Co-Opted?

*Exploratory Research on Canadian Resource ‘Imperialism’ in Postcolonial Tanzania*

Evans Rubara (YU # 212-036-885)
Supervisor: Dr. Anna Zalik
Submitted on: July 31, 2014

A Major Paper submitted to the Faculty of Environmental Studies (FES) in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master in Environmental Studies
York University, Toronto – Ontario, Canada

*Signatures:*

Evans Rubara: _______________________

Professor Anna Zalik: _______________________
Dedication

To Maggie and Danny, my precious gifts, and to the children I have encountered in the mining areas since I started my Social Justice journey. You are the inspiration that has kept me on this challenging journey, filling my heart with joy and the hope that justice will eventually be attained in the land of the living.
Acknowledgements

First and Foremost, I acknowledge and thank the Creator of Heaven and earth in whom “...we live and move and have our being” (Acts 17: 28).

I want to convey many thanks to the Tanzania Mining Education Study Group (TSMEG) committee at Trinity St. Paul’s (TSP), the United Church of Canada (UCC), Mining Watch Canada (MWC), and Kairos Canada for both moral and material support. You have done more than a professional networking relationship deserves. You have been my family home away from home.

As well, I want to thank the Faculty of Environmental Studies (FES) and the Centre for Refugee Studies (CRS) for making it possible for me to begin to realise my dream in the academic world. Special thanks to Dr. Anna Zalik, Dr. Ellie Perkins and Dr. Felipe Montoya-Greenheck at FES, and Dr. Susan McGrath and Michele Millard for your trust, confidence, patience, insights, and encouragements throughout my studies. I would also like to thank Staff at the Office of Student and Academic Services (OSAS) at York University who spent their time working with me to find a way to accommodate so many of my logistical needs. The world needs more people like you. This work has been done in a language not close to where I come from. I want to take this opportunity to thank Jeanne Moffatt, Sarah Gayman and Terry Smith for proof reading my work.

Special thanks to Sarah Mshana for taking up the responsibility of raising our children during my study period besides her other responsibilities. Finally, my most special Thank You go to my children, Maggie and Danny for being so patient while away, accommodating and supportive of my studies. These last two years have been the most difficult for us, yet the sweetest knowing how blessed I am to have you in my life. You have taught me to be a friend, a father and above all, to accept being the object of your unconditional love. You are gems beyond any price in this world. Now that I have received much, it is time to give back.

“For everyone to whom much is given […] much will be required” (Luke 12: 48).

To all, THANK YOU!
# Contents

Acronyms ........................................................................................................................................... 6

Abstract ............................................................................................................................................... 9

Foreword .............................................................................................................................................. 10

*Research Limitations* .......................................................................................................................... 12

**Chapter 1:** Introduction: Historical & Social Context of Contemporary Multinational Mining Corporations in Tanzania ............................................................................................................ 13

*Context and Hypothesis* ...................................................................................................................... 13

*The United Republic of Tanzania (URT)* .............................................................................................. 15

*Geological Environments of Tanzania* .................................................................................................. 18

*Mining Activities in the Precolonial Tanzania* ..................................................................................... 19

*Mining Activities in the Colonial Tanzania* .......................................................................................... 22

*The Building Blocks of Imperialistic Legacy* ....................................................................................... 24

*Methodology* ....................................................................................................................................... 30

*Organisation of the Major Paper* .......................................................................................................... 31

**Chapter 2:** Conceptual Framework: The Making of ‘African’ Leaders .................................................. 32

*The evolution of ‘African’ Leadership and Governance Structures* ....................................................... 32

*African Leadership and Governance in the Liberation Movement* ...................................................... 35

*The Characteristics of the State Apparatus within the Tanzanian Context* ........................................ 36

*The Tanzanian Government: Accountability and Structural Allegiances* ........................................... 38

**Chapter 3:** Cultural Structures and the Dynamics in State Decision-making Processes ................. 41

*The Role of Kinship and Ethnicity in the Tanzanian Politics* ................................................................. 42

*Of Nepotism and Distributive Justice* .................................................................................................... 46

*Popular Theories regarding the Underdevelopment of African States* ................................................ 47

**Chapter 5:** The Canadian State and Its Contemporary ‘Trade’ Relations with Tanzania .................. 49

*Characteristics of Trade Relations between Tanzania and Canada* ..................................................... 50

*The Tanzania-Canada Relations Impact on Microeconomics* .............................................................. 52

*The ‘Machiavellian’ Economic Partnership in Canada-Tanzania Relations* ....................................... 54

*Canadian MMCs’ ‘Parasitic’ Business Trends in Tanzania* .................................................................. 60

**Chapter 5:** The Neoliberal ‘Pomposity’ & Its Realities in Tanzania ...................................................... 62

*Rural Communities and Mining Activities in Tanzania* ....................................................................... 62
Canadian MMCs in Tanzania: Socio-environmental Impacts (Kahama and North Mara) ..... 66

Environmental and Water Pollution: Impacts on Humans and Livestock ........................................... 71

Mineral Development Induced Displacements (MDIDs) ........................................................................ 74

Challenges of Relocation and Compensation in the Tanzanian Context .............................................. 76

Mineral-based Economics and Rural-Urban Migration Trends in Tanzania ........................................... 78

Political Competition and Social Services ............................................................................................ 80

Chapter 6: Conclusion and Discussion: Co-Opted? Challenges of Synthesised Governance Structures in Tanzania .............................................................................................................. 82

Mining Communities, Conflicts and Redress .......................................................................................... 84

The State of ‘Indifference’ and Tanzania’s Mining Sector ......................................................................... 88

Value and Contribution of the Major Paper ............................................................................................ 89

Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 92
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>µg/l</td>
<td>Micrograms per litre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABG:</td>
<td>African Barrick Gold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFGEM:</td>
<td>Africa Gem Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGA:</td>
<td>AngloGold Ashanti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU:</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAKWATA:</td>
<td>Baraza Kuu la Waislamu Tanzania (The National Muslim Council of Tanzania)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCR:</td>
<td>Bomani Commission Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGC:</td>
<td>Barrick Gold Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM:</td>
<td>Chama cha Mapinduzi (The Revolutionary Party(^1))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCT:</td>
<td>Christian Council of Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO:</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CESCR:</td>
<td>International Covenant on Economics, Social and Cultural Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODESRIA:</td>
<td>Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC:</td>
<td>Constitutional Review Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS:</td>
<td>Centre for Refugee Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOs:</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFI(s):</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DID:</td>
<td>Development induced displacements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC:</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA:</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOSOC:</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC:</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EI:</td>
<td>Extractive Industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERP:</td>
<td>Economic Recovery Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES:</td>
<td>Environmental Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESRF:</td>
<td>Economic and Social Research Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBO(s):</td>
<td>Faith Based Organisation(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FES:</td>
<td>Faculty of Environmental Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIPA:</td>
<td>Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRELIMO:</td>
<td>Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (Mozambican Independence Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT:</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP:</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GGM:</td>
<td>Geita Gold Mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GGM:</td>
<td>Geita Gold Mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoC:</td>
<td>Government of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GST:</td>
<td>Geological Survey of Tanzania, The</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIPC:</td>
<td>Highly Indebted Poor Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICFTU:</td>
<td>International Confederation of Free Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICMM:</td>
<td>International Council on Mining and Metals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDMC:</td>
<td>Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs:</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Could also be rendered as ‘Party of the Revolution’
IFI: International Financial Institutions
IFPRI: International Food Policy Research Institute
IIED: International Institute for Environment and Development
ILO: International Labour Organisation
IMF: International Monetary Fund
IPTL: Independent Power Tanzania Limited
KMCL: Kahama Mining Corporation Ltd.
LARRRI: Land Rights Research and Resources Institute
LEAT: Lawyers Environmental Action Team
LHRC: Legal and Human Rights Centre
MAC: Mining Association of Canada
MAC: Mines and Communities
MAI: Multilateral Agreement on Investment
Mct(s): Million Carat(s)
MDA(s): Mineral Development Agreement(s)
MDID(s): Mineral for Development Induced Displacement(s)
MEM: Ministry of Energy and Minerals
MIDR: Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement
MIGA: Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
MMC(s): Multinational Mining Company/ies or Corporation(s)
MNCs: Multinational Mining Corporations
MoF: Ministry of Finance
MP(s): Member(s) of Parliament
MSG: Multi-Stakeholder Group
MWC: Mining Watch Canada
NAFCO: National Agriculture and Food Corporation
NARCO: National Ranching Corporation
NBS: National Bureau of Statistics
NCA: Norwegian Church Aid
NESP: National Economic Survival Program
NGO(s): non-Governmental Organisation(s)
NMGM: North Mara Gold Mine
NULS: Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU)
OECD: The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSAS: Office of Student and Academic Services
PL: Prospecting Licence
PMO: Prime Minister’s Office
PMORALG: Prime Minister’s Office: Regional Administration & Local Government
PMRC: Presidential Mining Review Committee
POS: Plan of Study
PUR: Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania
RBU: Regional Business Unit

---

2 Also known as HAKIARDHI
Abstract

Since the mid-1980s and the emergence of the structural adjustment policies (SAPs) and the Washington Consensus\(^3\) (WC) in Tanzania, there have been changes in the scope of State sovereignty in Tanzania as elsewhere in the Global South. The limitations of State sovereignty have been particularly apparent vis-à-vis the mining sector. The Tanzanian government has shown visible trends that suggest ‘it is operating under considerable pressure’ from external forces as it responds more to the Canadian corporate interests.


It explores the historical colonial as well as cultural/ethnic leadership and governance structures which could factor in the contemporary – neoliberal trade ‘collaboration’ between the Tanzanian government, the Canadian government and the Canadian multinational mining companies (MMCs) operating in Tanzania. This research looks at the mineral-based trade relations between Tanzania, Canada and Canadian MMCs operating in Tanzania and highlights the impacts of the Canadian MMCs operations in Tanzania. The research concludes that even though clothed in the language of neoliberal ‘sustainable’ development discourse, the mineral-based relations between Tanzania, Canada and Canadian MMCs embodies the tenets of European-dominated imperialist practices, and is fundamentally imperialistic.

---

\(^3\) The WC was a set of policy prescriptions originally written by John Williamson – former adviser to IMF, proposing economic recovery strategy for Latin American countries. The 10 point policy prescription was considered “to be desirable in just about all the countries of Latin America [this ] set of economic policies advocated for developing countries in general by [the IMF, World Bank], and the US Treasury” (Accessed on June 16, 2014 at: http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/williamson0204.pdf).
Foreword

My Plan of Study (POS), whose Area of Concentration is “Natural Resources, Communities and ‘Sustainability’”, has three major components, namely “Globalisation and Development”; “Social and Environmental Justice” and “Local Communities’ Displacement by Development”. This Major Paper research process has helped me to achieve most of my learning objectives, which were to:

i. acquire theoretical understanding of Global Justice and development issues
ii. develop an understanding in critical development studies as relates to social and environmental justice work
iii. develop an understanding of political thought embedded in social and environmental justice issues
iv. acquire knowledge on different forms of displacement confronting community members in mineral rich areas
v. gain an in-depth insight of the painful experiences that communities are subjected to during evictions and post-eviction
vi. acquire knowledge on different forms of displacement that community members face and how to effectively addressed legally and socially*4
vii. learn about positive/successful self-determining activities against displacement by resource extraction and explore applicability of these solutions to the Southern African context*

This Major Paper has addressed the above POS components through theoretical and empirical discussion on globalisation and development discourses, as well as the impacts of mineral-based trade relations between Tanzania, Canada and Canadian MMCs. In its different sections this Major Paper looks at the “Historical and Contemporary Contexts of the multinational mining corporations (MMCs) in Tanzania”. This section helped in understanding the evolution of the Tanzanian mining/extractive sector in precolonial and colonial times and

*4 Given the broad nature of my POS’ Area of Concentration and study areas of interest, it soon became evident that these last two learning objectives could not be addressed exhaustively within the MES programme. The last two learning objectives proved rather broad and required a study period dedicated at looking into the CSO programmes in Tanzania in comparison to those in Zambia and Costa Rica as indicated in my POS.
helped identify reasons as to why contemporary mining in Tanzania do not address effectively the social and economic needs of the people of Tanzania.

Adopting a Marxist theoretical framework, this research analytically looks at leadership and governance structures within the Tanzanian context from historical liberation and postcolonial perspectives in “The Making of African Leaders” section. This section was helpful in understanding the complexity of different relations between the State and the ruling class. As well, this section highlighted different leadership and governance structures at play within the globalisation and development discourse. As well it highlighted apparent external pressures experienced by actors within the Tanzanian State in pursuit to address the needs of its citizenry, especially those living in the mining areas.

In looking at some of the contributing factors to the seeming apathy within the Tanzanian State, the chapter looking at “Cultural Structures and the Dynamics in State Decision-making Processes” section, helped in understanding the structural dynamics faced by the Tanzanian government. It was clear from this section that the Tanzania’s leadership structure as it is today is an attempt to espouse synthesised sociopolitical and economic systems. It would appear that after the demise of *Ujamaa* policies in 1985, Tanzania has not found a clear social and political framework on which to establish its social, political and economic values and practices.

To understand the complex relationship between the MMCs’ home/host countries and the MMCs operators I looked at “The Canadian State and Its Contemporary ‘Trade’ Relations with Tanzania”. This section was useful to understand factors which lead to the state of apathy on the part of the Tanzanian State apparatus. This section highlights the ‘imperialist’ characteristics of the ‘trade’ relationship between the two nation-states as well as the strategies by the Canadian government and Canadian MMCs to influence policymaking processes. This section is followed by a section which highlighted the pros and cons of “The Neoliberal ‘Pomposity’” and highlighted social, environmental and economic impacts of mineral-based trade relations between Tanzania, Canada and Canadian MMCs, especially in relation to the operations of Canadian Barrick Gold Corporation (BGC) through its African business unit (ABU) subsidiary African Barrick Gold (ABG) in Bulyanhulu – Kakola area, North Mara and Buzwagi mining areas.
Apart from learning and acquiring new skills, the Master in Environmental Studies (MES) programme, has challenged my views on why a number of African States, including Tanzania lag behind economically. Formerly, I was of the view that the social, economic and environmental woes the people of Tanzania are confronted by were a result of residual colonial structures. Indeed, colonialism had its impacts and residual colonial structures are still identifiable within Tanzania’s leadership and governance structures. But residual colonial leadership and governance structures cannot be absolutely blamed for mismanagement of resources and abuse of office by Tanzanians 50 years after independence. Besides this Major Paper research programme process has highlighted the dynamics confronting the civil society organisations (CSOs) in Tanzania including political party players. The scramble for project funding and the increasing need for livelihood needs are introducing a peculiar nepotistic in the Tanzanian social, political and economic environments. The latter has different impacts on the efforts by different actors for an equitable society in Tanzania.

**Research Limitations**

In the initial undertaking of this Major Paper research, I proposed a research presentation that was both theoretical and specific, based on Parliamentary Hansards from the Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania (PURT) 1995 - 2010, group interviews in local communities in Bulyanhulu – Kakola area, North Mara and Buzwagi mining areas and secondary materials. This was not possible as I was not able to travel to Tanzania for fieldwork due to unavoidable circumstances. Instead, I was able to access and utilise Parliamentary Hansards between the years 2008 and 2010 which were accessible online through the Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania (PURT) website. This factor changed the direction of my Major Paper research. Therefore, this research is in most part theoretical with some empirical evidences in the 5th and 6th chapters. However, the Parliamentary Hansards and secondary sources, that is to say reports by NGOs and News Reports have been sufficient in addressing the majority of the learning objectives stated on my POS.
Chapter 1

Introduction: Historical & Social Context of Contemporary Multinational Mining Corporations in Tanzania

Colonialism in both its forms and its substance, posited the issue of contingent human violence [...] with the lingering doubt of the very possibility of self-government, and with the risk, which has never disappeared, of the continent and Africans being again consigned for a long time to a degrading condition.

(Achille Mbembe 2001: 13)

Context and Hypothesis

Mwalimu Nyerere, the founding Father of the Tanzanian nation, stepped down from his Presidency in 1985 after 24 years (1961 – 1985). Since that time, Tanzania has gone through significant changes related to mineral sector legislations (Lange & ESRF 2006; AU/ECA 2011; Munganyizi 2012; URT 1997; URT 2008). Various iterations of the Tanzanian government have tried to formulate mineral policies which would, on one hand, attract foreign investment to the country and, on the other hand, ensure that its people were well provided for.

However, the reports of success in the implementation of the neoliberal capitalist market-led economic policies (MacDonald & Roe 2007) conflict with the deepening poverty among the people of Tanzania (AU/ECA 2011). The analysis of this Paper is an attempt to explore factors that lead to what appears to be the abandonment of the people of Tanzania by the government, especially the citizens living in the mineral-rich regions of the country while collaborating with the ‘imperialist’ Canadian MMCs.

The expectation of citizens of a country harbouring significant deposits of mineral resources such as Tanzania is that such mineral resource endowment should be a means of social and economic wellbeing for its citizens but especially for community members in the mining localities and the national population in its entirety. According to the report compiled by the Presidential Mining Review Committee (PMRC) to advise the Government on oversight of the
Mining sector also known as the Bomani Commission report, until 2008 Tanzania’s confirmed mineral deposits as shown on the figure below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mineral Type</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>2,222 tones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nickel</td>
<td>209 million tones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>13.65 million tones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron Ore</td>
<td>103.0 million tones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamond</td>
<td>50.9 million ounces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tzanite</td>
<td>12.60 tones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limestone</td>
<td>313.0 million tones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soda ash</td>
<td>109 million tones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsum</td>
<td>3.0 million tones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phosphate</td>
<td>577.04 million tones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>911.0 million tones</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 1: Tanzania's Confirmed Mineral Reserve. Source: URT 2008*

Despite such mineral wealth endowment the exploitation of natural resources in Tanzania has led to despondency among local community members due to mass expropriation of land and environmental pollution. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 1980 – 2010 Human Development Index (HDI) indicators, Tanzania falls in the lower HDI categories with mean 0.488 and ranked at 159\(^5\) out of 186 countries. Besides, Tanzania is currently listed as one of the least developed countries (LCDs) globally with a confirmed 93 per cent total dependency ratio\(^6\) (TDR) with 90 per cent\(^7\) of its poverty stricken population living in the rural areas, which includes the mineral rich areas.

This Major Paper questions the extent to which the Tanzanian State actors have internalized western capitalist values and ideologies such that they seem to turn blind eyes from social, economic and environmental challenges brought by foreign direct investments (FDIs) in the mining/extractive sector from Global North countries such as Canada. Hence the title, “Co-Opted?” In its pages, this Major Paper attempts to answer its main research question which asks: “What are the historical political, economic and social factors that lead to apparent apathy within the Tanzanian government, and failure to prioritize the interests of its citizenry in the mining areas while it appears to be more responsive to Canadian corporate interests?”

---

The United Republic of Tanzania (URT)

The United Republic of Tanzania (URT) is one of the East African Community (EAC) countries bordering the Republics of Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. Located to the South-East of the other EAC member countries, Tanzania declared its Sovereign State status in 1961 from Britain, the colonial power, and became the republic of Tanganyika in 1962. In 1964 Tanganyika became the United Republic of Tanzania after its Union with Zanzibar. Identified as the World’s 31st largest country, currently Tanzania is the home of some 44,928,923 Tanzanians covering a total area of 945,000 km². After its independence, Tanzania developed its own social, political and economic strategies. These were enshrined in the Arusha Declaration (1967). Described as a “post-independence model [...] intimately tied to the rise and struggle of the nationalist movement in the 1950s” (Havnevik & Isinika eds. 2010: 20), the Arusha Declaration 1967 embodied the Ujamaa vision and policies. Ujamaa envisioned self-reliance and self-determination. It encompassed economic, political and cultural aspects of the Tanzanian society, and was aimed at setting Tanzania on a path of structural and psychological decolonization through localized strategies. In particular, agriculture, education and health were prioritized. In Mwalimu Nyerere’s own words:

It [the Arusha Declaration] defined socialism as we understand it; it incorporated a call for self-reliance and it established a 'Leadership Code' which was designed to ensure that the Party and the Government served the people of Tanzania and not just the interests of the elite (Nyerere 1974: 6).

Ujamaa’s objective was multifaceted. It was intended to counter colonial hegemony (Nyerere 1968; Havnevik & Isinika eds. 2010; Shivji 2012; Rodney 1972), foster power among the Tanzanian people, promote leadership that would work for the people and create a system

---

9 Information accessed on July 15, 2014 at: http://www.tanzania.go.tz/home/pages/68
10 Information accessed on July 15, 2014 at: http://www.tanzania.go.tz/home/pages/219#
11 Information accessed on July 15, 2014 at: http://www.nbs.go.tz/
13 The transliteration of this word means Kinship but in the political context it means a country united as one extended family. This was a villagisation project which was established and implemented between 1967 and 1973 as a ‘pilot project’ for the African Socialism movement.
14 Teacher in KiSwahili and both a professional and endearment title Tanzanians used to address the nation’s founding father Julius Kambarage Nyerere.
that would respond to the needs of the citizenry. This was to be done through formulation of policies and the establishment of institutions which would effectively deliver social services on the one hand, and on the other hand, through the establishment of government institutions that would be answerable to the people of Tanzania by adherence to the national statutes enshrined in the constitution as well as other formulated policies and bylaws. *Ujamaa* sought to eliminate elitism and social strata within the borders of liberated Tanzania. Pioneered by Tanzania’s “first generation of African nationalists” (Shivji 2012: 103) under the leadership of Mwalimu Nyerere, *Ujamaa* as enshrined in the Arusha Declaration 1967. The goal was to bridge African “traditions [and] modern technology” (Nyerere 1968: 2). *Ujamaa* policies as stipulated in the Arusha Declaration 1967 envisaged a Tanzanian Society whose central theme is to “promote the dignity and the growth to excellence” (Nyerere 1968: 5) among the people of Tanzania.

