THE URBAN POLITICS OF SETTLER-COLONIALISM:
ARTICULATIONS OF THE COLONIAL RELATION IN
POSTWAR MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA, 1945-1975 (AND BEYOND)

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation documents some of the ways that colonial practices and mentalities have shaped relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people in the historical and material conjuncture of Minneapolis, Minnesota, with a focus on the period 1945 to 1975. Building on political and geographical literature concerned with the enduring effects of settler-colonization in North American urban environments, my inquiry starts from the premise that the “colonial relation” retains a persistent structural trace in Minneapolis, manifesting through a series of practices and dynamics that operate to enforce particular forms of social, economic, and territorial domination. I begin by demonstrating that Indigenous peoples in the area were territorially and economically displaced in the construction of the newcomer settlement that became Minneapolis, which I describe by looking critically at the life of one of the city’s early “city builders,” Thomas Barlow Walker. I then expand this discussion by developing a series of arguments that demonstrate how the “colonial relation” has articulated in the Phillips neighborhood of South Minneapolis, which, for a variety of reasons, emerged as a site of significant Indigenous residential concentration and congregation in the aftermath of the Second World War. In particular, I consider how colonial practices and mentalities hastened Indigenous migration to the inner-city, constrained the knowledge practices of non-Indigenous advocacy organizations interested in alleviating urban forms of Indigenous marginalization, and shaped a culture of inner-city “racialized policing.” I then conclude with a brief and speculative look at the colonial relation in present-day Minneapolis, examining some of the ways that both Indigenous marginality and economic prosperity are bound up with broader deployments of state violence, particularly through the activities of local weapons manufacturers. Throughout, I argue that to make sense of the distinct patterns of group differentiated insecurity that disproportionately plagued Indigenous migrants to Minneapolis in the postwar period and the decades that followed, we need to think beyond the immediacy of the present and pay close heed to the ways in which colonially-inflected legacies, material distributions, and knowledge practices continue to have distinct effects.
For the rank-and-file members of our union that spent four weeks on the picket lines to render “impossible” demands a material reality.
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Chapter 1 Introduction: Postwar Minneapolis and the Colonial Relation

1.1 Introduction

In the late 1950s, *Minneapolis Tribune* staff writer Carl Rowan produced a series of reports about the “plight” of the Upper Midwest’s estimated seventy-five thousand Indigenous inhabitants.¹ The seasoned reporter had spent weeks collecting lurid tales of lives “full of misery, bitterness, confusion and insecurity,” as he travelled the region visiting “wilderness slums” and inner-city tenements, overcrowded “shacks” and vermin-infested rental apartments. He who “once ruled America,” one telling headline announced, today inherits only “hunger, dirt and disease.”

Rowan was not the first – nor would he be the last – to present such a grim portrait of twentieth century Indigenous life in the United States. His intervention fits in a long tradition of inquiry concerned with why so many Indigenous Americans lived in quotidian circumstances that are radically less secure than those of the “dominant society,” a phenomena that, in the patronizing language of Rowan’s day, was still often called the “Indian problem.”² Rowan’s dispatches from “Indian

¹ Carl Rowan, “The Plight of the Upper Midwest Indian: ‘The First Are Last’,” *Minneapolis Tribune*, Special Supplement, February 17 – March 3, 1957. NB I use the term “Indigenous” throughout this dissertation to refer to the pre-colonial inhabitants (and their descendants) of the territory that is now called Minnesota. In North America and elsewhere, Indigenous peoples are distinguished from “other sections of the national community” by their “distinctive identity, values, and history” (See Willie Ermine, Raven Sinclair, and Bonnie Jeffrey, *The Ethics of Research Involving Indigenous Peoples: Report of the Indigenous Peoples’ Health Research Center to the Interagency Advisory Panel on Research Ethics* (Saskatoon: Indigenous Peoples Health Research Center, 2004), 5.) The terms “American Indian” and “Indian” appear frequently in quotations below and should be understood as synonymous with the term “Indigenous,” as I use it here.

Country” shared much with earlier exposés but they are distinguished by the special attention they paid to the persistence of Indigenous insecurity in the city. While earlier observers tended to focus on the reservation as the primary locus of hardship, Rowan was intent to show that the “Indian problem” was also now an urban one.

In part, Rowan was responding to the fact that Indigenous Americans were moving to cities in greater numbers than ever before. The advent of the Second World War amplified a process of mass migration that would see thousands of reservation residents leave their home communities and settle in urban environments across the United States. More than twenty-five thousand Indigenous people enlisted in the war effort itself (a participation rate higher than any other group) and more than forty thousand others found work in wartime production. For most, these pursuits afforded a first opportunity to leave reservation communities for a sustained period and many chose to stay on in the city at war’s end. Opportunities afforded by the postwar GI Bill extended this broader migratory trend by encouraging returned combatants to enroll in academic programs, pursue vocational training, or take work in the private sector, all of which usually required a move to the city. Meanwhile, other federal initiatives, including the dubious Termination and Relocation programs launched in the early 1950s, actively

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encouraged reservation residents to pursue new lives in urban America. In the period between 1952 and 1972, public programs contributed to the urban “resettlement” of more than one hundred thousand Indigenous people.\(^4\)

In Minnesota, these trends were as pronounced as anywhere else. In fact, the war and its aftermath only added momentum to a migratory trend that was already well underway, “ignited” by significant reservation land loss and the economic deprivations of the Great Depression, among other factors.\(^5\) While the Indigenous population of Minnesota’s Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul numbered only a few hundred at the start of the war, it mushroomed to more than six thousand by the formal end of hostilities in Europe and the Pacific.\(^6\) This migratory process only accelerated after 1945 and by the late 1960s conservative estimates pegged the local population at ten thousand.\(^7\) Notably, too, while the broader phenomenon of Indigenous urbanization in this era was characterized by wide dispersal to cities across the United States, Indigenous people that left Minnesota reservations tended to stay in their home state at a much higher rate. Between 1955 and 1960, an estimated fifty-nine percent of the state’s “Indian out migrants” relocated within Minnesota. Only California had a higher rate of intra-state relocation.\(^8\)

In spite of their growing presence in cities like Minneapolis, however, Indigenous migrants often faced considerable hardship in urban settings. In *Night Flying Women*, Ignatia Broker recounts that her wartime move from the White

\(^5\) Child and White, “I’ve Done My Share,” 197.
Earth Reservation to the Twin Cities demanded that she learn how to cope with a complex range of hostilities and privations, including predatory landlords, institutional exclusion, interpersonal discrimination, and distinctly urban expressions of economic insecurity, among others. Broker’s experience was not unique, of course, and these challenges were persistent features of the lives of many that left reservation communities for the Twin Cities throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. Thus when the Minneapolis Tribune lamented in a 1968 editorial that most Minneapolis “Indians” were living in the “poorest sections of the city,” wracked by a sprawling crisis of unemployment, “subsisting on poverty-level incomes, lacking high-school educations, dropping out of school,” and trying to make a life “even without telephones,” it was describing part of a broader pattern of group-differentiated inequity in relatively accurate terms.

Rowan was not the only Minneapolis-based observer to characterize these challenges as symptomatic manifestations of what had long been called the “Indian problem.” Yet this dubious diagnosis has meant different things in different periods. In early usages of the phrase, the “problem” was interpreted as one of menace, as Indigenous people were deemed to pose palpable threats to settler ambitions and cultural codes. In the twentieth century, however, the “problem” came increasingly to be interpreted as one of integration, as Indigenous people were deemed defeated and downtrodden, ill equipped to adjust to the norms of the “dominant” society and unwilling to accept the presumed impossibility of sustaining traditional lifestyles in the face of the juggernaut of American modernity. The legal scholar Ray Brown

articulated the latter interpretation succinctly in an essay that he penned at the height of the Great Depression:

Most of the Indians’ possessions of value have passed into our hands, and dangers from hostile uprisings have long since passed into history. Looking at the situation through the eyes of the Indian, however, it is doubtful whether his condition at any time has been as critical as it is today. His ancient heritage in the hands of others, his customary mode of life is largely impossible, and even the means of subsistence, which he and his ancestors possessed, have vanished. Not having yet achieved the education and the economic competence necessary to survive in the struggle for existences with his non-Indian neighbors, he, and with him the American people, squarely face the issue of whether he shall sink into the disease, poverty and crime ridden stratum of society, or whether he shall survive as a respectable and self sustained part of our society.¹¹

For Brown and others, Indigenous people were at a crossroads: they must acquiesce to the norms of “respectable” American society or remain mired in destitution and defeat.

Variations on Brown’s assessment remained remarkably durable in the decades that followed and they were soon being articulated in analyses of the “Indian problem” in urban settings. In 1965, for example, a report issued by the Governor of Minnesota’s Human Rights Commission reiterated Brown’s anxieties and noted that the state’s burgeoning urban Indigenous population was encountering both “fortune and frustration” in the “alien world” of the city.¹² Some had “succeeded” by securing gainful employment, or learning how to “identify themselves with their new community.” In fact, some had come so far that “their children will be even further removed from the old life than they are,” the report...

crowed. But others have found “nothing but trouble in the city,” it continued. This group was deemed incorrigible and likely to “carry the worst of reservation ways to their grave.” Yet these “Indians” were not only a problem for themselves, the report surmised, because they “give non-Indian city dwellers an unfavorable image of the whole race.”

Those that lamented the persistence of the “Indian problem” often reiterated some variant of this problematic binary as non-Indigenous commentators proposed a range of theories to explain why such “failures” persisted. Some stressed that Indigenous migrants suffered because they lacked marketable skills, Christian tutelage, sociability, commitment, or startup money, while others proffered more structural explanations, such as a lack of entry-level jobs or bureaucratic impediments that barred access to key social services. Some of these interpretations were nakedly chauvinistic, openly declaring Indigenous people to be the authors of their own misfortune. Others were broadly sympathetic, stressing that a culture of institutional inflexibility was key to understanding the “plight” of Indigenous urbanites.

In both kinds of explanations it was often simply assumed that Indigenous people were, as a group, fundamentally unprepared, unable, or unwilling to win urban “success.” Yet while challenges of adjustment were real for many that left reservation communities for a life in the city, this line of interpretation has too often

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operated to absolve non-Indigenous commentators of the burden of pursuing a more rigorous examination of the sources of group-differentiated marginality. As the chapters that follow will demonstrate, the basic material fact that Indigenous migrants to cities like Minneapolis endured a far greater degree of insecurity than their Euro-American peers cannot be neatly summed up as a question of adaptation. Making sense of these distinctions requires that we ask a series of bigger questions about the social and political histories that undergird them.

To do so, it is necessary to consider how practices of colonization and their legacies continue to shape contemporary relationships. To paraphrase Audra Simpson, non-Indigenous conceptualizations of the “Indian problem” generally do very little to advance our understanding of the complexity of the “Indian’s problem.” Far too often, they obscure the constitutive importance of sordid histories of violence in rendering Indigenous lives less secure than those of their non-Indigenous counterparts.16

1.2 Research Objectives

Against such exculpatory presentations, my core objective in the chapters that follow is to demonstrate how persistent colonial practices and mentalities shaped relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people in the historical and material conjuncture of postwar Minneapolis, roughly, but not exclusively, in the period 1945 to 1975. I start from the premise that the project of Euro-American settlement, in the United States generally, and in the American Upper Midwest specifically, has been profoundly violent. Indeed, it is a matter of historical fact that

since at least the early nineteenth century Euro-American Minnesotans and their political representatives have pursued a range of strategies to impose territorial and social dominion over the region’s original inhabitants and their descendants. Through this process, Indigenous peoples have had their territorial holdings radically diminished, their cultural and political forms radically undermined, and their capacity to organize as self-sustaining and autonomous human collectivities radically interrupted (which is not at all to say extinguished). Yet the hierarchical political dynamics that animate these inauspicious beginnings do not belong to a now concluded historical past and my primary concern in what follows is to understand how they have been recalibrated and transformed in ways that allowed them to continue to shape contemporary relationships in the postwar period and beyond. My aim, in other words, is to “think carefully” about the continuity of the colonial relation, to trace the ways in which “streams of the past still infuse the present,” to borrow a phrase from Bruce Braun. 17 To do so, I draw on the work of Glen Coulthard and others in arguing that in settler-colonial societies like the United States, historically-inaugurated modes of being together remain persistent structural features of our shared contemporary existence, functioning as a “relatively secure or sedimented” set of relations that continue to enforce particular forms of social, economic, and territorial domination. 18

In the chapters that follow, I employ the term “colonial relation” to describe this enduring complex of dynamics. What I have in mind when I invoke this term is precisely the practices and mentalities that have operated to privilege the social


forms, economic prowess, territorial ambitions and interpretive frames of Euro-American settlers and their descendants over and above those of the region’s original inhabitants and their descendants. In other words, I adopt this language to stress that understanding the distinct patterns of group-differentiated insecurity that disproportionately plagued Indigenous migrants to the Twin Cities in the postwar period requires that we think beyond the immediacy of the present and pay close heed to the ways in which colonially-inflected legacies, material distributions, and knowledge practices continue to shape collective forms of togetherness.

I am fully cognizant of the fact that building a dissertation around the idea that a particular sort of relationship has endured over the course of roughly two centuries is a perilous enterprise. It is critical to acknowledge that to do so is to risk imposing a transhistorical metanarrative on the material and cultural specificity of a particular time and place. This is a danger that I intend to avoid and not least because I take seriously Cole Harris’ injunction to heed the local and historical specificities of different colonial contexts, to “position studies of colonialism in the actuality and materiality of colonial experience.”19 With this challenge in mind, my aim in what follows is emphatically not to suggest that a singular colonial logic has persevered across the centuries, impressing its dark prescriptions on the minds of successive generations of settler colonists and their descendants. It is, rather, to argue that elements of a complex politics of group-differentiated domination have continued across time precisely because they have adapted, mutated, and recalibrated in accordance with the demands of new social and political

conjunctures. My aim in this study is to trace some of these imperfect lines of continuity.

I am also fully cognizant of the fact that building an argument around the idea that a distinct sort of relationship persists between groups as broadly defined as “Indigenous” and “Euro-American” Minnesotans is to invite a host of objections. Thus as the very least, it is necessary to stress that there is an immense degree of internal differentiation within and amongst the broad categories “Indigenous” and “Euro-American,” in Minnesota as elsewhere. Those that might reasonably be included in either of these categorizations come from a huge range of personal backgrounds, class positions, cultural traditions and geographical locations. My point is not at all to assign a singular or static identity to either, nor to suggest that the forms of domination that I consider have uniform effects. It is, rather, to suggest that all of us negotiate our lives within shared political contexts, however divergent our individual experiences of them might be. Importantly, these contexts are not neutral. They are shaped by the interaction of myriad social relations, including those that operate to sustain and render legitimate the social, economic, and political power of some and not others.

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21 Interesting in this regard is Ruth Gilmore’s materialist definition of racism as the production of group-differentiated exposure to vulnerability and premature death. See Ruth Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prison, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 28.
1.3 Existing Research

Simply put, this dissertation is concerned with understanding the marginalization of Indigenous people in postwar Minneapolis as a relationally produced phenomenon. My primary interest is thus not in the experiences of urban Indigenous people *per se* but in how those experiences are shaped in the context of that group’s *relationship* to others, especially Euro-American settler colonists and their descendants. This is not merely a matter of methodological preference. As a non-Indigenous researcher, I have consciously sought to break with a long and problematic history of academic research that has treated Indigenous peoples as objects of study rather than autonomous collectivities that are fully capable of interpreting and narrating their own experiences. By focusing on these questions as part of a colonial *relationship* – and one that implicates settler-colonists and their descendants explicitly – I hope that this study will make a modest contribution to broader attempts to understand and ultimately transform contemporary forms of being together. In doing this research, I have been inspired by Indigenous activists across the North American continent that have worked to create new spaces for serious conversations about how we might collectively confront the persistence of colonial policies and mentalities on both sides of the 49th Parallel. In recent years, the #IdleNoMore movement, in particular, has made substantial contributions to these efforts by promoting a “transformative vision of decolonization” that seeks to build opportunities to form “genuine alliances between natives and non-natives” in order to reimagine and alter the ways that we live together.  

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“reimagining” surely involves a collective taking-stock of where we have been. I hope that this study will contribute to efforts to understand the Upper Midwest’s colonial past and present in ways that will help amplify and extend efforts to build decolonial futures. Specifically, I hope that this study will be of some interest and use to those engaged in efforts to build decolonized futures in the American Upper Midwest and beyond.

In this dissertation, I pursue a line of inquiry that differs from the two most common approaches that have animated existing work on these questions in the context of Minnesota’s Twin Cities urban region. In the first place, I consciously seek to break with a long line of academic, institutional, and journalistic analysis that has approached urban Indigenous marginality as a consequence of dynamics that are internal to Indigenous communities themselves. Here, I am thinking of a range of studies that have sought to make sense of this phenomenon by explaining it as a consequence of the trauma of reservation-to-city migration, the unpreparedness of Indigenous people to cope with the demands of urban life, or the incommensurability of Indigenous “lifestyles” with those of the “dominant society,” among other factors. At their worst, studies that adopt this approach minimize the degree to which an explicit politics of group-differentiated domination has operated to disproportionately advantage “white” Minnesotans, often at the expense of Indigenous people and other racialized groups.

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23 See for example Community Welfare Council Indian Committee, *The Minneapolis Indian in Minnesota* (Minneapolis: Community Welfare Council of Hennepin County, 1956); Cross, “Indian Church is on Road to Integration”; Vern Drilling, *Problems with Alcohol Among Urban Indians in Minneapolis* (Minneapolis: Training Center for Community Programs, 1970); Edgerton, “Economic Insecurities Plague Indians in the City”; Governor’s HRC, *Minnesota’s Indian Citizens;* Rigert “You Never Get Away From Being Indian”; Rowan, “The Plight of the Upper Midwest Indian.”
Importantly, though, this problematic approach has long been offset by studies that demonstrate that Indigenous marginality was and is the product of discrete forms of racialized oppression. The vast majority of studies in this vein have focused on the city’s impressive history of Indigenous resistance and the many organizations and cultural strategies that were mobilized to confront this inequitable set of circumstances. Among these, most have been concerned with “Red Power” organizing and the activities of the American Indian Movement (AIM), which was founded in inner-city Minneapolis in the summer of 1968. While this work has sometimes been criticized for focusing too heavily on the efforts of certain charismatic individuals amongst AIM’s leadership, some studies have sought to historicize the movement amongst a much longer and broader based tradition of

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urban contestation. In general terms, however, this line of inquiry has been enormously important and I draw on contributions to it repeatedly in the analysis that follows.

Yet while studies in this latter group have illuminated an important history of contestation and anti-colonial activism, they haven’t always told us much about the broader urban context in which that resistance was articulated. Thus while the best among these studies make critical contributions to our understanding of how Indigenous people developed strategies for survival and organized collectively to confront various forms of oppression, they have been relatively unspecific about how those same forms of oppression were part of a broader complex of urban relations that operated to channel economic, social, geographical, and political advantages to others, especially settler colonists and their descendants. In this study, I seek to contribute to the closing of this gap in the research by thinking carefully about how the production of Indigenous marginality in postwar Minneapolis is inextricably connected to the production of the prosperity, entitlement, and well being of other groups. To reiterate, mine is attempt to think carefully about how these issues are

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26 Brenda Child argues, for example, that a longstanding focus on the mediagenic and charismatic male protest leadership that emerged in the 1960s has sometimes overshadowed the critical role that Indigenous women, in particular, have played in building and sustaining a broad range of organizations and institutions that have been critical to Indigenous survival in the Twin Cities, including AIM itself. She notes that what has often been obscured in “conventional” presentations of AIM’s history is the degree to which women played “developmental roles” and “laid the foundation for new institutions for education and social welfare that have been extraordinarily long-lived in the Indian community.” These include, for example, the establishment of one of the nation’s first urban Indian Health Boards, the establishment of a range of community schools, including two AIM survival schools, and key activism against police brutality, child apprehension by state adoption authorities, racist textbooks and school curricula, inadequate housing and a broad range of other challenges. See Child, Holding Our World Together, 139-160. In this vein, see also Davis, Survival Schools.
part of a broader *relationship* that is rooted in the hierarchical dynamics of settler colonization.

### 1.4 Research Setting

In what follows, I am primarily concerned with considering these questions in the historical and material conjuncture of postwar Minneapolis. Minnesota’s largest city grew up around the Falls of St. Anthony some ten miles north of the confluence of the Mississippi and Minnesota Rivers, an area that has long been part of the cultural and economic life of Dakota people. By the close of the Second World War, or the period that concerns us most here, Minneapolis was already well established as a regional economic powerhouse. In the years after 1945, the broader metropolitan region (which includes Minneapolis’ twin city of St. Paul) solidified its position as the second largest economic and population center in the Upper Midwest, after Chicago.

Spatially, I am primarily concerned with events that transpired in the Southside Phillips neighborhood (see figure 1.1), which, for a variety of reasons (discussed below, especially in Chapter 4), emerged as a site of significant Indigenous residential congregation in the aftermath of the war. As we shall see, it was in this district that Indigenous people worked, lived, resided and built institutions, more than in any other part of the Twin Cities metropolitan region. Importantly, though, it was also in this district that Indigenous people disproportionately encountered a range of urban privations and inequities, including precarious housing, predatory landlords, police targeting, endemic economic
insecurity, and quotidian racism, as I allude to above and develop in the chapters that follow.

Temporally, I am primarily concerned with the period 1945 to 1975 because it is in this era that two broad historical dynamics coincided most dramatically. Specifically, Indigenous people began migrating to cities in historic proportions in a period when American metropolitan regions were being dramatically transformed in accordance with the exigencies of a series of postwar political imperatives. Understanding the human and spatial implications of this coincidence in the context of the colonial relation is at the very center of my efforts in this study, as we shall see. Yet while the bulk of my analysis is concerned with the events that occurred in this three-decade stretch (Chapters 3-6, in particular), I also commit considerable energy to thinking about how urban articulations of the colonial relation both predate the acceleration of Indigenous urbanization in the postwar period (Chapter 2, in particular) and continue today (Chapter 7, in particular).

1.5 Research Approach

The analysis that follows is based on extensive fieldwork conducted in Minneapolis between October 2011 and June 2013. My inquiry began with a simple and relatively open-ended question. What is the relationship between Indigenous marginality in postwar Minneapolis and the region’s history of colonialism? Or, to put it slightly differently, how did colonial practices and mentalities continue to shape life in the postwar city? To start answering these questions, I began by identifying and immersing myself in the existing academic and political literature on the history of the Indigenous community in the Twin Cities urban region (much of
which is alluded to in section 1.3). Yet as I have already mentioned, I quickly found that this literature did not always consider events and developments in the Southside “Indian neighborhood” as part of a broader set of urban dynamics. Thus what became clear to me over the course of this preliminary review was that more research was needed to demonstrate how Indigenous marginality was and is explicitly connected to a series of urban transformations that operated to consolidate the privilege of some but not others, that a colonial relationship grounded in an inequitable distribution of advantages has shaped the life of the city. To begin making this case, I then turned to a comprehensive analysis of a series of historical primary sources. At the Central and Franklin Avenue branches of the Hennepin County Library system, I sought to establish the context of my study by reviewing a series of neighborhood-based historical document collections, including an extensive clipping collection from the city’s main newspapers and an extensive collection of community newspapers and periodicals. Meanwhile, in the Special Collection of the George Lattimer Central Library in St. Paul, I accessed and analyzed historical city directory and census data. Through this process, I began to identify a number of more specific thematic lines of inquiry (all of which correspond to the chapters that follow) and began to build more structured arguments by drawing on specific archival collections. At the Minnesota Historical Society Archives in St. Paul, I consulted a number of collections, including the personal papers and research files of “Indian advocate” Elizabeth Ebbott, the personal papers of community organizer and journalist Gerald Vizenor, the extensive catalogue of “Indian Affairs” publications produced by the League of Women Voters and Training Center for Community programs, political documents related to the American Indian Movement, and a series of historical document collections, including case files from the Minneapolis
Department of Civil Rights, papers related to the life of TB Walker, and a diverse series of transcripts and reports related to the history of the Phillips neighborhood Indigenous community. At the University of Minnesota Archives at the Andersen Library, I consulted documents related to the activities of the university's Training Center for Community Programs. In the Minneapolis Collection at the Hennepin County Library, I accessed a series of neighborhood-based document collections, including Minneapolis Model City reports and documents, and a range of reports and studies connected to the city’s postwar urban history.

Importantly, I also sought to supplement archival material by speaking to as many informants as possible. While the findings of this study are primarily archival, I have consciously tried to texture and verify my observations by engaging with people that have (or had) intimate knowledge of the city’s urban history and/or Indigenous community. Thus throughout the course of my time in the archives, I kept a running list of the people that continued to appear in the documents that I was reviewing and, when relevant or feasible, I tried to contact them and set up a meeting. As a result, I conducted semi-structured interviews with a diverse range of individuals, all of whom had either personal or professional familiarity with the issues that concern me below. Though I only occasionally cite these conversations directly, many of them were helpful in shaping my understanding of these themes and pointing me to particular resources or lines of inquiry. For this reason, I am indebted to the following individuals who generously agreed to meet with me and share their perspectives: Robert Albee (Ventura Village Neighborhood Association), Fred Armell (Phillips resident), Dick Bancroft (American Indian Movement), Dennis Banks (American Indian Movement), Clyde Bellecourt (American Indian
Movement), Anthony Bouza (Minneapolis Police Department), Brenda Child (researcher), Fay Cohen (researcher), Randy Croce (photographer), Bear Cronick (American Indian Movement), Will Delaney (Center for Urban and Regional Affairs), Kevin Diaz (Minneapolis Star-Tribune), Juanita Espinosa (Minneapolis American Indian Center), Andrew Hestness (Native American Community Development Institute), Kirk Hill (Minnesota Tenant’s Association), Justin Huenemann (Native American Community Development Institute), Pauline Danforth (researcher), Pat Kaluza (The Alley), Mary Keefe (HOPE Community), Bill Means (American Indian Movement), Craig Palmer (May Day Collective), Joe Selvaggio (Project for Pride in Living), Mordecai Specktor (The Circle), Gerald Vizenor (researcher, community organizer), Laura Waterman Wittstock (First Person Radio, Mgizi Communications), Waziyatawin (researcher), Paula Williamson (The Alley), Harvey Winje (The Alley).

1.6 Plan of Dissertation

The core arguments of this study are articulated over the course of six substantive chapters and a conclusion. In what follows, I begin by developing the theoretical framework that animates my inquiry and then turn to a series of discussions about specific events and phenomena in order to illustrate that framework’s purchase in the context of postwar Minneapolis.

In Chapter 2, “Theoretical and Contextual Foundations,” I elaborate what I mean by the “colonial relation” and seek to situate my use of this term theoretically and contextually. To do so, I develop five core arguments in order to explain why I think this is a useful conceptual frame for making sense of the issues that concern us here.
In Chapter 3, “Urban Origins and the Colonial Relation,” I examine the life of Thomas Barlow Walker, an early and important contributor to Minneapolis’ urban becoming. In doing so, my aim is to examine the explicit link between the historical production of the Twin Cities urban region and the violence of settler colonization. To this end, I argue that Walker’s rise to local fame and fortune (accented as it is by immense accumulations and urban investments) is inseparable from the colonial relation’s valorization of the territorial and social claims of settler colonists, over and above those of their Indigenous counterparts. My aim here is to challenge revisionist presentations that interpret the urban region as a strictly settler creation by re-inscribing dispossession at the center of this history. I am not merely interested in the role that colonial violence played in producing urban pasts, however. Accordingly, I also argue that it retains an explicit material trace in the urban present by demonstrating that fortunes amassed through processes of “primitive accumulation” continue to have an impact in contemporary Minneapolis.

In Chapter 4, “Metropolitan Transformation and the Colonial Relation,” I turn explicitly to the postwar period and examine the urban dynamics that facilitated the emergence of an “Indian neighborhood” in South Minneapolis in the years after 1945. In doing so, I argue that the production of this inner-city geography of racialized deprivation is reflective of the enduring potency of the colonial relation. To make this case, I stress that the making of the “Indian neighborhood” is inseparable from a broader remaking of the Twin Cities metropolitan region that worked to consolidate group-differentiated privilege geographically, as suburbanization, urban renewal, interstate construction and other publicly-subsidized projects transformed the urban landscape.
In Chapter 5, “Non-Indigenous Advocacy Research and the Colonial Relation,” I examine the work of two non-governmental research organizations, the Minnesota League of Women Voters and the Training Center for Community Programs at the University of Minnesota, both of which published extensively on urban Indigenous issues in Minneapolis. Paying close heed to the ideologies that informed these efforts, I argue that their assessments of Indigenous marginality made substantial analytical contributions but stopped well short of contributing to efforts capable of meaningfully interrupting its reproduction. I contend that because the interpretations of these two organizations failed to seriously grapple with the colonial relation they also failed to seriously confront the ways in which the existing political order continued to consolidate and protect the interests and advantages of some and not others.

In Chapter 6, “Inner City Law Enforcement and the Colonial Relation,” I consider the fraught relationship between Indigenous residents of the Southside of Minneapolis and the Minneapolis Police Department, with an emphasis on events that took place in the 1960s and early 1970s. In doing so, I demonstrate that the targeting of Indigenous urbanites by law enforcement agencies is inseparable from the persistent potency of broader ideologies of racialized privilege. Here, I argue that the colonial relation manifests in a culture of “racialized policing” through which particular kinds of “knowledge” operate to depoliticize the disproportionate entanglement of urban Indigenous people with all branches of the criminal justice system. But I also demonstrate that this “knowledge” has often been contested and consider how key moments of mobilization have operated to repoliticize the violence.
of racialized policing by dramatizing the culpability of law enforcement actors and the broader society of which they are part.

In Chapter 7, “Imperial Intersections,” I argue that the colonial relation does not articulate in isolation but within and alongside a broader field of practices through which the injuries and benefits of American imperial practice are distributed. To do so, I argue that the production of the city in general (and the Phillips neighborhood in particular) is bound up with economic and migratory flows that are explicitly generated by American violence at home and abroad. Looking closely at events in the Twin Cities, I examine some of the ways that both Indigenous marginality and economic prosperity are bound up with broader deployments of state violence, particularly through the activities of local weapons manufacturers.
Figure 1.1 Minneapolis Neighborhood Boundaries (Image Source: Adrian Werner, Institute for Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg).²⁷

²⁷This map displays the contemporary neighborhood boundaries of the city of Minneapolis, in Hennepin County. The Phillips district is composed of four smaller neighborhoods (Ventura Village, Phillips West, Midtown Phillips, and East Phillips).
Chapter 2 Theoretical and Contextual Foundations

2.1 Introduction

Settler-colonial transformations of the American Upper Midwest have operated to disproportionately promote the interests of Euro-American settlers and their descendants over and above the interests of the region’s existing inhabitants and their descendants, however unevenly and imperfectly. In the chapters that follow, I argue that this basic dynamic is at the center of a colonial relationship grounded in hierarchical ways of being together that have consistently operated to funnel social, spatial, economic, and epistemological advantages to the former, generally at the expense of the latter. While the form and content of this domination has varied considerably over the course of the last two centuries, its core inequities have proved remarkably durable.

The forms of togetherness that have emerged in and through this complex history of negotiation are what I have in mind when I invoke the term “colonial relation.” I adopt this formulation to stress that we cannot make sense of contemporary forms of Indigenous marginalization, exclusion, and insecurity without thinking carefully about how present distributions of power and opportunity connect to longer histories of group-differentiated domination. Because this concept is at the center of this dissertation, it is critical to situate my deployment of it theoretically and contextually. With this in mind, I turn now to an elaboration of five of the core arguments that animate my use of the “colonial relation” as a tool for understanding the historical and contemporary life of Minnesota’s largest city.
2.2 The Colonial Relation in Settler Colonial Societies

The first argument that animates my use of this conceptual frame is that the colonial relation takes a distinct form in settler-colonial societies, such as the United States. Colonization is not a singular phenomenon and its form and consequences vary considerably in different milieu. At the outset, it is critical to acknowledge that key differences exist in and between colonial enterprises and that metatheorizations don’t always match material conditions on the ground.¹ Thus in the interest of analytical specificity, I begin here by defining what I mean by settler colonialism and establishing why I characterize Euro-American incursion in the American Upper Midwest as an expression of it.

Before doing so, however, it is necessary to acknowledge that there are considerable points of incongruity between the regional experience of colonization that interests us here and well-established interpretations of what colonialism is. Consider, for example, Jürgen Osterhammel’s widely cited definition of colonialism as “a relationship of domination” between “an indigenous (or forcibly imported) majority and a minority of foreign invaders.”² For him, the colonial situation is one in which “the fundamental decisions affecting the lives of the colonized people are made and implemented by the colonial rulers in pursuit of interests that are often defined in a distant metropolis.” These same “rulers”, he observes, are “convinced of their own superiority and of their ordained mandate to rule” and reject “cultural compromises with the colonized population” (all emphasis added).

While elements of this interpretation undoubtedly correspond to how colonization unfolded in the context that concerns us here, others diverge considerably. For example, the suggestion that colonialism entails the domination of a minority of foreign invaders is incongruent with events that transpired in Minnesota. This demographic formulation does, of course, accurately reflect the very earliest stages of Minnesota’s incorporation into the territorial dominion of the United States, particularly in the first half of the nineteenth century at a time when Indigenous people still constituted a considerable majority in the region. By 1860, however, the settler population had mushroomed to nearly two hundred thousand and now vastly outnumbered an Indigenous population that had been reduced to less than one tenth that size. Surely, however, this basic demographic reversal does not mean that Minnesota ceased to be properly “colonial” in the mid 1850s as settlers began to outnumber Indigenous people.

Osterhammel’s suggestion that colonial forms of domination serve “interests” that are defined by a far off metropolis is also incongruent with conditions in the Upper Midwest. By the time “foreign invaders” had begun to comprehensively transform Minnesota into a robust settler outpost of the United States in the latter half of the nineteenth century, American settlers had long since ceased to orient

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3 In 1849, for example, estimates suggest that non-Indigenous settlers numbered fewer than five thousand, or less than one sixth of the total Indigenous population. Importantly, though, these mid-century estimates are considerably complicated by the federal government’s disinterest in identifying people of mixed Indigenous/European ancestry. See Bruce White, “The Power of Whiteness, or, the Life and Times of James Rolette Jr.,” Minnesota History 56 (1998-99): 182-3; Minnesota Historical Society, The U.S. Dakota War (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 2012), accessed January 2015, http://www.usdakotawar.org.

their activities in accordance with “interests” in London or any center of imperial power. Certainly, the colonization of the American west was partly fueled by investments from New England and Europe but nothing like the traditional model of “metropolitan” imperialism was still in place in this period. By the 1850s, the vast majority of settlers that came to Minnesota did so to settle permanently, not to extract surpluses for the enrichment of far off sponsors. Surely, however, this basic organizational distinction does not mean that the patterns of domination that transformed the region were not part of a “colonial” process.

Scholars working in the emergent subfield of settler colonial studies have begun to develop theoretical models that offer a means of working through these incongruities. Specifically, their scholarship suggests a framework for interpreting the colonial experience in societies where an outside group (or groups) has permanently settled in existing Indigenous territories and asserted a settler sovereignty distinct from that which emanates from a metropolitan core. Patrick Wolfe argues that “colonial” (i.e. “metropolitan”) and “settler-colonial” forms of

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colonization are animated by different relationships to the colonized territory and its existing inhabitants. He argues that “metropolitan” colonists are foremost concerned with the extraction of wealth from the colonies in tandem with faraway interests. They are, therefore, primarily driven by a desire to accumulate resource wealth from the land and surplus value from the colonized population. Settler colonists, by contrast, “come to stay” and are foremost concerned with the construction of a new society on the expropriated land base. They are, therefore, primarily driven by a desire to possess and settle the land in perpetuity, in addition to benefiting from new opportunities to accumulate. In the latter contexts, colonizers do sometimes rely on Indigenous labor but their primary interest lies in the eventual clearing of the expropriated territory for settler use and the incorporation of that territory into the regulatory ambit of settler institutions of governance. In other words, Indigenous land, not labor, is the sine qua non of settler-colonial desire, as a range of empirical studies illuminate.

The key point of distinction here is that settler-colonial projects are oriented around the achievement of permanent territorial occupation. Their aim is not merely to dominate existing inhabitants but to fundamentally replace them as the legitimate occupiers of the land. For this reason, thinkers like Wolfe and Coulthard encourage us to see settler-colonial forms of domination as structural features of contemporary experience. They remind us that dispossession is not a

7 Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology, 1-3.
8 Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” 388.
9 Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology, 1-3.
10 For elaborations of this point in specific historical contexts, see Sarah Carter, Lost Harvests: Prairie Indian Reserve Farmers and Government Policy (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990); Harris, “How Did Colonialism Dispossess?,” 167; Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks, 12.
historical episode but part of an ongoing project to secure the territorial dominion and political hegemony of the colonial order. Thus settler-colonial “invasion” is a “structure not an event,” as Wolfe puts it. Accordingly, this structural orientation shapes the ways in which settler colonists and Indigenous people interact with one another. It is at the core of the relation that exists between them.

Of course, it is important to be cautious about overstating the points of distinction between these ideal-typical models. “Reality is inevitably complex,” writes Lorenzo Veracini “and colonial and settler-colonial forms constantly interpenetrate each other and overlap in a variety of ways.” Nevertheless, the settler-colonial frame offers a helpful way to think about how and why a different sort of colonial relationship emerges in societies where “foreign invaders” have “come to stay” and others where they have not pursued a project of permanent settlement.

2.3 Material and Immaterial Articulations of the Colonial Relation

The second argument that animates my conceptual frame is that settler colonization (and the colonial relation that undergirds it) is achieved through a diverse range of material and immaterial practices. We need to be cautious about describing these varied practices as distinct phenomena, of course, because in the actuality of lived experience, they inevitably co-mingle, overlap, and intersect, both with each other and alongside other power relations. For the purposes of elucidation, however, it may be helpful to consider some of these material and immaterial expressions separately, even if reality is inevitably more complex.

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12 Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology, 2, 163.
13 Veracini, Settler Colonialism, 12.
Material Forms of Domination

In settler-colonial societies like the United States, the colonial relation is expressed most forthrightly as a material politics of dispossession. In a basic sense, settler colonization is a process through which settler colonists seize and assert dominion over the material bases of already existing societies. As we shall see, settler migrants came to Minnesota in the latter half of the nineteenth century for a variety of reasons but the opportunity to settle, possess and extract value from the land was certainly what attracted most. For Wolfe, it is this possessive impulse that gives processes of settler colonization their “inherently eliminatory” character.14 “Whatever settlers may say” he writes, “the primary motivation” of settler-colonial incursion is “access to territory.” The literary theorist Thomas King makes a similar point in The Inconvenient Indian.15

The issue that came ashore with the French and the English and the Spanish, the issue that was the raison d’être for each of the colonies, the issue that has made its way from coast to coast to coast and is with us today, the issue that has never changed, never varied, never faltered in its resolve, is the issue of land. The issue has always been land. It will always be land, until there isn’t a square foot of land left in North America that is controlled by Native people.

Because settler colonists require territory to achieve their ambition of building a new society, the material acquisition of lands is at the center of their efforts. In Coulthard’s terms, the fundamental organizing principal of settler-colonial political formations is to “shore up” sustained access to territory “for the purposes of state formation, settlement, and capitalist development.”16 Thus settler colonization is

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14 Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” 388.
16 Ibid., 125.
fundamentally a project of territorialization through which settler political communities produce, define, and affirm their control over particular spaces (generally through the vehicle of the state). To speak of “territorialization,” as opposed to “territory,” however, is to emphasize the contested and incomplete character of this process, as Joel Wainwright observes.¹⁷ It is to signal that the production of settler state space is an ongoing and iterative process composed of the “myriad socio-spatial practices” that operate to “define the nation-state as spatially coherent.”¹⁸

By definition, projects of settler-colonial territorialization do not occur in a social vacuum. Because the territories claimed by settler colonists are used and occupied by Indigenous people, the imposition of a settler-colonial order necessarily requires explicit forms of dispossession. The incorporation of vast swaths of the North American continent into the territorial ambit of the United States, for example, required that existing forms of occupation and land use be undermined and replaced.

In the American context, settler colonization took a particular political economic form. From its beginnings, the United States enshrined the (selective) right to possess and retain private property as “one of the most vital expressions of human rights” and affirmed that commitment in its very “founding scripture.”¹⁹ Accordingly, American expansion westward necessarily entailed the imposition of the capitalist mode of production where it had hitherto been absent and the near

¹⁸ Ibid., 21.
universal transformation of commonly held Indigenous lands into alienable parcels of property.

