ABSTRACT

This dissertation traces how NATO has evolved from a defensive alliance concerned with the collective defense of its members to a global security nexus engaged in preemptive crisis management interventions. In reaction to what I see as the limitations of traditional methodological approaches in the discipline of International Relations I develop an alternative research program that places the production of space and trans-scalar interactions at the heart of my analysis. I discuss how NATO reacted to the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new geoeconomic order as neoliberalism spread across the planet and the United States became a global hegemon. Particular attention is paid to the effect of the 2007 Global Financial Crisis upon NATO. The new era of austerity, which followed, accelerated and deepened changes that had begun within NATO starting in the 1990s. NATO now sought to form partnerships with countries across the world and adopted a far broader understanding of security that saw it intervening far from its traditional European area of operations. The impact of austerity is also readily apparent in the two interventions NATO has carried out thus far in the 21st century in Afghanistan and Libya. NATO’s sustained peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan contrasts sharply with its aerial assault on Libya in 2011. I posit that the intervention in Libya can best be understood as a trans-scalar space of intervention, a concept I develop to analyze how and why NATO became embroiled in the country. I conclude the dissertation by examining Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine and hypothesize that they will lead to a renewed focus on collective defense within NATO.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

RESEARCH QUESTION AND DESIGN

The 2007 Global Financial Crisis and the turn towards austerity by Western governments, which followed, accelerated a trend towards the primacy of risk analysis techniques within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the displacement of collective defense as the strategic foundation of the Alliance. This transition has altered both the institutional framework of NATO and the format of NATO operations. At the institutional level, formerly inconsequential components of NATO’s apparatus, namely Allied Command Transformation and the Science and Technology Office, have been greatly elevated in importance due to the new strategic priorities of the Alliance. These institutional changes mark, I argue, the evolution of NATO from a regional security actor to what I call a global security nexus. This organizational transformation has had a clearly observable impact upon how NATO conducts its operations. NATO’s last two interventions, Afghanistan and Libya, offer a sharp contrast in mission styles. Afghanistan, conducted prior to the crisis and NATO’s strategic and organizational alteration, represents a now outdated style of intervention, with its deployment of thousands of NATO forces for over a decade in a peacekeeping mission. Libya, NATO’s first intervention since the 2007 crisis, lasted a total of eight months and was notable for the complete lack of post conflict reconstruction, with the role of NATO being limited to conducting bombing runs. Libya, I argue, represents a new model for NATO combat operations, what I conceive of as a trans-scalar space of intervention, born from the intertwining of the imperative of austerity with the logic of risk management within the global military apparatus of NATO. A trans-scalar space of intervention is defined as a site where violence is temporarily concentrated by a transnational military apparatus to
eliminate a perceived threat. This is a threat that is contained within a particular national locale and is unable to manifest itself transnationally; its capacity is therefore several orders of magnitude below the force projection abilities of the transnational military force seeking its destruction.

The declaration that NATO is involved in the production of trans-scalar spaces of intervention requires not only a recognition that NATO is transgressing traditional territorial boundaries and divisions, but that in doing so NATO is actually producing new scales and spaces. The trans-scalar space of intervention is a temporary space of violence that is inaugurated by NATO’s decision to engage and closes when it withdraws. To fully analyze this process requires a movement outside of the traditional confines of International Relations, as historically the discipline has fixated on the international as a discrete space of analysis, without a consideration of how the international is interpenetrated from a variety of areas conceptually considered to be formally outside of it.¹ This has led to a rigid understanding of different scales and levels as largely separate spheres with one necessarily predominant over the others, as seen in the levels of analysis approach, the foundational methodology for the majority of International Relations scholarship today.

My development of trans-scalar interventions as a concept will emerge through a critique of the levels of analysis literature in International Relations, elaborated most notably by Kenneth Waltz and J. David Singer. I will expand upon this critique to elaborate by own perspective through an engagement with the alternative understandings

of space and scale that exist within the fields of geography and critical geopolitics by relying on the work of Neil Brenner, John Agnew, and others. This critique will allow me to link, in a comprehensive manner, the challenges of the present security environment to instability in the global economy. Oddly, the fields of security studies and international political economy are often conducted in isolation from one another whereas I see the dynamics of both as intrinsically interconnected. However, while engaging in academic debate and bridging disciplinary boundaries is a useful endeavour and necessary to comprehensively address my research agenda, on its own it is insufficient. I must also outline what I see as the contours of the current conjuncture and trace the sources of the major factors that are impinging upon the present.

Austerity, as I have already noted, emerges as a central organizing logic post-2007. Yet, austerity was not responsible for beginning the ascendancy of risk management within NATO, rather austerity ensured it. The start of the process of incorporating the logic of risk management within NATO begins with the end of the Cold War and the formation of what I term the post-Cold War geoeconomic order. The concept of geoeconomics originates in the work of Edward Luttwak and was employed to describe the perceived primacy of economics over traditional political concerns in the immediate post-Cold War period, countries would now, it was argued, utilize economic tools, rather than military force to compete with each other. In the dissertation, I

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significantly modify and extend the limits of geoeconomics to explain the transition between different forms of world order, in this instance the binary dynamic of the Cold War period, with the far more complex post-Cold War geopolitical environment.

I believe that geoeconomics is useful for comprehending this transition in the structural underpinnings of world order because it connects together spatial, economic, and political processes within a unified framework of analysis. At the economic level, neoliberalism became the global ideology of capitalism,\(^3\) superseded the binary geopolitical confrontation of the Cold War. A stable frame for conflict no longer exists. A new geopolitical environment and a new period of capitalism require the creation of new conceptual tools and material apparatuses in order to analyze and guide effective action. These wider dynamics were reflected within NATO during the course of the 1990s with the growing irrelevance of collective defense as a strategic framing that was no longer appropriate in this new epoch. In its place a strategy of risk management was gradually elaborated which provided a more effective means of framing the increased geopolitical uncertainty that characterized the end of the Cold War. In 1999 after its intervention in Kosovo, risk management, or as it was rebranded within NATO, crisis management, moved over the course of a decade, from an accepted part of the Alliance’s wider strategic rubric, to following its 2010 Strategic Concept, an essential core task of the Alliance. When one considers the sheer unpredictably and near infinite sources of threat that policy makers are presently forced to confront it is not surprising that NATO has chosen to adopt this new strategic posture. Below I outline the contours of the present

moment, before explaining why I decided to focus upon NATO, rather than other security actors and conclude by detailing the content of the chapters that comprise the dissertation.

The contemporary world is beset by uncertainty and instability as the United States, the world’s hegemonic power and architect of the military, financial, and political institutions that have underpinned global interactions since the Second World War is beset by trouble at home and abroad. Domestically the 2007 Global Financial Crisis destroyed the confidence that the public had in Wall Street and in the potential for continual stable growth.4 Claims that the American economy had entered a period of stability and steady growth in the 1990s5 have faded. They have been replaced by the necessity, according to all major political parties, following the debts incurred from the coordinated bailout of their respective financial sectors, of enduring a new normal of tightly restrained budgets and greatly reduced expectations regarding social services, steady employment, and general quality of life. Record high levels of inequality, driven by decades of stagnant wages and attack on labour rights have led to a deep and widespread deterioration of America’s middle classes, once the linchpin of the global economy.6 This situation is replicated across Western Europe with unemployment in the double digits across the continent and anemic levels of growth. The remarkable political

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4 A recent survey found that over three quarters of American do not feel confident that their children will enjoy a better life than they do. Patrick O’Connor, “Poll Finds Widespread Economic Anxiety,” Wall Street Journal August 5 2014.

5 Commonly referred to as the “Great Moderation” during this period there was a widespread perception that of a reduction in the volatility of business cycles starting in the mid-1980s and was commonly utilized to explain the period of robust growth the American economy experienced from the mid-1990s to 2001. For further detail see Craig S. Hakkio, “The Great Moderation: 1982-2007,” http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/65

stasis, dysfunction, and disconnect of the political elites of the West with the everyday reality of their societies have spurred ever greater hostility from an increasingly disillusioned public, record low approval ratings\(^7\) and steadily falling turnout in elections.\(^8\)

Internationally the War on Terror continues despite setbacks on its two major fronts, with Iraq on the verge of fragmentation and a resurgent Taliban on the move in Afghanistan. American Special Forces and drones span the globe eliminating whoever is deemed a threat, based upon an opaque disposition matrix without the basic legal right of due process.\(^9\) The extensive surveillance and security apparatus put in place after the events of 9/11, ostensibly to protect Western societies, remains firmly entrenched and largely outside the scope of public oversight. This despite frequent scandals, the NSA revelations of Edward Snowden only the most recent in a long line, which demonstrate that civil liberties and individual privacy have been fundamentally undermined by these very same institutions.

While Western states have remained fixated on fighting an intractable and seemingly endless conflict, regional powers, most notably Russia in Ukraine and China in the South China Sea, are jockeying for position. Both are testing the extent to which they can expand their sphere of influence as the West remains distracted by the War on Terror.

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\(^7\) Approval ratings for the US Congress, for example, have in the last several years dipped to record lows of 9% and have rarely been above 20% since 2011. Jeffrey Jones, “Congress Job Approval Starts 2014 at 13%: Essentially unchanged since December,” *Gallup Politics*, January 14, 2014. http://www.gallup.com/poll/166838/congress-job-approval-starts-2014.aspx

\(^8\) Mair recounts the growing lack of engagement of the public with official political institutions in Western Europe in Peter Mair, *Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy* (New York: Verso, 2013).

and weakened by the effects of the Global Financial Crisis. In these circumstances NATO, the cornerstone of Western security for over sixty years is being called upon to play a key role, far outside of the region, Europe, in which its operations have traditionally occurred and with drastically different mission parameters than those that were originally envisioned for when it was established at the start of the Cold War.

NATO is the site in which both a new security architecture that extends beyond its official membership is being forged and new strategies and tactics are being elaborated in response to a rapidly altering and highly unpredictable economic, social, and geopolitical environment. Understanding this dynamic is the motivation behind the research and analysis that follows.

While the United States, as the world’s foremost military power and with an empire, spanning the globe will loom large in the following discussion, this dissertation is by no means solely, about how the American political and military establishment have responded to the crisis. Numerous books, articles, and a constant stream of online commentary already exist that analyze contemporary American military practice and strategy from every conceivable angle. With such an extensive literature already in existence, it would be difficult to contribute anything mildly original. My research agenda is focused upon how the West generally, not simply the United States, has responded to the crisis. Although the world order forged at the end of the Second World War had been American led, it was structurally; in terms of the states, it brought together, a Western order, whose basis extended beyond the North American continent to envelop Europe as well. This Western world order included states that were aligned to American
power, but also pursued their own particular national interests; fixating on just the United States means largely ignoring this rich interplay of relations.

With these motivations in mind NATO, the trans-Atlantic link that provided an institutional framework that connected together the security policies of North America and Europe, becomes the obvious candidate for the primary subject of my dissertation. While there are a number of studies that examine how well NATO was adapting to performing peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan,\(^{10}\) not many have discussed the path it would take as its commitment there wound down. NATO’s intervention in Libya, a relatively quick affair with no boots of the ground provided a stark contrast to its over a decade commitment in Afghanistan offers a new model for future NATO interventions. Austerity and the quantification and identification of risk are the central and connected factors that have spurred this change, not only in how NATO conducts operations, but also in how it conceives of itself and its role in the world.

What follows is an analysis that breaks with a number of the conventions traditionally practiced in International Relations and draws upon an eclectic range of sources, from internal NATO policy documents to the work of French philosophers. While some may criticize my lack of adherence to a single specific subfield, I see it as source of strength and dynamism that avoids loyalty to ossified modes of thought. It is my hope that the discussion that follows will offer some insight into the contemporary

production of Western security and its relationship with the requirements of continual capital accumulation and present social conditions.

Chapter Outline

The first chapter lays out my theoretical and methodological framework, provides the basis for the more expansive, and detailed analysis that follows in later chapters. I will elucidate the connection between the contemporary dynamics of political economy and the organizational state of NATO through the elaboration of a range of concepts. My central argument in this chapter will be demonstrating that austerity has created an intensified variant of neoliberalism, which has forced NATO to metamorphosize into what I term a global security nexus. This transformation has altered the format of NATO’s interventions from sustained peacekeeping operations to the generation of trans-scalar spaces of intervention.

The second chapter will explore how NATO responded to the tectonic shift in geopolitics that occurred with the sudden end of the Cold War and the disappearance of its major adversary, the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1990s, NATO grappled with a new strategic environment and sought to find a way to justify its continued existence. The formation of an expanded set of external partnerships, coupled with a growing acceptance of out of area operations provided a renewed sense of purpose to the Alliance. NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo, as this chapter will demonstrate, was a watershed moment, marking the final acceptance of out of area operations, and transforming NATO from a defense alliance concerned with the collective defense of its members to one that sought to proactively confront threats to its members’ interests. The 1999 Strategic Concept that followed on the heels of the intervention in Kosovo would mark the first mention of crisis
management as one of the core tasks of NATO and mark the start of its evolution into a global security nexus.

The third chapter will detail the effects of the 2007 Global Financial Crisis upon NATO. The turn towards austerity and the subsequent intensification of neoliberalism resulted in sharp cuts to the defense budgets of NATO members. At the same time, with rising global instability the tasks the Alliance was expected to perform were increasing. In response, NATO redoubled its efforts at renewal by elevating the importance of institutions such as Allied Command Transformation and the Science and Technology Office and making crisis management one of its strategic pillars in its 2010 Strategic Concept. This reconfiguration of the organizational structure of NATO and the creation of new strategic priorities demonstrate how far removed the Alliance is from its Cold War posture.

Chapter four will begin by examining the shortcomings in resources that have consistently plagued NATO and argue that their root cause lies in the conflict between the national sovereignty of member states and the collective sovereignty of the Alliance. This clash has undermined the governance capabilities of NATO and threatened its ability to secure the interests of its members. Disputes over governance are a reoccurring trend in NATO and have negatively impacted its last two operations in Afghanistan and Libya. The manner in which these two interventions were carried out and their objectives sharply differ. What Afghanistan can be viewed as an example of neoliberal state building I will argue that the intervention in Libya is the first example of the creation of a trans-scalar intervention by NATO. Libya represents a new form of intervention, which
can occur more rapidly and regularly, as a mechanism to reinforce Western power in an ever more unstable world.

My argument will conclude in chapter five where I will begin by analyzing the recently proposed Smart Defense program. This initiative seeks to integrate national military forces and provide a new mechanism of force projection for NATO. As I demonstrate, the impetus behind Smart Defense arose from the desire for NATO to have the capacity to carry out further Libyan style interventions in the future. However, a rapid shift in the geopolitical situation on the European continent since 2014 has greatly diminished the probability that out of area operations will be conducted by NATO in the near future. NATO’s last two summits that occurred in Chicago in 2012 and Wales in 2014 clearly illustrate a shift in strategic priorities. Although separated by only two years the concerns that drove the discussions at each conference and the newly proposed programs that emerged from these discussions were radically different. Chicago was about solidifying NATO’s embrace of crisis management, with Smart Defense offered as a potential solution to its chronic budgetary problems. Wales, in contrast was overshadowed by the Ukrainian crisis and an increasingly hostile Russia that necessitated a renewed focus upon collective defense. As I will demonstrate, this is a new variant of collective defense complementary to the procedures of crisis management. The chapter and the dissertation will end with an encapsulation of its major arguments and posit that collective defense will assume a renewed prominence in the future.
CHAPTER 1

A WORLD IN FLUX: THE SHIFTING CONTOURS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND GLOBAL SECURITY

The unipolar moment proclaimed after the West's victory in the Cold War\textsuperscript{11} has passed. A global reordering of power is now underway with huge consequences for both geopolitics and the world economy. The actual contours of this reconfigured world order are not yet clear however. What is certain is that the West, as a coherent constellation of power, has weakened considerably since the onset of the 2007 Global Financial Crisis, a crisis that has yet to be satisfactorily resolved. The architecture of Western power, constructed following the Second World War under the oversight of the United States was extensive and allowed for a multifaceted expression of power. Although in the immediate post-war period the United States bore the burden alone, establishing the Bretton Woods institutions and funding the reconstruction of Europe through the Marshall Plan, once the recovery was complete Europe wed itself to American power.\textsuperscript{12} This created a trans-Atlantic formation that while politically and economically independent would work in concert to ensure that the foundations necessary for the continued accumulation of capital on a global scale would continue to be reproduced and that the pre-eminence of the West, politically, economically, and militarily would remain in place.\textsuperscript{13}

Central to this projection and protection of Western power was the formation of

\textsuperscript{11} See Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” \textit{Foreign Affairs}, 70 (1990): 23-33, for the origination of this concept.
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. Yet as it nears its seventh decade, NATO is struggling to maintain its role as the world's dominant military organization in the contemporary period, as the West finds itself mired in a deep and prolonged crisis, one characterized by a generalized turn towards austerity.

At its core, my dissertation is about the contemporary relationship between security and austerity. I have chosen NATO as my central focus because it is the world’s predominant security organization. NATO’s actions significantly influence the contemporary manifestation of security by maintaining a particular world order that results in the reproduction of a specific form of capitalism, all of which reflect the interests of Western states. However, this is not a singular process. The contemporary structure of world capitalism and geopolitical dynamics also shape the conditions of NATO’s existence. Thus, NATO can serve as a lens, which can be employed to analyze the larger interrelation and manifold effects of austerity upon the modern provision of

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15 The idea of the West and who are, and are not members, of this cultural, political, and economic formation is a contentious issue. It is incorrect, for example, to claim that all members of the West are also members of NATO. Australia and Japan are seen as core members of the West today but are excluded by the terms of the NATO charter from official membership. Lithuania and Estonia are members of NATO, but cannot claim the mantle of the West to the same extent as Australia and Japan. For the sake of argument when I employ this term it will mean states that are closely allied with the United States, are clearly militarily subordinate to it, with American bases often on their own national soil, and are neoliberal in their economic and political orientation. For further discussion of the malleable concept of the West, see Alastair Bonnett, The Idea of the West: Politics, Culture and History, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
security.\textsuperscript{16}

This dissertation is driven by the desire to understand how, at a variety of levels, (organizationally, epistemologically, and in terms of military strategy and tactics) NATO has sought to adapt and respond to the contemporary conjuncture. This is a project that is often conducted within the research parameters of the discipline of International Relations (IR). I found it necessary, however to move beyond these debates and expand upon concepts that I found to be too restricting. In constructing my own methodological approach and conceptual framework, I drew heavily upon the fields of International Political Economy and Geography to develop my own perspective that places space and scale as its central components, not typical forms of analysis in IR.

This chapter will lay out my theoretical perspective, methodological approach, and elaborate a terminology that clarifies the connections between a variety of elements and processes. I will conduct this discussion in three stages beginning with terms concerned with the foundation of political economy, then turning to their geopolitical ramifications before I finally present my methodological synthesis.\textsuperscript{17} The political economic concepts of intensified neoliberalism, austerity, and geoeconomics will be employed to comprehend the current political and economic environment. This first set of factors is the driving force behind the second collection of terms I utilize to analyze the organizational state of NATO: risk management and global security nexus. Both the

\textsuperscript{16} Of course the viability of this approach is based in the assumption that NATO will continue to exist in the future as a meaningful security assemblage. Past practice does not ensure future events and NATO could collapse from a range of unforeseeable events. However for the temporal period under analysis here, NATO is an effective and powerful security actor, an assumption which will inform the discussion which follows.

\textsuperscript{17} This implies that, following Marx, the present political moment, i.e. the manifestation of world order is derivative of the economic situation and the balance of class forces. See Karl Marx, \textit{A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy}, (Moscow: International Publishers, 1979), 9-18.
independent environmental variables and the dependent organizational variables are linked together in my trans-scalar methodological approach, which expands on the dominant levels of analysis perspective in International Relations to incorporate the production of space by trans-scalar configurations of power. This process results in what I refer to as a trans-scalar space of intervention, a concept I deploy to encapsulate NATO’s contemporary format of interventions. With the initial introduction of my approach and the historic frames of reference provided this chapter lay the foundation for the more expansive and detailed analysis that follows in later chapters.

The Dynamics of Political Economy: The transition between geoeconomic orders, the formation of intensified neoliberalism, and the spread of austerity

Before providing an explanation of the term intensified neoliberalism, I must illustrate how it diverges from standard neoliberalism. This requires an overview of how neoliberalism reworked state institutions and priorities, with particular emphasis on the American experience, to become the sole prevailing ideology of political economy. By detailing the internalization of neoliberalism within Western, state structures in the 1970s and 1980s and its global spread in the 1990s following the end of the Cold War the foundation will be laid for the presentation of my first conceptual term, geoeconomics, which I use to theorize the transmutation of neoliberalism from a Western to a global phenomenon. I will then have the basis to discuss how the intensification of neoliberalism has occurred since 2008 with the extension of austerity to the military sector.

After the collapse of the Breton Woods system in the 1970s, the United States became the locus for a new highly financialized version of capitalism.¹⁸ This

¹⁸For an intellectual history of neoliberalism see Jamie Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). For accounts that trace the global spread of neoliberalism and its
transformation, conducted under the aegis of what later became known as neoliberalism, provoked wide-ranging transformations in the state, society, and individual preferences. Neoliberalism is a broad and contested concept that combines ideological, institutional, and economic elements, many of which are contradictory. For the purposes of the ensuing discussion, however the definition provided by Campbell and Pederson provides a good foundation. They state that, “Neoliberalism is a heterogeneous set of institutions consisting of various ideas...it includes formal institutions, such as a minimalist welfare-state and business regulation programs... it includes normative principles favoring free market solutions to economic problems...It includes institutionalized cognitive principles, notably a deep, taken for granted belief in neoclassical economics.”\(^\text{19}\) Perhaps one of the clearest transformations that occurred within Western states with the rise of neoliberalism was the reconfiguration of welfare state policies to expose ever-larger areas of society to the competitive mechanisms of the market. This process was not a uniform one, as Albo and Fast argue, but assumed different characteristics and intensity depending upon the prevailing social conditions within each particular state.\(^\text{20}\)

Jessop provides a useful paradigm for framing this transition, arguing that it marks a shift from the welfare to the workfare state. Rather than the pursuit of full employment policies that characterized the welfare state of the Bretton Woods era, the workfare state of the neoliberal era is concerned with the promotion of labor flexibility.


This new workfare form of state was concerned with, as Jessop argues, “...intervening on the supply-side to strengthen as far as possible the structural and/or systemic competitiveness of the relevant economic spaces...serving as the nodal point in a wide range of economic, social and cultural discourse which has implications for the reconstruction of entire social formations.” As opposed to the embedded liberalism of the past, where society was explicitly protected from the major vicissitudes of the market, it would now be open to them. Polanyi spoke of a double movement through which, “...the extension of market organization in respect to genuine commodities was accompanied by its restriction in respect to fictitious ones.” Neoliberalism gradually overturned this dynamic.

A reengineering of the state was central to the project of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism never sought a generalized rollback of the state. Rather as Konings argues, “...neoliberalism was a return to classical liberalism only on an ideological level; neoliberal practices were never about institutional retreat or the subordination of public and private actors to the discipline of disembedded markets but precisely involved the creation, legitimation and consolidation of new institutional capacities and mechanisms

23 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, (Beacon Hill: Beacon Press, 1957), 76
24 In Gramscian terms neoliberalism should be understood as an “organic ideology” that provided the intellectual basis for the structural reconfiguration of the both civil and political society. “One must distinguish between historically organic ideologies, that is ideologies that are necessary to a given structure and arbitrary rationalistic, willed ideologies. Insofar as they are historically necessary, ideologies have a validity that is psychological; they organize the human masses, they establish the ground on which humans move, become conscious of their position, struggle, etc. As for arbitrary ideologies, they produce nothing other than individual movements, polemics, etc.” Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks Vol. 3, ed. Joseph Buttigieg, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 171.
of control.” While the capacities of the state, under the influence of neoliberalism, were reduced in some areas, most notably the provision of social services, in others, particularly surveillance and control, they were extended. What was occurring under neoliberalism was not a process of deregulation that sought to reduce the absolute size of the state, but instead a re-regulation that relatively increased the capacities of the state in specific areas. While this failure to reduce the size of the state in an absolute sense would appear to conflict with one of the core tenets of neoliberalism, its desire for a minimal state, to arrive at this conclusion would be a misreading of neoliberalism. A range of authors central to the neoliberal tradition acknowledges the crucial role played by the state in creating the conditions conductive to the functioning of markets. What neoliberalism provided the impetus and guidance for was not a retrenchment of the state, but instead its redesign.

This redesign occurred in primarily two areas, welfare and the penal system. New disciplinary logics were inserted into both areas and mechanisms of surveillance and control were greatly extended. Welfare benefits were substantially reduced and the requirements to obtain welfare were greatly increased. Concurrent with this trend the

28A key moment in this process was the signing into law of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act in the United States. Amongst its provisions was a lifetime cap of five years support, the exclusion for consideration for aid for formerly protected categories including poor children suffering from disabilities and teen mothers who refuse to reside with their parents, and changes to federal funding which greatly reduced the overall national level of aid provided. See Loic Wacquant,
prison population, in the United States especially, exploded at an exponential rate. As Wacquant argues the ever-greater restrictions placed upon welfare and the vast expansion of the prison system must be viewed a cohesive process that sought to target specific segments of the population.

The activation of disciplinary programs applied to the unemployed, the indigent, single mothers, and others on assistance so as to push them onto the peripheral sectors of the employment market on the one side, and the deployment of an extended police and penal net with a reinforced mesh in the dispossessed districts of the metropolis on the other side, are the two components of a single apparatus for the management of poverty aims at effecting the authoritarian rectification of the behaviours of population recalcitrant to the merging economic and symbolic order.

The creation and extension of these programs sought to contain and control those viewed as potential threats to the social order. Rather than considering them as extra-economic functions of the state, the alterations to these two programs must be viewed in light of the rising inequality and greater levels of poverty resulting from the deployment of neoliberal economic policies. The changes made to welfare sought to push those on it into the emerging low wage service sector. While the surge in the numbers of those imprisoned, the majority for minor crimes, served to warehouse those deemed incompatible, for a multitude of reasons, with the new demands of neoliberal society. By removing, those incapable of successfully competing in an ever-crueller society the foundations for

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continued accumulation based upon the neoliberal model were strengthened.

Neoliberalism, as it was carried through the institutional framework of the state, entailed an undermining of its beneficial functions and an expansion and hardening of its coercive mechanisms. Neoliberalism strengthened the state in some areas while weakening it in others. Perceptions of the neoliberal state, as Hilgers notes, are dependent upon the nature of your interaction with it. “The state is thus both more present and visible, but at the same time more absent and weak, capable of coercion through informal measures but incapable of fulfilling its social obligations. In certain cases, we see a state that is expanding and even becoming stronger in some ways. Yet, its weakness and porousness are revealed on a daily basis.”

For those seeking to petition the state for benefits the state is likely to appear quite weak, even fragmented, while for those who, for whatever reason are deemed to be a threat the state will appear to be quite strong and coordinated.

Smashing the radical social movements of the 1960s was a prerequisite for the establishment of neoliberalism. Also required, as Short notes, was the formation and of a coherent intellectual and political leadership was capable of putting neoliberal ideas into practice and flexible enough to adapt as circumstances demanded. Only once this

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process had been completed could the definitive break with the postwar social order occur, allowing the epoch of neoliberalism to be ushered in. The outcome of these moments of rupture is variable and dependent upon the relation of social forces, as Gramsci noted. In the *Prison Notebooks* he argued that “A rupture can occur either because a prosperous situation is threatened or because the economic malaise has become unbearable and the old society seems bereft of any force capable of mitigating it... various outcomes are possible: victory by the old society, which obtains for itself some breathing space by physically destroying the enemy’s elite and terrorizing its reserves, or even the reciprocal destruction of the conflicting forces and the establishment of a peace that is as quiet as a graveyard...” The contemporary conjuncture is reflective of the historic defeat which the working class suffered across the West in the 1970s. It was not a reciprocal destruction of conflicting forces that occurred, but rather the severe degradation of one and the near absolute victory of the other, which the consequential establishment of a new equilibrium marked by occasional, manageable, outbursts of discontent.

Already in the late 1970s the new relationship between the state and society and their impact upon the political were clear to Poulantzas who declared that, “A new form of state is currently being imposed...namely intensified state control over every sphere of socio-economic life combined with a radical decline of the institutions of political democracy and with draconian and multiform curtailment of so-called formal

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liberties...”37 While formally the role of the state in the economy appeared to be declining with the mass privatization of state owned enterprises, it was the state, as shown above, which continued to ensure social stability and made the continual accumulation of capital possible38, albeit on a footing that was now considerably less favorable to the majority of the population. Yet it was not simply the relationship between individuals and the state that altered, the interactions between individuals were transformed as well.

Neoliberal ideology sought to place the market as the sole mechanism through which individuals engaged with one other.39 The level of intervention by the state within society was not drastically reduced, instead it was reconfigured and sought to place market mechanisms at the heart of every interaction. Foucault astutely observed the start of this process,

> Neoliberal intervention is no less dense, frequent, active, and continuous than in any other system. But what is important to see is what the point of application of these government interventions is now...Government must not form a counterpoint or a screen, as it were, between society and economic processes... it has to intervene on society so that competitive mechanism can play a regulatory role at every moment and every point in society and by intervening in this way its objective will become possible, that is to say, a general regulation of society by the market.40

Neoliberalism then posited society as a collection of atomized individuals whose sole purpose was to maximize their own market value, rather than as a collective that

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represented a plurality of views and potentials for the future.

Neoliberalism was an attractive paradigm to some because it was presented as increasing individual freedom through limiting the extent that society could impinge upon individual action. In fact, a false sort of freedom was offered. As Bauman notes, “Paradoxically, the call to take life into one’s own, individual hands and the pressure to do just that may rebound in less individual control over its course. That call and those pressures divert the minds and the deeds of individuals from the collectively set conditions that determine the agenda and the chances of their individual choices and efforts.”41 Rather than increased freedom and the multiplying of the possible choices that one could pursue to shape one’s own life, what resulted was a sharp curtailing of freedom and a limiting of choices for the majority of society and an increasing concentration of economic and political power within a smaller fraction of the population.

This was not accidental, but a desired outcome of the advocates of neoliberalism, as market relations were extended to encompass society. The freedom that neoliberalism sought was the freeing of capital from its restraints. This particular type of freedom depended upon shifting elements that were formerly governed by society to the market, in the process closing them off from the majority of society. With the advent of neoliberalism, the ability for the individual to make choices about their own life, and their ability to influence collective decision making through the election of representatives, who determined how society was to be governed, were sharply curtailed. Instead, choice was abstracted and removed to the realm of the market with neoliberalism eventually becoming the shared consensus amongst all mainstream Western political parties.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the full reintegration of the former Soviet states within the global economy in the 1990s would mark the victorious globalization of neoliberalism. The gradual spread of neoliberalism across the planet was a process that proceeded in a number of simultaneous stages. From its initial formulation in its heartlands of Western Europe and North America, neoliberalism was violently imposed upon Latin America, adopted by Deng Xiaoping in China\textsuperscript{42} and introduced into Eastern Europe and Russia through policies of shock therapy.\textsuperscript{43} The proclamation of the Washington Consensus\textsuperscript{44} represented the apex of neoliberalism, occurring at a time when the United States was riding high on its victory in the Cold War and was growing accustomed to dictating the appropriate economic policies to the rest of the world. It was the end of the Cold War that made possible the unquestioned dominance of neoliberalism across the globe.\textsuperscript{45} The vanishing of “actually existing socialism” made neoliberalism the only game in town, a condition that continues today, even in the wake of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. As Peck and Ticknell argue, “Neoliberalism does indeed seem to be everywhere. And its apparent omnipresence is at the same time a manifestation of and a source of political-economic power.”\textsuperscript{46} The lack of a competitor to

\textsuperscript{42} My historical background is based upon the sequence of events that David Harvey lays out in David Harvey, \textit{A Brief History of Neoliberalism}, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). A fine overview is also provided in Noam Chomsky, \textit{Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order}, (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1999).

\textsuperscript{43} Within Russia the social upheaval caused by shock therapy would be a major factor in the deterioration of Western relations with Russia. This connection is made in Joseph Stiglitz, \textit{Globalization and its Discontents}, (New York: WW Norton, 2002), 133-165.


\textsuperscript{45} Neoliberalism was not reproduced in a monolithic fashion as Albo and Fast remind us. The characteristics of its manifestation were dependent upon prevailing social conditions. Greg Albo and Travis Fast, “Varieties of Neoliberalism: Trajectories of Workfare in Advanced Capitalist Countries,” Presented at the \textit{Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association}, May 30th, 2003.

the neoliberal model was a stark contrast to the decades of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union loomed as an ever present, though not appealing alternative.

The transition between the Cold War era and the post-Cold War period of the 1990s can, I argue, best be understood as the movement between different geoeconomic orders. The Cold War both created and was determined by a set of institutions, economic relations, and spatial and political configurations that for over forty years overlaid the conduct of states within the international system. The rapid dissolution of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War gave rise to a new set of dynamics and processes that dramatically altered the nature of world order. A crucial ramification of this process was, as I have noted, the expansion of neoliberalism from a primarily Western to a truly global phenomenon.

Geoeconomics is a useful term to employ to understand this transition because it connects together spatial, economic, and political processes all aspects that figure prominently in my methodological approach. Edward Luttwak originally coined geoeconomics in a 1990 essay where he asserted that in contrast to the Cold War era, economics would assert its priority over traditional security concerns. The dichotomy between low and high politics would be inverted. Luttwak stated that “Everyone, it appears, now agrees that the methods of commerce are displacing military methods with disposable capital in lieu of firepower, civilian innovation in lieu of military-technical advancement, and market penetration in lieu of garrisons and bases. States, as spatial

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47 Cowen and Smith also note these interconnections. They argued that a new geopolitical social emerged in the post-Cold War period. “This geopolitical social, the assemblage of territory, economy and social forms that was both a foundation and effect of modern geopolitics is currently being recast by an emerging geography of economy and security that might best be captured as geoconomics with its own attendant social forms.” Deborah Cowen and Neil Smith, “After Geopolitics? From the Geopolitical Social to Geoconomics,” Antipode 41 (2009): 23.
entities structured to jealously delimit their territories, will not disappear but reorient themselves toward geoeconomics in order to compensate for their decaying geopolitical roles.”  

Written in the heady days following the end of the Cold War Luttwak overstated his case. Military power was not going to dissipate and borders were not going to evaporate, but Luttwak’s analysis did speak to wider systemic changes that were occurring in the world economy and political order, as the United States and her allies reshaped global governance arrangements to more effectively reflect their interests and extend their influence. As Gilpin notes, “Systemic change involves a change in the governance of the international system. That is to say, it is a change within the system rather than a change of the system itself...” These changes included a world recast along neoliberal lines as capital penetrated into the former Soviet states, Western states sought to concentrate and consolidate their coercive power through the expansion of NATO, and a general spatial reordering, all of which occurred throughout the 1990s.

All these changes constitute the movement from one geoeconomic order to another. While the end of the Cold War was a moment of profound historical significance for NATO and the world, the 2007 Global Financial Crisis occupies the central narrative in my analysis. I see this crisis as the pivotal event that shaped the contemporary contours of NATO because it placed austerity as the foundation of Western economic policy. This resulted in the spread of an intensified form of neoliberalism, with significant impacts upon the military sectors of Western states.

49 This sort of triumphalism was not uncommon in this period. Fukuyama’s end of history thesis is the most famous example of this. Francis Fukuyama, “The end of History?,” National Interest 16 (1989): 3-18.
51 This was a highly violent and disruptive process as Naomi Klein recounts. Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, (New York: Picador, 2007), 275-310.
To be clear the pursuit of austerity as socio-economic policy is nothing new. While austerity is currently one of the central organizing logics of the present providing both the justification and the means through which contemporary Western societies are being reordered, and is hence, usually associated with neoliberalism its utilization as a technique of government predates both the current crisis and the advent of neoliberalism. Austerity is deployed as a set of economic and social policies that seek to reduce the functions and responsibilities of a state that is deemed to be playing too large of a role in society. In terms of its policy parameters Blyth defines austerity as “...a form of voluntary deflation in which the economy adjusts through the reduction of wages, prices, and public spending to restore competitiveness, which is (supposedly) best achieved by cutting the state's budget, debts, and deficits.” Austerity should be understood then as a set of economic policies utilized to reduce the size of the state. The professed aim of these policies is to restore economic growth by reducing the state’s capacity to intervene in a progressive manner within society. As a policy, austerity is defined by the lowering of tax rates on top income earners and corporations and deep reductions in a wide range of social services provided by the state, such as education and healthcare. Austerity is also utilized as a reason by corporate and state actors to weaken labor protections and rollback collective bargaining rights. These moves are driven by the desire to eliminate


54 Programs commonly associated with the post-war welfare state, which are designed to reduce inequality and provide increased social opportunities to vulnerable segments of the population are the most viciously attacked by the extension of austerity.

55 The attack on collective bargaining rights by Wisconsin governor Scott Walker is perhaps the most blatant example of this. For an overview see Etienne Cantin, “The Politics of Austerity and the
state deficits and restore conditions of corporate profitability. Western governments have continually turned to austerity to rectify what is deemed an overextended state or in response to a stagnant economy. Austerity has a long history, but it was perhaps most notably employed in the interwar era as the initial response of governments to the onset of the Great Depression, to disastrous effect.56

Austerity then is not a new tool of governance; however, the specific manner in which it is employed differs depending upon prevailing conditions. Although austerity is inherent to the current variation of neoliberalism, which I have termed intensified neoliberalism, austerity is not equivalent to neoliberalism in the general sense. It is possible to have fiscally expansive forms of neoliberalism that increase public financing to support the private provision of services. This is not the case in the current period as intensified neoliberalism is characterized by the general reduction of state budgets in sectors traditionally sheltered from the demands of the market.

While neoliberal policies suffered a near death experience in 2007-2008, several years on from the depth of the crisis it is clear that in terms of economic policy neoliberalism remains more entrenched than ever.57 There is no immediate post-neoliberal dawn on the horizon, as some commentators believed during the depths of the crisis.58 Instead governments, through deploying austerity measures, are seeking to renew

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56 The retrenchment in government spending and the fixation on balancing the budget in order to restore business confidence during the early years of the Great Depression served to deepen and prolong the downturn. See Ibid., 184-191.
the conditions upon which neoliberalism has historically been based. This requires, as Harvey succinctly puts it, “...the integrity of the financial system and the solvency of financial institutions over the well-being of the population...” The result is the prioritization of part-time low wage precarious labor that constrains future economic growth.

The intensification of neoliberalism caused by the pursuit of austerity is a project Western governments have been pursuing since 2010. After a brief flirtation with Keynesian deficit financing in the immediate wake of the 2007 Global Financial Crisis the G20, during its Toronto summit in June 2010, would declare that the time had come for Western states to begin rolling back their stimulus programs and shift focus to deficit reduction, with states pledging to half their deficits by 2013. This is the point at which our present age of austerity began.

This turn towards austerity should be viewed as an effort to resuscitate a morbid neoliberalism by attempting to reconstruct its socio-economic basis. What I refer to as intensified neoliberalism is a mutation of neoliberalism that emphasizes particular elements that have been inherent within it since its initial coalescence in the late 1970s. As a form of capitalism neoliberalism sought to roll back the postwar welfare state and

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60 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 71.

61 Further detail on why this turn to Keynesianism ended so abruptly can be found in Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 54-62.


64 For an excellent analysis of how neoliberalism not only survived, but was strengthened by the financial crisis see Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: how Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown, (London: Verso, 2013).
increase economic exploitation, reordering the relationship between the state, capital, and society. The current turn towards austerity is one that is deeply rooted in the logic of liberalism and seeks to extend and deepen these processes. The most recent crisis as Peck, Theodore, and Brenner remind us is only the latest in a series faced and overcome by neoliberalism. They argue that “...crises have repeatedly served as moments of (re)animation and renewal for the neoliberal project, and the Great Recession has been no exception. Rather than a death knell for neoliberalism, we may be witnessing another historical inflection point in the mutating processes of neoliberalization.”

The pursuit of austerity is provoking just such a mutation by spreading the rationalities of neoliberalism to new areas of society and deepening the operations of neoliberalism where they already exist.

Nowhere is the spread and deepening of neoliberalism clearer than in the military sector. In the last several years, Western states have begun to implement a remarkable series of rollbacks in their military expenditures. Once sacred military budgets have been slashed, forcing the implementation of creative programs and initiatives as Western governments seek to preserve military capacities while responding to new economic imperatives; imperatives which they had been sheltered from while they served as the governing principles for the rest of the economy. The governments of Europe and the United States have responded differently to these new economic realities. Historically European defense budgets have been chronically low, especially when compared to the

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United States. The Global Financial Crisis has only worsened this situation, as it has prompted cuts in the core operating capacity of European states. The recent British experience is emblematic of the declining fortunes of European defense.

Britain has undergone not one, but two rounds of spending cuts to its military since the onset of the crisis. The first round, embodied in the *Strategic Defence and Security Review* published in October 2010 led to a total budget cut of 7.7% over four years with total military personal reduced by 42,000. Historical centerpieces of Britain’s military such as its sole aircraft carrier, the Arc Royal, and its Harrier jump jets were retired as part of this review. The second round of cuts, proposed in December 2012, call for additional reductions of 245 million pounds in 2013 and 490 million pounds in 2014. The effect of these cuts, according to the UK National Defense Association is that, “The security of the United Kingdom is being severely compromised...our armed forces have lost many of essential capabilities.” Ivo Daalder, the American Ambassador to NATO, shared these concerns. While the continual budget reductions to Britain’s military signal the end of the sheltering that the military sector has traditionally received from the curtailment of government spending that has characterized other sectors of society under neoliberalism, the transformation underway in the British military go beyond the drive to eliminate redundancies. The new drive for efficiencies, of

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doing the same, with far less resources, is leading to the creation of innovative agreements between states as they seek to share the burden of defense in an era of austerity. Britain's signing of the Defence and Security Co-operation treaty with France in November 2010 is an example of this trend.\textsuperscript{73} The treaty not only seeks to promote the pooling of resources and opens access of each country’s defense market to one another, but also establishes a senior level group that will coordinate the defense policies of both countries.\textsuperscript{74} This merging of the defense policies and military capabilities of two sovereign states, is symptomatic of the effect that neoliberalism is having upon Western militaries. As will be seen later, these processes are not restricted to just the UK and France; NATO is also seeking to promote the integration of member militaries through its Smart Defense initiative.

Cuts have also begun to affect the American defense establishment, although there has been no suggestion of integrating the American military with other national militaries. Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has possessed the world's preeminent military force.\textsuperscript{75} Under the pressures of the Cold War and the Global War on Terror, the American military has consistently received extraordinarily high levels of funding.\textsuperscript{76} In 2011, the American defense budget was $ 739.3 billion US dollars, 300

\textsuperscript{73} The role of austerity in driving the treaty has been admitted by UK Defense Secretary Liam Fox. See MercoPress, “UK/France Ratify Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty,” May 12, 2011. http://en.mercopress.com/2011/05/12/uk-france-ratify-defence-and-security-co-operation-treaty
\textsuperscript{75} While American defense spending obviously rose to record levels during the Second World War, reductions in the military budget began soon after the end of the conflict. Indeed Truman wanted to sharply limit the amount of funding the military received. It was only with the onset of the Korean War that this trend was reversed. See Aaron Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and its Cold War Grand Strategy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 115-125.
\textsuperscript{76} Defense spending jumped by more than 80% in real terms from 2001 to 2009 and accounted for roughly 20% of all federal government spending over this period. See Gordon Adams and Cindy Williams, Buying National Security: How America Plans for and Pays for its Global Role and Safety at Home. (New York: Routledge, 2010), 1.
billion more than the next ten countries combined.\textsuperscript{77} The position of the American military as a privileged sector, once protected from the ravages of austerity that are effecting the rest of the American economy,\textsuperscript{78} would appear to be a given then. Yet, although the situation for America's defense budget is nowhere near that of the United Kingdom, large reductions are in the early stages of being enacted. Already cuts in defense spending totalling $487 billion US dollars over the next decade have been agreed to.\textsuperscript{79}

American finances are simply not able to sustain record spending on the military that has been reached with the onset of the War on Terror. As Layne argues, “The Nation's ballooning budget deficits are going to make it increasingly difficult to sustain the United States' level of military commitments...Its strategic commitments exceed the resources available to support them.”\textsuperscript{80} In the early stages of the multi-year long debate over the federal deficit that has paralyzed Washington the Budget Control Act of 2011 was signed into law. This act provides for an automatic series of cuts in the budget, should Congress and the President be unable to agree upon a deficit reduction strategy. The ranker between the two parties and the failure to reach a final agreement on a number of occasions\textsuperscript{81} meant that the Budget Control Act went into effect in March 2013, immediately cutting

\textsuperscript{78} This can be observed by billions in cuts provoked by the state deficit in California and the state takeover of cities in Michigan, prompted by financial emergences. See Jennifer Medina “Approving billions in cuts to social services, California reaches a budget deal,” \textit{New York Times}, June 21, 2012 and Matthew Dolan, “Michigan Weighs Detroit takeover,” \textit{Wall Street Journal Online}, February 19, 2013.
85.4 billion dollars from the budget. In response dozens of government grant, research, and education programs were cut. Although low income support programs were largely protected from the sequester expansions to the US food stamp program and unemployment insurance which were undertaken in the very depths of the crisis were allowed to expire by Congress, further reducing demand in the American economy and harming the prospects for future growth.

On the defense, side with the Budget Control Act coming into force it is calculated that military spending will be cut by 1 trillion dollars over the course of the next decade. The scale of these cuts would dramatically reduce American engagement around the world, according to military experts. In the opinion of Baron, Bensahel and Sharp, “... we judge that the U.S military’s ability to execute America's global engagement strategy, as it is currently articulated would be placed at a high risk...”

The looming cutbacks to the American defense budget have sparked concern amongst some analysts that a retrenchment is underway for America's international

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82 Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2013 to 2023, (Washington D.C: Congressional Budget Office, 2013)
86 America's dominant global role is built not only on its ability to project its own power internationally, but in buttressing its allies as well. The chronic fiscal problems experienced by the United States and the budget cuts they are provoking threaten this arrangement. As noted by Gilpin, “In order to maintain its dominant position, a state must expend its resources on military forces, the financing of allies, foreign aid, and the costs associated with maintaining the international economy. These protection and related costs are not productive investments; they constitute an economic drain on the economy of the dominant state. Domination, therefore, requires the existence of a continuing economic surplus.” Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 156-157.
commitments. This retrenchment can clearly been observed in how the Department of Defense has chosen to respond to budget cuts, by reducing the size of the Army to pre-World War II levels and eliminating long-term successful programs, like the A-10 aircraft. These cuts mark a dramatic deviation in the formerly sacrosanct American defense budget and demonstrate the incorporation of austerity within the military sector, a central component of intensified neoliberalism.

*The effect of austerity upon NATO: The adoption of risk management and its transformation into a global security nexus*

Beyond simply a reduction of resources, the key effect that austerity has had upon NATO is promoting a rapid acceleration of its adoption of risk management techniques. This process began with the end of the Cold War, as NATO sought to adapt to new uncertainty realities of the post-Cold War geoeconomic order, which contrasted markedly when compared to the relative stable bipolar configuration that preceded it.

With the end of the Cold War the predictable and clear delineation of potential adversaries, that collective defense assumed appeared to be rapidly receding, in favor of an increasingly complex and ever more unpredictable world. The emergence of a new geoeconomic order in the 1990s obliviously had the potential to undermine the entire conceptual and strategic edifice upon which NATO had been based throughout the Cold War. Rather than fade away however as numerous authors predicted, NATO sought to reinvent itself by elaborating a radically different understanding of the world, based upon the precepts of risk management. The ever-increasing prominence of risk management

within NATO was due to long standing tendencies that emerged with the end of the Cold War, with the propagation of austerity by Western governments in response to the Global Financial Crisis finally triggering this seismic shift. With the reduced resources of its members and persistent geopolitical uncertainty outside of its borders, risk management techniques were seen to perform a crucial function for NATO by providing a recognized manner to determine potential threats and hence allow preventative action to be taken. Further risk management would allow for an improvement in the efficiency of NATO, as only select events would require contingencies to be put in place and fewer still an eventual response from NATO.

The elevation of crisis management as one of the strategic foundations of NATO is a watershed moment in its history. Collective defense, the basis upon which NATO was founded and its central operating principle for more than fifty years saw its influence in both theory and practice significantly diminished. This shift redefined how NATO conceives of security and laid the foundation for a wide-ranging institutional transformation that transformed it into what I term a global security nexus. Risk management is an attempt to quantify uncertainty and to create a measure of predictability or, at the very least, a recognized standard of response to events as they occur. This desire to understand and contain uncertainty arises from the sheer complexity and unpredictability of the modern security environment. Risk analysis serves to frame dangers, either real or potential, in a manner in which makes them calculable to security actors allowing for coherent action to be taken against them. Through the logics of risk analysis as Beck notes, “The unpredictable is transformed into something predictable;
what has not yet occurred becomes the project of present action.”

However the utility of risk analysis extends beyond the identification of specific threats, it also weaves together a wide spectrum of dangers into a cohesive narrative. Risk management techniques provide, as Rasmussen notes, the link that allows for connections to be drawn between the seemingly distinct entities that challenge the West, allowing for policy makers to make sense of what would otherwise be an inconceivable set of dangers. As he explains, “The concept of risk as the new guiding principle of strategy makes it possible to connect a number of events, policy initiatives and technological developments, which would otherwise seem random and unconnected...the risk framework allows one to see how these well-known elements are being put together in a new way...”

The procedures of risk management then function as a paradigm that binds together seemingly disparate elements and provides the mechanisms that allow for the formulation of coherent action by taking institutional knowledge and aggregating it in a manner that allows for the creation of a coherent set of dangers that can be targeted.

The manner in which risk management was incorporated within NATO under the rubric of crisis management affected both its strategic orientation and had tactical ramifications that altered the format of its operations. NATO is now seeking to transform itself from a standard international security organization that was concerned, above all, with the collective defense of its members, to a transnational organization focusing upon crisis management. Rather than simply operating in the collective defense of its members NATO has, since its 2010 Strategic Concept, assumed a role as the preeminent vehicle of

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global crisis management. Instead of defensively reacting to threats, NATO is retooling itself as an aggressive, pre-emptive organization. Gheciu encapsulates this shift in NATO's priorities. As she argues, “The main approach to security issues is now preventive defense against a multitude of dangers; most of which are ill-defined and abstract...the institutions of the transatlantic security community must now take preventive action on a global scale, targeting actors, be they states or non-state actors that are perceived as a source of actual or potential risk to international security.”

The incorporation of risk management techniques in NATO has altered its organizational and conceptual framework marking the transition of NATO from a traditional military alliance to what I call a global security nexus, a far more flexible and dynamic configuration that can more rapidly respond to threats.