However, despite the sense of national unity achieved through the *Ujamaa* policies (Nyerere 1968; Rodney 1972; Havnevik & Isinika eds. 2010), Tanzania under the Mwalimu Nyerere administration became a ‘rogue’ nation-state in the eyes of the international community (Hoskyns 1968). Historically, African liberation followed one or more conflicting characteristics. For some, the liberation movement championed political view which called for a complete break-away from the Western powers at independence as a way to gain a greater level of autonomy (Nyerere 1968; Hoskyns 1968). Other countries decided to hold on to the capitalist principles introduced by the colonists with the hope that Western capital would boost economic stability within their context (Hoskyns 1968). Thirdly, other countries only fought against the colonisers as a way to get rid of the white settlers among them and reclaim their traditional hierarchical relations (Saul 2011). Apparently, Tanzania, in its independence, resisted Western strategies regarding “internal and external developments” (Hoskyns 1968: 448), and fell within what could be termed as ‘politically and economically marginalised nation-states’ segments.

Even though Tanzania under Mwalimu Nyerere’s administration remained critical of and resisted advances made by the international community for 24 years after its independence (1961 – 1985), and even though *Ujamaa* policies supported mining activities by local community members (Chachage 1993/2009), the pressures from the World Bank and the International

---

15 Taking the country’s topmost job shortly after a long period of colonial rule, which presented many facets since 1776 until Tanzania’s independence in 1961, Mwalimu Nyerere saw no better way to proceed than “to build and nurture ‘territorial nationalism’ based on a sovereign independent state” as opposed to the requirement by the Pan African movement to “to dissolve individual sovereignty” (Shivji 2012: 104).
Monetary Fund (IMF) became overwhelming. Mwalimu Nyerere’s administration was determined not to give in completely to the Fund’s demands. But seeing the deplorable conditions in which the citizens lived, in early 1970s the government compromised and accepted the proposed changes (Nord et al 2009) including, “…stimulation of exports by devaluation and rationalization of the producer price scheme; reduction of budget deficits by strict control of public spending, the parastatal sector included; and liberalization of inter-regional trade” (Biermann & Wagao 1986: 95). Tanzania then received two fund disbursements between 1973 and 1977 from the World Bank (WB) following an assessment report in 1973 which gave Tanzania “an excellent performance rating” (Holtom 2005: 552). Mwalimu Nyerere’s administration used the funds to address urgent needs of its citizenry such as education, health and other social services. This decision by the Mwalimu Nyerere administration only intensified animosity between the Bank and the Fund16 (Holtom 2005; Death 2012; Hoskyns 1968 Biermann & Wagao 1986; Pratt 1999). This led to the alienation of Mwalimu Nyerere’s administration from international development partners from the European Economic Community (EEC), including France and West Germany.

In 1982 Tanzania ceded to the structural adjustment policies (SAPs). As a starting point, Tanzania began its path to ‘economic recovery’ with the National Economic Survival Program (NESP) establishment, followed by the implementation of the Economic Recovery Program (ERP). Since the ERP followed all the conditions that were laid by the Bank and the Fund, it “won the first IMF Stand-by Arrangement in mid-1986, and then the second ERP in 1989” (MacDonald & Roe 2007: 19). Since 1985, Tanzania has gone through significant mineral sector legislation changes. Finally, in 1995 the implementation of the neoliberal economic system was launched by the William Mkapa’s government. Since the introduction of the neoliberal capitalist market-led economic system in Tanzania various changes have been made to the Tanzanian mineral policies with an aim to both attract foreign investment to the country and improve lifestyles of the people of Tanzania. However, the promises of prosperity through the implementation of the neoliberal economic system by Mkapa’s administration (Lissu 2001), conflicts with the deepening poverty among the people of Tanzania in the face of plenteous mineral deposits and natural resource endowments.

16 The terms ‘the Bank’ and ‘the Fund’ will be used (interchangeably) to indicate the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) respectively.


**Geological Environments of Tanzania**

Apart from Tanzania’s winning the description ‘harbour of peace’ in Africa due to political ‘moderation’ that has prevailed since its independence in 1961, Tanzania hosts a variety of mineral resource deposits (ref. Figure 1 below) economically viable (Lange & ESRF 2006). The mineral resources found in Tanzania include metallic minerals such as gold, iron, silver, copper, platinum, nickel and tin; gemstones such as diamonds, tanzanite, ruby, garnet, emerald, alexandrite and sapphire; industrial minerals such as kaolin, phosphate, lime, gypsum, diatomite, bentonite, vermiculite, salt and beach sand; building materials such as stone aggregates and sand; and energy minerals such as coal, uranium, and rare-earth.

![Figure 2: The Geological Map of Tanzania. Source: Geological Survey of Tanzania (GST) 2011.](image)

To understand the Tanzanian mining landscape it is imperative to look at historical narratives of Tanzania’s extractive/mining industry. Tanzania could ‘strictly’ be said to have

---

two\(^{18}\) distinct periods within which mining activities occurred, namely the precolonial period and the European-dominated colonial period. The current mining regimes only have slight improvements on the colonial mineral policy frameworks while the practices in the mining sector in Tanzania remain essentially the same.

It should be noted that a number of changes were made in Tanzania after the Arusha Declaration in 1967. The Declaration was followed by the nationalisation of several of industries between 1967 and early 1970s, mining included (Lange & ESRF 2006). Currently, the situation in Tanzania could be described as the ‘reinstatement’ of the colonial policies to govern and regulate the exploitation of mineral resources. Thus, the two mineral-based economic periods, namely 1967 – mid-1980s and 1995 - 2010 are foundational to this research. However, the latter period 1995 – 2010 remains the primary focus of this research. It suffices to mention though, that the period covering 1967 – mid-1980s speaks more of artisanal mining activities which are dealt with in detail later in chapter 5. This period was characterised by support to artisanal miners by the government which included different policies and bylaws enacted to protect the interest of artisanal miners as well as government revenues from the artisanal mining activities. The period covering 1995 – 2010 speaks much of the current mineral regimes in Tanzania.

**Mining Activities in the Precolonial Tanzania**

Contrary to the popular assumption that Tanzania’s mineral exploitation commenced towards the end of the 19\(^{th}\) century with prospecting by German prospectors, mineral exploitation activities apparently began in Tanzania between the 7\(^{th}\) and 8\(^{th}\) centuries\(^{19}\) (Chachage 1993/2009; Emel et al 2011). This was earlier than in various other parts of Southern Africa, where mineral exploitation began in the 11\(^{th}\) century (Rodney 1981). Originally, mining activities were carried out by local community members in the mineral-rich areas in Tanzania. Such artisanal mining activities served local community members in the mineral-rich parts of the

\(^{18}\) Most narratives considered in this work identify three periods of economic dispensation in relation to mineral sector economics in Tanzania. These could be described as the precolonial mineral regime, the colonial/European-dominated mineral regime and the postcolonial/neoliberal mineral regimes. In the findings of this research, it appears that there are only two distinct periods within the Tanzanian mineral-based economic trajectories.

\(^{19}\) A number of writers give different dates as to the exact time the Arab merchants arrived in Tanzania but the dates lie between the 7\(^{th}\) and 8\(^{th}\) centuries. However, the presence of the Arab traders can be in the east coast of Africa as early as the 2\(^{nd}\) century (Beachey 1967). According to Chachage (1993/2009), “Mining activities in Tanzania are historically traceable to the precolonial period. Most known activities at the time consisted of mining and working on iron, copper and salt. Gold, unlike the other minerals which were primarily exploited by Africans, was being exploited to some scale by the Arab traders” (Chachage 1993/2009: 6).
country as a supplementary income source beyond farming (MacDonald & Roe 2007). In this early period, therefore, artisanal mining activities were not central to the livelihood of community members in the mineral rich areas in Tanzania. Such activities were carried out to meet the needs of the local community members, out of farming season, until the merchants from Arab countries entered the local mineral market between the 7th and 8th century (Chachage 1993/2009; Emel et al 2011).

The advent of the Arab merchants introduced a new dimension within production and trade relations. It introduced a production mentality which was not just geared towards subsistence but also opened a market for new agricultural and non-agricultural products – spices, salt, precious metals and stones. The latter were and are mainly concentrated in the Lake Regions and North-East/West parts of Tanzania. There are also significant mineral deposits spread country-wide.

In their trade relations with the communities on the Swahili coast, the Arab merchants maintained high ethical standards in the way they related with local community members (Rodney 1981; Chachage 1993/2009; Emel et al 2011). However, to the Arab merchants the focus was not as much on the exploitation of mineral resources as it was on spices, salt, and later, slavery; they maintained fluidity in their trading practices. The market of the day and what can be said to have attracted the Arab merchants in the 8th century is spices and salt trade. This seeming good relationship can be attributed to somewhat mutual goals between the Arab merchants and local community members.

Arab merchants integrated their trade activities into local seasonal production practices. They would buy spice in season and gold mined using traditional tools when such products were available. Local community members seemed to have worked collaboratively with the Arab merchants in the extraction of gold, copper, iron and salt. According to MacDonald & Roe

---

20 It is not clear what types of trading practices were present with respect to mineral exploitation in pre-Arab Merchants in the 7th or 8th centuries and precolonial era. It could be suggested though, that such mineral articles would be traded in exchange of grain and other basic commodities needed by the community members. Leaders in precolonial Tanzania could be said to have played the stewardship role just as reflected in the Ujamaa/Arusha Declaration 1967 period where the government had national grain banks which were sold back to the public at a subsidised cost.

21 History of the mining sector [in Tanzania], the Tanzania Chamber of Minerals and Energy (TCME); Accessed on March 04, 2014 at: http://www.tcme.or.tz/mining-in-tanzania/history/
(2007), collaborative trade relationships between local community members and Arab merchants spanned a period longer than a millennium.

The years 1498 to 1560 present a peculiar period within the Tanzanian history. It was the beginning of restlessness among the community members. This struggle could be suggested to have evidenced in both the introduction of foreign religious beliefs and practices by the newcomers from Europe (Levi 2009), as well as the introduction of the ‘modern system’ of the pillaging of resources from Africa (Rodney 1981; Pouwels 2002; Chachage 1993/2009), especially in contrast to the traditional ways of mineral exploitation. Vasco Da Gama, a Portuguese explorer arrived on Unguja Island in 1498; this was followed by the conquest of the East African coastal belt which saw Portuguese domination of Pemba and Unguja Islands in Tanzania and Mombasa in Kenya between 1503 and 1506. The Pemba revolt followed in 1510, only to be subdued the same year (Akinola 1972; Nimaga 2011).

As European colonial trade continued, Portuguese and other European migrants who came to the coast of East Africa at the beginning of the 16th century, also came for the gold (MacDonald & Roe 2007). With the subsequent development of European colonialism in the mid-1800s, the associational life that was already established between the local community members and the Arab merchants was disrupted. What followed was chaos as slaves and community members turned against and killed their own leaders (Gray 1980; Higginson 1984). Some sources record that the Portuguese were not as good to the local people as were the Arab merchants. With the coming of Europeans, economic infrastructures that were already established within communities where the Arab merchants had settled were disrupted (AU & ECA 2011). Violence and suppression which resulted in the revolt seem to have taken a negative toll on the local economies. This resulted in a dwindling economic environment and harsh living conditions, forcing local community members to leave their homes to find peaceful areas where they could start new lives.22

Clearly, the priorities of the Arab merchants were different from those of the European-colonial Empire that followed, specifically, the Portuguese. It is noteworthy to mention that before the Great Depression in 1929, mining activities were not as important as cotton and coffee

farming in the economics and livelihoods of the population in the Lake Regions in East Africa (Roberts 1986).

**Mining Activities in the Colonial Tanzania**

European private foreign investment interest in Africa’s mining sector emerged in the mid-19th century. The industry at the time thrived and recorded rapid growth under the British colonial regime’s management and regulation. Business was, as it is today in Tanzania and a number of African mineral rich countries, conducted among the elites. As explained by Frick (2002):

> During the colonial period (roughly between 1850 and 1960) the Mining sector developed very rapidly and resulted in a world class industry in a number of regions on the continent which were producing a very large range of important minerals. Whereas the Colonial Governments provided the political, administrative and scientific knowledge frameworks for the industry, the capital, initiative and skills were mainly provided by private companies and individuals with equity raised on the European Stock Exchanges or through private stock issues. The development of the mining industry thus resulted largely through a form of direct foreign investment even though the investments were in a way captured investments by individuals or companies from the specific colonial power in their own colonies (Frick 2002: 3).[^23]

Historically, the Portuguese, British and Belgians were responsible for the colonial practices in Africa’s mining industry (AU & ECA 2011). The popular account about the European “discovery” of gold in Tanzania, according to some writers, was in 1884, in the Lake Regions of Tanzania (Lange & ESRF 2006; Roberts 1986). However, others like MacDonald & Roe (2007) in their report “Tanzania Country Case Study, the challenge of mineral wealth: using resource endowments to foster sustainable development”, place the “discovery” of gold in Tanzania in the year 1894. While the European colonial mining regime did commence in the late 19th century, it should never-the-less be stressed, as indicated above, that gold was discovered in Tanzania even before Vasco Da Gama and other Europeans invaded Tanzanian mineral rich areas in 1498 and 1560.

Another view widely in circulation among development practitioners is that “large-scale mining in Tanzania was formally established in 1997, facilitated by the country’s new Mineral Policy” (Goldstuck & Hughes 2010: 9). This claim overlooks the point made above: commercial large-scale mining in Tanzania commenced towards the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. Furthermore, it does not acknowledge the historical significance of the discovery of gold in the Geita, Kahama and Sekenke areas of the Lake Victoria Goldfields in the mid-1880s. The claim above does not even begin to acknowledge that the Sekenke gold mine could be described as the prototype for modern mining ventures in Tanzania. According to MacDonald & Roe (2007): “The first mine to start producing gold was the Sekenke in Iramba district in 1909. Other mines began operation in the Geita and Musoma districts in 1913 during the German colonial administration” (MacDonald & Roe 2007: 20).

In colonial Tanzania, mining activities started in the mid-19th century (Frick 2002; Giblin 199224) and the first multinational mining project commenced in 188425 after gold was discovered in the Lake Nyanza region (MacDonald & Roe 2007). “The German colonial government (1884 - 1917) introduced the concession system which gave companies exclusive mining rights over large areas” (Lange & ESRF 2006: 14). The colonial era was marked by domination through dispossession, by the influx of Europeans into the mineral rich areas in the colony, by land appropriation, expatriation of resources such as plants and wild animals and the creation of parks and large mining sites which led to the forceful displacement of the local community members (Mansfield 2007). In his views, Death (2012) writes that both German and British colonists “established particularly coercive, command-and-control styles of environmental planning and management, as elsewhere in the colonies” (Death 2012: 7).

The politics of the colonial power seemed indifferent to the needs of the local communities. Appropriated land, mineral extraction and the illegal transportation of plants and animals to foreign lands were all for the benefit and economic security of the dominant power. In the case of Tanzania, the resource exploitation, especially in the mining sector, was for the benefit, material security and furtherance of the European colonial enterprise, principally that of

---

24 Giblin (1992) writes extensively on environmental discourse in Tanzania, with a particular focus on agriculture and impacts of famine in Tanzania in his work titled, “The Politics of Environmental Control in Northeastern Tanzania, 1840-1940, published by the University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia - USA
25 http://www.tcme.or.tz/mining-in-tanzania/history/
the British colonial powers. The well-being of the general population throughout Africa, including Tanzania, was considered insignificant in the main decision-making processes. Contemporary mineral regimes in Tanzania could be said to have similarities to the colonial mineral regimes if not the very building blocks in the continuation of imperialistic legacy.

**The Building Blocks of Imperialistic Legacy**

In the period preceding independence through to 1967, both mining operations and the agricultural sector were under private, foreign investor ownership (Lange and ESRF 2006; Wobst 2001). After the Arusha Declaration 1967 the government acquired majority shares in a number of industries. As one of the main economically viable sectors, mining was one of the industries nationalised by Mwalimu Nyerere’s administration (Lange & ESRF 2006). This was followed by the establishment of the State Mining Corporation (STAMICO) in 1977, a period characterised by unproductivity (Lange & ESR 2006; MacDonald & Roe 2007; Wobst 2001).

At the time poor governance and a lack of skilled personnel (Frick 2002; AU/ECA 2011) to run the mines were cited to be the factors mitigating against the nationalisation strategy by the Tanzanian State under the Mwalimu Nyerere administration. Concurrent with the critique of state mining, the principles of the Arusha Declaration of 1967 were modified to make room for structural adjustment policies (SAPs).

The Foreign Investment Act of 1963 was replaced by the new National Investment Promotion and Protection Act of 1990. This act made provisions for incentives and guarantees to the investors to further attract foreign investment (Lange & ESRF 2006; Munganyizi 2012). This was followed by the formulation of the Mineral Policy of Tanzania (1997) and the repealing of the 1979 Mining Act, which paved the way for the Tanzanian Mining Act (1998). These two regulatory instruments made it clear that the government’s role was no longer that of a regulator with authority to reprimand MMCs in case of any operational malpractices on but mere promoter of business in the mining industry to potential investors. Further to this, these regulatory tools were seen as setting a business platform on which both large-scale multinational mining corporations and small-scale (artisanal) miners would operate, equally. This was done with the belief that large-scale - multinational corporations (MNCs) and artisanal miners’ activities could

---

26 According to the report commissioned by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the agricultural sector thrived mainly as Tanzania had adopted the World Bank’s “transformation approach” (Wobst 2001).
be done side by side (URT 1997; URT 1998). By this time in Tanzania’s mining areas, artisanal mining were almost insignificant as most of the areas where artisanal mining activities occurred were licensed to foreign mining companies.

![Map of Tanzania's mining areas](http://www.helioresource.com/i/maps/Tanzania-Map-DTM-Feb-09-1.jpg)

**Figure 3:** Multinational Senior Mining Companies in the Lake Victoria Gold Fields since 1995. Source: HelioResources Corp 2009: [http://www.helioresource.com/i/maps/Tanzania-Map-DTM-Feb-09-1.jpg](http://www.helioresource.com/i/maps/Tanzania-Map-DTM-Feb-09-1.jpg)

As seen on the map above, out of the 8 senior gold mine operations in Tanzania, Canadian Barrick Gold Corporation (BGC) and its British-based African subsidiary, African Barrick Gold (ABG)\(^27\) owns and operates four gold mines namely Bulyanhulu, North Mara, Buzwagi and Tulawaka\(^28\), including Kabanga Nickel. The formulation of Mining Policy 1997 and the enactment of Mining Act 1998 further attracted other investors. From the inception of trade liberalisation in 1995 to 2014, Tanzania’s mining sector has attracted over forty different

---

\(^{27}\) The timeframe of mining rights and mining activity concessions in Tanzania, in relation to Canadian multinational mining companies, especially Barrick Gold is difficult to pinpoint. Most of Barrick Gold operations were ‘grafted’ on to other original agreements as will be seen in the following chapters. But they can be traced as far back as 1983. Yet it would be satisfactory to say that mining concessions started in mid 1990s.

\(^{28}\) According to News reports “Mining operations at the Tulawaka mine ceased in 2013 with the gradual decrease of reserves. STAMICO, Tanzanian state-owned mining company, acquired the mine and its surrounding exploration licenses from African Barrick Gold (ABG) and Canada-based MDN Northern Mining in January 2014”. Information accessed on June 4, 2014 at: [http://www.mining-technology.com/projects/tulawaka-gold-mine/](http://www.mining-technology.com/projects/tulawaka-gold-mine/)
foreign mining companies and nineteen associate or mining equipment supply companies. These new arrangements led to the closure of STAMICO, the establishment of the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) in 1997, (Lange & ESRF 2006).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mine</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Mineral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulyanhulu</td>
<td>Kakola – Kahama</td>
<td>African Barrick Gold</td>
<td>Gold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Mara</td>
<td>Tarime – Mara</td>
<td>African Barrick Gold</td>
<td>Gold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buzwagi</td>
<td>Buzwagi – Kahama</td>
<td>African Barrick Gold</td>
<td>Gold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulawaka</td>
<td>Biharamulo – Kagera</td>
<td>African Barrick Gold</td>
<td>Gold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabanga Nickel</td>
<td>Kabanga – Kagera</td>
<td>African Barrick Gold &amp; Xtrata</td>
<td>Nickel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geita</td>
<td>Geita – Mwanza</td>
<td>AngloGold Ashanti</td>
<td>Gold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williamsons</td>
<td>Mwadui – Shinyanga</td>
<td>Williamsons Diamond</td>
<td>Diamond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golden Pride</td>
<td>Nzega – Tabora</td>
<td>Resolute Tanzania Ltd</td>
<td>Gold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buhemba</td>
<td>Musoma – Mara</td>
<td>Lake Victoria Mining Co.</td>
<td>Gold</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 4: Addendum of the mine sites identified on Figure 3 above.*
The table below lists active mining operations in Tanzania since it ratified trade liberalisation policies in 1995.  

