophonie) groupings are also not included, as there is only partial representation of Caribbean countries in each.

There have also been recent efforts to deepen CARICOM-Australia relations, not reflected in the above matrix. The outlines of these relations have been sketched, but the nature of the relationship is still in its infancy, and not fully elaborated. The focus of Australia's development partnership with CARICOM is on: “Combatting the negative effects of Climate Change and reducing the risks posed by natural disasters; building regional economic resilience and supporting regional economic integration; and strengthening people-to-people linkages through volunteer programs, scholarships and fellowships and other exchanges” (CARICOM Secretariat 2010c). Since 2007, Australia has sought to more concertedly engage the Caribbean; most recently reiterating its commitment to enhancing its ties with CARICOM by way of an address—the first of its kind—to the Thirteenth Meeting of CARICOM's COFCOR, in May 2010, by Australia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hon Stephen Smith (Ibid). A much-cited marker for this new relationship was “the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding [underscoring the establishment of a new relationship] between CARICOM and Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in Port-of-Spain in November 2009 in the margins of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Trinidad and Tobago. This meeting of CARICOM Heads of Government with Australia's Prime Minister was the first of its kind. It was followed by the formal accreditation of Australia's High Commissioner to Trinidad and Tobago on 30 April 2010 as Australia's first Plenipotentiary Representative to CARICOM” (Ibid). Moreover, “the areas of collaboration provided for under the [aforementioned] Memorandum of Understanding [and that are seen as] vital to the development of CARICOM rang[e]...from climate change and emergency management, to regional integration and trade facilitation, diplomacy, renewable energy, food security and agricultural cooperation, sports, youth, culture, education and human rights” (CARICOM Secretariat 2010d).

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344 Mr Jose Antonio Melendez Adrian, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to Saint Lucia: Interview by author, Castries, St Lucia, 29th April, 2010.
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<td><strong>Value of Jamaica’s Imports from, Exports to, and Balance of Trade with CARICOM by Country: 2003-2010</strong></td>
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### Table 6

Value of Trinidad and Tobago’s Imports from, Exports to, and Balance of Trade with CARICOM by Country: 2000-2010

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* Data excludes The Bahamas (not a member of the CSME), Montserrat (at request of author), Haiti (data not available)

Source: Regional Statistics Programme, CARICOM Secretariat
List of Interviewees


- Bilal, S. (Head of Economic Governance Programme, European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)): Interview by author, Brussels, 22 January 2010.

- Brussels-based diplomat: Interview by author, 21st September, 2011.

- Bubba, C. del (Attache, Embassy of the Federative Republic of Brazil to St Lucia): Interview by author, Rodney Bay, St Lucia, 30th April, 2010.


- Caribbean trade official: Interview by author, 29th February, 2011.


- Fernandez Aybar, L. M. (Ambassador-Executive Secretary of the National Trade Negotiations Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dominican Republic): Interview by author, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 12th June, 2012.


- Gill, H. (former Director General, CRNM): Interview by author, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 18th May, 2012.


- Gonzales, A. P. (Interim Director, IIR-UWI and former Senior Coordinator-WTO at the CRNM): Interview by author, Barbados, 22nd September, 2011.

- Humphrey, E. L. (Head, EPA Implementation Unit, Foreign Trade Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Barbados and former Vice-Dean of the CARIFORUM EPA College of Lead and Alternate Lead Negotiators (he also served as Ambassador of Barbados to Belgium and the EU): Interview by author, Cave Hill, Barbados, 23rd April, 2010.

- Isaacs, B. (Adviser to the Secretary-General in the Implementation of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), CARICOM Secretariat (also serves as Head of the EPA Implementation Unit and Trade in Goods Specialist in said Unit)): Georgetown, Guyana, 16th September, 2011.


- Knight, C. (Trade and Regional Integration Officer, Delegation of the European Union to Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean): Interview by author, Cave Hill, Barbados, 23rd April, 2010.

- John, E. (St Vincent and the Grenadines' emissary to CARICOM and Head of the Regional Integration and Diaspora Unit in the Office of the Prime Minister): Interview by author, in Georgetown, Guyana on 25th May, 2012.


- Langenhove, Van L. (Director, United Nations University-Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS)): Interview by author, Prague, Czech Republic, 17th January, 2010.

- La Rocque, I. (Assistant Secretary-General Trade and Economic Integration Directorate (presently Secretary-General), CARICOM Secretariat): Interview by author, Georgetown, Guyana, 15th March, 2011.

- Lewis, V. (Emeritus Professor, University of the West Indies and former Prime Minister of Saint Lucia and former Director-General, OECS Secretariat): Interview by author, Castries, Saint Lucia, 5th February, 2010.


- Ogando Lora, I. (Director-General, CARIFORUM Directorate, CARICOM Secretariat): Interview by author, Georgetown, Guyana, 22nd June, 2011.

- McDonnough, L. T. (Chief Executive Officer, CARICOM Development Fund (CDF)): Interview by author, Hastings, Barbados 22nd April, 2010.

- Melendez Adrian, J. A. (Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to St Lucia): Interview by author, Castries, St Lucia, 29th April, 2010.
- Murdoch, C. (Antigua and Barbuda's Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Trade (who also serves as an OECS Commissioner on behalf of that country and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Caribbean Export Development Agency)): Interview by author, Georgetown, Guyana on 25 May 2012.


- Richards, J. (Trade Consultant, Barbados Private Sector Trade Team): Interview by author, St John's, Antigua and Barbuda, 26 October 2011.


- Sapir, A. (Professor, Université Libre de Bruxelles): Interview by author, Prague, Czech Republic, 16th January, 2010.

- Senior Caribbean policy maker: Interview by author, 30th November, 2009.

- Senior trade official: Interview by author, 14th June, 2011.


Bibliography and References

Introduction


**Chapter 1**


CARI


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Chapter 3


319


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323


325


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326


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328


Chapter 6


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Conclusion