The global security element of this term is self-explanatory. NATO is now a global actor, which seeks to promote, in a multitude of ways, the security of Western and Western aligned states. The choice of the word nexus requires further elaboration however. Oxford defines a nexus as, “a connection or series of connections.” Since the 1990s and in particular since its most recent Strategic Concept in 2010, NATO has sought to significantly increase the interconnectedness of its member militaries and to provide a greater level of analytical insight and actionable intelligence through the creation of new institutions and initiatives. These developments have served to expand and deepen

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93 This conceptualization of NATO as a global security nexus has been echoed by Hillary Clinton, who declared that NATO should be, “…the hub of a global security network with a group of willing and able nations working side-by-side with us.” Hillary Clinton, “Remarks at Euro-Atlantic Security Community Initiative. February 4, 2012. [http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/02/183326.htm](http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/02/183326.htm)
95 Although NATO is a collection of member states, like all large bureaucratic organizations it has a stake in insuring its own survival and, at times, may pursue objectives that arise from its own institutional
NATO’s architectural framework. By labeling NATO as a nexus, I seek to provide a conceptual tool that will assist in comprehending the scope of these transformations. The idea of a global security nexus is not an entirely original one but it has yet to be employed to examine NATO or utilized at length in an academic analysis.

The contemporary nexus form of NATO serves as a coordinating center and a point of linkage that reduces the costs associated with collaborating amongst a diverse range of military actors. This large core organization which is headquartered in Brussels, but has offices across the world, is why NATO should be thought of as a nexus, rather than other terminology that is applied to analyze contemporary organizational forms. Classifying NATO as a network for example, would be incorrect, because it would overlook the hierarchical organizations of NATO that carry out regularized sets of tasks and follow specific sets of procedures that comprises the majority of what NATO is as an organization. Yet NATO’s influence and impact extends beyond these organizations. Referring to NATO as a nexus seeks to encapsulate its ever-growing scale, both in terms

framework and not from any of its members specifically. Similarly, an organization that has existed for decades and includes thousands of staff may develop a degree of independence that while still subservient to the direction of its leadership, may choose to implement new policies in a manner that is suited to its unique organizational habitus.


NATO has 1,200 permanent staff members in addition to 2,000 members of national delegations and 500 international military staff at its Brussels Headquarters. NATO also has a number of liaison offices in locations as diverse as Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.

Networks are a horizontal set of relationships where actors and institutions are linked together due to a common interest in a particular issue. The organizations or groups of individuals linked together in a network framework are able to quickly adapt to emerging situations and are able to draw upon the capabilities of other actors in the network to solve problems and share information through the constant stream of communication which occurs between them. For an expanded discussion of the benefits of a network form of organization, see Marshall Van Alstyne, “The State of Network Organization: A survey in Three Frameworks,” Journal of Organizational Computing 7 (1997):83-151 and Helen Hasan and Hamid Pousti, “SNA as an attractor in emergent networks of research groups,” CD Proceedings of the 17th Australasian Conference on Information Systems, 6-8 December 2006.
of how it approaches the planning and implementation of operations and the broadening apparatus through which it seeks to engage and connect together its formal members with non-member states. Taken together both elements give rise to a cohesive web of interactions that extend across the globe and buttress a Western led world order, allowing NATO to penetrate into the spaces wherever threats are deemed to lurk.\footnote{This process is also noted by Brzezinski. See Zbigniew Brezinski, “An Agenda for NATO: Toward a Global Security Web,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 88 (2009): 2-21.} This unique combination of a core set of bureaucratic institutions organized on a pyramid structure,\footnote{By core organizations I mean the original set of institutions that were created after NATO was formally established. These include the North Atlantic Council, which holds effective governance authority and powers of decision making over NATO, Allied Command Operations, which directs military units assigned to NATO, and the International Staff, who are responsible for fulfilling administrative tasks.} with clearly delimited responsibilities and chains of command alongside an ever-expanding web of relationships with non-member states are what make NATO a nexus of global security.

This new nexus configuration is fixated on increasing the amount of connections that NATO has with other states and deepening these connections where they already exist. As a global security nexus, NATO is confronting the dilemma of striving to be adaptable and responsive to world events as they occur, while remaining a massive organization stretched across more than twenty countries with conflicts often present between its members. In these circumstances, it is incredibly difficult for an organization like NATO to react quickly to situations as they materialize. As a result, there has been a movement within NATO away from involving its entire membership in a unified action towards self-selected members and outside partners acting to contain threats that are seen to imperil their own interests. This development potentially extends the range and frequency of NATO’s operations but it could also fracture its historic unity. This would
fatally weaken the Alliance it. The continued viability of NATO as it completes its evolution into a global security nexus is thus far from assured.

_Framing NATO’s transformation: The necessity of a trans-scalar methodology_

To analyze the full spectrum of what NATO’s transformation into a global security nexus entails while clarifying its relationship to the dynamics of political economy requires the elaboration of a methodological framework that breaks with many of the conventions in International Relations. Instead of focusing upon which level of analysis is most appropriate for analyzing a specific phenomenon or what agency should be ascribed to NATO my methodology is concerned with illuminating how NATO is engaged in the production of space and is fostering interactions that occur across a range of scales. This approach allows for a more comprehensive understanding of how the institutional transformation of NATO into a global security nexus has affected the format of its interventions and how each has been driven by the demands of austerity.

As a global security nexus, NATO is forging ever more extensive and elaborate governance mechanisms that multiply and deepen the points of connection between member and non-member states. In doing so NATO is, to an ever-greater degree, bisecting traditional divisions between the national and international sphere and solidifying a trans-scalar set of interactions. However, this concern with governance does not extend to cultivating it within areas subject to NATO’s intervention. Instead, after identifying threats through the application of risk management techniques NATO creates what I refer to as a trans-scalar space of intervention, temporary spaces where violence is applied from the trans-national scale and concentrated against targets at the local scale, once they are eliminated NATO withdraws and the space of intervention collapses.
NATO’s most recent intervention in Libya is an example of such a formation. This style of intervention is a stark departure from past NATO efforts, which were concerned with re-engineering societies upon neoliberal lines. NATO’s footprint is now far more ephemeral. The full breadth of the changes that have occurred within NATO through its transformation into a global security nexus and the effect that these changes have had on the geopolitical environment is not something that can be determined through the simple application of either of the major methodological approaches in International Relations. Both levels of analysis and the manner in which agency and structure are typically discussed fall short, as I will demonstrate through a brief initial critique.

The influence of Kenneth Waltz for those seeking to engage with questions of international politics is inescapable. Waltz provided the initial formulation for what would become the levels of analysis debate in *Man, the State, and War*, one that still has a great deal of resonance for how research is conceptualized and conducted within the disciple of International Relations today. Waltz proposed that relations between states, in particular the outbreak of war, could be most effectively understood through the three images of the individual, the state, and the international system as a whole. Although Waltz argued that the condition of anarchy that prevailed in an interstate system, the third image, was the general underlying cause of conflict\(^1\), he clearly noted that in particular cases it was often interactions between the three images that led to a specific conflict. As Waltz presented it “Some combination of our three images, rather than any one of them,\

\(^1\) Anarchy, as Waltz argues, is a structural factor that determines the range of viable actions available to a state. “Given imperfect states in a condition of anarchy, crises will arise…with this as a starting point, it is possible to describe almost abstractly the kinds of calculations that as a logical minimum each state, under the pressure of its security interests, must make” Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 220.
may be required for an accurate understanding of international relations…understanding the likely consequence of any one cause may depend on understanding its relation to other causes.”102 Despite realizing the potential for interaction between these three images, Waltz saw them as largely immutable. Although powerful individuals could influence the policies of states, they would never be capable of changing the basic parameters of the international system.103 Further, the conditions of anarchy would always structure states to behave according to certain patterns. Radical breaks that reconfigure the international system itself are not possible in the Waltzian framework,104 with the sole exception of changes in polarity. This blindness to the dynamics of political economy and shifts in geoeconomic orders is a great weakness of this approach.105

Despite Waltz’s major contribution of the structural effect that anarchy has upon shaping the relationships between states, his model obscures a number of processes that that are crucial to explaining NATO’s current behavior. This is primarily because his three-image framework explicitly rules out the formation of new levels or new units that are not sovereign states, but composed in a different manner and capable of penetrating

102 Ibid., 14
103 While having evil or moral political leaders surely has an impact on the course of events and the decisions a state makes, it is not the determining factor for Waltz. Human nature for him is not a panacea in the matter it is for Morgenthau. “The importance of human nature as a factor in causal analysis of social events is reduced by the fact that the same nature, however defined, has to explain an infinite variety of social events.” Ibid., 27
104 The difficulty in modifying the international system for Waltz becomes apparent through this critique, in chapter five, of the policies of European socialist parties immediately preceding and during the First World War and in the conclusion where he states that “…the following discussion is not intended to suggest how a balance of power analysis now must be different from such an analysis applied to the nineteenth or eighteenth centuries, but rather to suggest the fundamental points on which there is continuity despite the many and important changes induced by shifts in the distribution of power and transformations in technology.” Ibid., 217. Thus, while the content and context of the international system has changed drastically over the last three centuries for Waltz, certain interactions remain the same.
105 A traditional of realist political economy does exist however and is exemplified by the work of Robert Gilpin. However the Waltzian contribution to levels of analysis lacks a direct engagement with issues of political economy.
through levels and reshaping the respective units contained within. What Waltz’s framework obscures is the subtle way that political actors can work between levels, altering the interactions occurring within and between states and thus having a systemic impact, creating a condition in which anarchy between states becomes manageable, but not eliminated. These are the functions that I see NATO as a global security nexus performing. NATO in this formation is inter-scalar; it is operating within and between the levels identified by Waltz. NATO’s efforts to build a unified command and control framework and promote the sharing of knowledge across its institutions and through its members’ security and intelligence services is causing a blurring of the distinction between the national and international level.

Restricting NATO to a single level of interaction therefore makes no sense, because NATO is currently impinging across a number of levels. NATO is active at the international level, indeed, it is a global security organization, but it is also shaping domestic processes of security by encouraging its member’s states to adopt programs that allow for their more effective interfacing with the institutional apparatus of NATO. In this regard, NATO also challenges the parameters of the structure-agent problematique, another dominant methodological approach within International Relations. NATO is neither a structure nor an agent; in fact, it manifests the properties of both.106 As a structure, NATO shapes the perspectives and priorities of its members by providing a comprehensive and overarching security framework. Yet NATO is also an agent, it has a

bureaucracy and an institutional apparatus that is concerned with its own self-perpetuation and as a result has formed its own interests. Therefore, the demand that the study of NATO must occur through reference to only a single level of analysis or one side of the structure agent dynamic sharply limits the potential for complete analysis of its current functions,\textsuperscript{107} and is reflective of the restricted ontological scope prevalent within contemporary IR.\textsuperscript{108}

In contrast to the approaches outlined above my own methodological framework is a flexible one capable of incorporating contrasting and at times contradictory process. Central to my approach is comprehending how the contemporary engagements of NATO are leading to the formation and closure of space.\textsuperscript{109} Yet merely examining the production of space obscures the full depth and degree to which NATO is impinging upon a multitude of different social processes. It is also necessary to provide a method that allows for the discerning of how NATO privileges particular types of interactions over

\textsuperscript{107} The rigidity of traditional international relations methodology can be traced back, as Latham argues, to their dependence upon territory as the sole container for social interactions and its lack of theorizations of alternative considerations of space. He argues that “...the fundamental context for the classic level-of-analysis framework is the set of territorial nation-states and the interactions among them. Yet space itself is not an explicitly theorized concept in IR...This is especially problematic, since it is increasingly recognized that social and political space can be understood along lines extending beyond the political territoriality of nation-states.”


\textsuperscript{108} Indeed the third ‘great debate’ of international relations that revolved around the foundational research issues of epistemology, ontology and methodology and which pit positivists against reflectivists was never substantially resolved. Instead the discipline fractured into a number of different isolated camps. The terms of this debate and the resulting schisms is recounted in David Lake, “Theory is dead, long live theory: The end of the Great Debates and the rise of eclecticism in international relations,” \textit{European Journal of International Relations} 19 (2013): 567-587.

\textsuperscript{109} NATO’s role in the construction of space remains an unexplored topic. The sole existing analysis focuses upon NATO’s construction of discursive spaces. See Andreas Behnke, \textit{NATO’s Security Discourse After the Cold War: Representing the West}, (London: Routledge, 2013), 31. My approach differs substantially from Behnke’s.
others. What is required then is a methodological framework that offers a clear means of differentiation that allows for an analysis of how NATO penetrates down several distinct fields of social interaction in its creation of a trans-scalar space of intervention and how the formation of these spaces establishes a new set of relations in place of prior ones. Rooting my analysis of NATO’s role in spatial production within a set of shifting scales achieves this purpose by maintaining the dynamism and explanatory potential of my methodological approach. Both space and scale are the product of social processes, but also, through their formation, serve to constrain and privilege certain practices and interactions over others.

For NATO the efficient and effective application of violence is its primary concern. Trans-scalar spaces of intervention are simply the latest manner in which the violence of NATO is deployed. The existence of these spaces is reflective of the

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110 Scales overcome the rigidness present in levels of analysis; for this reason then scales then, cannot as Moore argues, be equated with levels. Instead he argues that “…treating scales as the given levels, platforms or arenas of politics profoundly flattens and distorts a variety of sociospatial processes by erasing spatial differences and granularity and oversimplifying the complex, and multiple, spatial positionality of social actors and events.” Adam Moore, “Rethinking scale as a geographical category: from analysis to practice,” Progress in Human Geography 32 (2008): 212.

111 The role that social processes, arising as a result of particular material conditions, play in shaping the creation of space and scale has been clearly noted by Swyngedouw. “The struggle over the control over place produces specific forms of territorial coherence at various scale levels. In short, territory as a social relationship is a spatial moment in the historical unfolding of class relationships, while the scale of territory defines the spatial moment of control in the struggle in and over space.” E A. Swyngedouw, “The Mammon quest: glocalisation, interspatial competition and monetary order: The construction of new spatial scales,” in M Dunford and G Kafkalas, eds., Cities and Region in the New Europe: The Global-Local Interplay and Spatial Development Strategies. (London: Belhaven Press, 1992), 60.

112 These spaces, on the surface, appear to resemble what Agamben labeled spaces of exception, where the political power is utilized to negate individual rights and where certain subjects no longer have value ascribed to them, becoming merely a barrier to the achievement of various political objectives. In Agamben’s view, “…the state of exception is a legal civil war that allows for the physical elimination not only of political adversaries but of entire categories of citizens who for some reason cannot be integrated into the political system.” Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 2. The situation which trans-scalar spaces of intervention are meant to contain is different however. As opposed to spaces of exception where violence is enacted upon segments of the population in pursuit of a comprehensive project of governance, NATO has no interest in governing in the spaces where its violence is operative. The elimination of individuals then is, in this instance is detached from the concerns of governance.
current economic environment of NATO. It is through the procedures of risk management, which have been adopted due to the impact of austerity, that a threat is identified and the forces of NATO mustered to eliminate it. NATO’s engagement in the practice of creating these new spaces is a result of the limited resources available to Western states and hence NATO. The growing disinterest by NATO in conducting sustained peacekeeping operations, which characterized its interventions during the waning years of the 20th and early years of the 21st century, is a direct outgrowth of the circumscribed economic conditions it now confronts.

This chapter presented the argument that the 2007 Global Financial Crisis and the subsequent turn to austerity by Western governments had a dramatic effect on NATO. The constrained budget NATO was forced to operate with spurred the adoption of risk management techniques and sparked a wide-ranging institutional transformation, with the Alliance evolving into what I termed a global security nexus. At the tactical level, the format of operations that NATO engages in has altered as well, away from sustained peacekeeping and towards the creation of what I labeled as trans-scalar spaces of intervention. This chapter laid out the broad contours of my argument and provided the initial presentation of the core concepts and the overarching methodological approach that will guide my analysis. The following chapters will expand upon and root these ideas within their historical and material condition.
CHAPTER 2

THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND NATO’S SEARCH FOR PURPOSE IN THE 1990S AND BEYOND

This chapter will position NATO within its historic context and argue that it has played a crucial role in reproducing the West both materially and ideationally. I will do so by first detailing how NATO operated under the logic of collective defense during the Cold War and not only bound together the states of Europe and North America in a cohesive configuration of power but in doing so served as a platform that aided in the global projection of American power. The primary focus of this chapter however will be not upon how NATO operated during the Cold War, but how it struggled to respond to its sudden end. I will trace the process of slow and halting internal reform that NATO underwent throughout the 1990s as it fumbled towards becoming the global security nexus that it is today with risk management and out of area operations core parts of the Alliance. The United States, as I will demonstrate, was central to this transformation, constantly pushing NATO to adopt a more global configuration and take on a wider security role. NATO’s European members, in contrast, were far more cautious fearing that such a change would lead to a de-emphasis of European security concerns in favor of more diffuse global issues. That the United States succeeded in eventually overcoming this hesitation illustrates the substantial influence that it has within NATO. By detailing the shifts in the ideational and material priorities of NATO, following the end of the Cold War this chapter provides an overview of the state of the Alliance prior to the 2007 Global Financial Crisis.
Forged in the crucible of the Cold War NATO was designed to ensure the collective defense of its members. On paper, NATO is an alliance of equals, but the United States has always occupied a central role in the Alliance, largely determining its orientation and the scope of activities. American influence in NATO derives from the simple fact the majority of the cost of running NATO is bore by the United States, which provides roughly three quarters of NATO’s budget.\textsuperscript{113} From the era of collective defense during the Cold War, on its mutation into a global nexus the United States has maintained its commitment to NATO. The reason, as John Kornblum, US senior deputy to the undersecretary of state for European affairs, succulently explains is simple. “The Alliance provides a vehicle for the application of American power and vision to the security order in Europe.”\textsuperscript{114} NATO was deemed to be an important organ for the maintaining the cohesiveness of Western power because it served to entrench American hegemonic power by providing a recognized forum for trans-Atlantic military interactions.

Yet NATO also played a key role in constructing an image of the West that could be projected around the world. The heavy emphasis that NATO placed on the promotion of Western values separated it from prior defensive arrangements. Although Gress may overstate the ideological function of NATO somewhat by declaring that, “Within the Western community itself, NATO's political and cultural role as the institutional cement

\textsuperscript{113} The United States provides roughly 25 percent of the funding in each of NATO’s three major budget lines. See Carl Ek, “NATO Common Funds Burdensharing: Background and Current Issues,” (Washington DC: Congressional Research Office, 2012), 9.

\textsuperscript{114} John Kornblum, “NATO’s Second Half-Century, Tasks of an Alliance,” NATO on Track for the 21st Century, Conference Report, (The Hague: Netherlands Atlantic Commission, 1994), 14. This argument also matches the one made by Waltz to explain the reasons for NATO’s continued existence after passing of the Cold War, that the United States had determined that it was in its national interest, an incorrect conclusion according to Waltz, to keep NATO functioning. Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25 (2000): 5-41.
of what people began calling the Atlantic civilization was more important than its military role.”\textsuperscript{115} NATO has always served to both project and embody Western values. NATO is the archetypical security community\textsuperscript{116} whose compatible values and mutual responsiveness reinforce its continued viability.\textsuperscript{117} Of course, as Deutsch recognized, shared values and a general cultural understanding were not the sole reason for the creation of the North Atlantic security community. The hegemonic role played by the United States was pivotal to its construction.\textsuperscript{118} Despite the power of the United States, the domestic values and norms of other members have impinged upon and influenced the direction of NATO, generating a greater collective identity.\textsuperscript{119} The strength of these ties is the reason behind NATO’s continued existence after the end of the Cold War.

NATO not only provides a dense and complex framework that establishes and regulates a mode of behavior amongst its members, it produces abstract and applied forms of knowledge that informs its strategic understanding of the world. In doing so NATO serves as means of coherently organizing Western power at a transnational scale.\textsuperscript{120} As the world’s premier military alliance for over six decades, NATO has an

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 138.
\textsuperscript{119} This has been noted in Simon Koschut, “Transatlantic conflict management inside-out: the impact of domestic norms on regional security practices,” \textit{Cambridge Review of International Affairs} 27 (2014): 339-361.
\textsuperscript{120} I have chosen to employ the concept of epistemic communities rather than rely upon the far more popular regime theory, because I feel that the latter suffers from a number of deficiencies and was designed to respond to different circumstances than the ones I am concerned with. Regime theory, at least in its initial formulation, was an analysis of how a liberal world economic order would survive the perceived decline of American power in the 1970s and 1980s. See Robert Keohane, \textit{After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World}, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). It did not have much to say about
extensive institutional apparatus and a wealth of institutional and professional memory to draw upon. It also retains extensive material support, with the world’s sole remaining superpower as a member, along with many of the largest and most productive economies in the world. Further, despite the recent wave of defense cutbacks in 2014 NATO will still account for 56 percent of total worldwide defense spending.\footnote{Anders Rasmussen, “Secretary General’s Annual Report 2012,” (NATO, January 31, 2013)} NATO then clearly speaks with an authoritative voice on security issues. How NATO defines the problems it faces and the solutions it proposes to them have far-reaching implications.

The argument that NATO plays an important role in both producing and representing the West is not a new one. However, when scholars have discussed this topic the crux of their analysis has usually been upon NATO’s wider cultural role, especially how it reinforces the ontological boundaries of the West, while largely ignoring its epistemological significance. Behnke’s approach is indicative of this trend. As he presents it, “NATO’s task to represent the West is not only an ontological challenge in that this cultural identity needs to be rearticulated in the absence of its constitutive other. It is also a challenge to the very idea that cultural identities can be universal, that in other words, they can define sites from which all other cultural articulations can be truthfully assessed in terms of their correspondence to history.”\footnote{Andreas Behnke, “NATO’s Security Discourse After the Cold War: Representing the West, (London: Routledge, 2013), 3. A similar approach is adopted in David Gress, From Plato to NATO: The Idea of the West and its Opponents, (New York: Free Press, 2004).}

\footnote{Stephen Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” International Organization 36 (1982): 186. Finally regime theory adopts a technical approach and eludes the issue of power relations, a concern that is central to my research. For an expansion of this argument see Susan Strange, “Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis,” in Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, 337-354.) While this style of approach is useful in drawing out how closely the ideas of the West and NATO are interrelated, I}
want to move past what is largely a discursive frame of analysis to an examination of how the strategic logics of NATO have evolved over time. In tracing these changes, I believe it is useful to classify NATO as an epistemic community because it offers a coherent means of illustrating the connections between abstract concepts like collective defense and risk management and material transformations. Positing that NATO is an epistemic community provides a more integrated method for understanding how it is continually recreating a Western led world order.

NATO’s operations and actions have always been driven by an elaboration of a form of knowledge that provides logic and coherence to its actions. The construction of world order\textsuperscript{123} and the maintenance of global capitalism is a continual process that is never truly solidified. As a socio-economic system, capitalism is inherently unpredictable and constantly subject to disarray.\textsuperscript{124} The continual (re)construction of the circuits of capital accumulation requires the production of new forms of knowledge and the elaboration of new conceptual frames that can apply this knowledge to ontological existence.\textsuperscript{125} Doing so allows so not only makes the world comprehensible, but also

\textsuperscript{123} Agnew and Corbridge provide a useful starting point for considering what world order entails, “...order refers to the routinized rules, institutions, activities and strategies through which the international political economy operates in different historical periods.” John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, \textit{Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy}, (London: Routledge, 1995), 15.


\textsuperscript{125} The world must be made safe for global capital. This requires that strategies be developed that create the conditions which allow for the continued accumulation of capital. A stable and predictable environment is a prerequisite for most forms of capital accumulation. Thus, the state strives to create a legal framework that provides a mechanism for resolving disputes and hold a monopoly of violence within its own territory which is utilized to protect property relations. At the global level organizations such as NATO maintain a particular Western framework of power that assists in regulating global interactions and favors some capitals over others. The actions which NATO takes in defense of the West require that it comprehends the contemporary conjecture, which requires an epistemological method, and that it possess the capabilities,
provides guidance to the actors that reside in a world over-determined by the relations of capital. The formation of an epistemological framework is thus a prerequisite for meaningful action within the world.

In carrying out its geopolitical role to buttress Western power NATO brings together networks of professionals with recognized knowledge and skills in security issues thereby forming an epistemic community. Epistemic communities offer a means of comprehending the intertwining of knowledge and power within international organizations by providing a method for determining how international organizations recognize their interests and make decisions. In order to function international organizations must be able to analyze and comprehend their environment. As Cross along with the ontological awareness, to act in a manner which defends the interests at stake. Thus in this instance epistemology and ontology are linked through the provision of security in the defense of a particular set of socio-economic relations. The relationship between epistemology and ontology in this instance is not positivist, as the form of knowledge produced is not “objective” but is determined by the structures and interests of the organization. Further discussion of this issue can be found in John Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization, (London: Routledge, 1998), 95-97.

NATO is a product of and acts within a world shaped at every level by capital relations. A single geopolitical event that NATO may be forced to confront is determined by multiple causes, many of which may be related to the process of capital accumulation. For further discussion of how capital relations overdetermine social phenomenon. See Louis Althusser, For Marx, (London: Verso, 2005), 87-128.

Gramsci spoke of this at the individual level when he noted that “…everyone, in his own way, is a philosopher, no normal human being of sound mind exists who does not participate, even if unconsciously, in some particular conception of the world.” See Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks Volume 3, ed., Joseph Buttigieg, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 352. This is also applicable to complex transnational organizations such as NATO. In order to function they themselves must possess a particular conception of the world.

Hass defines them as “…networks of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area.” Peter Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” International Organization 46 (1992): 3. Haas was responsible for popularizing this concept within international relations.


This task is crucial. If international organizations cease to analyze the international environment they cease to exist. Haas concurs with this assessment arguing that, “…international organizations are hyper dependent on their environments; they can hardly be distinguished from their environments.” Ernst Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 27.
argues, epistemic communities make sense of the world. He states, “One cannot assume a priori that facts have a fixed interpretation, objects have a given value, and actor preferences are inherent. Epistemic communities are an actor that helps to assign meaning to things.”\(^{131}\) Epistemic communities construct reality based upon the conceptual framework that they employ and the analytical tools utilized. Depending upon their influence epistemic communities cannot only set the conditions by which their members interact in the world, but as Ruggie notes, they can set the contours of international society itself. By shaping intentions, expectations, symbols, behavioral rules, and points of reference epistemic communities “…delimit the proper construction of social reality for its members, and if successful, for international society.”\(^{132}\) This is certainly the case for NATO, as its impact now extends far beyond its membership or regional area of operations to effect the strategic calculations and organizational logics of states across the globe.\(^{133}\)

Epistemic communities, like NATO, play a key role in transnationalizing their areas of concern.\(^{134}\) The connections they create between other actors across the globe give rise to new structures of governance. Cross argues that “Epistemic communities are at the forefront of recognized trends towards transnational governance, and they are a

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\(^{133}\) The formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 can be read as an attempt to counter the influence of NATO in Central Asia. See Adam Castillo, “SCO: Rise of NATO East?,” *Diplomatic Courier* August 18, 2008.

\(^{134}\) Global economic governance and transnational activism are just two of countless areas in which epistemic communities have promoted transnational linkages. For further detail on each area see Marie-Laure Djelic and Sigrid Quack, *Transnational Communities and Governance: Shaping Global Economic Governance*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
major means by which knowledge translates into power.” Since its foundation NATO has been a transnational security actor, weaving together the fates of Western Europe and North America. Over its decades of existence, NATO has created an elaborate and extensive framework of knowledge that has informed and influenced the strategic orientation of the organization and its membership.

The conceptualization of NATO as an epistemic community that I have presented above is a broad understanding of the term that conflicts with how it is has often been narrowly interpreted to apply only to the production of scientific and technical knowledge. However, I believe that my interpretation can serve as a useful concept for understanding the interactions presently occurring within NATO as well as their wider ramifications. Indeed Cross has argued that epistemic communities can be applied to understand high-level military interactions. He writes, “…specific groups of high ranking military officials who interact transnationally have the potential to form epistemic communities by virtue of their shared professional norms and expertise as long as they seek collective policy goals as a result of these policies.” NATO clearly satisfies these characteristics as it constantly adapts to changes in the international environment by formulating responses that offer comprehensive guidance to its membership.

NATO does not simply statically reproduce the values of its members, rather it promotes social learning amongst its members, fostering the creation and acceptance of

new norms and establishing a new collective identity amongst members. NATO then, is far more than the sum of its parts, if it was it would merely be an alliance of Western states. Instead, NATO, as Rasmussen argues, has come to represent the collective identity of the West. “Whereas the West is a collective identity that shapes the actions of certain governments on a wide range of issues, NATO has become the pivot of Western security. It institutionalizes a collective identity at the same time as it provides the military and political infrastructure for its member governments to act in concert.” As the overarching security architecture of the West, NATO has sought to protect Western interests and maintain its preeminence as the world's most powerful collection of states. Ensuring the collective defense of its members has been, for much of NATO's history, how it primarily achieved these goals.

Formulating a Strategic Logic: The Basis of Collective Defense

The essence of NATO's collective defense doctrine is contained in article five of its founding treaty, which declares that, “The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs that each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense... will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and

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138 A perspective shared by Alder and Barnett “….the emergence of collective identities is prompted by learning processes that occur within institutionalized settings, and subsequently lead to changes in cognitive structures. In an event, the processes that develop are critical for the development of a security community.” Emanuel Alder and Michael Barnett, “A Framework for the study of security communities,” in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Communities, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 45.

maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” In this regard, NATO would appear to be simply a regular defensive alliance, in the mold of the Concert of Vienna, aimed at maintaining an equilibrium of power on the European continent. However, as Thies notes, NATO is distinctive from previous military alliances, because despite the Soviet threat providing the impetus for its formation, it always sought to be more than simply a reaction to a single danger. As he observes “...pre-1939 alliances were often little more than temporary arrangements created to address a particular need, typically to launch an attack or repel one, after which they were disbanded or rendered inoperative. The Atlantic Alliance, in contrast, was intended to be both permanent and open ended...” NATO then was always viewed by its membership an integral part of the postwar liberal world order. The structure that NATO would come to assume and the security logics it would employ were an outgrowth of its immersion within the wider postwar liberal world order.

In terms of military strategy, collective defense is a mechanism that allied states employ to guarantee their own security and the perpetuation of a particular form of world order. It involves aligning the foreign policies of member states along with the sharing of information on potential threats to members of the collective defense arrangement. Yet, as I will show, collective defense extended beyond the realm of strategy generating an

144 Latham treads similar ground, noting the impact that liberal systems of governance have had on shaping forms of militarization at the international level and the constitution of security structures and outcomes. Robert Latham, *The Liberal Moment: Modernity, Security and the Making of the Postwar International Order*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 5.
epistemological framework that determined the ontological path available to NATO during the Cold War. The central purpose of a collective defense posture is to deter attacks by states outside the collective defense framework upon member states. The desire to achieve the heightened security offered by a collective defense arrangement is what initially brought NATO member states together. It is important however to draw attention to the fact that NATO is, in its organizational sense, not a collective defense organization. Rather, it should be classified as a collective security organization. As Rupp argues, a collective security organization interacts with the world in a fundamentally different manner than states that are simply parties to a collective defense agreement. He makes the point that “Collective defense is far less ambitious than collective security. Whereas collective security seeks large-scale memberships, and seeks to unite diverse states against threats to peace, collective defense binds a limited number of states sharing the view that a particular state, or states, threatens the vital interests of each of them.”

While NATO was formed to ensure the collective defense of its members, its promotion of a shared cultural understanding of the world, meant that NATO developed into a collective security organization, seeking to protect the interests of its member states wherever they are threatened. NATO came to practice a limited form of collective security, in contrast to the aspirations of the global form of collective security sought by the United Nations. While NATO then is in a technical sense a collective security organization.

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organization to maintain conceptual clarity I will primarily refer to NATO in this chapter as operating under the logic of collective defense, as this was the term used by NATO to designate its primary strategic doctrine.

At its heart, collective defense is about maintaining the status quo. It seeks to minimize and contain disruptions and achieve a stable and predictable form of geopolitics. Collective defense seeks to restrict changes to the current world order, but ironically, this serves to induced blindness to potential sources of change, as Pick and Critchley note: “Inherently, collective defense shares the weakness of all status quo oriented systems by ignoring the dynamics of political, social, and economic change. Change, and the management of change are the stuff of politics, an essentially static system becomes unreal...collective security is rigid and inflexible.”

Collective defense envisions a perpetual extension of the present, a world in which, through concerted and concentrated action, the avenues of metamorphosis can be foreclosed as they emerge. This ability is based upon the assumption that threats to the present order are clearly perceptible.

During the Cold War, a narrow spectrum of threats confronted NATO and Western powers. The clearly discernible and rigid geopolitical framing of the Cold War, of two superpowers and their allies confronting one another, determined the forms of knowledge and analytical tools that were developed to comprehend this situation and provide strategic guidance to NATO and other relevant actors. Those tasked with making these assessments were also drawn from a specific subset of institutions that further constrained the epistemological framework that was produced during this period.

During the Cold War, geopolitical risk analysis was the monopoly of an

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establishment community of intellectuals of defence and statecraft. It was their job to survey the surface of world affairs, identify dangers and calculate risks. The larger narrative that enframed their work as risk analysts was the struggle between the two geopolitical superpowers and their allies. Risks within this narrative were mapped onto both territory and otherness, the clearly identifiable territorial home of one’s geopolitical antagonist, and the overdetermined otherness that made this antagonist the enemy.\textsuperscript{148}

Collective defense was patterned upon a dual set of relationships: the internal dialogues between members of the epistemic community of NATO and other related bodies and their external connection to the geopolitical binary of the Cold War. The manner in which collective defense was understood and employed by NATO throughout the Cold War grew out of these relationships and informed NATO’s behavior during this period.

By internalizing the logic of collective defense, NATO would predicate its operations upon a particular set of procedures that would determine the possible spectrum of actions available to it. Collective defense served to generate a strategic rubric for NATO that was based upon certain assumptions about world order. In assuming a largely static world order, collective defense presupposes that the threats which emerge can be easily perceived and that quickly contained. Cimbala makes this assertion noting “...this theory assumes that in most interstate conflict situations one can determine with reasonable clarity the identity of the aggressor and the defender. The identity of the aggressor established, it follows that the member states will permit their forces to be used to reestablish international order according to the status quo...”\textsuperscript{149} Collective defense is both a means of deterrence and a reactive approach to inter-state conflict. Ideally, under


the logic of collective defense, potential aggressors will not challenge the interests of those who are party to a collective defense arrangement, because they are aware that doing so would provoke the reaction of the entire group of states that are subject to the agreement. If however a party does attempt to act against the interests of the members of a collective defense arrangement, the doctrine assumes that the forces of the allied member states can be marshaled to prevent the realization of the aggressor’s goals before irreparable damage is caused to their interests. This was the strategic frame that NATO functioned within during the decades of the Cold War. Collective defense created an acceptable and clearly defined range of actions available to NATO based upon international developments; in doing so it set the parameters of NATO’s ontological existence.

Not only were the threats that NATO assumed that it would face during the Cold War easily discernible and emerging from a clearly identified rival, but the type of threats that would emerge to challenge NATO were considered to be highly circumscribed. The threats that NATO was tasked with responding to were the traditional issues of high politics that concerned the very survival and future viability of its members. The referent object of security was thus quite constricted, with the ever-present possibility of imminent nuclear annihilation focusing the minds of policy makers and military professionals upon a restricted set of concerns. This is an assessment that Gilpin concurs with when he states, “During the Cold War, the United States and its allies generally

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150 High politics are defined as military-security issues, while low politics are the domain of economics and the environment. During the Cold War high politics prevailed over low politics concerns, especially in the field of security studies. This changed with the end of the Cold War. For further background see Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, (London: Penguin, 1998), 40.

151 For detail on how the referent object of security is constructed see Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997), 37-40.
subordinated potential economic conflicts within the alliance to the interests of political and security cooperation. Their emphasis on security interests and alliance cohesion provided the political glue that held the world economy together.\textsuperscript{152} Security issues, understood in this sense, were of paramount importance during the Cold War. NATO was a central component of the post-war liberal world order constructed by the West during the Cold War to confront the Soviet Union and its allies. The binary opposition between the superpowers and the wider geopolitical realities of the period provided the impetus for NATO’s formation and established both its epistemological scope and ontological characteristics.

The security guarantee provided by NATO was just one element of a far vaster apparatus that was constructed under the guidance of the United States in the post war period.\textsuperscript{153} This included not only the Bretton Woods institutions, but also sustained connections at innumerable levels through organizations such as the G7 and OECD that as Cox argued fostered a systemic level of understanding between Western states. As he argues, “Adjustments were thus perceived as responding to the needs of the system as a whole and not to the will of dominant countries. External pressures upon national policies were accordingly internationalized…Not only were pressures on state behavior within this power structure internationalized, they were also, through ideological osmosis, internalized into the thinking of participants.”\textsuperscript{154} NATO played a crucial role in this wider dynamic by providing a mechanism that coordinated interactions across Western


militaries and arrayed them in a coherent fashion against the Soviet Union. While the liberal post-war order largely effectively responded to the challenges posed by the Cold War, it was caught completely unaware by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the sudden removal of the conditions that had both given rise to its initial formation existence and sustained a particular framework of power for decades.

The transition between geoeconomic orders and the redefining of security

The passing of the historical moment of the Cold War and the transition to an uncertain post-Cold War future would have far reaching ramifications; a new world order would have to be constructed. Latham explains the scale of transformation that can occur as one historical moment fades away and a new one is brought into view. He asserts, “…periods or even episodes when routines tend to fall away or are smashed, creating the opportunity for the construction of either new relations and structures or the reestablishment of old ones in relatively new terms. This type of period is what I mean by a historical moment.” As the overarching security framework of the West NATO sought during the Cold War to deter the threat of the Soviet Union, while also projecting an appealing vision of world order based upon liberal norms. The collapse of the bipolar system that defined the Cold War drastically altered the security environment rendering obsolete many of the security calculations and logics that were crafted in this era. The spread of neoliberal rationalities after the end of the Cold War provoked a general spatial reordering that resulted in the production of new forms of space and the decline of

155 This was a necessity explicitly recognized by the American political establishment at the time. Then President George HW Bush spoke of the necessity of forging a new world order in the wake of the end of the Cold War. George HW Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit,” September 11, 1990.

territory as a site of strategic calculation. On the economic side, the raft of regional free
trade and investment agreements signed throughout the 1990s provided a form of order to
capital flows and consumer goods in a world that had globalized under the precepts of
neoliberal economic policy.\textsuperscript{157} Alongside this, threats were becoming ever more diffuse
and unpredictable as the political and economic structures of the Cold War collapsed and
the logics of neoliberalism were extended and solidified in their place.\textsuperscript{158} While these
agreements provided regularity to these new flows and offered a dispute mechanism\textsuperscript{159} to
settle conflicts, they also served to alter spatial relations. The penetration of capital
transformed legal, social, and political frameworks in a manner that favored the
reproduction of Western hegemony. In doing so, they served to privilege hierarchies
already present within the international system\textsuperscript{160} and reordered spatial relations.

These agreements can thus be read as a strategy of Western states to solidify their
own economic power, and should be interpreted, as Sparke argues, as a form of
geoeconomic practice. He states that “…geoeconomics can be understood not just as a
description of a certain style of economically oriented geopolitics, but also as a form of
spatial strategy…Geoconomics is useful as a term insofar as it allows us to name an

\textsuperscript{157} Gill has referred to this process, in particular its impact upon national states, as the new
constitutionalism of disciplinary neoliberalism. Stephen Gill, “Global Structural Change and
University Press, 2014), 1-22.
\textsuperscript{158} Gheciu argues that as NATO extended eastward it was involved in a complex process of socialization
that sought to instill liberal norms and values within these states in order to prepare them for incorporation
with a Western led world order. Alexandra Gheciu, \textit{NATO in the New Europe: The Politics of International
\textsuperscript{159} The World Trade Organization’s dispute mechanism is the most prominent example of one. For further
detail see Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis, “WTO Dispute Settlement, Transparency and
\textsuperscript{160} David Lake provides a systemic account of the hierarchies present in international relations from a
neoliberal institutionalist perspective. David Lake, \textit{Hierarchy in International Relations}, (Ithaca: Cornell
array of quotidian assumptions and practices that emerge out of the context of free trade and the resulting force of borderless economic flows.”

While the formation of new economic forces would impinge upon the contemporary manifestation of space, the collapse of the geopolitical boundaries that had defined the Cold War would also have a significant impact upon these processes. The end of the Cold War meant the end of the bipolar system that had structured and overdetermined international interactions for decades. Not only was the old division between East and West surpassed, but also a multitude of new states emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The bewilderment in Western capitals as the full magnitude and speed at which the world was changing became clear would soon be matched by an effort to prefigure these changes in a manner that aligned with their interests. This would entail not only adjustments in defense budgets and the promotion of more technological solutions in the elusive search for greater precision in military affairs but a reconceptualization of what security itself meant.

A central concern that occupied NATO in the immediate post-Cold War years was whether it should expand to include states formally members of the Soviet led Warsaw Pact, retain its current membership, or even if it should still continue to exist. Many former American policymakers were opposed to NATO’s expansion eastward arguing that doing so would violate an agreement the United States had reached with Russia in 1990 that had promised no expansion would occur. Concerns were also raised that the

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162 Fifteen new states were formed as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union.
enlargement of NATO would destabilize the delicate balance of power in Europe by angering Russia and threatening its rapprochement with the West. 164 These misgivings have been borne out as the current hostility of Russia to Western interests largely stems from the violation of this agreement. Indeed Russian President Vladimir Putin has explicitly mentioned NATO’s expansion as a central reason for Russia’s stridently anti-Western orientation. 165

The decision by the Clinton Administration to push for NATO expansion 166 was due, as Vice President Al Gore argued, to the fear that without a new project for the Alliance to engage in it would rapidly become irrelevant and fade away.

Everyone realizes that a military alliance, when faced with a fundamental change in the threat for which it was founded, wither must define a convincing new rationale or become decrepit. Everyone knows that economic and political organizations must now adapt to new circumstance—including acceptance of new members—or be exposed as mere bastions of privilege. 167 The disappearance of NATO was not in the interest of the United States, because without NATO, the trans-Atlantic security link between America and Europe would be lost and the United States would see its influence sharply decline on the continent. NATO enlargement thus became a way to justify its continued existence until the formal acceptance of out of area operations and the evolution of the Alliance from a regional to a global security organization at the end of the 1990s provided it with a new sense of purpose that would carry it into the 21st century.

Beyond the debate over expansion two major interlocking trends effected Western

166 This was not a decision that was reached without a considerable amount of debate as Goldgeier recounts. James Goldgeier, “NATO expansion: The anatomy of a decision,” The Washington Quarterly, 23(1997): 83-102.
167 U.S. Department of State Dispatch, September 12, 1994, 597-598
defense, sectors and therefore NATO in the years immediately following the end of the Cold War. The first was a general cut in defense budgets, referred to as the “peace dividend” due to the West’s victory in the Cold War. From 1990 to 1997, NATO saw a 25 percent reduction in its military strength due to cuts in the defense budgets of member states.\(^{168}\) Although this would weaken NATO for a brief period the impact of these budget reductions would soon be reversed as the United States and other members increased their contributions to NATO’s common fund in order to prepare for its expansion into Eastern and Central Europe by the end of the decade.\(^{169}\)

The second factor was what became known as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).\(^{170}\) The rapid success of American and coalition in the first Gulf War with their application of intense airpower and usage of latest technology were seen as heralding a new era of combat.\(^{171}\) While a wealth of discussion occurred about the need to continually innovate the armed forces by incorporating new technological developments to create nimble forces capable of responding to threats across the globe the effect of these discussions upon actual policy was minimal.\(^{172}\) Owens concurs on this issues when

\(^{168}\) William Johnsen, *NATO Strategy in the 1990s: Reaping the Peace Dividend or the Whirlwind?*, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), 18.

\(^{169}\) Cost estimates produced by NATO and verified by the American Department of Defense indicate that the first stage of NATO’s expansion in 1999 with membership extended to Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic incurred costs of 1.5 billion US Dollars. Department of Defense, *Report to Congress on the Military Requirements and Costs of NATO Enlargement* (Washington D.C: Department of Defense, 1998), 1.

\(^{170}\) In terms of combat action the Revolution in Military Affairs has been defined as, “Greater lethality and dispersion, increased volume and precision of fire, better integrative technology leading to increased efficiency and effectiveness, increasing ability of smaller units to create decisive results, greater invisibility and increased detectability.” Jacob Kipp, “The Revolution in Military Affairs and its Interpreters: Implications for National and Internal Security Policy,” Paper presented at *Academy of State Management of President of the Russian Federation* September 1995 Moscow, Russia.

\(^{171}\) One that was overblown to some extent. As Cohen argues, “Despite the attention the press lavished on smart bombs during the 1991 Persian Gulf War most of the ordnance in that conflict consisted of 1950s-technology, unguided bombs dropped by aircraft developed in the 1960s or in some cases 1970s.” Elliot Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” *Foreign Affairs* 75 (1996): 37.

\(^{172}\) Further information on the Revolution in Military Affairs can be found in Sean Edwards, *Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present, and Future.*, (Palo Alto: RAND, 2000) Thierry Gongora and Harald von
he states that “...despite the rhetoric that filled military journals and public pronouncements about new eras, peace dividends, and military revolutions, the U.S military was quite happy to avoid rapid change. The Pentagon was not really interested in pushing a revolution in military affairs, and few in other parts of the executive branch or in Congress were either.” The manner in which war was conceived may have undergone some alterations, but the way it was practiced by the United States and its NATO allies remained largely the same.

Despite the West emerging stronger than ever from the Cold War a deep sense of unease permeated amongst academics and policymakers about what lay ahead. In contrast to the Cold War era in which the dangers were clearly discernible, the Soviet Union and aligned countries, the threats now faced by the West were now more elusive and complex. Buzan, reflecting on how the emerging post-Cold War order would differ from the previous forty years of Cold War engagement posited that states would face an expanding and diverse range of challenges in the future. He claims, “...the new security agenda will be considerably less monolithic and global, and considerably more diverse, regional and local in character than the one...Although there will be some shared issues, in the post-Cold War world the security agenda will vary markedly from actor to actor in

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173 Two different responses to the new range of threats that would confront the West in the post-Cold War period can be found in Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy: How scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism, and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet,” The Atlantic, February 1, 1994. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).
terms of both the issues and priorities. The proliferation of a range of non-traditional security threats, such as ethnic conflict, state fragmentation, health and environmental issues seemed to illustrate that the Cold War had contained and subsumed a wide range of issues under the dynamics of great power rivalry. This provoked a vigorous debate over what the concept of security itself meant in the post-Cold War world with the lines drawn between those who favored widening the concept of security to include a vast new range of issues and those who sought to limit it to traditional topics of military strategy. This debate was largely settled in favor of those who sought an expanded conception of security. Since the end of the Cold War, how security the manner in which security has been conceived has both scaled up and broadened out. Academically this dynamic has been analyzed under the rubric of non-traditional security challenges. Terrorism, climate change, infectious diseases, transnational crime and illegal migration, are all examples of non-traditional security challenges. Although these threats all existed during the Cold War, the end of the great power dynamic that characterized that period

led to these threats receiving increased attention from security analysts and transnational security organizations. These threats are all inherently transnational and highly unpredictable. The response to them by security actors has resulted in, as Hameiri and Jones note, “…the attempt to rescale security’s spaces, discourses, and management from the national level to a range of new spatial, political, and/or institutional arenas, in alignment with the interests, strategies, and ideologies of key actors, further transforming state apparatuses.” This realignment of scales is shaped then by the understandings of the actors involved in this process and should be understood as an ongoing and dynamic economic and political process.

This generalized rescaling of security has as two primary elements. First, the locus of security has scaled upwards, with the transnational arena, in many instances, achieving precedence over other scales. Second, and concurrent to this process, is a broadening of what is considered an object of security. Transnational organizations like NATO were well positioned to take advantage of these shifting dynamics. Indeed an expansion in the institutional capacities of NATO occurred throughout the 1990s due to the seemingly new spectrum of threats that had emerged.

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181 NATO then is involved in reshaping the spatial relationship between states and in doing so alters the geopolitical environment. This is a role that military alliances have historically played. For further analysis see Harvey Starr, *On Geopolitics: Space, Place, and International Relations*, (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2013), 73-92.

With the waning of the Cold War and the gradual emergence of a new fractious
geo-economic order, policymakers were confronted with a multifaceted and complex
range of challenges. Coinciding with this process governance mechanisms underwent a
process of change, with the formation of new assemblages of governance that are no
longer articulated in a singular unified fashion based upon a specific territorial domain or
a set of rights and duties derived from a national actor. Scholars such as Aydinli have
argued that it is now at the transnational level that the geopolitical tone is being set and
the interactions with the most wide reaching scope are generated. Aydinli writes,
“...arguably the most interest and evolutionary developments in world affairs, leaps in
global mobility, new organizational formats, the construction of new patterns, rules, and
forms of engagement between various actors are taking place within the transnational
space...” This ongoing dynamic makes transnational security organization such as
NATO more relevant than ever. The sheer complexity and unpredictability of the
current period raises the value of institutional architectures that are capable of binding
together a diverse array of political actors, who on their own may lack the capabilities to
formulate a coherent strategy to an often-perplexing geopolitical environment.

NATO has been largely successful in creating a transnational space of interaction
between its members, through extending and deepening dialogical engagement amongst
its membership and beyond. In doing so NATO not only generates regularized

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183 The work of Saskia Sassen has explored the construction of these new assemblages. A good statement of
her perspective is found in Saskia Sassen, “Neither global nor national: novel assemblages of territory,
184 Ersel Aydinli, “Statist-transnationalism for a security cooperation regime,” in *Emerging Transnational
185 As Starr argues, there are ranges of geopolitical factors present at any one time that both constrain and
provide opportunities to actors within their environment. See Harvey Starr, “On Geopolitics: Spaces and
procedures and institutionalizes a particular pattern of relationships around specific issue areas, something common to all international organizations, it also transnationalizes concerns that initially were solely national and recasts them within a new transnational problematic. NATO did this in its early decades, weaving a transnational security discourse and integrating the fractiousness states of Western Europe in the wake of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{186} A similar process occurred after its conclusion in Eastern Europe. Gheciu, for example, traces the dynamic that occurred as NATO expanded eastward in the wake of the Cold War.

By encouraging repeated identification with the group within the framework of a broad array of activities, NATO sought to create an enduring sense of oneness among Western and Eastern civilians and military officers. This was accompanied by a similarly systemic effort to perpetuate the sense of collective identity through extensive alumni networks...This, it was assumed, would lead students to promote those same norms and values in the future, and to work with their transnational contacts to overcome domestic obstacles to change.\textsuperscript{187}

The systemic effort to extend the values of the North Atlantic security community and integrate Eastern Europe states within NATO’s security architecture was successful. In doing so aspects of the traditional national and international divide were overcome with the external security of these new member states now becoming the interest of NATO as a whole, and hence transnationalized across the organization. This process continues today, with NATO continuing to function as a site of transnational synthesis that amalgamates the national and international concerns of its member states.