The introduction of these new organizing principles was a decidedly violent process but the history of the American West is hardly unique in this regard. For Karl Marx, violence is at the very center of the transition to capitalism. In his discussion of this “primitive” process of accumulation, he explicitly rejects “nursery tale” mythologies and reminds us that in “actual history it is a notorious fact that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, in short, force, play the greatest part.” In his terms, primitive accumulations are doubly dispossessive. They rob extant collectivities of their control over the “the social means of subsistence” by converting those means into private capital. And they rob “immediate producers” of control over the surplus fruits of their production by converting them into “wage laborers.” Thus for Marx, the introduction of capitalism is a process through which “great masses of men are suddenly and forcibly torn from their means of subsistence, and hurled onto the labor-market as free, unprotected and rightless proletarians.” The material loss of communally held lands is necessarily part of such endeavors because expropriation of the “peasant” from the “soil” is the “basis of the whole process.”

While Marx’s own analysis of this process was largely restricted to the European milieu, scholars concerned with the colonial imposition of the capitalist mode of production in North American contexts have sometimes pointed to the applicability of his formulation. Coulthard, for example, suggests that a “non-

21 Ibid., 876.
22 Ibid., 876.
dogmatic” reading of Marx’s analysis of the forms through which “collectively held territories” were “forcefully opened up” to privatization and enclosure, may well hold the potential to “shed insight into the cycles of colonial domination and resistance that characterize the relationship between white settler states and Indigenous people.” He does not advocate an uncritical adoption of Marx’s formulation, however, and stresses that its applicability to settler-colonial phenomena is constrained by a number of core problems.

Critically, Coulthard argues that researchers need to make a contextual shift in order to rehabilitate the “primitive accumulation” formulation as an analytical tool that is useful for interpreting historical and ongoing dispossession in settler-colonial phenomena.

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24 Coulthard cautions, for example, that Marx's analysis suffers from a politics of “normative developmentalism” that positions non-Western societies at a lesser stage of “historical and cultural development.” At its worst, this thinking promotes a staged interpretation of human development that assumes that the introduction of capitalist relations is a necessary pre-condition for the achievement of putatively advanced forms of socialist human development. (On the endurance of this thinking, see Tom Keefer, “Marxism, Indigenous Struggles, and the Tragedy of ‘Stagism’,” *Upping the Anti* 10 (2010).) Additionally, Coulthard argues that Marx's formulation presents a rigid “temporal framing” of primitive accumulation that fails to account for its sustained relevance, implying that this violent phenomenon merely inaugurates the capitalist process of accumulation which then gives way to what Marx called the “silent compulsion of economic relations.” So constrained, Marx's formulation offers little for analyses that are concerned with the ways in which “violent dispossession continues to play [a role] in the reproduction of colonial and capitalist social relations.” Rosa Luxemburg’s key contribution to this debate was to argue that processes of primitive accumulation were not simply a discrete stage in the history of capitalism but a persistent dynamic defined by “force, fraud and state power”. (For an elaboration of Luxemburg’s contributions to this debate, see Anthony Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey*, 2nd Edition (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 59.) Similarly, David Harvey notes that by relegating “accumulation based on predation, fraud, and violence to an “original stage” that is considered no longer relevant,” we risk missing the “continuous role and persistence of [its] predatory practices… in the long historical geography of capitalist accumulation.” For this reason, Harvey advocates using the less temporally restrictive term “accumulation by dispossession.” (For a full elaboration of this formulation, see David Harvey, *The New Imperialism* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 144.)
colonial societies. For him, the enduring difficulty with the Marxian framework is its emphasis on the constitutive importance of the “capital relation” and the tendency of these early rounds of enclosure to lead to the proletarianization of a “peasant” population. This analytical emphasis has limited purchase in settler-colonial societies where territorial dispossession and not proletarianization has been the “dominant background structure” of the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the institutions of settler governance and control. For Coulthard, this distinction demands that we shift our interpretive frame towards the “subject position of the colonized vis-à-vis the effects of colonial dispossession” and away from the conventional Marxian emphasis on proletarianization (emphasis in original). In doing so, he reminds us that the domination inherent to the settler-colonial relation has less to do with the exploitation of Indigenous people as “rightless proletarians” than it does with the enduring effects of a politics oriented around the explicit diminishment of Indigenous access to land. Settler colonization, in other words, establishes a relationship in which the material bases of Indigenous self-sufficiency, autonomy, and cultural practice are under sustained threat.

*Immaterial Forms of Domination*

This is not to say that the colonial relation is reducible to material/territorial forms of domination alone, however. Rather, its enactment depends on the sustained deployment of intersecting and complimentary *immaterial* forms of domination.

“Neither imperialism nor colonialism is a simple act of accumulation and

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acquisition,” observes Edward Said, both are supported by “impressive ideological formations” and specific forms of knowledge that justify and legitimate domination. Thus immaterial practices are a key means through which settler societies perform and enact their legitimacy. Indeed, setter colonial territorialization is impossible without the wide range of immaterial practices that Matthew Hannah calls the “epistemological mastery of national territory.” The production and distribution of a diverse range of political, social, and spatial knowledges, for example, is critical to the naturalization of the settler-colonial order of things, anointing it with a degree of inevitability.

For Veracini, this naturalization is partly accomplished through knowledge practices that cast the colonial relation as a thing of the past, a characterization that suggests a properly “postcolonial” (in the strictly temporal sense of that term) future has begun to be negotiated. Indeed, knowledge practices that promote the sense of a stark divide between a previous moment of conquest and a present reality in which the effects of that conquest are absent (or merely residual), are often more persuasive than forms of outright disavowal. It is increasingly common for segments of settler-colonial societies to acknowledge, express regret for, and sometimes even formally apologize for previous acts of violence. This is particularly true, for example, in settler societies where governments have acknowledged past wrongs

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and articulated a desire to move towards a politics of “reconciliation” with Indigenous groups. Importantly, though, such acknowledgements sometimes operate to obscure the degree to which colonial forms of injustice continue to have distinct effects. Michel-Rolph Trouillot reminds us that acts of collective apology tend to create a sense of “pastness” by emphasizing a present in which the act of transgression is concluded. Gabriel Piterberg highlights what is at stake in such presentations, arguing that the core danger of “white hegemonic narratives” lies not in “the sovereign settlers’ denial of the wrong they have done to those whom they have dispossessed (though such denials are protested all too often), but in their denial that interaction with the dispossessed is the history of who the settlers collectively are.” So obscured, the domination inherent in the colonial relation loses its contemporaneity and the structural forms of its articulation begin to “recede into invisibility.”

Immaterial practices are also a key means by which settler-colonial projects impose intellectual, political, and social forms of dominion. Because the colonial relation is grounded in dominance, rather than mutuality, these practices routinely operate to impose degrees of uniformity in a range of registers, by establishing

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34 Piterberg, The Returns of Zionism, 56–7. For a comparable discussion of why many are willing to concede that “past generations of [African Americans] had legitimate grievances about slavery, segregation, vigilante violence, and disenfranchisement” while simultaneously insisting that “the problems black people confront today are of their own making,” see George Lipsitz, How Racism Takes Place (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011), 1-6.

settler definitions of property, morality, and propriety as sacrosanct, for example. This is not to say, however, that Indigenous cultural practices, political forms, and intellectual traditions have not also shaped settler societies but rather to make the point that the domineering influence of those who dominate has often posed palpable threats to key forms of Indigenous alterity and difference. Settler colonization is thus partly a process of cultural imposition, enforcing and enshrining the dominance of settler definitions of reality. For Anthony Hall, colonial conquests old and new threaten the “priceless epistemological inheritance” contained in Indigenous languages, knowledges and ways of seeing. At stake, for him, is the destruction of key parts of “humanity’s shared philosophical commonwealth” and the vast repository of alternatives that it surely contains. This perspective puts the epistemological violence that is at the center of colonial relationships in stark relief. We must acknowledge, however, that Indigenous societies have always resisted such impositions. In fact, the vibrancy of Indigenous cultures in North America is a living testament to the remarkable resilience that Indigenous peoples have shown in the face of Euro-American efforts to limit or erase the influence of their practices and traditions.

Importantly, though, to suggest that settler colonization is oriented around a politics of uniformity is not to suggest that it seeks to eliminate difference tout court. In fact, the reproduction of particular forms of difference is woven into the very fabric of both the colonial and capital relation. Here, I am thinking especially of the reproduction of what Henri Lefebvre called “minimal difference,” including the kinds of distinction that emerge from the “fragmented alienations of private property,

36 Ibid., 64.
37 Ibid., 65.
individualism, [and] the administered commodity form,” among other things. To this list, we could certainly add the various forms of “minimal difference” that emerge through (and are sustained by) the hierarchical politics of settler colonization.

Given all of this, it is critical to pay close attention to the ways in which the colonial relation is both reproduced and obscured through contemporary immaterial practices. For Wolfe, this task entails charting the “continuities, discontinuities, adjustments, and departures” through which the logic that animates historical practices of dispossession re-emerges in the different “modalities, discourses and institutional formations,” which produce “the historical development and complexification of settler society.” Doing so, in my view, requires that we pay close attention to what Eva Mackey describes as the “longstanding institutionalized frameworks and material relations of settlement [that] create certain ‘modes of feeling’ amongst non-native people in settler colonies,” which have the effect of “normalizing settler presence, privilege, power.”

2.4 Transformations of the Colonial Relation

The third argument that animates my conceptual frame is that the colonial relation shifts and transforms, often by adapting resiliently to changing circumstances. In spite of these shifts, however, I argue that what Coulthard calls

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the “deep seated structural features” at the center of the colonial relation remain firmly in tact. Thus while shifts at the level of the state and elsewhere may operate to “alter the intensity of some of the effects of colonial-capitalist exploitation and domination,” they generally do not go so far as to explicitly challenge the dominance inherent in the “generative structures” of contemporary arrangements. Coulthard’s efforts to track the ways in which articulations of the colonial relation have shifted in the Canadian context offer a helpful blueprint for analyses of other settler-colonial situations, including the one that concerns us here. In the interest of understanding how these “deep seated structural features” endure in the context of postwar Minneapolis, it is necessary to situate them in the broader context of the colonial history of the region.

*Dakota Homeland*

To do so, we must begin at a moment when Indigenous peoples were the only inhabitants of the region that would become the American Upper Midwest. For many generations “beyond remembering,” the lands that form the present state of Minnesota were part of the vast territorial homeland of Dakota people. Indeed, “Minnesota is a Dakota place.” This is true both in the sense that “the Dakota people named it and left their marks in the landscape and in its history” and in the sense that it remains central to their identity and cultural practices. In the period before European travelers made their way to this section of the North American

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42 Ibid., 35.
43 Wingerd, *North Country*, xix
45 Westerman and White, *Mni Sota Makoce*, 3.
interior, various Dakota groups (alongside their Lakota cousins) ranged over a geography that stretched from Western Wisconsin in the East to the Missouri River in the West.\textsuperscript{46} Those that populated the woodlands of the upper Mississippi Valley (in addition to vast swaths of what is now Northern Minnesota) built an existence around harvesting a broad array of resources in long-established seasonal rhythms. These “semi-nomadic” activities were coordinated through a series of permanent clan-based settlements, including villages composed of bark long houses and governed through kinship laws.\textsuperscript{47} Oriented in this way and located deep in the continental interior, Dakota communities remained relatively isolated from sustained European traffic until the final decades of the seventeenth century.

\textit{Anishinaabe Arrival}

Most histories of Minnesota identify an expedition that brought French Canadian travelers Pierre Radisson and Médard Chouart des Groseilliers to the heart of Dakota country in the 1650s as the harbinger of profound change, but Europeans trappers were not the only outside group to penetrate these lands in the seventeenth century. In this period, the northern stretches of what is now Minnesota were first contested between the region’s long time inhabitants and Anishinaabeg (Ojibwe) migrants from the eastern stretches of North America. The latter have had a long history of relocation and “migration has always been a key component in Anishinaabe adaptation strategies.”\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{46} Wingerd, \textit{North Country}, xix.
\textsuperscript{48} Melissa Meyer, \textit{The White Earth Tragedy: Ethnicity and Dispossession at a Minnesota Anishinaabe Reservation, 1889-1920} (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 9.
Anishinaabe groups that came to Minnesota did so by way of Sault Ste. Marie, which by the mid seventeenth century, had emerged as a “bustling trading center” and sanctuary for displaced eastern clans, some of which were seeking refuge from sustained Iroquoian incursion in their traditional territories. By about 1680, the growing population at Sault Ste. Marie had begun to strain local resources and resident clans were forced to expand their seasonal migrations outward, north and south along the shores of Lake Superior. Those that travelled south eventually established a settlement some four hundred miles west of Sault Ste. Marie at Chequamegon Bay, where game and resources were abundant. The shifting exigencies of the intra-imperial fur trade, however, eventually began to sap Chequamegon of its commercial buoyancy, forcing the Anishinaabeg to push west into what is now Minnesota, a migration that brought conflict with the resident Dakota.

For much of the next century, the northern stretches of Dakota country were transformed into a contested zone of inter-tribal conflict and sometimes even open war, as the Anishinaabeg embarked on a series of “armed migrations” westward. By the 18th century, the Anishinaabeg had wrested control of what is now Northern Minnesota and the Dakota had been forced from their “northern homeland.” For Waziyatawin, these “invasions” were part of a broader “chain of events” set in motion by colonial processes of dispossession that would “eventually be detrimental to all Indigenous people.”

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50 Ibid., 13.
51 Ibid., 17.
**Borderland Hybridity**

By the dawn of the 18th century, the expanding fur trade had fully penetrated Dakota lands and the region had begun to be remade as a kind of meeting point of European and Indigenous civilizations. “Similar cultural meeting grounds emerged, at least for a time, all along the North American frontier,” observes historian Mary Wingerd, “but the hybrid society of the Upper Great Lakes, sustained by the fur trade, developed more fully and lasted longer than anywhere else on the North American continent.”

In the wake of its revolutionary founding, the United States accelerated its process of assertive territorialization but full inclusion of the northern plains and forests was still several generations away and the region remained marked by a degree of cultural and political fluidity. Thus in emphasizing the centrality of territorial expropriation, as this dissertation does, it is critical not to collapse the experience of Indigenous/settler exchange into a singular narrative of imperialist violence. Over the course of numerous generations, many forms of cooperation were developed and persisted between resident Indigenous groups and European migrants. According to Richard White, the broader region functioned as a kind of “middle ground” animated by degrees of hybridity and mutuality from the mid seventeenth to the early nineteenth century.

**Settler Colonization**

The fluidity of the frontier “borderland” was eventually overwhelmed, however, as the Upper Midwest was integrated into the territorial ambit of the

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United States. This transformation undermined generations of “syncretic and symbiotic Indian-European arrangements” as the nascent republic unleashed a “virulent model of homestead property” and assumed unilateral authority to “confer or deny rights to peoples within their borders.” The successive waves of settlers that would eventually come west over the Appalachians to stake their claims in the continental interior altered territorial relationships as they amplified a process of enclosure and redefinition.

These transformations marked a key turning point in the nature of the colonial relation in what is now Minnesota. In this context, the assertion of a new order grounded in explicit expressions of settler dominance began to permanently alter existing patterns of mutual reliance and respect. By the 1850s, the mercantilist mode of production that was synonymous with the fur trade was rapidly being replaced by the capitalist mode of production. The extension of transportation networks and other infrastructures into the region brought new opportunities to win profit from the state’s vast stretches of arable land and unlogged forests. In this context, land and timber replaced furs as the region’s most coveted assets and Indigenous peoples, who had long been central players in the regional fur trade, were increasingly imagined as barriers to economic development.

By the mid-nineteenth century, settler migrants had begun to dominate the region demographically and politically. Their numeric strength and political will

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hastened the aggressive acceleration of a program to comprehensively reduce Indigenous landholdings and remake Minnesota as a settler-colonial geography.

*Dispossessive Territorialization*

In fact, this process had begun in earnest in the early nineteenth century when representatives of the United States brokered an agreement with the Dakota that allowed them to establish a foothold in the region. In 1805, Captain Zebulon Pike secured title of one hundred thousand acres of “prime real estate” in what is now the Twin Cities region for the “unconscionable price” of two thousand dollars. By 1819, the United States established Fort Snelling at the confluence of the Minnesota and Mississippi Rivers, at the place the Dakota call Bdote, but the 1805 arrangements were merely the opening salvo of what would become a comprehensive effort to seize control of the Dakota homeland.

By 1851, settler colonists were aggressively pursuing an agenda of dispossession. Treaties signed in that year reduced Dakota holdings to two narrow strips of land along the Minnesota River. In sum, these agreements transferred an estimated twenty-four million acres to the United States for promised annuity payments that would amount to little more than three cents per acre. In fact, the mutuality implied by the term “treaty” is deceptive in this case. These agreements were so shot through with deception and manipulation that they have been described by one historian as a “monstrous conspiracy” that is “equal in infamy to

anything else in the long history of injustice perpetrated upon the Indians by the authorized representatives of the United States government.”

The events of 1851 also set the stage for the US / Dakota War of 1862 and its devastating consequences. Ten years after the dubious treaties were brokered, an Indigenous revolt – provoked to a large degree by hunger and delayed annuities – was met with a settler counter-insurgency program so comprehensive that it ended in what remains the largest single mass execution in US history and the outright expulsion of Dakota people from their traditional territory. Waziyatawin uses definitions outlined in the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide to make the case that these moments are consistent with contemporary definitions of “ethnic cleansing.” She argues that the eviction of Dakota people from their traditional territories, finalized through the war of 1862 and its aftermaths, constitute an “act of genocide” perpetrated by “white” Americans, “primarily so that they could continue to occupy Dakota lands unhindered.”

The Anishinaabeg of Northern Minnesota also saw their territorial base dramatically reduced in the nineteenth century. The first Anishinaabeg land cessions were brokered in 1837, inaugurating a process that would facilitate the gradual relinquishment of the vast majority of Northern Minnesota by 1883. The treaties facilitated settler migration into Northern Minnesota in ways that were markedly different from the fur trade era. “Previously, [the Anishinaabeg] had been

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60 Ibid., 60-1.
acquainted with the few Euroamericans who lived among them in their country,” writes Melissa Meyer. “Now strangers were everywhere.”

Reservazionization

By the middle of the nineteenth century, Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)-administered Indian reservations had become the dominant spatial form of Indigenous life in Minnesota. Here again, settler governments pursued a strategy that would make room for the acquisitive advance of the settler frontier. This too marked another key shift in the management of the colonial relation. This process of settler territorialization was not unique to Minnesota. Regional settlement strategies were part of a far broader project of incursion grounded in “shoving the Indians out of the way” in order to remake vast swaths of the continent according to the ambitions of Euro-American settlers. Deploying strategies that ranged from outright removal, to resettlement, and reservanization, federal policymakers engaged in what Donald Meinig describes as a “project” of “geographical social engineering.” These efforts were so comprehensive in their scope that by the final decades of the nineteenth century much of the arable land in the American West had been transferred to state and private hands. Throughout the region, the policy of reservationization allowed railway companies, land speculators, and non-Indigenous settlers, to seize territory on an unprecedented scale.

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62 Ibid., 38.
64 Ibid., 100.
65 See Hall, American Empire and the Fourth World, 427-469.
Allotment and Territorial Alienation

These transformations, among others, hastened another shift in the dominant articulation of the colonial relation at the end of the nineteenth century, as the reservation strategy began to lose favor among American lawmakers. Starting in 1887, a range of legislative efforts at both the federal and state levels were brokered to break up collectively held Indigenous territories and convert them into alienable fee-simple property. The passing of the federal *Dawes Severalty Act* by the United States Congress in 1887 (implemented in Minnesota under the auspices of the *Nelson Act* of 1889) initiated a new process of territorial alienation so thorough that by mid 1930s Indigenous land holdings had been reduced from one hundred and thirty-eight million acres to roughly fifty million acres.66

This process continued apace until Congress adopted the *Indian Reorganization Act (IRA)* of 1934, which put a temporary end to the federal efforts to transform reservations into fee simple allotments and slowed the massive territorial attrition of Native lands inaugurated by the *Dawes Act*.67 By the late 1930s, however, the *IRA* was already the subject of considerable scorn and a variety of forces had begun to clamor for its abandonment. Such calls routinely invoked a language of emancipation, insisting that the state “liberate” Indigenous people from the paternalistic restrictions of federal control. In fact, the force of this argument even won over one of the *IRA*’s principle legislative sponsors who by 1937 had begun to fear that the legislation’s “community emphasis” bore the ideological impress of

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the “collectivist and totalitarian movements then sweeping the world.”\textsuperscript{68} Fear of “collectivism,” central planning, and anything that bore the slightest trace of socialism was ripe in this period and OK Armstrong, a political journalist and former member of the Missouri House of Representatives, embodied this spirit in full. In his view, the IRA had imposed cumbersome bureaucratic impediments on Indigenous people and ensured that their lives would continue to be defined by the paternalism and regimentation of wardship and unfreedom.\textsuperscript{69} Armstrong’s views were increasingly widespread after 1945. In fact, commitment to this brand of “emancipation” was something that brought liberals and conservatives into “frequent cold-war consensus,” according to James Lagrand\textsuperscript{70}

\textit{Termination and Relocation}

In this context, state interest in assimilation became explicit once again. In the wake of the Second World War, policy actors laid the political groundwork for what would become the federal policies of Termination and Relocation. The former was intended to divest the federal government from trust responsibility for tribal groups and territories whereas the latter was intended to provide the means for reservation dwellers to integrate into the economic and social “mainstream” of American life through urban relocation.

The motivations for these shifts were not exclusively “humanitarian,” however. The federal government had a discrete economic interest in Termination


\textsuperscript{69} For a discussion of Armstrong’s intervention see Peter Iverson, \textit{We Are Still Here: American Indians in the Twentieth Century} (Wheeling: Harlan Davidson, 1998), 120.

\textsuperscript{70} LaGrand, \textit{Indian Metropolis}, 46.
not least because it offered officials an opportunity to unburden themselves of the significant cost of Indian administration, service delivery, and the protection of tribal territories from further encroachment.\textsuperscript{71} Myla Vincenti Carpio suggests that legislators were also motivated by the opportunity free up resources to offset the growing cost of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{72} Finally, Termination promised new access to Indian Country’s rich resource base. The list of the tribal territories that were deemed ready to be terminated first revealed that more than administrative savings and ideological commitment were at play.\textsuperscript{73}

Federal efforts to relocate American Indians from reservations to urban centers, meanwhile, dovetailed nicely with these ambitions. By 1951, the newly-minted BIA commissioner Dillon Myer – who had distinguished himself during the war years as the head of the War Relocation Authority and its program of Japanese internment – had established a Branch of Placement and Relocation and opened a number of urban field offices with the intent of facilitating and supervising Indigenous urbanization.\textsuperscript{74} The Relocation program brought nearly 2000 migrants to select urban areas in its first year alone, offering them a modest transportation allowance (usually in the form of a one way ticket \textit{away} from the reservation), and start-up funds for housing and living costs. Through a strategy that echoed the objectives of the assimilationist Boarding School program, most relocates were deliberately settled far from home to discourage easy return to the reservation.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{71} Hall, \textit{American Empire and the Fourth World}, 467.
\textsuperscript{72} Vincenti Carpio, \textit{Indigenous Albuquerque}, 10.
\textsuperscript{73} Iverson, \textit{We Are Still Here}, 123.
\textsuperscript{74} On the connection between Dillon Myer’s work in Japanese internment and the postwar "Indian" Relocation program, see Richard Drinnon, \textit{Keeper of Concentration Camps: Dillon S. Myer and American Racism} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).
\textsuperscript{75} Iverson, \textit{We Are Still Here}, 132.
the years that followed, many more enlisted in the relocation program and its successor initiatives, not least because of the economic destitution of reservation economies. Yet while “Bureau personnel spoke of job training and continuing aid... most Indians who came to the city through the federal program reported they had received little of either.\textsuperscript{76}

\textit{Postwar Urbanization}

The Twin Cities were not designated an official federal relocation site but postwar in-migration to Minneapolis and St. Paul was encouraged through less explicit means. In 1948, the local BIA area office opened an employment placement office and a range of other agencies launched “smaller-scale relocation programs” of their own, for example.\textsuperscript{77} Among other factors, the Twin Cities’ status as a regional economic center and its relative proximity to a broad range of Indigenous communities made it a logical migratory choice for many. It was in this context, then, that the Twin Cities Indigenous community began to grow substantially.

Connectedly, Indigenous migrants to Minnesota’s cities tended to arrive from fewer and more proximate places. Anishinaabe people have consistently been in the majority in Minneapolis and many Indigenous residents of Minneapolis’ inner city came from, or were affiliated with, reservations in the Upper Midwest, especially the White Earth and Red Lake communities in Northern Minnesota.\textsuperscript{78} Smaller numbers

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 134.
\textsuperscript{77} Davis, \textit{Survival Schools}, 23.
\textsuperscript{78} League of Women Voters of Minneapolis, \textit{Indians in Minneapolis} (Minneapolis: League of Women Voters of Minneapolis, 1968); Laura Waterman Wittstock, in discussion with the author, Minneapolis, Minnesota, April 20, 2012. It is also worth noting that reservation affiliation was not the only one thing that brought people together in the city. Another was the fact that urban Indigenous people sometimes knew each other as a result of their experiences in regional institutions that had a
of Dakota and Lakota people have also long formed a substantial minority of the city’s larger Indigenous population. Members of other tribal groups, including Ho-Chunk people for example, have always formed a relatively minor part of the Twin Cities Indigenous population as a whole.

*Urban Challenges and the Politics of Assimilationism*

In the Twin Cities, Indigenous people faced a host of economic and social difficulties, as I have already suggested and the chapters that follow will demonstrate. Non-Indigenous organizations that took notice of these challenges tended to share the federal government’s assimilationist politics and this dynamic shaped local articulations of the colonial relation throughout the 1950s. In Minneapolis, for example, the early leadership of the United Church Committee on Indian Work (later renamed the Division of Indian Work) endorsed this politics explicitly.\(^79\) One of the group’s first leaders, Daisuke Kitagawa, who had been interned alongside other Japanese Americans during the war, was a strong proponent of the view that integrative urbanization was the best way to extend the full benefits of American citizenship to Indigenous peoples. “As one who has gone through the whole experience... of mass-evacuation, life in an assembly center and a relocation center, and finally the resettlement in an utterly unknown city, I firmly believe that the current policy of ‘off-reservation resettlement’ is ultimately the only way to assure American Indians of their future as American citizens,” he wrote in an

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article for the Missionary Research Library.\textsuperscript{80} Similar sentiments prevailed among the leadership of a non-denominational evangelical “Indian church” that had been formed in the 1950s. One Minneapolis Tribune profile noted that the congregation had been formed with the support of an organization called the Global Gospel Fellowship that had taken an interest in “Indians who need help” and sought to provide them with preparatory tutelage for joining the dominant society. “Only five per cent of the Indians are ready for direct integration… you have to get them ready,” noted the organization’s general director, John Carlsen.\textsuperscript{81}

Yet the aggressively assimilationist character of the colonial relation that prevailed in the 1950s began to be significantly challenged in the decades that followed. By the early 1960s, Indigenous urbanites in Minneapolis “declared pride in their Indian identity” and “sought new ways of controlling their destinies, both through the system and in defiance of the system,” according to Pauline Brunette.\textsuperscript{82} This emergent spirit manifested in a number of ways, including demands for greater representation on the organizations that claimed to serve the interests of Indigenous people. It was in this era that Indigenous people began to demand a role in determining how the “assistance” that was intended for them would be administered and delivered. In the mid-1960s, activists successfully secured substantial concessions from Mayor Art Natfalin, for example, ensuring that half the seats on an Indigenous-focused urban employment center would be filled by Indigenous people and that municipal funding would be committed to an Indigenous-led task force on


\textsuperscript{81} Cross, “Indian Church is on Road to Integration.”

“Indian problems,” among other things. Local observers, including the reporter Sam Newlund, took note of what seemed to be an unprecedented Indigenous investment in urban politics. “With a new gusto, the activists among them are getting involved in anti-poverty work, serving on committees, writing their Congressmen, visiting the mayor and demanding a voice in programs designed to help,” he noted in a 1966 report for the *Minneapolis Tribune*. Gerald Vizenor, then a community organizer in Minneapolis, saw “the new Indian participation” as a watershed. “I believe... this is the first time that the Indian community as a subculture has been approached positively, without restrictions, or justifications or value limitations,” he said at the time. These initial activities helped spawn what would become an impressive culture of Indigenous-led political contestation in Minneapolis, largely centered in the Phillips neighborhood.

Thus as this schematic account attests, the prevailing contours of the colonial relation have shifted considerably over the course of the region’s modern history. In spite of these transformations and the diverse ways that people have experienced them, however, certain dynamics have remained persistent throughout. Indeed, one “structural feature” that endures across this historical sweep is that settler colonists and their legislative partners have been consistently oriented around efforts to seize, take control over, and transform Indigenous territories, in accordance with their own ambitions. Thus while the colonial relation itself has taken diverse forms throughout this process, its structural orientation towards securing advantages for Euro-American settlers has remained firmly in tact.

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84 Ibid.
2.5 The Contested Character of the Colonial Relation

The fourth argument that animates my conceptual frame is that the domination inherent in the colonial relation is contested, not inevitable. While this may seem to be a truism, it is critical to elaborate this point because a number of critics have suggested that settler-colonial theory, in particular, has sometimes overstated the completeness of the colonial enterprise in ways that obscure the contingency of contemporary arrangements. For example, Tim Rowse argues that critical interpretations of the settler-colonial enterprise in Australia have sometimes problematically asserted Indigenous “helplessness” in the face of “overbearing colonial pressure.”\(^{85}\) The effect of such presentations, he contends, is to reproduce a “sorrowing” form of outrage in which “defeat and marginality are highlighted at the expense of understanding the nature and limits of Indigenous agency.”\(^{86}\) Additionally, Alissa Macoun and Elizabeth Strakosch argue that scholarship in this emergent subfield has sometimes promoted a kind of “colonial fatalism” by presenting settler-colonial domination as structurally embedded, “highly stable,” and relatively impervious to serious interruption.\(^{87}\) More damningly, they suggest that analyses that rely too heavily on this structuralism can lead non-Indigenous scholars to treat “settler action” as “always already colonizing” in ways that present anti-colonial political practice as futile and tacitly excuse those scholars from the ethical demand of engaging in it.\(^{88}\)


\(^{86}\) Ibid., 69.


\(^{88}\) Ibid., 435.
For a number reasons, the risk of reproducing these problematic approaches is particularly acute in my study. For example, my focus in this dissertation is to highlight the persistence of Indigenous “marginality” in the context of postwar Minneapolis and a serious consideration of the various forms of Indigenous resistance and political organizing that have been mobilized to confront this set of circumstances is beyond the scope of my work here. Thus while this history is of critical importance, I am more concerned in the chapters that follow to understand the broader set of urban relations in which that marginality was produced, a part of this story on which very little has been written. Thus while other researchers have focused on the internal dynamics of the Indigenous community itself, I am more focused on the complicity of external accumulation strategies, public policy approaches, knowledge production, and other practices, in reproducing settler colonial privilege. In doing so, I run the risk of overstating the potency of colonial domination while obscuring the degree to which Indigenous people have come together to collectively challenge their exclusion from the security and prosperity of the dominant society, among other things.

In light of this danger, I want to unequivocally assert my view that there is nothing inevitable or intractable about settler-colonial forms of domination. In fact, one of my aims in this study is precisely to consider a series of circumstances that reveal their contingency. I share Nicholas Blomley’s view that articulations of colonial domination in settler societies are “immensely powerful” but also “partial and incomplete” and that this contingency leaves practices of domination open to challenge and contestation.\(^{89}\) To argue that the forms of domination that animate

\(^{89}\)Blomley, *Unsettling the City*, 109.
the colonial relation are structurally imbedded – that they function as a “relatively secure or sedimented set of hierarchical social relations” as Coulthard puts it – is not to argue that the persistence of that domination is in any way pre-determined. My hope is that this project will be useful alongside existing and future studies of how resistance has flourished in this context. That it will contribute, in some small way, to broader efforts to challenge the persistence of the colonial relation and broader conversations about how we might “live our lives in relation to one another and the natural world in nondominating and nonexploitative terms.”

### 2.6 Urban Articulations of the Colonial Relation

The fifth and final argument that animates my conceptual frame is that the colonial relation continues in contemporary urban contexts. This too may seem like a truism, particularly in light of a recent proliferation of research in geography and other disciplines that has been concerned to understand how historically initiated colonial dynamics endure in contemporary contexts. Yet as Blomley observed a decade ago, there has been a “striking absence” of studies that have sought to take these themes up in the context of contemporary cities, with a few notable exceptions. In his view, this is an “important oversight” not only because “historic injustices continue to resonate and provide a basis for contestation over the histories and geographies of settler societies,” but also because they increasingly do so in

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91 Ibid., 13.
urban contexts.\textsuperscript{93} “The colonial encounter continues even within the city,” he stresses.

In the years since Blomley made this observation, however, a number of studies have begun to close this gap in the research.\textsuperscript{94} In important ways, they have contributed to existing efforts to erode a persistent line of thinking that has imagined the place of colonialism to be \textit{out there}, on erstwhile frontiers or at sites where conflicts over Indigenous territorial rights are most explicit, for example. The best of these studies remind us that cities are part of a broader colonial economy, demonstrating that geographies coded “urban” and “Indigenous” do not exist in states of absolute isolation from one another.

In fact, many North American cities (including Minneapolis) are built on geographies that were first settled and used by Indigenous people and processes of urbanization have often been accomplished at the expense of already existing communities.\textsuperscript{95} In many cases, these cities were not as much “settled” as they were “re-settled.”\textsuperscript{96} Yet acknowledging this history is important for reasons that go beyond mere political correctness, as Evelyn Peters reminds us. It is also a means of remembering that Indigenous migrants often “do not arrive in cities like other

\textsuperscript{93} Blomley, \textit{Unsettling the City}, 108.


\textsuperscript{96} Blomley, \textit{Unsettling the City}, 110.
migrants, national or international...” and that many are “travelling within their traditional territories.” 97 This observation is an important corrective to the “newness” that is often presumed to define Indigenous migrants’ encounters with urban settler society. In recent years, a number of scholars have explicitly challenged this presumption, emphasizing the continuity of Indigenous presence in the city. 98

Though continuous occupation is demonstrably verifiable in many cities, it is also a matter of fact that many of the people that left reservation communities for the city in the aftermath of the Second World War had little personal experience of urban life. In what follows, I am primarily concerned with the local effects of this postwar mass transfer but that does not mean I am not also interested in how the relationship between Indigenous and urban communities extends beyond this particular context. On the contrary, one of the ways that we can trace the endurance of the colonial relation is by looking closely at the ways in which both city and reservation are the products of longstanding and ongoing processes of political, cultural and spatial negotiation that are inextricably linked to each other. For this reason, I argue throughout what follows that colonial practices of dispossession are part of the complex field of material and immaterial practices that produce cities like Minneapolis and structure the everyday lives of those who live them.


This chapter has elaborated five arguments about what the colonial relation is and why it is a relevant framework for trying to make sense of the events that concern us here. In the chapters that follow, I will build on and extend these arguments as I seek to understand how the colonial relation has manifested in the context of postwar Minneapolis and beyond. Before I do so, however, I want to turn to a brief consideration of the connections between the urban region’s origins and the colonial relation.
Chapter 3 Urban Origins and the Colonial Relation: Notes from the Life of Thomas Barlow Walker

On a hill by the Mississippi where Chippewas camped two generations ago, a girl stood in relief against the cornflower blue of Northern sky. She saw no Indians now; she saw flour-mills and the blinking windows of skyscrapers in Minneapolis and St. Paul. Nor was she thinking of squaws and portages, and the Yankee fur-traders whose shadows were all about her. She was meditating upon walnut fudge, the plays of Brieux, the reasons why heels run over, and the fact that the chemistry instructor had stared at the new coiffure which concealed her ears.

- Sinclair Lewis, Main Street, 1920

3.1 Introduction

The opening scene of Sinclair Lewis’ Pulitzer-nominated Main Street introduces readers to a precocious undergraduate named Carol Milford.¹ We encounter our protagonist on a hill near the Mississippi River where “Chippewas” camped two generations before but we are told that Milford saw no “Indians” now, as she looked out upon a horizon dotted with “flour-mills and the blinking windows of skyscrapers in Minneapolis and St. Paul.” She may well have been surrounded by the spectral trace of “squaws” and “Yankee fur-traders,” but her imagination was occupied with more immediate matters, “walnut fudge, the plays of Brieux, the reasons why heels run over, and the fact that the chemistry instructor had stared at the new coiffure which concealed her ears.” For Lewis, Milford’s petty preoccupations signal more than banal self-absorption. That our protagonist could fixate on the perils of fashion and the pleasures of French theatre indicates the eclipse of a time when more basic concerns governed the rhythms of everyday life.

¹ Sinclair Lewis, Main Street (New York: Signet Classic, 2008), 1.
Where Milford’s “pioneering” predecessors were consumed with the quotidian slog of basic reproduction, she enjoyed the privilege of suspended obligation and urban abundance. Where earlier settlers took up the “burden of planting American civilization in the wilderness,” Milford could enjoy all the amenities of a modern metropolis.\(^2\) In Lewis’ rendering, the basic privations of frontier life are radically superseded, banished to an irretrievable past by the same revolution that brought industry, skyscrapers, undergraduates, and walnut fudge to the heart of the “American Middlewest.”

*Main Street* is not the only text to interpret the emergence of Minnesota’s Twin Cities as a process of radical metamorphosis. In many accounts, the rapid nineteenth century rise of two urban centers of significant regional consequence is understood as a sudden and transformative act of creation.\(^3\) Most acknowledge that the area on which the urban region now sits, was once used and occupied by Indigenous people. For example, they tend to note that it was an integral part of the lived geographies of Mdewakanton Dakota people at the time that the United States initiated the first treaties in what is now Minnesota, and later an important meeting point and trading hub for a range of Indigenous peoples and their Euro-American counterparts. In most urban genesis stories, however, these early moments of intercultural negotiation are the last time we encounter Indigenous people as significant players in the life of the city. Indeed, the process by which Euro-American settlers secured title over the present site of the urban region is generally

\(^2\) Mary Vance Carney, *Minnesota, the Star of the North* (Boston and New York: D.C. Heath & Co., 1918), 121.

presented as a prelude to urbanization, a kind of prehistory to a period in which settler migrants would conceive, build, and develop a fundamentally new geography, independent of the area’s first inhabitants. The city, in other words, is understood to be a settler creation that exists separately of ongoing negotiations with the region’s original occupants. Thus what most of these interpretations share with Main Street is that Indigenous people appear only as spectral “shadows” to be remembered or forgotten, insofar as they appear at all.

This chapter starts from the premise that such presentations operate to dissociate the development of the Twin Cities from broader processes of settler colonization and the enduring centrality of the colonial relation. By presuming the existence of a radical break between an initial period of negotiation and a formative period in which settlers actively constructed a modern American metropolis, they obscure the degree to which the latter was and is contingent on an ongoing process of dispossession. As such, they conceal the ways in which the city was produced through a process of transformation in which control over vast stores of natural wealth and territory was transferred from one group of peoples to another.

This history of dispossession is routinely minimized in mainstream accounts of the urban region’s emergence. Explanations of how and why urbanity bloomed in this part of the prairie tend to downplay existing occupancy while stressing the courageous ingenuity of the recently arrived. Such presentations often assign decisive importance to role of certain “city building” men, an elite that are said to have possessed the aptitude and acumen to capitalize on an advantageous geographical location and call forth a propitious urban future. “While Minneapolis has great natural advantages of waterpower, situation and surroundings, these
would have been of little avail had not courageous, far-sighted and public-spirited men of great energy taken hold of the enterprise at an early day with a determination to build a large city,” begins one typical account.4 In such narratives, the most accomplished among this celebrated city-building few are frequently described as “empire builders,” a term that came to be synonymous with “ambitious men of Anglo-Saxon descent” who migrated to the American Midwest in the years that followed the Civil War and developed the industries “upon which the city’s growth was based.”5 Included among their hallowed ranks are the barons of the lumber, milling, and transportation industries, figures such as James J. Hill of St. Paul (chief executive of the Great Northern Railway) and Charles A. Pillsbury of Minneapolis (co-founder of the Pillsbury Corporation). The ambition and élan of these men is routinely presented as a precondition for the urban region’s ascendance. The emergence of a “big city must necessarily be the work of big-minded men,” wrote the boosterist Minneapolis Daily News at the dawn of the twentieth century, and “in such men Minneapolis is rich.”6

In this chapter I examine the life of one of these “big-minded men,” the timber baron and “city-builder” Thomas Barlow (TB) Walker. I do so because Walker is routinely counted among the most important in a field of important men whose civic mindedness and public commitment are said to have ensured that Minneapolis would rise to a position of regional dominance. In the first part of what

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follows, I consider his life and contributions to Minneapolis in an effort to
demonstrate how and why he earned this reputation. Yet I am also interested to
show that while Walker’s accomplishments were substantial, they are routinely
celebrated in a historical and political vacuum. Hagiographical portraits of Walker’s
life, for example, operate to purge his biography of its context, obscuring its
imbrication in the violence of settler-colonial dispossession. My interest here is to
correct this partial telling by demonstrating that Walker was not merely a self-made
success but also a spectacular beneficiary of opportunities born of the nineteenth
century incorporation of large swaths of Western North America into the territorial
dominion of the United States. In the second part of this chapter, then, I argue that
he derived immense personal advantage from the colonial relation and the socio-
spatial processes of transformation that are so central to it. Importantly, though, I
also stress that the advantages seized through these processes cannot be neatly
quarantined in a now concluded historical past. Indeed, the personal fortunes of
figures like Walker have an enduring life in the city; they continue to articulate as
economic and social power. What I want to emphasize is that wealth generated
through processes of settler-colonial incursion is not merely preliminary. Early
rounds of accumulation are the basis for future rounds of accumulation, investment,
and endowment that persist in the contemporary city.