**Senior Mining companies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th># Licenses</th>
<th>ML</th>
<th>PL</th>
<th>SML</th>
<th>Area(s)</th>
<th>Registered Name</th>
<th>Owned in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Barrick Gold</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bulyanhulu, Buzwagi, North Mara</td>
<td>Bulyanhulu Gold Mine Ltd.</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geita Gold Mine Ltd</td>
<td>SA/UK</td>
<td>12 PML</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Geita - Mwanza</td>
<td>Central Geita Gold Mines Ltd.</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golden Pride</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nzega - Tabora</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williamsons Diamond</td>
<td>Canada/SA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mwadui - Shinyanga</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TanzaniteOne Mining</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Arusha</td>
<td>Tanzanite One Mining Ltd.</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ML:** Mining License        **PL:** Prospecting License        **SML:** Special Mining License        **PML:** Primary Mining License

---

29 Part of this information indicating “Senior” and “Junior” mining companies depicts members of the Tanzania Chamber of Minerals and Energy (TCME). Information accessed on June 16, 2014 at: [http://www.tcme.or.tz/home/our-members/](http://www.tcme.or.tz/home/our-members/)


31 South Africa and United Kingdom

32 This information was accessed at: [http://www.flexicadastre.com/Tanzania/](http://www.flexicadastre.com/Tanzania/)

### Junior Mining companies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th># Licenses</th>
<th>ML</th>
<th>PL</th>
<th>SML</th>
<th>Area(s)</th>
<th>Operating Under/Registered As</th>
<th>Owned in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bafex Tanzania Ltd</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rukwa</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canaco Tanzania Ltd</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Handeni</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currierose Resources</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mwanza</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakota Resources Ltd</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shinyanga</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Royalty Corp.</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mwanza</td>
<td>Buckreef Gold Company</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twig Gold Ltd.</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nzega</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIKA Resources</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>120 PML</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Several ownership/shares</td>
<td>Various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDN (T) Limited</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Biharamulo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabanga Nickel Co.</td>
<td>Cnd/Australia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ngara</td>
<td>Kabanga Nickel Company Ltd.</td>
<td>50% x2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continental Nickel</td>
<td>Cnd/Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nachingwea</td>
<td>70/30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indago Resources</td>
<td>Cnd/Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>North Mara</td>
<td>49/51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mantra Resources</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Namtumbo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Metals Tz</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Namtumbo</td>
<td>Western Metals Uranium Ltd.</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uranex Tanzania Ltd.</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bahi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANZOZ (T) Limited</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not Clear</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coeur Tanzania Ltd.</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bunda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savannah Exploration</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not Clear</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanta Mining Co.</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chunya and Singida</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rangold Resources Ltd</td>
<td>SA/UK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Musoma</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

33 Co.: Company. The Kabanga Nickel also hold 1 Retainer License (RL)
34 Cnd: Canada
35 Various mining companies, for example Canadian Uranium One, Russian Rosatom Corp. (a subsidiary of ARMZ Uranium Holding Co.) are operating the Nyota Prospect uranium project under Mantra Resources Ltd.
36 Tanzania
Even though contemporary mining in Tanzania has been widely promoted by both Benjamin Mkapa (1995 – 2005) and Jakaya Kikwete’s administrations (2006 – Present), it is nevertheless wracked by governance problems. Observers put forward assertions of rapid growth in the Tanzanian extractive/mining sector as a possible source of economic stability to Tanzanians (MacDonald & Roe 2007; Lange & ESRF 2006; Death 2012). The social, economic and environmental conditions among the people of Tanzania, especially those living in the gold mining areas, are deplorable amidst the glitter of gold. The situation in Tanzania presents what seems to be a historical challenge. The lack of political will. This is a challenge found throughout underdeveloped and perhaps even some developed countries. Many countries in Africa lack a strong if not a deliberate political will to formulate laws and enforce such laws to make sure that natural resource revenues actually benefit people in the countries (and regions) where these reserves are found.

In his writings Mwalimu Nyerere seems to acknowledge the imbalance between Ujamaa principles which sought to protect Tanzania’s independence and freedom to formulate its own regulatory frameworks, and on the other development through foreign aid. In his own words he says the following:

The first responsibility of the government – its first principle – is the protection of Tanzania’s independence and its freedom to determine its own policies both internal and external […] yet this principle has already cost us aid from West Germany, and is undoubtedly affecting the quantity of aid from the other sources (Nyerere 1968: 189).

Tanzania has gone through significant changes related to mineral sector legislation. This has had varying impacts at different societal levels. Tanzanian governments have tried to formulate mineral policies which would, on one hand, attract foreign investment to the country and on the other hand, ensure that its people were well provided for. However, the paradox of it all lies in the reports of success in the implementation of the neoliberal capitalist market-led economic policies and the deepening poverty among the people of Tanzania (AU/ECA 2011). The Tanzanian state appears to have abandoned or forgotten the citizens living in mineral-rich regions of the country while collaborating with ‘imperialist’ Canadian extractive industries. As such, it appears that the Tanzanian government is more responsive to foreign (such as Canadian)
corporate interests than to local needs, and seems unable to prioritize the interests of the citizenry, especially communities in the vicinity of mineral resources.

Since before the time of Arab merchants, local community members in Tanzania had already developed their ways of extracting gold and other precious metals and stones. It is important here to stress that at this early stage (between 4th and 8th centuries) indigenous knowledge was widely used in natural/mineral resource exploitation as well as appropriation of mineralised lands by the colonial powers (AU & ECA 2011). Until recently (1999 – 2008), Tanzania recorded a gross annual earning of up to “$890 million” (Roe and Allan 2009: 18) from the extractive sector. While this record is verified, it appears that such profits are externalised to the benefit countries of the MMCs origin (Gordon 2010; AU & ECA 2011; Dumett 1985). It could not be overemphasised that the neoliberal capital market-led economy in Tanzania championed by the neoliberal proponents within the Tanzanian political administrations acted as a catalyst to resource pillage37 and “a means of private accumulation and wealth” (Shivji 2012: 112).

Methodology

My interest in selecting this topic for my Major Paper resulted from the work I have done over the years with a number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the Southern African Development Community38 (SADC). As an activist passionate about social justice issues, I found myself at a loss to understand why the majority of rural community members in the mining areas live in abject poverty in the midst of plenteous mineral wealth in their ancestral land. To understand this context, I desired to examine in depth what might be wrong with the management of natural resources within the political boundaries of African governments and the histories of colonial rules; also, to understand how this has affected prospects for the prosperity of their people. To start this journey, it seemed practical to start with the Tanzanian government.

In this Major Paper research, I employ document analysis. Its analyses is based on Parliamentary Hansards from the PURT (2008 – 2010), Ministerial and other government reports, news reports, reports published by non-state actors - CSOs,39 and scholarly literature.

37 In being co-opted, a very small number of political elite appear to be enjoying their share of the bounty.
38 Tanzania is part of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC).
39 Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) is used here as an inclusive term for all the non-state actors.
Chapters 1, 2 and 3 have utilised more of the academic material related to the individual chapters as well as government policy documents from the government of the United Republic of Tanzania (URT). Chapters 4 and 5 are a combination of Parliamentary Hansards from the PURT, Ministerial reports, News reports and scholarly papers related to respective sections.

**Organisation of the Major Paper**

In addressing the research question, the various sections of this Major Research Paper give, in Chapter one, a general historical background of Tanzania and its extractive/mining sector to date by contrasting the extractive/mining sector in precolonial, colonial and contemporary neoliberal structures; Chapter two attempts to understand African leadership and governance structures through the lenses of the Marxist school of thought by looking at the formation of African leadership and governance structures. It explores how the formative and colonial years have shaped or impacted the current leadership and governance structures within the Tanzanian context; with different structures at play within the Tanzanian leadership and governance system; Chapter three explores how cultural leadership and governance structures have contributed to the current governance structures in Tanzania; Chapter four examines the characteristics of the contemporary mineral-based trade relations between Tanzania; and Chapter five highlights and connects the historical and neoliberal mineral regimes realities in Tanzania. Chapter six concludes that leadership structures that evolved over time – since Tanzania became independent but significantly, since the demise of the Ujamaa policies driven government (1986 – current) are but serving the imperialist system introduced in Tanzania in mid-1600s.
Chapter 2


The State cannot enshrine and reproduce political domination exclusively through repression, force or naked violence, but directly calls upon ideology to legitimize violence and contribute to a consensus of those classes and factions which are dominated from the point of view of political power. Ideology is always class ideology, never socially neutral. In particular, the ruling ideology constitutes an essential power of the ruling class

(Poulantzas 1980: 28)

One of the questions asked by different development practitioners is; ‘What are some of the historical structural – even colonial factors contributing to the apparent ineffective leadership and governance structures in Tanzania?’ ‘What are the factors that contribute to the unresponsive leadership and governance structures in the African continent which leads to the mismanagement of its resources and deepening levels of poverty among citizens of the African countries, such as Tanzania?’ and ‘What role does the Tanzanian government play in directing the affairs of the United Republic of Tanzania?

This chapter attempts to understand and explain African leadership and governance structures from the lenses of the Marxist school of thought. It looks at the formation of African leadership and governance structures, and how the formative and colonial years might have shaped or impacted the current leadership and governance structures within the Tanzanian context.

The evolution of ‘African’ Leadership and Governance Structures

African leadership and governance structures were founded on lineage and/or kinship because land was communally owned within families and clans. This factor predicated livelihood patterns and called for an authority figure who could provide a sense of direction in terms of leadership for one such respective family/clan. Land was not just a heritage, but a major factor in bringing the community members together, not just within a particular local context but also with other members of the community at large – members from other clans and even from other
regions – as they traded goods harvested from subsistence agricultural activities and animal husbandry. There were also significant political dynamics, which Hamilton and Wright (1990) have captured when they state in their work on leadership structures in the Amalala clan of the Zulu tribe in South Africa. In their research Hamilton & Wright (1990) reveals that acceptance into or exclusion from a different kinship by way of marriage or covenant served to indicate members of a certain community’s politically included or excluded.

Until the 19th century, leadership and governance structures in Africa were communal. In the accounts given on the engagement of Arab merchants with local community members in the Swahili Coast, there is no particular mention of expropriation of land from local community members, but allusion is made to a kind of a relationship where local community members laboured, using traditional instruments for agricultural or mineral production to fulfil the demands of the Arab merchants (Sweezy & Dobb 1950). By the time Arab merchants settled in the Swahili Coast, it appears that most of the economic activities were of ‘feudal’ nature. The locals leased vast tracts of land to the Arab merchants. This resulted in local community members working for Arab landlords for livelihood purposes (Sweezy & Dobb 1950; Brown 1974; Bhaduri 1973). It could be suggested agricultural activities including animal husbandry were done using local knowledge. In other words, Arab merchants did not see the need to alter local epistemologies.

But the emergence of European colonial powers introduced new systems of learning and production. This required a new set of knowledge among local community members that would assist in the expansion of European domination. A few members of a community were selected to take part in such education which was geared to further “the domination and exploitation of the [African] continent as a whole” (Rodney 1981: 240), an education characterised by a number of attributes. In the first place, the education was foreign; it introduced foreign concepts among the local community members. The selective nature of this education brought a rift between community members as it not only implied favouritism of a kind, but also caused the selected

---

40 Marx and Engels, in their famous “Manifesto of the Communist Party” (1848) put it this way, “The bourgeois clap-trap about the family and education, about the hallowed co-relation of parents and child, becomes all the more disgusting, the more, by the action of Modern Industry, all the family ties among the proletarians are torn asunder, and their children transformed into simple articles of commerce and instruments of labour”, (Marx & Engels 1848: 24, 26).
members of the community to feel a little more important than the ones who were not selected for this foreign education. Conservation skills for sustainable use of resources were not inculcated, nor were help to create confidence and promote pride in being an African. Apart from the fact that this education did not take into consideration the pillars of the African societies (and hence the values that are communicated through community learning and language), it did not have depth to equip the local community members for employment beyond cheap labour (Rodney 1981; AU & ECA 2011). Also, this education had qualitative differences compared to that given to the European children. The European colonial education in pre-independence Tanzania was carried out in a few selected areas. For example:

…inside [colonial] Tanganyika, a map showing the major cotton or coffee areas virtually coincides with a map showing areas in which colonial education was available. [This] means that those whom colonialists could not readily exploit were not offered even the crumbs of education (Rodney 1981: 243).

Not only was this education meant to create a sense of difference between Africans and Europeans, it also created an uneven field of development among the community members socially and academically; it was used as an effective and systematic, if not structural, means to “eradicate African political power” (Rodney 1981: 226) by depoliticising selected Africans by imposing European political views and understanding through the colonial education system.

The sociopolitical and economic environment created by the European colonial powers in the African soil resulted in household rivalry and hate. This could be described as ‘selective despotism’.\footnote{This term “selective despotism” suggests a system which uses a select group of oppressed persons to exercise power over the entire community.} Local community members who were not working closely with the white European settlers felt marginalized in the colonial power structure as well as estranged from the community members selected to work for the colonisers. Another type of hate was that coming from the colonially\footnote{The terms “colonially educated” and “colonised intellectuals” are used interchangeably to refer to African people who received Eurocentric colonial education} educated community members, hating their own traditions as required by the colonisers, if they were going to be loyal. Yet another type of hate was that which the “colonised intellectuals” (Fanon 2004) felt against the colonisers when they realised that by siding with the colonists, they risked exclusion from their communities, families and kin (Fanon
This latter component of hate, the hate of white colonial oppressor could be said to have been carried into African liberation struggles.

**African Leadership and Governance in the Liberation Movement**

Leadership and governance appear to be fundamental in any discussion on factors weakening or strengthening social, economic and political structures. In his work “How Europe Underdeveloped Africa” Rodney (1981) highlighted that during European colonial era in a number of African countries, the European colonists economic security needs outweighed the racial theories. However, racial factors certainly played a role in defining the European colonist’s agenda.⁴³ Given that race remained a significant basis for oppressions, calls for liberation emerged from both African community members who lived under oppression and from the local community members who served as agents for the colonial domination. In a speech on African liberation, Eduardo Mondlane⁴⁴ (1920 – 1969) is quoted saying that the Mozambican liberation efforts were characterised by hate. And that he acknowledged that Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique⁴⁵ (FRELIMO) was formed out of “hatred of colonialism and the belief in necessity to destroy the colonial structure and to establish a new social structure” (Saul 2011: 20).

Suggested in that excerpt from Mondlane’s speech is the fact that in the wake of calls for African liberation in the 1950s, there was a glaring lack of a concrete political ideology and implementation plan among African liberation (Saul 2011). But such a blanket statement undermines the sociopolitical credibility of the personalities who embodied this struggle such as Kwame Nkrumah, Patrice Lumumba, Gaafar Nimeyri, Kenneth Kaunda, and Julius Nyerere etc. However, it can be assumed that African liberation fathers of many newly-independent African nations assumed that “…they had the freedom to plan their development in ways compatible with their own economic and cultural traditions” (Sethi 2011: 5). It could be suggested further that the African liberation pioneers believed that they could merge both Eurocentric colonial and

---

⁴³ This point was well explained by CLR James (1901 – 1989) who is quoted by Rodney (1972) to have said, “The race question is subsidiary to the class question in politics, and to think of imperialism in terms of race is disastrous. But to neglect the racial factor as merely incidental is an error only less grave than to make it fundamental” (Rodney 1972/1981: 89).

⁴⁴ Eduardo Mondlane was an educator, a nationalist, and the leader of the Mozambique independence movement Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO). In 1969 Mondlane was killed by a bomb which had been disguised as a notebook and sent to him by unknown assassins. This is an excerpt on Mondlane from BlackPast.org online index, accessed on April 30, 2014 at: [http://www.blackpast.org/gah/mondlane-eduardo-chivambo-1920-1969](http://www.blackpast.org/gah/mondlane-eduardo-chivambo-1920-1969)

⁴⁵ Mozambican Independence Front
African cultural governance structures and values to produce a sociopolitical and economic system that would work.

What seems plausible is the argument suggesting that African liberation fathers paid inadequate attention to the fact that colonial experience in Africa introduced new social, political and economic structures which appropriated “a very large part of the economic surplus [and] bureaucratically directed economic activity in the name of promoting economic development” (Saul 1974: 351). This was ultimately a threat to their assumed vision and mission to bring about social and economic development to benefit the citizenry without the involvement of foreign elements (Saul 2011). The neocolonial context, as theorized by Nkrumah (1965), Fanon (2004), Rodney (1972), etc. placed limitations on the revolutionary leadership in Africa. If they did not play the role of enabling “the neocolonialists to pursue their class interests in the postcolonial societies” (Saul 1974: 352), they would be socially, politically and economically ‘punished’. Out of fear of such punishment, which was accorded to African Freedom fighters such as Patrice Lumumba, Kwame Nkrumah and later Julius Nyerere, to name a few, many African leaders resorted to align political and economic of their countries to that of the colonial dominant powers.

**The Characteristics of the State Apparatus within the Tanzanian Context**

Tanzania has a vibrant history of peasantry. Its ‘liberation’ struggles brought together peasants and proletarian, a group which comprised of teachers, peasants and community members who can simply be called villagers (Stein 1985; Saul 1974; Engelbert 2000). A people whose livelihood was/is tied to tilling ancestral land or land allotted to them by the governing authorities. From a Marxist point of view, peasantry is subordinate to the dominant mode of production providing casual labour when needed. One of the peculiar characteristics of this traditional mode of production is that it is not deterred by the constraints pertinent to the world of neoliberal capitalist market-led economy (Roberts 1990). Proletarians on the other hand are members of the society who by virtue of having no means of production of their own, sell

---

46 It should be noted though that peasants and proletarians in the context of Ujamaa polity are rather fluid words and require a lot of caution. This caution is related to the fact that there is a rather insignificant line of division when these two groups are discussed. The same peasant you saw becomes the proletarian you are yet to meet. In other words these words identified, to a greater extent, the same coin with different identities on each side.

47 In the Tanzanian context villagers have long been identified with subsistence farming and pastoral activities in the rural settings.
their services for a wage. This group has been seen as the most vocal when it comes to demanding the rights of the working class.

Because of their colonially received knowledge, several writers on the subject of “postcolony” have viewed the role of the postcolonial State apparatus as inherited from the coloniser. The argument behind this claim is that the postcolonial leaders do not have independent perspectives from the received colonial principles (Mbembe 2001: 24). If this claim is true, then, the State in Tanzania48 assumed the role of authority patterned after the dominating culture of the imperialistic and colonial rule – characterised by systems of “subjection” (Stein 1985; Mbembe 2001; Fanon 2004 Saul 1974; Mbembe 2001). This theory is supported by the works of Miliband (1969) in the discussions on “advanced capitalism” and the production of the “managerial and corporate ‘new class’”, (Miliband 1969: 38). Apart from suggesting that industrial relations, which could be considered from similar perspectives as political relations, “remains one of domination and subjection”, he goes on and elaborates (and echoing sentiments from Fanon 2004) that:

…the industrial armies of advanced capitalism, whoever their employers may be, continue to function inside organisations whose patterns of authority they have had no share in bringing into being, and to the determination of whose policies and purposes they have made no contribution (Miliband 1969: 39)

This leads to asking the question as to whether the leadership in the postcolonies was made up of bourgeois class. Was there a possibility that in Tanzania, there arose an elite capitalist class in the transition between the colonial regime and, specifically the transition from the capitalist economic trajectory to Ujamaa in the Arusha Declaration 1967?

Marxists define the bourgeoisie as a group of people, few in number who hold ownership of the world’s wealth and means of production. It is a class born out of the feudal society which

48 Tanzania claimed its independence from the British colonial authorities in 1961, which was followed by the union of Tanganyika, Unguja and Pemba Islands to become Tanzania in 1964. As a way to strengthen national autonomy, in 1967 the Tanzanian government under the leadership of Mwalimu Nyerere made a declaration, famously known as Azimio la Arusha 1967 (Arusha Declaration 1967). Enshrined in the Arusha Declaration was the call by the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) for nationalisation of the means of production, strengthening the agricultural sector among others, as strategies to lessen dependency on foreign entities and improve the lives of the people of Tanzania (Stein 1985). This period not only marked Tanzania’s departure from, if not contestation of, the capitalist mode of production but also Tanzania’s “transition [to] a bureaucratic [and] hegemonous” (Stein 1985: 106), economic and political systems.
in the contemporary reality reproduces itself through new forms of wealth accumulation and wage-labour relations (Marx & Engels 1848; Freyhold 1977; Panitch & Gindin 2012). According to Marx and Engels (1968), the bourgeoisie finds ways in the course of time, to connect with the political organisations or movements to advance and replicate itself. Given this definition and by its composition and early resistance to capitalism, Tanzania as a country cannot be said to have produced proper bourgeois class.

Within the Tanzanian context, rather than the production of an elite bourgeois class, there arose a type of elite class identified by titles ranging from “bureaucratic bourgeoisie”, “exploitative/progressive factions”, Nizers,49 or a “faceless Class”, to “Wabenzi”50 (Shivji 2012; Stein 1985; Mueller 1981; Saul 1974; Freyhold 1977). This group, of elite class have by and large taken somewhat ‘neutral’ position. In their political vocation, they maintain social and political fluidity. This way they are able to have access to both the citizenry of their nation-states and the ruling class (Stein 1985; Mbembe 2001; Fanon 2004; Saul 1974). Therefore, the State apparatus in the postcolonies, including Tanzania, have ‘unwittingly’ or deliberately taken up the role of foreign economic interest intermediaries, and turning the State apparatus into “a terrain of [reckless] accumulation” (Shivji 2012: 106).

**The Tanzanian Government: Accountability and Structural Allegiances**

Very early in the post-independence period, Kwame Nkrumah (1965) coined the term “neocolonialism” to express the extent to which nominal political independence and sovereignty was limited by the reality of continued external or foreign economic domination and control. In some cases, this foreign control was maintained through the strategic creation of political elite that collaborated with foreign interests. Views expressed by Marxist theorists such as Fanon (2004) and Rodney (1972), capture in detail the nature of relationships between the coloniser and the colonised, the creation and production of social strata and how such capacities as created have been utilised to expand the European dominated imperialistic rule in the ‘former’ colonies beyond the physical presence.