\textsuperscript{187} Alexandra Gheciu, \textit{NATO in the New Europe: the politics of international socialization after the Cold War}, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 138
This transition is not a radical break with past practice for NATO. Rather the rescaling and a broadening of its security apparatuses emphasize tendencies that have been present since its foundation. As a security community, NATO facilitates deep and extensive relationships between its members, which succeeded in turning national security concerns into collective and hence transnational concerns shared by the entire membership. As Thies recounts NATO members, “…gradually found themselves enmeshed in a collective effort requiring an unprecedented degree of strategic collaboration in peacetime and an unprecedented degree of intrusiveness by various NATO committees and planning groups into national policies and plans.”  

This of course was not a linear process free of discord, but the strength of these relationships is demonstrated by NATO’s continued endurance when its original purpose, containing the Soviet Union has long since been fulfilled.

The ideational strength of NATO means that it is more than just a forum that grants its members a wider avenue to pursue their own interests. While NATO is a creature of its members, it is does not simply reproduce their disparate national interests on a wider stage. Instead, NATO alters the conditions and perspectives of its members, generating a new transnational perspective amongst them. NATO then is responsible for constituting an expansive intersubjective process. As Kitchen writes, “The Atlantic community is intersubjective. It is not simply the sum of the identities of its member’s states, but exists in the spaces between them and is constitutive of them.”

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189 France abandoning NATO’s command structures for over three decades is only one of many examples that could be pointed to in this regard.
ability of NATO to fashion a collective identity amongst its members is not replicated in empirical effectiveness. NATO’s success as a producer of norms and values has not allowed to it create governance mechanisms capable of extracting a consistent level of resources from its members enabling it defend, on a far greater basis, the interests of Western states. NATO is often blocked from achieving these aims by the sovereign prerogatives of its members, as will be seen below.

The trends that have existed since the end of the Cold War and the formation of a new geoeconomic order are still in place, even after the attacks of September 11th and the start of the War on Terror. These events largely represent the intensification of the post-Cold war condition, not the emergence of a new world order, as Gheciu points out. She notes, “In some ways, 9/11 only served to reinforce transformations that had occurred in response to the end of the Cold War…the focus on non-conventional threats and multiple security referents has become even more intense.”\textsuperscript{191} With the acquisition and application of knowledge central to geoeconomic practices,\textsuperscript{192} the scale of the changes which occurred after the end of the Cold War would necessitate the development of new radically different epistemological framework in order to comprehend the strange new world that had emerged. In this new environment knowledge crafted to analyze structures and actors from the Cold War that no longer existed would naturally decline in value and explanatory potential. This was the fate that awaited collective defense. NATO’s sole strategic doctrine would become a holdover from a prior era. To remain

relevant NATO would have to both significantly modify its epistemological framework and explore new forms of partnership and military integration. NATO’s post-Cold War orientation would be greatly affected by the growing influence of risk management within the security sector.

The Identification of Risk as a New Approach to Security

The concept of risk itself is an essentially contested concept,193 with its definition and application differing sharply depending upon the field in which it is being employed. While there may be a large amount of confusion and debate over what a risk actually is, that has not prevented it, as Power notes, from becoming a hugely influential concept spanning a range of fields. Power writes, “…the concept remains elusive, contested and inherently controversial…while expert commentators may bemoan the lack of consensus about what risk is and point to the confusions of using it within diverse settings, it has become an empirical fact that the concept of risk in its raw form has acquired social, political, and organizational significance as never before…”194 The pervasiveness of risk and the necessity to quantify and develop responses it to arises from the complexity of modern society. The inherent unpredictability of modern life is a consequence of the structure of modern society. Institutions that are constructed to regulate the uncertainties of contemporary existence often serve to generate new risks. Modern society, which is

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193 There is widespread agreement that the concept of risk describes actual existing social realities, but not the proper manner of its application. Risk then should be considered an essential contested concept as defined by Gallie “…concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users.” W.B Gallie, “Art as an Essentially Contest Concept,” The Philosophy Quarterly 6 (1956): 169. Smith concurs with this, pointing out that the debate is not over whether the concept itself exists, but over, “…the proper use of the concept, with all arguing that the concept is being used inappropriately by others.” K. Smith, “Mutually Contested Concepts and their standard general use,” Journal of Classical Sociology 2 (2002): 332.
obsessed with the identification of risks, ironically ends up producing innumerable risks as a condition of its existence. Hence, modern society, as Beck has argued, can best be defined as a risk society. He writes, “...the emergence of the risk society designates a developmental phase of modern society in which the social, political, economic and individual risks increasingly tend to escape the institutions for monitoring and protection in industrial society...the institutions of industrial society become the producers and legitimators of threats they cannot control.”

Contemporary societies are reflexive. Awareness exists that the problems faced by modern societies are of their own making; yet at the same time, the institutional framework that exists is often unable to formulate an adequate response to these conundrums. The growing predominance of risk management in a wide range of social and technical fields is a response to these realities.

The key drivers of risk today, the main sources of uncertainty, are the economy and the geopolitical environment. The manner in which risk analysis has occurred in each field has been sharply circumscribed however with a predominate focus upon the individual rather than systemic constructions of risk. The economy as a generator of risks is a well-known phenomenon. The initial impetus for wide scale state intervention in the economy beginning in the nineteenth century and continuing with the rise of the welfare state in the twentieth, which brought comprehensive regulations that protected workers and public health was designed to curtail the risk posed by unregulated markets.

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dominance of neoliberalism in the later part of the twentieth century reconfigured the relationship between the individual, society, and risk. With the decline of the welfare state, the role of the state in protecting individuals from risk was reduced. Instead it the identification and management of risk became an individual responsibility.

Neoliberalism promoted a new form of subjectivity, one in which, as O’Malley argues, everyone is responsible for calculating their own risk, and “…a particular alignment of uncertainty and risk has generated a characteristic hybrid of enterprising prudentialism in the last quarter century or so. The prudent subjects of neoliberalism should practice and sustain their autonomy by assembling information, materials, and practices together into a personalized strategy that identifies and minimizes their exposure to harm.” The good neoliberal subject resembles as closely as possible the actualization of the rational individual assumed by neoclassical economic theory. The growing literature encouraging individual risk and heaping praise on the risk taker is an outgrowth of these larger economic shifts.

In terms of geopolitics as well the identification and quantification of risk has primarily focused upon individual existence. The formation of critical security studies in the 1990s and the focus on human security by prominent international organizations are illustrative of this development. The United Nations provided one of the first definitions

of human security and promoted the trend towards quantifying risk in individual terms. The UN report declared, “…safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life—whether in homes, in jobs or in communities.”\textsuperscript{201} Human security focuses on identifying a broad spectrum of threats that individuals face and then striving to mitigate them through the promotion of aid and international development\textsuperscript{202}, or in extreme cases humanitarian intervention when it is determined that a state is actively threatening the security of its citizens.\textsuperscript{203} What is eluded in the human security approach however is any systemic engagement with the structural factors that give rise to the conditions that it seeks to ameliorate. As Robert writes, “human security as a concept has always been disengaged from causation…In no instance has its causation been traced to power in the international system. Indeed, the converse is true: conditions of human insecurity have been quite openly dislocated from central causation.”\textsuperscript{204} Human security then examines and seeks to responds to the consequences of risk, while overlooking their actual production.

This myopic focus upon the individual and the ignoring of the wider systemic

construction of risk is a trend that extends across analysis of the practice of risk management today. The majority of scholarly analysis of risk management has focused upon how private actors have conceived and responded to risk; public actors have received far less attention. Roberts argues that, “International security risks form an under-researched part of an expanding set of risks…Relatively little is known about public risk management compared to its private sector equivalent.”205 There has been some analysis conducted of how risk management has been incorporated by public actors and applied in the areas of criminology206, health,207 and the environment208; but in terms of the effect of risk management has had on how public security actors conceive of their role and determine threats to stability the analysis has tended to be mechanical and formulaic, with an objectified concept of risk predominating.209

The focus upon the reaction of the individual to already pre-existing risks ignores that these risks arise from larger social interactions and institutional frameworks that shape the conditions of individual existence. Risks, to put it simply, are socially

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constructed. They do not have their own essence, but are formed through the interactions of different forms of knowledge, with interpretation of an event or phenomenon playing the pivotal role in the construction of a risk.\textsuperscript{210} As Beck noted, “Risks do not have any abstract existence in themselves. They acquire reality in the contradictory judgments of groups and populations...risks count as urgent, threatening and real or as negligible and unreal only as the result of cultural perceptions and evaluations.”\textsuperscript{211} The identification and quantification of risk represents an attempt to establish a procedure of action against a perceived threat. Not all actors have an equal ability to declare something a threat however. Those identified as security experts or professionals have access to the knowledge, credentials, and networks to both claim that something is a risk and to propagate these claims.\textsuperscript{212}

In arguing that the determination of risk is socially constructed with security experts playing a key role in this process I am trending on similar ground to Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde and their elaboration of securitization acts. In their approach securitization involves a securitizing actor, the one who declares an something to be a security issue; a referent object, something that is being threatened and needs to be protected; and an audience which needs to be pursued to accept something as a security threat. This is an open-ended process, with the range of potential security issues unlimited. They posit that, “Securitization can be seen as a more extreme form of politicization. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{210} Ewald makes a point along these lines when he notes, “Nothing is a risk in itself, there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event.” Francois Ewald, “Insurance and Risk,” In G. Buchell, C. Gordon, and P. Miller, eds., \textit{The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality}, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 199.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{211} Ulrich Beck, \textit{World at Risk}, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 13.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{212} Bigo analyzes this segment of expert at length in Didier Bigo, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease,” \textit{Alternatives} 27 (2002): 63-92.}
nonpoliticized through politicized to securitized. In principle the placement of issues on the spectrum is open: depending upon circumstances, any issue can end up on any part of the spectrum. The major focus of securitization is on the discourse that develops around a threat and how awareness of it is spread. My main point of differentiation with the Copenhagen School, which will be expanded upon below, is that my concern lies with the internal calculations that security experts develop to quantify risks as well as the organizational transformations that occur when logics of risk management become central to an institution. These topics receive only passing reference in the analysis of the Copenhagen school.

Risk analysis serves a double purpose for security actors, providing both a form of comprehensive analysis that allows them to act in the world, and at the same time, increasing their legitimacy and influence. By positing something as a threat, a measure of power, authority, and legitimacy are returned to the actors and institutions that have seen it drain away. Power notes this process when he argues that, “When objects of concern are described in terms of risk, they are placed in a web of expectation about management and actor responsibility. The apparent risk-based description of organizational life and personal life corresponds to the widespread expectation that organizations must be seen to act as if the management of risk is possible.” In responding to and containing threats

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214 The rising anxiety within Western societies due to the constant situation of precarity under neoliberalism has the potential to undermine support for governance institutions if not properly managed. For further detail see Barbara Adam and Joost van Loon. “Repositioning Risk: The Challenge for Social Theory,” in Barbara Adam, Ulrich Beck, and Joost van Loon, eds., *The Risk Society and Beyond: Critical Issues for Social Theory*. (London: Sage, 2000), 1-32.

a renewed sense of security is projected as governments are viewed as taking proactive measures to curtail potential dangers and protect their populations. While risk analysis is useful then because it serves to increase the legitimacy of security actors, it is also employed because it is seen as an effective response to actual conditions of contemporary uncertainty. As I noted above, with the emergence of the post-Cold War geoeconomic order the nature of threats changed and conceivable security concerns vastly widened. The collapse of the security arrangement of the Cold War resulted in a vast proliferation of potential dangers and a general diffusion of threats. As Heng notes, “In the absence of clearly defined Cold War threats, proactive policies come to the fore addressing more amorphous concepts of danger…with globalization dangers stem from diffused processes rather than traditional premeditated aggression.” Risk analysis, at least within the security domain, became hugely influential because it offered a coherent response to this new reality. As a mode of thought risk assessment imbues policymakers with the belief that through its calculations the predication of a threat can be made before it emerges to damage important interests.

Risk management became increasingly prevalent within the security sector in the wake of the Cold War because it was deemed to provide a form of knowledge which allowed policy makers and security institutions to both comprehend and respond to the new spectrum of threats with emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Whether or not risk analysis actually performs these functions is beside the point. It is quite possible that risks are vastly over-exaggerated or indeed non-existent. Risk are not an objective form of knowledge, but are constructed by fallible risk experts whose unfounded fears

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may lead to the misidentification of risks. As Williams notes, the constructs created by risk experts can be based in completely unfounded fears. He argues that “The West has become ever more preoccupied with the what ifs of life, with subverting the potential for future risk rather than considering cold, hard facts...Instead a nexus of insecurity permeates the minds of policy makers and the public, feeding a dangerous cauldron of possible disasters that threatens to dislodge the distinction between the possible and the probable.”\textsuperscript{217} Yet I believe that by serving as a paradigm and a providing a recognized form of knowledge and set of procedures risk management has already provided a useful function, its actual level of effectiveness is immaterial. Indeed even when the outcomes predicated by risk analysis are demonstrably incorrect its influence continues to grow simply because it is seen, rightly or wrongly, as elaborating a persuasive vision of the world that corresponds to the reality observed by security actors.\textsuperscript{218}

The permeation of risk analysis throughout the security sector was a result of the new factors that arose with the formation of the post-Cold War geoeconomic order. NATO was not immune to this dynamic. In the decade and a half following the end of the Cold War, NATO, in the word of its Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, underwent a paradigm shift, a shift that was further solidified after the events of September 11\textsuperscript{th}.

During the Cold War, the prevailing security paradigm went something like this: security is about safeguarding your territorial integrity, and this is something that can be accomplished by deterrence…Over the past fifteen years however, that paradigm has been challenged to the point of obsolescence. Developments since


\textsuperscript{218} Power shares this assessment, noting that even though the predcitions made by risk management models are continually incorrect they continue to be retained. Michael Power, \textit{Organized Uncertainty: Designing a World of Risk Management}. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 5. This extends beyond risk models in the security sector. As Davies and McGoey point out the financial risk models that preceded the largest economic crisis since the Great Depression remain largely in place with slight modifications. William Davies and Linsey McGoey, “Rationalities of ignorance: on financial crisis and the ambivalence of neoliberal epistemology,” \textit{Economy and Society} 41 (2012): 64-83.
the end of the Cold War have been increasingly at odds with our established worldview…In my view September 11th dealt the final blow to the old, Cold War paradigm with its Eurocentric view of the world.\textsuperscript{219} In the place of the deterrence-based approach of collective defense, NATO would gradually adopt the proactive posture inherent within risk management approaches to security.\textsuperscript{220}

Central to the logic of collective defense is the belief that the world is the largely static and predictable. In contrast, for risk management the world is chaotic and unpredictable. Collective defense assumes that the world will remain largely the same, while for risk management the future is indeterminate. The shift in NATO between strategic logics would result in a fundamental change in its behavior. Operating under the logic of collective defense during the Cold War, NATO would never strike first, but would only respond to a direct attack against one of its members. As Yost notes during the Cold War, “Preventive war against the Soviet Union was always out of the question for NATO. Moreover, the allies did not use the word pre-emption, because they had no intention of initiating the use of force.”\textsuperscript{221} When viewed through the lens of collective defense NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo makes no sense. NATO’s engagement there only becomes possible once the shift to risk management is well underway. Pivotal to this shift was an expansion of NATO’s strategic field beyond its membership and outside of its traditional area of operations.

\textsuperscript{221}David Yost, “NATO and the anticipatory use of force,” \textit{International Affairs} 83 (2007): 44.
Fashioning A Coherent World Order: NATO’s Expansive Array of Partnerships and Growing Military Integration in the 1990s

During the 1990s in response to the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new unpredictable geoeconomic order, NATO launched an array of partnerships and its first multinational rapid reaction military force. These initiatives would begin to provide NATO with the institutional capacity to carry out preemptive interventions outside of its traditional European area of operations. However, the effectiveness of these programs would be sharply curtailed until the out of area debate within NATO was definitively settled its 1999 Strategic Concept. The programs discussed in this section are important because they pushed NATO away from a sole concern with collective defense and down the path towards a global security nexus. They form an important precursor towards NATO finally determining that out of area operations were a central function of the Alliance in 1999. The discussion in this section will set the basis for the next section that will examine the parameters of NATO’s out of area debate and the factors that led to its conclusion. The following penultimate section of this chapter will examine the range of new agreements that formed in wake of NATO’s successful conclusion of the out of area debate and detail the overall state of the Alliance prior to the 2007 Global Financial Crisis.

The partnership arrangements that NATO offers, as Flockhart and Kristensen argue fall under three different categories depending upon the objective they are meant to achieve. The most complex agreements are for countries viewed as potential members. This format of agreements provide for extensive institutional linkages that are designed to prepare the participating countries for potential membership. The second set of
arrangements are for countries not viewed as potential members, but where an ongoing
dialogue and the formation of limited partnerships outside of NATO’s traditional sphere
of operations can serve to improve its geopolitical position. The final grouping of
partnerships are NATO’s relationships with other liberal democracies whom NATO
shares fundamental values and strategic orientation with. This set of partnerships only
took shape in the early years of the twenty-first century.222 The Partnership for Peace
Program falls under the first category, while the Mediterranean Dialogue occupies the
second category; states who are members of the Contact Country group comprise the
third category and will be examined in a later section of this chapter.

NATO offers a range of potential options for engagement to a country depending
on its geographical location and that level of interaction that both NATO and the country
in question deem suitable to their mutual security interests. Freed from the geopolitical
confines of the Cold War and seeking to spread its influence outside of its traditional
European base of operations these partnerships provide NATO with the ability to engage
in regions and with countries outside of its historic North Atlantic domain. They allow
NATO to project its power and shape developments in areas viewed as crucial to its
strategic interest. The role of partnerships within NATO has continued to grow in
importance as the global interests of the organization continue to multiply. The United
States has consistently been a major advocate for the growth of NATO’s partnership
programs and has sought to utilize them as a supplement to American power. As Kay
argues, the expansion of NATO partnerships occupy a prominent role in American

222 Trine Flockhart and Kristian Kristensen, NATO and Global Partnerships: To be Global or to Act
foreign policy. He argues, “Partnerships can be a grand scheme for managing systemic change but they may also simply be used by diplomats to work out grey areas of international relationships. American officials value the concept’s lack of clarity because partnerships can justify flexible bilateral and multilateral architectures.”

The scope and scale of the interactions that occur within these arrangements can be expanded or contracted depending upon the perceived strategic significance of the state in question and its geopolitical position via member states. NATO’s partnerships can be thought of as a sort of transnational deployment, along the lines elaborated by Latham.

Although a NATO partnership does not solely determine the strategic priorities of the state in question, it does generate a new set of social relations that may prefigure the actions available to a state in the future.

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is the most senior and advanced of NATO’s partnership plans. Originally created in 1994 to gradually integrate the recently independent countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia within the security sphere of NATO. Today PfP has 22 members. PfP countries are able to choose from a toolkit of available options provided by NATO that determine the level of coordination and interoperability they will have with the organization. Activities on offer under the aegis of PfP program touch on virtually every field of NATO activity including defense-related work, defense reform, defense-policy and planning, civil-military relations, education and training, military to military cooperation and exercises, and scientific and environmental

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cooperation. The PfP program offers six different tiers of commitment depending upon the depth of engagement that the member country seeks with the rest of NATO, these range from tier one which is simply low level cooperation and confidence building, to tier three at which an intensified dialogue of enhanced cooperation with the aim of possible membership in the future begins to occur, countries that successfully pass through tier three become part of the Membership Action Plan at tier four, where a formal offer to join NATO is extended. Tiers five and six comprise the final steps and verification procedures before a state becomes a full NATO member.

PfP offers a broad set of options and points of contact with states that NATO has identified as contributing to its strategic interest and which its hopes to develop a closer relationship with. While in its earlier stages PfP served primarily as a forum that prepared European states for future membership in NATO, in the last ten years the focus of PfP has changed as it has shifted its orientation to Central Asia and the Caucasuses, a move that was made explicit in NATO’s 2004 Istanbul Summit. The document declares that “…in response to the changing international environment, the Alliance will put special focus on engaging with Partners in the strategically important regions of Caucasus and Central Asia…NATO will refocus existing resources toward these two regions, consistent with NATO’s long term strategy to enhance stability across the Euro—Atlantic area by

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encouraging and supporting reform.”\textsuperscript{228} Part of the impetus behind this move was no doubt due to NATO’s mission in Afghanistan that ended in 2014.

The Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) was initiated in the same year as PfP, 1994, yet it remains a far less developed program. Due to the region that the countries involved in MD are based, outside of the North Atlantic Area, formal membership within NATO was never an option for them. Instead the MD was developed as its founding document declares, “…a forum for confidence-building and transparency in which Allies could learn more about the security concerns of Dialogue countries as well as dispel misperceptions about NATO’s aim and policies.”\textsuperscript{229} The MD includes Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Algeria. In its early stages the MD simply provided for regular bilateral meetings between member countries and NATO and occasionally multilateral meetings involving all seven-dialogue countries. In contrast to the PfP in which a plethora of activities and points of contact were on offer, the MD provided for a sharply limited set of interactions. This state of affairs persisted until 2004 when the functions of the MD were greatly extended to encourage out of area operations, a topic that will be returned to below.

Alongside the plethora of partnership, arrangements that NATO launched during the 1990s it also initiated the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) program, the first in what would become a series of initiatives that were designed to increase the functionality of Alliance by providing it with the capability to rapidly deploy a range of forces depending upon the geopolitical environment. The CJTF represents an early effort by

NATO to generate more extensive trans-scalar linkages between its members and establish a reliable coercive capacity that it can draw upon as necessary in order to respond to threats.

The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) arose in response to the changed geopolitical environment after the Cold War. Officially launched at NATO’s Brussels Summit in 1994, the CJTF was developed in order to increase the effectiveness and coordination of European military forces. The CJTF concept creates a set of regulations and procedures that establish a command and control framework for multinational and multiservice task forces that are quickly generated and tailored to fulfill specific NATO operations. Adm. Paul Miller, former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic characterizes CJTF as “…both a process and a structure: as a process, it enables us to assemble and groom the forces and capabilities to operate together; as a structure, it provides the command and control architecture to direct and employ a coalition operation.” CJTF then represents an early experiment by NATO in creating a command and control mechanism capable of responding to complex security environments, a process that continues today.

The effectiveness of the CJTF concept relies upon successive changes to NATO’s military command structure. The rapid response and speed by which a CJTF can be generated is based upon the creation of CJTF nuclei within NATO. These nuclei will

have permanent staff tasked to them. If directed to do so by the political leadership of NATO, these staff members will provide the basis through which resources can be coordinated, improving the speed at which forces can be put in the field. NATO itself details how this process would work, under ideal circumstances. “CJTF headquarters nuclei or core staffs are being established on a permanent basis within selected parent headquarters of the NATO military command structure. Together with augmentation modules and support modules generated for the purposes of a specific operation they will form a headquarters to command a CJTF structured to meet the requirements of the operation in question.”233 CJTF Headquarters would be tasked with the assimilation and dissemination of intelligence planning, receiving and committing forces, and maintaining communications between NATO and a diverse array of relevant local authorities, non-government agencies, and private actors.234 However, internal political divisions have served to undermine the potential effectiveness of the CJTF and prevented its mobilization in situations where it is was clearly called for.

The first opportunity to utilize the CJTF concept came soon after it was formerly announced in the summer of 1995 as the breakup of Yugoslavia accelerated and the situation in Bosnia began to spiral out of control. Yet, as Kaplan recounts, a lack of political will by Europe’s leaders prevented the activation of a CJTF for Bosnia. In his opinion, “…the summer of 1995 should have been the occasion for the Europeans to mount a CJTF, it was unable to act. The trouble at this point was not about the

234 Peter Jones, NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force Concept: Viable Tiger or Paper Dragon? (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1999), 18.
mechanism; the CJTF offered a genuine means of fulfilling the European partner’s aspirations to manage crises of greater concerns to them than to the American partner. Rather, it was a lack of will on the part of European leaders that inhibited them in the Bosnian War.”\textsuperscript{235} In fact although CJTF was first proposed in 1994, it was not actually implemented until over two years later due to disagreements between France and the United States over how the CJTF would be deployed. France opposed fully integrating the CJTF within NATO command structures. At the time France was still maintaining its thirty year boycott of NATO’s political and military structure and argued that placing the CJTF under NATO military command, rather than establishing a new political framework to govern its actions would ultimately place it under American oversight, as the Supreme Allied Command for Europe, who is by tradition always an American, would have an implied veto over NATO’s military actions.\textsuperscript{236} This impasse was finally resolved in early 1996 when a change in French policy led it to rejoin NATO’s military command and the United States assuaged French concerns over the command structure of the CJTFs.\textsuperscript{237}

While political disagreements plagued the early years of the CJTF, disorganization over how the CJTF was going to be implemented within the NATO command structure, specifically what the total number of CJTF headquarters should be, resulted in the impairment of long-term planning and made clear that the CJTF would be


\textsuperscript{236} A prime French concern was also establishing the ability for Europe to act militarily independent of the United States, if it saw if Europe saw it as in its interest to do so. In this sense the CJTF did serve to strengthen the link between Europe and the United States within NATO. As Bensahel argues, the CJTF was the final nail in the coffin of the Western European Union, the best opportunity that existed for European Union states to form an independent military organization outside of the confines of NATO and thus with greatly reduced American oversight and influence. Instead the CJTF would remove this possibility. See Nora Bensahel, “Separable but not Separate Forces: NATO’s Development of the Combined Joint Task Force,” \textit{European Security} 8 (1999): 64.

\textsuperscript{237} Historical background is provided in ibid., 60-63.
beset by the inertia typical of NATO. The number of CJTF headquarters have historically been in flux; reduced from an initial 65 to 20, and then altered again on successive occasions.\textsuperscript{238} Thus, as is all too common within NATO, a promising concept was undermined by divisions within the organization. Jones shares this assessment when he notes that “NATO’s CJTF concept fits a long-standing pattern in which political imperative and goals are often incompatible with military concerns and capabilities. Consequently, the viability of the CJTF concept is stretched between meeting the demands of the changing strategic and security environment, shifting political goals of Alliance members, and the military’s desire for an integrated and viable command and control structure.”\textsuperscript{239} The CJTF was designed to provide a predictable and regularized format that would quickly allow the formation of NATO expeditionary forces to carry out approved operations. These forces would be unified at the command level for a temporary period in order to complete a specific mission and would then return to autonomous national control upon completion of the mission.

The CJTF concept is a set of procedures that governs the integration, under a sole command, of national military forces for a limited duration. The CJTF thus assumes that a level of interoperability exists between these forces. The military assets committed by member states would, in all likelihood, be under the command of non-national commanders, raising questions of sovereign control. This trans-national synthesis effected through the unification of command represents a sharp break from past multi-

\textsuperscript{239} Peter Jones, \textit{NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force Concept: Viable Tiger or Paper Dragon?} (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1999), 44.
national engagements such as the First Gulf War, where a coalition command was created, but national forces retained their own separate command under national commanders. While the initial implementation of the CJTF was a rocky one, the importance of this concept would be greatly elevated within NATO with the definite settlement of the decade long out of area debate.

Kosovo and the end of NATO’s Out of Area Debate

Although it was during the course of the 1990s that the out of area debate in NATO was finally definitively concluded, discussions concerning whether NATO should intervene outside of its member states were a reoccurring issue within the organization. Tensions arose in the Alliance around whether it should intervene during the Suez Crisis of 1956, if it should formally support America's war in Vietnam during the 1960s and 70s and over its role in the First Gulf War. In each instance, NATO declined to formally commit itself collectively to conflicts in which its members had embroiled themselves. These refusals to expand the role of NATO beyond its European area of operations were based on the concern that doing so would lessen the role of collective defense as the underlying principle of the organization and draw attention away from

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240 Bustamante provides an analysis of the difficulties of a coalition command structure and utilizes the Boxer Rebellion and Operation Desert Storm as case studies. David Bustamante, *Coalition Operational Command and Control: Lessons Learned for the Relief of Peking During the Boxer Rebellion*, (Newport: Naval War College, 2005).


NATO's countering of the Soviet threat in Europe. The sudden end of the Cold War however removed this dynamic, made collective defense seemly obsolete, and left NATO struggling to find a reason for its continued existence.\(^\text{244}\)

The decision to go out of area and proactively respond to threats to its membership as they arose would provide NATO with a renewed sense of purpose. NATO eventually decision in favor of out of area operations, paving the way for its first ever intervention in Kosovo. This intervention would lead to the adoption of risk management as one of NATO’s central strategic principles and elevated the importance of new forms of analysis.

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War US Senator Richard Lugar declared that, “NATO had to go out of area or go out of business.”\(^\text{245}\) This starkly crystallized the options available to NATO with the disappearance of its major adversary and seemly sole reason for existence. During the 1990s NATO would eventually chose to go out of area and gradually redesigned itself to engage in operations that were outside of its initial mandate. This process did not occur without significance internal debate however. The United States was the foremost advocate for this process, pushing for a broadening of NATO's concept of security that would justify an expanded basis for interventions. It was resisted in this attempt most strongly by Germany, who sought to restrict NATO, as much as possible, to its original purpose as a defense alliance.\(^\text{246}\) In this debate, Germany would

\(^{244}\) Bertram sums up the thinking during this period writing, “NATO is not on track for the 21st century. Instead, it is in deep, enduring crisis and may not even reach the end of the decade. The reason for this disturbing state of affairs is not just the familiar and now banal one that NATO's old reason for existing is no longer there. It is, more profoundly, that this unique Western security club... has a common memory, but no longer a common purpose.” Christoph Bertram, “NATO on track for the 21st century?,” Security Dialogue 26 (1995): 65-71.


seem to have the NATO charter on its side. The geographical basis for NATO operations was clearly set by article six of the NATO treaty and defined as “...Europe or North America, on the territory of or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.”

NATO's first strategic concept in 1991 did allude to new security challenges and risks which faced the alliance in the post-cold war environment along with the possibility that NATO could engage in the management of crises at an early stage, but a firm stance on out of area operations were deferred to a later date.

However, the reluctance of NATO to engage in out of area operations began to erode soon afterwards as the new configuration of the post-Cold War geoeconomic order became increasingly clear. This necessitated that NATO adapt to these circumstances in order to remain relevant. This adaption, as NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer notes, is one that continues to this day. As he argues, “The Cold War belongs to a distant past. Globalization is accelerating. As a result, our security environment is becoming ever more complex. We are forced to reconsider established approaches, and we must have the courage to jettison those ideas that no longer correspond to today’s world.”

The early stages of this reconsideration, and the first step in the erosion of the relevance of collective defense, occurred in April 1992 when NATO provided aircraft to support the UN declared no-fly zone over Bosnia. NATO further escalated its

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248The 1991 strategic concept is the first declassified one from NATO. Prior to 1991 NATO did not regularly develop strategic concepts, indeed the NATO's last substantial discussion of strategy occurred in the Harmel Report of 1967. Strategic concepts lie only below the NATO treaty in terms of expressions of Alliance policy and provide a broad, open negotiation framework for the range of the Alliance's pursuits.
involvement in December 1996 with the deployment of a Peace Implementation Force under the authorization of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{251}

While contributing to each of these efforts Germany expressed deep concerns that the proliferation of such operations in the future would lead to an overstretching of NATO. However, German reluctance over NATO’s move towards out of area operations was not met with any alternatives. According to Keller, during this period German policy towards NATO was in favor of the status quo simply because it lacked a coherent security policy. Keller argues, “...German security policy is not focused on a clear strategic goal. Without a strategic goal, the drive to accomplish change or to optimize current tools and processes gets lost. Maintaining the status quo becomes the most attractive strategy.”\textsuperscript{252}

Maintaining its Cold War posture, with collective defense as its sole strategic foundation would have resulted in a slide into irrelevance and eventual dissolution; doing so was not an option if NATO wished to survive the decade. The continuing crisis in the former Yugoslavia, combined with American pressure would eventually conspire to force NATO to directly resolve the issue of area deployments once and for all.

Despite NATO's deployment in Bosnia the situation in the former Yugoslavia continued to deteriorate. Massacres of ethnic Albanians by Serbian forces in Kosovo and attacks by the Kosovo Liberation Army upon Serbian army positions and civilians led to an escalating cycle of violence.\textsuperscript{253} On September 23, 1998, the UN issued Resolution 1199 that called for Yugoslav forces to cease all action against civilian populations and to

\textsuperscript{253}For an overview of the acts of violence committed by both sides see, Human Rights Watch, “Kosovo War Crimes Chronology,” accessible at \texttt{http://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/kosovo98/timeline.shtml}
allow of international monitors in the disputed territory of Kosovo. Resolution 1199 notably, did not authorize the use of force in any of the Yugoslav republics.254 The NATO bombing campaign in Serbia, which began on March 23 1999 and ended on June 10, 1999, was precipitated by the failure of the Rambouillet conference, which set a hard line to the Serbian government calling for complete military occupation and substantial political control of Kosovo by NATO. This tough policy towards Serbia was largely set by the United States, which seemed to be striving to effectively box NATO in, so it would have no choice but to commit to a bombing campaign.255 Secretary of State Madeline Albright’s remarks on the eve of Rambouillet illustrate this tactic. “If the Serbs are the cause of the breakdown, we’re determined to go forward with the NATO decision to carry out air strikes.”256 The American determination that NATO attack Serbia was driven by a number of factors, but one of them, I believe, was the desire to force the issue of out of area operations within NATO and have the organization finally accept them as legitimate part of its functions. This would, in American eyes, keep NATO viable as it entered into the 21st century. As will be seen in the next chapter, the United States, despite frequent frustration, sees NATO as an important tool for projecting and organizing Western power.

NATO’s intervention in Serbia would not only set a precedent in regards to out of area operations, it would also mark the first time NATO acted militarily without explicit UN authorization. As Daadler and O’Hanlon explain, “As a defensive military alliance, NATO has traditionally considered using force only if one or more of its members were

attacked. The case of Kosovo was different...this was not a question of self-defense. Accordingly, under one interpretation of international law, the alliance could use force in this instance only with the explicit authorization of the UN security council.\footnote{257} Such authorization was highly unlikely however, with both Russia and China signaling their willingness to veto any resolution that authorized the use of force. NATO intervention within Serbia then would both violate international law\footnote{258} and induce a landmark shift within NATO, transforming it from a defensive alliance to a proactive one that sought to aggressively intervene and manage crises as they emerged. In doing so, it would also finally settle the out of area debate in favor of those who supported an expansion of NATO activities beyond its territories.

Why were European states, which had initially appeared to be reluctant to intervene in Serbia, drawn along by the United States? The case of Germany, which sought a limited role for NATO throughout the 1990s, is representative of the Continental European position on NATO. As Leithner argues, Germany's eventually support for the Serbian operation and its commitment of military forces to it was based on a number of factors, particularly a strong desire to protect human rights and prevent a perceived genocide that was occurring on their doorstep. Perhaps the central factor however, was the deep integration of Germany within NATO and belief that preserving NATO as a viable mechanism for international security in the post-Cold War world was a strategic and political necessity.\footnote{259} In this context then, with the United States pushing for a

\footnote{258}For further detail on how NATO’s intervention in Serbia violated international law see Katharina Coleman, \textit{International Organization and Peace Enforcement}, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 19-73.  
bombing campaign over Serbia, coupled with the driftlessness of NATO throughout the 1990s, the failure to intervene and to do so successfully had the potential to make or break NATO.\footnote{Although it could be argued that NATO’s enlargement in 1999 also had a renewing effect upon the organization, absent the direction provided by Kosovo and NATO’s two subsequent strategic concepts, the enlargement would have further exposed the inability of NATO to adapt to the post-Cold environment. The burdens of an expanded membership, without a clear sense of purpose would have likely provided fatal to NATO.} As one commentator at the time put it, “…the debate about intervention is no longer a dispute over the means to an end. It is a debate over abandoning NATO and the American claim to international leadership. If there is no NATO victory over Serbia…there will no longer be a NATO.”\footnote{John Pfaff, “Serbia is Make or Break for NATO,” \textit{Boston Globe}, April 12, 1999. For further detail see Noam Chomsky, \textit{The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo}. (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 1999), 133-137.} NATO’s intervention in Serbia set the mold that the organization would assume in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. It became in effect, as Shea argues, “…the proving ground, where the alliance could adapt to its major post-Cold War role…”\footnote{Jamie Shea, “NATO at Sixty and Beyond,” in Gulaur Aybet and Rebecca Moore, eds., \textit{NATO in Search of a Vision}. (Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2010), 17.} Serbia was where NATO finally figured out its post-Cold War role,\footnote{Although some argued that this actually occurred with NATO’s response to September 11\textsuperscript{th} for this position see Julian Lindley-French, \textit{The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Enduring Alliance}. (London: Routledge, 2007), 9.} one that was proactively focused on confronting crises outside of its traditional area of operations.\footnote{NATO’s intervention in Kosovo would not have been possible without a strategic shift and a redefinition of threat. As Heng argues, “Over Kosovo, the definition of strategic importance changed as a consequence of globalization. Previously, it derived from resources or geography…Through globalization, information technology and collapsing Cold War controls, Kosovo’s significance lay more in its potential to cause damage beyond its boundaries, exporting unwanted phenomena such as chronic insecurity, chaos, illegal immigration and drug trafficking. Increasing global interconnectedness meant that instability in a relatively strategic backwater like Kosovo according to this logic, could undermine the very stability globalization depended upon. The Kosovo campaign in this sense, served to manage such risks.” Yee-Kuang Heng, \textit{War as Risk Management: Strategy and Conflict in an Age of Globalised Risks}. (London: Routledge, 2006),67-68} Establishing standards for how NATO would determine what actually constituted a crisis as well as the mechanisms that it would follow once this identification had occurred would be elaborated in its 1999 and 2010 Strategic Concepts as well other
as internal documents.

With the Serbia intervention making out of area, operations a viable prospect for NATO, its 1999 Strategic Concept sought to formalize these developments. Approved in the midst of the campaign in Serbia in April 1999, NATO’s second post-Cold War Strategic Concept greatly expanded NATO's definition of security along with the range of potential threats that could challenge the Alliance in the future. The document argued that, “The security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability...that could evolve rapidly. Some countries in and around the Euro-Atlantic area face serious economic, social and political difficulties. Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability.”265 The NATO Intelligence Warning System (NIWS) was created following the 1999 Strategic Concept in order to assess risks that fell under these categories. The manner in which NIWS assesses risk differs sharply from the largely quantitative forms of analysis conducted during the Cold War under the rubric of collective defense.

The NIWS was designed to be a much more inclusive warning system that its predecessor and to take account of the risks identified in the Alliance’s 1999 Strategic Concept…it covers not only threats to NATO, but also a wide variety of military and non-military risk indicators…NIWS methodology calls for analysts to decide well in advance which events can serve as decision points for any given warning problem…By focusing on these critical indicators, analysts no longer based judgments on a mathematical, mechanical and quantitative approach to indications and warning. Instead, they can provide qualitative, forward-looking, predictive assessments for the outcome of a clearly defined situation. 266

The NIWS provides a regularized mechanism for the gathering and processing of information and the identification of risk. Its employment of a different methodology along with the consideration of different events as threats is indicative of the new strategic frame created by the 1999 Strategic Concept.

The 1999 Strategic Concept was also notable because it lifted the formal restriction on NATO that limited it to a defensive alliance simply concerned with responding to an attack against one its members, to one that proactively sought to manage and intervene in world affairs. As Article 31 of the 1999 Strategic Concept declares, “NATO will seek, in cooperation with other organizations, to prevent conflict, or, should a crisis arise, to contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law, including through the possibility of conducting non-Article 5 crisis response operations.”

Non-article five out of area operations were now recognized as an acceptable action by NATO. A centerpiece of NATO strategic thinking for fifty years was downgraded in the process. As Carpenter argues, “The Alliance's 1999 Strategic Concept, reflected an unmistakable shift of emphasis from the traditional mission of collective defense to the new mission of crisis management and out of area interventions, in that sense it was a crucial defeat for Article 5 traditionalists.”

The 1999 Strategic Concept was therefore a landmark event for NATO, one that altered its strategic foundations and greatly expanded the range of activities that NATO would seek to engage in the future. It also set off an internal process within NATO that was concerned with elaborating techniques of risk management and modeling that would allow NATO to perceive and

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respond to the wide range of potential threats to the Alliance.

*New Partnerships and New Possibilities: NATO in the early years of the Twenty-First Century*

Following its 1999, Strategic Concept NATO created new forms of partnerships and new force coordination projects that provided the Alliance with the capacity to preform out of area operations. Some of these initiatives built directly built upon pre-existing arrangements, while others were created entirely new patterns of relationships with states that had never engaged with NATO in a significant manner. While NATO’s new partnership agreements extended the reach of the Alliance and would transform it into an organization with truly global reach, its efforts at force coordination through the NATO Response Force and NATO Special Operations Headquarters ran into considerably greater difficulties.

As I recounted above the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) provides a flexible model of coordination across multi-national and multi-service units that can be employed during NATO operations. However, it was not until the activation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) in 2003 that the relevance of CJTF could be demonstrated on a consistent basis.\(^{269}\) The concept of the NRF was formally endorsed at NATO’s 2002 Prague Summit.\(^{270}\) NATO defines the NRF as, “A coherent, high-readiness, joint, multinational force package of up to 25,000 troops that is technologically advanced,

\(^{269}\) Although the CJTF concept was finally approved in 1996 it took several years after this for it to be fully implemented. By the Spring of 1999 this process was still ongoing and as a result the CJTF was not fully utilized in NATO’s Kosovo Operation of that year. For further detail see Henning Frantzen, *NATO Peace and Support Operations, 1991-1999: Policies and Doctrines*, (London, Routledge, 2004), 79.

flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable.” While it was formally inaugurated in 2003, the NRF actually became operational in 2006. The purpose of the NRF is to provide a rapid reaction force to support NATO missions as required. The NRF is designed to be deployed anywhere in the world within five days and remain operational for thirty days without resupply. Forces contributed to the NRF initiative by member countries train together and then are deployable for six-month rotations. While the NRF program has been critiqued both for the caliber of forces made available to it by member countries, as well as for the short six-month rotation, which greatly impedes unit cohesiveness, it is the closest NATO has come to establishing a permanent military force of its own. This attempt at trans-scalar force projection has however been severely undermined by national concerns.

While the NRF is formally overseen by Allied Command Operations, with the actual decision to deploy made by the North Atlantic Council, the command structure of the NRF is based upon the CJTF model. As Mariano argues, “…in many ways the NRF is the son of the CJTF…” The NRF command and control structure consists of a Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters, with subordinated Land, Air, and Maritime

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273 The NRF has been deployed a total of six times. For the 2004 Olympic Games, the Iraqi Elections, the 2011 Libyan civil war, humanitarian relief to Afghanistan, humanitarian relief in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, and for humanitarian relief in Pakistan.
Component Commands. The CJTF’s ad-hoc and flexible command structure is thus utilized to connect together a NRF, which by its operational mandate comprises regularly shifting unit formations. The NRF is significant because for the first time NATO has access to permanent force projection capabilities. Instead of cobbling together an intervention, force from member states in response to a crisis having the NRF allows for a rapid reaction to emerging events. While it is only capable of being deployed for a short length of time, it provides the opportunity for NATO to immediately engage when it sees its interests as being negatively impacted and creates the time for a more significant force to be organized during the NRF’s deployment. The NRF in theory should be a major progression for NATO and once that its membership should largely support as in the future the frequency which NATO will be called upon to engage in crisis response operations is likely to rise.

On paper, the NRF appears to have significant potential benefits for NATO. Yet a lack of long-term planning has served to create large gaps in the NRF’s capabilities. Bialos and Koehel detail the impacts of these planning oversights. As they note “…there has been little longer-term focus to date in NRF force planning on explicitly linking the NRF’s long-term development to its underlying capability acquisition goals…there is no clear plan to facilitate NRF interoperability.” The diverse composition of forces made available to the NRF necessitates a comprehensive interoperability program in order for the NRF to be able to function together effectively; the inexistence of such a program is a major oversight. A related issue is that the forces that compose the NRF are totally

dependent upon donor countries. There is no mechanism in place for the NRF to request specific unit types, which would complement the overall cohesiveness of it. Finally, there remains a particularly unwillingness on the part of states that are members of the NRF to share intelligence gathering capabilities. Perhaps these deficiencies should not be surprising as states have historically been reluctant to share the intelligence they have and the methods by which they have acquired it, viewing this information as crucial to maintaining their sovereign prerogatives.

A far more successful force coordination initiative due to both American support and its direct relation to the War on Terror is the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ), whose formation was first announced at NATO’s Riga Summit in 2006. The NSHQ falls under the auspices of the ACO and is designed to provide support and training to member military forces and promote interoperability across them. The tasks that the special operations forces that are organized under the NSHQ can be called upon to take part in are broad and multifaceted. The principal tasks expected of contributing nations and how well or poorly Alliance members have done to date have not been made public. Nevertheless, it is possible to gain a reasonable overview of the sorts of operations that the NSHQ is likely to engage in through reference to the Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations. These include providing human intelligence that places eyes on targets in hostile, denied or politically sensitive territory engaging in decisive tactical operations, and providing a broad spectrum of measures in support of friendly

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278 Ibid.
281 Ibid., 2-2.
forces in the field.\textsuperscript{282} Taylor elaborates on the benefits, but also the potential limitations that these possessing these capacities would provide to NATO. As he explains, “Such forces would provide NATO vastly improved capabilities to respond to combat and crisis contingencies wherever they may arise, and to eliminate the potential for crises to emerge at all…political factors may act as a constraint in practice as a result of the luxury each Alliance member has in limiting the roles that its forces play in NATO operations.”\textsuperscript{283} Coordination and interoperability within the NSHQ is of a far greater degree when compared to the NRF. These can be seen by the dramatic rise in the number of Special Forces deployed to Afghanistan. Within its first six years of operations, NSHQ has managed to standardize special operations practices across Europe, resulting in a fivefold increase in the number of Special Forces deployed to Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{284} This is due to the central role played within the NSHQ by the United States.

The United States is the framework nation within the NSHQ, providing implementation, administration and IT infrastructure and support.\textsuperscript{285} With strong support from the major funder of NATO, the NSHQ has experienced a degree of success that has eluded the CJTF and NRF. As Gompert and Smith argue, “It is certainly in the interest of the United States to increase the availability and quality of allied SOF for counterterrorism missions. While some allied SOF may compare well with U.S. SOF in specific skills and tasks, the U.S. capabilities may be viewed together as a gold

\textsuperscript{282} Ibid., 2-3.
\textsuperscript{285} NATO, “NATO Special Operations Headquarters,” http://www.aco.nato.int/page208301014.aspx
Since the start of the War on Terror in 2001 the United States has come to greatly rely upon its special forces in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives. The budget for United States Special Operations Command has quadrupled since 2001, while the number of personal employed has doubled. American Special Forces now operate in over hundred countries worldwide. Their reach is so pervasive and encompassing that it has resulted in, as one commentator chilling put it, “…the development of a precision-killing machine unprecedented in the history of modern warfare, one whose scope and genius will be fully appreciated only in later decades, once the veil of secrecy has been removed…” With the increasing dependence by the United States upon its special forces it has sought to use NATO as the coordinating mechanism to link its special forces to those of allied countries. NSHQ then represents a classic instance of burden sharing through improving the interoperability of Special Forces from different states, an act of burden sharing that because of the units that comprise it, is under a far heavier veil of secrecy than usual. While the NSHQ will no doubt be helpful in achieving the shared objectives of alliance members, Special Forces will be retained for the pursuit of particular national objectives, which may not be shared with other members. There are limits, in this instance, to the coordination and sharing of burdens.

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In contrast to direct military-to-military interactions, NATO has made more progress since 1999 at the level of political collaboration. At the 2004, Istanbul Summit NATO elevated the Mediterranean Dialogue, which has previously existed as simply a forum between it and other Mediterranean states, to the level of a genuine partnership and sought to utilize it as a framework to contribute to regional security. Using the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program as a model, the MD would now extend military cooperation to its members.

Active participation in selected military exercises and related education and training activities could improve the ability of Mediterranean partners’ forces to operate with those of the Alliance in contributing to NATO-led operations. These could include non-Article 5 crisis response operations…a more ambitious and expanded framework for the MD should be developed by making extensive use of lessons learned and as appropriate, tools from PfP with special emphasis on enhanced practical cooperation.  

Similar to the drive to expand the reach of PfP this move by NATO to deepen its relationship with countries in the MD and establish regularized military contacts between them is occurring because NATO is seeking new partners for what it sees as its primary function in the future: out of area operations that are rapidly organized based upon a risk assessment. NATO needs to expand the number of outside countries that it can draw upon in these scenarios as its own resources dwindle under the impact of budget cuts.

Another grouping of outside NATO member countries was established at the same Istanbul summit in 2004. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) is composed of...
four Middle Eastern Countries: Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. The ICI is far less developed than even the MD was in its early stages. No formal meetings at the level the head of state, foreign or defense ministers have been held between ICI countries and NATO. Further the ICI is not a collective grouping, meetings only occur between individual member states and NATO, undercutting the potential for the ICI to serve as a coherent collection of states, along the lines of PfP that can be drawn upon by NATO if circumstances call for it. While NATO has been largely successful in drawing key regional countries into its framework with the PfP and MD the two Western aligned countries in the Middle East, Oman and Saudi Arabia, have steadfastly refused to participate in the ICI. This, as Razoux argues, fundamentally weakens the ICI. He notes, “All researchers and analysts agree that the absence of these two key countries is a major obstacle to the future of the ICI. Between them the two states own 70% of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s military potential and their armed forces are considered the most credible on the Arabian Peninsula.” NATO’s stymied attempts to build linkages in the Middle East are reflective of historic Western foreign policy in the region, which has been riddled with missteps and miscalculations. Whether the ICI will be able to evolve past its current stillborn state remains doubtful at this point, especially as hostility to Western power in the region rises due to the ramifications of the Arab Spring.

The final set of states that NATO has formalized arrangements with since 1999 are not part of any set group and are referred to either as Contact Countries or Global Partners. They comprise states situated far outside of NATO’s traditional sphere of

operations. Despite this, the level of coordination and integration that exists between these countries and NATO often approach those of senior PfP members, indeed in many instances these states are de-facto members of NATO, prevented by article 10 of the NATO Charter, which restricts new NATO membership to Europe from being recognized as formal members of the organization. NATO’s relationship with these states most clearly demonstrates its evolution into a global security organization. NATO currently considers Afghanistan, Australia, Iraq, Japan, Pakistan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Mongolia its global partners, although as will be seen NATO has a far deeper level of commitment with some of these countries than others.²⁹⁴ The path towards NATO establishing a formal and regularized framework to engage with these countries has been a long and complex one that remains incomplete at present. The United States, more than any other NATO member, has been the driving force behind the formation and extension of these arrangements.