3.2 The Making of a Lumber King

The life of TB Walker has all the hallmarks of a Gilded Age parable; it is a
story of dazzling ascent from humble origins to the dizzying heights of the American
plutocracy. As we shall see, Walker’s rise to prominence and economic largesse is
intimately entwined with that of his adopted city, Minneapolis.
Walker was born in southern Ohio to Yankee transplants in 1840. He entered Baldwin University at sixteen and subsidized his education by working as a travelling salesman between terms (always with books in tow). After his studies were completed, he took a job selling grindstones and traveled the Upper Midwest extensively, eventually finding his way to Minneapolis. The latter was apparently a “lucky accident” that would not have happened had Walker not encountered a fellow traveler at McGregor, Iowa who sung the praises of “the embryo city by the falls of St. Anthony.” The traveler’s assessment of the “prospects and possibilities of the coming metropolis,” so moved the young salesman that he booked immediate passage up the Mississippi to see it for himself. Walker did not yet know, of course, that this fateful decision would inaugurate his spectacular rise from lowly salesman to “Pine King” of the American West.

Biographers describe Walker’s 1862 arrival in Minneapolis as an experience of unmediated delight. He was apparently so taken with his surroundings that he began to close out his grindstone commitments and wrote to his betrothed to tell her that he had “found the city where we will make our home.” With characteristic decisiveness, Walker apparently made all these arrangements within hours of his arrival.

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Settling into his new life, Walker found work on a government land survey under the leadership of George B. Wright. In August 1862, he set out on the first of a series of expeditions that would take him to all corners of the state over the course of the next half-decade. Walker had a scientific understanding of the principles of surveying but had little technical skill, so the new recruit started out as a brush clearer and “chainman” while Wright “manipulated the instrument himself.” However, the “new man” was a quick study and it would not be long before he was the one carrying the compass.

In Joseph Conrad’s terms, this was an era of “geography triumphant,” in which the “white spots” on settler maps were rapidly succumbing to the “dominion of science,” thanks largely to the work of surveying parties contracted to assess and produce geographical knowledge about ever remote reaches of the newly formed state. It was in this context that Walker’s freshly acquired talents would be put to diverse use as he participated in a broad range of public and private expeditions in the years that followed.

These productions of geographical knowledge were not merely innocent pursuits, however. Land surveys are one of the central technologies through which new property regimes were imposed in colonial milieu and the production of cadastral knowledge was at the center of colonialist efforts to introduce new

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“economic and spatial order[s]” at the expense of existing Indigenous societies.\textsuperscript{13} In this regard, Minnesota was no exception and Walker was no innocent recorder of neutral geographical facts. Throughout the course of his work as a surveyor he kept precise records of the state’s vast arboreal resources and his archive would eventually yield staggering personal benefit.

Indeed, Walker’s geographical expertise allowed him to enter into alliances with “men of ready means” and secure an auspicious entry into the western lumber trade.\textsuperscript{14} While he had little capital of his own, his territorial knowledge and adept sense of how and where to negotiate access, made him an attractive asset to those who did. Accordingly, the earliest stages of his entrepreneurial career were driven by a series of mutually beneficial alliances with moneyed partners, through which he was enlisted to assess, purchase, and assemble timberlands. This process frequently included acquiring scrip from “half-breed” and Indigenous holders.\textsuperscript{15}


Building on the spoils of these initial arrangements, Walker began assembling a lumber empire of his own, as he rapidly transformed modest timberland holdings into a vast set of interests in extraction, processing, milling and stumpage. By the 1890s, he was the largest owner of timberlands in the state and was reported to manufacture and handle more logs than any person in the region.\textsuperscript{16} At various points, Walker held significant interests in the timber markets of the Red River Valley, the Upper Mississippi, and throughout Northern Minnesota, alongside milling operations in Minneapolis. His arboreal empire soon extended westward as he acquired large timberlands in Oregon and California, acquisitions that would prompt one San Francisco newspaper to describe him as the “Minnesota lumber king who owns half of Northern California.”\textsuperscript{17} By the turn of the century, Walker had amassed a fortune so large that he was reputed to be the richest man in Minnesota, with an estimated personal worth of ten to sixteen million dollars.\textsuperscript{18}

Walker’s spectacular success made him a staunch defender of what he saw as the productive and liberatory dynamism of the capitalist wage economy. He balked at what he perceived to be the persistence of a “general prejudice” against capitalists (which he described as “a most useful class of citizens leading the most strenuous lives in building up and maintaining the public interest”).\textsuperscript{19} Walker often spoke publicly about the perils of collectivist social organization, taking aim at what he

\textsuperscript{16}Atwater, “History of Minneapolis Minnesota,” 80-82.
\textsuperscript{18}Minneapolis Journal, “T.B. Walker Reputed to be Richest Man in Minnesota,” in Sketches of the Life of Honorable TB Walker (Minneapolis: Lumberman Publishing Company, 1907), 64.
called the “fallacies of socialism.”\textsuperscript{20} He was fond of opining that socialist aspirations were animated by belief in an “imaginative system” and stressing that all organizational experiments that proposed “living together in harmony and common ownership of property” were failures in practice.\textsuperscript{21}

Walker often cited observations from his encounters with Indigenous people as the material basis of this claim. For example, he was fond of recounting a story about two Indigenous men that endeavored to raise a crop of potatoes in order to sell them to an expected party of loggers. One interpretation of these events is included in Walker’s memoir and is worth quoting at some length as an illustration of his thinking.

These two men, Naugonup and Chechegum, raised about thirty-five bushels of potatoes on a little tract of very rich land… in a very beautiful and attractive situation…. These potatoes were stored in holes under the houses, and some rough poles and boards put over them for a floor. There being no road from [this location] to the lumber camp, six or seven miles distant, the potatoes could not be moved until the swamps froze, when they could be hauled over a summer trail that a team could go over to bring them. The Indians at Oak Point, twenty-five miles away, heard of this horrible conspiracy on the part of these two Indians… to deprive the band to which they belonged of their natural rights to appropriate all the surplus above the day’s supply and to transfer it to a lot of white men in the lumber camps. This was so repugnant to their ideas, of the right of one fellow in the product of the other fellow’s labor, that they went in force with their canoes… to the two little log houses under which the potatoes were stored, and took away… every potato that the enterprising two Indians had raised for their own benefit, to buy provisions and carry them through the winter. Afterward these two Indians were always at a discount and somewhat ostracized by the band, because of its interest in the produce of their labor.\textsuperscript{22}


\textsuperscript{22} Thomas Barlow Walker, “Memories of Early Life and Development of Minnesota,” in Minnesota Historical Collections no. 15 (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1915), 467-8.
For Walker, these events offered a “real view” of the “calamity of socialism” and illustrated the perils of that system’s characteristic contempt for the productive labor of enterprising individuals. In this interpretation, Walker was closely aligned with the mainstream of American political thinking that tended to denigrate Indigenous forms of social organization on the grounds that they favored an inefficient “collectivism.” Throughout the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this civilizational shortcoming was routinely cited as the source of a perceived Indigenous backwardness, among leading political figures. As Otis and Prucha show in their study of the 1887 Dawes Severalty Act, contemporary lawmakers and officials shared Walker’s view that private property ownership was a vehicle through which a “high degree of civilization” could be achieved. At the heart of this contention was the view that the collective forms of tribal life discouraged ambition and bred a culture of dependency. The “present communistic state of affairs,” lamented one BIA official in the early 1880s, explicitly discourages “effort” by evenly distributing the spoils of labor “irrespective of the merits of individuals.” Walker’s oft-repeated yarns made comparable claims, employing Indigenous “collectivism” as a foil in presentations intended to render plain the apparent virtues of merit-based capitalist social organization.

Walker understood that his work was part of a settler transformation of territories that had long been occupied and claimed by Indigenous people, even if he would not have put it those terms. He could not have ignored the tensions produced

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23 Ibid., 468.
25 Ibid., 4.
by a steadily rising settler pressure on the lands that Indigenous people continued to inhabit. These very tensions, in fact, brought his first surveying trip to an abrupt end, as Dakota people rebelled against starvation, delayed annuities, dubious dealing on the part of government officials and a range of other grievances in the summer of 1862. Though accounts of events vary, Minnesota’s brief but consequential “civil war” was reportedly set off by the killing of a small group of white settlers, a “rash” retaliation by a few young men that “ignited a powder keg of anger, disillusionment, and desperation” and led to more than two months of marked hostilities. Venturing out as the disturbances began, Walker’s expedition was said to have “narrowly escaped a disastrous ending,” as it entered “into the heart of a country infested with hostile Indians”. The Minneapolis Tribune chauvinistically noted that Walker’s surveying party had been “constantly beset and harassed by the red men who had just then started on that path of massacre which dyed with blood the prairies and the forests of Minnesota.” In an effort to secure themselves from the “frightful outbreak,” Walker and his surveying colleagues sought refuge at Fort Ripley in central Minnesota where, by Walker’s own account, the party stood fast with “a view to defend the fort against an army of Sioux that were reported coming from the New Ulm country... and also against an additional force of Chippewas who were reported as coming down from Leech lake to attack the fort.” Neither of the dreaded armies would ever arrive at Fort Ripley, however, and

27 Wingerd, North Country, 304.
28 Successful American, “Thomas Barlow Walker,” 58.
30 Walker, “Memories of Early Life and Development of Minnesota,” 461. The language of “outbreak” - which recurs repeatedly in narrations of Walker’s life - is interesting because it admits that Euro-American settlers were explicitly engaged in processes of containment. After all, it is only in a context where Indigenous people were subjected to particular forms of “spatial, economic,
Walker soon found himself back in Minneapolis.\(^{31}\) The Dakota, meanwhile, suffered a considerably less comfortable fate, as state authorities responded to the rebellion with merciless ferocity; settler vengeance was meted out with little distinction and nearly all Dakota people suffered profound privation in one form or another.\(^{32}\) While some faced capital punishment (including the thirty-eight that were simultaneously hanged in what remains the single largest execution in American history), others were left to cope with the consequences of abrogated treaties, cancelled annuities, incarceration in abhorrent conditions, and eventual exile through a program of “Indian removal,” or what Waziyatawin describes as a campaign of ethnic cleansing.\(^{33}\)

Walker’s defenders described him as a shrewd but virtuous capitalist, noting that his aptitude for “empire building” was closely linked to his record of cautious good sense and interpersonal decency. He is reputed to have been a savvy reader of economic trends, for example, not least because he anticipated the economic “panics” of 1873 and 1893 in time to protect his assets from devastating depletion.\(^{34}\) Beyond the prudent management of his own interests, however, Walker earned a reputation for unimpeachable good character amongst his fellow capitalists. The Michigan industrialist H.C. Akeley, who acquired half of Walker’s massive timber interests in

\(^{31}\) The Anishinaabeg of Northern Minnesota did not join the rebellion.

\(^{32}\) While the number of Dakota that had actually participated in the fighting was limited, perhaps as few as one thousand among the multiple bands that made up a population estimated to exceed seven thousand, the vengeance of the settler state was meted out with little distinction. See Wingerd, \textit{North Country}, 307.


what was described as one of the “most exceptional land deals and business transactions that can be found in the history of business affairs,” apparently had so much faith in Walker’s character that he did not think it necessary to examine the land or titles before inking the deal.\footnote{Minneapolis Tribune, “An Illustrious Minneapolis, The Honorable Thomas B. Walker,” in\textit{ Sketches of the Life of Honorable T.B. Walker} (Minneapolis: Lumberman Publishing Company, 1907), 37.} Walker’s defenders also often noted his personal generosity, citing, for example, the public benches he placed at the edge of his lawn (where “most people would have placed a barbed wire fence”), a reputation for insisting that those in his employ receive decent wages, his considerable contributions to a range of charitable organizations, and his apparently selfless campaign to distribute free seeds to the victims of the crop-destroying “grasshopper visitation” of 1875.\footnote{Saturday Spectator, “Thomas B Walker: A Representative Citizen and Leading Business Man,” in\textit{ Sketches of the Life of Honorable TB Walker} (Minneapolis: Lumberman Publishing Company, 1907), 63; Minneapolis Journal, “T.B. Walker - Captain of Industry,” 110; San Francisco Bulletin, “Life of T.B. Walker,” 70-4.}

Walker was also described as profoundly “civic-minded” and interested in ensuring the “success” of Minneapolis.\footnote{Minneapolis Journal, “T.B. Walker - Captain of Industry,” 110.} While his fortune put him in the company of an elite global few, he remained committed to his adopted home as a developer, investor, and booster. Walker’s local engagement was motivated both by a desire to secure his city’s ascendancy in a context of robust inter-urban competition and to convert surpluses extracted from the regional hinterlands into productive urban investments. In part, this entailed significant re-investments in the city’s built environment. Thus as Walker’s fortune grew, so too did his extensive urban portfolio, which soon included interests in industrial, commercial, and residential real estate and a diverse range of infrastructure. He was an instrumental

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\footnote{37 Minneapolis Journal, “T.B. Walker - Captain of Industry,” 110.}
underwriter of the Minneapolis Land and Investment Company (MLIC), which sought to expand the city’s industrial capacity through the establishment of the “manufacturing suburb” of St. Louis Park, among other things. After acquiring seventeen hundred acres of land at the western edge of the city limits and fitting it with necessary amenities in the 1890s, the district became home to “many valuable plants,” including both a successful farm implement factory and a beet sugar refinery. Walker also developed profitable interests in warehousing, including one of the most extensive “commission plants” for the distribution of produce and agricultural products in the entire country. His own interests, moreover, often dovetailed with broader efforts to promote Minneapolis to outsiders. He was a founding member of the Business Men’s Union, for example, a group of industrialists and elites that sought to attract capital to the city. The group’s efforts were often undertaken in direct competition with St. Paul, and it was considered a coup when the Chicago mail-order firm Butler Brothers chose Minneapolis as the site of a new warehousing facility in 1906. Walker himself was instrumental in securing this arrangement, engaging in an aggressive campaign to attract the firm that included a


39 The Business Men’s Union (sometimes called the Minneapolis Business Union) is one in a substantial list of elite organizations that wielded considerable power in Minneapolis through the first half of the twentieth century. It was part of a network of institutional power that fought vigorously to defend the “interests” of the city’s wealthiest citizens, not least through (sometimes violent) efforts to keep Minneapolis an “open shop” town. The virulent anti-union politics that animated these networks is very well documented, see for example William Millikan, A Union Against Unions: The Minneapolis Citizens Alliance and Its Fight Against Organized Labor, 1903-1947 (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 2001); Bryan Palmer, Revolutionary Teamsters: The Minneapolis Teamsters Strike of 1934 (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2014); Liam Quam and Peter Rachleff, “Keeping Minnesota an Open-Shop Town: The Citizens’ Alliance in the 1930s,” Minnesota History 50 (1986); Charles Walker, American City: A Rank and File History of Minneapolis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005 [1937]). This history reminds us that the “interests” of those that we might call settler colonists were by no means unified and that Minnesotan urban life was shaped by rigidly defended class boundaries.
commitment to build a facility with more than five hundred thousand square feet of
door space. Notably, his support for the project included a personal effort to strong-arm municipal authorities into waiving their right to remove rail access to the building, should it be in the public interest to do so at some future date.

Walker also took an immense personal pride in both endowing and promoting the city's intellectual and cultural life. He was instrumental in the establishment and governance of the city's first public library, opening access to materials that were previously only available to those with paid subscriptions to private collections. He was at the center of efforts to build a public library that would house a considerable circulating collection, an “academy” for the study of natural sciences, and an impressive fine arts center. On the eve of this building’s completion, one observer would note of Walker: “He it was who by liberal expenditure and much hard work broke the crust of conservatism in the old Athenaeum library [a private reading room], and thereby paved the way to the present grand consummation of a triple union between the culture forces of literature, science and art in the public library.”

Most notably, perhaps, he is celebrated for having amassed one of the most impressive personal art collections in the country and opening his own home for regular public viewings. This initial contribution would have a lasting impact and Walker's collection (amplified by the endowments of his descendants) provided the foundation of what would become an internationally celebrated gallery. Today,

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40 Minneapolis Journal, “Butler Bros. Come to Minneapolis; One of the Largest Jobbing Companies in America Selects This City as Center of the Great Northwest,” in *Sketches of the Life of Honorable T.B. Walker* (Minneapolis: Lumberman Publishing Company, 1907), 72.


the Walker Art Center describes its namesake’s original collection as the “modest start” of a “contemporary arts center now revered throughout the world for the range and vitality of its visual arts, performing arts, and media arts programs.” For these and other deeds, Walker is remembered alongside other “great men” as one of an elite few that laid a foundation of industry, prosperity, and “civilization” that would assure the urban region’s ascendance.

3.3 The Spoils of Colonial Incursion

To understand the rise of Minneapolis (or the Twin Cities more generally) as primarily a consequence of the vision, commitment, and courage of “big-minded” men is, however, to obscure the material and social relations on which their actions rested. Hagiographical portraits of “empire builders” frequently imagined their subjects as people who built something out of nothing, interpreting the urban landscape as a kind of tabula rasa on which a new generation of great men would leave their stamp in the form of a dynamic human community where once there was none. In this vein, Montgomery Schuyler, Harper’s architectural critic, would describe fin-de-siècle Minneapolis as a city that had risen like an “exhalation,” an almost sudden creation that had sprung forth “from the heads of its projectors full-panoplied in brick and mortar.” In interpretations like this one, “empire builders” are imagined as visionaries that tamed a remote and sprawling “wilderness,” a “vast waste of prairie and pine lands.” One of James J. Hill’s biographers, for example, noted that his subject made a “Titanic impress” on the “country of the young,” by

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44 Schuyler, “Glimpses of Western Architecture,” 736.
bringing the building blocks of industrialization to a “rich section of the earth that had gone for ages almost untouched by man.”⁴⁶ Such narrations promote the sense that westward settlers were the inheritors of an immense and “unimproved” natural endowment, an unfathomable material abundance that sat waiting for those with the wherewithal to tap into it.

Yet narrations that emphasize the role of these men in calling forth a “great” city from a “wasted” or largely uninhabited land have often obscured that such achievements were contingent on more than the ingenuity of a few brilliant men and an army of laboring settlers. They were facilitated by a violent process of colonial incursion through which Euro-American settlers expropriated large swaths of Indigenous land, incorporated those lands into the territorial networks of American state power, and replaced existing systems of social organization with a capitalist political economy grounded in private property, commodity production, and wage labor. To put it another way, Minnesota’s “great” cities did not merely spring from the “heads” of their “projectors” but were contingent on a massive transfer of wealth from one group to another.⁴⁷

Walker’s capacity to amass a vast fortune is inseparable from the sweeping transformation of social and political life that was accomplished as large swaths of Western North America were incorporated into the territorial ambit of the United

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⁴⁷ To speak of a transfer from “one group to another” is of course to simplify a complex history. It is critical to reiterate that the benefits of settler colonization were far from evenly shared amongst the diverse range of settlers that came to Minnesota (see footnote 39 above). Thus while a full accounting of these distinctions is beyond the scope of this study, it is necessary to acknowledge that the “Big Men” version of regional history that I present here runs the risk of obscuring the radically unequal class composition of settler society.
States and Euro-American settlers established permanent occupancy, beginning in the latter half of the nineteenth century. His vast accumulations are inseparable from the introduction of the colonial relation and its valorization of the territorial and social claims of settler colonists over and above those of their Indigenous counterparts.

In other words, Walker and his descendants were and are the explicit beneficiaries of primitive accumulation. Yet as I outline above, North American forms of primitive accumulation did not always entail the conversion of the “social means” of subsistence into capital and the conversion of the existing “immediate producers” into wage laborers. In Minnesota, the former is a demonstrable historical fact but the latter is decidedly more complicated. Indeed, the collective production and consumption patterns of Indigenous people were radically interrupted by settler incursions into lands that had been parts of established harvesting rhythms for many generations (seasonal patterns that settlers often mistook for itinerancy) but the dispossessive territorialization of the region did not always entail the conversion of Indigenous people into wage laborers, at least not in the sense of general “proletarianization” that Marx had in mind. Thus while Indigenous people were increasingly “divorced” from the territorial wealth that formed the basis of their livelihoods, they were not always encouraged to take a place in the wage economy. Indeed, it was often the case that settler populations were dramatically more interested in the lands occupied by Indigenous peoples than they were in Indigenous people as a pool of potential laborers.

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Walker and other “empire builders” benefitted enormously from the simultaneous introduction of the colonial relation and capital relation as core organizing principles of Minnesotan political life. The alienation of Indigenous peoples from their lands and the conversion of Indigenous resources into trade-able commodities were the twin bases of his immense prosperity. Indeed, the natural abundance of the nineteenth century American West contained immense wealth in and of itself, as William Cronon shows. 49 The process by which vast stores of natural resources were accessed and converted into wealth in the form of capital required a process of transformation through which the existing “quilt” of Indigenous commons were enclosed and colonial-capitalist property relations were imposed.50 In spite of what settler accounts often tell us, these territories were not unused, wasted, or uninhabited, however. Accordingly, this process necessarily entailed the dispossession of the land’s existing users. Beginning in the first half of the nineteenth century, and accelerating considerably after 1850, the land holdings of Indigenous people in what is now Minnesota were dramatically and comprehensively reduced, as I outline above. The rise of “empire builders” was explicitly connected to the accumulation opportunities made possible by this transformation.

Urban centers that emerged on North American colonial “frontiers” did not exist in isolation but functioned as key nodes “in a broader colonial network” and

50 Allan Greer, “Commons Enclosure in the Colonization of North America,” *American Historical Review* 117 (2012): 372. Greer uses the metaphor of a “quilt of native commons” to suggest that a diverse range of territorial arrangements existed in the “real” America “where Europeans came to establish their colonies.” By stressing that the continent contained diverse range of human societies each governed by their own set of “land-use” rules he writes against the Lockean view of America as a “universal commons completely open to all.”
staging areas for expanding settler incursion into the “colonial interior,” as Blomley observes. These centers were not removed from colonial dispossession but “pivotal” to its accomplishment. Thus while cities like Minneapolis may well have been removed from the immediate negotiations of colonial settlement, they remained key hubs for the organization, financing, and outfitting of the enterprises that drove it. So too were they places where the resources extracted from the colonial interior were processed, coordinated, and distributed. Minneapolis milling interests, for example, were entirely reliant on production and extraction activities in ever expanding colonial hinterlands. The process by which such territories were claimed and converted into agricultural and timberlands was, of course, the same process of incursive colonization through which Indigenous people were increasingly confined to smaller and smaller territories. The introduction of the capital relation coincided neatly with the introduction of the colonial relation, which established settler entitlement to the land as legitimate and settler forms of social organization as supreme.

The life of Minnesota’s Twin Cities is thus closely linked to these incursive transformations and the surpluses accumulated through productive activities on newly acquired Indigenous lands were routinely invested in the urban built environment. Walker’s capacity to invest in the bricks and mortar of a growing metropolis, for example, was an explicit result of his spectacular success in extracting capital from newly opened hinterlands. To ignore these vital linkages is to divorce the city from its material imbeddedness in the violence of dispossession. This is true both in ecological and human terms. In his study of nineteenth century

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51 Blomley, *Unsettling the City*, 110.
Chicago, Cronon observes that for many that city seemed to “break free from the soil and soar skyward as a wholly artificial creation.” Yet this interpretation of Chicago as a “triumph of human labor and will,” he continues, “concealed long-standing debts to the natural systems that made it possible.” To a large degree, the same can be said for nineteenth century Minneapolis where the commodification of surrounding hinterlands facilitated the rise of an urban region of significant consequence. Yet while there is certainly an acknowledgement that Minneapolis emerged as a “resource town,” most urban origin narratives so valorize the ingenuity and creativity of settler imaginations (not least of the “empire builders”) that they often present the city as a kind of miraculous triumph of collective or individual wills. It is precisely these narratives that obscure a basic economic truth: that in order for urban interests to benefit from the development of the colonial interior, that interior had to be cleared for their benefit and remade according to their ambitions.

It is critical to reiterate, moreover, that the wealth generated through initial rounds of accumulation was and is the basis for future rounds of accumulation. In tangible ways, the fortunes amassed by “empire builders” through the settler-colonization of the region were and are the same fortunes that were reinvested in Twin Cities infrastructures, built environments and cultural amenities. Those “influential” families that came to Minnesota in the mid nineteenth century to “form an industrial and financial” class and were rewarded with spectacular personal wealth are, in many cases, the same families that continue to be key players in the political, social, and cultural life of the state. It is no coincidence that major urban

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amenities continue to bear names like Walker, Weyerhaeuser, Dayton, and Hill. The capital generated through colonial processes of dispossession is not locked in a hermetically sealed past but continues as a dynamic force of economic and cultural privilege.

![Walker Art Gallery in South Minneapolis, as seen from Hennepin Avenue](Image Source: Walker Art Center).

These basic links are, however, often obscured by the enduring potency of an imagined epochal break between a past moment of colonial contestation and urban an after-life in which it that contestation is presumed to be absent. To trouble this break is to “unsettle” the city by insisting that the colonial relation be understood as central to the life of Minnesota’s largest city, both in historical and contemporary

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54 It is worth noting that a major portion of the archival research that went into this dissertation was conducted in the Weyerhaeuser Reading Room at the Minnesota History Center.
terms. In sum, “empire builders” and less celebrated settler migrants did not forge *something out of nothing*. The former were not merely the beneficiaries of good luck, good instincts or their own ingenuity but of the opportunities produced by the settler territorialization of Minnesota and the dispossession of Indigenous peoples. Importantly, too, this argument applies to settler colonists of considerably more modest means. It is no coincidence, for example, that today more than forty five million Americans are able to trace their familial wealth to the Homestead Act of 1862.\(^5^5\) In the simplest terms, settler colonization, like other forms of imperialism, is a process of transference. It entails both the “mass transfer” of populations from one place to another and the transfer of vast territories from one group of occupiers to another.\(^5^6\) Because the colonized territory contains vast surpluses of natural wealth, this appropriation ought also to be read as a transfer of wealth from group to another, even if that wealth is shared unevenly amongst the group that appropriates it.

Such transfers do not hinge on material practices of removal or confinement alone, however. Immaterial practices of domination must also be mobilized to justify and enact dispossession. Accordingly, the “mass transfer” of a settler population onto appropriated territories is closely linked to ideological practices of transfer, or what Blomley calls conceptual forms of displacement.\(^5^7\) In urban terms, various forms of intellectual, cultural, and artistic representation operate to locate Indigenous people as either absent from, or inconsequential to, the origins and continuing life of the city, obscuring the enduring relevance of the colonial relation.


\(^{56}\) On processes of settler colonization as forms of "mass transfer" see Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, 106-44.

\(^{57}\) Blomley, *Unsettling the City*, 109.
Thus many accounts – from text books to academic histories – promote the sense that the Twin Cities region ceased to be part of a properly colonial political economy after the territory on which it sits was ceded to the United States in the early nineteenth century. Such interpretations operate to reinforce settler ownership over the Twin Cities, rendering it natural and quarantining it outside of the realm of contemporary politics. The effect of these displacements is to create a sense of rupture between a colonial moment (which happened out there and back then) and the creation of a new city through an organic process of settler ingenuity. To reproduce this fetishistic revisionism is to conceal the enduring relevance of the colonial relation in the life of the contemporary city, a theme that I explore in considerable detail in the chapters that follow.

3.4 Summary

I begin with these arguments to stress that Minneapolis does not exist independently of processes of settler colonization, in spite of an enduring tendency to present the city as a fundamentally new creation forged through settler ingenuity and commitment. I have tried to trouble the idea that clear lines of demarcation can be drawn between an Indigenous past and a settler present. As the lives of settler colonists like Walker demonstrate, the urban region was not produced in a socio-political vacuum but rather in a context of explicit colonial dispossession. Minneapolis did not merely rise like an “exhalation” but was produced through discrete forms of territorial and material transfer. Indeed, the surpluses generated through territorial expropriation are the very basis of the city’s urban becoming and

58 See for example Carney, Minnesota, Star of the North; Antoinette Ford, Gopher Tales: Stories From the History of Minnesota (Chicago and New York: Lyons and Carnahan, 1948); Blegen, Minnesota.
remain persistent features of its enduring life. Yet while the colonial relation originates in early iterations of settler-colonial primitive accumulation, it is expressed in diverse forms in the contemporary city. In the chapters that follow, I continue to trace its enduring potency, paying close attention to the ways in which it rearticulates in different forms in the urban present.
Chapter 4 Metropolitan Transformation and the Colonial Relation: The Postwar City Divided

4.1 Introduction

East Franklin Avenue emerged as one of South Minneapolis’ principal commercial corridors at the end of the nineteenth century. Irene Anderson was born in this era and spent much of the next eight decades in and around the Avenue’s elm-lined expanse. She studied at Adams School, on the present site of the Minneapolis American Indian Center, and later at South High, on the present site of the Little Earth of United Tribes housing development. In her twenties, she married a local boy whose father ran a small grocery store at the corner of East Franklin and 11th Avenues and started a family in a nearby low-rise apartment complex. Anderson remembers the area as a place of neighborly fellowship, describing East Franklin as the attractive center of a tightly knit urban community, a place that “came alive” with the bustle of salubrious commerce in and around meticulously maintained family-run shops.† It was “a beautiful place for shopping and meeting neighbors.”

These fond reminiscences jar against descriptions of East Franklin that began to appear in local publications in the decades that followed the Second World War. By the mid 1950s, mass suburbanization had begun to hasten the decline of vast stretches of the city’s urban core and the Avenue had begun to suffer some of the most deleterious effects of metropolitan reorganization. Local journalists took note of these transformations and began filing dispatches that described the area as

† Karen Karvonen, “Franklin Avenue Revisited,” The Alley, April 1979, 3.
an emergent urban slum, increasingly populated by racialized people and teeming with conspicuous signs of economic insecurity.

Indigenous people were often at the center of these reports, increasingly counted among the ranks of an inner-city population that had been largely excluded from the spoils of postwar prosperity. In 1957, Carl Rowan was already describing the presence of an “unofficial reservation” in South Minneapolis. Here, he found “Indian families” living in “wretched” apartment blocks and “dark, squalid, bug-infested dwellings.” By 1969, Gerald Vizenor was writing about a crisis that had amplified in scale and intensity. “Thousands of cockroaches infest the kitchens of substandard dwellings rented by Indian families in the poverty area,” he reported of the residential districts that straddled East Franklin Avenue. “Many children sit on mattresses close to space heaters in dimly-lighted rooms watching television. They seem happy and oblivious of their surroundings, but their lips are cracked from the dry heat.” By the mid 1980s, a City Pages reporter could describe East Franklin as “one of the most tawdry strips in the city.” In his estimation, the Avenue remained “afflicted” by high vacancy in its mature building stock, the damaging effects of a spiraling crisis of unemployment, and a “very visible problem of drunkenness, vagrancy, and panhandling among its predominantly American Indian Street people.”

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2 Rowan, “The Plight of the Upper Midwest Indian.”
4 Dick Dick, “Does Franklin Avenue Have a Future? When the Problems are Poverty, Unemployment, Alcoholism, and Empty Buildings, What are the Solutions?” City Pages, August 10, 1983, 7.
Thus popular understandings of East Franklin Avenue and the Southside Phillips neighborhood transformed markedly in the wake of the Second World War, as the area came to be associated with poverty, deprivation and the metropolitan region’s Indigenous population, above all else. In this chapter, I consider the material and immaterial practices that lie behind this metamorphosis and the dominant forms of its interpretation. While several previous studies have peripherally considered the factors that contributed to the emergence of the “Indian neighborhood” in South Minneapolis, they have seldom sought to consider these developments as part of a broader set of urban transformations. In this chapter, I aim to contribute to the correcting this imbalance.

To do so, I begin by describing how and why an “Indian neighborhood” emerged in Phillips in the decades that followed the Second World War. In the first section of what follows, I demonstrate that Indigenous life in the inner city was often animated by privation and insecurity. Drawing on a range of evidence, I examine why Indigenous people were routinely relegated to the city’s “worst” housing and most precarious tenancy situations. But I also suggest that paying attention to dynamics that were internal to the inner city is insufficient. To more fully understand the emergence of this geography of racialized exclusion we need to comprehensively account for a much broader set of urban developments that are the very condition of its possibility. In order to elucidate this context, I turn to a consideration of a series of political economic developments that operated to comprehensively remake the urban geography of the Twin Cities metropolitan

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5 See for example Bancroft and Waterman Wittstock We Are Still Here; Brunette “The Minneapolis Urban Indian Community”; D’Arcus “The Urban Geography of Red Power”; Child, Holding Our World Together; Davis, Survival Schools.
region in the postwar period. In this section, I examine some of the ways that postwar urban strategies and political developments (suburbanization, the expansion of the middle class, interstate construction, and inner-city devalorization, for example) have operated to divide the city by producing and sustaining discrete zones of privilege and deprivation, cementing the “structured advantage” of some and the exclusion of others. Building on this analysis, the final section of this chapter attempts to consider these developments within the broader theoretical focus of this dissertation by considering how the distribution of these advantages is illustrative of the enduring potency of the colonial relation.

4.2 The Making of an “Indian Neighborhood”

In the years that followed the Second World War, the United States was remade by a sweeping “metropolitan revolution” that profoundly reoriented urban life and cast asunder a wide range of existing spatial and social certainties.\textsuperscript{6} Explosive suburbanization ushered in an unprecedented deconcentration of the urban population, the expansion of automobile-based transportation networks facilitated sweeping metropolitan growth, and processes of urban renewal razed and remade large sections of downtowns while core neighborhoods entered periods of protracted decline. In this context, once bustling inner-city districts came to be associated with destitution, abandonment, and the people excluded from the country’s growing prosperity.

Urban poverty was not a new phenomena in the United States, of course, but the “forms and distributions” of its postwar variants had no substantial precedent.7 “In previous periods of American history, poverty and unemployment were endemic,” observes Thomas Sugrue, “but poor people did not experience the same degree of segregation and isolation.” Indeed, the “urban crisis” that emerged in the quarter century that followed the war was qualitatively new. Its complicated alchemy of social and economic forces worked to concentrate and isolate groups of economically marginal and racialized people in distressed and declining inner-city districts in ways that had not been seen.

This development posed new challenges for policymakers and efforts were brokered at various scales of government to address its most deleterious effects, particularly in the 1960s. Most famously, Lyndon Johnson’s campaign to achieve “total victory” over the sources of impoverishment committed federal support to a broad range of anti-poverty programs, many of which were aimed at the inner city.8 The president’s sweeping efforts and other initiatives were far from sufficient to address the scale and scope of the “urban crisis,” however, and inner-city poverty would intensify as state-led efforts to find solutions were retrenched and transformed in the 1970s and 1980s.9

While poverty itself did not increase very much after 1960, its spatial location continued to be consolidated. The absolute number of families living below federal

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poverty lines varied slightly in the last four decades of the twentieth century, but the concentration of that poverty in the inner city accelerated dramatically.\textsuperscript{10}

Minnesota’s Twin Cities were not immune to this broader national trend. By the 1960s, a series of impoverished pockets had begun to emerge in the inner cores of both Minneapolis and St. Paul. The 1970 census revealed that the two cities had a combined total of seven Census Tracts (CTs) with “extreme” poverty rates of forty percent or more, nearly all of which were clustered around their respective central business districts.\textsuperscript{11} By 1990, that number had grown to more than thirty with inner-city CTs still comprising a significant majority of these “extreme” poverty zones.\textsuperscript{12} This growing inner-city economic insecurity corresponded to an accelerating crisis of core area joblessness. In 1960, for example, only a few small pockets of the inner-city Southside had unemployment rates higher than 3.5%.\textsuperscript{13} By 1990, that rate had risen to roughly 15% in the area as a whole, more than twice the city average.\textsuperscript{14}

In the Twin Cities, the intensification of inner-city poverty intersected intimately with the growth of racialized populations in core neighborhoods. In the Southside’s Phillips neighborhood, for example, African Americans and Indigenous people began to emerge as significant demographic minorities in the early 1960s.\textsuperscript{15}

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\textsuperscript{11} John Adams, Barbara VanDrasek, and Laura Lambert. \textit{The Path of Urban Decline: What the 1990 Census Says About Minnesota} (Minneapolis: Center for Urban and Regional Affairs, 1995), 37.
\textsuperscript{12} Todd, “A Better Day in the Neighborhood.”
\textsuperscript{13} Model City Policy and Planning Committee, \textit{Problem Analysis: Goals, Objectives, Strategies} (Minneapolis: Minneapolis Model City Program, 1971).
\textsuperscript{15} Model City Policy and Planning Committee, \textit{Problem Analysis}, 6.
\end{footnotesize}
The district’s population grew steadily in the years that followed and by 1990 “non-white” residents constituted a majority of neighborhood residents for the first time.\textsuperscript{16} Not coincidentally, these transformations were closely connected to the place-specific deepening of poverty described above and by the end of the 1980s, racialized people in Minneapolis and St. Paul were more likely to live in low-income neighborhoods than their counterparts in any other metropolitan region in the United States.\textsuperscript{17}

The dramatic postwar growth of the Twin Cities inner-city Indigenous population was an aggregate effect of a number of intersecting factors. In a basic sense, Indigenous urbanization was driven by the desire of many reservation residents to pursue opportunities that were not available in their home communities. Indigenous people moved to cities for a host of reasons, of course, but the prospect of escaping endemic reservation poverty is certainly central among them. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, reservations in every part of the country were wracked by crises of acute economic insecurity, not least in Minnesota. Successive rounds of territorial alienation and the devastating impacts of a range of BIA policies had radically interrupted the capacity of Indigenous communities to ensure the collective well being of their residents. At the mid century mark, for example, roughly half of all adult reservations dwellers were earning less than five hundred dollars annually.\textsuperscript{18} Meanwhile, the migratory pressures produced by these privations were amplified by a federal policy climate that was increasingly oriented around the connected goals of breaking up the


\textsuperscript{18}Fixico, \textit{The Urban Indian Experience in America}, 9.
reservation system and assimilating Indigenous people into the “mainstream” of American life, as I demonstrate above.

The vast majority of Indigenous people that migrated to the Twin Cities in the postwar period took up residence in the inner city. In Minneapolis, clusters of Indigenous congregation formed initially in the inner-city Northside, Elliot Park, and Phillips neighborhoods, where an abundance of rental housing had been opened up by the suburbanization of previous inhabitants. Through the 1960s, however, it was Phillips, above all others, that came to be synonymous with the urban Indigenous community. By 1970, about two thirds of the total urban population were living in this Southside neighborhood, many in the immediate environs around East Franklin Avenue. It was in this context that the area came to be understood as the cultural, residential and political center of Indigenous life in the Twin Cities, a de facto “urban reservation.” In part, this clustering reflected a widely shared desire on the part of Indigenous people to be around friends, family, and to build community in a context of considerable adversity.

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19 Davis Survival Schools, 26.

20 Ibid., 26. The emergence of an “Indian neighborhood” on the Southside of Minneapolis poses an important challenge to Susan Lobo’s suggestion that residential concentration has not been a dominant feature of urban Indigenous life in the United States (See Susan Lobo, “Urban Clan Mothers: Key Households in Cities,” American Indian Quarterly 27 (2003): 505-6). Her research suggests Indigenous migrants to American cities have rarely clustered in “ethnically homogenous geographic locations, unless they are historically established villages or communities that have been engulfed by the expanding metropolis.” For this reason “Indian urban communities differ substantially from more visible ethnic-based neighborhoods,” she contends. In her estimation, then, because urban Indigenous experience has often been one of dispersal, urban Indigenous forms of togetherness tend to defy commonsense conceptualizations of community as geographically concentrated; accordingly, she contends, they are perhaps best better understood as a network of relationships spread widely over the space of the city. The evidence from Minneapolis suggests that we should be cautious about assuming the universal applicability of Lobo’s assertion, however.

Importantly, though, the Southside “Indian neighborhood” was produced by more than just an active desire for congregation. Indigenous urbanites routinely found themselves residing in Phillips and other inner-city districts because the dilapidated and sub-par rental units that were available in these declining neighborhoods were often the only housing options available to them. In 1969, Alfreida Beaver, a planner with the Model Neighborhood Project in Minneapolis, told an investigative committee that Indigenous urbanites faced de facto forms of involuntary relegation. “There is a higher concentration area [of Indigenous people] in the south ... [because] that is the only place they are allowed to move to.”

Dennis Wynne, an official with the Minneapolis Housing and Redevelopment Authority, told the same committee that Indigenous people often had to contend with extraordinary constraints in securing decent shelter.