---

49 'Nizers' or 'nizations' (from Africanization) is a term applied by Tanzanians to refer to that stratum or class which social scientists have called 'educated elite', 'labour aristocracy', or 'petty bourgeoisie - those who took over important administrative and economic positions when colonialism was defeated […] 'Nizers' is a precise and dialectical term. It refers […] the progressive aspect of Africanization, to the promise that those who take over the power would return this power to the people on whose behalf they took it away from the colonialists’ (Murray 1974).

50 Those who own Mercedes Benz vehicles as an indication of individual wealth and prosperity.
In Tanzania, leadership and governance structures at independence in 1961 not only carried elements of colonial dominant policies into the new government system but used employed expert capacity from the Colonisers in the initial establishment of the new nation-state (Hoskyns 1968). Consequently, “new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle” (Marx & Engels 1848: 14) arose, as it were, to replace the old systems of oppression. Evidently, the old systems of oppression had been elevated to a different level which not only legalises the historical primitive accumulation but ensured that contesting voices are silenced by despotism or nepotism, co-optation or compradorship.

Classical Marxist theories on the role of the State clearly indicate that State apparatus is a tool – an instrument, in the hands of the ruling class useful in enforcing pro-social stratum policies as well as guaranteeing the stability of the ruling class (Marx & Engels 1848; Marx & Engels 1968; Miliband 1969; Lenin 1974; Jessop 1982; Wetherly et al 2008). This theory finds its support in the partisan politics within capitalist market-led economies. Miliband’s work on the topic suggests that such systems are focused on producing leaders “who tend to succeed each other in office in […] capitalist countries [and] whatever their political labels or party affiliations, are bourgeois politicians”, (Miliband 1969: 69). This is clearly seen within the Tanzanian political context where most political leaders are groomed over time, starting at the lowest ranks in the political parties and ministerial departments and moving to a level where they become affluent politicians able to protect and promote the dominant party’s interests.

There is no doubt that African leadership and governance structures have evolved over time and this could be the reason for the apparent shift from the traditional leadership and governance structures. It could be proposed here that leadership and governance structures up to the time of colonial aggression towards the end of the 16th century were synthetic – that is to say, combined feudal and indigenous African characteristics. Apart from the force of European colonial domination being felt so strongly in Africa, due to a lack of strong united political convictions, it could be said that such entrenchment of European colonial ethics swiftly rooted

---

51 Even though much of the preceding discussion gives perspectives on practices that took place before the rise of neoliberalism, it is difficult to pinpoint significant differences. Principally, terms and guidelines in the relations between the state apparatus then and now, remains fundamentally the same.
itself in the African context as Africans welcomed colonial powers through the lenses of Ubuntu\textsuperscript{52} philosophy, unaware of the intentions of the European settler community.

Ineffectiveness of leadership and governance structures in Tanzania as well as other postcolonial States in Africa, especially in addressing political and economic affairs could be viewed in three different ways. First, from Mondlane’s speech cited above, the African liberation struggles were partly misguided and lacking concretely formulated political thought. Second, political theories adopted by African nation-states including Tanzania, immediately after ‘liberation’ were not formulated independently from the ones that were in place during the colonial period (Rodney 1981; Fanon 2004). Affiliation with colonial political theories weakened young African postcolonial States from developing assertive, constructive and inclusive political theories to maintain African communal associational life as well as environmental values. Last, is the view which argues that postcolonial African leadership and governance structures were influenced by the desire to dominate. European colonial domination was based on mineral economics. Tanzanian mineral resources were accessed by the help of local leaders. Similarly, leaders in the postcolonial nation-states seek new social, political and economic alliances to protect and further wealth and political interests, regardless of the consequences to the citizenry.

---

\textsuperscript{52} Ubuntu means ‘My humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in yours.’ Human beings belong together in a bundle of life. A person is a person through other persons. A person with Ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good, for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who they are (Paraphrased from Tutu, Desmond 1999: No Future Without Forgiveness; Published by Doubleday, Random House Inc. New York).
Chapter 3

Cultural Structures and the Dynamics in State Decision-making Processes

...relationships which have redistributive elements can contain the germs of differentiation or be outright unequal

(Guyer 1981: 101)

The preceding chapters have explored various aspects of the formulation of leadership and governance structures in African. It is clear that European colonial structures left ‘indelible’ impacts on future leadership and governance structures in the postcolonial African States, including Tanzania. Hand in hand with this, it also appears that there are synthesised leadership and governance structures in Tanzania in particular. Accusations from the Global North of corrupt leadership and lack of capacity in Africa are frequent. Indeed, different reports blame ‘corruption’ and ‘lack of capacity’ as factors that lead to the deplorable living conditions within Africa’s social and political contexts, including that of Tanzania (AU/ECA 2011). Foreign management of natural/mineral resources within African States including Tanzania has focused on capacity building and uprooting graft; its social, political and economic structures are affected by kinship, ethnic/regionalism and household practices.

With different structures at play within the Tanzanian leadership and governance system, this chapter explores how cultural practices in Tanzania have affected leadership and governance structures in Tanzania. How do kinship and household allegiances impact leadership and governance structures in Tanzania? How do nepotistic structures – cultural or political - affect decision making processes in Tanzania leading to the mismanagement of its natural/mineral wealth endowments? And what are some theories that have been prominent in explaining underdevelopment in African countries, including Tanzania?

53 In the multitude of divergent views invoking factors which have led to weak or failed states in Africa, cultural practices, i.e. ethnicity, kinship, household allegiances are rarely considered as major factors. This is done either by way of deliberate omission or by assumption that kinship, ethnicity and household politics doesn’t affect national leadership and governance structures.
The Role of Kinship and Ethnicity in the Tanzanian Politics

Although at its independence in 1961 to the inception of Ujamaa policies in 1967 Tanzania seemed to have played down tribalism and promoted a united Tanzanian society, these policies did not do away with household and kinship structures which continued to exist within the State power and decision-making processes in Tanzania. This was in large part due to the pre-existence of household and lineage structures within the Tanzanian society prior to colonial domination. Household structure in Tanzania were concerned with “domestic unit […] decision-making autonomy [in relation to] production and consumption” (Guyer 1981: 89), on one hand, and lineage with “African local organisation” (Guyer 1981: 90) on the other.

African leadership and governance structures were, and to a greater extent are still based on kinship (Samatar 1997; Guyer 1981). Even in the 21st century, it would seem, there are still elements of extended relations, African traditional values and associational life in the leadership and governance structures. Such traditional values could be said to be comparable to those of native people in America, Guinea and other parts of the world (D’Azevedo 2009; Guyer 1981). The difference is only found in the fact that in Africa, Western capitalist principles tend to seek an operational balance with African ways of life – traditional practices as pertaining to leadership and governance structures. This is different in other indigenous environments over time; native communities have been reduced to a minority both in economic and associational life environments (Guyer 1981).

Even though traditional chiefdoms are not as discussed in the Tanzanian context as in other countries in Africa, especially in Southern and West Africa, there were, nevertheless, established kingdoms and or chiefdoms. Such advisory bodies were known as councils made up of “sub-chiefs [and] headmen” (D’Azevedo 2009; West 1998). These structures were (and still are in African countries like Zambia) equivalent to the local administration authorities. Chiefdom structures trace their foundations from the founding ancestor of one respective community. They are hierarchical and “arranged in accordance with [relationship] distance from this ancestor. Numerous attached groupings” (D’Azevedo 2009: 509) and future residents identified themselves by the name of the elder who led the community members to their settlement in the

new locality (West 1998). This not only marked a territory belonging to a community, but a livelihood territory as well, and to a greater extent traditional political boundaries. With the help of the council members, the chiefs executed their roles among the community members. Fundamental decisions related to community’s welfare were therefore made consultatively between the chiefs, sub-chiefs and elders.

Tanzania introduced a “descending” government system (Ingle 1972: 211), with the lowest rank being at the village level. The introduction of the “Ten-house cell” system in Tanzania in 1963 was seen by the Mwalimu Nyerere administration as a way to create a discursive platform within communities, establish accessibility structures (community members would easily have the ears of central government leaders) and be the medium through which needs of the local community members would be effectively communicated to the central government and obviously strengthening TANU, (Ingle 1972). The Ten-house cell was led by *Mabalozi*. Since Tanzania started working towards eradicating tribalism and focusing on building a united nation, leaders/elders were chosen from the immediate communities. Most of these leaders were appointed through consensus with respect to their good reputation and through recommendations from elders making up the village council. Empirically, there were and still are instances of conflict of interests as to the persons who would take the *Balozi* position. Lineage, kinship and wealth played a decisive role.

However, the Tanzanian political landscape has changed to comply with trends of capitalism which have gained momentum. The neoliberal capital market-led economic system has dominated social politics, as well as environmental and economic discourses within central and local governance structures. Such powers within local communities have now taken a more political strand and are bent “toward [a] more complex social differentiation” (D’Azevedo 2009: 517). Guyer (1981) denotes that such changes could be traced back to a time when the terminology shifted from using such words as household/lineage to peasants. This shift marked the transition from a traditional African associational life to a more globalised view of life within an African setting, reflecting more and more Western/foreign ways of life. This adopted

---

55 Ten-House Cell is a system in Tanzania which appoints a village council representative for a village council area consisting of ten households. The representative (an elder) of the Ten-house Cell unit is known as *Balozi*
56 “Ten-House Cell” elders (plural) in Kiswahili.
57 “Ten-House Cell” elder (singular) in KiSwahili
associational life promotes self-gratification and caring for one’s needs and that of one’s family, and divorcing one’s thoughts from the communal life that had characterised most communities in the African context for centuries. This trend is rife within the Tanzanian community, whether in politics, trade relations, or in recruitment circles.

_Ujamaa_, even though it introduced a system where the state “[orchestrated] public and private accumulation [through an attempt] to restructure local and kinship relationships” (Guyer 1981: 107), ownership of land, which is considered as the principal resource in Tanzania and a number of countries in Africa, remained in the hands of the newly formed kinship structures. The new economic dispensation in Tanzania not only brought differentiation, but also heightened the sense of the need for individual gain. Economic gain, in this case, seems to have taken precedence over other cultural values. While this should not be seen to suggest that family ties are severed, it does speak to the volatility introduced by the new focus – the neoliberal capitalist society trend within the Tanzanian communities. _Ujamaa_ in Tanzania created new forms of household and kinship relations and reproduced synthetic ethnic practices, it also introduced another type of proletarian segment of the society characterised by economic nepotistic politics, partisan politics, and nepotistic partisan politics. It is important to make a distinction of these three viewpoints as they have importance in domestic politicking in Tanzania as relates to globalisation and development discourses. Economic nepotistic politics refers to the fact that family/household and kinship ties play an important role in the recruitment practices in Tanzania which, apart from demarcating household and or ethnic territory, serve as an assurance of economic security when members of such community groupings lose their work, and economic security. This has been described by the general public in Tanzania as “…getting in front of

58 There are several aspects to the discussion about ethnicity in Africa, which, while important, lie outside the scope of this research. First, ethnicity should be looked at from a larger grouping perspective. Tanzania is home to three large ethnic groups, the Bantu, the Nilotic and the Cushitic. Each grouping is made up of a number of clans. Ethnic grouping can also mean a small group of people, for example the indigenous people. These are represented by the hunter-gatherer communities, Akie (Ndorobo) and Hadzabe, and the pastoralist Barabaig and Maasai communities. These groups differ from the rest because of their unique lifestyles, but they still belong to the main three ethnic groups as noted above. It is also important to note the different groupings in Tanzania – especially the difference between an ethnic group and a tribe. The latter represents one kinship group made up of community members who speak the same language and presumably come from the same ancestor or the first person who settled in an area. For example the Kurya, the Basweta, and the Chagga tribes are all from the Bantu ethnic group. Tanzania is the home to more than the three main ethnic groups, as it also has a long history of being the home of the Asian and Arabian diaspora communities. This research are limited to the Bantu, Nilotic and Cushitic ethnic groups.
someone who works in the relevant industry, and being remembered by them when the right opportunity arises”.

Partisan politics refers to political positions with the main focus on promoting one party’s politics. Such political inclination has only strengthened ruling class politics, hierarchy, and puppetry (Fanon 2004; Rodney 1981; Marx & Engels 1848; Marx & Engels 1968; Miliband 1969; Mbembe 2001), and such trend is clearly seen in how the chieftain positions were used by the colonial dominant powers for intermediary purposes (Rodney 1981; Fanon 2004; Welsh 1996; Guyer 1981; West 1998; Samatar 1997; Berg-Schlosser 1984).

A third category within the African political landscape is partisan nepotism. This refers to a political trend which is family/household or kinship based. Even though Tanzania for a long time stood out among other East African Community (EAC) countries in maintaining a measure of ethnic diversity as far as leadership and political office-bearing roles are concerned, the country seems to be experiencing drastic changes with regards to this reputation. While Tanzania has had different phases of government transitions, all its leaders have come from the same party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), which led the country’s claiming independence.

Such nepotistic practices are becoming more visible in Tanzania. For example, in recent news, opposition Members of the Parliament were cited as decrying the rising levels of nepotism within the Tanzanian labour industry. The Parliamentarians were quoted as saying that “…vacant posts in the civil service are either filled by 'Godfather' clientele methods, or by outright nepotism”. Even though this speaks of recruitment within the civil service, it is not, however, limited within the confines of civil service sector as it is also found within the civil society and public institutions placing job vacancies in the newspaper as a formality after a position has already been occupied”.

---

59 This report goes further to explain that nepotism in Tanzania has entrenched itself in the labour sector to an extent that, “It is commonplace for even some public institutions to place a job vacancy in the newspaper as a formality after a position has already been occupied”. Accessed at: http://www.staffingindustry.com/row/Research-Publications/Daily-News/Tanzania-Nepotism-undermining-recruitment-agencies-27184

60 Partisan politics cannot be said to be peculiar to the Tanzanian context, as it is a political practice widespread in Africa as well as other countries in the global south.

61 Since its independence in 1961 Tanzania has had 4 different heads of State who sprung from different ethnic groups. Mwalimu Julius Nyerere came from the Zanaki people of Tanzania, Al haj Hassan Mwinyi is from Kivure in the Tanzania’s Coast Region, Benjamin Mkapa is from Ndanda – Masai in the Southern part of Tanzania, and the fourth phase president of Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete is from Msoga, a village in Bagamoyo District – Coast Region.

62 The Revolutionary party of Tanzania (CCM) was born out of the merger between Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) and was established in 1977. TANU/CCM has dominated Tanzanian political scene since the country’s independence.

the recent decentralisation and devolution discourses in Tanzania (Berman 1998). One of Tanzania’s most progressive social media hubs reveals that the problem of nepotism is becoming more and more visible, especially within the fourth sitting government, under the Kikwete administration. One of the discussants stated the following:

... Now in Tanzania we see a very high level of nepotism in politics, and many people here seem to take this as normal. Some even give praises for this sad trend. I really don't understand Tanzanians. We see nepotism in ministerial posts picks. We see nepotism in public servants picks. We also see nepotism in [Members of Parliament] MPs picks, and some of these people are being prepared to be our future rulers, to replace their parents/seniors, and worse enough, no merits are always considered in these picks, and people sit here and offer their hypocritical congratulations. If Tanzanians (especially the educated ones) will fail to decry this open nepotism, then Tanzania will never change because these picks will always protect and conserve the status quo. In fact, nepotism is one of key features of [President Jakaya Kikwete’s] JK's leadership (you can't exclude this sad reality from his leadership). Tanzania may be leading on this untold reality in Africa (much as it leads in begging, albino killings, etc. etc. very sad indeed.64

The statement above comments not only on how entrenched nepotism is within the governing systems, but also points out that such practices are condoned. This leads to the question “how is it possible for such a system to pursue equity and meet the needs of the general members of the Tanzanian public?”

Of Nepotism and Distributive Justice

A spoken word artist cum musician in Tanzania, Mrisho Mpoto in his celebrated song, “Nikipata Nauli”65 (If/When I get fare), focuses on Tanzanian politicians serving their own interests and those of their extended family members as a way to create security for their years out of employment. The song also talks about the passivity of political leaders in exacting justice for the marginalised citizens. And while joining the forces of graft on the one hand, by their actions and using their positions, they instil the sense of fear among the people by employing

brute force. This song expresses the way politicians and public servants in Tanzania justify their wealth and flee public scrutiny – by giving evidence of being benevolent to their relatives. This song serves to show that the network system within the Tanzanian governance structures jeopardises decision-making processes which would result in distributive justice.

Since the emergence of the SAPs (1970s), through to the Washington Consensus (1989) and the development project (1990s), Tanzania has attempted to ensure that it ‘judiciously’ follows the development frameworks set by the Bank\textsuperscript{66} and the Fund.\textsuperscript{67} Yet through such proposed efforts aimed at fostering political reform and equity participation, (and even if Tanzania is lauded by the international business community as making progress towards consummation into the neoliberal capitalist society) (Death 2012), “the evil triumvirate of patronage, corruption and [nepotistic trends appear to reassert] their retrograde influence”, (Berman 1998: 306) pulling it back into the archaic and imperialistic culture of domination.

While there were exerted efforts during the African liberation to do away with kinship and ethnopolitics, the latter cannot be done away with as they are part and parcel of African society (Wunsch 2000; Welsh 1996; West 1998, Ake 1993). Because of household, ethnic and partisan politics, it is difficult for members of such groups to disown one of theirs in pursuit of distributive justice, which can only be realised by having a free and untied hand to social strata allegiances which, at best, creates societal schisms, socio-political and economic woes in the national context.

\textit{Popular Theories regarding the Underdevelopment of African States}

Most political scientists still hold that the underdevelopment of African States results from such States’ lack of “capacity to design and implement policies, make credible commitments, run an efficient bureaucracy and provide constraints to opportunistic behaviour”, (Englebert 2000: 8). The latter assumption seems to receive wide acceptance not only in the imperial global north, but also among nation-state players in the global south. Such acceptance is seen in the manner in which countries in the global north not only run but create scenarios of want, to be able to play the saviour role to the poor – both mental and material poverty, in the global south.

\textsuperscript{66} Refers to the World Bank (WB)
\textsuperscript{67} Refers to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Other theoretical perspectives are those which have received wide acceptance among government figures, scholars, and the civil society which claim that African States are underdeveloped as a result of “ethnic diversity [which has] led to social polarization and entrenched interest groups” (Englebert 2000: 9), and such weakness as seen in the African institutions results from inheriting “artificial polities from colonialism [and resorting] to neopatrimonial strategies” (Englebert 2000: 9), as a way to protect the interests of the ‘developed’ peasants (Fanon 2004; Englebert 2000; Mbembe 2001). The analysis of this topic would propose that the above theories are correct as theories, but cannot be taken as the final verdict on the topic. Modern day leaders in Africa, including those in Tanzania have more education and are able to make their policy-based decisions on the direction the governing class should take to ensure the security of the masses socio-politically and economically.

It would appear that kinship and nepotistic attitudes play a big role in the Tanzanian politics. Kinship and partisan politics seem to be one of the main challenges, if not the primary challenge, confronting rational decision-making processes within the Tanzanian governing authorities. This has led to the current power dynamics, which in turn, promotes the silencing of voices within the Tanzanian State apparatuses and individual personnel who attempt to support and advocate for the welfare and equity in the distribution of revenues from the exploitation of natural/mineral resources. With an inclination to ‘territorial’ politics characterised by both kinship and partisan politics, the Tanzanian government has not been effective in prioritising the interests of the people of Tanzania.
Chapter 4

The Canadian State and Its Contemporary ‘Trade’ Relations with Tanzania

…the postcolonial relationship is not primarily a relationship of resistance or of collaboration but can best be characterised as illicit cohabitation, a relationship made fraught by the very fact of the commandement and its ‘subjects’ having to share the same living space. It is precisely this logic, the necessary familiarity and domesticity in the relationship that explains why there has not been [...] the resistance or the accommodation, the disengagement or the ‘refusal to be captured’.

(Mbembe 1992: 104)

The previous two chapters have explored political and cultural factors contribute to shortcomings in leadership and governance structures in Tanzania. These factors seem to promote the apparent apathy in the Tanzanian government to address the needs of its citizenry. European colonial practices in collaboration with cultural leadership and governance structures as seen in Tanzania are essentially systems of appropriation and personal gratification. Critics suggest that the 1967 Arusha Declaration and subsequent social and economic strategies were only but a ‘façade’ of a government which was entrenched in colonial practices and merely interested in domination of the rest of the country’s populace. In principle the relationship between Tanzania and Canada has over the years been driven by ‘benevolence’. However, it has distorted Tanzanian production systems and weakened Tanzanian government’s ability to attend to the social, economic needs of its citizenry. This chapter explores and examines the characteristics of the contemporary mineral-based trade relations between Tanzania and Canada. It will address the fundamental principles in the natural/mineral resource-based relationship between Tanzania and Canada. What are the economic impacts of Tanzania – Canada mineral-based trade relations? What roles have the Canadian government and Canadian MMCs played in strengthening or weakening institutional and policy frameworks in Tanzania?

Characteristics of Trade Relations between Tanzania and Canada

In the Colonial period, and in order to succeed in ‘assimilating’ Africans into a belief that they belonged to a German or British territory, the colonial powers formulated what could be termed as a common law to regulate land ownership. Starting with the Germans, and then later the British colonial periods, land rights and the sense of entitlement to the ancestral land by Tanzanians was lifted and in accordance to the “Imperial Land Ordinance of 1895 [all land was] vested as crown [property]” (Emel et al 2011: 74). Access and control of land was critical to accessing both arable and mineralised subsoil. According to earlier research findings, there were already seventy six (76) mineral prospecting fields identified and a hundred and eleven (111) claims as early as 1910 (Chachage 1995; Emel et al 2011).