In 2006 at NATO’s summit in Riga, the United States pushed for the creation of a new category of partners with more formal ties to NATO.²⁹⁵ The American view was that extension of NATO was necessary in light of new geopolitical realities of the War on Terror. A more expansive and coherent interface of power, capable of easily aligning itself with and supporting more aggressive American force projection was sought. NATO offered a historically tested apparatus of power through which these aims could be

²⁹⁴ See NATO, “Partners,” [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/51288.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/51288.htm) for a list of the members of different partnership arrangements. NATO has also sought to establish formal relations with India, although an agreement here remains elusive. See N.C Bipindra, “NATO woos India, says ties important to ensure global security and safety,” *India Strategic*, September 2011.

achieved. The usage of NATO by the United States in pursuit of its own strategic interests should not be surprising. Indeed NATO has always been a key part of the wider hegemonic articulation of American power. American interaction within NATO can be considered as a form of nested politics, a multilevel set of interactions in which a global organization is utilized to more effectively carry out national interests, Braumodler places this process within the international system. He posits that “…different levels of politics are nested within each other like Russian dolls…this is the nested nature of international politics-sovereignty nested within hierarchy nested within anarchy is the engine of change in international security politics.”

As larger forum underpinned by American power the United States has its own sets of interests that it pursues in NATO. NATO is seen as a useful mechanism that expands the scope of American power by providing a sustained and regularized means through which it can interface with aligned states, thus reducing the costs imposed upon it in maintain global order.

Having NATO serve as a strong collective and coercive apparatus serves American interests. Although the United States engages with NATO in order to strengthen and maintain its own power the exact manner in which it goes about doing so is modified depending upon the respective power positions of other states within NATO and how their own perceived interests align or clash with the United States. While the United States is often able to get its own way within NATO, due to its apex position, the achievement of its aims is not without impediment. The difficulty with which the United


\[\text{This form of multilateralism and the arrangement of power which it seeks to secure runs against the hope that Cox held out for a more equitable and just world order. Robert Cox, “The Crisis in World Order and the Challenge to International Organization,” Cooperation and Conflict 29 (1994): 99-113.}\]
States in reaching agreement on an enhanced partnership program is a testament to this. This plan was strongly opposed by NATO’s European members at the Riga Summit, who were wary of overextension and a shift in focus away from Europe and was eventually shelved.298 Only a vague statement that “…enabled the Alliance to call ad-hoc meetings as events arise with those countries that contribute to or support our operations and missions,”299 was included in the final declaration. How to approach relations with these countries remained an unresolved issue until the 2010 Lisbon Summit and the proclamation of its current Strategic Concept.300

The number and scale of NATO’s partnerships have continued to grow because they are viewed as useful tool that provides malleable mechanisms of engagement between NATO members and countries with whom it believes that having a regularized and formal relationship with would be beneficial to both parties. The proliferation of various forms of partnership agreements is due to the ever-expanding strategic interests of NATO. No longer restricted to the European continent by the dynamics of the Cold War, it had a freer hand to influence world affairs. NATO’s relations with partner states may be one that reinforces the subservient position of a state, Georgia for example, to NATO, or one that increases the prestige of a state, i.e. Mongolia. Regardless NATO’s partnership arrangements grant it allies far outside of its traditional area of operations and provide it additional points of contact that both expand and deepen the scope of the

299 NATO, Riga Summit Declaration, November 29 2006, http://nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm
300 NATO did however develop a Tailored Cooperation Program at its 2008 Bucharest that included a range of cooperation activities between member countries and NATO that could be selected from. Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea participated in these arrangements. Yet these agreements did not create a coherent framework for engagement and failed to formalize the role of global partnerships within NATO’s structure.
alliance. These flexible arrangements from diffuse to concentrated, grant the contemporary global security nexus manifestation of NATO a variety of methods by which it can interact with the world. These partnerships are the clearest signal of NATO’s evolution from a regional into a global security organization.

_The transnationalization of security after September 11th_

The uncertainty of the post-cold War period only intensified after September 11th, as the zone of conflict, the form of combat, and even the actors that were being confronted were further muddled. 301 While the state is still the central participant in modern warfare, it is now forced to share the stage with a variety of combatants residing within states and able to strike at a variety of points unexpectedly. 302 The idea of a battlefield as a clearly delineated territorial space in which all participants are known to one another is declining in relevance. This is not to say the role that territory plays in determining conflict vanishes completely, as Latham reminds us, “Whether or not land as a reason to go to war is less relevant, states, even in the developed world, are still organized to fight wars across territory and to seize and hold it if necessary.” 303 It does mean however, that control over territory is no longer the sole reason underlying contemporary warfare. This is an outgrowth of the trend, post September 11th, of a growing prevalence of transnational, rather than national or international security threats.

This new security environment has changed both the calculation of risk and the apparatus

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301 This overall thesis is found in Phillip Bobbitt, _Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century_, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008).
302 The diffusion of technology was a key, but by no means sole factor driving this development. For an account of warfare post-September 11th which heavily privileges the role of technology see John Robb, _Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization_, (Hoboken: Wiley, 2008).
constructed to respond to it.

Although some risks, such as natural disasters, have always been transnational in origin, an entirely new set of risks, at the transnational level, are now confronting states and security agencies. This development is eroding the distinction between national and international as security actors construct new forms of governance to evaluate and respond to these new dynamics. Kahl recounts how this new security context challenges the ability of single states to adequately respond to emerging threats. He argues that “...firmly established boundaries between the actions of national and international actors are being called into question. The prevention and management of transnational risks of violence generally necessitates comprehensive problem solving...single nation-states are increasingly unable to reconcile the risks established by transnational actors with their own resources and within their sphere of responsibility.”

The spread of violence outside the container of the nation-state, leads to an ever greater meshing of the security apparatus of aligned states, as they struggle to comprehend the complexity of the world that confronts them. Risk management techniques play a key role in allowing states to analyze this process, but the creation of an institutional apparatus capable of overseeing these actions, facilitating the sharing of information, and drawing states closer together is necessary to provide order and consistency to this process.

The development of an increasingly complex array of global governance mechanisms is underlying and supporting this process. As Sinclair argues, global governance mechanisms fulfill a valuable role by assisting in coordinating between actors and generating forms of knowledge that can be utilized to comprehend contemporary

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developments.

The process of global governance can be thought of as elevating global knowledge and the sorts of intelligence and communication that contribute to and help coordinate other aspects of globalization. This process can be thought of, first, as aimed at coordination and risk abatement in a context of intensified global competition and, second, as dependent on the creation of new forms of epistemic authority...The process of reorganizing relationships in this way gives rise to new transnational fields of authority.\(^{305}\)

NATO should be seen as an important part of this wider global governance, due to its creation of new epistemological frameworks and its ability to coordinate amongst a diverse set of actors, as I have noted at length above. Unsurprisingly as the world's premier security organization NATO is a central element of what I see as an emerging transnational security apparatus.\(^{306}\)

Earlier I noted that epistemic communities have a tendency to promote the transnationalization of the forms of knowledge that they develop. This forging of transnational links is not only carried out through knowledge production but extends to the concept of security itself, generating a growing sphere of transnational security concerns. As Beck notes, NATO has replaced national security concerns with transnational issues that intersect and penetrate the state apparatuses of its members. He argues that “…NATO has provided answers to national security questions in a transnationally organized form...it has simultaneously denationalized and transnationalized issues of national security and thereby renationalized them through...”


cooperation.” This reformulation of security onto a transnational scale has wide-ranging repercussions, spawning a situation of which I refer to as scalar flux, where the traditional distinctions between the national, international, and local erode. A major consequence of scalar flux is that the clear delineation of political space becomes increasingly difficult to maintain. This trend began after the end of the Cold War, intensified after September 11th, and has been deeply impacted by the contemporary extension of austerity and its reworking of security relationships within and between states.

Engaging with the expanded spectrum of threats that now confronts NATO requires a reinvention of its organizational apparatus; a task that it has only recently embarked upon. This chapter sought to examine how NATO responded, in a conceptual manner, to the immediate post-Cold War period and on into the War on Terror. The next chapter will carry through this analysis to the present day and explore the material and organizational changes that NATO has undergone in response to an ever more uncertain world. These changes have transformed NATO into what I label as a global security nexus; a new formation is uniquely suited to operating in the contemporary conditions of scalar flux. Yet while the commitments of NATO have grown ever larger, its capacity to adequately respond is imperiled, as the logic of austerity curtails the material resources available.

The need for NATO to develop the partnerships and military arrangements traced above along with its de-emphasis of collective defense and elevation of risk management

arose out of the complex and uncertain environment that it faced with the end of the Cold War. The choice NATO confronted in the 1990s was to either evolve or perish. NATO’s decision to adopt an expanded conceptualization of security and move outside out its traditional European area of operations, both in terms of interventions and institutional linkages indicate that it chose survival over irrelevance. The trends that NATO confronted in the years after the Cold War have only deepened in the wake of the 2007 Global Financial Crisis. The global instability in the wake of the crisis was compounded by the pursuit of austerity, the way chosen by governments as the means out of the crisis. The current conjecture, one that is characterized by the weakness of capitalism economically, but the persistent strength of ruling classes globally has resulted in the extension and intensification of NATO’s global security apparatus in order to provide the space and time for necessary for the reordering of global capitalist accumulation. The acceleration since 2007 of the project to transform NATO into a global security nexus forms the central topic of discussion in the next chapter.


309 While the relation of the state to capital has long been examined from a historical materialism perspective (the famous Miliband-Poulantzas debate is only one prominent example) less attention has been paid to how the security and economic organs of global governance assist in the reproduction of capitalism on a world scale. Exceptions to this include Paul Cammack, “The Governance of Global Capitalism: A New Materialism Perspective,” Historical Materialism 11 (2003): 37-59 and Heikki Patomaki, The Political Economy of Global Security: War, Future Crises and Changes in Global Governance, (Milton Park: Routledge, 2008), 125-156.
CHAPTER 3

THE DENOUEMENT OF 2007

The impact of the 2007 Global Financial Crisis on NATO and the continued viability of a Western led world order is difficult to overstate. The crisis threw into disarray the architecture of power that had been constructed in the immediate Post-Cold War period. It marked a sharp decline in both the desire and the ability of the United States to provide its traditional role of global leadership. Since 2007, the global economy has been buffeted by instability and anemic growth. Coinciding with the weakened state of the global economy has been a shift in geopolitical power away from the West that has yet to manifest itself in any coherent alternative governance mechanisms. The contemporary world situation is best characterized by a lack of any clear leadership where no state or collection of states has the capacity to guide the global economy through its present turbulence. Bremmer and Roubini are correct when they state that, “We are now living in a G-zero world, one in which no single country or bloc of countries has the political or economic leverage or the will to drive a truly international agenda.”

The experience of Bretton Woods, where a new project to guide and manage the global economy was forged after the Second World War, is unlikely to be duplicated today.

While 2007 caused a facture in the postwar liberal order, it did not represent a sharp break from past practice for NATO. The Alliance had already undergone a decade

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of intense debate prior to the crisis that had culminated in the 1999 Strategic Concept that set forth a new direction for NATO. Instead, 2007 for NATO was a denouement that accelerated and solidified trends that were already in place. While the acceptance of out of area operations and a broader conceptualization of security within NATO predates the 2007 Crisis, the intensification of neoliberalism that followed encouraged a fixation on operational and organizational efficiency within the Alliance. This renewed focus led to the expansion of NATO’s global partnership agreements and a greater emphasis on risk management; sparking a wide ranging institutional transformation that sought to make knowledge production and information sharing the centerpiece of NATO’s transition into a global security nexus. This chapter will examine the root causes of the 2007 Global Financial Crisis, and demonstrate its impact upon the global economy and geopolitical order. It will then discuss the effect of the crisis upon the institutional structure of NATO and the format of its operations. The chapter will conclude by explaining why the dominant research approaches in International Relations are inadequate for comprehending the alterations that have occurred in NATO since 2007 and present my own alternative approach.

The Centrality of Risk in Modern Financial Markets

In contrast to previous financial crises, the Global Financial Crisis of 2007 began in the heartland of Western capitalism, the United States, and spread rapidly outwards.311 The major preceding crises of the 1990s and 1980s began in South East Asia and Latin

America respectively. While American corporations and the American economy certainly suffered from these crises, the United States was not at the epicenter of these downturns. The 2007 crisis was different in this respect as the crisis began due to widespread foreclosures in the American housing market. While a run on the American housing market was the actual event that precipitated the crisis two factors affected the speed at which it spread and the scale of its impact. First, the financialization of the world economy since the advent of neoliberalism in the late 1970s resulted in the dense interconnection of financial markets across the globe; a failure in circuits of accumulation, particularly in the world’s largest economy would quickly have a far-reaching impact. Second, the 2007 Crisis was marked by a breakdown in the ability to quantify financial risks. This failure fuelled a growing sense of panic that was responsible for the dramatic scenes that occurred in the Fall of 2008, when following the collapse of Lehman Brothers; it appeared that the entire American financial system, the linchpin of the global economy, was teetering towards a complete meltdown.

While financial processes are central to the mechanisms of accumulation within neoliberalism, it is important to note that financial capital, in the neoliberal era, did not claim ascendancy over an older and less adaptable industrial capital replacing it as the dominant form of capital. The classic critics of finance capital, Hilferding and Lenin, argued that finance capital had come to dominate industrial capital. Hilferding argued:

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“The mobilization of capital and the continual expansion of credit gradually brings about a complete change in the position of the money capitalists. The power of the banks increases and they become founders and eventually rulers of industry, whose profits they seize for themselves as finance capital, just as formerly the old usurer seized, in the form of ’interest’, the produce of the peasants and the ground rent of the lord of the manor.”\textsuperscript{314} Yet, finance capital, in its contemporary manifestation cannot be viewed as sitting atop of a hierarchical arrangement of different forms of capital. Finance in the present era is no longer largely contained within vast cartels with the surplus exported to low investment markets. Instead, finance shapes every aspect of modern life. Finance as Martin argues, “...has become a means, a machine for living whose architecture is at once international and intimate. What was meant to finish a process, to close a deal, now lies everywhere in the midst of everything.”\textsuperscript{315} The prerogatives of finance capital have subsumed the processes of contemporary capitalism, determining the manner in which it presently operates. With finance pervading every aspect of modern life, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to impose a separation between financial and non-financial forms of capital. This pervasive financialization was set in motion in the late 1970s, becoming a central component of an emergent neoliberalism.

The United States was responsible for leading the way in integrating financial processes and calculations within every aspect of the global economy.\textsuperscript{316} Contemporary

\textsuperscript{316} This argument is made in Leo Panitch and San Gindin, \textit{The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire}, (Verso: London, 2012)
capitalism then is not a competition between efficient financial capital and inefficient industrial capital; instead, as Marazzi argues, financialization has become the primary form of value production today. Marazzi’s view is that “...financialization is not an unproductive/parasitic deviation of growing quotas of surplus-value and collective saving, but rather the form of value production symmetrical with new processes of value production.”

Arguing that a competition exists between industrial and financial capital, is to posit that a “pure” form of industrial capital exists, one that is capable of challenging a diametrically opposed financial capital. Rather there is no form of capital that has not been touched by the logic of financialization. Peet, surveying the effect of thirty years of neoliberalism, echoes this point. He notes, “Over the last thirty years, capital has abstracted upwards, from production to finance; its sphere of operations has expanded outwards, to every nook and cranny of the globe; the speed of its movement has increased, to milliseconds; and its control has extended to include everything. We now live in the era of global finance capitalism.”

One of the most profound impacts of this financialization of everyday life are the ever-expanding set of calculations concerned with the identification and assessment of risk.

Risk, in financial terms, is defined by McNeil and others as, “...the risk of a change in the value of a financial position due to changes in the value of the underlying components on which that position depends, such as stock and bond prices, exchange rates, commodity prices, etc.” The ability to profit in financial markets is dependent on

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318 GM Financial is an example of the interrelationship between finance and industry.
one's level of knowledge about the perceived or actual risk as it relates to a particular corporation, product, or service and the manner in which this risk will impact upon profitability. The identification and measurement of risk is not simply restrained to markets however. The production of risk, has, as Cutler notes, become one of the central elements of modern society. She argues that “... the manufacture of risks is possibly one of the most dynamic and expansionary characteristics of modern capitalist activity... the concept of risk becomes fundamental to the way both actors and technical specialists organize the world.”321 These calculations effect a wide range of social processes outside of the financial domain and explain why the failure to properly calculate risk was a key precipitating factor of the current crisis, an event that has continued to reverberate in unexpected ways and shape the security environment within which NATO operates.

Of course, the calculation of risk is not unique to the neoliberal period. Indeed, it has a long history that predates the current neoliberal era by centuries. The measurement of risk originally developed out of the necessity to provide a reliable method for determining the premium that should be charged to insure marine cargo as it was shipped across the Atlantic Ocean in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.322 Reliable and standardized methods for the identification of risk were developed, as Levy argues, as a method to stabilize and provide some regularity to the processes of capital accumulation. He notes that “…in the end capitalism itself assumes the risk. It assumes, in other words, that financial instruments of its own making can adequately stabilize its own

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unpredictable rhythms.” This ability to quantify risk is central to the process of capital accumulation, yet it has broken down on numerous occasions, most recently and spectacularly during the 2007 Global Financial Crisis. Although the present crisis had multiple causes, an important prerequisite to its onset was an unawareness of the high levels of systemic risk present in modern financial instruments. A large part of the problem lay in the financial models employed. The value at risk model, (VaR) which forms the foundation for determining the structure of many of the transactions that Wall Street financial institutions engage in, possessed a fundamental flaw. This is because, as Nocera explains, “VaR uses a normal distribution curve to plot the riskiness of a portfolio. However, it makes certain assumptions. VaR is often measured daily and rarely extends beyond a few weeks, and because it is a very short-term measure, it assumes that tomorrow will be more or less like today. Even what’s called “historical VaR” a variation of standard VaR that measures potential portfolio risk a year or two out only uses the previous few years as its benchmark.” Thus, the model in which financial firms based their understanding of risk, induced blindness to any events that occurred outside of the narrow range of the model. This short-term overview may have been useful in conducting millisecond trades, but in terms of comprehending the financial system as a whole VaR

323 Ibid., 18.
was not only useless, but also dangerous.

Risk, or rather the inability to properly perceive it, has played a key role in sparking the present crisis. Financial institutions failed to identify and adequately measure systemic risks in the global economy. The securitization of subprime mortgages, combining them with other financial products, and adding a further level of risk by taking out credit default swaps and other derivative options on top of these instruments led to, as the United States Senate report examining the causes of the crisis recounts to “...an explosion of so called innovative financial products with embedded risks that are difficult to analyze and predict...U.S financial institutions reached unprecedented size and made increasing use of complex, high risk financial products...” The size of the market in which these financial transactions occurred was astronomical. On the eve of the Crisis, the combined total value of financial derivatives was nearly $200 trillion US dollars, approximately five times the estimated GDP of the entire planet. Thus, what began as a crisis in the American mortgage market in 2007 quickly spread and became global on August 9, 2007. Major European investment funds froze, as it was impossible determine the value of their portfolios, which included unknown quantities of U.S securitized subprime mortgages.

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327 As Beck argues at a certain point ascertaining risks in the economy became impossible. “The market failed because the incalculable risks of mortgages and other loans were deliberately concealed in the expectation that the risks would be minimized by distributing and concealing them. However, it is now evident that this minimization strategy has turned into its opposite, namely a strategy of maximizing and disseminating incalculable risks. Suddenly the risk virus is spreading everywhere, at least as anticipation.” Ulrich Beck, *World at Risk*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 201.
329 Anastasia Nesvetailova, *Fragile Finance: Debt, Speculation and Crisis in the Age of Global Credit.* (Houndsmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 46.)
The full cascading effects of the crisis would be seen in the Fall of 2008 with the buyout of Bear Sterns by JP Morgan, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the rescue of AIG by the American government, and the subsequent launch of the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program in a desperate bid to restore interbank lending and unfreeze global credit markets.\textsuperscript{330} The core of the problem was that with financial instruments so complex, and the market now so unpredictable, banks and other financial institutions no longer had any way to calculate the value of their assets. As Germain recounts, “Financial assets which had been given a particular (book) value found these to be irrelevant to their working value, or what is often called market to market value. In fact, simply establishing the market value of many of these assets was impossible because the market had vanished and count not be recreated.”\textsuperscript{331} The ability of financial firms to calculate the risk and hence the value of their assets simply evaporated. The loss of this central component of market operations nearly caused the collapse of global financial system. Lack of government oversight compounded the problem. In the decades prior to the current crisis, governments systemically abandoned their regulatory oversight of financial markets. Adherence to many regulations was made voluntary and the Security and Exchange Commission, tasked with overseeing Wall Street, was underfunded, lacked proper investigative tools, and suffered regulatory capture.\textsuperscript{332}


A new Great Depression was only narrowly averted through not only flooding the American domestic market with credit to flush out the toxic assets that had caused the crisis, but through a coordinated response by the G20 and central banks to stimulate the global economy. In October 2008 the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada, the Swiss National Bank, and the Swedish Riksbank, working in concert for the first time, all agreed to cut their interest rates by half a percentage point. At the April 2009 London Summit of the agreement was reached on an unprecedented 5 trillion dollar global stimulus package. This sustained bout of stimulus spending and heavy government intervention in the economy led many to believe, incorrectly, that this crisis marked the death of neoliberalism and would lead to the emergence of a new financial model.

This brief Keynesian revival was to be short lived however. Only 14 months later the 2010 Toronto G20 summit marked the end of coordinated stimulus programs and the adoption of austerity. The intellectual basis for austerity is based upon contradictory and questionable arguments. The foremost academic and policy advocates for austerity, or expansionary fiscal consolidation, as it is referred to in economics journals, have been Alberto Alesina along with Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff. Alesina's work has been highly influential in EU policy circles while Reinhart and Rogoff have been

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336 Ironically by the time one of the major works heralding the revival of Keynesian economics, Robert Skidelsky, Keynes: The Return of the Master (New York: Public Affairs, 2010) was published in October 2010 the shift away from Keynesism had already begun.

frequently cited by Republicans in the United States in support of deficit reduction. Alesina's argument for austerity is based on several assumptions. First, on the demand side, if the enactment of austerity now is seen as removing the possibility for sustained and greater levels of austerity in the future, then customer spending will rise as a result. Further austerity should serve to convince bondholders that the economy is stabilizing, reducing government bond yields and hence the real interest rate. On the supply side, reducing the government labor force increases the size of the general labor pool, driving down wages and increasing profits, investment, and competitiveness. Yet bond rates and unemployment continue to reach record levels in Europe, where governments are pursuing austerity with a determined single-mindedness. Austerity is far more likely to provoke a prolonged economic contraction, rather than an expansion. As King argues, “The economic fundamentals that the proponents of austerity point to as drivers of economic recovery are absent. Worldwide customer and business confidence is severely depressed, and households and companies are prioritizing debt repayment over expenditure. Despite historically low interest rates, unemployment is high and increasing as consumption and investment are languishing.” Reinhart and Rogoff share Alesina's fixation with deficit reduction, arguing that when debt to GDP levels for an economy

340Spain’s government bond yield at one point stood at over 7%, while unemployment remains above 25%. Irish Times, “Spain Bond Yields at Record High,” Irish Times, June 14 2012.
341The IMF shares this analysis noting that, “Fiscal consolidation typically has a contractionary effect on output. A fiscal consolidation equal to 1 percent of GDP typically reduces GDP by about 0.5 percent within two years and raises the unemployment rate by about 0.3 percentage point. Domestic demand—consumption and investment—falls by about 1 percent.” IMF, IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2010, 94
reach over 90% median growth rates fall by an average of one percent. However, an analysis of their claims by Herndon, Ash, and Polin found that, “…coding errors, selective exclusion of available data, and unconventional weighting of summary statistics lead to serious errors that inaccurately represent the relationship between public debt and growth.” The intellectual case for austerity then appears to be based upon either a misunderstanding of how the public or investors will view the pursuit of fiscal consolidation or on faulty data.

Empirically as well, the case for austerity is lacking. While unemployment has been dropping in both the United States and the United Kingdom, the jobs that are being creating are primarily part-time and low wage. Further this drop in the unemployment rate masks record low labor participation, as many simply abandon the search for work. The picture in the rest of Western Europe is even bleaker as unemployment remains at record levels. Even on its central goal of reducing government deficits austerity has failed. Debt to GDP ratios for the 17 Euro area countries, where austerity has been enacted to the greatest extent, have grown from 70.1% in 2008 to 93.4% in the second quarter of 2013 according to Eurostat.

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345 Lucia Mutikani, “75 percent of jobs created this year were part time due to weak economy, Obamacare Concerns,” Reuters, August 21, 2013. Phillip Inman, “UK remains reliant on part-time workers, Manpower survey shows,” The Guardian, December 10, 2013.
347 Unemployment in Spain is at 26%, 10.8% in France, 12.7 in Italy, 27% in Greece and 12% overall in the Euro area. Eurostat, “European Unemployment Rate at 12.1%” Eurostat, January 8, 2014.

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Rather than turning the corner the global economy has instead entered a long period of stagnation, characterized by short sputtering spurts of growth followed by renewed periods of contraction. Foster and McChesney describe this as a stagnation-financialization trap. They note: “Characteristic of this phase of accumulation is the stagnation-financialization trap, whereby financial expansion has become the main fix for the system, yet is incapable of overcoming the underlying structural weakness of the economy. Much like drug addiction, new, larger fixes are required at each point merely to keep the system going. Every crisis leads to a brief period of restraint followed by further excesses.” Although no single factor can be pointed to as definitively causing the current crisis, a key underlying cause of the crisis that has perpetuated it is the lack of demand in advanced capitalist countries. One important indicator of this lack of demand are the stagnant wages for the majority of American workers, the economy whose consumer demand is crucial for the continued growth of global capitalism.

While wages for the top 1 percent of income earners in the United States rose 275 percent between 1979 and 2007 income only grew 65 percent for the next 19 percent, 39 percent for the next 16 percent and 18 percent for the bottom 20 percent. This deepening inequality with the over-concentration of wealth in a tiny minority and slow

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349 The narrowly averted triple dip recession in the UK is emblematic of this. Ben Chu, “UK narrowly escapes triple dip recession as GDP figures show 0.3% growth in first three months of the year.” Independent, April 25, 2013.
351 The largest survey of the literature on the crisis found that amongst the books reviewed, “...there is still significant disagreement as to what the underlying causes of the crisis were, and even less agreement as to what to do about it.” Andrew Lo, “Reading about the Financial Crisis: A Twenty-one-book review,” Journal of Economic Literature 50 (2012): 173.
352 Real hourly compensation for non-farm businesses fell at an annual rate of -1% in the third quarter of 2013 in the United States. United States Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statics. “Third Quarter 2013, Revised” Table A.
income gains in the rest of the society was an important condition that underlaid the current crisis. Dumenil and Levy share this perspective noting that, “...the rate of consumption, notably on the part of the upper income brackets, is at the center of the mechanisms the led to the crisis. Thus the crisis must not be interpreted as the outcome of overaccumulation or underconsumption, but rather overconsumption paralleling underaccumulation.”354 The explosion in consumer debt in the past twenty years355 was an attempt to maintain consumption standards, while real wage gains remained stagnant. This response to low wage growth eventually proved to be unsustainable over the long term.

The connection between growing levels of inequality and slowing economic growth was noted in a recent IMF report, which found that persistent and high levels of inequality are correlated with lower levels of overall growth. Its analysis of the income distribution of a number of countries found that “…inequality has a statistically significant negative relationship with the duration of growth spells. A one-Gini-point increase in inequality is associated with a 6-percentage point higher risk that the spell will end the next year… the overall effect of redistribution is pro-growth, with the possible exception of extremely large redistributions. There is no negative direct effect, and the resulting lower inequality seems to be associated with longer growth spells.”356 Highly unequal income distributions lead to an ever-greater dependence upon the increased

355 American household debt as proportional to disposable income has risen from 70% in 1980 to over 110% in 2010 while household debt proportional to GDP has risen from 50% to over 90% over the same period. See US Federal Reserve, “Household Sector: US Household Debt vs Disposable Income and GDP, 1980-2010,” (Washington D.C: US Federal Reserve, 2010).
consumption of an ever-smaller segment of the population, in order to maintain economic growth.\textsuperscript{357} Austerity then is not a viable strategy for sustained economic growth.\textsuperscript{358} Especially when the central problem in the American, as well as the global economy, is a lack of demand, along with a correlated lack of private investment.

This reduced level of demand has in turn reduced investment. Many corporations and business are unwilling to invest because the prospects for future growth are extremely uncertain. Confidence in future growth is low from both CEOs of large corporations\textsuperscript{359} and small business owners.\textsuperscript{360} While in the early stages of the crisis states pumped trillions of dollars into their economies, these funds were largely horded due to future economic uncertainty. As McNally recounts, in the United States, “...the base money underpinning the system may have tripled, but the money circulating throughout the economy did not. Instead, rebuilding of reserves by banks, hoarding of cash by corporations, a decline in the velocity of money, depressed demands from loans from over-stretched consumers, and the reticence of banks to lend all combined to thwart any dramatic expansion of the real money supply.”\textsuperscript{361} Austerity has contributed to this

\textsuperscript{357} The magnified role of higher income earners was noted in a 2005 Citigroup report that stated, “The world is dividing into two blocs - the plutonomies, where economic growth is powered by and largely consumed by the wealthy few, and the rest.” Ajay Kapur, Niall McDonald, Narendra Singh, “Plutonomy: Buying Luxury, Explaining Global Imbalances,” (New York: Citigroup, 2005), 1. The reliance upon an ever-narrower segment of the population for an ever-rising share of consumption will lead to lower over all levels of economic growth.

\textsuperscript{358} This was recognized by Keynes with his elaboration of the concept of the marginal propensity to consume, which falls as income rises. As he noted, “…the growth of wealth, so far from being dependent on the abstinence of the rich, as is commonly supposed, is more likely to be impeded by it. One of the chief social justifications of great inequality of wealth is, therefore, removed. John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. (New York: Edison Martin, 2013), 166.


\textsuperscript{360} Tiffany Hsu, “Small business hiring and sending less but excepting more,” Los Angeles Times, October 9, 2012.

uncertainty and perpetuated the weakness in the global economy. Because of these conditions, trillions of dollars of corporate reserves sit awaiting the return of profitable investment opportunities.362

While austerity is not solely responsible for the present economic malaise, its pursuit by Western governments is preventing the return of sustainable growth to the global economy.363 Beyond a simple failure of economic policy, austerity is also symphonic of a wider intellectual bankruptcy. Instead of exploring alternative economic arrangements and attempting to forge a more equitable social order, a difficult task that would require wide ranging structural reforms364 and the creation of a new institutional framework policymakers365 have instead chosen to salvage a retrograde neoliberalism.366 However, the resuscitation of the ideology and policy prescriptions that failed so spectacularly in 2007 and 2008 not only has economic consequences but also geopolitical ramifications.


364This could have included breaking up banks that were too big to fail, turning the banking sector into a public utility, or a larger and more sustained program of infrastructure investment. See Greg Albo, Sam Gindin and Leo Panitch, In and Out of Crisis: The Global Financial Meltdown and Left Alternatives, (Oakland: PM Press, 2010), 101-128. Daniel Indiviglio, “Should Big Banks Be regulated as Public Utilities?” The Atlantic, April 14, 2011. Hyunseung Oh and Ricardo Reis, “Target Transfers and the Fiscal response to the Great Recession,” NBER Working Paper 16775.


366Neoliberalism has been popularly referred to as a “zombie ideology” See John Quiggin, Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk Amongst Us, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010)
**Austerity’s Geopolitical Impact: The 2010 Strategic Concept**

The turn towards austerity is negatively impacting NATO’s ability to guarantee Western security in both a general and a direct sense. Austerity has directly affected NATO by spurring a series of budget cutbacks after the 2007 Crisis and the subsequent intensification of neoliberalism as I recounted in the first chapter. These reductions have reduced the capacity of NATO when the tasks it is expected to perform are increasing. Austerity is eroding Western security in two ways. First as austerity begins to bite tensions and instability are elevated, potentially serving as a catalyst that sparks new international conflicts that may eventually require a response from NATO. Second austerity has solidified the weakness of the West by curtailing the ability of both the United States and NATO to intervene abroad in order to achieve their foreign policy interests.

The present crisis and the continued weakness of the American economy are beginning to place constraints upon American foreign policy. As Miandelbaum argues, “What the world's strongest power faces in the conduct of its foreign policy is not only weakness in relation to others but also, where foreign policy resources are concerned, scarcity.” While the United States remains, without question, the world's strongest state and the sole superpower, its ability to shape global dynamics in its favor is declining.

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Zakaria echoes this argument, pointing out that while the United States remains predominant, current trends point to a gradual weakening of American power. He declares that, “At the military economic and political level, we still live in a unipolar world. But along every other dimension-industrial, financial, social, cultural, the distribution of power is shifting, moving away from American dominance.”\textsuperscript{371} Germain shares this assessment, arguing that, “There is no question that the relational power of the U.S is eroding: firms from emerging market economies are challenging American firms in some areas, while the ability of the U.S state to dictate preferences onto a pliant world no longer holds.”\textsuperscript{372} Yet, despite the ravages of the most recent financial crisis, and a decline in the economic strength of the United States, American corporations and American based finance capital continue to greatly influence the course of the global economy. As Starrs observes, when the commanding heights of the global economy are examined, “...the United States leads in a remarkable eighteen of the twenty-five broad sectors of the top 2000 corporations in the world, the crème de la crème of global capitalism”\textsuperscript{373} America and the West as a whole still lead the globe in a number of crucial areas. The continuing crisis has however exposed weaknesses in the foundations of this power. The turn towards austerity, chronicled above, is only serving to exacerbate these weaknesses.

Ironically, while the pursuit of austerity was formulated as a policy to consolidate Western power it is having the opposite effect, degrading the mechanisms of control and

\textsuperscript{372} Randall Germain, “Power, the state, and global politics after the Great Freeze: Towards a new articulation?” \textit{Alternate Routes} 2012, 116.
governance necessary for the reproduction of this power across the globe. As the overarching security, architecture of the West NATO has not been immune to the effects of austerity. NATO is only as strong as its members are and cuts in their defense budgets have reduced the ability of NATO to carry out the increasingly large tasks that are being set for it. As Gordon details, “Many cuts have been made with little intra-Alliance coordination. If this uncoordinated process of reduction continues, NATO risks losing critical capabilities, which could seriously erode its ability to meet the rapidly changing security challenges it will face in the second decade of the twenty-first century.”

To meet the new challenges that were set in motion by the current economic crisis and the highly unpredictable and fluid geopolitical situation that followed NATO accelerated a transformation that it first embarked upon with its 1999 Strategic Concept, culminating in its current Strategic Concept adopted in 2010.

The impetus for a new Strategic Concept came from a panel of experts chaired by Madeline Albright, who issued a report arguing that NATO was still struggling to comprehend the world around it and need to adapt in order to retain its effectiveness. She wrote: “NATO must find its place within a less centralized and more complicated international order. Its new role will be influenced by the emergence of specific threats form a diverse spectrum of possibilities...they could arrive in forms with which we are familiar or in hybrid variations...” NATO's response was to greatly elevate the centrality of risk management within its strategic calculations. While NATO's new role in risk management and its enshrining of non-Article 5 crisis response operations as official policy occurred in the 1999 Strategic Concept, they only formed a small part of a much

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larger document. It is in NATO's present strategic concept, adopted at its 2010 summit in Lisbon, that crisis management is elevated to form part of NATO's core tasks and principles.\textsuperscript{376} NATO, as one of the section headings states, will now seek “security through crisis management”.\textsuperscript{377} This requires that NATO develop the capacities to “...continually monitor and analyze the international environment to anticipate crises, and where appropriate take active steps to prevent them from becoming larger conflicts.”\textsuperscript{378} NATO has done so by developing a comprehensive set of procedures that allows it to quantify and react to risk.

\textit{The Identification and Treatment of Risk in NATO}

Although access to a number of NATO documents concerning its risk based planning, procedure is restricted,\textsuperscript{379} from the documentation available to the public it is possible to discern the impact that the incorporation of these procedures have had upon NATO's strategy. As a 2008 report states, the ability to identity risk has been elevated to a top priority with NATO and is being utilized to link together a variety of disparate activities together.\textsuperscript{380} The report details that, “The capability to continuously assess and manage risk has been identified as a priority 1 measure...this activity can be linked with the following requirements from NATO strategic commands. Intelligence support, the need to develop intelligence collection and analysis tools, the need for advanced

\textsuperscript{376} NATO: “Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security for members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” November 2010, Lisbon, 7-8
\textsuperscript{377} Ibid., 19.
\textsuperscript{378} Ibid., 19-20.
\textsuperscript{379} For example, NATO: Science and Technology Organization Collaboration Support Office, “Risk Based Planning RTO-MP-SAS-093,” October 2011, is listed on NATO databases, but cannot be accessed without proper clearance.
\textsuperscript{380} NATO is not alone in developing risk analysis procedures. This has also been an interest of the American Department of Defense. See Nathan Freier, \textit{Toward a Risk Management Defense Strategy} (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009).
analytical tools for threat assessment.”

NATO’s approach to risk assessment is as a continuous and cyclical process, the geopolitical environment is constantly assessed as threats can emerge at any time from a variety of areas. This style of risk assessment allows for an improved understanding of the situational environment as further information become available. NATO's risk management process comprises four steps: establish scope, identify risks, analyze risks and treat risks. After these four stages have been completed, the creation of a risk management plan in a specific area of analysis becomes possible. These assessments are shared throughout NATO's institutional framework and influence its policies.

The first step is to determine the scope and issue areas from which potential threats may arise. Workshops conducted by NATO on risk assessment concur that narrowing the spectrum of threat is critical to allowing it to target its resources and formulate an appropriate response. A major priority then is “…reducing the problem space by finding clusters of similar threats…the clustering of threats are based on similarities in the function requirements that each threat imposed on a detection system, threats with similar functional requirements for detection are grouped together.”

In order to determine the seriousness of a threat, a number of indicators and variables are generated. Multiple flagging of these indictors moves a particular target up the spectrum of threats with further analysis conducted. This serves to improve the efficiency

382 An elaboration of this process is provided in Ibid., 2-2-27.
384 For an example of variables that NATO considers important see Neville Stanton, et al. Digitising Command and Control: A Human Factors and Ergonomics Analysis of Mission Planning and Battlespace Management, (Burlington: Ashgate, 2009), 1-2.
of NATO as it does not have to analyze and respond to every potential threat, but only smaller selected subsets.

Once the scope of the issue area to be examined the next step is for the identity of the risk to be ascertained. It is here then that the actual risk is formulated. Stages two and three, identification of a risk and analysis of it, are usually conducted simultaneously. This is because actual creation of a risk occurs through analysis and the gathering of information. Surveillance plays a key role in laying the foundation for any preventative actions that NATO may have to take in the future.

The final stage of NATO’s risk assessment procedure is the treatment of risk. At this point NATO has four different responses available; it can chose to either avoid, reduce, transfer or retain the risk in question.\textsuperscript{385} Retain is the most common response as no further resources are expended, NATO simply learns to live with the identified risk. Avoiding requires that NATO has excellent forecasting of a potential event and is capable of altering its policies before this potentiality becomes a reality. Reducing a risk occurs once a risk has already become a reality and a crisis has begun to emerge. After taking stock of the situation and determining that it poses, a threat to its interests NATO would intervene as rapidly as possible in order to mitigate the damage. The transferring of a risk happens once it is clear that the situation has devolved into a full-blown crisis, at this stage a military intervention by NATO becomes increasingly probable. Indeed NATO’s interventions in both Serbia and Libya have been characterized as risk transfer wars.\textsuperscript{386}

\textsuperscript{385} These are the common responses to identified risks. Dogulas Hubbard. \textit{The Failure of Risk Management: Why It’s Broken and How to Fix it}, (Hobken: John Wiley and Sons, 2009). See also Edward Borodzicz, \textit{Risk, Crisis and Security Management}, (Hobken: John Wiley and Sons, 2005), 96-98.
In addition to its risk assessment, procedures NATO has also established modeling and simulation programs to build upon the information gained through risk assessment. This increases, in the mind of NATO policy makers, their ability to predict and rapidly respond to threats as they emerge. A summary of a NATO conference held to discuss new modeling and simulation programs, illustrates their centrality to current NATO operations. As Tolk summarizes,“...for the continuing transformation of military capabilities and for promoting interoperability of proposed implementations modeling and simulation has been recognized within NATO as a key element in addressing these new requirements and challenges of the NATO transformation process.”387 Elaborating a clear set of procedures through which the quantification of risk can occur and creating modeling programs to predict future crises are a part of the steps that NATO has taken in response to global uncertainty.

_A Global Alliance: NATO’s New Partnerships_

Beyond creating the ability to identify risk NATO must also have the capability to react curtail the threat posed by a risk. Engaging in crisis management operations requires that NATO prepare for a far wider range of operations and learn to work with broad array of actors. The current 2010 Strategic Concept recognizes this with its call to “Further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations, including counter-insurgency, stabilization, and reconstruction operations...enhancing integrated civil-military planning throughout the crisis spectrum.”388 NATO has sought to develop these capabilities by developing relationships with new states and deepening already

388 Ibid., 21.
existing ones.

The 2010 Strategic Concept places a great emphasis upon forging relationships with states across the globe that share NATO’s general strategic interests with a firm pledge to, “…develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nations and relevant organizations across the globe that share NATO’s interest in peaceful international relations.”389 This commitment led NATO to extend the privileges for states that were members of its Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and create a new category of relationships for states that lacked any prior formal relationship with the Alliance. At its Lisbon Summit in 2010, NATO launched a comprehensive review of the political-military framework for NATO-led PfP operations. This review eventually resulted in the creation of a Political-Military Framework that allowed PfP members the ability to shape decisions on the operations and missions that they contribute to.390 These changes were made with the aim of increasing PfP member involvement in future non-Article 5 out of area operations. This is made clear in the text of the framework itself. “From a NATO perspective this Political-Military Framework forms part of a wider framework of conceptual and practical documents and arrangements developed for the Alliance’s new missions beyond collective defense.”391 Since the ratification of the framework, NATO has aggressively pursued countries in the Caucasus and Central Asian region for PfP membership. By doing so NATO is laying, the foundations that would allow it to more

391 Ibid., section 2-3.
effectively intervene in these regions in the future by drawing important regional players within its sphere of influence.\footnote{392}{Potential reasons why NATO is so vigorously pursuing partners in these areas could be to continue the encirclement of Russia and China and to secure access for potential pipeline routes.}

The Lisbon Summit also laid the groundwork for the creation of the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program (IPCP) a year later, in 2011, at a foreign ministers meeting in Berlin.\footnote{393}{NATO, “Foreign Ministers Endorse New Partnership Policy,” April 15, 2011. \url{http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_72368.htm}} The IPCP provides a standardized format of engagement for countries that are not part of NATO’s existing regional groupings. Countries that have an IPCP agreement with NATO are now able to select from the same set toolkit that is provided to PfP countries, they are also able, like PfP countries, and to influence the direction of any NATO led operation that they contribute to.\footnote{394}{NATO, “Political Military Framework for Partners Involvement in NATO-Led Operations”, 15 April 2011, at \url{http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_04/20110415_110415-PMF.pdf}} Utilizing this strong and coherent foundation NATO has rapidly formed IPCP agreements with Mongolia\footnote{395}{NATO, “NATO and Mongolia Agree on programme of cooperation,” March 19, 2012. \url{http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_85430.htm}}, New Zealand,\footnote{396}{NATO, “NATO and Australia Announce Plans to Deepen Security Ties to Meet Common Threats,” June 14, 2012 \url{http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_88426.htm}}, Australia\footnote{397}{Melissa Houston, “Australia: A Global Member for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” \textit{Global Voices}, May 2012.}, and South Korea.\footnote{398}{NATO, “NATO and the Republic of Korea sign new partnership programme,” September 20, 2012. \url{http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-D0A9D832-90EFF34B/natolive/news_90101.htm}} NATO has also finalized an accord with Columbia,\footnote{399}{NATO, “NATO and Colombia open channel for future cooperation,” June 23, 2013. \url{http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_101634.htm}} and signed a joint political declaration with Japan.\footnote{400}{NATO, “NATO and Japan sign Political Declaration for a stronger partnership,” April 2013. \url{http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_99655.htm}} These burgeoning
partnerships are a clear indication that the strategic frame of NATO has expanded to encompass the entire globe, marking a dramatic change in priorities for the Alliance.401

The global environment that NATO confronts has altered substantially since the end of the Cold War, the sources and type of threats that the Alliance confronts have become increasingly difficult to discern. This is due, in large part, to the ever expanding and deepening interconnectedness of the world’s population that has been central to period of accelerated neoliberal globalization that has characterized existence since the late 1970s.402 With the end of the Cold War, these processes have come to encompass the entire planet, affecting geopolitical dynamics and spawning a new geoeconomic order as I noted above. The Global Financial Crisis only served to add a further level of complexity to an already convoluted world. An outgrowth of this process has been what Cha and others403 refer to as a reconfiguration and recombination of social forces, which challenge traditional conceptions of space and the organization of political power. As they argue, “Globalization is best understood as a spatial phenomenon. It is not an event, but a gradual and ongoing expansion of interaction processes, forms of organization, and forms of cooperation outside the traditional spaces defined by sovereignty. Activity takes place in a less localized; less insulated way as transcontinental and interregional patterns

401 Taking the entire planet as an object of geopolitical analysis is not a new development, indeed it goes back centuries to the start of inter-imperial rivalries amongst European powers. The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 which formally divided Africa amongst the imperial European powers based upon their geopolitical positions is an example of this. For further detail on the Berlin Conference see Sybil Crowe, The Berlin West African Conference, 1884–1885. (New York: Longmans, 1981.)

402 I speak of an accelerated process of globalization, rather than globalization in a general sense, because globalization itself is not a new phenomenon, indeed the main components of globalization were described by Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto. See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, (London: Penguin, 1967), 220-226. What have changed are not the processes themselves, but their pace, which has multiplied exponentially.

crisscross and overlap one another.” The current geoeconomic order then marks the collapse of the state as a bordered power container; indeed, it is doubtful that such a conceptualization of the state was ever appropriate.

The spatial uncertainty and constantly shifting interactions that are characteristic of the contemporary period have impinged upon the ability of states to pursue their security objectives in a variety of ways. Kirshner, for example, notes three principal impacts: reduced state autonomy, a reshuffling of relative capabilities, and the creation of new sources of conflict. As an inter-state organization, NATO has been simultaneously drawn up by these dynamics and forced to adapt in response but it also plays an important role in reinforcing particular aspects of the current geoeconomic order, namely the geopolitical dominance of the West. NATO’s partnerships are a reaction to the uncertainties of the current period that seek to provide the material basis through which interventions can be launched to contain threats as they arise. While NATO’s

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405 This conceptualization of the state is found in Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence: Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, (Berkley: University of California Press, 1987). Although the modern form of the state that arose in the late medieval period in Europe sought a centralization of power within a specific territorial space, this has always been a highly contested and continuously unfinished process. The authority of the state is never absolute and uniform, as Giddens, posits but is rather highly varied. For historical background see Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State*, (London: Verso, 1985) and Charles Tilly, “War and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyr and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169-187. For criticism of Giddens see Bob Jessop, “Capitalism, nation-states and surveillance,” in David Held, John Thompson eds., *Social Theory of Modern Societies: Anthony Giddens and his critics*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989), 103-128.

406 Cox’s conceptualization of social forces in the world economy provides a sharp contrast to Giddens and is closer to my own opinion. “Particular social forces may overflow state boundaries, and world structures can be described in terms of social forces just as they can be described as configurations of state power. The world can be represented as a pattern of interacting social forces in which states play an intermediate through autonomous role between the global structure of social forces and local configurations of social forces within particular countries.” Robert Cox, “Social Forces, states and World Orders: Beyond IR Theory,” in Robert Cox with Timothy Sinclair, eds., *Approaches to World Order*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 105.

proliferating, partnerships clearly illustrate its aspirations to mold global security dynamics in the interests of its members they represent only a portion of the transformation that the Alliance has undergone since the Global Financial Crisis. Alongside expanding its external connections NATO has also redesigned its institutional structure to prioritize the production and sharing of knowledge.

While NATO’s new partnership programs provide the ability for it to react to events, implementing knowledge production and sharing procedures allow for the comprehension of the factors that lead to crisis and provide the ability to determine when and in what form to intervene. This combination of an expanding web of external connections and internal alterations to improve the coordination and governance capabilities of NATO mark its emergence as a global security nexus. While this section explored the external network of arrangements that NATO has concluded in response to the Global Financial Crisis the next section will examine the internal effects of the crisis and the impact that NATO’s strategic shift towards crisis management has had upon its institutional architecture.

*Rethinking War: The Science and Technology Office and the Elaboration of a New Model Command and Control*

A major outcome of the elevation of risk management in NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept has been a fixation upon promoting and deepening processes of knowledge development across its entire institutional apparatus. Knowledge development within NATO is not simply an abstract inclination, rather its actualization demonstrates the inter-relation between the framing of knowledge, the production of specific types of
knowledge as a result, and institutional innovation. The influence of knowledge development has been far reaching, leading to the creation of a new model of command and control model, the formation of new institutions, such as Allied Command Transformation, and a greater importance for already existing institutions like the Science and Technology Organization. These new models and structures result in greater combat efficiency by deepening the linkages between military actors and dramatically improving reaction time and battlefield awareness. The Science and Technology Organization and Allied Command Transformation are perhaps the most dynamic and innovative components of NATO’s far-reaching organizational apparatus, providing both the analytical rigor and the guidance required as NATO embarks upon its path of reinvention as a global security nexus. Central to the operations of both institutions is their promotion and extension of knowledge development, the conceptual manner by which NATO has incorporated the logic of risk management within its operations. However, there is a paucity of academic analysis on both institutions. This dearth of commentary is curious especially in light of the wider impact that the analytical framing and concepts that these two institutions have developed have had upon NATO as a whole.

Allied Command Transformation and the Science and Technology Organization each seek to improve NATO’s flexibility and responsiveness in a unpredictable world, taken together they should be considered as the nexus component of NATO’s formation as a global security nexus. While the ever-expanding set of agreements and interactions that NATO is engaging in with non-member states that seek to expand the scope of its influence amount to the global security portion of NATO as a global security nexus. The Science and Technology Organization (STO) is located within the civilian side of NATO
and was established shortly after NATO itself was founded in 1949. NATO’s Chief Scientist heads STO and its members, appointed by their respective national governments can be drawn from government, industry, or academia. While given a wide degree of independence as a subsidiary body having the same official legal standing as NATO itself, the STO is formally overseen by North Atlantic Council, NATO’s highest political body. The creation of Allied Command Transformation (ACT) is a far more recent event, occurring in 2002. ACT lies firmly on the military side of NATO, a military officer directs ACT, all of its leadership are drawn from member militaries and it follows standard military chain of command. Alongside Allied Command Operations, ACT is one of two NATO Supreme Commands that report directly to NATO’s military committee.