We have a rental market in Minneapolis wherein an Indian family who may have been here for some time, comes in and has few options where to live. For the most part, they are limited to substandard housing, apartments which are, in many cases, barely livable. Often these are owned by absentee owners. I think they can best be described more accurately as an exploitation market because that is what it really amounts to – exploitation of families, or individuals – many times by absentee owners and sometimes by governmental structures themselves.

Meanwhile, a 1968 report prepared by the League of Women Voters of Minnesota made the same case in even starker terms. “Finding decent inexpensive housing, a

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22 Committee on Urban Indians, Public Forum Before the Committee on Urban Indians in Minneapolis-St. Paul, March 18-19, 1969 (Statement of Alfreida Beaver, Minneapolis Model Neighborhood Project), 68.
23 Ibid. (Statement of Dennis Wynne, Minneapolis Housing and Redevelopment Authority), 146.
major problem for all poor people in the cities, is especially hard for American Indians,” the group observed.24

The poorest segment of the population, Indians have the least to spend on rent. They therefore must take the worst available housing – often buildings slated for demolition. These and other old apartment buildings embroiled in frequent code violation complaints under frequently changing ownership make up the neighborhoods where the majority of urban Indians live. The reality of nowhere else to go leaves Indians at the mercy of indifferent landlords. Housing is in such short supply that there are no alternatives.

As these interventions attest, the emergence of an Indigenous community in and around Franklin Avenue is inseparable from a particular political economy of exclusion.

Indigenous renters faced problems that extended far beyond the indifference and absenteeism of Southside landlords, however. A rich material record reveals that many encountered explicit forms of racist discrimination in their efforts to find and secure housing. Alongside various studies that allude directly to the pervasiveness of this problem, case files from the Minneapolis Department of Civil Rights (MDCR) offer an incomplete but significant glimpse at some of the ways that this abuse manifested.25

For example, many that filed civil rights complaints described contacting landlords to confirm the vacancy of a unit and being assured that no tenant had been found. After meeting in person, however, the would-be renter often found that the landlord had had a change of heart or insisted that the unit was no longer available. The files reveal that in some of these cases MDCR investigators followed

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25 MDCR complaint files are only available from period 1968-1977.
up with landlords, appointing “ testers” to present themselves as “white” or non-Indigenous prospective renters. Often such testers learned that the apartment was, in fact, still available.

In most of these cases, landlords with a preference for “ white” tenants were cunning enough not to reveal their prejudices openly to MDCR inspectors or officials. One file, for example, recounts the experience of a complainant that contacted a landlord by phone to inquire about a vacancy and was explicitly asked if she was “white.” “When she replied that she was Indian,” the report notes, “he said that he was sorry, no hard feeling [sic], but he couldn’t rent to her because she was Indian.”26 When MDCR investigators followed up with this landlord he proved to be shrewd enough to change his rationale for denying tenancy. This time he complained that the would-be renter’s credit rating was poor, noting that he had taken the time to look it up. When investigators learned that the complainant was receiving a significant bank loan to open a restaurant on nearby Franklin Avenue (hardly an indication of poor credit), they again followed up with the landlord. The MDCR investigator’s report of that conversation is revealing.

I contacted [the landlord] again on May 1. He was, again, very hostile. He immediately went into a tirade about the [complainant], the key sentence being, “Her credit stinks.” I told him, quite calmly, that I had checked with [the complainant], and that I believed she wouldn’t be a particularly poor credit risk, but that if he was worried about it, the logical procedure would be a more thorough reference and credit check. He said something about not wasting his time on people like that... he could tell they were poor credit risks. (From a brief phone conversation). He also said he had a good deal of experience in real estate and saw what different kinds of people did to property, and that he would rather have the property vacant than have problems. He didn’t want a whole lot of people living there, property damage;

etc. He did not ever say “Indians” but there is no doubt in my mind that this is what he was talking about.\textsuperscript{27}

In this and other cases, the landlord’s actual motivations were only revealed after considerable prodding.

But the complaint files also reveal a range of incidents where landlords were less circumspect, openly revealing their racism and announcing their unwillingness to rent to Indigenous people. In one such case, a BIA Housing Guidance Assistance worker reported that a landlord told her explicitly “I just won’t take anymore of your people.”\textsuperscript{28} The landlord insisted that his complex already housed a number of Indigenous residents. “They give me trouble,” he said. “Don’t bother to fill out the application. I wouldn’t rent to you anyway and besides, it cost me 2¢ so give it back to me.”

MDCR complaints also offer evidence that even renters that had the financial backing of social service agencies often encountered explicit prejudice. In one telling incident, for example, a young woman was referred to a South Minneapolis apartment by a social worker that had spoken to a caretaker about the prospective renter, and explained that she was young, reliable, and that her rent would be covered by an institutional source. The MDCR report indicates that the caretaker seemed pleased with all of this but when the renter arrived to see the apartment her attitude shifted abruptly. Again, the report of the young renter’s complaint is revealing.

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.

I proceeded to 2507 Nicollet on September 19, 1972 for the purpose of renting an apartment. I met a female inside who indicated to me that she was... the Caretaker of the apartment. [She] looked at me a long time and said, “Where did you come from?” She also asked if I had a home and family in Minneapolis. I handed [her] the “landlord statement” which indicates public relief will pay my rent from the public relief department. [She] said, “I can’t take that.” On the way to show the apartment, [she] asked if I were married or single and if I were employed. I informed her I was single and had just returned from an employment interview. She then said, “We don’t want parties.” [She] opened the apartment but did not show me around. I asked [her] if the apartment came furnished and she said, “No.” The apartment was in fact furnished at the time. When we returned upstairs, [she] kept telling me the apartment was for older persons, but she never said how old. [She] never offered me an application. I learned later that same day from the Social Service Aid that she had called [the caretaker] after I had come to the apartment. The Social Service Aid informed me that [the caretaker] had said pertaining to me, “well I didn’t know she was Indian.”

Importantly, these complaints offer only a provisional and schematic glimpse at the diverse forms of abuse that Indigenous migrants encountered in the rental housing market.

For a range of reasons, Indigenous people that migrated to the Twin Cities in the postwar period were routinely relegated to low-quality rental units, almost always in the poorest parts of the inner city. Already by the mid 1950s, the paucity of decent shelter available to Indigenous people was being described as the “gravest threat” to that group’s health and well-being. The situation had not changed much a decade later and one City Planning Department official would describe the shelter occupied by Indigenous people as the “worst housing in the worst neighborhoods in the city.” At that time, a survey of Indigenous housing found that 72% of dwellings were in substandard condition, 75% had broken doors, plaster, and stairs, or lights

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30 CWC Indian Committee, The Minneapolis Indian in Minnesota, quoted in LWV of Minneapolis, Indians in Minneapolis, 55.
31 Ibid., 55.
that did not work.\textsuperscript{32} Though Minneapolis had a robust housing code, the report observed, it lacked serious enforcement. “The Housing inspection crew is so short staffed that it can only keep up with complaints,” and “legal loopholes” make it possible for landlords to ignore rules.\textsuperscript{33} In this context, housing long slated for demolition wasn’t brought up to code and functioned instead as a “considerable resource for poor Indian renters.” This unenviable condition persisted in the decade that followed. Through the 1970s, more than 90% of Indigenous Southsiders lived in rental units, many of which were in a state of advanced deterioration.\textsuperscript{34}

The relegation of postwar Indigenous migrants to the least desirable sections of the inner city did not occur in a socio-political vacuum, however. Making sense of this phenomenon demands that we look beyond questions of poverty, landlord discrimination, or the unfamiliarity of migrants with the urban housing market, and ask about the broader set of relations that undergird it. In other words, understanding the experiences described above requires that we scale up our analysis from the level of the inner city and ask how a more complex set of urban circumstances operated to distribute the advantages of secure housing and economic prosperity to some and not others. Indeed, zones of crushing disadvantage and zones of “happy prosperity” do not exist independently of one another but are “parts of the same city,” as Jeff Sommers and Blomley remind us in another urban context.\textsuperscript{35} In the context that interests us here, making this analytical shift requires that we

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\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 109.
\textsuperscript{34} Phillips Neighborhood Improvement Association, \textit{Phillips Comprehensive Neighborhood Plan: Inventory and Analysis} (Minneapolis: Phillips Neighborhood Improvement Association, 1979).
\end{flushright}
examine a broader transformation of the urban geography of the Twin Cities in the postwar period. Doing so, allows us to see how the making of an “Indian neighborhood” on the Southside of Minneapolis is inseparable from a diverse set of public policies and social relations that have operated to consolidate and amplify the advantages of certain groups, over and above others.

4.2 Remaking the Postwar Metropolis

The dramatic acceleration of Indigenous migration to American cities in the wake of the Second World War coincided with a sweeping reorganization of metropolitan space. Those that left remote and reservation communities to make new lives in places like Minneapolis arrived at a time when cities had begun to be radically and rapidly remade by a series of interconnected socio-spatial revolutions. At the close of the Second World War, the American metropolis retained many of the features that defined it throughout the first four decades of the twentieth century. Downtowns remained the unrivaled “command centers” of the commercial, social and political lives of metropolitan regions and tended to be served by centripetal transportation systems that preserved the inner core’s strength. But “things fall apart,” as William Butler Yeats reminds us, and the dominance of the urban center could not hold.

In the wake of the war, urban America was remade by a “metropolitan revolution” that powerfully decentralized and fragmented existing patterns of urban

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life as it ushered in new geographies of privilege and deprivation. These changes brought undreamed of levels of prosperity for many but they did not do so without considerable collateral damage. In spatial terms, inner-city neighborhoods were the principal casualty of these shifts. In human terms, African Americans and other racialized people suffered most acutely as they were overwhelmingly relegated to the declining inner city while suburbs boomed all around them. The emergence of Minneapolis’ “Indian neighborhood” is inseparable from the dramatic re-engineering of urban life that occurred in the postwar period. It did not emerge as part of a neutral or organic process of development but through an explicit set of decisions that worked to distribute advantage, privilege, and security in radically uneven ways. Indeed, the very urban strategies that delivered undreamed of comfort and abundance to a new generation of suburban Minneapolitans were the same strategies that hastened the decline of Phillips and other inner-city geographies, producing the conditions in which they would become places acutely racialized marginalization.

Postwar Accumulation and the Expansion of the Middle Class

Public policy strategies aimed at sustaining the strength of wartime accumulation and expanding economic growth were at the center of postwar processes of metropolitan decentralization. In the years after 1945, policy makers faced significant challenges in attempting to create conditions in which the enormous productive capacity of the war economy could be preserved in an era of relative peace. American contributions to the reconstruction of a shattered Europe offered a partial fix but export markets alone would not have been sufficient to fill

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the massive gap left by the cessation of wartime production. To meet this and a host of other postwar challenges, state planners and corporate elites promoted a sweeping expansion of domestic consumptive capacity as a partial solution. Building on strategies inaugurated in the New Deal era, policy actors sought to broker and cement a grand “settlement” between capital and organized labor that would ensure economic expansion by growing middle and working class incomes. Under these new arrangements, federal policy explicitly encouraged and underwrote private consumption and union movements willingly curbed their militancy. The organized American working class, in this schema, was transformed into the “backbone of a high-wage and high-consumption proletariat.”

The results of this approach were immediate and dramatic. Personal consumption increased by $72 billion between 1945 and 1950, a jump that was more than enough to offset a $69 billion postwar decline in defense expenditures. This was an era of activist government, to be sure, as the Keynesian doctrine that governments could play a leading role in promoting economic growth by marshaling public spending to promote consumption, gained broad bi-partisan acceptance. These strategies had dramatic spatial effects, as state-backed and debt-finance policies produced the “Keynesian city” as a “consumption artifact.”

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40 Ibid., 82.
41 Ibid., 83.
Suburban Revolution

The most dramatic effect of these strategies was the accelerated suburbanization of American residential life and the pace and scale of peripheral development was explosive in the years after 1945. Nationally, suburban areas grew roughly ten times faster than cities did in the 1950s. Federal public policies explicitly encouraged these shifts. Generous tax incentives encouraged commercial developers to build on a scale that was hitherto unimaginable. The Interstate Highway Act of 1956 and other automobile-based postwar transportation policies transformed once-inaccessible peripheries into viable commuter communities. New Deal era loan programs were massively expanded and federal monies were freed up to secure personal mortgages, making home loans more accessible than ever before. These and other policies facilitated immense levels of suburban decampment as the availability of affordable housing on the urban fringe diminished the desirability of the inner city, hastening an historic exodus of (mostly “white”) working and middle-class families.

Thus the levers of state power that were mobilized to generate new forms of prosperity in the post-war period were often the same levers that sustained and secured “white” privilege. Central among these were state-subsidized home loan programs that disproportionately funneled public support to “white” homeowners in ways that reinforced and extended already existing forms of racialized exclusion. It

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was in this context that declining inner-city cores became synonymous with African Americans and other people of colour.

The Twin Cities metropolitan area was no exception to these continental trends. New housing construction had all but stopped in Minneapolis and St. Paul during the war years and the decade of economic turmoil that preceded them. Acute housing shortages in both cities were exacerbated by the return of an estimated eighty thousand veterans to a region that was ill equipped to house them. \(^{46}\) Private developers (benefiting from public subsidy) embarked on a broad range of new projects on the urban fringe and drove suburban migration at a furious pace. \(^{48}\) The municipalities of Minneapolis and St. Paul lost a cumulative total of nearly four hundred thousand people in the generation that followed the war. \(^{49}\) Regional suburban growth outpaced central city growth by a margin of five to one in the 1950s. \(^{50}\) By the end of that decade the Twin Cities would rank among the twenty least dense metropolitan areas in the country. \(^{51}\)

Importantly, this was not merely a middle-class revolution and many former proletarian or lower-middle-income earners shared in the fruits of the new suburban prosperity. Typical of the latter were Louis and Faye Bombeck, a young couple who left a downtown St. Paul rental unit for a single-family home in the booming

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\(^{49}\) Ibid., 5.


Minneapolis suburb of Brooklyn Park in 1960. The Bombecks departure for the northern suburbs was motivated by a number of factors. One was proximity to work. Louis Bombeck’s employer, a manufacturer of industrial cleaning machines, had recently relocated from Minneapolis to a sprawling twenty-acre lot in the nearby suburb of Golden Valley.\textsuperscript{52} The move was part of a broader exodus of central-city industrial and corporate activity that would eventually reach crisis proportions as nearly two hundred firms left Minneapolis between 1962 and 1970, with most destined for nearby suburbs.\textsuperscript{53} The departure of downtown corporate offices alone emptied an estimated 180 acres of land and deprived the city of eleven thousand jobs and $1,666,000 in annual property tax revenues. The Bombeck’s move wasn’t simply about being closer to work, however. It was also about a recalibration of expectations. Like other working class families, they had begun to enjoy a degree of material prosperity that would have been unthinkable to people of their economic status in previous generations. “More and more ‘proletarians’ are finding themselves able to afford the amenities of middle-class life,” noted a Minneapolis Tribune story about the growing presence of families like the Bombecks in suburbs like Brooklyn Park.\textsuperscript{54}

The inclusion of certain strata of the American working-class into the ranks of suburban prosperity helped reshape the commercial geography of the Twin Cities. The status of downtowns as the centers of metropolitan shopping began to be eroded across the United States in the years that followed the war and by the late 1950s many department stores were building suburban branches to preserve or restore

\textsuperscript{52} Saunders, “Surburbia Booms.”
\textsuperscript{54} Saunders, “Surburbia Booms.”
their profitability. Minneapolis department store magnate Donald Dayton was in the national vanguard of retailers willing to reinvent their empires in order to accommodate and attract suburban shoppers like the Bombecks and their more well-heeled counterparts. Dayton understood that by building facilities that were close to growing suburban populations (and providing abundant space for shoppers to park) he could capture their consumer loyalty and reap ample rewards. As the *Minneapolis Tribune* noted in 1960, “the change of living habits of the Bombecks and thousands like them has opened up vast new markets for manufacturing of consumer goods ranging from power lawn mowers to martini pitchers,” and facilities like Dayton’s Southdale Center in suburban Edina were well positioned to benefit from these shifts. “The well-planned, well-managed shopping center is more than simply a new plan for retail expansion,” observed one developer in a 1956 *Time* article. “It represents a massive reorganization of the urban community.” Already by the early 1960s, long-established “Main Street” corridors like East Franklin Avenue lost their appeal and proximity to a ready base of customers. In this context, they were ill-positioned to compete with hyper-convenient suburban alternatives. Accordingly, business directories from this period reveal a precipitous decline in the number of professional offices, service providers, retail outlets, and public institutions, like libraries and post offices, operating on East Franklin. The directory for 1962 lists seventy-two such enterprises on the Avenue. By 1969, that number

57 Saunders, “Suburbia Booms.”
had dropped to sixty-four. By 1977, it was down to twenty-nine. By 1996, only twenty such enterprises remained.

Interstate Construction

Postwar decentralization demanded the production of a new urban infrastructure. In particular, new transportation networks were required to make it possible for people to comfortably commute across a vast metropolitan expanse. To achieve this end, the federal government and its local partners completed the sprawling Interstate Highway System between 1956 and the mid 1970s. The new interstates were the very condition of possibility for urban decentralization in the postwar period and “few public policy initiatives have had as dramatic and lasting an impact on modern America,” as historian Raymond Mohl observes. In Minneapolis, the completion of Interstates 35 and 94 in the late 1960s facilitated rapid development on the urban fringe as developers began to “devour newly urbanized land at a brisk pace.”

Downtown boosters praised the new corridors for their capacity to “whisk” central-city workers to and from suburban communities in mere minutes. But those same boosters were largely mum about what, precisely, was being “whisked” over. New interstates cut vast cleavages through the existing urban fabric and often

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64 Adams and VanDrasek, *Minneapolis-St. Paul*, 94.
profoundly disrupted the lives of residents in affected areas, many of whom had already been excluded from the security and prosperity of the postwar boom. One Southside resident described the sense of isolated *in-betweenness* that these changes provoked:

> From a low-income perspective there was no more community...we were caught up in the middle, we weren't involved downtown or out in the suburbs. We became transient. You don't feel like you have any roots, you're stuck in purgatory. It was like a whole area blown away.  

Interstate users often have little connection to the places that they pass through. In form and function, these corridors have the effect of destroying the “connectivity of the city.” In considering these disruptions, we should not forget how physically imposing these roadways actually are. At points, they extend between ten and twenty lanes of traffic, not including access roads, medians, paved shoulders and massive wooden sound barriers (see figures 3.1 and 3.2). Neatly contained in these concrete canyons, commuters are able to move “quickly in and out” and do not see what is all around them, according to the Twin Cities urbanist Judith Martin. In a certain light, the postwar experience in Minneapolis resonates with Frederick Engels observation that nineteenth-century Manchester had been planned with such attention to the convenience of the privileged that “plutocrats can travel from their homes to their places of business in the center of the town by the shortest routes,

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67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
which run entirely through working class districts, without ever realizing how close they are to the misery... which lie on both sides of the roads.”

Figure 4.1 Interstate 35 West, as seen from East Franklin Avenue, facing north (Image Source: David Hugill)

In Phillips, moreover, the isolation produced by interstates was not merely symbolic. The new urban expressways offered no direct access point to East Franklin and their construction exacerbated the deleterious effects of decentralization and hastened the Avenue’s transformation from a viable “working-class neighborhood” to one where poverty was decidedly concentrated. Additionally, these initiatives

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entailed the destruction of large portions of the neighborhood’s their housing stock. In the CT where interstates 94 and 35W meet (an area that includes parts of East Franklin Avenue), for example, more than half of existing housing units were toppled by 1970.\textsuperscript{72} Thus while the Interstate system was celebrated as a “uniting force,” its benefits and burdens were far from evenly distributed.\textsuperscript{73} In inner city contexts, interstate construction might well offer an \textit{avant la lettre} case study of what Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin would call “splintering urbanism” in the neoliberal context.\textsuperscript{74}

\textbf{Figure 4.2} Interstate 94, as seen from Chicago Avenue South, facing west (Image Source: David Hugill)

\textsuperscript{72} Minneapolis Model City, \textit{Problem Analysis}.
\textsuperscript{74} Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin \textit{Splintering Urbanism} (London: Routledge, 2001).
The concentration of economically marginal and racialized populations in the inner city is also connected to the displacements of state-initiated processes of urban renewal and slum clearance. In the 1960s, downtown cores contained most of the last remaining densely populated mixed-used districts. This was certainly true in Minneapolis where the urban core of the prewar city had grown up around the milling and timber industries that were located near the falls of St. Anthony on the Mississippi River. Many of the area’s buildings were erected during the boom years of the late nineteenth century to serve a variety of functions connected to these and the other activities that then dominated the economic life of the city. By the 1920s, however, lumber production had ceased and milling had entered a process of terminal decline, while manufacturers, too, had begun to see downtown Minneapolis as out-of-step with their shifting needs. By the late 1940s, city leaders were faced with an increasingly obsolete city center that seemed destined to continue losing residents and business to the booming periphery.

These challenges were widespread in urban America and the federal government responded by creating opportunities for local governments to rejuvenate declining downtowns through processes of urban renewal. The 1949 United States Housing Act authorized municipalities to seize properties through eminent domain and assemble them as large tracts that could then be sold to private developers. Its ambitious goal was to “revive downtown business districts by razing the slums, bringing new businesses into the core, and attracting middle-class residents back to

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75 Martin and Goddard, Past Choices, 6.
the city.” Minneapols policy actors were quick to act on this legislative opening and proposed a sweeping renewal project that would raze large swaths of the historic city center. The newly formed Housing and Redevelopment Authority (HRA) set to work developing plans for key sections of the downtown core and won federal funding for to achieve their ambition by the late 1950s. Between 1959 and 1963 roughly forty percent of the built environment of central Minneapolis was razed, as the wrecking ball took aim at more than 200 buildings. By the mid 1960s more than $60 million worth of new construction was underway and existing contracts promised that more was sure to follow.

The elimination of Minneapolis’ Skid Row was an explicit objective of these efforts. In the first half of the twentieth century, downtown sections of Washington and Nicollet Avenues, in the city’s Gateway District, had become increasingly synonymous with a rough homo-social drinking culture connected to the area’s transient population of seasonal male workers. Railroad construction, timber extraction, and labor intensive forms of agriculture were central components of the industrial economy of the Upper Midwest and they all demanded a highly flexible seasonal work force, particularly from the 1870s to the 1920s. Minneapolis became a key node in the migratory circuits of this pool of laborers and much of the Gateway’s storefront activity was oriented around serving its needs. Cheap restaurants, bars, residential flophouses, “cage hotels” (featuring stacked sleeping quarters divided by chicken wire), pawnshops, thrift stores, and Christian missions came to dominate

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76 Katz, Why Don’t American Cities Burn?, 38.  
78 Martin and Goddard, Past Choices, 18.
the area. The Gateway was also home to a series of encampments, or “jungles,” where those who couldn’t afford (or chose not to pay for) accommodation also tended to live. Life on Skid Row was rough, precarious, and occasionally violent, to be sure, but as bar owner Johnny Rex (sometimes called the “Mayor of Skid Row”) reveals in documentary footage that he shot in the area in the late 1950s, it was also a place of considerable social solidarity, mutual aid and comradely co-existence.

Nevertheless, the entire district was razed by renewal efforts. Transformations of the industrial economy of the Upper Midwest ultimately spelled Skid Row’s doom. The industries that had employed Skid Row’s mobile work force were “all but dead” by the 1950s and urban leadership was far less inclined to tolerate a “vice” district if it did not serve the function of providing a “ready supply of cheap labor.” This coupled with an elite desire to remake Downtown Minneapolis as a modern urban center that was free of “blight” and capable of attracting new enterprise. Connectedly, the elimination of Skid Row was seen as a vital step in stemming the migratory tide of commercial and residential life to the suburbs.

The dismantling of Skid Row as a geographical fact required the removal of its residents. The area’s permanent population of about twenty-five hundred was primarily composed of single men over thirty, many of whom “didn’t really have any other place to go.” The initial HRA plan had promised a housing component that would provide shelter for displaced residents but political hurdles prevented that

79 Edwin Hirschoff and Joseph Hart, Down & Out: The Life and Death of Minneapolis’s Skid Row (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 10.
81 Hirschoff and Hart, Down & Out, 23.
82 Lightfoot, Down on Skid Row.
from ever materializing. The situation in Minneapolis mirrored outcomes in other cities across the United States. The 1949 federal law that authorized Urban Renewal had provided for the construction of more than eight hundred thousand units of public housing across the country but by 1960 only three hundred and twenty thousand of those units had been built, falling well short of actual need. Accordingly, these investments only helped a small number of the nearly four million people estimated to have been displaced by urban renewal and freeway construction, between 1956 and 1972.

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83 Hirschoff and Hart, *Down & Out*, 51.
Thus while urban renewal did dramatically remake the downtowns of a number of American cities by subsidizing high-rise construction and related amenities it did so at a significant cost. Far more low-income housing was destroyed than built and little of substance was done to counter the effects of suburbanization or improve conditions in the inner city.\textsuperscript{90} In Minneapolis, most of the displaced Skid Row residents ended up in a series of nearby inner-city neighborhoods, including the Southside area around East Franklin Avenue.\textsuperscript{91} The elimination of Skid Row was thus not simply a process of dismantlement but also a process of displacement. Skid Row poverty wasn't eliminated but relocated. None of this was lost on Johnny Rex. “They called it Skid Row then, now they call it the inner city,” he told a documentarian in the late 1990s.\textsuperscript{92}

\textit{Inner-City Decline and the Devalorization Cycle}

The decline of the inner city was not strictly a process shaped from outside, however, and core neighborhood “slums” had an internal political economy of their own that cannot be ignored. In thinking through the decline of the Phillips neighborhood after 1960, it is useful to turn to Neil Smith’s “devalorization cycle” as an analytic tool.\textsuperscript{93} While Smith himself is cautious to stress that the causes of neighborhood change are too complicated to be reduced to a universal schema, he

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{90}Ibid., 38.
\bibitem{91}Dahl \textit{Does Franklin Avenue Have a Future?}, 8; Martin and Goddard, \textit{Past Choices}, 66-7.
\bibitem{92}Lightfoot, \textit{Down on Skidrow}.
\end{thebibliography}
does suggest that his “general framework” can help shed light on the “concrete experience” of particular neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{94}

In Smith’s schema, neighborhood house values tend to remain stable (or even improve) so long as owner-occupiers continue to invest in their upkeep. This maintenance must be ongoing in order to avoid sustained depreciation. Yet at the moment that it becomes more advantageous for homeowners to move elsewhere than to make the investments necessary to counter sustained depreciation (i.e. major structural repairs), then they will tend to do so. The widespread availability of affordable suburban housing that followed the Second World War was undoubtedly such a conjuncture. In this context, circumstances were such that it became economically advantageous for owner-occupiers to sell their properties rather than continue to invest in their upkeep. As Smith’s schema suggests, these circumstances can (and in this case did) lead to an exodus of owner-occupiers to other parts of the city. When this happens, the aging housing that they leave behind tends to be converted into rental properties. This transformation can have significant consequences. As Smith points out, landlords often have different motivations than owner-occupiers and the former may have less incentive to maintain the property so long as they continue to collect rent. This is not true in all contexts, of course, but in areas where the housing market is in decline, landlords may have an “inherently ‘rational’ reason” for putting off maintenance and repairs, particularly in cases where “undermaintenance will yield surplus capital to be invested elsewhere.”\textsuperscript{95}

\textsuperscript{94} Smith, “Toward a Theory of Gentrification,” 543.
The decline of the Phillips neighborhood after the 1960s followed this pattern relatively closely. The neighborhood is composed primarily of wooden-frame single-family homes in its eastern half and larger single-family homes (including a small mansion district) and higher density apartment buildings in its western half.96 While these properties were primarily owner-occupied for the first several cycles of their existence this began to change rapidly as new housing became widely available with the postwar suburban boom. The exodus of owner-operators hastened the conversion of much of the neighborhood’s stock into rental units. By 1980 this transformation was so advanced that renters outnumbered owners by a margin of more than four to one.97 In the late 1970s, the Phillips Neighborhood Improvement Association (PNIA) conducted a comprehensive inventory of buildings and found that most former single-family homes had been subdivided into rental units. The PNIA study also found that nearly one third of surveyed residents cited “poorly maintained housing” as a major problem while one fifth cited “absentee landlords.”98 Indigenous renters were vastly overrepresented among those that lived in this low-quality housing. What Smith’s schema reminds us is that there is an economic logic to all of this and that slum landlords stood to benefit from charging high rents in under-maintained properties.

Collectively, then, state subsidized processes of suburbanization, interstate construction, urban renewal, and slum removal, coupled with profitable forms of slum landlordism, and a range of other factors, contributed to the production of an urban geography in which privilege and deprivation were radically isolated from one

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97 City of Minneapolis, "Neighborhood Profiles."
another. In this context, Indigenous migrants to the city were often the inheritors of the “worst” sections of a changing city.

4.4 Postwar Urbanism and the Colonial Relation

I present this broader urban context to demonstrate that the production of the “Indian neighborhood” is neither politically neutral nor the net effect of an organic process of development. Rather, it occurred in a distinctly political context through which public policies operated to remake metropolitan space in ways that disproportionately advantaged some groups while excluding others from the prosperity of the postwar economic boom. George Lipsitz, in particular, offers a useful framework for making sense of the complexities of these developments. In his terms, the “structured advantages” disproportionately enjoyed by the dominant segments of the American population, who were usually “white”, are not haphazard but the product of a long line of political practice that has operated to funnel opportunity and enrichment to this group, almost always at the expense of its “non-white” counterparts. He argues that a “wide range of public and private actions” have operated to “protect the assets and advantages that whites have inherited from their ancestors,” including “wealth originally accumulated during eras when direct and overt discrimination in government policies, home sales, mortgage lending, education, and employment systematically channeled assets to whites.”

To this we might add the suite of postwar public policies that operated to amplify the American city’s economic and “racial” divisions by directing public resources towards the ends of expanding a largely “white” middle class, reorienting urban infrastructure around the needs of a growing suburban population, and “renewing” central cities as places

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of orderly commercial activity, while neglecting the needs and aspirations of increasingly racialized inner-city populations. As Lipsitz reminds us, however, this was not merely a postwar phenomenon. He stresses that the politics of “white” advantage have roots in much longer histories of exclusion, including processes of primitive accumulation that operated to divest Indigenous people of much of their lands. Indeed, more than forty-five million “white” Americans can trace their inherited family wealth to the Homestead Act of 1862, just as more than thirty-five million “white” families benefitted from overtly discriminatory federally insured home mortgages between 1934 and 1970. Yet Lipsitz also insists that we not understand these developments as one-off moments of subsidy. Indeed “because money is passed down across generations through inheritance, the patterns of the past still shape opportunities of the present.”

Though Lipsitz is primarily concerned with the way in which racialized policies operate to disadvantage African Americans, the usefulness of his observations to studies of American settler colonization is clear. Building on his observations, we can interpret the emergence of the “Indian neighborhood” in South Minneapolis as a latter-day effect of long history of settler-colonial politics in which particular forms of advantage have been funneled to “dominant” groups.

This relationship of enduring structural advantage offers one particularly stark illustration of what I have in mind when I invoke the idea of the colonial relation. By building on Lipsitz’s observations, we can, I think, interpret the deprivations and degradations of the “urban reservation” as a continuation of a long

\[100\] Ibid., 2.
\[101\] Ibid., 2.
colonial history of distributional unfairness through which Indigenous people have been confined to spaces of economic and infrastructural marginality, even as considerable prosperity and abundance has been enjoyed all around them.

What is critical for our purposes, however, is to understand how these “structured advantages” are downplayed, naturalized, or rendered invisible in mainstream interpretations of the urban “Indian problem.” This question is thorny, however, because the very idea that members of a particular group remain systematically excluded because of their cultural or ethnic status jars against oft-repeated assumptions about a prevailing equality of opportunity in the United States. Indeed, the idea that prosperity and comfort are attainable for all with the wherewithal to obtain them has remained a durable American conceit. The persistence of the colonial relation is legitimated or rendered opaque by the prevalence of ways of seeing that render the functioning of a discrete “machinery of enforcement” invisible.¹⁰² This exculpatory thinking, I contend, operates to absolve the beneficiaries of a distinct field of power relations from the burden of examining the politics that undergird group-differentiated forms of advantage. In so doing, it allows non-Indigenous people to interpret Indigenous marginality as self-generated crises, rather than the explicit outcome of a long line of political negotiation that has consistently excluded racialized Others from the benefits of American prosperity.

This kind of exculpatory thinking often takes a distinctly spatial form. What Lipsitz calls the “white spatial imaginary” is linked to an interpretation of American urban space that allows “whites” to see themselves as “individuals whose wealth

grew out of their personal and individual success in acquiring property on the ‘free market’ rather than a disproportionately privileged subset of the population that includes many who benefitted from their capacity to access an “expressly discriminatory” pool of government-backed mortgages and other advantages.\textsuperscript{103} Connectedly, this same “spatial imaginary” has allowed “whites” to view racialized inner-city populations not as “fellow citizens” denied certain structural advantages but as “people whose alleged failure to save, invest, and take care of their homes forced the government to intervene on their behalf,” to build public housing projects and other amenities that were then “ruined” by the willful neglect of their inhabitants.\textsuperscript{104} The degree to which public monies and efforts were explicitly invested in the production of “white” suburbs and their inhabitants is often excluded from this interpretive frame.

There is much in his thinking that can help illuminate discussions about Minneapolis’ “Indian neighborhood.” There is considerable evidence, for example, that what Lipsitz calls the “white spatial imaginary” has animated certain interpretations of Indigenous marginality in the inner city. Prevailing explanations of why this marginality persists have often relied on cultural/behavioral interpretations that operate to assign blame to Indigenous people themselves. For example, the pervasiveness of Indigenous occupancy in cramped, dilapidated, vermin infested, and under-repaired housing units has sometimes been explained as a function of the moral and proprietary failings of the tenants. Particularly illustrative here is the reaction that Vizenor received after he reported in the \textit{Minneapolis Tribune} that hundreds of Indigenous families were paying extortionary

\textsuperscript{103} Lipsitz, \textit{How Racism Takes Place}, 27.  
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 27
rents to live in roach and rat infested hovels in the Southside “poverty” area.\textsuperscript{105} Though Vizenor laid the blame for these conditions squarely on the public policies that had allowed them to be produced, the prevailing reaction does not seem to have been widespread calls for a municipal crackdown on predatory landlords or new rounds of investment in affordable inner-city housing. One reader, for example, wrote to Vizenor to register his concern about what he interpreted as a lack of basic cleanliness on the part the “Indians” living in “substandard dwellings.”

What caught my eye was filth and garbage all over the place. It seems to me the first step for anybody to live with pride is to be clean. I wonder if these people really care where they live. If they were given a $20,000 home rent free would it be neat and clean or littered with garbage and filth? Perhaps, these people need to be educated in how to maintain their dwellings. Perhaps some church organizations could secure volunteers to teach these people the basics of clean living and home maintenance.\textsuperscript{106}

The reader acknowledges that repairs may well be needed but notes that he can’t understand why a landlord would bother to “fix up a dwelling if it will just be wrecked again.”\textsuperscript{107} In another letter received by Vizenor, a self self-anointed “disgusted taxpayer” offers a similar, if less-solution oriented, set of reflections.

The article you had in the Sunday paper was very disgusting. I don’t feel one bit sympathetic for these people. I don’t donate 5¢ to the welfare. I have heard too much about these people on welfare. If these people want to live like pigs why spend money on them. They can at least be clean, and ... [indecipherable] be responsible for the damage they do. I am sure there are thousand of people that agree with me.\textsuperscript{108}

The view expressed in these letters, that a \textit{culture} of uncleanliness is the reason why Indigenous residents of the inner city were living in such appalling conditions, was

\textsuperscript{105} Vizenor, “Indian’s Lot,” B1.
\textsuperscript{106} R.M. Johnson to Gerald Vizenor, June 12, 1969, box 2, Gerald Vizenor Papers, Minnesota Historical Society Archives, St. Paul.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{108} Disgusted Taxpayer to Gerald Vizenor, January 13, 1969, box 2, Vizenor Papers, Minnesota Historical Society Archives, St. Paul.
not limited to irritable *Tribune* readers, however. In 1978, for example, a Minneapolis building inspector named Martin Thompson allowed a local reporter to tail him as he made stops in the Phillips neighborhood, or what he called “the hell hole of the city.”\(^{109}\) Thompson held forth, voicing outright contempt for racialized people living in poverty, observing that social assistance recipients rarely bothered to maintain their rented homes, and waxing philosophical on the apparently transhistorical nature of Indigenous filthiness. “They used to be able to crap all over everything and move the teepee but they can’t do that anymore,” he opined.\(^{110}\)

The deployment of such cultural explanations to account for Indigenous marginality was not limited to outright racists, however. It seems sometimes to have seeped into broadly sympathetic interpretations too. For example, one report prepared by the League of Women Voters of Minneapolis acknowledged the role of persistent structural problems in limiting the housing options of Indigenous people but also mobilized cultural explanations to help explain why this was the case. Consider, for example, this partial interpretation:

One reason for poor Indian housing is overcrowding, some of which seems to be due to an Indian philosophy that even distant relatives are part of the family and should be taken into the household. This practice makes household budgeting difficult for the Indian, even when he is motivated to budget his expenses; it may also cause unpleasantness with the landlord. On the other hand, Indians seldom request repairs, and put up with really deplorable conditions without complaining.\(^{111}\)

It is, of course, a matter of demonstrable fact that Indigenous residents of the Southside often shared large households and it may also be true that this was

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\(^{110}\) Ibid., B1.

\(^{111}\) LWV of Minneapolis, *Indians in Minneapolis*, 36.
sometimes motivated by a “philosophy” of accommodation. To cast this philosophy as a major cause of “poor Indian housing,” however, is to come dangerously close to explaining the dramatic paucity of spaces where Indigenous families could secure comfortable accommodation as the result of a cultural preference for togetherness that is “unpleasant” for landlords. More generally, to explain group-differentiated marginality through narratives of cultural deficiency or incompatibility is to risk obscuring the constitutive importance of what Lipsitz calls the “structured advantage” of the dominant group.112

Importantly, these and other expressions of the “white spatial imaginary” are not articulated in a historical vacuum. They are formed within the complex and shifting articulations of the colonial relation. It is precisely through this dynamic that particular forms of “knowledge” about Indigenous people have been reified and naturalized as uncontroversial truth. With varying degrees of emphasis in different periods, settler colonists and their descendants have interpreted Indigenous people and practices as uncivilized, filthy, primitive, debauched, and backward.113 In more recent decades, they have been depicted as out of step with the presumed orderliness of settler society and contemporary urban life. The persistence of these discourses shape and reshape the epistemological contours of how the lives of Indigenous people are understood by the dominant group. In shifting and incomplete ways, they

112 Lipsitz, How Racism Takes Place, 3.
produce “knowledge” about who Indigenous people are and where, precisely, they are properly “in place,” to borrow Tim Cresswell’s formulation.\textsuperscript{114}

Critically, though, to interpret Indigenous people as properly belonging to an inner city geography of destitution and filth is not merely an expression of racist contempt. The emergence of Minneapolis’ “Indian neighborhood” is inseparable from a long history of social and political negotiation through which settler colonists and their descendants have aggressively consolidated material advantages for themselves. “White supremacy does not exist or persist because whites foolishly fear people with a different skin color,” notes Lipsitz. “It survives and thrives because whiteness delivers unfair gains and unjust enrichments to people who participate in and profit from the existence of a racial cartel that skews opportunities and life chances for their own benefit.”\textsuperscript{115}

Connectedly, processes of settler colonization enshrine spatial and political orders in which “unfair gains and unjust enrichments” are channeled to settler populations. Nevertheless this process does not simply come to end once Indigenous populations have been thoroughly (though not entirely) divested of their lands. The “structured advantages” of settler colonization, key expressions of the colonial relation, persist in contemporary life in myriad forms. Yet precisely because these advantages are so assimilated as commonsense, so thoroughly dissolved within the self-absolving contours of the “white spatial imaginary,” they no longer appear to be

\textsuperscript{114} See Tim Cresswell, \textit{In Place / Out of Place: Geography, Ideology, and Transgression} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

\textsuperscript{115} Lipsitz, \textit{How Racism Takes Place}, 36.
advantages at all; the “machinery of enforcement,” to invoke Schulman’s phrase again, is rendered opaque.116

4.4 Summary

This chapter argues that the relegation of Indigenous people to the “worst” sections of the inner city cannot be understood in a socio political vacuum. By drawing on a range of sources, I have tried to show that the emergence of the Southside “Indian neighborhood” is inseparable from a broader series of urban dynamics (and the public policies that animate them) that operated to produce a metropolitan space that was radically divided along “racial” lines. I have also argued that this context can and should be understood as an articulation of the colonial relation, an enduring politics of domination that persists in the context of the urban present. To expand and extend these arguments, I turn now to a consideration of how the work of two non-Indigenous research and advocacy organizations shaped “knowledge” about the “Indian neighborhood” and its inhabitants.