This trend was not abandoned when Tanzania became an independent state. The postcolonial Tanzanian State did not change the colonial articles which catalysed expropriation of land from its citizens, but carried out similar principles in the formulation and enactment of the 1969 Mining Ordinance which repealed the 1929 Mining Ordinance. It is stated in the 1969 Mining Ordinance that, “The entire property in and control of all minerals in, under or upon any lands in Tanganyika are and shall be vested in the President” (URT 1969: 1). Similarly, the repealed Mining Act 1998 and the new Mining Act 2010 express the same principles on ownership of land and natural property control. However, these last two legislations have minor differences in the way they are written. The last parts where ownership and powers to control the use and disposal of land for domestic, investment or other uses, state, “subject to the provisions

---

Even though the latter part of the Mining Act 2010 paints an imagery of the Head of State being responsible and answerable to the ‘republic’ on matters related to land and exploitation of such resources as found “on, in and under the land” (URT 2010), such allusion has no real effect in Tanzania, especially in the extractive or agribusiness sector. Due to this legislative structure relating to ownership and control of land and all mineral resources, the government of Tanzania or the representatives of the United Republic of Tanzania can appropriate land from its own citizens at any time and grant control to whomever it pleases. Colonial legislative ‘remnant’ positions such as that found in the Tanzanian case, are not peculiar to Tanzania. Mégret (2011), writing on mining in Burkina Faso, confirms further that most former colonies were subjected to the same imperialist mining ordinances. In the case of Burkina Faso, it is evident that the legislative position on land ownership coincided with land reforms implemented in 1984. The reforms gave “exclusive” land ownership rights to the State. Supporting this is Burkina Faso’s 2003 Mining Code, Article 5, which expressly states that “Natural mineral substance deposits in the soil and subsoil of Burkina Faso are, by law, the property of the State” (Op. cit. pg 395).
of this Act the entire property and control over minerals on, in or under the land to which this Act applies is vested in the United Republic\(^7\) (URT 2010: 13).

In the name of development, and economic progress, as indicated above the Canadian government as early as the 1970s was involved in alienation of vast tracts of land from Tanzanian community members through the Tanzania-Canada Wheat Complex (TCWC) project. Securing land for the TCWC project was facilitated by the government of the United Republic of Tanzania. Today, BGC/ABG – a Canadian multinational mining company (MMC) operating in Tanzania, claims to “own land” (Rubara 2008) in Tanzania. This ownership is not just for purposes of their immediate operations. Rather, they acquire land in excess, some of which is not put to use, while community members in the mining areas suffer great need for land (Chachage & Mbunda 2009; Rubara 2008; Chachage 2009). In this analysis, Greg Walker, the then (2008) general manager at Barrick Gold Corporation’s mine site at Kakola in Bulyanhulu is quoted as saying:

> We have been holding discussions with the government on whether the Kakola – Bulyanhulu residents should remain on the land where they are right now for a long time but until now we have not reached a consensus. Seeing what the people go through, we have decided to give them the land. Actually it is not yet theirs but we are finalising legal documents to finally hand over the land to Kakola people, (Rubara 2008).

In both the case of the pastoral community in Hanan’g and in the operations in the extractive sector, the Canadian investment ventures in Tanzanian mining sector appear to follow the colonial methods of claiming local property rights, especially land ownership. Experientially, such rights are either granted through mineral exploration or mineral development agreements. Similarities could be drawn between the current system in Tanzania where investors in the extractive sector own land and that of the colonists; the legislative structures inherited from the colonial period remain unchanged. Leaving the major sectors in Tanzania, the agricultural and the extractive sectors under the control of the investor community replays the colonial methods

\(^{7}\) Italics mine to show the difference between the earlier versions which either gave the rights of ownership and control of the natural resources to the “Crown” or the “President” as with the 1929 and 1969 Mining Ordinances. This alteration is important as it helps to recognise the sense of the representative role of governing authorities. However, this does not mean that the governing authorities are deterred from abusing their given positions for their own benefit at the expense of the people of Tanzania
of wealth accumulation where “institutional structure [served] metropolitan interests” (Gulhati 1990: 1148). The relationship between the Canadian and Tanzanian governments appears to evidence ‘master-servant’ relationship paradigms. The Tanzanian government seems to be playing the role of providing “political and legal security [as well as offering] support to mining firms for acquiring and controlling the requisite [Tanzanian] labour” (AU & ECA 2011: 13).

The Tanzania-Canada Relations Impact on Microeconomics

Critics of governance structures of the Global South economies such as Tanzania have long argued that underdevelopment in the South results from different levels as well as different versions of corrupt practices (Cole et al 2004) within the governing class structures while the general population lives under deplorable conditions and abject poverty. Other analysts would go as far as suggesting that governance structures in the Global South, especially in Africa, are not stable – as they are characterised by the ‘survival of the fittest’ elements. Empirically, leaders who neither have confidence nor capacity in a profess that requires both, will succumb to opportunistic strategies to stay in such positions. Indeed, African leaders are said to harbour personalistic objectives “to survive as rulers” (Gulhati 1990: 1148). This attitude towards leadership promotes nepotistic trends as well as corruption. Another perspective presented when discussing the underdevelopment of nation-state governance structures in the Global South highlights the ‘lack of capacity and expertise’ among State actors in the Global South countries (AU & ECA 2011).

A number of commentators have shown that Tanzania struggles with macroeconomic management. In fact, it has been described as facing “serious macroeconomic mismanagement” (MacDonald & Roe 2007: 7), along with governance deficiencies which characterise governance and development discourses in the Global South countries with regards to managing resources for sustainable development (MacDonald & Roe 2007; AU & ECA 2011). Such ‘comparative’ analysis is drawn from social and economic development indicators from the contexts where neoliberal capital economic methods have had significantly positive economic impact.

---

71 The work conducted by Cole et al (2004) especially focuses on countries whose economies are dependent on FDIs with respect to creating pollution havens. Even though its main discussion is on the subject of corruption from an environmental politics perspective, this work is useful as it articulates the general perception of neoliberal capitalist system’s sociopolitical, economic and environmental critics on global north-south economic discourse dimensions.
Even though the 1962 UN Declaration of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources\(^2\) stresses ‘sovereignty’ of countries to control and utilise natural resources for the benefit of their citizenry, the reality is the very opposite. It is apparent that affluent countries such as Canada still find ways to manipulate governance structures in underdeveloped ‘sovereign’ postcolonial states, such as Tanzania, with the help of the IFIs, for their own economic gain. The sense of ‘sovereignty’ over natural resources invoked by the UN appears not to encourage group action against economically dominant countries; rather, it appears to encourage bilateral agreements which have characterised the mineral exploitation sectors globally. This analysis is descriptive of the relationship between the Tanzanian and Canadian governments.

MacDonald & Roe (2007) write of the rapid growth of the mining sector in Tanzania since the mid-1990s and its ‘presumed’ contribution to the national economy. This report also claim that artisanal mining activities “contributed less to Tanzania’s employment and [to the gross domestic production (GDP)]” (Op. cit. pg. 7) compared to the contributions from large scale multinational mining operations. This study which looked at the economic contribution trends of the mining sector from 1996 to 2003 deplored the results as ‘below expectation’. Another report issued by the Religious Mother-bodies in Tanzania including Tanzania Episcopal Conference (TEC), Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT) and Baraza Kuu la Waislamu Tanzania (BAKWATA)\(^3\), which analysed revenues from the mining sector in Tanzania between 1997 and 2005, reported revenue loss to Tanzania of up to $265.5 million “as a result of an excessively

\(^2\) “In 1952, the General Assembly requested the Commission on Human Rights to prepare recommendations concerning international respect for the right of peoples to self-determination. The Commission on Human Rights recommended the establishment of a commission to conduct a full survey of the right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources, having noted that this right formed a “basic constituent of the right to self-determination”. In accordance with this recommendation, the General Assembly established the United Nations Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources on 12 December 1958 under resolution 1314 (XIII). In 1961, this Commission adopted a draft resolution outlining principles concerning permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Following consideration of this draft resolution by the Economic and Social Council and the Second Committee of the General Assembly, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1803 (XVII). Resolution 1803 (XVII) provides that States and international organizations shall strictly and conscientiously respect the sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural wealth and resources in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles contained in the resolution. These principles are set out in eight articles concerning, \textit{inter alia}, the exploration, development and disposition of natural resources, nationalization and expropriation, foreign investment, the sharing of profits, and other related issues.” Accessed on April 11, 2014 at: http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ga_1803/ga_1803.html

\(^3\) The National Muslim Council of Tanzania
low royalty rate, government tax concessions that allow companies to avoid paying corporation tax and possibly even tax evasion by some companies if allegations are true” (Lissu & Curtis 2008: 7). Within the same period other reports suggested that Tanzania was making progress economically with indicators of significant contributions from the mining sector both at the national and grassroots levels.74

**The 'Machiavellian' Economic Partnership in Canada-Tanzania Relations**

Canadian MMCs interest and involvement in Tanzania go back to 1983. According to information on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE), Sutton Resources,75 the Canadian Mineral Exploration and Development Company based in Vancouver, British Columbia first listed its operations in Tanzania with TSE on June 8, 1983. Due to financial challenges and “trouble obtaining financing because of weak gold prices [Sutton Resources sold its business equity to Barrick Gold Corporation (BGC)] for about $350 million in stock” (NY Times 1999). This goes against the common belief that Canadian MMCs in Tanzania begun operating in Tanzania in mid-1990s.

With the implementation of trade liberalisation policies after Tanzania became a member State at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on January 1, 199576; it witnessed an influx of interest from foreign investors (Igoe 2006; Lange & ESRF 2006; MacDonald & Roe 2007; Bourgouin 2011). Especially, after the formulation and enactment of the Tanzania Mineral Policy of 1997 and Mining Act of 1998 respectively, both of which allowed absolute foreign ownership (Bourgouin 2011; Mjimba 2011; Lange & ESRF 2006; MEM 2009). and multinational mining corporations (MMCs) became dominant forces in gold production At the inception of the SAPs in the 1970s, countries in the Global South were confronted by a number

74 In his presentation in Vancouver, Canada in 2004, entitled “*Impact Assessment and the Mining Industry: Perspectives from Tanzania*”, Professor Raphael Mwalyosi writes that, “…mining sector has already recorded an impressive growth of around 17% a year between 1997 and 1999. Estimates show that mining will contribute more than $ 1 billion a year and contribute over 10% of the GDP […] the production of gold enabled the investors to pay taxes to the government to the tune of 47 billion Tanzania shillings by 2002, 17 times more than in 1997 [and] according to the observations by Tanzania’s Minister for Energy and Minerals recently, the Sector has not made any significant contribution to the alleviation of the country’s poverty”. This information was accessed at: [http://www.tzonline.org/pdf/impactassessmentandtheminingindustry.pdf](http://www.tzonline.org/pdf/impactassessmentandtheminingindustry.pdf)


76 Information accessed at: [http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/countries_e/tanzania_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/countries_e/tanzania_e.htm)
of conditions prescribed by the Bretton Woods System (that is to say the Bank and the Fund) before ‘development’ funds disbursement could be effected.

Privatisation and trade liberalisation policies acted as ‘connectors’ between the elite community made up of the international organisations, political and administrative leaders from Tanzania and Canada as well as the executives from the MNCs. Notably, the influx of FDI into Tanzania did not just attract investors from the Global North but also from the Global South, especially from South Africa. Although there was already South African involvement through De Beers in the operations of Williamsons Diamond in Mwadui – Shinyanga since the 1930s, it is clear that “Tanzania became the leading recipient of South African investment capital in 1998, with FDI topping about US$443 million” (Kabelwa 2002: 2). Although this reception of FDI from South Africa could be read as a way for Tanzania to show support to the process of ending apartheid in South Africa, it also coincided with the major changes that were taking place in Tanzania with respect to trade liberalisation policies that were sweeping across the globe starting in the early 1990s (Kabelwa 2002). Between the year 1994 and 2002 when South African FDI to Tanzania became significant, a total of 59 South African operations were registered. These operations were cross-sectoral and were actively involved in mining, security services, manufacturing, tourism, petroleum, services, construction, and agriculture (Kabelwa 2002).

Even with such mineral concessions granted to foreign MMCs including non-restrictive tax regimes, imposing of fiscal incentives among etc. the relationship between the representatives of the MNCs and the government actors and others in the business promotion sectors remained selective. Within such social and professional groups, there are those who are pro-mining as well as those who are against mining operations. The mining/extractive sector became a peculiar case for contestation. Having in mind that structural reforms in Tanzania were

---

77 The Williamson diamond mine is operated and owned by De Beers [75%] and the Tanzanian government. The Mwadui kimberlite was one of the world’s largest producing kimberlite pipes. The mine has been in operation since the 1930’s and has produced as much as 2Mct. From 1940 – 1970, Williamson Diamonds undertook an extensive exploration program covering nearly all of Tanzania. More than 300 kimberlite pipes were found, of which 60 were found to be diamondiferous. Information accessed at: [http://www.mbendi.com/indy/ming/dmnd/af/ta/p0005.htm](http://www.mbendi.com/indy/ming/dmnd/af/ta/p0005.htm)

78 Sanctions against this regime prevented South African companies from investing their profits abroad. The adoption of a democratic regime in 1994, however, released this previously dormant investment capacity. Since then, South Africa became the major source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in many African countries (Kabelwa 2002: 4)
acceded to by way of ‘compromise’\textsuperscript{79} (Bourgouin 2011) between the governing authorities, the TNCs and the Bank, the extractive industry, as a prime economic and investment sector in Tanzania, immediately attracted competing forces. Such forces were formed with business ideologies, institutional and legal frameworks on the one hand and ‘Machiavellian’ trends on the other.

The first item, it seems, on the list to be discussed once the structural economic reforms proposals were ratified by the Bank, the Fund and Tanzanian government in 1995 was the role of the State apparatus. Similar to other countries which previously accepted the development conditions from the bank and the Fund, the role of Tanzanian government was reduced to that of legitimising presence of FDIs and providers of security to the interests of foreign investments (Bourgouin 2011; MEM 2009; Mjimbwa 2011; Emel et al 2009; Mégret 2011; Szablowski 2007; Gordon 2010). That is to say, the role of the Tanzanian State was ‘redefined’ (Campbell ed 2004). Besides the views of the scholars cited above, it would be plausible to suggest that this “redefinition” of State apparatus role, is in fact, the reinstatement of imperialistic principles. Local people in leadership in the colonial period in Africa were allowed positions of authority only for strategic purposes, i.e. to act as agents of the colonial powers.

Relationships between the governments, mining companies’ executives and corporate promotion agencies became more obvious in the business bidding process in pursuit of prospecting and mining licence issuance. One such instance depicts the Canadian government through its diplomatic mission in Tanzania lobbying for Sutton Resources’ operational interests in Tanzania (Lissu 2001; Kerr & Holloway 2002). According to the reports published on Canada’s interest in the mining sector in Tanzania in 1996, it was reported that while Canadian TNCs executives lobbied their stakeholders to consider investing in the Tanzanian mining sector in the wake of the trade liberalisation policies implementation, “the Canadian government threw its weight behind [Sutton Resources’] management to convince the Tanzanian government to remove the [artisanal] miners” (Kerr & Holloway 2002: 4).

\textsuperscript{79} As for the saying ‘history repeats itself’, the proposals for new agricultural projects were proposed to the Tanzanian government at a time of need. Canada’s proposal for the TCWC project came at a time when Tanzania “was attempting to qualify for the World Bank’s [Highly Indebted Poor Countries] HIPC [whose] conditionality included macroeconomic reforms”, (Butler in Campbell ed 2004: 70)
Excerpts from correspondence between the Canadian High Commissioner at the time, Verona Edelstein’s office, and Ottawa concerning the transfer of ownership of the Kahama Mining Corporation Ltd. (KMCL) equity from Sutton Resources to Barrick Gold Corporation (ABG/BGC) predicted that the “Tanzanian Government will be clearing mining site of illegal miners beginning 20 of May [1996]” (Kerr & Holloway 2002: 5). The transition of management of KMCL operations from Sutton Resources to BCG was documented to have been characterised by gross human rights violations. Reports from various sources, such as Mines and Communities (MAC 2001), Palast (2003), Glynn (2006), Mining Watch Canada (2002), Conason (2001) to mention a few, reported that over 50 artisanal miners died as a result of being buried alive in the artisanal mining shafts. This happened when Barrick Gold Corporation BGC was backfilling the shafts within its newly acquired KMCL property in 1996. This was part of the exercise aimed at clearing ‘illegal miners’ (Lissu 2001; Kerr & Holloway 2002; Palast 2003).

The Canadian government came once again under the spotlight in 2008 when the most recent mining legislation (Mining Act 2010) was being tabled in the Tanzanian Bunge. It was

---

80 Barrick Gold Corporation (BGC) has since February 2010 changed its name to African Barrick Gold (ABG). According to the information on their Annual Report (foreign private issuer) Filed 03/28/13 for the Period Ending 12/31/12, pg. 23 states that “Barrick no longer has an African [Regional Business Unit] RBU; however, for reporting purposes [African Barrick Gold] ABG continues to be treated as an operating segment within Barrick. Barrick currently holds a 73.9% equity interest in ABG. The assets, liabilities, operating results and cash flows of ABG are consolidated by Barrick. ABG’s operations consist of its Bulyanhulu mine, its 70% interest in the Tulawaka mine, its North Mara mine and its Buzwagi mine, all located in Tanzania”. Information accessed at: http://www.barrick.com/files/agm/Barrick-40F-2012.pdf

81 The reports cited above record the number of artisanal miners who were buried alive as between 50 and 52, empirical evidence and accounts from local people (and from my personal experience working with communities in the mining areas in Tanzania) suggests a higher number – over 70 artisanal miners buried alive in the mining shafts in the clearance exercise by BGC. The latter claims are difficult to prove as the recommendation by Judge Mark Bomani for an independent investigation in 2002 (Kerr & Holloway 2002; IRIN News 2002) ‘fell’ on deaf ears. This situation was later blamed on pressure and intimidation from foreign and local (Canadian/Tanzanian governments and the Canadian MNCs executives) players which led to the judicial repression which characterised the whole process (Lissu 2001; Kerr & Holloway 2002; Simbeye 2002). Apart from the reports of human rights violations and forced killings, the take-over of the Bulyanhulu gold fields also led to the loss of means of livelihood for at least 400,000 Tanzanians whose lives depended on artisanal mining activities (Lissu & Curtis 2008).


84 “There is Death in them thar’ Pits”: Canada's Barrick Gold in Tanzania: http://www.dominionpaper.ca/features/2006/07/05/there_is_d.html


86 “Exporting Corporate Control: A Gold Company with Ties to the Bush Family Tries to Muzzle a Muckraking Journalist”: Common Dreams: http://www.commondreams.org/views01/0721-08.htm

87 The Parliament
reported that the then Canadian High Commissioner to Tanzania, Janet Siddall, accompanied by “a high-level Canadian delegation” (Simbeye 2008) paid a visit to the Tanzanian Parliament in an “attempt to influence” (ThisDay 2008) concluding discussions on the amendments recommended after the probe by the The Presidential Mining Review Committee (PMRC), also known as the Bomani Commission. Among other recommendations, the Bomani Commission recommended that the government of Tanzania needs to:

- motivate its citizens or “villages owning license to come into share with [multinational] investors so as to benefit from the income than selling their land” (URT 2008: 100)
- increase the “value of royalty in diamond and unprocessed gemstones to rise from 5% to 7% and for the processed to rise from 0% to 3%” (URT 2008: 102)
- increase the royalty for metallic minerals like Gold, silver and copper to be elevate from 3% to 5% (URT 2008: 102)
- enact into law and require MMCs “to pay withholding tax during the interest payment done to related parties” (URT 2008: 105)

The Bomani Commission report also highlighted poor relations between the MMCs and local communities in the mining areas, environmental pollution by the MMCs, conflicts between MMCs and artisanal miners and mine workers. As well, the Bomani Commission report highlighted lack of linkages between the extractive sector and other social and economic sectors in Tanzania. Lack of public awareness of mining activities as relating to the sector’s social, environmental, economic, and political impact was also prominent. The Bomani Commission report attributed all this to “weakness in the mining [sector’s] oversight system and in the legal system” (URT 2008: 28).

89 In this research, the translated “popular” version of the Bomani Commission’s Report published by Policy Forum is used. This version was accessed on April 23, 2013 at: http://www.policyforum-tz.org/files/BomaniReportEnglish.pdf
90 Even though Tanzania the mining sector in Tanzania have attracted many investors from countries like Australia, Britain, South Africa etc. the PMRC highlighted poor relations between Barrick Gold Corporation and communities in the areas of their operations such as Bulyanhulu, North Mara and Buzwagi.
In his article, Wa Simbeye (2008) says that this delegation was meant “to lobby lawmakers on delaying or altogether rejecting some of the most constructive proposals made by a presidential mining sector review committee”.

The Bomani Commission report (URT 2008) also indicated that the emergence of neoliberal resource exploitation activities in Tanzania, including those of Canadian MMCs, such as Sutton Resources and Barrick Gold Corporation took advantage of departments within the Bank such as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). Both of which made it difficult for a poor country like Tanzania to negotiate a better economic deal for its people (Lissu 2001).