The STO and ACT are engaged in complementary and at times overlapping functions. Each is dedicated to increasing knowledge sharing and connectivity between NATO’s diverse organizational components. However, important differences, in addition to their chain of command and organizational culture exist between them. The STO concerns itself with conceptual innovation and seeks to develop a new apparatus of knowledge that deepens NATO’s understanding of the contemporary geopolitical environment. ACT, in contrast, engages in more focused endeavors by creating military doctrine that governs Alliance activities. Both organization are central to understanding the current orientation of NATO and where it is headed in the future.

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In its early years the main focus of the STO was upon aerospace research and armament research. Indeed one of the first major actions taken by the STO in 1952 was to establish the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development, 410 which created a series of subordinate areas such as flight combustion and wind tunnel and model testing. 411 In 1967 the NATO Defense Research Group was established, its purpose was to foster cooperation on research and new technology that could lead to future defense equipment. 412 These two organizations merged in 1996 to form the Research and Technology Board, (R&T) under the oversight of the STO. 413 Since its inception, the R&T has regularly issued technical reports that seek to generate new concepts that can be applied by NATO to understand a complex contemporary strategic environment and develop a common knowledge base between NATO members to ensure that a shared understanding exists regarding NATO’s priorities. The R&T also conducts reviews of the military doctrine of NATO members and attempts to align them on key points. An in-depth examination of several recent technical reports provides an excellent overview of the current direction that NATO policy, in terms of its organizational framework, is heading.

NATO’s shift to a risk-centric strategy has necessitated that it increase the knowledge gathering and reflexivity of its own institutions. The R&T acknowledges this when it argues for, “The need to shorten learning cycles and implement lessons learned

are imperative in contemporary military operations. It will only become more so in the future. Thus, we must learn, preserve and enhance real time learning mechanisms and the methodology of managing knowledge, before, during and following operations for the future. This perspective is echoed in another related report by NATO, which attempts to outline a model by which NATO should respond to future crises. The management of crises is a difficult endeavor as, “The characteristic of a crisis is that it is unpredictable, out of frame, that it exceeds the existing means, and that it cannot be anticipated by scenarios.” Although the techniques of risk management may provide an overarching framework of action and understanding for NATO, on their own they are not sufficient, as they do not contribute the actual tools and concepts required in the specific circumstances encountered by NATO. The imperative that NATO has set for itself to rapidly access and respond to emerging situations necessitates the emergence of new forms of analysis. Risk management serves to impart only a general level of understanding, the particular elements that will actually guide NATO’s policy and actions, must be generated within NATO itself. With risk management serving as the methodology, what remains is its utilization in an effective manner that allows for the discernment of reality in a way that assists NATO in achieving its objectives.

As an R&T report noted, the contemporary production of knowledge is a complex task. “Generating knowledge is increasingly about practical usefulness and tends to require a larger, more diverse system of epistemic communities, actors, stakeholders and

participants involving a continuous negotiation. Research priorities must adapt to a constantly shifting landscape and the research enterprise must embrace more uncertainty.” The overwhelming sum of information available and the diversity of sources from which it arises confront policymakers, makes their distilling into useful concepts that can serve as the basis for action a difficult one. NATO has sought to overcome this conundrum through the development of filtering mechanisms that bring important information to the forefront, while disregarding superfluous data. Social radar is an example of such a tool.

Social radar seeks to use social media and the internet to provide insight into current threats as well as assist in predicting future trends that may threaten NATO’s interests. Based upon a pre-set selection of key indicators a wide net is cast in order to determine the nature of the contemporary political environment. While the actual content of the social radar program employed by NATO remains classified, Costa and Boiney, provide an overview of what is necessary to establish a successful social radar program that is worth quoting at length.

Success of social radar depends on continuous access to global data on general population perceptions, attitudes, opinions, sentiments, and behaviors. Much of the most timely and valuable data will be found through a variety of increasingly Internet-based sources, including, of course, social media. Analysts must use all relevant data, in conjunction with current and emerging technologies, to support an analysis of non-kinetic messages, forecasting of messaging effects, course of action planning and measurement of effects. This combination of data and technical capabilities will enable improved situation awareness and decision support for anticipating instability, countering violent extremism, and building partner capacity.417

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Social radar does not represent a new source of information; rather it is an encompassing mesh, which highlights the relative importance of already existing sources of information. It is an example of the new forms of analysis that NATO is developing to increase its comprehension of an ever more complicated and unpredictable world. These new analytical tools are being utilized as the foundation for the creation of a new conceptual apparatus, an apparatus that provides the impetus for alterations to NATO’s mechanisms of command and control. Information gathering programs, such as social radar are central to these new command and control models as they provide a wealth of data that can then be analyzed to offer heightened strategic awareness. This data is processed through new command models with threats generated and actions taken as a result. The incorporation of logics of risk management, which has spurred the elaboration of these new models, are responsible for radically reshaping how NATO approaches battlefield management.

NATO’s command and control mechanisms are not often the subject of wider discussion. Stares’ complaint, made in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, remains relevant today. He wrote “…NATO’s command system has attracted little attention…and has rarely, if ever been questioned let alone systemically studied.” On the rare occasions when NATO’s command and control mechanisms have been studied, the predominant concern has been how NATO would respond to or initiate a nuclear

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418 Although no specific examples can be found that in which a social radar program developed by NATO is connected to its new command and control models, it is easy to envision situations in which it would be useful to link them together. The analysis of trends conducted by a social radar program could be incorporated into the new command and control framework presently being elaborated by NATO, greatly improving the situational awareness of this model.

This analysis speaks to an earlier era where collective defense was the sole strategic doctrine of NATO. The unpredictable geopolitical environment and consequentially the elevation of risk management to a central strategic doctrine has had an impact this shift has had upon how NATO approaches battlefield engagements have yet to be rigorously examined. This oversight is surprising, as two STO working groups, SAS-050 and SAS-065, have conducted an in-depth internal re-examination of NATO’s command structures. Their reports have elaborated a dynamic new form of command and control that seeks to increase the availability, speed and range of knowledge that can be acquired and processed by NATO. With their focus upon access and disbursement of knowledge, these models represent the latest iteration of a long historical process, one that, following van Crevald, extends to the earliest forms of military organization. “The history of command can be understood in terms of a race between the demand for information and the ability of command systems to meet it. That race is eternal; it takes place within every military organization, at all levels and at all times.” While the foundations of NATO’s new command and control mechanisms may be ancient, the solutions proposed are original and creative.

In order to capture as broad a spectrum of relationships as possible and allow for a rapid reaction, NATO has relied upon modeling software to capture developments as they emerge. NATO is particularly interested in the creation of programs that can assist its

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422 To be deemed valid and useful a conceptual model must meet a long list of requirements. These include: supporting the testing and refinement of casual and influence links, suggests points of influence and pressure, helps in rapid generation of ideas, supports studies and analysis, identifies gaps in knowledge, and
command and control mechanisms in developing a more network centric approach that
increases communication between different institutions and assists in the spread of
knowledge concerning the current strategic environment amongst all relevant parties.\textsuperscript{423}
In this regard, NATO working group, SAS-050 was struck to, “…support the exploration
of new, network-enabled approaches to command and control and compare their
characteristics, performance, effectiveness, and agility to traditional approaches to
command and control.”\textsuperscript{424} This resulted in the creation of a complex model consisting of
over 300 variables.\textsuperscript{425} This model was designed to analyze information provided about
ongoing events, classify these events into one of seven possible categories, and then
suggest a framework of action.\textsuperscript{426} The working group on this project created two distinct
case studies to test the parameters and effectiveness of the model. The first envisioned a
complex peacekeeping and warfighting scenario, while the second case sought to test the
broader tenets of network centric operations.\textsuperscript{427} The result of these case studies was
positive, as the report notes they, “…demonstrated that, even in its immature state, the
Conceptual Model went a long way towards providing the kind of support envisaged. The
case study was of great value in informing the further development of the model; if a
similar exercise were carried out now with a more mature model it would be of

\textsuperscript{423}NATO succinctly states its reasons for engaging in these projects as follows, “The tenets that form the
intellectual foundation for these ongoing transformations are: A robustly networked force enables the
widespread sharing of information. Widespread information sharing and collaboration in the information
domain improves the quality of awareness, shared awareness and collaboration. This, in turn, enables self-
synchronization. This results in a dramatic improvement in operational effectiveness and agility.” Ibid., 1-1.
\textsuperscript{424}Ibid., 2-3
\textsuperscript{425} Ibid., 1-3.
\textsuperscript{426} These include track, target, engage, assess and anticipate events. Ibid., 10-2-2.
\textsuperscript{427} The actual content of the case studies is not elaborated further. Ibid., 10-2-3.
significant benefit in further validation.”\textsuperscript{428} The lessons learned from the analysis conducted and the data provide through this model would be utilized by a later working group to create a model of greater complexity.\textsuperscript{429}

This later working group, SAS-065 worked in conjunction with the United States Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program. The direct involvement of the Department of Defense illustrates the elevated gravity with placed upon the analysis being conducted. The key innovation of this report, entitled the \textit{NATO NEC2 Maturity Model}, when compared to the efforts of the previous SAS-050 group, was that it developed and incorporated a scalable model of command and control that utilized the complex modeling system created by the SAS-050 group. NATO’s understanding of command and control is an explicit critique of what it sees as the static and prevailing conceptualization of these concepts. Hence, before delving into the actual components of the scalable model of command and control that is developed in this report, it is useful to explore how NATO defines command and control as well as how it seeks to break with the contemporary framework. Doing so is not only useful not only in terms of understanding what the SAS-050 working group sought to achieve, it has a larger applicability as it prefigures and assumes a specific mission format and set of interactions with other political actors in the future that differs from the one historically assumed by NATO.

\textsuperscript{428} Ibid., 10-2-4.
\textsuperscript{429} The executive summary of the SAS-050 report notes that the model will be further refined in the future by SAS-065 which has been created as a follow up effort. Ibid., ES-1.
NATO views its engagements in the 21st century as far more fluid and extending beyond the traditional organizational boundaries that have confined it in the past. Future operations will require a collective approach in order to be successful. As Alberts argues “The challenges faced by NATO and its member nations in the 21st century require the creation of a coalition; a collection of disparate entities who are pursuing related but not identical goals. This collective is composed of contributing entities, both military and non-military from the various NATO nations. This coalition will likely include contributions from non-NATO countries and international organizations…” To be an effective security actor in the future NATO will have to break out its institutional boundaries, through networking and integrating with a diverse range of actors with aligned, if not matching interests. It is through this process that NATO takes on the characteristics of a global security nexus as it weaves together a diverse group of states together and attempts to coordinate their efforts in an effective manner. Indeed the framework of command and control that NATO elaborates in this report is an explicitly collective one, which seeks to provide a means of linking together an ever-alternating set of actors. If fully enacted this model could provide a coherent framework of command and control as NATO assumes, to an ever-greater degree, its role as a global security nexus.


431 This is an example of NATO following, rather than leading global trends as it struggles to respond as rapidly as possible to changing dynamics. “…the increasingly volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous operational environment, characterized by a more agile and increasingly capable antagonist, requires similarly enabled protagonists. Throughout history changing environments have led to the adoption of new practices to augment or replace existing approaches,” Ibid., 9 If it was a hegemonic organization NATO would be setting the terms through which it engaged with the world and would not be forced to adapt behind the curve. Interestingly who this future antagonist is remains undefined or is described in vague terms throughout the report.
The scalable nature of this model contains within it a conceptualization of space that violates traditional territorial boundaries, cutting across traditional scalar and spatial and hence governance boundaries. Such a capability is not unprecedented for a hegemonic state like the United States, whose military seamlessly spans the globe. Indeed, as early as the first Gulf War, the declining impact of territory in strategic and tactical calculations was noted by Virilio. He posited that, “...we can no longer legitimately speak of a battlefield or of a localized war...they are overshadowed, totally dominated by the scope of a global capacity, of an environment in which the spatio-temporal reduction is the essential characteristic.”[432] While the overcoming of territory as a limit upon contemporary battlefield engagement is not a recent development, the attempt to achieve this level of situational dominance by an organization which binds together a multitude of states of highly varying military capabilities like NATO is a project of a starkly different magnitude, one this is highly contingent and prone to collapse, but if successful would provide coherence to and renewal to a Western-centric constellation of power. This is goal of the command and control modeling currently underway within NATO.

The overriding critique that NATO has concerning traditional methods of command and control is that they adopt a commander centric viewpoint. This approach to command adopts a singular focus, where the role of single individual representing a single institution is evaluated above all others. This model is unhelpful as a method of organizing 21st century operations, because, as noted, for NATO these will be primarily collective endeavors. In these circumstances, “The commander-centric view of what is

after all a set of functions required for mission success is totally antithetical to the way in which these functions need to be accomplished in 21st century complex endeavors…For a variety of reasons no single entity will be in command. Hence, a commander centric view makes no sense.”

Indeed the extent to which traditional new models of command need to be rethought is so great, which such a radical departure required that the research group ponders whether it would be best to abandon the terms command and control in favor of focus and convergence, ultimately deciding for the sake of clarity to retain them, for the time being.

In the place of a commander, centric model SAS-050 offers a scalable five level model of command and control suitable to managing the diverse set institutions of institutions that NATO is likely to oversee as they seek to obtain their objectives within a complex security environment. The convergence of scale, space and the elaboration of systems of command and control within this model is not a unique development. Indeed the British Empire and the United States in the 19th century both engaged in similar projects.

What separates NATO’s configuration from those earlier eras is a matter of scope and speed.

The near instantaneous knowledge of battlefield developments and the shared field of vision available to all relevant actors dwarfs these

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433 David Alberts, Reiner Huber, and James Moffat, NATO NEC2 Maturity Model, (Washington D.C: DOD Command and Control, 2010), 15.

434 The relevant passage reads, “… we need to think differently about what the term command and control means at a minimum or introduce a different term that refers to the ways in which the functions that are normally associated with the practice of command and control will be accomplished…if a new term can be found that captures the intended concepts, this may be preferable.” Ibid., 24.


earlier endeavors that possessed a far more circumscribed amount of knowledge that was limited to a narrower range of participants.

The five levels of increasing command and control maturity levels that have been elaborated are from one to five: stand-alone (disjointed) operations, de-conflicted operations, coordinated operations, integrated operations, and transformed (coherent) operations.\(^{437}\) NATO’s new command and control maturity model explicitly incorporates a scalar and spatial approach. In terms of scale each, “…specific level of command and control maturity is associated with a specific set of capabilities that focus an entity or set of entities and converge on a desired set of outcomes… The command and control maturity model is a layered framework with levels of increasing maturity as the levels increase.”\(^{438}\) This layered model, which offers expanding capability sets scalable to the specific mission type being confronted and the costs willing to be incurred. The conceptual model developed by the prior SAS-050 working group fits into this framework by providing guidance as to the appropriate level of command and control maturity required for the current task. This scalar model of command and control presented by NATO possesses an important spatial component that is utilized to judge the effectiveness of each subsequent level as the scale of command and control maturity is expanded or contracted. It is important however not to confuse these command functions with the scalar itself. This command framework is a response to, not a generator of scalar uncertainty. The scale, properly conceived, is the plane of interaction, not the interaction itself.


\(^{438}\) Ibid., 36.
Information and cognition are the crucial elements that are empathized in the command and control maturity model presented in this report. Information and cognition are conceived together as part of a social domain, NATO’s understanding of these domains is expressed in spatial terms, as is the impact that they have upon command and control. Improving the flow of information between relevant actors and improving cognition of it allows for a spatially expanded command and control framework capable of accessing and analyzing ever-greater amounts of information and acting upon this information in a useful manner. The report claims that “Achieving a significant amount of shared understanding enables a collective to be more agile and span more of the command and control approach space, which is needed to realize higher levels of command and control maturity.”

Thus, information and cognition serve as the primary variables whose existence affects the portion that other secondary variables will be present. NATO identifies these secondary variables as agility, patterns of interaction, and allocation of decision rights. The extent to which these values are present allows for movement up the scale of maturity. From the first, conflicted level of maturity, where all interactions take place within individual entities and no collaboration exists, to the fifth level where entities within the collective are capable of self-synchronization that is predicated on a robustly networked set of connections that enables extensive sharing of information and rich, continuous interactions.

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439 Ibid. 27.
441 For a detailed account of the capabilities of each level and the requirements necessary to move up the scale of maturity see Ibid., 50-60.
This new model of command is necessitated by the new emerging format of missions that NATO sees itself as contributing to in the future. Within this new format of missions, interoperability and efficiency are of paramount importance, due to the demands of austerity. Wider economic conditions are serving to alter how NATO approaches its operations. In contrast to the sustained peacekeeping operations of the 1990s and early 2000s, future operations will more closely resemble NATO’s relatively brief operation in Libya. The conceptual framework developed through the reports issued by the RTO, which I have analyzed above represent a thinking through of the challenges confronting NATO and the attempt to pattern of thought and action that sharply diverges from its historical legacy. They form the basis of the policy shift presently underway within NATO towards an organization that favors knowledge-sharing, networking, and the adoption of a collective form of command and control. Yet these reports remain largely abstract and do not offer practical steps to translate their analysis into actual doctrine and institutional changes. This work falls to Allied Command Transformation (ACT). Its projects demonstrate the promise of NATO’s current transformation, but also the constraints placed upon innovation within the Alliance.

Allied Command Transformation: The Declining Relevance of Territory and the Militarization of Knowledge

ACT was established alongside Allied Command Operations (ACO) at NATO’s Prague Summit in 2002 as part of a generational reorganization of NATO’s command structure. This reorganization occurred as NATO faced an uncertain future of declining
resources and fluid requirements brought about by the spatial uncertainty characteristic of the post-Cold War geoeconomic order. This redesigning of NATO was designed to create, in the words of the Alliance defense ministers at the Prague summit, “…a leaner, more efficient, effective and deployable command structure, with a view to meeting the operational requirements for the full range of Alliance missions.” The salience of these elements has only heightened since the 2007 Crisis. Despite the claims of reinvention, however these two strategic commands, ACT and ACO, were not original creations; rather they evolved from prior strategic commands that were given new names and provided with new mission parameters. Allied Command Atlantic and Allied Command Europe, both established in the early 1950s become Allied Command Transformation and Allied Command Operations, respectively. Regardless of their prior history, the renaming of these commands was more than simply a cosmetic change but represented a fundamental shift in NATO’s strategic approach.

The renamed commands lacked reference to a geographical region, illustrating the sharply reduced impact that territorial space has upon setting the terms of NATO policy. Instead, as ACT itself argues, the focus is now upon functionality, regardless of geography. In the early 21st century “…Alliance thinking fundamentally shifted: The NATO Command Structure was to be based on functionality rather than geography.” This shift represents a dramatic reassessment of NATO’s Cold War positions in which a static geographical framing underpinned its strategic orientation. This foundation has been largely removed and replaced with a concern with functionality,

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regardless of the territorial space within which these processes are occurring. Inherent in this new approach is a move towards a global scale of interactions and away from the overarching regional concern that defined NATO in its first five decades.

The explicit degrading of the importance of territory demonstrates the immersion of ACT and NATO more broadly within the current geoeconomic order. The declining role of territorial space as a prefiguring factor can be observed both for capital and for the military forces of advanced states. Territorial and capitalist logics have historically been intertwined in a dialectic relationship with one another, simultaneously confronting and merging together with one another. However, in the contemporary period of intensified neoliberalism a fully functioning state that blankets its domain with an extensive governance apparatus that reproduces itself in a uniform manner is not necessarily a prerequisite for capital accumulation. As a result, sovereignty becomes far more elastic, taking on the characteristics of what Ong has called graduated sovereignty. She explains, “I use the term graduated sovereignty to refer to the effects of a flexible management of sovereignty, as governments adjust political space to the dictates of global capital, giving corporations an indirect power over the political conditions in zones that are differently articulated to global production and financial circuits…graduated sovereignty is an effect of states moving from being administrators of a watertight national entity to regulators of diverse spaces and populations that link with global markets.”

Only specific spaces or particular nodes are important for a time, not an entire territorial space.

444 Harvey provides an analysis of how this interaction is occurring in the present neoliberal period. See David Harvey, *Spaces of Neoliberalism: Toward a Theory of uneven geographical development* (Munich: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2005), 81-84.
This logic is not restricted to capital accumulation but can be extended to some forms of military operations today. The linkage of the geopolitical and the economic with the military mirroring capital flows is at the heart of the present geoeconomic order. Many of the activities of the American military today, whether it is special forces operations\textsuperscript{446} or drone strikes\textsuperscript{447} are informed by this logic, indeed this appears to be fast becoming a prevalent tendency in modern warfare.

Knowledge development, the institutional project that ACT is engaged in, represents an extension of this understanding of warfare to NATO. As opposed to the RTO, which was limited to offering only a conceptual framework, ACT seeks to implement institutional changes that are beginning to actualize many of the elements first envisioned by the RTO. In doing so ACT is leading to the way towards ever more network centric modes of organization within NATO. Although achieving greater levels of knowledge development will require wide-ranging institutional transformation, these changes at seen as part of a natural progression, not a radical break with past practice. In the Alliance’s thinking, “Knowledge development is an evolution, not a revolution in thinking. Processes and information already exist within NATO that support decision-

\textsuperscript{446} The violation of traditional conceptions of space and scale by American Special Forces is noted by Niva. “Shadow warfare in which hybrid blends of hierarchies and networks combine through common information and self-synchronization to mount strike operations across transnational battle spaces,” Steve Niva, “Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare,” \textit{Security Dialogue} 44 (2013): 185.
\textsuperscript{447} Drone warfare, as Kahn argues, is responsible for collapsing many of the notions of warfare that were inherited from past conflicts. The interest is no longer in the governance of a territory, instead the emphasis is upon crossing time in space in the quickest and most efficient manner possible to eliminate an identified threat at a specific point. “The drone is both a symbol and a part of the dynamic destruction of what had been a stable imaginative structure. It captures all of these changes: the engagement occurs in normalized time and space, the enemy is not a state, the target is not innocent, and there is no reciprocity of risk.” Paul Kahn, “Imagining Warfare,” \textit{European Journal of International Law} 24(2013): 199-226. Further analysis of the geopolitical ramifications of drone warfare can be found in Ian Shaw, “Predator Empire: The Geopolitics of US Drone Warfare,” \textit{Geopolitics} 18 (2013): 536-559.
making. The problem is that this information or isolated knowledge often resides in the heads and offices of subject matter experts across the organization; it is not fused, de-conflicted, or shared, at least not in a formal, well established manner.\textsuperscript{448} ACT then is an attempt to graft a new set of functions upon an older core structure. The heart of the NATO, its military committees, North Atlantic Council, and international staff bureaucracy, despite the rhetoric of change and transformation sweeping across the Alliance will remain largely immutable. The old Cold War apparatus of NATO will stay in place; but it will exist alongside a new framework, one that better responds to the demands of the current geoeconomic order.

ACT, along with the programs it is responsible for overseeing, is not a case of old wine in new bottles, as many of these programs are altering NATO in crucial ways, but the embrace of deep radical change is circumscribed by its institutional legacy. ACT is organized into four main branches: Strategic Plans and Policy, Resource & Management, Capability Development, and Joint Force Training. ACT also works in conjunction with eighteen centres of excellence. These centres seek to improve NATO’s capabilities in areas as diverse as cold weather operations and energy security.\textsuperscript{449} ACT has sought to promote knowledge development in three major ways. First, through the gradual removal of barriers between internal NATO actors and external academic and industry groups through the Framework for Collaborative Interaction; second, through developing new metrics that measure the innovative potential of different projects, and third through

establishing new centers and initiatives, like the Lessons Learned Centre and the Network Enabled Capability initiative that encourage knowledge sharing across NATO.

In comparison to the RTO, which seeks to produce new forms of knowledge and generate conceptual frames that can provide a coherence to NATO’s actions ACT is illustrative of how the altered strategic priorities of NATO has effected its interactions with outside institutions and promoted the militarization of further areas of knowledge. This occurs through what I see as ACT’s employment of an open innovation model. Open innovation, as it was initially developed, assumes a corporate framework, with firm-to-firm interactions occurring only between private entities, yet I argue that it can also be applied as a means to understand the manner in which ACT has sought to engage with outside actors. ACT adoption of an open innovation is highly significant, because not only does it represent a departure from the compartmentalization of knowledge historically common to military organizations but it also demonstrates the militarization of outside areas of practice and knowledge by ACT. By doing so, ACT provides an example of the incorporation of processes usually associated with the accumulation of capital, not military organization. ACT’s usage of open innovation models along with innovation metrics, tools that were initially created for and utilized by private enterprise, offers an example of how intensified neoliberalism and austerity, with its demand for quantitative measurements of increased efficiency gains, is impacting the internal organizational logics of NATO and hence its wider behavior.

Open innovation is a concept that was originally developed by Chesbrough to analyze how inter-firm cooperation occurred on research and development projects. Chesbrough defined open innovation as, “…a paradigm that assumes that firms can and
should use external ideas as well as internal ideas, and internal and external paths to market, as the firms look to advance their technology.”\footnote{450} Fully adopting open innovation as a framework for knowledge development requires the breakdown of vertical fully integrated modes of innovation and their replacement with more dynamic mechanisms capable of absorbing external information and applying it to the internal processes within the organization. West and Gallagher outline the characteristics required for the successful actualization of this process. They note that “Under this paradigm, internal innovation is supplemented by systemic scanning for external knowledge facilitated by firm investments in absorptive capacity…Such strategies require firms to realign innovation strategies to extend beyond the boundaries of the firm, while creating mechanisms for appropriating value from the combined innovation.”\footnote{451} The model of open innovation should be extended then in this case to include patterns of interaction between intergovernmental, public, and private actors. ACT has in fact fulfilled the basic requirement of an open innovation model, according to West and Gallagher by elaborating its own open innovation strategy and plan for engagement with academia and industry with its Framework for Collaborative Interaction (FFCI), a key part of NATO’s integrated knowledge strategy established in 2009.

ACT is clear that the FFCI is not a program in the traditional sense. The FFCI does not provide financial incentives to outside actors to engage in collaborative projects; instead, the incentive that the FFCI offers its partners is based simply upon the


collaborative form of interactions that it generates. “FFCI is not a program; it is an enabler to achieve results similarly to the way contracting supports projects. Academia and Industry have engaged in many FFCI projects without directly receiving any financial contributions. These organizations find benefits beyond the financial aspect, a collective benefit perspective. This action brings awareness of the current capabilities within industry to NATO.”

Outside actors benefit from their engagement with this process because they gain a greater understanding of the objectives that NATO is currently pursuing and its preferred means of achieving them. These actors are then able to reorient themselves based upon this knowledge and deepen their connection with NATO, increasing the potential that they will receive lucrative projects or be provided with other lines of funding in the future. For NATO, it gains an awareness of contemporary developments in a wide range of fields and can then utilize this knowledge to set the parameters of its own path of innovation. This interaction represents a militarization of knowledge as the actors that are part of the FFCI process tailor their information and the activities they engage in to suit the priorities of NATO.

The success of the FFCI in fostering connection between industry, academia, and NATO can be seen not only in the wide range of projects that have occurred under the auspices of the FFCI, from cloud computing to medical support for operations, but also in the large numbers of organizations that attend ACT’s industry and academic gatherings. ACT’s last academic conference in Bologna in October 2012 brought together over 50 academics from nearly every NATO member state and resulted in the publication

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453 Ibid.
of a monograph analyzing NATO’s current strategic trajectory.\footnote{Dynamic Change: Rethinking NATO’s capabilities, operations and partnerships, ed., Riccardo Alcaro and Sonia Lucarelli is available on the University of Bologna’s Institute for International Affairs website at \url{http://www.iai.it/pdf/dynamic-change.pdf}} ACT’s last industry forum took place in Istanbul in November 2013 and brought together representatives from technology and defense firms with members of NATO’s military command.\footnote{Details of this event can be found at \url{http://www.cvent.com/events/nato-industry-forum-2013/event-summary-8c81f28f82814d7d9bab9a599e370efc.aspx}} These regularized forums provide an opportunity to ground the process of interactions between NATO and outside actors allow for reflection upon the events of the past year, and assist in elaborating NATO’s future strategic direction. The expanded field of knowledge that FFCI generates is central to the new strategic frame of risk management, which NATO has developed over the last decade and a half. The generation and assessment threats and preparation for future engagements necessitates a greater depth of knowledge and connection with outside actors that open innovation projections such as the FFCI provides. FFCI then improves the situational awareness of NATO allowing for the possibility for more effective action by the Alliance.

The overarching knowledge apparatus that NATO has constructed extends beyond engagements with corporate actors and universities, to integration with the civil apparatus of member states. This has occurred under the oversight of civil-military fusion centers project. Established in 2008 the Civil-Military fusion centre is an experiment to test how effectively of open-source, unclassified information could be shared amongst civilian and military stakeholders during a crisis. This blurring of the lines between civilian and military tasks, while seemingly innocuous, as ACT itself notes, this project was an attempt to push the boundaries of the limits traditionally placed upon
civil-military interaction. An internal ACT report declares, “…the implementation of the fusion centre concept was an effort to influence a paradigm shift towards creating an environment where information can flow freely between civilian and military actors engaged in complex crises.”\textsuperscript{456} The only active civil-military fusion is in Afghanistan, where its presence has served to promote the militarization of aid within the country. However, regular analysis is also conducted of specific countries throughout Africa and the Middle East, providing an indication of countries that NATO deems particularly important to have an easily accessible base of knowledge and perhaps suggesting possible sites for future interventions.\textsuperscript{457} These civil-military fusion centers are part of a much larger trend that is serving to blur, to an ever greater degree, the line between the domestic and external security services of states.

Military-fusion centers provide another example, in addition to the FFCI, of NATO programs of which promote the greater militarization of knowledge. Although the militarization of knowledge is not in itself, a recent development, indeed it can be traced back to the era of early state formation,\textsuperscript{458} NATO’s attempts to influence the research

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\item \textsuperscript{457} These reports are classified under the heading “Complex Coverage” and can be accessed from \url{https://www.cimicweb.org/Pages/v6/welcome.html#}
\item \textsuperscript{458} While the necessity of creating and maintaining military forces fostered a massive expansion in the organizational capacity of the state, as well as being responsible for creating the fiscal foundations of our current global economy, the military sector has also historically played a highly influential role in advancing both production methods and providing the impetuous for numerous technological breakthroughs. The demand by military enterprise for material of the highest quality has often set the standard by which technical developments have been judged. Further, its requirement for the creation of particular products, along with providing the necessary financing and facilitates to make the possible the groundbreaking research required to create these new products, has historically shaped the path by which innovation has occurred. Further detail can be found in these, by no means comprehensive sources. Keith Krause, \textit{Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade}, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), David Parrott, \textit{The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Harold Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” \textit{The American Journal of Sociology} 46 (1941): 455-468. Ann Markusen and Sean Costigan. “The Military Industrial Challenge,” in \textit{Arming the Future: A Defense Industry for the 21st Century}, ed. Ann
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agendas of outside actors only began to occur in earnest with the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in 2007. The first military-fusion centre became operational in 2008, while the FFCI was created in 2009. Thus, it is the crisis that is the key event that links together and can explain the emergence of these elements. These programs should be understood then in light of the incorporation of the logics of austerity within NATO.

After covering the mechanisms which ACT has developed to allow it to access external sources and expand the scope of its knowledge development I will now turn to the second way that ACT has sought to encourage knowledge development by examining the internal processes that it has created in order to facilitate innovation and promote creative solutions to the challenges that the contemporary geopolitical environment poses to NATO. In this regard, ACT has also sought to create a system of metrics to measure the level of innovation that its various programs are fostering. Innovation metrics are commonly used in the corporate world to measure, encourage dynamism, and hence increase profitability.459 In this area, a wealth of perspectives exists with no single approach enjoying universal acclaim.460 ACT’s interest in employing innovation metrics does not lie with a concern of profitability, rather it is seeking to refashion these tools in order to achieve greater levels of institutional flexibility, allowing it to more effectively


respond to an uncertain geopolitical environment. Once again then ACT is seeking to pattern the functioning of NATO upon the template of capital accumulation, providing yet another example of the intertwining of capital and the generation of coercive force that is occurring under the pressures of intensified neoliberalism.461

ACT’s innovation metric system, which is still in the early stages of development, relies heavily upon the nine-step process elaborated by Morris.462 For Morris innovation can be conceptualized as moving from an initial stage of strategic thinking, through successive stage of portfolio management, research, ideation, insight, targeting, innovation development, market development and finally sales. Morris’ innovation metric was explicitly written for and targeted to private sector innovation. In seeking to measure innovation Morris provides a comprehensive and detailed framework that views innovation as equally qualitative and quantitative. Innovation starts as a diffuse and uncertain process and gradually solidifies into a more coherent sense of understanding. The initial soft metrics that Morris proposes eventually lead to hard metrics, which provide a more rigorous measurement of the innovation process. Morris writes, “The soft metrics are qualitative, sometimes in the form of proactive questions that are intended to get people to think more deeply and effectively about the work they’re doing. The hard metrics are quantitative, and amenable to statistical analysis.”463 This process mirrors the one that NATO is presently engaged in where it is attempting to translate new conceptual

461 This relationship is as old as capitalism itself. What I seek to do here is examine some characteristics of its latest inflection.
apparatus and ways of framing knowledge into a coherent framework that can serve to
guide institutional changes within NATO that make it more responsive to world events.

While innovation metrics provide a mechanism that supports the creation of new projects and initiatives NATO is also seeking to develop the means to allow it more effectively learn from the success and failures of past experiences as well as create new standards that encourage knowledge sharing across NATO. These projects comprise the third way in which ACT has sought to promote knowledge development. The Secretary General formally initiated the Lessons Learned process in April 2011 in reaction to the Libyan campaign. NATO’s Operation Unified Protector in Libya and the new format of intervention that it represented posed a number of challenges for NATO.

Lessons Learned was created in order to judge how NATO responded to events in Libya and what the wider ramifications of the operation would have for NATO in the future.\textsuperscript{464} The initiative for Lessons Learned came from the very top, demonstrating the importance of this process for NATO. ACT however took a leading role in actually implementing this process, developing a handbook\textsuperscript{465} that elaborated a six-step procedure that served as the foundation for how NATO as a whole enacted lesson learned. Additionally ACT sent staff members educated in these procedures throughout NATO to ensure that they were implemented correctly. Lessons Learned then creates a feedback loop that closes the circle of knowledge development and institutional innovation that NATO has engaged in since the start of the Global Financial Crisis in 2007. Lessons

\textsuperscript{464} For an overview of the role that the Libya campaign played in instigating the lessons learned process see Peter Sonneby, “Operationalizing Transformation-Bringing the NATO Lessons Learned Process to Life,” \textit{The Transformer} 8 (2012): 8.

Learned generates an institutional memory of events as well as set of information from past NATO activities. This data can then be fed into future irritations of its risk models, allowing for the creation of both risk and command and command models of progressively greater effectiveness and hence offer a more accurate picture of the current geopolitical environment along with possible future trends. The Lesson Learned process illustrates the emphasis that NATO is now placing upon increasing its reflexive capacities and how it regards past experience as a source for guidance for the future.

The proliferation of ways in which ACT has sought to engage with outside actors, create procedures that encourage and measure innovation, along with its attempts to foster a culture of contemplation are all in jeopardy if the individuals who are involved within them remain isolated from one another. If knowledge is not shared amongst individuals and between institutions, within NATO then all of the effort expended to promote knowledge development and hence a more responsive and proactive security organization will be undermined. To avert this outcome ACT has embarked upon its most extensive and transformative project, NATO’s Network Enabled Capability program (NNEC). Indeed the success or failure of NNEC will have a great impact on the future of ACT itself.

The NNEC program was begun shortly after ACT’s inception and has continued ever since, thus the fates of ACT and NNEC are tightly intertwined. Yet the ramifications of NNEC extend beyond the confines of ACT to encompass the entirety of NATO. A conference report on NNEC declares, “NNEC is defined as the Alliance’s cognitive and technical ability to federation the various components of the operational environment from the strategic level down to the tactical level through a networking and information
infrastructure…” NNEC then is the centerpiece of ACT’s knowledge development strategy, it seeks to link all elements of NATO together within a cohesive framework that will allow an individual or institution within NATO to rapidly gain access to the crucial information necessary to complete their current objectives. NNEC represents a dramatic shift in how knowledge is viewed in military organizations, which have traditionally been secretive and sought to compartmentalize information. Indeed this shift is apparent in the NNEC’s slogan, “share to win”. NNEC marks a transition point from past “need to know” organizations of knowledge that have been predominant in the military sector towards a more open understanding of knowledge.

At its core, NNEC is about aiding in the sharing breakthroughs and unique experiences that may prove relevant to future engagements. Moving from theory to actual practice however requires a large degree of standardization. Fundamental to the success of NNEC, as ACT notes, are the harmonization of information repositories and the deployment of common forms of technology and interfaces across NATO and its partners to ensure the easy dissemination of relevant and timely data. NNEC is not a framework unique to NATO. Indeed the British military is just one of a number of NATO members that have begun to implement their own network enabled capability strategy in coordination with NATO. The scope of NNEC extends far beyond simply sharing knowledge. NNEC, if it were fully realized, would establish the basis for a common

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467 See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_54644.htm for an example of this logo.
468 Allied Command Transformation, 10th NNEC Conference Report, 23-25 April 2013, 7-12.
system of command and control through NATO and across its member states. “With NEC joined up coalition operations become possible. Members are operating within a single command and control architecture, with the same picture and the same access. Everyone is therefore more responsive: subordinate units are much more inside the mind of the commander, which in turn means greater agility and tempo on the ground and greater speed of response.”470 If this envisioned framework were, achieved NATO and its aligned military forces would share amongst them the fifth or highest-level command and control maturity as identified above by the STO.

Making this vision, a reality is the goal of the command and control centre of excellence, which seeks to promote common NNEC criteria across affiliated parties, leading to the achievement of greater levels of command and control maturity. NNEC is the fulcrum that directly connects knowledge development to lines of command and control and hence operations. NNEC then is the link between the strategic and the tactical and the basis upon which the emergent mission format of NATO will rest. It is the medium through which the modifications of the RTO and ACT will actually be implemented. Were the NNEC to fail it would threaten the entire architecture of knowledge that NATO has constructed following the Global Financial Crisis.

This failure is a real possibility, as the vision of NNEC projected by NATO and actual reality remain quite separate with reports and analysis issued by the command and control center of excellence admitting that actually achieving, let alone approaching these goals, remains elusive. Problems with implementing NNEC across NATO include

diffused and conflicting lines of command and control, shortages of key personal and numerous failures to share information amongst national intelligence agencies.\textsuperscript{471}
Evaluations of how effectively military units under NATO command have implemented NNEC criteria have not been well received. In response, the command and control center of excellence has launched a number of further assessments that are ongoing at this time in an attempt to improve the implementation of NNEC.\textsuperscript{472}

The theorization of knowledge development, through the creation of new conceptual apparatuses, alongside the establishment of new centres and initiatives, which were both traced above, are all designed to make NATO a more efficient and effective calculator of risk. NATO’s recent initiatives, however innovative and groundbreaking they may be, have only served to alter NATO on the margins with the viability of the most ambitious program in this regard, the NNEC, being questioned by its most steadfast proponents. NATO’s shift in organizational form, the nexus portion of NATO as a global security nexus remains a work in transition at present. Where NATO has been far more successful is in the global security aspect through the array of partnerships it is has formed with non-member states. Yet while greater efficiency and influence is an outcome of these programs, they are being undercut, as key components necessary for their successful realization are not being fully implemented due to the demands of austerity.


\textsuperscript{472} Announcements about the poor state of NNEC implementation and the launch of new rounds of evaluation can be accessed at Command and Control Centre of Excellence, “Support to NRF Assessments 2013,” \url{http://c2coe.org/2013/04/support-to-n nec-assessments-2013/} and “NNEC Criteria Development,” \url{http://c2coe.org/2013/06/n nec-criteria-development/}
Ironically, an ideological project that advocates greater efficiency subsequently imperils it through subsequent cutbacks in NATO member budgets.

*The Constraints of Austerity upon NATO’s Transformation*

NATO’s transformation into a global security nexus represents an attempt to provide a more coherent and extensive global governance arrangement with more states sharing the burden of maintaining the overarching geoeconomic order in wake of the largest crisis since the 1930s.\(^{473}\) The reinforcing role that military power plays in upholding the structural foundations of the contemporary American-centric expression of global capitalism, has even been recognized, in a rare burst of insight, by the normally obtuse Thomas Friedman. He observes: “The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist, McDonald’s cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas…”\(^{474}\) NATO serves effectively as the security and defense arm of the current epoch of globalization,\(^{475}\) however it is often examined purely from a security or institutional perspective not as an organization immersed in and contributing to the articulation of a particular mode of political economy.

At the present moment, NATO is involved in the complex task of upholding a generalized regime of austerity while being negatively impacted by this same process. I believe that austerity, in the manner it has been reproduced in the defense sector

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\(^{473}\) The expansion in NATO’s partnership programs can be understood then as an effort to mitigate the free rider problem commonly found in international relations by having a larger number of states assume some measure of responsibility for maintaining the present world order. Further detail on the free rider problem as it pertains to international relations can be found in Andrew Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 120-123.


\(^{475}\) This is a position put forward in Julian Lindley-French, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Enduring Alliance* (London: Routledge, 2007), 111.
generally and NATO particularly, can be understood as a dialectical contradiction in the 
current workings of capitalism along the lines elaborated by Marx and Engels. They 
argued: “What constitutes dialectical movement is the coexistence of two contradictory 
sides, their conflict and their fusion into a new category.” 476 While austerity is seen as 
sacrifice necessary to create the conditions which will allow for the stable reproduction of 
capitalism, it undercuts the possibility for the realization of these conditions by 
potentially increasing social tensions through the heightening of exploitation 477 and 
simultaneously reducing the resources available to the coercive apparatuses responsible 
for containing any sustained outbreak of dissent. 478

This same interaction is playing out at the international level; as the crisis has 
weakened the position of the West vis-à-vis its main geopolitical rivals Russia and China. 
Expanding the reach of NATO is central to reducing any shifts in geopolitical power. 
Hence, the push by the United States for a larger and more elaborate partnership program. 
Yet the viability of this endeavor along with NATO’s drive to create an intricate internal 
network of communication examined above that prioritizes knowledge development is 
threatened by a lack of funding resulting from the condition of austerity. Austerity then

477 Indeed this current crisis was both caused by and has led to ever rising levels of exploitation a position shared by Duncan Foley, “The Political Economy of Postcrisis Global Capitalism,” South Atlantic Quarterly 111 (2012): 251-263.
478 A direct example of this contradiction, viewed from the perspective of the ruling class, has been budget cuts of 20% to police forces in the United Kingdom, at a time when it the sensible policy would be to increase the budget to deal with potential social unrest as austerity begins to bite. Obviously the present current government is counting on the inertness of the British public. Alan Travis, “Police numbers fall by further 3,488 officers: Total in England and Wales decreases by 2.6% to 128,351 in year to September as 20% police budget cut continues to be felt,” The Guardian January 29, 2014.
is a determining factor of contemporary existence, but it is not shaping reality in a direct linear fashion, rather it is doing so in a manner that is laden with contradictions. How these contradictions are resolved will determine the contours of the future political economy that NATO, in addition to other actors, will be forced to confront.

Returning to the problems of the present, the vast range of military exercises, educational opportunities, and options for institutional reform available to states that are members of any of NATO’s expanding range of partnerships outlined above all require the expenditure of funds, with most of the cost bore by NATO. In effect, this means that American funding to NATO has been largely stable, although reviews have been recently conducted of how the Department of Defense allocates funds to the PfP, which could suggest cuts may be forthcoming in the future. Former American Defense Security Robert Gates in his last speech to NATO warned that,

The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress – and in the American body politic writ large – to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense... Future U.S. political leaders—those for whom the Cold War was not the formative experience that it was for me—may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost.

American exasperation with the continual high levels of funding it must provide to support NATO is a long standing compliant, but in an era of austerity with the strategic focus of the United States shifting, with the ongoing pivot to Asia, and a consequently declining focus on Europe the potential for cuts in American funding to NATO is

Broadening funding avenues is the one of the major reasons why NATO has offered countries like Australia and Japan an increased role within the organization. NATO has also launched a range of innovative programs, such as Smart Defense that are designed to promote interoperability, increasing efficiency and reducing costs that will be explored in the next chapter.

Regardless of the threat of funding shortages in the future, the global security aspect of NATO is far more developed than its nexus portion. This is not surprising as the majority of NATO’s partnerships have long histories; PfP is approaching its twenty anniversary. Agreements between political actors concerning cooperation and security matters are regular and accepted parts of the international system. In contrast, the programs and conceptual apparatuses that ACT and RTO are in the process of creating are far more challenging to implement as they are seeking to alter longstanding institutional practices. NATO as a global security nexus then remains a work progress. With this caveat in mind however, it is clear that NATO, because of its partnerships and expanded strategic frame is now a global security organization. On this point, policymakers and academics agree both, although opinion differs on the causes and consequences of this development.

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481 Analysis of the effect of the pivot on American funding of NATO is provided in Barry Pavel and Jeff Lightfoot, “The transatlantic Bargain after the pivot,” Atlantic Council Issue Brief, March 2012.
482 Australia has contributed over 1,000 troops to NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, more than many NATO members. From 2009-2013 Japan has extended 5 billion US dollars to support NATO operations in Afghanistan. NATO: “International Security Assistance Force: Key Facts and Figures,” http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/2013-08-01%20ISAF%20Placemat-final.pdf Miha Hribernik, “Toward a global perspective: NATO’s growing engagement with Japan and South Korea,” (Belgium: European Institute for Asian Studies, 2013), 3
The Limitations of the Global NATO Debate

There are two major streams of argument in the Global NATO debate. The first draws upon liberal theories of international relations and proposes that a Global NATO should serve as a stepping-stone on the path to a worldwide concert of democracies. This approach envisions a Global NATO as potentially marking the start of an institutional reordering of world affairs. As Bunde and Noetzel explain: “… [NATO] can be seen as a first step towards a more ambitious reorganization of the institutional structure of world politics or the nucleus of a potentially universal community of liberal democracies.” Freed from the ideological combat of the Cold War and with liberalism now recognized as the best form of governance, NATO should transition from a defensive alliance to take up the mantle as the champion of liberal values across the globe. Values that are, after all, prevalent in the preamble of NATO’s founding charter. This is a case, as Daadler and Goldgeier argue, of values triumphing over geography. They argue, “…a shared commitment to shared values should be a more relevant determinant of membership than geography. Any like-minded country that subscribes to NATO’s goals should be able to apply for membership in the Alliance.” These sentiments appear to be in line with the current American policy towards NATO. The United States, it will

484 The liberal argument for a global NATO appears, on some accounts, to be steeped in the Fukuyama tinged triumphalism that was prevalent in the years immediately following the end of the Cold War and dissipated with the start of the War on Terror. In echoing this bygone era in the present when the capabilities of liberal states to intervene as they choose around the globe is no longer an option the imagination of these liberal critics outstrips actual material capabilities. For an extended retrospective see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, (New York: Free Press, 1992).
486 Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that, “NATO should be the hub of a global security network with a group of willing and able nations working side-by-side with us…our shared values are the bedrock of our community. We need to vigorously promote these together around the world…”
be recalled, has been one of the major advocates of a more globalized NATO. However, the rhetorical promotion of liberal values is revealed as just that, rhetoric, as NATO draws closer to Middle Eastern autocracies through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative provides another example of how the pattern of interaction between liberal states differs sharply from the manner in which they engage with non-liberal states. Although a pacific zone of liberal peace⁴⁸⁷ was created following the Second World War and extended after the end of the Cold War, the demilitarization of the internal interactions of the West has been matched by an ever-greater militarization of its relations with external states. While liberal states have generated a thick institutional framework with allows for interaction to occur between them in a multitude of issue areas⁴⁸⁸ they pursue a far narrower set of relations with non-liberal states, one in which military interactions are clearly the predominant factor. As Latham argues this is actually to the benefit of liberal states as the resources they have to deploy are limited while non-liberal states remain entrapped in a subservient position to liberal states. As he observes “…the authoritarian military rule of unstable societies may represent an efficient regime in the context of international liberal order. It has tended to minimize the scope of the political engagement of liberal hegemony with such societies to the military

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sphere, thereby avoiding the necessity of building more comprehensive hegemonic political institutions to help achieve domestic order. Furthermore, military collaboration has appeared to provide a sufficient basis for the loyalty of such states to the liberal order. Yet the construction and maintenance of the liberal world order is not simply due to progressive cycles of international militarization. Rather military-to-military connections provide the initial avenue that allows for the further internationalization of capital, the penetration of non-liberal states by the major capitalist economies of the West and the promotion of processes of transnational class formation.

This occurs because of the nature of international militarization, as it exists within a liberal capitalist world order where it is deeply rooted within wider geopolitical and economic process and serves to solidify particular mechanisms and practices of governance. NATO is involved at both ends of this process, serving as an agent of militarization that further extends the reach of the liberal world order and as an apparatus of global governance that provides coherence to the coercive architecture that underpins this very world order. The interrelation between the economic and coercive aspects in production and extension of a Western led liberal world order is a dynamic which has been analyzed by Barkawi and Laffey. They argue: “The project of liberal ordering evident in recent Western policy can be framed as the production of liberal spaces, democratic subjects and institutions to administer them. In this new geostrategic and political economic context force is used in the service of defending and expanding

489 Ibid., 149.
economic and to a lesser extent political liberalism beyond the liberal capitalist core.”

Liberalism, as it exists within the discipline of international relations, is silent on these factors. It has been left to scholars of materialist international political economy to offer a sustained elaboration and critique of these processes. Ironically, liberalism provides only a superficial and highly ideological analysis of liberal world order.

Other authors, relying upon the realist tradition, propose that the Global NATO we have today is simply the result of states bandwagoning into a successful organization that is closely aligned with the world’s sole remaining superpower. They see the drive to extend NATO membership past its traditional Euro-Atlantic region as occurring because the United States can afford to loosen the restrictions placed upon NATO when it was arrayed against another alliance, the Warsaw Pact. Mowle and Sacko fit this categorization when they argue, “Two effects of this unipolar structure are particularly relevant to NATO. The first is that a unipolar power has less interest in maintaining a tight alliance structure than a bipolar one does. The second is that weaker states have an incentive to bandwagon with the unipolar power, rather than balance against it.” Yet this approach removes any sense of agency from NATO, which as I have sought to show above, has aggressively pursued partnerships with other states across the world. This is not a case of countries piling into NATO, but rather NATO seeking, in a sustained manner, to extend its reach across the globe. The realist approach does however provide

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492 Another line of argument based in realism argues that NATO has survived in the post-Cold World because it offers a brokerage house that facilitates the organization of offensive power by secure states. This is an argument that I find rather convincing. See Jonathan Sireci and Damon Coletta, “Enduring without an enemy: NATO’s realist foundation,” Perspectives 17(2009): 57-81.
an explanation of why the United States have been the foremost advocate for a Global NATO. Having a coherent constellation of power that is aligned with American interests and can be drawn upon if necessary to provide a coalition willing to assist is a useful tool to have at one’s disposal.