116 Schulman, The Gentrification of the Mind, 27
Chapter 5 Non-Indigenous Advocacy Research and the Colonial Relation: The Limits of Liberal Anti-Racism

5.1 Introduction

In 1968, the Minneapolis Tribune published an editorial lamenting the social and economic marginality of the city’s Indigenous population and summarized the situation like this: “Indians began migrating to the cities after World War II to escape reservation poverty and seek a better life. Instead, they found a mirage.”¹ This basic observation alluded to a set of circumstances that was often described as an urban manifestation of the “Indian problem,” as I mention above. In Custer Died For Your Sins, Vine Deloria remarked that such characterizations reflected an enduring tendency among “white” commentators to define “minority groups” as problems of their own.² But as we shall see, some of those “white” commentators were not so cavalier about the persistence of Indigenous marginality. Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, a new generation of “white” advocates emerged and refused to accept that there was anything inevitable about the persistence of racialized disadvantage. Buoyed by a climate of liberal reform, they sometimes sought to contest the racialized exclusion of Indigenous people from the prosperity of postwar American life.

In this chapter, I look at the work of two Minneapolis-based non-governmental research and advocacy organizations that were motivated by precisely this ambition. The first is the League of Women Voters of Minnesota (LWV), which

¹ Minneapolis Tribune, “Plight of the Urban Indian.”
began to take a keen interest in “Indian affairs” in 1961 and committed significant resources to research, advocacy, and legislative lobbying over the course of the next two decades. The second is the Training Center for Community Programs (TCCP), an academic and community outreach institute at the Twin Cities campus of the University of Minnesota, which, from 1967 through the mid 1970s, engaged in a range of federally funded projects concerned with understanding and brokering solutions to the isolation of Indigenous people from the social and political life of “mainstream” America.

The knowledge produced by these organizations merits attention for a number of reasons. For one, they were collectively responsible for the production of a huge volume of information about Indigenous people in the Upper Midwest in general and the Twin Cities in particular. For another, their work was also influential in public policy circles and both organizations had close ties to Minnesota’s mainstream liberal political establishment and drew on those connections to advocate for a range of proposals. Additionally, both groups saw themselves as advocates for the interests of Indigenous people and emerged as influential voices in mainstream debates.

In what follows, I begin by looking at the context in which these organizations came to weigh in on Indigenous issues in Minnesota. I then turn to a discussion of some of the key assumptions that undergirded the knowledge that they produced. In doing so, I argue that both organizations were committed to a politics of liberal anti-racism and that this shaped the way that they interpreted the “problem” of Indigenous urban marginality and conceived of solutions to it. In the final section, I think critically about the implications of these assessments. Here I argue that the
published material generated by these groups has serious analytical and political limitations. Ultimately, I trouble contributions by arguing that by framing the “Indian problem” as a manageable public policy challenge rather than a substantial social cleavage rooted in the persistence of the colonial relation, they stop short of seriously confronting the ways in which the existing political order continued to consolidate and protect the structured advantages of some and not others. Ultimately, I argue that while their work was often genuinely concerned with alleviating the marginalization of Indigenous people, it did little to challenge its generative conditions.

5.2 Knowledge Production and “Indian Affairs” Advocacy

In his celebrated 1962 investigation of American poverty, Michael Harrington observed that while the postwar boom had ushered in the “highest mass standard of living the world has ever known” there remained millions of Americans yet “maimed in body and spirit, existing at levels beneath those necessary for human decency.”

His widely read inquiry both echoed and inspired a new generation of advocacy groups, social scientists and policy elites that were committed to smoothing over these contradictions and extending the unprecedented prosperity of the period to those corners of American society that were persistently excluded from postwar abundance. In Minnesota, Indigenous communities were routinely identified as spaces where the new prosperity had yet to penetrate. Taking this basic material reality as a challenge that could be overcome, two non-Indigenous organizations set

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out to understand the sources of Indigenous exclusion and broker solutions that could help overcome it.

The League of Women Voters of Minnesota

One was the League of Women Voters of Minnesota (LWV). This venerable organization’s initial foray into Indigenous issues was driven by the advocacy efforts of key activists in the organization’s local chapter in White Bear Lake, an affluent Twin Cities suburb. The central figure behind this push was Elizabeth Adams Ebbott who, by the early 1960s, had made it known that she wanted the statewide organization to contribute to the amelioration of the situation of “the Chippewas of Minnesota,” or what she called the state’s “ignored minority.”5 It is not entirely clear what sparked her interest in the marginalization of Minnesota’s Indigenous population but the presence in her personal files of a neatly annotated copy of Carl Rowan’s “Plight of the Upper Midwest Indian” articles, published in the Minneapolis Tribune in 1957 (and cited above), may offer some hint. Ebbott’s marginal notations on these texts are few but they cohere enough around a series of specific themes that we can make some assumptions about what she found noteworthy in the fifteen pages of broadsheet text.6 Nearly every passage underlined, starred, or otherwise flagged, relates to either the depth of Indigenous hardship or the failure of the political establishment to address it. Ebbott’s markings suggest, importantly, that she was not merely concerned about the widespread exclusion of Indigenous people


from the prosperity of American life but also that she understood that exclusion to be fundamentally political, and therefore eminently solvable.

In this, Ebbott shared the national LWV’s longstanding position that the formal political institutions had a fundamental responsibility to promote “general welfare by positive action.” This conviction dates to the organization’s founding in 1919. The national LWV emerged first as an auxiliary of the National American Woman Suffrage Association in the wake of that group’s victorious campaign to secure the 19th amendment to the constitution of the United States, which prohibited individual states from denying the right to vote on the basis of gender. The civic education of newly enfranchised women was the national LWV’s original raison-d’être but from its inception it also pursued “non-partisan” legislative advocacy on a range of issues. The organization’s earliest publications make it clear that LWV members believed they could be a “new force for the humanizing of government”. They also make clear that members believed that the government itself could be a “humanizing” force within American society. The first iteration of the organization’s “legislative program” is illustrative of this point. It envisions a robust regulatory role for government on a broad range of issues, including labor conditions, public welfare, public education, “social hygiene,” and the consumption of alcohol.

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Thus state-led intervention, in the organization’s official view, was critical to ensuring the general well being of the population. LWV historian Louise Young summarizes this longstanding orientation:

Laissez-faire doctrines, from a feminist perspective, have served too well the bastions of male privilege, offering discouragement to the feminists’ desire to aid the disadvantaged, including themselves. The League would repudiate the concept of a passive, noninterventionist government, standing aside while competition guaranteed the survival of the strongest.¹⁰

Perceiving itself an advocate for the oppressed, the LWV supported legislative attempts to curb the exclusion of particular groups from the full benefits of American citizenship. In this way, members of the Minnesota organization understood advocacy on behalf of Indigenous peoples as consistent with a longstanding organizational tradition.

The efforts of the White Bear Lake chapter to encourage the Minnesota LWV to take-up “Indian affairs” as one of its central research and advocacy foci resonated with organization activists that felt that one of the League’s indispensible functions was to challenge the injustice of group exclusion. Not surprisingly, then, it was to precisely this sense of moral calling that Ebbott and her White Bear Lake colleagues appealed when they sent a letter to all other Minnesota chapters in the lead-up to the 1961 statewide convention. Their missive, which urged the Minnesota LWV to combat Indigenous disadvantage, began like this:

Life expectancy – 37 years.

One third of the children die before the age of five.

Estimated per capita income of the most affluent group – 150 per year.

¹⁰ Young, *In the Public Interest*, 4.
If the total wealth of the land were divided equally among the residents, it would come to about $500 per person.

These statistics are not from some report about the Congo, the natives of India or the people of Korea. These foreign people with similar statistics have our sympathy, have our support, have the League working for their betterment.

No, these facts state briefly and dramatically the condition and plight of about 20,000 Minnesota citizens – our ignored minority, the Chippewas of Minnesota.\textsuperscript{11}

The letter goes on to invoke the moral authority of the popular Christian journalist Harold Fey, to remind readers that “as a whole the Indians live in deeper poverty than any other racial group in the nation,” a destitution, they noted, not even shared by “our latest newcomers,” Puerto Ricans.

The efforts of the White Bear Lake activists would not be in vain. By the early 1960s, they had convinced the statewide organization to take on “Indian affairs” as one of its primary advocacy issues and embark on a range of connected initiatives. Central among these was a lobby program aimed at influencing public policy at both the state and national levels. In the decades that followed, the organization pushed legislators to defend traditional hunting and ricing rights, provide basic services to Indigenous people that were not living in reservation communities, fairly distribute Johnson-O’Malley funds, and restore the territorial rights of the Menominee people of Wisconsin (which had been forfeited as part of the federal government’s dubious Termination program in the 1950s), among other things. They also developed working relationships with a range of Indigenous and

\textsuperscript{11} Elizabeth Ebbott and White Bear Lake LWV to local chapters of the LWV of Minnesota, 1961, box 1, Elizabeth Ebbott Research Files, 1955-1986, Minnesota Historical Society Archives, St. Paul.
Indigenous-serving organizations and institutions, including the Minneapolis Area Office of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.\textsuperscript{12}

The organization’s most substantial contribution in the realm of “Indian affairs,” however, was its effort to produce informational resources about the “needs” of Indigenous people in Minnesota and their relationship to government, including the publication of five editions of the survey text \textit{Indians in Minnesota}. The origins of the book are modest and the first edition appeared as a self-published pamphlet in 1961. This initial version does not contain a separate section on the urban Indigenous experience, either in the Twin Cities or elsewhere. It does, however, make peripheral mention of problems that were unique to Indigenous urbanites, including the disproportionate entanglement with the criminal justice system, police brutality, the difficulty of accessing services in the city, and the challenge of securing employment without an established network of contacts or recognized skills, among other things.\textsuperscript{13} This urban oversight began to be addressed in 1968 with the publication of a stand-alone pamphlet called \textit{Indians in Minneapolis}.\textsuperscript{14} As the authors put it: “League members decided... that they wanted to take a closer look at what has been called ‘Minnesota’s largest reservation,’ Minneapolis.” Future editions of \textit{Indians in Minnesota}, beginning with the 1971 edition, all featured at least one chapter on issues that were unique to urban environments. This development is not surprising given that by the mid-1960s a number of urban Indigenous groups had emerged as key voices in the region’s urban politics. It’s hard

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\textsuperscript{12} See, for example, BIA Assistant Area Director invitation to address LWV of Minnesota on “Social Problems of Minnesota’s Indians,” January 22, 1964, box 1, Elizabeth Ebbott Research Files, 1955-1986, Minnesota Historical Society Archives, St. Paul.
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\textsuperscript{13} LWV of Minnesota, \textit{Indians in Minnesota, 1st Edition} (Minneapolis: League of Women Voters of Minnesota), 33, 37, 45, 49.
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\textsuperscript{14} LWV of Minneapolis, \textit{Indians in Minneapolis}, 1.
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to imagine that the LWV could have continued to give urban issues such short shrift in this context.

The Minnesota LWV invested significant energy in getting these documents into the hands of influential people. Elizabeth Ebbott seems to have been the primary force behind these efforts and her personal files contain a broad range of correspondence to this effect. This is evidenced, in part, by the many letters of thanks that she received from significant figures in the wake of the publication of the 1971 edition of *Indians in Minnesota*. The powerful Federal Judge and former Congressman Edward J. Devitt, for example, wrote to Ebbott while he was in the midst of preparing landmark rulings that would affirm the rights of Anishinaabe people to hunt, fish, and harvest rice on their territories without the interference of the state.15 “I have paged through it,” Devitt wrote in a letter of thanks.16 “It looks like a splendid work and should be particularly helpful to me in obtaining background knowledge about legal and factual issues involved in my Indian fishing and ricing cases.” Ebbott also received letters of congratulations from significant figures in “Indian” administration, including the Acting Deputy Commissioner of the Federal Department of the Interior and other high-ranking government officials. Her correspondence also suggests a working relationship with Senator Walter Mondale who wrote to Ebbott after hearing that a second edition would be published and noted that the earlier edition had impressed his colleagues on the Indian

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15 On these decisions see Gerald Vizenor, *Crossbloods: Bone Courts, Bingo, and Other Reports* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), 233.

Education subcommittee in Washington and that he had had it reprinted in the formal hearing records.17

Yet while LWV members were able to establish ties to leaders in the upper echelons of local and national political power, they were not entirely disengaged from grassroots organizations. There is evidence that the group had a complicated and occasionally productive relationship with American Indian Movement and others, for example. Indeed, AIM organizers occasionally relied on the LWV for particular kinds of support just as the LWV relied on AIM to confer a certain kind of legitimacy upon its activities. When movement activists picked up on the efforts of earlier Twin Cities organizers by re-inaugurating a picketing campaign in front of the Minneapolis Area Office of the BIA to protest the lack of services available to Indigenous urbanites in 1970, for example, the League marshaled its institutional clout to support the demonstrators. In the days that followed the demonstrations, Minnesota LWV President Irene Janski published a letter in the Minneapolis Tribune expressing unequivocal support for the demands that had been articulated. “Indian Citizens have made their statement eloquently,” she noted, before expressing the League’s hope that it would be heard at all levels of government.18 This was no empty demand coming from a group that was as well connected to institutional power as the LWV. In the weeks that followed, Minnesota Senator Walter Mondale built on the organization’s lead by making a statement of his own

and formally entering Janski’s letter into the Congressional record. AIM Chairman Dennis Banks wrote directly to Janski to thank her for her support.¹⁹

Members of AIM also called on the League for support in more dire circumstances. The LWV’s 1971 statewide convention coincided with the eviction of AIM demonstrators from the nearby Twin Cities Air Naval base that they had been occupying. Internal reports prepared by the League’s Human Resources-Equality of Opportunity Chairperson reveal that AIM activists turned to League leadership requesting an opportunity to address the convention and build support for those that had been arrested. After scheduling complications were smoothed over, AIM leaders were allowed to address the convention briefly and a box was placed at the door so League members could contribute to efforts to raise bail money for the arrested. It is perhaps a testament to both the persuasiveness of those who spoke and the formal political clout of the LWV that following the convention more than thirty attendees “went unofficially to the Governor’s office and presented him with a signed statement declaring their concern over the incident.”²⁰

LWV leadership understood that the legitimacy of their “Indian Affairs” work required that they cultivate positive relationships with leading Indigenous organizations and agencies. In the early 1970s, AIM was still routinely counted among these ranks. Thus when Elizabeth Ebbott wrote to the powerful Hill Family Foundation requesting funds for the publication of the 1971 edition of Indians in Minnesota, she was told explicitly that securing endorsements from some of the

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¹⁹ Dennis Banks to Irene Janski, April 26, 1970, box 1, Elizabeth Ebbott Research Files, 1955-1986, Minnesota Historical Society Archives, St. Paul

“Indian leadership in Minnesota” would help improve prospects. Foundation representatives suggested that she seek recommendations from the State Office of Indian Affairs, the State Department of Education and, notably, the American Indian Movement. It is hard to imagine that just two years later – after AIM activists had engaged in an armed confrontation with the FBI at Wounded Knee – the movement would still be included in such a lofty list of institutional authority.

*The Training Center for Community Programs*

In the years that followed the Minnesota LWV’s emergence as a major institutional voice in Indigenous advocacy, the Training Center for Community Programs (TCCP) at the University of Minnesota emerged as the most prolific producer of social science research on “Indian affairs” in the Upper Midwest. The organization’s path to this position was a circuitous one, however. The TCCP was formed in 1963 to be one of a series of research sites tasked with tackling issues of “youth delinquency,” a Kennedy administration project that both anticipated, and would eventually be subsumed by, the Johnson administration’s Great Society and War on Poverty efforts. TCCP researchers approached “delinquency” as a social product, rather than an individual failing and their work focused on the functioning of society’s “major institutions” (public schools, government institutions, the criminal punishment system, etc.) rather than the “intrinsic nature of the disadvantaged or

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deviant.”23 Organization researchers were primarily interested in the everyday protocols of these institutions and they sought to make recommendations about how existing approaches might be adapted to “meet the needs of those who are outside of the mainstream of American life.”24 In this sense, they shared the basic ideological orientation of Great Society programming in general. Namely, that the “basic structures of American society were satisfactory,” as Ira Katznelson summarizes, but that they needed “adjustment, fine-tuning, [and] enhanced access,” goals that could be achieved through training programs, expanded participation, and effective neighborhood-level programming.25

The TCCP’s work was not merely ideologically linked to the federal state’s approach to fighting poverty, however. Its decade of research activities, from these humble beginnings in delinquency research through a considerable expansion in the late 1960s, was financed almost entirely by the core funding bodies of the War on Poverty and its predecessor initiatives, especially the federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW). For our purposes here, the most significant federal investment in the Center came in 1967, when HEW funded its “laboratory for social change,” which targeted four areas where research efforts and experimental programming were deemed most needed. The project sought to expand community awareness about organized labor, promote and experiment with educational and training opportunities for low-income people, build training programs for board members of social agencies, and establish a center for Indian affairs that would

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24 Ibid.
bring together community and university resources to address key needs of the Indigenous peoples of the region.  

The centrality of the latter of initiative was exemplified by the TCCP’s decision to hire sociologist Arthur Harkins as the its new director. Harkins identified himself as a “student of American Indian life” and was in the process of editing a book titled *Modern Minnesota Ojibwa* at the time of his appointment. His War on Poverty credentials were also well established. Harkins had spent two years working as a consultant on “Indian Community Action programs” for a private research firm. Harkins explained that the center existed to “rethink traditional structures and assumptions,” particularly in the context of urban environments “where most universities have been particularly slow.” He noted that research on “the urban Indian” had become a “major effort” for the TCCP in part because “no one in the country has done much on it.”

In this context, the TCCP emerged as a prolific publisher of a broad range of research about Indigenous people. Much of this work focused on questions of “Indian education” but the more than seventy reports that the research center released between 1968 and 1973 span a broad range of topics. Importantly, too, they are a key source of information about the experience of urban Indigenous residents of the Twin Cities, including those that lived in the Phillips neighborhood. 

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27 It is not clear whether *Modern Minnesota Ojibwa* was ever published.  


29 Kotke, “U Program For People.”
reports, written by Harkins, his TCCP collaborator Richard Woods, and a diverse set of others, provide some of the earliest academic research on the Indigenous experience of labor market exclusion, housing discrimination, quotidian racism, and public education, among other things. Center researchers believed that the university had a vital role to play in addressing social divisions and deprivation. They argued that “informing the citizens of our communities of the nature and problems of poverty” was essential to building public support for efforts to ameliorate the lives of the disadvantaged.

In spite of these lofty social ambitions, however, the organization sometimes engaged in dubious research practices. Consider, for example, two reports published in 1970 that present the results of a loosely defined survey administered by a series of undergraduate researchers. The research plan, it seems, was to simply arm the students with pen and paper and send them into the “urban slums” to “question people about Indians in their vicinity.”\(^{30}\) The end result of this exercise, presented and published as collected inner-city “field notes,” is a loosely curated and ethically fraught stream of testimony collected from any neighborhood dwellers that was willing to pronounce on the lives and motivations of their “Indian” neighbors. It is certainly telling that the TCCP felt no compulsion to follow up with a report in which undergraduate researchers returned to those same “urban slums” in order to gather the opinions of “Indian” residents about their experiences with “whites in their vicinity.”

\(^{30}\) Gary Skovbroten and Joan Wolens, *Indians of the Urban Slum: Field Notes from Minneapolis* (Minneapolis: Training Center for Community Programs, 1970); Richard Gibbons et al., *Indian Americans in Southside Minneapolis: Additional Field Notes From the Urban Slum* (Minneapolis: Training Center for Community Programs, 1970).
Additionally, TCCP reports often reveal a great deal of defensiveness about the legitimacy of their research on Indigenous issues. For example, the organization’s leadership seems to have held in great contempt a group that it condescendingly dubbed the “new urban chiefs.” The capital crime of this group, according to TCCP writers, was that they routinely accused social service agencies of unethical behavior without providing “alternative practical guidelines or goals for the agencies that would allow [them] to improve their Indian-related functions through altered philosophies and programs.” The vehemence with which TCCP writers discounted those that had the gall to level the charge of “racism” or “bureaucratic insensitivity” suggests that they were often on the receiving end of such accusations. Consider, for example, the condescension dripping from this assessment:

To the “chiefing” Indian poverty professional or quasi-professional, who is actually conducting Indian projects in Minneapolis? All the ‘wrong’ people – whites building academic careers on the backs of Indian respondents, and duped Indian sell-outs playing patsies to some variant of white neo-colonialism. Who is perceived to legitimately conduct Indian urban research? No one – unless that research is engaged in by persons from whom no threat bodes in findings... Who would be most desirable in performing in urban Indian research and action roles? The Indian poverty Chiefs themselves, of course. The researcher doth protest too much, methinks.

Moreover, Harkins, in particular, seems to have earned a reputation for detachment. “He was afraid to be on the streets [and] required the sanctuary of the university” recalls Vizenor, who worked as a Southside community organizer in this

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32 Ibid., 23.
period. More damningly, perhaps, Vizenor also suggests that Harkins had an “exploitative” side. While Vizenor was director of the American Indian Employment Center in 1967, he recalls designing a simple form to collect some basic information from clients, in part to have a record of the organization’s activities should one be required to satisfy its funders. The TCCP’s research director somehow got wind of the existence of this data set and approached Vizenor surreptitiously.

Harkins approached me on campus at a meeting or something and pretended to be so interested and gratified with the work [we were doing].

“If I can help out in any way...would you like me to process the information for you?”

And I said, “how?”

He said “we can categorize it, run it through key sort, just do some basic stuff for you as part of your information reports.

And I said, “yeah, that’d be nice.”

So I handed over this whole pile of stuff and I never heard from him again. He wouldn’t even answer a phone call. 

Vizenor recalls pursuing several avenues to hold Harkins to account but it was only after he threatened the university with a lawsuit that the Employment Center’s information was returned. “I don’t know if he did that with other organizations but I doubt it was idiosyncratic. I think it was his style. Exploitative.” Notably, the Employment Center’s data was republished in no fewer than three TCCP reports.

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33 Gerald Vizenor, in discussion with the author, Naples Florida, April 2014.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
It was through these contexts that the LWV and the TCCP emerged as two of the most influential and prolific producers of institutional knowledge about the “Indian problem” in Minnesota. I turn now to an assessment of the ideological commitments that undergirded their work in an effort to show how they animated conceptualizations of what the urban “Indian problem” was and how solutions to it could be brokered.

5.3 The Politics of Liberal Anti-Racism

The research and advocacy efforts of the Minnesota LWV and the TCCP were oriented around finding ways to diminish the disproportionate deprivation shouldered by Indigenous residents of the Twin Cities, as the previous section demonstrates. Their respective approaches to these problems were not identical, of course, but I contend that both were ideologically oriented around a politics of liberal anti-racism. Before explaining how this is the case, it is critical to clarify what I mean by these terms.

Liberal Anti-Racism

I describe the political orientation of these two groups as “liberal” for two reasons. The first is that both shared and articulated a series of assumptions about the nature of individuals and society that are consistent with the core tenets of the Modern Western liberal philosophical tradition. While there is considerable differentiation between and amongst the kind of thinking that might be reasonably collapsed under this banner, there is also a “core set of ideas” that marks its

distinction from other traditions. First, liberals are committed to the primacy of the individual as the basic unit of moral and political life. Second, liberals believe in equality in the sense that they recognize a “common moral standing” between individuals. Third, liberals are universalist in that they believe that human beings are united by a common foundation, which transcends “particular historical, social, and cultural differences.” Or, at the very least, liberals believe that such differences are “secondary.” Fourth, liberals are fundamentally meliorist in that they believe that all social arrangements can be reformed and improved through rational intervention, that “moral, political, economic and cultural progress is to be brought about by and reflected in carefully planned institutional improvement.”

I also describe the political orientation of these groups as liberal because they both articulated support for a form of statecraft that has long been branded with that label in the United States. At this stage, it is critical to make a clear distinction between the broad philosophical orientation described in the previous paragraph and the historical and political specificity of a postwar American political tradition that is routinely described as “liberal” in popular discourses, however semantically dubious that practice may be. Setting etymological debates aside, I invoke the term “liberal” in this second sense to signal that both groups were closely aligned with the dominant current of political life in the United States from the 1930s to the 1970s. They shared, in other words, the core convictions of what has sometimes been called the “New Deal Order,” a midcentury political coalition and approach to governance.

38 Goldberg, Racist Culture, 5.
39 Ibid., 5.
40 Ibid., 5.
41 Gray, Liberalism, xii.
42 Goldberg, Racist Culture, 5.
grounded in Keynesian economics, expanded social provision, tempered labor militancy, and modest forms of wealth redistribution. Acolytes of this approach put their “faith in the wisdom and legitimacy of a strong federal government” and believed in its capacity “to secure the greatest possible good for the greatest possible number of Americans,” as Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin summarize. Thus at the center of this politics is the conviction that the work of an enlightened and interventionist state can and should be mobilized to resolve the core contradictions of American capitalism.

What distinguished the New Deal Order from other political currents interested in harnessing the power of the state as a vehicle of redistributive justice was its commitment to the preservation of capitalist democracy as the fundamental basis of American life. Accordingly, I do not use the term “liberal” to describe an oppositional politics grounded in collective deliverance from the injustices and inequities of capitalist social organization. Indeed, the liberal coalition that emerged through the politics of the New Deal was born out of the crushing defeat of the organized anti-capitalist left. Its ascendance required the transformation of radical constituencies from opponents of the capitalist state into what Chris Hedges calls “domesticated negotiators with the capitalist class” (emphasis added).

While there are obvious tensions between these two interpretations of the term “liberal,” I argue that they are not antithetical to one another. For example,

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45 Hedges, Death of the Liberal Class, 11.
postwar liberals in the United States believed in interventionist government but remained committed to the idea that the values held sacrosanct in classical liberalism, such as the moral primacy of the individual, were best protected in a capitalist social formation. In this sense, the politics of New Deal liberalism ought to be historicized not as a deviation from classical liberalism, with its characteristic hostility to collectivism, but as a movement that sought solutions within the “framework of the liberal faith” at a particularly challenging moment, as Louis Hartz observed in 1955.\(^46\) In his estimation, postwar American liberalism ought to be understood as a movement of resilient reform that sought to “extend the sphere of the state” while simultaneously retaining the “basic principles of Locke and Bentham.” As we shall see, this brand of interventionist liberalism was a particularly potent political current in postwar Minnesota and the LWV and TCCP were ideologically and politically connected to some of its staunchest champions.

Additionally, I describe their politics as “anti-racist” (if only in a restricted sense) because both groups were driven by a discomfort with what they perceived to be a generalized exclusion of Indigenous people and other racialized groups from the prosperity of postwar American life. They found it unacceptable, even odious, that Indigenous residents of their state were so disproportionately disadvantaged and they sought affirmative strategies to correct this group-differentiated imbalance. Their anti-racism, like their politics more generally, was animated by a prevailing faith in the liberatory potential of modest institutional reform. They believed, in other words, that racialized deprivation in general, and the “Indian problem” in particular, could be solved without challenging the basic structures of American

social and political life. Oriented in this way, they did not approach racism or colonialism as constitutive elements of contemporary experience in settler-colonial societies like the United States. Accordingly, their work was in line with the anti-racism of contemporary social science knowledge production, which, as David Theo Goldberg has shown, sought primarily to manage “race relations,” and “identify the individual and intentional causes of racial conflict and the means for its alleviation.”

These shared political commitments were at the center of both groups’ efforts to produce knowledge and advocate for policies that they felt would challenge the exclusion of Indigenous people from the economic and social security of the dominant society. In other words, the liberal anti-racism that undergirded how these two groups diagnosed the urban “Indian problem” also shaped how they conceived of solutions to it. To illustrate this point, it is useful to consider some of the ways that researchers from the LWV and TCCP characterized the “problem” of urban Indigenous marginality.

Social Science Knowledge Production

In the first place, both organizations understood the “problem” partly as a product of widespread ignorance on the part of legislators, academics, and the general public. Indigenous marginality persisted, they contended, because it was misunderstood, under studied, and ignored. Minnesota LWV activists identified a prevailing “public attitude” of “apathy and ignorance” as one of the key sources of

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47 Goldberg, Racist Culture, 8.
enduring Indigenous disadvantage. Both organizations assumed that the development of an extensive body of knowledge about the nature of these difficulties, and the dissemination of that knowledge, was a necessary pre-condition to negotiating solutions. They also assumed that formal institutions (including, but not limited to, the three levels of government) were the key vehicles through which that knowledge could be acted upon and lasting change could be meaningfully brokered.

These twin convictions were at the center of their advocacy efforts. LWV activists cited a combination of “citizen education” and “state legislative action” as key objectives. TCCP researchers, similarly, promoted “increased understanding” and the steady provision of public funds for community programs as critical tasks if the “doors of opportunity” were to be opened to the disadvantaged in general, and Indigenous people in particular. For both organizations, knowledge production was thus a critical task.

Public Policy Reform

In asserting their faith in the transformative capacity of knowledge production and institutional reform, the LWV and TCCP revealed their ideological proximity to one of the dominant currents of postwar political thinking in the United States. The idea that a strong and “integrationist” state can (and ought to) be a

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“harmonizing force” in a plural society was sacrosanct to a generation of liberal thinkers that had come of political age in the shadow of the New Deal.⁵¹ In Minnesota, perhaps more than anywhere else, proponents of this view were politically dominant. It was from this state that a number of titanic figures in the postwar Democratic Party first ascended to prominence, including Hubert Humphrey, Eugene McCarthy, and Walter Mondale. From the mid 1940s to Mondale’s crushing defeat in the 1984 Presidential contest, these men and their allies had a decisive impact on state and national politics.

It is critical to point out, however, that while these vaunted figures enjoyed a national reputation as left-inclined progressive reformers, their politics were far from radical. The postwar Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party (DFL), which this generation of liberal-welfarist acolytes came to dominate, was not the “natural heir” of its stridently socialist Farmer-Labor predecessor but rather the progeny of that party’s evisceration.⁵² Significantly, the dominant figures of the postwar DFL didn’t learn their politics in the mines of Northern Minnesota’s Iron Range or on the shop floors of the Twin Cities, as some of their predecessors had, but mostly in law schools and university classrooms. It was in these academic spaces, that a number of these future leaders came to see themselves as “post ideological” proponents of competent and compassionate statecraft.⁵³ The department of political science at the University of Minnesota, where Humphrey and others were trained, was dominated

⁵¹ Delton, Making Minnesota Liberal, 22.
by thinkers that sought to “convince the American public of the beneficence of a strong central state, fairly administered by trained scientists, who alone understood the complexity of modern social and economic problems.” Humphrey and others like him were motivated by an enduring faith in the capacity of disciplined governments to solve complex social problems through scientifically informed and flexible policy prescriptions that balanced diverse interests, rather than visions of class struggle and proletarian deliverance. Prominent figures in the Minnesota LWV and the TCCP emphatically agreed with this vision and their efforts to produce and publish research about the causes of Indigenous disadvantage were reflective of it.

Both organizations also characterized the “problem” of urban Indigenous marginality as one of exclusion. Indeed, the LWV and TCCP’s forays into “Indian affairs” were motivated, in part, by the idea that American society was becoming increasingly polarized between two distinct camps: those that were sharing in the prosperity of the postwar economic boom and those that continued to toil in deprivation and insecurity on what Lyndon Johnson called the “outskirts of hope.” Indeed, when activists from the White Bear Lake LWV invoked the specter of an “ignored minority” to encourage colleagues to get behind their push for the inclusion of “Indian affairs” in the organization’s statewide agenda, they were articulating a moral position that prefigured a broader liberal anxiety about the persistence of poverty amidst unprecedented material abundance.

In this, their appeal anticipated the central thesis of Harrington’s The Other America, published a year later, which popularized the idea that economic insecurity

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54 Delton, Making Minnesota Liberal, 21.
55 Johnson, “Special Message to the Congress Proposing a Nationwide War on the Sources of Poverty.”
was so pervasive in the United States that the impoverished had come to constitute a separate society. Harrington’s contribution enjoyed wide circulation and favorable reviews that helped extend its influence, even to the highest echelons of American power. John F. Kennedy reportedly read the book at a time when he was considering comprehensive anti-poverty legislation and it is cited as one of the influences on Johnson’s decision to declare his “unconditional” War on Poverty in 1964.\textsuperscript{56} It is perhaps not surprising, given this success, that the TCCP would invoke Harrington’s authority directly in a 1966 request for federal grant money. “The United States in the sixties contains an affluent society within its borders,” the proposal quoted from \textit{The Other America}.\textsuperscript{57} Yet “at the same time, the United States contains an underdeveloped nation, a culture of poverty. Its inhabitants do not suffer the extreme privation of the peasants of Asia or the tribesmen of Africa, yet the mechanism of misery is similar.”

Yet the conviction of both groups that such exclusions could and should be overcome also reflected a certain liberal optimism. Just as \textit{The Other America} had invited readers to be “angry and ashamed to live in a rich society in which so many remained poor,” LWV activists started from the premise that Indigenous marginality was an outrage that could and should be addressed through compassionate and enlightened reform.\textsuperscript{58} The TCCP articulated its work as an explicit effort to bridge the gulf between these two Americas. “In the broadest possible terms, the goal of our Training Center is to help bring these two nations

\textsuperscript{57} Untitled grant report, 1966, Training Center for Community Programs, Program Files 1966-1973, University Extension Records, University of Minnesota Archives, Andersen Library, Minneapolis.
\textsuperscript{58} Isserman, “Michael Harrington.”
together” and “open doors of opportunity for the ‘Other America,’” wrote an organization researcher in 1966.\(^{59}\)

Integration

In sum, then, both groups were oriented around negotiating access points into a mainstream from which many Indigenous people were presumed to be alienated. By the mid 1960s, the LWV had reached “consensus” that the “ultimate goal of all programs for Minnesota Indians should be self-sufficiency of the Indian population and acceptance into American life.” \(^{60}\) “But this acceptance or integration,” they cautioned, “does not imply altering their reservation status or cultural patterns except as Indians may desire it... It is to be accomplished on their own terms.” Comparably, the TCCP’s work in “Indian affairs,” started from the premise that public policy efforts could intervene and interrupt the “plight of Minnesota’s Indian” in order to create a situation in which “the Indian, like all other Americans, has a range of opportunities open to him.”\(^{61}\) Rhetorically at least, they remained agnostic on the question of which of the “variety of alternatives” (“reservations or city, assimilate or emphasize the ethnic,” for example) Indigenous people ought to pursue. In fine liberal form, they emphasized personal choice as the principle that needed to be defended. “In time, clearer answers for the group will

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\(^{59}\) Untitled grant report, 1966, Training Center for Community Programs, Program Files 1966-1973, University Extension Records, University of Minnesota Archives, Andersen Library, Minneapolis.

\(^{60}\) LWV of Minneapolis, *Indians in Minneapolis*, 108.

emerge when freedom of choice exercised by the individual has illustrated which alternatives most effectively serve the interests of the Indian,” they wrote.62

Both organizations also characterized the “problem” of urban Indigenous marginality in historical terms. They believed that “Indians” had been the victims of conquest and a long line of connected abuses at the hands of “white” Americans. The assertion that Indigenous Americans were living in an “other America,” was sometimes accompanied by an acknowledgement that a history of colonial violence was at least partly to blame. In fact, recurring illusions to the effects of that violence animates the writing of both groups, even if it is usually not characterized in such stark terms. In perhaps the most explicit such acknowledgment, for example, the White Bear Lake activists encouraged their colleagues to remember that “our whole country” and the “basis of our standard of living” is rooted in the “conquest” of Indigenous lands, noting that this implied that a “very real debt” was owed to “the Indian.”63 In this and other statements, activists showed a willingness to concede that contemporary American prosperity was not merely the product of an ever-extending democratic freedom but a kind of plundered treasure won at the cost of considerable violence and dubious territorial seizure. Emphasizing this point, another LWV publication displayed a condemnatory passage from Black Elk Speaks, (the oral history of a Lakota medicine man that was witness to extraordinary violence as waves of settler colonists made new incursions into the Dakotas in the late nineteenth century, collected by John Neihardt):

62 Ibid.
Once we were happy in our own country and we were seldom hungry, for then the two-leggeds and the four-leggeds lived together like relatives, and there was plenty for them and for us. But the Wasichus came, and they have made little islands for us and other little islands for the four-leggeds, and always those little islands are becoming smaller, for around them surges the gnawing flood of the Wasichu, and it is dirty with lies and greed.\textsuperscript{64}

The LWV’s publication interest in this passage show at least a rhetorical willingness to put contemporary problems in a broader historical context. Ebbott made this even more explicit in an article she published in \textit{White Bear Facts}, the local chapter’s internal newsletter. “Prior to the arrival of white men, Indians had their own way of life which adequately met their needs,” she observed.\textsuperscript{65} But with reservationization and the “the loss of land and game,” she continued, “the Indian way of life was destroyed.” This “past treatment by government,” she concluded, “is the basis of current problems.”

In response to this history of violence, both organizations felt an obligation to distinguish themselves from those that denigrated Indigenous traditions and cultures. Accordingly, their writings rhetorically challenged the chauvinistic conceit that the best way to ensure Indigenous deliverance from disadvantage was to absorb of Indigenous difference into the cultural and economic “mainstream” of American life. In doing so they were partly reacting to a contemporary revival of a politics of assimilationism that has had a very long history in the United States. Indeed, in the decades before the LWV and TCCP would include “Indian Affairs” in their research


and advocacy programs, the idea that Indigenous people were best served by being encouraged to adopt the norms of the dominant society was enjoying something of a cultural and political resurgence.

The Minnesota LWV and the TCCP broke from this stridently assimilationist perspective in a number of key ways. The equation of assimilation with liberation that had been so common among “Indian advocates” throughout the 1950s was increasingly rejected by the 1960s. The emergence of Indigenous-lead urban political movements explicitly refused and denounced this assimilationist politics and advocated Indigenous control of efforts aimed at helping Indigenous people reshaped the political climate. The paternalism of earlier Twin Cities “Indian advocates” became increasingly taboo as Indigenous urbanites began to demand such a stake.66 Influenced by this contestation, LWV and TCCP advocacy efforts echoed the chorus of Minneapolis-based Indigenous activists that had begun to challenge the commonsense view – promulgated by those that apparently had their best interest at heart – that the key to Indigenous “success” in the city involved assimilation to the norms of the urban mainstream. Thus in a certain light, the contributions of the Minnesota LWV and the TCCP marked a refreshing departure from the strident chauvinism of earlier interpretations of the “Indian problem,” in urban environments and elsewhere.

66 The existing literature tends to focus on AIM as the primary organizational vehicle through which these challenges were brokered but the historical evidence suggest that they had begun in earnest by the mid-1960s. On this, see accounts in Vizenor, Interior Landscapes; Child, Holding Our World Together; Brunette “The Urban Indian Community in Minneapolis.”
5.4 Limits of Liberal Anti-Racism

Thus while there is much that is laudable in the work of these organizations, it is also constrained by a number of significant limitations. To be sure, both organizations understood themselves as working in the interest of Indigenous people and there is some evidence that they were, in fact, doing so. It seems to me, however, their contributions are constrained in a number of key ways. I want to turn now to a consideration of three of them.

*Limit 1: Institutional Faith*

In the first place, the prevailing optimism with which organizations like the LWV and TCCP embraced the agenda of postwar welfarism betrays excessive faith in the fundamental decency of the institutions of American political rule, as well as their fundamental reformability. Both organizations assumed that those that had been routinely excluded from the full benefits of American citizenship, including Indigenous people, could be meaningfully integrated into the American mainstream if only the levers of state power could be properly manipulated.

It is my view that this approach is based on a fundamentally flawed interpretation of what the American state is and how it responds to political demands. In promoting the idea that Indigenous marginality could be overcome through modest bureaucratic reforms of existing state practices, both organizations promoted the idea that state power is broadly benevolent, harnessable, and responsive to the needs of marginalized peoples. I take an alternative view and argue that because the state is a “strategic field formed through intersecting power networks” that constitute particular kinds of political possibilities, the prevailing
optimism of the LWV and TCCP is misplaced. Following Nicos Poulantzas, I understand the capitalist state as a material expression of a “relationship of forces” and not so much as a “subject” or a “thing.” In the United States and elsewhere, this relationship was and is constituted through a long history of domination through which the interests of certain powerful fractions have been asserted over and above those of others. In other words, governments are not neutral arbiters of competing claims but complex and shifting “condensations” of these histories of contestation. If we understand the organization of state power in this way, then the assumption that genuine social change springs from enlightened governance is untenable. As the history of American politics demonstrates, social gains have always been won through processes of vigorous collective contestation and not the benevolence of informed rulers. I share Frederick Douglass’s observation, expressed more than a century and a half ago, that “power concedes nothing without a demand,” that it never has and never will.

For this reason, I argue that the inclusive strategies pursued by liberal activists in the 1960s and 1970s, including members of the Minnesota LWV and the TCCP, embraced a flawed political strategy. In calling for the full “inclusion” of Minnesota’s Indigenous population, postwar liberals were more compromised than their socialist and social-democratic predecessors who had believed that social movements, not social scientists, were best equipped to secure social gains.