On May 16, 2013 Canada and Tanzania entered the Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA). This agreement has been viewed by critics as another form of the 1999 proposed – but dismissed in analysing the signing of the FIPA between the Tanzanian and Canadian governments, Butler & Rubara (2013) perceive this step as a strategy “to protect Canadian investments in Tanzania [as well as a strategy to limit future] possibilities for Tanzania to introduce policies that will protect and favour domestic businesses and Tanzanian citizens against aggressive foreign competition”. Such agreements as FIPA are only advantageous for the Canadian government. It is not yet clear why the Tanzanian government made the decision in signing this document while there is a backlog of social, environmental and economic related to the mineral-based trade relations to be dealt with between Tanzania, Canada and Canadian MMCs.

In their analysis on Tanzania-Canada FIPA, Butler & Rubara (2013) describe the Canadian attitude as featuring “all the now-classic elements of a neo-liberalized investment regime designed to favour and benefit transnational business”. This is reminiscent of the Marxist theory of instrumentalisation through strategic policy influence “to [support] status quo that

---


92 The Canadian government is busy negotiating similar agreements with other countries. Online records from Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada show that between 1991 and 2014 the Canadian government has engaged 51 countries in the FIPAs. Out of the 51 countries, “27 FIPAs are in force, 3 FIPAs signed, 10 concluded FIPAs negotiations, and 11 ongoing FIPAs negotiations”. Accessed online on “Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada” website at: http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/index.aspx?lang=eng
undermines accountability and democratization” (Tripp 2012 – Abstract). On his part, Gordon (2010) suggests that wealth accumulation trends adopted by the Canadian government in its relationship with countries in the third world under the guise of ‘the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments’ is imperialistic. He says further that the character of Canada is that of a “country [which] actively participates in the global system of domination in which the wealth and resources of the third world are systematically plundered by capital of the global north” (Gordon 2010: 9).

**Canadian MMCs’ ‘Parasitic’ Business Trends in Tanzania**

The analysis on the nature of the relationship between the Canadian and Tanzanian governments at the State level clearly shows unequal trade “cohabitation” (Mbembe 1992) is founded on colonial structures and perpetuates colonial principles characterised by satellite-metropolis ideologies.

Lack of public awareness on the impacts of MMCs’ activities as identified by the Bomani Commission (URT 2008), and lack of political will, on the part of the Tanzanian State apparatus, could be seen as loopholes taken advantage of by the Canadian MMCs to further the imperialistic pillage of resources from Tanzania. The Canadian MMCs involvement could be described as parasitic in nature. Apart from this parasitic attitude, the Canadian MMCs operating in Tanzania, especially African Barrick Gold (ABG), is reported to engage in lobbying the government of the Tanzanian government at different times and in different ways. Greg Walker, the then (2008) ABG’s general manager at its Kahama Mining Company Ltd. (KMCL) operations in Bulyanhulu stated: “[ABG] has been in dialogue with the government on a number of the newly proposed policies on mining. There are those which are harsh to an operation like ours and we have asked them to review them if at all we are going to help Tanzania make economic advancement from mining activities” (Rubara 2008).

The attitude evidenced by the Canadian MMCs is far from being exclusive to Tanzania and other mineral rich countries in the Global South contexts. Canadian MMCs are also reported

---

93 I employ the term ‘parasitic’ in this context to show that Canadian MMCs, especially in relation to ABG/BGC operations in Tanzania, while opportunistic, seems to flourish at the expense of local community members. The deaths and the blood of local community members seem to be ABG/BGC’s economic fertiliser.
to practice the same ‘parasitic’ culture within Canada. Any self-determining policies related to the rights of the indigenous people are seen as an impediment for mineral exploitation. In this Globe and Mail report, MMC in Canada called for “a more favourable tax regime, better cooperation between Provincial and Federal governments [and] a more streamlined and standardised process for dealing with the government’s duty to consult [and attend to] the concerns of the Aboriginal and other communities”. As would be expected and similar to other postcolonies, it is the responsibility of the State to deal with rights relating to the local community members. In the Tanzanian context where governance structures have been declared weak, the MMCs have smooth sailing and have dealings only with senior ministerial officials, the Head of the State, and when it suits their needs, with selected individuals who have the ears of the man at the top.

Mineral-based trade relations strategy employed by the Canadian government and its MMCs in Tanzania, and perhaps other countries in Africa and elsewhere in ‘the global’ and Global South countries evidences a “a neo-liberal subject who operates in a contemporary zone of neocolonialist power relations […] situated in a web of unresolved historical trauma associated with colonial and racial violence” (Butler 2014: 87, 92). And just as it was with the Tanzania-Canada Wheat Complex (TCWC) project in 1970s, so it seems in the neoliberal mineral-based trade relationships between Tanzania and Canada. In the Tanzanian experience, Canadian benevolence is a self-serving – economic raw deal accompanied by social, environmental and economic injustices.

---

94 For example, advocates for mining activities in the native territories in Canada recently suggested that consultative approaches are a ‘waste’ of time. In a seemingly ‘arrogant’ extrapolation published by the Globe and Mail, the Canadian MMCs community expressed how “building and operating the complex mines that contributed $52 billion in GDP to Canada’s economy in 2012 is a relatively straightforward task compared to the heavy lifting often required to navigate the [mining] industry’s regulatory regime and cope with challenges such as Aboriginal consultation “Miners Call for Further Reforms: Sector Sees Regulatory Improvements but want More Cuts to Red Tape”; Globe and Mail, Special [Report]; Monday, March 3, 2014 Issue, IM1.


96 I am using this term in inverted commas to identify mid-range economy countries which even though poor when compared to developed countries in North America and Europe and elsewhere, their (countries such as China, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Argentina, Egypt etc.) poverty levels cannot be compared to that in many countries in the Global South (without inverted commas).
Chapter 5

The Neoliberal ‘Pomposity’ & Its Realities in Tanzania

[Tanzania is] faced with a choice: Either to resist change and be swept aside by that massive wave and continue to be tossed around on the margins of global development in the 21st century; or to rapidly change our policies, administrative practices and our thinking in order to devise means and strategies to enable us to benefit from this new system of global relations.

(Benjamin Mkapa's⁹⁷ May Day 2001 Speech Excerpt in Lissu 2001: 51)

The previous chapters have highlighted the historical sociopolitical and some of the economic factors instrumental for the apparent apathy within leadership and governance structures in Tanzania. Contrary to the expectations of the people of Tanzania created by the enunciation of the emergence of the neoliberal era in Tanzania in 1995, the neoliberal development forecast has deepened poverty and a sense of dejection among community members in the mining areas. This chapter gives a historical snapshot of community based mineral exploitation and highlights social, economic, environmental and political realities of neoliberal mineral-based trade relations between Tanzania, Canada and Canadian MMCs.

Rural Communities and Mining Activities in Tanzania

Contemporary artisanal small-scale mining activities were recognised in Tanzania since 1960s (Chachage 1995). These activities developed rapidly and coincided with the rise in gold prices in the 1970s (Lissu 2001). Artisanal mining activities started in Bulyanhulu goldfields in Kahama District much earlier, later to be joined by similar activities in North Mara area in 1980s (Lange 2008(2); Spiegel 2012). At this stage, artisanal mining served as secondary livelihood activity (Kitula 2006; MacDonald & Roe 2007). Subsistence farming was the primary livelihood, and still is among the majority of Tanzanian rural communities. However, in the 1980s and coinciding with the end of state monopoly of the mining sector (Spiegel 2012), the Tanzanian

⁹⁷ Benjamin William Mkapa was the Third Phase Head of State in the ‘postcolonial’ Government of the United Republic of Tanzania
government encouraged artisanal mining and even formalised the artisanal mining sector. As such, artisanal mining was recognised as part of the national social and economic growth (Lissu 2001; Spiegel 2012; Mutagwaba et al 1997). Many people from the Tanzanian rural setting joined in artisanal mining as a “sub-sector for their livelihood and poverty reduction efforts” (Scoble et al 2007).

Artisanal mining is labour intensive. But records show that between 1980 and 1995 artisanal mining sector employed between 400,000 and 1.5 million people (Chachage 1995; Lissu 2001; Lange & ESRF 2006; Scoble et al 2007; Kerr & Holloway 2002; Scoble et al 2007). Those who carried out artisanal mining activities were mainly from the rural areas in Tanzania. Other research states that “officially, there were 1,440 small scale claim holders and 480 prospecting certificate holders in 1993, [and] at a very conservative estimate of 10,000 people per site, there were about 900,000 people involved in small scale mining and auxiliary activities” (Chachage 1995: 6). However, the increase in the artisanal mining activities between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s in North Mara and Bulyanhulu was accompanied by an influx of population as well as “a variety of economic and socio-cultural activities, and agricultural production changed to respond to the new needs created” (Lissu 2001: 29).

In recognising growth and the contribution of artisanal mining activities to the national economy, the government of Tanzania under Ujamaa policies enacted both the Gemstone Industry (Development and Promotion) Act in 1967 and the 1979 Mining Act (Chachage 1995) to protect artisanal mining sector as well as secure government revenues. The government established structures which allowed local miners to sell their gold to state authorities through the Bank of Tanzania (BoT) (Chachage 1995). In the arrangement, artisanal miners were paid and taxed accordingly. As they dealt with BoT directly on the sale of artisanally-produced gold...
and other precious stones and metals, the government could not be said to have experienced tax evasion. There was, in effect, a productive partnership between peasant miners and the State. The 1979 Mining Act required applicants for both prospecting and mining licenses to present a plan for the employment and training of Tanzanians, as well as for local procurement of goods and services. However, such requirements became obsolete at the time Tanzania joined the WTO in 1995. Since industrial mining was much less labour-intensive than artisanal mining, and due to lack of modern skills and education commensurate with requirements of the modern mining among rural populace, peasant miners lost their artisanal mining sites. As well, the appropriation of vast tracts of ancestral land from local community members in these areas affected the agricultural sector significantly. The Mkapa administration acknowledged the contribution of artisanal – small-scale miners in the “discovery of the mineral occurrences, mineral production and creation of employments and creation of incomes in the rural communities” (URT 1997: 15). Subsequently, the government of Tanzania, through the Mineral Policy of 1997 ‘promised’ the creation of an enabling environment for artisanal miners in the Policy’s (URT1997: 15, 16 #3.3.6 i-vii).

But in the wake of multinational large-scale mining in Tanzania, the MMCs claimed that within a very short time it contributed “almost 4% of total tax revenues and over 3% of total domestic budget revenues [which is] not insubstantial contribution [as compared to] “almost nothing” from the artisanal mining activities (MacDonald & Roe 2007: 10). Other research findings contradict this postulation by MacDonald & Roe (2007) as it concludes that artisanal mining in Tanzania provided more direct employment opportunities to rural Tanzanian citizens, (Chachage 1995), especially women who accounted for “30% to 50%” (Scoble et al 2007: 6) of the workforce, than large scale mining activities. Chachage (1995) writes that “Tanzania was hardly gaining anything from their [MMCs] “operations”. It was the small scale miners who remained [as] the major foreign exchange earners up to the second half of the 1990s” (Op cit. pg. 7). Another report commissioned by FBOs in Tanzania documented evidence which stated that large scale mining created around 10,000 jobs between 1997 and 2007 compared to the artisanal
mining sector which employed between 500,000 and 1.5m people. It concludes that “large scale mining may have made around 400,000 people unemployed” (Lissu & Curtis 2008: 9).

In the documentary film titled “A Golden Opportunity?” local community members recount how Tanzania’s third phase government under the Mkapa administration promised them that they “would ensure that there is partnership between artisanal miners and MMCs”. As already indicated from the excerpt of Mkapa’s address to Africa Gem Resources (AFGEM) meeting in 2001, the highlights of anticipated prosperity in welcoming large scale miners in Tanzania’s mining sector set a high tone of hope.

This promise did not materialise. The adverse social, economic and environmental impacts in Tanzania resulting from the Canadian MMCs’ operations have received wide coverage in the contemporary news as well as countless professional and academic research. Mkapa’s speech highlighted the ‘new’ economic dynamic, the desire not to be left behind and the urgency to catch up with the rest of the world economically. In his speech, Mkapa urged Tanzanians to emulate the rest of the world and called upon Tanzanians to change. In this Mkapa made an urgent appeal for Tanzanians to join the rest of the world in “creating conducive policy, administrative and legal environment” with a warning of possibilities to “reduce [Tanzania’s] attraction to investors” (Mkapa in Lissu 2001: 51). The ‘new’ economic dynamic introduced through the implementation of the neoliberal capital market-led economic system, required land.

According to Lissu (2001), “in June 1995 [and] on the on the basis of [Prospecting Licence] PL 216/94, KMCL commenced legal proceedings in the High Court of Tanzania against small-scale miners [operating at the Bulyanhulu gold fields] seeking to evict them…” (Op. cit.) As would be expected, this became a battle of ownership between the artisanal miners and KMCL. Even though the justice system in Tanzania is said to have identified flaws in the transaction pitting the artisanal miners and Canadian Sutton Resources, in his verdict Judge Mchome found no “provision made for compensation and/or resettlement of the indigenous

100 It is proper to emphasise that this estimate only accounts for the number of artisanal miners evicted from the Kakola – Bulyanhulu area artisanal gold mining fields in 1996. Going by the initial estimates, it is possible that the number might be higher than this estimate given by Lissu & Curtis (2008), Lange & ESRF (2006) etc.
101 “A Golden Opportunity?”, (at 17m: 50 Sec – 18 m: 02Sec); Accessed on June 17, 2014 at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eaY0h1qnIh0
102 Italics mine
people” (Lissu 2001: 31); the process of clearing artisanal miners proceeded (Lissu 2001; Kerr & Holloway 2002).

Even though artisanal miners were initially made to believe that there would be joint ventures between their activities and those of the Canadian Barrick Gold Corporation (BGC), by Mkapa’s administration, proved futile, if not utopian. The mineral policy reform process was figuratively depicted by Mkapa (in Lissu 2001) as ‘bitter medicine which stands between cure and death’ (Op. cit.). The results of this figurative speech became more evident as Canadian MMCs established their operations in Tanzania.

**Canadian MMCs in Tanzania: Socio-environmental Impacts (Kahama and North Mara)**

The Canadian MMCs from the beginning of large scale gold mining in Tanzania have ‘stolen’ the limelight in social, economic and environmental injustices. These are related to reports of high levels of gross human rights violations in their mining operations within the Tanzanian mining sector (Lissu 2001; Kerr & Holloway 2002; Lissu & Curtis 2008; Bitala et al 2009). The first incident of brutality leading to deaths of local community members was reported during the takeover exercise of the KMCL mining area from the artisanal miners in 1996 at Bulyahulu, which ultimately spurred an international outcry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Incident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 5, 1994</td>
<td>Sutton Resources granted prospecting license for KMCL mining area in Bulyanhulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1994</td>
<td>Barrick Gold Corporation lays claim over KCML licenced area in Bulyanhulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1995</td>
<td>Barrick Gold Corporation lodges application asking eviction of Artisanal miners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 29, 1995</td>
<td>High Court of Tanzania rejects Barrick Gold Corporation application for evictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 9, 1995</td>
<td>Barrick Gold Corporation appeals against High Court’s decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 22, 1996</td>
<td>Barrick Gold Corporation withdraws its lodged appeal against High Court’s decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 30, 1996</td>
<td>The government of the United republic of Tanzania orders eviction of artisanal miners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 2, 1996</td>
<td>Artisanal miners challenges the order to vacate Bulyanhulu area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 12, 1996</td>
<td>Media reports on 23 artisanal miners feared dead by being buried alive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 13, 1996</td>
<td>Media reports on 52 artisanal miners dead on claims of being buried alive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2000</td>
<td>MIGA provides $172 million guarantee for Barrick Gold Corporation’s KMCL project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2002</td>
<td>International Fact-finding Mission visits Bulyanhulu but denied access</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

105 M. Islam and M. Rweyemamu, ‘Uncertainty reigns over the Kahama Killings: The number of those dead in the mines feared to reach 52: Photos of the dead sent to Dodoma: They were allegedly buried by graders’, Tanzania Newspapers, Tuesday, August 13, 1996 issue.
The Bulyanhulu and North Mara cases are particularly egregious example of human rights violations associated with Canadian mining in Tanzania. This case gained particular attention because of reports that artisanal miners and local residents were buried alive. Excerpts from different reports give accounts by survivors from the incidents that followed in the incident that left over fifty artisanal miners dead by being buried alive in the artisanal mining shafts. These deaths were reported to have occurred at the nine artisanal mining ‘centres’, referred to as “No. 1, No. 2, No. 3, No. 9, Bariadi, Kabare, Mabagikulu, Kakola Proper and Bushing’we. Of all the centres, the first two were known to produce the most gold. It is there that it is feared most victims of the eviction order are buried”.

Figure 5: Location of African Barrick Gold’s Kahama Mining Corporation Ltd. (KMCL) in Kakola – Bulyanhulu. Source: http://www.infomine.com/index/properties/Bulyanhulu.html

Among them is Melania Baesi whose narration has been documented in a short documentary film titled “A Golden Opportunity”. In the narratives as well as in Lissu (2001), artisanal miners were given conflicting information on the dates they were to vacate the

---

108 This documentary film was produced jointly by the Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT), Tanzania Episcopal Conference (TEC) and the Muslim Council of of Tanzania. It is accessible on Youtube at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eaY0hlqILb0
Bulyanhulu gold fields. According to the correspondence between the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) at the World Bank:

On July 30, 1996, the Tanzanian government issued orders that the Bulyanhulu complainants should vacate the lands, settlements and property within 24 hours. Paramilitary police and demolition equipment belonging to the project sponsors [referred to earlier in the 13 page of the correspondence as Barrick Gold Corporation of Toronto, Canada (“the project sponsors”)] and operated by their employees were then situated in the Bulyanhulu complainants’ villages and settlements\(^{109}\) (CAO 2002: 14E).

From the statement above, the government of Tanzania and Barrick Gold Corporation, referred to in the statement as “the project sponsor”, collaborated in this fatal exercise which led to the death of 50+ artisanal miners.

Reports of brutality on community members and seeming avoidable deaths of local community members in the mining areas where Canadian MMCs, especially ABG/BGC operate, did not stop with what could rightly be called ‘Bulyanhulu Massacres’. The documentary evidence includes reports shooting and continuous killing of local community members in North Mars. Various contemporaneous online newsfeeds and mainstream media reported that in 2010 at least three people were shot dead by ABG/BGC security personnel and 15 others “seriously wounded”.\(^{110}\) In June 2011, it was widely reported that the community members around NMGM clashed with security personnel at the mine waste site. A number of newspapers were dominated by headlines which read “Seven dead in clash at African Barrick mine”,\(^{111}\) “Gold mine saga sign of things to come”,\(^{112}\) and “In an African mine, the lust for gold sparks a deadly clash”.\(^{113}\) On June 7, it was reported that ABG/BGC security personnel fired live bullets at unarmed waste-


rock gleaners leaving the site (Globe and Mail Op. cit.; Butler 2014; Pike 2012). The Toronto-based Toronto Star reported in its business section that:

Security forces at African Barrick Gold's North Mara mine in Tanzania killed seven “criminal intruders” and injured a dozen more after 800 people stormed the project armed with machetes, rocks and hammers in a bid to steal gold ore […] a number of intruders sustained gunshot wounds, resulting in seven intruder fatalities and 12 injuries (Op. cit).

A most recent report of brutality by Canadian ABG/BGC security personnel against local community members ending in death was in March 2013. This incident which left 2 people dead was later reported to have been caused by the Tanzanian police force posted at ABG/BGC’s North Mara mine for security purposes.\textsuperscript{114}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North Mara Gold Mine: Shooting Incidents</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>#Fatalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A man was fatally shot</td>
<td>11 Dec. 2008\textsuperscript{115}</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A villager prospecting for gold at the Mine was shot dead</td>
<td>21 Jan. 2009</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospectors were killed</td>
<td>2 June 2009</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospectors were shot and injured by police at the Mine</td>
<td>2 June 2009</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villagers shot and killed by police</td>
<td>8 July 2009</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospector was injured when a tear gas bomb exploded near him</td>
<td>28 Sept. 2009</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospector was shot in the back by police and died</td>
<td>15 Oct. 2009</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four people were killed close to the Mine site by police</td>
<td>2 Feb. 2010</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospector was shot in the left leg by police at the Mine</td>
<td>15 March 2010</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospectors were shot by police while on the Mine site</td>
<td>9 May 2011</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospector was shot after police opened fire</td>
<td>14 May 2011</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five people were shot dead and three others injured one Paralysed</td>
<td>16 May 2011</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villager shot by police in the right side of his body and Paralysed</td>
<td>16 May 2011</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospector was shot and injured</td>
<td>14 July 2011</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospector was shot in the chest and killed.</td>
<td>7 May 2012</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undisclosed number of people killed\textsuperscript{116}</td>
<td>August 2014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even though the list above gives 25 incidents which have been confirmed by the police between 2008 and 2012, other records show that the number could be higher. In his article on the published in the Vice news April 19, 2014 issue, with the title “The Killing Continues at a


\textsuperscript{115} The rest of information on this table were accessed at: http://www.miningwatch.ca/sites/www.miningwatch.ca/files/abg-a_pattern_of_abuse.pdf

Canadian-Owned Mine In Tanzania”, Chris Oke taking recording narratives from villagers writes, “In the past three years [2010 – April 2014], 69 people have been killed by police at the North Mara Gold Mine”. The table below shows other incidences which have occurred in the areas Canadian MMCs Barrick Gold Corporation operate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Impacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulyanhulu</td>
<td>Eviction of artisanal miners from Bulyanhulu</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Loss of livelihood for approximately 400,000 evicted artisanal miners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Mara</td>
<td>Overflow of toxic sludge/Environmental pollution</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Loss of livestock and Plants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overflow of toxic sludge/Environmental Pollution</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Loss of livestock and health hazards to community members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14 women sexually assaulted by police and security guards at the mine.</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Physical and psychological trauma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buzwagi</td>
<td>Eviction of Artisanal miners from Buzwagi gold fields</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Loss of livelihood for 600 evicted artisanal miners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In contrast to the ‘change’ and ‘attractive-ness’ discourse that promoted the mineral-based neoliberal capitalist economic system to the people of Tanzania (Lissu 2001; Chachage 1995), mining activities in Tanzania have proved “inherently disruptive” (Kitula 2006: 405) to social, economic and ecological environments in Tanzania, as well as in other mineral rich countries in the global south. As seen in the above tables, the advent of multinational mining operations in Tanzania, especially the mining operations from the Canadian extractive industries, have not resulted in prosperity that was promised to the local community members by the Mkapa’s government.