What both liberal and realist approaches elude, indeed what no academic analysis of NATO conducted so far has done, is examine how effect that a Global NATO is having upon reworking the dimensions of space and scale and how this expands or limits wider political economic process and impacts upon the construction of a liberal world order. This omission is even more surprising when one considers that the conceptualization of space and scale and its utilization to analyze their own activities has been employed by ACT and RTO to inform their approaches towards NATO’s transformation. Not only does NATO in its present form as a global security nexus transgress many of supposedly firm boundaries that are central to the study of international relations, but the manner in which is intervening in the world challenges many of these assumptions as well. Yet it should not be surprising that this crucial aspect of NATO’s transformation remains unexamined. The discipline of international relations has failed to engage with these developments in a meaningful manner because it possesses a historic blindness to questions of space and scale. When these concepts have been examined, it has been indirectly, through the levels of analysis debate and later arguments concerning questions of agency and structure.
The Inadequacy of Both Levels of Analysis and Agent-Structure Methodologies for
Comprehending NATO as a Global Security Nexus

Although Waltz, as I noted in the first chapter, provided the initial foundation for
how international relations should be conceived with his three images of the international
system, the state, and the individual, it was Singer who first determined what the terms
and parameters of levels of analysis, the dominant methodological model of the
discipline would be. Singer argued that in order for a level of analysis to be an effective
model of research three requirements had to be fulfilled. It had to be highly accurate,
explain the relationships under investigation, and offer the promise of reliable
prediction. Singer’s level of analysis model prioritized scientific analysis and
precision. He identified only two appropriate levels of analysis, the state and the
international and argued that each study conducted under the rubric of international
relations should only adopt a single level of analysis at a time.

494 Buzan however argues that Singer’s model, despite its professions of analytical clarity does not provide
a useful framework of analysis. “It is not clear whether levels of analysis is more an epistemological
construct or whether it is ontological. It is not at all clear what the rules are for designating something as a
level, or for denying it that status. Consequently, there is no agreement on how many or what levels there
are for the study of international relations.” Barry Buzan, “The Level of Analysis Problem in International
Relations Reconsidered,” in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds., International Relations Theory Today,
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 202


496 As Singer argued, “…any description of national behavior in a given international situation would be
highly incomplete were it to ignore the link between the external forces at work upon the nation and its
general foreign policy behavior…How, it might be asked, can one speak of causes of a nation’s policies
when one has ignored the media by which external conditions and factors are translated into a policy
decision?...The contrary view would hold that the above argument proceeds from an erroneous
comprehension of the nature of explanation in social science…Isn’t an explanation which flows logically
from a coherent theoretical model just a reliable as one based upon a misleading and elusive body of data
most of which is susceptible to analysis only be techniques and concepts foreign to political science?” Ibid.,
87-88.

497 Singer cautioned that, “We may utilize one level here and another there, but we cannot afford to shift
our orientation in the midst of a study.” Ibid., 90.
Singer’s methodological model trades parsimony for depth. The international level is limited to the study of systematic patterns such as the creation and dissolution of coalitions and the frequency and duration of specific power configurations.\textsuperscript{498} Utilizing the state level approach restricts one to the decision making process of states. By seeking to maintain the isolation between his two levels of analysis in his approach, Singer greatly undermines the usefulness of his model.\textsuperscript{499} In doing so a wide range of interactions are dismissed as irrelevant. The state and the international are simply assumed with no accounting for the social forces that give rise to them.\textsuperscript{500} The state for example, the central political actor for international relations impacts and influences events both at the domestic and international levels. Yet restricting analysis of the state to a single level excludes a large set of its interactions and engagements simply for the sake of maintaining methodological purity. Despite its shortcomings, Singer’s rigid and minimalist model would have a great impact upon how international relations scholars approached their area of study.\textsuperscript{501}

\textsuperscript{498} Ibid., 80.
\textsuperscript{499} Other, more sympathetic commentary on Singer has noted this aspect as one of his major deficiencies. See William Moul, “The Levels of Analysis Problem Revisited,” \textit{Canadian Journal of Political Science}, 6 (1973): 496.
\textsuperscript{500} As a corrective Temby puts forward a useful conceptualization of levels of analysis as a social structure which is examined for its effects on another social structure. Owen Temby, “What are levels of analysis and what do they contribute to international relations theory?” \textit{Cambridge Review of International Affairs} (2013): 8.
\textsuperscript{501} Although Singer levels of analysis model strongly influenced the research agendas of a generation of international relations scholarship, the actual content of Singer’s contribution was not intensely probed. Yurdusev, writing over three decades after the publication of Singer’s level of analysis article noted this lack of critique. “Classic as it is Singer’s formulation is incomplete and rather confusing. For example, the selection of the micro or macro level of analysis and the sorting and arranging of the phenomena under study do not necessarily mean the same thing. Moreover he reduces the level of analysis and the unit of analysis to one category, without distinguishing between the two of them, taking them to mean the same thing.” A. Yurdusev, “Level of Analysis and Unit of Analysis: A Case for Distinction,” \textit{Millennium} 22 (1993): 77.
In addition to levels of analysis, the disciple of International Relations has also confronted ontological issues through discussions of what became known as the agency-structure problematic. Writing several decades after Singer, Wendt argued that ontological and methodological concerns were interrelated.

The level of analysis problem, in other words is a problem of explanation: of assessing the relative importance of casual factors at different levels of aggregation in explaining the behavior of a given unit of analysis...the unit of analysis, the phenomenon to be explained, changes; first it is the behavior of state actors, then the behavior of the international system. This is a problem of ontology: of whether the properties or behaviors of at one level can be reduced to those at another.\textsuperscript{502}

Questions of agency and structure are therefore inextricably linked to concerns over levels of analysis. The levels of analysis debate in international relations is concerned with at what plane of interaction should a particular political unit, usually, but not always the state, reside in. Levels of analysis poses the problems of method then, by privileging a specific set of interactions that an identified political unit is engaging in. Conversely, the agent-structure dynamic is concerned with how a structure, the international system most prominently, shapes the range of possibilities available to the political actors that dwell inside its web and vice versa.\textsuperscript{503} This dynamic is ontological as it is internal to the unit being considered. Levels of analysis then is external, as it seeks to examine interactions


\textsuperscript{503} Wendt provides an excellent summary of the causes and consequences of the agent-structure problem. He writes, “…human agents and social structures are, in one way or another, theoretically interdependent or mutually implicating entities. Thus, the analysis of action invokes an at least implicit understanding of particular social relationships in which the action is set, just as the analysis of social structures invokes some understanding of the actors whose relationships make up the structural context…The problem with all this is that we lack a self-evident way to conceptualize these entities and their relationship.” Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure problem in international relations theory,” \textit{International Organization}, 41 (1987): 338.
as they occur, not the limits that may have given rise to a certain set of interactions over others.

Wendt’s initial contribution to the agent-structure debate in international relations occurred in his 1987 article in *International Organization*. Here he sought to incorporate developments in other social sciences concerning agency and structure within international relations to build towards a more informed and substantive understanding of these relationships in the discipline. For Wendt, the major problem with approaches in international relations was that they forced either the agent or the structure to be ontologically primitive to the other; they reduced one unit of analysis to the other.\(^{504}\) Wendt went on to criticize both neorealism and world system theory as performing this function from a different angle. Contrary to the claims of neorealism, that it offered a structuralist understanding of international relations through the logic of anarchy, Wendt argued that neorealism served to privilege agency over structure. “Despite its strongly systemic focus, neorealism’s view of the explanatory role of system structures is decidedly state or agent centric. It sees the system structures in the manner in which they appear to states, as given external constraints on their actions, rather than as conditions of possibility for state action.”\(^{505}\) World systems theory was guilty of the opposite crime, of privileging agency over structure. In Wendt’s opinion, “…the world system in effect seems to call forth its own reproduction by states…world systems theorists treat the world-system as at some level operating independently of state action, in practice they


\(^{505}\) Ibid., 342.
reify the world-system.” Wendt saw both formulations as troublesome, because in privileging one side of the agent-structure problematic over the other, world systems theory and neorealism were each forced into certain patterns of thinking that privileged some assumptions while ignoring other elements in order to maintain their framework of understanding. World systems theory did this by viewing system structures as separate from the activities of state and class agents, this leads it towards static and functional explanations for state action. While neorealists, despite identifying the state as the primary political actor, lack an explicit theory of the state that is able to explain its powers and interests. This omission means that neorealists’ efforts to build compelling systemic theories of international relations are seriously compromised.

The solution that Wendt proposed to overcome this dilemma was to place agent and structure on an equal plane, identifying each side of this dynamic as equally able to influence and shape the other. To do so in a coherent fashion he reached outside of the domain of international relations and into the realm of social theory. Through applying developments in scientific realism and structuration theory Wendt argued that it became possible to view the relationship between structures and agents in a new light. “As a set of possible transformations, social structures are, by definition, not reducible to

506 Ibid., 347.
507 Ibid., 348.
508 Ibid., 344.
509 The inability of international relations to formulate its own unique theoretical perspectives and its tendency to lag behind the debates occurring within other social sciences is a long-standing concern in the discipline. The classic article in this regard is Martin Wight, “Why is there no international relations theory?” International Relations 2 (1960): 35-48. For a more current engagement with these issues see Chris Brown, “The poverty of Grand Theory,” European Journal of International Relations 19 (2013): 483-497.
510 In its most basic sense scientific realism is an epistemological position within the philosophy of science that claims that the entities described by scientific theory exist objectively and that the claims made by theory can be determined to be either true or false, within the confines of the theory.
the relationships between a structure’s elements that are observed in a given concrete context. Structures make a given combination or instantiation of elements possible, but they are not exhausted by whatever particular manifestation is actual.”

Wendt believed that he had resolved the issue at the heart of the agent-structure problematic by providing a method through which the interactions of each element, agent and structure, could be examined without the existence of one prefiguring and solely determining the potential of the other. Other scholars however remained unconvinced.

The most valuable comment on Wendt’s structuration solution to the agent-structure dynamic and the one most directly relevant for the following discussion was made by Doty. Doty argued that the solution posed to the problem of agent-structure by Wendt and others who relied upon a structuration solution were inherently deterministic. The crux of the problem for Doty was that an oppositional relationship between agency and structure was simply presumed. “The agent-structure issue in International Relations has been framed within an oppositional logic that presumes structures and agents, or some combination of the two, are the only alternatives, i.e. the only significant forces that are operative in social/political life. Far from resolving the issue, this presumption merely replicates it.” For Doty the central question was, why

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511 Ibid., 357.
512 Friedman and Starr for example argued that Wendt conflated agency with social role and thus his formulation offers only a static conception of social roles and cannot account for an evolving relationship between agent and structure. Gil Friedman and Harvey Starr, Agent, Structure and International Politics: From Ontology to Empirical Inquiry (London: Routledge, 1997), 13, 24.
513 Another valuable contribution was made by Hollis and Smith, who offered criticisms and not only Wendt, but of a number of other scholars who utilized and developed the structuration approach. See Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, “Beware of Gurus: Structure and action in international relations,” Review of International Studies 17 (1991): 393-410.
515 Ibid., 368.
should the interactions that occur in the international sphere be reduced to either agent or structure? Establishing this dichotomy creates an oppositional dynamic between these two social entities. This opposition remains implicit as long as this form of categorization exists, regardless of Wendt’s claim that he had succeeded in placing agent and structure on equal footing. For Doty then the solution of the agent-structure dilemma was to be found, not in modifying its terms, but in disengaging from the terms of the debate itself.

In place of agent and structure Doty proposed a focus upon practice. This provides a means of illustrating the constraints that employing an agent-structure dynamic places upon social interaction. For Doty the full range of practices cannot be contained by the debate over agent and structure. As she argues, “Practices overflow that which can be accounted for in purely structural or agentic terms. Practices contain a surplus of meaning which exceeds these two things.” This is not to state that prior contributions to the agent-structure debate do not account for practice Doty recognizes this. However past analysis and engagement with questions of agency and structure have placed limits on the role of practice because they assume a pre-existing agent that exits outside of the processes of social construction that occurs in the relationship between agent and subject. This results in the creation of a deformed view of subjectivity. She argues, “Subjects maintain a point of agency that is never identifiable with the categories of their social construction. This preserves the notion of a pre-discursive, pre-socially

516 For Doty the failure of the oppositional logic of agent and structure becomes clear in how they grasp the notion of rules and norms. “The question arises as to whether rules are essentially deep, generative process of enduring structures or intersubjective understandings of agents in their immediate and local practices; or if they are both. If they are both, then conceptualizing them as the definitive feature of structures cannot be entirely correct; i.e. if agents and structures can be defined by some of the same properties how are we to differentiate them?” Ibid., 371.
517 Ibid., 377.
constituted agency that is at odds with attempts not to take agency as given and certainly ushers in an element of identity that is exogenous to practice.”518 However, while Doty critiques the limits of the agent-structure dynamic in international relations her approach, with its highly abstract and circumscribed formulation, actually serves to demonstrate the limits placed on the interplay of agent and structure within the traditional methodological framework of international relations.

Doty never actually connects practices to real material processes. In her analysis, they exist in a vacuum removed from the considerations of political economy. Nor does she explore the tensions internal and external to practices, they are assumed to move seamlessly across the social frame; a problematic assumption in world characterized by proliferating tensions. This apolitical framing is not Doty’s failing alone but reflective of the dominant approaches to research in the discipline itself.519 Yet despite its deficiencies Doty’s focus on practice, offers the beginning of a way out of the conundrums presented by relying upon either of the dominant research approaches in International Relations to comprehend NATO.

A simple reliance on practice, as Doty presents it is inadequate. Wight rightly criticizes Doty for not actually defining practice and employing a circular logic when

518 Ibid., 380.
519 The simplistic and ahistorical construction of agency within International Relations contrasts sharply with what Maclean outlines as the attributes necessary for a substantive and robust form of agency. “Agency is a complex abstract concept referring to what become socially established in any particular historical period as the natural limits of social reality and hence practice. Consequently, agency refers not only to practices which are capable of being realized, but also and simultaneously to those which are not. Agency is a shorthand term for the resolution of the agent-structure problem achieved in any historical period...What agency is, or might be, in international relations can only be established as the conclusion of a historicized analysis exposing the complex set of relations in and through which is constituted theoretically and substantively” John Maclean, “Toward a political economy of agency in contemporary international relations,” in Martin Shaw ed., Politics and Globalization: Knowledge, ethics and agency (London: Routledge, 1999), 181.
describing how practices operate. As he points out “…what in Doty’s account enables practices? What are the conditions of possibility for practices? ... Doty cannot simply explain practices in terms of practices.” Practice, in the abstract sense with Doty details it, is not a useful concept that can be utilized for the formation of research agendas or as part of a larger methodological framework. Practice here serves as a useful source of critique, but lacks any positive content of its own.

Spatial Creation as Practice: NATO as a Site of Spatial Production

What I propose is to examine NATO’s current practice of space creation and how this practice is intertwined with current dynamics of political and economic power. In doing so, I am not claiming that this is the only practice that NATO is presently engaged within, as a complex and multifaceted organization I recognize that NATO is engaged in an expansive range of practices, indeed my conceptualization of NATO as a global security nexus demonstrates this. In linking the practice of space creation to NATO in this manner, I am also declaring that NATO is the originating site for these practices. This undermines Doty’s conceptualization of practice as inherently decentering and incapable of being fully contained within a coherent social space. Indeed it is not practice, in the abstract sense which Doty presents it, which is responsible for decentering, rather it the social fabrication of reality, a reality that is brought into existence by and interspersed with the relations of capital accumulation, where the

responsibility for decentering lies. However, my formulation retains an element of Doty’s idea of decentering as the practice of space creation and collapse is one that challenges many of the regimented methodological notions present within international relations.

Why focus on the practice of space creation? Adopting an approach that privileges spatial dimensions is important because it poses a challenge to the foundations of both levels of analysis and conceptions of agent and structure, the deficiencies of which I identified above. These frameworks of understanding are each predicated upon the notion of stable territorial space. In the levels of analysis tradition, each level contains within it a set of political actors operating within a static political space. For example, at the international level, the primary actors are states, each state is assumed to have dominion over a defined territorial space, their interactions give rise to a global space, which is different in scale, but generally reflective of the spatial qualities ascribed to states. Similarly, within the agent-structure debate it is the interactions between these two entities that is the central focus. The spatial dimensions that agent and structure are operating within and the impact that their relationship has upon the formation and evolution of space are often overlooked. Each of these approaches then internalizes a static notion of space, one that dramatically overemphasizes the actual impact of territory upon contemporary political processes. This is problematic because as a global security nexus that is able to project its power across the planet the confines of territory have an ever-declining impact upon the strategic calculations of NATO. By internalizing a

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522 In this sense at least I profess to be a structural Marxist as I view capital, following Althusser, as in the last instance determinative of the pattern of social relations. Louis Althusser, For Marx (London: Verso, 2005) 111-117.
territorial biases both levels of analysis and discussions of agent and structure fall into what Agnew termed “the territorial trap”.

Agnew argued that the social sciences, including international relations, have historically viewed space through the lens of the state. This results in a sharply delimited perspective on the nature of space. In Agnew’s perspective, “…space is viewed as a series of blocks defined by state territorial boundaries. Other geographical scales are disregarded. The usually taken for granted representation of space appears dominant in fields of political sociology, macroeconomics, and international relations.”523 In this conceptualization, the state becomes an ideal-type or a logic object rather than a site of contestation. The space occupied by the state, its territory, is simply assumed.

International relations then does not lack a conceptualization of space, rather its understanding of space is a static one, determined by the territorial boundaries of the state. This state-centric approach results in a narrow understanding of political interaction.524 In this framing, the state becomes sole political actor, as it is the state, through providing a regularized framework for interaction and the extension of various security guarantees to its citizens that makes engagement in politics possible. This conceptualization of the state, politics, and space is not limited to the discipline of international relations, but has served as one of the foundational percepts for Western political philosophy.525

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524 For further discussion of the detrimental effects that a spatial approach rooted in a state centric logic can have upon contemporary analysis see Neil Brenner, “Beyond state-centrism? Space, territoriality, and geographical scale in globalization studies,” Theory and Society 28 (1999): 39-78.
This vision of the state as a self-contained space, a container for social interactions has long been recognized as problematic within the discipline of international relations. Indeed as early as 1957 Herz authored an authoritative piece illustrating how the advent of ballistic nuclear missiles had shattered the notion of states as self-contained territorial entities. Yet the framing of space in this manner has persisted.

The persistence of what Agnew called the territorial trap, is due to the existence of three factors. First, a reification of state territories as fixed units of sovereign space that serves to decontextualize processes of state formation and disintegration. Second, the division of the national and international into separate polarities that obscures the interaction between processes operating at different scales. Finally, the existence of a perspective dominant within international relations which views the state as existing prior to society and containing society within its own organizational framework. Rather than a static framing that serves only as a limit upon interactions, space needs to be viewed as a mutable and flexible concept whose manner of existence has real material effects upon reality. Space represents a specific configuration of power that arises because of particular processes. This is not a singular dynamic with state actors responsible for the entirety of this process. Instead, space arises because of a complex series of interactions across a range of political actors. Space then should be viewed as a contested practice, one that alters based upon prevailing geoeconomic conditions, rather than an a priori assumption.

The production of space is the result of complex social processes. Space, as Smith notes, is not only produced, it also serves as the field within which social relations themselves arise and develop. For Smith, “…space is both available as a foundational metaphor and at the same time as a produced, mutable, and intrinsically complex expression of social relations. Not only is the fragility and transitoriness of social relations expressed in space; the production of space is increasingly the means by which social difference is constructed and reconstructed.”

There is no single unifying form of space, nor a single actor responsible for its construction. While the territorial based space of the modern nation-state is often seen as the most predominant form of space that suppresses alternative configurations and acts as homogenizing force, the space that the state constructs is not a uniform one. The practices that an individual is exposed to and forced to engage with alter depending upon ones location within the space of the state. Interactions that occur in border spaces for example are radically different from those that confront one in other state created spaces.

Spaces then, as Soja notes, overlap with and intersect one another. “The production of spatiality in conjunction with the making of history can be described as both the medium and the outcome, the presupposition and embodiment, of social action and relationship of society itself. Social and spatial structures are dialectically intertwined in social life, not just mapped onto the other as categorical projections.”

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529 The explosion in border studies in recent years is a testament to the manifold composition of state spaces. The *Journal of Borderland Studies* provides an excellent outlet for an overview of contemporary developments in border studies.
from a multitude of actors and processes. Some are durable, other quickly emerge and
collapse as the forces that gave rise to them dissipate resulting in the enclosure of space.
As the overarching socioeconomic system that penetrates all facets of modernity,
capitalism of course has a determining effect upon the creation and maintenance of space.
Many of the processes of spatial creation originate from the demands of capital
accumulation. Indeed the incorporation of spatial concerns within the social sciences was
led by a wave of Marxist geographers in the 1980s who sought to examine how the ever-
changing dynamics of capitalism were resulting in the privileging and exclusion of
particular spaces as well as creating new spaces to spur the accumulation of capital.531
The dynamic of capital accumulation continues to affect the construction of space today
with the logic of austerity leading to the closure of some spaces, as options for public
engagement are increasingly foreclosed, and the creation of others, as the ever-greater
complexity of financial instruments continues largely unabated.

While the role of economic processes in prefiguring spatial production have
received a large amount of attention the generative role that security practices have on the
production of space has been less examined.532 This oversight is surprising in light of the
intertwining of space and violence noted by Lefebvre, who was responsible for providing
the initial impetus that reasserted discussion of space within the realm of social theory.

531 Some of the noteworthy early texts that inserted discussions of geographical space into social theory are:
David Harvey, Limits to Capital, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982), David Massey, Spatial
Divisions of Labor: Social Structures and the Geography of Production, (New York: Methuen, 1984), Neil
532 The work of Simon Dalby is a notable exception to this. See for example, Simon Dalby, “Political
Space: Autonomy, Liberalism, and Empire,” Alternatives 30 (2005): 415-441. Blomley also treads similar
ground. See Nicholas Blomley, “Law, Property, and the Geography and Violence: The Frontier, the Survey
As he argued “…the logic of space, with its apparent significance and coherence, actually conceals the violence inherent in the abstraction. Just as violence is intrinsic to tools in general, it is also of necessity immanent to instrumental space no matter how rational or straightforward this space may appear.” 533 The presence of violence then is always inherent within the construction of space. Often this violence is not directly present, but exists as an implicit understanding between actors interacting within the space, violence that is manifested if specific conditions are not met. 534 My own elaboration of a trans-scalar space of intervention is an effort to explain how NATO is involved in and contributing to these dynamics.

The Formation of Trans-scalar spaces of Intervention

Trans-scalar spaces of intervention closely resembles the concept of transnational deployments elaborated by Latham. As he explained, “Transnational deployments are by definition specialized in relation to any local social order they enter since they rest on the forward displacement of a defined and delimited organization from the outside. In other words, they move along relatively narrow bands of intervention or engagement with local order…The most extreme form of this external movement is extraterritorial, where the deployed organizational form carries its own culture, laws and juridical authority.” 535

Trans-scalar spaces of intervention are narrow and ephemeral engagements designed to remove identified risks to NATO’s interests. The conclusion of a NATO intervention and

534 Borders again are the most common example of such a space. For the underpinnings of violence present within interactions occurring at the border see Mark Salter, “Theory of the /: The Suture and Critical Border Studies,” Geopolitics 17 (2012): 734-755.
the collapse of the trans-scalar space of intervention results in the creation of a new set of often highly unpredictable processes. The involvement of NATO however has concluded. The high potential for disarray created in the wake of the removal of NATO lies outside of purview of its concerns, unless they are deemed at some point in the future to again pose a risk to NATO’s interests.

My own concept of a trans-scalar space of intervention while related to Latham’s transnational deployments expands upon it in three ways. First, it links the practice of NATO’s intervention to the practice of space creation and hence wider political and economic processes. While NATO instigates this practice, it does not have full control over the eventual outcome. On this point I concur with Lefebvre who stated that “…space produced serves as a tool of thought and action, in addition to being a means of production it is also a means of control and hence of domination, of power that; yet that, as such, its escapes in part from those who make use of it.”536 Second, my concept of a trans-scalar space of intervention is linked to a specific actor, NATO, and will be utilized to explain the role that it, as a global security nexus, is currently playing as one of the primary global circuits of violence whose actions transcend static territorial boundaries, in the effort to alter and change the prevailing situation within these states to suit the collective geopolitical interests of its members. Finally and a point that until now has remained unexamined, but is explicit in the term itself, NATO’s interventions do not only produce space, but in doing so they impinge upon and reshape a number of scales, they are thus trans-scalar in nature.

The manner by which NATO intervenes within the affairs of targeted states has altered. NATO now moves down through a number of scales from the transnational level at which its actions are organized, down through the national and into the local, level where its military force is brought to bear. The created trans-scalar space of intervention is one that simultaneously contains the interactions between entities that are organized at a number of different scales. In crossing through these scales, NATO’s actions affect each of them.

The elaboration of scale is a continually unfolding process that NATO as a political and security actor is deeply involved within.\(^{537}\) Scale, as Brenner argues, is constructed by the intrusion of political power; his conceptualization of a politics of scale is worth quoting at length as it encapsulates the dynamic and complex arrangement of social forces contained within any scalar arrangement.

The notion of a politics of scale refers to the production, reconfiguration or contestation of particular differentiations orderings and hierarchies among geographical scales. In this plural aspect, the word ‘of’ connotes not only the production of differentiated spatial units as such, but also, more generally, their embeddedness and positionality in relation to a multitude of smaller or larger spatial units within a multtiered, hierarchically configured geographical scaffolding. The referent here is thus the process of scaling through which multiple spatial units are established, differentiated, hierarchized and, under certain conditions rejigged, reorganized and recalibrated in relation to one another. Here, then, geographical scale is understood primarily as a modality of hierarchization and rehierarchization through which the processes of sociospatial differentiation unfold both materially and discursively.\(^{538}\)

\(^{537}\) Politics, power relations, and hence the construction of scale are not limited to the state. Non-state actors are also involved in the formation of scale. For greater detail see David Delaney and Helga Leitner, “The political construction of scale,” Political Geography 16 (1997): 94.

Brenner’s exposition of a politics of scale and what it entails deeply informs my own perspective which strives to encapsulate and explain the multivariate and complex processes presently underway within NATO. My research methodology privileges a number of specific scales, the local, national, and international, while recognizing that they are not discrete and self-contained entities, but rather exist in relation to one another.\textsuperscript{539} In doing so I seek to make a contribution that connects the configuration and manipulation of space and scale to alterations in world order and illustrate the politically charged nature of this dynamic. Although I am using the example of NATO to provide an empirical center to my argument I believe that the schema that I have begun to lay out can be applied to examine other actors who possess the ability to cut across scales and create new spaces of interaction.\textsuperscript{540}

This chapter sought to demonstrate the effects that the 2007 Global Financial Crisis had on NATO. The crisis and the turn towards austerity that followed was provoked, in part, by the failure to quantify and understand risk within the financial sector. Ironically, the miscalculation of risk in one sector would lead to its incorporation within another, the military sector, which had largely stood outside the prerogatives of neoliberal economic policy prior to the crisis.\textsuperscript{541} The current prevalence of risk

\textsuperscript{539} For an elaboration of how the dynamics of scale can only be grasped relationally see Neil Brenner, \textit{New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood}, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 10.

\textsuperscript{540} International Financial Institutions, NGOs, and transnational activist groups all fall under this category.

\textsuperscript{541} The actual content of risk management techniques within each sector is radically different of course. There are a number of similarities at the abstract level however. In both circumstances risk analysis is concerned with an analysis of the current situation, either movements in the market, or shifts in the geopolitical environment. The purpose of this form of analysis is to identify threats as they emerge, allowing for the actor concerned to formulate a response that mitigates the threat. The actual calculations utilized are different then but the general reason for their formulation is the same.
management within the military sector, particularly NATO, is one of the key changes that can be linked to the continuation and extension of neoliberalism in the wake of the crisis. The force driving these developments in NATO is the desire for ever greater cost efficiencies, which lie at the heart of austerity, combined with the pervasive sense of uncertainty amongst policy makers. This provoked an alteration in how NATO perceives itself and the form in which it projects power internationally resulting in its transformation into what I termed a global security nexus.

This new institutional arrangement of NATO is far more dynamic and flexible than its Cold War configuration. I noted, at length, what NATO as a global security nexus entails in practice, through an examination of the two institutions within NATO, ACT and the STO, which are responsible for spearheading the promotion of knowledge sharing and the creation of new mechanisms of command and control. Following this, I engaged in a critique of the two main methodological approaches in international relations, levels of analysis and agent-structure and argued that both were inadequate for the task of conducting a contemporary analysis of NATO. The full ramifications of what NATO, as a global security nexus that is involved in the creation of trans-scalar spaces of intervention, entails necessitates a methodology approach that prioritizes flexible notions of space and scale. While have I have traced NATO’s institutional evolution and argued that it has created a new conceptual framework to guide its activities, I have yet to discuss how the format of its interventions have changed. This will occur in the next chapter, which compares NATO’s last two interventions in Afghanistan and Libya I argue that the Libya intervention provides a template for future NATO operations.
CHAPTER 4

A REDESIGNED ALLIANCE: COLLECTIVE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE CREATION OF A TRANS-SCALAR SPACE OF INTERVENTION IN LIBYA

NATO’s current configuration as a global security nexus is one that provides it with a great deal of flexibility both in how it engages with other security actors and in the format of its interventions. While NATO has succeeded in weaving a vast security web and establishing a number of innovative governance mechanisms, its efforts to confront threats to its members are curtailed by its inability to independently raise revenue and provide more comprehensive direction to members’ military forces. These are functions that are central to the practice of national sovereignty. The failure to reconfigure sovereignty upon a broader institutional basis, to create a form of collective sovereignty, is the root cause for the continual frustration of NATO projects and circumscribes its ability to alter the geopolitical environment in a manner that suits its interests and those of its members.

NATO has had far more success generating an ideational framework, than it has been in fashioning a comprehensive material order. This success can be most clearly observed in the foreign policies of its members. NATO, as Buzan and Weaver argue, now overlays many aspects of foreign security policies for the majority of its members, and in doing so redefines how they conceive of security. As they state “Much of the defense policies and the interventions by NATO countries are not now driven by existential

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concern for one’s own security, but occur as foreign policy, with military means, whether as policies for positioning one’s own country, or in response to the securitization of humanitarian issues and human rights principles.”

NATO has inserted a new collective transnational dynamic into the foreign policy process of its members and by doing so has created a new set of strategic interests and priorities that did not exist prior its formation.

As a global security nexus NATO bisects the national and international scale, but does not submerge them; states retain a large amount of autonomy within NATO. The interplay of the international and national scale, specifically how international factors shape domestic policy, has long been a major stream of analysis within international relations, especially in game theory. This style of analysis however produces artificial separations by positing that the international and national are distinct arenas of interaction. Under this rubric, something is either an international or a domestic concern. What this perspective ignores however are process and practices that are not either or, but are rather intertwined and thus trans-scalar in origin.

Trans-scalar formations arose prior to and were studied in depth before the end of the Cold War, but have assumed a renewed prominence since its conclusion and the

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545 Haggard and Simmons make this exact point critiquing the “…issues that have been neglected by the revival of game theory, including the erasure of the boundaries between domestic and foreign policies, the importance of transnational coalitions, and above all the way in which domestic political forces determine patterns of international cooperation.” Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” *International Organization* 41 (1987): 492.
emergence of a plethora of new vulnerabilities. Rosenau, for example, identifies structural changes in world politics after the Cold War as responsible for the increasingly determinative role of transnational forces in modern life which he characterizes as “…the interplay of events which may reconfigure identities and redraw boundaries as they cascade into and through every community, country and region of the world, sometimes resulting in a globalizing transnationalism that embraces popular forces as well as governments, sometimes culminating in a localizing individualism and sometimes remaining confined to the interactions of governments in the interstate system.” Under these conditions, institutions of trans-scalar governance, such as NATO, are assuming ever more crucial roles in the manufacture of modernity.

However despite the elevated stature and increased responsibilities of NATO in the current moment its efforts to coordinate with public and private actors to elaborate a cohesive institutional architecture that would allow it to more effectively meet the challenges faced by its members have encountered considerable difficulties. NATO’s attempts to synchronize crisis-management efforts with both the EU and the UN, NATO’s two most obvious partners in any crisis, are beset with obstacles. In the private domain, NATO has aggressively pursued contacts with relevant NGOs, regularly inviting them to attend NATO conferences and seminars on issues of mutual interest.

548 James Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 52
549 Ibid., 120.
However due to the greater amount of resources available to it these interactions have been dominated by NATO, creating suspicion in the NGO community about its intentions. As Jakobsen explains, “The imbalance in resources between NATO and the NGOs has made training cooperation a rather one-side affair…this contributes to the perception in the NGO community that NATO-NGO cooperation is driven and dictated by military concerns.” Yet the biggest obstacle to NATO’s attempts to improve its governance capabilities comes not from external actors, but from its own membership.

States are reluctant to circumscribe their own sovereignty in order to increase the collective sovereignty of NATO, even if this may promote their foreign policy interests. This conflict between the national sovereignty of member states and the emergent collective sovereignty of NATO has been a reoccurring theme in the Alliance that assumes a renewed prominence whenever a new intervention is undertaken. NATO’s two major interventions since September 11th in Afghanistan and Libya have both been imperiled by this dispute. In each instance, the strategies that NATO developed to guide its actions in the country were undermined as crucial material resources and command responsibilities were denied. NATO’s efforts to obtain the material resources necessary to expand its governance capabilities are thus being undercut by the jealous defense of sovereign prerogatives by member states.

This chapter will begin by exploring the fundamental attributes of national sovereignty and juxtapose them to the new form of collective sovereignty that NATO as a global security nexus and an organ of trans-scalar governance is attempting to strengthen. Despite its lack of sovereign capacity, NATO has been able to alter the format of its operations in response to shifting geopolitical and economic conditions. As my subsequent case studies will demonstrate, the strategy NATO adopted in Afghanistan and Libya differed significantly, from sustained peacekeeping to a restricted trans-scalar space of intervention. While concerns of sovereignty and governance prefigure NATO operations the dramatic contrast between its missions in Afghanistan and Libya were not caused by debates over governance, but rather the economic and political consequences of austerity. In an era of constrained budgets and reduced political will for sustained foreign commitments, Libya will serve as a template for future NATO missions. That NATO succeed in adapting to these new circumstances, despite a dearth of resources illustrates the flexibility of its present configuration as a global security nexus. However, the experience of Libya also provides a cautionary tale for the Alliance, as it struggled to complete its objectives. Libya demonstrated that NATO is reaching the limits of what it can achieve with the current levels of commitment from members. In response, NATO has proposed the Smart Defense initiative, a radical new proposal that would integrate and coordinate the militaries of European members, sharply reducing costs and providing a stable commitment of military force that can be drawn upon in future operations. While Smart Defense offers a solution to the persistent capacity problems that the Alliance faces it is unlikely to be implemented, as it would dramatically restrict the sovereignty of participating countries. The dispute between national sovereignty of members and the
incipient collective sovereignty of NATO will remain a reoccurring problem with negative consequences for Alliance force projection.

Sovereignty; National and Collective

Sovereignty is a central concept in the study of political science and international relations. Yet no universally accepted definition of sovereignty exists, provoking one commentator to remark that, “...there exists perhaps no conception, the meaning of which is more controversial than that of sovereignty.” At its most basic level, sovereignty can be understood as the organization and projection of power and authority through an institutional framework within a defined space of interaction. As Philpott plainly states, “Supreme authority within a territory-this is the general definition of sovereignty. Historical manifestations of sovereignty are almost always specific instances of this general definition.” Sovereignty then is an overriding form of power that is able to obtain, through consensual or coercive means, the loyalty or acquiescence of individuals residing in the space where it is operative. Sovereignty is intrinsic to the modern state. The state, by wielding sovereignty, generates a sphere of generally predictable and sustainable interaction that makes political engagement possible.

557 Creating and maintaining this dynamic is for Machiavelli the essence of politics itself. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (Mineola:Dover, 1992), 39-40.
558 This idea extends back to some of the earliest political philosophy and can be found in the texts of the ancient Greeks that were concerned with the factors necessary to govern well and guarantee a good life conducive to politics. The two most notable texts in this regard as Plato, The Republic, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), and Aristotle, The Politics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
States that are unable to exert sovereignty over their populations and territory exist in only a de jure or legal sense.\textsuperscript{559}

What is considered to be the modern Westphalian form of sovereignty, in the form of a distinctive nation-state only emerges in the late 17\textsuperscript{th} century, with the waning of the medieval period and the formation of states\textsuperscript{560} within Europe, that were able to assert their dominance within a specific territory and over a particular population.\textsuperscript{561} Biersteker and Weber argue that factors that comprise sovereignty are not static, but rather exist in a complex relationship with one another. How sovereignty is expressed alters over time and is dependent upon the arrangement of forces and prevailing social conditions. As Biersteker and Weber argue, “The modern state system is not based on some timeless principle of sovereignty, but on the production of a normative conception that links authority, territory, population and recognition in a unique way and in a particular place…The ideal of state sovereignty is a product of the actions of powerful agents and

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\item \textsuperscript{560}This process and the changes which occurred in this new form of sovereign power manifested itself amongst the populace is elaborated at length in Michel Foucault, \textit{Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison}, (New York: Random House, 1975. For a Marxist approach see Perry Anderson, \textit{Lineages of the Absolutist State}, (London: Verso, 1985)
\item \textsuperscript{561}The state, following Weber’s classic formulation, is usually conceived of as the sole authority within a specific territory space, one that, in the last instance, is able to enforce its will on the population through the extension of coercive force. Weber wrote that, “…a state is a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory…the state is considered the sole source of the right to use violence.” Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in \textit{Max Weber: Essays in Sociology}, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), 77.
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the resistances to those actions by those located at the margins of power.”

Sovereignty should be understood as a flexible concept, one that needs to be continually reproduced and harnessed by the institutional framework that comprises states and allows them to both organize and project their power internally and externally as they jockey for position with other states.

Realist and liberal international relation perspectives have tended to obscure both the formation and perpetuation of sovereignty and its interrelation with the dynamics of capital accumulation. Sovereignty is often simply presumed. For realists the state is seen a “black box” whose internal features are bracketed and largely ignored. For liberals reductionist game theory is commonly employed to understand the convergence

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563 The state has endured as the dominant mode of political organization because it remains the most efficient means for the organization and propagation of violence. The state was formed in the crucible of war and remains at its core a war fighting organization as Tilly has eloquently argued. See Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Tehda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back in, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169-187.

564 It was the economic cost of war as Kennedy argues, that led to the formation of a coherent fiscal framework and the eventual birth of capitalism. As he wrote, “...the only way a government could finance a war adequately was by borrowing: by selling bonds and offices, or better, negotiable long term stock paying interest to all who advanced monies to the state. Assured of an inflow of funds, officials could then authorize payments to army contractors, provision merchants, shipbuilders, and the armed services themselves. In many respects, this two way system of raising and simultaneously spending vast sums of money acted like a bellows, fanning the development of Western capitalism and of the nation-state itself.” Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. (New York: Fontana Press, 1988), 100. This interrelationship between the state and capital continues today, with the state, as Gramsci argues, serving a crucial role in the production and maintenance of class hegemony. See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, eds., Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Smith, (Moscow: International Publishers, 1971). The work of Nico Poulantzas and his conceptual framing of the state as the terrain that organizes, but is also a product of class dynamics is also very useful. See Nico Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism (London: New Left Books, 1978).


and divergence of interests or the examination of how societal ideas, interests, and institutions influence and order state behavior is done in a manner that abstracts these features from the structural dimensions of power. The teleological assumption that both perspectives share of the state as the predetermined authority within its own territory is reflected in how they comprehend the interactions that occur between states. As Nelson makes clear, “…the discipline of international relations takes form in its quest for certainty about the state and the international system as constitutive entities, and especially the state’s many and highly varied relations in which, quite remarkably, the disciple then fashions into a self-enclosing system of analytical inquiry where the forms of power required to effect the state’s very presence in history are themselves used to constitute the interpretive-analytics of a bounded field of international relations itself.”

Yet, a concept as central as sovereignty cannot simply be presumed, especially since the core coercive aspect of sovereignty is now being shared, to an ever greater degree,

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569 An example of this is Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Relations,” *International Organization* 51 (1997): 513-553. Barnett and Duvall reference Moravcsik and complain that, “The failure to develop alternative conceptualizations of power limits the ability of international relations scholars to understand how global outcomes are produced and how actors are differentially enabled and constrained to use resources to control the behavior of others.” Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” *International Organization* 59 (2005): 41.


571 The power to make a decision, to determine who the enemy is, is the centerpiece of sovereignty for Schmitt. The law, like politics, is not a separate sphere but is rather formulated directly as a result of sovereign power. If the sovereign creates the law, then the sovereign has the power to abrogate it, to decide when there is to be an exception to the law, summed up in the oft-quoted phrase by Schmitt, “…the sovereign is whoever decides what constitutes an exception.” Carl Schmitt. *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2005), 5. Under this logic is NATO clearly not sovereign as it does not have the independent capability to decide who an enemy is, nor is it able to act against it, both of these actions fall to individual members, who then collectively operate through NATO.
amongst other sovereign states and transnational actors such as NATO. This development represents the formation of a collective type of sovereignty.

The ability of states to share aspects of their sovereignty amongst themselves or through a transnational organization such as NATO should not be viewed as an absolute decline in their sovereign power (although in some cases this may be the result). Instead as Heller and Sufaer argue such acts represent, from those tasked with exercising sovereign power themselves, not a reduction in their own state’s power but rather the contemporary transformation of sovereignty into new forms. As they note, “The concept of sovereignty is not a set of established rules, to which states must bend their conduct in order to preserve their capacities. It is instead an ever changing description of the essential authorities of states…their capacity to deal with the complicated problems of a changing world is seen by those engaged in the practices of statecraft as perfectly normal, an exercise rather than a diminution of sovereignty.”

Just as sovereignty itself is often a contested concept, with no universally accepted definition of what it comprises, the organization and practice of sovereign power is summarily complex and multifaceted. Attempting to confine sovereignty to a specific set of practices and institutional arrangements obscures this reality along with the dynamic nature of sovereignty, as it exists in present.

The argument that crucial aspects of sovereignty are no longer limited to national institutions but can be produced by transnational organizations may seem like a drastic

change from an inviolable national sovereignty. However, as Latham notes sovereignty is not simply a product of national forces, but can be constructed by a variety of actors rooted in different political processes at a variety of scales. Latham writes, “Sovereignty can be and historically has been understood as an attribute not just of states but of other forms of social organization as well, operating across and within national territories…Defining sovereignty socially does not require that we abandon the close association of states and sovereignty, but only that we place that association in a wider context." However, there are real limits imposed by nation-states upon the expansion of collective sovereignty and the transfer of powers to trans-scalar organizations.

The European Union (EU) offers the most advanced example of collective sovereignty and has been commonly pointed to as a new type of multilevel or shared form of governance. Yet while deep fiscal and legal integration exists between EU states this same dynamic has not been extended to the military sphere, where national sovereignty has traditionally been jealously guarded. In comparison to the EU, the degree of integration in NATO is quite weak. NATO lacks any independent fiscal instruments and is completely as the mercy of its members in terms of the resources

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576 The Western European Union, Europe’s best chance for a cohesive and integrated military force has been defunct since 2011. Its successor, the Common Security and Defence Policy, who tentative agenda is constricted by American expectations, which as former Secretary of State Madeline Albright articulated mean: no duplication of what has been done effectively under NATO, no decoupling from the US and NATO, and no discrimination against non-EU members. See Madeline Albright, “Transcript: Albright Press Conference at NATO HQ,” December 8, 1998. http://www.fas.org/man/nato/news/1998/98120904_tlt.html These American expectations remain in place, sharply curtailing the effectiveness of the Common Security and Defence Policy.
available to it. While NATO has attempted several times in the past to create military sharing arrangements the strong resistance to these measures by many of the states within the Alliance is a testament to endurance of the logic of self-help in an anarchical international system.\textsuperscript{577}

Despite these restrictions, NATO is central to the increasing prominence of the trans-scalar forms of governance. In the current moment the trans-scalar is serving as a terrain which both organizes and give rise to multitudes of interactions that blurs the responsibilities of national sovereigns as some of their functions are shifted upwards while others are parried way. This tendency is not a recent development, but was noted by E.H Carr in the early decades of the twentieth century when he observed that, “The concept of sovereignty is likely to become in the future even more blurred and indistinct that it is at the present.”\textsuperscript{578} This process has accelerated in recent decades as organizations such as NATO acquire new tools and mechanisms that infringe upon the sovereignty of member states. Austerity, the magnitude and unpredictability of present threats, coupled with the declining power of the West following the 2007 Global Financial Crisis have all coalesced to provide further momentum to this process.

Governance has expanded beyond the national scale to encompass a growing array of transnational organizations. As Sinclair notes, with the complex and diverse

\textsuperscript{577} The extent of the cooperation that exists within NATO can be read, as one alternative reading argues, as an example of self-help and a form of “contingent realism” as states realize that they can best achieve their security goals within a collective framework. Charles Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” International Security 19 (1994): 50-90. Clearly however there are limits to the extent that states are willing to cooperate, particularly when their independence begins to be sacrificed in a substantial manner. \textsuperscript{578} E.H Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939, (London: Macmillan and Company, 1981), 229. For greater detail as to have this blurring of conventional boundaries effects the provision of security see Alexandra Gheciu, Securing Civilization? The EU, NATO, and The OSCE in the Post-9/11 World, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 156-157.
range of issues in the contemporary world governance that takes place at multiple levels may be better suited to confronting modern problems. He argued that “…governance, when used as part of the term global governance suggests that the informal, sub or supra governmental systems it comprises may actually be better adapted for a world of new challenges that the formal legal mechanisms of government. Global governance should not be understood as a weaker or less developed system of rule because it lacks a united government. Although global governance may seem amorphous, it operates at more levels than formal systems.” The problem in NATO’s case is it is often unable to assume the governance functions that would allow it to carry out the ever-growing set of tasks expected from it by its members. The real world effects of the lack of governance and material capacity that the Alliance has long suffered from can be observed in the two radically different type of interventions that NATO has carried out in the 21st century in Afghanistan and Libya.

Afghanistan: Neoliberal state building under the Comprehensive Approach

Over ten years since NATO assumed leadership over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003; over 41,000 troops remain in Afghanistan engaged in combat operations. By the end of 2014, just under 10,000 foreign troops will remain in the country with the primary task of training Afghan forces and ISAF’s mission will have finally concluded. Discerning the financial cost of ISAF is difficult as most

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The invasion of Afghanistan was the initial American and allied countries response to the attacks of September 11\textsuperscript{th} and marked the start of the War on Terror. Policymakers constructed a grandiose narrative in order to justify the restricted liberties at home and unending warfare abroad. The War on Terror was cast as a war to save civilization\footnote{Richard Jackson, \textit{Writing the War on Terror: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism} (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 48.} against insidious and barbaric regimes that threatened the liberal democratic way of life.\footnote{George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President upon Arrival,” The South Lawn, Washington D.C September 16, 2001.} The United States was portrayed as a blameless victim who was attacked completely unprovoked.\footnote{Of course nothing justifies attacks on civilians; however policies pursued by the United States in the Middle East and Central Asia generated huge amounts of anger that eventually resulted in the terrorist attacks of September 11\textsuperscript{th} as a response. To argue otherwise would be to make the nonsensical claim that September 11\textsuperscript{th} was caused by irrational hatred with no basis in reality. By people who “hate our freedom” as President Bush often claimed. George W. Bush, “President Bush Address the Nation,” Congress, September 20, 2001. For detailed historical overviews of American foreign policy in the Middle East and Central Asia see, respectively, Robert Fisk, \textit{The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East}, (London: Fourth Estate, 2005) Steve Coll, \textit{Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10,2001} (New York: Penguin Books, 2004).} As Jackman argues, framing the War on Terror in this manner appealed to the emotions of American populace and undercut criticism of
its conduct. He writes that, “…the discourse of grievance and victim-hood fulfills certain functions and has a genuine political value to officials…inducing anger, hatred, fear and a desire for revenge, which then translates into support for the violent policies of leaders.” 587 In order to make the world safe for democracy it was not enough for the United States and its allies to simply expel the Taliban from Afghanistan, instead following in the pattern of Western interventions set by the watershed of Kosovo in 1999 significant resources would be expended in an effort to transform the country into a (neo) liberal society.

Afghanistan is likely to be the last in a string of interventions that marked the end of the Cold War and were characterized by long, grinding conflicts in the quest to socially engineering target societies into liberal democratic states. These efforts grew out of an expansive liberal triumphalism that sought to recast the world and integrate states within a liberal world order dominated by the United States. 588 This resulted in a considerable modification in the purpose of peacekeeping, from the original purpose of maintaining ceasefires to reconstructing societies. 589 In a sense, as Suzuki notes, this represented a return to the nineteenth century, when Western states colonized most of the planet empowered by the belief that their method of societal organization was the only valid one. He observes that, “…peacekeeping operations shifted their focus from the traditional

587 Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terror: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 36.
588 The apex of this triumphalism was reached in 2004, in the wake of the invasion of Iraq, when Karl Rove declared, “We’re an empire now, and when we act we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality-judiciously, as you will, we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors…and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.” Ron Suskind, “Faith, Certainty and the Presidency of George W. Bush,” New York Times Magazine, October 17 2004.
589 The first peacekeeping operation took place in 1956 to end the Suez Canal crisis and separate the warring parties. Further detail can be found in Michael Carroll, Pearson’s Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-1957 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009).
ones of maintaining ceasefires to peacekeeping, where attempts are made to reconstruct
states based on Western models of liberal democracy and market capitalism. In a similar
fashion to the paternalism prevalent in the late nineteenth century, Western liberal
democracies’ command of the truth or knowledge towards a better life, as well as their
superior social standing was rarely questioned.\textsuperscript{590} Some of the impetus behind this wave
of peacekeeping was motivated by a genuine desire to improve the lives of people in the
states within which these operations occurred; giving rise to a new academic paradigm of
human security that argued that the protection of the individual, rather than the state
should be the primary referent of security.\textsuperscript{591} Yet, as authors such as Chandler have
shown\textsuperscript{592}, the nebulousness of the concept of human security and its lack of a clear
strategic policy vision meant that the term was rapidly co-opted by the Western political
establishment to legitimize and provide a humanistic cover to their foreign policies.