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69 Ibid., 125.
Instructive in this regard is Katznelon’s observation that, by the 1960s, mainstream efforts to smooth over the contradictions of American life, including the War on Poverty itself, were ill equipped to achieve their ambitions because their most important political assets had been all but forfeited. The labor movement, for example, had ceased to function as a strictly oppositional force as its interests became increasingly aligned with the interests of American capital. The brokering of the historic pact of non-aggression between organized labor and corporate America had transformed the former from fomenters of social upheaval into “congeries” of interests in search of “the best possible deal” for their membership. In this, once formidable oppositional forces appeared more as an atomized set of “interest groups” than a unified historic bloc capable of winning significant social transformation. These developments worked to contract the “political space” occupied by the left in American politics and altered the focus of debate from core questions of “social organization and class relations” to questions of “technical economics and interest group politics.” Thus the radical thrust that had animated the American left in the 1930s and 1940s, winning the welfarist reforms of the New Deal and other social democratic concessions, was gradually transformed from a broad based social movement into an incorporated element of the prevailing order.

My point here is not that if the American left had remained a potent oppositional force in the postwar period, Indigenous marginality would have been alleviated or resolved. It is, rather, to stress that the welfarist ambitions of the LWV and TCCP – including their approach to the “Indian problem” – were grounded in a

72 Ibid., 190.
73 Ibid., 190.
74 Ibid., 187.
set of political commitments and social ambitions that fundamentally misread the nature of American state power. Of course, these efforts should not be dismissed *tout court*. Certainly, the welfarist policies that both groups emphatically supported, if fully implemented, would have gone a considerable way in alleviating some of the immediate material suffering that was disproportionately shouldered by the state’s Indigenous population. Daniel Cobb has shown that a number of Great Society initiatives, particularly the Community Action Programs, had a significant impact in a range of Indigenous communities. But by assuming that benevolent administration alone could and would address Indigenous marginality they promoted a simplistic interpretation of the nature of that marginality and how it might be meaningfully contested. By seeking nothing more than modest adjustments of existing institutional practices, liberal reformers, and their allies in the liberal state, were not in a position to support Indigenous efforts to substantially challenge what Coulthard calls the “generative structures” which are constitutive of the hierarchical relations that sustain their marginality.

Importantly, this flawed approach and circumscribed ambition tell us something about the failures of state-centric postwar liberalism more generally. Because liberal reformers did not substantially challenge the fundamental bases of poverty and deprivation, they failed to achieve their already muted ambitions. “Neither the War on Poverty nor Great Society slowed or reversed the impact of urban redevelopment and racial segregation on the nation’s cities,” observes Michael

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76 Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*, 35.
The cumulative effect of this failure was that many of the social achievements of the postwar era proved vulnerable to retrenchment in the significantly more conservative political climate of the 1970s and 1980s. Importantly, too, the failures of 1960s liberalism came to serve as an important symbol for the forces of the new right. By the early 1980s, neo-conservative were increasingly citing problems with 1960s anti-poverty efforts as incontrovertible proof that redistributive and welfarist forms of statecraft were doomed to failure, trapping the impoverished in cycles of dependency rather than providing them with opportunities to secure their own well-being. In this context, it was possible for the leading figure of American neoliberalism, Ronald Reagan, to declare that postwar efforts to defeat the “sources of poverty” had been an abject failure in practice. “I guess you could say, poverty won the war,” he gloated in a 1986 radio address.78

Limit 2: Status Quo Inclusionism

The liberal approach promoted by the LWV and TCCP was also limited by the kind of “inclusion” that it prescribed for Indigenous people. The LWV and the TCCP wanted to facilitate reforms that opened points of entry into the prosperity of the dominant society but emphasized that any such integration must happen on the terms of the people who were being integrated. Both expressed respect for Indigenous desires to pursue different sorts of destinies and assume sovereignty over the conditions of their collective existence. Ebbott, for example, was fond of repeating the mantra that those interested in helping Indigenous people ought to

77 Katz, The Undeserving Poor, 163.
remember “two basic facts.” First, that “Indians want to be Indians” and, second, that “Indians want to control their own lives.”

But while there is much to be lauded in this and other declaratory promotions of Indigenous autonomy, how exactly the sorts of strategies that these organizations promoted were in fact oriented around supporting Indigenous forms of alterity and self-determination is a very murky question. It is worth asking what, exactly, liberal reformers had in mind when they promoted the desirability of “self sufficiency” and “personal choice” in their writing. The answer to this question isn’t always entirely clear in their published work.

What is clear, however, is that both groups retained a fundamental faith in the essential desirability of dominant forms of social organization. By acknowledging that the “ultimate goal” of their efforts was to broker Indigenous points of entry into the mainstream of “American life,” the LWV, for example, offered a qualified endorsement of that mainstream. In so doing, they presented American life as a broadly neutral field in which Indigenous people can and should make a life of their own. By making this case, they assumed the inevitability and desirability of the status quo and betrayed their ideological proximity to the universalist conceit at the center of their liberal anti-racism. By assuming that American citizens were united by a common foundation that transcends “particular historical, social, and cultural differences,” they minimized the degree to which American life is organized around an economy of power relations that has been consistently hostile to the needs,


80 LWV of Minneapolis, Indians in Minneapolis, 108.
aspirations and desires of Indigenous people.\textsuperscript{81} By setting the horizon of their ambition as the inclusion of Indigenous people into the ranks of the comfortable, relatively prosperous, and wage-earning dominant society, they failed to engage with more comprehensive demands for a rethinking of the colonial order of things.

\textit{Limit 3: Minimization of the Colonial Relation}

Finally, the approaches promoted by the LWV and TCCP’s were constrained by their failure to fully grasp the degree to which the colonial relation functioned as a “structural” dimension of contemporary life. The crisis that they sought to resolve was less one of entrenched domination grounded in the persistence of settler-colonial politics, and more one of individual prejudice, generalized ignorance, misappropriated funds, bureaucratic inefficiency, and political negligence.

To the limited degree that these organizations acknowledged that colonial forms of domination have had an enduring importance in the context of contemporary American life, their interpretations were circumscribed in at least two key ways, both of which temper how they diagnose the “Indian problem” and propose policies that might lead to its resolution.

The first is that they endorse a temporal politics that works, unwittingly or not, to confine colonial violence to a historically concluded past. Thus while “past treatment by government” may well be the “basis of current problems,” the unforgiveable transgression itself is relegated to a distant horizon.\textsuperscript{82} The “crime” of

\textsuperscript{81} Goldberg, \textit{Racist Culture}, 5.
dispossessive and assimilative settler incursion into Minnesota, in such interpretations, is rightly denounced for the horrors it unleashed, but that violence is also presumed to have occurred in an epoch of American history that is now largely closed. In this, the violence of settler colonization is compartmentalized as a series of past events while contemporary manifestations of that violence, insofar as they are acknowledged, are categorized as residual symptoms of that “past” treatment. Insofar as violence is understood as continuing, moreover, it is presumed to do so only as an echo of the original sin of historical colonization. The idea that contemporary American prosperity (“our standard of living”) was won at the cost an earlier period of violence implies a debt, to be sure, but denies the persistence of an economy of privilege and disadvantage that functions as a constitutive dimension of contemporary American life. Accordingly, the moral imperative for those who seek to overcome this original violence is understood as one of settling accounts. But debts, like apologies, create a sense of “pastness” in which the transgression for which the debt is owed is no longer present. Decolonization, in this limited view, is understood as a matter of acknowledging historical wrongs rather than a process of actively dismantling colonial structures in the politics of the present. In this way, the solution is understood as one of bringing Indigenous people into that standard of living rather than challenging its basic foundations.

The limited interpretation of colonial violence espoused by the LWV and TCCP is also closely connected to a spatial imaginary that largely exempts the

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84 It is worth noting that while Indigenous activists have often made similar demands - insisting that Indigenous people be adequately housed, able to access state benefits, not have to fear police violence, for example – they have often done so in ways that insisted on the ongoing nature of colonial violence.
contemporary city from colonial violence. At the center of this imaginary is a surgical distinction between frontier or reservation geographies which function as the spatial instantiations of a violent past and an urban geography where that past is experienced only as a residue. If we follow the logic of the LWV, and to a lesser degree the TCCP, the “crime” of colonization (land theft, containment, assimilationism) is something that is presumed to have happened out there. The reservation, in such tellings, is understood as the supreme expression of this violence, as the LWV’s favorable quoting of *Black Elk Speaks* attests. In such interpretations, the confinement of Indigenous people to this series of “shrinking islands” constitutes one of the central crimes of settler incursion. The economic devastation of present-day reservations, meanwhile, is a residual expression of the original transgression. Absented in this presentation, however, is the degree to which urban environments (for our purposes, Minneapolis) are also products of settler-colonial violence. Yet the city, in their presentations, is imagined as a neutral time-space, a geography of the present in which diverse peoples come together and negotiate their lives on even terms. Insofar as problems associated with the colonial crime persist, they do so either as remnants of the violence of that other place, as burdens that have been imported to the city from elsewhere, or as manageable interpersonal problems that can be overcome through education and the effective management of “race relations.” The implication of this thinking is that the contemporary city is exempted from the long history of settler-colonial spatial negotiation, it is rendered an exceptional place, cut off from the messy negotiation of colonial contestation, and bounded by a kind of postcolonial cordon sanitaire. The critical point, however, is that urban and reservation geographies have never existed in isolation. Rather, they are relationally entwined outcomes of a unitary process of
geographical production grounded in the colonial relation. In the same way that Harrington’s “other America” has always been intractably connected to the America of postwar affluence, so too has Indigenous disadvantage always been intractably linked to settler prosperity in the city, as previous chapters have demonstrated. To exempt the contemporary city from the foundational violence of the settlement of Minnesota, is to conceal the degree to which that violence has shaped the distribution of advantage and disadvantages in the urban contemporary.

5.5 Summary

In sum, then, the LWV of Minnesota and the TCCP made substantial contributions to field of “Indian affairs” advocacy in the 1960s and 1970s. As I have demonstrated, their work was motivated by a desire to address a very real social cleavage. In this, both organizations were products of their time. They were animated by a spirit of postwar optimism and held that no social problem was so intractable that it could not be ameliorated by compassionate, comprehensive, and research informed statecraft. But their liberal anti-racism also operated to profoundly limit the ways in which they interpreted this and other inequities. By framing the “Indian problem” as a challenge that could be addressed without asking bigger questions about the forms of social organization that had produced it, their work stopped well short of confronting the endurance of the colonial relation in a meaningful way.
Chapter 6 Inner-City Law Enforcement and the Colonial Relation: The Politics of “Racialized Policing” and the “Indian Patrol” in South Minneapolis

6.1 Introduction

On the evening of Saturday April 17, 1993, police responded to a complaint at a Downtown Minneapolis apartment complex. Upon arrival, responding officers Michael Lardy and Marvin Schumer found Charles Lone Eagle and John Boney sleeping (and apparently drunk) in front of the building.1 “Let’s just throw them in the trunk,” said one of the officers, according to witness reports.2 Lone Eagle remembers being thumped in the chest with a police nightstick, handcuffed to his friend, and “dumped” in the trunk of a Crown Victoria squad car. Lardy and Schumer then transported their captives to the nearby Hennepin County Medical Center. But they didn’t seem to be in much of a rush, according to one of the men in the trunk.3 The short journey took an “unreasonably long time” and involved a good deal of erratic driving along the way.4

Word of this unorthodox transfer soon reached the media and the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) found itself at the center of a growing political scandal. Pat Amo, the city’s Indian Community Liaison, accused the officers of treating human beings like animals. “I don’t care whether you are transporting people 2 feet, 2 blocks or 2 miles, you must treat them with dignity,” she told the

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3 Human Rights Watch, Shielded From Justice.
4 Ibid.
“There’s a certain segment with the Police Department that has a John Wayne frontier mentality about Indian people,” said Clyde Bellecourt of the American Indian Movement. “We have twisted reality to believe that Native drunks have fewer rights simply because we despise their condition,” wrote Laura Waterman Wittstock in an op-ed.

These and other expressions of outrage were not articulated in a historical vacuum. Many in the Minneapolis Indigenous community felt that the “trunk incident” was only the most recent in a long line of episodes in which MPD officers had been exceptionally aggressive in their dealings with Indigenous people. For this reason, reactions to Lardy and Schumer’s actions were animated by a sense of enduring grievance.

In this chapter, I take this history of targeted aggression as the starting point for a broader discussion about how knowledge practices and cultural expressions that are rooted in the colonial relation have shaped local policing strategies and interpretations of them. My objective here is not just to make the case that the MPD were especially brutal to Indigenous people. Numerous studies and a robust evidentiary record that spans from the 1960s to the 1990s (and beyond) already make this plain. Rather, I attempt to look beyond the troubling actions of

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5 Furst, “2 Officers Suspended after Putting Indians in the Trunk.”
6 Ibid.
individual officers in order to assess the broader cultural field in which their actions were articulated. In doing so, I build on Elizabeth Comack’s observation that to understand “racialized policing” we need to “broaden our gaze” in ways that allow us to locate the roots of targeted violence in a broader context.\(^9\) In her work, Comack has shown that Indigenous peoples’ encounters with police are often shaped by particular ideologies of “racialized privilege” through which the dominance inherent in the colonial relation is depoliticized and rendered natural. In her terms, racialization is a process by which racial “categories, identities, and meanings” are constructed and assigned to particular groups whereas privilege is precisely the capacity to define situations in the cultural terms of one’s own experience and to “have those judgments stick”.\(^10\) Drawing on these insights, my objective here is to understand how the reproduction of particular kinds of “knowledge” about Indigenous people has operated to render their disproportionate entanglement with the criminal justice apparatus understandable, tolerable, and even natural to certain publics. But I am also keen to show that this cultural knowledge is always contested and that key moments of Indigenous political organizing have operated to interrupt the potency of its ideological impress.


\(^10\) Ibid., 17–8.
To make this case, I begin by demonstrating some of the ways that the MPD and the broader criminal justice apparatus have operated to disproportionately target Indigenous residents of South Minneapolis. Building on Comack’s insights, I then argue that this history of “racialized policing” is inextricably linked to the reproduction of particular kinds of “knowledge” that shape police actions and render them understandable to a broader population. To do so, I demonstrate that three broadly circulated assumptions about Indigenous people have operated to motivate, legitimize, and depoliticize aggressive targeting by police. But I also demonstrate that certain forms of intervention have worked to actively repoliticize systemic violence by dramatizing the culpability of police and the broader society of which they are a part.

6.2 Racialized Policing and Indigenous People in South Minneapolis

The “trunk incident” provoked outrage in part because it confirmed the continuation of a long tradition of hostile and humiliating policing in the inner city. Those that articulated anger over this event tended to interpret it as only the most recent in a long string of incidents in which Indigenous urbanites had been singled out for disproportionately aggressive treatment by police. In short, the record suggests that many Indigenous residents of the inner-city Southside have experienced some form of police “brutality,” whether we define that term broadly to include a “range of abusive police practices, such as the use of profanity, racial slurs and unnecessary searches” or more narrowly as the use of physical violence, or “excessive force,” in the course of police work.\(^\text{11}\) It is beyond the scope of this chapter

to consider the full range of forms that this violence has taken but it may be helpful to begin with several brief anecdotes that will ground our discussion in the actuality of lived experience.

Rita Rogers and Joan Strong had a run in with two aggressive MPD officers after one of their friends was arrested for fighting outside of a Franklin Avenue bar in the fall of 1968. Insisting that their friend had only been defending himself, they pleaded with responding officers Haugen and Wiley to release him. Haugen did not appreciate this intervention and soon began hurling a range of insults, including “you Indian women are nothing but a bunch of slobs and dirty pigs,” according to one complaint.\textsuperscript{12} Strong was not intimidated and apparently told Haugen that she had “slapped men’s faces for saying less.” “If I did would you shoot me?,” she asked the agitated officer. Haugen replied that he “certainly” would and added that he would have “one less Indian to worry about” if he did.\textsuperscript{13} Now fully irate, Haugen apparently told the assembled crowd that “Indians” and “niggers” are “all the same,” before his partner finally pulled him away.\textsuperscript{14} Rogers and Strong filed a formal complaint of “bias” but it was later dismissed in a Hennepin County court.\textsuperscript{15}

Donna Folstad was relaxing at an East Franklin Avenue bar one evening in 1975 when her parked car was struck by a “white woman” trying to squeeze into a narrow spot. Stepping outside to assess the situation, Folstad discovered some minor damage and decided to file a report.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
[When] the police came... this white woman told the[m] that there was no accident [and] that she hadn't done it. The police officer started to write down that there was no accident... I got very upset and said “Well, wasn’t he going to listen to Indian people? Why would he take the word of a white woman?” We had witnesses. He just told me to shut my mouth, that I was an interfering person. I got really angry and called him a pig. He turned his car mirror and said, “If you want to see a pig why don’t you look in the mirror?” Then I swore. I called him a [fucking] honky pig. He punched me in the head. My head went way out. Then he got me by the back and he yelled to his partner who was still off talking to the white woman, “Come over here. I’ve got a big one over here.” Both of them proceeded to punch me again and get me down on the ground...They pulled my top up and they hand-cuffed me and threw me in the car. There were no men around. There were a couple of women who tried to help me but they just kinda threw them off.  

This was not the end of Folstad’s ordeal, however. The officers opted to “circle” around the neighborhood with their detainee agitated and in a state of semi-undress. “My top is still up and I’m exposed and I’m asking them please wouldn’t they help me because I couldn’t get my top down,” recalled Folstad. “They just laughed at me and made a few remarks. Then they took me to where four or five other police cars were parked... officers would take turns coming over and looking at me and laughing.” In the end, Folstad was charged with breaching the peace.  

Les Robinson, a Southside teenager, encountered an aggressive crew of MPD officers after he was caught hiding in the upstairs closet of an 11th Avenue home that he had been burglarizing one summer afternoon in 1980. Accepting defeat, he made no effort to resist apprehension but was tackled, choked, and hit in the back of the head with a flashlight or nightstick by the officers that discovered him. Robinson was bleeding profusely as officers took him to the squad car. Neighborhood kids saw what was happening and ran down the street to find the young man’s brother.

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17 Ibid., 26-8.
18 Ibid., 26-8.
19 Parker, “What Happened to Les Robinson?”
Dennis Robinson arrived quickly and asked the officers why his brother was bleeding. “Because he is a fucking burglar. We shot him,” one of them replied.\textsuperscript{20} The officers then grabbed the inquiring brother and searched him thoroughly, intentionally stepping on his bare toes as they did. Next, they wanted to know whether he was employed. Dennis Robinson said he didn’t have a job. “Welfare puke,” said one of the officers. Les Robinson was still bleeding when he was processed into Hennepin County jail later that afternoon. One of the guards wanted to know what had happened. The arresting officer told him that Robinson had been trying to fight back. “Weren’t you?” said the officer as he pulled the teenager’s handcuffed arms backward and served his detainee with one final jolt of pain.\textsuperscript{21}

Richard Graves, was stopped for suspected intoxication after leaving an East Franklin Avenue bar in the early 1970s. Though he was broadly cooperative, he found himself on the receiving end of police aggression. “Between the time they stopped me and I was downtown, two eyes were black and my nose was broken and my teeth were loose [and my face] was swollen out to here and... [I had] black and blue marks all over me,” he told a Minnesota Human Rights Commission inquiry in 1975.\textsuperscript{22} “You can’t tell me that two mature adults can’t handle me,” he continued. “I’m not a very big man.” In spite of this violence, however, Graves felt that taking a complaint to the MPD Internal Affairs unit would only create more problems. “I work on this avenue and I don’t want to be harassed every time I drive down the street.” His fears seem to have been well founded. In the weeks that followed the original incident, Graves was the target of routine harassment and even a

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} Minnesota Human Rights Commission, \textit{Police Brutality}, 3-4.
shakedown of sorts. “I was approached just recently by three police officers... and they intimidated me,” he said during his testimony. “They suspect I know something about a burglary or I know who did it, and if I don’t give those people ... their names by tomorrow afternoon, they’re going into the court on this incident where I was beaten up, make sure I get the maximum penalty, or, this really bothered me, [the officer] stressed this, that he was gonna drop my name in circles around the avenue that I went and snitched and hopefully I’d get taken care of by people around here.”

The form and content of police targeting wasn’t always so dramatic, however. The evidence also speaks to the pervasiveness of far more mundane and routinized forms of aggression. For example, police regularly focused their energies on a series of East Franklin Avenue bars, primarily frequented by, and associated with, an Indigenous clientele. Beginning in the 1960s, these “Indian bars” were consistently targeted by MPD raids, which generally led to dozens of arrests. “There was a time on Franklin Avenue when you could set your watch when the patty [sic] wagon would come down... the officers would come in the bars, go in the front door and out the back, arrest people, put them in the wagon and take them downtown,” recalled one Southsider. “They rounded us up like cattle and booked us on ‘drunk and disorderly’ charges, even if we were neither,” remembered another.

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23 Ibid., 4.
24 The evidence suggests that MPD aggressively targeted the customers of a shifting range of East Franklin Avenue establishments, including Bud’s Bar, the Coral, the Bear’s Den, the Brite Spot, the Anchor, and Mr. Arthur’s.
26 Banks and Erdoes, Ojibwa Warrior, 59.
For many, it was clear that this sort of targeting was not practiced in other parts of town. Fay Cohen’s research on the Southside’s “Indian Patrol” (discussed at length below) notes that it was common among participants to believe that “non-Indians, drinking in fashionable bars in wealthy neighborhoods, rarely were arrested and taken to jail [while] Indians drinking in bars in poorer districts... were likely to be arrested and put in the drunk tank downtown.” One MPD official effectively confirmed this assumption in an interview with the Minneapolis LWV, noting that “Indians” were more frequently brought in on drunk charges because they were more “visible” to police because “they were drunk on “skid row” rather than at home or in front of a fashionable restaurant.”

Notably, too, the targeting of Indigenous people in and around Franklin Avenue bars was so acute, that this group consistently made up a significant portion of the MPD’s arrests for drunkenness. In 1969, for example, Indigenous urbanites accounted for nearly one third of a weekly average of 156 such bookings. Drawing on this and other evidence, Michael Indergaard concludes that police targeting of “Indian drinkers” for minor “public disorder type offenses” was so intense that it constituted an institutionalized strategy to exercise “constant” “social control against Indians.”

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27 LWV of Minneapolis, Indians in Minneapolis, 51.
These anecdotes offer only a partial indication of why so many Indigenous Southsiders had fraught relationships with police. In a certain light, the situation in Minneapolis offers a local illustration of Barbara Perry’s observation that North American Indigenous communities, rural and urban, have tended to be both “over” and “under” policed.\textsuperscript{30} Indeed, the MPD routinely failed Indigenous residents by acting as a source of predation \textit{and} failing to serve its basic protective function. Not surprisingly, then, one survey of attitudes among the “Indian community” revealed the perception that police were either indifferent or hostile to the needs of

Indigenous residents. “Call the police about anything and they’ll just take one look at you and say – ‘another drunken Indian,’” observed one respondent.  

The degree to which Indigenous urbanites were disproportionately targeted by the criminal justice system did not end with the police, however. “No matter what aspect of the justice system is examined in relationship to Native American people – law enforcement, courts, or corrections – Native Americans are disproportionately represented compared with their numbers in the Minnesota population,” observed the US Commission on Civil Rights in 1975. Connectedly, various studies reveal, that Indigenous people were (and are) dramatically over-represented among the ranks of Minnesota’s incarcerated. In the early 1970s, one study revealed that while Indigenous people made up only half of one percent of the state’s total population, they constituted roughly ten percent of its male prison population, with a considerable majority of those inmates coming from urban areas.

Head counts only tell part of the story, however, and the form and duration of punishments meted out to Indigenous arrestees were often much stiffer than they were for others. Research conducted in 1979, found that Indigenous residents of Minnesota were considerably more likely than their “white” counterparts to be

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arrested and spend time in jail, and considerably less likely to secure bail, be acquitted, or receive probation. These and other discrepancies persisted through the 1980s, prompting one Minnesota LWV report to conclude: “comparatively Indians enter the correctional system younger, have more frequent contacts with the courts, and spend more time in correctional facilities.” Meanwhile, other evidence suggests that the consequences of being arrested were amplified for those that were economically marginal, particularly those that had difficulty proving they had stable work and housing. Accordingly, low-income people often faced tougher penalties and served fuller sentences.

6.3 Depoliticizing Racialized Policing

Thus as we have seen, Indigenous people in South Minneapolis were disproportionately entangled with every level of the criminal justice system, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s. To make sense of this targeting, I want to return now to Comack’s insights about “racialized policing” and consider how the sustained reproduction of certain kinds of “knowledge” about Indigenous people has operated to depoliticize the “over” and “under” policing of this group on the Southside of Minneapolis. Following Comack, I am interested in how certain recurring “categories, identities, and meanings” have shaped police and other non-Indigenous people’s understanding of the urban Indigenous community and how these ways of seeing have operated to render the group-differentiated aggressiveness of the criminal justice system understandable, natural, and tolerable to some

35 Roger Benjamin and Choong Nam Kim, American Indians and the Criminal Justice System in Minnesota (Minneapolis: Center for Urban and Regional Affairs, 1979).
observers. Critically, these “knowledge” practices are part of a broader politics of domination that has operated to consolidate economic, social, and political forms of security in the hands of certain segments of the population (especially Euro-American settlers and their descendants) while denying those advantages to certain others.

What is important for our purposes here is the way in which the deployment of certain kinds of “knowledge” has operated to render inequitable distributions natural, masking the degree to which a distinct “machinery of enforcement” has operated to ensure their reproduction. In particular, I am interested in the potency of three interconnected interpretative frames, all of which reflect the cultural politics of domination that is at the center of the colonial relation. The first is the idea that urban Indigenous entanglement with the law is a consequence of the traumatic alienations of urban migration. The second is the idea that this entanglement is a consequence of the fundamental disorganization of urban Indigenous communities. And the third is the idea that this entanglement is a consequence of a group-specific genetic or cultural pre-disposition to alcoholism and all its deleterious effects. In practice, of course, these interpretive frames overlap and intersect in myriad ways but in the interest of clearly elucidating why they are relevant to our present discussion it is worth considering each of them in isolation.

The Trauma of Migration

The assumption that urban migration had been the source of considerable trauma for Indigenous people has helped naturalize Indigenous entanglement with the institutions of the criminal justice system and explain the aggressiveness of
police. “The American Indian living in Minneapolis is beset by problems inherent in his move from the reservation,” wrote one Minneapolis Star reporter in 1968.38 “He is faced with adjustment in a competitive, urban society which is alien to his culture.” The idea that the “problems” of Indigenous urbanites were “inherent” to the trauma of migration was widely circulated in the postwar period and came to function as a core element of a coherent explanatory framework.

In Minnesota, institutional reports often promoted this view. For example, the Community Welfare Council of Hennepin County’s “Indian Committee,” a group established in the 1950s to respond to the rapid growth of the Minneapolis Indigenous community, noted, in one final report, that the large number of Indigenous urbanites that had begun to appear in Hennepin County courts, generally arraigned on a host of minor charges, was a result of the migrants’ unfamiliarity with city life and a series of connected difficulties, including the various discouragements of joblessness, the strain of substandard living conditions, and, most condescendingly, an “improper use of leisure time.”39 Less than a decade later, the (Minnesota) Governor’s Human Rights Commission reiterated this sentiment, noting that while some Indigenous migrants have “succeeded” by finding work, shelter and “identify[ing] themselves with their new community,” others have found “nothing but trouble in the city.”40 The Governor’s Commission identified this deviating sub-group as the source of an “Indian jail rate” that was “far out of proportion with the number of Indians in the cities” and noted that their failure to adapt to urban norms was making “successful” integration difficult for others. One

39 CWC Indian Committee, The Minnesota Indian in Minneapolis.
40 Governor’s Human Rights Commission, Minnesota’s Indian Citizens, 42–43.
report published by the TCCP, meanwhile, suggested that difficulties of adaptation were key to the preponderance of Indigenous “trouble with the law.” The researcher proposed a number of possible explanations for these discrepancies including “intercultural conflict,” “alienation from a legal system that has frequently betrayed Indian interests,” “deep conflicts between an older, traditional Indian way of life and the demands of a modern technological society,” and a “self-defeating way of expressing rebellion against the dominant society which is perceived as having abused, exploited and discriminated against Indian Americans” (emphasis added). What each of these explanations has in common is that it identified the activities and behaviors of Indigenous people themselves as the decisive factor.

Disorganization

Connectedly, non-Indigenous researchers often insisted that disproportionate Indigenous entanglement with the criminal justice reflected the inherent disorganization of urban Indigenous family units and the community more generally. For example, the TCCP report cited above explicitly identified “family and personal disorganization” as a key factor. The Minneapolis LWV, for its part, noted that “a disorganization of family life brought on by poverty and heightened by the need to balance new ways with old in a complex, urban society” was at the very center of the “disproportionately large” percentage of the local “Indian” population that found themselves “in trouble with the law” (emphasis added). These and other reports often stressed a profound distance between Indigenous “lifestyles” and established standards of propriety, though the latter are rarely if ever defined. The

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41 Richard Woods, Rural and City Indians in Minnesota Prisons (Minneapolis: Training Center for Community Programs, 1970), 1.

42 LWV of Minneapolis, Indians in Minneapolis, 49.
Welfare Council’s Indian Committee, for example, worried that the “slum” housing that so many Indigenous people found themselves residing in was part of a “total environment” that was not only “bad” but also represented “a serious hazard to Indian children and young people, morally, physically, and in relation to their educational opportunities,” whether “Indian families realize it or not.”

The broader community could not afford to “let such conditions persist,” they concluded, because “they breed delinquency and backwardness.” Non-Indigenous observers routinely assumed that a diverse range of “cultural” differences posed barriers to “successful” integration. These included, for example, the presumptions that Indigenous children lacked adequate supervision or guidance, that Indigenous women lacked skills in household management, and that Indigenous men had little sense of how to spend their time responsibly, among other things. Taken together, these depictions consolidate a commonsense impression of an urban community that was fundamentally at odds with an abstract standard of mainstream urban propriety.

In making these claims, observers joined a long tradition of US urban research that has represented inner-city communities of colour in terms of “disorder and lack,” understanding them as repositories of “concentrated unruliness, deviance, anomie and atomization, replete with behaviors said to offend common precepts of morality and propriety, whether by excess (as with crime, sexuality and fertility) or by default (in the case of work, thrift and family),” as Loïc Wacquant has observed. While Wacquant’s observations concern representations of the African American ghetto (and, importantly, he insists that the “ghetto” be understood as a

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43 CWC Indian Committee, The Minnesota Indian in Minneapolis, 4.
“historically-determinate, spatially-based concatenation of mechanisms of ethnoracial closure and control” that is unique to the African American urban experience), they are also obviously relevant in this context.

**Predisposition to Alcoholism**

Finally, the over-representation of Indigenous urbanites on arrest sheets, in court dockets, and in the carceral system has also often been explained as the consequence of an epidemic of Indigenous alcoholism. The conservative State Representative Frank DeGroat, one of only a very few Indigenous people to serve in the Minnesota House of Representatives in the twentieth century, exemplified this position when, at a late 1960s pre-legislative conference in St. Paul, he told the gathered audience that the “law enforcement problems with Indians” could be explained, in part, by “easy access to liquor” and the “leniency of law enforcement.”

In fact, the view that Indigenous alcohol use and “trouble” with the law were intertwined was so well established in a certain public imaginary that one TCCP researcher simply used the high number of Indigenous people appearing in municipal courts on “drunkenness” charges (an average of 156 arrests per week, in 1969) as unambiguous evidence that a crisis of Indigenous alcoholism existed.

That this researcher did not feel compelled to complicate or justify such an assertion is evidence of the degree to which a common-sense image of the Indigenous inebriate was already established. Indeed, as Joseph Westermeyer observed, the image of the “drunken Indian” has been “long lasting” and “thoroughly ensconced in our social

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46 Vern Drilling, *Problems with Alcohol Among Urban Indians in Minneapolis* (Minneapolis: Training Center for Community Programs, 1970).
Not least, as others have shown, because it has become a routine feature of news reporting about North American Indigenous people and communities. This image has longed served to render Indigenous people as without agency. For Westermeyer, the “Indian drunk” is imagined as a “powerless figure” in popular representations, one that has “no alternative to drunkenness with which to cope with poverty, the destruction of his culture and the undermining of his family”.

This is, perhaps, not surprising given the cultural puissance of a series of stereotypes about Indigenous alcoholism, particularly the “firewater myth” which holds that Indigenous people suffer a genetic weakness to alcohol. “Indians are the wild alcoholics in the literature of dominance,” Vizenor reminds us, and the long colonial shadow cast by the “firewater myth” has proved remarkably resilient, particularly given its scientific groundlessness. In 1976, The Alley felt it was necessary to run an article reiterating that there was no scientific basis for the presumption of genetic weakness. “Stated simply, if Indians drink more than Whites, it’s not because they were born drinkers,” it informed readers. In spite of such correctives, the image of a community that was genetically pre-disposed to drunkenness has experienced an enduring cultural afterlife.

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49 Westermeyer, “The Drunken Indian,” 29.
51 Vizenor, Manifest Manners, 29.
My point here is not to suggest that these interpretations have no basis in reality, that the stereotypical assignations of vulnerability on which they are based were drawn exclusively from a series of absolute falsehoods. Researchers have long established, often in considerably nuanced ways, that many of the thousands of Indigenous people that migrated from rural or reservation communities to various American urban centers in the postwar period faced a host of challenges, including the ones listed above.53 My point is, rather, that these difficulties, real or imagined, do not, in and of themselves, provide a sufficient explanation of why Indigenous people were so disproportionately intertwined with the various levels of the criminal justice apparatus.

What is missing in much of the analysis drawn on above is an attempt to understand and work through the ways in which the criminal justice system itself has worked to disproportionately target, punish, and incarcerate Indigenous people. At their worst, these interpretations work to exculpate a culture of “racialized policing” from consideration, ignoring the degree to which it has shaped Indigenous encounters with the law in this particular urban setting.

Yet the starting point for thinking through this quandary, in much of the observational reporting that I cite above, is almost always in the behavioral, cultural, and lifestyle characteristics that are assigned to Indigenous. Through these assignations, Indigenous Southsiders have often forced to bear the burden of being “woven” “out of a thousand details, anecdotes, stories” that were not their own,

53 Brunette, “The Minneapolis Urban Indian Community”; Fixico, The Urban Indian Experience; LaGrand, Indian Metropolis; Davis, Survival Schools.
to borrow a phrase from Frantz Fanon.\textsuperscript{54} As such they are rendered the authors of their own misfortune. The racialized practices of the criminal justice institutions, by contrast, are rarely identified as a cause.

The work of frontline police officers was often conducted in an through these commonsense frames. “They carry into their interactions with Native Americans the same stockpile of stereotypes and images that shape broader patterns of cultural imperialism,” assumptions that are “located in both the occupational and popular culture,” observes Robynne Neugebauer.\textsuperscript{55} In early 1976, reporters from The Alley spoke to MPD officers about their experiences patrolling the 6\textsuperscript{th} precinct (which included parts of South Minneapolis, including East Franklin Avenue). The interviews reveal, among other things, that some officers understood themselves as policing a profoundly troubled community, with one describing their work as maintaining a “fine line” between “what we have now” and “total chaos.”\textsuperscript{56} The officers described their function in stark Manichean terms. When challenged on questions of brutality, one noted that “we don’t have any contact with the good people... all we come in contact with are the bad people and it starts to seem like there’s nothing but rats in the area.”\textsuperscript{57} The interviews also suggest that the police felt that one of the key sources of the “chaos” that they were always warding off, was, in fact, the product of a lack of concern on the part of conventional authorities. This perceived culture of permissiveness, one suggested, also helped explain the neighborhood’s economic decline. “Until the parents and the courts start showing

\textsuperscript{54}Frantz Fanon, \textit{Black Skin, White Masks} (New York: Grove Press, 2008), 91.
\textsuperscript{56}The Alley, “Police/Community Relations,” 8.
\textsuperscript{57}Ibid.
concern things aren’t going to get any better,” suggested one officer. “You are not going to see businesses going down there. All you see is them leaving,” he continued.\textsuperscript{58}

Collectively, then, these and other cultural explanations coalesce into an explanatory frame that renders Indigenous peoples disproportionate encounters with the law understandable. In this sense, their broad circulation operated to depoliticize domination by reframing disproportionality as a consequence of the actions and lifestyles of Indigenous people themselves. In effect, these interpretations operate to divest practices of “racialized policing” of their broader context and recalibrate them as natural responses to a troubled community.

6.4 Repoliticizing Racialized Policing

Importantly, though, the practices of racialized policing and the series of commonsense ideological commitments that underpinned them were routinely contested and repoliticized by neighborhood activists. Most famously, the early activities of AIM, which formed in Minneapolis in 1968, were explicitly directed at challenging the violence of the criminal justice system, as we shall see. But it is also important to point out that this organization was not the first to raise these questions. The singular focus on AIM’s political work that (which has been so common in writing on Minneapolis’ Indigenous political traditions) has often overshadowed earlier efforts to organize around a range urban grievances, including MPD brutality. Indeed, these partial tellings have sometimes overshadowed the constitutive importance of work that predates the organization’s activities,

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
particularly that of a new generation of Indigenous activists that began to insert themselves into inner-city politics, starting in the mid-1960s. While a genealogy of Indigenous-led anti-brutality organizing is beyond the scope of this dissertation, such a study would surely mark an important contribution to our understanding of this history.

Indigenous organizations existed in the Twin Cities even before the Second World War, of course, but it was not until the Indigenous population became geographically concentrated in Phillips and other inner-city districts that groups began to organize explicitly around contesting group-differentiating patterns of inequity. The shared experience of urban impoverishment, slum housing, police violence, and widespread discrimination created a “shared sense of embattlement” and hastened the emergence of an “activist community.” Thus AIM did not emerge in a political vacuum and its varied successes are in many ways indebted a culture of contestation that began well before the organization came on the scene.

**Early Evidence of Anti-Brutality Organizing**

The earliest evidence of anti-brutality organizing that I have encountered comes from the mid-1960s. While there had been some discussion about police targeting of Indigenous people in Minneapolis throughout the early 1960s (including some modest efforts by the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union to document it), the intensity of these claims began to be been amplified considerably in the

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charged atmosphere of urban revolt that would sweep across the United States in the years that followed.

In 1967, future AIM leader George Mitchell ran as a candidate for Alderman in the Southside’s Ward 6 and made targeted policing an explicit part of his campaign. “I’ll admit that I’m a bitter man,” he acknowledged in one campaign speech, “bitter because while driving here tonight I see the same things [that] I saw ten years ago.” His pitch to Southside voters voiced concern about the deterioration of the inner city and offered a full-throated condemnation of the routinized violence of the MPD. Mitchell invited Southsiders to join him “in the belief that real law enforcement does not involve police brutality” and insisted that “a better informed community is our best protection.”

Concern about brutality was also voiced by less prominent members of the community. Southsider Marvin Needham, for example, penned an article called “Police Brutality, An American Indian Problem” and sent a draft copy to Gerald Vizenor in January 1967. Needham’s piece pulses with righteous indignation and begins by citing a number of recent beatings “administered to the Indians being arrested in the East Franklin Ave. area” as evidence that “discrimination and bigotry” were part of the MPD’s quotidian culture. “If there is any doubt in anyone’s mind about the dissimilarity in treatment of Indians and Whites, regarding arrests and their subsequent treatment in the Courts, all one has to do is sit in Court on a

62 Ibid.
Saturday or Monday morning; or take a trip to the Workhouse and see the ratio of Caucasian inmates to the Minority inmates,” he continued.

Later in 1967, Needham appeared prominently in coverage of an “Urban Indian Conference,” convened by the Mayor’s Indian American Task Force.64 One report from the conference reveals that Needham seized the opportunity to vocalize concerns about the MPD and call for the establishment of a new Indigenous group that would monitor their activities in the inner city. The article notes that Needham had drawn inspiration from an incident in the city’s Near North district, in which a group of residents (presumably African American) had actively “interceded” to thwart the arrest of a friend. He had found their commitment laudable. “I may not agree with all their methods,” Needham said, “but I admire their desire to change their way of life.”65 For our purposes here, this intervention is interesting both because it gives voice to what was certainly a broader distrust of police among Indigenous Southsiders and because it anticipates a broader politics of contestation that was yet to materialize. In calling for the establishment of an Indigenous-led police-monitoring group, he portended tactical innovations that would garner a great deal of attention with the emergence of AIM and the early iterations of its Indian Patrol in the years that followed.

*Emergence of the “Indian Patrol”*

AIM’s urban roots have often been overshadowed by the organization’s participation in a series of rural rebellions, most notably the 1973 occupation of

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64 Bernie Shellum, “Lawyer Hall Urges Indians to Be Politically Active,” *Minneapolis Tribune,* February 27, 1967.
65 Ibid.
Wounded Knee. The hyper-mediation of a series of images connected to these events – iconic photographs of small groups of rifle wielding men standing on the windswept South Dakotan plains, for example – have sometimes obscured the fact that the organization spent the first two years of its existence primarily organizing around a series of local issues, especially police violence. According to most accounts, concerns about the MPD were at the center of the group’s initial activities.