---


Information accessed at: [http://www.miningwatch.ca/fr/node/6356](http://www.miningwatch.ca/fr/node/6356)

Information accessed at: [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/19/killings-uk-owned-gold-mine-tanzania-concern](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/19/killings-uk-owned-gold-mine-tanzania-concern)

Environmental and Water Pollution: Impacts on Humans and Livestock

Community members in the mining areas in Tanzania have been forced to live in a polluted\(^{122}\) environment and left to use water from contaminated sources. Incidences of toxic sludge flowing into water sources used by local community members and livestock living adjacent to the North Mara Gold Mine (NMGM) owned by the Canadian African Barrick Gold (ABG) - a subsidiary of Barrick Gold Corporation (BGC) have been widely reported. One recent incident of such toxic sludge spillage from the tailing pond, which was preceded by the initial spillage in 2005, was reported on May 9, 2009\(^{123}\). According to the reports related to this spill from ABG’s North Mara mine, “203 people became ill, 43 people died, and 1358 livestock died according to the Ward authorities in North Mara”\(^ {124}\). Reacting to the media reports, legislators in the Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania called on the government to form a “probe team to investigate the matter in terms of effects, magnitude of the disaster and victims’ compensation”\(^ {125}\).

\(^{122}\) In his work, Kitula (2006) indicates the probable chances that environmental pollution found in the Northern gold belt of Tanzania hosting most of the MMCs could not be attributed to the current mineral exploitation regime (1995 – 2014). His research findings conducted in Nyakabale village – Geita District elucidate facts that lead to the conclusion that, “most of Lake Victoria Gold Fields contain sulphide minerals associated with gold. After gold extraction, the decomposition of sulphide minerals releases acid waters in the form of acid mine drainage. Such drainage, which is now common in the old Geita Mine (mined before independence in 1960s), can contaminate nearby streams and ground water for centuries after a mine has closed. The formation of acid mine drainage is accelerated by high rainfall and high temperatures, reminiscent of the climate of Geita. The acids tend to leach heavy elements in tailings and mine waste dumps to produce toxic solutions which comprise heavy metals,” (Kahindi 2006: 410). Even though this research talks also about hazardous nature of cyanide and mercury use by both large and small scale miners, it does not, however, show comparative levels of environmental pollution as per large or small scale miners’ contribution.

\(^{123}\) Reports on this incident are found at: http://barrick.live.radicaldesigns.org/article.php?id=499; http://barrick.live.radicaldesigns.org/article.php?id=500;

\(^{124}\) Information accessed on June 18, 2014 at: http://www.miningwatch.ca/fr/node/6356;

\(^{125}\) Information accessed on June 18, 2014 at: http://barrick.live.radicaldesigns.org/article.php?id=502
A scientific study conducted in the areas around North Mara Gold Mine owned by ABG/BGC and Geita Gold Mine (GGM) owned by AngloGold Ashanti (AGA) reported levels of potentially life threatening arsenic in the North Mara and Geita respectively (Almas et al 2009). These injustices have been viewed differently by various non-State actors, including national and international CSOs, Faith Based Organisations (FBOs), research organisations, academics, political leaders and Tanzanian general public. They view such outcomes as attributive to the fact that “foreign [investors in Tanzania’s mining sector have been granted] too generous conditions when they were invited to invest in Tanzania in the early 1990s” (Lange & ESRF 2006: 1). This undercuts the government’s ability to impose punitive measures to keep away the mineral curse ‘rhetoric’ from Tanzania’s mineral sector (Campbell ed 2004; Bourgouin 2011; Mjimba 2011; Mégret 2011; Szabowski 2007; Gordon 2010). This situation has rendered the Tanzanian government incapable of addressing the challenges faced by the people of Tanzania living in the mining areas. The table below shows some of the incidences that have taken place since the emergence of liberalisation policies in Tanzania.

![Figure 7: Impacts of toxic water sludge in North Mara Gold Mine. Photo: ERubara 2010](http://www.miningwatch.ca/sites/www.miningwatch.ca/files/FinalTanzania_0.pdf)

Apart from the media reports, the research commissioned by FBOs in Tanzania and jointly conducted by NULS/NMBU and UDSM (op. cit.) after investigating the area where the spillage occurred and repeating the tests for up to seven months in 2009, concluded that water

---

and the environment around the spillage area: “…remains toxic for human consumption and
grazing use [as the] concentration of arsenic around the tailing dam was from 111µg/l\textsuperscript{127} to
1142µg/l. An area used for grazing by cattle contained 40 times the current WHO standard for
safe drinking water of 10µg/l. A nearby area used for drinking water and deemed safe by the
population contained 8µg/l of arsenic.\textsuperscript{128}

An excerpt from one of the daily newspapers in Tanzania reporting in June 2009 on the
NMGM toxic sludge spillage read:

VILLAGERS living near a gold mine owned and run by Canada’s Barrick Gold Corp. in
Tarime District, Mara Region are demanding the immediate closure of the project, saying
they are paying a deadly price for the mining activities in the area. Already, scores of
people residing around Barrick’s North Mara Gold Mine are showing serious signs of
exposure to pollution in the form of water contaminated with various chemicals allegedly
flowing out of the mine and into the nearby River Tigithe. The villagers accuse the mine
management, under the Canadian investor company, of causing fatal health hazards to
human beings, livestock, and land in Kebasula Ward in Tarime, where the mine is
located.\textsuperscript{129}

\textbf{Figure 8}: Location of African Barrick Gold's North Mara Gold Mine. 
\textit{Source: http://www.tanzaniagold.com/North_Mara.html}

\textsuperscript{127} Micrograms per litre
\textsuperscript{128} Information accessed on June 18, 2014 at: http://www.miningwatch.ca/fr/node/6356
Mineral Development Induced Displacements\(130\) (MDIDs)

Development induced displacements (DID) as a research topic have been dealt with in depth in Robinson (2003), Termsinski (2013), and Cernea\(131\) (1997) to name a few. Due to the broad nature of this subject, it will only be discussed in summary in this work as related to the MDID within the Tanzanian context. Worldwide assessment on DID showed that at the end of 1996 about 80 – 90 million people were displaced by development projects; there was an increase of DID incidences by the end of 2006 (Robinson 2003). Involuntary displacements caused by development are viewed as “a worldwide problem [as well as] being borne disproportionately by the poorest and most marginalized populations” (Robinson 2003: 10).

Documentary evidence suggests that mining activities “cannot be considered a consistent cause of development-induced displacement” (Termsinski 2013: 60), yet it is also documented that MDID was responsible for “10.3% of development-induced displacement worldwide” (Op. cit. pg. 61). According to the current statistics on internal displacements recorded by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 52,369 people were displaced in Tanzania between 2008 and 2012.\(132\) These statistics do not specify whether or not such displacements are related to the MMCs operations in Tanzania. The best known statistical data on DID related incidents in Tanzania are connected to environmental conservation projects, an example being the displacements during the 1993 establishment of the Serengeti National Park, which expropriated land and facilitated involuntary displacement of up to “50,000 members of the Maasai tribe [as well as] the displacement of 10,000 indigenous people in connection with the creation of Mkomazi National Park” (Op. cit. pg. 67) in 2006.

---

\(130\) MDIDs is used here as to make a distinction between extractive industry induced displacements and other development induced displacements. Different sources considered, such as Robinson (2003), Termsinski (2013) and Cernea (1997) looks at displacement from a broader development perspective without specificity to displacement caused by mineral based development activities such as considered on this research. In the cited works and others not referenced on this research, terms such as ‘Development Induced Displacements’, ‘Environmentally Induced Displacements/migration’, ‘Conflict Induced Displacements/Migration’, etc. are widely in circulation in international development discourse circles.

\(131\) Cernea (1997) in his work titled “The Risks and Reconstruction Model for Resettling Displaced Populations” draws empirically proven perspectives that have led to his development of theoretical model of displacement, reconstruction and resettlement. This work which appeared in World Development Journal, Vol. 25, No. 10; and Published by Elsevier Science Ltd - Great Britain, was accessed on June 13, 2014 at: [http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/science/article/pii/S0305750X97000545](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/science/article/pii/S0305750X97000545)

Even though mining operations in Tanzania are reported to affect a number of community members in the mining areas, there seems to be a lack of proper statistical inventory to account for the number of community members in the mining areas who have been forced out of their homes to pave way for the MMCs operations. Available data on MDID scattered in reports by the CSOs are few in number. Other reports on MDID incidents in Tanzania have reported the eviction of community members from Mtakuja village in Geita District paving the way for the expansion of Geita Gold Mine (GGM) operations.

For example, a report by the interfaith committee in Tanzania documents the displacement of 86 family units comprising over 250 evictees (Mining for Life 2008133). This incident has also received significant reporting from other news agencies such as the Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)134 (2013). A report on human rights and business issued by the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) Tanzania places the number of the Mtakuja evictees at 85 (LHRC: 2013). A research conducted by Kitula (2006) findings report that “some 1800 villagers were forcibly displaced in Mtakuja, Nyamalembo and Nyamange villages in Mtakuja Ward, following the establishment of the Geita Gold Mine” (Kitula 2006: 411).

MDIDs are difficult to avoid given the open pit mining projects common in Tanzania. Inherently, open pit mining projects displace huge numbers of rural community members in the mining areas as such project requires a lot of land. It requires land for its plant and the mining site; it requires land space for waste rock disposal as well as land for its personnel. This being the nature of open pit mining, displacement of local community members is inevitable. Such displacements present a number of implications for the evictees at the individual, household and communal level - a total change in a community’s associational life.

The findings of the research conducted by Kitula (2006) in Geita District, especially among community members in the mining localities drew a conclusion that at least “47.3% to 67.6% [people] in mining and non-mining communities […] were engaged in agriculture” (Op. cit. pg. 407). As Kitula documents, apart from displacements of the local community members,

---

there were cases of “unemployment, child labour, accidents […] prostitution, increased incidences of banditry, changes to indigenous lifestyle” (Kitula 2006: 410).

Figure 9: An Abandoned Court house provided by the Geita District Administration to accommodate over 250 evictees from Mtakuja Village. Photo by ERubara (2007)

Challenges of Relocation and Compensation in the Tanzanian Context

Documentary reviews on the impacts of MMCs operations on the experiences of local community members also draw attention to the losses of land and livelihood. This issue is closely connected to MDID incidences. Related but not peculiar to the Canadian MMCs operation areas in Tanzania, compensation losses have been identified as one of the perpetual challenges faced in the land tenure ‘negotiations’ between mining MMCs and the local community members. In addition to ‘heated’ discussions in the Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania (PUR), ranging from the MDAs to the establishment of security infrastructures in potential mineral development areas (HS-12-41-2008 #360), the issue of compensation was described by the Kahama MP James Lembeli, as a persistently ‘nagging’ problem.
Compensation challenges were identified at the Canadian ABG/BGC mining operations in Buzwagi, pitting local communities displaced from their ancestral land areas and homes to pave way for the operations of ABG Buzwagi Gold Mine in north-western Tanzania against ABG. “Disagreement about the differences on compensation rates” (HS-12-3-2008/#26: 13) was identified to be the main cause of discord. According to the Parliamentary Hansards, the compensation process began as early as 2005. Property evaluation for compensation due to displacement of local community members from ancestral land was conducted in Mwime, Mwendakulima and Chapulwa villages. The Hansards show that “205 houses were compensated as well as an agreement to construct 207 ‘modern’ housing units along with monetary compensation amounting to Tzs. 200,000 for each of the artisanal mining shafts” (HS-12-3-2008/#26: 13).

Even though the compensation records as per the Tanzanian parliament from MEM show only 205 cases requiring compensation in 2008, the number cited by the MP for Kahama was higher by 335 compensation and relocation cases. It appears from the Parliamentary records that there were at the time 540 households evicted from the Buzwagi Gold Mine area “awaiting to get redress from the government” (HS-12-3-2008/#26: 14) on their compensation and relocation disputes with ABG/BGC Buzwagi mine management. However, further discussions in the PURT

Figure 10: One of the resettlement residential units constructed by Pangea Minerals Limited in Buzwagi.
Photo: Erubara 2010
about compensation matters in relation to these displaced community members seem to have been stalled by ‘protocol’ challenges on the part of the government of Tanzania in fulfilling its promise to deal with these compensation and relocation challenges (HS-10-5-2008/#121).

The construction of the 207 residential units by Pangea Minerals Limited\textsuperscript{135} which started officially in 2007 was completed and the housing units were open for community members a year after as seen on Figure 8 above. However members of the community who were allocated the residential units seem not to be satisfied with the quality of the housing units. There have been complaints. Such complaints were that the units are small and not able to accommodate even a household of 4. Empirical evidence and from my experience working with the displaced community members in Buzwagi shows that the most complaints regarding the sizes of the residential units provided by ABG/BGC came from large and Polygamous\textsuperscript{136} households as they could not fit in the provided resettlement units.

\textbf{Figure 11:} Location of African Barrick's Buzwagi Gold Mine. Source: http://www.infomine.com/index/properties/Buzwagi.html

\textbf{Mineral-based Economics and Rural-Urban Migration Trends in Tanzania}

Another issue of concern is the fleeting rural life attachment among the younger generation, which was vibrant before the mid-1990s. Farming has become largely useless to many of the youthful members of society. While this cannot be said to be the case in all local

\textsuperscript{135} Pangea Minerals Limited is a subsidiary of African Barrick Gold. It operates ABG’s Buzwagi Gold Mine.

\textsuperscript{136} In an African setting, especially in polygamous families, each wife had her own house. According to the community members I interacted with over the housing issue in Buzwagi, both men and women said that “the government has left them in the hands of foreigners who have no respect to the African cultural values.”
communities in Tanzania, it is certainly the case among local communities living in the mining areas. This seeming desertion, even detestation of traditional rural life, can by no means be only attributed to climate change trends, which have contributed to the migration of rural populace, including those from the mining areas into urban areas (Bryceson et al 2012; EU 2013: 2).

Among the challenges faced by local community members living in the mining areas since the inception of MMCs operations in Tanzania is the widening of the poverty margin. Whether out of fear of destitution due to lack of land for farming or uncertainty in getting proper jobs in the MMCs hosted in their communities, most rural dwellers including those with minimum or no trade skills are now moving to the main urban centres.

The 2012 census results, as shown in Figure 10 below, confirm the rural-urban migration trends. Dar es Salaam alone is currently – in the year 2014, a home to about 4,364,541 inhabitants as shown in Figure 10 below. An employment survey conducted by Global Post reveals that “out of over 1,000 young people across Tanzania, only 14 percent reported working a formal, wage-earning job [and that] each year, 900,000 young Tanzanians enter a job market that is generating only 50,000 to 60,000 new jobs”.137

Another report compiled by the European Union looking at ‘city dynamics and growth rates’ places the Tanzanian urban population to be at least 10 – 12 million inhabitants and a growth rate of 35%, similar to Cameroon and Ghana (EU 2013). The report states further that such “similarities are attributable to historically differing social, economic and political processes in each of the countries” (EU 2013: 3). Yet another report provides a comparative view on urbanisation growth, which establishes an annual urban population growth of up to 29.1% in 2012 as compared to 5.7% in 1967 (Smitha 2014). A detailed urban statistical outlook attempts to elucidate rural-urban population migration dynamics. Migration patterns from rural to urban areas could be suggested as one of the direct impacts of the MMCs’ operations in rural Tanzania.138 It does not take a long time even for a visitor in Dar es Salaam to realise that the

---

138 Proper investigation need to be carried out to identify rural-urban migration patterns from and to the mining areas. Until now, statistical evidences of the influx of rural-urban – unskilled migration to Dar es Salaam are countrywide.
The majority are travelling from the rural areas to urban areas such as Dar es Salaam in pursuit of a job. Any job.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mainland Urban Population</strong></td>
<td>685,092</td>
<td>2,257,921</td>
<td>3,999,882</td>
<td>7,554,838</td>
<td>12,701,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Growth rate % p.a.)</td>
<td>(11.5%)</td>
<td>(5.9%)</td>
<td>(4.7%)</td>
<td>(5.3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>- of which: Dar es Salaam</strong></td>
<td>272,821</td>
<td>769,445</td>
<td>1,205,443</td>
<td>2,336,055</td>
<td>4,364,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Growth rate % p.a.)</td>
<td>(9.9%)</td>
<td>(4.6%)</td>
<td>(4.8%)</td>
<td>(6.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mainland Total Population</strong></td>
<td>11,975,757</td>
<td>17,036,499</td>
<td>22,507,047</td>
<td>33,461,849</td>
<td>43,625,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Growth rate % p.a.)</td>
<td>(3.3%)</td>
<td>(2.8%)</td>
<td>(2.9%)</td>
<td>(2.7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urbanisation (%)</strong></td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td><strong>13.3</strong></td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td><strong>29.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 12: A Comprehensive table showing growth rate in the administrative capital Dar Es Salaam and general growth rate in Tanzania mainland. Adapted from the IGC (2014)*

**Political Competition and Social Services**

Various research reports on compensation and relocation matters attribute delays in paying compensation to displaced community members to two main causes: political gain and graft. Lange & ESRF (2006) cite accusations of favouritism made against political leaders as the practice of diverting local development project funds for one area to local areas where they have personal interests. In the same report, a local leader is quoted as follows:

…the process of agreeing upon a project is very cumbersome, since both the members of parliament and the councillors are eager to see projects implemented in their own constituency (Op. cit. pg. 20).

A research conducted by the Legal and Human rights Centre (LHRC) suggests that, compensation process is characterised by corrupt practices as well (LHRC 2013). Even though the LHRC report primarily concerns human rights and business for the year 2013, it captures the lack of accountability of government officials in Tanzania in handling compensation processes for poor Tanzanians in the mining areas.

---

In conclusion, weaknesses within the Tanzanian governance structures demonstrate the need for political and economic responsibility to citizens. Parliamentary discourses on issues related to the welfare and redress of local community complaints against the MMCs have been countered by indifference by the neoliberal government in Tanzania. Colonial structures and neoliberal system combined seem to make it difficult for the State actors in Tanzania to attend to the needs of the people of Tanzania. The situation even worsens when cultural structures are revisited. But with the choice of three different leadership and governance structures, the Tanzanian government must make a choice. It must choose which structure will be suitable in addressing the challenges faced by its citizenry.
Chapter 6

Conclusion and Discussion: Co-Opted? Challenges of Synthesised Governance Structures in Tanzania

While a successful and a failed state in Africa [depends] on the political and accumulation strategies of contemporary political and economic actors [...] political and social maladies that bedevil many African states are but traditional in nature.

(Samatar 1997: 687)

By way of exploration, the analyses of this research have attempted to explain historical political, economic and social factors that have led to potential ineffectiveness of leadership and governance structures in Tanzania. Through the pages of this research, it is evident that with leadership and governance structures modelled after colonial structures, it is impossible for postcolonial States such as Tanzania to prioritise the interests of its citizens through proper management and equitable distribution of revenues from the exploitation of their natural/mineral resource.

Rooted in the perspective of the classical, structural Marxist schools of thought and African cultural associational practices, this paper has sought to emphasise that mineral-based sociopolitical and economic relationship between the Tanzanian and Canadian governments are largely exploitative and imperialistic. This imperialist regime adopted by the Canadian MMCs to their benefit, was built upon existing African leadership and governance structures which were adapted under the colonial regime. With this traditional and colonially adapted leadership and governance foundation already in place, Canadian MMCs are at an advantageous position.

Both classical and neo-Marxists such as Marx & Engels (1848/1968) and Miliband (1969) have explained why the Tanzanian state actors may be used as tools by the elite capitalist society to further the capitalist society’s economic agendas. Neo-Marxist theorists such as Rodney (1981) and Fanon (2004) suggest that such attitude found within the Tanzanian State comes from its actors being mentally, morally and politically ‘sanitised’ from any sense of
accountability to its own citizenry through colonising education and by the fact that the initial economic system developed outside their domain. In fact, those who could be described as neoliberal capitalist political and economic system critics such as Mbembe (1992/2001), Samatar (1997) and Berman (1998) would propose that governance structures in Tanzania are imported. From this view, those in the leadership and decision making positions are being used by the Canadian MMCs as a person would use a robot. This research finds such a suggestion too general and restrictive of the other factors that must be considered when theorising leadership and governance structures in Tanzania, as well as other African nation-states.