Perhaps it was unsurprising then that the lack of coherence inherent within the
idea of human security was replicated in the interventions that were ostensibly carried out
to promote it. As Mayall and de Olivera note there never was a clear model or guiding
rational behind the peacekeeping missions of the 1990s and early 2000s. As they note
“When the Cold War ended, there was no clear strategic design that could be discerned,
and no single will or competing wills to give one shape. None of the traditional responses
was available after 1989. The specific manner chosen by the leading Western states-

\textsuperscript{590} Shogo Suzuki, “Paternal Authority, Civilized State: China’s Evolving Attitude towards international
trusteeships,” in James Mayall and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, eds., \textit{The New Protectorates: International
\textsuperscript{591} The first exposition of human security was made in a United Nations report. United Nations, \textit{United
expeditionary warfare, postwar occupation and the social and political re-engineering of societies is consequently best understood as an elective approach that reflects a vaguely defined liberal convergence of views at a certain moment in time.” Viewed in this context it becomes apparent that the scattered and ineffectual efforts to remake the societies in question have their basis in the intellectual confusion and strategic inconsistency that defined the period, a condition that continues unabated today.

Not only is humanitarian intervention as a foreign policy concept troubling in and of itself, but also the development that followed the initial deployment of force occurred along narrow neoliberal lines, with the primary concern being upon establishing avenues for foreign capital accumulation, rather than creating state capacities or improving social stability. In the case of Afghanistan, a highly problematic approach to development occurred under the rubric of the Comprehensive Approach, which adopted a singular focus to development and brought non-military development assistance and military units under the same command. By blurring the lines between military and civil functions, the Comprehensive Approach was fiercely resisted by civil actors, who feared that by integrating their activities and serving alongside NATO forces they would lose their non-combatant status.

NATO’s Riga summit in 2006 officially endorsed the idea of a Comprehensive Approach to security and crisis management. The Summit Declaration stated that, “…today’s challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments…” In traditional NATO

fashion however actually defining what a Comprehensive Approach officially entailed remained vague.\(^595\) NATO would encourage its members to not view threats as requiring a predetermined response. As its forward-looking *NATO 2020* report argued, “Instead they should nurture the habit of thinking of these issues as developing along a continuum.”\(^596\) Clearly, NATO’s Comprehensive Approach called for an integrated response to crises involving a broad spectrum of both public and private actors, but what this actually meant in practice remained elusive.

It was not until mid-December 2010, four years after the Riga summit, that Allied Command Operations released a Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive that clarified what a Comprehensive Approach to Operations entailed from a military standpoint and how it would relate to non-military actors in a future operation.\(^597\) This planning directive extensively detailed, at both the strategic and the operational level, a six phase process that NATO decision makers would conduct internally, prior to, during, and after the completion of a mission. Engagement with outside civilian actors should occur as early as possible in the first phase of situational awareness, prior to actual engagement. Interaction with these actors should occur through two primary mechanisms, the Civil-Emergency Planning Directorate (CEPD) and the Civil Military Fusion Centre (CFC). The main task of the CEPD in a crisis would be to compile a database of experts

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597 The United States introduced provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan in 2002, which combined military and non-military components and can been seen as an early example of a comprehensive approach to security.
in relevant areas,\textsuperscript{598} while the task of the CFC would be to facilitate the exchange of information on current conditions between the various organizations in the field.\textsuperscript{599} Taken together the information gleaned from these interactions would allow NATO to develop an ever more elaborate systems analysis of the operational area. NATO’s \textit{Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive} argued that, “A system analysis examines potential adversaries, friendly and neutral actors holistically as complex adaptive systems to understand their behavior, capabilities and interaction within the operational environment. This analysis will reveal strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities and other critical factors, including the actors’ capacity for adaptation, which provides insight into how they can be influenced.”\textsuperscript{600} In theory then NATO has established the internal mechanisms and procedures that set how it is supposed to interact with other actors during a crisis. Yet as is often the case with NATO, actual practice did not coincide with reality.

The one sustained example of the Comprehensive Approach in action, the deployment of provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan, has been widely decried as a failure, which threatened the lives of humanitarian workers.\textsuperscript{601} As Williams explains, “The criticism from humanitarian organization is essentially that the assistance programs provided by PRTs can blur the differences between humanitarian NGOs and military forces in the eyes of Afghans. The very nature of PRTs, argue the critics, militarizes

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{599} Ibid., 2-6
  \item \textsuperscript{600} Ibid., 2-10.
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While this is a valid concern, the large scale rejection of the Comprehensive Approach by humanitarian actors ironically further militarized the provision of aid and development in Afghanistan as NATO was forced to become more directly involved in the reconstruction process, triggering further protests by NGOs and an increased reluctance to work within the framework of the Comprehensive Approach.603

Not only was the manner in which the Comprehensive Approach was deployed in Afghanistan problematic, but as Albo notes, the content of its projects were highly dubious. According to his analysis, “The various members of the PRT attempt to establish governance, security, and development projects. The new modes of administration however are dominated by neoliberal precepts that give priority to the building of markets and providing opportunities for capital investment…military objectives dominate the PRT, development is subordinated to military strategy, and both are designed to stabilize capitalist development in Afghanistan.”604 This neoliberal development agenda was set from the early stages of the Afghan occupation, with the amount of funding provided for the rebuilding of the country after thirty years of warfare not only inadequate,605 but with the lions share earmarked for Western NGOs in support of

605 In 2004 it was calculated that just under $4 billion dollars a year for five years was necessary to bring Afghanistan up to minimal international standards in health, education and transport. However the 2006 London donors conference only offered a total of $10.5 billion dollars, large sums of that money never provided. For more detail see William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 244.
privatization schemes. Only 20 percent of international aid went directly to the Afghan state. The result was the creation of a non-functional state that exercises little control outside of Kabul.

If the objective in Afghanistan was to create, a state aligned to the West and capable of providing a stable investment climate for transnational capital, then it is clear that the extended peacekeeping operation in the country is a failure. Under the neoliberal model of state building crucial funding was denied to the embryonic Afghan state and projects of questionable validity, were pursued, which significantly undercut the chances for the success of the stabilization mission in the country. The Comprehensive Approach, NATO’s peacebuilding strategy in the country is unlikely to be used as a model for development in the future. This is due not only to the apparent deficiencies the Comprehensive Approach suffers from, but because also because of the high costs associated with peacekeeping on this scale, costs that become more difficult to endure as austerity drains the financial resources of Western governments. Instead Libyan style interventions, bombing campaigns that lack any sustained or coherent peacekeeping component afterwards are likely to become the new norm for NATO engagements.

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NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan occurred during a period of heightened liberal confidence and with far more ideological currency invested in it then the subsequent operation in Libya a decade later. Afghanistan should be viewed as an example of neoliberal state building on an extensive and prolonged scale, one unlikely to be replicated in the future. In contrast, NATO’s subsequent operation in Libya occurred in the midst of an age of austerity with a declining liberal triumphalism prevalent following debacles abroad and did not easily fit in the prevailing logic of the War on Terror. Libya therefore would be characterized by a lack of a sustained post-combat presence and any meaningful effort at state building. The stark contrast between Afghanistan and Libya illustrates the role that NATO played in the past and the possible direction that it is headed in the future.

*Geopolitical Dynamics and the Fabrication of Trans-scalar Spaces of Intervention: Libya and the Changing Nature of NATO Operations*

NATO’s most recent foray into Libya, under the auspices of Operation Unified Protector, provides a stark example of how the new logics, practices, and institutional arrangements that have been developed since 2008 have modified the planning, implementation, and aftermath of NATO interventions. The implications of these processes are far reaching, impinging upon economic and political dynamics and giving rise to new practices of spatial creation. All of these dynamics can, I argued, be encapsulated and linked together under the rubric of geopolitics. Understood as both a scale of analysis and a distinct plane of interaction the geopolitical provides an overarching clarity and coherence to what might otherwise been seen as essentially disparate and compulsive actions taken by political actors in response to the current
security environment.

Traditionally geopolitics has examined the impact that geographical factors (resources, physical location, demographics, etc.) have upon the positions of states in the international system and their ability to project power. Geopolitics has historically been implicated with the process of empire building. It was initially theorized and employed as a method of foreign policy analysis by Germany in the early 20th century, with an American variant forming during the Cold War and a European geopolitics emerging after the end of the Cold War. My own deployment of geopolitics as a concept and an analytical framing sharply diverges from these perspectives. I am not interested in encouraging or providing substance to projects of imperial expansion. Instead a critical understanding of geopolitics will inform the discussion which follows in this chapter. Critical geopolitics, following Agnew and Corbridge, is concerned with “…not only the

609 The three earliest theories of geopolitics were elaborated by the American Alfred Thayer Mahan, the German Friedrich Ratzel, and the Englishman Sir Halford Mackinder in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Each of these theorists was intimately connected with the imperialist expansion of their respective states underway at the time and saw themselves as offering valuable contributions to these projects. Mahan was an Admiral in the Navy and a major advocate of the development of a blue water navy by the United States in order to control valuable commercial chokepoints and project power. Mackinder was the first to formulate a theory of the heartland and the concepts of the world island and the pivot area, which were later popularized by Brzezinski. Ratzel saw states as naturally expansive and growing entities with no natural borders and argued that the expanse of a state’s borders is a reflection of the health of the nation, what he referred to as Lebensraum, which later became central to justifying the expansion of Nazi Germany into Eastern Europe. See A.T Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783 (London: Dover Military History, 1987). H.J Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” The Geographical Society 23 (1904): 421-437. Harriet Wanklyn, Friedrich Ratzel: A Biographical Memoir and Bibliography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961).


611 Critical geopolitics arose as an explicit reaction to the imperialistic and racist history of classical geopolitics. Although some have argued in its desire to break from the past, critical geopolitics has actually harmed its analytical power and political influence by seeking to develop an anti-geopolitical position. For example see Terrence Haverluk, Kevin Beauchemin, and Brandon Mueller, “The Three Flaws of Critical Geopolitics: Towards a Neo-Classical Geopolitics,” Geopolitics 19 (2014): 19-39.
material spatial practices through which international political economy is constructed but also to the ways in which it is represented and contested.\textsuperscript{612} Geopolitics, utilized in this sense, refers to the spatial configurations that arise due to the deployment of political and economic power.\textsuperscript{613} Geopolitics in the manner which I will utilize it is concerned with the creation of defined areas through which a particular set of interactions can occur, which are designed to either increase the capabilities of the actor responsible for their creation or achieve a particular strategic interest.

While both classical geopolitics and critical geopolitics possess a spatial component, it is only within the critical perspective that space is considered a contested concept. As Kelly notes in his comparison of classical and critical geopolitics, “To the classicist…the world can be seen as objectively distinct from the viewer and its spatial parameters are fixed.”\textsuperscript{614} In contrast, for those in the tradition of critical geopolitics the construction of space is a central concern, O Tuathail, one of the most prominent scholars working in the field of critical geopolitics sums up his approach as, “The study of geopolitics is the study of the spatialisation of international politics by core powers and hegemonic states…struggles over ownership, administration, and mastery of space are an inescapable part of the dynamics of contemporary global politics.”\textsuperscript{615} Yet while my focus is on the spatial component of contemporary geopolitics, it differs in an important respect from critical scholars. Their concern is largely on how geopolitical space is discursively

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\item \textsuperscript{613} Geopolitics is not always dependent upon the application of military force. Indeed the raft of economic agreements that China has brokered with African states are a prime example of geopolitical engagement. For further detail see M. Power and G. Mohan, “Towards a critical geopolitics of China’s engagement with African development,” \textit{Geopolitics} 15 (2010): 462-495.
\item \textsuperscript{615} Gearoid O Tuathail, \textit{Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 60.
\end{itemize}
constructed through the production of foreign policy documents and inherent cultural dispositions. The analysis that follows below is concerned with the construction of space, but will exclude discussion of these elements that are central to the contemporary study of critical geopolitics.

My reasoning for doing so is simple. My focus is on the creation of trans-scalar spaces of intervention, which are temporary sites created purely through the application of violence. There is no interest in the governance of these spaces, nor in conducting any forms of Western centric cultural analysis to glean useful knowledge about the terrain, the sole reason for the creation of these spaces is to eliminate a threat the apparatus that is deployed in one that simply enacts violence and lacks a positive regulative function.

This, as I will demonstrate below, is what occurred during NATO’s most recent operation in Libya. There was no cultural analysis conducted, as there was in past interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, because there was never the impetus to conduct a prolonged peacekeeping operation designed to reengineer Libya into a good neoliberal state. In this instance the extent of Western involvement would be limited to dropping bombs from


617 Gaub writes that, “…the Alliance paid very little attention to Libya’s cultural terrain. They had no cultural advisor on staff, no one from Libya nor from any other Arab country. Also, there was no one who was familiar with the local conditions.” Florence Gaub, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya: Reviewing Operation Unified Protector*, (Carlisile: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2013), viii.

618 During its occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq the US military created Human Terrain System teams that employed personal with backgrounds in anthropology, sociology, political science, regional studies, and linguistics to provide a comprehensive understanding of the local population where American forces were deployed. Many anthropologists were critical of the program and the militarization of academic knowledge. See American Anthropological Association, “American Anthropological Association Executive Board Statement on the Human Terrain System project,” October 31, 2007. http://www.aaanet.org/issues/policy-advocacy/statement-on-HTS.cfm
aircraft, providing armaments to militia groups opposed to Gaddafi, and encouraging their respective oil firms to increase their investments in the country,\textsuperscript{619} although with the prolonged instability which has marred Libya since 2011, many firms have actually reduced their investments,\textsuperscript{620} despite continuing American political intervention in the country.\textsuperscript{621} Conducting a discursive and cultural examination of the Libyan intervention then would only serve to add a superfluous layer of complexity to my methodological framework and detract from my interest in the construction of new geopolitical spaces.

Operating at the geopolitical scale NATO is now involved in the practice of creating, through its application of coercive force, what I refer to as trans-scalar spaces of intervention, because they exist simultaneously at a variety of national, international, and transnational spaces, each of which harbors a different set of actors and institutional frameworks whose engagement alters the general projection of the particular space of intervention. Trans-scalar is hence adopted as a prefix to space of intervention because it encompasses interactions occurring within a variety of scales and their impact upon the specific space of intervention in question. These are temporary spaces where violence is enacted upon targets that are deemed a threat to NATO’s interests. Once the threat is eliminated, the coercive apparatus deployed by NATO is withdrawn and a new pattern of relations emerges.

This was the manner in which Operation Unified Protector was conducted. A

direct application of force was organized and projected by NATO from the transnational level directly on the opposing Libyan forces. The discrepancy of capabilities between Libyan state and NATO was so vast that several scales of interaction were effectively negated, with only two scales, the transnational and the local relevant to the conflict as NATO’s weapons penetrated from the transnational scale, unimpeded to the point where they struck their targets. The central concern of classical geopolitics with the movement of forces through territorial space was rendered irrelevant, as NATO forces were able to strike freely throughout the country. Thus, a highly circumscribed set of interactions occurred because the Libyan state was incapable of offering a coherent response and engaging NATO forces, it was limited to the local scale, while NATO struck from the trans-scalar, out of reach figuratively and literally. NATO’s actions served to strip away the governance mechanisms of the Libyan state, to the extent that they existed. Yet as will be seen below no effort was made to replace the vacuum that now existed with a new more liberal form of governance that could offer economic, social, and political opportunities to a heavily armed and fractious populace. NATO’s concern with Libya ended with the death of Gadaffi and the closure of the trans-scalar space of intervention.

I then conceptualize trans-scalar spaces of intervention as ephemeral sites of contestation whose existence is the result of risk calculations and the weighing of geopolitical concerns within transnational military bodies such as NATO. What occurs inside a trans-scalar space of intervention is the layering of the geopolitical interests mapped onto a specific spatial site. What drives these geopolitical concerns can be

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diverse, from threat elimination, the denial of economic advantages to rival states, or simply the desire to demonstrate one's material power. Trans-scalar spaces of intervention are sites in which an abundant interplay of interests and contradictions are concentrated and intensified. Their spatial form is distinct from territorial constructions, because, as I have noted above, of the disinterest present within them of establishing systems of governance. Trans-scalar spaces of intervention represent, in Sack's terminology, non-territorial places. In his opinion, “...it should be emphasized that a place can be used as a territory at one time and not at another...it is important to distinguish between a territory as a place and other types of places. Unlike many ordinary places, territories require constant effort to establish and maintain. They are the results of strategies to affect, influence and control people, phenomena and relationships.” Trans-scalar spaces of intervention are examples of these “other types of places.” The nihilism of these spaces, with destruction their sole purpose illustrates the reduced horizons of what is politically possible in the current moment. Past interventions, shaped as they were by neoliberal proclivities, at least gestured to a vague vision of the future, this is absent in the new model of intervention propagated by NATO.

Libya was a realm of experimentation where NATO tested the viability of a new mission format and engaged in the practice of a unique form of spatial creation. However, the Libyan intervention also made starkly apparent a number of weaknesses in the Alliance. The most detrimental to its future viability was the frayed unity between NATO members, with only a minority actually contributing to Operation Unified Protector and

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key members such as Germany, making public their opposition to the mission.\(^{625}\) This prompted one commentator to argue that, “Given the lackluster levels of support provided by most NATO members, the mission in Libya could be more appropriately described as being conducted by a coalition within the Alliance.”\(^{626}\) This lack of support compounded with a dearth of crucial equipment\(^{627}\), especially intelligence sharing and unit coordination assets\(^{628}\) meant that NATO struggled to implement a coherent and sustained campaign against a country with inferior infrastructure and paltry military forces.

The Libyan intervention itself was significant for NATO for three reasons. First, the process behind the decision for NATO to intervene and assume control of the mission in Libya demonstrates the interplay of new factors and strategic calculations that only became relevant following the elevation of crisis management to a core strategic principle within the Alliance. Once it had decided to act NATO moved in its forces into position in record time and began operations only ten days later, a marked contrast from the slow start to previous operations.\(^{629}\) Second, from a procedural standpoint, the refusal of several members to commit to the Libyan intervention illustrates the weakness of crisis


\(^{627}\) NATO nearly ran out of precision munitions and Italy was forced to withdraw its carrier, the Garibaldi during the midst of the campaign due to a budgetary shortfall. Karen DeYoung and Greg Jaffe, “NATO runs short on some munitions in Libya,” \textit{Washington Post} April 15, 2011. “Italy removes aircraft carrier from Libya campaign,” Defense News July 7, 2011. htp://www.defensenews.com/story.php?id=7030819

\(^{628}\) European nations were forced to rely on the United States to provide both a target radar attack system and for aircraft refueling tankers. “Early military lessons from Libya,” IISS Strategic Comments 17, September 2011

management in cohesively binding together NATO’s membership with a common purpose and understanding of the world. Third, the actual operation itself, how the combat phase was conducted and the lack of post-conflict reconstruction has numerous consequences regarding spatial configurations and the deployment and arrangement of military forces, and can, as I have argued, best be conceived of as a trans-scalar space of intervention.

One of the primary motivations for the transition in mission formats between Afghanistan, where NATO undertook an operation of sustained duration and high expense, both in terms of human life and material cost, and Libya that was relatively inexpensive and did not result into a single NATO casualty, is due to the intensification of neoliberalism that has occurred since 2008. Afghanistan and Libya are examples of different varieties of neoliberal campaigns. What happened in Libya is a radical departure from the experience of Afghanistan. In Libya, the interest was not in implanting a new liberal society in a region with no history of one, but rather simply the elimination of a threat. If Afghanistan represents a neoliberal intervention in the classical sense, with the accompanying attempting at peacebuilding and supposed concern for human rights, then Libya, with its lack of post-conflict reconstruction and far more constrained ideological rhetoric is an example of an intensified neoliberal intervention. Libya, I believe, points the way towards what Western interventions will look like after the 2007 Global Financial Crisis.\textsuperscript{630}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{630} This perspective is shared by Chivvis who states, “Future NATO operations will more likely resemble Libya than Afghanistan.” Christopher Chivvis, “Libya and the Future of Liberal Intervention,” \textit{Survival} 54 (2012): 88.}
Libya and the End of Neoliberal Post-Conflict Reconstruction

The guiding logic of intensified neoliberal style of interventions is one of significantly reduced expectations regarding the ability of Western states to reshape the geopolitical environment in their favor. Hodge, contrasting the Afghanistan and Libyan interventions, succinctly makes this point, when he declares that, “What was deemed possible in March 2011 involved a considerable retreat from the ambitions of 2001.”

What changed in the intermediate period was first, as I have already noted above, the turn toward austerity which greatly reduced the resources available to NATO member militaries and second ideological exhaustion and a waning enthusiasm for future extended interventions after two wars, with mixed, at best results, that lasted over a decade. Thus, the sustained commitment of resources, both material and ideological required for the classical style of neoliberal interventions is simply no longer available in the current moment. This dearth of capacity can be observed both in the lack of grandiose rhetoric that was deployed to justify the Libyan campaign and the relatively light footprint of NATO in the country.

The justification for the Libyan intervention did not rely upon the discursive framework of the War on Terror. Not only has the manner in which NATO operations are conducted changed, but so too has the ideological justification which they receive. Gone is the rhetoric of state building and peacekeeping that surrounded past interventions. The

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632 Hodge provides an overview of the general atmosphere in which the Libyan campaign occurred. “Two decades of intervention have strained the humanitarian sentiment, aggravated the inequities in burden-sharing and led to a decade long and dead ended COIN in Central Asia.” Ibid., 80. Indeed Obama’s reactive foreign policy and his lack of strategic vision can be seen as an outgrowth of this environment. For further detail on Obama’s foreign policy approach see Ryan Lizza, “The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring remade Obama’s Foreign Policy,” The New Yorker, May 2 2011.
implcation of this is that there is a growing disinterest in efforts to form liberal subjects and governance mechanisms that while rapacious and dysfunctional, allowed for some measure of interaction with and incorporation of a tiny stratum of targeted societies within wider economic and political flows. Instead, there is now simply disciplining without incorporation. Trans-scalar spaces of intervention, like Libya are not concerned with offering the chance at integration or even vague gestures towards it. Instead, Libya marks a blatant exercise in realpolitik. The dilution of liberal principles that this represents is not simply limited to the sort of justifications that will be provided for interventions in the future, but are part of the changing nature of the interventions themselves, with rationalization and the drive for efficiencies moving to the forefront. Peacebuilding is expensive, simply bombing positions from the air is considerably less so.

Operation Unified Protector was not framed as a battle for civilization, but rather as necessary to protect the civilian population from a massacre by Gaddafi’s regime as they advanced eastward toward Benghazi from retreating rebel forces. UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which established the legal basis for a no fly zone over Libya, “authorizes member states…to take all necessary measures…to protect civilians.” The clash of civilizations narrative that had permeated Western military operations prior to

634 Whether such a massacre would have actually occurred is open to debate. Kuperman argues that such an outcome was unlikely given Gaddafi’s behavior in the conflict up until that point. Alan Kuperman, “A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign,” International Security 38 (2013): 108-113.
Libya was discarded in this instance. Instead, the Libyan campaign resuscitated the idea of the Responsibility to Protect, which had languished since its formal adoption by the United Nations in 2005.\textsuperscript{636} Ironically the manner in which NATO conducted itself in Libya, summarized as “bomb to win”\textsuperscript{637} by one commentator and the ensuing chaos in the country and its destabilizing effects upon the wider region undoubtedly resulted in greater civilian deaths than if NATO had simply stood aside.

By limiting itself to bombing runs, providing arms and advisors to the rebels and with no sustained ground presence, the financial costs of the Libya operation, especially compared to hundreds of billions of dollars spent in Afghanistan, was extremely economical. The Department of Defense estimated that the cost to the American taxpayer was just over a billion dollars,\textsuperscript{638} while the British and French governments, two of the largest contributors to the campaign to remove Gaddafi placed their costs at $337 million\textsuperscript{639} and $502 million\textsuperscript{640} respectively. NATO suffered no combat casualties, prompting Vice President Joe Biden to crow that, “…we didn’t lose a single life. This is more of the prescription for how to deal with the world as we go forward than in the past.”\textsuperscript{641} Viewed solely from these metrics the Libyan intervention would appear to have been a highly successful and efficient operation that removed a reviled dictator from power. What occurred in Libya during NATO’s intervention in 2011 and its continuing


\textsuperscript{638} Kevin Baron, “For $1 Billion, One Dictator,” \textit{National Journal}, October 21 2011.

\textsuperscript{639} Nick Hopkins, “Libya Conflict may cost UK 1.75 billion,” \textit{Guardian}, September 25 2011.


\textsuperscript{641} Bradley Klapper and Julie Pace, “Biden: Libyans have rid country of dictator,” \textit{The Record}, October 20 2011.
ramifications since are far more problematic and complex. Rather than an easy win for NATO and a demonstration of the effectiveness of its organizational transformation in a global security nexus and the corresponding viability of its new mission format, Libya exposed a number of fractures within the Alliance and posed a number of strategic and tactical challenges that it has still failed to terms with.

The huge differences in the commitment of financial and military resources and the rhetoric to justify each intervention can be traced back to the different variety of neoliberalism predominant during the period when each operation was organized and executed. NATO’s efforts to build the capacities of the Afghan state can be characterized as an example of classical neoliberal intervention. In contrast the absence of a state building project from NATO’s intervention in Libya separates it from the earlier ISAF mission and represents a new model of intervention, one that arises from the current conditions of intensified neoliberalism and is likely, due to its low cost and speed at which it can be organized to be replicated in the future. While this section offered, a broad outline of the general conditions in place during each intervention the next section will move on to the specifics of what occurred in Libya. It will analyze how NATO’s new institutional framework of the global security nexus projected force in Libya, expand upon my conceptualization of Operation Unified Protector as generating a trans-scalar space of intervention, and examine the wider geopolitical ramifications of the intervention.

*A Case Study of NATO’s Operation Unified Protector*

**Historical Background**

At the start of 2011, Libya was not an obvious target for NATO intervention. It
had long ceased to be a persistent irritant on the scale of North Korea or Iran for Western policymakers. Indeed in the years prior to his removal from power and death at the hands of Western backed militias Gaddafi had guided Libya on a remarkable transition from a pariah state under heavy international sanctions that was listed as a state sponsor of terrorism by the American State Department to in 2004 hosting a remarkable meeting in the desert with then British Prime Minister Tony Blair and being feted across Europe by its political class. Libya’s short road back to international respectability began in 2003 when it pledged to abandon its chemical weapons program and accepted responsibility, if not blame, for the 1988 Lockerbie bombing agreeing to pay out $1.5 billion to the families of the victims. Blair’s early visit to Libya provided further crucial momentum and by 2007, Libya was welcomed back into the international community with decades of isolation and hostility seemingly evaporating after a momentous four-year period of rapprochement. The speed at which this rehabilitation occurred was due in no small part to Libya’s oil reserves, the largest in Africa with 47 billion barrels of proven supply. In Chorin’s assessment, “…if it had not been for oil,

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642 UN Security Council Resolution 748 and 883 imposed a wide range of sanctions on Libya including banning Libyan aircraft from UN member states, freezing Libyan government accounts housed in foreign bank accounts, and banning the sale of oil terminal equipment. For the impact of the sanctions upon Libya see Waniss Otman and Erling Karlberg, *The Libyan Economy: Economic Diversification and International Repositioning* (Berlin: Springer, 2007), 44-47.


645 Perhaps the oddest result of the lifting of sanctions and Gaddafi being able to freely travel internationally was the friendship that developed between him and Italian Prime Minister Silvo Berlusconi and the “cultural” exchanges that occurred between the two countries. Tom Kington, “Gaddafi files Italian women to Libya for cultural tours- and romance,” *Guardian*, November 12 2010.


648 KPMG, “Oil and Gas in Africa: Africa’s Reserves, Potential and Prospects,” *KPMG Africa* 2013, 8
associated construction and power contracts, and, later arms deals, the commercial interest in Libya would have been decidedly weak. Oil was the key resource."^649 Gaddafi was welcomed back into the international community with open arms, despite his highly eccentric and erratic style of leadership, because of the riches that lay under Libyan soil. British industry would be generously rewarded by Blair’s shepherding of Gaddafi back to respectability with a huge windfall for corporations such as British Petroleum.\(^650\)

While Libya went through a process of reform at the international level, no pressure was applied at the domestic level to encourage greater democratization and respect for basic human rights in the country. Instead, Gaddafi was allowed to proceed as he had since coming to power in a nearly bloodless coup in 1969.\(^651\) In 1977 following the recording of his unique brand of political philosophy, referred to as “Third International Theory” which blended together elements of Islamic socialism, Arab nationalism, and the principles of direct democracy in his *Green Book*,\(^652\) Gaddafi declared the formation of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or state of the masses.\(^653\) Libya was now to be a direct democracy without any political parties governed by its populace through a series of national councils and communes. Gaddafi was merely, “the brotherly

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650 In 2007 British Petroleum was awarded acreage in Libya’s North Ghadames block the size of Kuwait and acreage in the offshore Sirte basin the size of Belgium. In return Britain provided $50 million dollars in educational grants of Libyan professionals, which led to 2,800 students from Libya studying in the UK by 2011. Horace Campbell, *Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya: Lessons for Africa in the Forging of African Unity*, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2013), 56.
leader and guide of the revolution.” In reality he was a dictator who governed as he pleased, publicly hanged protesting students, banned all independent organizations including unions, professional associations and women’s groups and administered a kleptocratic regime.

Despite Gaddafi’s erratic and incoherent approach to governance, he was correct in one regard about the nature of the relationship between the Libyan state and society. Libya, as several scholars have argued, was unique amongst despotic Arab regimes for lacking the cohesive institutional framework and extensive mechanisms of governance this is characteristic of modern states. Libya was effectively a nearly stateless society. Outside of a few military units commanded by immediate family members and a basic surveillance and confinement apparatus significant enough to contain occasional minor outbreaks of dissent, the majority of Libya’s citizens had very few direct interactions with the Libyan state. This was not an accidental outcome, but was rather a direct result of Gaddafi’s policies, as he feared being ousted in the same manner in which he had come to power, through a military coup. Thus, Gaddafi sought to prevent the formation of

656 Ibid., 121-122.
657 Ronald Bruce St. John, Libya: From Colony to Revolution (Oxford: Oneworld, 2012), 166-168
660 The 32nd Reinforced Brigade of the Armed People, commanded by Gaddafi’s youngest son Khamis is a notable example.
661 The Abu Salim prison in Tripoli, site of an infamous massacre of 1,270 prisoners during a riot in 1996, was Libya’s main prison.
all coherent power bases that could be utilized to organize effective opposition to his rule. These efforts would, as Sorensen and Damidez note negatively impact him in 2011, forcing Gaddafi to rely primarily upon mercenary forces in a doomed effort to salvage his regime. As they write “Ironically the very system that the Colonel has taken great effort to organize, divide, and control in order for it not to pose a threat to this power eventually failed to protect him…In a sense, it was an intricate system based on divide and rule…The deficiencies in military organization, training, and equipment contributed to the fragmentation accepted, and even cultivated by the regime.”

This lack of a central state, would as will be seen below, also shaped the direction that Libya would take post-Gaddafi. Absent a governance, apparatus that could unify its disparate ethnic groups or an extensive project of state security sector reform Libya would rapidly descend into internecine warfare following the conclusion of NATO operations.

In the immediate years prior to his downfall and following the lifting of the last of the sanctions against his regime, Gaddafi rapidly reverted to his old ways. Chorin posits that Gaddafi was pressured by his advisors and his family to reform himself in order to gain access to Western markets for Libyan oil and once he had succeeded in doing so carried on as he was accustomed to. He argues that “As soon as the last of the bilateral US-Libya sanctions were removed the old Gaddafi quickly reemerged…From 2007 to 2010, Gaddafi’s performances became more and more bizarre.” Perhaps Gaddafi was confident that with the relationships he had developed with a number of European

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leaders, combined with the fawning over him by prominent British academics, that his position was secure. Indeed this was an opinion that was shared by all major risk management assessment models, from the Economist Intelligence Unit to Crisis Watch, which all perceived Libya as a relatively stable country, with many of them only issuing a conflict risk alert after widespread violence had already broken out in the country. The failure to detect the volatility simmering just below the surface is a clear indication of the ineffectiveness of risk management techniques as tools capable of predicting geopolitical crises. Crises emerge from a complex interplay of factors, many of which are only relevant in hindsight, after the crisis has already occurred, thus their actual anticipation is a rarity; crisis are by their nature unpredictable.

Although the West was not responsible for the initial outbreak of unrest in Libya, once the opportunity was presented to remove Gaddafi it was seized upon. Despite the public displays of goodwill, many Western states, especially European ones, merely tolerated Gaddafi as a necessary annoyance. A major source of their irritation was the

665 Anthony Giddens made two trips to Libya in 2006 and 2007, organized by the Boston Based Monitor Group a management consulting service founded by professors from Harvard Business School, that was contracted by Gaddafi in 2005 to run a public relations campaign for the country. Andrew Solomon, “Letter from Libya: Circle of Fire,” The New Yorker, May 8 2006. After his trips Giddens wrote publicly about what he deemed to be the positive reforms underway in the country. Anthony Giddens, “The colonel and his third way,” New Statesman, August 28 2006. The Libyan government forged further ties to the English academic establishment with a £1.5 million donation from its International Charity and Development fund, which was chaired by Gaddafi’s son and heir apparent Saif al-Islam Gaddafi. Saif acquired a PhD from the London School of Economics in 2008 under the supervision of David Held. Yet allegations soon began to surface that his dissertation had been either ghostwritten or plagiarized. Jonathan Owen, “LSE insider claims Gaddafi donation openly joked about,” The Independent, March 31 2011. The LSE was forced to distance itself from the Libyan regime after Saif made a televised speech on February 20, 2011 threatening that “…thousands of deaths and rivers of blood will run through Libya.” Vivienne Walt, “Gaddafi’s Son: Last Gasp of Libya’s Dying Regime?” Time, February 21 2011. When ties between Libya and the LSE were made public several days later its director resigned and David Held was forced into exile. Jeevan Vasagar, “Academic linked to Gaddafi’s fugitive son leaves LSE,” Guardian, October 21 2011.


667 Campbell argues that, “… Gaddafi’s zigzags in relation to his international policies frustrated Britain and the United States who wanted a dominant say in the future of the Libyan economy.” Horace Campbell,
renegotiation of oil production agreements that occurred from 2005 onwards and resulted in significantly less favorable terms for Western oil firms along with requiring them to pay out a total of $5.4 billion in upfront bonus payments. As leaked diplomatic cables reveal, the United States closely monitored the reduced stakes of Western oil firms in Libya and periodic threats of nationalization from Gaddafi. Further, increased Russian investment in Libya, along with plans to open a naval base in the country also raised concerns in Washington. Gaddafi then was viewed in Western capitals as an unreliable partner who regularly antagonized the West and was seeking to strengthen ties with some of its perennial adversaries, most notably Russia. Forte argues that the eventual NATO strikes against Libya must be seen in this larger geopolitical context. As he explains, “NATO’s war should be seen as part of a larger process…It is part of an ongoing conflict between U.S power against the interests of China, Russia and other ascendant regional hegemons to secure access to both material and political resources…” Libya became a battleground to guarantee the predominance of Western interests in the country; although the haphazard manner in which Western intervention occurred and the ensuing chaos

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which followed would actually serve to deny Western access to Libyan resources and sharply curtail its influence in the country.

It was the outbreak of the Arab Spring in early 2011 and its eventual spread to Libya that finally moved Western states and regional allies to intervene. As Prashad explains it was in Libya that a line was drawn in the sand to curtail the further extension of the Arab Spring. He writes: “...the Libyan rebellion gave the Atlantic powers, Qatar and Saudi Arabia an opportunity to attempt to seize control over an escalating dynamic that had spread across the Middle East and North Africa...This dynamic needed to be controlled, or at least harnessed. Libya, which sits in the center of North Africa, with Egypt on one border and Tunisia on the other, provided the perfect space to hurry along the clock, to skip summer and hasten winter.”\textsuperscript{672} It can be argued than that the involvement of NATO in Libya can be read then as an attempt to ensure that the traditional pattern of relationships in the region, that was largely compliant to the West and had prevailed since the defeat of Arab nationalism remained secure.\textsuperscript{673} NATO’s strike on Gaddafi was also designed to send a message to potential rivals by demonstrating its ability to control the course of events in its immediate region. This was the broader context in which NATO would back a rebellion that would remove Gaddafi from power. I will now turn to examining the actual NATO intervention itself and the wider ramifications of it upon the unity of the Alliance, the configuration of world order, and arrangement of relations within the geopolitical scale.

\textsuperscript{672} Vijay Prashad, \textit{Arab Spring, Libyan Winter} (Oakland: AK Press, 2012), 160-161.

\textsuperscript{673} Arab nationalism was a post colonial project of state building and the pursuit of an independent foreign policy by the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. After reaching its apex under Gamal Nassar in Egypt, it suffered an irreversible decline with the defeat of the Arab armies in the Six Day War with Israel in 1967. Afterward the United States become the dominant powerbroker in the area with Israel and Egypt serving as the linchpins of its regional geopolitical strategy. For an overview see Youssef Choueiri, \textit{Arab Nationalism A History: Nation and State in the Arab World}, (London: Blackwell, 2001).
Protests in Libya, inspired by the events of the Arab Spring, began in earnest on February 17, 2011 with a national “day of revolt.”\footnote{David Kirkpatrick and Mona El-Naggar, “Qaddafi’s Grip Falters as His Forces Take on Protestors,” \textit{New York Times}, February 21 2011.} In the next several days, protests rapidly spread across the country with hundreds of deaths reported as Libyan security services opened fire on demonstrators.\footnote{Ian Black, “Libya on Brink as Protests Hit Tripoli,” \textit{Guardian}, February 21 2011. Charles Levinson and Tahani Karrar-Lewsley, “Libya Death Toll Surges in Crackdown,” \textit{Wall Street Journal}, February 21 2011.} Defections of military and government officials mounted throughout the month as the government crackdown grew more brutal.\footnote{Ian Black, “Libya: Defections leave Muammar Gaddafi isolated in Tripoli bolthole,” \textit{Guardian}, February 23 2011.} Rebel forces coalesced into the National Transitional Council (NTC) on February 27, providing a political face and a government in waiting for the revolution.\footnote{Reuters, “Anti-Gaddafi figures say form national council,” \textit{Reuters}, February 27 2011.} By March 1 the Eastern, half of the country had fallen under the nominal control of rebel forces, with pockets of resistance in around Tripoli and major cities in the West, such as Zintan and Misrata.\footnote{For a harrowing on eyewitness account of the early days of the Libyan revolution see Andrei Netto, \textit{Bringing Down Gaddafi: On the Ground with the Libyan Rebels} (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).} Despite these early gains, Gaddafi’s forces rapidly regrouped and pushed back along the coast towards Benghazi, the heart of the resistance. With the position of rebel forces increasingly untenable and fears of a bloodbath taking place once Libyan forces entered Benghazi,\footnote{David Kirkpatrick and Kareem Fahim, “Qaddafi Warns of Assault on Benghazi as U.N. Vote Nears,” \textit{New York Times}, March 17 2011.} the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 on March 17th, with authorized member states “To take all necessary measures… to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamhiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding an occupation force.”\footnote{UN Security Council, “Security Council Approves No-Fly Zone Over Libya, Authorizing all necessary measures to protect civilians by vote of 10 in favor with 5 abstentions,” March 17 2011.} French forces planes were the first in
the air and began bombing Libyan positions on the evening of March 19th.\textsuperscript{681} From March 19th until March 25\textsuperscript{th}, the enforcement of Resolution 1973 was organized under the rubric of Operation Odyssey Dawn, with United States AFRICOM command overseeing the conduct of a multinational military campaign that included European, American, Canadian, and Gulf forces.\textsuperscript{682} Command responsibility was handed off to NATO on March 25\textsuperscript{th}, with the NATO led Operation Unified Protector officially beginning on March 31\textsuperscript{st}\textsuperscript{683} and continuing until October 31\textsuperscript{st},\textsuperscript{684} shortly after Gaddafi’s death on October 20\textsuperscript{th}.

With the overall timeline clarified a detailed examination of the actual operation and its wider consequences can now proceed. From the earliest stages of the campaign, it was clear that several unique dynamics were in play. This was an intervention that the United States participated in with only great reluctance. The American military establishment, reeling from the costs of Iraq and Afghanistan, was strongly opposed to any involvement in Libya. As Chorin elaborates, “…still recovering from a more than trillion dollar campaign in Iraq and an expanding effort in Afghanistan it was widely felt within the defense establishment that the US simply did not have the wherewithal to wage another major campaign…”\textsuperscript{685} The American position on Libya was confused until the nearly the last moment, with a firm commitment in favor of intervention only

\textsuperscript{685} Ethan Chorin, Exit the Colonel: The Hidden History of the Libyan Revolution (New York: Public Affairs, 2012), 215.}
becoming clear late on March 15th. In contrast, Britain and France, concerned about maintaining access to Libyan oil and worried by a potential flood of refugees across the Mediterranean in the event of a prolonged conflict, had already made the decision to intervene weeks earlier. While the United States would provide the initial command framework under Operation Odyssey Dawn, responsibility was handed off to NATO as soon as it became feasible. Britain and France then came to bear the brunt of the operation, carrying out the majority of the combat sorties under Operation Unified Protector, with the United States “leading from behind” and limiting its role to providing key enablers such as in-flight refueling and reconnaissance.

With Operation Unified Protector the advantages and drawbacks of NATO as a global security nexus was on full display. NATO clearly demonstrated its role as an indispensable forum for organizing multinational military campaigns. As Michaels makes clear, there is simply no other organization that offers the same framework, resources, and capabilities that NATO can provide. He argues, “Among the key reasons why it was felt NATO should take over was that it would have greater legitimacy than a coalition of the willing and would be better able to bring in partners. Moreover, it had the established military command structure, regional facilities and a transatlantic link that were not

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686 For an examination of the divisions within the American policy establishment and the process by which an affirmative decision was reached see Josh Rogin, “How Obama turned on a dime toward war,” Foreign Policy March 18 2011.


guaranteed under alternative schemes.\textsuperscript{690} The Libyan intervention also provided, as its Secretary General noted, the opportunity for NATO to put theory into practice and exhibit the effectiveness of its new crisis management procedures.\textsuperscript{691} Yet crisis management, as would quickly become apparent, is a far less binding strategic doctrine than collective defense.

Under the logic of collective defense, NATO, as whole, must respond to a direct attack upon one of its members. The failure of all NATO members to respond in such an instance threatens the viability of the entire Alliance and undermines the security of each individual member by revealing that assistance from fellow members cannot be presumed and therefore every member can only rely upon themselves for their own defense. The circumstances in which collective defense would be invoked are narrow and clear-cut, any aggressive action that threatens the territorial integrity of a member state. This is not the case for crisis management, which is far more subjective and interpretive. At any particular moment in time, numerous crises are occurring or about to occur across the globe. What determines the involvement of NATO in these instances is the imperilment of the interest of one or more of its members. Yet it is highly unlikely the one crisis will be perceived as potentially harming the interests of all 28 members, who are all pursuing highly varied foreign policy agendas, and thus NATO collectively. Crisis management


\textsuperscript{691} Rasmussen described the operation as an example of how, “…academic theories connect with real world…today we have a real crisis unfolding on our doorstep—Libya. And NATO is not just sitting idly by.” Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “Hungry for Security: Can NATO help in a humanitarian crisis?” March 31 2011, www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_71864.htm Internal documentation also framed Operation Unified Protector as an example of crisis management in action. “NATO’s action is in line with NATO’s New Strategic Concept that commits NATO to prevent crises, manage conflicts in close consultation with its international partners, as they may affect Alliance security.” NATO, “NATO Strategic Communications Framework- NATO Operations in Support of UN Security Council Resolution 1973,” Document PDD (2011) 0102 REV 3, April 21 2011.
interventions then are likely to be organized by a core group of member states within NATO and other concerned non-member states who feel that their interests are threatened by a particular event that is precisely what occurred in Libya.

The threats posed by the situation in Libya to a number of national interests, but not significantly the general interest of NATO, explains the lack of sustained commitment from the United States and the lackluster response from its membership. It also clearly illustrates the pitfalls of NATO’s transformation into a global security nexus. As Noetzel and Schreer argue, cohesion has been sacrificed in the name of flexibility. They declare that, “Greater institutional flexibility will come at a cost. Crisis management operations will exacerbate the trend among allies to participate, abstain or even oppose common operations. In such cases, the influence of the Secretary General to generate strategic consensus will remain very limited, as NATO’s Libya operation demonstrated…with the challenge of an alliance fragmented into fractions of divergent strategic interests.”692 The more diffuse and extensive institutional structure that NATO has created over the last fifteen years has improved its response time to international crises, expanded its geographical reach, and allow it to carry out a new category of operations. Tasks that were once peripheral to the organization, if they were ever given any consideration at all, have now become central within its current configuration. However by adding an additional layer of complexity, states whose primary concern is with ensuring their own territorial integrity and who joined NATO for this purpose and thus view their interactions within the Alliance through the prism of collective defense, do not see the

benefit of crisis management operations. This applies to the states that joined NATO as part of its post-Cold War expansion. Poland and the Baltic states, sat out Operation Unified Protector.\textsuperscript{693} A divide has therefore emerged in the Alliance, between its Western members who seek to utilize NATO to carry out a far greater range of tasks and those in Central and Eastern Europe who want it to adhere to its original purpose.

The consequences of the gradual piecemeal alteration in the strategic calculations of NATO, which forms the basis of its transformation into a global security nexus, are now apparent. The intervention in Libya is a result of the shift from a narrow to the broader set of security concerns inherent in the focus upon crisis management operations that are now a major function of NATO. Yet the absenteeism and outright rejection of the Libyan operation by a large portion of NATO’s membership demonstrates that significant resistance to these new strategic priorities exists. It is currently too early to tell whether the splintering in the unity of NATO that occurred in 2011 will be replicated as the Alliance takes on further crisis management operations in the future or if it is simply an ephemeral response by dissatisfied members to a single operation. If it is the former, the continued viability of the Alliance is in serious jeopardy. If the latter is the case then NATO will need to increase its capacities in several key areas, most notably intelligence and reconnaissance, where it experienced crucial shortages,\textsuperscript{694} and be wary of being drawn into conflicts where it has only a tangential interest.

While Operation Unified Protector may have caused great discord within NATO at the same time, it also provided an example of the effectiveness of the extensive partnerships and greatly expanded institutional connections that have come along with its

development into a global security nexus. Despite NATO airstrikes, it is incredibly
doubtful that rebel forces would have ever succeeded in toppling Gaddafi without the
substantial contribution of Qatar, who had hundreds of special operatives on the ground
working in conjunction with NATO, through the framework of the Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative, providing material and organizational coordination to the rebels. Prior to
Qatar’s involvement, which included the shipment of 20,000 tons of weapons and
hundreds of millions of dollars in cash, rebel fighting forces were in a shambolic state.
Despite these extensive levels of support and constant NATO bombardment, the
disorganization and ineptitude of the rebels was so great that it was only in mid-August
that they were capable of launching a sustained and coordinated offensive against
Gaddafi, after months of stalemate. Even then, Qatari Special Forces played a key role,
storming Gaddafi’s compound in Tripoli during the final battle for the city in late August
as NATO aircraft bombed positions throughout the city. This is what the global
security nexus configuration of NATO, working as a multifaceted point of
interconnection between multinational military forces and insurgent groups with a
common interest can achieve.

697 By late July concern in NATO capital was growing at the length of time it was taking to remove Gaddafi from power. Campbell Clark, “As Libya settles into stalemate the West grapples for a way out,” Globe & Mail, July 27 2011.
of new partnerships that expanded the access of the Alliance to area countries with a strong desire to contribute to the success of the mission, and the process of knowledge development which created the conceptual apparatus that allowed NATO to comprehend and respond to contemporary crises, the toppling of Gaddafi would not have been possible. Still, NATO struggled to remove him from power, taking seven months to complete its operations in Libya, far longer than originally envisioned against a decrepit state with its people in open revolt.

Despite the language of UN Resolution 1973, which only authorized a no-fly zone and aid to the civilian population, the aim of NATO’s Operation Unified Protector was always regime change in Libya.700 The declaration by Obama, Cameron, and Sarkozy on April 14th that the conflict would continue until Gaddafi was removed from power only publically formalized the violation of the terms of the resolution, which had already been discretely occurring for some time.701 Campbell argues that the objectives of Resolution 1973 were achieved within the first two days of Operation Unified Protector and that a decision was made early on that Gaddafi had to go. As he observes, “Once the objectives of the UN Security Council Resolution had been achieved, that is the restricted mandate to protect civilians, the objectives of NATO became confused and driven by the unwritten plan to change the regime and execute Gaddafi.”702 This would appear to be collaborated by what was being targeted during combat sorties. Less than two weeks after the start of the operation NATO aircraft were attacking retreating Libyan forces that were not in the

vicinity of any civilian populations and thus outside the mandate of Resolution 1973.703 Further, all efforts to end the conflict were refused.

The rebels and NATO rejected three separate ceasefire offers by Gaddafi and the Libyan government. Venezuela offered to mediate between the rebels and Gaddafi as early as March 3 2011, prior to NATO intervention, an offer accepted by Gaddafi, but rejected by the rebels.704 On April 11th Gaddafi approved the terms of an African Union proposal for an immediate ceasefire to be followed by a national dialogue; both NATO and the NTC rejected this.705 Finally, on May 26 the Libyan government offered not only a ceasefire, but also negotiations towards a constitutional government and compensation to victims of the conflict.706 The intransience of NATO led Kuperman to conclude that the real goal of Operation Unified Protector was not the protection of civilians, but the removal of Gaddafi. He argues that “…all available evidence indicates that NATO’s primary objective was to help the rebels overthrow Gaddafi, even if this escalated and extended the civil war and magnified the threat to Libya’s civilians.”707 Indeed Kuperman’s detailed analysis of the conflict found that NATO’s involvement extended the length of hostilities by thirty weeks, resulting in thousands of additional deaths.708 Without the intervention by NATO, it is likely that the conflict would have only lasted six

weeks\textsuperscript{709} and the destabilization of Libya and the surrounding region would have been avoided.\textsuperscript{710}

Additional evidence that protecting civilian life was a secondary concern of Operation Unified Protector comes from NATO’s refusal to investigate the scores of non-combatant deaths caused by its airstrikes, despite separate reports and calls for action by both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.\textsuperscript{711} If the real reason behind intervening in Libya was truly to protect its population than NATO should be transparent about the methods pursued and welcome suggestions to reduce the harm its actions have caused, instead of stonewalling any efforts to provide a more complete picture about its conduct, which Milne rightly criticizes. He writes that “…NATO leaders and cheerleading media have turned a blind eye to such horrors as they boast of a triumph of freedom…but it is now absolutely clear that, if the purpose of western intervention in Libya’s civil war was to protect civilians and save lives, it has been a catastrophic failure.”\textsuperscript{712} In blocking all efforts to both bring an early end to the conflict and ignoring calls for an internal review of its practice during the course of the conflict leaves only two possible reasons for why NATO engaged in Operation Unified Protector. Either considerations other than humanitarian ones were paramount or, if as policymakers claim,

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\textsuperscript{709} Ibid., 120.
\textsuperscript{710} Kuperman’s acerbically concludes that “Overall, NATO intervention significantly exacerbated humanitarian suffering in Libya and Mali, as well as security threats throughout the region. The only apparent benefit is the Libyans have been able to vote in democratic elections, but the elected government has little authority in a country now controlled by dozens of tribal and Islamist militias accountable to no one.” Ibid., 132.
\textsuperscript{712} Seumas Milne, “If the Libyan war was about saving lives, it was a catastrophic failure,” \textit{Guardian}, October 26 2011.
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protecting civilians was the only motivation, then the operation was run in an incredibly incompetent and inept fashion.