In fact, these issues were debated at the movement’s hastily organized inaugural meeting in 1968. In the days leading up to the gathering, Dennis Banks, still a relative neophyte to Southside politics, and his friend George Mitchell, a well-seasoned Twin Cities activist, had gone door to door with leaflets that read: “we need to have a meeting.”66 The expectations of the organizers were decidedly modest and they were surprised when dozens of local people responded to their call. Finding himself at the front of a much bigger than anticipated crowd, Banks recalls opening the meeting with a broad question.

People are fighting in the streets of Chicago. They’re fighting to stop the Vietnam War and bring about changes in the political party system. They’re fighting in the streets of Alabama to change the whole structure of universities. What the hell are we going to do? Are we going to sit here in Minnesota and not do a goddamn thing? Are we going to go on for another two hundred years, or even five, the way we are without doing something for our Indian people?67

According to banks, this lofty invitation was brought to ground by the intervention of a young Clyde Bellecourt who, speaking with an enthusiasm that “swept over us like a storm,” put the question of police violence at the center of the group’s discussion. In Banks’ version, Bellecourt asked: “When do you propose to go down

66 Banks and Erdoes, Ojibwa Warrior, 61.
67 Ibid., 62.
there to Franklin Avenue, to all those Indian bars where the cops inflict abuse on our people every night? ... Let’s go down there right now, tonight!”⁶⁸ While Bellecourt’s call for immediate mobilization did not materialize, it anticipated the sort of interventions that AIM would soon be making, particularly on and around East Franklin Avenue. In the formative years 1968 and 1969, especially, AIM activities were primarily driven by efforts to challenge urban challenges, including predatory landlords, labor market exclusion, and police violence, among other things.

One of AIM’s first interventions was to organize a volunteer monitoring force that would patrol the Southside streets in order observe police activity and offer help to people who needed it. These were volunteers “seeking safety for Indian people in a white world,” observes Laura Waterman Wittstock.⁶⁹ On foot and in cars painted red, a shifting cast of activists spent weekend evenings monitoring activities on the Avenue and reporting incidents back to a central command post, initially located in the basement of the American Indian Youth Center at 1304 East Franklin Avenue.⁷⁰ Armed with rudimentary equipment, some modest donations, and matching red jackets, the Indian Patrol sought to help people avoid arrest and run counter-

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⁶⁸ Ibid.
⁶⁹ Bancroft and Waterman Wittstock, We Are Still Here, 4. This interpretation is not universal amongst members of the Minneapolis Indigenous community, of course. Vizenor describes AIM’s early work: “The serious issue was police harassment, but the method of trailing police cars in expensive convertibles became an extravagant satire. The rhetoric was colonial oppression, the press coverage was excellent then, and thousands of dollars of guilt money rolled in from church groups...” See Gerald Vizenor, “Dennis of Wounded Knee,” American Indian Quarterly 2 (1983), 55.
⁷⁰ Brian Anderson, “Indian Patrol’s First Night Quit; Seeking Harassment by Police,” Minneapolis Tribune, August 25th, 1968; Banks and Erdoes, Ojibwa Warrior, 63; Cohen, “The Indian Patrol in Minneapolis.”
surveillance on the activities of police.\textsuperscript{71} AIM’s plan to monitor police was an immediate headline grabber and journalists were dispatched to observe the new organization’s activities. “The patrollers, about 20 strong and consisting of several black and whites, but primarily Indians, kept a watchful eye on E. Franklin near 14\textsuperscript{th} Avenue S., the scene of alleged police harassment of drunks,” reported the Minneapolis Tribune on the “Indian Patrol’s” inaugural night in August 1968.\textsuperscript{72}

The patrol’s first night was described as the “quietest night in 15 years,” as few police cars trawled the area and the all-too-familiar paddy wagon made only one appearance, the Tribune noted. Building on the strength of this initial success, AIM

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\textsuperscript{71} Banks, Bellecourt and Mitchell had all experienced the unevenness of the criminal justice system first hand. In Banks’ telling, his politicization and subsequent desire to build some form of organization, came from his experience in Stillwater prison, where served time for burglary between 1966 and 1968. It was here that Banks first began to develop an analysis of systemic racism, initially through a friendship that he developed with another inmate, Tom Jones.\textsuperscript{71} Through the course of their conversations Jones had encouraged Banks to pay close attention to the disproportionate number of Indigenous inmates serving time for petty crimes. As Banks remembers: “[Tom asked me], “How many people are here on capital crimes?” I said, “probably about three.” I was working in the athletic department [and] I had a clipboard to go around... [and] I'd go around asking people whether they wanted to sign up for basketball, baseball. But I was looking more for Native people and so I went through A block, B block, C block... A, B, C, D, E,... and so I knew all the Indians in there. And eventually I knew what they were in there for. We’d talk. Three people were in there for capital crimes. But the rest of them – the rest of us – they’re in there for burglary, there was ten guys they were up there for pick pocketing, cashing bad cheques... So when Tom [started] asking me... how many people were there for capital crimes I said “well, I know, Tom.” He said, “well, lets think about it.” And so all the real petty crimes was about that [gesturing large] and the felony crimes were like that [gesturing small]. The prison population was a thousand people. The number of native people was [maybe] 520, 525... We’re like not even one percent [of the broader population] and yet here we make up fifty percent of the prison population. And he was saying, “do the math, Dennis, do the math.”\textsuperscript{71} (See Dennis Banks, in discussion with the author, Federal Dam, Minnesota, July 15, 2012). For Banks, it was these realizations, coupled with a growing awareness of the upheaval occurring outside of the prison, which first fomented his political ambitions. “I would read the papers and see that demonstrations about civil rights and the Vietnam war were going on all over the country. I realized I desperately wanted to be part of a movement for Indian people,” he recalls. (See Banks and Erodes, Ojibwa Warrior, 60.) George Mitchell, Banks’ fellow leaflet-distributor and childhood friend (from the Pipestone Indian boarding school), had already had considerable political experience by the time he was helping coordinate what would become the American Indian Movement.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
voted to continue the patrol and agreed that non-Indigenous people could continue to participate. Throughout the remaining weeks of the summer and into the fall, volunteers met regularly on weekend evenings and hit the streets by 11:30 PM. The Patrol’s critical work happened during the hour that followed last call at bars on the East Franklin strip, a short stretch in which they felt there services were most needed.73 On a typical evening, the Patrol’s work oscillated between escorting people home and gathering information about the police.

As a matter of course, the Patrol recorded the details of any incident, collecting police badge and license plates numbers, alongside any other information they could glean. They felt that doing so would allow them to measure the scale of police presence in the neighborhood.74 This monitoring work had immediate results, according to some. Bellecourt describes that impact like this:

After we started our own surveillance of the police, officials here in South Mpls. and their conduct by photographing them, being there to witness the assaults, harassments, and taking down license numbers, badge numbers, etc. we started showing up in court the next day and telling people they didn’t have to plead guilty anymore to something they didn’t even know they were guilty about, a lot of these things began to stop.75

AIM activists claimed that their approach had won immediate results as the number of Indigenous arrests on the Avenue dropped dramatically. By year’s end, Patrol organizers were boasting that they had managed to go twenty-two straight weeks

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74 Cohen, “The Indian Patrol in Minneapolis”; Birong, “The Influence of Police Brutality on the American Indian Movement’s Establishment.”
75 Minnesota Human Rights Commission, Police Brutality, 15.
without any alcohol-related charges on the Avenue, though the leaders themselves faced a number of serious confrontations with police.\textsuperscript{76}

The tactics employed by the AIM patrol were not conceived in a vacuum, however, and the organization drew consciously from the lessons of other contemporary “citizen patrols.” According to Fay Cohen, who observed the first iteration of the Indian Patrol closely as part of her Ph.D. research at the University of Minnesota, AIM’s monitoring activities were inspired, in part, by a range of similar groups that were animated by the idea that local residents could do more to protect their community than the police, who were often viewed as a hostile presence.\textsuperscript{77}

In this vein, it has often been reported that the Black Panther Party (BPP), were one of AIM’s key inspirations.\textsuperscript{78} The BPP had formed two years earlier, in Oakland, California, foremost as an effort to protect local African Americans from police violence. If true, this connection further affirms Manning Marable’s observation that the “inchoate black rebellion” that spread across the United States in the decade between 1965 and 1975, both “inspired and, to a profound degree, initiated similar revolts among other American people of color,” including Indigenous groups.\textsuperscript{79} Among the various organizations forged in the crucible of that


\textsuperscript{79} Marable, \textit{Race, Reform, and Rebellion}, 155.
decade long rebellion, Marable notes, the Oakland BPP quickly emerged as the “most influential revolutionary nationalist organization in the US.”

Notably, the Panthers had also drawn inspiration from elsewhere. Founders Huey Newton and Bobby Seale modeled their efforts on the work of activists in the Southern California city of Watts that had organized an effort called the Community Alert Patrol to curb police violence against fellow African Americans, in the wake of the historic rebellion there. Building on this model, the Panthers recruited from among the ranks of Oakland’s African American ghettos, and organized armed cadres to counter-patrol the police.

The Panthers understood their work as primarily defensive and described their police-monitoring activities explicitly in those terms. For example, the seventh point of the BPP’s ten-point program, *What We Believe*, codified this ambition explicitly. “We believe we can end police brutality in our black community by organizing black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending our black community from racist police oppression and brutality.” For the Panthers, self-defense often entailed being heavily armed. Newton, for one, took pains to be up to date on local and state gun laws and would routinely conduct patrol activities with a shotgun in hand.

Yet in AIM’s early years, while the organization remained primarily grounded in the urban politics of the Twin Cities, conspicuous display of weaponry

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80 Ibid., 123.
83 Marable, *Race, Reform, and Rebellion*, 107.
was not part of their initial aesthetic. “I rejected violence and some of the methods involving force adopted by the Panthers,” wrote Banks in his memoir, “but I knew AIM would do what we had to do to achieve our ends.”  

Indeed, Banks and others invoked the specter of militancy from the very beginning. He was quoted at length to this effect in a *Pioneer* article published in the fall of 1968. “I don’t believe in violence, but I do believe in a form of militancy… to be effective as an organized group... we will probably have to come to the brink of rioting.”

Interestingly, there are a number of historical and biographical dimensions that link Minneapolis AIM and the Oakland BPP in interesting ways. In the first place, both were urban movements that emerged out of populations that, for the most part, were composed of relatively recent arrivals to the urban environments in which they organized. As Curtis Austin has observed of the Panthers, all of the organization’s early leaders were “recent transplants” from the American South. While their parents had left Dixie for California in search of “a better life,” they had encountered “more of the same” in the ghettos of Oakland. In this context of renewed frustration and hardship, the young radicals “concluded their forebears had fought the good fight but had used the wrong tools,” and turned to militancy as a tactic to challenge the persistence of African American oppression. Similarly, many of the young radicals that would form AIM and other political organizations in the Twin Cities, had arrived in Minneapolis from either the economic hardship of depressed reservation economies or Indian Boarding Schools throughout the Upper

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84 Banks and Erodes, *Ojibwa Warrior*, 63.
86 Austin, *Up Against the Wall*, 26.
Midwest. Many of the migrants who had come to the Twin Cities in the decades that followed the war, encountered a new range of difficulties upon arrival. Those that formed AIM interpreted the pervasiveness of these difficulties as a function of racist oppression, and sought to forge a political movement capable of challenging its persistence. In both cases, too, the organization’s founders had become intimately acquainted with the coercive arm of the state. The Panthers had been motivated by the omnipresent violence of the Oakland PD and the experience of coming of age in an environment where a predominantly white police force patrolled the African American ghettos with an aggressive zeal. AIM leadership, moreover, had for the most part encountered state coercion through their experiences of the criminal justice system, Indian Boarding Schools, and MPD practices on the streets of South Minneapolis.

Yet while the influence of the Oakland Panthers is often cited as the central outside inspiration for AIM’s police-monitoring activities, far less attention has been paid to the influence of local African American activism. The history of African American revolt in the Twin Cities has often been played down, yet both the degree of its intensity, and its influence on other movements, are of considerable significance. The rage of inner-city African American youth was expressed most dramatically in the summers of 1966 and 1967, when two “disturbances” on the Northside’s Plymouth Avenue gave Minneapolis a small taste of the fiery

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87 For an example of research that emphasizes the centrality of the BPP’s influence on AIM, see D’Arcus, “The Urban Geography of Red Power,” 1250.
fightbacks that had engulfed other northern cities in the period.\textsuperscript{89} The municipal response to the disturbances has sometimes been seen as comparatively enlightened, particularly the de-escalatory approach that Mayor Natfalin took in the face of considerable police pressure to respond aggressively, but mistrust of law enforcement remained widespread.\textsuperscript{90} In the aftermath of both disturbances, informal patrols seeking to ensure peace emerged from amongst the African American community. While the police had initially opposed these patrols, they would later win their endorsement (although that relationship would eventually deteriorate). In the tense aftermath of the assassination of Martin Luther King, in April of 1968, for example, these and other community members took to the streets calling themselves “Black Patrols” and “Citizens’ Patrol Groups” and were successful both at de-escalating tensions \textit{and} encouraging police to reduce their presence in the neighborhood.\textsuperscript{91}

The impact of the Black Patrol was not lost on those organizing the Indian Patrol, and some members of the latter felt that the “roughest officers” had begun to avoid the Northside precisely because of this new form of community oversight.\textsuperscript{92} Those same officers, they felt, were now “trooping into the Indian neighborhood” instead. Banks’ was explicit that the Black Patrols had been an inspiration. “The negroes got rid of that sort of thing [police harassment] on Plymouth Av. with their patrol, and we’re going to have to do the same thing,” he told the \textit{Tribune} as the

\textsuperscript{89} For an interesting analysis of these revolts, see Gerald Vizenor, “1966: ‘Plymouth Avenue is Going to Burn’,” \textit{Twin Citian Magazine}, October 1966, 20-21.


\textsuperscript{91} Cohen, \textit{The Indian Patrol in Minneapolis}, 190–193.

\textsuperscript{92} Cohen, “The Indian Patrol in Minneapolis,” 781.
Indian Patrol was first preparing to hit the streets. “The only way to get any action is by a show of force,” he added.

For all their militancy, however, AIM maintained relationships with a number of liberal organizations and officials, secured funds from a range of anti-poverty bureaucracies and were adept at navigating connections with a number of corporate benefactors, particularly in their first two years. Groups like the Minnesota LWV maintained a posture of cautious support for AIM and offered modest assistance at various junctures, as I argue above. Meanwhile, Minneapolis AIM also managed to secure some financial support for its various activities from both private and public sources, including a series of Twin Cities churches and foundations, as well as federal anti-poverty funds that flowed through the Office of Economic Opportunity. Additionally, a number of AIM leaders managed to secure leave from their employers in order to pursue their community activism. In the relatively progressive atmosphere of ascendant Civil Rights activism, Clyde Bellecourt managed to secure secondment from Northern States Power Company to pursue AIM activities, for example.

In spite of these rather conventional ties, however, AIM’s approach to the MPD was often openly oppositional. AIM leadership tended to view police as hostile force, an “arm of the White establishment,” according to Cohen. The earliest issues of AIM’s community newsletter reflect this position in a characteristically brash tone. Indeed, one of the publication’s core functions was to recount incidents of police

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93 Edmonds, “Indians to Patrol Franklin.”
94 Matthiessen, In the Spirit of Crazy Horse, 36.
95 Clyde Bellecourt, in discussion with author, Minneapolis, Minnesota, May 15, 2012.
96 Cohen, “The Indian Patrol in Minneapolis,” 49.
brutality, often while naming names. Consider the following account of the arrest of one the AIM comrades in the early 1970s:

Richard C. Johnson, the arresting “COP” is evidently a high-strung and sick young COP. He must feel that with a badge and the law behind him that he can do no wrong. He took it upon his own to incur punishment while doing his so called duty. [AIM activist] Mr. Obrien was hit with a closed fist twice in the stomach and had his head banged on the squad car door simply because he asked a question and because he is an INDIAN. Mr. [Clyde] Bellecourt was also a victim of his brutality. He merely told Johnson that there was no reason to treat O’Brien in the manner he was doing....Bellecourt was handcuffed and taken to a squad car. He was put in the backseat and Johnson got in with him. All the way to the Courthouse or Jailhouse, he was harassed by Johnson. Also, the Cop continually twisted and jerked the handcuff’s [sic] on Bellecourt’s wrists until they were raw, cut, and bleeding. Bellecourt was not informed of what he was being arrested for until he was completely booked downtown.97

After recounting this incident, the writer makes explicit that he believed it was Bellecourt’s status as an Indigenous person that had prompted the officer to treat him with such contempt. “Other citizens are told what they are being arrested for and do not receive this treatment... why do we always have to remind the great white society that we are human beings,” he asked.

In these early years, AIM showed remarkable skill at channeling moments of crisis to contest broader patterns of police aggressiveness. For example, by politicizing a range of confrontational incidents that occurred between the police and AIM activists in 1969, the organization effectively forced the MPD to respond to their accusations. That spring, Police Chief Donald Dwyer attended an AIM organized public meeting in which more than two hundred people attended to voice

their grievances with law enforcement. Cohen observed the meeting and described the scene:

[Bellecourt] led the meeting. He asked people to sign a list if they had been treated unfairly, so that they could be called upon to give “open testimony.” Then he described his recent encounters with police and showed slides of his bruised and abraded wrists. He accused police of an “escalation of war against Indian people”, [Bellecourt’s] testimony was followed by other accusations: that police beat Indians; that police ridiculed Indians; that police invaded Indian homes. Police were said to ignore Indian requests for help. Nothing was done to meet Indian needs, said one woman, “because we’ve got Brown faces... you’ve got to be an affluent White or a Black militant to get anything done.” The crowd cheered in agreement with her.98

Though Dwyer rejected Bellecourt’s view that police actions were an “escalation of war against Indian people” he did dutifully “write down specifics” and seem “conciliatory and concerned.”99 Through this and more subtle moments, the MPD was increasingly forced to acknowledge that’s routinized aggressiveness on the Southside was the source of considerable community anxiety.

**Politicizing Routinized Brutality**

The duration of the first iteration of the “Indian Patrol” was relatively short lived and probably only had a limited impact on reducing police aggressiveness in the decades that followed 1968. What it did do, however, was provide an organizational vehicle to express outrage at MPD treatment of Indigenous people. While the sense that Indigenous urbanites were both “under” and “over” policed certainly predates the Patrol, what these monitoring efforts did was channel that longstanding “sense of grievance” into an organizational form capable of capturing both Indigenous and non-Indigenous attention. In this sense, AIM patrollers and

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98 Cohen, “The Indian Patrol in Minneapolis,” 71.
99 Ibid.
other activists contributed to a larger process of contestation that worked to redefine Indigenous insecurity as a contested issue in the inner city. In doing so, they politicized the routinized brutality of racialized policing. By communicating the pervasiveness of aggressive policing in a mediagenic form, AIM activists were instrumental in denaturalizing its occurrence for non-Indigenous audiences. Whereas dominant interpretations often relied on narratives of migratory trauma, community disorganization, and the pervasiveness of alcoholism to explain why Indigenous Minnesotans were so disproportionately entangled with the criminal justice system, the Patrol sought to tell a different story. At the very least, this had the effect of implicating institutions of the state as partly culpable for the disproportionate criminalization and policing of Indigenous urbanites and worked to erode the potency of the cultural explanations listed above. It is critical to note, however, that Vizenor takes a decidedly different view. He argues that AIM’s media profile effectively “created the heroes of confrontation for an imaginative white audience” while those dedicated to less mediagenic forms of institutional negotiation were largely ignored.\footnote{Vizenor, “Dennis of Wounded Knee,” 55.} In spite of such critiques, the activities of the “Indian Patrol,” however flawed, were at the very least an occasion in which the aggressiveness of the MPD could enter a broad public discussion.\footnote{Vizenor, Crossbloods, 160.}

### 6.5 Summary

This chapter builds on the diverse evidentiary record that demonstrates that Indigenous people were disproportionately targeted by aggressive policing on the Southside of Minneapolis in the decades that followed the war by arguing that these
practices were part of a broader culture of “racialized policing.” Building on Comack’s analysis, I have argued that to make sense of this history we need to look beyond the troubling behavior of individual officers and consider how aggressive group-differentiated policing articulates within a broader cultural context of dominance. Accordingly, I have tried to show that police violence is intimately connected to the reproduction of particular kinds of “knowledge” about Indigenous people has operated to render their disproportionate entanglement with the criminal justice apparatus understandable, tolerable, and even natural to certain publics. I also argue that this “knowledge” serves an exculpatory function by operating to render Indigenous people as the authors of their own misfortune. But I have also tried to show that this cultural “knowledge” is always contested and that key moments of Indigenous political organizing have operated to interrupt its potency. To make this case, I have suggested that the interventions of the Indian Patrol, in particular, went some way in countering this knowledge by dramatizing the targeting of Indigenous people rather than seek answers in the individual shortcomings of those caught up in the criminal justice system. In sum, their presence in the media and on the streets communicated the inadequacy of “commonsense” thinking that understood Indigenous Southsiders as legitimate targets for aggressive policing, working to politicize that targeting by denaturalizing its legitimacy.
Chapter 7 Imperial Intersections: American Violence at Home and Abroad

7.1 Introduction

Minneapolis has long been touted as one of the most “progressive” cities in the United States. Its longstanding association with the center-left of the Democratic Party (particularly through the personages of Hubert Humphrey, Walter Mondale, Paul Wellstone, and Keith Ellison) has been instrumental in consolidating this reputation. So too has its impressive performance in a series of informal national studies through which it has been deemed the “gayest city in America,” the “most literate city in America,” and “America’s best bike city.”¹ In recent years, these and other accolades have shored up the city’s progressive bona fides and ensured that it is nearly always included alongside Portland, Seattle, and Denver in listing exercises that identify American oases of livability, tolerance, and liberal enlightenment. Local promotional material often taps this reputation for openness, citing, for example, the city’s “vibrant” LGBT scene and ethnic diversity as sources of local pride and as amenities to be enjoyed by visitors.² Notably, this atmosphere is also routinely identified as a key asset in the intra-urban competition to attract mobile capital and grow local prosperity. Recently, urban “guru” Richard Florida included Minneapolis on an updated list of twenty US metropolitan areas best


positioned to capture and retain the so-called “creative class.”  Florida’s study cites “innovation, high technology, and tolerance for racial, ethnic and social diversity” as the key ingredients in the city’s strong performance.

There are, however, a number of problems with this rosy assessment and for our present purposes I want to identify and dwell on two of them. The first is that presenting the Twin Cities as a harmonious place, where a climate of tolerance for “racial, ethnic and social diversity” prevail, obscures a long and enduring history of urban racism and group-differentiated inequity. Distinct patterns of marginalization have long shaped the lived experiences of the city’s racialized populations, as the preceding chapters have shown, but recent analyses also suggest that they continue. Responding to an Atlantic article that characterized Minneapolis as a final redoubt of the “American Dream,” Jessica Nickrand countered that the benefits of the city’s contemporary economic buoyancy are far from evenly shared with local people of colour. Indigenous residents of the Twin Cities continue to cope with many of the problems cited above, not least a crisis of economic hardship that directly effects nearly half of the local population. Moreover, a recent study demonstrates that “foreign-born” headed families in Minnesota are three times more likely to live in poverty than the non-immigrant population, nearly half of all female-headed “foreign-born” households subsist beneath the official poverty line, and nearly

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3 Ibid.
twenty percent of “foreign-born” adults over sixty-five do too.\(^6\) Other research demonstrates that the urban region’s African American population also suffers disproportionately from endemic poverty and social exclusion. The gap between black and white employment rates is larger in the Twin Cities than any other metropolitan area in the country.\(^7\) Meanwhile, the local African American population was devastated by the recent subprime mortgage crisis; even “high income blacks” were nearly four times more likely to receive subprime financing than “low income whites.”\(^8\) And recent data suggests that Minnesota arrests and incarcerates African American males at a higher rate higher than any other state in the nation.\(^9\)

The second problem is that presenting Minneapolis as a place of cosmopolitan prosperity obscures the degree to which such circumstances are achieved at the expense of other places. Stefan Kipfer and Kanishka Goonewardena remind us that to understand Western cities as endogenous producers of prosperity is to ignore the degree to which “economic and ecological parasitism, forms of socio-political

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\(^6\) Minneapolis Foundation, *A New Age of Immigrants: Making Immigration Work For Minnesota* (Minneapolis: Minneapolis Foundation, 2010).


\(^9\) David Vassar Taylor, *African Americans in Minnesota* (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 2002), 80. As in other American cities, the view that police consistently target black men with unwarranted stops has been a source of considerable political tension in Minneapolis. In recent months, local activists organizing under the banner Black Lives Matter have drawn attention to municipal ordinances that criminalize conduct such as “lurking, loitering and spitting on sidewalks,” which they say are consistently employed to “profile, cite, and harass people of color.” See Black Lives Matter Minneapolis Facebook Page, accessed January 2015, https://www.facebook.com/BlackLivesMatterMinneapolis.
exclusion... and a dependence of commercial exchange on militarism, imperial expansion, and other forms of primitive accumulation,” are all “formative” dimensions of their urban past and present. In other words, the economic strength of Western cities is not produced in isolation. As we shall see, Minneapolis’ economic prowess and status as a lauded “arrival city” for migrant populations are closely linked to a series of transnational relationships that complicate the city’s “progressive” characterization. Geographers have long demonstrated that local environments are relationally produced, that places “are what they are” partly “as a result of and present participation in relations with elsewhere,” as Doreen Massey puts it. While there is undoubtedly a number of ways that these connections could be explored in the context of Minneapolis, I am particularly interested in the ways that the city’s prosperity and diversity are linked to a distinctly American political economy of violence.

If we weigh these two problems against the celebratory accounts that I began with then we are confronted with a thorny contradiction. On the one hand, we encounter Minneapolis as a place that is rich in diversity and prosperity, a place of economic buoyancy animated by a prevailing spirit of cooperation, tolerance, and interpersonal decency. On the other, we encounter Minneapolis as a city acutely divided along ethnic and “racial” lines, a place in which opportunity, security, and prosperity are far from universally shared.

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In describing this as a contradiction, however, my aim is not to suggest that these two interpretations are “so totally at odds that both cannot possibly be true,” as the most common use of that term would suggest.\textsuperscript{12} Rather, I have in mind something closer to a Marxian use of the term to describe a situation in which two “seemingly opposed forces are simultaneously present.”\textsuperscript{13} In this usage, oppositional forces need not cancel each other out. They can exist simultaneously in a given milieu. This form of contradiction better captures the context that concerns us here, I think, because Minneapolis is a place where two realities persist alongside each other. In many ways, the city simultaneously exhibits tendencies that are progressive and regressive, tolerant and exclusionary, cohesive and divisive. Yet these oppositional tendencies do not merely co-exist. They are also often organically linked to one another. In this chapter, I argue that the forces that produce genuine forms of prosperity, abundance, cohesion, and tolerance, are relationally connected to the forces that produce marginality, exclusion and even death, at home and abroad.

Though nationalist dogmas have long cited universal “liberty” as the great source of American prosperity, such claims almost always obscure the “machinery of enforcement” that sustains the economic prowess of the United States. The immensely disproportionate consolidation of wealth and privilege in the industrialized “core” in general, and the United States in particular, has a long imperial history, of course, but the ways in which that domination has been articulated in the wake of the Second World War is considerably different. In this

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 1.
period, the United States emerged as the world’s most powerful economic force and preeminent military power, but unlike its predecessors, the American state has sought to consolidate and sustain its hegemonic position by promoting a “fully global capitalism” and “coordinating its management,” rather than by ruling foreign polities directly.\(^\text{14}\) This strategy has allowed the American state to play a “vital role” in “superintending capitalism on a worldwide plane,” without the burden of administering a formal colonial network.\(^\text{15}\)

This does not mean, however, that the postwar defense of American hegemony has been achieved peacefully. Since 1945, American military spending has grown to epic proportions. In 2011, for example, American taxpayers invested more than $700 billion USD in their military, a sum greater than the next thirteen countries combined.\(^\text{16}\) And these have not been idle investments. Since the close of the Second World War, the American state has deployed military force in an enormous range of formal and informal conflicts in nearly every corner of the world. While such interventions have often been justified through an official rhetoric of democratization and humanitarian intervention, William Blum argues that they have nearly always been motivated by a series of self-interested guiding imperatives, including “making the world open and hospitable for [economic] globalization,” bolstering the success of American defense contractors, “preventing the rise of any society that might serve as a successful example of an alternative to the capitalist model,” “extending political, economic and military hegemony over as

\(^\text{15}\) Ibid., 1.
much of the globe as possible, to prevent the rise of any regional power that might challenge American supremacy,” and creating “a world in America’s image, as befits the world’s only superpower.”\textsuperscript{17}

The strength of postwar American capitalism is inseparable from the violence that has been deployed to achieve these ends. The United States’ status as the richest society in the history of the world cannot be decoupled from the routine use of state violence. Indeed, American violence is at the center of the policies and practices that have operated to secure capital flows and facilitate the integration of ever-greater stretches of the earth into a now “fully global” capitalism. In Minneapolis and elsewhere, this not an abstract point. Local corporate enterprises that form the core of the Twin Cities economy, from retail giants like Target and Best Buy, to technology manufacturers like Honeywell and 3M, owe their spectacular strength to the benefits born of American-led economic globalization.

The ethnic and cultural diversity of the Twin Cities and other American urban regions is also intimately linked to the international interventions of the American state. While there is undoubtedly some truth to the oft-repeated cliché that migrants come to the United States and other industrialized countries in order to “seek a better life,” the question of why people need to leave their homes to find that “better life” is often left unexamined. The broader social and political context that precipitates migration often lacks in mainstream analyses of “arrival cities.” Thus to include this basic fact in our analyses of multicultural Western urbanisms is to complicate what is at stake in uncritical celebrations of diversity and tolerance.

In this chapter, I investigate these themes in the context of the Phillips neighborhood. What I intend to make clear is that the production of this and other Twin Cities neighborhoods is intimately linked to economies of state violence. Writing against celebratory accounts that describe the city as a desirable mix of economic opportunity, political enlightenment, and cultural diversity, I demonstrate that the forces that ensure that these sources of local pride persist are relationally connected to forces that are the source of immense suffering and displacement.

To do so, I look at two discrete ways that state violence has shaped life in the neighborhood. I begin by examining the activities of one neighborhood-based defense contractor and argue that its efforts to employ a small number of “hard to employ” Indigenous residents in the production of “anti-personnel” landmines is indicative of a certain cruel irony. Namely, that members of a group so intimately acquainted with the deleterious effects of state violence (and so disproportionately excluded from the spoils of American prosperity), would be enlisted to produce instruments aimed explicitly at perpetuating that violence (and doing so for wages that keep that prosperity out of reach). Building on this argument, I then consider a broader series of connections between Phillips residents and the projection of American military violence. Here, I consider why three migrant groups came to Minneapolis in the postwar period, settling (at least initially) in the Phillips neighborhood (Indigenous people from rural and reservation communities in the United States, Hmong people from Laos and other parts of Southeast Asia, and Somali people from refugee camps in Kenya or directly from Somalia itself). I argue that what these groups have in common is that their collective presence in South Minneapolis is intimately bound up with broader histories of American state
violence. My core objective here is to trouble the idea that the effects of this violence are only experienced in far away theaters of war or domestic sites of military coordination, in Baghdad or Fort Hood, for example, and to concretely demonstrate that they also articulate in “banal geographies of neo-imperialism” like Minneapolis.\textsuperscript{18} Mine is an attempt to show that both the benefits and the injuries of American violence coexist in the contradictory confines of this “progressive” urban environment. In keeping with the broader objectives of this dissertation, I am also keen to show some of the ways in which the colonial relation articulates alongside, and intersects with, other forms of domination.

7.2 “Building Better Lives with Land Mines”

My suggestion that the social, cultural and economic life of the Phillips neighborhood is intimately linked to a broader economy of American state violence is not abstract. While I make this case in a number of ways throughout the course of this chapter, I want to begin by considering a series of events connected to the neighborhood’s most notable corporate resident, the Honeywell Corporation. In particular, I am keen to consider the implications of a program through which Honeywell indirectly employed a small number of neighborhood residents – most of whom were “hard to employ” Indigenous people - to manufacture parts of its “anti-personnel” land mine cluster munitions.\textsuperscript{19}

Honeywell International’s present status as a global technology giant and stalwart in the top quintile of the Fortune 500 belies its humble beginnings. The


corporation was born in the early twentieth century out a merger between two relatively modest midwestern temperature control firms, the Electric Heat Regulator Corporation of Minneapolis and the Honeywell Corporation of Wabash, Indiana. On the eve of the Great Depression, the two firms consolidated their interests as Honeywell Minneapolis and the new entity chose Minnesota as its permanent home. In 1927, the new enterprise set to work on the construction of a substantial inner-city headquarters on a vacant lot that would come to “anchor” the western portion of the present-day Phillips neighborhood. From these modest beginnings, the corporation set out on a meteoric ascent from regional to global dominance, becoming the world leader in residential and industrial temperature control technologies by the mid twentieth century.

The outbreak of the Second World War allowed Honeywell to expand and diversify its activities. In particular, wartime mobilization emboldened the corporation to pursue lucrative interests in aerospace and weapons manufacturing. In short order, Honeywell emerged as a significant supplier of military equipment and technologies to various branches of the American defense establishment. In the decades that followed 1945, it began to develop and supply a range of destructive instruments, including large and small caliber tank ammunitions, torpedoes, artillery shells, and land mines, such as the Area Denial Artillery Munition (ADAM) and the Remote Anti-Armor Mine (RAAM), among others. Additionally, it began to develop guidance technologies for weapons with immense destructive capacity,

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20 Wizard Marks, “Honeywell: From the Damper Flapper to a Corporate Giant in 105 Years,” The Alley, July 1990, 10-11.
21 Ibid., 10-11.
including intercontinental nuclear ballistic missiles such as Boeing's Minuteman and Northrop's MX.

In Minneapolis, Honeywell's weapons work gradually became a source of local controversy. Indeed, the corporation emerged as the primary target of the Twin Cities’ significant peace, disarmament, and anti-war movements from the Vietnam-era through the 1990s. As war raged in South East Asia in the 1960s, “dinner parties in certain Minneapolis neighborhoods were always at risk of being ground to a halt by guests who would produce a mock-up of [Honeywell’s] fragmentation device and patiently explain the damage it inflicts on humans,” write Paul Chaat Smith and Robert Warrior.22

For Twin Cities organizers, Honeywell was a local symbol of the perverse proximity between the interests of corporate America and what they perceived to be the morally dubious deployment of state violence in the Cold War era. In 1968, local New Left leader Marv Davidov and a number of allies formed the Honeywell Project (HP) in an ultimately unsuccessful effort to encourage the corporation and other defense contractors to convert to peaceful production while protecting local jobs. Over the course of several decades, Davidov and others engaged in a diverse range of tactics aimed at impugning the reputations of Honeywell and other local firms. While the corporation’s involvement with nuclear weapons remained the primary grievance, activists often also pointed to the devastation reaped by its land mine cluster munitions as well. By the 1980s, HP was in coalition with a wide range of anti-militarist and disarmament groups, including Clergy and Laity Concerned, Educators for Social Responsibility, Friends for a Non-Violent World, Minnesota

22 Smith and Warrior, Like a Hurricane, 130.

Building on the strength of the local movement, HP led a diverse range of large-scale nonviolent civil-disobedience demonstrations that targeted the corporation’s headquarters in the Phillips neighborhood. These events ranged in size and influence over the course of the decades but at certain points they were very effective at capturing significant local attention. The latter was particularly true when days of action lead to mass arrests. In 1986, for example, nearly 140 demonstrators were detained outside of Honeywell’s annual shareholders meeting, including the spouse of MPD Chief Tony Bouza.23

Honeywell took these public relations challenges very seriously and actively sought to defend its reputation as a responsible and positive force in the Twin Cities. In response to the large-scale protests visited upon Honeywell’s corporate headquarters throughout the 1980s, executives and their spokespeople routinely echoed President Reagan’s view that military strength was the best means of ensuring peace. In one case, they responded to a mass demonstration by releasing a statement reminding the public that Honeywell’s employees also “deplore war,” insisting that they too were “working to assure peace by meeting the U.S. public

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preference for a strong defense.”

The corporation’s PR strategies were not merely reactive, however, and Honeywell made substantial investments in a diverse range of community education programs to demonstrate its apparent commitment to a world without war. In one case, for example, it provided most of the $240,000 operating budget of an initiative called “Prospects for Peacemaking” in which a coalition of groups that included the Minnesota LWV and the Humphrey Institute at the University of Minnesota hosted a series of public discussions about nuclear weapons.

Honeywell’s charitable and community investments extended well beyond efforts to mitigate its association with nuclear weaponry, however. Indeed, the corporation has sometimes been described as the driving force behind Minnesota’s national reputation as “a place where business demonstrates social concern.” Consistently, Honeywell did not merely seal itself off from the increasingly impoverished neighborhood that surrounded its headquarters and consistently made commitments to invest in the social and economic wellbeing of Phillips. In 1957, the charitable Honeywell Foundation was established with the explicit intention of improving life in the neighborhood. Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, it endowed a diverse range of initiatives in the district, including crime prevention programs, career training services, improvements in the built

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24 Ibid., B1.
26 Inskip, “Business Executives Look For Ways to Help the Hard-to-Employ.”
environment, and even an alternative high school for teen-age mothers that operated out of a building on its corporate campus.\textsuperscript{27}

The corporation also established a reputation for being actively concerned with the economic marginality of the neighborhood’s ever-growing Indigenous population. In the 1960s, for example, Honeywell empowered future AIM leader Dennis Banks to actively recruit Indigenous employees. As Smith and Warrior put it, “Honeywell seemed to like both Indians in general and Dennis Banks specifically” and the latter managed to recruit more than four hundred new employees during the course of his tenure with Honeywell.\textsuperscript{28} Banks was also granted a paid leave of absence in 1968 in order to pursue his organizing work among the Twin Cities Indigenous community. While away from the job, however, Banks apparently had a change of heart and decided that he was no longer interested in recruiting for a weapons manufacturer.\textsuperscript{29} In hindsight, he felt that Honeywell’s generosity was contingent on cooperation and noted that “once you turn around and start criticizing them and biting the hand that feeds you… they’re not going to give you anymore.”\textsuperscript{30} Severing ties with Banks did not mark the end of Honeywell’s engagement with the urban Indigenous community, however. While direct recruiting waned considerably in the years that followed Banks’ departure, the corporation continued to provide some modest forms of support to neighborhood jobseekers.

One such initiative is of particular importance for our purposes here. In the early 1980s, a number of Honeywell executives pledged early support for a nonprofit

\textsuperscript{28} Smith and Warrior, \textit{Like a Hurricane}, 130.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 130.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 130.
industrial services enterprise called Phillips Works, which had a mandate to help “hard to employ” neighborhood residents earn a livelihood. The vast majority of those that would eventually come to work at Phillips Works were Indigenous, and nearly all were heads of households that had been without work for more than a year. With the help of Honeywell, the Dayton Hudson Corporation, the Minneapolis Foundation and a series of community funders, Phillips Works was able to marshal the resources, equipment, and technical assistance necessary to get their operation off the ground. Starting as a small-scale bindery operation, the enterprise built on early success and soon expanded the scope of its activities to include light forms of manufacturing and assembly. As momentum accumulated, the enterprise adopted a for-profit model and continued to expand while maintaining its preference for employees that had difficulty finding work elsewhere. Within five years, Phillips Works had outgrown its initial worksite and began making plans to relocate to a much larger space in an East Franklin Avenue facility, newly built and operated by the American Indian Business Development Corporation (AIBDC). According to Phillips Works’ leadership, none of this would have been possible without Honeywell’s considerable support. In particular, the corporation was praised for outsourcing a series of manufacturing contracts that now formed the core of the community enterprise’s growing activities. “Our business would not have happened without Honeywell,” one of Phillips Works principals told the Star-Tribune at the height of the organization’s expansion.

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32 Ibid., A15.
33 Ibid., A15.
In spite of these auspicious beginnings, however, Phillips Works’ connection to Honeywell soon became a source of considerable local controversy. In 1986, several news outlets revealed that the company’s manufacturing division (Light Manufacturing) was involved in the production of two of Honeywell’s most reviled weapons, ADAM and RAAM. Sheila Hegna, President and part owner of Light Manufacturing, acknowledged that the division’s work included the inspection of a 3 by 5 inch metal component of an anti-personnel mine and the recycling of plastic tubes related to other weapons work but noted that the company did not handle any explosives. More than half of Light Manufacturing’s annual revenues came from Honeywell contracts, she acknowledged, stressing that the promise of future defense work was a critical means of establishing needed credibility with financial institutions. “Banks like military contracts,” Hegna told the *Star-Tribune*, “… they know those payments come in and they’re fairly secure. Those contracts pay on a regular basis.”