Irrespective of the fact that Tanzania’s past political and economic policies from 1967 – 1985 sparked a considerable negative reaction from the international community (Tripp 2012) and especially from the Bank and the Fund, the preparations for introducing the neoliberal policies in Tanzania started in 1986 shortly after Mwalimu Nyerere stepped down from power. The establishment of the neoliberal economic system in Tanzania in 1995 by Mkapa’s administration opened a new sociopolitical and economic dispensation. This ‘new’ era was, at the very beginning, characterised by partisan politics. In this scenario, most economic decisions that were made were politically inclined. With the echoes of democratising political discourse gaining momentum across Africa, the ruling party – CCM, took a strategic position “given their reading of the political tea leaves […] to stay ahead of the game [and] enhance [their] credibility over that of the opposition” (Tripp 2012: 1). In doing so, most critical sociopolitical and economic discussions were carried out within party boundaries guided by the principle of seeking to establish an affluent party whose policies would be accepted by the international trade and investment community (Tripp 2012).

Clearly, the Tanzanian government as seen throughout this research, especially in chapter 1 and 2, is espoused to the residual colonial structures. This happened after the demise of the Ujamaa policies. This research has also identified nepotism to be among the factors that lead to the state of apathy within the Tanzanian government. The epoch of self-centred political careers and political vocations which are based not on patriotism but has as its benchmark, nepotistic trends. This produces leadership and governance structured which are built not on true stateswo/manship but on networks of self-gratification and favouritism. This is where kinship, household, ethnic and partisan politicking comes.
From the Tanzanian context, and as a country which has ratified almost all conventions related to trade and environment, we are presented with a case of “extremely complex and convoluted networks of power relationships [and] overlapping legal conventions” (Death 2012: 15) to which the Tanzanian governing authorities must comply. Globalising sociopolitical, economic and environmental discourse has not only taken the rights of sovereign states to formulate policies that protect the citizenry, the economy and the environment within their political territories; it has also allowed high levels of social and environmental recklessness in the Global South by affluent countries from the Global North through its MMCs operations.

**Mining Communities, Conflicts and Redress**

Mining activities are inherently disruptive (Kitula 2006), especially in a country like Tanzania where almost all mining operations are open pit. This industry has inherent social, economic and environmental impacts which affect local community members in such mining areas directly. The need for vast tracts of land may be higher than during the colonial period as mining companies have increased in number. Overall, large scale mining operations are a source of conflict, claiming ancestral land from community members (Newenham-Kahindi 2010; Butler 2014), leading to the alteration of local community members’ associational life by forcing the displacement of local community members, and introducing health hazards within the local environments as well as economic differentiation (Kitula 2006; Carstens & Hilson 2009; Guesnet & Müller eds. 2014; Butler 2014; Newenham-Kahindi 2010).

In an attempt to explore the roots of such conflicts between community members and foreign investors such as African Barrick Gold (ABG), various views have been presented. One of the immediate causes of such conflicts has been highlighted as the expropriation of land (Kitula 2006; Carstens & Hilson 2009). Although land remains a major contributor, it cannot be proved that land is *the* main problem. Experiences from working with local community members show that community members in the mining areas in Tanzania were ready to move from their ancestral lands as long as government authorities and the investors were ready to provide another resettlement area furnished with the social utilities that would meet their needs. It should be noted that in all the eviction records highlighted in the discussion above, there is no single community in Tanzania evicted from their ancestral land that resisted at first. Rather, community members who were evicted from Bulyanhulu complained about both the short and conflicting
notice they were given by the government to move from the KMCL area without an alternative place where they could start life (Lissu 2001; Kerr & Holloway 2002). Many of these community members are still waiting for the government to fulfil its promise for compensation and provision of resettlement areas.

The main cause of conflicts reported in the mining areas in Tanzania is lack of employment. Historically, this is not a problem peculiar to the neoliberal mining regimes. Closely related to lack of equity in employment opportunity is the whole issue of education and skills to be able to get non-farming jobs (AU & ECA 2011; Carstens & Hilson 2009; Roberts 1986). Local community members have been, as it were, caught unaware by mining projects and they have insufficient to no knowledge in terms of how to integrate into the sector as a primary source for their livelihood. Lack of skilled human resources in Tanzania in relation to the opportunities that are available in the mining sector is still a widespread problem (AU/ECA 2011)

Conflicts in the mining areas arise from the lack of Social License to Operate (SLO), as well as the lack of Free and Prior Informed Consent (FPIC). These two concepts, even though they appear to have essentially the same meaning, nevertheless present two different perspectives. SLO as defined by Pike (2012) “consists of both the acquisition and on-going maintenance of the consent of the local stakeholders” (Op. cit. pg. 3) on the one hand, and FPIC refers to the local community’s inclusive, knowledge-based decision-making processes before the mining operations commence and “is invoked in decisions that affect indigenous land, livelihoods, culture, or resources” (Szablowski 2011: 111). Even though SLO and FPIC could be useful when put to work, they remain weak and ineffective in a country like Tanzania where land is vested in the Republic and all decisions on matters related to land are made by the Head of State. Indigenous land rights are therefore not effective. However, lack of both SLO and FPIC could be said to be one of the major reasons besides expropriation of land which causes conflicts in the mining areas.

\[140\] Even though FPIC is meant to promote a sense of partnership between the primary land owners and protectors – the community members, it is viewed with suspicion and resentment by the governing authorities. It is shrouded with contention “because of its implications for state sovereignty and control over natural resource development”, (Szablowski 2011: 114)
Another contributing factor to the grievances ending in fatal confrontations between community members and Canadian MMCs’ operators, is that of being indifferent to the people. This not only fosters a sense of insecurity among the local community members, but also acts as a catalyst for companies to claim irresponsibility in case of a fatal accident, deliberate killings or other fatalities related to any such mining operations. This could explain why the government of Tanzania is has not properly reprimanded ABG/BGC on reports of acts of lawlessness both in terms of brutality and destroying the environments around their areas of operation. Conflicts confronting Canadian MMCs in Tanzania are therefore a product of multifaceted causalities. On the one hand is the factor of estranged relationship between ABG and the local community members, and on the other is the sense of community members being abandoned by their own government into the merciless hands of a foreign investment entity.

Looking at the key conflicts identified in the mining sector in Tanzania, it is not clear from the different documents examined why the relations between ABG/BGC and the local communities have not been resolved. In normal cases in the face of conflicts and even resistance, it would be expected of the management of the mine site operators to slow the planned implementation of such multimillion dollar mineral projects and revise initial investment strategies to address the needs and concerns of the local community members. But this is not so when it comes to the operations of Canadian ABG/BGC. According to Gordon (2010) “resistance does not deter Canada from its global mission of free market fundamentalism, [instead] it simply inspires its capacity to engage in violence” (Op. cit. pg. 12). This it achieves through the operations of its MMCs, such as Barrick Gold Corporation, operating in conflict-ridden goldfields in Tanzania. What is even more ‘interesting’ is how inconsequential the lives of local community members are to ABG/BGC as compared to gold.

On the part of the government of Tanzania, a number of theories could be employed to explain its seeming apathy towards cases of brutality. From a Marxist point of view, it would be argued that the government of Tanzania has been influenced by the neoliberal capitalist discourse to an extent that all it could do is to comply with the latter’s commands. Compatible with strategies used for foreign aid, the governing class in Tanzania have used such relationships to create or buy political loyalty and in the process “ignore their citizens needs altogether” (Tripp 2012: 30). Indeed, such preferential economic strategy (LHRC 2013), especially between
Canada, Canadian MMCs and the Tanzanian government, leads the community members in the Tanzanian mining areas to even greater depths of despondency and a sense of abandonment by their government.

Due to the litany of both social and environmental injustices in the mining areas in Tanzania and the state of apathy evidenced by the government for its citizens, there has been an increase in number of local and international non-government actors working with local community members on equity, participation, and distributive justice issues. The civil society organisations (CSOs) have played the mediation role between the local community members and the government as well as the investor community in the mining areas. They have also been perceived as showing partiality in handling human rights violations by the multinational mining companies in the Tanzanian mineral rich rural areas, especially those operated by Canadian MMCs. Even though this is not a bad thing in itself, it nevertheless suggests a discursive platform with high possibilities to allow those with “influence over governance, including government, industry, finance and [even CSOs]” (Op. cit. pg. 28) to easily assert their demands over those proposed by less affluent parties. However, this should not be understood as underestimating positive contributions made by selected key players within the CSO platform in Tanzania in highlighting the plight of local community members in Tanzania.

In its efforts to establish structures to “increase transparency and accountability in the national extractive industries”, (URT 2008: 141) the government of Tanzania through the Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM) joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (EITI). This began the process which led to the establishment of Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (TEITI). Even though this initiative was established to increase transparency, TEITI’s first validation report reveals that members of the Multi-Stakeholder Group (MSG) raised transparency related concerns as “certain inclusions were deemed questionable” (TEITI 2011: 11). At its initial stage and to ensure that transparency initiatives in Tanzania were recognised, the MSG proposed the inclusion of the TEITI mandate in the Mining Act 2010 to the Legislative Assembly but was ignored (TEITI 2011). It later became evident that the Mining Act 2010, has a “prohibition (clause) against the disclosure of

---

information” (URT 2010: 25) in Section 25. The TEITI process has proved effective in highlighting ‘misplaced’ or unaccounted for expenditure and in their third payments reconciliation reported “a net difference of Tzs. 11 billion […] unresolved” [government payments which] represents 2.21% of the total reported government receipts” (TEITI 2013: 5).

Besides such payments unaccounted for, the report also points to Canadian AGB/BGC operations in Bulyanhulu and North Mara “not paying corporation taxes though they are making profits” (TEITI 2013: 5). The reason given for this continued lack of corporation tax payments is their continued declaration of “significant unutilised tax losses from previous years of USD 1.3 Billion as of 31 December 2011 (2010 USD 1.5 Billion” (TEITI 2013: 5). Additionally, recent media reports have highlighted a bribery incident at ABG/BGC in North Mara’s operations. According to Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2014 issue, ABG/BGC is cited to have “…paid more than $400,000 in cash mostly to Tanzanian government officials and consultants responsible for valuing the land, according to company invoices and copies of checks reviewed”.142 Even though TEITI was established by the government of the United Republic of Tanzania to highlight such malpractices, it is surprising that the government of Tanzania is still failing to take proper measures to ensure that tax evasions and bribery reports are dealt with.

**The State of ‘Indifference’ and Tanzania’s Mining Sector**

Tanzania opened up its natural resource and mineral reserves for exploitation by the global north countries. The global north employed the development discourse and the ‘knowledge/capacity deficit discourse’ to access the most coveted resource in the global south countries. In his address to the Africa Gem Resources (AFGEM) gathering, Benjamin Mkapa143 is quoted as follows: “I invite you to Tanzania. Let us forge a profitable and smart partnership – we, in Tanzania with our mineral resources144 and you, with your capital, technology, knowhow and managerial skills”145 (Benjamin Mkapa in Lange & ESRF 2006: 1)

---


143 Benjamin Mkapa was the third phase head of State in Tanzania.

144 Italics and formatting mine

145 Italics and formatting mine
Mkapa’s address assumed that Tanzania’s economic woes could be addressed if the country’s resources were used to reach a better economic position not just for the government but for the people of Tanzania as well (Gausnet & Frank in Guesnet & Müller eds. 2014: 5) In contrast to the Ujamaa, policies which envisioned a Tanzanian economy supported by communal efforts of empowered citizenry (Spalding 1996), the neoliberal capital system in Tanzania proposed laying out the nation’s natural resources, especially the mineral resources, in exchange for “capital, technology, know-how and managerial skills” (op. cit.).

**Value and Contribution of the Major Paper**

Several social justice movement groups in Tanzania, including the civil society organisations (CSOs) hold the belief that underdevelopment among Tanzanians results from lack of skilled expertise and lack of deliberate strategies by the government to empower its citizenry. The CSOs have therefore embarked on capacity building and empowerment programmes. Even though a lot has improved and rural community dwellers get more chances to learn, capacity building strategies still revolve around programme officers and other already empowered people. Empowerment for personnel from the CSOs is done to enable effectiveness of fund management as well as help partners in proposal writing, documentation etc. Just as the government of Tanzania harbours nepotism and colonial structures, so could be said of the CSOs. Nepotism and politics of favouritism are on the rise.

The lack of capacity, i.e. in mineral resource management specific skills, and human resource capacity has been sold wholesale to and within the Tanzanian civil society since the introduction of the development discourse in the 1990s. As a result, most civil society organisations fail to identify and attract knowledge-based capacities among the local populace. Instead, civil society in Tanzania seeks ‘foreign’ expertise thus furthering dependency on outsiders in cleaning up social, economic and environmental problems that could be best handled by locals who understand the context better. Experientially, some of these demands are imposed on local civil society by donor organisations from the Global North. The organisations who fail to comply run the risk of not receiving any funding for such projects which seeks to address inequity. This attitude, besides perpetuating colonial mentality by way of material imposition, creates negative and enslaving divisiveness between actors within the global civil society fighting against illiteracy, diseases and poverty. Yet, there has not been deliberate resistance and
efforts within the CSOs, among academic experts and expert researchers in Tanzania, in Africa as well as other countries beyond the African continent to demand, claim and promote equality within the expert knowledge on mining specific leadership, governance and technical skills.

From the findings of this research it is clear that similar to some misguided intentions during liberation calls in Africa in the 1950s, so are some of such misguided intentions seeking to address leadership and governance issues in Africa today. Corruption has been highlighted as one of the contributing factors to the state of abject poverty in Tanzania besides lack of capacity. But nepotism, even though it does not attract as much attention as lack of capacity and corruption, proves to be the biggest challenge within leadership and governance structures in Tanzania. Nepotism, as seen in this research can be exercised at different levels, that is to say, culturally, politically and professionally at both national (local context) and international levels. Practices of nepotism have therefore not only been useful in enriching a small percentage of the Tanzanian population but could be described as the obvious yet ignored enemy.

And despite Tanzania’s known extensive natural/mineral resource wealth, the average income of Tanzanian citizens remains very low. Tanzania still faces high levels of early deaths, lack of basic social services and deepening poverty levels in rural areas including the mineral-rich areas. This situation indicates how important it is for a far greater proportion of the mineral wealth to be invested in social and economic infrastructure that would improve the living standards of the Tanzanian people, beginning with the local communities in the mining areas.

The Tanzanian government suffers from lack of a clear political framework upon which to develop by fostering the mineral deposits within its political territory for the benefit of the people of Tanzania. The residual colonial structural economic foundations were never dealt with at independence and are still a challenge 50 years after Tanzania’s independence. Traditional pathways on leadership and governance have long been abandoned. Highly learned Tanzanians, learned Tanzanians and those who still struggle to define their future turn their faces ashamedly from traditional pathways. Progressive politicians as well as academics and people of different expertise are silenced as the government of the day embraces neoliberal capitalist market-led economic system. In embracing the neoliberal capitalist market-led economic system, the Tanzanian government services the old system as the wood in Ayi Kwei Armah (1968). Ayi Kwei Armah in his book “The Beautyful Ones Are Not Yet Born” says:

Ayi Kwei Armah in his book “The Beautyful Ones Are Not Yet Born” says:
What had been going on there and was going on now and would go on and on through all the years was a species of war carried on in the silence of long ages, a struggle in which only the keen, uncanny eyes and ears of lunatic seers could detect the deceiving, easy breathing of the struggles. The wood within would win and win till the end of time. Of that there was no doubt possible, only the pain of hope perennially doomed to disappointment. It was so clear. Of course it was in the nature of wood to rot with age. The polish, it was supposed, would catch the rot. But of course in the end it was the rot which imprisoned everything in its effortless embrace. It did not really have to fight. Being was enough. In the natural course of things it would always take the newness of the different kinds of polish and the vaunted cleansing power of the chemicals in them, and it would convert all to victorious filth, awaiting yet more polish again and again and again. And the wood was not alone. Apart from the wood itself there were, of course, people themselves, just so many hands and fingers bringing help to the wood in its course towards putrefaction. Left-hand fingers in their careless journey from a hasty anus sliding all the way up the banister as their owners made the return trip from the lavatory downstairs to the offices above. Right-hand fingers still dripping with the after-piss and the stale sweat from fat crotches. The calloused palms of messengers after they had blown their clogged noses reaching for a convenient place to leave the well-rubbed moisture. Afternoon hands not entirely licked clean of palm soup and remnants of kenkey. The wood would always win (Armah 1998: 12, 13).

146 Italics original. Kenkey is a staple dish of West Africa traditionally made with Maize meal or Cassava.
Bibliography

Ake, Claude 1993: The Unique Case of African Democracy; Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 69, No. 2; Wiley on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs; Accessed on April 23, 2013 at:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2621592

http://www.jstor.org/stable/41856945

Armah, Ayi Kwei 1988: The Beautiful Ones Are Not Yet Born; Heinemann Educational Publishers – Great Britain


Beachey, R. W. 1967: The East African Ivory Trade in the Nineteenth Century; The Journal of African History, Vol. 8, No. 2; Cambridge University Accessed on April 10, 2014 at:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/179483

http://cps.sagepub.com/content/17/1/121

http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/content/97/388/305.full.pdf


Bourgouin, France 2011: Mining for sustainable development? What role for multinational mining corporations in resource-rich developing countries; New Values, Voices and Alliances for Increased Resilience. Accessed on March 06, 2014 at:


Campbell, Bonnie 2014: Investment is not Synonymous with Development; Ottawa Citizen. This Article was first published by Un seul monde – Huffington Post Accessed on April 15, 2014 at: http://blogs.ottawacitizen.com/2014/04/14/investment-is-not-synonymous-with-development/

Carstens, Johanna and Hilson, Gavin 2009: Mining, grievance and conflict in rural Tanzania; IDPR, 31 (3). Accessed on March 06, 2014 at: http://liverpool.metapress.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/content/dn4477108g743h7n/ful text.pdf

Chachage, Chambi & Mbunda, Richard 2009: The State of the then NAFCO, NARCO and Absentee Landlords’ Farms/Ranches in Tanzania; Land Rights Research and Resources Institute (LARRRI/HAKIARDHI)


Fanon, Frantz 2004: Wretched of the Earth. Grove Press – New York


GoC 2013: Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments


Havnevik, Kjell and Isinika, Aida S. eds.2010: Tanzania in transition from Nyerere to Mkapa; Mkuki na Nyota – Dar Es Salaam


Hoskyns, Catherine 1968: Africa's Foreign Relations: The Case of Tanzania; International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 44, No. 3; Wiley on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs; Accessed on April 22, 2013 at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2615025


HS-12-3-2008: Kikao cha Tatu – Tarehe 12 Juni, 2008 (3rd Parliamentary Seating, June 12, 2008) #26. Accessed on March 5, 2014 at:  
http://polis.parliament.go.tz/PAMS/docs/HS-12-3-2008.pdf


Igoe, Jim & Kelsall, Tim eds 2005: Between a Rock and a Hard Place: African NGOs, Donors and the State; Carolina Academic Press, North Carolina - USA

http://www.jstor.org/stable/3876809


Kabelwa, George 2002: South African FDI into East Africa: The Case of Tanzania; Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF). Accessed on March 10, 2014 at:  
http://global.esrftz.org/output/glob012.pdf


Mansfield, Becky 2007: Global Environmental Politics. The SAGE Handbook of Political Geography: 
http://www.uk.sagepub.com/oswmedia3e/study/chapters/handbooks/handbook13.2.pdf

Marx, Karl & Engels, Frederick 1848: Manifesto of the Communist Party 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf

Marx, Karl & Engels, Frederick 1968: Selected Works. Progress Publishers; Moscow

Mbembe, Achille 1992: Provisional Notes on the Postcolony; Source: Africa: Journal of the 
International African Institute, Vol. 62, No. 1; Edinburgh University Press. Accessed on 

Mbembe, Achille 2001: On the Postcolony; Regents of the University of California Press, LA – 
USA.

Mégret, Quentin 2011: Gaining access to a globally coveted mining resource: a case study in 
Burkina Faso; UNESCO 2011. Blackwell Publishing on behalf of UNESCO. Accessed on 
June 25, 2013 at: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/doi/10.1111/j.1468- 
2451.2011.01781.x/pdf

Accessed on April 28, 2014 at: https://mem.go.tz/wp- 

York

Mjimba, Vuyo 2011: Dug too deep: untangling the policy terrain of the minerals commodity 
sector in Tanzania; New Values, Voices and Alliances for Increased Resilience. 

Mueller, Susanne D. 1981: The Historical Origins of Tanzania's Ruling Class Source: Canadian 
Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines, Vol.15, No. 3: 
Canadian Association of African Studies; http://www.jstor.org/stable/484731

Muganyizi, Tonedeus K. 2012: Mining Sector Taxation in Tanzania; Research Report 1. 
Accessed on March 06, 2014 at: 
http://mobile.opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/2311/ICTD%2 
0Research%20Report%201_0.pdf?sequence=1

Mutagwaba, Wilson et al 1997: The Impact of Technology on Poverty Alleviation: The Case of 
Artisanal Mining in Tanzania; Research Report No. 97.2, Research on Poverty 
Alleviation (REPOA) – Dar es Salaam. Accessed on June 16, 2014 at: 
http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/1809/Ressearch_Repor 
t_97_2.pdf?sequence=1

Mwaikusa, J. T. 1993: Community Rights and Land Use Policies in Tanzania: The Case of 
Pastoral Communities:
http://heinonline.org.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/jaflaw37&div=20&g_sent=1&collection=journals#150

NBS 2012: Population of Dar Es Salaam by Sex, Number of Households, Average Household Size and Sex Ratio; Accessed on June 14, 2014 at: http://www.nbs.go.tz/


Roemer, John eds. 1986: Capitalist Imperialism,' Crisis and the State; Harwood Academic Publishers; New York – USA


Welsh, David 1996: Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa; International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 72, No. 3; Ethnicity and International Relations. Wiley on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs: Accessed on March 06, 2014 at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2625552