I adhere to the first position. I believe that humanitarian intervention and its latest variant, the Responsibility to Protect, are employed as a veneer to guarantee domestic support for overseas adventures and mask their true geopolitical motivations. I thus broadly align myself with both the realist and radical critique of humanitarian intervention, which both argue that they are carried out in the pursuit of national interest. Krieg summarizes the realist position as follows, “…realists argue that national interests must prevail in the decision to intervene…self-interested motivations have to be an inherent part of humanitarian intervention. Indeed, national interests cannot be divorced from humanitarianism or altruism…” The claim then that humanitarian interventions are completely selfless moral efforts is thus simply false. On this point realists find common ground with more radical critiques of humanitarian intervention, who nevertheless present, what I feel, is a more sophisticated analysis of the ideological and economic motivations that condition these interventions. These radical critiques argue that the proliferation of humanitarian interventions in the post-Cold War world can be understood as a contemporary manifestation of imperialism, one that employs the language of human rights and democracy to justify warfare in pursuit of national

715 The intersection of realist with Marxist influenced critiques of international relations is not a new phenomenon. Indeed Alker and Biersteker were arguing that elements of each approach could be usefully integrated decades ago. See Hayward Alker and Thomas Biersteker, “The Dialectics of World Order: Notes for a Future Archeologist of International Savoir Faire,” *International Studies Quarterly* 28 (1984): 121-142.
advantage and to enrich a connected political and economic class.\footnote{For analysis in this vein see Ellen Meikins Wood, “Democracy as Ideology of Empire,” in Colin Mooers, ed., \textit{The New Imperialists: Ideologies of Empire}, (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006), 9-24. Seymour provides a sustained and detailed critique of the ideology of liberal imperialism in Richard Seymour, \textit{The Liberal Defence of Murder}, (London: Verso, 2008). Harvey focuses upon the economic aspects that promoted project of American imperial expansion in the immediate post 9/11 period. David Harvey, \textit{The New Imperialism} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).} While the Responsibility to Protect was trotted out as a justification for the Libyan intervention and formed a core theme of NATO’s public relations strategy,\footnote{“The focus of communications efforts will be on the following topics, once NATO political direction is given, which provide the opportunities to promote and/or reinforce the themes: a) Protect Civilians- By taking action NATO is contributing to the broad international effort to protect the Libyan people…e) Humanitarian Assistance- as a responsible international actor, and in support of its regional partners, NATO stands ready to respond to any requests for assistance to ease the humanitarian situation that has resulted from the uprising in Libya.” NATO, “NATO Strategic Communications Framework in Support of UN Security Council Resolution 1973” PDD (2011) 0102 REV 3, April 21 2011.} NATO put more effort into media management than post-conflict reconstruction. The application of humanitarian as an adjective to the intervention in Libya is therefore an indefensible one.

That Operation Unified Protector was humanitarian only in the sense of the language employed to justify it should not be surprising. As a trans-scalar space of intervention, it was created and maintained solely through the application of violence. While the conduct of the intervention clearly demonstrated advances in the military hardware, coordination between multinational forces, and the ability of the complex institutional nexus structure to tie together the strategic and tactical elements necessary for the success of such a campaign, it was absent the claims of political and social process that accompanied NATO’s mission in Afghanistan. As hollow as those claims may have been, their disappearance from contemporary interventions illustrates the degraded importance attached to any substantive social project. The highly problematic projects of neoliberal state building which characterized the immediate post 9/11 period are being discarded in favor of attempts at simply maintaining the geopolitical perimeters...
of Western order. As Lindley-French argues the new style NATO interventions have an overwhelming focus on this single objective. In his opinion, “These interventions have as much to do with preserving the structure of the international system the West built by shoring up states as reflective of any humanitarian impulse. Therefore, structural intervention is the stuff of contemporary NATO and forces defense planners on tight budgets to make hard choices about the most cost-effective use of their national effort in pursuit of a stabilizing effect given the ever-increasing political imperative to intervene. In other words, NATO’s new interventions represent a strategic tipping point for the Alliance…” This is how trans-scalar spaces of intervention, should be conceived of, as a new format of post-humanitarian interventions occurring due to the conditions of intensified neoliberalism and heightened geopolitical uncertainty that characterize the present. The existence of these spaces then is representative of the collapsed horizon of what is politically possible in the contemporary conjuncture.

Trans-scalar spaces of intervention are rewriting the form of interactions occurring within the geopolitical scale and contributing to the condition of scalar flux that pervades the present. However, before these attributes are delved into it is first necessary to conclude my discussion of NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya and survey the chaos that followed in its wake. Ironically, for an operation where the efficient elimination of a threat in an attempt to gain an advantageous strategic position, was the sole motivating factor, the concentration of violence did not lead to a productive outcome, but rather resulted in the destruction of the social basis of Libyan society. Trans-scalar spaces of intervention are not productive arenas. Indeed it was this very fixation with reducing the

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cost and length of the operation that spurred a lack of planning for the post-conflict phase, thus leading to the wider destabilization of the region and laying the basis for future interventions and the further expenditure of funds. Trans-scalar spaces of intervention are hence not actually efficient or effective if viewed from a wider perspective, beyond the actual duration of the space itself.

**Post-Intervention: A crescendo of chaos after the closure of the trans-scalar space of intervention:**

The brutal execution of Gaddafi on October 20 as he fled Sirte by Mistra based militias was a foreshadowing of the violence and chaos that would soon envelop Libya. As Netto notes the brutality of Gaddafi was mirrored by the brutality of the rebels, with their actions undermining the potential for the emergence of a stable democratic society in Libya. He explains that, “…the message the rebels were sending by having allowed the executions to take place and then protecting whoever had carried them out did not bode well for a country that had aspired to rebuild itself on democratic foundations…Despite the mood of freedom in the air, Libya in the first few days after the end of the regime was not much different, in terms of justice, from the country Gaddafi had controlled for so long.”

The end of the Libyan conflict was thus encapsulated by a final act of violence that the violated spirit of justice along with the rule of law and denied the Libyan people the restitution that a trial and public accounting of the abuses of the Gaddafi regime would have brought. Instead, the final stage of Operation Unified Protector was

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721 A warrant for Gaddafi’s arrest had been issued by the International Criminal Court in June. His standing trial for crimes against humanity would have been preferable to his actual fate. Colum Lynch, “Gaddafi is subject of ICC arrest warrant,” *Washington Post*, June 27 2011.
characteristic of the wider pretensions, under which the intervention had initially occurred, with its flagrant violation of the terms of UN Resolution 1973 and a lack of transparency regarding its conduct.

With the decades of distrust sowed by Gaddafi and a paucity of state institutions, Libya lacked a strong basis to build a new liberal society following the official conclusion of NATO operations in the country on October 31 2011. Although the NTC was widely recognized as the official government of the Libya, fighters from a range of different ethic and regional militias had done the actual fighting against the former regime. United by little else than a hatred of Gaddafi, a sustained project of reconciliation and nation building would have been necessary to demobilize them and unite the fractious former opposition to Gaddafi that as now faced with the tasked of governing. Unfortunately, as Pack points out, the NTC lacked this very capacity. As he notes, “The NTC was largely unable to appeal over the heads of the militias directly to the Libyan people because throughout the transitional period it was too weak to launch infrastructure projects, create jobs, establish functioning institutions, or even establish sufficient demobilization or vocational training programs to get militiamen prepared for civilian employment.” The NTC’s problems were further compounded by the lack of legitimacy it held within the country, with much of its leadership viewed as representing Western or Gulf rather than Libyan interests.

In contrast to the sustained presence that followed the initial period of conflict in

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Afghanistan and Iraq, the international community rapidly abandoned Libya. Michaels observes that, “Interestingly, despite the experience of Afghanistan and Iraq, there seems to have been no meaningful consideration of the post-conflict period.” This was not a simple oversight, or forgetfulness on the part of NATO. Instead, once the trans-scalar space of intervention was closed and the enactment of violence ceased, all interest in Libya as a political and social entity vanished. The mission objective, the removal of Gaddafi, had been achieved. While public interest in Libya quickly waned, economic interest remained strong, as multinational oil companies jockeyed for position in this new environment. These machinations however would amount to little, as despite the early, misplaced, optimism by some scholars the situation in Libya would rapidly degenerate. Western states would lose their ability to influence events on the ground, destabilizing wider geopolitical dynamics. Eliminating the perceived threat of Gaddafi would then result in the proliferation of multitude of further threats.

The power vacuum in Libya would be filled by the violence of hundreds of militias, originally armed and backed by Western and Gulf States, would jockey amongst

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728 Early on NATO’s intervention was hailed as a triumph and the future prospects for Libya were judged to be quite promising. Analysis that as later events would show was heavily tinted by rose-colored glasses. See Ivo Daalder and James Stravridis, “NATO’s Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an Intervention,” Foreign Affairs 91(2012): 2-7. Dirk Vandewalle, “After Qaddafi: The Surprising Success of the new Libya,” Foreign Affairs 91 (2012): 8-15.
themselves for power, run amuck over an ineffectual central government, and drag the
country into a cycle of lawless revenge.\textsuperscript{729} A brief survey of the major events in Libya
since NATO departed from its skies is sufficient to provide an idea of the depth of the
disorder that has gripped the country. Since the election of the General National Congress
in July 2012, Libya has had four Prime Ministers, one who resigned after he was
kidnapped and other after his family was threatened.\textsuperscript{730} In September 2012, Islamic
militants attacked and burned to the ground the American consulate in Benghazi, killing
its ambassador.\textsuperscript{731} Benghazi has become a hub of Islamist militancy following the fall of
Gaddafi.\textsuperscript{732} In early 2013, France bombed and sent an expeditionary force to the
neighboring country of Mali, after Islamic forces, empowered by weapons looted from
armories in Libya, seized large swaths of the country and threatened its government.\textsuperscript{733}
The Libyan intervention thus led directly to a future intervention and sparked a new
conflict.

Throughout 2013 anti-militia protests in Libya were regularly met with violence,
with dozens killed and hundreds wounded.\textsuperscript{734} In January 2014, the General National
Congress refused to stand down once its mandate had expired.\textsuperscript{735} Its weakness was put on

\textsuperscript{729}For an early overview of Libya’s militias see Amnesty International, \textit{Militias Threaten Hopes for New Libya} (London: Amnesty International 2012).
Sam Frizell, “Libya PM Quits, Says he was targeted in armed attack,” \textit{Time}, April 13 2014.
\textsuperscript{732} Nancy Youssef, “Benghazi Libya has become training hub for Islamist fighters,” \textit{McClatchy Newswire}, Washington D.C, December 12 2013
\textsuperscript{735} Patrick Markey and Ghaith Shennib, “In Standoff, Libyans protest over parliament extension,” \textit{Reuters}, February 7 2014.
clear when it was unable to prevent Eastern based militia groups from selling oil to a North Korean flagged tanker, prompting a US Navy Seals operation, which seized control of the tanker and handed it over to the Libyan government.\textsuperscript{736} In May former General Haftar, who had refused to recognize the authority of the General National Congress when it had extended its mandate, launched Operation Dignity with elements of the Libyan army and aligned militia groups against Islamic militants in Benghazi and concurrently attacked the Libyan parliament in Tripoli with heavy weapons.\textsuperscript{737} Astoundingly in these circumstances, elections were called in June of 2014, with turnout at 18\%.\textsuperscript{738} the Council of Deputies, the successor to the General National Congress, fled, due to security concerns east to the city of Tobruk. Due to a lack of suitable accommodations in the city, it has been holding meetings in a Greek Ferry offshore.\textsuperscript{739} Meanwhile Islamist parties that had refused to recognize the election results formed a rival New General National Congress and remained in Tripoli.\textsuperscript{740} France, Britain and the United States closed their embassies and recalled their staff in August, an inglorious end in Libya for the states what had spearheaded the intervention only three years prior.\textsuperscript{741} Shortly after this departure, a coalition of Islamist and Misrata militias seized and largely destroyed Tripoli’s international airport.\textsuperscript{742} Fearing the growing strength of Islamist

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\textsuperscript{742} Muhammed Juma and Amro Hassan, “Islamist militias seize main Libya airport as conflict deepens,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, August 24 2014.
militias the UAE and Egypt secretly launched airstrikes against their positions in Tripoli, without the prior knowledge of the United States, strikingly illuminating its declining influence in the region and providing alongside Mali, further evidence of the unpredictable and expansive regional blowback that NATO’s actions have had.\textsuperscript{743}

From the overview above it is clear that whatever promise post-Gaddafi Libya had has quickly evaporated. As Gaub puts it, “Libya appears to be heading for disaster, harried by kidnappings of high-ranking officials, mortar strikes, assassinations, car bombings, attacks on diplomats, mob rule and a lack of institutions strong enough to rebuild the country. In this volatile climate, political decision-making is fatally slow, oil production is down 70\% and Libyans are increasingly pessimistic about their country’s fate…the country seems poised on the edge of lawlessness, violence, political atomization and even renewed authoritarianism.”\textsuperscript{744} Libya is on the verge of becoming a new Somalia on the Mediterranean, a failed state that is a source of regional instability and a site for the proxy conflicts of neighboring states; that may once again draw in Western countries as new sanctions and a possible future intervention are contemplated.\textsuperscript{745}

The initially restricted and concentrated violence of the trans-scalar space of intervention has generated an expansive, permeable, and durable area of disturbance. The percolating effects that continue to reverberate from NATO’s intervention provide a practical example of what Beck referred to as a risk boomerang, where what at first

glance can seem a fairly innocuous action to eliminate a singular risk results in the production further dangers in the future. He writes, “Formerly unseen secondary effects thus become visible primary effects…” The projection of power downward by NATO from the transnational to the local, has been reciprocated by the upward projection of Libyan militia groups, who operating from the local scale, have shattered any coherence or semblance of governance at the national scale within Libya and are impinged upon both the international and transnational scale, forcing actors at both levels to adjust their security calculations.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear the outcome of NATO’s first intervention as a global security nexus has not been a desirable one. Despite the high levels of planning and coordination that occurred during the duration of Operation Unified Protector, it has proven to be disastrous to the Libyan people, regional stability, and Western interests in the area. Although a large portion of the blame for this result is due to the lack of thought given to Libya post-Gaddafi, it is questionable whether the eventual outcome would have been different if this were not the case. Previous Western interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan were followed by a sustained peacekeeping component, yet the situation in both countries has deteriorated and lasting stability has proven to be elusive. In my opinion, the optimal response would have simply been one of non-intervention. Western excursions abroad have historically been fraught with contradictions and hypocrisy. It is preferable to simply allow independent dynamics to

746 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a new Modernity (London: Sage, 1992), 37. Heng applies the boomerang effect in the context of international relations to argue that it can provide a means of explaining how a strategy to eliminate a singular risk can result in the production of multiple unpredicted risks in the future. Yee-Kuang Heng, War as Risk Management: Strategy and Conflict in an Age of Globalised Risks (New York: Routledge, 2006), 54.

747 This inversion of scalar relations can also occur in the pursuit of progressive ends. For example see Jennifer Fluri, “Geopolitics of gender and violence from below,” Political Geography 28 (2009): 259-265.
develop based a relationship of upon mutual respect. Too often, the result from the unintended consequences of these actions is the loss of additional life and the expenditure of resources that could have been directed to more socially beneficial ends.

The conflict between national and collective sovereignty was clear during Operation Unified Protector in Libya, where a majority of NATO’s membership refused to contribute to the mission that was subsequently plagued by supply shortages. Libya as I outlined in this chapter was notable in two further respects. First, it demonstrated the practical operation of NATO as a global security nexus under conditions of austerity. Second, Libya represents a new format of intervention; one that I argued could can be conceptualized as a trans-scalar space of intervention. NATO’s immersion in contemporary economic and geopolitical pressures have highlighted weaknesses in its new organizational form as the unity of its membership increasingly frays.

Smart Defense and the deep integration of European militaries that it proposes are, as I argue in the next and final chapter, a response to these problems. Yet if history is any guide it is highly unlikely that Smart Defense, if it is enacted at all, will remotely resemble what has been proposed. Instead, NATO will muddle through until the next crisis that besets the West sparks a plethora of new proposals for reform that will be largely forgotten once the looming danger fades. Indeed this is exactly what has happened with NATO’s response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its threatening posture to its Baltic members.
CHAPTER 5

A RETURN TO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE?

This final chapter begins by examining the repercussions of NATO’s Libya operation. After arguing that Libya demonstrates a declining interest by NATO and by extension, the West in sustained governance projects the chapter turns to examine the impetus behind the ambitious Smart Defense initiative. I argue that Smart Defense is driven by both the demands of austerity and the necessity of providing NATO with a dedicated force if it is to successfully carry out future out of area expeditionary operations. However because it challenges core aspects of national sovereignty Smart Defense is unlikely to be fully implemented. The later portion of the chapter discusses how Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its increasingly bellicose posture towards NATO is sparking a renewed focus upon collective defense after over a decade of attention upon risk management. The rapidly shifting geopolitical environment then is altering the strategic logic of NATO and will likely spark an institutional reorganization of the Alliance. While, as the concluding section argues, this dissertation has traced the movement from one strategic orientation to another and how it sparked a wide-ranging transformation of NATO, it is likely that the Alliance is on the cusp of just such another momentous moment in its long and storied history.

The Wider Ramifications of the Libyan Intervention

NATO’s Libyan experience illustrates its sharply declining capability for coherent spatial management. Since the end of the Cold War, how space has been conceived and its relationship to the geopolitical scale has undergone at least two marked shifts. During
the Cold War a strategy of containment, against the geopolitical rivalry of the Soviet
Union prevailed, in the decades following the victory of the West and with no clear
ideological competitors, a sharp reversal occurred; now the encouragement of political
and economic flows and transversal linkages between societies was of paramount
concern. Indeed, it was the spaces that remained static and refused to integrate within this
new post-Cold War geoeconomic order that were deemed threats and viewed with
suspicions.748 Barnett referred to these spaces as the “...non-integrating gap, where
connectivity remains thin or absent. Simply put, if a country was losing out to
globalization or rejecting much of its cultural content flows, there was a far greater
chance that the United States would end up sending troops there.”749 Integrating these
areas within the flows of neoliberal globalization became a primary strategic concern of
Western states in the immediate post-Cold War period.

A project of this magnitude required the extension of new governance
mechanisms to guide this process. The peacekeeping operations of Iraq and Afghanistan
were efforts to implant the mechanisms of neoliberal governance within states that stood
outside of the post-Cold War geoeconomic world order. They were designed to enmesh
these states in a subservient relationship with the West. This strategic initiative influenced
the format of geopolitics practiced in this era, spawning what Roberts, Secor and Sparke
labeled as a new form of neoliberal geopolitics.750 My contribution in the last chapter was

748 Katharyne Mitchell, “Ungoverned space: Global security and the geopolitics of broken windows,”
1996). Matthew Sparke, “Not a state, but a state of mind: cascading cascadias and the geoeconomics of
cross-border regions,” in M. Perkmann, & N.-L. Sum eds., Globalisation, regionalisation and cross-border
regions (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 212-240.
749 Thomas Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the twenty-first century, (New York:
750 Susan Roberts, Anna Secor, and Matthew Sparke, “Neoliberal geopolitics,” Antipode 35 (2004): 886-
897.
to place this discussion of geopolitics and geoeconomics within a wider framework of space and scale and utilize it to discuss how the format of NATO’s interventions have changed over the last decade from Afghanistan to Libya.

The Libyan operation represented the abandonment of the attempt at integration that characterized these earlier efforts and thus the decline of traditional neoliberal geopolitics. In its place a new variant of geopolitical reasoning has emerged that will foster further sources of instability in the future. The foreclosure of ambition and the reduction of strategic horizons present in this new formulation will impact upon the production of the geopolitical scale. The ramifications of the intervention in Libya then exceed the duration of the operation itself and offer a window to the contours of the present conjuncture and the wider systematic structure of the current geoeconomic order. This is because Libya served as both a site for the interplay of geopolitical relations and its current state is a result of their outcome. As Agnew puts it, the geopolitical and its linkage to the process of spatial, formation is a central component of contemporary existence. He writes that “…the modern world is defined by the imaginative ability to transcend the spatial limits imposed by everyday life and contemplate the world as a whole…The geopolitical imagination therefore is a defining element of modernity.”

The geopolitical is thus the fulcrum upon which practices of spatial creation and the elaboration of new forms of strategic knowledge interrelate and emerge in the world. Libya provides an example of their actualization in the sense that realization of the intervention in the country transgressed a number of formal spatial separations, as I have noted above.

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While the geopolitical strategy of the West, and hence NATO, had been on extending the breadth of spaces considered ordered, i.e. neoliberal, prerogatives have shifted. This strategic turn has been driven by the imperative of austerity and the logic of risk management, elements that were both encapsulated within the formation of a trans-scalar space of intervention in Libya. What has occurred is a movement from the attempt to instill governance mechanisms to a strategic agenda that can best be understood as the governance of non-governance. NATO’s intervention in Libya was not guided by a wider programmatic purpose, but was simply an effort to remove an irritant and demonstrate the vigor of the West and its allies. What this lashing out has actually illustrated however is the ineptitude of the West and its inability to control the course of events as an ever more expansive area of disorder is generated. What should have been an obvious realization, that the non-governance that exists at the local and national scale within a trans-scalar space of intervention would be replicated as a wider and seemingly permanent condition once it collapsed was remarkably not apparent to policymakers.

Libya displayed the ability of NATO to reconfigure space and scale and formulate a new style of intervention in reaction to changing economic and geopolitical dynamics. The experience of Libya made clear strains between NATO members and the lack of resources that the Alliance had at its disposal. Following on the heels of Operation Unified Protector, a new initiative, Smart Defense, began to rapidly take shape in response to these issues. Smart Defense seeks to build upon past interoperability and integration initiatives and reconfigure the military forces of NATO’s European members into an expeditionary force capable of carrying out limited interventions within its regional sphere.
To do so Smart Defense proposes a substantial reconfiguring of the sovereignty of some NATO member states into a collective format with important elements of sovereignty being assumed by NATO. The circumscribing of sovereignty in order to bring into force a greater collective sovereignty, is not a uniform and linear process; neither however is the practice of sovereignty, as Lake reminds us, “…pure Westphalian sovereignty of the type assumed by the classical perspective may be a status this is enjoyed only by the greatest powers…Nearly all others face greater or lesser restriction on their sovereignty.”752 The dozens of Status of Forces Agreements that the United States has signed with states across the world, which provide the legal framework the allows for the stationing of the American military in foreign states and commonly provides immunity from all local laws to military personal, is a stark example of how the sovereignty of one state can be reduced, and consequently, that of another increased.753 Thus, the curtailing of one state’s coercive apparatuses to in effect align it with that of another more powerful state is not unpredicted. The circumstances with NATO are unique however because this process is now being affected by a transnational military organization and not a hegemonic state.

Smart Defense: Establishing the Foundation for Future NATO Operations

Smart Defense proposes the integration of many aspects of NATO’s European militaries. The Smart Defense initiative is therefore far more radical in its aims than the any previous programs examined thus far like the Combined Joint Task Force or NATO

Response Force. If successfully enacted to the full extent presently proposed Smart Defense would in effect establish a new form of collective sovereignty and see the emergence of trans-scalar military force on the European continent and the disappearance, in many respects of independent national militaries. Numerous capabilities that are considered an intrinsically part of national sovereignty would cease to exist. Participating states would lose the ability to solely determine the composition of their military forces, this would have knock on effects upon their foreign policy, requiring them to act in concert with other Smart Defense states on a wide range of security areas, or not at all. Integration to this extent requires a far more extensive and sophisticated level of governance than NATO has demonstrated up to this point. Indeed, it has struggled to promote the far less strenuous task of interoperability between members. It is highly doubtful that Smart Defense will become a viable initiative that will transform the military landscape in Europe and across NATO. The fact that such a program merits serious discussion by policymakers however is indicative of how much the geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape is altering with austerity and the rise of new strategic challenges forcing the elaboration of creative solutions in response.

Smart Defense was formally approved at NATO’s 2012 Chicago summit\textsuperscript{754} and focuses upon encouraging prioritization, cooperation, and specialization amongst NATO members.\textsuperscript{755} Prioritization encourages national governments to pursue defense spending in specific areas that will allow them to operate with greater efficiency with other NATO


\textsuperscript{755} There are currently twenty-eight active Smart Defense projects in areas as diverse as creating a universal armaments interface and pooling maritime patrol aircraft. NATO, “Multinational Projects: Media Backgrounder,” October 2013, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2013_10/20131018_131022-MediaBackgrounder_Multinational_Projects_en.pdf
forces. Cooperation attempt to achieve economies of scale and promotes strategic sharing of information. Out of these three components, it is specialization that separates Smart Defense from past initiatives and will be by far the most difficult aspect to implement. Specialization tries to get states to focus on particular areas of national expertise, while allowing their capabilities in other areas to degrade. Ongoing budget cuts are the main rational behind encouraging specialization. NATO admits this in a press release explaining the motivation behind Smart Defense, “With budgets under pressure, nations make unilateral decisions to abandon certain capabilities. When that happens the other nations fall under an increased obligation to maintain those capabilities. Such specialization by default is the inevitable result of uncoordinated budget cuts. NATO should encourage specialization by design so that members concentrate on their national strengths and agree to coordinate planned defense budget cuts with Allies…” Specialization then seeks to develop a comparative advantage for each country where they already have expertise. Germany for example would focus upon battle tanks, while France could increase its capacity in fighter-bombers.

To be successful specialization depends upon bonds strong enough between members to overcome the suspicions of other states that are one the hallmarks of an anarchical inter-state system. As MacDonald notes, “A paramount political constraint for Smart Defense is the considerable trust and shared sense of identity which is necessary when security issues are on the table. Governments desire to maintain complete autonomy when it comes to military and security issues is a constant feature throughout

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history...Smart Defense initiatives will raise fears of entrapment. On the other hand, 
countries will also experience fears of abandonment related to pooling partners’ possible 
refusal to take part in a given military mission.”

Smart Defense demands unity in order 
to function. One could easily imagine a situation in which a state that had specialized in a 
crucial capacity refused to take part in an intervention, thus effectively exercising veto 
power over the mission. As the experience of Libya indicates, where the majority of 
members chose not to contribute to the operation these are not idle fears.

In addition to the requisite high level of trust, which it is doubtful exists at this 
stage within NATO; successful specialization requires the creation of new decision 
mechanisms to protect the formal equality that NATO members have historically held 
within the organization. Yet historically NATO has been far better at prosing creative 
solutions, then actually not enacting them. Henius outlines the difficulties that NATO 
faces, “…if NATO pursues specialization, in addition to the challenges of keeping 
physical capacities available one should take into account the need to ensure a just and 
fair politico-strategic decision process. If an ally no longer possess certain capabilities 
and thereby is physically prevented from participating in a certain mission, should it still 
have the same voice in the Alliance as those allies who actually do hold the assets 
required for the mission?”

Ironically then specialization could serve to aggravate 
divisions within NATO and institutionalize a multitier alliance, with states that have 
specialized in key areas exerting greater influence upon the organization.

At present no

760 Of course informal influence within NATO has always been present, with the United States, as the major financial backer of NATO always determining senior positions within the organization.
new decision mechanisms that could address these issues has even been proposed, a significant oversight, if NATO is serious about pursuing national specialization.

While the idea of national specializations is a unique development, the Smart Defense projects currently being pursued and its other two areas of focus: prioritization and cooperation are not novel creations. The pooling and sharing of resources they propose is in fact a common arrangement between allied states. Indeed the European Union has pursued its own pooling and sharing arrangements through the European Security and Defense Policy. Central to this policy is the policy European Defense Agency that is tasked with encouraging the integration of national European defense industrial bases into a common European one. Concerns with maintaining national sovereignty have blocked any substantial progress. As Molling argues, “…states are blocking a higher level of economic efficiency and military effectiveness by clinging to their desire to decide unilaterally on the interest of their armed forces.”\footnote{Christian Molling, “Pooling and Sharing in the EU and NATO,” (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2012), 3.} This is a position echoed by other authors.\footnote{See David Blagden, “Modeling European Security and Defence Policy: Strategic Enablement, National Sovereignty and Differential Atlanticism.” Yale Journal of International Affairs 3 (2008): 87-99. Giovanni Faleg and Alessandro Giovannini, “The EU between Pooling & Sharing and Smart Defence. Making a Virtue of necessity?,” (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2012), 25.}

If pooling and sharing arrangements have encountered severe difficulties amongst members of the European Union, who are linked together by an extensive institutional framework that far exceeds NATO; then the prospects of joining together non-EU members such as Turkey within such an arrangement, are not good. Even within NATO Smart Defense is not the first attempt at a comprehensive pooling and sharing
The Defense Capabilities Initiative was created at the 1999 NATO Washington Summit, laid out several broad defense related categories, and sought to secure commitments from states to focus upon particular areas. After only ten months, however the initiative was effectively dead in the water, due to a lack of interest from NATO members. A relaunched effort in 2002, the Prague Capabilities Commitment, also met with little success.

The impetus for the renewed effort at pooling and sharing which Smart Defense represents arises from and is being driven by the contemporary era of austerity that is reshaping political and economic relations. While burden sharing has long been a point of contention within NATO, the scale of the defense cuts being passed by NATO’s European members threatens to undermine the viability of the organization. Smart Defense is viewed, in words of NATO’s Secretary General, as the answer to “…preventing the financial crisis from becoming a security crisis.” With the United States pivoting towards Asia and possessing its own independent globe spanning military, Smart Defense can be seen as a project to preserving the terms of the trans-Atlantic bargain that NATO has always embodied. Smart Defense is designed to maintain the

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764 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, The Defence Capabilities Initiative and NATO’s Strategic Concept, Interim Report, (Brussels: Defence and Security Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities, 2000).
765 Carl Ek, NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment, (Washington D.C: Congressional Research Service, 2007).
768 Hallams provides an overview of the terms of the Trans-Atlantic bargain and how it is being challenged by current geopolitical developments. Ellen Hallams, A TransAtlantic Bargain for the 21st Century: The
ability of NATO’s European members to function as a coherent and credible military force, in concert with, or separate from the United States. In this sense then Smart Defense is a new answer to the dilemma that has persisted within NATO since its foundation how to connect the disparate defense capabilities of the United States and Europe together in a sustained and systemic fashion.

Smart Defense and the retooling of NATO this entails is ambitious and far reaching. It is designed to provide a sustainable foundation that will allow NATO to carry out a new format of missions in the future. At the conceptual level, as Lindley-French argues, echoing my perspective, NATO has no shortage of solutions to the contemporary challenges which its faces. Whether it will have the material capacity to act upon this potential doubtful however. As Lindley-French observes, “NATO has just about got its vision, structure and organization right for the new missions…However too many of the member nations are unable to provide forces capable enough and with sufficient capacity to make best use of the Alliance.”\textsuperscript{769} Smart Defense seeks to generate the material capacities that will make NATO’s transition into a global security nexus successful. This process however is fraught with tension. Far less ambitious NATO pooling and sharing programs have failed. Even if Smart Defense achieves a measure of success, as Larrabee reminds us, pooling and sharing is not a cure-all solution. He argues, “Pooling and sharing is no panacea. It can help to rationalize defense efforts and reduce costs, but it cannot make up for sustained drops in defense spending.”\textsuperscript{770} Yet Smart Defense is more

than simply a pooling and sharing program, it seeks, through its specialization
mechanism, to provoke a reorganization of power from the national to the trans-scalar
level.

If Smart Defense is successful, it will solidify a new internationalization of
military force across its member states. This process is still in its early stages and is
primarily gestating within, across, and through the states of the European Union, as
Mayer notes, “A transnational military network is emerging particularly within the EU,
with widely shared practices, cross-border cooperation, and often multinational and hence
interlocked capabilities in which Member States’ autonomous capacity for action is
increasingly subject to political, institutional, and physical constraints.” Smart Defense
is by and for Europe. The United States is encouraging this process, as a Europe capable
of organizing and projecting its own military force frees up American forces for
engagements in other endeavors, but is standing largely outside of it, as it has the
capacity to maintain a full spectrum military force for the foreseeable future; the US, in
contrast to Europe, has no need to specialize.

Smart Defense exemplifies transnationalism, serving as a stark example of how
NATO is striving to become a trans-scalar organization, through rendering a central
element of the national and international divide, domestic control over external coercive
force, irrelevant. Smart Defense arises out of the demands of austerity and the
consequential decline in national levels of defense spending. While Smart Defense is
being blocked because it circumscribes the ability of NATO’s European members to field

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forces capable of engaging in the full spectrum of traditional military operations,\textsuperscript{772} austerity is quickly making this fear a reality.

For over sixty years for as an alliance concerned with the collective defense of its members and now as a global security nexus engaging in crisis management operations NATO has built bridges between formerly distinct national and international concerns, fostering a trans-scalar synthesis across its membership that has generated new approaches to security. While NATO has experienced great success ideationally, producing new norms and values, it has been largely unable to translate this success into actual practice. The full realization of its efforts to promote interoperability and integration have been blocked by states concerned about potential infringement upon their sovereignty. The tension between national and collective sovereignty is one that has continually stymied NATO operations.

\textit{A Renewed Emphasis on Europe and Collective Defense}

Opening the 69\textsuperscript{th} Session of the United Nations in the autumn of 2014, Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon painted a bleak picture of world affairs. “The horizon of hope is darkened. Our hearts are made very heavy by unspeakable acts and the death of innocents. "Cold War ghosts have returned to haunt our times. We have seen so much of the Arab Spring go violently wrong."\textsuperscript{773} A series of escalating crises, geopolitical, economic, and environmental in origin, all with no easy solution in sight mark the arrival

\textsuperscript{772} Full spectrum forces are able to engage in the complete range of military operations in land, sea, and air situations.  
\textsuperscript{773} Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, “Secretary-General’s address to the General Assembly- From Turmoil to Peace,” United Nations, New York, 24 September 2014.  
of a more turbulent state of global affairs. The balance, as Haass has argued, shifted from order to disorder, with altered structural conditions alongside blunders by policy makers responsible for destabilizing the international system.\(^{774}\)

Unsurprisingly in this climate the constant, drumming rhetoric about the necessity of identifying and containing risk and reacting to crisis has only intensified. A narrative of constant crisis has encapsulated current discourse and subsumed political expression. As Skilling explains, “…characteristic of modern politics is the construction of a constant crisis and of a permanent state of exception…crises no longer look like crises, but have become an everyday, taken-for granted part of social reality.”\(^ {775}\) The condition of pervasive uncertainty is the reality of the post-Cold War world where the ceaseless and grinding logic of the War on Terror serves as an empty signifier\(^ {776}\) that can be applied to justify a broad spectrum of Western policies from drone strikes abroad to the curtailment of civil liberties at home. Despite tottering in 2007-2008 neoliberalism remains firmly entrenched as a matter of socio-economic policy and political practice. NATO, as I have demonstrated, sought to transform itself to effectively operate in this new world

The overarching goal of this dissertation was to analyze what I identified as a systemic shift in the institutional and intellectual apparatus of NATO, a process that started in 1990s but was rapidly accelerated following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Collective defense, the basis upon which NATO was founded and its central operating principle for more than fifty years saw its influence in both theory and practice

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significantly diminished. In its place, crisis management was elevated to the centerpiece of NATO strategy. Crisis management became the predominant approach in NATO for largely two reasons. First because it offered techniques which allowed for connections to be drawn between the seemingly distinct entities that challenge the West, enabling policy makers to make sense of what would otherwise be an inconceivable set of dangers. Second because crisis management was seen to improve the efficiency by which threats could be identified and reduce the cost with which these threats could be eliminated. In contrast to the lengthy and expensive Comprehensive Approach style operations like Afghanistan, crisis management operations were conceived as relatively short affairs that lacked any sustained or coherent peacekeeping component afterwards, thus significantly reducing their cost. In this regard, NATO’s most recent operation in Libya can be seen as an example of a crisis management operation in action.

The shift between the strategic logics of collective defense and risk management would result in fundamental changes in NATO’s behavior. Operating under the logic of collective defense during the Cold War NATO would never strike first, but would only respond to a direct attack against one of its members. In contrast under the logic of crisis management NATO adopted a far more proactive and aggressive posture. NATO would now seek to respond to and contain threats as they emerged, rather than react only if attacked. This transformation, as I have endeavored to illustrate, has touched upon all aspects of NATO and is responsible for giving rise to new institutions such as Allied Command Transformation, new models of collective command and control, new styles of intervention, and a new conceptual apparatus to comprehend and direct these developments. From my perspective conducting an academic examination of these
developments required that I reach beyond the traditional confines of the discipline of international relations and draw upon a diverse spectrum of thought in order to elaborate a trans-scalar methodology that I felt was more effective at capturing the complex dynamics occurring. While NATO has sought to position itself as the world’s premier global security organization and an effective calculator of risk, it has also through its actions served to increase the risk and unpredictability of the international system. The enveloping chaos presently engulfing Libya following NATO’s intervention in the country provides a clear indication of the unforeseen boomerang effects that its actions can have.

Crisis management is an outward looking approach that assumed, with the end of the Cold War that security issues on the European continent were largely settled. NATO was only able to go abroad, inserting itself into conflicts in Afghanistan and Libya, because peace reigned at home. This is clearly no longer the case, as the European geopolitical environment is now beset with uncertainty, sparked by Russian incursions into Ukraine that culminated in its annexation of Crimea and support for separatist forces in the east of the country. The old predictability and regularity that characterized interactions between Europe and Russia is quickly fading as a growing chorus of current and former world leaders proclaim that a new Cold War is looming. Although

Smart Defense, as I noted in the last section, was developed in order to provide NATO with the capacity to engage in out of area operations it could also be utilized to provide the Alliance with a stable commitment of force to deter an ever more hostile Russia.

NATO spent more than a decade fixated on regions outside of its traditional area of operations, now it is being forced to reorient itself once again and shift its strategic focus back to its borders with Russia. Russia’s actions in Ukraine, its annexation of Crimea, and bellicose posture towards the West has required that NATO reassure its concerned Baltic members about their territorial integrity. These efforts are leading to a return of collective defense to the centerpiece of current NATO strategy. This shift in focus can be seen in the formation of rapid response units based in Eastern Europe designed to respond to any Russian incursions. The renewed prominence of collective defense within NATO will result in a modification of both collective defense and crisis management, they will increasingly no longer appear as opposed doctrines but instead as complementary approaches with each modified under the pressures of current geopolitical realities.

The next section of this chapter will compare and contrast NATO’s 2012 Chicago and 2014 Wales summit. Although separated by only two years the concerns that were at the heart of each summit were radically different from one another. While NATO’s Chicago Summit was focused upon Smart Defense and how it would operate under

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782 Ewen MacAskill, “NATO to announce 4,000 strong rapid reaction force to counter Russian threat,” *The Guardian* September 5 2014.
conditions of prolonged austerity the Wales Summit was dominated by Russian actions in Ukraine and warnings of a return to the confrontations that characterized the Cold War. If Chicago sought to put into practice and solidify the foundations of crisis management, Wales may be remembered for starting a turn back towards collective defense. This discussion will be followed by a brief section that will offer some comments about possible future research agendas and a conclusion that will summarize the long, winding, and often contradictory path of NATO’s progression since the 1990s and situate this dissertation within its wider historical context.

**Chicago and Wales: From Smart Defense to Collective Defense?**

NATO’s 2012 summit in Chicago was meant to serve as the final encapsulation of the redesigning of the Alliance that had begun in earnest with its 1999 Strategic Concept, which provided the first official sanction to the elevated role that crisis management was coming to play in its strategic orientation. It was in Chicago that NATO finalized its terms of withdrawal from Afghanistan and congratulated itself for its seemingly successful operation in Libya. Chicago was where Smart Defense, a radical solution that threatened to blur the sovereignty of NATO’s European members was put forward as the solution to its perpetual budget crisis as I recounted in the last chapter. Regardless a Deterrence and Defense Posture Review conducted during the summit concluded that while budgetary issues remained a concern, “NATO has determined that, in the current circumstances, the existing mix of capabilities and the plans for their development are

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sound.” Chicago then was about solidifying the current course of NATO, not forging a new direction.

In contrast, the 2014 Wales summit occurred under the cloud of the unfolding crisis in Ukraine, with the Russian annexation of Crimea in March and its continuing support for separatists in the country’s east. Although Ukraine was not a NATO member, these actions occurred on its doorstep. Amidst the suddenly highly fluid geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe, with political leaders warning about a return to the tense atmosphere of the Cold War, and Russian incursions occurring in numerous Baltic States collective defense assumed a renewed prominence. However, NATO will have to elaborate a modified form of collective defense. Russia has adopted a hybrid or non-linear style of warfare in Ukraine – one that involves covert use of Special Forces and intelligence agents, local proxies, mass disinformation campaigns, intimidation through displays of military strength, and all manner of economic coercion. Collective defense against these types of attacks will not succeed if NATO simply reinvests in traditional military forces, such as tanks, artillery, and nuclear deterrents. Instead, NATO will have to prioritize a new set of assets, including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance,

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787 A term originally coined by Valdislav Surkov, one of Putin’s advisors and expanded upon by Peter Pomerantsev to describe the situation in Ukraine. See Peter Pomerantsev, “How Putin is Reinventing Warfare,” Foreign Policy, May 5 2014. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/05/how-putin-is-reinventing-warfare/
command and control, border management, and the capacity to deploy forces rapidly throughout Europe.788

This renewed focus on collective defense does not mean that crisis management will fade away. Rather NATO will also have to rely upon the tools of crisis management in order to anticipate the evolving situation in Eastern Europe.789 The Readiness Action Plan formulated at the Wales summit in response to Russia’s actions, demonstrates that complementary nature of both collective defense and crisis management.790 A core element of the Readiness Action Plan is the formation of a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, a continuous presence of 10,000 soldiers stationed in Eastern Europe along the Russian border and able to deploy within days, if called upon.791 This force will serve as a tripwire monitoring the situation along the border and utilizing crisis management techniques to do so in an effort to secure the collective defense of NATO members.

The Wales Summit is likely to herald a new era of restrained realism for NATO. In contrast to earlier summits where out of area operations and forging closer partnerships with states far outside NATO’s traditional domain of activity were high on the agenda, the discussion in Wales was focused upon issues that were the original function of the Alliance. As Rynning explains, “…NATO was not ready to extend new guarantees in response to threatened values in outside countries but instead focused on

788 Again budgetary constraints will be a major impediment even prior to the summit Canada and Germany blocked any discussion from occurring about raising spending targets. David Pugliese, “Canada and Germany derail NATO request to increase military spending targets,” National Post, September 3 2014.
789 For a reading of the crisis in Ukraine as an example of crisis management from both Russia’s and NATO’s perspective see Lawrence Freedman, “NATO and the Art of Crisis Management,” Survival 56 (2014): 7-42.
ramping up its capacity to defend existing members…This new found sense of realism resulted in the Readiness Action Plan for allies and deferred membership perspectives for Ukraine and Georgia.” 792 With an era of steadily worsening relations between Russia and the West is likely for the foreseeable future and both sides digging in for an extended confrontation, barring any extraordinary developments, such as Ukraine joining NATO, 793 a dynamic of managed hostility will define the relationship between Russia and the West. Rather than facing the choice of going out of area or out of business that it did in the 1990s NATO’s renewed realism places it in familiar territory.

**Future Research Agendas**

NATO is a vibrant and complex domain of study with an array of different areas that could be focused upon in future research. The most obvious one would be to analyze how NATO reacts to Russian actions and the impact that its response has upon Russia and the wider global economy. So far, efforts to encourage a resolution to the dispute over Ukraine have led NATO to level an array of sanctions against Russia 794, which Russia has responded to with its own counter-sanctions. 795 These retaliatory sanctions have had a negative effect upon global trade and financial flows and could possibly herald a gradual Russian decoupling from the global economy as it attempts to forge a regional based economic order through the institutional framework of the Commonwealth

of Independent States and the Eurasian Economic Union. A thickening and hardening of a Russian regional security complex, is then a very real possibility.\footnote{Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, \textit{Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 397-435.}

Another future research project would be to employ the trans-scalar methodology I developed during the course of this dissertation to improve the comprehension and provide a greater range of detail to operations of other multilayered transnational organizations. In this manner the genesis and enactment of projects by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund could be traced in a new way that demonstrates their interactions across a range of spaces both Western and non-Western and the dense exchange of information that occurs across a variety of scales local, national, and international in order to put these projects into action. Turning from the economic to the military sphere, my methodological framework would also be particularly useful in analyzing the drone strikes regularly conducted by the US military across the world and the trans-scalar spaces of intervention that they establish nested within a set of supposedly formal and rigid spaces and scalar apparatuses. Indeed the greater chaos that these strikes generate increases the unpredictability of the international system, paralleling in this sense NATO’s intervention in Libya.

\textit{Conclusion}

The initial impetus for my project began with a desire to understand the effects that the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and the subsequent turn to austerity in 2010 would have upon the projection of Western power. The new era of austerity would place great
strain upon the liberal world order that had been in place since 1945 and would require institutional and strategic alterations in response. While the post-war order which has determined so many aspects of social, political, and economic life around the world has undoubtedly been American centric, I did not want my dissertation to be simply about the how the United States has responded to a challenging economic and geopolitical climate, instead I wanted to discuss how the larger cultural and political configuration of the West was being changed post-2008. While this certainly required a large amount of focus upon the United States, it also required an analysis of the pressures that the extended crisis was placing upon the linkages that bind the aligned states that comprise the West. In this regard, NATO, the linchpin of Western security since the end of the Second World War, provided an obvious case for study. Defying critics, NATO had survived the end of the Cold War and embarked on a path of transformation, one that would surely be impacted by new global economic realities.

Central to this transformation was the gradual decline of collective defense as the core strategic logic of NATO, the growing influence of risk management, and the eventual acceptance of out of area operations by Alliance members. The 2008 Global Financial Crisis is the pivotal moment that accelerates and solidifies these pre-existing trends which it why discussion of it occupies large portions of chapters one and three. The stark contrast between NATO’s operations in Afghanistan and Libya, with Afghanistan occurring prior to the crisis and Libya coming afterwards provided an illuminating instance of what the decline in resources and the shift in strategic priorities resulting from the crisis would entail in operational terms.
The research methodology and the conceptual framework that I developed to analyze NATO’s transformation and the ramifications of the Global Financial Crisis upon the provision of security is one that is highly critical of the traditional, levels of analysis and agent structure approaches in international relations and is cross disciplinary in its orientation. These perspectives elaborated by Waltz, Singer, and Wendt offer, as I discuss at length through my survey of the relevant literature in the first and third chapters, what I feel to be a greatly circumscribed and static form of analysis, the alternatives, proposed by Doty amongst others are highly abstract and separated from political and economic considerations. Thus, I elaborated a methodology that relies upon developments in geography and political economy and places trans-scalar interactions and spatial production at its foundation. This approach offers a more responsive and comprehensive understanding of the manner in which traditional boundaries of national sovereignty are being traversed through the proposal of programs like smart defense, offering a recognizable way of comprehending the expanding array of linkages that NATO is pursuing with other political actors, and provides a manner of conceptualizing both why NATO choose to intervene in Libya and the actual format of its intervention. Insights that cannot be gained if we simply make the a priori assumption that the rigid national/international divide offers the sole way of framing a research agenda.

The institutional evolution of NATO, marked by its transition away from a defensive alliance concerned with the collective defense of its members to a pre-emptive logic of risk management and its reconfiguration in what I term a global security nexus, illustrates the necessity of the methodological approach which I employ. Over the last 15 years NATO has become a far more diffuse and complex organization than it was during
the decades of the Cold War. This is a process that I traced a length in chapter two where I explored how NATO broadened its understanding of security to include preemptive action in the 1990s and definitely settled the out of area debate at the end of the decade with intervention in Kosovo; in chapter three, where I examined the growing influence of the Science and Technology Office and Allied Command Transformation, which resulted in a post-territorial strategic posture and the formulation of an integrated multinational command structure and in chapter four where I analyzed the ramifications of these changes upon NATO’s style of intervention by comparing the decade long sustained peacekeeping effort in Afghanistan to the relatively short bombing campaign in Libya, which I argued could be viewed as what I labeled a trans-scalar space of intervention. This concept provides a coherent manner of analyzing how NATO organized and projected force in Libya, as well as its consequences.

My dissertation strived to demonstrate the interrelationship between political and economic factors, which is why I frequently delve into discussions about the broad structural forces shaping the global environment. I did this for example in chapter two, where I discuss the idea of geoeconomics. Austerity as I have previously noted is a central logic in this regard, impinging upon and shaping a plethora of processes. In the case of NATO, while less severely affected than a country like Greece, austerity did have an important impact, spurred the elaboration of new programs like Smart Defense, a focus on expanding its partnerships, and a shift in strategic orientation.

While I have situated my research within various academic literatures, I would like to conclude by talking briefly about its wider implications. In the early stages of conducting research and writing I believed that NATO’s Libya intervention, an out of
area operation, highly dependent upon NATO partners rather than members, and conducted relatively quickly and at low financial cost would serve as a template for future operations. Libya would be the first of many crisis management operations and would mark the final shift away from the traditional collective defense posture NATO had held since its formation. As I have discussed in this chapter however Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its perceived aggression towards NATO’s Baltic members has completely transformed the geopolitical environment in Europe. NATO is now shifting its focus back to Europe. Growing concern about defending NATO borders from intrusions means that future out of area operations are a diminishing possibility. Rather than pointing the way towards the future, as I originally thought, my dissertation is now properly thought of as a periodization study which covers a roughly two decade span, with particular emphasis on 2008 to 2014 and examines the causes for the waning influence of collective defense and the rise of crisis or risk management within NATO. The current moment is defined by the development of the opposite trend, a topic that is best left to future studies.

NATO’s constant elaboration of alternative doctrines could be read as a sign of weakness, of it simply lurching from crisis to crisis, with no overall coherence or formal vision. A contrasting and I believe more accurate assessment is that these shifts illustrate the flexibility of NATO by demonstrating its ability to rapidly shift in response to contemporary events. It is by effectively responding to the challenges faced by its members that NATO has continued as a viable and vibrant security organization for well over six decades.
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