These revelations precipitated something of a local uproar. Phillips Works had won initial praise as a difference maker but was now linked to the production of one of Honeywell’s most dubious product lines. By the spring of 1987, the association was already threatening to translate into real consequences. Jim Heltzer, Executive Director of the Minneapolis Community Development Agency, was one of the first public officials to trouble these connections. Light Manufacturing was slated to occupy more than half of a building in which the city had invested $1.7 million USD as part of its inner-city economic development efforts and Heltzer worried that it

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might be inappropriate to use public money slated for inner city development to subsidize weapons work.\textsuperscript{36}

Publicly mediated opinion on the matter seemed to break into two broad camps. Those that felt Heltzer's concerns were misplaced cited a number of reasons why Phillips Works should continue to receive public support, in spite of their connections to Honeywell. Most of the arguments raised in support of this position were neatly summed up in a \textit{Star-Tribune} editorial that sought to demonstrate why Heltzer's objections were straightforwardly “mistaken.”\textsuperscript{37} “Both Honeywell and the Phillips company are engaged in work that is legal and honorable, even if considered immoral by a portion of the community.” Municipal authorities have an obligation to do everything in their power to bring needed jobs to a downtrodden neighborhood, they continued. Moreover, the community enterprise’s efforts were providing key opportunities for low-income people to edify themselves through meaningful work, the editors felt. “Helping Phillips Works Light Manufacturing would give only slight aid to Honeywell and the Pentagon,” but “far greater benefit would flow to a blighted area of the city and to low-income Minneapolis residents seeking to improve their lives through work.”\textsuperscript{38} They also argued that there was a local precedent for such subsidies, citing previous rounds of municipal investment in the “research” activities of Honeywell and the FMC Corporation. “Declining to help the Phillips firm, especially after aiding FMC and Honeywell, would convey an unfortunate double standard: Workers with higher incomes and better educations can benefit from

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., B1.  
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., A18.}
defense contracts, occasionally with city assistance, but low-income people do not deserve the same.”

Those that questioned the desirability of municipal support for Light Manufacturing’s weapons work made a number of compelling counter points. In the first place, they contested the view that Honeywell’s landmine work was in any way “honorable.” Twin Cities journalist Mordecai Specktor reminded readers of the Star-Tribune that “Honeywell’s cluster bombs have killed and maimed civilians in Southeast Asia and Lebanon.” He noted that locally built landmines could soon be used again, perhaps in ongoing conflicts in Central America. It was thus entirely plausible, he continued, that a weapon produced by “poor Minnesotans” would wind up being employed to maim or kill “poor Salvadorans or Guatemalans” in the not so distant future. In the words of one Star-Tribune reader, this was precisely the “Faustian bargain” being offered to “hard to employ” Phillips workers.

Critical voices also raised questions about Honeywell’s motivations. As Specktor pointed out, the corporation had long been the target of “mass protests” and was in need of avenues that would allow it to “maintain a positive face in the

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39 Ibid., A18.
41 It is worth noting that the various “counterinsurgency” programs carried out and supported by the American state during the 1980s were the source of considerable controversy among some Indigenous radicals in the United States, particularly in the American Indian Movement. Opinion was split over the Nicaraguan revolution. Some argued that the Sandinistas posed a serious threat to the survival and wellbeing of the Miskito peoples while others supported the revolution’s toppling of the Somoza regime and its American backers. See Audra Simpson and Andrea Smith, Theorizing Native Studies (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2014, 17-18; Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, Blood on the Border: A Memoir of the Contra War (Cambridge: South End Press, 2005).
Thus these investments were part of a shrewd ploy to entangle “murderous profits” with the “misfortune of jobless inner-city residents.” Moreover, this was a moment when the Reagan administration and its congressional allies were pursuing major new investments in military research and exacting painful retrenchments of the existing social infrastructure. Specktor argued that Honeywell was playing on this dynamic. “While peace activists argue that federal military spending forces cuts in social programs,” he argued, “Honeywell is able to present a façade of social concern by creating jobs in the four- to eight-dollar range for several dozen indigent Phillips residents.” There must be a “better choice” than “working on “weapons of war or going without,” he concluded, and future discussions on the matter need to be conducted “with sensitivity towards those caught in the middle.”

In making these points, critics of Honeywell’s entanglements with Phillips Works went some way in pointing to the fundamental inequity at the heart of this controversy. They rightly observed that Honeywell was acting from a position of considerable strength, seeing an opportunity to cloak its reviled weapons work in a mantle of community assistance. While this was surely not the corporation’s only motivation, it was undoubtedly part of what drove their investments in Phillips Works and the neighborhood more generally.

In this context, it is worth remembering that the corporation’s landmine work was very profitable. Between 1985 and 1995, Honeywell and its spinoff enterprise

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Alliant Techsystems (now ATK) won Department of Defense landmine contracts worth more than $336 million USD. Thus while Honeywell executives and workers may well have “deplore[d] war” and military violence, they were also quite clearly the immediate beneficiaries of it. As Honeywell’s critics pointed out, those making decisions at the corporation had a very different set of interests than those working on landmine production for Phillips Works. Indeed, those forced to make the “Faustian bargain” on an inner-city production line were motivated by an entirely different set of factors than their counterparts in Honeywell boardrooms and policy circles charged with military decision making. Against the clichéd idea of a shared national “interest,” the Phillips Works controversy reminds us that the spoils and suffering of American state violence are far from equally distributed.

What these critics did not articulate, however, was the way in which a longer history of violence was also at the center of this controversy. As I have tried to demonstrate throughout this dissertation, if we are interested in understanding Indigenous marginalization in Phillips we need to extend our analyses beyond immediate economic circumstances. Doing so demands that we account for the ways in which contemporary suffering is linked to the longstanding hierarchical politics of the colonial relation. The preponderance of Indigenous suffering in this neighborhood at this time can and must be connected to the long history of racialized domination through which material security, prosperity and political freedom were disproportionately funneled to settler Americans and denied to Indigenous people. This, fundamentally, is the contextual backdrop of the “Faustian bargain” that

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Phillips Works employees were forced to make. Importantly, Honeywell's support did not merely create opportunities for a group of “poor” people. Rather, it did so for a group “poor” people with a particular relationship to the deployment of state violence, a group of people whose economic marginality is inseparable from a distinct pattern of dispossession that left Indigenous communities largely outside of the immense prosperity of settler society. The cruel irony here, is that Honeywell’s decidedly minor efforts to mitigate the consequences of that history had the effect of implicating “hard-to-employ” workers in new rounds of state violence, exacted, for the most part, against marginalized people in other parts of the world. Of course, in the end, we are only talking about a few dozen jobs and a very small part of Honeywell’s significant landmine operation. For our purposes here, however, this series of events is instructive insofar as it demonstrates how the enduring violence of the colonial relation articulates alongside other forms of American violence.

Figure 7.1 Political Cartoon published in *The Alley* (Image Source: *The Alley*, January 1986).
7.3 American Violence and Migration to South Minneapolis

The Honeywell incident is not the only way that the outward projection of American violence has had distinct local implications, however. The benefits and injuries born of the pursuit of American “interests” through violent means have shaped other outcomes on the inner-city Southside, including the migratory flows that altered its ethnic composition in the postwar decades.

It is no coincidence that substantial Indigenous, Hmong and Somali communities have emerged in this district, if only temporarily in some cases. The substantial proportion of these groups that settled in and around the Phillips neighborhood over the course of the last five decades did so for a variety of reasons but one is certainly that few other neighborhoods offered affordable housing and opportunities for migrants to live amongst their peers while establishing initial networks for survival.

Indigenous residents of the Twin Cities numbered only a few hundred before the Second World War but the opportunities sparked by wartime mobilization created conditions in which that population would grow to an estimated six thousand by the time hostilities ended in Europe and Asia, as I outline above.\(^{47}\) This urban population continued to expand in the years that followed, particularly in the Phillips neighborhood where by 1990 the Indigenous population was more than six times greater than it was in any other neighborhood.

The inner-city Southside was also an initial point of settlement for many of the large number of Hmong (primarily Laotian) people that moved to the Twin

Cities in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. In the United States, refugee settlement is primarily administered by third party voluntary agencies (VOLAGs) that make agreements with the State Department to facilitate the settlement of a given number of refugees in a particular community and commit to provide initial settlement services. In Minneapolis, a number of very active VOLAGs sought to accommodate Hmong refugees and, as a result, the urban region emerged as a key hub of the global Hmong diaspora. Today, the City of Minneapolis claims to be home to the largest Hmong population outside of Laos.\(^48\) Upon their arrival in the Twin Cities, Hmong refugees tended to secure housing in low-income inner-city neighborhoods, often in public housing projects, before moving on to other parts of the city after they had reached a certain degree of stability.\(^49\) Several hundred Hmong families settled in the Phillips neighborhood between 1979 and 1981, initiating a wave of Southeast Asian migration to the district that would peak in 1990, the same year that people of color first constituted a demographic majority of neighborhood residents.\(^50\)

Since the early 1990s, the Twin Cities has also been home to the largest community of Somali migrants in the United States. Like the Hmong before them, many of the first Somalis to come to Minneapolis did so as refugees sponsored by Twin Cities’ VOLAGs. In subsequent years, the local Somali population grew substantially and recent census estimates suggest it could well exceed thirty thousand.\(^51\) The Southside of Minneapolis has remained an important geographical

\(^{48}\) City of Minneapolis, “Diverse Minneapolis.”
\(^{50}\) Compton, “1990 Census.”
center for this community. Phillips is home to a significant Somali population and a number of Somali businesses, including the Karmel Square Somali Mall on Pilsbury Avenue in the southern part of the neighborhood and a number of Somali grocery stores and remittance shops along Franklin Avenue in the north. The most robust center of inner-city Somali life is undoubtedly the Riverside Plaza housing estate in the nearby Cedar-Riverside neighborhood. This Corbusier-inspired Modernist complex – composed of a series of cinderblock high-rises and made iconic by its appearance in the opening sequence of certain seasons of *The Mary Tyler Moore Show* has become synonymous with the city’s Somali community and is sometimes even dubbed Little Mogadishu. Many of the businesses on the adjacent section of Cedar Avenue cater explicitly to a Somali and East African clientele.

Conventional narrations of how and why these three groups came to Minneapolis tend to stress a desire on the part of migrants to seek deliverance from a range of hardships in their place of origin. Media explanations, for example, tend to emphasize danger or vulnerability at home as definitive. In the late 1960s, the *Minneapolis Tribune* summarized the causes of Indigenous migration to the city like this: “Indians began migrating to the cities after World War II to escape reservation poverty and seek a better life.” In the early 1980s, the *New York Times* narrated the cause of accelerated Hmong migration to the United States like this: “About 35,000 Hmong are now living in the United States. Most of them fled their homeland after it was overrun in 1975 by the Pathet Lao.” More recently, a *New

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53 Minneapolis Tribune, “The Plight of the Urban Indian.”
*York Times* profile on the Somali community in Minneapolis narrated the cause of their migration to the United States like this:

The country they had fled, on the eastern tip of Africa, was embroiled in a civil war that had left it without a functioning government since 1991.

The anarchy reached American televisions two years later, when warlords shot down two Black Hawk helicopters, killing 18 United States soldiers. By then, tens of thousands of Somalis had died and a mass exodus had begun.

A generation of Somalis grew up in the overcrowded refugee camps of northern Kenya, where malaria, scorpion infestations and hunger took their toll. Tales of America sustained them. Clean water was said to flow freely in kitchens, and simple jobs like plucking chickens paid handsomely.  

There is nothing particularly egregious about the *content* of these synoptic interpretations, all of which are typical of a much broader pattern of explanation. It is a matter of empirical fact that many reservations were in dire economic shape in the period that followed 1945, that the victory of the Pathet Lao in 1975 was immensely dangerous for those associated with the other side of the conflict, and that the collapse of the Somali central government in 1991 dramatically amplified civil strife. What such interpretations tend to exclude, however, is the degree to which forms of violence that were explicitly coordinated through the American state were (and are) complicit in producing the existential vulnerabilities that foreground each of these mass migrations.

Thus to interpret migratory hubs like Minneapolis strictly in terms of their status as zones of refuge is to risk obscuring a key point. The security and abundance that define western arrival cities has often been achieved at the expense of the places that those seeking deliverance have left. Acknowledging this basic point

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55 Elliott, "A Call to Jihad."
is an important corrective to the self-congratulatory tendency to interpret cities in the global north as the benign beneficiaries of migratory flows. Indeed, to interpret the peace and prosperity of American life in isolation is to risk obscuring its complicity in the production of vulnerability elsewhere.

In their most perverse form, such interpretations decontextualize migratory movements to the heartlands of American prosperity and define them as the consequence of particular kinds of insecurity that are the fundamental property of the social disorganization, internal strife, and underdevelopment of the migrants’ places of origin. Achille Mbembe’s description of Western interpretations of the African continent as a “vast dark cave where every benchmark and distinction come together in total confusion, and the rifts of a tragic and unhappy human history stand revealed… a bottomless abyss where everything is noise, yawning gap, and primordial chaos” hints at what I mean.\textsuperscript{56} If the radical insecurity that defines places of origin is understood as a result of the inability of the residents of those places to achieve a basic level of organization and prosperity than the degree to which the pursuit of American (and other sovereign) “interests” has contributed to the production of that insecurity need not be explored. This exculpatory logic allows American cities to be interpreted as places of deliverance from insecurity rather than the producers and beneficiaries of it.

We should not simply conflate the experiences of these three migratory groups (to say nothing of their internal differentiation) nor ignore the substantial differences within the social and political circumstances that foreground their arrival in Minneapolis, but it is worth pointing out that clear lines of continuity exist

between them. In each of these three group migrations, the American state’s pursuit of its own “interests” and/or a sense of American entitlement to enter and act in lands occupied by other people precipitated extraordinary deployments of military violence. In each case, the deployment of American force resulted in the alienation of resident groups from earlier patterns of land use and contributed to the production of conditions of extraordinary hardship and insecurity. American violence, in other words, was explicitly complicit in driving forms of mass migration out of existing home communities and into places like Minneapolis. Thus while the political contexts that produced substantial Indigenous, Hmong and Somali communities on the Southside of Minneapolis differ substantially, they are united by the fact that each migration was at least partly driven by the deployment of American state violence. In the interest of elucidation, it is worth considering this point in each context.

Sources of Indigenous Migration

The postwar migration of Indigenous people to Minneapolis is frequently interpreted as a socio-economic response to the devastation of reservation economies, as the Star-Tribune interpretation cited above suggests. Chronicling reservation destitution seems to have been a good scoop in the world of postwar Minnesota journalism and a series of multi-article exposés in Twin Cities newspapers chronicled the difficulties of reservation life in lurid detail. Tribune writer Carl Rowan’s 1957 visits to a series of Upper Midwest reservations, for example, offered evidence that an epidemic of reservation poverty was driving migration to urban environments. Reporting from one reservation in the “north woods” of Minnesota, Rowan found residents wandering “almost frantically,” “looking for the rabbit or
squirrel that will mean the difference between eating Sunday dinner and fasting.” Reporting from reservations in the “lonely prairies” of North and South Dakota, Rowan found a bitter human geography composed of fruitless landscapes dotted with “a thousand tarpaper shacks, leaning away from bitter winds... their roofs sagging under the winter snow.” Less than a decade later, another Tribune reporter, Sam Newlund, visited seven regional reservations and concluded “poverty is still the rule, prosperity the exception.” Indeed, Newlund had no trouble “finding poor people on [the] Indian reservations” of the Upper Midwest and his reporting provided anecdotal support for a series of grim national statistics, including reservation unemployment rates that were more than seven times greater than the national average, reservation housing stocks that were more than ninety percent unfit, and an average life expectancy that was only two thirds that of the general population. Newlund reported that even on the Red Lake reservation, sometimes regarded as the “best off” of Minnesota’s Indigenous communities, it was still “hard” to cobble together a basic living. He noted that able-bodied adults might be able to find seasonal work in pulp-cutting, fishing, or wild-rice harvesting but less than ten percent of the population as a whole was able to secure steady year round work. Several years later, a special supplement published by the Minneapolis Star reiterated these impressions, noting that urban migration was being driven in part

57 Rowan, The Plight of the Upper Midwest Indian.
58 Ibid.
60 Sam Newlund, “Reservations Offer Little Regular Work; Isolation from Commerce, Poor Farms are Factors,” Minneapolis Tribune, July 15, 1966.
by reservation economies that offered limited land, limited resources and were increasingly taxed by a growing population.\textsuperscript{61}

The circumstances that these reporters described were not new, however. In Minnesota, as elsewhere, the processes of territorialization through which the American state seized, partitioned, and re-imagined the North American continent had devastating consequences for the extant Indigenous population and the patterns of life on which their societies were based. The pressures of white settlement began to seriously disrupt established territorial arrangements by the latter half of the nineteenth century, a violence that went as far as outright eviction with the forced removal of the Dakota in 1862. In the years that followed, however, new rounds of incursion into Indian Country tended to be legislative. Starting in 1887, a range of legislative efforts at both the federal and state level sought to break up collectively held Indigenous territories. The passing of the federal \textit{Dawes Severalty Act} by the United States Congress in 1887 initiated a process of territorial alienation that was so thorough that by 1934, when legislation that would come to be known as the \textit{Indian New Deal} ended the federal government’s emphasis on allotment, Indigenous land holdings had been reduced from 138 million acres to roughly 50 million acres.\textsuperscript{62} Other processes aimed at breaking up Indigenous land holdings continued well into the 20\textsuperscript{th} century and beyond, most famously with the postwar policies of Termination and Relocation, which sought to terminate “Indian” title and induce reservation dwellers to migrate to American cities. In Minnesota and other jurisdictions, lands set aside for reservations were often the least desirable and those tracts that proved

\textsuperscript{61} Minneapolis Star. “Indians are Drawn From Reservations by the Job Opportunities of the Cities,” \textit{Minneapolis Star}, September 20, 1969.
\textsuperscript{62} Hall, \textit{Earth Into Property}, 466.
lucrative at a latter stage were sometimes alienated from Indigenous communities through dubious agreements, as in the case of the White Earth reservation where precious timber stands were lost through the double-dealing of timber interests and the complicity of the state.\textsuperscript{63}

Though certain mythologies about the peacefulness with which this transformation was accomplished persist, the historical record itself reveals that a sustained pattern of violence coordinated and perpetuated against Indigenous populations by various branches of the United States government was central to it. Indeed, the process by which Indigenous people were quarantined on remote reservations profoundly disrupted existing patterns of quotidian existence and often reduced tribal groups to dependency on outside assistance and government “commodity” diets.\textsuperscript{64} This history of violence and the long shadows that it has cast are, of course, at the center of the reservation poverty that, alongside other factors, precipitated mass migration away from existing Indigenous communities and into cities like Minneapolis.

\textit{Sources of Hmong Migration}

The migration of Hmong people to the Twin Cities also corresponds to this broad pattern. Throughout the period of French Colonial rule in Indochina, most ethnic Hmong subsisted as agriculturalists in the relative isolation of the northern stretches of Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. The defeat of French colonialism in the


1950s precipitated dramatic change, however, and the emergence of groups committed to achieving projects of communist liberation refigured regional politics. In Laos, where a significant proportion of the Southeast Asian Hmong lived, a period of prolonged conflict was inaugurated as forces allied with the Royal Lao Government clashed with forces allied with the revolutionary Pathet Lao. While several attempts to forge unity governments were brokered, they were repeatedly scuttled. Not least because the United Stats understood communist advances in the region as an affront to its “interests” and made dogged efforts to repel them. Though the 1954 Geneva Accords limited the legal right of foreign powers to assert influence in the region, American operatives routinely shirked these dictates in order to support anti-communist efforts. American interventions dramatically amplified regional violence, not least by training and outfitting the covert Armée Clandestine from the 1950s on.\(^{65}\) In the early 1960s, the CIA brokered a deal with Vang Pao, a key figure in the Royal Lao Army, and began working with him to train a local guerilla force capable of fighting Pathet Lao.

Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, the United States provided military aid to the anti-communist campaign by disguising it as US Agency for International Development (USAID) development grants. “The Laos war was overseen by the US ambassador, run by the CIA, and supported by the US military – all without the consent and knowledge of Congress.”\(^{66}\) As broader American efforts in the region were amplified and spilled into the Laos / Vietnam border region in the early 1970s, an estimated twenty thousand Hmong fought alongside American forces and


provided “critical aid” in reconnaissance and disruption of the Trường Sơn, or Ho Chi Minh Trail. By 1975, however, anti-communist forces in Laos were facing certain defeat and the US-led campaign came to an abrupt end with the evacuation of American forces and a small Laotian elite. The vast majority of Hmong that had fought as allies of the United States were left abandoned by their sponsors in an extraordinarily perilous theater of war.

Those left behind were not only alienated from their agricultural territories and patterns of subsistence but also faced the retribution of their victorious enemies after years of catastrophic fighting. In this context of abandonment, many “scurried to find their way out.”67 “If the communists see you were with the Americans, they kill you,” recounted one man who would eventually settle in the Phillips neighborhood.68 Like so many others, he was forced to make a harrowing escape through a punishing wilderness in order to find refuge in a Thai refugee camp. In his case, this journey included months of deprivation, the execution of several members of his travelling party, and a final death-defying cross of the Mekong River into Thai territory. Thus it is worth pointing out that this pattern of American intervention, disruption and eventual abandonment, is at the very center of the mass migration that saw so many ethnic Hmong flee Laos and settle in the United States.

Sources of Somali Migration

The migration of a large number of Somali nationals to the Twin Cities also bears the imprint of this pattern of American intervention and abandonment. The incursive violence of outside power has cast a long shadow in the Horn of Africa and

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what is now the Federal Republic of Somalia. European colonial administration of these territories, though shifting in its composition, would not be fully extinguished until the independence movements of the 1960s successfully achieved their objectives. But the territorial scars of European partition continued to have important effects. The traditional territories of the ethnic Somali population had been divided into a series of fragments by European and Ethiopian invasion and the successful achievement of Somali independence in 1960 only managed to unite a series of coastal sections. The retention of the Ogaden region (sometimes called “Western Somalia”) by Haile Selassie’s Ethiopian empire remained a source of considerable tension between Somalis and Ethiopians.

Importantly, the end of European control did not signal the end of outside intervention, however, and the Horn of Africa would prove fertile ground for Cold War powers to pursue their “interests” through proxy conflict. The Ethiopian empire, in particular, received immense support from the United States until Haile Selassie was deposed in 1974. The Emperor’s administration received fully half of US aid to sub-Saharan Africa between 1953 and 1973.\(^69\) The fall of Selassie brought considerable transformation to the region, however, as his leftist successors declared their allegiance to the socialist camp. In this context, the Soviet Union hoped that a socialist alliance in the Horn would allow them to exert considerable power over parts of the Middle East and control shipping corridors with access to the Indian Ocean.\(^70\)


\(^{70}\) Ibid., 80.
Such an alliance would never come to fruition, however, and conflict over the contested Ogaden region flared up in the mid 1970s, eventually bringing Somalia and Ethiopia into a short but brutal war. In this context, the Somali state transferred allegiance to the United States while Ethiopia remained allied with the Communist Bloc. The war initiated a period of extraordinary violence and intensified proxy conflict, as the two superpowers lavished their allies with weaponry and support. The Carter administration, if at times reluctantly, provided considerable military and economic aid to Somalia, while the Soviet Union did the same on the other side of the border.71

In spite of the considerable investments it received from the US, however, the Ogaden war devastated Somalia’s small economy. The country’s external debt tripled to nearly three hundred million USD between 1976 and 1979 and mushroomed to nearly two billion by 1990, as the Somali state “began its final descent into chaos.”72 Discontent with President Siad Barre’s administration in Mogadishu began to manifest as armed revolt by the late 1980s and would continue to amplify until the government lost control of the capital in 1991. The vacuum left by Barre’s ouster created a series of conflicts throughout Somalia as various factions sought power. By 1992, the spiraling crisis had resulted in devastating famine in various regions and mass displacement followed. Refugee camps in neighboring Kenya were set up to house Somalis that crossed the border in “desperate physical condition.”73 “The abandonment is vividly evident here in the Horn of Africa, reported Jane Perez in the New York Times in the months that followed Barre’s

72 Parenti, Tropic of Chaos, 83.
ouster.\textsuperscript{74} “Ethiopia and Somalia, which were at the center of the tussle for influence on the African continent in the 1970s, now lie devastated, orphans of the post-cold war era.” With the ouster of Barre, “a long-rotting structure came crashing down, and Somalia has not had a functioning government since,” notes Christian Parenti.\textsuperscript{75} “Worse yet, its war and constant instability have infected the entire region” as “the flow of weapons, ammunition, contraband, and armed men across borders has created a lawless zone that, increasingly, includes Kenya,” he continues.

Here again, the violent interventions of the American state (alongside and against the Soviet Union) contributed to a massive human catastrophe, which included the alienation of Somali people from their traditional territories and, in a context of abandonment, drove a sprawling refugee crisis as millions of Somali nationals sought refuge elsewhere. The considerable growth of the Somali population of the Twin Cities is, of course, explicitly connected to the radical instability of contemporary Somalia, an unenviable set of conditions that the United States is decidedly complicit in having created.

In rather explicit ways, then, these three migratory patterns were precipitated by the coordinated violence of the American state. This relatively basic point serves as an important corrective to interpretations that see Minneapolis primarily as a refuge from forms of violence that are far removed from its basic rhythms. To insist that this is the case is, I think, to begin to complicate the pat suggestion these migrant groups were simply seeking a “better life.” To do so is to

\textsuperscript{75} Parenti, \textit{Tropic of Chaos}, 83-4.
ask tough questions about the material histories of domination on which that “better life” has been built.

Thus while Minneapolis can and should be celebrated for its multiculturalism, we need to ask what sort of relationships make that multiculturalism possible. In a very immediate sense, Phillips and other Twin Cities neighborhoods ought to be understood as geographies that have been actively produced by the outward projection of violence. This basic observation can help us think about some of the ways that the practices of American violence are productive of space even where their most visceral effects are not plainly observable. In sum, then, it seems to me that we ought to think of the neighborhood as a “military geography,” insofar as this term can be understood broadly to include the spatial effects of militarism.\textsuperscript{76} In this vein, Flusty et al. insist that research agendas need to extend beyond “the well-studied ‘spaces of exception’ where bodies are subject to ‘extraordinary rendition and ‘enhanced interrogation,’” in order to focus on the “unexceptional spaces of metropolitan cores, colonized edges, and sites like superbases and homeless shelters where cores and peripheries irrupt deep within one another’s hearts.”\textsuperscript{77}

\textbf{7.4 Summary}

By way of a conclusion, I want to return to the contradiction that this chapter began with. While on the one hand, cities like Minneapolis are understandably lauded for their social amenities, economic buoyancy, civic ambition and

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\textsuperscript{76} For a comprehensive discussion of “military geographies” see Rachel Woodward, “From Militarized Geography to Militarism’s Geographies: Disciplinary Engagements with the Geographies of Militarism,” \textit{Progress in Human Geography} 29 (2005): 720
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\textsuperscript{77} Flusty et al., “Interventions in Banal Neoimperialism,” 619.
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multicultural density, it is critical to ask what lies beneath these local advantages. It is important to ask what sorts of relations make these conditions possible and sustainable.

What I have tried to show in this chapter is that the celebration of the prosperity and diversity of “progressive” Western cities often belies the degree to which those advantages are contingent on a predatory or parasitical position within a global power circuitry which disproportionate funnels advantages towards places like Minneapolis through the same mechanisms that render other places radically insecure. While this is true in a number of ways, I have focused here on how the deployment of violence (especially through the vehicle of the American state) is at the center of this power circuitry and the relationships that define it. Importantly, though, I have also tried to show that the spoils of this predatory relationship are not evenly shared at home. The experience of Indigenous people in the United States and other settler-colonial societies reminds us that the politics of securing advantages for some through the politics of violent domination was first and foremost a domestic agenda. In this way, I hope this chapter has demonstrated some of the ways that the sustained articulation of the colonial relation intersects with other forms of violence.
Chapter 8 Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

In the spring of 1988, Ronald Reagan stood beneath an immense bust of Vladimir Lenin and addressed an audience of students and faculty at Moscow State University. The President's remarks were pointed but diplomatic, mixing abstract contempt for central planning with a gentle optimism that the United States might yet make a “friend” out of a long time adversary.

The broader Moscow Summit, of which Reagan’s speech was a small part, was not always so successful at diffusing mutual animosity through carefully scripted diplomatic niceties, however. On the day before his university address, the President provoked the ire of his hosts by meeting with a large group of dissidents at Spaso House, the residence of the US Ambassador. The Soviet press retaliated to this affront by publishing a series of articles depicting the United States as “a contrasting land of technological marvels, poverty, hunger and repression.”1 Soviet television, meanwhile, aired a press conference held by Indigenous activists who had come from the United States to draw attention to a range of grievances and demand a meeting with Reagan.2

Responding to the activists’ appeal, a young biology student at Moscow State seized an opportunity to put the Indigenous delegation’s demand explicitly to the President. During the question period that followed Reagan’s speech, she asked if he

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would make an effort to meet with the activists, if not in Moscow then back at home. Reagan was a bit sheepish at first. He told the young student that he was not aware of any meeting requests and noted noncommittally that he’d be happy to engage with the visitors. He then pivoted, assumed a more cocksure tone, and seized the opportunity to contest Soviet claims that the treatment of Indigenous people in the United States revealed the hypocrisy of American sermonizing about “human rights.” Holding nothing back, the President offered an improvised interpretation of the colonial history of his country.

Let me tell you just a little something about the American Indian in our land. We have provided millions of acres of land for what are called preservations – or reservations, I should say. They, from the beginning, announced that they wanted to maintain their way of life, as they had always lived there in the deserts and the plains and so forth. And we set up these reservations so they could, and have the Bureau of Indian Affairs to help take care of them. At the same time we provide education for them – schools on the reservations. And they’re free also to leave the reservations and be American citizens among the rest of us, and many do. Some still prefer, however, that way – that early way of life. And we’ve done everything we can to meet their demands as to how they want to live. Maybe we made a mistake. Maybe we should not have humored them in that wanting to stay in that kind of primitive lifestyle. Maybe we should have said, no, come join us; be citizens along with the rest of us. As I say, many have; many have been very successful.3

The President’s tidy sweep was, of course, rife with inaccuracy and he was roundly criticized at home by a small but vocal group of critics that took umbrage at his sanitized presentation of a violent history. His chief transgression, they noted, was to suggest that Indigenous people had been “humored” in being allowed to cling to “primitive” forms of life.4 The literary scholar Kenneth Lincoln described the


remarks as an “ethnocentric whitewash,” reminding his readers that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) was not a government agency intended to “take care” of Indigenous people but one that emerged first as a branch of the US Department of War, that reservations were never intended to be oases for cultural survival and more often resembled “wasteland tokens for outright theft and betrayal,” and that American citizenship, far from something that had been rebuffed by reservation residents pursuing an “early way of life,” had been extended to Indigenous Americans more than six decades earlier. In other words, the President’s off-the-cuff history lesson was steeped in revisionist fantasy.

In spite of its glaring inaccuracies, however, Reagan’s sketch should not be simply dismissed as the unscripted rambling of an out-of-touch chauvinist or the strategic posturing of a seasoned cold warrior. Distilled to its elemental core, the President’s interpretation recapitulates a narrative of American innocence that has had an enduring place in both pop cultural and academic interpretations of the history of the United States, as a range of scholars have shown in other contexts. While such presentations do not always disavow historical violence tout court, they routinely insist that the American experience of continental territorialization (as well as future incursions into foreign lands) has been animated by a fundamentally different logic than the territorial conquests of European empires.

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The perseverance of this and other “legitimizing myths” hinges, in part, on the view that the United States was and is an anti-imperialist polity, that it is a political community forged through the crucible of a revolt against empire and has eschewed imperialist ambitions of its own. This nationalist apologetics has proved remarkably durable. For example, Frederick Turner’s late nineteenth century vision of the frontier of westward expansion as a place where post-European identities were constructed was steeped in this exculpatory thinking, re-imagining American expansionism as a mode of emancipation, rather than conquest. But this conceit did not vanish with the “closing” of the frontier and as Said observes, American interpretations of inherent national “greatness” – apparently born of a “unique and somehow unrepeatable” revolution against empire – have “remained constant,” dictating and obscuring the realities of historical and contemporary forms of American imperial practice. That Reagan’s remarks at Moscow State elicited only a minor blowback, driven primarily by the leadership of Indigenous advocacy organizations, is perhaps a testament to the enduring potency of this exculpatory thinking.

The idea that the state of Minnesota was born of out a colonial process of dispossession is hardly a matter of serious historical debate. This basic truth is supported by a rich evidentiary record, which is easily accessed by any with the desire to examine it. Yet while non-Indigenous observers sometimes acknowledge this troubling past, they rarely suggest that historical patterns of dispossession have anything to do with contemporary social arrangements. It is, however, not sufficient

7 Hietala, Manifest Design, 256.
9 Said, Culture and Imperialism, 8-9.
to deal with colonial violence as a historical relic. Moving towards anything like a politics of decolonization surely demands that we think carefully about (and actively work to undermine) the ways in which a discrete “machinery of enforcement” that secures the unequal material advantages described above is so often rendered invisible to those that benefit from it.\footnote{Schulman, \textit{Gentrification of the Mind}, 27.}

8.2 Summary of Arguments

The evidence presented in this dissertation explicitly seeks to challenge historical and contemporary mythologies of American innocence by paying close attention to the ways in which a colonial relationship grounded in a hierarchical politics of dispossession has endured as a dimension of social and political life in the United States in general and Minnesota in particular. By drawing on diverse examples from Minneapolis – and especially the postwar dynamics of its Southside Phillips neighborhood – I have demonstrated some of the ways that this politics of domination has persisted, not least by disproportionately channeling the benefits of material security, prosperity, and other advantages to Euro-American settlers and their descendants while diminishing the capacities of Indigenous Minnesotans to secure advantages for themselves. What I have tried to show, in part, is that these contemporary forms of group-differentiated domination are reflective of the enduring potency of a hierarchical set of relations that continue to structure contemporary experience.

This dissertation seeks to make a contribution to a burgeoning body of academic inquiry that is concerned to understand how colonial mentalities and
practices continue to shape urban life, in North American settler-colonial cities and elsewhere. The preceding chapters have drawn on evidence from Minneapolis to try and build on and extend this work by examining how the core inequities of the colonial relation have been reproduced, reconstituted, or sustained in the postwar period. In the interest of summarizing the major contributions of this study, I want to briefly highlight five of the arguments that I deploy in the preceding chapters.

In the first place, I argue that Minneapolis (and cities like it) are inextricably linked to colonial accumulations and transfers of wealth. To make this case, I challenge representations of the city as a settler creation (e.g. an achievement whose contemporary life is removed from the basic dynamics of primitive accumulation and Indigenous dispossession) by demonstrating that Minneapolis was explicitly produced through a series of transformative shifts that allowed settler colonists to seize Indigenous territories and repurpose them towards their own enrichment. My discussion of the spectacular rise of TB Walker (alongside less notable figures) demonstrates that the spoils accumulated through settler processes were not neutral achievements but forms of colonial accumulation rendered possible by the imposition of a politics of settler-colonial domination. Critically, though, I have also tried to stress that these early accumulations have a continuing life in the city; that they continue to articulate as economic and social power in the context of the urban present. In other words, settler colonial accumulations are not merely historical events but the basis of future rounds of accumulation and contemporary economic power. Importantly, too, these early forms of acquisition exist alongside (and are sometimes explicitly connected to) new rounds of enclosure, privatization, and municipalization of Indigenous lands. Importantly, Minneapolis is not the only city
where this case can be made and it seems to me that this line of inquiry may well be fruitful in other North American urban contexts.

Secondly, I have argued that urban forms of Indigenous insecurity and marginality are intimately linked to the enduring potency of a colonial power economy that has operated to consolidate racialized privilege geographically in postwar urban environments. To make this case in the context of Minneapolis, I argue that the production of the inner-city “Indian neighborhood” is relationally connected to a broader set of urban policies that operated to disproportionately funnel advantages to “white” Americans, as suburbanization, urban renewal, interstate construction and other publicly-subsidized projects transformed the urban landscape. Importantly, the historic migration of Indigenous people to the city that fueled the emergence of the “Indian neighborhood” was not simply the product of a sudden and spontaneous collective realization that the city was a place of opportunity. The dramatic growth of the Twin Cities Indigenous community in the years after 1945 is inseparable from settler-colonial processes of incursion and administration that actively contributed to the production of geographies in which broad-based collective wellbeing was very difficult to achieve. That Indigenous people continued to face these challenges in the Twin Cities is not a coincidence. It is a material expression of the ways in which discrete forms of domination have continued across generations, albeit in shifting forms. This line of inquiry also has broader applicability for researchers interested in the urban dimensions of the colonial relation. Indeed, the processes that remade Minneapolis were national in scope and it could well be fruitful to pursue these questions in other metropolitan contexts.
Thirdly, I have argued that non-Indigenous knowledge production about the “Indian neighborhood” and its residents has often failed to seriously grapple with the persistence of the colonial relation in urban settings. For example, my discussion of the research and advocacy efforts of the League of Women Voters and the Training Center for Community Programs suggests that their efforts to contribute to the amelioration of the lives of Indigenous people were constrained in a number of key ways. In particular, I argue that by framing the “Indian problem” as a relatively manageable public policy challenge rather than a longstanding social cleavage rooted in the persistence of hierarchical ways of being together, they stopped short of seriously confronting the ways in which the existing political order continues to protect the structural advantages of some and not others. By acknowledging that the “ultimate goal” of their efforts was to broker Indigenous points of entry the mainstream of “American life,” they offered a qualified endorsement of that mainstream. In so doing, they presented American life as a broadly neutral field in which Indigenous people can and should make a life of their own. Indeed, by defining the “problem” as one of economic exclusion, institutional imperfection, and individual attitudes, they failed to grasp the complexity of the colonial relation and the hard work that would be required to begin to transform its violent thrust. Borrowing from Coulthard, I argue their efforts may well help “alter the intensity of some of the effects of colonial-capitalist exploitation and domination,” but stopped well short of challenging the “generative structures” that operated to produce this particular set of circumstances.¹¹ Here again, this line of inquiry surely has broader appeal throughout North America where forms the

¹¹ Coulthard, Red Skins, White Masks, 35.
politics of recognition (often without reform) has moved to the fore of state strategies to negotiate colonial legacies.

Fourthly, I have argued that the reproduction of colonial forms of “knowledge” has operated to justify and depoliticize the marginality of urban Indigenous people in urban settings. My discussion of the disproportionate entanglement of Indigenous people with all branches of the criminal justice system is illustrative of this point. By building on Comack’s insights, I have shown that urban practices of “racialized policing” are inextricably linked to the reproduction of broadly circulated assumptions about Indigenous people that have operated to motivate, legitimize, and depoliticize aggressive policing. These interpretations have often relied on a series of cultural and behavioral explanations that operate to assign blame to Indigenous people themselves. Critical here, is the degree to which these immaterial deployments of racialized “knowledge” have operated to render inequitable distributions of power and opportunity natural. Yet I have also argued that the colonial relation is not merely inevitable and colonially inflected forms of domination remain open to challenge and contestation, as the rich history of Indigenous organizing in the Twin Cities reminds us.

Finally, I have argued that the violence of the colonial relation does not exist in isolation but articulates alongside other expressions of urban power. To make this case, I argue that the production of the city in general (and the Phillips neighborhood in particular) is bound up with economic and migratory flows that are explicitly generated by American violence at home and abroad. In doing so, I sought to demonstrate that the colonial relation is part of a broader field of practices through which the injuries and benefits of American imperial practice are distributed. This is true in the sense that many, if not all, North American cities
remain places where the profound inequities and contradictions of settler-colonial dispossession continue to articulate, as the preceding chapters have demonstrated in rather lurid detail. But it is also true in the sense that Indigenous urbanites share something with certain groups of racialized migrants in that their collective presence in South Minneapolis is intimately bound up with broader histories of American state violence.

8.3 Summary

To summarize, then, this dissertation suggests at least five ways to think about the how the core inequities and hierarchical politics of the colonial relation continue to have an enduring potency in the urban present. These contemporary articulations include the enduring potency of wealth and power generated through disposessive accumulations, the production of urban geographies that disproportionately funnel spatial and economic advantages to “white” Americans, the persistence of “progressive” ideologies that fail to challenge the core inequities produced by colonial violence, the enduring potency of racialized “knowledges” that render Indigenous marginality understandable to certain publics, and a political willingness to continue to use extraordinary violence to secure prosperity for some but not others.

To suggest that the colonial relation continues in the urban present is to remind ourselves that colonial practices are not merely the property of a regrettable past. Rather, they retain a persistent structural trace in our shared contemporary realities. To start from this basic premise is to remember that settler colonization is not so much an “event” as field of inequitable relations that requires active undoing
in the present. Certainly, part of what is required to do so is to unlearn prevailing exculpatory ways of seeing like the ones cited at the beginning of this conclusion in order to unlearn pervasive forms of explanation that encourage us to interpret group-differentiated advantage and disadvantage as existing independent of a “machinery of enforcement.” I hope that this study will contribute to this effort in some modest way.
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